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From the Editors

In 2009, the U.S. House Armed Services Committee convened to revisit, re-assess, and recommend changes to professional military education (PME), a key component of the landmark 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, which had configured the United States’ military apparatus along joint Service lines of effort after a series of unfortunate inter- and intra-Service missteps during the previous two decades of peace and war.\footnote{To be sure, the Goldwater-Nichols legislation has reaped anticipated results to streamline command and control at the strategic level of warfare, in simplifying byzantine defense-procurement policies and, through the efforts of the 1989 Panel on Military Education chaired by U.S. Representative Ike Skelton (D-MO), to provide joint education and training for American servicemembers, as well as their interagency and multinational partners. Yet, by the dawn of the twenty-first century, sufficient concern in Congress about the ongoing quality of military education led the committee to look at the latter issue anew. Through a series of hearings, the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations found much to further recommend within the Services as they grappled with instituting intellectual rigor within PME curricula while also meeting important training requirements. As the subcommittee noted:}

PME . . . must remain dynamic. It must respond to present needs and consistently anticipate those of the future. It must continually evolve in order to imbue service members with the intellectual agility to assume expanded roles and to perform new missions in an ever dynamic \[sic\] and increasingly complicated security environment.\footnote{The 2009 investigation was, in fact, something of a culminating exertion in self-contemplation undertaken years prior among the Services themselves. In 2006, the Marine Corps conducted its own PME study, emphasizing points similar to those enumerated by the special subcommittee as well as its own specific recommendations indicating “the way forward.” Among its suggestions,}
the internal study encouraged an expanded “institutional vision of PME” that viewed education as “a continuum that begins before an officer enters active service, persists as an essential part of his or her active duty daily lifestyle, and extends beyond retirement.” Perhaps most saliently, the Marine Corps’ report advocated to “rebalance the curricula of the respective schools to place appropriate proportional emphasis on the art and science of warfare,” rather than foster an intellectual climate that focused disproportionately, it argued, on the former rather than the latter line of effort.

Indeed, an ongoing challenge for anyone involved in the PME process is achieving an appropriate balance or, as some advocate, imbalance between executing essential training requirements demanding the reflexive understanding of tactics, techniques, and procedures, while at the same time providing students the opportunity—and, perhaps more importantly, the time—to hone the kind of reflective critical- and creative-thinking tools necessary for military leaders at all levels to both consider and execute national policy dictates. Scholars of PME, including Cynthia A. Watson, Nicholas Murray, John T. Kuehn, Pauline Shanks Kaurin, Robert H. Scales, and Joan Johnson-Freese, have weighed in at various times—and with varying degrees of activism and intensity—to this debate, using historical and institutional analysis, as well as theoretical and pedagogical frameworks, to identify deficiencies within PME and to suggest a means to correct these problems to enhance intellectual rigor within the military schoolhouse.

The current issue of Marine Corps University Journal, while consciously avoiding the spirit of the above debates, nevertheless devotes much of its content to the myriad aspects of educating and training military personnel in articles emphasizing institutional, pedagogical, and historical perspectives. The PME Round Table section looks principally at the efforts of select components within Marine Corps Training and Education Command to enhance the development of Marines through the employment of innovative instructional and career-management techniques. As Sergeant Major Scott Hamm notes in his leadoff essay, the modern battlefield is one typified by dispersed military formations; decision making within this milieu tends not to be performed by officers of high rank—as had been the case in the contests of centuries past—but rather by enlisted leaders. With this reality firmly in mind, MCU’s Enlisted Professional Military Education program seeks to place creative-thinking and critical-reasoning skills within the capable and ready hands of enlisted Marines, promoting such methods as historical case studies and cultural awareness training in conjunction with MCU’s Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning. Following Hamm, Rebecca Johnson discusses the Marine Corps War College curriculum, emphasizing its strategic field study initiatives, national policy wargames, and a rigorous student assessment program required
to carry out its mission to cultivate the nation’s future senior military leaders. And Colonel Brian S. Christmas, in his round table contribution, focuses on Marine Corps Training Command’s Transformation Enhancement Program, a comprehensive effort performed across 90 schools that seeks to shape Marines through the career-long promotion of five core competencies, extending from values training and resiliency programs to introducing the young Marine to the tenets of maneuver warfare.

The need to train military professionals to perform essential, often scientific, tasks and the concomitant requirement to develop within them the cognitive abilities necessary to manage, if not overcome, volatile and uncertain environments has, of course, generated dialogue among military educators, theorists, and practitioners long before the establishment of American PME. Indeed, Bruce Gudmundsson’s look into the early life of the Hanoverian-born soldier-intellectual Gerhard von Scharnhorst reveals an eighteenth-century subaltern who, through his exposure to outwardly divergent, yet wholly complementary training and educational pedagogies, “cultivate[d] . . . powers of systematic preparation, careful analysis, and scientific inquiry as well as those that fostered . . . [an] ability to improvise, synthesize, and exploit fleeting opportunities.” And in an important counterweight to formalized, accredited educational programs, Rebecca Hannagan of MCU’s Lejeune Leadership Institute points to the lasting vitality of informal and incidental learning among Marine servicemembers, including such practices as learner-initiated networking, coaching, and mentoring. Indeed, such informal educational pipelines, Hannagan suggests, may be more effective in conveying the ethos of an institution like the Marine Corps than those located within its schoolhouses.

The essays contained within the Historical Perspectives section provide further investigations into the character of military education. Iain Farquharson examines the British Army’s officer selection process for its Staff College in Camberley during the interwar years, discovering that traditional biases inherent to the British regimental system prevented the selection of truly meritorious officers for coveted student billets. Tobias Roeder explores the nascent movement for Enlightenment-era British and Austrian officers devoted themselves to their duties to state and regiment quite seriously, receiving practical—and, at times, sequential—military training to better prepare them for the leadership challenges of modern warfare. William A. Taylor’s article returns focus to the United States, assessing the Army’s short-lived Experimental Demonstration Unit, an ill-fated effort to implement universal military training during the years immediately following the Second World War. Craig Stone provides a careful, nuanced look at Canadian Forces College’s contemporary officer education program; the reader will discover that it faces challenges similar to those of its American counterpart, including
balancing curricular emphasis between conventional and irregular operations, considering whole-of-government rather than singularly military approaches to achieving national policy objectives and accentuating the development of critical-thinking skills through the granting of graduate degrees. Finally, Timothy Mc Cranor moves beyond customary interpretations of those who bore influence upon Carl von Clausewitz. In an inventive piece, the author constructs connections between the Prussian-born philosopher and German hermeneutics pioneer Friedrich Schleiermacher and the writings of his celebrated military countryman. In so doing, McCranor questions the findings of Clausewitz scholar Jon Tetsuro Sumida, whose highly esteemed Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War (2008) posits that On War may be read as a theory of military practice rather than a theory of the phenomenon of war itself.

The remaining articles within the On the Radar section fall outside the journal’s training and education theme, yet they merit a scrupulous reading in their own right. Leading off, David Todd and Paolo Tripodi discuss the importance of behavioral ethics instruction for servicemembers. Much military-ethics instruction, the authors note, resorts to a prescriptive, one-size-fits-all normative approach to what are in fact deeply contextual and contingency-dependent problems. The article suggests a more proper method that focuses on behavioral ethics; examinations into why individuals act in the ways that they do when presented with ethical choices. Fortunately, behavioral ethics has found a place in the PME classroom, but more needs to be done, Todd and Tripodi aver, to promote ethical behavior in field-exercise settings and through career-long assessment measures. Next, Lesley McBain investigates the power dynamics at the heart of veteran access to higher education in the years following the passage of the Post–9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008. “Understanding these power dynamics,” the author notes, “is important not only for higher education overall to better serve student veterans but also for institutions and their representatives in the veterans’ education policy community to navigate both changing policies and policy maker attitudes on how higher education should serve student veterans.” Last, Major Gregg Curley proposes, as a means to maximize available talent to meet an ever-expanding mission set, the creation of a virtual reserve force to augment the 133 extant cyberforce teams currently populating U.S. Cyber Command. Indeed, such a reserve force already exists within the federal organization—the U.S. Public Health Service’s Commissioned Corps Ready Reserve—and may serve as a model, if not a template, for the Department of Defense as it envisions future challenges within the cyberdomain.

The remainder of the journal rounds out for the reader with a selection of literature and book reviews on a variety of topics from air power and drones to Clausewitz and federal policy and strategy. The coming year will be a busy one for the MCU Journal editors as we bring you two additional issues of the jour-
nal: a special issue on gender integration and the military and the fall issue on the broad concept of superpowers. We look forward to hearing your thoughts on these topics and to your future participation. Join the conversation on the MC UPress Facebook page or communicate with us via email at MCU_Press@usmcu.edu.

Notes
5. U.S. Marine Corps Officer Professional Military Education, 42. Emphasis added.
Educating an Enlisted Force That Can Win in the Future

Sergeant Major Scott Hamm

Today’s Marine noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and staff noncommissioned officers (SNCOs) will be at the center of almost every friction point, often without an officer present, and they will be expected to make decisions directly impacting the mission. One thousand years ago, those on the battlefield responsible for making those decisions were kings. One hundred years ago, they were generals. Fifty years ago, they were captains and colonels. Today, with advances in communications, imagery, and the lethality of supporting weapon systems, the decision makers are often enlisted leaders. Recognizing the significance of this situation, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Robert B. Neller, laid out his vision for how Marines will fight future wars and how to prepare the force to fight in the Marine Corps Operating Concept. Among other tasks, he charges the Corps to “review our education and training curricula to ensure we are developing Marines with the agility and perspectives to manage uncertainty, think critically, and solve complex problems.” To enable this action, he directs Marine leaders to “develop unit structures that rely on skilled enlisted operators to offload some of the decisional burden so that leaders can focus on employing their force to defeat an adaptive enemy” and to “train and educate Marines in decision-making skills to help them avoid information overload in a rich situational awareness environment or compensate for the lack of information when C2 [command and control] and ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] systems are degraded or denied.”

SgtMaj Hamm is the director of the Senior Enlisted Academy and the sergeant major for the College of Enlisted Military Education. He has served more than 25 years and is a graduate of many of the Enlisted PME schools and the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College at Quantico.
Why is this important? In addition to recognizing that the Marine Corps is placing enlisted Marines in increasingly demanding decision-making positions, it is necessary to consider the roles that our young Marines also play in ensuring precious resources go where they can best impact mission success. For example, squad leaders and platoon sergeants need to communicate directly with their higher headquarters concerning the current situation. They must also understand the commander’s intent for their mission and what the desired end state is for their own, adjacent, and higher units. Once the intent is clear, a properly educated, equipped, and trained Marine NCO or SNCO can evaluate the situation, think critically, and formulate a creative solution that will lead to that end state. This role of communicating needs for resources is, in fact, a competition, and those who are best educated and operating with a true understanding of both the art and science of the profession of arms will succeed. This understanding cannot be developed by merely training Marines for skills and occupational proficiency. Training prepares for the known. Education, conversely, prepares one to operate amid the uncertainty and confusion caused by the unknown. When we educate our enlisted force in decision making, the Marine Corps planning process, and other aspects of warfighting’s art and science, and we combine that with broadened perspectives gained by conversations with Marines of different elements within the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), we get closer to developing the Marines the Commandant calls for in the Marine Corps Operating Concept.

But how do we increase the enlisted force’s ability to do the things the Commandant demands? The case study method is one way the Marine Corps University’s College of Enlisted Military Education (CEME), formerly known as the Enlisted Professional Military Education Branch, seeks to do this. It puts students in the role of decision maker and feeds them information and context, while at the same time forcing them to make choices, as well as revealing the historical choices made, to increase their abilities to think critically—looking for the root of the problem—and to find solutions for complex problems. Many times, historical examples can then be compared to more contemporary problems to illustrate the utility of this problem-solving technique. Another means of increasing the force’s abilities is to update the curriculum and push more art and science into the syllabus at earlier ranks. The CEME will accomplish this by continuing to ask within every grade’s curriculum, “Who do they talk to, and what should they be talking about?” While the operating environment Marines fight in will always be an uncertain one, they can be taught how to manage chaos and think through unfamiliar situations when their perspectives are broadened through the introduction of meaningful information as early as possible.

Another benefit of educating our enlisted leaders, starting with our NCOs, is that as they mature and have more “fleet experience” to couple with their
education, they will be far more prepared and equipped to develop the Marines under their charge. Much is made of the differences between generations of Marines, often saddling the current generation with a reputation for needing to know the *why* more than their predecessors. However, the truth of the matter is that leaders can only execute their missions by knowing *why*—something they get from commander’s intent and issued orders—and having the ability to truly understand the planning process. As a result, being adept at communicating the *why* enables leaders to educate their subordinates to function at higher levels. This can happen through better communication with their Marines, which raises confidence levels in their leadership, and through their ability to issue explanations of orders and to amplify information in a succinct, coherent manner.

Enlisted leaders also are finding that they will be required, whether in an official or unofficial capacity and at an increasing rate, to represent the Marine Corps to both American citizens and foreign nationals. Social media plays a progressively relevant role in that representation. Many people today communicate with enlisted leaders through personal posts on social media platforms or blogs. Neglecting to educate Marines about their obligations as representatives of the Corps and about the ethics of their profession, both in private and public, exposes them to the risk of broadcasting uninformed, inaccurate, or otherwise questionable content that could injure public opinion of Marines and the Corps. While, at times, these posts may be meant as innocent attempts to blow off steam, their ability to negatively impact countless citizens’ perceptions about the Corps’ professionalism and ability cannot be underestimated. Recent examples of immature and ignorant individuals’ online activities clearly demonstrate the damage such interactions can do to the Corps’ reputation and support in Congress or with the American people. How Marines conduct themselves and communicate in other countries also matters more today than in the past. Incidents that previously may have merited only local news exposure can now be captured digitally and sent around the globe almost instantaneously. The results of immature or culturally ignorant actions can have far-reaching consequences, and once again, education can help ensure Marines know what is expected of their behavior at home and overseas.

The Marine Corps Embassy Security Group works closely with the State Department to ensure it educates its Marines on cultural topics to reinforce the ethical obligations of those representing the United States and the Marine Corps. The average Marine, therefore, requires cultural education to ensure mission success. In many instances, Marine Corps University’s Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning can assist units to prepare; it plays a significant role in an individual’s development through the Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization Program.

The Marine Corps expects today’s NCOs and SNCOs to think critically,
solve problems, make tough choices, and communicate what resources they require for mission success. The Marine Corps knows this, and it cannot rely on luck to ensure the enlisted leaders at a given decision point know what they need to know and possess the skills required to reason and communicate. Enlisted education is the surest way to continued success for the Corps.

Notes
How Senior Leader Education Supports the Warfighter

Rebecca Johnson

The recently published *National Defense Strategy* includes this troubling indictment: “PME has stagnated, focused more on the accomplishment of mandatory credit at the expense of lethality and ingenuity.” While it is true that war colleges are required to teach certain topics to retain their Joint accreditation, this does not preclude them from preparing their students to be lethal and innovative leaders. At the Marine Corps War College (MCWAR), we strive to “put more war in the war college” by running a series of interactive wargames, field studies, and senior leader engagements to provide as much vicarious learning as possible in an academic setting. As part of a university-wide initiative to improve students’ creative problem-solving skills, MCWAR faculty also are increasingly intentional about putting students in situations where they are required to demonstrate strategic ingenuity. While that can be a challenge—and MCWAR is by no means perfect in its efforts—our students graduate with the experience and mental preparation needed to return to their Services as more capable and confident warfighters.

The Marine Corps War College has a distinguished history of educating the Corps’ leaders in the intersection of war, strategy, and national policy. MCWAR was founded on 1 August 1990 to fulfill Commandant General Alfred M. Gray Jr.’s vision to provide professional military education for all ranks and cement a commitment to continued professional education in the Marine Corps’ ethos. Its founding name—Art of War Studies—captures that focus. During the intervening 28 years, MCWAR has grown from eight Marines and one PhD to

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30 students taught by eight faculty. Our cohort includes three international officers; students and faculty are Joint and interagency. Students now graduate with Joint Professional Military Education Phase 2 credit and a master's in strategic studies, accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools.

MCWAR’s mission is to “develop critical and creative thinkers, military strategists, joint warfighters, and strategic leaders who are prepared to meet the challenges of a complex and dynamic security environment.” While that may sound like jargon, our approach is straightforward—small, Socratic seminars with anywhere from 5–15 students; field studies to Congress, the Pentagon, State Department, and National Security Council; interactive wargames; multiple domestic and international trips to visit locations of strategic importance and speak with foreign leaders; and conversations with senior leaders like the FBI director, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Service chiefs, and notable scholars. With only 30 students in the college, these conversations are highly interactive and candid. Students are able to ask meaningful questions about leadership at the strategic level, evolving national security concerns, the future of military innovation, and how to prepare for looming threats. They receive answers from the individuals charged with shaping the nation’s responses to each.

MCWAR is organized around six core courses—Diplomacy and Statecraft; Economics and National Power; Joint Warfighting; Leadership and Ethics; National Security; and War, Policy, and Strategy. We teach across the instruments of national power—not because we are told to by our accreditors but because it is the best way to prepare our students to combat the complex challenges that face the United States today.

Our students come to us as experts in their respective specialties but few are experts in the role diplomats play in securing U.S. national interests or how diplomacy works alongside the military to keep the nation safe. Our students have fairly deep tactical knowledge of Iraq, Afghanistan, and a few other countries around the globe, but only a couple have dedicated real time to studying Chinese, Russian, European, and Asian security and emerging powers such as India.

Through the Diplomacy and Statecraft course, our students develop the ability to evaluate past, present, and likely future policy and security environments; they practice formulating new policy objectives (ends) and policy actions (ways and means) for strategic leaders and decision makers; and they evaluate possible second- and third-order effects of those actions to demonstrate judgment of risk and uncertainty. Faculty teach students to leverage analytical frameworks to evaluate historical and contemporary case studies of key U.S. allies and adversaries. The course culminates in a two-week field study to either Europe or Asia, where students meet with host nation governments, think
tanks, and business leaders to better understand the national interests and foreign policy decision-making processes for key regional powers. It is an important element of the curriculum that forces our students to shift their perspectives from that of a super power to a rising hegemon, regional partner, or fledgling power. This perspective taking—coupled with the substantive knowledge our students gain from interacting with foreign leaders in a small group setting—is essential to develop the insight they need to make wise planning assumptions and recommendations in their follow-on assignments. While the logistical requirements to support this trip are immense and our staff is small, MCWAR remains committed to the field study program because of the essential insights and experiences it provides our students.

If our students know little about the role of diplomacy in securing national interests, they know even less about the role of economics. Though international finance, national debt, and trade are critical to providing national security in the twenty-first century, these larger economic forces fall outside the scope of our Joint accreditation requirements. Still, it is hard to imagine preparing the future force or actually defeating a near-peer competitor without a basic understanding of how monetary, fiscal, and trade policies are influenced by (and influence) the national security community; the ability to evaluate the strategic impact of economic forces on the global security environment; and the ability to evaluate the impact of economic considerations on national security, strategic decision making, and warfare. The Economics and National Power course pursues these outcomes through a series of seminars, wargames, and conversations with senior financial leaders. Students always want more time dedicated to this course, particularly once they develop an appreciation for the impact economic factors have on national security. We take their heightened interest in the subject as an indication that we are right to include it in our curriculum, even though it gains us no advantage with our accreditors.

The final four core courses in our program are the bread and butter of what you would expect to see at a war college. In National Security, students learn about the other actors involved in the national security enterprise; they evaluate the formal and informal processes and frameworks that contribute to national security strategy, policy development, and implementation; and they examine how historical, contemporary, and future security environments affect strategies in support of national objectives. A series of seminars, practical applications, and field studies to the Pentagon and Capitol Hill educate students on how our government functions. Understanding this process provides the context our students will need as they move forward to positions that require them to shift their perspective from a strictly military to a broader national security mind-set. The heavy emphasis on future war prepares students to think creatively about emerging threats and how to counter them.
While National Security provides the political and national policy context for military action, Joint Warfare provides a deep and rigorous look at Joint warfare processes, strategies, and operational plans; develops students’ strategic perception by evaluating current and future Joint topics; and teaches students to evaluate ambiguous environments and create effective ways to operate within them. While our students come to us already having completed their initial Joint education, few have spent any significant time working in a Joint environment. Their education at MCWAR is essential preparation for the next phase in their military careers. That preparation takes the form of instruction in doctrine, operational design, and Joint planning. This instruction is solidified through conversations with the Service chiefs, planning practicums, and field studies to help students visualize the impact of different operational and strategic decisions.

In this way, there is a strong connection between Joint Warfare and the course War, Policy, and Strategy (WPS). WPS uses military history and theory to teach students to evaluate traditional and nontraditional principles of war at the strategic and operational levels; assess national security policies, national military strategies, and associated theater campaigns and operations; evaluate the relationship between the elements of national power and the achievement of operational objectives and strategic end states; and evaluate the impact of cultural, social, and political factors on the design, development, and execution of military operations and strategy. The use of case studies and wargames forces students into the position of actual military decision makers, to “increase the reps” students get in making operational and strategic decisions.

Wargames take center stage in WPS and range from Polis, which recreates the conflict between Athens and Sparta, to contemporary games that examine Great Power rivalries, like U.S.-Chinese competition in the South China Sea. These games develop students’ ability to integrate the instruments of national power into national-level strategy while honing their military lethality and ingenuity. The most important part of these games (and, arguably, the entire academic year) is that faculty set our students up to fail at them. The Blue Force does not always win; in fact, it is fairly rare when it does. Why? Because the United States is on the verge of facing actual near-peer competitors in the next two decades, and our senior military leaders need to know what it looks like when an adversary gains strategic leverage and operational advantage. If they cannot recognize when it is about to happen, they cannot stop it. The United States cannot rely on technological superiority to win the next war. We need skilled strategists and operational leaders. Skill is honed through failure. Our students grow through defeat in a way they simply do not through victory, and the games played in WPS make a significant contribution to that growth.

A field grade officer who only possesses operational or strategic proficien-
cy is useless; they must also be able to lead increasingly large and complex organizations. The Leadership and Ethics course helps our students make the transition from direct to organizational and strategic leadership. Here, students learn how to evaluate effective strategic leadership, to assess the ethical and moral dilemmas strategic leaders face, and to evaluate the impact of legal and ethical considerations associated with the use of military force in a complex and dynamic security environment. Seminars, case studies, and senior leader engagements put students in the position of needing to make challenging ethical decisions in the gray areas that are common to strategic leaders. Just as with vicarious battlefield losses in our wargames, we want our students to experience ethical failure in a safe environment, where actual risk is minimized. A highlight of this course is a platform we have borrowed from National Defense University—the Executive Assessment Development Program (EADP). EADP is a strategic self-assessment tool that provides deep insight into students’ developmental needs if they are to succeed at the strategic level. Students complete the EADP, receive coaching from our trained faculty, then write a plan for how they will strengthen the weaknesses and capitalize on the strengths identified in their assessments. Students value the feedback, the coaching relationships they develop with faculty, and the opportunity they have to invest in their own personal growth while at MCWAR.

While we take great pride in our curriculum, how do we know that it actually develops better warfighters? Like every war college, MCWAR has a rigorous and sustained process of curriculum and program review. We collect data on student performance, student learning outcomes, program outcomes, and Joint learning objectives as well as data on faculty performance, student self-reporting, and alumni and stakeholder evaluations. This data is analyzed throughout the curriculum review process to identify any gaps in coverage or weakness in execution. Last year, we realized the need to provide greater coverage of operational contract support and mission command, so we built curriculum to explore these topics. Students detailed significant learning from the field study we took to Normandy this year to study “Campaigning for Strategic Effect,” so we will make sure to prioritize that trip in our budget submission for the next academic year.

While formal metrics are essential, as dean, the data that carries the most weight is not something included in our annual Institutional Effectiveness Report. It is the number of times our graduates reach out to ask for recommendations on how they should approach a new challenge they face in their current assignment, the number of times a student makes a point to stop by and tell a faculty member how a certain class has shaped their thinking on a pressing national security concern, and the frequency with which graduates email us articles “they really think we would like” on a topic we covered in class. Doctrine will change;
the geostrategic environment is constantly in flux. What we teach our students will be dated. How we teach our students to engage ideas and challenges will not. Intellectual curiosity is easy to maintain when it is your sole focus for 10 months. It is far tougher when working 60–80 hours a week on the Joint Staff or at a combatant command. Our graduates consistently reach back to us after they have moved on to new assignments to maintain relationships with faculty and continue to grow professionally. While that speaks to the caliber of students sent to our program, it also speaks to the quality of the education our students receive while they are here. They leave and still want more.

An impressive number of students tell us that their commanding officer, department head, or peer told them “they have to go to MCWAR.” This is as common among our civilian students as it is among our officers. Our students work hard for their degrees. Our graduates appreciate them enough to recommend us to their friends and mentees. This speaks volumes about the caliber of our program. If students did not find the value of their MCWAR education in their follow-on assignments, they would not recommend this program at the rate they do.

None of this means we are perfect. We do not have enough time to teach everything we want our students to know. The faculty love each other like family but fight like family when it is time to decide what makes it on the calendar. Our bureaucratic reporting requirements to maintain Joint accreditation are stifling and exhausting. This detracts from time faculty could spend mentoring students and covering topics our students should know that are not required by our accreditors. We do not always have the money we need to support the educational opportunities we would like. Every organization is—and should be—resource constrained, but it can be a challenge to convince fiscal reviewers of the educational value of innovative teaching practices, even though everyone from the Commandant to the chairman is calling for them. The glacial pace of technology waivers keeps us years behind where we would like to be in terms of actual educational technology and outreach. While there are good reasons to be cautious about bringing new hardware and software onto military networks, innovative learning in 2018 requires a robust tech backbone. Accomplishing this, however, has proven far easier said than done.

Senior leader education in 2018 differs significantly from when MCWAR was founded in 1990, though its original focus on “The Art of War Studies” endures. As the character of war continues to change, so will our program, its students, and faculty to best respond to our students’ educational needs. No 10-month program will completely change an officer’s intellectual and warfighting capability, but we remain committed to providing the best education possible to those students sent to us by their Services and civilian organizations.
Lethality and ingenuity are reasonable expectations for the secretary of defense to have of his war colleges. We think we deliver on those expectations and strive to ensure we always will.

Notes
3. “Mission Statement,” MCWAR.
Transformation and transition are synonymous and are typically defined as a change from one state or condition to another. This change has proven a challenge in large organizations such as health care, education, and training institutions. All three rely on complex continuums that “transition or transform” thousands of patients/students to levels that require effective coordination, communication, and consistency.¹

The Marine Corps’ Training Command falls into this category of large and complex organizations. Training Command is responsible for training more than 99,000 enlisted Marines and sailors and another 3,500 officers each year. Training Command provides instruction through more than 700 programs of instruction (POI) at 19 colonel/captain-level command schools with 71 subordinate schools and detachments strung across the continental United States, Hawaii, and Okinawa. A little more than 80,000 of these Marines and sailors are entry-level students while the remainder are career Marines who are either attending career progression or skill-enhancement courses. Everything Training Command does ensures focus on the 102,000 Marines and sailors as well as the 7,000 permanent personnel made up of instructors, staff, and support personnel. The focus is to ensure training goes beyond just instilling the tactical and technical skills to meet the published training and readiness standards. Training Command strives to develop the total Marine and sailor by instilling good habits that ultimately increase individual, family, and unit readiness along with combat effectiveness.

Through the entry-level pipeline, recruits and Marines have very little his-
tory for leaders to develop an understanding of that individual’s challenges and strengths.2 Waiver codes and Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery scores are a start but not nearly enough. To build this profile and to ensure the best possible transition within the training continuum and ultimately the operating forces, Training Command developed the Transformation Enhancement Program (TEP).

**Transition/Transformation Programs**

Programs to ensure effective and efficient transitions are not new, but they have certainly proved challenging for large and complex organizations. Through the two academic years spanning from 2014 to 2016, the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) for Higher Education in Scotland commissioned two projects to examine transition skills and strategies that a student might develop and put to use during a transition. The goal was to provide students and staff with a suite of resources to understand and develop the skills that may ultimately lead to successful transition through the education continuum. The study focused on students, student services and support staff, teaching staff, curriculum and program management staff, students’ association support and advice staff, and resources that can be integrated within student induction sessions. Six packages were developed that provided information, tools, and other materials to support course curriculum development. They focused on self-belief, self-management of expectations, critical self-reflection, academic resilience, mind-set, and time management. The QAA realizes that the expectation for positive results relies heavily on prepared programs, which includes readily available resources for all involved in the process of this transition through the education continuum.3

Similar to the QAA approach, the TEP focuses on all parties involved in the training continuum and provides the necessary guidance and resources to ensure success. The TEP is based on guidance provided in the Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC), Commandant of the Marine Corps Fragmentary Orders (CMC FRAGOs), and other documents that identify areas in need of improvement. Focused on our entry-level Marines, TEP guides and reinforces the transformation process while strengthening the warfighting ethos of the Marine Corps to develop more resilient and capable Marines.4 The TEP consists of changing the training methodologies at each of the schools to enhance learning by providing more repetitions and sets along five key themes that go above and beyond the knowledge and skills required in the designated programs of instruction. It goes beyond simply understanding the five themes by actually practicing them in their personal and professional lives to develop good habits to carry with them throughout their service time and beyond. These efforts will ultimately strengthen the culture and warfighting ethos of the Marine Corps by developing more resilient and capable Marines and sailors.
Shortly after Training Command introduced the TEP, the Marine Corps Recruit Depots (MCRDs) developed and instituted the fourth phase of recruit training. This phase marks the transformation period from recruit to Marine and from drill instructor to counselor/teacher/mentor. The final weeks of the 13 weeks of training provides an opportunity for recruits to gain a new understanding of the title they have earned and the role of the Marines adjacent and above them. While a benefit to recruiting and ultimately the Corps, post-graduation boot leave period (typically 10 days) further exposes these newly minted Marines and their understanding of their role and responsibility to the challenges and peer pressures that they had the courage to leave behind. Many will feel the tension between what they became at the MCRD and what they were prior to stepping on the yellow footprints, and many fall to the pressures that had overwhelmed them in the past. The TEP aims to build off of the fourth phase while attacking bad influences. Negative influences that become even more prevalent at Marine Combat Training (MCT) or the Infantry Training Battalion arise when the Marine is given freedom, money, and access to social media on a daily basis. The question of what or who will become the most prevalent influence on these young warriors becomes apparent, and the Training Command instructors are prepared to take lead. The TEP is not only focused on preparing these new Marines but also provides a refresh for the instructors and support staff. Faculty and staff development is a necessary part of a successful TEP at the schoolhouse and provides the foundation for positive role models as the instructors and staff take full advantage of the opportunity to apply the lessons and not just instruct them.

All 90 entry-level and advanced schools have reviewed their training methodologies to enhance learning along the five key themes. The intent is to integrate these themes into Marines’ personal and professional lives to make them habitual. The five themes include:

- **Strengthening our core values/culture.** Instructors expand their students’ basic understanding of our core values of honor, courage, and commitment and focus on strengthening a sense of inclusivity and acceptance of the contributions made by all Marines regardless of race, color, or gender. Attention is focused on diversity defined by life’s experience and not on demographics. Marines and sailors will not only understand the core values, but they will also apply them in both their personal and professional lives.

- **Instilling the basic tenets of maneuver warfare.** This effort includes the introduction of the basic tenets of maneuver warfare and training them at the private first class/lance corporal levels. In the past, this warfighting concept was only instilled at our career level and advanced schools and during officer PME. Today, as a result of a Joint Training
Command and Doctrine Division effort, all entry level training (ELT) Marines receive a copy of *Warfighting*, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP-1) upon arrival at the School of Infantry, and all officers receive a copy and an initial introduction at the end of Officer Candidates School. Officers go on to study maneuver warfare in depth at The Basic School while the enlisted Marines receive instruction and conduct discussions throughout the training pipeline. Officer and enlisted alike join their first operational units with a deeper understanding of the Corps’ concept of maneuver warfare.

- **Developing future leaders.** The schools are organizing students into small units and providing the students an opportunity to fill leadership positions under the mentorship of instructors to develop and produce our future leaders. Leadership development comes from experience and exposure. By developing a system that rotates subordinates through billets to maximize leadership opportunities, students in the training continuum will gain experience that will foster success in the operating forces.

- **Strengthening resiliency.** Training Command discharged a battalion’s worth of Marines last year alone as a result of young Marines’ and sailors’ inability to deal with basic challenges in life that cause stress. Training Command therefore realized that it must find ways to train its students to be able to overcome the basic rigors of life before it can focus on mentally hardening them to withstand the rigors of combat. As a result, Training Command instructors are providing the tools necessary to cope with the stressors of life, including building a foundation that facilitates their success, improving their unit readiness, and ensuring they are able to train hard and withstand the rigors of combat.

- **Improving fitness and wellness.** The TEP instills a sense of personal ownership for each Marine’s fitness, which contributes to larger unit readiness. Training Command leverages the Force Fitness Instructor program and takes wellness to the next level, focusing on injury prevention, nutrition, strength and conditioning, and overall wellness, including spiritual health.

The TEP is a guideline rather than a curriculum. Every school is unique and the knowledge and skills imbued are diverse, but the traits and characteristics expected of professional Marines and sailors are consistent. Therefore, every school has been given the latitude and flexibility to be creative and innovative with the design of their programs to fill the gaps.

At the MCT Battalions, they have implemented structured discussion time and practical application that is nested in their existing POI. This is done
through small group engagements that take place in and outside of the classroom. Collectively, MCT allocated 5 hours to discussion on core values; 7 hours of discussion and practical application on warfighting; 19 hours on leadership; 4 hours on discussions about resiliency; and 34 hours on physical fitness that incorporates dialogue on nutrition and injury prevention. More important, they have created opportunities in the Marines’ daily routines to put these lessons into practice in both their personal and professional lives.

At Marine Corps Communication-Electronics School (MCCES), the TEP includes a focus on the warrior ethos and mind-set, where students are frequently reminded that they are part of the profession of arms and that the skills they will gain at the school are meant to be employed on the battlefield. Each student, upon arrival at the school, receives an intelligence brief to set the tone and reveal the nature of the threats to the United States. Daily interactions with instructors and staff realize a continued emphasis on the serious nature of the profession the students have chosen. Additionally, to address resiliency, MCCES leverages organizations like Survivor Outdoors that have proven programs to address both resiliency and spiritual fitness.

The above are just a few examples of how each school addresses the five themes of the TEP. In addition, Training Command also has provided the tools necessary for each school to take advantage of the event on PME, Join the Conversation, and the study by Patricia Devine on unconscious bias.

Join the Conversation is a PME event focused on identifying destructive behaviors, promoting self-awareness, and recognizing how these behaviors are detrimental to the individual, the unit, and the Corps. The event also provides Marines and sailors ways to intervene when these behaviors are identified. While not practical to execute the two-hour program strictly by design, use of the guided scenario component, where applicable, has proven invaluable. The schools have been provided the full facilitator guides to execute the program in its entirety during faculty and staff development, while using the tools to enhance their interactions with the students.

The PME event on unconscious bias is inspired by the work of Patricia Devine from the University of Wisconsin. Her research provides an in-depth look at the bias we have without fully comprehending its impact on our decision making and approach to other individuals. Dr. Devine provides six strategies that counter these unconscious prejudices that are both practical and effective tools in faculty and staff development, ultimately enhancing the instructors’ interactions with the students.

Training Command anticipates that, during the next year, the Marine Corps will see similar success with the TEP that fully developed programs like the QAA have enjoyed. Training Command’s schools will see a reduction in attrition rates, higher academic scores, and improved instructor duty satisfaction.
That said, unlike the QAA model, Training Command is taking its program to the next level by ensuring a proper and effective warm hand-off.

**Warm Hand-Off**

The health care industry has struggled with accountable care and the ability to ensure effective patient transition from one caregiver to the next. Discussions and efforts on health care integration have focused on gaining significant benefits by improving clinical coordination as patients move among providers, levels of care, and actual locations. Adamant that their efforts must go beyond the referral, the details associated with both the patient and the long-term care plan are necessary with every patient transition. Joanne Sammer’s article for the Institute for the Advancement of Behavioral Healthcare, titled “Warm Handoffs Serve as the First Step toward Accountable Care,” speaks directly to the challenge of responsibility during the transition. She emphasizes that accountability is based on positive interaction and hand-off. No different than a pilot ensuring positive hand-off of the stick with his copilot, direct communication and validation are necessary, especially with hospital to community program transitions. The chief executive officer of the Treatment Research Institute, David Gastfriend, states that “the program receiving the patient can send someone from the clinical team to the program that is discharging the patient, and meet the patient face to face, conduct a follow-up assessment and orient the patient as to what to expect.” This ultimate accountability, which includes a full download of a patient’s data, effectively results in all parties being members of the same treatment team. This is a wonderful prospect, however, the challenges associated with cost and limited staff available to compile and exchange this information make progression in this area difficult for many health care providers. To alleviate this problem, along with the challenge of determining what information to share, the American Society of Addiction Medicine (ASAM) has developed a software tool to be able to transfer the right information to the follow-on caregiver.

Efforts similar to ASAM’s have realized significant success when focusing on transition and utilizing a warm hand-off tool. In 2014, the *New England Journal of Medicine* published a study focused on the positive results following the implementation of a hand-off program. The abstract states that “miscommunications are a leading cause of serious medical errors. Data from multi-center studies assessing programs designed to improve handoff of information about patient care are lacking.”

The study provides standardized oral and written hand-offs, hand-off and communication training, a faculty development and observation program, as well as a sustainability campaign. Nine hospitals were provided these tools and procedures, and their rates of errors and preventable adverse events and
miscommunications rates were measured. The program yielded significant results. Based on more than 10,000 patients, the medical-error rate decreased by 23 percent while the preventable adverse events decreased by 30 percent. The study revealed that two of every three sentinel events are the result of miscommunication during hand-offs, including omission of critical information and transfer of erroneous information. In addition to the positive statistical results, the hand-off program was also associated with significant improvements for patients, doctors, and the hospitals.

Similar results are expected for Training Command’s implementation of a warm hand-off. Each school ensures that there is not only a standard reception plan of new joins but also a warm hand-off for all of the Marines and sailors to each accepting unit. This includes a warm hand-off tool consisting of relevant information that provides indicators for gaining unit consideration.

The warm hand-off is designed to provide accepting units a visual picture of Marines and sailors before they are received. Similar to the health care examples provided above, the information provides situational awareness for the joining unit and supports the transformation process. The process encourages direct communication between the releasing and gaining units, while not violating the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). This helps to identify at-risk students early for preventive engagements and identify students with potential for immediate and greater responsibilities early on in the training. The warm hand-off is not meant to predesignate, but it is meant to provide an opportunity to engage, mentor, and strengthen those who might need that initial boost to gain success with the initial hurdles of transition. While the tool itself is currently internal to Training Command, as it looks to capture lessons learned from initial implementation, schools, including the Infantry Training Battalions, already conduct face-to-face hand-offs with the infantry battalions that are receiving the newest graduates. These efforts alone are making a difference while the Marine Corps continues to develop an institutional capability to effectively and efficiently transition Marines and sailors along with their pertinent information.

**Assessment**

Training Command’s approach to transformation is a focused effort that is different at each school, is reinforced by other initiatives, and results in handing off Marines and sailors that are better prepared for the demands they will face in the operating forces.

TEP is an ongoing effort for Training Command that will continue to evolve as available time, based on POI changes or development, changes in each school house over time. Defined in Line of Effort 1, Enhance the Transformation, of the “Training Command Campaign Plan, FY18,” TEP has specified
measures of effectiveness that allow detailed analysis to identify shortfalls and
the means to mitigate those shortfalls.\textsuperscript{10} Integration of the five themes and the
continued focus on leadership and such topics as prevention of suicide, hazing,
and sexual assault will have corresponding impacts to the incidence of those
misconducts. Therefore, the expectation is that there will be changes in integrity
violations, unauthorized absence, drug violations, administrative separations,
nonjudicial punishments, hazing allegations, suicidal ideations or attempts, sexual
harassment or assault allegations, academic drops, positive comments on
instructor rating forms, and overall academic averages. These changes will either
be positive or negative and will result in analysis briefs to the commander and
the staff to inform them of gains, as well as shortfalls, with identified methods
to engage and mitigate them.

The strength of the TEP lies in the instructors, training, resources, and information
made available to them. In addition to the robust instructor development
mentioned above, similar to the QAA program, Training Command developed
a SharePoint site that provides resources from other agencies (Marine Corps
Community Services, the Lejeune Leadership Institute, etc.) and every school’s
products; in addition, it leverages the Training Command Network on Marine
Net featuring videos that can be used to support TEP initiatives. Currently,
there are more than 190 videos available and more will be continually added
based on lessons learned throughout TEP’s implementation.

**Ultimate Goal**
The ultimate goal of Training Command’s efforts is to develop habits that be-
come a way of life for all Marines and sailors, instructors and students alike,
in the entry-level training pipeline with the end state of sustaining and building
upon the transformation established at recruit training. This would include
maximizing the training value in everything that is done and better preparing
Marines and sailors for the demands they will face in the operating forces and
supporting establishment.\textsuperscript{11}

**Notes**
1. The terms transition and transformation are considered synonyms. However, one could
argue that transition is actually one aspect of an effective transformation. The examples
provided in this article regarding civilian education and health care focus on the
transition portion of a transformation and are relevant to Training Command’s Trans-
formation Enhancement Program.
2. In draft form, *Entry Level Training* is defined as “the sequence of approved programs
of instruction (POI) executed within the initial phase of the training continuum, from
recruit and officer candidate training to final primary military occupational specialty
(PMOS) assignment, which qualifies an initially accessed Marine for assignment and
service in the first enlistment. Marines that conduct lateral moves from their PMOS
are not considered ELT Marines.”

4. The difference between transition and transformation is seen here, as the TEP not only transitions Marines and sailors from one level to the next, but it also transforms them into more effective, efficient, and resilient Marines and sailors. The QAA intends to do the same with its students, faculty, and staff based on its program and not just transition them from one school to the next.

5. Patricia Devine, “Empowering People to Break the Prejudice Habit” (lecture, Calvin College, Grand Rapids, MI, 2 May 2018).


7. Sammer, “Warm Handoffs Serve as the First Step toward Accountable Care.”


11. Large portions of this paper are taken directly from Training Command policy papers, guidance letters, and other venues either written by or directly influenced by the author.
The Education of the Enlightened Soldier

Bruce Gudmundsson

In 1989, General Alfred M. Gray Jr., then serving as Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, founded the Marine Corps University, promulgated the Commandant’s Reading List and, by means of the first edition of Warfighting, Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1, made maneuver warfare the cornerstone of formal doctrine. That same year, an obscure academic press published a book called The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militärische Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801–1805.1 At first glance, the appearance of a scholarly monograph on the subject of four years of the peacetime achievements of a bookish, somewhat tongue-tied officer who, in a time long past, had served a country that, as of 1989, had not existed for 70 years, seems to have been entirely unconnected to the great reforms of the “Quantico Renaissance.” However, in the 29 years that have passed since its first appearance in print, The Enlightened Soldier has enjoyed remarkable popularity within the Marine Corps. In that period, the Marine Corps Gazette has published 13 articles in which American Marines point to the eponymous protagonist of that book, Gerhard David Scharnhorst (1755–1813), as both a paragon of military professionalism and a major contributor to the tradition of maneuver warfare. Indeed, the fact that 10 of these articles have appeared in the last decade suggests that interest in that work may even be on the rise.2

The purpose of this article is to provide readers of The Enlightened Soldier, both past and future, with information that will complement the material made available by that work. In particular, it will provide a brief description of a period that is largely ignored in the (extraordinarily sparse) English-language literature that deals with Scharnhorst’s life: the first 10 years that he spent in
uniform. As Scharnhorst spent this decade, which began in 1773 and ended in 1782, as either a student or a junior teacher, the focus of this narrative will lie squarely on his experience of formal schooling. More specifically, it will deal with the experiences that set up the creative tension at the heart of the remarkable accomplishments of his later life, whether as a teacher, a reformer, or a staff officer in the field. In other words, this article will provide an overview of the experiences that helped Scharnhorst cultivate his powers of systematic preparation, careful analysis, and scientific inquiry as well as those that fostered his ability to improvise, synthesize, and exploit fleeting opportunities.

Gerhard David Scharnhorst was born on 12 November 1755 in the little town of Bordenau in what was then the Electorate of Hanover, which was at the time one of the largest of the 300 or so component states of the Holy Roman Empire. His father, Ernst Wilhelm Scharnhorst, was what his English-speaking contemporaries would have called a “yeoman farmer.” That is, for much of his life, he employed several laborers to help him run a substantial farm that he leased from a landlord. Later, a substantial inheritance enabled him to own the land that he managed. Before taking up farming, the senior Scharnhorst had served as a trooper, noncommissioned officer, and quartermaster in a cavalry regiment of the Hanoverian Army, seeing active service in the War of Austrian Succession (1740–48). The economic standing of the Scharnhorst family was such that it could afford to send its children to village schools, where they acquired the rudiments of reading, writing, and arithmetic. Beyond that, however, they were left to their own devices.

Scharnhorst would later describe the technique that he employed to learn how to spell—a task that was complicated by the difference between the broad dialect of German that he spoke and the standard version of that language. Here is my method. I have experienced very little in the way of formal instruction. In order to learn how to spell, each day I asked [one of] my siblings to dictate a page from my reader. I then corrected what I had written, and marked [in pencil in the book] any word that I had spelled incorrectly. The next day, I reviewed the words that I had marked. If I failed to remember the mistakes that I had made, I marked the word a second time. This was an indication that I should revisit the word before I went any further. In this way, I made steady progress. By the time I reached the fifth page of the book, I was able to spell all the words correctly the first time that they were dictated to me, with the only exception being terms of art that were new to me.

In April 1773, when he was 17 years old, Scharnhorst entered the mili-
tary academy that Count William, ruler of the small but sovereign state of Schaumburg-Lippe, had recently established on the island fortress of Wilhelmstein.8 There he served first as an apprentice gunner, then as a noncommissioned officer, and finally as a warrant officer, in the tiny Artillery and Engineer Corps of Count William’s minuscule army.9 As this unit also provided Wilhelmstein with its garrison—the military academy with its “school troops” and Schaumburg-Lippe with its military engineers—this service gave Scharnhorst firsthand knowledge of the many arts practiced by the gunners and sappers of his day. 10 Moreover, thanks to Count William’s passion for experimentation, Scharnhorst enjoyed many opportunities to participate in attempts to improve the science of gunnery, methods of gun founding, and various aspects of the technique of siege warfare.

When not performing their purely military duties, the students at Wilhelmstein followed an academic curriculum that made extensive use of what would now be called the “tutorial method.” Each of the tutors—who were chosen from among the “cleverest” of the officers of the Artillery and Engineer Corps—would guide the students in their charge through a program of assignments. These, depending on the subject, might take the form of essays to write, maps or diagrams to draw, translations to make, mathematical problems to solve, or theorems to prove. To explain new assignments, review work submitted, and evaluate progress, the tutors met with their students on a regular basis. Ideally, a student would attend these meetings in the company of a fellow student who was working through the same series of assignments at the same time. However, as the student body was small and composed of young men who had begun their studies at many different times, and with varying degrees of preparation, there were many occasions when tutors met with individual students.11

Solitary study occupied four of the six days of the standard academic week at Wilhelmstein. In particular, Mondays, Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays were set aside for meetings with tutors and the completion of projects assigned by tutors. On Wednesdays and Saturdays, students gathered in the library of the fortress, where they divided their time between group classes and self-directed study. According to Count William’s initial conception of the academic calendar, the group classes were to take place in the morning, leaving the afternoons free for the perusal of books, instruments, manuscripts, maps, and models. However, surviving descriptions of particular periods of instruction indicate that some group classes were held in the afternoon.12

The topics for tutorials and group classes, as well as the materials made available for self-directed study, belonged chiefly to the realm of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. Even the study of living languages, which would today fall into the category of the humanities, consisted largely (though not exclusively) of making translations from works in French and English on such
subjects as ballistics, shipbuilding, mathematics, and siegecraft. Moreover, while Count William charged tutors to view the curriculum he prescribed as nothing more than a starting point for a broader exploration of the subjects in question, he also forbade them to devote time to the teaching of such mainstays of Enlightenment education as philosophy, metaphysics, and rhetoric.

In 1778, Scharnhorst returned to Hanover, where he accepted a commission in the 8th Cavalry Regiment, the unit in which his father had previously served. The colonel of this regiment, Emmerich d’Estorff, had much in common with Count William. Both were aristocrats, members of a land-owning warrior elite who had from birth been trained for lives of leadership, service, prerogative, and privilege. Both were cosmopolitans, well-read, well-travelled polyglots who participated fully in the international high culture of the day. In each man, moreover, these seemingly disparate sets of characteristics combined to create a powerful, pervasive, and persistent passion for military education.

The common elements in the visions for military education of Count William and d’Estorff included an appreciation for the value of reflective reading, the conviction that the study of the military arts and sciences ought to be nested within a framework of broad general culture, and belief in what might be called the “unity of the art of war.” That is, neither Count William nor d’Estorff viewed the various levels of war as distinct phenomena, the study of which was reserved for persons holding particular positions in the military hierarchy. Instead, both encouraged an integrated approach to the study of war in which techniques were taught (or tested) within the context of tactical situations, plans of campaign, strategic settings, political goals, and philosophical ideals.

The approaches to military education of Count William and d’Estorff were not, however, identical. Each embraced a different vision of both the ethical basis for going to war (jus ad bellum) and the right way to conduct a war (jus in bello). These visions shaped the choices that each man made: the policies that he preferred, the strategies that he studied, the campaigns that he contemplated, the battles that he imagined, and the techniques that he added to his tool box. These things, in turn, had a profound effect on the curriculum each man crafted and the teaching methods he employed.

For Count William, the only just war was one that used defensive means to serve defensive purposes. Thus, the centerpiece of his plan for responding to an invasion of Schaumburg-Lippe was the use of the fortress of Wilhelmstein as a personal headquarters, a base for the operations for his tiny army, and a symbol of resistance. This, in turn, meant that a favorable outcome to any war depended entirely upon the skill with which Count William and his men resisted attempts to take the fortress. In other words, the military arts and sciences of greatest interest to Count William, and thus those that loomed largest in his program of instruction, were those of the engineer and the artillerist. Likewise,
the branch of the art of war of greatest importance to Count William’s strategy, and thus the one that played the greatest role in the studies of his students, was siegecraft.

Toward the end of the seventeenth century, the art of taking a fortress had been reduced to a series of stock solutions applied in a highly predictable fashion during the course of several weeks. At the same time, the art of defending a fortified place had also become an entirely conventional affair in which each measure taken by an attacker had its match in a well-established countermeasure. By the time Count William established his academy, moreover, the widespread publication of the works of the authors of these practices (the most famous of whom was Sébastien de Prestre de Vauban) and their many imitators ensured that detailed descriptions of the component conventions of contemporary siegecraft were widely available.

The many innovations undertaken by Count William took place within the confines of the conventions of eighteenth-century siege warfare. This was as true for revolutionary enterprises, such as the attempt to build a submarine to operate in the waters around Wilhelmstein, as it was for undertakings aimed at marginal improvements, such as the refinement of the canister rounds fired by various types of canons and new designs for field fortifications. It also applied to innovations that fell somewhere between these two categories, the most notable of which was an attempt to optimize the organization, armament, and drill of the infantry of the garrison of Wilhelmstein for the defense of the walls, bastions, and outworks of that place.

The various components in Count William’s scheme for defending his little country had their counterparts in the curriculum of his academy. Thus, his program of instruction—or, to be more precise, his program of study—included boatbuilding, ballistics, and, to give students access to the most important contemporary literature on those subjects, plenty of practice in translating technical texts written in English. Similarly, the cadets at Wilhelmstein devoted a lot of time to the exploration of books about siege warfare, military architecture, and military engineering. As these were largely in French, much effort was also devoted to learning that language. Schaumburg-Lippe was an ally of Great Britain, and French was the language of elite culture, diplomacy, and military command throughout Europe. Thus, the study of English and French provided students with important secondary benefits as well. All of the technical subjects studied at Wilhelmstein rested on mathematical foundations. Therefore, whatever else they were doing, Count William’s cadets could often be found pondering problems of a decidedly quantitative character.

The tempo of the work at Wilhelmstein, whether academic or practical, was also in keeping with the central role that defensive fortress warfare played in the plans, policy, and philosophy of Count William. For operations of this
kind, a successful outcome depended more on the preparations made in time of peace than on quick decisions made in the course of highly dynamic situations. Indeed, in the event of a conflict, the small number of issues that required rapid resolution would, for the most part, lie within the personal purview of the commander in chief, that is, Count William. Thus, it is far from surprising that Count William gave his cadets a great deal of practice in solving well-defined problems in a creative, systematic, and methodical way but few, if any, tasks that fostered their ability to act quickly and decisively in novel, ambiguous circumstances. In other words, Count William’s curriculum provided him with officers who, while exquisitely well-schooled in siegecraft and gunnery and powerfully inclined to improvement, invention, and even innovation, were largely innocent of the arts of immediate improvisation and intuitive decision making.

While every bit as mindful of moral mandates as Count William, Emmerich d’Estorff had developed a different view of the ethical imperatives of military policy. For d’Estorff, the chief desideratum was the protection of the population of one’s own country from hardships that inevitably resulted from the proximity of armies on campaign. This meant that, whenever possible, d’Estorff wanted to arrange things so that Hanoverian forces operated in the territory of states other than the Electorate of Hanover. That, in turn, meant that Hanoverian soldiers needed to prepare for active service in unfamiliar places. This was particularly true for those, such as the officers, noncommissioned officers, and troopers of the 8th Cavalry Regiment, who could expect to take part in a large number of reconnaissance patrols, raids, and other small-scale enterprises in the intervals between armies.

In d’Estorff’s view, the ability of a leader to succeed in the “small war” was dependent on their ability to make, in a very short period of time, an accurate estimate of the tactical possibilities of a particular piece of ground, a faculty that he, like so many of his contemporaries, called by the French *coup d’oeil* (or strike of the eye). The best method for developing *coup d’oeil*, he argued, combined the critical reading of military history, both ancient and modern, with what he called “supposing” (*supponieren*), the habit of placing imaginary forces in whatever real piece of ground happened to be at hand:

An officer who has, out of true passion, dedicated himself in this way to the honorable study of war, each time he goes out for a walk or a ride, instead of looking at things casually, will view them with a military eye. . . . Each village will provide him with a new subject for study, how he will attack it if it is occupied by an enemy, or, if he is using it to quarter his troops, how he will defend it.\(^{21}\)
Sometime after 1770, d’Estorff commissioned the construction of a large “maneuver table.”\textsuperscript{22} With a length of about five meters, the table represented terrain approximately 30 kilometers long and 15 kilometers wide.\textsuperscript{23} Thus, while the ostensible purpose of the table was to allow the officers using it to \textit{suppose} in inclement weather, the extent of the ground depicted suggests that d’Estorff was interested not only in the depiction of battles and engagements but also of the larger context of each clash of arms. The size and scale of the table also suggests that d’Estorff may have been particularly interested in giving his subordinates opportunities to plan routes for raids and reconnaissance patrols.\textsuperscript{24}

D’Estorff also placed a great deal of value on the general education of his officers. In the same memorandum in which he described his technique for cultivating the coup d’oeil, he encouraged them to read books on politics, international trade, and manufacturing, as well as the shorter encyclopedias of the day, which were designed less for reference than for giving readers an overview of a wide variety of topics. Such reading, he argued, would give officers the means of conversing with people of many different walks of life, whether on social occasions or in the course of official travel to foreign lands. D’Estorff encouraged the study of natural history, both from books and in the field. The search for specimens, he noted, provided an officer on leave with an excellent pretext for reconnoitering the environs of a foreign fortress.\textsuperscript{25}

D’Estorff placed particular value on the ability of officers to read French. A substantial proportion of the works on the reading list he provided for them were written in that language.\textsuperscript{26} He also devoted much care to ensuring that his officers were able to converse in French. Indeed, Scharnhorst reports that, as with the other officers (and, presumably, officer-candidates) of his regiment, he was required to devote many evenings, for a total of 12 hours each week, at an event known as the “French assembly.” Supervised by a senior field-grade officer, Major Jakob Niemeyer, this seems to have been a gathering in which the officers were free to discuss any topic they liked but were forbidden to do so in any language other than French.\textsuperscript{27}

Soon after Scharnhorst reported for duty with the 8th Cavalry Regiment, d’Estorff put him to work teaching short courses in mathematics, military engineering, and tactics to cadets and junior officers. In letters written at this time, Scharnhorst complained of the toil and trouble this duty caused him and, in particular, his differences with d’Estorff when it came to teaching methods. D’Estorff, he wrote, “rushes and brushes lightly over things. I prefer to work, so that no one might miss the essentials, according to the deliberate methods of the Count of blessed memory. Naturally, I always finish late.”\textsuperscript{28}

In 1782, Scharnhorst published the first issue of a journal called the \textit{Military Library}. The largest article in this issue, accounting for 32 of its 142 pag-
es, was the first half of a two-part piece titled “Introduction to Reading and Field Exercises for Officers.” This article laid out a comprehensive program of book-based self-tuition, not merely in the military arts and sciences but also in mathematics, French, and English. The first issue of the Military Library also contained a notice explaining that the second half of the article, which was to be published in the second issue of the journal and deal with field exercises, would draw heavily upon an unpublished memorandum on professional education that Emmerich d’Estorff had written for the officers of his regiment. If this memorandum is the same document in which d’Estorff describes the use of supposing as a means of cultivating coup d’oeil, it follows that, by 1782, Scharnhorst had learned how to “rush and brush lightly” in the manner of his commanding officer. Unfortunately, Scharnhorst failed to keep either his initial promise to publish the second half of this piece in the second issue of the Military Library or his subsequent promise to include it with the third issue of that journal. Thus, one cannot be entirely sure either of the timing or the degree of Scharnhorst’s embrace of d’Estorff’s approach to the teaching of tactics.

In 1782, the same year in which he published the first issue of his Military Library, Scharnhorst left the 8th Cavalry Regiment, and thus the regimental school of that unit, to take up a commission in the Artillery Regiment of the Hanoverian Army. The express purpose for this transfer was the employment of Scharnhorst as an instructor in the artillery school that had just been established in Hanover. There, he would make use of what he had learned in two very different military environments to teach an approach to the art of war that made use of both the “slow thinking” of Count William of Schaumburg-Lippe and the “fast thinking” of Emmerich d’Estorff.

While it serves as the only book-length biography of Scharnhorst in English, The Enlightened Soldier deals mostly with the protagonist’s role in the establishment of the Military Society of Berlin. As the chief activity of the Military Society was the presentation and publication of papers written by its members, readers of The Enlightened Soldier will learn a great deal about the slow thinking element of Scharnhorst’s particular brand of military professionalism, but very little about the role played by fast thinking. Similarly, the other works in English that address the life and work of Scharnhorst, particularly those of Peter Paret and Dennis Showalter, describe his work as a reformer and technologist. In doing so, they also reinforce the bias toward slow thinking.

