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Interviewer: General, as you look back on the history of your time, what thoughts predominate?

Wedemeyer: I have a troubled sense of the futility that has marked so much of our international experience. Think of the wars and crises that have wracked the world in this century! We Americans tend to get involved quite blindly, with little real understanding of ends or thought of consequences. We plunge emotionally into conflicts, lose thousands of lives, spend billions of dollars, help wreak enormous damage on the world and its peoples. Then we go back and spend more billions trying to put things together again. What an inane cycle! And look at what happened after World War II: we destroyed one set of tyrants only to build up another! We “won” that war only in a limited military sense.

Interviewer: What can or should be done?

Wedemeyer: Americans simply must become more forehanded and consistent in the way we manage our public affairs. As populations grow and the struggle for space and resources becomes more intense, a lot of heat is generated. We can’t afford simply to sit back, let events take their course, and jump in with a military solution when a crisis gets out of hand. There are so many ways in which the course of events can be influenced without the use or threat of force. Economic, diplomatic, cultural, psychological, and other means are available in limitless variety. If all these “instruments of national policy” are employed in a timely, coordinated, and imaginative way, in accordance with a reasonably steady game plan, there is good reason to hope for progress toward a better world without the scourge of war.

Interviewer: I guess you are saying that we should all become strategists—in the broader sense of that term?

Wedemeyer: Precisely!

Then Lt. Col. Albert C. Wedemeyer was the chief author of the Victory Program, the initial strategic plan guiding U.S. conduct of World War II. Promoted to general officer, he subsequently served in a series of assignments primarily in the Far East.

Suggested Themes and Topics

Global Security

- What nations consider themselves to be at war or in conflict with the United States? Nonstate actors? How are they conducting war, and what does this mean for the Army?
- What operational and logistical challenges are foreseen due to infrastructure limitations in potential foreign areas of operation and how can we mitigate them?
- What lessons did we learn during recent hurricane relief operations?
- What is the role of the military in protecting natural resources?
- What lessons have we learned from U.S. counterinsurgent military assistance in Africa?
- What are the security threats, concerns, and events resulting from illegal immigration into Europe?
- Saudi Arabia and Iran: How are cultural changes in both societies affecting the operational environment and potential for conflict between them?
- Iran: What should the U.S. military do to prepare for and promote normalization?
- Case study: How does Japan’s effort to establish the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” compare with current Chinese efforts to expand control over the South China Sea?
Institutional

- After eighteen years of institutional/operational experience largely focused on counterinsurgency, how do we return to preparing for large-scale combat operations (LSCO)?
  - See/understand/seize fleeting opportunities?
  - Develop the situation in contact and chaos?
  - Offset "one-off" dependencies and contested domains?
  - Rapidly exploit positions of advantage?
  - Survive in hyperlethal engagements?
  - Continuously present multiple dilemmas to the enemy?
  - Decide and act at speed?
  - Fully realize mission command?
- What are the greatest threats the Army faces (either externally or internally)? How should the Army deal with them?
- What is needlessly duplicated in the Army (e.g., what should be done away with, how should the Army adjust, and how would it benefit)?
- What must be done to adjust junior leader development to a modern operational environment?
- What must we do to develop a more effective means of developing and maintaining institutional memory in order to deal with emerging challenges?
- What is the role for the Army in homeland security operations? What must the Army be prepared for?
- Case studies: How do we properly integrate emerging technology?
- What are the potential adverse impacts on military standards due to factors associated with poor integration of new cultures, ethnicities, or racial considerations and how can those impacts be mitigated?
- Case study: How is gender integration changing the Army and how it operates?
- Case study: How does tactical-level military governance during occupation following World War II and Operation Iraqi Freedom compare?
The Suwalki Gap

A Proving Ground for Cluster Munitions

Capt. Gregory Fetterman, U.S. Army

The need for cluster munitions is growing as Russia poses a credible threat of a high-intensity conflict in the Polish/Lithuanian borderland called the Suwalki Gap. An operational law attorney discusses the concerns over the use of cluster munitions and how to mitigate the risks associated with them.

A Central Asian Perspective on Russian Soft Power

The View from Tashkent

Robert F. Baumann, PhD

A scholar with expertise in Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia analyzes Russian soft power, specifically as it is employed in Uzbekistan.

The Decades-Long “Double-Double Game”

Pakistan, the United States, and the Taliban

Thomas F. Lynch III, PhD

The strategic challenge of the Afghan Taliban continues to mean that the U.S. must pursue imperfect means to attain its most pressing security aim: denying international terrorists safe haven in either Afghanistan or Pakistan. In this regard, the author discusses the misalignment in U.S. and Pakistani strategies for Afghanistan and the South Asia region.
79 Many Voices Telling One Story
Public Affairs Operations across Africa in Support of Combatant Commanders
Capt. Jason Welch, U.S. Army

A public affairs officer (PAO) illustrates how Army PAOs must step outside traditional military leadership roles to communicate effectively on behalf of their command in the challenging environment of Africa.

88 Preparing Security Force Assistance Brigades for the Complexity of Human Interaction
Lt. Col. Brent A. Kauffman, U.S. Army

The U.S. Army would be well served to make significant investments in human domain training to maximize the effectiveness of security force assistance brigades as they advise, train, and assist foreign forces in their own environments. The author recommends three sources to inform a human domain training program.

110 Mexico’s Fight against Transnational Organized Crime
Dr. R. Evan Ellis

The author discusses Mexico’s security challenges and its progress in combatting criminal groups and associated flows of illegal goods, and he offers recommendations for U.S. policy makers regarding support for our southern neighbor.

123 China-Latin America Arms Sales
Antagonizing the United States in the Western Hemisphere?
Capt. George Gurrola, U.S. Army

The author analyzes how China’s arms flows to Latin America can provide further specific insight into the maturity of China’s military relations with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.

133 Directorate S
The C.I.A. and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan
Kevin Rousseau

The author reviews Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan by Steve Coll.

136 Letter to the Editor
A reader comments on a previous article.
The 75th Ranger Regiment Military Intelligence Battalion

Modernizing for Multi-Domain Battle

Maj. Paul A. Lushenko, U.S. Army
A soldier pulls himself across a rope bridge 21 February 2011 during the Mountain Phase of Ranger School at Camp Merrill, Dahlonega, Georgia. Regimental Military Intelligence Battalion personnel complete the same training as combat arms soldiers assigned to the ranger battalions, including the U.S. Army’s Airborne and Ranger courses. (Photo by John D. Helms, U.S. Army)
A focus on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations since 9/11 has eroded the U.S. Army’s readiness according to Gen. Mark Milley, chief of staff of the Army. Defined by Milley, readiness approximates the Army’s ability to exercise its organizational design and fulfill its mission. The Army’s doctrinal mission consists of fighting and winning America’s wars through sustained land combat as a member of the joint force. The most pernicious consequence of the Army’s readiness deficit is its inability to outmatch the lethality of near-peer competitors including the so-called “Big Four”: China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. The Army’s modernization strategy, published on 3 October 2017, is designed to ensure soldiers and units are prepared to confront these and other threats. This principle goal turns on several priorities including optimizing human performance and designing a “network” that is inured to operating environments characterized by a denied or degraded electromagnetic spectrum.

One recent example of U.S. Army modernization is the establishment of the 75th Ranger Regiment’s Military Intelligence Battalion (RMIB) on 22 May 2017 at Fort Benning, Georgia. I argue that while the RMIB furthers the Ranger Regiment’s readiness through experimentation and innovation, it also informs the Army’s broader structure and emerging operating concepts to help outmatch near-peer competitors.

Perhaps the most progressive of those concepts is multi-domain battle (MDB). According to then U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commander, Gen. David Perkins, this concept “allows U.S. forces to take advantage of existing personnel quality and training strengths to outmaneuver adversaries physically and cognitively, applying combined arms in and across all domains.” In consonance with the MDB concept, on the one hand, the RMIB encourages new collection, exploitation, and analytical practices to enable special operations including lethal strikes, raids, and offensive cyber operations that underpin the Army’s lethality. On the other hand, the RMIB conditions the Army and joint force for tailorable, distributable, and interdependent capabilities sets. These formations “package individuals and teams with associated equipment against identified mission requirements that span the spectrum of conflict and enable a multi-echelon, joint, and/or multi-national response.” Such capabilities sets constitute a useful operating paradigm to assist the Army’s goal of projecting power across multiple domains to decisively defeat threats to America’s national security and provide for global security.

The remainder of this article unfolds in three parts. First, it canvasses the Army’s periodic formation of ranger units to better position the significance of the Ranger Regiment and its new military intelligence battalion. The article next unpacks the RMIB and addresses its approach to collection, exploitation, and analysis in the interest of cross-pollinating practices to conventional forces that can help redress the Army’s readiness gap. The article concludes by briefly introducing the RMIB’s central contribution to the MDB concept referred to as capabilities sets.

“Rangers Lead the Way”

Employed by English foresters in the thirteenth century, the term “ranging” described the activity of patrolling to prevent poaching and protect against marauders. Colonial rebels including Col. Daniel Morgan and Francis Marion adopted ranging during the American Revolution to circumvent the British army’s equipment, training, and personnel advantages. Col. Thomas Knowlton, who served for Gen. George Washington and is considered the first ranger intelligence officer, built a network of informants to enable ambushes and raids against the British. These irregular warfare tactics represented a key pillar of Washington’s strategy to “wear away the resolution of the British by gradual, persistent action against the periphery of their armies.” Beyond Britain’s ignominious defeat in 1783, due partly to the unconventional practices of Washington’s regular and partisan forces, Army leaders developed ranger units at key turning points in the service’s history.

While both the Confederate and Union armies employed rangers during the American Civil War from 1861 to 1865, the Army did not constitute similar organizations until World War II. Gen. George C. Marshall, then chief of staff, modeled a unit after the British Commandos to gain combat experience prior to invading Europe. The activation of the 1st Ranger Battalion in June 1942 by Lt. Col. William O. Darby bookends the modern ranger era. Given its success during Operation Torch in North Africa in November 1942, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower instructed Darby to establish two additional battalions. “Darby’s Rangers” combined with the 3rd and 4th Battalions to form the 6615th Ranger Force. Tragically, the 6615th Ranger Force was decimated in
Italy at the Battle of Cisterna in January 1944. Five months later, the 2nd and 5th Battalions participated in the invasion of Europe known as Operation Overlord. Historians credit the latter for crystallizing the 75th Ranger Regiment’s motto, “Rangers lead the way,” when the 29th Infantry Division assistant commander, Brig. Gen. Norman Cota, enjoined the 5th Rangers to lead the way off Omaha Beach amid stiff German resistance.

Whereas the Army also sanctioned the 6th Ranger Battalion in the Pacific, the 5037th Composite Unit (Provisional) was formed by Lt. Gen. Joseph “Vinegar” Stillwell in January 1944 to disrupt Japan’s supply lines across the China-Burma-India theater. “Merrill’s Marauders,” named after unit commander Brig. Gen. Frank Merrill, was the only U.S. ground force in the theater. As such, Barbara Tuchman argues it “attracted a greater share of attention from the press and from history than a similarly sized unit merited anywhere else.” This includes a dramatized portrayal of its actions in a 1962 film, Merrill’s Marauders, which some historians contend whitewashed the unit’s mismanagement, culminating in the capture of Myitkyina Airfield in May 1944 at significant cost to the remaining and exhausted rangers.

As “the strategic jewel of northern Burma,” this airfield provided Japan a land-bridge between China and India. The Ranger battalions dissolved following Germany and Japan’s capitulation in 1945 but appeared again during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. To this point, ranger units were episodically formed and ephemeral. They lacked hierarchy, did not share uniform training standards, and their use was largely informed by anecdote.

Gen. Creighton Abrams reactivated the 1st and 2nd Ranger Battalions in 1974 during his tenure as chief of staff. He intended the battalions to rectify the Army’s readiness shortfalls following the Vietnam War by inculating heightened professionalism through performance-oriented training. The “Abrams Charter” envisaged these battalions “to be a role model for the Army” and compelled leaders trained in them to “return to the conventional Army to pass on their experience and expertise.” Gen. John Wickam Jr. and Gen. Gordon Sullivan, who respectively served as the thirtieth and thirty-second chiefs of staff, codified Abrams’s intent in their own charters. They further identified the 75th Ranger Regiment, its headquarters established in 1984 alongside the 3rd Ranger Battalion, as a key inflection point between conventional and special operations forces. The Ranger Regiment has since evolved to represent the U.S. military’s most responsive forcible entry option. It is postured to conduct platoon- to regiment-sized operations anywhere in the world within eighteen hours after notification. The regiment recently demonstrated its capability to seize enemy airfields, for example, in Afghanistan and Iraq. The addition of a military intelligence battalion constitutes the regiment’s latest structural adjustment and is designed to ensure lethality amid an arguable shift in the character of war. This consists of enhanced precision across multiple domains enabled by a proliferation of sensors.

Introducing the 75th Ranger Regiment Military Intelligence Battalion

From 1984 to 2007, the Ranger Regiment bifurcated its intelligence training and operations between battalion intelligence sections and a military intelligence detachment attached to the regimental headquarters. Offset training and deployment cycles stymied the regimental intelligence officer’s ability to synchronize multiple echelons of intelligence operations in support of the regimental commander’s priority intelligence requirements. Establishment of a special troops battalion in 2007 consolidated a preponderance of the regiment’s intelligence functions, personnel, and capabilities within a military intelligence company. Yet, activation of the battalion and company did not enhance managerial oversight of the regiment’s intelligence training and operations as intended. At times, they exacerbated...
tension between the regimental intelligence officer’s intent to standardize the recruitment and training of analysts and the battalions’ interest in autonomy. This organizational challenge, coupled with several additional considerations, encouraged the regimental commander, then Col. Marcus Evans, to recommend that the United States Army Special Operations Command provisionally activate the RMIB. 22

First, the RMIB enables the regiment to better understand and operate in the cyber domain. Second, by providing broader mission command of the intelligence warfighting function, the RMIB accords the regimental commander greater flexibility to rapidly adjust analytical focus against emerging threats while integrating insights from current operations. Finally, the RMIB facilitates more consistent coordination with the U.S. Army’s intelligence enterprise and its key institutions including the Intelligence Center of Excellence and the Intelligence and Security Command.

Pending approval from the Department of the Army, the RMIB will officially activate in 2019 under the leadership of a lieutenant colonel and a command sergeant major selected by a special mission unit board. The RMIB’s mission is to recruit, train, develop, and employ highly trained and specialized rangers to conduct full-spectrum intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, cyber, and electronic warfare operations to enhance the regimental commander’s situational awareness and inform his decision-making process. Key to the RMIB’s mission is inculcation of the Ranger Regiment’s standards-based culture codified in the Ranger Creed developed by the 1st Ranger Battalion in 1975. Adherence to this ethos, which emphasizes discipline, resilience, and learning, will enable the RMIB to balance technical and tactical competencies to engender trust and confidence across the ranger battalions, other special operations forces, and the Army’s intelligence corps. This means assignment of intelligence personnel to the RMIB is contingent on passing the Ranger Assessment and Selection Program, which consists of an evaluation board for officers and noncommissioned officers. 23 Pending this certification process, RMIB personnel will complete the same training as combat arms soldiers assigned to the ranger battalions including the Army’s Airborne and Ranger courses. When formally established, the RMIB will consist of three companies and maintain a

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Recognizing that I volunteered as a Ranger, fully knowing the hazards of my chosen profession, I will always endeavor to uphold the prestige, honor, and high esprit de corps of the Rangers.

Acknowledging the fact that a Ranger is a more elite soldier who arrives at the cutting edge of battle by land, sea, or air, I accept the fact that as a Ranger my country expects me to move further, faster, and fight harder than any other soldier.

Never shall I fail my comrades. I will always keep myself mentally alert, physically strong, and morally straight, and I will shoulder more than my share of the task, whatever it may be, one hundred percent and then some.

Gallantly will I show the world that I am a specially selected and well-trained soldier. My courtesy to superior officers, neatness of dress, and care of equipment shall set the example for others to follow.

Energetically will I meet the enemies of my country. I shall defeat them on the field of battle for I am better trained and will fight with all my might. Surrender is not a Ranger word. I will never leave a fallen comrade to fall into the hands of the enemy and under no circumstances will I ever embarrass my country.

Readily will I display the intestinal fortitude required to fight on to the Ranger objective and complete the mission though I be the lone survivor.

Rangers lead the way!
personnel end-strength equivalent to a conventional intelligence battalion assigned to one of the Army’s three active-duty expeditionary military intelligence brigades (see figure, page 12). Presently, the RMIB consists of a detachment and two companies.

The staff and command group are embedded within the Headquarters Detachment. It leads the regiment’s recruitment and management of intelligence officers and soldiers, synchronizes intelligence training and operations across the regiment and with other special operations and conventional forces, and also functions as the regiment’s intelligence section. This means the battalion commander also serves as the regimental intelligence officer, the battalion executive and operations officers serve as assistants, and all three deploy as the senior intelligence officers for a joint special operations task force. The military intelligence company, reapportioned from the special troops battalion, is the cornerstone of the RMIB. It possesses the most personnel and capabilities across the battalion including all-source analysts, geospatial analysts, human intelligence collectors, and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). This enables the company to conduct multidiscipline collection and all-source analysis, as well as provide an expeditionary imagery collection and processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) capability to enable the regiment’s training and operations.

The cyber-electromagnetic activities (CEMA) company integrates and synchronizes cyber, electronic warfare, signals intelligence, and technical surveillance in support of the regimental commander’s objectives. Personnel and capabilities resident to the CEMA company are normally disaggregated across multiple echelons and lack a coordinating agent. The CEMA company is therefore on the leading edge of fulfilling the Army’s intent to establish a CEMA capability within tactical formations. As reflected by operations against the Islamic State (IS) in the Middle East and South Asia, it also advances the Army’s ability to combine electronic warfare and signals intelligence in support of lethal targeting through unique
technologies and tactics. The CEMA company’s mission is enabled by consolidation of the regiment’s electronic warfare, signals intelligence, and technical surveillance personnel and capabilities; introduction of cyber personnel; and broader partnerships with the Intelligence and Security Command, Cyber Command, and other special operations forces.

The Ranger Approach to the Intelligence Cycle

While designed to enable special operations, the RMIB’s evolving approach to the intelligence cycle, consisting of collection, exploitation, and analysis steps, can help the Army overmatch near-peer competitors given the regiment’s expanded interoperability with conventional forces. The article now explores the RMIB’s innovative practices within each phase of the intelligence cycle.

Collection. The RMIB continues to innovate tactics, techniques, and procedures to accelerate the Army’s ability to find and fix enemy combatants. Training and operations against IS demonstrate several contributions to the Army’s readiness. The military intelligence company recently experimented with a small UAS, the Puma, to provide platoon and company commanders, who are often dislocated from headquarters in austere terrain, timely and reliable full-motion video. Although applicable to the spectrum of operations, the Puma is particularly salient to forcible entry operations conducted by the regiment and other global response forces including the 82nd Airborne Division and 173rd Airborne Brigade.

The military intelligence company tested its ability to integrate two operators to parachute the Puma with ranger assaulters during an airfield seizure training scenario. The operators deployed the Puma ten minutes after landing and provided the ground force commander near instantaneous situational awareness of the terrain and enemy. Of course, the Puma is merely one solution, and more compact aircraft exist. The Puma provides ground force commanders greater range and longevity, however, making it the most advantageous tactical collection capability at this time according to testing. To facilitate similar training and operations across the Army, the military intelligence company is working with the Maneuver Center of Excellence to draft the doctrine that underpins employment of small UASs. The company has also developed an expeditionary PED capability integral to the employment of UAS resident to its UAS platoon. This advancement is designed to overcome a problem that threatens to malign Army PED cells. It is challenging to impart common understanding between mission commanders, aircraft operators, and geospatial analysts. The military intelligence

![Figure. Simple Regimental Military Intelligence Battalion Task Organization](image)

**Figure. Simple Regimental Military Intelligence Battalion Task Organization**
company’s PED capability consists of two geospatial analysts equipped with a portable system encompassing geospatial and analytical tools. Collocating geospatial analysts with the mission commander at a deployed site ensures they are aware of all mission events that provide critical context often not available. A conventional military intelligence company can adopt this practice given it also possesses a UAS platoon, has access to geospatial analysts, and will field expeditionary analysis systems.

The CEMA company also unifies disparate collection disciplines designed to operate in the electromagnetic spectrum. It exercises this capability by integrating cyber, electronic warfare, signals intelligence, and technical surveillance collectors into a special reconnaissance team. The team is capable of infiltrating hostile territory to enable sensitive collection, exploitation, and targeted operations against the enemy’s computer and communications networks. The CEMA company recently enhanced the realism of a ranger battalion’s airfield seizure exercise by replicating network configurations and communications protocols employed by near-peer competitors. The CEMA company also integrated its special reconnaissance team into the exercise. The team applied unique capabilities provided by national agencies to collect against the enemy’s mission command systems and facilitated the ranger battalion’s airborne operation. This training approach offers a useful framework for the Army’s various combat training centers.

**Exploitation.** If intelligence drives the military decision-making process, then enrichment of data exploited from enemy material is decisive to the regiment’s high-value targeting methodology known as “F3EAD”—find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate intelligence. Experimentation with machine learning has enabled the RMIB to rapidly identify connections between seemingly disparate media.
devices, personalities, and their social networks. This advancement has reduced the time and labor required to wade through a meteoric rise in the volume of data confiscated during combat operations since 2001 and resulted in operations against “leverage points” central to insurgent and terrorist organizations including facilitators, financiers, and couriers. Insights gained from these operations have enabled action against more serious threats to America’s national security epitomized by the coalition airstrikes in northern Afghanistan in October 2016 that killed Faruq al-Qatani. As a senior al-Qaida official responsible for planning attacks against America, al-Qatani may have intended to disrupt the 2016 presidential election. To further enrich data, the RMIB has integrated the exploitation of publicly available information into its all-source training and analysis. Although nascent, this practice helped broaden the U.S. intelligence community’s understanding of the lethality of IS’s “Khorasan” branch defined by its ability to inspire, enable, and direct external attacks from Afghanistan. A 2016 attack on a German train by a seventeen-year-old Afghan asylum seeker resulting in five wounded passengers evidences this trend. The digital footprint of America’s near-peer competitors implies that the RMIB’s integration of machine learning and publicly available information into exploitation operations is equally relevant to interstate conflict. Milley’s identification of a readiness gap vis-à-vis the “Big Four” also means transference of the RMIB’s exploitation operations to conventional forces can enable more rapid understanding and disruption of the enemy’s decision-making cycle.

Arguably, it is the RMIB’s integration of liaisons within key U.S. government departments and agencies, often referred to as the interagency, which stands to contribute the most to the Army’s exploitation operations. The RMIB’s representatives, immaterial of branch affiliation and ranging in rank from non-commissioned officers to warrant officers to company grade officers, are placed in agencies including the National Media Exploitation Cell and underline the regiment’s network-based exploitation approach.

Proximity enables liaisons to build relationships that accord several dividends. First, liaisons gain access to data without which the regiment’s understanding of the enemy’s intent and capabilities would be disadvantaged. Liaisons also influence the interagency’s exploitation priorities against the regiment’s targeting lines of effort. In the best case, liaisons shepherd interagency coordination that, according to Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, “forges the vital link between the military and the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power.” The ability of the RMIB’s liaisons to articulate the impact of counterterrorism operations on the legitimacy of Afghanistan’s government and regional security order-building contributed to justification of the coalition’s continued assistance outlined in President Donald Trump’s South Asia policy address in late August 2017.

**Analysis.** The RMIB’s approach to talent management produces intelligence professionals that can confidently provide the regimental commander accurate and timely intelligence to turn his decisions into “yes” or “no” answers. It also enables ranger intelligence professionals to prudently justify or caution against lethal force. This competency derives from a disciplined approach to probabilistically assess the certainty of a target’s location, critically evaluate a target’s value to both enemy and friendly forces, project the risk to mission and force, and anticipate the impact to America’s international standing. The RMIB’s talent management program, which balances the regiment’s intelligence requirements against the interests of individual rangers, is based on two interrelated considerations. First, realistic training and operational deployments allow the battalion commander and sergeant major to certify ranger intelligence professionals have mastered basic operations and intelligence planning frameworks. At times, ranger intelligence officers not previously obligated to serve in the combat arms will attend the Maneuver Captain’s Career Course to gain a deeper appreciation for rigorously executing intelligence preparation of the battlefield lest a tactical scheme of maneuver fail to account for key considerations that result in casualties or mission failure. The course also emphasizes doctrinally sound language that maneuver commanders easily understand and imparts legitimacy. Second, unique and demanding training and assignments enable the RMIB to broaden the understanding and critical thinking skills of its personnel, especially its noncommissioned and warrant
officers. Opportunities include liaison positions for all-source analysts and warrant officers, advanced technical training for human intelligence collectors, and interoperability training for signals intelligence collectors with other special operations forces.

The RMIB also capitalizes on the talents of soldiers across the reserve component to enable broader situational awareness and rigorous analysis critical to closing the Army’s readiness gap. Similar to the Army’s Intelligence Readiness Operations Capability, conceived as “supporting a forward element or a member of the intelligence community from a sanctuary location,” the RMIB established the Ranger Intelligence Operations Center (RIOC). The RIOC pivots on live-environment training. This expands the scope and audience of training management to include soldiers with less common occupation specialties that support intelligence operations, including analysts, teams, and capabilities. As a pillar of the integrated training environment, live-environment training through the RIOC also enables the Ranger Regiment’s ongoing operations. By integrating intelligence analysts from the reserve component, the RIOC has the added benefit of facilitating the Army’s Total Force Policy. This is designed to organize, train, and equip the active-duty and reserve components as an integrated force.

The 335th Signal Command (Theater), responsible for providing cyber and signal units in support of the Third Army, Army Central Command, and homeland defense missions, recently invested ten U.S. Army Reserve analysts into the RIOC to meet annual training requirements while supporting the regiment’s operational intelligence requirements.

Capabilities Sets: The RMIB’s Contribution to Multi-Domain Battle

Although addressed discretely, the RMIB’s innovative approaches to collection, exploitation, and analysis are the constituent components of the intelligence cycle. They also undergird one promising way the RMIB can help enable the MDB concept: capabilities sets. The RMIB’s understanding of the composition, disposition, and intent of capabilities sets derives from multifunctional teams that participated in counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. These teams, consisting of multidiscipline collectors that gathered, exploited, and disseminated combat intelligence to tactical-level commanders, provided expertise to focus combat power as well as to sequence and synchronize lethal and nonlethal operations.

Capabilities sets, which couple collectors and analysts with requisite equipment, replicate the tailor able and distributable qualities of multifunctional teams. They provide for an expansion or decrement of capability based on shifts in the threat and the commander’s priority intelligence requirements and objectives. By decentralizing personnel and resources, capabilities sets also maximize mission command, defined by Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, Mission Command, as “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders.” In practice, capabilities sets are smaller-scaled forces, no greater than platoon size, that operate disassociated from headquarters for extended periods given broad guidance. In the case of a war against a near-peer competitor in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, for instance, commanders could establish various capabilities sets to conduct multidiscipline—cyber, human, imagery, and signals—intelligence collection, exploitation, and analysis to enable operations that outpace the enemy’s ability to react.

The RMIB’s capabilities sets provide two additional advantages essential to the MDB concept. First, they engender interoperability between conventional and special operations forces across all Army components. The RMIB’s integration of the 335th Signal Command (Theater) into the RIOC sets the conditions to deploy reserve-component analysts in support of unique operational requirements. Second, the RMIB’s capabilities sets enable joint and multinational interdependence. According to the former chief of naval operations, Adm. Jonathan Greenert, this “implies a stronger network of organizational ties, better pairing of capabilities at the system level, willingness to draw upon shared capabilities, and continuous information-sharing and coordination.” The RMIB’s incorporation of analysts from the 17th Special Tactics Squadron, which provides the regiment tactical air controllers, represents movement toward broader joint force interdependence. Meanwhile, the RMIB’s exercises...
with foreign militaries are important to set theaters of operations defined as having the necessary forces, bases, and agreements established to enable regional operations. Given broader interoperability within the Army, and more meaningful interdependence across the joint force and with allies and partners, capabilities sets promise to enhance a commander’s situational awareness, preserve freedom of maneuver, and confront the enemy with multiple dilemmas. As a result, they may serve as a useful starting point to formalize the “multi-domain task force” envisioned by Gen. Robert Brown, commander of the United States Army Pacific, and retired Gen. David Perkins, former commander of TRADOC.

The author is indebted to several reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article. These include Maj. Gen. Gary Johnston, Maj. Gen. Robert Walters, and Brig. Gen. Joseph Hartman; previous regimental and ranger battalion commanders including Col. Marcus Evans; former regimental intelligence officers including Col. Joshua Fulmer and Lt. Col. Bryan Hooper; and the Ranger Military Intelligence Battalion staff and company command teams, especially Sgt. Maj. Lee Garcia.

Notes

1. Capt. David Darling, email to the author, 5 November 2017. Gen. Mark Milley defined organizational readiness during a speech at the 2017 Captains Solarium symposium, attended by approximately one hundred captains, including Darling, drawn across all U.S. Army components; see also Rick Maze, “McCarthy Gets Tough on Army’s Priorities,” Army Magazine 67, no. 10 (October 2017); 11. Ryan D. McCarthy, former acting secretary of the Army, defines readiness as the ability to “put soldiers on a plane to immediately address a priority” and preparedness to “fight tomorrow.”
5. Paul Lushenko and Anthony Williams, “Defeating the Islamic State: Reconciling Precision and High Value Targeting,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis 8, no. 9 (September 2016): 10.
23. The Ranger Assessment and Selection Program, or RASP, consists of two parallel courses. RASP trains and assesses sergeants and below. RASP trains and assesses staff sergeants and above. Small Unit Ranger Tactics, or SURT, is a mandatory course for members of the Ranger Regiment preparing to attend the U.S. Army Ranger School.
25. Maj. Matthew Sheftic, conversation with the author, 12 December 2017. Sheftic serves as a brigade combat team intelligence officer and previously served as an observer coach/trainer at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California.


41. Vincent Brooks, “Rebalanced and Beyond,” Army Magazine 64, no. 10 (October 2014), 108.


Followership: Avoid Being a Toxic Subordinate
Command Sgt. Maj. Brian M. Disque

Through a great deal has been written about the destructive aspects of toxic leadership, relatively little has been written about the deleterious effects of toxic followership and how to counter them. Command Sgt. Maj. Disque’s practical observations help fill this gap.

Based on his invaluable insights born of many years of operational experience, he recommends specific and concrete remediating principles—along with the Army Values—be inculcated into all soldiers and leaders during training and then applied in the field.
Developing a Light Infantry-Robotic Company as a System

Maj. Zachary L. Morris, U.S. Army
Substantial changes are altering the future operating environment. Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) are likely in a developmental phase similar to combat aviation before World War I. Within a decade, aircraft experienced exponential growth in combat capability, increasing speed, power, firepower, maneuverability, and endurance. A simplified explanation of Moore’s law states “processor speeds, or overall processing power for computers, will double every two years.” Depending on the historical accuracy of Moore’s law, autonomous and robotic weapons could improve dramatically in the near future.

Gen. Mark A. Milley, chief of staff of the U.S. Army, described a potential future environment as highly lethal, requiring constant maneuver, dispersion, and speed; involving extremely capable forces in complex urban terrain; constraining U.S. frontline resupply capability; and degrading typical American advantages such as communications and networked technologies. To meet the challenges of such a future environment, the U.S. Army Robotic and Autonomous Systems Strategy identified five critical capability areas: increase situational awareness, lighten the soldiers’ physical and cognitive loads, sustain the force, facilitate movement and maneuver, and protect the force. The U.S. Army should conceptually visualize how units could maximize these critical capabilities as well as organize and fight by using LAWS in a complex future environment.

LAWS could substantially increase light infantry unit capabilities. This article argues that the U.S. Army should develop a light infantry-robotic company (LIRC) as a system—integrating controlled LAWS and human capabilities—in the near future. The first section explains how the U.S. military should incrementally increase LAWS authority and capability. The second section develops a LIRC organization, conceptually based on the Stryker infantry company configuration. The final section depicts a potential LIRC tactical enabling concept using a movement to contact scenario.

