THE POLITICAL CONCEPTS OF LUIS MUÑOZ RIVERA (1859-1916) OF PUERTO RICO

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PREFACE

This study proposes an examination of the political philosophy of Luis Muñoz Rivera with particular respect to the political autonomy of Puerto Rico, as this philosophy is reflected in his public acts, speeches, articles, poetry, correspondence and contemporary public documents. An attempt will be made to demonstrate the importance and viability of his ideas in connection with recent and contemporary political problems.

Related Influences. Any significant political philosophy is shaped by three different but closely related influences.¹ The first of these is what Alfred North Whitehead has taught us to call the "climate of opinion" -- those fundamental presuppositions which in any age so largely determine what men think about the nature of the universe and what can and cannot happen in it, and about the nature of man and what is essential to the good life. The "climate of opinion" of nineteenth century Spain and of nineteenth and early twentieth century United States have been widely discussed elsewhere, so this study will endeavor to bring a closer scrutiny to bear upon the fundamental presuppositions of Puerto Ricans in the half century from 1867 to 1916.

The second influence is more specific: it derives from the particular political and social conflicts of the time, which
dispose groups and parties to accept a particular interpretation of current ideas as a theoretical support for their practical activities. Since there is no political history of Puerto Rico in print in English, it will be necessary for this writer to provide in English translation a considerable amount of what at first may appear to be only antiquarian history but which is necessary background for the primary objective of analysis. In this dissertation the translations are always those of the writer except when referring to a work which has been cited as translated by another.

The third influence is more specific still: it derives from the mind and temperament of the individual who gives to the political philosophy its ordered literary form. Whatever is original in the philosophy is usually contributed by the individual who gives it this form. Whatever value it has for its own time and place will depend largely on the extent to which it serves to illuminate or resolve the particular political issues of that time and place. But its value for other times and places will depend upon the extent to which the general presuppositions upon which it rests have a universal validity, the extent to which they express some enduring truth about nature and the life of man.

The political philosophy of Luis Muñoz Rivera was not in essentials original with him. It was his only in the sense that he gave to ideas widely accepted at the time and genuinely entertained by him a Muñoz-ian form and flavor. Muñoz Rivera might well have said, as did Jefferson, that it was not his
purpose "to say things which had never been said before, but
to place before mankind the common sense of the subject," and
to harmonize the "sentiments of the day, whether expressed in
conversation, in letters, printed essays, or the elementary
books of public right."² It was indeed Muñoz Rivera's merit,
and the high value of his articles, poems and speeches, that
he expressed in lucid and persuasive form political ideas then
widely accepted and thereby provided a reasoned justification
for demanding autonomy, first from Spain and then from the
United States. In providing the reasons for demanding autonomy
from a particular government at a particular time, Muñoz Rivera
looked toward the formulation of the universal principles which,
as he thought, could alone justify self-government, or self-
determination of peoples, at any time.

A Time of Troubles. In outlining our method and our
primary sources, we have used the term, "political philosophy,"
without defining it. It is dangerous, at this time at least,
to use "political philosophy" without some clarification.
Indeed, American political theory, and political science as
well, seem to be upon a "time of troubles," with respect to such
fundamental considerations as meaning, scope and role.³ Pro-
fessor Harold D. Lasswell, for one, has suggested that political
science may stand in danger of being "given back to the Indians,"
and it is said that some persons feel that political science is
a discipline only "by the grace of God, the indifference of the
other sciences, and the tolerance of the humanities."⁴ Three
political theorists have asserted, and demonstrated to a consider-4 degree, that more creative work is being done outside the profession than within it. 5

This is hardly the place for solving or resolving all of these problems, but the doubts expressed should at least impel anyone who presumes to write in the field of political theory to make a careful examination of the authorities who are attempting to clarify some of these matters—to make clear the justification for the particular study being undertaken (as political theory or political philosophy) and to show how it may make some contribution to the field.

Some of the arguments employed here may occasion the charge that the writer "protesteth too much," but the statements supporting the study of ideologies, others supporting political theory "in action" and others indicating a generally more "down-to-earth" approach, are necessary to a justification of this study. From the vantage point of having communicated with people who knew Muñoz Rivera and his career, I feel sure that the "ideology" label (or worse, "opportunism") is attached to most of what he thought or said, simply because he was Muñoz Rivera—a politician known more for his strenuous political action and rough-and-tumble debate than for his intellectual abilities or attainments. Far from having great misgivings about embarking upon a study of Muñoz Rivera's philosophy, I expect that this study will demonstrate that his thought will qualify under any of the definitions of political theory or political philosophy.
Some Definitions. A determination of the proper province of political theory or political philosophy involves the definition of these terms as well. A group of leading American political scientists has recently undertaken the task of developing some workable definitions of these terms in the course of attempting to determine the relevance of political theory to the "study of politics."  

Harry Eckstein's "interpretive commentary" on this conference reports that "all agreed" that the term "political theory" should not be used interchangeably with "political philosophy."  

Apparently the critical difference between the two terms was to be found in the aspect of scope--political philosophy having as its scope the "construction of comprehensive theories of politics."  

Eckstein admitted to the lack of precision of such a distinction, and offered a rule-of-thumb guide: one may present a theory as to the reasons for defeat of the British Labour Party in 1951, but political philosophy would be exemplified by "... theories like Marx's analysis of the state and the determinants of political power, which obviously involve the ordering of almost the whole of political experience and call for a judgment as to what is significant and insignificant in experiences as such."  

In brief, then, political philosophy is theory, but not all theory is philosophy. Aside from the arbitrariness of this definition, one is entitled to ask for further explanation of "comprehensive," and also to wonder if more than a handful of works could pass muster as philosophy.

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A no more satisfactory conclusion is to be derived from the conferees' discussion of ideologies. No attempt was made to define the term, but it was agreed that "ideologies" were fundamental to the analysis of political behavior. Further confusion was contributed by the conferees' labeling of the content of our history of political thought course as "highly refined ideologies." One must ask, "When does ideology become 'highly refined ideology'? When does 'highly refined ideology' become political theory? When, with any exactitude, can we say that political theory becomes political philosophy?"

The only empirical "proof" of the meanings of these terms and what should or should not be included in their scope is the testimony, implicit and explicit, of leading students of the subject. Eckstein's fellow conferees must be out of touch with what is going on in the field. Though it may be urged that the writers of our leading political theory textbooks have an eye to the market or perhaps an eye to the deficiencies of students, it is clear that they have not been encumbered by any complex scrutiny of what it is that they are writing about. Such terms as "political theory," "political philosophy," and "political thought" are used interchangeably by nearly all such writers--sometimes with such other terms as "ideas," "political mind," "opinions," "doctrines" and "body of beliefs." Where definitions are offered, they are of the "commonsense," un-cluttered variety, enabling one to get on with the business at hand.11
Professor Sabine, for example, has said:

... For, on the one hand, political theory has always been a part of philosophy and science, an application to politics of the relevant intellectual and critical apparatus which is at the moment available. And, on the other hand, it is a reflection upon morals, economics, government, religion, and law--whatever there may be in the historical and institutional situation that sets a problem to be solved. It is of the essence of the point of view here adopted that neither factor should be neglected.12

In a stimulating exchange in the American Political Science Review, David G. Smith gives an engaging, if not a very precise, definition:

... Political theory, in its most constructive and ambitious endeavors, is literary in form ... Like the novelist, the political theorist paints pictures in words of a political life we might choose, or that we are now leading to but do not fully comprehend. He records his reflections upon politics to help us to decide how we are to live. As Plato observed, that task is no mean one.13

David Easton's recent study of the state of political science tells us that "political theory" is "customarily used to refer to discussion of political values or the philosophy of politics."14 Though it is readily seen that this definition is of little help in discovering the meaning of "political theory" or "political philosophy," Easton subsequently reaches a more meaningful elaboration of his position. He explains that political theory is to be divided into two phases: "value theory" and "causal theory." Causal theory is "the frame of reference that fixes the order and relevance of the facts" or "the logic behind the selection and accumulation of facts."15

The major burden of Easton's book is to demonstrate the need
for such a general theory of politics which would be a "conceptual framework for the whole field."\textsuperscript{16}

Easton, however, later elaborates upon the meaning of "value theory." It is theory used in the "reformative sense,"\textsuperscript{17} or "the discussion of alternative mechanisms for improving the political structure and processes."\textsuperscript{18} He also indicates that this branch of political theory is concerned with the "authoritative allocation of values for a society."\textsuperscript{19} It is this type of theory which particularly claimed the attention of Munoz Rivera.

Benjamin E. Lippincott has presented what may be judged as an unsophisticated and yet eminently practical definition of political theory: ". . . a systematic analysis of political relations."\textsuperscript{20} More explicitly, he says:

Political theory focuses its attention on the relations of the individual to the state, or the relations between one man and all others with respect to the matter of governance. . . . It analyses ideologies, such as those associated with democracy, fascism, and communism. It analyses, also, specific political relations within a state, such as rights, liberty, equality and property. It examines the relation of the government to the economic order, whether it be socio-capitalism, socialism or communism.\textsuperscript{21}

The UNESCO study, The University Teaching of Social Science; Political Science, gives political theory short shrift. There is no section on political theory in the book and "political theory" does not appear in the index!\textsuperscript{22} The explanation for this cavalier treatment of an important area of political science may be found in the attitude of the editor, William A. Robson. Under the heading, "Scope, Content and Nature," Robson makes only passing reference to political philosophy after having explained that po-
Political science is still an "embryonic" field wherein there is a "lack of general agreement of its scope." 23

Professor Robert A. Dahl prefers the term "political analysis" about which he has this to say:

Is political analysis, then, a science? Or is it an art? I believe that it is both. To the extent that many aspects of political analysis are most easily acquired by practice and training under the supervision of a person already skilled in political analysis, it is an art. Whenever students of politics scrupulously test their generalizations and theories against the data of experience by means of meticulous observation, classification, and measurement, then political analysis is scientific in its approach. To the extent that this approach actually yields tested propositions of considerable generality, political analysis can be regarded as scientific in its results. . . . The extent to which political analysis should be considered an art or a science is a hotly debated issue among contemporary students of politics.

Skill in analyzing politics is not the same as skill in practicing politics. Sometimes the two do not go together. . . . Nevertheless, every skilled political practitioner must have some capacity for political analysis, even though he may be unable to explain what he knows. 24

However termed and defined, "political theory" is the field of political science in which there seems to have been a substantial growth of interest between 1953 and 1961, according to Somit and Tanenhaus. 25 Yet it would appear that there is a definition of political theory or political philosophy for every political theorist and a multiplicity of conceptions of its scope. One may be driven to the assertion: "This study is 'political theory' because we say it is--we who have been trained in the field of political theory and political science." 26 Such bluntness and temerity may be no worse than some of the scholasticism and semantic snobbery that is reflected in attempts to refine
our terminology. Most educated people know what is meant when one proposes to write of philosophy or political theory. It is understood that we mean to place primary emphasis upon the ideas which have to do with the study of government and politics—that we propose to raise and try to answer some questions as to the advisability, value or utility of various forms, systems, practices and policies in the realm of government.

Some Supporting Statements. Whether we call it theory, philosophy or ideology, virtually all of the authorities consulted have indicated, directly or indirectly, the value of the type of study which is proposed here. Some representative samples follow.

Eckstein stresses the importance of studying politically significant ideologies and chides his profession for its failure to mine these sources. He lays blame equally upon the "behaviorists" and "theorists." "There is, consequently a vast territory of politically significant information which lies fallow, mainly because we seem to be unable to reach a reasonable compromise between the study of Plato and the study of local government in Illinois." 28

On the other hand, Eckstein felt that proper use was not being made of ideas from the history of political thought. "The reason we rarely do this," he said, "is plain and has already been mentioned: the fact that behaviorists have a generally insufficient interest and preparation in the history of political thought and the fact that the historians of political thought hardly ever do anything but expound the history of political ideas." 29
Finally, Eckstein's group felt that the most immediate step toward an amelioration of the situation would be "... some sort of collaborative analysis of the area in which political science and philosophy touch most closely on one another, i.e., the field of politically significant 'ideologies'." 30

In addition to his remarks cited above, we should note this statement by Smith:

... Traditionally, political theory has claimed a series of special problems, such as those related to personal and civil liberties, loyalty and civil disobedience, equality, authority, and the appropriate grounds and limits of government intervention. The creative role of the political theorist depends largely upon what he can say about these matters. 31

The views of Professor Lippincott seem almost deliberately directed at the particular type of study to be undertaken in this dissertation. He says, "Political theory, clearly, must be studied operationally, if it is to possess meaning. Political theory that is not related to the actions and behavior of men is a sterile intellectual exercise." 32

Professor Sabine says that "... political theory in action ought to receive equal treatment with political theory in books," 33 and:

It cannot be supposed that any political philosophy of the present time, more than those of the past, can step out of the relationships in which it stands to the problems, the valuations, the habits or even the prejudices of its own time. 34

The comments of Professor Wanlass, in the first chapter of Gettell's History of Political Thought, are even more apropos:
It is evident that a close relation will exist between political thought of any given period and the actual political conditions then existing. Most political theories arose either to explain and justify the authority that men obeyed or to criticize it in the hope of accomplishing change. Sometimes, it is true, political philosophers speculated concerning the ideal state, or drew imaginative pictures of political conditions as, in their opinion, they should be. Even this type of political theory, will, if closely examined, prove to be based on the political ideals of its time, and will usually be aimed at certain specific evils to which the conditions then prevailing gave rise. 

Wanlass points out that much of political theory is not articulated as such, that often true political thought of an era may not be found in the writings of political philosophers who are "too much removed from practical life, or too close to their own institutions to get a proper perspective, . . ." And finally:

A considerable amount of information concerning the theory of the state may be derived from the writings and speeches of men who occupy official positions in government, or who exercise leadership in public opinion. Such materials, though often colored for public consumption, nevertheless reveal, sometimes quite unintentionally, important political principles. They have both the merits and defects that result from being in close contact with the realities of political life.

We could ask for no better statement to support the validity of an inquiry into the political philosophy of Luis Muñoz Rivera with respect to self-determination and autonomy.
NOTES TO PREFACE


4Lasswell, American Political Science Review, L, 979, and Rogow, American Political Science Review, LI, 771.


6Eckstein, American Political Science Review, L, 475.

7Ibid., 479.

8Ibid., 480.

9Ibid., 481.

10Ibid., 484.


12 Sabine, p. xii.
13 Smith, American Political Science Review, LI, 746.
14 Easton, p. 52.
15 Ibid., p. 53.
16 Ibid., p. 65
17 Ibid., pp. 79-80
18 Ibid., p. 65.
19 Ibid., p. 129.
21 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p. 16.
27 See Odegard, American Political Science Review, XLV, 969.
28 Eckstein, American Political Science Review, L, 485.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., 487.
31 Smith, American Political Science Review, LI, 744.

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35 Gettell, p. 4.

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INTRODUCTION

Although he had been dead for almost forty-eight years, Luis Muñoz Rivera appeared on the ballot in the Puerto Rican general election of November 3, 1964--his picture the symbol chosen to assist illiterate voters to cast their ballots for Muñoz Rivera's son, Luis Muñoz Marín.\(^1\) This was more than clever politics, for certainly Muñoz Rivera's attempts to secure self-government for Puerto Rico, first from Spain and then from the United States, implied an autonomous island, the philosophical and theoretical ancestor of Muñoz Marín's Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.\(^2\)

Moreover, Luis Muñoz Rivera is a symbol of one of the four alternative goals for the permanent political status of Puerto Rico.\(^3\) He and three other patriots provide four insular holidays: Muñoz Rivera (autonomy); José Celso Barbosa (statehood in the Federal Union);\(^4\) José de Diego (independence);\(^5\) and Eugenio María de Hostos (membership in an Antillean confederation).\(^6\)

Puerto Rican preoccupation with its political status is so well known that it is often the subject of humor. The story is told of a scientific-literary contest held in Paris whose entrants, among others, included a German, a Frenchman, a Yankee, and a Puerto Rican. The contest dealt with the life of the elephant. When the papers submitted were examined, it was found that the German had presented two thick volumes entitled, "Brief
Introduction to the Life of the Elephant." The Frenchman wrote his paper under the title of "Love Life of the Elephant." "How to Grow Bigger and Better Elephants" was the title of the Yankee's presentation, while the Puerto Rican chose the theme, "The Elephant and the Political Status of Puerto Rico." Political status has been, and is still, the principal political issue in the island in the minds of the masses of the people, even though individual leaders and intellectuals have understood the need for attention to civil and political liberties, governmental reform, and economic and social concerns.\(^7\)

In 1965 when the number of sovereign states in the international community increases yearly, it seems axiomatic that former colonial areas should ask for, and try to achieve overnight, the status of complete political independence.\(^8\) In 1898, when the armed forces of the United States separated Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico from Spanish despotism, immediate independence was not the result.\(^9\) Despite Jose Martí and José Miguel Gómez, Cuba had her Platt Amendment.\(^10\) The goal of José Rizal and Emilio Aguinaldo for the Philippines was not realized until 1946.\(^11\) In Puerto Rico complete independence has never come and has never had support from more than a small minority.\(^12\) even the great José de Diego, the leading advocate of complete independence, was willing to hold office under both the Spanish and the United States colonial governments.\(^13\) It is commonly accepted that Puerto Rico's remarkable economic and social advances of the past two decades are due in no small measure to the generous Congressional policy of allowing Puerto Rico to have her cake and
eat it, too--exempt from Federal taxes but nevertheless eligible for Federal benefits.\textsuperscript{14} Whether the present liberality is owed to Puerto Rico to atone for the decades of neglect is a moot question.\textsuperscript{15}

It is not the purpose of this paper to try to answer such questions as, "Why has Puerto Rico sought autonomy when the vast majority of other former colonial areas have not done so?" To do so would require a psychoanalysis of a whole people and their leaders, as well as assigning causal characteristics to historical events. Rather this research seeks to present Luis Muñoz Rivera as the leading political figure of Puerto Rico during the past seventy-five years, whose imprint is as surely on the Commonwealth Constitution of 1952 and the platform of the Popular Democratic Party in 1964 as it was on the Autonomy Charter of 1897 and the Jones Act of 1917.

The focus here is on what Muñoz Rivera did and on what he sought, his political philosophy of means and ends. He was more an activist than a thinker, and he wielded the pen not for its own sake but to achieve political victories. He was not a political theorist writing a Republic--he did not publish a single volume of prose--and the ideas motivating his political activity are found in his letters, speeches, articles, and poems. In 1959, the centenary of his birth, some critical and historical writing was briefly stimulated, almost none of which is available in English.\textsuperscript{16} If this dissertation succeeds in nothing more than making Muñoz Rivera, his ideas and his deeds, better known and in offering a more complete bibliography of his concerns and his
times, the writer will be well satisfied.

Who was Muñoz Rivera? It is well at this point to present the barest outline of his life, drawn chiefly from the Biographical Directory of the American Congress.17 Luis Muñoz Rivera, third Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico, son of Luis Muñoz Barrios and Monserrate Rivera Vázquez and grandson of a Spanish officer, Luis Muñoz Iglesias, who came to Puerto Rico in 1822,18 was born in Barranquitas, P. R., July 17, 1859. He attended the common schools, engaged in commerce and general business, and contributed poems to several newspapers.

His political career began in earnest when he founded La Democracia, a daily newspaper, in Ponce, P. R., in 1890.19 He was sent to Madrid in 1896 as a member of a commission to confer with the Liberal Party of Spain on establishing home rule in Puerto Rico, and was one of the founders of the Liberal Party in Puerto Rico in 1897. Spain appointed him secretary of state under the home-rule government in Puerto Rico and president of the cabinet in 1897; he created and organized the insular police. In 1898, when United States sovereignty was declared, he resigned, but his resignation not being accepted, he continued to serve until 1899.

He was representative of his party to Washington, D. C., regarding the establishment of free-trade relations between the United States and Puerto Rico;20 organized the Federal Party in 1900 and on its dissolution in 1902 organized the Unionist Party. He founded the Diario de Puerto Rico in 190021 and published the Puerto Rico Herald in New York City in 1901.22
Muñoz Rivera served two terms in the Puerto Rico House of Delegates, 1906-1910, and presided over a special commission of the House of Delegates which was sent to Washington, D. C., in 1909. In 1910 he was elected as a Unionist a Resident Commissioner to the United States; reelected in 1912 and 1914 and served from March 4, 1911, until his death in San Juan, P. R., November 15, 1916. He was buried in San Antonio de Padua's Cemetery, Barranquitas, P. R.

He married Amalia Marín Castillo on January 5, 1893, at Ponce, P. R., daughter of the patriot, Ramon Marín and Amalia Castillo. She died May 4, 1957, aet. 87, and was also buried at Barranquitas. Their son, Luis Muñoz Marín, was born February 18, 1898, at San Juan, P. R. There are four grandchildren: Muna Muñoz Lee, Luis Muñoz Lee, Vivian Muñoz Mendoza, and Victoria Muñoz Mendoza.

Now let us consider in more detail Muñoz Rivera, the politician and the statesman.
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION


3 Stichting, p. 201; Emilio del Toro, Patria (San Juan: Biblioteca de Autores Puertorriqueños, 1958), II, 101-109.

4 Antonio Salvador Pedreira, Un hombre del pueblo, José Celso Barbosa (San Juan: Imprenta Venezuela, 1937), p. 135; José Celso Barbosa, Orientando al pueblo (San Juan: Imprenta Venezuela, 1939), p. 7.


13 Vivas Maldonado, p. 265.

14 Florida, University, p. 170.

15 Puerto Ricans had seen with profit the object lesson of the Philippines where preferred economic treatment after commonwealth status was to be continued for only eight years (American Academy of Political and Social Science, *Puerto Rico, A Study in Democratic Development*/Philadelphia, 1953/, p. 4-5).


19 La Democracia began publication July 1, 1890, at Ponce as a triweekly (Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday), and became a daily from May 1, 1893. On October 23, 1900, the presses were moved to Caguas and from there to San Juan on June 1, 1904. *La Democracia* continued to be published well into mid-twentieth century, supporting first the Autonomists and later the Unión Party. Luis Muñoz Marín, like his father, Muñoz Rivera, was at one time an editor (Antonio Salvador Pedreira, *El periodismo en Puerto Rico*/Habana: Imprenta Úcar, García y Cía., 1941/, pp. 373-74; Cesáreo Rosa-Nieves, *Historia panorámica de la literatura puertorriqueña, 1589-1959*/San Juan: Editorial Campos, 1963/, I, 562). Muñoz Rivera also founded but did not direct *El Liberal*, organ of the Puerto Rican Liberal Party, a daily which began publication in San Juan January 10, 1898, and lasted about a year (Pedreira, *El periodismo en Puerto Rico*, p. 411).

This organ of the Federalist Party began publication in San Juan on January 5, 1900, and the presses were destroyed by an anti-Federalist mob aided by the inaction of the governor, on September 18, 1900 (Pedreira, El periodismo en Puerto Rico, pp. 377-78).

This weekly paper in English and Spanish began publication on July 13, 1901, and the University of Puerto Rico library has issues through June, 1904 (Antonio Salvador Pedreira, Bibliografía puertorriqueña, 1492-1930 /Madrid: Imprenta de la Librería y Casa Editorial Hernando, 1932/, p. 5).

Torregrosa Liceaga, p. 40.

El Mundo, 6 de mayo de 1957.

Current Biography, XIV (1953), 444-46.
CHAPTER I

THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY PUERTO RICO

Back of nineteenth century Puerto Rico lay three centuries of Spanish colonial dominion and unnumbered years' habitation by Indian tribes oblivious of Western European civilization.

In contrast to the aborigines of some other areas of Latin America such as Peru,¹ the Indians of Puerto Rico had not reached a high level of civilization prior to the Spanish Conquest, and the early decimation of the Puerto Rican Indians by war and disease tended to restrict their contribution to physical, rather than cultural, anthropology.²

Pre-Columbian Puerto Rico was occupied by a fairly large population of Arawak Indians, whose sedentary villages and small, loosely structured local states were based on the production of a considerable number of domesticated crops. When the Spaniards discovered the island in 1493, they did not at first leave any permanent settlements but merely released some livestock in order to provide food for future residents. When the conquest and settlement came in 1509, the Indians were quickly pacified.³

By the time the island was settled by the conquerors, its position made it the base for Indian strategy in their wars against Spanish colonists in Santo Domingo. Nevertheless, the Indians were defeated, and the Spanish Crown encouraged the
immigration of families. Most of the early white settlers were males, however, and the predominant racial cross in this period was between white men and Indian women. The prevalent belief that the Indian element in the population became extinct is based upon a confusion of cultural assimilation with biological extinction. Although the population in 1964 is extremely mixed racially, there is considerable evidence of Indian physical features.

Puerto Rico's geographic position in the Antilles has always made it a coveted island in the ever strategic Caribbean area, "the American Mediterranean," from the free-booting days of the Spanish Main to the era of Yankee hegemony. This fact was recognized by the Spanish queen who wryly remarked that the walls of El Morro Castle must be made of gold, since they cost the Crown so much treasure. That Lord Cumberland, Drake, and the Dutch admiral, Boudewijn Hendrikszoon, all had more or less the same idea is evidenced by the fact that they tried, unsuccessfully, to seize the island. El Morro and its sister fortress, San Cristobal, both located in San Juan, defeated all efforts made by enemy nations until 1898 to capture this lesser Pearl of the Antilles.

Geography placed Puerto Rico on the well-known "hot-spot" both under Spain and under the United States. Occupying as it does the central point in the arc of the chain of islands that begins with Cuba and extends down to the coast of South America, Puerto Rico has always been the exposed point of the Antilles, most ideally located as the entrance to the Caribbean Sea. It
is the easternmost of the Greater Antilles and is the pivot island where the chain of islands breaks sharply southward toward South America. This fact was appreciated by the Spaniards and later by the United States. 6

Puerto Rico under United States rule occupied no great position of importance until World War II. There were those who felt that Puerto Rico should serve as a Spanish-American cultural center and become the "Bridge of the Americas." When the United States decided upon an "all-out" defense effort in 1940, the military saw in Puerto Rico an admirable base. The advent of the airplane greatly increased the effective range of defense. Puerto Rico is the only Caribbean island whose facilities could be fully exploited by the United States, making it the key to United States defense in the Caribbean and of the Panama Canal. 7

Prior to the nineteenth century, Puerto Rico made no special contribution to the science of government nor to political theory. 8 During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Puerto Rico was largely an isolated military strong point along the lines of empire from Spain to the New World, governed in much the same way as other parts of the empire, but because of its small size, lack of population and resources, it did not attract or develop an intellectual class. It was not until private property in land was legally established in 1778 that there developed a class of wealthy farmers who could influence governmental policies. 9

This commercial class began to emerge throughout the empire under circumstances of revolutionary disturbance that led to the
independence of many Latin American Republics within a few decades. This rapid development was a reflection of Spain's waning power and her need to inaugurate new policies in the face of threats to her empire. Puerto Rico's insular position kept her isolated enough from the independence movement so that she did not gain her independence when the Spanish mainland colonies did.

During the nineteenth century, the population of Puerto Rico expanded rapidly, not only because of internal growth but because of the importation of slaves and because of increased immigration. There was a sharp increase in commercial activity between the island and the rest of the world. During the nineteenth century there were various trends in land use: an increase in land under cultivation, a decline of subsistence production, and an increase in cash crop production (sugar, coffee, tobacco, and cotton). The total land under cultivation, however, still remained under its maximum limits. Credit facilities were inadequate; the main sources of credit during this century were private capitalists. Statistics of 1899 show that .025 per cent of the farm-owning population owned more than 35 per cent of the cultivated land, while over 56 per cent of the farmers controlled only 10½ per cent of the cultivated area. The majority of the population was engaged in agriculture of some kind throughout this period.

The period from 1815 to the closing decade of the century was marked not only by the intensified commercial and economic activity but by accompanying political and social ferment. Only
that small minority of the population who were capable of raising
the required poll tax enjoyed the franchise. The growing pressures
for abolition and equal rights for the Negro, the movement
against forced labor, the quests for political freedom, the
increasing demand for expanded educational facilities, all these
were evidence of a spirit of unrest. Most important, a substantial
class of merchants, professionals, and wealthy local planters had
developed as the result of expanded economic activity. This class
was instrumental not only in pressing for reforms of the kind
noted above, but also assumed an important role in the struggle
for greater political freedom—whether independence, Antillean
confederation, assimilation to Spain, or autonomy within the
Spanish Empire. The pattern of sporadic revolt, rebellion, and
protest followed by new and sterner government measures aimed
at stifling resistance persisted until the end of the century.12
During the greater part of Spanish rule on the island, the polit-
ical activities of Puerto Ricans found expression in organized
pressure groups rather than in avowed political parties. As we
shall see, formalized political parties first appeared in 1868,
towards the end of the Spanish period. We now examine specif-
ically and in more detail Puerto Rico's political climate in the
nineteenth century.

Puerto Rico, at the eastern extreme of the Caribbean Sea,
was characterized by some historians as Spain's "... ever loyal
and faithful isle."13 The lack of natural resources, a deep sea
shelf, incompatible with profitable fishing, and a large area of
poor mountainous terrain imposed upon Puerto Rico a geopolitical
handicap which made dependence the accepted way of life. Her isolation from the continent of North and South America, and her population and geographical size, small in comparison to neighboring Cuba, made military control relatively simple. "In fact, the very features of the island lend themselves to the preservation of peace," wrote an American historian, commenting on the Cuban insurrection, "... for, while the island of Cuba affords secure hiding-places for innumerable insurgents ... in Puerto Rico, on the contrary, there are few points of vantage for the revolutionist." A few select Spanish garrisons, stationed at strategic posts, successfully enforced censorship and maintained peace and order.

For the greater part of the 19th century, Puerto Rico was the last refuge of those who fled the diverse independence struggles which swept the Spanish mainland. Each cataclysmic effort for Latin American independence washed upon the island a fresh wave of political refugees, loyal to Spain. Many of these refugees were absorbed into the culture, and lost their partisan identification in the process. Often, however, the wealthier emigrés resisted assimilation, and were able to retain their cultural ties to the Spanish Crown. They buttressed the conservative upper classes of the larger cities, establishing themselves in the fields of commerce and trade.

These newly arrived merchants reinforced traditional arguments for the blind loyalty and devotion which characterized their dependence on Spain. Their influential role explains, in part, the apprehension with which many Puerto Ricans viewed
independence. Later, when the role of the United States became more pronounced, these emigrants represented the strongest block in the resistance to Americanization, lavishly praising as superior all cultural values emanating from the Iberian Peninsula. A closely knit group, with a certain degree of social and financial aloofness, they have been described as fixed in their:

... loyalty to the past, inelastic to changing concepts of society and industrialism, thinking of Puerto Rico as their own feudal domain, and unhappy over the intrusions of liberty and restless labor where once they ruled as patriarchs. In large measure they have been rich in possessions--sugar plantations, banks, business houses. Culturally, politically, and financially they have remained Spanish through many generations, intermarrying and flourishing.16

Nevertheless, independence feeling arose and the first organized movement for independence was directed by an expatriated Puerto Rican, Ramón Betances in the 1860's.17 As a student of medicine in the France of the Second Republic, he had developed a profound admiration for democratic principles. Upon his return to Puerto Rico, he pursued his medical career on a part-time basis, devoting most of his time and energy to political concerns. Betances was continually involved in disputes with the Spanish officials; he vigorously fought for the emancipation of slaves, and he was an outspoken critic of the government's policy of political suppression.18 His activities forced him to seek refuge in Santo Domingo, where he continued his harassment of the Spanish administration in Puerto Rico.19 Aided by other separatists such as Segundo Ruiz Belvis, Juan Manuel Macías
and Comingo Coicera from their offices in New York and Chile, he bombarded the island with propaganda.\textsuperscript{20}

As a result of these efforts, small clandestine groups, advocating immediate autonomy, were organized throughout much of the island. Most liberals, however, refused to offer their support, fearing that conspiracy would lead to violence. "They might wish for a measure of independence from their unnatural parent, but they appeared to prefer peaceful means of obtaining it."\textsuperscript{21} The movement was kept alive by sympathetic Latin Americans, who supplied Betances with money for arms and equipment. However, only a small part of the material which he attempted to smuggle into Puerto Rico reached his scattered followers.

In spite of limited resources, plans were completed in 1868 for a general uprising. The leaders of the plot tried desperately to maintain secrecy, but because of the decentralized nature of the organization, little could be concealed from the ubiquitous Spanish authorities. When it was learned that their intentions had become known to the government, several leaders decided to advance the date of the rebellion, while others quickly withdrew their support.\textsuperscript{22} It was all in vain. Only in Lares, where a band of insurgents proclaimed "The Republic Boriquen," was there even momentary success. Attempts to spread the movement to neighboring villages met with failure. Spanish soldiers converged on the poorly armed rebels. Within a few hours most of the resistance collapsed. Many of the rebels managed to return home, their absences unnoticed by the authorities. Others,
less fortunate, fled to the hills, where they were attacked, pursued and eventually captured.\textsuperscript{23}

The three-day uprising, which was not a reflection of popular sentiment, was doomed to failure. It was devoid of unifying direction, aims or support, and the disaster which occurred ". . . was the inevitable confusion which resulted from the absence in the theatre of operations of those who would direct it by 'remote control' from exile."\textsuperscript{24} After 1868, however, when this abortive uprising for independence--which became known as the \underline{Grito de Lares}--was crushed, the concept of independence and autonomy gained popularity.\textsuperscript{25}

The years that followed the \underline{Grito de Lares} brought both growing dissatisfaction with Spanish exploitation and increased expressions of sympathy with the ideology of independence. A small group of liberals initiated a relentless campaign against indifference to Spanish political suppression. They waged battle both at home and abroad, in an attempt to rouse their countrymen from the lethargy which prevailed among them. Confusion in Spain was to aid them.\textsuperscript{26}

The Spanish revolution of 1868 initiated a new era of political instability in Spain. During this time the liberal parties wrested control from Queen Isabella. From 1868 to 1898 the Peninsula was ruled by a provisional government, an ineffectual Italian King, liberals in the First Republic, and finally, the compromising Bourbons, during the Restoration. The initial effect of Spain's instability was beneficial to Puerto Rico in terms of political stimulation. During this period, a new constitution
was promulgated, by which the island was given the right to hold elections for some local posts and was again represented in Spain's national councils.

For the first time in Puerto Rican history, political parties emerged as real entities. Two "catch-all" factions were created: the conservatives and the liberals. In spite of the fact that during elections "the ballots were so manipulated that none but conservatives could be chosen," the liberals managed to survive Spain's prejudicial policies and gradually increased their following.

The conservative group, representing upper-class interests, and consisting of the island's Spanish colony, government employees, and some Puerto Ricans, was motivated by the desire to maintain the status quo. This group expressed satisfaction with the existing regime and supported the prevailing ties with the Mother Country. A vociferous minority within their ranks, aspiring to protect their investments with additional security, sought ultimate assimilation with Spain.

The majority of Liberals, on the other hand, who drew their greatest strength from the small middle-class, were alienated from the conservative movement by their orientation in the natural rights theories of Locke and the philosophies of Diderot, Montesquieu, and Voltaire. While vowing loyalty to Spain, they held steadfastly to the principle of man's legal and moral right to govern himself. They believed that their objectives could be realized in a decentralized government, with responsibility remaining in the hands of the local community.
time another very small group of Liberals advocated complete assimilation with Spain. In 1883, the latter faction organized the Liberal Reform Party in an attempt to reconcile the differences between Liberal thought in Puerto Rico and the concepts advocated on the Peninsula. This minority was encouraged by the belief that with full recognition in the Cortes, Puerto Rico could enjoy the liberties customarily enjoyed by Spanish citizens, but invariably denied to members of her overseas empire.

Under the articulate leadership of Rosendo Marienzo Cintrón, Santiago Veve Calzada, Ramón Baldorioty de Castro, José Celso Barbosa, and a young newcomer, Luis Muñoz Rivera, who became politically active in 1883, the liberal movement began to coalesce. By 1887 most liberals subscribed to the newly formed Autonomist Party. Internal dissension was consequently centered around one principal issue—the means of securing autonomy for Puerto Rico. The liberal philosophy now rejected assimilation as incompatible with the extension of insular liberties. Even when the island enjoyed limited representation in the Spanish Parliament, the electoral system then in effect tended to favor the conservative element. In addition, the liberal factions discovered, to their dismay, that proposals which originated in the conclaves of their party were not given serious consideration.

A series of fortuitous circumstances in Europe, which eventually aided the liberal cause, strengthened the growing radicalism of liberal ideology. Spain's blundering in Cuba,
political repression in Puerto Rico, and the encouragement offered by the United States stimulated a mild awakening of popular interest in the island. Counteracting the increased demand for autonomy or separation, the Conservatives, abetted by local Spanish administrators, responded with accusations of treason. They warned that independence would leave the Antilles to the mercy of United States imperialists. In 1887 the conservatives in Puerto Rico, supported by the Governor General Romualdo Palacio González, resorted to force and initiated a series of reprisals against all liberal expression. Intimidation, imprisonment and torture were employed in a desperate effort to destroy all thoughts of "subversiveness." Known as the componte, this reign of terror ended only when authorities in Spain learned of it and replaced Romualdo Palacios with a less violent governor general.

By the 1890's Spain's situation was critical. Suffering from external disorders and confused domestic affairs, she was fast approaching a chaotic state. Revolutions had again flared up in Cuba, while the United States, displaying deep sympathy for the rebels, applied pressure for a quick settlement. Internally, Spain's economic confusion, coupled with the emergence of strong sectionalist sentiment, undermined efforts of the traditional parties to save face by establishing a unified program. Galicians, Catalonians, Basques, Conservatives, Liberals, Republicans, Socialists, and Carlistas struggled for power. The upheaval spurred literary efforts toward a cultural revival, but no historical self-examination was
possible under the unrelenting turmoil of political agitation. During this period, ministerial power alternated between the two traditional, but greatly weakened parties--the Liberals led by Praxedes Mateo Sagasta, and the Conservatives under Canovas del Castillo.

In 1891, in the light of developments in Spain, Luis Muñoz Rivera, by then a leader in the Puerto Rican Autonomist Party, revived the idea that his party would benefit by joining with Sagasta's party in a political pact. In his paper, *La Democracia*, he proposed an alliance between the Autonomist Party and the Fusion-Liberal Party in Spain. Muñoz expressed the hope that, in the event of a Sagasta victory, this arrangement would prove to be the shortest route to the defeat of the local conservatives and, at the same time, help achieve the coveted autonomy status.37

A dissenting group within the Autonomist Party, under the leadership of José Celso Barbosa, refused to participate in any arrangement entailing affiliation with the Spanish monarchy. Barbosa's faction, known as the Anti-pactistas or Anti-fusionistas, included ardent admirers of United States democracy. Confident that autonomy could be achieved without the undesirable pact between monarchy and the autonomist republican aspiration, Barbosa condemned the pact as "... a betrayal to our principles,"38 and rallied resistance against it. Their newspaper, *El País*, explicated this opposition:

In the autonomist organization as it is presently constituted, there are members from all liberal parties of the Peninsula, since it is not necessary
to belong to a political school in order to be a partisan to the autonomist solution. For that reason, there are not only republicans, but also monarchists, who are affiliated with the Puerto Rican Autonomist Party.

What would happen if tomorrow, in one of our meetings, the majority of the delegates agreed to declare that our membership would enroll in a republican party? It seems obvious that in this case, the autonomists with monarchical ideas, although continuing to be autonomists, would cease ipso facto belonging to a group which demands, explicitly or implicitly, that they renounce an important part of their political ideas. 39

Despite the efforts of the Anti-pactistas, the Autonomists "... recognized their power during Spain's crisis with rebellious Cuba, and under the pleas of sincere loyalty to the home government, but with covert intiminations of a possible uprising of the people against existing law," 40 organized a committee which was sent to Spain for the purpose of conferring with representatives of Práxedes Manuel Sagasta's Liberal Party. Sagasta was exceedingly hospitable to the visiting delegation. He was eager to show Spain and the rest of the world the noble intentions of his party, and at the same time he was willing "... to sacrifice everything to conserve the integrity of Spanish soil in the Antilles." 41 The necessary arrangements were made. The agreement granting autonomy was honored when Spain's Liberal Party, after gaining power, drafted a constitution extending almost complete autonomy to Puerto Rico. 42

By the terms of the Constitution of 1897, the insular parliament was empowered to exercise full legislative authority, except for a few national laws which remained operative on the
island. Among those powers delegated to local authorities were complete control over banking, tariffs, monetary matters and taxation. A preferential trade system, similar to that regulating commerce between Canada and Great Britain, was agreed upon by Puerto Rico and Spain. Under Title VII, the governor general was to represent the Crown and the national government in Puerto Rico. He was restricted, however, by the requirement of securing the approval of a responsible minister of his cabinet before any of his executive orders could become effective. The groundwork was also laid for an elected house and an upper chamber with a majority of elected members. "In fact, Puerto Rico became an autonomous state, federatively associated with its former metropolis." After more than 400 years of Spanish domination, Puerto Rico was finally preparing to experiment with home rule, having "... drifted along through the years, enduring without protest every form of imposition." The political liberty which was suddenly conceded by Spain had not been won by Puerto Rican efforts alone. United States concern in the Caribbean, instability in Spain, manifested by an inconsistent foreign policy, and revolutions in Cuba had the cumulative effect of hastening administrative changes. The concessions granted to Cuba, in an effort to placate its rebellious spirit, were extended to Puerto Rico. The Sagasta pact with the island's liberals was generally regarded in Spain as an expedient maneuver to mollify any potential movement toward rebellion. Puerto Rico benefitted from this precaution.
Puerto Ricans did not realistically comprehend the problems which would be inherent in political autonomy. Few were concerned with the lack of preparation for self-government. The history of Puerto Rico before the middle of the 19th century was marked by exceedingly limited local responsibility. Its size and its isolation had facilitated Spanish dominance and made it unnecessary to grant the island more than a minimum of political concessions. Moreover, a strict censorship kept most of the inhabitants ignorant of the democratic traditions and philosophies which were developing around them. Only a few had traveled abroad and witnessed the full potentialities of democracy. Their reports found a receptive audience among a few educated and idealistic countrymen, but most of the islanders continued to remain indifferent to democratic aspirations:

The great unlettered mass cared nothing about the new movement [autonomy], beyond the fact that the illiterate always feel an ill will toward the governing class, and that they hated Spaniards and wealthy men as representing the task master.47

The small liberal movement which survived in spite of periodic persecutions during the nineteenth century did not aspire to overthrow the Spanish regime. Instead, it worked for an increase in home-rule while affirming its loyalty to Spain.49

In the last decade of the nineteenth century, this plea for autonomy temporarily succeeded in unifying liberal forces. Within the ranks, however, there soon emerged two dominant
factions: one advocated bonds with sympathetic parties in Spain; the other consisted of admirers of United States democratic institutions who refused to participate in the formulation of agreements with elements supporting the Spanish monarchy. In spite of the efforts of Sagasta, who demanded unification for the sake of governmental harmony, the Barbosa and Muñoz bands could not be reconciled.\(^5\) Each group developed an international philosophy opposed to the other. The two groups, however, were to form the nucleus of the island's political structure for the next forty years. As a result, all issues, even those of a domestic nature, came to be examined in the light of insular status.

Beyond attention to the demands of Cuba and Puerto Rico for autonomy—the "special laws" which had been so often promised them in vain—Muñoz Rivera's political thought places him squarely in the middle of the arguments over federalism which was characteristic of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As we shall see, Muñoz took a lively interest in "nation-building" with particular attention to Spain, Canada, Australia, Ireland, South Africa, the Philippines, New Mexico, and Arizona, constantly studying their goals and methods in order to obtain ideas which might be used to advantage to Puerto Rico, and to identify himself with the causes of human freedom.\(^5\)

In his youth he witnessed and pondered over the Spanish Republic of 1868-1874 and the British North America Act of 1867.
Both the Canadians and the Spanish Republicans wanted, though not entirely for the same reasons, two levels of government ruling the same land and people, each level with at least one area of action in which it was to be autonomous, and with some guarantee of the autonomy of each government in its own sphere.  

