This year’s theme: “World Hot Spots: Which of the world’s hot spots is the Army least prepared for? Should resources be diverted to prepare for them? What is the most efficient way to become ready for conflict in this region?”

Contest opens 1 January 2018 and closes 16 July 2018

For information on how to submit an entry, please visit http://www.armyupress.army.mil/DePuy-Writing-Competition/.
Themes and Suggested Topics

Global Security

- What nations consider themselves to be at war or in conflict with the United States? How are they conducting war, and what does this mean for the Army?
- Pakistan: friend or foe?
- What operational and logistical challenges are foreseen due to infrastructure limitations in potential foreign areas of operation and how can we mitigate them?
- What lessons did we learn during recent hurricane relief operations?
- Lessons learned from U.S. counterinsurgent military assistance in Africa?
- What was the role of the Spanish military for preventing secession of Catalonia? Ethical or appropriate?

- What was the military role in the recent coup in Zimbabwe, Africa? Evaluation of whether such military involvement is ethical or appropriate?
- Security threats/concerns and events resulting from illegal immigration into Europe?
- Saudi Arabia and Iran: How are cultural changes in both societies affecting the operational environment and potential for conflict between them?

Institutional

- After eighteen years of institutional/operational experience largely focused on counterinsurgency, how do we return to preparing for large-scale combat operations (LSCO)?
  - See/understand/seize fleeting opportunities?
  - Develop the situation in contact and chaos?
  - Offset "one-off" dependencies and contested domains?
  - Rapidly exploit positions of advantage?
• Survive in hyperlethal engagements?
• Continuously present multiple dilemmas to the enemy?
• Decide and act at speed?
• Fully realize mission command?
• What are the greatest threats the Army faces (either externally or internally)? How should the Army deal with them?
• What is needlessly duplicated in the Army (e.g., what should be done away with, how should the Army adjust, and how would it benefit)?
• What must be done to adjust junior leader development to a modern operational environment?
• What must we do to develop a more effective means of developing and maintaining institutional memory in order to deal with emerging challenges?
• What is the role for the Army in homeland security operations? What must the Army be prepared for?
• What are the impacts on military standards due to factors associated with poor integration of new cultures, ethnicities, or racial considerations, and how to mitigate them?
• Case studies: How is gender integration changing the Army and how it operates?
• Case studies: How do we properly integrate emerging technology?
• What are the potential adverse impacts on military standards due to factors associated with poor integration of new cultures, ethnicities, or racial considerations and how to mitigate them?
• How is gender integration changing the Army and how it operates?

U.S. special operations and multinational soldiers take a wind reading 4 March 2017 as they wait for a C-130 aircraft to drop parachutists and equipment during Flintlock 17, an exercise with forces from more than twenty nations, in N'Djamena, Chad. The annual exercise strengthens security institutions, promotes multinational information sharing, and develops interoperability among partner nations in North and West Africa. (Photo by Richard Bumgardner, U.S. Army)
6  What Kind of Victory for Russia in Syria?
Michael Kofman
Matthew Rojansky, JD

The author describes Russian actions during its intervention in Syria and discusses in detail whether Russia succeeded in meeting its military and political goals in that conflict.

24  Diasporas, Foreign Governments, and American Politics
Samuel P. Huntington, PhD

In this excerpt from Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity, a former Harvard University political scientist discusses diasporas, how they are exploited by their home countries, and how they affect U.S. foreign policy.

40  Russian Diaspora as a Means of Russian Foreign Policy
Öncel Sencerman

In a companion piece to the Huntington article, a Turkish PhD candidate describes how Russia is using its diaspora as an instrument of foreign policy in the former Soviet republics.

50  Rethinking the U.S. Army Infantry Rifle Squad
Maj. Hassan Kamara, U.S. Army

The author uses Sir Michael Howard's dimensions of war (operational, technological, logistical, and social) to analyze how changes in military affairs and human society, as well as projections about future war, warrant reconsideration and change to the makeup of the current infantry squad.

61  The U.S. Army and Mission Command
Philosophy versus Practice
Maj. Brett Matzenbacher, U.S. Army

According to this author, the Army could successfully adopt mission command as its overarching command philosophy by using a more precise definition of mission command and by aligning professional military education with it.

72  An Army Overseas
Expeditionary Maneuver through the Maritime Domain
Lt. Col. Trent J. Lythgoe, U.S. Army

The Army must restore its expeditionary capabilities. Success in the future depends on coordinated and mutually reinforcing air, sea, and land expeditionary forces, says this author, and the Army must do its share. (Honorable Mention, 2017 General William E. DePuy Writing Competition)

81  Putting Concepts of Future Warfare to the Test
Maj. John Spencer, U.S. Army
Lionel Beehner, PhD
Capt. Brandon Thomas, U.S. Army

Three West Point researchers refute the widely held assumption that younger soldiers possess a higher aptitude and familiarity with digital technologies than their predecessors, but they support the Army's progressive-and-sequential training model.
90 Commanding in Multi-Domain Formations
Maj. Anthony M. Clas, EdD, U.S. Army

The author describes what the U.S. military needs to be successful in the twenty-first century multi-domain operational environment and recommends where further research and shifts in approach should be directed.

101 The Tyranny of the Shores
Army Planning for the Asia-Pacific Theater
Brian J. Dunn

The U.S. Army must consider and prepare for a role in the Asia-Pacific region that goes beyond merely fighting anti-access/area denial threats to one that better accounts for the value of large-scale land operations in support of a joint campaign.

108 Western Anbar after the Awakening
A Tale of Three Cities
Maj. Michael W. Hein, U.S. Army

The period of five years following the Anbar Awakening offers important lessons and highlights potential consequences for a tribe-based counterinsurgency strategy.

118 A Joint and Operational Approach for Security Assistance to Georgia and Ukraine
Col. Tim Kreuttner, U.S. Army
Lt. Col. Sami Alnaqbi, United Arab Emirates Navy
Maj. James Woodard, U.S. Marine Corps

Four authors with different military backgrounds explain how an integrated joint approach to security cooperation focusing at the operational level with Ukraine and Georgia would strengthen those U.S. partners and serve as a deterrent to Russian aggression.

130 Mission before Comfort
A Mission-Focused Approach to Gender in the Army
Capt. Molly Kovite, U.S. Army

An Army judge advocate uses anecdotal evidence to argue against gender-based billeting segregation as it is an impediment to mission accomplishment. (Third Place, 2017 General William E. DePuy Writing Competition)

140 Implacable Foes
War in the Pacific, 1944–1945
Lt. Col. Jesse McIntyre III, U.S. Army, Retired

The author critiques a book by Waldo Heinrichs and Marc Gallicchio that describes the last year of war in the Pacific Theater during World War II and the challenges faced by the United States in defeating a foe committed to fighting to the last man.
What Kind of Victory for Russia in Syria?

Michael Kofman
Matthew Rojansky, JD

The war in Syria has ground on for more than half a decade. Hundreds of thousands have died, entire cities and towns have been destroyed, and billions of dollars in infrastructure have been decimated. Millions of refugees have flooded into neighboring Middle Eastern states that can ill afford to house them, while others have sought safety as far away as Europe and North America, exacerbating divisive battles over immigration, jobs, and cultural identity in Western democracies.

Syria has tested every world leader individually and collectively, and has laid bare the failure of international
institutions to deal effectively with the problems those institutions were designed to manage and prevent. Despite a prolonged commitment of U.S. military and diplomatic resources to the conflict, a peaceful settlement remains remote, and the bloody-handed Assad regime remains firmly in control of population centers along the Mediterranean coast. The impending battlefield defeat of the Islamic State (IS) in the desert interior of Syria and Iraq is qualified by the fact that its fighters have joined and inspired more elusive terror cells outside the region.

Meanwhile, the Russian-led coalition, including Syrian forces, Iran, and numerous allied militias, appears to be closing in on its own military and political objectives. The Syrian conflict will likely enter a new phase in 2018, as both IS and the Syrian opposition cease to be relevant forces, and the two coalitions seek to negotiate a postconflict settlement. While it is far from assured that any settlement acceptable to the principle domestic and international players can be struck, for now the main outcome of this war is that President Bashar al-Assad will stay, but the Syria that existed before the war is gone.

Russia has only been directly involved in this conflict since September 2015, but its intervention has radically changed the war’s outcome. The natural question is whether Russia has, in fact, won a victory. The answer to that question depends first on what Moscow intended to achieve—in other words, how did and does Russia define victory in Syria, what are its continuing interests there, and have those interests been secured or advanced?

While the Russian campaign might be judged a qualified success from the standpoint of the Kremlin’s own objectives, Russia’s actual performance in both military and political terms bears closer examination. How did the Russians achieve their successes, both on the battlefield and on the wider diplomatic and political stage? Finally, armed with a better awareness of how Russia’s Syria campaign measured up in terms of Russian objectives and capabilities, what lessons should Americans take away for future U.S. engagement in Syria, the Middle East, and beyond?

**Origins of the Russian Intervention**

That American and Russian military power came to meet on the ground and in the skies over Syria in 2015 is a kind of historical accident. The country was hardly the centerpiece of either state’s global strategy, or even their respective regional policies.

Russian-Syrian relations draw on a Cold War legacy, since Moscow first began to support Syria after the 1956 Suez Crisis. However, Syria did not become a true client state of the Soviet Union until 1971. The Soviet Union gained a well-situated naval base in Tartus, on Syria’s Mediterranean coast, to support its Fifth Eskadra—an operational naval squadron—along with intelligence-gathering facilities ashore.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Soviet fleets departed the Mediterranean, and the importance of Syrian bases rapidly declined. Moscow had far less cash available to sustain its patronage network of client states; relations with Syria became decidedly transactional, as Russia sought payment for continued arms sales. Russian ships continued exploiting the port of Tartus as a minor resupply point, but with little military significance. Tartus was, in any case, ill equipped for Russian ships to dock, and for a lengthy period, there was little Russian naval activity to even merit its use. That changed in the wake of the 2015 Russian intervention. The expanded Tartus port is now much more capable
of supporting operations and resupplying the Russian Mediterranean squadron, which was stood up in 2013 for the purpose of supporting Syria.

In general, Russia did not seek bases in Syria; it had to establish them and expand existing infrastructure to save the Syrian regime. Buoyed by perceived success, Russia was determined to check U.S. interventionism, initially by supplying the Syrian regime with arms and equipment, and by blocking efforts to pressure the regime in the UN Security Council.

"[Russia’s] fear of yet another U.S. military intervention, this time much closer to Russia itself, and targeting its only remaining client in the Middle East, was seemingly vindicated when President Barack Obama called for Assad to step aside."

and looking to stay, in 2017 Russia signed a forty-nine-year lease on Tartus, which is still in the process of being upgraded into a serviceable naval base. What the Syrian relationship truly offered for post-Soviet Russia was a position in the Middle East, which helped confer great power status in international politics. A confluence of events led to what would become Moscow’s most significant military foray beyond the immediate post-Soviet space in over a quarter century.

Although Russia had lingering interests in Syria, the changing context of U.S.-Russia relations beginning in 2011 was a more influential factor in how Moscow would come to view this conflict. Russia’s response to the U.S.-led intervention in Libya in that year was categorically negative, and Moscow sought to draw a line in the sand in Syria, opposing U.S. use of force to advance what it viewed as a “regime change” agenda. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov applied the Libya logic to Syria directly in May 2011, when he said, “The calculation is that foreign players will get imbued with this problem and will not only condemn the violence there, but subsequently repeat the Libyan scenario, including the use of force.”

The cornerstone of Russian policy in Syria became preventing the United States from carrying out a Libya-like intervention to overthrow Assad. Lavrov warned, “Some leaders of the coalition forces, and later the NATO secretary-general, called the Libyan operation a ‘model’ for the future. As for Russia, we will not allow anything like this to happen again in the future.” The fear of yet another U.S. military intervention, this time much closer to Russia itself, and targeting its only remaining client

Equally important was the firm belief among Russian elites that Assad’s downfall would result in IS and al-Qaeda affiliates taking over the country, spelling disaster for the region and creating a potential super-highway for Sunni extremists into Turkey and the Caucasus. This concern was somewhat vindicated as the ongoing civil war combined with the displacement of civilians due to the rise of IS resulted in a massive refugee flow into Turkey, neighboring countries, and central Europe, causing uncertainty and threatening regional stability (see figure 1, page 9). Unlike distant Libya, a complete implosion of Syria was not only too close for Russia’s comfort, but thousands of Russian citizens and thousands more Russian-speakers from the wider region had already joined militant extremist groups fighting there. Moscow feared that in the event of an IS victory, some of those fighters would enter Russia and join insurgencies in the North Caucasus or plot attacks against the Russian heartland. Accordingly, some Russians described entering the fray in Syria as launching a preventive war against terrorism.

Russian interests and objectives in the Syrian intervention also stem from the collapse in Russia-West ties following Moscow’s invasion of eastern Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014. In this sense, U.S. and European sanctions and diplomatic pressure catalyzed the Russian decision to intervene in Syria. Rather than giving in to Western pressure and offering concessions on Ukraine, Moscow looked to Syria to broaden the confrontation on terms more favorable to itself. Eventually, Russia hoped its
Syrian intervention could force Washington and its European allies to abandon Ukraine-related sanctions and diplomatic isolation in the interests of achieving a negotiated settlement with Russia over Syria.

Russian domestic political considerations were also a factor, though their role should not be overstated. Russia’s military dealt Ukraine a blow at the battle of Debaltseve in February 2015, leading to the second Minsk ceasefire agreement, which appeared to be a political victory for Moscow. The agreement quickly broke down, however, and Western sanctions remained in full effect, taxing the Russian economy at a time of persistently low energy prices. Struggling to stabilize the economic situation at home, and with policy in Ukraine increasingly adrift, there was little prospect for Russian leadership to gain further victories either at home or in Russia’s near abroad. Although Moscow hardly saw entering a bloody civil war in the Middle East as a path to easy gains, Russia’s tolerance for the risks attendant on intervention grew dramatically in the face of these domestic and international pressures.

A limited Syrian intervention, calibrated to reduce political risk at home, became the less perilous proposition. By mid-2015, Moscow had few alternatives to use of force if it hoped to shore up the Assad regime, its ally in Damascus. In April, the situation for Assad’s forces was dire. Al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, had assembled a coalition of fighters into the “Army of Conquest,” which drove back regime forces in the northwest and threatened major population centers further south. At the same time, IS was pushing westward, and had captured the historic city of Palmyra. Assad’s forces were being squeezed, and they were falling back on almost all fronts. That summer, the head of Iran’s Quds Force, Qassem Soleimani, together with senior Syrian officials, made several trips to Moscow in an effort to coordinate a military intervention. By August that year, there were clear indicators that Russia was preparing to intervene, and when Russian tactical aviation began arriving at Hmeimim Air Base in September 2015, the die was cast. Figure 2 (on page 10) depicts the approximate Syrian situation in terms of territorial control exercised by participants in the conflict near the outset of Russian operations initiated in support of the Assad regime.
Framing the Russian Intervention

Although hemmed in by tactical necessities, Moscow’s entry into the Syrian fray was also strategically ambitious. A successful intervention could offer victory on three fronts: preventing U.S.-backed regime change in Syria, breaking out of political isolation and forcing Washington to deal with Russia as an equal, and demonstrating at home that Russia is a great power on the main stage of international politics. Moscow hoped Syria would offer a new and more favorable front, where the United States could be outmaneuvered in the broader confrontation, which up to 2015 centered almost entirely on Russian actions in Ukraine.

Once military operations began, as is often the case with military campaigns, the intervention would take on additional objectives, reflecting secondary or tertiary vested interests. “Ambition creep” is a common illness afflicting most great powers when they deploy military forces. Russia may not have come to Syria with hopes of regaining power and status in the Middle East at the top of its agenda, but regional aspirations grew with each success on the battlefield. As a consequence, Russia has become a potential powerbroker, and perhaps a balancer against U.S. influence, even if it did not embark on the Syrian campaign with those goals in mind.

Whatever Russian expectations of success may have been—and there are indications that the Syrian leadership misled Moscow early on as to the true state of its forces (historically not an uncommon practice for Damascus)—Moscow pursued a campaign with both political and military objectives in fairly close alignment.

These efforts were mutually reinforcing, but a path to victory had to overcome steep challenges.

On the ground, Russian forces had to find a way to quickly and dramatically alter the balance in Assad’s favor by destroying the opposition’s capacity to continue the fight, while working under severe resource constraints. In parallel, Russia had to change the calculus and policy of its principal opponents in this conflict, including Turkey, the United States, and Saudi Arabia, while entering into arrangements with other potential actors in the region. Otherwise, military gains would quickly disappear in the sand, and a political victory would be
elusive. Russia also needed a political process running concurrently to lock in military gains on the ground, since as Mao Zedong wrote, political power would “grow from the barrel of a gun.”

Relations with allies like Iran, cobelligerents in the form of local militias, or potential spoilers such as Israel had to be carefully managed. The compound risk of conflicting political incentives and operational objectives among these parties made for a complex battle space. The risks of escalation to direct conflict between the intervening powers were considerable, as underscored by Syria’s use of chemical weapons in March 2017, resulting in a prompt retaliatory U.S. cruise missile strike, or the Turkish shoot down of a Russian Su-24M2 in November 2016. Russia led the coalition, but never controlled it; thus, it had to be comfortable with uncertainty and the associated risk of having the likes of Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah on its team.

Success for Russia entailed securing a commitment from the other parties to pursue a political settlement largely on its terms. This meant convincing Saudi Arabia and Turkey that their respective proxies had no chance of victory in the war, and pushing the United States to abandon its policy favoring regime change. Over time, Moscow achieved success on both the military and political fronts, coercing adversaries and negotiating changes to their positions one by one, though the pathway to this outcome was hardly a smooth or straightforward one. Russia’s success is not unqualified, but at the time of this writing, it appears that if the campaign in Syria is not a victory for Russia, it is certainly a defeat for those who opposed the Russian-led coalition.

**Russian Strategy in Syria**

To achieve this success, Russia had to secure some leverage in Syria, which in turn rested on being able to destroy the Syrian opposition and compel opponents to change their policies, forcing them and their proxies in the conflict to the negotiating table on terms favorable to Russia’s coalition. Moscow also sought the opportunity to reframe itself as a positive force in the battle
against terrorism, and press the United States into military cooperation. Russian leaders hoped this would ultimately fracture Western cohesion on punitive measures imposed over Ukraine, and grant Russian President Vladimir Putin recognition as a prominent player in international affairs.

These were the desired ends, yet the Russian strategy was not deliberate. If anything, Russia pursued an “emergent,” or “lean,” strategy. This was an approach characterized by the “fail fast, fail cheap” ethos of startup business, with iterative adjustments to the operation. The centerpiece of this strategy was flexibility, with a preference for adaptation over more structured strategy. In emergent strategy, success begets success, while failure is never final or disqualifying. Several vectors are pursued simultaneously, and at times, they may even appear to be contradictory. Resources are added in favor of the approach that shows the most progress, while others are discarded without regard to “sunk costs.”

To be successful in implementing a lean strategy, leadership must be agile, politically unconstrained, and uncommitted to any particular approach in the battle space (i.e., willing to improvise and adjust

Militant Islamist fighters parade 30 June 2014 in the streets of northern Raqqa Province, Syria, to celebrate their declaration of an Islamic “caliphate” after the group captured territory in neighboring Iraq. Russian forces, after supporting Assad’s defeat of Free Syrian Army forces holding the northern city of Aleppo, turned their primary attention to defeating Islamic State. (Photo by Reuters stringer)

course). In Russia’s case, it actually helped being an authoritarian system, and having relatively few allies or other geopolitical constraints on decision-making. But Russia also had few other options. Given resource constraints and high uncertainty, including poor information about the reality on the ground from its allies, Russia was not in a position to pursue a more deliberate strategy. That limitation ultimately played to Russia’s advantage relative to other powers, which expended considerably more blood and treasure via structured and deliberate, but ultimately less successful approaches in the region. Russia’s lean strategy worked, because when flawed assumptions were proven wrong in the conflict, it could quickly pivot and adapt.
Still, the limitations of the Russian armed forces imposed hard constraints on Russia’s overall operation. The Russian military had almost no experience with expeditionary operations after withdrawing from Afghanistan in 1989, Syria itself had limited capacity to host a major military footprint, Russia’s long-range supply and support capabilities were weak, and the Russian military was in the midst of major reforms and modernization. Coordinating with Iran and its associated Shia militias like Hezbollah was an added complexity on an already crowded battlefield, while Russian commanders had a generally low opinion of Syrian forces’ combat performance. In short, it was far from clear how the forces Russia could deploy would make the impact needed to turn the conflict around. Early on, outside observers doubted the prospects for Russia’s intervention, especially given recent Western experiences in expeditionary operations in the Middle East.

The campaign Russia envisioned would be based on a small footprint to keep its exposure low, reducing the chances of being steadily dragged into a conflict where local actors increasingly gain leverage over a stronger international benefactor. Russian leadership instead sought room to maneuver, retaining flexibility and the option of quick withdrawal should things go badly. In the early days of Russia’s intervention, physical constraints limited its presence. Tartus was not a real naval base, Hmeimim Air Base lacked apron space for a large contingent of Russian aircraft, other Syrian bases were exposed, surrounded, or ill equipped, and Russian logistical support would have limited throughput.

In short, reality helped dictate a more conservative and ultimately smarter approach to the battle space. It was not Moscow’s skill or experience, but the absence of abundance and limited options that made the Russian armed forces savvier in how they approached the conflict. That said, even after expanding the Syrian air base and making major investments in the naval facility, Russia’s General Staff continued to calibrate presence down to the bare minimum necessary. By 2017, it became clear that despite increased local capacity to host Russian forces, and improved infrastructure, Moscow was reluctant to use it. The opportunity to expand the means applied to this conflict was there, but Russia did not want it, judging that Syria would not be won with a means-based approach, the all too familiar “more is more” school of thought.

The Russian strategy was about Syrian, Iranian, and Shia militias doing the fighting and Russian forces providing support, not the other way around. Syria continued to reveal the general Russian preference to use local forces first, mercenaries and other Russian proxies second, and its own forces last, only for decisive effect on the battlefield. Russian military power would pulse, peaking when necessary in support of offensives and withdrawing when judged unneeded.

**Russian Combat Operations in Syria**

When Russian forces first arrived in Syria in September 2015, they inherently introduced a new dynamic, compelling what became a dialogue on “deconfliction” arrangements with the United States. Several Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters were shown on the runway at Hmeimim Air Base as Su-24M2 bombers began to deploy. Leveraging an upcoming UN Security Council General Assembly summit, Moscow pressed for a high-level bilateral meeting between Putin and Obama—a break from what had been more than a year of U.S.-imposed diplomatic “isolation” of Russia in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

Though the Obama administration rankled at the appearance that it had been coerced into restoring military dialogue, the risk of a military incident between the two big nuclear powers in the skies over Syria trumped other considerations. In a ninety-minute discussion, the two sides agreed to continue efforts to “deconflict” operations. Within days, Russia had achieved its first political gains from the intervention, which had yet to conduct a single sortie.

Still, it was clear that there was no agreement on the political way forward in Syria, and early Russian targeting in the air campaign, which launched on 30 September 2015, revealed that Russia’s air wing would focus on the “moderate” Syrian opposition under the rubric of a counterterrorism fight. Moscow’s rules of engagement were relatively simple: there was little to no distinction between the various nongovernment armed groups in Syria, as all except for Kurds and pro-regime militias would be considered “terrorists.” Putin declared at the UN assembly, “We think it is an enormous mistake to refuse to cooperate with the Syrian government and its armed forces, who are valiantly fighting terrorism face to face. We should finally acknowledge that no one but President Assad’s armed forces and Kurdish
militias are truly fighting the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations in Syria.\(^8\)

This was not just a matter of convenience for the sake of establishing a free-fire zone. Indeed, from Russia’s perspective, there was no such thing as a “moderate” opposition in Syria, and the entire term was a misguided Western invention aimed at legitimizing extremists opposed to Assad. The Russian political strategy at home and abroad was to frame the conflict as binary—only Assad’s regime had legitimacy, and all others were de facto terrorist groups of varying stripes allied with IS or Jabhat al-Nusra.\(^9\) Over time, Russia would also seek to create a systemic opposition, cobbling together forces that would be amenable to sharing power with the Assad regime.

Taking advantage of the momentum in 2015, Russia set up an intelligence sharing and coordination center in Baghdad, which included Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Israel. The center’s purpose was to deconflict Russian air operations with neighboring countries. Moscow also hoped to create the public sense that it was leading a coalition of countries in a counterterrorism effort no less legitimate than the U.S.-led coalition against IS. Russia’s leadership sought to parlay this posture and the U.S.-Russian deconfliction dialogue into more formal recognition of U.S.-Russia cooperation in Syria. Indeed, Moscow repeatedly asked for Washington’s acknowledgment of the Russian-led coalition as a legitimate partner in the Syrian war, which would have amounted to a recognition of Russia as Washington’s geopolitical “equal,” at least in this context.

Initial Russian combat operations were intended to change the momentum on the battlefield, providing a substantial morale boost to the Syrian forces and allied militias. Russia also hoped the United States would cede the battle space, at least by default, by focusing on its own combat operations against IS in Northern Iraq, and Kurdish allies in Syria. This would mean a rapid abandonment of the moderate opposition and other proxies seeking Assad’s overthrow, who would be powerless to deal with Russian airpower and increasingly isolated on the battlefield. In many respects, this goal was accomplished, as Russia and the United States established a de facto division of labor in Syria and complementary campaigns.

The first Russian deployment to Syria consisted of thirty-three aircraft and seventeen helicopters. These included twelve Su-24M2 bombers, twelve Su-25SM/
UB attack aircraft, four Su-34 fighter-bombers, four Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters, and one Il-20M1 reconnaissance plane. The helicopter contingent consisted of twelve Mi-24P attack helicopters and five Mi-8AMTSh transports. Later in 2015, this number would grow with four more Su-34 fighter-bombers and four additional Su-35S air superiority fighters. Mi-35M attack helicopters and Mi-8 transports arrived in the following months. A Mediterranean squadron led by the Black Sea Fleet would support the operations from the sea, though the Russian navy mostly concerned itself with providing logistical supplies to the intervention via landing ship tanks in what was dubbed the “Syrian Express.” In order to supplement limited transport capacity at sea, and equipment brought in by air via Ruslan An-124 cargo planes, Russia purchased eight Turkish cargo vessels and pressed four of them into service.

Initial Russian objectives focused on regaining access to key roads, linking infrastructure, breaking isolated Syrian bases out of encirclement, and softening up opposing forces by destroying as much hardware as possible—much of it captured earlier from the Syrian army. Although in the early months Russia had supposedly only helped Syria regain control of 2 percent of its territory, by February 2016, it was clear the air campaign was having an effect in shaping the battlefield, and with it, the political fortunes of the Syrian opposition. The opposition’s momentum stunted, Syrian morale began to recover.

Territorial control in Syria was always elusive, as local leaders would sign up with whoever was winning. Thus, “control” could swing rapidly toward the side that had the clear momentum, and Russian forces oversaw numerous “ceasefire agreements” between Syrian forces and village leaders. In reality, Assad’s forces had control over much of the population of Syria, while large tracts of opposition or extremist held territory were depopulated from the fighting. Thus, it would take less than two years for the Russian-led coalition to make the leap from gaining
only 2 percent of territory to appearing to be the victor in the conflict. Russian aircrews flew sorties at a high rate, averaging perhaps forty to fifty per day, but spiking to one hundred during peak combat times, such as January 2016. Two crews per airframe were needed to sustain the intensity of operations, along with a small village of defense contractors to support the newer platforms being fielded in Syria. Russian airpower in Syria never exceeded thirty-to-fifty combat aircraft and sixteen-to-forty helicopters of various types, a deployment many times smaller than the combat aviation group the Soviet Union fielded in Afghanistan. The rate of mechanical failure or combat loss was also magnitudes less than previous Russian or Soviet air operations.

During the conflict, Russian aerospace forces would be supported by around 3,000 ground troops, with perhaps 1,500 based at Hmeimim alone. These would include Naval Infantry from the 810th Brigade based in Crimea, elements from the 7th Airborne Assault Division, armored companies fielding T-90A tanks, MSTA-B towed artillery, and a host of air defense units including Buk-M2, Pantsir-S1 and S-400 units. Sophisticated electronic warfare equipment was deployed as well, alongside Russia’s Special Operations Command. After the capture of Palmyra in the spring and of Aleppo in the fall of 2016, Russia also introduced demining units and specialized military police units from the North Caucasus.

Russia’s special operations command featured prominently throughout the conflict, conducting diversionary operations, targeted killings, and reconnaissance. Another two thousand or so private military contractors (PMCs), the largest of which is known as Wagner
Group, bolstered Syrian forces and absorbed most of the casualties on the battlefield. With Russian air power in support, veterans-turned-PMCs made a difference amidst the poorly trained militias, taking the risk for $4,000–$5,000 per month.

On the whole, Moscow sought to keep its presence small. The initial force did not field long-range air defenses or dedicated air superiority fighters; rather, their arrival was prompted by an unexpected incident with Turkey, when Russia’s Su-24M2 was shot down by a Turkish F-16 in November of 2015. The Russian bomber had been attacking Turkmen militias in Syria, and had strayed through Turkish airspace. Indeed, Russia’s air force repeatedly violated Turkish airspace in an effort to coerce Turkey to change its policy in Syria and reach a modus vivendi with the Russian-led coalition. The crisis between Russia and Turkey was arguably the most dangerous moment of the entire intervention, and likely the closest a NATO country had been to military conflict with Russia in decades.

The Russian reaction to the incident was to impose harsh economic and political sanctions on Turkey, while showing on the battlefield that Turkish-backed forces had little hope of achieving victory over Assad. By the summer of 2016, Ankara gave in, issuing a quasi-apology in order to restore normal relations with Moscow. One by one, Russia would seek to change the positions of the major parties backing anti-Assad forces in Syria. First, Moscow pushed Washington to concede that a policy of regime change was not only unrealistic, but that its support for the Syrian opposition had no chance of success, all the while dangling the prospect of a ceasefire and humanitarian relief for civilians in the conflict. The United States did inch toward tacit acceptance of the Russian intervention, and of Assad’s de facto victory over the radicals as well as the U.S.-backed opposition.
Russian ambitions were also well served by competition among U.S. allies in the region, who frequently and vocally disagreed with Washington’s approach. Turkey was more hostile toward Kurdish fighters in Syria than toward Assad or IS, yet the Kurds were Washington’s chief ally against IS on the ground. Washington also had no interest in supporting Sunni extremist groups favored by the Saudis and other Arab states, nor were extremists seen as a viable alternative to the bloody Syrian regime. Eventually, after crushing Turkish-backed proxies in Syria, Russia got the cooperation it sought with Ankara. Saudi Arabia, too, began to show flexibility, and in October 2017, the Saudi king visited Russia for the first time in recognition of Moscow’s growing significance in the Middle East.

Russia also saw Syria as a testing ground for new weapons and platforms, giving as much of its military an opportunity to participate in the conflict as possible. This included rotating countless crews through the theater of operations, giving ships and bombers the opportunity to fire cruise missiles, and fielding a small ground force as well. After a period of military reforms from 2008 to 2012 and a large modernization program begun in 2011, Moscow wanted to bloody its air force in conflict.

Syria has had a profound impact on the Russian armed forces, as countless officers have been rotated through the campaign on three month stints to gain combat experience. According to Russia’s Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov, the commanders of military districts, combined arms armies, air force and air defense armies along with many of the divisional commanders have gained experience in Syria.12 Promotions in 2017

Citizens of Aleppo display portraits of fallen Russian servicemen killed while fighting in Syria during a 22 December 2017 parade in Aleppo, Syria. The Syrians were expressing appreciation for the Russian Federation’s contributions during the first anniversary celebration of the capture of Aleppo. (Photo courtesy of the Russian Embassy’s Twitter account, @EmbassyofRussia)
further advanced those who served in Syria. The experience will shape Russian military thinking and personnel decisions for years to come.

Alongside these training objectives, Russia also used combat operations in Syria as a technology demonstration for arms sales abroad, showing off the latest generation of Russian tech alongside older Soviet workhorses that did most of the fighting.

Starting with an initial strike on 7 October 2015, over the course of the conflict, Russian ships and submarines fired numerous Kalibr land-attack cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. Similarly, Russia’s long-range aviation joined the fray in November 2015, and since then, Tu-95MS and Tu-160 strategic bombers have flown a substantial number of sorties deploying Kh-555 and newer Kh-101 air launched cruise missiles against targets in Syria. The Tu-22M3 medium bomber force supplemented combat sorties from Hmeimim Air Base, though these aircraft exclusively dropped FAB unguided bombs from medium to high altitude. Later Moscow would also field Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile systems, Bastion-P antiship missiles, and other advanced weapons in an effort to demonstrate their capability.

Although the precision-guided weapons involved in the conflict represented a tiny portion of the actual mixture of weapons used, perhaps less than 5 percent, Russia demonstrated the capacity to employ long-range guided weapons from various platforms. Syria showcased both the advances Russian airpower forces had made since their dismal performance in the Russia–Georgia War of 2008 as well as the remaining limitations of Russia’s armed forces. Much of the bombing was done by older Su-24M2 and Su-25SM aircraft, and almost all of it with unguided area-of-effect munitions. With the exception of systems on the Su-34, which was used to employ the KAB-500S satellite-guided bomb, among other precision weapons, Russian fixed-wing aircraft as a whole lacked targeting pods to effectively employ precision-guided munitions.

Russian naval aviation was not impressive. The carrier strike-group sortie to Syria ferried by Russia’s vintage Kuznetsov heavy-aviation-carrying cruiser in 2016 was a publicity disaster, losing a Su-33 and Mig-29K to equipment failures. Otherwise, remarkably few Russian aircraft were lost, with most of the casualties among helicopter crews. Russian technicians kept both old- and newer-generation aircraft in the sky, with only one Su-24M2 lost to technical failure.

Russian air strikes were certainly effective, but incredibly costly in civilian casualties and collateral damage inflicted, some of which appeared intentional. Much of the ordnance used was for area of effect, and much too large in payload for targets in Syria. The Russian Aerospace Forces as a whole are still confined to an early 1990s form of fighting (though still a generational leap from where they were in 2008), but relying almost entirely on unguided weapons and, more importantly, lacking in the ISR assets necessary to conduct information-driven combat operations. Russia’s Aerospace Forces also lack the means to engage small moving targets with guided precision, relying on unguided weapons and munitions that are truly overkill. Just as the Soviet Union before it, the Russian military is a brutal mauler in close quarters, but continues to struggle in finding and seeing its target.

Russia made heavy use of drones to supplement its manned air campaign, conducting battle damage assessment and reconnaissance. Russian drones are rumored to have flown more sorties than manned aviation over Syria. The best Russian drones were licensed production variants of Israeli models—a product of Russian-Israeli defense cooperation. Despite substantial spending on development, Russia still has no armed unmanned aircraft systems, and thus lacks a real time recon-strike option for its drone platforms. Syria highlighted the need for Russian armed forces to invest further in the development of unmanned strike systems, and develop a larger repertoire of guided weapons for the Aerospace Forces, particularly for tactical employment.

Those limitations aside, Moscow did use the Syrian campaign effectively as part of a broader diplomatic and political engagement with the United States, demonstrating capability and resolve to use long-range guided weapons, many of which have nuclear-tipped variants. Syria did much for Russian coercive credibility, painting a clear picture about the resurgent capability and capacity of its armed forces to impose costs on NATO in a conventional conflict and its ability to reach out at long ranges to hold much of Europe at risk, if need be. Long-range strikes by strategic bombers, ships, and submarines should not be viewed simply as combat tests to gain experience; they were also intended as strategic messaging to boost Russian credibility writ large.
Not Home by Christmas

Upon entering the conflict, Russian armed forces quickly discovered that the intervention would take considerably more time than initially expected or desired. Syria’s army had degenerated into armed militias that were formally unified under the Assad banner but that no longer represented a coherent fighting force. Russian leadership was aghast at the large amount of Syrian and Iraqi hardware captured by the opposition and various militant groups while the Assad regime held barely 10 percent of territory. Some Syrian units were still capable of action, but Russian officers would have to embed across these units to conduct military operations and start rebuilding the Syrian army’s fighting potential.

Despite an influx of Iranian and Hezbollah troops in October 2015, it was clear that the warring sides were all leveraging proxies on a battlefield with a low density of forces. Their combat effectiveness was poor, and Syrian forces would continually call in Russian air strikes, make small gains, and retreat at the first sight of counteroffensives by well-motivated Jabhat al-Nusra or other fighting groups.