Phase I and Phase II of Autonomous Weapons Development

Ethical considerations, primarily target discrimination and responsibility concerns, and dubious American confidence in autonomous systems are the largest obstacles confronting autonomous weapons. Incrementally increasing autonomous weapons authority and capability—using iterative learning, experimentation, and fielding—is necessary to increase American confidence in these systems and to ensure the ethical application of autonomous weapons.

The U.S. military is currently in the first phase of autonomous weapons development. This phase maximizes discrimination and responsibility by limiting weapons to semiautonomy; capable only of targeting weapons, projectiles, or other autonomous systems. The current Department of Defense directive states “human-supervised autonomous weapon systems may be used to select and engage targets, with the exception of selecting humans as targets,” in defense of a static position or “onboard defense of manned platforms.” This policy limits autonomous weapons by engaging “materiel targets” only. It essentially approves already employed weapon systems, such as the AEGIS combat system on manned cruisers and destroyers, designed to defend against incoming high-speed projectiles and missiles. Thus, semiautonomous weapons remain completely within the control of military personnel and limit violations of discrimination. However, restricting autonomous targeting authority significantly constrains development and military utility for most maneuver units.

Phase two described below is the next ethical step that advances autonomous weapons and U.S. military capabilities while maximizing target discrimination and responsibility. Phase two begins by experimenting with controlled fully autonomous weapons; autonomous weapons can engage human targets in limited situations complying with discrimination and clear responsibility. For example, commanders would arm the autonomous weapon and control engagements based on target type, time period, geographic area, rules of engagement, and weapons control status—such as hold, tight, or free (see note for definitions).

In this phase, fully autonomous engagements should emphasize targets unmistakably identified as belonging to a hostile military. The primary way to

Previous page: U.S. Army Pacific soldiers from 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, move forward toward a simulated opposing force with a Multipurpose Unmanned Tactical Transport 22 July 2016 during the Pacific Manned-Unmanned Initiative at Marine Corps Training Area Bellows, Hawaii. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Christopher Hubenthal, U.S. Army)
achieve target clarity, based on current technology, means restricting autonomous systems to targeting military vehicles, such as armored vehicles and aircraft. For example, the Army could employ autonomous weapons for air defense, antiarmor, artillery, and other vehicle or target-specific (such as grid location) requirements because technology (such as radar, thermal and visual shape recognition, and other sensors) could enable autonomous weapons to likely identify and target enemy vehicles adequately to meet or surpass human discrimination requirements now.

On the other hand, autonomous weapons should remain heavily constrained from attacking individual humans due to current technological limitations on distinguishing types of human targets. However, by using a free-fire area within a geographic kill box or sector of fire, commanders could enable engaging human targets in a tightly constrained time and area in which only hostile military targets are known to be present. These limitations and constraints for phase two are probably achievable now, or in the near future, also ensuring discrimination and clear responsibility for autonomous weapons. Further, transitioning into phase two could radically improve combat power for maneuver formations, particularly a light infantry company.

Ethical considerations, primarily target discrimination and responsibility concerns, and dubious American confidence in autonomous systems are the largest obstacles confronting autonomous weapons.

The Future Organization for a Light Infantry-Robotic Company

The future LIRC team should conceptually mirror the Stryker infantry company organization (see figure 1, page 22). Soldiers marked “DVR” (or driver) in figure 1 are the primary operators, as needed, of the unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and unmanned aircraft systems (UASs).

The headquarters element is designed to operate in two or more dispersed locations providing survivable command, control, communications, and intelligence across the LIRC. Each command element could include the commander, first sergeant, or executive officer, one fire support team, and one or two members of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) team. Thus, each command section would contain two command UGVs, two ISR UASs, and one large quadcopter UAS. The medical evacuation team, capable of autonomously evacuating four litter and two ambula-

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generally mirror most infantry platoon headquarters, but it would include a four-man robotic section to manage the platoon’s two equipment carrying UGVs, ISR UAS, and autonomous attack UAS. Finally, the weapons squad would retain dismounted capability while adding two-armed combat UGVs (and in the future, as autonomy and capability increases, possibly four) capable of employing one machine gun, two antitank missiles, and two air defense missiles. This organization would retain the size and capability of current infantry platoons, while greatly reducing the soldier’s combat load, and increasing protection, situational awareness, and firepower.

The U.S. Army should not develop a LIRC larger than the organization described here until autonomy and artificial intelligence improves significantly for two reasons. First, a larger organization would likely exceed the command and control capabilities of many company grade officers and noncommissioned officers in a combat environment. The Stryker company is the largest current U.S. maneuver infantry company; exceeding the size of a Stryker organization would likely diminish tactical improvements due to the challenges of controlling a large organization in combat. Likewise, further increasing autonomous system numbers could reduce a unit’s command and control effectiveness. Second, a larger organization could significantly reduce strategic mobility and strain maintenance and logistics for a light unit. Strategic lift, maintenance, and logistics are vital concerns for the Army, and any future unit must work within these constraints somewhat. The LIRC described above would already increase mobility and logistical strains; further expansion would likely exacerbate these issues. Thus, any alterations from the organization explained above should probably reduce the size, not enlarge the LIRC.

Figure 1. Organization of a Light Infantry-Robotic Company Headquarters
While a smaller organization is better than a larger unit, a smaller LIRC would have several weaknesses. Smaller units would probably fail several Army autonomous objectives, such as increasing situational awareness, lightening soldiers’ physical loads, facilitating movement and maneuver, and protecting the force.\textsuperscript{19} The best way to reduce the LIRC size would likely include removing the rifle platoon’s armed combat UGVs and some of the ISR UASs. However, these size reductions are limited and could significantly reduce the company’s situational awareness, force protection, and firepower; other reductions could have more drastic impacts. Fewer UASs would diminish the LIRC’s situational awareness, intelligence gathering capabilities, and tactical and operational targeting ability. Removing the heavy weapons platoon would significantly reduce the LIRC’s firepower and force protection, and limit the potential for overmatch capabilities.\textsuperscript{20} Finally, decreasing equipment-carrying UGVs would inhibit movement and maneuver, and sustain current excessive individual soldier equipment loads. Thus, while smaller organizations are better than oversized formations, significantly smaller units could limit many potential tactical and operational improvements.

**Light Infantry-Robotic Company Movement to Contact Tactical Concept**

The following is a notional employment of the LIRC to illustrate a concept of employment. The situation begins when an enemy force seizes Columbus, a small city in allied Balttening, during a crisis. Enemy forces quickly reposition southward while consolidating around Columbus and attempting to use the crisis for political gain. The LIRC is part of a rapidly deployable infantry brigade, arriving at the Balttening-held Fryar Drop Zone (FDZ) within seventy-two hours of the enemy attack. The LIRC’s mission is to clear from the line of departure (LD) to the limit of advance (LOA), identified as phase line (PL) LD and PL LOA, respectively, in order to secure a foothold in Columbus and protect FDZ to enable arrival of follow-on units (see figure 3, page 24).\textsuperscript{21}

The expected enemy unit consists of two light infantry platoons; an armor platoon of four T-72B3M main battle tanks (MBTs); a mechanized infantry platoon, including three BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs); two self-propelled artillery vehicles; and one air defense vehicle.\textsuperscript{22} Also, civilians are present on the battlefield, especially in the vicinity of the expected enemy main line of defense in the southern outskirts of Columbus. Further, Balttening forces are currently unable to participate in the attack while they rebuild defensive positions.

After completing preparation and information updates, the company departs the assembly area (AA). The company uses the designated approach march route, fording the Chattahoochee River and passing checkpoint 1 (CP1) before reaching the release point (RP). (See figure 4, page 25, for a visual representation of the company’s organization.)
of the movement.) During the movement, units are dispersed to protect the force from enemy observation, air attacks, and indirect fire. The UGVs each carry equipment, food, water, fuel, and ammunition supplies for twenty-two soldiers. These equipment-carrying UGVs reduce the average soldier physical load from 120–150 pounds to approximately 50 pounds. All UGVs use a leader-follower function to maintain proper formation, speed, route, and position behind a designated human operator, leaving the infantryman to find the best route and maintain situational awareness.

Squads employ quadcopters around each platoon during the movement, providing 360-degree situational awareness. Autonomous ground attack weapons operate on a weapons hold status, requiring humans in the loop for any engagement. Air defense autonomous weapons operate in a weapons tight status, able to engage any enemy air platform independently within ten kilometers. From the AA to CP1, the company receives updates on the situation from higher headquarters as long as communications are available. At CP1, within fifteen kilometers of the area of operations, the company becomes self-sufficient for ISR and information gathering.

After passing CP1, the company begins gathering organic information and targeting data. The company saturates areas of interest using autonomous UASs, capable of flying independent recon routes and tracking multiple vehicles or groups of people. Platoon assets search the initial objective areas, from PL LD to PL Bravo (PL B), pinpointing enemy positions and movement. Company-level assets—the ISR, mortar, and fires section—scan for deep targets around the enemy main defensive line between PL B and PL LOA. Using small dismounted situational awareness video receivers, each element can observe any encrypted UAS video, greatly improving the company’s situational awareness. The ISR team uses one command UGV to manage all the ISR video links and pass critical information to higher, adjacent, and subordinate units. One critical task involves confirming zero civilians present in kill boxes 1 and 2 (see figure 4, page 25). Once

**Figure 3. The Situation**
confirmed, the company establishes both kill boxes and authorizes independent autonomous weapons engagement against human targets within both geographic areas. After completing the approximately twenty-five-kilometer approach march and arriving at the RP, platoons disperse to their assigned zones across PL LD.

Prior to crossing PL LD, the company initiates the disruption phase of the operation. Autonomous weapons transition from a weapons hold status to a weapons tight status, able to engage any enemy military vehicle within the company’s boundaries. Further, autonomous weapons may engage human targets within established kill boxes. However, autonomous weapons still require humans in the loop to engage other enemy personnel, ensuring proper target discrimination. The company fires multiple autonomous attack UASs with antitank and antipersonnel capabilities. The systems are fired from each of the three line platoons and mortar section. Attack UAS target either kill boxes 1 or 2, or areas already observed by ISR platforms during the approach march. Each weapon receives engagement priorities for enemy vehicles, such as air defense vehicles, indirect fire vehicles, MBTs, IFVs, and armored personnel carriers. These systems use thermal and shape recognition software to distinguish between enemy military and civilian vehicles. Using autonomous weapons prevents signal jamming and cyberattacks after launch because of the weapons independent nature.

Simultaneously, the mortar section engages enemy positions between PL A and PL B using precision-guided munitions and conventional warheads. After the initial strike, the company employs ISR platforms to confirm: one air defense vehicle, one artillery piece, and two IFVs destroyed; twelve enemy casualties in kill box 1; and two enemy dead in kill box 2. Approximately 50 percent of the autonomous systems fail due to enemy countermeasures, including active defenses, rapid movement, camouflage, and decoy vehicles. As the LIRC crosses PL LD, a second autonomous attack UAS strike destroys one MBT, the
last artillery piece, and inflicts five additional casualties in kill box 1. See figure 5 for a visual representation and updated enemy situation.

Upon crossing PL LD, the company conducts target handover, allowing squad quadcopters to track enemy positions between PL LD and PL B. In the eastern sector, the remaining enemy recon team withdraws. Further, the executive officer confirms no civilian presence in kill box 3 and establishes it (see figure 5). Autonomous attack UASs and 120 mm mortars begin destroying the enemy squad in kill box 3 while the company advances. In the western sector, the company makes contact using the smallest element possible—usually a single UGV—because of accurate situational awareness created by the ISR network over the area of operations. Four armed UGVs enter kill box 1 to destroy or suppress remaining enemy humans while one infantry platoon envelops the position. The commander disables kill boxes 1 and 2 before any friendly humans enter the area, restricting autonomous weapons engagement authority to enemy vehicles only.

Once restricted, the UGVs continue autonomously scanning sectors of fire using sensors to detect human or vehicle targets. As the UGVs lock onto sequential targets, human operators command the UGVs to either engage or move on to the next target within their sector of fire. Because of the UGVs stabilized autonomous weapons and programming, they are capable of incredible accuracy and lethality, similar to a common remotely operated weapon station (CROWS) system. Thus, by the time infantrymen attack through the enemy positions, most enemy soldiers are already casualties or suppressed and unable to respond to attacking humans.

As the company crosses PL B, it employs all systems to further degrade enemy leadership and combat power. The 120 mm mortar fire and autonomous attack UASs shape the battlefield by forcing the enemy to constantly reposition, further exposing them to attacks. Long-range engagements also open seams between positions and reveal exposed flanks for the company to isolate and attack. The autonomous UGVs move forward with local

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**Figure 5. Assault Line of Departure to Phase Line Bravo**
infantry support and engage the remaining three MBTs and the lone IFV using antitank missiles. Three UGVs are destroyed during this engagement; however, the IFV and one MBT are also destroyed (see figure 6). The two remaining MBTs withdraw north into Columbus. Infantrymen, using suppressing fire from UGVs and information from ISR systems, isolate and destroy enemy infantry units. As air defense threats and availability allow, the company employs close-air support and close-combat attack aircraft to engage additional enemy targets. Once the enemy retreats, the company continues using indirect fire and close-air support to pursue and disrupt enemy units. The company then consolidates, moves up supply UGVs, conducts casualty evacuation, and establishes a defensive line along PL LOA.

**Conclusion**

Historian Michael Howard observed, “No matter how clearly one thinks, it is impossible to anticipate precisely the character of future conflict. The key is not to be so far off the mark that it becomes impossible to adjust once that character is revealed.”

Attempting to visualize the future battlefield and environment is one of the Army’s sacred duties. The U.S. Army should create more concrete visualizations of the future battlefield and incorporate potential LAWS. The military, and especially light infantry community, must move with a sense of urgency in the autonomous weapons field because “adversaries are developing and employing a broad range of advanced autonomous technologies as well as employing new tactics to disrupt U.S. military strengths and exploit perceived weaknesses.” In the future, adversaries’ LAWS could significantly threaten American infantrymen, and U.S. systems could drastically improve the combat capability of infantry formations.

The Army should transition LAWS to phase two, thereby increasing authority and capability while maintaining ethical standards and developing U.S. confidence in

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**Figure 6. Final Assault Phase Line Bravo to Phase Line Limit of Advance**

Legend

- AA—Assembly area
- CP—Checkpoint
- PL A—Phase line alpha
- PL B—Phase line bravo
- PL LD—Phase line line of departure
- PL LOA—Phase line limit of advance
- RP—Release point
autonomous systems. A Stryker company provides a good organizational model for the future LIRC. This organization could achieve the U.S. Army Robotic and Autonomous Systems Strategy objectives and goals. Further, the LIRC could achieve many of the U.S. Army Operating Concept objectives, such as improving mobile protected precision firepower, lethality and effects, protection, and situationally understanding. In fact, the Army Operating Concept recognized that “autonomy enabled systems will deploy as force multipliers at all echelons from the squad to the brigade combat team.” The U.S. Army must not avoid the risk of lethal autonomous weapons and develop units that recognize and leverage these potential capabilities across all levels while taking prudent risks. Without developing these forces, the U.S. military may find itself at a significant disadvantage in the next conflict.

The views in this essay are the author’s own and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army or Department of Defense.

Notes

7. ARCIC, The U.S. Army Robotic and Autonomous Systems Strategy, 23. Autonomy is defined as “the level of independence that humans grant a system to execute a given task in a stated environment.” The independence of an autonomous system (or weapon) is a point on a spectrum that can be tailored to the specific mission, level of acceptable risk, and degree of human-machine teaming.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
12. Rules of engagement are directives issued by a military authority controlling the use and degree of force, especially specifying circumstances and limitations for engaging in combat. Weapons control statuses describe the relative degree of control over weapons engagements. Weapons fire: this is the least restrictive status and weapons can fire at any target not positively identified as friendly. Weapons tight: weapons may only engage targets positively identified as hostile, according to prevailing rules of engagement and hostile criteria. Weapons hold: this is the most restrictive weapon control status and weapons may not fire except in self-defense or in response to a formal order.
14. ARCIC, The U.S. Army Robotic and Autonomous Systems Strategy, 25. An unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) is an electromechanical unmanned ground platform. UGVs can be operated via remote control, teleoperation, or may be equipped with some degree of autonomous behavior.
15. Command UGVs would provide blue force tracking, radio communications, retransmission capability, tactical satellite communications, other command capabilities as needed, and local electronic warfare, jamming, and direction finding capabilities. Company autonomous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) should be similar in size and general capability to current Puma UAS. However, more advanced systems should include greater autonomy, such as independent flight, return, target tracking, area search programming, and other capabilities, which would allow one operator to control multiple systems and reduce electronic warfare threats. Information regarding Puma capabilities can be found online at “UAS: RQ-20B Puma AE,” AeroVironment, accessed 12 March 2018, https://www.avinc.com/uas/view/puma.
16. The 120 mm mortar UGV provides autonomous digital targeting, precision-guided munitions (PGMs) capability, and carries ammunition for the system. Dismounted 60 mm mortars could be carried as the mission and unit requires. Equipment-carrying UGVs provide communications capability, electric power, and transport twenty-two soldiers’ equipment, and food, water, ammunition, and fuel for three to five days of operations. Autonomous attack UAS would have similar capabilities to current Switchblade systems.
However, autonomous attack systems would require: longer battery life, antiarmor warheads, antipersonnel warheads, bunker-busting warheads, autonomous targeting programming, and fire and forget capability. Current Switchblade information can be found online at “Switchblade Tactical Missile System, United States of America,” Army Technology, accessed 12 March 2018, http://www.army-technology.com/projects/switchblade-tactical-missile-system/. Heavy-weapon UGVs include autonomous targeting capability based on phase-two requirements, and autonomous movement and control capabilities. Further, these systems are armed with heavy direct-fire weapons (potentially 20 mm or 30 mm cannon, and 240B coaxially mounted), antitank missiles (two Javelin-like weapons), and air-defense missiles (two stinger-like weapons). Kent Massey, “Squad Mission Equipment Transport (SMET): Lessons Learned for Industry” (annotated version of briefing, NDIA Ground Robotics Capability Conference, Springfield, VA, 2 March 2016), accessed 12 March 2018, https://india-stor-age.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/ndia/2016/GRCCE/Massey.pdf.


20. TP 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept, 11. Maintaining overmatch capability is a critical task in the concept.

21. For a detailed explanation of how to conduct a movement to contact, see FM 3-21-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, chap. 3. For an explanation of operational terms and graphics, see FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, September 2004).


24. ARCIC, The U.S. Army Robotic and Autonomous Systems Strategy, 24. Leader-Follower Function: an appliqué kit that provides a limited robotic-like capability to UGVs enabling them to follow a designated leader’s route, speed, and formation.


28. TP 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept, 31.

29. Ibid., iii.


31. TP 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept, 36–40.

32. Ibid., 39.

33. Ibid., v.
Reconnaissance beyond the Coordinated Fire Line

Division Warfighter Trends

Maj. Paul E. Roberts, U.S. Army
Charges of cavalry are equally serviceable in the beginning, the middle and the end of a battle [emphasis added].

—Napoleon Bonaparte

In the decisive action training environment (DATE) Warfighter, divisions and corps struggle to continuously plan and execute reconnaissance operations beyond the coordinated fire line (CFL). The lack of ground-based reconnaissance assets at the division level contributes to this problem. The Army is addressing this gap, but the concept currently being tested by the Reconnaissance and Security Brigade Combat Team (R&S BCT) is only part of the solution. Overall, divisions fail to maintain situational awareness of upcoming decision points and the priority intelligence requirements (PIR) associated with them. As a result, the reconnaissance portion of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan often becomes overlooked in favor of the deliberate, lethal targeting cycle. As operations progress, this deliberate targeting usually evolves predominantly into dynamic targeting beyond...
the CFL. This leads to an overall trend of fires and intelligence collection driving the maneuver plan rather than the two acting in support of it. However, placing maneuver back into the forefront of capturing operational objectives is achievable. Divisions must reempower the operations and intelligence synchronization meeting (OPSYNC) and introduce a reconnaissance cell into the main command post. This cell will represent either the R&S BCT or the division reconnaissance task force created from organic assets.

**Decision Points and Future Planning**

During the military decision-making process (MDMP) that occurs before operations commence, divisions identify decision points that are typically well planned and well articulated. However, as operations progress, divisions lose awareness of upcoming decision points. They fail to adjust the decision support matrix (DSM) as the operational environment changes. This is not to suggest divisions completely disregard the DSM. Key senior leaders, such as the G-2 (intelligence officer), G-3 (operations officer), and chief of staff (COS), remain aware of upcoming decision points and typically keep the commander well updated during scheduled battle-rhythm events, such as the division targeting working group. Despite this awareness among the leadership, divisions typically lose the critical oversight of upcoming decision points on the floor of the current operations integration center (COIC). The DSM and PIR are printed out and posted for reference, but as the mission progresses through phases, these documents fade into the background and become familiar standard wallpaper. As a result, the chief of operations (CHOPS)—the staff member responsible for managing the COIC and normally the first leader given the opportunity to analyze information reported from subordinate units—is at a significant disadvantage in regards to recognizing variance. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0, *The Operations Process*, describes the role of commanders and staff in analyzing the changing situation on the battlefield: During execution, commanders and staffs monitor the situation to identify changes in conditions. Then they ask if these changes affect the overall conduct of operations or their part of it and if the changes are significant. Finally, they identify if the changed conditions represent variances from the order—especially opportunities and risks. Staff members use running estimates to look for indicators of variances that affect their areas of expertise. The commander, COS (XO), and command post cell chiefs look for indicators of variances that affect the overall operation.1

The COS is expected to look for indicators of variance, but the CHOPS is the first point on the critical path toward the commander’s decision and must be trained to look for it as well. The best way to do this is for the CHOPS to become thoroughly familiar with the DSM. If given the opportunity to conduct MDMP with the rest of the staff—in particular, the war game and the combined arms rehearsal—the CHOPS becomes very familiar with the document and the decision points before operations. Even the best DSMs are difficult to decipher on the surface, and unless units integrate them into synchronization drills or morning and evening update briefs, they will not assist the staff in the way designed.

**Confirming, Updating, and Tracking Priority Intelligence Requirements**

Beyond the CFL, in accordance with the ISR plan, sensors are dedicated to answering PIR. The lack of awareness of these sensors on the COIC floor often leads to an overemphasis on dynamic targeting occurring in the joint air ground integration cell (JAGIC), most often at the expense of these specific reconnaissance missions. In addition to remaining familiar with the upcoming decision points on the DSM, the CHOPS must be kept apprised of the way in which PIR will be answered. If the division staff limits
information requirements to only critical information that will enable decisions, the actual number of PIR should be manageable and resourced. The targeting cycle and all the working groups contained within it (information collection working group, targeting working group, and targeting decision board) naturally occur out of sight and out of mind from the COIC floor. An exception would be those members of the staff who participate through chat rooms. The benefit of this method frees up the CHOPS and the JAGIC to prosecute lethal targets; the con of this process is the CHOPS remaining unaware of which sensors have been dedicated to answering particular PIR. This is not to suggest that the CHOPS is even necessary in the actual targeting cycle discussed above, and certainly the personnel within the JAGIC are responsible for knowing and recommending delivery systems, etc.

Regardless, the potential missed opportunities to seize the initiative demand that the CHOPS be aware of when specific reconnaissance missions aimed at confirming or denying PIR are being conducted.

Another factor compounding the overall problem is that divisions are primarily limited to unmanned aircraft system (UAS) reconnaissance beyond the CFL. This is not a new phenomenon and, as mentioned at the beginning of this article, the Army has been working to fill this gap with some form of ground-based reconnaissance at echelons above brigade. In an article from the April 2017 edition of *Armor* magazine titled “The Reconnaissance and Security Strike Group: A Multi-Domain Battle Enabler,” Nathan Jennings does an excellent job of describing the functions and potential missions these types of organizations will perform for the Army in the future. But until the Army puts

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**Figure 1. Decisive Action Training Exercise Environment and the Current Operations Integration Center Integration Cells**

(Figure adapted by author from Operations Group Delta Mission Command Training Program original figure. The figure illustrates a reconnaissance mission conducted beyond the CFL in the division deep area. Whether an unmanned sensor or an actual unit, reporting from the mission is relayed by either a reconnaissance cell or the IC manager to the CHOPS in the COIC. Using the DSM, the CHOPS determines if confirming or denying the PIR associated with the NAI shows variance with the existing plan. The CHOPS then recommends to the COS if an adjustment decision is necessary. If needed, the G-3 issues guidance to FUOPs to refine the plan.)
... unless divisions create a reconnaissance and surveillance task force out of their internal assets, they are severely restricted in terms of gathering intelligence requirements beyond the CFL [coordinated fire line].

This organization into practice, in DATE scenarios, divisions must rely on organic Gray Eagle UASs or occasionally special operation forces to confirm PIR beyond the CFL or the fire support coordination line.

It is tempting to ask, why does any of this matter? Are divisions able to answer PIR beyond the CFL using only their organic Gray Eagles; if so, why do we even concern ourselves with the CHOPS’s role in it? The answer has to do with the link between current operations and future operations, and shortening staff reaction time to seize the initiative.

Figure 1 (on page 33) illustrates the battlefield geometry of the DATE and the integration cells normally located within the COIC. As stated previously, unless divisions create a reconnaissance and surveillance task force out of their internal assets, they are severely restricted in terms of gathering intelligence requirements beyond the CFL. Moreover, even when divisions do create a reconnaissance task force, there is a deliberate and conscious balance that must take place. Combat power is taken away from the brigade combat teams in order to build a task force robust enough to survive beyond the CFL to accomplish reconnaissance objectives.

Some divisions believe they cannot afford to lose this combat power within their brigade combat teams. Active-duty and National Guard divisions in past Warfighter exercises have approached this problem in different ways, with different levels of success. For purposes of illustration, figure 1 depicts a reconnaissance mission beyond the CFL as a generic cavalry unit moving to a named area of interest to confirm or deny division PIR. Confirming or denying PIR gives the personnel within the COIC, specifically the CHOPS, the first opportunity to recognize potential change in the division’s operation. Figure 1 depicts how the DSM is the tool best suited to allow the CHOPS to recognize this variance. With the combined input from the intelligence collection manager and the rest of the staff, the CHOPS can make the quick determination if an execution or adjustment decision may be necessary. Of note, the process at this point remains within the COIC and should not take much time, provided the CHOPS remains well versed in the DSM. ADRP 5-0 describes execution decisions as the following:

Execution decisions implement a planned action under circumstances anticipated in the order. In their most basic form, execution decisions are decisions the commander foresees and identifies for execution during the operation. They apply resources at times or situations already established in the order.5

ADRP 5-0 goes on to describe adjustment decisions:

Adjustment decisions modify the operation to respond to unanticipated opportunities and threats. They often require implementing unanticipated operations and resynchronizing the warfighting functions. Commanders make these decisions, delegating implementing authority only after directing the major change themselves.4

Of note, if the division conducted a thorough war game, the unanticipated opportunities and threats as described above may have been previously identified as branch plans implementing change. However, before the commander directs this change, the information must be analyzed. The CHOPS is the first point on the critical path toward making these types of decisions. If the CHOPS determines that an adjustment decision may be necessary, he notifies the COS, who together with the G-3 organizes the staff to conduct the steps of the rapid decision-making process. Figure 1 then shows the G-3 providing the guidance to future operations to refine the plan in accordance with the changing situation. The goal of this entire process is to eliminate the current trend in DATE Warfighters of failing to recognize variance and making adjustment decisions only at certain points in the scheduled battle rhythm, such as the commander’s update brief or the targeting decision board. Empowering the CHOPS to recognize variance, to determine if the situation has changed based on...
reporting from reconnaissance missions beyond the CFL, enables the division to flatten the network, quickly seize initiative, and exploit opportunities.

**Forcing Functions: The Empowered Operations and Intelligence Synchronization Meeting and the Division Recon Cell**

One key figure, the commander, is omitted from the process as described above. This is certainly not meant to minimize the role of the commander; he or she plays the dominant role in the rapid decision-making process. But the commander does not and should not monitor the situation from the COIC floor at all times. This responsibility falls squarely on the staff and personnel within the COIC. Therefore, the key to ensuring information collection is holistic and nested with the targeting cycle in support of maneuver is two-fold: divisions should insert a forcing function into the battle rhythm and introduce a reconnaissance cell into the main command post.

The forcing function can take many forms. Essentially, it is whatever synchronization meeting or drill the COIC uses to allow the staff sections to provide their running estimates and together gain better understanding of the friendly and enemy situation. Most divisions use the OPSYNC to do this. Field Manual 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, states, “The operations synchronization meeting is the most important event in the battle rhythm in support of the current operation.” Despite the general use of the OPSYNC, divisions seldom use this scheduled battle rhythm event to review the DSM and any upcoming decision points. The culprit here is time; COIC personnel typically refine the way they conduct OPSYNC over the course of the Warfighter, narrowing down what information is necessary versus what is redundant. Compounding the problem, the DSM is a busy document and not well suited for gaining understanding at a glance, especially when it is seldom utilized. As a result, COIC personnel seldom include it in the OPSYNC or any other meeting or drill to resynchronize operations. This reoccurring problem has been observed and reported on in the last three years of the Mission Command Training Program’s (MCTP) key observations documents. In 2014, MCTP reported, “Units are not directly linking the CCIRs to decisions that the commander needs to make.”

Digging deeper, in 2016, MCTP reported, Some staffs struggle to identify if a decision is pending or to update commanders with conditions prior to asking them to make a decision. Common causes include tracking too many CCIR [commander’s critical information requirements] at one time, failing to focus CCIR on upcoming decisions or confusing other information requirements (such as essential elements of friendly information [EEFI] or “wake-up criteria”) with CCIR thereby preventing the current operations cell from sharing critical information with commanders in advance of a decision. Finally, CCIR are rarely answered definitively; assessment methods are neither developed nor refined following COA development. Since staffs fail to provide complete assessments, commanders must rely on their own intuitive processes to determine conditions related to anticipated decisions.

The good news is this problem can be fixed rather simply. Units must force themselves to discuss the DSM at some point in their synchronization drill, preferably at the beginning of the meeting and again at the end. An example of this drill’s agenda follows: The CHOPS begins the brief with a quick overview of the upcoming decision points in the current phase, noting the indicators associated with the related PIR. The staff then proceeds with their reports and updated estimates. At the end of the brief, the CHOPS takes the time to once more go over the decision points in the current phase; this time every staff member is better informed to determine how and why the situation may have changed. Finally, the CHOPS concludes the brief by asking the future operations representatives in attendance if anything discussed during the brief changes what they are currently working on in their integration cell.

**More Than a Liaison: The Reconnaissance Cell in the Division Current Operations Integration Center**

To provide additional focus on answering PIR and to assist the CHOPS in the process described above, the division should create a reconnaissance cell in the
COIC. The OPSYNC process as described is relatively simple, yet it can be difficult to implement initially. This is because analysis takes time, and the objective of a synchronization drill is meant to gain understanding quickly. However, with repetition, both the CHOPS and the staff will become better at quickly determining what information is important and which pieces are irrelevant. This is definitely a step in the right direction; however, more often than not in DATE Warfighter exercises, the CHOPS is swamped with dynamic targeting in support of the lethal fight occurring in the JAGIC and simply cannot afford to dedicate enough time and focus on decision points outside the actual OPSYNC. The addition of a reconnaissance cell in the COIC will assist the CHOPS with this problem. The reconnaissance cell will ensure that PIR are continually managed and answered. Working with the information collection manager and the CHOPS, the reconnaissance cell ensures division reconnaissance (intelligence) drives fires and maneuver (see figure 2).

Figure 3 (on page 37) depicts a brigade reconnaissance cell as shown in Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 17-12, Reconnaissance and Security Commander’s Handbook; it is useful for determining which functions a division-level cell should emulate. If the division has been task organized with
the proposed R&S BCT for a particular phase or phases of the operation, then the reconnaissance cell should closely mirror figure 3 regarding size and functions. If the division creates an internal reconnaissance-and-security task force from organic assets, then the reconnaissance cell within the COIC will be correspondingly smaller. The cell must have enough personnel to allow for twenty-four-hour operations and to represent the cell in targeting and information-collection working groups. Regardless of the size and manning involved, the purpose of the reconnaissance cell remains the same: to represent the reconnaissance units on the battlefield and to ensure reconnaissance continues to support the maneuver plan.