Wheare has pointed out that Canada was led to desire union from a variety of reasons: defense, independence, economic advantage, prior political association; geographical neighborhood, and similarity of political institutions. Other factors less decisive were community of language, of race, of culture, of religion, and of nationality. 

As Livingston has pointed out, the Canadian federation was a piecemeal growth:

In 1867 it began with four provinces, and not until 1949, when Newfoundland was included, did it reach its present extent of ten provinces, with more than ten times its original area.

The four colonies were little more than scanty pockets of settlement, subsisting on farms, fisheries, forest industries, and localized manufactures. Federal union was desired as a means of achieving an extensive area of free trade, wherein interprovincial commerce would stimulate economic development beneficial to all the struggling colonies. 

The political purpose of federation, scarcely separable from the economic, issued from the desire to achieve greater protection against the imperial pressures of the United States, and from the anxiety in both Canadas to transform the defective
union of 1841 into something stronger and more harmonious. Moreover, true federation, with an extensive measure of provincial autonomy, seemed to be a logical way to escape from a union wherein the full fruition of responsible government was impaired by cultural fissures. It promised to harmonize the diverse cultural groups in a larger political unit. For the French it was a means of preserving their identity; for other colonists it was an escape from colonial inferiority to self-government on a generous national plane, with an ever-widening horizon of expansion.

The Canadian Fathers sought to create a genuine federation, a state wherein legislative powers would be so logically divided that the Dominion government would be competent to deal with all matters of national concern and the provincial governments with all those of local concern. Yet they were federalists with a definite Hamiltonian bias, determined to possess a strong central government, e.g., endowing the federal Parliament with a residual authority in matters beyond those assigned to the provinces. Young Luiz Muñoz Rivera with his great interest in politics was well aware of what was going on in Canada, even though he realized that the system of self-government for Puerto Rico could not ape that of Canada, because of obvious differences of geographical size to begin with.

The other contemporary experiment in government, the Spanish Republic, though it did not last, made a great impression on Muñoz Rivera. Although Federal republicanism did not
"take" in nineteenth century Spain, it stimulated much discussion.

The main lines of Spanish republican history are comparatively clear. As with so many other Spanish political parties, the history of federal republicanism is the history of its dominant personality, Francisco Pi y Margall. The movement's active history lasted from the 1868 revolution to the Bourbon restoration of 1874—the six-year revolutionary period of political experiment—with origins in the 1850's and repercussions in the later years of the century.

Federal republicanism is interesting not only in terms of its originality in Spanish politics but also in relations to a wider European framework. Republicans believed themselves part of an international movement, protagonists in an ideological struggle. In 1868 the Spanish revolution, which overthrew Isabel II, released the energies of a new vocal, militant party whose leaders regarded themselves as in the vanguard of this reviving European republicanism. Although Spanish republicanism must be interpreted in terms of national conditions and traditions, much of its significance lay in the eagerness with which its leaders tried to break down their country's intellectual isolation from the rest of Europe and to justify their own political beliefs by relating them to the general European scene. The originality of Spain of these beliefs lay in the conception of politics as a national regeneration movement within the context of a reviving international republicanism.
The singularity of the Spaniards was their equation of republicanism with federalism. They were able to appeal both to historical traditions of regional autonomy and to the political resentment of provinces chafing under misrule from Madrid. The main theoretical justicication for federal republicanism came from Proudhon and it was in Spain that his political views found their first practical expression outside France. The whole structure of federal republicanism was built on the two flimsy assumptions that the "people" would be the new regenerating force and that European republicanism was still active in the 1870's.

What was the significance of the nineteenth-century federal movement and what position must be assigned to Pi y Margall in modern Spanish history? He was responsible for making nineteenth-century Spanish republicanism synonymous with federalism; by his theorizing he gave coherence to the popular desire for greater independence from centralized government, giving doctrinal form to a tendency which had been a marked feature of Spanish life since the collapse of the centralized state during the War of Independence.

One of the Federal movement's main features and one of its weaknesses was that it appealed to two conflicting impulses--on the one side that of isolated communities which resented the disturbance of a traditional way of life by agents of a centralized power, and on the other that of industrial and commercial interests which resented the domination of land owners in government and the sacrifice of economic interests
in order to pay the patronage bills for a handful of political adventurers at Madrid.

The Federal movement began and ended as an urban movement, centering on the struggle for the control of local government and the patronage dependent on it. Federal republicanism, therefore, did not break with the past but developed within the orbit of traditional Spanish politics. But because it lacked any firm basis in a social class, the reformers were unable to break the monotonous pattern and were condemned to the sterility of factional conflict and personal rivalries.

In spite of its failures, federalism was the first political movement in Spain to try to generalize politics, to educate public opinion, and to mobilize it to overthrow a political system which had encouraged the abuse of power. In addition to the formulation of a republican tradition the federal movement was important for its influence on two other movements which played a central part in subsequent Spanish politics--Catalan political regionalism and anarchism. With this background on two types of federalism, Canadian and Spanish republican, we now move on to consider Puerto Rico's particular concept of self-government, most frequently called autonomy.
NOTES TO CHAPTER I


9Steward, p. 48.


13Ober, p. 222.

14Ibid.

15For an authoritative study of the nineteenth century immigration to Puerto Rico, see Estela Cifre de Loubriel, "Los inmigrantes del siglo XIX: su contribución a la formación del pueblo puertorriqueño," *Revista del Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña*, núm. 7 (abril-junio, 1960), 32-36.

For a detailed account of Ramón Betances' political activities, see Lidio Cruz Monclova, Historia de Puerto Rico: Siglo XIX Río Piedras: Editorial Universitaria, 1958), I, 105-14.

Revista del Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, núm. 3 (abril-junio, 1959), 43.


Antonio Ballesteros y Beretta, Historia de España y su influencia en la historia universal (Barcelona: P. Salvat, 1936), VIII, 116-17.


Antonio Rivera, Acercándonos al grito de Lares (San Juan: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1958), p. 36. Rivera has utilized all available sources in making his investigation of the grito de Lares a definitive work. Contrary to most accounts of the incident, Rivera goes to great pains to show that it was not a national movement with insular-wide support.

For details of the judicial process against those "insurgents" caught by the Spanish authorities, see Boletín de Historia Puertorriqueña, II (1950), 41-206.

Rivera, p. 36.

The incident, nevertheless, has assumed greater importance with time. It was the first important display of Puerto Rican initiative against Spanish tyranny. See Corretjer, p. 8.


Jose A. Gontán, Historia político-social de Puerto Rico (San Juan: Editorial Esther, 1945), p. 199.

Florida, University, Papers Delivered at the Sixth Conference on the Caribbean (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1956), p. 27.

According to the thesis of the Puerto Rican historian, Gómez Acevedo, the greater number of liberals remained loyal to Spain throughout most of the nineteenth century. It was the Spanish insular officials, however, who confused efforts to reform the regime with disloyalty to Spain. Their refusal to accept criticism in good faith led to the growth of separationist sentiment (Gómez Acevedo, passim).

Gontán, p. 191.

Ernesto Juan Fonfrías, "Luis Munoz Rivera, Político," Revista del Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, núm. 4 (julio-septiembre, 1959), 44.

The Autonomist Party of Cuba had been organized in 1886 and exercised much influence among liberal sentiment in Puerto Rico (Gontán, p. 213).

Miguel Meléndez Muñoz, "El jíbaro y el componte," Revista del Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, núm. 12 (julio-septiembre, 1961), 42.

For eye-witness accounts of the componte read the revised edition of Francisco Mariano Quiñones, Apuntes para la historia de Puerto Rico (México: Editorial Cultura, 1957).

La Democracia, ano II, números 328 and 329, cited by Lidio Cruz Monclova, Luis Muñoz Rivera; diez años de su vida política (San Juan: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1959), p. 213.


Modesto Lafuente y Zamolloa, Historia general de España (Barcelona: Montaner y Simón, 1890), XX, 385.

The pact was approved by a vote of 79 to 17 in the Autonomist Party's general assembly. It was at this meeting that Barbosa and a few followers officially broke with the party (Rafael Torres Mazzorana, Luis Muñoz Rivera y el pacto con Sagasta (San Juan: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1960/, p. 5). Puerto Rico was not the only country to be granted greater local governing responsibilities. Under pressure from the United States to resolve the critical Cuban situation, Sagasta had made genuine efforts by granting Havana "all rights enjoyed by subjects in the kingdom at home, and the electoral laws of Spain itself" (Samuel
It is difficult to explain Puerto Rican apathy while neighboring Cubans were fanning their resentment with cries of independence. In addition to geographic factors, other reasons have been suggested to explain the growth of Cuban nationalism. One Puerto Rican statesman-historian has pointed out the early foundation of centers of resistance, superior organizational abilities, and the role of the Cuban woman: "Cuba had early in the century seen the formation of revolutionary clubs in its principal cities, which tended to unify separatist thought throughout the country. While the Puerto Rican woman remained indifferent to questions of politics . . . the Cuban woman played a principal role in encouraging revolutionary sentiment. Since the nineteenth century, Cuban women had played an active part in instilling men with the nobleness of fighting for independence" (Roberto H. Todd, Estampas coloniales /San Juan: Imprenta Venezuela, 1946/, I, 46).

Angel Manuel Saavedra, Historia de Puerto Rico (San Juan: Imprenta Soltero, 1944), p. 46.

Muñoz Rivera's letters, speeches, and articles attest to this.


CHAPTER II

THE AUTONOMIST MOVEMENT AND THE PACT WITH SAGASTA

The historical facts concerning the pact with Sagasta\(^1\) are clear. This pact was the signed agreement between Práxedes Mateo Sagasta,\(^2\) leader of the Spanish Liberal Party,\(^3\) in the name of said political group, and the Puerto Rican Autonomy Commission,\(^4\) that visited Madrid during the last five months of 1896 and January of 1897.

The Commission, composed of José Gómez Brioso,\(^5\) Luis Muñoz Rivera,\(^6\) Rosendo Matienzo Cintrón,\(^7\) and Federico Degetau,\(^8\) was directed to move to Spain, where, in company with Rafael María de Labra,\(^9\) leader of the Puerto Rican Autonomist Party,\(^10\) it was to undertake important negotiations toward securing political reforms for Puerto Rico.

The decision to send this Commission to Madrid was made by the central committee (delegación)\(^11\) of the Autonomist Party assembled in Caguas, July 27, 1896, under the chairmanship of José Gómez Brioso.\(^12\) The meeting was called to consider the advisability of fulfilling a pledge made in the Autonomist Assembly held in Mayagüez, May 15-18, 1891,\(^13\) in which Article 7 of Title I of the party Constitution of 1887,\(^14\) had been amended to read as follows:
The Delegación, in agreement with the leader of the Party, and by means of commissioners whom it appoints and of whom the leader shall be chairman, is authorized to arrange and put into effect understandings or alliances of the Puerto Rican Autonomist Party with the Peninsular democrats who accept or defend the autonomist administrative system of the Antilles.\textsuperscript{15}

The newspaper, \textit{El País},\textsuperscript{16} political organ of the autonomist group opposed to the ideas of Luis Muñoz Rivera, summarized the agreement of Caguas as follows:

That the Commission visit the present head of government to officially inform him of what the party is going to do.
That it begin its work of exploratory information with the heads of the Peninsular democratic parties, from Sagasta to Pi.\textsuperscript{17}
That it be authorized to arrange the alliance with the party that promises to defend now and to carry out when in power, if it not be at present the government, the complete program as it is found in the Constitution.
That the solemn promise of the Peninsular party to accept our doctrine be considered valid only upon the declaration of the head of the party in the presence of the Cortes, and if this not be in session, in a signed and published document.\textsuperscript{18}
That for the understanding with the Puerto Rican autonomists the party be preferred which may have the surest possibilities of carrying out as soon as possible the doctrine as the party in power.\textsuperscript{19}

The pact, as it was approved in its final form by the leader of the Spanish Liberal Party, Práxedes Mateo Sagasta, read as follows:

The Commission of the Autonomist Party of Puerto Rico, in the name of its Delegación, by virtue of the powers invested in it, declares that it will lend its support to the Liberal Party led by Práxedes Mateo Sagasta, both in its general platform as well as in its Antillean platform, inasmuch as this party, in carrying out the bases of reforms with the most expansive spirit and the most liberal judgment, will give the Antilles, as it would have done had it remained in power, the greatest decentralization possible consistent with national unity, so that the initiative and management of their local, municipal, and provincial interests belongs to them completely, as the
Puerto Rican Liberals are asking, and that, bringing to an end all difference between Spaniards, the inhabitants of Puerto Rico may enjoy the same rights as peninsulars, as the surest means of living up to the democratic principles proclaimed by all. And since for the required unity in procedure the incorporation into the Liberal ranks of the Puerto Rican Autonomists is necessary, the Commission will submit to the general Assembly of the Party the mentioned incorporation so as to constitute in the Island one Liberal Party only, bound to the discipline of that of the Peninsula, as its prolongation in that overseas province. --Madrid, January 12, 1897.20

The Autonomy Commission returned to Puerto Rico in February of 1897. Immediately it met with the Delegación of the Party and reported to it, through the political director, José Gómez Brioso, the steps taken in Madrid. On that occasion, Manuel F. Rossy, José Celso Barbosa, Luis Sánchez Morales, and Santiago Veve Calzada, after hearing the report by Gómez Brioso, expressed their reservations with regard to the procedure of the Commission and warned that they would not renounce their republican ideas.25

During the next two nights, February 12-13, 1897, the Assembly of the Party to hear the Commission was held in the San Juan Municipal Theater. Manuel F. Rossy and José Celso Barbosa presided over the session. Gómez Brioso closed the tense and prolonged debate advising the Assembly to ratify the pact as the indispensable solution to the political problem.27 The Assembly approved the pact with Sagasta by a vote of 79 to 17. It was at that moment that Barbosa rose and left the Assembly with a small group of friends, saying that he was carrying away the flag of autonomy.
Muñoz Rivera answered him with a brief speech, in which he emphasized the following points: 1) that the Assembly and the supporters of the pact (pactistas) were, by democratic virtue of an immense majority, the Autonomist Party; 2) that the pact represented the creed of Ponce transformed from a dream to a reality; 3) that the Party had sent the Commission to Madrid, and that now it was ratifying its completely correct procedure; 4) that they bade farewell to Barbosa, Rossy, and Veve as brothers and that they awaited them with open arms whenever the latter became convinced that the pact was the salvation of the country.

In our hands—Muñoz Rivera said on that occasion—will wave in victory the banner that we swore to defend ten years ago in Ponce. I pledge you that we will defend it until we nail it to the peak, or until we fall wrapped in its folds. We bid you farewell with sorrow, but this is mitigated by the assurance that when you are convinced that we are going to victory, that we are pursuing the welfare of the country, you will come to us, so that you may be mingled in close embrace with those who never forget the days of happiness or of sorrow passed at your side. We await you, certain that you will return and that you will return soon. 28

That memorable Assembly of February 12-13, 1897, by transforming the Autonomist Party into a branch of the Spanish Liberal Party radically changed the course of the political destinies of the Puerto Rican people. Those who walked out of the Assembly, with Barbosa at the head, never returned to rejoin their old comrades in arms. Mistakenly they turned their backs on the political realities of the period with which it was necessary to deal in the battle for the liberties and rights of Puerto Ricans. They thus placed themselves on the periphery
of the approaching historical events. A few months later, in August of 1897, when Antonio Cánovas del Castillo was basely assassinated by the anarchist Angiolillo in Santa Agueda, the crisis of the Conservative government which Cánovas headed was aggravated, a crisis carried to the extreme by the events in Cuba, as indeed Práxedes Mateo Sagasta had made clear in the manifesto read by him in the Liberal Circle of Madrid in June of the same year.

Two months after the death of Cánovas, on October 3, 1897, Queen-Regent María Cristina called a conference with Sagasta, who the following day formed a cabinet and brought to power the Liberal Party which, by virtue of the pact, was one and the same as the Party in Puerto Rico.

Sagasta did not delay in fulfilling the promise made to the extinct Autonomist Party. Within six weeks after gaining control of the government, November 25, 1897, he signed with Queen-Regent María Cristina, the decree promulgating autonomy for Cuba and Puerto Rico. Three days later Muñoz Rivera delivered a speech in Ponce alluding to this event:

Between the workers for the people's cause who met here in 1887—the leader from Barranquitas said then—and those of us who are here in 1897, there is an essential equality and a difference, both of which synthesize our ideal, our labor, our routes, and give an idea of what we were and of what we are. There is an essential equality: that autonomy is the ideal which we preserve unspotted. There is a difference: that yesterday we were autonomists in theory, and that today we are practicing autonomists. Now the creed of autonomy is not an illusion; now our party is not a propaganda party, now it is a governing party, and the autonomy we brought about will bring us shortly to occupy a place of honor among civilized peoples, who prosper and progress, because
in them duty is fulfilled without selfishness and the law is carried out without obstacles.  

The two newspapers which most enthusiastically defended the Antillean liberties in Spain and in Cuba expressed themselves in the same or similar terms about the Autonomic Constitution.  

El Liberal said editorially,  

Sagasta has earned legitimate honor, for the Antillean Constitution will always rank with the abolition of slavery among the greatest advances of a century which was lighted at the beginning with the Declaration of Rights of Man.  

Elsewhere, El País published a thorough article entitled, "Autonomy for Cuba," which was reprinted by Muñoz Rivera in La Democracia and from which are extracted the following paragraphs, equally applicable to Puerto Rican autonomy:  

The system about to be inaugurated is not the administrative and economic decentralization previously offered by the Liberal governments. It is not the deficient regime of the French colonies, nor is it representative of the governmental councils which ruled in the British Antilles and in Canada before the great reform of 1839, signed by Lord Russell. It is true autonomy, of the sort which the latter statesman sanctioned, establishing the responsibility to the provincial assembly of the members of the executive council. It is representative autonomy with parliamentary and responsible government, which was the last evolution of the process and the culmination of the political aspirations which our program sets forth.  

In order to reach this crowning of the edifice, the system, according to the published decrees, originates from the broadest base of universal suffrage, through the application to the Antilles of the law in force in the Peninsula. The representative principle is elaborated in three organs, which are sufficient in the most civilized and freest countries to assure to all citizens the right of vigilance and of intervention in the management of their interests, from the lowest to the highest in political rank: municipalities, provincial delegations, and legislative houses. According to indications, the new organic laws, municipal and provincial, will give to these in-
ferior corporations the freedom of action so necessary if they are to cease to be mere instrumentalities without independent existence, slaves of bossism.

Our readers have full knowledge of the powers of the House and of the Administrative Council since these were published in full. They include not only the laws and regulations of a social character, the voting of the taxes and the power to impose tariffs, but others of a higher sort, such as the power to enter into commercial treaties subject to the approval of the Cortes, to prepare the national expenditure budget, and finally the freedom to reform all the legislation in force relating to local affairs, the freedom also to ask for and propose the reform of the laws emanating from the sovereign power.

The Governor General shorn of the many strange powers centered up to now in his authority occupies as chairman of the executive and coparticipant in the legislative functions, the place of the King in the governments of constitutional monarchies, and, therefore, convenes, adjourns, and dissolves the Houses. He has also the function of overall inspection which is legitimate for the representative of the national government, and the duty to suspend, so that the supreme authority of the Cortes may rule, the actions taken by the Insular Houses on matters beyond their competence.

Such is, in general terms, the new colonial constitution that Spain has promulgated. They are sufficient to discern its fundamental character, fully autonomous.

Two witnesses of highest quality, El Liberal of Madrid, and El País of Havana, have been cited so that it will be clear what sort of government was brought to Puerto Rico at the close of the last century by the pact with Sagasta. Luis Muñoz Rivera has described the swearing in of the first Autonomist Cabinet on February 11, 1898. Muñoz says:

The government invited the political leaders of San Juan, the highest civil and ecclesiastical authorities, and the leaders of the military corps. In the front of the throne room appeared, under a throne with canopy, the pictures of the Queen-Regent and of King Alfonso. In front, a table covered with a crimson scarf. On the table, the Gospels. The concourse was divided in two wings, to the right and to the left. We entered, first the Governor with his secretary, followed by the Cabinet secretaries.
These knelt, one after the other, in the following order: the President, the Secretary of Grace and Justice and Interior, the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the Secretary of Public Education, and the Secretary of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce. Señor Francia read aloud the oath: "Do you swear by God and by the Holy Gospels to be loyal to His Majesty, King Alfonso XIII and in his name to the Queen-Regent, to follow strictly the laws and their true meaning and the colonial constitution, to carry out the office which the Governor has entrusted to you with all the energy and attention of which you are capable, seeking above all the welfare of the nation and of the Island of Puerto Rico?" \(^4^{5}\)

All the secretaries present took the oath. The Cabinet was composed of Francisco Mariano Quiñones (Orthodox, President); Luis Muñoz Rivera (Liberal, Secretary of Grace and Justice and Interior); Juan Hernández López (Liberal, Secretary of Public Works and Communications); José Severo Quiñones (Liberal, Secretary of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce); Manuel F. Rossy (Orthodox, Secretary of Public Education); Manuel Fernández Juncos (Orthodox, Secretary of Finance). In this government were also José de Diego (Liberal, Subsecretary of Grace and Justice and Interior) and José Celso Barbosa (Orthodox, Subsecretary of Public Education).

As we have seen, there formed part of the autonomous government four of the Orthodox leaders who in the San Juan Assembly a year before had divided the Autonomist Party, separating themselves from the majority on the basis of their republican ideas. These men who opposed the pact and walked out of the Assembly carrying "the banner of autonomy" with Barbosa at the head, now swore fidelity to the King of Spain, and, of course, to his government, headed by Práxedes Mateo Sagasta.
The Autonomy Commission which negotiated the pact with Sagasta represented the two points of view which prevailed in the bosom of the Autonomist Party. One, headed by Muñoz Rivera favored an alliance with a Peninsular party capable of coming to power in Madrid. The other, whose principal spokesman was José Celso Barbosa, was in favor of fighting for autonomy without definite links with any Peninsular party, much less with parties of the constitutional monarchical type.

The thesis of Muñoz Rivera always was that the alliance should be made, preferably with a democratic party, but one capable of becoming the government. To fulfill the first requisite, the Caguas Assembly had designated positively the parties that it had in mind calling them "from Sagasta to Pi." Perhaps it would have been most satisfactory to come to terms with Francisco Pi y Margall, but it was highly doubtful that the latter would ever come to power.

How to carry out the will of the Assembly to ally the cause of autonomy with the party which according to the very language of the assembly "had the surest possibilities, as the government, of putting the doctrine into effect as soon as possible"? For Muñoz Rivera, the alliance ought to be with the Liberal Party of Sagasta, so that when the latter came to power he would form a government in Puerto Rico with the Autonomists and not with the unconditionals (incondicionales). Within any alliance things would have turned out this way, even under the colonial formula that Puerto Rico endured. But what the Caguas Assembly determined, in complete accord with
the convictions of Muñoz Rivera, was that the alliance would have to be on the basis of a program, of a political norm. That program consisted in legislating in accord with the doctrine of the Autonomist Party, in promulgating the widest possible autonomic reforms in Puerto Rico. Since the reform had to come accompanied by suffrage, Muñoz was convinced that in honest elections the unconditionals would be swept from the government which would then pass into the hands of true, native Puerto Rican patriots.

This thesis of the fusion with Sagasta was fought by a group within the Autonomist Party, in which figured two of the members of the Commission sent to Madrid: the political director, José Gómez Brioso, and Federico Degetau. At the same time, the Antillean leader in Madrid, Rafael María de Labra, who was expected to advise the Commission and in actuality was in a position to guide its negotiations, did not share the position of Muñoz Rivera and opposed pacts with Sagasta's Liberals or with the Conservatives\textsuperscript{52} of Cánovas del Castillo.

The other member of the Commission, Rosendo Matienzo Cintrón, was partisan to Muñoz Rivera's thesis, of which he became convinced in the summer of 1896, as a result of some impressions of Madrid which Muñoz had published in \textit{La Democracia}. Upon reading them in Yauco, Matienzo went to see his friend in Ponce. Muñoz Rivera wrote in his \textit{Apuntes Para un Libro}\textsuperscript{53} the topic of the conversation. Matienzo spoke to him as follows:
I confessed myself before incredulous as to the possibilities that we, the Autonomist Party, and the Liberal Party could come to an understanding. Today the aspect of the question changes greatly, from the moment in which you received such final offers from the lips of Sagasta, of Moret, and of Gamazo. I admit now, by virtue of these facts, that it is right to go to Spain and seek the understandings, the alliances that you have been advocating since 1890. Count on me. I will write to our most influential partisans and, if La Democracia decides to lift the banner again, I will help unwaveringly.

Of course, Muñoz would lift the banner again, at that time in need of unfolding vigorously in the wind, and that mere personal questions had kept sadly hanging at half staff since the deaths of Román Baldorioty de Castro and Julio L. Vizcarondo. The banner of autonomy was not to be lowered or to be carried away to someone's house; it was a symbol of combat which had to fly from Government House (La Fortaleza) and it was to that spot that Muñoz Rivera carried it thanks to the creative vision which allowed him to negotiate the pact with Sagasta.

Why was it to be the Liberal Party of Sagasta and not another which would put the government in the hands of the Autonomist Party converted into the Liberal Party of Puerto Rico? It ought not to surprise us that some of the autonomist leaders of the 1890's asked themselves, undoubtedly in good faith, this interesting and confusing question. Simply stated, these distinguished compatriots were very prone to believe in the efficacy of the republican and leftist parties in the Peninsula. These parties had always been loyal to overseas autonomist principles. Degetau thought, and to a degree Labra
also, that the republican moral force would compel the rightest parties to establish reforms in the Antilles. For Labra as for Degetau it would have been idle to dream of the return to power in Spain of those republican parties, now almost broken up. What perhaps these two politicians counted on was a sort of Antillean passive resistance that through the republican sector would compel Cánovas del Castillo and Sagasta to give in to the demands of autonomy. Degetau further reached the belief that the reforms would come and that no one less than Antonio Cánovas del Castillo would implant them. One can imagine the ironical smile of Labra at such a fantasy, not a little inconsistent with the extreme faith that Degetau always placed in the republican idea, chemically pure.

Muñoz Rivera, on the other hand, without failing to recognize the validity of Peninsular republicanism, confined himself to fighting, not so that autonomy would come from a republican Spain, but for Puerto Rican autonomy made a reality at the earliest possible date through a governing party, within the monarchy or within the Spanish republic. This was the pregnant idea that convinced Gómez Bríoso of the Muñoz thesis in the crucial hour when everything indicated that Sagasta would return to power in the near future. Muñoz Rivera knew the Spanish political situation at first hand since making his first trip to Madrid in 1895, and he had an opportunity to consult with Fusionist Liberal leaders, with whom the Autonomy Commission was to reach an agreement a year later.
Since 1890, the year of the founding of La Democracia, when he was scarcely thirty-one years old, the youth from Barranquitas had already given evidence of possessing an extraordinary political vision. Called to Ponce by the patriot, Ramon Marín, in 1891 a direct plan was mapped out toward practical autonomy. He saw that the Puerto Ricans were victims of betrayal on the part of the colonial governors, who on reaching Puerto Rico, even if they came from the ranks of Peninsular liberalism, as soon as they moved into La Fortaleza allied themselves with the small group of unconditional Conservatives headed by Pablo Ubarri and others of unhappy memory. The latter monopolized the points-of-view and decisions of the government and used their influence to push aside the Puerto Ricans who were fighting for national rights, and at the same time to put themselves in power in the shadow of despotism. Muñoz understood that while the Autonomist Party continued outside of the government, wasting away its public force in platonism, although it had the support of the immense majority of the people, it would not succeed in establishing guarantees for liberty nor for civil rights, since both rested upon the arbitrary and undeniably tyrannical disposition of the unconditionals who influenced the governors of the colony.

With regard to the responsibility of the Peninsular parties, Muñoz knew that thirty years of historical circumstances and of realities prevailing in Spanish politics undercut ideas of a possible republican triumph or of a possible devastating moral influence by this national movement over the militarist
interests with which they were in constant struggle, both the Conservatives of Cánovas del Castillo and the Liberals of Sagasta.

In that long historical period, from the Revolution of 1868, Spanish public opinion was gestating the two principal currents which were to impose themselves upon the destinies of Spain—sad destinies—until the end of the nineteenth century. Two persons typified these two currents in many extraordinary ways: the head of the Conservative Party, Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, and the head of the Liberal Party, Práxedes Mateo Sagasta.

With regard to overseas politics, from the point of view of autonomy, the republican current backed by the great personalities of this persuasion, was incarnated better than anyone else by Rafael María de Labra. In order to understand well that period of Spanish political history, it is necessary to examine the role that each one of these three men—Cánovas, Sagasta, and Labra—played in overseas politics in that era.

Before the Septembrist Revolution, the setting of the Court was propitious neither for the liberties of the Peninsulars nor for those of the Spaniards overseas. Ramón del Valle Inclán has woven a fictional tapestry which pictures this in three of his best known novels, La Corte de los Milagros, Viva Mi Dueño, and Baza de Espadas.

In the second of these novels the author described a scene in which the queen is signing a state paper in the presence of her minister, Luis González Bravo.
Her Catholic Majesty—says the novelist—always magnanimous, replied to the ungrateful indifference of her people increasing by royal decree the number of national heroes. And the Spaniards were unaware of the generous spirit with which their queen governed them. Freely, without increasing taxes, she bestowed on them two brand-new captains-general: she offered them without limitation, crowned with laurels, bald and asmatic, both to decorate match boxes and to make decrees.

Minister González Bravo, friend of Cánovas del Castillo, was a formidable demagogue to whom General Narváez pandered in order to satisfy the bosom of the army. Sister Patrocinio, the nun of the wounds, governed principally in the palace, but there were other influences not so religious: poor King Francisco, says Valle Inclán, "with the shyness of a lap dog at the near approach of the Queen" and General Narváez "with his air of old bully"—the tamer of the brass hats whether emigrated or in the conspiracy. "In order to understand the Spain of Isabel II," wrote Valle Inclán, "there is nothing better than the dances of the master Iradier." And to give the final touch to the picture, he added in El Periquito Gacetillero:

To the history of Spain in her great hours, there has never been lacking the accompaniment of romances. And the epic poem of the amens of Isabel must be looked for in the poetry that was sung then by the Ruedo Ibérico (arena). Apollo took the laurel at the doors of the taverns, as in the war with the French, when the vulgar muse of lay brothers and beggars, rascals and barbers, was the best warrior against Bonaparte. All Spain in those amens of Isabel gargled for a Second of May.

How tragic proved to be such amens for the last Spanish colonies in America. The Nina is coming, was whispered then in the underworld and in the Masonic centers of Cádiz. A revolution so many times praised openly, that came into the world
still born and dressed, in its antecedents, with the finery of a lively zarzuela the same in the august chambers of the Palace as in the uproar of the common people.

Sagasta was little more than forty years old when he joined the Liberal conspiracy headed by General Prim, and was minister of interior and state after the coup of 1868. He favored the ascent to the throne of Amadeo I and served in his first government as minister of interior and president of the Council. During the first Republic he went over to the opposition. After the coup of Pavía, in 1874, he again served as minister of state and was president of the Council. With the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty on the proclamation of Alfonso XII, he signed with his opponent Cánovas the famous Pact of El Pardo, which established the system of alternating parties in power. Thus this original man headed the governments of 1881-1883, 1885-1890, 1892-1895, 1897-1899 and 1901-1902.

Cánovas del Castillo, a much more educated man, was less shrewd than Sagasta. He began as a moderate and ended as a Conservative, occasionally with touches of liberalism in his plumage—in his plumage only. In the times of General O'Donnell he was minister of interior, overseas affairs, and treasury while Isabel II was still reigning. During the election of Amadeo I he voted a blank ballot in the Cortes. He was biding his time for 1874, the year in which he planned to organize the normal restoration of Alfonso XII in favor of whom Isabel had renounced her rights to the throne. But General Arsenio Martínez de Campos jumped the gun with the uprising of Sagunto, Decem-
ber 29 of that year, precipitating the decrees of loyalty of the brass hats. It is curious that then, on the instructions of Sagasta's government, Cánovas was arrested and accused of conspiracy. As soon as they became aware of such a crass error, General Serrano and Sagasta commissioned General Primo de Rivera, capitain general of Madrid, to free the illustrious prisoner. Cánovas came out of prison to head the Regency Cabinet. From then on he did not leave the government again, except to give Sagasta his turns in power in accordance with the Pact of Pardo.

Upon the fall of Isabel II and the accession of General Serrano, Cánovas expected that the minister of overseas affairs, Adelardo López de Ayala, would accelerate the Antillean reforms. He was very soon convinced, however, that this political chameleon did not believe in anything, that he would lend his brilliant talent and his astuteness for intrigue as readily for the liberal revolution as for the Bourbon despotism, for the left as for the right. López de Ayala, poor Spanish imitation of the character of Fuche, was the cynic who laughed at the Cuban patriot, Nicolás de Azcarate, when the latter went to speak with him about the reforms which Generals Serrano and Dulce had promised to favor. López de Ayala, the poet who wrote the Manifesto of Cádiz, in which was announced the uprising of the chiefs of the navy and the army against Isabel, was the same personage that Cánovas del Castillo made minister of overseas affairs in the Regency Cabinet,
probably to appease the brass hats, in spite of common knowledge of the former's participation in the Cádiz coup against the august Sovereign of the Conservatives.

Cánovas and Sagasta were musicians perfectly harmonized in the concert of Antillean politics, just as in Spanish domestic and provincial politics. In a way they governed as hostages of the highly exalted military chiefs who ruled Spain, Cuba, and Puerto Rico as one piece. They sent to Cuba and Puerto Rico their protégés with the unlimited powers of governors in state of seige, in accord with a decree in force of Fernando VII. Neither Cánovas nor Sagasta had been able to prevent the progressives from expelling from the Cortes the representatives of Cuba and Puerto Rico and from arranging that the islands would be governed by special laws which had not been proposed at the time Cánovas took charge of the ministry of overseas affairs, in 1865. As a matter of fact, it was only on November 29 of that year that the decree was promulgated creating the investigating committee on Cuba and Puerto Rico (Junta de Información de Cuba y Puerto Rico) whose immediate results were nil.

Cánovas, as much as or more than Sagasta, distrusted the military and only agreed to deal with them as an invincible historical force of that period. He had seen them overthrow Isabel, while they were monarchists to all appearances, and proclaim the Republic without believing in it. Cánovas and Sagasta never succeeded in completely recovering from the tragic blow to morale perpetrated that ill-fated third of January of
1874, when General Pavía\textsuperscript{106} surrounded the Cortes with soldiers and ordered the illustrious Nicolás Salmerón\textsuperscript{107} and the other deputies to evacuate the legislative chambers.

From 1874 on, Cánovas was never able to prevent things going badly for the Antillean autonomists. For five years Rafael María de Labra, at times surrounded by loyal Puerto Ricans and Cubans, raised his voice in favor of the reforms, all in vain. The progressive cabinet of 1881 came, and then all hope of justice for the Antilles was lost. The return of Cánovas to power and the appointment of the reactionary Romero Robledo\textsuperscript{108} in the ministry of overseas affairs brought about a new period of confusion for Puerto Rican libertarian aspirations. In November of 1885, Cánovas fell and Práxedes Mateo Sagasta took over the government again with Antonio Maura\textsuperscript{109} in the ministry of overseas affairs. The historian Enrique Pineyro has pointed out slily that the new minister made his debut with a masterful statement: "I do not know," he said, "any conspirator so dangerous nor do I believe anyone had done so much against Cuba's love of Spain as has done the Spanish ministry."\textsuperscript{110}

We must thank Maura, naturally, for accompanying his beautiful statement with the first autonomy bill that the Cortes approved, and which was retouched that year in the conservative barbershop, after Buenaventura Abarzuza\textsuperscript{111} and Romero Robledo deformed it with cosmetics and shaves to the point of making it a monstrosity that was then called autonomy.
The disturbing and pessimistic picture that has just been painted in bold strokes was known by the Puerto Rican reformers and autonomists, but few of them had pondered so much over it as Luis Muñoz Rivera. He conceived of the autonomist action as a battle of violent realities, which was the way Román Baldorioty de Castro knew it by heart from having lived with it in Spain and in Puerto Rico. After the Componte (police tyranny) and the Autonomist Assembly of 1887, the personal efforts of Baldorioty, now somewhat tired and ill, were not sufficient to prevent the disorganization and weakening of the Party.

There had arisen, besides, an internal intrigue in the group aimed at removing Baldorioty from command. Two groups were formed: followers of Baldorioty and followers of Francisco Cepeda, protege of Rafael María de Labra. Cepeda was a Spanish journalist who had lived for some time on the island and who published the Revista de Puerto Rico. A person of outstanding ability, Cepeda had been the great pen of autonomy before the birth of La Democracia. In 1888, Cepeda made a trip to Spain and when he returned, in January of 1889, he began to publish in his Revista a series of interviews which he had had in Asturias with Rafael María de Labra.

At that time the controversy and enmity between Labra and Julio L. Vizcarrondo was very much alive. The interviews of Cepeda caused a sensation in the island. That same year Baldorioty and Vizcarrondo died. Ramón Marín was left alone until Muñoz Rivera joined with him a year later to found
La Democracia in Ponce. The decisive polemic with Cepeda was grievous and depressing for autonomy. Ramón Marín from the pages of El Diario de Puerto Rico and Salvador Brau from El Clamor del País opened fire on Cepeda. It was at this time that Muñoz Rivera published in El Clamor his famous article entitled "Sin Miedo y Sin Tacha" (without fear and without flaw).

It is not necessary to go into the details of the controversy between Muñoz Rivera and Cepeda. The availability now of all the articles published both in the Revista as well as in the rest of the newspapers will permit historians to form reasoned opinions about the famous episode. It need only be pointed out that Cepeda did a great favor for autonomy by coming to fight for its cause in Puerto Rico; that he did a great kindness to the island by holding the interviews with Rafael María de Labra and later publishing them; and finally that he did the greatest favor to autonomy by leaving Puerto Rico, with all due respect to Sr. Cepeda.

Two talents of the breadth of Muñoz Rivera and Cepeda did not fit in the Autonomist Party—with ideas so contrary as to the means of securing autonomy. After all, Muñoz Rivera appeared predestined to put on the spotless robe of Román Baldorioty de Castro. There are indications that many people were disturbed by this inexorable decision of history. Cepeda was by no means small minded. The man was an echo of the intellectual originality of Labra. Thus it was with Labra and not with Cepeda that Muñoz Rivera was compared. The inter-
views with Labra, later published in the form of a book by Cepeda under the title, *Conferencias de Abulí*, must have worked a deep influence on the thought of Muñoz Rivera. The man from Barranquitas must have read them carefully and they must have weighed heavily in his thought as a patriot during all the campaigns in *La Democracia* and in the inner sanctum of the party from 1890 to 1898.

It was through this book rather than through the scattered, private letters to his friends and the articles and speeches likewise scattered, that the island succeeded in discovering in a single compilation from Labra himself, how he, their most lucid exponent in Madrid, conceived of autonomy and the Antillean reforms and how he believed the work should be carried forward in the Cortes, the press, and the Spanish debates. Following *Las Conferencias de Abulí*, in 1891 was published the book *La Reforma Electoral en las Antillas*, a collection of speeches and propositions of Labra in the Cortes of 1890 on the autonomy theme. The heart of the prologue of this book of Labra's was also published and widely distributed in Cuba and Puerto Rico, as a book entitled *La Política Antillana en la Metrópoli Española*.

Muñoz Rivera had, then, bases for judgment at first hand to plan his future actions in the light of what Labra accomplished during the first twenty years of his support of autonomy. Labra had been born in Cuba in 1840, son of Brigadier Ramón Labra, an Asturian supporter of the Spanish Constitution of 1812, who had fought in the war of Spanish
independence and had lived as an emigré in London from 1823 to 1834. From his mother, Rafaela González Cadrana, of Cuban ancestry, Rafael Labra inherited his undoubted Antillean patriotism.123

While a deputy from Infiesto,124 on July 10, 1871, Labra made his first speech in parliament. Not since 1837 had there been heard so valient a protest, so well reasoned, so virile, against the unjustified postponement of the overseas reforms. As a result of this speech of Labra's a resolution was passed by the house in which was expressed the desire that the Cuban insurrection end and that the promises of the September Revolution with respect to Antillean policy be honored. From then on Labra, tiń: deputy from Sabana Grande, P. R.125 became the man who represented in the Cortes the Puerto Rican reform program which originated in the activity of Acosta,126 Ruiz Belvis127 and Quiñones in the investigating committee of 1866 (Información Española de 1866).128 This program was not yet autonomist--it was content with administrative decentralization, with parliamentary representation, etc.

Surrounded by an excellent Puerto Rican delegation in the Cortes of 1871-72 and 1872-73, Labra began to open great breaches for the trampled-upon rights of Puerto Ricans. To his understandings with Ruiz Zorrilla129 and Martos,130 in a sort of partisan agreement, he attributed the bills for the abolition of slavery, the extension to the island of the civil code,131 and the application of the municipal and provincial laws of 1870,132 legislation bordering on autonomy. In later
years Labra used to recall that it was the Spanish Republic which in 1873 proclaimed the operation in Puerto Rico of Title I of the Constitution of 1869,\textsuperscript{133} beginning the normal operation of individual rights, necessary liberties and universal suffrage which was later destroyed by the military coup of General Pavía in 1874. History shows that on April 27, 1891, the republican minority in the legislature presented an amendment to the resolution replying to the Speech from the Throne, in which there is a paragraph which asks for the Antilles full equality of political rights with the metropolis, universal suffrage, civil supremacy over the military, and insular autonomy.\textsuperscript{134} Labra wrote this paragraph and the amendment was signed by such republican leaders as Pedregal,\textsuperscript{135} Azcárate, Becerro de Bengoa,\textsuperscript{136} Muro,\textsuperscript{137} Pi y Margall and Vallés y Ribot.\textsuperscript{138} This was the first time, says Labra, that a national party reached that decision.

Such was the man with whom Luis Muñoz Rivera had to be compared in the field of applied political ideas. With the basic idealism, with the high republican aims of Labra, Muñoz was in profound agreement. These ideals were felt with sincerity equally in Barranquitas as in Abulí in the shadow of Covadonga.\textsuperscript{139} But in Ponce and in Barranquitas and in all Puerto Rico they fought for liberty and for autonomy, within Spanish national unity, with or without republicanism, and certainly at the risk of life, in the jails and at home and in the street confronted with the persecution of the military government and of its followers the unconditionals.
Munoz Rivera always gave to principles the importance that they had in the ideological field, because he was a man of high thoughts, but in politics he preferred to measure principles specifically by the constructive results which they attained when they were valiently defended without evasions and bowings and scrapings. He respected his adversaries for their ideas, but he had no use for those who trampled his country underfoot and persecuted it. With his militantly patriotic point-of-view, as well as a well-reasoned one, certain roundabout procedures and certain romantic concepts of the Autonomist Party did not move him a whit, and, of course, neither did he share the parsimonious and at times dogmatic ideas of Rafael María de Labra, involved as he was in the delicate situations that the latter had to traverse with care on account of his commitments in the national political stage of Spain.

