DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CANAL ZONE.

she was a floating derelict, going whither the winds and currents might carry her. That she was in peril; that she needed assistance and must perish without it, is the uncontradicted evidence of all those who saw her. That the services rendered her in this condition by the tug which had been dispatched from Balboa were not "for the purpose of expediting the voyage" on which she had set out, is so obvious any argument to the contrary would be an absurdity. Whatever service was rendered, therefore, must have been a salvage and not a 'towage service, and in the further consideration of this case, without reference to other facts and circumstances which will arise, will be so treated.
2. It is urged by counsel for respondents that the libellants can not recover for the reason that the tug Gorgona and the vessel Olockson had a common ownership (the United States). Libellants claim, on the contrary, that this action is prosecuted pursuant to Sec. 10 of the Act of Congress of March 9, 1920, 'which provides as follows: That the United States and the crew of any merchant vessel owned by the United States or such corporation shall have the right to collect and sue for salvage services rendered by such vessel and crew, and any monies recovered therefrom by the United State for its benefit and not for the benefit of the crew shall be covered into the United States Treasury to the credit of the Department of the Government of the United States or of the United States Shipping Board, or of such corporation having control or the possession or operation of such vessel.
It is admitted that the tug Gorgona was operated by The Panama Canal, and that the Olockson, while operated by the Barber Line, was what was known as a Shipping Board vessel, and that each belonged to the United States. It is evident the purpose of the Act of Congress was to give relief to salvors against the established rule which prevented suit against the United States except by consent. Accordingly, the act in question was passed making all vessels belonging to the United States subject to the general laws and rules governing privately owned merchant vessels, except that a vessel owned by the United States might be relieved from the operation of a libel in rem, and the ship be released, as was done in the present case. In the recent case of Jacobson vs. Panama Railroad Company, 266 Fed. 344, it was held that a common ownership, even on the part of the United States, need not deprive the master and crew of the salvaging vessel of compensation for salvage services, and that the members of the crew had an independent right accorded them by law for compensation in a salvage action. See also Rees. vs. United States, 134 Fed. 146; The Colima, 6 Fed., Case 2996. Under authority of these cases, and what would seem to be a fair construction of the Act of Congress, above recited, the plea in bar with respect to a common ownership, must be denied.