INTEREST GROUPS AND THE POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: WILDLIFE CONSERVATION POLICY, THE STATE, AND ORGANIZED INTERESTS IN ZIMBABWE

By
KEVIN A. HILL

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By

Kevin A. Hill

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This project uses interest group theory, especially the relationships between the state and functional groups in society, to explain how natural resource policies are made in the developing world. Specifically, it posits that the state, being at the pinnacle of a system of limited and structured, albeit meaningful, public involvement, seeks that type of bargaining with interest groups within society which furthers its own power and endurance. This conceptualization puts developing world conservation programs into a broader political context and links an understanding of environmental policies to an understanding of the broader political power relationships within the polity. This research tests these and related propositions about African environmental policymaking, using three case studies from Zimbabwe's wildlife conservation regime. The
dissertation finds that, crudely put, the Zimbabwean state is not solely interested in saving wildlife because that is the right and ethical thing to do. On the contrary, the utilization of living resources provides the state with convenient linkages between itself, rural farmers, the white urban middle class, large scale commercial farmers, and even international elites. Also, wildlife conservation policies are the cite of inter-agency struggles for power and jurisdiction between state agencies. Using interviews, contextual data, content analysis, and aggregate economic and political data, the dissertation empirically probes the nature of wildlife conservation policymaking in Zimbabwe, with a firm theoretical eye toward generalization about conservation policy regimes in the developing world, especially the role of group-state bargaining in policymaking.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Wild animals may seem out of place in a discussion of interest group politics in Africa and the attendant concepts of pluralism and corporatism. Big game mammals, after all, do not vote, nor do they politically organize themselves. Ostensibly, then, environmental conservation has little to do with political organization or political economy. But the peasants who have to live in close proximity to these animals are, at least potentially, political actors, as are the conservation constituency of local and international organizations and concerned citizens, and those political leaders and civil servants charged with wildlife conservation. In the current Age of the Environment, much ink has been spilt in the popular press and among academics about the plight of Africa's big game. Yet this running debate has been framed almost entirely in ecological terms, as if preservation of wildlife for preservation's sake were the only criterion to be considered. With the advent of the World Conservation Strategy and other studies in the 1980s, some debate has shifted to the economic aspects of wildlife conservation and utilization. Yet almost no research currently exists which examines the relationship between
politics and conservation in developing nations. Indeed, Yeager and Miller (1986) report that between 1968 and 1981, of the 210 wildlife research projects that had been carried out in Kenya, only four dealt with explicitly human factors. This is also the case with recent research on Zimbabwe's wildlife utilization projects; no study has been carried out by a political scientist, and no study has dealt explicitly with political factors.

Research Questions

This chapter outlines a dissertation which will explore the connection between big game conservation and politics, using Zimbabwe's historical experience and three current policies as case studies. Using interest group theory, drawn from pluralist and corporatist studies of the developed and developing worlds, insights can be gained into why the Zimbabwean state pursues certain wildlife policies, and how these policies are themselves reflections of a deeper, more fundamental political process of transition from a colonial to a post-colonial polity. Further, by carefully exploring the nature of wildlife policy making and implementation, the degree to which these conservation policies are functions of bargaining between the state and various interest groups, between the groups themselves, and between different state agencies, can be discerned. This
study will address three major questions. First, what methods are used by the state in a relatively new polity like Zimbabwe to consolidate and extend its authoritative power, particularly through organizing, coopting, and bargaining with different functional, class, or ethnic groups in society? Second, and more specifically, why should people interested in successful wildlife conservation consider the specific political-historical environments in which state, peasant, and other local actors form their attitudes and pursue their preferences regarding wildlife conservation. What specific policies are more likely to succeed and fail in light of these political and politicoeconomic processes?

**The Nature of Group Politics in Africa: Pluralist and Corporatist Linkages**

Broadly speaking, the study of interest group politics has tended to fall into one of three camps: pluralist/structural-functionalist, Marxist, and corporatist. These three theoretical schools of course address far wider topics than just interest group politics and differ in their treatments of human agency, structural constraints on groups and individuals, and subsequently the salience and definition of individual and group motivations, incentives, and power. All three bodies of theory, at least as they regard interest groups and the state, have origins in the
study of Western European and North American political systems and processes. However, Marxist and corporatist theories have benefited from experiences and adaptations made in the developing world, particularly in Latin America (Schmitter, 1974; O'Donnell, 1977; Cawson, 1988; Bianchi, 1984).

What relevance do these general orientations have for the study of environmental conservation policies in Zimbabwe? This dissertation will use elements of pluralist and corporatist interest group theory to explore not only the internal dynamics of groups operating under Zimbabwe's conservation regime, but also the formal and informal political linkages between these groups and the state, and the bargaining arrangements which result. Pluralist theory, with its tradition of methodological rigor drawn from interest group studies in the industrialized world, allows the analyst to precisely specify and measure the motivations, incentives, internal arrangements, and resulting actions of interest groups. Conversely, recent corporatist theories applied to Western Europe and Latin America require the researcher to place these rigorously measured variables into a broader political context, and seriously address the power and role of the state in any nation, or under any given policy area.

Chapter Two will be the broadest theoretical stroke of the dissertation, and as such it lays out a general course
of study for the remainder of the analysis in the dissertation. This chapter will be the theoretical link between conventional comparative interest group theory and the present study of Zimbabwe's wildlife conservation regime. Along with Chapter Four's proposition that environmental policy can be treated as an independent variable, this will be the major theoretical foundation for the formal model of conservation policymaking, and the empirical results from Zimbabwe, which are to follow.

The Current Conservation Debate in a Broad Perspective

After establishing the major theoretical framework in which one operates, one must next consider the global and historical milieu in which the environmental debate currently operates, both in theory and practice. Of particular interest to the present discussion is the longrunning controversy over whether or not preservation of ecological resources for preservation's sake is viable as a conservation strategy, especially in the developing world. Many ecologists, such as Aldo Leopold (1966), John Muir, and others, have argued that nature has the right to exist independently of human wants and needs. Writing about the Western environmental movement, Rosenbaum states that "reduced to essentials, environmentalism springs from an attitude toward nature that assumes humanity is part of the
created order, ethically responsible for the preservation of the world's ecological integrity" (Rosenbaum, 1991, 12). Other ecologists and many economists have adopted a more economically-centered approach toward the environment.

The World Conservation Strategy (IUCN, 1980) is the most completely articulated document this economically centered approach has produced. Taking a position steeped in market logic and rational choice economics, the WCS proposes three major conservation goals: to maintain essential ecological processes and systems, to preserve genetic diversity, and to insure sustainable utilization of species and ecosystems. This "use it or lose it" (Hudson, 1989, 65) approach to ecology capitulates to the fact that humans will not conserve something unless it is of immediate or long term economic value to them. The WCS further argues that economic development and biological conservation are compatible, as long as economic choices are tempered with an economic logic toward the sustainability of ecological resources (Tisdell, 1988). The Zimbabwean government openly claims to follow this rationale in pursuing its policies of wildlife conservation, which include culling elephants and distributing the profits derived from them among the people who live in close proximity to the animals.

Since the WCS was formulated mostly by ecologists, with input from economists, the document is a formal marriage of ecology and social science which will be needed if
academicians and policy makers are to gain a complete picture of how nature and humans interact, hopefully in mutual benefit. But the WCS does not complete the picture on human-environment interactions, and as such should not completely inform our understanding of the human's relationship with his or her natural surroundings. As Tisdell pointed out in his 1983 critique of the WCS, and in his 1989 article on "Economics, Ecology, and Ethics," while the WCS is an important first step toward social responsibility in resource management, its ultimate success or failure "will depend upon the realities of politics" (Tisdell, 1983, 472).

More specifically, the WCS and its underlying philosophy of rational choice theory cannot directly address any set of values and norms a given society holds toward the human-environment relationship (Tisdell, 1988). A natural resource has its worth determined either by an inherent, quantifiable property (e.g., gold's value in monetary terms) or by a societal perception of its value (Karr, 1978). The latter is completely neglected by rational choice theory. Further, this incomplete marriage of ecology and social sciences neglects to view potential or realized conservation policies and popular attitudes in their proper historical or cultural contexts.

Other criticisms have been leveled against a rational choice approach to environmental conservation. Economists
themselves use the Prisoner’s Dilemma model (Tisdell, 1983; Wade, 1987) to show that even if a group of like-minded individuals is convinced that wildlife preservation is in their economic self-interest, members of that group may tend toward an immediate, sub-optimal outcome (e.g., poaching and overhunting), which degrades the entire system. A logic of conservation and rational calculation may also be plagued by Eurocentrism, as the anthropologist Marks points out in his study of conservation policy implementation in Zambia:

because conventional wildlife management is part of a complex division of labor and knowledge within a relatively homogenous industrial society, it focuses almost exclusively on populations of wild animals within a biological framework of knowledge. This narrow perspective fails to comprehend the consequences of this knowledge under differing political and economic circumstances [emphasis added]. (Marks, 1984, 10-11)

Whereas Chapter Two surveys the general literature on comparative interest group theory, Chapter Three also takes a general approach. But instead of a general theoretical approach as in the preceding chapter, this section of the dissertation takes a general subject approach, outlining the broad strokes of the study of environmental policymaking.

Natural Resources as Political Goods: Environmental Policy as an Independent Variable

While Chapter Two will lay out a general theoretical framework for the dissertation based in comparative interest group theory, and Chapter Three likewise will establish a
general subject framework for the study of environmentalism and environmental policymaking, Chapter Four ties these two together for the specific cases at hand. Taking the general work of the preceding chapters, this section more specifically models environmental policymaking in the developing world as a politically motivated process through which the state (or various subparts of it) attempts to pursue its own interests of legitimacy and authority maintenance and extension. Thus, Chapter Four is a specific justification for political scientists to study environmental policymaking in the developing world.

This approach models environmental policies as the product of group-state interaction, with both interest groups and the state conservation authorities having very distinct interests in the outcomes of policy, and how policy is made. So the state uses conservation policies in much the way it uses taxation, investment, interest rate, or land resettlement policies: to establish and extend its own interests, which in a relatively new and tenuous polity center on hegemony and legitimacy. In other words, environmental policy is actually an independent variable, affecting the dependent variables associated with state power. So, the dissertation's approach here turns conventional environmental policy analysis on its head, arguing that natural resource policies themselves serve to further or diminish the authority, hegemony, autonomy, and
legitimacy of the state, as well as the power of organized groups in society. Normally, analyses of conservation policies would see the wildlife policies themselves as dependent variables, influenced by the above political processes. I see conservation policymaking as instrumental to state action, rather than a result of state power or struggles with interest groups.

Thus, in this light wildlife conservation is seen as part of the broader political process in Zimbabwe, which is overall tinctured by the will of the state to consolidate its hegemony and legitimacy over and among a quite strong, vibrant, and functionally differentiated civil society. So, in the conservation realm of policymaking, the state constructs, modifies, and implements environmental policies in ways which allow it to extend its authority via such divergent groups as (black) peasants, (white) tour and hunting operators, local (white) conservation groups, (white) commercial game ranchers, and internationally based wildlife organizations, such as the WWF. These policies also are used by the state to integrate or separate these functional, regional, class, and ethnic groups, on terms maximally favorable to the state. Of course this dissertation will not propose a priori that the state is successful in achieving these goals. Here, the state's power is not taken as a given, but as a variable whose parameters must be empirically verified in the three case
studies to follow. All in all, this is the section which I really view as the theoretical "meat" of this dissertation. It sets the practical and policy related parameters for the study of environmental politics, and will also generate hypotheses about environmental policymaking for the following case studies to test.

**The Colonial Legacy of Conservation in Zimbabwe**

Whereas Chapters One through Four will address general theoretical issues, Chapters Five through Seven will detail the specific Zimbabwean wildlife conservation case study. Chapter Five provides ammunition for the preceding theoretical work, by placing Zimbabwe's conservation regime into its broader historical context. The colonial conservation policies and their oppressive nature are an important variable to consider here. Wildlife preservation policies in the colonial era led to land alienation and created a hostility to wildlife conservation among local people that still must be battled today.

Under the Parks and Wildlife Act of 1975, hunting and ranching of non-endangered wildlife are allowed in both communal and commercial farming areas, under the logic of sustainable utilization (the "use it or lose it" philosophy). Zimbabwean parks authorities and conservationists assert that only through this approach to
game conservation will the long term survivability of species like the elephant be insured. The CAMPFIRE Program--Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Natural Resources--was established in 1986 as part of the overall philosophy of sustainable environmental utilization. Although the program in theory includes all possible natural resources in the communal areas, it has to date focused almost exclusively on mammalian wildlife and to a lesser extent on fisheries. CAMPFIRE is actually more an approach and set of local programs than it is an overarching policy regime. The idea behind CAMPFIRE is to give local communities, through their local governments, an economic stake in and benefits from their local natural resources. Currently, about 85% of the revenues generated by CAMPFIRE programs come from the proceeds of safari concessions granted to local professional hunters and their clients. District Councils administer wildlife conservation programs for Wards and Villages which have some wildlife resource. Central government grants "appropriate authority" to such district councils, who are given legal jurisdiction over their natural resources which would otherwise reside with the Natural Resources Board and the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management. The intent of CAMPFIRE is to transfer ownership of natural resources as far down the local ladder as possible. Thus, the idea of CAMPFIRE has
been held up as the ultimate model of local empowerment and
the devolution of power (Peterson, 1991).

But is CAMPFIRE really a decentralization of
administration, and a devolution of authority to rural
areas? And if so, is effective decentralization actually an
effective way for the central government to extend its power
and authority in areas which otherwise would be on the
periphery of its power? Do the revenues and markets created
by successful CAMPFIRE decentralization projects further
bring rural farmers into a cash economy, thus integrating
them into the already relatively advanced Zimbabwean
political economy? Chapter Eight will answer these
questions under the rubric of the theoretical framework
formalized in Chapter Four.

CAMPFIRE programs may well be creating "mini civil
services" and thus duplicating national bureaucracies at the
local level. Consequently, while bringing relative
efficiency to the use of natural resources and their
monetary proceeds, CAMPFIRE could be creating another layer
of government under which people live. By duplicating
national governmental functions at the district level,
proceeds from wildlife utilization which would otherwise go
totally unrealized would be at least partially siphoned off
by some level of government. Government's own CAMPFIRE
guidelines suggest that 35% of the CAMPFIRE proceeds should
go into a district "wildlife management" fund, thus creating
a de facto tax of one-third on the wildlife proceeds. In a
district like Nyaminyami, this is as much as Z$300,000 per
year, quite a monetary supplement for the district council.
Figures show that in the few years that a CAMPFIRE program
has existed there, the proceeds per resident from wildlife
utilization have actually declined (Murombedzi, 1992).

The practical and political importance of CAMPFIRE for
the national government is that by using an existing
resource, local people can realize some monetary profits
from wildlife and thus become more integrated into the
national economy. Further, while CAMPFIRE supposedly (and
often does) increases local responsibility for natural
resources, it also takes place under the auspices of
district government, which itself is strengthened monetarily
and often employs more people in CAMPFIRE's administration.
The more successful a CAMPFIRE project is at letting local
people realize monetary gains, the more those people are
oriented toward a cash economy. The more successful local
government is at extracting a "management" tax from wildlife
proceeds, the stronger it becomes. The less National Parks
has to administer these programs, the more money it saves
for other projects.

This section will thoroughly outline this wildlife
conservation policy, providing a policy contrast between the
rhino and elephant protection policies of Zimbabwe. Thus,
Chapter Five sketches the historical background of
conservation in Zimbabwe and gives details on current policies. It will also introduce the major actors in the conservation realm: National Parks and Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources officials (mostly Harare based), field-based wildlife officers, rural farmers who live in close proximity to wildlife, commercial wildlife ranchers, and locally based Zimbabwean conservation organizations.

International Constraints: North-South and South-South Conflict Over Environmental Values and Priorities

The 1990s may well be the International Decade of Environmental Awareness. As the media and environmental interest groups focus on cross-border problems such as ozone depletion, toxic waste, garbage disposal, and the greenhouse effect, the public is bombarded with gloomy information about the future and present ecological integrity of the planet, and subsequently our quality of life. Along with worldwide, non-excludable environmental problems such as those listed above, other more country-specific issues have raised awareness in publics around the world. Most of these country or region-specific issues have been concentrated in the developing world, with prominent examples being depletion of the Brazilian rain forest and the survival of big game mammals in Africa. The popular western press, not to mention countless documentaries and
mailings from environmental groups, has brought attention to these and other Third World environmental issues in the West.