The views of Labra, as they are set forth in his aforementioned book and also in the book by Cepeda on the Abulí interviews, may be summarized as follows: 1) he would not aid directly or indirectly an Antillean revolution; 2) he did not believe a whit in autonomy, which he described as "a striving for effect analagous to the close of patriotic speech-making with the hymn of Riego"; 3) he was not partisan to an electoral boycott; 4) he recognized many abuses overseas, but he didn't forget that freedom of press, freedom of assembly and of public trial were enjoyed; 5) when violations of rights were committed,
he fought them effectively close to the Council and the Overseas Ministry, without risking attacks in the Cámara against the government when he considered them unnecessary; 6) he pointed out that in Spain things occurred as bad as those in Puerto Rico and Cuba, and that there the fight was so great that Ruiz Zorrilla himself had said that one couldn't live there and that revolution was the only escape; 7) he believed it was necessary to overcome fear, as he himself had to do by proclaiming colonial autonomy in the Cortes of 1879, and previously in 1872, when he introduced the fight for the abolition of slavery; 8) he asserted that he had never been affiliated with any peninsular political party that at any rate dodged the solution of autonomy, and that when he joined responsible parliamentary groups capable of committing themselves, he always insisted on the definitive recognition of colonial autonomy; 9) he believed, nevertheless, that the autonomists in the mother country could not disregard "the general law of politics" nor pretend to continue fighting without means, believing that it was enough to denounce the outrages in the insular press; 10) he believed that in Madrid it was necessary to play politics "the way everybody does"; 11) he said that the Antillean reform was making progress, in spite of some apparent failures and of the complaints and protests of some Antillean newspapers; 12) he affirmed that the decisions would be made in Madrid and that what was done in Cuba and Puerto Rico would not be a determining factor in the decisions; 13) he complained that
the effort that was made in Madrid was very weak, although that
made in the Antilles was admirable; 14) he said that in Madrid
it was necessary to do things with greater intensity; that the
senators and deputies should always be at their posts from the
beginning to the end of the legislative session; that it was
necessary to become intimate with the national political leaders,
make friends, get out of Parliament to write articles, give
lectures and speeches, speak out in the newspapers, in the
athenaeums141 and in the literary circles; 15) that it was
necessary to have a newspaper in Madrid and to take part and
help in the general and peninsular problems in harmony with the
Spanish leaders who were carrying on the campaign in favor of
the Antillean reforms; 16) he believed that it was necessary
to maintain solidarity with the parliamentary representation
that backed such reforms.

During the five years that followed the publication of
the books of Labra and Cepeda--that is, from 1890 to 1895--
Muñoz Rivera had on his hands four continuous and arduous
battles. A battle against the unconditionals (incondicionales)
in Puerto Rico, servile instruments of the despotism. A
battle against the military governors who allowed themselves to
be dominated by the unconditionals. A battle with the
governments of Madrid that maintained and upheld those
governors. A battle against the opponents of his ideas within
the Autonomist Party. In this last battle the autonomy movement,
as a partisan organization, was being torn apart by the in-
ternecine fight that continued even after the death of Roman
Baldoriotty de Castro and Julio Vizcarrondo. Involved in a task without rest, Muñoz was delineating the new image of a party that aspired to get out of its languor and decadence to rehabilitate itself in militant and invigorating activity. From this hard task after purging itself of quarrels and the appearance of new leadership, was to arise the conscience of a vigorous party favorable to the consumation of the aspirations of the Puerto Rican people. The positive aspirations were two: to implant autonomy and to take control of the government by means of free suffrage.

Muñoz Rivera shared a great deal of the thought of Labra, as it has been outlined above, with regard to the substance and with regard to the methods to achieve the ends which were to be pursued. Muñoz did not, however, sense the autonomy idea with the very unique feeling of that brilliant politician, always in tune with what he conceived to be the Spanish realities. Muñoz realized that the experience and the loyalty of Labra could teach the Antilleans the most effective tactics for the benefit of the common cause in specific circumstances. Above all, he had just been confirmed in Cepeda's book his own ideas about the country's aspirations. He saw eye to eye in principle with the leader: the fight had to take place in Madrid, but he was convinced that the Puerto Ricans themselves would have to join the battle allied to a powerful peninsular party, this latter an idea which Labra rejected.

Muñoz's first trip to the Spanish capital must have been made in obedience to the wish to carry out that impulse to
do his duty that belonged to him. From that trip of 1895 it may be said that Muñoz Rivera arose as a great and enthralling political figure. It was then that there began to be evident the future mature fruit of action and thought which were to carry him to triumph. At the time he was 35 years of age. Like the Apostle Paul, he was to cover many new and unknown routes planting the idea of autonomous coexistence. As before he had travelled, to plant the idea in his own heart, the road from Barranquitas to Ponce, and afterwards to disseminate it with fervor, the roads from Ponce to Caguas and to San Juan, now he had to take the Spanish roads. At the end he would return victorious, but a quirk of history would snatch from him the joy of seeing his country enjoying freedom and would give him the pain of finding it ensnared in the nets of a new colonialism, new chains and a new path in the business of patriotism, this time in the routes of New York and Washington.

He himself has told us, in his Apuntes Para un Libro, that he left unfinished, some aspects of that first trip in which he visited Sagasta, Moret, Castelar, Pi y Margall, Contreras and other liberal and republican leaders to explore their attitudes and to interest them in the plans of autonomy. He attended on various occasions the sessions of the legislature, where he listened to the best known orators, including Labra, with whom at that time he had no dealings. He said that even acknowledging his talent, his valor, his unspotted record, he didn't like to praise this man. "Because," wrote Muñoz, "in the midst of his private and public virtues,
of his merits and his services, he has the defect of becoming angry with those who speak up to him; I declare myself almost incompatible with his Olympian pride. All of which does not prevent me from offering him the homage of my praises, all the more disinterested to the degree that I shall not go hatching them in the columns of La Democracia, to collect for them in smiles or favors.\(^{145}\)

The second trip, with the Autonomy Commission of 1896, was for Muñoz Rivera a continuation of that first. On this occasion he already was treading on firm ground. He knew, better than his other companions of the Commission, the political background and the personalities with whom they were going to rub elbows. When they landed at the port of Vigo, neither Labra nor his representative was waiting for them. They sent a telegram to the leader, which the latter delayed in answering. Muñoz was highly annoyed. He refused to go to Abulí for the first interview with Labra. Finally they succeeded in persuading him. In Abulí, the conversation took a tone of pessimism. Muñoz was not at all surprised; it was what he expected. Labra imposed on them "an almost complete period of inaction,"\(^{146}\) thus Muñoz told it later and added that the leader told them: "If it is possible, let no one know, for the present, of your arrival in Madrid on a political commission."\(^{147}\)

When they reached the Spanish capital, it fell to Gómez Brioso to set the dates on which the interviews were to be held. While waiting, Muñoz busied himself in preparing the way with his friends of the liberal sector in order to get close to the
leaders of the party. He got in touch with García Molina\textsuperscript{148} in order to reach Segismundo Moret; with Perojo\textsuperscript{149} to reach Antonio Maura; with Gascón\textsuperscript{150} to make contact with Germán Gamazo.\textsuperscript{151} He accompanied his commission-friends to the first interviews with Nicolás Salmerón,\textsuperscript{152} Pi y Margall, Muro and Esquerdo.\textsuperscript{153} One day, on the advice of Perojo, Muñoz decided to visit, alone, Práxedes Mateo Sagasta, who was to be found relaxing at the Fortuna hot springs.

He took the express train as far as Cartagena, then made a long trip to Archena and four hours more in a carriage to Fortuna. Sagasta was waiting for him in a little hotel at the springs. He received him very graciously. He asked him for information about the Autonomy Commission, which Muñoz summarized for him giving an account of his own judgment and of the attitudes of the other members of the group. Sagasta asked him if the Autonomist Party thought as he (Muñoz) and Matienzo Cintrón did or as Gómez Brioso and Degetau. Muñoz replied that if the Liberal Party accepted the autonomist platform in its entirety, the immense majority would be in favor of the Pact. Muñoz delivered to Sagasta a copy of the declaration of principles of the Ponce Assembly of 1887,\textsuperscript{154} which the latter read over twice.

Muñoz warned Sagasta that if the Commission failed in Madrid, he would have to return via New York, that is to say, to join forces with the Club Borinquen\textsuperscript{155} that operated there and whose decision was to go to arms as had been done in Cuba. Sagasta asked him what Canovas del Castillo thought. Muñoz
replied that he did not know, because when he left for Fortuna, the commission had not yet seen the Prime Minister. "And Labra?" asked Sagasta. To which Muñoz answered, "Labra is one of the members of the central directorate. He does not forget his promises. He does not go along with us on this change of tactic; but from his own advice we infer that he is not opposed to it and that he will let us go ahead readily."

Muñoz continues to tell how Sagasta read the Ponce program again and made the following comment:

You don't ask much. I must not anticipate anything until I come to agreement with the various elements in the Liberal Party. I will say to you, nevertheless, as much as I can say. You go to work. Be confident. The Liberal Party will go far, perhaps much farther than you think. What matters in the Antilles, above all, is to maintain the honor of Spanish arms and the undisputed rule of the mother country. That does not conflict with autonomy. Rather, autonomy will be perhaps a means to attain that. A mild formula is needed, that will not produce alarm in peninsular opinion. We will find it.

While Muñoz was absent at Fortuna, the Commission had visited Cánovas del Castillo, for whom Labra had given them a letter. The full Commission went on with conversations with other political leaders of diverse shades: Silvela, Gamazo, Maura, Puigserver, López Domínguez, Romanones, etc. In due time they talked with the republican leadership and, finally, held decisive conferences with Segismundo Moret and with Sagasta.

Meanwhile, December 31, 1896, Cánovas got the Queen to sign a series of royal decrees, possibly timed to hush the clamor of the Liberals and to try to save a situation more and more deteriorated due to the failures in Cuba and in the
Philippines. Tomás Castellano y Villarroya, Overseas Minister, renewed the old conservative trick: to propose the long overdue application and fulfillment of the law of March 15, 1895, which would pass by custom to be studied by the Council of State. A statement of intentions beautifully executed; the announcement that soon other bills would be introduced of an administrative and regulatory nature "as the whole question of the reforms might require"; approval of the municipal and provincial laws; clauses dealing with the Governor-General and the Junta de Autoridades, the civil and commercial administration and the careful analysis and remedy of complaints.

But it was already late. La Magdalena didn't want finery. The Autonomy Commission, sure of its course, save for the vacillations of Federico Degetau and the cold which the reserve and circumspection of Labra threw on it from time to time, had carried the negotiations with Sagasta to a highly advanced stage; the first draft of the Pact was in preparation and this was, in final form, checked and approved by the Liberal leader, January 1897, as has been noted before.

During these negotiations considerable private correspondence took place between the friends of the Commission and their Puerto Rican colleagues. Until these letters are published in their entirety, it will not be possible to know completely the fluctuations of political thought that the negotiations of the Commission produced in the two sectors in which the Autonomist Party was now divided. The partial publication of the letters sent between Madrid and San Juan, instead of giving us
a complete picture, detracts from historical truth which must be known without overlading it with appraisals favoring some personages and belittling the patriotic work of others.

This synthesis of the autonomist mission is based on the concrete data that motivated it: the plan of partisan action by Muñoz Rivera, founder of the Pact with Sagasta, and the positive results which were achieved with the Pact. It is hazardous to pretend to give to the history under examination a rationalized slant in order to justify attitudes totally lacking in validity in the light of the realities of the time. Nor is it justifiable to theorize about the motivations of the personages who took active part in the negotiation of the Pact, since the latter was approved by the governing Assembly of the Autonomist Party, later transformed into the Liberal Party of Puerto Rico.

The men of the Autonomy Commission of 1896 were patriots who looked at the colonial problem with some differences of judgment. The judgment which won out, backed by three of the four commissioners, was that which the Assembly of San Juan ratified. A few months later as we have already seen, Práxedes Mateo Sagasta came to power and the Crown decreed the autonomy of Puerto Rico. In four months Muñoz Rivera secured a pact that could not be achieved through 25 years of parliamentary battle with the moral support of all the central republican political apparatus of Spain.
NOTES TO CHAPTER II

1 The final wording of the Pact was an elaboration by Sagasta and his lieutenant, Segismundo Moret, of the sixth draft proposed by José Gómez Bríoso with the inspiration of Luis Muñoz Rivera (Bolívar Pagán, Procerato puertorriqueño del siglo XIX /San Juan: Editorial Campos, 1961/, pp. 480-81).

2 Práxedes Mateo Sagasta (1825-1903) was a leader of the Progressive Party in the Cortes and was twice exiled for his opposition to the government of Isabel II. In 1868 he led, with Juan Prim, the revolution which resulted in the Queen's deposition. He served as premier (1871-72) under King Amadeo and as cabinet minister under the first Spanish Republic, but retired after the accession of Alfonso XII. In 1880 the Liberal Party was founded under his leadership, and Sagasta returned to power as premier (1885-90, 1892-95, 1897-99, 1901-1902). Sagasta offered Cuba autonomy, but was unable to suppress the Cuban revolution or to prevent United States' intervention. Sagasta signed the Treaty of Paris of 1898, which ended the Spanish-American War, and he was generally blamed for the Cuban disaster (Diccionario de historia de España, desde sus orígenes hasta el fin del reinado de Alfonso XIII (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1952), II, 1088-89.

3 Founded in 1880, the original name was Partido Fusionista (Ibid., I, 1192).

4 Luis Muñoz Rivera was not a member of the delegación (central committee) which authorized the Commission but attended its 1896 meeting as an invited guest, with voice if not vote (Cruz Monclova, Luis Muñoz Rivera, pp. 419-20).

5 As political director of the Puerto Rican Autonomist Party, Gómez Bríoso was to act as chairman of the Autonomy Commission until its arrival in Madrid (Pilar Barbosa de Rosario, La comisión autonomista de 1896 /San Juan: Imprenta Venezuela, 1957/, p. 1). Gómez Bríoso, a physician as well as a journalist and political leader, was director of the section of communicable diseases of the Department of Health in the early twentieth century. (Eugenio Fernández y García (ed.), El libro de Puerto Rico (San Juan: El Libro Azul Publishing Co., 1923), and Manuel Quevedo Báez, Historia de la medicina y cirugía de Puerto Rico (2 vols.; San Juan: Asociación Médica de Puerto Rico, 1946-49).

6 Muñoz Rivera had left the party in April, 1896, but was nominated by Rosendo Matienzo Cintrón (Barbosa de Rosario, La comisión autonomista, p. 1).

7 A lawyer (1855-1914), in 1887 he made a seconding speech to the nomination of Labra as autonomist leader in Spain (Carlos N. Carreras, Hombres y mujeres de Puerto Rico /Mexico: Editorial Orión, 1957/, p. 88.)
Another lawyer (1862-1914), Degetau y González was the first Resident Commission from Puerto Rico in the United States House of Representatives (U.S., Congress, Biographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 794).

Rafael María de Labra y Cadrana (1841-1918) dedicated his entire life to the problems of the Spanish colonies. From 1872 to 1899 he represented almost without interruption some district of the Antilles in the Spanish Cortes. He was the leader and spokesman of the Puerto Rican autonomist movement in Spain (Juan Castellanos, "Labra y Puerto Rico," Revista del Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, núm. 19 (abril-junio, 1963), 57-64).

The Autonomist Party was founded in March, 1887, following presentation and discussion of a plan to reorganize the Liberal Party. Officially in favor of the Spanish Republic, the Party pledged itself not to seek to overthrow the monarchy by violence, but to work within the Spanish government and political parties to further Puerto Rican autonomy (Reece B. Bothwell and Lidio Cruz Monclova, Los documentos... ¿qué dicen? (San Juan: Ediciones de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1960), pp. 3-4).

The delegación consisted of fifteen members, one for each district electing a deputy to the Cortes, and fifteen alternates, as provided in "La constitución del partido autonomista puertorriqueño" (Págán, Procerato puertorriqueño del siglo XIX, pp. 358-62).

Cruz Monclova, Historia de Puerto Rico, siglo XIX, III, 2. parte, 394-95.

Págán, Procerato puertorriqueño del siglo XIX, pp. 424-25.

Ibid., p. 353.

Ibid., p. 425.

This autonomist daily published in San Juan first appeared August 7, 1895, and disappeared in 1902. After the Sagasta Pact the paper became the organ of the "orthodox autonomists" whose principle remained that of no alliance with Spanish political parties. Among the collaborators were José Celso Barbosa, José Gómez Brioso, and M. F. Rossy (Paul Nelson Chiles, The Puerto Rican Press Reaction to the United States, 1888-1898 (Philadelphia: Privately printed, 1944), p. 102).

Francisco Pi y Margall (1824-1901) was a Spanish statesman and author. A liberal journalist, he fled to France after the unsuccessful uprising of 1866 against Ramón Narváez, Duque de Valencia. After the Revolution of 1868 he was elected (1869) to the Cortes. He briefly was president (1873) of the short-lived first Spanish Republic, and he continued as deputy in the Cortes after the restoration of the monarchy. He defended the principle
of federalism against centralism, thus gaining wide popularity in Catalonia, and he favored autonomy for Cuba. His upright- ness and intelligence won him the respect even of the hostile right (Diccionario de historia de España, II, 839-40).

18 The first national Cortes (representative assembly) of Spain met at Cádiz in 1812 in the Peninsular War, which was also the Spanish war of liberation from Napoleonic rule. They voted a liberal constitution, later (1814) revoked by Fernando VII. Thereafter, the status of the Cortes frequently changed in its struggle for power with the king (Diccionario de historia de España, I, 789-91). Puerto Rico was represented in the national Cortes during three periods: 1812-14, 1820-23, and 1868-98 (American Academy of Political and Social Science, Puerto Rico, a Study in Democratic Development /Philadelphia, 1953/, p. 16).

19 El País, 28 de julio de 1896.

20 Boletín Histórico de Puerto Rico, VIII (1921), 25.

21 Rossy (1862-1932) was a lawyer, journalist, and orator. With Barbosa, Degetau, and others, he founded the Republican Party under United States sovereignty. A legal reformer, he was particularly interested in civil rights and in women's rights (Vivas Maldonado, pp. 277-78).

22 Barbosa (1857-1921), like José Gómez Brioso, was a physician. His birthday, July 27, is a legal holiday in Puerto Rico, and Barbosa represents the statehood alternative for political status (Ibid., pp. 258-59).

23 Sánchez Morales (1867-1934) was an orator, journalist, and legislator, president of the Executive Council of Puerto Rico, 1912-17. He consistently followed the policies of Barbosa (Paul Gerard Miller, Historia de Puerto Rico /3d ed.; Chicago: Rand, McNally, 1946/, p. 414).

24 Another physician in politics, Veve Calzada was over a long period of time a member of the "second string" Republican leaders, both before and after 1898 (Tomás Carrión Maduro, Oradores parlamentarios y hombres notables de la Asamblea Legislativa de Puerto Rico /San Juan: Imprenta del Boletín Mercantil, 1904/, p. 171).

25 Among the Republican idealists, it must be remembered, were those who accepted violence as a means of securing their end, as well as those who believed only in constitutional changes. There were also those who held a republic as their ideal but were willing to cooperate with a liberal constitutional monarchy. The objection here was against collaboration with a monarchical party on behalf of autonomy. Cf., Luis Muñoz Rivera, "Ni republicanos ni monárquicos--Puertorriqueños!" in La Democracia, 18 de julio de 1896, as quoted in his Campañas políticas, I, 214-17.
Spanish conservative statesman, historian, and man of letters (1828-97), he led political plans to restore Alfonso XII and was afterward repeatedly premier. The chief figure in stabilizing the restored monarchy, he helped work a political arrangement that rotated power within a narrow group. His reputation later suffered because of criticism from all sectors of Spanish politics. He edited Historia general de España (18 vols.; Madrid: El Progreso Editorial, 1891-99) and wrote several historical and critical works (Diccionario de historia de España, I, 519-22).

The execution of the anarquists of Barcelona unleashed the liberal press of the entire world against Cánovas. The assassination of Cánovas by Miguel Angiolillo was a result of the violent campaign (Ballesteros y Beretta, VIII, 418-19).

María Cristina (1858-1929), Queen of Spain, is not to be confused with the grandmother of her husband (Alfonso XII), Queen Maria Cristina, consort of Fernando VII. The latter lady was regent for Isabel II and the former for Alfonso XIII. Alfonso's mother was an Austrian Habsburg archduchess married (1879) to Alfonso XII. After her husband's death she was regent (1886-1902) for their posthumous son, Alfonso XIII. During her regency little was done to remedy the social ills of Spain, and the last Spanish possessions in America were lost in the Spanish-American War (Diccionario de historia de España, II, 375-76).


Muñoz Rivera, I, 229.

Other reactions are quoted in Cruz Monclova, Historia de Puerto Rico, Siglo XIX, III, 3. parte, 110-17.

El Liberal (Madrid) was published from 1893 to 1913. It was a widely read and respected paper whose editor, Miguel Moya, was a political foe of the policies of Maura and also founded La Sociedad Editorial de España (1906). Muñoz Rivera was the founder of El Liberal (San Juan) in 1898, with which the Spanish paper is not to be confused (Diccionario de historia de España, II, 901-904; Pedreira, El periodismo en Puerto Rico, pp. 313-19).
37El Liberal (Madrid), 27 de noviembre de 1897.

El País (Habana) was the official organ of the Partido Autonomista Cubano and as early as 1886 was publishing Puerto Rican news as well as that of Cuba (Lidio Cruz Monclova, Historia del año de 1887 /Río Piedras: Editorial Universitaria, 1958/, p. 124).

39Muñoz Rivera founded La Democracia as an autonomist paper in 1890, and it continued to be published until the mid-twentieth century. Its political orientation changed with that of its editors: Autonomist, Unionist, Liberal, Popular Democratic. It is another link between the philosophy of Luis Muñoz Rivera and that of his son, Luis Muñoz Marín, the latter also being at one time an editor of La Democracia (Rosa-Nieves, I, 562).

40The historical development of the idea of autonomy for Puerto Rico is outlined in Cruz Monclova, Historia del año de 1887, pp. 3-27, and Pagan, Procerato puertorriqueño del siglo XIX, pp. 317-20.

41In accord with the assimilative tendency of the government in Madrid, aided by the demands and memorials of the deputies from Puerto Rico in the Cortes, by decrees and royal orders there were extended to Puerto Rico numerous laws in force in Spain (Pagan, Procerato puertorriqueño del siglo XIX, p. 315).

42La Democracia, 16 de diciembre de 1897.

43Alfonso XIII (1886-1941), the posthumous son and successor of Alfonso XII, was King of Spain (1886-1931). His mother, María Cristina (1858-1929) was regent until 1902. In spite of his personal popularity, the monarch was threatened by social unrest in the newly industrialized areas, by Catalan agitation for autonomy, by dissatisfaction with the Moroccan situation, and by the rise of socialism and republicanism. The reign of King Alfonso was heir to problems generated in the nineteenth century and culminating in the colonial disaster of 1898 (Diccionario de historia de España, I, 124-28).

44Benito Francia Ponce de Leon was the secretary of General Manuel Macías Casado, one of the governors of Puerto Rico in 1898 (Cruz Monclova, Historia de Puerto Rico, siglo XIX, III, 3. parte, 159.

45Muñoz Rivera, II, 82-83.

46Francisco Mariano Quiñones (1830-1908), one of the Puerto Rican commissioners of the Junta Informativa of 1867, deputy to the Spanish Cortes, chairman of the Mayagüez assembly of the Autonomist Party, member of the House of Delegates under the Foraker Law (Vivas Maldonado, pp. 274-75), was also an historian and a novelist (Rosa-Nieves, I, 414).
47F. E. Jackson & Son (comp. and ed.), The Representative

48José Severo Quiñones Caro (1838-1909) was a lawyer,
and later a judge—the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of Puerto Rico under United States sovereignty (Boletín Histó-
rico de Puerto Rico, XI /1924/7, 283; Fernández y García, p. 990).

49Manuel Fernández Juncos (1846-1928) was a Spaniard who
came to Puerto Rico at the age of 11. Aside from his continuing
interest in the cause of Puerto Rican self-government, he is
known for his writings and his oratory (Josefina Rivera de Alva-
rez, Diccionario de literatura puertorriqueña /Río Piedras:
Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1955/7, pp. 286-89). The importance
of Fernández Juncos' literary periodical, El Buscapíe, is well
detailed in Frank Gaetano Carrino, "Manuel Fernández Juncos:
Pivotal Force in the Insular Movement of Porto Rico Through El
Buscapíe" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michi-
gan, 1957).

50José de Diego (1866-1918), lawyer, poet and journal-
ist, deserves to be the subject of another doctoral disserta-
tion. With Muñoz Rivera almost from the beginning, he moved
toward the last of his life toward the independence point of
view (Vivas Maldonado, pp. 265-66). At one time he even leaned
toward the possibility of an Antillean confederation, for which
see his Unión antillana (San Juan: Tipografía del Boletín Merc-
cantil, 1915).

51This was the name given to the supporters of the gov-
ernment of Spain in Puerto Rico, who were active in the Conserv-
ative Party, in order to give emphasis to their loyalty without
conditions. For the origin and development of this interesting
party, see Cruz Monclova, Historia de Puerto Rico, siglo XIX,
III, 1. parte, passim. The program of "creed" of the incondi-
cionales is found ibid., p. 7.

52The Partido Conservador of Spain, founded by Cánovas,
maintained during almost half a century of relative political
stability. In some ways it was a personal party dependent upon
strong leadership, after Cánovas' death provided by Maura. When
in power the party achieved many of the objectives of the Liber-
als and differed chiefly from the latter group in the rigidity
with which it enforced the law and fortified the executive power
(Diccionario de historia de España, I, 738-39).

53"Apuntes para un libro" was first published in Muñoz
Rivera's Diario de Puerto Rico during July and August, 1900,
until a mob destroyed his printing press in September of that
year. These notes were later collected and published in Vol.
3 of Muñoz Rivera's Campañas políticas, pp. 1-94.
Segismundo Moret y Prendergast (1838-1913), a lawyer of a good family, was Overseas Minister in the cabinet of General Prim and in 1873, as minister signed the law abolishing slavery in Puerto Rico. Later, he joined Sagasta's Liberal Party and when the Liberals came to power in 1897, assumed again the Overseas Ministry. An eloquent orator, he defended free trade. Through Moret, of course, the autonomy came to Puerto Rico in 1897 (Diccionario de historia de España, II, 565).

Germán Gamazo (1838-1901), orator, lawyer, and financial expert, was Overseas Minister in 1885 and Treasury Minister in 1892. In 1898 he took the portfolio of Development (Fomento). A trusted adviser of Sagasta whom he converted to protectionism, Gamazo later broke with his leader and led a group of dissidents into the Conservative Party (Ibid., I, 1201).

Muñoz Rivera, III, 5.

Román Baldorioty de Castro (1822-1889) studied and taught the natural sciences, and was a Puerto Rican deputy in the Spanish Cortes. A militant autonomist, he was imprisoned and exiled at various times. He was the first president of the Puerto Rican Autonomist Party and at his death the leadership went to Muñoz Rivera (Coll y Toste, 123-35).

Julio L. de Vizcarondo y Coronado (1830-89), abolitionist and humanitarian, was constantly at odds with the authorities whom he as constantly attacked in the columns of the various newspapers he edited. He was also a deputy to the Spanish Cortes; lived four years in the United States, the birthplace of his wife. He was one of the fathers of the Puerto Rican autonomy movement (Vivas Maldonado, pp. 279-80).

La Fortaleza (Governor's Palace or Government House) has had a long and colorful history, closely allied to the history of the whole island. Its foundations date to 1529, although it has been rebuilt and remodeled many times since. Then as now it housed the governor and the government offices (U.S., Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration, pp. 189-93).

Spanish political parties were a result of the constitutional regime initiated by the Cortes of Cádiz. The parties of the left included the Liberals, the Democrats, the Socialists, etc., as well as the Republicans. In Spain, of course, the Republicans were a truly radical party, not to be compared with the Republicans of the United States, for the Spanish group sought the abolition of the monarchy (Diccionario de historia de España, II, 776).

Passive resistance, a campaign of civil disobedience expressed in nonviolent resistance to the laws, or mahatmamachandismo, was never a popular political technique in Puerto Rico. On the one hand, boycott of an election might be used, or sabotage, or (the favorite Puerto Rican device) verbal attacks on
the government through political newspapers. What is pointed out here is the mistaken belief of Degetau in ideals not backed up by any sort of force except their asserted intrinsic value. For a study of Degetau's position, see Ángel Manuel Mergal Llera, Federico Degetau, un orientador de su pueblo (New York: Hispanic Institute in the United States, 1944).

62 Fusionist Liberal was the complete, correct name of Sagasta's party, while Conservative Liberal was the name of Canova's group (Diccionario de historia de España, II, 241).

63 Ramón Marín Solá (1832-1902), father-in-law of Muñoz Rivera, educator, poet, dramatist, and journalist, was frequently in trouble with the law, for his autonomist ideas. At the close of his life he served as Director of Welfare (Boletín Histórico de Puerto Rico, X [1923], 327-30).

64 Pablo Ubarri Capetillo is on record as having opposed the extension of the electoral suffrage (ibid., V [1918], 255) and the creation of a University of Puerto Rico (Cruz Monclova, Historia de Puerto Rico, siglo XIX, III, 3. parte, 328-29), typical of the reactionary attitudes of the Unconditionals.

65 As the only great national secular institution in Spain, the Army was in a peculiar position to make or break any Spanish ministry. The army did not always side with the monarchy. On the other hand, it was quick to resist such liberal ideas as the equality of officers and enlisted men or civil supremacy over the military. However, the Army was not a continuing political party but rather the force behind a series of caudillos whose principles changed with the winds of political expediency and personal ambition. The Army as a political pressure group was neither united nor well-handled (The Cambridge Modern History /New York: Macmillan, 1910/, XII, 257-67).

66 The Revolution of 1868 was led by Marshal Serrano and Admiral Topete, an instance in which the military did not side with the monarch. The liberal parties united on a revolutionary program, following a severe press law and the dissolution of political clubs. The opposition to Isabel II was personal as well as theoretical and political. Scandals which gathered about the queen's name were ruthlessly exposed in the newspapers and undermined her position. Her latest favorite, Carlos Marfori, a cook's son and an actor by profession, was made Minister of State. The Queen fled to France (September 29) and was declared deposed (Diccionario de historia de España, II, 1041-42). An effect of the Revolution of 1868 in Puerto Rico was the release of the prisoners condemned to death for their part in the grito de Lares of 1867 and a general amnesty for all political prisoners and emigres (Miller, p. 280).

67 Isabel II (1830-1904), Queen of Spain (1833-1868), was a daughter of Fernando VII and María Cristina of Naples. Her mother was regent until 1840. Isabel's uncle, Carlos, contested
her succession under the Salic Law (females excluded from the line of succession to the throne) and the Crlist Wars began. Isabel was declared of age in 1843. Her rule, ignoring the economic and social problems of Spain, was one of party conflicts and of continuous cabinet changes (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1964/, XXII, 955-56).

68 The Revolution of 1868 is often referred to as the Sep-
tembrist Revolution because its principal events took place in
the month of September. Similarly, the Revolution of 1854 is
sometimes referred to as the July Revolution because its main
events took place in that month (William Leonard Langer [ed./7],
An Encyclopedia of World History, Ancient, Medieval, and Modern,

69 Ramón del Valle Inclán (1866-1936), Spanish novelist,
poet, and dramatist, was renowned for his colorful personality
and his preoccupation with style. With a growing social and
political consciousness, he wrote in a tone of burlesque tragedy
and a style superbly adapted to his grotesque, satirical, Goya-
like vision, calling the new genre esperpento ("an ugly, ridicu-
los person or thing"). In this vein is the unfinished series,
El ruedo ibérico, which consists of La corte de los milagros
(1927), Viva mi dueño (1928), and the posthumous Baza de espadas
(1958), and deals with the political degradation of nineteenth
century Spain (Encyclopaedia Britannica /1964/, XXII, 955-56).

70 Luis González Bravo (1811-71), lawyer, journalist, and
politician, was the reverse of St. Paul, for he was liberal in
his youth and ultra-conservative after the age of thirty-five.
He was one of the few ministers whom Isabel II trusted and he
went with her into exile after she was dethroned (Diccionario
de historia de España, I, 1254).

71 The two favorites referred to are Jose Gutiérrez de la
Concha (1809-95), some time governor general of Cuba, and Manuel
Pavía y Lacy, Marques de Novaliches (1814-96), captain general of
Cataluña and later of the Philippines. Novaliches is not to be
confused with Manuel Pavía y Rodriguez de Alburquerque, captain
general of Madrid, etc. (Ibid., I, 725, and II, 785-86, respec-
tively).

72 Ramón del Valle Inclán, Viva mi dueño (Buenos Aires:
Editorial Losada, 1940), I, 126.

73 Ramón María Narváez (1800-68), a Spanish soldier and
statesman who distinguished himself in the fighting against the
Carlists (1834-39). As leader of the moderate conservatives,
Narváez held the premiership repeatedly after 1844. His authori-
tarian policy suppressed revolutionary movements, but it also
prepared the uprising which soon after his death caused the down-
fall of Queen Isabel II (Diccionario de historia de España, II,
626-28).
Maria Rafaela Quiroga /Sor Maria de los Dolores y Patrocinio/, "la monja de las llagas," (1811-91), was a sort of female Rasputin in the court of Francisco and Isabel II. Her stock rose and fell, both in Madrid and in Rome, but she was a popular favorite, and the cause of her beautification has been begun (Ibid., II, 955).

Maria Fernando Francisco de Asis (1822-1902), nephew of Fernando VII, married (1846) his cousin Queen Isabel II. Although he was granted the title and honors of King Consort, the Queen's notorious philandering soon estangled them. He was granted no part in the administration of affairs, although he was a particular foe of Narvaez and tried to maneuver his downfall. He left Spain (1868) when the Queen was driven out and was granted a separation from her in 1870 (Ibid., I, 1175).


Ibid., p. 23.

The word in Spanish is espadones ("brass hats"). See note 65 supra on "military interests."

Sebastián Iradier (1809-65) was a Spanish composer, professor of voice in Paris, and a student of Cuban folklore (Diccionario enciclopédico U.T.E.H.A. /Mexico, 1952/, VI, 386).

Ramón del Valle Inclán, Baza de espadas (Barcelona: Editorial AHR, 1958), p. 69.

Diccionario literario de obras y personajes de todos los tiempos y de todos los países (Barcelona: Montañer y Simón, 1959), IX, 366-67.

Joseph Bonaparte (1768-1844), the elder brother of Napoleon, who made him King of Spain in 1808. Thoroughly unsuccessful in defending his throne in the Peninsular War, he reluctantly abdicated in 1813. A lawyer by training, Joseph sought to bring some liberal reforms to Spain, but he was always regarded as a conqueror and intruder. The 1808-14 period, also known as the war of independence, marked the lowest point of the Spanish Bourbon dynasty, but the spirit of the Spanish people asserted itself in fearless querella warfare against the French oppressors. In Latin America, the war served as detonator for the independence revolutions of the Spanish colonies (Diccionario de historia de España, II, 106).

The Second of May (Dos de Mayo) refers to the general uprising of the citizens of Madrid against the French invaders, setting off a national revolution (1808). The quotation is from Valle Inclán, Viva mi dueño, II, 155. Cf. Diccionario de historia de España, I, 913-15.
"La Niña" represents the revolution (Valle Inclán, Viva mi dueño, I, 7, and II, 183).

In Spain as elsewhere in Europe and America, the Masonic centers were often efficient elements in the triumph of liberal ideas. For more detailed information, see Enciclopedia universal ilustrada europeo-americana (Barcelona: J. Espasa, 1930), XXXIII, 741-47.

Juan Prim y Prats (1814-1870) was a Catalan officer who fought for María Cristina and Isabel II against the Carlists and became one of the chief factional leaders in the fierce political rivalry of Isabel's reign. He held high offices and was a leader in the Cortes. For plotting against General Narváez he was imprisoned and exiled. Later as governor general of Puerto Rico and as a commander (1859-60) in the warfare in Morocco he proved a capable general and a stern administrator. A political opponent of General O'Donnell, he was again exiled from Spain (1864-66) but returned to take a large part in the overthrow of Isabel. Prim was a key figure in the choice of a new monarch, and secured the choice for Amadeo, but before that prince could arrive in Spain, Prim was assassinated by his political enemies (Diccionario de historia de España, II, 908-11; Andrés Galera y Romero, Del tronco ibérico /San Juan: Tipografía San Juan, 1926/, pp. 11-20).


Amadeo I (1845-1890), King of Spain (1870-73), was son of Victor Emmanuel II of Italy. Juan Prim urged his election as king by a constituent assembly after the expulsion (1868) of Isabel II. Amadeo accepted the crown reluctantly. The upper classes were opposed to Amadeo, who belonged to the anti-clerical House of Savoy, and repeated attempts were made on his life. When a new rebellion by the Carlists began, Amadeo abdicated and returned to Italy. A year later Alfonso XII was proclaimed king (Diccionario de historia de España, I, 181-83).

The First Spanish Republic was proclaimed, following the abdication of Amadeo I on Feb. 12, 1873, by the radical majority in the Cortes elected in August, 1872 (the Carlists having abstained). On May 10, 1873, a constituent Cortes, now elected, was divided among partisans of different types of federal republic. On September 8, in the midst of Carlist uprisings, Emilio Castelar, partisan of a centralized republic, was made head of the government, with the mission of restoring order. Castelar retired January 2, 1874. A military coup promptly followed, with Marshal Serrano as head of a provisional government. The Carlist Wars continued, marked by exceptional brutality (Ibid., II, 1023-27).

Pavía, captain general of Madrid, came with his troops to the Camara (House) and dissolved it, January 3, 1874. He
called a meeting of the heads of the political parties in order to resolve the situation. A provisional government was formed under General Serrano. The new ministry suspended the constitutional guarantees, dissolved the Republican Cortes and set about to resolve the two conflicts of greatest urgency: to stamp out the remains of cantonalism and to suffocate the Carlist War (Jesús P. Martínez, Historia de España en cuadros esquemáticos /Madrid: Ediciones y Publicaciones Españolas, 1951/, p. 143).

The agreement provided that the ministerial power would alternate between two parties, both supporting the regime: the Conservatives (led by Cánovas del Castillo) and the Liberals (under Sagasta). See Diccionario de historia de España, II, 771, 1319-20; Fernández Almagro, I, 462-64.

Leopoldo O'Donnell (1809-67), Spanish general and statesman, was a member of a branch of the Irish O'Donnells of Tyrconnel. He fought successfully for María Cristina against the Carlists and went with her to France when Espartero seized (1840) power in Spain. He failed in a coup (1841) against Espartero at Pamplona, but returned (1843) to Spain after Espartero's fall. He was governor of Cuba from 1844 to 1848; in 1854 he reached an agreement with Espartero, and they overthrew the government of María Cristina. He served as War Minister (1854-56) under Espartero and was several times premier as leader of the Liberal Union Party which he founded. He followed a more or less moderate policy and restored (1856) the constitution of 1845. In 1866 his government was overthrown by Ramón Narváez and Juan Prim (Diccionario de historia de españa, II, 687-88).

Arsenio Martínez de Campos (1831-1900) was a Spanish general who served in Morocco (1859-60), with Juan Prim in Mexico (1861-63), and in Cuba (1869-72). He played a leading role in the proclamation of Alfonso XII as King and helped bring the Carlist Wars to an end. In 1877 he was sent to Cuba, where he ended the Ten Years War. In 1879 he was briefly premier of Spain and then War Minister. In 1895 he was sent to put down the insurgents in the Cuban Revolution, but his lenient attitude caused his replacement by Weyler. He was later president of the Spanish Senate (Ibid., II, 413-14).

With the grito de Sagunto (or pronunciamiento de Sagunto) in December, 1874, began the restoration of the monarchy in the person of Alfonso XII (Ibid., II, 1091).

Francisco Serrano y Domínguez (1810-85) was a Spanish general and statesman who distinguished himself in the war against the Carlists in 1834-39. He at first supported Espartero but later worked for his overthrow. He was appointed captain general of Granada (1847), then of Cuba (1859). On his return he was created Duke of La Torre and a grandee of Spain. After the death of his friend O'Donnell he led the Liberal Union Party. He participated with Juan Prim in the Revolution of 1868
and was named regent by the constituent assembly. Serrano was premier under King Amadeo, after whose abdication (1873) he opposed the newly established republic. In 1874 a military coup d'état placed him at the head of the provisional government. Serrano fled to France when Alfonso XII was restored (1875) to the Spanish throne, but he returned soon afterward (Ibid., II, 1168-70).

Fernando Primo de Rivera y Sobremonte (1831-1921) is not to be confused with his more famous relative, Miguel Primo de Rivera y Orbaneja (1870-1930) (Ibid., II, 911-17).

Adelardo López de Ayala (1828-79) was a famous dramatist who in politics was a Liberal. He wrote the famous manifesto, España con honra, which sought to justify the Revolution of 1868 (Ibid., II, 282-83).

Joseph Fouche (1763-1820) was a French revolutionist and Minister of Police, sometimes considered the father of the modern police state. He was famous for unfailing efficiency (Enciclopedia universal ilustrada europeo-americana, XXIV, 785-86).

Nicolás de Azcárate (1828-94) was a Cuban politician, journalist, and orator. As a reformer he failed to get more liberty from the Spanish royalist government and lost prestige (Enciclopedia U.T.E.H.A., I, 1246).

Domingo Dulce (1808-69) was a general of liberal tendencies in Spanish politics but was unpopular in Cuba due to his harshness toward the separatists (Diccionario de historia de España, II, 919-20).

Entitled España con honra, this document signed by the military leaders sought to justify the Revolution of 1868 (Ballesteros y Beretta, VIII, 102-103).

Fernando VII (1784-1833) was King of Spain in 1808 and in 1814-33. The decree referred to is the Facultades Omni-modas of 1810, text of which is found in Miller, pp. 578-79.

The label, "progressives," is here used in a general sense to connote the party-complex in power during the First Republic. For a precise history of the progressive parties of Spain, see Diccionario de historia de España, II, 927.

For the complete story of the "special laws," see Loida Figueroa Mercado, "Puerto Rico ante la oferta de leyes especiales por España, 1808-1887" (unpublished doctor's dissertation, Universidad Central de Madrid, 1963).

For a history of the work of this Junta Informativa de Ultramar de 1866-67 and the attempted reforms of that period, see Porfirio Valiente, Reformes dans les îles de Cuba et de Porto-Rico (Paris: A. Chaix, 1869).
106 Manuel Pavía y Rodríguez de Alburquerque (1827-95), captain general of Madrid, put an end to the First Republic by emptying the Cortes. See note 90, supra, and Diccionario de historia de España, II, 786.

107 Nicolás Salmerón y Alonso (1838-1908) was both a statesman and a philosopher. A professor at Oviedo and Madrid universities and a convinced Republican, he became, after the expulsion (1868) of Isabel II, a member of the revolutionary junta, of the constituent assembly (1869), and of the Cortes (1871). After Amadeo's abdication, he was Minister of Justice and then President of the Republic (1873). He restored some order, but was unable to handle the confused political situation and soon resigned. He opposed Pavía's coup d'etat and fled to Paris after the restoration of Alfonso XII. Returning to Spain, he regained (1884) his chair of philosophy at Madrid and was re-elected to the Cortes, where he led the Federalist Republicans (Diccionario de historia de España, II, 1098).

108 Francisco Romero Robledo (1838-1906) began his political career at the age of 25 as a Liberal but became progressively Conservative. Cánovas included him in his cabinet because of his undoubted political skill and popular appeal (Ibid., II, 1066-67).

109 Antonio Maura y Montaner (1853-1925) entered the Cortes in 1881 as a Liberal but later became prominent as a Conservative. His program for reform (a "revolution from above") was never enacted. He held several cabinet posts before serving a number of times as premier (Ibid., II, 429-432; Galera y Romero, pp. 47-55).