The officer in charge of the cell should be the chief of reconnaissance. His presence removes some of the burdens of managing PIR from the CHOPS, though it’s critical the two must work closely together. The chief of reconnaissance becomes a critical bridge between current and future operations by providing focus and attention on the reconnaissance missions currently in execution as well as those planned to allow future operations to continue with their planning efforts. The reconnaissance chief’s presence in the COIC and the OPSYNC helps to prevent the familiar DATE Warfighter trend of ignoring PIR in favor of only dynamic targeting. His or her presence also provides emphasis on the ground- or aerial-based reconnaissance missions capable and suitable for answering PIR beyond the CFL. This frees up the division’s limited and crucial Gray Eagles for lethal targeting and confirming/denying PIR deeper in the area of operations.

**Final Thoughts: Reconnaissance, Decisions, and Maintaining the Initiative**

In the current DATE Warfighter scenario, divisions are squandering opportunities to seize the initiative from their near-peer enemies. By failing to closely manage PIR and the associated DSM within the COIC, the ability to determine if the situation has changed from previously approved plans diminishes significantly. As a result, commanders are seldom
asked to make decisions outside their scheduled battle rhythm events. ADRP 3-0, Operations, states,
Timely decisions and actions are essential for effective command. Commanders who consistently decide and act more quickly than the enemy have a significant advantage. By the time the slower commander decides and acts, the faster one has already changed the situation, rendering the slower one’s actions inappropriate. With such an advantage, the commander can maintain the initiative and dictate the tempo.9

Charging the division CHOPS within the COIC with closely managing PIR and the DSM is a crucial part of providing commanders this opportunity to seize initiative. In order for the CHOPS to perform this task correctly, the COIC must reempower the OPSYNC as a synchronization drill that includes a DSM review. The division must also introduce a reconnaissance cell within the COIC. This cell not only acts as a liaison to the ground and air reconnaissance units within the task organization, but also ensures that reconnaissance missions are considered within the information collection and targeting cycles and are monitored on the COIC floor for answering PIR. This emphasis on reconnaissance within the COIC will mitigate the DATE Warfighter trend of ignoring missions tasked with answering PIR in favor of only the dynamic, lethal targeting occurring in the division’s busy JAGIC. Regardless of the mission set, the Army’s need for reconnaissance remains paramount, and with a few steps, we can ensure reconnaissance does indeed drive fires and maneuver.

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Notes


3. ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process, 4-32.
4. Ibid., 4-33.
The Suwalki Gap
A Proving Ground for Cluster Munitions
Capt. Gregory Fetterman, U.S. Army

Over fourteen years have passed since the United States last used cluster munitions in combat. Revered by artillerymen and despised by humanitarian groups, these combat multipliers are once again relevant due to a recent Department of Defense (DOD) policy change and the reemergence of an adversarial Russia. The need for cluster munitions is growing as Russia poses a credible threat of a high-intensity conflict in the Polish/Lithuanian borderland called the Suwalki Gap (see figure, page 42). However, the dangers and...
concerns of cluster munitions remain present. Before cluster munitions are deployed in this new “Fulda Gap,” there are several considerations to account for to ensure the Suwalki Gap does not become synonymous with the civilian tragedies that can occur from use of such munitions.2

Cluster Munitions Background

Cluster munitions are composed of a nonreusable canister or delivery body containing multiple conventional submunitions, or “bomblets.”3 They are delivered from aircraft, rockets, missiles, or artillery and come in anti-personnel, antiarmor, and antimateriel packages.4 These packages provide area effects on targets, with devastating results. The shaped-charge bomblets on antiarmor packages are especially effective on moving armor columns—much more so than conventional shrapnel produced by unitary munitions.5 Considered an “economy of force” weapon, cluster munitions create logistical advantages by requiring fewer weapons platforms (aircraft, artillery tubes, etc.) and munitions to achieve the same effects as unitary munitions.6 This allows a smaller force to engage and degrade a larger enemy force.7 As a testament to their efficacy, the short (four-day) duration of the first Gulf War of 1991 is, by some accounts, attributed to the effectiveness of cluster munitions.8

Legal and Humanitarian Concerns of Cluster Munitions

Yet, for all the military advantage they provide, cluster munitions’ potential violations of the principles of distinction and proportionality remain a concern both
They are designed to scatter their bomblets over a wide area in order to produce effects on targets such as troop and armor formations as well as airfields. This indiscriminate pattern presents a risk the munitions will fall on nearby civilian populations and produce collateral casualties. However, the risk is mitigated by the collective efforts of accurate targeting intelligence, the expertise of an experienced fires advisor that understands dispersal patterns and area effects of cluster munitions, and the sound advice fed to a commander by an operational law attorney. While this only mitigates the risk of collateral casualties, use of military force “need not be a perfect laser beam of lethality that will with 100 percent certainty destroy only the military objective, causing no collateral damage. If that were the case, there would be no need for commanders and soldiers to engage in the delicate and difficult balancing test that is the proportionality principle.” To be sure, the legality of these munitions has been reviewed extensively over the years and been found to be, per se, not in violation of the law of war.

The rate of unexploded ordnance (UXO) left in the wake of an artillery barrage also presents concerns. These rates vary between munitions, from 2 percent to 30 percent of submunitions—a significant number when accounting for tens of thousands of cluster munitions used during an armed conflict. This UXO poses a danger to civilians and is blamed for thousands of civilian deaths—even years after the fighting ends. Their often bright colors, designed for easy identification if they fail to explode, pose particular danger to children who are attracted to the colors and mistake the bomblets for innocent objects or toys. Though these munitions are not designed to target civilians, the concern is nonetheless real.

These dangers played out in recent history, both affecting movement on the battlefield and causing civilian casualties. Though devastatingly effective, UXO from Operation Desert Storm led to the deaths of twenty-five military personnel from the United States and delayed the Marines’ capture of the Kuwait City Airport. In 1999, NATO forces used 1,392 cluster bombs during the Kosovo conflict. The barrages left approximately thirty thousand UXO bomblets on the battlefield that failed to explode due to the soft ground and rainy conditions. Perhaps the most consequential use of cluster bombs came in 2006, when Israel dropped an estimated one million bomblets into Lebanon. Ninety percent were dropped in residential areas in the final seventy-two hours of the conflict, when a resolution to the conflict seemed imminent.

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“undertake never under any circumstances to (a) Use cluster munitions; (b) Develop, produce, or otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, cluster munitions; (3) Assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this convention.”22 To date, 119 states have joined the convention—including most NATO countries and, in particular, Lithuania. Notably absent, however, are the United States, Poland, Russia, and Belarus.

United States’ Response to Cluster Munitions

Though not a signatory to the CCM, the United States imposed policies to move toward the CCM. In 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates mandated the following: cluster munitions that exceed operational planning requirements be eliminated; after 2018, the military would only employ cluster munitions that do not exceed a 1 percent UXO rate; the military would maintain information relevant to facilitating the removal or destruction of cluster munitions.23 Though this policy memo affirmed the value of cluster munitions, it also clearly set the United States on a path toward CCM compliance.

This policy was updated in October 2017—perhaps in response to a lack of readily available and adequate replacements for current cluster munitions. The new policy, signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Patrick M. Shanahan, extends the use of the DOD’s current inventory (with combatant commander approval) until sufficient quantities of munitions are acquired that meet certain standards.24 Combatant commanders may also accept transfer of cluster munitions that do not meet these standards to meet immediate warfighting demand. Procurement of cluster munitions is still limited, but the policy expands the criteria to include cluster munitions designed with certain safety requirements (internal power source for arming and detonating that renders the bomblet inoperable after fifteen minutes or less; electronic self-destruct mechanism; bomblet cannot be armed or detonated by incidental handling, contact, or movement when it does not arm after deploying from the canister). While this policy does not necessarily bring the United States into compliance with the CCM, it goes a long way toward minimizing the dangers of UXO and creating more manageable cluster munition development standards. Still, it leaves the United States with nothing more than its current inventory.

Suwalki Gap: An Impetus to Use Cluster Munitions?

In the meantime, a resurgent threat appears on the horizon. In 2008, Russia invaded the nation of Georgia, intervening on the side of pro-Russian rebels in the breakaway provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.25 They again invaded a sovereign nation in 2014, when Russian forces annexed the Ukrainian province of Crimea and, later, parts of eastern Ukraine.26 Each of these actions were preceded by Russian military movements under the guise of an exercise. Gen. Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in July 2015 that “Russia presents the greatest...
threat to our national security.” He went on to describe Russia as an existential threat to the United States, and justified this statement by noting Russia’s nuclear arsenal, its destabilizing role in Ukraine, the threat it poses to NATO nations on its borders, and its behavior.

The question then remains, “Where will they strike next?” While the possibilities are limitless, the Suwalki Gap is a likely target.

Similar to the Fulda Gap before it, the Suwalki Gap is both strategically located and militarily vulnerable. It lies in the northeast corner of Poland in a marshy, lightly populated lowland that straddles the sixty-mile border of Poland and Lithuania. The narrow pass of land separates Kaliningrad, Russia’s only Baltic port that does not freeze in the winter, from Russia’s ally, Belarus. The region also contains the main rail link between Kaliningrad and Russia, which runs just north of the gap and relies on a tenuous short-term agreement with an apprehensive Lithuania. Russia’s ability to bridge this gap would allow an unimpeded all-season direct land route from the Baltic Sea to Moscow, significantly improving Russia’s ability to control the Baltic region and gain a logistical advantage over NATO countries. It would also cut off Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia from the rest of their NATO allies, preventing these countries from receiving reinforcements should a Russian attack occur. This area keeps Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, until recently the commander of U.S. Army Europe, awake at night.

Russia’s military advantage in the region also makes the Suwalki Gap an appealing target. The Kremlin is spending approximately $313 billion on defense upgrades to its military, including two new divisions in its western region. In 2015, Russia began increasing its military presence in Kaliningrad, making it one of Europe’s most militarized places. Before Zapad 17, a large-scale Russian military exercise that involved, by NATO estimates, upward of 100,000 Russian and Belarusian service members throughout Western Russia, Belarus, and Kaliningrad, the International Centre for Defence Studies estimated Russia had 57,500 troops in its Western Military District and another 11,000 stationed in Kaliningrad. It also has artillery forces that can match U.S. artillery in firepower, a formidable layered air defense force, and two air bases (Chernyakhovsk and Donskoye) located in Kaliningrad that house S-400 and S-300 air defense systems, a variety of fighters, strike aircraft, and more than 10,000 troops. These forces create significant risks for U.S. aircraft and would turn the region into a de facto no-fly zone.

Contrast Russian forces with those of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, whose combined size equals about 28,000 lightly armed troops with little air or sea fighting capability and little armor. Though NATO has troops stationed in these Baltic States, a study by the RAND Corporation found a comparison of NATO forces to Russian forces to dramatically favor Russia. Factors such as overwhelming tactical and operational fires superiority, numerical armor superiority, a lack of adequate NATO firepower, and Russia’s close proximity and ease of access into the Baltic countries indicate that current NATO forces are insufficient to defend against a hypothetical Russian attack.

As indicated by the new DOD policy on cluster munitions, there are currently no adequate surface-based cluster munition alternatives that meet the CCM standards. Surface-based munitions are critical due to Russia’s air defense strength in the region, making air-delivered munitions dangerous and impractical. Lockheed Martin is developing an alternative warhead for its Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System, which explodes thirty feet above a target and provides an area effect with 182,000 inert preformed tungsten fragments. While these munitions meet the standard of both the DOD cluster munitions policy and the CCM, there is no indication they adequately bridge the capability gap that cluster munitions (specifically, dual-purpose improved conventional munitions) provide.

The Suwalki Gap dilemma presents a compelling case for the use of cluster munitions. Russia, a peer nation, stands at the steps of a friendly country with
superior numbers of troops and armor—and with greater access and mobility to the battlefield than other NATO forces. U.S. forces would be forced to maximize their limited capabilities defending the Suwalki Gap until fellow nations could mobilize and reinforce their efforts in what would likely become a tough artillery fight.\textsuperscript{40} Cluster munitions would do precisely that: maximize a force’s limited firepower by saturating an area with armor-piercing munitions produced from a limited number of artillery platforms. These munitions would reduce the amount of submunitions required to have the same effects against a Russian invasion—an important factor when facing numerically superior forces. They would also allow the United States to fight on the same terms as Russia, who is not a signatory to the CCM and has shown its willingness in recent conflicts (Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria) to use cluster munitions.\textsuperscript{41}

**Cluster Munitions from the Lithuanian Perspective**

A consideration in this decision lies in Lithuania, a party to the CCM. In contrast to Poland, who has not signed the CCM and maintains cluster munitions in its inventory, Lithuania may have stronger feelings about firing cluster munitions within its borders and potentially littering the countryside with cluster munition UXO, presenting dangers to its civilian population.\textsuperscript{42} This same concern has been shared by other NATO CCM signatories, some of whom have previously threatened to withdraw forces from conflicts were the United States to deploy cluster munitions.\textsuperscript{43}

However, the CCM was signed in 2008—before Russia became a true threat to Lithuania or NATO as a whole. This was seventeen years after NATO last faced the prospects of a peer adversary and sixty-three years since Europe last engaged in a high-intensity conflict. Until now, these conflicts were considered a thing of the past, making cluster munitions anachronistic for modern warfare. Would Lithuania and NATO allies feel the same about cluster munitions now that an existential threat that itself uses cluster munitions lies on their borders?
A CCM signatory may have legal concerns about authorizing another nation to use cluster munitions within its own borders. The CCM not only prohibits signatories from using cluster munitions but also from assisting, encouraging, or inducing anyone to use cluster munitions.44 There is also a duty to promote the Convention to other nonparty nations.45

However, the CCM contemplated such dilemmas. It contains a provision that allows signatories to “engage in military cooperation and operations with states not party to this convention” that use cluster munitions so long as the signatory nation does not “expressly request the use of cluster munitions in cases where the choice of munitions used is within its exclusive control.”46 In other words, Lithuania may allow the United States to use cluster munitions within its borders—as long as Lithuania does not request cluster munitions when other munitions are available.47 While individual nations have their own laws implementing their own additional measures, Lithuania currently has no additional restrictions apart from the CCM. Though the United States should respect the wishes of a sovereign state and ally when operating within its borders, it should be prepared in the event Lithuania permits cluster munition use within its borders under the above circumstances.

**Steps to Successfully Deploy Cluster Munitions**

The first step to ensure the United States is prepared to deploy cluster munitions in a potential conflict against Russia is to ensure a sufficient stockpile of such munitions. Since 2008, in accordance with the previous DOD policy, cluster munitions that exceeded planning requirements were removed from the active inventory and demilitarized. Given that the United States has not used large quantities of cluster munitions in combat since 2003, it stands to reason that the planning requirements were exceptionally low.48 Additionally, due to low demand, there are currently no cluster munitions producers in the United States.49 Are there sufficient cluster munitions stockpiles for a likely artillery-heavy battle with a near peer? What is the UXO rate of our current aging inventory? The DOD should evaluate this requirement and determine whether current inventories are sufficient and do not result in unacceptable UXO rates. If current inventories are unsatisfactory and replacements that meet the new DOD policy standard are unavailable, the DOD should be prepared to procure off-the-shelf technology to fill the void until new technology is available.

The DOD should also be leery that its forces have not practiced regularly with cluster munitions for almost fifteen years. Do we still have the expertise to safely deploy these munitions in combat? Though the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System allows artillerymen to observe likely bomblet distribution patterns, how will weather conditions affect this distribution? Technology can only compensate so much for real-world experience and application. Today’s artillery should train on cluster munitions and observe their distribution patterns and effects in all conditions, thus reducing the likelihood of bomblets discharging onto civilian populations.

The same goes for deployment on all-terrain types. The Baltic States are covered with a thick mud during the autumn and spring months. This weather and terrain condition, called rasputitsa, is caused by the poor drainage of underlying clay soil in the region.50 It can consume vehicles and is often credited with stopping both Napoleon and the Wehrmacht during their respective invasions.51 From an artillery standpoint, this softer ground would increase the UXO rate of cluster munitions. Identifying the likely UXO rate in such terrain would assist commanders in determining whether the risk of UXO and, as such, collateral casualties, is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage gained from the use of cluster munitions. To identify this UXO rate, U.S. forces should conduct live fires with their Polish allies in Poland during rasputitsa conditions to identify the effects such terrain has on both the UXO rate and ordnance-clearing abilities.

**Conclusion**

Cluster munitions beget many concerns and inflame passions on both sides of the debate. They may result in collateral casualties from both their bomblet distribution pattern as well as the UXO left on the battlefield long after the last shell is fired. However, the utility of these weapons is undeniable, and when faced with a peer threat capable of conducting a high-intensity conflict, it would be foolish to send our troops into battle without the means to successfully prosecute the fight. Russia and
the Suwalki Gap present this growing threat. Like all weapons, their use may result in tragedy if used irresponsibly. However, tragedy can be minimized through the use of legal and intelligence assets before deploying, responsible explosive ordnance disposal practices after their use, and continued research and development in the interim. These safeguards work best through training and, as such, the military should ensure it is ready and competent to fight in future battlefields such as the Suwalki Gap by evaluating its current inventory and reincorporating cluster munitions into its training program.

Notes


2. Agnia Grigas, “Putin’s Next Land Grab: The Suwalki Gap,” Newsweek (website), 14 February 2016, accessed 23 February 2018, http://www.newsweek.com/putin-russia-suwalki-gap-426155. The Fulda Gap is a reference to the pass near the border of the former East Germany and West Germany that was regarded as the most likely area where the Soviet Union would invade the West.


7. Ibid.


9. LOW Manual, paras. 2.4 and 2.5. Proportionality is the principle that even where one is justified in acting, one must not act in a way that is unreasonable or excessive. Distinction, or discrimination, requires belligerents to distinguish between the armed forces and the civilian population, and between unprotected and protected objects.


11. LOW Manual, para. 2.4.1.2. While enemy engagement in armed conflict always presents the risk of collateral casualties, the standard commanders must follow is found in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, art. 51(5)(b), 1977: “An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” violates the rule of proportionality. While the United States has not ratified Additional Protocol I, it follows this same principle in practice.


19. Ibid., 8.


21. Ibid.


28. Grigas, “Putin’s Next Land Grab.” While the Fulda Gap was heavily militarized during the Cold War, both “gaps” are strategically located relative to their time period.


34. Ibid.


37. Ibid. Though the study considers access through other means than the Suwalki Gap (e.g., Latvia and Estonia), the message is the same: NATO forces are outmatched by Russian forces.

38. John Hudson, “Last Remaining US Maker of Cluster Bombs Stops Production,” Stars and Stripes (website), 1 September 2016, accessed 27 February 2018, https://www.stripes.com/news/us/last-remaining-us-maker-of-cluster-bombs-stops-production-1.426738. While the BLU 105 sensor-fuzed air-dropped bomb arguably complies with the CCM (0 percent unexploded ordinance rate, GPS guided, target sensors, and self-destruct mechanism), critics argue this cluster munition, in practice, failed to live up to the safety standards required by the CCM. These arguments, due, in part to Saudi Arabia’s use of the BLU 105 in Yemen and the alleged resulting collateral casualties, led to a significant decrease in demand for these munitions. As a result, Textron, producer of the BLU 105, no longer produces these munitions. There are currently no U.S. producers of cluster munitions.


44. CCM, art. 1(1)(c).

45. Ibid., art. 21(1).

46. Ibid., art. 21(3) and (4).


51. Ibid.
A Central Asian Perspective on Russian Soft Power
The View from Tashkent

Robert F. Baumann, PhD
During the past year, recurring headlines have raised American consciousness about the capability of foreign powers to conduct digital strikes against databases and websites, orchestrate large-scale trolling operations, and generally pollute the domestic dialog concerning crucial questions of national policy. Though not alone, Russia has become the country most associated with internet behavior ranging from merely mischievous to hostile. That observation provides context but is not the focus of this article. What is equally interesting from a strategic point of view, but much less apparent, is Russia’s ability to influence others by means of “soft power,” a phrase coined by Professor Joseph Nye.¹ The spheres in which soft power operates include economic activity, diplomacy, and the dissemination of information or disinformation, as well as the subtle influence of garden-variety entertainment, popular culture, and news channels.

American soft power brands, movie stars, and fashions have reached almost every corner of the world. Yet, in many places, American cultural influence is not uncontested. This analysis concentrates on Russian cultural influences transmitted through various media and institutions. While looking at some general patterns, it will spotlight Uzbekistan, where this author has spent much of the last two years acting as an academic adviser to the Armed Forces Academy (AFA) in Tashkent.

For the most part soft power falls within the range of normal interaction among states and is not overtly aggressive or even hostile in its intent. Americans in particular do not notice because Russian or other foreign films, television programs, books, and music have made very few inroads into our fairly parochial popular culture. In contrast, the manifestations of America’s global impact are so numerous and pervasive that they drown out all other influences within our borders. This is not the case closer to Russia’s geographical frontiers, particularly in those other fourteen now independent states that were once part of the Soviet Union. Even in the Baltic States and Ukraine, with whom relations range from chilly to hostile, Russia still exerts appreciable soft power influence. Across other former Soviet republics, the extent varies depending upon historical associations, the politics of the moment, and the intensity of local nationalism, demographics, and other factors.

Russian influence in Central Asia, particularly in Uzbekistan, arguably manifests itself in several ways. First, every former Soviet republic inherited a sizeable institutional legacy. Modes of political thinking, bureaucratic processes, a sense of place in the world, and shared historical experience to some degree incline leaders at a minimum to take into account Russian interests or viewpoints. Second, Russia’s continuing outreach via various media shapes perceptions in many instances. If Uzbeks, for example, have been culturally conditioned to view Russia as a “normal” country, this affects both their gut feelings about Russian behavior and their expectations toward their own society. Thus, if Russian media sources unquestioningly support official positions of their own government, such an approach seems more reasonable and acceptable in an Uzbek context as well. Third, Russia’s point of view concerning the rest of the world will often serve as a point of departure for making sense of international events, including wars and political conflict. If nothing else, this makes it easier for regional political leaders to align themselves with Russian foreign policy.

Before launching into an analysis of Russian soft power, a few observations are in order concerning the audiences in the former Soviet Union, and Central Asia in particular. In the March-April 2018 edition of Military Review, Öncel Sencerman wrote of the Russian diaspora across the territory of the former Soviet Union.² During the final decades of the Russian Empire as well as the era of Soviet power from 1922 to 1992, ethnic Russia or Russian-speaking citizens from European Russia were encouraged to settle in the non-Russian borderlands to promote economic development and to strengthen the political integration of the country. When the Soviet Union dissolved, many Russians found themselves stranded in new countries as a distinct ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural minority. For this audience especially, the flow of cultural influences emanating from Russia provides an important connection to what might be thought of as an ethnic homeland. Russia has officially taken an interest in the welfare of its diaspora, a fact that its

Previous page: Russian President Vladimir Putin pays tribute to the memory of Islam Karimov, the first president of Uzbekistan, 6 September 2016 in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. (Photo courtesy of the Office of the President of Russia)
neighbors cannot afford to ignore. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine stands as exhibit number one.

In sum, it stands to reason that Russia is sensitive to the concerns of Russians in the “near abroad,” and that they, in turn, are receptive to cultural influences from Russia. This does not, however, fully encompass the roles played by the Russian language as a medium of Russian soft power.

The Role of the Russian Language and Ethnicity

During the Soviet period, virtually all non-Russians studied Russian as a second language in school. The residual effect of this policy is that today Russian is still widely understood in the former Soviet republics. To be sure, there is a pronounced generational distinction in the level of fluency. In Uzbekistan, for instance, young non-Russians—principally Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, and Kazakhs—often speak Russian with difficulty or not at all. After its independence, the government deemphasized study of Russian as part of a general campaign to elevate the use of Uzbek in public life. Also, given the influence of globalization and the opening of society to greater engagement with the international economy, English has emerged as an attractive study option for many. However, fluency in English remains relatively uncommon.

Overall, English may hold greater attraction than Russian for the young, but it is still not a significant medium of influence through news sources, movies, and so forth. By comparison, Russian programming abounds and requires only a passive understanding of the language rather than spoken fluency. According to one 2004 study, 20 percent of Uzbeks actively use Russian and 60 percent profess elementary competence. Although these figures have almost certainly declined since then, it is this writer’s experience that Russian remains important as a medium of news, entertainment, and commerce in Tashkent and other Uzbek cities. It also remains
significant for another interesting reason. Russian is still the “go-to language” for communication between ethnic groups in many cases and for the conduct of relations among the former Soviet republics. Because Russian once served as the lingua franca for the Soviet Union, as scholar Aneta Pavlenko reports, it continues to serve that function today in much of Eurasia.4

The role of Russian in higher education remains significant, although it has lost ground to both Uzbek and English. Most professors are fluent in Russian and a considerable share of instructional materials in a variety of subjects are primarily accessible in Russian. Still, the generational divide is inescapably moving the country in the direction of Uzbek instruction. Ever more curricula are translated from Russian into Uzbek for classroom presentation; this is true in military education as well. By far the largest share of instruction is conducted in Uzbek at the Uzbekistan AFA, and younger officers are less likely to be proficient in Russian than their elders.

In the meantime, there is now an English-language university in Tashkent catering to the popular demand by local students looking for opportunities in international commerce. Likewise, the most prestigious private secondary school in Tashkent also operates in English, and English-language centers offering tutorial and small-group instruction are popping up all around. In short, English is gaining ground with select audiences but does not rival Russian as a medium to reach the masses.

Naturally, the Russian language has the greatest clout in countries where the Russian minority is large and there is a border with Russia. Neither of these factors applies to Uzbekistan. In contrast, the Russian population in Kazakhstan, as of 1989, was still 37.6 percent overall and heavily concentrated in major urban centers that drove the economy and cultural life. Although the Russian population shrank significantly as a percentage of the whole by 2004 Kazakhstan still had 477 Russian-language newspapers. Meanwhile, as of 2006, an estimated 75 percent

Then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin speaking with Russia-1 deputy CEO Kirill Kleimyonov (second from right) and CEO Konstantin Ernst 3 February 2011 in a news studio at the Ostankino television station in Moscow. Prominent Russian-language news and information channels such as Russia-1 and Russia-24 air all-day programming in Uzbekistan. (Photo by Alexey Druzhinin, Government of the Russian Federation)
of ethnic Kazakhs were fluent in Russian and over 60 percent of the general population professed to use Russian actively in everyday life. Logically, the long-term prognosis for Russian cultural influence in Kazakhstan is far healthier than in Uzbekistan.

Of course, economic relationships often reflect demographic trends. Russia has had a shortage of workers for years and has attracted many migrants from Central Asia to make up some of the deficit. Meanwhile, over half the population of Uzbekistan is under the age of thirty and the number of good jobs available cannot meet the current demand. Consequently, many Uzbeks travel to Russia, or just across their northern border to Kazakhstan, to find work. According to United Nations Development Programme data between 2010 and 2013 remittances from Uzbekistan citizens employed abroad accounted for 10 to 12 percent of the gross domestic product. Over time, it appears the Uzbekistan economy is strengthening and its poverty rate is declining. For now, Russia serves as an important source of employment.

**Russian Impact on Information Flow**

Given that Russia wields significant cultural influence in Central Asia, it is valuable to appreciate the informational mechanisms through which it operates. For the purposes of this article, several approaches stand out as warranting closer examination. The first might be described as institutional, encompassing political theater—that is, the use of presidential pronouncements, meetings of Russian leaders with their Central Asian counterparts, declarations of cooperation, and so forth. Outreach by the Russian Orthodox Church, a pillar of support for the current government, also plays a role. The second element would be Russia’s role as a source of world news and general information. Russian media, particularly television, reach into all of the major Central Asian markets. Russian news programs generally reflect higher production quality than domestically produced programs, a factor that may help drawing appreciable viewership. Moreover, Russian news programs typically cover a wider range of topics that bring to light stories not reported by other regional media sources. Third, Russian entertainment programming, once an object of ridicule in the West, has made great strides since the fall of the Soviet Union. Again, relative superiority to locally produced programming in Central Asia inevitably draws significant viewership. Russia’s most prominent television channels are well financed and, driven by advertising revenues, have figured out what entertains and holds audiences.

To consider each of these elements in turn, political theater was an art form during the Soviet period and certain patterns still apply. Presidential-level meetings have long served as a staple for television and newspapers. The close attention paid to official actions by senior statesmen tends in the public mind to affirm the gravitas of government decisions and cast leaders as wise, judicious, and respected abroad. Presidential-level announcements or official statements serve the same intent and are dutifully transmitted in full in the print and online press. Also following the Russian pattern, most news media make little effort to dig beneath the surface to enlighten their viewers about underlying issues that might concern them.

Following the death of Uzbekistan’s first and only (as of that time) president, Islam Karimov, in September 2016 expressions of condolence poured in from foreign leaders around the world. Just days after Karimov’s death, Russian president Vladimir Putin visited Karimov’s birthplace of Samarkand to place flowers at the gravesite and pay respects to the presidential widow. This visit was well covered by both Russian and Uzbek news sources, and strongly conveyed a reassuring message of continuity in Russian-Uzbekistan relations. In his official statement, Putin asserted, “We will do everything to maintain this path of joint development and to support the people of Uzbekistan and the Uzbek administration. You can fully count on us as your most reliable friend.” The moment served as a prime opportunity for Putin to highlight the importance of Russian presence in the region as well as the fact that it would not be Russia that would publicly take

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Uzbekistan to task over its opaque political system or curbs on the expression of dissent.

Just seven months later, in April 2017, the newly elected president of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, returned the favor with a visit to Moscow. In his official remarks, Mirziyoyev emphasized the search for common ground with Russia on the most important regional question, stating, “Uzbekistan fully supports Russia’s efforts to advance the national reconciliation process in Afghanistan and will take part in the expanded meeting on the situation in Afghanistan on April 14 in Moscow.” He also noted the increased import by Uzbekistan of Russian military equipment and other cooperative endeavors. Overall, this statement reflected a subtle warming of relations with Russia as well as a generally pragmatic and conciliatory approach by Mirziyoyev toward all of his neighbors in the region during the first year of his administration. Coverage blanketed the front pages of all the newspapers in Uzbekistan and led the television news coverage as well. Overall, whereas ritual state visits might pass almost unnoticed in the Western press, they receive a prominent place in media coverage among the less Westernized former republics of the Soviet Union. Moreover, thorough coverage of often mundane exchanges of official statements tends to obscure the widespread absence of hard news in the domestic press.

Again, Russian television news programming helps to fill the void. The channel Russia-24 offers nonstop news programming and is widely available. The format mirrors Western news shows, but the content generally fits Putin’s prescription to the letter. Other prominent channels such as Russia-1 offer periodic informational programming through the day as well as discussion programs that seem to be a hybrid between panel discussion and game show. Discussants are seldom highly placed government officials or senior scholars, although most can claim some connection to politics or the subject at hand. The discussion is free-wheeling and seemingly open. It is not necessarily focused or strictly oriented toward facts and evidence, however. The program rains opinions, whose very diversity mimics panel analysis in Western programs without intending the same result. The real purpose seems not to bring clarity to points of dispute but rather to encourage rhetorical fireworks and make viewers’ heads spin. Patriotic messages come through loud and clear, but the sum total is to leave audiences entertained yet unconvinced of much of anything.

According to a former Russian reality television producer Peter Pomerantsev, this may well be the intended effect. In his 2014 book Nothing is True and Everything is Possible, Pomerantsev describes the art form of news obfuscation. Information is torn loose from its traditional moorings to make sorting fact from fiction almost impossible for ordinary people. Following the 2014 shooting down of Malaysia Airlines flight MH-17 in Ukraine, Russian media saturated the airwaves with a stunning variety of theories, all pinning the blame on Ukraine or the United States. The lack of consistency or congruence among the explanations
created a kind of white noise that, for a Russian domestic audience, muted charges from the West in which Russia’s separatist allies in Ukraine were the culprits. Putin did not create this culture of incoherence but has certainly learned to thrive within it.