Over time Russia would train up lower-ranking Syrian officers, and establish the 5th Volunteer Assault Corps, led by Russian commanders and equipped with more advanced Russian equipment. The 5th has been Syria’s primary assault force for the past year. Combining Syrian fighters, PMCs, and Russian leadership to put together offenses has yielded battlefield victories at minimal cost.

Russian operational objectives were suited to its strategy: make decisive gains where possible, fragment the Syrian opposition, and seek to parlay victories in Syria into broader political objectives with the United States. To this end, the Russian General Staff sought to avoid exhaustive battles over population centers, especially given that Syrian forces lacked the manpower to hold anything they took. Such an approach would, and eventually did, result in having to retake the same terrain multiple times, as in the case of Palmyra. Russia also genuinely wanted to turn the fight eastward toward IS in an effort to glue together its effort at cooperation with the United States. Syria and Iran were not interested, instead seeking near total victory over the opposition and the recapture of all the major population centers in the west.

While Russia retained the image of a powerbroker and leader of the coalition, in reality, it did not have buy-in for such a strategy from its allies and cobelligerents; nor could Moscow compel them. In this regard, Russia suffered from the same deficit as the United States. Both were outside powers intervening in Syria without the necessary influence over local and regional allies to broker big deals. These differences came to the fore in March 2016, when Russia declared its withdrawal from Syria while turning the attention of its forces to Palmyra. In fact, Moscow had no intention of withdrawing, simply deleveraging and settling in for a longer fight, while Assad was focused on retaking Aleppo.

With its March declaration, Russia sought to recast the intervention in Syria as a sustainable longer-term security presence in support of a political settlement, rather than combat per se. The idea was to normalize Russian operations in the eyes of Russia’s domestic audience and to declare victory in some form. Medals were handed out and a small contingent was rotated back home, but meanwhile, Russia prepared to turn the Syrian campaign into smaller “campaigns” to avoid the perception that the intervention could take years. The first segment was concluded with the Russian capture of Palmyra in March 2016. Syrian and Iranian forces then turned toward Aleppo, a battle that ultimately scuttled Russian attempts to negotiate a joint integration group with the United States. The second cut was made in January 2017, after the seizure of Aleppo, and a third “victory” has been set at the closing of 2017 as Syrian forces capture Deir ez-Zor and IS appears on the verge of defeat.

This latest declaration of victory, ahead of the March 2018 presidential election, is fraught with risk since Russian forces are not just staying but further expanding the infrastructure at Tartus and Hmeimim. As Gerasimov said in a recent interview, “we’re not going anywhere.” Not long thereafter, a mortar attack on 31 December damaged several planes and killed a number of Russian soldiers at the airbase. The strike was followed by a drone attack from militant groups against both bases on 6 January. Both were a stark reminder that triumphalism is somewhat premature, and Russian forces in theater remain at risk. Figure 3 (on page 21) depicts the approximate Syrian situation as of November 2017 in terms of territorial control exercised by participants in the conflict near the official close of Russian operations initiated in support of the Assad regime (see figure 1, page 9, for a comparison to the situation at the beginning of the campaign).
Postconflict Settlement and Beyond

Now that the bulk of Syrian territory and population centers have been wrested from the hands of antiregime opposition groups, Russia can turn its full attention toward the postconflict settlement. It is true that Assad has committed to retake “every inch” of Syrian territory, and that even if Russia does not support this ambition, it will have little choice but to back continued regime efforts to secure energy and water resources in the country’s north and south. However, the main focus of both the Russian military and political action will be around the diplomatic settlement and supportive conditions on the ground.

Most importantly, Russia has apparently gained Washington’s acceptance of its role as a key broker in Syria’s future. In their November summit meeting in Vietnam, Presidents Trump and Putin confirmed not only continuing U.S. and Russian deconfliction dialogue and support for “de-escalation zones,” a largely Russian initiative, but also underscored the centrality of the political process for negotiating a postconflict future for Syria. That process is shaping up in line with Russia’s main strategic interests.

First, Russia has broken the monopoly of the Geneva process and of U.S. diplomatic leadership. It has successfully integrated both the Astana-based negotiations it launched in 2016 to the formal UN-backed international process and has regularly convened meetings of various opposition groups in an attempt
to foster the emergence of a common opposition grouping, which will be amenable to compromise with the Assad regime. Moscow’s progress on the political front is fitful, but at this writing it appears to be the only plausible path forward.

Second, Russia has managed to maintain productive ties with each of the other key regional players, ranging from Saudi Arabia on one end of the spectrum to Iran on the other. In fact, despite continuing disagreement with Saudi Arabia over the composition of the “legitimate” Syrian opposition to be represented at Geneva, and with Turkey over the role of the Kurdish self-defense forces, Russian diplomacy (backed by military force) has won recognition from both, a fact that is especially welcome in Moscow in the run-up to Russia’s March 2018 presidential election. Iran has proven a thorny ally for Russia; however, the relationship between the two countries remains largely stable, since the Iranians expect to be able to maintain their de facto dominance on the ground in much of Syria, solidifying their corridor of power from Iraq to Lebanon.

Finally, Russia will retain its ally in Damascus, because for the foreseeable future, the Assad regime appears back in control. In fact, Assad’s stock has risen so much since the Russian intervention two years ago that he is largely able to set the terms of his participation in the Geneva process. The opposition can howl in protest, but the regime has simply refused to engage in negotiations if the question of its own departure is on the agenda.

This is also clearly a victory for Russia, since Moscow has capitalized on its victories to secure long-term leases on its military facilities at Hmeimim and Tartus, as well as to position Russian firms to play potentially prominent and lucrative roles in Syrian reconstruction, especially in the energy and energy transit sectors. Russia not only needs these bases to continue supporting Syrian forces, but the conflict is now also part of a larger bid for becoming a power broker in the Middle East, and a balancing option for those seeking to hedge against U.S. influence.

The main area in which Russia’s Syria campaign fell clearly short of initial objectives was in the effort to broaden the platform for diplomatic engagement with Europe and the United States in the wake of the Ukraine crisis and associated Western sanctions.
Although Moscow did break through the Obama administration’s attempted isolation policy by forcing Washington to conduct deconfliction talks, those talks have not expanded into the full-fledged Russia-U.S. cooperation for which the Kremlin had hoped. Moreover, there has been zero willingness from Western capitals to think of Syria and Ukraine in quid pro quo terms. As much as Westerners may lament the death toll and flood of refugees from the Syrian civil war, the Ukraine conflict is simply much closer to home, and European governments have held firm in their support for sanctions tied to fulfillment of the Minsk agreements, while the United States has actually ratcheted sanctions dramatically upward in the wake of Russia’s apparent attempts to meddle in the 2016 U.S. election.

In sum, Russia appears to have won at least a partial victory in Syria, and done so with impressive efficiency, flexibility, and coordination between military and political action. On the one hand, Russia’s embrace of the Assad regime and its Iranian allies, its relative indifference to civilian casualties, and its blanket hostility to antiregime opposition groups are fundamentally at odds with widely held U.S. views on Syria. On the other hand, Russia’s “lean” strategy, adaptable tactics, and coordination of military and diplomatic initiatives offer important lessons for the conduct of any military intervention in as complex and volatile an environment as the Middle East. More than a decade and a half into the U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, with ongoing fighting in Libya and Yemen, and countless other tinderboxes that could ignite wider regional conflict threatening U.S. interests, Washington should pay close attention to the Russian intervention and how Moscow achieved its objectives in Syria.

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Notes


13. The initial employment of long-range aviation was in response to the terrorist bombing of Russia’s Metrojet flight out of Egypt.

14. Pukhov, “The War that Russia Won.”

Editor's note: In a March 2017 speech given by General of the Russian Army Valery Gerasimov, he observed that modern wars would likely be fought mainly by means other than martial weapons. He alluded to the concept that the primary purpose of war is to achieve a nation's political objectives, and there are increasingly a host of other potential means, informational and sociological, to achieve such objectives without resorting to violent military conflict. Such an observation highlights that the traditional concept of national security in the twenty-first century is being severely tested along with the very concept of the nation-state itself as the global population continues to explode, cheap and available mass communication proliferates, and international borders are weakened by a range of factors including ease of transnational transport and shifting political allegiances.

As the United States grapples with planning its own defense in the face of the emerging pressures of an ethnically complex world, the salience of the nation-state and national security concepts are sorely in need of refinement and clarification to facilitate effective future policy formulation and execution. With the above in mind, a plethora of serious political, economic, or social factors related to competition among political adversaries have emerged that might be decisive in determining the outcome of future conflicts in ways other than those that might previously have been decided by war. These include not only economic, diplomatic, and informational means to affect and undermine an adversary but also sociological and demographic changes that, if exploited in an effective manner, may have the potential to achieve political objectives by decisively collapsing the political will of an adversary state from within. Such “war by other means” has the potential to render previous concepts associated with national security as well as the...
nation-state obsolete and deserves close analysis by serious students of war.

The below chapter excerpt from the book Who are We?, published in 2006 by now deceased Harvard political scientist Samuel B. Huntington, details the challenges one such sociological phenomenon—ethnic diasporas—may pose to the national security and continuity of modern nation-states in general, and to the United States in particular.

As agreed upon with the publisher of Who Are We?, Simon & Schuster, Military Review has not edited this work for style; it is presented word-for-word as it was originally published.

Diasporas, Foreign Governments, and American Politics

Excerpt from Chapter 10, “Merging America with the World,” of Who Are We?

Diasporas are transnational ethnic or cultural communities whose members identify with a homeland that may or may not have a state. Jews were “the classic diaspora”; the term itself comes from the Bible and was for long primarily identified with Jews as a people who, following the destruction of Jerusalem in 586 B.C., were uniquely dispersed. They were the prototype of the “victim” diaspora, several of which exist in today’s world. More important now, however, are migrant diasporas, people who voluntarily leave their homeland to live and work elsewhere but also identify primarily with a transnational ethnic-cultural community that encompasses...
their homeland. The essence of the diasporan mentality was well expressed in 1995 by the American Jewish Committee: “Although geographically dispersed and ideologically diverse, Jews are indeed one people, united by history, covenant, and culture. Together we must act to shape the Jewish destiny; let no one, in Israel, America or elsewhere, erect barriers among us.” Diasporans thus differ conceptually from ampersands. Ampersands have two national identities, diasporans one transnational identity. In practice, however, the two often merge and individuals easily shift from one to the other.

Diasporas differ from ethnic groups. An ethnic group is an ethnic or cultural entity that exists within a state. Diasporas are ethnic or cultural communities that cut across state boundaries. Ethnic groups have existed in America throughout the nation’s history. They have promoted their economic, social, and political interests, including what they have seen as the interests of their ancestral country, and have competed with each other and with business, labor, agricultural, regional, and class groups. In doing so, they were engaging in national politics. Diasporas, on the other hand, form transnational alliances and engage in transnational conflicts. The central focus of diasporas is their homeland state. If that state does not exist, their overriding goal is to create one to which they can return. Irish and Jews have done this; Palestinians are in the process of doing so; Kurds, Sikhs, Chechens, and others aspire to do so. If a homeland state does exist, diasporas strive to strengthen it, improve it, and promote its interests in their host societies. In today’s world, domestic ethnic groups are being transformed into transnational diasporas, which homeland states have increasingly seen as the communal and institutional extension of themselves and as a crucial asset of their country. This close relation and cooperation between state diasporas and homeland governments is a key phenomenon in contemporary global politics.

The new significance of diasporas is primarily the result of two developments. First, the large migrations from poor to rich countries have increased the numbers,
wealth, and influence of diasporans with both their home and host countries. The Indian diaspora, it was estimated in 1996, consisted of 15 to 20 million people, with net assets of $40 billion to $60 billion and a “brain bank” of 200,000 to 300,000 highly skilled “doctors, engineers and other professionals, academics and researchers, managers and executives in multinational corporations (MNCs), high tech entrepreneurs, and graduate students of Indian origin.” The 30 to 35 million members of the long-standing Chinese diaspora play key entrepreneurial roles in the economies of all East Asian countries except Japan and Korea and have been indispensable contributors to mainland China’s spectacular economic growth. The rapidly growing Mexican diaspora of 20 to 23 million in the United States is, as we have seen, of increasing social, political, and economic importance to both countries. The Filipino diaspora, largely in the Middle East and the United States, is crucial to the Philippine economy.

Second, economic globalization and the improvements in global communications and transportation make it possible for diasporas to remain in close contact economically, socially, and politically with their homeland governments and societies. In addition, the efforts of homeland governments, like those of China, India, and Mexico, to promote economic development, to liberalize their economies, and to become increasingly involved in the global economy all increase the importance to them of their diasporas and create a convergence of economic interests between diasporas and homelands.

As a result of these developments, the relations between homeland governments and diasporas have changed in three ways. First, governments increasingly view their diasporas not as reflections on but as important assets to their country. Second, diasporas make increasing economic, social, cultural, and political contributions to their homelands. Third, diasporas and homeland governments increasingly cooperate to promote the interests of the homeland country and government in the host society.

Historically, states have had varying attitudes toward their members who migrate elsewhere. In some cases, they have attempted to prevent emigration and in others adopted ambivalent or permissive attitudes toward it. In the contemporary world, however, massive migration from poor to rich countries and the new means of maintaining contact with migrants have led homeland governments to view their diasporas as key contributors to the homeland and its goals. Governments see it in their interest to encourage emigration, to expand, mobilize, and organize their diasporas, and to institutionalize their homeland connections so as to promote homeland interests in host countries. Developed countries exert influence in world affairs through the export of capital, technology, economic aid, and military power. Poor overpopulated countries exert influence through the export of people.

Homeland government officials increasingly hail diasporas as vital members of the national community. Beginning in 1986, Philippine governments regularly encouraged Filipinos to migrate and become OFWs, “overseas Filipino workers,” and as of 2002, up to 7.5 million had done so. “Educated families and young professionals—nurses, doctors, computer analysts” supplemented the poorly educated, manual workers who had dominated previous emigration. While in exile in the United States in the early 1990s, former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, according to Yossi Shain, identified Haitian “diaspora members as Haiti’s ‘tenth department’ (Haiti is divided into nine), to which they responded enthusiastically.” In the late 1990s, a significant change occurred in the Israeli government attitude toward the Jewish diaspora. Earlier its policy had been, as J. J. Goldberg, author of the book *Jewish Power*, observes, “to replace Jewish life elsewhere, rather than reinforce it.” In 1998, concerned about the worldwide erosion of Jewish culture and identity, the government of Benjamin Netanyahu adopted a new approach and launched efforts to revitalize Judaism outside Israel. Netanyahu became, in Goldberg’s words, “the first Israeli prime minister to show an interest in supporting Jewish life in the Diaspora.” An even more dramatic indicator of the new importance of diasporas was the change in the policies of the Cuban government toward the overwhelmingly anti-Castro Cuban community in the United States. Aware of the hostile attitudes, the government in the mid-1990s, Susan Eckstein reports, “modified its public stance toward the diaspora, facilitated transnational bonding, and more openly supported economically motivated migration. The émigrés whom Castro previously had pejoratively portrayed as gusanos, worms, to be spurned by good revolutionaries, were redefined as the ‘Cuban community abroad.’” For most of the twentieth century, Mexicans, including government officials, also looked down on their countrymen who had migrated to the United States. They were disparaged as *pochos* or, in the term used by
Octavio Paz, *pachuco*, who had lost their “whole inheritance: language, religion, customs, beliefs.” Mexican officials rejected them as traitors to their country. By “imposing penalties,” Yossi Shain says, “Mexico sought to warn its citizens against the perils of departing their native country and forsaking their culture in search of a better life in the United States.” In the 1980s, that attitude changed dramatically. “The Mexican nation extends beyond the territory enclosed by its borders,” President Ernesto Zedillo said in the 1990s. “Mexican migrants are an important, very important part of it.” President Vicente Fox described himself as president of 123 million Mexicans, 100 million in Mexico and 23 million in the United States, a figure that includes Mexican-Americans not born in Mexico.6 Homeland leaders drench with encomiums those who leave the homeland. “You yourselves are heroes,” President Mohammad Khatami of Iran told eight hundred Iranian-Americans in September 1998. “We want to salute these heroes,” President Fox of Mexico said in December 2000, who went to the United States searching “for a job, an opportunity they can’t find at home, their community or their own country.”7 Homelands governments encourage their people to leave their country and facilitate their doing so.

Diaporas are increasingly a global phenomenon. In Brazil, the Liberdade neighborhood of Brazilian capital São Paulo is locally referred to as “the Little Tokyo” (shown in this 2014 photo). More than 1.6 million Japanese nationals reside in Brazil, the largest population of Japanese outside mainland Japan. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)
president, he supported legal status for the several million Mexicans who have entered the United States illegally, argued the need to provide "humane working conditions for Mexicans already in the United States," and urged the United States to provide up to $1 billion in Social Security benefits to Mexicans who had worked in the United States. Homeland governments have developed formal institutions and informal processes to bolster their diasporas and link them more closely to their homelands. The countries to America’s south, Columbia University Professor Robert C. Smith pointed out, “are the site of extremely interesting diasporic experimentation, with Mexico, Colombia, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and other states attempting to cultivate and institutionalize relations with what one Mexican official called their ‘global nations’.” In January 2003, the Indian government and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry organized in New Delhi “the largest gathering of the Indian diaspora since independence in 1947.” The two thousand “non-resident Indians” who came from sixty-three countries were “politicians, scholars, industrialists, and jurists,” including the prime minister of Mauritius, the former prime minister of Fiji, and two Nobel Prize winners. Four hundred came from the United States, representing the 1.7 million Indian-Americans, who have an aggregate income equal to 10 percent of India’s national income.

In the last decade of the twentieth century, the Mexican government became a leader in developing intensive relations with its diaspora. President Carlos Salinas took the first major step by creating in 1990 the Program for Mexican Communities Abroad as a subsidiary of its foreign ministry. It was designed, in the words of Robert Leiken, “to build an institutional bridge between the Mexican government, on the one hand, and U.S. Mexicans and Mexican-Americans.” The PCME carried out a widespread range of activities, sponsoring Mexican-American groups, promoting the interests of Mexican immigrants in the United States, enhancing their status in Mexico, founding cultural centers, and encouraging federations of the Mexican hometown associations in the United States. The personnel and budgets of Mexico’s forty-two consulates in the United States were significantly expanded to carry out these functions. President Zedillo continued these activities.

### Table 2. Countries with the Largest Chinese Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Chinese Population</th>
<th>Percent of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>10,392,792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>7,417,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>5,081,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2,832,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>2,547,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1,769,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1,643,611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>1,637,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1,350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1,213,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>~1,000,000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>823,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>674,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>466,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Graphic courtesy of Wikimedia Commons; various data from 2011–2017)
On taking office, President Fox appointed a prominent state governor to a new post in his cabinet to coordinate activities relating to the U.S.-Mexican border. Six months later, he laid out a six-year National Development Plan that included the goal of protecting Mexican immigrants in the United States and the creation of a special prosecutor’s office for that purpose.\(^\text{11}\)

The enhanced role of Mexican consulates was dramatically evident in Los Angeles with its huge Mexican population. In 2003, Consul General Martha Lara claimed, “I have more constituents than the mayor of Los Angeles.” In one sense she is right: about 4.7 million Mexican-Americans live in greater Los Angeles, while the total population of the central city is 3.6 million. The consul general and her staff of seventy, according to the *New York Times*, provide “a range of services,” which “often makes Ms. Lara seem more like a governor than a diplomat. She inaugurates immigrant-owned businesses, certifies births, marries lovers, and crowns beauty queens.”\(^\text{12}\) The most significant “governing” role of the consulates, however, is providing certification to illegal Mexican immigrants that they are American residents.

September 11 reduced the salience to the United States of its relations with Mexico, and the U.S. government did not move forward with the anticipated “normalization” of the several million Mexicans in the United States illegally. The Mexican government responded by promoting its own form of legalization: the issuance by its consulates of registration cards, the *matricula consular*, certifying that the bearer was a resident of the United States. Some 1.1 million of these were issued in 2002. Simultaneously, Mexican agencies launched a major campaign to get general acceptance of these cards. By August 2003, they had succeeded with “more than 100 cities, 900 police departments, 100 financial institutions, and with thirteen states.”\(^\text{13}\)

Legal Mexican immigrants have no need for a *matricula consular*. Possession of such a card, consequently,
is presumptive evidence that the bearer is in the United States illegally. Acceptance of that card by American public and private institutions cedes to the Mexican government the power to give to illegal immigrants the status and benefits normally available only to legal residents. A foreign government, in effect, determines who is an American. The success of the Mexican matrícula consular prompted Guatemala to start issuing them in 2002, and other homeland governments have been rushing to follow.

As was documented in Chapter 8 [of the Huntington book], ampersands promote dual citizenship laws to legitimize their dual loyalties and dual identities. Homeland governments also find it in their interest to allow diasporans to be homeland citizens as well as citizens of their host country. This establishes another tie to the homeland and also encourages them to promote homeland interests in their host country. In 1998, a Mexican law took effect that permitted Mexican migrants to retain their Mexican nationality while becoming U.S. citizens. “You’re Mexicans—Mexicans who live north of the border,” President Zedillo told Mexican-Americans. By 2001, as part of their extensive outreach to their diasporans, Mexican consulates were actively “encouraging Mexican nationals in the United States to naturalize as U.S. citizens, while keeping their nationality as Mexicans as well.” Candidates for political office in Mexico campaign in the United States to raise money, to induce diasporans to get their family and friends in Mexico to vote for them, and to get Mexican citizens to return to Mexico to vote. President Fox has supported Mexican citizenship for U.S. citizens of Mexican origin, including those born in the United States, which would enable them to vote in Mexican elections. They would constitute about 15 percent of all potential Mexican voters. If they can vote at their consulates in Los Angeles, Chicago, and elsewhere, the campaigns in these locations by candidates for office in Mexico are likely to be at least as, and possibly more, intense than the campaigns by candidates for office in America.

The promotion of their diasporas by homeland governments is paralleled by and has encouraged diasporas to contribute to and support their homeland. This takes many forms. Most obvious are huge remittances diasporans send home. Historically, emigrants have sent money back to their families and communities. The extent and the institutionalization of these transfers took on new dimensions in the late twentieth century. In this process, diasporans as well as ampersands—and, of course, the two often overlap—have played active roles. The transfer of funds becomes not just an effort to help family and friends, but a collective effort to affirm a diasporan identity with the homeland and to support it because it is their homeland. Estimates of the global amount of migrant remittances from $63 billion in 2000, exceeding the $58 billion in official aid, to $80 billion in 2001, with $28.4 billion of this coming from the United States. Reportedly, Jewish Americans contribute $1 billion or more a year to Israel. Filipinos send more than $3.6 billion home. In 2000, Salvadorans in the United States sent $1.5 billion to their home country. Vietnamese diasporans reportedly send home $700 million to $1 billion a year. Even remittances...
from the United States to Cuba amounted to $720 million in 2000 and over $1 billion in 2002. The largest U.S. remittances, of course, are to Mexico, which have grown dramatically. The Mexican government estimated that they would increase by 35 percent in 2001, exceed $9 billion, and probably replace tourism as Mexico’s second largest source of foreign exchange after oil exports. Estimates for 2002 and 2003 exceed $10 billion.16

Diasporas contribute to the economic well-being of their homelands not just through large numbers of small remittances to those they have left behind to be spent as the recipients wish, but also increasingly by substantial investments in particular projects, factories, and businesses, ownership of which they may share with indigenous partners. The Chinese government has encouraged such investments from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, and elsewhere. Indian, Mexican, and other successful immigrant entrepreneurs in the United States have been importuned for investments by their homeland governments. Beginning in the 1960s, some 25,000 Indian “top graduates” in engineering and related fields left for the United States, where many became extremely successful, among other things, running “more than 750 technology companies in California’s Silicon Valley alone.” They have responded positively to the Indian government’s urging them to invest in educational programs, training institutes, and productive facilities in India. One 2002 survey found that half of foreign-born (largely Chinese and Indian) highly skilled technocrats and entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley had “set up subsidiaries, joint ventures, subcontracting arrangements, or other business operations in their native countries.”17 Successful entrepreneurs and professionals from Mexico and other countries have acted similarly.

and the homeland governments vigorously attempt to direct such investments into projects that the governments deem essential. Diasporas make noneconomic contributions to their homelands. Following the end of the communist regimes in eastern Europe, diasporans, many of them from the United States, provided presidents of Lithuania and Latvia, a prime minister of Yugoslavia, two foreign ministers, and a vice minister of defense who then became chief of the general staff in Lithuania, as well as numerous other lower officials in these countries. Support was expressed in Poland and the Czech Republic for Zbigniew Brzezinski and Madeleine Albright becoming presidents of these countries. Neither, however, evinced interest in that possibility, and Brzezinski commented that this suggestion forced him to examine his own identity and to conclude that while he was historically and culturally Polish, politically he was American. Diasporas also try to shape the policies of their homeland governments. As Yossi Shain has argued, on occasion they have attempted to “market the American Creed abroad,” promoting American values of civil liberties, democracy, and free enterprise in their homelands. This certainly happens in some cases; nonetheless, as critics like Rodolfo O. de la Garza point out, Shain did not convincingly demonstrate this to be the case for three most important diasporas in the United States: Mexican-Americans, Arab-Americans, and Chinese-Americans, all of which “act counter to Shain’s assertion regarding the promotion of democratic practices in the homeland.” It would appear, however, that in 2000, Mexican-Americans overwhelmingly supported the end after seven decades of the monopoly of power in their homeland by a single party.

Diasporas take positions on their homelands’ foreign policy. In controversies involving the homeland country or homeland groups in conflict with other states or groups over the control of territory, diasporas have often, but not always, supported the more extremist of their homeland colleagues. Stateless diasporas, such as Chechens, Kosovars, Sikhs, Palestinians, Moros, and

![Figure. Breakdown of Latino Diasporan Groups in the United States](Graphic by Arin Burgess, Military Review; data courtesy of Pew Research Center)
Tamils have provided money, weapons, military recruits, and diplomatic and political support to their compatriots fighting to create independent homelands. Without external diasporic support, such insurgencies are unsustainable. With that support, they end only when the insurgents achieve what they want. Diasporas are important to the maintenance of homeland states; they are indispensable to the creation of such states.

The third and in many ways the most significant new dimension of diasporas is the extent to which homeland governments have been able to mobilize and to establish close means of cooperation with them so as to promote homeland interests in host societies. This development is especially significant for the United States. First, America is the most powerful actor in global politics and is able to exercise some influence on events in almost every part of the world. Other governments hence have a special need to influence the policies and behavior of its government. Second, America is historically an immigrant society and in the late twentieth century opened its doors to tens of millions of new immigrants and thus became host to more and larger diasporic groups. Third, given the extent and variety of American power, foreign governments have only limited ability to affect American policies through conventional diplomatic, economic, and military means.
and hence must rely more on their diaspora. Fourth, the nature of American government and society enhances the political power of foreign governments and diasporas. Dispersion of authority among state and federal governments, three branches of government, and loosely structured and often highly autonomous bureaucracies provide them, as it does domestic interest groups, multiple points of access for promoting favorable policies and blocking unfavorable ones. The highly competitive two-party system gives strategically placed minorities such as diasporas the opportunity to affect elections in the single-member districts of the House of Representatives and at times also in statewide Senate elections. In addition, multiculturalism and belief in the value of immigrant groups' maintaining their ancestral culture and identity provide a highly favorable intellectual, social, and political atmosphere, unique to the United States, for the exercise of diaspora influence.

Fifth, during the Cold War, as Tony Smith has pointed out, the interests of refugee diasporas from communist countries broadly corresponded with the goals of American foreign policy. Eastern European diasporas promoted the liberation of their countries from Soviet rule; Russian, Chinese, and Cuban diasporas supported U.S. efforts to weaken or end communist control of their homelands. With the end of the Cold War, however, ideological opposition to homeland governments gave way (except for the Cubans) to renewed identification with and support for their homeland and its government, whose interests did not always coincide with American national interests. Sixth, during the decade between the end of the Cold War and the start of the war on terror, America had no overriding foreign policy goal, and hence the way was open for diasporas and economic interest groups to play more important roles in shaping American foreign policy.

September 11 drastically reduced the power and status of Arab and Muslim groups and generated questioning attitudes toward immigrants generally. It is dubious, however, that in the absence of major additional attacks, it will have all that much of an effect in the longer run, given the powerful political, social, and intellectual forces deriving from both globalization and the nature of American society and politics that make the United States a fertile field for the exercise of influence by homeland governments and their diasporas.

As a result of these factors, in the late twentieth century, foreign governments greatly increased their efforts to affect American policies. These included expanding their lobbying efforts and public relations activity, providing support to think tanks and media, and mobilizing their diasporas to contribute funds and workers to political campaigns and for those interested in a related reading … in the November-December 2006 edition of Military Review, three journalism professors trace the historic tendency of emerging media technologies to stimulate the formation and balkanization of group identities among media consumers in their article “Vertical versus Horizontal Media: Using Agenda-setting and Audience Agenda-melding to Create Public Information Strategies in the Emerging Papyrus Society.” The article illustrates the essential role of emerging public communication technologies in various eras in building and cultivating group identity. The article is salient to the phenomenon of diaspora because modern technologies dramatically facilitate the enabling of diaspora groups to resist assimilation and to retain separate national and cultural ethnic identities apart from the national-states in which they may reside.

To view this article, visit http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20061231_art005.pdf.

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To view this article, visit http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20061231_art005.pdf.
In today’s world, culture and ethnicity have replaced ideology. In America, many different diasporan constituencies that can be exploited by many different foreign governments have replaced the single ideological constituency exploited by the Soviet Union.

to lobby congressional committees and bureaucratic agencies. These governments and their supporters also became much more sophisticated in their understanding of the dynamics of American government and the means of securing access to centers of power. The shift in the scale and sophistication of Mexico’s efforts is one example of these changes.

In the mid-1980s, Mexico was spending less than $70,000 a year on lobbying Washington, and President Miguel de la Madrid (a graduate of the Harvard Kennedy School of Government) lamented the difficulty he had getting his diplomats not just to deal formally with the State Department but to develop close relations with the congressmen who had the real power to affect Mexico’s interests. In 1991, under President Carlos Salinas (also a Kennedy School alumnus), the Mexican embassy in Washington was doubled in size and its press attachés and congressional liaison officers expanded even further. By 1993, Mexico was spending $16 million on Washington lobbying, and Salinas was leading a multiyear $35 million campaign to get congressional approval of Mexico’s joining the North American Free Trade Agreement. As has been pointed out, Mexican political and consular officials also began to make great efforts to mobilize and organize the Mexican diaspora to promote Mexico’s agenda in Washington. In 1995, President Zedillo explicitly urged Mexican-Americans to become as effective in promoting Mexico’s interests as the Jewish lobby was in promoting Israel’s. As one State Department official commented, “The Mexicans used to be invisible here. Now they’re all over the place.”

Mexico is a dramatic example of the intensified activity by foreign governments to influence American policy and to mobilize their diasporas for that purpose. Other governments making parallel efforts include those of Canada, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Israel, Germany, the Philippines, and China, with annual spending by many of them reaching into tens of millions of dollars and in a few cases probably exceeding a hundred million dollars.

Homeland governments exploit their diasporas in various ways. One is as a source of agents for espionage and influence. Throughout history, the desire for money has motivated people to turn against their country and to sell themselves to a foreign state. Americans working for the CIA, the FBI, and the military did this in the 1980s and 1990s. Spies also may have other motives. In the 1930s and 1940s, those who became Soviet agents, including U.S. officials, Los Alamos scientists, and the Cambridge coterie of diplomats, were motivated not by lucre but by ideology. In today’s world, culture and ethnicity have replaced ideology. In America, many different diasporan constituencies that can be exploited by many different foreign governments have replaced the single ideological constituency exploited by the Soviet Union. Immigrants whose primary loyalty is to America can provide and have provided important services, including espionage, to the United States in its relations with other governments. To the extent, however, that they see themselves as members of a diaspora encompassing their homeland society and its government, they also become a potential source of agents for that government. “Espionage,” Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan once observed, “is almost invariably associated with diaspora politics,” and as the Department of Defense reported to Congress in 1996, “many foreign intelligence agencies attempt to exploit ethnic or religious ties” of American diasporans to their homelands.

Much more important than espionage and involving far more people are the efforts of diasporans to shape American policy to serve homeland interests. These efforts have been documented at length at a general level in studies by Tony Smith, Yossi Shain, Gabriel Sheffer, and others as well as in innumerable studies of specific
In recent decades, diasporas have had a major impact on American policy toward Greece and Turkey, the Caucasus, recognition of Macedonia, support for Croatia, sanctions against South Africa, aid for black Africa, intervention in Haiti, NATO expansion, the controversy in Northern Ireland, and the relations between Israel and its neighbors. Diaspora-shaped policies may at times coincide with broader national interests, as could arguably be the case with NATO expansion, but they are often pursued at the expense of broader interests and American relations with long-standing allies. It can hardly be otherwise when diasporas identify themselves completely with their homeland, as in the case of Elie Wiesel: “I support Israel—period. I identify with Israel—period. I never attack, never criticize Israel when I am not in Israel. ... The role of a Jew is to be with our people.”

Studies show, Tony Smith argues, that “the organized leadership” of the Jewish, Greek, Armenian, and other diasporas are “strongly influenced by foreign governments to take positions that may contradict American policy or interests in the region” and are unwilling “to concede that any voice but theirs should be authoritative with respect to the area of the world that concerns them.” The claim of diasporas of the right to dominate the shaping of American policy toward their homeland area usually rests on an underlying assumption that no possible conflict could exist between homeland interests and American interests, an attitude succinctly expressed by convicted Israeli spy Jonathan Pollard: “I never thought for a second that Israel’s gain would necessarily result in America’s loss. How could it?”

Diasporas achieve influence in Congress because they can affect elections to Congress by providing money and workers to their friends and campaigning vigorously against those opposed to their policies. The political action of the Jewish diaspora is credited with the defeat in 1982 of Representative Paul Findley (Rep.-Illinois), senior Republican on the Middle East Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, because of his support for the PLO, and in 1984 of Senator Charles Percy (Rep.-Illinois), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for his backing the sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia. In 2002, Jewish diaspora groups were central to the primary defeats for the reelection of Representatives Earl Hilliard (Dem.-Alabama) and Cynthia McKinney (Dem.-Georgia), because they had endorsed Palestinian and Arab causes. The Armenian National Committee of America gets some credit for the defeat in 1996 of two representatives whom it had labeled among the most pro-Turkish members of Congress: Jim Bunn (Rep.-Oregon) and Greg Laughlin (Dem.-Texas). Bunn’s successful opponent, Darlene Hooley, praised the ANCA “for mounting a nationwide campaign in support of my candidacy.”

Countries such as Israel, Armenia, Greece, Poland, and India have obviously benefited from the efforts of their mostly small but well-placed, affluent, and articulate diasporas in the United States. Countries opposing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Core Jewish Population</th>
<th>Percent of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Israel</td>
<td>6,014,300</td>
<td>43.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 United States</td>
<td>5,425,000</td>
<td>39.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 France</td>
<td>478,000</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Canada</td>
<td>380,000</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 United Kingdom</td>
<td>290,000</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Russian Federation</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Argentina</td>
<td>181,500</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Germany</td>
<td>118,000</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Australia</td>
<td>112,500</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Brazil</td>
<td>95,200</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Graphic courtesy of Wikimedia Commons; stats from 2013)
these homelands have often lost out as a result. Increased and diversified immigration to America is multiplying, however, the numbers of diasporic communities and their actual and potential political influence. As a result, conflicts abroad between opposing homelands increasingly become conflicts in America between opposing diasporas. One Arab-American leader described the congressional contest in Georgia in 2002 as “a little, Middle East proxy war.” Such “proxy wars” fought politically between diasporas in America are tributes to America’s power to influence the real wars between homelands abroad and also evidence of the extent to which homeland governments and their diasporas believe they can affect the course of American foreign policy. As the diaspora universe becomes more diverse, proxy wars are also likely to multiply and become more diverse. One particularly intense conflict was the 1996 senatorial contest in South Dakota. This was as much a contest between Indians and Pakistanis as between Republicans and Democrats. Each candidate ardently solicited the support of a diasporan constituency. Indian-Americans contributed about $150,000 to Senator Larry Pressler’s reelection campaign because he supported limits on U.S. arms exports to Pakistan. Pakistani-Americans gave a similar amount to his opponent. Pressler’s defeat produced elation in Islamabad and dejection in New Delhi. In 2003, a similar line-up and result occurred with the unsuccessful effort of an Indian-American, Bobby Jindal, to become governor of Louisiana. He was enthusiastically backed by Indians and Indian-Americans and vigorously opposed by Pakistani-Americans, who contributed substantial sums to his successful opponent.

