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Cover photographs: U.S. Army photos
It has been an honor to serve as the 48th Commandant and Chief of the Military Police Corps Regiment. As I write this, my last message as Commandant and Chief, I am grateful to have had the opportunity to serve alongside a tremendous team of professionals. My time here at the U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, has been an extremely rewarding experience. I cannot say enough about the dedicated Soldiers, leaders, and Department of the Army civilians who proudly serve, unselfishly, to protect the freedom that we so desire and our American way of life.

Some have asked me what legacy I want to leave behind when I leave this position. My response is that I hope that the Soldiers of the Military Police Corps know that they are the centerpiece to our Corps—as seen through the eyes of Army leaders now, in 2025, and beyond. What they do today—good, bad, or indifferent—will shape the vitality of the Military Police Corps in the future. Therefore, it is imperative that we uphold the Army values in every measureable way, and it is essential that we continue to be policing professionals, serving and conducting missions at home and abroad. All eyes will be on the Military Police Corps to “do what needs to be done.” We must perform our policing responsibilities with dignity and respect in any operating environment in which we may find ourselves.

Our Military Police Corps is an eclectic group of Regular Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve Soldiers who possess vast amounts of resident skills inside our core competencies of policing, corrections, and investigations. Because of this, we are the sole-source provider of these technical skills for the Department of the Army and, in some cases, the Department of Defense. Coupled with the acquisition of other emerging capabilities (criminal intelligence, forensics, nonlethal weapons, the expanded role of military working dogs), the Military Police Corps is, and will continue to be, a lethal and essential asset to commanders and unified action partners in support of unified land operations.

Our military will deploy to environments full of complexity and challenges. To that end, military police Soldiers will be an integral part of winning against any adversary we might face. By 2050, it is expected that 70 percent of the world population will reside in and around cities. These heavily populated urban areas will require that we operate inside them, interface with the population living there, and conduct various missions (identifying criminal elements, bringing them to justice, working with and training host nation police forces, and building trust back into a reconstituted police force) to serve and protect their citizens. As our military units conduct military offensive and defensive operations, military police will be expected to enable maneuver through maneuver and mobility support operations, shaping populations and terrain to deny adversaries the ability to influence populations or seize terrain. The range of military operations demands that military police units remain flexible and adaptive in order to thrive in any situation, thus exemplifying the fact that we are truly the “Force of Choice.”

As the Military Police Corps continues to look for ways to equip our Soldiers and formations to deal with current and future threats, it is important that we continue to capitalize on opportunities across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) domains. The Military Police Corps invests in emerging capabilities by looking at how to change or modify any of these DOTMLPF domains to successfully integrate a skill or materiel capability.

Over the last 2 years, my priorities have remained consistent, ensuring that the Military Police Corps—

• Remains ready to meet the demands of the Army today and in the future.
• Continues to adapt and learn our profession.
• Takes care of our Soldiers, Families, and Department of the Army civilians.
• Provides unique skills and tools to the Army.

(Continued on page 4)
Greetings to all from the Home of the Regiment.

I am truly honored and humbled to serve as your 13th Command Sergeant Major of the Military Police Corps. This honored selection was made possible by the many great leaders and Soldiers who have supported me and my Family throughout the years. For that reason, I promise to serve faithfully and remain a selfless servant to our Military Police Corps and to the Soldiers and civilians who proudly call themselves military police professionals! I am excited, and I look forward to the opportunity to visit the amazing military police professionals around the world, honorably serving this great Nation that we call the United States of America.

Within just a few weeks of the change of responsibility, I had the amazing opportunity to meet the entire team that makes up the U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, by receiving briefings from the directorates. The ability to see firsthand the unique capabilities and skills of our leaders, instructors, and staff was beyond remarkable. These briefings resulted in one conclusion—we have tremendous Soldiers and civilians who are passionate about developing our force to remain relevant and to always be known as the “Force of Choice.” Additionally, I had the opportunity to visit the Military Police Branch at the Human Resources Command, Fort Knox, Kentucky. It was an honor and a privilege to meet the military police Soldiers and civilians who work tirelessly behind the scenes every day to manage our career management field (CMF). Some would say that it is a thankless job, but the Soldiers and civilians are super proud to serve our military police Soldiers. During my visit to the Human Resources Command, their love and passion for what they do was clearly evident!

In professional development news, the Army Career Tracker (ACT) has begun to make its mark as a portal for sponsorship and becoming or selecting a mentor—but it has become more than just that. ACT is also a great tool that can be used to aid in counseling Soldiers, to view professional development models (PDMs), and to assist in information sharing within our Regiment. Our proponency office has been busy developing our military police (Military Occupational Specialty [MOS] 31 CMF) officer, warrant officer, and enlisted pages under the Communities Section for the past few weeks. These communities will allow Soldiers who subscribe and join the page to view new and relevant information affecting our Regiment. Some recent examples of such information include senior noncommissioned officer promotion board analysis, the 76th Military Police Anniversary schedule, and the Military Police Competitive Challenge, to name a few. Some of the other ACT improvements include—

- **Redesigned enlisted career maps.** In November 2015, ACT redesigned and updated the enlisted career maps that are located on the PDM page. The redesign standardized and centralized career maps across all CMFs and MOSs. Soldiers can view recommendations tailored to their MOS and rank, allowing them to proactively plan and manage their career progression.

- **Directly related and starred credentials on PDMs and career maps.** In addition to the redesigned career maps, Soldiers now see the most relevant credentials directly related to their MOSs. These credentials are annotated with a star icon, indicating that they are considered to be the most recommended for their career phase. ACT receives these starred credentials directly from the Army’s official credentialing source system, the Credentialing Opportunity Online.

- **Added joint professional military education on PDMs and career maps.** Soldiers preparing for broadening assignments in a joint environment can view joint professional military education opportunities in their PDMs and career maps. ACT is also helping leaders achieve their goal of tracking and managing their subordinates through—

  - **Two-way leader and mentor requests.** Leaders and mentors can directly request that first-line subordinates and mentees link up in ACT. For users to access the application, their first-line leader must be identified in ACT. Additionally, first-line leader linkups are necessary to approve Soldiers’ individual development plans, which is an annual requirement outlined in Army Regulation 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development*.
• **Training validation and completion input.** Leaders can validate completed training for subordinates, which will be populated in their ACT career records. Completion types include Army Regulation 350-1 mandatory training, transition requirements, and Total Army Sponsorship Program sponsor training.

• **Exportable profiles.** Soldiers can export their ACT profile into a document, which they can then use as a resume template and their leaders can use as they populate their leader books.

Lastly, I would like to announce that, on behalf of myself; the Commandant and Chief of the Military Police Corps Regiment, Brigadier General Vereen; and the Regimental Chief Warrant Officer, Regimental Chief Warrant Officer Fitz, we will be hosting the 76th Military Police Competitive Challenge, 16–20 September 2017, at Fort Leonard, Wood, Missouri. This event will recognize the Regiment’s best Soldier (private through specialist) and noncommissioned officer (corporal through sergeant first class) over a 3-day competition. The event is limited to a maximum of 58 attendees (29 Soldiers/29 noncommissioned officers) in temporary duty status, with no more than two competitors from each installation; exceptions are installations with two major commands (such as Joint Base Lewis–McChord, 6th Military Police Group, and 42d Military Police Brigade). Due to a temporary duty cap issue, no sponsors, coaches, or unit representatives will be allowed to attend. Attendance is on a first-come, first-served basis and will be based on registration. The 76th Military Police Competitive Challenge will consist of a physical endurance assessment, written tests, hands-on warrior tasks and battle drills, weapons qualification, a land navigation course, an obstacle course, and battlefield forensics. This competition is open to all MOS 31-series Regular Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve Soldiers.

Again, I am honored to serve in this great Regiment, and I remain committed to providing viable solutions to the Army as it affects the Military Police Corps and our enlisted population.

Of the Troops, For the Troops.
Assist, Protect, Defend—Preserve the Force!

Endnote:


(“Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment . . .,” continued from page 2)

• Expands collaboration efforts with federal, joint, interagency, and multinational partners.

• Maintains a high sense of Regimental pride across military police formations.

The future of the Military Police Corps is extremely bright, and I cannot think of a better branch of the military of which to be a part—a critical enabler to Army mission success! As I close, I want to personally thank the more than 50,000 military police members and Department of the Army civilians serving at home and abroad for your service! I am honored to have served with you all, and I look forward to seeing the Military Police Corps on full display, making its mark in the annals of history—our Army needs us. Remember our Soldiers who are serving in military operations across the world and their Families; we are still a nation at war. MP6 signing off of the net!

Assist, Protect, and Defend—Preserve the Force!
In line with one of our Commandant’s enduring priorities, we continue to focus on developing unique capabilities that offer the Army what is needed to support maneuver. In doing so, we must understand that crime has a direct impact on readiness, whether it be personnel, equipment, or systems readiness. The threats we currently face, and those yet unknown, produce complex environments in which our military police force must operate. The effects of illicit drug use, sexual assault, contract fraud, property theft, and cyber attacks are detrimental to the Army’s ability to increase and maintain readiness on and off the battlefield.

The U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, is teaching basic “battlefield forensics” to initial-entry military police Soldiers. These basic evidence identification, collection, documentation, and preservation techniques are preparing these young Soldiers for current (law enforcement) and future (expeditionary) mission requirements.

Each day, our Regiment provides the assistance, protection, and defense necessary to combat these threats to readiness. Our military police and U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID) special agents are working right now to deal with the criminal elements that threaten the Total Army.

As we look toward the future and the role that our Regiment will play in combating criminal threats, one thing we recognize is the need for expeditionary forensic capabilities. But what does this mean exactly? Part of the answer to combating criminal threats is the use of expeditionary forensic facilities, positioned in locations where they can provide rapid feedback to maneuver commanders given the mission to defeat or deny enemy forces, many of which could be considered sophisticated criminal organizations. The Forensic Expeditionary Division (FXD), Defense Forensic Science Center, Forest Park, Georgia, is forward deployed and currently providing latent print, deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), firearms, and chemical analysis to operational forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, where the threat is most obvious. The forensic-enabled intelligence that FXD provides has been instrumental in identifying individuals and networks responsible for attacking U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. As we seek to enhance this capability and improve upon our support to maneuver, we must look at doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) solutions that address the need to take expeditionary forensics farther forward on the battlefield.

One of the greatest privileges I have, and one of the most exciting, is having a role in the development of these future capabilities. The expansion of our current forensic capability from law enforcement toward unified land operations will certainly require an integrated effort across the Regiment. Developing the roles, responsibilities, and mission sets of our military police and CID units presents unique challenges for our Regiment—challenges we must face together as we work toward solutions that address these irregular and criminal threats.

During recent travel to Europe; Fort Riley, Kansas; and Fort Carson, Colorado, the Commandant, Regimental Command Sergeant Major, and I had the privilege of visiting with military police and CID units executing all three of our core competencies: policing, investigations, and corrections. In spite of many challenges, the Soldiers and civilians assigned at these locations conduct garrison policing, detention, security and mobility support, engineering (yes, engineering), and investigative operations to the highest standard and with the utmost professionalism. I am regularly amazed by the commitment and competence of those young, first-term Soldiers entrusted with law enforcement and detention duties. Their ability to comprehend the mission, understand their responsibility and authority, and execute their duties with tact and confidence, is truly remarkable. For those wondering why I mentioned engineering among the list of operations conducted, it’s not an error. The 15th Engineer Battalion, Grafenwoehr, Germany, one of the busiest engineer units in the Army, is subordinate to the 18th Military Police Brigade. Whether in support of current operations or exercises with North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners, these “military police engineers” conduct bridging operations and route reconnaissance and build facilities in European nations such as Estonia and Lithuania. I am proud to have such dedicated, highly skilled Soldiers as part of our Regiment.

In addition to addressing future capability needs, we continue to review, enhance, and improve the investigative training and professional military education we provide as an institute of learning. Newly acquired crime scene equipment is being...
integrated into training, and students will soon have the opportunity to learn how to operate and employ this new technology. Graduates will be better prepared for the operational environment. Emphasis has been placed on exploring ways to improve the technical training within our Warrant Officer Basic and Warrant Officer Advanced Courses, resulting in graduates who are better prepared for future assignments as team chiefs, special agents in charge, detachment commanders, and battalion staff officers.

I frequently call on our operational units for input and recommendations on ways we can make things better—and many have responded. I appreciate the feedback and have been using these ideas to help shape discussion. During the next calendar year, we will be convening several critical task site selection boards to analyze some of our investigative training and warrant officer professional military education. These boards require the participation of Soldiers and civilians from the operational force, and we need highly qualified, highly motivated personnel willing to share and debate their ideas on how to best shape training and education. So, consider what you have to offer and how serious you are about making a difference and be prepared to answer the call when it comes.

In closing, I want to thank each of you for your sacrifice and commitment to the Army and to the Regiment. Your professionalism is evident through comments received from senior leadership across the Army. Your contributions, exceptional performance, and dedication to preserving the force are not unrecognized or unappreciated. Thank you!

Do What Has To Be Done—Preserve the Force!

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Scan the QR code or access the online form at <http://www.wood.army.mil/digital_mpsubscribe.htm>.
While most people rang in the New Year by spending time with their friends and families, more than 80 Soldiers from the 552d Military Police Company, 728th Military Police Battalion, 8th Military Police Brigade, 8th Theater Sustainment Command, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, commemorated the start of the New Year by quietly deploying on their long-awaited, yearlong mission as the Task Force Talon security force in Guam. The 552d Military Police Company “Peacekeepers” officially cased their colors during a deployment ceremony on 8 December 2016. The event was scheduled early to provide Soldiers more time with their Families during the holidays before their departure on New Year’s Day.

In order to support the U.S. Pacific Command security force mission in Guam and additional mission requirements in the region, the 552d Military Police Company was split in half. One half of the company, dubbed Team Shield, remained at Schofield Barracks for various local and regional missions. The other half of the company, Team Sword, supported operations in Guam.

“I am very proud of you and your dedication as you have prepared for these missions. Your training, education, and experiences have you more than ready for this journey. Trust in it,” said Lieutenant Colonel Chad Froehlich, commander, 728th Military Police Battalion, during the December deployment ceremony. Froehlich praised the Soldiers’ capabilities and said that he knew that the Peacekeepers were the unit to take on this critical mission set. “I have faith in your leadership, competence, [and] courage and absolute faith in your determination,” said Froehlich.

Captain Joseph Price, company commander, said he was proud and very confident in his Soldiers’ ability to successfully complete their missions. “Peacekeepers, I am extremely thankful to soldier with you. Your talents are endless, and your mental fortitude has set the tone for our success. Thank you,” said Price.

Price also acknowledged the sacrifices of the Families and expressed his appreciation directly to the spouses of the Peacekeeper Soldiers. “You allow [me] and the [first sergeant] a lot of your spouses’ time away from you, and I will not forget it. I am grateful to have you on their team for when they return home, and I can assure you that those deploying on the Guam mission will be in good hands,” said Price.

One Soldier’s wife said that being away from her husband, a sergeant, for any length of time was difficult and that it was even more so now that they have kids. “It’s going to be hard; we are a team,” she said.

The sergeant said he was actually feeling excited despite the stresses that he knows he will face while being away from his Family. “I’m looking forward to the experience, gaining new knowledge, and building up the team cohesion with my Soldiers,” he said.

Team Sword will serve as the Task Force Talon security force, offering many opportunities for increased readiness in core military police competencies. This deployment is the first for most of the Soldiers in the company, but there is little doubt that they are more than ready for the challenges ahead. The first sergeant and Price were impressed on a daily basis; “Peacekeepers, . . . you are truly the best Soldiers to complete this mission,” said Price.

