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The Professional Bulletin of Army History
In the Spring 2019 issue of Army History, we are pleased to offer two engaging articles, the story of an interesting artifact, a glimpse at part of an exhibit under construction at the National Museum of the United States Army (NMUSA), a quality group of book reviews, and a few words from our executive director.

In the first article, author Christopher Kolakowski details the harrowing story of the Japanese attack on British troops in India at Kohima. Recognized as one of the greatest battles in British military history, the determined and desperate stand by the small garrison is the stuff of legend. Painting a graphic portrait of the savage fighting, Kolakowski details the siege and the relief efforts, as the beleaguered British force fights to hang on in the face of the Japanese onslaught.

The next article, by Center of Military History (CMH) historian Kathleen Fargey, examines a sampling of the Army’s response to the influenza outbreak of 1918–1919. Looking at five locations, or case studies, in the United States and France, Fargey documents the Army’s attempts to respond to, treat, and mitigate the effects of a disease that would take more U.S. soldiers’ lives than had been lost on the actual battlefields of the First World War. The Army found itself wholly unprepared for the sheer volume of patients that would pass through its hospitals. Attempts to cope would strain the Army’s medical system to the breaking point, but the lessons learned from the pandemic informed plans for response that the Army utilizes to this day.

Our NMUSA feature shows a part of museum exhibit construction that few ever get to see, as actual artifacts are incorporated into a realistic battlefield scene that visitors will one day soon be able to walk through. The Artifact Spotlight highlights a World War I helmet and includes the personal story of the soldier who brought the item home.

Opening and closing this edition, the CMH director discusses an issue of critical importance to the Army historical community as the Center looks forward to its transition into a component of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command.

I continue to invite your constructive comments on this publication as we strive to continue to bring our readers engaging and enlightening content.

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Under the leadership of Dr. Mark T. Esper, the twenty-third secretary of the Army, the Department of the Army began a series of management reforms in the spring of 2018, with the ultimate objectives of reducing the size of the headquarters, focusing the headquarters on policy and management, and empowering the Army Commands (ACOMs) to accomplish daily Army activities. These changes should allow for greater focus and more efficient execution of the secretary’s enduring priorities of readiness, force modernization, and reform. At the beginning of this process, the ACOMs offered suggestions for Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), activities and missions that they could assume. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) recommended a realignment of the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) from the Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army to TRADOC. This is one of a number of realignments which will centralize responsibility for training and education programs within TRADOC.

In its more than one hundred years of existence, the Army’s historical office has had different physical locations and chains of command, but its mission has remained the same. The Army’s official historians, archivists, and museum professionals are custodians of our institutional memory and material culture. Army historians who teach in service schools create and sustain historical perspective and critical thinking skills across the force. Our distilled mission—to Educate, Inspire, and Preserve—encompasses those missions. However, CMH has long wrestled with the complexities of accomplishing related, but distinctly different, missions for the Army: providing historical support to HQDA, administering an Army-wide historical program, and fostering professional collaboration among all Army historians. Realignment to TRADOC will allow us to do all of this more effectively, through stewardship of an Army Historical Program that is more unified and collaborative, with enhanced relevance to the force.

The discipline of history, within and outside of the Army, has been under great strain for some time now. Undergraduate enrollment in history courses has been on the decline for several years, and within the Army, history instruction and the staffing of command historical offices have been steadily reduced. History of the Military Art, the two-semester sequence that has been a core academic requirement at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point for decades, was recently cut in half, to one semester for all cadets (history majors take both semesters). At both West Point and the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, core military history instruction has been focused on the twentieth century and after, neglecting the foundations of the American military experience and the genesis of the concept of civilian control of the military. With just three exceptions, Army operational units at division-level and above have eliminated or declined to fill their command historian positions as they deal with budget cuts and other restructuring actions. The evidence is undeniable: our historical mindedness as an institution is under threat. This situation makes the third of the missions above, while not specified in our regulations or policy, almost as important as the other two.

I believe that our entire Army should have a greater degree of historical literacy: a baseline familiarity with the themes, events, and personalities that form the bedrock of our communal consciousness. If you ask any current or former Marine, regardless of rank, about the historical touchpoints of their Corps, they will tell you about Belleau Wood, Iwo Jima, Chosin Reservoir, Khe Sanh, and Fallujah. Many will know about Presley O’Bannon, Archibald Henderson, Dan Daly, or Chesty Puller. We should expect the same conversance with history and heritage in our own ranks—Yorktown, Gettysburg, the Meuse-Argonne, the Bulge, Inchon, Dak To, and George Washington, Ulysses S. Grant,
CMH Volume Translated into Japanese

A 2006 Center of Military History (CMH) book, *Nisei Linguists: Japanese Americans in the Military Intelligence Service during World War II*, by James C. McNaughton, has been translated into Japanese and published by the Sairyusha publishing house in July 2018. The Japanese edition, titled *Mou hitotsu no taiheiyōsensō: Beirikugun nikkei nisei no gogaku-hei to jōhō-in* (*Another Pacific War: U.S. Army Nisei Linguist Soldiers and Intelligence Staff*), was translated by Mr. Yukio Morita, a Japanese scholar who specializes in the Nisei experience during World War II. The translation will add to a growing body of Japanese-language scholarship on American Nisei soldiers and civilians. For thirty years, McNaughton served in several positions with the Army History Program before his retirement in 2017. He wrote much of the book while serving as command historian for the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, Presidio of Monterey, California. He is also the author of *The Army in the Pacific: A Century of Engagement* (CMH Pub 70–121–1). His final assignment was as chief of the CMH Histories Directorate. CMH originally published *Nisei Linguists* as CMH Pub 70–99–1 (paper), and it is available for purchase by the general public from the U.S. Government Publishing Office.

Call for Submissions: The Army and World War II in the Pacific

With the seventy-fifth anniversary of World War II upon us, *Army History* is specifically asking for article submissions covering any aspect of the U.S. Army in the Pacific Theater. In addition to the standing invitation for articles, the details of which appear in every issue of *Army History* in the Call for Submissions box, we are now looking for contributions that touch on the wide range of topics related to the Army in the Pacific. Our intention is to publish a few quality pieces in the Winter 2020 issue. Articles should be between approximately 4,000 and 8,000 words with endnotes. The use of primary sources is highly encouraged. It is recommended that authors adhere to the CMH Style Guide (https://history.army.mil/howto.html). Submissions should be in Microsoft Word format, double spaced, in Times New Roman 12-point font, and should be sent by 1 September 2019 to the following email address as an attachment, usarmy.mcnair.mbx.army-history@mail.mil.

1st Annual Conference on World War II

The 1st Annual Conference on World War II convenes at the Wyndham Hotel in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, on 8–10 November 2019. Cosponsored by the Dwight D. Eisenhower Society, this event will feature engaging presentations and discussions by several internationally recognized speakers. Dennis E. Showalter delivers the keynote address about the importance of World War II military history. James M. Scott, Craig L. Symonds, Cate Lineberry, Nigel Hamilton, Nina Willner, Stephen Harding, Flint Whitlock, Christopher L. Kolakowski, and Steven J. Zaloga address topics including D-Day, the Battle of the Bulge, women in military intelligence and the medical services, Anzio, the campaigns in the Philippines from 1941 to 1945, and Franklin D. Roosevelt at war. The registration fee of $225 (increasing to $250 after 1 October) includes all speaker events plus a cocktail reception and lunch. An additional private tour of the Eisenhower National Historic Site plus a large privately owned collection of tanks, equipment, and rare memorabilia is available for $110. Rooms at the Wyndham start at the special conference rate of $119. Register at americashistoryllc.com, email info@AmericasHistoryLLC.com, or phone 1-703-785-4373.
“Is That the END or Do We GO On?”

THE BATTLE OF KOHIMA, 1944

By Christopher L. Kolakowski

A Japanese roadblock on the Imphal-Kohima Road being dismantled by men of the West Yorkshire Regiment.
Lord Louis Mountbatten visited the battlefield of Kohima after the fighting had ended in 1944. Considering the ground and the course of the battle, he commented, “The Battle of Kohima will probably go down as one of the greatest battles in history.” Field Marshal Sir William J. Slim agreed, writing in 1956 that, “sieges have been longer but few have been more intense, and in none have the defenders deserved greater honor than the garrison of Kohima.”

For two months, from early April to early June 1944, the eastern Indian town of Kohima and its surrounding hills were the focus of very intense and dramatic back-and-forth fighting between Allied and Japanese forces. Both sides alternated offensive phases with desperate defensive fighting. Although the battle took up a relatively small area, its course affected operations from Manchuria to India and attracted attention as far away as Washington and London. Today, Kohima is known among the superlative battles of World War II.

After the Pacific War’s outbreak in December 1941, Japanese forces pushed through Thailand into Burma. In a fast campaign over the first months of 1942, the Japanese Fifteenth Army drove a mixed Chinese, Indian, and British force almost completely out of the country. At the same time, other Japanese forces secured Malaya, Singapore, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies. The Fifteenth Army’s advance stopped at the Indian and Chinese borders, after having cut the last land connection to China via the Burma Road. American planes began ferrying supplies to China over the Himalayas.

The Allies launched two offensives in 1943: one in the Arakan in Burma that resulted in a humiliating defeat, and an inconclusive raid by a brigade (the famous Chindits) under British Brig. Orde C. Wingate. Both failed to change the strategic balance. In the last days of 1943, Sino-American forces under Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell commenced a southward advance into northern Burma to reopen a land route to China via the key town of Myitkyina. In contrast to the previous year’s defensive attitude, the Japanese in Burma...
thought in offensive terms for 1944. Lt. Gen. Kawabe Masakazu’s Burma Area Army held the country with forces scattered along the major invasion routes. In southwest Burma stood Lt. Gen. Sakurai Shozō’s Twenty-Eighth Army with the 54th, 55th, and 2d Divisions, the last having just recovered from a mauling at the Battle of Guadalcanal. In central Burma, the Fifteenth Army under Lt. Gen. Mutaguchi Renya faced India with the 15th, 31st, and 33d Divisions supported by the division-sized Indian National Army (INA). The independent (and elite) 18th “Chrysanthemum” Division under Maj. Gen. Tanaka Shinichi opposed Stilwell’s forces and the airlift to China. The Allies did not know of this limitation and remained sensitive to any threat to Dimapur.

Wingate’s 1943 operation had inspired Mutaguchi about the feasibility of advancing across the mountains into India, specifically the border area around Imphal. Capturing Imphal and the surrounding area would eliminate a major British base in eastern India and hopefully cause restive elements of the Indian population to revolt against British rule in a larger version of 1942’s Quit India Movement. Mutaguchi also recognized that a victorious invasion of India would enhance both his personal and Japan’s national prestige, especially given the many reverses Japan suffered in the Pacific in 1943. In January 1944, Imperial General Headquarters sanctioned Mutaguchi’s plans.

**The March on Delhi**

Throughout February, Mutaguchi’s forces made their final preparations for the advance into India. Although Tokyo portrayed the Fifteenth Army’s advance as a “March on Delhi,” and Mutaguchi himself dreamed of conquering India, Kawabe’s orders limited Mutaguchi to taking Imphal and the surrounding area. While the 15th and 33d Divisions and the INA attacked Imphal from three sides, Lt. Gen. Sato Kotoku’s 31st Division would secure the north flank by capturing Kohima. Significantly, the Japanese left the Allied base at Dimapur, forty-five miles west of Kohima and on the key Bengal and Assam Railway, off their list of objectives. This was a major omission, as taking Dimapur would sever the major transportation artery linking Allied forces in eastern India and strangle supplies for both Stilwell’s forces and the airlift to China. The Allies did not know of this limitation and remained sensitive to any threat to Dimapur.

On 6 March, the first of Mutaguchi’s forces moved forward, with the rest following in stages over the next nine days. They faced 70,000 British troops around Imphal and the hamlets to the north, all under the command of Lt. Gen. Geoffrey Scoones’ IV Corps. Scoones answered to the Fourteenth Army under then-General William Slim, who oversaw the entire front along the India-Burma border from the Bay of Bengal to Stilwell’s advance in North Burma.

IV Corps stationed most of its strength south and east of Imphal, represented by the 17th, 20th, and 23d Indian Divisions with supporting units. Thirty miles northeast of Imphal at Ukhrul was the two-battalion 50th Parachute Brigade under Brig. M. R. J. Hope-Thomson, whereas twenty-five miles east of Kohima stood Lt. Col. William Felix “Bruno” Brown’s 1st Assam Regiment, a locally recruited unit. The weight of Sato’s advance would encounter these two units.

Slim knew Mutaguchi’s offensive was coming; he planned a phased withdrawal to Imphal to fight the decisive battle there. However, General Scoones was to decide the timing of the movement. The battle developed gradually, causing Scoones to order the withdrawal at a point almost too late. Moving with speed and ferocity, the Japanese soon pressed IV Corps back toward Imphal. South of town, the 17th Indian Division fought its way out of encirclement twice to reach Imphal. At the end of March, Japanese forces cut the Imphal-Kohima Road, isolating IV Corps.

Meanwhile, the 15,000 men of Sato’s 31st Division slashed their way into India. The division formed three columns, centered on each of its three component regiments: 58th on the left, 124th in the center, and 138th on the right. Their advance crossed several parallel mountain ranges, each over 5,000 feet in elevation. “In general, the advance of the Division was relatively smooth,” noted a staff report, “but the transportation of supplies through the rugged mountain ranges was extremely difficult . . . The men also suffered from exhaustion and malnutrition.”

Sato’s left column brushed up against Hope-Thomson’s paratroopers at Sangshak, near Ukhrul. Although outside his zone of operations, the column commander, Maj. Gen. Miyazaki Shigesaburo, diverted southward and attacked Sangshak on 22 March. Over four days the Japanese stormed successive hill positions as the paratroopers
held on tenaciously. On the morning of 27 March, Hope-Thomson’s men cut their way out to Imphal. The battle cost the Japanese 500 casualties and 5 precious days.9

Further north, the Japanese 138th 138th Regiment encountered Brown’s Assam Regiment. The main body held Jessami with Lt. John “Jock” Young’s A Company defending an outpost at Kharasom. Brown and Young had orders to fight “to the last man and the last round.” Both places received attacks on 26 March, and over the next five days both units held their own. But they had lost communication with Kohima, and recall orders could not be issued. A U.S. colonel flew a Piper Cub to airdrop orders, which Brown finally received on 31 March; he pulled back 1 April. Young never got the message, but on his own ordered his men out. “I shall be the last man,” he declared, and with difficulty got his company moving toward Kohima. No one ever saw Young alive again, nor was his body identified. But these sacrifices were not in vain—they delayed the Japanese advance another five critical days.10

Slim well understood the importance of these developments. A captured Japanese order from Sangshak confirmed his worst fears. “Within a week of the start of the Japanese offensive,” he recalled, “it became clear that the situation in the Kohima area was likely to be even more dangerous than that at Imphal. Not only were the enemy columns closing in on Kohima at much greater speed than I had expected, but they were obviously in much greater strength.” Slim had expected a strike toward Kohima by a Japanese regiment, but the entire 31st Division was on its way. “We were

Left to Right: General Sato, General Scoones, General Slim, Lieutenant Young
not prepared for so heavy a thrust,” Slim admitted. “Kohima with its rather scratch garrison and, what was worse, Dimapur with no garrison at all, were in deadly peril.”

Slim needed reinforcements in a hurry. He asked his superiors, General Sir George Giffard of 11th Army Group and Supreme Commander of Southeast Asia Command Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, for air transport. Mountbatten directed thirty U.S. aircraft be diverted from ferrying supplies to China to fly the 5th Indian Division into Imphal from the Arakan. In one of the first strategic air movements of its type, two brigades and the divisional troops flew into Imphal over seven days, 19–26 March. The division’s third brigade, Brig. D. F. W. Warren’s 161st, had been diverted to Dimapur and Kohima, and arrived in late March to assist the defense. Lt. Gen. Montagu G. N. Stopford’s 33 Corps Headquarters and Maj. Gen. John M. L. Grover’s 2d British Division, both training in southern India, also started for Dimapur.

At Stilwell’s request, Allied commanders met at Jorhat on 3 April to discuss the situation. Stilwell offered Slim the elite Chinese 38th Division to help hold Dimapur and the railroad. Stilwell warned, “it would mean stopping his advance, probably withdrawing, and certainly not getting Myitkyina before the monsoon,” recalled Slim. “I was sure this was Stilwell’s great opportunity. I, therefore, told him to retain the 38th Division . . . and to push on to Myitkyina as hard as he could go.”

Stopford arrived on the scene 23 March, although his headquarters did not formally open until 3 April. Slim gave him several missions, starting with protecting Dimapur and the railroad. Once done, his corps was to reopen the road to Imphal. Grover’s division was on the way, but for the moment Stopford’s only field force was Warren’s brigade, just arriving at Kohima. Stopford felt that even though holding Kohima was of major importance, Dimapur was the more critical position to defend. Despite protests from local commanders, the 161st received orders to retrace its steps to Dimapur. On 31 March, Warren’s men retired to Nichugard Pass, ten miles east of Dimapur. Over the next days, elements of the 2d British Division arrived on the scene to reinforce the Dimapur defenses. On 4 April, the 161st Brigade was ordered back to Kohima.