The increasing numbers of Arab-Americans and Muslim Americans and their growing political involvement also pose challenges to the influence of the Jewish diaspora on American Middle East policy. In the 2002 Democratic primary in Georgia, incumbent Representative Cynthia McKinney, who had been a major supporter of Palestinian causes, “received campaign contributions from Arab-Americans around the country,” including “respectable lawyers, physicians and merchants” but also others who were “under scrutiny by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for possible terrorist links.” McKinney’s opponent, Denise Majette, was able to raise $1.1 million, almost twice what McKinney raised, with the help of “contributions from Jews outside Georgia.” McKinney had other problems affecting her reelection campaign and lost by a vote of 58 percent to 42 percent. But, as the Economist commented two years earlier on the growing political role of Arab-Americans, “The pro-Israel lobby is far better organized and financed than its putative rival.

Samuel P. Huntington discusses social and political influences trending in a direction that could lead to the weakening and eventual dissolution of the United States. He poses the example of the Soviet Union as a case study demonstrating the weakness of mere ideology (communism) employed in an effort to unify different cultures and nationalities—an approach that eventually failed. To mitigate and reverse such trends in the United States, he proposes solutions to restore and stimulate American cohesion and national identity.
But now there is at least a putative rival—and that is quite a change in American politics.\footnote{1}

American politics is increasingly an arena in which homeland governments and their diasporas attempt to shape American policy to serve homeland interests. This brings them into battles with other homelands and their diasporas fought out on Capitol Hill and in voting precincts across America. An ineluctable dynamic is at work. The more power the United States has in world politics, the more it becomes an arena of world politics, the more foreign governments and their diasporas attempt to influence American policy, and the less able the United States is to define and pursue its own national interests when these do not correspond with those of other countries that have exported people to America.\footnote{2}

Notes


22. See Smith, Foreign Attachments; Shain, Marketing the American Creed Abroad; Sheffer, Modern Diasporas in International Politics.


Russian Diaspora as a Means of Russian Foreign Policy

Öncel Sencerman


The Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 after about fifty years of competition between two very different ideological poles. During that period, conflict zones became frozen, and the demands of different ethnic groups and peoples were quashed and rejected. The imperialism that had been started by the Russian Empire on its own territory had finally come to an end.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many former Soviet republics declared their independence, one after another, and a period of reconstruction for those nations began. However, this reconstruction was hindered by political, economic, social, and demographic problems. Foremost of these problems was Russian diaspora: Russian people and Russian-speaking communities in the former Soviet republics.

The borders between the former Soviet republics were internationally recognized with the Minsk and Almaty Agreements in 1991, consequently leaving sixty million people, twenty-five million of whom were Russians, out of their home countries.¹ Ethnic Russian people and other Russian-speaking ethnic communities who had settled in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan), southern Caucasus (Georgia and Azerbaijan), the Baltics (Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia), Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova became minority groups after the breakup of the Soviet Union (see figure, page 44).

As these newly independent states are re-creating their national identities, their Russian and Russian-speaking populations are facing discrimination and marginalization. However, the problems these minority communities are facing in the former Soviet states have started to affect the domestic politics of the Russian Federation (thereinafter referred to as Russia). Additionally, the Russian and Russian-speaking minorities living in Russia’s “near abroad” (the term used by Russians to describe the newly independent states created after the fall of the Soviet Union) are playing a key role in increasing Russia’s power in the region by influencing Russian politics and helping Russia re-create its own national identity.² Russian diaspora is clearly tied to Russian foreign policy toward countries having Russian minorities.³

This article will first consider Russian diaspora from a historical perspective, examining Russian expansion into its near abroad. The second part

Öncel Sencerman is a PhD candidate in international relations at the University of Yalova, Turkey. He holds a BA from the prestigious Boğaziçi University in Turkey, and an MA from Adnan Menderes University, Turkey, where he now works as the director of the International Office. His works mostly focus on conflict and peace studies related to sub-Saharan Africa.
deals with the question of how Russian diaspora has turned into an instrument of Russian foreign policy.

**The Birth of Russian Diaspora**

Russian settlement in the former Soviet republics around Soviet Russia and on other lands outside of Russia today started in the sixteenth century, with migrations of Russian people from their Tsarist Russia homeland to the east and the west. While the conquests and expansionist activities during the reign of Ivan the Terrible in the Russian Empire had strategic benefits, the main reason for this migration was economic exploitation; the vast lands of the east and west offered seemingly limitless furs and various resources for Russia. This movement of peoples increased until the end of the Tsarist Era.

Before the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, millions of Russian peasants from Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus were settled in Kazakhstan by Tsarist Russia with the intention of ensuring the Russification of Kazakhstan’s southern regions. Russian people also migrated to the Baltics and to Central Asia. The Old Believers (members of the Eastern Orthodox Christians who refused revision of older forms of Orthodox liturgical and ritual practices) in Russia, for example, immigrated to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia with the start of a reform period in the Russian Church. The Russian Old Believers arrived to the north of Kazakhstan and the Ural region during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Subsequently, implementation of Tsarist Russia’s resettlement policy continued and intensified. Thousands of Russians were settled in small groups in the three Baltic States, in the Muslim states of Central Asia, and in Siberia, where they established their own cities. By the end of the eighteenth century, Russians occupied most of the lands around what is the Kazakhstan border today, the Altai Mountains, and the whole basin of Ural River.

Russian expansionism increased in the twentieth century in Central Asia with the sociopolitical changes in the Russian Empire brought on by the Russian Revolution. During the Revolution, approximately 250,000 peasants were sent to neighboring communist states under the policy of “collectivization.” Russians who migrated to these parts of what had become the Soviet Union played an important role after the 1930s as they helped to industrialize these remote regions.

The Russification process gained momentum during the Second World War, as one-fifth of the factories located on the front line in Russia were moved to Central Asia. This made it necessary for Russian skilled workers to be settled in this region. Another great migration occurred after World War II, brought about by a land development program known as The Virgin Lands Campaign. Started by Nikita Khrushchev, this program authorized mostly Russians and other volunteers speaking communities from Ukraine and Belarus to settle in Kazakhstan.

Russian people also came to the Baltic Soviet Republics after World War II. The first to arrive in the Baltics were Russian intelligentsia who escaped from the political oppression of the Communist Party. Teachers, physicians, engineers, researchers, actors and actresses, journalists, and highly skilled workers soon followed them. And, after them, Russian soldiers and other Russian people were sent to the region for security reasons. The present Russian population in the Baltic Soviet Republics can be explained by this former settlement policy.

Similarly, Russians immigrated westward into Ukraine and Belarus for different historical reasons. Belarus, which constituted a part of Kiev Russia in the Middle Ages, later became a part of the Russian Empire and turned into one of the first four members of the Soviet Union. The Principality of Kiev and the Treaty of Pereyaslav are regarded as the foundation of the relations between Ukraine and Russia. The Russians started migrating toward Ukraine in the seventeenth century, and a large number of Russians rushed into Ukraine with its industrialization in the eastern part of the country in the nineteenth century. Stalin, who was following rapid industrialization policies, invited Russians and Belarusians to settle in Ukraine.

The history of the relations between Russia and Moldavia goes back to the time of Russo-Turkish Wars. Moldavia was given to Romania after the Crimean War and World War I. However, in 1924, the Soviet Union established the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic in the east of Dniester under Ukrainian sovereignty, and it joined the Soviet Union in 1944. A great number of Russians and Ukrainians moved to the newly constructed industrial zones in the Trans-Dniester region while it was under Soviet rule.

The Russian population in the former Soviet republics started to decrease with the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Union, yet the rate of this population was constant in some of them. The table shows the percentage of Russians in the former Soviet republics in 1989 compared to the Russian population in those countries between 1995 and 2005 as determined by Minority Rights Group International.23

As is seen in the table, the percentage of Russians in the former Soviet republics decreased over time. This was primarily for economic reasons after the break-up of the Soviet Union and the voluntary resettlement program put into effect after 2000 by Russian President Vladimir Putin. More than 80 percent of the Russian population in Tajikistan, one third of those in Turkmenistan, half of those in Uzbekistan, and one third of those in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan migrated to another country in 1991; this migration caused the population in these countries to diminish, yet helped the indigenous nationalization process gain speed in the former Soviet republics.24 This drastic decrease after 1989 occurred for a variety of different reasons, including discriminatory policies toward Russians and Russian-speaking people, identity development processes in the former Soviet countries, and the Putin government’s economic improvements to attract the Russian diaspora back to Russia.25

Russia started to pay close attention to Russian diaspora, whose total number had reached up to 25 million, after the transition of power from the Atlanticists to Eurasianists during the Yeltsin era, and it developed clear-cut policies about its near abroad.26 The second part of this article discusses how Russia began to make use of Russian diaspora as a means of implementing foreign policy starting with the Near Abroad Policy formed in 1993, and how Russia benefited from the Russian population fomenting trouble in its neighboring countries to convince their governments to formulate policies that were favorable to Moscow’s interests.27

### Russian Diaspora as a Means of Russian Foreign Policy

The collapse of the Soviet Union left Russia needing to prove itself a power in the international arena. Russians responded to the subsequent period of economic and political instability with nationalistic sentiment and national integration movements as they sought to construct a new identity for their country. Russia’s predilection for domestic centralization led to the development of a new foreign policy bearing political, military, and economic aspects regarding the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).28 Right-wing Russian political groups viewed this new policy as a means to reverse political trends and reinstall the unitary state in Russia and its near abroad. Their political programs held imperial tones, and they believed the Russian

#### Table. Proportions of Russian Population to the Country Population in the Former Soviet Republics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>The percentage of Russians in 1989 (%)</th>
<th>The percentage of Russians after 2005 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
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(Graphic by author)
diaspora held an important role in implementing their policies.\textsuperscript{29} As Pal Kolsto stated in his work in 1993, these right-wing groups aimed to revive the Russian Empire and were convinced they could benefit from the Russian diaspora like Hitler benefited from the German population in Gdansk and in the Sudetenland.\textsuperscript{30} Moreover, the Red-Brown Alliance also accepted former territories of the Soviet Union as natural borders of Russia, and the statists asserted that Russia should assume a dominant role among other former Soviet states.\textsuperscript{31}

As the Eurasianist school began to gain power and influence over Russian foreign policy, Russian diaspora was beginning to be seen as a factor that could both help Russia exercise influence over the newly founded states in its near abroad and contribute to the development of its national identity.

**The Near Abroad Doctrine and Russian Diaspora**

The change in Russian foreign policy from the breakup of the Soviet union until the end of 1992 was remarkable, as Russia defined its priorities in foreign politics with the foreign policy doctrine of the Russian Federation and turned its eye to the near abroad.\textsuperscript{32} The near abroad policy that emphasized Russia’s great power and its influence on the region was formulated as the first foreign policy concept of Russia by Andrei Kozyrev.\textsuperscript{33} This doctrine, called “the Yeltsin Doctrine” or “the Russian Monroe Doctrine,” described Russia’s privileged interests and its special role in the former Soviet republics. It also legitimized Russia’s military intervention in the region if necessary to protect its own interests.\textsuperscript{34}

The near abroad doctrine affected the Russian diaspora by addressing termination of conflicts in Russia’s neighborhood, the protection and human rights of regional Russian-speaking minorities, and the declaration of Russia’s vital interests in the former Soviet territories.\textsuperscript{35} Russia sought closer relations and greater influence with the members of the CIS in economic, political, and military fields.\textsuperscript{36} The Yeltsin government widened the concept of Russian nation so as to include the twenty-five million ethnic Russians in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{37} Therefore, Russian doctrine gave the Russian diaspora great importance between 1992 and 1994, since it gave Russia the asserted right to legitimately intervene in the domestic affairs of

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**Figure. Percentage of the Population that Identifies as Ethnic Russian**

(Graphic by Alyson Hurt, National Public Radio. Source: United Nations Statistics Division, CIA World Factbook)
the newly independent states in the interests of ethnic Russians.\textsuperscript{38} In an attempt to protect the rights of the Russian minorities in its near abroad, Russia offered dual nationality to those people, but this offer was denied by the members of the CIS and the Baltic countries.\textsuperscript{39}

**The Putin Era and Russian Diaspora**

When Putin became president of Russia, he made it a priority to reintegrate post-Soviet regions to reinforce the claim that Russia would be an important global actor in maintaining the stability of Eurasia.\textsuperscript{40} The “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation” underlined the importance of Russian diaspora in Russian foreign policy; it expressed Russia’s discontent about the borders after the collapse of the Soviet Union by restating the protection of the rights of Russian citizens and compatriots living abroad.\textsuperscript{41} The term “compatriot” used in the Russian Federation’s State Policy included “Russian Federation citizens living abroad, former citizens of the USSR, Russian immigrants from the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation, descendants of compatriots and foreign citizens who admire Russian culture and language.”\textsuperscript{42}

One of the practices that sprang from this compatriot policy was the voluntary resettlement campaign. The intent of the State Program of Voluntary Resettlement was to resettle Russian compatriots into scarcely populated areas of Russia. The program enjoyed a state budget that could cover nearly all the expenses of resettlement, yet only seventeen thousand compatriots benefited from this program between 2007 and 2011.\textsuperscript{43}

The Putin government took its first serious steps regarding Russian diaspora and gave it an important role in Russian foreign policy. The “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation” in 2013 declared that Russia would protect the rights and interests of Russian citizens and compatriots living abroad. Article 45 of the document maintained that Russia could benefit from Russian diaspora, asserting that the Russian Federation would pay special attention to negotiating agreements to protect the social rights of the compatriots living in the member states of the CIS.\textsuperscript{44}

Over the last decade, Russia has espoused soft power policies, hoping to benefit from Russian diaspora with the help of these policies. Vladimir Mukomel points out that the state policies regarding Russian compatriots living abroad are funded separately within the federal budget and lists state institutions supporting Russian diaspora:

- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
- The Federal Agency for the CIS
- Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo)
- The Government Commission on the Affairs of Compatriots Living Abroad
- The Interdepartmental Commission for the Implementation of the National Program to Assist the Voluntary Resettlement in Russia of Compatriots Currently Living Abroad
- The Russian Centre of International Scientific and Cultural Cooperation under the Direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- The Federal Agency for Education Subject to the Ministry of Education and Science
- The Ministry of Culture and Mass Communications
- The Moscow City Government
- The City of the St. Petersburg Government

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs transfers about 400 million rubles to Russian government programs for compatriots through its embassies.\textsuperscript{46}

Apart from these state institutions, there is one additional institution, the Russkiy Mir Foundation (Russian World), which helps develop policies on Russian diaspora and conducts activities related to public diplomacy. The objectives of the Russkiy Mir Foundation are to promote Russian language instruction in Russia and around the world; to introduce Russia’s rich history, art, and culture to the world; and to reconnect the Russian population abroad with their homeland by establishing strong ties with them and supporting cultural and social programs, exchanges, and voluntary resettlement.\textsuperscript{47} Russkiy Mir has approximately sixty-five centers, and its annual budget, funded by both the federal government and private companies, is around 500 million rubles.\textsuperscript{48}

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are also instruments of soft power in support of Russia’s compatriot policy objectives. These NGOs together with a network of more than fifty cultural centers called “Russian
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House,” which helps Russian compatriots strengthen their ties with their homeland and contributes to the protection of Russian culture and language, ethnic belonging, and cultural values.49

While Russia has embraced soft power, developments in Georgia, Ukraine, and Crimea over the last few years show that Russia will also apply hard power in order to achieve its national goals of increasing its authority in the region and reestablishing its spheres of influence under the pretext of Russian diaspora. Jeremy Bender states that since Putin declared that Russia has the right to intervene when Russian minorities are in trouble, a Russian intervention in Eastern Europe or Central Asia could be a problem in the future.50

Pranas Ciziunas writes that Russia uses the ethnic and social discontent of the people in the Baltic States to increase its influence over them (and over other countries within its sphere of influence).51 Janusz Bugajski asserts that Russia tries to exploit political, regional, religious, social, and ethnic conflicts and to influence the foreign and security policies of each country that he identifies as within the spheres of Russian influence (the CIS in Europe—Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldavia—the Baltics, Central Europe, and Southeastern Europe). He adds that Russia is attempting to undermine the military integration processes of these countries with the United States and prevent every other kind of regional cooperation.52 One of the ways to achieve these objectives, according to Ciziunas, is to take advantage of ethnic differences. Russian people and other Russian-speaking communities are regarded as sources of regional influence by political decision-makers in Russia, and the Kremlin thinks that creating as many privileges as possible for the Russian diaspora means investing in a loyal social and political structure suitable for supporting Russia’s state policy.53

John H. Herbst writes that Putin wants to rebuild Russia’s sphere of influence in the former Soviet republics and in the former territories of the Russian Empire, and he wants to protect the rights of ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking communities in the countries where they live. According to Herbst, Putin waged war in order to change the post-Cold War order and to reshape the borders in Ukraine and Georgia. As Herbst puts it, a great power is for the first time since Hitler trying to find ways to change the borders in Europe.54

It is hard to predict what Russia will do in the former Soviet republics under the pretext of supporting the Russian diaspora. However, it is clear from the 2013 Foreign Policy Concept that Russia has started to adopt seemingly soft power policies. The chapter of the concept titled “Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation and Modern World” states that soft power is a comprehensive means for achieving foreign policy objectives (Article 20), and Russia intends to improve soft power politics.55

Russia’s Soft Power and Russian Diaspora

Joseph Nye asserts that at least five factors affect the global distribution of power: mutual economic interdependence, supranational actors, nationalism in weak states, proliferation of technology, and changeable political issues.56 He adds that, due to these factors, it is very expensive today for countries to force other countries to do what they want through military force. Therefore, countries require other, more attractive ways to use their power beyond the traditional use of force. A country can achieve preferred foreign policy results when other countries want to follow it or they agree with it about a situation that has potentially negative effects. For his reason, Nye defines soft power as getting “other countries to want what it wants.”57

Russia’s new foreign policy concept emphasizes achieving national interests using soft power as described by Nye. Accordingly, this concept offers using new technologies and realizing the potential of Russian diaspora. The institution called Rossotrudnichestvo in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was assigned to develop and carry out Russian foreign policy to that end.58 Russia’s open declaration that it will consider exercising soft power is very helpful for analyzing Russian foreign policy. When this concept is considered regarding compatriot policy and its implementation, it is obvious that Russia is striving to influence Russian diaspora by applying its soft power so it can influence the domestic policies of its neighboring countries. Russia’s emphasis on the importance of civil society, information, communication, humanitarian, and other means of soft power is something new in Russian foreign policy.59 Additionally, Russia

Next page: Pro-Russian protesters in front of the Donetsk Oblast Regional State Administration building remove a Ukrainian flag and replace it with a Russian flag 1 March 2014 in Donetsk, Ukraine. (Photo courtesy of Andrew Butko)
seems to have shifted its attention to the east, placing a high importance on integration and paying close attention to the CIS, the customs union, the Eurasian Economic Community, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and its relations with Ukraine.60

In support of Russia’s compatriot policy and its shift toward soft power, Russia hosts the World Congress of Russian Compatriots every three years. Issues such as the voluntary resettlement of Russian diaspora, protection of minority rights, and maintenance of cultural and religious relations with Russia are discussed in this forum with the participation of state heads of former Soviet states.61 Putin stated during the fourth World Congress of Russian Compatriots in 2012 that Russian diaspora was beneficial for its historical homeland, introducing Russian socio-economic development and reinforcing its international power and prestige; he added that supporting Russian diaspora was one of the main policies of the Russian state. Putin also mentioned in his speech that the Russian Orthodox Church played a special role in strengthening humanitarian and cultural connections between the Russian diaspora and their historical homeland.62

Over the past five years, Russia exercised soft power through several activities in support of the Russian diaspora:

- the revision of voluntary resettlement program, of which about one hundred thousand people benefited from as of 2012;
- the implementation of a Russian language program between 2011 and 2015 in the former Soviet republics to support the use of the Russian language and to protect Russian ethnic and cultural identity;
- the introduction of a large-scale state program to support compatriots between 2012 and 2014;
- the employment of Russian diaspora as translators and volunteers during the Summer Universiade in Kazan in 2013;
- the Sochi Winter Olympics in 2014;
- support for those who want to study or work in Russia; and
- the establishment of Russkiy Mir Foundation.63

**Conclusion**

Russia experienced an identity crisis for a couple of years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but it is emphasizing and reinforcing its national Russian identity by introducing itself as a historical homeland to the ethnic Russian people and other Russian-speaking communities at every opportunity.

Russia makes use of the Russian diaspora—a population of Russians and Russian-speaking communities that numbered about twenty-five million after the collapse of the Soviet Union—as a means of implementing foreign policy. Following the Yeltsin Doctrine, it used the diaspora to influence the domestic and foreign policies of the newly independent states after the fall of the Soviet Union. Not content with the borders drawn up after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia intervened in these countries’ domestic affairs on the ground of supporting the Russian diaspora.

The Russo-Georgian War in 2008, the crisis in Ukraine, and the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation all reveal that Russia will take an aggressive attitude if necessary when acting as a protector of all Russians and Russian-speaking people beyond its borders. Russia’s military interventions under the pretense of Russian diaspora lead some to believe that the Cold War is back again and cause the countries that have a good number of Russian people among their populations to be on alert against revisionist actions by Russia. Nevertheless, Russian foreign policy today is placing more and more importance on the use of soft power in support of the Russian diaspora.

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**Notes**


2. Zeynep Dağı, Kimlik, Milliyetçilik ve Dış Politika Rusyayın Dönüşümü [Identity, Nationalism and Foreign Policy Transformation of Russia] (İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 2002), 209.


12. Ibid., 53.
18. Ibid., 61.
20. Ibid., 49.
22. Utku Yapıcı, *Yeni Soğuk Savas, Putin, Rusya ve Avrasya* [New Cold War, Putin, Russia and Eurasia] (İstanbul: Başka Kitaplar, 2007), 124.
30. Ibid.
33. Rakowska-Harmstoner, “Russia’s Monroe Doctrine”;
35. Ciziunas, “Russia and the Baltic States,” 293.
Rethinking the U.S. Army Infantry Rifle Squad

Maj. Hassan Kamara, U.S. Army
We should think of nothing in the past as sacred, except the concept of victory. The structure and organization of our Army, both operational and institutional, may change drastically, and we must be open-minded to that change.

—Gen. Mark A Milley

Discontinuities in war, military affairs, and human society since the 1940s, as well as projections about future war, sufficiently invalidate many of the foundational arguments, facts, and assumptions that generated the legacy infantry squad to justify reform. This article highlights how, and recommends an alternative for squad reform.

The U.S. Army adopted the nine-man infantry rifle squad over the twelve-man infantry rifle squad it used in World War II based on the discourse and findings of the 1946 Infantry Conference at Fort Benning, Georgia. Though it has evolved some, today’s infantry rifle squad still comprises nine personnel (two fire teams of four led by team leaders who are subordinate to the squad leader). Gen. Robert B. Brown concurs that the infantry squad has remained fundamentally the same over time with minor changes, writing that “despite new soldier equipment and technological advances we deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq, squads operate in the same manner their predecessors did in Vietnam and Korea.”

Change expert John Kotter articulates the importance of evaluating and managing organizational systems, structures [such as the infantry squad], and concepts to keep up with the pace of change in today’s world. Kotter writes, “The world is now changing at a rate at which the basic systems, structures, and cultures built over the past century cannot keep up with the demands being placed on them.” In the case of the infantry squad, Kotter’s assertion suggests that military professionals and scholars should examine the legacy infantry squad construct for its continued relevance.

Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, participate in a combined arms live-fire exercise 6 December 2017 at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. The exercise allowed the soldiers to practice working with multiple combined arms elements including artillery, air support, and mortars to establish superior firepower on the battlefield. (Photo by Staff Sgt. David N. Beckstrom, U.S. Army)
So, how relevant are the foundational arguments, facts, and assumptions that generated the infantry squad relative to developments in war, military affairs, and human society since 1946, as well as projections about future war? These developments sufficiently invalidate many of the foundational arguments, facts, and assumptions underpinning the current configuration of and employment of rifle squads to justify needed reorganization and reform.

Moreover, why focus on the rifle squad, which is only a small part of the total combat organizational construct? This article focuses on the infantry rifle squad (not the different variations for mechanized and Stryker infantry) because it is the basic foundation of the decisive force of the future. Moreover, given the changes in warfare since it was adopted, the current squad configuration is likely to experience needless problems in future operations that could be mitigated if reconfigured and readapted before employment. (Figure 1 depicts the current infantry squad configuration.) This disconcerting possibility is already manifesting itself as continued changes in technology and warfare have added new capabilities and equipment (e.g., drones, electronic warfare), and combat functions to the legacy squad construct.

By highlighting this concern at the foundation of the decisive force of the future, this analysis will help promote ensuing studies that will critically analyze the entire legacy force construct or order of battle of the U.S. Army (to include configurations for Stryker, mechanized, airborne, and air assault squads) to assess the degree of obsolescence based on changes in war and military affairs since they were adopted.

Sir Michael Howard’s dimensions of war (operational, technological, logistical, and social) are used as units of analysis to highlight how changes in military affairs and human society since the squad’s creation, as well as projections about future war, warrant reconsideration and change. This framework, in addition to encompassing the typical military dimensions (operational, logistical), compels consideration of the societal and technological dimensions of war, which are as intrinsic to war as the operational and logistical dimensions. Arguably, this framework is the best in comprehensively highlighting how changes in military affairs and society since the 1940s—as well as projections about future war—warrant institutional reevaluation and reform of the squad.

**Dimensions of War**

A brief discussion of the dimensions of war is necessary to frame and understand the ensuing analysis. Howard uses the dimensions of war as a framework for analyzing military strategy, but they are also
adaptive, useful, force-transformation tools for holistically assessing the impact of long-term operational, logistics, societal, and technological discontinuities on warfighting organizations.

**Operational dimension.** From a force transformation perspective, careful planning and change implementation in the operational dimension will improve the decisive employment of forces and capabilities against an adversary. When planning and implementing change in warfighting organizations, militaries must ensure they focus on all the dimensions of war, not just the operational dimension.

**Logistical dimension.** When the framework is used to examine military transformation, the logistical dimension helps identify and highlight critical change considerations in logistics (supply, maintenance, medical support, etc.).

**Social dimension.** When applying the dimensions of war framework to force transformation, the social dimension invites focus on the interaction of warfighting organizations with societies, cultures, and environments (think overpopulation and megacities) in prosecuting and trying to conclude wars. This dimension also induces questions like, “What will be the implications for military organizations in the event of a mass conscription characteristic of conventional war?”

**Technological dimension.** From a force transformation perspective, the technological dimension fosters consideration and commitment to technological developments that can deliver operational superiority against potential adversaries while enabling logistics, and strategically beneficial interaction with the local population in a conflict zone. According to Howard, since the twentieth century, technology’s role “as an independent and significant dimension, could no longer be left out of account.”

### The Squad and Discontinuities in the Dimensions of War

War and military affairs have evolved considerably since 1946, presenting discontinuities that warrant reevaluation and reform of the legacy infantry squad construct. Highlighted within each of the dimensions of war, such discontinuities sufficiently challenge and (in most cases) invalidate the arguments, facts, and assumptions behind the genesis of the infantry squad.

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Maj. Hassan Kamara, U.S. Army, is a Chief of Staff of the Army Strategic Study Group Fellow serving on the Army Future Studies group and the Army Modernization Task Force. He holds a BA in political science from Arizona State University, an MA in strategic studies from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, and an MA in acquisitions and procurement from Webster University. He is an honor graduate of the U.S. Naval War College Command and Staff Course. Kamara has commanded a Stryker infantry company at Fort Bliss, Texas, and an armor company in Kirkuk, Iraq.

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Figure 2. The World War II Twelve-Man Infantry Rifle Squad with Automatic Rifle

(Graphic from Field Manual 22.5, Infantry Drill Regulations, July 1939)
The Squad in the Operational Dimension of War

The 1946 Infantry Conference was organized to study the Army’s experiences in World War II from the infantry’s perspective and to derive lessons that would help overcome organizational, training, and equipping challenges as well as spur innovation and institutional reform. Col. A. O. Connor concurred, and in his lecture at the conference, he stated, “The purpose of the Infantry Conference is to arrive at sound decisions regarding the solution of the infantry’s many present and future problems.” The conference was attended by officers and enlisted personnel from every World War II theater of operation. Attendees were organized into committees; Committee A focused mainly on equipment, while Committee B—under the leadership of Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin—focused mainly on organizational issues. Naturally, doctrine was extensively debated in both committees. The committees voted on force transformation proposals that were presented in the final conference report to the commandant of the Infantry School at the time—Maj. Gen. John Wilson “Iron Mike” O’Daniel.

Basis of the legacy squad. Committee B recommended changing the World War II twelve-man infantry rifle squad to a nine-man infantry squad based on arguments that had to do with command and control, organizational survivability, and fire and maneuver. The twelve-man infantry rifle squad used in World War II comprised a squad leader, an assistant squad leader, a three-man automatic rifle team (machine gunner, assistant machine gunner, and ammunition bearer), and seven riflemen, two of whom were designated as scouts (see figure 2, page 53). The proposed nine-man infantry squad was made up of a squad leader, two scouts, an automatic rifleman (machine gunner), an assistant gunner, and four riflemen (including one grenadier). The committee proposed the new squad organization
because it believed that this was the maximum amount of personnel a squad leader could control in combat.

The conference defined the squad as “a group of enlisted men organized as a team: smallest tactical unit consisting of only as many men as a leader can direct easily on the field,” and based on this definition, it chose to “limit the size of the squad to the number of men one leader can personally control with voice or hand signals.”11 In its report, Committee B clearly stated that “one man under favorable conditions can control no more than eight men in the field.”12

The squad’s survivability as an organization in high-attrition combat was another factor behind the newly proposed squad, but it was secondary to command and control. The members of the Infantry Conference observed that infantry squads typically operated below full strength during World War II and sought to ensure that any change to the twelve-man infantry rifle squad had to be able to survive and retain effectiveness after some attrition. Consistent with this rationale, the committee decided on the nine-man squad as the most survivable construct that a squad leader could control with voice and hand-arm signals in combat. In other words, the conference participants mostly agreed that the proposed nine-man squad, while smaller, would still be able to support platoon maneuver after attaining some battlefield attrition.13

Additionally, based on their World War II experience, the participants at the Infantry Conference believed the smallest unit capable of organic fire and maneuver was the platoon. Proponents of the new squad—who were in the majority in Committee B—argued that during World War II “the rifle squad almost never employed tactical maneuvers in the attack, i.e. the Able, Baker, and Charley elements of scouts, base of fire, and maneuver.”14 In his lecture on infantry organization, Connor stated that “wars are won by platoons” and added that “in combat, fire and movement is a platoon job.”15 Subsequently, conference participants saw the squad as capable of fire and maneuver only at the platoon level—either establishing a base of fire to support the maneuver of other squads within the platoon, or maneuvering as a single unit while another squad provided supporting fire. Many of the conference participants, especially those in Committee B, did not believe that the squad was capable of fire and maneuver at the squad level (one fire team supporting the maneuver of the other fire team with fires). Thus, they reasoned it was unnecessary to keep the twelve-man infantry rifle squad for its greater capacity for fire and maneuver.

Discontinuities since 1946 and future concerns.

Much has changed in the operational dimension since 1946 to invalidate the above arguments, facts, and assumptions for adopting the nine-man infantry squad. In terms of command and control, modern personal communication equipment available to today’s infantry soldiers makes it possible for squad leaders to communicate and direct team leaders and—if required—any member of the squad. Enabled by technology, capable team leaders, and the maturing philosophy of mission command, today’s squad leaders can maneuver more than eight men. Moreover, situational awareness tools available to soldiers under initiatives like the Warfighter Information Network–Tactical program enable combat leaders to maneuver formations far beyond hand-and-arm signal, voice, and visual range.16

Though considered immaterial at the 1946 Conference, squad-level fire and maneuver is an integral part of infantry maneuver today, and improvements in targeting by peer U.S. adversaries appear to necessitate adjustment to using the squad as the smallest primary unit of maneuver on future battlefields. The latter would require growing the squad for increased fire during maneuver, and invalidate any need to keep the squad small so it can be more maneuverable as a single monolithic element in platoon fire and maneuver.

As far as the operational dimension is concerned, the foundational arguments, facts, and assumptions for the genesis of the nine-man infantry squad are outdated and invalid. In other words, the concerns of the 1946 Infantry Conference that led to the development of the legacy squad construct have been largely invalidated by changes in war, military affairs, and human society. This calls for a thorough reevaluation of the construct and its subsequent reform.

The Squad in the Logistical Dimension of War

As mentioned previously this dimension is concerned with the recruiting, equipping, and sustainment aspects of war. From a squad transformation perspective, it focuses on manning, equipment, and sustainment.

Basis of the legacy squad. As far as squad transformation was concerned, manning and equipment were
the predominant aspects of this dimension in the 1946 Infantry Conference. In terms of staffing, the integration of wartime replacements seemed to be the main logistical concern that supported the recommendation of the nine-man squad. Squad logistics in terms of sustainment (supply, maintenance, etc.) did not seem to feature in the conference dialogue, which was understandable because infantry leaders of the day had a platoon-centric outlook on small-unit operations.

Personnel at the conference seemed to lean toward the nine-man infantry squad because they reasoned it would be easier for new conscripts and replacements to understand and fight in a smaller squad. Conference participants were largely influenced by their wartime observation of the difficulty experienced by conscripted noncommissioned officers in leading the larger twelve-man rifle squads in World War II. The consensus seemed to be to keep the squad construct simple with nine personnel so the conscripts and replacements of a mass-mobilized army could quickly understand and fight the new organization in war. Gen. Omar Bradley cited this concern in his address to the conference. Bradley endorsed the recommendation for the nine-man squad, citing observations about the struggles of conscripted noncommissioned officers that had to take the role of squad leader due to high attrition. He said, “With rapid promotion due to casualties, you sometimes find yourself with people commanding squads who are having a pretty hard job commanding that large a squad.”

Discontinuities since 1946 and future concerns. War, military affairs, and human society have sufficiently evolved with respect to this dimension to undermine the rationale for the genesis of the nine-man infantry squad. Restricting the squad to nine personnel to make it easier to integrate conscripts in the event of a mass mobilization is no longer a valid argument. In addition to hands-on field training, which is typically resource-intensive (e.g., ammunition, fuel) and therefore cannot be practiced frequently, the Army now has virtual-reality simulations it uses for training. Arguably, this cost-effective training capability enables the Army to train soldiers more effectively than it could during the World War II era, because it can give them sustained (repetitive) practice in immersive, simulated combat environments. This helps to allay the concern that the Army would be less able to train and integrate conscripts if it made the squad bigger.

The issue of squad-level resupply, though absent from the dialogue at the 1946 Infantry Conference, could grow to task the Army’s logistics infrastructure with the increased dispersion of forces—possibly down to the squad level—on future battlefields. For example, developments in sensors, targeting, and long-range precision fires by potential peer adversaries will likely induce the necessity for increased dispersion of U.S. forces on future battlefields.

The Squad in the Social Dimension of War

Mass conscription was a huge factor in America’s victory in World War II. The ranks of the U.S. Army swelled relatively quickly with citizen-soldiers who were highly inexperienced compared to regular soldiers, but who were eager to train and fight.

Basis of the legacy squad. Wartime experience with training and integrating conscripts into the active Army drove many of the 1946 Infantry Conference participants to advocate for the smaller nine-man infantry squad. Based on their own first-hand experiences, these veterans believed it would be easier to train and integrate conscripts into the new nine-man squad than the twelve-man World War II squad simply because command and control over inexperienced conscripts would be better in the smaller squad. Thus, the participants chose the nine-man squad.

Discontinuities since 1946 and future concerns. Thanks to the inherently greater capabilities for learning in the information age, the Army is arguably better able today to effectively train conscripts in the event of a mass mobilization for war than it was at America’s entry into World War II. This negates the need to keep the squad at nine personnel to better help the average conscripted citizen quickly learn how it operates. Moreover, information technology—in the form of games and media—has exposed the American population to warfighting on a far greater level than it experienced in the interwar years (the period between World War I and II). Thanks to technology, the average American youth in the twenty-first century has on average logged more time in some time type of simulated close combat (gaming, virtual reality, paintball, etc.) than his or her counterpart did during the interwar period. In his study of how “world-class” performers develop, Geoff Colvin convincingly shows through successive case studies of highly successful top performers in different fields that
exceptional performance is developed through sustained or deliberate practice. This suggests that, based on the sustained or deliberate practice they gain through virtual-reality combat simulations prior to joining the Army, today’s youth may inherently be more capable trainees (in terms of technological savviness and combat instincts) than their counterparts from the World War II–Korean War era. This interesting development in American society may serve the nation well in the event of another mass mobilization type of war, and it is additional grounds to reconsider the 1946 rationale of limiting the infantry squad to nine personnel for the sake of rapid training and integration of conscripts.