Staff Sergeant Hill is the public affairs operations noncommissioned officer for the 8th Military Police Brigade.
Institutional Education in Combat: The Afghan National Army Military Police School

By Captain John P. Brost, Sergeant First Class Robert A. Villarreal, and Staff Sergeant Alejandra Johnson

Institutional education is the foundation upon which all future operational experiences and professional self-development is built, and it is critical to the survivability of young Soldiers and leaders in combat. Institutional education is one area that U.S. forces use to distinguish themselves from adversaries and allies. It is evident during overseas operations that U.S. forces perform at a higher level of proficiency and operational tempo than others. Acknowledging the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) role in our performance is the first step in facilitating the improved performance of our allies and increasing global security. After 16 years of leading combat operations in Afghanistan, we and our multinational allies are now performing a support role in training, assisting, and advising (TAA) throughout Afghanistan. Our Afghan counterparts at the Afghan National Army Training, Education, and Doctrine Command (ANATEDC) and Afghan military occupation schools are also taking on this support role throughout the country. ANATEDC, the Afghan equivalent to TRADOC, oversees the operation, curriculum, resourcing, and table of distributions and allowances of all Afghan military occupation schools. The current emphasis being placed on doctrinal education for the Afghan Army is commendable; it will help escalate future strategic and tactical successes.

An assessment team from the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, spent 7 days in March of 2017 gauging the effectiveness and quality of training conducted at the Afghan National Army Military Police School (ANAMPS). The team reviewed policy and doctrine, curricula, instructor training, facilities, and training areas and provided recommendations to a multinational TAA command. ANAMPS had recently relocated from Kabul and selected a new commandant with ANATEDC experience to ensure the peak operation of ANAMPS and a higher quality of trained Afghan military police. At the time of the visit, ANAMPS was offering 11 courses (basic military police training, a military police noncommissioned officer course, a basic officer leader course, a commander’s course, personal security training, a traffic accident investigations course, an investigations course, corrections course, a provost marshal operations course, a law enforcement desk course, and a marksmanship course). Courses are taught on a rotational basis with some instructors leading multiple courses each year.

ANAMPS bases its curricula and training around U.S. military police doctrine. This allowed for a productive assessment due to the team’s combined subject matter expertise on all military police doctrine. The school operates with a program of instruction and cadre structure similar to USAMPS and follows a crawl-walk-run approach with all topics instructed and trained. These methods and operating procedures created a great base from which to initiate and expand institutional topics of discussion. Although the team was tasked to assess, they were able to share personal experiences that had an immediate impact on the school. Contrary to what many may believe, ANAMPS has a structured administrative in-processing and in-depth training schedule that uses lesson plans and approved slides for each block of instruction. Students are also tested at ANAMPS; but due to the various dialects and languages spoken, they are required to perform tasks instead of pass written examinations. The USAMPS team was impressed with the level of detail that was provided to Afghan instructors for instruction and training.

The strength of ANAMPS is its instructor cadre. All instructors possess numerous years of institutional teaching experience and have demonstrated the positive qualities and skills required to successfully instruct and produce effective military police. The instructors are knowledgeable and motivated, and they maintain a command presence that instills confidence in their students. The team attended multiple blocks of professionally led instruction with high student retention rates. The USAMPS team conducted separate sensing sessions with the instructors and the students. The team discovered that, to a certain extent, ANAMPS instructors have some of the same concerns that USAMPS instructors often have, but the largest obstacle that ANAMPS faces is a lack of resources. Many of the ANAMPS instructors felt that, with proper equipment and resources, they could increase the students’ retention of the curriculum, better assist those who learn better with hands-on practical exercises, conduct more realistic training, and increase the recognition of ANAMPS professionalism throughout the Afghan National Army.
Upon completion of the 7-day assessment, the USAMPS team conducted an out briefing for the ANAMPS commandant. The briefing highlighted many of the strengths of the school and provided recommendations for areas that could be enhanced to increase the effectiveness and credibility of the school. ANAMPS has not received TAA support in almost 5 years. The ANAMPS commandant believes that the school can reach its full potential with TAA and resource assistance. The final mission out briefing with a report on the school’s success and recommendations for enhancements was presented to the multinational commander of all TAA elements in Afghanistan. A recommendation for a TAA package that would create a permanent partnership between ANAMPS and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and ensure that the school is teaching updated and relevant doctrine was also presented.

References:

Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development, 19 August 2014.


Captain Brost is currently attending the Command and General Staff Officers’ Course, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. His previous assignment was as a small-group leader for USAMPS. He holds a master’s degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University.

Sergeant First Class Villarreal is the senior training management noncommissioned officer for the Command and Tactics Division, USAMPS. He is due to complete his bachelor’s degree in psychology from Missouri University of Science and Technology next fall.

Staff Sergeant Johnson is a corrections/detentions instructor at Company C, 701st Military Police Battalion, Fort Leonard Wood. She is due to complete her degree in general studies this fall.

Afghanistan is a crucial ally in the War on Terror, and it requires strategic and tactical support in order to defeat our common adversary. This support begins at the institutional level with lessons learned and updated doctrine that has been proven at home and overseas. Instilling proper tactics, techniques, and procedures as well as sound doctrinal training early on impacts the survivability and fighting effectiveness of Afghan soldiers. A better-led, well-trained Afghan army force allows its multinational allies to take a support role in the fight on terrorism in the Afghan operational environment and to allocate their resources elsewhere. Although we no longer lead the fight in the operational arena, we can take the lead in the institutional arena to ensure that our allies receive premier TAA support and continue to fight shoulder-to-shoulder in the longest war.
The launched-electrode stun device (LESD) is the official Army term (and acronym) for a conducted electrical weapon (CEW). The TASER®, a well-known example of an CEW, is a civilian law enforcement tool that was originally developed in 1974 by former National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) researcher, Mr. John “Jack” H. Cover, Jr. He derived the name from the Thomas A. Swift electric rifle used by his childhood hero, Tom Swift.¹

After receiving requests from deployed forces for a nonlethal method to incapacitate noncombatant civilians without causing serious physical harm, the LESD was developed for Army use in 2004. The intent was to deescalate situations that might otherwise get out of control. When control of unruly personnel is necessary, blunt-impact weapons or chemical sprays may be counterproductive or may have residual effects on bystanders or those employing the weapons.

The TASER M26™, which was used by civilian law enforcement officers across the country, was the initial CEW of choice. However, technology moves swiftly in electronics-based industries and CEWs are no exception. During the early stages of testing, the manufacturer, TASER International, developed a more compact, efficient, and reliable CEW. This more advanced device, the TASER X26™, replaced the older model.

The Army effort to procure and field the LESD capability to military police resulted in the selection of the TASER X26 model. Its advanced technology provided greater probability of achieving the required effect—neuromuscular incapacitation—with a low risk of serious injury. Fielding of the LESD, primarily to military police units, began in August 2013 and, for the most part, was completed in early 2015.

During new-equipment fielding events, more than 12,000 LESDs were fielded to military police and other military units; more than 2,400 Soldiers were trained as users and unit trainers, and more than 1,300 of those Soldiers experienced the effects of the weapon. But not all Soldiers who were trained “took a ride” (an expression for being exposed to the weapon). The Army does not require exposure to receive the training; however, some local policies may dictate exposure if a Soldier is to carry an LESD while performing law and order or other security duties.

As the fielding effort was coming to a close, TASER International discontinued the manufacture of the X26 model. The Army purchased enough TASER X26s to equip and sustain the Military Police Corps; however, the demand later expanded to Department of the Army civilian police, medical command security guards, and materiel command security guards. The Army now requires more LESDs, but is unable to purchase more of the discontinued device.

The question of when the Army will acquire new LESDs is frequently asked, but obtaining the required Army funding is time-consuming. Therefore, it will take time to fulfill the increased need. The Program Manager Close Combat Systems, Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, and the Army Nonlethal Scalable Effects Center, U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, are working together to provide, through redistribution and cross-leveling, additional LESDs required by Army Soldiers and civilians.

Another frequently asked question is how to acquire additional training cartridges for the LESD. At one time, a unit could order cartridges directly from the manufacturer or supplier; but since the approval of the LESD as an official Army program, that is no longer possible. The TASER XP25™ cartridge is the only cartridge authorized for the LESD. The Army classified the TASER XP25 cartridge as Class V ammunition. All ammunition must be forecasted and requested through the Total Ammunition Management Information System. Units should use the Total Ammunition Management Information System process to request the cartridges required for training. In order to maintain and increase authorized cartridge training allocations, units must use the full training allocation available to them. If units require more cartridges than the currently authorized quantities, they should request them as an exception.

In summary, the only way to increase the training cartridge authorization for the LESD is to conduct training at the unit level, expend the authorized number of cartridges, request additional cartridges when needed, and document a shortfall if additional quantities are needed and unavailable.

When Soldiers train to proficiency and employ the LESD according to Army, installation, and unit policies, the LESD is a reliable, efficient, nonlethal weapon. The LESD is highly effective at deescalating a use-of-force situation and preventing serious injury to subjects, bystanders, and law enforcement/security personnel.

Endnote:

¹Victor Appleton, Tom Swift and His Electric Rifle, Grosset and Dunlap Publishers, New York, 1911.

Mr. Gerspach is a nonlethal weapons specialist at the Army Nonlethal Scalable Effects Center. He served 21 years in the Military Police Corps and retired in 2003. He is the combat developer for the LESD program.
Supplement and Demand:
The Absent Principle in Determining the USAREUR Military Police Shortage

By Captain Thomas E. Dickson

There are two crippling factors that military police in the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) have been facing for the last decade—an ever-dwindling number of permanent military police Soldiers and an ever-increasing law enforcement and operational manpower commitment. These two factors, a decreasing supply and an increasing demand, leave any military police leader privy to this “perfect storm” of personnel deficit with one rudimentary fact: USAREUR is running out of military police, and it is taking a toll on our formations.

There are roughly 100,000 Army Service members, Family members, Department of Defense employees, contractors, and other personnel who access one of the 13 permanent USAREUR Army garrisons on a daily basis. Yet, less than 1,000 military police officers are responsible for the safety and security of those personnel. This means that even if every military police officer worked law enforcement every single day, the ratio of military police to personnel would be approximately 1:100. However, that work schedule is far from realistic. Just accounting for mandatory days off lowers the “achievable ratio” closer to 1:600.

To gain a perspective on these numbers, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that our civilian law enforcement counterparts average a 1:400 ratio. The U.S. Army Installation Management Command–Europe has recommended a much lower ratio limit of 1:1,000, which unintentionally obscures military police personnel shortages. Keep in mind that the aforementioned 1:600 achievable ratio does not account for time a Soldier needs to train, attend schools, complete professional development, or participate in any other operational missions. Those tasks that are not accounted for will, of course, be prioritized differently by every military police leader. At least some of those tasks must take place in a combat support military police company (pushing the achievable ratio even lower). This is the statistical situation in which USAREUR military police units currently find themselves. To understand why it is a problem, and why it is not improving, we must look at supply and demand.

In USAREUR, the supply part is understandably easy, although that makes it no less important. In fact, the supply portion of the military police equation seems elementary; over the last 5 years, military police Soldiers permanently stationed in USAREUR have decreased by close to 20 percent. The decrease is a result of the inactivation of two battalions and several companies and the loss of hundreds of military police personnel billets. Coupled with a simultaneously increased emphasis on the European area of operations, the reduction has left a severe supply shortage of military police throughout the USAREUR footprint. This personnel shortage is a huge contributor to the ever-decreasing law enforcement ratio discussed earlier, but it is not the sole culprit for the current predicament. The more complex issue, and subsequently the more difficult one to understand and improve, resides in the demand side of the military police equation. Military police in USAREUR face two constantly increasing demand functions:

- Law enforcement requirements of Directorate of Emergency Services (DES)/garrison commanders.
- Operational requirements of combat support units.

The DES/garrison goal is simple: minimize the risk the garrison faces in the law enforcement world. The DES/garrison do not (nor are they expected or required to) acknowledge any other demands—they focus on their mission. The law enforcement mission, coupled with an increased emphasis on the security of the European area of operations, has resulted in the only USAREUR military police brigade being designated as a theater-committed unit. This designation means that the brigade does not prioritize any missions that occur outside of the USAREUR area of operations. It also means that DES directors and garrison commanders try to use the entire supply of military police for their singular mission.

The complex security environment and volatile force protection conditions that USAREUR faces have caused DES directors and garrison commanders to enact policies of risk mitigation centered on antiterrorism and force protection conditions that constantly drive manning requirements higher. The increased requirements have been left relatively unchecked and have inadvertently contributed to an astronomical increased demand on USAREUR military police. To understand how massive an effect this has had on military police formations in USAREUR, consider the example of the 92d Military Police Company, one of the largest military police companies in USAREUR. Over the past 4 years, the 92d
has reduced its active patrol areas by more than 200 square kilometers, yet has simultaneously increased its daily law enforcement commitment by 21 patrols a day.\(^4\)

The reason for this inefficient distribution is simple. Higher-echelon leaders have made force protection and installation security top priorities, which DES directors and garrison commanders have translated as “more military police.” That may seem like an overly simplistic interpretation, but it certainly briefs well. When a leader asks how a garrison is increasing force protection or ensuring the safety of its troops, the easiest answer is “we are increasing military police patrols,” a simple line that has far-reaching consequences of exhausting the military police supply. However, the law enforcement requirement is only half of the demand function that USAREUR military police must navigate.

The operational side of the military police mission in USAREUR has grown just as large as the increased law enforcement commitment (if not larger). Given the heightened threat environment, huge multinational exercises have become the norm for USAREUR. In the past 5 years, USAREUR has spearheaded or participated in dozens of joint and multinational training events and USAREUR military police are not immune to the increased operational tempo. Port and convoy security, route reconnaissance, and even gap-crossing missions have all used USAREUR military police units. These missions have all required equipment, expertise and, most importantly, personnel. USAREUR leadership has made it clear that these types of events and exercises are critical in today’s security environment and will continue to be executed and expanded, which means, once again, more military police.

So we have a dwindling supply and a two-pronged, increasing demand. We do not need an economist to tell us what that means: USAREUR military police face an unsustainable manpower commitment that eliminates their combat effectiveness and mission readiness. Thankfully, a number of leaders have recognized this; and although it’s not as openly acknowledged as some think it should be, there have been attempts to make improvements.

The first temporary stopgap measure involved bringing in more military police. Over the last 3 years, several Regular Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve military police units have rotated into USAREUR for 1- to 9-month tours. These overseas deployment training (ODT) units are expensive, and logistical planning usually requires 12 to 18 months of notice. The ODT rotations were initially created to shoulder a portion of the law enforcement commitment and allow the permanently stationed units time to conduct training at the squad, platoon, and company levels. But recently, the rotating units have taken precedence over the permanent units in a number of operational commitments—a number of ODT units rotated to USAREUR and plugged directly into the operational training events, while permanently stationed units received no manpower assistance or opportunity to train themselves. There are still some ODT units whose sole purpose is to contribute law enforcement manpower to permanently stationed units; however, local leaders have often simultaneously increased the law enforcement requirement so that the permanent unit receives little, if any, actual manpower benefit.

Another major attempt to improve the situation was less costly, but more effective: transitioning the 18th Military Police Brigade Commander to serve as the brigade commander and USAREUR provost marshal. This transition attempted to link the brigade and provost marshal’s office with the demand function for USAREUR military police. The redesignation has helped to bridge the gap between the two competing demands, but improvement is still needed. Each garrison still has its own commander, provost marshal, and DES; and their priorities are still their own law enforcement needs. The question of how in-depth the manpower demands can be synchronized at such a high echelon of command remains to be seen, but dual-hatting this position has significant potential.

Despite these efforts to improve the current situation, there is still much work to be done if the outlook for USAREUR military police units is to improve in the foreseeable future. The simplest solution is to increase the number of military police permanently stationed in USAREUR, possibly reactivating one of the companies or battalions that was deactivated in the last 5 years. However, a solution focusing on the supply side of the equation will ultimately be determined by budgets, something not easily influenced by military police leaders. So with that in mind, we must dig into the deeper, more intricate demand side for plausible solutions.

