PAGE 1 Advanced High-Speed Aircraft April 1980 NTIS order #PB83-110585 PAGE 2 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 80-600060 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 Stock No. 052-003 -00745-2 PAGE 3 Foreword In April 1978, the House Science and Technology Committee requested that the Office of Technology Assessment perform a technology assessment to provide a fresh look at the impact of eventual widescale introduction of advanced high-speed aircraft. The specific issue raised was whether the potential benefits of advanced supersonic transport aircraftor second generation supersonic transportsjustify increases in the levels of Federal funding for generic research and development in supersonic cruise technology. This request was subsequently endorsed by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Responding to this request, OTA proposed a broad and long-term study to examine the potential for advanced air transport technology, both passenger and cargo. The objectives of this study were to examine the economic, environmental, energy, societal, and safety impacts of advances in the technology of high-speed aircraft, commuter aircraft, and air cargo. To bring the scope of the assessment within manageable bounds, we focused strictly on the aircraft technologies and excluded the examination of such areas as the airport and terminal area capacity and the air traffic control process, all of which could affect the convenience, efficiency, and safety of our future airport system. This report is the first in a series and deals solely with advanced high-speed aircraft, including both subsonic and supersonic. Three other reports to be published in the near future comprise the remaining parts of this assessment. They are: Financing and Program Alternatives for Advanced High-Speed Aircraft, Air Service to Small Communities, and Air Cargo. In conducting this assessment, OTA was assisted by an Advisory Panel and a Working Group each comprised of representatives from Government agencies, the aerospace industry, public interest groups, financial institutions, and universities. The contributions of these individuals and members of their respective organizations were significant and extremely important to the outcome of this study. JOHN H. GIBBONS Director Ill PAGE 4 . Impact of Advanced Air Transport Technology Advisory Panel Robert W. Simpson, Chairman Director, Flight Transportation Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Jane H. Bartlett President Arlington League of Women Voters Ray E. Bates Vice President Douglas Aircraft Co. Norman Bradburn Director National Opinion Research Center Frederick Bradley, Jr. Vice President Citibank, N.A. John G. Borger Vice President of Engineering Pan American World Airways, Inc. Secor D. Browne Secor D. Browne Associates, Inc. F. A. Cleveland Vice President, Engineering Lockheed Aircraft Corp. Elwood T. Driver Vice Chairman National Transportation Safety Board James C. Fletcher Burroughs Corp. William K. Reilly President The Conservation Foundation David S. Stempler Chairman, Government Affairs Committee of the Board of Directors Airline Passengers Association, Inc. Janet St. Mark President SMS Associates John Wild Executive Director National Transportation Policy Study Commission* Holden W. Withington Vice President, Engineering Boeing Commercial Airplane Co. Michael Yarymovych Vice President, Engineering Rockwell International Observers: Charles R. Foster Associate Administrator for Aviation Standards Federal Aviation Administration James J. Kramer** Associate Administrator for Aeronautics and Space Technology National Aeronautics and Space Administration *Commission was dissolved Dec. 31, 1979. l Resigned from panel during conduct of study after leaving NASA. iv PAGE 5 Advanced High-Speed Aircraft Project Staff Eric H. Willis, Assistant Director, OTA Science, Information, and Transportation Division Robert L. Maxwell, Transportation Program Manager Lemoine V. Dickinson, Jr., Project Director Jerry D. Ward, Co-Project Leader Yupo Chan Larry L. Jenney Jacquelynne Mulder David Seidman Paula Walden Arthur L. Webster Contractors F. Edward McLean, Technical Advisor to Advanced High-Speed Aircraft Working Group William E. Howard, Editor Advanced High-Speed Aircraft Working Group Richard Alpagh William Sens Chief, Nonhighway Transportation Pratt and Whitney Engine Co. Branch Department of Energy Jane H. Bartlett President Arlington League of Women Voters Richard D. Fitzsimmons Director, Advanced Program Planning Douglas Aircraft Co. Jack I. Hope Manager HAECO Inc. Publishing Office Armand Sigalla Chief, Technology Preliminary Design Boeing Commercial Airplane Co. John Wesler Director of Environment and Energy Federal Aviation Administration Bruce R. Wright Lockheed California Co. John C. Holmes, Publishing Officer Kathie S. Boss Debra M. Datcher Joanne Heming PAGE 6 Contents Chapter Page I. II. III. IV. V. VI. Summary of Findings . . . . . . . . . . Discussion. . . . . . . . . . . . . Current State of Technology . . . . . . . . . Variable-Cycle Engine . . . . . . . . . Technology Validation Program . . . . . . . Fuel Considerations. . . . . . . . . . Financing Considerations . . . . . . . . . Foreign Competition. . . . . . . . . . . Energy Issues: Availability and Price of Fuel . . . . . . Environmental Issues: Noise, Sonic Boom, and Atmospheric Pollution.. World Requirements for New Aircraft . . . Societal Concerns . . . . . . . Study Findings in Brief . . . . . . Advanced High-Speed Aircraft: The Next 30 Years . Outlook for New Aircraft Types . .:....... . World Requirements for New Aircraft . . . Beginnings of Supersonic TransportThe Concorde, The American Supersonic Transport (SST) Program. Current Status of Supersonic Technology . . . Variable-Cycle Engine . . . . . Technology Validation Program . . . Prospective Issues. . . . . . . . Variables Affecting a Supersonic Transport Market . The Path to Improved Productivity. . . . . Cost of Productivity for Supersonic Aircraft . . The Impact of Quantity . . . . . . The Potential Market . . . . . . Energy Uncertainties . . . . . . . Stage Lengths and Environmental Conditions. . . The Cost of Environmental Acceptability . . . Prospects for Future Long-Range Aircraft: Five Scenarios Projected Fleet Size . . . . . . . Types of Aircraft. . . . . . . . Scenarios. . . . . . .% . . Economic Issues: An Analysis . . . . . Assumptions. . . . . . . . . Results . . . . . . . . . The Effects of Competition . . . . . Energy: Fuel Price and Availability . . . . Present Fuel Consumption. . . . . . Fuel Price Effects . . . . . . . Comparative Fuel Efficiency . . . . . Analysis of Energy Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....**. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 8 9 10 10 11 11 13 14 16 17 18 21 22 25 25 28 33 33 34 34 39 39 41 43 4.5 48 48 49 53 54 56 57 63 63 64 66 69 69 70 71 72 vii PAGE 7 . Contentscontinued Chapter Page Alternative Fuels . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Application to Supersonic Transports . . . . . . 79 VII. Environmental Issues . . . . . . . . . . 85 Noise . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Sonic Boom Effects . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 Cosmic Ray Exposure . . . . . . . . . . 90 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 VIII. Supersonic Transportation and Society . . . . . . . 93 Impact of Increased Long-Distance Travel. . . . . . . 93 Communications and Transportation . . . . . . . 94 The Future Environment . . . . . . . . . . 95 IX. Competitive Considerations and Financing . . . . . . 99 Identification of the Technology . . . . . . . ..101 Alternative Strategies . . . . . . . . . . 103 Beyond Technology Readiness . . . . . ..............104 LIST OF TABLES Table No. Page 1. World RequirementsNew Aircraft . . . . . . . . . 3 2. NASA Supersonic Cruise Research Program R&D Expenditures . . . . 33 3. Progress in Aircraft Productivity . . . . . . . . . . 40 4. Free-World Commercial Jet Fleet With and Without ASTsYear 2010 ......., . 55 5. Characteristics of Four Projected Aircraft Types . . . . . . . 56 6. Economic Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 7. Present and Projected Commercial Air Service and Fuel Consumption . . . 70 8. Estimated Fuel Efficiency of Advanced Subsonic and Supersonic Aircraft . . . 72 9. Energy Impacts of AST-III: Scenario l. . . . . . . . . . 73 10. Energy Impacts of AST-I and AST-III: Scenario 3 . . . . . . . 73 11. Energy Impacts of AST-II or AST-III: Scenario 4 . . . . . . . 74 12. Summary of Energy Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . 74 13. Properties of Some Candidate Fuels . . . . . . . . . 76 14. Comparison of a Supersonic Transport Aircraft Fueled With Liquid Hydrogen or Jet A Fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 15. Advantages and Disadvantages of Liquid Hydrogen Compared to Synthetic Jet Fuel 80 LIST OF FIGURES Figure No. Page l. Aircraft Productivity . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Relative Total Costs of Supersonic and Subsonic Aircraft . . . . . 5 3. Effect of Fuel Price on Aircraft Operating Cost. . . . . . . . 13 4. The Relationship of Aircraft Productivity and Costs . . . . . . 40 5. Influence of Speed on Aircraft Productivity and Costs. . . . . . . 42 6. History of Direct Operating Costs, 1930-75 . . . . . . . . 43 7. Influence of Market on Unit Cost. . . . . . . . . . . 44 PAGE 8 Contentscontinued Figure No. Page 8. Relationship of Aircraft Productivity, Technology, and Costs . . . 45 9. AST Market Shares, New York-Paris Route in 1995 . . . . ., 46 10. Impact of Relative Fares on Fleet Mix, New York-Paris Route in 1995. ..., 47 11. Commodity Input to U.S. Balance of Trade. . . . . . 54 12. Scenario Timetables . . . . . . . . . . . 57 13. Time Between Introduction of AST-I and AST-III v. Market Split . . 66 14. The Price of Coal-Derived Aviation Fuels as a Function of Coal Cost . . 78 15. The Cost and Uncertainty of Noise Reduction . . . . . . 87 16. Predicted Effect of Improved Aircraft Technology on the Ozone Layer. . 90 17. Average Auto Trip Rate v. Trip Time. ., . . . . . . . 95 18. Long-Term Economic Trends . . . . . . . . . 96 19. Typical Aircraft Cash Flow Curve . . . . . .............100 20. Phases of Advanced Transport Development (SCR) . . . . . .103 21. Cost of a Representative AST Program. . . . . . . . .104 ix PAGE 9 Chapter I SUMMARY OF FINDINGS The following are the major findings of the OTA assessment on advanced high-speed aircraftboth subsonic and supersonic typesin the context of major uncertainties over world energy supplies: l Barring some major disruption in the growth of the world economy and assuming reasonable success in coping with increasingly costly energy, the total market for air travel and commercial aircraft should continue to expand in the future. Growth in passenger-miles and airline route miles over the next 30 years will be closely tied to the price and availability of fuel. Accordingly, the demand for advanced long-range aircraft could vary from 2,200 to 3,300 units. This would represent sales by manufacturers on the order of $150 billion in 1979 dollars. (See table 1.) Table 1 .World Requirements-New Aircraft Potential sales 1980 thru 2010 1979 dollars Short and medium range (up to 2,700 nautical miles) 6,500-8,500 a $235 billion Long range (over 2,700 nautical miles) 2,200-3,300 a $150 billion aEstjmates exclude U S S R and the Peoples Republlc of China. SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment l While supersonic aircraft might satisfy a portion of this long-range market, it is expected that the market will be dominated by subsonic aircraftat least in this century. Substantial improvements in technology for subsonic aircraft may provide the incentive for new designs. To offset rising fuel costs, manufacturers already are developing subsonic aircraft with more energyefficient engines, such as the Boeing 767 and 757. This trend probably will continue and will most likely be fed by more technical advances in aerodynamic efficiency, lighter materials, and still more efficient enl l gines. These could help lower operating costs, energy usage, and aircraft emissions. The most compelling argument for an advanced supersonic transport (AST) is improved aircraft productivityseat-miles generated by an aircraft per unit of time. Since the advent of jets, major productivity improvements have resulted almost entirely from increases in size. (See figure 1.) But the potential for further productivity gains through scaling up aircraft size is not as impressive as in the past. Thus, while aircraft may be further stretched, the market for larger subsonic jets will be constrained by the number of airline routes with sufficiently high passenger densities to warrant placing them into service. Increased speed offers another avenue for major productivity improvement. An aircraft able to fly at better than 1,600 mph (Mach 2 + ) can transport twice as many passengers a day on long-distance flights (more than 2,700 nautical miles) as a subsonic aircraft of equivalent size. This higher speed provides a significant timesaving for the passenger on these long-distance journeys. The drawback in the past from pursuing speed-derived productivity has been cost. The productivity could have been achieved, but at too high a proportionate increase in total operating costs (TOC). In other words, higher productivity does not necessarily mean profitability. Over time, however, this cost penalty has been decreasingthe difference in the potential cost of supersonic aircraft compared to subsonic aircraft has been shrinking. While rising energy costs could slow the trend, it is reasonable to expect that through technological improvements this convergence will continue. To the extent that it does, the economic penalty of supersonic cruising aircraft will become less. (See figure 2.) 