**Population growth as a driving factor.**
Additionally, changes in human society, particularly the growth of megacities, challenge the Infantry Conference’s decision to make the squad smaller for greater command and control. Looking ahead, the emergence and growing ubiquity of megacities worldwide mean that future wars will most likely be fought in extremely congested and restrictive urban environments. According to the U.S. Army, “it is highly likely that megacities will be the strategic key terrain in any future crisis that requires U.S. military intervention.” This is largely because factors like “population, urbanization, and resource trends contributing to the rise of megacities show no signs of abating or reversing.”

Gen. Mark A. Milley appears to share this outlook and states that “future wars are almost certainly going to be fought mostly in cities, which has significant implications for the military.” This evolution in urban environments will increase attrition of personnel, equipment, and ammunition in future combat operations. The World War II battle for the German city of Aachen in October 1944 provides insight into how future urban combat against a conventional adversary in megacities could affect infantry squads. John C. McManus writes that despite the valiant efforts of the Army medics at Aachen, casualties were still eroding the fighting power of the rifle companies. Within a few days, most were operating at half or two-thirds...
strength. Each night, personnel officers fed brand-new replacements into the companies. This kept the rifle companies in operation, but they were always understrength, in constant need of reinforcements.²¹

At Aachen, the larger twelve-man infantry squads undoubtedly proved that their greater organizational survivability (ability to survive and retain combat effectiveness amidst attrition) was an advantage in high-attrition urban combat against a highly competent, conventional adversary. Just as in Aachen as well as other battles fought in densely urbanized terrain, in future combat against a peer adversary in a megacity, infantry squads will likely lose far more people than they did against insurgents in Iraqi cities, so they will need to be bigger to remain effective after enduring attrition. Organizational survivability will prove especially important in this regard, because the Army’s combat troop replacement system has not been stressed in such a manner since the Vietnam War over a half-century ago.

The Squad in the Technological Dimension of War

Technology should be a salient factor in the construct and operation of the future infantry squad. Technological growth and automation have increased the capacity for greater workloads while reducing the need for manpower in commerce. However, the opposite is true for the infantry rifle squad. Technology and automation seem to have increased the workload of the squad on contemporary battlefields, with more equipment for the same nine people to manage and operate in addition to legacy warfighting functions.

Basis of the legacy squad. Participants at the conference supported the recommendation for a nine-man infantry squad based on assumptions about technology. Some reasoned that contemporary and future advances in weapon systems such as improved and lighter automatic rifles and machine guns negated the need for the firepower provided by the additional three personnel of a twelve-man infantry squad. In other words, the participants believed that the better weapon systems of today would equate the firepower of a nine-man squad to that of a twelve-man squad that used older weapons, which justified their recommendation for a smaller squad. For example, in his testimony at the conference, Bradley stated that he thought the World War II squad was too large and favored the new smaller construct, stating, “With better weapons, it might be best not to have too many [riflemen] on one team.”²² As projected in 1946, squad weapons did improve and squad firepower did increase. But, due to the proliferation of similar advancements among potential adversaries, such advancements are no longer valid justification for retaining the reduced size nine-person infantry squad.

Discontinuities since 1946 and future concerns. While military technology since 1946 has helped increase the firepower of the infantry squad to what it is today, and will no doubt continue to enhance it in the future, it is no longer sufficient grounds for retaining the squad at its current manning, or reducing it. In fact, quite to the contrary, emerging military technology that will grow to enhance the capability of the squad, like armed drones and other robotics, make a strong case for increasing the number of soldiers in the infantry squad with another team of riflemen.

Grounds for Change

The highlighted discontinuities in military affairs and human society, as well as projections about future war necessitate rethinking and reforming the squad. From an operational standpoint, since command and control is now possible for a larger squad, the Army should grow the squad to increase its capacity to survive complete destruction in high-attrition combat with peer adversaries.

In terms of logistics, fighting dispersed on future battlefields to negate the effectiveness of enemy targeting will require innovative ways to resupply remote squads without overtasking the theater logistics infrastructure. Adapting the squad to leverage new technologies like drones for supply and logistics could help the Army fight dispersed and complicate targeting by the enemy in future conventional conflicts. Interestingly, in anticipation of such future developments, the Army experimented with multiple prototype unmanned aerial vehicles called Joint Tactical Autonomous Air Resupply Systems in April 2017.²³

Based on changes in the social dimension of war—the growth of populations and megacities—and the real possibility of engaging in high-attrition urban combat in megacities, increasing the amount of personnel in the squad will increase its survivability for combat. Additionally, technological developments
in training and an increased preservice exposure to combat in the conscript population negate the need to keep the squad small, so conscripts will find it easier to understand how it works.

From a technological perspective, adding another team to the squad could optimize it for unmanned armed reconnaissance, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities. In concert with the blossoming philosophy of mission command, growing the squad to leverage the above technologies will better prepare it to operate dispersed from parent formations (platoon and company) on future battlefields. In future interstate conflict with a peer or near-peer adversary, Army leaders envision battlefields in which small units (most likely squads) will fight dispersed to complicate enemy targeting and fires while maintaining the ability to aggregate as needed. According to Milley, future battlefields will see heavy use of sensors, and with sensors everywhere, the probability of being seen is very high … if you can be seen, you will be hit. So that means just to survive, our formations … will likely have to be small. They will have to move constantly. They will have to aggregate and disaggregate rapidly.24

Arguably, the most critical organic combat capability that squads will need when fighting dispersed from parent formations (platoon and company) is reconnaissance. On a sensor-laden future battlefield, the importance of locating the enemy first through reconnaissance, and rapidly leveraging fires to destroy them cannot be overstated.

**Recommendation**

The Army should consider restoring a modified form of the scout reconnaissance team it used in World War II to make the squad more survivable for high attrition combat, better resource it to manage the increased workload of the new capabilities it is integrating (drone, cyber, and electronic warfare), and help it operate and fight dispersed from parent organizations on future battlefields. Conceptually, a three-person cyber/reconnaissance team, comprising infantrymen trained on unmanned aerial systems and robotics systems, will permanently add unmanned armed reconnaissance, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities to the squad. This change could increase the squad’s survivability (quantitatively) as a dispersed small element on the battlefield, and empower it to fight in multiple domains [ground, close air, and cyber domains]. Moreover, the change could provide squads the capability and capacity to leverage drone and robotics technology for resupply in future dispersed combat environments. This reform will also create an open organizational architecture in the squad for the continued integration and use of rapidly evolving military robotics and drone technology.

**Conclusion**

Changes in war, military affairs, and human society since the 1940s, as well as projections about future war, sufficiently invalidate many of the foundational arguments, facts, and assumptions that generated the legacy nine-person infantry squad, and justify institutional reevaluation and reform. The current era is most opportune for this change as the institution mulls organizational changes that will better enable it to fight in multiple domains (land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace) consistent with the multi-domain battle concept.

Despite being somewhat of an institutional sacred cow, it is time to boldly reevaluate and duly reform the squad by increasing its size for optimum battlefield survivability and performance. According to Milley, “It’s better for us [the U.S. Army] to slaughter our sacred cows ourselves, rather than lose a war because we’re too hidebound to think the unthinkable.”25 Consequently, ensuing studies should not only boldly explore and examine new organizational constructs for the squad across formations (to include Stryker and mechanized infantry squads), but also for the U.S. Army’s entire order of battle (platoon through Army level). Fostering this discourse is critical to ensuring the structure and organization of the U.S. Army is optimized for conflict in spite of discontinuities in the dimensions of war.

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**Notes**

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

U.S. ground forces are transitioning from a period of sustained large-scale counterinsurgencies to preparing for future conflicts. The evolution of ground operations portends a synthesis of counterinsurgency with traditional warfare, unconventional with conventional warfare, and irregular with regular warfare for future military engagements in Europe. Through a review of the geopolitical environment and strategic and operational theater missions, this study examines not only the role of the Army Service component command in theater, but also lessons and best practices that can be leveraged for future missions. To view this special study, please visit http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/17587P.pdf.

6. Ibid., 104-5.
8. Report of Committee “B” on Tactics and Technique, T-18. "Survivability" is used in this article to refer to the squad’s ability to retain combat effectiveness in the face of attrition. This is consistent with the doctrinal definition of survivability in Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 16 October 2013), 1-10. "Survivability is the capacity of an organization to prevail in spite of adverse impacts or potential threats."
10. Report of Committee “B” on Tactics and Technique, T-18. 6
11. Ibid., T-18, 3.
12. Ibid., T-18, 5.
13. Ibid., T-18.
17. The Infantry Conference: Report of Special Committee on Organization of the Infantry Division (testimonial of Omar Bradley), 8.
25. Ibid.
The U.S. Army and Mission Command

Philosophy versus Practice

Maj. Brett Matzenbacher, U.S. Army

Officers of the German Wehrmacht (armed forces) at the Kriegsschule (war school) conduct map exercises in Berlin in the 1930s. Precommissioning preparation for entering the German officers’ corps was intensive and of long duration, often taking about a decade to complete. The process was the foundation of an environment that encouraged trust as well as independent initiative based on tactical competence that enabled effective employment of Auftragstaktik (mission-type tactics, commonly considered the forerunner of the modern concept of mission command) during the first stages of World War II. (Photo by Alamy)
In the late spring of 1940, the German army was poised along the western front to break the calm of Germany’s seven-month “phoney war” with France and England, during which no major land operations were conducted. The chief of staff of the German invasion forces, Oberst (Col.) Kurt Zeitzler, issued orders to the subordinate commanders of Panzergruppe Kleist. He reportedly commanded “that your divisions completely cross the German borders, completely cross the Belgian borders, and completely cross the River Meuse. I don’t care how you do it, that’s completely up to you.” Such were the mission orders that guided the actions of the 250,000 soldiers of the German army’s main effort in the battle to defeat the combined forces of the Western allies massed along the French border.

As Jörg Muth, author of Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901–1940, and the Consequences for World War II, describes, “in contrast, the orders for the American forces to land in North Africa were the size of a Sears Roebuck catalog.” Muth’s description emphasizes the differences in the command philosophies of the two armies at that time. The former, represented by Zeitzler, is the philosophy of Auftragstaktik, characterized by decentralized leadership, maneuver warfare, and the empowerment of subordinates to make decisions and seize the initiative whenever possible. The latter is the twentieth-century American “managerial approach” to war, “characterized by centralization, standardization, detailed planning, and quantitative analysis,” according to Eitan Shamir in “The Long and Winding Road: The U.S. Army Managerial Approach to Command and the Adoption of Mission Command (Auftragstaktik).”

About forty years after World War II, however, the U.S. Army began to embrace the philosophy of its former enemy, with the 1982 version of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations. Over time, Auftragstaktik was loosely translated into “mission command.” The idea has become a pillar of the Army’s operational concept, now called unified land operations. Since 1982, many articles on mission command have been written, and

A German Panzer (armor) column advances into France in May 1940. The flexibility of mission-type orders and the freedom given German commanders to exploit opportunities that they found without waiting for orders gave the German army a great advantage over the French defenders, who were much more restricted in their freedom to act independently. (Photo courtesy of Bundesarchiv)
the phrase has permeated Army doctrine. Additionally, the Army has refined the concept after numerous combat operations across the globe. As such, one might assume that the assimilation of the mission command philosophy into the Army's culture would be well advanced. However, the reality is that the Army has failed to fully integrate the concept of mission command because it has failed to properly define the philosophy and to set the conditions for its successful implementation. The Army could achieve the culture change it needs by using a more precise definition of mission command and by aligning professional military education with it.

The Origins of Mission Command

German Army Regulation 300, *Truppenführung* (Unit Command), 1933, succinctly described the Auftragstaktik philosophy and the framework the German army would use in World War II.\(^7\) The regulation's introduction stated that Auftragstaktik was necessary to counter the inherent uncertainty and ever present friction in war.\(^8\) Because of the inherent uncertainty and friction, subordinate leaders would need to be empowered to make "independent and decisive decisions" based on their commander's intent, even if that meant not following the original order received.\(^9\) Additionally, their freedom of action would be possible because of the trust and understanding between subordinate and superior.\(^10\) Finally, Auftragstaktik was inextricably tied to, and a vital prerequisite of, *Bewegungskrieg* (maneuver warfare), the genesis of the famed blitzkrieg (lightning war) tactics. Germany saw maneuver warfare as the solution to the dilemma it regularly found itself facing due to its geographic location within Europe: fighting on two fronts while outnumbered.\(^11\) In essence, victory would be achieved through quick, decisive, offensive actions in which the superior quality of German military leaders and soldiers would compensate for their inferior numbers. Because units were operating independently under the principles of Auftragstaktik, they would be able to more rapidly observe, orient, decide, and act (reminiscent of the more modern-day Boyd's OODA loop) than their opponents.\(^12\)

In *Transforming Command: the Pursuit of Mission Command in the U.S., British, and Israeli Armies*, Eitan Shamir describes how Auftragstaktik evolved from a body of thought that began to take root in the Prussian-German army around the turn of the nineteenth century.\(^13\) Auftragstaktik was among the reforms implemented after Napoleon defeated the Prussian army at the Battle of Jena-Auerstedt in 1806.

A number of influential reformers, to include Gen. Gerhard von Scharnhorst and Gen. August Neidhardt von Gneisenau, began to reform the Prussian approach to command even before Jena-Auerstedt.\(^14\) After the defeat, these reforms gained momentum and were continued by two of these officers' protégés, Carl von Clausewitz and Helmuth von Moltke the Elder.\(^15\) While Clausewitz enjoys more fame today, it was really Moltke who "institutionalized the new approach to command"\(^16\) As chief of the Prussian (and later German) general staff from 1857 to 1887, Moltke was ideally placed to ensure that Auftragstaktik became fully entrenched.\(^17\) In addition, he demonstrated the effectiveness of this new command philosophy by using it to achieve victories in the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars.

The success of Auftragstaktik in these conflicts cemented its place within the German army. The Germans continued to refine their command philosophy prior to World War I, and after that war, determined that Auftragstaktik should extend all the way down to the noncommissioned officer level.\(^18\) As such, by World War II, this body of thought had been a part of the German army's culture for over a hundred and fifty years.

After the Vietnam War, American senior leaders were looking for an innovative upgrade to the existing attrition-based doctrine to offset disadvantages in facing the numerically superior Soviet army. In 1980, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commander Gen. Donn A. Starry even went so far as to hold a four-day conference with a number of former *Wehrmacht* (Nazi Germany's unified armed forces) officers to "derive lessons for a modern defense of Europe against a Soviet invasion."\(^19\) This interaction led to the
principles of Auftragstaktik becoming a focus of the 1982 version of FM 100-5. Their adoption signified a dramatic shift in the American approach to war and the birth of the U.S. Army’s notion of mission command.

The Change from Management to Mission Command

Making a radical change in thinking and practice within such a large and tradition-bound organization as the U.S. Army presents a complex, if not impossible, challenge. To understand how and where the Army has gone wrong, this paper builds on Shamir’s analysis in Transforming Command, in which he applies former Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Edgar H. Schein’s organizational culture model.

In Organizational Culture and Leadership, Schein proposes “three levels of culture.” These levels include artifacts, espoused beliefs and values, and basic underlying assumptions. Schein suggests that an organizational culture’s artifacts are the easiest level to identify, and they include the mission, the organizational structure, and, in the case of a military organization, the doctrine.

While the artifacts may be the most visible aspects of a culture, they also have the least impact on how it thinks and operates, according to Schein. The next level, espoused beliefs and values, can consist of “written or unwritten ideologies, ideals, goals,” or education. This level has a much stronger and more direct impact on an organization’s true beliefs and ways of thinking—its basic underlying assumptions.

While this article does not seek to apply every level of Schein’s model to the Army, it does examine changes the Army has made in its artifacts and its espoused beliefs and values. More specifically, this article explores the Army’s doctrine and education system to illustrate how
the Army has failed to implement mission command. As Shamir states in his analysis of the behavior of armies, if an army’s second and third levels of culture “remain unaltered, so will [the army’s] organizational behavior.”

Two potential “gaps” exist when an organization attempts to adopt the practices, or culture, of another, writes Shamir. The first gap occurs during adoption and interpretation, with the possibility that the idea “will be interpreted and practiced differently by the adopting party due to the impact of particular strategic settings and organizational cultures. Consequently, the impact of the adopted concept on the organization and its effectiveness may be different than expected or intended.” Shamir states further that the “second gap, praxis, develops during the implementation of the adapted doctrine.”

The Army’s Unfocused Interpretation of Mission Command

The Army doctrine publications (ADPs) offer “logic maps” as graphic representations of their major principles. Let us compare the logic map in the 2012 edition of ADP 6-0, Mission Command, with a notional logic map that captures the essence of Auftragstaktik in Truppenführung. Figure 1 (page 64) shows the logic map found in ADP 6-0. Figure 2 shows a logic map depicting the role of Auftragstaktik, based on Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki’s summary of Truppenführung.

A comparison of these two graphics demonstrates distinct differences between the original German concept of Auftragstaktik and the U.S. Army’s adaptation. Although a visual comparison of the two figures indicates some variations in complexity, a deeper examination of the two clarifies some significant differences.

In the German approach, the command philosophy of Auftragstaktik was the driving force behind the operating concept (maneuver warfare). Auftragstaktik permeated everything about Germany’s approach to warfare. This likely is why the principles of Auftragstaktik were explained in the introduction to Truppenführung. Auftragstaktik, by implication, was meant to provide the overarching basis for leadership and command, regardless of the situation. Based on ADP 6-0, however, mission command is simply “one of the foundations” of unified land operations. As such, it is clear that the concept of mission command does not enjoy the same primacy in American doctrine that it did in its German predecessor.

Second, as figure 1 captures, U.S. Army doctrine has conflated a command philosophy, mission command, with the command-and-control warfighting function. Mission command, however, should be the...
central philosophy meant to influence the way in which an organization’s noncommissioned and commissioned officers lead their units. It should inform the way they train, plan, educate, and conduct operations. Command and control should be viewed as the supporting process that stipulates the authority, systems, and procedures used to execute mission command—in other words, the tools a leader uses to synchronize the actions of an organization with adjacent units and within the leader’s chain of command.

In overlaying on, and mixing, the philosophy of mission command with command and control, Army
Doctrine has only succeeded in confusing the two. The result is that many junior leaders, and for that matter, some senior leaders, have the impression that the Army is simply renaming a warfighting function rather than trying to change the essence of its underlying command philosophy. In _Truppenführung_, the Germans recognized the potential for such confusion, and as such, separated these two distinct concepts. **Auftragstaktik** was described in the introduction of _Truppenführung_ precisely to reinforce the idea that those principles applied to everything in the remainder of the manual. The procedures and systems that comprised the command-and-control function were subordinated to the overarching philosophy and described in chapter 2 of _Truppenführung_, titled “Mission Command.”

Finally, the U.S. Army has lost focus on the end state that it was attempting to achieve by changing its command philosophy. The primary reason the Army began adopting the principles of **Auftragstaktik** was to respond to a changed understanding of the nature of emerging modern war, and the kind of environment Army forces faced at that time, as discussed in the 1982 edition of FM 100-5. The new doctrine led the Army to transition from an attrition-based approach to one based on maneuver warfare. To illustrate, figure 2 (on page 65) depicts the logic behind what the Germans believed were the principles of Auftragstaktik in conducting modern maneuver warfare. Similarly, FM 100-5 also draws the link between these principles and the successful conduct of maneuver warfare throughout its second chapter.

However, the logical relationship between the needed changes in command practice to the conduct of modern maneuver warfare appears to have been lost in formulation of mission command doctrine. While the Army’s operating concept, unified land operations, does represent the tenets of maneuver warfare, neither ADP 3-0 nor ADP 6-0 makes the connection that mission command is a prerequisite for maneuver warfare as an operational approach. At best, U.S. doctrine states mission command, presumably the philosophy rather than the warfighting function, is “a foundation” of unified land operations. While this does denote that mission command retains significant importance in the Army’s operating concept, as was the case in the German army as illustrated in figure 2.

While this may seem to be simply nitpicking doctrinal minutiae, these gaps in definition and description are noteworthy. If, as ADP 3-0 states, the role of doctrine is to serve as “a body of thought on how Army forces operate” and as a “guide to action rather than a fixed set of rules,” then it is crucial that doctrine clearly describe the concepts the organization wants to employ and why it wants to employ them. Clear understanding is, after all, one of the principles of mission command.

As a consequence of the lack of commitment to the concept of mission command as the key philosophical foundation of its new doctrine, the Army’s adoption of mission command has been incomplete due to a flawed interpretation of the concept of Auftragstaktik. However, this is but one of the obstacles currently facing the Army as it struggles to implement mission command.

An exploration of the second gap, what Shamir refers to as “praxis,” is helpful. As Shamir succinctly explains, praxis gaps occur “as a result of an interplay between external and internal factors.” Examples of external factors that could affect the implementation of a foreign idea into one’s own military include changes in technology and “civil-military relations,” while some internal factors might “include education, training, and personnel policies.”

The Need to Reform Leader Development for Mission Command

In the 150 years between the German army’s defeat at the Battle of Jena-Auerstedt and its early victories of World War II, the German army effected many changes in its education, training, and personnel policies to inculcate its command philosophy. The U.S. Army, since the release of FM 100-5 in 1982, through subsequent doctrinal manuals, has attempted to shrink this period of evolution. Yet, while the Army has changed its doctrine, it has neglected to make critical educational reforms necessary to successfully integrate mission command into its culture. An analysis of the lack of changes in Army education, particularly of officers, provides the best understanding of where the praxis gap described by Shamir has occurred. First, however, an analysis of how the Germans changed their officer education system to instill their new command philosophy into the moral and psychological fabric of their forces will provide some context.

By the early twentieth century, the Germans had developed, arguably, the best officer education system the world had ever seen. With a clear eye on their objective, “the whole German professional military educational
system paved the way for the famous Auftragstaktik.”40 Prior to World War I, “serious military education” for a German officer aspirant would begin at age fourteen (some schools admitted boys as young as ten), at one of the various Kadettenschulen (cadet schools) found across Germany.41 These schools "offered the same curriculum as a Realgymnasium [secondary school]," though it was slightly altered to allow more time for courses in language and geography as well as time for drill and athletics.42 While formal military training was minimal, an established cadet chain of command and commissioned officer instructors were already evaluating cadets on leadership and character.43

After the eleventh grade, cadets were tested to determine if they had acquired the requisite knowledge to continue officer training. If they failed this exam, they were excused from the Kadettenschulen and returned to civilian education.44 Following the thirteenth grade, at age nineteen, cadets would again be examined and, upon passing, “gain a degree equivalent to the Abitur (ready to enter a university)” despite the fact that in the final two years “military subjects taught would by far outweigh regular school disciplines.”45

Even upon graduation from the Kadettenschulen, cadets were not commissioned as officers but were promoted to Fähnrich (ensign), ranking just above sergeants. They would be sent to their respective regiments, where their training would continue under the tutelage of the officers of their regiments for approximately a year, depending on the ensign.46 Once their regimental commanders deemed them ready, the prospective officers would be sent to the Kriegsschule (war school) for two years of intensive training in their respective branch.47 Upon graduating from the Kriegsschule, the ensigns would return to their regiments to continue to gain practical experience, and finally, “the regimental commander would decide—usually after a conversation with all the officers of the regiment—if the young aspirant had proven worthy to become an officer.”48

Even upon commissioning, the young lieutenant found no respite. Once again, his commander and brother officers would assist him in preparation for the exams that would determine his eligibility to attend the vaunted Kriegsschule (War College) roughly five years after receiving his commission.49 An officer’s performance in these exams was a matter of pride (or shame) to the entire officer corps of the regiment, and that performance could directly affect the career of the regimental commander.50

Education, combined with multiple opportunities to gain real-world experience with soldiers, was emphasized. As Muth states, “real life was the test for the German officer aspirant, not the artificial atmosphere of an enclosed military academy.”51 Thus, the Germans approached leader development along three separate lines of effort: the institutional domain, the operational domain, and the self-development domain. Upon graduation from a Kadettenschule, a young officer would gain operational training, education, and experience in the aspirant’s regiment under the supervision of the regimental commander with observational participation by the other officers of the regiment. Everyone had a vested interest in the development of every new member of the regiment’s officer corps. Institutional education, training, and experience were gained in the final two years of a cadet’s time at the Kadettenschulen and at his respective branch school.

Finally, while with his regiment, and in preparation for his branch schooling, an ensign was expected to commit considerable time to self-development, again, under the tutelage of his brother officers within the regiment. In total, the typical German lieutenant received about six years of training and education, including two years of practical experience with soldiers, prior to being commissioned and assuming a position of authority.

Though the Kadettenschulen were abolished after World War I in accordance with the Versailles Treaty, German precommissioning officer training during the interwar years was very similar to the model discussed above.52 Formal and informal education continued throughout the officer’s career with the same thoroughness demonstrated in precommissioning.

Contemporary U.S. Army precommissioning officer education pales in comparison to the German model and has undergone minimal change since the 1982 release of FM 100-5. The vast majority of U.S. Army officers are produced via the Reserve Officer Training Corps or the United States Military Academy at West Point. Regardless of the path a cadet takes, the journey provides a similar experience. Earning a civilian degree is the cadet’s priority. In contrast, military-centric training is restricted to short drill periods, with the most intensive training occurring over the summer months between the cadet’s junior and senior years. This training focuses on
providing cadets with skills similar to what a recruit would receive during basic training, with some additional leadership, team building, and tactics included. This level of training would roughly correspond to what a cadet would have received in the German system before graduating from a Kadettenschulen. However, unlike the German system, upon graduation a U.S. Army cadet is commissioned as a second lieutenant. The new officer is then sent to a branch-specific school, which typically lasts about six months. Once the young officer has completed this training, he or she is put in charge of a platoon or given a staff position until a platoon becomes available. Despite the fact that the U.S. Army uses a similar leadership development methodology, as captured in figure 3, a new second lieutenant has only received a fraction of the institutional training, education, and experience as his and her German predecessor.53

Opportunities in the operational domain for U.S. Army cadets are limited to a handful of tactical training events with other cadets, not in an actual tactical unit. The exception is Cadet Troop Leader Training, which “provides cadets the opportunity to experience leadership in” active-duty units where aspiring officers will ideally shadow a current platoon leader for three to four weeks.54 However, Cadet Troop Leader Training is not universal, nor is it mandatory, and experiences vary significantly depending on the type of unit and the training cycle.

Upon arriving at a tactical unit, leader development remains extremely uneven. As Gen. George C. Marshall stated in 1939, “I thoroughly agree with the Chief of Infantry as to the too strong tendency of regimental commanders to rely on the service schools for the education of their officers.”55 Unfortunately, this statement is just as applicable today as it was in 1939. While some battalion and brigade commanders dedicate extraordinary energy to the development of their junior officers, many do not, and the Army has no method of evaluating how well leaders develop their subordinates, like the Germans had in the 1930s.

The self-development domain is even less structured. Some new officers do not learn their first duty assignment until they are well into their branch-specific training course; therefore, they have no mentors from their gaining units to guide them in their self-development program. Some exceptions may include reading lists or an online self-study program, depending on the branch. Self-development, however, should be guided and mentored to achieve its true potential, as in the German model. Done incorrectly, as Maj. Joe Byerly stated in a Naval War College Joint Military Operations paper, this leads to “learning the wrong lessons from history and using selective readings to reinforce one’s prejudices.”56

Contemporary Army officers report to their first unit with three to four years less training, education,
and experience than their 1930 German equivalents. Not only is this discrepancy in time significant, but the breadth and depth of a German officer’s development also made the individual officer infinitely more capable and ready to assume the leadership within the unit once finally commissioned. The officer had already proven worthy in the eyes of soldiers and peers of the regiment, giving a level of credibility that few second lieutenants in the U.S. Army today enjoy.

The Way to Develop a Shared Understanding of Mission Command

Arguably, the two most important principles of mission command are shared understanding and mutual trust. Ironically, U.S. doctrine fails to convey a clear, shared understanding of mission command. The Army’s doctrine on the matter is confusing and inconsistent. Additionally, the U.S. Army’s system of developing its officers fails to build mutual trust between echelons of command. Junior officer precommissioning training has been examined here as the vehicle to demonstrate this, but the same could be said for intermediate and senior officer professional military education as well as the Army’s noncommissioned officer education system. U.S. Army leaders are often underprepared for the responsibilities they are given. Returning to Schein’s levels of culture, the Army has made only cursory changes to its artifacts, and it has failed to change its espoused beliefs and values (its education system). As such, the Army has failed to change its culture.

Mission command is indeed the proper command philosophy for the U.S. Army. Current and likely future operations will be complex, dynamic, and too varied for one central commander to make sense of every relevant factor and then direct actions to each subordinate commander. The Clausewitzian notion of fog and friction is no closer to being mitigated today than it was in the 1830s. However, as noted historical and military author Daniel Hughes states in an article in the International Military Defence Encyclopedia, “as long as Western armies regard Auftragstaktik simply as a policy of short general orders, rather than a fundamental principle governing all requiring decisions and judgment, their officers will not understand what the principle entails, let alone implement it on the battlefield.” This is not an insurmountable task nor does it require that the U.S. Army attempt to copy or replicate the actions of the German army of the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries. Additionally, as Martin van Creveld said, “it is not necessarily true that a non-German armed force has to traverse that history in its entirety, to understand and apply” Auftragstaktik, or mission command.

However, the Army is going to have to do more to successfully adopt mission command as its overarching command philosophy. First, it must forcefully and clearly articulate that the concept is the essence of its doctrine and distinguish it from the command-and-control warfare function. In other words, the Army’s artifacts must accurately reflect the culture it is attempting to adopt. Second, “it is not enough to write new doctrine.” Changes must be made to the Army’s officer and noncommissioned officer military education and training programs that remakes and reshapes its espoused beliefs and values. In this way, the Army can truly change the foundation of its basic assumptions and its culture. If the Army is unwilling to make these changes, mission command will remain merely an espoused leadership philosophy, rather than a philosophy in practice.


Notes

2. Johann Adolf Graf von Kielmansegg, “Bemerkungen zum Referat von Hauptmann Dr. Frieser (Panzergruppe Kleist) aus der Sicht eines Zeitzeugen” [“Comments on the Report by Captain Dr. Frieser (Panzer Group Kleist) as Seen by an Eyewitness”], in Horst Boog, Operatives Denken und Handeln in deutschen Streitkräften im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert [Operational Thinking and Action in German Armed Forces in the 19th and 20th centuries], ed. Günther Roth (Herford, DE: Mittler, 1988), 152. Kielmansegg was a logistics officer for the 1st Panzer Division, and he was present when Col. Kurt Zeitzler spoke the order.
8. Ibid., 17.
9. Ibid., 18.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., 3, 18.
15. Ibid., 98.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 98–121.
21. Ibid., 69.
22. Ibid., 68–69.
23. Ibid., 68.
24. Ibid., 68–77.
26. Ibid., 27.
27. Ibid., 26.
28. Ibid., 27.
34. ADP 6-0, *Mission Command*, 1.
35. ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, 1.
37. Ibid., 29.
38. Ibid., 28.
39. Ibid.
41. Ibid., 87.
44. Ibid., 103–4.
45. Ibid., 107.
46. Ibid., 184.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., 185.
49. Ibid., 149–62.
50. Ibid., 149–55.
51. Ibid., 184.
An Army Overseas Expeditionary Maneuver through the Maritime Domain

Lt. Col. Trent J. Lythgoe, U.S. Army
A bulldozer pushes an Army Trident pier back out to sea 17 July 2008 to make another practice run during Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore (JLOTS) 2008 at Camp Pendleton, California. JLOTS 2008 established command and control of Army and Navy units, constructed a life support area, conducted force protection operations, executed an in-stream offload of shipping from a sea echelon area, employed an offshore petroleum distribution system, retrograded, and safely redeployed allocated forces. (Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Brian P. Caracci, U.S. Navy)
The paramount concern ... of maritime strategy is to determine the mutual relations of your army and navy in a plan of war.

—Julian Corbett

A n expeditionary Army is essential to American security. America has historically depended on expeditionary forces to defend worldwide security and economic interests. Today, increased globalization, along with the geographical dispersion of America’s top security challenges (China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and transnational terrorism), make globally responsive expeditionary forces more necessary than ever. The U.S. Army, however, is hard-pressed to meet these challenges for a variety of reasons. The Army’s legacy force-flow model (reception, staging, onward movement, and integration [RSOI]) depends on large airfields and vulnerable deepwater seaports. America’s adversaries are increasingly positioned to exploit this weakness using anti-access warfare. Even so, lulled by successes in the Gulf War (Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm) and elsewhere, the Army continues to rely on RSOI.

The Army must return to its roots as an expeditionary force to meet the challenges of today’s security environment, particularly the challenges of anti-access warfare. The joint force needs Army forces capable of expeditionary maneuver; rapidly deployable land forces that can maneuver over strategic distances, transition to the offense quickly, and fight in austere conditions. Expeditionary maneuver will allow Army forces to attack at unexpected times and locations, creating multiple entry points for follow-on forces and creating multiple dilemmas for the enemy. Expeditionary land forces can bypass enemy anti-access defenses emplaced to deny entry via airfields and ports.

Central to successful expeditionary maneuver is restoration of the Army’s maritime expeditionary capabilities. Expeditionary maneuver requires the ability to sealift large, heavy Army formations, move them ashore, and rapidly transition to combat operations. For such a restoration of maritime expeditionary capabilities to be successful, certain joint capabilities need to be prioritized. This article outlines six joint capabilities required to enable expeditionary maneuver: sea control, using the sea as maneuver space, capable initial entry forces, rapid reinforcing forces, ship-to-shore connectors, and joint force integration.

A Brief History of Expeditionary Warfare

The whole power of the United States to manifest itself in this war depends upon the power to move ships across the sea. Their mighty power is restricted, it is restricted by those very oceans which have protected them. The oceans which were their shield have now become a bar, a prison house, through which they are struggling to bring armies, fleets and air forces to bear upon the great common problems we have to face.

—Winston Churchill

America is a maritime nation; a strategic island bordered by two oceans and reliant on overseas trade. Historically, maritime powers have depended on expeditionary forces to secure remote national interests, and the United States is no exception. During peacetime, expeditionary forces secure trade routes and global interests. In times of war, they allow maritime powers to use expeditionary warfare in an “away game” strategy (i.e., fight somewhere else other than on the homeland territory). By fighting abroad, expeditionary forces spare the homeland from destruction.

Modern joint expeditionary warfare emerged at the end of the eighteenth century as a powerful strategic advantage. Moving land forces by ship had been part of warfare for thousands of years. But, in the late 1700s, advances in sailing technology allowed maritime powers to orchestrate campaigns using expeditionary sea and land power together as mutually supporting joint forces. Newly empowered maritime powers could not only protect interests beyond their shores but could also execute “peripheral campaigns” to attack enemies indirectly at multiple points or along multiple axes.

British operations from 1805 to 1815 are early cases in point. After gaining sea control at Trafalgar, British expeditionary forces seized French territories in the Caribbean, depriving the French regime of vital revenue. Meanwhile, British army operations on the Iberian Peninsula, supported by the Royal Navy, tied down large numbers of French troops, preventing Napoleon from reinforcing the continental fight in Russia and Germany.

The United States likewise used joint expeditionary operations to further interests abroad. From 1800 to 1945, joint expeditionary operations played a prominent
role in nearly every major U.S. conflict, including the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, and World War II.\textsuperscript{11} America’s first large-scale expeditionary operation was the 1847 Mexico City campaign. Army Gen. Winfield Scott’s eleven-thousand-strong force conducted a forcible entry at Veracruz, and then pushed west to capture Mexico City. The U.S. Navy supported the campaign by providing troop transport and naval gunfire during amphibious operations and by keeping sea lines of communication open as Scott pushed inland.\textsuperscript{12}

Elsewhere, the Pacific “island hopping” campaign (1943–45) is a classic example of joint expeditionary force application against the Japanese anti-access strategy in the western Pacific. Allied land forces, maneuvering by sea and supported by naval forces, bypassed Japanese strongholds and seized strategically important islands, which became support bases for aircraft and logistics. This, in turn, enabled joint air, sea, and land forces to project even deeper into enemy territory. The ability of Allied forces to mutually reinforce their efforts across land, air, and sea domains (and the Japanese forces’ inability to do so) was a critical factor in Allied success.\textsuperscript{13}

American expeditionary capability reached its peak in 1945, at which point the United States was able to project and support a land force of over 1.3 million soldiers.\textsuperscript{14} As World War II ended, however, U.S. expeditionary capabilities were intentionally drawn down. Expeditionary posture gave way to forward-positioned forces that could deter and respond to Cold War threats in Europe, and later in Korea.\textsuperscript{15}

These forward garrisons provided assured access to key infrastructure, which would allow reinforcing forces to flow

Lt. Col. Trent Lythgoe, U.S. Army, is an aviation officer serving as an instructor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds a BA from Weber State University and an MA from Webster University. Lythgoe’s previous assignments include the Army Capabilities Integration Center, 3rd Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, Eighth U.S. Army, and 1st Cavalry Division.