If this article remedies bias toward slow thinking in the Anglophone literature about Scharnhorst, then it will have achieved its purpose. This is not to say that the readers should disparage, denigrate, or discount the role played by formal analysis and systematic synthesis in the teaching methods of the eponymous protagonist of The Enlightened Soldier. Rather, the author of this piece hopes that, when they engage the life and work of Gerhard Scharnhorst, readers
will remember that, in addition to being formed by the “deliberate methods” of Count William of Schaumburg-Lippe, he was also shaped by the very different teaching techniques of Emmerich d’Estorff.

Notes


3. At the time of Scharnhorst’s birth, approximately 700,000 people lived within the borders of the Electorate of Hanover. That is, while not as large as the Kingdom of Prussia, which had approximately 4.1 million inhabitants, it was 42 times as populous as the County of Schaumburg-Lippe, which had fewer than 17,000 residents. For a discussion of the population of Hanover between 1757 and 1763, see E. Michelsen and F. Niedderich, Geschichte der Deutschen Landwirtschaft [History of German agriculture] (Berlin: Paul Parey, 1890), 175. For a thorough examination of the population of Prussia in 1756, see Reinhold Koser, “Zur Bevölkerungsstatistik des preußischen Staates von 1756–1786” [On the population statistics of the Prussian state, 1756–1786], in Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preußischen Geschichte [Investigations into the history of Brandenburg and Prussia], ed. Otto Hintze (Leipzig: Dunker und Humblot, 1903), 16:583–89. For details of the population of Schaumburg-Lippe, see Carl-Hans Hauptmeyer, “Die Bauernunruhen in Schaumburg-Lippe 1784–1793” [Peasant unrest in Schaumburg-Lippe 1784–1793], in Niedersächsisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte [Lower Saxon yearbook for regional history], Band 49 (Hildesheim, Germany: August Lax, 1977), 152.


5. For a characterization of the service of the senior Scharnhorst in the 8th Cavalry Regiment of the Hanoverian Army, see L. von Estorff, Scharnhorst und Wir [Scharnhorst and us] (Berlin: R. F. Koehler, 1926), 11, 14.


The term warrant officer is used to translate the eighteenth-century rank of conducteur. While not included among commissioned officers, conducteurs performed the sort of duties that would otherwise be assigned to second lieutenants. Count William described the role of the conducteurs as follows: “In case of need, such as when there is a shortage of officers of the watch, conducteurs perform the duties of officers. Conducteurs are not non-commissioned officers.” Count William of Schaumburg-Lippe, undated note, reprinted in Curd Ochwadt, ed., Wilhelm Graf zu Schaumburg-Lippe, Schriften und Briefe II: Militärische Schriften [Count William of Schaumburg-Lippe, writings and letters II: Military writings] (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), 98. This volume of the papers and publications of Count William is hereafter referred to as Militärische Schriften.

Commanded by a major, the artillery corps of Schaumburg-Lippe consisted of seven “divisions,” each of which consisted of a lieutenant, a second lieutenant (or conducteur), 40 enlisted men, and several students, two of whom ranked as senior non-commissioned officers. Theodor Schmalz, Denkwürdigkeiten des Grafen Wilhelms zu Schaumburg-Lippe [Memorabilia of Count William of Schaumburg-Lippe] (Hannover: Helwing, 1783), 59–60. For descriptions of the field exercises conducted by the artillery corps and practical skills learned by the cadets, see Max Lehman, Scharnhorst (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1889) 1:25; and Count William of Schaumburg-Lippe, untitled note from 1773, Militärische Schriften, 98–99.

For a detailed description of the academic program at Wilhelmstein, see Count William of Schaumburg-Lippe, Reglement, die Studia und Exercita der Schaumburg-Lippe-Bückeburgischen Ingenieurs und Artilleristen Betreffend [Regulations relating to the studies and exercises of the engineers and artillerists of Schaumburg-Lippe-Bückeburg] (Stadthagen: Johann Friedrich Althans, 1770), reprinted in Militärische Schriften, 78–87.

For a list of subjects addressed in the group classes, see Schmalz, Denkwürdigkeiten, 61–62. For the emphasis that Count William placed on extensive and critical reading, see Brockner, Gerhard von Scharnhorst, 25. For the methods of self-tuition that Scharnhorst employed for learning living languages and mastering mathematics, see Scharnhorst, “Anleitung zur Lecture und zu den Feld-Uebungen für Officiere,” 29–33.

For an overview of the curriculum followed by Gerhard Scharnhorst at Wilhelmstein, see the records of his Prüfungskollektive (examinations), reprinted in Michael Sikora and Tilman Steive, eds., Gerhard Scharnhorst, Private und Dienstlichen Schriften: Band 1 [Gerhard Scharnhorst, private and official writings: Volume 1] (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2002), 3–23.

For Count William’s instructions to tutors concerning the spirit with which they were to approach both their teaching and their own educational development, see Count William of Schaumburg-Lippe, Befehle, die Privatinformationes und Vorlesungen in Unserer Militärschule auf denen Wilhelms Inseln betreffend, vom 9. März 1773 [Commands relating to tutorials and lectures in our military school on William’s Island, 9 March 1773] (manuscript), reprinted in Militärische Schriften, 91–92. For a list of subjects prescribed and prohibited, see Count William of Schaumburg-Lippe, “Memoranda, das Ostern-Examen von 1774 betreffend” [Memoranda relating to the Easter time examinations of 1774] (manuscript), reprinted in Militärischen Schriften, 101. While this list includes history among the forbidden subjects, an undated note reprinted in Militärischen Schriften, 96, indicates that some students studied Portuguese by trans-
lating accounts of past military campaigns written in that language. For a list of subjects that includes “history and, above all, military history,” see Broicher, Gerhard von Scharnhorst, 25. For the works of history upon which Scharnhorst was examined, see Prüfungsprotokolle, 20.

15. Scharnhorst was appointed to the rank of Fändrich. While this is the direct ancestor of the present-day rank of Fähnrich, which is usually translated as “officer candidate” or even “senior cadet,” the conditions of Scharnhorst’s service, as well as the duties he was asked to perform and the time that he spent in that rank, all suggest that his status was that of a commissioned officer. In 1782, in a description of the pay of officers of the British Army, Scharnhorst uses Fändrich to translate “ensign,” a rank that, in the British infantry of that time, corresponded to that of second lieutenant in the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers. Gerhard Scharnhorst, “Vergleichung des Englischen, und Holländischen Besoldungs-État” [Comparison of English and Dutch rates of pay], Militair Bibliothek [Military library], no. 1 (1782): 141–42. When Count William introduced the rank of Secondelieutenant to his artillery corps, he mandated that it be seen as equivalent to the rank of Fändrich. Count William of Schaumburg-Lippe, undated note, reprinted in Militärische Schriften, 103.

16. Emmerich Otto August d’Estorff (1722–96) belonged to a family that had previously styled its surname as von Estorff (or von Estorf) and would, in the nineteenth century, revert to that custom. However, in keeping with the Francophile fashion of his times, d’Estorff seems to have preferred to use the French version of his family name. For documents that d’Estorff signed with the French version of his name, see “Statement by Emmerich Otto August d’Estorff,” 15 February 1760, SP 87/37/53, National Archives of the United Kingdom, at Kew; and “Anweisung für Offiziere aus dem Jahre von 1768” [Instructions for officers from the year 1768], Militärwochenblatt 82, no. 44 (20 May 1899): 1173–80. For a biography of d’Estorff, see Bernhard von Poten, “Estorff, Emmerich Otto August von,” in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie [General German biography] (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1904), 48:434–35.

17. For a précis of the educational philosophy of Emmerich d’Estorff, see the substantial excerpts from his memorandum of 1768, Anweisung für die Offiziers des Kurbraunschweig-Luneburgischen Regiments von Estorff [Instructions for the officers of the d’Estorff regiment of electoral Brunswick-Luneburg] that were printed as part of “Anweisung für Offiziere aus dem Jahre von 1768.” For d’Estorff’s educational methods, see “Kriegsschule für Reiterei” [War school for cavalry], Staats-Anzeigen [State gazette] 8, no. 32 (1785): 465–75. In his biographical article about d’Estorff, Poten (Estorff, Emmerich Otto August von, 435) ascribes the authorship of this article to Scharnhorst. Scharnhorst, however, attributes the article to Estorff. This attribution, which is made in the course of a discussion of a dispute over the invention of a new type of telescope, can be found in “Nachricht von der Einrichtung eines Micrometers zum Militärishen Gebrauch” [Report on the creation of a micrometer for military use], in Gerhard Scharnhorst, Private und Dienstlichen Schriften: Band 1, 89–90.

18. Count William laid out his philosophy of defensive warfare in his Mémoires pour Servir à l’Art Militaire Défensive [Notes in service of the art of defensive warfare] (Buckebourg: privately printed, 1775). For various drafts of this work and related notes, see Militärische Schriften, 167–363.

19. In his “Vauban: The Impact of Science on War,” Henry Guerlac provides an excellent introduction to eighteenth-century siege warfare. This article can be found in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 64–90 and the bibliographical notes on 880–81. Readers eager to experience something of the spirit of siegecraft in the century leading up to the building of Wilhelmstein may want to begin with the elegy pronounced by Phillip Pétain on the occasion of the tricentennial of Vauban’s birth. The text of this oration was published in G. T., “Un éloge de Vauban par le Maréchal Pétain en 1933,” La Revue Administrative 60, no. 360 (November 2007): 638–41. For a broad overview, well salted with snark, see the diptych by the formidable Christopher Duffy, Siege Warfare: The Fortress in the Early Modern World, 1494–1660 (London: Routledge and

20. For a description of some of these experiments, see Gerhard Scharnhorst, “Von den Militär-Anstalten des Vestorben Regierenden Grafen Wilhelm zu Schaumburg-Lippe,” August Ludwig Schlözer's Briefwechsel [The correspondence of August Ludwig Schlözer], no. 56 (1782): 93–107. The full text of this article can also be found in Klippel, Das Leben des Generals von Scharnhorst, 1:183–88.


23. The anonymous author of “Kriegsschule für Reiterei” gives the dimensions of the table in Füße (feet) and those of the ground represented in Meilen (miles). As the precise definition of these measurements in eighteenth-century Hanover varied considerably, their conversion to present-day metric measurements is necessarily approximate.

24. The description of the maneuver table provided by the author of “Kriegsschule für Reiterei” does not tell us whether the ground depicted on the table was fixed or whether there was some means of changing it. For a description of the use of what would now be termed geomorphic tiles on a wargaming table from the early nineteenth century, see Phillip von Hilgers, “Eine Anleitung zur Anleitung. Das taktische Kriegsspiel, 1812–1824” [An introduction to an introduction. The tactical war game, 1812–1824], Board Games Studies, no. 3 (2000): 63. However, the author of “Kriegsschule für Reiterei” does mention that the table was expensive, which suggests that the surface consisted of more than a board with a simple map painted on it. He also mentions a set of movable figures, which might well have included models that represented terrain features as well as those that stood for military units.


27. The description of the French assembly comes from an undated letter that Scharnhorst sent to his uncle Heinrich Kaspar Scharnhorst at some point between November 1778 and the end of that year. The letter has been reproduced in Karl Linnebach, ed., Scharnhorst's Briefe [Scharnhorst’s letters] (Münich: George Muller, 1914), 1:2–3.

28. For a different interpretation of this passage, which was reprinted in Linnebach, Scharnhorst's Briefe, 5, see White, The Enlightened Soldier, 7.


30. In the foreword to the second issue of the Military Library, see “Vorbericht,” Militair Bibliothek, no. 2 (1783): 3–4. Scharnhorst explained that lack of space forced him to move the publication of the second half of his two-part piece on reading and field exercises to the third issue. This, however, did not happen. As the copy of the third issue of the Military Library consulted by the author in Militair Bibliothek, no. 3 (1784) lacked its front matter, he was unable to determine the reason for this omission. The fourth, and last, issue of the Military Library in Militair Bibliothek, no. 4 (1784) was published with neither the second half of the two-part piece nor an explanation for its absence.

31. The use of the terms slow thinking and fast thinking is inspired by Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011).

Informal and Incidental Learning in the Marine Corps

Rebecca Hannagan

This article will examine a single concept: What is the value of incidental and informal learning in the Marine Corps? Specifically, what do Marines think about informal and incidental learning as part of the larger construct of training and education? An answer to this question was gathered as part of a larger project on what makes a great Marine unit, sponsored by the Marine Corps University Foundation and the Lejeune Leadership Institute in 2015. The Marines and sailors that were part of this project emphasized that informal and incidental learning were the most effective ways of learning what being a Marine really means, and they were either enabled or inhibited by Marine leaders. The value of these informal practices are not presently measured or assessed by the organization, but the Marines who participated in the study attributed the effectiveness of great units to the development of good Marines via incidental and informal learning. The relationship between informal and incidental learning and readiness is ripe for future research.

Informal and Incidental Learning

There will always be a need for formal learning via training and education courses that are typically sponsored by the organization, take place in a classroom or field setting, and are highly structured through programs of instruction. The Marine Corps’ formal Professional Military Education (PME) programs serve a vital role in developing the skills and knowledge of Marines, as do various training courses. Those training and education opportunities for formal learn-
Informal and incidental learning are not the only ways Marines learn skills and gain knowledge about how to be Marines, however. Significant informal and incidental learning takes place throughout the Corps and is key to the development of Marines; that development contributes to what makes great Marine units. In other words, although critical skills and knowledge can be conveyed in formal training and education contexts, an essential aspect of Marine development is conveyed largely through informal and incidental learning. Because only a small percentage of time in the Marine Corps is spent in formal learning settings, it is fair to say that Marines learn how to be Marines mostly via informal and incidental learning.2

Informal learning differs from formal learning not just in its lack of structure or the fact that it is typically not classroom based but in that the learning is entirely in the hands of the learner.3 In contrast to formal learning, there is no one communicating the goals of the particular program of instruction (POI). Compared to formal POIs, informal learning takes place typically while something else is being done, such as accomplishing a task or having a conversation about something unrelated to the thing that will be informally learned. In this way, informal learning could be thought of as a by-product of something else that is happening. The Commandant’s Reading List is a way to encourage informal learning. The extent to which that encouragement influences individual reflection or social conversation about being a Marine is a research question beyond the scope of this article, but it is certainly pertinent to any discussion of the value of informal learning in the Marine Corps.

Some scholars have referred to types of informal learning as “sensing the organizational culture” or picking up on something important “despite an environment not highly conducive to learning.”4 Having a conversation while completing a task, for example, happens all the time for many Marines and sailors, but it may not be thought of in retrospect as having been a developmental opportunity or mentoring session because it is so commonplace. When the learner takes away a lesson, good or bad, about how to be a Marine, what the organization expects of them, or what kind of a leader they want to be or not be, this takeaway is due to the learner thinking about lessons that were not conveyed in an overt way. In this instance, the Marine has taken it upon themself to learn something outside the context of the immediate task at hand and without being told or instructed in that setting to attend to that particular lesson.

Other forms of learner-initiated learning may include networking, coaching, and mentoring.5 Despite empirical evidence that mentoring programs can be successful in bringing about learning outcomes as well as personal growth and development for professionals, in the Marine Corps making something formal or programmatic changes the likelihood of positive outcomes for many Marines.6 Marines tend to be somewhat skeptical about programs, given that many programs are touted as important under certain circumstances, yet do not
get prioritized in actual practice due to operational tempo or other competing priorities. Also, when something such as coaching or mentoring is only done when there is a demand for it from the chain of command, the program gets the reputation of “checking a box” or not really being authentic or genuine in its intent. As a result, many Marines are not motivated to actively invest in their personal and professional development. Thus, by making formal what would otherwise be informal via a program, the meaning of the practice for those involved changes and so does the result.

The point here, and one made by scholars of informal learning, is that it is not the existence of a program or a practice that matters but the quality of that program or practice. A bad program is often worse than no program at all because it may send a message that the organization really does not care, or worse, that the organization cares more about appealing to Congress and public opinion than to the warfighting ability of the Corps. Another way to think about the consequences of programs in the Marine Corps may be to consider in what ways some programs, though well-intentioned, may actually be antithetical to unit effectiveness and readiness.

**How Incidental and Informal Learning Works**

For any type of learning to be effective, the learner has to care enough to think about what the content of the training or education is about. The additional burden on the learner in the case of incidental or informal learning is that there is no formal declaration of the intended outcomes. Because the learner is not formally invited to think about a specific thing, introspection on the part of the individual to reflect on the lessons rest entirely upon the learner. Another way to reflect on incidental or informal lessons is through social conversation. For example, although a task performed by junior Marines as directed by an NCO may not be formally about leadership, they may later have a discussion about the kind of leadership displayed by the NCO and how they agree or disagree with it. The informal lesson on leadership style was brought about by social conversation among the junior Marines. Additionally, this scenario suggests that though they may not be aware of it, Marines are always informally teaching one another. Their posture, tone of voice, what they are doing with their hands, and other expressive modalities complement or perhaps contradict what is coming out of their mouths. The best Marine leaders know that their very presence is communicating to their Marines.

One of the important findings from the research on informal and incidental learning is that these activities are highly relevant to the practice of culture for an organization. This is an important point for those developing and assessing training and education efforts for the Marine Corps. Without keeping the notion of incidental learning at the forefront, it is possible to create training and
education programs that end up being antithetical to the culture of the Marine Corps. How? The lessons Marines take away may not be the lessons intended by those conducting the training or those who created the content. Without a fairly robust understanding of the practice of Marine Corps culture, programs and initiatives are unlikely to be effective in the way Headquarters may like them to be.10

Any and all interactions between Marine leaders and junior Marines convey something about that particular Marine leader, intended or otherwise, but also about the concept of leadership within the culture of the Marine Corps and what the organization values.11 One strategy to hedge against young Marines learning the wrong lessons is to talk about the meaning of what they experience. This was something heard again and again in interviews with Marines reflecting on what makes a Marine unit great.12 If you leave young Marines to their own devices, they will come up with narratives about what it means to be a Marine and what the organization values. Narratives may be consistent or inconsistent with what the organization values. The only way a leader will know whether to make a correction is to listen, ask questions, and have those conversations with young Marines about meaning. Guiding the thinking of Marines and encouraging informal development can be as simple as asking, “What do you think about that?”

**Examples from the Experience of Marines**

A sergeant major interviewed said, “When you start to see leaders that are inconsistent in the way they handle situations and the way they handle people or treat people, that’s definitely something that’ll make a unit go downhill really fast.”13 What the sergeant major is conveying here is exactly what the previous section pointed to. Though a leader may have very good reasons for their handling of situations and people, the perception that they are unfair or inconsistent may impact trust and have an impact on the functioning of the unit. Alternatively, a leader that is consistent provides a different set of cues for his or her Marines. A perceived lack of fairness erodes trust, while a perceived sense of fairness builds trust. Asking Marines about their perceptions of things is key to assessing the incidental and informal lessons learned.

A lance corporal interviewed conveyed a similar sentiment in this way: “How they lead is how we’re gonna follow and get the job done. Leading by example . . . doing it *with* your Marines.”14 And a captain echoed this idea: “In units where leaders are working out with their people, they typically have a better bond . . . it is good for building teamwork and implicit communication. ‘Cause when you spend a lot of time around people, you typically know how they think . . . it builds trust.”15 Togetherness builds familiarity; that does not
automatically build trust if familiarity is akin to micromanagement, but it may if the familiarity is authentic conversation that conveys genuine interest and care. Authenticity is something Marines and sailors talked about as making the difference between leaders they really learned from and those they did not. Marines and sailors also cited a lack of authenticity, or a lack of genuine care, as reasons formal mentoring and counseling efforts do not work.

A major commented that

[a]s a company commander with a unit deployed to Iraq my first sergeant was very good at helping me know where he needed me to go. The company gunny was a crotchety, grumpy, mean son-of-a-gun but was a fantastic balance to my “formal knowledge.” He was the guy to tell you that you’re all jacked up and bring everybody together on something . . . that coming together worked in that where somebody wasn’t as strong, somebody else could come in and take care . . . the roles weren’t based on what you are supposed to do so much as what needed to be done. That was a fantastic team.16

When a situation demands it, and a team builds trust such that Marines implicitly know to do what needs to be done, some of the formal divisions of duties based on rank, job, billet, etc., tend to matter less. According to Marines, the effective team was often a result of this kind of trust, which can only be accomplished by letting those who know better provide guidance when appropriate, regardless of rank.

It was junior Marines who first pointed out,

You can have a leader that is tactically and technically proficient, but what makes a good leader is that he knows to listen to people who are smarter than he is. You can have a unit that is completely ineffective simply because the implementation of set guidance and the commander’s intent is terrible . . . people balance each other out . . . cohesiveness is you’re strong in something and I’m strong in something else.17

A captain repeated something similar, stating, “I think that another good indicator of a good unit is if everybody feels like they have value to add . . . and it goes back to leadership. I think the CO [of advisory team in Iraq] did a really good job talking about why the job was so important.”18 This is a great example of going beyond the technical or skills aspects of the job—what is the focus of formal training and education as well as having conversations about why things matter.
All that trust building and implicit communication results, according to Marines and sailors, in a better functioning unit. Why? According to the lance corporal quoted above, you work harder for those you believe are in it with you. In other words, informal and incidental learning have an impact on effectiveness because they are so key to people taking the time to build relationships and help everyone who wants to develop personally and professionally do so. It was only through extended conversations with Marines that we can understand just how those informal practices mattered. These practices are the result of personal reflection and social conversation and very much linked to learning in others. Thinking about and talking about what it means to be a Marine tends to permeate great units. That talk reinvigorates the practice of values.

One of the best practices of great Marine units identified in the study sponsored by the Marine Corps University is that leaders who engage in constant informal learning and self-reflection in themselves also foster an environment that encourages constant informal learning and self-reflection in their Marines.\(^\text{19}\) This is where incidental and informal learning are cited by the participants in the study as paramount to developing good Marines, which in turn create great units. In such units, you tend to have fewer incidents of Marines taking up alternative meaning and values. Self-reflective, learning, and adaptive organizations tend to be more effective than those that are rigid and stagnant.\(^\text{20}\) More effective organizations tend to be those that are aware of the power of incidental and informal learning.

**Conclusion**

Formal education and training efforts tend to convey skills and knowledge that are important for the proper functioning of the Marine Corps. When we think about how Marines learn to be Marines, we tend to think about basic training, The Basic School, Officer Candidate School, and all the PME programs. It is important, however, not to neglect the powerful forms of informal and incidental learning that take place in the Marine Corps. A major conveyed the following regarding formal models versus the reality of the lived experience of Marines:

\[ \text{[I]n an effort to produce numbers and apply scientific management theory, the major assumption [by the Marine Corps] is that all inputs or ingredients are the same... in a human endeavor, not every 18 to 24 year old is the same... prepackaged methodologies don't produce the same outcomes. [The] reality of complex interactions, interpersonal dynamics, violent situations with unstoppable forces and immovable objects reveal the fragility of that approach. The excellent leaders are those} \]

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\(^{19}\) 
\(^{20}\)
who are able to innovate and adapt within those complex and violent situations and come out of it . . . it is not just actions taken but ways of thinking.21

The ways of thinking he talked about evolve through reflection and conversations about values and meaning.

The study of Marine units and this article reflecting on the value of incidental and informal learning in the Marine Corps from the viewpoints of the Marines and sailors that participated in that study barely scratches the surface for a topic as wide-ranging as training and education. There is tremendous opportunity for additional study on the quality of incidental and informal learning in the Marine Corps, as well as understanding the attitudes and behaviors that result in more effective units.

Notes
1. The Great Units Study (Quantico, VA: Lejeune Leadership Institute, MCU, 2015). The Marine Corps Institutional Review Board approved this study (IRB Control Number USMC.2015.0004).
3. Victoria J. Marsick and Karen E. Watkins review literature on informal learning and note that the scholarly literature defines and differentiates informal learning and related concepts in many ways including Albert Bandura’s concept of social modeling, Phillip C. Candy’s experiential learning, R. W. Revans’ action learning, Donald Schön’s reflection in action, and Etienne Wenger’s communities of practice, to name a few.
the core value of courage is taught to Marines through embodied practices rather than formal training in “An Ethnography of ‘Courage’ among U.S. Marines” (PhD dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2010).

10. The Great Units Study.
12. The Great Units Study.
13. Anonymous interview with author, April 2015, Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA.
15. Anonymous interview with author, May 2015, Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA.
16. Anonymous interview with author, April 2015, Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA.
17. Anonymous interview with author, May 2015, Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA.
19. The Great Units Study.
21. Anonymous interview with author, April 2015, Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA.
A Scientific or Regimental Staff
The Reform of Staff College Selection
in the British Army, 1927–31

Iain Farquharson

Abstract: This article explores a key debate within the British Army of the power of the regimental system over the structure of the army. It will do so by focusing on the discussions undertaken between 1927 and 1931 on the issue of allocating vacancies to the two Staff Colleges at Camberley and Quetta. It will demonstrate that the regimental system of the British Army was so ingrained as to effect the reform of a structure that had stood outside the scope of regimental influence since its formalization in 1905. In doing so, it will be argued that the existence of the attitudes created by the regimental system in senior British officers had a significant impact on the British Army’s ability to recognize the need for the reform of Staff College entry process despite the increased importance and technicalization of staff duties as a result of the First World War.

Keywords: Staff College, British Army, education, interwar period, regimental system, Army Council

In the interwar period, the British Army faced a series of circumstances that would test its ability to adapt, reform, and develop, while simultaneously maintaining its commitment to an increased number of manpower-intensive deployments across the empire. Historians have long discussed how these increased territorial responsibilities—combined with revulsion at the casualties suffered during the First World War and the desire of ordinary soldiers to be de-
mobilized—contributed to a significant weakening of the British Army in this period.1 Furthermore, much has been made of the fact that while other European nations maintained large standing armies through a system of compulsion, Britain rapidly reverted to its prewar roots in the form of a small, professional army, backed up by a reserve of volunteer units.2 In this context, the efficient use of manpower, particularly the limited peacetime supply of officers, was crucial to ensuring that the British Army was able to meet its many commitments in the interwar period. While some recent scholarship acknowledges the failure of the British Army to make the best use of its resources in general terms, the narratives have focused principally on the initial allocation of personnel to arms of service.3 This article will argue that the failure to manage manpower resources, arguably a relatively new phenomenon in the technologically dominated battlefields of the post-1918 world, was also a problem for that part of the British Army generally referred to as “the brain of the army”—the staff.

At a time of disarmament and social disquiet over the perceived aggressive nature of the British Army, when young men were deterred from an army career due to slow promotion and a lack of opportunity to learn skills useful in civilian employment, the British Army failed to move away from the historical conservative dogma of the officer corps. As a result, despite evidence that supported open competition to the staff colleges at Camberley and Quetta and the subsequent increase in technical corps officers obtaining vacancies, the Army Council continued to put its faith in the traditional arms and restricted entry of those officers who could have improved the quality of the staff through their appreciation and understanding of modern methods of war.

The importance of issues relating to staff training through the interwar army should not be underestimated. While the Haldane reforms of the early twentieth century had established the principles of the general staff and resulted in the creation of Field Service Regulations, it must be remembered that throughout the period discussed in this article, the British Army and regimental commanders in particular remained suspicious of officers who wished to apply to Staff College.4 Indeed, even into the later years of the interwar period, regiments boasted that none of their officers had been encouraged to apply.5 In addition to this, the majority of deployments and engagements undertaken by the British Army in this period were relatively small in scale.6 In many cases, troop concentrations did not exceed a reinforced battalion and, as a result, no formal staff was required (the lowest level at which an organized staff was required was the brigade). Thus, any staff work was undertaken by regimental officers assigned staff responsibilities in addition to their normal regimental duties. For example, while Palestine, Ireland, and Burma represented significant drains on imperial manpower in the 1920s and early 1930s, operations largely consisted of small motorized flying columns or platoon patrols to maintain discipline and order
or to undertake surgical strikes against key hostile leaders. As a result, for many officers in the British and Indian armies, their first experience of staff training was based not on the centralized training made available at Staff College but on the administrative training provided by their regimental commanders. In this context, the centralized staff training provided at Staff College was, in practice, unexploited. However, in the wider context of the period in which the British Army found itself scrapping with the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force to define a role for itself in imperial defense planning, such centralized training was of prime importance. It was only by ensuring that the British Army had a modern, efficient planning staff in place that it could be sure of setting out realistic plans to “suit the special requirements of any particular campaign and of rapid expansion to meet the case of a grave emergency.”

While its organizational doctrine emphasized flexibility of approach, as an addendum to this, its operational doctrine emphasized that “the instructions laid down herein cover a war of the first magnitude, but can be modified in their application to other forms of warfare.” Thus, while still emphasizing the importance of flexibility in the context of imperial defense and low-intensity warfare, Field Service Regulations also recognized the possibility of the British Army needing to deploy in greatly expanded form to meet an organized, well-equipped enemy. As will be demonstrated below, with the imposition of a quota system for competitive vacancies to Staff College, the Army Council effectively impeded its own ability to create flexible and coordinated defense plans, in favor of a commitment to regimental soldiering.

**Background to the Quota System**

The quota system for allocating vacancies to the staff colleges came about as the result of wider problems surrounding the recruitment of officers for the army. This problem would plague the British Army throughout the interwar period and would plant its roots firmly in the changed social and political attitudes toward the army as a result of the experiences of the First World War and the early years of the interwar period. Of particular consequence for the British Army was the growing belief, “particularly in the upper and educated classes . . . that little separated the lot of the victors from that of the defeated.” The growing distaste for war that these feelings engendered was particularly damaging for the British officer corps as it was these two groups, the upper classes in particular, who continued to supply the bulk of candidates for commissions. Antimilitary attitudes were strengthened with the formation of the League of Nations and led to the erroneous belief that military action on the scale of the First World War was a thing of the past and that “all international conflicts were amenable to negotiation and discussion.” As a result, the general political mood toward disarmament and the rapid reductions in British Army strength in the early
part of the interwar period were praised and supported by the sections of the population most needed to fill positions of leadership.

In addition to this general desire for disarmament, the army retained its public perception as being an aggressive force, designed for destructive offensive action, in support of a wealthy, industrial elite, rather than to serve as the defensive bastion of the empire and its people. Indeed, the most stark example of this was the Amritsar massacre in 1919, in which approximately 380 unarmed Indian civilians were killed by Ghurkas under the command of British Brigadier General Reginald Dyer while attending a political rally. Less deadly, but far more impactful to the civilian population, was the deployment of 36 battalions called out on emergency duty to aid the police and civil authorities during the 1926 General Strike. Combined with the significant deployment to peacekeeping duties in Ireland, this relatively aggressive use of the British Army in this period did much to dissuade a war-weary population of the positive benefits of service in the army. Furthermore, the near constant reduction in military strength in the years immediately following the end of the First World War did little to encourage those wishing to commit to a long-term career to join the army. Ultimately this came down to two factors, the first of which was slow promotion within the regiment. With the abolition of purchase, promotion within the individual regiment was governed by seniority. For the corps regiments (Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, Signal Corps, and the Royal Army Service Corps), each had one list for all the officers within the corps, further reducing the frequency of promotion. The result was a blockage of the promotion of junior officers, “taking perhaps twelve or more years before a Subaltern could become a Captain.” As well as discouraging recruitment, it left many junior officers living “in hopes of another war or the recurrence of the Black Plague.”

In addition to these internal factors, the British Army faced stiff competition from the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force for its officer recruits. In the interwar period, all three Services were attempting to recruit from the same pool of public school–educated young men. Indeed, in a report on the education of potential candidates for Royal Air Force commissions, it was noted that “this qualification depends upon a certain moral temper as much or as more than upon any purely intellectual proficiency. It is often described as the quality of a gentleman.” Furthermore, as the Royal Air Force and the army shared admission papers, with candidates selecting their order of preference, these two Services were in direct competition for officer cadets. In addition to this competition, the civil service commissioners who set the relative pass marks required for each college tended to ensure that the most academically gifted gained entry to Cranwell by setting the required pass grades at “41% for Cranwell, 38% for Woolwich and 36% for Sandhurst.” As a result, not only
was the army facing a significant public relations problem in its attempts to secure suitable candidates for commissions, but the most academically able of those seeking to join the Services were being skimmed off by either the Royal Navy or the Royal Air Force.

The result was a decline in quality within the officer corps of the British Army, which led Major General Sir Hugh J. Elles to note, “We are now unable to fill the cadet colleges . . . the quality is not high.” This in turn resulted in a dip in quality of officers applying for and gaining places at the staff colleges. As noted above, while the operational commitments of the army did not necessarily require a high-quality staff, the doctrinal requirement for flexibility in planning that had been enshrined in Field Service Regulations established a crucial precedence for creating such a staff at the War Office to aid operational planning for possible conflicts. The ability of the staff in the 1920s to do this was called into question by Chief of the Imperial Staff Sir George F. Milne, who stated, “It is a positive danger to the Army and a crime to the nation that some of the officers are allowed by their commanding officers to be put on the Staff College list.” In an attempt to improve the quality of officers on the staff as well as the attractiveness of the army to those seeking a challenging career, in 1926, it was proposed to remove the original quota for competitive vacancies for places at the staff colleges. Before examining the impact of this change, it is worth describing the process of entry to the staff colleges in this period.

Staff College Entry in the Interwar Period

During the interwar period, the principle method of entry to the Staff College was via competitive examination, held once a year in February or March in various locations across the empire, including London and Delhi. The examination was divided into two sections—obligatory and voluntary subjects—with each section being designed to test the skills deemed necessary to succeed as a staff officer. Those subjects rated as obligatory were: Training for War, Organization and Administration, and Imperial Organization. These papers were to serve as a litmus test for potential staff officers, and they ensured that “the percentage of marks allotted to military subjects was eighty per cent [sic].” The optional subjects included a wide variety of languages, physics, chemistry, political economy, and the history of British India and thus, while covering a wide array of subjects, still retained an element of military knowledge. Until 1926, a prewar quota system was in force that assigned a specific number of vacancies to each arm of Service taking the competitive examination. While in the post–Boer War period the curriculum of the college had undergone significant change, the allocation of vacancies had not. As a result, the number of vacancies offered was broadly the same as that of the late 1880s, namely, “Cavalry and Infantry 18, Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers 6, Indian Army 3, Royal Marines 1,
Nominations 4.” Given the significant changes in warfare during the course of the First World War, with the increased focus on field fortifications, the growing dominance of artillery and defensive firepower, the subsequent relegation of cavalry to a supporting role, and the introduction of aircraft and tanks, such a division of vacancies was clearly unsuited to the demands of modern warfare. However, this allocation, heavily favoring the “teeth arms,” traditionally seen as comprising the infantry and cavalry, was ideally suited to the demands of an army focused on imperial policing and tied to the Cardwell system of linked battalions. As a result, while British Army doctrine expressed the need for flexibility, the reality of the situation, including for the provision of staff officers, was that “the greater portion of the British Army is regulated by the conditions prevailing on a portion of one of the frontiers.”

To be eligible for one of the nominated places on offer, they had to have achieved the minimum pass mark on the competitive examination as well as “(i) Good service in the field. (ii) Three years’ service as Adjutant. (iii) Good service on the Staff or as an instructor for two years.” These additional conditions aimed at not only ensuring a minimum standard of competency had been achieved but also that those who did not qualify high enough in the examination to gain a competitive place gained practical experience to compensate for this lack of academic standing. While principally serving as a reward for those who had already demonstrated their competency in peacetime staff roles, nomination had allowed “distinguished field officers to supplement their battlefield experience with formal, theoretical training in staff matters.” As the interwar period progressed, the former became more prominent as war experience among junior officers gradually decreased.

Recent scholarship has been highly critical of the British Army’s process of nomination to the Staff College with Edward Smalley arguing that “the initially sound use of nominations to utilize Great War talent reduced in value . . . until it reached the point of undermining the credibility of the Staff College.” In support of the process of nomination, statistics presented by the commandant of Camberley in the late 1920s, Major General Sir Charles W. Gwynn, demonstrated that in the majority of cases, nominated officers were equal to those who had gained entry via the competitive examination. He showed that, in the class passing out of the Staff College in December 1927, “in the top half there were 25 British Service officers of whom 14 were nominated and 11 entered by competition. In the bottom half of 29 . . . 9 were nominated, 12 [entered] by competition.” Consequently, not only were those officers nominated to a place as capable of performing as those gaining entry via competitive examination, the 1927 figures suggest that nominated officers were actually outperforming those entering by competition. In large part, this can be attributed to the additional practical experience gained by those officers nominated, because although the
numbers of those who entered by competition in both groups was relatively even, the disparity between nominated candidates, 14:9, suggests that prior experience of staff responsibilities gave nominated students a boost during the various schemes and questions posed over the duration of the course. As a result, until 1927, the British Army had a system of entry to the Staff College that was broadly suited to the demands of the army in this period. The combination of competitive examination coupled with nomination theoretically ensured that a mix of academically capable officers and those with practical experience of staff duties gained access to the ranks of the army staff. Furthermore, the structure of the exam papers allowed the varied requirements of British service to be represented. Given the requirements for operational planning within the British Army, this combination seems to have been ideally suited for the task at hand, able to both plan for multiple eventualities while also retaining a practical sense of the limitations and requirements of the British Army.

In practice, however, this system of entry was open to significant abuse, which ultimately impacted the ability of the colleges to ensure they were obtaining the best candidates for the staff. As noted above, the interwar army had a noteworthy problem recruiting the most academically able candidates due to competition from the other Services, who did not suffer from the tarnished reputation of the army post-First World War. In addition, the ethos and attitude of the officer corps mitigated against the academic study of their profession that the type of flexible planning set out in British doctrine required. Indeed, British officers of all Services clung to their amateur past, with a future marshal of the Royal Air Force writing, “There was something agreeably amateur about the Services, perhaps particularly about the Army, in those days.”32 This attitude was epitomized by the regimental system, which prioritized social status and “gentlemanly” pursuits. Indeed, “‘shop talk’ was strictly forbidden at meals; officers occupied themselves with discussions about racing, horses and other gentlemanly pursuits.”33 Recent scholarship has convincingly demonstrated that, while junior officers were required to undertake various assessments and training to progress in rank, study beyond the minimum required was not encouraged. Indeed, future Field Marshal Edmund Ironside, when he was a junior officer in India, recalled an occasion while hospitalized, when he was found with military textbooks on his bedside table by a senior officer. He was asked, “What the devil are you reading those for? You are a horse artilleryman; what more do you want?”34 In this context, where many officers had grown out of the habit of professional study, the challenge posed by the Staff College entrance examination, particularly in light of the increased competition for places, led many to look for shortcuts to success.

For them, the solution to overcome the army’s lack of focus on continuing professional education was to pay to attend a “crammer,” who would, during
a relatively short period of a few months, attempt to impart all the necessary information an officer required to pass the Staff College competitive examination. However, even though this method undoubtedly helped many officers pass the examination, it did create significant problems, not just for the officers concerned but for the army as a whole. First, there was no guarantee of finding a good quality crammer, for as a contemporary publication noted, “Some are—well, business men, shall we say? . . . who are fully aware that if a candidate fails . . . he may return a second or third time.” 35 Thus, were an officer to engage a charlatan crammer, at best he would have to pay multiple times for the same instruction, and at worst he could develop a “feeling of discouragement and even discontent . . . [as] in spite of sometimes repeated efforts . . . failed to achieve [his] ambition to get to the Staff College.”36 Not only would the officer have been out of pocket, he would potentially have been discouraged from taking any further interest in continuing to learn beyond his regimental duties. Furthermore, for those who found an effective crammer who could help them pass the examination at the first attempt, although they had achieved their initial objective of obtaining a place at Staff College, their longer-term knowledge may not have received a boost.

Indeed, in discussing the relative merits of cramming and personal study, A. R. Godwin-Austin noted, “He will probably benefit considerably by burrowing for it, since knowledge diligently acquired remains longer in the memory.”37 As a result, not all officers were able to continue the promise shown by their examination scores into their studies at the colleges. In an analysis of the 1925 Junior Division, Major General Ironside noted that only “about 30% are obviously fitted for further training.”38 Thus, not only did the system of vacancy allocation to the staff colleges fail to allow for one of the central tenets of British doctrine, namely flexibility of purpose, it encouraged a system of learning that did nothing to encourage junior officers to break away from long-established traditions of amateurism and aversion to learning for learning’s sake. As will be seen below, opening up competitive vacancies—while not solving the army’s political and social difficulties with defining a role for itself within the wider sphere of imperial defense planning—would have, theoretically at least, improved the available staff. It would have done so by encouraging more academically capable men to apply, not just for Staff College, but to join the army as officers through the greater possibility of advancement within the more scientific corps. Furthermore, it would have allowed the creation of a general staff more capable of undertaking operational planning of a scientific and flexible nature, through the incorporation of officers from all corps.

**Abolition of Prewar Quotas**

Even though no justification was given for the abolition of the prewar quota
system in 1926, given the recruitment problems facing the army at this time, the reasons behind this decision should be clear. In addition, the open recognition by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) that certain officers put forward for the staff should not have been allowed essentially forced the alteration of the system by the Army Council. Removing this system had the desired effect, as the 1926 intake saw a significant increase in the overall scores earned by those officers obtaining competitive vacancies. Under the prewar quota system, the lowest successful mark was 5,473 out of a possible 10,100. In contrast, by removing the quota system, the lowest successful mark rose by between 147 and 456 marks to a maximum of 5,929. Given that the difference between the lowest seven qualifying marks was less than 100, this is significant. By assuming that the difference in marks between candidates broadly followed that provided to the military members, under the prewar quota system, the lowest qualifier would have sat 18 places lower in the order of merit than under a system of open competition. With an average of 25 competitive vacancies on offer each year, it is clear that this scenario would have seen a significant decrease in the academic quality of those gaining competitive places. For the army as a whole, removing the quota and improving the academic quality of prospective staff officers had some key benefits. Chief among these for the army was that it helped move away from the idea that “what mattered were questions of breeding . . . not acquired skills or theorizing about the conduct of war.” Furthermore, by implementing open competition, the Army Council virtually removed the element of luck, whereby an officer who passed the examination well could be denied access due to the quota for his service arm being filled, while an officer from another arm who “had just scraped through all the papers is . . . eligible.” This would have gone a long way to improve morale within an officer corps where, due to limited promotion prospects, Staff College represented the most secure route to continued progression within the army. Thus, the decision to make competitive entry to Staff College a meritocracy was crucial for a period when the majority of ambitious junior officers believed that “unless they can get a p.s.c. [passed staff course], their chances are nil.”

Although clearly of benefit to the army at a time when it was grappling with significant problems in the structure of its officer corps, the result of this change had a series of unintended and not necessarily negative consequences for the army and its staff, namely a change in the balance of arms at Staff College. A decline in the number of infantry officers successfully obtaining competitive vacancies, coupled with an increase in the number of Royal Engineer officers applying for the Staff College would have resulted—had it continued—in the Staff College intake being dominated by officers of the Royal Engineers by 1930, followed closely by the Royal Artillery. Indeed, an analysis of the distribution of officers taking the entrance examination showed that in 1930, of
the top 40 candidates, 13 came from the Royal Engineers, 10 from the Royal Artillery, 8 from the Indian Army, only 5 from British infantry units, and none from British cavalry units. This represented a significant shift from 1926, the last year of the prewar quota, when 16 came from British infantry, 10 from the Royal Artillery, 6 from the Royal Engineers, 4 from the Indian Army, and 1 from British cavalry. As a result, the abolition of the prewar quota system and the subsequent increase in the number of officers from the technical corps had the potential to create an army staff that mirrored the changed face of a modern European battlefield, with its increased emphasis on field fortifications, artillery, and additional logistical and supply requirements.

Furthermore, figures presented to the CIGS demonstrated that not only were these officers applying for Staff College in greater numbers, but their military knowledge was equal to that of their colleagues in the infantry and cavalry. The director of staff duties, Major General Cameron, compared the results of infantry, cavalry, Royal Artillery, and Royal Engineer officers taking the 1926 Staff College entrance examination. He found that officers from the technical arms achieved better average marks in the examination than the infantry and cavalry officers (6,083.25 compared to 5,855.75). As demonstrated above, the 200-mark difference this entailed would have represented a significant difference in placing an officer in the order of merit and therefore in the theoretical academic quality of the officer attending the Staff College. In addition, it was demonstrated that in the four training for War examination papers, seen as the litmus test for potential staff officers, the technical corps achieved broadly comparable scores (2,321.7 compared to 2,374.25). As a result, it is clear that even though these officers may have had less practical experience of regimental duties and the handling of troops in the field, their theoretical knowledge was as sound as those officers for whom handling troops in combat was their regimental role. As has already been shown, the majority of British commitments did not require field level staffs beyond those at headquarters level. The main concentration of staff officers was at the War Office in a variety of planning and organizational roles, where theoretical planning knowledge, rather than practical operational leadership, was required. Furthermore, from a temperament perspective, officers from technical arms, with their more academic and technical training, were ideally suited to the type of staff work generally required of junior staff officers. Field Service Regulations stated that staff officers’ duties involved assisting “their commander in the execution of the duties entrusted to him, to transmit his orders and instructions to subordinate commanders and to the services, to make the necessary arrangements in connection therewith.”

Given the nature of the training received by officers in the technical arms, it is evident that these officers were more suited to the duties described above than those of the more aggressive, action-oriented infantry and cavalry.
This technical training was largely gained after officers had completed their initial officer training at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich. Engineering officers were then sent for a two-year mechanical science course at Cambridge University followed by courses at the School of Military Engineering. In a similar manner, officers from the Royal Artillery attended a course at the School of Artillery at Larkhill, where they learned the technical and scientific skills required of their role as well as how to cooperate with infantry in the field. In contrast, officers from the infantry and cavalry undertook a two-year course at Royal Military College, Sandhurst, followed by a nine-month period of training at a regimental depot, where they were taught the history of their new regiment, the interior economy of an infantry company, and relearned the drill they had already been taught at Sandhurst.

Thus, officers from the technical arms received significant post-commissioning training in academic subjects via university, skills easily transferable to the heavily administrative functions of the staff, and the teeth arms received training that was far more practical and focused on action, leadership, and tactical training. Furthermore, while the training provided to technical officers could guarantee a standard level and quality of education, the same could not be said for that given to infantry and cavalry officers.

A significant problem within the British Army was its ability to provide uniform, effective tactical training for its officers that was carried out within individual units. This left the British Army at the mercy of its regimental commander's attitudes toward training. “Some, like Wavell, Hobart and Burnett-Stuart, were enthusiastic trainers. . . . Other senior officers adopted a laissez-faire attitude towards training. . . . Some had so little imagination that they failed to recognize the need to explain to their subordinates the lessons which a particular exercise was intended to highlight.” This was to be a problem with broader consequences for the British Army’s ability to conduct operations in the opening battles of the Second World War, particularly in the ability of formations that had not previously served or trained together to cooperate seamlessly on the battlefield. However, when it came to its impact on staff training, it is clear that the more critically minded, uniformly trained technical officers were better suited to the role of coordinator and planner than the variable professional training of the infantry and cavalry officer. Similarly, the roles undertaken within their regiments gave further support to the positive nature of this increase in technical officers obtaining Staff College vacancies. Wartime developments, particularly within the artillery but equally so the Royal Engineers, had resulted in a more scientific approach to warfare for these arms that fitted them for staff service. For the Royal Artillery, the development of flash spotting for counter-battery fire, preplanned creeping barrages, and the use of battery boards and map firing all developed this arm’s knowledge and experience of preoperational planning, advanced supply collection and coordination, and the issuing of com-
plex operational orders at regimental level. In contrast, infantry and cavalry officers’ roles were dominated by the character traits deemed to make them effective leaders of men rather than able administrators.

**Challenging the Social Status Quo**

This shift in the makeup of the Staff College intake proved a significant stumbling block for a number of senior officers and resulted in a change of policy for the allocation of Staff College vacancies, which reflected not only the institutional prejudices of the regimental system but also reflected a significant problem within the British Army. This latter problem was an ingrained lack of understanding or agreement over the purpose of British Army staff colleges. Both of these issues had been present within the British Army long before this discussion about the allocation of vacancies took place and represented significant stumbling blocks not just for Staff College in this period but for the army in general. The problems engendered by the regimental system of the British Army had existed long before it was formalized by Edward Cardwell and Hugh Childers in the 1860s and 1870s. The reforms of Cardwell aimed at improving the reputation of the army within society and encouraging the recruitment of “a better class of recruit and reduce losses from desertion by doing away with the prospect that soldiers could expect to spend most of their adult lives in colonial exile.” In addition, it sought to improve professionalism within the officer corps, along the lines of the Prussian system and to “control the over-regulation payments for commissions . . . by ending purchase entirely.” Although not an overt attempt to break the hold of the traditional officer class over the army, there were many within the institution who believed that the abolition of purchase would create more of a meritocracy within the officer corps.

Ultimately, the reforms were more an attempt to professionalize the army after its disastrous performance in the Crimean War, and any idea that a true meritocracy would develop within the officer corps was effectively snuffed out by the reforms proposed by Childers a decade after those of Cardwell. The creation of localized regiments by Childers aimed at much the same ideal as those of Cardwell in that it desired improved professionalism within the army, while the introduction of compulsory retirement ages and promotion via regimental lists aimed to streamline the promotion process for regimental officers and remove those unfit for further promotion through a system of qualifying examinations. Within these reforms developed a system of regimental hierarchy that became so embedded in the psyche of the British military that the civilian permanent under secretary of the War Office felt secure in stating that “it is a principle established from the very inception of the army, that fighting corps . . . have the precedence of all other corps.” Even though a distinct hierarchical
structure existed within the fighting corps, it was the distinction between the fighting corps and the military tail that was to cause significant problems for the reform of Staff College during this period.

This was largely a reflection of the generally conservative social structure of Britain at the time, particularly those sections of society that had historically provided the officer corps for the army. Indeed, Kier has argued, “While ‘social suitability’ was an important criterion for the prestigious infantry and cavalry regiments, the technical branches ranked candidates according to professional standards.”61 This departure from the gentleman amateur created similar feelings within the officer corps as that experienced within the Royal Navy on the introduction of engineer officers and created hostility toward the idea of a “garage mechanic’s war.”62 This idea was most clearly set out in the discussion on vacancies at Staff College by Major General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, in which he stated, “As a general rule the R.E. officer inspires less confidence in commanders and troops.”63 As a result, according to those officers who thought like Bonham-Carter, though they may have manifested the key attributes to be a good staff officer, they did not have the aura of leadership required to be an effective commander. Following on from this comment, Bonham-Carter noted that it would be “advisable to limit the number of R.E. officers who can enter the Staff College without the check of nomination.”64 By requiring engineer officers to be nominated, Bonham-Carter was essentially proposing a character test to mitigate the supposed lack of command character among officers of this corps and ensure that those admitted possessed “stamina, courage, gallantry, character, and above all morale.”65 As a manifestation of the tradition of the gentleman-officer, such a move provided senior officers with a pseudo-legitimate reason to deny officers from the technical corps a place at the college, ultimately being based on the Victorian ideals of the characteristics required of a good officer. Similarly, the adjutant general, Sir Walter P. Braithwaite, stated that he was “apprehensive of an overdose of R.E. officers at the Staff College and the resultant difficulty of placing such officers, when they become p.s.c. to the best advantage so far as the good of the Army is concerned.”66 Braithwaite does not elaborate on what “the good of the army” means, although his later comment, “that the number passing would embarrass you in the placing of them on the staff in the future,” perhaps provides some indication.67 As demonstrated above, technical officers displayed the same level of operational knowledge in the examination as those officers from the infantry and cavalry; indeed, the growing domination of competitive vacancies by officers from the Royal Engineers demonstrated that they frequently received higher marks than officers of those arms. Thus, it could not have been their academic standing that would have caused embarrassment to the CIGS, but their social standing.
**Staff College or War College?**

The second factor to create resistance to this change centered on a divergence of views surrounding the actual purpose of the Staff College within the interwar army. Principally, this was a debate waged between the postwar commandants of the Staff College and senior officers who had held roles in the prewar college. The former believed that “the Staff Colleges have their own special role, in the training of officers, in the duties of the staff in their respective services.”68 This view reflected the changed nature of modern warfare and was based on the experiences of the British Army during the First World War. For postwar commandants, it was important to ensure that future staff officers and commandants recognized the increased importance of prearranged fire plans, logistical support, and the rapid replacement of exhausted units with fresh formations, alongside having the practical knowledge required to ensure that such planning as was necessary took place. In contrast, those with experience of the prewar Staff College, particularly during the period when Sir Henry H. Wilson was in command (January 1907–July 1910), believed that it served “(a) To get into the way of concentrating on work. (b) To learn how to work and what to work to. (c) To learn how to read with understanding. . . . In fact the true value of a Staff College course is not so much to learn what you do learn . . . as to be put in the way of continuing your own education.”69 Wilson had believed firmly in the establishment of the Staff College as a school of thought with the result that one student during his tenure in command, future field marshal, Lieutenant Archibald P. Wavell, was moved to note that teaching was “too academic and theoretical and aimed too high. Its main object should surely have been to turn out good staff officers.”70 Therefore, even at the time, these attitudes were the subject of controversy.

Much like the issues surrounding the social status of technical officers, this subject had its roots in traditional problems within the institution of the British Army. Unlike many European armies, the British Army was very slow to come around to the concept of a general staff. Indeed, in 1870, German General Bronsart von Schellendorff was “astonished to find the duties of the Prussian Great General Staff performed in Britain by twelve general staff officers.”71 Along with the Cardwell and Childers reforms, the creation of a staff college at Camberley in 1858 came about as a result of British Army performance in Crimea.72 Taking place prior to the establishment of the general staff in 1904, its initial purpose was never truly established; however, during the years leading up to the First World War, it established itself as “the only school of strategy, of organization, of Imperial Defence, in the Queen’s dominions.”73 This was an idea firmly established by Sir Henry Wilson to the extent that immediately prior to the First World War, the commandant, Lieutenant General Sir Launcelot Kiggell, commented that “it would be a good idea to change its
name to ‘War School’.” However, it must be remembered, these developments had taken place at a time when the army had not experienced a European-scale war since Crimea and had little understanding of how the logistical demands of this type of war had changed. Furthermore, the conditions that had manifested during the First World War, although not necessarily revolutionary in type, were certainly on a scale far beyond the experiences of the nations involved. As a result, the staff colleges were the only establishments available to train higher commanders and thus became the de facto route to high command until the opening of the Senior Officers’ School in 1916 and the Imperial Defence College in 1927. Hence, while many in the army saw the training provided at the staff colleges as the best preparation for future commanders, many shared the attitude displayed both in the 1880s and during the course of the 1920s debates around the allotment of vacancies to Staff College that “the man who is likely to become the best Staff Officer is one who has obtained ample, practical experience in the handling of troops.” That Staff College was seen as the breeding ground for British commanders by senior officers during the 1920s is evident from the fact that the CIGS, Sir George Milne, filled 74 percent of senior posts with Staff College graduates. This attitude continued beyond Milne’s term of command to the extent that under Field Marshal Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd (1933–36), 100 percent of senior appointments were held by Staff College graduates. It is clear that for many senior officers, Staff College was a place to teach officers the art of learning and the knowledge they would need to be successful commanders rather than the practical skills required of a staff officer.

At the time these views were developed, this understanding was broadly correct; however, the conditions prevailing in the First World War had completely changed the landscape of war for the British Army and for its system of staff work and training. The rapid proliferation of staff schools during the First World War clearly demonstrated a need for the rapid training of staff officers, not only to make good losses but also to cope with the vastly increased logistical demands. Alongside this, the development of a worldwide informal network of learning within the British Army, largely facilitated by staff officers, suggested that the system of training was no longer fit for the purposes of modern war. Furthermore, this focus on the training of commanders resulted in the staff becoming “infantry to excess.” Ultimately, as warfare was no longer a matter of infantry fighting it out until one side was too exhausted to continue, this overfocus on command was outdated. With the change in makeup of Staff College courses reflecting the dominant arms of the interwar period, it, like the army as a whole, was clearly entering a period of transition. However, similar to the debates surrounding the development and use of armored forces and their consequent morale-lowering impact on the traditional arms, when it came to
the shifting of the allocation of Staff College vacancies, there was resistance from senior officers.

**The Response and Its Impact**

Despite the clear positive impact of the system of open competition on the academic quality of officers entering Staff College and its change in composition more closely representing the increasingly technical nature of operations, a meeting of the military members of the council decided “that the allotment of vacancies at the Staff College to officers of technical corps, in which they include the R.E. [Royal Engineers], R.C. [Royal Corps] of Signals and the R.A.S.C. [Royal Army Service Corps], should be limited in number.”82 As demonstrated above, this change did not reflect the academic abilities of technical officers, or their importance to the army in future conflicts. Instead, it reflected a social hierarchy that owed as much to the Victorian army as it did to the backgrounds of those of a heavily class-conscious, postwar society that continued to view the army as a refuge for a certain strata of public school–educated man. Indeed, the quotas set out by the director of staff duties demonstrates exactly how far traditional attitudes and beliefs were represented. Figures for 1930 show that the infantry were allocated 16 competitive vacancies to the Royal Engineer’s 4.83 This new quota system was to run alongside the continued use of nominations in the proportion of 80 percent competitive to 20 percent nominated.

Given that this examination had been undertaken to improve the quality of officer attending the staff colleges, it was added that “no British Army officer will, however, be eligible to fill a competitive vacancy unless he is within the first 45 in order of merit.”84 However, this pass requirement could not be met by some arms, with the result that the infantry failed to fill its full allocation of competitive vacancies requiring 5 of the 16 available infantry vacancies to be filled by nomination.85 Thus, to find infantry officers who would be eligible for nomination, the nominating committee had to look outside the top 50 candidates. Even though it has already been demonstrated that those officers entering the staff colleges via nomination were of comparable quality with those entering via competition, this return to the pre-1926 quality of candidate did not represent the expected improvement in the quality of officer. In addition, as the interwar period progressed, the much-desired wartime experience would have diminished, with the result that “the quality of nominated candidates declined . . . and, by 1930, most nominated officers had never seen combat; selection was instead based on subjective assessment of routine duties.”86 Thus, it would have become virtually impossible for the committee to ensure that a nominated officer had the necessary character qualities to appoint based on the flawed understanding that the staff colleges existed to mold and train future commanders. However, based on the factors cited above, it is easy to see why those officers,
with their ingrained regimental attitudes and prewar belief in the role of the Staff College, reacted as they did. Had the vacancies been filled through open competition, thus giving competitive vacancies to the first 33 officers on the examination order of merit, the Royal Engineers would have amassed 18 vacancies to the infantry’s 6.87

Theoretically, this new quota system could have benefitted the army. By examining the staff lessons of the First World War, the Army Council could have quickly identified the more complex and technical nature of staff work in the postwar military and adjusted the quota to suit these needs. However, the issue of India, along with those discussed above, served to further nullify the British Army Council’s ability to see this. The system of linked battalions, established as part of the 1860s Cardwell reforms, essentially ensured that a large number of infantry battalions were required to be maintained on the British Army strength to serve as reinforcement depots for the British/Indian establishment.88 This, combined with the problem of needing to improve the attractiveness of the army as a career by ensuring the possibility of progression to senior rank, meant that any quota system adopted for the allocation of Staff College vacancies had to be based on “regimental peace establishments.”89 Thus, with a greater number of infantry officers to satisfy as to their future progression, alongside the hierarchical, elitist attitude fostered by the regimental system, effectively negated any potential for positive change.