3 PAGE 10 4 l Advanced High-Speed Aircraft I ,/. PAGE 11 . Ch. ISummary of Findings l 5 Figure 2.Relative Total Costs of Supersonic and Subsonic Aircraft 3 2 1 Props \ 1930 1950 1970 1990 2010 Year of introduction into commercial service SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment based on industry data. l l Assuming that an economically viable and environmentally acceptable AST could be developed in the 1990-2010 period, its greater productivity could command sales of about 400 aircraft worth about $50 billion in 1979 dollars. This would represent approximately one-third of the total sales anticipated for the long-range market through 2010. AST sales would mean fewer sales of subsonic aircraft. It is estimated that 400 ASTs could replace approximately 800 subsonic aircraft. While the market outlook for an AST appears to be inviting, the actual development, production, and operation of such an aircraft are clouded by major uncertainties. Two principal uncertainties are fuel price and availability and the technical feasibility and cost of satisfying increased community sensitivity to noise around airports. Fuel price and availability: There are great unknowns as to the future price and availability of fuel. However, given that an AST would have fuel consumption rates at least 1.5 to 2 times greater per seat-mile than equivalently sized subsonic transports, it would be more sensitive to fuel price increases than a subsonic aircraft. Therefore, future fuel price increases could have a larger impact on the total operating cost of an AST than on a subsonic transport and could be a significant factor in determining its future viability. Further, fuel for transport aircraft must be available on a worldwide basis. Examination of alternative fuels such as synthetics or liquid hydrogen or methane should be continued. Noise: One of the greatest obstacles appears to be the ability of an AST to cope PAGE 12 6 Advanced High-Speed Aircraft l with diminishing public tolerance toward noise, especially in the vicinity of airports. Public attitudes are likely to bring about more stringent noise standards in the future, affecting both supersonic and subsonic aircraft as well as airport operations. While present supersonic work by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) indicates the possibility of meeting the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) (FAR part 36, stage 2) noise regulations, more research and technology development, at further expense, would be needed to meet more stringent regulations. Until the uncertainty over changes in the regulations is resolved and the uncertainty about supersonic aircraft noise is reduced, aircraft manufacturers may be reluctant to commit themselves to a new supersonic aircraft program. The investment would be too large to risk failure of not meeting a more stringent noise standard. The Supersonic Cruise Research (SCR) program conducted by NASA since the American supersonic transport (SST)* was canceled by Congress in 1971 has identified and made advances in several technology areasaerodynamics, structures, propulsion, and noise reduction on takeoff and landing. Significant improvements may be achieved with further work, but even if these technolog y advances are validated there can be no guarantee that the aerospace industry would act on them. The cost of applying this technology to the design and development of a suitable aircraft could run to $2 billion in 1979 dollars. Tooling up and starting production could require at least an additional $5 billion to $7 billionsums believed to be far beyond the resources of any one company. Th e financial risk could be reduced by the formation of a domestic consortium of two or more aerospace companies, or perhaps by an international consortium that would inThroughout, the abbreviation SST refers only to the U.S. supersonic transport program that was begun in 1963 and terminated in 1971. elude foreign manufacturers. Formation of a corporation similar to that of COMSAT is another alternative which may be applicable for undertaking such a program. Foreign manufacturers are moving ahead in the subsonic field. Their willingness to embark on an AST appears to be tempered by the same uncertainties as those facing the U.S. industry. However, the supersonic area does present them with another opening where they could alter the longstanding U.S. competitive advantage in the sale of long-range aircraft. Thus, given the probability of an expanded market for air transportation in the future and the importance to our domestic economy and our international trade balance of sustaining U.S. leadership in commercial aviation, it appears that it would be in our national interest to keep our options open in the supersonic field. Accordingly, it appears appropriate to carry out a generic R&D** program to preserve the supersonic option. This program should be adequate to maintain the skills and knowledge from which a future development project could be effectively initiated and should produce more factual information to reduce the technical uncertainties. The objectives of this generic R&D program should be carefully defined to yield information that would facilitate a decision on whether or not to proceed with an AST at a later date. The financial risks also need to be more fully understood. If Congress wishes to maintain the U.S. SST option, then the existing level of Federal support is not considered adequate to accomplish this. R&D, however, will not shed light on those external factors governing the viability of an ASTthe increasing senl An analysis of these alternatives is reported in a soon to be published OTA report entitled Financing and Program Alternatives for Advanced High-Speed Aircraft l l In this report, generic R&D is that process of verifying and validating technologies leading to a state of technology readiness for development of a specific product. At a state of technology readiness, R&D activities can move from the generic to the specific. Specific R&D is that part of the process where a product or a family of products is defined. When the term research is used in this report, it refers to generic R&D. PAGE 13 Ch. lSummary of Findings l 7 ///us frat/ons Courtesy of McL)onne// Doug/as and Boe/ng Aircraft C O Artists concepts of advanced supersonic transport PAGE 14 8 l Advanced High-Speed Aircraft sitivity of the public to aircraft noise, the plies, and the availability of financing for price and availability of adequate fuel supsuch a major capital commitment. DISCUSSION This study examines the prospects for introducing new types of large, long-range aircraft subsonic, supersonic, and hypersonic, beyond the next generation of scheduled aircraft such as the Boeing 767 and 757into commercial service over the next 30 years and weighs the financial and other risks inherent in acquiring the technology for developing these advanced transports. Traditionally, the generic R&D from which subsequent generations of commercial aircraft have evolved has been supported by the Department of Defense, by NASA, and by the U.S. aerospace industry. In the subsonic field, this trend seems likely to continue, although NASAs role ma y become comparatively greater than the militarys in the pursuit of more fuel-efficient and quieter transport aircraft to satisfy future environmental concerns. Generic R&D leading to an AST that is safe, economical, and environmentally acceptable involves a different supporting structure. Because the military is not aggressively pursuing a supersonic cruise aircraft, no suitable engine or airframe is expected to emerge from the Department of Defense R&D programs. Since the cancellation of the U.S. SST program in 1971, technological development at a low level of effort has been carried out by NASA and the aerospace industry. It is generally agreed that considerable additional technological development would be necessary to reduce the technical risks of embarking on an AST to a level acceptable to private investors. Therefore, a central purpose of this assessment is to identify for Congress the positive and negative impacts of future commercial supersonic transports. These will need to be taken into account in considering the level of Federal Government funding of NASAs generic R&D leading to possible development of an AST, a second-generation aircraft with performance capabilities beyond the British-French Concorde. In this perspective, our assessment is not a market study of the prospects for a specific supersonic aircraft design. It is rather an evaluation of whether technological research toward a class of possible future supersonic aircraft seems sensible in the long run and whether mastery of supersonic technology in this country will be an important factor in our international competitiveness in the future. In looking at the overall issue of supporting further research into supersonic cruise aircraft and what might be gained from itthis study assesses where the technology stands now and examines the directions it might take. The real issue now is whether the long-term promise of some kind of supersonic transportto be designed perhaps in 5 to 10 yearsis sufficient to justify getting the technology ready. If we keep with past practice, the burden of financing such research would fall in large measure on the public treasury, which is why the question was originally put to OTA. CURRENT STATE OF TECHNOLOGY Present supersonic technology is not likely to aerodynamic or other solution to the present produce an aircraft during the time frame conFederal ban on over land supersonic commercial sidered in this study that would be able to fly flights appears to lie many years away. The at supersonic speeds without producing a sonic question of solutions to the sonic boom is boom. Although some theoretical work has critical in looking at where technology is headed been done on shaping the sonic boom, an because restricting any proposed AST to super- PAGE 15 Ch. lSummary of Findings l 9 sonic flight over water also restricts the marketand possibly the overall viability of a supersonic aircraft program. The Concorde represents proven technology dating back to 1960. This aircraft has shown that a supersonic airliner can be operated safely from existing airports. Its major deficiencies are small size (about 100 seats), high fuel consumption, and engines designed before noise regulations were imposed. Since 1971, NASAs SCR program has generated knowledge that could realize sizable gains over the Concorde. Among other advances, the work has yielded a new wing configuration that wind tunnel tests indicate would result in much improved aerodynamics and a lift-to-drag ratio in the range of 9 to 10, approximately 20 percent more efficient than the Concorde in supersonic cruise. Advanced computational and finite-element modeling techniques have been developed, reducing the structural design time for major aircraft components from 3 months to 1 week and offering promise of lower development costs. NASAs studies indicate that major weight reductions (10 to 30 percent) and cost savings (up to 50 percent) in aircraft structures may be achieved through superplastic forming and concurrent diffusion bonding of titanium. Various forms of high-temperature polyimide composite structures with further weight-cutting possibilities also have been investigated. Variable= Cycle Engine In the propulsion area, a concept has been proposed for a variable-cycle engine which may Photo credif, Nat/ona/ Aeronautics and Space Adrn/n(sfraf/on Variable-cycle experimental engine testing PAGE 16 10 l Advanced High-Speed Aircraft be able to operate at nearly optimal fuel efficiency while cruising at either supersonic (turbojet) or subsonic (turbofan) speeds. Moreover, the internal configuration of the engine would permit changes in the exit nozzle velocit y profile that may lower the sideline noise at takeoff and landing. A body of opinion within the aviation industry holds that, should the variable-cycle engine prove itself in a development and test program, it would be a significant factor in designing a viable AST. The engines promise is this: if able to operate optimally at both subsonic and supersonic speeds, the engine would enhance the possibility that an AST could be integrated into regular airline route structures. For example, it would be possible to originate AST service to London or Tokyo from Chicago, Denver, or Dallas. The over land legs would be flown subsonically and the over water legs supersonically. Technology Validation Program In August 1979, in response to a request from the House Science and Technology Committee, NASA outlined possible plans which were identified as focused initiatives