Meanwhile, in this writer’s experience, Putin’s reputation is solid in Central Asia. He is not adored, but he is generally perceived as a rational and responsible leader who looks after Russia’s interests and seldom makes political waves in the region. Of special note are Putin’s interviews with filmmaker Oliver Stone, which were conducted between 2015 and 2017 and released for television throughout the region. A Russian-language version circulated in the stores of Tashkent soon after the interviews first aired. The result was that Putin’s image probably improved. Viewers, as far as I could determine, saw him as someone with whom they could have a conversation. He seemed reasonable and humble but also commanding and forceful. I did not encounter anyone who could reconcile this performance with assertions in the Western press that Putin was rash, aggressive, and disrespectful of international norms. Almost anyone with an opinion also noted that the interviewer was an American, a detail that elevated the credibility of the encounter. Few realized that Stone was not actually a journalist or noticed that the questioning was not very tough. Fewer still connected Stone with some of his controversial films concerning topics such as the assassination of President John Kennedy.

The Power of Entertainment

Fittingly, the border between news and reality television in Russia has blurred. One remarkable instance this writer witnessed was in the fall of 2016. A reality American-made movies advertised in 2017 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Some observers assert that the current worldwide dominance of the American entertainment industry provides the United States with a type of soft power that it uses to shape the popular culture of other countries such as Uzbekistan to its political and economic advantage. (Photo by author)
show called *The Team* (*komanda*) featured Putin ally, President Ramzan Kadyrov of Chechnya, who staged a competition among sixteen contestants to become his “assistant.” Chechnya, of course, was the scene of two Russian wars intended to prevent its secession from the Russian Federation. The current Kadyrov rose to power following the assassination of his father. Reputed to run his semiautonomous state with an iron fist, Kadyrov has a frightening reputation for extreme methods in dealing with his opponents as well as those of his boss. During this serialized program, Kadyrov comes across as a regular guy, revealing a sense of humor as well as a new set of personal values reflecting his recent conversion to Islam. Interspersed with conversational asides about everything from his own early days fighting Russian troops in the mountains to the role of women in the home, the show featured a sequence of weird events entailing ice cream sales, boxing, coordinating surgical procedures, and offering a “vision statement” for Chechnya’s future. If the intent was to humanize Kadyrov, it probably succeeded.

Meanwhile, in the entertainment sphere, Russia has learned to compete to a limited degree with America’s soft power juggernaut—Hollywood. In fact, in mid-April 2018, during a visit to Tashkent, Russia’s deputy telecom and communications minister Alexei Volin proposed the collaborative development of movies and programs, and even the possibility of a joint television channel. For decades, the unparalleled ability of American studios to crank out hugely popular blockbuster movies has provided a formidable platform for the unsystematic transmission of perceptions, opinions, and behavioral norms. These days, American movies are typically released in Moscow or Tashkent within a few weeks after their debut in U.S. theaters. Take a look at any marquee in Tashkent and titles of American movies predominate. So pervasive is the American cinematic presence in most of the former Soviet Union that Russia recently made it a bit more expensive for its own theaters to show American movies. Nothing of the sort has happened in Uzbekistan, although authorities do control public entertainment to keep it within the bounds of conventional morality. For example, the government recently announced that a popular historical soap opera produced in Turkey would no longer air on domestic television due to its inappropriate content. Similarly, guidelines recently appeared placing some restrictions on the costumes of musical groups.

Actually, when it comes to selecting movies for public viewing, Russia exerts considerable influence on what plays in Uzbekistan and elsewhere. A primary reason is that the production of Russian-language versions of American films takes place in Russia. Thus, Russia, in effect, chooses what films will be disseminated around the region. Only after this initial step does the host country get a vote. Uzbekkino, the official Uzbek governmental film agency, can determine on its own that any particular foreign-made film is unsuitable for local release. Even then, there is occasional latitude for individual theaters to exercise discretion. In a curious recent instance, the trendy Ilkhom Theatre in Tashkent elected to present *The Death of Stalin*, a British-produced dark comedy, on the sixty-fifth anniversary of the Soviet leader’s death. The film was initially scheduled for showing in Russia but was ultimately banned for its disrespectful tone. Perhaps a few years ago, Uzbekistan might have followed suit. This incident appears to reflect yet another subtle change introduced by the new presidential administration in Uzbekistan.

One way to crowd out Western-produced material from Russia’s point of view is to create more of its own. What is more interesting than the role of censors is the way that the Russian television and film industries have “raised their game” in recent years. Perhaps realizing the cultural impact of a robust film industry, the Russian government has encouraged television and film to take on more ambitious projects. A case in point would be the serialized biography of Catherine the Great, which aired on Russia-1 in 2016 and 2017. The acting and production quality were relatively high, and perhaps more to the point was the entertainment value. In fact, this marks one of those rare instances when a Russian-produced program is so good that an English-language version is sold in the West. This is not some dull hagiography to a past Russian ruler. Rather, it is a complex story that, for the most part, adheres to historical fact, and aptly reflects Catherine’s multifaceted life and personality. Her difficult marriage to the quirky Peter III, her string of love affairs, her immersion in politics, and her embrace of the role of empress who would do much to enlarge the expanse and prestige of Russia all receive serious treatment.
The program was perhaps significant in another respect as well. In the Central Asian region that still reflects a male-dominated view of societal roles, a popular serial about a great female leader could not fail to attract notice. From a Russian viewpoint, the program also fits well within Putin’s agenda to arouse the love of country. The narrative reinforces the perception that Russia is besieged by treacherous foreign adversaries and that sometimes great leaders must make morally problematic decisions for the good of the state. An intellectual after his own fashion, Putin is a fan of military history and a booster of the Russian Military History Society for its work to inspire patriotism.

Another, even more current, domestic box office Russian hit, *Dvizhenie Vverkh* (*Going Vertical*), concerns the unexpected and dramatic Russian capture of the gold medal at the men’s basketball competition during the 1972 Munich Olympics. The best way to describe this movie is to see it as the mirror image of the American movie *Miracle*, which depicts the U.S. “miracle on ice” victory in ice hockey at the 1980 Winter Olympics in Lake Placid, New York. The parallels are obvious, but only viewers with some recollection of history will discern a bit of creative license in the Russian basketball version. In 1980, the U.S. men’s hockey team competed in an era when professionals were still banned from Olympic participation. This particular rule heavily favored the Soviet Union, whose players were not considered professional despite the fact that they were in every realistic sense full-time, paid athletes while nominally in military service or other professions. The Soviet team was a magnificent hockey machine, and the American triumph of hustle and grit was about as close to a sports miracle as you can get.16

On the other hand, while it is true that the U.S. men’s basketball team was favored in the 1972 games, it was not a lead-pipe cinch to win, even though America had never lost in Olympic basketball competition to that point. As the rules stipulated, the United States had to field a team of young but talented collegians who would train together for only a few months before the competition. In turn, the state-subsidized Soviet players were far more seasoned, physically mature, and had played together for years in the top Soviet league. In short, the contest had the makings of a highly competitive game. However, in the Russian movie, which also gets in a few pokes at the Soviet bureaucracy, their team is somehow a huge underdog against a bunch of ugly Americans who will go to any lengths to win. In the end, the Soviets prevailed, assisted by confusion at the scorer’s table and by intervention from the head of the Fédération Internationale de Basketball Amateur, who left the stands and overruled game officials to direct the addition of two seconds on the game clock at the very end. This resulted in the Soviets having a second and then third attempt at a game-winning bucket. A subsequent U.S. appeal was denied 3-2 by a panel of five judges, three of whom were from communist states. That said, the final play was remarkable and falls within the domain of amazing athletic finishes.17 In any case, the point is clear for Russians in the current hyperpatriotic atmosphere. Furthermore, the movie will no doubt entertain Russian-speaking audiences across much of Eurasia.

Moreover, it is a reminder that sport was a Soviet and now-Russian medium of influence as well. Success in the international arena elevated domestic pride and reflected favorably on the internal order. At the same time, it indicated to the outside world that Russians could be highly successful in competitive endeavors. A great feature of sports success was that it generated lots of positive press coverage.18

Book publishing is another realm where Russia has outsized influence. Bookstores do not abound in Central Asia and local publishers are modest operations with limited editions. Especially for coverage of contemporary affairs, readers must turn to works printed in Russia. Among the works recently available in a Tashkent bookstore, two examples can illustrate the point. The first, 

Meanwhile, in the entertainment sphere, Russia has learned to compete to a limited degree with America’s soft power juggernaut—Hollywood.
Russia, Crimea, History, outlines Russia’s historical claim to the region and why justice was served by its “return.”19 A second has the provocative title Evil Myths about Russia: What Do They Say about Us in the West? This work is a rapid historical excursion about negative impressions of Russia harbored in the West right up to the curious claim that today the West wants to transform Russia into a colony.20 (In my informal explorations, I found a broader ideological spectrum of works in Kazakhstan, including a couple that were critical of the Russian government.) Tashkent newsstands also display a handful of Russian-language newspapers that are simply local editions of the same published in Moscow. In brief, Russia’s take on the world is represented in just about every niche of the information marketplace.

So, why does this matter? One emergent point in the context of the global competition for influence is that appeals to emotions are frequently more effective than those that resort to fact-based argumentation. This is especially true in a digitally-enhanced environment where facts seem ever more suspect. The entire planet is now connected by a virtual infrastructure in which the appeals of a group such as the Islamic State can compete on equal footing with sources that, from a Western rationalist point of view, are far more authoritative and trustworthy. Put another way still, facts only matter to those who believe they are important or can distinguish plausible reporting from propaganda. A recent study published in Science, using data from Twitter for the period 2006 to 2017, reported that falsehoods circulate far more quickly than truth.21 In the future, the information high ground may belong to those who have studied how the transmission of ideas operates across the cloudscape of digitally networked human brains.

Actually, America’s own experience with apparent disinformation efforts has prompted the creation of an interdisciplinary group of scholars to study not only ways to constrain the flow of false news into our “information ecosystem” but also aspects of human psychology that make us susceptible to certain kinds of appeals. Thus, there are two points of focus, according to Brendan Nyhan, a Dartmouth professor of government. One is, “How can we create a news eco-

The old Soviet approach to population control entailed shielding them from outside information. Today, Russian citizens have far more access to foreign information sources, even foreign educations.
In some ways, regard for fact might have been higher in both the United States and the Soviet Union fifty years ago. The old Soviet approach to population control entailed shielding them from outside information. Today, Russian citizens have far more access to foreign information sources, even foreign educations. However, with the explosion of domestic tabloids, fact-free speculation on television, and bewildering internet chatter, Russians are more cynical about information in general. The way things are evolving, America’s information culture may be trending in the same direction. Especially disturbing is an increasing tendency to disparage the motives of those who disagree with us. As we have become more tribal in our thinking, we seem more inclined to view philosophical adversaries as enemies, menacing and somehow morally unfit. Good faith attempts to bridge the gap with intelligent dialog are losing out to rhetorical sleight of hand and ad hominem character assassination.

Without morally equating various extreme groups inhabiting polar positions on the American or global political spectrum, it is nonetheless possible to notice a symbiotic relationship, each group using its adversaries to galvanize anger and mobilize followers to action. Timur Kuran, a professor of Islamic studies at Duke University, explains that “intolerant communities compete for members. ... Like the propaganda departments of parties, they promote ideologies that focus attention on particular grievances, interpretations of history, and policy instruments. They also provide social status to their members and treat nonmembers with contempt. Finally, they claim to speak for entire categories of people.”

A Russian military delegation headed by Lt. Gen. Alexander Lapin, commander of the Russian Central Military District (seated third from right), meets with an Uzbek delegation led by Maj. Gen. Pavel Ergashev, first deputy defense minister and chief of the Army Staff of Uzbekistan (seated third from left), 16 February 2018 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, to discuss military cooperation between the two countries. The sides exchanged views on a wide range of topics including the situations in the Central Asia and in the Middle East, plans to share organizational experience in combat training and in daily service, and a counterterrorism exercise that took place at the Forish field training ground in Uzbekistan’s Dzhizak region. (Photo courtesy of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation)
Not since the Vietnam era has American political
dialog so readily called to mind the grave warning
about rhetorical excess penned by Thucydides about
civil strife over two thousand years ago. Describing
revolution in ancient Greece, Thucydides wrote,
Words had to change their ordinary mean-
ing and to take that which was now given
them. Reckless audacity came to be consid-
ered the courage of a loyal supporter; pru-
dent hesitation, specious cowardice; moder-
ation was held to be a cloak for unmanliness;
ability to see all sides of a question incapaci-
ty to act on any. ... The advocate of extreme
measures was always trustworthy; his oppo-
nent a man to be suspected.28
Of course, we are not there yet, but social media has
proven especially inviting to demagogic banter and
virtual vigilantism.

A statue of Amir T emur, Tamerlane the Great, occupies a square once
graced by Karl Marx's statue 24 October 2013 in Tashkent, Uzbeki-
stan. Uzbekistan associates its history with the empire of Tamerlane
the Great, who ruled from Samarkand in the fourteenth century. (Pho-
to by LoggaWiggler, Pixabay)
This brings the discussion back around to Russia. Using the writings of Russian General Valery Gerasimov as a point of departure, long-time Russia analyst Timothy Thomas argues that, given its limited means for exerting influence, Russia emphasizes social media and the internet as a means to shape or disrupt information ecosystems in various places. He explains, for example, that websites such as the “International Russian Conservative Forum” attempt to insert themselves into political discussion abroad with the intent to “amplify” those voices that might be most extreme and distorting. Lynn Ellen Patyk, a Dartmouth assistant professor, described the phenomenon this way: “Provocation—an act that is intended to produce a reaction from its target that serves the provocateur’s ends and is damaging to his opponent.” In the past, the Soviet Union typically attempted to insinuate its influence through the manipulation of voices on the left end of the political spectrum. Today, freed from the imperative to push a single ideological perspective, Russia has learned that it can wield information war across the spectrum and inflame opinion on multiple sides at once.

Not surprisingly, states that impose limitations on electoral debate or on internet activity might actually enjoy a degree of insulation from this kind of interference. Also, because they keep a close eye on websites and social media, the robust security services of the Central Asian states would probably spot some types of foreign interference early and curb their activity.

Uzbekistan’s Security Posture in Cultural Context

Though consistently friendly to Russia, Uzbekistan has long kept its neighbor at arm’s length, avoiding binding military alliances or other relationships that might cede some aspect of its sovereignty. This does not mean there is no military cooperation with Russia. On the contrary, in late 2017, Uzbekistan reportedly decided to purchase twelve Mi-35 Russian attack helicopters during a visit by Russia’s Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev. Also, in October 2017, Russia and Uzbekistan participated in a joint military exercise for the first time since 2005.

A short glimpse at the Uzbekistan Armed Forces offers some insight into the national approach to security issues. Inevitably, the legacy of the Soviet army has had a strong influence. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Uzbek army not only inherited equipment, training philosophy, and doctrine but also an institutional outlook encompassing modes of thought and education. The organizational culture, such as the absence of a capable, empowered noncommissioned officers corps, strongly reflected inheritance from the Russian and Soviet armies.

In education, this legacy manifested itself in heavy dependence on lectures and memorization of content, mastery of which would be confirmed by quizzes and tests—a formula once prevalent in American education as well.

In 2017, Mirziyoyev declared in a January address that military reform in Uzbekistan would embrace the system of military education as well. At the AFA, which recently relocated to a more modern campus in Tashkent, engagement with educators from the United States and some NATO partners has contributed to the adoption of a variety of instructional methods and greater emphasis on the role of seminars as forums for substantive discussion. The academic year 2016-2017 marked the first year during which a so-called Ministry of Defense Advisor, working under the auspices of the Defense and Security Cooperation Agency, served in a resident advisory capacity at the AFA.

Working along converging lines, a string of military educators (including a number from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, or CGSC) have visited the AFA in recent years under the umbrella of the Defense Education Enhancement Program. The focus in both instances has been to encourage the use of what are known as adult learning methods employed at CGSC and elsewhere. Stress on developing critical thinking has been a singular feature of this effort. Critical thinking, in turn, requires looking at problems from multiple perspectives and allowing latitude for various approaches. In other words, it marks a break from the transmission of received wisdom as determined by figures in authority. This is not in any way a descent into relativism. Classroom rigor demands that opinions be well-informed and that students can cogently articulate the reasons for their views. In the meantime, several visits by delegations from the AFA to the CGSC at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, over the past five years further prompted the AFA to build classrooms based on a similar design. Such is the prestige of the CGSC brand that the AFA now desires to emulate many of the features that highlight a CGSC education.

Inventing Uzbekistan

Of course, the AFA is perfectly willing to accept good ideas from Russia or China as well and will
Certain continues to do. A model of prudent caution, Uzbekistan has generally taken a multilateral approach to military questions, engaging all without becoming unduly dependent on any single source. Avoiding entanglements, Uzbekistan has abstained from participation in operations, even peacekeeping, outside its borders. This has worked satisfactorily as an element of foreign policy but has left a void regarding operational experience. For this reason, the AFA takes a special interest in the study of foreign military experience, which constitutes one of the major subjects of instruction.

Overall, the outlook and approach of Uzbekistan is shaped by its youth as an independent state. The same holds true for other former Soviet republics. Nevertheless, for the Central Asian states above all, independence has entailed a high degree of self-invention. Some of the other republics, such as those in the Caucasus or the Baltic region, had past histories as independent states to which they could turn for a sense of national identity and a usable past. Even Ukraine had begun to develop national consciousness before its 1917 revolution and subsequently went but were not based on a national principle or closely identified with a titular nationality. Islam served as the main organizing concept. Consequently, the process of sorting people into nations began under the Soviet Union, which in a way provided an incubation period for emerging national states in the post-Soviet era.

This means that their experience as part of the Soviet Union is inordinately significant as a shared and remembered journey to the present. However, to foster a stronger sense of historical identity, these states must reach back into a deeper past without clearly identifiable signposts. Therefore, some creative license has proved necessary as part of constructing national histories or, some would say, national myths. Uzbekistan has chosen to associate its history with the empire of Tamerlane the Great, who ruled from Samarkand in the fourteenth century. Tamerlane’s statue occupies a prominent square in downtown Tashkent once graced by Karl Marx’s statue. Tamerlane’s grandson, Ulugh Beg, has also earned his place among the local greats. Both a ruler and accomplished astronomer of the early fifteenth century, whose amazing observatory can still be visited in Samarkand, Ulugh Beg reminds citizens of Uzbekistan of a rich intellectual tradition to which they can lay claim.

One point to draw from all of this is that Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states are learning to engage the world in the same way that they are engaging their own pasts. In a substantive way, foreign influences have become part of the mix of factors shaping the development of these young states. Russia in the twenty-first century has figured out perhaps more quickly than any other state how to pursue its foreign policy objectives through all available media. Still, geography alone will ensure that Russian influence in Central Asia will persist. Even so, Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states are not so easily influenced. After a quarter century of independence, they have a clearer sense of their identity and interests and will insist upon foreign engagement on equal terms.

Notes

4. Ibid., 76.
5. Ibid., 72–75.
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26. Ibid.


The Decades-Long “Double-Double Game”
Pakistan, the United States, and the Taliban

Thomas F. Lynch III, PhD

October 7th will mark the beginning of the eighteenth year of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. On that date in 2001, the United States began intense bombing followed by an Army Ranger raid on Taliban-controlled targets in the southern Afghan city of Kandahar. A response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., these U.S. military actions were the opening salvo in a wider American global war on terrorism.

Nearly two decades later, a third consecutive U.S. administration completed another review of U.S. aims and activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Trump administration, led by a president known to be highly skeptical of continuing the long-term U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, arrived at a familiar conclusion: U.S. military and intelligence forces need stay.

In announcing a new South Asia strategy on 21 August 2017 at Fort Myer, Virginia, President Donald Trump tweaked the approach of his post-9/11 predecessors by lifting some of the post-2014 limitations on U.S. military rules of engagement. But Trump’s new strategy for sustained U.S. military and intelligence presence in Afghanistan again emphasized that U.S. counterterrorism aims remained paramount and yet unrealized in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Thus, in 2018, the United States finds itself facing a strategic conundrum that is little changed from the one it faced shortly after its 2001 Afghanistan incursion. To defend itself at home and its major interests abroad from the menace of catastrophic terrorism, America cannot abandon its military and intelligence footprint in Afghanistan. Although the Taliban is gone from power in Kabul, the Afghan government and its security forces remain too weak to halt the Taliban insurgency or prevent large tracts of Afghanistan from becoming unfettered safe havens for menacing terrorist and extremist groups. At the same time, Pakistan’s national security narrative remains so hostile to India and so wary of nefarious Indian influence in Afghanistan that it steadfastly refuses to divorce from its Islamist militant groups with influence there—the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network (HQN).

The Trump administration has learned what its predecessors have well known. Pakistan continues to play a “double game” with the United States in terms of its counterterrorism partnership. Pakistan’s military and intelligence services view the Afghan Taliban and the HQN as the best—or perhaps the least worst—option to hedge against rise of threatening Indian influence in Kabul. At the same time, Pakistan often “plays nice” with the United States in achieving major international counterterrorism goals or shared aims against militant groups operating in Pakistan that directly threaten the Pakistani state.

From the Pakistan perspective, U.S. policies have increasingly undercut Islamabad’s perceived existential security struggle with India. Pakistan’s military believes the U.S. intervention into Afghanistan to have been naïve about the endemic ethnic chaos there and—worse yet—blind to the degree that U.S.-supported leaders in Kabul are capable of pursuing Indian security interests that put
Pakistan’s survival at risk. Pakistan has wooed the United States to join in security partnership against India, but Islamabad laments that the United States has slipped Pakistan’s embrace and pursued the siren’s song of strategic partnership with India. For Pakistan, it is the U.S. side playing the double game—teasing Pakistan with the offer of counterterrorism partnership but never siding fully with Islamabad in its many grievances against India.

Properly understood, the Afghan Taliban is a symptom of the misalignment in U.S. and Pakistan security strategies for Afghanistan and the wider South Asia region. The Afghan Taliban and the HQN are actually symbols of the “double-double game” vexing U.S. security policy and annoying Pakistan’s military and intelligence services.

The way forward for U.S. policy in Afghanistan and against the Afghan Taliban and HQN is best framed in context of the U.S.-Pakistan security relationship—the double-double game. This requires a review of the strategic backdrop of the U.S.-Pakistan security relationship. This article will frame the essential U.S. security objective in Afghanistan and in South Asia since 11 September 2001. It will sketch Pakistan’s main security imperatives and how its complex relationship with Islamist militant groups remains deeply imbedded in its security strategy. It will demonstrate that despite the incongruity between how the United States and Pakistan view the Afghan Taliban, counterterrorism cooperation has been successful where Pakistan’s security aims have aligned with those in Washington and been disappointing where they have not. The review will conclude with recommendations for the least-worst U.S. strategic approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan in light of the double-double game. These
recommendations will stipulate that the strategic challenge of the Afghan Taliban continues to mean that the United States must pursue imperfect means to attain its most pressing security aim: denying international terrorists renewed safe haven in either Afghanistan or Pakistan.

The Essential Backdrop: Origins of the Double-Double Game

In the post-World War II era, American security interests in South Asia have been suborned to international strategic aims. During the period of U.S. Cold War containment against the Soviet Union, Pakistan was a close partner with Washington, while India stood largely aloof from the global U.S.-Soviet Union clash. After the Soviet Union’s collapse, America’s major strategic concern became that of nuclear weapons nonproliferation. Pakistan and India both defied Washington’s strategic aims with development of nuclear weapons programs that accelerated into the 1990s. Both were chastised and sanctioned in a failed U.S.-led effort to get them to halt. Both openly tested nuclear weapons in 1998.

By the late 1990s, America’s post-Cold War strategic focus turned fully toward counterterrorism. On 23 August 1996, Osama bin Laden declared war against the United States on behalf of his Salafi jihadist organization, al-Qaida, in a thirty-page fatwa, “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places.” Bin Laden issued his fatwa within months after moving to Afghanistan to live under Taliban protection. Al-Qaida’s first major attack against the United States came in August 1998 with the bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. These killed 224 people including twelve Americans. The United States responded with cruise missile strikes into Afghanistan (and Sudan) that killed six al-Qaida personnel but not bin Laden.

India offered Washington rhetorical support and some intelligence information. Pakistan maintained a cautious approach toward the evolving U.S. global strategy. It did not object to the U.S. cruise missiles that flew over Pakistani airspace in the strike against al-Qaida in Afghanistan in 1998. It also shared intelligence on suspected al-Qaeda operatives with U.S. agencies in the 1999–2001 timeframe.

After 11 September 2001, Pakistan pursued a dual-tracked policy—or double game. First, it accepted a role as a vital U.S. counterterrorism ally. Simultaneously, it maintained its affiliation with irregular Muslim militias (including the Afghan Taliban).

Table 1. Pakistan-India Key Comparative National Statistics (2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Gross domestic product (GDP growth)</th>
<th>Defense spending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>189 million</td>
<td>$217 billion (4.7%)</td>
<td>$7.6 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1.309 billion</td>
<td>$2.112 trillion (8.0%)</td>
<td>$40 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table by author)

Table 2. Pakistan-India Key Comparative Military Statistics (2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Active forces</th>
<th>Paramilitary forces</th>
<th>Reserve forces including paramilitary</th>
<th>Combat aircraft</th>
<th>Battle tanks</th>
<th>Surface combat ships</th>
<th>Patrol and coastal ships</th>
<th>Submarines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>644,000</td>
<td>304,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>~2,500</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1,346 million</td>
<td>1,403 million</td>
<td>2.14 million</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>~4,100</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table by author)
in a manner that would not compromise Pakistan’s national security concept against India.5

Pakistan Grand Strategy, Islamist Militants, and the Double Game

Pakistan does not publish a national security strategy. Yet, the parameters of such a strategy are clear. One threat dominates: India. India remains Pakistan’s self-identified existential security threat and dwarfs all other security concerns. Antistate indigenous tribal Islamic militants, mainly based in western Pakistan, are Pakistan’s other ongoing security challenge, but this is a challenge that Pakistan believes it can manage and now has under control. India and Pakistan fought four major wars between 1947 and 1999, and nearly came to blows in 2001-2002 and in 2008.6 Miscalculation set in motion the battlefield clashes.

Pakistan was born in 1947 with a population less than a quarter that of India. After the loss of East Pakistan in the 1971–72 war of Bangladesh succession, Pakistan has remained at a 6:1 disadvantage in overall population, as well as a proportional disadvantage in gross domestic product growth and defense spending (see table 1, page 66).7

These numerical disadvantages are reflected in Pakistan’s chronic shortcomings in conventional military forces compared to those of India. India boasted a total military manpower strength (active, paramilitary, and reserve) of about five times that of Pakistan in 2015. It also maintains a sizable and rapidly growing numeric advantage in major combat weapon systems (see table 2, page 66).8

Acutely aware of its deficits, Pakistan has attempted to offset military conventional weaknesses by developing compensatory strength in the other two levels of conflict, subconventional and nuclear. Pakistan’s strategic reliance on subconventional forces (a.k.a. Islamic militant groups) must be understood in this context. Although divisions do exist between Pakistan’s civilian and military leaders regarding Islamic militancy and national security, in Pakistan, the military firmly controls security policies. Military commitment to an array of Islamist militant groups is firm.

From its inception in 1947, Pakistan has used Muslim tribal militants for security aims. Armed Pashtun (or Pathan) tribal outfits, or lashkars, were the first fighters to enter Kashmir in 1947 in an effort to stake Pakistan’s claim to that princely state over that of the claim by India during the violent 1947–48 partition of the subcontinent.9 The calamity of Indian intervention and Bangladesh succession in 1971–72 fueled a “return to Islam” as a key remedy (along with nuclear weapons and a warmer embrace of China) for national trauma and worry of further Pakistani dismemberment by Indian malice. The East Pakistan crisis inspired the Pakistani military to invest more heavily in Islamist militant groups—especially those from the far west of Pakistan—as a key component of national homeland defense.

Pakistan’s manipulation of Afghanistan for its own security purposes began in the 1950s. Aggravated by Afghanistan’s early refusal to recognize Pakistan’s independence or the legitimacy of the Durand Line border between the two and animated by its belief that Afghan leaders were supporting Pashtun separatism across Pakistan and abetting an insurgency in Pakistan’s Baluchistan Province, Pakistan’s leaders helped establish the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami party as a player in Afghan politics.10 In the 1970s, Pakistan upped the ante with weapons and financial support to rebel Afghan Islamists—known as the “Afghan cell”—who aimed to overthrow Afghanistan’s king.11

Pakistan’s military president from 1977 to 1988, Chief of Army Staff Gen. Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, oversaw the dramatic expansion of Muslim militant groups in Pakistan as the primary means to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. With Gulf Arab money, and

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with U.S. and Chinese military hardware, Pakistani military and its Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) Agency tightly managed these jihadist “freedom fighters” from a vast array of Afghan refugee camps and safe havens across western Pakistan.  

After the Soviet defeat, Pakistan’s military-intelligence complex sustained its oversight of these Islamist militants. Numerous jihadist outfits remained in Afghanistan to fight in a half-decade of civil war that raged into the late 1990s. Many others were re-missioned for covert or proxy activities against “Indian occupation forces” in Jammu-Kashmir, against India proper, and against South Asia neighbors too amenable toward India.

The 9/11 al-Qaida attack of the United States put Pakistan on the horns of a dilemma. America gave Pakistan’s president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, an ultimatum: Pakistan could either become a partner in America’s new war against Islamist terrorist groups, or it could be branded an enemy and a state sponsor of terrorism. Musharraf took the offer of counterterrorism alliance. He saw it as problematic but far preferable to the possibility that the United States might forge a counterterrorism alliance with India and turn Pakistan into a target instead of a partner.

In late 2001, Musharraf cautiously sent some Pakistani frontier paramilitary units to the Afghan border in a show of solidarity with American counterterrorist battles against al-Qaida and Taliban operatives fleeing Afghanistan. Subsequent Pakistani military and paramilitary incursions into western Pakistan in 2004, 2006, and 2008 fared poorly, with tribal militias embarrassing regular Pakistani troops in a series of engagements. Pakistan’s military struck peace deals that did not hold. Aggravated by what they saw as Musharraf’s treachery with the United States, several Islamist militant combinations went rogue in 2008, invaded Pakistan’s Swat District, declared jihad against Pakistan from North Waziristan, and unleashed terrorist strikes across a wide swath of Pakistan.

By the end of the 2000s, Pakistan’s military and intelligence services confronted an unpleasant post-9/11 reality: they must now deal with “good Islamist militants” and “bad Islamist militants.” Pakistan established a differentiated framework for dealing with divergent outfits. If an Islamist militant group put the state of Pakistan first and international Islamist causes second, then it would be supported. If the group prioritized international Islamist causes but remained supportive or neutral in its approach to the Pakistani state, then it would be treated warily, but often with benign neglect. If the Islamist group threatened the Pakistan state or viewed international Islamist jihad as the highest order priority, then Pakistan’s military would fight it. In some cases, Islamist militant groups might shift from a low threat to a high threat, or vice versa. In such cases, Pakistan military-intelligence services would recalibrate an approach to that group.

Since 2009, Pakistan’s military has been continuously fighting selected Islamist militant outfits who practice jihad against the Pakistan state: the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the Pakistani Taliban, the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi, and some others. Pakistan also has undertaken selective military action against foreign imports who are either enabling anti-Pakistan indigenous jihadists or who severely aggravate Pakistan’s international allies (e.g., China or the Central Asian states). Groups in this category include the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the East Turkestan Movement, the Islamic State, and isolated members of al-Qaida. From 2010 to 2017, Pakistan committed an average of about 140,000 of its 644,000 regular-duty army forces to counterinsurgent and counterterrorism operations in its western provinces—almost 25 percent of a force that army leaders would prefer to have arrayed against India.

Pakistan also has alternately collaborated with or attacked Islamist factions that vacillate in their allegiance to the Pakistani state. These groups—which some scholars label “frenemies”—have included Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Pakistani Taliban factions led by

By the end of the 2000s, Pakistan’s military and intelligence services confronted an unpleasant post-9/11 reality: they must now deal with ‘good Islamist militants’ and ‘bad Islamist militants.’
Mualvi Nazir and Gul Bahader, and breakaway leaders from the Lashkar-e-Tayyibah like Ilyas Kashmiri. This approach allows Pakistan’s ISI to play Islamist factions against one another and to leverage differentiated groups to different advantage in varying types of external and domestic security conflicts.