What are the implications of this globalization of environmental interest? Chapter Six will use the 1989-1992 debate over the international ivory trade as a case study with which to explore this question. These are all important questions to answer from a value-conflict perspective. Indeed, international environmentalism has almost always been analyzed under the "cooperation rubric" (see for example Oran Young, 1989). This chapter will demonstrate that environmentalism can be described and explained fruitfully from a conflict-analytic perspective, both as a tool of theoretical analysis and as a description of political-environmental reality. This use of environmental policy as a tool of control and power internationally is perfectly in line with Chapter Three's assertion that environmental policy is instrumental to state power, rather than a simple dependent function of it. This chapter will bring an international dimension to Zimbabwe's conservation regime. How does the government deal with international conservation organizations such as the World Wide Fund for Nature? How do these groups interact with locally based Zimbabwean groups, such as the Wildlife Society of Zimbabwe? Perhaps more importantly, how does Zimbabwe interact with overarching environmental regulatory regimes like the
Council on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)? Since CITES also includes as members other African nations which are virulently opposed to Zimbabwe's sustainable utilization elephant culling policies, how do the government's conservation policies affect its relationship with nations like Kenya and Tanzania?

Commercial Wildlife Ranching and the Land Question: Public Policy and the Privatization of Environmental Resources

Chapter Seven focuses on two major political ramifications of Zimbabwe's wildlife conservation policies. First, in exploring the politics surrounding commercial wildlife ranching on primarily white owned large scale commercial farms, this chapter squarely addresses the "land question" in Zimbabwe. The Land Acquisition Act of 1992 allows the government to "designate" land for redistribution, giving the land holder no recourse to the civil courts. Instead, the Act allows the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, and Water Development to identify land for redistribution, to set what it believes to be a fair price for that land, and then compensate the owner in Zimbabwe dollars. If the owner is not willing to sell, or disagrees with the price offered, he or she may appeal to an Appellate Board within the Ministry of Lands. Thus, the Ministry is in effect prosecutor, judge, and jury for the entire land acquisition process. Among the several criteria
spelled out in the act for determining which lands to acquire are "underutilization," "misutilization," and "derelict land."

Although the formal regulations defining what constitutes the above have not been published (and it is unclear whether the Act actually requires them to be known to the public or farming community), one can pay close attention to statements made by Ministry of Lands personnel, politicians, and ZANU-PF functionaries to gain some insights into what Government sees as either "underutilization" or "misutilization" of commercial farm land. Recently, employees of the Ministry of Lands have said that wildlife ranching in the more fertile regions of the country is a misuse of land, even in light of some economic evidence that wildlife ranching is more profitable than maize cultivation, etc., even on the most fertile lands. Further, politicians in Parliament and in the ruling party have made public statements against the use of wildlife as an economic resource on commercial farming lands, and some agricultural specialists are vocally against wildlife ranching because they claim it poses a food security risk if practiced at the expense of edible crop cultivation on large tracts of commercial land. Thus, the use of wildlife on commercial farming lands would seem to open up the farmer to potential land designation, if one accepts the assumption that these kinds of statements reflect government policy on
underutilization of land. Yet, wildlife ranching is currently the fastest growing commercial farm use in Zimbabwe, and some farmers have told me they think putting game fencing on commercial farming land will actually help them avoid designation. Thus, this case study of commercial wildlife ranching does help us focus specifically on the land question, by analyzing the construction of such a vague government land use policy.

Second, the case study is even more complicated because of the overlapping jurisdiction and interest of the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management and the Ministry of Lands. National Parks has authority over all wildlife resources, whether on public or private lands. Further, Parks' policy since at least 1975 has been to encourage the commercial use of wildlife on large scale ranches and farms. So, while the Ministry of Lands and several politicians can be seen as less than supportive of if not hostile toward commercial wildlife ranching, National Parks has actively encouraged this practice, although Parks takes on a largely advisory role in commercial areas. Still, the overall policy of sustainable wildlife utilization includes commercial wildlife ranching, and in fact generates far more money than wildlife utilization in communal areas.

Thus, there is not only a potential conflict between government and white commercial farmers over land use
practices, but also between two government ministries over proper land use and jurisdiction. The unfolding land acquisition policy will eventually show which unit of government "wins," but for this dissertation the fact remains that this is another example of government (or at least a subpart of it) using environmental policy to affect its power and authority over a unit of society. Further, it is a unique example of one part of government using one natural resource policy to extend its authority in a domain, while another unit of government uses a different policy to attempt to extend its power in the same domain.

Conclusion

This dissertation will seek to empirically demonstrate that no analysis of ecological conservation in the developing world is complete if it does not incorporate a political component. Further, when one is dealing with a transformation polity such as Zimbabwe's, the relations between the state and groups with material and purposive interests in those policies, as well as the internal organization and outward actions of those groups, are crucial subjects for social scientists to explore.

In polities which are still in an early postindependence phase, such as Zimbabwe, understanding these group interactions with the state and each other is crucial, not
only regarding the dwindling of indigenous living resources, but also to understand why and how governments bargain with these functional and attitudinal groups to further their hegemony, if not their legitimacy, in the eyes of those people formerly oppressed by colonial "conservation" policies. Indeed, the orientation of resource policies can greatly affect the function or dysfunction of state authority and power vis a vis organized interests in society, since these are among the few policies that directly affect peasants and interested urban elites, and as such are among the few direct linkages between peasants and national governmental authorities. Thus, when we focus politically on resource conservation policies, these policies take on an even wider meaning than most previous studies of the human dimensions of global environmental change acknowledge.
They have been labeled voluntary associations, organized interests, nongovernmental organizations, pressure groups, special interests, and political organizations. They have been called a cancer in the polity as well as the crux of a democratic civil society. They have been loved and hated simultaneously by the public and academics alike. They are interest groups. Perhaps this love-hate attitude toward interest groups, especially by political scientists, is a reflection of the fact that as a discipline we have not come to grips with the "proper" role of organized interests in society. More specifically, political scientists often study interest groups either in their internal arrangements of leadership, recruitment, and organizational maintenance, or in their external linkages with each other and the governments they are trying to influence.

Of course this compartmentalization of the study of interest groups is part of the academic division of labor, and the desire to study a manifestation of a phenomenon in
depth. Indeed, those scholars who study organizational recruitment and maintenance all realize the effects these arrangements have on the success or failure of interest groups to put their points across. Unfortunately, the most damning criticism of the study of interest groups is in the large scale failure of political science to come to theoretical grips with the roles of organized interests and the state in making and influencing policy. Scholars of interest groups often overlook the theoretical role of the state in influencing interest group activity, and the implications of this two-way influence on both policymaking and democratic theory. Likewise, state scholars usually generalize about the state itself as if it were a monolith in a vacuum, leaving little if any analytic inquiry for the role of organized interests in engaging the state.

One striking aspect of this split is crucial for the present study. Almost all theories of interest groups and the methodologies used to test those theories have originated and remain in the study of American or European politics. On the other hand, most writings on the role of the state in recent years have been in comparative politics, especially among those scholars studying the developing world. Thus, theoretical breakthroughs by one's colleagues down the hall are often ignored by both camps, again for reasons of academic compartmentalization.
This would not be such a problem if the state were uniquely important to the exclusion of interest groups in the study of the developing world, and vice-versa in America and Europe. Unfortunately, studying the state and interest groups in isolation from each other obscures the important political linkages which common sense tells us exist. In fact, since elections, parties, public opinion, and the media--institutions commonplace in the developed world--are often absent or irrelevant in the South, the study of state-interest group interaction should be at the foundation of any serious analysis of the politics of African nations.

Fortunately, on the other hand, it is possible to construct a theoretical and methodological framework for the study of state-group linkages based on existing scholarship. The methodological sophistication of interest group studies, primarily in American politics, can inform a study of organized interests in the developing world, if one is careful to specify a theory of groups relevant to the South. Conversely, the existence of broad and sectoral studies of the state in the developing world, along with group theories from political science in general, can help in the construction of a theory of group-state relations for Africa. And, thinking far beyond the scope of the present study, why could not state and interest group studies of the developing world not help Americanists and Europeanists come
to grips with the role of interest groups and the state in their own areas of interest?

Emphatically stated, the goal of this chapter is not to put forward some new grand group theory linked to recent scholarship on state autonomy. Rather, Chapter Two seeks to review the theoretical literature on group politics and survey the relevant literature on the state in Africa. From this foundation, the chapter then exposes Africanists to the methodological tools used by scholars of the industrialized world to study internal and external interest group dynamics. Then, Chapter Two sets out the theoretical assumptions of various schools of group-state interaction on the role of interests and the state in politics (especially their relationships to each other). From this survey of theoretical and methodological writings, the paper then moves onto discuss why a rigorously specified version of corporatism is particularly useful for the study of state-group bargaining, conflict, and consensus. Finally, Chapter Two justifies the use of this model of corporatism to study Zimbabwe's political economy, and to outline how this model can be useful in explaining the environmental case studies to follow. In the end, this chapter on organized interests and the state will, it is hoped, complement and extend the current scholarship on state-society relations and democratization being published by Africanist scholars.
Theories of Organized Interests

Before sketching the academic history of interest group theory, some common definition of interest groups must be agreed upon. Jeffrey Berry offers a simple definition of an interest group as "an organized body of individuals who share some goals and try to influence public policy" (Berry, 1989, 6). This definition, although broad, does exclude several categories. "An organized body" excludes nascent groupings of people such as citizens who live in the 32602 ZIP code area of Gainesville, Florida. However, since interest groups always represent only a fraction of their potential members, if Gainesville's city commission were organized along ZIP code boundaries, there could be an organization formed to represent the interests of residents to government. "Try to influence public policy" would further exclude organizations which are expressly unpolitical, such as the members of the Old Hararians Sports Club. Although businesspeople and politicians may well attend rugby matches there in order to network politically, Old Hararians is not a political organization.

Now that we know what interest groups are, what political purposes do they serve? Again, Berry (1989) summarizes the existing pluralist and post-pluralist
literature very well. Interest groups serve to represent constituencies, give people the opportunity to participate in politics, educate the public on political issues, influence the agenda building process in government, and monitor government policy implementation. A corporatist would add that organized interests channel public dissent into a few formalized functional groups and give government ready made allies or yes men in the private sector. Finally, a Marxist would argue interest groups merely disperse or submerge class conflicts, and as such are mere appendages of the ruling hegemony, as is the state. Having set out these parameters, the chapter now turns to a brief history of interest group theory.

Pluralism and Its Critics

The earliest academic harbinger of modern pluralist theory is David Truman's The Governmental Process, published in 1951. Drawing on cultural anthropology and social psychology, Truman argues:

In all societies of any degree of complexity the individual is less affected directly by the society as a whole than differentially through various of its subdivisions, or groups. (Truman, 1951, 15)

Thus, according to Truman, to not study the role of groups in politics is to miss the inevitable nature of politics itself. This thesis goes further, claiming that interest groups form in response to some "disturbance" in the polity.
In other words, people organize when their political self interest is compromised by government action. The thesis goes on to claim that countervailing groups will arise in an equilibrium to the development of competing groups. For example, trade associations of affected businesses will form after unions form to lobby government for better working conditions. In this way, group politics is a self regulating closed system. The roots of structural functionalism are evident in Truman's analysis.

Robert Dahl's highly influential *Who Governs?* (1961) signaled the highest point of the pluralist argument about interest group politics. In his study of New Haven, Dahl found that in three distinct areas of public policy, different interest groups were active and influential. This was taken as evidence that New Haven did not have a tightly knit, closed group of elites running all aspects of political life. Since he found loose coalitions of interest group members and political leaders and administrators, Dahl surmised that:

> the normal American political process is one in which there is a high probability that an active and legitimate group in the population can make itself heard effectively at some crucial stage in the process of decision. (Dahl, 1956, 45)

These books by Truman, Dahl, and others were highly influential in political science, seeing the emergence and

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2Political party nominations, urban redevelopment, and public education.
maintenance of organized interests as not only a natural part of political life, but also a democratic virtue. The theory of pluralism elegantly and simply described political life, justifying the necessary role of interest groups as something beyond their own self-interest. Contemporaries of these scholars, especially C. Wright Mills (1956) and Floyd Hunter (1953) had fashioned what was known as "elite theory," which argued that America\(^3\) was ruled by a small, interlocking elite. To elite theory, the idea that interest groups formed almost spontaneously (Truman, 1951) or had major influences on the democratic process (Dahl, 1961) was an illusion.

Post-pluralist Interest Group Theory

Just as structural-functionalism came under attack in comparative politics, anthropology, and sociology, so did pluralism in the 1960s and 1970s. From a theoretical standpoint, pluralism was criticized for defending the status quo. In the often-cited, rarely read *The End of Liberalism* (1969), Theodore Lowi concluded that government through interest groups was basically conservative because it created resistance to change. Agreeing with the basic premises of disturbance theory, Lowi pointed out that political organizations arise to protect their interests,

\(^3\)And, implicitly, other industrialized nations.
but that these interests are narrowly defined, rather than in the interests of democracy at large. Once government administrators and lawmakers began acting in response to the interest of political organizations, Lowi argued, public policy reflected the entrenched interests of one group at the expense of others.

Explicitly targeting the idea that countervailing interest groups arise to oppose others in a political equilibrium, Lowi pointed out that the privileged access of richer, better organized groups favors them against newly organized interests, and groups from less economically advantaged parts of society. Jack Walker (1966) made arguments similar to this, although in the context of an article which explicitly rejected the power elite thesis as atheoretical. Rather, this post-pluralist school called attention to the myth of equal access to government, and the equal opportunity of political organization. Real world events such as the civil rights movement in the United States and the Vietnam war also called into question the pluralist ideal of a group-based society in which everyone was represented equally through some organization.

The academic problem with this post-pluralist school is that, although it rejects the normative bases of pluralist theory, it does not reject its basic proposition about the role of interest groups in society. Both the pluralist and post-pluralist scholars conceded that interest groups had a
profound effect on public policy making and implementation. The difference was in who was influential and why. Still, the Lowi argument that highly organized, well financed groups will get their way more often than poorly financed, poorly organized groups implies that, if only the poor group could get some more money and better organization, it too would feed at the public trough. So, both 1950s-1960s scholarship, and 1960s-1970s scholarship measured cause and effect in public policy as running from interest groups to government, and upheld the paramount, almost exclusive importance of organization and financing as variables. Neither school of pluralism really rejected the group bases of politics, and the idea of the state as a black box, in the terms of structural functionalism and systems theory.

Contemporary Interest Group Studies: From Grand Theory to Scattershot Conceptualization

No systematic theory of organized interests has emerged to replace pluralism, at least among Northern scholars. Rather, today's students of interest groups are content to conceptualize and measure interest group activity at a much more modest level, which has extended our knowledge of the internal workings of organized interests immensely. Unfortunately, the gap between grand theory and the current compartmentalized level of analysis hamstrings the study of interest groups, separating internal group dynamics from
their effects on crucial, politically relevant relations with other groups and the state. Nevertheless, contemporary scholarship of organized interests has become much better at specifying specific internal and external group phenomena, and strategies of measuring those concepts. It is with some measure of irony that this paper proposes that this unorganized, largely uncoordinated scholarship can help inform the study of African politics. This is due largely to the failure of scholars of Africa to specify clear measurement strategies for their models of "state-society relations" and civil society's linkages with the state. To be sure, there is no shortage of general sketches of Africa and specific nations, and how it is important to assess the relations between state and society, especially in light of trends toward democratization (Migdal, 1988; Chazan and Rothchild, 1989; Callagy, 1984).