In regard to the law enforcement aspect of the demand function, it is important that we as military police leaders at every level accurately articulate the capabilities of our formations. This includes conveying the message to higher-echelon leaders who determine acceptable levels of risk that our men and women are a finite resource. Successful solutions should incorporate maintaining active crime statistics to show under- or over-utilization in areas, participating in all manpower and policing policy discussions, and gaining the trust of community leaders based on exercised expertise. In garrison, commanders are enamored with broad concepts of force protection and preventive policing and solutions must be effective (the use of metal detectors should be encouraged, more thorough gate and vehicle checks should be maintained, and classes should be taught to units tasked with troop diversion duties). The goal is not to shirk law enforcement duties, but to showcase that sometimes reverting back to the simple solution of more military police is not necessarily the best option.

The operational piece of the demand function is a bit more controllable because it relies mostly on military police leaders and their priorities. The simple ability to say “yes” to operational events that are beneficial and “no” to those that merely add a tally in the participation category is critical. This is often difficult due to heavy and multidirectional pressure from echelon commanders to participate. Military

(Continued on page 14)
Back in September 1970, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked three international flights on three different airlines: British Overseas Airways, Trans World Airlines (TWA), and Swiss Air. The hijacked aircraft were forced to fly to the Jordan Desert, where they were blown up and destroyed. This did not sit well with President Richard Nixon, who ordered that, effective immediately, all U.S. international flights and selected domestic flights would be protected by armed sky marshals.

The Federal Aviation Administration was designated as the lead for the program, and federal law enforcement personnel were immediately drafted into the program. The Treasury Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Marshal Service, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, and several other agencies provided all the personnel they could, but the numbers were not enough. An additional 1,000 sky marshals were needed. The Department of Defense was then tasked. The U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force provided about 200 personnel with a career field in law enforcement; and the U.S. Army provided more than 800 military police.

The qualifications were high: a rank of staff sergeant or above, a general technical (GT) score of 125 or above, expert qualification with a handgun, a physical training score of 250 or higher, and the passing of an oral interview that showed one's ability to function as an undercover civilian on international flights.

Following acceptance, personnel from all branches of the Service went through a 7-day training program at Fort Dix, New Jersey. Training included hijacker profiles, hand-to-hand combat training, firearms training (including target shooting in a retired Boeing 707 located at the nearby McGuire Air Force Base, Trenton, New Jersey), and a crash course on how to fly an airplane. Military police got a civilian clothing and baggage allowance and a nice temporary duty advance. On Day 8, the new sky marshals were sent on their way after being sworn in as Deputy U.S. Marshals.

At the time, I was stationed in the 759th Military Police Battalion, Fort Dix, and due to my proximity to the training location, I was in the first class. Sky marshals were assigned to a specific airline that took charge of scheduling. My partner, another staff sergeant from the 759th, and I were assigned to TWA, and we flew the international routes. We alternated between first class and coach—one of us in first class and the other in coach. We went to crew briefings where we met the flight crew, and then we moved to the terminal and blended in with the other passengers.

Of course, the duty was undercover and a sky marshal had to have a good cover story. I was a young-looking 25-year-old at the time, so I had to develop a good story for traveling first class. Airline employees traveled in first class when deadheading (flying as a passenger on company business) or when traveling on pass. So I became a “TWA employee” from TWA Cargo, traveling on a pass or for temporary duty at some other airport. I did my homework on TWA Cargo and printed business cards for my cover story. A sky marshal had to be good at portraying his cover story because a favorite pastime of passengers was playing the “guess the sky marshal” game. About the time I thought they might be zeroing in on me, I would order a drink and the stewardess would bring me a virgin Bloody Mary or a mix-it-yourself drink with ice tea in a miniature bottle. The flight crew was great at helping a sky marshal hold his cover, even to the point of telling the sky marshal that he or she had had enough to drink.

Our orders were not to get involved in any disruption unless it involved an overt attempt to take over the aircraft. Intelligence officers warned that a disturbance might be staged to draw out the sky marshals. This possibility was sometimes a challenge for the young cop in me because, from time-to-time, people could be downright mean and ugly. I must say that I honed my negotiation skills as I watched the stewardesses defuse some ugly incidents. We never had a hijack attempt, and only once did I get involved in an incident. One night, flying first class from London to New York on a 100 percent full 707 flight, a young man from coach entered first class and was stopped by the stewardess. He said that there was a line for the bathroom in the back and that he wanted to use the first-class facility. She blocked
Master Sergeant Gillam is a retired 20-year veteran of the Military Police Corps and a graduate of the old Military Police School at Fort Gordon, Georgia. Following his military retirement, he spent a second 20 years with the Hinesville Police Department, Georgia. He retired from the police department in 2006, and he spends his time traveling and writing. He is the author of Fool Me Once, Never Twice.

police leaders must understand the difference in payoffs between simply joining a cross-country, highway convoy and actively contributing to the operational and tactical betterment of their Soldiers. This is arguably the only way that military police leaders will be able to keep pace with and stabilize the growing operational commitments in today’s fluid security environment.

Overall, the situation faced by USAREUR military police formations is a microcosm of similar struggles faced by the Regiment across the globe, but the last few years have put USAREUR military police very close to the tipping point. If there is any help for USAREUR military police to continue to be the forbearers of the Regiment’s multitooled and combat-effective disposition in the European area of operations, there must be a concerted effort toward that goal. The good news is that there is still a very real opportunity to understand and embrace the simple economics of supply and demand in the military police world; we just need the principle.

Endnotes:


3USAREUR Message No. 1501051, Modification 1 to USAREUR Operation Order 0054-14 (Fiscal Year 2015 Community Law Enforcement), 22 January 2015.

4In 2014, the active patrol area per daily manpower equaled approximately 300 square kilometers per 18 military police in the 492d Military Police Company; in 2017, the active patrol area per daily manpower equaled approximately 66 square kilometers per 39 military police.

Captain Dickson served as a platoon leader and executive officer for the 92d Military Police Company, Kaiserslautern, Germany, and he is currently attending the Marine Expeditionary Warfare School in Quantico, Virginia.
Suicide is an eternal enigma. There are three classifications of suicide:

- **General suicide.** In these types of suicides, the subjects kill themselves. A clear majority of suicides fall into this category.
- **Murder/suicide.** In these types of suicides, subjects kill other people and then kill themselves, normally as a result of a domestic incident or sometimes a workplace incident.
- **Suicide by cop.** In these types of suicides, the police become the instrument of death.

For law enforcement, incidents of suicide are normally straightforward. Once investigated, the cases are generally resolved. However, there is one type of suicide that not only destroys the life of the subject but can also consume everyone else involved in the incident. This type of suicide is referred to as “suicide by cop.” In suicide-by-cop cases, the police become the instrument of death. During incidents of suicide by cop, the suicidal person sets up and advances his or her plan until law enforcement officers are forced to shoot and kill the subject. This occurs at the point in which the police officer fears for the safety of others or for his or her own life. The situation often becomes a matter of self-preservation; thus, the officer shoots the subject. While serving as a senior criminal intelligence analyst in the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID), I reviewed numerous suicide-by-cop cases that occurred on the installation or were committed by Soldiers off the installation.

Incidents of suicide by cop are sometimes elaborately constructed events. The subject maintains an elevated level of stress until the police officer believes that his or her only option is to eliminate the threat (the subject).

Suicide by cop was first studied and written about as “suicide by means of victim-precipitated homicide.” In this initial study, M. E. Wolfgang reviewed the files of the Philadelphia Police Department for records of 588 consecutive criminal homicides committed between 1 January 1948 and 31 December 1952. Within these cases, Wolfgang found that 150 homicides (26 percent) were victim-precipitated homicides. Wolfgang identified various factors that he believed enabled one to distinguish between homicide and suicide by means of victim-precipitated homicide. During the 1980s, as incidents of victim-precipitated homicide became more commonplace and as the number of deaths by police increased, these incidents took on the name “suicide by cop.”

The principal difference between suicide by cop and other types of police shootings may be in the intensity level of the incident. In other incidents of police shootings, the subject spends his or her energy attempting to flee to freedom or to shoot and kill the police officer. In incidents of suicide by cop, the subject’s energy is spent attempting to force the officer to kill the subject. The subject will not harm the officer; the officer is the means of his or her suicide. If a second officer or a civilian is present, the subject may harm them in order to increase the stress on the officer and the likelihood he or she will be killed.

In cases of suicide by cop, research has shown the significance of the subject’s history and the present events. There are five factors to be considered when reviewing the history of the subject:

- Mental or chronic physical illness.
- Drug or alcohol use.
- Low socioeconomic background.
- Previous suicide attempts.
- Criminal history.

The presence of three of these five factors can cause the case to be considered a suicide-by-cop incident.

There are 12 factors to be considered when reviewing present events:

- The incident is initiated by the subject or a third party, not by the police.
- A precipitating event occurred to ensure police response.
- The subject forces a confrontation.
- The subject initiates an aggressive action.
- The subject threatens a police officer with a weapon.
- The subject advances toward a police officer.
- The subject refuses to drop a weapon.
- The subject threatens a citizen.
- The subject possesses a deadly weapon.
- The subject has experienced recent stressors.
- The subject injures a police officer or a citizen.
- A police officer retreats.

The presence of eight of these 12 areas can cause the case to be ruled a suicide-by-cop incident.

There are two case types in which suicide by cop manifests itself—hostage/barricade incidents and incidents of direct confrontation in which there is no time for escalation.
to a hostage/barricade incident. In incidents in which the subject has barricaded himself or herself or is holding hostages, the negotiator, over time, sees the incident progress to the point that a tactical option is the only available solution. During the incident, the intelligence officer should be the first to pick up on the possibility of a suicide-by-cop situation based on interviews with the primary officer and other officers on-scene and on checks conducted through the agency criminal records division. As the incident progresses, if the subject does not get his or her wish (to die at the hands of the police), he or she begins to harm hostages in order to force a police response. (See Vignette 1.) In the second case type, officers do not have the chance to put together all of the facts that would enable them to identify the situation as a suicide-by-cop incident. These incidents are very fluid, and they unfold rapidly. (See Vignette 2.)

When the intelligence officer or any other member of the incident scene has reason to believe that the situation is possibly a suicide-by-cop incident, this information should be immediately presented to the on-scene commander. Upon receipt of this information, the on-scene commander, along with the negotiation team and tactical team advisor, should review the incident to ensure that no opportunity exists for the subject to force his or her death and to identify any probable future opportunities (within the current situation) for a suicide-by-cop incident to occur. Every police officer on-scene must be informed if the case is believed to be a suicide-by-cop incident.

As with other suicides, the subject may be experiencing acute (less than 6 months) or chronic (6 months or more) life stressors. Suicide by cop is still suicide; only the instrument of the suicide differs. The question is, if the subject is armed, why doesn't he or she harm the police officer? One possible reason is that the police officer is the weapon and by harming (disabling) the police officer, the subject neutralizes the weapon.

In conclusion, although diagnostic criteria for incidents of suicide by cop can be identified, there is still no way to take this knowledge and produce an intervention strategy that can assist police officers in defusing these incidents. These incidents are very fluid in nature, and police officers may not have time to put the puzzle pieces together in order to produce an alternative other than death. The law enforcement

Vignette 1. Hostage/Barricade Case Study

A 28-year-old male subject holds two children hostage. One child is his 4-year-old son by a previous girlfriend, and the second child is his girlfriend’s 2-year-old daughter. In February 1994, the subject and the two children are in the apartment that he shares with his girlfriend. The subject is abusing cocaine and drinking alcohol.

The girlfriend returns home and is confronted by the subject. During the confrontation, the subject assaults his girlfriend and fires a handgun at her. The girlfriend flees the house, and neighbors call the police. When the police respond to the address, they meet the subject’s girlfriend in the street, and she informs them about what has occurred. The subject then appears in the doorway of the apartment and points the handgun at the police officers. The officers retreat behind their vehicle and call for assistance. The subject then goes back into his apartment. Responding officers secure the perimeter and call for police negotiators and the quick-response team.

During the operation, intelligence officers discover that the subject has an extensive history of violence, numerous weapons and narcotics violation charges, and a history of prior involuntary mental health commitments—and that the female hostage is the daughter of an inmate who has been sending love letters to the subject’s girlfriend.

During negotiation, the subject repeatedly holds the female hostage up to the apartment window. Each time the subject returns to the window, he escalates the violence directed toward the hostage. Approximately 1 hour into the incident, two gunshots ring out from inside the apartment. The subject then fires one shot out of the apartment window in the direction of the officers. Approximately 2 hours into the incident, the subject holds the female hostage in the window and forces the barrel of the handgun into her mouth. At this time, a police department marksman fires a single shot that strikes the subject in the mouth.

Vignette 2. Nonhostage/Barricade Direct-Confrontation Case Study

In April 1990, police officers receive a call about an incident involving a female subject who is chasing another female with a handgun. Upon arrival at the house, police officers find an 83-year-old woman with a .38 caliber handgun in her hand, standing in the living room. The officers instruct the subject to drop the weapon. Instead, she turns to the officers and advances toward them. The officers retreat from the living room and eventually out of the house and into a fenced in backyard, where they become cornered. The officers continue to order the subject to drop the weapon. Neighbors who hear the confrontation come outside and also request that the woman drop the weapon. Instead, the woman raises the weapon and starts to walk toward the cornered officers. At this time, the police officers fire, hitting and killing the subject.

The shooting investigation reveals that, on the morning of the incident, the subject had retrieved one of her handguns and told her 82-year-old sister that she was going to kill her and then commit suicide. The sister tells police that the subject had been suffering from a tumor and cataracts. Investigators also find that the subject is under an extensive regimen of prescription drugs.
agency must react swiftly after a suicide-by-cop incident. The dynamics of a suicide-by-cop incident must be explained to the community and to the officers involved. The purposes of this law enforcement agency action are to avoid unnecessary damage to the already strained relationship that exists between police officers and the community and to protect the mental health of the police officer.

Endnotes:


2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

Mr. Lindsay has studied and researched the subject of suicide for 44 years. He began his career in law enforcement as a military police Soldier in 1972. In 1978, he left the military to enter civilian law enforcement. After retiring from the Baltimore City Police Department in 1999, he entered federal law enforcement as a criminal intelligence specialist assigned to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. In 2008, he returned to military law enforcement, where he was assigned to the Command Intelligence Operations Center, CID, and finished his career working cold cases.

New Book Features the History of the U.S. Army Military Police Corps Regiment

Sponsored by the Military Police Regimental Association

The Military Police Regimental Association is sponsoring a new book, History of the U.S. Army Military Police Corps Regiment. This book will provide a detailed history of warrior police and will feature biographical narratives of the men and women who have served our country since 1941.

One of the Nation’s leading publishers of commemorative history books has been commissioned to oversee this landmark project. The book is being written by a team of our association’s most prominent members. In addition to the Corps’ colorful history, this exciting book will feature a special section showcasing biographies of military police veterans, with “then and now” photographs. Widows, friends, and Family members are also encouraged to send in biographical portraits and materials for their loved ones who have passed on—a perfect tribute to their veteran’s service to our Nation. There will be no cost to have biographies included.

Our book will feature veterans from all eras, from World War II to the deserts of the Middle East and the ongoing War on Terror. All military police veterans are encouraged to participate, even those who were active in peacetime. The book will also include special after action reports, stories, and photographs from members.

Biographies should be brief vignettes (up to 200 words) detailing the person’s military career and life after the military. Biographical submissions may also include two photographs, one during service and a current picture.

Historic photographs and general-interest stories of up to 1,000 words may also be submitted for the editor’s review. When sending photographs, please include your name, address, and a caption on the back of each. In addition, memorable stories or quotes from your time of service are encouraged.

