THE POLITICAL CULTURE IN THE PRESIDENCY OF QUITO AT INDEPENDENCE: A REGIONAL COMPARISON

By

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A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR IN PHILOSOPHY

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Hay hombres que luchan un día y son buenos.
Hay hombres que luchan un año y son mejores.
Hay hombres que luchan muchos años y son muy buenos.
Pero hay quienes luchan toda la vida.
Esos son los imprescindibles
(Bertold Brecht, citado por Mercedes Sosa.)

A la memoria de mis padres
y
a mis hijos.
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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

THE POLITICAL CULTURE IN THE PRESIDENCY OF QUITO AT INDEPENDENCE: A REGIONAL COMPARISON

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This dissertation compares the political culture of three regional groups in the Presidency of Quito (modern day Ecuador) at the time of independence in the early 1800s: the aristocracy in Quito, merchants and planters in Guayaquil, and vecinos in Portoviejo--mostly middling merchants and Indians. Great emphasis has been placed on culture and language as a pre-requisite for understanding the political beliefs and aspirations of each of these groups. For this purpose, the study incorporates some of the most recent thinking on the relation between language, politics, and experience. The study aimed to identify the origins of regionalism in Ecuador during its preliminary steps towards nation-state building. In the process of so doing it has incorporated the analysis of political beliefs
and practices of sectors hitherto marginalized from the history of this period, i.e. Indians and mestizos in Portoviejo. Part of the finding of this research is that regional differences were already significant during the late colonial period. The coast had a more secularized culture than Quito's, including non-elite groups from Portoviejo. These differences prefigured conflicts surfacing in the second half of the nineteenth century, in the liberal-conservative contention.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this research has been to study the political culture of different regional groups during the independence period in the Presidency of Quito, modern day Ecuador. We chose this as subject for our dissertation, influenced, no doubt, by our knowledge of the difficulties encountered by this Andean nation throughout most of its republican history in achieving a broader national consensus. In the nineteenth century, regional centripetal forces called into question the very survival of the country as an independent nation; in more modern times, regional conflicts have at times undermined efforts to seek solutions for some of the country's most pressing problems.

These considerations led us to search for the roots of regionalism in the independence period, when the earliest steps towards nation-state formation were taken. The time frame for these events in the Presidency of Quito extended from the earlier insurrection between 1809 and 1812 in Quito to the second wave of insurgency between 1820 and 1822, at which time Guayaquil became independent.
and Quito was finally liberated with the aid of Bolivar's army.

The historiography of this period has remained, with few exceptions, l'histoire evenémentielle of the elites. Perhaps not without reason, it has been claimed that only when national elites can reach consensus through sources other than history, will they allow it to become objective. This may now be the case in Ecuador, where la nueva historia is already bearing fruit. Still vast sectors of society have yet to find their place in history.

Nor has it been helpful, that in general Ecuador has been excluded from the agenda of foreign-trained historians, who perhaps could have broadened their field of inquiry to include some of these marginalized sectors. But then, foreign-trained as well as nationals have interpreted "the masses" during this period in Latin America as being outside the political process. It may well be that historiography, through its methods of inquiry, excluded itself from their political involvement. There are, however, notable exceptions, as we shall see in the bibliographic essay.

All of these considerations, along with more personal ones, have led us to focus for the purpose of comparison on two hegemonic regional elites--namely those from Quito and Guayaquil, and provincial groups outside the mainstream of society, as were those from Portoviejo.
The concept of political culture, defined as the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which underlie the practice of the political actors, has been most useful for our purposes. We have, however, used the concept in a certain way. Rather than focusing on the political culture as abstraction, whenever possible we have focused on the political actors as subjects— that is as agents of their own history. For this purpose we have broadened our research to include cultural practices not directly related to the political which have furthered our understanding of the actors' values and the semantic orientation of their language. We have focused extensively on their language as much as was possible without being an expert in the field. But, then, our main objective was not language per se, but language as a means to understand the actors' culture and world view, which would enable us to approach them as subjects.

With these aims in mind—we shall note in the following chapters, we have drawn extensively from the work of specialized scholars. J.G.A. Pocock introduced us to the relation between language and politics, as well as the paradigmatic function of language. From Raymond Williams we have learned the relation of language to experience, and furthermore a view of language as a form of activity or praxis, from which there follows the importance of understanding its subjective meaning. Perhaps audaciously, we have drawn from Foucault to claim
for Quito a form of knowledge and being in the world, which corresponded to an earlier period when the order of things (or the prose of the world, to use his own phraseology) was interpreted in terms of resemblance. This might seem a questionable use of Foucault's concept, for Quito in the eighteenth century was also a center for the baroque, which Foucault himself has described as an expression par excellence of the latter classical period. Nonetheless, Foucault's analysis—we shall see in the pertinent chapter, seemed peculiarly appropriate for the use of language and symbols-as-sign as we are claiming for Quito. Foucault has also claimed that the existence of one set of codes did not preclude the existence of others.

Finally, from Jurgen Habermas we have adopted a view of language as communicative action, through which members of a society transmit, renew and transform cultural knowledge. In this sense, language both reflects and constitutes reality, for in contrast to Foucault, Habermas recognizes the autonomy of the subject.

The first two chapters refer to the elites in Quito and Guayaquil. To better understand communicative action in Quito we have drawn from, among others, Julian Pitt-Rivers and his description of the importance of honor among certain societies. For the merchants in Guayaquil, we have been influenced by Pocock and his work in the ideology of republicanism. For the chapter of Portoviejo, the work of James C. Scott on moral economy and Joel
Migdal on the involvement of peasants in outside political process helped to provide a theoretical framework.

This dissertation was made possible through the scholarly guidance and support of Dr. David Bushnell. His personal encouragement, furthermore, helped us in countless occasions to overcome the inevitable stresses of an otherwise immensely enriching experience--that of pursuing graduate studies in a country and in a language that were not our own. We also wish to thank the Department of History of the University of Florida for a teaching assistanceship which allowed us to pursue graduate studies in the United States. A summer grant from the Department of History and the Spain-Florida Alliance helped us to do research at the Archivo de Indias in Seville. In Quito, we wish to thank the personnel of the Archivo Nacional de Historia for their warmth and friendly assistance during the period in which we were doing our research, as well as Oscar Ortega for his invaluable help.
CHAPTER II

INSURGENCY IN QUITO

On August 17, 1809, the nobility, ecclesiastic and secular cabildos, the tribunes, religious orders, army, guilds and plebs met at the Cathedral in Quito for high mass and a te deum, a ceremony that was to sanction political events that had recently unfolded. In a magnificent theater, as recalled by an overwhelmed spectator, the public witnessed as members of the newly formed Junta approached the altar in ceremonial attire to pledge allegiance before the Bishop of Quito, José Cuero y Caicedo, to Fernando VII, the Catholic Faith, their homeland, and the new government.¹

The Marquis of Selva Alegre, President of the Junta and recently granted the title of Serene Highness, led the way, in the garment of the Order of Carlos III, followed by their excellencies, the Marquises of Solanda, Villa Orellana, and Miraflores, don Juan José Guerero y Mateu, don Manuel Zambrano, don Melchor de Benavides, don Manuel de Larrea, and don Manuel Matheu y Aranda, all members of the Junta and of the patriciate, and dressed in crimson and black. In the proper order and attires, came the ministers of state, don Juan de Larrea, don Juan de Dios
Morales, and don Manuel Rodriguez de Quiroga, while members of the corporations and the army wore their old Spanish uniforms with slight accents in color to reflect the changing order. We need not rely for details of this lavish affair solely on descriptions by fervent Quiteños but on the sober account of an Englishman, William Bennet Stevenson, secretary of the deposed president of the Audiencia, Don Manuel de Urriéz, Count Ruiz de Castilla.²

Barely a week had elapsed between this ceremonial display and the dawn of August 10, when the octogenarian and unsuspecting president had awakened in his palace chamber to discover that he was being relieved from office by a Supreme Junta, which would govern in the name and in the absence of their beloved Fernando VII. On the eve of the coup, the dissaffected had successfully seduced a small yet critically important garrison stationed in Quito, thus effectively neutralizing any threat of resistance. They had appointed representatives for each of the barrios and corporate groups, and had gathered signatures of hundreds of supporters, successfully swearing them to secrecy. The coup was swift and bloodless, attested by the fact that only seven arrests were made, among them colonial bureaucrats; all of those arrested were Europeans.³

Throughout that entire day, the sound of church bells and artillery fire underscored the importance of the events, further highlighted by three consecutive nights of
music and fireworks. With few exceptions, such as Ministers of State Rodríguez de Quiroga and Morales, members of the new government belonged to the nobility, and as might be expected in a colonial city the size of Quito, they were closely related through blood or marriage.  

The conspirators had met since at least December, 1808. Stevenson claimed that when President Ruiz de Castilla arrived in August, 1808, the creoles had staged performances of La Araucana, Catón, Zoraida and Andrómaca, at the Colegio de San Fernando, with the hidden intention of spreading ideals of liberty, undetected by the failing count. Shortly after, Audiencia authorities received notice of the abdication of Carlos IV in favor of his son Fernando VII, and the invasion of the peninsula by Napoleon.

In November, an envoy of Viceroy Amar of New Granada, the Spanish Captain Rafael de Burman, arrived in Quito with news that the royal family was captive in France and that the tyrant had usurped the Spanish throne for his brother, José Bonaparte. During such troubled times, news evidently reached Quito with considerable delay. Quiteños learned, as well, that resistance in Spain had been organized through local juntas, coordinated by a junta central, which from Aranjuez claimed sovereignty as Supreme Junta of Spain and the Indies. Special envoys, such as Burman, were dispatched to the colonies, urging
authorities to insure recognition and allegiance from the creoles, an event that took place in Quito on December 9. Among those pledging allegiance to the Junta Suprema were the conspirators of a few weeks later.7

On December 25th, the dissaffected met at the obraje of the Marquis of Selva Alegre, in the nearby valley of Chillos, to discuss a hypothetical plan of government. As they later claimed, the project was to be executed solely in the event that the Junta Suprema should be overcome by Napoleon. Several options had been considered, among them a monarchy under the rule of Princess Carlota Joaquina, Fernando's sister, and the possibility of bringing Fernando VII and the Pope to safe haven in America.8

The conspiracy was discovered, and its participants charged with treason. Among those imprisoned were Juan de Salinas, a captain of the Spanish Army, Dr. Pablo Riofrío, a secular parish priest, Juan Pío Montúfar, Marquis of Selva Alegre, the previous secretary of the President, Juan de Dios Morales, Manuel Rodríguez de Quiroga, the vice-rector of the University, Nicolás de la Peña, a captain in the militia, and Antonio Negrete, secretary to Selva Alegre. Morales and Quiroga, two well versed and articulate lawyers, natives of Antióquia and Chuquisaca, defended their case artfully. It was not seditious, they argued, for Americans to consider separation from the monarchy in the event that Spain should be overcome by Napoleon. Had not Fernando VII, through a letter made
The credentials and social standing of the accused, and the duplicity of two members of the audiencia, Oidor Felipe Fuertes Amar, a nephew of Viceroy Amar, and the fiscal interino, Tomás de Arechaga, a native of Oruro and protegé of Ruiz de Castilla, determined the course of events. The court proceedings mysteriously disappeared, and a royal officer, José Joaquin de la Peña, who had earlier denounced the conspiracy, found himself imprisoned, notwithstanding his European origins. Soon after, Ruiz de Castilla, uncomfortable with the status and influence of the suspects, was more than willing to free those imprisoned and pursue the cause no further, with the exception of Salinas.

The insurgent government established in August included representatives for the different estates—the nobility, the clergy, and the barrios—three ministers of state, and a bicameral senate with an upper and lower chamber for civil and criminal offenses. The lower
chamber was presided over by a regent, while both chambers were subordinated to a governor. This unusual mélange of political institutions led Joaquín de Molina, the successor of Ruiz de Castilla, to ridicule the insurgents as "gríegos americanos," who had established a senate, alien to Iberian political tradition, when in effect they had an audiencia. His animosity, of course, was understandable, since during his tenure Molina had been prevented from entering Quito, forcing the audiencia to convene in Cuenca.

The junta held the title of Majesty, as did the junta central in Sevilla, since it would govern in the absence of Fernando VII. It established a regiment bearing the name of Fernando VII, and quite appropriately, an order of nobility, the Order of San Lorenzo, patron saint of August 10. Laws deemed most urgent for the common good soon followed: lowered prices for papel sellado, catering to all sectors, since it was needed for most public transactions; a reduction of the land tax and annulment of unpaid debts, to benefit the insurgents, since among them were indebted hacendados and obrajeros. They abolished the tobacco monopoly, which was subject, from then on, only to payment of the alcabalas or sales taxes, aiming, most likely, to ease the shortage of specie and to benefit merchants and shopkeepers.

The insurgents did not claim independence from Spain, except in the event that Fernando should fail to recover
the peninsula or establish himself in America. In their earliest pronouncements, they condemned the colonial government as improvident and inept in face of critical circumstances, and blamed metropolitan government for the disasters befalling the nation and the tragic fate of the young king.\footnote{14}{}

According to more than one reliable source, the president of the Audiencia had been unconcerned with matters of government and was interested, rather, in such activities as gardening, cooking and daily palace sessions of gambling.\footnote{15}{A lieutenant general in the Spanish army and a career bureaucrat, with forty years of experience in the colonies, Ruiz de Castilla had served in Huancavelica, Oruro, and later, as president of the Audiencia of Cuzco. He had also earned some recognition in the repression of Tupac Amaru's revolt. At this late age, he appeared disconnected from the realities of Quito's political life. Four days before the coup of August 10, he reassured the Supreme Junta in Spain that there was no reason to doubt the oath of loyalty pledged in Quito on December 8.\footnote{16}{}}

The same sources deplored the moral character of other audiencia authorities. Two oidores, Antonio Suárez Rodríguez and Baltasar Minaño, had been separated from office on grounds of factious and unruly behavior, leaving the audiencia with only three judges, including the regent.\footnote{17}{Of those remaining, José Merchante was described as weak and vain, Fuertes Amar, ignorant and
immature, and the regent, José González Bustillos, together with the asesor general, Francisco Manzanos, and Simón Sáenz de Vergara, his father-in-law, responsible for much of the turmoil that had disrupted Quito. Sáenz de Vergara, a successful merchant, was the collector of the tithe and a regidor at the cabildo. It should be noted that all of the above were Europeans, and that they were among those imprisoned after the coup of August 10. The fiscal interino, Arechaga, was portrayed as scandalous, libertine and arbitrary, and likened to Manuel Godoy, since both were said to derive their power and influence from the weakness of their benefactors. Arechaga had total sway over Ruiz de Castilla's judgement.

The Quito elites were clearly unhappy with such a state of affairs, the more so in that a former president, Baron Hector Luis de Carondelet, whose tenure lasted from 1799 until his death in 1806, had identified and ingratiated himself with the creole patriciate, to the extent of frequently voicing their interests and aspirations before Santa Fe and Madrid. Carondelet married his daughter, Felipa, into one of the most aristocratic local families, the Marqueses de Maenza, having first weathered strong opposition on their part. The haughtiness of the Quito elite was such that, notwithstanding his office and reputation, Carondelet was hard pressed to prove the distinction of his lineage in Madrid, where the Marquesa made representations. The
Marquesa complained that once it became known in Quito that her son was a grandee of Spain as Count of Puñonrostro, conspiracies and ambition to marry into her family had become rampant.21

In earlier decades, creoles held access to higher bureaucratic posts, but by 1809 they were regularly excluded from the more prestigious offices.22 A native Quiteño, Domingo Félix de Orellana, had earlier served as president of the Audiencia, and in 1765, four out of six ministers in the audiencia were creoles. In 1809, all ministers, except Fiscal Tomás de Arechaga, were Europeans, and Arechaga was, after all, a valido of a peninsular president.23

Creole control of the cabildo had also waned. Simón Sáenz de Vergara, the wealthy peninsular, imprisoned in 1809, who had a longstanding feud with the Montúfares, was regidor in 1797,24 and alcalde in 1798 and 1801. Two similar cases were those of José Vergara y Gaviria, a European merchant, also involved in disputes with the Montúfares, alcalde in 1801,25 and imprisoned, as well, in 1809, and Pedro Pérez Muñoz, a peninsular, royalist, and alcalde in 1807 and 1808.26 Earlier, the King had reproached the cabildo for disregarding the alternativa, but problems among creoles and peninsulars for the office of alcalde had continued over the years.27 Similar difficulties surfaced in the religious orders, where disputes among creoles and peninsulars over the
alternativa were so severe that they frequently transpired outside the convents, demanding the intervention of lay authorities and soldiers to restore order. By 1809, the patriciate retained access to higher offices only at the provincial level, for instance as corregidores.

It was not infrequent for peninsular bureaucrats to marry into the local elite, as had been the case of the first Marquis of Selva Alegre and later, President Carondelet's daughter. Through such marital unions, the upper class, obviously, gained indirect access to power. Indeed, if we are to believe Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, despite their mutual dislike creoles preferred Europeans as husbands for their daughters. Nevertheless the same authors claimed that passions due to factionalism ran no less high in private homes where Europeans and creoles were linked by marriage.

More than frequently, disputes among factions concealed intra-elite competition for political and economic hegemony, irrespective of regional origins. Juan and Ulloa claimed that factionalism had created "a purgatory, and ultimately a hell for those involved," particularly in cities and towns in the mountains which they attributed to the lack of commerce with outsiders. In 1804, Pedro Montúfar and Melchor Benavides both of whom would become members of the rebellious junta, had sided in one such dispute with Oidor Decano Antonio Suárez Rodríguez, a peninsular, against Pedro Pérez Muñoz and
Pedro Jacinto de Escobar, a creole and later insurgent. Escobar, a lawyer, objected to hearings by Oidor Suárez Rodríguez, who, he claimed, professed so much hatred for him that he failed to greet him in public or even raise his hat. In return, Pedro Montúfar, a sibling of the Marquis of Selva Alegre, faulted Escobar for his past association with Eugenio de Santa Cruz y Espejo, who, we shall later see, had been imprisoned in 1794 for crimes against the state, and has been labeled the ideological precursor of independence. The underlying problems in this dispute were economic, despite the fact that both sides invoked issues such as defamation, alleged marital infidelities, or public display of an improperly dressed slave. Escobar had defended José Checa, governor of Jaen, against Pedro Montúfar, who had rented the hacienda of Checa and owed him 5,000 pesos of unpaid rent. Added to this were allegations of unfairness and favoritism in granting tenure at the College of San Fernando. 32

Factions frequently included among their members peninsulars as well as creoles. The Marquis of Selva Alegre was, for instance, a close friend of Oidor Felipe Fuertes Amar, 33 a peninsular later to betray the patriots, and Fiscal Arechaga, a creole, was allied with the ruling European faction; yet both Fuentes Amar and Arechaga were appointed to the newly established senate in 1809. As cabildo members explained to cabildos in hostile Popayan and Pasto, the insurgents had demonstrated their loyalty
to Spain, by appointing to office men of good will, regardless of their national origins.  

In 1801, as members of the cabildo, the Marquis of Selva Alegre and the Spanish José Vergara had sided, for instance, against Manuel Rodríguez de Quiroga, later the enlightened ideologue of the insurrection. They accused him of voicing expressions conducive to seduction, for Quiroga had criticized their proceedings as "contrary to humanity," in the presence of others. These were serious charges at the time against Quiroga, for he was already under the surveillance of the Tribunal de la Inquisición, for having written a preface to a pamphlet entitled "Pensamiento Filosófico sobre la Muerte."  

Anti-Spanish feelings may have been more common during periods of crisis, particularly among the populace, as in 1765, during the revolt of the barrios, when Europeans had been forced to leave the city, and again in 1810, after the city had suffered the excesses of the pardo militia from Lima. Even during the early stages of the insurrection of 1809, when popular response was weak, peninsulars decried the excitement of the plebs, instigated, they claimed, by the nobility. They stated that the password "Quien vive?" was no longer answered with "España," but "El Rey." Yet among the elite, a more pragmatic attitude prevailed, one calling for alliances as through marriages, however uneasy.
In the eighteenth century, the social and regional origins of peninsular immigrants to the colonies had changed considerably. They arrived mostly from northern Spain, poor, hoping to "hacer la América" under the protection of an established relative or family acquaintance. These were chapetones, recent immigrants who were not as yet familiar with the uses and ways of creole society, whereby the expression, "hacer la chapetonada." Creoles appreciated them less because they were newly arrived, sometimes transient, and above all, unwilling to defer to the established hierarchies and ranks of colonial society. As Carlos Montúfar wrote his father from Cádiz in 1809, referring to accusations leveled against Selva Alegre for saying that fourteen chapetones should hang in the public square, America was the scene of great injustice, by "chapetones canallas," "men without honor, education or principles."

Moreover, these newly arrived Spanish, frequently from Vizcaya, fared well financially, and in Quito this meant increased competition for already scarce resources. Simón Sáenz de Vergara was precisely one of the new arrived chapetones. Originally from Vizcaya, he had arrived in Quito as a clerk to Felix Miranda, an established merchant. He married in Popayán into a family of "distinguida calidad," and in Quito, had ascended from officer in the militia and alcalde de Santa Hermandad, to regidor in 1797, alcalde de primer voto in 1798 and 1801,
and **alcalde ordinario**, in 1802. By 1809, Sáenz de Vergara had been named collector of the tithe. In contrast to heavily indebted **Quiteños**, Sáenz de Vergara was faring well, though not entirely through legitimate channels, as an **obrajero**, and owner of a **tintoreria**. As Carlos Montúfar saw it, all **chapetones** were like "Simon," who had come to America only to make money.

Although issues varied in this longstanding feud between the Montúfares and Sáenz de Vergara, in its origins there were also economic underpinnings. In 1793, Sáenz de Vergara had confiscated two **cabos de bayetas** belonging to Pedro Montúfar, as payment for an earlier debt, an action that had provoked the ire of Montúfar, then acting alcalde. Later, the Montúfares complained to Madrid that Sáens de Vergara held undue influence in the audiencia. They wrote that he frequently dined at the home of the regent, and was called by the familiar name of "padre" by his children. We shall come back to this dispute since it allows us to gain some insight into the values prevalent in a society such as Quito. For the moment, let us add only that the family of Sáenz de Vergara was deeply divided. He had fathered an illegitimate daughter, Manuela, later to become the lover and inseparable companion of Bolivar. Another daughter, Josefa, was married to Francisco Manzanos, a royalist, imprisoned by the insurgents and later, a member of the Supreme Council of the Indies. Josefa became a heroine
for the royalist cause in 1812, when according to the Spanish historian Mariano Torrente she encouraged the troops to final victory at the battle of Chimbo. A son, José Sáenz was an officer of the Spanish army, who defected in 1820, with the entire Numancia batallion in Perú, an event that proved to be decisive for the patriots' cause. Sáenz de Vergara was among those imprisoned in 1809, forced into exile in 1810, and later became an established merchant in Panama, where he arranged the marriage of the rebellious Manuela to a British merchant.

Chapetones eventually blended or learned the ways of creole society, but this by no means ended factionalism, since as we can gather from the above examples, it crossed the boundaries of national or regional groups. As Juan and Ulloa explained:

But if differences between nations are finally resolved, this is not the case with the whites in Perú. Despite better lines of communication, the welding of kinship bonds and other good reasons for being conciliatory, united, and friendly, discord increases all the time.47

Economic Stagnation

Far more serious than these local animosities was the increasing metropolitan control of government as a result of centralization, and of neomercantilist and utilitarian policies, all of which had translated into an erosion of the political, economic, and social standing of the Quito patriciate.48 Bourbon activism had introduced a more efficient extraction of revenues through fiscal
innovations, such as direct administration of revenue collection and monopolies. These reforms, initiated in the early 1780s by Visitador José García de León y Pizarro, worsened a pre-existing money shortage derived from the loss of textile markets to European competition. Collection of taxes was previously rented out, which allowed tax farmers to use these fiscal monies for commercial ventures and thus make a profit on them. Once the reforms were initiated, fiscal revenues and the profits earned by tax collectors were drained from the local economy and drawn directly into the royal coffers.49 Quito had no mines, and its textiles were the only exports capable of injecting specie back into its economy. After trade was either tolerated or encouraged around Cape Horn, Quito lost the Peruvian markets. New trade outlets in northern New Granada gained importance as a result, and servicing the mining region of Chocó brought some relief, but contraband of efectos de Castilla was easily introduced through Panama.50

The reforms were a success from the perspective of the metropolis, but for Quito, they had resulted in protest, specie scarcity, and decline.51 The same can be said of changes in the handling of situado funds delivered to Cartagena for the purpose of defense and which amounted anywhere from two hundred thousand to three hundred thousand pesos a year, which entailed further extraction of specie from the regional economy. The situadista,
usually a merchant from Quito, would engage in trade with these funds before delivering them in Cartagena, thus providing some outlet for local production. New regulations attempted to shorten the time allowed for the situado to reach Cartagena, and to prohibit all commercial transactions with these funds.52

The audiencia had also suffered territorial losses, since the Obispado and Comandancia General de Maynas had been placed under the jurisdiction of Lima in 1803. This was followed a year later by partial surrender, also to Lima, of jurisdiction over the Gobernación de Guayaquil.53

Audiencia presidents, cabildo members, and other prominent Quiteños had repeatedly brought to the attention of Madrid the problems plaguing the region, suggesting possible solutions.54 They requested, for example, protection for their textile industry, as well as more extreme measures, such as permission to coin their own specie, none of which were, of course, granted. An enlightened Quiteño, the Count of Casa Jijón had even recommended opening a canal through Panama to expedite traffic with the peninsula.55 In a more realistic frame, Quiteños sought royal approval to establish a seaport in the Gobierno de Esmeraldas, closer to their northern trade outlets, and to build a connecting road to Quito, an initiative welcomed by the crown and by merchants in Panama.56 Still, as far as the crown was concerned, the cost of building the road and port was to be locally
financed. Merchants in Panama donated 5,000 pesos, the situadista Miguel Ponce offered 0.5% of the situado funds, and bonds were issued in the amount of 1,000 pesos at 5% interest. Furthermore, to finance the construction of the road and lower the costs of the labor force employed, Audiencia authorities decided to buy the gold mine of Cachaví in Esmeraldas, together with its force of slaves, since they figured that employing its 60 slaves to build the road was more convenient than hiring wage labor. The port of Carondelet, so named since it was promoted during his tenure, opened for trade in 1804, favored by the Crown with lower tariffs as were other minor ports in Perú. But in 1807 the king protested the use of slaves from his royal mines in Esmeraldas to build the road from Quito to Carondelet. The Bourbons appeared far more interested in developing areas such as coastal Guayaquil, with its busy shipyard, port facilities and reserves of raw materials, than in a depressed, obraje economy like Quito.

But it was not only a matter of economic decline. Quito's isolation and the laxity of Habsburg rule had allowed its elite a considerable degree of freedom. Forced labor in the obras, for example, had continued into the eighteenth century, despite repeated orders from the king expressly forbidding obrajeros to continue with such practices. When the Bourbon monarchy sought to impose strict controls, discontent naturally resulted.
Government by Consent

Juan and Ulloa had warned against drastic reforms in government for Perú as early as 1734, since a sudden shift "from plenty of freedom to subjugation" would endanger the security of those kingdoms.\textsuperscript{61} These enlightened critics had deplored what they viewed as chronic disregard for the law, which they claimed was true of both creoles and peninsulars in Perú. Orders issued directly by the king might be granted somewhat more respect but were equally dismissed. As told by Juan and Ulloa, the king's vassals in Perú would give his royal order a "special distinction by kissing it, placing it above their heads, and adding later in the proper tone of voice, I obey it but do not execute it because I have some reservations about it."\textsuperscript{62} This traditional view of the law had surfaced in Quito during the revolt of the barrios in 1764.\textsuperscript{63}

In medieval societies, and of course not alone in Iberia, the law (although divinely inspired), belonged to the people. This by no means implied equality before the law, for it belonged to the people in accordance with their rank and order, including the king, who was not subject to the law in the same manner as his vassals, but could not enforce the law without the people's consent.\textsuperscript{64} This medieval view of the law was revived during the counter reformation in Spain by scholastic thinkers as Francisco de Vitoria, Domingo de Soto, Juan de Mariana, and in the seventeenth century, Francisco Suárez. It was
commonly expressed through the formula "obedezco pero no cumplo," perhaps, more often in the colonies as a result of distances from metropolitan centers.\textsuperscript{65} In the course of the eighteenth century, as government became centralized and acquired a more impersonal style, conditions had gradually changed, in Quito as elsewhere in the empire. Orders issued from Madrid on behalf of the \textit{supremo gobierno} or the \textit{consejo de estado}, rather than the familiar "I the King," allowed less leeway for immemorial, though honorable ways to disown the law.\textsuperscript{66} As \textit{Quiteños} complained, they had to travel halfway around the globe to represent their case before the ministries of state, and even then, with thin chances of success.\textsuperscript{67} Such changes from government by consultation to a more impersonal, centralized government, which had negative effects for Quito, were viewed as the result of tyranny and despotism, and under deteriorated economic conditions, contributed to the events of August 9.\textsuperscript{68} The political vaccuum in Spain provided the opportunity to claim home rule and attempt to nationalize decisions, which understandably would widen the rift between creoles and peninsulars.

In their earliest pronouncements, the insurgents in Quito accused the ruling European faction of alienating the American Spanish, as they chose to identify themselves, through distrust and deliberate efforts to mislead regarding developments in Spain, allegations echoed by patriots throughout the colonies, including
Bolivar. They also accused the regent, González Bustillos, of publicly voicing the need to rid Quito of its patriciate, accusations strongly denied by Bustillos. In turn, Bustillos claimed that creoles were more than willing to believe bad news from Spain and consistently diminished its victories.69 Most aggravating to the patriciate, it was claimed that local Europeans had locally boasted that if one Spaniard survived the Napoleonic invasion, he could still claim the right to govern America.70

Yet, even then, boundaries remained ill defined. The insurgents counted among their own peninsulars such as Magistral Rodríguez Soto, while royalists included prominent members of creole society.71 At the cabildo, on September 5, Regidor Manuel Zambrano, a creole and member of the rebellious junta, was met with scorn by fellow cabildo members, when he called for a cabildo abierto to submit to "el pueblo soberano" the decision whether to send troops to Popayán and Guayaquil. "Who was el pueblo soberano?" demanded those opposing the insurrection, led by Rafael Maldonado y León, Pedro Calisto, José Fernández Salvador and others. The chosen few who had ignored the cabildo and installed a Junta in name of the "sovereign people?" And why sovereignty, when Fernando VII and the royal dynasty were alive and the Junta Central was governing in Spain? The insurrection was as scandalous to some creoles as it was to Spanish authorities, which led
them to ignite a counterrevolution in neighboring corregimientos. Hostilities on the part of these corregimientos, and the gobiernos of Guayaquil and Popayán, as well as a successful trade embargo on such bare essentials as salt, induced the rebels to surrender in October, 1809, provided certain conditions be met. Among those conditions was banishment from Quito of the ruling European faction, the emphasis to be placed on "ruling" rather than "European," since creoles and peninsulars had embraced the "justa causa" on either side.

Sovereignty Reclaimed

In contrast to patriots in Murcia and Sevilla who claimed sovereignty in 1808 angered by the king for the cession of the throne, or riots in Aranjuez against Godoy, or those against authorities accused of bonapartism, as in Mexico and Buenos Aires, Quito rejected the right of the Junta Central to represent the colonies in the absence of the king. The nation disrupted, once the Junta had fled to Sevilla, Quito claimed the same right as Sevilla to establish a sovereign junta. It followed that local magistrates were no longer empowered and sovereignty had returned to the people.

The pronouncements of the Quito insurgents were embedded in traditional thinking, clearly on the question of sovereignty, but on other aspects of government as well. Rodriguez de Quiroga, the most enlightened among them, imprisoned in 1810, derived his defense from ancient
Castillian law. Quiroga justified what he described as their "noble enthusiasm," with maxims drawn from Alfonso X and the Siete Partidas:

Apoderarse debe el pueblo por fuerza dela tierra, quando non lo pudiese facer por maestria e por arte.\textsuperscript{75}

The learned king, argued Quiroga, had sanctioned insurrection when homeland was endangered. Had he not cautioned, "quando el ome bueno fuerte e bien armado guarda su casa, en paz está todo lo que tiene?" And furthermore, "sin la pena que Dios le daría, non sería pequeña la que de los enemigos les vendría quando les faciesen perder la tierra a daño e deshonra de sí?"

One might be tempted to dismiss such claims to legitimacy as desperate attempts by already imprisoned insurgents, fearful for their lives (which as we shall later see, proved to be well founded). Yet not once did Quiroga express regret or beg for pardon. On the contrary, his defense was delivered in a dignified and forceful manner, even in defiance. Quiroga claimed that despite his imprisonment and isolation, he would not sacrifice his honor or in a cowardly way forsake his rights. He admitted that the insurgents had intended to secede from Spain in the event that the Junta Central should be overcome by Napoléon. Once more, he argued that their actions were guided by loyalty to the king and their zeal to conserve Fernando's rights. He substantiated his claims through such evidence as their oath delivered on
August 17 and the cabildo abierto of August 16, convened under the effigy of the beloved and unhappy king. On both occasions, argued Quiroga, the presence of the community had publicly sanctioned their actions. Quiroga's allegations were consistent with statements by other members of the junta.

Their traditional political ideology was also evidenced in the style and manner in which they conducted the affairs of government. The junta, a self-appointed minority, represented the comunity, which was conceived as an organic totality of corporate groups. The nobility, the clergy, and the barrios or common people were each represented by a member of the junta. Such a form of government was in line with medieval notions of government and society, the polis expressing its corporate mind through its magistrates and natural leaders.76 A tribune represented the castes, but no representation was allowed for an overwhelming majority of Indians, except through the protector de naturales.77 Indians remained in the category of infames, and as such, were outside the political community.

This compact between government and the community implied a relation far removed from the more modern conception of Rousseau's *Contrat Social*.78 For the latter, the social contract referred to a compact among individuals, who thereby delegated authority to government. In turn, the political community safeguarded
their individual rights as citizens. In Quito, a pre-existing political community, which had regained sovereignty due to the events in Spain, established a compact with the newly formed junta, which was thus, compelled to safeguard their well being as a community. In accordance with traditional political thinking, the compact was established not among individuals but between ruler and ruled. Hence the importance, even for an enlightened thinker such as Quiroga, of the cabildo abierto of August 16 and the public oath of August 17, since the presence of the community, in its proper order and precedence, had supposedly legitimized their actions. In 1809, as well as in past insurrections, Quito aimed to react as a community. In their pronouncements they spoke on behalf of "el pueblo," a word which in Spanish, as one author has noted, has a double meaning. "El pueblo" refers both to the people and to the locality, which reinforces the sense of community. It was "el pueblo soberano" which had supposedly claimed sovereignty and installed the junta.

**Hegemony of the Patriciate**

Such were their ideological premises, yet to what extent did they reflect reality? Quito was, of course, no medieval society, and in contrast to earlier, more homogeneous communities in history, consensus was not easily obtained. When confronted by the insurgents for failing to represent their views at the cabildo abierto of
August 16, dissident cabildo members replied that the presence of fifty well armed guards had been reason enough to opt for silence.80 Legitimacy in this highly stratified, hierarchical and factionalized society required more than the mere presence of the community.

Yet recourse to force was highly unusual. True, in 1809 the insurgents had established committees in defense of the revolution, but such controlling measures were the responsibility of the people.81 According to President Molina, the Quito patriciate had mobilized the plebs in more than eighty-nine insurrections.82 Molina represented to the Council of Regency that "activities on the part of the upper and lower pueblo had been intimately related in Quito, and that the latter had always acquiesced to subversive demands from the upper strata."83

Collective mobilization was, of course, not alien to Quito. In the sixteenth century, its encomenderos had sided with the revolt of Gonzalo Pizarro and some of the most violent and decisive battles had taken place in its vicinity. Somewhat later, in 1593, the imposition of a sales tax, the alcabala, had given rise to violent urban protest, earning the Quiteños a reputation for rebelliousness.84 More recently, in 1765, the restructuring of the state monopoly of aguardiente, and reforms of the administration of the sales tax had once more inflamed urban rage. With the complicity of the patriciate, the populace had staged a violent
insurrection, forcing Viceroy Mexia de la Cerda to such extreme measures as to convene troops from neighboring provinces to restore order. As the Viceroy later complained, rebellions for spurious reasons by disobedient vassals like those in Quito were more to be feared than threats from outside enemies. 85

The lower sectors held grievances of their own, since they were as hurt by the estanco de aguardiente and other reforms as the elites. Yet rumors were spread that taxes would be levied on small plots of land, children in the womb, the river water used by washerwomen, and worse still, monopolies would be established on tobacco, potatoes and maize, which spurred the populace into violence. 86 Only when their own safety was endangered, as was already the case of the Europeans, did the creole patriciate agree to pacify the populace, but not before authorities had agreed to delay the implementation of the reforms.

The Quito patriciate were apparently not as fearful of the plebs as elsewhere in the colonies. Their relation was not unlike the symbiotic relations among upper and lower orders described for urban centers in pre-modern Europe. 87 The plebs and the patriciate in Quito had close ties. Stevenson described that families of the elites occupied the upper levels of their homes, and that the lower levels were rented to artisans and small shopkeepers. In this enclosed neighborhood, members of the
elite families had personal ties with their own shopkeeper, craftsmen and other providers of services, usually mestizos. Kinship ties, co-parenthood, and other types of bonds, usually strengthened such vertical linkages.

The use of rumors to incite the populace into revolt was most useful in a society such as Quito, with the added advantage that they could be spread anonymously, which, perhaps, led Viceroy Abascal--hostile to creoles to begin with--to describe Quiteños as malicious people. Prior to the insurrection, rumors spread that a prophecy by a Peruvian saint foretelling the destruction of Quito was nothing but a conspiracy of the Europeans to decapitate the patriciate. According to a contemporary, fearful Quiteños repeated "se acabará Quito el 10," and as this eyewitness saw it, they were most grateful that the insurrection of the morning of August 10 had forestalled the fulfillment of the prophecy. Later, in 1811, rumors were spread that President Molina had offered his troops three days of looting, thereby ensuring that the populace would prevent Molina from ever entering the city of his mandate.

Use of rumors for political purposes was also reminiscent of the behavior of the urban crowds in pre-modern Europe, where factions of the patriciate were said to align with plebeians for specific purposes, as for example, in the dispute between a country and court
faction in late seventeenth-century England. It is worthwhile remembering that in Quito, the nobility and the plebs shared common grievances against "mal gobierno," and common interests, as well, regarding the impoverished Indian population in the hinterland. It is therefore not unreasonable to argue that the patriciate sought alliances with the plebs when it suited their purpose. And, in a society as hierarchical as Quito, where public judgement was critical for the social order or for one's reputation, it is understandable that rumors were invested with such power, and not only in politics.

As Julian Pitt-Rivers described for societies based on deference and hierarchy, as Spain's undoubtedly was, honor depended as much on one's own evaluation as on the evaluation of others. Hearsay had great importance, since the possession of honor required the acknowledgement of others. Furthermore, it was not considered dishonorable to mislead, for although the concept of honor entailed love of truth, it was considered honorable to deceive an opponent. By the same token, only that which was publicly known could dishonor, and therefore demand retribution. In colonial documents, we frequently come upon the word "scandalous," by which was meant publicly known. That which was scandalous could no longer be tolerated and demanded action, whether on the part of government or private individuals. The law recognized these attitudes towards public judgement and hearsay. The use of rumors
with malicious intent, if proven, was punishable under ancient Castillian law, and the opposite was also true, hearsay was sometimes granted legal standing as when we read in notarized documents, "diga si oyó decir," or for the purpose of one's status, "diga si fue tenido por noble." In both cases the law granted legal value to public hearsay, or publicly held views. In many ways, Quito had an oral culture, with great emphasis placed on the spoken word, even in the context of a written document.

The dispute between the Montúfares and Sáenz de Vergara, after hostilities had flared over the earlier debt, was sparked by rumors, and had to with honor and prestige, notions deeply engrained in Spanish culture. Sáenz de Vergara had spread word that the elder siblings of the Marquis of Selva Alegre were of illegitimate birth, hinting that the first Marquis had fathered them while his first wife was still alive in Arequipa, which made the elder Montúfares adulterine children and greatly damaged the honor of the deceased Marquesa. Sáenz de Vergara had retrieved this information by eavesdropping in parish records, where he discovered that the marriage of the Marqueses was registered shortly before the birth of their second son, Pedro.

According to the accounts of witnesses brought forth by the Montúfares, the first Marquis of Selva Alegre had wed his second wife without the necessary waiver from
Madrid, and due to "his love for the presidency" had decided to keep the marriage secret. A priest had counseled him that it was better to face retribution from Madrid than to endanger the honor of the Marquesa and his descendants, so the marriage was registered shortly before the baptismal records of his second son. The Montúfares claimed that rumors spread by Sáenz had tarnished their lineage and damaged the honor of their mother, a member of a powerful family in Quito. Sáenz also spread word that the first Marquis had bought the presidency of the Audiencia, which was true.

The Marquis of Selva Alegre raised his case before the higher court in Madrid, claiming, as we have already noted, that Sáenz de Vergara was intimate with His Majesty's ministers, and had great influence on them. As retribution he demanded that Sáenz be compelled to post bond for 6,000 pesos and chant the palinode in public, before the alcalde and "omes buenos" in accordance with Castillian law, for nothing less would restore the honor of the Marquesa. For his part, the accused refused to pay the fee or submit himself to the disgrace of public recantation, which he argued was only for plebeians. Sáenz also claimed "fueros" as a native of Vizcaya, to which prosecutor Tomas García de la Sierra replied that being from Vizcaya was not enough to claim nobility, just as being born in the Indies did not make one noble. One had to prove descent from the early "pobladores" in
Vizcaya or conquistadors in the Indies. Nobility, explained Tomás García de la Sierra, derived from the actions of ancestors, to which legitimacy did not add or detract anything. Furthermore, the law demanded that nobility be proven at the place of birth and not the place of residence.

The Audiencia was unwilling to acquiesce to Selva Alegre, arguing that there was no malicious intent on the part of Sáenz, which was, of course, untrue. The fiscal of the Audiencia ruled that private satisfactions by Sáenz should suffice to restore the honor of the Marquesa, satisfactions that Sáenz was more than willing to provide, since by that time, he had gone into hiding. After much litigation, the crown attempted to end the dispute by downplaying the offense, assuring the Marquis that Madrid had no doubts as to the legitimacy of the Montúfares or the distinction of their lineage. A letter to the president of the Audiencia reminded him of the services performed to the crown by the first Marquis of Selva Alegre and his descendants, none of which assuaged the anger of the aggrieved family. Finally, in 1795, the Council of State ruled that the audiencia was not guilty of denying justice to the marquis, while admonishing Selva Alegre to refrain from raising such issues to the higher court in Madrid. It instructed parish priests to prevent outsiders from gaining access to parish records, and ordered Sáenz de Vergara to return to Popayán and resume
marital life. It also ruled that Pedro Montúfar should cancel his earlier debt to Sáenz de Vergara. As García de la Sierra noted, through such actions the audiencia and His Majesty had alienated the most powerful family in Quito, his relatives, and all of the nobility. In 1797, Selva Alegre complained, once more, that Sáenz de Vergara, a regidor of the cabildo, was still unpunished. We can appreciate that such offenses, aggravated to a great degree by changing conditions in Spain and the colonies, were not conducive to feelings of loyalty on the part of the Quito nobility, which viewed itself as a corporate group. An offense to one member, and specially such a powerful member, was offense to all.

Rumors were also deployed among the rural population, as we might infer from one documented case. Carlos IV had granted the Indians in the provinces of Riobamba, Latacunga, Guaranda, Ambato and Alausí a tribute exemption for one year, after an earthquake had devastated the region in 1797. It was discovered that José del Corral, a jurist and audiencia prosecutor, had distributed seductive letters to caciques and gobernadores, alleging that a rival faction in the audiencia was plotting to disregard the royal order. Corral had even suggested a derrama to collect funds to defend the exemption. He was disbarred and immediate action was taken to diffuse a potentially dangerous situation, for in recent decades tensions in the Presidency of Quito had surfaced mostly among its mestizo
and Indian rural population, who had grown increasingly suspicious of ongoing fiscal reforms.  

Between 1765 and 1803, at least seven rebellions had flared in the central and northern highlands, endangering the lives and properties of local townsmen and hacendados. Yet it is significant that despite sometimes violent destruction of the property of the hacendados, most of these revolts were suppressed by local townsmen and hacendados, with little or no help from Audiencia authorities. Colonial officials and soldiers more often arrived only to sanction actions that had already ended.  

It would seem that the hegemony of the Quito elites was such that they relied less on colonial government for the purpose of social control. The aristocracy felt no qualms about mobilizing the populace, even for such private endeavors as courtship. The Marquesa de Maensa represented in 1805, that her daughter, Mariana, had been abducted by her suitor, Francisco de Ascáñubi, from the safety of relatives where she had placed her, owing to the scandalous complicity of the plebs.  

Recourse to symbolic domination and cultural hegemony was more frequently the case in Quito. Legitimacy, for once, required a state apparatus endowed with much pomp and formality. Affairs of government were lavishly enacted both for its plebeian public and the aristocracy, as had been the case with the "magnificent theater" at the Cathedral on August 17. As Augustín Salazar y Lozano
explained in 1824, such magnificence was necessary "to tone down the excesses" of the people. Salazar, an offspring of one of the insurgents, wrote in response to derisive remarks by José Manuel Restrepo, a historian from New Granada. Restrepo claimed that the behavior of the insurrects had dismayed creoles in New Granada and diminished the credibility of the revolution. The "junta teatral" appeared ridiculous to "rational and objective" observers, who felt that devoting so much time to trivialities as the color of their uniforms or proper manner of address was incompatible with "well organized heads for revolution". What Restrepo and other critics failed to understand was that such expressive symbolism catered to both the aristocracy and the plebs for in Quito, those who governed spoke the same language as the governed.

Culture as Text

In a traditional society like Quito, where legitimacy derived from thirteenth-century Castillian law or events of their immemorial past, such as the actions of ancestors of three hundred years earlier, culture was ritualized and expressive. The social structure, for instance, was reenacted in certain public events, which explains the quarrels and bickering over seemingly minor slurs, such as improper seating, or incorrect salutation, concerns that interfered even with their religious practices. Seating in churches was a frequent source of disputes, as was the
offer of peace during mass, when deference was not properly observed. Such idiosyncracies of Quiteños were well described by John L. Phelan for the seventeenth century. The public event, in effect, became the social structure, which explains the importance of precedence, for on such occasions, it was a simile for rank in society.

In the context of such highly textualized cultures, where certain events could be read as texts "which said something about something else,"^103 form was as important as content.^104 Political events, which by their very nature aimed to reconcile differences, were particularly invested with symbolic meaning. Thus, the cabildo abierto held on August 16, was held under the "beloved effigy" of Fernando VII, as Quiroga pointed out from prison. On such occasions the effigy, a symbol of the king, became the king, much as the image of a saint in a procession became the saint, which explains why Quiroga would include this detail in his defense from prison. Quiroga, an enlightened lawyer, may have thought differently, but was aware of the symbol's bearing on others. The same was true of the estandarte real when led in procession through colonial cities.^105 At such moments, the estandarte real became the king, and failure to honor it in the proper manner was considered a crime of lèse majesté.^106

This relation between form and content, explains why, in the aftermath of the coup, Quiteños devoted time to
such details as the bestowal of honorary titles and their proper attire, since these signs were useful for the purpose of forging consensus. Selva Alegre became "His Serene Highness," the Junta bore the title of "Majesty," the ministers of state, "their excellencies," and all other members of government "their lordship." The insurgents went about such details in the same manner as actors would for a performance, for this was indeed the "theatre" of politics, highly invested with symbolic and poetic meaning. Insurgent Quiteños had first to insure internal legitimacy before worrying about external threats.

Such a relation between form and content surfaced as well in interactions among private individuals, where the "persona" or public image took precedence over the private person. Once more, we might examine another dispute between Pedro Montúfar and José Vergara y Gaviria, a chapetón, a merchant, and the director of postal services in 1801. Montúfar accused Vergara of purposely delaying delivery of funds to Popayán, accusations denied by Vergara, and promptly turning into a heated confrontation in the street. Offenses "en la calle pública" were considered most serious, for reasons pertaining to the notion of honor, as already discussed, particularly when blows were delivered to the face, as had been the case with Pedro Montúfar in the earlier dispute with Simón Sáenz de Vergara. In 1801, Montúfar branded
Vergara as an inferior, an opinion echoed by casual observers who counseled Montúfar against exposing himself to dishonor with someone so beneath his rank as Vergara. Yet both parties claimed offenses in name of their public, rather than their private self. Vergara, for one thing, was outraged because Montúfar, by calling him a crook, had offended an alcalde and a minister of the king, and in turn Montúfar claimed grievances as a nobleman and captain of the militia.109

Claims similar to these had been raised in the earlier dispute between Pedro Montúfar and Simón Sáenz de Vergara, and were frequent in "pleitos" in the colonial period. What was at stake was the status and honor of their public image, for the importance of the persona or their public self derived from its relation to the hierarchical social structure. In a society such as Quito which viewed itself as an organic whole of corporate groups, the social individual was non existent. Persons responded as members of particular corporate groups. One's social identity derived from the corporate group to which one belonged: the nobility, the lineage, the family, the militia, the town, and an offense to one was an offense to all. This is why, earlier, Tomás García de la Sierra had claimed that by alienating one member of the nobility, the Crown had alienated all. We can thus understand how centralizing attempts by Madrid, which impinged on
"fueros" and immemorial rights, would alienate the Quito nobility, as well as other corporate groups.

Michel Foucault and Jurij Lotman, though in somewhat different terms, have stated that perception and knowledge in societies such as the one we are arguing for Quito, were founded on resemblance. Knowledge by similitude implied that the sign, linguistic or material, acquired its significance in its relation to that which it represented, since the order of things, or for that matter the universe, was perceived as a series of relations made possible through resemblance, contiguity and identity. It was through these principles—resemblance, contiguity, identity—that the sign became that which it represented, much as the portrait of the king became the king, the ritual event became the social structure, and private persons identified with their "persona". Textualized cultures, argued Lotman, placed more emphasis on expression than content.

On the contrary, knowledge through representation, the episteme of classical and enlightened thought, focused more on content than on form. The symbol, whether linguistic or material, ceased to be considered a sign. Once freed from the constraints of resemblance, the symbol had the potential to become multivalent and embody different meanings. It could relate to other symbols and reflect upon itself endlessly, a condition that was at the basis of abstraction and which calls for infinitude in
knowledge. From there on, its significance could only be understood in knowledge rather than its identity or resemblance to that which it represented. Representation, according to Foucault, is the episteme of modern Western culture, an epistemologic rupture that he dated in the seventeenth century. As is well known, Foucault used as an example the painting Las Meninas of Diego Velásquez and his use of "trompe l'oeil" effects through reflection in mirrors, assimilated to the endless reflection of the symbol. Foucault also explained this rupture through Cervante's novel Don Quijote, the first modern novel, as in its second part, the character, don Quixote, reflected upon his own story, much as the symbol could reflect upon itself. The Russian linguist Jurij Lotman linked these changes in semiotics, in language as well as in culture, to the Enlightenment, to centralization and absolutism.

The mode of perception based on resemblance perhaps explains why in a society such as Quito, the spoken word had so much importance, since words were used as signs for the "real thing," or that which they represented, not unlike the power of the word among primitve societies. The Montúfares felt in effect defamed and shamed when Sáenz spread such malicious rumors about their lineage, and retribution was demanded through the spoken word as through public recantation. This would also explain, along with the notion of honor, why hearsay attained legal
standing, and why the spoken word had such preeminence even if in writing.

Fear of Decay

But this also raises another issue. If the perception of reality was founded on resemblance rather than, say, insight into internal conditions, and if form or appearances were, indeed, as important as content, we can see why in 1808 and 1809 Quiteños interpreted their own conditions in light of the events in Spain. Signs of decay in Spain were taken to be the influence of the valido Godoy and the surrender of much of Spain to Napoleon, which were viewed as the result of improvidence and ineptitude. Just like in Spain, the insurgents interpreted their own problems as the result of improvidence and mismanagement. Tomás de Arechaga was called a valido, when not outwardly called Godoy, and the improvidence of audiencia government was taken to be the result of the local "Morlás and Castaños," for "were not those ruling in Quito from the same climate as the Morlás and Castaños of Spain?" If conditions in Quito were taken to resemble those in Spain, it followed that the same fate of the peninsula awaited the colonies, unless corrective measures were adopted, as they frequently claimed in their pronouncement. In their address to cabildos in Pasto and Popayán, they stated that:
Querer que nada hagamos cuando se incendia la casa vecina es querer que la América se entregue a Bonaparte, como fue entregada la España por su impolítica confianza y su culpable descuido y manejo.114

Local government was, perhaps, no more corrupt in 1809 than in earlier years, yet the paradigm to express their grievances, was this threat of improvidence, the same as they perceived to be the case in Spain. Whether they entirely believed this or whether it was the legitimizing language, is difficult to know. Ideology, however, is partly grounded on reality, since otherwise it would convince no one. What we do know is that this eschatological language was their language of choice to express their political grievances in 1809.

Creoles elsewhere in the colonies used the metaphor of the family to describe their grievances. Patriots in New Granada, for instance, claimed that Spain had behaved with America as a "step-mother" rather than a mother, while Bolivar spoke of Spain as the mother who had abandoned her children. In Guayaquil in 1820, independence was viewed as a natural coming of age.115

The use of the family as metaphor for political purposes was common to eighteenth-century political thinking, as was the case with the North American colonies, since "emancipation" was one of the main concerns of the Enlightenment. On the contrary, quiteños expressed their political grievances through this fear of decay, which they perceived in Spain. The use of eschatological
language for political purposes has been attributed to pre-modern social movements, which in turn are described as pre-political in nature, not because they lack political objectives, but because these objectives have still to be clearly defined.116

Reacting to their expressed fear, in any event, Quiteños set about to establish their junta and take matters into their hands, not unlike provinces in Spain. Peninsular authorities, of course, saw things differently. As President Molina and the Bishop of Trujillo claimed, creoles were not threatened by imminent invasion as were patriots in Spain, and had used this fear simply as pretext to establish their own subversive juntas.117

Views on monarchy were also traditional. The king was above suspicion, and the ills that had befallen the nation were the result of mismanagement at both metropolitan and local levels. The immemorial slogan "viva el rey, abajo el mal gobierno" had once more regained full meaning. "Mal gobierno" had been the frequent battle cry of insurrections, in Quito, in 1736, again in 1765, as elsewhere in New Granada and more recently in Chuquisaca in May 1809,118 the difference perhaps, that at this late stage, "Mal gobierno" had acquired a distinct European as opposed to American identity. The insurgents were monarchists and self proclaimed arbitrators between bad government and the king, characteristics that have been
attributed by historian Pierre Vilar to Spanish political culture.119

Their stance regarding the monarchy was, furthermore, congruent with their aristocratic ethos, as evidenced in their taste for titles of nobility in spite of economic hardships.120 Monarchy embodied the social order on which their hierarchies and values rested. (Juan and Ulloa had also described the exaggerated vanity and nobility of creoles, particularly in "cities in the mountain, where there was less opportunity for trade with outsiders," irrespective of the fact that "one can discover so many errors in their genealogies").121

The insurgents disowned Audiencia government and the Junta Central in order to properly conserve the rights of the king. In a manifesto to the people of America, they proclaimed that the most sacred laws of Christ and Fernando VII, persecuted and expelled from Spain, had found sanctuary in Quito, by way of the transformation of August 10.122 Likened to a heavenly city, Quito had become the depositary of the true and legitimate order, where laws had recovered their ancient dominance and justice had replaced despotism. King and religion were two powerful mobilizing forces, not as "the mask" of Fernando VII attributed to other creole leaders in other parts of America, but as compelling symbols inherent to their own ideology.
Quiteños opposed despotism from the vantage point of their glorified past. Such pronouncements had, no doubt, economic underpinnings, but also expressed a longing for past liberties and autonomy more akin to Habsburg Spain. They held steadfastly to an earlier view of empire as a conglomerate of kingdoms, whereby Quito, as well as other kingdoms in America, had the right to regain sovereignty and constitute their own juntas, a proposition found scandalous by Spanish authorities, and clearly incongruent with the realities of Bourbon Spain. The insurrection in Quito and the response of colonial authorities reflected a confrontation between two views of empire which could not be reconciled.