Perhaps it is unfair to blast these and other works for failing to develop falsifiable conceptualizations and concrete research methodologies. Indeed, the literature on Africa in the 1980s, with a few notable exceptions largely abandoned the study of organized interests in favor of studying state autonomy exclusively. Therefore, today's mad rush to theorize generally about civil society is

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'For a particularly egregious example of this tendency for comparative politics to overgeneralize and not propose conceptual and measurement strategies, see Chazan and Rothchild's *The Precarious Balance* (1989).
understandable in its attempt to make up for lost time. Still, this field needs some tools with which to study interest groups rather desperately. Fortunately, scholars to not have to reinvent the wheel or rediscover fire to do this. The tools provided by post-pluralist interest group studies in the North, if carefully used in a relevant way, can help scholars conceptualize and measure some aspects of state-society relations. Of course these tools will need a theoretical framework, which will be discussed in the next section.5

Internal Dynamics of Organized Interests

Scholars have made several advances in their understanding of how interest groups actually work. Studies of how interest groups begin, how they retain members, and how they govern themselves and make decisions are myriad. Further, methods of achieving goals in all these areas, such as fundraising, communications with the public and government, and lobbying skills, have been analyzed in depth. This is especially the case in American scholarship, a polity in which interest groups are numerous and have exploded in number since about 1920 (Walker, 1983). In

5It would be hypocritical in the extreme for the author to blast Africanist scholarship for having no methodology, and Americanist scholarship for having no theory, without offering a moderate measure of both!
general, though, the insights of these scholars can be useful to those wishing to study interest group mobilization, maintenance, and internal organization in Africa and elsewhere.

**Interest group mobilization**

The question of why interest groups form in the first place is an important one. Do people join groups because they are threatened, they want to extend their material gains, they want to do something good, they want to gain some exclusive benefit the group offers, they want to experience the comraderie of being with people like them, or because they are deeply moved by an organization's leader? All of these have been sighted as reasons people join or contribute to political interest groups. Of course, the same could be said for political parties (Key, 1961).

Going back to David Truman (1951), his disturbance thesis holds that some identifiable event or series of events causes affected sectors of society to form interest groups to engage the government. He sights the US Grange movement as having started in the 1870s due to of an economic depression, when farmers sought help from government. This disturbance theory, with its neat clean argument and clearly specified cause and effect, though elegant, remains a flawed argument, primarily because groups do not automatically arise in response to disturbances.
Even if they did, not every group would have the same potential to engage the state, even if all had identical resources. Interest group politics simply is not that inevitable.

Robert Salisbury (1969) put forward another version of interest group formation based on the existence of entrepreneurial leadership. Explicitly challenging the Truman thesis, Salisbury also studied nineteenth century farm organizations, finding that farmers only joined those groups which they thought could provide them tangible benefits. This thesis, known as exchange theory, is one of the roots of modern interest group studies, which study the various incentives groups offer members and contributors. According to Salisbury, these incentives are best communicated by effective leaders who can sell their groups, thus the term entrepreneurship in Salisbury's writings on interest group leaders.

A typology of incentives had actually been constructed several years before Salisbury's exchange thesis appeared in The American Political Science Review. Writing about organizations in general, James Q. Wilson (1961) identified three types of incentives offered by interest groups to solicit members and donors. First, material benefits have a concrete value. People join and give money to groups because they feel something worthwhile will result from the group's activities. Under these assumptions of group
mobilization, potential members and contributors ask "what will society get if I join or support this group; and what will I get if I join or support this group?" Of course these tangible benefits could be anything from better government to a slick calendar, but the most important material good a group can provide a member or donor is often information (Moe, 1980), whether through papers, newsletters, or magazines.

For example, a person may join the Sierra Club because he or she wants to get the Sierra Club's glossy magazine or discounts on their calendars. A more general material benefit of a political organization would be, of course, if the group brought about a change in public policy that directly benefited members. Again using an environmental example, a person may join Ducks Unlimited to help lobby Congress to pass wetlands legislation, so that more ducks would be available for the hunt. Material incentives are important, then, wherever money is involved.

A second incentive is a purposive benefit from group membership. When people join or contribute to organizations whose policy objectives are of no material benefit to the members personally, they may be attracted by purposive incentives. Under this assumption, people join interest groups because they further a public cause. For example, single gay men who support pro-choice organizations and do so because of the belief that choice is a right, support
those groups for purposive reasons (Luker, 1984). This is
not to say that purposive benefits give no rewards to
members. On the contrary, the man who supports pro-choice
organizations with money and membership derives much
satisfaction from that membership because the group's
actions have contributed to the betterment of society.

The final incentive cited by Wilson and Salisbury is the
solidary benefit a person receives from group membership.
People join organizations not for some material benefit or
some sense of justice, but because they like participating
in politics in some way. Joining the Veterans of Foreign
Wars allows one to meet regularly with people who may have
served in the same war, or who share common experiences
about the act of war itself. Although VFW may well provide
material benefits such as publications, and may lobby
government on matters of foreign policy important to
members, the person who joins VFW for solidary reasons does
so out of a sense of belonging (Berry, 1989).

This incentive is the least expressly political of the
three described by Wilson, and as such must often be
combined with other types of incentives if interest groups
are to attract members and donors. Indeed this brings up
the important analytic point that no group can survive and
hope to be effective in its engaging of the state if it can
only offer one type of benefit. Surely in almost every
polity, groups must fit into their own political niches if
they are to remain relevant and survive. Finding the members to help them fill these niches requires an appropriate mix of benefits (Aldrich and Staber, 1986).

Mancur Olson (1968) added a measure of controversy to the benefits problem when he proposed that people join groups because they provide selective incentives. This argument holds that people will only contribute to or join a group if that group can provide a benefit unavailable to nonmembers. Good government is obviously not an exclusive good. Further, people may well decide not to join Ducks Unlimited, letting other people contribute money to a successful lobby to preserve wetlands. Here, the nonmember hunter receives just as much benefit from the work of Ducks Unlimited as does the paying member. Clearly, Olson's theory is best suited to groups and areas of public policy in which money is at stake. Using this logic of economic rationality does not explain why people join Greenpeace to save whales when those people live 2000 miles away from the ocean, and have no intention of ever seeing a whale in their lives. Thus, the Olson thesis breaks down when trying to explain the mobilization of ideological groups.

To recapitulate by way of example, take the National Rifle Association. Using the incentives outlined above, a person may join that organization for at least four reasons, and they may well be interlocking. First, if motivated by material benefits, a person may join the NRA because he or
she enjoys the magazine. Second, the purposive benefit of joining the NRA is to do one's part in making sure Congress does not restrict the right of hunters to carry AK-47 assault rifles to hunt quail. Third, if a person joined the NRA because he or she liked going to the NRA shooting ranges to meet other hunters, then that would be evidence of solidary benefits of membership. Finally, if a person joined the NRA to receive reduced group rates on accidental death and dismemberment insurance unavailable to nonmembers, that person would be attracted by a selective incentive.

Of course the average member may sight all four of these as benefits of NRA membership. The important task for political scientists is to specify how groups which attract members primarily for reason of receiving one benefit or the other differ from other groups, both in their composition and in their relationships with government. In the case of Zimbabwe and conservation groups, these hypothetical reasons will be spelt out in Chapter Four.

Organizational maintenance

As anyone involved with an interest group or development project knows, starting a group is one thing, but maintaining it is quite another. No matter what the raison d'être of an organization, and no matter how large or small it is, all interest groups must maintain themselves by raising money and/or attracting members on an ongoing basis.
Of course a constant supply of funds is not the only important criteria for maintaining an organization. Depending on the type of interest group in question, keeping qualified staff on the payroll, keeping members from dropping out and/or free riding, or simply keeping in the public eye are key components of organizational maintenance.

Organizational maintenance also recalls Walker's ideas about entrepreneurial leadership (Walker, 1969). While an effective, charismatic or managerially competent leader can be instrumental in forming a political group, those qualities are also crucial in attracting new members, keeping old ones, and expanding the monetary and even regional base of an organization.

Money is, however, important in some way to all interest groups. What are the various sources of funding for organized interests? Peterson and Walker (1986) have done two studies in the United States which are of relevance here. They found that trade associations (groups of businesses) received 63 percent of their funds from member dues, while citizens; action groups, public interest firms, and other lobbies receive from 33 to 50 percent of their funds from member dues. So where does the other support for interest groups come from? At least four sources are cited in studies on the United States, and all can be found in Zimbabwe as well.
First, foundations and trusts contribute money. In the developing world, of course, this is no surprise, given the prevalence of donor agencies who often fall over each other giving out money to what they usually call "nongovernmental organizations." Usually these donor agencies are from the outside, either from governments (for example, USAID and SIDA), or private concerns (for example, the Ford Foundation). However, there are local foundations which contribute money to local interest groups in the developing world, and these should not be overlooked in any analysis. At this point, one must extend the insights of American interest group scholarship: what is the political significance of an interest group receiving financial support from a local versus international donor?

Second, organizations can raise their own funds through fees and publication charges, that do not necessarily come from their members. This is especially true for think tanks and research organizations, which have the staff expertise to produce handbooks, pamphlets, magazines, and tracts for public consumption. Further, interest groups may also sell

"One needs only look at the development literature to see several phases in donor funding in the developing world. Grants to governments for large projects were common in the 1960's, while in the 1970's small became beautiful, and community development was conceived of in terms of small NGO's. The 1980's saw donors contributing to private sector groups, targeting specifically the formal and informal market economy, while the 1990's show all evidence of becoming the "Decade of Giving to Intermediate Size Environmental Organizations."
their services or even merchandise to raise funds. The Wildlife Society of Zimbabwe is a good example of all these fundraising schemes. The WCZ publishes a quarterly magazine which is available on newsstands. It also sells a calendar, has two shops in Harare, has its own game park in Harare's suburbs, and has established a popular camping site at Lake Kariba', all of which is charged for. Indeed, Zimbabwe's environmental NGO community is a veritable paper mill, producing all manner of publications for sale to the public and scholars.

Third, organized interests may garner support from what Berry (1989) calls Sugar Daddies. Gaining support from high profile people not only brings in financial support from that person, but also prestige which can serve as a recruitment aid for both new members and additional funding (Moe, 1980). Nearly every organized interest in Zimbabwe tries to get President Mugabe or former President Canaan Banana to become its patron. Former Rhodesian Prime Minister Garfield Todd is also a patron for some.

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The camp site at Lake Kariba is also a teaching station where local children can learn about wildlife. Here, although the WCZ does not raise funds from the children, it is actively investing in organizational maintenance, since it is implicitly recruiting members for the future.

Sir Garfield Todd is one of the few "politically correct" former white politicians in the country, since he was an active proponent of racial accommodation in the 1960's, and was placed under house arrest under rebel UDI Prime Minister Ian Smith. Mr. Smith, needless to say, is
organizations. Sugar Daddies can also be organizations, especially in the developing world. Again, many groups try to secure high profile support from such international entities as the US Ambassador's Self Help Development Fund in the hopes that the prestige attached to such sugar daddies will attract further funding and support. Again, the existence of high profile support for interest groups must be assessed for its political significance. Do organizations try to solicit support from people popular with government, in order to increase their contacts with the state? Do organizations supported by international agencies or persons have less legitimacy in the eyes of the state than do groups receiving support from local sugar daddies?

Fourth, interest groups seek to maintain their organizations through government grants. In the developing world, it is important to keep grants from the state and grants from other governments separate. Further, whether groups receive startup or maintenance grants from government is also important. If government actually pays to establish an organization, rather than contributing to merely maintain the group, then with the proper theoretical framework one can discern a pattern of government cooptation not on the board of any environmental NGO in Zimbabwe, although he is a recent past President of Old Hararians Sports Club (see note 3).
of at least a part of civil society (see Chapter Five).
Still, the existence of government maintenance fund for an organization is important, especially when the state funds one group in a sector of society and not others.

**Interest group governance and decision making**

As with any organization of people, interest groups must have arrangements to govern themselves. Even small research organizations with a few staff members create roles for those staff, and a hierarchy inevitably arises. All organizations, whatever their size and role in the political process, generate a decisionmaking apparatus for the allocation of resources, the selection of salient political issues and personnel, the development of tactics and strategy, and the accountability of staff to members (Berry, 1977). In the developing world when comparing political organizations, one must be careful to specify their relative level of internal organization and routinization. Indeed, organizational structure is an important variable in its own right (Simon, 1949), and surely has an effect on a group's ability to engage the state at the expense of other groups and governmental officials (Herbst, 1990).

The infamous "iron law of oligarchy" often leads to the rule of interest groups, even ones with large memberships, by a few staff members (Michels, 1958). Internal authority arrangements, however, are a variable between groups, and
not a constant, with the staff or board of directors and the rank and file having differing amounts of relative authority. Again, these internal power arrangements can be important political variables, affecting the ability of groups to efficiently engage the state and raise money and recruit members at the expense of other groups.

Whatever the relative democracy of organization a group has, agenda setting is fundamental to both the effectiveness of the interest group and its ability to please members and contributors (Hirschman, 1970). Depending on the internal cohesiveness of a group's members, interest group leaders may or may not try to push through controversial proposals that affect the issues the group researches, implements, or lobbies for. Berry argues that "when leaders of a group perceive a strong view in some segment of the membership contrary to the organization's general policy, they will usually prefer to shy away from fighting the issue out" (Berry, 1989, 69). This would seem to be especially true of economic organizations such as peak trade associations like the Zimbabwe Wildlife Producers Association. Creating splits, even over important issues, would definitely not be in the interests of a trade association which depends on its membership dues for survival.

No matter how open and democratic an interest group wants to be, it is often impractical to involve large numbers of members or even staff in making everyday
decisions. One means of getting member input to approve decisions already taken and suggest others is the annual general meeting or expanded open board meeting (Green and Buchsbaum, 1980). Again, the relative level of democracy versus efficiency in an interest group may be a crucial influence on that group's ability to participate effectively in politics. Now that the basics of internal group dynamic have been outlined, let us now turn to how groups actually participate in politics, both with other interest groups and the state.

**External Linkages: Coalitions, Subgovernments, and Issue Networks**

How interest groups interact with each other and the state is ultimately the most important political question to ask about the nature of interest group politics in a country. While it is very important to analyze the internal structures of interests—their origins, maintenance, and type of internal organization—these structures are really independent variables that influence how organized interests are or are not successful at achieving their goals. Further, these internal arrangements are independent variables which likewise influence how and why the state chooses to bargain with, confront, or simply ignore interest groups.
Political scientists studying interest group politics in the industrialized world have traditionally classified the possible range of interest group regimes into three categories: coalitions, subgovernments, and issue networks. Each of these arrangements (both in theory and practice) varies in its permanence, scope, and complexity, and in the size of role given to the state.

Coalitions

Coalitions are ubiquitous in politics. Indeed, ad hoc arrangements based on achieving some immediate goal have their roots in pre-modern political thought, especially Macchiavelli. Definitionally, coalitions are simply groups of organized interests who come together to achieve some common political goal (Berry, 1989). The main reason groups enter into coalitions is often to expand the set of eyes, ears, and voices brought to bear on a political issue. Resources and research are often pooled toward a defined political end, such as a coalition of group forming to defeat legislation or to bring more economic aid to some region of a nation. Permanent financial arrangements are relatively rare in interest group coalitions, and the mingling of financial resources on anything approaching a permanent basis is rarer still (Salisbury et al., 1987).

Interest group coalition, by their very ad hoc nature, often lead to strange bedfellows. One particularly striking
example of this is the coalition which sometimes forms between fundamentalist Christian groups and radical feminists to support anti-pornography legislation (Pear, 1987). Here one sees a concrete example of why a coalition is never permanent, and why financial resources are rarely pooled--these groups are more often than not battling each other's interests. When the international ban on the ivory trade was instituted in 1989, a strange coalition of the United States, Hungary, Tanzania, and Somalia formed to back it. Zimbabwe sometimes witnesses strange coalitions, such as when the white Commercial Farmers Union and the sometimes radical Catholic Commission on Justice and Peace, which has often advocated a redistribution of land, joined forces to oppose portions of the Land Acquisition Act of 1992, which removed the right of farmers to appeal to the courts in cases of land seizure. In the end, coalitions are common because they are the easiest way to share resources without giving up group autonomy.