**Conclusion**

As can be seen, the reintroduction of a quota system for allocating competitive vacancies at the Staff College had a significant impact, not only on the quality of officers attending the colleges. By lowering the qualifying position in the order of merit and introducing a set limit on the number of officers from each arm, the British Army denied itself the opportunity to recruit the best officers for staff training and the ability to reshape its staff on the basis of its wartime experiences. Instead, by continually relying on regimental prejudice and Victorian notions of the qualities required to be a good regimental officer and commander, the British Army chose to ignore the lessons of industrial warfare and the attitudes of society toward the army and focus only on those skills seen as traditionally beneficial. Doing so not only disregarded the increased importance of the logistical tail of the army and the requirement for extensive operational planning and interarm cooperation developed during the First World War but also had ensured the continued alienation of educated potential candidates for commissions. Given that the British Army was overstretched during the interwar years and struggled to recruit officers in adequate numbers or of the required quality, such a policy represents a significant failure to adequately utilize its available resources. Had the system of open competition been allowed to
stand, the British Army would have rapidly acquired a staff that better reflected the planning requirements of modern war and also served as a vehicle to dismiss the idea that bright young men could not make a career in the army. With the rapid proliferation of threats from Germany, Italy, and Japan, combined with the continued fear of Russian involvement in India and other colonial actions, a more controlled and considered approach to operational planning was vital. Consequently, by returning to a system of vacancy allocation similar to that which had existed prior to the First World War, the Army Council condemned the British Army to repeat the mistakes of the early twentieth century and to focus on training future commanders, rather than officers capable of the type of logistical and operational planning that was to become the hallmark of warfare in the twentieth century.

Notes


18. Tony Mansell, “Flying Start: Educational and Social Factors in the Recruitment of Pi-


28. Godwin-Austin, *The Staff and the Staff College*, 278.


35. Godwin-Austin, *The Staff and the Staff College*, 283.


37. Godwin-Austin, *The Staff and the Staff College*, 283.


41. *Report on the Staff Conference Held at the Staff College, Camberley, 17th to 20th January 1927*, 51.

42. *Report on the Staff Conference Held at the Staff College, Camberley, 17th to 20th January 1927*, 49.

43. Godwin-Austin, *The Staff and the Staff College*, 277.

44. Staff College Entrance Examinations 1926–1930: Distribution by Arms of first 40, 45 and 50 Candidates Competing for Camberley, NA, WO 32/3092.

45. Staff College Entrance Examinations 1926–1930.


47. MajGen Cameron to Field Marshal Milne.
52. *Report on the Staff Conference Held at the Staff College, Camberley, 13th to 16th January 1930* (London: HMSO, 1930), 49.
64. Bonham-Carter to Milne.
67. Braithwaite to Milne.
68. MajGen Sir Hastings Anderson memorandum to the Committee of Imperial Defence subcommittee on the institution of a joint Staff College, 20 September 1922, NA, CAB 16/45.
69. Gen Sir Walter Braithwaite to MajGen Cameron, 22 March 1926, NA, WO 32/4840.
71. Bond, *The Victorian Army*, 44.
74. Bond, *The Victorian Army*, 266.
75. Many historians have demonstrated how the American Civil War heralded an era of trenches, field fortifications, machine guns, and supply requirements. However, even the largest battles of this war were dwarfed by the requirements of the western front in the First World War.
76. The Imperial Defence College was established in 1927 as the result of a Committee of Imperial Defence subcommittee, with its aim being to provide a pool of senior officers from the three Services trained in the requirements of imperial defense as a whole. The Senior Officers’ School opened in 1916 as a result of the poor quality of battalion commanders during the First World War and would continue into the interwar period as an effective commander training course for those officers taking command of formations.
77. Gillman to Milne, 6 November 1928, NA, WO 32/3092.
79. Godwin-Austin, “The Great War and After,” in *The Staff and the Staff College*.
82. Extract from Military Members Meeting No. 543. Wednesday, 21 November 1928, NA, WO 32/3092.
84. Staff College, Camberly and Quetta—Entrance Examination, NA, WO 32/3092.
85. Bonham-Carter to Milne.
86. Smalley, "Qualified but Unprepared," 58.
87. Bonham-Carter to Milne.
88. Bond, British Military Policy, 100–2.
89. Bonham-Carter to Milne.
Professionalism and Training of Army Officers in Britain and the Habsburg Monarchy, 1740–90

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Abstract: A majority of the army officers from Britain and the Habsburg Monarchy were committed full-time soldiers in the later part of the eighteenth century. For a large portion of the officer corps of infantry and cavalry, initial training was not centralized but conducted in their respective regiments. The special requirements of the technical branches meant new academies for them; the Habsburg Army also created a general military academy, providing a few dozen cadets each year. Although the Habsburg Monarchy followed a path of more proactive professionalization, creating a number of comprehensive regulations and closely monitoring officer discipline, the British public sphere was conducive to a wide discourse on military matters. In the Habsburg Army, military knowledge was considered arcane and confidential. However, in both armies, officers took an active part in improving the Service, including a more humane and empathetic understanding of discipline enforcement toward subordinates.

Keywords: officers, professionalization, British Army, Habsburg Army, military training, education, military academies, public sphere

This article investigates to what extent a sense of professionalism can be distinguished in the officer corps of the armies of Britain and the Habsburg Monarchy from the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–

48) up to the eve of the French Revolutionary Wars (1792–1802). As professionalism is a broad concept, certain indicators will be used to approach it. Service time, training, commitment to the Service, and interest in improving it are all factors to take into account. The treatment of the enlisted men is another issue, which needs to be considered in this context. And apart from the attitude and aptitude of the officers themselves, the efforts by the respective governments to improve training and professionalization of the officer corps is also integral to this question.

To explore the extent to which we can term the officer corps of eighteenth-century Britain and the Habsburg Monarchy a professional elite, it is useful to first consider how long officers served before advancing to a position of greater responsibility. Time in service shows how much experience company captains and field officers had gathered over a career. Indeed, for the British Army, John A. Houlding points out that most officers in the eighteenth century were career soldiers, spending their life in the army, advancing through long distinguished service even when supported by political interest, and acquiring substantial experience. The proprietary colonels also had, on average, served for long periods before they were given command of their regiments. George II and George III in particular made sure that only able and deserving officers were promoted to these positions of power, even if the latter took political interest into greater consideration.1 James Hayes argues that from the length of time served in the regiments one can conclude that about two-thirds of all line officers around the middle of the eighteenth century may be regarded as career soldiers.2

In the Habsburg Army, we see a similar tendency. With a sample of personal information of officers from 14 regiments created from Austrian muster lists for the years of the Seven Years War, as well as the later 1760s and the 1770s, we can discern that none of their field officers in the 1760s had served for less than 10 years; that two-thirds of the majors had served more than 15 years; and that out of 16 Obrist Commandanten (colonel commanding) only 1 had served less than 25 years (with two of unknown service time), half of them for more than 30 years. If we look at the company command, around three-quarters of Hauptmänner (infantry captain), Rittmeister (cavalry captain), and Capitain-Lieutenants had served for more than 15 years. For these numbers, we have to take into account that wartime casualties had led to faster advancement before 1763. Therefore, officers had served less time in each rank they held before the mid-1760s. Slower advancement after the war made long service times even more pronounced in the 1770s.3

It is apparent that both the British and Habsburg officer corps were filled to a large part with men who had made service in the army their actual profession and saw it as their main calling. However, time served and commitment to the Service does not necessarily make a good officer. High service time also meant
increasing age, especially at a time when there was no regulated retirement age. One of the problems of the British Army when it was called to war in 1740 was that a number of veteran officers were obviously unfit for service because of age and illness. This was due, in part, because the British Army had been reduced in size and was not engaged in much action between the wars of the Spanish and Austrian successions. With an increase to the army’s size, new officers were needed, but first they had to gain experience.

The Habsburg Army also was about to be reduced to a new peacetime establishment after the unsuccessful Turkish war of 1737–39. As part of the plan for the reductions, vacant commissions were to be left unfilled. Fortunately, the long discussions about the right way to carry through these reductions led to them never happening before the death of Charles VI in 1740, and the subsequent outbreak of war then called for an increase in the size of the army.

This leads to the question of how the new officers were trained in both expanding armies; the answer is that they were trained on the job. New officers did not receive formal training, but they had to learn in their units. To become a lieutenant in the British Royal Navy, midshipmen needed to pass an exam, but there were no educational requirements or examinations for British Army officers in the eighteenth century. Apart from personal teaching from more experienced noncommissioned officers (NCOs), peers, and superiors, military manuals and regulations offered another possibility to gain the necessary knowledge for military leadership. British and Habsburg officers encountered quite a different set of resources in this case. In Britain, one of the most influential works was that of Lieutenant Colonel Humphrey Bland, a veteran of the war in Flanders and Spain. His concern for the loss of the expertise of experienced senior officers prompted Bland to put together *A Treatise of Military Discipline* in 1727, which was to serve as a compendium of knowledge and advice for military leadership; it succeeded in becoming a standard for the eighteenth century with a great number of reprints. In 1728, central sections of Bland’s work were turned into an official regulation of the British Army by the Board of General Officers and by order of George II, known as *Exercise for the Horse, Dragoons and Foot Forces* or by the shortened title, *1728 Regulations*. Indeed, it was a necessary addition to the drill books of the late-Stuart times, which were still in use. The later *1748 Regulations* under the Duke of Cumberland’s captain-generality were only concerned with the firings and part of the maneuvers. The *1756 Regulations* introduced new platoon exercises after the regulations of 1728 had already been individually modified by regimental colonels and field officers. The *1757 Regulations* encompassed these, together with all other elements of drill, among them new evolutions and maneuvers. The latter had been devised by Cumberland, the Adjutant General Robert Napier, and Lieutenant Colonel Drury of Cumberland’s 1st Foot Guards. Bland’s 1727 work was, however, still
needed, as he also offered advice on leadership and instructions on the duty of officers. It was still being read by young officers during the American War of Independence.\textsuperscript{11} New comprehensive regulations on such topics were only officially issued for the different branches of the British Army in the early 1790s.\textsuperscript{12}

The Habsburg Army’s leadership was far more active in producing comprehensive regulations. During the early eighteenth century, a variety of regulations had been written by individual regimental proprietors.\textsuperscript{13} Some of those were circulated more widely and used by a number of regiments.\textsuperscript{14} The first general infantry regulations had already appeared in 1737, but they were mostly neglected, probably because of the outbreak of the Turkish war in 1736.\textsuperscript{15} The War of the Austrian Succession then saw the circulation of “Observationspunkte,” short regulations for problems encountered on campaign. A circular by \textit{Feldzeugmeister} (full general) Karl Freiherr von Thüngen in July 1741 takes its lessons from the Battle of Mollwitz, a Habsburg defeat earlier that year, arguing that keeping the formations in order was of primary importance while either retreating or pursuing an enemy. A sufficient number of officers in the fighting units needed to ensure that this well-ordered formation did not deteriorate (as at Mollwitz). There were rarely sufficient numbers of officers due to illness, postings/special orders, and other issues. As a remedy, for example, the \textit{Führer} (a middling NCO rank) was ordered to immediately carry the colors, rather than the \textit{Fähnrich} (ensign), who should be used to supervise and command the subdivisions like platoons.

Discipline among officers seems to have been a general problem, as they were ordered on their honor and reputation (while enlisted men risked summary execution) not to leave their duty post to loot. Further criticism was leveled at absenteeism and a general lack of interest in the day-to-day service, as well as a lack of care for the men. The circular advised them to gain the men’s trust and appreciation, partly also by sharing the state of operations with them, in this instance by making them understand why they were fighting. Furthermore, it was recommended that officers should not frequent coffee houses, gambling establishments, or the camp followers’ shops at headquarters, but rather keep the company of their peers or superiors.\textsuperscript{16}

There were clearly grievances to be addressed regarding the officer corps of the War of the Austrian Succession, and Graf Leopold von Daun in particular did not hold back when, in a letter to the Empress of Austria Maria Theresa on 14 December 1750, he wrote that the enlisted men had not been lacking in goodwill and courage, but that many officers had failed in their duty owing to ignorance and tardiness and especially failing in actual leadership of their men.\textsuperscript{17} By that time, Daun had already been identified as the man to tackle ignorance and leadership problems and was de facto in charge of putting together an official regulation book for the infantry in 1749. Daun had a rapid military
One of the main issues the regulations were to address was negligence of duty by officers. While part one of the regulations was dedicated to weapons drill and smaller unit maneuvers, the second part laid down the duties of officers, as well as those of NCOs and private soldiers. Among other stipulations, officers were declared responsible for instilling the drill of the first part of the regulations, preserving unity and harmony in the regiment, serving as a moral role model, and monitoring orderliness and cleanliness of all soldiers and their equipment. The Obrist-Lieutenant (lieutenant colonel) should visit the companies every couple of weeks and the Obrist Commandant should have the whole regiment drawn out once a month to inspect it, with all officers present with their partisans (or cut-and-thrust polearms, used by Habsburg officers until after the Seven Years War) in hand. Furthermore, it included a highly detailed order of reporting among NCOs and officer ranks. If men were ill or had been injured and were in the field hospital, the Unter-Lieutenant (second lieutenant) was supposed to visit them three times a week. Care of the common soldiers also included a limit placed on corporal punishment. Physical punishment of soldiers was identified as a source of desertion and was to be limited. Rather, officers should show men their mistakes in a civil manner, without using abusive language, which applied for field officers, officers, and NCOs. If they did not react to this critique, various punishments should be considered before corporal punishment, such as jailing them for a time or giving them additional duties. NCOs and officers were then restricted in how often they were allowed to hit a man. Any graver punishment should only go through the regimental leadership. Regulations for the cuirassiers and dragoons followed in the same year, the hussars received theirs in 1751, and the field artillery (apart from an earlier exercise manual in 1749) in 1757. A major update followed in 1769 for infantry and in 1769 and 1772 for heavy cavalry. When the new regulations were introduced, all majors and drum majors were educated in Vienna concerning the unified movements and drills to transfer this to their regiments. They then assembled all the regimental officers to instruct them, so that these could in turn properly train their companies.

Regimental officers were the obvious transmitters and keepers of these new regulations. The regulations were printed, but they were not published and were not publicly available but rather maintained in a highly confidential way. Officers had to make sure the text did not fall into the hands of outsiders, or “unter fremde Hände.” This secrecy was even more relevant for Generalfeldzeugmeister (full general) Franz Moritz Graf von Lacy’s great project after the Seven Years War, the Generalreglement (regulations for general officers and general
staff) of 1769, which regulated general staff work and was a continuation of the *Feld Dienst Regulament* (field service regulations) of 1749, which served as instructions for conducting marches, setting up camps, and employing battle tactics for the general officers. While this was clearly Lacy's specialty, he had his draft peer reviewed by other general officers, involving them in the process and making changes according to their suggestions.

In 1751, Empress Maria Theresa took another step to improve the military education of her officers by establishing the *Militär-Akademie* (military academy) of Wiener Neustadt: “ein Cadetten-Corps von zwayen Compagnien, einer von 100. adelichen—und die zwayte von eben so vielen militar-officiers-Kindern, welche das Vierzehende Jahr ihres Alters erreicht haben” (A cadet corps of two companies, one consisting of 100 noblemen—the second of as much officer children, who have reached 14 years of age). In addition, a preparatory *Pflanzschule* (an old German word for preschool) was established in Vienna, where younger children between the ages of seven and nine years could receive a primary education to later be transferred to the Militär-Akademie. As noble attendance at the Wiener Neustadt and its preparatory school in Vienna was low, an additional academy in the style of the noble knightly academies was established in Vienna, attached to the preparatory school through the personal union of the principal. This, however, turned out to be a failure. Men of noble birth would rather make their way into the military through direct appointment by a proprietary colonel, who could still fill the positions below the field officer ranks.

The Militär-Akademie, however, while not attracting great numbers of nobles, was nonetheless a success. Again, it was Daun who became the first *Generaldirector* of both the Militär-Akademie and the Pflanzschule. The Akademie in Wiener Neustadt was run by an *Unter-Director* (subdirector). The composition of the teaching personnel changed over time, but they generally included officers from field to subaltern level, engineer officers, civilian teachers and instructors, clerics, and servants. The most senior and diligent cadets were awarded NCO ranks during their education. As opposed to other military academies, there was from the outset a pedagogical concept in that the cadets would not just stay to be taught for an undefined time, but they would stay for a roughly similar period according to a set curriculum. This curriculum encompassed those subjects deemed appropriate to make a good officer: military drill, fencing, dancing, riding, military science (e.g., basics in engineering and artillery application), mathematics, languages, geography, and history. The training ended according to age and growth, between six and eight years later, if the cadets were fit for duty in regiments. There was no final examination, but there was constant testing of the material learned. In case their progress left something to be desired at that point, they would be sent to the regiments as gen-
tlemen volunteers, possibly until they showed themselves capable of becoming officers. While the vast majority of graduates were commissioned in the infantry (85.9 percent in 1755–86), some ended up in cavalry or Grenzer (military frontier troops) regiments. A few directly joined the general staff or switched to the technical troops.

In 1769, the Militär-Akademie and the Pflanzschule merged to make the curriculum more coherent and useful, with the official name becoming “k.k. Theresianische Militär-Akademie” (Imperial-Royal Military Academy of Maria Theresa). Curricula and teaching methods were further changed and refined over the years. In 1778, the new subject of “räsonierende Tactik und Kriegswissenschaft” (contemplated tactics and art of war) was added to the curriculum. One year later, Genera Major Franz Joseph Graf Kinsky took over as unter-director and worked to instill a new soldierly spirit (Soldatengeist) in the Akademie and its students. He expanded and militarized the riding school by replacing the civilian riding masters with active officers, who were commanded from cavalry regiments, thereby preparing all prospective graduates for the possibility of serving in cavalry regiments.

The Akademie had, from the beginning, emphasized the equality of students with noble families and the sons of officers. This was underlined by Maria Theresa in the regulations for the Akademie of 1775, which stipulated that “da man in der Akademie keinen anderen Adel als das Verdienst und eine rechtschaffene Aufführung gelten läßt” (as within the Akademie no other nobility but that of merit and virtuous conduct are recognized), no differences should be made between the cadets from different social backgrounds and no titles or Prädikate (noble name particle, e.g., von) were to be used in addressing the cadets. Joseph II went further and reduced the number of places exclusively reserved for nobles among the 400 students to just 96.

The academy graduates were not the only officers serving in the Habsburg Army as there was also a “Frequentanten” (visiting student) program, established sometime after the Seven Years War, for normal cadets and young officers from the regiments, who came to be educated in Militärischen Wissenschaften (military science) and regulations.

While specialized military education was helpful for officers in infantry and cavalry, it was essential in the technical branches. Therefore, the greatest number of these officers were trained separately. To satisfy the need for trained personnel in artillery and military engineering, Charles VI had already set up partially state-funded academies (Ingenieur-Akademie) in Vienna in 1717 and Brussels in 1718. In 1755–56, the Akademie in Vienna was formed into the fully state-run k.k. Ingenieurschule (imperial-royal engineering school) from 1760 under the Prodirектор des Geniewesens (director of military engineers), or the head of the military engineers. Of the 329 students educated between 1755
and 1765, 79 began their service in the engineer corps, while 223 were commissioned in line regiments.

The school was open to all social tiers and a significant number of the students entering were the sons of officers, NCOs, or even private soldiers. Added to these were sons of civil servants and craftsmen. The prodirektor had been the head of the engineering corps since its reorganization in 1747, when four brigades were formed, one out of an existing brigade in the Netherlands and three out of the officers from the German lands, Hungary, and Italy, with an overall establishment of 98 officers. The brigades were commanded by a colonel who also had to oversee the fortifications in the assigned area of the brigade. Yet, the progress seemed to have been slow, as the Austrians still depended on the help of the French in the Seven Years War and in its aftermath.

Additionally, a Sappeur (sapper) Corps was established in 1760 to provide skilled men as well as officers to lead them in the manual undertaking of the siege works. Three of those officers were awarded Militär-Maria-Theresienorden (Maria Theresa military order) after playing a major role in the defense of Schweidnitz in 1762 (out of only 24 officers and men employed there).

Artillery officers had originally been experienced and distinguished men, raised from the ranks. The social openness, in which it differed from infantry and cavalry, was retained during the century and can be seen from the Grundbuch (personnel record book) of the Feldartillerie-Regiment 2 in 1776, where among the three majors, two were non-nobles and about two-thirds of the company officers were non-nobles.

The artillery as a branch underwent its major professionalization process from the War of the Austrian Succession into the interwar period. The man behind all this was Prinz Joseph Wenzel von Liechtenstein. Being of high noble birth, he started out as a cavalry officer and proprietor of a dragoon regiment in 1725. Already a Knight of the Golden Fleece in 1740, he was severely wounded at Chotusitz, Czech Republic, in 1742. His experience in that battle made him realize that Austria needed to modernize its artillery after he had seen the Prussian gunners in action. From then on, he devoted his time and family fortune to the reform of the Austrian artillery, and an impressed Maria Theresa made him general-director of the branch in 1744. He established laboratories and assembled an international team of experts. While the officers had originally been trained in the regiments from among the rank and file, Liechtenstein established the Artilleriecorpschule (artillery corps school) at Bergstadl, near Budweis, in 1747. The professionalization and militarization of the branch already took effect from the beginning of the Seven Years War and led to seven artillery officers being awarded the Militär-Maria-Theresienorden. In 1778, the Artillerie-Lyzeum (artillery college) replaced the Artilleriecorpschule, and a few years later in 1786, the newly founded Bombardier Corps absorbed the
Artillerie-Lyzeum to provide an ever more practical and advanced training for officers.\textsuperscript{46}

The British military leadership also realized the need for a central training for its artillery officers and engineers at the beginning of our period of interest. Therefore, in 1741, King George II established the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich “for instructing the raw and inexperienced people belonging to the military branch of this office [Master General of the Ordnance], in the several parts of Mathematics necessary to qualify them for the service of the Artillery, and the business of Engineers.”\textsuperscript{47} By 1746, the establishment consisted of 46 cadets between the ages of 12 and 30. After short oral examinations, graduates were able to become artillery officers as vacancies arose. Only from 1761 onward were they commissioned directly as engineers; before then, they had to serve as artillerists for some time. Some also entered the Services of the East India Company or became infantry officers instead.\textsuperscript{48} While discipline seems to have been quite lax in the early days, there had already been a production of special treatises by the professors for the instruction of the cadets “and all concerned in the Art of War, by Land or Sea.”\textsuperscript{49}

In 1764, discipline and education were improved by providing a proper staff and through the work of the lieutenant-governor (de facto director on the spot) of the Royal Military Academy, Lieutenant Colonel James Pattison. From that point, only new cadets were educated as opposed to more seasoned NCOs and officers as previously, and the usual age would not be more than 18 years. The official minimum age was fixed at 14 years in 1782, but exceptions occurred. The establishment of the Royal Military Academy rose to 60 cadets in 1782 to satisfy this demand, following the increasing size of the Royal Regiment of Artillery from 29 to 75 officers. It was further raised to 90 cadets in 1793 with the onset of the French Revolutionary Wars. While originally the Master-General of the Ordnance just appointed cadets to the academy, entry examinations testing the basics of mathematics and Latin were introduced in 1774 on Pattison’s urging.\textsuperscript{50} By the end of the period of interest, subjects taught included mathematics, drawing, languages, artillery, fortifications, geography, chemistry, and dancing. An oral examination was held at the end of one’s studies. Graduates of the academy were more than enough to fill the vacancies of artillery and engineers; many actually had to be commissioned in the infantry, especially after the American War of Independence, when the supply of graduates far exceeded the demand for officers in the technical branches.\textsuperscript{51}

For infantry and cavalry, no state-run military academy for early training was in existence until the establishment of Sandhurst in 1812. Men from a well-to-do background, however, had the option of attending a private military academy, either on the continent or in Britain itself.\textsuperscript{52} Some British officers were even educated at universities in continental Europe or undertook tours visiting
battlefields and serving as volunteers in foreign armies.\textsuperscript{53} The most renowned and successful institution in Britain was the academy of Lewis Lochée. Located in Little Chelsea, London, it would teach young men—as one advertisement claimed—contemporary languages, foremost French and German, as well as mathematics, mechanics, fortification, artillery, tactics, geography, drawing, law, history, and “all the Military Manœuvres.” In addition to theoretical learning, there were practical exercises, such as sports, swimming, riding, fencing, dancing, and weapon drill. Lochée’s academy was not only a school for young gentlemen—to some parents, it also served that purpose—but was also quite distinct in its mixture of theoretical and practical training as well as its emphasis on moral education, setting a relatively strict environment and long training days for its students.\textsuperscript{54} One should not go too far and overestimate its impact, as J. E. O. Screen estimates only some 20–25 students attended in 1771.\textsuperscript{55} Men from wealthy families could, however, get a head start when entering a regiment, a sign that knowledge of the profession was taken seriously. The latter point is underlined by an even more prominent student: Thomas Picton, born in 1758, who was commissioned as an ensign in the 12th Foot in 1772. He first spent two years at the academy and only then joined his regiment at Gibraltar. Picton was to become one of the Duke of Wellington’s most able and courageous commanders before being killed as a lieutenant general leading his division at the Battle of Waterloo.\textsuperscript{56} Other young officers were even given leave after joining their regiments to be educated at private academies, especially Lochée’s. This leave was supported by the crown, which was, of course, responsible for handing out the commissions.\textsuperscript{57} Lochée’s academy proved to be so successful that he was given an annual pension for life by King George III. This led to Lochée adopting the name “Royal Military Academy” for his institution. His success was also supported by his own widely appreciated writings.\textsuperscript{58}

Indeed, publications on military subjects are an important source of evidence for the case that a considerable number of British officers took their profession seriously. Officers published a great number and variety of military treatises, or just sent their ideas to the adjutant general, which, as Houlding agrees, showed their zeal for the Service. Like the civilian Lochée, many officers were rewarded for their work with favor and promotions by the sovereign. The subscription and use of these treatises lends further evidence to the professional interest of British Army officers of this period. The treatises helped to preserve customary knowledge and provided those officers without formal training with some theoretical groundwork.\textsuperscript{59}

Another popular work, specifically aimed at the instruction of those freshly commissioned, is Captain Thomas Simes’s \textit{The Military Guide, for Young Officers}.\textsuperscript{60} Yet it also has sections that should prepare them for advancing to a command position in which a junior officer could actually quickly find himself
due to casualties in the field. Simes, furthermore, encourages changes to usual practices and innovations in tactics and military order. The very first section is highly interesting as it deals with the importance of military discipline and its proper application. Simes tells the young officer that, while strict discipline and subordination is absolutely necessary, “judgement” and “moderation” is required when “enforcing your authority.” The superior must appear impartial and be clear in giving his orders as well as always enforcing them. Capital punishment for crimes like marauding or desertion is inadvisable, as it makes men—including the officers—look the other way, because they would rather not bring someone to the gallows.  

This underlines the thesis put forward by Ilya Berkovich that European armies of the eighteenth century did not continuously flog their soldiers into obedience. Indeed, Simes urges that “in regard to private conversation, politeness should exceed authority, and the Officer subside in the gentleman.” Further, he devotes large passages to the duties and proper behavior of all the officers in a regiment. Some of Simes’s arguments are underlined with quotes of venerated historical commanders, like Marshal Maurice de Saxe and the Habsburg Feldmarschall Graf Raimondo Montecuccoli.

Translating the writings of great military leaders was another output of intellectual engagement with their own profession observable in British officers. Lieutenant Colonel William Faucett took it upon himself to translate the Regulations for the Prussian Infantry and Regulations for the Prussian Cavalry as well as the Reveries by Marshal de Saxe. That those were not idle divertissements of the mind is shown by the effort of 300 of Faucett’s fellow officers in financing by subscription the publication of the translated cavalry regulations. Translations of classical authors also were popular. The writings of Vegetius had been a hallmark of military thought in early modern Europe and still found new translators and readers in the eighteenth century. One of the translators was John Clarke, a lieutenant at the time of the first publication in 1767 and later lieutenant governor of Senegambia, West Africa, at the time of his death in 1778. He provided what was only the second translation in English (the other dating from 1521), which was subsequently widely circulated.

Another military publication abounding in references to Roman and Greek military history is Major Robert Donkin’s Military Collections and Remarks. Building his mostly short chapters on defining and commenting on common military terms, he uses examples from the ancient past and explores how they compare to the conditions in contemporary armies, especially, of course, the British Army. Donkin’s publication also had a high number of subscriptions among active officers, which he proudly presented at the beginning of the text. The discourse on the military profession among British officers happened within the public sphere through publications by, and for, officers.
A quite different picture presents itself in the Habsburg Monarchy. There, we find hardly any publications on military subjects as such, and those that exist are anonymous. This prompted the perception among historians that the the Habsburg Army was an environment hostile to intellectual military thought and academic military professionalism.69 One of the apparently anonymous works, however, points to another reason. Appearing in Vienna in 1777, Die Kriegsschule oder die Theorie eines jungen Kriegsmannes in allen militärischen Unternehmungen (The school of war or theory of a young warrior in all military undertakings) claimed to be aus den berühmtesten Kriegsbüchern gezogen und zusammengesetzt von einem kaiser-königlichen Hauptmann der Infanterie (extracted from famous books on war and assembled by an imperial-royal captain of the infantry).70 In fact, as Manfried Rauchensteiner has discovered, it was written by Graf Philipp Georg von Browne (1727–1803), one of the sons of Graf Maximilian Ulysses von Browne. Rauchensteiner claims that its focus on historical examples rather than current military issues as well as its lack of new ideas exhibited the limited intellectualism of the Habsburg officer corps.71 But as we have seen above, there was still a keen interest among eighteenth-century officers in the study of historical examples and treatises. Rauchensteiner, however, also gives the more important and informative reason for the lack of publications by Habsburg officers on military subjects; the high command, rather than rewarding a discussion of military topics in print, actually discouraged any form of presenting what they thought was arcane military knowledge to the public and, therefore, indirectly to the enemy.72 Exemplifying this phenomenon is not only the secret character of disseminated regulations but also the stated goal of the first Habsburg military history commission. It was created by Joseph II in November 1779 with the goal of providing knowledge of recent military operations from the beginning of his mother’s reign to provide educational content for the officer corps. This knowledge was to be as practical as possible and more detailed than theoretical and was not to be printed. Ironically, this commission was to be headed by Feldmarschall-Lieutenant (lieutenant general) Fabris and none other than Feldmarschall Lieutenant Graf Philipp Georg von Browne, whose interest in military history must have been well-known to the emperor.73

A notable treatise, which can truly be called a work of “military enlightenment” discussing humanity and religious tolerance in the army, was that of the long-serving officer Jacob de Cognazzo, who anonymously published his critical account of the Habsburg Army in 1780 as a response to the Westphalian Catholic clergyman Johann Wilhelm von Bourscheid's history of the War of the Bavarian Succession, Der erste Feldzug im vierten preußischen Kriege (The first campaign of the Fourth Prussian War). Cognazzo criticizes the latter's all-too-positive account of the Austrian performance and dismissive remarks about Frederick II. He also questions the practicality of parts of the infantry and
cavalry regulations—which were by that time apparently often applied with too much zeal and pedantry—as well as the importance of the secrecy around them, as they would hardly entail any practices that the Prussians did not already know or were actually copied from them. However, he admits that the regulations had done a lot to make the army more effective, especially by making German the general language of command.\textsuperscript{74}

Most officers who wished to contribute with their experience and intellectual insight would do this by writing to the \textit{Hofkriegsrat} (Aulic War Council, or HKR) or the sovereign. In his extensive memorandum that Major von Marschal had submitted to the HKR, he not only stated his negative opinion on officers raised from the ranks and immigrated from outside the monarchy, but he also addressed such issues as the management of the regimental funds, recruiting, and which field officers should be on horseback during battle. Furthermore, he talked about the duties of the major and the difficulties his position carries.\textsuperscript{75} Despite his clear views on class distinction and that nobles were more qualified to be officers because of their upbringing, Marschal seems to have been a practical man who was concerned for the good of the Service.

The inherent hierarchical system of an army and the lack of a public forum for military topics did, however, finally mean that innovations could mostly be carried forth by general officers of some reputation like Daun, Liechtenstein, and Lacy. The latter, after becoming \textit{Generalquartiermeister} (quartermaster general, or de facto chief of staff) at the beginning of the Seven Years War, had built an actual general staff of the army from scratch within two months, encompassing two generals and a couple of field officers as well as staff infantry, dragoons, \textit{Jäger} (riflemen with a hunting background), and pioneers at his disposal.\textsuperscript{76}

In the British Army, many innovations were born at the regimental level. Even before the alternate fire became regulation by 1764, some regimental officers, like the later General Wolfe, had their men train with it in addition to the regulation platoon fire, as it was thought more effective, especially after it had been used successfully by the Prussians.\textsuperscript{77}

Many British military authors at the time also were occupied with the conduct of “petite guerre,” or partisan warfare. This was not so much about light troops fighting in an irregular warfare fashion but rather regular troops operating in independent detachments. According to Guy Chet, the superiority of highly trained regular infantry and their employment enabled the British to prevail in the American wilderness during the Seven Years War, not the adoption of irregular warfare. They, however, also combined regular infantry with lighter auxiliaries. But both Native American allies and freelancing ranger units proved insufficient for this task.\textsuperscript{78} Therefore, with the support of General John Campbell, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Gage also formed the first light infantry regiment, the 80th Foot, which was a novelty for the British Army. Addi-
tionally, the 60th Foot, the Royal Americans, were taught similar skills at the behest of their commander, Colonel Henry L. Bouquet, in addition to linear maneuvers, even if not officially designated as light infantry. While the concept was not a new one, having been employed earlier in Europe, the initiative still speaks for an active approach to duty by officers like Gage.79

British officers made further adjustments to tactics in the American War of Independence by fighting in areas where the concerted movement of larger forces was limited. Different maneuvers, tactics, and formations were employed by commanders as the scenario and environment dictated, occasionally with company captains acting independently of their battalion. The British troops, however, did not at any point adopt a guerrilla or at least concealed fighting style, and both officers and men despised the Americans when they—and later mostly their militia—did so.80 And, indeed, under the term partisan warfare, most British writers described the detachment of an independently operating unit, reaching in size from small 100-man outposts to (temporarily) self-sustaining brigades, whose task it was to harass the enemy main force while shielding their own forces from enemy partisan activity. According to Roger Stevenson, this required highly competent officers who showed strong leadership and were ready to share the hardships of their men. Both he and Robert Donkin were of the opinion that such an officer should not be prone to keeping female company, to greediness, or to drinking.81

How could the high command ensure that order, discipline, and a proper application of duty were maintained? Both Britain and the Habsburg Monarchy had a system of reviewing regiments in place. However, in Austria this was mostly used to keep a record of numbers and personal information about their soldiers, especially in case of desertion. In Britain, this was conducted by the reviewing generals, who also inspected and commented on the state of the regiment. Those comments were part of formal reports, which addressed personnel, performance, and equipment. Officers, as a category, could provide information on their arms, their uniforms, their mounts, and whether they saluted well. Some were more detailed and also acknowledged that the officers were “very perfect in their Duty.” The general would include all these remarks in a section for “Complaints” and “In General,” where the general would give his conclusion as to quality and fitness for service of the regiment.82 It shows that there was a regular mechanism in place to check on the state of the regiments and their officers. According to Houlding, the reviewing officers usually carried out their duty with the required professionalism and duly reported any deviations or bad performances, even if it reflected badly upon the officers of the regiment. Regiments were able to perform well at the reviews, and this lends evidence to the hard work officers and NCOs must have put into the little training time they had in divisions and even less time training as a whole battalion.83
General officers also undertook performance reviews in Austria, but those seem to have been distinct from the muster reviews. Reviewing generals who did not take their duty seriously could incur scathing criticism from the HKR.\(^{84}\) While in Britain, the small numbers of the army, combined with the dislocation of regiments across the country, even of regiments parts, prevented great maneuvers from happening during the eighteenth century. The Habsburg Army held them on a regular basis and the high command did its best to make them useful exercises for the units and the generals, which soon showed favorable results.\(^{85}\)

At the outset of our period of interest, the *Obrist Inhaber* (proprietary colonel) was still the dominant person in a Habsburg regiment. The regiment was named after its obrist inhaber and ranked on the army list according to the inhaber’s rank, usually a general officer rank or member of the imperial-royal household. Obrist inhabers were able to commission and promote their officers to vacant positions, choose the regimental lapel colors, hold judicial authority, and carve out profits from the regimental funds marked for recruitment and equipment. Not all proprietors abused their powers; some sank large sums of money into their regiments and created their own regulations (as shown above). Still others left their regiments in a desolate state or exerted a tyrannical rule over their soldiers.\(^{86}\) Therefore, reforms following the War of the Austrian Succession restricted regimental proprietors’ rights and powers. In 1748, the obrist inhabers were restricted in their right to impose corporal punishment; in 1766, they lost the right to promote field officers; and in 1767, they lost the right to choose the lapel color of the regimental uniform, both rights being transferred to the Hofkriegsrat. Finally, their name was replaced with a fixed number as the regiment’s denomination in 1769, when the opportunities to generate additional perquisites were also restricted. This strengthened the role of the *Obrist Commandant* (colonel commanding), who actually ran the regiment.\(^{87}\) The inhaber of a regiment could, however, still exert influence, especially if they kept in close touch with the commandant and commanded his respect, which can be clearly seen from the correspondence of the commandant of the Infanterie-Regiment 4 *Deutschmeister* with the inhaber, the actual *Hoch-und Deutschmeister* (Grand Master of the Teutonic Order), Erzherzog Maximilian Franz, brother to Emperors Joseph II and Leopold II.\(^{88}\)

While the colonel of a British regiment never had the same rights as in the Habsburg Monarchy, his monetary opportunities were not restricted in the same way. This could lead to fraud, especially with regiments stationed or fighting overseas, as there was less central control of them and their supply of clothing and equipment. Alan Guy states that false musters seemed to have been fairly rare, and if discovered punishments were usually harsh.\(^{89}\) It must be noted that some of the colonels needed the additional money they received out of the
usual and fairly legal perquisites—although this still depended on them actually making enough money through good economic management and the right circumstances—as most were general officers and therefore expected to exhibit a much grander appearance than their subordinate officers. At the same time, they were the patron to officers and men of their regiments. Some of those who had greater private funds at their disposal were, in ways similar to the Austrian case, ready to invest their own fortune and even ruin themselves without taking money for favors.90 While junior colonels sometimes still served with their regiments, senior regimental colonels, who were also general officers, would usually not serve with their regiments for reasons of age, other responsibilities, and clash of rank with the commanding general as they might be of equal or even superior rank.91 This seemed to have been similar in the Habsburg Army, where it appears to have been common practice to put the regiment of the inhaber under the command of another general.92 Most proprietary colonels took an interest in their regiments and corresponded regularly with their obrist commandant or their lieutenant colonel, respectively.93

Although the proprietary colonels were regularly absent, the same was not the case for their officers. While absence of officers seems to have been a problem in Britain at the beginning of the century, albeit being tackled by the kings and their officials, it was less so in the period of interest. By midcentury, it had been fairly regulated, so that leave of up to three months could be granted by the colonel but any more only by the lord-lieutenant or lord-justices. Responsible colonels also ordered that only a certain number of officers were permitted to be absent at one time—usually around one-third.94 On campaign, leave of absence had to be sought from the commanding officers, which for a subaltern had to include the colonel and the commanding general.95 Even on duty station in India, only a few officers were absent at any one time, as can be seen from the 39th Foot in 1754–57. Occasional unwarranted absence was usually met with leniency, while those who overdid it could easily be dismissed from the Service.96 Since 1764, longer leave of absence requests had to be forwarded to the sovereign or the commander in chief, and officers on active service generally needed permission from the sovereign to leave the country.97 New officers were supposed to stay within regimental quarters until they had learned their duties.98

In the Habsburg Army, the regulations of 1749 postulated that officers were not allowed to leave their unit or duty post without permission of the obrist commandant.99 If one had an adequate reason for longer absence, he could apply to the HKR for an Absentierungslizenz (leave of absence).100 Absence without leave for extended periods could quickly lead to cashiering.101

The Habsburg Army’s leadership was also keen to further discipline its officer corps by tackling certain vices deemed detrimental to the Service. The 1749
regulations stipulated, for example, that officers were not allowed to engage in high-stakes gambling; low stakes with no risk to personal fortune were, however, allowed. This was meant to keep officers out of trouble and prevent them from running up debt. And, indeed, incurring debt was given as a reason that could hinder promotion.102

To monitor both training and personal conduct, Conduite-Listen (conduct reports) were introduced, which the field officers had to fill out for the officers and NCOs under their command.103 They listed “natural talents,” ability in exercising the troops, knowledge of military engineering, law, and zeal for the Service (“Eifer und Application”). But the commanding officers were also asked to inform the HKR about their officers’ lifestyle (“Lebensart”), in civil life as well as within the Service and also regarding their behavior toward their subordinates. And under the category of flaws (“Fehler”) the conduct reports described whether an officer was a drinker, ran up debt, or was prone to quarrel with other people. The commanding officers then had space for any other comments and could mark an officer fit or unfit for advancement.104

Joseph II, especially, took these Conduite-Listen very seriously and established a system to punish those with obvious flaws, namely alcoholism, gambling, significant debt, and quarrelling. If officers fell into these categories, without their superiors being able to tell of any recent improvement, they would qualify to forfeit one-third of their pay, even if all their other conduite points were positive. For example, Ober-Lieutenant (first lieutenant) Anton Hessen of the Grenzer-Regiment (military borderer regiments) Wallachia-Illlyria, who in 1781 is described “als Trinker, Spieler und Zänker” (a drinker, gambler, and quarreler).105 For the notoriously meager pay of company officers, this could be a serious problem, and the field officers of the Grenzer-Regiment Wallachia-Illlyria were clearly uncomfortable putting their brother officers into such a precarious situation. The field officers, therefore, wrote a supplication to the HKR asking to take into account that Ober-Lieutenant Hessen and four other officers were actually very able men, who did their duty with passion and diligence, and had served with distinction in the recent War of the Bavarian Succession (1778–79). The intention behind the Conduite-Listen was to monitor and encourage an improvement in the officers’ behavior. To this end, the HKR kept a list they used to check on an officer’s progress or lack of it if an officer was recently added to these categories. In extreme cases, where no improvement could be seen during the course of time, this would lead to dismissing the officer from the Service. The field officers of the Grenzer-Regiment Wallachia-Illlyria, therefore, added that these officers were by no means set in their faulty ways, but they could be corrected, and that one of them was already on the path to improvement. Some also had families and only their salary and
no other income to support them. For all these reasons, they suggested offering a final warning, instead of cutting their salary right away, and the HKR, indeed, accepted this.\textsuperscript{106} This also shows the field officers’ sense of duty in reporting truthfully to the HKR, while at the same time caring for the officers under their command.

The Conduite-Listen are a good example of how the Habsburg Monarchy established formalized processes of control but at the same time stayed open to consider special circumstances and cases. In the British Army, such issues were less formalized, but this did not mean that bad officers could not be weeded out. When identifying a pariah bringing shame on the regiment, officers would unite and try to remove him from their midst (e.g., by the means of bringing about a court-martial). Lieutenant John Meredyth of the 93d Foot was apparently quite a disagreeable character and an unruly, brawling drunk who so disaffected all his brother officers that they wanted him out of their mess. Having promised to better himself after arrest, he was given a second chance under the condition that he not misbehave further. When he continued to behave in an atrocious manner, however, he was eventually dismissed, as he was perceived to have brought dishonor to the corps.\textsuperscript{107}

Finally, another look at treatment of men by their officers appears useful. Indeed, the idea that eighteenth-century officers solely exerted submission of their men by threat of flogging and execution has been corrected.\textsuperscript{108} Surely enough, men could still be punished at the regimental level without the need to convene a formal court-martial. Regimental courts-martial in Britain had great leverage and sometimes acted upon cases that should have been brought to a general court-martial, instead.\textsuperscript{109} However, for both armies we have seen tendencies in regulations and treatises to make punishments less arbitrary. Even Cognazzo, who views \textit{Kriegszucht} (discipline) as one of the most central elements of a successful army, argues that overly harsh punishments are only warranted in certain cases, but they are otherwise detrimental to discipline and \textit{Menschlichkeit} (humanity), especially if punishments were not meted out in the same way for the higher ranks.\textsuperscript{110} Christopher Duffy argues that, around the middle of the century, mistreatment of common soldiers had been banned and a significant number of officers, not just the central leadership, acknowledged that the common soldier “was a human being with a brain, a heart and a soul that were capable of grasping the concept of honour.”\textsuperscript{111} Such an understanding can be seen in the writings of both Cognazzo and Marschal, even if the latter clearly preferred to keep officers and men socially apart from each other.\textsuperscript{112}

In the British case, we have an example from the Caribbean island of Dominica after the American War of Independence, where a captain lieutenant was obsessed with punishing trifling mistakes and infringements of his soldiers.
When his brother officers realized this fact, they roundly dismissed his further complaints and attempts to initiate courts-martial against the men. Before bringing a case to a regimental court-martial or applying heavier punishments such as single confinement, misconduct of soldiers could be corrected by reprimands, low-level beating with a rattan stick, or punishments like assigning additional tedious duties according to the extent of the transgression; even public shaming and peer pressure could be used. Indeed, there were often caring officers who were appreciated by their men and who looked after them by securing good provisions, ordering new clothing, or visiting ill soldiers. Their paternalism earned many officers the appreciation and love of their men. As Berkovich points out, good personnel management paid off for the officers, while not demonstrating a decent amount of care could lead to desertions, which cost colonels money and regimental officers career advancement.

This leaves us with the impression that British and Habsburg officers took their profession seriously. Although wealthy nobles could still find ways to fast-track their careers to a position of relative importance, most were long-serving men who had made the military their primary life commitment. Indeed, both states exerted control over their officers’ presence in the regiments and, more so in the Austrian case, their personal behavior and way of life.

Training of officers was still, to a large part, handled in the regiments, at least for infantry and cavalry officers. Both Britain and Austria had established academies and institutes for the training and improvement of the technical branches, while only the Habsburg Monarchy founded an academy for training infantry and cavalry officers, which could, however, only provide a small number of the young officers needed. The Habsburg Monarchy was also more proactive in generating regulations to instruct officers on their duties, while Britain showed a greater intellectual discourse with the publication of treatises by and for officers, some of which also were specifically directed at the instruction of younger officers. Through those publications, officers were also able to suggest innovations and improvements. In Austria, those were usually put forward through memoranda to the central leadership or enacted directly by able general officers.

Both the British and Habsburg high command monitored the state of discipline and training within regiments through reviews. Diligent officers were able to improve the discipline and effectiveness of their troops, and the performance of men, officers, and generals in the later wars of the period gives some credit to this. While there is no doubt that some officers cared little about reforming their ways, there are significantly positive examples of care and empathy shown toward subordinates, both the men and the more junior officers, creating trust and cohesion.
Notes

Note that the German primary documents cited here do not follow the traditional order of archival sources.


3. Oesterreichisches Staatsarchiv [Austrian State Archives Vienna; OeStA], Kriegsarchiv [war archives; KA], Personalunterlagen [personnel files], Musterlisten [muster lists].


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25. Manfried Rauchensteiner, “The Development of War Theories in Austria at the End of the Eighteenth Century,” in *East Central European Society and War in the Prerevolution-
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27. OeStA, KA, Militär-Schulen [military schools], Kt. 127, Nr. 3, 14/12/1751.


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44. OeStA, KA, Armee-Schemata [army schematics; AS] Akten [files], Kt. 5a.


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73. OeStA, KA, Hofkriegsrat (Aulic War Council; HKR), Hauptreihe (main series; HR) Bücher (books), 1779, Kt. 1446, G-9055.
75. OeStA, KA, Memoires IX-88, Memoires raisonné sur differens moyens de perfectionner la Constitution du Militaire Autrichien par le Major Marschal en 1754 [memorandum on various points to improve the constitution of the Austrian military by the Major Marschal in 1754].
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79. Chet, Conquering the American Wilderness, 127.
84. OeStA, KA, AS, Akten, Kt. 5, 87a.
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104. DOZA, Mi 9/1.
105. OeStA, KA, HKR, Akten, 1781-12-4, 1781-12-7, 1781-12-13.
106. OeStA, KA, HKR, Akten, 1781-12-4, 1781-12-7, 1781-12-13.
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The Cavalcade of Universal Military Training
Training and Education
within the Experimental Demonstration Unit

William A. Taylor

Abstract: Beginning in 1943, U.S. military leaders and policy makers engaged in a sustained campaign to institute Universal Military Training (UMT) in America. This program envisioned that every 18-year-old male in the nation would undergo basic training, thereby creating a large pool of trained personnel to speed mobilization. In 1947, the U.S. Army launched a special unit at Fort Knox, Kentucky, to experiment with the training and education required for the program’s success and to demonstrate UMT’s necessity and desirability. This article explores the unique facets of training and education within this unit and considers their broader significance for the early Cold War period.

Keywords: Cold War, education, general Reserve, George C. Marshall, Harry S. Truman, John M. Devine, mobilization, training, Universal Military Training

Described as a “slight but wiry soldier,” Private Charles M. Stover hailed from Washington, DC, the only representative of the district in his new unit, the first of its kind in American history. The 17-year-old former
student of Coolidge High School in Northwest Washington, DC, now served in the Universal Military Training (UMT) Experimental Demonstration Unit located at Fort Knox, Kentucky, which conducted three consecutive six-month cycles of training and education from 3 January 1947 to 15 July 1948. As a result, observers colloquially referred to Stover and his fellow trainees as “Umtees.” The Army chose Stover as the typical Umtee. When the American Legion launched a campaign to “placard the Nation with a UMT poster,” Stover’s image, standing ready with an M-1 Garand rifle held at port arms and armed with the distinctive UMT patch on his helmet and shoulders, adorned billboards across the country. The Army hoped that Stover and his fellow Umtees would be the vanguard of a new era.1

Throughout the mid- and late-1940s, senior U.S. leaders, especially within the Army, planned, launched, and sustained a campaign for UMT. Their plans developed during several years and took on numerous forms, but they always sought to have every 18-year-old male in the United States undergo one year of military training and education, including six months of basic, specialist, and small-unit training and education, followed by six months of combined arms and large-unit training and education. Afterward, Umtees would have multiple options, including entering military service, participating in Reserve duty, or returning to civilian life. Army leaders anticipated that such a program would improve America’s military mobilization potential by creating a large pool of trained personnel known as a general Reserve.2 Advocates of UMT existed throughout American military, government, and society. Kenneth C. Royall, secretary of the Army, ordered that all units under his control plan for UMT: “It is assumed that the Congress will enact a law providing that, as the essential foundation of an effective national military organization, every able-bodied young American shall be trained to defend his country.”3

The most interesting outcome of the national campaign for UMT was the creation of the UMT Experimental Demonstration Unit, which, as its name implies, experimented with training and education methods to implement the envisioned national program and to demonstrate through the unit’s success the viability and desirability of expansion from it to a national program.4 John M. Devine, the unit’s first commanding officer, said, “The idea of an Experimental Unit for UMT was born last fall when preparations were already being made to present to the 80th Congress the War Department’s plan for Universal Military Training.” Devine further revealed the underlying rationale of the experimental unit: “The purpose of the unit is twofold. It is designed to test the War Department program for training the youth of the Nation, to find and correct any deficiencies in applying our present methods to teen-agers [sic], and to perfect the whole plan for use in the event that Universal Military Training is made law by Congress.”5 Throughout its short-lived epoch, the unit’s personnel kept detailed
records documenting their training and education methods, as well as every other detail of the unit’s existence. Much of this historical record survives in *The Cavalcade of UMT*, which was a yearbook of the unit and charted everything from human-interest stories of trainees and cadre to training and education techniques, extending to the relationship between the unit and the national program. Before grasping the intricacies of the unit, however, one must first understand the broader contours of the proposed national program.

**A Program for National Security**

Throughout the 1940s, a wide array of supporters, including civilian proponents, military planners, and government advocates, mounted a sustained, and at times aggressive, campaign to enact UMT in the United States. The broad support for this program included patronage from the highest levels of leadership. President Harry S. Truman asserted,

>The importance of universal training has already been recognized by the Congress, and the Congress has wisely taken the initiative in this program. The Select Committee of the House of Representatives on Postwar Military Policy has organized hearings and has heard extended testimony from representatives of churches and schools, labor unions, veterans organizations, the armed services, and many other groups.

Truman concluded, “After careful consideration the Committee has approved the broad policy of universal military training for the critical years ahead. I concur in that conclusion, and strongly urge the Congress to adopt it.” Robert P. Patterson, secretary of war, avowed, “There is no escape from the logic of the need for universal military training. Its opponents or those who do not think the question through to its logical conclusion are reduced to one of two arguments: That the atomic bomb has made armies obsolete, or that the United Nations will outlaw war.” George C. Marshall, Army chief of staff, contended, “This Nation’s destiny clearly lies in a sound permanent security policy. In the War Department’s proposals there are two essentials: (1) Intense scientific research and development; (2) a permanent peacetime citizen army. . . . The importance of scientific research is the most obvious to the civilian, but the importance of a peacetime citizen army based on universal military training is of greater importance, in my opinion.”

Their purpose was simple as well as ambitious. Tasked with planning the national program, the War Department took the lead. “During the last Congress, bills were introduced stating in broad terms that universal military training was in accord with national policy, but agreement on details was not reached,” disclosed one brochure distributed throughout the Army. The brochure fur-
ther explained that the War Department continued to develop and present an acceptable program. On 2 October 1946, the War Department publicized its plan; though it would continue to revise it throughout the next couple of years. The War Department based its plan for a national program on four principles:

- Each physically and mentally fit male citizen and alien residing in the United States owes an obligation to this country to undergo training that will fit him to protect it in an emergency.
- Adequate preparedness will prevent aggressive wars against this country and the needless sacrifice of human life.
- A well-trained citizenry is the keystone of preparedness.
- Such preparedness can best be assured through a system of military training for the youth of the Nation.

These four principles undergirded the War Department’s plan for a national program and fused them into a single rationale, whereby the UMT program would promote national defense by providing a large reserve of men trained as individual specialists and as members of teams.  

The War Department argued that accomplishing this mission would result in seven tangible benefits for the trainees, the military, and by extension American society:

- In the event of an emergency, the machinery will already exist whereby the Nation can mobilize and train its wartime Army rapidly.
- In peacetime, it will enable the nation to maintain its Regular Army, National Guard, and organized Reserve at the highest level of readiness, on a voluntary basis, because of the previous training of many enlistees.
- It will allow America to choose individuals with demonstrated capacity as leaders and give them further training.
- It will train and develop a pool of persons with special skills required in modern war.
- It will train and develop, in each community, men able to defend and assist in the event of local disaster resulting from initial enemy action or disaster that might be expected in the early stages of a future war.
- It will offer opportunity to bring up to a minimum requirement that element of the nation’s youth whose illiteracy would normally preclude military service.
- It will give opportunity to evaluate the physical condition of the youth of the country and correct defects which, if neglected, would result in physical incapacity in later years.

As demonstrated by the seven outcomes articulated by Army planners, many
of the supposed benefits of UMT blurred the lines between military and civilian realms. Combating illiteracy and improving national health were but two examples. The brochure, “Army Talk 155,” went on to explain that, “although not a primary purpose of Universal Military Training, an important result will be that the welfare of the Nation can be improved because . . . opportunity will be provided for the raising of the standard of education for the Nation’s young manhood. . . . The physical well-being of all trainees will be improved by means of athletics, adequate medical care, and physical conditioning.”

The intended purpose of UMT was, in order of importance to Army leaders: to speed mobilization; increase the readiness of the regular Army; improve the National Guard; strengthen the Organized Reserve Corps; enhance leadership; foster military proficiency and invigorate homeland defense, all in the military dominion; and combat illiteracy and improve public health in the civilian sphere.

With the purpose of UMT established, military planners honed and clarified the details of their plan during the course of several years. In general, the program would entail one year of training, including six months of small unit training and education, followed by six months of large unit training and education. The Army invested the most planning into the first six months: “The latest version and the one on which all AGF [Army Ground Forces] plans are based consists of a twenty-five (25) weeks [sic] course divided as follows: two (2) weeks induction period including prebasic training, eleven (11) weeks basic training, eleven (11) weeks branch and unit training, one (1) week for Deprocessing.”

The Army also operationalized the first six months training and education program in the UMT Experimental Demonstration Unit, primarily because there were no UMT divisions at that time with which to conduct the second six months of the training and education phase. The Army planned for there to be 21 UMT camps, each one home to a training division. 

“IT was decided that the type of organization to be used would be the Training Division and that there could be one Division at each UMT Station,” verified Jacob L. Devers, Army Ground Forces commanding general. Devers planned that each UMT division would have 17,062 Umtes. Significantly, UMT training divisions would be segregated, as was the broader U.S. military at that time. Devers specified that “negro personnel will be organized in negro units. These Negro units will not be consolidated at separate stations but will form component parts of the larger training units. The smallest Negro unit will be the company.”

Devers’s staff completed detailed plans for training a range of military occupational specialties (MOSs) within the national program. While UMT sought compulsory military training for all males in the United States, there were other options as alternatives. In lieu of the 12 months of military training, American youths would have eight choices: enlist in the Regular Army, join the National Guard, serve in the Organized Reserve Corps, attend a Service acad-
emy, enter Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) with or without government aid, or attend technical education in college, trade, or vocational school with or without government aid. On 29 January 1947, the assistant chief of staff, G-3 (operations), appointed members to a UMT board, which continued to plan for implementation of the national program and produced an updated and refined plan on 13 March 1947. War Department arrangements detailed everything down to the specific equipment that Umtees would have at all stages of their training. During their year of training, Umtees would receive $30 per month for their efforts.

**UMT Experimental Demonstration Unit**

The envisioned national program birthed the UMT Experimental Demonstration Unit. After exhaustive study and planning, Devers disseminated on 20 October 1946 his guidance that transitioned UMT from the theory of a national program to the reality of the experimental unit. Devers contended, “The training program for the Demonstration Unit will be exactly the same as the proposed training program for the different arms and services as laid down under the Universal Military Training Program for Army Ground Forces, 20 Oct. 46. The Demonstration Unit will be used as a means of testing the adequacy of the projects under that program.” Devers ordered that the unit would be a battalion composed of unique soldiers: “The Demonstration Unit selected for training is a composite battalion, made up of five (5) composite companies in addition to the necessary Headquarters and Headquarters and Service Company. One of the training companies will be composed of Negro personnel.”

Devers insisted that all phases of training be in operation by 24 March 1947 and ensured that each company would have 166 Umtees, including 40 trainees from the Special Training Unit category. Devers intended to assign African American Umtees MOSs in only infantry, engineers, transportation, and Special Training Unit, which was a much more limited array of assignments compared to white Umtees, who would fill assignments in infantry, artillery, engineers, armored, signal corps, medical, ordnance, transportation, chemical, quartermaster, and Special Training Unit. Devers initially planned to segregate the experimental unit. He commanded that “colored personnel will be trained in separate organizations or units. . . . These colored units will not be consolidated at separate stations but will form component parts of the larger training unit.”