Warren’s men promptly got back on the road. By the time his lead battalion, the 450 men of Lt. Col. John Laverty’s 4 Royal West Kent (4 RWK), reached Kohima, the siege was underway.

**KOHIMA PHASE 1: SIEGE**

Kohima town sits at a pass that provides the vital link between Imphal and the interior of India. The town and its namesake ridge sit along and astride the key Imphal-Dimapur Road, and several other tracks into the hills all intersect at Kohima. The area has traditionally been a communication route between Burma and India, and had been the scene of fighting in the 1870s.

Kohima Ridge thus was overlooked by surrounding heights: Pulebadze to the south, Jotsoma to the west, and the Naga Village/Merema to the east and northeast.

On 22 March, Col. Hugh Richards arrived from Delhi to take command of the garrison at Kohima. He faced the daunting problem of organizing a defense with limited combat troops and constantly changing forces. Richards quickly determined to concentrate his limited forces on Kohima Ridge itself. He sent away most of the logistical troops, evacuated the hospitals, and organized the men in the replacement depot into platoons base a year earlier, some of its various hills had become known by their function. From south to north, they were GPT (General Purpose Transport) Ridge, Jail Hill, DIS (Detail Issue Store), FSD (Field Supply Depot), Kuki Picquet, and Garrison Hill. A northwest extension of Garrison Hill housed a hospital and became known as IGH (Indian General Hospital) Spur. Thick woods, interspersed with the town’s and base’s structures, covered most of these hills. Garrison Hill was terraced and landscaped, and included the home (complete with clubhouse and tennis court) of the deputy commissioner for the area, Charles Pawsey. The Imphal-Dimapur Road skirted the ridge to the east before turning west past Garrison Hill. Treasury Hill and a Naga Village settlement overlooked the ridge from the northeast; those heights also extended north to the hamlet of Merema. Southward loomed the imposing Pulebadze Mountain, whereas three miles to the west rose a knoll topped by the village of Jotsoma. Kohima Ridge thus was overlooked by surrounding heights: Pulebadze to the south, Jotsoma to the west, and the Naga Village/Merema to the east and northeast.

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to be assigned to combat units. Richards was the one who recalled the Assam Regiment, and protested Warren’s withdrawal to Dimapur. He also unsuccessfully sought to keep a battalion of the West Yorkshire Regiment that had orders for Imphal.16

One advantage Richards enjoyed was the loyalty of the local Naga people. Throughout the battle they assisted the British as guides, porters, and spies. Pawsey had spent years among them as Deputy Commissioner, and did not want to abandon what he regarded as his people. He also understood that if he left, the British would lose face forever. The Nagas recognized his importance; “Charles Pawsey,” affirmed one, “was one of the reasons the Nagas remained loyal to the British . . . His action at a critical time improved the image for the British administration.” Pawsey remained at Richards’ side through the battle. Thanks to intelligence from the Nagas, Richards could track the Japanese approach.17

Sato planned a two-pronged advance on Kohima. Miyazaki and the 58th would drive straight up the Imphal road, while the 138th secured the Naga Village and swung around behind Kohima to cut the road to Dimapur. The 124th would be in reserve.18

On 3 April, Brown brought the Assam Regiment into the perimeter. Of 500 men who started the campaign, 280 remained, but they were a welcome reinforcement. The next day, Richards’ outposts made first contact with the Japanese. The West Kent, plus a company from 4th Battalion, 7th Rajput Regiment, arrived with artillery in the late afternoon of 5 April before the Japanese closed the road west after sundown. This left Richards with 2,500 men, 1,000 of which were noncombatants. The garrison’s combat strength centered on 4 RWK, assisted by the Assam Regiment, five detached companies of Indian infantry, a battalion of the paramilitary Assam Rifles, and the half-trained Nepalese Shere Regiment. There was plenty of ammunition and food to last for weeks, although water was short.19

Warren led the rest of his troops forward and found Japanese shellfire already striking around Garrison Hill. He quickly realized his entire brigade could not fit into the perimeter; he took position at Jotsoma and formed an all-around defense. His artillery would assist the defense of both Jotsoma and Kohima.20

Kohima faced its first test on the evening of 5 April, as Miyazaki’s men attacked GPT Ridge and Jail Hill. The latter held out, whereas the troops defending the former gave way and retired toward Dimapur. The Japanese swung east and repeatedly attacked Jail Hill on the 6th, forcing its evacuation. That night, a company of 4 RWK wiped out a Japanese penetration into the structures between FSD and DIS; an exploding ammunition dump flushed many Japanese into the open where the British gunned them down. Daylight on 7 April revealed forty-four Japanese bodies in the defile between the hills. Other Japanese had sheltered in the tandoor ovens of a bakery, and L. Cpl. John P. Harman went in with grenades, dropping one into each oven. Two men, including an officer, survived and Harman captured them. He carried them back to British lines over his shoulder like logs. The British found the officer had a map of Japanese artillery positions around Kohima. “This is even worse than Sangshak,” some of the
Japanese prisoners complained, surprised at the defense’s steadfastness. 21

After forty-eight hours, the pattern of the siege grew apparent. The Japanese would fire furiously at dusk in what the defenders called the “evening hate.” Repeated night attacks denied anything but the most fitful sleep, whereas during the day, snipers, machine guns, artillery, and mortars harassed Kohima’s defenders. British artillery from Jotsoma, aided by spotters in Kohima’s perimeter, engaged the enemy as needed. The loss of GPT also meant the loss of most of the garrison’s water access except for a small spring on Garrison Hill; Richards’ had to limit his defenders to one pint of water per man per day.

Japanese attention next shifted to Garrison Hill, as elements of two Japanese battalions attacked up the terraced slopes from the Naga Village against the reinforced company holding the terraces. Mortar fire blanketed the British positions as the Japanese pressed upward. Indian Bren gunners defended to the last as the tide washed over them. Pawsey’s residence fell, and the defenders, reinforced by A Company of the West Kent, took position at the tennis court. Supporting fire came from the clubhouse, with a pool table and other furniture providing platforms for the Brens. There the Japanese surge stopped, leaving the width of the tennis court between the two sides. These lines would not move for weeks. 22

Farther south, the Japanese had placed a machine gun overlooking DIS that threatened to make the British position untenable. In broad daylight, Harman single-handedly attacked the position and killed the crew. He hoisted the gun over his shoulder and started back to the lines, seemingly unconcerned about the danger. A heretofore hidden Japanese machine gun shot him dead. This action, plus the one at the bakery the day before, earned Harman a posthumous Victoria Cross. 23

Meanwhile, Grover’s 2d Division struggled to open the road. On 8 April, Sato’s 138th Regiment had reached Zubza, thirty-two miles from Dimapur, and set up several defended roadblocks in the ten miles between Zubza and Jotsoma. Warren tried to break out westward, but found the defenses too strong; he also needed to defend his artillery position. Grover’s British troops would have to fight their way in.

Despite Stopford’s urging to take risks, Grover was torn between the imperative of relieving Kohima or protecting the road to Dimapur with only two of his three brigades on the scene. He posted Brig. J. D. Shapland’s 6th Brigade along the road and sent his lead brigade, the 5th under Brig. Victor Hawkins, forward. With tank support from...
Richards and Laverty tracked these movements via the 4 RWK’s headquarters’ radio link to Warren. Laverty was somewhat jealous of his prerogatives regarding his battalion, and maintained control of this connection to the outside throughout the siege. This tension between the two senior officers did not matter much, as Capt. Tom Coates of the West Kent explained. “The siege was primarily a privates’ battle,” he recalled, “and our success was due mainly to the very high morale and steadiness of the NCOs [noncommissioned officers] and men.”

The garrison weathered more attacks over the next four days. Despite the enemy’s best efforts to break through, the lines held. But casualties mounted, and it forced Richards to abandon DIS. Meanwhile, more wounded crowded into IGH Spur, filling the area behind the sector held by Brown’s Assam Regiment. There, doctors led by the indefatigable Lt. Col. John Young, did what they could despite enemy activity and scarce water. Medical supplies were running low, and Japanese shelling made the situation at the hospital worse. Aircraft had dropped some water canisters to the garrison with mixed success, but the wounded needed more than water. Young appealed to Richards, who on the evening of 12 April asked for an airdrop of medical supplies, to which Laverty added mortar ammunition and grenades.

That night, the garrison repelled another attack. On the morning of 13 April, the Japanese deliberately shelled IGH Spur, inflicting over fifty casualties on already wounded men and killing three doctors. In the afternoon, the drumming of aircraft engines could be heard from the west. Three U.S. C–47s appeared and came in low over the ridge. They parachuted water and the requested supplies, but almost all of it drifted into the Japanese lines. The Japanese used some captured mortars to shell Kohima’s defenders with the airdropped rounds. A little later, Royal Air Force (RAF) transports successfully dropped ammunition and medical supplies to the garrison, but the ammunition had been meant for the artillery at Jotsoma and was the wrong caliber for any of Kohima’s guns.

These developments, plus the weeklong strain of constant siege, sapped the garrison’s morale. The 4 RWK war diary called this day “The Black Thirteenth.” Richards sensed the mood and issued an order of the day. “The relief force is on its way,” Richards told his men, “and all that is necessary for the Garrison now is to stand firm, hold its fire and beat off any attempt to infiltrate among us. By your acts you have shown what you can do . . . I congratulate you on your magnificent effort and am confident that it will be sustained.”
Understrength 4 RWK companies. In close-quarters combat, which in one case involved a man strangling a Japanese officer with his bare hands, the defenders drove off the attackers. At the tennis court, B Company of the 4 RWK endured repeated attacks. A Bren gun jammed, and some Japanese rushed the position; the gunner died but another soldier beat off the attackers with a shovel. The Assam Regiment reinforced the sector the next day.

For Kohima’s defenders, the next few days were blurs of shelling, sniping, and attacks from Japanese troops. Artillery from Jotsoma and RAF Hurricane fighter-bombers lent their firepower to the defense when possible. Thirst increased despite rain coming on 14 April, as there were few facilities to catch the water. Blasted trees no longer gave shelter from the weather or concealment from the enemy, and many snared supply parachutes. But the garrison stood firm because of the sights and sounds to the west.

As Kohima endured, Hawkins’ brigade fought to open the road. Rain slowed operations and limited the use of tanks. On the 14th, Warren promised Laverty and Richards: “I’m doing my best, but intend to make a proper job of it.” Late that day, Hawkins launched an attack on the last position between his men and Jotsoma; it fell the next morning. At 1100 on 15 April the 5th Brigade and 161st Brigade joined hands.

Warren signaled this news to Kohima, and promised relief on the 16th. He sent 1st Battalion, 1st Punjab Regiment (1/1 Punjab) attacking eastward with some success. But Grover arrived in the afternoon and postponed the final relief attack for one day, citing lack of “time for recce [reconnaissance] . . . and lack of adequate provision for the security of the right flank of the brigade.” Warren regarded those as acceptable risks in view of the garrison’s condition, but had to acquiesce to the postponement. The British defeated the Japanese attacks on the road on 16 April, but the threat of being cut off remained. Despite only a mile or so remaining to Garrison Hill, on the morning of 17 April, Warren postponed his relief effort yet another day.

The garrison’s morale wavered at these repeated delays of rescue. Grim jokes about help never arriving circulated among the soldiers, and both officers and men began to lose confidence they would get out of Kohima alive. In the hospital, wounded officers asked for their sidearms back—they wanted a quick end when the Japanese came.

On the night of 17 April, the Japanese preceded a mass charge against FSD with heavy artillery fire. The exhausted defenders reeled backward and were pushed off both FSD and Kuki Piquet by the early hours of 18 April. “We couldn’t do a thing sir,” reported a West Kent soldier to an officer on Garrison Hill. “The Japs were simply all over us.” This defeat left Richards and his garrison with a perimeter roughly 350 yards wide by 350 yards deep, centered on Garrison Hill. There was no further retreat possible; it was do or die. Every man who could, including the wounded and Richards himself, took a weapon and went to the line. The defenders peered into the darkness and braced for an assault. Dawn would save them, but hours of darkness remained.

As they waited, a young soldier turned to Richards. “Sir, can I ask you a question?” “Of course,” Richards replied. “What is it?”

“When we die, sir, is that the end or do we go on?”32
Mutaguchi to detach three battalions of Sato. Not only had he failed to fully capture the place was a veritable paradise for flies.”

Shapland’s 6th Brigade replaced Kohima’s weary and exhausted defenders. The Japanese made half-hearted attempts to attack, but the relief went on without interruption. Richards finally left on 20 April after handing over command to Shapland himself.

Garrison Hill’s appearance shocked Shapland’s troops. “The place stank,” recalled Maj. John Nettlefield. “The ground everywhere was ploughed up with shell-fire and human remains lay rotting as the battle raged over them. . . . Men retch as they dug in.” The amount of wreckage impressed others. “It was possible to pick up anything from a Tommy-gun to a pair of ladies’ shoes,” noted Lt. Col. Wilbur Bickford, commanding the 1st Royal Berkshire. “The place was a veritable paradise for flies.”

Kohima’s relief came at a bad time for Sato. Not only had he failed to fully capture Kohima Ridge, he now received orders from Mutaguchi to detach three battalions of infantry and one of artillery under Miyazaki to Imphal, where Mutaguchi planned to use them to break into IV Corps’ perimeter from the north. Sato assembled the force, two battalions of the 124th, one of the 138th, and 3d Battalion of the 31st Mountain Regiment, south of Pulebadze near the village of Aradura. Meanwhile, the rest of the 138th and 124th, bloodied in battles along the road, fell back to defensive positions at Merema and Kohima. The 58th held its ground on Kohima Ridge, and Sato decided to use its ebbing strength to attack Garrison Hill one more time.

General Grover also took this time to deploy his division and decide his next move. Captured documents revealed both Mutaguchi’s orders for the detachment and Sato’s plans to comply. Prodded by Slim and Stopford, who were in turn pushed by messages from Washington and London, Grover decided to attack with his entire division. Hawkins would move to Merema and then south of Kohima, while Shapland would attack from Garrison Hill outward. Brig. Willie Goschen’s 4th Brigade (minus one battalion remaining to protect the road) would march from Jotsoma to Pulebadze in an effort to flank Sato’s troops to the south. Warren’s tired force would help protect the road to Dimapur.

Sato’s men attacked Garrison Hill, now held by the 1st Royal Berkshire and 2d Durham Light Infantry (DLI), on 23 April. The Royal Berkshire at the tennis court held firm, and the DLI fought a back-and-forth action that ended with the defenders back in their positions after hours of heavy fighting. For the Japanese, the fighting had wiped out nearly four of the seven attacking companies, and those losses were irreplaceable. Sato realized that if he detached the forces Mutaguchi wanted, his division would likely be unable to hold its positions around Kohima, which was essential to preventing Imphal’s relief. He cancelled Miyazaki’s marching orders and ordered all of his units to the defensive.

Meanwhile, Grover’s brigades moved forward. After trying and failing to get tanks up the back side of Garrison Hill, Shapland’s infantry secured positions overlooking the intersection below Pawsey’s house. Although the Japanese still held the terrace itself, tanks could now round the bend and come up Pawsey’s driveway—although not immediately as it took several days under fire for engineers to regrade a curve in the driveway to fit a Grant tank. Farther north, Hawkins’ brigade reached Merema and probed southward toward the Naga Village. To the south, Goschen’s infantrymen encountered little opposition but the terrain slowed their pace to a crawl. “It was a case of up one steep khud [ridge] and down the other side, then up a steeper and down again,” recalled an officer.

“To anyone who hasn’t soldiered in Assam the physical hammering one takes is difficult to understand. The heat, the humidity, the altitude, and the slope of almost every foot of ground, combine to knock hell out of the stoutest constitution.” Rain, intermittent to this point, started in earnest on 28 April; it rained at least once every day for the rest of the battle.

Grover had expected to have cleared Kohima by 30 April, but the slow pace of operations forced him to recast his plans. On 4 May, the earliest 4th Brigade could be ready, he sent his entire division forward. During the night, Hawkins’ 5th Brigade, every man wearing gym shoes, infiltrated the Naga Village and occupied the north-west portion early on 5 May. The brigade repelled repeated ferocious counterattacks. In the center, Shapland’s infantry failed to dislodge Kuki Picquet’s defenders although the DLI managed to get atop FSD for a short time. Supported by tanks and elements of Warren’s brigade, a renewed attack cleared all but the eastern slopes of Kuki Picquet and FSD by dusk on 7 May.