in a number of aeronautical fields. In supersonic cruise research, NASA concentrated on propulsion, airframe, and aircraft systems technology. In the propulsion area, the program would be broadened to include research on a variable-flow propulsion system and an advanced core engine system that would be integrated with the variable-cycle experimental engine. The aim would be to produce design options for an array of supersonic aircraft applications, plus potential military applications. The airframe technology program would concentrate on nacelle/airframe integration and acoustic suppression design methods and high-temperature structures problems, including the selection, fabrication, and testing of titanium and composite materials. The aircraft systems technology effort would identify those portions of the engine and airframe programs requiring inflight investigation and validation. NASA estimates it would take up to 8 years to accomplish these objectives. If successful, the program would lead to a state of technolog y readiness, which would be a decision point for the aerospace industry on whether further development of an AST appears feasible. The proposed NASA program would cost $662 million (1981 dollars) over an 8-year period, as opposed to an alternate program offered by NASA in 1978, which was priced at $561 million (1979 dollars) over a similar 8-year period. In addition to these two plans, again in response to a request from the House Science and Technology Committee, NASA prepared a plan leading directl y to technolog y readiness in industry. This plan would sustain full competition in the U.S. industry and would require as much as $1.9 billion (1977 dollars). The three widely different plans have raised a question for Congress as to what is the appropriate level of Federal support for supersonic research, because a decision to embark on any one plan would mean a substantial increase over the approximately $10 million a year that has been invested in SCR since 1971. Fuel Considerations In the event an AST is eventually developed, the aircraft would be designed for a service life of about 20 to 25 years. This means that when the time for decision on development arrives, in the late 1980s by NASAs timetable, future fuel supplies for the aircraft and confidence in fuel price stabilit y must be assured from the onset, The impending petroleum shortage has prompted the Federal Government to support a large-scale program to develop alternate energy sources. These efforts may begin to bear fruit in the late 1980s, putting the Nation on a different energy track. If that track is synthetic petroleum, resulting in Jet A fuel with characteristics similar to Jet A from petroleum, only minor modifications would have to be made in aircraft systems to use it. But if liquid hydrogen, methane, or a fuel dissimilar to Jet A should become the track, radical changes might be required in future aircraft design concepts including fuel systems and engines. Thus, uncertainty hangs over what fuel a future aircraft should be designed to use. While that design decision does not have to be made now, it is a PAGE 17 Ch. lSummary of Findings l 11 reason for adopting a cautious approach in both program and in continued examination of possithe funding and the content of the technology ble alternative fuels. FINANCING CONSIDERATIONS Even if the energy picture becomes clarified, manufacturers still may be hesitant to embark on a full-scale development program because of the cost of design and development, estimated to be around $2 billion in 1979 dollars. An additional estimated $5 billion to $7 billion would be needed to tool up and start production. Such sums are far beyond the present financial resources of any one U.S. aerospace company. This situation could change over the next several years. But it remains questionable whether the industry and private capital markets would However, alternative financing arrangements beyond the generic R&D phase, may be possible without direct U.S. Federal Government support. These options include formation of domestic or international consortia involving two or more manufacturers and creation of a COMSAT-type public corporation to assume responsibility for producing the aircraft. These management and financing options are examined and reported in a soon to be published volume on the Financing and Program Alternatives for Advanced High-Speed Aircraft be able on their own at the point of technology readiness to initiate activities leading to fullscale production. FOREIGN COMPETITION The more advanced a supersonic aircraft is economically and environmentally at the time of introduction, the better its chances in the marketplace. The level of technology available at the time of design makes the difference. While this may be a truism, it needs to be kept in mind in deciding the pace of a research program designed to keep our options open in the supersonic transport field. The main reason for maintaining options is the size of the potential AST market and the threat of losing some or all of it to foreign competition. Our assessment indicates potential aircraft sales of about 400 for an AST that could fly supersonically only over water. This would amount to expected sales totaling $50 billion in 1979 dollars in the 1990-2010 periodor approximately one-third of the value of all sales of long-range transports anticipated over the next 30 years. This amount would be a significant sum for the U.S. aircraft industry to lose to foreign manufacturers. How great is the threat of foreign competition? Though we were unable to collect information on the Russian TU-144, manufacturers in France and England are now engaged in generic AST research and have the same doubts as the U.S. industry. They also believe rising fuel prices and the expense of hurdling the technical barriers of an ASTrestrictions on aircraft noise and increasing total operating costsmake the development and production of an AST too risky at the present time. Thus, it appears that the threat of foreign competition is not close at hand or at a point where it might dictate the pace of technology development by the United States. PAGE 18 12 l Advanced High-Speed Aircraft PAGE 19 Ch. lSummary of Findings l 1 3 ENERGY ISSUES: AVAILABILITY AND PRICE OF FUEL Projections of steadily rising airline traffic over the next 30 years may be optimistic. An expanded market for both advanced subsonic and supersonic aircraft may not materialize. If the market does not materialize, the questions dealing with the impact of advanced aircraft are moot. The controlling factors could be the rising cost and limited availability of fuel. Today, the worlds commercial aircraft fleet, excluding the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China, uses approximately 1.5 million barrels per day (MMbbl/d) of fuel. Estimates indicate that by the year 2010 the world commercial air fleet fuel usage could represent about 3.5 MMbbl/d. The majority of airline consumption will continue to be for shortto medium-range service with the longrange aircraft using about 15 percent of the total. However, a fleet of 400 ASTs could increase the worldwide petroleum consumption of commercial aircraft by about 10 percent. Furthermore, if serious shortages occur, air traffic may be drastically reduced. This would favor more energy-efficient subsonic aircraft, because, by current estimates, they would consume approximately half the amount of fuel per seat-mile as future supersonic aircraft. The higher fuel consumption of an AST, associated with rising fuel price, would make the increased energy costs of supersonic aircraft greater than those of subsonic aircraft. Over time, the cost penalty for improved productivity has been decreasing and, as previously shown in figure 2, the difference in the total operating cost of supersonic aircraft compared to subsonic aircraft has been shrinking. Further, if an economically and environmentally acceptable AST could be developed, it is reasonable to expect that this convergence would continue. However, rising fuel costs could offset the gains to be expected from improved AST technology and might actually cause the curves to diverge. Figure 3 compares the estimated total operating costs (TOC) for an advanced subsonic transport (ASUBT) with those of an AST as a result of increasing fuel price, relative to all other costs. As can be seen, because of higher fuel Figure 3.Effect of Fuel Price on Aircraft Operating Cost 11 1978 actual ~ Supersonic 10 aircraft 9 8 7 6 5 4 [ aircraft 3 2 1 1 I I I 1 I I 1 1 .20 .40 .60 .80 1.00 1.20 1.40 1.60 1.80 2.00 Fuel price per gallon (constant 1978 dollars) SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment based on industry data PAGE 20 1.4 l Advanced High-Speed Aircraft usage, the supersonic aircraft is more sensitive nificant factor in determining the economic viato fuel price increases than a subsonic aircraft. bility of a future commercial AST. There is much disagreement over the future price and availability of fuel. If all other effects On the other hand, labor cost could also have are held constant, figure 3 shows that the ratio a major effect on TOC. Rising labor costs would of supersonic aircraft TOC to subsonic aircraft probably be more detrimental to subsonic airTOC would rise from about 1.2 at $0.50 per galcraft economics than to supersonics due to the lon to approximately 1.4 at $1.30 per gallon and higher productivity of flight crews in supersonic 1.5 at $2.00 per gallon. Fuel price could be a sigaircraft operations, ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES: NOISE, SONIC BOOM, AND ATMOSPHERIC POLLUTION The most critical environmental issue facing future supersonic aircraft is the ability to meet increasing community sensitivity to airport noise. In the case of the Concorde, the principal controversy surrounding permission to operate at Washingtons Dunes Airport and New Yorks John F. Kennedy Airport was the anticipated additional noise in neighboring communities. The Concorde was placed at a disadvantage because it had already evolved before noise rules were established for any class of aircraft. Since the start of operations, carefully controlled takeoff and landing procedures have minimized noise complaints. But, it should be recalled that the noise issue played a major part in the cancellation of the prior U.S. SST program in 1971 and most probably will be a major factor in the consideration of any future U.S. SST program. The noise issue has to be looked at in the context of total aircraft operations expected in the future, If air traffic expands substantiall y an d there is a major increase in the number of jet transports, communities will be exposed to more noiseeven if future subsonic transports are made quieter. The number of operations by supersonic aircraft would be relatively small compared to the total. But nonetheless they would add to the total noiseand therefore be controversial. Furthermore, the public seems to be becoming less tolerant toward noise and more active in opposing environmental degradation. Currently, it seems likely that communities will press for more stringent airport noise regulations. It may be some time before final standards are promulgated. Until the uncertainty over changes in the regulations is resolved, aircraft manufacturers may be reluctant to commit themselves to a new supersonic aircraft program. Their investment would be too large to risk failure of not meeting noise standards. The sonic boom is another environmental concern that remains from the first SST program and the Concorde. Present Federal regulations prohibit civil aircraft from generatin g sonic booms that reach the ground. This effectively bars present and future SSTs from operating supersonically over land, forcing them to fly at subsonic speeds and at less efficient fuel consumption rates. Research indicates there may be ways to lower sonic boom pressures, but practical aerodynamic solutions appear to be many years off. Research to ameliorate sonic booms should be emphasized because of its long-term importance to an economically and environmentally acceptable, AST. The capability of cruising supersonically over land would increase the market potential of an AST and might eventually permit it to replace most long-range subsonic transports. In 1971 there was considerable concern that engine emissions from a fleet of supersonic airliners would deplete the ozone in the upper atmosphere. A reduction in this protective shield against the Suns rays, it was feared, would increase the incidence of skin cancer. However, studies since then, including an FAA program now in progress to monitor the upper atmosphere, indicate that previous predictions of PAGE 21 Ch. lSummary of Findings l 1 5 Photo credit Errv/ronrnenta/ Pro fecf/on Agency Noise pollution PAGE 22 16 l Advanced High-Speed Aircraft ozone loss through subsonic and supersonic airistry and physics is still growing and, as new craft pollution appear to have been substantialdata and models become available, it will be ly overstated. The science of atmospheric chemclearer whether the current outlook is justified. WORLD REQUIREMENTS FOR NEW AIRCRAFT If a solution can be found for the worlds oil aircraft, which could be on the order of $150 bilproblem and national