Addressing the cabildos in hostile Pasto and Popayán, cabildo members in Quito lamented that three hundred years of servitude had fostered among creoles the idea that only Europeans were fit to govern and that resistance to subaltern despotism was a crime against the king, who, they argued, was not to be confused with Europeans. Creoles were vassals only to the king and not the Spanish nation. Elsewhere they claimed that Quito, discovered by a courageous nation, held no grievances against the king or his beneficial laws, but against Europeans who scorned creoles, forgetting that Americans were descendants of those Spanish who had earlier conquered the land. They expressed resentment at being considered
less Spanish than the peninsulares, consistent with the fact that they identified themselves as American Spanish.

The insurgents viewed themselves as loyalists and grossly miscalculated the reaction to their "noble enthusiasm." Nowhere was this more apparent that in letters dispatched to neighboring corregimientos and gobernaciones. Such letters exuded confidence and optimism that Guayaquil, Cuenca, Pasto and Popayán would accept the hegemony of Quito, and, secondly, welcome their endeavors as loyal vassals of the king. True, these letters were addressed to cabildos, traditional entrepots of creole power, yet they also wrote the Spanish governor of Guayaquil, who shortly after participated in the military campaign against Quito. They tried to lure him with the offer to appoint him governor and captain general of Guayaquil, at the rank of mariscal de campo, and to give his son, the rank of lieutenant in the army. They named the Bishop of Cuenca, a fanatical royalist, an honorary member of the junta, and even asked Viceroy Amar for financial aid to dispatch envoys to Sevilla to explain their actions to the Junta Central, all this while expeditions were being readied to bring Quito back into submission. Clearly, their reality testing was either faulted or outdated.

In certain ways, the insurrection in Quito closely paralleled what Eric Hobsbawm has characterized as "legitimistic" social movements in pre-modern societies,
frequently undertaken on behalf of church and king. Such rebellions aimed to restore or correct deviations from the proper manner of conducting affairs of society and government, irrespective of the king's views, a fact not entirely appreciated by those concerned. Traditional order, says Hobsbawm, demanded obedience rather than "the noble enthusiasm," described by Quiroga. Moreover the insurgents in Quito were, of course, far removed from the popular rebels of Hobsbawm's concern, socially, historically and geographically. Yet, allowing for the proper distances and differences, the simile is there. Quiteños opposed the instituted government to better conserve the rights of church and king, threatened by the tyrant. Royal response to their enthusiasm may well have rendered these loyal vassals of Fernando VII into determined separatists.

Religion was as much of a mobilizing force as was the king. There was the fear of heterodox French influences, and afrancesados or Bonapartists, a fear shared by royalists and rebels alike. However, the rebellion in Quito was by no means a religious war as has been recently claimed. Religious and eschatological language was the language of choice to express their political grievances, another characteristic that Pierre Vilar has described as inherent to Spanish tradition. We might furthermore listen to J.G.A. Pocock, who warns that for the study of Christian politics--and this was no doubt a Christian
society—apocalyptic, eschatologic and millennial concepts should not be accepted at face value, since they are powerful elements, as likely to be employed by members of the power structure as by rebels against it, "to explain events and justify claims too dramatic and unprecedented to explain otherwise." 132

The insurrection in Quito in 1809 was closer to earlier rebellions in eighteenth-century Spanish America, in as much as they were guided by traditional views of government and rejected despotism or centralizing attempts by Spain. 133 Perhaps, the commonality among these widely different groups, including Hobsbawn's rebels, derived from the experience of transition that their societies were going through as they became increasingly drawn into an economic order which was not the result of their own agency or evolution, and which threatened their way of life. 134 Rather than looking to the future, rebellious quiteños looked to the past for ways to resist such changes. They relied on sixteenth- and seventeenth-century populist ideas and attempted to restore the autonomy they had previously enjoyed.

Enlightened Quiteños

In spite of its isolation and infrequent intercourse with outsiders, as Juan and Ulloa would say, Quito had been "a key country in colonial life" for the introduction of enlightened learning. 135
Quito had prestigious centers of learning, which had converted to the "Ciencia Nueva" as early as 1728, when the Teatro Critico of Benito Feijóo was first made known. New courses had been added to its colleges and universities, and libraries had been enriched with volumes of contemporary authors. Visitors such as Francisco José de Caldas, the botanist from New Granada, and the geographers Humboldt and Bonpland were highly impressed with Quito's libraries, the Jesuits' in particular, but also with private libraries, such as the collection of the Marquis of Selva Alegre. Quito claimed, as well, interested scholars in both the empirical sciences and the new philosophies: the geographer, Pedro Vicente Maldonado, a member of the French Academy of Science, Juan Magnim, who in 1747 wrote a treatise on Descartes, the Jesuits Pedro José Milanesio, Juan Bautista Aguirre, Juan de Hospital, and the historian, Juan de Velasco, all of whom had taught at the University of San Gregorio. The most outstanding of their students, Francisco Xavier de Santa Cruz y Espejo, who in turn became the mentor of the liberal representative to Cortes, José Mexia Lequerica.

Espejo was born in 1747, and despite his inferior status as the offspring of a Quechua and a mulata, was able to obtain a solid education in philosophy, and later, a degree in medicine at the college of San Fernando, at the age of twenty. From the University of Santo Tomás he earned his degree in law.
Due to his lowly origins, authorities were at first reluctant to allow him to practice medicine, yet later he achieved scientific prestige when he published his "Reflexiones acerca de un método para preservar a los pueblos de la viruela", a treatise on the prevention of smallpox. Espejo linked the spread of epidemic to the lack of hygiene and to "particles transmitted by air" a truly revolutionary concept at the time. His work was sent to Madrid, where it was appended to a book published by a member of the Royal Academy of Medicine.

In 1783, Audiencia authorities had felt sufficiently threatened by his satirical writings to confine him to the inhospitable region of Maynas, where he was appointed attending physician for the expedition that set out to clarify boundaries with Portugal. In defiance, he chose to remain in hiding, wherefore President García de León y Pizarro had him imprisoned and later exiled to Bogotá. In New Granada, in 1788, he befriended, along with the Marquis of Selva Alegre, members of an enlightened and increasingly disaffected generation, which included Francisco Caldas, Camilo Torres, Antonio Nariño, and Antonio Zea. Upon his return to Quito, Espejo founded, in 1791, the first Sociedad Patriótica and the first journal, the short lived "Primicias de la Cultura de Quito," published in 1792. A talented essayist and incisive critic, he was again imprisoned in 1794, accused of posting subversive pasquinades on the streets of Quito.
Although later found innocent, he died shortly after as a result of imprisonment.139

Espejo was undoubtedly the mentor of many of those involved in the August revolution of 1809, in particular the Marquises of Selva Alegre and Villa Orellana, as well as Juan de Dios Morales and Antonio Ante. The society for the advancement of knowledge gathered its members from the nobility, the clergy, and letrados. It indicated changing intellectual concerns as well as novel forms of sociability. Membership in these learned societies was no longer conditioned by one's lineage or social origin, but by shared interests and concerns, which in a society like Quito was certainly innovative. Yet Espejo's aims were reformist rather than revolutionary, and his social and political critique, though grounded in enlightened thinking, clearly constrained. He was critical, for instance, of the abuses of the hacendados against the Indians, yet justified the religious fiestas sponsored by the clergy. The issue is not so much his defense of the clergy, which the liberal historian Roberto Andrade attributed to dire financial needs, but his argument that without such fiestas and the lure that ritual cargos held for Indians, an otherwise idle people would fall back into their unproductive ways, an argument than ran deep into three hundred years of exploitation.140 Still, Espejo was too "revolutionary" for enlightened peninsulars, such as Visitador Garcia de León y Pizarro, who along with his
successor, Villalengua, persecuted and imprisoned him. Espejo was critical of local education and the prevalent scholastic formalism, and critical of colonial economic policies, the lack of infrastructure and the status of scientific inquiry in the colonies.

There is no documentary evidence to prove that Espejo had indeed considered independence, though he was later called an ideological precursor. The historian, Bishop Federico González Suárez was the first to claim that after his return from Bogotá, Espejo had drafted a revolutionary plan of government. Gonzalez Suárez may have relied on allegations made by President Joaquín de Molina in 1814. In a lengthy exposition to Cortes, which aimed to discredit Mexia Lequerica for his defense of the insurrection in Quito, Molina argued that Espejo had spread his revolutionary ideas as far as La Paz, and that after his death, Morales and Antonio Ante had been commissioned to enact the plan. Such allegations by Molina appeared to be the result of bitterness, since he also claimed that Carlos Montúfar was responsible for the establishment of juntas in Caracas, Cartagena and other colonies, and that the similarities between the constitution of Cadiz, already in disgrace by 1815, and the one drafted in Quito, in 1812, suggested that they were written by one and the same author, who could be no other than Mexia. Only an embittered Molina could find similarities between the liberal constitution of Cadiz and
the constitution of the Estado de Quito in 1812, which basically reflected the same views of government described earlier.141

José Mexía Lequerica was born in Quito in 1776, and due to his illegitimate birth, shared with Espejo the stigma of lowly origins. In 1788, he entered the College of San Fernando, where he studied under Espejo. Later he pursued degrees in philosophy, theology, and law. He was, nonetheless, denied doctoral degrees in the fields of theology and law, owing not only to his illegitimacy, but also to his seditious spirit and his prior connection with Espejo, having later married Espejo's sister.

Mexía had an inquisitive mind and dedicated himself to the study of science and nature. In 1806 he traveled to Lima, where he was honored at the Universidad de San Marcos, and in 1809, to Spain, under the patronage of the Count of Puñonrostro. In Spain, he and the count fought against Napoleon's army, and after defeat they settled in Sevilla. Later, Puñonrostro and Mexía were named representatives for New Granada to the Cortes.142

In Cádiz, Mexía excelled as an orator of radical convictions, siding on all issues with the liberals.143 He favored freedom of the press, limited state intervention in the economy, and religious liberties, an idea scandalous to other liberals at Cortes, who viewed Catholicism as the only possible religion of the state.144 Although his political views referred to all of Spain, he
fervently defended the actions of rebellious Americans, which he explained as a reaction to an unjust system of "unequal rights among equal men." 145

Yet, it is not clear to what extent the ideas espoused by men like Espejo and Mexia had spread into society. The enlightenment entailed a change in world view, 146 which radically altered man's view of himself, his fellow men and the universe, and Quito, as we have seen, remained very much the captive of its own conventions.

Spanish American enlightenment, was, of course, filtered by the enlightenment in Spain, which, to begin with, has been described as reformist and utilitarian as opposed to revolutionary. 147 Furthermore, what has been said of Lima, another enlightened center of learning, also applies to Quito. Richard Graham claims that Lima's conservatism, despite its enlightened academic centers, was ingrained proof that ideas alone do not change society. 148

A Separatist Movement

The first stage of the Quito insurrection ended but three months later, as the result of internal dissention, misgivings on the part of some revolutionaries, 149 and external threats. The rebels surrendered to Ruiz de Castilla provided certain conditions be met, among which, as we have mentioned were banishment of ruling Europeans, and most important, a pledge that there would be no retaliations.
Encouraged by the arrival of troops from Lima and Panama, and perhaps, the influence of Arechaga, Ruiz de Castilla failed to keep his promise, and in December, 1809, prosecuted more than four hundred former rebels. Properties were confiscated and more than eighty of the former revolutionaries were made prisoners, while others went into hiding, including the Marquises of Selva Alegre and Villa Orellana. Among those imprisoned were the ideologues Quiroga and Morales, Captain Juan de Salinas, the parish priest Riofrío, and other members of government. In July of the following year, the proceedings were dispatched to Bogotá, since Fiscal Arechaga demanded the death penalty and Ruiz de Castilla wanted a decision by a higher court. Meanwhile, in Quito, rumors spread that the Spanish planned to execute the prisoners. It remains unclear whether such rumors were spread by the patriots or by the authorities, since the latter had threatened to execute the prisoners if attempts were made to free them.

On August 2nd, the populace approached the Cuartel Real of Lima, apparently with the intention of freeing the prisoners. The shooting of one of the officers enraged the soldiers, who in revenge indiscriminately massacred the prisoners, in connivance with their guards. When news of the massacre spread, the enraged populace rioted and calm was not restored until the bishop and the nobility led a procession through the streets of Quito.
populace was pacified, the army of occupation, mostly pardos from Lima, engaged in three days of pillage and looting, murdering women, children, or whomever they found in the streets. Following these events, authorities adopted a conciliatory tone, and it was agreed that Arechaga, Bustillos and other Europeans should leave Quito, as well as Arredondo, the comandant who had led the troops from Lima.

The tragedy of the insurgents in Quito was deeply felt by patriots throughout the colonies: in Caracas, Santiago, New Granada, and may have radicalized their positions. As one historian has claimed, the credibility that escaped them in their lifetime, they achieved through their death. Later, in 1813, Bolívar was to justify his war to death against the Spanish through events such as the holocaust in the "unfortunate Quito."

Shortly after, in September, 1810, Carlos Montúfar, the second son of the Marquis de Selva Alegre, arrived in Quito as the appointed comisionado regio of the Council of the Regency. His instructions were to conciliate differences, coordinate efforts for the defense of the colonies and encourage the establishment of local juntas, which were to name representatives to Cortes. Comisionados were also sent to other colonies, e.g. Antonio de Villavicencio for New Granada, to convince Americans that a new and more liberal government in Spain would grant them equal rights and representation in
affairs of government. Montúfar did precisely that on his way to Quito, meeting with patriots in Caracas, Cartagena, and Popayán, yet arriving too late to prevent the massacre of August 2. Nonetheless, a provincial rather than supreme junta was established in Quito, on September, 1810, with Ruíz de Castilla as president, Selva Alegre as vice-president, and as representatives for corporate groups, former members of the earlier junta who had survived the massacre of August 2nd. Thus started the second stage of the Quito insurrection. Carlos Montúfar had left for Spain in 1805, in the entourage of Humboldt, who had been much impressed with this young and refined Quiteño. Not withstanding his dislike for chapetones, Montúfar believed that a new and more liberal government in Spain would improve conditions in the colonies, a conviction that surfaced in his private as well as his public letters. Villavicencio and Montúfar voiced their opposition to absolutism in much the same way as Spanish liberals did in Spain. Yet in the colonies such attitudes were labeled as treason, particularly by absolutists such as Viceroy Abascal, or by "subaltern despots," such as Governor Tacón, in Pasto, Aymerich in Cuenca, and Cucalón in Guayaquil.

It also seems clear that the opposition of Quiteños to absolutism did not reflect a desire for total independence. Both constitutions drafted in 1812 recognized Fernando VII as the legitimate monarch,
although one of them, the one not finally adopted,, conditioned Fernando's rule on the unlikely possibility that he reside in Quito.

Montúfar's insistence that he was responsible only to the council of the regency and could therefore bypass the authority of both viceroys, soon became problematic and clearly unacceptable to authorities. To complicate things further the Regency had replaced Ruiz de Castilla as president with Joaquín de Molina, without Montúfar's knowledge. By so doing, the Regency had in effect canceled Montúfar's mandate, since Molina made it known from Guayaquil that he planned to restore conditions to those prevailing before the insurrection of 1809, in other words, restore the Audiencia and dissolve the junta,

Armed skirmishes with neighboring provinces soon gave way to military encounters with troops sent earlier by Abascal and Amar, which had been retained as a precaution in Guayaquil and Guaranda. The war, costly in human lives and resources, started in 1811 and ended in November, 1812, when General Montes, the successor of Molina, triumphantly entered Quito.

Yet internal dissention had already undermined the Estado de Quito, formally established in December, 1811. Factions vied for power, in particular the more radical Sanchistas, who were the followers of the Marquis of Villa Orellana, and the Montufaristas, led by Carlos Montúfar.
By this time, the populace and other sectors, such as the clergy, had been mobilized, mainly as a reaction to the excesses of the troops and to threats from the neighboring province of Guayaquil. Bishop José Cuero y Caicedo, having been appointed president, urged the clergy to defend the "justa causa," as did the Bishop Quintián Ponte from Cuenca for the opposite side. Regiments were placed under the command of priests and friars, who exchanged their robes for military outfits. Among these were Francisco de Saa, a Franciscan, who led the "Batallón de cuchilleros," and the provisor of the cathedral, Dr. Manuel Caicedo, a nephew of Bishop Cuero y Caicedo, and the brother of the revolutionary president of Popayán, Joaquín Caicedo. Even then, the involvement of the clergy was not for religious reasons, as has been argued. The clergy was deeply embedded in society and had reasons of their own to resent innovations made by metropolitan government, although, much research is needed on this subject. In 1786, for instance, the crown had limited the number of fiestas that parish priests could celebrate in Indian parishes. Later, it prohibited priests from receiving inheritance or donations from their parishioners, and the eclesiastical court from ruling on these issues. Franciscans had particular grievances against the crown, since they had been separated from their previously held parishes.
Quito was once more threatened by outside forces as much as by internal dissention, and the populace no longer seemed to accept passively the hegemony of the elites. According to eyewitness accounts, in 1811, confusion reigned in Quito, and it was unclear who ruled whom, whether the populace or any one of the factions fighting against each other. Taking matters further into their hands the populace masacred Oidor Felipe Fuertes Amar, and José Vergara y Gaviria, as they tried to escape to the Napo region, as well as the failing, and probably well meaning President, Count Ruiz de Castilla. As stated earlier, the alliance between the plebs and the patricians remained uneasy.158

After the defeat of 1812, General Montes implemented a policy of reconciliation. Yet many were executed, including Francisco García Calderón, a radical separatist, who led the military expedition against Cuenca. García Calderón was a royal officer, and a native of Havana, who had married into a prestigious family in Guayaquil, that of Francisco Ventura de Garaicoa, first administrator of the Royal Monopoly of Tobacco. His son, Abdón Calderón, was the young lieutenant who, at eighteen, died as a hero in 1822, at the battle of Pichincha. A daughter later married Vicente Rocafuerte, a liberal ideologue from Guayaquil. Other patriots went into hiding, or managed to escape, as did Carlos Montúfar, who joined the patriots in New Granada, and was later captured and executed in 1816.
Many were later exiled to Ceuta, the Philippines, Cuba, among whom were several priests, while members of the nobility petitioned to be allowed to return to Spain, "the land of our ancestors." Quito finally became independent in 1822, owing to the intervention of Bolívar's army, under the command of Mariscal Antonio José de Sucre.159

Notes


2. William Bennet Stevenson, "A historical and descriptive Narrative of Twenty years residence in South America," translated by Inigo Salvador Crespo, La Revolución de Quito 1809-1822, ed. Jorge Salvador Lara (Quito, 1982), 67-93. Stevenson had arrived in Chile in 1804, in a British vessel engaging in contraband. Due to his nationality and his queries into social and economic matters (later the basis for his book), he aroused the suspicion of colonial authorities, who deported him to Callao. In Lima he met Count Ruiz de Castilla shortly before he was appointed President of Quito, and became his secretary. During the government of the insurgent junta, Stevenson was named Governor of Esmeraldas, where he was taken prisoner in 1811. He managed to escape in Guayaquil and fled to Peru, where in 1819 he joined the expedition of Lord Cochrane, and later became his secretary. Memorias de William Bennet Stevenson sobre la campaña de San Martín y Cochrane
en el Perú Estudio introductorio de Diego Barros Arana (Madrid, s/f).

3. Those arrested were: Regent José Gonzalez Bustillos and Oidores Felipe Fuentes Amar and José Merchante, Asesor General Xavier Manzanos and his father-in-law, Simón Sáenz de Vergara, collector of the tithe, Comandant Joaquín Villaespesa, the postal administrator, José Vergara y Gabiria, Bernardo Resua, and José María Cucalon, the son of the governor of Guayaquil.

4. Juan Pío Montúfar y Larrea was a cousin of Melchor Benavides and Manuel de Larrea, and the brother-in-law of Juan de Larrea, Joaquín Sánchez de Orellana was related to Manuel Mateu y Aranda, who in turn was the brother in law of Xavier de Ascázuibi. Manuel Mateu was also related to Juan José Guerrero y Mateu.


7. "Junta extraordinaria compuesta de los tribunales principales convocada por el Conde Ruiz de Castilla, contando con la presencia de don Rafael Vicente Bourman, Diciembre 9, 1808." Quito, Archivo Nacional de Historia (hereafter cited as ANH), Presidencia, 457.


10. "Expediente que promueve José de la Peña por persecuciones de las que ha sido objeto, Diciembre 10, 1809," ANH, Rebeliones, caja 6.

12. For the financial difficulties of the elites in Quito, see Ramos Pérez, Entre el Plata y Bogotá, 140-147.

13. Ibid, 174-175.


15. Royalists and rebels shared the same opinion of the inefficiency and corruption of Audiencia authorities. See letters from Bishop Cuero y Caicedo and Viceroy Amar to His Majesty, in José Gabriel Navarro, La revolución de Quito de 10 de Agosto de 1809 (Quito, 1962) 43-44, as well as "Carta del Regidor de Quito don Pedro Calisto Muñoz a la Junta Central Gubernativa de la Monarquía Española," and "Oficio del Conde Ruiz de Castilla al Virrey de Santa Fe," Ponce Rivadeneira, Quito, 1809-1812, 183-186.


17. In 1804, Carondelet obtained the separation of one of the Ministers of the Audiencia, Antonio Suárez Rodríguez, for factious behavior and accused a second one, Baltazar Minaño, of carrying a weapon to the Audiencia. ANH, Presidencia, 418.


19. The decay of colonial government was attributed by the Bishop of Trujillo in Peru, to the influence of French ideas and the afrancesados. "Memorial del Obispo de Trujillo, Octubre 26, 1810," AGI, Estado 74. Yet, in 1734, Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa similarly deplored the corruption and decay of royal government in the Indies. Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, Discourse and Political Reflections on the Kingdom of Peru, Tr. John J. TePaske and Besse A. Clement (Norman, 1978).

21. The Marquesa accused the bishop of conspiring with Carondelet to marry his thirty-year-old daughter, Felipa, with her twenty-year-old son. Another daughter, Mariana, had also been abducted by her later husband, Joseph Ascáubi, with the connivance of the plebs. The King ruled in favor of Carondelet and the couple were wedded. "Representación del Barón de Carondelet por querella con la madre del Marqués de Maenza, Noviembre 25, 1803," AGI, Quito, 384.


25. Both Sáenz de Vergara and José de Vergara quarreled with the Montufares, and in 1801, both were members of the cabildo. ANH, Presidencia 391.

26. Washburn, "The Bourbon Reforms," 205. Pedro Pérez Muñoz had arrived in Quito as secretary to Bishop Miguel Alvarez Cortés, and by 1809 owned gold mines in Esmeraldas. He was married to Teresa Borja y Calixto, whose father, Regidor Pedro Calixto y Muñoz, and brother, were executed by the insurgents in 1811. In 1810 Pérez Muñoz complained to the crown about the persecutions he had suffered at their hands and asked financial aid to settle his family in a country more loyal to his beloved Spain. He recommended that several of those governing in America should be changed, since they frequently claimed to owe more to Carlos IV than Fernando VII. "Comunicación de don Pedro Pérez Muñoz, Julio 6, 1810," AGI, Quito 263.


28. In 1747, Franciscans of European and creole origin engaged in serious quarrels over elections for the office of provincial, mobilizing the populace and eventually endangering the safety of the president. The best accounts of the turmoils and disputes within colonial convents in Quito are found in Federico González Suárez, *Historia General de la República del
Ecuador, 6 volumes, (Quito,1970) In 1791, in a dispute regarding the alternativa among Franciscans, Fray Antonio Marín represented to the king that Europeans were lured to Quito with bright promises, yet were sent as missionaries to Maynas, irrespective of their higher education. He accused the president and bishop of intervening in elections in support of one of the factions, allegations denied by the fiscal and President Muñoz de Guzman. "Representación de Fray Antonio Marín, Franciscano, por injurias de Fray Joaquín Andraca," ANH, Presidencia, 298 and "Expediente contra el Presidente de la Audiencia seguido por Fray Antonio Marín," ANH, Presidencia, 327.


31. Ibid

32. "Expediente de recuso puesto por don Pedro Jacinto de Escobar, abogado de esta Real Audiencia, en contra del Sr. Oidor Decano don Antonio Suárez Rodríguez para que no conosca de ninguna de sus causas, Agosto 14, 1804," ANH, Gobierno, caja 53.

33. José Gabriel Navarro, La revolucíon de Quito de 10 de Agosto de 1809.

34. "Demostracion Legal y Politica que hace el Cabildo de Quito a los Cabildos de Popayán y Pasto sobre los procedimientos de la Corte de Quito," Ponce, Quito, 1809-1812, 165-169. In colonial society as well as in Spain, "national" frequently referred to persons of foreign as well as local origins.

35. "Comunicación del cabildo al Presidente contra el abogado Rodríguez de Quiroga, Julio 18, 1801" ANH, Presidencia, 393.


38. "Representación de José de la Peña," and "Informe Elevado a la Junta Central Gubernativa de España por el Regente de la Audiencia de Quito D. José Fuentes González Bustillos," Ponce, Quito 1809-1812, 188-196.
40. Ibid
43. According to Mariano Torrente, the insurgents confiscated from Saenz de Vergara somewhere between 150,000 to 200,000 in goods and cash, in *La revolución de Quito, 1809-1822*, ed. Jorge Salvador Lara, 130.
44. Other reliable sources as Ramón Nuñez del Arco, cited in Washburn, "The Bourbon Reforms," 224, as well as Ruiz de Castilla, in Ponce, *Quito, 1809-1812*, 185, held similar views regarding Sáenz de Vergara. In 1807 he was involved in litigation with Pedro José Mexia, Dean of the Cathedral, who had accused him of irregularities. ANH, Presidencia, 453. On another occasion, a merchant by the name of Nicolás Vivanco had also complained that Sáenz had taken advantage of him both in the quantities of clothes that he had purchased as well as their price. ANH, Presidencia, 454.
49. Ibid, 144.
50. "Informe del Presidente Carondelet sobre introducción de efectos extranjeros por Panamá," ANH, Presidencia, 393.

52. In 1795 the viceroy in Bogotá attempted to restrict the use of such funds for purposes other than their conversion into doblones. The main problem was the delay in entering the situado in Cartagena, which sometimes took well over a year. The situadista in 1794 was Nicolas de la Peña, an insurgent in 1809, who by 1795, owed the royal treasury the situado of the previous year, in the amount of 200,000 pesos. ANH, Presidencia 391. During these years, Juan Pío Montúfar and his brother Joaquín were also granted the privilege to deliver the situado between 1891 and 1801. Under pressure from the viceroy in 1802, President Carondelet attempted unsuccessfully to auction the right of delivering the situado to Cartagena, under more stringent conditions. The situadista was to announce by April that he was readying the situado, and would leave by June. In 30 days he was to deliver the situado in Popayán, either to a local bidder or to a royal officer. Furthermore, no other transactions than conversion to doblones were allowed. "Expediente tramitado en Quito para que se remate en subasta pública el oficio de conductor del situado," ANH, Presidencia, 399. The following year Miguel Ponce de León was granted the right to deliver situado funds to New Granada, since no one participated in the auction, a privilege extended to him for the next 10 years in 1804. See "Reales Ordenes," ANH, Presidencia, 408; In 1808, Ponce complained that delivering these funds was profitable in times of peace, since the situadista could exchange goods from Quito for efectos de Castilla, but in times of war, which was more frequently the case, delivery of the situado was no longer profitable. ANH, Presidencia 427 and 429. In 1808, Ruiz de Castilla promised Viceroy Amar 300,000 pesos over the situado of 200,000 pesos, owing to the difficulties facing the nation, to be delivered in Cartagena by two situadistas, Miguel Ponce and Joaquín Gómez Tinajero. ANH, Presidencia, 457.

53. Ramos Pérez, Entre el Plata y Bogotá, 162-165. These territorial losses were relevant enough to be included in a document written by Quito's representatives to the Cortes, the peninsular Francisco Rodriguez de Soto and Mariano Valdivieso, both former insurgents, who in 1814 were unable to take office due to the monarch's decision to dissolve the Cortes. "Nota que acompañan a S.M. los infrasquitos diputados a Cortes nombrados por las provincias de Quito en 26 de Agosto de 1814, sin estar en ejercicio, y con el solo objeto de cubrir su
54. Descriptions of the problems afflicting Quito were written by the Marqués de Maenza in 1753, Miguel de Gijón, Conde de Casa Jijón, in 1776, José García de León y Pizarro, in 1779, President Mon y Velarde in 1790, and finally Barón de Carondelet in 1800. See Ramos Pérez, Entre el Plata y Bogotá, 112; 116; 122; 150, and Washburn, "The Bourbon Reforms," 155-160. All of those concerned agreed that Quito's problems stemmed from the liberalization of trade through Cape Horn, the loss of markets, and a more efficient fiscal extraction. President Carondelet blamed the shortage of specie on the situado which by the late eighteenth century drained the regional economy of anywhere from 250,000 to 300,000 silver pesos each year, whereas only 80,000 entered as a result of external commerce. ibid, 159-160. Carondelet further recommended closer links with Panama, and seeking new export commodities capable of drawing specie back into Quito. "Informe del Presidente Carondelet," ANH, Presidencia 378; also Ramos Pérez, Entre el Plata y Bogotá, 153-154. Yet as Washburn argues, Quito's economy was hurt through contraband, before the reforms. See also Robson Tyrer, Historia demográfica y económica de la Audiencia de Quito, (Quito, 1988) 237-238.

55. The Count of Casa Jijón excelled for his entrepreneurial spirit both in the colonies and Spain, where he became a member of the Sociedad Patriótica in Madrid and performed important services to the crown. He returned to Quito by the late eighteenth century to establish a textile industry, for which purpose he hired technicians in France and Cuba and imported up-to-date machinery. His brother was corregidor of Otavalo and he was related to the Marqués de Sánchez de Orellana. Ramos Pérez, Entre el Plata y Bogotá, 120-123.

56. The royal order was dated December 28, 1801, "Comunicación del Presidente Carondelet, Junio 16, 1802," ANH, Presidencia, 398. A seaport for Quito, other than Guayaquil, had been a long cherished ambition for Quiteños. In the seventeenth century they had attempted to open a road to Bahía de Caráquez, in La Canoa, and early in the eighteenth century to the coasts of Esmeraldas, projects opposed by the merchants from Guayaquil. See John L. Phelan, The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century (Madison, 1967) 3-22; and Documentos para la historia de la Audiencia de Quito, ed. José Rumazo González (Madrid, 1948). Also Ramos Pérez, Entre el Plata y
Bogotá, 153-159.

57. Ibid


60. For the extreme conditions prevalent in the obrajes and the cunning ways by which Quiteños avoided royal efforts to regulate abuses, see Juan and Ulloa, Discourse and Political Reflection, 34-140. They wrote that "all the plagues that make life unbearable have been combined" in the obrajes, describing them as "galleys on a perpetual voyage, constantly struggling in a calm sea but never successful in reaching a distant port, even though men in the galley labor unceasingly in the hope of getting some respite." Indians, men, women, and children were frequently locked inside and subjected to rigorous punishment if they failed to perform their job. Tyrer states that the mita had been abolished for obrajes in the course of the eighteenth century, yet it was replaced by debt peonage, another form of forced labor. Historia demográfica y económica de la Audiencia de Quito, 251-254.


62. Ibid, 243-244.


Although the latter adopts a somewhat different view. Political scientists and European historians have adopted a different approach. They regard this contractual view of the law as common to medieval societies, which would explain its prevalence in European societies where the patrimonial state was non-existent, as well as in Spain before the Habsburg era. See for example, Anthony Mcfarlane, "Civil Disorders and Popular Protests in Late Colonial New Granada," Hispanic American Historical Review 64:1 (1984) 17-54 and "Urban Insurrection in Bourbon Quito." Also George Sabine, A History of Political Theory, 199-210; Eric Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels (New York, 1959) 118-121; The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, (Cambridge, 1988) 163-165, and 364-442. The latter view places more emphasis on social interaction rather than the state or other institutions. By doing so, the rationale of those involved, or their underlying logic, becomes more clear.

66. As Timothy Anna and others have argued this view of the law permitted the state to function, since it enabled Spain to govern a gigantic empire of widely differing ethnic and cultural groups without the use of force. Spain and the Loss of America, 5-7.


68. For Carlos Montúfar, the injustice in Quito was the result of tyranny and despotism. Historian Joseph Pérez, who has argued that the independence movement in Spanish America was guided by traditional political thinking, is willing to concede that changes in allegations from "tyranny" to "despotism" were indicative of evolution in the political thinking of creoles, since tyranny was a medieval notion, as opposed to despotism, a concern of the Enlightenment, Los Movimientos precursores de la emancipación en Hispanoamérica (Madrid, 1977).

69. "Informe Elevado a la Junta Central Gubernativa de la Monarquía Española por el Regente de la Audiencia de Quito D. José Fuentes González Bustillos," Ponce, Quito, 1809-1812, 188-196.

70. "Manifiesto de la Suprema Junta de Quito a América," Ibid.

71. According to Núñez del Arco, there were approximately 40 prominent peninsulars in Quito, among whom he counted seven insurgents. "Estado General de los
Empleados de Quito con notas exactas de la conducta que han observado durante la revolución de Quito," Quito, Archivo del Banco Central (from hereafter, ABC) Fondo Jijón y Caamaño, f/248-250.

72. Ramos Pérez, Entre el Plata y Bogotá, 105-106.

73. "Manifiesto al pueblo de Quito," Ponce, Quito, 1809-1812, 136-139.


75. "Defensa de Rodríguez de Quiroga."

76. George Sabine, A History of Political Theory, 206.

77. Whereas in Venezuela and elsewhere in the colonies references were made to Indian antiquity for the purpose of legitimacy, Anthony Pagden, Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination, 29-130, it is interesting to note that no such claims were made by the patriots in Quito.

78. See See O.Carlos Stoetser, Scholastic Roots, and Anthony Pagden, Spanish Imperialism.

79. Mcfarlane, "Urban Insurrection in Bourbon Quito."

80. "Representación del cabildo de Quito, Noviembre 17, 1817," AGI, Quito 390.

81. "Representación de José de la Peña."

82. "Comunicación de Joaquín de Molina, Julio 23, 1813."

83. Ibid; also "Oficio del Presidente Molina al Consejo de Regencia," Ponce, Quito, 1809-1812, 236-246.

84. Suzanne Austin Browne, "The Effects of Epidemic Disease in Colonial Ecuador," (Ph.D. Diss. Duke University, 1984), 64.

85. Relaciones de los Virreyes del Nuevo Reino de Granada, compiladas por don José Antonio Garcia y García (New York, 1869), 102.
86. Mcfarlane, "The Rebellion of the Barrios: Urban Insurrection in Bourbon Quito."


90. Roberto Andrade, Historia del Ecuador, parte primera, 196.

91. "Representación de don Joaquín de Molina."

92. Medick, "Plebeian culture in the transition to Capitalism."


95. Juan and Ulloa claimed that this was a common practice in Perú, searching each other's genealogies for defects. Discourse and Political Reflections.

96. "Testimonio del Expediente seguido por el señor Marqués de Selva Alegre, caballero de la Distinguida órden Española de Carlos III, contra don Simón Sáenz de Vergara sobre injurias, 1793-1797." AGI, Quito 362.

97. "Expediente de recusa puesto por don Pedro Jacinto de Escobar, abogado de esta Real Audiencia al Sr. Oydor Decano don Antonio Suárez Rodríguez para que no conosca de ninguna de sus causas, Agosto 14, 1804." It is interesting to note that later the caciques whom Coral had targeted for rebellion used the affair to their own advantage. Through a notarized document they made it known that despite seditious allegations by Coral they had refused to engage in insurrection.
98. For a thorough account of these rebellions see Segundo Moreno Yánez, *Sublevaciones Indígenas en la Audiencia de Quito* (Quito, 1978).


100. Agustín Salazar y Lozano, *Recuerdos de los sucesos principales de la revolución de Quito desde el año de 1809 hasta el de 1814* (Quito, 1834), 25.


102. Restrepo, "Historia de la Revolución de la República de Colombia," 312.


105. Juan and Ulloa described these processions held during Easter week in Quito, and there is ample testimony of these devotions or "fiestas" to certain images, which, we might add, continue to this day in rural villages. *Discourse and Political Reflection*. The following is a contemporary description of such processions, with a regionalist slant, since its author, the Jesuit Juan Bautista Aguirre, was a native of Guayaquil. *Letras de la Audiencia de Quito*, (Caracas, 1984) ed. Hernán Rodriguez Castelo, 244-248.

Hay tal o cual procesión, mas con rito tan impío que te juro, hermano mío, que es cosa de inquisición. Van cien Cristos en montón corriendo como unas balas treinta quiteños sin galas, mas de ochenta Dolorosas, San Juan, Judas y otras cosas, casi todas ellas malas
106. It is significant that the Cortes abolished by decree, on January 7, 1812, the immemorial practice of displaying, on certain occasions, the estandarte real, a tradition that Fernando VII was quick to reinstate, once he returned to power. Fernando claimed that this practice had been abolished by the Cortes on the assumption that it was a testimony to the conquest of those territories, and contrary to the perfect equality, mutual affection and common interests, proclaimed by the Cortes. The King argued that this was an expression of the love that Americans held for His Royal Person. "Reales Ordenes, 1814," ANH, Presidencia, 522.

107. " Expediente de Don Pedro Montúfar, Capitán de Milicias, que se querella contra don José Vergara y Gaviria, Alcalde ordinario de segundo voto y administrador de Correos, Setiembre 11, 1801." ANH, Presidencia, 387. Vergara y Gaviria was a member of the "ruling European faction" in 1809, imprisoned after the coup and later, in 1811, murdered with Felipe Fuertes Amar by the populace, when they tried to escape to the eastern lowlands.

108. For a discussion of the symbolism of the head see Pitt-Rivers, "Honor and Social Status," 36-37.


110. It is tempting to draw a parallel between the arguments of Foucault and Lotman, and the anthropologist Claude Levi Strauss, in his La pensée sauvage, in which he argues, precisely, that non-Western modes of perception were based on concreteness and resemblance, rather than abstraction.


112. "Demostración Legal y Política que hace el cabildo de Quito a los cabildos de Popayán y Pasto de los Procedimientos de la Junta de Quito," Ponce, Quito, 1809-1812, 166.

113. See "Manifiesto de la Junta Suprema de Quito al Público," and "Manifiesto del pueblo de Quito," "Manifiesto de la Junta Suprema de Quito a América," and "Demostración Legal y Política que hace el Cabildo de Quito a los Cabildos de Popayán y Pasto sobre los Procedimientos de la Junta de Quito," in Ponce, Quito, 1809-18122, 136-139, 142-144, 157-158, and 165-169.
114. Ibid, 166.

115. For New Granada, see Hans-Joachim Konig, "Metáforas y Símbolos de Legitimidad e Identidad Nacional en Nueva Granada (1810-1830)," paper presented at the VII Congreso AHILA, May 15-18, 1985. For Guayaquil, see the following chapter.


118. "Abajo el mal gobierno y viva el rey" was often voiced in riots in Quito as well as other colonies. In Quito and New Granada, see for example, González Suárez, Historia General de la República del Ecuador, Vol VIII, 83; Mcfarlane, "The Rebellions of the Barrios: Urban Insurrection in Bourbon Quito," and "Civil Disorder and Popular Protest in New Granada;" also Joseph Perez, Los Movimientos Precursores de la Emancipacion en Hispanoamérica.

119. Such was the case in the Motín de Esquilache in 1766, and later Aranjuez, against Godoy, Pierre Vilar, Hidalgos, amotinados y guerrilleros (Barcelona, 1982) 117.

120. Tyrer describes the expenses that the elites incurred in Spain in order to improve their lineage Historia demográfica y económica de la Audiencia de Quito, 192. Most of these titles were acquired in the course of the 18th century, when the economy was already in decline. According to Stevenson there were six marquises, three counts, one viscount, and several families of "distinguida nobleza," mentioning that the family of the Count of Punonrostro, "un grande de primera clase," also lived in Quito. "Como era Quito cuando se declaro libre," 223.

121. Juan and Ulloa, Discourse and Political Reflections, 219-220.

122. "Manifiesto al Pueblo de Quito," speech delivered by Rodríguez de Quiroga at the cabildo abierto convoked on August 16 at the Convent of San Agustín, in Ponce, Quito, 1809-1812, 142-144.

123. Ives Saint-Geours and Marie Danielle Demelas interpret that Quíteños sanctioned despotism, since they knew no other form of monarchy, which would explain their loyalty to the king. Marie Danielle Demelas and Ives Saint-Geours, Jerusalem y Babilonia.
Religion y Política en el Ecuador 1780-1880 (Quito, 1988) 62, yet Hobsbawm notes that in pre-modern societies, the king (fortunately for him, a distant figure), remained above suspicion.

124. "Demostración Legal y política que hace el Cabildo de Quito a los cabildos de Popayán y Pasto sobre los procedimientos de la Junta de Quito," Ponce, Quito 1809-1812, 165.

125. "Manifiesto del Pueblo de Quito," Ponce, Quito, 1809-1812, 142.

126. "Manifiesto de la Junta Suprema de Quito a América," and "Demostración Legal y Política que hace el Cabildo de Quito a los Cabildos de Popayán y Pasto," Ponce, Quito, 1809-1812, 157 and 165-168.


129. According to Hobsbawm, this legitimism was frequently shunned by rulers. The Austrian emperor, Francis I, a Habsburg, had once exclaimed "Now they are patriots for me; but one day they may be patriots against me," Primitive Rebels, 119.

130. Such is the interpretation of Demelas and Saint-Geours in Jerusalem y Babilonia, Religión y Política en el Ecuador, 85-95.

131. Vilar, Hidalgos, Amotinados y guerrilleros, 117.


133. Similar views are found in Pagden, Spanish Imperialism, 122-123.

134. Pierre Vilar claims that in contrast to French liberals, this nostalgia for the past was characteristic of Spanish liberals.

135. O. Stoetzer, Scholastic Roots of the Spanish American Revolution, 92-93.

137. Ibid; also Stoetzer, The Scholastic Roots of the Spanish American Revolution, 92-93.


139. These pasquinades read "Liberi esto. Felicitatem et Glorian conseguto," and on the reverse, the words "Salve cruce". In Pedro Fermín Cevallos, Historia de Cevallos, (Quito, s/f) 32.

140. Eugenio de Santa Cruz y Espejo, "Defensa de los Curas de Riobamba," in Pensamiento Ilustrado Ecuatoriano, ed. Carlos Paladines. Half a century earlier, Juan and Ulloa had already described the exploitative nature of these fiestas and their detrimental effect on the Indians. Discourse and Political Reflection, 118.

141. Two constitutions were written in 1812, one by Magistral Calisto Miranda, which was discarded and has been reproduced in Ponce, Quito, 1809-1812, 270-278, and a second one drafted by another priest, Dr. Miguel Rodriguez, reproduced in Pío Jaramillo Alvarado, La Presidencia de Quito (Quito, 1938-39). Both constitutions were similar in context and showed the influence of Spanish traditional political thought, despite claims to the contrary by some Ecuadorean scholars. Excerpts from the second constitution have also been reproduced in Ponce, Quito, 1809-1812, 102-103.


143. María Teresa Berruezo León, "El funcionariado americano en las Cortes Gáditanas," in Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos 460 (October, 1988), 44.

144. Ibid, 164.

145. Ibid, 165.


147. Jean Sarraihl, La España Ilustrada (Mexico city, 1957).

149. See, for example, a letter written by the Marquis of Selva Alegre to Viceroy Abascal, on September 9, 1809, in which he claimed that the Junta had been a necessary evil to avoid greater threats, and offered to restore Ruíz de Castilla as soon as possible. Ponce, _Quito, 1809-1812_, 162-163, as well as a letter from Juan de Salinas to Ruíz de Castilla. Ibid, 186. Both Montúfar and Salinas blamed "el pueblo" for the insurrection.

150. Andrade, _Historia del Ecuador_, 227-236.


152. Ramos Pérez argues that the regency had not authorized Montúfar to establish juntas in America, but only to conciliate differences. Since documentary evidence is missing it is not possible to establish whether Montúfar, indeed, took upon himself faculties that the regency had not intended. _Entre el Plata y Bogotá_, 205-207.

153. See for example his letter to his sister from Cartagena, dated May 10, and intercepted by the Spanish. Reproduced in Ponce, _Quito, 1809-1812_, 201-202. In this letter, Montúfar claimed that "ya tenemos un gobierno sabio y justo que sabrá premiar y hacer justicia." Also his letters to cabildos in Guayaquil, Cuenca, Viceroy Abascal in Perú, 206-216, and to Governor Vasco y Pasqual in Guayaquil, on April, 1811,"no ignora Ud. lo acontecido en Quito anteriormente, las apuradas circunstancias en que yo llegué aquí después de los horribles asesinatos recientemente cometidos el 2 de Agosto," adding, "Ud. y yo venimos de Europa, hemos palpado los acontecimientos de nuestra amada patria, hemos visto quanto ha sido preciso que cedan autoridades muchas veces de sus derechos." AGI, Quito 262.

154. See "Representación que hace Don Antonio de Villavicencio al Marqués de Someruelos, Mayo 2, 1811," ANH, Presidencia, 437.


156. Ibid

157. In 1812, Mariano Guillermo Valdivieso and Francisco García Calderón, members of this faction, used as an example the defeat of the English by General Gates and the "generous bostonienses", as they
indiscriminately referred to Anglo Americans, to incite villagers in Riobamba to fight against the Spanish. They used as their source, Alcedo's Diccionario Histórico y Geográfico. As they explained to local townsmen, Gates had commanded rustic peasants, armed with nothing but improvised weapons, and had, nonetheless, defeated the British. Other members of this radical faction, were Sánchez de Orellana and the peninsular Rodríguez Soto.

158. In true quiteño, plebeian style, the first Junta had been ridiculed through the following popular verses:

Que es la junta? un nombre vano, que ha inventado la pasión por ocultar la traición y perseguir al cristiano. Que es el pueblo soberano? Es un sueño, una quimera. Es una porción ratera de gente sin Dios ni rey. Viva pues viva la ley y todo canalla muera.

Cevallos, Historia de Cevallos, 55-56.

159. Insurgents later exiled to Spain were Antonio Ante, Mariano Guillermo de Valdivieso and José Xavier Ascáubi. The Marquis of Selva Alegre was also exiled but remained stranded in Loja due to illness. Later, he was able to travel to Spain where he died shortly after. Among those exiled in 1813: Salvador Murgueitio, Manuel Zambrano and Luis Quijano, members of the earlier Junta, to Ceuta; the lawyer Ignacio Ortíz de Cevallos who led the expedition against Pasto and was accused of instigating the deaths of Oidor Fuertes Amar and José Vergara, to the Napo region; the priest Tadeo Romo, "one of the most enthusiastic insurgents," to the Recoleta in Manila. Juan Alvarez, the secretary of the earlier Junta, and Xavier Zambrano y Mateu, the lieutenant who conspired with Salinas to seduce the army, to Havana. Feliciano Checa to the Presidium in Omsa, and the priest, Juan Pablo Espejo, the brother of Eugenio Espejo, to the Recoleta in Cusco. ANH, Presidencia, 493. Others attempted to escape to New Granada through the region of Esmeraldas, but were captured. Among them, Nicolas de la Peña, executed, as already mentioned, with his wife in Tumaco, Dr. Vicente Lucio Cabal, Joaquín Montúfar, and Bishop Cuero y Caicedo, along with several nuns. Cuero y Caicedo was exiled to Lima where he died shortly after. ANH Presidencia 481.
CHAPTER III
MERCHANTS AND PLANTERS IN GUAYAQUIL

At the height of the Quito rebellion, the coastal city of Guayaquil was once more in flames, not with dissension but fire, a most dreaded occurrence according to contemporaries. Located some thirty five miles inland on the western bank of the Guayas River, this busy river port remained highly vulnerable to fire, having suffered several major blazes in the previous century and three by the early nineteenth century.¹ Such misfortunes left Guayaquileños demoralized and in a state of shock, for they feared most the warning sound of bells, more so than earthquakes or pirate attacks, other recurrent calamities.²

Vulnerability to fire derived in part from improvidence, i.e. failure to properly maintain fire fighting equipment, but it also derived from the city's geographic location and the very materials used for construction. Whereas Quito, in the highlands, was built of adobe and stone, materials readily available in its mountainous and volcanic surroundings, in the lowlands, Guayaquil was built of wood and reed, abundant and appropriate materials for its hot, humid climate and swampy soil conditions. Wood was, in effect, such an
abundant resource that, early on, the city had specialized in ship building, becoming the most important shipyard in the Spanish Pacific, once Realejo had ceased production.\textsuperscript{3} Fire and related issues were, indeed, very much a real concern, for hardest hit in monetary terms during the blazes were these wealthy sectors: merchants, planters, and shipowners, as flames spread from the thatched huts of Indians and mestizos to El Centro, where the affluent lived, destroying homes, warehouses, and other valuables.\textsuperscript{4} Attempts to enforce construction with the less inflammable \textit{quinche}, made with reed and mud and braced with sturdy wooden frames, had failed, as had municipal efforts to ban the use of highly inflammable thatched roofs. Only the homes of the more affluent near the waterfront complied, leaving Guayaquil a highly inflammable city.\textsuperscript{5}

Notwithstanding their fear of fire, and in the aftermath of one that on February 13, 1812, destroyed almost one fith of the city, the Cabildo of Guayaquil refused to accept the solidarity of the insurgents in Quito, labeling their political behavior more painful than the effects of fire. In a letter to the Cabildo, Bishop Cuero y Caicedo, then president of the Junta, had echoed hopes that hostilities would cease and relations be renewed among "hermanos y compatriotas,"\textsuperscript{6} for as Viceroy Abascal had envisioned, a trade embargo on the part of Guayaquil was the most effective way of dealing with insurgency in Quito. The Cabildo replied that by its very
nature Guayaquil was vulnerable to fires, but these were the result of fate and as such must be endured, unlike the unprecedented and unforeseeable events in Quito. It added that nothing would please Guayaquil more than to renew relations with Quito, once Viceroy Abascal's conditions were met.

Such determination in the wake of tragedy was not surprising, for Guayaquil had shown support for the royalist cause from the onset of the insurrection in Quito. The Cabildo had ignored the rebels' "seductive letters," or responded "con un insultante desprecio," as Cuero y Caicedo complained. In 1810, it had asked Comisionado Regio Carlos Montúfar, recently arrived from Spain, to refrain from visiting the port, for Guayaquil had no use for reforms other than those wisely adopted by Viceroy Abascal. Such loyalty had earned the Cabildo the title of excelencia, and individual members, the title of señoría, also bestowed on other loyal cabildos in Panama, Popayán, Cuenca, and Loja.

The Coastal Economy

While detrimental to Quito's textile industry, Bourbon policies had favored the development of fringe areas such as Guayaquil, with its potentially rich hinterland, through tax incentives, liberalization of trade, and expansion of commercial crops such as cacao and tobacco. As the main port of the Audiencia of Quito, the city benefited, for it serviced the needs of both
external and internal trade, the latter through a network of navigable rivers that spanned the Guayas basin and connected, towards the interior, with winding roads leading to Quito, Cuenca, and other highland towns. The port profited also from its location in the commercial routes of the Spanish Pacific, midway between Acapulco, Realejo, Callao and Valparaíso, and profited as well from coastal trading between Chocó and Perú.11

First founded on the slope of nearby Cerro Santa Ana, the city was relocated in the 1690s to the lower bank of the river, where Ciudad Nueva, to distinguish it from Old Town, stretched in the grid pattern alongside the river.12 By the early nineteenth century, Guayaquil had undergone considerable growth and urban development, mostly the result of prosperity, but ironically, also, the unintended consequence of fire, since after each blaze, homes were fashioned with more comfort and up-to-date style.13

With a population of approximately 13,000 in 1804, Guayaquil offered a pleasant sight to visitors sailing up river, with its well laid streets, two and three story wooden framed buildings, and its characteristic railed balconies and porticos, sometimes extending over the entire sidewalk for protection against the tropical sun.14 As described by a traveler, such buildings swarmed with people of every color, grade, trade, and profession. On the ground floors, there were stores and pulperias, crowded with buyers and sellers "chattering like magpies,"
since Guayaquileños supposedly talked a great deal and in loud voices. Tenants lived in the first story, and the owners in the upper stories, where at dusk the ladies could be seen in their balconies, tastefully dressed and groomed with high peinetas, leaning against the railings, enjoying the breeze of the river.\textsuperscript{15} The province had absorbed most of the population growth in the Audiencia,\textsuperscript{16} a demographic increase well grounded in the booming cacao trade of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{17} Cacao plantations, shipbuilding, and other port related activities lured workers from the highlands, as well as immigrants from the peninsula and other colonies, many of whom became well established merchants by the turn of the century.\textsuperscript{18} On several occasions, the Crown had favored Guayaquil with lower tariffs for its cacao exports,\textsuperscript{19} as in 1775, when Procurador Francisco Trejo petitioned on behalf of its vecinos for a reduction of excise duties on cacao, claiming, precisely, the devastating effects of "el fuego grande" of 1764. The Crown acquiesced, lowering export taxes by 50\%, as well as import taxes at colonial ports of destination.\textsuperscript{20} In 1774, trade with certain restrictions had been allowed between the Viceroyalties of Peru, New Granada, New Spain, and the Captaincy General of Guatemala,\textsuperscript{21} and shortly after, in 1778, Guayaquil was among those puertos mayores included in the decree of free trade.\textsuperscript{22}
In 1788, the Crown changed duties on cacao imported from Guayaquil to Spain to ad valorem, a move that also responded to the interests of the merchants of Cádiz, who argued that cacao from Guayaquil sold at competitive prices, while Venezuelan cacao carried higher prices and was subject to monopoly. Yet it was only in 1789 that free trade between Guayaquil and Acapulco became effective, for the merchants from Guayaquil had powerful rivals in Caracas.

New Spain was the most important market for Guayaquil's cacao, yet trade with Acapulco was restricted due to the influence of Venezuelan planters and merchants, who claimed that cacao exports from Guayaquil would glut the market and bring about their ruin. Guayaquileños were assigned annual quotas of 10,000 fanegadas for their cacao exports to New Spain, even after the free trade decree. These regulations did not, of course, deter them from exporting larger quantities than the allowed quota, or engaging in other forms of lucrative, yet risky, contraband with Acapulco. Locally built ships, often the property of cacao exporters, carried licensed trade along with contraband of cacao, cascarilla, and rum from Perú, frequently unloaded through faked arribadas, or involuntary landing due to ship trouble. On their return, they brought efectos prohibidos, such as silk, china, and other valuables from the East, Castilian goods
from Panama, and even contraband in coin, since money was also taxed as an import.\textsuperscript{28}

In 1739, Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa had already observed that the volume of contraband through the unguarded coastline of the Audiencia of Quito was a serious threat to royal coffers, an allegation echoed by most governors. Contraband was introduced through Manta, Santa Elena, and other harbors to the north of Guayaquil, with the complicity of local \textit{tenientes}, carried by land to Guayaquil, and then shipped to northern Perú and Callao.\textsuperscript{29} Yet several of these governors were eager partners in such ventures.