Farther south, Goschen’s men ran into the 124th Infantry, having been sent by Sato to GPT to prevent just such a flanking move. The 2d Royal Norfolk, in the lead of
Hawkins fell wounded as his brigade fought Ridge in three days of heavy fighting. The Division was, in fact, rapidly losing its offensive ability. \(^42\)

Sato understood what these developments meant. His division had suffered losses that made it a shadow of its former self. The monsoon was starting, and his tenuous overland communications became more fragile by the day. On 25 May, he signaled Mutaguchi his intention to withdraw unless supplies arrived within days. None came, so on 31 May, Sato ordered his men to leave Kohima. Most would go east, with a battalion-sized group under Miyazaki to fight a delaying action along the road to Imphal. \(^43\)

Pursuit

On 2 June, Sato’s headquarters and infantry abandoned the Naga Village. After a sharp fight in the Aradura area, Miyazaki’s men retired southward toward Imphal on 5 June. The British detected the slackening of Japanese resistance, and Stopford urged his two division commanders, Grover and Messervy, to press the attack. Messervy moved his division east and southeast toward Jessami and Ukhrul, while Grover directed his men south along the Imphal Road. The IV Corps position was seventy-five miles away. \(^46\)

"As the advance progressed, the magnitude of the Japanese defeat began to be realized," recalled Brig. M. R. Roberts, whose 114th Brigade led the 7th Indian Division’s advance. "Arms, equipment, and guns were found abandoned along the track in increasing quantities." Sato’s retreat was becoming a rout. \(^46\)

Messervy’s men found worse as they penetrated deeper into Sato’s rear areas. "In their cautious progress, the brigade passed through and around deserted camps of leafy huts, concealed strongpoints, living accommodation for thousands," recalled an officer of the division artillery. "Unburied dead lay everywhere, many untouched, some fat and well-looking, others emaciated, filthy skeletons. Typhus, that scourge of armies, had done its work... Naga tribesmen started bringing in Japanese prisoners too sick to move, filthy skeletons, raving, weeping and gibbering in their madness, the ultimate resistance of their minds broken by the unspeakable hardships to which their bodies had been subjected." \(^47\)

Meanwhile, Grover’s 2d Division started southward toward Imphal. Miyazaki’s men took up bridges, laid mines, and set up roadblocks on the narrow and twisty road, but the British kept a close pursuit. The Japanese stood at the villages of Viswema and Mao Songsang, where the road narrowed between heights to the west and a deep valley to the east. Both times British infantry flanked the Japanese position and forced a retreat. Grover alternated brigades to always keep a fresh unit at the front of the pursuit. \(^48\)

By 18 June, the 2d Division stood just north of Maram, at mile marker eighty on the road and forty miles from Imphal. There, Miyazaki had organized a roadblock he thought could hold for ten days. The 5th Brigade attacked down the road under cover of smoke and air strikes, while a bulldozer followed behind to clear the block. The position fell within hours, and the Japanese fled eastward. The 4th Brigade passed through and advanced another eight miles before outflanking the 15th Division’s headquarters. The 6th Brigade next took up the advance.

On 22 June at 1030, the DLI met advance elements of 5th Indian Division at mile marker 109 in Kangpokpi. After eighty-five days of isolation, IV Corps at Imphal again had land communication with the outside world. That night, a truck convoy drove from Kohima to Imphal with headlights blazing. \(^49\)
ImpHAL'S RELIEF SIGNALED THE FINAL FAILURE OF MUTAGUCHI'S INVASION. IN EARLY JULY, HE ACCEPTED DEFEAT AND ORDERED HIS BATTERED FORCES BACK TO BURMA. “ALL HOPE OF CAPTURING IMPHAL OR PALEL WAS NOW GONE,” STATED A STAFF REPORT, “AND THE FIFTEENTH ARMY REALIZED IT WOULD BE FORTUNATE IF IT COULD EXTRICATE ITSELF FROM ITS EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS POSITION WITHOUT GREATER LOSSES.” WITHIN A MONTH OF IMPHAL’S RELIEF, THE TROOPS OF FIFTEENTH ARMY HAD ALMOST COMPLETELY ABANDONED INDIA. THE DREAM OF A MARCH ON DELHI WAS GONE.

CONCLUSION

The Battle of Kohima proper lasted two months, from 5 April to 5 June 1944. In the two months of combat, the British lost 4,064 casualties. Richards’ garrison contributed 401 to this total, whereas the 161st Brigade lost 462—a combined approximate total of one in three. Grover’s 15,000-man 2d Division lost 2,125 men around Kohima, and Messervy’s division lost 623 of 12,000 in three weeks of battle and one month of pursuit. As for the Japanese, Sato took 15,000 men into India; 6,264 were killed, wounded, or died of disease. Another 2,800 required immediate hospitalization upon returning to Burma, leaving only 5,936 men fit for duty at the end.

Kohima also cost the two principal division commanders their jobs. On 4 July, Stopford, increasingly dissatisfied with Grover’s methods, relieved the 2d Division commander and sent him home to Britain. The next day, the Japanese removed Sato from command of the 31st Division. “I do not intend to be censured by anyone,” Sato announced to his staff. “Our 31st Division has done its duty.” After several months of staff duty in Burma, officials sent him home on a medical furlough and he saw no further active service.

Kohima was the high-water mark of Japanese fortunes in Southeast Asia. Sato’s retreat started a yearlong rollback of the Japanese front line that ended with the liberation of Rangoon in May 1945. Never again would the Japanese wield the initiative in Southeast Asia as they did during the thrust into India. Had Richards’ gallant defenders been overrun, the Japanese could have blocked any attempt to relieve Imphal for some time, perhaps permanently. They also would have threatened Dimapur and its railway, and certainly been in a position to block the line with detachments. This hazard alone would have affected the supplies going to Stilwell and China. Less supplies on the railroad would have slowed or stopped air operations in China, and the pace of Stilwell’s campaign against Myitkyina. Victory in Kohima ensured that these things did not happen.

Today, Britain remembers Kohima, along with Imphal, as one of its greatest battles of all time. The Kohima Museum in York, England recalls the battle and the 2d Division. Japan recognizes Imphal-Kohima as one of its worst defeats, but also one of its larger battles; each year Japanese tourists come to visit the battlefields and often hunt for the remains of relatives lost in the invasion. India has somewhat belatedly recognized the importance of these engagements, and local preservation and tourism efforts are underway to promote their importance.

Garrison Hill now lies in the middle of Kohima, which has grown to engulf most of the 1944 battlefield. The area around the Pawsey residence is now the Kohima War Cemetery, maintained by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission. The terraces remain, and now hold 1,421 graves of those who fought on and around that hill. The battle’s 917 Hindu dead, since cremated, are also remembered. Stones also mark the precise location of the famous tennis court, which is next to the cemetery’s Cross of Remembrance. It is a focal point of visits to the cemetery and the battlefield.

At Garrison Hill’s base is a monument to the 2d Division, made of stone from a nearby quarry. It contains an inscription by John Maxwell Edmonds that today is known as the Kohima Epitaph. It charges the viewer and offers a timeless reminder:

When you go home
Tell them of us and say
For your tomorrow
We gave our today

AUTHOR’S NOTE

The author thanks Yaiphaba Kangjam, Lowrie Tucker, and Rob Palmer for their research assistance. This article is dedicated to the Royal Norfolk Regiment, the Lancashire Fusiliers, and 86 Battery Royal Artillery—all units at Kohima to which the author has ancestral ties—and their comrades, some of whom never came home.

Place names used in this article are as they stood in 1944. Japanese names are provided surname first.

NOTES


3. Kirby, War Against Japan, pp. 71–81. The 54th and 2d Divisions arrived in Burma in stages throughout the first months of 1944. General Mutaguchi had commanded the 18th Division until being promoted to command of the Fifteenth Army. In April 1944, the 18th and 56th Divisions came under the newly created Thirty-Third Army.


5. Allen, Burma, pp. 150–155; 188–190; Barker, March on Delhi, p. 15–16.


7. Barker, March on Delhi, pp. 93–130. The 17th Indian Division's nickname was the “Black Cats,” during the withdrawal they successfully fended off the 33d Division, nicknamed “White Tigers.”


10. A searing account of these fights is in C. E. Lucas Phillips, Springboard to Victory (London: Heinemann, 1966), pp. 79–90.

11. Slim, Defeat Into Victory, p. 305.

12. Barker, March on Delhi, pp. 120–25. See also Kirby, War Against Japan, Appendixes 25 and 26, for details and statistics related to air transport operations in Burma and India from February through August 1944. The 5th Indian Division had no airborne training, and many of its men had never flown before.


16. Ibid.

17. An excellent source on the Naga experience is Charles Chasie and Harry Fecitt, The Road to Kohima: The Naga Experience in the 2nd World War (Tromso, Norway: Barkweaver 2017), passim. The quote comes from p. 83.

18. BOR, pp. 119–23.

19. A detailed order of battle of the Kohima garrison is in Prasad, Reconquest of Burma, p. 416.


24. Harman is buried in the Kohima War Cemetery.

25. Kirby, War Against Japan, p. 305; see also Swinson, Battle of Kohima, pp. 76–87.


27. Ibid, pp. 182–84; see also Kirby, War Against Japan, p. 301.

28. Swinson, Battle of Kohima, pp. 81–84; see also Lucas-Phillips, Springboard to Victory, pp. 185–95.

29. Swinson, Battle of Kohima, pp. 81–84; see also Kirby, War Against Japan, pp. 304–05.

30. Swinson, Battle of Kohima, pp. 87–91.

31. Ibid.

32. This and preceding paragraphs are based on Lucas Phillips, Springboard to Victory, pp. 211–214. Colonel Richards related this exchange to Lucas Phillips.

33. Kirby, War Against Japan, pp. 297–312; Swinson, Battle of Kohima, pp. 95–96.

34. Ibid.

35. Quoted in Swinson, Battle of Kohima, pp. 102–03.

36. BOR, pp. 123–25. Some accounts say Mutaguchi's order arrived 17 April; this source says “about 19 April.”

37. Prasad, Reconquest of Burma, pp. 286–89.


42. BOR, p. 139.

43. Ibid, pp. 139–42; Roberts, Golden Arrow, pp. 121–36; Prasad, Reconquest of Burma, pp. 294–300. This offensive opened the same day as Operation DIadem against Cassino in Italy, the attack that led to Rome's liberation on 4 June 1944. In some bunkers on GPT, the Royal Norfolks found regimental cap badges of an early-war design; they had been taken from members of the regiment's 4th, 5th, and 6th Battalions who had surrendered at Singapore in 1942. The author had a relative in 6th Royal Norfolks who survived captivity.

44. Quoted in Swinson, Battle of Kohima, p. 230; see also BOR, pp. 142–43.


46. Roberts, Golden Arrow, p. 137.

47. Quoted in Roberts, Golden Arrow, pp. 144, 146.

48. The best summary of this pursuit is Prasad, Reconquest of Burma, pp. 305–10.

49. Ibid.

50. BOR, p. 154.

51. British losses come from Kirby, War Against Japan, p. 526; Japanese losses are from BOR, p. 164. Prasad gives slightly different numbers for Sato's division—20,000 in strength and 13,000 casualties of all types, drawn from a report to Southeast Asia Command at the end of the war. Regardless of the numbers used, 31st Division was shattered at Kohima.

52. Swinson, Battle of Kohima, pp. 244–53.
The Center of Military History now makes all issues of Army History available to the public on its Web site. Each new publication will appear shortly after the issue is printed. Issues may be viewed or downloaded at no cost in Adobe® PDF format. An index page of the issues may be found at www.history.army.mil/armyhistory/issues_complete_guide.html.
German Howitzer Installed in World War I Tableau

By Paul Morando

Over the last quarter, exhibit construction has greatly increased at the National Museum of the United States Army (NMUSA), as we install key elements.

Recently, workers carefully placed a German 10.5-cm. light field howitzer in the World War I immersion tableau inside the Nation Overseas Gallery. The howitzer was a standard weapon used by Germany during the First World War. It fired a shell weighing around thirty-two pounds and had a maximum range of over 10,000 yards.

The overall scene will depict a battle-ridden landscape from the Meuse-Argonne Offensive in 1918, along with five cast figures representing American soldiers from the 140th Infantry, 35th Division, as they assault a German machine gun position. Exhibitors will construct the ground form of the tableau using historical references and images to accurately capture the look and feel of the battlefield. The fighting took place on part of the overgrown Verdun 1916 battlefield and the harsh terrain consisted of eroded craters, pieces of barbed wire, foliage, and debris. Amid the landscape will be the battle-damaged howitzer, slumped over on its side, laying across a muddy road as the soldiers charge ahead. The howitzer will be portrayed as being partially destroyed by American artillery fire, and will be subject to a scenic treatment of mud and debris.

An elevated glass bridge will guide visitors across the entire scene. Innovative show-control technology utilizing large-scale video projection, timed lighting, and surround-sound effects will immerse visitors and bring the entire diorama to life. To the right of the scene will be a Renault FT-17 tank known as the “Five of Hearts.” This tank is the only surviving FT-17 tank known to have been used by the American Expeditionary Forces. Exhibitors installed it in August 2017 before the Museum walls were constructed.1

Curators put much effort into the installation of the howitzer: the angle and height had to be exact before workers constructed other exhibit elements around it to complete the tableau. The inclusion of the howitzer adds important visual interest to the exhibit. Although this particular gun was not one of the pieces captured by the 35th Division in the Meuse-Argonne, it is one of the hundreds of German artillery pieces captured and sent to the United States after World War I.

The Army recovered this gun from a veterans’ hall in southern Virginia in relic, or relatively poor, condition and it has been stabilized for display. Before coming to NMUSA, it was part of the collection of the Ordnance Museum at Fort Lee, Virginia.

Now that the howitzer is in place, the construction of the rotunda that houses the immersive exhibit is under way. Once complete, it will be one of the more dynamic components of the Nation Overseas Gallery.

Paul Morando is the Chief, Exhibits Division, of the National Museum of the United States Army.

NOTE

A Soldier’s Trophy
Remembrance Through Artifacts
By Dieter Stenger

World War I ended on 11 November 1918, after more than four years of fighting. The American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) were a key factor in the defeat of Germany, capturing some 49,000 German soldiers and 1,400 guns in six months. More than 1 million American soldiers saw action and the AEF saw 50,280 killed and 200,600 wounded. The industrialization of warfare transformed the fighting and left many veterans blinded, disfigured, and psychologically impaired. Their memories, embodied within artifacts picked up on the battlefield and brought home, not only serve to recall their sacrifices and hardships, but also celebrate their achievements.1

The collecting philosophy of the Army Museum Enterprise recognizes that these “artifacts serve as a primary source of information, a segment of reality from another place and time, and serve a cultural purpose that fulfills a universal human need to provide context and connection in order to understand our past in ways that are real, visual, and tactile . . . which informs our understanding of the capabilities and constraints governing the actions of the past or persons and events otherwise forgotten.”2

Cpl. Swain Matthew Pearson, a member of Company A, 348th Machine Gun Battalion, 91st Division, brought home the German M1916 steel helmet shown here. Pearson was inducted into the U.S. Army on 17 September 1917 and arrived in France sometime after July 1918.3 The only division without previous combat experience, the 91st proved its worth during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive as it broke through two German lines and penetrated a third, advancing eight kilometers. Moreover, the 91st drove the Germans out of the villages of Véry, Épinonville, Gesnes, Éclisfontaine, and the Tronsol Farm. On 31 October, during the final drive to destroy the Germans in Belgium, the Division was on the attack until the war ended, capturing the towns of Audenarde, Welden, Petegem, and Kasteelwijk.4

The German M1916 Stahlhelm (steel helmet) offered far greater protection against shell fragments and replaced the Pickelhaube (spiked helmet). It consists of three parts: the shell covers the head; the visor offers shade and protection against bad weather; and the neck guard protects the ears and neck. The iconic helmet lugs on either side of the dome provide ventilation and points for hanging a ballistic frontal armor plate, issued primarily to sentries and machine gun troops. The helmet’s camouflage pattern, which is the most common pattern encountered on German helmets, made use of earth tones and irregularly shaped polygons to obscure the helmet’s outlines and help it blend into the environment.

The guns of World War I have now stood silent for more than a century, but surviving memorabilia, such as this helmet, connect us directly with the soldier who brought it home. The helmet is now preserved at the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, where it is displayed in the “Good-Bye Broadway, Hello France: America in the Era of World War I” exhibition, open through November 2019.