110 Enrique José Nemesio Pineyro y Barry, Como acabo la dominación de España en America (Paris: Garnier Hermanos, 1908), p. 86.

111 Buenaventura Abarzuzu (1843-1910) was a friend of Castelar, Minister of Overseas Affairs (1894) and a negotiator of the Treaty of Paris (1898) (Diccionario de historia de España, I, 2).


113 Francisco Cepeda Taborcías (died 1911) was an ardent defender of political-administrative autonomy in Cuba before coming to Puerto Rico (Rivera de Álvarez, p. 238; Enciclopedia universal ilustrada europeo-americana, XII, 1125).

114 La Revista de Puerto Rico was published in San Juan (1886-87) and in Ponce during 1888-1894 (Ibid.).

115 El Diario de Puerto Rico was published in San Juan daily including Sundays from 1893 to 1894. It is not to be confused with the later newspaper of the same name published
by Luis Muñoz Rivera (Pedreira, El periodismo en Puerto Rico, pp. 377-78).

116 Salvador Brau y Asencio (1842-1912) was a dramatist, poet, journalist, and historiographer who was an ardent fighter for reforms for Puerto Rico. See Arturo Córdova Landrón, Salvador Brau; su vida su obra, su época (San Juan: Editorial Universitaria, 1949).

117 El Clamor del País (1883-94) was a Liberal, reformist, and (later) Autonomist newspaper, published Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday in San Juan (Pedreira, El periodismo en Puerto Rico, p. 365).

118 Quoted in Cruz Monclova, Luis Muñoz Rivera, pp. 353, 706.

119 Cepeda gave as his excuse for leaving Puerto Rico early in 1892 the state of his health and that of his wife (Ibid., pp. 171-73).

120 Ponce: Tipografía de la Revista de Puerto Rico, 1890.

121 Rafael María de Labra y Cadrana, La reforma electoral en las Antillas españolas (Madrid: Imprenta de El Liberal, 1891).

122 Rafael Marís de Labra y Cadrana, La política antillana en la metrópoli española (Madrid: Imprenta de El Liberal, 1891). This bound with the publication mentioned in note 121, supra.


124 Infieisto is a "villa" in the province of Oviedo. It is said that political struggles have always been violent in Infieisto because it has been unwilling to follow the leadership of bosses (Ibid., XXVIII, parte 1, 1430).

125 Sabana Grande, Puerto Rico, was founded in 1814 (Ibid., LII, 1053).

126 José Julián Acosta y Calvo (1825-91) was a teacher, journalist, political prisoner, deputy to the Cortes, and assimilist who retired from politics upon the emergence of the Autonomist Party in 1887 (Vivas Maldonado, pp. 255-56).

127 Segundo Ruiz Belvis (1825-67) was a lawyer and abolitionist who died in exile in Chile at the early age of 42 (Ibid., p. 278).

128 Cruz Monclova, Historia de Puerto Rico, siglo XIX, I, 486-556.
Manuel Ruiz Zorrilla (1833-95) was a politician whose influence extended widely. A monarchist who turned Republican, he held various ministries over the years and was premier under King Amadeo (Diccionario de historia de España, II, 1077-78).

Cristino Martos (1830-93) was a student radical while studying law. He served as Minister of Grace and Justice in 1874 and in 1886 was president of the Congress (Ibid., II, 423).

Ibid., I, 675-76.

Pagán, Procerato puertorriqueño del siglo XIX, p. 315.

Ibid., p. 255; Diccionario de historia de España, I, 754-55.

Cruz Monclova, Historia de Puerto Rico, siglo XIX, III, 1. parte, 363.

Manuel Pedregal y Canedo (1832-96) was a propagandist for liberalism from an early age; lawyer and politician, he was the author of many works of history, politics, law, and economics. He founded the Centralist Party in 1888 with Salmerón, Azcárate, Labra, and others (Diccionario de historia de España, II, 792).

Ricardo Becerro de Bengoa (1845-1902) was a journalist who supported the Republican cause (Enciclopedia universal ilustrada europeo-americana, 7, 1403-04).

José Muro López (1840-1907) was a Republican and Minister of State under Pi y Margall (Diccionario de historia de España, II, 604).

José María Valles y Ribot (1849-1911) was a lawyer, journalist, and orator who served as a deputy to the Cortes from the Federal Republican Party (Enciclopedia universal ilustrada europeo-americana, LXVI, 1104).

Covadonga is a city in the province of Oviedo (Diccionario de historia de España, I, 804).

The hymn of Riego, the Spanish revolutionary anthem of 1820, was made the national anthem by the Republic of 1931. The author, Rafael de Riego y Núñez (1785-1823) was a Liberal-Anarchist (Enciclopedia universal ilustrada europeo-americana, LI, 513-14).

The ateneos of Spain, following the example of those of the French Revolution, were centers for the discussion of the social sciences as well as the humanities. Like the Masonic lodges, they were often the centers of liberal or revolutionary movements (Diccionario de historia de España, I, 316-17).

Cf., for example, II Cor. 11.
Emilio Castelar y Ripoll (1832-99) was a Spanish statesman and author greatly admired by Luis Muñoz Rivera. A professor of history and philosophy at the University of Madrid and a Republican leader, he was Foreign Minister and then head of the government (1873-74) in the brief Republic that followed the abdication of King Amadeo. Under Alfonso XII he was a member of the Cortes and became reconciled to the monarchy itself, although he remained in the political opposition. He wrote historical, political, and literary works (Diccionario de historia de España, I, 602-603).

Juan Contreras (1834-1906) was a Liberal and Republican leader as well as a general, the "hero of Trevino" (1873) in the last Carlist War (Ibid., II, 769).

Francisco García Molinas was a doctor as well as a politician (Enciclopedia universal ilustrada europeo-americana, XXV, 813).

José del Perojo y Figueras (1852-1908) was a journalist who was also an expert in colonial and administrative questions. He favored autonomy for Cuba and was a regionalist on the Catalan question (Ibid., XLIII, 994).

Juan Francisco Gascoñ y Fernández Rubio was the Spanish Liberal who represented Quebradillas, Puerto Rico, in the Cortes of 1898 (Cruz Monclova, Luis Muñoz Rivera, p. 636).

See note 55, supra.

See note 107, supra.

José María Esquerdo (1834-1912) played a gallant part in the Carlist Wars (1874) and was a member of the Cortes (1893-1900) (Enciclopedia universal ilustrada europeo-americana, XXII, 381-82).

Bothwell and Cruz Monclova, pp. 29-32.

The small but active group of Puerto Ricans in New York who formed the Club Borinquen in 1891-92 advocated an autonomy that was little short of independence and were willing to fight for it (Cruz Monclova, Historia de Puerto Rico, siglo XIX, parte 1, 439-51).

Muñoz Rivera, II, 31.

Ibid.
Francisco Silvela (1845-1905) was head of the Conservative Party after Canovas (Diccionario de historia de España, II, 1185).

Joaquín López Puigcerver (1845-1906) was a lawyer and faithful Liberal who held a variety of ministries over the years (Ibid., II, 288).

José López Domínguez (1829-1911) was Minister of War from 1892 to 1895 (Ibid., II, 285-86).

Alvaro de Figueroa y Torres (1863-1950), Conde de Romanones, was mayor of Madrid (1894-95); a militant Liberal (Ibid., II, 1065-66).


Tomás Castellano y Villarroya (1850-1906) was Overseas Minister from 1895 to 1897 (Diccionario de historia de España, II, 604).

This law was also known as Ley de Bases y Ley Abarzuzu and dealt with the administration in Puerto Rico (Cruz Monclova, Historia de Puerto Rico, siglo XIX, III, 2. parte, 429).

Pagan, Procerato puertorriqueño del siglo XIX, p. 472; Diccionario de historia de España, I, 732).

The Junta de Autoridades was a sort of emergency council of holders of political power called in the face of a popular insurrection (Enciclopedia ilustrada universal europeo-americana, XXVIII, 2. parte, 3178).

"La Magdalena" refers to the character in Tirso de Molina's El vergonzoso en palacio who was the first female revolutionary in the history of modern love (Diccionario literario, XI, 599).

One collection of such correspondence is René Jiménez Malaret, Epistolario histórico del Dr. Félix Tío y Malaret (San Juan: Imprenta Soltero, 1953).

This quarter century began with the expectations aroused by the First Republic in 1871 and ended with the negotiations with Sagasta in 1896. But of course the completion of the Pact with Sagasta was not the fruition of only four months' effort but of ten years of incessant struggle. With the achievement of the Pact, on the other hand, words written in 1889 by Francisco Cepeda Taborcías were completely disproven: "God does not call Muñoz Rivera by the road of politics. For if he had called him, if he possessed the high gifts and fruitful energies that he sarcastically questions in the present Executive Committee, he and not the Committee would have regenerated the party. It is a well known fact that poets were never consummate
masters of the art of government (Quoted in Cruz Monclova, Luis Muñoz Rivera, p. 706). The Orthodox Party was left a minority group, and the political influence of Labra reduced to naught. It was a moment of triumph for Muñoz Rivera in which all avenues of power seemed to be open for him to initiate his ambitious program of reform: civil rights and liberties; public health; law enforcement; judicial reorganization and reform; equalization of taxes; Administrative reforms; civil service; more government positions for native Puerto Ricans; development of public education; establishment of a publicly-supported university, etc. But his was an ephemeral triumph. July 22, 1898, the Spanish government asked the United States for an armistice in which to discuss peace terms. Three days afterward American troops disembarked at the port of Guánica. A month later, they controlled almost all the island. And on the following October 18, which the signing of the peace treaty in Paris, the processes of cession and surrender of the island to the representatives of the United States were formalized.
CHAPTER III

THE AUTONOMIC CONSTITUTION OF 1897

The peak of Spanish "progressive" colonialism was reached in the Autonomic Constitution of 1897. However, the United States invasion intervened before it could be put into full operation. The Governor-General (Lieutenant-General Manuel Macías) assumed office February 3, 1898; the Insular Cabinet was sworn in February 12, 1898; the elections for the Insular Chambers were held on March 27, 1898; and on July 18, 1898, the first session of the Chambers opened. An all-Liberal Chamber of Representatives reduced the Cabinet from five to four secretaries as the sum total of its labors. July 25, 1898, United States troops landed at Guánica. On February 6, 1899, the autonomic government was formally abolished by Major General George V. Henry. Thus there were no actual operations, no judicial decisions, no administrative practices, no reservoir of custom and usage under the Autonomic Constitution with which to test its worth or interpret its clauses. Yet an analysis, though limited to the theoretical vacuum of the printed word, is most necessary since this document lived on past the Spanish regime as a symbol of what might have been and as a standard by which to measure United States efforts. In the political philosophy of Luis Muñoz Rivera, the Autonomic Constitution
represents an acceptable form of government for Puerto Rico, a government in which Muñoz Rivera himself held office.

The relationship between Spain and Puerto Rico under the Autonomic Constitution of 1897 incorporated many features that could definitely be labelled "progressive" in the frame of reference of colonial autonomy. Discounting for the moment the rather generous allocation of power to the Governor-General, Puerto Rico achieved a degree of self-government in some respects as yet unattained under the present Commonwealth Constitution of 1952. Puerto Ricans, as Spanish citizens, still enjoyed the civil rights protected by Title One of the Spanish Constitution of 1876. In addition, not only was the right of participation in the Spanish Cortes retained but it was set forth as "no trifling or insignificant advantage" in the Preamble to the 1897 document:

The Antilles can be completely autonomous, in the broadest signification of the word, and at the same time have representation in, and form part of, the national parliament.

So that while the representatives of the insular people govern, in their local chambers, the interests peculiar and special to their country, other representatives, chosen by the same people shall assist and cooperate in the Cortes in the framing of the laws that are the mold in which are amalgamated and unified the diverse elements that form the Spanish nation.

... a privilege solicited today, as one of the greatest political advances of our times, by the autonomous English colonies, which desire to share, in an Imperial Parliament, in the high functions of legislators and rulers of the great British Empire.

The home government enjoyed only those powers reserved to it, i.e.,
specially and expressly reserved to the Cortes of the Kingdom or to the central Government as herein provided, or as may be provided hereafter, in accordance with the prescription set forth in additional article 2.\(^3\)

All other powers were assigned to the colony. This was further strengthened under the amending procedure which allowed amendments only "by virtue of a law and upon the petition of the insular parliament."\(^4\) Perhaps the most "advanced" of all provisions were to be found in those granting virtual commercial and tariff autonomy to the islanders. Commercial treaties affecting the island, regardless of whether they originated with the Home or Insular governments, were to be made by the former "with the cooperation of special delegates duly authorized by the colonial government."\(^5\) Any commercial treaties made without the participation of the Insular government were to be submitted to the Insular government for "its acceptance or nonacceptance of their stipulations."\(^6\) These rights were buttressed by the grant to the Insular parliament of total control, except for transitory measures found in Article 40, over the framing of the tariff, including both import and export duties. It is interesting to note that the provisions of Additional Article 2 as well as Articles 37 and 38 have been used by Puerto Rican Nationalists as a basis for their claim that the transfer of the island from Spain to the United States by the Treaty of Paris was illegal.\(^7\)

According to the Preamble "three important aspects" emerged by "implanting . . . an autonomic constitution," namely, "the sacred interests of the mother country," "the
aspirations, the needs, the desires of colonies," and "the vast and interesting aggregation of the nations created, the interests developed in the long past." Against this background the document essentially delineated the powers and functions of the Governor-General, the Insular Chambers, and the municipal and provincial governments (the judiciary, with some qualifications, being reserved to the national government). 8

"The supreme authority of the colony shall be vested in a Governor-General, appointed by the King on the nomination of the Council of Ministers." 9 This "supreme authority," as specifically stated in the Constitution, was to represent the Mother Country, autonomy not stretching its mantle to cover the executive branch of the new government. Although the Constitution referred to the Governor-General in a dual capacity, as representative of the home government and as chief executive of the colonial government, 10 it was in the former role that the bulk of the power seemed to have been placed. The power inherent in the patronato of the Indies, the command of all military and naval forces on the island, the power of appointing employees of his cabinet, the power of pardon, the duty to take care that colonial justice be promptly administered, and the right to communicate directly on foreign affairs with Spanish representatives throughout America were buttressed by powers far greater in their scope and effect. 11

As regards the Insular Chambers, the Governor-General appointed seven out of the 15 members of the Council of Administration, said councilors holding life tenure. 12 In addition to the right to convene, suspend, and adjourn the sessions of
the Insular Chambers, he could dissolve either or both of them, with the limitation of recall or renewal within three months. The duty of presenting the colonial budget was supplemented by the right, through his secretaries, of initiating and proposing colonial statutes. The veto power of the Governor-General does not emerge clearly from a reading of the Constitution. He was to sanction and proclaim the acts of the Insular parliament, the Constitution not giving any indication that this was a discretionary function other than what could be assumed from the term "sanction." In testimony given before Henry K. Carroll, it was definitely stated by Luis Muñoz Rivera that the Governor-General had the veto. The Governor-General also had the duty to transmit to the Council of Ministers in Spain for their action, laws of the Insular parliament which in his judgment went beyond its powers, infringed upon the rights of the citizens or jeopardized the interests of the colony or of the nation. He enjoyed a suspensory veto on the resolutions of the home government which "in his judgment and in that of his secretaries he considers . . . liable to injure the general interests of the nation or the special interests of the island."

In many respects the most far reaching power of the Governor-General came as a corollary to his duty to preserve the order and safety of the colony. In a manner reminiscent of "state of siege" practices on the Peninsula and in the Latin American republics, he was given the authority to suspend certain civil rights extended by Article 1 of the National
Constitution. These were the procedural guarantees plus the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, and petition. This was bolstered by the grant "to take all measures which he may deem necessary to preserve the peace within and the safety without for the territory entrusted to him," with or without consulting his secretaries. His position was that of a very strong executive responsible to and representing the Mother Country.

Though the Preamble carried the definite intent of establishing the parliamentary system, its actual mechanics must be deduced from scattered provisions. These leave the impression not of the clear-cut English or French prototypes but rather of the "semi-parliamentary" schemes adopted by several of the Latin American republics. The executive, while accountable through his cabinet, was left a wide area of discretion which might negate at vital moments the concept of responsibility. The Governor-General was neither a figurehead nor was he severely limited as to actual executive power.

To be remembered is the duality of roles, the Governor-General representing the nation and the Governor-General representing the colony. The executive orders of the Governor-General, "acting as a representative and chief of the colony," had to receive the countersignature of a secretary of the cabinet who as a consequence made himself responsible for these orders. As already mentioned, executive initiation of colonial statutes proceeded through the cabinet. Checks of the cabinet upon the Governor-General in his role as representative of the
Mother Country were couched in terminology ("with the aid of his secretaries," "his judgment and that of his secretaries," "he shall hear the counsel of his secretaries," etc.) indicative of advisory rather than absolute control over the executive. Even here there were instances when the Governor-General might act on his own responsibility. In the hearings before Commissioner Carroll both Luis Muñoz Rivera and Manuel F. Rossy painted a picture of the Governor-General in which he was severely and definitely limited by the Cabinet. Any apparent discrepancy can be resolved by remembering the aforementioned dual role of the Governor-General, who was limited in the one and not the other.

The Cabinet itself did represent a direct link between the Governor-General and the Insular Chambers in that Cabinet secretaries might be members of either Chamber, participate in the debates of the Chambers, and vote in the Chamber to which they belonged. As to the responsibility of the Cabinet itself, the Governor-General was granted the power "to appoint without restriction the employees of his Cabinet" as well as the President of the Cabinet, who was given no special prerogatives. This was reinforced by a bald statement to the effect that the Governor-General had power "to appoint and remove, without restriction, the secretaries of his Cabinet." By the same token, "the secretaries of the Cabinet shall be responsible to the Insular Parliament," which also could increase or diminish cabinet size as well as the scope of each executive department. The Insular Chambers had the power "to enforce the responsibility
of the secretaries of the Executive, who shall be tried by the Council, whenever impeached by the Chamber of Representatives." 30
The above system was strengthened by the instructions found in the transitory provisions to the effect that once the Insular Chambers shall have been constituted, the "Governor-General shall immediately appoint . . . those Cabinet secretaries who, in his judgment, most fully represent the majorities in the Chamber of Representatives and the Council of Administration." 31
In summation, this represented an attempt to establish a parliamentary system--an attempt destined to founder upon the traditional Hispanic shoals of reluctance to reduce executive power.

To complete the picture, it is necessary to turn to the Insular Legislature. As regards structure, the Insular Chambers consisted of a Council of Administration (with 15 members, seven appointed members serving for life, eight indirectly elected for staggered ten year terms) and a Chamber of Representatives (directly elected by all males above the age of 25). 32 The obvious intent was to have the Council of Administration based upon an "aristocratic" or "semi-aristocratic" foundation, while the Chamber of Representatives was to be the countervailing "popular" body. In the traditional approach, the concurrence of both Chambers was necessary to enact a law. 33 Each enjoyed some special prerogatives: the Chamber of Representatives originated measures dealing with taxes and public credit and impeachment of the executive, while the Council of Administration tried the impeachment. 34 The normal
immunities were granted to the legislators except when he should himself admit to being "the author of any article, book, pamphlet, or printed matter wherein military sedition is cited or invoked, or the Governor-General is insulted and maligned, or national sovereignty is assaulted." 35

The general grant of legislative power in colonial matters was bestowed upon the Insular Chambers "conjointly with the Governor-General." 36 The latter as well as either Chamber had the right to initiate colonial statutes. As already mentioned, the powers of the Insular Chambers were limited only by those "specially and expressly reserved to the Cortes of the kingdom or to the central government as herein provided, or as may be provided hereafter." 37 The enumeration of the "power to legislate on all matters and subjects concerning the Ministries of Justice, Interior, Treasury, Public Works, Education, and Agriculture" was enlarged by the statement that it did not pre-suppose "any limitation of their power to legislate on other subjects." 38 The legislature was granted the exclusive power to frame the local budget. This, however, was divided into two sections, one dealing with "revenues needed to defray the expenses of sovereignty, and the second part . . . the revenues and expenditures estimated for the maintenance of colonial administration." 39 The former had to be voted first, the Cortes of the kingdom determining the nature and amount of said "expenses of sovereignty." 40 The miscellaneous powers and duties of the Insular Chambers included receiving the oath of the Governor-General, the right to impeach and try the
secretaries of the executive, the right to petition the home
government, and the duty to implement certain national laws.\textsuperscript{41}
To round out the picture of legislative power, it is interesting
to note that legislative-executive conflicts were to be resolved
by judicial decision.\textsuperscript{42}

The foregoing analysis has covered the salient provisions
of the Autonomic Constitution of 1897, deliberately omitting
the clauses dealing with municipal and provincial government,
as being of secondary interest and never actually put into
practice. What root in history does government find here?
The obvious conclusion is that the prime legacy was a lack of
training in self-government. The Puerto Ricans never could
point to any extended period of time during which they managed
their own political affairs. Eugenio María de Hostos, among
others, recognized this problem when he wrote, "We have been
educated outside of these \textit{democratic} principles."\textsuperscript{43}

Yet although untutored in self-government, the Puerto
Ricans constantly strove for it. This struggle was seemingly
successful in 1897, but was nullified by the military triumph
of the United States. If the United States Congress were willing
to continue its customary practice of assuming that the
territorial status was but a transition stage before eventual
statehood, then United States occupation might bring Puerto
Rican political development to full fruition. If, on the other
hand, the Congress should decide to embark upon colonialism,
then the Puerto Ricans would receive a political disappointment
certain to produce bitterness and hostility, unless diplomatically and skillfully handled by the new "Mother Country" through the discovery of some alternative status.

The Autonomic Constitution, which we have been discussing, was a remarkably complete fulfillment of the goals of the Autonomist Party of Puerto Rico as expressed in its Programa y Declaraciones of 1887, to which Munoz Rivera subscribed. The following quotations detail the principles of the Party:

Art. 2. Said Party will try to obtain political and juridical identity with our peninsular brethren; and the fundamental principle of its policy will be to achieve the greatest decentralization possible within the national unity.

Art. 3. The clear and concrete formulation of this principle is the autonomic arrangement which has as its bases the direct representation of local interests in charge of the Provincial Deputations, and the responsibility, also direct, of those who are in charge of the exercise of public functions, with respect to what concerns purely interior or local administration.

Art. 4. As a consequence of this doctrine, the Party will ask that local administrative affairs be finally resolved in Puerto Rico and that the country be administered with the consent of its inhabitants, giving to the Deputation the function of approving all that relates to purely local matters, and without any intervention in what has a national character; such as, voting and preparing local budgets and without prejudice to the rights of the Cortes in matters of national budget.

Art. 5. The Party does not reject national unity but rather proclaims political and juridical identity, according to which, in Puerto Rico the same as in the Peninsula, will prevail the same Constitution, the electoral law, the law of assemblies, the same representation in the Cortes, the same law of association, of the press, of civil and criminal procedure, of the courts, of civil marriage, of public peace, the same provincial and municipal law; that is to say, that in regard to civil and political rights, the Party asks that the Antilles be equal with the Peninsula.

Art. 6. And by virtue of the administrative decentralization that the Party asks, the local questions which as a general rule, ought to be reserved to the Antilles, are following: public education, public works,
health, welfare, agriculture, banking, formation and policy of political subdivisions, immigration, ports, waters, mails, local budget, taxes and duties and commercial treaties; the latter always subject to the approval of the Central Government; so that, in making this reservation, the mother country continues in the full enjoyment of sovereignty, and in the conduct of the empire, with exclusive jurisdiction over everything related to the army, the navy and the courts of justice, diplomatic representation and general administration of the country to which is allotted its appropriate share in the general budget of the State, carrying on the direction of general policy, watching over the faithful observance of the laws, resolving all the conflicts of corporations and organizations, appointing and dismissing, in accordance with the general laws of the Nation, its representatives in the diverse branches of public administration, and in the right to suspend and nullify the agreements of the insular Deputation, when ultra vires or contrary to the national interest.44

To make some clarifying comparisons, Puerto Rican autonomy resembled United States territorial government, in that the governor was appointed by the central power at home,45 but approximated United States federal statehood with respect to representation in the central legislature in Madrid.46 In giving Puerto Rico parliamentary rather than presidential government, Spain followed European political philosophy.47 Puerto Rico's right to propose international commercial arrangements and to participate with Spain in their negotiation exceeded the power of the states or territories of the United States.48 Yet the emergency powers of the governor of Puerto Rico under autonomy, providing for the temporary suspension of civil rights and liberties were a possible source of abuse,49 although the Autonomic Constitution was in operation too short a time to see whether Puerto Rico would follow the dictatorial tendencies of many other Latin American republics.50
By making amendment of the Autonomic Constitution subject to the separate approval of Puerto Rico and of Spain, the Constitution became in fact a sort of international agreement or treaty, giving Puerto Rico greater power in this respect than that enjoyed by a state of the United States and analogous to the arrangement embodied in the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico of 1952.

The proclamation of the Autonomic Constitution produced diverse reactions both in Puerto Rico and in Spain. Let us consider at least the responses of Muñoz Rivera, De Diego, Hostos, and Barbosa.

For Muñoz Rivera, the Autonomic Constitution made Puerto Rico

a sovereign state, absolute master of its fate and capable of making its civil laws without the intervention of Spain nor of the powers that be in Madrid.

"The Autonomic Constitution," Muñoz Rivera reaffirmed four months later, "presented self-government without obstacles" and with it Puerto Rico began to feel itself master of its present and its future.

And a little later he repeated:

With the autonomy of 1897 the personality of Cuba and Puerto Rico was acknowledged more generously than England recognized that of Canada and Australia, for we continued to send senators and deputies to the Congress of Madrid.

With the autonomy of 1897 we were given legislative houses and a responsible executive Cabinet. Spain only had a representation more nominal than effective; that of the governor, who rules but did not govern, like the sovereigns of parliamentary monarchies.
The autonomy meant complete liberty in present time; in the future it meant something else: independence without machetes and jungles (i.e., guerrilla violence).55

In his speech at Ponce on November 28, 1897, at the time the autonomy was proclaimed, Muñoz Rivera explained why his party did not ask for "the autonomy of Canada." They wished to preserve the national unity under Spain as a safeguard against the autonomy falling into the hands of the unconditionals, the ultra-conservatives in power in the government at San Juan at the time of the autonomy proclamation. It was feared that if Spain gave "dominion status" to Puerto Rico, the unconditionals—a minority in the saddle—would frustrate the grant of universal suffrage (rig the elections) to perpetuate themselves in power.56

In this same speech Muñoz Rivera promised that the liberal government would uphold the laws, "true freedom of press, true freedom of assembly, true universal suffrage."57 He promised that the forthcoming elections would decide the verdict of the people, not the verdict of the politicians.58

José de Diego, undersecretary of justice, state and interior in the autonomy cabinet, later to become the symbol of the movement for complete independence, after manifesting that the introduction of autonomy by the autonomists was the work of Muñoz Rivera,59 declared that "its promulgation constituted the most transcendental act that had taken place in the Antilles since the discovery and colonization."60
De Diego wrote,

Since the first autonomist times I have had the pleasure of agreeing with the great intelligence of Muñoz Rivera in the essential basis of his thought: to carry our political life to the bosom of the national life, without abandoning our ideals, as if we were carrying the regionalist feeling to the heart of the fatherland or brought the heart of the fatherland to the regionalist feeling.

I directed that trend toward the bright heights—inaccessible, alas—of the republican ideal; he defended it with more years and more experience and more understanding, on the terra firma of the practical. His proposition was that the Autonomist Party, preserving its aspirations, enlist in the liberal dynastic party led by Sagasta; mine, that it unite, with the same reservations, with the Republican Party headed by Castelar . . . .

Later, my idea like a solitary call in the air, was extinguished, as thus happens with all the pure ideas that are not sustained by feeling. Because in the liberal parties of Puerto Rico there was never a true republican sentiment, nor was the republican ideal loved as the autonomist ideal was loved, the ideal made fatherland, like God made man.

As for me, I say that I was not an autonomist because I was a republican, rather that I was a republican because I was an autonomist, and I believed that the introduction of the new colonial law was almost impossible under the monarchical regime and almost certain in the republican regime.

With God nothing is impossible and the autonomy is the work of God; but the grandiose nationalization of our little political life, the efficient introduction of autonomy by the autonomists and the exaltation, never seen before, of our party to the spheres of the Government, these are deeds of long consequence due to the illustrious head of liberal politics in Puerto Rico.

The autonomy has been decreed and it was the Liberal Party that proposed it and the Queen of Spain who promulgated it, and although it were only due to gratitude, if it were not for a hundred thousand reasons, I would be on the side of the Government and at the feet of the Queen.

It doesn't matter if I am accused of political inconsistency; for my fatherland I have sacrificed a cherished ideal, and I am happy, because it has been a true sacrifice.
The best exposition of Hostos' political thought can be found in his forceful speech in the Ateneo of Madrid on December 20, 1868, three decades before the proclamation of the Autonomic Constitution:

Because I am an American, because I am a colonial, because I am a Puerto Rican, I therefore am a federalist. From my island I see Santo Domingo, I see Cuba, I see Jamaica, and I think of a confederation . . . . I prophesy a providential confederation . . . . The bond of liberty which still can unite the Antilles with Spain is a federal bond; the means of achieving independence within dependence is the federation.62

Hostos, the Puerto Rican expatriate who first sought a Spanish federation with the Antilles and later an independent confederation of island states, the Confederation of the Antilles, found it extremely difficult to accept the politics of his separated brethren. "As for Puerto Rico, it's better not to grieve thinking that one cannot even go there to die . . . there is not a piece of ground on which a conscientious Antilian can go to look for quiet and pleasant hospitality."63

The death of Hostos in 1903 gave rise to a number of manifestos in favor of the confederation. One maintained that the Caribbean Confederation would soon be realized under the protection of, and in dependence upon, the United States.64 This is important only in the sense that it indicates that in the pro-United States wave which swept the island, even the concept of the confederation was Americanized.

Since the confederation idea died so early in the twentieth century, it seems permissible to complete the story while we are still discussing the Autonomic Constitution of 1897. This idea
did catch the interest of one United States citizen. General George W. Davis, the second military governor of Puerto Rico, suggested the establishment of a West Indian Republic composed of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Spanish-speaking part of Santo Domingo. He argued that, given certain economic benefits, such as preferential trade agreements with the United States, this nation of four million people with the same language, the same religion, and the same customs and laws, could set up its own government and fill its own offices. The United States would control the foreign relations of the nation and maintain naval stations on each; thus "every advantage we could secure by annexation would be gained."

This concept of the Caribbean Confederation was not far removed from contemporary propaganda and jingoism about the "American Mediterranean," and did not escape those who looked upon the Confederation as a means to obtain political freedom. They rose up to defend their ideal from such perversion. Dr. Antonio Rosell y Carbonell, one of those who reacted against this process of Americanization, looked upon the Confederation of the Spanish-speaking islands as the only possible way to resist the advance of the United States. Far from hoping that the United States would establish a Confederation he suggested that such a move, if taken, would serve as a barrier to further political expansion of the colossus to the north.

Favoring the formation of a Federation of the Antilles, they will be able, in an effective manner, to inspire the confidence of suspicious people in their good faith without even abandoning their expansionist and imperialist policies.
Most of these writers did little more than pass a commentary on or make a slight variation in an idea which long before had been established by Betances and Hostos. They respected the ideal of the Confederation, but did not take up that ideal, adopt it as their own, and work ceaselessly for its realization. There is, with the possible exception of Dr. Rosell, nothing of lasting value which they can add to the work of Hostos and Betances. Soon, however, even these meager commentaries disappeared until in our own day, under the urgency of World War II, Caribbean unity was again discussed.

The importance of Dr. Rosell lies, however, in the fact that he was the first to give concrete thought to the mechanics of the political organization of the Caribbean Confederation. He proposed that the seat of the inter-island government be in Havana but that the president, elected by the legislature composed of representatives of the three countries, should spend a month each year in Puerto Rico and Santo Domingo. The term of the president was to be for seven years and he was not to succeed himself but rather to be followed by a Puerto Rican and then in turn by a Dominican. The president was to select his own cabinet, consisting of two Cubans, two Puerto Ricans, and two Dominicans, from the legislative assembly.

This plan was submitted to the legislature of Puerto Rico by nine of its members on February 27, 1909. Although not formally rejected, it was not acted upon.
Other suggestions by Rosell included a uniform monetary and postal system, free trade between the islands, and encouragement of an interchange of products. The mere fact that all the islands produced almost the same products, sugar, coffee and tobacco, in varying quantities did not seem to occur to him.

The last serious effort to establish a Caribbean Confederation was made by Jose de Diego, who devoted his life to the freedom of his island from United States control. He attacked the problem of unity from a natural point of view: the cultural approach.

He hoped to set up an inter-island organization dedicated to the exchange of social, literary, scientific, and artistic knowledge. This interchange was to be carried out by interested organizations established in each of the three islands with the ultimate objective of establishing a feeling of unity among the Ateneos, academies, universities, schools, associations of writers and artists, casinos and other centers of learning and recreation of the aforementioned islands.69

Although intellectual and cultural in its approach the Unión Antillana as devised by De Diego did not neglect the economic or commercial aspects of the life of the islands. Agricultural fairs and industrial expositions would be held in each capital from time to time with the aim of stimulating commercial interchange.70 It was even suggested that the labor unions in the various islands hold joint assemblies and work toward greater unity.
It was to be clearly stated, however, that this union was not to be thought of or used as, an instrument to secure the independence of Puerto Rico. "... Neither its aims nor works go directly toward the confederation of the Antilles, even when it naturally attains the vision of a future nationality which is great and strong,\(^71\) comprising "those islands\(^7\), united by their ethnic origin and by their common history, with the purpose of maintaining full sovereignty and of strengthening the dignity, the liberty and the happiness of the people of the Antilles, in an ample horizon which reaches the supreme ideal of their future political confederation."\(^72\)

It seems that, although the Unión Antillana openly rejected immediate political aims and professed cultural, commercial and intellectual interests, its ultimate objectives were to realize certain political changes which would come about naturally once there was created "a national Antillan consciousness."\(^73\)

The constitution of the Unión Antillana was accepted by groups in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico during 1915. Although the three units mentioned were to initiate the Unión Antillana, it was not to be restricted to them since any of the other Antilles was welcome to enter the Union.\(^74\)

It is difficult to imagine what would have been the success of a Confederation if it had been formed. Hostos, Betances, and De Diego never made more than passing references to economic ties which linked the destinies of the islands.
Such a factor would have to receive careful thought by the states about to enter into a political agreement. The three islands, each with similar climatic and topographical conditions, would have shortly found themselves competing for markets rather than being able to work out arrangements for complementary economic production. Since at no time was any political agreement considered between the governments of the islands, it is understandable that such economic problems, which might arise from political union, were overlooked.

It is quite evident also that Cuba, because of its larger size, greater population, and advantageous geographical position would have dominated the political field of the Confederation. With this in mind and a knowledge of Caribbean politics, one wonders what the result might have been.

Thus, the Confederation of the Caribbean, born out of hopes for independence, and sustained by Puerto Ricans who despaired of the prospect of raising up their own island in active revolt, was destined to remain a bright hope which would attract those idealists of the nineteenth century as well as those of the present century. But it was never more than a shining hope and therefore its appeal was never tarnished by the stains of reality.

We have already seen enough of Muñoz Rivera's pragmatic approach to appreciate that he would have little sympathy for, and would lend no support to the confederation idea, because it was so unlikely to secure and preserve Muñoz Rivera's supreme objective, self-government for Puerto Rico.
José Celso Barbosa, the last of the quadrumvirate of patriots, found himself and his followers in a rather embarrassing position when, contrary to his predictions, Muñoz Rivera's alliance with the Spanish Liberals of Sagasta did in fact bring the long-sought autonomy. Barbosa had been so sure that it could and would come only through the Spanish Republicans and that it should come without the Puerto Rican autonomists losing their identity as an insular party in their own right.75

Naturally, Barbosa could not reject the autonomy once it had been decreed. There occurred a rather selfish scramble on the part of the barbosistas to secure as many political posts as possible and at the same time to maintain their party intact. Local committees having been organized in nearly all the towns of the island, the Autonomistas Ortodoxos, as the followers of Barbosa called themselves, met in San Juan, November 6, 1897, and proceeded to organize their Delegación (board of directors), according to the constitution of the old Puerto Rican Autonomist Party. Barbosa was one of the thirteen members of the Delegación. The following day the Directorio (executive committee) of three was constituted, with Barbosa as economic director. There was increased excitement and political activity, looking ahead to the first elections to be held under the Autonomic Constitution.76

It was apparent to everyone that the success of the new autonomic government would be greatly impaired if the fratricidal strife continued between the two autonomist groups,
the barbosistas and the munocistas. Originally suggested by Rafael María de Labra, Puerto Rican autonomy leader in Madrid, a movement was begun to conciliate both groups, in order to introduce the autonomy with the approval and participation of both Liberals and Orthodox Autonomists. The government in Madrid headed by Sagasta favored this coming together and announced their intention of introducing the autonomy with participation by both groups which had been clamoring for it since 1887. Muñoz Rivera, somewhat reluctant at first toward such a reconciliation, soon agreed to favor it in the interest of harmony as urged by the governmental authorities in Madrid. The Minister of Overseas Affairs, Segismundo Moret, especially favored this reconciliation. The governor of Puerto Rico, General Sabás Marín, interposed his authority and influence to facilitate the peace and to bring about the understanding between Liberals and Orthodox Autonomists.77

Even before the agreement setting up the Unión Autonomista Liberal (approved February 25, 1898, with both Muñoz Rivera and Barbosa as members of its executive committee), on February 10, 1898, Governor Manuel Macías named the first autonomic cabinet, which as we have seen78 contained both Liberals and Orthodox Autonomists, both Muñoz Rivera and Barbosa.

The whole island celebrated with enthusiasm the inauguration on February 13th of the new autonomic government, and fiestas, parades, meetings and other activities demonstrated the satisfaction and jubilation of the Puerto Rican People.79
The autonomic cabinet began to govern in Puerto Rico, showing restraint and a mature capacity in the exercise of self-government. The cabinet at once made various moves, among them, the organization of the various departments and the appointment of administrative personnel; the allocation of a life-time pension to the widow of the late patriarch, pioneer and champion of autonomy, Román Baldorioty de Castro; in accordance with the powers given to the government of Puerto Rico by the Autonomic Constitution, a commission to revise the customs system was appointed; and another commission was named to study and negotiate commercial relations with Spain, Cuba, and United States and other countries.

The autonomic cabinet met in harmony the problems of the country. But all was not to be harmony and happiness under the autonomic government. The former divisions and controversies between the Liberals and the Orthodox Autonomists were sleeping but abeyant, the disagreements that at times took on a quality of bitterness that degenerated into polemics of strong name-calling and personal attacks.

The new autonomic government had to be permanently constituted in a parliamentary fashion, with the cabinet responsible to the legislature. To do that it was necessary to elect the House of Representatives and select the elected and appointed members of the Administrative Council, the upper house. The governor called for elections to be held March 27, 1898.
Controversy arose in the nomination of candidates. There were disagreements and conflicts in the designation of candidates in some districts. The leaders of the former Liberals claimed that, in accord with the voting in the San Juan assembly which approved the pact with Sagasta and according to the popular strength of each group, they should name the candidates in a majority of the districts. The former Orthodox Autonomists asked for an equal distribution for both groups, accepting some specific exceptions. Their feelings having been aroused and strained earlier by disputes about the candidates of various districts, the Liberal group would not agree to Barbosa's running as candidate from San Juan. This was the last straw, and the Orthodox Autonomist leaders declared the agreement forming the Unión Autonomista Liberal broken. Each group proceeded to designate a candidate of its own for every district. A hot campaign ensued, releasing repressed passions.83

The party of the Españoles sin Condiciones, the "unconditionals," still loyal to past Spanish colonial policy, confused and depressed by the turn of events, had neither the power nor the spirit for an electoral contest. Nevertheless, on March 16, a dissident group left to form a new party called Agrupación Autónomica Oportunista.84 Thus four parties were represented at the polls on March 27, with the following results:
To complete the Administrative Council with seven appointed life members, the governor named three Liberals, two Orthodox and two Unconditionals. With clear majorities in both the House (23 to 9) and the Council (8 to 7), Liberals were elected speaker and president respectively when the legislature was organized July 17th. The new cabinet was now all Liberal, with Muñoz Rivera its president as well as Secretary of State.85

Muñoz Rivera was elected to the House of Representatives, but Barbosa was no longer in public office. Before the elections he had resigned as undersecretary of public instruction and left the capital to campaign out in the island. In fact on March 24, three days before the elections, the Orthodox Autonomists decided that its members must resign their positions in the Unión and in the colonial (autonomic) government. The patching up of differences thus lasted only a matter of weeks, and the battle between muñocistas and barbosistas that was to characterize Puerto Rican politics for two decades was a real "hot war."86

Speaking of war, the Spanish-American War was also in the offing. Muñoz Rivera joined other members of the first autonomic cabinet in the following proclamation of April 22,
1898, which was contemporary with the proclamation of martial law
by the governor:

By a sad decree of fate the introduction of the
autonomic regime has coincided with the proximity, now
visible, of a war in which Spain, in its territories
in America, will fight not only for her interests which
are great but for her honor and right, which must be
saved at any cost. The foreign threat, the foolish
intervention, the display of power stir up the national
spirit and make of every Spaniard a hero ready to give
his life for honor and for country.

The people of Puerto Rico have always shown that
they love peace; but they have always shown that they
know how to conduct themselves in war in a manner
worthy of their race and of their history. The conquer-
ing foot of a foreigner has never tread upon our homes.
When the enemy squadrons rushed legions of combatants
to these shores, Puerto Rican mothers sent their sons
to fight and die before submitting to the infamy of an
insult or the vengeance of a conquest.

The Insular Council, hoping that it will not be
necessary to renew old feats nor to revive the laurels
of the past, is confident that when the hour of necessary
sacrifice arrives, no patriot will forget his duties.
We are not responsible for the fight; nor did our land
provoke it nor did our deeds originate it. But we nei-
ther shrink from it nor fear it, because we know how
to answer force with force and to prove to the world
that in this archipelago the blood which fertilized the
campaigns of both American hemispheres in the glorious
days of Pizarro and Cortes has not degenerated.

If we proudly defended the Metropolis in the dark
times of the colonial system, we shall defend it bravely
in the happy times of the autonomic system. Affection
motivated us then; now affection and gratitude stir us.
All horizons opened to hope, all the ideals fulfilled
in the law, Puerto Rican loyalty appreciated Castilian
generosity. And if the slur of traitors seemed to us
an opprobrium before, today the slur of traitors and
ingrates will seem to us an opprobrium and a discredit.