economies are stable and lion in 1979 dollars over this period, is expected growing, the demand for air travel and for more to be dominated by continued production of exaircraftboth additional and replacementis isting widebody jets and by the introduction of likely to expand substantially in the next 30 new models, such as the Boeing 767 and 757 years. Technical advances in subsonic jets could now under development. make them quieter and possibly more energy efficient. Greater energy efficiency could affect the cost of air travel favorably by permitting the real prices for air transport services to decrease. Approximately 4,700 jet aircraft are in operation around the world today, excluding the fleets of the Soviet Union and Peoples Republic of China. Within the next 30 years, the total requirements for new aircraft in the jet fleet could total 7,000 to 12,000 aircraft, as already presented in table 1, if projected demand for air travel materializes. The market for long-range In addition to increasing fuel efficiency, it may be possible to stretch further the body of subsonic jets, thereby increasing the payload, and thus improving productivity. Seating for up to 800 passengers is considered technically feasible. However, the demand for such large aircraft would be limited because of the small number of routes with travel densities sufficiently high to warrant putting them into service. The only other avenue to significantly higher productivity is increased speed. The relationship of Photo credit Boeing Aircraft Co Model of the Boeing 757 now under development PAGE 23 Ch. ISummary of Findings l 17 improved productivity resulting from increased size and higher speed was illustrated in figure 1. Thus, in an expanding commercial air system, supersonic transports might satisfy a portion of the long-range market and complement subsonic service. The logic for an AST is that at twice the speed of sound it could carry about twice as many passengers per day as subsonic aircraft of equivalent size. As noted previously, the major drawback is the cost of developing an AST that is both economically viable and environmentally acceptable. If the technological problems and uncertainties concerning fuel availability, fuel price, and noise are resolved, there could be a market for about 400 ASTs through the year 2010, with expected sales of about $50 billion in 1979 dollars. In arriving at this estimate, it was noted that the Concorde, despite its size limitation, has demonstrated both customer appeal and safe supersonic commercial operations. On its North Atlantic runs, the aircraft has operated at average of 70-percent capacity, even though fares are up to three times higher than average coach fares on subsonic aircraft. an the the If the problem of sonic boom can be solved to eliminate the annoyance on the ground and further technical advances are made to lower total operating costs, there is a greater potential market for a third-generation AST that could fly supersonically over land. Thus, it is possible to regard continuing generic R&D on an AST as a promising direction in the continuing evolution of aircraft technology. SOCIETAL CONCERNS For most Americans, the question of pursuing research on a supersonic aircraft was rendered moot by the cancellation of the previous SST program in 1971. The inability of the Concorde to become a paying proposition in terms of aircraft sales can be expected to reinforce public attitudes that further Government support for research in this area is not warranted. Furthermore, the Government may be subject to criticism for involvement in a program that may lead to eventual development of an aircraft perceived by some as being affordable only by privileged classes. In this connection, there also may be negative reactions to an aircraft that is a high user of energy in an era of rising fuel costs and dwindling energy supplies. Another unknown that could affect the future of air travel is the continuing revolution in telecommunications. Over the next 30 years, improved electronic devices may make it easier to transmit more data, voice, and picture information and could substitute for many types of travel. At the same time, better electronic communication could also stimulate travel by making more people aware of new opportunities in other places, both for business and recreation. It is too early to say with certainty what the effect of telecommunications will be on future air travel. The perceived impacts on society of an AST will be extremely important in determining its acceptability. Prospective concerns about ozone depletion, noise, and sonic boom were critical factors in the cancellation of the previous U.S. SST program. Undoubtedly they will continue to be major considerations in decisions on any future U.S. supersonic aircraft programalong with how much a program would cost and the level of Federal involvement in such a program. PAGE 24 .. 18 l Advanced High-Speed Aircraft STUDY FINDINGS IN BRIEF In sum, the study of advanced high-speed air. Support of a generic R&D program appears craft has found: appropriate. This would: maintain the option for future develop. The long-term prospects for advanced ment of an AST, and supersonic transports are significant and clarify and reduce the technical uncerreal. The uncertainties l real. Specifically: tainties, however, it would not shed light on those external factors governing the are also significant and viability of an AST: the increasing sensitivity of the public to aircraft noise, the fuel price and availability, price and availability of adequate fuel s 4s noise, and supplies, and the availability of financing market size. for such a major capital commitment. l If Congress wishes to maintain the U.S. suThe potential threat from foreign compersonic option, then the existing level of petitors appears tempered by the same unFederal support is not considered adequate certainties. to accomplish this. PAGE 25 Chapter II ADVANCED HIGH-SPEED AIRCRAFT: THE NEXT 30 YEARS Air transport technology is entering a new evolutionary phase. Both American and European manufacturers are midway in the develop; ment of the next generation of subsonic jetliners, a first step along a path to create more n of Alternate Fuels for Aircraft, NASA Technical Memorandum, September 1979. R. D. Witcofski, Hydrogen Fueled Subsonic Aircraft, NASA Langely Research Center, presented at the International Meeting on Hydrogen and Its Prospects, Liege, Belgium, November 1976. G. J. Schott, Alternate Fuels for Aviation, Boeing Co mmer cial Airplane Co., presented at the 29th annual conference, California Association of Airport Executives, July 1975. 15G D Brewer and R. E. Morris, Tank and ~ue~ Systems c~)l. sideratiom for Hydrogen Fueled Aircraft, Society of Automotive Engineers, paper No. 751093, November 1975. 1 6 EXXON Engineering and Research Company, Alterrrute Energy Sources for Non-Highway Transportation, for U.S. Department of Energy, contract No. EC-77-C-05-5438, December 1978. PAGE 74 80 Advanced High-Speed Aircraft Table 14.Comparison of a Supersonic Transport Aircraft Fueled With Liquid Hydrogen or Jet A Fuel (Mach 2.7,4,200 nm, 234 passengers) Ratio Jet A Parameters Unit LH 2 Jet A LH 2 Gross weight. . . . . . . lb 394,910 762,170 1.93 Operating empty weight. . . . . lb 245,240 317,420 1.29 Block fuel weight . . . . . lb 85,390 330,590 3.88 Thrust per engine . . . . . lb 52,820 86,890 1.64 Wing area. . . . . . . . ft 2 7,952 11,094 1.39 Span . . . . . . . . ft 113 113.5 1.18 Fuselage length . . . . . ft 304.2 297 0.87 Field length required . . . . ft 7,800 9,490 1.22 Lift/drag (cruise) . . . . . 7.42 8.65 1.17 Specific fuel consumption (cruise) . . Ibflb 0.575 1.501 2.61 hr Aircraft price . . . . . . $10 45.5 61.4 1.35 Direct operating cost . . . . /seat nm. 3.40 3.86 b 1.14 Energy utilization . . . . . Btu/seat nm. 4,483 6,189 1.38 Noise, sideline . . . . . . EPNdB 104.0 108.0 Flyover . . . . . . . EPNdB 102.2 108.0 Sonic boom overpressure (start of cruise). psf 1.32 1.87 1.42 BaSedOnaCOSt of$xooperlo6f3tU. bBa~~don acoStof$2,00per 106EtU. SOURCE: OTA Working Paper, Lockheed-Ca~fornla cov January 1979 Table 15.Advantages and Disadvantages of Liquid Hydrogen Compared to Synthetic Jet Fuel Advantages Disadvantages l l l l l l l l Lighter weight aircraft than synthetic jet fuel aircraft. Longer range possible. Greatest performance advantage is with supersonic flight Emission of CO, CO 2 HC, and odor eliminated; NO X emission equal to or less than synthetic jet fuel. Reduction in noise and sonic boom due to smaller size aircraft. Initial cost lower for supersonic aircraft, about same for subsonic. Maintenance cost may be lower. Can use shorter runways. a l l l l l l Airport modification to add hydrogen storage and handling facilities would be a major undertaking. Overall economics unfavorable compared to shale oil based fuel for subsonic and supersonic aircraft. Overall economics unfavorable with coal-based liquids for subsonic, but close for supersonic. Requires more energy from mine to engine. Amount of water vapor emitted in flight is higher. Handling liquid hydrogen is more hazardous than synthetic jet fuel. Based on a ratio of coal based liquids to shale oil fuel cost per gallon of 1.8 to 1. SOURCE EXXON Research and Engineering Co., Alternate Energy Sources for Non-Highway Transportation, December 1978. l disadvantage of a low density and so low volumetric heat content and also a low boiling point. l Liquid methane is 15 percent more energetic on a weight basis and has a specific heat 1.7 times greater than synthetic jet fuel. It is six times more dense than liquid hydrogen. The fuel costs, on a per-flight basis for a subsonic aircraft, are lowest for shale-derived jet fuel, followed by an indirect coalliquid jet fuel. A direct coal-liquid jet fuel PAGE 75 Ch. VIEnergy: Fuel Price and Availability l 81 l l l Illustration: Courtesy of Lockheed Aircraft Corp Artists concept of hydrogen-fueled hypersonic aircraft and liquid methane are roughly equal in cost. The hydrogen-fueled aircraft would be the most expensive to operateover three times the cost of operating an aircraft fueled with a shale-derived liquid. For a supersonic aircraft (Mach 2.7, 4,200 nautical miles, and 234 passengers), the design advantages with hydrogen are greater than for a subsonic aircraft. However, the fuel cost per flight still favors the synthetic liquid fuelsshale oil first, followed by coal-derived jet fuel and then hydrogen. With regard to natural resources and the resources required between the mine and the aircraft, a shale-oil-derived jet fuel is the most efficient. Hydrogen requires about double the amount of natural resources as shale oil. Laboratory tests have shown that acceptable jet fuels can be made from either coal or shale. Production of aircraft fuels from shale oil should be more straightforward than from coal. *Based on the following cost ratios per 10 Btu: liquid hydrogen from coal (3.8); jet fuel from coal liquefaction (1 .8); and jet fuel from shale oil (1 .0). l l Coal-based jet fuels will have poorer combustion properties than shale oil fuels because they form naphthenes rather than paraffins when the coal liquids are hydrogenated. An economic comparison between upgrading fuels to meet current hydrogen levels and modifying the engine shows that there are incentives to develop an engine that can accept a poorer quality fuel. If a fuel of 12 percent hydrogen can be used, the incentive would be about $170,000 per year per engine to operate an engine capable of using a fuel with a lower hydrogen content. The Federal Government currently is planning to launch a large-scale synthetic fuel production program. But the details of the plan and where this new fuel would be allocated have not been worked out, so they cannot be related to development of a supersonic aircraft at this time. However, due to the uncertainty of the energy picture, it seems quite appropriate to continue the examination of alternative fuels to ensure fuel availability for any new type of advanced air transport either subsonic or supersonic. PAGE 76 Chapter Vll ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES Over the past two decades, the potentially adverse effects of commercial supersonic flight on the environment have been the subject of considerable controversy and, at times, heated debate. The principal issues are noise, the sonic boom, pollution from engine emissions, and, to a lesser extent, radiation effects on passengers and crew. During the debate, both fact and conjecture have been used to support opposing points of view, clouding the issues in the minds of most Americans. In an effort to remove these clouds and to determine whether the environmental concerns are real or imagined, the U.S. Government initiated several research efforts following cancellation of the U.S. supersonic transport (SST) program in 1971. These research programs, although still not providing complete and final answers, have generated a greatly improved understanding of potential advanced supersonic transport (AST) environmental impacts. In the following sections, the results of U.S. Government studies are summarized briefly and the environmental impacts that are currently perceived for an AST design are discussed. Engine noise was a critical factor in