146 SUPREME COURT OF THE CANAL ZONE.

as indivisible, or inseparable, and the concurrence of both being necessary to constitute a felony.
The wording of the Executive Order would seem clearly to -relate only to subsequent offenses-that 'is, to the joint offense of having been deported and of returning therefrom subsequent to the-Order. It certainly fails to specifically relate to anyone returning who at any time theretofore had been deported from the Zone.
The Executive Order might have expressly referred to persons who had theretofore been deported after having been convicted and served a sentence of imprisnient-so as to make its meaning clear and free from doubt in this respect.
It is significant that in the Act of Congress of October 1, 1888, it was considered necessary to specifically refer to "Chinese laborers who had theretofore departed from the United States." .Therefore, considering the acts of deportation and returning to the United States as both together necessary to constitute the offense, and the Executive Order not referring to any prior deportation, and the Executive Order being penal in its nature, we hold that in returning to the Canal Zone after having been deported prior to the Executive Order the defendant was not guilty of the offense provided for therein. It follows that the verdict of guilty, and the judgment and sentence of the court must be reversed, and the case remanded to the Circuit Co urt of the First judicial Circuit for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.
Reversed and remanded.
CANAL ZONE versus ELIC.
No. 90. Submitted August 5, 1912. Decided September 18, 1912.
ASSISTING A CONVICT TO ESCAPE FROM PRISON. One who aids an escaped convict to depart from the Canal Zone is guilty of
violating section 140 of the Penal Code, and the accused, in order to be held guilty, need not be present in person to aid and assist in -the escape from
prison.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Third Judicial Circuit, Hon. Thomas E. Brown, Jr., judge.
The facts appear in the opinion.
W. IH. Carrington, for appellant. Charles R. Williams, for ap-

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