Dieter Stenger is a curator of arms and ordinance with the Army Museum Enterprise, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
NOTES


3. Military History Institute, AHCAS 2609 Shelf Report for CCN 878683, copy in curators files.

The world has been devastated by one of the worst scourges in history. It took a terrible toll from our army camps. It shattered every organization trained to combat such a condition by attacking the individual cogs in the machine and many of the most important of these succumbed [sic]. —Maj. Ellis K. Kerr, Medical Corps, U.S. Army"
The Longer War

In the first several months after the Armistice of 11 November 1918, much of the chaos created by World War I continued to affect America and the world. On the last day of fighting, many military commanders insisted on prosecuting the war up until the last moment, causing approximately 11,000 casualties on all sides before the Armistice officially began at 1100, leaving those bereaved and wounded that day with little inclination to celebrate. It took months of complex negotiations involving twenty-seven nations before the Treaty of Versailles was signed on 28 June 1919, officially ending the war. In the meantime, fighting continued for many. A Polish uprising in the German province of Posen in late 1918 lasted into February 1919, when an armistice was agreed, but Polish and Soviet troops clashed into 1921. The Easter Rising in 1916 led to fighting between British forces and Irish rebels into 1921 and then a civil war among Irish factions (over the terms of Ireland’s independence) lasting until 24 May 1923. In the former Russian Empire, civil war continued into October 1922 between the Red Army of the Bolsheviks and the White Army attempting to stem the Communist revolution. Discontent over the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and other postwar arrangements in the reshaping of nations and empires would affect significant portions of Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa, and the punitive treatment of Germany created fierce resentment. Such discontent would fuel further violence in the following decades.

The deadliest enemy to strike during the war ignored the Armistice to wage its third and final campaign during the first half of 1919. With its common ally, pneumonia, influenza came back to make one final cull. In early April, it had perhaps its biggest impact on history: President Woodrow Wilson became severely ill and was never quite the same in mind or body afterward, suffering a follow-on stroke in September. After working so hard for an equitable “peace without victory,” Wilson seemed to lose much of his will after his apparent bout of influenza and gave in to French demands that Germany be made to accept occupation and pay heavy reparations.

Though we tend to think of World War I dangers in terms of artillery, gunfire, poisonous gas, and barbed wire, the influenza pandemic had a much greater impact than occasional references would suggest—it played a central role in the lives and deaths of American servicemembers. According to the Center of Military History’s fact sheet on the U.S. Army in World War I, more than 50,500 U.S. servicemembers were killed in battle or died of combat wounds during World War I. A severe new form of influenza killed about 55,322 U.S. servicemen in Army camps, on Navy installations and ships, and in the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) overseas. This influenza also affected civilian communities, taking the lives of about 675,000 Americans and millions of people worldwide (estimates range between 20 and 50 million, with some estimates as high as 100 million), making the 1918–1919 flu the deadliest disease in history. Symptoms included body temperatures up to 105 degrees, delirium, and as author Lynette Iezzoni puts it, coughing up of “pints of greenish sputum.” Flu weakened the body’s defenses, often allowing secondary pneumonia, which caused most of the deaths, to invade, filling lungs with blood and other fluids and turning oxygen-deprived skin blue. Influenza occasionally led to other respiratory conditions or severe complications such as meningitis, internal bleeding, and organ damage. At Camp Meade, Maryland, 1st Lt. James M. McTieernan, a
doctor with the Army’s Medical Reserve Corps, recalled forty-eight influenza patients who developed otitis media (a potentially dangerous infection causing middle ear swelling) which physicians treated by making incisions into the ear drum. Doctors also observed thirty-seven cases of ear complications among influenza patients at the Army’s Walter Reed General Hospital in Washington, D.C.\(^5\)

The theory accepted by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and many historians is that “Spanish influenza” (so-called because unlike French newspapers, Spanish ones ran uncensored reports on the disease) originated in Haskell County, Kansas, early in 1918, and spread in three waves. By the first week of March 1918, a severe strain of flu had infected soldiers at Camp Funston, which was part of Fort Riley, Kansas. As the military sent large numbers of soldiers and sailors to military establishments all over the United States, influenza traveled with them. By May 1918, American servicemen had brought the flu to Europe. Theory holds that this influenza virus then mutated into a deadlier form which struck during the fall of 1918. In Europe, the flu spread to Allied forces, to the German military, and into civilian populations, and then to Asia, Africa, South America, and back to North America. The third and final, but less lethal, wave of Spanish flu occurred in early 1919. The 1918–1919 flu affected between 20 percent and 40 percent of American military personnel.\(^6\) It is therefore at the center, not the periphery, of the American military’s World War I experience.

Most military camps and U.S. civilian communities experienced their greatest crises during the second wave of the pandemic from August to October 1918, but with the third wave occurring in 1919, U.S. soldiers’ battle against influenza became the later, as well as the deadlier, of their two wars. By looking at five Army locations—Camp McClellan, Alabama; Camp Merritt, New Jersey; Camp Meade, Maryland; Camp Greenleaf, Georgia; and Gièvres, France—we can examine how the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic affected the U.S. Army.

**Camp McClellan, Alabama**

Camp McClellan (renamed Fort McClellan in 1929), is one of several major Army camps established in 1917. About six miles from both Anniston and Jacksonville, Alabama, Camp McClellan was a National Guard camp which received troops from New Jersey, Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, and the District of Columbia. In May 1918, it became a field artillery brigade firing center. At its peak strength in October 1918, the camp housed nearly 28,000 soldiers, mostly in tents. The 29th Division trained at McClellan before deploying overseas in June 1918. The camp hosted the Headquarters of the 6th Division and parts of the 7th, 9th, 12th, and 98th Divisions.\(^7\)

Influenza arrived at Camp McClellan on 20 September 1918, and the height of the epidemic there was between 10 and 20 October. Officials quarantined the camp from 2 to 14 October. When regular medical facilities filled up, camp officials used recreational buildings, tents, and
canvas-covered boardwalks as additional wards for flu patients. According to a senior surgeon, “Medical officers inspected the entire command daily, and isolated suspicious cases in the end of company streets. All cases with a temperature above 99 were sent to the base hospital.” Military authorities also attempted to prevent the spread of infection by keeping buildings clean, airing out tents and bedding daily, exposing troops to fresh air, and keeping recovering patients isolated for an additional ten days. Units which seemed prone to illness were sprayed with chemical agents in an attempt at decontamination.

The senior surgeon cited an influx of new troops, causing “temporary overcrowding and unavoidable exposure,” in the two weeks preceding the onset of influenza as a factor in the camp’s epidemic. Quarters and clothing for newly arriving troops (some of whom arrived drenched by a cold rain) were initially inadequate. Soldiers were quartered in tents, and doctors imposed a strict limit of five men per tent in an attempt to limit the spread of flu. Soldiers recovering from flu, once they had normal body temperatures for forty-eight hours, were moved from hospital beds to a tent convalescent camp nearby. At the epidemic’s peak, Camp McClellan had over 4,900 cases of influenza and pneumonia, and about 228 reported deaths from these causes occurred there in the month of October 1918. Only a few soldiers died in subsequent months.

**Camp Merritt, New Jersey**

Camp Merritt, New Jersey, was established in August 1917 as an embarkation camp to move troops through the port at Hoboken. Its base hospital opened 9 January 1918. Camp facilities included thirty-nine warehouses, a large bakery, and a delousing plant capable of processing 260 men per hour. From December 1917 to November 1918, over half a million soldiers representing dozens of Army divisions deployed overseas from the camp. From November 1918 to October 1919, roughly the same number returned to Camp Merritt from overseas, leaving Camp Merritt with a population of 44,500 at the end of June 1919. From February 1918 through April 1919, the camp’s permanent garrison was generally between 4,000 and 6,000, being as low as about 2,000 before and after this period.

Pandemic influenza arrived at Camp Merritt on 16 September 1918, and it took a few days for doctors there to realize that the new flu cases were “of far greater severity” than earlier cases of flu. About a week later, many flu patients developed pneumonia. In three weeks, the base hospital expanded from one influenza ward to fifty-one influenza and pneumonia wards and brought in new medical personnel—many of whom became sick themselves, especially nurses. Another complication was that several sick servicemen were transferred to Camp Merritt’s hospital from other locations, including docked ships. Dozens of enlisted soldiers detailed to assist in the wards had no medical experience. Medical officers transferred influenza patients who developed pneumonia to separate wards to isolate them from other patients. Several autopsies conducted on soldiers who died of pneumonia at Camp Merritt indicated hemorrhages in the lungs and signs of emphysema. By 1 November 1918, 265 of Camp Merritt’s 999 pneumonia patients had died, a mortality rate of just over 26 percent.

**Camp Meade, Maryland**

Camp (now Fort) Meade, Maryland, was another of the large cantonments established in 1917 to handle draftees. It was 18 miles from Baltimore with tracks connecting to the Pennsylvania and B&O Railroads. Meade hosted more than 400,000 soldiers during the war: the 11th and 79th Divisions, parts of the African-American 92d Division, training battalions, a depot brigade, an Ordnance Supply School, and a remount station handling over 22,000 horses and mules. After the Armistice, 96,000 returning soldiers were mustered out at Meade. Meade also hosted medical training for Army and civilian personnel. In November 1917, at
the north end of the camp, a base hospital opened with 105 buildings including a pharmacy, a kitchen and various messes, baths, officers’ quarters, a chapel, a farm to supply vegetables and decorative flowers, and an exchange with a lunch counter, barber shop, and tailor. Wooden corridors joined thirty-two hospital wards, and there were three isolation wards for dangerous diseases and stand-alone convalescent wards. During the epidemic, all except the isolation wards housed flu patients. There were additional regimental and brigade infirmaries.13

On 17 September 1918, a handful of soldiers reported to Meade’s base hospital and doctors discovered they had influenza. Camp Meade’s doctors were aware of influenza outbreaks at other Army camps and had cleared beds—they had moved patients, convalescents, and staff to tents—in anticipation of the flu’s arrival. Company commanders were ordered to ensure ventilation and cleaning of barracks. Nonetheless, the hospital admitted 800 soldiers on 24 September, and officials placed the camp under a quarantine that lasted until 20 October. By the time the epidemic waned in late October 1918, at least 11,000 soldiers (25 percent of the camp population) had gotten sick, and over 750 died, with a mortality rate of 27 percent for those who got pneumonia after catching the flu. Like many other Army camps, Camp Meade had to scramble to set up additional medical facilities and bring in outside help—Army nurse trainees, Johns Hopkins University medical students from Baltimore, and Catholic nuns trained as nurses. Camp Meade was the entry point for influenza into the state of Maryland, including the city of Baltimore, which experienced at least 24,000 cases of flu and 4,125 influenza-pneumonia deaths. However, death rates in Baltimore were lower than in hard-hit Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, and Boston.14

In keeping with wartime censorship and the drumbeat of positive patriotism, newspapers often deemphasized the seriousness of the influenza-pneumonia epidemic at Army camps. Even the Camp Meade Herald assured readers that Army doctors had everything under control and that the flu outbreaks would end shortly. The Harrisburg Patriot underreported the number of flu patients at Camp Meade (its figures are at odds with those of Camp Meade’s Division Surgeon’s report). On 25 September 1918, the Philadelphia Inquirer was hopeful that no quarantine of Camp Meade would be necessary, but a camp quarantine had already been imposed on 24 September. On 27 September, the Baltimore American quoted a local health commissioner’s declaration that Spanish flu was no different from regular seasonal flu, which had caused only 103 deaths the previous year—ignoring the fact that in September 1918, flu killed 12,000 Americans. In the gap between these rosy reports and the rapid spread and unusually high mortality rates of flu and pneumonia, rumors arose—generally along the lines that German infiltrators among the U.S. Army medical staff had been caught deliberately spreading flu germs among American soldiers. The Camp Meade Herald and other camp newspapers denounced a particular rumor making the rounds in Washington, D.C.: “Within walking distance of Army Medical Department headquarters here, an infantry regiment is encamped. Almost to a man, that group believed that three officers and six nurses had been shot at Camp Meade” for spreading flu.15

Although influenza and pneumonia spread rapidly at Camp Meade, affecting soldiers of infantry and service units, nurses, doctors, other medical personnel, chaplains, and volunteers of recreational organizations, some segments of the camp population appear to have benefited from isolation. Six companies of the 71st Infantry, the unit in which flu first appeared, were moved from their barracks to tents four miles away in an isolated area of the camp, and men in these companies remained free of influenza. African American soldiers living in segregated quarters were not afflicted with influenza at the same rate as whites, although their rate of sickness rose in October just as the rate of sickness among other soldiers decreased. On 26 October 1918, a contingent of about 372 black soldiers was marched out to Baltimore’s Mount Auburn Cemetery, which belonged to the African American Sharp Street Methodist Episcopal Church. There they buried the bodies of African American flu victims which had gone unburied for several days as Baltimore’s undertakers and gravediggers had been overwhelmed by the
number of flu deaths and incapacitated by illness themselves.16

**Camp Greenleaf, Georgia**

Camp Greenleaf was established in May 1917 as part of Fort Oglethorpe to provide Army training for medical professionals. In March 1918, Camp Greenleaf’s commandant officially took charge of Fort Oglethorpe’s post hospital. Camp Greenleaf consisted of medical schools (including dental and veterinary schools), a motor school, and training organizations for sanitary units of field hospitals and ambulance companies, noncommissioned officers of base hospital and convalescent camp units, replacement units for overseas service, and staff for evacuation hospitals and trains. From June 1917 through November 1918, according to War Department records, "6,640 officers and 31,138 enlisted men arrived at, and 4,318 officers and 22,138 men departed from, the camp. During this period 63 base hospitals, 37 evacuation hospitals, 5 field hospitals, 13 hospital trains, 5 ambulance companies, 21 evacuation ambulance companies, 9 convalescent camps, 10 replacement units and numerous detachments were organized."17 Camp Greenleaf trained and dispatched doctors and other medical professionals who would care for Army influenza patients around the United States and abroad, yet even this medical camp could not escape pandemic influenza.

Thanks to prominent physician Victor C. Vaughan’s article in the June 1918 issue of the *Journal of Laboratory and Clinical Medicine*, there is an unusually detailed description of the initial spring 1918 wave of Spanish flu which hit soldiers at Fort Oglethorpe beginning about 18 March 1918. It began with men of the 51st Infantry, and continued to spread over the next two weeks, though only part of Camp Greenleaf was affected. Because many of the flu cases "were not severe," the camp did not compile complete statistics, but Vaughan estimated 2,900 illnesses at Oglethorpe. Doctors did not initially identify the epidemic as influenza. Vaughan described the symptoms of this spring illness as “headache, pain in the bones and muscles, especially the muscles of the back, marked prostration, fever . . . [sometimes there was conjunctivitis, coryza [inflammation of mucous membranes in the nose], a rash and possibly nausea.” Patients generally recovered within a few days.18

On 23 September 1918, the second and deadlier wave of the epidemic arrived at Camp Greenleaf, when an enlisted man who returned from leave in Massachusetts was “sick on arrival.” On 25 September, there were twenty-six reported cases of flu at Greenleaf. Officials attempted to isolate patients in specific areas, but partly due to a shortage of tents, they were not successful in preventing the rapid spread of the disease. However, men in the detention area isolated in tents or stalls did not get sick, unlike those housed in regular barracks. Before the epidemic “disappeared completely” by 26 October, there were about 5,160 flu cases at Greenleaf and 999 cases of pneumonia accounting for 325 deaths. Surgeon general’s records report a 6.3 percent death rate for influenza at Camp Greenleaf with a 32.6 percent death rate for those who also got pneumonia. Forty-four German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war also died at Fort Oglethorpe in the Fall epidemic, which “greatly interfered” with training at the camp and prevented its personnel from being rapidly transferred to overseas locations—at a time when the Army urgently needed medical professionals. However, Camp Greenleaf did not join many other Army camps in "closing all places of public assembly" during the epidemic.19

**Gièvres, France**

Gièvres, in central France, was connected by rail to St. Nazaire on the Atlantic coast, where freight for American forces arrived. The U.S. Army’s 15th Engineers worked for months constructing additional railroad tracks, warehouses, and other facilities for an immense storage depot at Gièvres from which clothing, fuel, food, medicine, and other supplies were moved to troops around the European theater. The depot included
4,500,000 square feet of covered storage space and 10,000,000 square feet of open storage space. There was refrigeration space for 5,200 tons of meat and an ice-making facility capable of producing 75 tons of ice daily. In addition to approximately 32,000 Army personnel, the facilities at Gèveres housed Chinese and Spanish laborers and German prisoners of war.

In November 1917, the Army established an infirmary at Gèveres for the 15th Engineers. It consisted of two wooden barracks. It was converted into a post hospital in February 1918 and designated Camp Hospital No. 43 in April 1918. The hospital then expanded to include twenty-four buildings with a 400-bed total capacity by September 1918. In August 1918, Camp Hospital No. 43 began to treat fractures and perform surgeries of the type previously transferred to other hospitals. In February 1919, Camp Hospital No. 43 annexed a former base hospital at Pruniers. Apart from the regular hospital barracks, the Army set up twenty hospital tents to accommodate “the large number of mumps cases brought in with arriving troops.”

Many historians believe that U.S. troops carried the flu to France following outbreaks at fourteen large Army camps in the United States in the spring of 1918. By the end of summer 1918, all European armies had been exposed to the flu. Despite the risks of contagion, the U.S. Government decided against halting troop shipments because they did not wish to encourage the enemy. The government considered the sacrifices which influenza would require as a consequence of troop movements as necessary to the war effort. There is incomplete data on the epidemic in France, but between 125,000 and 250,000 civilians and about 30,000 military personnel died there as a result of the flu. The government banned French newspapers from reporting on the outbreak during the war.