the cancellation of the prior U.S. SST program and also the focus of controversy about the Concorde operating at Washington and New York airports. The noise issue will figure prominently in the consideration of any future U.S. aircraft program. Consequently, engine noise has been a major subject of the National Aeronautics and Space Administrations (NASA) research programs on both subsonic and supersonic technology. Since the Concordes have been operating at Dunes and Kennedy and more recently at Dallas-Fort Worth airports, a doubt has surfaced as to whether these supersonic aircraft have actually increased the overall noise exposure of neighboring communities because the number of supersonic aircraft operations compared to the total number of aircraft operations is small. It is expected that supersonic aircraft will comprise only about 5 to 15 percent of future total aircraft operations and, hence, will always contribute relatively little to overall noise. In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that only one generation of supersonic transports is in operation today. This generations design represents the technology available roughly between 1955 and 1965, a period before noise rules for any class of aircraft were promulgated. Thus, the supersonic transport has had no opportunity for the evolutionary progress in noise control that has benefited the subsonic fleet through several generations of aircraft and propulsion cycles. Notwithstanding the fact that the noise impact of future ASTs would be relatively small, the NASA supersonic research program has aimed at achieving noise levels comparable to those of advanced long-range subsonic aircraft. The research centers on an advanced variablecycle engine, which appears to have the capability of lessening noise by inherent design, and on advanced mechanical suppressors, which would substantially reduce noise with relatively small thrust loss. I The NASA program has made significant progress and, while verification through actual hardware is still necessary, it appears that an AST would be able to meet the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) noise rule (FAR part 36 stage 2), issued in 1969. Thus, Cornelius Driver, Advanced Supersonic Technology and Its Implications for the Future, presented at the AIAA Atlantic Aeronautical Conference, Williamsburg, Va., May 26-28, 1979. 85 PAGE 77 86 l Advanced High-Speed Aircraft Noise pollution this research promises a considerable improvement over the-noise levels of currently operating Concordes and of models reached by the close of the prior U.S. SST program. However, the viability of these improvements is thrown into doubt by the outstanding question of what additional noise standards both future subsonic and supersonic aircraft may have to satisfy by the time they are introduced into revenue operations. More stringent standards could affect the feasibility and acceptability of both kinds of aircraft and require further research and technology development. Because of the greater interdependence of all design facets in the aircraft, an AST will probably be more sensitive to strict noise requirements than comparable subsonic aircraft. Given the current status of supersonic technology, achieving noise 2 will be very formed a study Photo credit: Environmental Protect/on Agency levels below FAR part 36, stage costly. Lockheed recently perto provide data for FAA to use in working with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Committee on Aircraft Noise, Working Group E. This committee is setting noise standards for possible future supersonic transports. Lockheed addressed the relationship between predicted noise levels at the FAR part 36 measurement points and predicted direct operating costs for a supersonic transport with a specified emission. The results are shown in figure 15. This figure plots achievable noise versus operating cost penalties. The curve on the left reflects the results of Lockheeds calculations. Optimistically it shows that such an airplane would readily meet FAR part 36, stage 2 (108 PAGE 78 Ch. VIIEnvironmental Issues 87 Figure 15.The Cost and Uncertainty of Noise Reduction EPNdB 105 FAA 110 115 120 level regulation Traded takeoff noise EPNdB FAR part 36 stage 2. SOURCE OTA Working Paper, Lockheed California Co January 1979 EPNdB) without economic penalty and that it may meet stage 3 (about 105 EPNdB) with a 5to 6-percent direct operating cost penalty. However, when the second curve is added, reflecting the margin of uncertainty, the cost of meeting the various noise regulations greatly increases. Part of the reason for the 5 db margin of uncertainty, is the lack of solid experimental data to support the theoretical predictions. Thus, the results indicate that going much beyond the 1969 FAR part 36, stage 2 standards is likely to involve substantial direct operating cost penalties. Unless much of this uncertainty in noise calculations for supersonic aircraft is removed or reduced significantly, no manufacturer is likely to commit to a new supersonic aircraft program because the investment is too large to risk failure in meeting the standard. Substantial research and engine hardware testing will be needed to develop the data with which to reduce the margin of uncertainty to acceptable proportions. SONIC BOOM EFFECTS The general issue of noise dovetails with the specific problem of the sonic boom. Designed without regard to limiting the sonic boom, the typical supersonic transport would produce overpressure levels ranging from 1.5 to 4.0 pounds per square foot (lb/ft 2 ). These shock waves generated during acceleration and cruise flight remain an environmental concern which U.S. regulations have responded to in prohibiting civil flights at speeds which generate a boom that reaches the ground. Sonic boom effects on humans are difficult to pinpoint because of the subjectivity of the peoples responses and because of the diversity of variables affecting their behavior. Responses depend on previous exposure, age, geographic location, time of day, socioeconomic status, and other variables. Research and experimentation by FAA, NASA, and ICAO have turned up several findings about sonic boom phenomena related to humans, structures, and animals: 2 3 l l ~Anon., Co)zcorde Superso)l ic Tram.port Aircraft, Draft Etlz~iro)zme~ztul Impact Statemetz t (Washington, D. C.: U, S, Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, March 1975). Sonic booms do not affect adversely human hearing and vision or the circulatory system. The human psychological response is more complex, involving attitudes and habituation to sonic booms and their sources. In addition to the general observation that unexpected and unfamiliar noise startled people, the research indicated that intense booms tend to disorient people. Damage to structures appears the most serious potential impact of sonic boom, although even here the projected damage caused by supersonic transports may be minimal. Sonic booms with an intensity of 1.0 to 3.0 lb/ft 2 that is the intensity associated with a large supersonic transport, can cause glass to break and plaster to crack. In the range of 2.0 to 3.0 lb/ft 2 overpressure will damage about 1 window pane per 8 million boom pane exposures. Booms with overpressure from 3.0 to 5.0 lb/f t 2 ca n cause minor damage to plaster on wood lath, old gypsum board and bathroom tile, L, J. Runyan and E, J. Kane, Sot~ic BOIII)I Literature Sur-z!ey, Volume 1 State of tllc Art, Federal Aviation Administration report No. RD-73-129-1, September 1973. 6-285 O 80 7 PAGE 79 88 Advanced High-Speed Aircraft and to new stucco. Sonic boom impact will vary according to the condition of the structure. Boom overpressure dissipates with depth of water (e.g., to a tenth of initial value at a depth of about 122 feet) and so appears to pose no threat to aquatic life, including the capacity of fish eggs to hatch. Research on chickens, embryo chicken and pheasant eggs, pregnant cows, race horses, sheep, wild birds, and mink indicates that sonic boom effects on fowl, farm, and wild animals are negligible. Like humans, animals are startled by loud noises, but this reaction was found to diminish during testing. Although research indicates that overpressure of 4.0 lb/ft 2 or less produces little damage and few lasting psychological effects, sonic booms of such intensity would constitute a public nuisance. As present regulations prescribe, current and, at least, any second-generation supersonic transport cannot fly supersonically over populated land masses. Thus, market studies for future ASTs are restricted to flight patterns involving city pairs with over water supersonic legs. NASA has expended considerable effort on sonic boom minimization studies, 4 5 whic h point to the possibility of supersonic aircraft designs with a boom of lower intensity. Such lowboom airplanes will require a degree of technological refinement beyond current capabilities and are not a likelihood for the period considered in this report. Additional research could alter the picture, perhaps allowing an AST to be developed for introduction beyond the year 2010 that could operate over land. 4 F. E. Mclean and H. W. Carlson, Sonic-Boom Characteristics of Proposed Supersonic and Hypersonic Airplanes, NASA TN D-3587, September 1966. E. J. Kane, A Study to Determine the Feasibility of a Low Sonic Boom Supersonic Transport, NASA CR-2332, December 1973. Recently, the term secondary sonic boom has been used in connection with some Concorde operations. Secondary sonic boom is caused occasionally by certain meteorological phenomena. For example, the structure of the atmosphere is such that its temperature decreases from sea level up to an altitude of about 5 miles. From this altitude the temperature continually increases and decreases up to a region called the thermosphere. 6 This temperature structure is the primary factor that determines the noise profile in the atmosphere. With the wind profile it determines how sound propagates through the atmosphere and can result, under special circumstances, in sound radiated into the atmosphere being returned back to Earth. In the case of aircraft-produced sonic boom, the source of the noise could be waves from the airplane that propagate upward and are then returned or could be waves that reflect off the surface of the ocean, travel upwards, and then are returned. Measurements of these shock waves have been taken showing overpressures on the order of 0.02 lb/ ft 2 7 Sources of these secondary sonic booms have been identified as Concorde flights, distant gunnery practice, quarry blasting, and similar activities. They have also been associated with the overflight of space vehicles, including the Apollo 12 and 13 moon flights. 8 A Naval Research Laboratory study has concluded that secondary sonic booms from Concorde are of sufficiently low amplitude and frequency that it is unlikely that they are either responsible for some mysterious sounds observed off the east coast in 1979 or likely to disturb the public. 9 6M. Lessen and A. W. Pryce, Now Dont Get Rattled, Journal of Acoustical Society of America, 64(6), December 1978. Ibid. D. Cotten and W. L. Dorm, Sound From Apollo Rockets in Space, Science, vol. 171, February 1971. J. H. Gardner and P. H. Rogers, Thermospheric Propagation of Sonic Booms From the Concorde Supersonic Transport, Naval Research Laboratory, NRL memorandum report 3904, Feb. 14, 1979. PAGE 80 Ch. VIlEnvironmental issues 89 EMISSIONS In the early 1970s, concern was aroused that the engine emissions from a fleet of supersonic transports would deplete the ozone in the upper atmosphere, reduce the shielding from the Suns ultraviolet rays, and, thus, cause an increase in the incidence of skin cancer. This concern, originally directed only at anticipated supersonic aircraft, spread to the potential impact of the growing fleet of subsonic aircraft. At the time the issue was raised, there was simply not enough knowledge from which to draw the needed scientific conclusions. 10 During the congressional debate over the future of the SST program in 1970, the Department of Transportation (DOT) was directed to mount a Federal scientific program to obtain the knowledge needed to judge how serious the conjectured ozone-depletion effects might be and report the results to Congress by the end of calendar year 1974. This directive led to the establishment of DOTs climatic impact assessment program (CIAP), which drew on 9 other Federal departments and agencies, 7 foreign agencies, and the individual talents of 1,000 investigators in numerous universities and other organizations in the United States and abroad. At the same time, a special committee of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) was organized to review the work of CIAP and to form an independent judgment of the results. The principal findings of the CIAP study 11 were: l l Operations of present-day supersonic aircraft and those currently scheduled to enter service (about 30 Concordes and TU-144s) cause climatic effects which are much smaller than minimally detectable. Future harmful effects to the environment can be avoided if proper measures are taken in a timely manner to develop lowemission engines and fuels. IOA. J. Grobecker, S. C. Coroniti, and R. H. Cannon, Jr., ~~e Effects of Stratospheric Pollution by Aircra/t (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Department of Transportation, report DOT-TST-75-50, December 1974). 