**Subgovernments**

Whereas coalitions are ad hoc arrangements, subgovernments are much more enduring, and have been the subject of much vilification by academics, the public, and the media (Lowi, 1969). A popular image of a subgovernment is an arrangement in which rich lobbyists representing shady characters meet with legislators and bureaucrats in dark,
smoky bars, deciding how they are going to defraud the public treasury of tax dollars.9

The academic idea of a subgovernment, however, is more subtle than this. The idea of subgovernments can be traced back to Griffith's Impasse of Democracy (1939). In this scenario of subgovernments, policymaking is a consensual process quietly producing arrangements between interest groups, legislators, and bureaucrats. These subgovernments are ultimately built around the mutual support that participants offer each other. Since these subgovernments are set up in policy areas, rather than around specific policies, they are more enduring than coalitions, and thus become part of the institutionalized policy process.

Although this idea of subgovernments, which has never been fleshed out because of its shadowy, secretive nature, is related in some ways to recent corporatist theory, it is purely atheoretical. It offers a readily understandable, non-institutional, and common sense approach to politics, and as such has popular appeal. It also allows one to criticize the development of special interests as a threat to democracy in a much sharper way than did much post-pluralist scholarship. Hugh Heclo, the pioneer of the idea of "issue networks" (see below), has described the

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9In comparative politics the analog to this fantasy is dependency theory, which conjures up similar images of cozy, conspiratorial relationships between international capital and their lackeys in the national bourgeoisie.
subgovernment thesis as not so much wrong, but "disastrously incomplete" (Heclo, 1978, 88). Heclo writes that the arrangements between state and interest group actors described by the subgovernment school may well exist, but they are embedded in a much wider policy process.

The empirical work on subgovernments is not so accommodating to the conspiracy theories often popularized in the media and the public. One study found that over 70 percent of Washington lobbies surveyed thought they had bitter enemies among other lobbies, with many of these taking stands that essentially agreed with each other (Gais et al., 1984). Thus, inter-group jealousy precluded the establishment of "natural" allies amongst groups. Focussing on business groups and peak associations, Schlozman and Tierney (1986) found much more cooperation amongst groups active in the same issue area. Other research has found that bureaucrat-legislator-interest group collusion varies by policy sector. In the field of US energy policy making, Chubb (1983) found evidence of deep cooperation between business lobbies and administrators. This variation of subgovernmental patterns by policy sector is of particular importance to this study, which examines three case studies within one major policy sector--wildlife conservation. Each case study, however, includes a very different mix of group and governmental actors, each at different levels of analysis. Thus, while the literature on subgovernments is
atheoretical and mixed in its empirical conclusions, the ideas proposed by the school on government/interest group cooperation are important, when they are placed into a proper theoretical context.

Issue networks

While the idea of issue networks is a relatively new on in political science, it does share much in common with the subgovernment thesis, in that it addresses enduring patterns of linkage between government and interest groups than does the ad hocery of coalitions. According to Hugh Heclo, the first political scientists to widely use the term, "an issue network is a shared knowledge group that ties together large numbers of participants with common technical expertise" (Heclo, 1978, 103). Unlike the closed circle arrangement commonly described by proponents of the subgovernment thesis, issue networks are difficult to visualize and even more poorly defined. Unfortunately for empirical analysis, but more in line with what common sense would decree, "it is almost impossible to say where a network leaves off and its environment begins" (Heclo, 1978, 102).

Networks are not very different in their cast of participants from subgovernments, involving interest groups, bureaucrats, and legislators. Their scope and relatively open access to new members really sets them apart in size from proposed subgovernments (Berry, 1989). The idea of a
network is rather new to political science, but it has deep roots in sociological network analysis. The Sage green book on network analysis defines a social network as "a specific type of relation linking a defined set of persons, objects, or events" (Knocke and Kuklinski, 1982, 12). The "link" between interest groups, and between interest groups and government, is often information (Cook, 1982). As with coalition theory, interest groups can achieve economies of scale in action by pooling information. Laumann, Heinz, Nelson, and Salisbury (1987) have proposed and executed an interesting methodology to find issue networks. Using data gathered from interviews with Washington-based interest group leaders, participants were asked to identify three government officials with whom they interacted regularly. They were also asked about the nature of their relationships with these government employees. Next, the government officials were asked the same questions, with the same names and answers often coming up in the diachronic interviews.

While interesting, all three bodies of research--coalitions, subgovernment, and issue networks--are hopelessly atheoretical in attempting to explain anything meaningful about the polity in general. The very nature of these theses sees interest group interaction with the state as an amorphous or temporary process which either included very few or very many people. Without a proper theoretical framework, these post-pluralist studies remain interesting
in their individual findings and propositions, but woefully inadequate in their abilities to explain the role of interest groups in the polity, whether for their ability to include people in the political process, or for their influence in government policymaking.

These studies of the internal and external workings of organized interests do, however, propose very interesting concepts and methodologies about what to look for when examining an interest group. By specifying what to look for and how to look for it, these studies drawn from American politics could prove useful tools in explaining interest group politics, if only a proper theoretical framework were found. By using state theory drawn from the developing world, perhaps one could construct a set of concepts which explain the role of organized interests in Africa, especially their role in engaging the state. Further, one would have to propose a theoretical framework which not only addressed the workings of the state, but also the cause and effect linkages between the state and organized interests in society. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, while American scholarship has proposed measurement strategies, Africanists scholarship of both the state and civil society has failed to link theory to methodology. The next section surveys the literature on the state in Africa, with a view toward finding a proper theory of state-group interactions. Then the chapter draws together these two
major sections in its proposition that a modified
corporatist model satisfies many of the requirements needed
to construct a theory of interest group politics for Africa.

The African State as an Object of Study

As with any academic undertaking, the study of the
African state has progressed through several defined stages.
To understand academic thinking about the state, one must
first realize that in fact the African state is
comparatively disorganized and poor, and thus extremely
vulnerable in both the international arena and to organized
interests at home. So, one must keep in mind this tenuous
position of the African state, or "precarious balance" as an
institution (Rothchild and Chazan, 1989).

The irony, of course, is that although the African state
is weak, poor, and disorganized compared to its counterparts
in the North and in East Asia and Latin America, it also
plays an extraordinarily pivotal role in the economy of most
African nations. As Jeffrey Herbst explains:

while the state in Africa may have relatively few
resources, it generally operates in an environment that
is so materially deprived that the sphere outside the
public sector is even poorer and provides few, if any,
opportunities for economic advancement. (Herbst, 1990,
1)

Because the state is so weak, yet so economically important,
it is the grand prize to be seized, and those elites in
power will want to increase their power and resources vis a vis the private sector to broaden their own political and economic bases, and to prevent countervailing power centers from developing in society, which could pose a challenge to their authority (Young and Turner, 1985).

Some have even explained that widespread government corruption in some African nations is a result of the state being the only real institution capable of mobilizing substantial economic resources. As Henry Bienen notes:

employment in the modern sector in Africa is often employment by government. Control of the state apparatus brings the ability to reward and to coerce. Elites in Africa derive their [economic] power from control of the state, not from private property or private large-scale organizations. (Bienen, 1977, 27)

These are of course generalizations about 52 governments, and there is considerable variation among nations in the power of the state and its position vis a vis civil society. That Zimbabwe has one of the largest, most developed private sectors in Africa10, and a relatively well institutionalized state does not refute the above arguments. Rather, if state autonomy and power vis the private sector are taken as a variable11, then Zimbabwe does fit into the

10In Zimbabwe, government and government-owned enterprises spend "only" 50% of the GDP, and Zimbabwe's economy has the second largest percentage of GDP devoted to industry in Africa.

11One of the real problems with the state literature is that scholars are so intent on constructing a theory that works, that they make general statements that can only be falsified in a "yes/no" manner. Thus, if people ask "Is the
above scenario, although a few standard deviations from the center.

The state literature has gone through several iterations. The state autonomy literature has its comparative politics roots in Barrington Moore's study of the power and salience of state structures during periods of revolution (1966). More recently Theda Skocpol, following in the footsteps of Moore's work, has examined some of the same historical cases, specifically looking for when the state is autonomous from societal influences (1979). The very historical and pioneering nature of these works makes it a collection of generalizations, which nevertheless started a new academic conversation about the state's role in political and economic development. Prior to this period of state-centered writings, the state had been relegated to the famous black box of systems theory (Eastman, 1965) and structural functionalism, which had its own roots in Talcott Parsons' work on pattern variables influencing the development of society and the polity (1956).

Structural-functionalism was not the only academic pursuit to deny the importance of the state (or at least drastically diminish it). Dependency theory and classic

state strong vis society," the construction of the theory requires a "yes/no" answer. Rather, the question should be "How strong is the state, how powerful is it vis organized interests in society, and how does it compare to other African states on these questions?"
structural Marxism also denies the importance of the state as a variable in itself. According to the original dependencistas, the state was merely a subcommittee of the international bourgeoisie which relegated the acts of government to insignificance (Leys, 1975; Cardoso, 1977). Marxists who are not necessarily interested in international relations see the state as merely an arena for class conflict, which will vary over time with the nature of whatever class struggle is going on (Ougaard, 1982; Samoff, 1982).

Other nonradical studies have explicitly denied the importance of the state as an independent variable. Jackson and Rosberg's *Personal Rule in Black Africa* argues that patterns of the personal rule of the head of state are really more important than state structures (1982). To them, the political system is comprised of personal rulers, patrons, clients, supporters, and rivals. The state itself is therefore not an interesting or important object of study, nor does it play any pivotal role on its own in politics.

Students of the state have been fascinated with the idea of state autonomy. But, as Herbst laments, no one has been able to construct a suitable measurement strategy or even set of measurable concepts to test autonomy, because of the grand theoretical nature of these studies (1990). To try to explain state autonomy in general for either all nations or
even all policy sectors in one nation is a futile attempt indeed. Further, what does it really means to say the state is autonomous from society, even if it can be measured and conceptualized? Does it mean that the state is strong enough to bully organized interests and the public at large? And from a normative point of few, should we want the state to be autonomous? What does pure state autonomy do to democracy?

Herbst has taken this argument several steps away from grand theorizing toward conceptualization and measurement in his case studies of several policy sectors in Zimbabwe (1990). His notion of state autonomy is a disarmingly simple one—if the state is the major locus of decisionmaking on a subject, without interest groups making substantial modifications to the design or implementation of that policy—then the state is autonomous. If otherwise, then the state is not autonomous. This, Herbst himself notes, is not a grand theory, nor does it attempt to explain the totality of Zimbabwean politics.12 Rather, the study and its design simply allow one to test the autonomy of the state, as defined by Herbst. Hopefully State Politics in

12Still, because of the book's simple hypothetical propositions, consistent, relevant measurement strategy, and the author's breadth of knowledge and subtle understanding of Zimbabwean politics, Herbst and his book should have a profound impact on scholar's understanding of politics in Zimbabwe. The fact that scholarship should now move beyond merely measuring and affirming state autonomy is a complement to the influence this book should have.
Zimbabwe will put this academic pursuit of state autonomy to rest. The book has given conceptualization and measurement strategies that can be put to use in scholarship. Indeed, this study relies to some extent on Herbst's methods, and to a great extent on his conceptualization of the Zimbabwean state. Still, the time has come for scholars to move beyond deciding when and whether the state is autonomous. The important questions of so what and what implications does relative autonomy have for politics remain to be answered. As Goran Hyden has stated:

> everybody following African politics over the last two decades will probably agree that the various attempts to conceptualize and understand it have been rather disappointing. It has been difficult to come to the roots of the phenomenon and consequently there is not yet any theory, or theories of African politics that has gained wide currency. The search for adequate interpretations continues. (Hyden, 1983, 33)

One could also argue that the problem with African politics is that too many new theories or paradigm shifts are proposed without proper conceptualization and measurement strategies being offered. Thus, most new propositions are still born, or die of neglect in the fervent pursuit of saying something new. Again, it is with some sense of irony that I propose no new methodologies or new theories or even
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Pluralism</th>
<th>Corporatism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Extent of competition among groups.</td>
<td>Theoretically unlimited.</td>
<td>Structural differences in polity and economy limit the number of groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Nature of the interest groups.</td>
<td>Voluntary associations of individuals arising from common goals.</td>
<td>Functional and occupationally based groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Group relationships to public authorities.</td>
<td>Government officials are influenced by groups.</td>
<td>Formalized bargaining between state and groups over policy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 2:2
Three Theories of the State

**Pluralism:**
No independent state theory. The government is a collection of agencies and bodies which parties and interest groups seek to influence. The state is usually treated as a "black box" with no independent preferences.

**Marxism:**
The state is an agent of the ruling class, and is thoroughly captured by that class. The state is a necessary part of capitalist society and is a non-independent reflection of class cleavages.

**Corporatism:**
The state makes use of interest groups in formulating and implementing public policy. The government formally restricts this access to certain groups which represent some conception of a government-inferred "public interest."
Table 2:3
Three Theories' Views of Interest Groups

**Pluralism:**
Interests are preferences expressed by individuals. Groups participate in a political system in which people with shared values form groups to engage government for some common purpose.

**Marxism:**
Interests are expressions of class and false consciousness. Groups are expressions of differing class access to the modes of production.

**Corporatism:**
Interests can be shaped by the mere process of organizing. Relations between and within organizations are crucial, and are neither perfect reflections of individual preferences or class. Groups are constrained by and in turn shape the nature of interests concerned. Groups usually form around socio-economic functions rather than exclusively around common preferences.
new conceptualizations of politics here. Rather, I attempt to take existing methods and conceptualizations of politics from different areas of inquiry, and put them together in as simple a way as possible that makes political sense in explaining why the state does what it does in Zimbabwe. The following section and Chapter Four finish this process.

**Interest Groups and the State in Africa: Pluralist and Corporatist Linkages**

Pluralist and post-pluralist study, with its tradition of methodological rigor drawn from interest group studies in the industrialized world, allows the analyst to precisely specify and measure the motivations, incentives, internal arrangements, and resulting actions of interest groups. The state theories discussed above hone in on the crucial role of the state in Africa, and whether or not a state is relatively autonomous vis-à-vis civil society. Now the task is to bring this all together in a framework that: allows simple propositions to be made about why the state does or does not engage interest groups; the nature of those engagements; a way to test those propositions; and explains something non-trivial about how politics works in Africa from a state-interest group perspective, assuming this is relevant in the first place. Although not perfectly suited to the task, recent corporatist theories applied to Western Europe and Latin America require the researcher to place these
rigorously measured variables into a broader political context, and seriously address the power and role of the state in any nation, or under any given policy area.

What, then, are pluralism and corporatism, at least as conceived in this study? The best, (though most limiting), place to start is with ideal type definitions of the two concepts. Here Phillippe Schmitter provides elegant, dichotomously-phrased definitions. Pluralism is:

a system of interest representation in which constituent units are organized into an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchically ordered and self-determined categories not licensed, subsidized, created, or controlled by the state, and which do not exercise a monopoly over representational activity. In contrast, the ideal type corporatism is a system of interest representation in which constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly over representational activity. (Schmitter, 1974, 56-57)

Obviously, no existing nation or policy area conforms to either ideal; all polities fall on a continuum somewhere between the extremes. Still, corporatist theory can be distinguished from pluralist theory by the way in which it treats the major variables: the extent of competition in the group process; the nature of the groups involved; and their relationship to public authorities.

Table 2.1 presents these graphically. Further, pluralist, corporatist, and Marxist theories each treat the state differently, as seen in the previous sections; they also se the origins of interest groups as expressions of
different factors. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 break these ideas down graphically.

Nor do models of pluralism or corporatism have to encompass the whole national polity. Recently, many studies of interest group politics have used the term "meso-corporatism" to refer to the nature of interest group-state relations at the policy-sectoral level, with groups representing functional and sectoral interests, rather than secular interests, such as class (Cawson, 1988; Hutchful, 1989; Mozaffar, 1989). Since this study is concerned with Zimbabwe's wildlife conservation regime, such a sectoral level of analysis is possible and desirable. The role of groups and the degree to which these roles are granted, authorized, tolerated, or restricted by state officials is one set of key variables, along with the extent of competition in the group process and differential access to government (Cawson, 1988; Martin, 1977).

