MINNIX V. PANAMA R. R. CO.

into the elevator shaft. he had been negligently or wrongfully pushed by another person into- the shaft, he unquestionably could bring suit against such wrongdoer. In this event, if he desired to take compensation under the act he would be required- to assign his claim against the third party to the United States, or if he had already recovered damages against the wrongdoer, or made settlement with him, he would be required to credit that money received from the third party upon any compensation payable to him by the United States.
It is clear, however, that the provisions of the statute do not deprive him of his right of action against the third person. He may ignore the compensation act and bring suit in his own behalf against the wrongdoer and retain for himself whatever money he recovered.
Under the terms of the act the same choice of remedy appears to be left to an employee of the Panama Railroad Company. The term "employee" as used in the statute includes an employeeof the Panama Railroad,, and there is, no indication of any distinction being made in an application of the act between employees of the United States and the Panama Railroad. This being true, the rights of an employee of the Railroad Company would be the same as the rights of an employee of the United States, and such employee could elect to satisfy his claim for personal injury by suit against a third party liable therefor, in this case, the Panama Railroad Company.
The only provision in the statute that might suggest an intention on the part of Congress to make its remedy exclusive is found in Section 41, to wit: If an injury or death for which compensation is payable under this act is caused under circumstances creating legal liability in the Panama Railroad to pay damages therefor, under the laws of any State, territory or possession of the United States, or District of Columbia, or of any foreign country, no compensation will be payable until the person entitled to compensation releases to the Panama Railroad Company any right of action he may have to enforce such liability of the Panama Railroad Company."
Counsel for the Panama Railroad Company in all its cases raising this question in this court laid stress upon this provision, and contend that by implication it indicates an intention to permit an'election of the common law remedy only in those cases where the cause of action arises outside of the Canal Zone. It might be answered, first of all, that this suit if in derogation of the common-law right, must be strictly construed in favor of the right, and that strictly speaking, the Canal Zone is a possession of the United States within the meaning of the term as used in the statute. Apart from this, it can be urged with reason that the purpose of this provision is merely to prevent a double collection of damages where the right of action arises, outside of as well as within the Canal Zone.