One such governor was Ramón García de León y Pizarro, in office from 1779 to 1789, and the brother of Visitador José García de León y Pizarro, ironically commissioned by the crown to implement reforms that would bring higher fiscal returns. It was precisely through the initiative of Visitador Pizarro, and under the supervision of his brother, Ramón, that cacao and tobacco cultivation was expanded in the 1780s, the royal administration of \textit{alcabalas} established, and customs and state monopolies reorganized.\textsuperscript{30} Yet with equal zest, Governor Pizarro engaged in all kinds of licit and illicit ventures, often allied with the most powerful local faction. He was accused by the \textit{cabildo}, in particular his longstanding foe, Alferez Real José Joaquín Pareja, of profiteering, selling his vote for the offices of \textit{alcalde ordinario} and
alcalde de santa hermandad, and forcing cacao growers, with the aid of his tenientes, to accept half price for their product. 31 Pizarro was finally removed from office in 1789, when more serious charges reached the crown. He was accused by the teniente of Portoviejo, Manuel Nuñez de Balboa, of conspiring with other merchants to introduce a large contraband of efectos prohibidos from Acapulco, worth over one million pesos (most likely an exaggeration). The merchandise was expected to arrive in the vessel Santísimo Sacramento, alias La Guayaquileña, the property of Jacinto Bejarano, one of the wealthiest merchants in town, and was to be unloaded somewhere along the coast. 32 After much quarreling among Audiencia authorities, the governor was cleared of all charges and appointed governor of Tucumán, which represented a victory for nepotism, since his brother, the visitador, had recently left Quito for a higher post in the Council of the Indies, his nephew, Juan José de Villalengua y Marfil, was the new President of the Audiencia, and the Bishop of Cuenca, with ecclesiastic jurisdiction over Guayaquil, Francisco Xavier Carrión y Marfil, was Villalengua's cousin. 33 Earlier, in 1787, Pizarro, his lieutenant governor, José Mexia del Valle, and exporters Bernardo Roca, Manuel Guevara, Manuel Barragán, Martín de Icaza, and Jacinto Bejarano had, also, been accused by the Alférez Real and others, of monopolizing the annual quota of 10,000 fanegadas of cacao granted by the king for
Acapulco, exporting under false names, and depressing local prices to the point of forcing several ceccheros out of business. 34

Quite apart from the the volume of this ongoing illicit trade, which antedated the reforms, liberalization of trade and state-fostered expansion of commercial crops were beneficial for the provincial economy. Cacao exports rose sharply in the last decade of the eighteenth century, particularly to Spain. 35 Cacao was clearly the dynamic factor behind the coastal economy, especially once prices, at the end of the century, stabilized at approximately four pesos the carga of 81 pounds. 36

There were, no doubt, factors other than the reforms that contributed to economic well being, including demographic growth in the coast which provided better labor supply, 37 and improved overseas markets for cacao, resulting from demographic recovery in Spain and New Spain, economic revival in the latter, and industrialization in Western Europe. 38 But the thrust of the economic bonanza was the result of the reforms. So, in contrast to Quito, there was no resentment over centralizing attempts by the Crown. If anything, administrative reforms gave Guayaquil more autonomy, for in its effort to rationalize political administration, the Crown withdrew Guayaquil from the Audiencia in matters of defense and trade, placing it under the jurisdiction of
Lima and creating jurisdictional confusions that often
gave Guayaquileños more capacity for negotiation.

Even in the midst of this economic bonanza, and
despite a favorable balance of trade, many visitors
observed that local fortunes were modest compared to other
parts of the empire, with estimates for individual
holdings ranging between 40,000 to 200,000 pesos by the
early nineteenth century. This weak concentration of
capital has been attributed to a diversified economy that
limited the accumulation of capital in individual hands, for although there was a definite tendency towards
monoculture, cacao competed with other exports such as
cascarilla, tobacco, timber, and (though in decline)
textiles from Quito. Most of the rest of the trade
consisted of henequén, wax, toquilla hats, and other
artisan made goods. Ship building was another important
activity, although in later decades, production in the
astilleros involved mostly repair and maintenance rather
than ship building. Nevertheless, repair orders commanded
fairly large amounts of money.

Nearby regions catering to the markets in Guayaquil
also benefited from urban growth and higher cash income,
for these brought increased demand for beef, rice,
plantain, and other food crops from nearby Daule and rural
Guayaquil. Coastal towns, such as Santa Elena, Manta,
and Puná serviced ships with fresh water, firewood and
food supplies, while Indians from both partidos of
Portoviejo and Santa Elena earned cash as muleteers, often for the ongoing illicit trade, or trading natural fibers, such as henequén, and weaving the increasingly in demand toquilla hats.

Labor, forever scarce, was also expensive, even by foreign standards. By the early nineteenth century, rural workers earned an average of six to eight reales and one meal a day for a six hour shift, higher than in other colonies, such as Caracas, where daily wages averaged three reales a day, or the four reales paid in the mines of Perú, and also, a far cry from the 0.05 to 0.10 reales earned by rural workers in the highland provinces of Quito. More specialized workers in the shipyards earned between one and two pesos daily.

Slavery was in decline, perhaps reflecting the low concentration of capital noted above, since a slave labor force for cacao plantations would have required a large investment. Between 1780 and 1790, the number of slaves increased from 2,107 to 2,206, but as a percentage of total population it decreased from 7% to 5.8%. By the end of the century, there were 2,500 slaves, half of whom were to be found in the city. Plantation owners had instead shifted to a salaried and semi-salaried labor force. Cacao plantations were sometimes expanded through a system of parceria or share-cropping, where laborers would receive advances in cash or goods, to be redeemed in cacao trees.
Unlike labor, land was not a scarce resource, although there were local variances, since the cacao-producing districts experienced the most demographic increase. Conceivably, an open frontier due to low demographic density gave laborers more alternatives and made them less dependent on the hacienda, for they could clear a plot in the forest and move on. This is not to deny the use of coercive measures such as debt peonage, employed by both hacendados and merchants. Nonetheless, during this period, the number of jornaleros predominated over conciertos, even in the cacao producing partidos. This, in turn, was indicative of a more monetarized economy than Quito's, where higher demographic density and scarcity of land meant that an estimated 55% of the Indian population lived on subsistence plots owned by the hacienda, under the direct control of hacendados. In the coast, where almost half the population were pardos, the large estate competed with communal land and small land holdings, surrounded by a vast unsettled frontier. To be sure, this pattern of land tenure was beginning to change during these years, for complaints were frequently raised by the protector de naturales on behalf of Indian communities, whose communal land was being encroached by vecinos españoles.

The large number of import and export merchants also suggests a diversified economy, although it is difficult to assess how many of these merchants had actually settled
in Guayaquil, or rather were merchants from Lima with commissioners or agents in Guayaquil. In 1777, there were 106 import merchants, with values of trade ranging from 24,457 pesos, mostly rum and wine imported by Isidro de Icaza, to 0.14 reales for "dos cajones de mercería," imported by Raimundo Benítez. Exporters were even more numerous, 184 individuals registered during this same year by the Contaduría Mayor, and as was the case with import trade, the volume of transactions varied considerably, although the bulk of cacao trade was, undoubtedly in the hands of a few. Furthermore, a wider number of merchants exported other products than cacao, e.g. Marcos de Vera, a merchant from Portoviejo, who in 1777 exported "3 zurrones de cera y 20 libras de pita", for as little as 83.4 pesos. Notwithstanding the differences in value, the large number of merchants seem to indicate that export and import activity remained accessible to an array of individuals, including the smaller merchant who exported three or four cargas of cacao to closer ports of destination or who traded in hats, henequén, or other artisan-made products.

Importers and exporters were not the same individuals, particularly in earlier stages in the cacao boom. In 1777, the largest importers, Isidro de Icaza, Francisco Espinosa, Francisco Sánchez Navarrete, Damián de Arteta, Melchor de Ocampo, Manuel Munga, Vicente de la Riva, exported, if at all, in very small quantities.
Isidro de Icaza, from Panama, was the brother of José Gabriel and Martín de Icaza, the latter to become a large scale export-import merchant and cacao planter by the early nineteenth century. Damián de Arteta, who also became a cacao exporter by the following decade, was a shipowner, as was frequently the case with merchants, as were Francisco Espinosa, and Francisco Sánchez Navarrete.71 As for cacao exporters, other than the Cádiz-based merchants Ustaríz San Ginés, Juan Miguel de Mendiburu and Antonio López Escudero from Lima, and Raimundo Márrez, perhaps from Mexico, the largest local exporters during that year were Bernardo Roca, Manuel Barragán, and Mariano Crespo, none of whom figured significantly as importers.72

A relative lack of concentration also held for cacao planters between 1780 and 1787, or at least for those listed as beneficiaries from the expansion of cacao trees under Visitador Pizarro. Ninety seven individuals were the beneficiaries of this project, with cacao holdings ranging from 350 trees to 92,310. Although 15% of those planters owned 60% of the cacao trees,73 the number and wide range of holdings show that medium and small-scale cacao growers were also able to expand under the government sponsored-project.

Nor were planters and large scale exporters the same individuals during this decade. Among the 97 planters mentioned above, we know that only five engaged in export-
import trade: Silvestre Gorostíza, Francisco Plaezert, José de Ortega, Francisco Ventura de Garaicoa and José de Bustamante, the last three peninsulars who had settled in Guayaquil. True, these individuals had the largest cacao holdings: Gorostíza, for instance, planted 92,310 new trees, Ortega, 57,000, and Garaicoa, 50,000, yet none of them were large exporters or importers at the time. Ortega and Bustamante would eventually become highly successful ones. In 1777, they exported insignificant quantities, and we know that during the following decade the largest exporters were Jacinto Bejarano, Bernardo Roca, Damián de Arteta, Martín de Icaza, and Manuel Barragán, none of whom were listed as cacao planters during those same years.

Further research is needed on this subject, for boundaries among such groups were flexible, as when cocecheros petitioned for special trade quotas to Acapulco. Also, cacao growers and hacendados diversified into other activities. Juan Antonio Rocafuerte was a merchant, an hacendado, and in 1793, rented from the Crown the tar mines in Santa Elena. Martín de Isaguirre, a cocechero, traded salt with the interior, and was also a shipowner, as was Dr. Miguel de Puga, a planter, who had farmed out the aduana of Babahoyo in 1778, while those in Bola and Naranjal were rented by another large planter, Vicente Severo del Castillo. Still, the variety of export products, with cacao, of course, leading the way,
and the different sectors participating in the export-import economy, lend credence to the view that the economy in Guayaquil was diversified enough to restrain the accumulation of capital in individual hands.

Conditions may have changed later in the century, when cacao production rose from 68,000 cargas in 1779 to 100,000 cargas by 1801, and local exporters Roca, Barragán, Icaza and Bejarano, were accused of monopolizing cacao trade and forcing prices down. In 1787, when the alférez real complained that the powerful few had monopolized trade to Acapulco, he claimed that "los infelices cocecheros, hijos de la patria, y llenos de infelicidad gimen bajo el yugo de estos tiranos, que engrosan sus caudáles." By the late eighteenth century, planters such as José de Ortega and José de Bustamante were at the same time large scale exporters, as were Martín de Icaza, Manuel Antonio de Luzárraga, and Santiago Vitores, and Icaza and Vitores were, also, into import trade. Yet with the exception of the wealthier exporters who had expanded into cacao growing, merchants and planters appear to have remained two different groups, even if as members of the elite, they were closely related through kinship.

Observations regarding the modest scale of fortunes in Guayaquil were made well into the cacao boom, when William Bennet Stevenson, Andrés Baleato, and Adrian Terry visited the port. One possibility is, of course, that
as merchants diversified into production, as did Martin de
Icaza, Santiago Vítores and Manuel Antonio Luzárraga, the
circulation of merchant capital decreased, giving these
observers the wrong impression, for both Stevenson and
Terry made their assessments from "a commercial point of
view."82 They may have failed to take into account the
wealth invested in expanding cacao holdings or in other
economic activities, as shipping interests. Bejarano,
alone, was the owner of several ships, two among them,
Santiago el Fuerte and the frigate Sacramento, worth over
100,000 pesos each.83 Moreover, if increases in annual
harvests serve as indicators, some 4,000,000 new trees
were planted between 1779 and 1820, when annual harvest
rose from 68,000 to 190,000 cargas. It has been estimated
that 1,000 trees yielded 25 cargas, the equivalent of two
pounds per tree, and that increases in production were the
result not of better methods of production but planting of
new trees.84 Surely, such a rate of expansion must have
required some capital investment, if for no other reason
than to purchase the goods to indebt the labor force.85

Still another interpretation argues that the low
concentration of capital derived from the subordinate
relation of local merchants to their more powerful
counterparts in Lima. Whereas local exporters controlled
most of the cacao trade with Acapulco, trade with Spain
through Callao was under the monopoly of the wealthier
merchants from Lima, who controlled the fleet for long
distance trade. It has been estimated that 24 percent of profits from the cacao trade between Guayaquil and Cádiz was reaped by the powerful navieros from Lima, although an even higher share, or 48 percent of profits, went to the merchants from Cádiz. Cacao was the second product after silver imported to Spain from Perú, amounting to 11.4% of total imports, and most of it came from Guayaquil. Local merchants in Guayaquil frequently acted as factors or purchasing agents for the merchants from Lima, a subordinate and intermediary role decried by many contemporaries, as in 1787, when Bejarano, Roca, Icaza, and others were accused of being "recomendados de Lima," and diverting half a million pesos from local circulation.

Even the annual trade with Acapulco had to be protected from intrusions by the Lima merchants. Between 1781 and 1783, the crown granted these merchants licenses to introduce some 36,000 fanegadas to Acapulco, despite repeated complaints from Guayaquil that the trade quota was meant to benefit Guayaquil and not Lima. Their efforts, apparently, did not go unheeded, for in 1788, in response to one such petition, the Council of State reminded the king that trade restrictions between Guayaquil and Acapulco had derived from representations made by planters from Venezuela, and that the conditions that gave rise to them no longer existed. The following
year, Carlos IV liberalized trade between Guayaquil and New Spain.

By the end of the century, the Guayaquil merchants had become more independent from their wealthier counterparts in Lima. Several among them were owners of large vessels, suitable for trade with Acapulco, though not for the long voyage to Spain. Still, local merchants were bypassing Callao en route to Spain, particularly during the Napoleonic wars, when they were allowed to trade with neutrals. Indeed, the Crown was more than eager to promote cacao shipments from Guayaquil to Spain, and probably not averse to weakening the monopoly of Lima. In 1785, the Count of Santa Ana and Manuel Barragán shipped cacao to Spain via Callao, for lack of vessels sailing "en derechura a España," and for this had paid almojarifazgo de salida in Guayaquil. The king reimbursed them in 1791, declaring cacao shipments through intermediate ports to Spain exempt from almojarifazgos, provided that no alterations or trade take place in those ports. In 1802, the king again gave satisfaction to the merchants and planters of Guayaquil, abolishing the charge of 0.2 reales charged on each carga of cacao exported, destined to finance construction of a cathedral in Cuenca.

One local merchant who sought to bypass Callao was Jacinto Bejarano. In 1793, Bejarano, at the time in Spain, agreed to import 10,000 annual cargas of cacao during six
consecutive years, worth 40,000 pesos, from the local firm Ortega y Bustamante in exchange for merchandise exported by Bejarano from Cádiz. The deal did not go through, because Ortega y Bustamante sold their cacao at a higher price to Martín de Icaza, although they had already received "dos memorias de mercancía." (Bejarano sued, and in 1805, the Crown ordered the merchant firm to pay Bejarano principle and interest at 6% for the intervening years.)

Shortly after, in 1804, Bernardo Roca, "del comercio de Guayaquil" turned his attention to the Peruvian market itself and petitioned to Madrid for a license to introduce goods from Asia to Callao, without the slightest indication that this shipment might be contraband. Meanwhile, Martín de Icaza, one of the largest exporters, was trading heavily with Acapulco, for we know that in 1815 he lost 20,000 cargas in the fire of Acapulco started by Morelos.

Nevertheless, closer links to the viceregal court and the powerful Consulado of Lima, to which Guayaquil was subordinated during all but a brief span between 1799 and 1804, increased the influence and power of the Lima merchants. Not only were trade quotas unfairly appropriated, but royal concessions, such as reductions in tariffs, concealed from their lesser partners in Guayaquil. Thus, in 1804, a regidor and local merchant, Josef López Merino, obtained reimbursement of excess alcabalas paid by the merchants of Guayaquil, for in
January, 1800, the Crown had granted a reduction of 75% alcabalas to all ports of Perú, and this concession was withheld from Guayaquil by royal officers in Lima. In another gesture of good will, the King made reimbursement retroactive to 1796, although the decree had been issued in 1800, which did not prevent the Marqués de Avilés, viceroy of Perú, from arbitrarily withdrawing this exemption in 1806, except for trade with Callao.

Unfortunately for López Merino, he was, at the time, involved in internal factionalism so common in Guayaquil during this period, siding with the unpopular Governor Bartolome Cucalón against the most powerful faction in town, that of Coronel Bejarano. López Merino received little recognition for his action, other than commendations from the Governor for "servicios a la patria," he was slighted, instead, by Bejarano and his faction for being a mestizo and the son of a "pulpero and cigarrero." He was also accused of negligence regarding fires except to save his own house, for through the intervention of the Governor, López Merino had earlier been commended by the king for his actions during the blaze of 1804.

Patterns of Conflict

News of the insurrection had reached Guayaquil on August 19th, 1809, spurring the unpopular Governor Cucalón into immediate action. He imprisoned Quiteños and confiscated their goods, and proceeded to settle
personal accounts with local notables. He imposed a contribution of 12,000 pesos on Carlos Lagomarcino, a Genoese merchant settled in Guayaquil,\textsuperscript{103} perhaps for no other reason than his trade partnership with Guillermo Valdivieso, the vice-president of the rebellious Junta.\textsuperscript{104} As his letters to Fernando VII attest, Lagomarcino remained a loyal vassal of the Spanish king.\textsuperscript{105} He harassed, as well, his longstanding foe, Coronel Jacinto Bejarano and his powerful linneage,\textsuperscript{106} including his young nephew and protegé, Vicente Rocafuerte, recently returned after years of schooling in Europe. Feuding between Bejarano and Cucalón had begun in 1804, after Cucalón confiscated some 1,000 cargas of cacao and 7,000 pesos to satisfy Bejarano's debt with Temporalidades.\textsuperscript{107} Next, Juan Bautista Mayneri, a relative of Bejarano, accused the Governor of unfairness regarding a bid to construct four gunboats, awarded to his allies, Manuel Larrainsár and Pablo Franco.\textsuperscript{108} The following year, under the heading "quatro vecinos juiciosos y amantes del Rey," Bejarano accused the governor of introducing contraband from a British frigate near Santa Elena, in complicity with López Merino and the lawyer Antonio Marcos, and trading under the names of his son and nephew.\textsuperscript{109} More serious and outlandish charges followed, with hints that Cucalón might assist the entrance of the British enemy through Santa Elena, allegations dismissed by the Audiencia as proofless and infamatory.\textsuperscript{110}
Cucalón retaliated by imprisoning Bejarano for treason, for Bejarano had stated, "con notable escándalo del vecindario," that troops in Buenos Aires had fled cowardly from two thousand British enemies, and not the ten or twelve thousand that the viceroy claimed. Bejarano pursued his case in Lima, and obtained an inhibitoria from the Marqués de Avilés for himself and his kin four times removed. In the meantime, the Cabildo waged war against the governor, led by Alferez Real Joaquín Pareja, José María Luscando, and Juan Bautista Elizalde, the latter two, relatives by marriage to Bejarano, as well as the powerful vicario general, José Ignacio Cortázar y Lavállen, later described by Governor Juan Vasco y Pasqual as "the scourge of my predecessors." Cucalón was also facing problems with Pablo Llaguno y Lavayen, the wealthy cacao planter in Pueblo Viejo, also a member of the powerful Bejarano y Lavállen family.

The events in Quito, thus, gave Cucalón the opportunity for revenge, the more so in that rumors had it that the insurgents had attempted to contact Bejarano. A search for evidence proved unsuccessful, however, and charges were dropped when Bejarano and Rocafuerte sought and received once more, protection from the viceroy in Lima, a frequently used recourse by these wealthy sectors in Guayaquil.

The elites in Guayaquil could certainly have pride in their successful defiance and opposition against colonial
authorities. In 1776 they had faked the resignation of Governor Gaspar de Ugarte, with the apparent complicity of Spanish officers, including Francisco Requena,\textsuperscript{115} the engineer sent by the Crown in 1769 to draft a map of the city and a project for its defense. The governor, who had earlier described the city as "inquieta y turbulenta," was shortly after reinstated, only to be permanently replaced, for the ordeal had worsened his ailing health and age induced senility.\textsuperscript{116} In the 1780s, it was the \textit{cabildo} against Governor Pizarro, his lieutenant governor, Joseph Mexía del Valle, and Bejarano and his faction. As a result, the \textit{cabildo} refused to escort the governor to and from \textit{cabildo} sessions, and feuded intensely over precedence in church, processions, and even funerals.\textsuperscript{117} Alferez Real Joaquín Pareja was temporarily exiled, and to the chagrin of the people, display of the \textit{estandarte real} on the eve of Santiago banned by the Audiencia, for it ruled that through their bickering they had debased the royal insignia. In this context, the highly controversial Lieutenant Governor Mexia del Valle became known as the "Tomás Catari" of Guayaquil, for holding juntas conducive to rebellion with Bejarano, Manuel Barragán, Juan Antonio Rocafuerte, and others, ironically so, for the Indian leader in Alto Perú had fought in defense of altogether different interests.\textsuperscript{118}

In the 1790s, it was once more Bejarano and his faction against Governor Aguirre, bent on moralizing the
city, for Bejarano was again found guilty of introducing contraband from Acapulco and making illegal shipments of *cascarilla*.\textsuperscript{119} Aguirre impounded Bejarano's ship, *Santiago el Fuerte*, and refused to yield to pressures from President Mon y Velarde, or even the viceroy, to whom Bejarano had appealed.\textsuperscript{120} In a letter to the viceroy, Mon y Velarde complained that the most seductive rumors circulated in Guayaquil among those rallying in support of the governor.\textsuperscript{121} As a result, Governor Aguirre was fined by the viceroy, but in the end, he emerged victorious, for he was dispensed from the *juicio de residencia*, due to the satisfaction of the *vecindario* with his tenure.\textsuperscript{122}

Yet conflicts with authorities in Guayaquil did not translate into rebellions as they did in Quito, where we might remember that President Molina had counted over eighty insurrections involving the plebs and the nobility. Guayaquileños, it seems, were more inclined to appeal to higher courts, and frequently successfully, as Bejarano had in Lima against Aguirre, or in 1805 against Cucalón, and again in Lima, in 1809, when harassed by the governor for his alleged connection with the insurgents in Quito.

Even a conciliatory and well liked governor such as Juan Vasco y Pasqual, in office from 1811 to 1816, became uneasy on learning that his enemies had been in Lima, as when in 1812, when Regidores Casanova and Campusano returned from the Peruvian capital, boasting that Vasco would soon be replaced by former Governor Gil.\textsuperscript{123}
1814, Vasco deemed it necessary to explain his political conduct to Madrid, and not without reasons, for in that same year he had been temporarily stripped of his post as gobernador político of Guayaquil by the Audiencia in Lima to which Guayaquil had been added after the insurrection in Quito. Although we do not know the exact nature of the conflict, Estanislao Silva, Pablo Alarcón, and José Vergara, merchants from Guayaquil, had left for Lima to complain over Vasco's refusal to name jueces de letras, as determined by the constitution. Governor Vasco had chosen, instead, to keep in office the subdelegados or tenientes de gobernador, as they were known in Guayaquil. In that same year, Vasco likewise faced problems with José María Luscando, the relative of Bejarano appointed juez de letras by Lima, whom Vasco refused to confirm, claiming, as Cucalón had earlier, that Luscando belonged to the most powerful and extended family in Guayaquil. Vasco complained that it was rumored that Luscando received confirmation from the Audiencia Constitucional after one of his relatives traveled to Lima.

Despite such defiance towards colonial authorities, response to the insurrection in Quito was at best indifferent, when not overtly hostile. Among the expressions of hostility were pronouncements by the cabildo, reactivation of the creole militia through voluntary enlistment, and donations made by wealthy
merchants and hacendados as Martín de Icaza, Domingo Elizalde, Manuel Lara, José de Ortega and others for the campaign against Quito. Earlier, in November, 1809, the insurgents in Quito had failed to convince an envoy of Cucalón, Bernabé Cornejo y Avilés, a lawyer and hacendado from Guayaquil, that Ruiz de Castilla had been restored to power. Cornejo's account and the secret pleas for help from Ruiz de Castilla convinced Governor Cucalón of the need for military action. He sought help from Lima and Santa Fe, all of which ended, as we saw in the previous chapter, in the massacre of the patriots on August 2nd, 1810. As Vasco y Pasqual wrote in 1814, not only did Guayaquileños reject the maxims of the insurgent provinces, but they volunteered to participate in their reconquest.

There were, to be sure, dissident voices in the most loyal Guayaquil, especially among those who had close ties with the insurgents through kinship or business interests, or who had spent their school years in Quito, as had many Guayaquileños of standing for lack of local institutions. Bejarano and Regidores López Merino, Herrera Campusano and José Ignacio Casanova remained suspects throughout the upheaval in Quito, and were accused of trading in arms with the insurgents. In December 1810, Bejarano had been sent to negotiate the freedom of Joaquín Villalba, an envoy of President Molina, but he became a suspect when Governor Gil later learned
that Bejarano's account of the rebels troops may have been intentionally inflated, to dissuade the royalists from attacking the rebels.\textsuperscript{137}

Vasco on his part also complained to Madrid of the juez subdelegado eclesiástico, Vicario José Ignacio Cortázar, for ignoring the governor's request that he celebrate a te deum and three days of public prayers for the victories of the allies and the success of the congreso nacional decreed by the Cádiz parliament. Cortázar demanded to see an official transcript of the royal orders, only to inform Vasco that he no longer accepted orders except from the jefe político and the cabildo constitucional, and therefore could not comply with Vasco's request.\textsuperscript{138}

While it may be true that the change from despotism to a constitutional framework by itself brought disruptions, for it undermined traditional authority,\textsuperscript{139} Governor Vasco held other views. He claimed that such defiance was also the result of wealth, for with an annual income of 12,000 to 14,000 pesos, Vicario Cortázar y Lavállen displayed all the haughtiness that only money could sustain, a situation that was, perhaps, not that uncommon in Guayaquil. In the 1790s, a decade of growth for the provincial economy, Cabildo members complained that the "liga, facción y parcialidad de los poderosos," by which they meant Roca, Bejarano, Juan Antonio Rocafuerte, Barragán, Mexía del Valle and Comandant Manuel
Guevara, were bent on destroying those less powerful, and that in Guayaquil, "ya no se oía respirar otra cosa que abundancias y riquezas." Bejarano had, in fact, threatened to ship capitulares off to Isla de Juan Fernández and had taunted them for being unable to even pay for "costas," or legal fees.\textsuperscript{140} Regidor Andrés de Herrera and other cabildo members accused these "Nabucos" of monopolizing power, introducing contraband, and selling it freely in the city, including 100,000 pesos in pearls brought by the Conde de Santa Anta. These powerful merchants were charged, as well, with controlling the election of alcaldes, and giving entrance to cabildos abiertos to mestizos, pulperos and all their dependants, to gain votes for their conspiracies.\textsuperscript{141}

In contrast to the aristocracy in Quito, which relished archaic notions of honor derived from blood and lineage, in Guayaquil social standing was based more on wealth, used in oligarchic fashion to exert power, as was the case with the Bejarano y Laváyen family. We might remember that during these same years, when capitulares in Guayaquil were complaining that "esta oprimida ciudad sufre por los poderosos," the most influential family in Quito, the Montúfares, was expending resources in Santa Fe and Madrid to force Simón Sáenz de Vergara to chant the palinode, a recantation of medieval origins to erase offenses against honor.\textsuperscript{142}
Nonetheless, despite the flaunting of wealth and power, Guayaquil remained a relatively open society. Foreigners, for instance, settled with ease into the social fabric of the city, sometimes through marriage into prominent families, or through business ventures. There was no evidence whatsoever of ethnic cleavages or rivalries among peninsulares and creoles, as was common in other colonial cities, including Quito. In fact, for the generation that eventually produced the independence movement—those born between 1780 and 1790, it has been established that an equal number of its leading figures were born to both parents from Guayaquil as to a peninsular father and a native mother.¹⁴³

There was also some degree of social mobility. The most well known example was, of course, Bernardo Roca, a pardo from Panama.¹⁴⁴ Yet in Guayaquil, Roca was a highly regarded member of the elite, and an active participant in the social and economic life of the city, as were, later, his sons, two of whom reached the highest office in the Provincia Libre de Guayaquil and (in 1845) in the Republic of Ecuador. Esteban Amador, another succesful merchant, was also said to be a pardo from Cartagena.¹⁴⁵ López Merino, labeled a mestizo by Bejarano and by Governor Vasco y Pasqual in 1814, was another example.¹⁴⁶ Despite his rivalries with Bejarano, López Merino remained a respected member of the community, and his sons were active participants in the independence movement.
Expectations for mobility apparently filtered to the lower castes, for in 1787, as Roca, Bejarano, and others were accused of monopolizing trade to the detriment of cocecheros, Alferez Real Joaquin Pareja had this to say against the castes:

otra causa de mayor pobreza es que hasta el negro o mulato, marbasto, pardo y mestizo se ha introducido de oficio de mercaderes con lo que vistiéndose galante estos hombres sinverguenzas, a cada rato quiebran, se hacen amos los que debian de ser criados, y por otro lado quedan los campos sin cultivos y hasta llegan a hacerse suntuosas casas y todo el honor y buen nombre de la ciudad se trastoca.147

Avenues for social mobility were, no doubt, grounded in the economic bonanza of the late eighteenth century, but in addition the lower classes in Guayaquil apparently had a flair for novelty, color, and self expression, that impressed several travelers. Adrian Terry later described their "strong passion for dress, which they seized every opportunity to gratify," as well as "their broad humor" and "acute and quick apprehension," which he attributed to the "natural talent and character of the people."148

In any event, defiance against authorities in Guayaquil, while common, was not to be confused with forthright efforts to overturn the established order. A royalist in Quito seemed right on track when he claimed that only the insurgents were foolhardy in thinking that local discontent with royal officers, as Bejarano with Governor Cucalón or Valdecillas with the governor of Popayán, sufficed to bring these provinces into rebellion;
instead, they were soon in arms against Quiteños. Nor should it surprise us that in 1809, the unpopular Governor Cucalón was able to rally enough support from the elite to march against Quito, but barely a year later, in August of 1810, was deposed through the agency of these same sectors.

In some ways typical was the case of Vicente Rocafuerte who had been elected alcalde for the year of 1810, and despite strong opposition from Cucalón received confirmation from his brother in law, interim Governor Luis Rico, while Cucalón was in Quito. Soon after, Rocafuerte sought permission to travel to Panama, denied by Cucalón but granted by the viceroy. He sailed instead for Lima and returned victoriously in August 1810, with a letter from Viceroy Abascal advising the governor of his removal.

Earlier, in 1807, Juan de Dios Morales, one of the leaders of the Quito insurrection, had sought protection in Rocafuerte's estate from the arbitrary power of an interim president of the Audiencia. According to the later account of Rocafuerte, they amply discussed plans for the insurrection in Quito, which Rocafuerte opposed on grounds that it was first imperative to shape public opinion through the establishment of sociedades secretas. This was, no doubt, a credible stance for someone like Rocafuerte, schooled in Europe and well versed in the writings and ideas of the most influential
European political thinkers. Such was the course of action he later endorsed in Havana to promote the independence of the island.

In Europe, Rocafuerte had befriended Bolivar, Carlos Montúfar, José María Cabal from Buga, Fernando Toro y Rodríguez from Caracas, and other young creoles, with whom he had exchanged ideas about the "grandiose perspective" of the independence of Spanish America. In London he had joined one of the sociedades secretas that contributed so much to promote the cause of independence. Yet as alcalde in 1810, he was among those signing the manifestos of the cabildo, asking Comisionado Regio Carlos Montúfar to refrain from visiting the port, and in November of that same year, the Cabildo of Guayaquil, of which Rocafuerte was a member, sought protection from Viceroy Abascal against the junta recently formed by Montúfar, for which purpose, Abascal informed Madrid, that he had already made provisions. Again in Europe, in 1813 Rocafuerte learned that he had been appointed representative to the Cortes for the Viceroyalty of Perú, as had, earlier, his friend and compatriot, José Joaquin de Olmedo. Rocafuerte traveled extensively through Europe before arriving in Cádiz, whereby his participation in the Cortes was short lived. After the return of absolutism, he fled Madrid, narrowly escaping imprisonment for his refusal to give homage to Fernando VII with other representatives from Perú. Back in Guayaquil, in 1817, Rocafuerte devoted
himself to the management of his family's estate and, as he later recalled, teaching French on condition that students familiarize themselves with the writings of l'Abbé Raynal, Montesquieu, and Rousseau.158

In 1820, while on a business trip to Cuba, Rocafuerte was commissioned by a sociedad secreta of Caracas, to assess the mood of Spanish liberals regarding the insurrections in the colonies. Moving on to Madrid, Rocafuerte befriended liberals from Spain and the colonies, and participated in the lively debates of the sociedades patrióticas.159 He shared with other liberals a radical rejection of absolutism, but as one of his biographers claims, rather than total independence he envisioned home rule for the colonies, within a Spanish commonwealth.160 Disillusioned with the divisions plaguing the liberals in Spain, Rocafuerte left for Cuba and the United States, which had become centers of international intrigue for Spanish American separatists.161 He did not return to Guayaquil until 1833, years after the former Audiencia of Quito had gained independence from Spain and separated from Gran Colombia as the Republic of Ecuador. Between his departure for Europe at the age of 10 and his return in 1833, Rocafuerte spent only six years in his native land, an absence that later allowed General Juan José Flores, his political ally turned enemy, to accuse him of failing his country when it most needed him.162 But as his writings and activities in
Philadelphia, Havana, Mexico, and London attest, those years were not spent in vain, for Rocafuerte remained a committed Spanish Americanist, deeply involved with the fate of the new republics.163

The other representative to the Cortes, José Joaquin de Olmedo, was like Rocafuerte and other members of their generation, the son of a Spanish beaureaucrat, Miguel de Olmedo, who had settled as a merchant and married into a prominent local family. Unlike Rocafuerte, Olmedo had been schooled at the Colegio San Fernando in Quito, and was later entrusted to the care of his uncle, José Silva y Olave, bishop of Huamanga, to further his education in Lima.164 He earned a degree in the humanities at the Colegio de San Carlos, and in 1805 a doctorate in law at the Universidad de San Marcos, where he later taught. In 1810, he was chosen as representative to the Cortes, and although he did not excel as an orator, he delivered a dramatic plea against the mita which made an impact on the Cádiz parliament and was later published by Rocafuerte in London.165 Despite his modest contribution to parliamentary debates, Olmedo, a highly cultivated person who had shown literary talent from an early age, was appointed a secretary of the Cortes, a member of the committee to draft the constitution and the Diputación Permanente.166 Along with José Mexia Lequerica, the native quiteño representing New Granada, Olmedo was considered a liberal member of the Spanish American delegation,
although more moderate than Mexia. While in Cádiz, Olmedo also joined a secret society, the Gran Logia Regional Americana, whose foundation was attributed to Miranda.

Olmedo, a child of the Enlightenment, favored a constitutional monarchy, and gradually moved to a more radical critique of the colonial order. This shift became obvious in his poetry, for in contrast to Rocafuerte, Olmedo did not leave specific written testimony of his political ideas, which must therefore be extracted from his letters and literary work. His early poetry extolled the misfortunes of the royal family and the virtues of the Spanish nation. But by 1817, his views had shifted considerably. Frustration and disenchantment permeated this poem entitled "A un Amigo, don Gaspar Rico, en el nacimiento de su primogénito," as we can see in the following excerpts.

Tanto bien es vivir que presurosos
Deudos y amigos plácidos rodean
La cuna del que nace!
Y en versos numerosos
Con felices pronósticos recrean....

Pero será feliz? O serán tantas
Hermosas esperanzas, ilusiones?
Ilusiones, Risel. Ese agraciado
Niño, tu amor y tu embeleso ahora,
Hombre nace a miserable condenado.......

Mas que hablo yo de nombre y de fortuna?
Si su misma virtud y sus talentos
serán en estos malhadados días
Un crimen sin perdón.....La moral pura
La simple, la veraz filosofía,
Y tus leyes seguir, madre Natura,
Impiedad se dirá, rasgar el velo
Que la superstición la hipocresía
Tienden a la maldad: decir que el cielo
Límites ciertos al poder prescribe....
Como a la mar; y que la mar insana
Menos desobediente
Es al alto decreto omnipotente....

Olmedo's rejection of absolutism was clear. Yet despite his frustration with the times, Olmedo still grieved for "la patria en mil partes lacerada," and believed, as other "iluministas" had before him, that virtuous laws alone would bring about "candor riqueza y nacional decoro." The result for which he hoped was that:

... oh triunfo, derrocados
Caigan al hondo abismo
error, odio civil y fanatismo.171

"La Patria" in 1817 was still Spain for Olmedo, as it was in 1813, when he wrote this epitaph for Mexia Lequerica, who died that year in Cádiz:

Aquí espera la resurrección de la carne
el polvo de don José Mexia
Diputado en Cortes por Santa Fe de Bogotá
Póseyo todos los talentos
Amó y cultivó todas las ciencias
pero sobre todo amó a su Patria y
Defendió los derechos del pueblo español
con la firmeza y la virtud
con las armas del ingenio y de la elocuencia
y con toda la libertad
de un Representante del Pueblo.172

The fact that Olmedo, along with Rocafuerte and other members of the elite, did not opt for independence in 1809 should not surprise us. Their loyalties were with Spain, and perhaps understandably so, since we have seen that the Crown complied with so many of Guayaquil's most pressing demands. Furthermore, as several historians have pointed out, the insurrection in Quito was ill planned in terms of
obtaining much needed support from its neighbors. Guayaquil, like Popayán and Pasto, was informed of the insurrection only after it had taken place. We might also speculate that the elites in Guayaquil were as disconcerted with the aristocratic fanfare surrounding the establishment of the first junta in Quito as were patriots in some other colonies. Quito and Guayaquil had important regional differences of interest, some of which have already been suggested.

More intriguing was Guayaquil's muted reaction to the massacre of August 2nd, which so moved and alienated distant colonies such as Santa Fe, Socorro, Caracas, and Santiago. The official version was, of course, that the massacre occurred within the confusion of a rioting mob instigated by the insurgents. Yet, aside from their political allegiances, it is hard to understand how young and idealistic followers of the Enlightenment, like Rocafuerte and Olmedo, remained silent in face of such tragedy. At the time, we have seen, Rocafuerte was an acting member of the cabildo, while Olmedo was shortly after appointed asesor of the junta de guerra founded by the beligerent President Joaquín Molina against Quito. Their silence was all the more surprising, for among those massacred in Quito was a close member of the Bejarano and Rocafuerte family, Juan Pablo Arenas y Lavallén, half brother of Bejarano and uncle to Rocafuerte. Later, among the handful executed by President Montes, was Commandant
Francisco García Calderón, the radical separatist from Havana, married to Manuela Garaicoa, the young daughter of influential planter Francisco Ventura de Garaicoa. It is possible, of course, that the elites in Guayaquil kept silent out of fear. Although defense of the port was not reinforced until Commodore Brown's invasion in 1816, and even then, remained, mostly, the responsibility of the local creole and pardo militia, yet troops from Lima and Panama were stationed in the Audiencia between 1809 and 1810. In spite of their presence, insurrections did take place on the coast, but not in Guayaquil, rather in small provincial towns, as we shall see in a later chapter.

Perhaps to reflect the turmoil of the times, we might add that the Bejarano and Rocafuerte family was as divided regarding the justa causa as was the family of Simón Sáenz de Vergara in Quito. In contrast to Arenas and García Calderón, victims for the insurrection, other relatives of the family were strongly committed to the royalist side, as were Rocafuerte's three brothers-in-law: the already mentioned Coronel Luis Rico, interim governor of Guayaquil while Cucalón marched against Quito, General La Mar y Cortázar, who served under the Spanish army until the eve of the independence of Guayaquil and later became president of Perú, and a third one, Captain General Gabino Gainza, who defeated the patriots in Chile in 1816.
This muted reaction on the part of the elites in Guayaquil may also have been a consequence of "the public realm of reason,\textsuperscript{179} or a rational and self directed course of action on the part of an emerging merchant bourgeoisie, which had enjoyed consistent economic growth during the previous decades. This would represent another contrast to Quito, where rather than showing well defined objectives, the insurgents basked in their "ostentatious self-display," and catered to the "expressive symbolism" of the plebs.\textsuperscript{180}

In effect, the liberal constitution and reforms were warmly greeted among members of the Guayaquil mercantile community. Administrador de Aduanas Francisco Suárez Cardenal was harassed in name of the constitution, as when merchants refused to pay el derecho de igualación imposed by the Tribunal de Cuentas del Perú, claiming their constitutional rights.\textsuperscript{181} We have seen that in 1814 Vasco had been accused in Lima, for refusing to name jueces de letras as the constitution called for. Again in 1814, the cabildo constitucional informed Vasco, as Vicario Cortázár had earlier, that he was no longer in command but rather the jefe político, another office established by the constitution.\textsuperscript{182}

In Quito, after its reconquest, President Montes delayed publicizing the constitution until several months later than it was made public elsewhere. He informed Madrid that when he arrived in Quito he already had two
copies of the constitution, but "in concurrence with members of the cabildo," he delayed its publication until September of 1813. Perhaps, such prudence was understandable in view of the recent events in Quito, but he also informed Madrid that elections for diputados provinciales and to the Cortes were postponed until August 1814 months after the constitution itself had been abolished in Spain, at the request of Quito's constitutional cabildo, which claimed that:

ya que el pueblo se vió envuelto en el crimen de infidencia era forzoso tomar precauciones convenientes a fin de evitar toda intervención popular en las elecciones, con el conocimiento práctico que le asiste de su carácter sedicioso.  

We thus see that, by 1814, the blame for the insurrection had been displaced to the popular sectors, and furthermore, members of the constitutional cabildo were requesting changes in the electoral process that denied the very essence of the constitutional reforms. Nor was the Indian tribute abolished in Quito as decreed by the Cortes, but simply lowered to the tasa inferior. This occurred in part because the tribute was an important source of income for the highland provinces, as claimed by Viceroy Abascal for Perú, but also at the request of local hacendados. In the coast, where the tribute lacked any fiscal importance on account of the scant Indian population, Vasco faced rebellion when attempting to reinstate the tribute as we shall later see.
While Governor Vasco was harassed in name of the constitution, in Quito, President Montes delayed implementing many of its reforms to comply with the wishes of the local elite. Nonetheless, during these years, insurgents in Quito were persecuted, their properties confiscated and members of the clergy, in particular, banished to distant Ceuta, the recoletas in Cuzco, and even the Philippines, whereas in Guayaquil the most important issue, if we are to judge by their petitions to the Cortes, was to obtain the seat of a new bishopric. The latter was not a novel request, for ever since the Obispado de Quito had been dismembered in 1779, they had repeatedly petitioned for a bishopric of their own. Of course, their request for an obispado in 1810 was for secular rather than religious reasons. Guayaquil had no formal schools, except for one funded by Vicario Cortázar. Prominent vecinos testified that the merchant profession was not agreeable to all, so that they were compelled to send their sons to distant Quito and Lima, at great costs. Women faced a similar problem. The lack of a nunnery meant that those without a dowry or otherwise unfitted for marriage were unable to tomar estado, and thus, remained vulnerable to the dangers of the world.

Yet, what concerned Guayaquileños the most was the drain of currency to Cuenca by way of the diezmo, or the 146,474 pesos collected between 1790 and 1802 from the cacao trade for a non-existant cathedral, also in Cuenca,
to which Bernardo Roca alone claimed to have contributed some 25,546 pesos. In sound mercantilist reasoning, they assessed negatively their trade relations with Cuenca, or for that matter, Panama: unlike what happened with the northern valleys of Peru and Lima, merchants from Cuenca and those from "la nación inglesa," operating via Panama, sold their goods in Guayaquil but seldom bought any in return, thus, further draining currency from the local economy. They viewed themselves as mere tributaries of Cuenca, a metaphor that may well have influenced their decision later to separate from Spain, for they claimed that their city, destined to figure among the wealthiest in America, was instead "enfeudizada" and doomed, "como la vaca en poder ajeno, que solo se la atiende para ordenar."

As of 1810, however, their grievances were not directed against "la madre patria," but against Cuenca and Panama, not to mention Cartagena and Quito, the former for a tax levied on rum to finance a hospice, and the latter for (among other things) some 70,000 pesos donated earlier to the Jesuits for the purpose of a school, most of which had been delivered to Quito by President García de León y Pizarro, after the order was suppressed.

Olmedo and Rocafuerte, of course, translated these complaints into a more polished and sophisticated language, stressing the need for public education if all classes were to be enlightened in their social and religious duties. What better way, they asked, but
education to promote civic and moral virtues, in accordance with "el espíritu de las leyes?" By 1814, Olmedo and Rocafuerte added another request, a tribunal de consulado for Guayaquil, since distances to Lima so burdened local merchants. This request, they explained, had not been raised earlier for fear of hampering the effort of the Consulado of Lima to raise one million pesos, to assist "la madre patria" during such troubled times. As late as 1818, Guayaquil was still hopeful that its request for an obispado would also be granted, or in appreciation for its loyalty, a captaincy general.

Earlier, in 1816, Guayaquileños had yet another opportunity to show their loyalty to Spain, when the British adventurer Guillermo Brown, in command of a flotilla armed by the patriots of Buenos Aires, attempted to take the city by surprise. Brown's attack was thwarted by local townspeople and the militia, and although Guayaquileños later claimed that the purpose of Brown's expedition was predatory, the authorities at the time had no confusions as to its nature. It seems, therefore, unlikely that vecinos in Guayaquil were uninformed as to the real purpose of the expedition, for earlier it had made an attack Callao. Brown and his men had, no doubt, looting in mind, as was the norm with expediciones al corso on both sides, but the fact that Guayaquileños chose to resist the invasion indicates that their loyalties were still with Spain. After Brown's men
surrendered to civilian forces and the militia, led by Bejarano, Icaza, and others, an exchange of prisoners took place, which included newly appointed Governor Juan Manuel de Mendiburu, captured at sea by the insurgents, and Commodore Brown himself.

The hero of the occasion was José de Villamil y Jolly, another foreigner successfully settled as a merchant in Guayaquil, and later married into the powerful Garaicoa family. The son of a Spanish father and French mother, Villamil was a native of Louisiana, and by 1816 a citizen of the United States. As he later reflected, his loyalties were divided, for he loved Spain deeply, but while in Europe he had discussed the independence of the colonies with other young members of the creole elites.

Paradoxically, Brown's invasion may have triggered the same effect that the invasion of the British had for Buenos Aires in 1806. Villamil later wrote, "un pueblo que toma las armas por primera vez, que se expone en pampa rasa a un bergantín bien armado, que aborda ese buque a nado," could not help but get a heightened sense of its importance. As a result "Comprendí que un pueblo así seria una grande adquisición a la causa de la independencia. Hablé de ello a la juventud con menos reserva y bien pronto conoci que esa juventud solo esperaba una ocasión favorable." And such an occasion did arrive, in October, 1820, after General San Martín's expedition of 4,500 troops and seven warships set sail
from Valparaíso to Perú. News of his liberating expedition sparked insurrections in Trujillo, Piura, Lambayeque, and Guayaquil, as well as the surrender of the Batallón Numancia in Perú.195

By 1820, the legitimacy of colonial rule had, undoubtedly, been eroded, and San Martín's presence in Perú merely provided the necessary spark.196 Earlier, in 1818, Vicente Ramón Roca, the son of Bernardo Roca, was found by Governor Mendiburu to be in secret contact with a priest in Acapulco. The young Roca wrote in anger against the tyranny of Spanish rule, claiming that Spain attempted to retain the colonies through military despotism, but that struggle was preferable to the old rule.197

Political Emancipation

The intervening years between 1810 and 1820 had been fraught with difficulties for planters and merchants, partly the result of natural disasters, but mostly due to disruptions in New Spain and Europe.198 Several merchants declared bankruptcy or sought moratorium to pay their debts, their woes made worse by the dangers posed at sea by the insurgents.199 Until the defeat of Nariño in 1814, disruptions were carried out by insurgent caleños, who routinely raided the coast of Chocó, and made incursions as far south as Tumaco, La Tola, and Atacames, interrupting coastal trade and that with Panama. Later, it was privateers, armed by the insurgents from Río de la Plata, including Anglo-Americans, also eager to profit
through the introduction of contraband goods. Navigation became still more difficult after 1818, when the British naval officer, Lord Cochrane, took to the Pacific on behalf of the patriots of Buenos Aires and Chile. In 1818 the towns of Montecristi and Manta were raided by some of Cochrane's men, and Villamil himself lost two ships in Bahía de Caráquez in 1819 with cacao destined for Panama, as did Bernardo Plaza and other merchants.

The crown also faced insurrections in small provincial towns, the subject of another chapter, which suggests that during the intervening years between the insurrection in Quito and the independence of Guayaquil royal government had been considerably weakened. As later viewed by a government officer of the Provincia Libre de Guayaquil, determined by 1821 to compel these same independent minded coastal towns to accept the hegemony of Guayaquil, their boldness was a consequence of "el natural desgreño del gobierno Español."

Much has been written as to the reasons why the Guayaquil elites opted for independence by 1820. In this respect, it is well to pay heed to Carlos Lagomarcino, the Genoese merchant settled in Guayaquil, who wrote letters of advice to Fernando VII from Trujillo and Guayaquil between 1816 and 1820. His views were not original but were vested with common sense, and probably shared by other merchants. Lagomarcino was dismissed by
Madrid, as "un escritor polémico de mostrador y vara de medir," and his letters ignored and unanswered. Yet with remarkable resilience, Lagomarcino persisted in counseling the king.205

Among his suggestions was an alliance or "pacto social" between Spain and other powers, by which he meant Great Britain, Russia, Portugal and the United States, exchanging trade privileges for military aid to suppress the insurrections in the colonies. Lagomarcino, in fact, had such faith in their good will that he had written letters to the U.S. Congress and the British government informing them of the subversive activities in which Anglo-American citizens and British subjects were involved. Another suggestion was the establishment of free ports in Lima, Guayaquil, Panama, Acapulco, and San Blas, which would diminish the influence of Great Britain in favor of the United States, and satisfy loyal vassals in America. He also recommended judicial reforms, granting more power to the ayuntamientos and limiting the governors' rule only to military matters, which he claimed had been intended by the Cortes when it established ayuntamientos constitucionales, jueces politicos and jueces de letras. Having suffered under a despotic governor, as was the case with Cucalón in 1809, Lagomarcino stressed the importance of appointing "gobernadores de modales políticos," that is, with conciliatory dispositions. He also suggested granting
special privileges to the colonies similar to the ones enjoyed in Vizcaya and Cataluña, for Lagomarcino reminded the king that it was better to sacrifice some things than to loose all, and making reforms to the juicio de residencia, since former Governor Cucalón had been awarded a promotion (as had earlier Governor Pizarro), despite accusations still pending against him from Guayaquil. By 1820, Lagomarcino even congratulated the king for restoring the constitution, claiming that although it was not perfect, it was preferable to none.

As for the causes for dissaffection, Lagomarcino distinguished between those inciting earlier revolts, as at Quito and Santa Fe, and those that lay behind later insurrections. Among the first, he included Napoleon's invasion of the peninsula, mistrust of colonial authorities, and fear for the fate of the colonies, while the repression that followed the first round of revolts had promoted creole hatred of Spanish and Europeans. Also cited were corruption, excessive bureaucratization and "la muchedumbre de abogados." He counseled that as a corrective for the latter, "libros quijotescos" should be banned and academic curriculums designed to fit the needs of the state. This was, according to officials in Madrid, the only cause worthy of consideration, for a side note addressed to the Ministro de Gracia y Justicia, stated that "abogados y escribanos, ambiciosos, turbulentos y
anarquistas" had indeed produced social disruption in "France, Europe, Spain and America."

High in his list of later complaints were trade restrictions and the inability of Spain to protect merchants from pirate attacks. The fall of Buenos Aires and Chile had dealt a serious blow to the royalist cause, for it cast doubts as to Spain's ability to control the Pacific shipping lanes. After the loss of Chile, merchants from Guayaquil had felt particularly vulnerable, for rumors had it that those from Perú had sustained a loss of one and a half million pesos invested there. Another serious problem was the shortage of currency exacerbated by fiscal demands and the contributions imposed by Lima. Lagomarcino suggested minting copper coins, to ease "la circulación de riquezas" during such troubled times.

Undoubtedly, these were hard times for merchants and planters, while the problems posed by spreading insurgency made it difficult for Spain to display the same flexibility previously shown when dealing with Guayaquil. By October, 1820, the rational choice was to separate from Spain, although it was a slow coming change, for earlier during that year, the Cabildo through a lengthy petition to the crown still expressed hopes that Spain would ease some of its trade restrictions.

The events preceding the actual declaration of independence are too well know: a social gathering of the
elite at the home of a Spanish bureaucrat, which gave the conspirators an excuse to attend to final details. Among those participating in the wider conspiracy, were planters, merchants, lawyers, priests, and royal functionaries, including a significant number of peninsulars. There was a former royalist from Quito, whose own father and brother had been executed by the patriots in 1812. Also involved were three officers from the Batallón Numancia, dismissed for their suspect ideas, who were on their way to their homeland, Venezuela, and the commanding officers of the Batallón Granaderos, stationed in Guayaquil with 600 soldiers.

As was the case with the first Junta in Quito, the coup met with no resistance. It appeared to have enjoyed some popular support, for when rumors spread that naval officers had refused to surrender their gunboats and were planning to attack the city, an angry mob attempted to assault one of the army barracks. Once the defection of the troops became known, Governor Pasqual Vivero, whose own family was from Perú, graciously bowed to the inevitable.

The morning of October 9, 1820, the Ayuntamiento of Guayaquil assembled to consider measures necessary to sustain public order, once independence had been proclaimed, "through the general vote of the people." Their first resolution was the appointment of jefe político, for which purpose they chose Regidor José
Joaquin de Olmedo, the former representative to the Cortes. Next, they convoked an electoral college, to hold representatives from each town of the Provincia de Guayaquil, elected by padres de familia, that is, individual political actors. Nor were members of the electoral college chosen to be representatives of estates or corporate groups as in Quito, but townships or associations of inhabitants, for as Montesquieu had claimed "the inhabitants of a particular town are much better acquainted with its wants and interests" and the members of the legislature "should not be chosen from the general body of the nation, but it is proper that in every considerable place, a representative should be elected by the inhabitants." A provisional Junta was to govern until the convention assembled.

On November 8, the citizen members of the Electoral College chose a Junta de Gobierno, with Olmedo as President, and Rafael Ximena and Francisco Roca as members. The electors and those they elected were to be addressed as "citizens," which duly symbolized a new set of relations between the individual, society and government.

In his inauguration speech, Olmedo explained independence as a natural coming of age:

Desde que los hombres llegan a la edad en que recibe su razón el suficiente grado de luz y de firmeza para conocer y sostener sus derechos, y desde que adquieren los medios de subsistir comodamente, la misma naturaleza les inspira
el sentimiento de la emancipación, y el deseo de formar una familia.\textsuperscript{217}

Independence was assimilated to emancipation, which was a critical concern of the Enlightenment, for emancipation was achieved through reason,\textsuperscript{218} and was explained through the metaphor of the family, a frequently used paradigm, under enlightened despotism, to express the political. Spain was "la madre patria," while "hijo del país" described one's place of origin, which entailed a set of political rights and obligations.\textsuperscript{219} In turn, the language to describe family relations also reflected the political. "Familia" designated "la gente que vive en una casa debajo del mando del señor de ella," while "hijo de familia," or the status of the colonies before they were emancipated, meant "el que está sin tomar estado y se mantiene bajo la patria potestad."\textsuperscript{220} As has been said of New Granada, the use of this paradigm helped the patriots establish legitimacy for the new order, for it mobilized allegiances and provided a new identity,\textsuperscript{221} this was another contrast to Quito, where we have seen that the aristocracy played into the eschatologic fears of the plebs.

