DISTRICT COURT FOR TH CANAL ZONE.

a man leaves it temporarily or on business, he has intention of returning to, and which, when he has returned to, becomes and is de factor and de jure his domicile, his residence."
It is almost a universal rule that merely going to a State for the purpose of securing a divorce, and residing there the required length of time, but without any intention of remaining there permanently or indefinitely, is held not sufficient to give jurisdiction in divorce proceedings. This is especially true where a divorce is sought on grounds which would be insufficient in the State of the original residence. See Streitwolf, vs. Streitwolf, 181 U. S. 179, 45 L. Ed. 807, and cases there cited.
In the case of Bradfield vs. Bradfield, 154 Mich. 115, 129 Am. St. Rep. 468, 117 N. W. 588, the Court said: "That in determining whether the complainant was a resident of the State under the divorce law, and in any case where residence is to be determined, the intention, coupled with the acts of the party, must be considered. Intention is always to ibe given much consideration, but merely claiming intention without acts to support it is not controlling.
In the case of Mason vs. Mason, 69 N. J. Eq. 292, 60 Ad. Rep. 337, the Court said: "That under the facts of the case the complainant was entitled to a divorce provided that the court had jurisdiction of her matrimonial status; provided, in other words, that she had not come into the State for the mere purpose of obtaining a divorce, or for the accomplishment of any other present purpose, and had come and had resided there animus manendi."
The same authorities hold that "mere residence for the purpose of procuring a divorce has frequently held insufficient to give a domicile within the meaning of the divorce law."
In the case of Duxstad vs. Duxstad, 17 Wym. 411, 129 Am. St. Rep. 1138, 100 Pac. 112, the court said: "That a change of residence does not consist alone in going to and living in another place, but it must be with the intention of making that place the permanent residence; a residence once acquired continued until a new one is acquired."
In the case of Sneed vs. Sneed, 14 Ariz. 17, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 99, 123 Pac. 312, the Court said:
An actual bona fide residence" within the meaning of a statute conferring jurisdiction in divorce proceedings, was considered to mean a person who is in the State to reside permanently, and who, at least for the time being, entertains no idea of having or seeking a permanent home elsewhere.
In the case of Perkins vs. Perkins, (Mass.) 113 N. E. 841, 1917B, L. R. A., it is held that the courts of the matrimonial domicile which is retained by a wife innocent of matrimonial wrong, who is deserted by her husband, will not recognize on the grounds of comity a divorce