Finally, Pakistan closely manages and often enables groups like Lashkar-e-Tayyibah, Sipha-e-Sahaba Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban, and the HQN. These groups have direct security utility in subconventional operations against India, Indian interests in Jammu-Kashmir, and in Afghanistan, and they do not launch attacks against the Pakistani state. The Afghan Taliban and the HQN are strongly ensconced in this security asset cluster.

Pakistan’s military leadership repetitively claims that it is the major victim of the counterterrorism campaign “forced upon it” by the United States and other western states in 2001. Pakistan contends that it has lost over 4,100 soldiers killed and another 13,500 wounded since 9/11; and that the nation has suffered more than 80,000 civilian deaths and the loss of over $120 billion. In stating these costs, Pakistan’s military leadership draws attention to the fact that its “martyred” soldiers far exceed the 2,353 American military deaths reported in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014.

Pakistan’s unhappiness with the war on terrorism notwithstanding, its fight against anti-Pakistan militants intensified in 2014 with a long-awaited, and long-telegraphed, counterinsurgent operation into North Waziristan. Known as Zarb-e-Azb, it concluded in late 2017. From the beginning of Zarb-e-Azb, Pakistan’s civilian and military leaders claimed that they are now fighting terrorists in Pakistan without discrimination among groups. But, Pakistan’s policy of differentiated treatment toward Islamist militants remains unchanged. There is no evidence in 2018 that the Pakistani security apparatus is now, or will in the future, move to dismantle Lashkar-e-Tayyibah, the HQN, the Afghan Taliban, or a score of other militant outfits that remain part of Pakistan’s subconventional military arsenal.
American Strategy Post-9/11 and the Other Double Game: With Pakistan and Against Pakistan

The immediate U.S. strategic objective for Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks was the annihilation of al-Qaida. The Taliban Emirate of Afghanistan stood in the way of this objective by refusing to accept Washington’s ultimatum on al-Qaida and its leader, Osama bin Laden. Thus, the Afghan Taliban had to be toppled. U.S. military forces working with Afghan anti-Taliban militias in late 2001 routed Mullah Omar’s Islamic Emirate and its remnants fled into Pakistan. Throughout 2002 and early 2003, the U.S. military conducted concentrated military operations around Afghanistan to defeat al-Qaida remnants and Afghan sympathizers. Over the same two-year period, U.S. intelligence agencies worked closely with Pakistani intelligence and police to apprehend scores of al-Qaida leaders and operatives. The George W. Bush administration believed that the Taliban—vanquished in Afghanistan and in disarray in Pakistan—would be dismantled by Musharraf.27

However, Musharraf was not committed to this course. The value of the Afghan Taliban and affiliated groups like the HQN to Pakistan security outweighed the costs of eliminating them. From 2002 to 2004, Omar reportedly kept a low profile in Pakistan. In turn, Pakistan kept a keen eye on Kabul and on the trajectory of U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Increasingly, Pakistan did not like what it saw. First, Pakistan saw a new Kabul government led by an ethnic Afghan Pashtun, President Hamid Karzai, but perceived by Pakistan to be dominated by other ethnic Afghan groups that Pakistan viewed to be hostile to Pakistani security interests and too cozy with Indian interlocutors. Second, it saw the United States as distracted in Iraq, itching to get on to the fight there and out of Afghanistan altogether. These fears
seemed confirmed in late 2004, when the United States announced that it would begin a phased handover of the lead for the Afghanistan mission to NATO that would culminate in 2005–2006. Finally, Musharraf was alarmed by broader U.S. policy in the region. He felt betrayed by Washington’s growing infatuation with India. The United States extended its diplomatic hand to New Delhi and finalized the details of a civilian nuclear power deal with India that was not offered to Pakistan. Musharraf viewed this as treachery with the enemy, and the United States as reverting to old ways—an unreliable partner ready to cut and run from Afghanistan and leave Pakistan vulnerable to the instability there. Pakistan saw the United States as playing its own double game with Pakistan.

By 2004, Omar had reorganized the Afghan Taliban’s military and political command from inside Pakistan. Unsurprisingly, Pakistan had allowed it to regroup. In 2006, a resurgent Afghan Taliban infiltrated Kandahar and Helmand Provinces, threatening the U.S. plan to depart Afghanistan.

At the same time, the United States, England, and other west European intelligence agencies began to trace a disturbing number of complex and spectacular terrorist strike plots against respective homelands back to origins along the Afghan-Pakistan border. Egyptian bomb makers and Saudi martial arts trainers were identified working with British, American, and west European jihadists from sanctuary in western Pakistan to launch operations from 2005 to 2007 that could have produced devastating strikes against U.S. bridges and airports, and against British-origin airplanes.

Alarmed by the renewed international terrorism hub and the Afghan Taliban resurgence of 2006–2007, the United States conducted a pair of Afghanistan-Pakistan strategic reviews—one begun in 2008 under the lame-duck George W. Bush administration and a second in 2009 in the first months of the Obama administration. Both affirmed that while the United States had several strategic interests in the South Asia region, the counterterrorism objective remained paramount. Both concluded that Afghanistan and Pakistan remained a coveted location for international terrorist occupation and that, should the Afghan government fall or al-Qaida go unchallenged, the region would again become a safe haven for terrorists, “who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can.”

America’s 2008–2009 policy reviews generated an “Af-Pak” strategy and a U.S.-NATO military and civilian “uplift” from 2009 to 2012. The surge of U.S. military, intelligence, and diplomatic personnel into Afghanistan during this uplift period aimed at blunting the Taliban and buying Kabul time to develop a credible government and a military capable of defeating the Taliban on its own. The United States offered Pakistan military and economic inducements to become a full “strategic partner” in this effort. But, Islamabad never fully backed away from the Taliban. Informed by President Barack Obama’s fateful line in his West Point Af-Pak strategy speech of 1 December 2009 that limited the time of a U.S. military surge, Pakistan warned the United States of risks to Washington’s chosen course and held onto its own concept of a proper war against terrorists.

Pakistan’s limited post-2009 counterterrorism cooperation included intelligence sharing about international terrorists and a grudging acceptance of a U.S. drone campaign against terrorist leaders in the western part of Pakistan. At the same time, Pakistan prevaricated when asked to fully suppress or eliminate the Afghan Taliban or the HQN. Pakistan blamed incompetent Afghan leadership and ill-informed U.S.-NATO operations for what it argued (and continues to argue) is an indigenous Afghan Taliban insurgent movement that has its grievances stoked by Afghan ineptitude. The U.S.-Pakistan counterterrorism partnership from 2009 to 2014 produced mixed results: a noteworthy reduction in al-Qaida and other international terrorist group activities across western Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan but a frustratingly intractable Taliban insurgency.

After the U.S. Special Forces raid that killed bin Laden in May 2011 near a Pakistani military compound, the U.S.-Pakistan attempt at a strategic partnership spun inexorably downward. A once robust U.S. military train, equip, and advise for counterinsurgency force working in Pakistan that peaked above 650 in 2009 declined to about two hundred in mid-2015 and dropped to no more than sixty in 2017. U.S. military assistance for Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts became less generous and more conditional. U.S.-Pakistan military and economic partnerships declined precipitously from a level of $3.5 billion in U.S. assistance during 2011 to less than $1 billion in 2016 (and much of that was suspended in various U.S. conditional withholdings during 2016 and a Trump
The United States continued to conduct drone strikes against suspected international terrorist and selected Afghan militant targets in Pakistan but with less frequency.

In 2013, Obama announced the U.S. intent to transfer the lead for anti-Taliban counterinsurgency operations to Afghan forces by the end of 2014 and withdraw all but a small counterterrorism force and an attaché office from Afghanistan by the end of 2015. This second attempted U.S. transition “out of” Afghanistan hit another speed bump in mid-2015. Then, Afghan national security forces struggled to hold territory against invigorated Taliban operations, and the United States discovered a disturbingly large al-Qaida training camp that had sprung up amid Taliban-controlled Shorabak District to the west of Kandahar. It took a two hundred-man combined U.S. and Afghan Special Forces operation in the fall of 2015 to destroy this al-Qaida site.

At almost the same time, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) made an appearance in Afghanistan. A small but vocal number of indigenous Islamist jihadists—most of them fragmented from disputes within longstanding local militant groups like the Pakistan Taliban—declared themselves to be ISIS affiliates, and branded their movement as ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K). Obama took pause at these ISIS-K and al-Qaida developments. The United States halted its drawdown and made minor tweaks to its military rules of engagement. Another American effort to depart Afghanistan was thwarted by serious remaining terrorist concerns. Washington’s frustration with Pakistan hit post-9/11 lows, even as the Trump review of strategic options for South Asia began in 2017. In Pakistan, military and civilian leaders took a “told you so” approach to this second reversal of a U.S. exit plan.

The post-2011 decline in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship has been paralleled by a fully blooming Pakistan relationship with China. A China-Pakistan Economic Corridor agreement announced in early 2015 is pumping an estimated $50 billion over the next decade into an ever-fraught Pakistan economy for construction, infrastructure, and nuclear power development. Pakistan also is receiving more and more of its military hardware from China, growing less and less reliant on U.S. hardware and equipment.

Since late 2017, Pakistan’s evolving strategic status has been articulated in something known as the “Bajwa Doctrine,” named for the Pakistan army chief of staff (and most powerful national leader) Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa. In his unwritten but oft-referenced doctrine, Pakistan is done receiving ultimatums from the United States and the world about how it must do more to eradicate terrorism in Pakistan. The rest of the world should be asking how it can do more to help Pakistan, not the other way around.

The Bajwa Doctrine confirms that there is little in the way of “leverage” the United States can now exert to get Pakistan to change its historic and immutable view of the Afghan Taliban and the HQN.

**Essential Scope for Cooperation: Beyond the Double-Double Game**

There remains, however, an important basis of mutual agreement on counterterrorism collaboration between the United States and Pakistan that gets lost in the growing recriminations between the two over the Afghan Taliban and the HQN. The United States and Pakistan have been—and seem likely to continue to be—able to agree on certain dangerous Islamist terrorist groups to attack and often on how to attack them. Past cooperation has included points of friction, but in general, bilateral counterterrorism cooperation has achieved significant mutual policy aims and the one consistent, overarching U.S. policy objective: preventing a devastating terrorist strike against the U.S. homeland or critical U.S. assets overseas. Amidst much often overlooked evidence, three primary examples of successful bilateral counterterrorism cooperation stand out.

First, Pakistan and U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies have coordinated the kill or capture of more than a hundred international terrorist leaders and operatives. This cooperation also has disrupted or prevented several dozen plots to conduct catastrophic international terrorism. From 2001 to 2003, cooperation produced scores of successful apprehensions and kills of top-level al-Qaida operatives and affiliates from other international terror groups. Many of these operations—like the one that led to the capture of al-Qaida 9/11 bombing mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammad—came during activities in Pakistan itself. Other collaborative work gathered intelligence necessary from within Pakistan to disrupt and even dismantle Islamist terrorist groups in Indonesia, Malaysia, and elsewhere. From the late 2000s through today, intelligence collected in Pakistan has inhibited or thwarted major planned international terrorist
strikes from jihadist groups and leaders. Such collaboration captured al-Qaida operative Younis al-Mauritani in Pakistan before his 2011 plot for spectacular terror strikes in west Europe could launch.\(^3\) There is every reason to believe that Pakistan and the United States can continue to collaborate in these types of activities moving forward.

Second, the United States and Pakistan have cooperated in drone strikes against major international terrorist leaders and groups in locations throughout western Pakistan since 2004. This tacit cooperation frequently has been masked by a fractious public face. Pakistan’s ISI covertly works with the United States to assist in most strikes of the campaign, frequently providing target details and damage assessments. For domestic reasons, Pakistan’s military and political public relations spokespeople have denied involvement and protested U.S. strikes as a violation of Pakistani sovereignty.

The U.S.-Pakistan drone strike kabuki dance has evolved through four distinctive phases from 2004 to 2017: the 2004–2008 inception phase under Bush; the 2009–2014 Af-Pak Strategy phase under Obama; the 2015–2016 retrenchment phase under Obama; and the evolving phase of strikes under Trump in 2017 and 2018 (see table 3).\(^4\)

The campaign’s more than four hundred known total strikes are believed to have killed almost 2,500 militants. Many of those killed were from key U.S. terrorist watch lists. Dozens of al-Qaida key leaders were killed in the early years of the campaign. So too were many leaders and operatives from international terrorist outfits like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), The East Turkistan Movement, and the Chechen jihadists.

The covert drone counterterrorism campaign also has helped Pakistan against several its most threatening jihadist groups including Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi. The covert action allowed Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies to maintain the façade of being non-complicit while harvesting the security benefit.\(^5\)

### Table 3. Covert U.S. Drone Strike Campaign in Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>U.S. administration</th>
<th>Number of drone strikes in Pakistan</th>
<th>Militants killed (estimated)</th>
<th>Pakistan civilians killed (estimated)</th>
<th>Notable terrorists confirmed killed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004–08</td>
<td>Bush (43)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>· Nek Mohammad (Taliban)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>· Abdul Rehman (Taliban)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>· Abu Khabab al Masri (al-Qaida [AQ])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009–14</td>
<td>Bush (43) and Obama</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>2,064</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>· Sa‘ad bin Laden (AQ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>· Ilyas Kashmiri (AQ)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>· Baitullah Mehsud (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan [TTP])</td>
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<td>· Tahir Yuldashev (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan)</td>
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<td>· Hakimullah Mehsud (TTP)</td>
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<td>· Maulvi Nazir (Taliban)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>· Badruddin Haqqani (Haqqani network [HQN])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015–16</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>· Mullah Mansour (Taliban Emir)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>· Ustad Ahmad Farooq (AQ)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>· Adam Ghadan (AQ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017–18</td>
<td>Trump</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>· Abu Bakar Haqqani (HQN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>· Abdul Raheem (AQ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>413</td>
<td>2,437</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table by author)
By the end of the Obama administration, the United States and Pakistan had expanded cooperation to include strikes against mutually threatening groups like ISIS-K, and the United States continues to conduct limited drone strikes against Afghan Taliban and HQN leaders it identifies in Pakistani locations. Strikes against these groups are a source of friction between the two countries but have not yet led to any Pakistan ultimatum for the United States to stop or any threat to shoot down U.S. drones in Pakistani airspace. This suggests that they might be continued in a covert, prudent manner.

Third, there is circumstantial evidence that Pakistan plays a role in limiting the scale and scope of Afghan Taliban attacks against U.S. soldiers and other personnel in Afghanistan. Evident since 2001, Pakistan’s role seems especially important since 2015. Pakistan’s ISI almost certainly has helped deny lethal and provocative weapons to the Afghan Taliban arsenal. In more than seventeen years of ongoing aerial operations, U.S. and NATO coalition aircraft have never reported being engaged by a modern antiaircraft weapon. There never have been reports of Afghan Taliban or HQN operations featuring heavy artillery or heavily armored vehicles (e.g., tanks or personnel carriers). The U.S.-Pakistan counterterrorism partnership has shown a major value in this reality—and this should be a value that continues if even a strained counterterrorism partnership remains in place.

More recently, annual U.S. military fatalities have declined remarkably since 2015—reaching historic lows in 2016 and 2017 (see table 4). Some of this reduction can be explained by declining U.S. troop numbers across Afghanistan—9,800 for most of 2016 and 2017, about one-tenth of the number there in 2011—and by fewer U.S. military personnel assigned in remote locations supporting Afghanistan security forces’ counterinsurgency operations around the country. But, the rather significant decline in successful Afghan Taliban direct targeting of U.S. military locations does not seem likely to have occurred spontaneously. Pakistan intelligence agency preferences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of U.S. military deaths</th>
<th>Number of Afghan security force deaths (estimated)</th>
<th>Number of Afghan civilian deaths (estimated)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>800+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1,000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>1,012</td>
<td>1,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>1,106</td>
<td>2,100</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>2,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>1,480</td>
<td>2,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>1,950</td>
<td>3,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>3,400</td>
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<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>3,498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>3,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,409</strong></td>
<td><strong>33,856</strong></td>
<td><strong>35,000+</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table by author)
for limiting the U.S. military as primary attack targets seems very likely to have played a role. It is a role that the United States should be able to encourage Pakistan to continue into the future.

**American Interests and Actions—From Deaf Ears to Sustainable Counterterrorism Collaboration**

Sometimes additional pressure and confrontation with frustrating security partners can produce good strategic results. More often, policy makers do better on complex problems if they cooperate to attain minimally acceptable results.

The main—and minimally acceptable—aim for U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan remains what it has been since 12 September 2001, that neither location again become a hotbed for international jihadist organizations to plot, plan, and execute catastrophic terrorist strikes against the U.S. homeland or its major overseas interests. The United States actually has succeeded in this aim. There have been no catastrophic terrorism strikes against the U.S. homeland or its major overseas assets emanating from Afghanistan-Pakistan since 2001. Even the dangerous plots uncovered in western Pakistan during the 2004–2011 period were thwarted through collaboration. Despite obvious al-Qaida efforts in 2015, no new terrorist training center has returned to Afghanistan. U.S. counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan has helped prevent Pakistan from reverting to an international terror hub. Sustained U.S. military and intelligence presence in Afghanistan has prevented any major resurgence of such a hub there.

At the same time, it remains highly unlikely that Pakistan will ever see eye-to-eye with Washington or Kabul on the need to permanently dismantle the Afghan Taliban or the Haqqani Network. Pakistan’s recent self-defined success in suppressing its main domestic terrorist threats with Operation Zarb-e-Azb has reinforced a righteous perception of its counterterrorism approach. The main tenets of the Bajwa Doctrine make any greater U.S. pressure campaign toward Pakistan all but certain to fail. Pakistan’s shoulder shrug response to Trump’s 4 January 2018 tweet suspending $900 million in U.S. security assistance, its snub of U.S. South Asia Principal Deputy Assistant Alice Wells in January when she tried to deliver another message of U.S. unhappiness, and the polite but bemused smile on the face of Pakistan Prime Minister Abbasi in March 2018 when Vice President Mike Pence told him that Islamabad, “must do more to address the continued presence of the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and other terrorist groups operating in their country,” tells the story of futility that additional pressure on Pakistan now will produce.

The alternative for the United States is to maintain a prudent, low-level military and intelligence force in Afghanistan to inhibit any return of international terrorist entities there and to work professionally and deliberately to cooperate with the Pakistanis against terror groups in ways that Pakistan can tolerate.

The U.S. record of success in fighting terrorist actors in South Asia with Pakistan as an ally is far from perfect. But, the record of counterterrorism success without Pakistan’s participation during the period from 1992 to 2001 is much worse. The delicate and still dangerous situation calls for some form of continuing U.S. military engagement with Rawalpindi (home of the Pakistani army headquarters), albeit at a reduced level from the past seventeen years. This approach is far more likely to meet U.S. baseline security needs than a total cut off of counterterrorism support or military-to-military interactions championed by some.

Despite the influx of Chinese money since 2015, Pakistan remains an extremely volatile state. It could miscalculate Indian intentions and get embroiled in a major cross-border war where its growing tactical nuclear arsenal might be used—with attendant catastrophic consequences. It is likely to continue relationships with an array of Islamist militant groups deemed important to advancing Pakistani security interests in Jammu-Kashmir, in Afghanistan, and against India. At the same time, Pakistan’s military will continue a selective course of counterinsurgency operations against jihadist outfits declared as fighting against the Pakistani state. Overt and covert U.S. support for Pakistani efforts against its antistate militant groups should be sustained. The United States also should do more important work as a mediator between the Afghan and Pakistan militaries to limit border clashes between their forces—clashes that have become more deadly from 2016 through 2018 after U.S. military advisors and border monitoring posts were withdrawn.

As a minimum, capable and flexible U.S. bases at Kabul and Bagram, Afghanistan merit retention.
and management for counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and as a strategic hedge for the worrisome possibilities in Pakistan. Sufficiently resourced U.S. intelligence and special operations forces can acquire and attack the militants identified by Pakistan while recognizing that Pakistan cannot be expected to provide comprehensive targeting information on an array of other militant groups that will threaten Afghanistan itself. An autonomous American intelligence capability will be required to provide counterterrorism and other special information to U.S. assets that the Afghan intelligence services cannot provide and that the Pakistan ISI cannot be expected to share.

It remains unwise for the Trump administration to completely eliminate the U.S.-Pakistan counterterrorism military support framework. Instead, a prudent policy would be one that sustains limited bilateral counterterrorism collaboration with flexible annual authorities of up to $750 million per year along with sustained economic-related support authority of up to $500 million a year and another $300 million a year in broader security assistance programs. These amounts will not make the Pakistani military and intelligence services end their unhelpful relationships with any number of Salafi jihadist militant outfits. However, the sums will help sustain U.S.-Pakistani dialogue in both military-to-military and civilian-to-civilian counterterrorism forums and keep open the possibilities for critical terrorist information exchange and—if needed—crisis response.

At the end of the day, getting to and sustaining residual U.S. military security and strategic intelligence presence in Afghanistan is the best hedge against the inherent and significant security risks remaining from the many global terrorist groups operating in the region and often intermingling with militant outfits in Pakistan. The Trump administration’s August 2017 South Asia strategy seems to get the rebalance of U.S. force posture in Afghanistan about right—adding and remixing an additional four thousand military intelligence elements, Afghan unit advisors, and strike aviation assets capable of helping Afghan security forces keep the Taliban at bay and of preventing a return of al-Qaida or other international terrorist safe haven.

The U.S. must now recalibrate a less blunt, more nuanced, “goldilocks strategy” toward Pakistan—one not too hot and not too cold. Washington can continue to deter and disrupt major terrorism threats in Pakistan by working with the Pakistanis in limited, but mutually beneficial, counterterrorism processes that have shown important results over the last seventeen years.

Understood in full context, Pakistan’s double game is actually a U.S.-Pakistan double-double game. It is frustrating for both sides but remains one that can be played by Washington in a way that continues to attain America’s number one global counterterrorism strategic aim.

The opinions expressed in this analysis represent his own views and are not those of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

Notes


14. Fair, Fighting to the End, 112–32.


19. Author notes, Pakistani military briefing on continuing military operations against antistate militants in western regions, National Defense University, Washington, DC, 27 April 2015.


21. Author notes, Pakistani military briefing.


26. Fair, “The Pakistan Army’s Foray into North Waziristan.”


29. Ibid., 234–42.


31. Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.”


39. Agence France-Presse (AFP), “Senior al-Qa’ida Leader You-


44. Fair, “Pakistan’s Security Shift is Pure Fiction.”


47. Lynch, “After ISIS.”

48. Alan Kronstadt, Pakistan-U.S. Relations: Issues for the 114th Congress, CRS R44034 (Washington, DC: CRS, 14 May 2015), 16. Cited numbers are at the low-end of the range of U.S. support to Pakistan in these broad categories from 2010 to 2016 found in this source.

49. Lynch, "After ISIS."
Many Voices
Telling One Story
Public Affairs Operations across Africa in Support of Combatant Commanders

Capt. Jason Welch, U.S. Army
Every year the U.S. Army conducts exercises, security cooperation activities, train-and-equip missions, and senior leader engagements across Africa in an effort to enhance the capability and capacity of African militaries to promote regional security and stability. U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) public affairs officers (PAOs) are responsible for telling this Army story to the U.S. public and must overcome challenges across the continent to do so. Strategic and operational communication in Africa requires U.S. military personnel to coordinate between multiple interagency, interorganizational, and international partners; overcome culture shock and bridge cultural divides; and face the physical and technical challenges of distance.

Army PAOs must step outside traditional military leadership roles to communicate effectively on behalf of the command in this environment. The organizations and relationships involved are dynamic, sometimes temporary, and often complex. Public affairs professionals must analyze the information environment and identify potential coalition partners that can communicate a cohesive message through different media and transmission vectors. Then they must lead these loosely bonded networks, providing feedback to partners to encourage continued communication and support to operational narratives and objectives. Public affairs professionals who support activities across Africa at all echelons must take on the role of diplomats, team managers, logisticians, teachers, advisors, and content producers. Officers and noncommissioned officers must be equipped with the skills and experience to conduct planning and coordination for large-scale and strategic missions while simultaneously executing tactical-level tasks such as photography, writing, editing, media escort, and advising military leaders.

Successful public affairs across Africa means that public affairs professionals have to cross the divides separating cultures, languages, organizations, and governments to consolidate many voices into one.

Point 1: Interagency/Interorganizational Coordination

Commitment to interorganizational cooperation can facilitate cooperation in areas of common interest, promote a common operational picture, and enable sharing of critical information and resources.

—Joint Publication 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation

Any public affairs activity undertaken in Africa must be coordinated with both U.S. and host-nation government agencies. In each individual nation across the continent, the U.S. Department of State (DOS) is the lead U.S. government agency, and the U.S. ambassador to that country is the chief of mission. U.S. military commands coordinate with their DOS counterparts to ensure their activities are nested within the existing whole-of-government approach for each nation. All public military communication is coordinated through the respective U.S. embassy public affairs office, the office of security cooperation, the defense attaché, and the command’s security cooperation division. Only then can cooperation begin with foreign partners and other U.S. agencies outside of the Department of Defense (DOD) and the DOS.

Communicators involved in a mission or activity in Africa come from across the joint military force of each participating nation; different government agencies; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and local, regional, and international news media organizations. PAOs must be prepared to lead diverse teams originating from different units, branches, and even countries. The public affairs team that supported the USARAF-led exercise Central Accord 2016, held in Libreville, Gabon, was one such team. Central Accord 2016 was a multinational, joint, field and command-post exercise involving more than one thousand troops from over fourteen participating African and European militaries. The exercise involved multiple airborne drops, field maneuvers, attendance at a jungle warfare school,
and live-fire exercises. The public affairs footprint across the area of operations consisted of

- the USARAF PAO team;
- the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division PAO team;
- the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division PAO;
- the 49th Public Affairs Detachment;
- a 55th Signal Company (Combat Camera) team;
- an American Forces Network Europe broadcast journalist;
- a Defense Media Activity photographer from Sembach, Germany;
- a Gabonese public affairs officer;
- a U.S. Marine Corps PAO acting as an observer/controller-trainer;
- a Cameroonian public affairs warrant officer; and
- German information operations officers.

On just the U.S. side of public affairs, four branches of the Armed Forces were represented: Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.

Each of these individuals and teams represented an organization and command with its own unique background, training, expectations, and goals to achieve during the exercise. It was the responsibility of the lead PAO to plan and execute a single comprehensive public affairs mission that would unify all the disparate actors into one team. This task required months of coordination through the U.S. embassy public affairs office and the office of security cooperation to ensure the plan was nested within the existing U.S. operational strategy in Gabon, and to build a relationship with the Gabonese military that would allow for free access to maneuver and conduct public affairs tasks across the area of operations.

Logistics for each team member had to be resolved, from commercial air travel into Gabon, to movement of equipment, to local transportation between and life support at five distinct areas of major activity, and finally to the first U.S. global response force airborne jump into Gabon that brought the final elements of the team together. Each member of the team had to complete the theater entry requirements and possess an official passport with a Gabonese visa or waiver prior to arrival. The lead public affairs office was also responsible...
for the coordination between USARAF, Air Mobility Command, and the 82nd Airborne Division that brought participating U.S. news media representatives to the exercise in C-17 aircraft in the first military embed of *Army Times* reporters in over five years.5

Overcoming U.S. DOD and DOS bureaucratic requirements to bring a disparate team together for an exercise is one example of the interagency and interorganizational coordination required of a public affairs professional in Africa. Working alongside African partner PAOs is another challenge that requires PAOs to become both military planner and international diplomat. The annual African Land Forces Summit brings together the land force chiefs of African militaries from across the continent. In 2016 and 2017, more than forty African partner militaries participated.6 The summit rotates between nations and regions, held most recently in Tanzania, Malawi, and Nigeria, respectively. The host nation has the lead authority and responsibility for planning and conducting the event, including coordinating and escorting local and regional news media representatives.

The U.S. public affairs professional who is responsible for the event must begin months in advance, working with the DOS and DOD teams, and building a relationship with the host-nation PAO. This relationship is crucial to navigating the unique bureaucratic requirements of the host-nation military and government and establishing a unified communication plan for the summit. In Tanzania and Malawi, the host-nation PAO was the local expert. They accredited the local media and stringers for international wire services and provided transportation and access to venues. The relationship with the host-nation PAO in both situations led to a united communication effort, maintaining the security of the summit by
preventing unaccredited personnel from entering the area posing as media and demonstrating the effectiveness and professionalism of a united team. Because of the months of coordinating and face-to-face meetings, the Tanzanian and Malawian public affairs teams operated side-by-side with the U.S. public affairs team, sharing office space, vehicles, and tasks throughout both summits.

This interagency and interorganizational experience builds professionalism in both U.S. and African-partner public affairs institutions, and contributes to the USARAF line of effort to set the theater by strengthening relationships between public affairs professionals and local, regional, and international news media representatives. Public affairs professionals are de facto diplomats, negotiating and building rapport with their host-nation and international partners, and representing the interests of the U.S. government during engagements with both military and civilians across the continent. Even the smallest task becomes strategic in nature. PAOs accredit, escort, and arrange engagements with media journalists who may work as both local reporters and as stringers for international tier-one media organizations such as Agence France-Presse, Reuters, and Bloomberg News. They also gather imagery, video, and quotes from African and U.S. senior leaders to publish in stories and social media posts. Their products not only shape public understanding of the U.S. military but also the African partner military and government in the story or post. It is imperative that there is a relationship between the U.S. and African partner public affairs professionals to prevent misrepresentation of one another in the public information environment. It is also key to maintaining transparency with key stakeholders and audiences.

Point 2: Culture Shock

Culture shock: A sense of confusion and uncertainty sometimes with feelings of anxiety that may affect people exposed to an alien culture or environment without adequate preparation.

—Merriam-Webster Dictionary

Africa is the second largest continent in the world, with the second largest population. There are over 1,500 languages and dialects spoken across fifty-four countries with diverse religious and tribal cultures. For U.S. PAOs striving to communicate with key audiences, each country presents a unique challenge in religious, environmental, popular, and bureaucratic culture. PAOs must overcome the culture shock of working with partners who are restricted by their environment and organizations, and who view their roles in the communication process differently. It is important for all military leaders to maintain a sense of humility and not project their own preconceived ideals upon other cultures with different social and cultural norms.

Language barriers may be the most obvious obstacle to overcome; however, it is not as simple as coordinating for French, Portuguese, or Arabic interpreters. While Francophone and Lusophone (Portuguese-language) nations are prevalent throughout sub-Saharan Africa, and Arabophone nations exist mostly across the Saharan and Sahel regions, thousands of tribal dialects must be factored into communication plans. Local journalists may claim to speak English, French, or Arabic, but it is often not their primary language, and military jargon and themes can be easily lost in translation. Often, partner military PAOs are fluent in the regional dialects, or their staff members are, and can provide a bridge to local news media representatives and community leaders. During the USARAF-led multinational peacekeeping exercise Southern Accord 2015, held in Lusaka, Zambia, one Zambian Defense Force sergeant major was fluent or familiar with over half of the forty-six languages and tribal dialects across Zambia, an Anglophone nation. Each member of the Zambian public relations team spoke at least three dialects in addition to English, and they worked as a team to keep the invited media properly informed about progress and status during the exercise.

PAOs should not only factor interpretation into their plan to disseminate communication but also in how they will assess the effectiveness of their efforts afterward. The U.S. embassy public affairs teams often have local nationals that are familiar with the local media environment, can facilitate communication and arrange engagements, provide valuable cultural advice, and conduct media assessments or analyses during exercises and contingencies. Assessment of media operations is hampered in areas where media organizations are not publishing their content online, rather only using printed hard copy, local television, and radio. In these instances, it is important to have a strong relationship with the U.S. embassy public affairs team that routinely monitors and evaluates these media organizations and can provide vital feedback to military PAOs in assessing their efforts.
African militaries are often legacy organizations reflecting the customs and practices of their former colonial heritage. Breaking through the vertical and centralized hierarchy of our partner military communicators requires patience, preparation, and resources. Moreover, there is an aversion to risk taking for many of our military partners and a hesitation to do anything that is not clearly aligned with the political will and intent of the party in power. The African-partner planners who attend planning events on the continent in preparation for exercises and summits are action officers but are not empowered with decision-making authority. This task is withheld at much higher echelons.