Soldiers assigned to the 3rd Battalion, 27th Field Artillery Regiment, and the 188th Brigade Support Battalion execute joint-logistics-over-the-shore operations 6 December 2016 with Army mariners of the 7th Transportation Brigade near the mouth of Chesapeake Bay at Craney Island, Virginia, during Operation Neptune Fury. A High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) element traveled to shore on landing craft mechanized watercraft and then executed simulated HIMARS fire missions. (Photo by Sgt. Benjamin Parsons, U.S. Army)
into theater. Maintaining assured access and optimizing the RSOI process replaced expeditionary capability as the centerpiece of U.S. force projection strategy. However, as a result, expeditionary capabilities naturally atrophied.\textsuperscript{16}

**Desert Storm: A Strategic Inflection Point**

With victory, all of the army’s habits, procedures, structures, tactics, and methods will indiscriminately be confirmed as valid—or even brilliant—including those that could benefit from improvement or even drastic reform.

—Edward Luttwak\textsuperscript{17}

The magnificent performance of the entire coalition and the totality of the victory clearly establishes the tenor of after action discussions as absolute success.

—U.S. Central Command Desert Storm After Action Review\textsuperscript{18}

The Gulf War (1990–91) was a military-strategic inflection point for U.S. forces and would-be adversaries alike.\textsuperscript{19} By 1990, the U.S. Army had honed the RSOI force-flow model during years of Cold War preparation. But, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the Army faced a new problem. It had to deploy large numbers of heavy forces to a theater without forward garrisons. With little expeditionary capability, Army forces needed modern ports and airfields. The cooperation of Saudi Arabia, which had modern infrastructure close to the area of operations, became indispensable. Fortunately, the Saudis were willing allies and agreed to let U.S. forces use Saudi facilities.

The Gulf War deployment became a de facto test of the RSOI model in a post-Cold War conflict. History records the Gulf War as an overwhelming success. However, that assessment belies the fragility of the force flow that enabled that success. Over a period of eight months, the U.S. military flowed 576 ships and 10,002 aircraft into theater.\textsuperscript{20} This massive amount of cargo moved through only a few key sites: 96 percent of sea cargo

![Image of Army mariners loading an Army LSV](Photo by Sgt. Walter Lowell, U.S. Army)
flowed through just two ports and 78 percent of air cargo through five airfields. Had Iraq managed to destroy or degrade even one of these sites, the Gulf War could have been much more difficult for the coalition. Despite potentially fatal flaws, the Army embraced this new version of RSOI in which access agreements with regional allies replaced the forward garrisons of the Cold War.

Irrespective of the U.S. vulnerabilities that were not exploited, the swift expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait was a wake-up call for U.S. adversaries. China, Russia, and Iran suddenly sensed they were far behind the United States in military capability. The U.S. advantages in technology and training were plainly evident. Adversaries simply could not compete with the United States at the operational or tactical level. But while the Gulf War framed the problem in stark terms for potential U.S. adversaries, it also hinted at the solution. U.S. forces depended on vulnerable ports and airfields to get into position. Iraq’s failure to contest coalition force flow in the Gulf War was a costly strategic error, and one that China, Russia, and Iran determined not to replicate.

The obvious solution was an anti-access strategy designed to offset U.S. advantages by disrupting or defeating U.S. forces at a distance before they could bring their tactical and technological superiority to bear. Somewhat oblivious to the unique factors that had enabled its stunning victory, while adversaries were reorienting to an anti-access defense, the United States actually facilitated a diminishment of its expeditionary capabilities. One consequence was that U.S. forces spent the 1990s strategically adrift amid theoretical postulation and debate concerning a “Revolution in Military Affairs.” This theory predicted U.S. forces would enjoy air and sea supremacy in operations characterized by technology that would enable “perfect intelligence,” robust command, and long-distance precision strikes in future conflicts.

Despite this flawed thinking, U.S. forces were successful, at least in terms of force flow, in a series of actions from 1991 to 2011. Major operations in the Balkans and Libya, as well as early operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, seemed to validate the Gulf War RSOI approach. In each instance, the United States continued to enjoy air and sea supremacy, willing regional allies, and unmolested force flow through ports of entry to which they were given access.

In contrast, today the U.S. Army is now in a precarious position. It still relies on the twenty-five-year-old Gulf War RSOI model to move forces. But, whereas Iraq was ill prepared to face U.S. military forces in 1991, today’s adversaries have spent the last quarter century preparing to defeat the United States at a distance. To do so, they have developed effective anti-access capabilities, including antishipping weapons, integrated air defenses, long-range fires, counterreconnaissance, and asymmetric threats. In addition, the deepwater ports required for Army RSOI will almost certainly not be available (at least initially) in the next fight.

As a result, in the event of a regional conflict, determined and well-prepared adversaries can be expected to attack our flow of forces with long-range fires, asymmetric forces, and even weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, antiship and anti-aircraft systems, mines, surface and subsurface vessels, and asymmetric seaborne forces will make the surrounding littorals too dangerous for naval operations, much less the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and commercial vessels that typically move Army forces. Even ports distant from a location in which contingency operations are being considered may be untenable due to their being within the scope of enemy weapon attack. Moreover, adversaries can disrupt port operations at distant locations from the intended operational area using such asymmetric means as terrorist attacks, crime, cyberattacks, or fomenting labor disputes.

A Return to Expeditionary Maneuver

The proliferation of anti-access weapons and strategies means the U.S. Army’s next major operation is likely to be preceded by a counter-anti-access campaign. Although the initial phases will be strongly maritime in character, Army forces will nonetheless be essential.

In the event of a needed forced entry from the sea, it is expected that the coordinated and mutually reinforcing application of force across all domains will weaken, and eventually collapse, the anti-access defense. Expeditionary land forces are optimally used to attack or threaten at multiple locations, including anti-access nodes, forcing the enemy to dilute its defenses. Then, habitually, Army forces reinforce and exploit the initial success of marine amphibious operations to establish a lodgment. U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) land forces then occupy or seize key terrain to enable freedom of maneuver for naval and air forces. Upon conclusion of the counter-anti-access campaign, expeditionary army forces facilitate the flow of follow-on
forces by establishing expeditionary infrastructure and seizing previously denied ports and airfields.

This type of joint campaign requires the Army to be an expeditionary rather than a garrisoned force. The Army must be able to maneuver forces from the sea without reliance on ports, and potentially in contested areas.\(^3\) Expeditionary maneuver, as proposed by the Army Operating Concept, envisions an expeditionary army that can deploy and fight a mix of light, medium, and heavy forces for whatever duration and at whatever scale is necessary. These forces will maneuver over strategic distances, overcome or bypass anti-access defenses, and attack at unexpected locations to create multiple dilemmas for the enemy.\(^3\)

The case for an expeditionary army is supported by historical precedent and the likely demands of future conflict. How the U.S. Army will operate in the future depends largely on the particulars of the conflict. That said, there are six key capabilities common to such operations that will underpin any successful joint expeditionary operation regardless of scenario.

**Sea control.** Sea control is the first prerequisite for successful expeditionary operations. Although clearly a Navy responsibility, the Army has a vested interest in sea control.\(^3\) It is worth noting that in 1989 the Navy had 592 active ships, while today it has 274.\(^3\) While quantity is not necessarily equivalent to effectiveness, Army leaders should nevertheless be concerned about the size of the Navy and advocate for adequate naval capability.

**Using the sea as maneuver space.** The Army must maneuver, rather than move, on the sea. Army forces must arrive at positions of advantage ready to fight, not just ready to offload. Equipment must be combat configured and units must have embarked with it. Once underway, commanders and staffs must be able to maintain situational awareness and conduct mission command. Units must be able to transfer troops, equipment, and cargo between vessels while still offshore to prepare for combat operations.

To achieve this, the Army must rethink the way it employs military and commercial shipping. The Army will likely not move on Navy ships. Nor will Army forces stage on amphibious assault ships; there are already too few for USMC requirements.\(^3\) Rather, the Army must adapt existing shipping for expeditionary operations. MSC large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off vessels, normally used to move bulk-loaded Army equipment, could be modified to move combat configured equipment with troop berthing and a mission command suite. Other vessels have similar potential.

The expeditionary transfer dock, expeditionary mobile base, and expeditionary fast transport (formerly called the joint high-speed vessel) can all accommodate Army troops, equipment, and aircraft. Fortunately, efforts to adapt existing shipping along these lines are already underway.\(^3\) Although not fighting ships, these vessels could operate in a second echelon outside the threat zone. The joint force could use air and surface connectors to move between ships and from ship to shore, using the fighting ships in the amphibious ready group and carrier strike group as “lily pads,” if necessary. As the fight progresses inland and the threat lessens, second-echelon ships could move closer to shore.

**Capable initial-entry forces.** Initial-entry forces are essential in a counter-anti-access campaign. These forces establish lodgments at multiple entry points away from heavily defended infrastructure. Amphibious assault operations are likely to be the main effort during the initial phases. USMC amphibious forces are ideally suited to seize a lodgment through which seaborne Army forces could flow. Airborne, air assault, and special operations forces will likely operate simultaneously at offset objectives in order to present multiple dilemmas to the enemy and prevent the enemy from concentrating defensively at any one point. The threat of multiple entries will force the enemy to either thin its defenses along a large front, or accept weak areas based on an enemy risk calculus, thus providing additional opportunities to joint force commanders.

**Rapid reinforcing forces.** Initial-entry forces create an initial advantage using speed and surprise. However, entry operations must be quickly reinforced. Without rapid reinforcement, joint force commanders will be unable to exploit initial success and initial-entry forces may be defeated or destroyed. Current deployment times for Army forces are not fast enough for rapid reinforcement. Marine forces afloat, for example, may be ready to conduct entry operations in a matter of days or weeks after notification. However, under present circumstances, Army reinforcements could take up to ninety days to arrive.\(^3\)

There are multiple ways the Army can reduce or close the gap. Designating rapid response forces, including light, medium, and heavy units, is a good start. But, improving expeditionary capabilities in the Army writ large is also necessary. The Army must shorten lengthy institutional
deployment processes, increase combat loading for early responding forces, and reduce multi-modal transfers (two or more means of transport for a single cargo). Additionally, Army forces need expeditionary mission command capabilities and tailorable expeditionary sustainment packages. The Army should also reexamine its prepositioned equipment strategy, both in terms of composition (light, medium, heavy) and disposition (bulk vs. combat configured).

**Ship-to-shore connectors.** Army forces will need surface and vertical connectors to move forces ashore. Army helicopters are already capable of operating from the sea, albeit with increased maintenance costs. Army watercraft can augment Navy and USMC surface connectors. Army and Navy modular causeway systems can be used to transfer equipment from large vessels to surface connectors. In later phases of the operation, joint-logistics-over-the-shore operations will allow large ships to unload directly onto expeditionary piers.

Importantly, Army forces afloat must be able to move ashore even as the enemy contests this movement across all domains. The Army participants must not count on an uncontested “administrative” offload. Army forces reinforcing a marine amphibious assault, for example, should not expect a large, completely secure lodgment. As previously noted, combat configured units are essential so units can fight immediately or soon after moving ashore.

**Joint integration.** The operations envisioned here require true joint force integration rather than simple coordination or deconfliction, both technologically and from a command and control perspective. With multiple services operating across all domains, all units must be able to communicate with each other and maintain situational awareness using a common operating picture. While joint communications challenges are not new, they take on additional urgency in this environment.

Joint command will be more challenging in this fight. The joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) will likely control the counter-anti-access fight. The JFMCC must determine how Army forces will integrate into a predominately naval force, including the command relationships of Army forces, if and how they report to the amphibious task force commander, and when control of land forces shifts to the joint force land component commander. Army forces will be challenged as well. In many cases, Army units could be reporting directly to non-Army commands. For example, an Army Stryker battalion could be working under a marine brigade, which is in turn working for the JFMCC. The mission command, interoperability, and sustainment challenges of this situation are evident.

**Preventing a Mighty Fall**

In his 2009 book *How the Mighty Fall and Why Some Companies Never Give In*, Jim Collins examines why many highly successful companies suddenly fail. The path to failure begins with successes, which lead to an organizational sense of invulnerability. Companies then fail to adapt, and instead try to replicate past success. As failure approaches, companies begin to take excessive risks, followed by desperate grasping at ill-conceived “silver bullet” strategies. Finally, they die or fade into irrelevance.

The Army has stood too long on the success of the Gulf War while the world around it has changed dramatically. The question now is, will the Army adapt its capabilities to a new and different operational environment or constrain needed development by attempting to replicate previous successes using the relatively recent past as its main template? The Army must not let the lingering influence of the Cold War and Gulf War prevent a restoration of expeditionary capabilities. American expeditionary land power is rooted in history and flows from the natural strategic imperatives of a maritime nation. Success in the coming counter-anti-access fight depends on coordinated and mutually reinforcing air, sea, and land expeditionary forces. The U.S. Army must be ready to do its share.

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**Notes**


3. For simplicity, I will use the term “anti-access” to describe capabilities and strategies commonly associated with anti-access/area denial (A2/AD).


8. John B. Hattendorf, foreword to Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare.


16. Work, Thinking about Seabasing, 14–16.


19. Andy Grove, former Intel chief executive officer, defines a strategic inflection point as a time when the fundamentals of a business are about to change. Andrew Grove, Only the Paranoid Survive: How to Exploit the Crisis Points that Challenge Every Company (New York: Currency Doubleday, 1999), 3.


21. Work, Thinking about Seabasing, 22.


23. Ibid., 31.


27. Although there is no standard depth to be considered a “deepwater” port, the most common understanding is a port which can accommodate a draft of at least 39.5 feet. This depth will accommodate all Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships.

28. Anti-access is not the only threat to port access. In some areas the United States may not have allies willing to allow access (Turkey’s refusal in 2003 stands out as an example). In other areas, particularly the western Pacific, there are vast areas without adequate infrastructure to accommodate large ships.

29. This is not implying the Army should conduct amphibious assaults. However, it must be able to rapidly reinforce U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces from the Indian Ocean, and/or move ashore over a beachhead, which, while not actively contested, is not secured; only sealift can move a combination of light, medium, and heavy forces at sufficient scale and speed to an expeditionary fight. Heavy airlift cannot move a sufficient volume to build, on its own, a significant land force. I refer the reader to the following study: Alan J. Vick, David T. Orletsky, Bruce R. Pimrie, and Seth G. Jones, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team: Rethinking Strategic Responsiveness and Assessing Deployment Options (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002), 23.

30. TP 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept, 17.

31. Additionally, the U.S. Marine Corps is likely to be the Army’s primary provider of joint fires in the absence of usable bases for Air Force aircraft.


The Army’s vision of a future multi-domain battlefield makes many assumptions about the cognitive demands and capabilities of current and future soldiers. These assumptions, among others, include that soldiers of the current millennial generation are inherently more tech-savvy than their predecessors because of extensive, lifelong exposure to technological devices such as personal computers, virtual gaming, and cell phones. Thus, they should be able to better leverage new technologies to increase their...
performance in executing military missions. There is also an assumption that sequentially adding technologies into military skills training only after soldiers are trained in fundamentals will be adequate.

Our research suggests otherwise. The purpose of this study was to test a set of hypotheses and assumptions that younger cadets and soldiers possess a higher aptitude and familiarity with digital technologies that could be used to increase combat performance. Our research was conducted over the summer of 2017; it entailed a randomized control trial of West Point cadets participating in urban-raid lane training utilizing new technologies such as virtual reality (VR) goggles. The results of our research showed a sample of millennial soldiers with limited experience and proficiency in military tasks were too cognitively overloaded to accept new and unfamiliar technologies while under the stress of military requirements—despite the clear advantage these technologies held for completing their mission. Our results provide preliminary evidence that cadets generally default to analog technologies—namely, a notepad, pen, or paper—under duress or in the heat of battle, even one simulated. Moreover, our findings demonstrate that the need to train and develop spatial-projection skills are even more important than implementing new technology earlier in the training cycle.

**Digital Natives and Military Technologies**

The popularity of today’s video games, such as *Call of Duty*, *Halo*, and *Grand Theft Auto*, with millennials has not gone unnoticed by the U.S. military. The transfer of lessons and skills from these games, especially massively multiplayer online role-playing games, to improve soldier aptitude and agility has become a desire of military training. The gaming environment is of particular interest to the Army, based on the Army Capabilities Integration Center’s Early Synthetic Prototyping efforts—such as Operation Overmatch—to better understand how technologies are used. These “lightweight simulations” are meant...
to mimic the characteristics of the current operational environment with a great deal of fidelity, including “stress training,” which seeks to simulate time, noise, and performance pressures.

Moreover, the role of new technology, from robotics to information technology, will be increasingly important in future wars. In anticipation of such, the Army is developing a new multi-domain battle concept in preparation for fighting and winning its next war. Planners believe future battles will be fought in an operational environment where the Army will be challenged to maintain freedom of maneuver and superiority across not only the air, land, and maritime domains but also across space and cyberspace domains, as well as in the electromagnetic spectrum.

To maintain freedom of maneuver and superiority in future wars, future soldiers will have to arrive on high-tech battlefields cognitively ready to maximize U.S. military strengths while exploiting enemy weaknesses and taking advantage of split-second opportunities. As a result, they will have to be trained and equipped to use a wide range of enablers and technologies. Yet, the doctrine and techniques the Army will need to fight across all domains—especially for integrating tools and assets in space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum—are still to be developed.

As efforts are underway to develop new concepts and capabilities, there is a prevailing assumption among military planners that trust in automation is greater among younger generations, given their “digital nativism” as everyday users of new technologies, from gaming to social media. As a result, the military’s plan to integrate technology into a digital-native force structure is based largely on a previously untested assumption that digital natives will readily adopt technology and subsequently increase proficiency. For example, a 2013 study suggests that younger learners should seek greater speed, constant connectivity, and the ability to multitask more than their counterparts from previous generations. Similarly, another study found that video gaming provides long-lasting positive effects on users’ cognitive skills, including mental processes such as perception, attention, memory, and decision making. Other researchers assert that older generations tend toward greater caution when presented with unfamiliar or new technologies and put greater stock in trust cues.

Additionally, such studies are seemingly supported by the findings of some psychologists who assert that novices in new situations or faced with new tasks require more instruction than expert learners. Even after novices are given cues or essential information, they often interpret new information or technologies as redundant, leading to what is called “cognitive overload.” Put simply, this refers to the inability of learners to take in new information or demands without making the task overly complex.

The Modern War Institute at the United States Military Academy recently tested these assumptions during a tactical training exercise that included replicating many attributes described in the multi-domain battlefield discussions. The research results suggest that the integration of technology

Maj. John Spencer, U.S. Army, is the deputy director of the Modern War Institute at West Point, New York. He serves as the course director of the Cadet Capstone Research Course and an instructor of the Introduction to Strategic Studies course in the Defense and Strategic Studies Program. He holds an MPM from Georgetown University. During his career, he served as a military Fellow with the chief of staff of the Army’s Strategic Studies Group, the joint staff, the Army staff, 4th Infantry Division, 173rd Airborne Brigade, and the 4th Ranger Training Brigade.

Lionel Beehner, PhD, is research director at the Modern War Institute at West Point, New York, and assistant professor in the Defense and Strategic Studies Program. He is course director of Research Methods and previously was course director of Military Innovation.

Capt. Brandon Thomas, U.S. Army, is an instructor with the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at West Point, New York. He holds a BS from the United States Military Academy and an MS from Georgia Institute of Technology. During his career, he served with the 1st Cavalry Division and the 2nd Cavalry Regiment. His current duties include serving as course director for the Engineering Psychology Program’s Experimental Psychology and Anthropometrics/Biomechanics courses.
in training and on the battlefield should take place only after soldiers achieve a certain level of tactical proficiency without the benefit of supporting technology.

In addition to concerns about the impact of experience on the ability to receive new information, the study results showed the cognitive ability to mentally visualize and rotate images is essential for high levels of performance, but that such skills are notably lacking in many millennial trainees. This visualization and projection skill should be considered a prerequisite fundamental in individual soldier skills training. In simple terms, we must teach soldiers to mentally project and rotate objects from imagery to a greater degree than how we currently train soldiers to envision their land navigation routes. The overreliance on digital mapping navigation (e.g., Google Maps or Waze) has greatly reduced the skill set necessary for the previously mentioned mental processes. That is, we should not assume that younger soldiers, by virtue of growing up immersed in a culture of video games and other platforms, are naturally comfortable, competent, or confident in the use of digital technologies that draw

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<th>Mean time (seconds)</th>
<th>Average treatment effect (standard error)</th>
<th>P-value</th>
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<td>1764.1</td>
<td>-462.75 (96.8)**</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Objective rally point to first shot</td>
<td>1446.4</td>
<td>247.5 (0.19)*</td>
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<td>First shot to all clear</td>
<td>916.3</td>
<td>397.3 (65.7)**</td>
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**Total N=120**

(Graphic by authors. Note: First column lists average times [in seconds] for all five performance measures. Second column shows the virtual reality treatment effect [a negative sign equates to fewer seconds] and thus a higher performance measure [Robust standard errors in parentheses]. Third column lists p-values for a one-tailed t-test: *p<0.1 ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01.)

**Figure. Mean Treatment Effect; Photos versus Virtual Reality Goggles**
upon unlearned or underutilized skills in combat situations. Our findings are bolstered by parallel research of cadets’ trust in and use of technology.

Creating a Realistic Operating Environment

During their final summer at West Point, all cadets are required to execute a four-week field training exercise called Cadet Leader Development Training. The training is modeled after a phase of Ranger School and carried out in the dense forest a few miles from the academy. Cadets conduct a number of missions, or “lanes,” and are evaluated in leadership positions while executing platoon-level Infantry missions to include ambush, raid, and movement to contact. The Modern War Institute (MWI) partnered with the Army Cyber Institute and the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership to create a training exercise with many of the characteristics of warfare forecasted to be a part of the multi-domain battlefield.

The MWI designed a mission that required cadets to plan a platoon raid on an urban site. The objective was a seven-building village where the enemy had established a command node. The main building was equipped with a closed-circuit video system. The enemy consisted of seven personnel equipped with personal weapons, a heavy machine gun, and an unmanned aerial vehicle for observation and early warning.

Cadets planned their mission in a patrol base. During planning, cadets were provided with a cyber specialist from a cyber electromagnetic activities (CEMA) team with the ability to hack into cameras located on the objective and to “shoot down” (send an electronic message telling the device to shut off) any enemy drones they encountered. The cadets conducted a vehicle movement to a checkpoint where they would begin their walk into their area of operations. At the checkpoint, cadets were met by a two-man Special Forces team that gave the platoon leadership an intelligence update and guided them into their objective rally point (ORP). The movement from the checkpoint to their ORP was approximately eight hundred meters.

In their ORP, the Special Forces team provided the cadet leadership the ability to walk their objective by using sets of VR goggles that projected 360-degree panoramic photos of the objective. These photos and the virtual experience replicated photos taken by a human intelligence source (local informant) or footage captured by a drone. During the leader’s recon, cadets were able to hack into the closed-circuit video camera located on the target building. Finally, the CEMA team soldier was able to shoot down the enemy drone upon the cadet platoon leader’s command while executing actions on the objective.

The development of the virtual reconnaissance capability was significant. Officers from the Army Cyber Institute captured more than one hundred pictures in and around the objective using a 360-degree camera, linked the photos to waypoints with a three-dimensional VR programming language called Unity, and ultimately used a common virtual tour exploration application to allow a user to move between hotspots. Using an Android smartphone and a set of gaming goggles as the delivery tool, cadets were able to move from one end of the objective to the other, hopping from hotspot to hotspot to virtually walk their objective. They could stand in front of all the buildings, observing the number of entryways, the direction of door openings, and the lines of sight from anywhere outside the buildings. Cadets could also go to any planned support-by-fire, assault, or security sites to determine what they could see from those positions. Cadets received hands-on training on all three systems (counterdrone rifle, video-hacking capabilities, and VR reconnaissance goggles) prior to beginning their field exercise to reduce any issues with not knowing how to use the equipment when it was introduced during the field exercise.

Method

The creation of a realistic and advanced operating environment also served as a closed lab to test hypotheses applicable to modern and future warfare. In partnership with the engineering psychology program within the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, the MWI formulated a research plan to answer the following research question: Does a VR capability increase performance in military operations?

An experiment was conducted to determine if providing cadets with the VR reconnaissance goggles that allowed them to virtually walk their objective prior to the raid mission would increase their performance. During the study, twelve platoons consisting of forty cadets each were provided VR goggles while they were in their objective rally point and before conducting
their leader’s recon of the objective. Another twelve platoons, the control group, were provided a target packet consisting of twenty-five high-definition photos of the objective. The treatment and control groups were randomly selected. To prevent a violation of the trial’s exclusion restriction, cadets in the control and treatment groups had zero interaction or contact with their counterparts before or during the study.

There were two strongly held assumptions that contributed to the development of the research question. The first was that the millennial-age cadets were “digital natives” who grew up on and were highly proficient at video gaming and the use of ever-advancing mobile technologies, and consequently should have been better able to leverage technology and translate that to battlefield effectiveness at the tactical level. This assumption was so prevalent that it was heavily debated whether to evaluate cadets on their execution of the mission. It was believed that the cadets’ technological abilities and the chance to virtually walk their objective would give them a marked advantage compared to cadets conducting the mission without technological assistance. The final decision was to grade the cadets just like the other missions.

A second assumption was that based on the cadets’ ubiquitous use of technologies in their everyday lives, they would welcome and willingly use the VR reconnaissance goggles offered to them. There was a thirty-minute maximum set on the use of the goggles to prevent the cadets from spending too much time using them.

**Dependent Variables**

The study examined five time-performance measures:

- the amount of time the cadet leadership took to conduct their leader’s reconnaissance,
- the amount of time between leaving their ORP and their first shot (this included positioning all elements into their security, support by fire, and assault positions),
- the amount of time from first shot to the assaulting element reaching the first building on the objective,
- the amount of time from first shot to the assaulting element reaching the target building, and
- the amount of time from first shot to all buildings searched and cleared of enemy personnel.

Time as a performance measure was chosen based on its association with multiple aspects of the characteristics of the offense. As described in Army Doctrine Publication 3-90, *Offense and Defense*, the main feature of offensive missions is taking and maintaining the initiative. The four doctrinal characteristics of the offense—audacity, concentration, surprise, and rapid tempo—all indicate the vital importance of time. The least amount of time used to gain and maintain the initiative served as an effective metric to measure sound tactical execution.

The goal of the research was to understand whether VR reconnaissance can increase performance in military operations. We varied elements of the application of VR (the treatment effect) to assess and passively measure the key performance indicators and thereby determine if VR reconnaissance had a noticeable effect, either positive or negative.

**Results**

First, we examined the results using a difference in means OLS (ordinary least squares) regression as shown in the table (on page 84). We found that in all but one of the five performance measures, the treatment effect of using the VR goggles led to a significant increase in time—in other words, using the goggles had a negative effect on the cadets’ performance. The use of the goggles led to sufficiently slower times in the second, third, fourth, and fifth performance measures. All the measures, except for the second, were statistically significant to the .05 level. In the figure (on page 84), we see that the use of VR goggles had a significant effect in speeding up the leader’s reconnaissance performance measure, but it had a very negative effect on the performance measure “first shot to all clear.”

**Discussion**

The surprising response from the cadets was a hesitation or refusal to use the technology. When given the opportunity to use the VR reconnaissance capability, cadets *overwhelmingly chose not to use it* or only used it for a short amount of time before leaving for their physical reconnaissance. The average length of use of the goggles was five minutes, the minimum was thirty seconds, and the maximum was eight minutes.

One of our initial assumptions was that the cadets did not feel comfortable with the particular technology tool or the simulated virtual environment. This was unsupported by the evidence when compared to the amount of time the control group cadets spent looking at the photos of the objective. There was no significant difference in
the average, maximum, or minimum time of cadet use between the goggles and the photos.

The quantitative results show that the use of the goggles increased the speed of the cadets’ leader’s reconnaissance but found they were slower in the actual performance of all the other critical tasks or steps measured. This can be attributed to the cadets gaining a false sense of knowledge from only a few minutes of using the goggles and maps, thus rushing through their physical leader’s reconnaissance while failing to use the goggles to obtain the information that an experienced soldier might. The cadets did not use the goggles to obtain the critical information (e.g., lines of sight, building approach, building access points, covered and concealed positions) that would have allowed soldiers with experience in urban raids to considerably increase their performance on the mission.

The qualitative observations of the cadets suggested that they were overwhelmed by their lack of expertise in the leader and collective tasks they were being asked to execute. The cadets’ cognitive load was so full that they were not open or could not accept any additional information, technology or not. When presented with the goggles or high-definition photos, cadets could not spare the cognitive load to process the new information. They looked at the goggles or photos for a few moments—most likely only because they were being watched by evaluators—but preferred either to use simple tools such as a hand-written sketch or to see it for themselves by moving as close to the objective as they could get. Cadets would use these sketches standing directly above the high-definition photos or VR goggles they were provided.

Furthermore, cadets demonstrated a lack of an ability to spatially project themselves onto their objective. They...
could not picture themselves on a street or in front of a building and then use that mental imagery to discuss or alter their plan of action. This is consistent with lessons learned in land navigation at the United States Military Academy, where cadets demonstrated the same lack of visualization abilities when planning routes for land navigation. The ability to develop a visuospatial sketchpad (i.e., create a mental image) is critical for encoding information into our brains for learning and subsequently, decision making. Furthermore, the ability to rotate images and utilize projection of situational awareness on future events is a fundamental skill of modern warfare, where satellite or aerial imagery is often all soldiers are provided before conducting missions.

**Implications**

The results of this study provide insight into two widely held assumptions: first, that the current generation of soldiers (ages eighteen to twenty-five) want more technology based on their use of it during their civilian lives and therefore will be able to easily incorporate technology into military tasks and increase performance in accomplishing missions; and second, that military training with technology requires a progressive and sequential methodology that includes learning fundamentals in a technology-free environment and then incorporating technology once a level of competence has been demonstrated.

With respect to the first assumption, this study shows that despite being digital natives, cadets did not immediately welcome the use of a new piece of technology. They chose to use both the VR goggles and photos for only a few moments. Based on the experiment and survey results, this in part seems to be caused by the cadets lacking the requisite cognitive space; they were too fully loaded with the stresses of inexperience and time to permit any new technology or information. This is consistent with research on the cognitive free space of experts versus beginners.

The lack of participants’ use of aids was practically significant. The effect of experience—in terms of temporal workload and spatial situational-awareness projection—has significant practical implications for future training techniques and stands in stark opposition to current technological adoption assumptions. This should inform basic theories of soldier confidence and openness levels to technical advances and military plans to integrate more technology into soldier equipment sets.

A senior special operations leader visited the research lane. He commented on the integration of technologies with experts compared to overtaxed beginners. He felt that soldiers in a special operations unit can assess a new technology or piece of equipment and quickly know if that piece of equipment would help in the execution of military tasks. Beginners, on the other hand, lack the training and experience to know whether a new piece of equipment will benefit their performance.

The second assumption addresses the appropriate training methodologies and the timing of using more technologies to build fundamental military skills; the results of this study support the longstanding military progressive-and-sequential training model that emphasizes learning technology-free basic fundamentals first and then incorporating technology later. The cognitive resources and mental stress of executing new tasks can be reduced with experience and therefore has been shown to allow space for new information or tools.

But the realities of the modern battlefield cause a need for the ability to use technologies and information inputs such as satellite imagery or drone footage before executing a mission, because U.S. forces are often not able to infiltrate enemy-held terrain to physically see their objective beforehand, which is the method emphasized in training that has been passed down from previous wars. The ability to use technology-enhanced information feeds directly into the ability to spatially project future actions onto the location of the mission, a phenomenon that has previously never been explored.

We found that spatial projection was one of the core capabilities the cadets lacked. We determined that spatial projection is a learned mental ability or process that combines the use of the visuospatial sketchpad in relation to information encoding to the working memory, mental rotation, and situational awareness as applicable to anticipation of future events. Spatial projection allows a person to “see” the objective from multiple perspectives in order to make mission-critical decisions. In its simplest form, in a military context, it allows a soldier to plot the most advantageous route from point A to point B. In the case of executing a tactical task on any given objective, it allows for the soldier to use knowledge of terrain, images, etc., to paint a picture that influences decision making and actions on the objective.

While learning basic military skills before adding technologies still remains relevant, this research
highlights the need to train and develop individual spatial projection skills. The lack of ability to spatially project was also observed while trying to teach cadets land navigation skills at West Point. After continued decrease in cadet land navigation scores, a visualization class was added to the normal map reading and land navigation classes. After their visualization training, cadets were required to sketch a pictorial of their planned route between two points and verbally brief it to an instructor. The brief included verbalizing what the cadets would see on their route, the elevation changes, key types of terrain they planned to see, and major terrain features. This change significantly increased cadet performance on the land navigation course.

Spatial projection is a fundamental skill requirement to use information from technology like the VR goggles and photos, along with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance tools for mission planning. This skill set may be more important than what technology is provided to soldiers. If we are able to train these fundamental cognitive abilities and skills through concerted training at the individual soldier skill level before we introduce the technology, we believe the future soldier will indeed be able to pick up new technology and effectively glean all that there is to be learned or used from it in the most efficient manner possible.

**Way Ahead**

The impact of technology on battlefield performance is a relatively new area of study in the fields of military science and innovation, so there is not much rigorous or empirically tested literature about the impact of VR technology on combat effectiveness. Moreover, extant academic studies suffer from internal/external validity problems. The research attempted here was extremely pioneering and can contribute to establishing a foundation for future researchers to build from. To assess the validity of the study’s findings, it should be replicated with more formations containing a variety of expertise such as operational units going through the Joint Readiness Training Center.

However, this research strongly suggests that the Army should not assume millennial generation soldiers are more tech-savvy than their predecessors are, nor that they are more capable of using new technologies to increase their performance in executing military missions without development of certain cognitive skills as a prerequisite. This suggests that the addition of visualization and spatial projection training at the earliest point in training will benefit new soldiers as they become more proficient at military tasks and open to the use of more information inputs and technology.

Finally, the research conducted here was also a demonstration of how low-cost training can incorporate multiple aspects of both modern and near-future operating environments. The complexity of the individual and collective tasks was not increased; rather, the complexity of the environment was. The cadets who performed the best were the ones that utilized the doctrinal fundamentals they had been taught in their military science course.

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**Notes**


Commanding in Multi-Domain Formations

Maj. Anthony M. Clas, EdD, U.S. Army

The general who wins the battle makes many calculations in his temple before the battle is fought. The general who loses makes but few calculations beforehand.

—Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

The three pillars of the U.S. Department of Defense strategy are protect the homeland, build security globally, and project power and win decisively. The U.S. military presence around the world resulting from this strategy continues to provide its armed forces opportunities to bridge the gap into the future of warfare—war on a multi-domain battlefield. Multi-domain battle is the conceptual framework used to visualize potential combined arms capabilities across physical and psychological domains required against a near-peer enemy threat in an emerging twenty-first century multi-domain operational environment (MDOE).

Key areas of consideration on the multi-domain battlefield are cultural, technological, and military attributes that shape the MDOE, ethical dilemmas created by emerging technologies including those caused by the fielding of disruptive technologies, the operational and strategic implications of dense urban environments on military objectives, and the roles of leaders and soldiers.

The purpose of this article’s analysis is to develop a comprehensive picture of the arising needs of a future MDOE in order to orient readers to where further research and shifts in approach ought to be directed. One of the underlying assumptions is the need for a collaborative approach between the United States, NATO countries, and partnered nations against potential adversarial threats. It is logical to visualize and prepare for combat operations against a near-peer enemy threat by 2050, given predictions of how the planet will change. For one, the United Nations predicts a population growth of 2.6 billion. Additionally, climate change and biofuel use will triple by 2040, generating conflicts over land and water resources to keep up with the renewable energy demand. As resources diminish and political tensions rise, military alternatives may be seen as more viable options as opposed to diplomatic solutions. Consequently, preparation via new research, new institutions, new methods for readiness, and new concepts for future conflict against a near-peer adversary must be developed now.