As the contest begins, the Insular Council does not
doubt the victory. The fleet and the army, loyal to their
military traditions, will occupy the vanguard. And the
people, whose future is at stake in the combats to which
we are incited, will give their resources and their men,
their fortunes and their lives, without hesitation, dis-
daining danger and satisfied to offer in the holocaust
the noblest sentiments of loyalty and nobility. From
here we see with pride our European brothers who get
ready to conquer or succumb, and we want to join with
them in the triumphant success of Spanish arms.
Placed by nature at the center of the coming battles, our present energy can be measured by our eternal temperateness. We shall never renounce the flag which protected our cribs and will protect our graves. Let the island rest entire on reason, which is all Spain's, and be prepared to assist effectively the directing action of the Government and to support with bravery the august name and the unquestioned sovereignty of the fatherland.87

This was a forthright declaration of sympathy for Spain but hardly a vigorous call to arms of the "Give me liberty, or give me death!" variety. As a matter of fact, Puerto Ricans were largely spectators in the Spanish-American War. There was considerable admiration for the United States, the colossus of the North. United States military forces needed only nineteen days to conquer the island, and hostilities ceased on August 13th. General Nelson A. Miles issued a memorable proclamation at Ponce on July 28, 1898, stating that the Americans had come in the cause of liberty, justice and humanity; that they did not wish to make war against the islanders, but to protect them, and that he hoped they would peacefully accept the sovereignty of the United States.88

The first military governor of the island, General John R. Brooks, on October 18, 1898, issued his first general order, and the military government began to govern jointly with the secretaries of the Puerto Rican cabinet who countersigned the decrees and orders of the military authorities. On October 23, 1898, the Council of Secretaries, Luis Muñoz Rivera, President, issued another proclamation, to be compared with that of the previous April 22, six months earlier:
When Spanish sovereignty was ended and United States sovereignty began, with the establishment of the military power, absolute and supreme by the order of the President of the United States, we were occupying the Insular Government. Believing that the resignation of our positions was definitely assumed, we did so to General Brooke, promptly and formally. General Brooke believes that we ought to continue giving our help in the conduct of the affairs of the government of the island and filling the departments which will continue so long as the Congress in Washington does not legislate for the country. And, as we wish to respond to such an honorable proof of confidence, we shall remain at our posts, accepting during this transitional period the responsibilities that it creates.

And our position is based, of course, on the choice with which the illustrious representative of the Republic distinguishes us. The old patterns of the colony broken, the political groups disbanded, we are now not party men but government men. And we shall place the most complete impartiality as the invariable norm of our acts, in which the memory of the past will never be reflected, but the energy and the active aspiration of the future.

Puerto Rico must rally all her sons around the flag within whose shadow will be unfolded her progress and her liberties strengthened.

Since the territory of the island in which we were born has been ceded by Spain and we submit ourselves without reserve of any kind in the face of accomplished facts, from today forth we shall not serve a faction, we shall serve the new Metropolis which guarantees us welfare and law and serve the land in which our affections and our interests are rooted. Between old adversaries and old comrades, we shall not allow preferences; capacity and honor, these alone, will determine the access of the citizens to administrative functions.

The military regime reduces the orbit of our action to narrow limits. Nevertheless, we shall advise General Brooke in every case with the loyal and noble purpose that his acts may always rest upon justice and the law. As for our part, we shall aspire to the pure satisfaction that the United States, looking at these dominions, be convinced that here is a sensible people, docile, worthy to have the conquests of democracy, which have done so much for the fatherland of Franklin and Lincoln. If we aspire to fraternize with our compatriots of the North, we must equal them in their high civic virtues, and in their great abilities for the fight and for the triumph.

Thus we think, so we shall proceed. And in coming down from these posts, we shall feel calm and happy if we should merit, not the enthusiastic applause but the serene and reflective approval of the people of Puerto Rico.
It is not the theme of this dissertation to follow the full course of the history of Puerto Rico. We are limited to those events or aspects which tend to present the picture of the origins, formation, and evolution of the political philosophy of Muñoz Rivera, and the orientation of his contemporaries, in comparison and contrast. At this time the majority of Puerto Rican public opinion was aligned behind one of the two opposing groups as already mentioned. The barbosistas found themselves outside the government while the muñocistas enjoyed a brief heyday of power. General Guy V. Henry who succeeded General Brooke called representatives of the two leading parties to La Fortaleza to recommend harmony and unity. There was much eloquent patriotic oratory by Muñoz Rivera and others. The Orthodox Autonomists were more reserved and recommended the termination of the military regime and that Puerto Rico be constituted a territory of the United States, as the first step toward statehood. At this point the clashes were more of personalities than of ideas. For the moment both groups, muñocistas and barbosistas, were pro-United States and looked forward to freedom, democracy, and progress under United States dominion. 90

The honeymoon of Muñoz Rivera and his Liberal Party with Military Governor Henry did not last long. The exercise of civil authority, held in check by the supreme and absolute power of a military regime, involves contradictions which bring problems. There was friction between Muñoz Rivera and General Henry. On February 6, 1899, General Henry abolished the Council
of Secretaries by military decree. He reorganized the government under four administrative departments headed by two muñocistas and two barbosistas. Muñoz Rivera was left outside the government. This reorganization greatly cheered the Orthodox Autonomists. Muñoz Rivera practically took up the role of the opposition. Both groups tried to strengthen themselves and to make their platforms more concrete. The whole country now resented the prolonged military rule and public opinion clamored for the end of military government and proposed a civilian democratic system. 91

In May, 1899, General George W. Davis succeeded General Henry and eliminated the administrative departments, and created in their place a single civil secretary, subordinate to military authority.

During the military regime, in the changing participation of the parties in the administrative departments, partisan rivalries and passions were greatly revived. Each day the relations between the two groups became more inflamed. Intolerance and hatred flourished throughout the island, in spite of the fact that both political groups accepted the annexation of Puerto Rico by the United States and looked forward to the same solutions (territory, then statehood) for the political destiny of the island under United States sovereignty.

Actually the time between Spanish colonial autonomy and the Foraker Act falls into two periods: the movement for the ending of military rule, and the drive to secure an organic
act, the latter expected to be a clear statement of Puerto Rico's juridical position as well as a pattern of development of future political status. During these periods both Muñoz Rivera and Barbosa were outside the government.

The pro-United States attitude of Barbosa is explained without any difficulty. He was a republican by conviction, and he received his professional education in medicine at the University of Michigan, where he came to greatly admire United States customs and institutions. (Had he lived or studied in the South, Barbosa who was a negro would have had a quite different impression.) He felt that United States federalism was a realization of his highest political goals. Neither regionalism, not race, nor tradition, nor language, nor culture were obstacles for him in attaining this end. \(^{92}\) Muñoz Rivera, on the other hand, had no firsthand contact with the United States, and simply changed from advocating autonomy or self-government under Spain to self-government under the United States.

In 1898 the barbosistas formed a new political party, the Partido Republicano Puertorriqueño. The following year the muñocistas became the Partido Federal Americano, advocating Puerto Rico's acceptance as a United States territory, looking toward eventual statehood. The founding of the new party followed Muñoz Rivers's first trip to the United States in the summer of 1899, where he went in the interests of the economic state of the island after the hurricane of August 8th. \(^{93}\) In the same year, 1899, Santiago Inglesias and followers founded
the Partido Obrero Socialista, which resulted in sharpening the social concern of the older parties, which tended to stress political relationships to the neglect of economic factors.94

In 1899 Military Governor Davis held the first and only general elections under military rule, to elect municipal officials. The Federals (old Liberals) won in 44 of the 66 municipalities, and the Republicans (old Orthodox Autonomists) in 22.95

Finally, the Congress in Washington passed the bill introduced by Senator Joseph B. Foraker (Republican, Ohio) to constitute the civil government of the island, which became law upon the signature of President McKinley on April 12, 1900. The coming into force on May first of the Foraker Act really terminated the period of the Autonomic Constitution of 1897, because the forms and organization of the latter document persisted through the military regime. With the new "organic act" as it was called, a cleaner break was made with the part. We note that the Foraker Act was intended "temporarily to provide revenues and civil government for Puerto Rico" and history was to reveal that "temporarily" meant almost seventeen years, from May 1, 1900, to March 2, 1917. The Foraker Act lacked any preamble announcing a national policy toward Puerto Rico. It did not express any intention or promise for the future political destiny of the island.

The new scheme of government as provided for by the Foraker Act may be described as granting Puerto Rico political democracy on the "installment plan," for the governor, the upper
house, the judges, and other key governmental officials were appointed by the President of the United States. In making this arrangement Congress diverged from its usual practice of granting territorial forms of government. In a speech before the Senate, Mr. Foraker stated:

The people of Puerto Rico differ radically from any people for whom we have heretofore legislated. They have had different kind of experience, especially in the matter of government. They have had no experience such as to qualify them to elect members of the upper house, according to the testimony adduced before our committee at the hearings had, for the great work of organizing a government with all its important bureaus and departments such as the people of Puerto Rico are in need of. So the committee thought when they came to frame this bill, although they were anxious to give to the people of the island all the participation in government they could bring their minds to judge it was safe to give them, that as to these important officials the power should be reserved to the President to appoint them, thinking that by appointment of the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, men of capacity for the great work of organizing those bureaus and starting that government as nearly as possible in harmony with the spirit of our institutions might be secured.96

In conformity with this opinion Congress, in Section 17 of the Organic Act, provided for the chief executive of the island, "The Governor of Puerto Rico," to be appointed by the President with the consent of the United States Senate. He was to be responsible to the President. The Governor was appointed for a term of our years and was removable at the pleasure of the President. His powers were extensive but not as absolute as those of most of his Spanish predecessors. He controlled the executive, had appointive power, vetoed legislation enacted by the insular legislature, was commander-in-chief of the insular militia and granted pardons and reprieves.
The Governor was required to make an annual report to the President until July 15, 1909. From 1909 and through the period considered in this dissertation it was made to the War Department. 97

All local legislative powers were vested in a Legislative Assembly which consisted of two houses: the Executive Council and the House of Delegates. The Legislative Assembly, by Section 29, was limited to a session of sixty days in any one year, "unless called by the Governor to meet in extraordinary session."

The Executive Council which consisted of eleven members not only acted as the upper house of the Legislative Assembly, but as a cabinet as well. The members were appointed by the President with the consent of the United States Senate. According to Section 18, five members were required to be Puerto Ricans. The other six were Americans and all were appointed for four years. The six members, usually Americans, who formed the Cabinet held the positions of Secretary, Attorney General, Treasurer, Auditor, Commissioner of Interior, and Commissioner of Education. Thus the Executive Council had administrative as well as "legislative" functions. The five members who did not head departments attended cabinet and legislative sessions and had the prerogative to "participate in all business of every character that may be transacted . . . ." 98
In addition to acting as the upper house during the sixty days which the Assembly was in session, the Executive Council sat in so-called "executive sessions" throughout the remainder of the year to perform other important and varied duties. These duties, as stated in Section 32 included the following:

That all grants of franchises, rights, and privileges of concessions of a public or quasi-public nature shall be made by the Executive Council, with the approval of the Governor, and all franchise granted in Puerto Rico shall be reported to Congress, which hereby reserves the power to annul or modify the same.

The Council also was entrusted by the federal law with the power to approve certain appointments made by the Governor, and to prescribe regulations as to ballots and voting in the first election held under the Organic Act. Thus the Executive Council was given a character essentially different from that usually possessed by the upper houses of legislatures in the United States.

The House of Delegates consisted of 35 members elected by the people (male suffrage) for a term of two years. Voters were required to be made residents, twenty-one years of age or over, have lived in Puerto Rico for two years (five years for foreigners who have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States), and must be taxpayers who "paid at least $1.00 of some kind of regular tax for the support of the government" previous to October 12, 1899 or "able to read and write some language." Membership in the House was limited
to persons 25 years of age or over who were able to read and write either Spanish or English. No person "who is not possessed in his own right of taxable property, real or personal, situated in Puerto Rico," was eligible to be a member.

The Legislative Assembly with a two-thirds majority of all the members in each house had the power to pass legislation over the veto of the Governor. But since six members of the Executive Council were under the control of the Governor, especially in administrative matters, it was difficult to override the veto. This in essence was not government by separation of powers. Moreover, all legislation enacted by the Assembly was required to be reported to Congress which reserved the power to annul it. The Assembly also had the power to create, consolidate and reorganize the municipalities, and to provide and repeal laws and ordinances which were local in character.

Sections 33 and 34 of the Organic Act provided for a judicial system. Puerto Rico was constituted as a judicial district of the United States with a District Court of Puerto Rico." The judges were appointed by the President and the Senate for a term of four years. There was also a Supreme Court of Puerto Rico composed of a Chief Justice and four Justices, all appointed by the President of the United States. Eight Insular District Courts were created, each composed of a judge, a prosecuting attorney and a marshal, all of whom were appointed by the Governor for a term of four years, subject to the approval of the Executive Council. Municipal Courts were
established and each consisted of a judge, a secretary and a
marshal, likewise appointed by the Governor with Executive
Council approval. Justice of the Peace Courts were found in
the larger towns and had limited jurisdiction.

The Foraker Act also established free trade between
Puerto Rico and the United States; exempted Puerto Rico from
contributing to the support of the Federal Government; and
limited ownership of land by corporations to five hundred
acres. This very important provision was never enforced until
1940. Internal revenues on Puerto Rican products and customs
duties collected on foreign goods entering the island went
into the insular treasury. In 1901 the island was included
within the United States customs area, and the United States
tariff policy applied to Puerto Rico.

The new civil government went into operation on May
1, 1900, and Charles W. Allen was appointed the first civil
governor by the President. Governor Davis, the last United
States military governor of Puerto Rico, appointed six members
to the Executive Council to head the departments. The Governor
met with the Executive Council for the first time on June 28,
1900.

The island was divided into seven districts for the
purpose of electing members to the House, each district electing
five members. The committee (composed of the Puerto Rican
members of the Executive Council) which was named to devise a
scheme for the election of the members consisted of two Re-
publicans, two Federals, and one neutral. When the above plan
was approved by the Executive Council, the Federals vigorously opposed the arrangement, proceeded to withdraw from the committee, and failed to present candidates in the election, thereby leaving all the seats to be filled by the Republicans.100

At the general election of November 6, 1900, 35 Puerto Ricans were elected to the House of Delegates. These met with the members of the Executive Council in the first session of the Legislative Assembly on December 3, 1900, and continued in session until January 31, 1901. At this session several laws were passed providing for the establishment of the new system of government.101

This new system of government did not satisfy the aspirations of the politically conscious Puerto Ricans who preferred, if necessary, a less efficient government of their own model rather than one controlled by outsiders. Demands were made for an elected upper house and greater control over the executive. They wanted a legislature possessed with power to enact legislation over the Governor's veto. It was evident that the Americans, by virtue of their unique positions in the Executive Council and by serving as heads of departments, were in control of the insular government. Thus the first Organic Act was a blow to the pride of the Puerto Ricans. The Act also excluded them from citizenship in the country under which they were to live.
The discontent among the Puerto Ricans expressed itself in several ways. In the first place it determined party divisions and platforms. It also resulted in an effort to extend the powers and functions of the local governments, where the native islanders were in control, at the expense of insular authority. Above all, it later bred controversies between the two houses of the Legislative Assembly, because the lower house attempted to force its will upon the Executive Council and the Governor by refusing to vote appropriations except in return for political concessions.

Let us pause to analyze Muñoz Rivera's actions during the 1897-1900 period. Rexford G. Tugwell appears to evaluate correctly Muñoz Rivera's position when he says:

He seems to have accepted the change from Spanish to American hegemony as something beyond his power to affect, and to have gone to work to get as much for Puerto Rico out of the new relationship as he could.102

However, "to get as much for Puerto Rico, . . . as he could" did not mean bootlicking to Munoz Rivera. Opportunism is defined as "the art, policy or practice of taking advantage of opportunities or circumstances especially with little regard for principles or ultimate consequences."103 Munoz Rivera had high regard for principles and consequences.

The opportunists were the barbosistas who lent no aid in the campaign to secure autonomy through Sagasta's Liberals but who, when autonomy was gained, demanded as much power and prestige as the munocistas who had fought in the heat of battle. Then, when the United States took over, Muñoz Rivera ceased to
collaborate with the victors as soon as it became clear that Puerto Rico was to be ruled as a "conquered province" and that the battle for autonomy would have to be begun again at the beginning in the halls of the central legislature.

We have seen what Muñoz did; what did he say? His testimony before Special Commissioner Carroll, November 2, 1898, dispassionately asserted the lack of ideological difference between the muñocistas and the barbosistas: "All of them aspire to preserve the individuality of the country within the union of the states." 104

Commissioner Carroll apparently tried to draw a parallel between the governor's veto under the Autonomic Constitution of 1897 and the veto power of the military governor under United States occupation, hinting that Puerto Rico had as much autonomy under the United States as under Spain. But Muñoz Rivera, while admitting the veto power of the Spanish governor, denied that Puerto Rico was autonomous under the United States:

Mr. Muñoz Rivera. I can not consider that we are to-day an autonomous government, because the fact of the invasion dissolved the chambers, and the secretaries are not responsible members of the government. They have to appeal to General Brooke.

Dr. Carroll. It is a system of government ad interim, awaiting legislation from the United States to make necessary changes?

Mr. Muñoz Rivera. The country generally understands that, and desire and hope that the United States will legislate for them in such a way that their road to progress will be easy.

Dr. Carroll. Would the Territorial system of the United States be a satisfactory system for Porto Rico, with such adaptations as may be necessary?

Mr. Muñoz Rivera . . . . Porto Rico aspires to statehood and accepts as a transitory condition that of a Territory, asking that the military regimen
may be concluded as soon as possible . . . . I wish to emphasize the fact, before our interview closes, that I am earnestly in favor of the establishment here of a Territorial form of government with the modifications proposed, and I can say that with the more genuineness because I hold an office which will be swept away by the change to a Territorial form.105.

Munoz Rivera was right in minimizing differences between the new political parties, his Federals and Barbosa's Republicans. A comparison of their respective 1899 platforms shows agreement on acceptance of annexation by the United States, free trade between the United States and Puerto Rico, an early end to military government, conversion from Puerto Rican pesos to United States dollars at a fixed rate of exchange, expansion of the educational system, tax reforms, universal suffrage, an independent judiciary, guarantees of civil rights and liberties, etc. The Republicans alone asked for honest elections (the old cry, "We was robbed"), liberty of thought and expression, introduction of the English language, aid for agriculture; opposed the introduction of foreign contract labor; and included a gratuitous eulogy of the United States flag and President McKinley.106

On the other hand, still comparing 1899 platforms, the Federals uniquely emphasized municipal autonomy in budgets, education, police, sanitation, charity, public works, etc.; development of banking and industries; the welfare of the laboring classes and the peasants, trial by jury; and reform of penal and administrative legislation.107 Yet with all the areas of agreement shown, already there are appearing character-
istic tendencies and emphases, the Republicans looking toward the agriculturalists and Muñoz Rivera's Federals focusing on industry and labor.

In addition to Muñoz Rivera's oral testimony before Dr. Carroll, we have recorded his speech of September 7, 1899, upon his return from visiting the United States. He was impressed with all he saw: "I come from a country whose vigor is the astonishment of the world." He was inspired to aspire to make Puerto Rico the equal of any of the states of the union: "Inequality is for us inferiority." He emphasized:

For us to be good and loyal Puerto Ricans, we cannot be, we must not be, we don't want to be, absolutely and unreservedly, anything but good and loyal Americans.

As for program and procedure, Muñoz Rivera was characteristically realistic: in national affairs, to wait and to trust in the people and the Congress of the United States, recognizing that Puerto Ricans had only the right of protest when the United States appeared to abandon and forget Puerto Rico. He trusted, rather sanguinely, in eventual justice for Puerto Rico as a result of American public opinion making itself felt in Congress. In local affairs, Muñoz Rivera counselled faith in the party and its principles, and forebearance in the face of provocations by political opponents. He wished to make clear to General Davis and President McKinley that
We are not here to run after public office, nor to get worked up in sterile partisan quarrels, nor to grovel in search of official favors.\textsuperscript{112}

Muñoz Rivera in print supported Muñoz Rivera in deed and in word. There is no hint of a tendency, on the one hand, to compromise the ideals of autonomy for immediate political advantage nor, on the other hand, to demand sovereign independence, such as Cuba was given in name and the Philippines were led to expect. A manifesto of the Federal Party \textsuperscript{113} of which Muñoz Rivera was the inspiration if not the actual writer, began with a reaffirmation of "our energetic aspiration for self-government ... so that the sons of sons of Puerto Rico might administer Puerto Rico." In the federal union of North American states was now to be found the highest degree of autonomy yet achieved by man, with democratic guarantees superior to the untrustworthy support of monarchical Spain. The immediate status of a territory appeared to be the logical next step toward eventual statehood, with the modifications that Puerto Rico be allowed to have an elective governor rather than an appointive one, and that territorial law rest upon the approval of a majority of the territorial legislature (with no veto by the governor, the President of the United States, or the Congress). A resident commissioner with voice but without vote in the House of Representatives was advocated as an adequate link between the national and the insular governments.\textsuperscript{114} The rest of the manifesto is an amplification of the previously described Federal platform.
Articles in *El Diario de Puerto Rico* and *La Democracia*, both founded and edited by Muñoz Rivera, attest to his opinions by means of the printed word. Protest against the arrival of carpetbaggers under United States occupation was emphatic.\(^{115}\) There was protest against the abominable physical condition into which Puerto Rico had been allowed to drift by neglect, quite apart from the devastation of hurricanes.\(^{116}\) Disgust was vented against alleged favoritism of General Davis toward the Republicans in the conduct of elections.\(^{117}\) Muñoz Rivera gladly celebrated Washington's birthday to honor a great man, but was unhappy that the liberties for which Washington fought were not extended to the willingly conquered Puerto Ricans.\(^{118}\) While the Federal Party leader deplored the loss of followers to the toadying Republicans, he reaffirmed his faith in the positive emphasis on basic principles,

> Because, in our labor of a decade against the Spanish colonial system, we learned to recognize our friends and to measure their valor and their integrity. We don't want Judases that would sell us out nor Peters that would deny us; we want apostles that would go with us to the ideal Rome of our spirit and that with us would look, without unworthy trembling, on the calvary on which rise the three symbolic crosses.\(^{119}\)

This latter equating Muñoz Rivera with Christ is not intended as sacrilege, but is an honest expression of typical Latin *personalismo*\(^ {120}\) and characteristic of the charismatic leader.\(^ {121}\)

In a series of three articles Muñoz Rivera analyzed the deficiencies of the Foraker Act. The Executive Council (the appointed upper house of the insular legislature in which
the Puerto Ricans would be in the minority) would be a millstone around the neck of the popularly elected House of Delegates.\textsuperscript{122}

The continuation of Puerto Rico as an unincorporated territory whose inhabitants were not citizens of the United States was both an insult and a denial of historic democratic principles.\textsuperscript{123}

The turning over of administration in Puerto Rico to a horde of nonresident carpetbaggers was particularly unjust and reprehensible.\textsuperscript{124}

In the last article, Muñoz Rivera wrote:

> The Foraker Act is no more than a modus vivendi for a short time; it does not satisfy anyone. And it will last a year to be replaced by an expansive and just law. In that year Mr. Allen [the governor designate] will become the arbiter of our destinies.

The Foraker Act was to last seventeen years, and Muñoz Rivera was to be the leader of the opposition to it.

The little correspondence of Muñoz Rivera preserved for us from this period adds nothing to the picture already drawn. In this poetry, which in his youth expressed a fiery Puerto Rican nationalism, we find now a note of resignation and frustration, exemplified by his powerful poem "Sísifo" written in 1898.\textsuperscript{125} Muñoz Rivera's identification with the hero is only in the absurdity of his punishment and not in the complex legend which surrounds the personality.\textsuperscript{126} For offending the gods, Sisyphos was condemned after his death to laboriously roll a rock uphill without ever succeeding in reaching the top. It is an ancient story of futility and of endless retribution. The fall of France in the Second World War attracted Albert Camus to the myth of Sisyphos, just as the loss of Puerto Rican autonomy at the hands of the United States affected Muñoz Rivera.\textsuperscript{127}
Though Muñoz Rivera's poem closes on a note of despair, the everlasting futility of the poet's inescapable pursuit of his dreams, this spirit was not typical of him, for in his life the effort was not sterile, it called forth more love than hate, more hope than negation. Camus ended his essay saying that the struggle in itself is sufficient to fill the heart of man. And as for myths, they were told to stimulate the imagination. This is akin to the verdict of some classical scholars who made the senseless punishment intelligible as a periodic function eternally incumbent, like the rising and the setting of the sun.128

At any rate Muñoz Rivera would not say the struggle was wholly fruitless nor to be shunned. Rather, as in "Paréntesis"129 which begins with the proverb, "Happy is he who has never seen another river than that of his fatherland," Muñoz Rivera concludes:

I shall not fall; but if I fall, in the cataclysm I shall roll blessing the cause on which I based my entire life; my face always turned to the past and, like a good soldier, wrapt in a tatter of my flag.130

To summarize Muñoz Rivera's political philosophy as of 1900, we offer the following as articles of his creed:

1) Self-determination is the right of a geographical entity that is also a cultural and an ethnic unity.

2) Puerto Rico is such a geographical-cultural-ethnic phenomenon and, therefore, deserves self-determination.
3) Self-determination for Puerto Rico means autonomy--local self-government--administrative decentralization.

4) Puerto Rico does not need full independence to preserve her liberties and her culture.

5) Puerto Rico needs association with a great power, for the maturation of the civic education of her citizens and to prevent a dictatorial minority from usurping the will of the people.

6) Puerto Rico is too small for military, diplomatic, or economic independence, but the economic protection of a great power should not be a cover for exploitation.

7) Autonomy may be sought from a monarchy or from a republic. The great power (mother country) need not be wholly democratic at home, provided local self-government is guaranteed to Puerto Rico.

8) Puerto Ricans should have some voice and representation in the central government and enjoy equality as citizens with the residents of the mother country.

9) The parliamentary system with the executive responsible to the people but subordinate to the legislature is the best guarantee of the implementation of the people's will.

10) Puerto Rico should be administered by Puerto Ricans who are bona fide residents of Puerto Rico, not by Spanish or United States carpetbaggers.

11) Peaceful political evolution through constitutional channels and the power of the press will succeed where armed
revolt (not only impossible but unpoltic and inconsistent with principles) would surely fail.

In the sixteen short years of life yet remaining to Luis Moñoz Rivera, we shall see how this creed was fought for, modified, and realized in part.
NOTES TO CHAPTER III

1 Spanish Constitution of 1876, Title XIII, Art. 88. An English translation of this constitution is to be found in Puerto Rico, Office of Puerto Rico, Washington, D.C., pp. 9-21.


3 Autonomic Constitution of 1897, Title VI, Art. 32. (Additional Art. 2 is the amending process).

4 Ibid., Additional Art. 2.

5 Ibid., Title VI, Art. 37.

6 Ibid., Title VI, Art. 38.

7 "With the recognition of autonomy by the Mother Country (Spain), Puerto Rico became a member of the family exercising the essential attributes of sovereignty. The relations between both nations were governed by treaties. Spain could not modify the Autonomic Constitution 'except by virtue of a law and upon the petition of the Insular Parliament.'" (Comité Cubano Pro Libertad de Patriotas Puertorriqueños, Por la independencia de Puerto Rico / Habana, 1939?, p. 24).

8 Autonomic Constitution of 1897, Title VI, Art. 34.

9 Ibid., Title VII, Art. 41.

10 Cf. Ibid., Title IX, Arts. 66 and 67.

11 Ibid., Title VII, Arts. 41 and 42.

12 Ibid., Title III, Arts. 5 and 8.

13 Ibid., Title IV, Art. 15.

14 Ibid., Title VI, Art. 35, and Title V, Art. 20.

15 Ibid., Title V, Art. 24, and Title VII, Art. 43.


17 Autonomic Constitution of 1897, Title VII, Art. 43.

18 Ibid., Title VII, Art. 42.
19 Ibid.
21 Ibid., Preamble.
22 Ibid., Title VII, Art. 44.
23 Ibid., Title V, Art. 20.
24 Ibid., Title VII, Arts. 42 and 51.
27 Ibid., Title VII, Art. 42 and Art. 45.
28 Ibid., Title VII, Art. 43.
29 Ibid., Title VII, Arts. 47 and 45.
30 Ibid., Title V, Art. 29.
31 Ibid., Transitory Provisions, Art. 1.
33 Autonomic Constitution of 1897, Title V, Art. 23.
34 Ibid., Title V, Arts. 21 and 29.
35 Ibid., Title V, Arts. 25-27.
36 Ibid., Title II, Art. 3.
37 Ibid., Title VI, Art. 32.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., Title VI, Art.
40 Ibid., Title VI, Arts. 35 and 36.
41 Ibid., Title V, Art. 29, and Title VI, Art. 33.
42 Ibid., Title IX, Arts. 66 and 67.
43 Eugenio María de Hostos y Bonilla, Obras completas (Habana: Cultural, 1939), V, 176.
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44 Bothwell and Cruz Monclova, pp. 31-32.


49 Autonomic Constitution of 1897, Title VII, Art. 42.


51 Autonomic Constitution of 1897, Additional Art. 2. Bothwell correctly points out that this was never legally effective because the autonomy decree was never ratified by the Spanish Cortes (Bothwell and Cruz Monclova, p. 203).


53 La Democracia, año VIII, núm. 1818.

54 Puerto Rico Herald, año I, núm. 1 (July 13, 1901).

55 Ibid., núm. 32.

56 Muñoz Rivera, I, 231.

57 Ibid., 233.

58 Ibid., 234.

59 La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, año VII, núm. 2535.

60 El Liberal, año I, núm. 2.

61 La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico, año VII, núm. 2535.

62 Hostos y Bonilla, I, 98 and 104.

63 Ibid., IV, 194.
64Mathews, Historia, V, 227.


66Antonio Rosell y Carbonell, Confidencias y vaticinios de una cotorra boricuena (Matanzas: Imprenta Quiros y Estarda, 1910), pp. 37, 42.

67Ibid.


69José de Diego, Nuevas campañas (Barcelona: Sociedad General de Publicaciones, 1916), p. 300.

70Ibid., p. 288.

71Ibid., p. 279.

72Ibid., p. 287.

73Ibid., p. 288.

74De Diego, Unión antillana, p. 11.

75Pedreira, Un hombre del pueblo, p. 110.

76Pagan, Procerato puertorriqueño del siglo XIX, p. 499.

77Ibid., p. 500.

78Vivas Maldonado, pp. 170-71.

79Bothwell and Cruz Monclova, p. 270; Angel Rivero Méndez, Crónica de la guerra hispano-americana en Puerto Rico (Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra Artes Gráficas, 1922), p. 293.


81Ibid., p. 504.

82Bothwell and Cruz Monclova, pp. 280-81.

83Pagan, Procerato puertorriqueño del siglo XIX, p. 504.

84Ibid., p. 505.

85Ibid., pp. 506-507.

86Pedreira, Un hombre del pueblo, p. 122.
87Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños, I, 20-22.


90Ibid., p. 29.

91Ibid., p. 30.

92Pedreira, Un hombre del pueblo, p. 129.

93Luis Muñoz Rivera, Petition to the President of the United States of the Agriculturists of Porto Rico (Washington, 1899).

94Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños, I, 32, 37-38, 58.

95Ibid., p. 61.


98Ibid., p. 72.

99Ibid.


104U.S., Puerto Rico Special Commissioner, p. 233.

105Ibid., pp. 234, 236.

106Ibid., pp. 348-49.
107Ibid., pp. 349-50
108Muñoz Rivera, Campañas políticas, I. 235.
109Ibid., p. 236.
110Ibid., p. 237.
111Ibid., p. 238.
112Ibid., p. 239.
113La Democracia, October 5, 1899.
114This was achieved by the Foraker Act and subsequent action of Congress.
115El Diario de Puerto Rico, February 7, 1900.
116Ibid.
117Ibid.
118La Democracia, February 21, 1900.
119El Diario de Puerto Rico, March 22, 1900.
122El Diario de Puerto Rico, April 15, 1900.
123Ibid., April 17, 1900.
124Ibid., April 19, 1900.
125Luis Muñoz Rivera, Poesía (San Juan: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1960), pp. 179-183.
129 Muñoz Rivera, *Poesía*, pp. 175-78

130 Ibid., p. 178.
CHAPTER IV

MUÑOZ VS. THE FORAKER LAW, IN NEW YORK AND PUERTO RICO 1900-1911

This chapter deals with the period from the going into effect of the Foraker Law, the first organic act of Puerto Rico, on May 1, 1900, to the beginning of Luis Muñoz Rivera's first term as Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico in the House of Representatives, March 4, 1911.

It undoubtedly was deeply shocking to the political thought of the Puerto Rican leaders that the new Anglo-American metropolis, when the transitory military regime ended, would provide a reactionary governmental charter like the Foraker Law, which (1) kept the executive power in the hands of continentals, (2) destroyed or reduced the legislative power by putting a majority of continentals in the upper house, without whose concurrence every insular legislative initiative remained void, and (3) expressly reserved to the Congress in Washington the power to veto any legislation emanating from the Puerto Rican Legislative Assembly. This organic law of 1900 did no credit to the best traditions and libertarian principles of the United States.

Neither the provisions of the organic law nor the pronouncements of men of power and influence in Washington
seemed to promise hope for the Puerto Ricans with respect to the future political status of Puerto Rico nor the natural desire of the Puerto Ricans for a formula containing both liberty and justice.

The United States was only beginning its adventure into new territories beyond the continental frontiers. Isolated liberal voices which were raised in that period in the United States against proposals of colonial imperialism and the subjection of foreign peoples were drowned by the powerful prevailing current which clamored for the extension of the sphere of the vigorous nation, in the "manifest destiny" to extend the wings of the American eagle to distant shores, in what was considered lebensraum to strength the security and the world power of the United States.

The form of government provided by the Foraker Law, nevertheless, was not inferior to what the United States gave peremptorily to the various territories acquired after the federation of the nation of thirteen original colonies (with the exception of California, Kentucky, Maine, Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia), in the gradual growth of the United States across the continent. To all the recently acquired territories was given a system of government no more democratic than that established by the Foraker Law in Puerto Rico. These new territories included Guam, the Philippine Islands, Hawaii, not to mention the protectorate of Cuba, under the Platt Amendment.

But for those continental territories in the West, it was clearly stated that, in good time, when certain minimum
requirements were fulfilled, such as increased population and ability to support a state government, their inhabitants would immediately be placed on a par with citizens of the United States as to civil and political rights, and the territories would become new states equal to the others. 4

In the case of Puerto Rico, as has already been pointed out, its inhabitants were not made citizens of the United States, nor were all the guarantees of the United States Constitution extended to them. Nothing was indicated as to the future, nor was any promise of citizenship or of future form of government made. The adventure of the United States appeared to be purely colonial and imperialistic. 5 The people of Puerto Rico were submitted to a condition of tutelage for an indefinite period. In the face of this situation the political parties of Puerto Rico chose to continue the stubborn legal battle for the rights and liberties of their country.

Once the civil government was organized and in operation, the lower governmental posts were given to Puerto Ricans. A partisan fight was inevitable. The press and the leadership of Muñoz Rivera's Federal Party, although they accepted as a fait accompli the annexation and expressed aspirations for the territorial formula first and later statehood for Puerto Rico, openly combatted the status under the Foraker Law. Barbosa's Republican Party, likewise accepting the annexation, defended its political platform proposing territorial status first and later statehood, but also actively favored the rapid Americanization of the island and soft-pedaled the alleged defects of the
system established by the Foraker Law.

It is interesting to observe that, when the Puerto Rican political family was divided in the autonomist assembly which approved the pact with the Liberal Party of Sagasta, the group headed by Luis Muñoz Rivera favored the fusion of the insular autonomist party with the Spanish Liberal Party, clearly identifying Puerto Rico with the Spanish nationality. The group led by Jose C. Barbosa favored Puerto Rican autonomy without fusion or identification with Spanish parties alternating in power. Later in 1900, under United States sovereignty, the party over which Muñoz Rivera presided, in spite of the letter of its political platform, emphasized Puerto Rican regionalism, while the party directed by Barbosa favored assimilation with the new metropolis. Very soon this latter party became affiliated with the national Republican Party of the United States.

Early in 1900 preparations began for the elections of November, to elect the members of the House of Delegates created by the Foraker Law. Great political excitement prevailed throughout the island. The Republicans and the Federals defended Americanization and regionalism, respectively. The Socialist Workers' Party, officially excluded from the election machinery, was in practice not a political contender in the elections of 1900. The Puerto Rican workers' conscience was not yet mature enough for partisan political battles.

It was necessary to divide the island into seven electoral districts, each of which would elect five of the thirty-five
members of the House of Delegates, as provided in the organic law. It should be pointed out that the districts were not further subdivided into single member units but that the party gaining the majority in the district elected all five delegates from that district. The Republicans gained control of the Elections Commission of the Executive Council and gerrymandered a division of the island which appeared to favor a Republican victory. The Federal members of the Executive Council (one was José de Diego) first protested and then resigned. Republicans were appointed in their places and thus the Federals were left out of both the Election Commission and the Executive Council, and in open opposition to the government. In point of fact, later, under this same delimitation of election districts, the Unionist Party, successor of the Federal Party, won a majority in all the districts several times.

Two events are part of the picture reflecting the clash of personalities of the times. On September 13, 1900, Muñoz Rivera's newspaper, El Diario de Puerto Rico, published an article using strong language against the Republican mayor of San Juan, entitled "The Inquisition in San Juan: Manuel Egozque, Inquisitor." The day following the publication of that article, so-called mobs assaulted the place in San Juan where El Diario de Puerto Rico was published, and destroyed its shops, equipment, and presses. The home of Luis Muñoz Rivera was also assaulted. Muñoz Rivera and a group of his coreligionists (including Tulio Larrínaga, like Muñoz Rivera
a future Resident Commissioner) were indicted, accused of armed aggression! The trial was set for December 4, after the elections. The sessions of the trial were sensational, and the indictment kept the island at high tension. Muñoz Rivera and his friends were absolved by the court, presided over by one of the founders of the Republican Party!°

The second event was also a protest against the partiality shown toward the Republican Party by the government controlled by continentals. Alleging that there were no guarantees of an honest election and that there were threats of violence protected by the government, the Federal Party on September 1, adopted an agreement to remain away from the polls. This agreement was officially communicated to the Executive Council by Muñoz Rivera only two days before the election, when the ballots had already been printed with candidates of both parties included.

The Federal Party upheld the agreement, so that on election day, November 6, 1900, only 148 Federal votes were cast in the whole island as opposed to 58,367 votes for Republican candidates. A total of 64,625 registered voters (males, over 21 years of age, either literate or taxpayers) remained away from the polls.°° A Republican Resident Commissioner, Federico Degetau, and 35 Republican delegates were swept into office by 47 per cent of the electorate. The boycott of elections, a political tactic little used in the United States, had been practiced previously in Puerto Rico, Spain, Ireland, and elsewhere.°° So in 1900, not only was Muñoz Rivera out of office
but his Federal Party as well had no part in the government.

The House of Delegates met December 3, 1900, and passed a variety of laws which included the establishment of jury trial, something new for Puerto Rico. Other concerns were education, preparation of legal codes, a bill of rights sponsored by Barbosa, etc. But political status was not yet an issue in the Republican dominated, one party House of Delegates. In his first annual report of May, 1901, Governor Allen stressed the cooperativeness of the Republican Party and the hostility of the Federals who demanded municipal autonomy, increased powers for city councils, the incorporation of banks, and a better deal for the working classes. The Governor had to admit, however, that the interparty violence was verbal rather than physical.

Meanwhile, there was some grumbling among the Federals. Some quietly blamed the Federal leader (Muñoz Rivera) for the hostile attitude of the government toward the Federal Party. In the middle of 1901, Muñoz Rivera left Puerto Rico and remained for several years in voluntary exile in the United States. He founded in New York The Puerto Rico Herald, a newspaper edited in English and Spanish, as his rostrum of combat and mouthpiece of the sentiment of the Federal Party.

On July 13, 1901, in the first issue of The Puerto Rico Herald was published an article entitled "Nueva Politica" enumerating the aforementioned malpractices of the Republicans and of the continentals in the government, and chiding the Federals in Puerto Rico for not standing up to the government
more resolutely. In the same issue appeared an open letter to President McKinley signed by Luis Muñoz Rivera, "ex-president of the autonomous government of Puerto Rico," decrying the same lack of impartiality in the carpetbagger government and asking that the United States act to put Puerto Rico back on the road to self-government it was pursuing in 1897.

On September 15, 1902, William H. Hunt succeeded Allen as governor. Less diplomatic than Allen, Hunt had been fought by the Federals while he was Secretary under his predecessor.

Both Federals and Republicans participated in the elections of 1902, with Muñoz Rivera still in New York. The seats in the House of Delegates were divided 25 for the Republicans and 10 for the Federals, while the Republicans elected the municipal officers of 53 towns and the Federals, 13. Federico Degetau was reelected Resident Commissioner. José de Diego was among the Federals elected to the House of Delegates, and Jose C. Barbosa (Republican) remained a member of the Executive Council by Presidential appointment.

The elections of 1902 were popularly called "the two against one" elections, because of the three election judges in each precinct, one was Federal, one Republican, and one represented the government favoring the Republicans. There were complaints and protests on the part of the Federals regarding the conduct of the government in the elections, with accusations of illegalities and frauds. It was at this time that the then Secretary of Puerto Rico, Charles Hartzell,
commenting on an election complaint, made his famous statement that "worse things happen in Colorado."^{18}

Later Governor Hunt reported to Washington on the elections, lauding the cooperation of the Republicans and rejecting all the charges by the Federals. Hunt blamed the Federal press (tacitly pointing the finger at Muñoz Rivera) for the hostility of the Federal Party toward the government.^{19}

As early as mid-1900 there had been some agitation to dissolve the Federal Party. In October, 1900, at a Federal Party convention, dissolution had been moved, seconded, discussed, but voted down. Muñoz Rivera in November had written a series of articles in La Democracia opposing dissolution.^{20} Now in 1902 voices favoring dissolution were again raised, as growing minorities among both the Federals and the Republicans expressed themselves in favor of new political alignments. Some Federals rejected Muñoz Rivera's active opposition to the Foraker government, while on the other hand some Republicans disliked the toadying of the Republican scalawags to the continentals. Still others felt that Puerto Ricans should all unite to speak with one voice and thus improve the chances that the continentals would listen. One of the latter was Rosendo Matienzo Cintrón (Republican) who resigned from the Executive Council in order to preach the formation of the new political party. Matienzo launched his manifesto before a huge bipartisan audience in the San Juan Municipal Theater in February, 1902. Deploring personal antagonisms and the gradual alienation of the leadership of both parties from "the people," he said:
Puerto Rico must have a single political will. . . . The union, the holy union of all Puerto Ricans commands respect more irresistibly than ever. 21

The manifesto and this speech of the dissident Republican, Matienzo, had great repercussions throughout the island. Numerous local groups expressed accord with the idea of a new party, as did important segments of Republican Party and Federal Party leadership.

Rumors of what was on foot reached Muñoz Rivera in New York even before Matienzo's speech. On January 9, 1904, Muñoz Rivera writing in The Puerto Rico Herald, was ready to endorse a "neutral" party to push for reforms in the Foraker Law. The then president of the Federal Party, Santiago R. Palmer, 22 on January 24, 1904, wrote to his Republican counterpart, Manuel F. Rossy, proposing the dissolution of both parties to form a single collectivity. A week later the Republican reply rejected the Federal suggestion, making the point that union as a political idea is self-defeating because not all Puerto Ricans are agreed as to ends nor as to means. Moreover, if the union were to side with the government headed by continental, there would be retrogression to the era of the Spanish Captains-General and the unconditionals. If the union were to oppose the government, Puerto Ricans would appear hostile and ungrateful to the United States. And finally it was a bit ridiculous for the minority party (Federal) to propose the dissolution of the majority party (Republican) which latter appeared to enjoy the support of a majority of the electorate. So in these words the conservative Republican leadership rejected the dreams of union. 23
But Matienzo apparently read the signs of the times correctly, so much so that Muñoz Rivera returned to Puerto Rico in 1904 to launch a manifesto of his own:

Now Puerto Rico needs concord and peace among Puerto Ricans . . . . There is no citizenship here and we need to obtain it; there is no wealth and we need to restore it; there is no liberty and it must be established; there is no native land and it is urgent, indisputably urgent, that we form it if we do not want to continue living in constant fear, in unworthy submission, and in abject inferiority . . . . The union . . . is for the purpose of protesting against the sickly constitution of the Legislative Assembly and of the municipalities, fundamentally reforming the system, working to substitute for the Foraker Law a new law in which is recognized and defined the right of the native population to conduct its own affairs, without protection which humiliates it; without obstacles which restrict it; without foreign influence which disconcerts it; proclaiming the authority of the United States and affirming the autonomy of the region, unrestrained and free, within the immutable and sovereign federation. . . . Swear by the memory of your grandfathers, that while the Foraker Law rules you, and you have neither the full national citizenship nor the full insular autonomy, and you are inferiors in statutory law, and you are considered fit to endure slavery, that you shall give up the narrow political rivalries and that you shall consecrate yourselves, all together, with tireless energy, for the defense of your dignity and the restoration of your homeland.  

