SUPREME COURT OF THE CANAL ZONE.

The instrument before us, as has been said, is unlimited in time. It looks, admittedly, to a number of future transactions. It concerned a going business. The course of dealing between the parties shows that a succession of credits was to be extended for a time not limited by the instrument and, therefore, an indefinite time. The very words of the instrument "at no time shall our liability exceed" imply that an indefinite course of dealing was contemplated. Under such circumstances the guaranty must be deemed a continuing one in which the amounts expressed, whether expressed in the preamble or the body of the instrument, are expressed solely to limit the guarantor's responsibility and not the extent of credit. The guarantor's liability in such case would not be extinguished by payment by the original debtor on an open account of the amount to which the guarantor's liability is limited. It, therefore, follows that Thornton's liability under the guaranty did not cease and determine when sales amounting in value to $1,000, Panamanian silver, were made to Eagan on the faith of the instrument, or when Eagan paid said sum to Bruun, but continued to the extent of said amount so long as Bruun sold goods to Eagan relying on the guaranty, or until he, Thornton, was otherwise lawfully released.
Several questions other than that of the construction of the instrument were argued by counsel. Only one of these questions, however, seems to us to merit consideration.
It appears from the evidence that during the period when the security sued upon was in full force and effect one Carnot was engaged in the liquor business at Tabernilla. Carnot wished to close out his business and arranged with Eagan to take over goods which he, Carnot, had theretofore purchased on credit from Bruun, the plaintiff, and had not paid for. Bruun consented to the transfer of these goods to Eagan and by arrangement with Carnot and Eagan credited Carnot's account with $700, Panamanian currency, the price of the goods, and debited Eagan's account with the same amount. The respondent argues that this transaction was not in any sense a sale by Bruun to Eagan of goods, wares, and merchandise and that such transaction does not come under the terms of the guaranty. This view might be a correct one if it were true that one can sell only that which is in his immediate physical possession. But on the evidence, as it is before us, we can arrive at no other interpretation of the transaction than that when Bruun credited Carnot with the value of the goods Carnot became charged with their possession as Bruun's agent and in that capacity delivered

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