This unique book will give us the opportunity to record our Regiment’s rich heritage, inspiring and educating future generations. Please send your biographies, stories, and photographs so that this book may be as complete as possible. Additional information can be located at <https://www.mpraonline.org/history-of-mpr-book/>. Please take advantage of this special opportunity to help document the rich legacy of the Military Police Corps!
We Fixed It While We Were Here, Our Corps Identity: A Solution

By First Lieutenant Trevin R. Hazel

“Well, my friend, at least we can say we fixed it while we were here.” My former supervisor/mentor said these words as we transitioned away from provost marshal positions. After our transitions, our previous sections moved in completely different directions from that in which we had been working for more than a year. We had significantly increased the security of garrison organizations while shaping brigade and division use of military police assets as rear area combat security. But after our departure, security became a lower priority; military police assets that had been attached to our previous sections went back to being used as mounted infantry and personal security.

My former supervisor’s words ring true in regard to the whole Military Police Corps. Every leader (company, battalion, brigade) has their own view of what the military police role should be for the Army. Some leaders believe in professional law enforcement, some leaders only want combat elements, and some leaders strive to balance the two; other leaders see increased detention operations proficiency as the future of the Corps. Unfortunately, it’s all local conjecture. With these differences comes an important debate to determine the future of our profession; however, the differences also bring strife, confusion, and inconsistency to Soldiers as their leaders change and, consequently, Soldier requirements change as the pendulum of the Corps identity swings in another direction.

In today’s global, expeditionary, largely garrison, budget-constrained environment, the Military Police Corps cannot afford to change its function on an annual to biannual basis. The Corps needs to identify and commit to its function across the force. The infantry attacks, defends, ambushes, and moves to contact; the cavalry reconnoiters, facilitates movement, and secures the flanks. The Military Police Corps needs to have a similar core set of tasks that support the maneuver element. However, with its garrison commitment, it must also determine how to implement law enforcement, investigations, and detention operations within its ranks to ensure the security of the force at home and overseas.

First, the Military Police Corps is not appropriately structured to support the maneuver force. The military police brigade does not deploy as a landowner or tactically (or operationally or administratively, in most cases) control military police units that are actively supporting a maneuver element. The military police brigade is not the principal advisor for the employment of military police assets to any command; this is the role of the maneuver provost marshal. Military police battalions support their specific division formations (armor, infantry, airborne, air assault, Stryker, cavalry) by providing support to the maneuver commander, with the provost marshal shaping the commander’s view of the military police role. Therefore, military police brigades are irrelevant and should be eliminated. Battalions and divisions should be separated and allowed to train as they operate, without the brigade. The maneuver commander’s understanding of military police assets should be increased, military police tactical efficiency should be improved, and desynchronized priorities created by the military police brigade should be eliminated.

Second, law enforcement and investigations should be separated from combat support elements. Law and order battalions should be created to contain all policing assets (patrols, military police and criminal investigators, police and criminal intelligence personnel, military working dog teams, special reaction and drug suppression teams, traffic managers, physical security personnel) for an installation under a single battalion commander. These battalions should be consolidated under military police groups (similar to the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command) and made direct reporting units. This increases policing proficiency and objectiveness in the groups across the force while simultaneously increasing combat support tactical proficiency in the divisions. As it currently stands, military police elements are overwhelmed and rendered minimally effective with the wildly diverse, noninterconnected requirements of serving as local policemen and military police Soldiers.

Third, detention operations should be transferred back to correction and detention specialists. Current military police elements waste training time and resources training military police to perform a job for which the Army has a separate military occupational specialty. If the Army or the Military Police Corps wants combat support battalions and companies to conduct detentions operations, they will be authorized to have a squad or platoon of correction and detention specialists. Similarly, if division military police elements are designed to provide detention operations support, then they should authorize a detention operations platoon or company within the battalion.

(Continued on page 20)
The Solid-State Active Denial Technology (SS-ADT) is a directed-energy weapon currently being developed by the U.S. Army Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center, Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey. SS-ADT uses breakthrough technologies to produce nonlethal effects that will stop, repel, and suppress targeted individuals. SS-ADT projects a focused beam of energy that creates an intolerable heating sensation on the adversary’s skin. This nonlethal effect is instant and causes the targeted person to flee the area without injury. SS-ADT will equip Soldiers with a very dynamic ability to repel adversaries without using deadly force. This capability will save lives while increasing force protection measures within any area of operation. SS-ADT can be employed at entry control/check points or as a perimeter security enhancement. Future developments will eventually lead to smaller systems that can be mounted on vehicles for shoot-on-the-move applications such as convoy security.

"This radio frequency energy produces a heating sensation that instantly becomes intolerable and forces the targeted individual to flee. The painful sensation ends immediately when the targeted individual moves out of the beam or when the system operator turns the beam off."

How It Works

SS-ADT uses a transmitter that produces radio frequency energy and an antenna to direct a focused, invisible beam onto a human target. Traveling at the speed of light, the energy reaches the targeted human and barely penetrates the skin. This radio frequency energy produces a heating sensation that instantly becomes intolerable and forces the targeted individual to flee. The painful sensation ends immediately when the targeted individual moves out of the beam or when the system operator turns the beam off. The system is designed so that each shot automatically cycles off after 4 seconds. Despite the intense pain sensation, the beam does not cause injury because the energy is at a very low level and transmitted at a frequency that has been proven to be safe. Because the energy can’t penetrate deeper than 1/64th of an inch into the skin, there is no internal exposure. This weapon exploits the natural defense mechanism of the body, which induces pain as a warning for protection against injury. SS-ADT projects the nonlethal effect at distances of up to 150 meters. Larger systems can engage targets at more than 1,000 meters away.

System Development

In the late 1990s, the Raytheon Company developed a directed-energy weapon to be used as a force protection measure for the U.S. Air Force. This first system was extremely large and required vast amounts of power to produce a nonlethal effect. As the technology matured, several prototypes were developed and demonstrated within the joint Services community. The utility and need for this technology was recognized; and in 2005, the U.S. Army began an effort to develop a system more suited for ground operations. Solid-state components were developed to replace the original design, resulting in a significant reduction in the size, weight, and power usage of the system.

The current Army prototype can easily be transported on a flatbed truck, and it can be operated using a 15-kilowatt generator or standard alternating-current power. The operator control station uses a laptop and a joystick to engage targets. Efforts are underway to improve the design in order to integrate it into a vehicle-mounted platform.
Human Effects Testing

Radio frequency millimeter wave technology has been extensively tested on humans to ensure that SS-ADT safely produces the desired response. To prevent injury and long-term adverse effects, special attention was given to the technology to ensure the highest level of safety. The human effects test program is conducted in strict compliance with the procedures, laws, and regulations governing human experimentation. The tests are reviewed and approved by a formal institutional review board with oversight from the Surgeon General’s Office. An independent panel of medical experts from outside of the government periodically reviews and advises on the planning aspects and results of the research and test activities. An initial review of the program concluded that the system has a high probability of being effective and that the probability of causing long-term biological aftereffects is extremely low.

Before this technology was developed by the Army, the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory, Human Effectiveness Directorate, Brooks Air Force Base, Texas, conducted several years of successful and safe laboratory testing with similar technologies. Currently, the Army is planning for continued research in this area, and it is undergoing the approval process to test the human effects in military operational conditions.

The Way Ahead

The current configuration of the SS-ADT prototype has already been proven to effectively engage targets from a static, stand-alone platform. This version of SS-ADT comes equipped with a target acquisition camera and forward-looking infrared (FLIR) integrated technology with an automated tracking mechanism. While this gives Soldiers a better nonlethal capability to protect facilities and small areas, the anticipated end state is the development of a vehicle-mounted system. A vehicle-mounted SS-ADT would give maneuver forces the ability to take precision nonlethal effects with them anywhere in the operational environment.

The biggest challenges to developing a more maneuverable system are size, weight, and power. As the technology matures, the components will shrink and consume less power, giving system engineers the ability to mount SS-ADT on host vehicles. Ideally, the host vehicles will be able to provide sufficient on-board power and the cooling necessary to operate SS-ADT.

Preliminary demonstrations have shown that this type of directed energy may also be effective in stopping small drones in flight. As the overall development continues, SS-ADT may prove to be an effective weapon to protect against unmanned aerial systems in addition to repelling human targets.

First Sergeant Landis (Retired) is a nonlethal weapons specialist at the Army Nonlethal Scalable Effects Center, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He holds a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice from Columbia College, Missouri.

Finally, the Military Police Corps should embrace and own Army security. The Corps is the proponent for antiterrorism, protective services, and physical security. Military police leaders purport to be the defenders of the rear area, and standardized tactical tasks are focused on supporting maneuver in the rear. Why, then, do military police leaders object to providing protective service elements, security force assistance advisors, or patrols and military working dog teams to support high-visibility installation events? Military police should not only support these assigned missions, but also seek them out and market themselves as the ideal element to support security missions. While not as glorified as preventing al-Qaida elements from operating near division headquarters or responding to an active shooter, owning security missions for the Army makes military police elements valuable to the maneuver force. For the Military Police Corps, owning security translates to job security.

In addition to the four adjustments to military police units discussed above, a discussion on the role of the maneuver provost marshal’s office (PMO) at tactical to strategic levels is necessary. The provost marshal advises the commander on implementing military police assets into the combat environment. The PMO also serves as a “specialty” support section to its assigned unit, and assigned personnel are experts in the military police disciplines. In addition to advising the commander, the PMO should lead the antiterrorism, physical security, and emergency management programs for the organization. While these are generally military police programs, every Army unit at battalion level and above is required to maintain these programs. The PMO bridges the capability and knowledge gaps by providing experts in these programs to assist commanders in protecting assets. Similarly, the PMO should be the single point of contact for coordinating with local law and order and corrections battalions for necessary requirements (military working dog support, health and welfare inspections, prisoner escorts, deserter apprehensions, police intelligence products). Finally, the PMO should provide the organization with training on security-related tasks (access control, safeguarding of detainees, base defense) that units may support during the course of combat operations.

The Military Police Corps is relevant to today’s Army and the military as a whole. Some leaders have become apathetic toward the Military Police Corps, claiming that it is doomed for elimination. Others frantically try to impose what they believe to be relevant to their organizations, regardless of recent history. However, the Military Police Corps should commit to supporting maneuver elements with disciplined, expert elements in their field, revolving around the security of Army resources (personnel and assets). By implementing a deliberate campaign to claim its place in the Army, the Military Police Corps can transition from “we fixed it while we were here,” to simply, “we fixed it.”

First Lieutenant Hazel is a platoon leader and force protection officer for the 411th Military Police Company, Fort Hood, Texas. He holds a bachelor of arts degree in history from Texas A&M University, College Station.

First Sergeant Landis (Retired) is a nonlethal weapons specialist at the Army Nonlethal Scalable Effects Center, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He holds a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice from Columbia College, Missouri.

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Setting of the Stage

Changes in modern warfare include a remarkable shift in the international security pattern. While threats from traditional state actors still exist, emerging threats from nonstate actors have added complexity to national security challenges. As the world population continues to migrate to urban areas, adversaries will conduct operations among the civilian and noncombatant populations of these urban areas to counter the ability of our forces to maneuver and engage with lethal capabilities. Developing capabilities that enable Army forces to achieve campaign objectives while minimizing adverse effects of military operations on civilian populations and their environment is essential to success. Our capabilities must be flexible, effective, affordable, and robust enough to allow the successful and efficient training, equipping, and organizing of the force for a wide range of operational contingencies from joint expeditionary maneuver and entry operations to homeland operations.

Equipping current and future forces with nonlethal capabilities as a complement to lethal capabilities enhances the ability to achieve sustainable outcomes in ever-increasing, complex environments while minimizing adverse effects of military operations on civilian populations. The Army Nonlethal Scalable Effects Strategy represents the Army vision for nonlethal capabilities for current and future forces, and the strategy provides a way forward to equip commanders and Soldiers with nonlethal weapons (NLW) solutions to address validated operational-based capability gaps. The strategy ensures nonlethal capabilities provided to commanders and Soldiers are also effective solutions to multiple Army warfighting challenges.

Army Nonlethal Weapons Program

As described in U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-5, The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Maneuver Support, “Future forces possess nonlethal capabilities to deny critical areas to the enemy, minimize civilian casualties, limit unintended infrastructure damage, and increase force protection.” Other Army functional concepts (fires, movement, and maneuver) also highlight the importance of, and need for, NLW capabilities within the force, making the need for NLW a true Army issue requiring efforts to fund, develop, procure, and sustain essential capabilities for operational use. The employment of mutually supporting lethal and nonlethal capabilities across domains creates conditions designed to generate overmatch, present multiple dilemmas to the enemy, and enable joint force freedom of movement and action within those domains.

Within the vision of the Joint Nonlethal Weapons Program, the Army Nonlethal Scalable Effects Strategy integrates scalable nonlethal competencies within the Army to complement lethal effects, enhance joint force adaptability, and support strategic objectives that include minimizing civilian casualties. NLW contribute substantially toward the accomplishment of the mission by providing commanders with munitions, platforms, and weapons that have the ability to overmatch or deter the enemy while employing nonlethal force with precision and discrimination and providing battlefield scalable effects as discussed in the Army’s operating concept. A key attribute of NLW employment is that NLW are flexible enough to apply to almost any situation worldwide.

NLW Capability in the Multidomain Battle

The highly lethal forces of the Army remain the cornerstone of the decisive element of land power in the U.S. deterrent arsenal. However, U.S. forces will need to respond to situations across the range of military operations and within multidomains, some of which will not require the immediate application of lethal force. At the same time, the military faces increased media attention; worldwide environmental concerns; and a low national tolerance for long, lethal, and costly campaigns, possibly even where vital interests of the
Army Warfighting Challenges

U.S. forces are required to execute missions spanning the range of military operations (stability operations, disaster response, homeland defense, humanitarian assistance, full-scale armed combat). NLW enable commanders to tailor their responses to targets and situations across this continuum. The current NLW inventory expands the options for supporting mission objectives; however, as the military looks ahead to the coming decade, the shift to new operating environments (such as dense urban environments, otherwise known as megacities) and the rapid pace of technological change will require new NLW technologies to address capability gaps and threats from technologically evolving adversaries. The use of NLW in future armed conflicts in which targeting threats with traditional lethal force will result in massive unintended civilian casualties is fully consistent with the fundamental principles of the law of armed conflict and provides commanders with the increased ability to successfully apply the principles of discrimination and proportionality.

NLW Training

NLW enable immediate and proportionate force application to safely determine intent, incapacitate suspect individuals, disable and stop vehicles and vessels, and deny areas. While never intended to replace lethal force, NLW employment short of lethal engagements demonstrates our intent to minimize civilian casualties to the local populace, allies, partners, and international audiences. The use of NLW to complement lethal weapons provides a level of tactical agility and versatility that is tailor-made for environments requiring immediate and varying force escalation.

Through a variety of Army and joint courses and user level experiential learning environments, NLW training provides Army leaders and Soldiers with an innovative approach to how we fight, how we posture our forces, and how we leverage our strengths and technological advantages across the full spectrum of possible operations. NLW training should include applications of nonlethal capabilities across the spectrum of conflict and in escalation-of-force situations. Training should provide Soldiers and leaders with a better understanding of the applicability of nonlethal capabilities in an operational environment and make them aware of unique factors to be considered during operational planning at the tactical and operational levels.

Where practical, NLW systems should be trained for and integrated with training rotations, live-fire exercises, and situational training exercises to familiarize combat elements with the scalable inventory that the Army currently has at the platoon and company levels. Education of the force to better understand the capabilities that exist and deliberate planning for nonlethal systems are essential to provide flexible solutions to mission execution and should be integrated at the company and battalion planning levels.