Attributes of Multi-Domain Battle in 2050

The MDOE will continue to generate new threats to U.S. national security. The United States may potentially maintain military primacy through 2050 due to continued globalization of military activities under the Unified Command Plan, which provides operational direction to U.S. armed forces and sustains a global military network in allied nations. Nevertheless, it is naïve to believe that near-peer adversaries, state and nonstate actors alike, will not test the resolve of U.S. and NATO allies and partner nations. The attributes of a 2050 MDOE are being manifested in emerging capabilities now.

One of the primary attributes of the 2050 MDOE is emerging technologies and their relationship to the cultural norms of an interconnected world. Emerging technology will be designed to have less impact in the physical realm and more in the abstract cognitive domain. Minimum casualties and maximum gains via
influence and soft power in place of brute force will be the overarching theme given the current cultural milieu and emerging technology. Although population growth may recommend a more robust presence for security, network-centric warfare governed by political influence may be the key element of the MDOE in 2050.

**Network-centric warfare.** Network-centric warfare can be defined as effects-based operations that could permit a decentralized force to operate systematically as a dispersed mass. Using smart munitions such as Global Positioning System-guided ballistic missiles against an enemy force is an example of network-centric operations on the battlefield. This concept also affords a psychological advantage over an adversarial force because a network-centric force will have the capability to concentrate fires precisely where desired. This psychological advantage will leverage information operations designed to augment a larger diplomatic goal.

**Noopolitics and the noosphere.** Noopolitics is an international political leadership strategy combining the cyberspace network and mass media to manipulate the attitudes, opinions, or moral values of the general public. In the noosphere, some observers assert, interoperability of cybertechnology and information operations within the information environment afford maximum payoff with minimal risk for state and nonstate actors. The two key elements of information warfare in this context are network-centric warfare and information operations that have a psychological impact. A premier example of the future of information warfare can be seen in what Western thinkers term the emerging hybrid warfare campaign Russia is waging against the United States and its European allies in their escalating approach toward regional dominance.

**Hybrid warfare.** In eastern Europe, hybrid warfare—called “new-type warfare” by the Russians—is raising concerns in the United States as well as in other sovereign nations across Europe. Hybrid warfare is described as covert activities along with conventional and/or nuclear forces to influence domestic politics in targeted

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**Figure 1. Karber Hybrid Warfare Framework**

![Figure 1. Karber Hybrid Warfare Framework](Graphic by Philip Karber)
countries. Whether hybrid warfare is truly a military transformation is still to be determined. However, hybrid warfare appears to bridge the gap to a multi-domain battlefield. Figure 1 (on page 92) depicts the principles of hybrid-warfare actions measured by levels of intensity and degrees of state responsibility. The complexities of an MDOE will require leaders and soldiers to find more innovative ways to achieve dominance over an adversary in the nuanced and complex arena of the noosphere.

Challenges and Ethical Dilemmas Created by Emerging Technology

Emerging technology continues to affect exponentially the evolution of warfare. For example, as we begin to normalize drone use in military operations, more emerging technologies are being developed in the forms of signal deconfliction for electronic warfare; alternative positioning, navigation, and timing for global positioning systems; artificial intelligence for cyberwarfare operations; and swarm and counterswarm nanotechnology—all of which will figure prominently in the 2050 MDOE. The massive and rapid changes in technology, both in the military and civilian spheres, raises great difficulty for collective adjustment to the rule of law, at both the state and international levels.

Multi-domain battle is the result of advances in cyberwarfare, the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, and the use of artificial intelligence, which consequentially has raised concerns over violations of international law and the law of war. The law of war construct results from the balance between contrasting interests of military necessity and humanitarian concerns. As technology evolves and provides greater capabilities for both allies and adversaries, the more difficult applying the rule of law will be. International laws of warfare that apply to both “technologically-specific”, a certain weapon system, and “technologically-neutral,” a class of technology that can be weaponized—such as drones or artificial intelligence—and categorized by effect, may require a transformation of society for the governance of emerging technology. Universal conscription and security sector governance are potential methods to stay within the lines of morality agreed upon within the social contract framed around civil-military relations.

Universal conscription. Universal conscription is one recommendation made to counter the dilemmas created by emerging technology. Modern technology affords militaries the capability to project combat power across the globe with minimum casualties. Removing the human aspect from the battlefield further tips the balance in favor of military necessity, vice humanity, which is problematic when escalation of force includes a nuclear option. A conscript military will reflect society as a whole, vice an elite group of volunteers, and the conscripted service members will bring their experiences with the complexities of evolving technologies in the defense industry. It is fair to assume emerging technology will play a vital role in combat scenarios as advances in nanotechnology, information, communication technology, and robotics come to fruition. Universal conscription is a viable option in creating a vested interest by society to address moral concerns; however, there still needs to be a catalyst to generate a shared buy-in across the societal spectrum to build the technological capacity to compete in a future MDOE.

Security sector governance. The evolution of civil-military relations, otherwise known as the military’s role in society, is transitioning to security sector governance, which strives for democratic oversight and accountability of security forces. Security sector governance is a holistic approach that empowers congress and the military, and also employs nongovernment organizations to include academic research institutes, professional organizations, media, and civilian experts that have the capability to provide assessments of and insights into national security issues.

An example of this concept can be found in Harley-Davidson Motor Company’s contribution of ninety thousand motorcycles for military use and the opening of the Harley-Davidson Quartermaster School to teach military mechanics motorcycle maintenance during the two world wars. Security sector governance is the current trend amongst Western nations to manage the appropriate talent required to address the threats in the future

Maj. Anthony M. Clas, U.S. Army, is a public affairs officer in command of the 7th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment, Fort Hood, Texas. He holds a BA from Saint Xavier University, an MMAS from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, an MS from Tiffin University, and an EdD from Argosy University. His assignments include tours in Europe and deployments in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and New Dawn.
In terms of efficiency, it is much easier to recruit expertise and technology from industry than grow it in the military. Collaboration across society can be the catalyst for creating a sense of urgency to develop and equip the force with emerging technology and reduce capability shortfalls more rapidly.

Rapid fielding of emerging technology. The Army Rapid Capabilities Office is capable of fielding equipment within anywhere from one to five years depending on the level or echelon. However, the MDOE will not afford years to field capabilities to react to an adversarial force. Figure 2 (on page 95) depicts methodology the Army intends to use in Fiscal Year 2018 to create an “innovation ecosystem” leveraging industry partners to close capability gaps, which was introduced at the 2017 Association of the United States Army Annual Meeting and Exposition. Equipment procurement falls victim to the adage that it can be developed fast, of high quality, or inexpensive, but it cannot possess all three characteristics. With current constraints driven by the U.S. economy on military expenditures, there is no simple solution to solve the fielding of weapons systems required for the MDOE.

Prototyping methodology is one feasible option to rapidly field emerging technology to provide the required capability to the force when an adversary poses a threat. Prototyping methodology consists of identifying capability shortfalls, defining the problem, deconstructing the problem, and defining solution options, and then developing and assessing a prototype. The output is a “put-on-the-shelf” strategy acquisition process that would be more in line with how conflict will develop in the future. By assembling prototype housing offices in the future, creativity and innovation can be applied to create options that can be used against potential adversaries. However, there are certain conditions that must be met to ensure reaping the benefits of the prototyping process:

- Results are used to inform key program decisions.
- The prototype is designed to demonstrate the critical attributes of the final product in a realistic environment.
- Prototyping strategies and documentation are austere.
- There should be no commitment to production during the prototyping phase.
- No additional requirements are added or performance increases expected.

If the stakeholder does not ensure the aforementioned conditions are met the prototyping process could end up more costly and less timely fielding the required technology. If the conditions are set correctly, the prototyping process should cut down the acquisition cycle from years to months, thereby reducing costs applied to fielding equipment that will be obsolete by the time it is implemented against an adversary in an MDOE. Innovation and speed will be of the utmost importance as we move to more urban operational environments, such as megacities, due to an escalating world population resulting in dense urban environments.

**Impacts of Dense Urban Environments**

Megacities are complex operating environments that pose significant challenges on military forces. Two primary concerns in this environment are minimizing collateral damage to noncombatants and preserving infrastructure to mitigate the suffering of the local populace. Due to dense populations growing at alarming rates and infrastructure that significantly reduces effective intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations, adversaries may select dense urban environments to establish a base of operations. Developing a strategy that shapes the civil capacity of the infrastructure in concert with information operations that focus on the abstract and cognitive domains continues to need development of strategy, technology, and planning to deter civil unrest and reduce an adversary’s advantage in an MDOE.

On the strategic level, using security-sector reform procedures and institutions to shape the economic and information environments to create a “smart city”—one that uses technology and the information environment to efficiently manage resources—may be a worthy strategy to strengthen social quality and reduce social exclusion, which leads to highly restrictive multi-domain battlefields. The elements of a smart city required to improve social quality are social and economic security, social cohesion, and social inclusion.

Even with effective target discrimination, a kinetic fight in dense urban terrain has a high probability of resulting in collateral damage that will benefit an adversary in the information environment. Findings from certain Army megacity experimentation exercises (called Unified Quest) identified a need for strong information operations, the value of special operations forces...
and indigenous allies, limitations on the use of precision strike weapons designed for open warfare, and the requirement to incorporate stability activities throughout all phases of combat operations.\textsuperscript{28}

Loss of life and significant damage to infrastructure reduces the resolve of the host-nation populace affected by a conflict, which will ultimately result in loss of support across the alliance to continue the fight. Confucius’s philosophy pertaining to societies with dense populations applies here: “The quality of the population is more important than the quality of your armaments.”\textsuperscript{29}

Roles of Leaders and Soldiers in a Multi-Domain Battlefield

Gen. Mark Milley, chief of staff of the U.S. Army, suggests the military will require more mature and seasoned leaders to conduct ground combat operations in the future.\textsuperscript{30} The ability of the United States to conduct combined operations with NATO allies and partners is critical for facing future threats in an MDOE. Furthermore, a future MDOE will require leaders to be more innovative and agile when working through complex issues in combat.

Complex interdependence. The overarching theme relevant to leaders and soldiers alike in an MDOE is complex interdependence. Complex interdependence theory is defined as a mutual dependence between transnational actors due to growing ties that make each one vulnerable to each other’s actions.\textsuperscript{31} U.S. armed forces conducting combined exercises with ally and partner nations is a demonstration of complex interdependency, as countries work together to achieve interoperability between network-centric systems and increased situational understanding of each other’s tactics and procedures. Innovative leaders in concert with complex interdependency is the best combination to develop a force prepared to operate in the future MDOE.
**Entrepreneurial leadership.** Entrepreneurial leadership is the concept of influencing and directing performance of an organization’s members to identify and capitalize on new opportunities. An evolving MDOE will require leaders and soldiers to exercise innovation when working through the complexities of a multi-domain battlefield. Entrepreneurial leadership involves three key tasks to be successful in military culture:

1. identifying the assumptions of the role of the ideal combatant that underlie an innovation, and the extent to which those new concepts align with the existing culture;
2. demonstrating the new assumptions that are misaligned with the prevailing culture to improve the organization’s performance in the kinds of conflicts it anticipates; and
3. persuading the organization that the new concept of a combatant is not a rejection of the enduring values of the organization.

In short, entrepreneurial leadership requires leaders to rapidly work through the observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop and mitigate groupthink which may hinder cultural change. Operations that allow the United States, its NATO allies, and partner nations the ability to practice deploying force packages forward using a holistic approach to conduct combined training exercises during peacetime will significantly increase readiness for future conflicts.

Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, then commander of U.S. Army Europe, captures the OODA loop cycle in terms of “speed of recognition, speed of decision, speed of assembly, and finally, ready to fight tonight,” as well as demonstrating complex interdependence with regionally allocated force (RAF) units operating in Atlantic Resolve and NATO’s multinational enhanced forward presence battle groups.
conducting combined security operations in Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Continuing to develop complex interdependence with our NATO allies and partners in concert with empowering junior leaders to be innovative using entrepreneurial leadership is recommended to meet the “ready to fight tonight” immediacy in an MDOE. Gen. David Goldfein, chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force, proclaims the need for leaders to “visualize the multiple battlespaces and execute rapid decision-making” supporting an entrepreneurial leadership approach to react more decisively in an MDOE.

**European Reassurance Initiative and the Mission Command Element—Atlantic Resolve**

The United States and other NATO countries are in the early stages of shaping the MDOE against future potential near-peer adversaries. The European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) is at the forefront of evolving Western collective preparedness for a multi-domain battlefield. ERI provides funding to U.S. military forces and NATO allies and partners in an effort to collectively build deterrence capabilities against external threats or destabilization actions in the eastern European region. Russia has committed several territorial and treaty violations in the region to include the illegal annexation of Crimea and aggression in eastern Ukraine, as well as violating the U.S.-Russia Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The U.S. and NATO response to the aforementioned violations was the deployment of forces to the eastern European region to initiate Atlantic Resolve, where U.S. and NATO allies and partners conduct multinational training and security cooperation activities using ERI fund allocations.

The United States and NATO provide a good example of complex interdependence in the U.S. European Command, U.S. Army Europe-led Atlantic Resolve mission. The mission command element (MCE) for

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**Figure 3. Whole-of-Society Strategy for Multi-Domain Battle**

(Graphic by author)
Atlantic Resolve (MCE-AR) is a tactical division-level headquarters responsible for RAF units deployed in support of Atlantic Resolve in eastern Europe. The RAF units are operationally controlled by U.S. Army Europe and include a division-level MCE, an armored brigade combat team, a combat aviation brigade, and a combat sustainment support battalion serving as a rotational logistics force. The MCE concept provides armed forces a forward element to streamline the OODA loop process in areas of potential future conflict and also incorporates elements of complex interdependence and entrepreneurial leadership.

Atlantic Resolve serves as a catalyst for preparing U.S. and NATO allies and partners for the threats they may face in an MDOE. The mission command model encompasses centralized planning for decentralized execution exercising disciplined initiative and adaptive leadership to maximize an element’s effect in the MDOE. The MCE concept affords NATO allies and partners the ability to synchronize efforts against network-centric proxy warfare, as well as a means to search for indicators and warnings that may trigger additional force requirements in the operational environment in a unified response.

**Whole-of-Society and Strong Alliance**

Russia’s vigilance and use of hybrid warfare to build upon destabilization actions in eastern Europe affords U.S. and NATO allies and partners an opportunity to evaluate a whole-of-society (WoS) approach in an MDOE to create and maintain a strong alliance. Even though China may be a logical front-runner to surpass the United States economically by 2050 or sooner due to their rate of economic growth, the balance of power can shift more rapidly if a Sino-Russian alliance is formed. A WoS approach encompasses a wide range of societal actors, to include all nations that comprise the NATO alliance. Using the MCE-AR as a catalyst to strengthen the alliance between NATO allies and partner nations with a WoS approach will help counter emerging threats in the MDOE of the future.

**Recommendations**

Multi-domain battle is a complex issue that will continue to require attention as near-peer adversaries continue to revolutionize their tactics and capabilities. The following recommendations are offered to better prepare the U.S. armed forces capturing themes of interdependence, interoperability, and societal inclusion against potential threats in an MDOE:

**Strong alliance.** Generate more opportunities to build complex interdependency between allied and partnered nations and create leadership development opportunities to apply entrepreneurial leadership using creativity and innovation to work through problem sets within the organization. Conducting a mixed-methods program evaluation to assess the MCE-AR’s effectiveness in countering hybrid warfare on a multi-domain battlefield may determine if combining a WoS approach with the MCE concept is an effective strategy against future MDOE adversaries.

**Multi-domain battle.** Hybrid warfare is just the beginning of network-centric proxy warfare. Noopolitics operating within the noosphere, cyberspace network, and mass media will become more prevalent as interconnectivity becomes more prevalent in cyberspace. Developing an emerging technology strategy tailored around the Unified Quest findings: strong information operations capabilities that bolster special operations forces’ and indigenous allied forces’ effects in an MDOE. Implementing the “put-on-the-shelf” strategy by way of developing prototype housing offices can potentially significantly cut down on the acquisition process to get the right equipment to the military at the right time.

**Enhanced civil-military relationships.** Bolstering civil-military relationships via security sector governance and universal conscription may generate shared buy-in, minimizing ethical constraints and building essential emerging technology capabilities to defend against potential near-peer adversaries in the future MDOE. It is uncertain if future near-peer adversaries will be Russia, China, or a combination presented as a Sino-Russia alliance. Consequentially, exploring WoS options to bolster social inclusion by incorporating security sector governance and universal conscription merit further inquiry. Figure 3 (on page 97) depicts a recommended WoS strategy using the four elements of national power: diplomacy, informational, military, and economic application to a future MDOE.

**Conclusion**

The following areas are key focus points to narrow the gap in research and better prepare for
multi-domain battle: attributes that shape the multi-domain battlefield, roles of leaders and soldiers, ethical dilemmas created by emerging technologies, fielding of disruptive technologies, and the operational and strategic implications that dense urban environments have on military objectives. Although generalizability and validity are limited in this research, there were still several significant concepts worthy of future research.

Strong alliance, multi-domain battle, and smart city theory are concepts recommended for further evaluation to incorporate into a WoS strategy against the aforementioned focus areas in a future MDOE. The U.S. military needs to keep abreast of research and strategic effort in areas once considered outside of their lanes. Focus on technology development alone can no longer suffice, given what is understood today about the 2050 MDOE. The future is uncertain, and all of the research we conduct will remain conceptual until our assumptions become reality. Until then, the best course of action is to continue the search for more efficient and creative methods to defend against future threats posed by near-peer adversaries on a multi-domain battlefield.

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Notes


8. Ibid., 92.


10. Ibid., 32.


15. Ibid., 1169.


17. Ibid., 46.

18. Ibid., 42.


24. Ibid., 14.

25. Ibid.


39. Ibid., 2.


The Tyranny of the Shores
Army Planning for the Asia-Pacific Theater

Brian J. Dunn

The Tyranny of Distance

In any future emerging confrontation in the Asia Pacific, the U.S. Army eventually will have to take a pivotal role in order for the United States to prevail. Therefore, the U.S. Army must consider and prepare for a role in the Asia-Pacific region that goes beyond merely...
fighting anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threats to the Navy to one that better accounts for the value of large-scale land operations in support of a joint campaign.¹

The Army currently regards the Asia-Pacific region outside of the Korean peninsula as primarily the responsibility of the Navy and Air Force, augmented as necessary by the Marine Corps, who supply any limited requirement for ground-force needs. Such a misconception forfeits options to contribute to victory in the eventuality of large-scale engagement against the sophisticated, well-prepared, near-peer adversaries that are emerging in the Asia-Pacific region. As stated in an Association of the United States Army defense report, “The joint force must have expeditionary, campaign-quality strategic landpower to ensure the protection of the vital interests of the United States.”² At present, in anticipation of future conflict in the Asia-Pacific region, the Navy is focused on overcoming the A2/AD threat.³ The commander of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) envisions a minimal combat role for the Army in this endeavor, one tailored primarily to defeating Chinese A2/AD weapons threatening the fleet.⁴

In apparent support, citing historic Army coastal and harbor defense as well as a homeland air defense role, the commander of United States Army Pacific, Gen. Robert Brown, explained the combat role of the Army in the multi-domain battle concept for the Pacific region. In an article published in March 2017, he described an Army battalion protecting an airfield and Army anti-ship assets ashore. But he only hinted at the traditional role of the Army defeating enemy armies when he wrote that multi-domain Army operations described in terms of assisting sea and air dominance “will then re-enable maneuver for the entire joint force in any region.”⁵

The Tyranny of the Pivot

America continues to shift military power to the Pacific in response to China’s rise, but the Army’s full-spectrum capability is not being advocated in the mistaken belief that employment of sizable land power is ill-suited to the wider Asia-Pacific theater. This myopic Asia-Pacific vision that truncates a full-spectrum Army combat role—despite the long history of Army land campaigns there—must be fixed. The Army must make the case for employing greater land power in strategic calculations concerning the vast continent away from the Korean peninsula beyond the Pacific littorals, where large armies and air forces of near-peer adversaries or allies already stand ready to do battle.

America has worried almost exclusively about the “tyranny of distance” that America must overcome just to reach the Asia-Pacific theater. Increasing Chinese A2/AD capabilities create an environment that complicates the sheer distance by challenging the joint force to penetrate and operate within range of Chinese anti-ship weapons.⁶ In a 9 November 2011 briefing, a Department of Defense official explained the need for what was then called Air-Sea Battle:

That environment demands that U.S. forces be able to turn quickly from a defensive posture to one of offensive posture—not to turn and leave an area, but to stay in place and to continue to operate within an area of the global commons and not to be pushed out.⁷

Renamed Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC), the initially articulated objective remains to get into the sea areas off Asia and to “stay in place.” This is a reasonable objective. While a distant blockade is a potential U.S. response to the China A2/AD threat, this abandons all allies and partners who lie closer to China than the blockade line. The joint force must be able to push closer to China.

But, what is the purpose of fighting through anti-access weapons and staying there, if not to influence events ashore? The Army should provide its unique contribution to a joint campaign, “the ability to defeat and dominate opposing land forces and those elements contributing to the enemy’s ability to generate and project combat power.”⁸ Although JAM-GC recognizes the need for land power, it forfeits the potential unique Army contribution by treating the Army (and the Marine Corps, to a lesser extent) as an auxiliary in an air and naval campaign.⁹

Fighting a major war in Asia is a new challenge for the modern Army, which is battle tested in Central Command and reengaged in Europe. While the Pacific does challenge America’s ability to deploy, fight, and sustain combat forces far from established bases, the Army cannot rule out land campaigns in Asia because it “does not have the luxury of preparing to fight only one type of enemy, at one time, in one place.”¹⁰

“Tyranny of the shores” is a far more serious problem than simply overcoming the tyranny of distance. It is
We postulate that a war between the United States and China would be regional, conventional, and high-tech, and it would be waged mainly on and beneath the sea, in the air (with aircraft, drones, and missiles), in space, and in cyberspace. Although ground combat could occur in certain scenarios (e.g., a conflict over Korean unification), we exclude the possibility of a huge land war in Asia.12

China may or may not accept a limit on the scope of American military action, but the United States should not go along with that convenient assumption that simplifies China’s defense problems. Rather than precluding a land campaign by the U.S. Army, China’s geographic size confers both advantages and disadvantages for Army ground operations.13

The basic issue is that China is big, making it difficult for even a large invasion force to conquer China. On the other hand, if China must defend its far-flung coastal regions from American invasion because America does not assume such limits, the People’s Liberation Army ground forces could be dispersed, both ceding the initiative and giving the U.S. Army an opening to gain victories with local superiority after early-entry forces secure a lodgment on the mainland.

Although Chinese economic growth enables the military means to challenge America in Asia, that growth creates vulnerability. A modernized China will have significant regional interdependence, making China an integrated whole rather than a collection of semi-independent economic centers. That China will be far more vulnerable to losing one piece of territory, and it may find that it cannot retreat to the interior and wait out an enemy that captures part of the periphery.14

For those focused on the naval missions, a close blockade enabled by Army and Marine Corps forces ashore will be more reassuring to allies within range of Chinese air and missile power. For a joint campaign with an objective to force China to accede via a land war, the Army may be able to achieve a limited victory in a ground campaign along the coast of China despite lacking the numbers to occupy the country.15 But better opportunities exist around China’s periphery.

The Tyranny of Jointness

As an insular power, America must exert power and influence onto the Asian mainland from the sea. The Navy vision is to provide America with “maritime dominance.”16 Yet the Navy recognizes that even the core Navy mission of sea control “may require projecting power ashore” for supporting missions.17 The Navy is understandably focused on Navy and Marine Corps roles. The Army needs to push for an expanded role ashore. The Army should prepare for a joint campaign in the Asia-Pacific theater that includes the full spectrum of Army combat capabilities to provide land dominance anywhere in the theater.18

The Falklands War required the Royal Navy to operate within range of Argentinean air power, reflecting current A2/AD concerns.19 Yet, Britain operated within range of Argentina’s air power because Britain needed to land ground forces in the Falklands to liberate the land and the people who lived there.

In World War II, the American fleet fought its way to the doorstep of Japan in the face of potent anti-access weapons (both conventional and Kamikaze planes that functioned like early cruise missiles) in order to carry out military operations directly against the Japanese home islands.

What does PACOM do with the access it gains to remain in the seas close to China? The ability to defeat A2/AD capabilities is not an end but the means to overcome those capabilities to influence events ashore. PACOM must contemplate using access to the sea areas off China to project Army-led forces ashore to help allies under attack or to open new ground fronts against China.

China is certainly not America’s enemy. China’s ambitions may yet mellow to solidify cooperation for mutual and regional benefit, but thus far “China’s behavior

Brian J. Dunn holds an AB in political science and history from the University of Michigan and an MA in history from Eastern Michigan University. He retired from his job as a nonpartisan research analyst for the Michigan State Legislature, and he served in the Michigan Army National Guard for six years. He has published in Army magazine, Joint Force Quarterly, Military Review, and others, and writes about defense and national security issues for his online journal, The Dignified Rant.
has created friction with regional neighbors including U.S. allies and partners. Despite China’s geographic size, which limits ground campaign objectives in China itself, a significant ground campaign would be possible in JAM-GC-enabled campaign plans around China’s periphery. This view of defeating China is worth exploring:

A limited maritime campaign would afflict China with a nagging “ulcer,” much as the Duke of Wellington’s 1807–14 campaign in Portugal and Spain—one prosecuted from the sea, with expeditionary forces fighting ashore alongside indigenous partisans—inflicted on France what Napoleon termed a “Spanish ulcer.”

This suggestion is interesting, and recent emphasis on multi-domain synergy has the potential of moving the Army role beyond the impulse of the recent past that suggested that Army (or Marine Corps) units “with maritime-strike capability would deliver major strategic benefits.” That thinking, if not corrected, will continue to envision a limited Army combat role that fails to exploit the Army’s ability to seize and hold land, which was the real source of Napoleon’s Spanish ulcer that thwarted his efforts to dominate the European continent.

If America seeks to influence events on the shores of Asia, small Army units with anti-ship and antiaircraft assets posted on small strategically important islands are merely unpleasant indigestion rather than a debilitating condition that could fatally weaken China.

The Army may have been given a seat “very late” in the JAM-GC process, but the Army’s perspective can bring a view that is lacking. To truly exploit JAM-GC—and indeed for the doctrine to make any sense at all—the Army must be prepared to go ashore in force for limited objective campaigns. That scope of threat will fulfill the Army vision of being part of a joint military and civilian effort that can prevent conflict and defend stability. This will truly “defeat aggression against U.S. interests and increase the likelihood of … preserving peace” in Asia and the Pacific region.

The Tyranny of Numbers

The 2010 “Quadrennial Defense Review Report” focused the military on overcoming enemy conventional forces that use anti-access strategies. The retreat from the centrality of ground war occurred despite the fact that ground forces defeated enemies in Iraq and knocked back enemies in Afghanistan with surges of ground troops. Even though there were worries that a decade of combat would break the Army, in the end, it became combat tested.

Yet Americans in response to the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan may be unwilling to contemplate such casualties any time soon. The country seemingly resumed its pre-9/11 path to deemphasizing ground combat and reducing the Army in favor of joint forces capable of wielding precise air-delivered firepower supplemented by Army fires assets.

China fields sizable and well-supported land forces. How can the smaller U.S. Army wage a ground campaign against such a foe defending a large territory?

For the Army to provide its unique capabilities to a joint campaign in Asia, it must concede that this tyranny of numbers makes the Army more suited to limited-objective campaigns. Just as the Army advanced on Mexico City to achieve territorial concessions and marched across Georgia to sow despair in two of our nineteenth century wars, the Army may have enough operational superiority to dominate the area where it stands.

But, the ability to march at will and destroy local defenders is no substitute for the ability to occupy an enemy nation and impose victory. Air and naval power (and increasingly in the future, space and cyber power) will always be able to punish more easily than large ground forces, albeit much more slowly, so the Army must make sure its operations are not simply a substitute for bombardment and destruction. The Army must be able to achieve limited objectives in a war against a regional peer competitor, despite its small size relative to the Asia-Pacific area. Leveraging the land power of friends and allies will be crucial to allowing the Army to employ land power to gain strategic effect in a joint campaign.

The National Security Strategy states that Russia and China challenge American power, influence, and interests; while naming Iran and North Korea as states that threaten America and its allies by destabilizing regions. Russia, North Korea, and China lie in the Asia-Pacific theater (see figure, page 105).

The Korean peninsula is the most obvious scenario—because it was done once already—of fighting a land campaign with an ally against a threat. Other scenarios suited to ground operations in Asia include Japan, Taiwan, or the Philippines to repulse
invaders; the capture of Hainan Island to deny China bases to project naval and air power south; an expedition to Myanmar to deprive China of power projection bases into the Indian Ocean (either as an enemy or ally of Myanmar); the South China Sea (and other areas with small strategically important islands); Vietnam, which may look to America for help against a repeat of China’s 1979 invasion; and India, which could face Chinese ground forces in India’s northeast where assertive Chinese territorial claims compel India to bolster force structure and infrastructure. The red arrows in the figure show these potential points of friction.

Although North Korea is the most likely land threat and while China poses the broadest range of land challenges, should America not consider that Russian-Japanese territorial disputes could require a limited ground fight with Russia that would need to overcome Russia’s A2/AD capabilities? Indeed, is it out of bounds to wonder if Russia one day might value the potential power of an American contingency expeditionary force to help Russia resist irredentist Chinese claims to a greater relative advantage over China’s ground forces than American naval and air power have over their opposite numbers. Just maintaining a ground war option against China will cause China to divert resources from air and naval capabilities, giving American air and naval assets a greater chance of defeating Chinese A2/AD to enter and remain in the western Pacific. 31

An Army-Marine Corps force on the scale of those sent for Desert Storm or the Iraq War is the practical upper force limit even for a war against China unless America is willing to commit all active and reserve units for the duration and mobilize large numbers of new units.

And yes, even this would help in the A2/AD realm. Once ashore in force, Army air defense and fires assets could assist the Navy in staying in east Asian waters, in addition to the advantage of holding terrain and bases that the enemy might otherwise use to project power to sea. The Air Force could deploy air assets to captured air bases on the mainland to defend the Navy’s ability to operate close to the Asian mainland.

The problem will be in translating operational-level battlefield success into victory in war. That portions of Russia’s far east that China lost in the nineteenth century?

While the U.S. Army is relatively small in numbers compared to the space and population of the Asian mainland, there are many scenarios where America would have large local allied ground forces to fight alongside.

In many ways, given the hard-earned experience gained in Iraq since 1991 and Afghanistan since 2001, American ground forces have

Figure. Potential East Asia Scenarios Involving Ground Forces

(Graphic by author, map courtesy of CIA World Factbook)
will be the job of the diplomats who must persuade China to accept limited losses rather than risk a prolonged war or escalation.

**The Tyranny of the Shores**

The Army’s core competency is combined arms maneuver:

**Combined arms maneuver is the application of combat power in time and space to defeat enemy ground forces, seize, occupy, and defend land areas and achieve physical, temporal, and psychological advantages over the enemy.**

The relatively small size of the U.S. Army limits its unique contributions to a joint campaign against a regional peer competitor such as China. But, full multi-domain synergy requires PACOM to leverage the full spectrum of Army combat capabilities.

The Army can support Navy and Air Force JAM-GC efforts with anti-ship and air defense assets, but this must not be the limit of the Army’s combat role in PACOM. Army force levels must be determined in the context of how the Army will fight a possibly protracted land campaign in the Asia-Pacific theater in conjunction with the Air Force and Navy, and with the Marine Corps at its side, as these two ground components have long fought.

The Army must contribute its unique capability to America’s pivot to Asia, where large areas pose new challenges to the Army accustomed to conventional campaigns in the narrow confines of Europe, South Korea, and Iraq. On the surface, JAM-GC seems central for PACOM, where the tyranny of distance puts a premium on strategically mobile naval and air power. As the Navy likes to say, “70 percent of the world’s population lives within one hundred miles of a coastline.”

The U.S. Army must take its rightful place in America’s Asia-Pacific strategy in order to control (or help allies defend) the land and people that JAM-GC seeks to gain access to. Just knowing that the United States will not commit significant ground power gives an enemy the advantage of knowing it can operate in ways that they could not without that knowledge of American commitment limits.

Continuing conflicts in the Middle East since 2001 and a renewed focus on Europe since 2014 make it understandable that the Army has not fully recognized the wider challenges and opportunities in the Asia-Pacific region.

The full potential of the Army to contribute significant numbers of brigade combat teams for land campaigns appears largely ignored in the vast expanse of PACOM. Without disembarking the Army on the shore, what is the point of being able to penetrate A2/AD weapons and remain off the coast of China as their area denial strategy seeks to prevent America from doing? Is it really important merely to sail at will off the coast of where those people and those armies live and deploy?

The tyranny of the shores is absolute. Asia is an Army problem, too.

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**Notes**


 ground campaign would include seven Army and Marine divisions, twenty-one brigades, and two corps/Marine expeditionary force headquarters.


22. Ibid., 29, citing U.S. DOD, Joint Combat Concept, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, 8 November 2010, 27.


28. Jeff Vandenengel, “Too Big to Sink,” Proceedings (May 2017): 20. In pursuing relevance, the Army cannot promise casualty-free fighting. That the catastrophic loss of a super carrier and its air wing would result in casualties approaching all our multyear ground force losses in Iraq and Afghanistan does not affect the popular belief that land warfare is more risky.


32. TP 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept, 23.


Western Anbar after the Awakening
A Tale of Three Cities

Maj. Michael W. Hein, U.S. Army

After the Islamic State (IS) seized control of Fallujah in January 2014, it extended its territory to most of Iraq’s three Sunni majority provinces (shown in figure 1, page 109)—Anbar, Salah ad Din, and Ninawa—by the end of the year. IS capitalized on the marginalization of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs, particularly in the armed forces. Rather than reconciling with the Sunnis as it recaptured the major cities in these provinces in 2015, 2016, and 2017, Baghdad gradually displaced and eroded Iraq’s Sunni Arab community, leaving behind...
millions of internally displaced persons and empty, pockmarked cities such as Fallujah, Ramadi, Tikrit, and Mosul. Not surprisingly, as early as 2015, alleged atrocities and ethnic cleansing by Shiite militias undermined efforts to bring about a new Sunni Awakening, prompting calls for the deployment of U.S. troops. In November 2017, Iraqi forces recaptured the last IS-held town in western Anbar. And, during the two-year campaign to defeat IS, U.S. advisors were once again training Iraqi counterparts at Al Asad Airbase in western Anbar, as well as advising and accompanying them in battle against IS in Tal Afar. Consequently, it is not inconceivable that U.S. forces could be directed to assist in rebuilding local security forces after the defeat of IS. This is the role that U.S. forces played in the Anbar Awakening in 2006, and it required advisors to become deeply involved in recruiting and training Iraqi army and police units, thereby determining which tribes controlled local security. There is no guarantee that such an approach would be successful again, particularly given Baghdad’s systematic disenfranchisement of Sunnis following the U.S. withdrawal in 2011. Nevertheless, it is instructive to reexamine the previous U.S. tribal engagement in Anbar as U.S. advisors once again plan for phases IV (stabilize) and V (enable civil authority) of joint operations.

The period of five years following the Anbar Awakening offers important lessons and highlights potential consequences for such a tribe-based counterinsurgency strategy. Case studies of the three main western Anbar towns of Hit, Haditha, and Al Qaim from 2010 to 2014 suggest that where outside tribes are used to secure towns or where powerful tribes are excluded from local security forces, the stability achieved may be fleeting.

Western Anbar

Anbar is dominated by desert and is the largest by area of Iraq’s nineteen provinces; it can be divided into a sparsely populated west bordering Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, and a more densely populated east on the outskirts of Baghdad. Since 2003, western Anbar’s Sunni Bedouin population—with its homogeneous culture, religion, and ethnicity—has provided fertile ground for insurgent safe havens, recruitment, and training. And, as far back as 1995, Iraq’s government considered dividing Anbar into two provinces because it was too difficult to govern and because tribal leaders in the west lobbied for more autonomy in order to compete more effectively with Ramadi and Fallujah for government resources. Today, Anbar’s security forces are divided into western and eastern regions.

Maj. Michael Hein, U.S. Army, is assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency. During 2010 and 2011, he served as the battalion intelligence officer for 3-7 Infantry, 4th Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, which was responsible for western Anbar Province from July 2010 to June 2011. He holds a BA in history and a BS in biology from Stanford University and a JD from Columbia Law School.
In 2009, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that over half of the province’s one million residents lived in the two eastern cities of Fallujah and Ramadi, while the remainder were distributed among six districts with populations ranging from twenty thousand to over one hundred thousand residents. These are Hit, Haditha, Anah, Rawah, Al Qaim, and Rutbah. Each district has as its administrative center a town of the same name, and all of these towns, other than Rutbah, are located along the Euphrates River between Ramadi and the Syrian border.