During February 18-19, 1904, the general assembly of the Federal Party took place in the Hotel Olimpo in Santurce, under the chairmanship of Santiago R. Palmer, with the presence of the board of directors in full and party delegates from the whole island.

When the assembly was duly constituted, Luis Muñoz Rivera, José de Diego, and Santiago R. Palmer moved a resolution aimed to dissolve the Federal Party and set up in its place a patriotic association not intended to participate in elections but to be
only a pressure group. The Unión de Puerto Rico was to be non-
political and nonpartisan, a patriotic propagandistic organiza-
tion to be the mouthpiece of the consensus of Puerto Rican
opinion, an organization which would dissolve itself when the
question of political status was settled.

The Federal Party was dissolved by a vote of 92 to 11.25

Matienzo Cintrón joined the meeting the following day, and
Muñoz Rivera, De Diego and Palmer submitted a declaration of
Principles, calling for a stable and definitive political
status, self-government either as a state of the Union or as
an independent nation under the protectorate of the United
States. This was the famous base quinta ("fifth point"):26

We declare that we understand that it is feasible
that the island of Puerto Rico be federated to the
United States of North America, agreeing that Puerto
Rico be a state of the American Union, a means by which there
can be recognized the self-government that we need
and ask; and we declare also that the island of Puerto
Rico can be declared an independent nation under the
protection of the United States, a means by which also
there can be recognized the self-government that we
need and ask.27

A precise definition of citizenship was the final point asked for.

In the debate which followed the Estado Libre Asociado
("commonwealth") of 1952 was foreshadowed by the words of
Herminio Díaz Navarro, as a third alternative status, when he
spoke in these terms:

I favor for now a status, that within the quality of
non-organized territory where we are and with self-
government or autonomy as a base, allows us, establishing
that principle with regard to the solution of our economic
problem, to gain strength, to acquire the means with
which to be able to have in the future, with due respect,
that other supreme category.28
Díaz Navarro rejected outright independence immediately as being economically impractical.²⁹

Before adjournment Muñoz Rivera, unchallenged leader of the Olimpo assembly, proposed that a delegation of the new Unión de Puerto Rico visit Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, at that precise moment a guest in a San Juan hotel. Santiago Iglesias³⁰ and other socialist leaders were present. It was agreed that the workers' movement would cooperate with the new born Unión. That the Unión de Puerto Rico was not to function as a political party soon proved to be an unworkable ideal, and so in the 1904 elections on the Unionist ticket appeared representatives of the Free Federation of the Workers of Puerto Rico. It is interesting to note that the Unionist emblem was the same as that of the American Federation of Labor, two hands firmly clasped. Muñoz Rivera returned to New York, once again the undisputed chief of a vigorous political organization.

In 1903 the Puerto Rican Republican Party had been incorporated into the Republican Party of the United States, as a territorial branch of the national party, with voice and vote in national conventions and in the nomination of Republican candidates for President and Vice-President of the United States. This affiliation has been maintained until the present day with the exception of the years 1916-1919. The identification of the insular and continental Republican Parties greatly encouraged Americanization efforts and statehood hopes. Never-
theless, governors appointed by Republican presidents tended to work with the party in power in the Puerto Rican House of Delegates, which from 1904 to 1924 was the Unión de Puerto Rico.

There is an interesting historical comparison to be made with regard to the salient "fifth clause" in the declaration of principles of the Unionist Party. This was the first time in the entire history of Puerto Rico that a major political party expressed the possibility of this political aspiration. To be sure, the new political body espoused at the same time a pragmatic orientation, including various solutions to meet the political problem of Puerto Rico. But just as Muñoz Rivera told Sagasta in 1896 that if the Commission failed in Madrid, he would have to consult with the revolutionary forces in New York (autonomy or revolution), so in 1904 Muñoz Rivera was saying that unless the United States saw its way to giving Puerto Rico self-government, the alternative of independence would have to be seriously considered. This was a veiled threat which was nevertheless clearly perceived in the United States.

The reaction of the Republicans was hostile to the new party, as would be expected. They reaffirmed their aspirations to assimilate Puerto Rico into the United States, oriented toward the single and invariable goal of statehood. In the inner sanctum of the new Unionist Party there were expressions of disgust at the inclusion of the aspiration of independence in the declaration of principles. In the very assembly which founded the party, fifteen delegates voted against the inclusion
of any such formula. Later, these voices would be heard through the battles of the Unionist Party, giving rise to differences that would rack the unity of the party. As for the government, the declaration for independence produced uneasiness and annoyance. The continental press highlighted with varying comments, in numerous periodicals, such a declaration.

On February 22, 1904, in La Democracia, Luis Muñoz Rivera hastened to explain that the immediate aspiration and the creed of the party was colonial autonomy or self-government, which meant government of the people by the people. He made clear that, as far as independence was concerned, all that had been said about it was that it was feasible, under the protectorate of the United States.\footnote{In an article published in The Puerto Rico Herald, dated March 12, 1904, Muñoz Rivera also said:}

> We affirm the right by which Puerto Rico aspires to assert its own personality. Today an alternative is present: either statehood or independence. Tomorrow, if we have to submit to new injustices, . . . we would stand firmly for independence, with or without a protectorate, as the one and only aspiration of our proud and virile spirits . . . . [Governor Hunt] and his predecessor, Mr. Allen, are the ones responsible that the United States has lost the sympathies of the Puerto Ricans.\footnote{In the face of the regionalist enthusiasm which the ideal of independence awakened in many Puerto Ricans, the Republicans, somewhat resentful already of the treatment by the continental regime in the island, did not hide their deep annoyance against the Foraker government, although they reaffirmed the ideals of their platform. Barbosa himself joined the critics of the administration. The Republican Party began}
to demand insular decentralization and a greater degree of self-government for Puerto Rico.

For the elections of 1904, the electoral law had been modified, allowing minority parties to appear officially on the ballot, permitting nominations by petition, and widening the suffrage to include all males twenty-one years of age and over, whether literate, taxpayers, or neither. The electoral district boundaries were not changed. The law provided, nevertheless, that after July 1906, all new voters had to be literate.33

Meanwhile, on July 4, 1904, Governor Hunt vehemently attacked in Puerto Rico and in the United States by Federals and Unionists, was replaced by Beekman Winthrop,34 who came to the island with instructions from Washington to calm the protests against the continental administration in Puerto Rico. From the arrival of Winthrop on the island, both he and the new Secretary of Puerto Rico, Regis H. Post,35 did not hide their sympathies for the Unionist Party, even to the extent of wearing in public the official campaign colors of the Unionists.

The results of the elections held November 8 swept the Republicans out of control of the House of Delegates (Unionists, 25 seats; Republicans, 10) as well as out of a majority of municipal governments. Among the Unionist victors were six labor candidates. Tulio Larrínaga (Unionist) became the Resident Commissioner. Two of the four Republicans holding seats by presidential appointment in the Executive Council were replaced by Unionists, but José C. Barbosa and another Re-
publican were able to keep their seats for the duration of the Foraker Law. 36

The triumph of the Unionist Party in the general elections of 1904 gave this party control by an ample margin of the majority of the House of Delegates. This did not mean, naturally, the control of the administrative branch of the government—under the centralized colonial system of the Foraker Law—which remained unchanged with the chief executive and the heads of the administrative departments, as well as the majority of the Executive Council, in hands of continentals. Nevertheless, it smoothed for the moment the relations of the Unionist Party with the government. The Republicans, although firm and unchanged in their political direction and their aspirations for statehood, brought to light from time to time in their press the ill feeling against the Foraker regime. The Unionists, not satisfied with the treatment they expected to receive from the government, continued their opposition to the regime with increased vigor. As a practical matter, the need of holding general elections in the island every other year, as required by the organic law, contributed greatly to keeping alive a spirit of partisan struggle.

The Unionist Party, in its platform and activity, did not push with the authorities in Washington the specific demand of independence. But the public mention of independence as an eventual feasible solution, in company with the effect of the campaign oratory of De Diego, Matienzo Cintrón and others who
appealed to the sentiment for independence, contributed greatly to increase the tension which began to show signs of anti-Americanism. Public opinion tended to be divided in two irreconcilable groups, pro-american and anti-American.

In 1905 Governor Winthrop reported officially to Washington, among other things, that:

A very important question for the people of Puerto Rico, due to existing relationships, is whether citizens of Puerto Rico are citizens of the United States . . . . The granting of citizenship by Congress would greatly improve the sentiment of loyalty of the Puerto Ricans toward the United States . . . . We vigorously recommend favorable action by Congress, which would be received with great enthusiasm. 37

In 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt made a visit to Puerto Rico and said, on his return, in a message directed to Congress on December 11, 1906:

There is a matter on which I wish to call special attention, and that is the desirability of conferring complete American citizenship on the people of Puerto Rico. I hope with the greatest interest that this will be done. 38

These are the first two recommendations that high public officials of the United States made to better the political condition of the Puerto Ricans. The reports of previous governors, and even the official declarations of President McKinley and especially of Secretary of War Elihu Root, were always in language basically depressing for Puerto Rican yearnings for political justice, although frequently the language came sprinkled with courteous and paternal phrases. President Theodore Roosevelt himself, in the aforementioned message to Congress, declared that the apparatus of government created
by the Foraker Law functioned well and should not be modified.

The true inner feeling of the Republican and Unionist Parties against the Foraker regime was such that in the Republican city government of San Juan, in 1905, Mayor Roberto H. Todd took the initiative, which was enthusiastically taken up by the municipal council, to convene all the municipal officials of the island in a meeting, to discuss various matters of common interest, including the political situation of the island. Nearly all the city governments were represented at the assembly convoked. On July 25, 1905 (exactly seven years after General Miles disembarked at Guánica Bay, beginning the conquest of Puerto Rico), this assembly sent a memorial to Congress, signed by delegates of fifty-two city governments, both Republican and Unionist. This document pointed out how the Puerto Ricans had been defrauded in their hopes for self-government and liberty, denounced the established system of government which did not give due representation to the Puerto Ricans to manage their own affairs, complained how the will of the Puerto Ricans expressed through the House of Delegates was wrecked in the Executive Council controlled by a majority invariably made up to continentals, who at the same time served as heads of the executive departments and who with the governor were the rulers of the island's administration.

They protested that imported high officials, who were generally ignorant of the Spanish language and the customs and needs of Puerto Rico, by their seats in the Executive Council were converted into lawmakers to cast their votes on matters
touching the deepest interests of the island. The document made clear that, if on other occasions there were separate protests at various times from Republicans or from Federals and Unionists, this was a joint protest from both parties and of the entire country, which claimed better treatment and justice.

There was a demand for immediate amendment of the Foraker Law, so that the Executive Council with its presidentially appointed membership exercising both legislative and executive functions, could be eliminated. There was a request for the creation of an insular senate elected by the people, to legislate like the lower house, with the power to approve or reject the nominations of department heads made by the governor. The attitude and agreements of this assembly of municipal officials stirred up great interest in the island.

The protest reached the Committee on Insular Affairs of the House of Representatives, and there were public hearings. Delegations from both political parties, joined by Resident Commissioner Tulio Larrínaga, supported the protest describing the state of the government of Puerto Rico. The demands and the attitude of the municipal officials caused considerable concern in Washington.

In the elections of November 6, 1906, the Unionists captured all thirty-five seats in the House of Delegates, re-elected their Resident Commissioner Tulio Larrínaga, and elected governments in forty-three municipalities. A variety of minority parties received a scattering of votes. The Socialist Workers'
Party did not present candidates, preferring at the moment to concentrate on the organization of workers' movements.40

Among the Delegates elected in 1906 was Luis Munoz Rivera, representing the district of Arecibo. Jose de Diego, who had been a Delegate since 1903, was elected Speaker of the House of Delegates in 1907, a position he held until his death in 1918.41

A few days after the inauguration of the new session of the Legislative Assembly, early in 1907, the new House of Delegates sent a message to President Theodore Roosevelt, protesting against the Foraker regime and demanding liberal reforms, spotlighting the problem of government in the control of carpet-baggers from the continent, who constituted a majority in the Executive Council.42

On October 28, 1907, Regis H. Post (now governor) informed Washington that the people of Puerto Rico had grasped with marked rapidity the methods and the meaning of the American system of government, and that the legislative work of the last seven years had been excellent. He recommended the granting of citizenship to the Puerto Ricans, adding the following:

It may be true that many Puerto Ricans are not prepared for citizenship, and perhaps some of the more ignorant will not know what it is or have no interest in obtaining it, but the educated and intelligent, I believe, have a perfect right to the full citizenship of the United States.43

The Republican Party always supported and demanded United States citizenship for the Puerto Ricans, as a basic step toward the Americanization of the country and as an implicit promise of future statehood. The Republican Party under-
stood that the concession of United States citizenship ipso facto incorporated Puerto Rico as a territory of the United States, extending at the same time to the Puerto Ricans all the prerogatives of the Constitution of the United States, and that the doors of statehood would be opened to Puerto Rico, in line with the tradition of the continental territories.

The Unionists, with new tactics and the growing separatist sentiment, were not so enthusiastic for United States citizenship, many of them led by José de Diego preferring the status of "citizens of Puerto Rico," as defined in the Foraker Law. José de Diego based his preference for the citizenship of Puerto Rico upon his own legal interpretations, to the effect that the citizenship of Puerto Rico implied the decision not to annex Puerto Rico and the recognition of Puerto Rican sovereignty.44

With the House of Delegates unipartisan but faced with the frustration of frequently seeing its acts defeated or filed away without debate by the Executive Council, the Unionist Party resented more and more the restrictions of the Foraker Law, and redoubled its opposition to it, in Puerto Rico and in the United States. Resident Commissioner Tulio Larrínaga didn't lose any opportunities to emphasize in Washington the undemocratic character of the Foraker Law, which he described before a Congressional committee as "a slab of lead which covers the grave in which lie interred the rights and liberties of a million free men."45
After the elections of 1908, the House of Delegates remained unipartisan, because the Unionists again captured all seven districts, polling about two-thirds of the popular vote. The Unionist Resident Commissioner Tulio Larrínaga was reelected, as was also Luis Muñoz Rivera, the latter representing this time the district of Guayama. At a meeting of Unionist legislators and central board members, January 12, 1909, Luis Muñoz Rivera and others secured approval to an agreement making the destruction of the Foraker Law the first objective of the session.

Governor Post, in response to Unionist complaints at lack of patronage, asserted that he customarily consulted party leaders before appointing municipal officers. The Unionists also protested the conduct of the administrative departments, all headed by continentals, and the continued presence of Republicans in the Executive Council after the resounding Unionist victory at the 1908 elections.

The all-Unionist House of Delegates sent off a protest resolution to Congress and the President, and then adjourned sine die without having passed the annual budget and other important legislation. This created a crisis, because the Foraker Law had not foreseen such an eventuality, and the government was left without funds appropriated to pay the costs of the following fiscal year.

Governor Post called a special session of the Legislative Assembly on March 12, but it adjourned after heated bickering still without approving the budget. The House of Delegates appointed Luis Muñoz Rivera and two others as a committee of
protest to represent the House in Washington. The Executive Council appointed a similar committee made up of continentals to present its side of the case in Washington.  

After nearly two months in Washington the Unionist commissioners on their return to Puerto Rico, May 5, 1909, published a report which admitted that the tactics of the House of Delegates found few supporters in the North but that the unresolved budget crisis had dealt a mortal blow to the Foraker Law. The commission summarized:

The commission judged and judges that its work consisted in establishing the protest of Puerto Rico against a regime that creates taxation without representation and government without the consent of the inhabitants.  

The central committee of the Unionist Party and the Delegates to the House, on motion of José de Diego, unanimously thanked Luis Muñoz Rivera and his two companions.  

Five days later, May 10, 1909, President Taft devoted an entire special message to Congress to the Puerto Rican situation. After several paragraphs of background, Mr. Taft recommended that the Foraker Act be amended so that the budget of one year would be duplicated the following year whenever the Legislative Assembly failed to approve a new budget. The President made the following statements which seemed totally unrealistic, if not false, to most Puerto Ricans:

Puerto Rico has been the favorite daughter of the United States. The sovereignty of the island was transferred in 1898 to the United States with the full consent of all its inhabitants . . . . Without our protective munificence, Puerto Rico would be as weak as some of her neighboring islands of the Antilles . . . . This is
the first time in the history of Puerto Rico that the island lives under the protection of laws made by its own legislature . . . . If the Puerto Ricans desire a change in the Foraker Law, that is the business of the Congress . . . . In the thirst of certain of her leaders to secure political power, the Puerto Ricans have forgotten the generosity of the United States in its relations with them . . . . The present contingency is only an indication that we have proceeded too rapidly for their own good in giving political power to the Puerto Ricans.53

In response to President Taft's message, Congress approved on July 15, 1909, a joint resolution amending the Foraker Law, by providing that the appropriations of the preceding fiscal year would apply for the following year in case the insular legislature did not approve a budget in any year.54

Thus ended the crisis created by the break between the House of Delegates and the Executive Council. It was a forced solution, imposed by the power of Congress, but the results of the conflict were in the long run beneficial to Puerto Rico. For the first time, Puerto Rico was the sole topic of a presidential message to Congress. The attention of the continental, and even the foreign, press which the conflict drew, and the presentation before committees of Congress in Washington of the governmental situation prevailing in Puerto Rico, started some thinking in terms of modifying the organic law of Puerto Rico in more liberal and more just terms.55

In December, 1909, a Masonic lodge in Ponce, informed of a resolution adopted by a lodge in Bayamon after hearing a fraternal and patriotic address by Jose C. Barbosa, took the initiative to bring together the two great leaders of the time, Munoz Rivera and Barbosa, in order to unite wills and feelings
in favor of the highest interests of the country, declaring that the fights of the Puerto Ricans among themselves and the contemporary moral indisposition arise from the very deep differences that intervene, like an abyss, between two notable Puerto Ricans.\textsuperscript{56}

The initiative of the lodge of Ponce culminated in a great Masonic assembly held in San Juan, at which were present Barbosa and Muñoz Rivera, where both patriots came together in a warm fraternal embrace. Muñoz Rivera and Barbosa promised to work together for revision of the Foraker Law, including an elective senate and United States citizenship for Puerto Ricans. This personal agreement was subsequently ratified by the governing bodies of the two parties represented. \textit{La Democracia} and \textit{El Tiempo} published supporting statements from enthusiastic partisans in all parts of the island, and there was every indication of a healthy, patriotic truce and of a common harmonious effort to secure the reforms that the country wanted.

The bipartisan armistice did not last long, however. Later a Unionist commission, composed of Luis Muñoz Rivera and Cayetano Coll Cuchi,\textsuperscript{57} went to Washington. The opposition of these two men to United States citizenship for Puerto Ricans, based on the then current interpretation that citizenship would mean the definitive incorporation of Puerto Rico into the United States, was the reason for discord. The independence aspiration of the Unionist Party, although it was not a categorical demand nor was it flaunted in the faces of United States authorities, was the theme of harangues and partisan election exhortations which excited the Unionist masses. This was contrary to the
Americanization propaganda and categorical demand of future statehood that resounded in the political campaign of the Republican Party.

On March 15, 1910, Representative Marlin E. Olmsted (Republican, Pennsylvania), chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs, presented H.R. 23000. This bill was to provide a new organic law for Puerto Rico. The principal provisions of the Olmsted Bill were the following: it maintained the fiscal and economic arrangements between the United States and Puerto Rico already in force under the Foraker Law, that is, free trade, coasting rights, and reversion of United States customs receipts to the treasury of Puerto Rico; a bill of rights; an executive branch with a governor and six heads of departments named by the President of the United States; the legislative branch composed of two houses, a senate of thirteen members, eight of whom to be named by the President and five elected by the island, and an elective lower house; senators and representatives would have to be taxpayers; the governor would have the right of suspensive veto, and the United States Congress the right to annul any Puerto Rican legislation; the right of corporations to possess land was increased from five hundred to three thousand acres; after the general elections of 1910, only those could vote who could read and write or were property owners or taxpayers; as for United States citizenship, it was not to be given collectively, but those individual Puerto Ricans who would petition for it through a certain judicial procedure were given the right to obtain it.
This Olmsted Bill created no enthusiasm whatsoever in Puerto Rico. United States citizenship was offered in a form similar to that always open to any foreigner in the United States. The bill in general exemplified the retrograde mentality that then still prevailed in Congress. The bill passed the House, with amendments, but did not pass the Senate. The bill was, nevertheless, a sign of the concern of Congress for conditions in Puerto Rico.

In November, 1910, general elections were held again in Puerto Rico, under an unchanged electoral law, to select a Resident Commissioner, delegates to the House of Delegates, and municipal officials. The Unionists by the unit rule again elected all thirty-five seats in the House, and won in fifty-one municipalities. Luis Muñoz Rivera was for the first time elected Resident Commissioner to the United States, with seat and voice in the House of Representatives.60

Summarizing Muñoz Rivera's behavior from 1900 to 1911, we may say that he was a man called to leadership who was re-orienting himself after Puerto Rico passed from Spain to the United States. His initial attitude after leaving the military government was one of watchful waiting, but his criticisms of the shortcomings of the Foraker government quickly became increasingly specific and vehement. In terms of his personal career, from 1900 to 1911 he virtually repeated the sequence of journalist (La Democracia, 1890; The Puerto Rico Herald, 1901), party leader (Liberal Party; Federalist and Unionist Parties), and chief spokesman of Puerto Rico (president of the autonomous
government, 1897; Resident Commissioner elect, 1910).

Poetry which was his first means of political expression even before he entered politics was discarded in the early years of the twentieth century, during which he produced only "Paris" (1901), "Pro Patria Semper" (1901), and "Mens Divinior" (1902).

Revolutionary Paris, mother of republican faith, is the subject of the first of these poems. In two verses in which the author reverts to the first person, he suggests his rejection of violent revolution, except as a last resort, glorious as it may appear in the pages of history:

I condemn the uprising, yes! I condemn the rebellion enrestrained that kills and robs, burns and destroys: I know that reason sells her pride when she learns to fight in the shelter of a rough barricade.

But, oh! at times it is not possible to endure the coercion of the saber that it pleased some Attila to suspend in threats of dishonor or death, and the people is converted from criminal into judge, from victim into hangman.61

"Pro Patria Semper" (For Fatherland Forever) is a poem of pure patriotism, much of whose beauty is lost in translation, even though the allusions to contemporary Puerto Rican history remain clear:

When under the full weight of oppression the country arrives at the highest limit of its wrath, like a lioness that tenses her muscles before stretching them for the jump,

watch over the native home, and in the home the indignant anger, which attracts or impels the proud paladin, giving to his right arm the iron of the sword.
How ugly the cities on that day
on which a star appears far away,
they greet it, wild with joy,
as a pledge of light and of hope!

How sad today when all is understood
and when, by adverse fortune, the star
is changed in a rain of shame and mud,
light into shadow and hope into death!

If the domes of our faith topple,
while there remains a wall, noble and erect,
maintain, like the virgins of Rome,
the sacred fire on Vesta's altar.

And in the struggle against slaves and tyrants,
in the midst of so much misery and treachery,
the kerchief with which your hands gird us
will return victorious to your feet.\textsuperscript{62}

The last of Muñoz Rivera's poems (not counting the
rhymes and jingles dedicated to friends) was "Mens Divinior"
(The Diviner Mind) in which he acknowledged his shortcomings
as a poet, with unnecessary modesty, and which concludes with
his apologia pro vita sua:

Facing the sun, upon the solid language
on which the ideal stamps its mark,
I master my verses as the gauch\-\-o subdues
his wild steeds on the pampa.

Poet no. So long as the world lacks
the august splendor of the Greek Apollo,
like Palissy to seek my enamel,\textsuperscript{63}
I will go throwing my shop into the fire.

And if the vision I evoke does not come forth;
if from the pyre nothing is produced,
let my dreams little by little
be smelted in the last outburst.\textsuperscript{64}

As noted before, Muñoz Rivera's verses, with their classical
and medieval allusions sustain the right of rebellion, the
nobility of freedom, the inevitable triumph of justice, and the
just demands of sacrifice in the struggle. In his poetry we
find the subtest key to Muñoz Rivera's philosophy, though in
the heat of battle that poetry is displaced by the essays of
the journalist, the speeches of the orator, and the correspond-
ence of the friend and lobbyist. But whether the medium be
poetry or prose, Muñoz displays a heliotrophic life oriented
toward the sun of rectitude, sacrifice, and dreamed-of victory.
Like Palissy, he throws his shop in the fire, destroys the old
creative instruments in search of his enamel, the new expressivity
that he longs for.

Mariano Abril in the criticism which he included in
Sensaciones de un cronista about Tropicales, points out the
antithesis between the poet and the politician, because he thinks
that to be a poet is to believe in liberty, justice, and love,
and to be a politician is to distrust them. But he declares
that Muñoz Rivera the politician is as dreamy and honest as
Muñoz Rivera the poet. He distrusted his country when he saw
her sunk in ignorance and servility, and he became the constant
scourge of tyrants and sycophants. More than anything under the
sun, he loved his island, "la tierra novia" (my beloved land, the
land of my true love), with whom he entwined himself until he
became one with her.

As Hernández Usera says,

An adept journalist with overtones of irony called
Muñoz Rivera "el Hombre Patria" [the fatherland figure,
Mr. Puerto Rico], and surely the nickname, which he
wished to be disparaging, with the passage of time
could be said to describe without exaggeration and
without understatement the character of that man from
so many points of view singular, unique, who personified
in Puerto Rico all the civic virtues.
It is no wonder then that Salvador Soto Arana has found that in the patriotic poetry of Puerto Rico Luis Muñoz Rivera is the man of whom the insular poets have most frequently sung. He analyzed some 656 works of 410 Puerto Rican poets, finding 105 compositions on Muñoz Rivera, followed in second place by 57 on José de Diego.67

The earliest personal letter of this decade preserved to us is one from Muñoz Rivera to José Sosa y Oliva, a cor-religionist of Loiza, dated February 28, 1902, in which the former's pessimism is plainly stated:

On political matters I am sorry not to give you any optimistic note. I don't talk to anyone about Puerto Rican politics, precisely because I should not propagate my pessimism among the directing elements of insular opinion. For the last three years or more, since July 25, 1898, or before, I have believed only in the loss of the fatherland of the patriots. Our Puerto Rico received a mortal wound then and goes on in the throes of death, without a chance of preventing extinction. In the future there will be prosperity, physical well-being, wealth of fruits and of metals; but there will be no fatherland. And if there is, it will belong to the Americans and their children and grandchildren. Within half a century it will be a disgrace to bear a Spanish surname.68

The unrelieved pessimism of this letter had turned into a will to fight, if not into a spirit of optimism, when Muñoz Rivera wrote, August 5, 1908, to Domingo Collazo, New York correspondent of La Democracia, congratulating him on his reporting of the Democratic National Convention in Denver:

It is a sad destiny, that of our poor country, good prize of all the conquerors and tasty booty of all combats. I, who have placed independence as an alternative of desperation, in case justice is not done us, keep my ideal and protect my flag.

What do we know of the future! Nations, weak or strong, live at the mercy of the unforeseen. Some day the unforeseen will save us.69
Muñoz closed his letter with approval of Collazo's participation in the Democratic Party.

Writing from Washington a year and a half later, August 22, 1910, Muñoz told Pedro (?) de Elzaburu his opinion of William Jennings Bryan and the latter's visit to Puerto Rico:

A man of his stature should speak his opinions with frankness. . . . I always tremble whenever a committee disembarks or a politician arrives on the island. There, banquets, cheers, native courtesy, indigenous hospitality; here /in the United States/ expressions of disdain to recompense our gentility or our naïveté.

Bryan offered you to give us a whole day. He gave us fifteen minutes. We informed him, from the office of Tulio Larrañaga, that we would go to see him at his hotel. He answered us that he would go to see us. In this way it was easy for him to keep control of the time and retain the initiative of the leave-taking. The first five minutes passed in banalities . . . . The five minutes that followed, Larrañaga took to talk about citizenship, which is of no importance to me. The other five minutes, in telling us good-by, because his sycophants were coming to look for him, no doubt already previously agreed to interrupt the interview. And pax vobis.

Later he went to the Committee on Insular Affairs and talked about Puerto Rico, about the university, about anemia, about the military road, and so forth. And the only thing positive was this: "That country is cultured and justice must be done her."

What a vague thing /to say/ in the face of a crisis like today's!

And he saw President Taft. And he spoke to him in favor of citizenship! With which we shall be saved.

That is the man. Humbug and more humbug. May it be limited to that and he not influence his friends to destroy our preparation for a battle in Congress! I fear it greatly.70

Clearly Muñoz Rivera's preference for the Democratic Party over the Republican did not include much faith in, or respect for, the Democratic standard bearer, Mr. Bryan.

The last four letters of this period are written by Luis Muñoz Rivera from Washington, D. C., to Eduardo Giorgetti. On
November 25, 1910, Muñoz expressed his belief that a Democratic president would be elected in 1912. He felt it was a toss-up whether the Puerto Rican campaign for self-government would succeed. He mentioned the beginning of his struggle to learn English. Finally, he hoped that the current legislation (Olmsted Bill) already approved by the House, would not become a law, because he was sure improvements could be made in it with a little waiting.\textsuperscript{71}

Two weeks later, December 9, 1910, Muñoz counseled firmness toward Governor Colton:

Mr. Colton doesn't want to be attacked. To avoid the criticism of the newspapers and the hostility of the Central Committee, he will do everything he can within the circumstances surrounding him. One must have a good look to know at every moment how far one can go without the danger of a definitive rupture which in any event will bring grave consequences.\textsuperscript{72}

Muñoz expressed doubt that the Olmsted Bill would pass the Senate unmodified, but he looked forward with hope to a Democratic Congress in 1913.

Another fortnight later, December 23, 1910, Georgetti was advised to back the candidacy of San Juan Judge Pedro de Aldrey as associate justice of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, a presidential appointment. Referring also to the Olmsted Bill, Muñoz Rivera said:

I repeat that I put my hopes on the chance of a dispute between the government and the opposition, more than on the efforts of Larrínaga and myself. We can take advantage of the circumstances; but never control them at a moment as special as the present, when the two parties move their forces with a clever mastery to reach their desideratum, which is the exercise of power.
If I had great confidence in the Democrats, in their attitudes and in their promises, I would wish with all my soul and fight with all my strength so that the bill would fail, in the certainty that, in the 1913 session, the next Congress would pass for Puerto Rico a liberal form of self-government. And I say in 1913, because, even supposing that the Democrats maintain their influence over public opinion, the Senate in 1911 and in 1912 will have a Republican majority and the President will be Mr. Taft who does not retire until March 4, 1913. Note this: if the Olmsted Bill passes now, within three years we shall be in a position to ask for another reform. If the Olmsted Bill does not pass and goes to Congress in 1912, either the Senate will reject it or the President will veto it.73

The last of Munoz Rivera's letters before he took the oath as Resident Commissioner was dated February 24, 1911. Besides briefly discussing the slow progress of the Olmsted Bill, he urged Giorgetti and the Unionists to keep on good terms with Governor Colton, as far as they could without compromising principles, and spoke of his own patriotism as something like a physical complaint: "I was not born to rest."74

It had not taken him long to comprehend the political facts of life in Washington, despite his poor command of English. What is notable is his determination, his skillful pitting of political forces against one another in Puerto Rico's benefit when he cannot gain direct support for autonomy. When he cannot conceivably obtain the "whole loaf," he will accept "half a loaf" but that "half a loaf" is scrutinized, too, to be sure it is the best "half a loaf" possible. A later politician has called Munoz Rivera a "possibilist,"75 and a scholar has described Munoz Rivera's philosophy and method as "the art of the possible."76
During this period Muñoz Rivera's most famous speech was that delivered in the House of Delegates on January 30, 1908, and inserted in the Congressional Record by Tulio Larrínaga. Although delivered extemporaneously, it nonetheless contains a carefully thought out and well-rounded statement of his political philosophy as of that date, as the following excerpts will show.

Lack of Preparation an Invalid Argument against Self-Government:

That this is a transitory regime is the answer of the chief of the Republic Theodore Roosevelt. And we already know what that means, in terms so indefinite, that about the transitory regime; New Mexico has lived sixty years under that regime and when it asks to be recognized as a state of the Union, the press answers—I have read it in the New York newspapers—that New Mexico is not prepared; that New Mexico speaks Spanish and doesn't yet possess an American soul . . . . A worthy country does not resign itself; it swells with pride and vibrates. When the whip is raised, the peoples protest at that very moment, as I protest at this instant in the name of the people of Puerto Rico.

Shattered Hopes of American Liberal Rule

We saw the American armies disembark on our southern coasts; we saw them advance along our interior roads; we listened to the promises of General Miles; we knew the history of the United States, and the island almost unanimously—and I say almost unanimously because I never shared those illusions—believed that we would be given the liberties that are enjoyed in North America and that a place would be made for our country in the ensemble of the free peoples of the earth.

Self-Government Nothing less than Government of the People, by the People, for the People

In Venezuela, the Venezuelans rule; in France, the French; in Germany, the Germans, and thus in the other parts of the world. In Puerto Rico the Puerto Ricans do not rule; on the contrary, over them weighs the imperative will of a few functionaries to whom is entrusted the mission of civilized and administering us. It is not possible
to consent in silence that such a system be prolonged and, cost what it may, the truth about our deep sorrows must be proclaimed completely and unadorned.80

Liberty the Natural State of Society

There are no slave lands in the face of God and of Nature. God and Nature made all the lands of the world free.81

Independence the Natural Human Desire

But if it were possible to open the breast of each and every Puerto Rican, and if it were possible to see the collective soul of the million human beings who populate this forgotten rock, we would find written there, in indelible letters, the word INDEPENDENCE.82

Non-Belligerence nor Indicative of Lack of Preparation for Self-Government

I must examine closely and destroy the theory of our scant preparation. The people of Cuba has our origin, our education, our customs, but the people of Cuba was formed in the tremendous battle against tyranny. Cuba possesses a warlike spirit; Puerto Rico possesses the gentleness of peace. And the Congress of the United States recognizes that Cuba merits her independence and denies self-government to Puerto Rico.83

Literacy not the only Criterion of Capacity for Self-Government

Another reason that they consider weighty our governors use to prove the native ineptitude: the reason of our illiteracy. It is true that there are 700,000 natives who do not know how to read: seventy per cent of the population are ignorant of the rudiments of primary education, it is true. But what would we think of Syracuse and Alexandria, of Athens and of Rome, which in the times of their glory reckoned with five per cent of men educated? . . . We being sons of all that cyclopean effort, having inherited the Latin culture, and reckoning with thirty per cent of men educated, shall see how we are denied capacity for self-government.84

Racial Mixture not an Impediment to Self-Government

Another argument which is brought out against us is the mixture of races on our hospitable soil. In Cuba an equal amalgam exists; in the United States are nine million persons of color. And it wouldn't occur to anyone to think that the Cubans and the Americans are not equal to the self-government they enjoy.85
Racial Integration a Characteristic of True Democracy

The colored men of Puerto Rico, who live together with us, who fraternize with us, become mingled in the struggle, show their aptitude to carry out political functions. And on this point we are superior to the United States, where the Negro lives like a pariah in the isolation and in the inferiority imposed by the whites. 86

Even under Spain, Puerto Ricans First

We Puerto Ricans had a hundred reasons for affection toward Spain. She gave us her blood, her laws, her language, she gave us the pride of her legendary traditions and of her unique prowess; the press of Madrid accepted us like brothers in the intense claim of our right; and, nevertheless, we were separatists. I was born in 1859; Spain withdrew from these shores in 1898, and although in the innermost part of my being the Spanish spirit had taken root, the cry Long Live Spain never burst from my rebellious lips, nor did the Spanish flag float from the balconies of my home. Because before I was a Spaniard, I was a Puerto Rican, and before the sovereignty of my nation I defended the autonomy of my fatherland. 87

The Americans Less Prepared to Govern Us than We to Govern Ourselves

Those who invented that labyrinth /Foraker government/ take pleasure in repeating that "we are not prepared." And I want to return phrase for phrase, insult for insult, affirming and repeating that the American politicians are not prepared to govern colonies foreign to their temperament and their uniquely specialized civilization. 88

Simple Puerto Rican Citizenship Preferable to Second-Class American Citizenship

I would say to Speaker Cannon, to that gentleman who in the very confines of this House, reminded us of our alleged inferiority, I would say to Mr. Cannon, if American citizenship is to be granted us without the fullness of American law; if it is to consist only in an abstract formula, we prefer Puerto Rican citizenship. Up there, /they're/ very proud of their /citizenship/. We understand, since there is no glory in the world that surpasses the glory of the United States. But here, /we're/ very proud of ours, which is poor, which is weak, but which is ours. 89
Freedom Attained by United Puerto Rican Protest

It is indispensable that the people of Puerto Rico defend themselves with Spartan resolution against injustice. Submitting, one doesn't press forward toward the future. We must still make an ingathering of confidence, of the last tatter of our confidence; but, above all, we must resist with patriotic firmness. We are small and we shall be great; we are weak and we shall be strong, if we unite arm in arm on the difficult hill of Calvary which we are going over. Union will save us. And because of that and in order to save us, was laid down the foundation of the Union de Puerto Rico, which extends its arms and opens its doors to all Puerto Ricans.90

A Legislature One Hundred Per Cent Representative of the People Imperative

I enter, gentlemen, upon the examination of local politics, not as high, but nevertheless, not less important, than national politics. And immediately I stumble over the Executive Council. It is the major obstacle, it is without doubt the supreme obstruction on which are broken insular aspirations .... And do you know where may be found the work of the Puerto Ricans in the House? You will find it in the waste-baskets of the Executive Council. .... In Puerto Rico there is only one legitimate representation of Puerto Rico: the House of Delegates. It is a concentration of the popular will. It is the only House that has the right to speak and vote in the name of the country.91

Twenty-Four Hour Experts Incapable of Good Government

The honor of implanting so liberal and so wise a system belongs, gentlemen, to the American people, to the most democratic and most just people that history has known in its annals. Yet there is a fact which has been mentioned on many occasions: councilors come who twenty-four hours after setting foot on our shores, without knowing the Spanish language, without having become acquainted with the insular codes, without taking notice of the needs and the customs, legislate with great ease for Puerto Rico.92

No Discrimination in Employment: Equal Pay for Equal Work

And now we come to a very great injustice, to a monstrous injustice .... A clerk, a director of a section, any sort of employee, if he is American, draws a larger salary than the same clerk, than the same director, than the same employee with an identical task, if he is Puerto Rican.
So that on that point, too, is patent the scandal of native inferiority compared with foreign superiority. And no such inferiority exists; no such superiority exists; the employees from here are as capable as the employees from away. The fact has been evident for ten years. And I agree that Americans may come to our offices, although they should almost all be fellow citizens. What I don't agree to is that those Americans draw a bigger salary . . . . I accept the intervention; what I do not accept is the superiority.93

**Government by Consent of the Governed, Not Government by Kitchen Cabinet**

The government of Puerto Rico disregards the public opinion of Puerto Rico. And it disregards, not in an unconscious manner, but in a deliberate and systematic manner. Matters are resolved after consulting personal friends and not political organizations. And in this way is created in the times of the United States the "kitchen cabinet" that functioned in the times of Spain; I am against this clique.94

**Statesmen Needed, not Rubber Stamps**

I believe that we must be the "government men" of the governments that deserve this. Sincere "government men" who work to come to an understanding with the powers that be. Not "government men" who acquiesce with unconditional servility. We can concede much if much is conceded to us; we must reciprocate; we must, in a word, pay the government with the same coin that the government pays us.95

**Uncertain Political Status the Greatest Cause of Anxiety**

Our duty consists in asking for, in claiming, in demanding that the status of Puerto Rico be resolved, whether by means of statehood in the ensemble of the other states, or by means of a frank autonomy in the group of the other American colonies. The persistance will be rough; the demand will be vibrant and continual. And if finally we lose the last hope, if finally we exhaust the last remedy without being heard and our right recognized, then the fifth clause of the Unión de Puerto Rico will be unfurled over our consciences and we shall ask for the independence of Puerto Rico. And the explosion of our perpetual energies will be heard resounding on the anvil, beating and pounding until the chains of our slavery are broken into pieces.96
Among the many newspaper articles written by Muñoz Rivera during this period, in *El Diario de Puerto Rico*, *La Democracia*, and *The Puerto Rico Herald*, the vast majority dealt with nine themes and add little historical information or philosophical insight to what has already been presented. The nine themes were: The *Diario* incident, the proposed dissolution of the Federalist Party, the new tactic of the Federalists after the 1900 elections, the proposals for a *Unión de Puerto Rico*, the manifesto of the Unionists, and question of independence, the fundamental social and economic questions, the alleged failure of civil government under the Foraker law, and the 1909 crisis between the Executive Council and the House of Delegates over the annual budget.

During this period, however, there are four articles which deserve special attention. The first appeared in *La Democracia* for July 12, 1910, entitled "What I was, what I am, what I shall always be," written in answer to a questioning of his republican inclinations during the Spanish colonial period. Once again he had to justify publicly the pact with Sagasta which some characterized as "truckling with monarchists."

He wrote:

Listen to me carefully those of you who are arguing about me. If any nation in the earth—-not Spain now, the discovering and civilizing nation—-if any nation of the earth, Italy, England, Russia, Turkey, the monarchies, with their kings, their emperors, their caesars, their sultans, would have guaranteed me self-government for my poor tropical rock, I would have been Italian, Russian, English, Turkish, anything; because in this way I was neither Turkish, nor English, nor Russian, nor Italian; because thus I was the only thing that I am; what satisfies my native and reflexive desires; because thus I was Puerto Rican! . . .
Now there is no danger in being a republican. I am. I like this compatibility between my political desires and my patriotic duties; but if another monarchy should triumph at the gates of Washington, like Cataline at the gates of Rome; if a Theodore Roosevelt should create the American empire, as an Isabel the Spanish empire; if the circumstances were repeated so that I did not serve the monarchy, but that I brought the monarchy to the service of my fatherland, I would accept from Theodore Roosevelt, as I accepted from Cristina of Hapsburg, the salvation, the redemption of Puerto Rico.

This I was; this I am, and this I shall be until I fall in the silence and in the repose of the tomb. This I understand is what my good and discerning fellow citizens are to be.97

After his election as Resident Commissioner, Muñoz Rivera wrote from Washington to La Democracia using the pen-name of "Fairfax." On December 29, 1910, he urged Puerto Ricans to imitate the nonpartisanship sometimes shown in the United States, particularly in judicial appointments. The case in point was the nomination by President Taft of a Democrat, Edward D. White, instead of Republican Charles Evans Hughes, to be Chief Justice of the United States. Munoz also commended the personal good feeling among political opponents shown at the banquet of the Gridiron Club.98

On February 15, 1911, "Fairfax" wrote about "The Last Boer," upon reading of the death of Piet Arnoldus Cronje (1835-1911). For some time he had intensely admired the Boer commander of the Transvaal forces, conductor of the unsuccessful siege of Kimberley, who surrendered at Paardeberg in 1900. The admiration was summarized in the phrase, "he fought for his country."99

"The Sword of Damocles" was the title of the fourth and last of these significant articles, appearing in La Democracia.
for February 21, 1911. The topic was the Olmsted Bill, H.R. 23000. Though Munoz Rivera was not at all satisfied with the substitute for the Foraker atrocity proposed by Olmsted, he was thoroughly aroused at the ignorance and selfishness shown by the national legislators in amending the bill. "If from heaven God sees these iniquities and does not punish them, it is because God is too patient. Blessed be God!"