11A. J. Grobecker, et a]., op. cit. l l l On If stratospheric vehicles (including subsonic aircraft) beyond the year 1980 increase greatly in number, improvements over 1974 propulsion technology will be necessary to assure that emissions do not significantly disturb the stratospheric environment. The cost of developing low-emission engines and fuels would be small compared to the potential economic and social costs of not doing so. Many uncertainties remain in our knowledge of the dynamics and chemistry of the upper atmosphere. A continuous atmospheric monitoring and research program can further reduce remaining uncertainties, can ascertain whether the atmospheric quality is being maintained, and can minimize the cost of doing so. the recommendations of the CIAP studies, Congress has supported a NASA program to develop the technology for low-emission jet engines. This program has been successful in defining and testing a conceptual design for a burner which might solve potential future highaltitude emission problems as well as reduce low-altitude emissions. 12 Also, on the CIAP recommendations, FAA initiated a high-altitude pollution program (HAPP) to monitor continuously the upper atmosphere and conduct systematic research to address the uncertainties regarding ozone depletion attributable to future subsonic and supersonic aircraft. The ongoing HAPP studies have already indicated that the earlier CIAP and NAS studies substantially exaggerated the extent to which future aircraft will reduce the ozone layer. Present understanding of the phenomena indicates much smaller impacts and perhaps no net impact at all. 13 14 15 The current predictions are compared with earlier CIAP and NAS predictions in figure 16. Izcorne]ius Driver, OP. cit. 13A. Broderick, stratospheric Effects from Aviation, presented at the AIAA/SAE 13th Propulsion Conference, AIAA paper 77-799, July 1977. See p. 90. IsSee p. 90. PAGE 81 90 l Advanced High-Speed Aircraft This is a significant finding, but it should be accepted only tentatively. Knowledge about atmospheric chemistr y is growin g and continued assessments are necessary as new data and improved atmospheric models become available. Current findings, however, are on much firmer ground than prior estimates and give some reason for optimism on the emission problems of advanced aircraft. (Footnote continued from p. 89. ) 14P. J. Crutzen, A Two-Dimensional Photochemical Model of the Atmosphere Below 55 km: Estimates of Natural and Man Caused Ozone Perturbations Due to NO x Proceedings of the Fourth Conference on the Climatic impact Assessment Program (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Department of Transportation, report DOT-TSC-OST-75-38, 1976). ISI. G. poppoff, R. C. Whiteen, R. P. Turco, and L. A. Capone, An Assessment of the Effect of Supersonic Aircraft Operations on the Stratospheric Ozone Content, NASA reference publication 1026, August 1978. Figure 16.Predicted Effect of Improved Aircraft Technology on the Ozone Layer (000 Ft) km 65 ~ 60 55 50 45 40 35 ~ -24 -20 -16 -12 -8 -4 0 4 Ozone column change, percent SOURCE: High Altitude Pollution Program, Federal Aviation Administration, December 1977. COSMIC RAY EXPOSURE At the higher cruise altitudes expected of However, the increased intensity of radiation supersonic transports, cosmic rays are filtered will be somewhat compensated for by the deby the atmosphere less than at subsonic cruise crease in exposure time resulting from the airaltitudes or on the ground. This factor has given crafts supersonic speed. The best evidence to rise to some concern that crew personnel will date is that such radiation exposure will not exundergo excessive exposure to cosmic rays. ceed permitted occupational levels. SUMMARY Based on the current state of knowledge and assuming all supersonic legs will be flown over water, noise is the most significant environmental problem of a new generation of supersonic aircraft. Although other concerns do not appear to be as critical at this time, it is likely that all of the environmental issues of a future supersonic transport will both intensify and subside in the future. They will intensify in the sense that regulation is likely to become more comprehensive and stringent, and measurement and evaluation techniques more sophisticated and accurate. At the same time, the regulations are more likely to be shaped by compromise between all relevant considerations and thus viewed as an equitable balance between diverse points of view and conflicting objectives. Debate concerning environmental standards will be a more familiar and established process. The regulations that will be derived from them will be more accepted, so that the equipment that conforms to these regulations will likewise be more accepted. While this process is evolving, it seems clear that the continued technical assessment and research on the environmental issues of future advanced aircraft are highly appropriate. PAGE 82 Chapter Vlll SUPERSONIC TRANSPORTATION AND SOCIETY It is clear that advancements in transportation technology, such as the development of viable supersonic flight, would have an impact that alters the world we live in. It is possible to have a clear sense of the tangible ways in which technology changes the human environment, But at the same time, it can be very difficult to foresee exactly what a projected technological development will demand in the way of specific accommodations in the status quo. The more specific the technological development we are considering, the more general or speculative attempts at prediction become. The impact of the advent of advanced high-speed aircraft will be felt in the area of long-range, and especially international, travel. Advanced highspeed aircraft would not appear to offer a dramatic change in the character of patterns of international travel, but it would seem to offer the opportunity for an increase in the scale of travel. However, this potential for enhanced transportation is proceeding at the same time as revolutionary improvements of all sorts in communications capabilities. It is conceivable that progress in the communications area could allow the replacement of some amount of travel by rapid and sophisticated communications; however, as discussed below, it is often noted that increases in the quality and quantity of communications tend to be accompanied by similar increases in transportation. Assessing and projecting the effects of the mutual interactions of improving transportation and improving communications are very difficult tasks, and perhaps impossible. IMPACT OF INCREASED LONG-DISTANCE TRAVEL Underlying the assumption that an advanced supersonic aircraft would be economically feasible is the assumption that there would be a ridership for an aircraft that could fly basically international flights at very high speeds (see ch. III). The analysis here has not considered the amount of new travel induced by the higher speed service, especially offered by an advanced supersonic transport (AST) (see ch. IV). However, past experience suggests that most new transportation systems do in fact create a certain amount of new travel. A continuation in the rise of general real incomes and hence of discretionary incomes would tend to reinforce an increase in air travel. The late anthropologist, Margaret Mead, suggested that mankind is just now on the verge of a new consciousness of air as the ordinary medium for transportation: We have only begun to think in air terms instead of land and sea terms. The air sets up a new set of possibilities for human development, but also a new set of challenges. She writes, It is a framework within which the people of the world who have fought each other for land rights and water rights must now cooperate or perish. Indeed, at least four major trends can be conjectured that roughly follow from this recognition. The first is global cultural and linguistic homogenization, Habits and practices are transmitted across borders by both business and tourist travel. Xenophobia is likely, in general, to recede. This trend is likel y to be turbulent and not universal. The portent of change can be the precipitator of resistancewitness the recent events in Iran. But in the longer run, the general direction seems more likely to be toward softening rather than hardening of differences. The second phenomenon is the slow strengthening of supranational cooperative organizations. Increasing travel brings increasing awareness of common interests and mutual impacts. An example was the impact of nuclear testing in 93 PAGE 83 94 l Advanced High-Speed Aircraft an atmosphere that the whole world shares. As the awareness of need for supranational organizations grows, so will their likelihood. It is relevant that the strata of society most likely to understand these issues, and most likely to be in a position to take an activist role in their establishment, are also most likely to be the people who do the traveling. The third is a growing economic interdependence. This is really a subset of the trends addressed above, restricted to the sphere of the private sector and economic organization. Strengthening of the trend toward multinational companies should improve the efficiency of global resource usage. The fourth is a further strengthening of the position of the large cities in the worlds social and economic geographical hierarchy. The links in travel will be large cities. Given an AST, Tokyo and San Francisco will be closer in time than Bakersfield, Calif., and Eugene, Ore. As Margaret Mead has said, The ports of the future will be air cities, not coastal cities or railroad centers. COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION The communications field is undergoing a revolution with the application of advances in electronics to the transmission of information. It will be easier in the future to transmit more data, more voices, and more picture information and, in addition, it will become easier to set up more versatile combinations of these forms of communication (through holography, for instance) and thus extend telecommunications capabilities into new uses. It is anticipated that these innovations will take place at costs that, sooner or later, will make them quite attractive. Many of the anticipated developments in communications will have an immediate bearing on the continuing practicability of local and shortrange transportation, but they also can help establish a framework in which the interactions of communications and long-distance travel can be considered. The way the issue of the interaction of communications developments and transportation is typically framed is in terms of better communications either substituting for certain kinds of travel or stimulating travel. It is possible to conjure long lists of ways in which communications technology can serve both functions, but lists will not really analyze the problem. Developments in data communications and electronic correspondence may, in conception, allow the elimination of instances in which material or people are physically transported from office to office, from office to bank, or even from home to office. The development most relevant to long-distance travel is in teleconferencing technology. AT&Ts picturephone meeting service is a step in this direction, although it currently still operates only out of a small number of large American cities and requires that conferees travel to a special center for the long-distance audiovisual encounter. One report states that although there could be some impact on air transport, replacing business trips with audiovisual transmission, such teleconferencing may as often stimulate as replace or supplement the need for travel. It is noted that in most organizations that use teleconferencing no diminution of overall travel budget has taken place: travel money has been reallocated for purposes other than for travel to and from meetings. 