Flu first broke out at Gèveres in early June 1918 among Chinese laborers. Characterized by “sudden onset of gastrointestinal and bronchial disturbances,” it spread to the rest of the camp despite a quarantine of the Chinese section. This flu typically lasted four days and did not result in any deaths. During August and September 1918, U.S. troops arrived at Gèveres almost daily, prompting the expansion of the hospital.

The second wave of influenza arrived at Gèveres in late October 1918, beginning in the supply depot. This time, many flu patients developed pneumonia and cyanosis (blue-tinted skin due to oxygen deprivation), and there were many deaths, especially among African American soldiers. For those who survived, the illness lasted about fourteen days and recuperation was long and slow. A U.S. Navy medical officer stationed at Gèveres identified factors he believed contributed to servicemen developing severe cases of flu: “physical fatigue, long hours of uninterrupted labor with no relaxation from routine duties, no entertainment or change of scenery, and exposure to cold, inclement weather.”

U.S. Army medical officials at Gèveres kept separate wards for patients with specific diseases, including influenza and broncho-pneumonia—housing patients in tents if space ran out. Sometimes Army officials imposed quarantines on individual units or organizations, keeping them away from the YMCA (Young Men’s Christian Association) facilities and other recreational activities. The Army required all soldiers in units having disease outbreaks to gargle twice a day, and sprayed their noses and throats with an unspecified liquid. Medical staff sterilized mess kits, clothing, and bedding, and sprayed bunks and floors with disinfectants. Guidelines required all those attending the sick to wear masks and gowns. The camp hospital was kept ventilated, and “sputum, urine, and excreta disinfected before being removed from the wards.”
Although the Armistice of 11 November 1918 ended the fighting, it took months to bring thousands of American servicemen home from overseas. Army Camp Hospital No. 43 at Gièvres would continue to deal with flu cases well into 1919. It did not close until August of that year.26

Soldiers weren’t the only ones to die at Gièvres due to the epidemic. The YMCA sent a number of volunteers to organize recreation for American soldiers in Europe. Alice J. Knight of Natick, Massachusetts, a “missionary deaconess” for the YMCA, died of pneumonia on 21 February 1919 at Camp Hospital No. 43, and YMCA secretary Lorraine Ransom of New Rochelle, New York, died of pneumonia at the same hospital three days later. Both these women are buried in an AEF cemetery in northern France (now the Oise-Aisne American Cemetery).27
Army Fatality Rates

Many large Army camps have comparable statistics on the number of illnesses and deaths from influenza and pneumonia in 1918–1919, though comparisons must be made cautiously and with the caveat that statistical sources vary. Different statistics cover different time periods: some encompass only the height of the epidemic at a particular location; others cover a longer period. Statistics also reflect different circumstances: some include a camp’s total population; others measure only those who became ill or those admitted to a particular hospital.

For Maryland’s Camp Meade, flu statistics range from 11,400 to 14,280 illnesses, 607 to 763 deaths, and fatality rates of 4.4 percent to 6.7 percent (variances reflect use of different records and date ranges, and inclusion or exclusion of additional camp infirmaries). The surgeon general’s report of 1919 indicates 13,698 flu hospitalizations at Meade from September to December 1918 and 607 deaths (including 56 African Americans), for a fatality rate of about 4.4 percent. Carol Byerly, referring specifically to the base hospital, reports that 27 percent (about 11,421) of Meade’s 42,300 troops were hospitalized. Dr. Edgar Sydenstricker’s data on the 1918–1919 flu in 118 U.S. civilian communities finds mortality rates of 2.7 percent to 4.6 percent, making Camp Meade’s rate comparatively high.28 However, Meade’s statistics roughly match those of several other large Army camps. Camp Dodge, Iowa, had 13,700 flu cases among 33,000 men and 702 deaths. At Camp Devens, Massachusetts, (the first Army camp in the United States to be significantly affected by the second wave of the flu epidemic in fall 1918), 45,000–50,000 men had over 14,000 flu cases and over 500 deaths during the epidemic’s peak. Camp Lee, the entry point for flu into Virginia, had over 12,000 flu cases and at least 634 deaths at the flu’s peak. Camp Grant, Illinois, with very crowded barracks, had a high death rate: 1,060 deaths among over 10,700 flu cases in a population of 40,000. Camp McCllellan, with a smaller population of about 28,000, had fewer influenza cases than many larger camps did, with over 4,900 flu patients during the apex of the epidemic. However, its influenza mortality rate of about 4.7 percent is comparable to those of larger camps. Pneumonia mortality rates for Army camps are largely consistent at about 25 percent to 27 percent, as is the case for Camp Merritt, where 265 of 999 pneumonia patients died for a mortality rate of about 26 percent. Yet at Camp Greenleaf, where 325 of 999 pneumonia patients died, the pneumonia mortality rate was 32.6 percent, and the overall influenza mortality rate was also high at 6.3 percent.29

Although about 15,849 members of the AEF died of influenza and pneumonia in Europe, it seems that the Army surgeon general did not collect or publish disease statistics for individual camps or locations there as it did for Army camps in the U.S. Keeping in mind discharges of recovering patients, a general guess as to the prevalence of the flu epidemic at Gières, France, during the Fall epidemic can be made based on Camp Hospital No. 43’s usual capacity of 400, plus its report that influenza taxed that capacity “to such an extent that an average of 350 patients have had to be quartered in tents.”30 Certain differences in the progress and handling of the epidemic in different Army camps emerge from the information provided above. At Camp Meade, African Americans may have experienced lower rates of illness due to segregation, but at
Camp McClellan, where black soldiers received inadequate quarters and clothing, and in Gièvres, African Americans experienced higher death rates than white soldiers. Especially isolated populations, like those in the detention center at Camp Greenleaf and certain companies of the 71st Infantry at Camp Meade, managed to escape influenza altogether. Quarantine and isolation measures, however imperfect, were part of the normal Army response to outbreaks of flu and pneumonia, but unlike at other camps hit by the epidemic, Camp Greenleaf kept open its places of public assembly. Camp McClellan, which quartered its soldiers in tents rather than in barracks, limited inhabitants to five per tent. To what extent such measures helped stem the tide of influenza and pneumonia is not clear, but Camp McClellan does appear to have had a lower mortality rate than Camp Greenleaf (4.7 percent versus 6.3 percent). As a transit camp, Camp Merritt handled not only its own local cases of influenza but also flu patients transferred into the camp from ships and other locations. Medical officials at Camp Merritt attempted to isolate pneumonia patients in separate wards, as did officials at Camp Hospital No. 43 in Gièvres. Army medical officials enacted aggressive disinfection efforts, including the use of chemical agents, at many Army camps and hospitals, including Camp McClellan and Camp Hospital No. 43, which even undertook treatment of human waste before disposal.

The common denominator for the various Army posts, however, is the measure of chaos brought by the epidemic. During the influenza crisis, Army camps struggled to secure sufficient beds, medical personnel, and resources for their patients. Despite quarantines, sanitation efforts, and the isolation of patients, influenza and pneumonia affected hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Some Army installations and hospitals experienced outbreaks of severe influenza in spring of 1918, but the most deadly form of influenza arrived that fall, and was soon accompanied by pneumonia, and generally peaked in October. The United States Army took the 1918–1919 flu virus from Kansas to other states and to Europe, from which it encircled the globe.

**1919 Reprise**

While the final wave of the influenza pandemic was limited at some Army camps (Camp Meade experienced only seven influenza-related deaths in the first half of 1919), there are strong hints that the third wave of influenza was more costly at Gièvres, France, and surrounding areas. Private Alva Gressmire of Indiana went overseas with the 64th Engineers in March 1918 and survived earlier waves of influenza only to die of pneumonia on 13 February 1919 in Camp Hospital No. 43. Five hundred thirty-seven American servicemen and civilians who died after the Armistice at Gièvres and in other parts of France are interred or memorialized at the Oise-Aisne American Cemetery in northern France. Several of these individuals, such as 2d Lt. Richard Bishop Alvord of the 119th Infantry, 30th Division (died 27 February 1919); Pvt. Vandee Cotton (a black soldier) of the 335th Infantry; Alva Gressmire of Indiana went overseas with the 64th Engineers in March 1918 and survived earlier waves of influenza only to die of pneumonia on 13 February 1919 in Camp Hospital No. 43. Five hundred thirty-seven American servicemen and civilians who died after the Armistice at Gièvres and in other parts of France are interred or memorialized at the Oise-Aisne American Cemetery in northern France. Several of these individuals, such as 2d Lt. Richard Bishop Alvord of the 119th Infantry, 30th Division (died 27 February 1919); Pvt. Vandee Cotton (a black soldier) of the 335th Infantry; Pvt. Haskell Mayo Jr., of the 26th Infantry, 30th Division (died 13 March 1919); Sgt. Lucien J. Fenouillet of the 35th Quartermaster Labor Battalion (died 13 March 1919); and 2d Lt. Paul Nowers of the Transportation Corps (died 2 February 1919), died of influenza and pneumonia. Many are simply listed as having “died of disease” and among them are likely influenza-pneumonia victims.31

In many ways, the full impact of the Spanish flu only began to become clear in the months after the guns fell silent in Europe. Of those who survived, not everyone recovered fully. As a Catholic priest who served at Camp Meade wrote, “They [some of Meade’s flu survivors] wake to find the dream a sad reality. [ . . . ] the mental ward crowded with poor soldiers who will never recover from the [flu-induced] delirium.” Some flu survivors developed lasting respiratory conditions. Many family members and friends were left to mourn.32 Some Army families found out in 1919 that the influenza which had visited them in 1918 was not finished with them. Ettie May Perkins, a nurse at Camp Meade, died of influenza and pneumonia on 4 October 1918. Flu visited tragedy on the Perkins family again in April 1919, when the war veteran husband of Ettie’s sister Lizzie died of flu-related spinal meningitis a week after returning from overseas.33

Well into 1919, the Army surgeon general and others compiled statistics and reports. On 27 January 1919, the American Red Cross announced more than 200 of its nurses had died “of influenza contracted while administering to influenza-stricken soldiers.” On 30 April 1919, the Baltimore Sun newspaper cited a newly issued report by the War Department estimating that 51 percent of Army deaths during the war had been caused by disease—and that a further 12,000 deaths from disease had happened since Armistice Day.34 On 5 April 1919, thirty-six soldiers returning from overseas were sent to the base hospital at Camp Devens to recover from influenza. Camp Devens reported 208 new flu cases and 102 new pneumonia cases among returning troops for the week ending 18 April 1919. The Washington Post reported 5,679 new cases of influenza and pneumonia for the week of 26 April among soldiers in the United States according to an Army Medical Department report issued 6 May 1919, which nonetheless represented “a marked decrease” over previous weeks. Also as of late April, 44,172 servicemen lay sick in hospitals abroad (added to 9,428 recovering from war injuries), as the Army Medical Service hoped to bring them home by July 1919.35

Of course, they would not all make it home. At the end of March 1919, Haskell Mayo of Bakersfield, Vermont, received a telegram informing him of the death of his son, Pvt. Haskell Mayo Jr., of the 26th Division. He died in France on 12 March due to influenza, just before he was to sail for home. The Burlington Free Press noted, “He had participated in the hard fighting in which his division had been engaged without a wound or injury of any kind.” On 10 April 1919, the Vermont newspaper, St. Albans Weekly Messenger, published Private Haskell’s last letter to his father, dated 2 March 1919, in which he reported that his division was due to sail home in April and lamented that he couldn’t get home in
time for Vermont’s maple sugar–processing season. In his closing lines, he wrote, “Hope you are all well. I am, only I have a little cold. Hope to be with you soon.” On 30 April 1919, Mrs. Alice Mulliner received word that her son, Cpl. George Mulliner of the 44th Coast Artillery, who had been ill with influenza, pneumonia, and diphtheria, had died aboard the USS *Rijndam* on his way home from France.36

At a time when the pathogen causing influenza had not been identified, the American Medical Association called on the U.S. Congress to provide $1.5 million for research into the disease and attempts to prevent the next influenza epidemic.37 The war against our deadliest enemy, influenza, would continue.
The Threat Remains

Researchers at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases have discovered that all Type A influenza viruses circulating today are genetic descendants of the 1918–1919 virus. Influenza pandemics (generally accompanied by pneumonia) have continued to haunt us. The year 1957 saw a pandemic of “Asian flu,” and 1968–1969 saw the “Hong Kong flu” pandemic, which killed more than one million people worldwide. In late 1977, the “Russian” or “red flu” virus threatened people under twenty-five years of age. Researchers Jon Hodge and Dennis Shanks have provided examples of influenza’s impact on the U.S. military since 1918–1919, including the following: 1) the U.S. Air Force temporarily suspended bombing missions over Vietnam when the 1968 flu pandemic hit air crews based in Thailand; 2) severe respiratory diseases “often caused by influenza” were the main cause of nonbattle injury and disease for the U.S. Army during the Vietnam War; and 3) in 1996, a U.S. Navy cruiser experienced a 42 percent attack rate of influenza and had to return to port as a result. In early 1976, two potentially dangerous flu viruses circulated in crowded barracks at Fort Dix, New Jersey, but did not erupt into a major epidemic. A new and virulent H1N1 flu caused the World Health Organization to declare a pandemic on 11 June 2009. That year, medical researchers observing U.S. soldiers participating in military exercises in Egypt became concerned by the flu’s ability to affect young, otherwise healthy soldiers, to result in respiratory illnesses and other complications, and to affect military operations. Annual estimates regularly include seasonal influenza and pneumonia (counted together in one category) in the top ten medical causes of death in the United States. In January 2017, many French hospitals were reported to be “at breaking point” due to an influx of patients affected by a severe type of flu; hospitals postponed nonurgent operations and implemented emergency plans to provide more beds to flu patients. By September 2017, Australia had also experienced a severe flu epidemic with historically high numbers of flu cases in some of its states.38

The 2017–2018 flu season, dominated by the H3N2 virus, has been the worst flu season in the United States in many years. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that there have been 12,000 to 56,000 flu-related deaths per flu season (approximately five–six months long) in the U.S. from 2010–2011 to 2016–2017 (West Africa’s 2014–2016 Ebola epidemic took 11,325 lives). However, for the 2017–2018 flu season, the CDC believes that about 80,000 Americans died of flu, surpassing the flu mortality rates of the past several years.39 Additionally, influenza viruses in animals, which could affect humans and develop the ability to spread rapidly from person to person, represent potential pandemic threats. We have medical options—flu and pneumonia vaccines and antiviral (for flu) or antibacterial (for pneumonia) medicines—which didn’t exist in 1918. The CDC estimates that for the 2015–2016 season, flu vaccinations prevented 5.1 million illnesses, 71,000 hospitalizations, and 3,000 pneumonia and influenza deaths in the United States. However, timely production, distribution, and usage of a large supply of vaccines and medications remains a challenge. The U.S. Department of Defense Implementation Plan for Pandemic Influenza (DoD
Pandemic Plan) assumes that an effective vaccine will not be widely available until several months after a pandemic begins. In the meantime, seasonal flu vaccines may provide limited protection against a pandemic virus.40

Appropriate medical care is vital. During the Ebola epidemic, life-saving treatments were not readily available in West Africa. The epidemic’s mortality rate, 80 percent overall, dropped to 45 percent for those who received hospital care and to 18 percent for those airlifted to developed countries. Among Americans, 95 percent of “influenza deaths” are due to pneumonia which is not treated quickly enough.41

Since the DoD Pandemic Plan was developed in 2006, the U.S. military has pandemic exercises in locations such as Germany, Hawaii, Indiana, and South Carolina, involving rapid vaccination of local communities, enactment of quarantines, and communication and coordination with multiple agencies and officials.42 However, advanced planning isn’t always enough. In 1918, officials at Camp Meade anticipated the flu’s arrival and cleared hospital beds—and still the Army was unprepared for the high rates of infection and deaths that flu and pneumonia brought. Even a medical training camp, Camp Greenleaf, experienced high influenza and pneumonia mortality rates. A virulent virus might still overwhelm medical systems. Where plans fail, the ability to adapt rapidly will be vital. Overconfidence must be kept in check. As DoD’s plan predicts, “Any effective response [to a severe pandemic] will require the full participation of all levels of government and the private sector.”43

At 100-years-old, the Spanish flu is already a distant memory. Hardly anyone alive today has personal memories of it. And yet, the 1918–1919 influenza-pneumonia pandemic holds clues to a situation we may again have to face—and reminds us that the flu must be taken seriously. Soldiers may once again be on the front lines fighting against influenza and its allies like pneumonia.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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NOTES


41. Morens, “Epidemics Past and Present.”


43. DoD Implementation Plan, pp. 5, 8, 16, 24, 29, and 73.
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THE U.S. ARMY CAMPAIGNS OF THE VIETNAM WAR

THE DRAWDOWN
1970-1971
George C. Scott memorialized General George S. Patton Jr. in the minds of Americans in the 1970 film, Patton. Speaking in front of a wall-sized American flag, he stands at attention and salutes while the camera scrolls through close-ups of his spotless uniform and immaculate posture, just as the general would have presented himself. The viewer is first shown his salute and riding crop followed shortly thereafter with a chest of perfectly aligned medals and his pearl-handled revolver. This fictionalized representation of General Patton complete with demand for perfection and authority would be near to historically accurate as J. Furman Daniel III brings him to life in 21st Century Patton: Strategic Insights for the Modern Era.