100

In the little more than five and one-half years remaining to Luis Munoz Rivera, from March 4, 1911, to his death on November 15, 1916, we shall see the fruition of the political philosophy of this patriot, the one Puerto Rican elected by an island-wide constituency, who was derisively dubbed "el Hombre Patria."
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV


3Willoughby, chaps. ii-iii.

4Ibid., pp. 8, 12.

5We must be careful to note that in regard to Puerto Rico, "colonial" means "politically and economically dependent." As Emilio S. Belaval correctly points out, Puerto Rico is not a colony of the United States as the source of raw materials, the outlet for emigration, a supply of slave labor, the victim of official economic exploitation, nor is it culturally inferior with respect to the United States. "Puerto Rico es lo menos parecido a una colonia que alguna vez ha existido en el mundo" -- Puerto Rico is the least like a colony as has ever existed in the world. (Puerto Rico, ed. Julián Devis Echandía, "Colección América," Vol. X / Barranquilla: Editorial Nacional, 1947, p. 13).

6Manuel Egozcue y Cintrón was a banker who served as vice-president of the diputación provincial, Republican mayor of San Juan, and member of the House of Delegates in 1900 (Puerto Rico, Secretary's Office, First Annual Register of Porto Rico / San Juan, 1901, p. 58).

7For the complete story, see Pedro de Angelís, Célebre proceso (San Juan: Imprenta del Boletín Mercantil, 1901).

8Pagan, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños, I, 76.

9"Abstention from voting (retramiento) is an electoral practice widely admitted in Latin America. It is used to express the protest of a political party against some manifest coercion, an abusive electoral law, or an arbitrary measure of some sort" (William Whatley Pierson and Federico G. Gil, Governments of Latin America / New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957, p. 341).

10Charles Herbert Allen (1848-1934), first civil governor of Puerto Rico (1900-1902), banker, former Republican Congressman from Massachusetts (1885-89), served as assistant secretary of the Navy immediately prior to his service in Puerto Rico (U.S., Congress, Biographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 469; National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, XXV, 424; Who Was Who in America, I, 16).

12A weekly paper, the first issue was año I, núm. 1, July 13, 1901, and the last issue, año III, núm. 151, according to Pedreira, Bibliografía puertorriqueña, p. 5.

13Muñoz Rivera, Campañas políticas, II, 6-8.

14Ibid., 1-5.

15William Henry Hunt (1857-1949), had served as attorney general, member of the legislature, and justice of the Supreme Court of Montana, before coming to Puerto Rico in 1900 as Secretary of Puerto Rico. He was a lawyer, a Republican, and subsequently held office as U. S. district judge and U. S. circuit judge in continental United States (Puerto Rico, Secretary's Office, p. 47; Who Was Who in America, II, 271; National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, XXXVII, 249; Quién es quién en Puerto Rico /Z. ed.; San Juan, 1936/), pp. 19, 50.

16Puerto Rico, Legislative Assembly (1952- ), House of Representatives, Miembros y funcionarios de la Asamblea Legislativa del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico de 1900 a 1961 (San Juan, 1962), pp. 19, 50.

17See Puerto Rico, Laws, Statutes, Etc., Leyes de elecciones y de inscripciones de electores de Puerto Rico (San Juan: Tipografía El País, 1902).

18Quoted in Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños, I, 86.


20Muñoz Rivera, Campañas políticas, I, 288-309.

21Quoted in Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños, I, 91, 94.

22Santiago R. Palmer (1844-1908), a notary public, abolitionist, Liberal, imprisoned in 1887, representative of Mayagüez to the Autonomic Legislature of 1897-98, mayor of Mayagüez, Mason, and faithful Unionist until his death (Fernández y García, pp. 1004-1007).

23Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños, I, 95-99.

24Muñoz Rivera, Campañas políticas, II, 65-70; La Democracia, 26 de enero de 1904.
25 Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños, I, 106; see also, José A. Gautier Dapena, "Génesis, fundación y triunfo de la Unión de Puerto Rico," Historia, VI (abril de 1956), 3-34.


27 La Democracia, 20 de febrero de 1904.

28 Ibid., 4 de marzo de 1904. Herminio Díaz Navarro (1860-1918), lawyer, orator, disciple of Rafael María de Labra, member of the Autonomous Assembly of 1887, secretary of justice in the military government of General Henry, member of the House of Delegates (1903 and 1909-17), member of the Executive Council (1904-1908), was a pillar of the Unionist Party.

29 Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños, I, 109; Meléndez, Revista del Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, núm. 12, 51.

30 Spanish-born Santiago Iglesias Pantín (1872-1939), a cabinet-maker, after seven years as a trade union official in Cuba, moved to Puerto Rico, and in 1901 was appointed general organizer of the American Federation of Labor for the districts of Puerto Rico and Cuba. Member of the Senate of Puerto Rico (1917-33) and Resident Commissioner to the United States (1933-39), he belongs in the ranks of Muñoz Rivera, De Diego, and Barbosa, although his birthday has not yet been declared a public holiday (U.S., Congress, Biographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 1103).

31 Quoted in Muñoz Rivera, Campañas políticas, II, 71-74.

32 Ibid., 76.

33 Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños, I, 116.

34 Beekman Winthrop (1874-1940), a lawyer, was private secretary to William Howard Taft in the Philippines and later a judge there before being appointed Governor of Puerto Rico (1904-1907). He resigned as Governor to become assistant secretary of the treasury in Washington (Who Was Who in America, I, 1368; National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, XXXV, 247-48; Quién es quién en Puerto Rico [2. ed.], p. 174).

35 Regis Henri Post (1870-1944), lawyer, was a member of the New York Assembly (1899-1900). He was successively auditor (1903-1904), secretary (1904-1907), and Governor (1907-1909) of Puerto Rico, following which he was active in the American Red Cross and other relief organizations (Who Was Who in America, II, 429).


40Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños, I, 123-25.

41Puerto Rico, Legislative Assembly (1952- ), House of Representatives, pp. 52, 101.

42For a contemporary analysis by a political scientist, William Franklin Willoughby, who served as treasurer (1901-1907) and secretary (1907-1909) of Puerto Rico, see his "The Executive Council of Porto Rico," American Political Science Review, I (August, 1907), 561-82.


44De Diego, Nuevas campañas, pp. 144-45.

45La Democracia, 22 de mayo de 1908.

46Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños, I, 127.


48Ibid., pp. 47-48.

49Ibid., pp. 60, 62, 64.

50The members of the Executive Council who went to Washington were William F. Willoughby (secretary), George Cabot Ward (auditor), and Henry M. Hoyt (attorney general) (Ramón Meléndez, "El conflicto legislativo de 1909 en Puerto Rico," Historia, nueva serie I (enero, 1962), 79.

Ibid., p. 217.

Ibid., pp. 221-29. The original text is in U. S. President, 1909-1913 (Taft), Affairs in Porto Rico (Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1909). For Muñoz Rivera's reactions as carried in La Democracia for May 12-13, 1909, see his Campañas políticas, II, 203-212.


Governor Post was succeeded on November 6, 1909, by George R. Colton, who served as Governor until November 5, 1913. Colton (1866-1916) was a banker, Spanish American War veteran, and collector of customs in the Philippines before coming to Puerto Rico (National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, XXV, 179; Who Was Who in America, I, 246-47).

Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños, I, 143.

Cayetano Coll Cuchi (son of the historian Cayetano Coll y Toste), lawyer, journalist, member of the lower house of the legislature (1909-12, 1915-24), was a formidable figure in Puerto Rican politics for more than two decades (Rivera de Alvarez, p. 242).

Marlin Edgar Olmsted (1847-1913), lawyer, Republican Representative from Pennsylvania (1897-1913), was chairman of the House Committee on Insular Infairs (National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, VIII, 195; Who Was Who in America, I, 915).


Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños, I, 145-46.

Muñoz Rivera, Poesía, p. 188.

Ibid., pp. 191-92.

Bernard Palissy was a sixteenth century French potter. For sixteen years he worked in vain to imitate white-glazed pottery (probably Chinese), even burning his furniture to fire his kilns. He succeeded in producing a widely imitated pottery, Palissy ware, admired for smooth glazes in richly colored enamels.

65. San Juan: Imprenta La Democracia, 1903. See pp. 184-94. for "Con motivo de su libro Tropicales."


75. Hernández Usera in Muñoz Rivera, *Campanas políticas*, I, xxxvi.


78. Muñoz Rivera, *Campanas políticas*, II, 163.


86 Ibid.
87 Ibid., 167.
88 Ibid., 169.
89 Ibid., 170.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid., 171.
92 Ibid., 172.
93 Ibid., 174-75.
94 Ibid., 175.
95 Ibid., 177.
96 Ibid., 178; also repeated in letter of Muñoz Rivera to Luis Llorens Torres (1878-1944), lawyer, poet, publisher, and politician, written in La Democracia, 25 de enero de 1909, reprinted in Campanas politicas, II, 198.
97 Muñoz Rivera, Campanas politicas, I, xxxii-xxxiii.
98 Ibid., III, 231-34.
99 Ibid., 236.
100 Ibid., 243.
CHAPTER V

RESIDENT COMMISSIONER MUÑOZ AND THE JONES BILL

"The past is prologue." This final period of the life of Luis Muñoz Rivera—the period during which his political philosophy matured and in which we find the expressions and acts by which it must be judged—was by contrast with previous periods a stable, organized one, if only because Muñoz Rivera stayed at one job, Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico in the House of Representatives, from March 4, 1911, to November 15, 1916: five years, eight months, and eleven days. But though his life was stable in terms of occupation, he experienced the roughest political weather of his career, becoming a master of the arts of leadership and persuasion, as he was attacked by foes and misunderstood by friends both in Puerto Rico and in the United States.

The governors did not give as much trouble as some others. Governor George R. Colton—successor to Regis H. Post who was unable to cope with the House of Delegates in the 1909 fight over the annual appropriations bill—was the first United States civil governor of Puerto Rico to complete his full four year term, from November 6, 1909, to November 6, 1913. He was succeeded by Arthur Yager, whose incumbency was the longest of any United States appointed governor of Puerto Rico, from November 6, 1913, to May 15, 1921, seven years, six months, and nine days. Colton, generally liked by Puerto Ricans,
was, of course, a Republican. Yager, friend and fellow graduate student of Woodrow Wilson and a Democrat, held a Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins University and was at the time of his appointment to be governor of Puerto Rico, the president of Georgetown College (Kentucky), a small, coeducational, undergraduate institution affiliated with the Southern Baptist Church. Puerto Ricans had hoped rather wistfully that a Puerto Rican might be appointed, but they were not surprised and only mildly disappointed when Yager was named. Like Colton, Yager was apparently genuinely interested in furthering Puerto Rican self-government, and his differences with Muñoz Rivera and the Unionists sprang more frequently from disagreements about method than about goals.

Woodrow Wilson, former governor of New Jersey and one-time president of Princeton University, succeeded William Howard Taft on March 4, 1913. Taft had experience in colonial government in the Philippines and in Cuba, and believed in a very gradual tutelage of colonial peoples on the road of self-government. Wilson, long a believer in the principle of self-determination, was ready to move ahead more rapidly with Puerto Rico, although he said with regard to the possibility of statehood for Puerto Rico:

With the acquisition of Porto Rico and the Philippines as a result of the war with Spain, the United States acquired noncontiguous lands, already inhabited by peoples differing from ourselves in language, customs, and institutions. Unlike the territory previously acquired,—with the exception of Alaska and Hawaii,—the insular possessions are not adapted for the progressive development from territories to states. They are dependencies, and will remain as such until they reach the stage when they may become independent or self-governing.

This opposition to statehood for Puerto Rico was common in Congress, even among the advocates of liberalizing the organic law (Foraker Law).
It was expressed more emphatically and more crudely, for example, on May 5, 1916, by Joseph G. Cannon, Representative from Illinois, when he said on the floor of the House to the applause of his colleagues:

God forbid that in his /Muñoz Rivera's/ time or my time, there should be statehood for Porto Rico as one of the United States.\(^2\)

With Secretaries of War Henry L. Stimson (1911-13) and Lindley M. Garrison (1913-16) Muñoz Rivera had relatively less contact than with the heads of the War Department's Bureau of Insular Affairs, under whose jurisdiction Puerto Rico had been placed since the law of July 15, 1909. General Clarence R. Edwards was replaced by Brigadier General Frank McIntyre in 1912. Both these military men took a typically authoritarian view of Puerto Rican problems, trying to fit Puerto Rico into the procrustean bed of traditional American organizational and governmental philosophy.

In the Congress Senator John F. Shafroth of Colorado, chairman of the Committee on Pacific Islands and Porto Rico, and Representative William A. Jones of Virginia, chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs, were genuinely interested in expanding self-government in Puerto Rico and worked long and hard even after Muñoz Rivera's death, to make the Jones-Shafroth Act a law, finally achieved March 2, 1917. The Virginian is even better known for the Philippine Jones Act (1916) which brought increased self-government and the promise of eventual independence to the Filipinos.

The 1910 elections had left the Unionists firmly in control in the House of Delegates. With majorities in all seven electoral districts, by the unit rule they automatically received 100% of the seats in the House: seven districts of five delegates each, or a total of 35 seats.
On March 14, 1912, the electoral law was changed to provide, for the first time, for a guaranteed, automatic representation of the minorities. This law provided that each party could nominate not more than four candidates for delegates to the House for each district, so that, since each elector could vote for five candidates, there would always be elected at least one delegate of a minority party in each one of the seven electoral districts.

When the Unionist Party, for the fourth consecutive time, was victorious in all seven districts, under the new law, 28 Unionists and 7 Republicans were elected. The Republicans, however, never took their seats, in a boycott of the Unionist-dominated House similar to the election strike of the Federals in 1900. Luis Muñoz Rivera was reelected Resident Commissioner and the Unionist Party triumphed in a majority of local government contests.

In the 1914 elections the Unionist cause came out first in four districts and the Republicans in three. This gave the Unionists 19 seats in the House of Delegates as opposed to 16 for the Republicans, under the minority representation law. Muñoz Rivera was reelected Resident Commissioner, and the Unionists won in three-fifths of the municipalities. Since a minority of the Unionist Party, led by José de Diego, speaker of the House, became increasingly interested in, and vociferous about, independence, a plebiscite, and an Antillean union, the Unionist 19-16 working majority was often imperiled in practice.

The 1916 elections were postponed by Washington until the new organic law was signed, but by July 16, 1917, when the elections were held, Muñoz Rivera was dead. He had said he was not
going to seek reelection. His choice as his successor, Félix Córdova Dávila, was duly elected, and on August 6, 1917, became Resident Commissioner in Washington.

At least the main thread of Puerto Rican political history from 1911 to 1916 must be reviewed if we are to see Muñoz Rivera's political philosophy in its contemporary context. On January 11, 1912, the House of Delegates passed a resolution declaring against United States citizenship for Puerto Ricans unless accompanied by full self-government. The feeling behind this expression was based not only on nationalism but on self-respect. Some rejected American citizenship because it was feared that its acceptance would be irrevocable and would forever close the door to independence. Others rejected American citizenship at this time, because their dignity would not permit a second-class citizenship by which they were ruled by colonial bureaucrats and a Congress in which they had no representation, unequal to their fellow-citizens in the States and incorporated territories.

In 1912 Muñoz Rivera proposed modifications of the Unionist program in response to the protests of the growing independence movement within the party and the solicitations of José de Diego. Most of Muñoz' suggestions were approved in the extraordinary assembly which took place in San Juan, in 1913. This session was attended by José de Diego, Muñoz Rivera, Antonio Barceló (elected president of the party in 1911) and separatist leaders. In reference to the status question, they declared that:

The supreme ideal of the Unionist Party as well as for all men of dignity throughout the world is the foundation of a free country, complete owner of its own sovereignty, both in the present and in the future. Within the scope of this objective, the Union of Puerto Rico proclaims . . . for complete
independence, or with the protection and friendship of the Anglo-American republic.\(^4\)

With the publication of this statement, the Unionist Party openly declared itself for independence. This declaration was the logical result of fifteen years of political frustration at the hands of uninformed, misguided, and occasionally disinterested, American-appointed officials, many of whom,"... are unable to speak or understand Spanish. ... are appointed merely to pay off political debts, and ... as a rule ... underestimate and look down upon the natives ..."\(^5\)

The early Puerto Rican expectations of great democratic innovations by their Yankee conquerors had failed to materialize. Puerto Ricans had painfully accepted military occupation with the hope that it would serve to prepare the island for greater democratic responsibilities. The succeeding years under civil rule, however, failed to produce any signs which could be interpreted as preparation for eventual alliance of any kind with the United States. North Americans often criticized the island for its failure in developing statesmen, and pointed out that only insular leaders could "... grasp the situation, and counsel and lead their fellow men as an outsider cannot."\(^6\) Prospects for the island's political development were viewed pessimistically:

If the Spanish government is a thing of the past in Porto Rico, the logical outcome of four centuries of political bigotry and misrule is very much in the present. Sound political ideas and ideals were lost in the long-continued reign of personal prejudice and animosities, so it is not to be expected that man can rise free from these entangling alliances.\(^7\)

While some North Americans considered Puerto Rico to be a typically neglected Spanish by-product--undemocratic and leaderless--many congressional leaders such as William Jennings Bryan,
visualized the island as a great stepping stone for exchanges of culture, trade, and ideas between North and South America:

Now, these people in Porto Rico not only understand the Spanish language, but they understand the Spanish character, and in our dealings with South America we need people who not only understand the Spanish language but who understand the Spanish people, and I think we will find that in Porto Rico there is a place where these two peoples can become acquainted more quickly than they can either in the United States or in South America...\"8

Puerto Ricans were often confused by the contradictory statements of North American criticism and praise. Washington authorities took no steps to clarify the mainland's official position. As the islanders' hope for permanent association with the United States diminished, the number of independentistas increased.

Over and above all, it was gall and wormwood to them to feel that they were not competent to administer their own affairs and that they, so to speak, had to be kept in leading strings. It was an admission of inferiority that they were unwilling to accept.\"9

The Unionist program for independence was obviously based upon an understanding of the advantages of working within a framework of friendship and harmony with the United States. There were no uncompromising demands for the severance of all political ties. Other possibilities were recognized in this program. The assertion, "... or with the protection and the friendship of the Anglo-American Republic,\"10 suggested political alternatives, including perhaps statehood. The Unionist Party's open stand for separation was the harbinger of a series of independence proposals emanating from all corners of Puerto Rico. Clearly these demands for independence were a call for experimentation in the form of home rule and economic as well as political reform.\"11 This alerted Washington to the urgency of the situation, and to the need for effecting administrative changes in the island's government.
It was the independentistas who sensed the bitterness of the farmers who had given up their small farms to work as laborers for indifferent sugar corporations. José de Diego, the island's leading independentista, attracted a group of admirers when he referred to sugar as "bitter cane," and pointed out that United States investments were fostering permanent economic bondage on the island. Independentistas also criticized Puerto Rico's reliance on tariff supports as having fostered an artificial relationship with the United States in which economic dependency had become the normal, accepted way of life. This condition, the separatists noted, hindered all attempts toward economic reform and frustrated any efforts toward political self-determination. They also pointed out that the same tariff prevented Puerto Rico from purchasing cheap goods in the world market. Their argument is clearly summarized by the Latin American historian Bailey Diffie:

For the majority of them [Puerto Ricans] tariff protection is decidedly one-sided. The man who has no farm, manufactures and sells no produce to the United States, is not, by any stretch of the imagination, receiving any great aid from the tariff. Quite true, he works for a protected industry, but such labor is not paying him on an average of more than 80 cents a day and with this sum he cannot buy any more of the necessities of life than could be found by foraging before modern industry destroyed the tropical fruits which grew wild on the mountains and in the valleys. Some can wear shoes, but the majority of the peasants cannot. Many go to school, but more than half the children are still unprovided for. A great many have the privilege of work, but more than 35 per cent are unemployed. To all these people the tariff is not a benefit, but, on the contrary, an added burden.

On the basis of these observations and protests, many Puerto Ricans urged that, as a minimum concession, the United States grant the right of making commercial treaties to the insular government.

The major grievance of the independentistas was directed to absentee ownership. This practice was interpreted as the basis for
continued exploitation of the island's wealth by United States investors.\textsuperscript{15} Independentistas nostalgically recalled the island's situation prior to United States intervention. Actually, their conception of the island's economy at the turn of the century was distorted. They painted the picture of a people's joy and dignity, omitting the horrors of malnutrition and disease, e.g.:

The end of the nineteenth century found Puerto Rico a prosperous, healthy and happy country. The standard of living was not high but the land was divided among some 38,000 small landowners concerned chiefly with the production of minor crops. The population was about 85 per cent rural and the production of foodstuffs was more than abundant. According to the Census of 1899, the proportion of farm owners to the whole number of farmers was 93 per cent and the proportion of the cultivated area owned by the occupants was 91 per cent.\textsuperscript{16}

One of the best contemporary statements of what it was that the independentistas were really after is found in the paper prepared for delivery at the thirty-first annual Lake Mohonk Conference of Friends of the Indian and Other Dependent Peoples,\textsuperscript{17} October, 1913, by José de Diego himself. He offered some "main clauses" and "transitory provisions" as concrete suggestions for the consideration of the United States:

\textbf{Main Clauses.}

1st.---Retention of the island of Culebra for Federal uses by the United States government.

2nd.---The establishing of a naval and a coaling station in suitable ports of the island and the cession of land suitable for the location of one or more wireless stations.

3rd.---The right to make use of the submarine cable for official purposes under like conditions to those enjoyed by the government of Porto Rico.

4th.---The right of voluntary or unavoidable entry of United States shipping at any port or haven on the insular coasts.

5th.---The right of transit of United States troops, in case of war with foreign powers.

6th.---The people of Porto Rico shall carry out the terms of the Treaty of Paris in so far as they concern this island and shall respect and fulfill the terms of all concessions, franchises and privileges granted, during United States sovereignty and intervention, either by the United States government or by the government of Porto Rico.\textsuperscript{18}
De Diego asked for commercial advantages from the United States:

7th.--A reciprocal reduction of 25% in the tariff on imports from the United States into Porto Rico or vice versa. In any case with respect to the United States the application of the most favored nation clause.

8th.--The Constitution of Porto Rico shall apply indiscriminately to all the inhabitants of the Republic and shall embrace the rights, privileges and immunities specified in the I, IV, V (except that part relating to the grand jury), VI, XIII and XV amendments of the Constitution of the United States.19

The United States was to have part in Porto Rican foreign affairs:

9th.--The government of Porto Rico shall have no power to negotiate any treaty whatsoever conferring military or naval privileges to any other nation within the limits of Porto Rican territory.

10th.--The government of Porto Rico shall grant to no other country any right whatsoever, no matter whether military, economical, civil or political, that may in any way curtail the sovereignty of the people of Porto Rico or diminish the privileges conferred on the United States.

11th.--The government of Porto Rico shall negotiate no loan that may be a perpetual lien on its revenues or resources, or that may reduce its current income to such an extent as to hinder or imperil proper attention to the public service.

12th.--The President of the United States shall approve all international treaties made by Porto Rico, and he shall approve the negotiation of loans in so far only as they bear upon the conditions set forth in the three preceding paragraphs.20

Standards of public health were to be maintained:

13th.--The government of Porto Rico shall maintain an efficient Public Health Service, and where the maritime sanitary service is concerned with traffic between Porto Rico, the United States or other nations, shall proceed in harmony with the Department of Public Health and Marine Hospital Service of the United States.21

Problems of possible United States intervention were foreseen:

14th.--The government of the United States shall be authorized to interfere, either civilly or militarily, in the government of this country [Porto Rico] and to occupy its territory whenever internal revolution and civil war endanger the lives and properties of American citizens or foreigners, who may have taken no part in such strife, and cannot be subdued by the insular authorities.
The government of the United States shall likewise have power to intervene in the administration of insular affairs and occupy the territory for the purpose of maintaining and insuring the independence of Porto Rico whenever it may be threatened.

Under such circumstances the government of Porto Rico shall be given timely and sufficient warning of the impending intervention which shall not be made effective if the causes requiring it be removed within the time specified in the notification.

In no instance shall intervention be extended over a longer period than that required to reestablish a normal condition of affairs.

The expense of such intervention shall be borne by the government of Porto Rico and shall be so defrayed as not to hamper in any way the regular public service. 22

De Diego and his supporters recognized that of course there would have to be provision for transitory matters, particularly with regard to property and the courts:

Transitory Provisions.

1st.—The government of Porto Rico shall refund to the government of the United States such sums as the latter may have paid to Spain under the Treaty of Paris for arms, batteries or other property, and also such expenditures made by the United States on buildings and other Federal property, all of which shall pass over to the ownership of the people of Porto Rico.

Payment shall be made in annual installments not exceeding $500,000 each, and whatever sums within that limit that may be decided on shall be allotted on the annual budgets of the island.

Until these obligations are completely liquidated, as also loans made by the government, or by municipalities, or by insular school boards, in the United States up to the date on which the island is constituted into an independent republic, the United States government may appoint and maintain in Porto Rico a comptroller of the general insular revenues whose salary shall be paid out of the insular treasury, for the purpose of assuring the settlement of such debts at maturity.

2nd.—The District Court of the United States for the District of Porto Rico shall continue in operation and be in charge of the insular revenues for a maximum period of one year after the country has been constituted as an independent nation, and its jurisdiction shall be exclusively limited to the decision of cases pending before it at the proclamation of the Republic of Porto Rico.

If at such time the jurisdiction of the Federal Court shall have been transferred to the Supreme Court of Porto Rico, the United States Government may appoint a special judge to decide such pending litigation above referred to during the maximum period hereinbefore specified, 23.
The foregoing nearly complete transcript of José de Diego's clauses concerning the jurisdiction of the United States over Puerto Rico was clearly far short of the sovereign Republic of Puerto Rico. The system looked much more like a limited protectorate over Puerto Rico by the United States than like a full-fledged nation. Many independentistas in 1965 have forgotten that their spokesman, De Diego, demanded something far less than sovereignty, but it was precisely that "something less than sovereignty" that satisfied the independentistas in 1910-20. Puerto Rico would control internal affairs including the final appeal in the legal realm, would also have the last word in electing its chief executive and its legislative branch, govern its local subdivisions, control public works, welfare and education, etc., but Puerto Rico would depend on the United States for protection against foreign powers and against internal uprisings, and subsidization of the commercial relations of Puerto Rico with foreign countries.

The position of Barbosa and the Statehood Republicans had not changed an iota. The strategy was still to press on toward admission to the United States, either directly from the status of the "People of Porto Rico" or through the purgatory of the classification of territory. Barbosa wanted Puerto Rico to be Americanized as soon as possible, the use of English in the school, the imitation of American culture, the substitution of American patriotic symbols for those of Puerto Rico, complete identification with and integration in the United States. He wanted Puerto Ricans to be United States citizens, possessed of all the rights and privileges of the citizens of the forty-eight states. This rather monolithic program shut its
eyes to many realities in a sort of blind faith that the United States would somehow care for any area that succeeded in becoming a state. It was quite the reverse: the United States would not admit as a state any territory which could not in large measure pay for the cost of its government and of the welfare of its people.

As Professor Dauer has pointed out in his study, The Adams Federalists, "the first duty of the student of social science is to depict the actual social structure of a period." He continues:

>If this period is one in the past, this is primarily the work of the social, economic, and cultural historian. The next point of view is that theories and governmental policies must be examined in relation to their effort upon various groups of the population, comprising sections of different economic, religious, and cultural background.

Farther on Dr. Dauer states:

As matters are, much that is written is merely descriptive or narrative. How can we integrate political history with social and economic data before we know the skeleton of the story, before we have the basic facts? Again, how can we evaluate theorists—political, economic, or religious—before we can determine the effects of their theories on broad sections of the population? How can we evaluate political leadership unless we have objective data as to effects of policies on divergent sections and groups?

As we proceed to consider some of the "facts" about Muñoz Rivera during the last period of his life, prior to analyzing his political philosophy, we make no apology that the type of full-scale analysis to which Professor Dauer alludes is too large for this investigation. We can at least, however, lay out some of the elements of Luis Muñoz Rivera's last thoughts and try to show some of the components and trends thereof. We conclude this chapter with excerpts from his articles and speeches.

Muñoz Rivera had no illusions about how much influence he or any other Puerto Rican could bring to bear on the Members of
Congress. Puerto Rico's uncertain status as an unincorporated territory was a heavy weight on a representative lacking a vote. The first weapon he must stock in his armory was a fluent command of English.

An opportunity to test his proficiency came the following October when he addressed the annual Lake Mohonk Conference on dependent peoples. Muñoz Rivera presented here the basic conflict between ideals and realities that dominated his course of action as Resident Commissioner. After apologies for his heavy accent, Muñoz launched into an attack on the system of executive tyranny that had been imposed on Puerto Rico. This "sorrowful situation" called for immediate action. Then he mentioned the three possible solutions: Statehood, autonomy, or independence. Of the three, the first was preferable but unattainable, the second acceptable, the third held in reserve as the last refuge of Puerto Rican honor. It was apparent to him that Congress would neither grant statehood nor give Puerto Rico its independence. There was only one workable alternative—other than stirring up "dreams never to be realized"—and that was the rocky path of negotiation for autonomy. If the United States would not let go, perhaps it would relax its grip a bit. Muñoz affirmed that if and when the United States refused to grant a substantial reform bill, he himself would be in the separatist vanguard.

One of the classic statements of Muñoz Rivera's position is to be found in his letter to his friend, Epifanio Fernández Vanga, written August 2, 1912:

Between my essential objective, which is independence, and my method of procedure, which is autonomy, your analytical spirit finds serious contradictions. In reality the latter only appear to exist, they do not exist. Independence is a purely abstract
ideal. It can not be realized. It will never be realized. We point it out, we sustain it, because there are things that are above measurement, that are not susceptible of measurement. And one of them, the highest is honor, individual or collective. Perhaps I may succeed in shielding myself in it and converting it into my only battle flag; it will be when no possibility remains that we may be given what is ours. And it will also be the last protest, as useless as our political labor; but undoubtedly nobler and more beautiful.

If before or after that attitude is adopted, self-government is established without limits, I shall feel like an American and act like an American. And I believe that my fellow-citizens will feel and will act in the same way, because the fatherland will be saved by liberty and exalted by solidarity with the freest and greatest people of the earth. I was born in Puerto Rico; I love Puerto Rico; the mother, little and poor; the son proud to owe her life. If America treats my country like any one of the countries that form its confederation of autonomous states, I--a Puerto Rican to the death--will believe that my honor as a Puerto Rican is compatible with the sovereignty of America, and, without ceasing to be a citizenship of an island beloved above all the world, I shall be a citizen of a republic in which my people fit with their Latin spirit, with their Latin civilization, not inferior to Anglo-Saxon civilization or spirit.29

Here Muñoz exposes his feelings and reasons why he is willing to accept less than the absolute sovereignty of Puerto Rico:

Here, my friends, are the feelings and reasons which incline me to admire the Union, to raise in her program the ideal of independence, and at the proper time to anticipate the proclamation of a vigorous Americanism, against that day, if that day arrives, in which is ended the tyrannical usurpation of which we have been victims, and that we bring about the profound, mutual understanding of the two races, of the two civilizations, having as a base the only base that without discredit it would be possible for us to allow: equality. Since the colors of America have waived in San Juan, I began to say that. I repeated it for fourteen years, in a hundred different situations. I continue repeating it, and I will repeat it with the firmness of an indestructable conviction: an American, equal with other Americans, always; an American, subordinate to other Americans, never. For the sake of Puerto Rico, I want to be an American; for the sake of Puerto Rico I will be anti-American when I am convinced that America is irrevocably unjust and oppressive.

And don't you doubt that I will speak and write more extensively, more in my style, when the facts push me to wave the separatist flag. The sacrifice will stop, then, that began in 1898 and that was and is a filial homage to our sweet Borrinquel. I considered and I consider that this mighty nation [he is writing from Washington] and that tropical isle possess common.
interests: the interest of the nation to demonstrate the efficacy of its republican methods and the power of its historic institutions, thus attracting the sympathy and confidence of all the hemisphere in which it needs to develop its influence and its business; the interest of the island, to show it is not rebellious toward metropolitan methods and institutions and that, under its protection, Puerto Rico is fighting to obtain the positive recognition of her personality and the definitive triumph of her rights. Until now the island, on the one hand, understood its destiny and fulfilled its duty. Until now the nation, on the other hand, refused to understand and respond. A great misfortune and a great responsibility; the misfortune is completely ours; the responsibility rests entirely on those who try to apply the Bismarkian aphorism, "might makes right."

... Prosperity is not enough for us; we prefer self-respect...

What happens is outrageous. To preserve the bossism of a governor and the authority of a bureau, the prestige that George Washington established is compromised; ... the moral patrimony of the United States is defiled... 30

Muñoz Rivera consistently thought of outright independence from the United States as only the last resort when all else had failed. Here he cautions patience to José de Diego, speaker of the House of Delegates and one of the "big three" of the Unionist Party:

... I never spoke at that time of abandoning any of the three great principles of the Unionist Party/statehood, autonomy, independence/ nor of supporting the principle of independence, not then, but in the future and in the terrible event that the last recourse was exhausted and the last hope lost.

Have we exhausted the last remedy? Have we lost the last hope? I maintain that we have not ... We find ourselves face to face with the prospect of a very thorough reform. ... We are offered legislation for Puerto Rico in the next session of Congress. If we were to break today with the Democratic Party and put ourselves in the most extreme position, we would be going back on our word, we would destroy our work of fifteen years, we would appear fickle, without a compass, without a course, in the face of those who are to decide our case and perhaps we would succeed only in perpetuating the Foraker Act ... .

If we counted with the means to resist and fight, we would resist and fight from the first sign of tyranny. ... I believe that ... it is our duty to die for our country. But I believe also that it would be senseless to close the link of effort and of confidence prematurely, convinced before hand that we are going to precipitate the absorption and face annihilation. Therefore, I believe it indispensable to prolong the "truce"
until the Democratic sphinx speaks and either gives us autonomy or turns its back on us and forces us to rebel.31

Six months later, writing again to José de Diego, Muñoz Rivera suggested that home-rule, as an interim policy, could be a period of experimentation on the way to independence. He particularly cautioned De Diego against taking an uncompromising, inflexible stand for independence:

We patriots, enthusiastic, Latin to the marrow, with our speeches, our verses, our articles, with a series of acts, generous from the point of view of the ideal, are abandoning our guard of defense and are bearing our breasts, open and wide to the point of the adversary's sword. I believe we have lost the only chance to bring into being our creed of home-rule, to the end that home-rule, a field of experimentation, might serve later for the conquest of our independence.

I am here, watching, working, and my pessimism is covered daily with deeper shades. And I fear that, instead of fighting with the splendid arms that we would have acquired under an autonomous regime, we shall have to face an unequal foe, our flag flying, true, but beside the flag only the group of those who will bite the dust before compromising with ignominy. Ah! I wanted the fight--the fight was always a pleasure to me--but in positions that minimize the sacrifice of our countrymen and assure the triumph of our cause. . . .

I still counsel you to make a last effort of patience and of prudence and that the setback that we are going to suffer be not justified. . . . I believe with certainty that a record exists in the Insular Bureau in complete detail, of whatever happens in the island and, even more, of how the island reacts to the very special goals of the Bureau. That record contains, above all, the public acts of the political leaders. . . . We do not move toward, but away from, independence when we move away from home-rule, that is away from the only road that leads to the independence of weak peoples, incapable because of their size to take it by force.32

In mid July, 1914, the experimental character of self-govern-

Puerto Rico was, and is still, a splendid field for experimenta-
tion with American methods. The American government will spoil it by insisting on ruling through the Bureau of Insular Affairs islands which love their personality, which respect their dignity, and who do not compromise with a regime unjust in its foundations and even more unjust in its executive development.33
Another factor brought new pressures on the political scene. The newly organized workers were finding a way to make their voice heard over the clamor of rival ideologies and sterile debates on political status. On June 6, 1915, a committee representing the Free Federation of Workingmen petitioned President Wilson for an American investigation of labor conditions in Puerto Rico. This came at the same time that De Diego had decided to go abroad to beat the drums for Puerto Rican independence in Santo Domingo.

I think a great deal about the problem of the workers. There is immediate danger. In the 1916 elections, it is possible that we may not elect the majority of the House and it is also possible that they take the office of Resident Commissioner from us. The fault will fall to those entrepreneurs who abuse the workers and to the Unionist Party who do not intervene in time, sincerely and forcefully. We are their accomplices by our inexcusable silence. . . . On more than one occasion I have pointed this out in vain.35

Following his trip to Santo Domingo, De Diego was not only encouraged in his dreams for Puerto Rican independence but he revived the old idea of De Hostos regarding an Antillean confederation, this time a league more cultural than political. Luis Muñoz Rivera had this to say:

I believe that any proposal to unite Cuba, Santo Domingo, and Puerto Rico in one national body would be premature at this time. Before we speak of a confederation of the Antilles, we need as an indispensable condition that the three countries possess absolute sovereignty. None of them possesses it at the present time.

Cuba goes on developing under the imperialism of the Platt Amendment, which makes it a sort of protectorate; Santo Domingo obeys the economic control of the United States; Puerto Rico is a dependency and nothing more. . . . In my opinion the confederation will not even in many years go beyond the category of the dream to which Hostos, Betances, Martí, and you yourself have raised it. . . .

If Cuba and Santo Domingo move in a practical way toward that spiritual and intellectual union, I will fall in with pride among those who press toward it. . . .36
On May 5, 1916, on the floor of the House of Representatives in Washington, Luis Muñoz Rivera made the most important speech of his career, although of course any successful outcome was not only the result of his persuasiveness but also a combination of his realism and his good luck. His role was a singularly frustrating and powerless one. With voice but without vote since 1911 he had been deprived of any power, prestige or perquisites. He had only his arts of leadership and his dignidad (self-respect) to carry him on.

His points were not new but carefully made. Puerto Rico had home rule in 1898 when captured by the United States. The colonial (Foraker) government combined bureaucracy and oligarchy. The resulting confusion was such as would not only ruin Puerto Rico but would also ruin the good name of the United States.

Puerto Rico, pressed to the extreme, would probably react by passive resistance and parliamentary obstructionism, as violence would be absolutely futile. The Puerto Ricans can find no justification for continuing to remain a people without a country. The political sophistication and economic development of Puerto Rico justify much greater strides toward self-government. In particular, Puerto Rico wanted an elective legislature and no executive veto. Autonomy--home-rule, self-government--is more important than United States citizenship, while United States citizenship is absolutely worthless without the rights of citizenship.

In education and culture, Puerto Rico must be left to execute her own destinies. Economically Puerto Rico needs some support, more in the short run, less in the long run.
It is more the Americans than the Puerto Ricans who have closed the door to statehood, and it is more the Americans than the Puerto Ricans who, by their inaction or by their harassment, push the Puerto Ricans nearer every day to independence. Luis Muñoz Rivera closed with this plea:

Give us now the field of experiment which we ask of you, that we may show that it is easy for us to constitute a stable republican government with all possible guarantees for all possible interests. And afterwards, when you acquire the certainty that you can found in Porto Rico a republic like that founded in Cuba and Panama, give us our independence and you will stand before humanity as the greatest of the great; that which neither Greece nor Rome nor England ever were, a great creator of new nationalities and a great liberator of oppressed peoples. 37

In one of his last letters, Muñoz Rivera stated that he did not wish to run again for Resident Commissioner but rather to leave the nominations wide open in order that the party might freely choose whether it wanted an autonomist or an independentist in Washington. 38 Muñoz Rivera's choice was Félix Córdova Dávila who eventually succeeded him. The 1916 elections, however, were postponed to the following year by President Wilson, in order to give time for the passage of the Jones Act before the elections. The end came to the journalist-poet while he was still fighting the concession of United States citizenship, meaningless without the substantial rights of citizenship.

Luis Muñoz Rivera landed at San Juan on September 19, 1916, where a large crowd of his followers greeted him at the pier. By the end of October Muñoz was seriously ill with a liver infection. Late in the afternoon of November 15, he died. The grief that swept Puerto Rico as the news circulated produced a demonstration of respect and affection that is still remembered by those who
witnessed it. The body was taken to Ponce on the south coast, and then to Barranquitas for burial. There is no doubt that many Puerto Ricans considered Muñoz Rivera a martyr, and that his death greatly strengthened sentiment in favor of the Jones Bill and brought temporary party harmony.39

The day of the terminal operation, Muñoz Rivera had called his friends together, and with the knowledge of impending death, gave his personal testament. This was a reiteration of the Miramar resolutions of friendly cooperation with the United States, and the indefinite postponement of independence:

About politics there is little I have to tell you. I have already said everything in my speeches, in my letters, in everything you know about me, spoken or written.

The way is clearly marked out. The future of Puerto Rico consists in guaranteeing, in consolidating, its politics within a sincere friendship and a frank understanding with the people of the United States.

Although the objective of the problem is the independence of our country, we must have trust and absolute confidence in the great people under whose influence and under whose protection our destiny is to be decided.

The questions that disturb the political life of Puerto Rico are great and the enemy that surround us, creating difficulties for our efforts, are many. We need the help of the United States to solve them, to protect us behind its shield, and to sustain us with its great institutions.

The program of Miramar put us on the way, and we must not deviate from it, and there, in Washington, the Jones Bill is the first step of our evolution. The bill is not all that we would have desired, but if our people demonstrates its capacity upon putting it into effect, surely a series of more liberal reforms will follow.

Today, all the chief administrative officers elected in Puerto Rico. The governor elected by the people. Almost independence, or a state of liberty such that nobody would envy us, not the English colonies nor even any state of the Union either.

And so to march on, letting the people of Puerto Rico decide their fate in accordance with the circumstances that determine their future.

Nothing more, and that is enough, if the Puerto Ricans succeed in comprehending well and in understanding thoroughly that this is the only possible way for its freedom and happiness.40
This was the grand old man whom Cayetano Coll y Toste once asked for suggestions for names of famous persons to be the subjects of an essay contest. Probably he was expecting the names of some literary figures or perhaps some popular local heroes. Muñoz fired back his suggestions: Vercingetorix, Kosciusko, Paul Kruger, all fighters against foreign oppressors.41

This was the grand old man who wanted to make a comprehensive reform and not divide the revision of the organic law into measures covering citizenship, public health, agrarian reform, and an elective legislature.42

This was the grand old man who replied to the criticism of those who wanted to end politics—"less politics and more administration"—in these words: "In Puerto Rico we are not making politics: it can't be done, because the parties never come to power, although they triumph with enormous forces in the elections. In Puerto Rico we make patriotism."43 He went on to write:

Thus in the metropolis /U. S. A./, politics is business; there in the island, politics is priesthood. . . . That intervention /deprivation of sovereignty/ is something more serious than the convenience of the country; it is the self-respect of the country. Those who renounce self-respect, let them raise their hand.44

The discerning student of political science will recognize one more debt that Puerto Rico and the United States owe to Luis Muñoz Rivera. The hard labor which Muñoz Rivera expended in the cause of liberalizing the home rule aspects of the Jones Bill was not without effect. But in the final analysis the Commissioner's really important contribution was a negative one. He kept the majority Unionist Party from adopting a radical position on political
status, and forced a suppression of independence propaganda. Only as strong a leader as Muñoz Rivera could have accomplished this. While he lived he was the most dynamic political figure on the island; even José de Diego, the golden orator, was no match for him. Had Muñoz Rivera failed, or had he died a few years earlier, the De Diego group would have captured the Unionist party and mounted an anti-American campaign. It is difficult to imagine Congress offering citizenship and limited home rule under such conditions. Muñoz Rivera knew that the destiny of Puerto Rico was linked to that of the United States. It is to his credit that despite political embarrassments he acted in accordance with his vision.