Elsewhere in his speech, Olmedo expressed other enlightened concerns: the pursuit of happiness as a political ideal,\textsuperscript{222} the general will as legitimizing principle,\textsuperscript{223} and the need to restrain despotism and corruption through a tripartite division of power, clearly reflecting the ideas of Rousseau and Montesquieu.\textsuperscript{224}
Nowhere in Olmedo's speech do we find references to a legitimizing past but to a promising future, a conception of history different from that of Quito, where we might remember that Castillian law, immemorial custom, and tradition were the legitimizing principles for the insurrection. On the contrary, Olmedo viewed *patria* as a process of becoming, through the agency of the founding fathers and through beneficial laws to emanate from the General Representation. This was a more modern conception of time, of society, and of the relation between the two, for society was no longer viewed as timeless and unchanging, and change was not equated to disorder. His speech reflected a belief in progress, made possible through that ideal unity between theory and practice, also characteristic of the Enlightenment. A follower of Montesquieu, Olmedo further believed that to avoid the problems plaguing other republics, government should be adapted to local conditions in the Provincia de Guayaquil. From this early moment, Olmedo defended the right of the Provincia Libre either to remain wholly self-governing or to join any one of the larger associations of America.

The constitution of the Provincia de Guayaquil reflected these political ideals. The first article stated that the Provincia Libre was free and independent, its government elective, and Catholicism its official religion, as in the constitution of Cádiz. Also, laws
from the previous regime not opposed to their new form of government would remain in force. In its second article, the authors of the constitution asserted the right to decide the political future of Guayaquil, and in the third this community of merchants declared commerce to be free through land and sea with all nations not opposed to their new form of government.\textsuperscript{231} With the exception of slaves, the right to vote was in principle universal and compulsory.\textsuperscript{232}

It would be misleading to view these political ideas as merely reflecting the experience of Cádiz, or attribute them solely to the intervention of a highly cultivated man like Olmedo. Nor can differences between the insurrection in Quito of 1809 and the independence movement of 1820 be explained through the time frame of both events. From decades earlier, the elites in Guayaquil had spoken a different language than Quito's, where the aristocracy spoke the language of sovereignty and honor. Merchants and planters in Guayaquil had spoken the language of republicanism, the Renaissance ideology of commercial Mediterranean city states, formulated by Machiavelli, and critically revised for the eighteenth century by Montesquieu and Rousseau.\textsuperscript{233}

Fear of corruption, concerns for the public good, as corresponded to citizens of a republic, surfaced at one point or another in their discourse, as in this complaint
raised by the *cabildo* in 1809 against Asesor Pedro Alcántara Bruno:

No oprime menos a un Pueblo el Tirso con las armas que un mal ciudadano con la codicia, con la estafa, con la sedición y el engaño. Para alentar estos vicios necesariamente usa de otros y cada uno hiere inmediatamente la sociedad.\(^{234}\)

While during that same year in Quito, the insurgents attempted to subvert the cabildo with the following argument:

\[
y \text{y para consultar los intereses de nuestra santa religión, la soberanía y nuestra amada patria, pidieron se discutiese en cabildo abierto como estaba mandado convocar conforme a las leyes que disponen se congreguen los homes y prelados.}^{235}\n\]

In the first instance, their discourse evoked notions of citizenship, virtue, corruption, and society, whereas in Quito, the insurgents invoked religion, sovereignty, and the "homes buenos y prelados" from ancient Castilian law.

Complaints in Guayaquil frequently centered on republican virtues, as when in 1790, Regidor Andrés de Herrera Campusano accused Bejarano "de desatenderse entre otras de sus obligaciones de conciudadano."\(^{236}\) Or earlier, in 1787, when Alferez Real Joaquin Pareja, also feuding with Bejarano and Roca over the trade monopoly to Acapulco, claimed that "el beneficio público" was being threatened and that Bejarano and his faction had opposed "asuntos interesantes a la causa pública." The emphasis to be placed on "public," for at stake were no longer "el bien común," "el pueblo," or a community of medieval
origins, but the public sphere of private citizens. Such claims to "el beneficio público" and "la causa pública," reflected an incipient, but no less important, distinction between the private and the public, as befitting to a republic. In medieval communities there were no public rights, since "fueros" and special privileges were private in nature, for they belonged to a lineage, a group, or a corporation, while concern for the public good was the essence of republicanism.

"El asunto interesante de la causa pública," which Pareja referred to concerned a proposal made by Damián de Arteta, a wealthy exporter and shipowner from Guayaquil, who in exchange for exclusive rights to the quota of 10,000 fanegadas of cacao for Acapulco offered to enact projects beneficial to the public good. The arguments used by Arteta on his "paisanos y compatriotas," give us insight as to the prevailing ideology, for the cabildo had endorsed his offer, setting off the angry feuding with Bejarano.

Claiming that his offer reflected "amor a mi patria," Damián de Arteta viewed himself as an instrument of God to pursue the public good. In exchange for the monopoly of cacao trade to Acapulco during four consecutive years, he intended to deposit 200,000 pesos with the depositario general in Guayaquil, to provide credit to needy cocecheros at five percent interest, without imposing lower prices for their cacao, as was the usual case with
habilitadores. The return on the principle was to finance a religious school for young girls, for the benefit of both Majesties, God and King, and hire "tres maestros de escuela grátis al público....dos hombres en pasaje que se señale y una mujer, para enseñar a toda clase de gente." Two professors of grammar and philosophy would also be hired, while the remaining funds would be loaned to poor young men who wished to work. In a letter to President García de León y Pizarro, Arteta claimed that as procurador of the cabildo in 1778, he had promoted the establishment of free schools for children, and that after settling in Mexico, he had sent information to Guayaquil, regarding the actions of the Cabildo in Mexico City in favor of "public education."^41

His willingness to risk 200,000 pesos and forsake their interest, suggests that there were substantial profits to be made in a monopoly of cacao trade with Acapulco, so we might doubt his avowed intentions of seeking solely "the public good." Yet several modernizing ideas stand out in his proposal. Rather than the usual advance of cash by habilitadores, a common practice in the colonies to control production and trade, (since it enabled habilitadores to lower prices,) Arteta sought to offer credit to cocecheros at five percent interest, without imposing lower prices. He also endorsed another modern idea, that of "public education," no longer designed for such groups as the nobility, the Indians, or
el estado llano, in other words, organized according to corporate principles, but free and open to all classes. Secondly, education was viewed as the means to form good citizens for the benefit of both Majesties, as Arteta claimed, a common view of the Enlightenment.242 Also, with the exception of the school for girls, these schools were to be entrusted to lay individuals, one of whom, we might note, was a woman.

Such were certainly more secularizing and modern views on society than Quito's, where "plebs and the nobility" were the social categories most commonly employed and where corporate groups were the organizing principles for many of their social practices. Yet Quito was a center for enlightened learning, while Guayaquil had no formal schools, not to mention universities. This once more suggests the primacy of experience over ideas for the spread of the Enlightenment, as argued in the previous chapter.243

We have seen that in the nineteenth century Guayaquil was concomitantly described as a mercantile community, with little interest in politics and culture, only in business ventures. Yet as early as 1787, its language included such notions as "el beneficio público," "la causa pública," "conciudadanos," "compatriotas," "sociedad," abstract notions which, in essence, laid claims to uniformity and universality, ideals so common to the Enlightenment. These notions expressed a different
conception of society, no longer viewed as a totality of hierarchical corporate groups, but ideally perceived as a conglomerate of individuals equal before the law. Such an ideal was most certainly not realized in this eighteenth century colonial town, but the fact that these notions had become part of their vocabulary was a significant change. Furthermore, in a classic republican order, which we might remember was coeval with different political systems, including monarchies, citizens tended to be more politicized, for societies were also ideally conceived as having a public or political space, no doubt, at the expense of the private, where interests could be reconciled. Hence the frequent recourse to laws and courts rather than rebellions to air their differences, which in the following chapter we shall note was also the case with sectors other than the elites.

Another contrast to Quito, where conflicts of varying nature were frequently transformed into offenses against honor, was the forthright language in which the elites in Guayaquil expressed their differences, as when Regidor Andrés Herrera Campusano accused his enemies of forming "una liga de los poderosos para destruir a los que no lo son," or labeled his opponents as "caudillo de los poderosos," and "testa, caudillo y oráculo de su complot." Factionalism among merchants was intense in Guayaquil, as Alferez Real Joaquín Pareja complained in 1787, but then republics throughout history had been known
for internal discord and conflicts. Nonetheless, these conflicts were dealt with in a more direct manner than in Quito, even when feuding with royal governors. Shortly after his arrival in 1779, Governor Pizarro had informed the cabildo that he wished to be escorted to and from sessions as had been customarily done much earlier, a practice discontinued for unknown reasons in Guayaquil. Cabildo members informed the governor that they would not comply with his request, for there was no law which sanctioned such a practice. They, in fact, viewed such a practice as "vil servidumbre." The Cabildo's refusal sparked a feud with Pizarro, his lieutenant governor, and later of course with Bejarano and other wealthy exporters, which lasted for several years, with brief respites when the alférez real was banished from the city by the Audiencia. It was this feuding that supposedly had defiled the estandarte real, that most sacred symbol of the king. It was customary for the alférez real to exhibit the estandarte real on his balcony on the eve of Santiago, patron saint of Guayaquil, an event greatly appreciated by the populace, for the alférez would also provide music, luminaries and other such forms of entertainment. On one such occasion, Lieutenant Governor Mexia del Valle, already feuding with Pareja, withdrew the estandarte by force from the home of Pareja with the assistance of soldiers, provoking a scandal in which Bejarano, as commandant of the militia, refused to intervene. Yet
Mexia's aim was not so much the royal emblem but the accompanying musicians, since he wished to have the festivities closer to the home of one of his mistresses, who was in bereavement due to the recent loss of a child. Naturally, this behaviour was considered scandalous and greatly angered the alferez real, who had gone into considerable expense for the festivities. The Audiencia put an end to their dispute by banning the display of the estandarte in the ensuing years, to the chagrin of the populace. Yet, despite claims raised by cabildo members before the king that the royal emblem had been defiled, all their bickering suggests that the estandarte real had lost some of its sacred aura, and had rather been downgraded to a mere token of power vied by local factions, a situation that interestingly enough repeated itself decades later, when the younger Pareja, who succeeded his father as alferez real, feuded in much the same manner with Governor Cucalón. This was already a different use of symbols than in Quito, where we might remember that later, in 1809, the portrait of the king was made to legitimize the earliest convention of the insurgents. A keen observer as Stevenson, whose description of the lavish affairs of the insurgent government we have earlier noted, also described the rituals in highland villages and towns when welcoming Ruiz de Castilla on his arrival in 1807. These highly ritualized practices sanctioned as well labor relations
between hacendados and their Indian tenants. We shall return to this discussion in our conclusions, for we consider that these differences in culture had important bearings for the respective political projects.

Whether abstaining from insurgency between 1809 and 1812, or separating from Spain in 1820, the elites in Guayaquil gave evidence of a more self-directed course of action. The coup of October 1820, was truly a political emancipation, a rational choice on the part of merchants and planters, in face of deteriorating conditions that resulted from widespread insurgency in neighboring colonies. Guayaquil flourished under Bourbon rule, and expressed no nostalgia for past liberties as did Quito, or fears of corruption and decay. If anything, in earlier decades, Guayaquileños expressed concern over the well-being of the "public," for the cacao boom had inspired some merchants, such as Roca, Bejarano and other large exporters, to pursue more individual gains at the expense of the public. This led the cabildo to lament that in Guayaquil "ya no se oía respirar otra cosa que abundancias y riquezas", and that the "poderosos". "desatendiéndose de sus obligaciones de conciudadanos," had established "la liga para destruir a los que no lo son."

As with other late bloomers such as Cuba, Guayaquil was dispensed royal favors such as tax reductions for its cacao exports. It also enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy, if for no other reason than the jurisdictional
confusion created by ambiguous policies. This autonomy manifested itself most clearly between 1820 and 1822, when the Provincia Libre de Guayaquil claimed the right to self rule and self determination, a course of action overidden by Bolivar. Merchants and planters in Guayaquil sought to establish a neo-classic republic of civil liberties and virtuous citizens, as Olmedo undoubtedly did during his brief tenure as president of the Provincia Libre de Guayaquil.

In El Patriota, their first newspaper, funded through private initiative, they explained that:

La imprenta es el conductor clásico que transmite las luces a la mayor celeridad, y ya no habrá ángulo en la América, que no sienta el fuego de la verdad. Preparado esta el triunfo de la razón y la filosofía y la humanidad quedará vengada.247

They likewise extolled the virtues of commerce, claiming that "el hombre laborioso al pisar este país se hace comerciante por un influjo irresistible." They deplored that "tres siglos de ignorancia trabas y prohibiciones" had prevented Guayaquil, "señora del Pacifico", from enjoying the benefits of its resources, previously appropriated by the merchants in Lima, associated to those from Cádiz.248

Following independence in 1820, republicanism permeated there everyday worldview: their heroes pursued republican ideals, the ladies practiced republican virtues, and even their dead were given republican burials, a situation, we shall see, that was not much
different for sectors other than the elites in adjoining coastal regions. These early experiments with nation-state formation, however, were abruptly interrupted by Bolívar in 1822, when he annexed the Presidency of Quito to Colombia. We do not know, of course, if the outcome in the ensuing decades would have been any different had history been allowed to follow another course. Although it cannot concern us here, the commitment to civic liberties and republican virtues eventually waned, and in practice that ideal republic of virtuous citizens dedicated to the public good became more elusive.

In the following chapters, as we examine the political culture of sectors other than the elites, we shall discuss some of the conditions which explain the regional differences discussed in both this and the earlier chapter.

Notes

1. Major blazes in the eighteenth century were those of 1707, 1736, and "el fuego grande" of 1764, which left one and a half million pesos in losses. In the early nineteenth century, Guayaquil had suffered three blazes, in 1801, 1804, and 1807. Julio Estrada Icaza, "Evolución Urbana de Guayaquil" Revista del Archivo Histórico del Guayas, 1 (1972) 41-47; Abel Romeo Castillo Los Gobernadores de Guayaquil del Siglo XVIII (Madrid, 1931), 311; and Maria Luisa Laviana Cuetos, Guayaquil en el siglo XVIII. Recursos naturales y desarrollo económico (Sevilla, 1987), 44-60.

2. "Padece (el pueblo de Guayaquil) una turbación tan fuerte que los deja despavoridos y sin aliento" was the opinion of Visitador José García de León y Pizarro in 1778, quoted in Laviana Cuetos, Guayaquil en el Siglo XVIII, 54,
While in 1796, Martín de Icaza, a local merchant commented that "Viven constantemente sobresaltados. Se estremece hasta el más indolente a la voz de fuego, mas que temblores," in Castillo, *Los Gobernadores de Guayaquil en el siglo XVIII*, 319.

3. For a history of these shipyards, though in earlier centuries, see Lawrence A. Clayton, *Los astilleros del Guayaquil colonial* (Guayaquil, 1978). For the eighteenth century, see Laviana Cuetos, *Guayaquil en el siglo XVIII*, the chapter entitled "La Riqueza forestal y los astilleros," 227-301.


6. "El Gobernador de Guayaquil informa que la Junta de Quito se desentiende del cumplimiento de la Real Orden del catorce de Abril pasado, Mayo 9, 1812." AGI, Quito, 261.

7. Ibid

8. "Oficio del Obispo de Quito al Gobernador y Ayuntamiento de Guayaquil, Marzo 22, 1812." AGI, Quito, 262.

9. "Real Decreto de Fernando VII en que se concede al Cabildo de Guayaquil el Título de "Excelencia Entera" y los Capitulares el de "Señoría," in Cuadernos de Historia y Arqueología. 16/18 (1956), 142-144.


16. While the population in the highlands decreased from 359,554 in 1765 to 342,413 in 1825, during these same years, the population in the Province of Guayaquil increased from 22,445 in 1765 to 72,492 in 1825. The population in the city rose from 4,914 in 1765 to 14,000 by 1820. Hamerly, *Historia social y económica*, 65-71.

17. Ibid

18. Prosopographic studies for Guayaquil, or for that matter, the Audiencia of Quito, have yet to be done; nevertheless, examples abound of peninsulars and creoles who settled successfully in Guayaquil in the second half of the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century. By mid-eighteenth century, among others, Miguel de Olmedo, Juan Antonio Rocafuerte, Francisco Ventura de Garaicoa, Joseph Gorrochátegui from Spain. José Gabriel, Isidro and Martin de Icaza, and Bernardo Roca, from Panama. Later in the century,
José de Bustamante, José de Ortega, Manuel de Aguirre, Manuel de Avilés, José Larrainzár, Manuel de Jado, also, from Spain. In the early nineteenth century, Manuel Loro, Antonio Zuvillaga, Manuel Antonio de Luzárraga, Jacinto Camaño, from Spain. From Cartagena, José María Peña and Esteban Amador; José de Villamil, from Louisiana, and Carlos Lagomarcino from Genoa. Preliminary studies have been published by David Cubitt, in "La Composición social de una élite Hispano Americana a la independencia: Guayaquil, en 1820," Revista de Historia de América, 94 (Julio – Diciembre de 1982), 7-31; and "The Government, the criollo elite and the revolution of 1820 in Guayaquil," Ibero-Amerikanisches Archiv, N.F. Jg8 H.3 (1982), 257-282.


20. Ibid, 40.

21. Ibid, 32.

22. Hamerly, Historia social y económica, 124.


25. Hamerly, Historia social y económica, 124.

26. Merchants in Guayaquil openly and consistently violated this restriction between the years 1774 and 1789, when legal exports of cacao surpassed the quota of 10,000 fanegadas. See Laviana Cuetos, Guayaquil en el Siglo XVIII, 186 and 189. In 1779, for instance, they legally exported 46,000 cargas to Acapulco. "Informe de la Contaduría Mayor," ANH, Presidencia, 91.

27. In 1779, two local merchants, Joseph Bustamante and Juan Campusano paid fines for a contraband captured in Acapulco of "190 botijas de aguardiente" and "6 petacas de cascarrilla," confiscated in 1772, the property of Joseph de la Borda, ANH, Presidencia, 91. Hamerly notes that de la Borda was a shipowner and alcalde ordinario in 1760. Historia social y económica, 123.

28. The price of cacao placed in Acapulco has been estimated at 5 pesos each carga, and was sold anywhere from 15 to 60 pesos. Profits were
invested in contraband to be sold in Peru for 100 to 200% above its cost, so that total profits could range anywhere between 100 and 1000%, depending on prevailing conditions. León Borja and Szaszdi, "El Comercio del cacao," 16.

29. Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, Discourse and political reflections on the Kingdoms of Peru, 44-52. Contraband was introduced through the Guayas and Daule river, as well as the Partidos of Portoviejo and Santa Elena, where ships coming from Acapulco, Panama, Chocó and Realejo, as well as those coming from Peru, unloaded part of their cargo. "Instrucción que se ha de observar para el Resguardo General de las Rentas Reales y Puerto de Guayaquil por sus respectivos ministros, Noviembre 18, 1779" AGI, Quito, 241.

30. In 1778, Visitador Pizarro reported the need to establish a resguardo in Puná and Guayaquil to prevent the fraudulent introduction and export of contraband. He also proposed to import eight to ten slaves to patrol the coast, renting them out when off duty to cover living expenses. Ibid.


32. "Expediente presentado por el Teniente Gobernador de Puerto Viejo en que certifica su arreglada conducta, 1787-1789." AGI, Quito, 271.


34. "Certificación de escribano para Joaquín Pareja."

35. Cacao production almost tripled by the end of the century, from 35,000 cargas in 1765 to 68,000 in 1779, and 100,000 in 1800. By 1809 production had risen to 150,000 cargas, peaking at 180,000 to 190,000 by 1820. Laviana Cuetos, Guayaquil en el Siglo XVIII, 182-186. For trade figures see Hamerly, Historia social y económica, 122; Conniff "Guayaquil through independence," 392; For cacao imports to Spain, see John R. Fisher "The effects of comercio libre on the economies of New Granada and Perú: A comparison," Historia, 45 (Bogotá, 1988), 45-58.


41. Cacao exports had risen from 30% of total trade in 1765 to 60 and 80% by 1820, Michael Hamerly, *Historia Social*, 130-131. Carlos Contreras has a different view, and maintains that cacao remained between 45 and 50% of total exports; *El sector exportador de una economía colonial*, 91-123. In 1777, for instance, cacao exports totaled 54,382 cargas at 217,528 pesos, accounting for 55% of total exports, while in 1779, 53,000 cargas were exported, at 212,911 pesos, or 53% of total exports. "Contaduría Mayor," ANH, Presidencia, 83 and 91.

42. In 1777, for instance, 602 "fardos de panó" from Quito were exported at 90 pesos each, for a total of 54,180 pesos. An additional 36,982 pesos accounted for cascarilla, also from the highland, and 13,077 pesos for tobacco, yet the total value of these three products was roughly equivalent to 50% of the value of cacao exports. The remaining exports during that same year were mostly artisan made, for a total of 78,000 pesos, although it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between locally made products and those made in northern Perú, introduced in Guayaquil and reexported. "Contaduría Mayor."


46. Toquilla hats, or Panama hats, as they were later known, were woven in the Partido of Portoviejo, and eventually became the second export product after cacao. Juan Maiguashca, "El desplazamiento regional y la burguesía en el Ecuador, 1760-1860," in *Segundo encuentro de historia regional y realidad económica y social del Ecuador* (Cuenca, 1978); also Carmen Anhalzer, *Soberanía e insurrección en Manabí* (Quito
Stevenson found conditions of wage laborers in the city of Guayaquil different from other colonial districts. He described their personal independence due to the monetary relationship. Later, in 1825, the British Consul also believed wages to be excessively high. In Conniff "Guayaquil through Independence," 401-402. Much earlier, in 1774, Francisco Requena had felt likewise, Carlos Contreras, El sector exportador, 63.

Hamerly, Historia social, 111. Earlier, in 1773, wages at the tar mines in Santa Elena were 2 reales a day, including three meals a day, estimated at real y cuartillo. "Testimonio y diligencias actuadas en el Remate de la Mina de Brea y Copée existente en el Partido de la Punta de Santa Elena, Julio 13, 1772," ANH, Presidencia, 83.

León Borja and Szazdi, "El Comercio del cacao," 49; Hamerly, Historia social, 101; Conniff, "Guayaquil through Independence," 401-402, and Laviana Cuetos, Guayaquil en el siglo XVIII, 172.

Contreras, El sector exportador, 60.

In 1778, it was suggested that laborers be brought from the highlands to solve the problem of labor deficits for the expansion of tobacco cultivation. Wages in the highland were said to be 20 pesos a year and the tribute, which accounted for probably 4 to 5 pesos a year paid by the hacendado. The idea was to pay highland laborers in the tobacco plantations 40 pesos a year and the tribute, twice the amount paid in Quito. "Relacioones que se han hecho a favor de la cultura de los tobacos, 1778," ANH, Presidencia, 29, Doc. 197. Manuel Chiriboga has argued that in terms of real salary, the 0.6 reales paid in the coast was not much different from the 0.05 or 0.10 in the highlands, since the cost of living in Guayaquil was much higher than in Quito. This did not seem to be the case in the late colonial period, for 3 meals a day for laborers in the tar mines in Santa Elena were estimated at "real y cuartillo." The 3 reales earned in cash and three daily meals, gave these laborers some leeway. Also, by 1779, a head of wild cattle sold for one peso, and the cost of cheese was one real, which would indicate that laborers earning 6 reales a day and one meal, were not faring as badly as Chiriboga claims. "Testimonios de los Autos y diligencias actuadas en el Remate de las Minas de Brea."
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52. Laviana Cuetos, *Guayaquil en el Siglo XVIII*, 270.

53. 1814, for instance, Jacinto Camaño, owner of several haciendas in Guayaquil, placed a bid for 100 slaves from the mines in Playa de Oro and from an hacienda owned by insurgents from Quito in Esmeraldas, which had been sequestered by the Crown. Camaño was short of capital on account of "the turmoil of recent years," whereby he proposed to mortgage his "fincas" to cover an initial installment on the slaves, and pay the balance either annually or in tobacco. Camaño finally purchased only fifty slaves, after negotiating a lower price for the slaves claiming their "mala fama". He expected that "lejos del patrio suelo," the slaves would abandon "esas ideas locas de libertad." Jacinto Camaño was originally from Spain, and we assume, forebearer of later President of Ecuador and wealthy cacao planter, Jacinto Camaño. "Jacinto Camaño al presidente Montes, Agosto 6, 1814," ANH, Presidencia, 510.

54. In 1777, only 9 slaves were imported, their price ranging from 200 to 400 each. "Contaduria Mayor." ANH, Presidencia, 83.


56. Ibid, 101-102.

57. Ibid, 109. In the 1770s, for instance, merchants in Machala, one of the richest cacao producing partidos, were forbidden to collect payments from the Indians in their "huertas de cacao," for they were forcing them into debt. "El fiscal protector de los naturales del Distrito de esta Real Audiencia por la protección y defensa de los indios de la Puná y Machala," ANH, Presidencia. 74, Doc. 2970. Tobacco cultivation, after the reforms enacted by Pizarro, was expanded through a system of "matriculas." Each cocechero received a certain number of tobacco plants to be grown in private and government owned land, near river banks. In the 1780s, landowners in Daule were asking excessive rent from their tenants, "cocecheros de tabaco", denying them access to "cañaverales" and other resources, with which they supplemented their income. It was recommended that rent be charged only in proportion to the amount paid earlier to the crown for this land. "Relaciones que se han hecho en favor de la cultura de los tabacos, ANH, Presidencia, 29, Doc. 107. See also Laviana Cuetos, *Guayaquil en el Siglo XVIII*, 202-204.
In 1765, demographic density in the province was 0.45 inhabitants per sq. km; by 1840 it had increased to 1.72 per sq. km. Cacao producing partidos such as Daule, Baba, Babahoyo and Machala experienced the most increase between these years. Hamerly, Historia social y económica, 68-87.

This was the opinion of Requena, Stevenson, and Terry. The coast also functioned as an open frontier for the highland population, lured by the possibility of having their own land. Hamerly, Historia social, 71. Still, for the serranos, migration to the coast meant adaptation to an alien environment and often hostile conditions.

On several occasions the protector de naturales raised claims for abuses by merchants who indebted the Indians, as was the case in Puná and Machala, already mentioned, where they would indebted Indians in "500 and 600 pesos", and later collected these debts in cacao at a lower price. "El fiscal protector de los naturales del Distrito de esta Real Audiencia." In 1793, Juan de Ascaray placed an embargo on the tar mines in Santa Elena, rented by Juan Antonio Rocafuerte, at the time teniente of the Partido de la Punta, for the abuses he inflicted on the Indians with "reparto de mercancías," which according to Ascaray, were worse than in Perú. "Comunicación de Juan Ascaray, Mayo 18, 1793," ANH, Presidencia, 93. Somewhat earlier, the Indians of Jipijapa complained against the Teniente of Portoviejo, Manuel Núñez de Balboa for forcing them into debt in exchange for toquilla hats. "Expediente que sigue Juan María Romero, Administrador de Tributos y los indios del pueblo de Jipijapa contra el teniente gobernador de Puerto Viejo, sobre capítulos y malversación de conducta," AGI, Quito 271.

According to this same author, in 1832, there were only 3 conciertos in the Cantons of Daule, Santa Elena, Baba, Babahoyo and Machala, versus 1,704 jornaleros, 113.

See Tyrer, Historia demográfica y económica de la Audiencia de Quito.

Hamerly, Historia social, 102.

Ibid, 102 and 109. In 1777, for instance, two large cacao planters, Vicente Severo del Castillo and Silvestre Gorostiza were accused of unlawful appropriation of 10 leagues of land in Santa María de Tenguel, which had cacao trees "cultivados por la Divina Providencia". A small fraction of this land
was originally owned by the Cacique don Juan Thomalá, great grandfather of Gorostiza. "Denuncia de Miguel Gómez Cornejo sobre terrenos de Santa María de Tenguel, Abril 2, 1777." AGI, Quito 263.

65. Between 1771 and 1774, Francisco Plaezert, Juan Pablo and Pedro Murillo, were accused of encroaching communal Indian land in Ojiba and Puebloviejo, cacao growing partidos. "El protector de naturales por el amparo del gobernador don Clemente Nasacón, Junio 1774." ANH, Indígenas, 97.


67. Ibid. Ten merchants handled 78% of the cacao trade during that year, in volume ranging from 1,000 cargas, exported by Jacinto de los Santos, to 15,528 cargas, exported by the Cádiz-based merchants Ustariz-San Ginés, while the remaining 22% was exported by approximately 43 merchants. A similar situation applied in later years. Between 1804 and 1811, ten to thirteen merchants sold 55% to 88% of cacao, the remaining product marketed by 50 or 60 smaller merchants. Contreras, El sector exportador de una economía colonial.

68. Ibid, 68 and 87. According to Contreras, cacao exports for the years 1804, 1806, 1810 and 1811, were 104,479, 121,071, 74,213 and 23,082 cargas respectively, from information gathered at the Archivo Nacional in Lima. The decline in exports during 1810 and 1811 is understandable in view of the events in Spain and New Spain. If production was up to 150,000 cargas by 1809, it would be of interest to know what became of excess cacao production. Hamerly estimates that approximately 10% of cacao was lost after peeling and drying, and part of the product was, of course, sold for internal consumption. Historia social, 110.

None of the wealthier merchants from Guayaquil, such as Jacinto Bejarano, Bernardo Roca, and Martín de Icaza, figure among the list of large cacao exporters mentioned by Contreras for those years. In fact, among those mentioned, we are certain that only three merchants were based in Guayaquil: Manuel de Jado, José Agustín Zuvillaga and Manuel Ignacio de Aguirre, all three from Spain. We can assume that Pedro José Bejarano, José María Molestina and Manuel Sotomayor y Luna were also vecinos from Guayaquil. In a list of home dwellers drawn in 1812 for collection of fees for street chandlers, none of these merchants are listed as vecinos of Guayaquil at the time, with the exception of Jado, Zuvillaga, and Aguirre, which suggests that a large number of exporters during
these years were foreign based. "Lista de las Casas en el Centro de Guayaquil 9.VIII, 1812," in Revista del Archivo Histórico del Guayas, 2 (Diciembre, 1972) 105-114.


70. The largest importers in 1777 were Isidro de Icaza, Melchor de Ocampo, Manuel Munga, Damián de Arteta, Francisco Sánchez Navarrete and Francisco Espinosa, Silvestre Benavelles, Joaquín Ligero, and Oscar de la Riva, some of whom were probably not settled in Guayaquil. It was frequent for maestres traveling the coastal route, or even long distance routes, to engage in trade, and later become established merchant, as was the case with Martín de Isaguirre, Vicente López Escudero, Vicente Buillard and others. We know for sure that Icaza, Arteta, Sánchez Navarrete were settled in Guayaquil, yet non of these importers were listed among those planters expanding their cacao holdings. Isidro de Icaza specialized in importing rum and wine, the equivalent to 23% of total imports in 1777. Andrés de Castro, for instance, a merchant later settled in Esmeraldas, had sailed during 16 years between "Monte-Video" and Monte Blanco, as maestre of frigates belonging to the merchants from Lima. He had engaged in coastal trading with his own ships, having lost four bergantines. During the wars with the British, he had served as privateer, "al corso y mercancia", with 22 cannons and 100 men, finally settling in Esmeraldas where he had made repartimientos, or advances in goods along this coast. "Relación de Méritos de Andrés de Castro," ANH, Presidencia, 483.

71. Francisco Sánchez Navarrete had also rented the tar mines in Santa Elena between 1772 and 1779, while his brother Joseph Sánchez Navarrete had farmed out the collection of diezmos within the province of Guayaquil. ANH, Presidencia 91. Both brothers were the owners of several ships. For a list of ship owners during these years see Laviana Cueto, Guayaquil en el Siglo XVIII, 290-291.


73. Laviana Cueto, Guayaquil en el siglo XVIII, 117

74. As has already been mentioned, many peninsulars had settled during this period in Guayaquil, to become successful merchants and planters. For a list of Europeans living in Guayaquil during the independence period see Juan Emilio Roca,"Recuerdos Históricos de la Emancipación Política del Ecuador y del 9 de

75. In 1785, nine cocecheros petitioned unsuccessfully to the crown for a license to export 20,000 fanegadas to Acapulco: Josef Antonio Paredes, Pablo Bernales, Josef Antonio Carrera, Ignacio Delagado, Ignacio Avilés, Juan Ponce de León, Martín de Isaguirre, Francisco de la Vega, Antonio Arendo, Francisco de Herrera, Juan Cornejo, and Miguel Lavalle. Contreras, El sector exportador, 88-89.

76. In 1788, Isaguirre was accused of monopolizing the distribution of salt, and preventing the Indians from Santa Elena from selling their salt. ANH, Indígenas Caja 128. Contreras lists Isaguirre among the cocecheros seeking a license to export cacao to Acapulco in 1785. El sector exportador, 47. In 1791, Isaguirre was the maestre of a ship named Guarande, ANH, Presidencia 296. For a list of ship owners and maestres during this period see Laviana Cuetos, Guayaquil en el Siglo XVIII, 290-291.

77. "Lo cobrado por el Ramo de la bodega de Bola y Naranjal, 1779," ANH, Presidencia, 91.


79. Manuel Antonio de Luzárraga owned a total of 225,000 trees, Santiago Vitores, 200,000, and the heirs of Martín de Icaza, 325,000 trees. Hamerly, Historia social, 109.

80. Tables drawn by Hamerly from a census by occupation in the province of Guayaquil in 1832 show that 727 individuals or 43.3% identified themselves as "hacendados and propietarios," and 339 as "comerciantes and negociantes," the equivalent to 17.5% of those listed, Historia social, 113-116; Cubitt arrives at a greater number of merchants during the years 1820-1822, or 36.1% versus 19.4 hacendados and 19.4 propietarios. "La composición social de una élite en la independencia: Guayaquil en 1820," 15.

81. Such observations were made by Andrés Baleato, a Spanish bureaucrat visiting the port around 1820, William Bennet Stevenson in 1804 and 1822, and Adrian
Terry in 1830. Similar observations had been made earlier, in 1736, by Juan and Ulloa. Conniff, "Guayaquil through Independence," 396.

82. Adrian Terry, Travels in the Equatorial Regions, 60.

83. Other merchants who owned ships were Miguel de Jado and Manuel Ignacio de Aguirre. By 1803, though, Bejarano was apparently facing economic difficulties. He was indebted with Temporalidades in the amount of 24,526 pesos for "fardos de panos" which he had appropriated. The crown attempted to collect this debt in 1803, but Bejarano contested the amount arguing that earlier payments should have applied to the principal and not the interest. At the time, he had already sold La Guayaquileña and another frigate named Eufemia, the product of which was deposited at the Consulado of Lima. Bejarano claimed that these funds, a total of 45,000 pesos, were the only assets he possessed, so he asked that the "deuda justa," in accordance with canons from the Siete Partidas, be deducted from these funds. Bejarano reminded the Crown that on several occasions he had spent large amounts of money at the service of the king, as when Isla de Lobos was threatened by the British, at which time he spent over 14,000 pesos furnishing the troop and reconditioning his frigate, funds that he had never collected." "Representación de Jacinto Bejarano ante la Audiencia, 1803," ANH, Presidencia, Tomo 415.

84. Hamerly, Historia social, 110-111.

85. Much has been speculated regarding the low investment of capital needed for cacao plantations, given the underlying social and economic conditions. Land had little or no cost, and a preferred method of planting was "redención de cultivos," a system of sharecropping that required little investment on the part of the planter. See, for instance, Manuel Chiriboga, Jornaleros y gran propietarios, 16-17; Carlos Marchán, "Economía y sociedad durante el Siglo XVIII," Revista Cultura, 24 (Quito,1986) tomo I, 55-76; Andrés Guerrero, Los oligarcas del cacao (Quito, 1980); and Contreras, El sector exportador, 54-68. Still, some financial backing was probably needed to become a large cacao planter. The cost of producing a carga of cacao has been estimated at two pesos a year, including transportation and operational costs. León Borja and Szaszdi, "El comercio de cacao." A medium planter producing 6,000 cargas a year, as did the cacique Choez in Jipijapa in 1796, would supposedly need some 12,000 pesos a year for operational purposes, although this is not a good example, since we do not know the type of labor
relations instituted between a cacique and his Indians. "Compulsa de los indios de Jipiajapapara obtener título de propiedad y amparo," "Correspondencia del Gobernador de Manabí con el Ministro del Interior, Año de 1853", ANH Serie: Gobienro. But for the sake of comparison, larger planters, as Icaza, Luzárraga, Vítores, who owned over 100,000 cacao trees, would conceivably have higher operational needs, and thereby larger capital investment.


87. Freight costs between Guayaquil, Callao, and Cádiz, have been estimated at 9 pesos per carga. Contreras, *El sector exportador*, 70-71, whereas freight to Acapulco, has been estimated at two pesos por carga,. Conniff, "Guayaquil through independence." which would give a competitive edge to cacao from Guayaquil over cacao from Venezuela. The following table by Carlos Contreras, estimates the profits per carga of cacao in Guayaquil, Lima and Cádiz, assuming that the price of each carga was 4 pesos in Guayaquil, 12 pesos in Lima, and 38 pesos in Cádiz. *El sector exportador*, 72-77

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<th>Price (pesos and reales)</th>
<th>% of price</th>
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<td>Amount paid to grower</td>
<td>4p.4r</td>
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<td>Freight</td>
<td>9p</td>
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<td>Guayaquil-Callao-Cádiz</td>
<td>1p.4r</td>
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<tr>
<td>Profit-Merchants in Guayaquil</td>
<td>4p.4r</td>
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<td>Profit-Merchants in Lima</td>
<td>18p.4r</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38 pesos</td>
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89. In 1779, Jacinto Bejarano, Miguel de Olmedo, Pedro de Arteta and Silvestre Gorostiza tried unsuccessfully to prevent the crown from granting licenses to merchants from Lima. Bejarano, in particular, contested a license given to Antonio Elmes, from Lima, for he had just finished building the frigate *La Guayaquileña* to carry cacao for Acapulco, at a cost of 100,000 pesos. See León Borja and Szaszdi, "El comercio de cacao," 38-39.
90. The council reminded the king that earlier, in 1782, it had recommended that such restrictions be abolished, since the conditions which made these restrictions necessary, and which referred to the merchants from Venezuela, no longer existed. "Certificación de escribano para Joaquín Pareja." The change probably referred to the abolition of the monopoly of the Guipuzcoan Company, which forced independent merchants to market their cacao only in New Spain.

91. After 1773, cacao exports to Callao declined from approximately 50% in 1792 to 17% or less by 1804. Contreras, *El sector exportador*, 152-153; transportation remained, however, under the control of shipowners from Lima.

92. We have already mentioned Jacinto Bejarano, who owned at least three vessels by 1780. The frigate *Sacramento*, alias *La Guayaquileña*, built during this period, left Guayaquil for Acapulco in December, and returned in May. Secret compartments were supposedly built into this vessel to hide contraband goods. León Borja and Szaszdi, "El comercio de cacao," 39. Witnesses claimed that silk, damask, pekin, and china were sold freely in Guayaquil, by well known merchants as Bernardo Roca, with the complicity of Governor Pizarro and his lieutenant governor, Joseph Mexía del Valle, and that in Manta the maestre would be advised whether to continue towards Guayaquil, or else, unload before arriving to Punta de Arenas, with the aid of "balseros" and small river boat owners, the accomplices of Roca. "Pesquisa realizada por Pedro Quiñónez, Comisionado de la Real Audiencia", in "Certificación de escribano para Joaquín Pareja." In 1790 and 1791, this same vessel was again involved in contraband, as had been the case under Governor Pizarro. "El Gobernador de Guayaquil al Presidente de la Audiencia, Agosto 4, 1790" ANH, Presidencia 284.

93. León Borja and Szaszdi, "El comercio del cacao," 43. Between 1804 and 1813, 26% of cacao exports to Spain were shipped directly, whereas in earlier years, 50 to 75% had gone through Callao. Contreras, *El sector exportador*, 80-81.


96. Roca was granted permission to ship "efectos del Asia" to Callao without paying twice almofarizado. "Instancia promovida por Bernardo Roca del comercio de Guayaquil, Madrid, 17 de Junio, 1790," ANH, Presidencia 290.

97. León Borja and Szaszdy, "El comercio del cacao," 41.


99. "Expedientillo que contiene la Superior Orden concediendo la rebaja de derechos de Alcabalas a los Puertos del Perú a una cuarta parte del total que antes se cobraba, Mayo 4, 1802," ANH, Presidencia, 417.

100. Hamerly, *Historia social*, 129.


102. Among those whose property was confiscated were merchants who engaged in trade with Quito or who had recently arrived with their merchandise, such as Antonio Medina, Salvador Lemos, Antonio García, Andrés de Castro, Manuel Balberde, Manuel José Bergara, Felipe Xara, Martina Chico, Tomás Jurado, Juan Bautista Barberis, Mariano Legarda, José Xara, and Pedro Camacho. Among the goods confiscated were: *tinta añil*, hats, paper, pita, cacao, bayetas, *tocuyos*, xergas, ponchos, gold, and goods from Castille. "El Gobernador de Guayaquil representa el mérito y servicio del Comisario honorario de Fuerzas de Administración de estas aduanas, Abril 25, 1816," AGI, Quito 259.


104. "Expediente formado de oficio sobre averiguar que cantidad de dinero y géneros existen en la ciudad de Guayaquil en poder de don Carlos Lagomarsino de la pertenencia de don Mariano Guillermo de Valdivieso, Quito, Noviembre 25, 1812," ANH, Presidencia 478; and Modesto Chávez Franco, *Crónicas del Guayaquil antiguo*, (Guayaquil, 1945) 415.

105. Lagomarcino had settled in Guayaquil in the early nineteenth century and become a successful merchant. Between 1816 and 1820 he wrote several letters to Fernando VII, in which he identified himself as "natural de Guayaquil." Cubitt says that Lagomarcino was from Genoa, as does Chávez Franco, who also claims that Lagomarcino was the bastard brother of...
Fernando VII. Crónicas del Guayaquil antiguo, 415 In one of his letters, Lagomarcino mentioned that he had known Fernando VII when the King was five years old. "Cartas de don Carlos Lagomarcino, 1816-1819" AGI, Estado, 72; also, "Carta de Carlos Lagomarcino, Chiclayo, Setiembre 30, 1820," AGI, Estado, 74.

106. The family of Coronel Jacinto Rodríguez de Bejarano y Lavállen, Caballero del Orden de Santiago, or Jacinto Bejarano, as he liked to identify himself, included Vicario General José Ignacio Cortázar y Lavállen, appointed, in 1816, Bishop of Cuenca, José Luscando, asesor of the cabildo and interim governor, Regidor Juan Bautista Elizalde, Pablo Llaguno y Laváyen, an hacendado, Juan Antonio Rocafuerte, deceased in 1796, married to his sister, Josefa Bejarano y Laváyen, and the parents of both Vicente Rocafuerte as well as Bejarano's wife, since the Colonel had married his niece, Josefa Rocafuerte y Bejarano. Upon his death, she married General José de La Mar y Cortázar, from Cuenca, later President of Perú, also related to the Cortázar family in Guayaquil through his mother's side. Bejarano was also related to Coronel Luis Rico, interim governor in 1809, and General Gabino de Gainza, Captain General of Guatemala, both of whom had married other Rocafuerte and Bejarano sisters. Vicente Rocafuerte, Epistolario, ed. Carlos Landázuri (Quito, 1988) Tomo I, 33-35.


109. "Representación de vecinos de Guayaquil, 1805" ANH, Presidencia 431, documento 9936-41

110. "Capitulacion del Coronel Jacinto Bejarano del Orden de Santiago."

111. At the time, Cucalón complained to Lima of the unconditional loyalty of Asesor Luscando to the most powerful family in Guayaquil, that of Jacinto Bejarano, a cousin of Luscando's wife. Cucalón was also having problems with another relative by marriage to Bejarano, Pablo Llaguno, a landowner in Machala. ANH, Gobierno 56, "Expediente de don Pablo y Llaguno y Laváyen en que pide inhibitoria del teniente de Pueblo Viejo, Enero 24, 1807."
112. Ibid; "Informe del Presidente Ruiz de Castilla, enviando copia del informe del Gobernador de Guayaquil," AGI, Quito, 384.

113. Vicente Rocafuete, A la Nación. 166-167; Roberto Andrade, Historia del Ecuador primera parte, 204; and José Gabriel Navarro, La revolucion de Quito del 10 de Agosto de 1809, 91-95.


116. Ugarte was replaced in 1779, at the age of eighty, after rumors of his wanton life and constant quarreling with the cabildo reached the Viceroy. "El Virrey de Santa Fe a Gálvez, Diciembre 19, 1776," AGI, Quito, 237.

117. As in 1786, when Governor Pizarro bitterly complained to the Audiencia that Alferez Real Joaquin Pareja had walked away from a procession with the greatest scandal, simply to avoid escorting the Governor along with other cabildo members. (AGI, Quito 271), or in 1779, Lieutenant Governor Mexia protesting before the Audiencia for his assigned seat at the funeral of Josefa de Aviles, the sister of Depositario General Baltasar de Aviles, and cousin of an alcalde. "Comunicación del Teniente de Gobernador Mexia del Valle," Guayaquil, Archivo de la Biblioteca Municipal, (from hereafter, ABM), "Diversos Funcionarios, Vol. I.

118. "Representación del Capitan Andres Herrera de Campuzano." Joseph Mexia del Valle had arrived in Guayaquil, in the 1770s, sent by the Viceroy to assist Governor Ugarte, but was soon involved in factious behaviour against the governor, and allied on the side of the most powerful. In the 1780s, he was accused of contraband and illicit deals, along with Pizarro and the merchants already mentioned. In 1790, he shocked newly arrived Governor Aguirre, by stating that the only way to govern this "pueblo nacido de la esclavitud" was to ally justice and government to the most powerful and wealthy. "Comunicación del Gobernador de Guayaquil," AGI, Duplicado de Gobernadores, 262. Under Aguirre's tenure, Mexia was finally deposed and summoned to Spain, accused of introducing contraband of cascarrilla. ANH Presidencia, 289. Mexia had fathered
15 illegitimate children, one of them, apparently, José Mexía Lequerica, the brilliant representative to the Cortes for New Granada, who had married, as we saw in the previous chapter, Eugenio Espejo's sister.

119. Aguirre complained that all ships coming from Acapulco were loaded with contraband. "El Gobernador Aguirre al Presidente de la Audiencia, Agosto 4, 1790," ANH, Presidencia, 284. See also, "Representación del Capitán Andrés de Herrera Campusano."

120. "Comunicación del Gobernador Aguirre al Presidente de la Audiencia, Agosto, 4, 1790."

121. According to Mon y Velarde, rumors circulated in Guayaquil that the Viceroy had been bribed by Bejarano, and that Mon y Velarde was neither subdelegado nor comandant, and therefore had no jurisdiction to hear the case. "Comunicación del Presidente Mon y Velarde al Virrey del Perú, 1791," ANH, Presidencia, 284, Doc. 6982.

122. "Comunicación del Gobernador de Guayaquil Juan de Urbina, Julio 6, 1796," AGI, Quito, 262.


125. "Gobernador de Guayaquil protesta por haber sido despojado de Gobierno Político, Febrero 24, 1814," AGI, Quito, 262. Notwithstanding, Vasco remained in office until 1816, when his replacement, Coronel Juan Manuel de Mendiburu arrived in Guayaquil, though he had been appointed governor of Guayaquil in October, 1814.

126. The office of jueces de letras was established by the liberal Cádiz constitution. They would hear judicial matters or "causas contenciosas", previously, the responsibility of the teniente de gobernador, who were directly subordinated to the governor. As we shall see in the following chapter, the strongest opposition to the subdelegado came from the coastal towns in Portoviejo, where outright insurrection developed.

127. "Comunicación del Gobernador de Guayaquil, representando sobre incapacidad de José Maria Luscando, a quien se asegura ha repuesto la Audiencia de Lima, Agosto 20, 1814," AGI, Quito, 262.
Among cabildo members signing the communiqué to the Junta in Quito were wealthy planters as Jacinto Camaño, Sebastián Baquerizo, Manuel Ignacio Moreno, Manuel Ruíz, Juan Bautista de Elizalde, José Ignacio Gorrochátegui, Vicente Avilés, Francisco de Icaza, and Escribano Joaquín Montesdeoca. AGI, Quito 262. Among those endorsing the request to Montúfar to abstain from visiting Guayaquil: Vicente Rocafuerte, José Luscando, José Ignacio Casanova, José López Merino, Francisco Xavier Paredes, José Joaquín Pareja, Manuel Ignacio Moreno y Santistevan, Juan Bautista de Elizalde Domingo Iglesias y García, Juan Millán, all members of the merchant and planter elite. Ponce, Quito, 1809-1812, 210-211. A sole dissenter was López Merino, thereby denied the right to use the title of señoría granted to other cabildo members for their loyalty to the crown. López Merino had refused to sign one of the comunicóes, objecting to the phrase "el supuesto gobierno de Quito," for he claimed that on March, 1810, the Regency had recognized the Junta in Quito. Merino was a merchant from the interior, whose sons were at the time attending school in Quito, and later participated in the independence of Guayaquil. As a result, Merino became a suspect before Governors Vasco and Mendiburu. His sympathies for the Quito insurgency did not, however, prevent him from litigating his right to use the title. "Comunicación de Joseph Lopez Merino en que argumenta que la Junta fue aprobada por Real Orden del Concejo de Regencia, Mayo 14, 1811," AGI, Quito, 262.

In March, 1811, Governor Gil informed Madrid that a militia regiment had been reactivated with merchants, the Maestranza of the Astillero, and the battalion of Free Pardos, under the name of Voluntarios por la Defensa de la Patria. AGI, Quito, 260.

Martín de Icaza was commandant of the Regimiento de Milicias, and also donated a substantial amount of money for the troops, as did José de Ortega, another merchant and planter. ANH, Presidencia, 478.

Elizalde performed as secretary to Governor Gil in 1811, out of love for the King, and later volunteered to pacify the insurgent provinces. "Relación de Méritos de Domingo Elizalde, Teniente de Gobernador electo de Daule," ANH, Presidencia, 475.

In 1812, Manuel Lara, an hacendado in Daule, offered to pay all the expenses incurred by his son, an officer with the Compañía de Granaderos de la Milicia de Guayaquil, who had enlisted voluntarily. "Memorial de don Manuel Lara, vecino de Daule, Julio 17, 1812,"
133. Merchants and planters as Antonio Párames, Santiago Espantoso, Manuel Liona, Julián de Aspiázu, Juan de la Venera, Sebastián de Puga, José Ignacio Casanova, Juan Ponce, Agustín Rebolledo, Francisco Baquerizo, Estebán Amador, José Cornejo y Flor collaborated in one way or another with Governors Cucalón, Gil and Vasco y Pasqual in the campaigns against Quito. In 1809, for instance, Puga and Baquerizo imprisoned quiteños going through the Bodega of Babahoyo and escorted them to Guayaquil. Among those imprisoned were José Sánchez de Orellana and Ignacio Ortiz de Cevallos, both of whom were active participants in the second Junta. Roberto Andrade, Historia del Ecuador, primera parte, 203-204.

134. Notwithstanding their refusal to follow the maxims of the insurgent provinces, some merchants, apparently, continued to trade with the insurgents, as Vasco complained to Madrid. AGI, Quito, 262.

135. "Gobernador de Guayaquil instruye sobre su conducta política."

136. In 1812, President Montes informed that it was "público y notorio" that Merino, Bejarano and Casanova traded with the insurgents and supplied them with arms. AGI, Quito, 262.

137. "Informe del Gobernador Francisco Gil de Taboada, Enero 12, 1811," AGI, Quito, 237. Some historians, as Abel Romeo Castillo, view Bejarano as a precursor of independence, who had suposedly met with Miranda in 1797 in London, along with another Guayaquileño, José María Antepara. In doing so they have drawn from Chilean historian Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, and from Miranda's biographer, William Spencer Robertson, who identified one of Miranda's agents as Bejarano. Castillo, "Dos Guayaquilenos precursores de la independencia Americana: el coronel Jacinto Bejarano y el egregio José de Antepara," Cuadernos de Historia y Arqueología 9: 25/26 (Enero-Diciembre 1959-1960). This view has been disputed by other historians as Adam Szaszdi, "The historiography of the Republic of Ecuador" Hispanic American Historical Review 44:4 (1964), 529.

138. "Gobernador de Guayaquil instruye sobre su conducta política."
139. For Loja, see Marie Danielle Demelas, "Une dispute Municipal a Loja," Estudios Andinos, 13 (1984) 65-76

140. "Representación del Regidor Andrés de Herrera Campusano."

141. Ibid. Among those signing this complaint were Baltasar de Avilés, José Morán, Manuel Ignacio Moreno, Dr. Diego Espantoso.

142. Quito, we have seen, had 27 titles of nobility, whereas Guayaquil had none. While in Spain in the 1790s, Coronel Bejarano had petitioned for a title of nobility but was denied by the crown. In 1806, the crown issued titles to honor the marriage of Fernando and Maria Antonia de Borbón. The cabildo in Guayaquil nominated Martín de Icaza, but the privilege was instead granted to a Quiteño. It is, nonetheless, interesting to note the qualifications that the cabildo of Guayaquil chose to highlight for their candidate. They claimed that Icaza was "buen patriota, caritativo, juicioso y rico poderosamente, con la hacienda Santa Rita y otras que le rentan considerables miles," in Chávez Franco, Crónicas del Guayaquil Antiguo, 396-397. The cabildo of Quito nominated Manuel de Larrea y Jijón and Joaquín Sánchez de Orellana, although the Sánchez de Orellana family already belonged to the titled nobility. Larrea y Jijón was finally chosen, earning the title of Marqués de San José. ANH, Presidencia, 406.


144. Roca's preeminence in Guayaquil had been insured when he was placed in command of the pardo militia, although militia regulations demanded a white command and staff group. Another pardo who improved his social standing as captain of the pardo militia was Joaquin Murillo, later an hacendado. Allan J. Kuethe, Military Reform and Society in New Granada, 62-63.

145. "Representación de vecinos de Guayaquil, 1805" ANH, Presidencia, 439.

146. "Sobre calidad de don José López Merino quien compró en esta ciudad la vara de regidor," AGI, Quito, 262.
147. "Certificación de escribano para Joaquín Pareja."


150. Vicente Rocafuerte, *A La Nación*, 167. Such claims may have been mere bravado on the part of the elites in Guayaquil, for orders had sometimes been issued earlier in Madrid or in Lima. In 1805, Bejarano accused Cucalón and López Merino of concealing the fact that the royal order decreeing the reimbursement of alcabalas to the merchants in Guayaquil had already been issued by the king, and was not, therefore, an accomplishment of López Merino. Although the elites in Guayaquil claimed credit for Cucalón's removal, he was in trouble with the Viceroy for having opposed the annexation of Guayaquil to Lima after the insurrection in Quito, as he explained to the Minister of War in Spain, in a letter dated July 30th, 1810. Cucalón had complained heavily against Ruiz de Castilla and the Viceroy for depriving him of command in favor of Coronel Arredondo from Lima, for Cucalón had responded promptly to Ruiz de Castilla's urgent pleas for help. See list of documents in José Gabriel Navarro, *Historia de la revolución de Quito*, 501-505.

151. In France, Rocafuerte had made the acquaintance of a relative of the recently deceased Barón de Carondelet, who asked him to help Carondelet's widow, on her way through Guayaquil. Morales was Carondelet's secretary, and was persecuted by Coronel Nieto Polo who had proclaimed himself as interim president of the Audiencia.

152. *A la Nación*, 165-167.