Patton embraced all aspects of military leadership up to and including the specialized selection of riding boots and his signature sidearm to ensure a flawless, confident appearance at all times. More impressive and longer-lasting, though, is the general’s contribution to military theory and the early foundations of maneuver warfare and combined arms operations. Daniel brings Patton to life as a man not only dedicated to his public image, but also profoundly devoted to a lifelong study of military strategy and technology. Convinced as he was of “the importance of his own destiny” (p. 4), George Patton spent his decades in uniform dedicated to the study of warfare which allowed him to appear as a mastermind on the battlefield, “as if he had a natural and instinctive knowledge of the subject” (p. 10).

Daniel selects seven of Patton’s writings which together span over three decades of critical thought on leadership, tactics, technology, the future of warfare, and military organization. Daniel begins with Patton’s first published article from 1913, “The Form and Use of the Saber.” Though the use of swords and cavalry are long outdated to modern warfare, the author chooses the piece to showcase Patton’s ability to identify an Army-wide problem with equipment, formulate an effective argument for its replacement, and generate support for change at senior levels. Regardless of the insight into Patton’s mind and capabilities, the essay is a fascinating historical glimpse into cavalry-charge tactics on the cusp of revolutionary tactical changes in World War I.

The theme changes with the second selection as the author includes Patton’s reflections on his World War I experiences in which he attempts to “grapple with difficult questions regarding leadership, loyalty, and courage” (p. 13). The prologue to the chapter ties Patton’s writings nicely to contemporary motivations for military service. This piece, while highly insightful into the sense of pride and discipline Patton demanded of himself and his army, touches lightly on dated ideas of tribal evolution and male motivations for courage on the battlefield. Patton reaches his conclusion that while many great generals may have been intellectually gifted, they principally “owed their success to indomitable wills and tremendous energy” (p. 48), an argument he would reiterate throughout his career.

Daniel returns the reader to Patton’s technical abilities with the selection of the 1930 Cavalry Journal piece titled, “The Effect of Weapons on War.” In it, Patton explores the “perpetual state of flux” (p. 50) between new technologies on the battlefield and the tactics and techniques which develop to counter them. Two main points emerge from this article. First, we see Patton’s dedication to understanding the minute details of his armored machines in order to better apply them at the operational level and experiment with their capabilities in the theoretical realm. Second, Patton’s belief that good leadership and proper soldiers can overcome nearly any material shortfall is again emphasized when he argues, “few, if any, victories are traceable to weapons . . . It is the spirit of the men who fight, and the spirit of the men who lead, which gains the victory” (pp. 57–58). This argument is explored further in the fourth chapter in which he develops ideas on the prerequisites for victory in war. While “Patterns of Success” is probably the weakest chapter of the book, it contributes nicely to the perpetual debates between the comparative importance of leadership, technology, and mass on the battlefield.

Patton’s 1932 Army War College thesis along with the 1933 article “Mechanized Forces: A Lecture” serve as the zenith of the book. The reader stares back in time before the concepts of maneuver warfare and combined arms tactics had been articulated, debated, and instituted within the armed forces. In both pieces, Patton’s aptitude as an academic and thinker are showcased through an uncanny ability to predict both the fighting organizations and unit tactics which would achieve dramatic success in Europe a decade later. The author’s introduction to Patton’s thesis seamlessly prepares the reader for the discussion of mass conscript armies versus smaller professional armies which occupies the following fifty pages. Truthfully, the thesis should be mandatory reading for any introductory lesson on military organization and structure. “Mechanized Forces: A Lecture” contrasts the French and British employment of tanks in World War I before theorizing on the application of new types of armored units toward existing military tasks like reconnaissance and flanking operations. The chapter concludes with a quite humorous reinforcement of Patton’s now established belief in the impermanence of weaponry.
When Samson took the fresh jawbone of an ass and slew a thousand men therewith, he probably started such a vogue for the weapon, especially among the Philistines, that for years no prudent donkey dared to bray. Yet, despite its initial popularity, it was discarded and now appears only as a barrage instrument for acrimonious debate (p. 142).

One highlight from the lonely six pages of Chapter 7 are the author’s three and a half pages of introduction. Daniel describes the importance of the Tennessee, Louisiana, and Carolina Maneuvers in which Patton’s decades of training and theorizing paid off with stunning, rapid victories for his armored forces. The maneuvers so impressed his seniors that upon the outbreak of war, Patton was charged with training over 60,000 U.S. soldiers for imminent combat in the North African deserts. In the final published paper of General George S. Patton Jr., the legendary combat leader dwells not on high-minded theory or abstract concepts of warfare, but returns to the basics of combat with minute technical details and the human factors of desert conflict. In less than three pages, Patton addresses geography, the evasion of airborne reconnaissance, unit formations, bivouac sites, water consumption, food rations, and preventative vehicle maintenance, demonstrating in the end that his genius for war resulted first and foremost from an understanding of the microdetails of soldiers and armies.

If J. Furman Daniel III set out to answer the question, “Who was General Patton?” his contribution of 21st Century Patton to the U.S. Naval Institute’s 21st Century Foundations series answers the question as best any compilation could. The book’s contents are impeccably selected, organized, and commented upon to demonstrate that Patton’s visible success in war and outward image as a military genius was due to ceaseless and exhaustive preparation. Future military leaders can learn from the general the same lessons for military success with which Daniel concludes: “For George Patton, success was not an accident” (p. 150).

In Chapter 1, Schadlow attributes the disorder to four causes: the founding fathers’ aversion to establishing a standing army; ambivalence about governing others rooted in the nation’s anti-colonial heritage; Americans’ conviction that civilians should be in charge of governance; and, the U.S. Army’s belief that it should fight battles, not manage civilians. In this broad-but-shallow survey of American military history, Schadlow depicts Army officers as having to overcome this syndrome repeatedly in postconflict situations to secure American objectives and restore lasting order. Rather than having to relearn the same lessons continually, Schadlow argues the United States should expand the Army and prepare it to both defeat and govern other countries on the way to absorbing them into an American-led global order.

In Chapter 2, Schadlow begins to review American military campaigns in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Time and again, necessity drove Army officers to implement “governance operations” to restore order after successful military campaigns. In each case, commanders acted because American administrations failed to define the national policies these campaigns were supposed to fulfill. The Mexican–American War provides an early example. When Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott occupied Mexico City in 1847, he did so without guidance from President James Polk on postwar policy objectives. On his own authority, Scott established martial law to restore order and implemented indirect rule through indigenous administrators. Fifty years later, during the Spanish–American War, the Army tried to minimize troop deployments to avoid exposing soldiers to tropical diseases. However growing demands from Washington to suppress insurgents and establish civil administration pushed the Army to deploy more forces to fulfill the mandate. Finally, the challenges of occupying the Rhineland after the World War I fully exposed the Army’s need to govern defeated states. Maj. Gen. Henry Allen, the commander of American Forces in Germany in 1919, argued the occupation of the Rhineland exposed the folly “that armies could occupy enemy soil and yet dispossess themselves of most of the responsibility of government” (p. 75). Commanders occupying foreign soil frequently found they had to secure more objectives than anticipated and had to develop policies no one realized were important before the operation began.

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Chapter 3 covers World War II and the subsequent occupations of conquered enemy states, which is Schadlow’s idealized version of governance operations. The Army began rewriting civil affairs doctrine in 1940 and established a school to train select personnel on military governance. As combat units defeated enemy forces in the European and Pacific theaters, civil affairs teams helped commanders in occupied areas supervise civilians and restore order. The results, she argues, speak for themselves; the occupations of Germany, Japan, Italy, and South Korea succeeded in transforming key states into more democratic and liberally-oriented political and economic systems. The governance operations did so through political supervision and political reconstruction. In addition, the military occupations of these countries served as key instruments for the consolidation of US power during the early years of the Cold War. (pp. 144–45)

In Chapters 4 and 5, which cover the Cold War and the war on terror, Schadlow argues the United States failed to embrace World War II’s obvious lesson: that conquering enemy states and absorbing their civil societies into American-run economic and security systems was best for all involved. Instead, there was a hardening of attitudes against military involvement in civil affairs; soldiers and generals alike found civilian needs a distraction from what they believed was the Army’s purpose. In the Dominican Republic in 1965, an 82d Airborne Division paratrooper could not understand why he was cleaning streets. “Hell,” he said, “we came here to fight” (p. 191). In 2003, American attempts to withdraw from Iraq after the regime collapse were doomed. Chaos forced commanders to work with indigenous leaders to restore order and provide humanitarian assistance to desperate civilians. “All of the features of American denial syndrome emerged,” Schadlow writes, and they “seriously undermined the ability of the United States to achieve strategic success. . . . Senior leaders [who] believed they could avoid the politics of the conflict” were wrong (pp. 260–62).

Schadlow is not a historian and her purpose is not to understand the past but to use it to promote a vision of armed nation building using the U.S. Army. Contrary to her depiction of doctrinal-sounding “governance operations,” the Army’s roles in Mexico, post–Civil War reconstruction, the suppression of the plains Indians, the Philippines, and the Rhineland did not end happily for all involved. Even her preferred cases, Germany and Japan after 1945, depended on the specific circumstances of those countries’ wartime destruction and exhaustion, their unconditional surrender, and their willingness to be absorbed into a prosperous Pax Americana. Recent scholarship demonstrates that neither circumstance was the “Good Occupation” that Schadlow imagines.

I regret not having understood sooner that the U.S. Army is an instrument of policy, that it performs best when commanders understand the policy, and that civilian concerns are fundamental to policy. However, Schadlow’s prescription for military governance is a false guide; it sounds logical but lends itself to a bad outcome. Her remedy is threefold: first, the Army must organize and train units to govern occupied areas; second, it must be large enough to occupy other countries for the scale and duration needed; and, finally, the Army must realize its purpose is not just to win wars but to consolidate new political orders in occupied states. Schadlow’s argument ultimately fails because every military operation is an anomaly. Her attempt to extrapolate solutions for the frustrations of Iraq from the long-ago occupations of Germany and Japan ignores the policy concerns that were unique to each situation. Moreover, Schadlow’s rationale would transform America’s generals into proconsuls—leading imperial armies and wielding sovereignty over conquered territories. Schadlow seems to see 1898 as the future, but I consider it ancient history. Something to be commended in Schadlow’s work is its implicit challenge to policymakers to understand their objectives before launching ambitious operations abroad; they should contemplate the end of conflicts before venturing in search of elusive victories. However, postwar cautionary tales would have been more useful than Schadlow’s bold assurances that big armies and staying power will set the world aright. War tends to alter the political dilemmas we face but it does not often resolve them, and the past offers little evidence that military governance is the answer.

NOTE

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In It’s My Country Too: Women’s Military Stories from the American Revolution to Afghanistan, editors Jerri Bell and Tracy Crow have compiled an impressive anthology of women’s war stories, as told by the women themselves. Bell and Crow, both veterans, started this project after realizing that the voices of our country’s female veterans were rarely in print, and never with the same publicity and critical acclaim as men’s voices (p. xiii). The editors believe the general public is missing out on important American stories and that women currently serving,
and those who will come after them, deserve access to histories where they can see themselves reflected. They have done an admirable job in rescuing these voices and giving the world access to an important historical arc. These stories are multifaceted and varied, much like the military women who tell them. The book is at times lively, relatable, and even funny. Other stories are heartbreaking in their abuse, self-doubt, and loneliness. All of them are important.

There are many reasons women’s military stories have not been given the same attention as men’s. In the American Revolution and the Civil War, women had to dress as men in order to fight, so it makes sense that many of their stories will never be known. (One especially memorable exception is the story of two Confederate soldiers who gave birth as Prisoners of War [p. 14].) In later conflicts, women’s roles were not considered as exciting or meaningful as men’s, because women were not allowed in combat. But, as Bell and Crow demonstrate, military women were rarely far from danger. During World War II, nurses slept in tents yards away from German bombs falling during air raids (p. 98). First Lt. Sharon Lane, Army Nurse Corps, died in Vietnam when an enemy rocket hit her quarters (p. 178).

Perhaps worse than being lost to history or dismissed as unexciting, female veterans’ stories are often hijacked for political, social, or commercial agendas (p. xv). Women in the military hear accusations that they joined because they are victims of the patriarchy (p. xv), because they value implementing “social experiments” over military readiness (p. 214), or because they want to “get some of that good U.S. Department of the Navy grade-A meat” (p. 188). When women themselves answer the question of why they took up arms, the answer is resoundingly that they were answering “the call of our country in her hour of stress” (p. 82). Why would a woman want to fight in the American Revolution? Deborah Sampson, who served in the Continental Army, gives an answer that just as easily could have been written by a man: outrage that a nation three thousand miles away should subject the colonists to “plans of subjugation, the most unnatural in themselves, unjust, inhuman” (p. 9). The voices in this collection overwhelmingly prove that American women have always taken up arms for the very reason men do: because their country needs them.

Initially, it seems strange that each chapter of the book and each individual story begin with introductions by the editors, since Bell and Crow insist in their preface that women veterans need to tell their stories in their own words. Each of the eleven chapters begins with a brief introduction to women’s official and unofficial roles in the conflict at hand. Then, before the women’s voices begin, there are further introductions to the individual women themselves. At first, it seems that so much secondary text might drown out the women’s voices. However, the brief, interesting introductions to the veterans are necessary because, sadly, very few of them are household names. Even those already familiar with military history will enjoy learning the details and politics behind the formation of female units. It is also interesting to read debates between politicians over whether women should be allowed to serve in combat. These ring especially hollow situated between stories of women running for cover from enemy fire.

The introductions also give the reader a glimpse into the magnitude of the effort that went into creating this book. The stories come from a wide range of sources: published and unpublished memoirs, words lifted from pension dispositions, oral history projects, blogs, and even a few original essays written for this volume. In deciding which voices to include, Bell and Crow consciously avoided creating a “contribution history” that focuses exclusively on the few women already acknowledged as military trailblazers (p. xvi). The editors admirably attempt to rectify the exclusion of minorities’ voices by including women of color, immigrants, and members of the LGBTQ community in the volume. By correcting a journalist’s intentional misspellings in Harriet Tubman’s story (pp. 26–27), Bell and Crow give her words the dignity they deserve and show the familiar American abolitionist and activist in one of her other roles: a warfighter.

By including so many representations and featuring stories from the military’s most junior women, Bell and Crow have succeeded in creating a collection that reflects the many different aspects of being a woman in the military. We get glimpses of self-doubt, such as the first female Marine to serve in Vietnam calling herself a “devout coward” (p. 199). We read of a woman serving in an elite WAVES (Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service) unit during World War II who doubted her importance and wondered if she could be doing her part for the country at home, “serving cookies and jitterbugging” and wearing an “aqua prom dress at the USO with our brave boys who have to behave nicely there” (p. 116). Female veterans will also recognize the playfulness and camaraderie that emerges during long stretches of boredom, like racing rafts made of empty water bottles (p. 307) or spraying one another with neon from ChemLights (p. 304). Some women will recognize the delight in finding a male ally or making a perfectly timed comeback to a sexist remark. Others will recognize the feeling of being excluded when every workplace conversation somehow becomes about “whores, strip clubs, and no-boundaries masturbation” (p. 272).

Though Bell and Crow started their research believing that women currently serving, and the public at large, were missing out on the stories of America’s female veterans, the editors quickly realized that they had both served without a sense of their own history. They did not know whose shoulders they stood on or who had set the standard of women’s service and leadership (p. xiv). This book goes a long way to correcting that deficiency. These stories show us courage and bravery without shying away from alienation, loneliness, self-doubt, harassment, and even assault. The fight these women waged just to be allowed to do the most taxing and dangerous jobs in the world is truly awe-inspiring.

This book should be required reading for women in the military and those who seek to understand them. As the editors well know, it is entirely possible for a woman to serve with no knowledge of her military heritage, but having these stories at hand would certainly be a welcome source of strength, comfort, and the very special camaraderie of being both a woman and a veteran.