Western Anbar is bisected by an east-west highway running from Baghdad through Fallujah, Ramadi, and Rutbah to Amman, Jordan. A second highway follows the Euphrates River running northwest from Ramadi through or nearby Hit, Haditha, Anah, and Rawah to Al Qaim on the Syrian border and continues on to Aleppo, Syria. Western Anbar is also bisected by a large valley, approximately 360 kilometers long and 50 to 100 meters deep, called Wadi Horan, that runs from the Saudi border in the southwest to the Euphrates River near Haditha in the northeast. It provides an alternative route for travel across the province via dirt roads and has been a favorite location for insurgent training camps.

The towns of Hit and Al Qaim are plagued by the province’s worst power outages. In contrast, Haditha, located halfway between Hit and Al Qaim and less than twenty kilometers from Al Asad Airbase, has the province’s fewest power outages. Haditha is home to Iraq’s second largest hydroelectric dam and the K-3 pumping station connected via pipeline to the Beiji oil refinery in neighboring Salah ad Din Province. Haditha is also the most literate town in the entire province at 98 percent, higher even than the national average. Al Qaim’s state-run cement and phosphate plants employ many local residents, giving it the lowest unemployment rate of the three towns at 3 percent, far lower than overall rates for
Anbar and all of Iraq. Following the 2003 U.S. invasion, Al Qaim was critical for the insurgency due to its remote location on the Iraq-Syria border and its role as a hub for smuggling weapons, equipment, money, and fighters. Anah and Rawah are small towns located between Haditha and Al Qaim. Rutbah is the smallest of the main western Anbar towns and the only one located on the east-west highway.

Following the battle of Fallujah in November 2004, insurgents in Iraq retreated to western Anbar. Many Anbar tribes initially welcomed the arrival of foreign fighters as a marriage of convenience against a Shia-dominated government increasingly aligned with Iran, especially after the disbanding of the Iraqi Army and commencement of the Coalition Provisional Authority’s de-Ba’athification policy. Al-Qaida in Iraq used its dedication, organization, funding, and a willingness to die to seize control of the insurgency in 2006 from Iraq’s Sunni Arabs as the former regime elements, Islamic fundamentalists, and tribes eventually coalesced under Islamist organizations. The seeds of the Awakening were sown during this period, however. Al-Qaida in Iraq began targeting tribal leaders and sought to undermine tribal society by replacing tribal law with sharia law, replacing tribal sheikhs with emirs, seizing control of smuggling and other revenue sources of the tribal leaders, and demanding daughters of local sheikhs as wives. Eventually, the major Anbar tribes turned against al-Qaida for their own survival.

**Hit, Haditha, and Al Qaim during the Awakening: Disrupting the Tribal Equilibrium**

During the Anbar Awakening, in the two key towns of Hit and Al Qaim, the Albu Nimr and Albu Mahal
formed early tribal militias that worked with U.S. forces and eventually formed the backbone of new local security forces, giving the Albu Nimr control of Hit and the Albu Mahal control of Al Qaim. These two closely aligned tribes with shared common ancestry were critical to the Awakening in western Anbar, because U.S. forces pushed from the “bookends” of Al Qaim and Hit toward Haditha, Anah, and Rawah in the center using Albu Mahal and Albu Nimr tribal militia.23 As explained below, in both Hit and Al Qaim, U.S. forces gave control of the local security forces to a single tribe that had joined the Awakening early, in spite of being either outsiders (the Albu Nimr in Hit) or not the single dominant tribe prior to the Awakening (Albu Mahal in Al Qaim).

Hit. Hit and Al Qaim represent two distinct models of how a town’s tribal equilibrium can be disrupted, leading to future violence and instability. The town of Hit lies along a narrow strip of land between the Euphrates River and the highway, near Al Asad Airbase. It is comprised of families that identify themselves simply as Hitawi, indicating their origin in Hit, rather than members of Anbar’s prominent tribes. In contrast, at the time of the Awakening, the Albu Nimr were a single, powerful tribe based in the towns of Zuwayah and Tal Aswad in the Al Phurat subdistrict (in Hit district), across the Euphrates River from the town of Hit; Al Phurat constituted a large, powerful, and homogenous tribal area.24 Sections of the Albu Nimr rose up in revolt against Saddam Hussein in June 1995 following the torture and execution of an Iraqi general from the tribe who was suspected of plotting a coup.25 It took two days for the elite Special Republican Guard and Amn al-Khass (Special Security Organization) to suppress the unrest.26 The fact that elite units, rather than local police, were required to reestablish order illustrates both the strength of the Albu Nimr at the time and just how difficult it was for Saddam to control the Anbar tribes. Shunned by Hussein, the Albu Nimr backed the U.S. invasion in 2003.27 Unfortunately for the them, by mid-2005 insurgents had gained control over the Hit district council, and the Nimrawi leaders held them responsible for insurgent attacks on the Albu Nimr in their Al Phurat tribal area; relations became so strained that one sheikh threatened to level the town if any of his tribesmen were hurt.28

![Figure 2. Casualties in Iraq from 2003 through 2016](Graphic by author; source: Iraq Body Count, [https://iraqbodycount.org/database/](https://iraqbodycount.org/database/))
In 2005, the U.S. Special Forces team in Hit stood up a Nimrawi tribal militia, called the Desert Protectors, and in 2006 they helped integrate the Desert Protectors into the local Iraqi Army battalion as its scout platoon and formed a SWAT unit comprised of Albu Nimr tribesmen.29 Also in 2006, a U.S. Army battalion stood up a police force in Hit district, but the force was comprised entirely of Albu Nimr tribesmen.30 By that time, U.S. advisors suspected that Hit’s Nimrawi chief of police was participating in reprisal attacks against insurgents with a vigilante group formed by Anbar tribes in Ramadi, called Thawar al Anbar (Anbar Revolutionaries), that eventually functioned as the Awakening Movement’s own militia.31 In early 2007, the police force, backed by U.S. Special Forces, seized control of the town of Hit.32

Tensions continued to escalate, however. By May 2007, there were widespread allegations that the Hit police chief was responsible for extrajudicial killings, releasing insurgent detainees for bribes, and abusing detainees; night letters circulated in Hit, with one group condemning the police chief and another group defending him.33 Members of the Hit district council demanded that the police chief be removed. Convinced that the police chief was assembling his force to confront the Hitawi townspeople and that a bloodbath would result, the local U.S. commander arrested the police chief.34

Al Qaim. In Al Qaim, U.S. forces also gave control of the local security forces to a single tribe that had joined the Awakening early. The Albu Mahal were arguably the first tribe to join coalition forces against al-Qaïda in Iraq, and their path to dominance over the Al Qaim security forces was similar to that of their close relations, the Albu Nimr in Hit.

During the early stages of the insurgency in 2004, following the dissolution of the Iraqi army, the Albu Mahal established a tribal militia called the Kata’ib Hamza (Hamza Battalion) specifically to fight coalition forces and the new government of Iraq.35 In early 2005, tensions arose between the Albu Mahal and the influx of al-Qaïda fighters who began to interfere in tribal smuggling and disregarded tribal custom.36 By early May 2005, the Albu Mahal were in open revolt against al-Qaïda in Iraq. In an attempt to intimidate the tribe, al-Qaïda in Iraq beheaded the police chief, a Mahalawi tribesman, prompting the tribe to turn on al-Qaïda in Iraq’s local supporters, the Albu Karbuli and Albu Salmani.37 Within a week, al-Qaïda in Iraq kidnapped the Anbar governor, a Mahalawi sheikh and cousin of the tribe’s paramount sheikh; a prominent Albu Nimr sheikh, himself a former Anbar governor, requested assistance from U.S. forces.38

After being pushed out by U.S. forces, al-Qaïda returned in July 2005 and, joining forces with the Albu Karbuli and Albu Salmani tribes, drove several thousand Albu Mahal tribesmen and their families out of Al Qaim, killing dozens in the process.39 Faced with an existential threat, the Albu Mahal began to collaborate with coalition forces. In August 2005, the Albu Mahal established a tribal militia, called the Desert Protectors (the same name as the Albu Nimr militia in Hit), and helped U.S. marines clear Al Qaim by the end of 2005 as part

| Table. Casualties for Selected Cities during the Post-Awakening Period from January 2009 through December 2013 |
|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| 2009  | 2010  | 2011  | 2012  | 2013  | Total  |
| Hit   | 3     | 8     | 6     | 8     | 14     | 39     |
| Al Qaim | 5     | 7     | 6     | 7     | 4     | 29     |
| Haditha | 3     | 2     | 8     | 9     | 4     | 26     |
| Anah and Rawah | 2     | 0     | 1     | 3     | 6     | 12     |
| Rutbah | 1     | 0     | 1     | 3     | 12    | 17     |
| Total | 14    | 17    | 22    | 30    | 40    | 123    |

(Graphic by author; source: Iraq Body Count, https://iraqbodycount.org/database/)
of Operation Iron Fist and Operation Steel Curtain, and reach as far as Rawah and Anah by September 2006.40 The Albu Mahal were allowed to convert the Desert Protectors into the Iraqi army brigade based in Al Qaim and into the local police force, and they took control of smuggling operations across the Syrian border.41 The brigade’s commander, Col. Ismail Shihab al-Mahalawi, was a cousin of the paramount sheikh of the Albu Mahal, and two battalion commanders and various staff officers were also members of the tribe.42 While the author was deployed to Anbar in 2010, Mahalawi was promoted to major general and became the commander of the 7th Iraqi Army Division, headquartered at Al Asad Airbase, while his brother served as the Al Qaim chief of police.

**Haditha.** The same phenomenon did not occur in Haditha; however, where the dominant al-Jughayfi tribe turned against al-Qaida after the gruesome beheading of local al-Jughayfa policemen in the town’s soccer stadium in 2005.43 The al-Jughayfa are Haditha’s largest and most powerful tribe and have significant popular support.44 It was the al-Jughayfa, rather than a smaller or outside tribe, that U.S. forces worked with to push al-Qaida out of the Haditha area in 2006.45

### 2009–2013: Interregnum

By 2010, civilian (noncombatant) deaths in Iraq had reached their lowest levels since the 2003 invasion (these include attacks on local police, militia, tribal, and government personnel).46 Civilian deaths peaked again in 2014 when IS seized control of the Sunni provinces, but the years 2009 through 2012 represented a period of relative stability (see figure 2, page 112).

Casualty patterns for the three main western Anbar towns during this period, however, reflect an interesting correlation with the tribal composition of the local security forces. The table sets forth casualties for Hit, Haditha, and Al Qaim during the post-Awakening period from January 2009 through December 2013, the month before IS seized Fallujah (see page 113).47 Cumulatively, the three towns generally became more violent each year, however, the pattern was different each year in each town. In 2010, while overall attacks in Anbar were decreasing relative to 2009, attacks surged in Hit and Al Qaim, where the Albu Nimr had gained control of Hit and the Albu Mahal had gained control of Al Qaim. In 2011, attacks surged in Haditha. In 2012, attacks surged in the small towns of Anah, Rawah, and Rutbah. Finally, in 2013, attacks again surged in Hit—this time dramatically. Overall, violence was by far the highest and showed the greatest increase in Hit. Al Qaim was the next most violent. In contrast, Haditha experienced less violence than either Hit or Al Qaim. One hypothesis to explain this pattern is that formerly dominant groups allowed remnants of Sunni insurgent groups to conduct attacks on local security forces dominated by competing or outside tribes.

### 2014: Islamic State Returns

Following its capture of Mosul and Tikrit in June 2014, IS captured Al Qaim in August and Hit in October.48 Haditha, in contrast, was the only major town in western Anbar (indeed all of Anbar) that did not fall to IS.

**Al Qaim.** Weeks after retaking Al Qaim, IS published a map of the Caliphate’s provinces in Iraq and Syria.49 It depicted the state of “Euphrates” as centered on the town of Al Qaim, extending east to Anah and Rawa and west to Deir al Zor in Syria, and capitalizing on Al Qaim’s role as a smuggling hub with deep social and intertribal connections across the Iraq-Syria border.50 IS lost little time in targeting the Albu Mahal. In April 2015, its fighters executed three hundred members of the local security forces and civilians—most of them members of the Albu Mahal tribe.51 Not surprisingly, the al-Karbouli tribe (who sided with al-Qaida against the Albu Mahal and refused to join the Awakening), are now ascendant.52 Under pressure in Mosul, Raqqa,
Deir al Zor in 2016, IS appeared to be pulling back to Al Qaim where leaders reportedly held regular meetings and some of IS’s largest improvised explosive device factories were reportedly located, and in late 2017, IS’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was believed to be hiding in the desert along the Iraq-Syria border.53

Hit. In October 2014, IS retook the town of Hit.54 IS did not simply push the Nimravi-dominated local police out; they attacked the Albu Nimr tribal area of al-Phurat across the river, rounding up an estimated fifteen hundred families, executing over seven hundred Nimravi tribesmen in less than twenty days, and forcing over a thousand others to flee to Haditha.55

Haditha. In August 2014, IS laid siege to Haditha after the al-Jughayfa tribal militia, the “Lions of Haditha,” refused to turn over some two hundred tribesmen accused of collaborating with the Iraqi government.56 The siege lasted nearly two years, but IS failed to retake the town.57 A local Iraqi army commander attributed Haditha’s survival to the al-Jughayfa tribal militia, although U.S. airstrikes were also key when IS attempted to seize the Haditha Dam.58 The tribe’s resilience against IS over the past three years, together with Haditha’s strategic location near the dam, oil pipelines, and Al Asad Airbase, make the al-Jughayfa a very appealing partner for a future U.S. tribal engagement campaign in western Anbar. And, following the decimation of the Albu Nimr and the Albu Mahal, they may be asked to play a larger role in western Anbar. However, should they attempt to extend their control beyond Haditha, they may experience the same difficulties that the Albu Mahal and Albu Nimr experienced after the Awakening.

Conclusion: The Implications of Disrupting the Tribal Equilibrium

The experiences of Hit, Haditha, and Al Qaim after the Awakening suggest that following a successful counterinsurgency campaign in a highly tribal region, the tribal composition of local security forces may be a
useful predictor of future instability. Particular recruitment patterns among the local tribes may undermine popular support for local security forces. Giving a single tribe control over a town's security forces appears more likely to lead to violence and instability where control is given to an outsider tribe or to a local tribe that was not previously dominant than where control remains with the dominant tribe. Understanding this phenomenon can help planners anticipate the possible consequences of disrupting the tribal equilibrium in other tribal engagement campaigns, perhaps even in western Anbar following the defeat of IS.

The views expressed do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army, the U.S. Intelligence Community, or the U.S. Government.

Notes


8. Ibid.


11. Al-Rawi and Jensen, "Understanding the Wilaya Al-Farat.

12. Ibid.


17. Ibid.; Al-Rawi and Jensen, "Understanding the Wilaya Al-Farat.


20. Ibid., viii.

21. Ibid., viii, 12.


29. Ibid., 44, 60, 63.


32. Lindeman, “Inside Anbar,” 64–70.


34. Ibid.


38. Ibid., 8, 24.


43. Lindeman, “Inside Anbar,” 44.


45. Frantzman, “The Sunni Tribe that Survived a Two-Year Islamic State Siege in Iraq.”


47. Data is based on reported attacks compiled at Iraq Body Count, https://www伊拉q身体Count.org/database.


49. Al-Rawi and Jensen, “Understanding the Wilaya AlFurat.”

50. Ibid.


52. Habib, “The Iraqi City of Al Qaem May be the New Extremist Capital.”

53. Ibid.; Aboulenein, “Iraqi Forces Recapture Last Islamic State-held town.”

54. Gartenstein-Ross, “The Islamic States’ Stalled Offensive in Anbar Province.”

55. Ibid.


57. Frantzman, “The Sunni Tribe that Survived a Two-Year Islamic State Siege in Iraq.”

A Joint and Operational Approach for Security Assistance to Georgia and Ukraine

Col. Tim Kreuttner, U.S. Army
Lt. Col. Sami Alnaqbi, United Arab Emirates Navy
Maj. James Woodard, U.S. Marine Corps

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, both Ukraine and Georgia sought closer relationships with the West. In 1994, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) introduced the Partnership for Peace program to build relationships based on individual member state goals and preferences for cooperation, primarily with former Warsaw Pact adversaries. Partnership for Peace eventually evolved into an entry point for European countries seeking a potential path toward NATO membership. Ukraine and Georgia were among the first to join, signing the framework document in February and March 1994, respectively. Since joining Partnership for Peace, the two countries have participated in frequent multinational exercises and in NATO operations such as the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean Sea.

As NATO expanded eastward after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia became increasingly concerned about loss of influence in their traditional sphere as a result of strategic envelopment by the Alliance. Russian ire came to a head in August 2008 with the campaign to support Russian separatists in South Ossetia and again in 2014 after the fall of the pro-Russian Yanukovych government, which resulted in the Russian annexation of Crimea and subsequent support of separatists in eastern Ukraine. Russia has clearly decided that the Ukrainian and Georgian relationships with NATO are unacceptable to their strategic interests. Despite a NATO declaration at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that both Ukraine and Georgia would eventually become NATO members, their accession is unlikely for the foreseeable future. Russia’s demonstrated willingness to engage in warlike activities is preventing this, as there is a prerequisite that requires its applicants to solve their internal conflicts before accession into NATO becomes an option.6 Nevertheless, Georgia and Ukraine remain key partners of the United States and NATO. Each has received tactical training and strategic advice on defense reform for many years, and the United States and NATO have both responded to Russian aggression with a deepening commitment to their long-time partners by enhancing security cooperation and increasing deterrence measures. However, while both Ukraine and Georgia have benefited from training assistance, improvements in...
interoperability, and advice on institutional reform, there has been less emphasis in assistance to develop a joint force approach to campaign planning and execution capability at the operational level.

Ukraine and Georgia currently face a powerful Russian threat to their national stability that neither is fully prepared to address without substantial assistance. Now is the time to place at a higher priority training and assistance in joint- and operational-level competencies. An integrated joint approach to security cooperation focusing at the operational level with Ukraine and Georgia would strengthen those U.S. partners.

Some may argue that Ukraine and Georgia represent peripheral interests to the United States and do not warrant provoking Russia by providing them a higher level of security assistance and training. However, others assert that, while full NATO membership could risk provoking war with Russia, failure to support these key partners at this time will encourage further Russian aggression against weaker states and ultimately against the NATO alliance itself.

Notwithstanding, while continued conflict and strategic tensions make NATO membership an impossibility in the short term, the United States has a vital interest in continuing to build their defense capability and capacity to support their own national aspirations as well as a bulwark against aggression aimed at western Europe. As both countries are active contributors to U.S. and NATO operations, building their capacity strengthens U.S. and allied strategic depth by producing better military partners. To that end, placing greater emphasis on assistance in developing joint- and operational-level capabilities would help both countries provide more effectively for their own defense and reinforce deterrence against potential Russian aggression.

**Strategic Context and Russian Strategy**

As Russia slowly regained strength after the post-Soviet turmoil, perceived threats to its vital national...
interests from NATO expansion drove Russian strategy development. For example, Russia protested that continued expansion of NATO into eastern Europe violated a negotiated agreement between former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev and former U.S. president George H. W. Bush. Additionally, Russia asserts that the Soviet Union agreed to allow German reunification on the condition that NATO would not expand east, an agreement it felt was binding even with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, once the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact dissolved, with no binding legal authority to prevent increased membership, countries such as Poland, Romania, and the Baltic States hurried to join the Alliance.

Until 2014, NATO and Russia maintained a semi-cooperative relationship through mechanisms such as the NATO-Russia Council. But, Russian perceptions of Western influence during the 2014 Euromaidan protests in Ukraine and NATO reaction to the subsequent Russian actions in Crimea tipped the dynamic, effectively ending any pretense that the NATO-Russia relationship was moving in a productive direction.

Russian strategy became evident with the annexation of Crimea, though it should have been clear from at least 2008 considering Russian aggression in Georgia. These actions are indicative of Russia’s strategic objectives. First, Russia seeks to regain its role as a leading global power after years of reduced stature following the Soviet dissolution; second, Russia aims to check NATO encroachment on its territorial boundaries and sphere of influence; third, Russia claims as a pretext the right to protect the greater Russian-speaking community outside its borders—the so-called “near abroad”—mainly resident in many eastern European states that border Russia; and finally, Russia aims to maintain control of the Black Sea to secure resource flows and access to the Mediterranean Sea.

Russia’s 2008 incursion into South Ossetia and de facto control of Abkhazia within Georgia were also a logical implementation of its strategy to check NATO enlargement under the guise of protecting Russian-speaking people. The operation in South Ossetia employed hybrid tactics and overwhelmed unprepared Georgian forces. Caught largely unprepared to deal with the Russian aggression, the United States and NATO were unable to provide lethal assistance to Georgia without stepping too close to entering into direct conflict with Russia.

Over the last decade, to refine its approach to achieving its strategic objectives, Russia has significantly modified its military doctrine and concepts of employment. Following the Russian intervention in

Col. Tim Kreuttner, U.S. Army, is a strategist serving as chief of strategy and policy at U.S. Army North. He earned a BA from Lafayette College, an MBA from Webster University, and an MMAS from the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Kreuttner formerly served as future operations and plans branch chief at U.S. Army Europe, and policy branch head for NATO Allied Land Command. He has also served in various positions as an armor officer with 1st Armored Division and 1st Cavalry Division, and as a planner with U.S. Forces-Iraq during Operations Iraqi Freedom and New Dawn.

Lt. Col. Jarrod Knapp, U.S. Air Force, is an intelligence officer serving on the Joint Staff J32. He earned a BA from the University of New Hampshire, and holds a Master of Strategic Intelligence Analysis from American Military University and a Master of Military Operational Art and Science from Air University. Knapp has previously served at several intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance units, including multiple deployments during Operation Freedom and Headquarters, Air Force.

Maj. James Woodard, U.S. Marine Corps, is an aviation command and control officer who currently serves as deputy branch chief at U.S. Strategic Command J862. He earned a BA from the University of Washington, and he is a graduate of the MAWTS-1 WTI Course. Woodard has previously served as the wing air control officer and exercise planner, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and served as an IA in Operation Iraqi Freedom with II Marine Expeditionary Force (Fwd) and with 1st Marine Division during Operation Enduring Freedom.

Staff Lt. Col. Sami Alnaqbi, United Arab Emirates Navy, is on the faculty of the U.A.E. Joint Staff College. He is a graduate of the Pakistan Naval Academy, the Canadian Joint Staff College, and U.S. Joint Combined Warfare School. He has served in various positions in the U.A.E. Navy.

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South Ossetia in August 2008, the Russian government identified the need to transform its military into a leaner, more mobile, more capable force that would be able to rapidly respond to local and regional crises. It required a better-equipped and better-trained force able to conduct joint operations across all domains. In some respects, this mirrored U.S. military strategy.12

Subsequently, Russia’s operational concept employed what Russian military officials term *new type warfare*, which integrates conventional means with irregular warfare, covert action, cyberspace attacks, electronic warfare, and influence operations to achieve effects.13 The Russian invasion and subsequent annexation of Crimea with minimal bloodshed demonstrated Russian ability to successfully employ this hybrid strategy.14

In 2014, following the Euromaidan protests in Ukraine and the collapse of the Russian-favored Yanukovych government, Russia employed hybrid tactics to invade and ultimately annex Crimea. Considering the Western preference of the new Ukrainian government, the threat of losing its lease of the naval base in Sevastopol, set to expire in 2017, was one of several factors in the Russian decision to seize Crimea.15 As a precursor to Russian action, unidentifiable armed forces, referred to as “little green men,” created an atmosphere of ambiguity to obscure attribution and prevent a coherent response from NATO and the Western international community.16

Subsequently, in eastern Ukraine, Russian-supported “separatists” conducted an insurrection in the Donbas region, again relying on ambiguity to obscure Russian responsibility. In this region, Russia displayed an ability to employ a hybrid strategy while dominating in all domains, denying Ukraine the ability to respond effectively with air and maritime forces.17 Ukrainian land forces could only achieve a stalemate on the ground, leading to

An instructor with the Armed Forces of Ukraine (center) throws a smoke grenade on top of a BTR-80 armored personnel carrier 27 July 2015 as Ukrainian soldiers conduct convoy operations training during Rapid Trident in Yavoriv, Ukraine. Rapid Trident is a long-standing U.S. Army Europe-led cooperative training exercise focused on peacekeeping and stability operations. More than 1,800 personnel from eighteen different nations participated in the exercise. (Photo by Sgt. Alexander Skripnichuk, U.S. Army)
a state of “frozen conflict” that further served the Russian goal to frustrate Ukraine’s aspirations for NATO membership. Russia’s demonstrated improvement in operating as a joint force between 2008 and 2014 and a willingness to use aggression to achieve its strategic goals highlights the need to build joint and operational capacity in Georgia and Ukraine so that they might more effectively respond to future threats.

**U.S. and NATO Programs for Ukraine and Georgia**

With Russian aggression in Ukraine and its increasingly assertive posture in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the United States reinvigorated defense commitments to Europe and NATO. During speeches in Poland and Estonia in 2014, President Barack Obama emphasized U.S. commitment to the NATO alliance and defense of allies. While the U.S. priority was to strengthen the Alliance, the 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy also included security of partners as a priority. The 2017 National Security Strategy reinforces the U.S. relationships with allies, partners, and aspiring partners, saying “allies and partners magnify our power” and “are a great strength of the United States.” While the 2017 NSS emphasizes the need for allies and partners to carry their “fair share of the burden of responsibility to protect against common threats,” continued security cooperation and assistance with key partners such as Ukraine and Georgia will develop their ability to share more of the burden. The United States has no formal treaty obligations to defend non-allied partners such as Georgia. Although the 1994 Budapest Memorandum regarding removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine guarantees its security from nuclear attack by the signatories, as a non-NATO member, Ukraine is not entitled to collective defense under Article V of the Washington Treaty. Support since 2014 has been primarily diplomatic and economic, with military support limited to nonlethal aid, training,
and exercises. The U.S. approach has been a balance of deterrence through military cooperation and demonstration of allied military capability through exercises.

NATO’s response to Russian aggression in Ukraine began in 2014 with establishment of the Readiness Action Plan (RAP), with its centerpiece of expansion and heightened readiness of the NATO Response Force (NRF). The RAP also included “assurance” of NATO members, mainly in the form of exercises that nearly always included non-NATO partner nations (e.g., Ukraine and Georgia). While NATO activity has been robust, the approach in terms of assistance and support to partners directly facing the Russian threat has been more measured and cautious in order to avoid miscalculation and unnecessary provocation.

Ukraine. In 1997, NATO and Ukraine signed a charter for a “distinctive partnership.” After the 2004–2005 “Orange Revolution” resulted in a more Western-leaning government following popular protests against electoral fraud, Ukraine became seriously interested in NATO cooperation and started on a path toward membership in 2008. Subsequently, Ukraine has been an active contributor to NATO operations and exercises, including in Afghanistan, and was the first partner nation to contribute troops to the NRF.

Col. Volodymyr Postrybailo of the Ukrainian army, writing for the Strategic Studies Institute’s Project 1721, described the state of the Ukraine Armed Forces (UAF) in 2014 and the challenges it faced then and subsequently. After the departure of the Yanukovych government, Ukraine was unprepared for a military confrontation with a superior Russian threat and an enemy employing hybrid warfare. Deficiencies in joint capability were and continue to be a major factor: the conflict has already revealed many gaps in Ukrainian doctrines and concepts, mistakes made during planning and execution of combat missions, and shortages in a number of joint functions that could have been avoided and overcome if the UAF had utilized the best practices and experience of the NATO countries’ armies prior to the conflict.

Postrybailo further explained that the fight was primarily in the land and cyber domains. Russian and separatist air defenses effectively limited Ukraine’s air power to medical evacuation and transport, while the loss of Crimea severely curtailed Ukraine’s naval capability. He described the transformation of the Ukraine military, including the creation of a joint operational staff, crediting NATO training and exercises for helping the UAF achieve improved tactical capability. He further suggested that to address the gaps in joint functions, successes in tactical training must extend to the operational and strategic levels.

Since 2014, the NATO-Ukraine Commission, the forum for Alliance assistance to Ukraine, established two trust funds, later expanded to six, for institution building and assistance to Ukraine. In July 2016, the commission announced the establishment of the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) for Ukraine. The CAP focuses on security structures, oversight, economic reforms, and some nonlethal technical assistance, but it does not directly address operational-level capabilities and joint functions. A key gap remains.

The United States has been active in support of Ukraine bilaterally as well as through NATO. In a July 2014 Senate panel, Victoria Nuland, then assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, outlined U.S. policy toward Ukraine including political, economic, and security challenges in diplomatic efforts to deescalate the crisis with targeted sanctions on Russia and separatists, and loan guarantees. However, while United States policy makers expressed an urgent and strong desire to help Ukraine, they expressed a perceived and real risk of direct confrontation with Russia and therefore the President tempered calls for lethal assistance during the first three years of the conflict.

Practical assistance began in 2014–2015 with the Global Security Contingency Fund for Ukraine, a joint Department of State and Department of Defense provision of nonlethal aid (mainly materiel). The U.S. European Command subsequently established the Joint Military Training Group for Ukraine in 2015, in partnership with the Canadian Armed Forces, to provide training to Ukraine land forces and to provide advice on strengthening institutions. Beginning with training of the Ukraine National Guard, the program based at the Yavoriv International Peacekeeping Center continues to train regular Ukraine land forces in tactical skills as well as battalion-level staff planning and execution. To date, no similar program exists for Ukraine’s air and maritime forces, and no significant effort has been made to integrate multi-domain forces at the operational level.
With the repeated failure of ceasefires and conflict resolution efforts in eastern Ukraine, there were calls in Congress to authorize lethal aid. Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and commander of the U.S. European Command, in his March 2017 testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, gave his advice regarding the need for “lethal defensive weapons” for Ukraine to counter modern Russian equipment by further explaining that Ukraine needs additional training, equipping, government capacity building, and security (institution) building.36 President Donald Trump authorized the provision of lethal defensive weapons, including Javelin antitank missiles, to Ukraine in late December 2017.37 While the lethal defensive aid addresses a tactical capability gap, a long-term approach to building partner capacity should focus on organic institutions and force generation capacity that allows Ukraine to sustain its own defense in the long term. The approach should incorporate cross-domain planning and coordination, and integration of operational-level air and cyber forces with ground maneuver.

**Georgia.** Cooperation between Georgia and NATO grew substantially after the 2003 “Rose Revolution,” a peaceful uprising against corruption and fraud in the presidential election. After a new election, Georgia moved for greater reform and alignment with the West.38 A regular contributor to the NRF, Georgia was among the largest contributors to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and continues as part of the Resolute Support Mission.39

The NATO-Georgia Commission formed in September 2008 to provide political consultations and to assist Georgia in its goals to achieve NATO membership. Another purpose of the commission was to help Georgia recover from the August 2008 conflict with Russia in South Ossetia.40 At the 2014 Summit in Wales, NATO reaffirmed the commitment to strengthening Georgia’s ability to defend itself and further approved an assistance package at the 2016 Warsaw Summit.41 The “Substantial NATO-Georgia Package” (SNGP) includes measures to strengthen Georgia’s defense capabilities, increase security cooperation, and improve interoperability at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.42 The SNGP includes strategic-level advice and liaison, defense-capacity building, training, multinational exercises, and enhanced interoperability opportunities.43

Operational planning focused on combat and crisis management using NATO’s operational planning processes is also part of the package, though so far, “operational” planning has been a brigade-level program.44 Further highlighting Georgia’s status as a high-priority partner, NATO established the NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Centre in 2015 to facilitate security cooperation.45

The U.S. bilateral partnership with Georgia includes frequent exercises and training opportunities linked to NATO-Georgia programs. The United States and Georgia signed a “Charter on Strategic Partnership” in January 2009 covering multiple areas, including defense and security.46 The United States maintains support for Georgian aspirations for NATO membership. In 2016, Dr. Michael Carpenter, then deputy assistant secretary of Defense, signed a three-year security cooperation framework with Georgia that includes training and equipping in conjunction with the NATO SNGP.47

The United States and Georgia participate in multiple annual exercises including Exercise Noble Partner to increase U.S.-Georgian interoperability and preparation for the NRF duties. In recent years, Exercise Noble Partner has included demonstrations of mechanized, airborne, and marine forces.48 The Black Sea Rotational Force under Marine Forces Europe conducts occasional training with the Georgian Armed Forces throughout the year, most notably the Agile Spirit series of exercises. The Black Sea Rotational Force and U.S. Army National Guard troops from Georgia’s state partner, the U.S. state of Georgia, help to prepare and certify Georgian units for deployment to Afghanistan for Resolute Support Mission.49 In the maritime domain, the United States regularly conducts port visits and maritime training with Georgia and other Black Sea states. Black Sea port visits, training, and patrols enhance maritime security and the naval capability of partners in the region such as Georgia.50 In the air domain, however, limitations to exercises reflect caution related to Russian air defense threats and risk of miscalculations.

Several key NATO exercises with U.S. participation and support are designed to improve Georgian Armed Forces capability and interoperability. The first exercise under the SNGP was Agile Spirit 2015, which changed focus from counterinsurgency in previous years to a conventional focus.51 NATO-Georgia Exercise 2016 included an operational-level focus with the Georgian General
Staff and a multinational brigade headquarters leading a crisis response scenario. This type of exercise is a step in the right direction, though much more remains to be done to achieve joint integration and operational-level campaign planning and execution.

As with Ukraine, the U.S. partnership with Georgia tends to heavily focus on tactical-level training. The NATO SNGP and establishment of the Joint Training and Evaluation Centre are positive steps toward improving institutional capacity and joint capabilities. The SNGP recognizes the need for the operational-level development, but that is only beginning to take shape. Georgia would benefit from a more integrated joint approach to combined exercises including further development at the operational level. Future exercises should incorporate multiechelon training and begin with planning academics, crisis action planning drills, and command-post exercises to train and certify joint staffs in operational level planning.

**Considering A Way Ahead**

The objective of U.S. and NATO programs should be to develop partners that are interoperable and able to contribute to Alliance and coalition operations, as well as provide for their own defense. Doctrinal and procedural interoperability must extend from the tactical to the operational level. This necessitates an ability to plan and execute campaigns with joint-capable command-and-control structures. Developing joint and operational capabilities requires dedicated efforts to improve joint force integration, joint staff training and development, and operational level institution building.

Joint force integration must be emphasized along three operational axes: air-land integration, combined special operations forces and conventional integration, and integration of cyber into offensive and defensive operations. Operational campaign planning along these three
axes allows development of integrated objectives and combined-force employment for better interoperability with U.S. and NATO forces. Developing cross-domain operational-level planning competency requires dedicated training, education, and active participation by Ukrainian and Georgian forces in campaign planning activities.

Training and education programs should be enhanced to focus on operational planning and execution in national-level joint staffs and developing joint-capable headquarters. The CAP, Joint Military Training Group for Ukraine, the NATO SNGP, and exercises such as Exercise Noble Partner are steps in the right direction; however, when looking to the future, NATO and U.S. initiatives need to develop assistance plans that better incorporate joint and operational skill development. Existing programs requiring enhancement include mobile training teams; military-to-military engagements; institutional advising and liaison; intermediate, advanced, and senior service school exchanges; and use of the International Military Education and Training Program. This will require reviewing and creating new curriculum, programs of instruction and lesson plans, and applying the right expertise to deliver training and advice.

Beyond training and education, the U.S. and NATO should make a concerted effort to build institutions through exercises and evaluations, building on recent steps in this direction. This requires operational-level staff participation in NATO and other multinational exercises and operations. In the short-term, individual staff officers could participate in NATO multinational exercises to gain experience as they develop their own collective capability. U.S. and NATO forces must evaluate participation and provide meaningful feedback that includes measurable schedules and milestones to monitor progression.

The U.S. and NATO’s ability to deliver training, education, and advice at the operational level will face challenges. Synchronization of operational maneuver and the ability to integrate joint capabilities in a coherent campaign is something that even the best militaries have to work hard at to do well. The requisite expertise to train partners in operational planning and execution is not plentiful and usually resides in combatant command or other major command staffs, with the majority not dedicated to training, exercises, or other security cooperation activities.

Subject-matter experts capable of leading training are low-density, high-demand assets whose own organizations are often reluctant to part with for “secondary” security cooperation tasks—namely planners, strategists, joint-fires-qualified experts, and other joint doctrine and technical experts. The United States needs to manage the joint and operational expertise closely to leverage the right expertise at the right time while not levying an undue burden on owning organizations. But, for partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia to progress, this is necessary.