(Continued on page 24)
To understand where the Army Nonlethal Weapons (NLW) Program is going, a brief history of a nonlethal timeline from inception to date is needed. There was no Department of Defense (DOD) or Army NLW program until the mid-1990s. Each of the DOD Services had some NLW or munitions capabilities in their respective inventories, but applicability and use were limited to crowd control or civil disturbance operations. Much of the Army stock of NLW was old and useless; the 1960s era “Garden Plot” stockpile had rotted in warehouses and depot storage. What happened to change this?

History happened. The Regular Army strength of the U.S. Military dropped by almost half through the 1990s and into the early 2000s, the result of America’s decision to take a post-Cold War “peace dividend.” America may have taken a decade-long time-out, but the world did not. DOD and Army operational deployments nearly tripled during that same time, reflecting an ongoing, unpleasant, and ubiquitous global reality outside of the country’s domestic, “all-is-good” bubble. Deployments in support of post-Gulf War Kuwait, Haiti, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Somalia filled DOD’s plate. Many of these operations entailed significant noncombat-related aspects, either initially or after things were blown up and broken, and it was time to clean up the mess (evacuations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, postcombat peacekeeping operations). This increased operational tempo forced decision makers to realize that military forces needed more than just bombs and bullets to safely execute the many types of non-warfighting missions that they were being called upon to execute.

Leaders in Washington, D.C., sprang into action; the first step in solving the problem was recognizing that one existed. Therefore, Congress, via Public Law 104-106, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, recognized that the military role in “…operations other than war…” had increased.1 The statutory language directed the establishment of a DOD NLW program to conduct research and development of promising NLW and munitions technologies.

When the dust settled in March 1996, the Under-Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics had designated the commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps as the DOD NLW executive agent, charging other DOD Services to work with the executive agent in executing the necessary actions to develop NLW for use by the Services. The function that DOD used to ensure that the other military Services fully participated in a robust, cooperative effort with the newly established Joint Nonlethal Weapons Program (JNLWP) was simple: the other Services’ NLW budgets were consolidated into one joint fund. And, to this day, the majority of the DOD NLW research and development budget exists within the budget line of the JNLWP, overseen by the Joint Nonlethal Weapons Directorate, Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia.

Meanwhile, the Army reaction to the newly established JNLWP was not long in coming. In May 1996, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command established a Nonlethal Tactical Applications Proponent at the U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, and a Nonlethal Law Enforcement Applications Proponent at the U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, Alabama. In September 2000, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command consolidated the proponent functions into one school—the U.S. Army Military Police School, which was then located at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The new lead was charged to work with other Army proponent schools as they moved forward in the development of NLW for their uses as well.

Since the establishment of the JNLWP, the Army has managed to develop new NLW capabilities, including 12-gauge and 40-millimeter (low-velocity) nonlethal munitions, M5 nonlethal modular crowd control munitions (which look like Claymore mines—be careful out there!), three iterations of the Army nonlethal capabilities sets, M84 flash-bang grenades, launched electrode stun devices (LESDs) (M26 and X26E TASER®), and M1 and M2 vehicle arresting devices, and field them to operational forces. Once combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom were completed, demand from operational units for a means to effectively engage noncombatants or unknowns increased and this demand reflected the increased need. The fielding of this materiel to operational units resulted in some hard-won knowledge in the form of lessons learned. Following are some useful items to be aware of when your unit is in possession of, or in need of, these capabilities:

- Nonlethal munitions are still munitions and must be requisitioned through the standard munitions processes. Units may need to work with their respective chains of command to be granted authorization to requisition them.
• Rules of engagement have often proven to be a challenge in that commanders are reluctant to allow early or first use of nonlethal munitions capabilities, perhaps overlooking the point that early engagement with nonlethal munitions may result in the deescalation of a situation without things spinning out of control to the point where the only remaining recourse is the use of lethal force.

• LESDs are still weapons; treat them as weapons. Soldiers would not think of shooting each other with their 9-millimeter side arms for fun, and the employment of LESDs also should be limited to training events or operational uses.

• The LESD digital power magazines system should be left inserted during storage. This may seem counter-intuitive to the proper storage of lethal weapons, but it is the correct thing to do.

• The last nonlethal capability sets were fielded to maneuver enhancement brigades, military police brigades, and brigade combat teams in the Regular Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve. There are no more in the supply system; units that have these should keep them.

In the beginning of the DOD foray into the NLW world, things were a bit scattered as each Service acquired its own NLW weapons—mostly on the commercial market, which worked well for a while. With JNLWP implementation, order and structure were established. Army efforts, backed in many cases by JNLWP funding, succeeded in fielding needed capabilities to Army forces; these capabilities were used in post-war Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and other operational environments. However, more are needed. Just as the evolution of lethal firearms has progressed for more than 7 centuries and seems to be progressing at an accelerated pace today, so too must the development and evolution of new NLW technologies. The DOD NLW development effort has proven its value to the Services and its personnel at all levels. Much has been accomplished during barely more than 20 years of coordinated effort, so what will the next 50 years bring? There’s only one way to find out.

Endnote:


Mr. Lee retired in April 2000 after a 20-year Army career. He has been working the Army NLW Program and JNLWP since the late 1990s, beginning with his assignment at Fort McClellan, Alabama, and continuing to date at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He is currently serving as the Army Nonlethal Scalable Effects Center Deputy.

Conclusion

Our national values and guidance from senior leadership require commanders to protect innocent civilians while rapidly and decisively defeating the enemy. This requires the Army to develop, test, procure, integrate, and train NLW capabilities to ensure the safety of our Soldiers and innocent civilians while providing robust capabilities to defeat enemies. While nonlethal scalable effects are not a substitute for lethal weapons, they are a useful complement to lethal means. When the stated goal of the law of armed conflict is, in part, to save civilians from suffering the consequences of armed conflict to the largest extent possible, the use of NLW should be considered a welcome addition to the options available to responsible armed forces operating where civilians may be present.

Commanders must integrate nonlethal and lethal effects and capabilities, allowing for the application of the appropriate level of scalable force while ensuring that the force that is used minimizes civilian casualties and adverse effects to the environment. Soldiers and leaders must be trained, knowledgeable, and confident in their systems, doctrine, and abilities to employ nonlethal capabilities across all facets of the range of military operations.

Equipping current and future forces with nonlethal capabilities as a complement to lethal capabilities enhances our forces’ ability to achieve campaign objectives in ever-increasingly complex environments while minimizing the effects of military operations on civil populations, the infrastructure, and the environment. The Army Nonlethal Scalable Effects Strategy presents the Army’s vision for nonlethal capabilities for current and future forces and depicts the path forward to provide our Army with nonlethal solutions to address validated capability gaps.

Endnotes:


5Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Megacities and the United States Army: Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future, June 2014.

6Gardner.

7Ibid.

Major Kerfoot is the Chief, Army Nonlethal Scalable Effects Center, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He holds a master’s degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University, and he is a graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy Class #266, Quantico, Virginia.
Leader Development:
Commander Focus Areas for Platoon Leaders

By Captain Angelo Q. Taylor

What does it take to be a leader? As young officers, many of us have asked ourselves this question or have been present in the midst of our peers when this question has been asked. This complex question has many facets and great depth, and various leaders certainly have various answers.

During my tenure as a company commander, I have had the privilege of mentoring 13 lieutenants within my company: 10 platoon leaders and three executive officers. Although all were successful, I have gained meaningful insight into priority focus areas for propelling these new officers forward. I’ll outline three of these areas and provide broader explanations.

The initial focus of new lieutenants should be on competence; they should learn about their trade as officers and military police Soldiers. Next, lieutenants must have the energy necessary to address the challenging road ahead to effectively motivate themselves and their Soldiers. Finally, commitment is the most effective key to building and maintaining a high esprit de corps within a formation. Although competence, energy, and commitment do not exhaust all necessary steps to successfully lead Soldiers, they are common attributes that have been exhibited by successful lieutenants. Therefore, it is imperative that commanders take the appropriate time to cultivate lieutenants, ensuring readiness to lead in any operational environment. The following perspectives are intended to serve as general focal points for practical application of the Army Leadership Requirements Model.

Competence

Competence is an extremely effective inroad to gaining credibility with noncommissioned officer and junior enlisted subordinates. It affords young officers the platform to be heard for two reasons:

• Competence is a clear display of ownership for a platoon leader, in that he or she has a vested interest in the profession and spends time refining his or her knowledge base.

• Competence establishes a common ground of doctrinal reference that is more plausible than personal experience, especially given the fact that a young lieutenant likely lacks experience.

A practical area of initial doctrinal focus for platoon leaders is training management. Field Manual 7-0, Train to Win in a Complex World, lays out a clear and straightforward method for understanding the mission in order to prepare the unit to determine the tasks (individual and collective) that will best prepare Soldiers for the mission; determine the highest echelon of proficiency that will be reached; and develop the training strategy, complete with every training gate, training method, and resource associated with the training event. Gathering your lieutenants around a dry erase board and calendar, identifying a mission-essential task focus and commander-directed training gates, and plotting the information on a calendar facilitate understanding and visualization. The commander must describe the concept of white space and explain how to progressively build up to successfully complete the required training gates in a crawl-walk-run methodology.

Another area of focus is the Army’s operational concept, unified land operations. Platoon leaders must visualize this concept for training context and understand decisive action as the way in which the Army fights. Platoon leaders must incorporate the use of tactics to intelligently backbrief the commander on tactical missions and express their intent to subordinate leaders in the context of decisive action. This baseline prepares them to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that can seamlessly interface with a brigade combat team at a combat training center or in a deployed environment. In short, commanders must teach platoon leaders to understand the art and science of tactics, gaining familiarity with terminology and graphics to ensure that they can articulate their intent with contextual relevance in a training or combat environment.

Command supply discipline is critical to the readiness of a unit; however, equipment accountability is often a difficult concept to truly understand as a junior leader because of the intimidating detail associated with it. Although the systems for equipment maintenance and accountability can be daunting and the regulations are extensive, it is important that platoon leaders leverage the subject matter experts at their disposal (platoon sergeant, supply sergeant, motor sergeant, company executive officer) and others that may have experiential familiarity and specialized knowledge. One of the best ways to pair authority with responsibility in the Army is to sub-hand receipt equipment to subordinate leaders using Department of the Army Form 2062, Hand Receipt/Annex Number. Before signing for equipment from the commander, lieutenants must take a physical inventory.
of all equipment, annotating component shortages as they are identified and receiving confirmation from the commander that these shortages are acceptable before signing for the equipment. After signing for the equipment, platoon leaders should use DA Form 2062 to divide it among their squad leaders and instruct them to sub-hand receipt equipment down to the user level. This spreads the weight of responsibility and creates an appreciation of supply discipline.

Ultimately, the commander should foster a spirit of ambition based on practical TTP that promote mental agility, sound judgment, and self-development. Competence is one of the first foundational elements that establish a lieutenant’s reputation. Lieutenants should strive to quickly become familiar with these focal points to spur their relevance.

**Energy**

New employees in any profession must initially bring vitality and the pursuit of learning to their trade, improving themselves and contributing to the overall progress of the organization. There is no exception for new platoon leaders; what they lack in experience should be made up for in energy.

Leadership is the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. Purpose and direction are conveyed by platoon leaders over time as commanders teach the new lieutenants how to effectively articulate their intent. Motivation can be garnered early by leaders using their own methods to inspire Soldiers; many times, motivation can be spurred solely by a leader radiating natural energetic charisma in different settings, such as the field environment or during Army physical fitness training.

Young officers must be physically fit. Physical fitness levels influence first impressions; Soldiers and leaders are predisposed to notice and remember physical fitness. This is important because physical exertion and stamina are primitive gauges of mental toughness that give insight into a leader’s will to survive in a combat scenario. Although physical abilities vary from person to person, Soldiers are motivated by a platoon leader who is willing to diligently pursue meeting and exceeding the standard.

Additionally, the commander must encourage humility while ensuring assertiveness. Lieutenants must lead unapologetically, making no excuses for their inexperience. Most leaders, regardless of experience, have an instinctive perception of what is right and wrong. New leaders must clearly convey their position with respect to standards, discipline, and the Army values. This allows lieutenants to remain prudent, yet decisive, as green leaders, seeking the guidance of the commander and advice of the platoon sergeant or first sergeant in situations of ambiguity and to make clear decisions when addressing blatant cases of indiscipline or passive-aggressive, undermining behavior. Leaders who pretend to know everything repel Soldiers or create clones with similar mentalities. Therefore, it’s important for the commander to create a learning environment where humility is fostered.

These examples describe actions that propel a platoon leader forward through leading by example and getting results. As a byproduct, subordinate Soldiers notice the effort exerted, and are motivated to achieve as they lead the formation. The vigor exuded by a leader when motivating Soldiers for physical training or when establishing the baseline standard by making an on-the-spot correction is contagious. Regardless of the context, energetic leaders command the respect of their Soldiers.

**Commitment**

Ownership of the organization is the fuel that drives personal motivation. As a commander, I have found that when leaders and Soldiers develop cohesiveness and ownership, their motivation to be successful increases exponentially. Coaching lieutenants to internalize the mission at their echelon causes them to subscribe to the vision that the commander has provided, and it teaches them to envision and describe their intent to subordinates, as they should.

Each echelon is its own team and should be treated as such, with distinct pride. Each echelon is solidified through hard work. I have witnessed platoons thrive during periods when unit esprit de corps is rich and leaders have taken a genuine interest in the welfare of their Soldiers, emphasizing the importance of the mission. My company experienced an increased level of pride during its rotation at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, due to the reiterated mission estimation within the company and individual platoons. Every Soldier believed that the mission was important because platoon leaders and platoon sergeants kept them informed as frequently as possible. This built trust and cohesiveness, which ultimately cultivated esprit de corps.

Another way platoon leaders ensure commitment is through delegation; they must strive to develop subordinates by empowering them with knowledge and allowing them to craft plans and make decisions to accomplish the mission. Leaders mentor and certify two levels down, so squad leaders can be empowered to plan training events that certify individual Soldiers on Army warrior tasks and battle drills and military police Skill Level I tasks. This is an effective form of development because it forces subordinates to understand the platoon leader’s intent and presses the lieutenant to accept prudent risk after establishing a shared understanding with subordinates to reach a desired end state. Once there is shared understanding, a weight of responsibility is dispensed that spurs stress; when that young leader overcomes the stress, he or she develops confidence to succeed at challenging tasks.

Finally, one of the most impactful cornerstones of leadership is presence. Any platoon leader can bear the responsibility of dismissing his or her platoon for the weekend at 1630 on a Friday afternoon during perfect weather in garrison, with no upcoming deployments or briefs on Monday. However, difficult circumstances test the resolve of new leaders. During an unstabilized gunnery range, Soldiers in my company were subject to unfavorable conditions. Crews with little to no rest qualified during day and night.
Picture yourself in the following scenario: You are tasked to guard Haitian migrants in a compound. Of the approximately 550 Haitians, 540 are known to have the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) virus. Due to the increasing political conflicts within the Haitian government, the migrants are requesting political asylum in the United States. Some of the migrants have been held for more than 10 months, and they are becoming extremely agitated toward U.S. forces. As a result, they have destroyed property inside and outside of the compound. The destruction has reached the point that military force must be used to quell the threat. Due to limited assets and improper training in the use of force, military troops are forced to attack using fixed bayonets, which brings them into close contact with the migrants. This increases the threat and places U.S. Soldiers closer to fluid-borne pathogens, which increases their risk of acquiring HIV or other diseases. A better approach would be to contain and control the threat from a distance with munitions that are intended to modify behavior, not to kill. Not every situation requires a deadly force encounter; commanders should have better options.

