DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CANAL ZONE.

the contract of insurance to fix the time when the disability must occur. It is often difficult to determine whether or not a particular accident is the proximate or remote cause of the injury. The word 'immediately' was, no doubt, placed in the policy to guard the defendant against liability for disabilities which might not be directly and without delay caused by the accident but which might be due to remote or intervening causes occurring after the accident."
In support of such ruling the Missouri court cites a list of cases from the States of Missouri, Indiana, Illinois, Georgia, Wisconsin, New York, and Kentucky.
In the case of Masonic Protective Association vs. Farrar, 126 N. E. Rep. (Ind.), 435, a locomotive engineer injured his knee on January 30th, but continued to operate his engine until his total disability therefrom on February 23d, and the Indiana court held that his injury was not "immediately and totally disabling" within the terms of his policy, and did include in its opinion excerpts from the case of Merrill vs. Travelers' Ins. Co., 64 N. W. (Wis.), 1039; Williams vs. Preferred, etc. (Ga.), 17 S. E., 982; and Preferred Accident Insurance Association vs. Jones 60 (111.) App., 106. This Indiana Court adds that many other cases also could be cited in support of its conclusion.
In the Louisiana case of Feitel vs. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 84 S., 491, it is held that "A petition which alleged an injury, on August 28th, from which infection resulted and caused the confinement of petitioner in a hospital beginning from September 10th, without alleging that the disability was immediate or continuous after the injury, and without alleging that it resulted exclusively from the injury, does not entitle insured to recover the benefits provided by the policy for immediate and continuous disability resulting solely from accidental injuries." This Louisiana' court also cites the case of Continental Casualty Company vs. Ogburn 57 So. (Ala.), 852, wherein it is stated that "It is sufficientto say that the terms 'at once' and 'immediately,' as used in the accident policies in dealing with the nature and character of the disability, have been construed by a majority of the courts as adverbs of time and not of causation, and that they do not mean a reasonable time, but mean presently or without any substantial interval between the. accident and the disability.
In Mullins vs. Masonic Protective Association, 168 S. W. (Mo.), 843, it was held that The word 'immediately' should not be said to mean instantaneously, yet it has a meaning applied to time which limits that time, and several days later at one's usual avocation before disability ensues is certainly beyond the limit. The word is introduced to prevent uncertainty as to the cause of the disability. If an interval elapses, some obscure ailment may supervene and produce physical