To Muñoz Rivera's concern for a resolution of the problem of Puerto Rico's status we must add his interest in many other developing areas. He saw with approval Australia's establishment of a federal commonwealth in 1901, a move toward closer alliance among the colonies of that subcontinent with a simultaneous grant of greater self-government. The South Africa Act of 1909 culminated a number of decades of strife, in which the desire for union and for self-government was counterbalanced by the wish of the Boers to keep their own language and traditions. In 1912 after a half-century as incorporated territories, New Mexico and Arizona became states of the Union, and Puerto Ricans were acutely aware that their Latin cousins of the Southwest, rough as they were, were more acceptable as American citizens than Puerto Ricans.

The Philippines, still an unincorporated territory, secured an elective legislature and the promise of eventual inde-
pendence by the Jones Act of 1916. The Irish and the English, like
the Puerto Ricans and the Americans, represented different languages
and customs, and Luis Muñoz Rivera read about the uprisings that
began in Ireland in 1916 and wished the nationalists well.

But the wave of dominionship which had followed the early
nineteenth century wave of federalism was largely spent by World
War I. The next upsurge of peoples, based on national self-deter-
mination, would require the redrawing of boundaries in Europe and
preparations for extending self-government everywhere in the world.
Soon the publicist would be able to proclaim the end of dominion
status, and federal systems would experience an increasing concen-
tration of power in the central government. And today underdeveloped
economies and underliberated peoples are demanding the good things
of this world now, as the next wave crosses the strand of time.

Muñoz came to reject federal statehood, not only because
he couldn't get justice from those who ruled, but also because
Puerto Rico was an island, isolated in the sea. Nor, in this writer's
opinion, would Muñoz have approved either the French system of
making colonies into overseas departments (this would be the assim-
ilation of the Republicans) nor the Netherlands system of auton-
omous union, on a footing of equality for mutual assistance and
the protection of their common interests (for Puerto Rico would
not ally herself with another country as poor and weak as she
nor on the other hand, seek an alliance when the countries were too
disproportionate in size and power).

Historical events always mold institutions, and assuredly
Muñoz Rivera was not as antagonistic to the United States at the
time of his death as he was during the military occupation, for example. Historical events also molded the British Commonwealth of Nations, so that dominions became virtually independent nations, and colonies became self-governing countries, on the road to nationhood. Muñoz Rivera's contribution lay in clarifying the concept of the free associated state which was later to develop into the Puerto Rico brand of commonwealth.
NOTES TO CHAPTER V


2 U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st sess., 1916, LIII, Part 14, 1037.


5 Alpheus Hyatt Verrill, Porto Rico, Past and Present (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1914), p. 133.


7 Ibid., VI, 1470-71.


10 See the Unionist Party platform as found in Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños, I, 107.

11 Sebastián Dalmau Canet, Luis Muñoz Rivera; su vida, su política, su carácter (San Juan: Imprenta del Boletín Mercantil, 1917), p. 344.


15 Tugwell, The Art of Politics, p. 41.

The first Lake Mohonk Conference was held in 1883, when Mr. Albert K. Smiley, a member of the United States Board of Indian Commissioners, invited a number of persons to a meeting at Mohonk Lake to confer regarding the interests of the Indians. This was the first of a series of October conferences which have since been held annually through 1916. Previous to 1904, discussion was confined largely to Indian matters; that year, however, the scope of the Conference was definitely enlarged to include the peoples of the Philippine Islands, Puerto Rico and other insular dependencies of the United States. The Conference sought to clarify public opinion on these questions dealing with minorities through free discussion by those having firsthand knowledge of existing conditions. Cf., Report of the Thirty-First Annual Lake Mohonk Conference of Friends of the Indian and Other Dependent Peoples, p. 3.

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Ibid., p. 159.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 159-60.
Ibid., p. 160.
Ibid., pp. 160-61.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. ix.

The Unionist Party at the time of its founding in 1904 had called for complete autonomy for Puerto Rico, to be accomplished either through admission to the Union as a state, or through independence. See Gautier Dapena, Historia, VI, 3-34.


Muñoz Rivera, Campanas políticas, III, 136.
Ibid., III, 137-39.

This letter was dated July 25, 1913 (Ibid., 155-57).
This letter was dated January 23, 1914 (Ibid., 167-69).
This letter, addressed to Román Siaca Pacheco, was dated July 10, 1914 (Ibid., 188).


Muñoz Rivera, Campañas políticas, III, 202.

Ibid., 203-205.

U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st sess., 1916, LIII, Part 8, 7473.

Muñoz Rivera, Campañas políticas, III, 219.

Writing in his father's paper eighteen year old Luis Muñoz Marín promised: "Borinquen! If some day you need my blood, count on it; it is red blood; the same that ran through his veins" (La Democracia, 2 de diciembre de 1916).

Quoted in Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños, I, 178.

The correspondence was dated January 19, 1912 (Boletín Histórico de Puerto Rico, XIII, 166).

The date is January 23, 1912 (Muñoz Rivera, Campañas políticas, II, 252-56).

Ibid., III, 294.

Ibid., 294-95.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Luis Muñoz Rivera's political philosophy stands forth on grounds quite different from those of most of his contemporaries; his political thought was curiously dissociated from the natural rights philosophy which was the intellectual life-blood of the Latin American revolutionaries of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. It is entirely consistent with the originality of his other gifts in poetry, prose, and oratory that his contribution to Puerto Rican political thought should be an independent, distinctive philosophy of government.

The character of Muñoz Rivera's ideas is due in a large measure to the circumstances of their origin. Thought is always initiated by some form of indecision on the part of the thinker, and the nature of the causes of that indecision goes a long way toward shaping the nature of the thought. Muñoz Rivera dealt always with the exigent, but it is his particular intellectual triumph that his thought was not hampered by the limitations of those exigencies. His was a philosophy born of experience, and an unusual wealth of experience, at that; thus his ideas are expressed in terms of concrete problems and issues, and the inexorable shape of his thought is pragmatic.
This is evident in the inauspicious beginnings of Muñoz Rivera's speculative efforts, his regionalistic, patriotic poetry. The apparently prosaic ethical code which he then produced, may nevertheless be justly described as an achievement of intellectual struggle and laborious liberation which shows much enlightenment, sophistication, and critical thought.

Throughout the somewhat unsystematic development of Muñoz Rivera's political philosophy, certain salient characteristics emerge, giving unity and perspective to his ideas and shaping them into an integrated whole. Among these features, three are outstanding. Each indicates a way of thinking that is essentially pragmatic. Although it should be said that they are not the exclusive and logically necessary results of that kind of thought, Muñoz Rivera's particular development of these ideas suggests an essentially pragmatic character.

From this standpoint--the transition to or from a pragmatic kind of thought--the most important of these three aspects of Muñoz Rivera's political philosophy is its preoccupation with particular problems. This is a way of saying what has been said before: That his political philosophy was always ad hoc, occasioned by a specific requirement of political action, and guided by that particular requirement. But there is a deeper implication which was fully realized in Muñoz Rivera. Political philosophy is purposeful, not speculative; it is something one develops in order to get something done, not an intellectual exercise or part of a conscious construction of a Weltanschauung.
For a lesser intellect, that would have been a severe limitation, resulting only in a series of thoughtless expedients devoid of meaning beyond the minutiae of personal desires. But for Muñoz Rivera this was less a limitation than an influence; even in the relatively petty issues of his early political thought, he matched a provincial problem with a solution of world-relevance, proving that a tempest in a teapot could be settled by a cosmic calm. The really pertinent thing about this kind of procedure was that it strengthened Muñoz Rivera's conviction that political thought was a tool of action to be wrought and wielded by those who had an immediate mission to accomplish by its use.

Thus there is a strong sense of reality in Muñoz Rivera's political philosophy. He was always talking about something that the plain man could understand, nevertheless exhibiting a sophistication and philosophical grasp which commanded the respect of the high and the mighty. In every case Muñoz Rivera applied himself because something was urgently needed; and in every case he may be found busily constructing the workable, the profitable in the long run, as the only justifiable course of action.

Muñoz Rivera's concern with political problems was based on what is conceivably the most creditable intellectual trait he possessed, his humanitarianism. With utter spontaneity Muñoz Rivera was a man of good will; his concern always included a profound respect for human welfare. This is not to assert that he was an unmitigated altruist, for he unquestionably was captivated by the fact that he himself was a member of the human race, and that what helped humanity
helped him. But that identity of interest was not always obvious, and in particular cases not really necessary. His unwavering loyalty to human values belies any suspicions of purely egotistic motivation we might have: his humanitarianism stems from a very sensible balance of self-interest and regard for human worth.

Muñoz Rivera had an immediate sympathy for those whose lot was in some respect unfortunate, and, what is of paramount importance in this discussion, he insisted that government was often the agency responsible for their relief. It is true that he also founded a tradition of private initiative in assuming social responsibility; but he was nonetheless in advance of his time in throwing some of the burden on government. The particular twist in this aspect of his political thought is distinctly majoritarian; government should act when it could help more people than it harmed by its action.

It is difficult to think of Muñoz Rivera's humanitarianism without a mention of the most advanced, the most radical attainment of his political thought, his acceptance in principal of democracy. To be sure, the very real disappointment of actual politics often led him to inveigh against "the people," but when such utterances are fairly examined in context, it is clear that it is Muñoz the moralist or Muñoz caught in the emotion of a particular controversy, not Muñoz the political philosopher, who speaks. In principal, Muñoz Rivera consistently opposed privilege or discrimination within the citizenry, and he made many efforts to insure that Puerto Rico would be a land of political equality.
Indeed, Muñoz Rivera was the agrarian democrat from the first. His own humble origins, his struggle to acquire an education, his intimate knowledge of the problems of lesser citizens, his inbred humanitarianism—all these may have led him to champion the cause of the plain man. His enthusiasm for the future well-being of Puerto Rico was based on a vision of a society of producer-citizens, industrious, frugal—and politically active. His own early political activity was in opposition to special privilege, and one of his firmest principles was that government should function for all citizens alike, both in requiring support and bestowing benefits. And he soon saw the very practical necessity for giving the people at large some sort of share in government and by widening the suffrage, challenge his countrymen to measure up to the demands upon democratic constituencies.

Thus there were frankly utilitarian aspects in Muñoz Rivera's apprehension of democracy, and this points to one of the main themes of the pragmatic principle. This has been described as the idea that any theory, or any knowledge, is conditionally accepted until its validity is finally determined by the results of its acceptance. The results are usually thought of in terms of human happiness, and in the largest view of things.

Surely this describes Muñoz Rivera's approach to political thought. The simplest example in his thought as a whole was his departure from a theory of necessity after having been intellectually converted and then observing the unfortunate results of its acceptance. His earliest conviction about the function of government was based first of all on the fact that he had observed good results from such a measure on a previous occasion.
Muñoz Rivera's deepest sentiment regarding the relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico was that certain functions could be performed jointed more advantageously than they could by any system of parallel administrations. Thus when he struggled with the problem of the status of Puerto Rico, he often indicated a willingness to leave the ultimate question of United States rights out of it: if only Congress would not exercise authority, he might not insist on settling whether they had the right to exercise it.

It is easy to misconstrue this aspect of Muñoz Rivera's political thought as a kind of apostacy to the Puerto Rican cause, or as intellectual hypocrisy. It was neither; it was rather a recognition by Muñoz that what he wanted first of all was to see the United States-Puerto Rican alliance work--i.e., prosper--and abstract questions of right, whatever might be his convictions regarding them, were not of such urgent importance. It is the crowning trait of the man of action--the political pragmatist.

The other main theme of the pragmatic tradition, the greatest happiness principle, was a positive conviction of Muñoz Rivera. The most consistent idea in all his political thought is the notion of the general good, which really is the specific description of what "good results" are supposed to be. The interesting thing about Muñoz Rivera's development of the greatest happiness principle is the way in which it grew from "barrio" to municipality to island to America, and finally to the world.
For in addition to the main themes of the pragmatic tradition, Muñoz Rivera had developed another principle—also evolved from pragmatic kind of thinking—which occupies a prominent place in his political theory. This principle might be called simply "constitutionalism," but it must be emphasized that Muñoz Rivera's constitutionalism differed from that of most of his contemporaries, and it is that difference that sets him apart from the natural rights philosophy commonly inferred here.

Muñoz Rivera did not regard the Autonomous Constitution of 1897 as a sacred statement of immutable, absolute political truths. To be sure, he did not go so far (as did some Puerto Ricans) as to regard every act of the Legislature as an accretion to the constitution; but neither did he ever assert (as the natural rights theorists would insist) that this or any other constitution was "founded in nature." He simply regarded it as an authoritative, written delineation of rights and duties which was a heritage of a long experience. The rights which the Puerto Ricans claimed, were the fundamental rights of Spaniards and of Americans—not of mankind—whose observance had been in large part responsible for whatever prosperity and good government they had enjoyed. To deny the conditions of past satisfaction was to jeopardize future happiness. There is a certain pragmatism involved in justifying a constitution on the basis of its successful operation.

The whole weight of the natural rights philosophy went far wide of Muñoz Rivera's own independent political philosophy. Natural law was on the decline; the only important intellectual current
which embraced a natural law approach was mainly concerned with
economics. Muñoz Rivera apparently accepted the idea of a natural
economic order, and did not apply the idea to political thought in
such a way as to develop some idea of a natural political order
as well.

This strongly suggests that Muñoz Rivera was closer to
trends of thought in Europe than those in America, certainly in
the beginning. Yet the maturity of Muñoz Rivera's political thought
rarely negated his earlier American-made ideas. His European asso-
ciates, with his own growth of mind, contributed new cogency to what
was destined from the first to be a distinctive political theory.

One cannot accurately enroll Muñoz Rivera in any of the
great schools of world thought. Yet it is impossible to deny him
a respectably elevated niche in the history of political thought.
In America, he was the first, and the most distinguished, exponent
of autonomy—a derivation of his pragmatism.

Having placed Luis Muñoz Rivera in the tradition of pragma-
tism, humanitarianism, and constitutionalism, it remains to spell
out what his idea of autonomy was and what it was not, and how the
present Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is the contemporary manifestation
of Muñoz Rivera's home-rule ideas.

Three words characterize Muñoz Rivera's political thought:
"patria" (fatherland, or better, motherland, to remove the milita-
ristic connotations); "dignidad" (self-respect); and "igualdad"
(equality). Muñoz was not a jingoist, an imperialist, nor an
isolationist in any sense of the term. He simply loved his country
above any other country in the world. Because this country was an island, it was naturally more definitively separated from other countries.

A corollary of country was culture. Luis Muñoz Rivera was neither Hispanophile nor Anglophile. He employed the Spanish language because it was functioning when he arrived on the scene, but only as a medium of communication, and he freely accepted the true, the good, and the beautiful from every nationality.

Self-respect is a word often found on Muñoz Rivera's lips and even more frequently implied in his conduct: compromise but do not surrender; adapt but do not eat dirt. Muñoz Rivera was often called the "hombre justo" (just or upright man). His sense of dignity and of fairness was innate. "When you cannot determine events, at least try to take advantage of them," was his motto. This spirit of give and take, of flexibility, is noticeably lacking in the fixed positions of Barbosa and the aspirants to statehood, and of De Diego and the advocates of independence.

The equality which Luis Muñoz Rivera believed in was not only an equality of formal rights but an equality of spirit: Puerto Ricans equal to each other (religiously, politically, socially, racially), and Puerto Ricans equal to any other nationality on earth. It was not the sterile, mathematical equality of communism, but a concept of equal opportunities plus the aspect of mutual self-respect.

Muñoz Rivera was very clear why he rejected three of the four status alternatives. A confederation could only be the product of sovereign states, and neither Cuba, Santo Domingo, nor Puerto Rico (nor the lesser Antilles) was sovereign.
Independence required an economic autonomy precluded for many years to come by Puerto Rico's small size and meager resources. For statehood, Puerto Ricans needed and did not have the necessary economic, geographical and cultural factors to aid their acceptance by the United States citizens on the continent. The United States was not ready to attempt the incorporation of a noncontiguous state, with limited resources and firmly settled in a different culture, even though it might actually be older than that of the United States.

Autonomy, self-government, home-rule, seemed to be the logical and the realistic answer, though that compromise has found very few takers in the twentieth century. In a status allowing for flexible ties between Puerto Rico and the United States, there would be opportunity for growth and development in Puerto Rican-United States relationships as well as the chance to strengthen Puerto Rico democratically, economically, and in terms of human welfare.

It is common knowledge that the free associated state of Puerto Rico, "the commonwealth," is neither a nation nor a federal state, nor a colony nor a protectorate nor an independent country. Puerto Rico today is a free state in the sense that, with certain exceptions, it is at liberty to manage its internal affairs as it sees fit. It is an associated state in the sense that it is bound by legal ties to the government of the United States in a relationship which rests upon a compact mutually agreed to and changeable only by mutual consent.

At the basis of Muñoz Rivera's home-rule and the present Commonwealth of Puerto Rico lie five indispensable elements:
(1) common citizenship; (2) a common market; (3) a common currency; (4) common defense; and (5) common foreign policy. So long as we have these elements we have the commonwealth. If any one is missing, a new political system comes into being. The details are left for each generation to work out, but the foundation and the direction were the same for both Luis Muñoz Rivera and Luis Muñoz Marín. The political philosophy of Luis Muñoz Rivera lives today in the Popular Party and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

Did Muñoz have no new ideas? He made something stronger and more lasting out of what he found. Was he an opportunist? That sounds like sour grapes, the man who missed the bus. Was Muñoz a charismatic leader? He was a great leader, but autonomy and home-rule were just as much political slogans as muñocista in his time. Was he a demagogue? He introduced serious and dispassionate discussion in political debate, both spoken and written.

Since dependency, in any form, is today generally regarded by the world at large as a just grievance, it may be pertinent to consider just what independence, which is so greatly desired, can mean in the twentieth century. It is certain that all countries, whether great powers or small, are being linked ever more closely by the great discoveries which reduce or eliminate distance, and which will, to an increasing extent, open to all people of the world advantages hitherto enjoyed, if at all, only by the very few. Further, economic developments entailing a high degree of specialization have already resulted in the growing interdependence of the major producing areas of the world.
Even the United States, with its diverse and abundant natural resources, must lend to other countries so that they may buy a part of its production, already too large for its own citizens to consume. Political independence, too, does not, today, mean what it meant in the nineteenth century. Then, a great power would count itself as independent if it maintained reasonably strong armed forces, and had reasonably good diplomatic relations with its neighbors. Even in those days, however, "independence" was a relative term. Thus, the need for dependence on other friendly powers was relatively less for the United Kingdom, isolated from Europe by the English Channel, than for any of the European great powers; and the United States, in its physical isolation from potential enemies, was virtually secure.

The position is now wholly changed. Even the United States, today the richest prize for an aggressor, has now a need as great, or greater, for armed forces, good diplomacy and strong allies as any of the lesser powers. By itself, the United States is, and knows itself to be, insecure. How then, in such a world, is there any point in, or possibility of, attempting to satisfy the aspirations of the tiny island communities of the Caribbean such as Puerto Rico, which is so small and so obscure that the rest of the world has scarcely even heard of it?

There is a need for clarification of what, in these changed circumstances, the word "independence" now means. It is suggested that, although all states are now increasingly interdependent, those governments may be termed actually dependent which, year by year, rely for their essential requirements upon a regular subvention from
some richer country. Much, of course, depends upon what is meant by the term "essential requirement." Thus, a people content in the last resort with a relatively low standard of living may yet be independent in that, though their people are poor, they are self-supporting. Another people, in similar circumstances but demanding a higher standard of living, must put up with a measure of dependence. In simpler terms, the man content to live in a small house where he can pay his own bills, is independent, while his neighbor, having more or less the same income but living in a larger house, needs support from a rich patron, and is not.

The majority of Puerto Ricans have consistently preferred to live as the man in the larger house; and since the United States can, if it wishes, afford to pay the bills, it may well be that their decision is a wise one. Their problem, in this situation, is that they must find a way of keeping their own self-respect; and they must ensure, as far as this may be possible, that the United States will continue willingly to act as the rich patron. Both these aims can, it is suggested, best be achieved by the closest possible integration of Puerto Rico with the continental United States, whether this be by the maintenance or achievement of the present "commonwealth" status of Puerto Rico or, at some later date, by statehood. Charity may be hard to accept from strangers, but members of a closely knit and happy family do not feel embarrassed or ashamed at accepting help from one another. Further, while a donor may, in hard times, end his subscription to a deserving extraneous cause, he is much less likely to cut off one of his own family circle.
It must be made clear that no stigma attaches to the choice of Puerto Rico. Governments exist for the happiness and well-being of individuals. If individuals can, by the alteration of an ancient pattern, achieve a richer and a fuller life, it may well be right and proper that the necessary changes should be made. There is no virtue in clinging to the past for sentimental reasons and, in the circumstances, it should be a matter for congratulation if the people of Puerto Rico are sensible enough to realize this.

The critic may ask where, in these recommendations, is to be found a possible solution, or part solution, to the general problem of under-developed areas. The fact is that there can be no one policy, equally applicable in Persia and Nigeria; in Puerto Rico and in Kenya; in the great land-areas of south-east Asia, and in the tiny islands of the British Caribbean. Each territory, even those apparently so similar, has its own peculiar history, and its own destiny. This cannot, usually, be greatly altered, although the planners can, if they are careful, give a push this way or that. Their business is to accumulate sufficient wisdom to know which way to push, and when. Much patience and skill is required of them, and they can, if they will, learn much from each other's experience, even though there can be no master plan.

Luis Muñoz Rivera, by his insistence that neither assimilation in a federal union of states nor independence (sovereignty) was the only alternative of political status for Puerto Rico, laid the foundations for the present constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
There are very few, if any, other nonsovereign areas emerging from colonialism which can or will follow Puerto Rico's example in detail, because of the unique factors present in the case of Puerto Rico.

Yet Muñoz Rivera deserves the credit for securing autonomy for Puerto Rico, first from Spain and later from the United States, and for ably defending Puerto Rican autonomy in theory and practice. For it is obvious that the commonwealth status as conceived by its founders from Luis Muñoz Rivera to Luis Muñoz Marín is no midway station. It is an organic status with a capability of growth within its scope and context. It is rooted in basic democratic principles and undeniable realities. It is eminently suited to the island's environment and its geographic and cultural position. It responds to a yearning for freedom which has the experience of history behind it. Those who helped create it in recent years, whether in Puerto Rico or in the United States, are rightfully proud of their work. But recognition must also be given to leaders of former times who looked forward to a day when Puerto Rico would be a useful and significant partner of the United States in the struggle to make democracy a living force. Thus, the future of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is nurtured with the vision of men from several generations who with prudence and foresight labored for the removal of the onus of colonialism from another land of the Western World.

How far have Luis Muñoz Marín and the Popular Democratic Party carried Luis Muñoz Rivera's idea of autonomy? If we were to arrange all the governments in the world in rank order by degree of
sovereignty possessed, from completely independent countries through the various classifications of dominion, member of the British commonwealth, member of the French community, overseas department, overseas territory, federation, federal state, unincorporated territory, crown colony, colony, high commission territory, condominium, protectorate, to trust territory, we would have to admit that legally Puerto Rico in 1965 is still an unincorporated territory of the United States governed by Congress. But Congress has waived so many of its rights and turned over so large a portion of self-government to Puerto Rico that the unique status of "estado libre asociado" has been established and recognized. On paper in 1965 Puerto Rico would appear to enjoy approximately the same governmental powers as the Netherlands Antilles, the Maldive Islands, the Leeward and Windward Islands, and Singapore, or roughly the status of Canada and Australia in 1912. However, cultural and economic as well as political factors color the legal relationship, so that Puerto Rico's Commonwealth status is much richer and more satisfying than the organic acts and constitutional laws outline. As long as the spirit of Luis Muñoz Rivera is remembered, that legal relationship will continue to develop so as to give maximum self-realization and fulfillment to a proud, democratic people.
APPENDIX

SPEECH OF LUIS MUÑOZ RIVERA ON MAY 5, 1916, IN FAVOR OF THE JONES BILL, ON THE FLOOR OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

On the 18th day of October, 1898, when the flag of this great Republic was unfurled over the fortresses of San Juan, if anyone had said to my countrymen that the United States, the land of liberty, was going to deny their right to form a government of the people, by the people, and for the people of Puerto Rico, my countrymen would have refused to believe such a prophecy, considering it sheer madness. The Porto Ricans were living at that time under a regime of ample self-government, discussed and voted by the Spanish Cortes, on the basis of the parliamentary system in use among all the nations of Europe. Spain sent to the islands a governor, whose power, strictly limited by law, made him the equivalent of those constitutional sovereigns who reign but do not govern. The members of the cabinet, without whose signature no executive order was valid, were natives of the island; the representatives in the senate and in the house were natives of the island; and the administration in its entirety was in the hands of natives of the island. The Spanish Cortes, it is true, retained the power to make statutory laws for Porto Rico, but in the Cortes were 16 Porto Rican representatives and 3 Porto Rican senators having voice and vote. And all the insular laws were made by the insular parliament.
Two years later, in 1900, after a long period of military rule, the Congress of the United States approved the Foraker Act. Under this act all of the 11 members of the executive council were appointed by the President of the United States; 6 of them were the heads of departments; 5 exercised legislative functions only. And this executive council, or in practice, the bureaucratic majority of the council, was, and is in reality, with the governor, the supreme arbiter of the island and of its interests. It represents the most absolute contradiction of republican principles.

For 16 years we have endured this system of government, protesting and struggling against it, with energy and without result. We did not lose hope, because if one national party, the Republican, was forcibly enforcing this system upon us, the other national party, the Democratic, was encouraging us by its declarations in the platforms of Kansas City, St. Louis, and Denver. Porto Rico waited, election after election, for the Democratic Party to triumph at the polls and fulfill its promises. At last the Democratic Party did triumph. It is here. It has a controlling majority at this end of the Capitol and at the other end; it is in possession of the White House. On the Democratic Party rests the sole and undivided responsibility for the progress of events at this juncture. It can, by a legislative act, keep alive the hopes of the people of Porto Rico or it can deal these hopes their death blow.

The Republican Party decreed independence for Cuba and thereby covered itself with glory; the Democratic Party is bound by the principles written into its platforms and by the recorded speeches of its leaders to decree liberty for Porto Rico. The legislation you are about to enact will prove whether the plat-
forms of the Democratic Party are more than useless paper, whether
the words of its leaders are more than soap bubbles, dissolved
by the breath of triumph. Here is the dilemma with its two unes-
capable horns: You must proceed in accordance with the fundamental
principles of your party or you must be untrue to them. The mon-
archies of the Old World, envious of American success and the
republics of the New World, anxious to see clearly the direction
in which the American initiative is tending, are watching and
studying the Democratic administration. Something more is at
stake than the fate of Porto Rico--poor, isolated, and defenseless
as she is--the prestige and the good name of the United States
are at stake. England learned the hard lessons of Saratoga and
Yorktown in the eighteenth century. And in the nineteenth cen-
tury she established self-government, complete, sincere, and
honorable, in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Then in the
twentieth century, immediately after the Anglo-Boer War, she
established self-government, complete, sincere, and honorable, for
the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, her enemies of the day
before. She turned over the reins of power to insurgents who were
still wearing uniforms stained with British blood.

In Porto Rico no blood will be shed. Such a thing is
impossible in an island of 3,600 square miles. Its narrow confines
never permitted and never will permit armed resistance. For this
very reason Porto Rico is a field of experiment unique on the
globe. And if Spain, the reactionary monarchy, gave Porto Rico
the home rule which she was enjoying in 1898, what should the
United States, the progressive Republic, grant her? This is the
mute question which Europe and America are writing today in the
solitudes of the Atlantic and on the waters of the Panama Canal. The reply is the bill which is now under discussion. This bill can not meet the earnest aspirations of my country. It is not a measure of self-government ample enough to solve definitely our political problem or to match your national reputation, established by a successful championship for liberty and justice throughout the world since the very beginning of your national life. But, meager and conservative as the bill appears when we look at its provisions from our own point of view, we sincerely recognize its noble purposes and willingly accept it as a step in the right direction and as a reform paving the way for other more acceptable and satisfactory which shall come a little later, provided that my countrymen will be able to demonstrate their capacity, the capacity they possess, to govern themselves. In regard to such capacity, it is my duty, no doubt, a pleasant duty, to assure Congress that the Porto Ricans will endeavor to prove their intelligence, their patriotism, and their full preparation to enjoy and to exercise a democratic regime. [Applause.]

Our behavior during the past is a sufficient guaranty for our behavior in the future. Never a revolution there, in spite of our Latin blood; never an attempt to commercialize our political influence; never an attack against the majesty of law. The ever-reigning peace was not at any time disturbed by the illiterate masses, which bear their suffering with such stoic fortitude and only seek comfort in their bitter servitude, confiding in the supreme protection of God. [Applause.]
There is no reason which justifies American statesmen in denying self-government to my country and erasing from their programs the principles of popular sovereignty. Is illiteracy the reason? Because if in Porto Rico 60 per cent of the electorate can not read, in the United States in the early days of the Republic 80 per cent of the population were unable to read; and even today there are 20 Republics and twenty monarchies which acknowledge a higher percentage of illiteracy than Porto Rico. It is not the coexistence of two races on the island, because here in North America more than 10 States show a higher proportion of Negro population than Porto Rico, and the District of Columbia has precisely the same proportion, 67 white to 33 per cent colored. It is not our small territorial extent, because two States have a smaller area than Porto Rico. It is not a question of population, for by the last census there were 18 States with a smaller population than Porto Rico. Nor is it a matter of real and personal property, for the taxable property in New Mexico is only one-third that of Porto Rico. There is a reason and only one reason--the same sad reason of war and conquest which let loose over the South after the fall of Richmond thousands and thousands of office seekers, hungry for power and authority, and determined to report to their superiors that the rebels of the South were unprepared for self-government. [Laughter.] We are the southerners of the twentieth century.

The House of Representatives has never been influenced by this class of motives. The House of Representatives has very high motives, and, if they are studied thoroughly, very grave
reasons for redeeming my country from bureaucratic greed and con-
fiding to it at once the responsibility for its own destinies and
the power to fix and determine them. They are reasons of an
international character which affect the policy of the United
States in the rest of America. Porto Rico, the only one of the
former colonies of Spain in this hemisphere which does not fly its
own flag or figure in the family of nations, is being closely
observed with assiduous vigilance by the Republics of the
Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico. Cuba, Santo Domingo,
Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, Salvador,
Guatemala maintain with us a constant interchange of ideas and
never lose sight of the experiment in the colonial government
which is being carried on in Porto Rico. If they see that the
Porto Ricans are living happily, that they are not treated with
disdain, that their aspirations are being fulfilled, that their
character is being respected, that they are not being subjected
to an imperialistic tutelage, and that the right to govern their
own country is not being usurped, these nations will recognize
the superiority of American methods and will feel the influence
of the American Government. This will smooth the way to the moral
hegemony which you are called by your greatness, by your wealth,
by your traditions, and your institutions to exercise in the New
World. \[Applause\] On the other hand, if these communities,
Latin like Porto Rico, speaking the same language as Porto Rico,
branches of the same ancestral trunk that produced Porto Rico,
bound to Porto Rico by so many roots striking deep in a common
past, if these communities observe that your insular experiment
is a failure and that you have not been able to keep the affections of a people who awaited from you their redemption and their happiness, they will be convinced that they must look, not to Washington but to London, Paris, or Berlin when they seek markets for their products, sympathy for their misfortunes, and guarantees for their liberty.

What do you gain along with the discontent of my countrymen? You as Members of Congress? Nothing. And the Nation loses a part of its prestige, difficulties are created in the path of its policies, its democratic ideals are violated, and it must abdicate its position as leader in every progressive movement on the planet. Therefore if you undertake a reform, do it sincerely. A policy of subterfuge and shadows might be expected in the Italy of the Medicis, in the France of the Valois, in the England of the Stuarts, or the Spain of the Bourbons, but it is hard to explain in the United States of Cleveland, McKinley, Roosevelt, and Wilson. [Applause]

The bill I am commenting on provides for a full elective legislature. Well, that is a splendid concession you will make to your own principles and to our own rights. But now, after such a magnificent advance, do not permit, gentlemen, do not permit the local powers of the legislature to be diminished in matters so important for us as the education of the children. We are citizens jealous of this dignity; we are fathers anxious to foster our sons toward the future, teaching them how to struggle for life and how to reach the highest standard of honesty, intelligence, and energy. We accept one of your compatriots, a capable American, as head of the department of
education, though we have in the island many men capable of filling this high office with distinction. We welcomed his appointment by the President of the United States. In this way the island will have the guaranty to find such a man as Dr. Brumbaugh, the first commissioner of education, who deserves all our confidence. But let the legislature regulate the courses of study, cooperating in that manner with the general development of educational work throughout our native country.

I come now to treat of a problem which is really not a problem for Porto Rico, as my constituents look at it, because it has been solved already in the Foraker Act. The Foraker Act recognizes the Porto Rican citizenship of the inhabitants of Porto Rico. We are satisfied with this citizenship and desire to prolong and maintain it—our natural citizenship, founded not on the conventionalism of law but on the fact that we were born on an island and love that island above all else, and would not exchange our country for any other country, though it were one as great and as free as the United States. If Porto Rico were to disappear in a geological catastrophe and there survived a thousand or ten thousand or a hundred thousand Porto Ricans, and they were given the choice of all the citizenships of the world, they would choose without a moment's hesitation that of the United States. But so long as Porto Rico exists on the surface of the ocean, poor and small as she is, and even if she were poorer and smaller, Porto Ricans will always choose Porto Rican citizenship. And the Congress of the United States will have performed an indefensible act if it tries to destroy so legitimate a sentiment
and to annul through a law of its own making a law of the oldest and wisest legislators of all time—a law of nature.

It is true that my countrymen have asked many times, unanimously, for American citizenship. They asked for it when through the promise of Gen. Miles on his disembarkation in Ponce, and when through the promises of the Democratic Party when it adopted the Kansas City platform—they believed it not only possible but probable, not only probable but certain, that American citizenship was the door by which to enter, not after a period of 100 years nor of 10, but immediately into the fellowship of the American people as a State of the Union. To-day they no longer believe it. From this floor the most eminent statesmen have made it clear to them that they must not believe it. And my countrymen, who, precisely the same as yours, have their dignity and self-respect to maintain, refuse to accept a citizenship of an inferior order, a citizenship of the second class, which does not permit them to dispose of their own resources nor to live their own lives nor to send to this Capitol their proportional representation. To obtain benefits of such magnitude they were disposed to sacrifice their sentiments of filial love for the motherland. These advantages have vanished, and the people of Porto Rico have decided to continue to be Porto Ricans; to be so each day with increasing enthusiasm, to retain their own name, claiming for it the same consideration, the same respect, which they accord to the names of other countries, above all to the name of the United States. Give us statehood and your glorious citizenship will be welcome to us and to our children. If you deny us statehood, we decline your citizenship, frankly, proudly,
as befits a people who can be deprived of their civil liberties but who, although deprived of their civil liberties, will preserve their conception of honor, which none can take from them, because they bear it in their souls, a moral heritage from their forefathers.

This bill which I am speaking of grants American citizenship to all my compatriots on page 5. On page 6 it authorizes those who do not accept American citizenship to so declare before a court of justice, and thus retain their Porto Rican citizenship. On page 28 it provides that--

No person shall be allowed to register as a voter in Porto Rico who is not a citizen of the United States.

My compatriots are generously permitted to be citizens of the only country they possess, but they are eliminated from the body politic; the exercise of political rights is forbidden them and by a single stroke of the pen they are converted into pariahs and there is established in America, on American soil, protected by the Monroe doctrine, a division into casts like the Brahmans and Sudras of India. The Democratic platform of Kansas City declared 14 years ago, "A nation can not long endure half empire and half republic," and "Imperialism abroad will lead rapidly and irreparably to despotism at home." These are not Porto Rican phrases reflecting our Latin impressionability; they are American phrases, reflecting the Anglo-Saxon spirit, calm in its attitude and jealous--very jealous--of its privileges.

We have a profound consideration for your national ideas; you must treat our local ideas with a similar consideration. As
the representative of Porto Rico, I propose that you convocate the people of the island to express themselves in full plebiscite on the question of citizenship and that you permit the people of Porto Rico to decide by their votes whether they wish the citizenship of the United States or whether they prefer their own natural citizenship. It would be strange if, having refused it so long as the majority of people asked for it, you should decide to impose it by force now that the majority of the people decline it.

Someone recently stated that we desire the benefits but shirk the responsibilities and burdens of citizenship. I affirm in reply that we were never consulted as to our status, and that in the treaty of Paris the people of Porto Rico were disposed of as were the serfs of ancient times, fixtures of the land, who were transferred by force to the service of new masters and subject to new servitudes. The fault is not ours, though ours are the grief and humiliation; the fault lies with our bitter destiny which made us weak and left us an easy prey between the warring interests of mighty powers. If we had our choice, we would be a free and isolated people in the liberty and the solitude of the seas, without other advantages than those won by our exertions in industry and in peace, without other responsibilities and burdens than those of our own conduct and our duty toward one another and toward the civilization which surrounds us.

The bill under consideration, liberal and generous in some of its sections, as those creating an elective insular senate; a cabinet, a majority of whose members shall be confirmed
by the senate; and a public-service commission, two members of which shall be elected by the people, is exceedingly conservative in other sections, most of all in that which restricts the popular vote, enjoining that the right of registering as electors be limited to those who are able to read and write or who pay taxes to the Porto Rican Treasury. By means of this restriction 165,000 citizens who vote at present and who have been voting since the Spanish days would be barred from the polls.

Here are the facts: There exist at present 250,000 registered electors. Seventy per cent of the electoral population is illiterate. There will remain, then, 75,000 registered electors. Adding 10,000 illiterate taxpayers, there will be a total of 85,000 citizens within the electoral register and 165,000 outside of it. I can not figure out, hard as I have tried, how those 165,000 Porto Ricans are considered incapable of participating in the elections of their representatives in the legislature and municipalities, while on the other hand they are judged perfectly capable of possessing with dignity American citizenship. This is an inconsistency which I can not explain, unless the principle is upheld that he who incurs the greatest misfortune—not by his own fault—of living in the shadow of ignorance is not worthy of the honor of being an American citizen. In the case of this being the principle on which the clause is based, it would seem necessary to uphold such principle, by depriving 3,000,000 Americans of their citizenship, for this is the number of illiterates in the United States according to the census of 1910. There is no reason that justifies this measure, anyway. Since civil government was established in Porto Rico, superseding mil-
itary government—that is, 16 years ago—eight general elections have been staged. Each time the people, with a most ample suffrage law, have elected their legislative bodies, their municipal councils, their municipal courts, and school boards. These various bodies have cooperated to the betterment and progress of the country, which gives evidence that they were prudently chosen.

Perhaps one or a hundred or a thousand electors tried to commercialize their votes, selling them to the highest bidders.

For the sake of argument I will accept that hypothesis, though it was never proved. But even supposing that we had not to do with a presumption, but with an accomplished fact, I ask, Were there not and are there not in the rest of this Nation worthless persons who negotiate their constitutional rights? Did not the courts of a great State—the State of Massachusets—convict four or five thousand men of that offense? Was there not a case in which the majority of a legislature promised to elect and did elect a high Federal officer for a few dollars? I do not think that these infractions of the law and breaches of honor reflect the least discredit on the clean name of the American people. I do not think that such isolated crimes can lead in any State to the restriction of the vote. They are exceptional cases, which can not be helped. The courts of justice punish the guilty ones and the social organization continues its march. In Porto Rico, if such cases occur, they should have and do have the same consequences. But it would be a sad and unjust condition of affairs if, through the fault of one, 1,000 men were to be deprived of their privileges; or, to speak in proportion, if,
through the fault of 160 electors, 160,000 were to be deprived of their privileges.

The aforesaid motives are fundamental ones that require careful attention from the House. But there are deeper motives yet, those that refer to the history of the United States and of the American Congress. Never was there a single law passed under the dome of the Capitol restrictive of the individual rights, of the rights of humanity. Quite the contrary, Congress even going to the extreme of amending the Constitution, restrained the initiative of the States for the purpose of making them respect the exercise of those rights without marring it with the least drawback. There is the fourteenth amendment. Congress could not hinder States from making their electoral laws, but it could decree and did decree that in the event of any State decreasing its number of electors it would, ipso facto, decrease its number of Representatives in this House. The United States always gave to the world examples of a profound respect for the ideal of a sincere democracy.

I feel at ease when I think of the future of my country. I read a solemn declaration of the five American commissioners that signed, in 1898, the treaty of Paris. When the five Spanish delegates, no less distinguished than the Americans, asked for a guaranty as to the future of Porto Rico, your compatriots answered thus:

The Congress of a country which never enacted laws to oppress or abridge the rights of residents within its domains, and whose laws permit the largest liberty consistent with the preservation of order and the protection of property, may safely be trusted not to depart from its well-settled practice in dealing with the inhabitants of these islands.
Congress needs not be reminded of its sacred obligations, the obligations which those words impose upon it. Porto Rico had nothing to do with the declaration of war. The Cubans were assured of their national independence. The Porto Ricans were acquired for $20,000,000, and my country, innocent and blameless, paid with its territory the expenses of the campaign.

The treaty of Paris says:

As compensation for the losses and expenses occasioned the United States by the war and for the claims of its citizens by reason of the injuries and damages they may have suffered in their persons and property during the last insurrection in Cuba, Her Catholic Majesty, in the name and representation of Spain, and thereunto constitutionally authorized by the Cortes of the Kingdom, cedes to the United States of America, and the latter accept for themselves, the island of Porto Rico and the other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, as also the island of Guam, in the Marianas or Ladrones Archipelago, which island was selected by the United States of America in virtue of the provisions of article 11 of the protocol signed in Washington on August 12 last.

You, citizens of a free fatherland, with its own laws, its own institutions, and its own flag, can appreciate the unhappiness of the small and solitary people that must await its laws from your authority, that lacks institutions created by their will, and who does not feel the pride of having the colors of a national emblem to cover the homes of its families and the tombs of its ancestors.

Give us now the field of experiment which we ask of you, that we may show that it is easy for us to constitute a stable republican government with all possible guarantees for all possible interests. And afterwards, when you acquire the certainty that you can found in Porto Rico a republic like that founded in Cuba and Panama, like the one you will found at some future day
in the Philippines, give us our independence and you will stand before humanity as the greatest of the great; that which neither Greece nor Rome nor England ever were, a great creator of new nationalities and a great liberator of oppressed peoples.

[Applause.]

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1Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st sess., 1916, LIII, Part 8, 7470-73.
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Frederick Elwyn Kidder was born September 22, 1919, at White Bear Lake, Minnesota. In May, 1940, he received the degree of Bachelor of Arts, with honors in International Relations, from the University of California. From 1942 to 1945, he did social service work under the direction of the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration. From 1946 to 1955, he was a teacher, a student, or a librarian in California and Puerto Rico, receiving the degree of Bachelor of Library Science from the University of California in June, 1950. In January, 1952, he was awarded the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in Political Science, by the University of California.

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This dissertation was prepared under the direction of the chairman of the candidate's supervisory committee and has been approved by all members of that committee. It was submitted to the Director of the Center for Latin American Studies, to the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, and to the Graduate Council, and was approved as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

August 14, 1965

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