1 Other evidence suggests that, although communications innovations may eliminate the need for certain kinds of trips at least in theory, such innovations will not have the overall effect of reducing time and money spent on travel. For one thing, evidence from past communications developments does not suggest that a communications breakthrough reduces travel. The introduction of neither the telephone nor the telegraph appears to have been followed by a discernible reduction in travel. In a more recent instance, we do not tend to think of satellite communications as having reduced contemporary National Transportation Policies Through the Year 2000, National Transportation Policy Study Commission, Final Report, June 1979. PAGE 84 Ch. VlllSupersonic Transportation and Society 95 reasons or opportunities for travel, although no empirical work can be elicited to show this. In fact, there is a fair amount of evidence that the average time people spend in daily travel has remained essentially constant as far back in history as clues can be obtained. For the past century, more systematic data bears out that average travel time per person per day has remained roughly the same. This is rather remarkable, considering that during this century the telephone was invented and proliferated and the physical character of cities has changed from relatively dense developments where people depended largely on walking to extended areas crisscrossed by highways. One would think that in small cities, where the average travel time to work is shorter than in large cities, the total travel time per person would be much less than in large cities. However, this does not seem to be the case; people seem to compensate for short commutation with more noncommuting travel. Figure 17 shows some data on auto trips that illustrate this point. Eighteen cities ranging from New York with 16 million area residents to Rapid City, S. Dak., Commuter parking at airports Figure 17.Average Auto Trip Rate v. Trip Time SOURCE. Vacov Zahavi, Traveltime Budgets and Mobi//ty in Urban Areas, May 1974. with 73,000 are identified. It would appear that in smaller cities in which shorter distances shrink the average trip, people use the time saved to make more trips. *If this effect could be transferred to the market associated with supersonic travel, one would expect that the AST would increase the travel market on account of the timesaving of higher speed travel. Phofo cred(fs Enwronmenta/ Protect/on Agency Passengers waiting at airport terminals THE FUTURE ENVIRONMENT One approach to future projections is to implicitly assume that the world of the next 30 to 50 years will contain no long-term deviations from past trends. In Dr. Herman Kahns expression, it is the surprise-free scenario, at least the big surprise-free scenario. Given our cur- PAGE 85 96 Advanced High-Speed Aircraft rent concerns over the shortage of petroleum, is it reasonable to assume that we will somehow cope with the energy problem, possibly by providing substitutes, albeit at higher costs, that national economies will continue to expand, albeit slowly, and that world order will remain largely intact? These are necessary assumptions for growth in the air system. If these assumptions fail, the issues addressed in this assessment are moot. Historical precedent supports the reasonableness of these assumptions. The economic system of the world and the Nation has shown a remarkable ability to weather many other crises that in the context of a quarter-century could be considered short-term. Figure 18 shows a 100year history of economic and population trends for the United States. Under any economic growth rate that reasonably approximates past trends, we will be a more affluent nation by the end of the century. At the right of figure 18 are five hypothetical annual alternative outcomes in growth rates that show gross national product (GNP) per capita for the next 25 years. The total wealth should increase: at 2-percent annual growth in GNP, the Nation would generate $48 trillion in GNP (1975 dollars) between the years 1975 and 2000, compared to the $27 trillion between 1950 and 1975. At a 3-percent growth, the figure would be nearly $55 trillion. Whatever the growth in population, it should not be a drag on GNP because the labor force is expected to increase more rapidly than the population as shown. Whatever happens in this country is likely to approximate generally the economic well-being in other advanced nations of the world as the United States has become intertwined in the world economy. Obviously, the future is uncertain. In the context of the issues of this technology assessment, it seems that the most useful assumption about the nature of evolving high-speed air transport is not cataclysmic or revolutionary, but is generally a broad continuation of the trends of the last two centuries. Figure 18.Long-Term Economic Trends (1975 dollars) 3.45 I 2.74 I 3.25 I GNP 3. 5 1.4 0.4 -0.6 1875 1900 1925 1950 1975 2000 SOURCE: Toward 2000 Opportunities in Transportation Evolutlon, report No DOT-TST-77-19, March 1977. PAGE 86 Chapter IX COMPETITIVE CONSIDERATIONS AND FINANCING The costs of a new commercial aircraft programresearch, development, and production are very large. In the case of an advanced supersonic transport (AST), no one really knows the cost, though estimates range from $6 billion to $10 billion in 1979 dollars. The figure could be much larger. Much of the investment is essentially independent of the number of aircraft built, so that scaling back production plans is not an option for reducing the financial risks. A particular drawback is that a very large investment must be made even before testing has proceeded far enough to verify the technical soundness and performance of the product. Figure 19 shows how much an initial investment must be made before there is any possibility of a return. On the positive side, although the negative cashflow trough is very deep, it is followed in the later years of a successful program by large positive cash flows. Figure 19 also indicates how initial investments have been escalating over time. The Douglas Aircraft Planning Department has estimated that since the 1940s these costs have risen at about 11 percent annually in constant dollars, the result largely of growing size and complexity of various aircraft. (For example, the cost per pound has escalated from $83 for the DC-3 to $6,300 for the DC-10 in constant 1975 dollars. 1 ) By comparison, the net worth of the company has only grown at an annual rate of 6.6 percent. The discrepancy gives a crude measure of the ability of the company to finance new programs. As another example, the DC-10 frontend costs were 155 percent of Douglas equity, though the same costs for the DC-6 were 42 percent. The magnitude of the required investments and the delay in any substantial returns would induce a company to time any new program to take advantage of positive cash flows from prior programs to help finance the initial costs of new ones. The periods of positive cash flowsand relatively smaller commitments of technical skillsare the windows of opportunity for a commercial aircraft manufacturer. Determining when such windows of opportunity are likely to occur is important in the intelligent pacing of any precursor technological readiness programs. The magnitude of the required investments would either limit or preclude the possibility of two new aircraft programs being started at the same time by one company, or possibly by the entire industry. Thus, from the industrys perspective, a new supersonic aircraft program must be seen as competing directly with new subsonic aircraft programs. The freedom of the developer is impinged by the fact that the next window of opportunity is at least a decade or so in the future. Developers of large new commercial aircraft are motivated to act in accord with what they perceive as their long-term interests, not to assume high risks for the sake of flaunting technological glamour. Current financing trends are making it increasingly difficult, and perhaps impossible for a single company to undertake a large new commercial aircraft program. The sheer size of the financial commitment required to enter the supersonic transport market means there will not be many competitors, even if ways, such as subcontracting and consortium arrangements, are found to mitigate the financial burdens. Whereas there is the potential for many entrants in the general aviation and small transport market in countries around the world, the potential competitors for an AST market are only from a few of the most technologically advanced nations and from a few industrial organizations. (Of course, the list of potential collaborators is much larger. ) It should be remembered that competition offers its own set of risks: the potential for one economically successful program 99 PAGE 87 100 l Advanced High-Speed Aircraft Figure 19.Typical Aircraft Cash Flow Curve (billions of 1976 dollars) Development Production $6 billion to $10 billion, in 1979 dollars. SOURCE: OTA Working Paper, Lockheed California Co January 1979. of, say, 400 aircraft might, with two competitors in the field, turn into two more expensive and/or unsuccessful programs of perhaps 150 aircraft each. Balancing the forbidding size of development investments is the prospect that it pays to be the first to introduce a major new kind of aircraft. It is often observed that a large proportion of orders for a new aircraft are placed within the first several years before and after its introduction. Certainly, if an AST, reasonably competitive with subsonic aircraft, were introduced by one airline on a route, enormous pressure on competing airlines to follow suit would ensue. If the competitors fail to follow the lead, they stand to lose a major share of their markets. An airline can only afford to wait for a second offering if a later aircraft is sufficiently superior to recapture the lost competitive advantage. Another reason that the first manufacturer to offer a new aircraft product will stand to gain is that airlines prefer operating a homogeneous fleet. A mixture of airplanes not of the same basic technical family complicates maintenance and parts inventory and demands a more diverse standing array of labor skillsall of which increase costs. Thus, though there are simplifications here, once an airline has committed itself to a given aircraft, only the very marked superiority of an alternative will induce the airline to switch to other manufacturers for subsequent orders as the fleet expands. The risks of a homogeneous fleet, such as greater vulnerability if flaws appear in the chosen aircraft, do not appear to deter this inclination toward a high degree of homogeneity. Once any manufacturer commits to production and begins accepting orders for a new AST, in an international market where sales and competition are not constrained politically, the window for a second competitor with only a marginal technical advantage may be open for a PAGE 88 Ch. IXCompetitive Considerations and Financing l 101 very short time, perhaps less than 2 years. How long the window of opportunity is kept closed after this initial opening depends on the rate of growth of both the market and the increment of technical, and therefore economic, superiority the later aircraft might embody. The time and expense required to build a technological base will depend on the degree of advancement set as a goal. No U.S. manufacturer now feels the necessary technology is available and sufficiently validated to prudently commit billions of dollars for an AST development and production program. What further degree of advancement is necessary to meet environmental standards and reasonably assure an economically successful aircraft is still a matter of judgment, although attention has been devoted to defining the investment in money and time required to fill the existing deficiencies. The National Aeronautics and Space Administrations (NASA) technology validation program that has emerged, described in chapter II, could cost $0.6 billion to $1.9 billion depending on various suggested plans and require from 5 to 8 years to complete. The large financial demands and the need to ensure a large market for the aircraft are pressures to spread the manufacturing, and possibly some of the development costs, of an AST internationally. This can be accomplished either by extensive subcontracting or through the formation of some kind of consortium. For nations where the state partially or wholly controls both airlines and aircraft manufacturing there is a motivation to exert pressure for a quid pro quo: I will buy your airplane instead of Xs, if you will let us manufacture the hyperthrockels. One consideration in regarding such internationalization would be technology transfer licensing. Another would be cost. The impact of a multinational program would probably be to raise the price of development on account of the costs of coordinating and bridging the distance between participants. In addition, sharing the program would probably attenuate the balanceof-payments impact of each aircraft. On the other hand, an internationally diffused program would enlarge the assured market which might offset any such reduction in the balance-of-payments impact. IDENTIFICATION OF THE TECHNOLOGY The military has traditionally been of great service to the commercial aviation industry. For one thing, the military has led in researching and developing aircraft technology and has been responsible for such developments as allmetal construction, radar, navigation systems, high-strength lightweight materials, and various jet engines (the JT3, JT8, C-5 which led to the CF-6, and also the B-1 which led to the CFM-56) 2 3 Furthermore, the military has enhanced the economic viability of the commercial sector by ordering a large number of transport aircraft, such as, in the past, the DC-3, DC-4, and DC-6, the Constellation, and to a lesser extent the KC-135 and B-707, and, in the present, modifications of the DC-10 (KC-10 tanker), B-707 (AWACS), B-737, and DC-9. Future {~t Aviation, C{)mmittee Report, HC)LIW Science and Techn(~log}, U.S. Con~rw\, octobcr l~7b. l~elopm(nt C(lntrlbuti(~ns to Aviation Progr(~< ( \\a\h I ngton, [), C: Fdera I A\. la t Ion Adm I n ]~t ra t ion, 1 Q72 ). However, the situation has changed. The military is no longer leading the way in aircraft developments and thus spinoffs to commercial aircraft areas have been reduced or eliminated. The main reason