After meticulous preparation, Devers sent his plan to Robert P. Patterson, secretary of war, on 30 October 1946. The following week, Devers effused confidence that the unit would be a productive and useful experiment in military training and education. “I feel that this Demonstration Unit will provide
the War Department with a valuable and worthwhile means of demonstrating and testing techniques to be employed in Universal Military Training should appropriate legislation be favorably considered by Congress,” he confided to a friend.28 Patterson approved Devers’s plan on 13 November 1946 with one major, and fateful, exception: “Negro personnel will not be included in this demonstration unit. The size of the unit will be reduced by deletion of the Negro company and such Negro personnel as are included in the Headquarters and Service Company.”29 As a result, the unit went beyond racial segregation to outright exclusion, largely in an attempt to avoid contention in what was planned as a public relations cavalcade.

Contrary to Patterson’s intentions of minimizing attention to race, however, his decision cast a shadow over the unit throughout its existence and well beyond, permeating the debate about the national program. Jesse O. Dedmon Jr., secretary for veterans’ affairs of the National Association for Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), protested in congressional hearings at the height of the national UMT campaign: “The legislation now proposed would be a signed but otherwise blank check to be filled in by the Army.” Dedmon related his concerns directly to the training and education conducted by the UMT Experimental Demonstration Unit. “It can be noted that the experimental camp conducted by the Army at Fort Knox, Ky., did not include any Negroes,” Dedmon observed with consternation. He explained that the notable absence of African Americans from the experimental unit revealed that the Army planned to maintain segregation so as to avoid controversy: “It is our information that this particular experiment on the part of the Army did not contemplate the full integration of Negroes, so in order to not create opposition on his part left him out of the picture.”30 Dedmon linked this failure to the broader discrimination that had occurred during World War II, especially sanitary companies in the Medical Corps. “I mention this particularly because so long as Congress leaves the military with unfettered discretion to discriminate as it may please in training and service, the types and extent of discrimination will depend as a practical matter upon the will of the officers who are administering or supervising particular programs,” he admonished. “This Congress should not permit [discrimination],” Dedmon demanded, based on his concern that any racial discrimination, including within the experimental unit, was unjust and would reinforce segregation as the national status quo. He excoriated the systemic discrimination that resulted from the lack of African American units and full access to all MOSs. As a result, African Americans had to join limited specialties even if they were interested and qualified in others. Dedmon feared, “It is to be anticipated that this discrimination in training opportunities will persist or even be aggravated if the Congress gives the military the unlimited discretion which the proposed legislation would confer.”31 Dedmon mentioned several in-
indications of persistent racism in training and education, including exclusion from the National Guard except in five states, limitation to service as mess men in the Navy, and African American ROTC graduates denied commissions in the regular Army. The UMT Experimental Demonstration Unit perpetuated and reinforced these shortcomings in military service:

All of these are indicia of the basic pattern of discrimination which should be corrected in any event, and particularly if Negroes are to go into the peacetime Army and Navy by compulsion rather than consent. . . . Under the proposed legislation the Army and Navy can say to every American youth, “You shall live 1 year or more of your life under a system of racial segregation and discrimination imposed and administered by the Federal Government.”32

The unit was very concerned with public relations, which formed a core aspect of its mission. “Since the main objective of establishing the Demonstration Unit is the production of sound Public Relations, the Public Relations Section of the Demonstration Unit is proportionately large. It is not, however, capable of handling Public Relations on a national scale,” Devers explained. As a result, Devers called in public relations reinforcements, including those specialists at the highest echelons of the Army, anticipating that the public relations section would handle local publicity and that the War Department’s chief of public information would provide the necessary support for nationwide publicity.33 Augmented with publicity professionals locally and assisted by information experts at the War Department, Devers crafted a detailed public relations plan for the experimental unit. The public relations plan of the unit had two core premises:

That the UMT Demonstration unit is a part of an overall War Department program to acquaint the public, the Congress and other interested groups with the War Department Plan for Universal Military Training. . . . That the Commander of the UMT Demonstration unit is charged with the responsibility of obtaining the optimum of favorable publicity in cooperation with the Army Ground Forces and the PRD [Public Relations Division] of the War Department for the demonstration unit.34

The purpose of such efforts was “to publicize this demonstration of UMT so as to win for the overall UMT program the hearty approval of” multiple audiences, including the general public, influencers of public opinion, military personnel, and young adults and their parents who were affected by the UMT
program. In an unusual but revealing move, the Army augmented the unit’s authorized strength of 83 officers, 3 warrant officers, and 553 enlisted men with numerous public relations specialists.

The unit also had a robust newspaper, the *UMT Pioneer*, staffed by professionals and geared toward public dissemination of the purported positive virtues of the unit specifically and UMT generally. Devers conceded that “the publication of a weekly UMT Demonstration Unit newspaper is considered of top importance.” Simply producing the newspaper was not enough; instead, Devers sought to leverage it to disseminate broadly the UMT message. “An average of two papers per trainee, and some extra copies, will be needed. The distribution of this paper by the trainee to a parent of [sic] friend is considered one of the best methods of presenting our training plan,” Devers insisted.

The unit also focused heavily on public relations toward women. “It is essential that we provide a coordinated program aimed toward the largest resistance group—women’s organizations and the women of America,” Devers exclaimed. Throughout the campaign for UMT, women had voiced much of the angst about the program, albeit for a host of distinct reasons. As a result, Army planners made a concerted effort to appeal to women in their marketing, including assigning a special assistant to the experimental unit from the Women’s Interest Section of the War Department’s Public Relations Division. In addition, Devers planned that “whenever women visitors, and especially women editors and writers visit the camp, we should have a woman Public Relations assistant to aid them,” most likely a Women’s Army Corps public relations officer.

The massive public relations effort emanating from the unit garnered national attention and created some backlash, spurring congressional investigations that in turn triggered internal Army investigations. Secretary of War Royall ordered the inspector general to conduct an investigation in regard to the publishing, distribution and method of distribution of the pamphlet entitled “The Ft. Knox Experiment” issued by the Public Information Office, UMT Experimental Unit, Ft. Knox, Kentucky, and to review other publications, pamphlets, etc., issued by Headquarters, UMT Experimental Unit, since 24 July 1947, to determine whether the publication and distribution of the pamphlet “The Ft. Knox Experiment” violated any instructions or orders now existing or existing at the time of the publication of that pamphlet.

After a perfunctory review, the inspector general concluded that such efforts “do not violate any instructions or orders existing or existing at the time of their publication.” This outcome was not surprising, however, given that
UMT was one of the Army’s primary goals for the early Cold War period, the amount of effort put into both planning and proselytizing for it, and the nature of the unit as the only tangible manifestation of UMT in the nation. Thereafter, the marketing effort continued unabated. Major General Edward F. Witsell, adjutant general, promulgated, “At the direction of the Secretary of the Army, authority is now granted to the Commanding General, Ft. Knox, to continue the distribution of this pamphlet.”

**Umtees**

On 8 November 1946, Brigadier General John M. Devine, U.S. Army, arrived at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Devine was a graduate of the class of 1917 from West Point and had commanded the 8th Armored Division in combat during World War II. Upon his arrival at Fort Knox, he began creating the training area for the UMT Experimental Demonstration Unit, which would become known colloquially as “Father Divine’s Heaven,” both due to Devine’s puritanical approach to training and education within his unit and because of the enticing array of extracurricular activities supplied to Umtees. Devine had his work cut out for him because the unit’s training cadre was scheduled to arrive on 25 November 1946. That same day, Devine assumed command of the UMT Experimental Demonstration Unit, bringing it into active status.

Devine initially complained about problems securing enough qualified training cadre: “As might be expected, I am having the greatest difficulty in securing a cadre of sufficient intelligence, experience, and character to handle the trainees as they come in.” His recruiting woes would be temporary, however, as his boss, Jacob L. Devers, Army Ground Forces commander, had granted him “practically blanket authority to get the men I want, but getting them has proved very difficult.” As a result, Devine requested help to fill his training cadre from Major General Jens A. Doe, commanding general of 3d Infantry Division. Devine sent an envoy to Doe’s unit at nearby Camp Campbell, Kentucky, to evaluate 3,000 men “awaiting disposition” and requested Doe “to give my representative whatever help he needs in carrying out his mission” of recruiting qualified training cadre personnel. Cognizant of the widespread importance placed on the unit from leaders ranging from President Truman to General Marshall and many others, Doe dutifully complied.

Once Devine secured the necessary training cadre, his guidance to them was simple: “In this unit we will prove that we can teach discipline without the evils connoted by the word regimentation.” Devine further boasted:

*We will prove that we can produce well-trained and well-disciplined soldiers without suppressing their individuality, diminishing their self-respect, or hindering their personality*
development. Quite the contrary: We will teach them discipline, build their characters, give them confidence, increase their self-respect, and make them better citizens while also making them good soldiers. The proof will lie in the trainees themselves.48

For the most part, the training cadre accepted Devine’s novel methods, although there were undoubtedly naysayers who felt that Devine’s approach watered down traditional military training. Devine contended, “Some of our training company cadremen [sic] accepted these principles with reluctance, but almost without exception they used them. When the trainees arrived, their amazement at this kind of treatment was obvious. They had preconceived ideas of a drill sergeant.”49 Devine’s intent was to transition from the drill sergeant to the individual mentor.

On 4 January 1947, the first Umtees arrived at the train station at Fort Knox, destined to comprise the 164 men of the 1st Training Company, UMT Experimental Demonstration Unit. The Army heralded them as the vanguard of a new generation of soldiers, the boys of UMT. Reporters and local residents crowded the platform, while H. Steward Dailey, Paramount newsreelman, filmed the event. Devine, a war hero, greeted the youth as they awkwardly departed the train, shy in the face of such fanfare and anxious about what awaited them. First off the train was “UMTee Number 1,” Lester G. Whetzel of Derwood, Maryland. During the next two days, the remainder of 1st Training Company arrived, and by the end of January, all other companies had arrived and filled out the battalion. Training began and ushered in the era of UMT on the ground.50 Before long, residents surrounding Fort Knox could hear members of the all-teenage unit calling out cadence to their favorite rhythm, “Marching Along Together,” which the music program cadre composed specifically for Umtees. The tune beamed with futuristic optimism, characterizing “soldiers of the UMT” as “guardians of the future” and reassuring the youth, “We’ll take our places in history.”51

To accomplish their desired goal, Army leaders had to convince American society that the training and education in the UMT Experimental Demonstration Unit would not only be effective militarily but, more important, would benefit American youth. The American Legion, a strong supporter of UMT, perceived with unflinching clarity that “this Experiment has little to do with the final decision of Congress as to whether Universal Military Training is to be adopted as necessary National preparedness; it simply answers a question which every parent asks and which heretofore no one could answer: ‘What will UMT mean to my son?”52
Training

Training formed the crux of the national campaign and the heart of the experimental unit. In apocalyptic prose, the American Legion warned: “Millions of young men, skilled in the technical aspects of total war, disciplined in teamwork, trained to make decisions, unswerving in their handling of themselves and others—may spell the difference between victory and defeat.” The veterans group proposed that instead of last-minute training such as in the last war, it is better to give them—for their own sakes—training that is carefully planned and civilian-controlled. But beyond all this, every mother will agree that surely it is only common humanity—since war can come with such startling suddenness—that youth should be adequately trained before being called upon to defend their country and their homes.

To accomplish this broad training mission, preparation was essential. As a result, Devers prepared “a special course of instruction” for the Organized Reserve Corps, which would provide many of the officers and cadre staff for the experimental unit, so as to inculcate them “in the purposes and desired methods of execution of the UMT program.” Devers notified all Army commanders that “Course A, on UMT Cadre Instruction, at Fort Knox, Kentucky, which is normally for potential senior regimental commanders and staffs, will be given to Reserve Officers. The duration of the course is 2 1/2 days. This course will be given each week for six weeks beginning 12 August 1947.” Devers ordered that commanders fill their quotas, totaling 52 slots per week for the six armies comprising Army Ground Forces.

Once Umtees arrived, however, the training of the unit assumed unique characteristics. One of the major changes was eliminating drills and exercises originally designed to instill hatred for the enemy and a desire to kill. Much of this shift derived from the need to reduce criticism that UMT might militarize American youth and thereby foster public support for the overall program. Devine conceded that “such drills were of doubtful value even in wartime and certainly have no place in UMT.” By removing them, he sought to jettison a potential stumbling block for instituting the program nationwide. Devine admitted that his motives were as much about perception as they were about military training: “Parents feel that such drills teach the boys to be murderers, and they will furiously oppose exposing their sons to such doctrines.”

Devine explained that such a significant change came from the fact that this is not the Regular Army but UMT. He revealed that the advent of the experimental unit had shifted the raison d’être of military training from a focus on waging war to “develop the potential strength of the nation so that there will
not be another war.” The Army argued that one way to achieve deterrence in the early Cold War period was to create a General Reserve, a large pool of trained personnel that could prevent war in the best of circumstances and respond to it quickly in the worst of situations. To do so, the experimental unit aimed “to teach obedience, loyalty, and a sense of responsibility to the young men of the nation so that any future emergency will find a trained and disciplined citizenry ready to meet it.”

One reason for Devine’s caution was that Umtees were a unique group, primarily because of their youth. Even though Army leaders repeatedly touted Umtees as representative, it is clear that the Army handpicked them to give the unit the best chance of success:

The boys we have here are a typical group of Americans. As nearly as practicable they represent what we can expect to get under UMT. The average age at the beginning of training was 17 1/2 years. None have had any previous military service except a week or two in RTC [Replacement Training Center]. Nearly all states in the Union are represented. The average education is slightly above the national average. The average AGCT [Army General Classification Test] score is considerably above the Army average, and is probably higher than the national average. On the whole, however, they are a representative group and include all social and cultural levels. They are, of course, Regular Army soldiers, but are not necessarily volunteers for this unit. With this group we set out to demonstrate to the skeptical that the Army knows how to train young men.

Devine relayed plans approved by Dwight D. Eisenhower, Army chief of staff, to confirm that the Army selected Umtes who would ensure the unit’s success: “Just a little reminder on the question of trainee personnel for the UMT Demonstration Unit so I will be sure there is no misunderstanding. It was generally agreed at the presentation of the plan to General Eisenhower that the men selected for this Unit would have the following qualifications,” including no Umtees older than 20 years and preferably most younger than 19 years. Additionally, “the men selected will be a cross section of the youth of the nation intellectually, with the proper percentage in each group as determined by AGC Test.” They would also be representative of the country geographically, with all states included. In addition, “if practicable one company (166 trainees) should come from the vicinity of Fort Knox. The latter idea is General Eisenhower’s own and is intended to arouse local interest in the experiment.” Finally, Umtees would also be new to the Army.
In addition to shifting training methods toward mentorship of youth, the unit also took a novel approach to discipline. Devine contended, “Discipline is an unpleasant word to the average civilian because it suggests punishment, the iron hand of regimentation. Such an idea, of course, is wrong. Discipline means obedience—willing, cooperative obedience—to lawful authority. In this unit we set out to prove that we could teach discipline without the evils connoted by the word regimentation.” He envisioned transitioning from the harsh wartime culture of World War II to a new discipline system for the early Cold War based on personal mentorship, shared governance, and mutual respect.

To maintain discipline, Devine instituted a unique demerit system focused on eliminating the necessity for vocal punishment. Instead, the demerit system would dispense discipline for “minor delinquencies.” A dirty uniform, tarnished shoes, or a “failure to shave daily” all incurred two demerits. Amassing too many demerits would lead quickly to extra duty: “For each demerit over ten accrued by a Trainee during one calendar month, he shall be detailed at the earliest practicable date to one hour of extra fatigue duty.”

For major violations, including drunkenness, insubordination, and cheating on tests, Devine instituted another novel convention—the trainee court. The trainee court allowed Umtes to regulate themselves, thereby becoming an integral part of the discipline system for the experimental unit. The goal of such an unorthodox approach was to instill a sense of community among trainees. “The purpose is to make the offender feel that he has offended not the company commander but the community itself, and to make him feel responsible to the community for his behavior,” Devine explained. In addition, the trainee court reinforced good behavior as an important aspect of training at Fort Knox. Devine rewarded or punished individual training companies based on the collective behavior of their Umtees. As a result, the trainee court represented “an experiment in self-government with the object of developing in the individual trainee a sense of responsibility.” Devine explained the impetus for his focus on self-government: “If you remember President Truman’s press release of last November when he appointed the Advisory Commission on UMT, it was a ‘sense of responsibility’ that he particularly emphasized as a quality much to be desired in the younger generation. We have taken positive steps to develop such a quality in our trainees.” This unusual organization sought limited self-government and accountability for discipline among trainees themselves. Each company had its own cadet court of seven trainees, three of which were senior to the accused and shall be present at each trial, a trial judge advocate, a defense council, and a commissioned officer designated by the company commander to serve as law member without vote. Even more intriguing, “The Appointing Authority for each Cadet Court shall be the senior Trainee member of the company,” and its jurisdiction “will be limited to members of the company from which it is com-
posed who are formally charged with the commission of any of the offenses.” As a result, the UMT Experimental Demonstration Unit had a unique approach to discipline, including a detailed demerit system for minor infractions and a trainee court for major violations. The unit differentiated, however, between Umtees and training cadre: “The following plan for the maintenance of order and discipline among trainees is designed to operate within the limits of the Articles of War to which the Trainees of the Demonstration Unit, UMT, are subject. This Disciplinary Code will not apply to members of the cadre who will be governed by Military Law and established customs of the service.”

**Education**

The UMT Experimental Demonstration Unit also had a distinctive approach to education, including mandatory education programs on the weekends. “All boys take two subjects on Saturday morning, electives within limits. The intellectually ambitious take two academic subjects; the lazy ones take music and ballroom dancing,” Devine confided. The extent of the education program was vast, including such subjects as English, history, Spanish, German, psychology, bookkeeping, typewriting, shorthand, auto mechanics, radio, physical education, and music.

An important part of the education program was the trainee information program (TIP). Its mission was “to obtain better training by arming the trainee with sound conviction that . . . The reason for requiring his service are just. . . The opportunities open to him during and after training are worthwhile. . . The part he plays in training for national security is important.” A second related undertaking was to convert trainees to the benefits and virtues of UMT so as to promulgate the War Department’s marketing of the program to the trainees, their parents, local communities, and the nation. Much of the TIP reinforced material meant to convince a broad audience, participants and onlookers alike, that UMT was beneficial to American youth.

In addition to the TIP, there also was remedial education for Umtees who held minimal education. These Umtees fell within the Special Training Unit (STU), which the unit defined as “Below Fifth School Grade” level of education. The result was “Compulsory Literacy Training,” Devers explained. “Training time will be entirely devoted to orientation and basic training for the first four weeks after processing. Thereafter, STU personnel will receive literacy training five (5) days a week an average of three (3) hours per day.” This remedial aspect of education within the unit conformed well to the articulated goal of the national program to combat illiteracy and thereby improve American youth.

Another intriguing aspect of the UMT Experimental Demonstration Unit’s education program was moral education, whereby “the moral and spiritual development of the trainees is considered a vital phase of their training. To limit
the program to physical and mental improvement of the trainee produces an unbalanced program because a man’s character has a third side, a moral one, which sets his personal standards of behavior and attitude toward his associates, his superiors, and his country.” As a result of the increased emphasis on moral education, the unit leveraged military chaplains in a fascinating manner. The American Legion noted, “There’s an old figure with a new outlook in the Knox unit: the UMT chaplain. General Devine has given the Army chaplain a new mission. . . . It’s the chaplain who is responsible for the moral conduct and social hygiene of all the trainees.” Devine explained to his training cadre the importance of the chaplain in the UMT Experiment Demonstration Unit. The heightened role of the chaplain within the experimental unit evidenced a subtle but significant shift away from military matters toward social reform. Devine reiterated to his staff that Karl T. Compton, chair of Harry S. Truman’s President’s Advisory Commission on Universal Training, had once remarked that “the security of the country depends not only upon military preparedness but also upon the physical, mental, spiritual, and moral fiber of the youth of the nation.” Devine agreed: “We heartily subscribe to that statement of principle. It underlies our whole program. From the beginning we were determined to do our best to turn out well-rounded men, to include moral training in our schedule, and by some means to put increased emphasis upon spiritual guidance. Determining the precise steps to accomplish these ends was not simple, but I believe we have found the solution now.” Devine highlighted the importance of the initial interview that the chaplain had with each Umtee. In addition, the chaplain conducted a series of citizenship lectures, focusing on the duties and obligations of the citizen rather than on rights and privileges, where such duties and obligations are basically moral and fall within the realm of the chaplain. These efforts included weekly one-hour “Citizenship and Morality” lectures for every company in the experimental unit on such topics as the meaning of citizenship, state and government citizenship, religion, and speech.

In addition to initial interviews and citizenship lectures, the chaplains of the unit also ran an abstinence program. “Our social hygiene program, too, is in the hands of the chaplains,” Devine said, in which personal morality and abstinence were encouraged to prevent venereal disease. Devine’s approach to abstinence was based on confidence that most trainees would “do the right thing if he knows what it is, and it is our job to tell him.” He argued that a lack of information and a belittling training regimen combined to foster moral problems. Instead, he hoped that the experimental unit’s approach to training and education would prove that “it is easier to prevent bad behavior than to correct it.” Throughout the unit’s education program, the chaplain ascended to a significant position of more than a silent member of the staff. They were directly responsible for the morals and behavior of the men. Devine contended
that the chaplain “is not a police officer nor a disciplinarian, but it is his duty
to instruct the men, trainees and cadre, on proper morals and standards. . . . In
UMT the work of the chaplain is considered essential to the development of
good soldiers.”

Community Involvement
To implement its training and education program, the UMT Experimental
Demonstration Unit sought significant community involvement based on a
two-pronged approach: keep Umtees on base as much as possible through ex-
panded extracurricular activities and enhance their visibility off base to encour-
gage good behavior and reduce the potential for scandalous mischief:

It was the intention from the beginning to provide more in-
teresting recreation in the unit area than could be found in
nearby civilian communities. This hope materialized when it
was found that, except for the first week end of each month,
approximately 85 per cent [sic] of the trainee corps voluntarily
remained on the post and participated in one or more activi-
ties of the special service program.

To ensure that Umtees had a plethora of activities on base, Devine sought
and received significant funding to refurbish the entire training area for the ex-
periment unit, which became so decadent that observers referred to it as Father
Divine’s Heaven. Accounts of the facilities available to the unit painted an en-
ticing picture of the cornucopia of extracurricular activities available to Umtees:

The Athletic Section established and operated a Sports Center
in a warehouse type building adjacent to the unit area. Pool,
table tennis, an indoor driving range (golf), parallel bars, a
rowing machine, a trampoline (circus type net suspended hor-
izontally by springs to give the performer a vertical bounce),
a boxing ring, and other gymnastic equipment were available.
The Sports Center was opened and instructors were available
each evening and on Wednesday afternoon, Saturdays, and
Sundays.

In addition to athletic activities, there was a plethora of entertainment op-
tions, including a permanent dance band, The UMT Highlighters, with three
trumpets, five saxophones, two trombones, a drummer, piano, and bass violin
that, in a four-month period after its organization, played 71 dances, 51 of
which were for UMT personnel exclusively. There was also a tour group spe-
cifically for Umtees, which travelled to Abraham Lincoln’s birthplace, the Trapp-
pist Monastery at Gethsemane Abbey, and My Old Kentucky Home, an iconic

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nineteenth-century plantation in Bardstown, Kentucky. During the extensive overhaul of the experimental unit’s training facilities, Devine also purged beer and objectionable magazines from the post exchange, seeking to resurrect a puritanical environment for the youth.

The second pillar of community involvement was to identify Umtees off base to encourage their proper conduct and minimize any potential infractions, which might impair the public relations mission of the unit. For this task, the Army called in reinforcements from the surrounding community. “In the city of Louisville we have a Civilian Advisory Committee made up of representative citizens of Louisville and Elizabethtown. The committee was appointed by Governor Willis of Kentucky in cooperation with Mayor Taylor of Louisville,” Devine clarified. The Civilian Advisory Committee had numerous subcommittees, which examined every facet of the experimental unit except purely military topics, including health, religion, education, physical training, self-government, entertainment, and general well-being. Devine praised the contributions of the committee: “This committee has been very much interested in what we are doing, and its members have rendered services beyond price. They have given us the civilian viewpoint on our program and have provided an example of cooperation between the civilian and the military which should set the standard for all communities in a National UMT Program.” Devine was most pleased with the result, and he maintained, “These boys are not angels, and we have our share of malcontents. You can find trouble if you look for it, but you will have to look.”

One significant contribution of the committee was the creation of a distinctive patch for Umtees, aimed less at unit cohesion and more at identification of trainees off base by training cadre and, more importantly, civilians. The Civilian Advisory Committee used this patch to identify and monitor Umtees in town and to ensure that their behavior, good or bad, would not go unnoticed.

**Conclusion**

Army leaders judged the unique training and education of the unit a success, as demonstrated by its extension to the 3d Armored Division, also located at Fort Knox, and its planned extension to the rest of the Army in the intended national program. Army leaders extolled the virtues and results of the UMT Experimental Demonstration Unit. Major General Ray T. Maddocks, 3d Armored Division commanding general, boasted that his unit mirrored the “specific methods, procedures, and policies of the Universal Military Training Experimental Unit,” including the demerit system, trainee courts, venereal disease instruction, lectures on citizenship, and attendance at church. Maddocks contended, “By keeping our officers and enlisted cadre on a high mental, moral, and physical level, by maintaining high standards, and by keeping our program flexible, we are not only training soldiers but also developing better citizens.”
Army leaders envisioned UMT being enacted on a national scale and crafted official and detailed plans projecting passage of such a bill by Congress, resulting in appropriations around 1 July 1948, and cadre training beginning on 1 January 1949. Military planners further extrapolated that the “first shipment of trainees to induction stations for pre-induction examination” would arrive by 1 April 1949, and the “first increment of trainees arrives” around 1 July 1949, referred to by the Army as “U-Day.” As a result, the unit convinced Army leaders that UMT was both viable and desirable, and they planned accordingly to initiate UMT in 1948 and implement it nationwide during 1949. In addition, veterans groups promulgated the training and education approach of the UMT Experimental Demonstration Unit. The American Legion detailed the training and education within the experimental unit and distributed brochures nationwide in the hopes of securing a nationwide program.

The meteoric rise of the UMT Experimental Demonstration Unit was eclipsed only by its precipitous descent. The abrupt defeat of the national campaign in 1948 and the replacement of it with a resumption of the Selective Service System prompted the disbanding of the unit in 1949. As a result, the experiment in universal military training ended, and with it, the hopes of senior Army planners to make UMT the basis for their postwar plans. The Christian Science Monitor reported, “This nation’s first peacetime experiment in universal military training is being discontinued temporarily by the army.” The newspaper noted that much of the training and education program of the unit would continue into the early Cold War. Despite its demise, there were positive benefits of the program: “Officers reported, however, that many of the ‘new and different’ training methods developed at the UMT experimental unit here will be spread through the expanding army as it is built with new draftees.”

This brings us back to Private Stover. He had served in the armored force of the unit, maneuvering his M26 Pershing tank armed with a 90mm gun. It was only his billboards, however, that would remain. Even though Stover would not lead the vanguard of a new Army, he and his fellow Umtees did usher in unique training and education methods that would echo throughout the early Cold War Army.

Notes
2. The author acknowledges the assistance of Richard L. Boylan at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), who provided expert guidance on numerous primary sources chronicling the UMT Experimental Demonstration Unit. NARA at College Park, MD, houses the official military records for this time period. Record Group (RG) 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, Entry 479, was instructive in affording an overall view of War Department efforts on UMT, primarily from 1943 to 1946. Specifically, it revealed insights into the strategic rationale behind UMT, War Department policy regarding UMT, and the early marketing efforts of the War Department related to UMT. RG 337, Records of Headquarters Army Ground Forces, Entry 26F, provided understandings of the UMT Branch, pri-
arily from 1946 to 1948. Entry 91 charted the UMT Experimental Demonstration Unit at Fort Knox, KY, primarily from 1946 to 1949. This entry highlighted the detailed planning for the unit as well as the fanfare that attended the unit’s activation. It also accentuated the unique nature of the unit as a model for the proposed nationwide UMT program and hence its critical public relations function. On UMT, see Taylor, Every Citizen a Soldier.


4. At various times, official references to the unit included UMT Experimental Demonstration Unit, UMT Experimental Unit, UMT Demonstration Unit, and UMT Demonstration Unit (Experimental). For consistency and because it encapsulates the totality of the unit’s purpose to experiment and to demonstrate, the author has used UMT Experimental Demonstration Unit throughout this article.


6. The Cavalcade of UMT captures the futuristic optimism of Army planners that the unit would usher in a new era of military training and education.


8. Truman message, 2.


15. “UMT Station Complement Overhead by Grades, Confidential,” box 129, folder Division Cadre Courses at Stations (Refresher), RG 337, Entry #26F, NARA. The proposed UMT locations were Fort Dix, NJ; Pine Camp, NY; Fort Meade, MD; Fort Benning, GA; Fort Bliss, TX; Fort Riley, KS; Camp Carson, CO; Fort Lewis, WA; Camp Edwards, MA; Camp Breckinridge, KY; Camp McCoy, WI; Camp Pickett, VA; Camp Rucker, AL; Camp Custer, MI; Indiantown Gap, PA; Camp Chaffee, AR; Fort Leonard Wood, MO; Camp Cooke, CA; Fort Devens, MA; Camp Atterbury, IN; Camp Gordon, GA; Camp Roberts, CA; and Camp Polk, LA. See also BGEn George E. Armstrong, Deputy Surgeon General, “Memorandum to Director of Logis-
tics, General Staff, United States Army, Subject: Evaluation of Hospital Facilities for Universal Military Training Program,” 11 March 1948, box 132, folder Medical, RG 337, Entry #26F, NARA, 1, which lists the same 23 UMT stations.


17. “UMT Table of Distribution (To Be Used with Revised Army Ground Forces Plan, 20 October 1946, Revision of March 1947),” 12 March 1947, box 4, folder 24 UMT—T/A and T/O, Record Group 337, Entry #91, NARA, hereafter RG 337, Entry #91, NARA.


19. On military occupational specialty (MOS) training see box 134, which contains programs of instruction for many specialties. For example, see Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA, “Program of Instruction for UMT Infantry Non-Commissioned Officers Course (Long Term Specialist),” 15 March 1948, box 134, RG 337, Entry #26F, NARA.


22. War Department, “Universal Military Training Experimental Unit, Table of Allowances, No. 20-99T,” 13 February 1947, box 136, RG 337, Entry #26F, NARA; and War Department, “Universal Military Training Experimental Unit, Table of Allowances, No. 250-19,” 24 July 1947, box 136, RG 337, Entry #26F, NARA.


29. LtGen C. P. Hall, director of Organization and Training, “Memorandum to Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, Fort Monroe, Virginia, Subject: Detailed Plan for Demonstration Unit for Training Under a Universal Military Training Program, By Order of the Secretary of War,” 13 November 1946, box 6, folder 320 UMT—War Department Plan for UMT 1946, RG 337, Entry #91, NARA, 1.


32. Dedmon statement, 668.


41. Witsell memo, 1.
47. Devine to Doe, 1.
50. UMT Experimental Unit, “The Cavalcade of UMT, First Cycle, 6 January to 6 July 1947, Fort Knox, Kentucky,” box 131, RG 337, Entry #26F, NARA, 12. Prominent visitors to 1st Training Company included Patricia Lochridge, Washington editor of Woman’s Home Companion; Parks Johnson and Warren Hull of the Vox Pop radio program; Samuel I. Rosenman, presidential speechwriter; Karl T. Compton, president of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and chair of the President’s Advisory Commission on Universal Training (PACUT); and Raymond S. McLain, liaison officer between the War Department and PACUT, among many others.
51. “Music Program,” box 8, folder Staff Studies—Fort Knox, Kentucky, RG 220, Records of Temporary Committees, Commissions, and Boards, Records of the President’s Advisory Commission on Universal Training, Harry S. Truman Library, 1.
55. LtCol John E. Pederson, assistant ground adjutant general, “Memorandum to Commanding Generals, First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Armies, Subject: Reserve Officers Instruction at UMT Experimental Unit, By Command of General Devers,” 3 July 1947, box 134, RG 337, Entry #26F, NARA, 2.
59. John M. Devine to Col J. B. Sweet, G-1, Army Ground Forces, Fort Monroe, VA, 19 November 1946, box 6, folder 320 UMT—War Department Plan for UMT 1946, RG 337, Entry #91, NARA, 1.
75. Devine, “Interim Report, UMT Experimental Unit, Fort Knox, Kentucky,” 27.
84. Witsell, “Memorandum to Agencies Listed Below Under Distribution,” 31–32. For an excellent visual representation of the Army’s plans for UMT implementation, see Chart I on p. 31. On the Army’s views of UMT implementation during 1949 specifically, see Chart II on p. 32.
The Evolution of Canada’s PME after Afghanistan
From Counterinsurgency
Back to High-Intensity Conflict

Craig Stone

Abstract: Professional military education (PME) in Canada at the staff and war college levels needs to refocus its curriculum on high-intensity conflict. Unfortunately, unlike during the Cold War when the focus could be entirely on high-intensity conflict, today’s security environment requires Canada’s PME system to continue covering counterinsurgency operations as well. What is the correct balance and who should decide are some of the issues dealt with by the author. There are many interested parties, but the faculty actually involved in delivering the curriculum are arguably the best ones to decide how to achieve the balance. They have the knowledge and expertise in both curriculum design and delivery.

Keywords: professional military education, PME, Canada, War College, Command and Staff College, War College, high-intensity conflict, counterinsurgency, COIN

The election of a new government in the fall of 2015 and the announcement to the United Nations (UN) by the new prime minister, Justin Trudeau, that Canada was back, combined with a variety of changing global security requirements, a critical report on sexual assault in the Canadian...
Forces (CF), and failures in some major procurement projects, have led Canadian Forces to revisit what needs to be included in its professional military education (PME) programs. 1 Although not the first time significant internal and external events have caused serious institutional reflection on the content of PME, the challenge today is finding the correct balance among the multitude of competing topics that need to be covered in a finite amount of time.

In 1997, Professor Jack L. Granatstein wrote in a report to the minister of national defence that the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) had a “remarkably ill educated officer corps, surely one of the worst in the Western World.” 2 At that time, 53.3 percent of officers had university degrees and only 6.8 percent had a graduate degree, mainly in technical areas. 3 Granatstein argued that, compared to many of Canada’s allies, the CF lagged far behind in levels of education. 4 Much has changed in the intervening years, particularly for senior officers.

Since the 1997 report, senior officer PME provided by the Canadian Forces College (CFC) has evolved from one command and staff program focused at the major and lieutenant commander rank level to four major programs focused across a spectrum of professional military and civilian government education activities, from the command and staff level to the general and flag officer level. 5 More important, the CFC added PhD-qualified faculty from the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) as part of its teaching and curriculum development, thereby allowing the more significant yearlong programs to be focused on the education and critical thinking required for the graduate degrees now offered by RMC to those individuals prepared to complete the additional work associated with the master of defense studies or master of public administration.

Additionally, the security environment has changed significantly during the past two decades, and the faculty at CFC, both military and civilian, have adjusted the curriculum to reflect this changing environment and to respond to the needs of the profession of arms. Canada’s military, like most of its key allies, has spent more than a decade focused on counterinsurgency (COIN) as part of its contribution to Afghanistan and other events in the Middle East. The current security environment continues to require military forces skilled in COIN operations, but activities in the South China Sea, North Korea, and the Ukraine have brought the issue of being prepared for high-intensity conflict back into the discussion. 6 Should the focus of professional development switch to high-intensity conflict or continue with COIN? Does PME need to cover both and, if so, what is the correct balance? A recent Rand study on trends in armed conflict suggests that the U.S. Army must be prepared for both. 7 John Deni’s examination of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Article 5 also indicates a need for NATO nations to shift emphasis from crisis management back to Article 5 and collective defense against Russia. 8 Does the
The need to be prepared for high-intensity conflict apply to smaller armed forces like Canada?

The intent of this article is to examine what, if anything, needs to change in PME with the staff and war college curriculum. Is the CAF expecting too much from its people and its military schoolhouses? Does the existing curriculum need tinkering with or are significant changes required? Are current issues of the day usurping the longer-term requirements of the profession? Anyone in the PME business will know there are no easy answers to any of these questions.

This article begins by providing a general understanding of the curriculum-development process and how Canadian staff and war college programs decide what must be taught. It continues with a summary of how some of these issues have evolved with a focus on the changes that may now be required post-Afghanistan. The multiple competing demands facing curriculum developers are also discussed, and the article concludes by providing some thoughts on what might be appropriate for further study.

**Curriculum Development at the Canadian Forces College**

Professional military education requirements for the CAF officer corps is articulated in the *Officer General Specifications* (OGS). The OGS outlines the breadth and depth of requirements for CAF officers and reflects the demands the CAF places on its Officer Corps. It lays out the requirements for individuals wishing to join the Corps, as well as for those who strive to rise in its ranks. This document contains the essential requirements that officers are expected to meet and maintain during their military careers and provides the framework for the development and support of CAF officers in their roles as military leaders. We expect that this OGS will be used as the cornerstone of the military personnel system with respect to the selection, training, education, development, management, and support of CAF officers.9

The OGS is designed to provide the performance requirements for officers at specific ranks and includes information applicable to all officers in the CAF, along with information applicable to each of the Services in the CAF.10 It provides guidance on the profession of arms, leadership, and the fundamentals of officership within the CAF. The OGS is the foundation document from which the curriculum for war and staff colleges comes.

Although the bureaucratic structure for how guidance is received by the CFC for curriculum development is not important to this discussion, there is a
chain of command and approval process for the development of program goals, outcomes, and objectives to be achieved by officers attending CFC. Modifications and adjustments to reflect the changing security environment and the requirements of the CAF are approved and updated on a regular basis.

A recent internal audit of the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA), of which the Canadian Forces College is part, noted that the CDA had undertaken a review of the entire professional development system with substantial changes required.11 How much of this change applies to the staff and war college remains to be determined because final approvals of the recommended changes have yet to be accepted by the senior leadership of the CAF. Nevertheless, the audit report did note that the CDA review proposed

- a greater emphasis on career-long self-development in various subject areas, such as communications, psychology, sociology, politics, history, and anthropology. The content of mandatory PD [professional development] will need to be modularized further, and a system needs to be put in place to facilitate linkages between prior learning, PD requirements, and career management.12

This would imply that some review of the curriculum at the staff and war college level needs to be conducted to determine whether these issues are being addressed. The challenge for curriculum development is that there are always trade-offs. These include decisions that must be made to balance the multiple areas of study desired by all those with input into the process and those with the actual time available to deliver curriculum that allows individuals to improve their critical thinking skills and master elements of their profession.

The audit highlights one of the challenges for curriculum development at CFC and most staff and war colleges. In reality the OGS or another nation’s equivalent policy document is only one of the mechanisms that provides guidance for PME by articulating a core set of technical job requirements. But the audit illustrates that senior leaders as well as other agencies and events influence the development of curriculum at the staff and war college level. The faculty have to be aware of strategic direction from the chief of the defense staff, desires of the Service commanders, other institutional guidance on the broad responsibilities of senior leaders at the colonel and flag rank level, and other policy guidance or direction within the broader machinery of government.13 Benchmarking with allies is also an important consideration to ensure that the military maintains consistency in its ability to recognize the others’ qualifications and, more important in today’s environment, that interoperability in or on operations does not suffer.
The Programs at CFC

Each of the programs at CFC has a syllabus that outlines its goals, learning outcomes, and learning objectives, along with how the program is structured and delivered. Student assessment is completed for both academic and professional requirements, and an indication of how the program is connected to a graduate degree at the RMC of Canada, the degree-granting institution for the programs. Faculty, both military and academic, are organized into departments covering the broad areas of military planning and operations, command leadership and management, and security and international affairs. Not unlike our traditional allies, the development and delivery of curriculum is a shared responsibility that balances both the professional and academic requirements of a graduate-level learning experience.

The connection to graduate degrees means that curriculum is organized into courses, some mandatory and some elective. Course names and requirements are outlined in both the syllabus for the PME program on the CFC website and the graduate studies calendar on the RMC website. This linkage between the professional requirements and the academic requirements ensures that changes to curriculum are not done on a whim and are approved through the formal processes for both the profession of arms and the university. This connection between the profession and the university is important when changes are made to curriculum to reflect new requirements for the profession based on changes in the security environment and in government priorities, both domestically and internationally.14

Faculty at CFC make incremental changes every year to reflect the ongoing changes in the professional requirements and new research in the academic literature. Curriculum for both the staff and war college level programs is developed and delivered to meet the needs of broad program goals and more specific learning outcomes (tables 1 and 2). The tables provide the program goal, the intended aim of the goal, and the associated learning outcome. Not provided but available in the syllabus documents are the more detailed objectives associated with each outcome. For example, the six learning outcomes associated with the staff college leads to 23 learning objectives, while the nine outcomes for the war college leads to 40 learning objectives.

Faculty then develop courses with individual lectures, seminars, case studies, and exercises with specific items or teaching points that must be covered in the activity to achieve the overall outcomes and objectives either by the end of the course or, in some cases, by the end of the actual program.

What is obvious when looking at the material in the tables is how generalized the language is. This allows faculty significant flexibility in choosing the most effective teaching and assessment methods to meet the needs of the profession and the university in such a complex security environment. Note, how-
Table 1. National Security Program goals and outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program goal</th>
<th>Goal aim</th>
<th>Learning outcomes</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional leadership, strategic command, and strategic resource management</td>
<td>To further develop the participants' ability to evaluate and apply the principles of command, leadership, and management at the strategic level in leading the institutions of defense and national security, and to evaluate institutional policies and decision-making constraints and dynamics in the generation, employment, and sustainment of a national capacity to meet Canada's security needs.</td>
<td>Institutional leadership: at the end of the relevant courses, participants will have examined the concepts, theories, and techniques of executive leadership; analyzed their effective application at the strategic and institutional levels; and conducted self-assessment feedback to enhance their personal leadership styles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strategic command: at the end of the relevant courses, participants will have explored the theories and concepts of strategic command and the key constraints and dynamics affecting strategic military decision making within the context of comprehensive approaches within an environment of ambiguity.</td>
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<td>Strategic resource management: at the end of the relevant courses, students will have examined strategic management theories and managerial approaches; evaluated the resource management systems used within the federal government with emphasis on defense; and analyzed complex managerial planning, decision-making, and organizational components at the strategic level to generate and sustain institutional capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian governance and national security policy development</td>
<td>To further develop the participants' understanding of how nations develop and implement national security policies and how states interrelate regionally, globally, and with international organizations and other nongovernmental actors. Using comparison with other nations, the program will focus on Canadian government decision making; national security policy development; the factors, both internal and external to Canada, that influence the implementation of Canada's national security policy; and the geostrategic influences related to the potential tensions between Canada's national interests and the promotion of Canada's values.</td>
<td>International relations and the contemporary security environment: at the end of the relevant courses, participants will have examined how nations develop and implement national security policy; the relationship between states, international organizations, and other nongovernmental actors; and the contemporary international security environment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Program goal</td>
<td>Goal aim</td>
<td>Learning outcomes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategy formulation and the application of national powers</td>
<td>To further develop the participants’ understanding of the elements of national power through an examination of its diplomatic/political, informational, sociocultural, military, and economic determinants; to analyze their influence on Canada's strategic options; and to evaluate the controls on their implementation in intra-, inter-, and nongovernmental environments.</td>
<td>Geostrategic security environment: at the end of the relevant courses, participants will have distinguished and applied the elements of national power; examined the geostrategic environment including state, nonstate, and interstate actors; analyzed regional security issues and their effect on the development of Canadian international policy; and examined the roles and functions of international political, economic, trade-related, and military institutions that are specifically important to Canada.</td>
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<tr>
<td>National security strategy formulation and application:</td>
<td>To develop the participants' capacity to examine and design comprehensive approaches to operations in the context of current and future defense and security environments to generate strategic effects in complex security environments.</td>
<td>Operations in complex environments: at the end of the relevant courses, participants will have examined the processes and environments that influence the development of national security policies; assessed how national security strategies are derived from those policies; and analyzed how global and domestic environments affect those strategies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operations in complex environments</td>
<td>To develop students' ability to research, think critically, apply problem-solving techniques, and communicate effectively with internal and external audiences.</td>
<td>Communications skills and analytical thinking: through each of the courses and at the end of the program, participants will have applied research, critical thinking, problem-solving, and decision-making techniques to address issues and defend positions and will have used effective oral and written communication skills to present their analysis and message.</td>
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</tbody>
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Source: RAdm L. Cassivi, “Syllabus: Canadian Forces College (CFC), National Security Programme (NSP).”
Table 2. Joint Command and Staff Course Program goals and outcomes

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program goal</th>
<th>Goal aim</th>
<th>Learning outcomes</th>
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<tr>
<td>Command and leadership</td>
<td>To develop in each participant the requisite level of understanding of</td>
<td>At the end of the program, students will be able to apply the conceptual foundations of leadership and of command required to be effective in the institutional, operational, and cross-cultural contexts across national and international settings.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>the conceptual foundations of leadership and command required to be effective in the institutional, operational, and cross-cultural contexts across national and international settings.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communications skills</td>
<td>To develop students’ ability to research, apply problem-solving techniques, and communicate effectively with internal and external audiences.</td>
<td>At the end of each course, students will have applied research, problem-solving, and decision-making techniques to defend a position or point of view using the professional oral and written communication skills and public affairs skills required to be effective in the institutional, operational, and cross-cultural contexts across national and international settings.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military operations planning</td>
<td>To develop students’ ability to plan joint and combined operations at the operational level across the spectrum of conflict in support of federal government direction.</td>
<td>At the end of the program, students will be able to lead an element of an operational-level planning group in planning a military operation within the contemporary operating environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component capabilities</td>
<td>To develop students’ understanding of component capabilities in joint and combined force operations.</td>
<td>At the end of the program, students will be able to apply capabilities of component power in a contemporary operating environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National security and defense studies</td>
<td>To develop students’ ability to analyze Canadian national security, foreign, and defense policies, and the internal and external factors that influence them.</td>
<td>At the end of the program, the students will be able to translate national security strategy into military responses in the contemporary operating environment.</td>
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</table>

Source: MajGen J. G. E. Tremblay, “Syllabus: Canadian Forces College (CSC) Joint Command and Staff Programme Residential (JCS RESID) and Joint Command and Staff Distance Learning (JCS DL).”

However, that the generalized language also makes establishing clear measurement criteria more difficult. Nevertheless, it allows for adjustments to the material each year to reflect contemporary issues without having to change the broad set of goals, outcomes, and objectives. Unfortunately, at times, it also allows critics to view the generalized language and criticize what the college is doing without a clear understanding of how the outcomes and objectives are actually met. So what adjustments, if any, need to be made in the balance between high-intensity conflict and COIN? Is this even the correct question? In this context, it would be useful to understand what changes were made to the curriculum since the last major revision in the late 1990s that was referred to in the opening section.

The main driver for change prior to Minister of National Defence M.
Douglas Young’s era can be traced to the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 and Canada’s decision to engage in Afghanistan. Although Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan has ended, its military remains engaged in operations against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the Middle East and in NATO operations in Latvia, and it awaits a decision from the government for deployment on a UN mission to Africa. All of this creates some challenges for finding the correct balance in the curriculum moving forward.

The Challenges Moving Forward

Prior to Afghanistan, the focus of both the staff and war college level curriculum was not on the whole-of-government engagement that is found in today’s curriculum. For example, one of the staff college goals in the early 2000s was joint and combined operations aimed at developing an ability to plan and conduct joint operations but without any articulated reference to whole-of-government operations.15 It was military centered and aimed at providing education at the operational level of war. The program goal of military operations planning in table 2 has added the whole-of-government context when indicating “across the spectrum of conflict in support of federal government direction.”16 The phrase “across the spectrum of conflict” allowed faculty members to develop curriculum that included more emphasis on military operations other than war.17 The phrase “in support of federal government direction” allowed faculty to set the curriculum within the broader whole-of-government context. These adjustments were made gradually, leveraging lessons from operations in Afghanistan, discussions with our traditional allies, and in the case of the war college level program, input from our civilian colleagues.

The war college program has perhaps changed the most since Young’s direction. Originally delivered as a three-month program focused on warfighting and a six-month program focused on national security, the war college program was changed to a 10-month program in 2008.18 This new National Security Programme (NSP) includes civilian participation from other government departments and has a much more deliberate focus on how the government engages in complex security environments to achieve strategic effect. For example, the articulated aim in the 2017 syllabus indicates the NSP is “designed to prepare selected military, public service, international and private sector leaders for future strategic responsibilities within a complex and ambiguous global security environment.”19 As with the staff college program, college faculty have adjusted the curriculum to reflect the lessons during the past decade and the need for military effects at the strategic level to be part of the broader whole-of-government intentions. The creation of provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan with representation from multiple government organizations is an example of this whole-of-government approach.
More problematic is trying to find the correct balance between the war-fighting requirements of higher-level military command and the broader institutional requirements that most general and flag officers in a smaller middle-power military must master. Smaller militaries will work as part of larger coalitions, so there is room for a discussion about how much focus needs to be placed on the skills required of a force commander versus how much focus there needs to be on the corporate systems that support getting military capability to the fight. Canada is in a position today where there is a clear requirement for a program that touches the full range of responsibilities for the national security professional, military and civilian. What remains to be clarified moving forward is how broad this education must be versus which specific areas require more depth and expertise. This is a trade-off between a mile wide and an inch deep versus a mile deep and inch wide.

The other major change for both the staff and war college programs since Young’s direction is the connection of the programs to graduate degrees and the requirement to deliver professional military education at the graduate level. Here, the competing requirements of the profession of arms and academic credibility create challenges for how best to achieve the correct balance. Does the requirement to deliver PME at the graduate level mean that a graduate degree is required? Or is the real intention to create a leadership cohort that is capable of critical thinking, dealing with uncertainty, and demonstrating an intellectual capacity that allows officers to understand and work in a challenging, complex security environment with multiple actors, multiple agendas, and multiple priorities? The academic desire is for education at the graduate level to have the rigor needed to ensure that the individual has demonstrated the ability to integrate theories, conduct independent research of complex issues, and demonstrate coherent justifications of arguments presented. There are mixed messages within the profession as to whether this higher level of development is required or whether the requirement is that all courses must be taught at the graduate level. And even if it is the latter, the difficulty is that arguing that your curriculum is at the graduate level is only valid if a university is prepared to give you graduate credit for what you are doing. The balance is perhaps best articulated by Paul Mitchell:

CFC is not a university in function. It has a pragmatic and focused professional purpose which limits, to a degree, the free pursuit of knowledge: education must have concrete military and strategic utility. . . . Our mission is to help them think critically about their job, to more fully understand the larger political and strategic context in which they are embedded and the ways it influences how they act.
Once again, benchmarking with our traditional allies is important, and most staff and war colleges have connections to graduate degrees. Without a mechanism for achieving a graduate degree, international officer exchanges may be more difficult.23

The release of the new defense policy in June 2017 is also critical in determining what needs to be changed moving forward. This is the “in support of federal government direction” piece of the staff college’s military operations goal and the war college program’s “future strategic responsibilities within a complex and ambiguous global security environment.” One of the most significant issues from the new defense policy is the concurrency of operations concept and the requirement for CAF to conduct a variety of missions across the spectrum of conflict. The new policy defines the core missions and what the government expects CAF to do concurrently, to include “lead[ing] and/or contrib[uting] forces to NATO and coalition efforts to deter and defeat adversaries, including terrorists, to support global security.”24 This is a clear indication that staff and war college curriculum needs to cover both COIN and high-intensity conflict as well as a variety of other activities, such as disaster assistance and peace operations.

Peace operations in today’s environment bring a more challenging set of requirements that need to be considered for a middle-power nation like Canada. Perhaps one of the more significant challenges moving forward will come from the shift required for modern peacekeeping operations. In addition to the acceptance that UN missions today are peace support operations versus peacekeeping operations, most missions have the protection of civilians as a key objective; this includes preventing conflict-related sexual violence and dealing with child soldiers.25 Following a decade in Afghanistan, the military may find itself unprepared at this point in time for the demands of modern peacekeeping missions. This is just one issue in a long list of operational and institutional issues that faculty are being asked to deal with in a short, 10-month program of study.

Letting the faculty decide is probably the most pragmatic answer to trying to find the correct balance to these competing demands. But it is at the same time an unsatisfactory answer. Guidance on what the priorities are for both the staff and war college would be useful. Ideally, that guidance would also be informed guidance because the faculty will continue to adjust the actual content of lectures and case studies to reflect the political and operational realities that face the CAF.

Faculty know that, in 2018, military members are deployed in areas requiring knowledge of both high-intensity conflict and COIN and that is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Faculty know that the curriculum must cover both areas and that, for a smaller military such as Canada’s, there are significant numbers of general and flag officer positions engaged in the broader
national security enterprise, for government and institutional expertise will be just as important as military expertise. The curriculum must cover these issues in the correct balance to ensure the longer-term success for both the profession and the institution.

This is hardly a satisfactory answer for those expecting clarity in what is to be covered and how it is to be assessed. It is, however, likely the best of the worst options in an environment full of uncertainty and constrained resources. Faculty would benefit from clear and informed guidance that articulates the balance sought between warfighting, institutional excellence, academic rigor, and the priorities of government.

Notes
2. Dr. J. L. Granatstein, “A Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence: For Efficient and Effective Forces, The Honourable M. Douglas Young, Report to the Prime Minister” (unpublished paper, Ottawa, Public Works and Government Services Canada, 25 March 1997), 19. This was one of a number of papers written for the minister as a result of the CF engagement in Somalia and the death of a Somali teenager. There were significant changes made to the staff college curriculum as a result of the direction that subsequently came from M. Douglas Young. The key document came from Young, Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1997).
3. Up until this time, it was possible to join the Canadian Forces under the Officer Candidate Training Plan, a plan that allowed individuals to join the operational classifications (e.g., pilot, infantry, maritime surface) without a university degree. The key leaders in the Somalia incident did not hold university degrees.
4. One additional difference for the CF is the requirement to be able to work in English and French at the senior levels. You cannot be promoted to colonel without being able to work in both languages and language ability is a rated factor in the promotion process prior to that rank level. This adds a significant amount of additional training and education for an officer during their career.
5. The programs for 2017 included the Joint Command and Staff Programme (a yearlong residential version and a two-year distance learning version), the National Security Programme, and the Executive Leadership Programme. Note that the CFC also runs a two-week Canadian Security Studies Programme and a two-week Joint Command and Staff Programme.
6. For the purposes of this discussion, the term high-intensity conflict refers to warfare characterized by rapidly evolving, highly lethal, multidomain operations. For example, as far back as 2008, Maj Warren E. Sponsler, USA, wrote that the U.S. Army had been successfully fighting COIN wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but that units had “lost many of the full spectrum core-competency warfighting skills that make our Army the most formidable in the world.” See Maj Warren E. Sponsler, “Striking the Balance between Training High-Intensity Conflict and Countrinsurgency [sic]: Maintaining Full Spectrum Dominance in the US Army” (master’s thesis, Marine Corps University, 2008), ii.
10. Officer General Specifications, 1.3. Additional detail is provided by documents detailing the occupational specifications and specialty specifications.


12. Evaluation of the Canadian Defence Academy, 8.

13. For example, the chief of defense staff’s direction on Operation Honour to deal with sexual misconduct and harassment; the government’s agreement on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (S/RES/1325) for women, peace, and security; and the development of Joint Doctrine Note 2017-01 Child Soldiers are contemporary examples of policies, direction, and guidance that must be included in curriculum above and beyond the technical aspects in the OGS.

14. The Canadian government’s agreement to S/RES/1325 on women and gender is an example of an international agreement that then must be considered in the delivery of PME, while the post-9/11 decision by the government to engage in Afghanistan created a need to ensure that counterinsurgency was more deliberately covered in curriculum.

15. For example, the Command and Staff Course syllabus in 2000 indicated “the aim of area goal #4 is to develop the student’s ability to plan and conduct joint and combined operations.” MajGen J. G. E. Tremblay, “Syllabus: Canadian Forces College (CSC) Joint Command and Staff Programme Residential (JCSP RESID) and Joint Command and Staff Distance Learning (JCSP DL),” 1-E-2/3.


17. Military operations other than war is the contemporary term from the early 2000s to deal with operations that were not defined as high-intensity conflict.

18. The reader should be aware that this three-month and six-month structure began in 1998. In years prior, there was a yearlong program called National Defence College, but it was cancelled as part of budget reductions implemented in the mid-1990s.


20. In the context of this discussion, the term middle power refers to a state that holds a position in the international power spectrum below that of a superpower, which wields superior influence over all other states, or of a great power, but with sufficient ability to shape international events.

21. For example, in the Canadian case, could those officers selected for higher operational command attend an allied nation’s course like the United Kingdom’s Higher Command and Staff Course, or could CFC run a specifically designed and tailored program of study when the need arises?


23. It is important to note that the master’s of defense studies associated with JCSP is a professional degree that would prepare an individual to undertake a professionally based doctorate in defense studies but would not prepare an individual to undertake a doctoral program in a more traditional discipline-specific academic program. The master’s of public administration associated with the NSP is an academically based program at RMC and NSP students receive up to 9 of the 12 credits required for the degree.


25. Canada has recently developed specific doctrine for dealing with child soldiers. Released as a Joint Doctrine Note in March 2017, the CAF is setting an important precedent for military forces on UN missions. See Child Soldiers, JDN 2017-01 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2017).
On the Pedagogical Intent of Clausewitz’s On War

Timothy McCranor

Abstract: Jon Sumida provides a novel interpretation of On War that has implications for military education. Clausewitz, he argues, proposes a pedagogical theory of how to enhance the decision-making capacities of officers through an unconventional approach to the study of history. To support his case that On War is a theory of practice, Sumida demonstrates several affinities between Carl von Clausewitz and twentieth-century thinkers rather than late eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century ones. But there is also evidence that suggests that Clausewitz’s contemporary, Friedrich Schleiermacher, influenced the pedagogical intent of On War.