Likewise, African-partner military and government spokespersons are often limited to the senior echelons of their respective organizations. During the USARAF-led peacekeeping exercise Eastern Accord 2016 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, the only Tanzanian People’s Defence Force soldier permitted to speak to media—including U.S. Army public affairs journalists—was the senior commander, a brigadier general. There were two other brigadier generals from Tanzania that were participating in the exercise, but they lacked the relationship with the land force commander and his senior staff, and were not permitted to speak publicly.

Communication can also be stove-piped between organizations within the partner-nation government. In Cameroon, the military spokesperson is a senior colonel and is permitted to speak on behalf of the Ministry of Defense, but he must coordinate any public speaking engagement with the Ministry of Communications. This can be difficult during contingency operations when other actors in the area, such as NGOs and international organizations, are releasing information quickly and the host-nation military is not. PAOs can mitigate this challenge through coordination and relationship building prior to contingency operations, but they must also be prepared to navigate this restricted timeline once on the ground, coordinating with the DOS team, partner military, and even NGOs and other interorganizational partners to cut through bureaucratic obstacles or coordinate releases between multiple organizations.

In addition to organizational restrictions, PAOs must work with military partners that view the public affairs mission very differently. For many African partners, public affairs is also public relations and information operations, and a tool to influence the thinking and behavior of target audiences, often in direct support to an operational commander. For example, Cameroonian PAOs build communication plans to fulfill three pillars: image, influence, and action. Their first priority is to protect the image of the organization. Then, they seek to influence thought and behavior in target audiences. Finally, they look for actionable results in key populations like increased voter turnout, or decreased protesting against government forces.

Among such organizations, credibility is less important than speaking the party line, and African PAOs are hesitant to work with certain journalists or release information about controversial activities when it may hurt their organizational image or fail to influence audiences toward a designated goal. Objective and accurate reporting by journalists is not highly regarded by these nations’ governments; journalists that question the activities of the military or legitimacy of the government are sometimes blacklisted or, in the extreme, jailed and prosecuted. Accredited media are seen as those news media representatives who have historically told favorable stories about their activities and can be trusted to maintain the party line and not critique the government or military.

As a result, U.S. PAOs may see the benefit of amplifying a specific event to key audiences, but their military partner may not understand the reason so many resources should be allotted to a seemingly insignificant exercise or activity. PAOs often deal with this challenge, working to amplify a multinational training exercise that is unable to garner robust public affairs support from their host-nation partner. The exercise is not necessarily a priority for the host-nation military and may not warrant the same attention that U.S. PAOs give it.

This discrepancy is especially true for military partners that are currently dealing with violent extremism or unrest within their own borders. They have real-world military operations being conducted within their nation and often an internal audience that has been deemed an enemy of the state or, in the very least, in opposition to the current ruling political party. The communications objective regarding these audiences will be to sway their thought and behavior to preserve the legitimacy of the government and the integrity of the nation. Conversely, U.S. PAOs are trained and grounded in the DOD Principles of Information, the legally binding mandate to inform key audiences of all military activities in a timely and accurate manner.10
In an environment where information and the communication of that information is seen as a tool of political power, it is a challenge to maintain objective credibility with U.S. audiences.

U.S. PAOs must therefore put a priority on establishing a trusted relationship with their African partners to work through this difference of intent regarding communication. Being open and honest with a partner while making a concerted effort to understand the political pressure they are feeling is key to the formation of a cohesive team and the presentation of a unified communication strategy.

Point 3: Challenges of Distance and Technology

Reading and hearing about Africa is one thing; experiencing it directly is quite another. We know that Africa is not a country, but it is a continent like none other. It has that which is elegantly vast or awfully little.

—L. Douglas Wilder

The continent of Africa is over thirty million square kilometers and can fit the entirety of Europe, India, China, and the continental United States within its borders. Commercial flights from the United States can take an entire day. A single Air France flight from Paris to Johannesburg is over ten hours long. While technology is growing across Africa, developing infrastructure still limits access to digital resources and lines of communication. According to a 2015 Pew Research Center report, more than two-thirds of adults in Africa own a cell phone, but less than a quarter of these are
smartphones, and less than 2 percent of Africans have a landline in their home. In Malawi, the U.S. embassy in Lilongwe estimated that only 10 percent of the population is part of the electrical grid and that less than 5 percent have access to the internet. Power generation is a concern, with grids that are unreliable during the rainy season or dependent upon hydroelectric power in drought-plagued areas. PAOs must learn to adapt to technologically austere environments and operate with little to no additional resources for long periods of time.

During the 2014 Ebola outbreak in western Africa, the U.S. military was asked to respond in support of United States Agency for International Development efforts in Liberia. Operation United Assistance brought a USARAF-led joint task force to the small western African nation in increments. Flights were limited, and space on those aircraft was taken up by supplies and personnel considered essential to the mission. While military and civilian leaders stateside were requesting imagery from the mission, and news media representatives were asking for access and interviews, the public affairs presence on the ground was limited to three personnel, and early communication guidance from the DOD and DOS was restrictive, preventing imagery from reaching stateside news media organizations. It took time for the appropriate resources to be brought into country with a joint public affairs support element arriving two weeks after the main body and a public affairs detachment months later. Some of the delays in resources were caused by the bureaucratic timeline to secure them, but some were due to limited infrastructure and living space on the ground in Monrovia, Liberia. PAOs can anticipate similar conditions in future contingency operations and must be prepared to operate alone or with limited resources for extended periods of time.

Activities conducted in the United States, Europe, and even some Asia-Pacific regions typically cover much smaller land areas and can be supported by existing infrastructure that has been developed over decades of joint and combined partnerships. Internet access is more readily available, telecommunication lines exist, power generation equipment is more prevalent, and digital communication methods are taken for granted. Throughout Africa, infrastructure varies, and it is common to lose power during the rainy season, droughts, or after hard rains have washed out grid infrastructure. Bandwidth is extremely limited, delaying or preventing the transmission of imagery or video products. Local news media representatives sometimes do not have access to digital or online resources. They may not have the ability to take their own photographs or video, and may look to the on-ground PAOs to provide additional working space, internet access, transportation, and even food. It is not at all uncommon for partner-nation PAOs to pay for journalists to attend an event; such a practice is not considered unethical in their organizations. Without this stipend, many journalists cannot afford to cover military activities, and they use the money to pay for transportation or to rent photographic equipment or space in an internet café to produce their stories for their news media organizations.

For U.S. military PAOs, it can be frustrating when traditional methods of transmitting media stateside do not function. PAOs must plan and work in advance and integrate with operational planners in every operation to ensure their communication requirements are taken into account. These considerations include dedicated internet contracts, internationally capable phones, transportation for both public affairs teams and news media representatives, and power generation for equipment. Host-nation militaries often cannot provide these resources and will request to use the infrastructure and equipment the U.S. military provides. Furthermore, the Defense Video Imagery Distribution System portable satellite transmitter, the designated method for transmitting U.S. military public affairs imagery, print, and video products from deployed areas and for conducting live interviews with stateside journalists, has not been successfully utilized in Africa in recent years. Public affairs teams must rely on local infrastructure or the limited bandwidth of mobile internet devices and satellite phones.

Additionally, distance from the United States inhibits timely coordination and delays the ability for reinforcing operators on the ground. If a partner unit located in California or Alaska submits a request for information, response time can take twenty-four hours. The long flight time from the United States, coupled with the need to undergo a complex theater-entry process, limits what personnel and resources can be brought to bear on any activity across the continent.

During the USARAF-led exercise Unified Focus 2017, held in Douala, Cameroon, the public affairs support team traveling from the United States was unable to procure airplane tickets just before departure. The
exercise was scheduled to last a single week, and there was not enough time to source another team from the United States, gain theater entry clearance, issue visas, and fly them to the exercise location. The PAO on the ground was left to support the event alone. There are no local units or installations to request support from in Africa. PAOs who are in the middle of a mission must be prepared to conduct all the tasks required of an entire team of public affairs professionals, to include escorting media, advising and preparing leaders, taking photographs and video, and writing stories.

**Conclusion**

Africa is a vast continent, physically and culturally, and presents unique challenges to U.S. public affairs professionals tasked with operating there. PAOs must quickly adapt to situations and take on tasks they are not specifically trained for or experienced in. Additionally, they must build bridges that cross both cultural and organizational boundaries, linking together disparate entities and actors, and guiding them toward a common goal. All these efforts must be executed across a landscape three times the size of the United States and without the infrastructure and resources they are accustomed to in the United States.

As a result, because contingencies will arise unexpectedly, PAOs assigned for service in Africa must constantly prepare for unforeseen events, honing their craft and familiarizing themselves with the region while building relationships when possible to shape future opportunities. In this region, the PAO must become the diplomat to cross boundaries, the logistician to overcome the challenge of distance and technology, the technician to produce content, and the team manager to bring together a unique joint force capable of telling the U.S. Army and U.S. military story worldwide. Taking on many roles enables this comprehensive professional to merge many individuals to weave their efforts into one voice.

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**Notes**

2. Ibid.
Preparing SFABs for the Complexity of Human Interaction

Lt. Col. Brent A. Kauffman, U.S. Army

We are training, advising, and assisting indigenous armies all over the world, and I expect that will increase and not decrease. —Gen. Mark A. Milley, Army Chief of Staff

A recent Associated Press article highlighted the importance of cultural sensitivity and empathy in preparing the Army’s new security force assistance brigades (SFABs). While certainly useful and appropriate skills, SFAB-related articles typically only scratch the surface regarding the importance of understanding the human terrain while deployed abroad. Fortunately, a few research efforts provide deeper thinking and analysis to increase our understanding. Forces Command, Training and Doctrine Command, and the Army at large would be well served to make significant investments in human domain training to maximize SFAB effectiveness as they advise, train, and assist foreign forces in their own environments.

Apart from distracting stories about beret colors, SFAB articles typically emphasize a few key points. First of all, the six SFABs will provide a trained force dedicated to the advise-and-assist mission. Second, this added force structure will reportedly replace the current ad hoc approach and free up conventional forces to prepare for conventional wars. Finally, the SFAB training program will include extensive cultural and language training. It appears that after sixteen years of the U.S. military training, advising, and interacting with Afghans, Iraqis, and others with mixed results, the SFAB concept provides the Army with another opportunity to get it right. However, initial coverage of the SFAB suggests that the curricula are still not comprehensive enough for our forces to operate successfully in the human domain.

In support of the “Army’s effort to create a permanent, professional training program,” this article recommends three sources to inform that training regimen. Two separate research efforts published by the U.S. Army War College in 2015 offer helpful constructs for developing such a program. The third source, the Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations (JC-HAMO), was informed by the previous research and published in October 2016. These three sources are discussed in the following paragraphs.

What may seem contrary to a comprehensive training program, the Army’s SFAB recruiting website emphasizes that its soldiers serve as “combat advisors, not nation builders.” Understandably, this phrase serves to remind leaders and recruits that the Army should stick to what it knows and not repeat its nation-building attempts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Each of the sources discussed below proposes subjects that are likely to fall outside the comfort zone of most SFAB leaders and soldiers. Knowledge in these subjects is not intended to enable our forces to build a national government or even to piece...

Ratik Ole Kuyana, a safari guide, awaits the arrival of more service-members 15 October 2009 who participated in Natural Fire 10 in Uganda, a training exercise in which East African partner nations and the U.S. military worked together on a humanitarian assistance mission. Security force assistance brigades will provide a trained force dedicated to the advise-and-assist mission, free up conventional forces to prepare for conventional wars, and receive extensive cultural and language training to better enable multinational training and real-world mission execution in complex operating environments such as East Africa. (Photo by Spc. Jason Nolte, U.S. Army)
together a department within said government. Rather, the intent of a broader training program is to provide SFABs with the requisite tools to understand, relate to, and properly advise the foreign forces they are assigned.

Training for the Human Domain

For the first source, two British authors suggest specific categories for operating in the human domain in their monograph, *Training Humans for the Human Domain*. Steve Tatham and Keir Giles refer to these categories, or academic disciplines, as the “four ’ologies’ and one ‘istics’”: psychology, theology, anthropology, sociology, and linguistics. To be effective at advising foreign forces within their own culture and environment, it stands to reason that understanding how and why humans think and act would yield invaluable insights for SFABs to formulate appropriate advice.

Extensive education and training in these subjects may seem cost prohibitive. However, before ruling out investment in such a curriculum, the authors share how the UK military grades and confers different levels of proficiency, such as expert, practitioner, and familiar. Further, Tatham and Giles appropriately recognize that an individual’s level of proficiency should depend on their respective role or position. While some personnel may require expert knowledge in one or more categories, all personnel should possess familiarity across the range of subjects. Using a gradient of expertise can allocate resources more effectively. Perhaps also with an eye toward cost, the authors suggest three accelerated ways to close this human terrain knowledge gap. First, build or supplement red teams with experts in the social sciences discussed above and then assimilate red team input, some of which may be counterintuitive, into the planning process. A second way is to leverage and expand the foreign area officer program. This talented group of cultural advisors could train and develop a familiar-to-practitioner corps of advisors. Third, retain reservists with specialized knowledge in these areas, presumably through financial bonuses. This last method is also applicable for active-duty members that may have gained such knowledge through advisory missions or other experiences, including experienced SFAB soldiers.

Tatham and Giles also remind us that the “basic principles of understanding human terrain can hardly be described as new.” They continue by citing Marine Corps intelligence analysis that cautions, “study the people” or risk “decisive defeat.” That study should include the psychological makeup and cultural viewpoint of the population. Such analysis is consistent with Marine Corps doctrine that emphasizes human behavior, specifically:

It is the human dimension which infuses war with its intangible moral factors. War is shaped by human nature and is subject to the complexities, inconsistencies, and peculiarities which characterize human behavior. Since war is an act of violence based on irreconcilable disagreement, it will invariably inflame and be shaped by human emotions.

The Marine Corps’ definition of human dimension is significantly broader than the Army’s version, which focuses on performance and resiliency of its own soldiers and formations. This distinction was made by the next source, which used the term human elements to minimize confusion.

Human Elements of Military Operations

The second recommended source consists of the findings and tools developed by “The Human Elements of Military Operations” workshop, held 13–14 January 2015 at the U.S. Army War College, which was sponsored by the joint Strategic Landpower Task Force. The workshop focused on determining what human elements are applicable for the full range of military operations. A diverse group of scholars from twelve universities created two very different and flexible frameworks of human elements to consider when operating abroad.

The workshop participants were divided into two comparable groups, and the frameworks were developed independently. One framework identified eight broad categories, or major elements: culture,
information, security, economics, physical, power/politics, key actors, and unknowns. The six major elements of the second framework include identity, social structures and institutions, physical, psychology, information, and basic needs. In addition to the shared elements of information and physical, the top element from both frameworks—culture and identity, respectively—share many of the same descriptions and subelements.\textsuperscript{12}

Comparatively, all five categories from the previously discussed monograph were represented as major elements or subelements in one or both frameworks.

The workshop stood out for its interdisciplinary approach, which yielded these two holistic and interactive frameworks. Participants insisted on building flexibility into their frameworks to increase their applicability for a wide range of missions. Such flexibility is particularly important when advising and assisting different peoples from different cultures. As an example, one framework includes the category of unknowns in order to underscore that “no one-size-fits-all framework exists due to the complexity of humans, their dynamic interactions, and the changing environments around them.”\textsuperscript{13} Flexibility in the other framework is provided by multiple levels of analysis, and the focus is not necessarily on a key actor at the individual level. This framework allows for “any element at one level to interact with a different element at another level.”\textsuperscript{14} Similarly, Tatham and Giles touch on flexibility by pointing out that communication with various audiences “must be tailored to the local dynamics and with respect to the behaviors one is seeking to change.”\textsuperscript{15}

In keeping with the flexibility theme, workshop participants emphasized that any framework “should not be viewed as a checklist to hastily complete, but rather a tool to be considered, updated, and refined on a regular basis” throughout all phases of a military
operation. That refinement includes the framework itself. An author for Small Wars Journal also discusses the checklist approach. In February 2017, Patricia DeGennaro emphasized the importance and complexity of human interaction, and she lamented how human terrain analysis has become a “box to check,” if it is not ignored altogether. Credit goes to her journal for not ignoring it but rather waving the banner and advocating for more understanding and training for the human domain.

**Workshop Informed the Joint Concept**

The third recommended source for SFAB development is the JC-HAMO, which was informed by the human elements workshop. In addition to the previously discussed frameworks, workshop participants also examined and provided feedback on a preliminary graphic for JC-HAMO, as requested by the Strategic Landpower Task Force. That feedback directly led to a revamped graphic for the joint concept.

The preliminary graphic depicted a human outline divided into five segments, labeled as psychological, informational, physical, cultural, and social (see figure 1). While the five elements remained the same, their depiction changed in two significant ways in the new graphic (see figure 2, page 93). First, the segmented human outline morphed into an atom with revolving electrons, each representing a human element. Similar to the workshop discussions, this new graphic shows that the “elements are interconnected and interact with each other in a continuous and fluid manner.”

For the second major adaptation, the JC-HAMO graphic now includes a temporal lens, which allows for the human elements to be examined over time. This
temporal aspect was discussed at the workshop where participants “emphasized the importance of time” and “changes over time.” Different or changing circumstances may affect perspectives and decisions of relevant actors, requiring reassessment at different points in time.

However, JC-HAMO is much more than one graphic. It is a comprehensive approach to consider the human aspects at play in military operations. Its central idea is to develop a mindset that considers and seeks to understand these human aspects. This approach can improve how the joint force interacts with key actors within various environments.

To facilitate this improved interaction, the joint concept proposes an operational framework to identify, evaluate, anticipate, and influence relevant actors. This cycle of analysis, referred to as the four imperatives in JC-HAMO, contributes to “ongoing and continuous efforts to comprehend conditions and relevant actor behavior.” Relevant actors include individuals, groups, and populations that are critical to mission success. After all, wars are fought or avoided by these actors, all of which are human.

Avoiding the Mirror

By way of example, the SFAB training curricula should include recognizing the importance of avoiding mirror imaging—a concept mentioned in all three recommended sources. First, the monograph asserted that understanding the human terrain is necessary to avoid mirroring, that is “projecting Western assumptions onto a non-Western actor,” thereby failing to correctly assess that actor “whose decision-making calculus sits in a different framework to our own.” Second, some workshop participants felt the preliminary graphic (figure 1) “suffered from linear thinking and mirror imaging.” And finally, the joint concept encourages self-assessments by the joint force to understand their biases and avoid mirror imaging.

Based on recent comments by its commander, the first SFAB is trying to avoid this pitfall. Col. Scott Jackson was recently quoted as saying, “To be an effective advisor you have to be willing to work within that culture without losing your cultural identity.” Jackson provided further explanation by emphasizing two key points. First, “our partners respect us for who we are as long as we respect...
them for who they are." Second, our advice needs to be consistent with and not violate their culture, but we cannot lose our own cultural identity in the process.31

In conclusion, the SFAB concept provides the Army with another opportunity to properly invest in human domain training. A deeper understanding and appreciation of the human elements and how they interact will better prepare soldiers for this seemingly enduring advise and assist mission. This article recommended three sources to inform and develop such curricula. As the new assistance brigades continue to form and take shape, the Army should heed the Marine Corps’ warning. In addition to avoiding decisive defeat, studying and understanding people will enable SFABs to effectively advise foreign forces and minimize future conflict.

Notes


IN January 2015, the U.S. Army War College conducted a workshop focused on understanding the human elements of military operations. Under the assumption that current doctrine did not then adequately address the moral, cognitive, social, and physical conditions endemic to populations among whom U.S. forces may have to operate, two groups of experts from the behavioral and social sciences participated in an interdisciplinary examination of what human elements military leaders and soldiers need to incorporate into strategic and operational planning for foreign areas. The overall purpose of the workshop was to foster the development of new flexible, contextual frameworks for social and cultural analysis to facilitate more effective operational planning and execution. For the summary of workshop findings and recommendations, please visit: http://www.army.mil/LCDW/StrategicWargamingDivision/publications/Human%20Elements%20Workshop%20Report.pdf.
Lebanese Armed Forces Implementing Instruments of National Power as Lines of Effort to Engage a Palestinian Refugee Camp

Maj. Jean Dagher, Lebanese Army

Palestinian children collect stones to be thrown at their friends 4 December 2009 as they play a “war” game in the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr al-Bared on the outskirts of the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli. (Photo by Joseph Eid, Agence France-Presse)
A nation’s military is considered a reflection of its people’s norms, culture, values, and expectations, and its civilian and military leaders share the responsibility for national security. This tenet was tested in Lebanon when the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were employed in the unique circumstances of the 2007 Nahr al-Bared Campaign (NBC). The LAF’s deployment within its country’s borders for stability and combat operations appears to be inconsistent with a traditional army’s role in a sovereign state. Since the conclusion of the Lebanese Civil War in 1990 and the country’s reconstruction in 1991, the Lebanese government has entrusted the LAF with a stability mission in the country’s interior with its units assigned across all Lebanon. Thus, the LAF finds itself acting as an expeditionary force in its own country in addition to its central border security mission. In this context, the LAF experience in NBC deserves study.

This article first demonstrates how the four instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME)—represent a framework for understanding the LAF lines of effort (LOEs) in the NBC. Second, it analyzes the NBC by providing an overview of the NBC context: the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp, Fath al-Islam (FAI) and the rise of Islamic terrorism within the camp, and the Palestinians’ ambiguous legal status in Lebanon. Third, the article describes the events preceding the NBC, explains the LAF singular context, and describes the operational design framework developed to achieve the campaign’s desired objectives. Lastly, it concludes by recommending what military leaders can learn from a study of the NBC regarding the application of the DIME instruments of national power as LOEs in future engagements.

Over the course of more than three months (20 May–2 September 2007), the LAF was able to defeat the FAI terrorist organization that intended to establish an Islamic State (IS) presence in the North Governorate of Lebanon (hereafter called North Lebanon). In NBC, the LAF achieved major success, considering the magnitude of the challenges faced by the military. Through the effective application and integration of diplomatic measures, informational activities, military operations, and economic actions, the LAF became the most essential and critical means to advance the Lebanese government’s national interests. The DIME approach led directly to the defeat of the FAI. The fighting in NBC also refocused attention on the LAF’s role as the primary defender of Lebanese sovereignty, its constitution, and the formula for coexistence between the diverse religions and ethnicities that make up Lebanese society.

The Nahr al-Bared Campaign

The NBC was unique for several reasons. First, the campaign was the first joint operation conducted by the LAF since its establishment in 1945. Second, it was the first time that the military entered a Palestinian camp in Lebanon during peacetime. Additionally, the LAF’s death toll was the highest since the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990), totaling 169 soldiers. Lastly, the internally displaced personnel, the majority being Palestinians with few Lebanese, reached more than twenty thousand.

The clashes between the FAI and LAF began the night of 19 May 2007. After a bank robbery, the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) raided an apartment in Tripoli, North Lebanon, and the suspects inside turned out to be militants from FAI. Violence escalated between the FAI and the ISF, and before dawn the next morning, the FAI militants simultaneously attacked and seized the three LAF checkpoints around the Nahr al-Bared Camp, killing thirty-two LAF soldiers. The militants spread outside the perimeter of the camp with the aim of expanding and seizing northern Lebanon and establishing a terrorist base in the region. The hostile attack led to 105 days of ferocious war between the FAI terrorist organization and the LAF. The campaign ended
2 September 2007 with the fall of the camp to the LAF and the escape of some FAI militants. 6

**Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp.** To understand the military challenges posed by the NBC, it is necessary first to describe and analyze the geographic and demographic conditions of the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian Camp. Nahr al-Bared Camp is situated on the Mediterranean shoreline, approximately ten miles north of Tripoli—a city with the most extensive Sunni population in Lebanon—and some twenty miles south of the Syrian border. Additionally, the main road that links Tripoli to Syria intersected the camp. 7

The term “Old Camp” refers to the official camp established in 1949 as an emergency shelter for Palestinians when they fled Palestine beginning in 1948 during the Nakba (catastrophe—refers to the mass expulsion of Palestinian Arabs from their homes as a result of Israel’s declaration as an independent nation). Old Camp originally occupied an area of 0.2 square kilometers. 8 The extension of the camp during and after the Lebanese Civil War to adjacent areas, approximately two square kilometers, became known as the “New Camp.” 9

Except for one main road of four lanes that connected the two entrances of Nahr al-Bared, narrow corridors and randomly constructed, closely spaced buildings above underground tunnels of reinforced concrete characterized the Old Camp. Those tunnels, more than twelve feet underground, were initially designed as protection from Israeli air strikes. The number of buildings is estimated to be five hundred.

In 2007, according to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, the number of registered Palestinians in Lebanon was close to 450,000; half of them lived in the country’s twelve refugee camps recognized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as shown in figure 1. The population of Nahr al-Bared at the time of the conflict was approximately twenty-seven thousand refugees, making it second largest among the camps. 10 More than twenty Palestinian factions shared the responsibility for camp
security—bearing weapons, recruiting, and conducting military training inside the camp.\textsuperscript{11}

While the Nahr al-Bared Camp developed an informal credit-based economy, a major wholesale distribution center, and a dynamic economic center in North Lebanon, the complicated demographic conditions and the various Palestinian factions inside the camp formed an unstable environment where terrorist ideologies flourished. In addition, Palestinian extremism was particularly rampant in North Lebanon since Tripoli served as a strategic locale for a symbolic representation of the scattered Lebanese Sunni community.\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{Fath Al-Islam and the rise of Islamic terrorism.} Lebanon and Palestinian camps saw a rapid increase of terrorist organizations and Islamic jihadist extremism in 2006-2007. This security concern put the Lebanese government and the LAF under immense pressure. The FAI terrorist group was founded by Shaker al-Absi, a Palestinian-Jordanian, who believed in a “caliphate,” or Islamic rule, in North Lebanon. The group’s leadership council was composed of a media representative, military commanders, and a legislative board. Its origin was inspired by al-Qaida and its belief in the concept of “jihad.”\textsuperscript{13} Al-Absi was a close associate of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the former leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, and was believed to have established an original connection between the two organizations.

The first appearance of FAI was in the Nahr al-Bared Camp in November 2006. The expansion of FAI may be traced to the year 2000, when an Islamic armed group, al-Takfir wal-Hijra, engaged in an armed conflict with the LAF in al-Diniyeh, North Lebanon. Those among them who were able to escape fled to Nahr al-Bared. Also, Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 and Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 helped to spread the terrorist ideology in the Middle East. During this period, many militants who gained combat experience fled to the Nahr al-Bared Camp and joined the FAI.\textsuperscript{14} In addition, the withdrawal of the Syrian intelligence and security forces from Lebanon in 2005 allowed Islamist activities in the camp to proliferate. As the Sunni-Shia split grew after the 2006 Lebanon War, Salafi ideology flourished among Sunnis, especially those in Nahr al-Bared Camp, who sought to emulate in North Lebanon the Shia Hezbollah’s model in South Lebanon.\textsuperscript{15}

The Lebanese situation in the heart of the Levant made it a part of the ideological, political,
and territorial FAI IS-building project in Lebanon. Militants fleeing from neighboring countries found the Nahr al-Bared Camp a refuge from Lebanese security forces and spread their ideology there. In this context, the FAI was able to penetrate Nahr al-Bared and secure a military base inside the camp in late 2006.

**The ambiguous Palestinian legal status.** Since the Palestinians arrival to Lebanon as refugees in 1948, they have held an unclear legal and political position, which has led to their isolation from the Lebanese economic and social system. The UNRWA operates in Lebanon and provides Palestinian refugees education, health, social, and relief services. The agency is formally in charge of the twelve Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and is recognized by the UNHCR. These camps, including Nahr al-Bared, were kept out of reach of the LAF.

The Cairo Accord in 1969 regulated the relations between Palestinian Camps and the Lebanese State, endorsed Palestinian self-rule inside the camps, and provided the Palestinians virtual autonomy and the right to run their camps. Lebanon became the only country to allow Palestinians to train and carry arms within the refugee camps’ border and to exclude the presence of Lebanese military and military checkpoints at the camps’ entrances. The threat of the “Tawteen,” or permanent settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon, represented an excuse to justify the Lebanese government’s economic restrictions toward the Palestinian refugees. This ambiguous Palestinian legal status and the weakness of long-standing Lebanese-Palestinian agreements led to favorable conditions for harboring terrorists inside Nahr al-Bared Camp.

Palestinians in the camp also suffered from severe problems: poverty, shortage of economic opportunities, high unemployment, lack of infrastructure, and poor housing conditions. These were major causes of frustration and feelings of injustice within Palestinians who adopted FAI extremist ideologies. In addition, the devised posture and polarized politics among the various Palestinian opposing factions characterized the relationship among Palestinian groups sharing the power in the camp, who were unable to provide security for the Palestinians.

**The events preceding the NBC.** Between 2006 and 2007, the FAI terrorist organization conducted six armed robberies that served as a major source of finance. Beginning in 2006, the Lebanese authorities started becoming increasingly aware of the terrorist threat, and the LAF arrested several FAI-affiliated...
individuals. In January 2006, thirteen suspected al-Qaeda-linked militants were detained on suspicion of planning suicide attacks in Lebanon. In February 2006, the Lebanese ISF arrested five FAI militants involved in attacks on military posts in Beirut, which the FAI claimed to be in retaliation for the January arrests. Also in February 2006, a boat loaded with weapons was seized off the coast of Tripoli, signaling an emerging military operation. In November 2006, the FAI seized control of Palestinian faction bases (Fatah al-Intifada) in the camp and raised black banners with the inscription “Tawhid,” literally “God’s unity.” This ignited an armed conflict between different Palestinian factions and the FAI in the Nahr al-Bared Camp. Consequently, the LAF invoked a series of security measures, including enforcement of checkpoints around the entrances of the camp to deal with the security concerns.

The NBC was a clear turning point in Lebanese history. In this campaign, the LAF was able to unite the Lebanese population and politicians, eliminate terrorism, and safeguard Lebanese sovereignty. This successful accomplishment was due to the unity and cohesion of the LAF and its efficient application of the instruments of national power as the operational approach to NBC.

**The Lebanese Armed Forces Singular Context**

The context in which the LAF was able to use all the instruments of national power is considered unique because of Lebanese particularities. The DIME framework is not part of the LAF’s doctrine; regardless, the LAF was able to apply this terminology and principles in managing the NBC. The LAF integrated, coordinated, and synchronized all components of DIME effectively in support of NBC military operations to achieve national political objectives.

The Republic of Lebanon is a parliamentary democracy with a unique confessional sectarian political system consisting of a power-sharing mechanism between religious communities. The unwritten *National Pact* of 1943 and the 1989 *Taif Agreement* consecrated that the
top three political positions are distributed as follows: the president is a Christian Maronite, the speaker of the parliament is a Muslim Shia, and the prime minister is a Muslim Sunni. Also, Christians and Muslims equally share political positions in the parliament and the government, which are proportionally subdivided according to each denomination’s percentage in the population. The LAF has a similar religious sharing mechanism where officers’ corps commissions are divided equally among Christians and Muslims according to an ethnoreligious quota reflecting the balance in the Lebanese society.

The relationship between LAF command and civilian authorities presents an insightful perspective. Even though the LAF is subordinate to civilian control of the government and the president—the commander in chief of the armed forces—the balance between civilian and military leadership comes from agreement on key issues and a mutual understanding of defense vision.

The LAF executes its mission within the Lebanese government defense and security policy represented by the Ministry of National Defense. Shared identity and values between military and society imply that the relation between the Lebanese civilian and military leaders does not necessary follow a normative rule. The LAF is not a “blind obedient”; instead, it carries orders because its command agrees with them.

The relationship between the Lebanese government and the LAF can best be described as hanging between an objective and a subjective civilian control, such as the one Samuel Huntington, a founder of modern civil-military relationship theory, advances in his book, *The Soldier and the State*. This civil-military relationship standpoint is because the LAF reflects all social forces and political ideologies of the Lebanese society and prevents any particular religious subgroup or political party from having enhanced control over Lebanese military affairs at the expense of others. The more social divisions and absence of unified political decision on key issues, the less the LAF’s resilience to dealing with national threats and conducting any critical operation becomes, and vice versa.
The three military services (land, air, and naval forces) fall under the LAF command. The LAF missions are to defend the nation’s borders against any external attack, preserve sovereignty, enforce the constitution, and contribute to humanitarian assistance. In 1991, after the conclusion of the Lebanese Civil War, the Lebanese government entrusted the LAF with the mission of keeping peace and stability in the country’s interior, in coordination with the ISF and other security forces. The LAF deployed its troops across all Lebanon performing homeland security tasks, with units assigned to each of the five military regions that divide the nation. In addition, the Lebanese constitution and the National Defense Law gave the LAF flexible legal powers that become exceptional when the government declares a state of emergency or in case the population is exposed to danger.