153. Rocafuerte had left for Europe at the young age of thirteen and attended the Colegio de Nobles Americanos in Granada, and in Paris, the College de Saint-Germain-en-Laye, founded by Napoleon for the sons of the new nobility in France, where he was schooled in the classics and the most widely read authors of the Enlightenment. There are several biographies of Rocafuerte, the earliest one by Pedro Carbo, "Americanos Ilustres, Don Vicente Rocafuerte," *Revista Latino-Americana*, II (1874), reproduced in *Escritores Políticos, Biblioteca Ecuatoriana Minima*, 69-105. The most recent ones, Kent B. Mecum, *Vicente Rocafuerte, El Prócer Andante* (Guayaquil, 1983), and for his continental role, Jaime Rodriguez, *The
Emergence of Spanish American, Vicente Rocafuerte and Spanish Americanism, 1808-1832. His correspondence has recently been published as Vicente Rocafuerte, Epistolario, ed. Carlos Landázuri, 2 volumenes (Quito, 1988). 6

154. Rodríguez, The Emergence of Spanish America, 28-30.

155. Vicente Rocafuerte, A La Nación, 165.

156. Rodríguez, The Emergence of Spanish America, 19-20.

157. José Gabriel Navarro, Historia de la Revolución de Quito, 508.

158. Rocafuerte was the only surviving son among fifteen children. According to his own account, he avoided political activities during those years to comply with his mother's pleas, for she had lost a half brother in the massacre of August 2nd in Quito. A la Nación, 179.

159. Manuel Ortuño Martínez, "Manuel Eduardo de Gorostiza, hispanoamericano, romántico y liberal" in Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos, 460 (Octubre, 1988) 105-120; Rodríguez, The Emergence of Spanish America, 32-35.


161. Ibid

162. Rocafuerte returned from Europe in 1807 and remained in Guayaquil until 1811. Back in Guayaquil in 1817, he left for Cuba in 1819 and did not return until 1833. These accusations were leveled against Rocafuerte after he had concluded his tenure as chief of state, between 1835 and 1839. In the early 1840s, Rocafuerte led the opposition against Flores, who had drafted a new constitution known in Ecuadorean history as Carta Negra de la Esclavitud, for which reason he was forced into exile in Lima.

163. His writings during these years were: "Ideas necesarias a todo pueblo americano independiente que quiere ser libre," published in Philadelphia, in 1821; "Bosquejo ligerisimo de la revolución de Méjico, desde el grito de Igualá hasta la Proclamación imperial de Iturbide," in Mexico, 1822; "Lecciones para las Escuelas de primeras letras sacadas de las Sagradas Escrituras," "Ensayo Político: El sistema colombiano, popular, electivo y
represenativo es el que más conviene a la América independiente," in New York, in 1823, and "Cartas de un americano sobre las ventajas de los gobiernos republicanos federativos," in 1826.

164. In 1809, Olmedo left his post as professor at the Universidad de Santo Tomas in Quito to travel to Spain, with his uncle, Bishop Silva y Olave, who had been appointed to the Junta Central. While in Mexico, they learned of the dissolution of the Junta and returned to Guyaquil. Poesias, Jose Joaquin de Olmedo, ed. Clemente Ballen, (Paris, 1895).

165. Maria Teresa Berruezo, La Participacion Americana en las Cortes de Cadiz (Madrid, 1986), 139-140. Olmedo's defense of Native Americans was straightforward: "Permitiremos que hombres que llevan el nombre de español y que están revestidos del alto carácter de nuestra ciudadanía; permitiremos, digo, que sean oprimidos, vejados y humillados hasta el último grado de servidumbre? Aquí no hay medio; o abolir la Mita de los indios o quitarles, ahora mismo, la ciudadanía de que gozan justamente." In Destruge, La Revolución de Octubre, 133.

166. Maria Teresa Berruezo, La Participación Americana en las cortes de Cádiz, 150

167. Ibid, 151; 314.

168. Ibid, 315.

169. In a poem entitled El Arbol, written in 1809, after the abduction of the monarchs by Napoleon, we read, for instance:

Y cuando en su poder seguros fueron
Tratados como viles enemigos
Y expiar les hace en bárbaras prisiones
El crimen de ser reyes y Borbones
Siervos del crimen, nuestros caros reyes
Volvednos, sí; volvednos nuestros padres
Los dioses de la España,
y venir a quitarlos en campana.

And further on,

Ya en el campo de Marte sanguinoso
Le hará ver que en España,
para vengar la afrenta,
De Dios, del Rey y de la Patria santa
cada hombre es un soldado
y que cada soldado es un Pelayo,
Gaspar Rico was the "factor de la compañía de los cinco gremios de Madrid," in Lima. In 1812, he was banished to Madrid by Viceroy Abascal, owing to his "free and revolutionary spirit". Abascal described Rico's subversive activities as a cancer that should be extirpated. "Comunicación del Virrey del Perú, Junio 26, 1812," AGI, Estado 74.

In 1810, the Junta Suprema de Santa Fe wrote to the Cabildo of Quito: "Porque una distancia inmensa nos separa de esa ciudad....entonces los mandones de Quito, usurpadores de la legitima autoridad del pueblo, recibiran bien pronto el castigo de su temeridad. Mil patriotas se han ofrecido hoy a marchar a esa ciudad, sin premio ni recompensa alguna y sin otra satisfacción que la de vengar a sus hermanos. Que tenga Quito ese consuelo entre sus horrores, y que la América toda va a levantarse en un grito de venganza general." In Pedro Fermin Cevallos, Historia de Cevallos, (Guayaquil, n/d) 163-164.

In 1816, Manuela Garaicoa was declared "pobre de solemnidad," and sought a pension from the crown. President Montes recomended that she receive the salary that García Calderón had earned as royal officer in Cuenca. "Comunicación del Presidente Montes, 1814," AGI, Quito 259 In 1842, at the age of 59, Rocafuerte married their daughter, the much younger Baltasara Calderón Garaicoa, whose brother, we have mentioned, Abdón Calderón, died as a young hero in the battle of Pichincha in 1822.

As late as 1818, Viceroy Joaquín de la Pezuela informed Madrid that there were few garrisons stationed in Guayaquil, as well as in Pisco and other Peruvian towns which did not pose any threat to the Crown. "Joaquin de la Pezuela informa sobre el Virreinato, Noviembre 12, 1818," AGI, Estado 74.

Camilo Destruge, Historia de la Revolución de Octubre, 169-170.
178. Jaime Rodríguez, *The Emergence of Spanish America*, 17. Rocafuerte's parents, Captain Juan Antonio Rocafuerte y Antoli, from Valencia, and Josefa Rodríguez de Bejarano, a native of Guayaquil had fifteen children, most of whom died in their childhood years. The only surviving son was Vicente Rocafuerte and five of his sisters: Gregoria, married to General Gabino Gainza, later President of the Audiencia of Guatemala, Francisca married to Coronel Luis Rico y Pérez, Josefa, the wife of Jacinto Bejarano, her uncle, and later to Marcos Lamar y Cortázar, a relative of the Rocafuertes, Rosario, who married Vicente de Alzua y Lamár, and Tomasa, married to Domingo de Santisteban y Carbo, a native of Guayaquil. *Vicente Rocafuerte, Epistolario*, ed. Carlos Landazuri, 33-35.

179. Hans Medick, "Plebeian Culture in the Transition to Capitalism," 86-87 As every generalization, this overall assessment does no justice to the exceptions, mentioned in the previous chapter, and restated here for the sake of clarity: Quiroga, Morales, García Calderón, Sánchez de Orellana, Juan de Larrea, Mariano Guillermo Valdivieso, Carlos Montúfar, who in a letter to Governor Vasco, dated April 26, 1811 described the Cortes as "el fundamento de nuestra esperanza", and who pleaded in vain for flexibility with Vasco and other authorities, less the empire be lost, as had Comisionado Regio Villavicencio.

180. Ibid.

181. "El Gobernador de Guayaquil representa el mérito y servicio del comisario honorario de fuerzas administrativas de estas Aduanas, Marzo 12, 1811," AGI, Quito 259 In 1816, Cardenal's "Relación de Méritos," included services rendered to the Crown during the insurrection in Quito, the constitutional period, and Commodore Brown's invasion, and was endorsed by the governor and several "sujetos principales," among whom were some of the wealthiest merchants in town: Martin de Icaza, Gabriel García Gómez, a Spanish officer settled in Guayaquil and forebearer of President Gabriel García Moreno, Bernardo Roca, Santiago Viñores, Manuel de Jado, Felipe Alvarado, Esteban José Amador, Miguel del Campo, Juan Millán, Ramón Calvo y López, Regidor Manuel Ignacio Moreno, and Juez de Comercio Domingo de Ordeñana. These merchants approved of Cardenal's actions to sustain royal government. Vasco also claimed that Martin de Icaza, one of the wealthiest merchants in town, was also harassed in name of the constitution," "Gobernador rinde el mérito y circunstancia de Martin de Icaza," AGI, Quito, 262;
Viceroy Abascal also acknowledged aid given by José de Ortega, "Comunicación del Virrey a Montes, Agosto 21, 1812," ANH Presidencia 478.


183. "Toribio Montes, Presidente y Comandante General de Quito da cuenta de sucesos a su llegada a Quito, Junio 27, 1815" AGI, Quito, 275.

184. Ibid

185. All the same, after the return of Fernando VII, Montes was compelled to explain his conduct to Madrid, when members of the older absolutist cabildo represented that he forced them to pledge allegiance to the extinct constitution. The king also asked Montes to explain why he had taken upon himself the right to judge those accused of "delitos de infidencia." ANH, Presidencia 407. Later, charges of excessive leniency were also leveled against Montes by his successor, hardliner Presidente Ramirez. "Comunicación del Presidente Ramirez, Noviembre 21, 1812," AGI, Quito 260.

186. In 1815, rumors of a new insurrection led Coronel Juan Fromista to enjail many former insurgents, whom Montes had treated leniently. An investigation by Montes established that it had been "un exceso de celo" on the part of Fromista, instigated by Martín Icaza, the son of the wealthy merchant from Guayaquil, who had been appointed secretary to President Montes. Both Fromista and Icaza were reprimanded for their actions. In 1818, Ramirez reopened the case, and deported Antonio Ante to Ceuta, accusing him of instigating a new rebellion. Also exiled to Spain, Manuel Mateu, the brother of the Conde de Puñonrostro, Mariano Guillermno Valdivieso, the Marqués de Selva Alegre, Magistral Francisco Rodriguez Soto, José Xavier Asácazubi, all of whom had been treated leniently by Montes. "Informe del Presidente Montes, Octubre 17,1814," AGI, Quito, 260.

187. "Expediente promovido por los Diputados a Cortes de la Provincia de Guayaquil sobre que se le separe de la Mitra de Cuenca y se erija en ella un nuevo obispado," AGI, Quito 596 Upon his return to the throne, in 1814, Fernando VII had asked the representatives from the colonies to specify in writing the most pressing needs of their homelands, before their return to America. See Veronica Zarate Toscano, "Testamento de los Diputados Americanos"
Among those testifying: Pedro Santander, teniente de gobernador of Babahoyo; Bernardo Antonio de Echeverez, hacendado and cocechero de cacao; Manuel Morán de Buitrón y Castillo; Francisco Antonio García, hacendado; José de Ortega, hacendado in Babahoyo and Palenque; Clemente Coello, hacendado in Baba and Babahoyo, Francisco Xavier de Avilés, Capitán Nicolás Cornejo y Flor, Teniente Coronel José Carbo y Unzueta, Jose Díaz del Campo, Administrador de Correo; Juan Barrio y Ferruzola, Administrador de Aguardiente; Bernabé Cornejo y Avilés, hacendado; Jose de Ortega, hacendado in Babahoyo and Palenque; Francisco Antonio García, hacendado; José de Ortega y Merino, Ignacio de Avilés, merchant; Santiago Vítores, merchant, Bernardo Roca, merchant. Several of these witnesses were members of the ayuntamiento in 1810, including Vicente Rocafuerte, Manuel Ignacio Moreno y Santisteban, and Francisco Xavier Paredes.

Guayaguileños were probably unaware that in April, 1809, some 83,672 pesos collected in Guayaquil for the cathedral in Cuenca had been donated by Governor Aymerich to the Crown, "por amor al soberano, la Religión, la Patria y las Leyes". AGI, Quito 384.

Brown's forces included men of different nationalities, four of whom were made prisoners in June, 1816, when they sought refuge in the town of Atacames, in the northern coast of Esmeraldas: Juan Bautista Bellfort, from Brussels, Luis Lavy, from France, Victor Gasquerel, also from France, and Manuel López, from Chile. "Expediente actuado contra los prisioneros de guerra procedentes de la escuadra pirata Brown, Junio 28, 1816," ANH, Gobierno 63.

In 1816, for instance, the Teniente from Tumaco, José Maruri was given license to sail "al corso", in pursuit of the insurgents from Buenos Aires. ANH, Presidencia, 541

Villamil was sailing for Panama, when he spotted Brown's flotilla near the island of Puná. Taking advantage of the river tide, which prevented Brown from following him, he sailed back to Guayaquil and gave the voice of alarm. "Reseña de los acontecimientos políticos y militares de la provincia de Guayaquil, desde 1813 hasta 1824 inclusive (Lima, 1863)", La Independencia de Guayaquil, 3-41.
194. Ibid, 11


196. Cubitt, "The government, the criollo elite, and the revolution," 271.

197. In Camilo Destruge, Historia de la Revolución de Octubre, 147-150. Even under such circumstances, the Rocas were successful in obtaining an inhibitoria against Governor Mendiburu from Viceroy Joaquín de la Pezuela.

198. Hamerly has established that the coastal economy suffered a period of contraction between 1810 and 1820, Historia social, 130-131, and there has been a general consensus among historians that this was indeed the case. The information provided by Administrador de Aduanas, Andrés Cardenal provided somewhat different figures, for according to a certified testimony, net returns collected through customs for those years were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Returns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1806</td>
<td>96,023 2 1/2 r.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1808</td>
<td>97,119 7 1/2 r.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1813</td>
<td>136,908 7 1/2 r.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1814</td>
<td>129,142 9 1/2 r.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1815</td>
<td>170,436 7 1/2 r.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taxes had increased, but apparently not enough to justify the higher custom revenues noted above. "El Gobernador de Guayaquil representa el merito y servicios del Administrador de Fuerzas de Administración de esta Aduana, Setiembre 9, 1816" AGI, Quito, 260.


200. In January 1820, for instance, Carlos Lagomarcino, the Genoese merchant from Guayaquil, informed Madrid that the Pacific was infested with Anglo-American privateers, who armed their boats for "actividades al corso," after unloading their contraband. "Cartas de Carlos Lagomarcino," AGI, Estado 74.


202. Cubitt, "The government, the criollo elite and the revolution."
203. "Informe de la Contaduría de Guayaquil a la Junta Superior de Gobierno", Archivo del Banco Central, Quito, from hereafter ABC, Fondo Jijón y Caamaño, Documentos Miscelaneos 33/75

204. For a discussion of the different interpretations see Cubitt, "The government, the criollo elite and the revolution," 262. The earliest ones, by liberal historian José Manuel Restrepo, who claimed that Guayaquileños were uninterested in either culture or politics, but in their business ventures. Pedro Fermín Cevallos, in 1861, viewed their independence movement as similar in origins to the constitutional revolt in Spain.

205. "Cartas de don Carlos Lagomarcino."

206. The number of lawyers intervening in both the insurrection in Quito of 1809 and the independence movement in Guayaquil in 1820 was, indeed, significant. Perhaps, their number merely reflected the lack of options at existing Universities for up and coming creoles, as was the Church. But lawyers and members of the lower clergy may have also acted as "organic intellectuals" for dissatisfied groups seeking independence from Spain.

207. Hamerly, Historia social, 126-127.

208. Altogether there were twelve peninsulars listed as "próceres" of the October movement, some of whom were merchants, planters, and former functionaires. Among these, Gabriel García Gómez, the father of later President Gabriel García Moreno, and Gabriel Fernández de Urbina, father of Gabriel Urbina, also Chief of State. Robles Chambers,"Microdicionario Biográfico de los Próceres de la Independencia." Also David Cubitt, "Composición de una elite Hispanoamericana."

209. Carlos Calixto y Borja was the son of Pedro Calixto y Muñoz, executed by the patriots in Quito. Robles Chambers, "Microdicionario biográfico de los próceres de la Independencia."

210. The officers from the Numancia were Captains Leon de Febres Cordero, Luis de Urdaneta, and Major Miguel Letamendi, and from the Granaderos, Gregorio de Escobedo, later named military chief, and Hilario Vásquez, both from Cuzco, and the latter, belonging to the Indian nobility.
211. José de Villamil, "Reseña de los Acontecimientos Políticos y Militares de la Provincia de Guayaquil," 16.


213. In Spanish traditional political thinking, the community was an aggregation, as such, it had a corporate identity, as in Lope de Vega's Fuenteovejuna. For Rousseau, the community was an association of individuals, whereby the individual "while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before", cited in George Sabine, A History of Political Theory (New York, 1961) 587.


218. "Y si ninguna nación, por bárbara que sea, ha desconocido el derecho que tienen los hombres a emanciparse en cierta edad, quien sino la tiranía armada del poder, podrá disputar y negar igual derecho a los pueblos". Ibid For the importance of the notion of emancipation in the eighteenth century, see Jurgen Habermas, On Society and Politics, a Reader ed. Steven Seidman, (Boston, 1989) in particular, the chapter on "Dogmatism, Reason and Decision: On Theory and Practice in a Scientific Civilization."

219. Diccionario de la Lengua Castellana en que se explica el verdadero sentido de las voces su naturaleza y calidad. (Madrid, 1729-1739) Several volumes. For hijo del pais, Volume IV, 155 For the use of this metaphor in New Granada, see Hans Joachim Konig, "Símbolos y Metáforas de legitimidad."

220. Diccionario de la Lengua Castellana, Volume IV, 717.
221. Hans Joachim Konig "Metáforas y Símbolos de Legitimidad."

222. "De este principio sencillo y natural se deduce, que los pueblos que no están contentos con su suerte, y que tienen sentimientos de sus fuerzas físicas y morales, gozan eminentemente del derecho de remover cuantos obstáculos se presenten a su felicidad." Revista del Archivo Histórico del Guayas, 2:81.

223. "Al voto general de la América ha unido el suyo (tanto tiempo ha oculto y reprimido) esta rica y hermosa Provincia..." And elsewhere, "Nuestra primera atención debe ser pues formar un Gobierno e instituciones, aunque no sean tan perfectos por las circunstancias, podrá ir recibiendo continuamente nuevos grados de perfección; su legitimidad será incontestable, pues dimana de la voluntad general de los pueblos, expresada por los órganos que ellos mismos han nombrado libremente." Ibid.

224. "Como todo gobierno, bien se componga de uno solo o de muchos, siempre que reuna en si toda la autoridad, tiende indispensablemente al despotismo, contra el cual nos hemos rebelado con la América entera; dividid la potestad en tres partes y circunscribid los límites de cada uno." Ibid

225. "Pero la obra no esta consumada todavía y con este objeto, el sufragio libre y general de los pueblos, nos ha reunido hoy a establecer y consolidar el edificio de la libertad política y civil". Ibid.

226. "Para dar principio a tan laudable empresa estais reunidos, Padres de la Patria; en esta reunión esta depositada toda la confianza y voluntad general de la provincia; y por consiguiente esta autorizada para todo lo que contribuya a la salud y prosperidad común." ibid.

227. As G.H. Pocock writes in Politics, Language and Time, Essays in Political Thought and History, (New York, 1971).233-272, traditional societies conceive their past as immemorial continuity, whereas in more modern societies, tradition is repudiated, and the past is socially reconstructed through historical knowledge to authorize the future.

228. Ibid

230. "Acomodémonos a las circunstancias, y no nos afanemos en pos de una ideal de perfectibilidad que por lo general ha causado grandes males a los gobiernos nascientes." Revista del Archivo Histórico 2, 83 The same idea was expressed by Bolívar in his "Carta de Jamaica," which did not necessarily imply reactionary views either on the part of Bolívar or Olmedo. Rousseau stated likewise when he wrote: "Comme, avant d'elever un gran edifice, l'architect observe et sonde le sol pour voir s'il en peu soutener le poids, le sage instituteur ne commence pas par redigner des bonne lois en elle-meme mais il examine auparavant si le peuple auquels il les destine est propre a les supporter", Jean Jacques Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, (Paris,1971) 101.


232. In April of 1822, newborn slaves were granted their freedom, more than likely following the example set by Colombia, where a similar law had been approved in July of the previous year. David Bushnell, El Régimen de Santander, 206-207. After anexation to Colombia, in August of 1822, a group of slaves sought permission from Intendente Solón to establish a mutual fund to buy their freedom. Each slave was to contribute part of his wages to the mutual funds (which attests to the practices of hiring them out). The slaves explained "Que siendo natural en toda criatura el amor a la libertad, en nosotros es tanto mas vehemente, cuanto es casi mas positiva y dolorosa nuestra cautividad," a language perhaps not their own, but which in no way lessens the importance of their initiative. First, freedom would be purchased for those most in need, who would not receive their documents until all members were freed. They claimed that in the past they had been denied permission to convene by procuradores generales, perhaps, out of fear for the disorder they might cause. The slaves, however, offered to meet in an orderly manner in a public plaza, and gave the names of three individuals as advisors "que son muy nacionales y de nuestra entera confianza." Solón was sympathetic to their plan, and appointed Jose Leocadio Llona to assist them in all legal matters, but we ignore the effectiveness of this unusual plan for manumission. "Expediente sobre establecimiento de un sistema mutualista o cooperativo voluntario entre los esclavos para su liberación, con la intervención de una junta de manumisión (Guayaquil, 23, VIII,1822), Revista del Archivo Histórico del Guayas 5 (1974), 115-124.

For the influence of classic republicanism on Bolivar's political vision, particularly as formulated in his *Discurso de Angostura* in 1819, see Anthony Pagden, *Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination*, 140-142.


235. "Acta del Cabildo de Quito, Mayo 18, 1813" AGI, Quito, 275.

236. "Representación del Capitán Andrés de Herrera Campusano."

237. For Rousseau, the public sphere "represented a unique fact about a community, namely, that it has a collective good which is not the same thing as the private interests of its members." George Sabine, *A History of Political Thought*, 588-599.


239. "Certificación de Escribano para Joaquín Preja."

240. Ibid

241. Ibid

242. Montesquieu had claimed that "It is in a republican government that the whole power of education is required. The fear of despotic governments rises naturally of itself amidst threats and punishments; the honor of monarchies is favored by the passions,
and favours them in turn: but virtue is a self-renunciation always arduous and painful." The Spirit of the Laws, Book IV, Chapter 5, 130.

243. There is no doubt that Quito could boast of having enlightened thinkers the eighteenth century, Pedro Vicente Maldonado, for instance, who so impressed Carlos María de La Condamine in 1736, and who left with members of the geodesic mission for Europe, and short before his death was proposed as member of the Royal Academy of Science in London. José María Vargas, Historia de la Cultura Ecuatoriana (Quito, 1965) 258-264. Several of these converts to the new science taught at the university, which did not necessarily mean that an education reform had taken place in Quito, or that even the curriculum had been significantly changed. Stevenson, for instance, who described Quito as "monstruo de dos cabezas", since it had two universities, said that it was not for want of intelligence that young men in Quito did not excell in the sciences, but on account of the lack of "liberalidad de parte de los profesores," voicing hopes that "la abolicion de todas las restricaciones eclesiasticas, con una mejor seleccion de libros y otros materiales," would come about, "a fin de que las universidad de Quito compita con algunas de las renombradas europeas." W.B.Stevenson, "Como era Quito cuando se declaró libre," Ecuador visto por los extranjeros, ed. Humberto Toscano, (Puebla, 1960) 220-237.

244. "Representación del Capitán Andrés de Herrera Campusano, Abril 30. 1790."

245. It is interesting to note that pulperos had much earlier used the same arguments against the cabildo, which on that occasion chose to legitimize its demands for excessive taxes by claiming immemorial custom. In 1772, pulperos refused to pay excessive taxes collected by the alférez real, at the time, other than Pareja, by arguing precisely that there were was no written law, and that customary laws had no bearing if they benefitted only the few. The king gave his support to pulperos stating that "para establecer una costumbre lícita no basta la diuidirnidad en el tiempo sino es menester que sea honesta, justa y racional, sin que se oponga a las leyes u ordenanzas o al particular."


248. *El Patriota, No. 1, Mayo 26, 1821*, in *El Patriota de Guayaquil*, ed. Abel Romeo Castillo, 5. In extolling the virtues of commerce, they also followed Montesquieu, who claimed that "True it is that when a democracy is founded on commerce, private people may acquire vastly riches without a corruption of morals. This is because the spirit of commerce is naturally attended with that of frugality, oeconomy, moderation, labour, prudence, tranquillity, order and rule." *Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws*, Book V, Chapter 5, 137
CHAPTER IV
VECINOS IN PORTOVIEJO

In 1767, Juan Seguiche, and Indian from the Partido of Portoviejo, Gobernación de Guayaquil arrived in Madrid for the purpose of informing His Majesty of the abuses inflicted on Indians from Jipijapa by curas and corregidores from Guayaquil. Juan Seguiche reminded the king that in 1751 vecinos from San Gregorio de Portoviejo had likewise made representations, as a result of which in 1754 His Majesty had issued a cédula de amparo, a certified copy of which Juan Seguiche had brought to Madrid, to protect them from their more powerful neighbors in Guayaquil. Nonetheless, informed Juan Seguiche, conditions in Portoviejo had remained unchanged.¹

In effect, in 1754, in response to complaints by capitulares from Portoviejo against corregidores, tenientes, and oficiales reales from Guayaquil, the king had issued a royal decree instructing his viceroy in Santa Fe and the president of the Audiencia of Quito to conduct a full-fledged investigation, for capitulares had also raised charges of corruption against authorities from Guayaquil. If those charges were true, the king demanded suspensión de oficios, embargo de bienes, and other stern
measures, threatening to bring down the full brunt of his Real Indignación on anyone known to harass vecinos from Portoviejo for representing before him.²

Before arriving in Madrid, Juan Seguiche and his half brother, Manuel Pilay, had been commissioned by caciques and alcaldes from Jipijapa to travel to Santa Fe and make similar representations before the viceroy, a mission which they had accomplished in 1766. Recourse to higher authorities, claimed Juan Seguiche, had proven fruitless "por lo poderosos que son los contrarios," and in the past Indians from Jipijapa had instead been punished for seeking redress in higher courts. Such had been the case, he claimed, when they were forced to work during twelve years without pay in the construction of the local church. Juan Seguiche sought the protection of the king, convinced as he was that His Majesty, as Padre Común, would extend his loving care over his destitute vassals from Portoviejo. To undertake the long voyage, Juan Seguiche had served during four years as a sailor, before sailing in the last fleet for Spain.

Other than a personal exemption from the tribute for the four years he had worked as a sailor, Juan Seguiche petitioned for a cédula de amparo to the effect "que cesen los malos tratamientos y rigurosos castigos y se moderen los crecidos tributos," as well as a royal ban on the sale of land in Jipijapa to Indians from Guayaquil. He affirmed that Indians from Guayaquil, perhaps meaning
those from neighboring Santa Elena, coveted their more fertile soil, and that the "poderosos" cited His Majesty as an excuse to sell them land in Jipijapa.

On September 20, 1767, the king issued a real provisión addressed to the president of the Audiencia of Quito, followed by a letter to the viceroy in Santa Fe, remonstrating with them for failing to comply with the earlier cédula of 1754. The king instructed them once more to conduct an investigation and, if justified, to alleviate the suffering of Indians from Jipijapa and punish their offenders. He also demanded to be kept informed as to the measures adopted, after which, we presume, a successful Juan Seguiche returned to his distant homeland in Jipijapa.

We ignore the effectiveness of His Majesty's orders nor the accuracy of the claims presented by Juan Seguiche—a man, no doubt, of many resources, for in 1784 he embarked on a more daring venture, perhaps inspired by the success of this earlier encounter with the king. With the complicity of another Indian from Jipijapa, Manuel Agapito Pincay, he forged the signature of the Most Catholic Monarch, both were consequently taken in custody to Guayaquil, and publicly flogged and shamed throughout the city.

In all truthfulness, the grievances which he brought before the king in 1767 were unrelated to those earlier raised by capitulares from Portoviejo, giving rise to the
cédula de amparo which he had brought to Madrid. For one thing, the cabildo of Portoviejo was a Spanish cabildo and as such experienced a different set of difficulties with authorities from Guayaquil than those plaguing Indians from Jipijapa, which were in essence abuses typically inflicted upon a tribute-paying Indian population. Secondly, the cabildo of Portoviejo had long since ceased to exist, a reality that Juan Seguiche failed to address when representing before the King:

Juan Seguiche, natural del pueblo de Jipijapa, Provincia de Puerto Viejo del Distrito de la Real Audiencia de Quito, a los Reales Pies de Vuestra Majestad, dice con el mayor respeto: que el año de 1754 acudieron los capitulares del pueblo de San Gregorio de la misma jurisdicción de Puerto Viejo, haciendo presente las violencias, agravios y malos tratos y crueles castigos que experimentaban aquellos naturales por los corregidores de Guayaquil, sus tenientes y el Contador de aquellas Caxas don Gaspar de Ugarte.\(^5\)

By exhibiting the cédula de amparo extended to capitulares in 1754 and claiming that it had been disregarded, "sin haberse puesto en práctica la citada real órden, ni ninguno de los particulares que comprende,"\(^6\) he correlated events truly unconnected, seeking to add legitimacy to the Indians' complaints. More importantly, Juan Seguiche suggested disrespect for royal orders stemming as far back as 1754. These were serious allegations, for in 1751 the capitulares had described in considerable detail the corrupt practices against the Real Erario by authorities from Guayaquil. In case these implications went unnoticed, Juan Seguiche reminded the king of "los excesos
mala versacion de caudales y otros defectos perjudiciales
todos al Real Erario, que este Ministerio (authorities
from Guayaquil) comete y esta continuando," charges more
likely to elicit a prompt reponse than mere allegations of
abuses against Indians from Jipijapa.

Other than a keen strategy to add weight to their
representation, there was, no doubt, a common interest
between Indians from Jipijapa and their non Indian vecinos
from Portoviejo, which derived from the identity of their
adversaries: "los contrarios," as told by Juan Seguiche,
or "los poderosos de Guayaquil," as described by
capitulares from Portoviejo.8

Little did it matter that, in contrast to 1751,
Guayaquil by 1767 was no longer governed by a corregidor
but a military governor, that Contador Real Gaspar de
Ugarte was long since dead,9 or that capitulares from
Portoviejo had faded into history, for underlying Juan
Seguiche's complaints was the opposition between the
"others" from Guayaquil and a sense of "us," Indian and
non-Indian vecinos from Portoviejo.

San Gregorio de Portoviejo, head of the largest
partido in the northern coast of the Gobernación de
Guayaquil, was founded in 1535, early on in the conquest
of Perú, by a member of Diego de Almagro's expedition.10
For this reason, explained capitulares in 1751, as well as
for services rendered to His Majesty, Portoviejo was
granted the title of "muy noble y muy leal," and was made
seat of a corregimiento. "En lo primitivo," claimed the capitulares, corregidores, encomenderos and other Spanish vecinos had resided in Portoviejo, but the dryness of the land, difficulties for commerce and other adversities (among which figured prominently, though unmentioned, the dramatic decline of the income-producing Indian population) had induced most of its vecinos to settle in Guayaquil. Nonetheless, wrote the capitulares, some forty vecinos and their descendants had stayed behind and despite their poverty had maintained their cabildo until 1717, when they were no longer able to buy the offices of regidor, which had vacated during that same year.11 In effect, an anonymous description of the Gobernación de Guayaquil of 1605 supported much of what the capitulares described. It stated that Portoviejo had initially been granted an escudo de armas particular and was identified by His Majesty as a city in cédulas reales but by 1605, hardly deserved to be considered as such, due to the poverty of its vecinos,12 (all of which was confirmed by the engineer Francisco Requena).13

Improving economic conditions by 1746 probably induced vecinos from Portoviejo to restore their cabildo, extinct since 1717, despite strong opposition from Guayaquil.14 By reinstating their cabildo, they hoped to arrest "la despotiquéz e injusticia" of corregidores, tenientes de corregidor and oficiales reales from Guayaquil, among whom they singled out Tenientes de
Corregidor Pedro Salcedo and Pedro Sánchez de Mora, Corregidor Manuel Moreno y Ollo, and Contador Real Gaspar de Ugarte, as well as escribanos, alcaldes, regidores and other powerful vecinos from Guayaquil. Capitulares claimed that tenientes de corregidor, bolstered by the support of their allies in Guayaquil, exercised unrestrained authority in Portoviejo, a situation that had become unbearable for its vecinos. By restoring their cabildo, they hoped "que con el aumento de jueces que mirasen con otro amor el bien público, respirase en algo la afligida vecindad," for they considered the cabildo to be no less in rank than the office of teniente, a conviction that had induced them to demand from Salcedo "prueba de la fianza y títulos que debía manifestar para continuar en la tenencia." Their request had enraged Salcedo, for the teniente de corregidor was appointed by the corregidor, and was under no obligation to give proof of his credentials to the cabildo. Deemed offensive by Salcedo, the request of the capitulares had sparked a feud with the teniente that we later learn had its origins in trade rivalries between Salcedo and Juan del Barco y Ocay, a native of Vizcaya settled in Portoviejo and the alférez real of the newly established cabildo.

Prior to this incident, according to the capitulares, authorities from Guayaquil had employed all possible means to prevent the vecinos of Portoviejo from establishing their cabildo. One tactic was to obtain a favorable
ruling from the Audiencia, allowing oficiales reales to appraise the value of the cabildo offices in Guayaquil. In so doing, the "poderosos" from Guayaquil hoped to discourage the impoverished vecinos from Portoviejo from posting the required bids. Having failed in this endeavor, authorities from Guayaquil had next attempted to void the election of alcaldes, claiming spurrious reasons, and when this also failed had adopted "la violenta determinacion de removerlo (the cabildo) con estrépito de armas." In effect, in 1748, Teniente Salcedo had steered his ship towards Manta, well furnished with a barrel of gunpowder, the property of His Majesty, provided by oficiales reales from Guayaquil. In somewhat archaic manner, vecinos from Portoviejo stated that Salcedo "aquarteló bandera en el pueblo de Montecristi a son de caxa citando a los demas pueblos a la dicha diligencia," and from Montecristi moved his army to the town of Picoaza, holding Portoviejo in siege and threatening to enter the city in combat. An envoy from the cabildo appeased Salcedo, yet despite the peaceful reception accorded him in Portoviejo, Salcedo had continued to harass the capitulares, "al calor de los punchez y del aguardiente." In plain view of vecinos, he drilled "la dicha escolta compuesta de gente baja," instructing them that at his command they were to seize the alferez real and his hacienda. This they did, on learning that Juan Antonio del Barco had obtained an inhibitoria from the
Audiencia against Salcedo. Capitulares wrote that with great scandal the teniente charged against the alférez real, who barely managed to escape, while his wife courageously confronted the enraged teniente with the inhibitoria. Following this incident, fearful vecinos in Portoviejo had convinced the alférez real to burn the document.

In their lengthy representation, the capitulares informed the king that Salcedo had been overheard voicing opinions contrary to sovereignty and loyalty, as well as making threats against any oidor in sight of Portoviejo. They also described in considerable detail the ways in which authorities from Guayaquil defrauded the Real Erario, which included the establishment of monopolies, engaging "en el comercio prohibido con la otra costa," as claimed by Juan and Ulloa, and embezzlement of royal funds in contracts for the construction of ships, the almojarifazgo, and through the extraction of timber from the state owned preserves in the Bulubulu mountains, near Guayaquil.

Burning the inhibitoria had only momentarily appeased Salcedo, for shortly afterward he was once again with his army in Picoaza, holding Portoviejo in siege for seven months, until news of his excesses reached the viceroy, and Salcedo was removed from office. Their misfortunes, however, had not ended there, for in 1748 newly appointed Corregidor Moreno y Ollos, instigated by Contador Gaspar
de Ugarte, had staged a second expedition against Portoviejo, alleging disrespect on the part of capitulares to a commissioner sent to oversee their elections of alcaldes. A new commissioner had been dispatched, "con una escolta de doze zambos" and suposedly, secret instructions to kill the capitulares. He was likewise said to have rallied "una escolta de gente baja" against Portoviejo, an attack that was prevented only through the intervention of the clergy. Nonetheless, he had fined each regidor with 100 pesos, voided the election of alcaldes, disbanded the cabildo, and imprisoned the juez comisionado sent by the Audiencia to investigate these disturbances. As a result, Corregidor Moreno y Ollos was removed from office by the Audiencia, but he had managed to retain his post due to influences in Santa Fe.

Portoviejo's problems had continued under Salcedo's successor, for Teniente Pedro Sánchez de Mora likewise accused of contraband and harassing merchants from Puerto Viejo, had attempted to kill an alcalde during religious festivities in Montecristi, wounding instead an onlooker. The alcalde "apellidó la voz del Rey," and with the support of the people seized the teniente, placing him in the stocks for three days before sending him in handcuffs to Guayaquil. By 1751, discouraged capitulares informed the king that, though privileged to be the vassals of His Majesty, they remained defenseless due to distances from higher courts and the power of their neighbors from
Guayaquil. They had determined to dismantle their cabildo, but they had one request for the king: that vecinos or naturales from Guayaquil be prevented from holding office as tenientes of Portoviejo or jueces de residencia. Capitulares ended their representation wishing His Majesty a long life, "como la Cristiandad ha menester."\(^1\)

Such levels of conflict between vecinos from Guayaquil and those from Portoviejo obviously reflected a strong competition to control trade and local networks of production, for a witness in a secret investigation later ordered by the viceroy stated "es público como el Teniente don Pedro Salcedo mandó en los pueblos de su jurisdicción, que los sujetos que se hallaban deviendo a don Juan Antonio del Barco no le pagaran sus derechos y que debería ser preferido en sus cobranzas."\(^2\) This statement also attests to the practice of making advances in cash or goods to control production. Rivalries between vecinos of Guayaquil and Portoviejo were not entirely new, for in the early seventeenth century merchants from Guayaquil had made representations before the viceroy in Lima against a proposed port in Bahía de Caráquez, in the adjacent Partido de la Canoa. They had also opposed a connecting road to Quito, claiming that contraband through Portoviejo would bring about their ruin.\(^3\)
Legitimacy in Portoviejo

Other than reflecting rivalries with Guayaquil, representations by vecinos from Portoviejo displayed, no doubt, important features of their ideology. Not surprisingly, their views on government were traditional: the king was seen as arbitrator between bad government in Guayaquil and his vassals in Portoviejo. This was the same concept as earlier described for Quito, but with important differences. Vecinos of Portoviejo were not members of a titled though impoverished nobility as were those of Quito, and their humble constitution left them subordinate to Guayaquil. "Mal gobierno" was, therefore, identified with Guayaquil, a regional slant that gave Indians and non-Indians from Portoviejo a sense of shared identity when facing the "others" from Guayaquil. Their representations, as well as those of Indians from Jipijapa, exuded confidence that His Majesty, a "Padre Común," as Juan Seguiche claimed, would alleviate their suffering, indicating their appeal to a type of legitimacy that Max Weber has described as charismatic and patrimonial. Rather than placing confidence and reliance on institutions, those subjects believed that the persona of the king was the source of all legitimate power.

Also significant was the paradigm used by capitulares to describe their problems with Guayaquil. The teniente, they wrote, "aquarteló bandera" against Portoviejo, "juntó gente a son de caxa," challenged Puerto Viejo "en términos
de combate," and held the city in siege, while the corregidor was said to impose "escolta y armas" against the cabildo. All this was a paradigm reminiscent of an earlier period, as in conquest society, when militaristic values prevailed. Archaic overtones surfaced, as well, in the pesquisas of 1757, when we have seen that the alcalde "apellidó la voz del Rey" against Teniente Sánchez de Mora, a traditional mode of rallying support, or when in reference to this same incident, one Diego Martínez de Castilla "vido mucha gente," an arcaism of the verb "to see." The same can be said of the use of the word "ansi," instead of "asi." This somewhat outdated language reflected, more than likely, the early origins of Portoviejo and the subsequent stagnation of a minute population of no more than 400 vecinos españoles, scattered along river valleys and Spanish of course, in a sociocultural rather than racial sense.

The pesquisas secretas ordered by the viceroy took place between 1757 and 1758 and was conducted by Ramón Carlos Chacón, appointed for this purpose by the viceroy as teniente of Portoviejo. Witnesses testified that hostilities had stemmed from trade rivalries between del Barco and Salcedo, and the former's refusal to lend Salcedo 50 pesos in pita. In reprisal, Salcedo had ordered debtors throughout the different towns to prefer him "en sus cobranzas." The cabildo had further annoyed Salcedo, as already noted, through its pretension to
verify his titles as teniente, prompting the attack on Portoviejo. Del Barco, the only vecino of means in Portoviejo, had then sent two regidores before the Audiencia seeking an inhibitoria against Salcedo. As for Pedro Sánchez de Mora, witnesses testified that apart from the incident in Montecristi no other complaints had been raised against him. From these and other testimonies, the fiscal in Santa Fe concluded that the source of the hostilities had been the enmity between Salcedo and del Barco. He reprimanded del Barco for using the cabildo for his own purposes, and capitulares for faking disrespect on the part of Salcedo towards the cabildo and exaggerating their grievances. He also reprimanded the cabildo for bypassing the proper conducts to vent their complaints which of course was not the case, for capitulares had initially appealed to the Audiencia. Salcedo's excesses were attributed to drunkenness, while the incident in Montecristi involving his successor was deemed an accident. The fiscal also ruled that excesses on the part of the corregidor from Guayaquil did not exempt the cabildo of Portoviejo from obedience, counseling that "Aun el mas justo es humano." Whether such conclusions were accurate remains unclear, for the pesquisas secreta took place ten years after the alleged attack on Portoviejo. Furthermore, in 1751, capitulares had informed the king that, in contrast to the "poderosos" from Guayaquil, their poverty prevented
them from sending envoys to Santa Fe. But the fact that del Barco had mobilized the cabildo, or for that matter the entire city, against Salcedo and the corregidor from Guayaquil should come as no surprise, for Portoviejo was reacting as a corporation: an attack on one, particularly a powerful vecino such as del Barco, was an attack on all. As elsewhere in the colonies, vecinos from Portoviejo viewed the cabildo as the proper institution to resist central government. In this sense, cabildos may be described as oppositional,\(^2^6\) which did not mean democratic. Just as in Quito or Guayaquil cabildos reflected the interests of the local oligarchies, it then reflected local power groups in Portoviejo. For the purpose of legitimizing their representation before the king, vecinos from Portoviejo identified themselves through events that had taken place well over two hundred years ago, during the conquest period, when their city had enjoyed more preeminence. They had retained knowledge of their past mainly through their collective memory, for cabildo records had been lost to fire as early as the sixteenth century.\(^2^7\) In 1605, for instance, the vecinos knew that His Majesty had granted their city a coat of arms, but had no recollection as to the emblem itself.\(^2^8\) Yet in 1751, their early origins were deemed important enough to be cited in their representation before the king: "Fue esta ciudad," they wrote, "de las primeras de Vuestra Majestad que se fundaron en este Reyno de Perú,"
reminding the king that for this reason, as well as services rendered to His Majesty, it had received the title of "Muy noble y muy leal." They also emphasized the fact that, despite their poverty, they had kept their cabildo until 1717, which made Portoviejo a separate province from Guayaquil. Along with memories of a better past, impoverished vecinos from Portoviejo, apparently relished earlier values, for in 1751 they interpreted actions on the part of authorities from Guayaquil to be in violation of their territorial sovereignty.29 As the fiscal in Santa Fe described it, the underlying issue was "el poco sufrimiento y ninguna subordinación con que aquel cabildo quiere depender del corregidor de Guayaquil pues con tanto ahíno repugna sujetarse a sus providencias."30 This view was shared, of course, by the corregidor from Guayaquil, who claimed insubordination on the part of Portoviejo and on his part, concerns with enforcing the law.31 Further evidence of their refusal to accept their subordination to Guayaquil, was the capitulares' objection to the presence of the teniente or comisionado in their election of alcaldes, as stipulated by law. They also showed disrespect demanding that Salcedo verify his titles, when in effect the teniente was higher in rank than their cabildo.32

This controversy also illustrates the slowness and inefficiency of colonial government. Capitulares made their representation in 1751, which induced the king to
issue a cédula de amparo in 1754, acknowledged by the viceroy in 1756. The pesquisa secreta took place between 1757 and 1758, yet the viceroy was not informed of its results until 1760, for Teniente Chacón alleged distrust of postal carriers, claiming that it was common practice to seize the mail for the purpose of eavesdropping. In 1762, the king issued another decree inquiring about the investigation, acknowledged by Viceroy Messia de la Zerda in 1764. The fiscal, wrote the viceroy, had initially reported that in four years of office he had not heard or seen autos related to such matters, but a more thorough search had produced the files. The viceroy also informed the king that no further complaints had been heard from Portoviejo, which was not surprising, since the cabildo had been extinct since 1751. He also reported that the corregidor and contador real in Guayaquil were no longer the same individuals. Shortly afterward, in 1767, Juan Seguiche arrived in Madrid; and, in reply to the king's stern inquiry, the viceroy informed that since 1754 no vecino from Guayaquil had been appointed as teniente of Portoviejo. He at this time, finally made available the results of the pesquisa secreta of ten years earlier.33 As for charges of fraud against the Real Erario on the part of authorities from Guayaquil, the viceroy early on informed Madrid that action had been taken in 1756, when Contador Real Juan Martin de Sarratea y Goyeneche had been dispatched as visitador to the Caxas Reales of Guayaquil,
as a result of which royal revenues had increased considerably. (Portoviejo remained without a cabildo throughout the remaining part of the century, until the short lived cabildos constitucionales of 1814, at which time, we shall see, problems surfaced once more with authorities from Guayaquil.)

The Partido of Portoviejo

By 1765, the extensive territory of Portoviejo held a scant population of 5,250. By 1780 its population had risen to 7,104, and by 1790 to 8,388, an increase of 161%, similar to the one earlier described for the entire Gobernación de Guayaquil. Portoviejo was second in population only to the city of Guayaquil and its rural areas, which it slightly surpassed in 1808, when Portoviejo reached a population of 13,874. Nonetheless, this extended partido retained a low demographic density well into the national period.

The Partidos of Santa Elena and Portoviejo were the largest Indian partidos in the Gobernación de Guayaquil. The remnants of a once thriving population, coastal Indians had dwindled by 1765 to a mere 7,883, of whom 68% lived in Santa Elena and Portoviejo, in the so called costa seca (so rendered by the influence of the lower temperatures of the Humboldt current). By 1790, when the native population was in full recovery, 8,992 Indians, or 76% of the total, lived in both partidos: 4,045 in Portoviejo and 4,947 in Santa Elena. The
majority of Indians in Portoviejo lived in the parishes of Montecristi and Jipijapa,\textsuperscript{41} adjacent to the Partido of Santa Elena, as a result of early dispositions by Viceroy Toledo, who in the sixteenth century had forced the native population of Perú to relocate in designated areas.\textsuperscript{42} This explained the presence in Jipijapa of several \textit{parcialidades}, as the relocated ethnic groups became known,\textsuperscript{43} each with its own cacique.\textsuperscript{44} Paradoxically, this forced relocation may have allowed Indians in Jipijapa and Montecristi to retain rights to a vast territory throughout most of the colonial period, for \textit{blancos}, mestizos and the \textit{castes} lived predominantly in the city of Portoviejo, or in near by by valleys such Pichota, Río Chico or Charapotó. By 1796, Indians from Jipijapa sought to formalize land ownership through a communal land title, at which they succeeded in 1805, when they were granted property rights by the audiencia over an extensive territory, roughly equivalent to the territory of the parish of Jipijapa.\textsuperscript{45}

By the eighteenth century, coastal Indians were greatly hispanicized and had lost their vernacular languages. No longer were Indians from Portoviejo identified as "ladino en lengua española," as in earlier documents,\textsuperscript{46} (a term which suggests that up to the late seventeenth century they were still in possession of their native languages). On the contrary, by 1754, an observer stated that Indians from Santa Elena "hablan bien el
romance y lo cantan con gracia y aseo pareciendo en esto y otros modales a los aldeanos andaluces," as was also the case in Portoviejo. He found it more surprising "que no les haya quedado a estos indios rastro de sus lenguas y ésto es más de admirar por que no viven como los indios de la sierra, mezclados con blancos y mestizos." The fact that Indians from Santa Elena and Portoviejo had lost their vernacular languages and were hispanized was indeed surprising, given the fact that they inhabited separate territories from blancos. We might remember that, in contrast to Indians from Santa Elena and Portoviejo, 55% of a vast Indian population in the province of Quito lived among the Spanish in their haciendas, and yet had retained their language and culture. In 1774, Requena wrote that no outsiders were allowed to remain in Jipijapa, and that 433 mestizos who lived among them were native to Jipijapa and differed little in their customs from the Indians. As late as 1803, Indians from Portoviejo were said to have "superabundancia de tierras," as did those in Santa Elena, although much of the land in Santa Elena was barren for lack of water, which perhaps induced Juan Seguiche to seek royal protection in 1767 against the sale of land in Jipijapa to other Indians.

Indian peasantry in both partidos, as well as mestizo in Portoviejo, practiced a subsistence agriculture, complemented with cash income from the sale of products such as wax, honey and zarzaparilla, or in Santa Elena
salt and hilo de caracol, a much appreciated dye. Requena described how their natural inclination towards commerce induced them to commercialize many products in their surroundings. Indians from both partidos also earned cash servicing vessels in Manta and Santa Elena, and transporting cargo as muleteers to Guayaquil. Requena also described Jipijapa, an Indian village, as having more "gobierno y policía, muy diferente al abandono con que están todas las otras de la provincia." He also commented that Indians from Portoviejo brought their products directly to the market in Guayaquil:

Es genial, en estas gentes la ocupación de las ventas, de conformidad que solo de gallinas y huevos que llevan los indios de este partido a vender a Guayaquil sacan hasta 1500 pesos cada año. Este útil entretenimiento ha hecho a muchos de ellos acomodados.

Several were Indians of means, caciques in particular, the owners of cacao groves, cattle, mules, and sugar mills. But Indians from Portoviejo were better known for their artisanries made from these local fibers such as hammocks, albardas or riding apparels, and above all, hats, woven from toquilla and mocora. Indians from both partidos also earned cash delivering cargo from Manta and Santa Elena to Guayaquil.

However, inhabitants from Portoviejo, Indians as well as non-Indians, were compelled in years of drought to seek
a livelihood elsewhere, as in 1751, when capitulares complained that vecinos sometimes traveled thirty and forty leagues, the distance between Portoviejo and Guayaquil, to earn their living. In 1774 Requena wrote that in recent years droughts had forced its inhabitants to migrate elsewhere, "lo cual ha despoblado este partido, así por los que han ido a buscar otras habitaciones a las orillas de los ríos de Daule y de Palenque, como por los que han muerto de la peste que han sufrido por la secuela precisa del hambre que han padecido por falta de lluvias." Between 1785 and 1801, approximately one fourth of the tributaries from Portoviejo paid their tributes in the neighboring partido of Daule and to a lesser degree, in the city of Guayaquil. Such a migration was perhaps structural to the demographic history of Portoviejo, where ciclical droughts periodically compelled its male population to seek a livelihood elsewhere. In these circumstances, inhabitants from Portoviejo migrated on a temporal rather than permanent basis. But migration also attests to the fact that during this period there were few haciendas in Portoviejo where in times of need, for instance drought conditions, Indians and mestizos could earn wages, as compared to the cacao partidos or the neighboring Partido of Daule, where vecinos from Guayaquil held property.

Demographically speaking, the most dynamic group during the second half of the eighteenth century was the
so-called Spanish sector, which increased from 7.9% of the total population in 1765 to 13.5% by 1790, while the larger Indian and mestizo population remained, in percentage terms, relatively stable: 48% for Indians, and a declining 41% to 35% for the castes, which in Portoviejo included the mestizos. In 1765 there were only 400 "blancos" in Portoviejo, the descendants, more than likely, of those earlier Spanish who had stayed behind, some settled in estancias along river valleys. By 1780, they had increased to 990, and to 1,129 by 1790, an increase of 280% from 1765. This increase was much greater than the 161% noted for the total population of the partido during these same years, which suggests growth through mechanical rather than natural causes. Vecinos blancos near the coastline more than likely engaged in contraband, for Juan and Ulloa had written that in order to introduce goods brought from the Orient, ships unloaded their cargo at the ports of Atacames (in northern Esmeraldas), Portoviejo, and Punta de Santa Elena, taken from there by land to Guayaquil. They also wrote that in these areas of Perú, smuggling was generally viewed with an attitude of "live and let live." 

In the last quarter of the century, there were enough incentives, other than illegal trade, to attract outsiders to Portoviejo. Cacao as a commercial culture had expanded to the adjacent Partido de la Canoa, where vecinos from Portoviejo owned land, particularly in the valley of the
Chone river, for in the dryer climate of Portoviejo it fared well only in restricted, more humid, areas. In 1774, according to Requena, there were 10,000 cacao trees planted in La Canoa, their number expanding later in the century, when cacao from La Canoa was exported through Guayaquil and Bahía de Caráquez. The Partido de la Canoa was sparsely inhabited by the so called "zambos de Cabo Pasado y la Canoa," the descendants of runaway slaves and Indians, who had remained on the margins of colonial society but had been increasingly integrated through the extraction of *pita* as well as tortoise shell. Such products were traded for trinkets, in a manner which Requena found scandalous. Vecinos españoles also raised cattle and grew sugar cane in the valleys of Pichota and Charapotó, where apparently the older Spanish settlers had concentrated.

Another incentive in Portoviejo was the expanding production of toquilla hats, a cottage industry of Indians from Jipijapa and Montecristi. Rather than the product of specialized weavers, toquilla hats were manufactured by men, women, and even children, with the exception perhaps of *sombreros finos*, which may have required more skill. In 1787, *sombreros finos* sold in Jipijapa for 10 or 11 pesos, while *ordinarios* sold for eight reales. This expanding industry, which in the first half of the nineteenth century became the most important economic activity in the area, attracted outside merchants to the
towns of Jipijapa and Montecristi, earlier described by Requena as almost exclusively Indian. In contrast to earlier years, when no outsiders were allowed to remain in Jipijapa, by 1787 merchants were said to choose Jipijapa as their place of residence, for there were little incentives in other towns of Portoviejo. Creoles controlled much of the market for this and other Indian products such as pita and cabuya, but it was no less true, as Requena claimed, that Indians from Jipijapa and Santa Elena also sold their products in Guayaquil or in nearby ports. The lure of the hat weaving industry meant that Indians began to lose control over the commercialization and production of the toquilla hats and were no longer able to bar outsiders from their villages.

Weak Presence of the State

As a result of the reforms earlier enacted by Visitador Sarratea, between 1770 and 1780, Portoviejo was left without a teniente propietario, a lack of government that according to Marcos de Vera, vecino and natural of Portoviejo, had serious consequences for this extended partido. The Ramo de Reales Tributos in Guayaquil had been heavily burdened by the practice of granting corregidores, tenientes, oficiales reales, diezmeros, protectores and caciques a fee for each tributary Indian on each tercio, irrespective of the fact that most of them had little or nothing to do with the actual collection of the tribute. The teniente received eight reales per
tributary each year, the caciques received four reales, as did the remaining officers, with the exception of oficiales reales who received tres cuartillos. This "perniciosa corruptela," as labeled by Viceroy Messia de la Zerda, was abolished in 1770, following recommendations by Visitador Sarratea, with the exception of the fee earned by tenientes, which was, however, reduced to four reales per tributary each year. Such burdens on the Ramo de Tributos were, indeed, onerous, for in the coast, the amount of tributes collected was insignificant when compared to the amounts collected in the highland. Not only was the Indian population sparser but Indians from Santa Elena and Porotviejo paid six pesos and three and one half reales a year, a reduction from the 14 pesos levied earlier, in exchange for performing such duties as vigías and mail carriers from ports of entry to Guayaquil. Yet one result of this reform was to make the post of teniente less attractive and as a result, since 1770 Portoviejo had been governed only by interinos.