The U.S. Army has been using nonlethal weapons for years. Most nonlethal devices, except for a few specific chemical agents, rely on pain compliance and require the user to be in close proximity to the target, which can rapidly escalate into lethal means. Involvement of U.S. forces in peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, law enforcement, and homeland security missions supports the demand for nonlethal capabilities that offer flexibility regarding the escalation of force. Nonlethal devices and munitions provide commanders with weapons explicitly designed and primarily employed to incapacitate targeted personnel or materiel immediately, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property in the target area or environment. Nonlethal weapons are intended to have reversible effects on personnel and materiel.

When properly used, nonlethal weapons should result in zero fatalities, zero permanent injuries, and no after effects. When used in military applications, nonlethal weapons are useful—
- In crowd control and riot situations.
- In situations where hostile forces take cover in crowds.
- In urban terrain operations.
- In antiterrorist actions (with minimal collateral damage).
- During counterterrorism activities.
- During hostage situations.

Early generations of nonlethal munitions consisted of various types of low-velocity, blunt-impact weapons such as projectiles loaded with low-velocity/low-impact ammunition (soft beanbag rounds, rubber balls, rubber or plastic coated pellets, flashbang and hybrid kinetic/markng munitions). These munitions were designed to be employed from standard issue 12-gauge shotguns and 40-millimeter grenade launchers. Most kinetic, blunt-impact, nonlethal munitions are prevalently lethal and must be used with special care within strict operational limitations in which the munition was designed.

To reduce risk and offer true nonlethal effects over an engagement range from the muzzle to a maximum distance of 100 meters, the Army Nonlethal Scalable Effects Center and the U.S. Army Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center are working on a variable-velocity weapon system called the Individual Nonlethal System (INS). The INS is capable of achieving consistent nonlethal effects.
on targets at varying distances across an extended range. The INS—providing a single solution for the dismounted warfighter—will replace the current suite of blunt-impact, nonlethal munitions; decrease sustainment costs; and decrease the logistics burden of procuring, managing, and training multiple rounds. Expanding the usable range of nonlethal weapons increases the employment opportunities of nonlethal capabilities for the warfighter. The INS will also improve response time to potential threats, increase force protection, and reduce the potential for user error.

The INS is intended to be used by individual Soldiers against noncompliant and aggressive noncombatants. Its purpose is to deny access into and out of areas, move individuals through an area, and suppress individuals. It can be used for perimeter security at forward operating bases, for force protection for convoys, to gauge intent at road blocks and check points, to separate noncombatants from combatants, to aid in the apprehension of individuals, and to help maintain order (stop looters, rioters, and attackers from a safe distance). The INS can be deployed at any density, from one per platoon to one per Soldier; can be employed by all military occupational specialties; and operates like other small arms, requiring similar maintenance.

Two potential candidate systems, the Caseless Telescoping Less-lethal System and the PepperBall® Variable Kinetic System Launcher, were nominated and approved for entry into the Army Expeditionary Warrior Experiment–2018. The experiment will consist of a live-fire assessment of each system, focusing on accuracy, ease of use, and military utility. Soldiers will provide feedback for the INS capability development document, giving their perspective on—

- Ergonomics, weight, size, form factor, and integration with standard equipment.
- Usefulness of the system and enhancement of their ability to carry out missions within or outside of their military occupational specialty.
- The operator’s ability to selectively vary the muzzle velocity.
- The added utility of maintaining a similar level of impact for pain at all ranges versus the increased complexity of operation and training.

Upon the successful completion of the Army Expeditionary Warrior Experiment–2018, the INS program should proceed to the technology development phase, with the first unit equipped around fiscal year 2022. For additional information on the INS program or to provide lessons learned, which could be used to further define system characteristics, contact the Army Nonlethal Scalable Effects Center at <usarmy.leonardwood.mp-schl.mbx.nce@mail.mil>.

First Sergeant Niver (Retired) is a nonlethal requirements/capability manager with the Army Nonlethal Scalable Effects Center, U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

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fire in an environment that was cold and rainy throughout the training event. Platoon leaders and noncommissioned officers riding in their Humvees constantly checked Soldiers during qualifications, maintaining the leader presence that served as a crucial motivator during the challenging field problem. Leaders who are, within reasonable expectations, willing to do the tasks of their subordinates will be respected and emulated because there is no substitute for leader presence and no replacement for leading from the front.

**Conclusion**

These practical methods demonstrate commitment, and they are vital mechanisms that contribute to the overarching attribute of maintaining leader presence and displaying the ability to self-develop and develop subordinates. Although these focal areas can posture a new platoon leader for future success, the overarching, consistent factor that should always be considered is people. The Army is a people business that can only thrive when we are functioning as healthy, lively, human beings. Empathy, transparency, and reasonable exposure of frailty can have a particularly motivating and impactful effect on Soldiers. As leaders, we are taught to be strong and resistant to emotional feeling; however, Soldiers and leaders are, first and foremost, humans who face many of the same challenges encountered by our civilian counterparts. We must balance the disciplined structure of the Army with the normal chaos of unforeseen Family emergencies. We must welcome the long hours in the field alongside the vital need for community. Competence, energy, and commitment can create real traction to continuously move forward. However, the connection that reconciles these attributes is the human factor; platoon leaders bring who they are as people and their original perspectives from past experiences to contribute to their leadership style.

The charge to develop new leaders at all echelons lies heavily on the shoulders of the company command team as the accountable entity. This is why company commanders must have a vested interest in the growth of competent, energetic, committed lieutenants who exude the Army attributes and display the Army competencies. If all of these virtues are cultivated in a balanced manner, we will produce platoon leaders who lead with action and guide with words.

**Endnotes:**

1 Field Manual 7-0, Train to Win in a Complex World, 5 October 2016.

2 Department of the Army Form 2062, Hand Receipt/Annex Number, 1 January 1982.

3 Army Doctrine Publication 6-22, Army Leadership, 1 August 2012.

Captain Taylor is a small-group leader for the Military Police Basic Officer Leader’s Course at the U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He holds a bachelor of arts degree in criminal justice from Iowa State University.
On a sunny day in the middle of July 2016, 3d Platoon, 194th Military Police Company, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, executed a deliberate gap crossing of the Arkansas River in support of Operation River Assault 16, a river-crossing mission that included multiple Regular Army (814th Multi-Role Bridge Company, Fort Polk, Louisiana; 74th Engineer Dive Detachment, Fort Hood, Texas), Army National Guard (an unmanned aircraft system platoon from the 39th Brigade Special Troops Battalion, Conway, Arkansas), and U.S. Army Reserve (467th Engineer Battalion, Millington, Tennessee; 441st Engineer Company, Millington, Tennessee; and an Army aviation company) units from the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps (B Company, 6th Engineer Support Battalion, Portland, Oregon). Not only did military police perform critical support to mobility operations, but they also strengthened that mission-essential task by practicing an atrophied key collective task (Perform Military Police Support to Gap Crossing).

Mission Analysis

The Arkansas River is the sixth-longest river in the United States and the second-longest tributary of the Mississippi River. The 467th Engineer Battalion chose a crossing site just north of Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, where the river narrows relative to points just a mile in either direction. The plan called for a full day of equipment staging and a full day for execution, including crossing the float bridge in both directions.

The 194th Military Police Company received the mission only a few weeks before execution and started planning with the 467th Engineer Battalion headquarters. After a leader reconnaissance of the site, an initial planning session with the headquarters, and a cursory analysis of the crossing sites, the 194th determined that the mission would require a platoon size element with a supporting headquarters element for life support and operational support.

Execution

The platoon staged before all other elements and had complete control of movement along all of the main supply routes (MSRs) leading to the Arkansas River. Before staging, the platoon conducted 3 days of reconnaissance and rehearsals, allowing each team and squad leader to gain an intimate knowledge of the routes, tactical command post locations, and staging areas and to emplace their route signage. The various engineer units that were in operational control to the 467th Engineer Battalion had specifically assigned staging areas along the near side of the Arkansas River. During staging operations, they were responsible for moving multiple vehicles and assets that would facilitate an expedient construction of the float bridge the following day. Because of extensive rehearsals and preparations, the military police were able to handle the heavy traffic along the narrow, unimproved roads without difficulty.

During the early morning hours on the day of mission execution, 1st Squad, 3d Platoon, 194th Military Police Company, was transported across the Arkansas River to the far side via a Marine Corps raft. Once on the far side, the squad conducted a radio check with the near side military police and set up traffic control points (TCPs) at the far side staging area, where vehicles that cross the float bridge park and wait until they can be safely sent back across the bridge. As the morning light broke, the platoon ensured that the movement went smoothly. Military police at the various TCPs assiduously maintained communications with the near side and far side crossing sites and strictly enforced one direction of travel on all MSRs leading to the crossing sites. The roads were wide enough for only one vehicle, so this enforcement and communication prevented any major backups or vehicle accidents, facilitating the bridge construction and allowing the entire 60-vehicle element to cross the float bridge without delay.

Still, unexpected challenges arose. The platoon had to tactically address the issue of vehicle speed while on the MSRs and during the planning cycle with key leaders from adjacent units. Reduced visibility resulting from the dust and narrow routes created a hazard for other vehicles and Soldiers on the ground, especially dismounted military police at the TCPs. Safely enforcing speed was critical to the safety of the military police and engineers.

The second issue that needed to be addressed was far side traffic control. Traffic control on the near side was easier because each unit had a planned area of staging. However, the far side staging and assembly areas were less defined because the size of the crossing element was unknown until the day of mission execution and the exact method of return had changed 2 days before the operation. The original plan called for vehicles to cross the float bridge and then take a designated overland route on the far side back to the
assembly area at Fort Chaffee. At the eleventh hour, the overall plan changed to reflect that vehicles would cross the float bridge, arrive at a vehicle holding area (which the engineers had not reconnoitered), and recross the float bridge once all vehicles had crossed. Again, because of the platoon reconnaissance and exhaustive rehearsals, an area suitable to hold the entire 60-vehicle convoy was quickly identified. Still, several units attempted a return crossing before all of the units had finished their initial crossing; however, they were stopped by military police. The most critical function that the platoon performed was the prevention of vehicles from recrossing the bridge for a return until all units had initially crossed. This allowed for a smooth flow of traffic throughout the execution of the gap crossing.

Lessons Learned

A few lessons were learned during the gap-crossing exercise:

• **Train for excellence at the team level.** The platoon leader easily identified this lesson at the outset. The mission called for geographically separated teams operating multiple key TCPs; thus, the platoon was to execute mission command at the lowest levels. In the train-up, the platoon almost exclusively focused on team level training and strongly emphasized troop-leading procedures. This low-level focus allowed the platoon to react to any planning changes without incident.

• **Maintain constant involvement in the planning process as early as possible.** Although the 194th Military Police Company had been communicating with the engineer battalion weeks before the military police platoon arrived at Fort Chaffee, the engineer battalion was forced to adjust the river-crossing plan countless times, even hours before execution. The platoon leader or operations sergeant was required to be in attendance at each planning meeting. With military police leadership at each commander update brief and meeting, it was possible to paint an honest picture of traffic control constraints for the battalion commander and the operations cell to avoid planning themselves into a corner.

• **Add a supporting headquarters element.** Besides the ease of handling life support for the platoon, adding the headquarters element allowed the platoon leader and platoon sergeant to focus tactically on the mission while the operations cell handled the deluge of (oftentimes contradictory) reporting requirements. This kept the platoon leadership engaged in the fight, rather than commanding from the battalion tactical operations center located miles to the rear of the operation.

Conclusion

Gap-crossing operations are a lost art in the Military Police Corps and the Army. Although we executed Operation River Assault under the most forgiving of circumstances (deliberate actions, a large window of available time, little to no enemy presence, near-perfect weather and light conditions), there were still several opportunities for the operation to take a nose dive. A training focus at the team level, constant leader presence, and flexibility ensured zero vehicular accidents as well as praise from the engineer units regarding how quickly vehicles were able to move along MSRs and cross the bridge as compared to years past. Ultimately, military police-specific support to a gap crossing is easy for any military police unit that regularly conducts traffic control operations (either garrison policing operations or field operations). But with any operation, everything always boils down to the basics. The overarching Army specifics never change: lead and shoot, move, and communicate!

Captain Ciccolo serves as the commander for the U.S. Army Recruiting Company, Brooklyn North, Manhattan, New York. He was commissioned through the U.S. Military Academy—West Point, New York, in 2009. He holds a bachelor of science degree in computer science from the U.S. Military Academy and a master of arts degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University.
Protection, Sustainment, and the Corps Support Area: Challenges and Lessons Learned in the Decisive-Action Environment

By Captain Karl D. Rauch

The 13th Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) took part in Warfighter Exercise (WFX) 17-3 at Fort Hood, Texas, in February 2017. In conjunction with III Corps, the 1st Armored Division, the 35th Infantry Division, the 177th Military Police Brigade, the 35th Engineer Brigade, and other units from across the United States, the 13th ESC fully exercised and stressed its staff in a decisive-action fight. In preparation for WFX 17-3, the 13th ESC conducted a command post exercise–functional (CPX-F) to identify strengths and weaknesses. Events were designed to exercise all phases of a deployment for a decisive-action environment. During these exercises, two key force protection challenges related to the sustainment fight of tomorrow were identified: the flexibility to transition from forward operating bases (FOBs) to the decisive-action fight and the sustainer’s reliance on external units for force protection. The ESC identified challenges related to the corps support area (CSA) and potential solutions the Army may consider moving forward.

Challenges

First, sustainment planning and execution must be refocused away from the familiar FOB concept toward a more flexible approach. Anticipation and responsiveness are two principles of sustainment. Per Army Doctrine Publication 4-0, Sustainment, anticipation and responsiveness include the ability to foresee operational requirements and to react and respond to changing requirements, respectively. In other words, these two tenets translate to flexibility. The past 15 years have proven that leaders and planners are resourceful and creative thinkers. Yet, the consistent state of asymmetric warfare has also allowed the formation of habits that may inhibit an adaptive mindset.

The FOB concept demonstrates this inflexibility. Understanding the transition from the FOB battlefield toward the decisive-action environment is a fundamental challenge facing the Army today. As the military shifts focus back to the decisive-action environment, it can no longer strictly rely on past experiences gleaned from the counterinsurgency fight at company grade levels. The decisive-action environment of the 1990s is also vastly different than that of today.

Technological changes within the past decade have shaped the battlefield of 2020 into something completely unknown. The technology industry has seen unprecedented capability growth in many areas (drones, Web-based communications, anonymous Web access, hacking). This new technology explosion offers the enemy a multitude of new, readily available intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms. As an example, America is slowly losing its monopoly on unmanned aerial vehicle technology. State actors are rapidly advancing this technology, and the advent of online commercial retail sales has made it incredibly simple for any nonstate actor to rapidly acquire cheap drone technology. Rigid planning and a reliance on static locations will exponentially increase vulnerabilities to an extremely adaptive enemy.

Tomorrow’s battlefield is unfamiliar to today’s leaders and planners. However, thoughtful planning will improve protection efforts in the sustainment fight. The 13th ESC learned that mobility equals survivability. In the battlefield of 2020 and beyond, sustainers will no longer be able to rely on FOBs and massive supply support activities. Our rapid maneuver force rate of march requires flexible and mobile support operations. Preplanned locations for a future logistics support area, coupled with forward logistics elements, result in flexible logistics support for the maneuver unit.

Flexibility on our part can lead to unpredictability for the enemy. Logistics support area locations may operate and close within 48 hours. Supply commodities may be multimodal and multinodal. By using air, ground, and rail, coupled with the logistics civil augmentation program concept, redundancy is injected into supply operations. This makes the enemy job harder and passively protects sustainment
on the battlefield. Minimizing static locations also positively impacts cyber protection. The familiar methods of long-term, static FOBs; supply support activities; and supply stockpiles translate to high concentrations of electronic emitters (such as cellular telephones) located throughout the CSA. As the enemy acquires more sophisticated detection methods, it becomes easier to pinpoint critical node locations. Unpredictability and flexibility remain some of the most effective mitigations against this threat to our sustainment forces.