Keywords: Clausewitz, On War, officer education, professional military education, PME, pedagogy, Jon Sumida, historical reenactment, critical analysis, intuition, Azar Gat, Peter Paret, Friedrich Schleiermacher

While the need to read On War seems undisputed, the same cannot be said of its completeness, meaning, and intent. For some scholars, the work is incomplete. Its meaning and intent are not simply abstruse but nonexistent. For others, On War is sufficiently finished, but they disagree with how its concepts and dictums about friction, fog, and politics fit together to explain the nature of war. Still others argue that On War is not a theory of a phenomenon at all, but rather one of practice, an interpretation first

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MCU Journal vol. 9, no. 1
Spring 2018
www.usmcu.edu/mcupress
https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.2018090105
suggested by G. B. Gallie that was fully developed by Jon Sumida, who argues that *On War* "is about the how of learning to do something rather than the what of something’s general nature,” the aim of which is to provide a more effective method for officer education to enhance decision-making capacities. Introducing a new interpretation of *On War* is not the purpose of this article. Rather, it is to strengthen the case for Sumida’s pedagogical one, an interpretation that has implications for military education. As with most scholarship, Sumida addresses the ongoing debate about the philosophical character of Clausewitz’s thought, but he adopts another unconventional approach. To support his case that *On War* is a theory of practice, Sumida turns to twentieth-century thinkers rather than late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century ones. While his findings certainly reveal numerous affinities between Clausewitz and these later thinkers, there is also evidence that suggests that one of Clausewitz’s contemporaries influenced the pedagogical intent of *On War*. But in lieu of the usual German suspects, such as Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Friedrich Schleiermacher emerges as the philosopher who shaped Clausewitz’s attempt to design a novel method of self-education for military officers.

**The Question of Clausewitz’s Philosphic Roots**

Few military history scholars have failed to acknowledge Clausewitz’s intellectual ambitions, and *On War* is widely regarded as a highly philosophical work. Thus, identifying the intellectual sources of his thought has been an integral, persistent, and contested component of Clausewitz scholarship. According to the more-or-less traditional view, the philosophic language, substance, and methodology of *On War* suggest that Clausewitz was decidedly influenced by the German idealists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, namely Kant and Hegel, whose system of categories or dialectical method of analysis, for example, profoundly shaped several of his key ideas, such as absolute versus limited war and the relationship between attack and defense. In a frequently quoted passage, an early commentator describes Clausewitz as the “most German of Germans. . . . In reading him one constantly has the feeling of being in a metaphysical fog.” Though this emphasis on Kant and Hegel is, generally speaking, more characteristic of earlier scholarship on Clausewitz, it has not entirely disappeared.

This traditional approach to the philosophic origins of Clausewitz’s thought was challenged by a number of seminal works published during the last few decades, although a new consensus has hardly emerged. The significance of German idealism, especially that of Kant and Hegel, was increasingly questioned. Numerous new philosophic sources and contexts were considered or stressed. There was also a greater insistence that Clausewitz is best understood as an original thinker in his own right and that his experiences on the battlefield are as
important to understanding his thought as is his speculative education. Finally, the question concerning the extent to which Clausewitz was influenced by earlier philosophers gave way to the extent to which he anticipated later ones. While the following five authors hardly exhaust the scholarship on Clausewitz during this period, their novel lines of inquiry adequately represent the key themes and arguments necessary for the present study.

Two of these seminal works appeared in 1976. The first was Raymond Aron’s *Clausewitz: Philosopher of War*. In no uncertain terms, Aron argues that recourse to Kant and Hegel does not significantly enhance our understanding of *On War*. He concedes that a number of Clausewitz’s concepts are dialectic and that several of his expressions have “a Kantian ring,” but such affinities are too superficial and require too many qualifications to be helpful. Aron further maintains that “the conceptualization of Clausewitz resembles that of Montesquieu far more closely than anybody has ever suggested, and far more than any similarity it may bear to the works of Hegel or Kant.” Nonetheless, he concludes, “I do not think the influence of [Charles-Louis de Secondat] Montesquieu matters very much.” Instead of emphasizing possible philosophic sources, Aron emphasizes Clausewitz’s distinctiveness. *On War*, he writes, “is a study, by Clausewitz himself, of problems that arose from his own conception of things. . . . From the start, the dialectic of material and moral set Clausewitz. . . . against the great builders of systems.”

The other seminal work of 1976 came from Peter Paret’s *Clausewitz and the State*. To explore the genesis of his theory, Paret discusses Clausewitz’s “social and intellectual antecedents, his surroundings, his experiences, and the ways in which they influenced his attempts to understand and explain politics and war.” However, Paret recognizes that Clausewitz’s concepts and method owe much to the German idealists and romantics of his day—not only Kant, Hegel, and Johann Gottlieb Fichte but also Johann Gottfried Herder, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Friedrich Schilling, Alexander von Humboldt, and Friedrich and August Schlegel. “Clausewitz’s debt to the philosophy and science of his time is obvious,” he writes. “From Kant and his successors he acquired his tools of speculative reasoning, and learned to have confidence in their power.” Paret also examines the influences of non-German thinkers, such as Niccolò Machiavelli and Montesquieu.

But like Aron, Paret cautions against ascribing too much significance to these thinkers, let alone one of them, also noting the novelty of Clausewitz’s thought. “German philosophy,” he writes, “gave him the means of subjecting war to logical inquiry, and no doubt contributed to his desire to do so, but it did less to shape the result than might be assumed.” In an earlier essay, Paret decidedly argues that relating “Clausewitz to Kant or Hegel almost necessarily results in forced and unconvincing historical constructions.” While the com-
ponents of Clausewitz’s analytic system are perhaps derivative, his “originality lay in the manner in which he combined separate analytic strands and applied their integrated force to the issues of conflict. Perhaps for this reason we cannot point to any single ancestor of his theoretical method among German philosophers.” Paret further challenges the significance of Clausewitz’s predecessors on the grounds that his analysis of war “was as much the result of action and experience as it was of speculative effort.” What Clausewitz witnessed on the battlefield influenced *On War* as much as, and perhaps more than, what he heard in any lecture hall.

Another thorough treatment of Clausewitz appears in Azar Gat’s *The History of Military Thought*, which builds on the work of Aron and Paret while taking some issue with certain aspects of their work. Gat, too, denies to Kant or Hegel a singular or decisive influence, and he applauds the extensive material that Paret brings to bear on Clausewitz. Nevertheless, Gat faults them for failing to appreciate some of his major influences and for too readily brushing aside Kant and Hegel; Gat devotes some attention to Kant’s theory of art and Hegel’s philosophic idealism. Moreover, according to Gat, Aron and Paret, among others, fail to recognize the broader intellectual and cultural context that shaped Clausewitz. Clausewitz responded to military thinkers who sought to formulate a theory that would reduce war “to rules and principles of universal validity and possibly even mathematical certainty.” But these thinkers were not “curious eccentrics with peculiar ideas.” They were pupils of the Enlightenment, which equated humans and nature in their susceptibility to scientific analysis. Likewise, “Clausewitz’s ideas did not appear out of thin air.” He was part of the German Movement, a diverse intellectual response to the Enlightenment that included historicism, romanticism, and idealism. Clausewitz, Gat contends, cannot be understood apart from this complicated conflict between the Enlightenment and the German Movement.

Despite their different emphases with respect to who or what influenced Clausewitz, and to what extent such influence is significant, Aron, Paret, and Gat all agree that *On War* is a theory of a phenomenon. That is to say, all agree that *On War* is a description of the nature of war. Paret argues, for example, that the “purpose of Clausewitz’s theoretical writings was to develop not a new doctrine but a truer understanding of the phenomenon of war,” a purpose that Paret describes as “phenomenological in the modern, Husserlian sense of the term.” For Gat’s Clausewitz, the surface of war is always in flux but war itself has “an immutable core,” a spirit, essence, or nature. “Above historical study and crude rules,” Gat writes of Clausewitz’s approach, “there exists a universal theory which reflects the lasting nature of war, transcends the diversity and transformations of past experience, and is both generally valid and instructive.” To be sure, these scholars disagree considerably about how Clausewitz describes the
nature of war, as well as the extent to which that description has prescriptive implications for the conduct of war. But that Clausewitz is attempting to describe a particular phenomenon is generally accepted.

The position that *On War* is a theory of a phenomenon was first questioned by W. B. Gallie, who published his *Philosophers of Peace and War* shortly after the release of Aron and Paret’s major works. In the single chapter devoted to Clausewitz, Gallie levels a number of deep criticisms at *On War*. Nonetheless, Gallie upholds the judgment of Aron and Paret by insisting on the philosophical achievement and significance of *On War*. “No one with the slightest acquaintance with philosophy,” he writes, “could fail to suspect that [Clausewitz] was a man of marked philosophical ability,” whose contributions to philosophy, though limited, “would have been much appreciated by Aristotle.” Gallie departs from Aron and Paret somewhat, however, by arguing that Clausewitz’s methodology, particularly his distinction between absolute and real war, was influenced by Kant’s principle of division. Clausewitz’s conception of absolute war, as well as the fact that he attended J. G. Kiesewetter’s lectures on Kant in 1803 while at the Berlin War School, led Gallie to conclude that it “therefore seems to me highly probable that this idea is Kantian in origin or at least in inspiration.” But more importantly, Gallie also makes a few passing remarks that introduce a different approach to understanding *On War*’s philosophical character. He suggests that Clausewitz’s philosophical contributions “were centered on the idea of practice” and that aspects of his thought, far from being derivative, actually anticipate a later philosopher, R. G. Collingwood.

These two final suggestions were developed almost three decades later by Jon Sumida, in *Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War*. With respect to Kant and Hegel, Sumida argues alongside Aron and Paret, and against Gat and Gallie, that their influence was significant. As a consequence of *On War*’s philosophical character, Sumida argues, “much—indeed, perhaps too much—has been made of Clausewitz’s use of Kant’s principle of division or Hegel’s dialectical form of argument.” This misguided reliance on Kant and Hegel, according to Sumida, is the result of interpreting *On War* as a theory of a phenomenon rather than a theory of practice. Clausewitzian theory, he contends, “embodies ideas that anticipated those of later philosophers and the findings of twentieth-century mathematics and cognitive science.” *On War* is therefore “a philosophically and scientifically creative achievement rather than a mere adaptation of certain well-known philosophical approaches of his day.” Accordingly, Sumida examines the work of Charles Sanders Peirce, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Collingwood.

This brief survey of somewhat recent Clausewitz scholarship brings to light three relevant questions. The first is the extent to which Clausewitz was influenced by the philosophers of his age. Aron best illustrates the challenge to the
conventional view that superficially portrays Clausewitz as a Kantian or Hegelian, but he too readily disregards such influence altogether. Paret and Gat exemplify the approach that acknowledges Clausewitz’s highly eclectic approach to contemporary thinkers, though they place different emphasis on different sources. The second question is whether *On War* should be understood as a theory of a phenomenon or a theory of practice. Although their interpretations differ considerably, Aron, Paret, and Gat argue that *On War* is a theory regarding the nature of war. Sumida, and to a lesser extent Gallie, depart from this traditional view and argue that *On War* is a theory of practice. This disagreement leads to the final question: To what extent should Clausewitz be understood with the help of his contemporaries at all? Sumida, and to a lesser extent Gallie, argue that Clausewitz is better understood as a thinker who anticipated later thinkers rather than followed past ones. Thus, the contention that *On War* is a theory of practice rests, in part, on the case against understanding Clausewitz by reference to his contemporaries, let alone to Kant and Hegel. The rest of this article attempts to show that Sumida’s case for reinterpreting the intent of *On War* can be further strengthened by following the traditional approach to its philosophic character.

**Clausewitz and Schleiermacher**

Despite the persistent interest in the philosophic origins of Clausewitz’s thought, Germanic or otherwise, little consideration has been given to the possibility that Clausewitz was influenced by another contemporary of his, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), a German theologian, philosopher, and classical scholar. Though usually not placed in the same philosophic class as Kant and Hegel, Schleiermacher made important contributions to a number of fields, such as hermeneutics and liberal theology. Unfortunately, there is scant evidence that sheds light on the extent to which Clausewitz may have been familiar with Schleiermacher’s work and thought.

Lack of conclusive evidence notwithstanding, Paret, Clausewitz’s preeminent biographer, argues that “it is safe to assume that the two men knew each other.” Schleiermacher confirmed Clausewitz’s wife, Marie von Brühl, who also had a broad familiarity with the philosophic ideas of the age. In 1807, Schleiermacher returned to Berlin after serving as a professor of theology at the University of Halle for several years, whereupon the two resumed their acquaintance; Clausewitz and Brühl had begun their official courtship in 1806 and Clausewitz returned from internment in France to occupied Berlin in 1807.

In 1811, Achim von Arnim and other frequenters of the salon of Luise von Voss invited Clausewitz to the gatherings of the Christlich-Deutsche Tischgesellschaft, a group that met every second Tuesday throughout Berlin to discuss literature and politics. Its members included both Fichte and Schleiermacher.
Schleiermacher was also a friend of Gerhard Scharnhorst, whose “influence on the young Clausewitz, his pupil and closest protégé,” according to Gat, “cannot be exaggerated.”

An objection could be made that social relations hardly constitute evidence that Clausewitz read the work of Schleiermacher, let alone closely. But this objection is no more damaging with respect to Schleiermacher than it is with respect to other thinkers who may have influenced Clausewitz. In most cases, there is little evidence that Clausewitz was directly familiar with the philosophic works of Kant or Hegel. In discussing Clausewitz’s conception of absolute war, for example, Gallie argues that it is “highly probable that this idea is Kantian in origin or at least in inspiration: which is not of course to claim that Clausewitz had any detailed or even first hand [sic] knowledge of Kant’s writings, or any great insight into his philosophy.” As many scholars note, Clausewitz was introduced to Kant through the lectures of a well-known Kant popularizer, Kiesewetter. And despite all that has been made of their apparent similarities, there is also scant evidence that Clausewitz actually read Hegel.

When it comes to proving Clausewitz’s influences, emphasis is usually placed on his general interest in philosophic matters and the environment in which his thought developed. Despite the variety of interpretations regarding his influences, there is a consensus that Clausewitz was an incredibly erudite man who associated with Prussia’s intellectual elite, in part thanks to his marriage to Marie von Brühl. Paret describes Clausewitz as “a typical educated representative of his generation, who attended lectures on logic and ethics designed for the general public, read relevant nonprofessional books and articles, and drew scraps of ideas at second and third hand from his cultural environment.” For his part, Gat repeatedly stresses the importance of looking at the German intellectual environment in which Clausewitz operated, as well as the social circles in which he moved, to understand his thought. However deep their personal acquaintance may have run, then, it seems unlikely that Clausewitz would have been entirely unfamiliar with the thoughts of Schleiermacher, one of the most prominent philosophers of the time.

Taken together, these biographical details have already helped Paret and Gat to take note of the apparent similarities between Schleiermacher and Clausewitz. In a passing footnote, Paret remarks that “certain features of Clausewitz’s mature theoretical work show similarities with Schleiermacher’s writings—for example, the nondescriptive function of theory, the absolute concept of the subject studied, which is modified in reality, and the concern with the acting individual.” In particular, Paret and Gat both note that many of Clausewitz’s statements on religion reflect ideas that were articulated in the lectures that Schleiermacher published in Berlin shortly before Clausewitz’s arrival there. After citing a passage written by Clausewitz on positive religion, Gat writes...
that “Schleiermacher’s influence here is all too apparent.” More generally, Gat suggests that Schleiermacher’s ideas on the historical character of all positive religions in contrast to a universal religious feeling was one of the many intellectual sources that influenced Clausewitz’s attempt to “formulate a universal theory of war which would be valid despite and within the great diversity of historical experience.”

But these suggestions are scarcely more than passing remarks, and they are made in the context of interpreting On War as a theory of a phenomenon. The rest of this article explores the possibility that Schleiermacher played an important role in Clausewitz’s attempt to provide a theory of practice by drawing upon the novel interpretation developed by Sumida in Decoding Clausewitz. If Sumida’s interpretation is correct, then he rightly depreciates the influence of Kant and Hegel, and he judiciously makes use of later thinkers. However, neither step excludes the possibility of identifying another contemporary who influenced Clausewitz’s pedagogy. Indeed, both the problem and solution that Sumida believes Clausewitz to be laying out in On War bear a number of similarities with Schleiermacher’s work on hermeneutics, especially his translations of Plato.

**Clausewitz and the Problem of Language**

In large part, according to Sumida, On War was meant to address a pressing national security concern: preparing Prussia for a likely war with France. The most important element of this preparation for Clausewitz was the training and education of military leadership. A competent military commander possesses three fundamental attributes: intellect, temperament, and experience. The third and final element, arguably the most important, presented a particular problem; following a decade of peace, Prussia’s young military commanders lacked any practical experience in war. Teaching the dynamics and dilemmas of high command to individuals with no recourse to practical experience became Clausewitz’s preeminent concern. This endeavor was further complicated when he discovered the inability of the written word to teach properly.

Disparaging comments about the limited capacity of language to convey meaning permeate On War. When describing strategy, Clausewitz uses such words as “cheap,” and “the most common means of creating false impressions.” When describing the errors committed by prevailing military theories, he condemns “the retinue of jargon, technicalities, and metaphors, that attends these systems. They swarm everywhere—a lawless rabble of camp followers.” Despite the futility and vanity of these “technical expressions and metaphors,” military theorists cannot help but use them, leading to content without meaning. He also casts doubt about the possibility of providing proper and reliable
definitions for terms, concepts, and other expressions. “The very nature of the
question,” he writes, “makes it impossible to give an accurate definition of these
different factors of space, mass, and time.”45 Expressions such as “‘a dominating
area,’ ‘a covering position,’ and ‘key to the country’ are . . . for the most part
hollow shells lacking any sound core.”46

The weakness of language is particularly evident with respect to Clausewitz’s
primary concern: the nature of high command. This concern separates Clause-
witz’s thought from the conventional military theories of his day, which focused
on “material factors” or the maintenance of military forces, tactical engagement
on the battlefield, numerical superiority, supply, and interior lines.47 But in war,
these “material factors” are rendered irrelevant by the role of chance, the un-
certainty of all information, and the unpredictable interplay of two opposing
sides.48 Accordingly, the “moral factors” become paramount, the most import-
ant of which is the intuition, or genius, of the military commander. Complex,
strategic dilemmas are solved by intuition, not theoretical, dogmatic proposi-
tions.49 However, the importance of these moral factors is equaled only by their
ineffability. “Theory becomes infinitely more difficult as soon as it touches the
realm of moral values,” Clausewitz writes.50 Despite their paramountcy and per-
meation, the moral factors “will not yield to academic wisdom. They cannot be
classified or counted.”51

Clausewitz’s remarks regarding the unreliability of language constitute a
critical component of Sumida’s novel interpretation of \textit{On War}. Sumida argues
that these remarks help to demonstrate that Clausewitz is best understood in
light of later philosophers, such as Peirce, Wittgenstein, and Collingwood, as
opposed to Kant and Hegel. After providing a brief overview of these three
thinkers, Sumida writes:

These brief glimpses into the thought of Peirce, Wittgenstein,
and Collingwood provide ample evidence for Gallie’s conten-
tion that Clausewitz anticipated important later philosophical
work and possessed original philosophical talent of a very high
order. Like Clausewitz, all three thinkers problematized lan-
guage with respect to the communication of meaning about
matters involving human behavior, distrusted the invention of
technical vocabularies, were skeptical of the utility of theory
that was based upon rules, and believed that experience can
convey meaning in ways that language cannot.52

We cannot argue that Clausewitz expressed serious reservations about the value
of language and that these reservations were similarly expressed by Peirce, Witt-
genstein, and Collingwood. However, the latter three men are hardly the first
thinkers to write about the deficiencies and unreliability of language, in general, and the written word, in particular. In fact, these very same themes are clearly discussed by Schleiermacher.

To understand how Schleiermacher might have influenced Clausewitz, we must consider one of Schleiermacher’s major philosophic projects: his translation and interpretation of Plato’s dialogues. The substance of Schleiermacher’s work on Plato not only offers a likely source for his influence on Clausewitz but the timing and notoriety of that project strengthens the case that Clausewitz was exposed to relevant material. It is hard to imagine, in light of Clausewitz’s relationship to the intellectual milieu of his time, that he would have been unaware of Schleiermacher’s work on Plato.

According to Schleiermacher, no other thinker affected him as much as Plato.53 More importantly, Schleiermacher was the first scholar to translate Plato into German. Though the project to translate the Platonic corpus was originally conceived of by Schleiermacher’s friend, Friedrich Schlegel, and while it was Schlegel who invited Schleiermacher on board, Schleiermacher would become solely responsible for the project. Platons Werke was eventually published in six volumes. The first volume appeared in 1804, which included the Phaedrus, Lysis, Protagoras, and Laches, as well as Schleiermacher’s “General Introduction.” Another five volumes would appear during the next six years.54

The importance of Schleiermacher’s translations and interpretations is beyond dispute, and it did not take long for the quality of that work to be recognized. In a published review of Platons Werke shortly after its release, the philologist August Böckh wrote that “no one has so fully understood Plato and has taught others to understand Plato as this man.”55 According to a contemporary scholar of Schleiermacher, Julia A. Lamm, “Schleiermacher’s translation of Plato’s dialogues, along with his accompanying ‘Introductions,’ was a momentous event in the philosophical, philological, and literary world. . . . His interpretation of Plato’s dialogues, as explicated in his ‘Introductions,’ changed the entire course of Plato studies and continues to reverberate even now, two centuries later.”56 Some of the preeminent Platonic scholars of the twentieth century, such as Hans-Georg Gadamer, Leo Strauss, and Jacob Klein, also recognized the significance of Schleiermacher’s work on Plato.57

The intention here is not to provide a thorough examination of Schleiermacher’s approach to the study of Plato, let alone a critical assessment of that study; after all, most of Schleiermacher’s interpretation of Plato is irrelevant for studying Clausewitz. Instead, it is to identify particular aspects of that interpretation that Clausewitz might have applied to his own work. And one salient aspect of that interpretation concerns the problem of language. Schleiermacher’s “General Introduction” begins by dismissing the usefulness of Plato’s biographical details when interpreting the dialogues. Examining the status of
the study of language during Plato’s lifetime is a more suitable starting point. Schleiermacher writes,

And in like manner, also, whoever does not possess a competent knowledge of the deficient state of the language for philosophical purposes, to feel where and how Plato is cramped by it, and where he himself laboriously extends its grasp, must necessarily misunderstand his author, and that, for the most part, in the most remarkable passages.58

But Schleiermacher’s most interesting and relevant comments regarding the problem of language arise when he turns to the *Phaedrus*. And the dialogue that most clearly reveals one of the great ironies of Plato’s work: a Platonic dialogue is a written text, a mode of communication disparaged by Socrates himself, both in speech and in deed. It is also arguably the most important dialogue for Schleiermacher’s overall interpretation of Plato.

Toward the end of the dialogue, Socrates tells Phaedrus a story about the Egyptian god, Theuth, who founded many arts, including that of “written letters.”59 When describing the benefits of these various arts to the Egyptian king, Thamos, Theuth depicts writing as a drug that “will make the Egyptians wiser and provide them with better memory.”60 Thamos, however, demurs:

For this [writing] will provide forgetfulness in the souls of those who have learned it, through neglect of memory, seeing that, through trust in writing, they recollect from outside with alien markings, not reminding themselves from inside, by themselves. You have therefore found a drug not for memory, but for reminding. You are supplying the opinion of wisdom to the students, not truth. For you’ll see that, having become hearers of much without teaching, they will seem to be sensible judges in much, while being for the most part senseless, and hard to be with, since they’ve become wise in their own opinion instead of wise.61

Shortly thereafter, Socrates describes the simpleminded as anyone who thinks one can receive “something distinct and solid from writings.”62 He also makes a disparaging comparison between writing and a type of farming that is only appropriate “for the sake of play and festivity.”63 There is, Socrates insists, “of necessity much playfulness in the written speech about each thing and that no speech has ever been written, in meter or without meter, that is worthy of great seriousness.”64 He concludes that written speeches are “powerless . . . to teach true things competently.”65

The *Phaedrus* occupies a position of extreme importance in Schleiermacher’s
interpretation of Plato’s dialogues. According to his ordering of the dialogues, which is itself crucial for his interpretation as a whole, the *Phaedrus* is positioned first, and it contains “the germs of nearly the whole of [Plato’s] system.” When Schleiermacher explains the method by which Plato’s dialogues can be understood, he himself makes the following comments regarding the *Phaedrus*:

Treating the subject in a somewhat trifling manner, [Plato] complains of the uncertainty which always attaches to written communication of thoughts, as to whether the mind also of the reader has spontaneously conformed to such communication, and in reality appropriated it to itself, or whether, with the mere ocular apprehension of the words and letters a vain conceit is excited in the mind that it understands what it does not understand. Hence, that it is folly to build too much upon this, and that true reliance can be placed only upon oral and living instruction. 

This juxtaposition of disparaging statements regarding language and writing is not intended to argue that Plato, Schleiermacher, and Clausewitz are presenting identical arguments or concerns. For example, we make no effort here to distinguish between language, writing, and speaking. But to focus on such nuances with regard to Clausewitz is to miss the forest for the trees. Clausewitz does not develop a philosophy of language, nor did he intend to. But he nonetheless arrives at a conclusion similar to that of Plato and conveyed by Schleiermacher; that language, in whatever form, is a questionable instrument when it comes to learning.

In his analysis of the *Phaedrus*, Jacob Klein, a Platonic scholar who greatly admired Schleiermacher’s work, concludes that “a written text is necessarily incomplete and cannot teach properly.” In almost full agreement, Clausewitz writes, “A book cannot really teach us how to do anything.” What, then, are we to conclude concerning the works of Clausewitz and Schleiermacher’s Plato? Can we argue that neither one of them presents any sort of teaching? This accusation has been leveled at both *On War* and the dialogues. Both Sumida and Schleiermacher argue that this idea is wrong.

**Clausewitz’s Theory of Practice**

The absence of armed conflict renders the need for an effective, palliative substitute for the development of proper and effective military leadership. But the conventional, pedagogical practices of Clausewitz’s time were inadequate because, in part, the nature of high command, and the moral factors that constitute military genius, cannot be conveyed by the written word. Clausewitz’s approach to officer education must therefore fulfill two requirements: first, the
approach must serve as an appropriate substitute for actual experience; second, that approach had to be free from the defects of the written word.

The core of Clausewitz’s new approach to pedagogy is critical analysis, or what Sumida calls *historical reenactment*. Critical analysis is the thorough and rigorous examination of a single historical event, the focus of which is the high-ranking commander who participated in the event. Engaging in critical analysis means to taste, swallow, and digest everything the commander knew, considered, and did, to say nothing of the when, where, why, and how. The pupil must try, Clausewitz writes, “to put himself exactly in the position of the commander; in other words, he must assemble everything the commander knew and all the motives that affected his decision, and ignore all that he could not or did not know, especially the outcome.”

Sumida describes this process as “an imagined replication of past decision-making of a commander-in-chief,” the purpose of which is to feel, or experience, the moral, emotional, and psychological elements of high command. The most important outcome of critical analysis is not an evaluation of, but rather an appreciation for, the dynamics and dilemmas of high command. Its purpose is to understand “why decisions were hard, rather than whether they had been right or wrong.” Sumida explains:

In Clausewitzian reenactment, historical authenticity is less important than intellectual and emotional verisimilitude. This is because the aim of reenactment is not imitation of the behavior of the historical actor, but replication of conditions of decision-making that pose comparable, if not the actual, intellectual and moral challenges of the historical case.

In contrast to the conventional methods of Clausewitz’s time, critical analysis is not about examining particular cases in the past to formulate universal principles that could, in turn, be applied to particular cases in the future. Clausewitz considered such an approach flawed given the uniqueness of past and future events. Instead, critical analysis, by providing a substitute for actual war, is meant to develop the qualities that constitute military genius or, in this case, intuition. History, Clausewitz writes, provides no basis for “principles, rules, or methods,” though it is useful to study history nonetheless. “While history may yield no formula,” Clausewitz explains, “it does provide an exercise for judgment here as everywhere else.”

Clausewitz’s innovative use of history for critical analysis is complicated by the inability to document and authenticate the entire historical record; gaps will invariably exist. For Sumida, this complication is the foundation of, and impetus for, Clausewitz’s theory. “In short,” Clausewitz writes, “a working theory is an essential basis for criticism. Without such a theory it is generally impossible
for criticism to reach that point at which it becomes truly instructive." To meet the requirements of critical analysis, Sumida argues that Clausewitz "establishes the validity of certain general propositions, which are then used to generate additions to the historical record in order to provide what could be regarded as a more complete representation of the dynamics of command decision." These much-debated propositions include the concepts of friction, absolute war, and the relationship between war and politics. Critical analysis is thus a combination of history and theory that makes possible the appropriate application of military theory to the study of history for the sake of experiencing the moral dynamics of high command and developing an officer's intuition.

For Sumida, equating Clausewitz's famous propositions with the teaching of *On War* is a misreading of the text, a position that represents a significant departure from most scholarship on Clausewitz. The most egregious example of this misreading is reducing *On War* to Clausewitz's most famous statement that "war is merely a continuation of policy by other means." While Clausewitz "recognizes the existence of principles of war," Sumida explains, "he uses them as points of reference rather than standards of measure." Those propositions, in other words, are critical components of the education process. They are not positive doctrines; they are hardly even descriptive statements. Clausewitz writes,

> Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books. . . . It is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield; just as a wise teacher guides and stimulates a young man's intellectual development, but is careful not to lead him by the hand for the rest of his life.

Sumida's insistence on the pedagogical purpose of Clausewitz's famous propositions more or less constitutes his argument that *On War* is to be understood as a theory of a practice as opposed to a theory of a phenomenon; it is neither descriptive nor prescriptive in the conventional sense. "A theory of practice," Sumida writes, "is about the *how* of learning to do something rather than the *what* of something's general nature." In contradistinction to all previous studies, with the slight exception of Gallie, Sumida regards "*On War* as a set of instructions on how to engage in serious learning of a highly personal nature rather than an impersonal representation of the totality of that which is to be learned." And again, Sumida (and Gallie) argue that Clausewitz's concept of critical analysis anticipated the ideas of the aforementioned philosophers, particularly Collingwood and his concept of reenactment. However, it is again worth considering the possibility that Schleiermacher influenced Clausewitz's ideas regarding critical analysis.
The irony notwithstanding, Plato’s solution to the problem of writing is the Platonic dialogue, according to Schleiermacher. Having written the dialogues himself, and having demonstrated in those dialogues his awareness of writing’s defects, we can safely presume that the Platonic dialogue is composed in such a way as to overcome those defects. The starting point for understanding how the composition of the Platonic dialogue accomplishes this task is to state the obvious; although a written text, the Platonic dialogue is not a treatise or essay. For Schleiermacher, the Platonic dialogue is a work of art. Accordingly, it is necessary “to know Plato more strictly as a Philosophical Artist, than, certainly, has been hitherto the case.”

Schleiermacher begins his “General Introduction” by lamenting the then shortcomings in Platonic studies. No other philosopher has as much right as Plato to complain about being misunderstood. Schleiermacher identifies two prevalent yet erroneous opinions about Plato and his writings: first, that one will search in vain for anything in Plato’s writings that resembles a consistent and comprehensive doctrine; second, that the dialogues primarily represent Plato’s exoteric teaching, in contrast to his esoteric teaching that must be sought elsewhere. But Schleiermacher is somewhat sympathetic to these shortcomings for, in addition to the usual difficulties inherent to the study of philosophy, there is an additional and peculiar one in the case of Plato: “his utter deviation from the ordinary forms of philosophical communication.” But it is precisely this peculiarity that provides the key to understanding Plato.

Understanding Plato requires that the reader of a Platonic dialogue not be a passive spectator. The reader ceases to be a passive spectator when they examine not only the content of a dialogue but the form in which the content is presented as well, for in the philosophy of Plato “form and content are inseparable, and no proposition is to be rightly understood, except in its own place, and with the combinations and limitations which Plato has assigned to it.” Everything depends not only on what is said but also how, when, where, by whom, to whom, and among whom, something is said, to say nothing of what is not said. It is the brilliance of the Platonic dialogue “that nothing is without its use, and that [Plato] leaves nothing for chance or blind caprice to determine, but with him everything is proportionate and co-operative according to his subjects’ range.” The reader must attach import to every detail, however trivial it may appear. By associating the content of a conversation to the context in which it takes place, the reader is transformed from a passive spectator into an active interlocutor. They imitate the only proper method of teaching and learning—a conversation between teacher and pupil. “Lacking such participation,” Klein writes in a particularly apt passage, “all that is before us is indeed nothing but a book.”

In contrast to his remarks regarding the problem of language, Schleiermacher’s interpretation of the Platonic dialogue does not readily lend itself
to comparison with Clausewitz’s critical analysis. Instructive similarities exist, nonetheless. Schleiermacher’s approach to the study of Plato and Clausewitz’s approach to the study of history encourages the student to engage in an incredibly painstaking and attentive reading exercise, where the concern for reading widely and extensively is replaced with the concern for reading closely and carefully. For Clausewitz, the meticulous and proper scrutiny of a single battle is more valuable to an officer’s education than a cursory familiarity with 10. Likewise, contemplating the complete context of a single Socratic statement is more important to the education of a potential philosopher than memorizing an assortment of Socratic dictums, such as “virtue is knowledge” or “I know that I know nothing.”

The principal purpose of these pedagogical devices is to compel the pupil to engage in a solitary form of education designed to induce understanding from within him rather than introduce it from without. In Sumida’s words, *On War* does not, therefore, teach its reader how to acquire a skill as such, but rather how to explore realms of personal thought that included emotional elements in relation to the sorts of difficult problem-solving likely to arise in the course of decision-making in war. The intended product of this process is a sensibility . . . [that] can provide a measure of sound understanding and a platform for further learning. Clausewitz’s method of learning thus involved a process of inducing a form of self-knowledge, as opposed to the importation of technical knowledge.98

There is little doubt that Schleiermacher shares this sentiment with respect to the Platonic dialogue. In describing the “Platonic form,” he writes that every part of its composition flows from the “purpose of compelling the mind of the reader to the spontaneous production of ideas.”99 Plato’s “chief object” was to construct the dialogue in such a way that the reader is driven either to “an inward and self-originated creation of the thought in view, or submitting to surrender himself most decisively to the feeling of not having discovered or understood anything.” To this end, Plato drops hints that appear accidental and contrives contradictions that seem irreconcilable. The argument is never spelled out explicitly, leaving the reader to discover it on their own.100 And so, doubtful of the utility of books when it comes to teaching, and suspicious of timeless formulations, Sumida’s Clausewitz and Schleiermacher’s Plato designed distinct methods of instruction that share a common aim of self-education. If critical analysis is a palliative substitute for actual war, then the Platonic dialogue is a palliative substitute for a proper teacher.
Before considering what, ultimately, to make of these similarities, we must briefly explore one more aspect of Schleiermacher’s work, for his interpretation of Plato does not exhaust the possible origins of his influence; indeed, it may only be a beginning point. While space prohibits a thorough exploration, Schleiermacher’s work in hermeneutics is directly related to his work on Plato, and it shares several interesting affinities with Clausewitz’s critical analysis. Although Schleiermacher never published anything in a final version that he approved, his work on hermeneutics, or what he calls “the art of understanding,” appears in a variety of notes and lectures as early as 1805 and as late as 1833 or while Clausewitz was writing On War. Whereas Schleiermacher primarily applied this art of understanding to religious texts, he insists that it is applicable when interpreting a variety of texts and situations, and thus applicable to a variety of disciplines. It must suffice to mention a few aspects of this art that are especially evocative of Clausewitz’s critical analysis.

The task of hermeneutics is to provide the means by which an utterance made in the past can be understood in the present; indeed, the interpreter’s task is “to understand the utterance at first well and then better than its author.” This understanding is achieved by reconstructing the author’s thought and intention, or what Richard Palmer describes as “the reexperiencing of the mental processes of the text’s author.” This reconstructive process has two components. The first is grammatical interpretation, which includes a complex set of canons that demands a profound understanding of linguistic nuances, etymologies, historical context, and the reciprocal relationship between sentences and paragraphs. But the more relevant component is psychological, which includes reconstructing the “individuality” of the author: their will, motivation, intention, tone, mood, development, and procedure. It requires “putting oneself in the place of the author.” It makes use of what Schleiermacher calls “the divinatory method,” where “one, so to speak, transforms oneself into the other person and tries to understand the individual element directly.” Hans-Georg Gadamer describes this process “as a placing of oneself within the mind of the author, an apprehension of the ‘inner origin’ of the composition of a work, a recreation of the creative act.” Schleiermacher’s work in hermeneutics had a lasting impact on the field. According to Palmer, his “contribution to hermeneutics marks a turning point in its history,” and he is “properly regarded as the father of modern hermeneutics as a general study.”

This cursory presentation of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics is significant for two reasons. The first concerns the similarities between Schleiermacher’s psychological component of reconstructing a past author’s thought and Clausewitz’s critical analysis. To repeat, the purpose of critical analysis is not to reconstruct a historical event with a view to formulating laws of warfare; it is
to reenact the decision-making experience of high command in its moral and psychological dimensions. The unattainable ideal is “to place [oneself] exactly in the situation of the man in command.”110 The purpose is to appreciate why a commander made the decision they did, not to evaluate whether or not it was the right one. For his part, Sumida describes historical reenactment as “a form of personal psychological experiment.” Clausewitz’s theory, he writes, is “an integral part of the reconstructed reality being observed,” which helps to “recreate a past psychological reality.”111

The second reason concerns the history of hermeneutics. Following the death of Schleiermacher in 1834, the next major figure in the field of hermeneutics was Schleiermacher’s own biographer, Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911). Of particular interest, Gadamer argues that Schleiermacher’s “psychological interpretation became the main influence on the theorists of the nineteenth century, Savigny, Boeckh, Steinthal and, above all, Dilthey.”112 In agreement, Palmer writes that Dilthey’s “thinking on the hermeneutical problem started very much in the shadow of Schleiermacher’s psychologism” and that his work “renewed the project of a general hermeneutics and significantly advanced it.”113 Among the theorists whom Dilthey influenced is R. G. Collingwood, the thinker on whom Sumida most relies to elucidate Clausewitz’s understanding of critical analysis.114 In his final and perhaps most well-known work, The Idea of History, Collingwood describes Dilthey as “the lonely and neglected genius,” for whom “genuine historical knowledge is an inward experience (Erlebnis) of its own object.” He further argues that Dilthey’s “conception of the historian as living in his object, or rather making his object live in him, is a great advance on anything achieved by any of [his] German contemporaries.”115 Collingwood ultimately dismisses the psychological component of Dilthey’s approach to re-living the past, but the intellectual links and affinities between Schleiermacher, Dilthey, and Collingwood seem sufficiently strong to render Sumida’s recourse to Collingwood all the more tenable. Indeed, they suggest that the entire discipline and history of hermeneutics might be an important, if not necessary, source in any attempt to determine the intent of Clausewitz’s On War.

**Conclusion**

It is tempting to make much out of the similarities discussed above. There surely seems to be a comparable pedagogical concern in Sumida’s Clausewitz and Schleiermacher’s Plato, which stems, in part, from a dissatisfaction with the capacity of the written word to teach properly. Accordingly, both attempt to provide a means by which a student—whether an inexperienced officer or a potential philosopher—can engage in a method of self-instruction that depreciates the memorization of superficial formulations. More generally, Clausewitz’s
conception of critical analysis as the historical reenactment of command deci-
sions resembles Schleiermacher’s conception of hermeneutics as the psychologi-
cal reconstruction of an author’s thought and intention. But these analogies are
hardly perfect. The differences between historical reenactment and a Platonic
dialogue are obvious enough. Schleiermacher’s Plato had more to teach than in-
tuition. And Schleiermacher’s conviction that an interpreter can understand an
author better than the author understood themselves conflicts with Clausewitz’s
conviction that perfect reenactment is impossible, that “the critic will always
lack much that was present in the mind of the commander.” Above all, however,
even if they were perfect, these analogies do not prove that Schleiermacher
influenced Clausewitz, and such influence does not necessarily illuminate his
thought. The significance of these similarities, then, should not be exaggerated.

But neither should it be dismissed. The imperfect analogies suggest that
Clausewitz was influenced by Schleiermacher in the same way that he was influ-
enced by other German philosophers of his time. He was familiar with a great
variety of ideas associated with German philosophy at the turn of the century,
ideas that he often adopted and adapted to suit his practical purposes. To para-
phrase Gat, the question of whether Clausewitz’s critical analysis is exactly like
Plato’s dialogues or Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics misses the point. “Clause-
witz adapted scraps of ideas to his needs,” Gat aptly remarks in discussing the
influence of Hegel. Similarly, Paret concludes that Clausewitz “freely used
concepts learned from other writers, together with ideas that were the common
property of his generation.” It would be foolish to presume that Schleier-
macher’s work on Plato or hermeneutics provides a master key for unlocking
the meaning or intent of On War. However, it is unnecessary to consider their
affinities irrelevant or unhelpful on account of their discrepancies.

As to the value of identifying the origins of Clausewitz’s thought, we can-
ot deny that the primary task of interpreting Clausewitz is to determine what
Clausewitz actually said and whether what he said is true. But this does not
render the question of his sources meaningless, for their identification can be an
aid to interpretation. Thus, the principal value of casting light on the possible
influence of Schleiermacher is to strengthen Sumida’s interpretation of On War.
Peirce, Wittgenstein, and Collingwood may very well help us to understand On
War as a theory of practice rather than a theory of a phenomenon. The possi-
bility of Schleiermacher’s influence permits us to consider, perhaps even accept,
Sumida’s interpretation of On War as a theory of practice; this disputes the de-
cisive significance of Kant and Hegel without omitting the longstanding belief
that Clausewitz was greatly influenced by the notable German philosophers of
his day. Such a possibility, in other words, permits us to combine Sumida’s
pedagogical approach to On War—which, according to Sumida, challenges
the prevalent approach to military education today—with Paret’s and Gat’s sensible conclusions regarding the eclectic character of Clausewitz’s thought.

Notes
9. Paret, Clausewitz and the State, 149.
10. Paret, Clausewitz and the State, 84.
13. Paret, Clausewitz and the State, 5–6, 35.
17. Paret, Clausewitz and the State, 356–57.
20. Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, 42.
22. Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, 52.
23. Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, 42, 46, emphasis in original.
25. Paret, Clausewitz and the State, 167n34.
26. Paret, Clausewitz and the State, 103.
28. Paret, Clausewitz and the State, 212; Bellinger, Marie von Clausewitz, 113; and Gat, The History of Military Thought, 185.
30. Gallie, Philosophers of War and Peace, 52.
31. Aron, Clausewitz: Philosopher of War, 224; Paret, Clausewitz and the State, 69; and Gat, The History of Military Thought, 178.
33. Paret, Clausewitz and the State, 109.
34. Paret, *Clausewitz and the State*, 151.
36. Paret, *Clausewitz and the State*, 167n34.
42. Sumida, *Decoding Clausewitz*, 98.
52. Sumida, *Decoding Clausewitz*, 101–11.
74. Sumida, *Decoding Clausewitz*, 189.
75. Sumida, *Decoding Clausewitz*, 19, 178, 189; and Clausewitz, *On War*, 149.
77. Sumida, *Decoding Clausewitz*, 178.
On the Pedagogical Intent of Clausewitz's *On War*

80. Sumida, *Decoding Clausewitz*, 45.
82. Sumida, *Decoding Clausewitz*, 136.
84. Sumida, *Decoding Clausewitz*, xii, 19, 32; and Aron, *Clausewitz: Philosopher of War*, 195.
86. Sumida, *Decoding Clausewitz*, 2, emphasis in original.
87. Sumida, *Decoding Clausewitz*, 5, emphasis in original.
93. Schleiermacher, *Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato*, 14. Dobson actually translates Inhalt as “subject” rather than “content.” This is the only change made in the translations.
95. Schleiermacher, *Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato*, 57.
111. Sumida, *Decoding Clausewitz*, 45, 100, 178.
118. Paret, *Clausewitz and the State*, 84.
Behavioral Ethics
The Missing Piece of an Integrative Approach to Military Ethics

David Todd and Paolo Tripodi

Abstract: This article explores the expanding field of behavioral ethics, summarizing its findings under the gap between the perceived versus actual ethical selves, intuitive versus rational decision making, and the susceptibility to internal, organizational, and situational factors. Research into these influences indicates behavioral ethics should be integrated into the military ethical training and education endeavor and is most impactful when it is taught experientially.

Keywords: military ethics, behavioral ethics, ethical leadership, leadership development

The last few decades have been extremely important for the development of military ethics as one of the core disciplines taught at military education institutions, both at the junior and senior level. Today, all U.S. military educational institutions have some type of ethics program or department. Other nations’ armed forces—including the United Kingdom, Australia, France, and Italy, just to mention a few—have adopted or are in the process of adopting military ethics as a component of the formation of their officers and NCOs. The process that led to such a development in the field of military ethics began at the end of the 1990s, but it received renewed emphasis during
the years when thousands of troops deployed in two demanding wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

High-profile incidents of unethical behavior during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the resulting impact on future operations demonstrated the importance of preparing servicemembers for the ethical challenges of combat. Yet, unethical and unprofessional behavior is not limited to the battlefield. During the last few years, the Department of Defense (DOD) Office of the Inspector General has received a growing number of allegations of unethical conduct against senior leaders. According to the DOD Inspector General’s report, *Top DOD Management Challenges, Fiscal Year 2018*, “there was a 13 percent increase in complaints alleging misconduct by senior officials from [fiscal year] FY 2015 to FY 2017 (710 to 803).” Such allegations were mainly about personal misconduct, improper relationships or personnel actions, misuse of government resources, and travel violations. A significant number of personal misconduct incidents were related to improper relationships and sexual behavior.

In November 2012, then-Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta initiated a top-to-bottom review of ethics development, training, and education within the military. The review was vigorously continued by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel who appointed, in 2014, U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Margaret Klein as the senior advisor for military professionalism. Admiral Klein took a holistic approach to understand the issues at hand and how to explain ethical misconduct. More important, she investigated how to develop and deliver better and more effective ethics instruction. A few months after she began her investigation, she stated, “After talking with psychologists, sociologists, neuroscientists and others, the simple answer that they were bad people [people engaging in unethical behavior] may not be complete.” Klein noted how some behavioral research found that sleep deprivation, poor nutrition, and other physical strains can compromise an individuals’ self-control. She also emphasized the value of sociological and psychological research to understand the development of the so-called hubris syndrome as a result of unconstrained power and a certain degree of success. Leaders who become affected by the hubris syndrome can adopt impulsive self-destructive behavior. Klein stressed that “one of the unique symptoms of this hubris syndrome is the belief by these individuals that they are only answerable to history for their actions,” and she strongly emphasized how the scientific and business communities have a lot to teach to those leaders who make decisions.

In this article, we suggest that behavioral ethics, a truly interdisciplinary area of social science research, is the missing piece in military ethics and education and that by integrating and applying the different approaches to ethical thinking—normative ethics, behavioral ethics, and applied ethics—we can de-
velop stronger, more ethically resilient leaders who are better equipped to nurture and grow their team’s ability to make sound ethical choices in the crucible of operational challenge.

**Behavioral Ethics**

Social science research in individual behavior provides evidence that people, even those who have a clear understanding of right and wrong and are committed to do right, make unethical choices. Training and education programs based on normative ethics stress a prescriptive approach and rely on the assumption that ethically reasoning individuals will make sound ethical choices. While normative ethics remain important in the formative stage and early development of an individual, it might not be as helpful when ethical choices are made in an environment and situations in which many factors and variables come into play. In many ways, the prescriptive nature of normative ethics provides the individuals with guidance on how they should behave in a sort of emotional and physical vacuum. The reality is that ethical choices are extremely personal and emotional, and they take place in an environment or decision frame that might be very intense. A reliance on normative ethics alone may indeed develop individuals that are extremely versatile at reasoning ethically, but they might fail to make the right ethical choice (and take the right ethical action) in the heat of the moment.

Behavioral ethics focuses on how and why individuals make the decisions they do in the ethical realm. Descriptive rather than prescriptive in nature, behavioral ethics is an interdisciplinary field that draws on behavioral psychology, cognitive science, and related social sciences to understand why people make the ethical decisions they do. Max Bazerman and Francesca Gino define behavioral ethics as “the study of the systematic and predictable ways in which individuals make ethical decisions and judge the ethical decisions of others, ways that are at odds with intuition and the benefits of broader society.” Thus, behavioral ethics does not investigate how we should behave in a given situation, but it rather provides an exploration of how we might actually behave in a given situation when facing an ethical decision. In simple terms, behavioral ethics is the exploration and comprehension of the circumstances under which we might engage in behavior contrary to our ethical values. Most findings are comprehended under three primary propositions.

**The Gap between Perceived versus Actual Ethical Selves**

Dan Ariely’s *The (Honest) Truth About Dishonesty: How We Lie to Everyone—Especially Ourselves* argues that we tend to believe we are more ethical than others while at the same time engaging in behavior we routinely judge as unethical.
in others. For Ariely, our need to see ourselves as honorable conflicts with our need to have things, so we “fudge” up to the level that allows us to retain our self-image as reasonably honest individuals. Ariely believes “that all of us continuously try to identify the line where we can benefit from dishonesty without damaging our own self-image.”

In *Blind Spots*, Max Bazerman and Ann Tenbrunsel make a serious and compelling case that, before being confronted with an ethical decision, we predict that we will make an ethical choice consistent with our moral self-identity—we are a good person and therefore we will do the right thing. The reality is that, in many cases when faced with a specific ethical choice in a complex decision frame where we are experiencing a myriad of affective stimuli, we might make a decision that is in clear conflict with our ethical values as long as that choice is what serves us better at that moment. The ethical decision-making process is the outcome of many factors whose influence on us we have simply underestimated or not even considered. Having thought about the ethical choice in abstract terms might prove to be of little to no help.

Indeed, it is extremely important to recognize that a particular situation or a dysfunctional organizational system might create the conditions in which the lines between right and wrong become blurred. It is these types of environments in which individuals who think of themselves as extremely ethical and of strong character might engage in unethical conduct. Think of our near universal tendency to exceed speed limits. To survive all the poor drivers on the road today—of course, we are good drivers—we need to maintain the relative speed of the flow of the traffic, which is what everyone else is doing. We do not even consider our behavior as unethical—breaking a law—until we see the trooper over the next hill and slow down. Our cognitive flexibility enables us to keep our unethical behavior beyond our consciousness. Bazerman and Tenbrunsel introduce the term *bounded ethicality* to define the psychological processes that limit our ability to be aware of the ethical dimensions of a particular situation. While most anticipate behaving ethically, when faced with an ethical challenge, self-interest clouds ethical implications. In addition, after an unethical decision has been made, looking back on the situation, our desire to see ourselves as ethical biases our recollection of the event.

In many ways, behavioral ethics takes for granted that we know the difference between ethical and unethical behavior and that we are committed to uphold ethical standards. Behavioral ethics and its body of research warn us that despite a clear understanding and a strong commitment to the ethical standard, we might, given the circumstances, make choices that are in serious conflict with our ethical principles. We might be very surprised by how little our character might support us when confronted with ethical choices in which we have conflicting interests and desires and for which we have not prepared adequately.
In *Out of Character*, a telling title with an even more enlightening subtitle—*Surprising Truths About the Liar, Cheat, Sinner (and Saint) Lurking in All of Us*—David DeSteno and Piercarlo Valdesolo stress that “the tricky part of acting morally . . . doesn’t center on if we can judge what’s right or wrong and act accordingly—it centers on how we judge right and wrong and on how changeable these judgments, and thereby our character, can be.” DeSteno and Valdesolo rightly note that recently “much research has begun to show that our morals are often shaped as much, or even more, by our emotional responses than by our so-called rational ones.” Thus, rather than engaging in a constant rational reflection and deliberation on what we should do when confronted with an ethical choice, it would be much more beneficial to us to understand how our decision-making process works and then explore and consider the role of the factors—for example, bias, emotions, and psyche—that make an impact on our decision-making process.

This growing body of research illuminates a natural tendency toward our ability to enter into a self-deception process. This bent toward self-deception is as natural as self-interest. Indeed, “to be is to be rooted in self-deception” and “to deny this reality is to practice self-deception.” Yet, how consciously active, and therefore, how culpable, one is in self-deception is an open question. According to Ariely, self-deception is something we do to ourselves—our personal “fudge factor” accepts what we might initially feel is possibly unethical. For Messick and Bazerman, the very definition of self-deception is being unaware of the cognitive processes that reinforce our biases and color our judgment. Indeed, Tenbrunsel and Messick argue that self-deception “causes the moral implications of a decision to fade, allowing individuals to behave incomprehensibly and, at the same time, not realize that they are doing so.”

Technological advances in neurobiology and the ability to monitor and map the brain’s activity has provided the neurosciences with evidence that suggests a biological rationale for self-deception. The instinctive response to maximize benefit and avoid or minimize danger is a basic physiological survival response. Neurobiological research now suggests the same brain networks for basic physiological survival are activated by certain social stimuli that elicits a similar instinctive motivation to see the stimuli as reward or threat. Dr. David Rock, author of *Your Brain at Work*, summarizes these domains using the SCARF model—status, certainty, autonomy, relatedness, and fairness. A perception of danger to any one of these domains could trigger a behavioral response motivated by the survival instinct.

**Intuitive versus Rational Decision Making**

Traditional approaches to ethics lean heavily on the moral reasoning model: increasingly complex moral reasoning will lead to better moral decisions. In this
model, an individual arrives at the moral action through a rational application of moral ideals or principles to a certain situation. Conversely, the motivated moral reasoning model posits that affect—the subjective experience of feeling or emotion—and intuitive processes play just as an important and formative role in determining what we believe are moral and just actors and actions. In this view, we select evidence and evaluate moral arguments according to intuitive and affective moral outcome values already in place. Hence, “the primary sources of our moral evaluations are relatively automatic and affective as opposed to thoughtful and cognitive.”

Emerging empirical evidence suggests that individuals make most of their decisions intuitively and unconsciously rather than rationally. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s research reveals that people generally do not make decisions consistent with the rational actor model, but rather shortcuts and biases shape people’s everyday ethical decision making in ways they often do not understand or even notice. Kahneman’s *Thinking, Fast and Slow* popularizes the notion of two systems of thinking and summarizes much of the research on how these two systems drive the way we judge and choose. “System 1” is intuitive, fast, automatic, effortless, implicit, and emotional and more prevalent in separate, one-at-a-time decisions, while “System 2” is systematic, organized, slower, effortful, explicit, and logical and more prevalent in joint, multiple-option decisions. Most ethical decisions are first made intuitively by System 1 before System 2 engages. Others, including Johnathan Haidt, go further than Kahneman in suggesting that ethical choices are made by System 1, and then System 2 provides justification for the choice. As a result, our decisions can be impacted by cognitive heuristics (rules of thumb or shortcuts) or biases of which we are unaware.

Behavioral ethics emphasizes how important it is to develop and prime intuition or System 1 for optimal decision making in complexity and ambiguity. Gary Klein argues that an overly negative view of heuristics and biases can lead to restrictive regulations and procedures rather than an “appreciative inquiry” to understand the thought-making processes and how to improve them. Both System 1 (intuition) and System 2 (rational, analytical) are essential for optimal decision making. More than that, understanding how System 1 works can enable one to sharpen their intuitive system through education, experience, and reflection while learning how to identify and control fallible intuitive responses. Finally, leaders with an understanding of how these heuristics and shortcuts influence behavior can utilize choice architecture to inspire and encourage ethical decision making within their command.

The way our decision-making processes work clearly emphasizes the importance and value of learning from behavioral ethics. While normative ethics will feed mainly System 2, behavioral ethics will inform us about the potential
for fallacies of System 1 at crucial times. In a recent interview, Ariely provides clarity on how we behave: “People don’t predict correctly what will drive our behavior and, as a consequence, we need to be more careful. What happens is you have intuitions and axioms about the world, and you assume they are perfectly correct. I think we should just start doubting our assumptions more regularly and submitting them to empirical tests.” Indeed, in Robert Kegan and Lisa Lahey’s groundbreaking work, *Immunity to Change*, they argue that for real growth and change to occur, we must surface those assumptions—or otherwise remain captive (or subject) to them and continue to exhibit the suboptimal behaviors and resist real change.23

We have a strong tendency to believe that many of the choices and decisions we will make will be directed by the logic and rationality of System 2. That is where ideas of right and wrong, and concepts such as honor and integrity, have been stored. Many of us naively believe that, because we have reasoned and reflected through these important concepts, we will decide accordingly. The truth is, in the heat of the moment, System 1 will be the driving agent in the decision-making process while System 2 might be struggling and fail to influence System 1. Thus, despite the fact that we do have a clear, and yet abstract, understanding of right and wrong, when faced with the more practical and pragmatic aspects of a specific reality, System 1 might drive us to make decisions that are far from what we expected to do. The value of behavioral ethics is mainly experiential. We need to test ourselves empirically, rather than believing that we will make the right decision because we are people of strong character.

**Susceptibility to Internal, Organizational, and Situational Factors**

Behavioral ethics also has demonstrated that cognitive limitations, external societal and organizational pressures, and situational factors can make it difficult for even the most ethically intentioned individual to act morally, and in fact, the evidence suggests individual morality is contextually malleable rather than a stable trait. Ethical fading (or moral myopia) is the term often used to describe the psychological processes that cause the ethical properties of a decision to fade so that the decision appears to be void of moral implications. Self-deception is at the root of ethical fading because individuals tend to distance themselves from the moral implications of a decision to maintain a positive sense of their ethicality.24

Guido Palazzo, Franciska Krings, and Ulrich Hoffrage explore a similar situation they termed *ethical blindness*—“the decision maker’s temporary inability to see the ethical dimension of a decision at stake.” In their article, they provide an excellent exploration of how individuals and their organizations might create conditions (rigid framing) that can lead to ethical blindness. Their initial
assumption is that “often . . . (un)ethical decision making is less rational and deliberate but more intuitive and automatic. As a consequence, the ethical dimension of a decision is not necessarily visible to the decision maker. People may behave unethically without being aware of it—they may even be convinced that they are doing the right thing. It is only later that they realize the unethical dimension of their decisions.”

**Cognitive Errors**

Classical economic theory assumes that individuals seek to maximize their benefit from a particular course of action, and that they make decisions as rational actors. Nobel Prize economist Herbert Simon challenges such a view as he found that oftentimes individuals actually act against their best interests. Simon argues that rationality in decision-making is limited by available information, cognitive limitations of the individual, and the finite time available to make the decision. He coined this phenomena **bounded rationality**. Further development of Simon’s ideas led to the understanding of cognitive constraints to rationality in the arena of ethics (**bounded ethicality**) as well as awareness (**bounded awareness**). Research by Bazerman and Chugh suggests that bounded awareness, “the phenomenon by which individuals do not ‘see’ and use accessible and perceivable information during the decision-making process, while ‘seeing’ and using other equally accessible and perceivable information,” can also contribute to suboptimal decision making.

Indeed, there are many cognitive factors that weigh significantly on our ability to deal properly with ethical choices, and those very factors might end up playing a major role in how we make decisions. One of the most dangerous biases is **positive illusion**. People have a tendency to believe that they are more ethical than they actually are, overestimate their own abilities and character, have an exaggerated sense of their control of an outcome, and as a result exhibit unrealistic optimism in regard to future behavior. We subjectively evaluate our behavior in terms of intent, while we judge others on their actions.