The lack of government, according to Marcos de Vera, had resulted in such insolence and disrespect for authority, among both the plebs and vecinos de la cara blanca, that only a new conquest would bring them back into submission. Having had first hand experience as interino, de Vera cited several examples to prove that the office of teniente in Portoviejo was a high-risk post, as he pleaded with Governor Pizarro to relieve him from
"carga tan pesada" as the tenencia of Portoviejo, which the governor pressured him into accepting as propietario. De Vera complained that the collection of the tribute in Portoviejo was so hazardous and time-consuming that it would require the intervention of soldiers, and he wrote that attempts to collect the tribute had cost him part of his hacienda and the escape of his slaves. The same had also happened to most of his predecessors. Governor Pizarro accepted the accuracy of de Vera's claims, informing his brother, the visitador, that tributes in Puerto Viejo were backlogged three and four tercios, for in the past interinos had accepted the post on condition that they be exempted from collecting the tribute.

The tenientes had no salary, and de Vera reminded the Governor that they were compelled to cover the tribute of "los enfermos, los ausentes y los insolventes." He thereby conditioned his acceptance of the post of teniente on the renewal of the earlier practice of granting tenientes eight reales per tributary each year. Juan José de Villalengua, commissioned by Visitador Pizarro to make new population counts in the Audiencia, recommended to Visitador Pizarro that de Vera's request be granted, due to the lack of incentives for tenientes in Portoviejo, and taking into consideration "el genio perverso de sus habitantes," of which he claimed to have first hand knowledge. Visitador Pizarro concurred, reasoning that
"la naturaleza de aquella gente y su insolencia pudiera tener funestas consecuencias sin justicia." 82 That ruling was approved by Viceroy Manuel Antonio Flores the following year. 83 Nonetheless, in 1782, the Audiencia denied the two reales that de Vera petitioned for the caciques who did the actual tribute collection, arguing that de Vera earned 1,400 pesos through his part in the collection of the tribute and that this was enough to gratify his aides. 84

Lack of government in Portoviejo may have fostered among its inhabitants a disrespect towards authorities, as de Vera claimed, which was frequently conducive to violence. In 1774, Requena recommended the establishment of the militia there as a means to pacify their turbulent and unruly nature. Indeed, disturbances in Portoviejo frequently demanded the presence of soldiers from Guayaquil, as had been the case in 1748 and 1749, and again in 1780, when Governor Pizarro was compelled to send soldiers to restore order. 85 Soldiers from Guayaquil were repeatedly needed to pacify the partido in the decade preceding independence, as we shall later see.

The presence of the state generally was weak in Portoviejo. Before the reforms enacted by Visitador Pizarro in 1780, the teniente was the sole representative of royal government, and he ruled with little or no help over an extensive territory, as Teniente Interino Pedro de Aragundi complained in his resignation in 1779. 86 In
1780, Portoviejo had no jail, so necessary for "el registro y gobierno de la república," as Marcos de Vera claimed, and neither did Pichota, another town which held a sizable number of vecinos españoles and mestizos. De Vera also complained that vecinos in the countryside refused to come to Portoviejo when summoned by the teniente:

*y si el Juez los llama para distribuir justicia, unos no vienen y otros dicen que bendran y no paresen, y cuando llegan a benir para hacer recluta de gente, se encuentran con pariente o amigo de quien se va pesquizar, la da aviso y noticia y de todas maneras queda burlada la justicia.*

Where state institutions are weak, as in fronteer societies, individual valor and even violent behaviour are not only encouraged but highly regarded, since individuals are compelled to settle their affairs through their own initiatives. This was the case in Portoviejo, rightfully earning its inhabitants the reputation of insolent and unruly. The lack of discipline was such, that curas collected their stipends on their own, without first entering these amounts in the Caxas Reales in Guayaquil. Tenientes were also responsible for collecting the alcabalas de mar and the almojarifazgo in the port of Manta, but since their place of residence was nowhere near Manta, but rather was in distant Jipijapa, Montecristi, or Portoviejo, this meant that custom revenues went uncollected. Indian coast guards stationed in Manta and other harbors were supposed to report to the teniente the
arrival of vessels, a difficult task in such an extended partido, and probably impossible during the rainy season. This would explain why Portoviejo was a safe haven for contraband, which could be introduced through ports other than Manta, e.g., Cayo, Machalilla, Charapotó, and Bahía de Caráquez, in neighboring La Canoa.

Much the same can be said of Indians of Jipijapa and Montecristi, who, perhaps, exhibited less violent behaviour than vecinos de la cara blanca, except to resist payment of the tribute. Indians, after all, were subjected to more "gobierno y policia" than blancos, as Requena had observed for Jipijapa. Unlike Spanish vecinos who lacked a cabildo, Indians had retained theirs since the sixteenth century, and were also subject to caciques and gobernadores. Furthermore, the presence of the Church was also weak in Portoviejo. In 1774 there were four curatos in the Partido of Portoviejo, and altogether 7 priests, including one mercedario, the sole representative of the regular clergy. This meant approximately one priest for each 800 individuals. By 1797, the number of curatos had been reduced to three: Portoviejo, Jipijapa and Montecristi.88 The Church had more bearing among Indians, who were compelled to attend, nonetheless, Indians in Portoviejo and Santa Elena apparently showed little respect for their priests. In Santa Elena, for instance, Indians had earned a notorious reputation even for violence against several parish priests,89 while in
Jipijapa the parish priest Juan José Vivero complained in 1791 that he frequently had to rely on alcaldes and gobernadores to force Indians into church attendance. The doctrina in Jipijapa was imparted three times a week, and Vivero wrote that Indians kept their children in hiding, rather than allowing them to attend. In one instance, he had sought to make exemplary punishment on a principal for his inattendance, ordering him to leave the church during Sunday mass. The principal had not only refused to leave but had instead spoken back with insolence, which Vivero had ignored in order to avoid a scandal. After mass, he had the principal placed in the stocks, only to see him promptly removed by other Indians. "Este suceso da a conocer," claimed Vivero, "la altanería de estos principales y la necesidad que hay de hacerlos conocer con el castigo, la subordinación al párroco." In view of such weak institutional presence, including that of the church, it is understandable that inhabitants of Portoviejo had developed such a disregard for authority, which in turn had earned them a notorious reputation for insolence and unruliness. We might further expect that under such frontier-like conditions, normally associated with weak political integration and loose political ties, they would have lacked a strong sense of group identity, with the exception of the Indians who had retained their cabildo and had alternate forms of political relations, as well as a distinct ethnic identity. "Vivir y dejar
vivir," the maxim applied to these parts of Perú by Juan and Ulloa, may have well described more than the patronizing of smuggling in Portoviejo. Yet vecinos unhesitatingly claimed a distinct identity from Guayaquil, and gave evidence of territorial loyalties easily mobilized by del Barco in 1748 (and repeatedly, we shall see, during the independence period). In this respect, Portoviejo exhibited a behavior which differed markedly from other partidos in the Gobernación de Guayaquil. It resulted in large part from their earlier constitution as a separate province from Guayaquil: local allegiances, easily mobilized in Portoviejo, grew out of the collective consciousness of a shared history and were reinforced through market activities, which (as we shall argue) called for integration and fostered group identity formation. But first we must look at forms of resistance favored by Indians from Portoviejo.

**Forms of Resistance**

In contrast to provinces in the highlands, the coast was spared the rebellions of Indians and mestizos that erupted during the eighteenth century, as mentioned in the first chapter. This is not to imply more submissiveness on the coast, for the reputation earned by inhabitants in Portoviejo was just the opposite. Indians from Santa Elena were, perhaps, even more fiercely independent. Requena's description of rural areas in the Province of Guayaquil
suggested a state of almost endemic violence. He wrote, for instance, that:

El uso del puñal, pistolas y trabuco, tan recomendada la prohibición por las leyes, no es solo tolerado en los despoblados, sino que he visto insultar con desenfado por toda clase de personas, hasta negros esclavos, la presencia de la justicia con semejantes armas en los lugares de la provincia.  

Requena also deplored other forms of resistance, as when he complained that peons usually owed their masters two and three years' wages, which they seldom paid back, and that hacendados were forced to accept whatever conditions their workers imposed, a situation that also applied to artisans. Theft in the haciendas was so widespread that hacendados advanced their peons only the amounts they estimated would be stolen from them. He wrote that such defiance on the part of the plebs was encouraged by the opportunities for escape offered by nearby forests, where authorities would most certainly fail to follow them. Once they had found safe haven in these forests, the runaways usually settled in villages, only to become cuatreros, or highly mobile cattle thieves.

Requena, of course, failed to address the violence on the part of hacendados and justicias, which may have contributed to the state of affairs that he described. But it is no less true that in the coast, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the scarcity of labor and abundance of land gave an edge to rural laborers that was absent in the highland rural areas, where Indians were tied to the
haciendas through their subsistence plots, or huasipungos as they were later called. In fact, this labor force was considered so much a part of the hacienda that it constituted an important component of its worth. In addition, laborers in the highland were also tied to the obrasjes. In 1804 Stevenson described conditions prevailing in an obraje in Riobamba as the most abject in South America, and that the fate of these Indian weavers made slaves in the coastal valleys of Perú look like free men.

In Portoviejo, the Indians had the same recourse to nearby forests as did rural workers in other areas of Guayaquil. They sought refuge not so much from hacendados or merchants, for there were few in Jipijapa or Montecristi during this period, but from the demands of the state, particularly after the reforms implanted by Visitador Pizarro.

Coastal Indians had become adept at defending their rights through legal means. In 1770, a protector de naturales, complaining over the reforms of Visitador Sarretea, which had deprived protectores of the four reales earned per tributary Indian, protested that "cien indios de la sierra que generalmente son quietos y humildes no equivalen a diez de estas provincias que biven (sic) y duermen sobre el papel sellado, lo cual hace mas molesta su defensa."
Papel sellado and the assistance of the protector were, for instance, required to litigate cacicazgos, and between 1779 and 1787, there were three such litigations in Jipijapa alone. Under the stagnant economic conditions of earlier decades, several cacicazgos had gone apparently unclaimed, a situation that changed in the second half of the century, when demographic growth and increased economic activities rendered them more appealing. The manner in which these litigations were finally resolved, after endless legal procedures and paper work had failed, is worth describing. After Sunday mass, Indians were summoned by the teniente to the main plaza as witnesses to the litigation. Each contender brought forth witnesses, whose testimony was at times so unabashedly biased, though all claimed impartiality, that procedures had to be set for a later date. Witnesses might, for instance, fail to report kinship ties with one of the litigating parties, or they were accused of being of the same faction. Although instructions for the manner in which these hearings were to be conducted were issued by the Audiencia, the degree of participation of el común was significant, in much the same manner as Spanish vecinos would take part in a cabildo abierto. El común might express its opposition to a particular cacique quite vocally, through a chorus of "No lo queremos por cacique," "éste no vale," or "igual nos da éste que otro."
Indians in Jipijapa, in the eighteenth century, were highly politicized, perhaps, more so than blancos, who had no cabildo, which would explain why Juan Seguiche, an indio del común, came before His Majesty in Madrid, and argued his case effectively. In 1788 Indians from the parcialidad of Apechingue refused to accept as their cacique don Vicente Xalca, gobernador de Indígenas and cacique of the parcialidad of La Baja, who was litigating the parcialidad of Apechingue. "No, no señor, no lo queremos por tal cacique," they wrote quite explicitly, adding that "el nominado gobernador, diremos que es un hombre ciego que no sabe leer ni escribir, pues como podrá defendernos a una parcialidad tan numerosa como la de Apechingue," which attests to the importance attached to literacy in late eighteenth century Jipijapa. Indians further accused Xalca of being an enemy of the people, for he had spread rumors that Indians were plotting to rebel at the instigation of another cacique, don Manuel Inocencio Parrales y Guale, to protest against the expansion of tobacco planting. By irresponsibly spreading such rumors, Indians in Jipijapa felt that Xalca had placed them in grave danger, fears not entirely unfounded in the aftermath of the rebellions of Tupac Amaru and El Socorro. Their petition against Vicente Xalca bore the signature of 23 Indians and ended with threats to bring, if necessary, their case to the attention of His Majesty. We shall later see that by the late
eighteenth century, internal politics in Jipijapa often had ramifications extending as far as Guayaquil.

Papel sellado was also needed to claim noble status, again much in the same manner as the Spanish would, since proof of nobility warranted certain privileges, including exemptions from the tribute and the performance of servicios mecánicos. Not unlike peninsulars and creoles, Indians had become adept at procuring documents to prove their lineage, such as baptismal records and marriage certificates of several generations back. They also gathered true relaciones de mérito of their ancestors, in papel sellado, and duly notarized, which goes to show to what extent they had internalized the colonial system based on hierarchy and rank. These legal maneuvers on the part of Indians from Jipijapa showed that they were much aware, so to speak, of the demands of the system. In Jipijapa, claims to services rendered to His Majesty included the collection of tribute; obtaining oficios de honor as alcalde, regidor, sacristan, helping in the construction of the church, or delivering documents from the port of Manta to the governor in Guayaquil. In 1737, don Joseph Chonana, the cacique of Daule, articulated quite well the views of Indians on rank and precedence, when protesting the physical punishment inflicted on his son, don Alejo Chonana, by don Juan Caychi, gobernador de indígenas in Daule: "No diferenciandose en nada la nobleza de los Indios de la
Superior clase de los títulos de Castilla entre los Españoles, siendo por este motivo iguales las preeminencias y honores que se nos deben guardar." Don Joseph Chonana reminded the Audiencia that a similar abuse in Cuzco, on the part of a governor who had laid his hands on a cacique, had brought as punishment the mutilation of both hands. The Audiencia apparently agreed as to the seriousness of the offense, for it suspended Gobernador Juan Cacychi for one year.

It is also interesting to note that in contrast to blancos from Portoviejo, whose poverty in 1751 supposedly prevented them from pursuing their cause in Santa Fe, Indians from Jipijapa were frequently on the road, bypassing Guayaquil, in route to higher courts in Quito, Santa Fe, and Madrid. Such was the case in 1753, with Don Francisco Ligua, gobernador de indigenas of Jipijapa, and don Antonio Soledispa, cacique principal, to Quito; in 1754, with don Thomás Chóez and don Manuel Soledispa, caciques from Jipijapa, to Santa Fe; in 1766 and 1767, Juan Seguiche to Santa Fe and Madrid; and between 1785 and 1796, the most notorious case, don Manuel Inocencio Parrales y Guale, cacique y gobernador of Jipijapa to Quito, twice to Santa Fe and once to Madrid. Although we have no basis for comparison, this seems like a remarkable amount of traveling on their part for the purpose of seeking redress in distant courts. In 1765, Jipijapa was a community of no more than 2,400, according
to Governor Zelaya, increasing to perhaps 4,000 by 1785, but as Requena implied, and before him, Gobernador Zelaya, this all Indian village was the most prosperous town in the partido. Indians were also better organized than blancos (on account of having their cabildo), to engage in the type of comunal effort that these long trips entailed. These were, in any case, costly endeavors. The trip to Santa Fe of Cacique Parrales in 1785 cost 645 pesos, paid in part by el común, which had pledged 220 pesos, and the remaining 425 pesos provided by the cacique himself. Unfortunately, don Manuel Inocencio, received only 160 pesos of the amount pledged, owing to the intervention of Teniente Marcos de Vera and the cacique's long time foe, Francisco de Paula Villavicencio, the administrator of tobacco, whose abuses had spurred his trip to Santa Fe in the first place. Later (in 1793) while in Madrid, this tenacious defender of the Indians rights claimed that in his lengthy struggle of nine years he had spent all his possessions and 13,000 pesos in a "corta haciendita" which he had abandoned.

While in these distant cities, Indians were sometimes compelled to extend their stay until their case was resolved, and we know how lengthy the process could be with Spanish bureaucracy. But it was not only a matter of finances. Indians frequently arrived at higher courts with extensive documentation, duly certified and notarized; and gathering such documentation, sometimes
from several generations back, was a task in itself. It should not surprise that Indians arrived at the higher courts with documents proving that they had been commissioned by principales and el común, for more than likely their trips required the collaboration of the whole community.

The complaints brought by Indians before the higher courts were of varying nature. In 1753, they protested against jueces visitadores and the corregidor from Guayaquil, none other than Manuel Moreno y Ollos, claiming that Indians were forced to give these jueces, "2 reales y una gallina." They accused them, as well, of using their services for free, and they petitioned the Audiencia to limit the stay of these jueces in their villages to three days, claiming that Indians were treated worse than slaves, for at least slaves were better fed by their masters. The corregidor was also accused of abducting "chinitas huérfanas del pueblo" to be placed as house servants in Guayaquil or distant Lima, an abuse that was attested by the cura vicario of Jipijapa, Francisco Xavier Ruiz Cano. On November 12, 1755, the Audiencia ruled in favor of the Indians, ordering Moreno y Ollos to retrieve these young girls and return them to Jipijapa, and forbidding jueces visitadores from staying overnight in their villages. In 1754, Indians protested before the viceroy in Santa Fe against the forced contribution of one tomin for the Hospital de Santa Catalina in Guayaquil,
which they claimed they never used, since their homeland was healthier in climate than Guayaquil, a request also granted by the viceroy.\textsuperscript{116} We have already seen the grievances that induced Juan Seguiche to travel to Santa Fe and Madrid, and as for don Manuel Inocencio Parrales, his long saga merits closer attention, after we examine the impact in Portoviejo of the reforms enacted by Visitador Pizarro.

\textbf{Reforms in Portoviejo}

In 1778, seeking to increase royal revenues and arrest the scandalous incoming and outgoing contraband through the coasts of Guayaquil, Visitador Pizarro established the Resguardo General de las Rentas Reales y Puertos de Guayaquil.\textsuperscript{117} Tenientes partidarios were instructed that \textit{arrivadas} would no longer be allowed in Portoviejo and Santa Elena, unless amply justified for which \textit{tenientes} would be held responsible. In such cases where forced docking could not be justified, ships were forbidden to load or unload but were to be directed to Guayaquil. He also informed Madrid that in concurrence with Visitador Arreche in Perù traffic between Paita and the Gobernación de Guayaquil would be limited to the ports of Guayaquil and Puná.\textsuperscript{118} Furthermore, in 1779, the Administración del Tabaco was established in Portoviejo, having as its first administrator Francisco de Paula Villavicencio, a native of Jipijapa, and as mentioned above the long standing enemy of don Manuel Inocencio
Parrales. The collection of the tribute, backlogged for so long in the coast, was updated, partly as a result of a new tributary count taken early in the 1780s, but also because tribute collection was no longer farmed out. As part of the reorganization of government, tenientes partidarios were granted more responsibilities and in Portoviejo they bore the title of Administrador del Ramo de Aguardientes, de Tributos y Alcabalas, until the Administracion de Ramos Reales was founded sometime in the 1790s with Francisco Villavicencio as its first administrator.119

The reforms implanted by Visitador Pizarro increased the presence of the state in Portoviejo. Particularly aggravating for Indians and mestizos was the establishment of the state monopolies of tobacco and aguardiente and the state fostered expansion of tobacco cultivation, which lent itself to local abuses, and most likely the more efficient collection of the tribute. Vecinos blancos also felt pressure in the collection of alcabalas and the almojarifazgo in the port of Manta.

Of more far reaching consequences for Indians was the larger number of outsiders who settled in their villages, attracted by the opportunities for maritime commerce resulting from the liberalization of trade.120 Contraband more than likely increased at the same rate that did legal trade—at least so thought custom officers in Guayaquil following independence. who claimed that contraband from
Portoviejo was as voluminous as legal trade through Guayaquil. For the Indians, this influx of newcomers translated into an increasing loss of control over production and commercialization, in particular, of exportable goods such as pita, cabuya, and toquilla hats. In 1794, Indians accused merchants before the Audiencia of charging them interests and paying them lower prices for their toquilla hats, under the pretext of charging them alcabalas. Portoviejo was also drawn closer to the economic sphere of Guayaquil through its exportable goods which translated into greater interference into the Indians' affairs. This intervention was by no means suffered passively by Indians, for they were adept at manipulating the legal system for their own needs. Two disputes will help us exemplify this maneuvering on the part of Indians: that of Manuel Nuñez de Balboa y Páramo, appointed teniente of Portoviejo in 1786, and shortly after, denounced by Indians of Jipijapa for abuses which resulted in his removal and may have contributed indirectly, to the removal of Governor Pizarro, and the dispute with Francisco de Paula Villavicencio, the administrator of tobacco.

Soon after his appointment in 1786, Balboa had alienated Indians in Jipijapa by falsely accusing them of plotting to rebell against the expansion of tobacco planting, for which reason he was fined 200 pesos by Governor Pizarro. The protector in Guayaquil stated that
Indians had deserted town fearful of the consequences of Balboa's allegations. As a result Balboa was ordered by Governor Pizarro to leave Jipijapa and establish his residence in Portoviejo. He also faced problems with the cabildo in Jipijapa, and in particular, its alcalde of several years, Agapito Pincay, earlier mentioned along with Juan Seguiche, in regard to the forging of the king's signature.

On September 20, 1787, Núñez de Balboa filed autos in Portoviejo against Agapito Pincay, with the apparent aim of retaliating against the Indians who had complained against him, through the administrador del tributo, Juan María Romero, a member of Pizarro's faction. Pincay was accused of introducing contraband of aguardiente to Portoviejo, for the teniente had found in his possession 25 botijas de aguardiente without the proper license. Pincay, of course, denied these charges and claimed instead abuses on the part of the teniente. Similarly, Balboa had confiscated a comiso belonging to prominent vecinos in Portoviejo consisting of gold, pita and coin destined to Vicente Buillon, a well known merchant of Guayaquil. Among those implicated in this comiso were former teniente Marcos de Vera, who also claimed abuse on the part of Balboa.

Pincay was also accused by Balboa of depriving the elderly and widows in Jipijapa of their short inheritances as self-appointed appraiser. He introduced as evidence a
guerella de despojo filed much earlier by a widow from Jipijapa,¹²⁴ which would indicate that this was more a revenge on the part of Balboa, angered by the Indians complaints against him in Guayaquil. He also accused Alcalde Pincay of inducing Indians to abandon the planting of tobacco, sponsoring juegos prohibidos, and making repartimientos among muleteers, rather than handing them the cash payed by their clients. These and other accusations leveled by Balboa were supported by testimonies from Indian witnesses, including don Vicente Xalca. In turn, Indians accused Balboa of disregarding orders to leave Jipijapa, engaging in commerce and making repartimientos in cash to force Indians to weave the toquilla hats, using the viceroy as an excuse.¹²⁵ Balboa claimed that the viceroy in Santa Fe had asked for a dozen sombreros finos, with the intention of promoting their manufacture in Jipijapa. He was also accused of using their services as pongos and chasquis without pay, and exceeding himself with the cabildo and Alcalde Pincay, by confiscating the rum and placing him in the stocks.

Governor Pizarro and other authorities from Guayaquil, including Juan María Romero, administrator of the tribute, and Angel Tola, administrator of the monopoly of aguardiente, were inclined to believe the Indians rather than Balboa, inducing Balboa to seek legal counseling in Quito to defend his case before the Audiencia.¹²⁶ Thomas García de la Sierra argued on behalf
of Balboa, that he was being unjustly persecuted by authorities from Guayaquil for denouncing contrabands which involved sujetos de distinción, for charging alcabalaas previously uncollected in Portoviejo, and seeking to bring Indians back into submission.\textsuperscript{127} As proof, he presented testimonies in favor of Balboa from vecinos españoles in Pichota, parish priests and Indians from Charapotó and Montecristi, all of whom alleged that during the last twenty years no juez in Portoviejo had been willing to prosecute criminals as had Balboa.\textsuperscript{128}

On January 7, 1788, the fiscal of the Audiencia upheld some of the charges against Balboa but dismissed others as groundless, including charges of abuses against Agapito Pincay in confiscating the rum. Balboa was again ordered to leave Jipijapa and to cease engaging in commerce with the Indians. Prior to this sentence, though, Governor Pizarro had removed Balboa from office, which led Balboa to believe that he would not receive a fair trial in the Audiencia, since its president was Pizarro's nephew. He went instead to Santa Fe, where he accused Governor Pizarro of depriving him of his post as teniente of Portoviejo for the purpose of replacing him with a member of his faction, at a time when Pizarro was expecting the arrival of the frigate La Guayaquileña, as described in the previous chapter, with a contraband worth over 1',000,000 pesos.
When news of these and other accusations against Pizarro reached Madrid, leveled, we have seen, by prominent vecinos of Guayaquil, the governor was ordered to leave the city until the investigations were completed. The king gave his support to the Audiencia rather than President Villalengua over the issue of competency, for Villalengua had claimed jurisdiction to inspect the vessel upon its arrival. As one oidor claimed "¡Ni las leyes habían previsto ni resuelto extraordinaria casualidad de comprenderse el Gobernador del Puerto en el comiso y ser este tío del Presidente y Superintendente, y hermano de un consejero!" Joseph García de León y Pizarro, we have seen, was at the time a member of the Consejo de Indias, and although in the juicio de residencia of Governor Pizarro witnesses testified that goods from the Orient circulated freely in Guayaquil, and that it was common knowledge that Pizarro and his faction were involved, Pizarro was acquitted and appointed as governor of Tucumán.

As was frequently the case in disputes in colonial society, it is difficult to assess the validity of claims raised by contending parties, and more so in a place like Jipijapa, where witnesses retracted earlier testimony in favor of one or the other party, as was the case in Jipijapa, including don Vicente Xalca, and the parish priest, Francisco Xavier Ruiz Cano. The same was true of Governador Xalca, earlier testifying in favor of
Balboa, but privately conspiring against him, according to letters exhibited by García de la Sierra. In these letters, Xalca reproved Agapito Pincay for withholding information regarding Balboa, "como si los negocios y los asuntos de nuestro teniente no me convinieran a mí," further adding, "amigo, puede Ud. con satisfacción comunicar lo que ocurra para gobierno de todos." Xalca also made reference to an obscure incident regarding a European by the name of Bolaños, enjailed in Jipijapa, whose escape had been plotted by the Indians with the apparent intention of implicating Balboa. All of these maneuverings on the part of Indians from Jipijapa, in apparent connivance with authorities from Guayaquil, would lend credence to García de la Sierra's contention that Balboa's fate had been sealed through an alliance between Juan María Romero, the administrator of the tribute in Guayaquil, and Agapito Pincay, alcalde in Jipijapa.

Manuel Nuñez de Balboa, a native of Galicia, had arrived in Portoviejo with too much zeal both to enrich himself and to apply the law. Portoviejo, however, had been governed by interinos, and those acting as such, were either local vecinos or well acquainted with its idiosyncracies. The fiscal in Santa Fe ruled that charges against Balboa were not that serious. Tenientes had always resided in Jipijapa, as Cacique Parrales described in 1785, and had continued to engage in commerce despite the prohibition of two years earlier. Nevertheless, Balboa
was deprived of his post as teniente of Portoviejo, prevented from returning to Jipijapa to collect his money, and soon after declared "pobre de solemnidad."  

Antagonisms at the local level, as were those between Agapito Pincay, a mandón in Jipijapa, and Teniente Balboa played into vested interests in Guayaquil, which in turn activated quarrels in the Audiencia, calling for the intervention of Santa Fe and Madrid. Yet Indians artfully manipulated such conflicts for their own benefit, which suggests that they were ladinos not only in the Spanish language and culture, but also in the wider intricacies of colonial politics. This awareness surfaced, we shall see, repeatedly, in later decades and it would appear to be the result of several factors. In effect, the Indians' autonomy retained during most of the colonial period because of stagnation in Portoviejo had allowed them to have more control over their production. Added to this was their involvement as producers in markets of medium and long distance range, which would obviously increase their perception of the outside world.  

Several among them were sailors, few traveling perhaps as far as Juan Seguiche, but in the shorter "carrera" of Payta and Chocó. They had furthermore retained a certain degree of control over the sale of their products. As late as 1796, in the context of seeking to legalize their land ownership, don Manuel Inocencio described a wide variety of industries on the part of Indians, whose products they sold in
Guayaquil. A similar description was offered by the juez comisionado de tierras Agustín de Oramas, who reported that "estos indios son muy dedicados a sus industrias y a su labor, nada inclinados a la embriaguez y algunos de comodidad, viviendo indios y mestizos muy unidos entre sí." In 1787, Procurador García de la Sierra, in the context of defending their parish priest Francisco Xavier Ruiz Cano, had this to say regarding Indians of Jipijapa: "En toda la serranía son miserables y por lo común de extremada pobreza. Al contrario los de esta comarca y costa de Guayaquil son acomodados, ladinos y mucho mas despiertos, capaces aun de rozar con los Españoles mas hábiles de este interior." The Cacique Parrales quite clearly understood the need to protect the Indians' autonomy, which explains why he did not relent until the Indians were granted the land title in 1805, which required that he embark on one more trip to Santa Fe.

This relative autonomy had allowed Indians to retain an independent attitude towards authorities, both lay and religious. In 1786, for instance, acting on orders from Madrid, the audiencia restricted the number of fiestas that priests were allowed to celebrate in Indian parishes, which we might remember spurred Francisco Xavier de Santa Cruz y Espejo to write his "Defensa de los Curas de Riobamba." In it Espejo had justified these fiestas as incentives for an otherwise idle people. In Jipijapa, the
parish priest Francisco Xavier Ruíz Cano was compelled to seek counsel from Procurador Thomás García de la Sierra, for Indians had taken this ruling to mean that they were no longer under any obligation to pay their priest either **primicias** or stipends. Ruíz Cano complained that while the more devout among the Indians had been disconsolate over the prohibition to celebrate their fiestas, those less religious had shown great satisfaction and complacency. Prosecutor Gacia de la Sierra described his ministry to be "de los mas arreglados en estos reinos." He asked that Indians in Jipijapa be allowed to celebrate more **fiestas** if they so willed, and a clarification to the effect that this ruling did not exempt them from paying other dues to their priest, a request that was granted by the Audiencia. We have also noted the complaints in 1791 of Ruíz Cano's successor, Dr. Juan José Vivero, regarding the Indians' lack of respect for their parish priests. Later in the decade, Vivero had repeated opportunities to experience their disrespect. Labeled "nuestro enemigo común" by factions among the Indians, he was brought twice before the courts for allegedly demanding excessive stipends.

Their lengthy dispute with Francisco de Paula Villavicencio, the administrator of tobacco, is further proof of the Indians' defiance of authority and their manipulation of the legal system for their own needs. But first we might note the frequency of disputes and
litigations in which Indians were involved during this decade: with Villavicencio from 1785 to 1807, with Nuñez de Balboa between 1786 and 1787, with Ruiz Cano in 1787, with the priest Vivero in 1796 and 1804, and in that same year with Teniente Juan Antonio Menéndez, not to mention the three litigations concerning cacicazgos between 1779 and 1789. Internal factionalism often transpired in these disputes, significantly so in the case of cacicazgos, but also in their disputes with authorities, as for instance in the case against Nuñez de Balboa, when feuding between the caciques Xalca and Parrales y Guale first became obvious. This feuding between both caciques became even more intense in subsequent decades. We interpret the frequency of these disputes, with authorities as well as among Indians, to reflect the stresses common to the late eighteenth century, a result of Spain's efforts to modernize and reform, but also the result of demographic and social changes brought about by the expansion experienced by the coastal export economy.

The establishment of the Estanco del Tabaco in 1778 by Visitador Pizarro included a government sponsored program destined to increase cultivation of tobacco. In Portoviejo, this meant that cocecheros or matriculados, as they were also called, were allocated a certain number of plants, the product of which was to be sold exclusively to the estanquillos at a fixed price. In 1781 there were four estanquillos in Portoviejo, increasing to six by 1790.
Indians and mestizos in Portoviejo may have initially responded positively to the program, for we have mentioned that in 1781 there were 439 cocecheros registered there. By 1784, however, the abuses of the administrador del tabaco, Francisco de Paula Villavicencio, had induced Indians in Jipijapa to avoid being drafted into the program by deserting the village, which led Nuñez de Balboa to accuse them of plotting to rebel and Manuel Inocencio Parrales to embark on his long journey to Santa Fe. He arrived before the viceroy, "con poder de la gente de mi pueblo," describing that he had been forced to travel such great distance, "exponiendo mi vida por dilatados caminos, en diversidad de rigurosos climas, viéndome por ratos en los umbrales del sepulcro," for the sole purpose of protesting against the abuses of Villavicencio, the administrator of the tobacco monopoly.141

Parrales y Guale claimed that Villavicencio, a native of Jipijapa, exempted members of his faction, while forcing others to grow anywhere from 4,000 to 12,000 tobacco plants.142. He also noted that the expansion of tobacco cultivation threatened the subsistence base of the Indians, for Indians were forced to use their land for tobacco instead of food crops. Furthermore, Indians were held responsible for damages done by plagues, for Villavicencio had them imprisoned in the presidio of San Carlos in Guayaquil, which they left further indebted in
order to regain their freedom. "Se vale de detestables arbitrios," he claimed, "que atentan contra el buen gobierno de mi pueblo," for among other things he accused Villavicencio of empowering "índios de la mas ruin familia" and appointing members of his faction as alcaldes.143

Complaints by Cacique Parrales were clearly embedded in the moral economy of traditional groups,144 which would certainly disavow the arbitrariness displayed by Villavicencio or the undermining of the subsistence basis of the community. But his representation also gave testimony to the manner in which Indians from Jipijapa manipulated the legal system for their own purposes. Don Manuel Inocencio began his representation by stating that in Jipijapa there were many mestizos and people of color, whose improprieties corrupted the innocence of Indians, reminding the Viceroy that for this reasons, the laws of the Indies determined that members of the castes should not live among Indians. This preamble led to the identification of Villavicencio as a zambo, for he described that the administrator of tobacco as the son of a former slave of the parish priest Ruiz Cano and an "India del común" from Jipijapa, and that owing to the protection of the priest, and not withstanding the obscure circumstances of his birth, he had become a "mandón del pueblo." Other than requesting the abolition of the tobacco program in Jipijapa, and the confirmation of his
cacicazgo, Parrales y Guale demanded the expulsion of all zambos, including the administrator of tobacco. Just as Juan Seguiche, who artfully added legitimacy to the Indians' complaints by making common cause with a non-existent Spanish cabildo of Portoviejo, in 1785 Indians from Jipijapa added weight to theirs by attributing racial blemishes to the administrator of tobacco, a language well understood by the Spanish. The law sanctioned the need for purity of lineage, or "buena fama y calidad," as a requisite for holding any offices, as those "de honor y de república." We shall immediately see, that these racial slurs against Villavicencio, raised by Indians from Jipijapa, haunted him for well over two decades, between 1785 and 1807, since Indians repeatedly forced him to clear his name through legal means. Unfortunately, by including these racial slurs in each and every one of their writings along with more legitimate complaints, they may have lost credibility before the courts, as we shall immediately see, for Villavicencio's honor regarding his lineage had been cleared by as early as 1789.

On February 17, 1785, the fiscal in Santa Fe ruled in favor of the Indians from Jipijapa. Archbishop Caballero y Góngora instructed the Audiencia to perform an investigation, entrusting Parrales y Guale to personally deliver these rulings to President Villalengua in Quito. In turn, Villalengua informed the viceroy that the matter had already been referred to Governor Pizarro in
Guayaquil, for Parrales y Guale had previously brought these same charges before the Audiencia. Yet, between 1785 and 1788, the governor repeatedly ignored the Audiencia's request to either rule on the subject, send the *autos* to Quito, or remove Villavicencio from office, despite the fact that a *juez comisionado* sent by the Audiencia had confirmed all of the charges made by the cacique. Governor Pizarro chose, instead, to persecute the cacique, drop all charges against Villavicencio, and reinstate him as administrator of the tobacco monopoly and as collector of the tithe. He justified his actions by claiming that the Indians had failed to present their witnesses within the time frame allowed by the law, charges denied by the Indians, who instead claimed that they had not been notified on time. Attempts to bribe the cacique were also made by Marcos de Vera, a relative by marriage of Villavicencio, who offered him 1,200 pesos on condition that he drop the charges. But, asked the cacique, "como abia de vender a estos miserables indefensos?" Earlier, don Manuel Inocencio had also claimed that Indians refrained from deserting the village, "por el amor que me tienen como a su señor y cacique." Indians accused Pizarro of partiality in favor of Villavicencio, his *paniaquado*, which was perhaps the case, for Villavicencio, along with Marcos de Vera and Pedro de Aragundi, had testified in favor of the governor in the ongoing dispute that Pizarro
had with Nuñez de Balboa. Nonetheless, the Audiencia backed Governor Pizarro, and on September, 1789, it ruled that Villavicencio was free of all charges, inducing don Manuel Inocencio to go into hiding. Under this circumstances, he chose instead to come to Madrid, and seek justice directly from the king.152

Don Manuel Inocencio had a tendency to frame the complaints of Indians from Jipijapa in the widest possible context. In 1785, for instance, when representing before the Viceroy, he had likened conditions of Indians from Jipijapa to those affecting Indians "en los demás países de América," and the abuses of tenientes and mestizos to similar abuses "en los pueblos de la Real Corona y los demás pueblos de esta Provincia de Guayaquil."153 Later, in 1796, when on another mission to obtain the land title for Indians from Jipijapa, he would insist that he did not claim "tierras cacicales," as was common in other parts of the Indies, but "tierras del común," all of which tends to indicate that don Manuel Inocencio was well informed as to conditions prevailing elsewhere in the colonies.154 Most importantly, it suggests on his part a broader outlook, which transcended localisms and allowed him to argue the Indians' cases more effectively, something which we have argued was a result of the Indians' autonomy and involvement in market activities, particularly, through exportable goods.
In Madrid, on October 22, 1793, he informed the king that it had taken him two years to cover the distance of 5,400 leagues separating Madrid from his hometown in Jipijapa, where he had left a wife, children and other members of his family.\(^{155}\) Don Manuel Inocencio also described that he had arrived in Callao hoping to sail either for Panama or Cartagena, but had found only a ship "para las Españas," whereby he had determined to come before His Majesty, "Padre y Señor," and inform him "lo que por allá pasa en esas Américas con sus miserables indios indefensos."

As had Juan Seguiche and the capitulares from Portoviejo, the cacique expressed his conviction that the king would alleviate the fate of aquel "Nuevo Mundo al que tanto aspira y no tiene otro asilo sino es de un amoroso como Padre y como Rey."\(^{156}\) Don Manuel Inocencio's representation was endorsed by 74 signatures, among principales, índios del común, and a few mestizos. It was also accompanied by supportive documents, which included an earlier writing by the fiscal protector, a testimony by the priest Ruiz Cano, a relative of Villavicencio, and retractions made by Indians earlier backing Villavicencio. One of these Indians was Bartolomé Pilay, escribano of the cabildo of Jipijapa for several decades, who attributed his earlier endorsement of Villavicencio to an uncontrollable personal greed, "sin atender que ni la vida es estable," while another mestizo, proclaimed the cacique
to be "hombre tan amante a este común, que se lleva caminando las Audiencias" to defend Indians and mestizos against the excesses of the tobacco program.157

State sponsored tobacco cultivation was later discontinued in Portoviejo, but we ignore whether it resulted from the cacique's request. Parrales y Guale returned from Madrid with a cédula de amparo, as had Juan Seguiche before him, but in 1796, the Audiencia ruled that the legal proceedings followed by Governor Pizarro in 1788 were in order, and that Indians had not suffered indefensión, as argued by Parrales y Guale.158.

Francisco de Paula Villavicencio in many ways exemplified the dilemmas and contradictions plaguing mestizos, the fastest growing population in Spanish America, whose status was not as well defined as was that of Indians and Spanish. This ambiguity left mestizos in a sort of limbo, not entirely at ease either in the Indian or the Spanish world. Along with other members of the castes, they were frequently compelled to deny their ancestry by a system which prioritized purity of blood and lineage over personal merit. This situation was made worse when they bore the stigma of illegitimacy, as did Villavicencio. The system certainly gave leeway to circumvent the law, but surely, such circumvention, which entailed denial and legal change of one's true status, must have exacted a personal toll. In his youth, Villavicencio faced charges of brutal violence against a
woman in Jipijapa, who had apparently complained against him before Ruiz Cano for molesting her married daughter.\textsuperscript{159} Later, he was described by a protector de naturales as showing mortal hatred against Indians.\textsuperscript{160} He was also accused by Indians of promiscuity and sexually abusing his female slaves, to the point of committing incest.\textsuperscript{161} Yet Villavicencio also enjoyed a reputation as an honorable vassal of the king, having established the administration of Ramos Reales in Portoviejo at his own cost,\textsuperscript{162} donated silver ornaments for the church in Jipijapa, acted as mayordomo of cofradías, helped Indians in the construction of albarradas or deposits to conserve water, and actively pursued the establishment of a hospital to attend the poor in Portoviejo.\textsuperscript{163}

From his own account, Villavicencio was born Francisco Ruiz Cano y Chiquito, the illegitimate son of Gaspar Ruiz Cano, of noble status and the nephew of the parish priest of Jipijapa, and Tomasa Chiquito y Anzules, whom Villavicencio described as a descendant of the noble Anzules family from Jipijapa.\textsuperscript{164} On his father's side, Francisco de Paula claimed kinship ties with powerful lineages in Guayaquil and Lima, all duly certified through documents, information that he deemed important enough to mention in his will. He had, for instance, been recognized as kin by the Marquis of Villa Florida in Lima and by the engineer Francisco Requena, who had married into the Santistevan family in Guayaquil, the relatives of
the Ruiz Cano. In 1790, Villavicencio had sought and obtained *carta de naturaleza*, and he was later granted "quasi posesion de hidalguia" by the Audiencia in Lima. For unknown reasons, though, he bore the name of Villavicencio, and passed as the legitimate son of the sacristan of the parish priest, Antonio Gavilanes y Villavicencio, whom Indians described as being a mulatto and a former slave of the priest, and who had married Tomasa Chiquito, Villavicencio's mother. The fact that he chose to pass as Villavicencio rather than Ruiz Cano, raises the possibility that instead of being the son of Gaspar Ruiz Cano, he was the son of Francisco Xavier Ruiz Cano, the parish priest of Jipijapa, at whose side he grew up and whose protection, according to Indians from Jipijapa, enabled him to become a "mandón del pueblo." On the other hand, his choice of the name Villavicencio over Ruiz Cano may have also reflected his wish to avoid the stigma of illegitimacy, for at one point, while filing complaints for slander against one Martin Pérez de Villamar in Portoviejo, he had claimed to be the legitimate son of Antonio Villavicencio. Later he justified such action by claiming he had sought to avoid hurting those who had reared him as a son. Such inconsistencies on his part allowed Indians to harass him over the issue of his racial inadequacies on every occasion in which he was about to be promoted.
Villavicencio's public career spanned four decades, from 1777 to 1817, during which time he enjoyed the trust and friendship of governors as well as lesser authorities in Guayaquil. As administrator of Reales Rentas in Portoviejo, which included the ramos of Tobacco, Aguardiente, and mail, he faced, at varying times, charges of default against the Real Erario, raised by vecinos and Indians from Jipijapa, but managed to clear his name in every instance, including those brought against his administration of funds for the hospital in Portoviejo. He acted on several occasions as teniente interino in Portoviejo, although according to the Indians, Governor Pizarro had earlier ruled Villavicencio to be the sole administrators of Rentas Reales, who was not allowed to judge cases related to their administrations, on account of his lowly origins. If true, this ruling had been overturned in 1788 when Pizarro cleared Villavicencio's name, threatening instead to persecute Parrales y Guale, as the cacique himself complained in Madrid. Despite the opposition of Indians from Jipijapa, Villavicencio was appointed Teniente de Gobernador y Justicia Mayor in the partidos of Baba, in 1805, and eventually of Portoviejo, in 1807, an appointment made by the viceroy in Lima, once the Gobernación de Guayaquil had been placed under his jurisdiction for the purpose of defense.

Villavicencio had married Mariana Bravo de Brito y de Vera, considered of noble birth in Portoviejo, and had wed
his daughters to prominent vecinos españoles: José María Andrade y Mateus, a native of Viscaya, and the brothers Juan Antonio and Vicente Menéndez y del Barco, the descendants of Alférez Real Juan del Barco, who were in possession of noble status claimed on their father's side in his native Vizcaya. In his will, drafted in 1817, Villavicencio estimated his assets, consisting of coffee trees, cattle and slaves in Jipijapa and cacao in Chone, to be worth 35,759 pesos. Francisco de Paula Villavicencio was more than a mandón in Jipijapa, as Indians described him. He was a member of the local elite, and was, perhaps, the most well known vecino from Portoviejo in Guayaquil, where he was also a homeowner. Nonetheless, Indians from Jipijapa, instigated by Manuel Inocencio Parrales y Guale, succeeded in bringing him before the courts to clear his name, honor, and good fame at least five times between 1785 and 1807, for they not only identified him as a zambo but described his true condition to be that of tributary Indian. This denial of his mother's noble status was clearly a revenge, for the Anzules were a family of caciques in Jipijapa, whose cacicazgo had in fact been usurped in the eighteenth century by forasteros, i.e. the Soledispas. Indians chose to retaliate against Villavicencio where he was most vulnerable. They manipulated the ambiguities of his ethnic status, the rules of the system, and his relentless ambition to arrive and become an accepted member of the
colonial establishment. 175 In 1795, the Audiencia threatened to bar entrance to the courts to his accusers and their lawyer, unless they showed more respect to Villavicencio in the corridors and address him as don in their writings. 176 Such rulings did not, of course, deter Indians from reinstating the same charges at a later date. Nor did a peace agreement signed in Jipijapa in 1796, between Parrales y Guale and Villavicencio, at the instigation of authorities from Guayaquil. By this truce, both contenders pledged to cease harassing each other through slander or legal means. 177 In 1802, the Audiencia was once more compelled to confirm Villavicencio's "quasi posesión en que se halla de su buena reputación, mérito y natales," for in connivance with other Spanish vecinos from Portoviejo, Indians had again raised the issue of his racial status. The judges sentenced Juan Antonio and José Ramón Menéndez--the former later to become the son in law of Villavicencio, but at the time his enemies and temporarily allies of the Indians, to pay for costas or legal fees. Governor Urbina imposed perpetual silence on the Indians regarding this issue, under threats of facing serious punishments. Earlier, the Audiencia had also cited the royal decree of December 24, 1793, which sanctioned that "empleados de rentas de la clase que fueren sirvan oficios de república," a decree basically reflecting Bourbon efforts at reform. The irony in this case being that the royal decree was cited in defense of a
mestizo, accused of racial inadequacies by Indians rather than by creoles or other mestizos, as was more commonly the case. Nor were Indians deterred by sentences ordering them to pay for costas or legal fees, as also happened in 1796, and again in 1805, when Governor Cucalón ordered them to restore Villavicencio 200 pesos spent in legal fees. As had Governors Pizarro and Urbina before him, Governor Cucalón threatened to pass even more severe sentences, should Indians continue to bother the courts and harass Villavicencio for spurious reasons, which they did again in 1807.

The question is not so much why Indians waged opposition against Villavicencio, for his earlier abuses inducing the cacique Parrales to go to Santa Fe and Madrid, were well documented. More than likely, he was also guilty of the excesses attributed to him by the Indians as administrador de ramos reales and as teniente interino, in essence, the use of political power to increase his wealth. It is, though, intriguing that Indians from Jipijapa should target Villavicencio with so much vindictiveness for well over two decades, often repeating charges already aired, as were those concerning his racial blemishes and promiscuity. A sign of this vindictiveness was the fact that Indians allied themselves with former enemies, vecinos españoles who were seeking to discredit Villavicencio before the courts, for charges not directly affecting the Indians. Such was the case, for
instance, when Villavicencio was accused of defrauding the Ramos Reales by José Ramón and Juan Antonio Menéndez, or those raised by the priest Vivero, also with the support of Indians. Indians also made common cause with former tenientes, when they were feuding with Vilavicencio, as were Francisco Xavier Casanova, Manuel Ponce de León y Cosío, Josef Alvarez de la Camposa, and Juan Ponce de León y Palacios. These alliances made by Indians were so fast-shifting, that they are hard to follow, as in the case of their parish priest Vivero. One year, he was described as nuestro enemigo común only to be considered their ally the following year in the context of feuding with Villavicencio. The priest had accused Villavicencio of wrong doings in his administration of a cofradia, while Villavicencio accused Vivero before the Audiencia of demanding excessive stipends from the Indians. The Indians' vindictiveness led them to harass Villavicencio in the courts even when he was aspiring to office outside Portoviejo, as was the case in 1804, when he sought the post of teniente of Baba.

Such attitudes on the part of the Indians were all the more puzzling, since they had at one point or another endorsed Vilavicencio; even don Manuel Inocencio had done so. In 1804, several caciques petitioned the governor to appoint Villavicencio as teniente of Portoviejo, rather than Juan Antonio Menéndez. They described the latter along with his brother, as "nuestros enemigos capitales
constante de hecho y derecho, y no pueden gobernar en Paz, quienes sin atender el permiso que les dimos para vivir en nuestra unión, se han colocado y unido con nuestro enemigo común (the parish priest Vivero) y declaradamente nos persiguen para agraviarnos." They instead recommended don Francisco de Paula Villavicencio, "persona de notorios talentos, fondos de consideración, que no necesita defraudar para vivir, y que en las varias ocasiones que ha sido Teniente de Justicia mayor de esta provincia le hemos recibido con regocijo y contento." 182 This petition, signed by Parrales y Guale and several other caciques and principales from Jipijapa, cannot simply be dismissed as a result of the power or influence wielded by Villavicencio, for we have seen that when it suited them, Indians had no qualms about calling him a zambo, a criminal and depraved. They were most certainly capable of showing an independent attitude towards authorities.

Villavicencio also received the endorsement of other factions in Jipijapa, including don Vicente Xalca, the rival of Parrales y Guale, who in 1807 wrote to the governor in Guayaquil, on behalf of el común of Jipijapa asking that "se digne remediar los disturbios que entre unos y otros naturales padesemos metidos en bandos y disensiones para incomodar los tribunales." 183 He then identified don Manuel Inocencio as the main instigator of such disensions, calling him by the name of Guale y Alay instead of Parrales y Guale, and describing him to be the
son of Paula Alay, "India común barre calle que llamamos entre nosotors, quien por nuestra desgracia govierna este Pueblo." In so doing, the cacique Xalca downgraded the social standing of don Manuel Inocencio, apparently a frequent tactic of Indians from Jipijapa to demean their adversaries. Xalca likewise accused don Manuel Inocencio of conspiring with a sargent by the name of Juan Fálquez against Villavicencio and "el caballero, nuestro Teniente Juan Antonio Menéndez," and with one José Salcedo, a friend of Fálquez, "quien anda escribiendo papelones que dise saber forjar llenos de enredos y disparates, y quien por lo reboltoso y maligno traia el Pueblo inquieto con papeles y escritos entre los Indios, para guitarles y estafarles los cortos pesos." Indeed, the opposing faction, led by Parrales y Guale, had told a totally different story before the audiencia, labeling Teniente Menéndez as "iracundo, lunático, e ignorante," and Villavicencio as "hombre de mala fama," that is, with racial blemishes, and accusing them of harassing other Spanish authorities, including the Sargento Mayor de la Plaza de Guayaquil, don Juan Fálquez. Meanwhile, in his representation, Xalca had asked the governor to order Fálquez to leave Jipijapa, and to contain "ese mal cacique," further labeled "enemigo de su patria, que la ha consumido siempre con estafas de dineros con pretexto de bien público."184 This petition was signed by several caciques, principales, and primogénitos de caciques, as
the heirs to the cacicazgos liked to identify themselves. The problem was that most of those signing were either Anzules or Chiquitos, all relatives of Villavicencio. Nonetheless, another cacique, don Manuel Soledispa y Parral, had earlier accused don Manuel Inocencio of falsely pretending "amor a su patria, solicitando beneficios y haciendo (another archaism) que todo el pueblo firme en contra de sí propio" by defending the parish priest Vivero, his former enemy.185

What all these allegations and counter allegations quite obviously show is that factionalism among Indians in Jipijapa was rampant by the late colonial period. Such factionalism we take to be the result of increased competition for resources and political power, as newcomers vied with long term residents such as Villavicencio, and with caciques and principales, for the control of resources, or retain such control, in the case of the ethnic authorities. In their representations, Indians often complained that Villavicencio, the Menéndez family, the priest, and others wanted to destroy caciques and principales, legitimate concerns during this period, even for a cacique as committed to the defense of Indians as don Manuel Inocencio, capable of spending his corta haciendita in his trips to Santa Fe and Madrid, refusing to accept bribes and of pursuing tierras del común rather than tierras cacicales. In face of changing conditions in Portoviejo, which included greater demands from the state
as well as increased competition for resources, Indians from Jipijapa apparently chose to resist through legal means, rather than engage in the frequently ill planned and spontaneous rebellions taking place in the highlands. We might note that these disputes and factionalism among Indians mirrored conditions earlier described among the elites in cities such as Guayaquil and Quito, perhaps a measure of the extent to which Indians from Jipijapa had become mainstreamed into colonial society.

Their vindictiveness against Villavicencio perhaps derived from the fact that he, as a native of Jipijapa, was more threatening to caciques, since he could mobilize the support of his kin and other local relations for his own purposes. His inside knowledge, no doubt, allowed him to manipulate the Indians more effectively. In 1807, he had for instance threatened that once appointed as teniente he would take away cacicazgos litigated two decades earlier, as were those of don Vicente Xalca and don Manuel Soledispa, unless these caciques and their faction offered their signatures in his favor. At least, so claimed the son of don Manuel Inocencio and other members of his faction, in private letters introduced as evidence before the Audiencia.186 Also, Villavicencio's methods for acquiring wealth, though common, may have been more despicable in the eyes of Indians, when practiced by someone like him born and raised as one of their own in Jipijapa. By the time of his death, Villavicencio had
acquired what in Portoviejo would be considered a sizable fortune. He owned a cattle ranch in Sancán within the territory claimed by the Indians and had sought a ruling which would allow him to claim as his property the wild cattle roaming the area.\(^{187}\) This action apparently posed no conflict with the Indians, for in the context of seeking the communal land title in 1796, don Manuel Inocencio mentioned this *hacienda ganadera* as evidence of the industriousness of inhabitants in Jipijapa.\(^{188}\) Yet in 1785 he had accused Villavicencio of becoming wealthy with the labor of the Indians. Later several caciques claimed that Villavicencio advanced cash even to *tenientes*, in a partnership that Indians described as *parcería* or sharecropping, for the *tenientes* would use their authority to pay Indians less than the market price for their products.\(^{189}\) Such practices were widespread in the colonies, since merchant capital controlled much of production before it even started, as e.g., through the infamous *repartimientos*. But this widespread "putting out system,"\(^ {190}\) worked to the disadvantage of direct producers and was most effective when practiced by those wielding authority as corregidore or *tenientes*, financed by *aviadores* or *habilitadores*, as was apparently the case with Villavicencio.