for this change is that the goals of military aircraft are no longer compatible with those of commercial transports. What this means is that if it is desired to keep improving the U.S. technology base, other ways of supporting aeronautical technology should be considered. For subsonic aircraft, improvements are expected to continue in propulsion-system efficiency (through higher temperatures and pressures achieved by advances in metallurgy and materials), noise suppression, structures and weight technology (through composites, increased use of titanium, and advanced fabrication techniques such as superplastic forming), and aerodynamics (through airfoils, winglets, and active controls ). Improvements are also an- PAGE 89 102 l Advanced High-Speed Aircraft Phofo credif Boe/ng A/rcraff Co B-707 AWACS ticipated with respect to cost, safety, and maintenance. If the Governments role in funding research for subsonic technology continues as it has in the past, there will be further technological advancements in subsonic aircraft, Some funds will continue to be used to assess far-term technologiesgenerally the high-risk technology items including composite primary structures, laminar flow control, advanced avionics, and alternative fuels. Industry R&D funds are primarily directed at near-term technologies applicable to both new aircraft and derivative versions of existing aircraft. These include: active controls, composite secondary structures, aerodynamics, and improved applications of current high-bypass-ratio engines. In the supersonic area both NASA and the aerospace industry have been involved with improving the state-of-the-art for supersonic aircraft. As discussed in chapter II, NASA has proposed a supersonic cruise research (SCR) program divided into four phases, shown in figure 20. Two initial phases, of technology identification and validation, led to a phase of technology readinessand a decision whether to precede with any commercial aircraft production. To date, approximately 90 percent of the SCR program funds have been allocated to technology identification and the question now is how much should the Federal Government invest in the validation and readiness phases. The potential technology solutions include blended wing/body designs, further propulsion improvements (coannular nozzles, advanced inlet design), improved noise suppression, titanium sandwich construction, increased structural efficiency, active controls, advanced flight controls, flight management systems, and greatly PAGE 90 Ch. IXCompetitive Considerations and Financing Q 103 Figure 20. Phases of Advanced Transport Development (SCR) Technology readiness improved aerodynamic efficiency at subsonic and supersonic speeds. Along with the variablecycle engine concept, these technology solutions could provide a basis for achieving the desired economically viable and environmentally acceptable AST. However, as discussed in chapter II, work is only beginning on validating these advanced elements, identified in the first phase of technology research. SOURCE: NASA OAST, A Technology Validation Program Leading to Potential Technology Readiness Options for an Advanced Supersonic Transport, September 1978. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES The immediate issue is not a go or no-go decision on an AST, but rather the selection of a desired level of commitment to technology readiness. (Such readiness in the context of an assumed $8 billion total program is shown graphically in figure 21. ) Selection must weigh the attractiveness of future possibilities that a given level of technology might create or maintain against the cost of achieving such readiness. One strategy would be to concentrate on the subsonic market and not attempt to compete Figure 21. Cost of a Representative AST Program 2 1 with a supersonic aircraftthe base case discussed earlier. This strategy would be appropriate if a significantly worse energy situation in the 1980s makes an AST less attractive. It would also be appropriate, regardless of energy considerations, if the potential competitors of the United States also hold back from significant investment in technological advancement. If a new foreign supersonic transport were introduced without benefit of further advancement in technology, it may well capture enough of the market to be successfulsay, $20 billionbut it is less likely to be so successful as to make the subsonic market unattractive. The no-supersonic strategy has the great short-term advantage of saving the money that would be invested in technological development. However, its risk is long-term. If a supersonic transport were developed and it were sufficiently successful, it could capture the lions share of the market. Once there is a successful supersonic, the market for a third-generation aircraft could very well expand tremendously, especially if over land supersonic flights were permitted. If the United States refused to join the market at an early point, it would find it SOURCE. F E Mclean, OTA Working Paper, Advanced High-Speed Aircraft. both difficult and expensive to catch up. Among PAGE 91 104 w Advanced High-Speed Aircraft other impediments, it would be very hard to train a new generation of specialists with competence in supersonic technology. How difficult and how expensive such catching up might be has not been evaluated. The second strategy open to the United States would be the opposite of the abovea commitment to a fairly vigorous supersonic technology development program of perhaps $100 million to $150 million annually. This path could lead to a U.S. AST program or a major U.S. role in a cooperative international program. The ramifications of these possibilities have already been discussed. The risk is that the investment might lead to nothing except perhaps application of the technology to subsonics, military aircraft, or space transport. The third alternative might be called the hedge strategy. The United States might invest a certain amountperhaps $50 million per year in technological R&D. Such a strategy could serve as an adequate base to negotiate a cooperative international program. It also would retain the option of future acceleration as a basis for a U.S. program. It seems plausible that, whichever strategy is taken, the industry response would roughly parallel the national program. A vigorous supersonic R&D program sponsored by the Federal Government would probably evoke a much larger private sector financial commitment than a weak effort at the Federal level. The national signal is very important to the aircraft manufacturers. If some commitment is made to a supersonic program, it would appear that there is no shortrun alternative to continuing the past and current practice of funding NASA. As noted, NASA has a relatively modest SCR program underway, funded at about $10 million annually. In the long run, however, there may be preferable approaches for the continued development of aeronautical technology. Such alternatives have not yet been seriously identified and evaluated, but certain principles that should guide the identification of alternatives should be noted. Any alternative should ensure a healthy competitive posture for the aircraft industry. It should also encourage innovation. Any alternative to the NASA arrangement should seek to internalize the costs of aeronautical research to the air system. This would require, first, identifying appropriate sources of funds and, second, determining the best method for their allocation. The former is probably easier to accomplish than the latter. For example, each one-tenth of a cent levy on each domestic revenue passenger-mile would provide $200 million annually. Defining an allocation process would take time. However, in this and other regards relating to an alternative to the NASA research program, the general principle of limiting Government involvement should be followed. BEYOND TECHNOLOGY READINESS During the conduct of this study, concern was expressed about the manner in which the phase following technology identification, validation, and attainment of technology readiness would be funded. Though this area is addressed as a subsequent activity of this study, it is relevant here to present several alternatives which may be appropriate under different circumstances for financing the development and production of advanced supersonic aircraft: l A U.S. aircraft manufacturer could undertake the effort as a private venture and have suppliers develop components on a risk basis in the same manner as the large subsonic transports are now developed. In addition, funds could be obtained through advanced payments by the airlines. l It may be possible for several U.S. manufacturers to combine efforts or to form an independent organization supported b y PAGE 92 Ch. IXCompetitive Considerations and Financing l 105 several companies involved in the technology development phase. If two or more U.S. companies combined efforts, they would run the risk of antitrust threats which would have to be removed before this option could be considered, A recent NASA publication discusses some of the antitrust policy questions. It states: Among the most significant barriers to the formation of both domestic and multinational consortia is antitrust policy. Th e U.S. Department of Justice is not presently receptive to the suggestion that there may be a need for rationalization of the commercial airframe industry without which effective market competition may be reduced in the long run and U.S. interests may suffer materially in several ways. The only means currently available to a firm contemplating participation in any consortium to ascertain formally the acceptability of that consortium to the antitrust authorities is the Business Review Procedure of the Department of Justice. However, even a positive opinion by the Justice Department does not grant a permanent exemption from prosecution. The competitive impact of any proposed cooperative arrangement will be gauged by the Department of Justice primarily by: 1) the extent to which market competition in the United States between commercial airframe producers would be foreclosed in both the short term and the long term, and 2) the way in which the arrangement proposes to treat the issue of technology transfer. The competitive effects of proposed airframe consortia are largely indeterminate ex ante, particularly in the long run. However, given the present and prospect, both multinational and all U.S. consortia have at least as great a likelihood of enhancing competition as of thwarting it. 4 l The possibility also exists for a collaborative effort between a U.S. company and one or more. foreign companies or governments. A principal reason for such a consortium would be to reduce the amount of money committed unilaterall y to finance a new aircraft project through sharing the costs, benefits, risks, and responsibilities. NASA has offered various motives for becoming involved in either intranational or international consortia: The mechanism of a consortium can be expected to reduce the resources required for the development, production, and marketing of a transport aircraft below what would be required if any individual participant were to undertake the project alone. However, the consortium device will probably increase markedly the total resources required for its project. Neither multinational consortia with U.S. participation nor all-U. S. consortia automatically imply either a reduction or an increase in domestic aerospace employment opportunities, in either the short run or long run. Each case must be analyzed on its own merits. For example, some may argue that if a U.S. and foreign manufacturer formed a consortium, a certain amount of employment would be lost to foreign countries. However, it may be argued that, if such participation served to strengthen the domestic industry, a net improvement in employment could result in the future. A case in which this would apply would be one in which a U.S. manufacturer saw a potential for a family of aircraft, but would not engage in this venture on its own. The primary motive of U.S. firms for considering participation in multinational consortia is the enhancement of their individual financial resources. The consortium mechanism might also provide a means for a U.S. firm to pursue contemporaneously more than one transport aircraft development project. Preservation of market access is a secondary, but perhaps at times important, motive for commercial airframe manufacturers to join multinational consortia. 6 While this discussion is by no means exhaustive, it does indicate some potential ways in which consortia can aid in the AST programs. This chapter has only preliminarily addressed some of the major financing concerns with respect to validating the technology and developing and producing ASTs into commercial service. The intent was not to evaluate options for financing but only to suggest some alternatives. Itlld It-)Id PAGE 93 . 106 l Advanced High-Speed Aircraft A further examination of the alternatives as well documented in a later report Financing and as possible funding mechanisms is planned as a Program Alternatives for Advanced High-Speed subsequent activity in this assessment, to be Aircraft. IJ S GOVERNMENT PFINTING OFFICE : 1980 0 60-285