When we observe another’s behavior, we might explain a given action by placing a disproportionate amount of responsibility on the individual while underestimating the role of the situation. Typical of this approach is the **fundamental attribution error**, placing the entire responsibility for a given action on the proverbial “bad apples” with no consideration of the state of the barrel or situation. An extremely dangerous bias is incrementalism or “the slippery slope.” Intuitively, we understand that engaging in unethical behavior—for example, lying—will make us more easily prone to lie more frequently and on a greater scale. Once one has crossed the line into unethical behavior, it is easier to fall into larger ethical lapses in the future. George Loewenstein identifies what he termed the **hot-cold empathy gap** bias: “When people are in an affec-
tively ‘cold’ state, they fail to fully appreciate how ‘hot’ states will affect their own preferences and behavior. When in ‘hot’ states, they underestimate the influence of those states and, as a result, overestimate the stability of their current preferences.”27 Other cognitive biases include the illusion of transparency, loss aversion, self-serving bias/confirmation bias, role morality, moral equilibrium, and framing.28

Social and Organizational Pressures
Social and organizational or system influences heavily impact an individual’s ethical decision making. Behavioral ethics have validated the tendency to be overly obedient to authority and conform to the judgment and behavior of peers. The term ethical infrastructure refers to the organizational climates, informal systems, and formal systems relevant to ethics within an institution. It is difficult to identify all of the relevant factors, as the way things “really get done” is often not as clearly spelled out as the surface components, such as mission statements and codes of conduct.29 The social structures by which an institution establishes its role expectations, organizational goals, and the means to achieve those goals can unwittingly facilitate or condone unethical practices. Organizational or group loyalty can become a legitimating justification for otherwise unethical actions. Utilizing organizational language to psychologically sanitize unethical practices can encourage moral muteness. The bureaucracy and anonymity of organizations can lead to minimizing personal responsibility for moral agency, while hierarchy can foster blind obedience to authority and diffusion of responsibility to superiors.30

According to Philip Zimbardo, the system has great potential to enable a fundamentally bad situation to become significantly worse. In Zimbardo’s view, “systems provide the institutional support, authority, and resources that allow situations to operate as they do.”31 Guido Palazzo and others explain that the adoption on the part of the organization of a rigid frame makes us view the world from one particular and thus necessarily limited perspective, thereby creating blind spots. The more rigidly people apply specific frames when making decisions, the lower their ability to switch to another perspective, which increases the risk of ethical blindness.32

In military organizations, the command climate is probably the most important component to promote professional ethical behavior and to prevent unethical acts. A former U.S. Army brigade commander who served in Afghanistan stated, when asked about the importance of command climate to prevent ethical lapses, “Command climate has everything to do with it, but I would define it broadly to include discipline, leadership, training and understanding of the environment as well as values: courage, respect.”33 Indeed, command climate (the way the organization functions at all levels) is central to under-
standing why the members of a unit might believe that engaging in unethical behavior would be tolerated, and where even the command climate itself might unknowingly encourage unethical behavior.34

Behavioral ethics is essential to comprehending how a wrong understanding of obedience could result in a level of cohesion that becomes conformity. This type of group dynamics can seriously compromise command climate. Indeed, behavioral ethics has validated the tendency to be overly obedient to authority and conform to the judgment and behavior of peers. The Stanley Milgram experiment conducted over a number of years during the 1960s questioned whether his subjects would deliver ever more painful electric shocks up to a maximum dangerous level to another person who failed to answer questions correctly. More than 60 percent of his subjects obeyed the authority figure and administered the maximum shock, even when the other person screamed, complained of heart problems, or feigned unconsciousness.35

Conformity bias is the tendency to take cues for our behavior from those around us, suspending our own ethical judgment and deferring to our peers. Conformity in itself can be positive or negative as a well-led and cohesive unit demonstrates. New workers look to their coworkers to model acceptable performance; good conduct is contagious, but unethical conduct is even more so. Numerous studies validate that the pull to conform “is strong enough to make us give the wrong answers to questions . . . and strong enough to make us disregard the moral lessons we’ve learned and absorbed since childhood. The carrot of belonging and the stick of exclusion are powerful enough to blind us to the consequences of our actions.”36

**Situational Factors**

Good people who wish to do the right thing can be heavily affected by the situation in which they find themselves. Individuals who find themselves in an unethical organization will likely begin to parrot unethical behavior. Similarly, those who feel isolated, ostracized, or mistreated by the unit are more likely to engage in unethical behavior.37 Time pressure, anonymity or lack of transparency, fatigue, and the cleanliness of the working space are other situational factors that increase the probability of unethical behavior.38

Robert Lifton coined the term *atrocity-producing situation*, which describes an “environment so structured, militarily and psychologically, that an average person entering it, no better or worse than you or me, could be capable of committing atrocities.”39 In 1971, Dr. Philip Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE) demonstrated the power of the situation to induce good people to engage in deeply unethical behavior. The study was scheduled to take place during a two-week period with the participants, all screened by Zimbardo and his research team, role-playing a group of inmates and prison guards. No
training was provided to any participants as to their roles and the setting was designed to mimic a functional prison.

The situational forces quickly impacted the participants. Guards demonstrated more abrasive and humiliating treatment of the prisoners. Some prisoners became emotionally overwrought and five had to be removed due to stress disorders. Others found a way to survive by mindlessly following orders, submitting to the degrading treatment. Dr. Zimbardo’s noninterference to the unethical conduct around him gave tacit approval to the escalating level of brutality by the guards. Zimbardo lost the ability to see that what was taking place at the SPE was not only unacceptable but also extremely unethical. It was only after the intervention of Christina Maslach, a research assistant not associated with the experiment, that Zimbardo became aware of the situation; his focus on the experiment made him blind to what was taking place in the “prison.” The two-week experiment had to be terminated after only six days. Subsequent experiments and real-life situations have demonstrated that proximity, length of exposure, and leadership involvement are all key situational factors in determining unethical behavior.40

Teaching Behavioral Ethics

Traditional ethics pedagogy presupposes that ethical decision making is a cognitive and deliberate process governed by rational thought.41 Research in behavioral ethics indicates that at the moment of choice, it is more often than not the intuitive, affective System 1 thinking that most influences the choice. Therefore, the behavioral ethics approach emphasizes helping students understand their own behavior and how and why they make the decisions that they do as they discover the limitations, pressures, and factors that impact their ability to be the ethical person they desire to be. For this reason, it is essential that they are able to personally experience the phenomena to recognize its valence in critical decision-making situations. Because behavioral ethics focuses on the forces that impact their decision making, it complements, rather than conflicts, with normative and virtue ethics. The Socratic method of instruction works best, with a small class size and a discussion and participation-friendly set up. As the behavioral approach posits that decisions are made intuitively, it is important for the students to experience the phenomena themselves as much as possible. The use of audience response systems such as Turning Point to make real-time ethical decisions demonstrates the validity of the empirical evidence presented. Likewise, video clips demonstrate important points, provide emotional proximity or distancing to and from intense topics, and set the stage for meaningful discussion. There are many online videos that can be used to develop and present the findings of behavioral ethics.42

When engaging in behavioral ethics discussion, participants should
be encouraged to consider and reflect upon their behavior in three areas: as individuals; as individuals immersed in a specific situation; and, as a key component—often in a position of leadership—of the system (how they contribute to create and maintain a healthy command climate). When discussing the individual, participants need to be challenged, and therefore they will be given a chance to truly explore and test their own sense of ethicality. Unsurprisingly, the large majority of the participants in behavioral ethics instruction ethically position themselves above average and significantly above average in relation to their peers. A significant component among them show evidence of the positive illusion bias. Then, exposure to the biases discussed in this article can demonstrate how easy it is to engage in unethical behavior, despite the strong belief that we are individuals of character. The goal should be for the individuals to identify their own biases and mental heuristics and learn how to deal with these biases and heuristics in ethically challenging situations. Finally, it is important to emphasize the positives and drawbacks of each of the thinking systems (analytical and intuitive) and the potential for ethical lapses when the brain relies only on one of those systems.

It is extremely beneficial to educate about the power of the command climate/system and encourage individuals to take a professional approach to the system they are part of, and contribute to—their unit command climate. Those in a position of leadership not only have the ability but also the responsibility to shape the culture, discipline, obedience, trust, and cohesion of the organization. They will be agents in promoting the adoption of proper training, education, and best practices at the operational level. As Milgram's study on obedience and the Asch experiments on conformity demonstrate, the power of the system can influence even the most ethical to unethical behavior. Case studies like the Vietnam-era My Lai massacre, when a company of U.S. Army soldiers slaughtered more than 300 civilians, show how unethical behavior, in this case a mass atrocity, is the outcome of failures at many different levels. Clearly, the My Lai massacre can be explained by analyzing the situation and the individuals involved, yet the greatest failure was in the system—the command climate—and within that, such a failure was caused by poor and detrimental leadership. Lieutenant General William R. Peers, the senior U.S. Army officer who conducted a thorough investigation of the My Lai massacre, wrote in the opening pages of *The My Lai Inquiry*: “The My Lai incident was a black mark in the annals of American military history. In analyzing the entire episode, we found that the principal breakdown was in leadership. Failures occurred at every level within the chain of command, from individual noncommissioned-officer squad leaders to the command group of the division.”

Finally, the overwhelming power of the situation must be addressed. Here, Zimbardo’s research on the power of the situation is particularly helpful to raise...
awareness about the impact that situational forces might have on individuals and how we might be surprised by how much our behavior could change as a result of such power and forces. The intent is to try to mitigate the “cold-hot empathy gaps” for leaders who will operate in difficult, highly demanding, emotionally charged situations. Zimbardo rightly cautions us that “creating the myth of invulnerability to situational forces . . . set[s] ourselves up for a fall by not being sufficiently vigilant to situational forces.”

**Conclusion**

Recent incorporation of behavioral ethics into the curricula of Service war colleges indicates a growing acceptance of the findings garnered from this emerging field of study. Popularized by the work of Dr. Leonard Wong and Stephen Gerras’s *Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession*, the insights of behavioral ethics are being introduced to a wider audience within the military profession of arms. The growing familiarity with the neurosciences and their influence on battlefield behavior popularized in such works as Dave Grossman’s “On Combat” has stimulated research on how to best equip leaders to understand the dynamics of cognitive functioning in combat.

However, this material is often presented largely utilizing lectures and limited only to those attending one of these Service schools. One promising initiative is the development and utilization of behavioral ethics insights into high-intensity military field exercises. Because behavioral ethics focuses on behavior, it is vital that these insights are learned through actual experience in a controlled environment, followed by an opportunity for self-reflection to nurture greater self-awareness. By experiencing the effect of environmental stimuli on individual biases and heuristics, the power of the system and the detrimental impact of “atrocity producing” situations, students will be more apt to reflect and recognize these factors in real-life situations.

A third promising approach is evolving through focus on continual leader development. Because of the multidisciplinary nature of behavioral ethics, developmental courses on emotional intelligence encourage greater self- and other-awareness in identifying the specific way an individual responds to stress and the heuristics and biases that lead to unwanted behavior. Feedback tools such as multiraters assessments (360s) and leader practices or personality inventories, such as the Leadership Practices Inventory, EQ-i 2.0, Myer-Briggs Type Indicator, or the Hogan assessment, provide rich opportunities for better identifying potential problem areas. The utilization of Immunity to Change workshops provide opportunities to reflect on personal challenges, surface unexamined assumptions, and consider how they impact our ability to change suboptimal behavior or growth.

Incorporating behavioral ethics into training, education, and development
programs suited to servicemembers of all ranks provides a holistic perspective on ethics that equips individuals with the behavioral tools necessary to live out their commitment to core values. Only a comprehensive ethical culture that understands and embraces the ideal embodiment of those virtues (normative ethics), is realistic about the ethical quandaries inherent in the profession of arms (applied ethics), and is self-aware of the ways in which the self or system can be blinded to the ethical realm and how to counteract those tendencies (with the use of behavioral ethics) will be able to thrive and persevere in the ethically complex environment of the twenty-first century.

Notes
13. For a similar perspective, see the Arbinger Institute’s *Leadership and Self-Deception: Getting Out of the Box* (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2010).


For a case study, see Paolo G. Tripodi and David M. Todd, “Casualties of Their Own Success: The 2011 Urination Incident in Afghanistan,” *Parameters* 47, no. 3 (Autumn 2017): 65–78.


Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe, “Ethical Decision Making,” 571.

*Ethics Unwrapped*, an award-winning ethical training approach from the University of Texas at Austin, has developed a number of free presentations with teaching notes that present many of the insights mentioned in this article.
44. Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect*, 211.
Exploring Power Dynamics in Veterans’ Education Policy

Lesley McBain

Abstract: The Post–9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008 (or Post–9/11 GI Bill) is the most complex and costly version of the GI Bill; notably, tuition and required fee payments are directed to higher education institutions rather than student veterans, as in previous iterations of the bill. This structure has created a new and complex set of power dynamics between higher education institutions, policy makers, and military/veteran-serving agencies. Understanding these dynamics as illustrated by legislative examples is important in bridging the civil-military gap in higher education.

Keywords: Post–9/11 GI Bill, veterans’ education policy, higher education policy, student veterans

The Post–9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008 (or Post–9/11 GI Bill) is the most complex and costly version of the GI Bill to date and runs concurrently with earlier iterations. According to U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) data, in fiscal year (FY) 2016, 1,000,089 beneficiaries used VA educational benefits; of those, 790,090 were using Post–9/11 GI Bill benefits.1

As can be surmised from these statistics, the Post–9/11 GI Bill dominates VA spending on postsecondary education benefits. In FY 2016, 60,271 new users of Post–9/11 GI Bill benefits were enrolled in undergraduate programs alone, and new Post–9/11 GI Bill users made up 79 percent of new education

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In FY 2016, approximately $11.6 billion was paid out to institutions and students using Post–9/11 GI Bill benefits.\(^2\)

Because the Post–9/11 GI Bill allows eligible beneficiaries to transfer their benefits to a dependent child or spouse (unique among GI Bill iterations), the VA also collects data on these transfers. In FY 2016, 132,666 transfer benefit recipients received Post–9/11 GI Bill funding from an eligible beneficiary. Of those, 98,099 were dependent children and 34,567 were spouses.\(^4\)

In mid-2017, 18 different amendments to the bill were amalgamated and renamed for the former commander of the American Legion who wrote the original GI Bill, Harry W. Colmery. The resulting piece of legislation, popularly nicknamed the “Forever GI Bill” for one of its provisions, moved through both houses of Congress in 20 days after being introduced and was signed into law by President Donald J. Trump in August 2017. The bill had previously been thought moribund after different veterans’ organizations disagreed about how to pay for its expected $3 billion cost during its first decade.\(^5\) Notably, the bill removes the previous 15-year time limit on using Post–9/11 GI Bill benefits for both veterans who left service on or after 1 January 2013 and their qualifying dependents (hence the Forever GI Bill nickname).

Why is the Post–9/11 GI Bill and the larger field of veterans’ education policy important to higher education as a whole? An idealistic answer would reference the necessity of reintegrating veterans into civilian society and a nation’s responsibility to those it sends into harm’s way—who may return permanently disabled from serving the nation—to protect its interests. A more pragmatic answer is that because unprecedented billions of dollars in VA educational benefits are flowing to higher education institutions, it behooves today’s civilian higher education policy makers and cash-strapped higher education institutions alike to pay more attention to the student veterans and their dependents who bring that money into institutional coffers. Paying attention to those veterans and dependents includes better understanding the power dynamics among veterans’ organizations—and veterans’ political backers on Capitol Hill—that potentially affect the institutions’ receipt of said money.

As an example of new power dynamics that affect both higher education institutions and policy makers, veterans’ organizations were established or revitalized in the wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to serve the interests of a younger generation of veterans; Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America is one of the most prominent new organizations advocating for veterans’ interests. These organizations and older ones (e.g., the American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars) often make common cause on veterans’ education policy issues along with other issues important to veterans (e.g., health care). The organization focusing on veterans’ education is the Student Veterans of America (SVA). As their account of their founding
indicates, the organization prioritizes activism on behalf of student veterans: Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the U.S. launched Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq). As OEF and OIF veterans returned home to use GI Bill benefits, they found that their campuses did not provide adequate support services to assist student veterans as they worked towards their educational goals.

Lacking support, student veterans decided to organize on campuses across the country. These groups began to connect through social media with one another—spreading best practices, sharing success stories, and supporting one another to further strengthen the student veteran community. In 2008, members from various chapters formalized this grassroots movement and Student Veterans of America was born. . . . The nation’s renewed focus on veteran welfare has ignited change on campuses and in congress. SVA is committed to capitalizing on this momentum to ensure today’s and tomorrow’s veterans are supported in their transition to education and employment.6

Billions of dollars are being spent on VA education benefits to help reintegrate veterans into civil society and repaying the debt owed them for their national service. These benefits—more generous than previous versions of the GI Bill given the ability to transfer tuition/fee benefits to spouses/dependents and the removal of any time limit on benefit usage—have created a corresponding influx of veteran/dependent enrollees into civilian higher education institutions. Because of the civil-military gap in the United States—broadly defined as a mutual lack of cultural knowledge affecting how civilians and military personnel relate, but with various levels of nuance depending on viewpoint—these institutions have been largely unprepared to understand military culture and its influence on those enrollees.7

Both support for student veterans and civil-military tensions in higher education date back to the first GI Bill. In terms of civil-military tensions, the presidents of Harvard University and the University of Chicago originally raised objections to the bill based on their perceptions of veterans’ college aptitude or lack thereof. Robert Maynard Hutchins, president of the University of Chicago, feared that “academic institutions might well find ‘themselves converted into educational hobo jungles’ ” and proposed not only that returning veterans be required to take national aptitude examinations to qualify for the benefit but also that colleges pay 50 percent of the GI Bill tuition benefit so that they could choose only those applicants they deemed most qualified.8 James Bryant
Conant, the president of Harvard at the time, later changed his stance after observing student veterans’ performance on campus. During congressional discussions of the earlier Korean War-era GI Bill, “public grumblings already accused the G.I. Bill of giving veterans an unfair advantage in society and of allowing disreputable schools and businessmen to loot the public till. If Congress extended the benefits and provisions of the G.I. Bill to a new set of veterans, these problems would carry forward and perhaps become a flawed precedent for American veterans’ benefits as a whole.” Qualms over the Korean War GI Bill also were expressed by the Association of Public and Land-grant Universities (a higher education association in Washington, DC), when they called for a “‘new approach’ to veterans’ benefits, saying ‘when it [military service] is universal no reward should be expected or given’.”

Turning to the modern era and the campus environment, perspectives on campus vary regarding the military and student veterans and parallels prior broader research on the civil-military gap. One important historical event—the Vietnam War and its legacy of antimilitary campus protests—played a part in fostering an atmosphere of distrust between academia and the military that in some ways lingers to the present. In a macrolevel discussion of distrust revolving around both the role of the Service academies in educating future military officers and the larger civil-military divide, Bruce Fleming, a civilian professor who has taught English at the U.S. Naval Academy for more than two decades, opened a recent work by stating that “everything conspires against civilians and the military having a clear view of each other in the United States of the third millennium.”

In a different approach than Fleming’s discussion, one group of researchers surveyed faculty across the United States about their views on military service and U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, their perceptions of their ability or self-efficacy to address combat veterans’ classroom needs, and their perceptions of student veterans who might have post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Approximately 60 percent of the 596 respondents were at public institutions; 64.4 percent were in the social sciences. The authors’ analysis found that the more negative attitudes faculty expressed about military service, the less likely they were to put aside said attitudes and respect veterans’ service. Further, the more negative attitudes faculty expressed about military service, the less self-efficacy they reported in being able to teach and work with student veterans with symptoms of PTSD.

From the student perspective, one of the first studies on the post-9/11 era student veteran experience was a small-scale qualitative study of 25 combat veterans at three universities in the North, South, and West; the researchers used adult student transition theory to analyze respondent interviews about both military and civilian experiences. Analysis related to participants’ college
experience revealed that “[w]hile the ages of the participants in this study were not drastically different from other students, there exists a difference in level of maturity that comes from wartime military service”; student veterans frustrated and impatient with civilian students’ perceived lower maturity levels offered comments grounded in military culture such as “they don’t have people screaming at them to get things done at three in the morning. They sit in a sheltered dorm room and do homework. It’s not too hard.”

This led to interviewees having problems connecting with civilian student peers as well as adopting the strategy of “blending in” to conceal their military experience. A consistent, though contradictory, theme was that the student veterans “hoped faculty members would acknowledge their veteran status and attempt to understand them as a student population,” with one U.S. Marine participant stating, “The biggest thing that I want to come into this interview and say is the fact that I think the faculty needs to know who we are.”

Following along these lines, another researcher conducted a qualitative study of student veterans’ experiences at a four-year public land-grant university to better understand their transitional experiences and, with the students’ knowledge and consent, use them to help construct a veteran support program on campus. This study also noted that student veterans felt distanced from civilian students due to military experiences combined with their sense of greater maturity.

Negative, stereotypical reactions from civilian faculty and students were also pointedly mentioned, and “[a] perception that their military status was often met by professors and peers with uncertainty or suspicion with regard to their mental health and wellbeing was widely discussed in each focus group and interview.” This fed into the study’s most prominent theme: participants’ perceptions of a negative campus climate for student veterans. A majority of the students (9 of 14) expressed initial concerns about attending the university being studied given its liberal, antimilitary reputation:

Participants explained that these feelings were strengthened by their interactions with civilian classmates and professors, who they felt had made derogatory or overly simplistic comments about the military and the current conflicts in the Middle East. Additionally, participants in this study explained a perception that disclosing one’s self as a veteran was risky and left them vulnerable to inaccurate assumptions about their mental health and overall wellbeing.

Moving back to the policy level, in the current iteration of the Post–9/11 GI Bill, tuition/fee payments are directed to the institution rather than the student. This structure has created a new and complex set of power dynamics between...
higher education institutions, policy makers, and military/veteran-serving agencies. While this article does not address active duty servicemembers for whom the DOD pays education benefits to higher education institutions, they also factor into the power dynamics. Understanding these power dynamics is important not only for higher education overall to better serve student veterans but also for institutions and their representatives in the veterans’ education policy community to navigate both changing policies and policy-maker attitudes on how higher education should serve student veterans.

Based on the above, this article explores selected power dynamics within veterans’ education using John R. P. French Jr. and Bertram Raven’s theory on bases of power as social power resources used to effect social influence. Legislative examples—both introduced and enacted—are used to show how the various bases of power play out on both sides of the civil-military equation in higher education. These suggest avenues for future research into power dynamics in veterans’ education policy that have a potentially wider impact on higher education institutions as a whole.

**Theoretical Framework**

Of course, theories of power and social influence are not confined to veterans’ education—or higher education. French and Raven define social influence as the action of one person that changes the attitude, belief, or behavior of another person targeted for such action. Social power is defined as how someone brings about social influence. They originally identified five different social power bases/resources used to create social influence: reward power, coercive power, legitimate power, referent power, and expert power. Raven then added the concept of informational power.

Reward power is defined as the perception by the target of social influence that the would-be influencer can somehow reward them; coercive power is defined as the ability of the influencer to punish the target for not complying; legitimate power is defined as the influencer’s accepted authority to make the target behave in a particular way; referent power is defined as the target’s identification with the influencer; and expert power is defined as the influencer being deemed an expert in a relevant issue by the target. Raven defines informational power as explanations/persuasive reasoning by the influencer that convinces the target to do or believe something; the difference between this and expert power is that informational power is tied more to the merits of the information given to the target than the status of the influencer.

All these bases of power operate broadly within the higher education policy sphere, though their specifics and relevance differ depending on the matter at hand. In general, congressional actors can exercise combined legitimate, reward,
and coercive power in any given higher education situation (e.g., authorizing appropriations, introducing and passing legislation, and holding hearings on specific higher education issues). Federal agencies also can exercise these forms of power; in addition, some federal agencies (e.g., areas within the U.S. Department of Education) can exercise both expert and informational power. Outside Congress and the federal government, higher education associations, lobbyists, and think tanks also exercise a combination of powers. These external parties often, but not always, focus on expert power and informational power. For instance, while the case study by Susan B. Hannah of the 1992 reauthorization of the Higher Education Act (HEA) does not use French and Raven’s concept as its theoretical framework, its detailed dissection of how the varying political relationships between congressional staff, federal agency representatives, higher education lobbyists, policy consultants, and White House staff affected the eventual form of the reauthorized HEA shows various bases of power operating.25

The specific use of these different power bases in veterans’ education policy are influenced by the previously discussed civil-military gap in the United States, which has been extensively examined by sociologists and political scientists but less so by higher education researchers. One illustration of this gap is the fact that only 0.5 percent of Americans in the past decade have served in the military.26 Another is that, according to the Higher Education Research Institute’s 2016 Cooperative Institutional Research Program’s Freshman Survey, military-affiliated first-time, full-time freshmen “describe their political affiliation as more conservative than all [first-time, full-time] FTFT, first-year students” and “military-affiliated students express more conservative views on political and social issues than the national sample of FTFT incoming students.”27

Sociological research on the civil-military gap stretches from the work of Samuel P. Huntington to the present.28 Huntington views the concept of civil-military relations relatively narrowly as “the relation of the officer corps to the state.”29 Contrastingly, Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider conceptually reframe the civil-military gap as interdependent relationships “of civilian elites with military leaders, of military institutions with American society, of military leaders with their professions, among civilian elites, and of civilian elites with American society.”30 These interdependent relationships can be analyzed using French and Raven’s bases of power, because both higher education institutions and Congress can be classified as civilian elites and the relationship of military institutions with American society includes their relationship with civilian higher education. Also, the relationship between institutions, Congress, and military/veteran-serving agencies tasked with administering veterans’ education benefits is interdependent.
**Legislative Analysis**

The primary way by which veteran/military-serving agencies and their supporters in Congress can exert power over civilian higher education institutions as defined by French and Raven is a combination of legitimate power and coercive power. Because veterans’ education benefits are legally the province of the VA, this gives the VA and its supporters legitimate power, at least to some degree—the degree is contested, as will be seen in the legislative examples—over administration of these benefits. This leads to their ability to use coercive power—the threat to withdraw Post–9/11 GI Bill program eligibility and funds in whole or in part from civilian higher education institutions.

The easiest form of coercive power on lawmakers’ part is, of course, to legislatively mandate institutional cooperation. One introduced piece of legislation illustrating the use of coercive power is H. R. 1793, introduced on 29 March 2017 and titled Veterans Education Priority Enrollment Act of 2017; it was initially referred to committee, then reappeared in a different guise in the later-enacted Harry W. Colmery Veterans Education Assistance Act (S. 764 is its twin bill in the Senate). H. R. 1793:

> prohibits the Department of Veterans Affairs or a state approving agency from approving a program of education offered by an educational institution for purposes of an educational assistance program for veterans or members of the Selected Reserve or the Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces unless any such institution that administers a priority enrollment system allows an eligible veteran, member, or dependent to enroll in courses at the earliest possible time.\(^{31}\)

Simply stated, this bill proposed to withdraw all program eligibility from institutions if they have a priority registration system for certain student subpopulations (e.g., upperclassmen, students in specific majors, or student athletes) and do not allow veterans, servicemembers, or dependents to register “at the earliest possible time” under said priority registration system based on their receipt of Post–9/11 GI Bill benefits.

There is no data indicating that military-affiliated students’ inability to access priority registration is a national problem requiring a legislative solution. This does not mean individual incidents that may have occurred are not problematic because the legally time-limited nature of Post–9/11 GI Bill benefits (36 months) is a legitimate consideration when constructing priority registration policies, particularly for military-affiliated students enrolling in majors where class space is limited. Also, there is an equity argument that student veterans have voluntarily sacrificed to serve the nation and should thus, at minimum,
be given the same prioritization for registration as other subpopulations (e.g., student athletes) who have not.

However, a national legislative mandate means institutions either must comply—potentially privileging military-affiliated students over civilian students who pay the same tuition and fees and thus creating the unintended consequence of a backlash against military-affiliated students—or dismantle their priority registration systems and alienate the entire student body. There was no language in the bill about complaint verification/adjudication or indeed any kind of due process for institutions. If institutions are deemed noncompliant by the VA or local state approving agencies, which are VA funded and not experts on higher education policies and procedures, they will be removed from eligibility. This means that the military-affiliated students enrolled at those institutions will have to find some other way to pay for their educations, quit school, or transfer—possibly blaming the institutions rather than Congress or the VA.

Historically, Congress and the VA have not intruded quite so deeply into the broader administrative policies of higher education institutions enrolling GI Bill recipients. This legislative threat to remove institutional eligibility, and the corresponding tens of thousands to millions of dollars of institutional revenue, depending on the number of GI Bill recipients enrolled at an institution, if institutions do not rework their internal processes to give Post–9/11 GI Bill recipients priority registration over civilian students was a new example of coercive power exerted on higher education by veteran/military-serving agencies and their allies in Congress.

If nonprofit civilian higher education institutions in particular lose Post–9/11 GI Bill eligibility, this type of coercive power exercise on the part of Congress and the VA could force more military-affiliated students into the for-profit education sector. The for-profit sector aggressively recruits military-affiliated students—and has been the focus of controversy on this point—because their education benefits do not count toward the 90/10 rule requiring for-profit institutions to earn at least 10 percent of their profit from sources other than Title IV federal financial aid funds.32

Given the preceding issues, the formal statements for the record regarding this bill submitted in response by both the American Council on Education (ACE) on behalf of itself and eight other higher education associations and the American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers (AACRAO) are unsurprising in content. ACE’s response states, in part, “we are unaware of any evidence documenting a widespread problem that would warrant this type of federal mandate.”33 Further, it explains to the committee that institutions’ registration systems provide different types of priority registration (e.g., by class level, major, and/or by specialized course sequence required for
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graduation) so that they can be flexible in equitably serving multiple student populations. The bill, as the statement points out, also erroneously assumes that all institutions register their students in the same way, so it is unclear how it would work in practice when faced with multiple registration systems.

The statement concludes with a diplomatically voiced rebuttal to the coercive power that the bill attempted to exert, reminding the committee not only that higher education institutions are autonomously operated but that state laws also must be taken into consideration:

We strongly support efforts to help veterans succeed. We recommend reframing the bill to encourage institutions to consider implementing priority policies rather than mandating them and allow institutions the flexibility to find solutions that work best for their campuses. We believe this change would go a long way toward addressing our concerns. It also has the added benefit of ensuring that the bill would not conflict with existing state laws on the subject.34

The AACRAO statement was issued in addition to the organization’s signing onto the ACE statement for the record. While this is not necessarily common, it is not altogether unusual in the higher education policy sphere, particularly when one association specializes in a particular issue and would like to provide more technical commentary on it (i.e., demonstrating its expert and informational power). As the higher education association specifically representing the interests of registrars and admissions officers—the higher education administrative population that would bear the burden of a mandate that veterans receive priority registration status—AACRAO thus chose to make a separate statement focusing on its own membership and issues.

After a diplomatic opener similar to the ACE statement, in which AACRAO tacitly recognizes the legitimate and coercive power of congressional stakeholders to regulate veterans’ education benefits and positions itself as a partner in the effort to educate student veterans, the statement pivots to demonstrate AACRAO’s expert and informational power by rebutting the necessity for the bill.35 It first points out that, when queried on the issue, the national AACRAO membership was unaware of a large-scale problem with student veteran registration that would require a federal mandate to fix. Then the statement notes that some states already mandate priority registration for student veterans and thus schools would have to attempt to reconcile conflicting state and federal mandates.

AACRAO further states that mandated priority registration populations do not work in practice the way lawmakers think. The document concludes with an evidence-based opinion that the bill is unnecessary:
We are also concerned about the precedent that such a mandate would set. Such a measure could easily be applied to other categories of students and, more importantly, have adverse effects on students that truly need priority registration most. For example, one member institution with state prioritization mandate already in place reported that their institution watched their priority registration group balloon to include approximately 15 percent of their total student population, rapidly losing the intended benefit of priority registration.

. . . AACRAO is committed to and will continue to pursue the best services for veteran students. Our members, however, fail to see any evidence that veterans are more frequently closed out of the courses they require to graduate due to lack of priority registration. However well-intended, S.764, [sic] seeks to solve a problem that does not seem to exist.\(^3\)

Both the ACE and AACRAO statements rely on superior expert and informational power to make their points. They position themselves as respecting the legitimate and coercive power of Congress, but they provide evidence as subject-matter experts and representatives of the national higher education community that the presumed national problem—civilian institutions of higher education denying veterans priority registration—does not exist on a scale sufficient enough to warrant federal intervention. In addition, they remind Congress that some states have already mandated this priority registration and students have experienced unintended consequences as a result; therefore, further federal mandates could make the problem worse, not better.

Apparently, these statements and whatever discussions went on behind the scenes had the desired effect, because the Forever GI Bill was amended in a very different manner than the coercive power of H. R. 1793’s text would suggest. The final enrolled bill’s text dropped any threat to schools’ eligibility for Post–9/11 GI Bill funding and merely directed that the secretary of Veterans Affairs provide “information on whether the institution administers a priority enrollment system that allows certain student veterans to enroll in courses earlier than other students” to benefit recipients.\(^3\)

Another nuanced example of coercive power dynamics in veterans’ education policy is in S. 473, Educational Development for Troops and Veterans Act of 2017, introduced 28 February 2017 and referred to committee with hearings held.\(^3\) The bill would amend the latest version of the Higher Education Act—not the Post–9/11 GI Bill—to fund a small grant program to help no more than 30 individual institutions or institutional consortiums enrolling a sufficient number of military-affiliated students to establish, improve, maintain, and op-
erate campus veterans’ centers. Institutions or consortiums would be considered eligible if they enroll a “significant number” of military-affiliated students compared to their civilian student populations, serve veterans and spouses in the local community, and present a “sustainability plan” to maintain the campus veterans’ center with their own funds after the expiration of the grant.39

This is laudable on its face and follows emerging best practices in veterans’ education. The section of the bill is supported by not only the National Association of Veterans’ Program Administrators (NAVPA), which represents school certifying officials and other institutional personnel involved in veterans’ education programs, but also the Student Veterans of America (SVA).40 SVA points out in its statement of support that it operates its own grant program in conjunction with Home Depot to build veterans’ centers on campuses around the country.41 However, both the bill’s definition of what constitutes a campus veterans’ center, including workforce development for military-affiliated students, and additional criteria below rely on coercive financial power to affect institutional policies:

(3)(b)(iv) The institution or consortium commits to hiring a staff at the Veteran Student Center that includes veterans (including veteran student volunteers and veteran students participating in a Federal work-study program under part C of title IV, a work-study program administered by the Secretary of Veteran Affairs, or a State work-study program).

(v) The institution or consortium is willing to consider providing veteran students with academic credit for comparable subject-area training received while serving in the Armed Forces and commits to dedicating resources to helping its student veterans navigate their way through the transfer credit process.

(vi) The institution or consortium commits to using a portion of the grant received under this section to develop an early warning veteran student retention program carried out by the Veteran Student Center.

(vii) The institution or consortium commits to providing mental health counseling to its veteran students and their spouses.42

To be clear, imposing funding requirements on institutional recipients of a grant program is a form of legitimate power. Grant funders, whether public or private, have the right to specify uses to which their monies may be put. Institutions have the corresponding right to disagree with those uses and not apply for particular funds. However, the specific provisions in S. 473 also exert a subtle
coercive power on institutions awarded these grants beyond the obvious one of being required to hire veterans on staff as in (3)(b)(iv) and thus illustrate new power dynamics operating related to veterans’ education policy.

First, the issue with veterans not receiving academic credit at civilian colleges and universities for comparable military training—and the civil-military gap issue at its core—is long-standing. This occurs despite decades of credit evaluation guides and a Joint Services Transcript produced by ACE using civilian faculty evaluators to review military training programs in subject areas they teach. Thus, this bill uses nuanced coercive financial power to address the problem; if institutions want to be considered for veterans’ center grants, they must provide resources to help veterans negotiate the military credit transfer process and agree to at least consider providing academic credit for comparable military training. While the term consider can cover a multitude of student credit denials—and allows institutions to remain largely autonomous in their academic decisions—the note of coercive power is clear.

Second, the requirement that institutions receiving grant money under the program develop a separate student veteran academic retention program administered by the veterans’ center, not by existing institutional academic affairs offices, is another indication of coercive power. It also illustrates, consciously or not, civil-military tensions between separation and assimilation of veterans into society stretching back to the seminal theories of Huntington and Morris Janowitz. Huntington preferred to keep the military and civilian society in separate spheres, whereas Janowitz argued for more assimilation of the military into civilian society. Requiring that student veteran retention be handled by a student veteran center and not an existing academic affairs unit hearkens back to Huntington rather than Janowitz. The coercive power of telling a higher education institution how to advise a specific subpopulation of students—ignoring the institution’s own expert and informational power bases in so doing—is a new power dynamic in veterans’ education policy.

Third, the requirement that an institution provide mental health counseling not only for student veterans but for their spouses, regardless of whether those spouses are students at the institution, is another exercise of coercive power, particularly because student veterans have access to VA health care as one of their entitlements of service. The issue is not whether student veterans and spouses could benefit from the availability of mental health counseling services or whether mental health counseling services are better on a college campus than within the VA health care system. The question is whether or not an institution is being told it must provide this service for nonstudents and is able to sustain it out of its own funds once the grant expires. This is another new element in veterans’ education policy; how the power dynamic will evolve is still unknown.
The final legislative provisions discussed in this article are other parts of the Harry W. Colmery Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2017 that are further examples of power exerted by congressional actors and veteran-serving agencies over higher education institutions. The first, Section 305, is effective 1 August 2018 and is a new requirement for higher education institutions enrolling more than 20 student veterans:

(a) TRAINING REQUIREMENT.—The Secretary of Veterans Affairs shall, in consultation with the State approving agencies, set forth requirements relating to training for school certifying officials employed by covered educational institutions offering courses of education approved under chapter 36 of title 38, United States Code. If a covered educational institution does not ensure that a school certifying official employed by the educational institution meets such requirements, the Secretary may disapprove any course of education offered by such educational institution.46

This means that if colleges and universities do not require their main school certifying officials to take a specific course of training constructed by the VA and state approving agencies for veterans’ education benefits, they will no longer be eligible for Post–9/11 GI Bill funds. On the school level, certifying officials are often staff working in the registrar’s office who take on veterans’ benefits certification as a collateral duty. However, depending on the institution, they may be financial aid office staff, dedicated veterans’ center staff, bursar’s office staff, or other employees; they may also be full- or part-time employees depending on the number of student veterans enrolled. This, from the higher education institutional perspective, can prevent military-serving agencies from constructing an effective training program. Not only are these employees working in different roles within their institutions, the thousands of colleges and universities in the United States have diverse academic calendars, tuition and fee structures, and drop/add procedures—all of which can affect veterans’ education benefit processing. State approving agencies and the VA do not have expert or informational power when it comes to higher education administration; those power bases are the province of higher education institutions themselves. However, VA and veteran-serving agencies should have expert and informational power when it comes to how the Post–9/11 GI Bill works and be able to work with higher education institutions and their representatives to construct training that will be useful and helpful.

Training in benefit administration is a legitimate power to exercise when dealing with a complicated multi-billion-dollar federal program, and it should not be inferred from this analysis that institutions want to or should oper-
ate without guidance. However, the coercive power exercised in the training’s implementation—by threatening to remove Post–9/11 GI Bill eligibility from the institution if it does not comply—is complicated by years of institutional complaints about inconsistent, unclear, and sometimes flatly contradictory VA guidance on how to administer Post–9/11 GI Bill benefits. The VA, in turn, has complained that institutions do not mandate training for their employees, who then make errors in certifying benefits, and that VA should have more control over mandated training. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended more training of school officials to reduce overpayments in an October 2015 report on the program; this provision in the Forever GI Bill seems to have been a reaction to the report. What will come of the interplay of power dynamics between institutions, state approving agencies, and the VA on this front remains to be seen.

Finally, in Section 307, the secretary of Veterans Affairs is directed to provide educational and vocational counseling for student veterans on campus by VA employees, not by colleges and universities’ staff:

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall provide educational and vocational counseling services for individuals described in section 3697A(b) of this title at locations on the campuses of institutions of higher learning selected by the Secretary. Such counseling services shall be provided by employees of the Department who provide such services under section 3697A of this title.

(b) SELECTION OF LOCATIONS.—(1) To be selected by the Secretary under this section, an institution of higher learning shall provide an appropriate space on the campus of the institution where counseling services can be provided under this section.

(2) In selecting locations for the provision of counseling services under this section, the Secretary shall seek to select locations where the maximum number of veterans would have access to such services.

Embedding VA employees on campuses to provide college and vocational counseling services only to veterans and requiring institutions to provide counseling space for them on campus is yet another new exercise of coercive power, even ascribing good intent to the language. Counseling students about work and postsecondary options is legitimate and worthy. In addition, the Post–9/11 GI Bill and other veterans’ education benefits are complicated enough that special counseling is necessary for their recipients. However, assigning VA employees to college campuses who will only counsel student veterans, while having
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Campuses foot the bill for housing them, is unusual. It also presents an interesting set of potential power dynamics: are the VA employees as well-trained in the wide variety of higher education options available as professional admissions counselors and advisors? What if the institution’s admissions and advising staff have professional disagreements with the advice being dispensed by the embedded VA employees? Who has what power to challenge information they consider inaccurate or out of date? The legislative language is silent on this front; what will happen in the field remains to be seen.

Conclusions

The power dynamics in veterans’ education policy have changed abruptly with the advent of the Post–9/11 GI Bill and the billions of dollars now flowing through it to institutions that enroll student veterans and other eligible beneficiaries. Civilian and military-serving entities alike jostle for power and influence over veterans’ education policy and the billions of dollars attached to it. While both sides appear to genuinely wish to serve student veterans, their policy and practice viewpoints are affected by the long-standing civil-military gap in American society and its effects on their views and ideologies.

For instance, a student veteran advocate perception of a nationwide problem with student veterans being shut out of required courses spurred the introduction of legislation designed to strip institutions of Post–9/11 GI Bill funding if they made civilian student subpopulations (e.g., athletes, juniors, or seniors) eligible for priority registration but did not extend the same eligibility to student veterans. The possibility of student veterans fitting into more than one student subpopulation and being eligible for priority registration via other means—and the following question of which of their intersectional identities should be emphasized—was not considered in the proposed legislation. Because the Post–9/11 GI Bill is limited to veterans and eligible dependents, a veteran identity was foregrounded. It could be argued that part of the civil-military gap is emphasized by veteran-serving agencies seeing student veterans only as veterans and not taking student status, gender, race, religion, sexual orientation, parent status, or other components of their individual identities into the equation; however, both the narrow issue of whether student veterans’ student or veteran identities predominate and the broader issue of intersectional identity and higher education policy are beyond the scope of this article.

The presumption of discrimination against student veterans was rebutted by higher education associations using evidence to counter the perception that student veterans were being mistreated on a large scale by civilian institutions. As one association put it in a statement for the record, the legislation, “however well-intended . . . seeks to solve a problem that does not seem to exist.” Finally, the legislative language was softened considerably and partially in-
corporated into the latest revision of the Post–9/11 GI Bill as a compromise.

The example above shows how bases of power (see Raven and French) are employed as both sides attempt to influence multiple policy fronts. Veteran-serving agencies and their congressional allies tend to exert a combination of legitimate and coercive power over veterans’ education policy, as can be seen by both this example and earlier discussion of other legislation. In their turn, higher education institutions and their representatives in Washington tend to counter by using informational and expert power bases—including access to national institutional memberships’ wealth of data—to mitigate attempted coercion and inform legitimate exercises of power. While other parts of Raven and French’s theory (e.g., reward power) can be used by either group depending on the scenario, the easiest way for congressional stakeholders to influence American higher education institutions is via coercive legislative power; the stick of Post–9/11 GI Bill funding (or Title IV financial aid funding in other arenas) is large and simple to wield and offers a monetary reward for compliance.

The implications of this are clear. If advocates for military-affiliated students and their congressional allies feel that student veterans (or active duty servicemembers) are being mistreated or neglected by civilian higher education institutions, they will not hesitate to use legitimate and/or coercive power in an attempt to make civilian higher education institutions pay—literally—for it. In the post–World War II decades when traditional-age civilian students were plentiful to recruit and enroll, this might not have been a matter of paramount concern to civilian higher education institutions. Now, with billions of dollars at stake and the demographic landscape shifting to favor the nontraditional-age student category into which most student veterans fall, the power dynamics also have shifted between the two groups; how they will play out in the future is less certain.

**Implications for Higher Education**

Better understanding the shifting power dynamics within veterans’ education policy is important to both higher education policy scholars and institutional practitioners who help educate military-affiliated students for a number of reasons. One is sheer pragmatism. An individual faculty member or administrator will probably never need to delve into the depths of legislative language and power dynamics as this article does to work with an individual student veteran using the Post–9/11 GI Bill or an active duty servicemember using DOD tuition assistance funds to attend their school. However, power dynamics directly affect institutions, particularly when coercive power dynamics are exercised by using federal funding as a combined carrot and club. Thus, civilian higher education as a whole would be wise to pay attention to the campus-level effects of power dynamics playing out in the veterans’ education arena.
For instance, if an institution is selected to have VA employees embedded for counseling student veterans, per the language incorporated in the Harry W. Colmery Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2017, space must be found for those employees. That potentially affects more than just the student veteran population at that institution. Therefore, both scholars and practitioners better understanding how veterans’ education policy decisions can ripple out—as seen in the attempted amendment of the Higher Education Act discussed in this article, not the Post–9/11 GI Bill—to affect broader higher education policy and practice is necessary.

Another, more altruistic and possibly idealistic reason for higher education researchers and practitioners to better understand the power dynamics going on within veterans’ education policy is to help bridge the civil-military gap from the side of higher education. Military-affiliated students are an underrepresented and often misunderstood population in higher education.51 Therefore, higher education researchers and practitioners need more information on both the types of power dynamics operating in veterans’ education policy and the emotions behind them, often rooted in the civil-military gap in American society. A clearer understanding of the complexity of these power dynamics—which have not been previously researched in this sector given how the Post–9/11 GI Bill has changed the landscape—can potentially increase higher education’s bridge building with legislative allies and veteran-serving agencies to make better policy and practice to benefit this often-marginalized population.

Notes
11. Pash, “‘A Veteran Does Not Have to Stay a Veteran Forever’,” 228.
12. Donald Alexander Downs and Ilia Murtashvili, Arms and the University: Military


30. Nielsen and Snider, American Civil-Military Relations, 263.


34. Molly Corbett Broad letter, 2.
41. Hearing on the Topic of Modernization of the GI Bill and other Pending Legislation, Before the Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, 115th Cong. (15 June 2017) (testimony of William Hubbard, vice president of Government Affairs, SVA), 2.
50. Michael V. Reilly letter, 2.
The Provision of Cyber Manpower
Creating a Virtual Reserve

Major Gregg Curley

Abstract: Cyber manpower demands raise challenges similar to other high-demand specialties. This article looks at the viability of adapting the manpower model of the Public Health Service’s Reserve Commissioned Corps to the cybersphere. A reserve paramilitary force could serve interchangeably across the military and interagency without law of war restrictions, would provide a lower-cost manpower option than full-time active duty, and could complement—not compete—with the civilian cybersector. Last, targeted training, education, and retention could shape this reserve force to meet emerging demands.

Keywords: cyber manpower, cyber and the military, history of cyber, military cyber reserve, public health service

First Google then Facebook went dark. Netflix, Yahoo, Twitter . . . the top 100 websites became unusable in quick succession. Banks, stores, and hospitals remained online but with degraded capability for a few hours—just long enough for all of the personal data to be taken. Cell phones became paperweights. Power plants started to go offline, and the electricity was intermittent across the country. Air traffic control was forced to ground flights, ground traffic was brought to a standstill as traffic signals jammed, and mass transit ceased to function. The economy literally stopped as the New York Stock Exchange...
(NYSE) and NASDAQ Stock Market suspended trading and the banks closed to prevent a run. The delivery of food and goods ceased and widespread looting ensued. It was complete chaos.

A coordinated and large-scale, state-sponsored cyberattack, such as the one outlined above, has the potential to be utterly devastating. The response requires a whole-of-government approach with a mechanism for mobilizing the best cybertalent in the country and surging talent to a specific problem set. Such a force should complement the military and be paramilitary in nature but should source from a broader section of society. The Public Health Service Ready Reserve Corps provides an adaptable model for the provision of top civilian cybertalent at a manageable cost.

**History of Cyber**

Unlike the other four domains (land, sea, air, and space), cyberspace—in all its forms—is less than a century old and entirely manmade. The Department of Defense (DOD) played such an integral role in the development of cyberspace, it would not be a stretch to credit the military with creating the domain. In a twist of irony, the DOD now has the responsibility of protecting a domain it helped create but lost control of once it was opened to the public at large. There are unique aspects of this domain that did not exist in any form 70 years ago. Understanding the genesis of the cyberdomain will provide context when determining how to best defend it from malicious attacks or incursions.

The first device to resemble a modern computer was Charles Babbage’s 1834 design for an analytical engine. Essentially, the analytical engine was a giant four-function mechanical calculator that utilized punch cards for inputting information and was capable of producing printed output. In 1943, during the height of World War II, a computer was built for the British military. This computer, dubbed Colossus, was used to break the codes of the German Lorenz SZ40 cipher machine. Colossus, as its name implies, was enormous—a by-product of its primitive vacuum tube technology. Colossus and its vacuum tubes were characteristic of the first generation of computers, developed in 1937–46. Between 1947 and 1962, vacuum tubes gave way to transistors, and the second generation of computers was born. Second-generation computers had programming languages, memory, storage, and printing capabilities. Later, transistors ran their course and the integrated circuit ushered in the third generation of computers, spanning 1963–present. However, cyberspace required one more crucial development that did not materialize until two decades after third-generation computers first appeared—the internet.

The history of the internet is also relevant to developing an understanding of the cyberdomain. With the development of the computer came the desire to transmit and receive information between computers. In the 1960s, the Cold
War forced the U.S. military to develop solutions for sharing information in the event of a nuclear attack. One of the solutions was the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET). ARPANET functioned like an archaic version of today’s internet, but access was highly restricted—only the DOD and select contractors had access. A universal language for communicating among computer networks was developed—the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). On 1 January 1983, ARPANET officially adopted the TCP/IP language, and the internet was born. The technological progress from the 1983 birth of the internet to the present is utterly mind-boggling.

Today, our technology has surpassed the then-futuristic wireless flip phones portrayed in Star Trek, there are justified concerns that Russia influenced elections in the United States using cybercapabilities, and autonomous vehicles will soon be commonplace. The DOD’s cyberstrategy explains, “We live in a wired world. Companies and countries rely on cyberspace for everything from financial transactions to the movement of military forces.” Millions have virtual presences via social media, virtual currency supports online commerce (i.e., Bitcoin), and the internet impacts issues of sovereignty, defense, transportation, human rights, commerce, and law. The internet permeates almost every facet of modern life.

The year 2000 provided a sobering waypoint illustrative of how interconnected the world has become and how important this domain is to our everyday lives. In the late 1990s, the United States mobilized to address a cyberthreat: the Y2K bug. When early computers were programmed between the 1960s and 1980s, they were programmed with only two digits to represent the year. The fear was that 1 January 2000 would cause significant problems in various fields such as transportation, energy, and banking as computer systems would incorrectly interpret the date as 1 January 1900 versus 1 January 2000. This interpretive error was known as the Y2K bug. In response to this threat, the president formed a commission for Y2K conversion and civilian companies undertook significant reprogramming efforts. While the fears associated with the Y2K bug never materialized, were overblown, or were avoided through diligent efforts, the Department of Commerce estimated the total cost of preparing for the Y2K bug at $100 billion. In the ensuing 17 years, the level of interconnectedness, as well as the importance of the internet, has increased by orders of magnitude.

**Cyber and the Military**

Cyberspace was only formally recognized by the DOD as the fifth warfighting domain in 2005. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel David T. Fahrenkrug, in his study titled “Cyberspace Defined,” wrote that cyberwarriors “will be the recognized experts who understand the principals [sic] and techniques for conduct-
ing combat operations in cyberspace so that the [DOD] can deliver sovereign options for the defense of the United States of America and its global interests.”13 Because of the resources and lack of regulation that other nation-states and nonstate actors have, the DOD and the greater interagency need to be able to train, equip, and maintain a sufficient number of cyberwarriors to control and ideally dominate this domain. Raising and maintaining a skilled cyberforce is challenging, as the military is competing with the private sector, the training pipeline is extensive, and the work is highly specialized and technical. Additionally, the culture of the military and the modern technology worker are not wholly compatible. For a variety of reasons, traditional surge options (i.e., contracting, traditional reserve forces, internal sourcing, etc.), individually or combined, are suboptimal. The United States needs a cyber-specific ready reserve—a Virtual Reserve.

Defending a Domain

The DOD has identified three primary mission sets for its cyberwarriors: “[1] defend DOD networks, systems, and information; [2] defend the nation against cyber attacks of significant consequence; and [3] support operational and contingency plans.”14 To accomplish these three missions, the DOD will dedicate 6,200 personnel, divided into 133 teams sourced from across the Services.15 An additional 2,000 cyberpersonnel will exist in the reserve forces.16 On 24 October 2016, all 133 teams reached initial operating capability with approximately 5,000 trained personnel.17 Initial operating capability means “all Cyber Mission Force units have reached a threshold level of initial operating capacity and can execute their fundamental mission.”18 The full cyberforce will be mission-capable in 2018.19

The 133 cyberforce teams are provided by the various Services: 39 from the Air Force, 41 from the Army, 40 from the Navy, and 13 from the Marine Corps.20 These Service-sourced teams are task-organized to achieve the cyber-mission. Within that construct, there are 13 national mission teams, 68 cyber protection teams, 27 combat mission teams, and 25 support teams. The national mission teams defend the United States and its interests against cyberattacks of significant consequence.21 These teams are tasked with developing intelligence and warning capabilities, partnering with the interagency to defend the United States in cyberspace, sharing information with the Department of Homeland Security, and accessing and improving the United States’ deterrence posture.22 Each national mission team consists of 64 personnel.23 Cyberprotection teams defend priority DOD networks and systems against threats.24 Each cyberprotection team consists of 39 individual team members, and each team will be task-organized specifically for a given mission.25 The 27 combat mission teams provide support to geographic combatant commands by generating integrated
cyberspace effects in support of operational plans and contingency operations. Each combat mission team is made up of approximately 60 personnel. The remaining 25 teams are support teams that provide analytic and planning support to the national mission and combat mission teams. Each support team consists of 39 individuals.

Description of the Problem
When it reaches full operational capacity, the DOD will have a cyberforce equivalent to one and a half cyberbrigades; with the reserve capacity there will be two brigades or a similar-size entity. This is the force that is required to sustain current operations—there is no built-in reserve capacity. Developing, maintaining, and training this force poses some unique challenges. The size and complexity of a cyberattack could quickly overwhelm the United States’ cybercapability. Sustaining a two-brigade-size force of highly skilled, technical, and in-demand servicemembers is a difficult task. Sustainment of the force is imperative given the power parity in this domain; one hacker with an internet connection can potentially inflict more damage on the United States than the entirety of some nations’ traditional militaries.

Cyber is a new domain. As the DOD’s cyberteams are building to full operational capacity, now is the time to look to developing an effective and efficient bank of human capital that can be mobilized. Such a pool of talent is required to deal with contingencies in three distinct circumstances: sustained operations, specialized mobilizations (e.g., the Ebola outbreak and Stuxnet), and mass mobilizations (e.g., World War II and Vietnam).

Mobilization
Mobilizing military forces generally follows three macro models: sustained, specialized, and mass mobilization. These three methods and the attendant cyber-component are analyzed to establish a baseline and identify weaknesses within the current cyberconstruct.

Sustained Operations
The DOD has identified issues related to sustaining the current force: (1) Cyberprofessionals possess a highly specialized skill set requiring both an aptitude for the work and extensive training; (2) individuals with the required skill sets are in very high demand in the civilian sector; and (3) the Services have started to take targeted measures to retain and attract proven talent in this area. Ashton B. Carter, then secretary of defense, stated in a speech, “Military leaders have long complained that it is difficult to attract and keep cyber professionals in the services because they can make far more money in private industry.” Issues with sustaining operations in the cyberdomain boil down to manpower, partic-
ularly staying competitive with the civilian marketplace and providing the right balance of incentives and retention techniques to maintain a competent force.

The military must compete for personnel with the civilian sector. Whenever changes to military retirement, pay, and/or benefits are analyzed, one of the most important metrics is the competitiveness of the total package with the civilian sector. A military consisting of only those servicemembers that are incapable of marketing their skills in the civilian sector would be a hollow and ineffective force. In high-demand specialized fields, the incentives must be great enough to attract and retain a critical mass of highly competent individuals that, while they could have lucrative civilian careers, choose to serve instead.

The fields with civilian analogues (e.g., pilots, lawyers, doctors, and now cyber) are fields where additional incentives and retention techniques are required from time to time to remain competitive with the civilian sector. For instance, the Services are authorized to offer doctors entry-level commissions ranging from the 0-3 to the 0-6 level. To ensure a steady stream of doctors, health scholarships are offered across the Services. Military pilots, who benefit from very expensive government-funded training, incur longer service obligations to ensure full recoupment of the government’s investment, whereas doctors’ initial obligations can be shortened to two years to entice them to join. Bonuses are paid to high-demand military occupational specialties. Promotion precepts are utilized to quickly fill vacancies in undermanned specialties and school incentives are provided as reenlistment bonuses. Lateral moves from one military occupational specialty to another are used to generate middle management in fields with critical shortages. Generally speaking, these and similar strategies allow for the forces to appropriately shape military manpower. The success of these programs is reflected by the fact that, after 16 years of war, the United States still possesses an all-volunteer force; the stop-loss policy ended almost 8 years ago and there has not been a draft since Vietnam.

A current example of employing these various manpower-shaping tools is reflected in the Air Force’s approach to its pilot shortage. Proposed solutions to this crisis include lobbying the Federal Aviation Administration to increase the number of flight hours before military pilots may be hired by civilian airlines, offering bonuses, increasing aviation pay, liberalizing awards, and allowing return to active duty opportunities. While the cyberforce will ultimately number around 6,200, reaching that initial number has required use of some similar strategies. There is not an abundance of personnel with the required skill sets that the U.S. government could turn to in a national emergency at a reasonable price.

The military must source its cyberwarriors from the greater population. This is a daunting challenge as the U.S. cybersecurity job market is expected to grow from $75 billion in 2015 to $170 billion in 2020. In 2016, more than
200,000 cybersecurity jobs, in all sectors, went unfilled and job postings increased 75 percent during the previous five years. To open the aperture worldwide, there is a projected shortfall of 1.5 million cybersecurity jobs. It is clear that the demand for cybersecurity professionals has outstripped the supply. Basic economics dictate these market inefficiencies will pose challenges for the buyers in a seller’s market—and the U.S. government is a buyer.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) lists the annual median salary for an information security analyst at $92,600. By comparison, a 10-year gunnery sergeant (E-8) receives a total regular annual military compensation of $94,966. An E-4 with four years in service (the end of an enlistment) sees total regular military compensation of $50,746. If the basic allowance for housing is removed from the equation—assuming the servicemember is required to live in the barracks—the annual compensation package drops to approximately $37,000. Leaders have recognized this: “For troops who are trained in cyber security, six-figure salaries will be easy to find in the civilian job market—and the services know that money will be one important element of retention. For example, the Marine Corps has set aside 16 percent of its total retention bonus budget for targeting its small but growing cyber force.”