We might remember that Governor Pizarro had been accused of the very same practices regarding cacao. Indians in Jipijapa may have felt more resentful of such
practices on Villavicencio's part, for in a way he had betrayed them, not so much by earnestly seeking membership among the Spanish or by becoming a zealous administrator of the king, but by sacrificing the well-being of the community to his personal greed. Caciques and principales more than likely profited from the labor of the Indians, but they may have avoided undermining the subsistence basis of the community, as has been commonly noted to be the case among peasant and traditional societies. Complaints against Villavicencio indicated precisely the opposite, as when the Indians accused him of forcing them to plant tobacco in land previously used for their food crops, or paying Indians less than the market price for their products with the complicity of tenientes, or using his position as mayordomo from their cofradías, veritable communal efforts for their religious cult. In 1807, Villavicencio was even accused by the Indians of hurting their local hat weaving industry by making clandestine shipments of paja toquilla to the northern valleys of Peru. Indians claimed that he had appointed Santiago Vergara, a trader from the interior later to acquire considerable wealth, as teniente pedaneo in Jipijapa for the sole purpose of forcing the Indians to extract paja toquilla to be shipped as contraband to Perú. Paja toquilla was the raw material used for weaving hats and the Indians complained that by so doing, Villavicencio was undermining their local industry and promoting hat weaving
in the northern valleys of Perú, their most important markets. Jipijapa hats were in great demand in the warm, dry valleys of Trujillo, Lambayeque, and Piura, where local merchants also channeled them to the city of Lima.192 The protection the hat weaving industry by forbidding exports of paja toquilla to Perú remained, in fact, a major issue throughout most of the nineteenth century. These violations of their moral strictures may have been more irritating to the Indians coming from someone well rooted in their community as Villavicencio, than say, someone as Teniente Nuñez de Balboa, whose downfall was easier to plot. Whatever the case, Villavicencio's problems were not limited to those with the Indians, for after independence, he was declared "desafecto a la causa de América" and "enemigo de la república" by Bolivar, who imposed a penalty of 10,000 pesos on his heirs, for Villavicencio had died sometime before 1821.193 The patriots in Portoviejo had apparently sought to discredit Villavicencio, a royalist, by accusing him of divesting funds for the hospital in Portoviejo and from the cofradías in Jipijapa, charges that given the intensity of these disputes may or may not have been true.194

We have focused extensively on these disputes for they allow us to envision conditions prevailing in Portoviejo in the late colonial period and to better understand the events immediately preceding independence.
For reasons already discussed—autonomy and market activity particularly of long distance range—Indians in Jipijapa, as well as those in Montecristi, had acquired adequate knowledge of the system and had remained more of an open rather than a closed community. This was somewhat of a paradox, for we have seen that earlier they refused to allow outsiders to sojourn in their village. Contributing to this state of affairs was the stagnation of the vecinos españoles, which had prevented them from subduing the Indians to their own needs. All of these conditions allowed more flexible ethnic boundaries, as evidenced in the alliances, however fast-shifting and unstable, that Indians made with vecinos españoles and mestizos. Further evidence in support of this argument is the fact that by the end of the eighteenth century, Indians had incorporated into their language, publicly as well as privately, such expressions as "amor a la patria," "el bien público," or even "guerra civil" to describe internal factionalism. "Patria," in the sense used by Indians, obviously had the connotation of locality, but it was nonetheless significant when used in reference to the identity of the group, as when don Manuel Inocencio was accused of being "enemigo de la patria." In the following chapter we shall see in what ways these conditions influenced the response of the inhabitants of Portoviejo to the independence movement.
Notes

1. "Recurso de Juan Seguiche, natural del pueblo de Jipijapa, Julio 1, 1767," in "Mal Tratamiento que se hace a vecinos de Puerto Viejo 1754-1767." AGI, Quito 286.

2. The royal decree was dated August 31, 1754. "Mal tratamiento que se hace a vecinos de Puerto Viejo, 1751-1767."

3. Ibid


5. "Recurso de Juan Seguiche, Julio 1, 1767."

6. Ibid

7. Ibid

8. "Los Capitulares de la ciudad de San Gregorio de Puerto Viejo al Rey, Noviembre 9, 1751," in "Mal tratamiento que se hace a vecinos de Puerto Viejo."

9. Gaspar de Ugarte was in office as contador real of the Caxas Reales in Guayaquil from 1728 until his death in 1755. For the organization of the Caxas Reales during this period see Maria Luisa Laviana Cuetos, "Organización y funcionamiento de las caxas reales de Guayaquil en la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII, Anuario de Estudios Americanos, 27 (1980), 313-349.

10. San Gregorio de Puerto Viejo was founded by Francisco Pacheco, a lieutenant of Diego de Almagro, who instructed him from Piura to establish a city near the coastline, to aid vessels sailing down to Perú. Pedro Cieza de León, La Crónica del Perú (Madrid, 1932), 166.

11. "Mal tratamiento que se hace a vecinos de Puerto Viejo."


13. Requena reported that the priest in Jipijapa was "secular y vicario provinciano, siguiendo la antigua división que hacia este partido corregimiento separado de Guayaquil." Laviana Cuetos, "La
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descripción de Guayaquil por Francisco Requena, 1774," Historiografía y Bibliografía Americanista, 26 (1982), 79. From hereafter cited as "La descripción de Guayaquil por Francisco Requena."

14. "Mal tratamiento que se hace a vecinos de Portoviejo." Citation in the following paragraphs will all be drawn from this expediente.

15. According to the capitulares, Teniente Sánchez de Mora, the son in law of Contador Gaspar de Ugarte, had sought to establish monopolies of soap, candles and rum, "y otras cosas con el pretexto de establecer pulperías y al mismo tiempo hizo la pretensión de prohibir en los pueblos el comercio y también las herrerías y que las únicas que se estableciesen habían de correr por sus manos."

16. Capitulares accused Contador Real Gaspar de Ugarte of sending vessels loaded with cacao to Acapulco. They also accused authorities in Guayaquil of commissioning Teniente Salcedo to go to Bahía de Caráquez and receive a vessel arriving from Panama, "en donde se aprovechó de muchos pesos, quebrantando las órdenes de Vuestra Majestad, pues no se supo que hubieran aplicado ninguno para las reales caxas."

17. Capitulares had this to say about duties in the port of Guayaquil in 1751: "El Derecho Real de Almojarifazgo de aquel Puerto se haya hoy en el mayor aumento con la frecuente entrada y salida de embarcaciones y observándose que no corresponde al poco cargo que se hace en los tanteos," adding that "Tocante a otros comercios ilícitos como el de la remisión de dicho cacao, se ofrecería que decir vastante y con particularidad del tiempo que hubo guerra con el inglés."

18. Capitulares also complained before the Audiencia against regidores, oficiales reales and other vecinos from Guayaquil. The audiencia had appointed Regidor Joseph de la Cotera from Guayaquil, as Juez Comisionado. In 1750, he complained that Moreno y Ollos, Domingo de Santistevan, Joseph Baos and others had obstructed his commission by denying him jurisdiction, and had instead chosen "la medida impolítica" of sending an armed expedition against Portoviejo, feigning insubordination on their part. For this reason, the Audiencia suspended Moreno y Ollos as corregidor. "Real provisión encomendando al cabildo, justicia y regimiento de Guayaquil notifique al corregidor de Guayaquil que ha cesado en sus funciones." ANH, Presidencia, Libro 29, Doc.1632.
19. "Mal tratamiento que se hace a los vecinos de Puerto Viejo."

20. "Testimonio de las sumarias practicadas contra don Pedro Sánchez de Mora y don Pedro Salcedo, tenientes que fueron de la ciudad de Puerto Viejo (en virtud de orden de Su Majestad), sobre los excesos que estos cometieron en aquella ciudad. Octubre 14, 1757," in "Mal tratamiento que se hace a vecinos de Puerto Viejo."

21. For the proposed opening of a port in San Antonio de Morga and a connecting road to Quito see Phelan, *The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century*, 17-22.


23. In 1748, the following vecinos were regidores of the cabildo of Portoviejo: Juan Francisco Centeno, Juan Antonio del Barco, Juan de Vera y Rivera, Juan Isidoro de Mendoza and Thomas Moreira. "Los capitulares de la ciudad de San Gregorio de Puerto Viejo al Rey, 1751."

24. Witnesses in these investigations were: Francisco Flores Pita, assistant in Charapotó, Fernando Sánchez Valdez, Juan Isidoro Mendoza, Diego Martínez de Castilla, Joseph and Gregorio Pita, Marcos de Burgos, Joseph Pino Argote, Juan Ventura, Joseph Bravo de Brito, Esteban Macías, Manuel de Mendoza, and Pedro Veléz. "Testimonio de Sumaria practicada contra don Pedro Sánchez de Mora y don Pedro Salcedo."

25. "Comunicación del Virrey de Santa Fe al Rey, Enero 12, 1764," in "Mal tratamiento que se hace a capitulares de la ciudad de San Gregorio de Puerto Viejo."


27. In 1605, it was stated that "las antiguedades" of Portoviejo had been lost in a blaze of forty five years earlier, when cabildo records had been destroyed. "Descripción de la Gobernación de Guayaquil de 1605," 80.

28. Ibid

29. "Mal tratamiento que se hace a vecinos de Portoviejo."
30. "Comunicación del Virrey de Santa Fe al Rey, Enero 12, 1764," in "Mal tratamiento que se hace a vecinos de Puerto Viejo."


32. In 1774, Requena wrote that the teniente in Portoviejo, was head of the cabildo of that city, "La Descripción de Guayaquil por Francisco Requena, 1774," 76.

33. The following were tenientes of Portoviejo between 1746 and 1770: Pedro Salcedo, Pedro Sánchez de Mora, Francisco Caxier, Antonio Soliz, Ramón Carlos Chacón, Capitán Miguel de Zevallos, Capitán Marcos Fernando de Vera and Gaspar de Neira, while tenientes interinos were Joseph Menéndez, Antonio de Neira, Pedro de Aragundi, Francisco Picazzos, and Marcos de Vera, (named teniente propietario between 1780 and 1786). In the latter part of the century, tenientes of Portoviejo were: Antonio de Ugarte, Manuel Nuñez de Balboa, Marcos de Vera, Juan Ponce de León, Francisco Terrazos, Francisco Xavier Casanova, Manuel Ponce de León, Juan Antonio Menéndez, Francisco de Paula Villavicencio and José Luis de la Vega.

34. Laviana Cuetos, Guayaquil en el siglo XVIII, 114.

35. Ibid, 114.

36. Demographic density was estimated by Hamerly to be at 0.25 per sq.Km. for 1765, and 0.85 for 1825, however, both figures referred to the modern province of Manabí, which included the partidos of Portoviejo and La Canoa. Historia social y económica de la antigua Provincia de Guayaquil. Laviana Cuetos estimated demographic density in the entire Gobernación de Guayaquil from 0.5 for 1765 to 1.20 for 1808, but this included the city of Guayaquil, which distorted upwards the population density in rural areas. Guayaquil en el siglo XVIII, 12.

37. Indians from Esmeraldas were not included in these population counts, for that province was under the jurisdiction of Quito. Numbers for 1765 are drawn from the census taken by Governor Zelaya, in Laviana Cuetos, Guayaquil en el siglo XVIII, 88-89.

38. Ibid
39. In 1780, contadores reales registered 1,494 tributaries for Portoviejo, and estimated the tribute for that year at 9,617 pesos. "Comunicación de Oficiales Reales al Visitador Pizarro, Setiembre, 1780," in "Expediente relativo a la consignación que gozaban los Tenientes Partidarios de Guayaquil en el Ramo de Reales Tributos, 1780," ANH, Tributos caja 1C. We doubt that this information was accurate, for it would mean that the Indian population in Portoviejo circa 1780 would have to be considerably raised from the figure of 3,350 Indians shown by Hamelry for this same year, Historia social y econóica. Furthermore, Laviana Cuetos has estimated that in 1765 there were 636 tributaries in Portoviejo, using a coefficient of 4.67, and drawing her numbers from the census made by Governor Zelaya, generally considered a reliable source. Guayaquil en el siglo XVIII, 143. If the figures given by contadores reales in 1780 were correct, it would mean that tributaries in Portoviejo increased almost four times in as little as 15 years, for oficiales reales had also described the number of tributaries in Portoviejo between 1771 and 1775 to be the following:

1771 - 1,473 tributaries;
1772 - 1,454  
1773 - 1,455  
1774 - 1,538  
1775 - 1,572  

an information which they claimed had been obtained from parish records. These figures are obviously incongruent with the information available for 1765. More than likely, the number of tributaries mentioned by oficiales reales refered to all the province of Guayaquil rather than Portoviejo, for in 1780, Governor Pizarro informed the visitador, that there were 1,612 tributaries in Guayaquil, and 400 reservados. "Memorial del Governor Pizarro al Visitador y Presidente, Febrero 29, 1780." in Expediente relativo a la consignación que gozaban los tenientes," however, there are problems when estimating the number of tributaries for Portoviejo, for they fluctuated considerably. At any given year, between 1785 and 1801, when information was provided by the Contaduria de Tributos, the number of Indians paying their tribute in Portoviejo or paying it elsewhere, as in Daule, Santa Lucía, or Guayaquil, shifted considerably. The majority were found in neighboring Daule, which apparently attracted them in large numbers. They were categorized as "Indios de la Provincia de Portoviejo" in 1785, the first year when the Contaduria administered the collection of tributes. But even in Daule, their number fluctuated considerably from year to year. To further complicate matters, the Contaduria de Tributos did
not always provide this detailed information for each year, which makes it harder to estimate whether this was a permanent or temporary migration to Daule. The following table shows the differences in the number of tributaries paying their tributes in Portoviejo or elsewhere for the years of 1785, 1798, 1799, 1800 and 1801 for which we have information.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In Portoviejo</th>
<th>other partidos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1785</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1798</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1799</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1801</td>
<td>921</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numbers for 1785 were particularly distorted. During that year there was an unusual decrease in the number of tributaries paying their tribute in Portoviejo, which we suspect reflected evasion on the part of Indians from Jipijapa and Montecristi to nearby forests, a complaint of caciques and authorities. As we shall see, some of the reforms enacted by Visitorador Pizarro were being implemented in Portoviejo. In 1785 there were only 66 llactallos or originarios in Jipijapa, and 35 in Montecristi, as compared to 570 and 161 the following year. Since the extremely low number of tributaries in Portoviejo for 1785 quite obviously eschewed the number of tributaries for the entire Province of Guayaquil (2,149 as compared to 2,646 the following year), Laviana Cuetos had interpreted this to derive from the inclusion of forasteros, and tributaries from Tosagua and Machala in 1786. This discrepancy was rather the result of the low number of tributaries in Portoviejo in 1785. There were only 14 tributaries in Tosagua and 85 in Machala by 1786, which could not account for that great a difference. Also, up to 1801, the number of forasteros paying their tribute in Guayaquil was extremely low. The Contaduria del Tributo registered a total of 2,726 tributaries in 1801, 50 Indians paid their tribute as forasteros, and 26 as Indios de la Real Corona de Quito, altogether 76, an unusually low figure. The number of tributaries increased from 1,687 in 1765 to 2,726 by 1801, a figure which includes the number of forasteros listed above. Most of this increase took place in Santa Elena and Portoviejo, where our data for these years show that there were few forasteros in these partidos between 1785 and 1801.

40. "Padrón de la Provincia de Guayaquil en 1790," Appendix II, in Laviana Cuetos, Guayaquil en el siglo XVIII.
41. In 1786, according to the Contaduría General de Rentas established the year before, the number of tributaries listed in Portoviejo were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parish</th>
<th>Tributaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jipijapa</td>
<td>570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montecristi</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charapotó</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picoasa</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pichota</td>
<td>6</td>
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Total 788 tributaries

Cuentas de Tributos de Guayaquil, 1785-1801, AGI, Quito, 483. As the above figures indicate, the majority of tributaries were found in the parishes of Jipijapa and Montecristi. As noted, Laviana Cuetos has estimated a coefficient of 4.67 per tributary for this period. These figures would indicate that in 1786, there were altogether 3,679 Indians in Portoviejo and that 3,413 or 92% of Indians lived in Jipijapa and Montecristi.

42. The relocation of ethnic groups in Puerto Viejo was enforced in the late sixteenth century by Visitador Loayza. "Descripción de la Gobernación de Guayaquil de 1605," 90-91.

43. Altogether eight parcialidades were listed in Jipijapa during this period: Aguasá, La Alta, Payache, La Baja, Sancán, Apechingue, Apelope, and Pillasagua, all of which were mentioned in the "Descripción" of 1605 in the same Jipijapa, with the exception of Payachi. This parcialidad was originally from Portoviejo, but its cacique, don Juan Chóez, had married the cacica from Sancán, Catalina Anzules, and had moved all his Indians to Jipijapa, probably somewhere in the late seventeenth century. "Autos de proclama de don Pedro Chóez." ANH, Cacicazgo, caja 13. The parcialidad of Picalenceme mentioned in 1605, had become extinct early in that century, since by 1605 it had but one tributario and four reservados. This was also the case of the parcialidad of Salango, which had but one tributario and one reservado left, both without descendants. The "Relacion" noted that "a este numero se ha reducido todo un pueblo," the result of conquest and colonization in Portoviejo. "Descripción de Guayaquil de 1605," 83.

44. The following principales were caciques in Jipijapa during this period: Don Manuel Soledispa, Cacique of Aguasá, litigated by Juan Francisco Pin in 1779 ("Autos de proclama de don Manuel Soledispa con Juan Francisco Pin." ANH Corte Superior de Justicia, cacicazgo, Tomo 77); Don Pedro Chóez, Cacique of
Payachi, litigated by a descendant of the Anzúles in 1789 ("Autos de Proclama de don Pedro Chóez," ANH, cacicazgo, caja 13); Don Vicente Xalca, Cacique of La Baja and Apechigue, litigated by Juan Santos Ligua in 1787 ("Autos de Proclama de Juan Santos Ligua," ANH, Fondo Corte Superior de Justicia, cacicazgo, tomo 92). Don Antonio Parrales, Cacique of Apelope in 1779, inherited later, by don Manuel Inocencio Parrales y Guale, Cacique and Governador de Indígenas de Jipijapa in 1785. Don Alfonso Thoala, Cacique of La Alta in 1765. We ignore the process through which a governador de Indígenas, usually one of the principales or caciques was appointed. The fact that there were two parcialidades in Jipijapa named La Baja and La Alta would suggest the same type of structural division in moieties so common in the Andean world. See, for instance, Nathan Wachtel, La Vision de Vaincus (Paris, 1971).

45. "Compulsa de los Indios de Jipijapa para obtener título de propiedad y amparo, 1796-1806," in "Correspondencia del Gobernador de Manabí con el Ministro del Interior, 1853," ANH Gobierno, Fondo Gobernacion de Manabí, Año de 1853. In a previous work, we have estimated the extension of this territory to be 4,000 sq. Km., for its boundaries corresponded to the counties of Jipijapa, Paján and 24 de Mayo, in the province of Manabí. Soberania e Insurreccion en Manabí 41-42.

46. In 1677, for instance, in a pesquisa secreta destined to uncover prácticas de brujería in Portoviejo, Indians from Manta, Charapotó, Picoazá were identified as "ladino en lengua española." "Pesquisa Secreta de Juan Martínez del Junco, Juez Visitador de esta Provincia y Teniente General, 1677-1678" AHG. EP/ J 131. Earlier in 1605, the "Descripción de Guayaquil" had noted that Indians in Jipijapa had lost all but one of their languages, which they spoke along with Spanish. "Descripción de la Gobernación de Guayaquil de 1605," 93.

47. Bernardo Recio, Compendiosa Relación de la Christiandad de Quito. 182-183.

48. In 1605, Indians from Puerto Viejo were already described as "muy españolados," and several among them were said to be literate. "Descripción de la Gobernación de Guayaquil de 1605," 82.

49. "La Descripción de Francisco Requena," 77-78. In Santa Elena, he also described that there were seven Spanish, thirteen zambos, and ten mestizos.

51. In 1757, for instance, Indians from La Punta and El Morro earned cash through sales of the following products: *hilo de caracol* for eight reales the arroba. To passing ships: chickens and cabritos, at four reales each; a dozen eggs at one and a half real; fresh water at 2 reales a botija, a calf for three pesos, wood for three pesos, and plantain for twelve reales. They also harvested salt from the royal salt mines in Santa Elena, sometimes obtaining two harvests a year, and anywhere from two to three hundred fanegadas of salt from each well, which sold at four reales the fanegada. Indians had the monopoly over "cargadas," or the supply of salt to passing by ships, earning sometimes as much as three pesos each day. They were also the owners of cattle, as many as 1,500 by 1774. Vecinos españoles had desisted, therefore, attempts to establish their haciendas in Santa Elena for the Indians demanded high wages. "Comunicación del Protector de Naturales, Julio 24, 1758," in "Expediente relativo a la consignación que gozaban los Tenientes Partidarios de Guayaquil en el Ramo Real de Tributos, 1779-1780."

52. "La Descripción de Guayaquil por Francisco Requena, 1774," 81-82. For a description of the economic activities of Indians from Jipijapa circa 1796, see "Compulsa de los indios de Jipijapa para obtener título de propiedad, 1796-1806." It described that Indians in Jipijapa owned cattle, mules, grew sugar cane, and had altogether 70 trapiches, or sugar mills.

53. "La Descripción de Guayaquil de Francisco Requena," 79.

54. Ibid, 78.

55. Ibid, 81

56. Don Pedro Chóes, for instance, owned more than 6,000 cacao trees in 1796, which perhaps made him the largest cacao grower in Portoviejo during these years. "Compulsa de los Indios de Jipijapa para obtener título de propiedad y amparo, 1796-1806." In 1772, another cacique, Don Antonio Soledispa listed the following assets in his will: 48 heads of cattle, 10 mules, one donkey, two sugar mills or trapiches with all their implements, and copper and silverware. "Autos de proclama de Juan Francisco Pin con Manuel Soledispa, sobre el cacicazgo de Aguasa, pueblo de Jipijapa, 1779."
57. "Proveen los indios de este partido a toda la provincia de las alcaldías que usan en ella para andar a caballo, y por las que desprecian la mejor silla brida," described Requena, claiming that each year they made 400 or 500 of them, which sold for three and four pesos. Indians from Portoviejo also provided the province with hammocks, of which Requena commented that "alguna razón tienen en el aprecio que les dan pues logran en una sola pieza asiento y cama." Ibid, 79-80. But in the 1780s, the most important product made by Indians from Portoviejo were the toquilla hats. In 1784, for instance, 4,238 toquilla hats were exported, increasing to 17,299 by 1788, with a total of 53,393 hats being exported between these years. Laviana Cuetos, Guayaquil en el siglo XVIII, 216-217. In 1787, Indians were paid eight reales for a sombrero ordinario, and from 10 to 11 pesos for a sombrero fino. "Expdiente que sigue don Juan Maria Romero y los indios del pueblo de Jipijapa contra el teniente de gobernador don Manuel Nuñez de Balboa sobre capitulos y mala conducta 1787-1789," AGI, Quito, 271.

58. "Descripción de Guayaquil por Francisco Requena," 81. If the population of Portoviejo had been as depleted as Requena described in 1774, the number of tributaries reported by contadores reales in 1780 for the period between 1770 and 1775 deserves more serious thought.

59. "Cuenta de tributos de Guayaquil 1785-1801" AGI, Quito, 483. Indians from Portoviejo were highly mobile, as earlier mentioned. They migrated on a temporary rather than permanent basis, for even in Daule and Santa Lucia, which held such a large number of Indians from Portoviejo, their numbers fluctuated as follows between 1785 and 1801:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tr>
<td>1785</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1798</td>
<td>153</td>
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<tr>
<td>1799</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1801</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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60. Hamerly, Historia social y económica.

61. In 1774, there were 14,500 herds of cattle in Portoviejo, and Requena claimed that "hay por los campos 256 casas habitados por los hacendados que tienen en ellas sus siembras y ganados," "Descripción de Guayaquil," 80. These spacious huertas, fertilized by the Rios Grande y Chico, had been described in 1741, by Dionisio Alsedo y Herrera, as showing "árboles frutales, platanos, palmas de coco, y plantas de tabaco, el más escogido para el consumo
por la ventaja del gusto que le da calidad de haber sido la raíz, semilla que se llevo de Trinidad."

Compendio Histórico de la Provincia, Partidos, Ciudades, Astilleros, Rios, y Puertos de Guayaquil, en las Costas del Mar del Sur (Madrid, 1946) 70.

62. The number of blancos in Portoviejo for 1790 has been corrected downward by 2,009 by Laviana Cuetos, who argues that for the first time in 1790, mestizos were included with blancos, instead of the castes. In 1780, there were 990 blancos in Portoviejo, and 2,636 libres de todos los colores, while in 1790, blancos had increased to 3,129 and the castes declined to 1,016. Guayaquil en el siglo XVIII, 126-127 Her corrected figures would indicate that in the decade between 1780 and 1790, blancos in Portoviejo increased only by 139 individuals, which seems unlikely in view of the information that we have examined, although, not enough to dispute her figures. Nonetheless, the author states that the partido of Portoviejo and Baba experienced the greatest increase in the number of blancos between 1765 and 1790, which she is inclined to attribute to defectors from the Spanish army brought from Panama to pacify the provinces of Quito, who settled along river banks, as described by Requena. It might also be argued that the decline in the number of mestizos and the castes noted between 1780 and 1790 may have been the result of outward migration due to droughts, as was the case with Indians. It is interesting to note, for instance, that between 1765 and 1790, the castes increased from 1,304 to 3,993 in the more fertile partido of Daule, which so much attracted inhabitants from Portoviejo, a much larger increase than Guayaquil or the cacao producing partidos. Ibid, 136.

63. Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, Discourse and Political Reflections on the Kingdom of Peru, 49-59. In 1741, while in Piura, they had witnessed a vessel loaded with illegal cargo from New Spain which had sailed back to Manta, for its shipmaster wanted to sell his contraband goods in Quito. Ibid, 54.

64. See, for instance, "Registro de Instrumentos Publicos hechos por Manuel Ponce de León y Espinoza, Teniente de la Canoa, 1804," AHG, EP/J627, which lists several business transactions between cacao owners in Chone and merchants from Guayaquil, as was Santiago Vitores.
In the early nineteenth century, Josef Bernardo Plaza was exporting cacao in his own ship from Bahía de Caráquez to Panama. "Don Josef Bernardo Plaza sobre que se le permita la carga y descarga de su buque Carmen en la Bahía de Caracas (sic), 1816," AHG, EP/J563. Bernardo Plaza, originally from Riobamba, was an example of creoles settling in Portoviejo in the late eighteenth century. He was also the forebearer of General Leonidas Plaza, one of the leaders of the liberal movement in nineteenth century Ecuador, who was born in the coastal village of Charapoto, as was Eloy Alfaro, a native of Montecristi.

"La Descripción de Guayaquil por Francisco Requena," 83. For information regarding "mulatos gentiles" in Esmeraldas, see John Leddy Phelan, The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century, 3-22

A list of vecinos from Pichota in 1788 included several names which appeared in earlier documents, as were Bravo de Brito, de Vera, Mendoza, Loor, Masias, Intriago, Zedeno, Zambrano, Velasquez, Giler, del Barco, Evia. "Representación de vecinos de Portoviejo en favor del Teniente Nuñez de Balboa, Pichota, Noviembre de 1788," in "Expediente que sigue don Juan María Romero, Administrador del Ramo de Tributos y los Indios del pueblo de Jipijapa contra el Teniente de Gobernador de la ciudad de Portoviejo, sobre capítulos y malaverzación de su conducta, 1787-1789." AGI, Quito 271.

By 1830, when toquilla hats were second in importance only to cacao as export commodities, sombreros finos from Jipijapa and Montecristi sold in Guayaquil for 25 and 30 dollars. Adrian Terry, Travels in the Equatorial Regions of South America, 67.

In 1796, a cacique from Jipijapa described that paja toquilla, "hace de los comercios de estos indios la parte mas considerable y de la cual se tejen los mas especiales sombreros." "Compulsa de los indios de Jipijapa para obtener titulo de propiedad, 1796-1806." in "Correspondencia del Gobernador de Manabí con el Ministro del Interior, 1853."

After 1779, litigations involving Indians from Jipijapa often showed as witnesses Spanish or creoles, who gave Jipijapa as their place of residence, as for instance, Juan Manuel Salavarria and Francisco Merchán, merchants from Cuenca in 1779. ("Autos de proclama de don Manuel Soledispa con Juan Francisco Pin"), or in 1787, Phelipe de Béjar y Macias, from Panama, Juan Joseph Carmona, from Spain,
Manuel Espinoza, from Spain, Joseph Gomez de Tama and Ignacio Barberán ("Autos de proclama de don Juan Santos Ligua"). Other peninsulars whom we know had settled in Jipijapa during this period were Joseph Alvarez de la Camposa and Joseph Menéndez, from Vizcaya, and somewhat later, José María Andrade y Mateus, also from Vizcaya. Further research is needed on these Spanish and creole settlers in Portoviejo, an unusual number of whom were from Vizcaya.

71. Comunicacion de Marcos de Vera al Gobernador Pizarro, 17809," in "Expediente relativo a la consignacion que gozaban los tenientes partidarios de Guayaquil en el Ramo Real de Tributos, 1779-1780."

72. Ibid

73. "Comunicacion del Virrey de Santa Fe a los Oficiales Reales de Guayaquil, Junio 9, 1770," in "Expediente Relativo a la Consignacion que gozaban los tenientes partidarios de Guayaquil en el Ramo Real de Tributos."

74. "Expediente relativo a la consignacion que gozaban los Tenientes Partidarios de Guayaquil, 1779-1780."

75. In 1789, for instance, there were 40,305 tributaries in the Corregimiento of Quito, which included the central and northern highlands of the Audiencia of Quito. Robson Tyrer, Historia Demográfica y Económica de la Audiencia de Quito, 72, as compared to the 2,675 tributaries in the Gobernacion de Guayaquil during that same year. "Cuentas Reales de Tributos de Guayaquil, 1785-1801."

76. "Comunicación de Marcos Fernando de Vera, Febrero 4, 1780," in "Expediente relativo a la consignación que gozaban los tenientes partidarios de Guayaquil en el Ramo Real de Tributos."

77. De Vera claimed, for instance, that somewhat earlier a group of armed men had entered Portoviejo and in broad daylight had freed two criminals, adding that if a teniente had been in the surroundings, he would have been left a casualty.

78. "Comunicación de Pedro de Aragundy al Gobernador Pizarro, Enero 7, 1780," Ibid.

79. "Comunicación del Gobernador Pizarro al Visitador Pizarro, February 14, 1780," in "Expediente relativo a la consignación que gozaban los tenientes partidarios." Governor Pizarro described "la ruina que amenaza aquellas provincias por la carencia de
justicia que tantos años padece por lo cual se halla abandonado el caudal del Rey que produce el Real Ramo de Tributos de aquella comprensión," adding that he despaired of finding "sujeto de honor y conducta que quiera hacerse cargo de aquel partido." Collecting the tribute in Portoviejo may have been difficult from much earlier, for we have seen that in 1743, a cacique and governor of Jipijapa, don Antonio Soledispa, gave up his post as governor citing the difficulties in collecting the tribute.

80. "Comunicación de Marcos Fernando de Vera, Febrero 4, 1780," in " Expediente relativo a la consignación que gozaban los tenientes partidarios." Tenientes in Portoviejo, or for that matter in all the partidos of Guayaquil, did not earn a salary, a situation that was apparently common to all the colonies. John Lynch, "The Origins of Spanish American Independence", in The Independence of Latin America, ed. Leslie Bethell, (Cambridge, 1987) 7. They did, however, engage in commerce, as earlier describe for Salcedo and Sánchez de Mora. Furthermore, their greatest income probably derived from patronizing the free flow of contraband, as described by Juan and Ulloa.

81. Comunicación del Fiscal de la Visita General, Juan José de Villalengua al Visitador Pizarro, Marzo 17, 1780," in "Expediente de la consignación que gozaban los tenientes partidarios."

82. "Comunicación del Visitador Pizarro al Virrey de Santa Fe, Junio 18, 1781," Ibid.


84. This would ratify the information provided by oficiales reales regarding the number of tributaries in Portoviejo in 1780, since 1,400 pesos earned by de Vera, at eight reales per tributary a year, would result from tribute collected from 1,400 tributaries. New tributary counts in Guayaquil, however, were not made until somewhere around 1784, so it may well be that figures regarding the number of tributaries were inaccurate.

85. "Comunicación de Marcos Fernando de Vera". We do not know the reasons why Pizarro had been forced to pacify Portoviejo.

86. "Comunicación de Pedro de Aragundy al Gobernador Pizarro, Enero 7, 1780," in "Expediente relativo a la consignación que gozaban los tenientes partidarios." The Teniente was assisted at the local
level by alcaldes de barrios, asistentes, and later, tenientes pedaneos, whom apparently had little authority in Portoviejo.

87. "Comunicación de Marcos Fernando de Vera, Febrero 4 de 1780" It is interesting to note that de Vera mentioned recluta de gente, by which he meant the process of hiring labor by hacendados, a scarce commodity in Portoviejo, except in years of drought, when peasants were forced to seek their livelihood outside their subsistence plot.

88. "El Licenciado don Santiago Carvajal, cura por el Real Patronato de los pueblos de Montecristi, Charapotó, Tosagua y Chonen (sic), Jurisdicción de Guayaquil sobre la agregación de los pueblos de Picoazá a Jipijapa y Chonen a Charapotó, 1795," ANH, Presidencia, Tomo 315. In 1789, the bishop of Cuenca, supressed the parrish of Picoaza and Tosagua, annexing these towns to Jipijapa and Montecristi respectively. It is well to note that such aggregation referred not only to parish records, church ornaments and treasures, but also Indian parishioners. Those, at least, were the orders issued by the bishop in 1790, which he reinforced in a letter to Carvajal dated February 28, 1794. We do not know, of course, if Indians from Picoaza and Tosagua were willing to comply with such orders. As late as 1795, Carvajal had been unable to collect primicias and parrish fees from vecinos and cocecheros from the mountains of Tosagua and Chone. Ibid.

89. In 1790, it was described that Indians from Santa Elena had beaten in the main plaza several of their parish priests, including two friars, by the name of Joseph Ruiz and Thomás Sierra. At one time or another, they had also laid their hands on Fray Eusebio Cherri, Doctor Diego Galbán, and Fray Ramón Fernández. Apparently they had shown the same disrespect towards tenientes, for it was described that Teniente Pedro Sánchez de Mora, earlier accused by capitulares from Portoviejo, had also been physically attacked by the Indians. "Certificado del Teniente de la Punta de Santa Elena, Juan Antonio Rocafuerte, Julio 24, 1790," in "Causa de Capítulos contra el Cura de la Punta de Santa Elena, don José Mariano de la Peña, 1792," AGI, 362 In 1789, when the Bishop of Cuenca visited Guayaquil, Indians in Santa Elena had shown disrespect by not welcoming him properly, for which they later apologized, blaming their misconduct on their parish priest, Fray Mariano de la Peña. De la Peña was accused by Indians from Santa Elena of several charges in 1790, in connivance
with Juan Maria Romero, administrator of the tribute. Ibid

90. "Carta del Cura Vivero al Obispo de Cuenca, Enero 24, 1791", in " Expediente del cura Mariano de la Peña, 1792," AGI, Quito, 362. Juan José Vivero was a native of Latacunga, and with his brother. Luis Fernando Vivero, were involved in the insurrection preceeding independence. Soon after his arrival in Jipijapa as parish priest, Vivero expressed genuine concerns to the bishop over the spiritual fate of the Indians, yet he endorsed corporal punishment if done, as he claimed, with prudence and moderation. He was, however, sufficiently disquieted by the issue to probe the Bishop's opinion on the subject.

91. Portoviejo had strong ties with the northern coast of Peru, stemming from pre-conquest societies, when intense coastal trading had developed between the inhabitants of the northern coast of Peru and what is now coastal Ecuador. See, for instance, Maria Rostorowski de Diescanseco, Etnia y Sociedad, (Lima, 1977); Jorge Marcos, "Interpretación de la Arqueología de la Isla de la Plata," in Miscelanea Antropológica Ecuatoriana, (Guayaquil, 1981), and for the colonial period, Dora León Borja, "Los indios balseros como factor de desarrollo del puerto de Guayaquil" in Estudios sobre Política Indígenista Española en América, cited in Laviana Cuetos, Guayaquil en el siglo XVIII, 62. Little wonder that close cooperation regarding contraband developed between these two regions, but much research is needed to learn more about coastal trading between Payta, Portoviejo, and the region of Chocó in northern New Granada.

92. Laviana Cuetos has described a failed anti-fiscal revolt on the part of pardos from Guayaquil in 1781, apparently, discovered by authorities before it began. "Organización y Funcionamiento de las Cajas Reales de Guayaquil en la Segunda Mitad del Siglo XVIII," 345-349. It is interesting to note that in their petition for pardon, pardos claimed that it was not so much the "nuevos establecimientos," but the abuses enacted by their administrators that led them to revolt, which we shall argue was also the case in Portoviejo with the tobacco culture. Frequently, fiscal reforms per se have been blamed for these rebellions, a reaction attributed to the innate conservatism of traditional groups. Rather than the reforms per se, these groups perhaps reacted to the abuse on the part of local administrators.
93. "La Descripción de Guayaquil por Francisco Requena in 1774," 37.


95. W.B. Stevenson, "Viaje de Guayaquil a Quito con el Conde Ruiz de Castilla," in Ecuador visto por extranjeros ed. Humberto Toscano, (Mexico, 1960) 211-212.

96. "Comunicacion del Protector de Naturales, Julio 24, 1758," in "Expediente relativo a la consignacion que gozaban los tenientes partidarios, 1789-1780."

97. Whereas in 1743 don Antonio Soledispa, Cacique y Gobernador de Jipijapa, renounced his post claiming that the duties involved were detrimental to Indians and to his own interests, by 1769 he had apparently changed his mind. In 1787, his son, don Manuel Soledispa defended his rights to the cacicazgo of the parcialidad of Aguasa, against Juan Francisco Pin, who accused the Soledispas of being forasteros, since their forebearer had suposedly been granted the cacicazgo by the parish priest, Diego Pérez de Villanueva, in reward for services rendered to the community. Juan Francisco Pin and several witnesses testifying on his behalf also claimed that his ancestors had lost their cacicazgo due to their poverty and their lack of ambition. The audiencia confirmed the rights of Manuel Soledispa, but gave him the cacicazgo in administration rather than permanently, for the fiscal ruled that witnesses had proven that the Soledispas were not the owners of the cacicazgo. As for Juan Francisco Pin, he was exempted from the tribute and other compulsory services, in recognition of his noble lineage. "Autos de Proclama de Juan Francisco Pin con Manuel Soledispa sobre cacicazgo de la parcialidad de Aguasa. 1779," ANH, Corte Superior de Justicia, cacicazgo, tomo 77. Other cacicazgos in litigation were those of the parcialidad of Payachi, whose cacique, don Pedro Chóez, one of the wealthiest Indians in Jipiajpa, was also accused of being an usurper. His contestant was a boy of no more than eight years old, the descendant of the noble Anzules family. ANH, cacicazgo, caja 13. In that same year, another cacicazgo of the parcialidad of La Baja, was litigated by Juan Santos Ligua, against don Vicente Xalca, also said to have lost his rights to the cacicazgo due to the poverty of his ancestors. "Autos de Proclama de don Juan
Santos Ligua," ANH, Fondo Superior de Justicia, cacicazgo tomo 92.

98. See "Autos de proclama de Manuel Soledispa y Juan Francisco Pin, 1779," and "Autos de proclama de don Juan Santos Ligua."

99. "Autos de proclama de Juan Francisco Pin con Manuel Soledispa, sobre el cacicazgo de Aguasá, 177."

100. News of their alleged plans to rebel had apparently reached Guayaquil and Quito, and placed President Pizarro on the alert. The possibility, of course, remains that the Indians were simply disavowing plans that had gone awry, for Xalca alleged that Indians from the parcialidad of Apelope were seen gathering in suspiciously large numbers at the cacique's home. At any rate, Indians convinced authorities of the baselessness of such allegations, and instead placed the blame on Xalca and (we shall see), Teniente Manuel Nuñez de Balboa, for spreading such false rumors.

101. "Peticion al Teniente de Portoviejo de los del Congreso y ayuntamiento de la parcialidad de Apechingue, Junio 23, 1787," in "Autos de proclama de Juan Santos Ligua, 1787."

102. See for instance, "Autos de Proclama de Monserrate Reyes, Indio de Jipijapa, para que se le guarden los honores de hijo de cacique Diciembre 19, 1772," ANH, Indígenas 98; "Amparo de Mariano Chóez, tratado como indio ordinario 1773,"; "Expediente de Juan Buenaventura Muniz, sobre exoneracion de mandados particulares por ser descendiente de cacique, 1765,"; and "Expediente de Mariano Bacusoy, Indio de San Lorenzo de Jipijapa, sobre que no se le oblige a hacer servicios mecánicos, por ser descendiente de caciques, 1780," ANH Cacicazgos, Caja 13, Loja, Los Rios, Manabí.

103. Ibid

104. Ibid

105. "Certificación de don Juan Antonio Zelaya a Manuel Soledispa, Octubre 15, 1763," "Autos de proclama de Manuel Soledispa y Juan Francisco Pin, 1779."


108. "Comunicación del Virrey de Santa Fe, don Joseph de Solís al Presidente de la Audiencia de Quito, Marzo 5, 1755," in " Expediente Relativo a la consignación que gozavan los Tenientes Partidarios de Guayaquil en el Ramo Real de Tributos."

109. " Expediente de Don Manuel Inocencio Parrales y Gualé, Cacique y Gobernador de Jipijapa, de recurso hecho al excelentísimo senor Virrey contra Francisco de Paula Villavicencio, sobre injurias, 1785," ANH, Indígenas, Caja 120. and "Representación y documentos que ha presentado implorando la Real Protección, don Manuel Inocencio Parrales y Gualé, Cacique del Pueblo de San Lorenzo de Jipijapa del Gobierno de Guayaquil, relativo a la causa que en defensa de sus vecinos sigue hace 9 años contra Francisco de Paula Villavicencio, Administrador particular de Tabacos de aquella provincia, por sus excesos y vejaciones, Octubre 23, 1793," AGI, Quito, 349.


111. Ibid


113. Not to mention unexpected delays as in 1785, when don Manuel Inocencio Parrales fell ill in Santa Fe, and was forced to a lengthy hospital stay.

114. "El Protector de naturales por Francisco Ligua y Antonio Soledispa, cacique de Jipijapa."

115. Ibid

116. "Comunicación del Virrey de Santa Fe, don Joseph de Solís al Presidente de la Audiencia."

117. "Joseph García de León y Pizarro, Visitador General de la Audiencia de Quito dando cuenta de las razones por las cuales puso un Resguardo competente que vigilarse y celse las fraudulentas introducciones y exportaciones facilísimas de practicar sin esta custodia. Julio 2, 1781," AGI, Quito, 241. See also, Laviana Cuetos, "Organización y Funcionamiento de las
Cajas Reales de Guayaquil," 28-34.

118. Ibid


120. In 1786, witnesses testifying in favor of the Teniente of Portoviejo, Manuel Nuñez de Balboa, asserted that in Jipijapa "residen todos los mas de los comerciantes, y es raro internen en la provincia por ser muy pobrisima y hallarse toda la gente viviendo por los campos y montañas," "Expediente que siguen Juan Maria Romero, Administrador de Tributos y los Indios de Jipijapa contra el Teniente de Gobernador de Portoviejo, sobre capitulos y mala versacion de conducta, 1786-1789," AGI, Quito, 271.

121. "Expediente sobre representación del Procurador de Montecristi a causa de la falta de dinero debido a escasez de comercio, Abril 10, 1822," ABC Fondo Jijón y Caamaño, Documentos Misceláneos 33/75.


123. Sources for this and the next paragraphs were drawn from "Expediente que siguen Juan Maria Romero, Administrador de Tributos y los Indios del Pueblo de Jipijapa contra el Teniente de Gobernador de Portoviejo, 1786-1789."

124. "El Protector de Naturales por la defensa y amparo de Antonia Chonillo, viuda y natural de Jipijapa, 1884."

125. Indians claimed that Nuñez de Balboa paid them less for their hats than merchants, while vecinos españoles in Jipijapa complained that the teniente did not allow them to engage in commerce. "El Administrador de Tributos, Juan Maria Romero a nombre de los Indios de Jipijapa, Junio 9, 1787."

126. "Poder general otorgado por Manuel Nuñez de Balboa a procuradores de la Audiencia, Portoviejo, Febrero 14, 1787"

127. "El Procurador Thomás Garcia de la Sierra a nombre de Manuel Nuñez de Balboa."

128. "Súplica de vecinos de Portoviejo, Noviembre. 28, 1788."
129. "La Real Audiencia da cuenta de capitulacion que produjo ante ella Manuel Núñez de Balboa del Reyno de Galicia contra el gobernador de Guayaquil Ramón García de León y Pizarro, 1789."

130. The priest had endorsed Balboa, but retracted his support, when Balboa, according to Procurador García de la Sierra, had banished his mistress from Jipijapa.

131. Earlier we have seen that Xalca was rejected as cacique for being unable to read or write, but tinterillos were always on hand to write these letters on behalf of Indians or mestizos unable to do so themselves.

132. "Tenientes de Gobernador", described don Manuel Inocencio in 1785, "viven en Jipijapa, por que les acomoda el servicio de los Indios en su trato y grangera, sin retribución, por persuadirse los jueces de que lo merecen por su ministerio," in "Expedientillo de don Manuel Inocencio Parrales y Guale, Cacique de Jipijapa de recurso hecho al senor Virrey, contra don Francisco de Paula Villavicencio sobre injurias, 1785."


134. We have drawn heavily for this argument from Joel S. Migdal, Peasant, Politics and Revolution. Pressures Toward Political and Social Change in the Third World (Princeton, 1974).

135. "Compulsa de los indios de Jipijapa para obtener titulo de propiedad y amparo." Of course, in another context, as when complaining of the abuses by Villavicencio, the cacique could describe Indians in Jipijapa to be "como en los demás paises de América, humildes, abatidos, pusilánimes, y sujetos al trabajo y servicio que obliga la opresión y la necesidad." "Expedientillo de don Manuel Inocencio Parrales y Guale, Cacique de Jipijapa de recurso hecho al excelentisimo Señor Virrey contra don Francisco de Paula Villavicencio por injurias, Santa Fe, 1786."

136. "Compulsa de los Indios de Jipijapa para obtener título de propiedad y amparo, 1796-1806."

138. "Compulsia de los indios de Jipijapa para obtener título de propiedad."

139. "Autos de recurso de don Francisco Xavier Ruiz Cano, 1787."

140. He argued that in Jipijapa there were only four cofradías which he had found established upon his arrival 44 years earlier, with the exception of the one in honor of the patron saint of San Lorenzo, established by Bishop Nieto y Polo in his visita of 1751.

141. "Expediente de don Manuel Inocencio Parrales, cacique de Jipijapa, de recurso hecho al señor virrey contra don Francisco de Paula Villavicencio sobre injurias, Santa Fe, 1785-1786."

142. Ibid

143. Ibid

144. In these arguments we are following James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant (New Haven, 1976) 31-34.

145. "Representacion de don Manuel Inocencio Parrales ante el Virrey de Santa Fe, Enero 26, 1785.\textquotedbl", in "Expediente de don Manuel Inocencio Parrales de recurso hecho al señor virrey contra don Francisco de Paula Villavicencio, 1785-1786."

146. Ibid

147. Ibid.

148. Joseph Alvarez de la Camposa, a peninsular settled in Portoviejo was appointed juez comisionado by the Audiencia. He wrote to the Fiscal in Quito, that the abuses by Villavicencio "causa pudor estamparlas en el poder por no escandalizar los oídos de su señoría," describing that he had imprisoned two elderly Indians, one of them totally blind, simply because a few tobacco leaves had been found in their possession, and that the other Indian was sent to San Carlos in Guayaquil, and had lost his short possessions to regain his freedom."Comunicacion de Alvarez de la Camposa al Fiscal Merchante de Contreras, Mayo 22, 1786," in "Representación y Documentos que ha presentado implorando la Real
On May 5, 1789, the Fiscal Protector labeled the proceedings that cleared Villavicencio of all charges as a monstruousity, for they had not been filed in the Protecturía, Indians had not been notified on time, and one of the litigating parties, the cacique, had been instead persecuted. "El Fiscal Protector pide se declare sin ningún efecto sentencia de Gobernador de Guayaquil, Mayo 5, 1789." Ibid

"Representación y documentos que ha presentado implorando la Real Protección don Manuel Inocencio Parrales y Guale, Cacique del Pueblo de San Lorenzo de Jipijapa, Octubre 22, 1793."

"Comunicación de don Manuel Inocencio Parrales al Virrey de Santa Fe, Enero de 1785."

"Representación y documentos que ha presentado implorando la Real Protección don Manuel Inocencio Parrales y Guale, Octubre 22, 1793."

"Expediente de don Manuel Inocencio Parrales de recurso hecho al señor Virrey contra don Francisco de Paula Villavicencio, Santa Fe, 1785."

"Compulsa de los indios de Jipijapa para obtener título de propiedad y amparo."

"Informe de don Gregorio Thoala, el Alcalde Ordinario Pedro de la Cruz, el Alguacil Mayor Ildefonso Tumbaco, y Regidores Ponce y Chompol, sobre abusos de Francisco de Paula Villavicencio contra Francisca Ortega, Jipijapa, Abril 13, 1776," in "Representación y documentos que ha presentado implorando la Real
Protección don Manuel Inocencio Parrales y Guale, Octubre 22, 1783."


161. "Representación de los caciques de Jipijapa, Abril 8, 1807".

162. "Autos de la Audiencia reponiendo en las Administraciones a Francisco de Paula Villavicencio, Quito, Febrero 26, 1795," in "Expediente de Pase de Teniente de Portoviejo conferido a don Francisco de Paula Villavicencio." The following documents, unless otherwise stated, were all drawn from this expediente.

163. In 1801, vecinos from Portoviejo endorsed Villavicencio, at the time feuding with the parish priest Vivero, for his several deeds in favor of the community, as was obtaining funds for the hospital in Portoviejo. "Oficio de los vecinos de Portoviejo al Presidente de la Audiencia, 1801," ANH, Presidencia 393.


165. Ibid

166. "El Abogado, Agente Fiscal de lo Civil que hace de protector por el común de Indios de Jipijapa, Representación del Procurador Domingo Rengifo a nombre de don Francisco de Paula Villavicencio, Quito, Julio 1, 1807." in "Expediente de pase de teniente de Portoviejo."

167. Ibid

168. In 1807, as part of the documentation gathered by Villavicencio to defend his appointment before the Viceroy, he exhibited recommendations issued by Governors Urbina and Cucalón, and Tenientes from Portoviejo Marcos de Vera, Juan Ponce de León, Antonio de Ugarte, and Joseph Alvarez de la Camposa.

169. "Vista del Fiscal, Dr. Manuel Antonio Rubianes, al Presidente de la Audiencia, Quito, Febrero 13, 1795," also the case in 1805, and 1807. when he was cleared of charges faced as Administrador de Correos.

170. Villavicencio, for instance, was accused of fraud as administrador de aguardiente, as administrador de correo, where he also faced charges of eavesdropping
on letters, and as administrator of the funds for the hospital in Portoviejo, but was cleared of all these charges by the Audiencia.

171. "El Abogado Fiscal de lo Civil que hace de Protector por el Común de Indios de JIpijapa, al Fiscal de la Audiencia, Quito, Julio 1, 1807."

172. "Real Provisión y Amparo de Nobleza conferido a don Antonio Menéndez y sus hermanos, vecinos de la ciudad de Portoviejo, 1803." ANH, Presidencia, tomo 416.

173. "Testamento de Francisco Villavicencio."

174. The list of persons rejected by cacique Parrales to act as judges in 1805 for being too intimate with Villavicencio, included some of the more powerful vecinos from Guayaquil: the Protector de Naturales, Joseph Lisón, whose daughter was married to José Ramón Menéndez, Asesor Pedro Alcántara Bruno, the lawyers Antonio Marcos and José Joaquín Pareja, Domingo Espantoso, Mariano Viteri, and Juan and Felipe Cornejo. "Comunicación de Parrales y Guale a Victor Felix de San Miguel, Guayaquil, Setiembre 29, 1807."

175. We might contrast the opinion regarding the inhabitants of the Gobierno de Guayaquil held by the peninsular Francisco Requena, whom Villavicencio was so proud to claim as kin: "La pereza, el libertinaje y la rusticidad son los tres defectos que sobresalen y distinguen a estos moradores, raro es el que no se halle iniciado con cualquiera de ellos. El ocio, el abandono y la flojedad es tan común en indios, morenos y blancos, como prueba su género de vida. Los primeros apenas trabajan para pagar los tributos, los segundos solo lo que necesitan para vivir, y algunos de los últimos a impulsos de sus obligaciones. Los mas con pusilanimidad huyen del trabajo, sin que dejen por eso de amar la riqueza, pero con un amor tímido y aun vil, raíz de las usuras, trampas, ganancias ilícitas, industrias engañosas y sacias y quiebras fraudulentas." "La Descripción de Guayaquil por Francisco Requena, 1774." 36

176. "Autos de la Audiencia fechados Mayo 12, 1795." This ongoing feud with Indians was apparent even in the different manner in which Indians wrote Villavicencio's name. He referred to himself as don Francisco de Paula Villavicencio, and Spanish authorities called him accordingly. In turn, Indians omitted the title of don and de Paula, which perhaps added a note of distinction, identifying him instead
as Francisco Villavicencio y Chiquito, precedent, more often than not, by the designation of "el zambo".

177. This document was signed in Jipijapa, on July 4, 1796, before the Teniente of Portoviejo, Francisco Xavier Casanova, Ramón Rodríguez Plaza, Sustituto Protector de Guayaquil, Capitán Agustín de Oramas, Juez de Tierras, and Juan Ponce de León. Both parties agreed, "que de aquí en adelante se comprometen uno y otro de guardar la mejor armonía, verdadera paz y firme tranquilidad, sin que por uno ni otro muevan los pleytos que se hayan radicados en el Supremo Consejo de Indias, Audiencia de Quito, y Gobierno de Guayaquil promovidos por don Manuel, quien se desiste, quita y aparta de ellos dándolos por fenecidos, cavados y cancelados en todas sus partes con conocimiento de que todo es falso segun lo sabido, por cuya razón deja al citado don Francisco en su buena opinión, fama y notoria conducta." In "Expediente de pase de Teniente de Portoviejo en favor de don Francisco de Paula Villavicencio."

178. The Fiscal de lo Civil of the Audiencia, Victor Felix de San Miguel who represented the Indians in Quito in 1807, rebuked Villavicencio's appointment as Teniente y Justicia Mayor in the following manner: "Por eso la sabiduría de nuestras leyes en nada se muestran tan zelosas, como en procurar que las Magistraturas recaigan siempre en personas de legitimidad y limpieza, por la presunción de honor y desinterés que esta de parte del Nacimiento, de carácter pacifico y naturalmente benéfico; de procedimientos irreprehensibles y que sepan conducir a los súbditos a la felicidad por los poderosos estímulos de la virtud y el ejemplo." He then went on to question,"Sin estas cualidades de que deve estar revestido el Magistrado podrá entrar en el santuario de la justicia un hombre como Villavicencio que se confunde con las Eses de los Pueblos?."

179. Altogether 30 individuals, among principales, indios del común and mestizos paid a prorated fine of 5 pesos, before the teniente of Portoviejo, at the time Juan Antonio Menéndez y del Barco. "Sentencia del Gobernador Bartolomé Cucalón, Guayaquil, Setiembre 12, 1805."

180. We owe the wealth of information available regarding this ongoing feud between the Indians and Villavicencio to this last action on the part of Indians, for in 1807, Villavicencio was compelled to gather legal documentation spanning several decades, in order to defend his good fame and his post of teniente of Portoviejo bestowed upon him by the
Viceroy in Lima.

181. Indians, for instance, complained that in order to exempt them from growing tobacco, Villavicencio would charge them money. Mestizos also described that as diezmero he collected the tithe in cash, as had never been done before, allowing him to arbitrarily appraise heads of cattle or other assets subject to payment of the tithe.

182. "Comunicación de los caciques de Jipijapa al Gobernador de Guayaquil, Junio 18, 1804." They enumerated Villavicencio's actions in favor of Indians, which as mentioned, included, the construction of alharradas, the opening of roads, donnations of silver ornaments for the church, and the hospital in Portoviejo. They described him as a "Protector de los pobres desbalidos, no menos que a los perseguidos como nosotros de lobos carníceros que deboran nuestro rebaño." Ibid

183." El cacique don Vicente Xalca y Ligua, y demás caciques al Gobernador de Guayaquil, Jipijapa, Abril 5, 1807."

184. "El cacique y gobernador Vicente Xalca y demás caciques del pueblo de Jipijapa, Abril 9, 1807."