The LAF’s focus toward internal security reflects its positioning toward the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and Nahr al-Bared Camp in particular. In NBC, the LAF acted as more than just a military force; it represented the Lebanese population’s unity and played a prominent role in Lebanese society. Because of the homeland security posture with units deployed in the north and available reserve units, the LAF was able to rapidly maneuver to respond to the FAI terrorist hostile actions and regain control on the Nahr al-Bared Camp.

The Nahr al-Bared Campaign Operational Design Framework

In the 2007 NBC, synergy between the LAF and all the civilian actors was enabled through coordination among Lebanese diplomatic, informational, military, and economic entities to face the challenges from FAI terrorist activities. The DIME measures taken by the LAF reinforced its position before the FAI in the NBC and allowed it to overcome the campaign’s complex operational environment. The operational design framework (shown in figure 2, page 102) illustrates the strategic environment in which the campaign was executed, the problem that the LAF addressed, the strategic direction and guidance from the Lebanese national leaders, and the LAF operational approach to solving the problem.

The Strategic Environment. The magnitude of the NBC and the various military, political, religious, and international actors involved created a complex strategic environment. During the campaign, all Lebanese institutions contributed to the LAF efforts in combating terrorism and put their efforts in the hands of the LAF leadership. The exceptional legal powers granted to the LAF in time of war provide the context in which the LAF was able to make use of all the DIME instruments of national power during the NBC. Lebanon’s complex political system was subordinated by a social consensus and unified decision-making among the different religious and political parties of Lebanese society that prevented any objecting subgroup from impeding the LAF and enabled it to focus on dealing with the FAI national threats.

The problem. The LAF was challenged during the NBC to rapidly maneuver with limited resources to regain control of the three checkpoints around the Nahr al-Bared Camp and to deploy additional units to defeat a more prepared enemy.

The strategic direction and guidance. The Lebanese unified national and political decision-making regarding the Nahr al-Bared Camp crisis allowed for the development of precise strategic guidance to the LAF in engaging the FAI in the NBC. That guidance was to conduct a decisive operation to deny the FAI from establishing an IS foothold in North Lebanon by defeating the terrorist organization, seizing and regaining control on Nahr al-Bared Camp, and safeguarding civilians.

The operational approach. In the NBC, the LAF structured its campaign plan along four LOEs: diplomatic measures, informational activities, military operations, and economic actions. This operational approach, illustrated in figure 3 (on page 105), outlines the conditions that surrounded the NBC, the LAF LOEs, the supporting operational objectives and tasks, the conditions linked to support the achievement of the LOEs, and the LAF desired end states. These LOEs were related to the overall national goal of defending the homeland and achieving unity of effort.

Diplomatic measures. In additional to garnering national support, the LAF pursued international backing from partners and allied nations. Meanwhile, the FAI relied on the mainstream Arabs and Muslims and aggressively pursued diplomatic overtures to gain Palestinian and Islamic sympathy and support for their cause. During the campaign, the negotiations conducted between the LAF’s command and the FAI were very complicated. The LAF began to make its most significant successes in its war against the FAI when it won the political support of the Lebanese
government and internal political parties, Palestinian factions, and the international community.

Internally, the LAF preserved its national neutrality by leveraging Lebanese religious sectarian sentiments, which kept its actions as a reflection of Lebanese public opinion. In addition, the LAF persuaded the government to make the NBC its national security priority and to focus all its efforts toward defending the Lebanese sovereignty. Second, the LAF was able to overcome the weakness of the long-standing Lebanese-Palestinian agreements and the devised posture among the various Palestinian factions by using a combat-terrorism narrative that enabled the LAF to win their support in its fight against the FAI in the NBC. Lastly, the LAF used its international diplomatic relations to encourage several countries to pledge and assist in its NBC engagement. The international community stood behind the LAF’s campaign to defeat terrorism and backed the LAF’s fight to deny the FAI from establishing an IS presence in North Lebanon.28

The LAF served as the principal lead in the NBC negotiations, formally and informally, to influence decisions. Many unsuccessful negotiations were held between the LAF and the FAI, and many unacceptable initiatives that excluded handing over FAI leader al-Absi and its military commander Abou Hureira were submitted to the LAF headquarters from different actors, including those that espoused the disbandment of the FAI terrorist organization and expulsion of its fighters outside Lebanon.29 During the cease-fire period, the LAF conducted civilian evacuation, moving around twenty thousand Palestinians to the neighboring areas in a rate of almost a thousand internally displaced personnel a day.30 For the FAI militants, the negotiation period was a time to improve its operational positioning in an attempt to gain a relative advantage.

Informational activities. The LAF was very sensitive to its public image because it reflected the various Lebanese social and religious parties and because the LAF possessed a major role in preserving the nation’s unity after the long civil turmoil. During the NBC, the LAF conducted an extensive information campaign to motivate its troops, inspire the Lebanese population to gain broad-based support, and influence the Palestinians in and out of Nahr al-Bared Camp, which induced better circumstances for the military operations.

Figure 3. The Lebanese Armed Forces Operational Approach in Nahr Al-Bared Campaign
First, the LAF used its Directorate of Orientation’s media assets to address and communicate to its troops both local and international empathy with the LAF, which kept soldiers’ motivation high and encouraged their families to support the campaign, even with its sometimes harsh consequences. Second, the LAF publications (the National Defense Magazine and the Lebanese army’s magazine) were used as means to reach the Lebanese population. The magazine capitalized on effective messaging and disseminated information to attain the total support of the Lebanese populace against the FAI terrorist actions. Lastly, the LAF started new programs directed at the Palestinian population in and outside the Nahr al-Bared Camp to discredit the FAI terrorist organization, using explicit messages emphasizing the theme that terrorism was destroying their camp. Meanwhile, the FAI relied on both jihadi web forums and mainstream media to spread its message and intent, promote its ideology, and apply propaganda and pressure, as well as to recruit militants.

The LAF information campaign was very successful and stimulated most of the Palestinian refugees and factions to cooperate willingly with the LAF in NBC, which disrupted FAI terrorist attempts to gain sympathy from its targeted audience.

Military operations. Before the NBC, the LAF was experiencing budget constraints due to the fiscal challenges that the Lebanese government was facing as a consequence of the 2006 Lebanon War. However, when the campaign started, the Lebanese government allocated the necessary equipment as a priority to defeat the better trained and equipped FAI militants in unconventional warfare.

The LAF in the NBC conducted joint operations where the actions of its land, naval, and air operating components were commanded by a joint force commander. In addition to these tangible assets, the intangible capabilities represented by the high morale and esprit de corps of the LAF soldiers were value added in overcoming the deficit in equipment. The LAF key tasks
were to defeat FAI aggression, restore control over the Nahr al-Bared Camp, reinforce stability, and achieve the country’s political objective of denying FAI from establishing an IS presence in North Lebanon.

The first phase of the operation was to regain control of the three checkpoints around the camp that the FAI had seized and to begin deploying forces into the theater. The second phase was to set the conditions for the dominant phase by surrounding the camp. The third phase was to conduct a counterattack to occupy the New Camp and then the Old Camp and defeat FAI militants. The focus in the fourth phase was to set the conditions to transition control of the camp to civilian authority.

More than two thousand LAF troops participated in the NBC. Mission command was enabled by the Signal Regiment by establishing communication assets and structures that allowed the joint force commander to command and control his land, naval, and air troops. The land maneuver units consisted of one infantry brigade, four Special Forces regiments (the Rangers Regiment, the Navy SEALs, the Air Assault Regiment, and an intervention regiment), and two tank regiments. The Engineer Regiment carried out the demolition of tunnels and the clearance of improvised explosive devices. The LAF Directorate of Intelligence provided timely and accurate intelligence reports on the situation, the composition and disposition of FAI fighters, and other Palestinian activities in Nahr al-Bared. The two artillery regiments supported the maneuvering troops by delivering indirect fires on FAI fortified shelters. The Logistic Brigade provided sustainment services to the maneuvering units through maintenance and recovery to extend their operational reach in addition to providing personnel services and health service support. The LAF Military Police Brigade was responsible for the protection of the troops and physical assets while moving to and from the area of operation.

The LAF navy’s role in the operations was to close the shore and tighten control of the camp. The navy also provided much-needed fire support for land-forces operations and prevented the FAI’s infiltration toward the Mediterranean Sea from the west, which denied logistical support from the coast. The navy also provided observation for both indirect fire and close air support.

The LAF air force delivered close air support, reconnaissance, and observation to the joint force commander. The air force modified some of their UH1H helicopters, transforming them into attack helicopters with 250 kg and 400 kg munitions. The updated helicopters were used for aerial bombardment, targeting the FAI’s fortified positions, especially in the Old Camp. In addition, the helicopters conducted casualty evacuation and transported personnel, weapons, and ammunition to and from the area of operation.

The fighting in the NBC was a genuine opportunity for the LAF to gain major combat experience in counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare against a well-armed and well-trained enemy.

### Economic Actions

In the NBC, the LAF conducted several economic actions that helped shape the operational environment and achieve victory. The LAF sought to increase Lebanese government funding, pursued international military aid, and reduced the FAI’s ability to survive in the Nahr Al-Bared Camp. The LAF economic grip on the entire camp hindered FAI access to additional resources and was a major factor in forcing the FAI to negotiate.

First, the LAF had always experienced budget and defense expenditures constraints and had been unable to obtain modern equipment for years. In the NBC, the LAF operated in an entirely different operational environment and required supplies, equipment, weapons, and ammunition. The LAF was able to convince the Lebanese government to increase its military expenditures to meet NBC requirements and to prioritize the defense of the nation against the FAI’s credible threats.

Second, during ongoing operations, the LAF received considerable international military assistance from the United States, Syria, France, the United Arab Emirates, and other countries. This enormous support played a crucial role in bridging the gap between the LAF needs and its available means, providing the LAF with enough resources to win the fight against the FAI. One example of this support was the increase in U.S. military aid to Lebanon (e.g., supplies, equipment, and ammunition) in the 2007 budget of more than seven times that of the previous year. Lastly, the LAF influenced the government to put pressure on banks with FAI accounts to stop the latter’s financial support.

The severity of the security situation revealed unequivocally and objectively that noncooperation to support the LAF embracing all instruments of national power was just not an option. The Nahr al-Bared crisis
acted as a wake-up call and a red flag for all Palestinian factions. Fearing a similar fate, Palestinian leaders across the political spectrum in all refugee camps began cooperating on security matters in an unprecedented manner. In the 2007 NBC, adopting the DIME construct was crucial in achieving the LAF’s victory.

Conclusion

In the twenty-first century, the majority of military activities shifted from traditional warfare to stability operations. The global war on terrorism reveals an urgent need for unified national efforts and the strategic implementation of all elements of national power to combat violent extremism. Partnership and interaction between military forces and civilian leadership have become more important to military mission accomplishment. The use of military forces in homeland missions to provide security and stability is more often applied to defend a nation’s sovereignty, especially from the rising threat of terrorism.

In this context, the hostile actions by the FAI terrorist organization and the threat of establishing an IS presence in Lebanon in 2007 represented an existential threat to the sovereignty of the country. Taking into consideration the country’s singularity, the LAF needed to implement a holistic approach based on the instruments of national power as LOEs and their efficient integration to address the FAI terrorist aggression during the NBC.

The LAF was able to use the DIME framework during the NBC based on the authority conferred by the Lebanese constitution and the National Defense Law that grants the LAF exceptional legal powers in time of war. The LAF demonstrated its unity and cohesion with Lebanese civilian leadership and handled the aforementioned internal conflicts successfully.

The FAI rise in the Nahr al-Bared Camp was a consequence of the failed policies of the Lebanese government toward Palestinian refugees. However, through diplomatic measures, the LAF was able to overcome the weaknesses of long-standing Lebanese-Palestinian agreements. The LAF managed the informational campaign through maintaining a counterpoint to the FAI’s biased and disruptive propaganda. The LAF was also able to develop, acquire, and update military equipment to adequately project military force on the NBC. The economic measures used by the LAF restricted the FAI’s ability to survive longer inside Nahr al-Bared Camp and obliged the FAI militants to negotiate with the LAF. It was through these integrated efforts that the LAF achieved victory in the NBC and defeated the FAI.

The LAF’s focus on domestic security is growing due to the diverse internal security threats that Lebanon continues to face. The presence of large numbers of recently arrived Syrian refugees in Lebanon has exacerbated its complicated demographic situation. Moreover, because the LAF is performing a multitude of homeland security tasks in addition to its central border security missions, it requires maintaining a high level of responsiveness to support law enforcement while staying ready to respond to other external threats and emergencies. With all that said, the LAF’s success in the NBC highlights that the integration of the four elements of national power—DIME—as LOEs represents a proven framework to improve the LAF’s efficiency and success during future Palestinian camp campaigns, antiterrorism operations, or other missions. Other countries that face internal conflict might be interested in this operational design framework and apply it to their own military operations in support of homeland security.

Notes


5. Aram Nerguizian, The Lebanese Armed Forces: Challenges and Opportunities in Post-Syria Lebanon (report, Washington,


9. Ibid., 46–47.


11. Abdel Kader, Maarakit Nahr al-Bareed was Intisar Al-Watan, 6–7.


15. Abdel Kader, Maarakit Nahr al-Bareed was Intisar Al-Watan, 9–10.


17. Issa, "Palestinian Political Factions," 75.

18. Moujally, “Post-Conflict Governance in Nahr El Bared Palestinian Refugee Camp,” 78. The “Tawteen” becomes a powerful discursive practice opposed to the Palestinians’ right to return to Palestine.


30. Abdel Kader, Maarakit Nahr al-Bareed was Intisar Al-Watan, 27.


34. Ibid., 4–5.


36. Al-Arabiya News, “Lebanon’s Army Gears up for Fight.”

Mexico's Fight against Transnational Organized Crime

Dr. R. Evan Ellis
The security environment in Mexico is characterized by a dangerous fragmentation of and competition among criminal groups that pushed the nation’s homicide rate to a record high of 22.5 per 100,000 in 2017, a 27.5 percent increase over the prior year. The nation, whose security and prosperity strongly impacts the United States through geographic proximity and associated flows of people, money, and goods (both licit and illicit), is at a critical juncture in its fight against transnational organized crime. Since Mexican President Felipe Calderón launched the “war against the cartels” in December 2006 with the deployment of the Mexican army into the state of Michoacán, the nation’s security forces have taken down the leaders of multiple powerful criminal groups and debilitated their organizations. In the process, the Mexican military, police, and other security institutions have evolved their institutional structures, modified both their strategy and their doctrine, and strengthened their ability to combat transnational organized crime. Yet as with the experience of the United States in combatting terrorist groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mexico’s fight against the cartels, both despite and because of its successes, has created a more chaotic criminal landscape, with both a higher level of violence and a broader range of criminality.

Complicating Mexico’s security challenge is the disposition of the Trump administration to act aggressively against illegal immigration from Mexico (among other countries) into the United States, along with U.S. renegotiation and possible abandonment of the North American Free Trade Agreement. These actions increase stressors on Mexico, including the prospect of expanded deportations of immigrants to Mexico, the loss of remittance income, and impeded access by Mexican producers to the U.S. market. The Trump administration’s actions, magnified by rhetoric that many Mexicans perceive as an insult to their country and people, have combined with Mexican frustration over the persistence of violence and corruption to create the real prospect that leftist populist candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador could win the July 2018 presidential election, potentially taking Mexico on a course of more distant political relations and decreased security cooperation with the United States and expanded engagement with extra-hemispheric rivals of the United States such as Russia and China.
This article examines Mexico’s serious and evolving security challenges, and the key initiatives and critical issues confronting the nation’s security forces. It argues that the Mexican government has made important progress against a range of criminal groups and in innovating and strengthening its own capabilities to combat such entities and associated flows of illegal goods—capabilities that deserve to be recognized, further refined, and exploited in partnership with the United States and Mexico’s other neighbors. It concludes with recommendations for U.S. policy makers regarding the importance of strong and respectful support for Mexico at the present critical juncture.

The Transnational Organized Crime Threat

The actions of Mexican security forces against the cartels during the two most recent presidential administrations (sexenios) of Felipe Calderón and Enrique Peña Nieto, and the associated fighting unleashed between those cartels and their factions, have contributed to the fragmentation of Mexico’s criminal landscape, with a proliferation of groups that has made Mexico’s security environment more violent and less predictable.4

In the 1980s and 1990s, a limited number of criminal groups such as the Sinaloa, Arellano Félix, and Carrillo Fuentes organizations and the Gulf Cartel moved cocaine through the country, often with the complicity of corrupt Mexican government officials but with limited violence and competition against each other. Intergroup competition among Mexican cartels and associated violence began to increase before Calderón’s sexenio, thanks in part to the disruptive employment by groups such as the Gulf Cartel with significant military training and firepower to compete against each other. Yet, the introduction of military forces by Mexico to combat the cartels arguably accelerated the evolution and splintering of its criminal groups, which expanded from eight major cartels during

![Figure. Dominant Cartels throughout Mexico](https://www.geopoliticalfutures.com)
the Calderón sexenio to more than three hundred by the end of the Peña Nieto administration. (The figure on page 112 shows the most dominant cartels by region.) Such fragmentation expanded violence by increasing uncertainty and competition among groups and by engaging a greater number of entities in the supply chain moving narcotics, other illicit goods, and people through Mexico toward the United States. Whereas organizations such as the Guadalajara Cartel once had the contacts and infrastructure to move drugs from Colombia through Central America, the Caribbean, and Mexico to the United States, the breakup of groups left some of the new entities without such connections, dedicating themselves to moving illicit goods along only part of the route, taxing (extorting) others moving the goods, or engaging in other criminal activities. Further complicating matters, as the groups increasingly employed armed wings or gangs to protect themselves and wage war on each other, those groups engaged in local criminal activities to sustain themselves, expanding the level of common criminality in the country.

One of the most worrisome current dynamics in Mexico’s evolving criminal environment is the weakening of the Sinaloa Cartel, considered the wealthiest and internally best connected of the Mexico-based criminal groups, following the extradition of its titular leader, Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, to the United States. The fall of Sinaloa has enabled and been accelerated by the rise of the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (Jalisco New Generation Cartel). With its combination of international illicit business connections, orientation toward violence, and disposition to insert itself into preexisting struggles between other groups for its own benefit, Jalisco New Generation has contributed to the worsening situation in Mexico. Meanwhile, other major groups such as the Zetas are experiencing a resurgence in some parts of Mexico’s southeast, and in the state of Guerrero, and to an extent in adjacent states, the expanding violence and struggle among numerous factions in an area in which the state has historically had only a weak presence is pushing the area toward ungovernability.
Innovation and Organizational Adaptation in the Mexican State Response

In the context of the challenges posed by Mexico’s increasingly fragmented security environment, the Ejército Mexicano (Mexican army), Armada de México (Mexican navy), and other security organizations have achieved a number of successes against the cartels. They have also assumed new responsibilities and adapted their organizations to strengthen their capabilities in combating criminal groups in ways that deserve recognition.

As a presidential candidate, Peña Nieto promised to extract the military from its role in internal security operations in Mexico and replace it with an expanded national police and a new forty-thousand-person militarized police force called the National Gendarmerie. However, the political and other obstacles of doing so prevented the Gendarmerie (that was ultimately created as a division within the federal police) from being large and capable enough to replace the military in the fight against Mexico’s criminal groups. The need for Mexico’s army and navy to continue their direct involvement, in turn, has obligated the Peña Nieto government to adapt Mexico’s laws and to create new structures within the armed forces themselves to facilitate that role.

In December 2017, the Mexican congress passed a new national security law that more clearly defines authorities and responsibilities for the conduct of internal security operations by the armed forces. Importantly, the law does not provide carte blanche to the military to conduct operations throughout the country as it chooses. Rather, it specifies that authority to conduct such operations is limited to specific places and periods of time, and only when the appropriate civilian authority (such as a state governor) has affirmatively declared that the capabilities of civilian institutions responsible for security in the area have been exceeded.

The armed forces, including the heads of both the army and navy (who advocated for it), view the law as positive because of its role in clarifying conditions and responsibilities as much as it empowers their actions. However, as of May 2018, the law had eighteen challenges against it in the Mexican Supreme Court as well as significant political opposition from left-oriented Mexican political parties such as Movimiento Regeneración Nacional (National Regeneration Movement) and nongovernmental organizations. The law also faced discontent from a substantial part of the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party), as well as from state-level politicians, who are reportedly uncomfortable with the law’s requirement that local authorities have to formally declare the failure of their government to respond to the security challenge in the territory for which they are responsible in order to receive military assistance. Based on the wide array of groups with concerns, multiple Mexican experts consulted for this study believe that the law may be retracted or modified after the July 2018 elections.

Beyond the law, the inability to build a police force sufficiently large and capable enough to replace the military in the fight against the cartels has led the Mexican army to create military police (MP) brigades to best ensure that the forces it employs to conduct internal security operations are trained and equipped for the mission, including engaging with civilian populations. Whereas the military police was originally a small organization within the Mexican army dedicated to protecting installations and addressing crimes within the military, the current expansion transforms it into a branch and significantly increases it, with a targeted end strength of forty thousand persons (arguably not by coincidence, the size once envisioned for the Gendarmerie).

As of February 2018, the Mexican army had stood up seven MP brigades and was in the process of standing up an eighth. As part of the expansion of the military police and its transformation from a small organization focused on installation protection and internal criminal matters to a much larger one engaging with the Mexican civilian population, the Mexican army has greatly expanded its training facilities for military police and created a new MP career path (branch). While the officers used for the new MP brigades were initially transferred from other branches, the first class trained specifically for the new MP branch graduates the training program and enters service in 2018.

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A notable characteristic of the new MP brigades is their close relationship, by design, with the local government and population. In establishing the first brigades, the Mexican army chose locations where the presence of the military was strongly supported by the local governments. As part of the concept for setting up the brigades, state governments and local businesses agreed to provide the materials, funding, and other support to construct the facilities and other required infrastructure where the units are to be based. In Monterrey, for example, where the first brigade was stood up, the Mexican conglomerate CEMEX donated all of the cement for the construction of the facility; in combination with other donations, the facilities housing the brigade are the newest and arguably the nicest in the Mexican military. The next brigade will reportedly be established in the tourism-oriented state of Quintana Roo, where there has reportedly been a significant upsurge in violence from groups such as the Zetas.

While the Peña Nieto government and the Mexican military under Gen. Salvador Cienfuegos Zepeda have indicated their strong support for the MP brigades, the future of the initiative following the 2018 general elections is not clear. As suggested previously, the incoming government could rescind or replace the newly passed national security law, which makes important contributions to the legal framework within which the MP brigades conduct security operations as well as advancing an alternative concept for how to meet the security challenges facing the nation.

Beyond the MP brigades, the Mexican army is also involved in the installation of new radar systems in the northern part of the country that will strengthen Mexico’s control of its national airspace, in part by helping to deny the use of its national territory to narco traffickers. As of February 2018, the site survey for the radars was underway, although the timetable for the radar acquisition and installation were not clear.

While the MP brigade is the principal internal security project of the Mexican military, the institution is also
in the process of transforming itself into a more internationally oriented force. Notable milestones include expansion of the Mexican army delegation supporting the Interamerican Defense College and the Interamerican Defense Board in Washington, D.C. Indeed, for the first time, a Mexican army general, Maj. Gen. Luis Rodriguez Bucio, has been made head of the board.

Mexico has further committed to establishing a training institute for peacekeeping forces, the Centro de Entrenamiento Conjunto de Operaciones de Paz de México (Joint Training Center for Peace Operations in Mexico), and, together with the Mexican navy, the deployment of a peacekeeping battalion by 2020, although the status of the construction of the facility and the contribution of personnel for the battalion are uncertain. In April 2017, the Mexican army also hosted the Central American Security Conference for the first time, and it will host the thirteenth Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas in 2018.

By comparison to the Mexican army, the Mexican navy’s role in internal security operations has been more modest, although its special forces and other units have had numerous high-profile successes against the leaders of criminal organizations. While the Mexican army has established the aforementioned MP brigades, the navy’s use of its military police in operations for public internal security missions has been limited to a small deployment in the state of Veracruz, done as part of a commitment made by the president to the state. The mission is in the process of winding down in conjunction with the 2018 end of the period in office of the current Veracruz state government.

Although the Mexican navy has not followed the army in expanding its own military police for use in public protection, its naval infantry is regularly involved in operations against criminal groups, not only within one hundred miles of the coast where they traditionally operated but also in the entirety of the Mexican national territory. With approximately fifteen thousand personnel, the Mexican Infantería de Marina (Naval Infantry) is still recovering from a severe reduction in its numbers that occurred during the Fox administration (when it had as few as two thousand personnel). The use of naval infantry against criminal groups has arguably leveraged, more than driven, the organization’s recovery of end strength. Yet, the mission has arguably shifted the focus of the organization.

The principal training school for naval infantry in Campeche, for example, now has a strong focus on urban combat in addition to the naval infantry’s traditional missions of amphibious and jungle operations.

Despite the aforementioned changes, there is more continuity within the Mexican naval infantry than one might expect from its substantial role in operations against transnational organized crime. The commands and units comprising the force are fundamentally the same as those before the Fox administration, although some locations that were previously hosting company-size units (such as Puerto Penasco in Sonora) now have battalions. The number of general officers ( admirals) coming from the naval infantry has also remained relatively constant, driven by three brigades that are one-star commands, plus the billet for the naval infantry admiral who heads the navy special forces unit. Some general-officer-level staff billets have also been made eligible for naval infantry admirals, supported by a new course at the Naval War College to prepare them for the considerations of commanding both naval and infantry forces.

The most important land-oriented force within the Mexican navy for combating transnational organized crime has been its special forces command. Previously, Mexican navy special forces were split between regional centers in Manzanillo, Tuxpan (Veracruz), and Coyocan, where they were collocated with regional naval intelligence units that helped them to prepare for their missions. During the Peña Nieto administration, the force has been consolidated into a single brigade-sized force located in Coyocan to benefit from economies of scale with respect to training, technical capabilities (such as command and control), equipment, and other support. From Coyocan, special forces elements can be deployed for operations to any part of the country. Once deployed, the elements of the special forces brigade then leverage local Mexican navy and other intelligence and logistics assets, as well as what they bring from Coyocan, to support their mission. Yet, while consolidation of the Mexican special forces has indeed been beneficial for realizing economies of scale, some interviewed for this article expressed concern about putting “all of the eggs” of Mexican special forces into one basket.

Beyond the employment of its special forces and naval infantry more broadly against criminal objectives, the Mexican navy’s most significant new activity in the struggle against organized crime as the
Peña Nieto administration nears its end has been its assumption of control over port security from the Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes (Secretariat of Communications and Transportation, or SCT). During the initial phases of the war against criminal groups under the Calderón administration, the Mexican navy had established coordinating groups, called *cumares*, in the principal ports of Altamira, Veracruz, Lázaro Cárdenas, and Manzanillo to more effectively provide physical security of the ports, as well as to protect their personnel against criminal groups using threats of violence against port workers to secure access to the facilities and associated flows of goods. The use of these coordinating groups has now been expanded to twenty-one of Mexico’s largest ports, making the process of security planning and requesting assistance more direct for port authorities. As part of providing that security, in conjunction with the *cumares*, the Mexican navy has created and deployed special security units called *Unidades Navales de Protección Portuaria* (Naval Port Security Units, or UNAPROPs), to those ports. The UNAPROPs are generally about fifty persons in size, depending on the classification of the ports. While UNAPROPs are only assigned to the largest 21 of Mexico’s 103 ports, smaller ports are covered by Advanced Naval Stations, typically manned by twelve to fourteen Mexican naval infantry.

Since formally assuming control for port security from SCT in 2016, the Mexican navy has established an associated authority for the mission, the Dirección General de Capitanías de Puerto y Asuntos Marítimos (General Directorate of Port Captaincies and Maritime Affairs, or UNICAPAM). The navy has also created special programs, including within the Naval War College, to prepare its officers and personnel for the tasks associated with port security, oversight, and administration. Yet, while UNICAPAM provides oversight and coordination, civilian port captains continue to run all but a small number of key facilities such as Lázaro Cárdenas.

Progressive left-wing candidate for the Mexican presidency, Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the Juntos Haremos Historia coalition, waves to the crowd 13 April 2018 in the municipality of Cuautitlán Izcalli, State of Mexico. One of his campaign promises is to stop operations in Mexico by the Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. Mexico’s presidential election is scheduled for 1 July 2018. (Photo by Omar López, ZUMA Wire/Alamy Live News)
Similarly, the civilian Administration for the Generation and Training of the Merchant Marine continues to retain a number of nonsecurity functions in the ports and coordinates with the navy regarding these functions.

The navy has had some difficulties in obtaining information from and coordinating with SCT during the transition period, but senior naval officers and others consulted for this study generally assess that the navy’s assumption of the mission has notably increased the Mexican government’s control over the flow of goods through the ports, and correspondingly, seizure of illicit materials. While its new function does not give it direct control over Mexican customs operations, the Mexican navy does have people inside the customs organization, thanks to an initiative put forth in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. Although the Mexican navy does not inspect every container going through the nation’s ports, naval officials have both inside information and the ability to intervene in select cases, when intelligence from the navy or other sources indicates a reason for intervening with respect to a specific cargo.

In association with its port mission, the navy has also increased controls over illicit flows of minerals, traditionally obtained from both legitimate and unregistered mines in Michoacán and exported through the port of Lázaro Cárdenas, often to companies in China. Similarly, the navy has increased controls over precursor chemicals, including establishing on-site labs for testing suspected controlled substances manned by naval personnel in the ports of Veracruz and Lázaro Cárdenas (also supporting the adjacent port of Manzanillo, an entry point for many drug precursors), eliminating the previous delays created by the need to send samples to Mexico City for testing.

The navy has also made progress in expanding its cyberdefense capabilities, supporting both the defense of infrastructure and operations against sophisticated criminal groups. It recently established its cybersecurity organization, Unidad de Ciberseguridad (Cybersecurity Unit), as an independent entity, leveraging officers specially trained in the Mexican Naval War College Information Security Masters Course, set up in March 2017 as the first such capability in Mexico.17

Although the Mexican armed forces receive the majority of media attention for their role in the fight against transnational organized crime, the Mexican federal police (as well as state police) continues to be the principal force in combatting the scourge of crime and delinquency in the country. Depending on who is counted, the core of the federal police is comprised of approximately twenty-five thousand officers across five divisions.

As noted previously, the Gendarmerie was significantly reduced in scope from the 40,000-person force originally contemplated to approximately 1,200 today and implemented as a division within the Mexican police.18 Although a variety of missions have been proposed for the Gendarmerie, from critical-asset protection to community policing, in practice, it has been largely used as a reserve force, deployed to areas such as Valle de Bravo and Baja, California, when existing federal police units have not been adequate to cover the perceived need. While the Gendarmerie initially received significant attention and resources, to include receiving new, high-quality arms and equipment, authorities consulted for this study note that the organization appears to have lost much of its original prioritization within the police.19

Beyond the Gendarmerie, while the police in Mexico are widely perceived as corrupt, the Mexican federal police are arguably more professional and less tainted by corruption than their state and local police counterparts. All Mexican federal police officers now have to train for a full year in the Mexican police academy as well as pass a regular a battery of confidence tests, which include physical and drug tests and lifestyle interviews (to identify possible illicit enrichment), among others. Nonetheless, because of limited resources for such controls, officers average only one confidence test every three years, and there is potential
for corrupt senior officials to pressure subordinates to participate in illicit activities by threatening to falsely denounce them. Moreover, the lack of resources, difficult working conditions, and the perception that senior jobs are reserved for the friends of political appointees make it difficult for the federal police to attract quality candidates.

By contrast to the federal police, the performance of Mexico’s state-level police forces is uneven. Not only are levels of corruption on the forces often high, but state police forces also generally lack money for severance pay to eliminate police who fail confidence tests from the force, let alone track who employs them after they leave. Training is another problem for some state-level police forces, with at least one state employing officers after they have received only two weeks of training. Other problems include a lack of police investigators as well as serious discipline concerns, to include questions of involvement by some state police officers in Veracruz (among other states) in extrajudicial killings.

