SUPREME COURT OF THE CANAL ZONE. 5 is complementary to article 2347, it does not repeal it or modify it, but simply adds another class of cases to it. But we do not think that the Supreme Court of Bogota attempted to ingraft the exceptions of section 2347 to said article 5, nor do we think said article 5 would bear such a construction. On the contrary, we think there is much force in the contention that said article 5 was enacted in order to meet the conditions arising from the construction and operation of railroads in the country. In order to have a proper understanding of laws it is necessary to understand their history and origin and the conditions that produced them, and the introduction of railroads into the country would seem to have demanded a law fixing their responsibility for the acts of their servants, agents, and employees, in contradistinction to the law prevailing as to the liability of individuais therefor as prescribed in articles 2347 and 2349. Railroad companies can act only by and through their agents, servants, and employees. A corporation is an artifical person existing only by operation of law, and it acts only through authorized agents. Even in the case of an individual owner or emptesario of a railroad the operation is of such a complex and diversified nature that the owner or empresario could not reasonably be expected to be ever present and in a position to exercise authority and control over the employee, consequently, it seemed proper and necessary, in the case of railroads, to adopt the rule of law herein stated. If we look to the decisions of the Supreme Court of the Philippines we find cases apparently supporting the contention of the appellant, for instance; the case of Johnson vs. David, reported in volume V, pages 663 to 667, of the Philippine Reports, holds that the owner of a coach is not liable for the injuries arising from the negligence of his cochero. In that Case the court said: The question presented by these facts is, is the owner of a carriage driven by his cochero, liable for injuries growing out of the negligence of such cochero in the absence of such order * The defendant not having contributed in any way to the injury complained of, he is in no wise responsible for the same. The judgment of the lower court is, therefore, hereby reversed. But it will be noted that this case had to do with the responsibility of an individual (under the provisions of the Civil Code prevailing in the Philippines similar to those of the Canal Zone), and that it did not have to do with the liability of the empresario of a railroad, as defined by article 5 heretofore quoted. And so the case of city of Manila vs. Gambe, reported in volume VI, 126