Corporatism can be further refined into more specific categories of analysis. "State" corporatism, as defined by Schmitter (1974) and O'Donnell (1977), arises when the penetration of capitalism through the polity has been incomplete and largely dependent on relations with external capital. Here, very few powerful groups exist throughout society, with state elites attempting to hold power by simultaneously seeking structural arrangements with these groups for support and protection. Since capital has
unevenly and incompletely penetrated society, state elites simultaneously seek structural arrangements which will give them support from and protection from the groups which represent forces unleashed by dependent development (O'Donnell, 1977). Like Schmitter, O'Donnell distinguishes between two types of such systems of state corporatism. First, he identified repressive systems in which the state tries to narrow opportunities for groups to participate in the political process. Second, cooptative systems are arrangements under which the state encourages bargaining linkages with interest groups in certain sectors, with the goal of ultimately providing the ruling elite with support or active acquiescence. At first glance this would seem to be the case in independent Zimbabwe, since the government has to simultaneously deal with a white private sector of which it is suspicious, and to encourage the development of new black interest groups to take the place of white interests. These models of state corporatism are most often applied to the industrializing nations of Latin America, and to the former fascist states in southern Europe.

Bianchi offers a model of state corporatism which is more intimately linked to ethnic and cultural forces, rather than exclusively to the results of capitalist development. Drawing from studies of South Asia, Bianchi observes that in culturally diverse nations, state elites will seek to
preserve the pluralist patchwork of associations and tolerate group fragmentations within civil society. These groups are often culturally, ethnically, or regionally based. Hopefully for the state, the few tightly controlled bargaining relations between groups in society and the state will bolster the relatively weak state with modest resort to coercion (Bianchi, 1984). The goal of these tenuous relations is ultimately to prevent the emergence of threatening class cleavages. Since Africa is demographically and ethnically more similar to South Asia than to Latin America in its diversity, such a perspective as this will be useful when applying corporatist concepts to Zimbabwe and other nations. On the other hand, since the state is the political and economic "grand prize" to be controlled in Africa, in the relative absence of rival economic or coercive organizations, state-centric analyses derived from Latin America can also be usefully employed (Nyangoro and Shaw, 1989).

Furnivall (1956) makes similar statements to Bianchi's about culturally-based pluralism. Arguing that groups in Africa are often ethnically or religiously-based, rather than class-based, Furnivall claims that groups are not cross-cutting but segmentary, serving to hamper the development of interest groups based on class or common functional purpose. This argument, though certainly different from the corporatist writings of Schmitter and
Bianchi, also leads to the assumption that the African state must take on an authoritarian character in order to stop ethnic and religious groups from overwhelming the polity and "modern" economy.

Corporatism itself as a concept is not entirely new to Africa. In a perspective heavily influenced by Latin American corporatist thinking, Thomas Callaghy uses a model of the Zairian state which is:

conceived here as an organization of domination controlled by varying degrees of efficacy by a ruling group or class that competes for power and compliance, for sovereignty, with other political, economic, and social organizations both internally and externally. (Callaghy, 1984, 32)

Writing in his recent volume on corporatism in Africa, Timothy Shaw sees continuities in settler and post-independence state capitalism in Zimbabwe. Under the settler government, and particularly during the Ian Smith era, formal symbiotic connections were made between the ruling Rhodesia Front party, the white bureaucracy, military, and economy, particularly the commercial farming sector.

Even though the rulers of post-independence Zimbabwe are now the same people who fought against the government which founded these relations, similar patterns exist today, with formal, though sometimes adversarial, relations between black government, party, and bureaucracy, and white economy (Shaw, 1989). Given the importance of the state in Africa's political economy, corporatism in Africa must be modeled as
state-centric, since access to the state is often the only way an organized interest can survive economically. Thus, being excluded from any type of state-centric corporatist arrangement in Africa is a dangerous political and economic prospect for a given interest group (Nyangoro and Shaw, 1989).

Libby's volume on Zimbabwe's political economy distinguished two factions within the ruling party ZANU-PF: the "technocrats", who would largely preserve these symbiotic relationships for pragmatic economic and political reasons; and the "radicals", who call for a wholesale reordering of the political economy, primarily through massive land redistribution and nationalizations of key mining and industrial sectors. These latter pronouncements play well with ZANU's natural constituency of rural farmers and urban industrial workers (Libby, 1986). Could one not speculate that any relations between the state and interest groups in society affected by wildlife policies, will be affected by the corporatist nature of Zimbabwean politics? Taking Libby's point, could not one argue that the state pursues its wildlife utilization policies to quell or postpone peasant calls for land redistribution, while at the same time integrating key white conservation and tourist and hunting industry groups into the conservation regime, to preserve the tenuous relations between white economy and black polity? This is the broader political question this
dissertation proposes to answer, under a rubric of interest group politics informed by the theoretical continuum between pluralism and corporatism.

**Bringing State and Interest Group Theory Together**

This chapter has surveyed three literatures on interest groups, state theory, and corporatism. Although by nature a general overview, the chapter has also tried to justify the integration of relevant state and interest group theories, with the ultimate goal of explaining why the state interacts with organized interests, and under what conditions these interactions take place. Assumptions of cause and effect are important parts of any model of politics. Pluralist and post-pluralist studies of interest groups in the industrialized world assume, usually implicitly, that interests organize to influence the formulation and implementation of public policy by government. Little attention is paid to the government, expect in the ways in which policies are legislated or implemented, and who in the government interacts with whom in the private sector. Pluralist conceptualizations of interest group politics leave no real possibility of an independent role for the state's institutional interests.

Likewise, recent theories of the African state, whether Marxist or otherwise, leave the role of interest groups
largely unexamined, instead examining the role of the state in the polity. While understandable, given the neglect of the state concept for so many years, studies of states and state autonomy that take the existence of interest groups as a given or as an object of nonstudy leave unexamined important political questions. Why do groups form? How do they engage the state? Why does the state allow some groups to bargain with it, while attempting to exclude others? What does the nature of state-group interactions tell us about politics more generally in Africa?

Herbst's work has been cited as a breakthrough in the study of state autonomy vis organized interests. But now that Africanists have somewhat of a handle on the concept of state autonomy, where do we go from here? With special attention being paid to the internal and external dynamics of interest groups themselves, this study has proposed to examine why and how the state engages groups, and in turn how successful it is at accomplishing its goals. Corporatism has been offered as a theoretical framework to examine these questions in Zimbabwe. Corporatism's assumption that the state chooses to bargain with and coopt groups that will further the state's own power and legitimacy over civil society, is thus the crucial proposition for the remainder of this study. On the other hand, one cannot take as a given that these arrangements exist all across the polity, or even within one policy sector. Herbst analyzed state
autonomy across a range of policy sectors, and found wide variation in the locus of decisionmaking residing either in the state or in organized interests.

This study differs in two ways. First, it examines three case studies which are drawn from the same policy realm: wildlife policy. Second, it specifically targets variations between these three case studies in the state's success at establishing and maintaining essentially corporatist bargaining arrangements. The true advantage of using a modified corporatist theoretical framework rather than a state autonomy perspective is that the theory allows and requires thorough examination of both state actions and interest group internal and external dynamics. Chapter Three brings the case studies into a broad focus, examining the main cleavages in environmental thought. Then, Chapter Four will sharply focus the theoretical insights of Chapter Two and the issue-specific analysis of Chapter Three, specifying how to measure and conceptualize the modified corporatist theory proposed in this chapter.
CHAPTER THREE
GENERAL APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICYMAKING IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

Introduction

In the end, the attitudes and motivations different people hold toward wildlife conservation will largely determine policies and, ultimately, animal and human survivability. The proper context of those attitudes, however, must be thoroughly and fairly explored. This chapter analyzes the burgeoning environmental movement, both North and South, and the motivations and incentives to participate in environmentalist activities. It starts by briefly outlining the history of environmentalism and the rise of environmentally-oriented interest groups. The chapter then more fully analyzes the value-based and economically-based incentives and motivations for environmental action, paying special attention to the ideas of sustainable utilization and green values, and the tensions between them. Finally, Chapter Three outlines the potential for interstate and intrastate conflict over environmental values and conservation economics.

Before launching into a discussion of environmental conservation in Zimbabwe and the developing world in
general, one must first consider the history of environmentalism.

A Brief History of Environmentalism

A theoretical understanding of how environmental policies have been made historically, and especially how they are influenced in the international realm, is crucial if one is to gain a broader understanding of why environmental policies are so politically important in the developing world (Hill, 1991). The first question to consider is: where does environmentalism, however defined, fit onto the current political spectrum? Indeed, environmentalism occupies many places on the ideological spectrum. On the political right are the populationists who want to limit economic and population growth, and who do not discuss the economic implications of these policies on the poor. Although they may not wish to count themselves among the political right, populationists like Hardin and Erlich arguably fall into this category. Probably most Western environmentalists are part of the moderate-left, and are not terribly outside the mainstream of most political activists. They are generally concerned with a wide range of government regulation of the environment. Leftist environmentalists share with socialists a disdain of the market system, but at the same time reject economic and
political centralization. Greenpeace is probably the most identifiable example of this type of environmental group. Many left wing environmentalists also dislike industrialization, and implicitly would like to see the demise of the industrial working class (Paelkhe, 1989). In the West, then, environmentalism has been, to varying degrees, a political movement which seeks to change the framing of the political debate. It has been successful at doing so in many Western polities, where environmentalist values have become part of the political agenda (Jamison, 1990).

Second, the evolution of environmentalism as a political movement and as a social phenomenon must be clearly understood. There have been three major identifiable "waves" of environmentalism in the North in the past 100 years. First was the conservation or wilderness movement which was concentrated in the American west at the turn of the twentieth century. The idea of wilderness conservation in the US has its roots in the late 1800s, with the philosophy of sustainable exploitation of the environment. This was the idea behind the formation of National Parks system in the United States (Sandbach, 1980). President Theodore Roosevelt was a great proponent of this kind of large scale conservation, and the US system of National Parks is a model that has been copied all throughout the world, especially in savanna Africa.
The second wave environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s could be distinguished from the original conservation movement in two ways. First, the environmental movement was more concerned with urban issues such as pollution and energy use rather than with wilderness or forest. Second, the environmental movement was much more questioning of the political and technological foundation of economic growth, and thus was more of a political and ideological movement than the original nineteenth century conservation movement ever was (Paehlke, 1989). In the 1960s and 1970s, then, environmentalism could be seen as one of four things:

1. as a social movement,
2. as a set of ideas based on "ecology,"
3. as a back to nature philosophy, or
4. as a greater interest in environmental affairs (Sandbach, 1980).

So environmentalism as a social movement, rather than as a simple set of policy demands and actions, was a key aspect of green politics in the 1960s and 1970s. During the early 1970s, a flood of reports, documents, treatises, and editorials proclaimed that The End was just around the corner. The exponential economic growth of the industrialized world was about to kill off the environment, and presumably the rest of us with it (Cotgrove, 1982). Indeed, environmental groups as well as their critics tend to build walls around themselves and use language as a weapon against each other (Petulla, 1980). Groups such as Friends of the Earth and the Environmental Defense Fund
sought broader impact than just regulating environmental change. They argued that the only way to truly reverse environmental collapse was to fundamentally alter the values of industrialization. Further, during the 1970s the membership of diverse environmental groups, from Greenpeace to the National Wildlife Foundation, doubled (Cotgrove, 1982).

One can also argue that two strands of new environmentalism developed in the 1970s. Cotgrove (1982) labels the first one traditionalism, which sought a return to small, decentralized communities. This of course assumes that small, self-contained communities constitute some economic, political, and social Golden Age. So, traditionalism relies of the restoration of some pre-existing condition. Second was a more radical outlook, which was also attracted to small-scale communities, not because they hearken back to a more environmentally efficient society, but because they promise self-sufficiency, autonomy, and the general liberation of the human spirit from modern hierarchy and bureaucracy. Thus, while environmental traditionalism seeks environmental and economic balance in small scale social organization, radical environmentalists desire a much broader transformation of society and its assumptions.

What happens when one applies these various models of environmental interest group motivations and activities to
the South, where industrialization and the expansion of cash agriculture is encouraged and pursued as a matter of economic survival? This question surfaces again and again in the international environmental debate, and will be extensively analyzed in Chapter Six. It is important, however, to bear this potential conflict in mind when analyzing any environmental policy, including those national (internal) policies pursued by Zimbabwe, and fully explored in Chapters Five and Seven.

The economic recessions of the mid and late 1970s led to some reversal of public approval for environmental regulation. Particularly the energy shocks of this period led to public opinion approving of more rapid development of nuclear power and the further exploitation of US coal and oil resources. A broader argument about public opinion toward environmentalists and their beliefs is that many environmentalists advocate goals which are at odds with broader societal goals. Thus, some argued, the environmentalist movement of the 1970s was forced to change from a consensual movement to a more conflictual movement, based on at times radical challenges to some of the ethical and practical bases of industrial capitalism (Cotgrove, 1982; Sandbach, 1980). The third wave of environmentalism was a reaction to the deregulatory policies of President Reagan and the conservative leaders of other Western governments. Also, newer issues of global scope arose as
the environmental movement turned its attention to wilderness and forest as well as urban issues (Paehlke, 1989). Further, more recent concerns about biodiversity and global climate change, as evinced in the Earth Summit of 1992, have begun to dominate the world environmental agenda. Paehlke and others argue that environmental politics in the 1990s will succeed to the extent that environmentalists (1) communicate that apparent employment/environmental conflicts are frequently a false dichotomy, and (2) design policies that appeal both to the less advantaged and to those whose first concerns are environmental. More specifically, some people contend that environmentalism is a plot by a wealthy elite who have already obtained their money, who now want to fulfill higher needs of having aesthetically pleasing environments. Thus, they advocate policies which slow down economic growth, and throw those less economically fortunate into further poverty. Taken to its logical conclusion at the international level, this becomes a kind of "green dependency" (Schaiberg et al., 1986, 52).

It might be argued that where governmental regulation and enforcement were typical of the 1970s, the 1990s will emphasize altered patterns of consumer purchases (green products) and individual waste management habits (recycling). Of course these changes in primarily Western habits will have profound effects on the developing world, both in the redirection of economic relations and purchases,
and the values that go with carrying this Western imperative to the rest of the world. An excellent example of this in the case of Zimbabwe is in declining tobacco and asbestos demand worldwide. Since these are two of Zimbabwe's most important exports, concerns in the rest of the world over personal and larger environmental health matters will most likely lead to a decline in demand for these resources, and thus a decline in producer prices. As of April 1993, for example, the price paid for a kilogram of Zimbabwean tobacco was less than half the price paid in 1992. The following section explores more fully the "third wave" of environmental thinking, paying particular attention to the tension between value-based and economically-based orientations toward the environment, and the hybrid concept of "sustainable development."

The Bases of Environmental Thinking

As outlined in the introduction to this dissertation, there are several types of environmentalism, each with its own logic and motivational basis. Among major environmental strains, several assumptions hold:

1. Biocentric environmentalism, or deep ecology, takes on quasi-religious and metaphysical overtones;

2. Ecological or scientifically based environmentalism carries assumptions based on the scientific method of investigation, and the solution of environmental problems scientifically; and
3. Economically-based environmentalism carries assumptions about the efficient utilization of resources, and problem solving is based on efficiency (Petulla, 1980).

Of course none of these positions or philosophies are mutually exclusive. The false dichotomy between utilitarian conservation and preservationism which characterizes much Western environmental debate certainly hampers the establishment of successful development projects designed to suit both ecological integrity and human economic needs (Thompson and Hatley, 1988). Nevertheless, since these and other world views often do come into conflict in everyday policymaking and debates over natural resource policy, they should be analyzed separately.

According to Lincoln Allison (1991), the two fundamental foundations of the environment-economy dichotomy are "ecology" and "utility." The first tradition hold that humans should revere the planet or even treat nature as if it has rights of its own. The opposite tradition says we can and should use the planet's resources, limited only by efficient use. Allison refers to the philosophical roots of these approaches as "gray" and "green" morality. Gray morality is based on the calculation of what is best for a relevant population of humans. Green morality upholds the sanctity and importance of all life, with intrinsic rights which cannot be reduced to rights which humans alone grant them. Other scholars view this dichotomy of outlooks as "eco-centric" versus "homo-centric" (Engel, 1988).
Ecocentrists like Aldo Leopold stress the inherent right of existence of nature. Homo-centric belief systems, on the other hand, stress the paramount role, both practical and moral, of human beings in nature. The eco-centric approach has always been a major foundation of wilderness and endangered species preservation movements. Lately, however, as people realize that the costs of preservationist policies disproportionately impact the poor and marginalized, the special human role has become increasingly relevant to all but the most staunch preservationists. Whether a full ethical convergence comes about remains to be seen, not to mention the convergence of policies which will satisfy both preservationists and ecological utilitarians.