**Conclusion**

Ukraine and Georgia are on the front lines of strategic competition. While the United States and NATO have provided robust tactical training and strategic development over the last twenty years, there is a gap in joint training and development at the operational level. The U.S. and NATO security assistance to these geopolitically key nations contributes to deterrence of Russia while improving the interoperability and capability of important partners. An integrated joint approach to security cooperation focusing at the operational level will strengthen Ukraine and Georgia and serve as an appropriate deterrent to Russian aggression. A joint approach to partnership programs would significantly enhance the defense capability and interoperability of Ukraine and Georgia to participate in NATO operations and exercises. Expanding combined, joint interoperability at the operational level should be the next critical focus of our partnerships.

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**Notes**

5. “Study on NATO Enlargement,” NATO (website), 5 November 2008, accessed 6 November 2017, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohg/official_texts_24733.htm. The “Purposes and Principles of Enlargement” state that new members must “settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means …” and “states which have ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes, including irredentist claims, or internal jurisdictional disputes must settle those disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles. Resolution of such disputes would be a factor in determining whether to invite a state to join the Alliance.”


10. Nadia Diuk, “Euromaidan: Ukraine’s Self-Organizing Revolution,” World Affairs (March/April 2014), accessed 5 January 2018, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/euro-maidan-ukraine%E2%80%99s-self-organizing-revolution. The Euromaidan protests were in response to a surprise deal between Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and Russian President Vladimir Putin regarding sale to Russia of bonds and reduction of Russian gas prices for Ukraine; President Putin offered the deal as incentive for Ukraine to decline a deal with the European Union. Demonstrators protested the move, preferring a European relationship; violence between opposing sides followed.


22. “Russia and Developments in Ukraine.”


25. Ibid.


27. Ibid., 24–25.

28. Ibid., 24–27. Postrybalio notes that former President Viktor Yanukovych dismissed a U.S. program to help Ukraine create a joint staff.


30. Ibid.

31. Russia and Developments in Ukraine, 3.

32. Ibid., 11, 38, and 42. Derek Chollet, then assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, suggested three lines of effort with respect to Ukraine: providing nonlethal equipment, enhancing training and exercises, and helping to reform and rebuild Ukraine’s defense institutions. Former national security advisor Stephen Hadley noted that Russian President Vladimir Putin tends to escalate when he does not meet resistance and advocated support to Ukraine. Former national security advisor Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski advocated a judicious approach, warning against assisting with offensive capacity that Russia might perceive as a direct threat.


41. “Relations with Georgia.”


43. Ibid.


45. “Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP).”


52. “NATO-Georgia Exercise 2016.”
In an ongoing effort to focus interest, research, and informed discussion on a discrete number of geographical areas or emerging topics of priority national security concern, the Army University Press (AUP) has established and is continuing to develop a website on which it aggregates AUP publications together with selected publications from other sources germane to each topic or area. The two purposes of this site are to provide readers with an overview of issues related to the topics or areas about which AUP authors have written thus far; and, to encourage prospective authors to contribute additional articles or larger studies to the collection. To view this website, visit http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Special-Topics/Hot-Topics/.

Military Review has primary interest in the geographic flashpoints of conflict noted below:

**Hot Spots**
- Venezuela
- Russia
- Russia-Syria
- Russia-Ukraine
- Islamic Jihad-Europe
- North Korea
- China-Indochina
- Islamic State and al-Qaida in Africa
- Saudi Arabia and Iran conflict
- U.S.-Mexican border security
- India-Pakistan

**Hot Topics**
- Illegal immigration globally
- Urban warfare
- New extended battlefield (multidimensional war)
- Countering weapons of mass destruction
- Impact of gender inequality on operations and stability
Mission before Comfort
A Mission-Focused Approach to Gender in the Army
Capt. Molly Kovite, U.S. Army

Repeatedly, when Capt. Clara Martin’s unit was tapped to roll out for a recovery, she would only find out afterward. “The TOC [tactical operations center] messenger went directly to the male tent,” she explained; she was left behind, unable to account for her team.

For Capt. Diana Sluhan, mortar attacks meant an unnecessary degree of uncertainty. She was also housed in the female tent, away from the rest of the members of her section. She said, “It was unnerving during IDF [indirect fire], because I couldn’t get accountability until the all clear.”

To some of the soldiers in their units, these were examples of the ways female soldiers hurt unit effectiveness and made even simple things, such as spreading the word about an upcoming mission, more difficult. But the problem is not women. It is that we continue to rely on outdated social niceties about gender instead of mission effectiveness to dictate everything from billeting to battle-buddy teams.

When conducting predeployment pregnancy tests, sorting people according to their sex is efficient. During a urinalysis, having observers’ gender matched to the person giving the sample makes everyone involved more comfortable. Organization by gender creates no inefficiency and has positive effects. However, these two situations are far less complex than most gender-related scenarios that leaders encounter. What happens when the most effective thing to do feels like a privacy violation? What happens when it appears to be gender discrimination?

My answer to both these questions is the mission must always come first. But, before evaluating whether organizing by gender is mission efficient, leaders first need to realize they are actually making a choice. Often, the norm of gender separation is so powerful that no one has thought about the inefficiencies that result from that separation. Leaders need to...
put aside social niceties and make their decisions based on what is efficient for mission accomplishment. Where effectiveness cuts both ways, they should seek out solutions that avoid creating unintentional obstacles for female soldiers, and they should lastly consider comfort and privacy.

Taking gender into account should be the exception rather than the rule. Gender separation may provide comfort, but it does not often promote efficacy, and there is no indication that it reduces sexual assault or harassment; nor is there evidence that it reduces the likelihood of relationships that can cause prejudice to good order and discipline. However, it sometimes creates systemic barriers to mission accomplishment by making it more difficult for female soldiers to get the job done. While increased gender mixing may be met with cultural resistance, history has shown repeatedly that when it comes to making the force more effective, the force will adapt.

**The Costs of Comfort**

Capt. Marcus Petty, a transportation company commander, was a beanpole. He was self-conscious about his thinness and worried it set a bad example for his soldiers. He did not want to be in the position of changing in front of them, so instead of living in the company area, he had found an empty bed in a tent with some of the special staff.

It was before dawn when he heard his executive officer shouting for him. That probably meant his guys would be rolling out on a recovery mission shortly. He threw on his uniform, smoothed his hair, and stepped outside.

“Sir, multiple vehicles got hit in two different districts,” said the executive officer. “The battalion commander wants to know where you are and why it’s taking so long to get you to the TOC. He’s pissed.”

The battalion commander is unlikely to accept Capt. Petty’s privacy concerns as an acceptable reason for a delay in response time for a complex recovery mission. Yet, leaders consistently create such delays for
gender-related privacy concerns, even when the troops themselves do not share those concerns.

Billeting is a prime example of how this plays out. The benefit of separating people by gender is that most people are more comfortable with this arrangement and do not feel like their privacy is being ignored. There is also a widely held assumption that separation reduces sexual misconduct and problematic sexual relationships—this assumption, however, is not supported by the evidence and will be addressed later.

The cost of separation is that units are broken up, creating barriers to mission-essential communication and information dissemination. This form of segregation also diminishes unofficial mentorship and training opportunities and reduces accountability—all essential to a well-trained and disciplined force. Female soldiers end up housed with members from other units on different shifts, which interferes with their sleep cycles, resulting in suboptimal performance. Separating these soldiers from their units also creates the impression of special treatment and different standards for females, which undermines unit morale and trust. Lastly, living together turns people’s relationships from colleagues to friends. Separate billeting, and the culture of casual gender separation it perpetuates, decreases the likelihood that women will experience the kind of belonging that helps make the military worth the sacrifices it demands.5 Talented soldiers may leave the Army as a consequence.

Billeting separation and its negative effects begin in basic training, where male recruits and training staff are cordoned off from female recruits. Interviews I conducted with soldiers who went to mixed-gender basic training confirm that while this arrangement is designed to protect recruits, it backfires in many ways. Female recruits reported that they frequently missed changes in formation times, uniform changes, meal times, weapons cleanings, and other important communications.6 Female soldiers’ persistent failure to show up at the right time, in the right place, and in the right uniform tends to create an impression among their classmates and cadre that they are generally less capable or responsible professionals. This unmerited impression of incompetence can feed a perception that males and females are held to different standards, which is poison for unit morale. One RAND study put it succinctly: “To the degree that leadership can address and resolve such issues as the perception of a double standard for men and women, morale will improve.”7

Female soldiers also miss valuable training due to billeting segregation. One noted, “There were some very knowledgeable male cadre who would often do hip-pocket training with the males, and it wasn’t until the last week that the other barracks were made aware.”8 The pool of peers female soldiers can draw on when they need after-hours help to review a confusing subject or to complete a difficult task is also necessarily reduced. As a result, these soldiers emerge from training less prepared than they could have been, reducing the overall effectiveness of the force.

Segregated billeting is the default option outside of training environments as well. There are fewer regulations requiring separation in the field, but command decisions often create the same outcomes. General Order No. 1 (the order commanders customarily publish that identifies prohibited activities and establishes standards of conduct for deployed units) often addresses relationships and living conditions between males and females.9 For example, the General Order No. 1 issued by the commanders of both the 3rd and the 4th Infantry Divisions during their deployments in Iraq prohibited visitors of the opposite sex in each other’s rooms.10 Even if a General Order No. 1 does not address gendered billeting directly, lower-level commanders often make similar policies prohibiting entry into the living spaces of the opposite sex.11

Much like during training, separation in the field can cause communication issues and other unintended consequences. A RAND study from 1997 looked at segregated berthing on ships:

Segregated berthing lessened work group cohesion on recently integrated ships because department heads were generally accustomed to having their entire crew berthed together in the same area of the ship. Both official and unofficial information...
used to be communicated in berthing areas, either verbally or by posting notices, and often one worker would wake his replacement to take over the shift. Now men are still berthed according to unit, but the women are berthed together regardless of work group. Supervisors often did not think to go to women’s berthing in addition to their men’s berthing to pass along important information, and no male coworker dared to go into female berthing to wake a female sailor if she were the one that happened to oversleep that day.

While the Army does not have to contend with berthing on ships, the same situations arise in field exercises, trainings, and deployments.

Current accounts indicate this is still a problem. One female officer shared, “My deployment had gender segregation, and also shift workers. Females were always dragging because the lights were never out. Someone was always awake or waking others.” While being woken up is an issue in any bay barracks, the mix of shifts and units in female tents coupled with the exclusion of most other unit members make intrusions more frequent and disruptive in female quarters.

Another female soldier described the situation she experienced when her unit decided to make an all-female tent. She had a responsible male noncommissioned officer who ensured she got important messages, but her teammates were affected: “Because my male NCO couldn’t come into the tent, he’d yell through the wall for me. This was usually at night when we needed to go out on a random recovery mission. It would wake me up, so I didn’t miss the mission, but it also woke all the other females up.” Soldiers who are sleep deprived are not primed for optimal performance.

When new leadership directed a female transportation company commander nine months into a deployment to gender segregate her unit’s living quarters, she pushed back against the demands. “I’m safe in a tent with my male soldiers. I’m not necessarily safe seven tents over all alone.” Force protection is an inherent part of any mission, and creating a less safe situation to implement separate quarters makes no sense.

Another female commander found herself in a similar situation: “They wanted to create a female tent, and I fought that tooth and nail. They wanted to take people out of their unit, [away from] their leaders, the people they work with every day, and put them somewhere else,” she said. “That made no sense to me. When leaders are not involved, discipline breaks down, and you lose control.”

Billeting is the most visible area where gender separation happens without analysis and without regard to efficacy. However, battle-buddy systems are another common source of friction. The female transportation company commander’s new leadership also created a rule that females on a convoy had to have a female battle buddy. She responded, “So you’re telling me as a company commander that I can’t go with [my own] convoy unless I arrange to have another female join me?”

Other areas of friction include mentorship pairings, unit assignments, and attachment to outposts. And, there is the more general problem that any interaction between soldiers of different genders is potentially a “perception issue.” Defaulting to gender-matching sends a strong message that members of the opposite sex are not teammates, and are not to be fully trusted. This hampers the deep level of trust necessary for small-unit combat effectiveness. Those who try to bridge this divide open themselves up to admonishment. One first sergeant told me that a few female noncommissioned officers had confided in him about relationship difficulties they were experiencing during deployment. A sergeant major in his battalion told him that such discussions were inappropriate. The first sergeant countered that he had done the same for dozens of male soldiers, but the sergeant major stood firm. Similarly, a male company commander worked out frequently with a female noncommissioned officer in his company to help prepare her for Ranger School. This eventually caused sufficient hullabaloo that the commander stopped his training sessions. In the same deployment, workout partnerships with similar rank and positional disparities passed without comment because they were not cross-gender. In these two instances, the leaders’ abilities to advise and mentor their soldiers were curtailed, and the soldiers had fewer resources to resolve their issues or train themselves to be effective leaders.

Informal advice and unwritten rules can increase this air of distrust. A RAND study found that some leadership provided the following advice to men on how to interact with women: “Don’t talk to them, don’t sit near them in the mess, don’t breathe near them.” The same RAND study found that “men were reluctant to push women … because of the fear that the women would retaliate with
an unfounded charge of sexual harassment," and that most men were hesitant to counsel women without a witness for the same reason.21 As discussed below, integration is likely to reduce such a risk, not increase it.

**Gender Separation’s Impact on Sexual Harassment and Assault**

Perhaps leaders separate the genders thinking not only about privacy concerns but also about sexual assault and harassment. It may seem intuitive that gender segregation would reduce sexual harassment and sexual assault, but there is mounting evidence that shows the opposite might be true. Studies on workplace sexual harassment show that encouraging social integration at work can reduce harassment.22 Other studies show that increased contact with an “outgroup” (in this case female soldiers) improves attitudes toward individuals in that outgroup.23 These improvements are more likely to take place when group membership is de-emphasized during the interaction.24 Conversely, emphasis on group membership during cross-group interactions increases anxiety and reduces the benefits of cross-group contact.25 Outgrouping has been linked to dehumanization, which is associated with sexual harassment and rape.26

Norwegian soldiers Pvt. Elina Schnell Hjelle (left) and Pvt. Mathias Hoegevold get dressed early morning 8 April 2014 in their coed barracks at the Garrison of South Varanger in the arctic north of Norway. The garrison was part of a study on army gender relations conducted by the Information Centre for Gender Research in Norway, in which groups comprising two women and six men shared rooms. The study found that gender-integrated rooms had a degenderizing effect—sexual harassment claims decreased and morale increased. (Screen-shot of Ruptly YouTube video)

This theory was put to the test when the Norwegian army conducted a study on unisex housing.27 In the study, separate groups of two women were housed with six men. They found that sexual harassment claims dropped. The authors of the study postulated that the integrated rooms had a degenderizing effect, dampening the “us versus them” mentality that can lead to sexual harassment.28 While a single test conducted by a foreign military is far from conclusive, a plausible theory and supporting data should be sufficient evidence to prompt reconsideration of the benefits of segregation. This is especially true when failure to do so may sustain the military’s sexual assault problem and perpetuates the
general inefficiencies of gender segregation. Shared male-female bay barracks and tents are likely the best way forward in the field and during deployment but not necessarily in garrison or other environments that allow more flexibility. It should be one option of many in a spectrum of organizational possibilities.

Along with the concern about sexual misconduct comes concern about false accusations of sexual harassment or assault. Determining the proportion of sexual assault reporting that is false is difficult and imprecise. The best estimates are at a lowly 6 percent; nonetheless, most military men have an understandable fear of being on the wrong side of this nightmare scenario. Increased integration should ameliorate this problem for the same reasons it diminishes the problem of sexual assault. The same dehumanization that is required to sexually assault someone likely underlies a false accusation of sexual assault, and increased gender mixing has a humanizing effect.

Furthermore, the basic facts in many sexual harassment reports are undisputed, but the events are often mired in misunderstandings. Increased mixing is likely to reduce such misunderstandings where it would narrow the gap between the social contexts of male and female service members. In circumstances where a female soldier is trying to fit in, she may be hesitant to create tension by vociferously rejecting an advance. Such a clear rejection might embarrass her pursuer and cause peers to see her as someone who unnecessarily degraded their friend. Instead, she may send subtler signals—shaking off a touch, or turning her back to her pursuer and engaging with other people. If women already feel like they belong, they will be less hesitant to be assertive and
vocal about their objections to a sexual advance or to being touched. This is true whether the situation is one-on-one or in a group setting.

Additionally, male pursuers, with greater exposure, would begin to see their female counterparts less as exotic creatures and more as part of their peer group. This would be likely to diminish the “tea leaf reading” they engage in to interpret female behavior. In this case, a turned back, male or female, would simply be a signal that this person is not interested in talking, not an invitation to try harder or be more aggressive.

**Other Efficacy Concerns**

There is more room to observe social niceties outside of direct combat, be it on large combat bases, in garrison, or during training. However, when it comes to direct combat, the social niceties that underlie gender segregation go out the window. Female combat-camera soldiers sleep on the ground next to their male comrades when they go outside the wire. On long convoys, men and women urinate in front of each other because that is required to stay safe.

The Army must train and retain the best soldiers of both genders. However, many of the anecdotes conveyed in the first section of this article showed how policies can impede women from getting the mission done. One result of these impediments is that the Army will not be able to best identify some of its most talented soldiers because some face obstacles that others do not. While it can be difficult to pinpoint single instances where the separation of genders creates an obstacle that holds back a female soldier’s career, the cumulative effect of these obstacles can stunt a career progression. Even where it does not stymie a career entirely, it narrows opportunity for advancement and increases the difficulty of promotion. Where leaders implement policies to allay privacy concerns, but those policies have a negative impact on soldier readiness, career progression, and unit cohesion, those policies should be discontinued.

Another reason commanders may be hesitant to increase gender mixing is the increased opportunity it creates for distracting relationships to form. However, the degenderizing effect of increased gender mixing discussed above would likely reduce the formation of sexual relationships. Even if it did not, the current state of affairs seems to do very little to deter such relationships; those who are immature enough to let such entanglements affect their professional lives are the ones most likely to skirt the rules to pursue such a relationship in the first place. Segregation in billeting has obvious and identifiable negative impacts on the mission, and any benefits it has on good order and discipline are conjecture at best.

Sometimes mission-effective policies result in a negative impact on women as a group. Unfortunately, this might be a necessary outcome. In a mission to train partner-nation forces, for example, the partner-nation soldiers might be reluctant or unwilling to take instruction from females. In this situation, strategic-level leadership would have to decide whether the mission is to teach combat or other occupational skills to partner forces, or if there is a broader need to promote the value of equal rights. The latter would entail opening positions to qualified women who want to serve, and being willing to learn from whoever has the expertise to teach, male or female. Having women conduct training in this scenario could set a beneficial example. However, if the mission is simply to teach occupational skills to partner forces, then gender-integrated training would be less efficient and a waste of time. This might cut female service members off from some valuable deployment and leadership opportunities, which is an unfortunate but appropriate side effect of putting the mission first.

**Cultural Resistance**

We may not be able to set the standard for our partner forces, but we can set the standard for ourselves. If there is resistance within our own ranks to the most efficient arrangement of our forces, military effectiveness has to triumph. While some service members—both male and female—would resist increased integration, their preferences do not trump readiness. As Adm. (retired) Gary Roughead put it, “It is not our practice to go within our military and poll our force to determine if they like the laws of the land or not.”

This approach worked for racial integration. A poll conducted in 1945 interviewed white company commanders and platoon sergeants of the twenty-four infantry companies that contained black platoons. Sixty-four percent of respondents had unfavorable views of integrating companies before they experienced integration. After integration, 77 percent of both officers and noncommissioned officers reported having a more favorable view of the project than they did at the start. Sixteen
It also worked for the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” the U.S. military’s previous policy on homosexuals in the military. A coalition of over one thousand retired flag officers warned that repeal “would undermine recruiting and retention, impact leadership at all levels, have adverse effects on the willingness of parents who lend their sons and daughters to military service, and eventually break the all-volunteer force.” This doomsday prediction did not bear out. Instead, all reports indicate that unit cohesion was largely unaffected by the repeal, and that military readiness has slightly increased.

Anecdotal evidence indicates that this would likely be the outcome for increased gender mixing as well. A female officer who went through ROTC Advanced Camp, where males and females shared barracks, said integration helped cadets work together better. As for shared bathrooms—they just posted times for showers for each sex, and a sign to turn for all other times. A civil affairs officer reported that tents were integrated during selection. “This was so necessary for team cohesion,” she said. “Girls turned their backs when they changed. No issues.” Another said, “One of my fondest memories is a male cutting my bangs in the sink because they’d gotten too long while we were all rehashing how to make the next event better.” Men reported that they “appreciated the opportunity to have friendships with women,” and that they were able to discuss some things with women that they did not feel comfortable discussing with men. This, in turn, allowed them to handle their own stress better, and perhaps it reduced disciplinary issues down the line.

The current culture of gender separation benefits no one. Company commanders and first sergeants, first-line supervisors and their soldiers, chaplains and soldiers who seek their counsel—these are all potential opposite gender situations where one-on-one meetings are necessary and appropriate. The unthinking stigma against cross-gender association results in increased stress, reduced communication, decreased mentorship and training, and less cohesion. While civilians may have the luxury of subordinating their professional lives to social niceties, military professionals do not. By resetting defaults to put the mission first, even when it comes to gender, the Army can fix this culture. The three biggest changes leaders can make are the following:

1. Default to mixed-gender billeting. Where billeting is separated by gender, allow members of the opposite sex to enter with permission of a resident.
2. Eliminate battle-buddy pairing by gender. Trust soldiers to know with whom they are safe.
3. Instead of stigmatizing cross-gender engagements that create perception issues, quash the rumor-mongering that make them an issue.

The most important component of solving this problem is recognizing it. The social niceties that lead to these inefficiencies are norms in both civilian and military life, but in the military, they need to be recognized and rooted out where they interfere with mission accomplishment. We owe our nation the most effective fighting force possible, and unthinking gender segregation is hindering us.

Notes

3. Author’s note: This article specifically avoids commenting or taking a position on the integration of women into combat arms. It is an issue distinct from and beyond the scope of the topic of this paper, which is the organizational and cultural separation of men and women.
4. This is a fictional scenario.
GENDER INTEGRATION


10. Ibid.

11. For example, Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan Commander’s Policy Memo #14, 1 December 2016.


18. Unnamed master sergeant, interview by author (name withheld by mutual agreement), Eglin, Florida, 7 June 2017.

19. Personal observations of the author.


21. Ibid., 73.


24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.


30. Personal observation of the author based on six years’ experience as a Judge Advocate General officer.


33. The impact of sexual relationships on good order and discipline is complicated, and it is important to the overall issue of gender in the military. A full exploration of this topic is beyond the scope of this paper.


36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.


42. Kate Numerick, 28 January 2017, comment on Army Women’s Officer Mentorship Facebook page, https://www.facebook.com/groups/armywomen/permalink/1783597601857966/ (membership required).

43. Harrell and Miller, “New Opportunities for Military Women,” 82.

Implacable Foes: War in the Pacific, 1944–1945

Waldo Heinrichs and Marc Gallicchio
Oxford University Press, New York, 2017, 728 pages

Lt. Col. Jesse McIntyre III, U.S. Army, Retired

Implacable Foes: War in the Pacific, 1944–1945 is a fascinating look at the last year in the Pacific theater of operations during World War II. It describes the complex challenges of economic reconstruction, demobilization, redeployment, foreign policy, and public opinion faced by the United States in defeating a foe committed to fighting to the last man. The American victory over Japan, seemingly assured after the Battle of Midway in June 1942, would rely on two atomic bombs and the belated intervention of Japanese emperor Hirohito.

In a remarkably well-research volume, Waldo Heinrichs and Marc Gallicchio draw on a range of primary source material—personal accounts, U.S. records, and military correspondence—in providing an unprecedented view of the war in the Pacific. They begin with early 1944 as the balance shifted as American forces moved into unceasing offensive action that would take them to the Japanese homeland by summer 1945. Readers are given an up-front view of why the war in the Pacific was considered a special hell unlike any other theater.

The authors remind us that Japanese officials also understood that the war had entered another phase after 1943. The Japanese military doctrine abandoned its previous waterline defense in favor of mobile defense inland organized around fortified strong points. The overall objective would be to draw Allied forces into costly and time-consuming operations. Japanese training still emphasized the superiority of the warrior spirit but focused on a strategy of attrition and delay. Japanese officers became less willing to squander the lives of their men in suicidal banzai attacks, although this belief that all Japanese civilians should willingly give their lives for the emperor had become a fundamental principle of Japanese strategy.

The defending Japanese forces were not the only threat to Allied forces; the climate in the Pacific was a steady source of hardship and danger. Soldiers and marines suffered from a variety of insect and waterborne diseases that resulted in the highest noncombat-related casualty rates in the war. Malaria was by far the most devastating disease, causing more casualties than the
Japanese. At some point, between 60 and 65 percent of soldiers serving in the South Pacific reported having malaria. Additionally, the vegetation and terrain favored the Japanese. Americans often found themselves conducting costly frontal assaults during island operations in which the only outcomes could be victory or death.

April 1945 began on a high note, bringing welcome news to the American home front. In Europe, Allied forces swept across the Rhine and plunged into Germany’s industrial heartland. Newspapers reported daily on the surrender or encirclement of large groups of German soldiers as Allied forces pushed for Berlin. In the Pacific, American landings on Okinawa were unopposed. Heinrichs and Gallicchio cite contemporary media reports of an unopposed landing and light Japanese resistance. Two weeks later, however, press reports stated that the American advance on Okinawa had stalled in the face of fierce Japanese resistance. The eighty-two-day-long battle would result in over forty-nine thousand casualties and serve as a grim foreboding of the invasion of the Japanese homeland that lay ahead.

Allied planners developed Operation Downfall for the proposed invasion of Japan. Commanded by Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the plan consisted of two parts: Operation Olympic and Operation Coronet. Olympic would start in November 1945 and culminate with the capture of the southernmost Japanese island, Kyushu. Kyushu would then serve as a staging area for Coronet, the invasion of the Kanto Plain near Tokyo, scheduled for March 1946. Allied planners envisioned both operations involving five million men and the largest concentrations of planes and ships used in a single operation. William Shockley, an American physicist, prepared a study for Secretary of War Henry Stimson’s staff that estimated that conquering Japan would cost 1.7 to 4 million American casualties, including 400,000 to 800,000 deaths, and 5 to 10 million Japanese fatalities.

The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters came to the realization after the battle of Leyte in December 1944 that the overall outcome of the war had been decided in favor of the United States. Japanese planners accurately anticipated that the Americans would intensify their air and naval operations throughout the Pacific theater and would seek to neutralize the Japanese homeland. They would continue to degrade Japanese strength while moving in range of invading Japan.

The Japanese General Staff developed Operation Ketsu-go, a defensive plan for its homeland whose intent was not to throw back an invasion but to make it so costly that the United States would be more willing to negotiate. Decrypted Japanese military messages indicated that Japanese planners had accurately determined Downfall’s landing sites on Kyushu and the Kanto Plain near Tokyo. The Japanese planned an all-out defense of Kyushu with a targeted completion date of June 1945. The Imperial General Headquarters and the General Army Headquarters had arrived at the conclusion that the Americans must be engaged relentlessly in a decisive battle on the beaches and in the coastal zones to prevent the Americans from establishing lodgments. The chief of the Naval General Staff told the Imperial Conference in June 1945 that he believed it possible to destroy nearly half of the enemy forces before they ever landed on the Japanese beaches.¹

The authors artfully capture the challenge Downfall planners faced. Units currently in the Pacific would make the initial assaults in Olympic and Coronet. The incoming replacements would fill out the Olympic assault forces scheduled for November 1945 while units redeploying from Europe constituted the reserves and follow-on troops for Coronet. The intensity of fighting in the Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa required extensive infantry reconstitution of Army and Marine Corps divisions. Given the losses among his own troops as well as those of the marines at Iwo Jima, and with the battle of Okinawa underway, MacArthur expressed concern to Gen. George Marshall about the shortage of

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**Lt. Col. Jesse McIntyre III**, U.S. Army, retired, is an assistant professor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds a BA from the University of Missouri and an MA from Touro University. He served as the director for psychological operations policy, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict; psychological operations officer on the Department of the Army staff; and in a variety of special operations and infantry assignments. He also instructed at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School and Center.
available veteran Pacific infantrymen for Operation Olympic, the upcoming invasion of Kyushu. Exacerbating MacArthur’s manpower shortage was the War Department’s Demobilization Policy that discharged service members who had accrued eighty-five points based on months in service, months in service overseas, combat awards, and dependent children. This included a large number of combat-experienced infantrymen that were in the Pacific, thus reducing the available number of combat-experienced men required for Olympic.

A shipping crisis in the fall of 1944 through the winter of 1945 racked the American overseas supply system at the very moment when it was most overextended. Priority of shipping went to Europe in response to Germany’s offensive in the Ardennes and to bring relief supplies for European citizens facing a brutal winter. The shortage of available transports delayed the redeployment of European units and equipment back to the United States.

Heinrichs and Gallicchio illuminate the concerns of the redeploying soldiers, survivors of combat in the European theater, who now faced the grim prospect of invading the Japanese homeland. Among those was my father-in-law, Leonard Croft—a tank destroyer crewmember and veteran of the Ardennes, Hurtgen Forest, and Colmar Pocket—who found himself back at Fort Hood where he waited for redeployment to the Pacific. Redeploying soldiers would receive thirty days of leave and additional thirty days of training prior to redeploying. Army medical leaders expressed concern to Marshall that granting thirty days of leave to redeploying soldiers would result in large numbers of desertions.

Heinrichs and Gallicchio’s research counters a generation of revisionist scholars who assert the use of atomic weapons was to impress the Soviet Union or to exact revenge for Pearl Harbor. Gar Alperovitz, an American political economist and historian, concludes in The Decision to use the Atomic Bomb that President Harry Truman authorized the atomic bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima to send a message to the Soviet Union. Alperovitz argues that Japan by the summer of 1945 was essentially defeated. While Alperovitz is correct that Japan had no hope of winning the war, he fails in considering Japanese intentions in 1945.

Heinrich and Gallicchio’s research reveals that the United States possessed the capability of collecting information through Magic decrypts of Japanese diplomatic messages and Ultra decrypts of Japanese military messages. Analysis of the decrypted messages indicated that Japan remained unwilling to accept anything resembling unconditional surrender. Instead, Tokyo was employing diplomacy to avoid full consequences of defeat while simultaneously preparing for a bloody showdown on Kyushu.

Allied planners were alarmed at Ultra reports that indicate an increase of new Japanese units arriving on Kyushu that, if not checked, could have resulted in an attacker-to-defender ratio of one-to-one. Ultra reports also indicated an increase of Japanese aircraft being moved in range of Kyushu invasion beaches. Japanese military leaders had full intention of fighting to the last man.

Gen. Leslie Groves, director of the Manhattan Project, provided Truman an atomic bomb report that gave him hope that the war would be shortened without Operation Downfall. Possession of the atomic bomb provided Truman options and firmed his stance toward Japan. Truman was convinced that the bomb would make an invasion unnecessary. The report also alleviated concerns of the Navy that had been requesting an alternative to Downfall. The Japanese buildup on Kyushu strengthened the Navy’s inclination to question Downfall’s success probability, invasion casualty estimates, and Army readiness in time for Olympic. Adm. Raymond Spruance noted that the Army’s 77th Infantry Division and other Army divisions conducting operations in northern Luzon were in very poor shape.

The authors describe the anxious last days as intercepts of Japanese diplomatic and military traffic enabled Washington to watch the drama unfolding within the Japanese government. The dropping of two atomic bombs followed by the Soviet Union’s declaration of war left the Japanese stunned and demoralized. Tokyo remained defiant following the dropping of the second bomb on Nagasaki. War Minister Anami Korechika insisted that Japan would not consider surrendering unless the Allies agree to four conditions: preservation of the emperor and the imperial institution, no occupation of Japan, Japanese determination of who might be subjected to war-crime trials, and the right of the Japanese armed forces to disarm itself. He followed it up a day later that it would be better for the one hundred million Japanese to die as one than to agree to occupation of Japan. The sentiment was expressed by other senior military leaders.
Hirohito intervened and stated that Japan would accept terms of surrender as long as it did not remove his authority as a sovereign ruler. Dissidents in the imperial army attempted a coup in hope of preventing the emperor from issuing the surrender decree. The plotters planned to seize the imperial palace and destroy his recorded surrender message. It was quickly thwarted, and the plotters committed suicide in front of the palace.

Critics have questioned Truman’s decision to drop the atomic bomb. Truman made the right decision when one considers the bitter fighting of the Iwo Jima and Okinawa operations, Japanese intentions for Operation Ketsu-go, and projected Allied and Japanese casualties. My father, a naval aviator aboard the USS Enterprise; several uncles; and my father-in-law all would have participated in the invasion of the Japanese homeland. I am thankful they did not have to.

Implacable Foes: War in the Pacific 1944–1945 is superbly written. Heinrichs and Gallicchio’s extensive research makes it one of the most definitive studies of the final year of war in the Pacific. The authors’ inclusion of the key decision-makers, the inner turmoil of those leaders, and a detailed discussion of their motives help create vivid mental images of what was occurring behind the doors in Tokyo and Washington, D.C. This book depicts the challenges faced by the Truman administration. It is a must for both scholar and student alike interested in the war of the Pacific.

Notes

Retired Army Capt. Gary Michael “Mike” Rose was awarded the Medal of Honor by President Donald J. Trump in a 23 October 2017 White House ceremony for his actions during a covert operation from 11 to 14 September 1970 in Laos during the Vietnam War.

Trump said of Rose, “For many years the story of Mike's heroism has gone untold. But today we gather to tell the world of his valor and proudly present him with our nation's highest military honor.”

Rose, then a sergeant and a member of 5th Special Forces Group, was the only medic in a 136-man element participating in Operation Tailwind, a mission to interdict enemy supplies being funneled into Vietnam along what was known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Sixteen of those were American soldiers; the rest were Montagnard fighters from the highlands of Vietnam, an ethnically separate people from the Vietnamese.

After inserting seventy kilometers inside enemy-controlled territory, the unit almost immediately made contact with the enemy. When a wounded soldier became trapped outside the defensive perimeter, Rose rushed to his aid, braving heavy fire while performing first aid and carrying the soldier back to the safety of the unit. Over the next few days, the unit continued to move deeper into enemy territory, encountering more enemy forces and taking more casualties. With each engagement, Rose frequently had to move through intense enemy fire and personally engage the enemy to reach the wounded and render lifesaving medical treatment. While rescuing a wounded Montagnard soldier, Rose received shrapnel wounds in his back, leg, and foot from a rocket-propelled grenade. He ignored his wounds and continued to treat the wounded, although his own foot was severely damaged. He would complete the rest of the mission while using a stick as a makeshift crutch.

At one point, Rose’s company called for a medevac helicopter to evacuate the many wounded, but the aircraft could not land. Disregarding his own wounds and the threat to his personal safety, Rose stood to pass the wounded up to the helicopter crew, fully exposed once more to extremely heavy enemy fire. The medevac aircraft had to abort after being severely damaged, and it later crashed. Over half the company was now wounded, and Rose improvised litters for them and supervised their evacuation on foot.

After completing its mission, the unit was finally extracted by helicopter while under enemy assault from all sides. During the extraction, Rose, in great pain, continued to move under heavy fire to treat and evacuate casualties until his own extraction on the last aircraft. However, his ordeal was still not over.

Shortly after takeoff, Rose’s aircraft was hit by anti-aircraft fire. A Marine Corps door gunner was seriously injured, and Rose began to render medical treatment, even as the helicopter was crashing. Rose was thrown from the aircraft when it hit the ground, but he crawled back to the wreckage to pull out the wounded and unconscious men that remained inside. He continued to provide them with medical treatment until a second helicopter arrived to complete the extraction.

Rose treated sixty to seventy wounded personnel during Operation Tailwind; only three men died under his care over the course of four days under nearly continuous enemy fire.

Following the White House ceremony, he was recognized again for his extraordinary efforts during a second ceremony the next day at the Pentagon, where he was inducted into the Hall of Heroes. Acting Secretary of the Army Ryan D. McCarthy said during the ceremony, “Mike personally saved many lives over the course of those four days. It is a fact that there are veterans whose names are not inscribed on a black stone wall just across the Potomac [the Vietnam Veterans Memorial] because of Captain Rose.”

Rose’s award was one of only two presented in 2017, and it was only the second Medal of Honor presented by President Trump. The first was awarded to another combat medic, Specialist Five James C. McCloughan, on 31 July 2017.