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Culloden was: “a dynastic conflict between the Stuarts and the Hanoverians;” “fought between a modern army and the Highland clans;” “fought between Catholics and Protestants;” “a victory of muskets over swords;” “fought on a badly chosen site, and this was the fault of Charles Edward Stuart [Bonnie Prince Charlie or The Young Pretender to the British throne] and his Irish officers;” “fought to end a British civil war;” and “a defeat for Scottish nationalism.” Pittock dispels all these myths in War;” and “a defeat for Scottish nation-officers;” “fought to end a British civil to the British throne] and his Irish
Prince Charlie or The Young Pretender
fault of Charles Edward Stuart [Bonnie
on a badly chosen site, and this was the
victory of muskets over swords;” “fought
between Catholics and Protestants;” “a
defeat for Scottish nation-officers;” “fought
between a modern army and the Highland
clans;” “fought between Catholics and
Protestants;” “a victory of muskets over
swords;” “fought on a badly chosen site,
and this was the fault of Charles Edward
Stuart [Bonnie Prince Charlie or The Young
Pittock dispels all these myths in
Great Battles: Culloden
Murray Pittock
Oxford University Press, 2016
Pp. xxi, 192. $29.95

Review by J. Britt McCarley

For most interested parties, the 16 April 1746 Battle of Culloden in rainy
and windswept northern Scotland is the signature event of the 1745 Jacobite Rising in Great Britain. But there is much more involved in understanding the battle's context, course, and heritage. In Oxford University’s Great Battles series, Murray Pittock, eminent Scottish cultural historian and professor of literature, interprets Culloden from multiple angles, including national memory, historiography, archaeology, and material culture.

Because Pittock does not employ a traditional narrative method, readers will benefit from first reading “7 Myths About the Battle of Culloden Busted,” which summarizes the author’s revisionist approach to his subject. These long-held misconceptions are that Culloden was: “a dynastic conflict between the Stuarts and the Hanoverians;” “fought between a modern army and the Highland clans;” “fought between Catholics and Protestants;” “a victory of muskets over swords;” “fought on a badly chosen site, and this was the fault of Charles Edward Stuart [Bonnie Prince Charlie or The Young Pretender to the British throne] and his Irish officers;” “fought to end a British civil war;” and “a defeat for Scottish nationalism.” Pittock dispels all these myths in Culloden with abundant evidence from various disciplines.

The heart of the book begins with Chapter 2, “Conflicts and Armies: The Rising of 1745,” in which Pittock, using fresh interpretation of sources, atypically portrays the Jacobite Army as conventionally organized, armed, and trained. The Jacobites were also outnumbered on the Culloden battlefield by the army of Britain’s Hanoverian monarch, George II. Moreover, government troops enjoyed advantages in artillery (especially Coehorn mortars) and cavalry—the latter committed “to break the enemy only when they were already wavering” (p. 56). The combination of these factors leads Pittock to conclude that “in reality the Jacobites were too much of a normal army to do anything but fight [on the offense] at Culloden” (p. 36), rather than dissolve into the countryside and continue the rebellion as a guerrilla force for an indeterminate amount of time.

Pittock covers the battle itself in Chapter 3, “Culloden Moor,” the second longest one in the book but still not narration per se. His rebuttals of conventional historical wisdom in these pages are too numerous to catalog here, but several stand out. Rather than resulting from poor decision making, the Jacobites chose to fight the battle on boggy Drummossie Moor rather than other potential locations for at least three sound reasons: it was proximate to their headquarters at nearby Culloden House; it covered the neighboring town of Inverness, which was their supply point (for food in particular); and it was farther beyond the line-of-sight of the Royal Navy in adjoining Moray Firth. Because of the need to attack frontally, “the Jacobite Army relied on its front line to carry the day, and that meant breaking the British formations and driving them off the field” (p. 80). Lasting under an hour, including a less than ten-minute artillery exchange, the battle featured a westerly wind that blew black powder smoke into the faces of the charging Jacobites, who penetrated the British left but could not sustain their advantage. They eventually succumbed to the government’s stubborn resistance, voluminous firepower, and enveloping cavalry. According to Pittock, in one of the most revisionist parts of his interpretation, British “dragoons presented a cavalry concentration sizable enough to hit the Jacobite right flank or lead the pursuit of a broken enemy, which is in fact what they did” (p. 82) in both cases. Actually, Pittock maintains, “flanking cavalry . . . is the key to [understanding] Culloden” (p. 158). While total government losses that day numbered in the hundreds, Jacobites killed on the field totaled around 3,000, with many more to die later during the pursuit, which was “immediate, persistent, and brutal” (p. 98). Charles Edward’s entourage removed him protesting from the field, and he fled eventually back to mainland Europe.

Pittock covers post-battle developments in Chapter 4, “Aftermath and Occupation.” Put succinctly, “the British government had had a bad fight, and the Jacobites would pay for it” (p. 99). The government ceremonially and publicly executed nearly all the rebellion’s leaders. Most of the roughly 3,500 prisoners were also executed, were transported to overseas parts of the British Empire, or they enlisted in the army with duty in various pestilential garrisons. With upward of 13,000 troops seizing Scotland, three-quarters of them British regulars, “this was not a Highland pacification but a national occupation,” (p. 109) according to the author.

Pittock uses both Chapter 5 “The Battle That Made Britain: Historiography and Evidence in the Case of Culloden” and Chapter 6 “Culloden in British Memory: Objects, Artefacts, and Representations of the Conflict” to discuss and analyze how the battle has been interpreted and remembered. He chooses David Morier’s painting, An Incident in the Rebellion of 1745 (completed soon after the battle possibly using prisoners as models for the Jacobite soldiers), as emblematic of the traditional interpretation of the battle: that is, of killed, sword-wielding, and primitive but heroic Highlanders pitted against a regular, government army. The contrary is true. As Pittock repeats over and over throughout the book, “the Jacobite Army was a conventional, popular, and substantially non-Gaelic force” (p. 136).

In the final chapter, the author considers his subject from a perspective particularly appealing to this reviewer:
that of battlefield preservation and interpretation. In that regard, according to Pittock, Culloden became “an early memory site” and eventually “was to become a place of pilgrimage for many who identified themselves as part of the Scottish diaspora” (pp. 137, 145). During the last few decades in particular, the Culloden battlefield has been restored as much as possible to its 1746 appearance. Its size also has been increased, and it received a new visitor center in 2007. In the end, it is the combination of the disciplines of history and archaeology that have most shaped the reinterpretation of the Battle of Culloden. Identifying the centrality of Culloden to modern British history, Pittock concludes: “It was the last battle fought on British soil and ended the last armed conflict in which the nature of Britain—and indeed its existence—were at stake” (p. 158).

As mentioned above, Oxford’s Great Battles: Culloden is not narrative history. If a reader wants to precede it by perusing more traditional histories of “The ‘45,” several come to mind: Jeremy Black’s Culloden and the ‘45 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), Christopher Duffy’s Fight for a Throne: The Jacobite ‘45 Reconsidered (West Midlands, England: Helion & Company, 2015), and, for the whole Jacobite experience going back to its 1680s origins, Bruce Lenman’s The Jacobite Risings in Britain, 1689–1746 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1980). Unfortunately, all of Great Battles: Culloden’s black-and-white illustrations—maps, drawings, photos, and paintings—are generally of poor to mediocre print quality. Nonetheless, Pittock’s book brings fresh interpretation to its subject and is well worth the read.

NOTE


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Review by Frank Kalesnik

Former chief historian of the National Park Service, Robert M. Utley, is one of the foremost experts on the “Old Army” that fought the Indian Wars of the nineteenth century. The Commanders: Civil War Generals Who Shaped the American West is his latest contribution to American history. His subjects are Civil War veterans who remained in the Army and rose to command the nationally organized military departments of the service. They include Christopher C. Augur, George Crook, Oliver O. Howard, Nelson A. Miles, Edward O. C. Ord, John Pope, and Alfred H. Terry. These generals achieved varying degrees of success as field commanders and administrators. Utley carefully evaluates their performances before, during, and after the Civil War, with emphasis on their service in the West both in the saddle and behind desks. Authoritative, incisive, and engagingly written, The Commanders is an expert analysis of military leadership at all levels of command.

The book begins with a chapter describing the Army in the postwar era. The Civil War Army drew much of its strength from volunteer regiments provided by the states for wartime service. By 1874, the Regular Army’s strength was reduced to 27,000. Distinguished volunteer officers were allowed to apply for regular commissions, providing balance to the officer corps. Nelson Miles was one such officer, and he rose to become commanding general of the Army, retiring at the rank of lieutenant general.

While many Army leaders were seasoned combat veterans, the quality of their troops declined after the Civil War. According to Utley, the reenlistment rate was low and the desertion rate high. Promotions up to the rank of colonel were based on seniority, but general officer appointments were highly political, particularly when deaths or retirements created vacancies. Personal rivalries fueled by professional competition and grudges held for perceived slights were common.

Utley’s assessment of doctrine and professional education during this period grabs the reader’s attention. “Schools sprouted for special training, and professional journals proliferated,” he writes. “Yet neither in the schools nor in the instructional manuals was the unconventional warfare practiced by Indians addressed.” He notes, “The emphasis was on the next conventional war, to be fought by orthodox strategy and tactics.” He concludes, “This thinking, of course, ignored the fact that for a century the prime mission of the army was fighting Indians.” (p. 14) Ironic, considering that men who commanded corps and divisions between 1861 and 1865 subsequently led battalions and regiments in actions against Native Americans that would be considered minor skirmishes by Civil War standards.

The author’s evaluation of the generals’ performance is thought-provoking. He considers Nelson Miles, a Civil War volunteer with no formal military education, to be “the best Indian fighter,” but qualifies this statement by noting that Miles, “achieved this record as a colonel rather than as a brigadier.” As a department commander, Miles “sinks below mediocrity” (pp. 206–07). This reviewer does not concur with that assessment. In 1886, Miles ended the Apache Wars by securing the final surrender of Geronimo. At the next level of command (Division of the Missouri), he brought the Ghost Dance uprising to a close, held Lt. Col. Edwin V. Sumner (the Seventh Cavalry’s commander) accountable for the debacle at Wounded Knee, and continued to seek justice for the Native American survivors of that tragedy up until his death in 1925. Nelson Miles was certainly egotistical—few successful generals are not—but he did not become commanding general of the Army because he was incompetent.
Utley also scrutinizes the career of Miles’ professional rival, George Crook. A West Point graduate, Crook’s Indian fighting career began in the Pacific Northwest before the Civil War, where it resumed afterward. An avid outdoorsman, Crook was the personification of the rugged field soldier (an image Utley considers an affectation). Utley recognizes Crook’s relentless Tonto Basin Campaign (1872–1873) against the Apaches in Arizona as his crowning achievement, and rightfully criticizes his lackluster performance in the Sioux War (1876–1877). Utley concludes, “General George Crook does not deserve the exalted view that history accords him. But he does deserve to be remembered as one of the great generals of the frontier army” (p. 66). He also declares, “In short, only one other Indian fighting general, Nelson A. Miles, could match Crook’s career as a frontier army leader” (p. 65). This assessment is fair.

The concluding chapter of The Commanders summarizes the author’s evaluations of the generals, then rates them on their overall performance as department commanders. He rates Augur first, followed by Crook, Pope, Terry, Howard, Miles, and Ord. When focusing exclusively on their combat records as department commanders (and allowing for the fact that some relied on subordinates to conduct operations while they remained at headquarters), the order is Crook, Augur, Pope, Howard, Ord, and Miles (the author omitted Terry). Utley explains that, “Despite Miles’ successful campaigns as a colonel, he rates the bottom slot only by virtue of the Apache campaign of 1886” (p. 211). This reviewer believes the author’s evaluation is biased; Utley just doesn’t like Miles. The bottom line is that Miles had the most successful career, established by success in the field under conditions where his rivals failed.

The Commanders is still an excellent book. It is thought-provoking, highly readable, and a valuable contribution to American military history. Both professional historians and Western enthusiasts will enjoy it tremendously. Professional soldiers will also find it useful, particularly at the current time, when a renewed emphasis on preparing for conventional conflicts makes us forget that, in one form or another, the U.S. Army’s primary mission has always been fighting Indians.

Dr. Frank Kalesnik earned his bachelor’s degree in history at the Virginia Military Institute and his master’s degree and Ph.D. in American history at Florida State University. He has taught at the Virginia Military Institute and the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, and served as a command historian for both the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Marine Corps. He also served for twenty-two years as an officer in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. He is currently the command historian for Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

One of the many lessons contained in Daniel Hughes and Richard DiNardo’s Imperial Germany and War, 1871–1918 is the truth of an observation by the former United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, “Time goes by, reputation increases, ability declines.” For while the German army came into existence in 1814, and 1815, and Carl von Clausewitz articulated a new theory of war that emphasized mobile warfare in pursuit of a battle in which the enemy army is annihilated. Many of the army’s reforms were rolled back in the decades after those victories in order to maintain the political reliability of Prussian forces (which was important to its other primary mission, the preservation of the monarchy). However, Clausewitz’s ideas soon predominated in Prussian Army doctrine, thanks in no small measure to the efforts of Helmuth von Moltke the Elder.

For Hughes and DiNardo, Moltke is the pivotal figure in the history of the imperial German army, not just because of his stature as the foremost post-Napoleonic military theoretician of the nineteenth century, but for his practical military reforms as well. His controversial practice of operational flexibility (later known as Auftragstaktik) reflected his belief that tactical outcomes drove decisions at the larger operational and strategic level. The scale of war grew in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War with the adoption of conscription and other modernizations by Continental powers, and the German army had to formulate a response. With Moltke’s retirement in 1888, this task fell primarily to Alfred von Schlieffen. He reacted to the decreasing availability of maneuver space by adopting a different approach, one that stressed tactical success at key points. Here the authors join colleagues such as Terence Zuber and Hans Ehler in downplaying the notion of a “Schlieffen Plan,” noting the absence of any formal war plans during Schlieffen’s fourteen years as chief of the general staff. His approach was largely continued by his successor, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger. However, the memos
and deployment plans which defined the army’s reaction to any declaration of war were regularly modified to reflect changes in Germany’s geopolitical situation, such as the growing threat posed by Russia in the east and Italy’s drift away from the Central Powers.

With the outbreak of war in 1914, the limitations produced by these approaches quickly became apparent. A governing system highly dependent on personal leadership was hobbled by Wilhelm II’s limitations, depriving the army of much-needed institutional coordination. The army leadership’s educational focus on tactics, rather than on broader issues of statecraft, exacerbated the vacuum in grand strategy. Battlefield success was disconnected from any practical plan to end the war. Mobile warfare against opponents of a higher caliber than those in 1866 and 1870 produced gains at the cost of unsustainably high casualties, but not the desired breakthrough. All this forced the German army’s leaders to turn to “positional warfare” on the Western Front, while maintaining an emphasis on mobile warfare in campaigns against Russia and in the Balkans. Though the army adapted successfully, the skills of mobile warfare were lost in the process. When units on the Western Front were retrained in it later in the war, it was implemented without the traditional goal of the decisive-encounter battle. This effectively conceded the eventual return to the positional warfare that was fatally corrosive to the army’s strength. Along with the socially elitist composition of the officer corps fueling the loss of credibility among enlisted men, it brought about the collapse of the imperial German army by the autumn of 1918.

This failure to achieve either of its core missions has done little to tarnish the imperial German army’s stature as a fighting force, however. In this, Hughes and DiNardo’s book serves as a valuable corrective. Drawing upon the surviving primary source material in both German and English, the authors provide their readers with a comprehensive study of the German army’s doctrine, strategic planning, organization, and development. The depth of research and scope of analysis contributes to a balanced assessment of the imperial German army, one that explains how it prepared for war and how, in the end, those preparations proved wanting.

It is a book that every student of the First World War should read, as well as those interested in moving beyond the reputation of the imperial German army to better understand its true abilities as a fighting force.

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Angels of the Underground: The American Women who Resisted the Japanese in the Philippines in World War II

By Theresa Kaminski

Oxford University Press, 2016
Pp. xii, 497. $27.95

Review by Amanda Williams

Much has been written about World War II in the Philippines. Most of it focuses on General Douglas MacArthur, the 1942 defeat of U.S. and Filipino forces, the treatment of prisoners of war, guerrilla activity, and the 1944–1945 campaign to liberate the islands from Japanese control. In Angels of the Underground, Theresa Kaminski weaves these major areas of scholarship into a thoughtful study of women who resisted the Japanese occupation of the Philippines.

Kaminski’s work centers on two American women: Peggy Utinsky and Claire Phillips. After the fall of the Philippines, these women adopted other nationalities to avoid internment-camp incarceration with other Allied civilians. Utinsky managed to convince the Japanese she was Lithuanian, and Phillips was able to pass herself off as an Italian. Armed with these identities, they used their freedom in the occupation’s early days to search for their missing husbands. Very quickly however, these quests morphed into efforts to alleviate the suffering of prisoners of war. The women also assisted guerrilla bands and gathered intelligence.

Utinsky, or “Miss U” as she codenamed herself, organized a covert network of sympathizers who smuggled aid to the prisoners of war. A nurse by day, her network reached places like Camp O’Donnell, Cabanatuan Prison Camp, and Bilibid Prison. She was relentless—even returning to her smuggling work after being captured, tortured, and released by the Kempeitai.