Finally, it must be acknowledged that because of the mixing of cultures brought about by travel and colonialism (especially Western culture), traditions often blend to create new ones. For example, contemporary African religions often blend eco-centric values from animism with modern natural philosophies, including liberalism, which is a philosophical basis for capitalism. Thus, it is possible and even logical to have traditional reverence for the environment propped up by market-based sustainable utilization of species to create an ecology which recognizes the intrinsic value of the environment, both natural and financial. Of course even if such a syncretism is logical in an academic sense, this in no way automatically leads to
the confluence of these various environmental world views in policymaking. Thus, the following two sections address value and economic bases for environmentalism as if they were mutually exclusive dichotomies to illuminate the differences between these two (very general) categories.¹

The Value Bases of Environmentalism

Preservationist (or biocentric) environmentalism focuses on the maximal preservation of species and habitat. Further, this approach situates humans as one species among many, and in the extreme of deep ecology grants nearly equal intrinsic status to all forms of life (including humanity). Thus, extinction is the paramount situation which biocentric environmentalists seek to avoid (Petulla, 1980). But the many value bases of environmentalism run much deeper and wider than mere concern for one or the other species.

Specifically, much of Western Green thought laments that humans have lost touch with nature and thus with their spirituality. Since life has become restless and without

¹ The desired role of the state in regulating the environment is also an important variable, as will be made clear particularly in Chapter Six. On the one hand, those environmentalists who above all seek the preservation of an ecosystem, species, or biodiversity, or who seek global solutions to climate change problems, generally advocate a large measure of state involvement in the marketplace. On the other hand, those who advocate the sustainable utilization of resources, especially with a reliance on market forces, usually seek to keep state interference at a minimum.
direction, greens thus worry that ecological catastrophe may result (Allison, 1991). This kind of green thought logically gives rise to back to the land movements, animal rights campaigns, vegetarianism, and even nudism in an attempt to reconcile humanity with nature. Of course the irony of this is that the vast majority of people who live in the developing world and who engage in subsistence farming are (at times painfully) aware of their tenuous relationship with nature and the land.

Environmental ethicists sometimes question basing ethics on anthropocentric intrinsic value, since if human tastes toward the environment change, then so will the worth of the environment. There is nothing in human value systems to preclude a sea-change in human attitudes toward the environment. This is why some ethicists wish to construct a non-anthropocentric environmental ethic, which will in effect be timeless and divorced from human instrumentalism (Hargrove, 1992). Of course, anthropocentric intrinsic values are probably more accessible to the average person, so in the long run constructing non-anthropocentric views toward the environment may be practically fruitless.
Deep Ecology

A discussion of intrinsic values and the human's place within environmental thought would not be complete without some analysis of deep ecology. This fascinating strand of environmentalism is part of the minority tradition in Western philosophy which sees humans as part of the larger system, and not as masters of it. Two values are the crux of deep ecology. First, self-realization holds that the person is not an individual, but part of a broader whole which includes other people and living and non-living things. Second, ecocentrism holds that everything in nature has an intrinsic value, and one thing cannot be valued highly than another (Scarce, 1990).

By way of contrast with other environmental values, shallow ecology is an environmental ethic based on an anthropocentric emphasis on human needs, e.g., we value the forest because it is beautiful. Deep ecology seeks to be non-anthropocentric, trying to find intrinsic values in living things outside what humans grant them. Deep ecology is also a quest by humans to find their place in an embedded environment. It is not difficult to discern the political implications of deep ecology. Because deep ecology places humans on the same plane as any other living thing, concerns about the influences of environmental policies on people do not have a major place in this set of beliefs. And even though people actively practicing deep ecology are few in
number (and even fewer, if any, of these people are in positions of political influence), deep ecology is in large measure just the anchor on the extreme end of preservationist, value-based environmentalism.

Politics and Preservationist Values

Some of the value and moral bases of environmentalism have implications for politics as well as personal self-fulfillment. Many philosophers and theologians see Western society shifting its value bases beyond the liberal notions of the industrial era. These new values include concern for social rights and benefits, and the long term preservation of the environment (Engel, 1988). Arguably, Western society has been based on liberalism, and the belief that self-interest and self-regulation should be at the core of our values as a society. On the contrary, the emergent environmentalism of the 1960s and 1970s appealed to sacrifice, and for the diffuse benefits that would accrue to humanity and all living things in the long run (Hardin, 1974). Both the liberal and Marxist traditions have been criticized as overly committed to the inevitable advance of technology, and the spread of human control over the environment. Thus, some ethicists claim, the ethical bases of these traditions do not hold a special place for nature, while other traditions, usually drawn from the developing world, do. Allison (1991, 115) has commented on the mixing
of personal values and politics within environmental thought: "The magic number in Green philosophy and theology is one: oneness, wholeness, monism are ever present themes. In politics, the magic number becomes three: the programme and philosophy are a 'third way' which cannot be identified with left or right, with capitalism or socialism."

While preservationist environmental values and morals are ubiquitous, they are not without their critics, many of whom would also call themselves environmentalists and mean it. Some ecologists and environmental scientists resent or are suspicious of environmental interest group activity based on preservationist values. Nowadays ecology is often wrongly regarded as a kind of belief: a be kind to the environment attitude. Sometimes it represents a kind of panacea of sciences—an omni-science. The predicted ecological crisis has much in common with a fashionable portrayal of the Day of Judgement. The reality is, as usual, rather less fanciful. Ecology is still a science and not an ideology or a policy instrument. This dissertation takes the position that ecology is precisely an ideology and a policy instrument, as well as a part of the natural and social sciences. Still, this hostility between scientists and activists and politicians is a real one, as Chapter Six will illustrate in the case of the international ivory trade.
Further, when species or a singular environmental problem become the symbol for an environmental movement, the moral arguments brought to bear, especially on questions of species loss, can often overpower dryer yet important scientific questions. For example, is a total preservationist moratorium on whaling actually a threat to the long-term survivability of a species, since a natural predator (the human) is removed from the ecosystem? (Andresen and Ostreng, 1989).

In a similar vein, some have argued that preservationism in the Western context is economically regressive, in that the cost of environmental solutions is often passed on to the poor. For example, an economy hampered by intentional no-growth plans will fall hardest on the poor, who will have born the brunt of layoffs. Planned scarcity (or at least the potential of it), may explain why the poor are often more resistant to environmentalism than are others (Sandbach, 1980). In the specific case of the developing world, preservationist policies are often seen as an impediment to economic development, at least in official government rhetoric (Repetto, 1986). In the case of the pro-ivory trade southern African nations, much hostility has been generated in Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa against policies which seek a total preservationist ban on the elephant products trade, which these countries
claim is an unreasonable economic restriction on them, masquerading behind moralistic principle.

The Economic Bases of Environmentalism

Whereas many people base their attitudes toward the environment on values (whether preservationism, deep ecology, religion, etc.), others view natural resources and their conservation in economic terms.\(^2\) To be sure, uncontrolled, unmanaged exploitation of natural resources is an economic phenomenon. Such unmanaged pillaging of resources is not what is being discussed in this section, however. Rather, the present task is to analyze genuine approaches to the environment based on economic forces and economic management. Recently there has been much written on the subject of sustainability, usually sustainable development or sustainable utilization. Such discussions, while often vaguely defined in their parameters, almost always deal with environmental conservation and some effect of economic forces or policies on the environment, whether for better or worse. Further, since critics of sustainability as a concept often orient their analyses on what is wrong with using economics to inform environmental

\(^2\)In fact, the term "conservation" has been often associated with the economic management of natural resources, as opposed to "preservationism," which is usually associated with strict isolation of ecologies and environments from economic forces.
policy, it is important to know both the arguments for economic approaches to the environment, and the arguments against such policy beliefs.

Using the language of Allison's dichotomy of ecology versus utility, several differences arise between value-based preservationism and economic management of the environment. Utilitarian conservationists seek to preserve resources because they contain some sort of value, usually economic. Thus, the establishment of the US Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management sought to regulate the use of forest resources, primarily to preserve the economic viability of wood and other forest products. This powerful, simple logic has even been taken up by preservationists in their language. Even the essentially preservationist Sierra Club talks of the values of aesthetics in calling for the preservation of natural resources for birdwatchers, campers, and hikers (Petulla, 1980). The countries of southern Africa which advocate the continuation of the ivory trade use this utilization logic, arguing that people who live near elephants will not conserve a resource unless they perceive an economic benefit that may be derived from it.

Of course a marriage of environmentalism and economics is not always easy. In fact, some people believe that the two terms have no complementary place in the same sentence. Indeed, the two often cause bitter conflicts. Thus, it is important to understand the tension between conservation and
economic growth, both in theory and practice, especially as it impacts environmental policymaking and the motivations of interest groups to participate in any conservation regime.

Proponents of the utility school argue that the cost of preservationist environmental solutions is often passed on to the poor. For example, an economy hampered by intentional no-growth plans will fall hardest on the poor, who will have born the brunt of layoffs. Planned scarcity (or at least the potential of it), may explain why the poor are often more resistant to environmentalism than are others (Sandbach, 1980). From the other angle, the belief that environment and economics do not mix is based in the assumption that economic growth and resource degradation are inextricably linked (Anderson and Leal, 1991). This view is based in industrial era fears that we are running out of resources. Since Thomas Malthus espoused this fear in the 19th century, it is nothing new. The major challenge to the Malthusian argument is that it assumes static technology and static patterns of resource use. Since the study of the environment is a study in dynamics, this Malthusian belief actually runs counter to the nature of ecology and the way environmental sciences work, the utility school argues.

Again, this is no zero sum game. Growth proponents have learned that sometimes short-term wealth enhancements lead to long term ecological degradation, which is not economically rational. Conversely, many ecologists have
discovered that poverty is a major source of environmental degradation. Thus, the two have attempted to meet in the relatively new territory of sustainability, which is still vaguely defined. One approach discussed under the rubric of sustainability is the economic incentives approach, which seeks to achieve environmental objectives not through mandates or regulations, but through market incentives for proper behavior. This is precisely the philosophy behind Zimbabwe's conservation policies, including the CAMPFIRE program to give rural people an economic stake in conserving wildlife. If designed and executed properly, these programs can: reduce conflicts between economic growth and environmental degradation; ease the transition to sustainable rather than exploitative relations between environment and economy; and encourage the development of environmentally benign or even beneficial activities (Tietenberg, 1993). Whether or not such programs actually succeed in their environmental goals is of course an empirical question on which state policies and the attitudes and actions of interest groups will impact. Since this nexus of conservation and economics in sustainability is such an important theoretical and practical concept, it is discussed more fully below.
Sustainable Development and Steady State Economics

Sustainable development both as a concept and as a set of policy alternatives requires a broad view of both ecology and economics, and a political commitment by practitioners and politicians to its implementation. The problem is that ecologists and economists who are nominally committed to sustainability often talk past each other (Redclift, 1987). Even though sustainable development is a vaguely defined concept expressed by people with a diversity of opinion, it does generally lead to one conclusion: there must be some form of discipline imposed upon society in order to assure environmental survival. Generally, proponents of sustainable development have appealed to public institutions (both extant and proposed) to insure compliance with environmental policy. In some cases, as with Hardin³, authoritarian regulatory regimes are explicitly proposed. People with more of a market-oriented approach look to the market and self regulation as the key to environmental discipline. They argue that the market is a far more efficient regulator for both common people and large corporations, and claim that attempts to divorce environmental protection from economic development are futile, or would require omniscient, benevolent governmental

³These are proponents of the "steady state economy," outlined below.
structures which are exceedingly unlikely to work (Anderson and Leal, 1991).

What then, is sustainable development? The sustainable development paradigm, even though it is ill defined, was given considerable momentum by the 1987 publication of Our Common Future, published by the World Commission on Environment and Development. It was an explicit statement that future and present environmental and economic needs must be balanced. At least two major currents of thought have evolved in the sustainable development paradigm since the mid-1980s. The first current emphasizes growth in developing countries to alleviate poverty, which is to these people the major source of environmental degradation in the developing world. The second current of thought is suspicious of this market oriented environmentalism, instead calling for wholesale reordering of lifestyles and forced global equity (Porter and Brown, 1991). According to the Bruntland Report, sustainable development is "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (Brundtland, 1987, 2).

The Brundtland Report (Our Common Future) is in the tradition of such high level publications as The Limits to Growth by the Club of Rome (1972) and Global 2000 (1980) started by Jimmy Carter. The new thing about the Brundtland Report is that it specifically points to the link between
poverty and environmental degradation. Still, the seemingly simple concept of sustainable development gets considerably more complex when we recognize opportunity costs and attempt to implement policy. If ecological principles and environmental ethics are to be factored into development policy, we still must ask who will do the factoring. This is a particularly crucial point for the present study, which addresses interest group activity and the interaction of these various powerful groups with state actors, both in Zimbabwe and internationally.

Counterpoised to the various sustainability approaches of managing economic development and ecological integrity at the same time, is the idea of the steady state economy. Complicating the definitional problems with sustainable development, many partisans of the steady state would see their philosophy as the only one which can guarantee environmental sustainability and human survival. William Ophuls (1977) sees two options for industrial societies to meet future demands. First, technological utopia could be established. As this is unlikely to Ophuls, the alternative is to develop a society based on frugality. This society would require ordering priorities and thus requires extremely strong government and authoritarian regulation to achieve its goals. And of course scientists would be at the top of this order.
As with deep ecology and other forms of value-based environmentalism, proponents of the steady state question the roots of Western society. As Daly said:

A sustainable society presents many challenges to established political orders. It raises a new agenda of issues that have previously been buried by material affluence. It is this affluence that has legitimized self-interest in politics, laissez-faire economics, wealth as an indicator of worth, and rugged individualism. Population growth, resource depletion, and environmental pollution call all these institutions into question. (Daly, 1977, 200)

The political importance of the steady state view of economics and the environment is clear: there must be some overarching world authority to regulate economic growth and the allocation of resources. Although such an authority would require substantially more autonomy and strength than any existing international body, this can exist to degrees. For example, international regimes governing the trade in endangered species, greenhouse emissions, and biological diversity are already in place, receiving varying degrees of political support. In the abstract, authoritative regulation of the effects of economic forces on the environment is often proposed by environmentalists and ecologically-oriented interest groups, especially in the developed world. As was the case with the value bases of environmentalism, activists and organizations concerned with the environment from an economic (or anti-economic) point of view have unique and observable motivations to participate
in politics, and incentives to engage state organizations in various environmental activities.

The Demographic Bases of the Western Environmental Movement

In the words of one journalist, in the West "environmentalism is the hottest political cause since world hunger" (Anzovin, 1990, 55). What are the psychological, moral, and demographic bases of this seemingly widespread movement (one may even call it a mindset), in the developed world? Of course, Western environmentalism is really nothing new. Indeed, it can easily trace its roots back to the turn of the century conservationist movement, which in the United States led to the founding of the National Parks system (Paelkhe, 1989). Further, environmentalist causes made up a major part of the emergence of new politics in the 1960s and early 1970s (Rosenbaum, 1991). Important comparative work done particularly by Inglehart has argued that in the west over the past 25 years, a new dimension in politics has arisen. Labelled post-materialism, this proposed new political dimension stresses self-actualization and personal freedom above law and order and tradition, while at the same time stressing environmental preservation as a good to be cherished in itself (Inglehart, 1990)'. In an interesting

While there is no room to pursue the subject of post-materialism much farther here, there has been a lengthy, deep, and at times spirited debate about this whole concept
psychological corollary to the environmental component of post-material beliefs, Hyman and Stiftel (1988), argue that beyond the maximization of material well-being, humans require things such as love, friendship, and things that are aesthetically pleasing. Thus, the need for beautiful places also creates a need to preserve the environment. It is, of course, very difficult to quantify what is aesthetically pleasing. Some theories of aesthetic preferences hold that people prefer those environments that evoke the past. Interestingly for our present study psychologists have found in their experiments that open savanna land is the aesthetically-preferred psychological environment for people in the West (Hyman and Stiftel, 1988).