185. In 1805, don Manuel Soledispa y Parral wrote thus to Villavicencio: "Muy señor mio: satisfecho de su benigno corazón y del afecto que tiene a esta su patria, recurro a su favor en el presente conflicto que le referire; Sabrá su merced que don Manuel (Guale) después de haber aparentado amor a su patria solicitando beneficios y haciendo que todo el pueblo fime en contra de si propio, a fin de que el señor Cura de este pueblo se bindique de las justas quejas que pusimos sobre que se quitan tantas pensiones y gabelas nunca acostumbradas que nos quitan, de modo que el dicho Guale, por seguir sus raras ideas, no se para en hacer tan grave daño a su pueblo, a su familia, y aun a sus hijos, pues no siempre ha de ser cura el que ahora lo tiene engañado." Then he went on to ask Villavicencio to obtain from the Governor in Guayaquil, that Parrales y Guale be removed as gobernador de Jipijapa, promising that "como hombre de honor, nunca le faltará en agradecimientos y reconocimientos que corresponde a un hombre de bien." Ending his letter by saying that "Algunos estamos en favor del común por que no nos hemos dejado engañar de falsas persuaciones." This letter was later authenticated by the cacique's son, the Alcalde Mayor Antonio Soledispa, and the new escribano of the cabildo, Mariano del Espiritu Santo Toala.
"Comunicación de don Manuel Soledispa y Parral a Francisco de Paula Villavicencio, Jipijapa, Mayo 14, 1805".

186. Don Manuel Guale, the son of don Manuel Inocencio, reported to his father, at the time in Guayaquil, "los contrarios andan inquietando a los que han firmado contra Villavicencio, les dicen que se desdigan....que Villavicencio es un hombre bueno, que no hace mal a nadie, caritativo y hombre de dinero. He signed his letter as "Su Amante hijo, don Manuel Guale," which goes to show how much importance Indians attached to rank even in their private letters. "Manuel Guale a Manuel Parrales y Guale, Jipijapa, Setiembre 27, 1807." Through these letters Indians and mestizos asked don Manuel Inocencio to go before the Audiencia and inform the Fiscal of the evil doings of Villavicencio. "Comunicación de Juan Reyes a Parrales y Guale, Jipijapa, Setiembre 18, 1807," "Comunicación de Bernardo Reyes a Parrales y Guale, Jipijapa, Setiembre 12, 1807," Reyes claimed that their adversaries feared don Manuel Inocencio, "por que Ud. sabe ir a España y hablar con nuestro Rey," which shows how much prestige don Inocencio had earned through his earlier missions.

187. Laviana Cuetos, Guayaquil en el siglo XVIII, 221

188. "Compulsa de los indios de Jipijapa para obtener título de propiedad y amparo."

189. "Representación de Manuel Guale al Rey, Madrid, Octubre 22, 1793."

190. David Brading, cited in Carlos Contreras, El sector exportador de una economía colonial. La costa del Ecuador, 37-38


192. Carlos Contreras, El sector exportador de una economía colonial, 105.

193. "Testamentaria de Francisco de Paula Villavicencio, 1827."

194. A modern historian who has closely examined the accounting of these funds claims that such accusations aimed to discredit him, for his opponents knew that Villavicencio had earlier distributed part
of these funds among the poor. Julio Estrada Icaza, *La Lucha de Guayaquil por el Estado de Quito*, Tomo II, 384-385.

CHAPTER V
INSURGENCY IN PORTOVIEJO

In 1814, Governor Vasco y Pasqual estimated the population in Portoviejo to be well over 20,000,¹ numbers more than likely inflated but which, nonetheless, suggest that according to contemporary perception the population in the partido had increased considerably. Other sources also concurred with Governor Vasco's estimates. Indeed, whereas in earlier decades the villages of Montecristi and Jipijapa had been mostly Indian, during these early decades of the nineteenth century, a fairly large number of merchants listed these villages as their place of residence.² These new settlers had more than likely arrived to the partido lured by the growing industry of toquilla hats, and by increases in contraband from Panama. Several vecinos from Portoviejo were shipowners, as for instance, Domingo Romero, Bernardo Plaza, Joaquín Suárez, and they engaged in coastal trade with Chocó and Panama, and to the south, with northern Perú. As mentioned earlier, following independence, custom authorities of the Provincia Libre in Guayaquil estimated that contraband through Portoviejo was perhaps equal in volume to legal trade introduced through Guayaquil.

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During the brief constitutional period between 1813 and 1814, the authority of Governor Vasco y Pasqual was seriously challenged by the constitutional cabildos in Montecristi, Jipijapa and Portoviejo. The reforms were enacted shortly after the arrival of the constitution in January of 1813, and among other things, called for the establishment of **cabildos constitucionales** in every provincial town having over 1,000 inhabitants. Its members were to be appointed through popular elections, a truly innovative practice, for in the past, cabildo offices had been for sale and elections for alcaldes were the prerogative of regidores already in office. Altogether 19 **cabildos constitucionales** were established in the Province of Guayaquil, whereas before there existed only the Indian **cabildos** and that of the city of Guayaquil (once the **cabildo** in Portoviejo had been abolished in 1751, after its brief resurgence).

Problems first surfaced on Jipijapa on November 1813, when Governor Vasco sent troops to assist the **teniente** over a minor incident and the newly established constitutional **cabildo** protested vigorously over the governor's high-handed decision. Next, Governor Vasco faced problems with the **cabildos** of Portoviejo and Jipijapa over the appointment of **teniente de gobernador**, which the **ayuntamientos constitucionales** refused to acknowledge. The governor first opted for a peaceful solution, sending as commissioners Dr. Bernabé Cornejo,
Procurador Síndico Lupercio Robles, and Capitán Nicolás Cornejo y Flor, who were to oversee the elections of alcaldes. When these commissioners were snubbed by the cabildos, he was forced to take more stern measures.

In Montecristi, Commissioner Cornejo, unhappy with the results of the election, had unseated the newly elected alcalde Juan Anchundia and other cabildo officers, leading Anchundia to declare the election a farce and to demand that the constitution be observed. When Cornejo attempted to have him arrested, Anchundia went into hiding, later writing Governor Vasco in protest. He emerged the following October with a large crowd of supporters, recovering his office as alcalde.

Meanwhile in Jipijapa, a group of vecinos gathered in the main plaza following mass on Palm Sunday, to protest the election of alcalde Casimiro Gordillo, whom they deprived of office, naming instead Regidor Bruno Lino. Governor Vasco responded to such excesses by ordering the immediate reinstatement of the rightful alcalde. The governor's orders were disregarded by the cabildo, instigated by Regidor Silvestre Cantos, notwithstanding the presence of soldiers and the commissioners from Guayaquil. When news of these excesses reached the governor, he authorized Ramón Calvo y López, Teniente Coronel y Comandante en Jefe de las Milicias de Guayaquil to organize an armed expedition to pacify the partido and restore order. As had Salcedo in 1748, Calvo set sail for
Portoviejo well furnished with arms, troops and amunition,\(^1\) similarities, however, which end there, for this confrontation between cabildos in Portoviejo and authorities in Guayaquil took place in an entirely different setting.

Order was restored in Jipijapa with the arrival of Calvo and his troops. However the obstinacy of the cabildo had apparently alienated groups of vecinos, who felt that through its actions, the cabildo had placed the vecindario in unnecessary danger. Following orders from Vasco, Calvo reinstated Gordillo as alcalde, but when groups of vecinos approached him with complaints against Gordillo, he reversed his decision and reappointed Lino. Soon after, other vecinos voiced their complaints against Regidor Lino, and for that matter, against all members of the constitutional cabildo, accused of inciting the people into rebellion, "llamando al pueblo a son de caxa para que se opusiesen a los preceptos superiores."\(^1\) The seriousness of these allegations induced Calvo y López to dismantle the constitutional cabildo and send most of its members in custody to Guayaquil. Among those imprisoned were the Indians Gonzalo Parral, a nephew of don Manuel Inocencio, Ubaldo Toala, and Bartolomé Baque, as well as mestizos, such as Silvestre and Valerio Cantos, as was also Bruno Lino, since racial or ethnic status were no longer relevant for membership in the constitutional cabildos.
Calvo also learned that the instigator of all these disturbances was the parish priest Juan José Vivero, accused, among other things, of using his ministry to promulgate his ideas and denying his opponents absolution for confessions even in their death beds. Calvo, however, was spared the trouble of taking action against Vivero, for José Mariano Plaza, the parish priest of La Canoa, acting on commission from the gobernador capitular del Obispado, Dr. José María Landa, had already suspended Vivero In Sacris when he refused to go before his superiors in Guayaquil. According to Calvo, Vivero had left with this great grief for Guayaquil, while several vecinos in Jipijapa had expressed their satisfaction over his removal.12

Calvo had next to contend with Portoviejo, where the cabildo refused to acknowledge the appointment of Teniente de Gobernador Juan Ponce de León. Its resistance, however, did not reflect animosity towards Ponce de León, a long-time vecino of Portoviejo, but rather a confrontation with Vasco over his refusal to appoint a juez de letras.13 The "Instrucciones para el Gobierno Económico y Político de las Provincias" described the jefe Político to be the highest authority in the province, and to be separated from the military command, although it stipulated that both offices could temporarily merge in the same person.14 This was the case with Vasco, who bore the title of gobernador político y militar. The
"Instrucciones" also called for the appointment of subaltern jefes políticos in provincial towns, and jueces de letras. We have earlier seen that Vasco had faced problems in Guayaquil for refusing to appoint Luscando as juez de letras, and was called to order by the Audiencia constitucional in Lima. He had also been rebuked by Vicario Cortázár, who had refused to acknowledge Vasco's authority claiming that he only accepted orders from the jefe político, which the governor was not. Vasco had likewise kept the subdelegado or teniente de gobernador in the partidos rather than appointing jueces de letras. We have earlier mentioned that Estanislao Silva, Pablo Alarcón, and Santiago Vergara, vecinos from Portoviejo, the latter earlier seen making clandestine shipments of paja toquilla to Perú, had traveled to Lima and complained before the Audiencia. This resulted in Vasco's temporary suspension as gobernador político. But the viceroy in Lima gave his support to Vasco, which perhaps would explain why the governor continued in office until 1816. In any event, Vasco justified his decision concerning the tenientes on alleged provisions made by the Reglamento de Tribunales, although Calvo y López later stated that the reason for keeping Juan Ponce de León as teniente was the proximity of Portoviejo to the insurgent provinces of Chocó, and the need to have as Juez someone of higher rank and more educated than the local alcaldes. Calvo informed
that the alcalde in Portoviejo had been a fisherman, while Bruno Lino, alcalde in Jipijapa, was a retired sailor.17

While still in Jipijapa, Calvo received word that members of the constitutional cabildo in Portoviejo had gathered a force of 200 men to prevent him from entering the city. On his arrival, however, he found that the cabildo had hastily acknowledged Ponce de León as teniente de gobernador and had organized for him a welcoming reception. Nonetheless, Calvo sent in custody to Guayaquil Regidor José Alvarez de la Camposa, a peninsular, and José Salcedo, secretary of the cabildo, earlier found as tinterillo in Jipijapa. Another regidor, Manuel Saabedra, had left for his hacienda in Chone rather than signing the deeds of the cabildo acknowledging the subdelegado, a behaviour that Calvo found scandalous enough to summon him immediately to Guayaquil.

As in the case of Vivero, Calvo accused the parish priest of Portoviejo, the Quiteño Dr. Manuel Ribadeneira, of fomenting "el desprecio a las autoridades legítimas," both publicly and in private, "valiéndose para alucinar de la constitución política de la Monarquía." Ribadeneira was also accused of hiding insurgents from Quito, accusations leveled as well against another Quiteño, the parish priest in Montecristi, Dr. Cayetano Ramírez y Fita. Calvo alleged that the clergy in Portoviejo were solely responsible for the above disturbances, and that only by separating them from the province, would order be
restored. He therefore sought to send in custody to Guayaquil two other priests, also from Quito, the franciscans Rufino Gil, separated as apostate from his parish in Charapotó, and Fray Ramón Moreno. Gil managed to avoid detention by escaping to Chocó, the destination of choice for insurgents from Quito when attempting to avoid detention.¹⁸

His mission ended, Calvo informed the governor that the province had been pacified, and that vecinos throughout the partido had enthusiastically expressed their love and loyalty for His Majesty. He had, in fact, inspected all the militia regiments, including three de la nación indica, each with 100 Indians from Montecristi, all eager to prove their loyalty and render service to his Majesty. This was indeed surprising, for in addition to general unruliness, vecinos from Portoviejo had earned a reputation for resistance to accept the discipline of the militia. Earlier, in 1812, Governor Vasco bitterly complained to President Montes that he was unable to send reinforcements from Portoviejo as planned, for its inhabitants were almost in revolt after learning that Vasco demanded 50 members for the militia, a situation that would be frequently repeated in later decades.¹⁹

The subversive role played by the priests in Portoviejo was undeniable. All of them were natives of the provinces of Quito, and three of whom, Vivero, Ribadeneira and Ramirez y Fita held doctoral degrees.
Earlier, in 1813, Julián de Aspiázu had informed governor Vasco from Palenque, a town in the vicinity of the roads leading to Quito, that three individuals had suspiciously arrived after dark and were rumored to be insurgents from Quito, sent by the priest of Montecristi to the hacienda of Ramon Aragundi, another vecino of Portoviejo.\textsuperscript{20} Aragundi and Ramírez y Fita vigorously denied the charges,\textsuperscript{21} the latter claiming that those individuals were more than likely merchants from the interior, and long time residents of Portoviejo. He did admit to Vasco that he had earlier lodged the priest José Joaquín Chiriboga, an insurgent, who nonetheless carried a passport from Montes.\textsuperscript{22} These were difficult times for Quiteños, and the clergy in particular were being closely scrutinized by Montes, several among them were exiled, as mentioned, to distant recoletas and presidios, others forced to resume monastic life, or banished to inhospitable regions. Not surprisingly, during these years the presidency was inundated with petitions from the clergy and their relatives, begging for clemency or disclaiming any involvement in the insurrection.\textsuperscript{23}

We do not know the individual motives that induced the priests to engage in subversive activities in Portoviejo. In a sense, they kept the flame of insurrection alive after the provinces of Quito had come under the control of Montes and once Guayaquil had remained loyal to Spain. Portoviejo was the sole
convulsed region during this period, which Vasco attributed to "aquellos curas que fuese por estar muy distantes y ya por que son hijos de Quito y relacionados allí, animan a movimientos parciales a sus feligreses." It is possible that they had become disaffected from Spain as members of the lower clergy, who apparently were most hurt by the reforms of the church during the late colonial period. Nonetheless, the fact that during the insurrection in Quito approximately 40% of the clergy remained royalist, as did most in Cuenca, would indicate that there were more complex reasons. Whatever the reasons may be, contentions that theirs was a religious war would not seem to apply in Portoviejo, where as earlier noted for Guayaquil, religion was not a mobilizing force for political purposes as it was in Quito.

Loyalty to their homeland, at a time when it was under military siege, may have induced parish priests in Portoviejo to instigate subversion. Solidarity with their persecuted compatriots, other clergymen in particular, could have had the same effect. Following independence, Manuel Ribadeneira, the parish priest of Portoviejo, wrote to Olmedo, the president of the Junta in Guayaquil "No es dificil conocer cual será el gozo de un quiteño oprimido que ha padecido por todo este espacio de tiempo, persecuciones, injurias y calumnias de algunos crueles enemigos y bárbaros habitantes de estas montanas". He further added that he had been persecuted "por ser
patriota y amparador de los infelices patriotas que prófugos y perseguidos han pasado por aquí." 30 We would expect priests to be imbued with a esprit de corps which perhaps would explain their effective role in spreading the insurrection both in the provinces of Quito and in more distant regions such as Portoviejo and Esmeraldas. 31 No other sector had recourse to such an extended network as did the clergy, which made them the ideal agents to instigate insurrection, for they alone could for instance overcome the regional barriers, both ideologic and geographic, fragmenting the elites.

The clergy in Portoviejo was furthermore deeply embedded in the community, as was also the lower clergy in Quito. Fray Rufino Gil, for instance, separated from his ministry for apostacy, had continued to reside in Charapotó, his former parish. Other franciscans, Fray Ramón Moreno and Miguel Vallejo, coadjutor in Jipijapa for Vivero, were accused by Vasco of remaining in the province for 16 years for the sole purpose of escaping religious discipline. In 1814, Vasco informed President Montes that he was unable to banish them from Portoviejo for fear of instigating new disruptions similar to those earlier taking place in Jipijapa, 32 all of which further suggests that their insubordination and disrespect for legitimate authorities stemmed from secular rather than religious motives.
Authorities were correct in blaming the clergy as main instigators of the disturbances in Portoviejo, but the priests were treading fertile ground. Changes in the constitution had been well received in Portoviejo and other provincial towns, as they were in Guayaquil. The cabildo in Santa Lucía, a town in the Partido of Daule, lauded the constitution as "the Grand system of our Liberty (which would)... exile forever the terrible monster of despotism" In Portoviejo, as in Guayaquil, Vasco thus faced problems for failing to enforce some of the reforms stipulated by the constitution. A comparable situation could also be found in small provincial towns. The alcalde of an Indian cabildo in Santa Rosa, a village in the vicinity of Zaruma, requested from the Audiencia in Cuenca the promulgation of the constitution, stating that "en mi pueblo se conocen de las noticias de la constitución española y sus reglamentos y como estas nuevas Leyes son tan benéficas a los Vasallos y por lo mismo es necesaria su obediencia y cumplimiento." So did leaders of Carangue, a village of no more than 3,000 inhabitants, who wrote to Montes requesting that the constitution be enforced and "el antiguo despotismo" banned forever." However in Quito, we have seen that Montes delayed the enforcement of the constitution until August of 1813, for fear of instigating disturbances.

Following the abolition of the constitution, problems surfaced again in Jipijapa regarding payment of the
tribute, which had been abolished in 1811 and reinstated on July, 1815 under the guise of la única contribución. On September 8, 1816, Teniente José Luis de la Vega gathered the Indians after mass to notify them of their obligation to pay the única vontribución. The fact that beforehand he had requested local merchants, caciques and other vecinos to act as witnesses would indicate that he expected trouble, for Gonzalo Parral and other members of the constitutional cabildo of 1814 had recently been released from prison in Guayaquil and had returned to Jipijapa. In effect, the teniente's announcement was met with their immediate resistance, through expressions such as "lo que el Rey daba no quitaba", "que no quería cautivarse siendo hombr libre," or "que no pagaba aunque le quitasen el pescueso", and that "nada costaba estar preso aunque sea un año." Their defiance was echoed by other Indians, which moved the teniente to file autos on that same day, for which purpose he summoned as witnesses Alcalde Mayor José Pin, two local merchants, and two caciques, don Ramón Chiquito and don Manuel Inocencio Parrales. They testified that Parral and the other Indian protesters were the same instigators of the earlier disturbances that took place during the constitutional period. José Pin and Ramón Chiquito also described that since their arrival, Parral and his associates had joined members of "el partido revolucionario" and were again instigating rebellion. On his part, Don Manuel Inocencio
stated that he had refrained from intervening once he observed the Indians' determination against payment, induced by Parral and the others.  

As would be expected in faction ridden Jipijapa, not all Indians were in favor of "el partido revolucionario," whatever this meant. Don Manuel Inocencio Parrales enjoyed a reputation with Governor Mendiburu as a loyal vassal of the king, and in 1817 the governor recommended him to Madrid, along with another cacique, don Santiago Lucas from Montecristi, and two members of the maestranza in Guayaquil for their actions during Brown's invasion. The governor requested silver medals with the effigy of Fernando VII and an inscription to reward their loyalty. Perhaps don Manuel Inocencio, as had his mortal enemy Villavicencio, had remained a loyal vassal of the king.  

The resistance of Indians from Jipijapa to payment of the tribute was highly significant when contrasted with the stand taken by Indian groups on the same issue on later rebellions taking place in the Audiencia, as well as in other parts of Perú, for opposite reasons. The tribute was viewed by these communities as a guarantee of their fueros and corporate ethnic identity. Such did not seem to be the case with Indians in Jipijapa, apparently no longer interested in keeping their identity as a corporate ethnic group. We shall immediately see that following independence, Indians in Jipijapa, as well as those in Montecristi, embraced with enthusiasm the civic
identity of "ciudadanos libres," a transition perhaps as swiftly made as implied in 1821 by Mariano Pionse, an Indian from Jipijapa, in a letter to Olmedo. Pionse, gobernador de indígenas y cobrador de tributos, requested instructions from Olmedo regarding some 101 pesos that he had previously collected "destos naturales que en el día son ciudadanos." Pionse, who by the way ended his letter with the slogan "Dios, Patria y Libertad," displayed republican virtue by making available funds badly needed to defend the cause of independence still being fought for in Quito.

Merchants in Portoviejo had more reasons for disaffection than those from Guayaquil, for many were natives of Quito and suffered harassment from Spanish authorities. In 1816, Domingo Romero, a merchant from Quito settled in Montecristi, had his ship sequestered by Spanish authorities in Dagua, in northern New Granada, while he was imprisoned and sent in custody to Quito.43 The fact that these merchants engaged in coastal trading with Chocó and Panama and with the northern ports of Perú also left them more vulnerable to attacks from insurgents threatening the coast all the way from New Granada to Chile. Between 1812 and 1815, they were insurgents from Cali, who pillaged as far south as Tumaco and La Tola in Esmeraldas. In 1816, we have seen, Commodore Brown and patriots from Buenos Aires and following the liberation of Chile, patriots from that country, as well as British,
Anglo-Americans and all others under the command of Lord Cochrane, posed a constant threat. José Bernardo Plaza, for instance, lost a ship to insurgents near the coasts of Esmeraldas as did Villamil in 1819 in Bahía de Caráquez.

By 1818, insurgents had become so confident that they raided inland towns as Montecristi, pillaged by members of the expedition led by Cochrane. Montecristi had already acquired importance as a commercial center for the hat weaving industry, and losses suffered by local merchants were described as totaling from 9,000 to 10,000 pesos. The heaviest losses, however, were suffered by the church, the target of choice for insurgents in coastal villages. The fact, however, that they had arrived in Manta suspiciously inquiring about the priest Ramírez y Fita, the cacique Santiago Lucas, and other members of the Indian cabildo, not to mention the seeming indifference of authorities in Portoviejo to aid Montecristi, would indicate that disaffection had spread in Portoviejo. In fact, the cura teniente of Montecristi, Fray Miguel Jijón, an unwilling witness to the seizing of the church treasures by the insurgents, lamented that "los mismos patricianos indígenas nos vendieron y nos remataron," for among those pillaging were rumored to be Indians from Payta and Jipijapa.

Business ventures of local merchants in Portoviejo were also more modest in scale than those of Guayaquil merchants, which also meant that they were more vulnerable
to losses derived from disruptions in their trade. Merchants of modest scale were apparently in financial trouble in this period. One of these was Santiago Vergara, earlier seen making clandestine shipments of paja toquilla from Jipijapa to Perú but by 1817 having business ventures as far as Mexico and Perú, which perhaps meant that he could no longer be considered a "modest" merchant. Nonetheless, Vergara had very little capital and in 1817 he petitioned for a moratorium to pay his debts, as did several others. The evidence suggests that several of these merchants brought contraband from Panama, mostly clothes, which they traded along coastal towns in Chocó, but also forwarded to Quito. The fact that Quito was in recession and that it was itself a center for textile production simply means that more research is needed on both the recession in Quito and coastal trade between Chocó, Guayaquil and Perú.

For our purposes, these links with Quito, both through trade and through native origins of merchants as well as priests, would further explain the repercussions in Portoviejo of the insurrection in Quito. It would also help to explain a later confrontation between Portoviejo and Guayaquil, which almost warranted yet another armed expedition from Guayaquil. Following independence, in December of 1821, Portoviejo unilaterally declared its anexion to Colombia, an ill-conceived and worse-timed decision, for the patriots were still fighting against the
royal army in Quito. Sucre, however, dissuaded the Junta in Guayaquil from sending troops to subdue Portoviejo, and instead sent as commissioner Diego Noboa. In their manifesto, more than likely authored by the priest Ramírez y Fita, vecinos from Portoviejo claimed that Quito and not Guayaquil was their more important market, for the latter was just a port of entry. They also slighted Guayaquil by attributing its independence to the fortuitous presence of Colombians, e.g., the three officers from the Numancia regiment, Febres Cordero, Letamendi and Urdaneta, who were natives of Venezuela. Patriots in Portoviejo justified their decision by virtue of the "Ley Fundamental de Colombia", issued by the Congress in Angostura in 1819, which unilaterally had declared the Presidency of Quito, still under Spanish control, to be part of Colombia.

The only excuse for this decision by vecinos in Portoviejo was the fact that those of Guayaquil were undecided between annexation to Lima, New Granada or total independence. That indecisiveness was abruptly ended by Bolivar in 1822, when following the liberation of Quito, he declared the Provincia Libre to be part of Colombia. Prior to the arrival of Bolivar to Guayaquil, however, the declaration of annexation to Colombia from Portoviejo, printed in Lima and made to circulate throughout the province, had stirred popular unrest in Guayaquil in support of annexation to Colombia, which perhaps somewhat justified Bolivar's high-handed actions.
Given these conditions in Portoviejo, the smoothness of its transition from colony to independence should come as no surprise. News of the events in Guayaquil reached Portoviejo shortly afterwards and was received with "vivas a la patria," "vivas a la libertad," followed by festivities and solemn masses of thanksgiving. The priest Manuel Ribadeneira perhaps voiced the aspirations of the inhabitants when writing to Olmedo that "los hombres podrán llamarse dueños de sus posesiones, ya cada uno poseerá pacíficamente lo que es suyo; y el engaño sera desterrado y la virtud y el mérito premiados." 51 Delegates attending the constitutional congress of the Provincia Libre the following November in Guayaquil, attest to the wide spectrum of those politically active in Portoviejo: the priests, Ramírez y Fita and Rivadeneira, merchants such as José Joaquín Alarcón, Joaquín Medranda, and José María Nevárez from Montecristi; shipowners such as Bernardo Plaza from La Canoa, hacendados as Vicente Zambrano from Pichota, and Indians and mestizos from Jipijapa, as were José Cacao Parrales and Mariano González Parrales. The same wide social spectrum was evident in the cabildos established the following December, when Indians, mestizos, and blancos participated in local government. In smaller villages such as Paján, cabildo members could neither read or write, nonetheless they were solemn participants as ciudadanos libres, and were duly elected alcaldes and regidores, as were Juan Indio,
Valentin Anchundia, Juan Lucas. In Montecristi, commissioner Diego Noboa allowed equal representation to Indians and blancos in the local town council. In our conclusions we shall address the differences and similarities between this republican political culture of inhabitants from Portoviejo and that of their wealthier neighbors from Guayaquil.

Notes

1. "El Gobernador de Guayaquil instruye sobre su conducta política, Julio 14, 1814."

2. See for instance, "Sobre justificar la entrada de enemigos en el pueblo de Montecristi," which lists several merchants giving Montecristi as their place of residence. Hamerly also mentions a census of Montecristi for this period which we have been unable to see.

3. Cubitt, "The government, the criollo elite and the revolution of 1820 in Guayaquil," 263.


5. Cubitt, "The government, the criollo elite and the revolution of 1820 in Guayaquil." 264.


7. "El Gobernador de Guayaquil instruye sobre su conducta política, Julio 14, 1814."

8. David J. Cubitt, "The government, the criollo elite and the revolution of 1820," 266.


10. Ibid

11. Ibid
12. Juan José Vivero was the son of José Vivero, an officer with the royalist government in Quito and Mara Toledo y Vela, from Latacunga. He and his younger brother, Luis Fernando Vivero y Toledo had received a solid education in the universities in Quito. Luis Fernando Vivero had been a confirmed royalist during the Quito insurrection, but after 1814, settled in Guayaquil and married to the powerful Garaicoa family, he had become involved in the insurgency, playing an important role during the October movement. David J. Cubitt, "La composición social de una élite Hispanoamericana a la independencia: Guayaquil en 1820", 28-29. The priest had apparently espoused the cause of independence earlier. He died in Guayaquil, December 22, 1816. Estrada Icaza, La Lucha de Guayaquil por el Estado de Quito, vol. 1, 137.


15. "Reclama el Gobernador de Guayaquil por haber sido despojado de su empleo de Gobernador Político por Audiencia Constitucional de Lima, Febrero 24, 1814."


17. Ibid, 99-100.

18. Several insurgents from Quito attempted to reach Chocó, then under the control of Narino and the insurgents from Cali. Fray Francisco Saa, former parish priest of Esmeraldas and later, the notorious commander of the Batallón de Cuchilleros, had done so, as would later Carlos Montúfar. Other insurgents, as mentioned, had failed in this endeavor, as Nicolás de la Peña and his wife, executed in Tumaco. Also attempting to escape through Esmeraldas were Ramón Chiriboga, Dr. Lucio Cabal, Tomás Montúfar, Manuel Moreno. "Andrés de Castro a Montes, Esmeraldas, Enero 13, 1813," A.N.H. Presidencia, 481 Insurgents from Quito were closely connected with the region of Barbacoa, where some among them were mine owners, as they were in Esmeraldas.

19. "Comunicación del Gobernador Vasco al Presidente Montes, Octubre 1, 1812" ANH Presidencia 480. Immediately following independence, we shall see that
authorities in Portoviejo and Guayaquil were compelled to make concessions regarding the enlistment of troops, for inhabitants in Portoviejo were said to be in rebellion, when learning that they would be compelled to march to Guayaquil. In the national period, the governor of Manabí described in 1843 that "En ninguna parte como en esta provincia existe tanto horror por servir en las milicias", inducing the minister of the interior in Quito to lower the quota assigned for the draft in Manabí, given "el extremo individualismo de sus habitantes", a description, we might remember, that coincides with that earlier voiced by Governor Pizarro and other colonial authorities in 1780. A.N.H., Gobierno, "Gobernación de Manabí, 1853."


22. Evidence of the panic experienced by Quiteños was a letter from Baltasar Pontón, appointed administrador de alcabalas by the second Junta in Quito. He claimed to have been "alucinado" by the pronouncements of the junta and the alleged approval from the king, received in Quito after the arrival of Carlos Montúfar. Begging for clemency in 1813, Pontón explained to Montes that he had gone into hiding in Esmeraldas after rumors spread that General Montes was determined to execute all Quiteños over the age of seven. "Baltazar Pontón a Montes, Junio 16, 1813," ANH, Presidencia, 483. As we had mentioned in the first chapter, Montes adopted a policy of leniency, which earned him the animosity of the audiencia in Cuenca, as well as royalists in Quito, and even Guayaquil. Montes had later to explain his conduct in Madrid, for his successor, hardliner President Ramirez viewed matters differently. An exception to the leniency shown by Montes, as mentioned, was the execution of Francisco García Calderón, Nicolás de la Peña and his wife, and in Pasto, that of Joaquín Caycedo and the Anglo-american Alejandro Macaulay, despite the fact that the lieutenant in charge requested Montes to revise his orders."Thomás de Santa Cruz a Montes, Pasto, Enero, 1813," Presidencia 481.

23. See, for instance. A.N.H. Presidencia, volumes 479 through 493. A unusual petition was addressed to Montes by three slaves, Antonio Avila, Rafael
Bermudez and Antonio Benavidez, who claimed that after being accused by another black before the Junta, they had been sentenced to death. They had somehow managed to avoid the death sentence, and were instead destined to Chimbo. The slaves argued that by failing to defend them against the death penalty, their masters had effectively lost all property rights over them. They petitioned for their freedom, adding that they had never fired shots against the king’s army. "Oficio al Presidente Montesm de tres esclavos, Quito 1812," A.N.H. Presidencia 479.

24. "El gobernador instruye sobre su conducta política."


26. In the provinces of Quito, altogether 133 priests were said to be insurgents, while 116 remained royalists. Ibid 147-167.

27. Demelas and Saint-Geours, Jerusalén y Babilonia, Religión y política en el Ecuador 1780-1880. 90-95 We have, of course, argued in the first chapter that it was not a religious war in Quito either, but that religion was the mobilizing force or the paradigm of choice to express their grievances, for reasons, which we shall later expand.

28. Between 1793 and 1794, Espejo wrote two sermons for his brother, Juan Pablo Espejo, later an insurgent banished to the recoleta in Cuzco, in which he sanctified the relation between Spain and its colonies through references to Santa Rosa of Lima: "Y lo que es mas admirable, en medio de las sombras que forma la enorme distancia del sol ibérico que ella respeta y ama, Rosa implora al cielo la eterna unidad del Estado y de la iglesia, el vínculo perpetuo de las colonias y de la metropoli."

Later interpretations have viewed political implications in this sermon since Santa Rosa was said to have prophesied the demise of the Spanish empire. By establishing such links between the saint and the colonial relation, Espejo would have added a political dimension to his sermons. Demellas and Saint-Geours, cited in Leoncio López-Ocón, "El protagonismo del clero en la insurgencia Quiteña." 122. While this seems somewhat farfetched, it is true that rumors circulated before the insurrection in Quito, that "se acabará Quito el 10," which were linked to an earlier prophecy by the saint from Lima. This, however, was not proof that theirs was a
religious war, but rather that the paradigm to express their political views was religious.

29. On several occasions, insurgents were rumored to be on their way to La Canoa and Portoviejo, which would imply that they had connections there. This would not be surprising since other than the priests there were several merchants and traders from the interior settled in Portoviejo. In 1812, for instance, the priest from La Canoa, José Mariano Plaza, a the time a royalist, informed Vasco that he had reinforced coast guards in Muisne, a coastal town in northern La Canoa, where insurgents were expected to arrive. "Comunicación del cura de la Canoa a Vasco, Septiembre 17, 1812," ANH Presidencia 480. A lieutenant in the regular army, Ignacio Rodríguez, also informed Montes that he had been destined in La Canoa for three months to search for insurgents from Quito. He had earlier captured as prisoner the governor of Esmeraldas, a province under the jurisdiction of Quito. "Ignacio Rodríguez al Presidente Montes, Noviembre, 1812," Presidencia 480.


31. Although members of the higher hierarchy of the church were involved in the insurrection, as was Bishop Cuero y Caicedo and a Magistral Rodriguez Soto, a peninsular, the majority were creoles and members of the lower clergy. Among the regular orders, the Franciscans were highly represented. Insurgents (as well as royalists) were spread out in rural parishes of "Quito y sus cinco leguas", and other provinces as far as Riobamba, Ambato, Pasto, Macas, Esmeraldas, and we have seen, Portoviejo. "Informe de los Empleados de Quito por el Procurador Ramon Nuñez del Arco, Quito, Mayo 20, 1813," Leoncio López-Ocón, "El Protagonismo del Clero en la Insurgencia Quiteña," 147-167.

32. Fray Miguel Vallejo was finally forced to leave Jipijapa when he was accused of fathering two children with a 25 year old hat weaver, a mestiza by the name of Isabel Andrade. She was enjailed and later placed in the custody of relatives, but gave no sign of repentance. Instead she taunted her accusers for labeling her behaviour as scandalous, for they claimed that she disguised herself in order to visit Vallejo. If she was in disguise there was no scandal, she claimed, and her arguments were sound, for we have seen that scandalous in colonial society
was that which was publicly known. Andrade also stated that "mis hijos son de Dios que me los ha dado", and that her sin, if at all, had been "generativo desde la creación del mundo." She also reminded her accusers of the biblical story of Jesus, the Jews and the adulterine, although she assumed they would be ignorant in such events. "Expediente relativo a reducir a la obediencia de su prelado y disciplina monástica de que se hallan separado los padres Fray Miguel Vallejo y Fray Rufino Gil y Fray Ramón Moreno, presbíteros de la seráfica órden de esta provincia, 1814-1815," ANH Presidencia, 521.

33. In "The government, the criollo elite and the revolution," David Cubitt had addressed the significance of these disturbances in Portoviejo much in the same manner as we have here, for we have drawn extensively from him. His interpretation, however, differs from ours in as much as he viewed these earlier conflicts mostly as a reaction to the implementation of a new juridical regime as was the constitution, a view, by the way, somewhat shared by Governor Vasco, who claimed that "la justa consideración de que todo nuevo órden de cosas trae consigo la falta de inteligencia de unos y la malicia de otros" had compelled him to send comisionados to Portoviejo to oversee the electin of alcaldes. "El Gobernador de Guayaquil instruye sobre su conducta política, Julio 14, 1814." We have assigned a more active role than mere reactions to modernizing changes to vecinos from Portoviejo, influenced, perhaps, by our knowledge of Portoviejo's earlier history of insubordination and defiance towards authority, but also on account of the role played by the clergy and their connections with the insurgents in Quito.

34. Cubitt, "The government, the criollo elite and the revolution," 264.


38. Ibid 101.
39. We ignore how this impasse with Indians from Jipijapa in 1815 was finally resolved, for tribute collection was resumed later.

40. "El Gobernador de Guayaquil hace presente lealtad y servicio de habitantes de la provincia, Guayaquil, Setiembre 13, 1817." AGI, Quito 262.

41. Earlier we had documented his death as taking place in 1803, an information obtained from a local biographer. In 1816, Don Manuel Inocencio's age was listed as "más de 60 años", but we ignore the date of his death, or for that matter, his whereabouts after 1817.

42. For the territory of the Audiencia see Mark Van Aken "The Lingering death of Indian Tribute in Ecuador," Hispanic American Historical Review 61:3 (1981) 429-460. He claims though that the opposition to the abolition of the tribute derived from resistance to innovation, as opposed to other authors who have emphasized the role played by the tribute in guaranteeing fueros and other exemptions.

43. "Representación de Domingo Romero sobre relevo de cargo de alcalde por tres meses, Montecristi, Mayo, 1821," ABC Fondo Jijón y Caamaño, Documentos Miscelaneos, 31/12.

44. Added to these perhaps more justified pillagers, for they at least had political aims, were real pirates, who had their centers of operation in the Galapagos Islands and took advantage of all the confusion to attack both insurgents as well as the Spanish.

45. "Sobre justificar la entrada de enemigos en el pueblo de Montecristi."

46. David Cubitt, "The government, the criollo elite and the revolution."

47. Ibid

48. Another merchant, Joaquin Suárez, for instance, was harassed by Spanish authorities and his ship and goods destined for Quito, confiscated in the port of Isquandé. "Comunicación de Joaquin Suárez a Montes, 1816" ANH, Presidencia, vol. 550. In 1821, a merchant from Montecristi, José Joaquin Alarcón was said to earn through contraband from 10,000 to 12,000 pesos a year. "Comunicación de Domingo Romero a la Junta de Gobierno," ABM, Diversos Funcionarios, Volúmen 18, doc. 134.
49. See Wilfrido Loor, *La Provincia de Guayaquil en Lucha por su Independencia* (Portoviejo, 1974).


52. "El ciudadano que hace de juez en el pueblo de Paján, pide que presida elecciones Manuel Menéndez en obsequio de la madre patria." ABM, Oficios al Presidente de la Junta de Gobierno, vol. 8.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS

The differences in the political culture of the regional elites from Quito and Guayaquil, and provincial groups in Portoviejo have been addressed in each of the pertinent chapters, and would seem to require no further elaboration. Nonetheless, for the sake of clarity and to strengthen our argument we shall briefly enumerate them in these final statements, along with observed differences in their cultural matrix which we have interpreted to be the grounding context for the political.

We have described for Quito a political culture embedded in Spanish traditional political thinking.¹ Quito claimed sovereignty in the absence of the king. In the Manifiesto al Pueblo de Quito in 1809, the Junta justified its actions through "las imperiosas circunstancias (the absence of the king) que le han forzado a asegurar los sagrados intereses de su Religión de su Príncipe y de su Patria."² We have also argued for Quito a traditional view of time, society, and history, for Quiteños sought legitimacy through events in their past, as when in this same pronouncement they stated that "Quito, pues, conquistada 300 años ha por una nación valeroza...debia
ser feliz," yet the Spanish, "que unicamente la mandaban como una nación recién conquistada" had forgotten "que sus vecinos son también por la mayor parte descendientes de esos mismos Españoles." We have described a simbiotic relation between the patriciate and the plebs, calling for alliances against mal gobierno, strengthened, more than likely, through common interests regarding a vast rural Indian population. We have mentioned the importance of deference, rank and honor, and the fact that the social structure was reinforced through a variety of public events and cultural practices, such as the lavish staging of their junta in 1809. In this context, we have argued a particular relation of language and symbols to that which they signified based on resemblance and similitude, which would explain the power of the word and rituals in Quito. We have also mentioned that religion and eschatology were paradigms frequently used to express the political. In contrast to Guayaquil which had but one formal elementary school, Quito had universities and was furthermore an important colonial center for the arts, particularly the baroque.

In Guayaquil, we have emphasized the influence of the Enlightenment in the pronouncements of the governing junta. In 1820, Olmedo explained independence as a coming of age, as well as the result of reason: "Desde que los hombres llegan a la edad en que recibe su razón el suficiente grado de luz y de firmeza para conocer y
sostener sus derechos.....la misma naturaleza les inspira el sentimiento de la emancipación y el deseo de formar una familia." We have also recognized a more modern conception of time and history, for rather than seeking legitimacy through actions in the past, patria for Guayaquileños was a process of becoming. We have emphasized that in contrast to Quito, where corporate groups were constituted as political actors, in Guayaquil they were individual actors, identified as "cabezas de familia," perhaps best translated as "heads of household." Most importantly, we have shown that from decades earlier, the elites in Guayaquil had incorporated to their vocabulary such terms as "causa pública," "bien público," "conciudadanos," "corrupción," "virtud," notions common to the ideology of republicanism. This vocabulary, we have argued, would suggest a more modern conception of society than in Quito, for society was ideally perceived as having a public sphere separated from the private. We have described at great length the export economy in Guayaquil, which in contrast to Quito, had benefitted from the reforms. Also, the fact that during this period, wage earners were more commonly employed in plantations, while in Quito, 50% of the Indian population was tied to the haciendas. Nonetheless, conditions in rural areas in Guayaquil may have been more violent than in Quito, where a "seigneurial" type of hegemony relied more on symbolic domination than on force. Finally, the social identity of
the political actors in both cities also differed, though in certain ways it coincided: in Quito, the nobility (hacendados and obrajeros), the clergy, lawyers, minor bureaucrats and the plebs; in Guayaquil, merchants, planters, disaffected officers from Venezuela and Perú, lawyers, minor bureaucrats and to a lesser degree, the populace.

In Portoviejo, we have described frontier like conditions and economic stagnation during most of the colonial period, which had allowed Indians in Jipijapa and Montecristi to retain control over their territory and production. These conditions combined with a collective consciousness of its earlier constitution (added to competition over trade and contraband with Guayaquil), had fostered in its vecinos territorial allegiances easily mobilized and at times transcending ethnic boundaries. Also as in Guayaquil, and in contrast to Quito, the reforms favored economic growth, and concomitantly, contraband. We have described the Indians as being highly politicized, factionalized and knowledgeable in events outside their communities. Vecinos in Portoviejo, as those from Guayaquil, welcomed the constitutional reforms, and engaged in protests over the governor's refusal to enforce them. At independence, we have seen these same sectors in Portoviejo enthusiastically embracing their new status as ciudadanos libres, including some who could neither read or write. Theirs was, however, a republicanism of a
different sort from Guayaquil: more concrete, expressed in affective terms, and perhaps for these same reasons, more criollo, since the teachings of the philosophes had little bearing in Portoviejo. As in Quito, however, their sense of collective identity was easily mobilized and was made to derive from actions in their past. Their collective identity surfaced again in 1821 when the towns in Portoviejo united to secede from the Provincia Libre and become part of Colombia. It surfaced also in 1824, when they were forced by Bolívar to buy their land held from immemorial times and did so communally.

Portoviejo was a sort of melting ground for the coast and the highland, since so many serranos had been quietly settling there during the late colonial period. We can safely say that Portoviejo was more democratic than Quito or Guayaquil, since social distances were less pronounced, calling for a wider basis of participation in the political process. This was obvious in the conformation of the earlier cabildos in villages such as Montecristi, Jipijapa and others. Nonetheless, democracy in Portoviejo was not to be confused with the acceptance of dissension. "Formar partidos" was considered a very serious offense. Closely related to their inability to tolerate dissension was the fact that their political ideas were expressed in affective terms such as "desafectos", "seductor," "alucinar," for the basis for consensus in Portoviejo was
shared values that appealed to the affective and not abstract ideals.

From our research we can conclude that regional differences were already present before independence. But how do these differences relate to the origins of regionalism, since difference in themselves need not lead to conflict.

Perhaps, though, it is wise to first identify all other intervening factors which have generally been made responsible for regionalism in Latin America. One factor is the breakdown of empire, which as has been usually the case in history, gave way to a fragmentation into small political units, aptly described for Latin America, as the "Balkanization" of the colonies. Secondly, and closely related to the above, there is the privatization of political power which followed the earliest wave of reforms, and which favored the emergence of caudillos. Thirdly, the prevalence of regional markets over a national market, which for some, preceded the formation of the nation state. In an Andean country such as Ecuador, we must also take into consideration the geographic barriers, and the ethnic cleavages.

The preconditions for regionalism were there. Not so much on account of differences in the more visible aspects of culture, but because of differences in worldview which were more difficult to reconcile. Guayaquil, and to a certain extent Portoviejo, had a more secular orientation
in world view than Quito, where the aura of the sacred and
the holy remained a potent means to obtain consensus. No
better way to exemplify this but through a brief
comparison of the introductory paragraphs to their
constitutions.

Quito (1812)

Artículo del Pacto Solemne
de Sociedad y Unión
entre las provincias que forman
El Estado de Quito.

En el nombre de Dios todopoderoso
trino y uno,

El Pueblo Soberano
del Estado de Quito
legítimamente representado
por los diputados de las provincias
libres que lo forman y que se hallan
presente en este Congreso
en uno de los
prescriptibles derechos que Dios
como autor de la naturaleza ha
concedido a los hombres......

Guayaquil (1820)

Reglamento Provisorio
Constitucional de la
Provincia de Guayaquil
sancionado por su
colegio electoral.

Capítulo I
Disposiciones generales
Art. I

La provincia de Guayaquil
es libre e independiente;
su religión es la
católica; y sus leyes
las mismas que
regian últimamente,
en cuanto no se opongan
a la nueva forma de
gobierno establecido.

These two constitutions were written barely eight
years apart. As in Cadiz, the catholic religion was
declared the official religion in Guayaquil, but nowhere
do we find divine intervention as a source of legitimacy
as we do in the Pacto Solemne of Quito, but rather
references to a self-directed course of action—the
decision of a province libre e independiente—and to the
laws. In Quito, God was viewed as the giver of political
rights—ideas of Thomist and Suarezian inspiration.
Quito, to use the terminology of Habermas, whose arguments
we are following here, was a society in which the
"linguistification" of the sacred had not yet concluded, for only then, could the appeal to reason form the basis for consensus. Religion permeated most aspects of culture, with the exception of popular diversions as the "puros"—dances in which members of the clergy participated—and the masquerades, which as Stevenson described them place during carnival and following the bullfights, on which occassions the nobles, some highly circunspect clergy, and the plebs mixed freely, without there ever having been known to occur a single act of violence. Stevenson remarked with amazement at the number of processions, or the fact that the images of the Virgin of Guápulo was brought to Quito dressed in full military regalia, for she had been named by His Majesty captain general of the royal army, and was entitled to full military honors when arriving in Quito, as well as to be escorted by both the secular and religious cabildo. Fray Bernardo Recio—earlier seen voicing his surprise that Indians in Santa Elena were so hispanicized, reveled in Quito over the religiosity of the Indians. He noted that the Indians' salutation before dawn was "Bendito y alabado sea el santisimo Sacramento," which induced him to express hopes that Spanish viejos cristianos would show the same degree of religiosity. It is no surprise, then, that religion was the paradigm of choice to express the political in Quito, which was not the case in Guayaquil or Portoviejo. It would also explain the importance of
ritual, and the particular use of language and symbols, for Habermas claims that only when the above process has been completed—that is, when one can identify "oneself" and the "others" as subjects, and accept diversity, can language roam freely into the higher levels of abstraction.

These differences in world view entailed a different conception of society and eventually became irreconcilable during the post-independence liberal-conservative contention. Significantly, each of these regions played a role that was already prefigured during this period: Guayaquil a bastion for doctrinaire liberalism, Quito as the more conservative, and Manabí, the former Portoviejo, the stage for the armed confrontation that took place, and where a more populist and creole liberalism flourished.

We might conclude with another note from Habermas. He claims that only when the world view—or the "lifeworld" as he describes it, has been uncoupled from the system, are differences and diversity accepted. In that case, consensus is actively sought through linguistic means and through appeal to other than the more elusive and obscure, affective motives. Despite regional conflicts, Ecuador has arrived to the present with a wealth of cultural diversity, not so much regional as ethnic. Hopefully, the time has come for the acceptance of such diversity, in the terms proposed by Habermas, one of the
last believers in the Enlightenment: the appeal to reason and the acceptance of the other as subject.

Notes

1. The thesis of the influence of Spanish traditional political theory in the Quito movement was first set forth by Julio Tobar Donoso, "Dos Documentos Memorables (La Carta de 1812 y el Proyecto de Miranda), Boletín de la Academia Nacional de Historia, 98 (Julio-Diciembre, 1961); by Carlos de la Torre Reyes, La Revolución de Quito del 10 de Agosto de 1809 y su significación en el proceso general de la emancipación hispanoamericana (Quito, 1961), Jorge Salvador Lara, "Estudio Introductorio," La Revolución de Quito 1809-1822. A different interpretation may be found in Carlos Paladines, "Estudio Introductorio y Selección, Pensamiento Ilustrado Ecuatoriano, Volumen IX (Quito, 1981).


3. For lack of time and space we have not dealt with other such cultural practices, as for instance, the use of fiestas and certain rituals to sanction labor relations in the haciendas. Or the architectural complexes in these same haciendas, which characteristically included several buildings surrounding a main square, a chapel, and a large cross carved in stone in the center of the square. There were, of course, other manifestations of conspicuous consumption, which helped to legitimize the hegemony of the elites.

4. We are indebted to Mario Fazio Fernandez, Ideología de la Emancipación Guayaquileña, which first called our attention to the influence of Rousseau and Montesquieu in the pronouncements of the patriots in Guayaquil.

5. In this, as in other aspects regarding Guayaquil, we are indebted to Michael Hamerly, Historia social y económica, and to Maria Luisa Laviana Cuetos, Guayaquil en el siglo XVIII.

6. Immediately following independence, for instance, such accusations were common among factions, villages, and so forth. See for instance "oficios" from the different villages to Olmedo in 1821, in ABM, Diversos Funcionarios, Volumen 18. Or "Juicio criminal contra Juan Mendoza y Molina por sedición en


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(published and unpublished sources)

The archival material that has served as basis for this dissertation was drawn mostly from the Archivo de Indias in Seville and the Archivo Nacional de Historia in Quito. At the archives in Seville, we found most useful the following legajos, all listed under the heading of Quito: "Duplicado de Gobernadores," legajos 259-261; "Correspondencia con los Gobernadores de Guayaquil," 237; "Correspondencia con los gobernadores de Quito," 233-236, "Duplicado de Gobernadores de Popayán, Guayaquil y Cuenca," 262, as well as legajos 241, 275, 371, 483 and 596, since the first four contain information regarding events in Guayaquil and Quito, while the latter contains information regarding the tribute in the coast. For the political events leading to independence in Quito and Guayaquil, Estado 72 and 74. Information regarding Portoviejo and coastal Indians was more difficult to find. The few expedientes helpful in this respect were Quito 271, 286, 349, and 362. The Archivo Histórico del Guayas—the appropriate place to search for information regarding the coast, has been closed during the past three years for reorganization purposes, which greatly limited our search.
What little information we had gathered earlier from the Fondo de Escritanos Públicos proved to be most useful. This forced us to search for information on both Quito and Guayaquil at the Archivo Nacional de Historia in Quito, a time consuming task, for there is not that much information on the coast, and none whatsoever for the period between 1809 and 1820, when Guayaquil was placed under the jurisdiction of Lima. For this purpose we reviewed the following series: Presidencia--mostly correspondence with presidents of the audiencia, but also royal orders, volumes 27 (circa 1750) to 558 (circa 1818). Our task was made easier by the fact that these volumes are well organized and bound. Useful expedientes regarding pleitos were found in the serie Gobierno (cajas 62-64); regarding Indians in Cacicazgos, Tributos (Caja I C), Indígenas (cajas 127-130), and Fondo de la Corte Superior de Justicia: Cacicazgos; Rebeliones provided limited information on the insurgency in Quito. To a lesser extent we have obtained some information from the Archivo del Banco Central in Quito, at the time also under reorganization. Nonetheless, we were able to obtain some information from the Fondo Jijón y Caamaño, Documentos Misceláneos. In Guayaquil, our search at the Archivo de la Biblioteca Municipal was limited to Diversos Funcionarios.

We would like to add other work that has been influential for our theoretical framework than the ones

As for the more specialized literature on Ecuador, we would like to emphasize only those works which have been most useful for our purposes. For the rebellions in Quito as well as the behavior of the elites, Anthony McFarlane's article on "The Rebellion of the Barrios: Urban Insurrection in Bourbon Quito," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 69:2 (May, 1989). For Indian rebellions, Segundo Moreno Yanez, *Sublevaciones indígenas en la Audiencia de Quito* (1977). For the social and economic history of Quito in the eighteenth century Robson Tyrer,
Historia demográfica y social de la Audiencia de Quito (1988), and Allan Washburn's P.h.D dissertation, "The Bourbon Reforms: a Social and Economic History of the Audiencia of Quito, 1760-1810." For the involvement of the clergy, Leoncio López-Ocón, "El protagonismo del clero en la insurgencia quiteña," Revista de Indias 46:177 (1986). There is a wide literature on the insurgency in Quito of 1809-1812. Most useful is Alfredo Ponce Ribadeneira, Quito, 1809-1812 (1960) which reproduces most of the important documentation for the period. Also useful, José Gabriel Navarro, La Revolución de Quito del 10 de Agosto de 1809, (1962) Roberto Andrade, Historia del Ecuador, primera parte, (1984), and Demetrio Ramos Pérez, Entre el Plata y Bogotá: cuatro claves de la emancipación ecuatoriana (1978). Jorge Salvador Lara has published several accounts of the insurgency in La Revolución de Quito. 1809-1822. (1982), while Humberto Toscano, in Ecuador visto por los extranjeros. (1960), offers descriptions by visitors helpful for understanding the cultural context. Nueva Historia del Ecuador, vol 6 (1983) has several insightful essays. Although unrelated to the period that we have studied, we were greatly inspired by the work of John L. Phelan, The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century (1967).

The following books were of critical importance for our understanding of the political, social and economic conditions in Guayaquil: Abel Romeo Castillo, Los
governadores de Guayaquil (1931); Michael T. Hamerly, Historia social y económica de la Antigua Provincia de Guayaquil (1973); Maria Luisa Laviana Cuetos, Guayaquil en el Siglo XVIII (1987). Also useful, the articles by Dora León Borja and Adamz Szaszdi, "El comercio del cacao," Revista de Historia de América 57-58 (1964); Michael Conniff, "Guayaquil through Independence: Urban development in a Colonial System," The Americas 33:3 (1977). Carlos Contreras has added important information obtained from the archives in Lima in El sector exportador de una economía colonial (1990). The various articles by David Cubitt were most useful. In particular, "The government, the criollo elite and the revolution of 1820 in Guayaquil," Ibero Amerikanisches-Archiv 8:3 (1982), which greatly influenced the manner in which we approached our research, by calling our attention to middling sectors and their possible reasons for disaffection from royal government. We are indebted to Mariano Fazio Fernández for calling our attention to some of the ideologic aspects of the revolution in Guayaquil, in Ideología de la emancipación Guayaquileña (1987), and Julio Estrada Icaza for the information that he provides in La lucha de Guayaquil por el Estado de Quito, 2 vols. (1984). The most important accounts of the revolution in Guayaquil were published by Abel Romeo Castillo, La Independencia de Guayaquil. 9 de Octubre de 1820 (1983). Unfortunately, very little has been published on Portoviejo, except for
the works of Wilfrido Loor, which do not directly refer to this period, and some local monographs.
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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