Phillips participated in Utinsky’s smuggling network but also cultivated close ties with the Japanese. Codenamed “High Pockets” because of her tendency to hide contraband in her brassiere, she opened Club Tsubaki during the occupation. The nightclub was popular with Japanese military officers and businessmen and she used her talent as an entertainer to gather intelligence from her clientele. Her efforts in this area did not always endear her to other resistance members. For women like Phillips, the politics of entertaining the enemy could be difficult to navigate, and even more difficult to explain in the postwar period.

Writing about women and war can be tricky. One of the great strengths of Angels of the Underground is that Kaminski rejects the notion of a universal sisterhood in which all women supposedly band together and get along when confronted with crisis. Instead, Kaminski opts for a more nuanced view—that war is a very individual experience and women like Utinsky and Phillips determined “how the war would happen to them” (p. 6). Kaminski argues that even in the absence of a uniform, these women saw themselves as “accountable for their actions during wartime,” and believed that they “had to choose a side; they had to take action” (p. 98).

Patriotism alone is often the simplest explanation for their decisions to take action. Kaminski delves deeper and reveals they were also driven by revenge, restlessness, and a desire for recognition. They also had a difficult relationship with each other. These are not the typical qualities of “angels,” but in the absence of an idealized sisterhood, both women saved lives by choosing how the war happened to them.
The memoirs of Utinsky and Phillips provide the basis for much of the book. There is clear evidence that both women embellished their exploits and conveniently left out the awkward, petty, and unheroic bits. Without a doubt they were posterior conscious. So was everyone who wrote a memoir of the war. One of the tasks historians face when working with such sources is to identify and understand what has been included and what has been omitted. Kaminski does this and succeeds in placing both women in the context of the war while not glamorizing their stories or ignoring the controversies. From beginning to end, Kaminski addresses their personality issues and paranoia (which many male operatives also exhibited under stress), the doubts about the tactical value of some of their contributions, their failures in terms of tradecraft and operational security, and the difficulty of corroborating their stories.

In addition to telling the story of Utinsky and Phillips, Kaminski also does an excellent job of bringing Manila to life. Once the “Pearl of the Orient,” Kaminski reveals a Manila under siege, the chaos as it is declared an open city by General MacArthur, and the eerie calm before the Japanese takeover. She then details the brutal Japanese occupation that would last nearly three years. This gives the reader an interesting look at MacArthur’s departure and return through the eyes of the civilians left behind.

At times the narrative skips around and its pace is a little uneven, but Kaminski makes up for this with the book’s wealth of information and her ability to tease out her sources. Scholars of the resistance movement in the Philippines will appreciate the inclusion of Yay Panlilio, Gladys Savary, Millie B. Sanders, Edwin Ramsey, Pilar Campos, and German priest Theodore Buttenbruch. In addition to these women and men, many lesser-known members of the resistance also factor into the story of Utinsky and Phillips.

*Angels of the Underground* does not answer every question about Utinsky and Phillips, or about the role of women and the resistance in the Philippines. Sometimes it is impossible to untangle these shadowy stories, and sometimes unraveling a thread just adds more mystery. Nevertheless, *Angels of the Underground* is an important contribution to the field of military history. It is a levelheaded, sober assessment of how women experience war.

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**Review by H. Allen Skinner Jr.**

After reading the preface to Kathryn Coker’s *The Indispensable Force*, one would assume the book was a historical reference work focused on the United States Army Reserve (USAR) after 1990. Indeed, the director of the Army Reserve history program when the book was published, Lee Harford, describes the book as a “permanent historical reference . . . the institutional memory of the Army Reserve during a critical period of its history, serving as a guide for current and future operations.” Furthermore, Hartford declares that the book would not only give senior Army leaders a historical perspective in decision making, but would also prove useful to the general public in understanding the basic history of the USAR (p. xxxvi).

Unfortunately, the book falls short of Hartford’s promise, as it is riddled with structural flaws which greatly compromise its usefulness. Not only does the book lack the historical depth of a serious work of history, it lacks the clear organizational structure needed in a reference book. In attempting to reconcile two distinctly different objectives, the writer and editors of the book fail to adequately accomplish Harford’s goals.

For example, the beginning chapter, misleadingly titled “Post–Cold War Defense Strategy,” immediately veers into the participation of the Army Reserve in the First Gulf War—certainly an important topic but hardly germane to the chapter title. The remainder of the first chapter, which is an unreasonably long 142 pages, swerves from topic to topic ranging from personnel, training, base realignment, and family well-being. The chapters that follow are equally large and filled with graphics and PowerPoint data charts that hinder the reader’s ability to easily find information. In particular, this reviewer found many of the 276 photographs and reprints of Army artwork did little to support the text. One case in point is an artwork representation of the Audie Murphy competition inserted between Figure I-3 and the “Bottom-Up Review” section (p. 49), a juxtaposition which did not support the flow of the narrative.

Author Kathryn Coker, who spent eighteen years working as an Army Reserve historian before completing the book, appropriately compliments her narrative with twenty-eight figures and five tables which provide detailed historical information which would be of great value to Army decision makers—if properly organized. Continuing with the positive aspects of the book, Coker supports her narrative with detailed endnotes in each chapter. Her endnotes include thirty-one pages of source materials: books, articles, and internal documents produced by the Army Reserve, the Department of Defense, and other Federal agencies. Finally, Coker supplements her research with details gleaned from oral history interviews she conducted with senior Army Reserve leaders.

Despite the manifold flaws present in the book, *The Indispensable Force* should serve as a good starting point for a reader wanting to learn the history of the post–Cold War Army Reserve. Reorganizing the book thematically would go a long way toward improving the usefulness of the end product, and would turn *The Indispensable Force* into what it was originally intended, and best suited: a professional reference book for Army Reserve leaders. To accomplish the task of telling the history of the Army Reserve,
the Office of Army Reserve History should create a separate, in-depth historical study of the USAR’s organization since the end of World War II.

H. Allen Skinner Jr., a retired Army National Guard officer, is the command historian for the 81st Readiness Division, U. S. Army Reserve, located at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. He is currently working on a staff ride handbook covering the Southern Campaigns of 1780, while his staff ride guide for the Battle of Kings Mountain was accepted for publication by the Army University Press later in 2019. He received his master's degree in military history from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in 2006.

**Henry Ware Lawton: Union Infantryman, Frontier Soldier, Charismatic Warrior**

By Michael E. Shay
University of Missouri Press, 2016
Pp. xiv, 322, $29.95

*Review by Edgar F. Raines*

Henry Ware Lawton, famous in his own day, is now known only to a few historians specializing in the Indian Wars, the War with Spain in 1898, and the Philippine Insurrection (as this conflict is officially designated). Michael E. Shay, a former superior court judge in Connecticut, and the author or editor of five previous books, seeks with some success to restore Lawton to the prominence he once enjoyed in *Henry Ware Lawton: Union Infantryman, Frontier Soldier, Charismatic Warrior*. The book is the first scholarly treatment of Lawton’s life. The author’s previous biography of Lawton’s adjutant general in the Philippines, Lt. Col. Clarence R. Edwards, and his edited edition of the letters of Robert Dexter Carter, a civilian clerk in Lawton’s headquarters in 1899, obviously led Shay to his subject.

Lawton, born on 17 March 1843, in Manhattan, Ohio, is a difficult subject for any biographer. His father was a millwright who moved his family from job to job in Ohio and then Indiana. In 1849 or 1850 he left for the gold rush in California. His mother had to depend upon her relatives in Ohio for support—she and her three boys stayed with different kin. She died when Henry was ten. His uncle Andrew, a harness maker, took the boy as an apprentice. Three years later his father returned and took young Henry with him to jobs in Iowa and Missouri. Working with his father, Henry developed wood-working skills. This training would help him later when he served as a quartermaster in the American West. He had some schooling when young, but it was rather sketchy. Despite this, he was attending a Methodist college in Fort Wayne, Indiana, when the Civil War broke out. He volunteered and served as a sergeant in the 9th Regiment, Indiana Volunteers during Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan’s 1861 campaign. Mustered out after ninety days, he joined the three-year 30th Regiment, Indiana Volunteers as a first lieutenant. The regiment served in what became the Army of the Cumberland. By the end of the war, Lawton was a lieutenant colonel and the regimental commander, but until the Battle of Franklin (Tennessee) in late 1864, there is little in the historical record to describe what he was doing. None of his personal correspondence from the war or the years before survived, and no veterans wrote a history of his regiment. Consequently, the first two chapters of the biography are long on context with only brief glimpses of Lawton. The fact that we have even those glimpses is a testament to Shay’s considerable skill as a researcher.

We know that Lawton had impressed senior officers with his leadership skills, because none other than Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan took a personal interest in getting Lawton a commission in the Regular Army after the war. Lawton served in the African American 41st Infantry, later redesignated as the 24th Infantry, and then transferred to the 4th Cavalry. In fact, in these transfers he was following the moves of his regimental commander, Col. Ranald S. Mackenzie, who became the Army’s premier Indian fighter.

Lawton excelled as a quartermaster, getting supplies and remounts where they were needed to allow his regiment to stay in the field for weeks or even months in a very austere environment. He became an indispensable man, so much so that the teetotaler Mackenzie would overlook Lawton’s occasional “sprees.” Lawton was an alcoholic: spirits would dog him his entire career.

Lawton remained a fearless combat leader as he demonstrated in campaigns on the southern plains, in the Rocky Mountains, and in the Southwest. Lawton’s role in the last campaign against Geronimo is perhaps the most written about of all his service on the frontier. Biographies have analyzed that campaign from the point of view of Nelson A. Miles, Charles B. Gateswood, and Leonard Wood.1 Having an account from Lawton’s perspective emphasizes that he was key to maintaining the persistent pursuit into Mexico that wore down the Apaches, but, even more strikingly, it illustrates how important he was to convincing Miles to personally accept Geronimo’s surrender—the final essential step. Lawton’s reward was transfer to the inspector general’s department in 1888 and promotion to major. Shay has an interesting chapter on Lawton’s decade of service in the inspector general’s department, but he understates the amount of reform occurring in the Army during that period. Still, promotions came much faster in the staff than in the line. In July 1898, Lawton received a promotion to full colonel, but by then the nation was at war again and Lawton was in Cuba as a major general of volunteers.

Lawton commanded the 2d Division, V Corps, in the Santiago Campaign. He was younger than most of the senior leaders in Cuba. Shay provides a brief, largely descriptive account of Lawton’s role in the Battle of El Caney, a little less than two pages. I found this brevity disappointing given that this was Lawton’s one opportunity to command a division in combat. Subsequent to the surrender of Santiago, he became the commander of the department of the same name. Soon thereafter he went on a drunken spree of epic proportions. Word reached the White House, and President William McKinley relieved Lawton of his command. McKinley sent him to the Philippines to redeem his reputation.
Shay does not quite understand the importance of the role that Lawton played in the Fall 1899 campaign designed to destroy the Philippine Army and capture, if possible, the leader of the Filipinos, Emilio Aguinaldo. Because of incessant rain, Lawton dispatched a strike force under Brig. Gen. S. B. M. Young to block Aguinaldo’s withdrawal into northern Luzon, while he followed with the main force, dropping detachments to block roads. He devoted most of his energies to keeping his and Young’s force supplied.1 The effort failed, but not because of any error by Lawton or Young. The blocking force that landed at Lingayen Gulf failed to exhibit sufficient initiative to block the roads near the coast that Young could not reach in time. By focusing almost exclusively on Lawton and not sketching the larger strategy, Shay undervalues what he accomplished.

In December 1899, while displaying the frontline leadership that had always marked his career, Lawton was killed in action during a minor engagement at San Mateo, outside of Manila. Shay suggests that Lawton accompanied the expedition only because he wanted to secure his promotion to brigadier general in the Regular Army. Possibly, but Lawton was never willing to ask a subordinate to do what he was unwilling to do. The officer corps held him in high esteem. Perhaps for that reason, opposite the entrance to the main dining room of the Army and Navy Club in Washington, D.C., there is a magnificent head-and-shoulders oil portrait of Lawton by Charles Harold L. MacDonald. While Shay’s biography could be improved in some areas, it is a valuable book that at least partially fills a real gap in the literature about Maj. Gen. Henry W. Lawton.

NOTES


2. William T. Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun: An Adventure in Imperialism (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1939) provides perhaps the best account of the campaign and its significance. Shay did not, apparently, consult this work.

Alvin York, Audie Murphy, Paul Ray Smith. Through sustained engagement as part of the TRADOC enterprise, we can achieve it. Every Army soldier and civilian should be inspired to speak with some personal knowledge of our service’s contributions to the nation’s development and security. Former Senator and Secretary of the Navy James H. Webb reminds us that military organizations fight well because they recognize and try to live up to their history and traditions.

But this is about more than just heritage preservation and esprit de corps. Since the end of World War II, the U.S. Army has proven consistently adept at producing operationally and tactically proficient leaders, soldiers, and formations. As new threats emerge, however, and the post–Cold War, post–September 11th world reshapes itself, it will be increasingly difficult to translate tactical and operational success into sustained strategic success in a joint, interagency, and combined environment. Now, as in previous times of change, asking critical, creative, contextual questions is essential. Historical education creates higher-order thinkers who can develop and implement policy and link ends, ways, and means. We can and should have leaders with historical understanding at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. The study of history creates wisdom and perspective, helps leaders to cope with ambiguity and uncertainty, and sharpens critical thinking skills. In a word, history educates. Study of history makes us a smarter, and therefore better, Army. General Martin E. Dempsey, former chief of staff of the Army and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, makes the point constantly that historical knowledge is an essential part of strategic thinking and leadership at all levels.

We should take the opportunity provided by this realignment to refocus ongoing efforts to keep the Army’s institutional memory on a firm footing. Institutional memory consists of proper record-keeping procedures throughout the Army, the use of those records in the process of designing and implementing policy and strategy, and the custodial care of the Army’s material culture. Properly done, this requires the staffing of command history offices at all levels of command from Group and Regiment to Army, and in ACOMs and TRADOC branch headquarters. Command history offices generate annual historical summaries, which supplement the Department of the Army Historical Summary produced by CMH. This construct, supported by readily available documentary records, encourages institutional memory. A twenty-first-century Army Museum Enterprise, which uses our world-class artifact collection to train and educate, supplements our documentary record. When we preserve our institutional memory and combine it with rigorous historical education in our schools, the result is an intellectually agile force, with habits of mind sharpened by historical literacy.

Realignment to TRADOC will set the conditions for Army historians (and those who know me, know that I consider all of us to be practitioners and stewards of Army history) to have an even greater impact on the force. TRADOC’s Army Reform initiatives are grouped into four areas: acquiring soldiers; building and improving Army training and education; integrating missions, processes, and resources; and managing talent. Each of these areas can be enhanced with the expertise and collaboration of Army historians. As TRADOC streamlines programs to acquire soldiers, the Army should use the tremendous emotive power of its long history of service to the nation to increase the impact of recruiting programs. When TRADOC works to build and improve Army training and education, we should take the opportunity provided by the realignment to engage across the training enterprise to sustain or increase soldier contact hours in historical instruction, whether in precommissioning sources, basic training, branch schools, professional military education (PME), or in the operating force. Our museum professionals are a key resource, and we should see our museums and training support facilities as platforms for training and education. The realignment of CMH supports TRADOC’s effort to integrate missions, processes, and resources, giving the Army Historical Program a four-star advocate at the highest levels of the Army leadership. Finally, TRADOC efforts to reform the talent management enterprise will create yet more opportunities for CMH and a more unified Army History Program to improve our relevance to the entire force. The creation in 2013 of Career Program 61, serving the Army’s official historians, archivists, and museum professionals, is another indicator that the time may be right for this realignment of CMH’s authorities.

In July 2019, our Biennial Conference of Army Historians will take place at Fort Eustis, Virginia, TRADOC’s headquarters, with the theme of Army Reform Throughout History. We should take that opportunity to collaborate on an enhanced Army History Program. I suggest some directions for this inquiry:

- Emphasis on agreed themes in American military history, and application of those themes across the continuum of recruiting, retention, training, education, and service.
- Rigorous historical instruction in Army schools.
- Better professional integration between official historians and teaching historians.
- A reformed and industry-standard Army Museum Enterprise, with deeper collaboration between official historians, instructors, and museum professionals.
- Improved opportunities for professional mobility across the Army History Program.
- Increased use of Army historical publications in training and PME.

There is a clichéd saying, frequently employed on motivational posters, that ten percent of life is what happens to you, and ninety percent of it is how you react to what happens. This saying is actually quite applicable to our situation now, and I encourage all Army historians to view the CMH realignment to TRADOC as the opportunity of our professional lifetimes to make a real, lasting difference to the institution we all serve and love. If you are a CMH employee, stay plugged into this transition so that you can shape it, and if you are not a CMH employee, but engaging in the craft of history in another part of our Army, look to CMH as a colleague, ally, and resource.