Certainly, conclusions about the psychological motivations behind environmental preservationism in the West are complex and tentative. However, the demographic composition of Western environmentalism is much better established in fact. Being a member of an environmentalist organization is moderately correlated with age (youth), education (high), residence (urban), and ideology (left) (Cotgrove, 1982). While interesting and somewhat telling about the leaders of the organized Western environmental movement, such conclusions can be misleading, since they

and its generalizability to the whole western world. Nevertheless, many theoretical and empirical studies of mass opinions and interest groups do demonstrate that environmentalism is a salient political issue.
apply to members of interest groups in general (Laumann, 1987).

More general survey-based studies of popular environmental attitudes give broader hints about environmentalism in the West. Lumping together education, income, and occupation as part of an omnibus measure of socioeconomic status obscures the relationship of these variables to support for environmentalist values and policies. Increasing levels of education are correlated with increasing support for environmental values. The relationship between income level and environmentalist attitudes is rather curvilinear, with the very rich and the poor being less accepting of environmentalist values than people in the middle income categories. In Marxist rhetoric, then, Western environmentalism can be fruitfully seen as a bourgeois or middle class movement (Milbrath, 1984).

**North-South Conflicts**

In the West, environmentalism has been, to varying degrees, a political movement which seeks to change the framing of the political debate. It has been successful at doing so in many Western polities, where environmentalist values have become at least verbally part of the political agenda (Jamison et al., 1990). What happens when this is
expanded to the international level, where powerful environmental groups and popular opinion informed by preservationist environmental attitudes start to influence international agendas which affect other countries besides their own? This is the crucial question to ask about environmentalism, in whatever form, from a theoretical standpoint which recognizes the potential for value-based and economically-based clashes between different approaches to environmental problems of global interest. When these conflicts are between North and South, or even between subdivisions of those parts, as is the case with the ivory trade dispute, this question takes on more powerful and immediate political concerns.

States all have different outlooks on the environment, which are especially influenced by the fact that given environmental problems are not distributed equally throughout the globe. The costs and risks of environmental degradation vary, as do governments' abilities to address such problems. Further, perceptions of solutions to international environmental problems vary with proximity and economic impact (Porter and Brown, 1991). Additionally, many international environmental issues are affected directly or indirectly by international trade structures, especially if an environmental commodity is an import-export commodity.
During the 1960s, some conspiratorially-minded people argued that the growing concern for the environment was in part a displacement from more immediate problems such as Vietnam and race relations. Similarly at the North-South level of debate, some people contend that environmentalism is a plot by a wealthy elite who have already obtained their money, who now want to fulfill higher needs of having aesthetically pleasing environments. Thus, they advocate policies which slow down economic growth, and thus throw those less economically fortunate into further poverty. Take this to its logical conclusion, and this idea resembles dependency theory (Schaiberg et al., 1986).

When the original global environmental conferences were held in the 1970s, many officials from the developing world, both leftists and rightists, viewed Western calls for environmental protection and restrictions with skepticism. Some thought the West was trying to stymie the economic development of the Third World, leaving it perpetually underdeveloped. Similarly, some noted that the already affluent West was trying to garner more affluence for itself at the expense of the developing world: clean air, open spaces, and legally preserved natural settings, many of which were in the developing world (Agarwal, 1988).

These potential conflicts have not subsided. The Conference of the Nonaligned held in September 1989 noted with concern a growing tendency towards external impositions
and increased conditionalities on the part of some developed countries in dealing with environmental issues. Such conditions have sometimes been referred to as 'green imperialism.' As Anzovin remarked recently:

the big problem with all the new found concern about the rainforests is that almost all those expressing concern about the forests live in the West, and the forests are elsewhere. It's important to remember that conscience alone won't save a single tree, and the forested countries are unlikely to respond favorably to stirring moral pleas or self-righteous demands. (Anzovin, 1990, 56)

Conclusion: The Political Nature of Environmentalism

Certainly these conflicts in orientation toward the environment, and particularly the link between conservation and economic development, are important to understand. The various motivations and incentives of interest groups to participate in politics, and the reasons states propose and implement natural resource policies, have their roots in values, levels of economic development, proximity to the environmental problem, and the relative strength and organization of interest groups and governments. Clearly, a meaningful view of human-environmental interaction is not satisfied by a strict biological/preservational perspective. An ecological perspective informed by rational choice economics does broaden the lens to include the motive of human self-interest in wildlife preservation or exploitation, and is a perspective adopted by many writers
on the subject, as well as a growing number of policy makers charged with wildlife conservation (including Zimbabwe's).

Further, one cannot be satisfied with simply calling attention to the norms and values people hold or potentially hold about wildlife conservation. Indeed, much environmentalist writing today, both by activists and journalists, focuses simply on the ethical responsibility (Young, 1989) humanity as a whole shares for the preservation of natural resources. This attitudinal motivation probably drives Western policies on the current worldwide ivory ban. While well-intentioned, such attitudes, which are usually held by upper middle class, white, college educated North Americans and Europeans (Inglehart, 1990), often neglect the perspective of the rural farmer who must live in the same area as a large elephant herd. As Pollack wryly states, "it is only the very understanding farmer who can appreciate the value of preserving elephants for foreign tourists when a large bull is destroying his [or her] crops" (Pollack, 1974, 89). The Zimbabwean conservation movement and the government have both claimed that the worldwide ivory ban, at least as it was pushed by Western conservation organizations, amounted to environmental imperialism, and as such was an imposition of values by one culture upon another. While cultural imperialism is a subject which has been much studied and debated, the rise of international environmentalism may well
add another component to that discussion. Further, Zimbabwe's conservation policies in communal (black) and commercial (white) lands are influences by the same panoply of morality, economic reality, political expediency, and interest group power.

Public policy is fed by ideas, facts, and models from the world of science. It is also influenced by public opinion, political expediency, and the needs of government policymakers, politicians, and powerful (and not-so-powerful) interest groups. This chapter had outlined the major motivations for interest groups to participate in environmental politics, and the ways they might have an impact on national and international policy. It also proposes reasons that governments make environmental policies, and especially why policies which address both environmental conservation and economic development are so complex. The next chapter takes these motivations and incentives and puts them into a more focused political context. Using the insights gained from Chapter Two on why interest groups form, why they become powerful, and why and how they engage (or are engaged by) the state, Chapter Four lays out the case for the rest of the dissertation. By viewing environmental policy as an independent variable which itself influences the relations between the state and various organized interests, and thus the state's relative power and authority, Chapter Four takes this chapter's value
and economically driven arguments and puts them into an explicit political model, which will inform us about politics in general in Zimbabwe.
CHAPTER FOUR
NATURAL RESOURCES AS POLITICAL RESOURCES: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE

While Chapter Two laid out a general theoretical framework for the dissertation based in comparative interest group theory, and Chapter Three likewise laid out a general subject framework for the study of environmentalism and environmental policymaking, Chapter Four ties these two together for the specific cases at hand. Taking the general work of the preceding chapters, this section more specifically models environmental policymaking in the developing world as a politically motivated process through which the state (or various subparts of it) attempts to pursue its own interests of authority maintenance and extension, and ultimately legitimacy (Hyden and Bratton, 1992). Thus, Chapter Four is a specific justification for political scientists to study environmental policymaking in the developing world.

A Model of Environmental Policymaking

This approach models environmental policies as the product of group-state interaction, with both interest
groups and the state conservation authorities having very distinct interests in the outcomes of policy, and how policy is made. So the state uses conservation policies in much the way it uses taxation, investment, interest rate, or land resettlement policies: to establish and extend its own interests, which in a relatively new and tenuous polity center on authority maintenance and extension, and ultimately the creation of political legitimacy. In other words, environmental policy is actually an independent variable, affecting the dependent variables associated with state power. So, my approach here turns normal environmental policy analysis on its head, arguing that natural resource policies themselves serve to further or diminish the authority, autonomy, and legitimacy of the state, as well as the power of organized groups in society. Normally, analyses of conservation policies would see the wildlife policies themselves as dependent variables, influenced by the political process. I see conservation policymaking as instrumental to state action, rather than a result of state power or struggles with interest groups.

Figure 4.1 graphically outlines these differences. The top half of the figure is the traditional method of viewing environmental policymaking. In fact, this is a method based on structural-functional analysis, which still pervades much policy analysis and the study of American politics. Here, the ultimate dependent variable \( Y \) (Environmental Policy) is
simply an output of decisions made by the state (X). But, these state decisions themselves are products of interest group access (Z₁), attitudes (Z₂), and strength (Z₃). Thus, the state (X) is merely a black box. The bottom half of Figure 4.1 is my modified corporatist view of how environmental policy is made in Zimbabwe. Here, the ultimate dependent variable Y is completely different: it is the state's power. This power is itself partially a function of its environmental policies (Z₄), and of course a constant. This entire diagram would simply be identical to the traditional model, with just one more dependent variable added, if it were not for the two way arrows between Z₄ and the variables measuring group access, attitudes, and power. Here, bargaining, give-and-take, and cooptation are modeled as a two way process between state policymakers and interest groups. This is why the variable for environmental policy was labeled Z₄, rather than simply X; it is at once an independent variable and an indicator variable, since two way causality is modeled. This may seem a pedantic, trivial distinction of labeling only, but in fact it is a crucial theoretical difference from the pluralist model of policymaking. This modified corporatist model will serve as the theoretical guidance for the case studies to follow, and is thus a common thread between them.

What in fact does this analysis mean by "policy regime?" Mozaffar (1989), in his writings about the state
Traditional Method of Studying Environmental Policymaking

Environmental Policy $Y$

State Decisionmakers $X$

- Group Access $Z_1$
- Group Attitudes $Z_2$
- Group Strength $Z_3$

Corporatist Method of Studying Environmental Policymaking

State's Power (authority and legitimacy) $Y$

Environmental Policy $Z_4$

- Group Access $Z_1$
- Group Attitudes $Z_2$
- Group Strength $Z_3$

Figure 4.1
Different Ways of Modelling Environmental Policymaking
in Africa, refers to a regime as the set of political "rules of the game" in which state actors are legitimized and accepted as authoritative by the bulk of society's members. Thus, a policy regime is not merely a set of policies in a field, but is rather a structure devised consciously by the state to further its political goals beyond the mere immediate impact of those policies. Specifically writing in the corporatist vein, Mozaffar asserts that:

as a regime, corporatism is an organization of political society whereby social categories are brought into regularized and specified relationships with the state. A corporatist regime may be broadly based to encompass virtually all social categories in society, or narrowly based to include a limited number of particularly relevant groups. (Mozaffar, 1989, 6)

Thus, in this light wildlife conservation is seen as part of the broader political process in Zimbabwe, which is overall tinctured by the will of the state to consolidate its hegemony and legitimacy over and among a quite strong, vibrant, and functionally differentiated civil society. So, in the conservation realm of policymaking, the state constructs, modifies, and implements environmental policies in ways which allow it to extend its authority vis such divergent groups as (black) peasants, (white) tour and hunting operators, local (white) conservation groups, (white) commercial game ranchers, and internationally based wildlife organizations, such as the WWF. These policies also are used by the state to integrate or separate these functional, regional, class, and ethnic groups, on terms
maximally favorable to the state. Of course this dissertation will not propose a priori that the state is successful in achieving these goals. Here, the state's power is not taken as a given, but as a variable whose parameters must be empirically verified in the four case studies to follow.

**Why Zimbabwe? Why Environmental Politics?**

A legitimate question to ask about any study is: why is the author doing this? Why has the author chosen a particular subject, why is he or she studying that subject in a certain country, and how is that study to be executed? This last question about conceptualization and methodology is the subject of most of this chapter. This section, however, deals with the first two questions.

First, why has the author chosen Zimbabwe? Zimbabwe's political economy is at once typically African and unique in its composition. It is one of the few countries in Africa that has an important white settler population remaining,¹ and it is the third youngest country on the continent, having achieved independence in 1980.² Therefore, the

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¹The other nations with white settler populations are of course Namibia and South Africa

²The youngest nation in Africa is Eritrea (1993), while the second youngest is Namibia (1990).
polity can be expected to be still in a transitional phase, with old laws and patterns of bureaucracy and decisionmaking colliding and coalescing with post-independence patterns. This makes for a particularly interesting study site, and one which is in need of accurate interpretation, given the dynamism of ongoing transition.

The country is "typical" in that 80% of the population is still involved in agriculture. It is atypical in several ways, the most economically important being that it has Africa's second largest industrial sector next to South Africa (World Bank, 1992). For this study, it is also atypical in that almost 13% of the country's land is in National Parks, Safari Areas, or other classifications which restrict agriculture and development. This, combined with the prevailing pattern of land settlement in which whites (1 percent of the population) control 40 percent of the country's land, created obvious potential conflicts between not only white and black, but also between conservation and production. Thus, answering the second question of "why environmental politics?" one can respond that the implicit tension between environmental conservation and agricultural and industrial production is crucial to understand in Zimbabwe, given the prevailing patterns of land tenure, the desires of government to accelerate economic development, and the relatively large area of land under legal protection. Further, as will be shown through the case
studies to follow, conservationists and environmental interest groups are still almost exclusively white, which has several implications for the politics of transition discussed in Chapters One and Five.

Conceptualization

Now that Chapter Two has set forth the theoretical framework for this dissertation, and Chapter Three has introduced the motivations for interest groups to participate in environmental politics, one must begin to conceptualize what these relationships between the state and organized interests mean, and how they can be measured.

The Human-Wildlife Nexus: The Actors

Besides the state, which is at the legal and administrative pinnacle of Zimbabwe's wildlife conservation regime, several other actors interact with each other and the state.

Local conservation organizations

According to Shadrack Gutto, former lecturer in law at the University of Zimbabwe: "conservation is a religion through which a wealthy elite worship nature" (Zimbabwe
Wildlife, 1989b, 22). In the Zimbabwean context, the word "whites" could safely be substituted for "a wealthy elite."

The history of wildlife conservation does carry elements of racism, particularly the early land conservation laws outlined above. Immediately after independence in 1980, a wave of elephant poaching swept the communal lands and national parks. According to one game warden, as much as 90% of this poaching was not for ivory, but because the preservation of wildlife, especially those in the national parks, was associated with white rule (Timberlake, 1985).

Yeager and Miller observed the same white conservation phenomenon in Kenya, and found three major ramifications of this for wildlife policy: local whites can be largely ignorant of local customs regarding wildlife; owing to their tenuous nature in the polity, they can be easily intimidated by black politicians; and they are reluctant to speak out on land distribution issues, owing to their large scale ownership of commercial farming land. All these factors operate in Zimbabwe, with the land distribution issue particularly heightened, since 40% of Zimbabwe's arable land is currently controlled by fewer than 4000 whites.

International conservation groups

Several international conservation organizations are active in Zimbabwe, including the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), and the International Union for the Conservation of
Nature (IUCN), which have major offices in Harare, and which have formal institutional arrangements with Government. These organizations can be assumed to represent an "international citizenry with [Western] conservation values and concerns", owing to their scope and basis firmly within the Western environmental conservation movement (Pearl, 1989, 164). This accounts for the WWF and IUCN positions against an international ivory trade, which both the local conservationists and the government vociferously support.

Commercial farming and ranching organizations

The politically and economically powerful Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), made up almost wholly of large scale white farmers, has taken a direct interest in wildlife conservation recently. Owing to the provisions of the Parks and Wildlife Act of 1975, commercial farmers are allowed to raise wildlife on their lands for culling and even tourist purposes; this includes elephants. The Wildlife Producers Association (WPA) is the main organization representing the interests of commercial wildlife ranchers, and wildlife ranching is the fastest growing form of commercial land use. Thus, commercial wildlife ranching takes on a wider political significance, since as more commercial land is devoted to game ranching, that land becomes more integrated into the state's wildlife conservation regime. Consequently, the state's major stated goal of
redistribution of commercial lands to peasants becomes problematic.