While the compensation is not particularly competitive, especially at the lower ranks, the military does have a few advantages over the civilian sector. The military will provide training and education, whereas the civilian sector will generally expect a viable skill set prior to hiring. The military can provide money for college, food, shelter, tax advantages, travel opportunities, and health and dental insurance. There is also the ever-present pride that comes from serving. The military has already conceded to lawmakers that competing for talent with the civilian sector on the basis of pay alone is futile: “We are not going to compete on the basis of money. Where we’re going to compete is the idea of ethos, culture . . . that you’re doing something that matters, that you’re doing something in the service of the nation.” These inherent competitive advantages to military service may be sufficient to generate and maintain a force of 6,200, but the drawbacks attendant to service, such as deployments, constant moves, danger, and Service standards, coupled with the lure of lucrative civilian options, will siphon off a large amount of talent and pose significant barriers to quickly increasing the force size. Cloaking service in the flag will only go so far. There are already indications and warnings that the current way of doing business will be inadequate vis-à-vis cyber manpower, as then-Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James states: “We’ve made progress over the last year or two, but it’s not good enough. We need to do more, to be open to different ways of bringing people on and retaining people so we can bring the best and brightest into our ranks.”

DOD leaders have proposed a variety of strategies to gain and maintain
parity with civilian-sector cybercompetence. Secretary Carter proposed colonellevel direct commissions for cyberwarriors, and the Air Force is exploring changing physical fitness standards for cyberpersonnel. The Marine Corps is considering allowing cyberwarriors to bypass boot camp—a rite of passage in this Service. The Marine Corps also will allow cyberwarriors to stay in the cybermilitary occupational specialty. To civilians, each one of these initiatives appears to be a relatively innocuous force-shaping measure; however, each one runs counter to the culture of the Services. Many uniformed servicemembers were indignant over these proposed changes.

The potential negative impacts to morale of favorable treatment afforded to cyberwarriors should not be underestimated. Napoleon Bonaparte famously stated, “There are only two forces in the world, the sword and the spirit. In the long run the sword will always be conquered by the spirit.” When building our cybersword, it must be done in such a way that does not weaken the overall military spirit. During the course of building the cyberforce, Lieutenant General Gina M. Grosso, deputy chief of staff for Manpower, Personnel and Services, U.S. Air Force, states, “How much brawn does the military need, and how much intellect? I think about a cyber warrior. Do I care what a cyber warrior weighs? Do I care if he can run a mile and a half in 12 minutes?” If the goal is to build a cyberforce, the answer is no, the Air Force should not care. If the goal is to build an armed force with an integrated cybercomponent—because of the impact on morale and unit cohesion—the answer is yes, the Air Force should care quite a bit. Favoritism for one specialty can only be pushed so far before the rank and file will bristle at the disparate treatment for similarly situated individuals (e.g., Air Force E-4s from different occupational fields). The incentive scheme for an infantryman or a pararescue airman will quickly become inadequate if a cyberwarrior in an air-conditioned building can receive better pay, education benefits, and promotion opportunities while not shouldering similar personal risk or having to maintain typical military standards.

Culture and morale concerns are by no means limited to the Air Force. As the Marine Corps’ mantra states, every Marine is a rifleman. While a pithy saying, because every enlisted Marine attends recruit training, it is also grounded in truth. Changing that accession pipeline solely for the cyberfield will strike a significant blow to Marine Corps culture. Aside from Marines that serve within Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command (MARSOC), all Marines are required to serve in “B” billets—jobs such as recruiters, drill instructors, or embassy security—to remain competitive for promotion, reenlistment, and retention. These changes would strike at the very heart of what it means to be a Marine. These strategies also run counter to the culture of the Service, erode morale, and marginalize other specialties. A solution that can satisfy manpower requirements without negatively impacting morale will be ideal.
Specialized Mobilization
Certain contingencies do not require the military to grow, but they do require surge capacity in a specific field. Additional personnel were required to support the response to the 2014–15 Ebola outbreak in Africa.\(^5^6\) When the civilian air traffic controllers went on strike during the Ronald W. Reagan administration, military air traffic controllers were brought in to keep civilian airlines flying.\(^5^7\) In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the Army Corps of Engineers had a massive response to the relief efforts.\(^5^8\) There is no such surge capability in the cyber-community. Offensive cyberattacks will become more numerous and complex, requiring more specialized manpower in the future. Any internal solution that does not come with additional manpower and funding represents an opportunity cost; the Services must make cuts elsewhere to resource the cybermission. The 133 cyberteams are all being used on sustainment missions.\(^5^9\) Any emergent requirements will necessitate degradation to sustainment, contracting costs, or training additional personnel—all of which incur costs and delay.

Mass Mobilization
Mass mobilization of U.S. forces has not taken place since World War II. In assessing the capability for a mass mobilization, current assets, domain-specific surge strategies, and stop-gap measures must be assessed.

Existing Resources
If the hypothetical horde was to ride over the hill tomorrow and the United States was required to mobilize, the military would grow shockingly fast. In World War II, the Army alone grew from 174,000 to 11 million soldiers in the span of six years.\(^6^0\) Such a proportional mobilization today would mean the Army would go from 541,000 to 34.2 million soldiers. Given modern societal norms, females would most likely be required to register for the draft, significantly increasing the pool of people eligible for military service compared to World War II. While a mass mobilization can occur relatively quickly, the United States will not blindly add manpower and capacity. The government has substantial mechanisms in place that allow for intelligent mobilization. Even in the direst of situations, the United States will not conscript doctors to pull triggers, linguists to sweep for improvised explosive devices, or pilots to captain submarines—that is inefficient, ineffective, and a losing strategy. When exploring the viability of creating a cyber reserve, it is informative to understand the various mechanisms the government will employ if an intelligent mobilization is required.

Ground Forces
In a massive mobilization, the standing military would be quickly augmented
with the reserve forces. The Army Reserve is 202,000 strong, and the Marine Corps Reserve boasts 39,200 members. The Army also would nationalize the National Guard, which would instantly add another 350,200 to the rolls. With these mechanisms alone, the size of the standing army could more than double overnight. These forces are already trained, equipped, and organized into units.

For additional instant manpower, members of the Inactive Ready Reserve—“a manpower pool consisting mainly of trained individuals who have previously served in [active component] units or in the [selective reserve]”—could be called up. Military members who have retired could be called up with a mobilization of the retired reserve. As was done in World War II, the curriculum at the Service academies and Reserve Officers’ Training Corps could be truncated to provide additional entry-level officers.

**Naval Forces**

Naval forces would be increased in a fashion similar to the ground forces, calling on all components to activate and then relying on conscription for new recruits. Additionally, the Coast Guard would transfer from the Department of Homeland Security to the Department of the Navy. An additional resource pool would be the Coast Guard Auxiliary. The Merchant Marine also would be nationalized under the Department of the Navy to provide shipping and transport capacity. For ships, the Reserve Fleet—retired warships—could be returned to service appreciably faster than building new ships. The Reserve Fleet consists of 46 vessels that the United States keeps in “mothball” status in the event there is a national emergency. These ships are kept in various stages of maintenance. Additionally, there is a 99-ship National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF)—commercial vessels that sit at anchor and are kept ready for military use as troop or cargo transport. As with the Reserve Fleet, these ships could be pressed into service appreciably quicker than building or requisitioning new ones.

Growing the U.S. Navy through reserves will take longer than growing the ground and air forces through reserves due to the different hurdles they must overcome. Even mothballed ships would require time before they could be recertified and activated. To compensate for lack of sea duty time, active duty crews would need to be paired with reservists, and the crew as a whole would need to pass their certification. Even with the domain-specific lag times associated with mobilization, the U.S. Navy would still outpace other nations in growing the size of the force. The Navy is the most powerful blue-water navy in the world. Because the Service will start from a position of advantage and has such programs as the Naval Reserve, the Reserve Fleet, and the NDRF, the U.S. Navy would maintain a significant competitive advantage relative to potential
adversaries. Mobilizing the full might of the Navy’s reserve options would be a massive undertaking that would only be initiated if a conflict were against an adversary that boasted a formidable blue-water navy and the conflict had a long projected duration—otherwise mobilization would be a waste of time and resources.

**Air Power**

The Air Force will quickly augment with members of the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard. The Civil Air Patrol (the Air Force Auxiliary) would see its civilian mission expand. For assets, the Air Force has the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). The CRAF is a fleet of civilian airliners that can be pressed into national service in a time of war if the military’s airlift capabilities are inadequate. The federal government also contracts with civilian airlines directly for troop transport. Similar to the Navy, the Air Force maintains a mothballed fleet. This fleet is located at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Tucson, Arizona, and contains assets that can be updated, refurbished, or fixed relatively quickly and pressed into service if required. Each of these mobilization options capitalize on existing trained manpower and equipment.

**New Resources**

The military would need to martial new resources in the event that a major mobilization were needed—both materiel and manpower.

**Materiel**

One of the United States’ greatest assets is its economy. The military-industrial complex would be expected to satisfy the need for additional equipment. In World War II, American industry was able to successfully construct a troop transport ship in just four days. Today, the U.S. economy is the largest and most powerful in the world. The size and breadth of the country ensures it has ample supplies of natural resources and power required for manufacturing. The nation’s economic might is so great that a tank factory is kept running, not because more tanks are needed, but to ensure that if tanks are needed they can be produced without the delay of having to retool a factory and relearn the lost manufacturing skills. The U.S. economy, under most conditions, is capable of out-building, out-resourcing, outspending, and outlasting our military enemies.

**Personnel**

Such a large-scale mobilization would also require personnel. Enlistment waivers would become both more lenient and more prevalent. Additional new manpower would be added through conscription. Congress would pass legislation
authorizing a draft. Once the legislation is passed, the Selective Service will activate its reserve officers and a lottery will start drafting registered individuals. A draft would require a significant catalyst to become politically palatable; however, if conditions necessitated one, a draft would provide a substantial influx of personnel.

While an all-hands mobilization effort would be effective, there are inherent inefficiencies. By definition, a U.S. military draft is a lottery. The manpower will increase, but it will not increase in direct proportion to the need in certain fields (e.g., medical, legal, and cyber). To ensure that a conscripted force is the most effective it can be, mechanisms need to be in place to guarantee optimized assignments across all military occupational specialties. In sum, it is not about the sheer size of the force; how it is shaped is equally important. A force without sufficient shaping is a horde; a force without sufficient quantity is easily marginalized, bypassed, or defeated (i.e., ineffective).

Across the traditional domains, the United States has a well thought out mobilization plan. This smart approach to mobilization is a national security hedge—it allows for a smaller standing military because a high-capacity military is waiting in the wings—and an absolute behemoth can be mustered in a very short period of time. Given the interconnectedness of today’s society and potential damage an attack in the cyberdomain could inflict, an intelligent mobilization plan for this domain should be developed.

**Select Solutions**

Recognizing that a need to quickly increase number and capacity of the country’s cyberwarriors is a likely contingency, an analysis of select solutions follows: (1) maintain the status quo, (2) contract any shortfalls, and (3) create a cyber-specific reserve force.

**Status Quo**

The first and least expensive option is to maintain the status quo. If and when a situation presents itself that requires more cybercapacity than the United States can bring to bear, traditional methods of addressing the capability gap will be utilized. At the entry level, these methods include increased recruiting incentives, truncated training pipelines, enlistment bonuses, and even direct accessions. At the force-sustainment level, retention measures include stop-loss clauses, retention bonuses, promotions, awards, return to active duty opportunities, and schooling. Contracting will be used to address gaps present in the active force until the active force can recruit, train, and resource the shortfalls.

The drawbacks to maintaining the status quo include the potential for a drop in morale as cyberwarriors in effect become conscripts through programs such as stop-loss—where servicemembers’ active duty commitments are unilat-
erally extended by the government—or selfless sacrifice is subsumed by obligation garnered through retention incentives so lucrative that freedom of choice is illusory. In addition to the morale drop in the maintained force, any training of new troops will have a very long pipeline. The training pipeline will vary depending on the required skill set; in any event, additional and effective new manpower could not be applied to the capabilities gap without a significant lag time. Any required additional capacity that cannot be generated in a timely manner or maintained long-term within the military will need to be contracted.

**Contracting Solution**

One option is to contract for cyberwarrior services. In an age where a contract infantry can be created, a cyberforce could likewise be contracted. If the United States needs firewall protection for critical infrastructure, programmers for defense satellites, or countermeasures to corporate contractor espionage—contract it. This has been a solution to bridge manpower and expertise shortfalls in the past, as James Lisher notes: “[C]ontractors were used to support new weapons systems in [Operation Iraqi Freedom] OIF and [Operation Enduring Freedom] OEF. The dynamic nature of these contingencies resulted in employment of new weapons systems before the uniformed Services were manned to support them. Contractors, again, were used to fill this capabilities gap.”

Contracting does come with significant drawbacks. These drawbacks are highlighted by the high-profile leaks of classified information by contractors Edward J. Snowden and Reality Leigh Winner. Granted, this problem is not isolated to contractors. Then-U.S. Army Private Chelsea Manning released significant classified material but, generally speaking, there are relatively few military prosecutions for leaks. The United States will need to develop better ways of securing networks and information while also ensuring that control of the domain is not ceded to the contractors. One way to accomplish this is to decrease reliance on contractors.

Military contractors in the cyber realm also are subject to limitations placed on U.S. civilians relative to warfare. Civilians—including contractors—are barred from conducting offensive cyberattacks because “a cyber network attack [CNA] is ‘a category of fires employed for offensive purposes in which actions are taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt, degrade, manipulate, or destroy information resident in the target information system or computer networks, or the systems/networks themselves.’ CNA is the manifestation of combat operations in the cyber realm.” CNAs may only be executed by uniformed personnel.

At the macro level, the requirement for military personnel stems from the Tallinn Manual—NATO’s analysis of the law of armed conflict as applied to the cyberdomain. The Tallinn Manual states in Rule 20: “Cyber operations
executed in the context of an armed conflict are subject to the law of armed conflict." The law of armed conflict "bestows legal protections as a full-fledged combatant, which has implications that range from ensuring prisoner-of-war status under international law to immunity from prosecution in court." U.S. contractors conducting CNAs would be state-sponsored criminals, which would violate the Geneva Conventions. Violations of the Geneva Conventions would undermine the entire treaty, potentially expose all of our servicemembers to terrible atrocities, and would do irrevocable harm to the law of armed conflict.

To comport with the treaty and ensure appropriate legal protections under the law of armed conflict, DOD policy holds that only uniformed servicemembers conduct certain types of attacks. These operations are considered inherently governmental (IG), which "is defined by the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998 as ‘a function so intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by Federal government employees’." In a military context, IG functions include: “plan[ing], prepar[ing], and execut[ing] operations to actively seek out, close with, and destroy a hostile force or other military objective by means of . . . employment of firepower and other destructive and disruptive capabilities.” Offensive network attacks are specifically listed as a planned use of destructive combat capabilities under Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for Developing Workforce Mix. This construct is problematic when a force is mixed military/contractor. A military member must be the one to carry out the attack.

It makes sense that if the U.S. government is waging war on another sovereign or entity, the individuals conducting the actions should be a part of that government. As the DODI 1100.22 states, “The U.S. government has exclusive responsibility for discretionary decisions concerning the appropriate . . . use of destructive or deadly force on behalf of the United States.” This retention of responsibility stems from the high-stakes life-and-death nature of warfare, liability for destruction and damage, and the critical national interests implicated by combat operations. To ensure appropriate decisions are made, decision-making authority may only be delegated to military commanders; military commanders are held accountable for their decisions, they receive extensive military training, and they are held responsible for the training and readiness of their force. The government can exercise limited control over contractors with the only recourse short of criminal action often confined to economic measures: cancel the contract or withhold payment(s).

Cyber would not be the first area in which the government has turned to contracting to fix an emerging need. Contracted cooks, security, sanitation, billeting, and linguists have been and currently are a pervasive presence in Afghanistan. However, the cyberdomain poses special challenges to contracting. As James R. Lisher II points out in an article for the Journal of Contract Man-
agement: “In the past, the DOD faced similar challenges using contractors to fill emergent personal security and interrogation needs following the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The DOD must not rush to fill cyber capability gaps without doing a proper manpower analysis to prevent the outsourcing of inherently governmental functions.”93 To the extent the government contracts for cyberservices, a careful analysis of specific missions and functions must be conducted to ensure compliance with the law of armed conflict, policies, and directives.

Another drawback to contracting stems from the fact that many cyber issues are new, unique, and require a time-sensitive response. It is nearly impossible to contract for services and capabilities that are undefined until they are needed. Take for instance the Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) tactical vehicles of OIF and OEF vintage. At the start of those conflicts, the thin-skinned High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) was the tactical vehicle of the Services. A procurement program for an up-armored, V-hulled, desert-combat vehicle would have been summarily rejected in 2000. However, by 2005, as the enemy employed improvised explosive devices, it quickly became apparent that HMMWVs were a liability. Once the need was identified, an up-armored, V-hulled, desert-combat vehicle was quickly designed, procured, assembled, and delivered—the MRAP. The MRAP, a solution to an unanticipated need, became a model for expedited government procurement.94

Last, contracting is an expensive option. While the legacy costs in contracting are not a concern for the government, contractors will require more up-front money to compensate employees for this risk. Additionally, the more dire the need, the more the cost; this is basic economics. Contractors cannot be deployed anywhere strictly by executive fiat like the military—companies must entice them, and they do so with money. These financial considerations would render a contracted cyberforce an expensive option—an option that still may not be able to generate real-time effects for unanticipated cyberthreats or legally conduct the types of operations needed, all while simultaneously exposing the United States to a higher information-security risk. Undoubtedly, some contracting will be required, as it always has been in warfare. However, a more robust government cadre of skilled cyberprofessionals needs to be readily available to address emergent threats. Avoiding a foreseeable overreliance on contracting will provide more sovereign options to the United States while enabling the United States to be proactive in its cyberstrategy rather than reactive.

**Reserve Capacity**
The United States could increase the capacity of DOD and interagency cyber-warriors through a specialized reserve force. Reserve forces have their genesis
in the military medical community. Prior to the Spanish-American War, the military retained enough doctors to satisfy the peacetime mission. During the war, the Army turned to contracting the capability. However, drawbacks to contracting physicians quickly became evident—most notably the lack of flexibility with regard to where and under what conditions they would work. The solution to this problem was to offer reserve commissions to physicians who agreed to be activated in a time of war. This part-time construct for gaining and maintaining qualified personnel was so effective that it morphed into today’s Army Reserve—a force of approximately 450,000.95

Reserve forces, because they are on a retainer, are significantly less expensive than standing armies—some estimates quantify activated reserve forces at only 80 percent of the cost of active duty servicemembers. The reductions in cost are mostly attributed to reduced retirement obligations and reduced support costs (e.g., schools, housing, etc.). The reserves provide unique levels of experience and maturity that members acquire in the civilian sector. The greatest advantage to such a reserve force is the ability to shape the expertise contained within the force for a relatively low cost. If more network professionals are needed, offer scholarships in this field in return for a Service commitment. If the technology is changing, take high performers and send them to specialized schools. Offer bonuses in high-demand areas, recruit specific skill sets, or offer direct commissions to attract the talent necessary. As covered when addressing manpower, a variety of incentives can be used by the U.S. government to build and shape the force when it exists in a reserve capacity.

The drawback to a traditional reserve force is that it would require military standards—difficult for some of the more desirable cyberwarriors. For example, it is unlikely regulation haircuts and cybersecurity skills are positively correlated; however, the requirement for regulation haircuts may be negatively correlated with recruitment. In the cyberdomain, typing speed is more important than foot speed. A great cyberwarrior may be paralyzed from the waist down—currently that recruit would not be eligible for military service. There are other physical, mental, and training standards that are necessary for a traditional kinetic force that may be counterproductive to developing and maintaining a cyber-specific force. Doing away with some of the standards for one specific subspecialty is anathema to the military culture—the traditional reserve forces are subject to this constraint. This culture clash is represented by comments made by the commanding general of Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command: “You can let them in with purple hair but we’re going to shave it off anyways and plug up whatever holes [piercings] they have if they’re smart enough.”96 The problem is if the purple-haired cybergenius is in fact smart enough, there are sufficient civilian opportunities that are more lucrative and will not require them to shave their head and plug their holes.
Reserve military service within the interagency is not very seamless. Billets must be created, funding dedicated, and manpower applied. Every reserve member that is provided to another entity is one less that the unit can utilize to accomplish its primary mission. A reserve cyberunit would rightly demonstrate institutional inertia with respect to fragmenting the force and distributing it across the interagency. Additionally, military members are specifically prohibited from conducting certain activities (law enforcement), and congressional appropriations with specific earmarks further limit interoperability of a military force.

**Proposed Solution**
A hybrid of the three options provides the best solution. The standing cyberforce needs to remain competitive across the board. The force must be continuously shaped and honed. If a requirement emerges that necessitates a surge in cybermanpower, the traditional methods of incentives, training, and compulsion should be employed to organically grow both force and capacity. Special cyber reserve units will provide additional cybercapacity while also serving as a low-cost means for retaining trained personnel whose active duty commitments have been fulfilled. Contracting should be utilized to supplement the active and reserve forces and to bridge any capability gap while buying time for the military to increase capacity. All three options are currently being pursued in earnest; however, an additional nuance—a nonmilitary specialized reserve cyberforce—should be added to the mix to maximize capability while minimizing cost.

A specialized reserve force should be created that provides a low-cost nonmilitary option for sourcing some of the best talent in the cybersector. Such a force already exists in the medical community. In addition to military active duty, reserve, and contracted medical personnel, a complementary nonmilitary specialized reserve exists to supplement the medical field across the interagency: the Public Health Service. This effective model can be adapted to cyberwarfare and will address the remaining drawbacks of the current three-pronged approach.

**The Public Health Service Model**
An existing model could be adapted to provide cybermanpower. The Reserve Commissioned Corps of the Public Health Service, a paramilitary organization, provides the United States and the interagency with a bench of qualified manpower, at a lower cost, and without the legal restrictions of contractors.

**History**
An Act for the Relief of Sick and Disabled Seaman was signed into law by President John Adams in 1798. This law required American ships entering a U.S.
port to remit a portion of each seaman’s salary on arrival. The funds collected in this manner were used to create hospitals for sick and disabled seamen and fund doctors to care for them. In 1889, Congress approved the Public Health Service (PHS) Commissioned Corps to constitute the uniformed arm of the Marine Hospital Service. The PHS Commissioned Corps was organized with rank and authority in the same manner as the military, and the PHS officially became one of the uniformed services of the United States. The name was shortened to the Public Health Service in 1912 and the mission set was expanded to include sanitation and preventive medicine.

Like most government entities, the PHS expanded during World War II. In addition to doctors, it received authorization to commission nurses, dieticians, physical therapists, scientists, and public health officers. Today, the PHS consists of 6,700 uniformed officers. The PHS has responded to a laundry list of significant events over the past decade:

The [PHS] Corps has deployed to events ranging from terrorist events (9/11, Boston Marathon Bombings, anthrax) to natural disasters (Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Wilma, and Sandy; Red River flooding; Northeast ice storms); from humanitarian assistance (Haiti and Japan earthquakes, Indian Ocean tsunami) to reconstruction and stabilization (Iraq, Afghanistan); from public health crises (H1N1, suicide clusters on Indian Reservations) to hospital rescue (Mariana Islands). Over the past 10 years, the Corps has undertaken over 15,000 officer deployments in support of nearly 500 distinct missions and events.

The most recent deployment by the PHS was to provide support to Hurricane Harvey relief efforts in the Houston, Texas, area.

Section 5210 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 established a Ready Reserve Corps within the PHS. Functionally, the Ready Reserve Corps of the PHS is designed to be a low-cost supplement to the active duty force designed for “service in time of national emergency.” This ready reserve has not been fully implemented; however, the Ready Reserve Corps of the PHS is the proposed model for low-cost and highly effective cybersurge capacity because it presents many unique mechanisms that do not exist in the cyber domain.

**Interoperability**

While not technically a military Service, the interoperability between the DOD and the PHS was on full display during the Ebola outbreak of 2014–15. The PHS mobilized and provided rotating 70-man teams for 60-day deployments.
The PHS does not have a logistics arm, so the DOD provided that capability, as Rear Admiral Lushniak explains: “DOD will provide support for the officers, including billeting, food, water, and other basic living support. DOD construction of an Expeditionary Medical Support (EMEDS) unit included adaptations for infection control, plumbing, septic systems, structures for the family visitation centers and behavioral health counseling, and security measures.”

The military already has doctors in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and respective reserve components. From time to time, the military calls on PHS doctors to provide services, as does the greater interagency. This ability to provide medical surge capacity is valuable, as evidenced by the fact that the PHS is an asset the United States has utilized for 220 years. The PHS/DOD construct recognizes the requirement for an organic medical capability within the military, yet provides a complement to the existing active duty and reserve cadre of military doctors and health support personnel.

**Deployability**
The PHS is unique in both the United States and across the world. The PHS “Corps officers . . . can be deployed at a moment’s notice anywhere in the world to meet the needs of the President and the Department of Health and Human Services.” Members can be ordered to communicable disease hotspots, military conflicts, humanitarian missions, or any place on Earth they are required. While the mission set of the PHS may be unique, there are nuances to its manpower structure that make such a format very valuable to cyberwar fighters.

**Whole of Government**
The PHS primarily supports the myriad programs administered by the Department of Health and Human Services; however, PHS also supports the DOD. Additionally, PHS serves almost interchangeably across the interagency. Currently, members of PHS serve with the District of Columbia, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the National Park Service, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Division of Immigration Health Services, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Marshals Service. The ability to plug and play across the interagency is a relatively unique role within the executive branch and a concept that could be of great value in certain areas (i.e., engineering, cyber, etc.).

**Flexibility**
Clearly, PHS serves across the interagency. If the Coast Guard can be said to live a dual existence (Title 14, law enforcement and Title 10, military), PHS lives a multifaceted existence. When serving with a different interagency entity,
PHS members are not subject to the same restrictions as the military. For instance, the military is prohibited under the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 from enforcing domestic law. PHS members serving with the Department of Justice would not be subject to the Posse Comitatus Act, because they would not be a force specifically prohibited by statute from enforcing domestic law.109 While the image of doctors enforcing the law might be hard to imagine, a cyberforce could, and most likely would, be involved in domestic law enforcement; in that case, the distinction does matter.

Based on the Tallinn Manual, the law of armed conflict applies to actions in cyberspace.110 The law of armed conflict has significant implications in the cyberdomain. Members of the armed forces enjoy combatant status, which entitles them to combatant immunity and prisoner of war status.111 Cybercontractors or civilians who are not members of the armed forces would be classified as “unprivileged belligerents” and afforded no protection under the law of armed conflict.112 The PHS mission set does not authorize its members to conduct offensive military operations; however, as a paramilitary organization, if PHS members were authorized to conduct offensive military operations, they would be afforded the protections of the law of armed conflict.113 A paramilitary cyberforce authorized to conduct offensive operations would enjoy the protections of the law of armed conflict.

Centralized Control
PHS is answerable to the surgeon general. The surgeon general is responsible for training, equipping, and manning the force. The benefit of having a specialized force answerable to one individual is that it promotes unity of effort. PHS still maintains administrative control over its members when assigned to the interagency. While interagency PHS members are answerable to the supported entity chain of command, there are still lines of communication to PHS and the surgeon general.

Standards
As a uniformed service of the United States, PHS has its own standards and regulations. For instance, the physical fitness requirements are different from other Services.114 PHS, as a standalone organization, has its own eligibility criteria, award system, and policies. It does utilize sea-service uniforms and military pay and benefit schemes, but it maintains a distinctly unique service culture. This culture is very effective in addressing the simple and direct PHS mission: “protect, promote, and advance the health and safety of our Nation.”115 The PHS construct will translate nicely to the cyberdomain—a domain that would benefit from a similar laser-focused mission.
Adaptation of the PHS Model to Cyber

A Virtual Reserve modeled after the PHS would have many beneficial attributes. First and foremost, a Virtual Reserve would consist of a small—but not insignificant—force that can be pressed into service with minimal delay. There would be no requirement for recruitment or training delays before being able to instantly use the skill sets of these individuals. Members of the Virtual Reserve would be subject to orders just as with any other uniformed Service and receive the benefits and protections of the Uniformed Services Employment and Re-employment Rights Act of 1994.116

Second, no matter how technologically advanced or interconnected the world may become, the trigger puller will not become obsolete. Relaxing standards for an occupational field (as opposed to a Service) would create a special class within a Service that does not have to follow the same rules or live up to the same expectations as their peers. Such a construct would have a devastating impact on morale, readiness, and ultimately warfighting prowess. These concerns would be moot if this special class belonged to a unique nonmilitary uniformed service with its own homogenous culture, norms, and standards. Such a service would better navigate the tension between cyberdomain operational requirements and the available talent pool. The Virtual Reserve could promulgate Service-specific standards and requirements that ensure the nation is receiving the correct mix of brawn and intellect in the cyberdomain. Such a construct would also appeal to individuals in a lucrative career field that feel compelled to serve without the full commitment attendant to traditional enlistment or commissioning options. A cybersecurity executive could unlock a military retirement, health insurance, and benefits while still maintaining a civilian career. The United States can benefit from that executive’s knowledge and expertise at a fraction of the cost relative to purchasing it on the open market.

Third, the prohibitions on law enforcement present in the military would not apply to this service—similar to the Coast Guard. If a criminal cyberincident of national importance were to emerge, there are no restrictions on the Virtual Reserve assisting the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Department of Justice (DOJ); the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; Federal Marshals; or any other law enforcement entity. Criminal cyberattacks are quite common; just this year, there have been major ransomware attacks (Wannacry and Petya), leaks (voter records, Cloudbleed), and hacking (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], President Emmanuel Macron’s campaign in France, and the National Security Agency [NSA]).117 The United States must be able to mobilize a surge capability to help prevent, fix, patch, thwart, and counter these criminal attacks and then assist in identification, investigation, and prosecution of the criminal perpetrators.
Fourth, the proposed model comports with the law of armed conflict. A cyber reserve—even if it is generally a nonmilitary force—may lawfully participate in hostilities and receive protections: “[A] party to a conflict may incorporate a paramilitary or armed law enforcement agency into its armed forces.”118 The Tallinn Manual clarifies further that “once such groups have been properly incorporated into the armed forces, their members may conduct cyberoperations to the same extent as members of the regular armed forces.”119 As a uniformed service of the United States, members of this service component could conduct inherently governmental functions—including offensive network attacks.

Fifth, such a force may be shaped through all of the aforementioned manpower-shaping tools. If the force projects a shortfall in programmers, then tailored recruitment and scholarships, coupled with retention bonuses and lateral moves, would adequately address the capability gap. If top-level IT leadership is lacking, offering direct commissions at the 0-6 level for a Google or Cisco executive would be an option. High-level direct commissioning in a new and specialized force that specifically authorizes it would avoid some of the problems inherent in utilizing the same construct in the established military hierarchy. The message that is sent to a 20-year lieutenant colonel with three combat tours if the Air Force made a civilian Google executive an overnight colonel would be that the lieutenant colonel’s contributions are not valued as much. Contrast that with a direct commissioned 0-6 in a reserve cyberentity with specified policies for specific skill sets within the domain. In that hypothetical situation, the stated policies would prevent an equivalent morale drop and would not alienate the rest of the force. It is the practical difference between creating a GS-15 position versus disregarding Service culture, tradition, and hierarchy.

Sixth, current cybermodels exist in stovepipes. The CIA and DOJ cyber-teams have significantly different missions than DOD cyberteams. The DOD is not aware of what the CIA and DOJ are doing unless those entities are task organized for a specific crisis. Additionally, there is no unity of effort or unity of command. A Virtual Reserve with a centralized surgeon general-equivalent and personnel assigned throughout the interagency would facilitate the sharing of information and best practices. If a whole-of-government approach were needed, members of this Virtual Reserve would be ready-made liaisons with built-in unity of command/effort.

Finally, the cost of a reserve cyberforce would be much less than a standing force of equivalent size and capability. The civilian talent pool, including academia, has the inherent expertise and currency required for success in a free market. Tapping into that talent pool would generate cost savings over the alternative—training and maintaining an equivalent-size active duty force capability. The standing support costs associated with an active force would be avoided; this reserve force would be the same as any other reserve entity from
the perspective of personnel costs. Additionally, there could be some other creative cost savings that are unique to the domain. When an internet connection and a computer are all that are needed to access the domain, crowd sourcing, teleworking, and various other cost-saving measures become viable options.

**Recommendation**

The United States should establish a nonmilitary reserve uniformed service that contains a cadre of highly skilled cyberwarriors. This entity should resemble the envisioned Ready Reserve arm of the PHS—a cadre of highly skilled medical professionals that can complement the armed forces’ active and reserve medical personnel but also serve across the interagency. This paramilitary force would enjoy the benefits and legal protections associated with military service, while also operating under a unique culture and set of standards that facilitate fielding the most capable force for mission accomplishment in the cyberdomain. Once such a force is established, it can be shaped through a variety of incentives to ensure it has the correct mix of talent, competence, and leadership. This Virtual Reserve would provide surge capacity when needed by the military for offensive network attacks or military network defense, while benefiting from the protections afforded to lawful combatants. Additionally, this force would be equally adept and employable in combating corporate espionage on behalf of the DOJ, gathering intelligence for the CIA, or preventing data breaches at the Office of Personnel Management; essentially, this force would provide support to any agencies and/or mission sets that the president may direct. The Virtual Reserve would serve as the cyberdomain’s quick reaction force—capable of being employed on a national scale without the limitations of contractors, legal liability of civilians, or encumbrances placed on military personnel.

**Conclusion**

Regardless of the domain, a trained, skilled, and effective pool of manpower is required. There is nothing so unique about the cyberdomain that it should be the exception. Colonel Walt Yates describes this point effectively in his *Marine Corps Gazette* article entitled “Affordable and Effective Cybersecurity”: “[W]e have treated cyberspace as a mystical warfare domain with properties that are different from three-dimensional battle space. In truth, there are far more similarities between warfare in cyberspace and three-dimensional space than there are differences.”

Similar to the other domains, the cyberdomain will need the ability to increase manpower quickly and efficiently, but in a manner that takes into account the unique aspects of the cyber domain. The U.S. government must find a way to cost-effectively capitalize on civilian expertise, use that expertise interchangeably across the DOD and interagency, and tap into that expertise very quickly. Accomplishing this will require an entity that
would be open to a wider talent pool than the traditional military force. In the health field, that model exists in the Public Health Service's Commissioned Corps Ready Reserve; a similarly organized and employed cyber reserve should be created—a Virtual Reserve.

Notes

4. “Colossus.”
5. Steitz, “A Brief Computer History.”
15. The DOD Cyber Strategy, 6.
18. DOD press release.
23. Pomerleau, “Cyber Warriors.”
24. “Cyber Strategy.”
29. Pomerleau, “Cyber Warriors.”
34. See Members: Required Service, 10 U. S. C. § 651 (2011). The code explains that “the [military service obligation] for initial appointment in a critically short health professional specialty may be reduced by the Service Secretary to the greater of 2 years or the period of obligated service incurred by the officer upon accepting an accession bonus.” See also Minimum Service Requirement for Certain Flight Crew Positions, 10 U. S. C. § 653 (2011). This code states that “the minimum service obligation is to be set at 6 years for all pilots and at 8 years for all fixed-wing jet aircraft pilots.”
36. Ray Mabus, secretary of the Navy, memo to LtGen Mark A. Brilakis, USMC, “Precept Convening the Fiscal Year 2017 U.S. Marine Corps Colonel Promotion Selection Board and Lieutenant Colonel Continuation Selection Board,” 28 August 2015, 4; and MARADMIN 0539/09, FY10 Reenlistment School Seat Incentives, 9 September 2009.
44. Regular military compensation takes into account rank, years in service, tax filing status, basic pay, basic allowance for housing, basic allowance for sustenance, and the total tax advantage. For purposes of this calculation, the inputs were a single E-8 with 10 years of service living on post at Fort Belvoir, VA. See “Regular Military Compensation (RMC) Calculator,” Military Pay, Department of Defense.
45. Figure based on the RMC Calculator. For this calculation, the inputs were a single E-4 with four years of service living on post at Fort Belvoir, VA.
46. Figure based on the RMC Calculator. For purposes of this calculation, the inputs were a single E-4 with four years of service living in the barracks at Fort Belvoir, VA.
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90. DODI 1100.22, 18.
91. DODI 1100.22, 18–19.
92. DODI 1100.22, 18–19.
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97. An Act for the Relief of Sick and Disabled Seaman, 5th Cong., 2d. session, Chap. 77, section 3–5 (1798).
99. “History.”
100. Lushniak statement, 2.
101. Lushniak statement, 3.
104. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
105. See Lushniak statement, 5.
106. Lushniak statement, 4.
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114. “Readiness and Deployment Operations Group (RedDOG): Annual Physical Fitness Test (APFT),” Commissioned Corps, PHS.
The Military-Civilian Bridge

Jan Cook

Introduction
The unique needs of United States veterans accessing civilian health care is just beginning to be explored as a topic that is distinct from the needs of civilians using health care. A review of the literature was conceived to explore the premise that a dual public health crisis exists in veterans’ health care settings: the first for veterans at end of life, and the second concerning their unclaimed remains. The issues may be going unrecognized or largely ignored by those in health care settings and by the public, contributing to a lack of standardized population health care; in this instance, they point to a lack of strategic and tactical care for veterans in hospice and nonownership of the issues regarding burial of the remains of unclaimed veterans. The nonownership stems from lack of tracking veterans, lack of clarity as to responsible parties (e.g., family members, the military, the community), and a lack of policies to address the issues and standardize the entire process. Problems presently ingrained as the norm must be solved.

The guiding belief behind this investigation was that “ethical dilemmas are inherent in every healthcare setting” and that by explicitly identifying problems, opportunities can open toward solutions.1

The crisis is conceptualized as having dual aspects: veterans’ end-of-life (EOL) care and the unclaimed remains of veterans (UROV). The first aspect is that very often U.S. military veterans do not receive veteran-specific care and visitation in EOL care. Although veterans are a protected class of citizens when it comes to employment, their situation is different at EOL. The protection that is absent is a standard of care for the dying veteran. Without veteran-specific
hospice care and military visitation, a *military-as-first* cultural value is violated; veterans who do not have this strategic support are, in a true sense, without their family. This is premised on the concept that military members very closely carry cultural values, established while in the military and molded in military culture, with them throughout their lives.\(^2\)

Researchers are calling for attention to veteran-specific care in hospice settings. For instance, there should be “augmented support services for veterans and their families in hospice and palliative care.”\(^3\) There is strategic agreement that this must be accomplished, but the literature demonstrates a severe lack of tactical means or direction. Pamela Gerber plainly notes, “Although volunteer programming for [veterans’] hospice and palliative care is touched upon, few articles are focused on program development or training.”\(^4\) Shanna Freeman and Ann Berger observed differences between civilians and veterans when it comes to EOL care; they summarized the results from the 2006 Nebraska End of Life Survey, where “Veterans’ preferences for end-of-life care differ from nonveterans, particularly regarding visitation, fear of dying alone, and trust in health care professionals.”\(^5\) The fact that veterans have preferences in regard to EOL care suggests that supplementary methods are needed for such health care; optimally, there would be standards for visitation of veterans.

The distinction between a visitor, as opposed to a health care volunteer, is defined for the purpose of this review. Generally, volunteers in care facilities are unpaid workers. However, the model situation would be that veterans who are at EOL would have visitors that share time with them, such as their fellow veterans or concerned civilians, among them family members, or those sympathetic to the military culture or having some cross-cultural military-civilian knowledge.

The second aspect of the crisis of the rising numbers of unclaimed bodies in the country is a subset of the larger issue, where disposition is not standardized, but rather depends on where bodies go unclaimed.\(^6\) When no person, family, or institution exists to claim a veteran’s remains, what follows is a matter of discretion or indiscretion at institutions: nursing facilities, hospitals, hospices, morgues, research facilities, funeral homes, and cemeteries. Graciela Castex remarks that “the hallmark of the indigent burial is lack of choice and, all too often, the lack of respect and dignity.”\(^7\)

The two issues, EOL and UROV, have in common the military record DD Form 214.\(^8\) This military paperwork is a record of each veteran’s military history; military members receive copies upon discharge from military service. The form details such information as rank, duty assignment, military job specialty, conduct, separation information, home address, family contacts, benefits, and other specifics. There is a need for those who work in medical care to be able to access, interpret, and use such military records of identification as well as pos-
A research team led by Jennifer Lee proposed that veterans would benefit if health care institutions made systematic and specific changes: “Adding military health history sections to electronic health records, history and physical diagnosis textbooks, and licensing exams while also ensuring that this content is adequately covered in undergraduate and graduate health professional training.”

It became apparent through researching the literature that there is tremendous need to help veterans as they access health care and that their needs must be addressed now. For instance, some data raise concerns that point to a lack of concerted efforts in health care management. An example of this is the overprescribing of nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) among U.S. Army active duty soldiers: “The total number of NSAIDs that were prescribed to soldiers during 2006, 2011, and 2014 was approximately twice the number of utilizers, demonstrating that many soldiers were either being prescribed more than one NSAID or were receiving multiple prescriptions for a given NSAID over the course of a year.” Another issue stemming from lack of concerted efforts is the enduring problem of veterans’ indigent burials; the lack of concerted efforts are behind the wide variances in protocols across counties and states for unclaimed veterans’ remains; and, standardized tracking of veterans is absent. This has led to unfortunate outcomes where estranged veterans who died without families to claim them, and who should have been buried with honors, have instead gone forgotten. It seems realistic to envision that many unfortunate outcomes regarding EOL care and UROV could be prevented if medical field professionals realized consistency across medical health records (i.e., using veterans’ identification and health information from the DD 214s). An example of the DD 214 usage would be that nurses and social workers could readily access identification information to contact family members. And, doctors and nurses could diagnose more efficiently if they could determine medical histories; for instance, exposures to environmental contaminants are often associated with military assignments. The military history would also be useful in the gathering of life stories for the Project NAGA Bridge Model, which will be discussed in greater detail later. Unfortunately, it appears that there is a lack of specific, tactical instruction on how the medical field will manage and implement military records to improve health care. A systematic, comprehensive, nationwide plan is missing.

Clearly, military members serve their country selflessly, sacrificing monetarily, physically, and emotionally; and one can easily find overwhelming agreement from citizens that veterans are owed respect. But prevalent misconceptions about veterans stem from the military-civilian cultural divide. These misconceptions tend to cloud the discussion.
This literature review explains that both sides of the divide can meet and cooperate on EOL care issues. Navy nurse Captain Cynthia Kuehner identifies a primary barrier impacting veterans’ healthcare: “We must transcend the military-civilian knowledge and cultural divides that threaten optimal physical and mental health outcomes.” As veterans and civilians together break the military-civilian knowledge and cultural divide that complicate EOL issues, their concerted efforts will not only help veterans at EOL but also contribute value to society. Veterans’ accomplishments can be shared with intent, and by way of a bridging process, veterans will “find meaning, transcend, and integrate their knowledge and accomplishments into society.”

The concept of *transcension*, as used in this review, means that veterans who are dying will seek to know the meaning of their sacrifices. More important, when in hospice, the inner reflections of veterans will look different from that of civilians’. The reflections will be different because the interior monologues of veterans take veterans’ perspectives. Note that EOL does not necessitate losing the will to establish accomplishments. Veterans can find meaningful purpose through telling, teaching, and gifting their stories to future generations.

To contribute an emic perspective, this examination of the literature added a veteran’s viewpoint—through interviews with the author— informsy by military background and subjective experiences accessing health care. Incensed over the severity and extent of the EOL issues, Marine Dan Kohlbek, founder of Project NAGA (Never Again Grieve Alone) and the developer of the Project NAGA Bridge Model, made it clear that “these people are dying, they are not dead.” His thinking demanded that the life stories of veterans must not be lost, thereby “ensuring that the veteran’s life has meaning, i.e., knowledge, accomplishments, etcetera, which are integrated back into education systems, community, or businesses.” And, portending that nothing less than a paradigm shift is needed in EOL health care, according to Kohlbek, there are other principal factors to the effective management of EOL issues. It is crucial to act swiftly, eradicate negativity lodged in resistance to change, and comprehensively and completely solve the issues to realize permanent, positive solutions. He believes that a devaluation in ethical practices have occurred in regard to veterans at EOL and in regard to the burial of veterans’ unclaimed remains. The problems are at “crisis levels” and should not be ignored. From his estimate, “there are at least 40,000 veterans unclaimed in morgues and funeral homes, and the crisis is rapidly expanding on the civilian side (100,000+).” He explains that this is a conservative estimate but has confidence the numbers are significantly higher. Kohlbek’s estimate is based on a definition of elderly veterans of Vietnam, Korea, and the WWII era. He states, “With the US population at 325,700,000, there are 2,712,630 deaths in the US each year, based on 2015 data from the National Center for Health Statistics, and estimating that 7.3%...
of the population are veterans, and 3.48% are elderly veterans, that would mean of the approximate 198,021 veteran deaths per year, of those, 94,400 are elderly veterans. Project NAGA’s mission is to provide dying veterans with appropriate care and respect in death; it was founded on the dying wish of Vietnam veteran Private First Class Peter Evans, who professed that society can be enriched by the legacies of veterans. Project NAGA also was a direct result of conversations Kohlbek had with Vietnam veteran Chuck Perry, who was part of force reconnaissance. Perry recognized the extensive and pervasive problem of estranged veterans who go forgotten and therefore do not receive burial with military honor. The organization fosters conversation and action at the grassroots level and addresses the issues primarily in higher education settings. Kohlbek asserts that there are no models, national standards, or legislation for veteran-specific hospice visitation, or for burial of unclaimed veterans’ remains and, he states, “What is needed is some mechanism to address the issues and ultimately to engage with the culture of the community.” The Project NAGA Bridge Model is an educational mechanism designed to address such issues and is presented in this review.

Most of the available literature about thanatology issues pertain to the civilian population. Noticeable was a disparate system for the handling of death, dying, burial, and postmortem ownership. The Electronic Medical Records (EMR) systems issue requires attention. Still another aspect is the financial view, for there is a need to learn the long-term total cost of ownership and return on investment and to determine how a robust, widely integrated model can be implemented to improve care. Financial issues were not addressed in this review but require examination.

Four themes emerged. The first was the need for integrated health services. The second theme was the need for provisioning of veteran-specific training for medical care workers. The third was the importance of the recognition of military identity at EOL. The fourth was the breakdown of societies due to high death rates versus the need for respectful death rites and burial.

**Increased Need for Health Care**

Elderly populations are increasing in the United States, resulting in increased needs for health care. Jason Devine reports for the U.S. Census Bureau that the country is seeing a “historic increase in the number of deaths each year.” The trend is expected to increase until 2055, when a gradual decrease will begin to occur. Specifically, “residents age 65 and over grew from 35.0 million in 2000, to 49.2 million in 2016, accounting for 12.4 percent and 15.2 percent of the total population, respectively.” Veterans figure into this count. In Pennsylvania, for example, as of 2015, almost 50 percent of veterans were 65 years of age.
or older; in the state, across all age groups of veterans, 25 percent were using VA health care. Researchers led by Maria Olenick provide details on the percentage of veterans accessing civilian health care:

Total enrollees of veterans who utilize the VA health care system (8.9 million in 2013) is less than half the current total veteran population. Furthermore, approximately 61% of all separated OEF/OIF veterans have used VA health care since October, 2001. This means that veterans are largely using civilian medical care facilities further stressing the need for health care providers to be well versed in veteran-specific health issues, war eras, and reintegration issues veterans face; [sic] in order to provide excellent veteran care and outcomes.

Only 20 percent of Americans die at home, whereas others die in health care facilities. Assuming veterans follow the pattern of the civilian population, this suggests that 80 percent of veterans die in health care facilities, where there exists a lack of comprehensive, standardized, legislated systems for veteran-specific hospice visitation. The premise that a majority of veterans in hospice do not receive veteran-specific visitation is supported by the fact that “less than 10% of the veterans who die each year do so in VA facilities.”

**Veteran-Specific Health Care Issues**

The most prevalent health issues affecting veterans were identified in a study led by Jacqueline Moss, in which a group of competencies were developed for nursing students caring for veterans. The competency topics were “Military Culture, Veterans Healthcare Administration, Amputation and Assistive Devices, Environmental/Chemical Exposures, Substance Use Disorders (SUD), Military Sexual Trauma, Traumatic Brain Injury, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Suicide, and Homelessness.” Researchers led by Eunjeong Ko noted that homeless people struggle with more health conditions, mental health issues, drug abuse, risk of victimization, and premature mortality than the general population. Moss, Moore, and Selleck’s list did not include another prevalent issue—injury to veterans resulting from legally prescribed substances. An article for *Military Medicine* explains that “the vast majority of U.S. Army active duty soldiers are being prescribed NSAIDs. These data raise concerns because of the potential adverse effects that NSAIDs have on gastrointestinal, renal, and cardiovascular function, as well as bone health.”

In an article for the *American Journal of Nursing*, researchers provide an overview of veterans’ unique health care issues; discuss risk factors, comorbidities, and the complexity of care; and provide a table showing veteran-specific health history assessment questions. They mentioned that the aging process...
can exacerbate symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Kohlbek believes that, although aging factors tend to degrade health, there are other factors that can render disability and degrade dignity, such as “a medical care plan that adds prescription drugs, increased isolation and removal from daily normal life, and impossible access for visitation.”

Researchers added corresponding views on society’s obligation to preserve human dignity to essential care that would alleviate isolation. Consider the view of Perry Fine and Malene Davis, who profess that “what must not be lost along the way is the irreplaceable core virtue of hospice: human dignity.” Paul Carrola and Marilyn Corbin-Burdick believe that health care professionals should acknowledge veterans’ “individual diversity rather than viewing them or their experiences through a strictly pathological lens.” Authors Mercedes Bern-Klug, Charles Gessert, and Sarah Forbes explain that it has become a common view to think of death as a “medical event” because so many deaths occur in institutions. Bern-Klug et al. suggests revising assumptions about the scenario of dying; in today’s world, the personal aspect is lost because dying is an invisible process, compared to earlier generations where dying took place in the home and community.

Distancing from the home results in isolation. Carleton Pilsecker, a social worker for the VA Hospital, acknowledges that dying is often accompanied by pain, weakness, confusion, and isolation; these factors work against dying with dignity. Pilsecker explains that people who have an understanding of their physical condition and prognosis will usually want to talk about their situation and can handle their feelings. Individuals will vary in how they evaluate their life, but Pilsecker maintains that “for some people, comfort or consolation may come from being able to explore or share a review of their life with an interested listener.”

Libba Reed McMillan et al. looked at provision and integration of care. They describe a program, Project Serve, designed to create competency development between two baccalaureate programs and an active duty national medical military center. Nursing students of Project Serve visited and observed interactions at war memorials in Washington, DC; attended observational clinicals; and took part in panel discussions. The immersive program promotes excellence in knowledge transfer of military culture and nurse advocacy in caring for veterans, and it broadly identifies four areas of care: “Military culture and military specific health care needs, physiologic care, psychologic/mental health, and patient advocacy.” Through Project Serve, students deepened their appreciation of military sacrifice and experienced the program as life changing; some were influenced to join the military. Overall, McMillan et al. recommends that nursing curriculum design “must incorporate care of the military member, Veteran, and families.” Similarly, Lee et al. suggest that “history and physical
diagnosis texts should be revised to include an explicit military history as a standard component. Correspondingly, Olenick, Flowers, and Diaz, reporting on health care professionals’ awareness, suggest that health care education should implement veteran content into curricula, should use veteran clinical faculty, and nursing educators should create patient simulations and case studies in undergraduate and graduate nursing programs.

**Helping Veterans Transcend**

Most people would agree that EOL represents a uniquely special time in life. It is important to grasp that, during this time, contributions can continue to be made; conversations can take place that concentrate on the value of individuals’ accomplishments and meaningful learning can ensue. Such conversations can greatly enrich society by the wisdom imparted and communal history collected. Otherwise, when health care attention is dedicated solely to pain management medications and therapies, there is risk that attention to psychological reflection will be overlooked. For veterans, transcension involves knowing the meanings of their sacrifices. When veterans talk to fellow veterans at EOL, they share the common bridge of military bond. But for a civilian to be present for a veteran experiencing transcension, they must carry an offering, a gift. The gift is the union of the military-civilian partnership; acceptance of this gift occurs when veterans’ life stories are reflected upon and the attendant lessons edify and educate and then go on to become civic legacy to the larger community. The military-civilian bridge is thus formed. Psychotherapist Thomas A. Caffrey found that major psychological growth can happen at EOL. He saw value in addressing deep psychological issues at EOL, rather than providing only conventionally understood palliative care. Caffrey’s case study was a series of interactions with a dying Vietnam veteran suffering from the effects of drug use and heart attack. The patient defiantly resisted speaking of his experiences in Vietnam, but he eventually discussed the source of his trauma—the death of his friend in Vietnam. Thirty-three therapy sessions served to focus on the issues of the patient’s life, instead of focusing on the ensuing death. Caffrey, seeing the need for death to take a subordinate place, wrote, “Is that not the point of end-of-life therapy—to make the death, or the dying process, in the above sense, incidental?”

Moss, Moore, and Seleck recognize that nurses caring for veterans at EOL must have competencies in the following: identifying proxy support, getting the military health history, defining specific barriers to pain management, recognizing military culture and era of service, and identifying comfort care orders. Nurses would acquire “knowledge of advance directive documentation in the electronic medical record and legal aspects of document completion.”
Additionally, nurses would “apply knowledge from the military health history and cultural assessment to provide informed end-of-life symptom management and/or support.”

Charles Antoni et al., writing about military members who made it home and were facing life’s final chapter, identified special needs of veterans at EOL. They recognize that military members often tend to have significant life stressors greater than that of their civilian counterparts; may feel underappreciated for their sacrifices; have significant issues such as prevalence of major depression and PTSD; and have signature medical conditions related to the generation of their service. The researcher scrutinizes the meaning of underappreciated. In a historical sense of the concept, underappreciation of military members exists (i.e., Vietnam veterans were shunned by society). This represents an extreme of the spectrum. The other side basks in ignorance of military culture. Referencing the newer generation of veterans, underappreciation seems to be something different for them. This underappreciation manifests itself when civilian businesses severely limit their view of what veterans can accomplish and do, reducing their perceptions of veterans’ vocational capabilities to stereotypes. Veterans want society to have a depth of understanding of their management, teamwork, leadership skills, and civic-mindedness. Dave Philipps, quoting veteran Chris Marvin wrote, “We are people—people the public has invested in who have a lot of potential.” Because this recognition is not happening in any appreciable way, veterans feel an overwhelming disappointment toward society. This must be amended quickly. But promising things are happening toward amending the disappointment. The Project NAGA Bridge Model’s operationalized steps can be taken to promote social changes through widespread education on veterans’ issues.

Antoni et al. mention high rates of dependency and mental health issues: “Psychosocial issues often amplify in the setting of an advanced illness or a life-limiting prognosis.” This statement was met with a suggestion by Kohlbeck: Yes, but I believe the amplification is greater when they feel they cannot serve this country anymore. Meaning, there is no path to continuing accomplishing great things at EOL. Just accomplishing taking pills. Veterans Service Organizations like the Marine Corps League have awards for accomplishments for Marines and Marine Veterans. They [the Marines] should add a designation to awards that signifies an accomplishment that happened at/near EOL.

The McMillan et al. study recommends “engag[ing the] patient in express[ing] . . . feelings related to the grieving process.” The researcher counters with a philosophy attributed to the Project NAGA goals—it is not about
fixating on staid aspects of grieving but rather achieving transcension by utilizing precious time at EOL unapologetically to make sense of the veteran’s life. Society is enriched and enlightened when it gains an appreciation of how veterans’ lives make a difference. Civilian care staff and families, too, would ask themselves how individual veterans’ lives change the world for the better. A paradigm transformation in thinking builds the military-civilian bridge. Both sides participate in traditional grieving, but they additionally strive for and attain understanding through reflection on the value of patriotic sacrifice and its offering, which is a gift to citizens.

**Veteran-Specific Additions to College Curricula**

Kohlbek suggests that, to address honoring of veterans who are at EOL, changes are needed in nursing and social work to integrate veteran-specific curricula to enable health care workers to identify and improve care for veterans in civilian health care settings. State boards would be involved in changing the process; colleges would then set up certificate programs so that health care workers can attain continuing education units. The model for the process is currently being piloted. The nursing National Council Licensure Examination (NCLEX) study books are being reviewed by Bucks County Community College (BCCC) students, faculty, staff, and other concerned citizens of the community to determine where veteran-specific language should be added to nursing study books, ultimately to improve care for veterans. Teams assemble to review the study books and “identify one or two critical changes for each book, and ensure the system to integrate into BCCC, NCLEX, State Board, non-credit, etc.” Each book receives a complete review. As the process evolves at BCCC, an online area of collaboration will promote this open-source model. In Pennsylvania, Kohlbek communicated with the legislative office of state Representative Perry Warren about the possibility of legislating ways to effect changes, such as creating a bill to make EOL visitation easier and more effective, adding military history to medical records, and creating updates for the NCLEX books. These steps can be replicated throughout other states.

The knowledge and discussion of veterans’ issues also would not be restricted to curriculums regarding health care majors but should integrate fully into other college majors: art, business, culinary, equine therapy, legal, noncredit, music, technology, theater, etc. A primary way to accomplish this work is to “look at every course that a college offers and then to integrate the concept of the Military-Civilian Bridge. The easy ones [to make changes to curricula] are nursing (NCLEX) and social work (LSW).” It is important to realize that integration of the military-civilian bridge concept involves students and citizens across all majors and professions. For example, Kohlbek envisions that college credit could be given for independent studies involving various veterans’ issues
(e.g., legal aspects) and go by the name “Vet Credits.” By engaging in this work, students could attain significantly “better resume bullets, references, and real experience i.e., setting up non-profits to solve local community issues.”55 The involvement of students of all majors in the creation of this process for positive social change proposes to edify and develop society at many levels.