In practice, some state-level police forces are significantly more capable than others. In wealthy Monterrey, for example, the previous government established an elite police force, the Fuerza Civil, which ultimately recruited some 4,500 persons from across Mexico, including many retired military officers. Monterrey provided the recruits with good equipment and training, and special living quarters isolated from the community to protect members against the corrupting effects of threats by criminal groups against their families. Even such exemplar police forces have had difficulty, however, attracting adequate numbers of quality personnel.

In theory, under Peña Nieto, the Mexican government has been using its control over federal funding to the states to oblige the latter to incorporate the myriad of municipal police forces in Mexico under state control under the Mando Único (Unified Command) Program. Yet, Mexican security sector personnel interviewed for this study noted almost uniformly that implementation of Mando Único in different states has been uneven, and as the 2018 presidential elections have approached, such initiatives have lost momentum, in part because Mexico’s political parties seek to leverage the resources of state-level political machines during this period and are thus reluctant to pressure the governors over policy issues.

Beyond the police, at the federal level, two other key Mexican organizations in the fight against organized crime are the Procurador General de la República (Attorney General of the Republic, or PGR, and the national civilian intelligence agency Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional (CISEN). According to officials interviewed for this study, while CISEN continues to make important contributions to the struggle against organized crime, it has neither fully overcome significant prior cuts to its experienced analysts and field agents, nor has it placated concerns about its politicization that have historically plagued it.

With respect to the PGR, under the Peña Nieto administration, it has arguably been the most neglected law enforcement organization regarding resources and administrative attention for reforms. While the PGR has an intelligence branch with up to one thousand employees, it is principally focused on analysis to support building cases against criminal groups rather than on conducting field work.

One innovative tool created by the current Mexican government to help provide security in high-crime/high-violence areas has been Bases de Operaciones Mixtas (Combined Operations Bases, or BOMs). In the initial concept, BOMs were bases in which federal and local police, military forces, and other government forces were physically collocated to realize operations and act as a deterrent, in part because only the military had adequate firepower and other capabilities to respond to the threat in such areas, yet only the police could perform arrests. While experts interviewed for this study believed the BOMs deter criminal activity to some degree in the areas where they are established, their effectiveness is limited by the lack of confidence of federal forces that the local police with whom they work in the facilities have not been corrupted and could thus compromise their operations. Further undercutting the operational effectiveness of the BOMs, because the BOM facility is a known, fixed site, the concentration or convergence of various authorities to the BOM was a signal to criminals that an operation was about to be launched. As a result, today forces often do not concentrate in the BOM facility before the operation.

Beyond traditional law enforcement institutions, Mexico’s Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) also plays an important role, in conjunction with the U.S. Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, in attacking the resources and financial flows of organized crime groups. Yet, despite the FIU’s critical role, it is beset by problems. The organization is reportedly
under-resourced, given Mexico’s combination of a large, diverse economy with a sophisticated financial sector and a substantial informal economy. The FIU also reportedly has difficulties in coordinating with the PGR so that Mexican authorities can legally act on the cases that the FIU identifies as in need of intervention. Beyond the FIU itself, Mexican banking laws, while seemingly adequate to deter money laundering and other illicit financial activities, are very unevenly enforced.

In addition to the FIU and the fight against money laundering, Mexico’s prison system is an important, often overlooked component in the nation’s struggle against criminal groups. Effective control within prisons is critical not only in avoiding the escape of high-value targets such as El Chapo but also in ensuring that incarceration in such facilities effectively stops the illicit activities of criminal leaders and group members, rather than allowing them to use the prisons as bases from which they can plan and conduct operations.

At the federal level, Mexico has made progress in expanding and improving control in its federal prisons. During the past two presidential administrations, Mexico has expanded capacity from six thousand to thirty thousand beds in fifteen federal prisons, with modular designs for maintaining more effective separation between different types of prisoners. Prison capabilities have also been augmented with new monitoring technology and automated control systems in high-priority prisons such as the maximum security Altiplano facility (from which El Chapo escaped).

Despite such improvements, approximately 220,000 of Mexico’s 250,000 prisoners are in the nation’s 150 prisons within the state-level system, where the situation is much graver. Indeed, most of the recent serious stories about abuses within the prison system in Mexico cite incidents that occurred in state-level prisons such as Topo Chico and Piedras Negras.25

Finally, in the struggle against criminality and violence in Mexico, the state of judicial reform remains a serious problem. With the financial and training support of the United States, Mexico invested significant resources in transitioning to an adversarial-style justice system. While the implementation of the system was achieved on schedule in 2016, the performance of the new system has been uneven, particularly in states that waited until the last minute to transition to the new system.26 A key contributor to the problem is the inadequate training of police, prosecutors, and others—a weakness exploited by well-resourced criminals who hire skilled lawyers to secure the dismissal of their cases on technicalities. In one high-profile example in February 2018, José Alfredo Cárdenas Martínez, senior leader and accountant for the Gulf Cartel, was arrested by Mexican naval special forces, then released by the court because of a defect in the way that he had been detained.27

Other sources of frustration for Mexicans with the new system include the release of those accused of minor charges who then fail to show up for trial, and people threatening or bribing their accusers while waiting for the case to go to trial to intimidate them into settling or dismissing the charges. By one estimate, as many as 90 percent of the cases under the new system never go to trial.28

**Recommendations**

It is in the fundamental interest of U.S. security and prosperity, and the U.S. strategic position in the hemisphere to support the Mexican government in confronting the challenges of violence and criminality in Mexico’s increasingly fragmented and unpredictable criminal landscape. Yet, what is most needed is not significant additional resources for Mexico, and even less, direct action by U.S. forces to help “solve” Mexico’s challenges. Rather, the U.S. approach should concentrate on enhancing intelligence and operational coordination, helping Mexico to strengthen its institutions, and working with respect and patience to address issues on the U.S. side that contribute to Mexico’s difficulties.

As Mexico demonstrated through its purchase of more than $2.2 billion in helicopters, HMMWVs, signals intelligence equipment, and training aircraft during the past two years, the country does not need U.S. charity, but rather, U.S. partnership.29

To date, U.S. intelligence support to the Mexican military and police in going after the leadership and resources of criminal groups and dismantling their networks is one of the most important and appreciated aspects of assistance to Mexico, and it should be continued, if not expanded. Similarly, the United States should continue to enhance operational coordination, such as that between U.S. detection and interception assets on U.S. territory and international waters, and those of Mexico on its own territory. Such collaboration should particularly focus on dismantling illicit networks with
a presence on both the U.S. and Mexican sides of the border and on expanding collaboration with Mexico to stem the flow of firearms into the country.

To help strengthen Mexican institutions, the United States should explore the expansion of in-U.S. and in-country training for advanced military capabilities (not basic skills training) by its 7th Special Forces Group and others, including the sharing of tactics, techniques, and procedures with Mexican army special forces in areas where they have identified particular needs. The U.S. Department of Defense should further consider an expanded number of billets for Mexican officers in institutions such as the Western Hemisphere National Security Institute, the Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College, as well as the exchange of instructors, to both strengthen relations between the militaries of the two countries and serve as a conduit for sharing knowledge between U.S. and Mexican institutions.

Beyond military cooperation, the U.S. State Department should look for opportunities to strengthen and make more frequent the administration of polygraphs and other confidence tests within the federal police, as well as to expand support for the implementation of financial and other databases to identify cases of corruption and to track law enforcement officers who have been dismissed. Technology and resource support to Mexico’s FIU and expanded collaboration in identifying and pursuing the financial resources of Mexico-based criminal groups may be particularly productive.

Beyond the aforementioned assistance, and perhaps even more importantly, the United States needs to do more to control the key drivers of criminality and violence on the U.S. side of the border, including the growing consumption of opioids and cocaine. Without altering its laws, the United States can arguably also do more to coordinate with Mexico to control and track the firearms that are purchased legally on the U.S. side of the border and then smuggled into Mexico; such flows from the United States contribute significantly to the substantial firepower that Mexican criminal groups employ against each other, against authorities, and to extort the local population.

In whatever manner the United States addresses the status of Mexican immigrants living within its borders without legal status, it should also avoid abrupt mass deportations, or at least coordinate closely with its Mexican counterparts if it must do so. Through such gradualism and coordination, the United States will help avoid desperate deportees from becoming the recruits of criminal groups.

**Conclusion**

It is vital that U.S. and Mexican leaders communicate respectfully with each other. Cooperation and trust between Mexico and the United States is vital to addressing our shared security challenges.

Mexico is at a critical moment in its struggle against expanding criminality and violence, in the context of national elections that will strongly impact both its future posture toward organized crime and other policy issues as well as its relationship with the United States and extra-hemispheric actors such as China and Russia. There has arguably never been a moment in which it is more important for the United States to respectfully support Mexico as an integral part of the North American family whose security and prosperity directly affects that of the United States.

Notes


8. For an assessment of the criminal dynamics in different regions, and the status of different groups, see Ellis, “The Evolution of Security Challenges in Mexico.”


11. Based on conversations with Mexican academics and security officials in Mexico City, February 2018.


15. Interviews [anonymous] with Mexican navy officers, Mexico City, February 2018.


20. Ibid.


China-Latin America Arms Sales
Antagonizing the United States in the Western Hemisphere?

Capt. George Gurrola, U.S. Army

The engagement between the People’s Republic of China and the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region during the twenty-first century is highlighted by its extraordinary increase in commercial, political, and military relations. Since China’s entrance into the World Trade Organization in 2001, it has become an increasingly vibrant partner for the region. Chinese banks leased approximately $22.1 billion to Latin American governments, more than the combined loans from the two traditional multilateral lenders, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. Most

[Image of a military aircraft and soldiers]
researchers and senior U.S. policy makers have focused on Chinese economic activity, highlighting “its sale of increasingly diverse and sophisticated products in the Latin American and Caribbean market.”

Similar to China’s sharp increase in economic relations, it has also significantly expanded its military engagement, effectively creating opportunities to expand its arms market in the LAC region. However, little assessment has been placed on China’s emergence into the region’s arms market, particularly how that emergence pertains to China’s comprehensive strategy in building influence and strengthening military partnerships.

The sale of Chinese arms has several implications for the LAC region. For one, arms exports are a symbol of a country’s position in the global hierarchical system of arms production. Efficient arms production can provide revenue and balance costs related to defense research and development. On a functional level, armies must procure arms that have a maintainable life cycle. One can also argue that arms exports are a key component in a nation’s foreign policy and can help secure influence, or “soft power.” Simply put, the expansion of arms exports may provide multiple benefits and can reflect a nation’s interests abroad. In Latin America, the increase in arms sales has complemented China’s goals of “securing access to natural resources and exports markets.”

It is important to note that China’s “complementing” differs from “facilitating.” “If the latter becomes more prominent, it may be a worthy indicator or warning of a significant shift in the security environment.”

Given bureaucratic hurdles in expanding a nation’s defense industry to compete in the global arms market, analyzing China’s arms flows to Latin America can provide further specific insight into the maturity of Sino-LAC military relations.

The most recent literature and data suggest there is an upward trend in Chinese exports to the LAC region, specifically in arms exports. But, what are the drivers behind the remarkable increase of Chinese arms exports to the region? In isolation, what unique characteristics exist in the Sino-Latin American relations that facilitated the increase in arms sales? This research intends to answer those questions. The research and data from 2000 to 2016 demonstrate that as political and economic relations increased, Beijing’s arms sales also increased. A combination of factors including the countries’ ideological tendencies, particularly in the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, or ALBA) countries, and a comparative advantage in defense products facilitated the increase in arms sales.

As such, this research seeks to understand the intricacies of China’s Latin America policy and trends of its arms exports, both globally and with regard to the LAC region. The research concludes with strategic implications for the region and the United States while providing a forecast for future Chinese arms exports into the region.

**Background: Chinese Policy**

The evolution of China’s policy papers toward Latin America demonstrates the importance of building relationships and engaging in arms sales. In its 2008 policy paper, China outlines its willingness to “provide assistance for the development of the army in Latin American and Caribbean countries.”

It is important to note that China’s “complementing” differs from “facilitating.” “If the latter becomes more prominent, it may be a worthy indicator or warning of a significant shift in the security environment.”

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The evolution of China’s policy papers toward Latin America demonstrates the importance of building relationships and engaging in arms sales. In its 2008 policy paper, China outlines its willingness to “provide assistance for the development of the army in Latin American and Caribbean countries.”

Its 2016 policy paper reiterates the importance of “actively carry out military exchanges and cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries, increase friendly exchanges between defense and military officials of the two sides,” and expand “professional exchanges in military training, personnel training and peacekeeping.” Notably, the 2016 policy paper highlights “enhancing cooperation in military trade and military technology.” Furthermore, China’s official policy paper, “China’s Military Strategy,” specifically outlines the importance of raising the level of military relations, stating “it will continue the traditional friendly military ties with their African, Latin American, and Southern Pacific counterparts.”

Through analysis of its policy papers,
it is evident that China’s emergence in the region results from it having prioritized building military relations, specifically complemented by arms sales.

**Characteristics of Chinese Arms Exports**

Understanding the evolution of China’s total global arms exports and its geographical distribution provides the necessary background to highlight the recent shift to the Latin America arms market. Both table 1 and figure 1 (on page 125 and 126) demonstrate the evolution of China’s arms exports. The table shows the delineations of China’s arms exports between years and percentages by geographical distribution. It is important to note the low amount of military sales and exchanges between China and Latin America prior to 2000, especially when considering the U.S. shift in foreign policy post-9/11. In contrast, the period after 2000 is characterized by significant expansion into both African and Latin American markets.\(^{13}\)

Overall, China’s increased global arms exports indicate an “emergence of a global strategy that attempts to extend China’s economic, political, and possibly military outreach.”\(^{14}\) Figure 1 demonstrates China’s enormous increase in global arms exports from 1990 to 2016. When comparing in five-year periods, China’s global arms exports saw a sharp increase of 88 percent from 1990 to 2015.\(^{15}\) Further, during the 2011–2015 period, China became “the third largest arms exporter with $8.5 billion in exports” behind both the United States and Russia.\(^{16}\)

Although the top recipients of Chinese arm sales are Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, it also expanded its customer base to other regions, primarily Africa and Latin America.\(^{17}\)

As noted in table 1 and figure 2 (on pages 125 and 127), China’s entrance into the Latin American arms market is relatively new (since 2000) and can be considered as part of a new comprehensive strategy toward the region. As such, there are several noteworthy trends in China’s expansion of military engagement in Latin America. Prior to 2000, Chinese arms sales were limited to low-level equipment and military supplies, such as small arms and uniforms.\(^{18}\)

A closer look at the evolution of imports by country demonstrates that the growth in sales in the region is initially attributed to and facilitated by a country’s ideological tendencies, particularly in the ALBA countries. As seen in figure 2, ALBA member states Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia comprise most of the market share of arms imports from China. In its own publications, ALBA identifies itself as an “anti-imperialist”

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and “anti-neoliberal” organization that advocates for a socialist economic model. As a U.S.-China Commission report notes, this highlights a possible correlation with “anti-U.S. foreign policy orientation of the purchasers.” Further, China’s “non-intervention” policy makes arms sales attractive for countries. Based on China’s arms sales alone, one can infer its intention in the region is to expand its political influence while securing a future military presence in the region.

Another factor that contributed to the increase in arms sales is China’s relative comparative advantage. For one, China’s products are less expensive than those offered by the traditional international arms suppliers, such as the United States and Russia. More recently, China continues to make inroads into other nations besides the ALBA member states. This indicates an emergence into the market as an important actor. In 2009, “Peru—a key economic partner for the United States in the region and supporter of the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership—purchased fifteen of China’s FN-6 portable surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in a $1.1 million deal, along with ten more of its SAMs. Then, in 2013, it bought twenty-seven multiple rocket launchers in a $39 million deal.” A potential breakthrough for Chinese arms sales in the region came in 2015 when then Argentine president Christina Fernández de Kirchner approved a major arms purchase. The agreement, near $1 billion in Chinese equipment, included “armored personnel carriers, fighter jets, and navy vessels.” However, President Mauricio Macri, who is considered more pragmatic and moderate than his predecessor, has adjusted several Sino-Argentine initiatives, including placing the significantly large arms purchase on hold. Despite Argentina’s deferment, these recent developments indicate Chinese arms sales continue to make inroads with Latin American militaries.

The Case of China-Venezuela Arms Exports

The significance of China’s exports to the region are best explained through examining Venezuela’s case. Venezuela is the primary purchaser of Chinese defense products in the region, which seems to demonstrate the importance of ideologically aligned relationships in terms of developing relationships with China. China and Venezuela’s defense bilateral relationship began to strengthen in 1999 when
the late President Hugo Chávez visited Beijing. Subsequently, both countries began to increase military engagement with senior-defense level exchanges and personnel exchanges. For one, the perception of a potential U.S. invasion shaped Chávez’s decision to increase arms imports, which also provided an opportunity for increased cooperation with China. Specifically, the arms exports were fueled by the 2006 U.S. embargo on arms transfers, effectively making their U.S.-made equipment obsolete. Tensions in the region were also driven by Colombia’s announcement that it would raise its military spending to historical amounts. It is important to note that the Venezuela and Colombia bilateral relationship has been marked by maritime border disputes over “the area of the gulf region north of Maracaibo and to the Guajira Peninsula, between the lake and the Caribbean.” Additionally, during that period, diplomatic relations reached an all-time low due to Colombian President Álvaro Uribe’s policies toward Venezuela. Uribe sought to deploy Colombian troops across the border to pursue FARC rebels. Several factors led to warming Sino-Venezuelan relations. It can be argued that as a result of a perceived U.S. invasion and tensions with Colombia, Chávez turned to China for military hardware.

Venezuela’s major purchases were unique to the Latin American arms market due to both their sophistication and scope. As depicted in table 2 (on page 129), these weapons systems were diverse and reached across the spectrum of military capabilities, including communication systems, anti-air missiles, amphibious vehicles, fighter jets, and helicopters.

Among the most sophisticated weaponry was the Hongdu Aviation Industry Corporation’s L-15 fighter jet trainer, which provides Venezuela with an advanced aviation platform. Simply put, a combination of anti-U.S. ideology and a preference for no-strings-attached procurements drove Venezuela’s purchase of arms from China. Additionally, from a Chinese perspective, its arms exports also influence access to oil concessions including favorably low prices for oil. This is consonant with China’s interaction with other energy-producing partners, as “many states selling oil or oil concessions to China—Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Angola and Nigeria—are

![Figure 2. Value of Arms Imports from China, by Country, 2000–2016 Annual (US$ Millions)](Figure courtesy of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Arms Transfers Database, http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers)
also buyers of Chinese weapons.”30 As the world’s largest net importer of oil, China’s strategy to secure oil includes an arms providing component.31

**China’s Growth and Implications**

While the 2017 Jane’s World Defense Industry Survey indicates China is expected to see continued global arms sales growth over the next five years, this may not be the case in the region.32 On one hand, many militaries in the region are faced with outdated equipment requiring modernization and may turn to China’s defense industry to diversify their equipment. This would provide an opportunity for Chinese defense firms to increase their sales. However, Chinese arms sales face several other challenges in the short-term. For one, political turmoil and economic uncertainty may cause a net decrease in defense spending in Latin America over the same period, impacting arms sales purchases.33 This is particularly the case in Venezuela, China’s main customer in the region.34 Venezuela currently faces a political and humanitarian crisis and a drop in oil prices, which is a major source of its revenue. This directly impacts its defense spending and may inhibit it from buying Chinese arms in the short term.35

In addition, an increase in Chinese arms exports, especially in both volume and sophistication, may provide an indicator that China no longer fears antagonizing the United States in its own “backyard.” The growing Chinese presence in the Western Hemisphere continues to increase while the U.S. response has been limited. In essence, arms sales secure long-term military relationships and provide unique training opportunities for both militaries involved since Chinese arms sales not only provide equipment but also require specialized training and maintenance.

It remains to be seen if China can continue to deepen relationships at the people-to-people level.
Table 2. China-Venezuela Transfers of Major Weapons: Deals with Deliveries or Orders Made for 1990–2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supplier/recipient (R)</th>
<th>Number ordered</th>
<th>Number designation</th>
<th>Weapon description</th>
<th>Year(s) weapons ordered</th>
<th>Year of delivery</th>
<th>Number delivered</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China/Venezuela(R)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>JYL-1</td>
<td>Air search raider</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2006–2007</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Part of $150 million program for military-civilian air-surveillance system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China/Venezuela(R)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>JYL-1</td>
<td>Air search raider</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2008–2009</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China/Venezuela(R)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>JY-11</td>
<td>Air search raider</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2010–2011</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>JY-11B version</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China/Venezuela(R)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>K-8 (Karakorum-8)</td>
<td>Trainer/combat aircraft</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China/Venezuela(R)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>PL-SE</td>
<td>Short range air-to-air missile</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>For K-8 trainer/combat aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China/Venezuela(R)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Y-8</td>
<td>Transport aircraft</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2012–2014</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Y-8F-200W version</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China/Venezuela(R)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>SM-4 81mm</td>
<td>Self-propelled mortar</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2014–2015</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Part of $500 million deal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China/Venezuela(R)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>SR-5</td>
<td>Self-propelled Multiple rocket launcher</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2014–2015</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Part of $500 million deal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China/Venezuela(R)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Type-07P/VN-1</td>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicle</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2014–2015</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Part of $500 million deal; VN-1 version</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China/Venezuela(R)</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>VN-4</td>
<td>Armored personnel carrier</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2013–2015</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>For National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China/Venezuela(R)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>ZBD-05/VN-18</td>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicle</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Part of $500 million deal; VN-18 version</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China/Venezuela(R)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>ZTD-05/VN-16</td>
<td>Light tank</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Part of $500 million deal; VN-16 version</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China/Venezuela(R)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>K-8 (Karakorum-8)</td>
<td>Trainer/combat aircraft</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>K-8W or K-8VV version</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table courtesy of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Arms Transfers Database [as of 30 November 2017], [http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers](http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers))
More importantly, this may provide Chinese military personnel further access to U.S. military doctrine, programs, and equipment. Perhaps drawn from the U.S. International Military Education and Training program, China has grown closer by “funding lavish trips for Latin American military officers to live and study” in China. As a result, this impacts U.S. security and bilateral relationships in the region.

Moreover, arms production and transfer undergo a resource-intensive procurement process and overcome large bureaucratic hurdles. In this context, it is important to note that lethal weapons systems such as missiles or nuclear technology are not part of the arms exportation yet. The United States must be watchful of China’s overall military gains including its arms-trade characteristics, personnel-training exchanges, and Mandarin language programs in the region. As Latin American scholar Gonzalo Paz notes, “When arms and weapon systems become an important share of the trade, as in the cases of Nazi Germany and the USSR, perception of hegemonic challenge in the United States, and of threat, gain weight.”

Analysis of China’s weapons exports can provide a glimpse on how it “organizes itself internally and how it may attempt to extend its outreach and become a world power.”

Conclusion

This analysis outlined the current trends and factors leading to China’s increased arms sales to Latin America. As the data shows, China’s arms sales saw an increase parallel to its increased political and economic relations to the region. As the U.S.-China Security and Economic Commission notes, “China has sought to improve its diplomatic presence through an increasing number of high-level visits, military cooperation and exchanges, and involvement in several regional organizations.” Arms sales directly complement Chinese diplomatic relations.
and provide additional relationship building opportunities. They promote broader embassy coordination while creating familiarity between China’s military and its counterparts. Moreover, as China continues to cement its economic and military relations with the region, it is possible that Latin American leaders may become more open to purchasing Chinese defense equipment, especially if China continues to improve the quality of its defense products.

In regard to Sino-Latin American military relations, potential for research exists in regards to space cooperation. Although not included in arms exports statistics, space cooperation continues to increase. Unlike its 2008 policy paper on Latin America, China’s 2016 policy paper highlights its intention to “actively explore cooperation between the two sides in such fields as communication and remote sensing satellites, satellite data application, aerospace infrastructure, and space education and training.”40 Joint ventures in production and operation of satellites are ongoing, including the controversial “Deep Space Station” in southern Argentina.41 It remains to be seen how space cooperation develops, especially when considering the dual purposes space satellites provide. If arms exports are any indication, China will continue to increase its relationships across the spectrum.

While this analysis focuses on China’s arms exports to Latin America, further critical discussion can focus on its global arms-sales strategy. Some experts assess its expansion of arms can be attributed to its comprehensive strategy to increase its soft power and image building. Interestingly, all of the recipients of China’s arms exports are “low- and middle-income countries.”42 If Africa is any indication of China’s future policy in Latin America, what do the current arms sales trends suggest? Both African and Latin American arms markets are relatively new for Chinese firms. Also, both regions require and demand low-to-medium range of weapons, which presents an opportunity for Chinese expansion. It remains to be seen if China will mirror its “hard power” approach in Africa, where it established a permanent military base in Djibouti and deployed several troops in support of peacekeeping missions in South Sudan. As Dr. R. Evan Ellis notes, “nothing in the public discourse of the Chinese leadership, policy papers, or debates suggests that Latin America is considered in the short term as a base for military operations.”43

Notes


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In writing *Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan*, Steve Coll takes on the formidable challenge of adding yet another volume to the growing number of works on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Acknowledging the risk of treading where others have trod, Coll notes that while drafting *Directorate S*, he "had to consider how to absorb, but not regurgitate, the vast body of excellent journalism already produced by other reporters."

He himself is part of that crowd of reporters, having won a Pulitzer Prize for the 2005 book *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the C.I.A., Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*. Picking up where *Ghost Wars* left us, on the eve of 9/11, Coll breaks new ground and offers fresh insights into America’s involvement in Afghanistan with an absorbing clarity that can be found nowhere else. This is not just another blow-by-blow account of battlefield exploits or even a mere tell-all of alleged CIA history; it is instead a gripping narrative of America’s search for meaning and understanding in Afghanistan.

The book opens at a brisk pace, detailing the U.S. reaction to the attacks of 9/11. Coll artfully describes the crisis atmosphere in Washington, the decisiveness of the U.S. military response, and the CIA’s quick and efficient operations during the opening weeks and months of the Afghanistan campaign. There are numerous threads and themes that develop as Coll’s story moves forward. The most prominent theme gives the book its title; the role of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)—the Pakistani intelligence service—and its Directorate S, a behind-the-scenes force Coll depicts as persistently working at odds with U.S. efforts. His description of ISI’s continued support of the Taliban, and the alleged perfidy of Directorate S, is as convincing as it is frustrating.
Another thread that soon develops and weaves its way throughout the narrative is the continuous search by U.S. officials and military leaders for an improved understanding of their strategic operating environment. Coll rolls out a parade of various experts and academics, studies, and think tanks—all demonstrating a sincere determination by American officials to come to intellectual grips with the difficult situation they faced. To list just a few, these include a University of Massachusetts assistant professor of Islamic history contracted to study the motivations of Afghan suicide bombers, a Drug Enforcement Administration study into Afghanistan’s opium production, and a U.S. Air Force officer’s research into the “green-on-blue” killings of U.S. and European soldiers by their Afghan partners. All illustrate facets of the American government’s effort to better understand just what was going on in Afghanistan.

If one jewel shines brightest among all these efforts, that jewel is without a doubt the CIA’s district assessments. In the national intelligence course I teach at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, we analyze the challenges of providing effective strategic intelligence support to policy makers and military commanders. One of the lessons we discuss is that just being right is not good enough. For intelligence to be considered effective, it must actually have made a difference. By the time of the Afghanistan conflicts, the CIA had a long history of analyzing insurgencies. If one jewel shines brightest among all these efforts, that jewel is without a doubt the CIA’s district assessments. In the national intelligence course I teach at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, we analyze the challenges of providing effective strategic intelligence support to policy makers and military commanders. One of the lessons we discuss is that just being right is not good enough. For intelligence to be considered effective, it must actually have made a difference. By the time of the Afghanistan conflicts, the CIA had a long history of analyzing insurgencies. It also had a long history reflecting on how to effectively deliver frank and sometimes unwelcome assessments.

Coll delivers in chapter 17’s “Hard Data” what is probably the best account to date of how the CIA’s district assessments provided policy makers and military commanders a unique and powerful analysis of the war’s progress. Coll explains that “In the closed world of secret intelligence, most analytical products wound up in locked cabinets, having had little impact. But every now and then a bestseller broke through. The CIA’s district assessment maps of Afghanistan proved to be such a blockbuster, some of the most popular top secret products the agency had ever distributed.” The CIA had managed to deliver an unpopular message—that the war in Afghanistan was not going well—in an effective manner. This chapter alone is worth reading the book for, as it underscores the value of what the intelligence community (not just the CIA) can bring to the table: useful judgments that go beyond the obvious, using methodologies that instill confidence in those judgments, presented in formats that help raise the quality of policy and strategy discussions.

The pace of the narrative changes as Coll’s chapters march on. In the latter half of the book, he periodically lingers on the letters home of a soldier deployed to Afghanistan. This may strike some as contrived, or even a weakness in the narrative. However, this dalliance with a somewhat The Things They Carried-style approach also seems to reflect the pace of the war itself. The certainty and focus of the initial campaigns slowly gives way to a gnawing dissatisfaction, and the soldier’s ponderings are another aspect of the ongoing search for meaning. These letters are at some level akin to the district assessments, human terrain teams, think tank studies, and regional experts … all exemplify Americans striving to better understand what they are faced with in Afghanistan and what our strategy should be.

Another theme in Coll’s book of interest to a military reader is the relationship between the CIA and the Department of Defense. Out of shared experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, the CIA–Department of Defense relationship evolved toward closer cooperation and better synchronization. Coll describes how CIA leaders and senior military commanders, such as Gen. Stanley McChrystal, worked to develop the relationship—“a project that turned out to be measured in years.” Nevertheless, Coll describes how “fraying trust and communication between the CIA and Special Forces in Afghanistan” led to some missed opportunities. It is a relationship that must be continuously cultivated to remain collaborative and not competitive. He gives us a glimpse of that ongoing story, one that could probably be a book in itself.

Directorate S is a brilliant and highly readable account of America’s decision-making regarding Afghanistan over many years. It is a complicated tale.
Notes


4. Ibid., 57.

5. Ibid., 158.

Response to 2nd Lt. Noelle Walker’s “Cognitive Therapy for Soldiers Suffering From Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic Brain Injury”  

(Military Review, May–June 2018)

In your May-June 2018 edition of Military Review, there was an article by 2nd Lt. Noelle Walker, “Cognitive Therapy for Soldiers Suffering from PTSD and TBI.” While I understand that all articles within Military Review are solely the opinions of each individual contributor, I believe this article is extremely misleading for our military population. The article seems to suggest that the Army should implement “mandatory and preventative” cognitive therapy for all soldiers. The issue with this statement is that therapy is a treatment—indicating that there is a symptom (or symptoms) that we (providers) are treating. We do not conduct any type of therapy in a “preventative” manner. While 2nd Lt. Walker makes valid points regarding suicide and PTSD, she is not a licensed provider (as far as I can ascertain from her credentials). There are certainly preventative measures that we can take as a military to prepare our soldiers for the rigor of war, to include programs to bolster characteristics such as grit or resilience. Therapy is not one of those measures. I am concerned that an uninformed commander or soldier may read this article and attempt to submit themselves or their soldiers for “preventative therapy.” This article also discredits the behavioral health profession as a whole, suggesting that we provide nothing more than what a layman may identify as a “life coach,” someone who does not typically possess provider credentials, a license to practice, or a graduate-level degree. I urge you to consider the message that an article like this may send to our soldier population.

Maj. Rebecca A. C. Blood, PhD, U.S. Army
This October, the Army University Press will publish a seven-book set on large-scale combat operations (LSCO). Each book will focus on a specific aspect of LSCO; subjects will include:

- Mobility operations
- Deep maneuver
- Information operations
- Sustainment operations
- Combined arms maneuver
- Effects of fires
- Military deception

The September-October issue of *Military Review* will provide a summary of each of the books in the set, along with a series of articles focused on LSCO authored by senior Army leadership, doctrine writers, and other subject-matter experts.

With the publication of Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, and the emphasis on LSCO by the Army’s senior leadership, the next issue of *Military Review* should be of interest to all Army professionals.