The sustainer’s reliance on outside units for major force protection measures was the next challenge identified during the 13th ESC CPX-F and WFX 17-3. ESCs, sustainment brigades, and other sustainment units do not have major internal protection; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets; or the ability to deploy a tactical combat force. In order to best effect force protection, the sustainer must continue to rely on maneuver and maneuver support units. The challenge, however, is different because of the unique dynamics of a decisive-action battlefield. During WFX 17-3, multiple sustainment brigades were task-organized in direct support to the divisions.

The maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB), military police brigade, engineer brigade, chemical brigade, marine expeditionary unit, and air defense artillery brigade are examples of protection enablers in which close coordination is required. Much like a tenant unit on a garrison installation, the ESC relies on the AO owner for base; area and route security; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive response; and explosive ordnance disposal support. Through proper preplanning and coordination with higher and adjacent units, the ESC is able to prioritize protection requirements and make key recommendations to the enabler on the ground for best effect.

Lessons Learned

Through the CPX-F and WFX, we learned that deliberate cooperation and coordination with adjacent units and area of operations (AO) owners are critical to force protection. Official and commercial chat systems were used to communicate with higher, adjacent, and subordinate units. The unit Command Post of the Future System was the system of record throughout the exercise. All units experienced growing pains in synchronizing these systems. Without this coordination, the 13th ESC could not have effectively enabled decisive or shaping operations.

A key lesson learned from this exercise is the importance of integrating the Support Operations Mobility Section, our transportation battalion (movement control), and sustainment brigades into the protection cell. This integration synchronizes force protection into the movement allocation board. This made the unit better able to recommend the appropriate protection assets to specific convoys and logistical elements. The working group developed an effective critical asset list by merging capabilities and requirements with the Support Operations Mobility Branch, the Protection Cell, and subordinate brigades. This critical asset list remained extremely flexible to the mission-critical logistics movements throughout the joint operations area.

In addition, the movement control battalion proved to be instrumental in providing constant and accurate route status information to units throughout the joint operations area. This resulted in mission-critical commodities receiving the proper levels of protection in support of the decisive operation.

Finally, in conjunction with our adjacent partners in the CSA, the 13th ESC learned that the CSA is an AO with unique and specific challenges. It is no less important or mission-critical than a divisional AO, and in many ways, the CSA is more challenging and complex. Unconventional warfare, insurgencies, indirect fires, nongovernmental organizations, international borders, internally displaced persons, and enemy prisoners of war are just a few of the considerations that must be accounted for in the CSA. Add in the corps sustainment distribution mission, and the CSA quickly becomes an unfamiliar and fluid AO. The CSA is its own AO that must be treated in a manner similar to the divisional AOs.

A Way Forward

There must be effective and defined mission command for the CSA as an AO. Field Manual (FM) 3-81, Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, states: “The MEB . . . is normally assigned an AO and controls terrain. This capability makes the MEB the best organization in the Army to perform support area operations for the division and corps.” This was the general concept applied during WFX 17-3. A response cell was tasked to perform the MEB mission in the CSA. However, the 13th ESC, the 177th Military Police Brigade, the 35th Engineer Brigade, and the 196th MEB quickly realized that no true mission command existed in the CSA. Despite being the AO owner, the primary mission of the MEB, in effect, was to facilitate the 13th ESC sustainment distribution for maneuver divisions. The rear area was left with a coordinating headquarters instead of a controlling headquarters.

This exercise clearly identified a mission command gap regarding the CSA. FM 3-81 describes the MEB as tailorable. The size and scope of the rear area in WFX 17-3 (more than 200 square miles) was beyond the effective mission command capability of one brigade. One potential solution is to give operational control of the MEB to the ESC. This would force the ESC to mission command the rear area AO and the entire joint security area. Joint sustainment distribution requires the same dedicated focus as rear area command. Placing both missions within one headquarters would likely render each ineffective. A more effective solution may be to scale the MEB upward in size, proportionate to the size of the expected rear area. It is critical to anticipate how the rear area will shift and grow as divisions move forward and collapse their AOs. A tailored MEB must be able to anticipate and effectively absorb a much larger rear area than that with which it starts.

A properly scaled MEB, with doctrinally codified authority supported by the corps commander, will best mitigate some of the challenges faced during WFX 17-3. A central

(Continued on page 35)
Linking Antiterrorism Strategy, Policy, and Plans

By Lieutenant Colonel Craig F. Benedict (Retired)

The “tangle” of solving the problem of preventing a terrorist attack is a composite of three elements: strategy, policy, and plans (tactics). Successful defense against terrorist activities depends upon understanding these three elements. None of the three offers resolution without the others.

As an antiterrorism (AT) planner, have you considered the link among strategy, policy, and plans? The link between strategy and policy often becomes blurred when executing tactical plans. The problem is not unique to these times or to terrorism-associated strategies, policies, and plans. You might say, “I know how this works. Strategy is for someone else; I am an operational planner.” This is not true because once a commander focuses exclusively on an operational plan, it is possible to lose sight of the ultimate goal. It was also not true in World War II. According to Field-Marshall Viscount Sir William Slim, commander of the British Army in Burma, one cause . . .

affected all our efforts and contributed much to turning defeat into disaster—the failure . . . to give the forces in the field a clear strategic object for the campaign. As a result, our plans had to be based on a rather nebulous, short-term idea of holding ground—we were not even sure what ground or for what purpose.

In Burma during World War II, a senior commander acknowledged the distinction between strategy and planning and the difficulty encountered when the two are not linked. Policy also has a place. But before assigning a link among them, a short description is necessary to clarify the intent of this article. The dictionary definitions of strategy and planning are almost synonymous, but understanding the distinction clarifies their purpose and their relationship.

Strategy is the inspiration for action. The 18th-century Irish statesman Edmund Burke observed, “A state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation.” Strategy provides the overall vision and intent of the enterprise while anticipating change. In the case of AT, the strategy is presented by the Headquarters, Department of the Army, describing the end state and intent of Army senior leadership. These basics are found in the Army Antiterrorism Strategic Plan (ATSP), which forecasts necessary change to account for evolving threats and environments that sustain progress toward the Army AT vision.

Policy is the foundation for action. In the case of AT, policy is also provided by the Headquarters, Department of the Army. Policy provides the minimum standards to achieve the vision described in the ATSP. Delineated in Army Regulation (AR) 525-13, Antiterrorism, the Army standards indicate the basic requirements that apply to all Army AT programs. For the most part, they take the form of standard operating procedures applicable to AT programs. Standards expressed in policy provide current and specific guidance for the broad scope of AT, including areas of training, assessments, and requirements for assigned AT-related personnel.

Plans are the actions associated with implementing policy to meet a strategic end state. Plans express the tactics applied in unique circumstances to accomplish a mission. Plans, for the purpose of this article, refer to operational plans. They elaborate on situational approaches of organizations for applying protective measures against a terrorist attack in the current environment. Plans can be in the form of standard operating procedures, tactical plans, battle drills, or movement orders aimed at successful mission accomplishment. In many cases, AT will only be part of a larger plan but the planning concept is the same. Moreover, AT measures guided by Army leader intent should be embedded in all missions and activities.

Linking strategy, policy, and plans provides the basis for decisive action in overall protection against terrorist attacks. Contemplation of the three elements represents an inspiration, a foundation, and an action. Together, they fill gaps in expectations, aid in decision making, offer a common understanding for leaders at all levels of command, and assist in actively pursuing success now and in the future. Some operational planners might argue that there is little association between strategy and tactics or that policy has
Little to do with active, ongoing operations; but ignoring the
significance of any of the three elements reduces the pros-
pects for success in the near and long terms.

The Inspiration: Pulling Together

ATSP accomplishes two important tasks in support of
preventing terrorist attacks. It provides the inspiration for
AT-associated actions, and it encourages progress aimed at
constant and sustained improvement of AT-related protec-
tion. For operators, this is more significant than it may ap-
pear. The vision defines the responsibility and provides ex-
pectations for solutions in preventing a terrorist attack but
allows for latitude in judgment for execution. ATSP provides
a precise target for operators, expressing an end state while
leaving room for developing operational plans applicable to
unique situations and operational environments. The criti-
cal elements of ATSP remind AT practitioners where, when,
and to whom Army AT protection applies and relay a sense
of what is necessary to accomplish the responsibility. For
Field-Marshal Slim, this was the clear objective.

The intent clarifies any uncertainty about the fundamen-
tals for executing Army AT. An ATSP examines the follow-
ing operational constraints in terms most likely to facilitate
success:

• Embedding AT concepts throughout Army planning.
• Encouraging initiative at all levels.
• Compelling the productive, innovative, and effective use
  of limited AT resources.
• Demanding active leader participation.
• Prioritizing AT efforts over the long term.
• Anticipating the future environment.
• Applying AT protection guided by local estimates.
• Synchronizing with other supporting tasks and function-
al elements.
• Applying coordinated, preemptive efforts to disrupt pro-
spective attacks.
• Establishing and sustaining AT awareness.6

Just as significantly, an ATSP communicates broad pri-
orities to guide leaders in developing AT capabilities. An
ATSP prioritizes training first, followed by information
sharing and resource application. An ATSP does not offer
specific resources, but does imply that tangible resources
accompany solutions, stipulating that innovation and re-
sourcefulness are critical to success.

The Foundation: Operating From
Solid Footing

Often, Army planners ignore the significance of ARs that
form Army policy. In fact, these regulations provide more
than administrative details for the Army AT Program. Pol-
icy represents the foundation of a successful AT program.
The purpose statement in AR 525-13 explains why the Army
AT Program is important:

This regulation establishes the Army Antiterrorism
(AT) Program to protect personnel (Soldiers, members
of other Services, Department of the Army [DA] civilian
employees, Department of Defense [DOD] contractors,
and Family members of DOD employees), information,
property, and facilities (including civil work and like
projects) in all locations and situations against terror-
ism.7

The fundamental AT basis for any Army organization or
activity is found in this regulation. It assigns responsibili-
ties, delineates tasks, and outlines standards for execution.
The policy accounts for the many unique situations for Army
missions and allows the flexibility necessary to apply spec-
cific standards to execution. It is authoritative only in the
sense of providing the essentials necessary to launch effec-
tive operations. The prescriptive nature of the policy does
not circumscribe how to solve the problem of preventing a
terrorist attack; it gives the means for doing so. Solving the
specific problem is at the heart of planning.

The Action: Planning for the Situation

In “The Federalist Papers No. 41,” James Madison ob-
erves, “The means of security can only be regulated by the
means and the danger of attack. They will, in fact, be ever
determined by these rules, and by no others.”8 He recognizes
that success depends upon applying solutions to specific cir-
cumstances, not to general theory. And so it is with plans.

Army doctrine defines planning as “the art and science of
understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future,
and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about.”9
In practical application, it is the third and final element of
developing an effective AT program. The strategy and policy
provide the outline for action. By understanding the expec-
tations and constraints, planners can develop innovative
solutions to a specific situation. Plans represent a leader's
estimate of the threat, resources available, and mission as-
signed. The detailed plan is the culmination of solving the
problem, meeting expectations, and executing assigned re-
sponsibilities in preventing a terrorist attack.

During the early days of the American Civil War, the
Union Army struggled to find a balance among strategy,
policy, and plans. Most agreed that the Union Army of the
Potomac had evolved under General George McClellan into
a first-rate army, capable of winning the war. General Mc-
Clellan had developed policies for training and equipping,
and he composed a strategy many thought appropriate to
lead Union forces to victory. Despite the optimistic outlook,
McClellan’s plans led to defeat in the major campaigns dur-
ing his tenure as an army commander. Just before relieving
McClellan, President Abraham Lincoln expressed intense
frustration, saying:

The fact is, the people haven’t yet made their minds
up that we are at war with the South . . . they have got
it into their heads that we are going to get out of this
fix, somehow, by strategy! That’s the word—strategy!
General McClellan thinks he is going to whip the reb-
els by strategy, and the army has got the same notion.
They have no idea that the war is to be carried on and
put through by hard, tough fighting . . .10
Conclusion

Lincoln’s frustration almost certainly acknowledged too much emphasis on one or two of the three elements necessary for success. Removing even one element leaves a short-fall that is difficult to overcome. The linking of strategy, policy, and plans is the most certain formula for success in preventing a terrorist attack.

Acknowledgement: The title of this article also serves as the Army’s third quarter, Fiscal Year 2017, theme. More information can be found on the Army Antiterrorism Enterprise Portal (ATEP) at <https://army.deps.mil/army/sites/PMG/prog/ATEP/default.aspx>. The Army ATEP is common access card-restricted and requires the user’s e-mail certificate for entry. Other Army ATEP inquires can be made by calling (703) 695-3403 or (703) 695-8492.

Endnotes:

4. ATSP, Closing the Ring, 22 March 2017.
7. AR 525-13, paragraph 1-1.

Lieutenant Colonel Benedict (Retired) is a senior military analyst with the AT Branch, U.S. Army Office of the Provost Marshal General. He holds a bachelor’s degree in history from Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas. He is also a graduate of the Command and General Staff College and the Armed Forces Staff College.

No Easy Task

In conclusion, the protection warfighting function and the CSA have unique and challenging requirements that have often been overlooked and underestimated. The 13th ESC emphasizes sustainment training for tomorrow’s battlefield, not yesterday’s. A renewed focus on the sustainment principles and survivability will enable ESCs and sustainers to accomplish the principles of anticipation and responsiveness. The sustainer’s reliance on other units for major protection assets will remain, but deliberate coordination and collaboration will best enable supporting operations to the maneuver commander. Without a properly secured and highly operational CSA, maneuver units lose operational reach and freedom of action. The training audiences in WFX 17-3 had the unique opportunity to specifically train and practice this type of fight. All too often the CSA is overlooked during training exercises, often to disastrous results on the battlefield.

Endnotes:

1. Army Doctrine Publication 4-0, Sustainment, 31 July 2012.
2. FM 3-81, Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, 21 April 2014.
3. Ibid.

Captain Rauch is an operations officer with the 720th Military Police Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas. At the time this article was written, he was the protection operations officer for the 13th ESC. He holds a bachelor’s degree in political science from the University of Vermont, Burlington, and a master’s degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University.
Military police platoons from the 716th Military Police Battalion, 101st Airborne Division Sustainment Brigade (Air Assault), tested their skills during a platoon external evaluation, 13–17 March 2017, at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Observers from the 16th Military Police Brigade, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the 101st Airborne Division evaluated Fort Campbell military police on their ability to—

- React to enemy contact.
- Establish traffic control points.
- Respond to site exploitation.
- Evacuate casualties.
- Perform convoy security.

Captain Katherine R. M. Troxell, training officer in charge for the 716th Military Police Battalion, stated that using observers from outside the battalion was crucial to identifying the strengths and weaknesses of each platoon. With external observers, each platoon received honest and unbiased feedback and met Army training guidance. According to Troxell, overall platoon readiness is crucial for the battalion mission, which includes supporting Fort Campbell with law enforcement and supporting brigade combat teams with security and mobility operations.

The platoons used their gold cycles to progress from team certifications to squad certifications, culminating with platoon validations, Troxell stated. She indicated that the focus was on validating the platoons because it will generally be a platoon size element that deploys in support of a brigade combat team or other unit. Platoon external evaluations provide Soldiers with tough, realistic training that will better prepare them for possible downrange missions as well as everyday missions on the installation, she further explained.

“We want to make sure all of our Soldiers are able to react and engage confidently in any mission they encounter, regardless if it’s on Fort Campbell or in a deployed environment,” Troxell further stated. She added that the battalion goal is to have all platoons evaluated by the end of the fiscal year and then to move on to company evaluations.

Troxell said that evaluating the battalion at every level will enhance mission readiness because, as military police, the Soldiers need to be prepared for any mission. Before platoon evaluations, Soldiers had to successfully complete individual and squad level warrior tasks and battle drills that ranged from weapons training to reacting to an ambush, she said.