**DD 214: Ask, Identify, Verify**

This section explores literature that refers to the usefulness of implementing the DD Form 214 and suggests that improvements are needed in medical health record keeping. For instance, Counts, Freundi, and Johnson, regarding veterans accessing health care, assert that “initial assessment and intervention strategies are crucial.”56 And Olenick et al. proposes “identify[ing] veterans in clinical areas and provid[ing] clinical experiences for students with veteran patients of different war eras, branches of service, and military experience backgrounds.”57

A high percentage of veterans currently access civilian health care, and they very often present with unique health care needs. Typically, nursing curricula do not include veteran-specific assessment. Ideally, nurses and health care professionals involved with veterans’ EOL would ask about veteran status and then verify identity. Counts, Freundi, and Johnson recommend asking whether patients had served in the military, in which branch, their rate or rank, how long they served, and whether they had been deployed or sustained injury. Counts, Freundi, and Johnson provided a flow chart of medical questions that illustrate directives, such as “request[ing] additional information and document findings [and]. . . . obtain[ing] necessary consults (pastoral care, social work, giv[ing] VA resource information, etc.).”58 They also suggest that nurses take measures to connect veterans with veteran-specific sources of communication, such as a veteran champion at a hospital unit and encourage them to “request that your hospital’s Volunteer Services hire/use Veterans who would be willing to talk with patients. Veteran patients may be more likely to talk with another Veteran rather than a civilian.”59

Lee et al., looking at provisioning optimal care for military members, veterans, and their families, endorse “adding military health history sections to electronic health records, history and physical diagnosis textbooks, and licensing exams while also ensuring that this content is adequately covered in undergraduate and graduate health professional training.”60 The authors explained that, because veterans are not always identified in civilian care facilities, all health care professionals should ask patients if they have served in the military. The researcher understands that patients may not always have the ability to recall or identify their family members, nor is it a given they will have the wherewithal to claim ownership of their material holdings. Nurses and social workers could improve aid to patients by having access to and interpreting identifying infor-
Information from the DD 214. Lee et al. further suggest that “history and physical diagnosis texts should be revised to include an explicit military history as a standard component.”61 The study points out that the VA has a new integrated electronic health record that addresses these concerns and advise that other medical providers must move in this direction: “[The] VA is working with the National Board of Medical Examiners to add questions related to veterans’ health to the U.S. Medical Licensing Examination and to develop a military health subject exam. This alone will drive major curricular change on military health issues in U.S. medical schools, and we encourage other health professions licensing bodies to consider similar action.”62

Military surgeon Hassan Tetteh promotes integration of electronic health records. He explains that the electronic medical record systems currently used are the Veterans Health Information Systems and Technology Architecture and the Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application. These applications, the largest systems in the world, “manage data for individual patients that may move between the medical DoD and VA institutions.”63 Efforts are underway to redesign the systems to achieve better cooperation, collaboration, and communication among the applications to inform clinical practice, interconnect providers, personalize care, and improve health. Redesign of EMR systems will involve a whole new set of challenges that need to be managed.

**Recognition of Military Identity at EOL**

A topic that emerged in this review was the importance of recognizing military identity at EOL. U.S. Navy nurse practitioner Cynthia Kuehner identified the hallmarks of military identity and described the intense cultural expectations on military members.64 Although such notable work articulated basic tenets of military culture, there still exists a serious lack of understanding of military culture from the general civilian view. The researcher takes the view that greater understanding and appreciation of the military culture needs to occur because understanding the military culture and honoring veterans serves not only as a tribute to veterans but correspondingly substantiates citizens’ self-respect. In the *American Journal of Bioethics*, Mary Rorty expresses that “one of [the] most important factors in rehabilitating and sustaining our self-respect as a nation is assuring that our veterans receive, and perceive themselves to be receiving, care commensurate with their sacrifices.”65

Kelly Cooke and John Franklin talk about each veteran having a personal story and collective memory and highlight the importance of recognizing military awards and decorations at EOL: “Being able to reframe the military experience around valor rather than trauma will help highlight the courageous rather than the tragic and may help elucidate survivor guilt.”66 The researcher points out that the recognition of awards is principled. Although directed atten-
tion should go to conversations with veterans to discover the meanings of their experiences and how their experiences changed society for the better, the lessons should be disseminated by “shar[ing] this information in community-specific ways; those experiences and accomplishments are lessons that need to be integrated into education, business, community, etc.”67 The idea is to make sense of veterans’ experiences, learn and grow from them, and most important, to share. There might be conversations about how a veteran’s influence changed a business practice, how the veteran brought greater understanding to a situation, or changed the course of a life. While awards are a validation, the heart of the matter resides in the personal meanings found within the experiences of veterans, and there should be follow through via robust dissemination of such valuable legacies into the community. The model for dissemination, integration, and implementation is introduced in this paper as the Project NAGA Bridge Model, in which veterans and citizens unite via education and mutual understanding.

Another aspect of storytelling is found in its function to heal. Patricia Allen et al. promote storytelling as a form of therapy for veterans because [storytelling] enhances geriatric nursing information to include the health concerns of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam veterans [and] . . . include[s] story-telling as part of therapeutic communication. Reminiscing, life review, and opportunities to reminisce are also important to the integration of life events as veterans age. It is important also to differentiate the unique experiences and health risks of veteran cohorts (i.e., World War II, Korea, and Vietnam War veterans).68

**Institute Changes in Hospice, Medicare, and Information Technology**

Ethical issues routinely arise in hospice care. Discussions frequently revolve around such topics as “quality-of-life, privacy and confidentiality, interpersonal conflicts, disclosure and truth-telling, value conflicts, rationing of health care, and treatment options.”69 Other key areas of dispute include legalization of active euthanasia, assisted suicide, the concept of medical futility, and access to hospice and hospice services. Ellen Csikai’s study involved a random national sample survey of social workers in 267 hospices across six states. Csikai explains that there has been little research in hospice care, but one recognized issue is denial by the caregiver to honor the patient’s dying wish to die at home, rather than in an inpatient hospice, denying the patient’s self-determination. Although their health might be compromised, individuals still can have opinions and desires for making choices. Kohlbek stated that “these people can self-actualize and prepare for transition; stop treating elderly veterans in hospice situations as dead.”70
Nigel Hartley, chief executive at the Earl Mountbatten Hospice, points to needed updates in hospice and emphasized the importance of community engagement and partnerships between health care workers, the dying, and their families. He acknowledges that there is resistance to EOL care and recommended there should be “changes of focus introduced during initial healthcare professional training and ongoing education.” Kohlbek explains the reason for the resistance and proffered a solution: “There is resistance due to no established model that shows possible positive outcomes. Meaning, during the EOL process there is an opportunity to continue to help the veteran accomplish goals, educate, create a legacy, and have the knowledge transfer to the community.”

Fine and Davis see many differences in hospice and palliative care: “Where the differences emerge is in the devilish details of funding, implementation, and integration into healthcare systems.” Fine and Davis recommend that the Medicare hospice benefit should be updated, as the cost of Medicare has not kept pace with the need for care. This corroborates Antoni et al.’s findings: “The Medicare cutbacks and greater regulatory constraints will likely increase the financial pressures on community-based hospice agencies to limit services to those who are dying.” They expound that “because community agencies are largely dependent upon capitated reimbursements, impending Medicare cutbacks and greater regulatory constraints will likely increase the financial pressures on community-based hospice agencies to limit services to those who are dying.” Antoni et al. suggest that impending Medicare cutbacks will limit services to the elderly and recommended that “future studies are needed to compare the quality and costs of care for veterans provided by the VA versus that provided through contracted community services.”

Large expenditures in the medical field are common. They are attributable to numerous factors such as “outrageous administrative complexities, pricing failures, and business models that prioritize doing more and more[,] resulting in unjustifiable waste.” High hospital inventories are one factor. At times, incorrect current procedural terminology codes result in lawsuits. Another factor is that managers may be reluctant to underspend, fearing a permanent allowance reduction in successive years.

Although financial problems are seen in those broad areas, attention should focus on closer supply-chain vendor management. Hospitals tend to overpay for systems when compared to other industries. They also tend to fall short regarding information technology (IT) savvy: “These systems find it difficult to attract or retain experienced IT professionals, and they consequently lack the adequate resources to evaluate the claims of vendors.” To add to the problem, “all too many hospitals lack effective capital equipment replacement processes, which causes them to leave hundreds of thousands of capital dollars on the table for vendors.” Loyal purchasing relationships between surgeons and med-
ical device representatives factor into costs, and vendors may force contractual agreement.\textsuperscript{83} IT security issues abound: “Biomedical equipment vendors usually need more time than computing vendors to validate the security updates required for vulnerabilities before they can recommend changes for installation to their systems.”\textsuperscript{84} Adding to the complexity, lack of common data standards results in compatibility problems.\textsuperscript{85} For at least one veteran seeking health care, IT and health care management shortcomings boiled down to “miscoding in the system, data input errors, and unethical behavior such as the VA Crisis with wait times.”\textsuperscript{86}

Amid dire problems, it is apparent that some vendor management and expenditure problems are being challenged. Michael Dagley and John Kutch endorsed the consult of attorneys to press legal claims against vendors for the deinstallation of expensive equipment.\textsuperscript{87} The team of Hem Chandra et al. avowed that a vendor-buyer inventory system called Hospital Revolving Fund will cut costs and ensure availability of materials.\textsuperscript{88} The U.S. Navy has explored telecritical care and sees it as a potential for cost saving.\textsuperscript{89} Although progress is evident in select areas, much work is needed to establish and secure effective function across the health care field.

While the greatest percentage of attention goes to the promotion of health and wellness via traditional medicines and therapies, innovative systems of health care are being explored. For instance, there is integration of complementary alternative medicines. This includes such things as biological-based therapies (herbs), nutritional medicine (vitamins), and various other treatments including energy therapies.\textsuperscript{90} Integrated care refers to the use of multiple methods of care. When Pamela Gerber states that “integrated holistic care at the end of life is the standard Veterans deserve,” the context suggests it was in the sense of volunteer visits.\textsuperscript{91} An aspect of integrated health care was profoundly explored at the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center at Bethesda, Maryland, in 2001–12, where hospital design was seen as a type of holistic care. The Epidaurus Project developers created environments that facilitated patient care, promoted healing through nature, and saw wellness interventions such as “nutrition, exercise, mind-body medicine, and complementary and alternative medicine.”\textsuperscript{92} The Epidaurus Project serves as “a model for innovative systems of healthcare nationwide . . . [and] represents a significant collaboration between civilian medicine and the military in times of war.”\textsuperscript{93}

**When Veterans Are at Risk of Dying Alone**

According to Bill Novelli and Raca Banerjee, the elderly frequently express interest in a care goal, but their needs are often mismatched or misunderstood: “As we grow older, our care goals, wishes, and preferences evolve over time and it is essential to ensure these records are up-to-date and reflect our most recent
choices and preferences.” Just as with elderly people of the general population, elderly veterans’ preferences should be respected. But not all veterans who are at risk of dying alone are elderly. A chief way to assess the care and identification of any hospitalized veteran regardless of age is to incorporate the DD 214 as a primary source of intake information. Imagine that health care staff are trained to interpret the DD 214 medical history; nurses and social workers would know automatically to ask if the patient had served in the military. Kuehner suggests utilizing the key question, “Have you ever served or deployed in the military or with the National Guard?” Lee et al. explains the need to identify veterans:

Unfortunately, all too often when veterans are cared for in the community, they are not identified as veterans. Health care providers lose the opportunity to address important health and wellness implications of military service if they fail to ask, “Have you ever served in the military?” Asking this simple yet essential question can ensure that veterans receive optimal care for their unique needs, from the sequelae of toxic exposures to indications of posttraumatic stress disorder, traumatic brain injury, and suicide risk, or the psychosocial and economic impact of multiple deployments on spouses and families. . . . Too few physicians screen their patients for current or prior military experience. Even when patients are known veterans, however, very few receive screening for depression and anxiety because physicians often lack the referral resources to provide veterans with necessary screening and treatment.

Project NAGA Bridge Model

The Project NAGA Bridge Model provides steps to ensure that veterans’ legacies are recorded for posterity and meaningful lessons are integrated into society. The military-civilian bridge is a concept in which veterans and civilians can mutually benefit by collaboration. Once it is determined that the patient is a veteran, the DD 214 interpreted, and medical care assigned, then steps are taken to facilitate the military-civilian bridge. The process is visualized as having four phases: identification/integration, life stories, honor, and bridge. The Bridge Model proposes the gathering of legacies and does not stop at life stories but brings and instills veterans’ contributions within the community. Health care professionals working closely with veterans at EOL would begin at phase 1: identify whether the patient had ever served in the military, interpret the DD Form 214, find out if the veteran wants a military visitor, locate the veteran’s family. Then, continue with phase 2: encourage conversations with the veteran (with health care workers, families, and students involved in Project NAGA, etc.) that recognize the value of the veteran’s contributions to society to aid
transcension, ensure the veteran’s legacy is not lost, and gather the veteran’s life story. Next, phase 3: honor the veteran. Learn, reflect, and grow from the experience, and involve creative expressions in the telling of his/her life story, to encompass the arts—storytelling, painting, and music, to name a few, and including other creative forms (i.e., new businesses or procedures, research, historical study, etc.). Finally, phase 4: disseminate the lessons learned from the veteran’s life and bring the life stories to the community and into the larger society via education. This forms the military-civilian bridge (figure 1).

**Unclaimed Remains**

This part of the review seeks to understand the phenomenon of unclaimed remains of veterans. Literature is available on the phenomenon of unclaimed remains of the general civilian population. Very little information can be found about the unclaimed remains of veterans save for the Graciela Castex study and that seen on the VA website.

**Phenomenon of Unclaimed Remains in the United States**

The issue of veterans whose remains go unclaimed is a subset of the civilians’ unclaimed remains phenomenon and is associated with the increasingly high death rate in the United States and the high cost of burial. Cremation is viewed as an answer to handle the economic condition of death, providing a solution for intact families as well as for indigent populations. Cooper Allen interviewed burial program authorities and coroners, noting that the state of the struggling
U.S. economy is associated with increases in cremation as opposed to burial options: “Even families who don’t qualify for indigent assistance programs are looking to spend less for burials.”

Katie Zezima explains that it is not always that families cannot be located but that people just cannot produce the funds and noted that some states subsidize burial or cremation of the unclaimed; some are used in forensic anthropological research where students study decomposition of human remains. Kate Linebaugh explains that cremation of the indigent and unidentified is a way to cut expenses, although the issue is steeped in problems, both economic and moral. The cost to bury is often around $750, whereas cremation is around $200. While the situation often is reduced to a financial decision, decisions are not always clear-cut; for instance, some religions, such as Judaism and Islam, prohibit cremation. But clearly the majority of families are choosing cremation as the logical option, according to the Cremation Association of North America, which states, “By 2009, there were over 2,100 crematories and over 900,000 cremations . . . and 36.84% of deaths in the United States were handled through cremation, a percentage that is expected to grow to over half of deaths by 2018.”

The United States is not the only country experiencing challenges associated with a high death rate. Comparatively, Japan is experiencing a much higher death rate. The breakdown of family systems and territorial and community ties has been contributing to its citizens dying lonely deaths. Japan is addressing the problem as the responsibility of the larger society and is working to streamline the issues that surround dying and death. The country has responded with community centers that provide social connections, and funeral matters are being handled by organizations outside of the family.

The United States, too, is looking for ways to handle problems stemming from its high death rate. New York addressed one such problem; in 2016, radical changes happened in state law when Governor Andrew M. Cuomo signed a bill banning the use of unclaimed bodies without prior consent of a registered body donor or the written consent of the spouse or the next of kin. Nina Bernstein notes, “It ends a 162-year-old system that has required city officials to appropriate unclaimed bodies on behalf of medical schools that teach anatomical dissection and mortuary schools that train embalmers.” Originally, medical schools opposed the bill, but the schools eventually conceded, and they are now planning on expanding their programs. Incidentally, at least 4,000 bodies in New York City were offered for medical study in the past decade. This figure is mentioned to illustrate the extent of the phenomenon. Not all states have moved in the direction of changing their laws regarding unclaimed bodies; however, they may be reaching a critical point and could likely follow the example set by New York City. It is important to consider that veterans should have
the option to donate, but that veterans whose bodies go unclaimed should not be used in medical study (unless prior consent is attained).

Brian Roewe discusses what happens to unclaimed bodies in the United States. Roewe explains that 14 states cover burial costs while the other states assign the task to their counties, townships, or cities: “Federal intervention occurs only when the unclaimed person was a veteran; then the Department of Veterans Affairs arranges a burial at a military cemetery.”103 When no one claims the bodies, states can then offer these to medical schools and other educational institutions, a practice not without controversy. For instance, “Louisiana state law gives coroners custody of all unclaimed persons who die in their parish. They have authority to release remains to any interested party willing to claim them and provide interment.”104

Raphael Hulkower wrote about different aspects of anatomical dissection. Historically, desecration of the corpse carries negative connotations. Hulkower points out that committing crimes in the past was punishable by dissection: “To this day in the United States, the only federal law relating to the cadaver supply was passed in 1790; it permitted federal judges to add dissection to a death sentence for murder.”105 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, grave robbing was rampant; medical schools accepted these bodies, which fueled a profitable market. Once state governments realized that unclaimed bodies could be sourced for medical use, it cut into the profitability of grave robbing. Anatomy acts laws came into effect. For example, Hulkower finds that “Massachusetts was the first state to enact laws, in 1830 and 1833, allowing unclaimed bodies to be used for dissection.”106 It became legal to dissect unclaimed bodies of people who had died in asylums, hospitals, prisons, and marginalized people whose bodies went unclaimed. Some states exempted the unclaimed bodies of soldiers because of the belief that soldiers had already served society.

Society’s negative perceptions about dissection have changed only marginally. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) in 1968 changed how people think about ownership of one’s body: “[It] established the human body as property, a new privilege that allowed for a donor’s wishes to be honored in court even if his or her next of kin objected to the donation after death.”107 Today, all of the states have some form of the UAGA law. However, although the states have the UAGA, Hulkower finds that “even with these advances, the legal rights of a person over his or her own body postmortem remain ambiguous.”108

Castex discusses the trending increase in indigent burials and identified resources available for final disposition of remains. Castex speaks of society as being held together by observing respectful death rites and burials: “A person’s respectful final disposition is important for the living, for the deceased, and, it may be argued, for the health of the larger society.”109 She tells of the erratic and incomplete collection of death records regarding the indigent and, based
on public health records, estimated indigent deaths to account for about “5 percent of the 2.4 million U.S. Deaths.” Castex points to economic deprivation of the elderly (the largest cohort of the dying) and of impoverished young families whose infants have died (the second largest cohort of the dying). Given the associated challenges, social workers can intervene to prevent the common grave as a solution for burial of the unknown; to do so, skilled social workers must have sound working knowledge of the local legal requirements, such as the time frame to work within. They will know to contact government agencies such as the Social Security Administration, other government resources such as the Bureau of Indian Affairs, private organizations, and foreign governments. They can also appeal to community generosity and gather information via social media outlets.

Unclaimed Remains of Veterans (UROV)

Organizations such as the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and the Marine Corps League, which are chartered by the U.S. Congress, work toward the claiming process. In Bucks County, Pennsylvania, Guardians of the National Cemetery, a nonprofit volunteer organization, serves as an official support committee for the Washington Crossing National Cemetery. But there are also unique local community organizations not associated with Congress that work toward the claiming effort. The mix of organizations working toward a similar goal but contributing their distinctive value ensures that the claiming process stays efficient and effective. Not all people are identified quickly once they go into medical institutions, nor are the deceased always claimed by families. The same applies to veteran cohorts. Although veterans are entitled to burial-related benefits, identification of veteran status at times goes uncertain or unrecorded. This is where accessing the DD 214 could be advantageous to social workers by enabling them to readily locate family members.

An article that appeared in Vantage Point, the official blog of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, reported that eight veterans whose remains went unclaimed were laid to rest with full military honors. Mourners at the ceremony felt that the eight veterans now had a family, for they were now home among fellow veterans. Four comments that appeared in the blog expressed appreciation for the ceremonial event. One commenter pointed out that, although remains went unclaimed, that alone did not prove there was not a family. Another commenter, self-identified as an Army veteran, expressed disbelief that the system to identify veterans is flawed: “Doesn’t the Army or Navy collect information regarding their service men. There should be any mother or father or brothers and sisters looking for these brave soldiers who died for their country and there’s no family or related? Is [sic] unbelievable. How long did these hero[e]s serve . . . the country and died for it.?”
This example indicates bioethical problems surrounding UROV: 1) medical institutions lack a system to confirm the DD 214 Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty, resulting in lack of identification of medical history; 2) families go unidentified; and 3) historical records of veterans’ lives are not systematically recorded or valued as a legacy of the community.

Another enduring ethical problem revolving around UROV was noted in regard to cremains left at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, DC, when Michael Ruane states, “Thirty-one have been left in the past five years, including five in 2017.” The problem is increasing. It is not clear whether the cremains that have been left even belong to veterans (regardless of war era) for some have been deposited there with no identification at all. A policy has not been established on how to handle the problem.

Castex made mention of a veterans’ benefit enhancement that would subsidize burials so that burials occur close to home. Castex speaks of veterans discharged or released under conditions other than dishonorable: “The VA itself asks to be contacted to check whether any unclaimed person, male or female, qualifies for veteran’s burial benefits; the VA checks identities against a database. All veterans are entitled to a variety of burial-related benefits, as in some cases are their spouses and even some dependents.”

Another Vantage Point blog post mentioned that the VA offers new monetary assistance for burial of unclaimed veterans. To tap this resource, one locates the deceased’s service record through the VA’s National Cemetery Scheduling Office and finds out burial eligibility (i.e., status of discharge). The person or entity who takes responsibility for the arrangements can request reimbursement for expenses. If the veteran dies while in the care of the Veterans Health Administration, proper burial will be arranged. But Kristen Parker recognizes the stark reality of the unclaimed; some outlive their next of kin or lack financial means. She also notes, “Sometimes too, Veterans never seek the help they earned from the VA.”

Memorialization of the Deceased
Elaine Keavney’s study followed a baccalaureate nursing program of the American public university system that incorporated veteran-specific content into its curriculum by developing an eight-week course solely dedicated to the care of veterans. The course was open to nursing students and students of other health-related programs. Students gained an appreciation of the sacrifices that veterans make, learned not to stereotype veterans, and expanded their view of the health care system for veterans. The course curriculum included interviewing veterans, visiting veterans’ service centers, visiting a VA hospital and veterans’ memorial, critically viewing a film for its portrayal of veterans, and writing a research paper.
The researcher points out that there are diverse and profound ways to engage in awareness and action regarding EOL and UROV issues. For example, a person might attend a funeral for a veteran whose remains went unclaimed or conduct research to learn about the life of an unclaimed veteran. Awareness is growing and some institutions are taking action. Several colleges across the country have inspired and involved their students. Ideas have taken hold at BCCC, Modesto Junior College, and the University of Phoenix, where at each the veterans’ advisors and coordinators have engaged students in Flowers for Eva, an initiative of Project NAGA.117 For this initiative, students of BCCC have painted portraits of unclaimed veterans, researched legal issues that affect veterans, and written about UROV issues for the college newspaper.

Continuing with the discussion of memorialization, it is pertinent to provide some history. For instance, according to a paper in the journal Post-Medieval Archaeology, “the erection of a graveyard memorial was seen as the norm for a century, a pattern only recently challenged by the innovative disposal of cremated remains and alternative forms of green burial.”118 Today, however, families are seeing a multitude of options for burial and memorial and increasingly seeking cremation as an alternate to burial. Castex lists many options: “One may be interred in the earth, buried at sea, cremated, or entombed; have a green (ecologically respectful) burial; be donated for scientific research; or be cryogenically preserved.”119 Mark Zimmer, the president of a funeral home firm, mentions the option of postponement of a decision; in this scenario, a repository holds cremated remains until families decide on a final placement.120 Researchers led by Connor Graham observed that website memorialization has become a modern approach and creates the suggestion of a continued relationship with the dead, as if the dead were listening and where grief has the potential to be prolonged, so there is a remembering of the people as well as a perception of continued presence.121 These researchers speak of the impermanence of website memorials because of the transient nature of digital information. They see the potential of website memorialization to reach large audiences and note the intensity of emotions expressed through words on social sites.

**Conclusion**

This review deliberates on the unique needs of veterans accessing EOL health care in civilian facilities, and it points to a wide range of ethical concerns associated with UROV. For both matters, there is a lack of consistent, systematic, standardized implementation of military identification records that otherwise could work to solve prominent issues. The literature points to a tremendous need for medical care management to institute tactical goals to see productive outcomes for EOL and UROV issues. Researchers suggest that it would be wise to implement veteran content into nursing curricula. This has not happened at
an appreciable level where there is consistency across the medical field. Although
there are theoretical strategies regarding the handling of veterans accessing civil-
ian health care, evidence of sustained, coordinated, creative management is
missing at crucial tactical levels; and to compound the issues, there is a severe
lack of reportage to a time frame.

Serious attention is needed to attack the weaknesses in hospice care, Medi-
care, and IT health information systems that affect the health care industry and
foster countless ethical concerns. There is strong agreement that psychological
issues at EOL exist, and there is a pressing need for skilled health care work-
ers to alleviate psychological and spiritual suffering. Consideration must go to
those who are homeless, with additional aid for homeless individuals’ situations
at EOL. Moreover, some homeless individuals are veterans who have addition-
al psychological and medical care needs. The bioethical problems surrounding
UROV include lack of identification records, nonownership of the issues, and
absence of value attributed to the legacies of individuals who are veterans.

The overarching question derived from this examination of the literature
is: Where is the military-civilian bridge? There is a need for action centered on
veterans’ connection to the community and how society provides for veterans
at EOL. As stated earlier in this review, Rorty articulates such an exceptional
view: “One of [the] most important factors in rehabilitating and sustaining
our self-respect as a nation is assuring that our veterans receive, and perceive
themselves to be receiving, care commensurate with their sacrifices.”122 The two
cultures, military and civilian, serve a common goal to restore the self-respect
of the nation. They can do so by acting collaboratively and recognizing that
although the military and civilian cultures are separate, they serve as one. A new
paradigm in thinking must break the military-civilian cultural divide and forge
the two, military veterans and civilians, as a force.

The overarching theme of the literature is that dignified dying should be
made possible again. As Bern-Klug, Gessert, and Forbes so elegantly state, “The
personal side of dying should be reclaimed.”123 The reclamation of the honoring
of veterans will engage both veterans and civilians in the sharing of veterans’
legacies. The lessons learned will be disseminated into society to realize produc-
tive outcomes. To this end, there is emerging evidence seen in the educational
field across a few American colleges that veterans and civilians are beginning to
reclaim “the personal side of dying” by investigating and honoring the contribu-
tions of veterans at the military-civilian bridge.124

Notes
1. Ellen Csikai, “Social Workers’ Participation in the Resolution of Ethical Dilemmas in


13. For more on the program, see ProjectNAGA.org. NAGA and the Bridge Model are proprietary, trademarked programs.


17. Project NAGA and the Project NAGA Bridge Model represent an open source design intended to create social improvement with the goal of honoring veterans. Project NAGA addresses: 1) amending the lack of knowledge of the military culture, 2) helping veterans receive better care at end of life, 3) honoring society by recognizing that citizens and military members are united as one force, and 4) contributing knowledge to society. The model is being piloted in higher education institutions. Dan Kohlbek, interview with author, 27 April 2018.

18. Kohlbek January interview.

“Deaths and Mortality,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics, 3 May 2017; and Dan Kohlbek, interview with author, 26 April 2018.

Dan Kohlbek, interview with author, 26 September 2017.


Moss, Moore, and Selleck, “Veteran Competencies for Undergraduate Nursing Education,” 308.


Kohlbek January interview.


Mercedes Bern-Klug, Charles Gessert, and Sarah Forbes, “The Need to Revise As-
42. McMillan et al., “Caring for the Veteran, Military and Family Member Nursing Competencies,” 385.
49. Kohlbek January interview.
54. Kohlbek 7 March interview.
60. Lee et al., “Honoring Those Who Have Served,” 1198.
64. Kuehner, “My Military.”
70. Kohlbek, interview with author, 6 February 2018, hereafter Kohlbek 6 February interview.
72. Kohlbek 6 February interview.
74. Antoni et al., “Providing Support through Life’s Final Chapter for Those Who Made It Home,” 1500.
75. Antoni et al., “Providing Support through Life’s Final Chapter for Those Who Made It Home,” 1500.
76. Antoni et al., “Providing Support through Life’s Final Chapter for Those Who Made It Home,” 1500.
86. Kohlbek 25 January interview.


104. Roeve, “Louisiana Cemetery to Take in Unclaimed Bodies.”


112. Carmelo Ramos, blog comment, Vantage Point (blog), 27 May 2016.


Military use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones in the popular lexicon, have almost become synonymous with the Global War on Terrorism, as led by the United States. This familiarity has been facilitated by media coverage and popular culture. Throughout these venues, a thread of moral and ethical discomfort is often woven alongside our understanding of drones as valuable weapons and intelligence-gathering platforms—an unease that is frequently bound with the tragic and yet persistent challenge of unintended harm to civilians. Such challenges serve to raise questions about the ethics and legitimacy of military UAV application—questions considered by the two works presently examined. While both works attempt to provide a useful perspective—and in some cases, a new framework, for future policy makers and leaders to utilize in effecting positive change—the two works examine different aspects of the current UAV paradigm. *Rethinking the Drone War* focuses primarily on the overall
effect of the drone war, civilian casualties in particular, while Preventive Force evaluates the legal and ethical underpinnings of the strategy itself.

A key distinction is the concept of imminent threat. Upon reading Preventive Force in particular, it becomes clear that the post–9/11 paradigm has seen significant blurring in the distinction between preemptive and preventive force, to the point that individuals and groups with known activities against the national security of the United States are considered imminent threats and thus targeted for elimination as part of ongoing U.S. counterterrorism operations (Fisk and Ramos, pp. 7–11). Lewis and Vavrichek do not necessarily question the concept of imminent threat as it has become customarily defined, nor the strategy used to eliminate such threats. Instead, they focus on the effectiveness of counterterrorist action and potential ramifications in terms of civilian casualties, mission effectiveness, and international legitimacy (pp. 166–88). The contributors to Preventive Force, however, highlight the concerns and issues with preventive force, as they define U.S. response to potential (if not explicitly imminent) terrorist threats—and the choice of drones as a weapon in preventive force strategy (pp. 1–11). The frameworks and recommendations provided by these works, then, are specifically related to reducing civilian casualties and regulating the strategy of preventive force, respectively (Lewis and Vavrichek, pp. 165–67; Fisk and Ramos, pp. 116, 143, 171, 257–58).

Both works are effectively organized and present valuable surveys of both drone strikes in relation to civilian harm and the strategy of preventive force. Particular strengths of Preventive Force are the inclusion of divergent perspectives between the contributing authors, as well as an obvious effort to place the contributors in conversation with one another (Fisk and Ramos, pp. 116, 172, 250–51). This not only provides a useful balance and enhances the credibility of the overall product, but it also allows for increased scope and connectivity between various aspects of the topic. Strengths of Lewis and Vavrichek’s offering include the transparent honesty with which they identify shortcomings and discrepancies within the current U.S. counterterrorism/drone paradigm (pp. 11–13, 106), as well as concrete recommendations they provide to strengthen the overall effectiveness and legitimate standing of American counterterrorism operations (pp. 32–33, 150, 165–67, 198–207). While both works are perhaps more technical and specific than works intended for the general reader, specialists, policy makers, and leaders will benefit from the scope and attention to detail provided in these publications.

Specific observations and assertions posited by Lewis and Vavrichek span a spectrum of U.S. counterterrorism characteristics, but they begin by identifying a troubling discrepancy between the rate of civilian casualties reported by the UN, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (BIJ), and the New America Foun-
dation (NAF) and those reported by the U.S. government. The authors cite a variety of contributing factors that could produce such a discrepancy, but they ultimately conclude that if the “problem of civilian harm” is not sufficiently recognized and understood, civilian casualties and counterterrorism operations will not be addressed effectively, and an assessment process must be instituted to quantify and minimize civilian harm (pp. 6–19). Similarly, the authors observe that there appears to be no “effective operations analysis framework” to take advantage of lessons learned in counterterrorism operations and thus maximize the success of lethal counterterrorism action. Therefore, such a framework is proposed, and the authors argue that the U.S. government should support an independent analysis of its counterterrorism operations using that framework (p. 114–62, 165). Both of these examples illustrate the approach taken by the authors in identifying specific issues and shortcomings of the American “drone war,” examining the different aspects and possible solutions, and ultimately recommending a specific course of action to improve U.S. counterterrorism efforts.

Preventive Force, in contrast, and by the nature of the work as an edited volume with multiple contributors, explores a wider variety of perspectives on the topic at hand and offers arguments in a more abstract fashion generally. Common threads do exist, however, in the frequently shared opinion that U.S. preventive force strategy is founded on dubious legal footing, the distinction between preventive and preemptive force is generally imprecise in current operational and strategic frameworks, and although imperfect, preventive force as it is currently being deployed does in fact represent an effective, if controversial, choice for U.S. counterterrorism (pp. 52–55, 105, 143, 170–72, 272). Although the perspectives of the contributing authors include arguments both for and against preventive force, it is clear that most agree the legal foundations of such action in international law must be clarified, and that beyond these legal and ethical considerations, preventive counterterrorism strikes may pose future challenges for the United States strategically (pp. 143, 171, 229, 334).

All told, the two works examined here provide a valuable and sufficiently broad survey of the American use of drones in current counterterrorism operations. Preventive Force tends to be more critical of the U.S. targeted killing strategy, generally, and offers broad ethical and legal recommendations, while Rethinking the Drone War tends to be more supportive of U.S. strategy and offers more concrete recommendations to improve mission effectiveness, reduce civilian harm, and enhance American international legitimacy with regard to its use of drones to combat terrorism. The consideration of both volumes is recommended for those seeking a better understanding of American counterterrorism operations and strategy, academic or otherwise, and claims of useful
frameworks for reform made by both publications are not generally overstated. The American use of drones to specifically eliminate threats as part of a wider counterterrorism effort is a complex matter, and both works reviewed here provide an admiral exploration of that complexity.

*Charting a Course* deserves a prominent place in the curriculum at our professional military educational (PME) institutions focusing on strategy and policy development. The authors of the chapters represent respected scholars and national security practitioners with deep backgrounds in their various fields of expertise. This book is clearly targeted at rising military and civilian officials who will soon be charged with developing, articulating, and executing U.S. national security and defense policies.

The book was released in late 2016 and intended as a primer for the incoming presidential administration. While the authors could not have anticipated President Donald J. Trump’s election victory, they clearly understood that officials entering into any new administration could benefit from a crash course on the most important national security issues they will likely confront during their time in office.

The book is smartly and logically organized into chapters covering substantive issues of most immediate concern to Department of Defense officials and military planners. These include exceptionally well-written introductory chapters on the formulation of U.S. grand strategy; the anticipated nature of future conflict; and excellent historical reviews of U.S. defense policies, strategies, and budgets. With the recent publication of the national security and defense strategies by the Trump administration, some readers might be inclined to skip these initial chapters. This would be a mistake, however, as these sections establish the larger historical and strategic contexts in which today’s decisions to implement and operationalize these national-level strategies will be made.

These foundational chapters are largely reflective of traditional and consensus views on American national security and defense strategies. For instance, long-time students of strategy will find familiar ground in this book’s treatment of grand strategy within the traditional analytical framework of *ends, ways,* and *means.* In other words, strategy is best understood as the calculated relationship
between the strategic objectives to be achieved (ends), the application and synchronization of the national instruments of power (ways or diplomacy, intelligence, military, and economic measures), and the resources (means) required to execute the strategy.

Additionally, the authors adopt the consensus view of U.S. foreign policy elites that celebrate America’s dominant role in the world as an inherent good (not unjustifiably so) that since World War II has moved to effectively establish “a rules-based international and economic order that has widely benefited much of the world” (p. 6). Moreover, while acknowledging the role to be played by the nonmilitary instruments of power, the book emphasizes the traditional realist view that “hard military power and the will to use it are the coins of the realm” (p. 9). Not unexpectedly, the book also expresses support for the conventional wisdom of many experienced U.S. foreign policy practitioners that global security is best underwritten by maintaining America’s vast global network of military bases and forward-deployed forces and supplies.

These traditional views on strategy formulation and the utility of American political and military leadership in the world are not necessarily wrong. However, many of these conventional wisdoms reflective of the foreign policy consensus of academics, former senior government officials, and elite think tanks are increasingly being questioned both by the larger American public and, at least as important, by President Trump himself. Consequently, while this book can usefully serve as a foundational instructional text for PME instruction, faculty should supplement the chapters with articles and other resources that offer opposing and alternative viewpoints that will fuel robust discussion in seminar.

Subsequent chapters smartly and succinctly provide essential overviews exploring the most pressing functional and regional security issues that senior defense officials will confront. The functional chapters cover necessary national security reforms, weapons of mass destruction, ways to counter terrorism, and cyberpolicy. They are useful primers highlighting the primary security challenges confronting policy makers, assessing the implications of these issues for U.S. national security, and even more valuably offering specific and actionable recommendations to be considered.

The book concludes with excellent chapters providing regional overviews of U.S. security policies and issues within Asia and the Pacific, Europe, Russia, the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, and the Arctic. These chapters will most obviously immediately benefit military and civilian officials serving in positions with a regional focus. Senior military planners and intelligence officials heading for service at any one of the geographic combatant commands will find these chapters particularly useful, as the authors clearly identify the principal national interests at stake, succinctly describe the primary
regional threats to these interests, and conclude with a pithy set of recommendations for policy makers to consider.

The main strength of Charting a Course is that it is written by national security practitioners and academics who have taught at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. It is a book expressly written for an audience of rising senior military and civilian officials who will soon be responsible for developing U.S. national security strategies and policies.

The book’s contemporary focus on today’s national security issues means that it will necessarily have a relatively short shelf life, as the global security environment itself and the challenges and opportunities it presents to U.S. policy makers inevitably change. Nonetheless, it is a book that this reviewer hopes National Defense University would seek to periodically update with the aim of providing practical insights and advice to a new set of presidential administration officials as they assume their critical duties.

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This book seeks to capture the ethos of republicanism that undergirded American soldiers from 1775 to 1861. That ethos hung on five “threads” defining a culture of citizen-soldier: virtue; legitimacy; self-governance; God’s will and the national mission; and glory, honor, and fame (pp. x–xi). Each point receives a chapter bolstered by the book’s core strength: its research. The author, a professor of military history at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has gone to great lengths to include primary sources consisting mostly of letters from soldiers pulled from “forty archives in twenty-three states” (p. xi). The extensive notes and bibliography substantiate his claim of presenting a “multigenerational ideology” driving the American soldier during this “formative period in United States military history” (pp. xii, xiii).

The careful scholarship does not clarify a few points. A focus on soldiers does not necessarily bring “into clearer relief some of the broader values of American society, thought and culture” (p. x). Herrera proves where a large cross section of American soldiers fell in their view of republicanism. How this sentiment reflected the larger society is not covered and would require an en-
tirely different focus to do so. For instance, founding father Thomas Jefferson allowed for separate republics, and this vision may have been the most realistic to match American realities. In this light, whatever soldierly ethos of republicanism arose to foster national unity at times grated against the ambitions of the civilian elite. This key result is only obliquely registered in the book, at least until that very ethos among soldiers helped spur the collapse of the union, resulting in civil war, something Herrera raises to close his study. The tensions and struggle are outstanding guides to U.S. early history. Herrera smartly focuses on one to raise the consequence of the other.

What is addressed successfully marks the major themes. For instance, God’s will justified American boundaries coming into shape as a means of expansion west. These ambitions and sentiments meant Americans made war to “effect God’s plan for mankind” (p. 115). This lofty conceit validated continental wars to bolster the American system of government as best and the trust in individualism and the U.S. economic system as virtuous. The entirety of this value-laden belief system encompassed Manifest Destiny as soldiers performed their duty as a means of “a general uplifting of humanity” (p. 119). Regrettably, such zeal took Americans into ideological waters offering both continuity and confusion, a harmful result. To teach humanity to govern itself best by emulating American norms could not be done by example alone, as had been hoped at the founding of the colonies. The racism behind Manifest Destiny spurred on the use of force to achieve the end of affirming the need and virtue of republican government. The targets at hand were Native Americans, their cultural effacement a means of setting that punitive, worldly example. The use of national arms to achieve this purpose meant empire and imperialism were not far behind (p. 122). In the process, the military arm of the United States “represented the collective will of citizens” seeking U.S. expansion (p. 124). In this key respect, the military impulse of America met an embrace from a public seeking largesse by any means.

A common good also had to meet and mollify the need for individual gain, and a search for personal glory, honor, and fame spelled this end. But character mattered most in this endeavor, even if serving self-interest (p. 138). Still, military service bridged both competing aims: satisfying a thirst for individual distinction but acting for the “good of society” (p. 139). Resolving the tension rested on believing in God’s sanction as a measure of favoring the act of expansion (p. 140). And that reward was great, amounting to an immortality that came from successfully meeting a standard of sacrifice on behalf of good republicanism, much as those serving in the Continental Army had achieved. This standard drove succeeding generations of soldiers to try and best define the “character of the republic” (p. 162).

Different views of republicanism in American society ultimately led to civil war, and that is where the author ends his story—and the idea that soldiers
represented a stable American view of republicanism falters in this respect. They were too militant and welcomed violence too readily to settle the very issue of unity by 1861. A soldierly devotion to republicanism across multiple generations could not sustain the unity or, worse, helped to foster division, as soldiers expressing republican virtues called for a “southern republic,” or “a new country and a new future” (p. 164). Yet society joined with them and certainly did not restrain them. Did republicanism in the American soldier represent more restraint than the public it served? This question is valid then and now and is perhaps the most important issue raised in this book.

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After more than 30 books, one might think that Martin van Creveld had little more to say. A longtime giant in the field of strategy and a university professor in Israel, van Creveld’s works are a necessary stop on any strategic thinker’s educational journey. One of his earliest books, The Transformation of War, predicted the rise of terrorism and the end of conventional war. As the first part of that thesis rages on and the second part seems to be eroding, More on War offers an opportunity to reexamine the strategic philosophy of one of the most important strategic studies scholars. The book is explicitly an attempt to lay out the author’s theoretical framework rather than an attempt to introduce any major new idea. That grounding makes the book a useful introduction both to strategic theory and to the ideas of the man himself.

Van Creveld’s lifetime of scholarship shines through in this book. He is clearly at home discussing the theoretical aspects of war and linking them with real-world examples. Van Creveld takes Carl von Clausewitz’s On War and Sun Tzu’s The Art of War as his two lodestars, declaring them as the two most necessary texts of strategic theory. While those two books are required, they are not sufficient. They must be understood, but they are not enough to understand the totality of warfare. Van Creveld uses the two texts as a jumping-off point to discuss subjects like cyber and space warfare, the legal ramifications of war, and nuclear weapons. The later chapters are thus some of the best in the book.
as he pushes concepts forward rather than explaining older ones. Particularly interesting is that van Creveld is not shy about integrating works of political philosophy where they can inform discussions of war and warfare. The lack of a political theory perspective in most works of military theory is a glaring short-fall that van Creveld’s work does not share.

Perhaps predictably, the work suffers in its attempt to define war in a way that is different from Clausewitz’s definition. Van Creveld tries mightily to get an alternative view off the launch pad, but the effort finds no purchase, and the sheer gravity of Clausewitz’s view of war as a violent extension of politics pulls both reader and author back down to earth. Even where van Creveld describes nonpolitical issues—and in his view non-Clausewitzian—war, politics, and power dominate the discussion. As for its treatment of strategy, the book could have benefitted from a chapter on tactics. As it is, most of the chapter “Strategy” is actually tactics, so much so that van Creveld’s view of strategy is drowned out by the details of warfare. In the section where he covers concepts such as cyberwarfare, he does not cover information warfare but instead lumps it in with cyberwarfare; whereas, cyberwarfare should be a subset of information warfare. Lastly, van Creveld’s definition of the term asymmetric war in his chapter of the same name is so broad one wonders if his view that conventional war is waning is more of a function of that definition than an actual fact. Twenty-seven years have passed since he made his prediction of an end to conventional warfare and the rise of unconventional. As it becomes increasingly likely that these two forms of war are merging, an updated idea would have been welcome.

These are mostly quibbles though. As a retrospective work, similar to Colin S. Gray’s The Future of Strategy (2015), More on War is useful for the beginning student of strategy. Van Creveld covers a lot of ground—from the basics to the advanced—in a much more accessible style than some of his earlier works, such as Command in War (1985), as essential as that book remains. More advanced students could probably skip right from that book to The Transformation of War (1991), or to Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (1977), which still is probably the best work of military theory when it comes to logistics. His chapter on naval warfare, of particular interest to Marines, is bullish on amphibious operations but does not advance the theoretical discussion beyond a brief discussion of naval theorists Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett.

Fans of Martin van Creveld should find plenty to enjoy in this book. It’s a useful introduction—or summation—of the thinker’s corpus of writing over his long career. Even critics should find a few surprises; van Creveld is not as much of an anti-Clausewitzian as he is frequently portrayed. More on War, as a summary of his thinking, is thus a welcome addition to strategic theory.

Christopher Daase is a professor at the Goethe University in Frankfurt, Germany, while James Davis is a professor at the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland. Their work, Clausewitz on Small War, consists of Prussian military philosopher, historian, and general Carl von Clausewitz’s “My Lectures on Small War, Held at the War College,” “Testimonial,” “On the Political Advantage and Disadvantages of the Prussian Institution of the Landwehr,” and “Arming the People.” These were the products of an expanded translation of Clausewitz’s works presented at a workshop at Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC, and one of a series of Oxford University publications on Clausewitz. An introduction, bibliography, and index are provided to help readers through the disparate writings.

These selections are offered at several levels: as works of translation from German to English, as historical documents from a specific time and place, and whether they continued to be relevant at present as broader considerations of conflict or war. The editors conclude that these works were significant in the development of Clausewitz’s theory of war. They also feel that he was an early theorist of insurgency and asymmetric warfare with insights that are still applicable today. The publisher states that Davis and Daase showed “that asymmetric warfare is not a historical development that can be termed pre- or post-Clausewitzian as many contemporary scholars of war and military strategy argue” (pp. 17–18).

Clausewitz defined little or small wars (kleiner kreig) in terms of the magnitude of the units involved (squad to battalion-size) and whether or not these were employed as part of a larger engagement or battle. Distinctions between tactics, strategy, and policy are also provided. This collection is presented in the chronological order in which they were written from 1810 through 1831. The main article is Clausewitz’s war academy lecture notes that dealt primarily with the tactics and techniques of outposts, reconnaissance, security, and patrolling. At the time, this was meant to promote a transition from linear to open tactics during the reform period. The latter selections introduce concepts of partisan support to larger formations by regular forces, organized militias (landwehr),
and unorganized militias (\textit{landsturm}). The final piece, from \textit{On War}, goes on at length with the concept of the nation in arms. All are short of addressing anything like civil or revolutionary war notions of guerrilla conflict. Very little was found that resembled modern concepts of insurgency and its counter.

This reviewer’s own work with two German insurgency classics (\textit{Kleinkrieg: The German Experience with Guerrilla Wars, from Clausewitz to Hitler}, 2016) started with a consideration of what Clausewitz had written on the subject. This was from his “The People in Arms” and supported by academic papers on the subject. In 2005, Professor Daase presented a paper at Oxford University on small wars in which he posited Clausewitz’s superior conceptualization of political violence, including the utility of the concepts of offense and defense and explanations for why big states often lose small wars.\textsuperscript{1} Another paper was presented in 2010 by Professor Peter Paret at Humboldt University. Paret paraphrased Clausewitz’s teachings on small war from 1810 to 1811 at the Berlin War Academy. He concludes, “The lectures, strictly pragmatic, oriented towards issues of the day, are today read primarily by military historians.”\textsuperscript{2}

Daase and Davis’s publications take up where Paret left off, including an introductory essay by Professor Davis. This is augmented by the historical examples of wars or campaigns cited: Franco-Dutch War (1672–78), Seven Years War (1756–63), American Revolution (1775–89), French Revolutionary Wars (1792–1802), War of the First Coalition (1792–98), Vendee (1793–96), War of the Second Coalition (1798–1802), Prussia (1806 and 1813), Spanish War of Independence (1808–14), and Tyrol (1809). Clausewitz’s lesson plans included a selection of further reading about these conflicts for his students with the counsel “not to read much theory about Little War, but to devote their time instead to military history.”\textsuperscript{3}

Current American military command and staff or war college–level students might not find much here that is prescriptive or applicable to current events. In fact, these writings might be considered antiquarian material. But as an example of Clausewitz’s thought, it provides a focus in contrast to his major works and is worthy of consideration in a broader sense. Much of Clausewitz’s extensive writing remains in the German language, limiting the access of English-speaking scholars. Like others, this reviewer had to rely on translations of Clausewitz, which now include this work, along with \textit{On War}, \textit{Principles of War}, and accounts of the 1812 campaign in Russia and the Battle of Waterloo. This situation continues, but efforts like this publication help make great books available to a broader audience. As such, it should be read by Marines to expand their intellectual perspective.

\textit{Charles D. Melson}

\textit{Former chief historian, Marine Corps University History Division}
Notes


Of the many books reviewed over the years, this proved to be one of the most difficult for this reviewer. It is not the usual historical survey of a war or of a nation's air force in a war or time period. There are no colorful descriptions of dogfights or other engagements or the accomplishments of heroic and talented aviators fighting for their country. It is a fairly good-size book—based on page count—but for all that weight, the only photograph is on the front of the book jacket, a well-known photo of three colorfully camouflaged Israeli jet fighters over mountains near the Dead Sea. How could the editor and authors, as well as the publisher, omit using images to complement this scholarly, though heavily written, treatise? This question is never answered. Ample photography is readily available these days from many sources, official and unofficial, for any subject detailed in the text. And this reviewer exhorts anyone associated with a reprint, or second edition, of this title to strongly consider including anywhere from 30 to 50 good photographs—at least—to illustrate what the authors have obviously gone to such efforts to write.

Having written the preceding, this reviewer considers Airpower Applied a well-researched book offering a different angle of reporting how three different groups—the United States, NATO, and Israel—have conducted several very important aviation campaigns in the last 100 years. The individual authors of the lengthy chapters certainly have major credentials, especially Dr. Richard P. Hallion, at one time the U.S. Air Force historian, who has written several books and authoritative articles. The editor of the collection is a colonel in the Royal Norwegian Air Force—although not apparently a pilot or crewman with any aviation experience—with several books to his credit as well.

Throughout the book, it is plain the editor’s favor lies with other air forces, and not with the various navies of the countries his authors occasionally include. As an example, he continues the old saw of crediting the U.S. Air Force with the lion’s share of photo reconnaissance missions during the 1962 Cuban
Missile Crisis. In reality, of course, the Air Force’s McDonnell RF-101s were not ready to begin overflying Cuba, and that task rightly fell to the Vought RF-8As of the U.S. Navy’s Light Photographic Squadron 62 and the Marine Corps’ Composite Reconnaissance Squadron 2, which sent aircraft, pilots, and ground crews to its Navy compatriots.

The scope of this book, the wars, discussion of their early development and their length, and the fighting that occurred during the period of the conflicts are quite encompassing, and it takes considerable reader dedication to get through the book. A good deal of knowledge is also assumed by the editor and authors. The history portion or individual introductions are fairly extensive and probably should not be thought of as a deterrent. The section on the 1991 Gulf War and its “prequel,” the buildup, called Operation Desert Shield, and the actual war, called Operation Desert Storm, receive considerable coverage. The roles of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps get more coverage than other preceding discussions, but still, this reviewer feels the U.S. naval Services are given short shrift, which is unfortunate. The Air Force and other Coalition participants definitely did not win the war against Saddam Hussein all by themselves.

Of course, the headline-grabbing accounts of McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagles knocking down many Iraqi aircraft might have occasionally obscured the public’s perception of just who was doing the fighting, especially when the Navy could count only three air-to-air kills—two MiGs by two Navy McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornets in January, and one helicopter by a Navy Grumman F-14 Tomcat toward the end of the war.

One especially interesting section is the discussion of Operation Odyssey Dawn, which saw the demise of the reign of Libyan colonel Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. After all this time, this twisted terrorist was finally brought down by his own people, with the help of allied airpower, including Marine Corps McDonnel Douglas AV-8B Harriers. An important addendum concerns action against the American diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya, that ended with the death of the American ambassador and the rise of a terrible, and as-yet-unfinished account of the role of then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton by then beginning her unsuccessful run for the 2016 presidential election.

Early in the section on the Israel Air Force (IAF)—note the correct spelling, not Israeli but Israel—that author poses an interesting apples-to-oranges comparison that invites response: “Arguably the best combat aircraft of its era, the [McDonnell Douglas F-4] Phantom represented a quantum leap over the [Dassault] Mirage III in terms of performance, avionics, the variety and weight of ordnance it could employ, and its electronic warfare systems” (p. 249).

The reviewer asked long-time friend, retired IAF Brigadier General Iftach Spector, if he agreed with this statement. Spector is one of the IAF’s ranking aces with a combined total of 12 kills in Mirages and Phantoms. During his
long career, he fought in four Arab-Israeli wars and commanded two of the IAF’s premier fighter squadrons. He is a successful author and has turned to painting, often using his own experiences in the cockpit as subjects.

He comments on the matter:

The F-4 was, indeed, a quantum leap over the Mirage III in some dimensions, but in some it was not. Both aircraft were purchased by the IAF, and used, as multi-role fighters. Their top speed and rate of climb for interception were equal. The F-4 carried much more weapons and electronics, and had longer operational range, making it preferable for air-to-ground attacks, but still, in the six-day war our Mirages reached and destroyed enemy targets as far as our F-4s ever did.

The F-4 had large radar (with operator [sic] on board), and improved missiles, but still the Mirages, with their outdat-ed radar and single pilot, proved equal in air-to-air (including shooting enemy aircraft by night), and even better in close maneuvering, which was the case in most battles of that time.

From my experience, every aircraft gives wonderful results if it is operated by skilled operators, which consider its limitations and use its fortes. The wider lesson is, that air forces must put any weapon system to jobs that fit it. In this way, you get the maximum from your men and machines.

While this assessment of *Airpower Applied* is affected by its unfortunate lack of photographic support, it is still a good overall view of important portions of both the twentieth century’s and the early twenty-first century’s records of aerial warfare.

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*Marine Corps Aviation Since 1912 (2009)*

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As a combat arm, aviation is a historical rookie. Unsurprisingly, then, no one has written the book on airpower theory in the manner of Carl von Clausewitz or Alfred Thayer Mahan. *Airpower Reborn* begins to rectify that deficiency. Its
authors present two visions of airpower and raise questions about the nature of war itself. While admitting theirs is hardly the final answer in airpower theory, they make a serious effort to apply the same intellectual rigor to the third dimension that land and sea theory have enjoyed for centuries.

The editor, John Andreas Olsen, argues that airpower theory must “transcend the purely military sphere, view the adversary as a multidimensional system, and pursue system paralysis and strategic effects rather than military destruction or attrition” (p. 3). His definition of systemic paralysis echoes maneuver warfare in Warfighting (MCDP-1), seeking an adversary’s disruption and confusion rather than outright destruction. This is accomplished through two simultaneous lines of operation. The first is “process-oriented to achieve psychological impact,” and Olsen links this to John Boyd. The second is “form-oriented to achieve physical impact” and draws from the work of John Warden (p. 4). Boyd teaches how to think about conflict; Warden teaches how to act.

This echoes the difference between the theoretical Clausewitz and more prescriptive Antoine-Henri Jomini, and leads to the book’s real, if unintentional, question: Has airpower, as Giulio Douhet first argued, fundamentally changed the “nature of war?” If one believes that war is a fundamentally human activity, airpower changes nothing; it simply becomes a new tool. If war is not perpetually defined by its human aspect, then airpower—opening up a new dimension above the battlefield—most certainly changes its nature. Thus, Olsen’s lines of operation are less complementary and more about the malleability of war’s essence. The five essays present different sides of the question.

In “Paradigm Lost,” Peter R. Faber reviews airpower theory from Douhet to John Boyd and John Warden. Falling in the “fundamental change” camp, he argues that airpower theorists have failed to make their case because the very language of discourse is rooted in a Napoleon-industrial land-centric worldview. Faber concurs with Warden’s belief that modern aerospace technology makes the “physical and tangible elements of organized conflict just as important” as the moral (p. 45). Precision-guided munitions and stealth technology can neutralize even the toughest human mind.

John A. Warden III’s “Smart Strategy, Smart Airpower” expands on his “Strategy and Airpower” article of 2011. Like Faber, Warden believes that airpower is so revolutionary that it rewrites war’s vocabulary, rendering terms like fighting, battle, and warfighter obsolete. Presenting adversaries as resistant systems, Warden argues that affecting critical system nodes can overcome resistance and impose the changes one seeks. His five rings model depicts those nodes with leadership in the center, expanding to processes, infrastructure, and population, with an enemy’s fielded forces at the edge. Land-centric warfare attacks the fielded forces first; yet they are the least critical for affecting the deci-
sion makers at the center. Thus, wars become needlessly destructive, expending vast energies on the least decisive node. With airpower, one may precisely strike all rings simultaneously, breaking their linkages apart. Airpower advocates need to start believing in this paradigm-changing capability, entering strategic analysis with “‘the nonlimits of airpower’ in mind: the presumption that airpower can accomplish any military task” (p. 126).

In “Fifth-Generation Strategy,” Alan Stephens agrees that the land-centric model has failed, with Vietnam, two invasions of Iraq, and Afghanistan as evidence. Conversely, air actions in both Iraq invasions, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, and Libya speak to a model that works. Believing that fifth-generation aircraft revolutionize the conversation, Stephens fuses Boyd and Warden to present systemic paralysis built on their high-tempo technology. Concepts like “checkmate by operational maneuver” and the “rapid halt” allow fifth-generation countries to change adversaries behavior without physically occupying their territory (pp. 135–55). Like Faber and Warden, Stephens argues for a new vocabulary to express this supposed change in war’s nature.

On the other side of the coin are Frans P. B. Osinga and Colin S. Gray. Osinga’s “The Enemy as a Complex Adaptive System,” which distills his detailed analysis of Boyd’s work from *Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd* (2005). While Boyd did not postulate airpower-specific theories, Osinga highlights some linkages. Perhaps the most important is Boyd’s argument that an enemy is an open, complex, and organic adaptive system (p. 63). Contrary to the “game-changers,” who present enemy systems as fragile and vulnerable to a few blows at key nodes, Boyd’s adversaries are robust and adaptive. War’s goal is not to shatter the enemy system completely but to degrade its cohesion and keep its pieces from operating as a harmonious whole. This differs from the totality implied by *paralysis*: paralysis is ideal but an adversary whose system lacks cohesion and adaptability—and is kept that way—is just as good. Boyd’s emphasis on cognitive processes reminds us of his focus on the human element in war; or as Boyd often said, “Terrain does not fight wars. Machines don’t fight wars. People do it, and they use their minds.”

In “Airpower Theory,” Gray takes the most conservative position, cautioning that “[one should] resist the temptation to celebrate the particular believed lessons of a recent clash of arms as eternal truths about airpower” (p. 157). Gray instead presents *dicta*: statements on airpower he believes sufficiently reliable and well-evidenced to promote a grander airpower theory. Gray discusses how airpower performs some military tasks poorly as well as how strategic effects are the sum of very human responses. He concludes by echoing Boyd: “airpower theory can guide us only in how to think, not in what to think” (p. 179).

Overall, the book offers a picture of airpower theory that, in Gray’s words,
“is complete yet unfinished” (p. 156). The authors are silent on several areas; the Warden school, particularly, ignores advancements in air defense systems that parallel the fielding of fifth-generation aircraft. The cyber realm is likewise omitted, a problem considering modern airpower is dependent on data-heavy networks for everything from navigation to targeting. Space receives a passing mention. Yet, while the authors have not written aviation’s On War, that was not their goal. They sought a serious analysis, not previously undertaken, of a capability that has transformed the character, if not the nature, of war in the last century. In that, they succeeded.

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