First Lieutenant Shaun L. Kiely, a platoon leader with the 194th Military Police Company, 716th Military Police Battalion, and his platoon completed individual and squad level tasks and were evaluated as a platoon. “My Soldiers did an outstanding job throughout the different lanes,” said Kiely. He explained that his platoon conducted individual and squad training 2 weeks before the evaluation, which was extremely beneficial, and assisted the platoon in identifying and solving any challenges before completing the platoon evaluations.

Platoon evaluations provide company command teams with feedback so that they can tailor training plans according to areas that need improvement, said Troxell. This was the first set of platoons to be evaluated; and so far, the platoons have done well despite the changing weather. The platoons stayed motivated and conducted their missions to standard, Troxell added.

Sergeant Canfield is a public affairs noncommissioned officer for the Brigade Public Affairs Office, 101st Airborne Division Sustainment Brigade. She is currently working toward an associate’s degree at Hopkinsville Community College, Kentucky.
Military Police: The Force Behind the Fight

By Specialist Lauren A. Ogburn

The military police of Joint Task Force (JTF) Guantanamo who work within the detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, carry out a unique and difficult mission every day. The JTF Guantanamo mission of safe, humane, legal, and transparent care and custody of law-of-war detainees is unique in that it is carried out in the only U.S. facility that holds law-of-war detainees for an extended period.

The military police assigned to the 525th Military Police Detention Battalion serve as the main working force inside Camp VI, Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, according to Command Sergeant Major Michael Cosper, the JTF Guantanamo senior enlisted advisor. He explained that detainee operations is a military police core competency; military police are the subject matter experts. He also indicated that Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 31B (military police) and MOS 31E (internment/resettlement specialist) Soldiers bring their experience and training together in support of the detainee mission. "They are true professionals, and I'm extremely proud to serve alongside them," said Cosper.

According to Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Deaton, the 525th Military Police Detention Battalion Commander, the battalion is unique in that it is the only one in the U.S. Army that carries out strategic detention operations as its primary mission. He stated that the 525th Military Police Detention Battalion is the only battalion that performs detention operations 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and 365 days a year and the only triple-component battalion with Regular Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve Soldiers.

According to Cosper, troopers completed specialized training and certifications on 60 different tasks and trained on strictly enforced standard operating procedures within the facilities before assuming duty as members of the JTF Guantanamo guard force. Cosper also indicated that military police live and work by an unbreakable code of honor and courage; they are committed to treating all detainees with dignity and respect; and they are firm, fair, and consistent in the treatment of detainees. He added that the expectations of military police and medical professionals are extremely high as they stand watch, day and night, serving under a microscope of public scrutiny.

Every component of JTF Guantanamo is unique and necessary to the success of the entire mission, but the military police within the detention facilities are the glue that holds the mission together, said Deaton.
As the senior military police acquisition officer, I am just one member of a greater team with the responsibility to ensure that the military police warfighters of tomorrow have the right equipment to perform their mission. One of my duties is to advise the Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, and other military police leaders on the acquisition process so that they can make the most informed decisions regarding acquisitions. In this article, I provide brief overviews of the Defense Acquisition System, requirements identification, and rapid and deliberate acquisition processes; cover some of the challenges faced with equipping the future force; and discuss the Soldier Enhancement Program (SEP).

Acquisition System

The Department of Defense (DOD) Acquisition System is the DOD process to provide equipment in a timely and affordable manner. The DOD Acquisition System is composed of three main support systems: the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS); the Defense Acquisition System; and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) System. In simplest form, the DOD Acquisition System is the DOD process to identify a capability gap (JCIDS), apply a material solution to mitigate the gap (Defense Acquisition System) and, lastly, to allocate funds to the capability provided (PPBE). Although these three systems work independently, they are highly integrated and dependent on each other for effective management of the acquisition process.

Requirements Identification

The requirements process is the beginning and primary foundation of the acquisition process. Requirements are derived from several areas, starting at the strategic level with the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and Quadrennial Defense Reports. At the operational level, requirements are developed using current and planned operations, examining tasks and mission requirements, and developing a concept of operations as part of the Army concept framework. Lastly, requirements are generated from conducting studies, analyses, and assessments generated from center of excellence battle laboratories.

The ability to conduct specific tasks defined in the Army universal task list and the joint universal task list is the basis for establishing requirements. To identify a capability gap, we determine what we can do now in comparison to what we are being asked to do. The difference between the two is a capability gap. Capability gaps are analyzed in a process called capability-based assessments, which identify if and how the capability gap can be mitigated. The capability gap is examined to determine if changing or modifying doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) would best mitigate the capability gap. This analysis is presented to the Army Requirements Oversight Council to validate the recommendations and determine if a materiel approach is affordable and technically feasible. If a materiel solution is validated, an initial capabilities document is submitted through the JCIDS process. If a nonmateriel approach is chosen, a DOTMLPF-P change recommendation is submitted.

Rapid Acquisition Process

The emerging or urgent requirements process allows commanders in contingency environments to submit operational needs statements or rapid equipping force 10-liner requests for mission-critical equipment. Once an operational needs statement or rapid equipping force 10-liner request has been validated and funded, the request is sent to a rapid equipping force organization or an aligned acquisition program office. The required capability is identified, tested, and fielded to the requesting unit. Although this is the most flexible and fastest acquisition approach, commanders should not expect the new piece of equipment to be fielded for 1 to 2 years after validation (for equipment that has not been previously tested and fielded).

The rapid acquisition approach has enabled our military to rapidly respond and adapt to an ever-changing environment, such as that of Iraq and Afghanistan, by providing critical equipment to the warfighter to increase lethality and survivability. A potentially positive attribute of the rapid acquisition process is that the equipment being fielded is not considered part of a program of record (POR). To an extent, the Army only pays for the procurement of this equipment—not replacement or follow-on sustainment. This gives the Army the flexibility to annually determine which equipment receives sustainment funding and which does not. This potentially saves the Army money by eliminating the need to fund the sustainment of equipment that is no longer utilized.

Deliberate Acquisition Process

In the last several years, we have seen fiscal constraints affect the Military Police Corps and the Army as a whole. These fiscal constraints have directly led to a decrease in funding for research and development, future procurement, and the sustainment of fielded equipment. In this environment, a more deliberate acquisition approach, involving the entire JCIDS process, is required. This deliberate approach mandates fully defining the operating environment,
the capability gap, and the specific operational performance parameters within which the equipment will perform. The Military Police Requirements Determination Division, Maneuver Support Center of Excellence, Fort Leonard Wood, assists with this effort. The Military Police Requirements Determination Division works directly with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and USAMPS, developing the appropriate requirements documentation to shepherd requests through JCIDS and the DOD Acquisition System process.

Given the complexity and level of detailed analysis that is needed to develop requirements documentation, combined with Department of the Army-level approval, the average time from concept to equipment fielding can be 5 to 7 years. In comparison to the rapid acquisition process, the deliberate acquisition process produces equipment that will be considered POR. Research and development, production, sustainment, and eventual disposal of POR equipment are budgeted. In some cases, POR equipment is scheduled for updates, enabling the equipment to remain relevant and, thus, increasing its useful life.

**Challenges**

One of the biggest challenges (frustrations) with the acquisition process is the length of time from requirements identification to the fielding of equipment. It is understandable that a new combat vehicle platform, which will cost billions of dollars, will take years to properly research, test, procure, and field. It is more difficult to understand the time needed for the same process for less-expensive equipment and commercial, off-the-shelf equipment that is already available. Although the acquisition community and senior leaders are working to streamline and adapt the acquisition process, it still takes time to ensure that the Army has the necessary funding and that the equipment procured will meet the requirement.

The second challenge is developing requirements for the future. It is relatively easy to identify shortcomings in performing tasks with an understanding of the current operating environment and mission. The challenge lies in understanding future operating environments and missions. Without that understanding, identifying the gaps and working potential solutions are problematic. These are not issues when using the rapid acquisition process to meet those needs; but if the deliberate acquisition process must be used, the material solution may not be available in time to meet the operational demand.

Another challenge is securing the funding for research or the procurement of equipment. As an enabling force, many of the capabilities pursued do not directly assist with “killing in and destroying” the enemy. Additionally, many of our programs are not high on the Army priority list and are at risk of not being funded or being terminated. Senior leaders must make hard choices when determining what equipment to pursue and what equipment to delay or terminate. A decision made in one year can affect programs for many years.

**Assistance**

There are two areas in which Soldiers and leaders can assist with the acquisition process. The first is in providing honest feedback on new equipment during the testing phase or after the equipment has been fielded. It is important for the acquisition community to be aware of any issues and to understand how to improve equipment to better meet mission requirements. The second is in relaying ideas about how current equipment can be improved or ideas for new pieces of equipment up the chain of command.

**Soldier Enhancement Program**

One of the Army acquisition programs that allows Soldiers to provide input on transitioning commercial, off-the-shelf equipment to military equipment is the SEP. The SEP enables Soldiers or vendors to submit items to be reviewed and tested. A board meets twice a year and selects commercial, off-the-shelf equipment to be tested for the Army. Testing allows the Army to determine suitability and possible eventual fielding. Previous submissions have ranged from commercial lighting systems to weapons and weapon accoutrements. In short, if the equipment is not on the property book and it would help with the duties or mission, submit the recommendation. To submit ideas for the SEP, please refer to <http://www.peosoldier.army.mil/sep>.

**Conclusion**

The goal of this article is to give a brief overview of the acquisition process and to show some of the challenges in equipping the future military police warfighter. Although it is not an easy task, we are extremely fortunate to have dedicated military and civilian personnel working this issue. I am personally very proud to work in this capacity; I know that my efforts will help our Soldiers in the future. As the senior acquisition officer, it is my responsibility to assist military police commanders and staffs at all levels. If you or your staff have questions on the acquisition process, especially regarding the best way to procure or contract for equipment, contact the Military Police Requirements Determination Division at Fort Leonard Wood.

**Endnotes:**

1President of the United States, National Security Strategy, February 2015.


**References:**


TRADOC Regulation 71-20, Concept Development, Capabilities Determination, and Capabilities Integration, 28 June 2013.

Major Crumley is the senior acquisition officer for the Military Police Corps, Military Police Requirements Determination Division, Fort Leonard Wood. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and holds a master’s degree in business administration from Shippensburg University, Pennsylvania.
Headquarters and Headquarters Company
8th Military Police Brigade

Lineage and Honors

Constituted 8 April 1967 in the Regular Army as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 8th Military Police Group.
Activated 26 July 1967 at Fort Riley, Kansas.
Inactivated 18 December 1967 at Fort Riley, Kansas.
Inactivated 1 July 1972 in Vietnam.
Redesignated 16 April 1996 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 8th Military Police Brigade, and activated in South Korea.
Reassigned in July 2006 to U.S. Army Pacific; moved from South Korea to Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; and placed under the command of the newly created 8th Theater Sustainment Command.

Campaign Participation Credit

Vietnam

Counteroffensive, Phase V
Counteroffensive, Phase VI
Tet 69/Counteroffensive
Summer–Fall 1969
Winter–Spring 1970
Sanctuary Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase VII
Consolidation I
Consolidation II
Cease-Fire

Iraq

Iraqi Surge
Iraqi Sovereignty

Decorations

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1968–1969
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered IRAQ 2008–2009
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered AFGHANISTAN 2009–2010
### MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE LEVEL AND ABOVE COMMANDS

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| FM 3-39           | Military Police Operations                 | 26 Aug 13| A manual that describes the military police support provided to Army forces conducting unified land operations within the framework of joint operations; increases the emphasis on simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks; and contains a critical discussion of the defense support of civil authorities.  
**Status:** Under revision. Projected publication in 4th quarter fiscal year (FY) 2018. |
| FM 3-63           | Detainee Operations                        | 28 Apr 14| A manual that addresses detention operations across the range of military operations and provides detention operations guidance for commanders and staffs.  
**Status:** Under revision. Projected publication in 1st quarter FY 19. |
| ATP 3-37.2        | Antiterrorism                              | 3 Jun 14 | A manual that establishes Army guidance on integrating and synchronizing antiterrorism across the full spectrum of conflict and into the full range of military operations. It shows how antiterrorism operations nest under full spectrum operations, the protection warfighting function, and the composite risk management process.  
**Status:** Current. |
| ATP 3-39.10       | Police Operations                          | 26 Jan 15| A manual that addresses each element of the military police law and order mission, including planning considerations, police station operations, patrol operations, police engagement, traffic operations, and host nation police capability and capacity.  
**Status:** Current. |
| ATP 3-39.11       | Military Police Special-Reaction Teams     | 26 Nov 13| A manual that serves as a guide for commanders, staffs, and trainers who are responsible for training and deploying military police special-reaction teams.  
**Status:** Current. |
| ATP 3-39.12       | Law Enforcement Investigations             | 19 Aug 13| A manual that serves as a guide and toolkit for military police, investigators, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID) special agents, traffic management and collision investigators, and Soldiers conducting criminal and traffic law enforcement (LE) and LE investigations. It also serves to educate military police commanders and staffs on LE investigation capabilities, enabling a more thorough understanding of those capabilities.  
**Status:** Current. |
| ATP 3-39.20       | Police Intelligence Operations             | 6 Apr 15 | A manual that addresses police intelligence operations that support the operations process and protection activities by providing exceptional police information and intelligence to support, enhance, and contribute to situational understanding, force protection, the commander’s protection program, and homeland security.  
**Status:** Under revision. Projected publication in 1st quarter FY 19. |


**Doctrine Update**

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence
Capabilities Development Integration Directorate
Concepts, Organization, and Doctrine Development Division

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<td>ATP 3-39.32</td>
<td>Physical Security</td>
<td>30 Apr 14</td>
<td>A manual that establishes guidance for all personnel responsible for physical security. It is the basic reference for training security personnel and is intended to be used in conjunction with the Army Regulation 190 (Military Police) series, Security Engineering Unified Facilities Criteria publications, Department of Defense directives, and other Department of the Army publications. <strong>Status:</strong> Current.</td>
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<td>ATP 3-39.33</td>
<td>Civil Disturbances</td>
<td>21 Apr 14</td>
<td>A manual that addresses continental U.S. and outside the continental U.S. civil disturbance operations and domestic unrest, including the military role in providing assistance to civil authorities. <strong>Status:</strong> Current.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATP 3-39.34</td>
<td>Military Working Dogs</td>
<td>30 Jan 15</td>
<td>A manual that provides commanders, staffs, and military working dog (MWD) handlers with an understanding of MWD capabilities, employment considerations, sustainment requirements, and the integration of MWDs in support of full spectrum operations. <strong>Status:</strong> Current.</td>
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<td>ATP 3-39.35</td>
<td>Protective Services</td>
<td>31 May 13</td>
<td>A manual that provides guidance for protective service missions and the management of protective service details. <strong>Status:</strong> Current.</td>
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<td>TC 3-39.30</td>
<td>Military Police Leaders’ Handbook</td>
<td>11 Aug 15</td>
<td>A manual that is primarily focused on military police operations at the company level and below. TC 3-39.30 provides an overview of fundamental guidelines and is a quick reference guide to help commanders, leaders, and Soldiers successfully execute key military police missions in support of unified land operations through the three disciplines of security and mobility support, police operations, and detention operations. <strong>Status:</strong> Current.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TM 3-39.31</td>
<td>Armored Security Vehicle</td>
<td>20 Aug 10</td>
<td>A manual that provides military police forces with the tactics, techniques, and procedures and related information necessary for the employment of the armored security vehicle. <strong>Status:</strong> Current.</td>
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**Note:** Current military police publications can be accessed and downloaded in electronic format from the U.S. Army Military Police School Web site at <http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/>. Comments or questions about military police doctrine can be e-mailed to <usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.cdidcoddmpdoc@mail.mil>.

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