**Peasants**

Ideally, rural farmers are at the center of Zimbabwe's wildlife regime. Formally integrated into the state-centric system, rural farmers are the main intended target of the sustainable utilization philosophy. Thus, the wildlife conservation regime does not rely on cultivating a western-style environmental ethos among peasants (Matzke, 1977). Writing of Uganda, Pollack wryly states "it is only the very understanding farmer who can appreciate the value of preserving elephants for foreign tourists when a large bull is destroying his crops" (Pollack, 1974, 56). Here again one is confronted with differing ideas about the motivations behind and incentives offered by wildlife conservation. Figure 4.2 presents all the major governmental bodies involved in wildlife conservation policymaking and implementation. Likewise, Figure 4.3 show the major interest groups involved in this conservation regime.

**Problems of Measuring Wildlife Conservation Attitudes and Activity**

The immediate conceptual and operational problem is to define what interest groups are. In their discussion of natural resource politics, Ball and Millard list several questions the analyst should ask about interest groups:
1. What is the level of cohesion of shared values within the group?
2. Precisely where in the group are decisions made?
3. How politically and legally legitimate is the group?
4. Is the group exclusively or only marginally political?
5. Is the group's membership open, select, or by invitation only?
6. Does the group have a full time internal bureaucracy or staff?
7. How long has the group endured?
8. What is the nature and scope of the group's demands on the state?
9. Does the group have an official relationship with the state? Does it receive funds from the state? Was it founded by the state? (Ball and Millard, 1986).

To this list one can add questions asked by Robert Salisbury (1969):

10. Who leads this group? Does the nature of group leadership affect that group's functions and relationship with the state?
11. Who founded this group?

Another question asked by Jack Walker (1983) is key:

12. Where does this group get its funds?

Further elaborations on the concepts and questions listed above are clearly needed. The key questions about group shared values and their demands on the state have been addressed by scholars concerned with the motivations of people to join and remain in groups, and the incentives which produce those motivations. Even when the analyst is adopting a corporatist theoretical framework, which calls
for attention to the strong role the state plays in establishing bargaining relationships with functional groups, the motivations and incentives of groups and group members to participate are still important variables. Indeed, the extent to which group motivations and incentives, and the attitudes that go with them, correlate with interest group behavior is a key indicator of how strong and important state interests are vis-à-vis those groups. James Q. Wilson's pioneering work on motivations and incentives strongly informs the present analysis (Wilson, 1961). In his work on organizational theory, Wilson identified three types of motivations for persons to join political groups: solidary, when people join for social companionship; purposive, when people join because they identify strongly with a certain cause; and material, when people join to cull some monetary or material gain from group membership. These motivations for group participation clearly will affect both an individual's tenure within the group, and the ways in which the groups pursue wildlife policy interests, both independently and through interactions with the state. Further, different types of interest groups, e.g., peasant CAMPFIRE programs and the Wildlife Society of Zimbabwe, will likely exhibit different motivational patterns within their structures. How these different motivations affect the relationships of these interest groups to each other and to the state will affect
Governmental Agencies Involved in Wildlife Policymaking and Implementation

Figure 4.2
Figure 4.3
Interest Groups in the Wildlife Conservation Regime
the policy outputs of Zimbabwe's wildlife conservation regime.

Closely following on group incentive patterns is the type of internal group organization. As Ball and Millard (1986) point out above, the type of internal organization a group exhibits usually affects a group's legitimacy (external relations) and the intensity of members' involvement in group activities (internal relations). Placing this concept into a corporatist framework, could not the nature of group organization also affects how that group engages the state and other groups in society? Do certain organizational patterns correlate with external group linkages?

Similarly to group organization, the assets a group can mobilize will affect that group's participation in the wildlife conservation regime. Among the assets an interest group can mobilize are: key allies in government and in society, money, skills and expertise, and some measure of positive inducements for or even coercion of the state (Ball and Millard, 1986; Culhane, 1981). The extent to which a group can use its assets to influence the state at the expense of other groups or even other units within the state apparatus, is another important concept to address when considering Zimbabwe's wildlife conservation regime.

Closely related to group assets is the access a group has to decisionmakers within the state. A regularized
pattern of group access to certain government officials is to pluralist scholars a clear indication that that group has a comparative advantage over other groups (Culhane, 1981; Dryzek, 1983). For the analyst who pays heed to the corporatist nuances of group-state relations, such patterns can also be indications that elements of the state have purposefully entered into formal bargaining arrangements with a functional group in society. For the person concerned with the survivability of elephants, such relations can offer clues of why and how crucial conservation policies are made.

Finally, one must formally consider the interactions and patterns of alliance and competition between interest groups over wildlife policy. Laumann et al. (1987) asked the question: are interest group actions more a product of internal group organizational characteristics and member profiles, or are these actions largely the results of the conflict environment in which they operate, structured by group interactions and alliances with each other and the state? This question is actually a very straightforward recapitulation of the pluralist-corporatist continuum; why do groups do the things they do? Indeed, one can not really be satisfied with describing what happens as a result of Zimbabwe's wildlife conservation regime; one must explain how and why that regime operates.
Annotated Hypotheses

Attitudes

1. The more a group and its members are explicitly and overtly concerned with local economic utilization of wildlife, the stronger will be their bargaining position with the state.

This inquiry starts with group and member attitudes toward wildlife conservation. Hypothesis One proposes that a three-dimensional attitudinal cleavage separates different groups involved in wildlife conservation from each other. It is hypothesized that members of groups hold attitudes toward wildlife conservation which are unique in their motivational origin (saving wildlife as a moral issue versus saving wildlife for economic gain); proximate location to those interest groups (wildlife loss is part of a broader global crisis versus the wildlife of Zimbabwe must survive); and their perception of wildlife as a common property or a private economic good. This three-dimensional attitudinal cleavage captures motivational, spatial, and ownership phenomena, and allows the three to be measured separately for their unique effects on group activity and interaction with the state and other groups. Since the state operates a conservation regime based on sustainable utilization of elephants and other species,
groups and members which exhibit these attitudes on the above three dimensions will be better placed to enter into bargaining arrangements with the state conservation authorities.

**Group Organization**

2. The more hierarchically organized a group is, the more enduring and encompassing will be its attempts to engage the state and other groups within the conservation regime.

3. The closer a group's internal racial and ethnic profile matches the larger society, the greater will be that group's range of interaction with other conservation groups and the state.

Here, one conceptualizes a paradoxical effect of group organization: tightly organized, long-lasting groups will have the most interactions with the state and with other groups, while groups which are more representative of society (and thus by association more "legitimate") will have a wider range of groups with which they will naturally interact, as well as with the state. The paradox: the most tightly organized groups are often also the least representative of society.

This two dimensional conceptualization allows us to measure these concepts against each other for their explanatory power of group interactions within Zimbabwe's
conservation regime. Thus, one could hopefully determine whether it is more advantageous for groups to represent the rich, whites, blacks, rural farmers, etc., in their bargaining with the state, which sits firmly atop Zimbabwe's wildlife conservation regime.

The Central Role of the State

4. The state apparatus which oversees the conservation regime will seek public involvement (through the existing interest groups) when: it wants to secure group support for state-conceived goals; it wants to test the adequacy and viability of its implementation plans; and when it seeks to extend popular acceptance of or acquiescence to plans after they have been implemented.

5. The more the state uses these limited types of group-mediated public involvement, the stronger its position becomes vis-à-vis those functional groups and the fractions of society they represent.

The two last hypotheses test the key concepts and assumptions upon which this research rests: the state, being at the pinnacle of a corporatist system of limited and structured public involvement, seeks that type of bargaining with functional groups within society which will further its own power and endurance. This conceptualization of
conservation puts Zimbabwe's elephant programs into a broader political context, and links an understanding of wildlife conservation to the necessity of understanding broader political power relationships within the polity. Crudely put, the Zimbabwean state is not primarily interested in saving wildlife because that is the right and ethical thing to do. On the contrary, the preservation and utilization of living resources provides the state with convenient linkages between itself, rural farmers, the white urban bourgeoisie, large scale commercial farmers, and even international elites. Fortunately for the political power of the state, it finds itself firmly astride this conservation regime.

What can one learn from this disparate attitudinal and behavioral data (which will be modeled and collected in different ways for the three case studies to follow)? First, one must be careful to see how group attitudes about each other and the state correlate. If the state views a group in one way, while that group's leaders and members think the state views it in a completely different way, then that group may not be part of the bargaining framework of the wildlife conservation regime. Second, the motivations to conserve wildlife, as outlined in Hypotheses One, Two, and Three, may predict which kinds of participation are approved by the state, and thus which groups within society are most influential vis-à-vis each other and the state.
Third, Hypotheses Four and Five, tested by again looking at
group-state views of and access to each other, will
hopefully indicate whether group aggregate conservation
attitudes or raw political and economic power are the most
salient factors in a group having relatively secure
bargaining status with state authorities. Fourth, and most
crucial, a broader picture, painted with these attitudinal
and access-linkage data, will shed light on how successful
the state has been at using wildlife conservation to build
its power and authority with in various sectors of society.
Does peasant participation in Operation Windfall and
CAMPFIRE cause those rural people to view the ZANU
government more favorably? Does white participation in this
relatively small sector of the political process more firmly
marry the state with the white-controlled political economy?
How has the hostility generated between Zimbabwe and other
nations and international conservation NGO's by the ivory
ban affected Zimbabwe's relations with its African and
Western partners?

Conclusion

Table 4.1 summarizes this chapter's assumptions about
the political importance of environmental policies in the
developing world. As Michael Schatzberg has stated,
"interactions between state and civil society should be the
object of empirical inquiry before they become the subject of deductive theorizing" (Schatzberg, 1988, 142). Because Zimbabwe's wildlife conservation regime encompasses a relatively large amount of interest groups, and a state apparatus that has some measure of autonomy (Herbst, 1990), environmental policy and politics offers a fruitful avenue to pursue in testing propositions about the state's ability to maintain and extend its authority and legitimacy. By choosing one area of policy to study, this dissertation will undoubtedly find variation in state authority and legitimacy vis-à-vis organized interests even within this one area of policymaking. Variation, rather than a curse to academic grand theorizing, helps one understand the dynamic of politics. But this is the case only when such variation in power arrangements and influence can be effectively conceptualized, modeled, and measured.
Table 4.1
Natural Resources as Political Resources: Examples from Zimbabwe

- Clashes between North and South over environmental values and economic development
  - Example: the international ivory trade
- Conflicts and bargaining between government and rural farmers over conservation, game parks, and agriculture
  - Example: the CAMPFIRE wildlife utilization project
- Competition between various state agencies over conservation policies
  - Example: struggle between National Parks and Ministry of Agriculture for jurisdiction over large scale commercial wildlife ranching
- Bargaining arrangements between the state and very powerful economic interests
  - Example: commercial farmers versus the government over environmentally and politically appropriate uses of land
- Environmental Policies as Political Tools
  - Governments in the developing world can use conservation programs to extend their reach over various parts of society
  - Natural resource policies are often the most important central government policies in the developing world, because they affect almost every aspect of rural life
  - In the 1990's, international struggles will most likely be over natural resources (especially jurisdiction and access)
CHAPTER FIVE
THE HISTORY OF ZIMBABWE'S WILDLIFE CONSERVATION REGIME:
CAMPFIRE AS A NEW POLITICAL PRESENCE IN RURAL AREAS

By exploring the current and historical relationships between Zimbabwean rural people and the wildlife that surrounds them, one can hopefully gain insights into why Zimbabwe's effort to preserve the black rhino is failing, and, almost paradoxically, why the country's elephant population is actually growing. The cases explored in this chapter clearly indicate that the more rural people are allowed and encouraged to participate in the management of big game, and the more material benefits they accrue, the higher their stake will become in conserving those living resources. This seems to be the case as far as receiving financial benefits are concerned. Still, the implications of such sustainable utilization for the furtherance of the state's power have been unclear in scholarship to date. This chapter puts CAMPFIRE into a political framework, arguing that the establishment of wildlife utilization programs in agriculturally marginal rural areas also serves the interests of the Zimbabwean government to extend its authority in these otherwise neglected areas. This chapter,
then, illustrates a paradox in development: how can decentralization actually strengthen the government's power?

The Colonial Legacy of Conservation in Zimbabwe

Beginning with the establishment of the settler colony by Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company in 1890, the African population of Zimbabwe endured land alienation unsurpassed anywhere in its scale on the African continent. Through legislation and taxation schemes, rural farmers were either forced into the growing mining economy of the colony or into marginal, fragile scrub and dustland farming areas. Indeed in 1991, over 100 years after the Pioneer Column established Salisbury, 40 percent of Zimbabwe's arable land is still held by less than one percent of the population, most of whom are descendants of the settlers. But taxation and Colour Bars were not the only schemes used by the various colonial regimes to take the best land for themselves; wildlife preservation schemes also led to land alienation, and created a hostility to wildlife conservation among local people that still must be battled today.

Not only were rural farmers moved off the best land; they were also prohibited from hunting wildlife on the meager lands allocated to them (IUCN, 1988). In precolonial days (before 1890) wildlife probably survived because of low human population density, and because people utilized
wildlife sustainably as a food resource (Taylor, 1992). The last of the Ndebele kings, Mzilikazi and Lobengula, attempted to limit European hunting in their territories. Lobengula explicitly banned the hunting of female elephants and the gathering of ostrich eggs, and tried to restrict white hunters to certain racks, and charged trophy fees (Thomas, 1991).

Suddenly, with the advent of white settler colonialism, the Rhodesians became the gamekeepers, and the Africans the poachers. Whereas the local people had once hunted game both for food and ritual, what had once been a practice of everyday life now became illegal. They were even barred from killing elephants and other dangerous animals which threatened their crops. Thus, rural farmers had to suffer the consequences of living with wildlife while reaping no benefits from them, and having no say in their management. In this atmosphere of conflict and obvious lack of concern by the authorities for creating truly meaningful grass roots participation in conservation programs, rural farmers would rather be rid of wildlife than tolerate its presence; consequently, the conservation message had little meaning to these people (IUCN, 1988). Indeed, evidence of this attitude persists today. In a baseline sociological study of Chapoto Ward in northeastern Zimbabwe¹, researchers

¹A region very rich in wildlife resources.
found that 84.8% of respondents said wildlife had no value to their households whatever.

Changing Legal Institutions for Wildlife Conservation: 1890-1975

The royal game principle was adopted by the colonial government of Rhodesia. This simply meant that wildlife on any form of land with any form of tenure was state property (Taylor, 1992). Game was administered by the department of Agriculture until 1923. Then the Forestry department appointed the colony's first full-time game warden in 1928. The Game and Fish Preservation Act of 1929 gave the Forestry Department the full responsibility for game management, which they held until 1950. That act also established several contemporary parks, including the Hwange Game Reserve and Victoria Falls National Park. A key act for the contemporary environmental policy regime was the Natural Resources Act of 1941. Under its provisions, white commercial farmers were given the right to police and administer their own lands for resource degradation, under the auspices of the Intensive Conservation Area (ICA). These ICA's, which still exist today, are one of the several forms of local government which were basically privatized by the country's 4000 commercial farmers. With self-policing
powers\textsuperscript{2}, these ICA's not only served to conserve
environmental resources in the commercial areas, but also
gave the farmers even more structural power to run their own
affairs. These powers of local autonomy will be more fully
discussed in Chapter Seven.\textsuperscript{3}

The crucial Native Land Husbandry Act of 1950 was in
letter supposed to extend the philosophy of ICA's to the
Native Reserves.\textsuperscript{4} Instead, the Act became a vehicle of
oppression, giving the Natural Resources Board (NRB)
unappealable police powers to evict from their lands anyone
found in violation of conservation laws. Since these areas
were of poorer quality than white commercial areas, they
were much more susceptible to environmental degradation.
Consequently, many peasants were moved off their land under
the auspices of this act (Ranger, 1987). Largely due to the

\textsuperscript{2}Actually, the Department of National Parks and the
Natural Resources Board both have the legal mandate to stop
the unsustainable use of environmental resources in ICA's,
but usually keep hands-off.

\textsuperscript{3}See also Herbst (1990) and Bratton (1987) for
excellent discussions of the power of rural councils.

\textsuperscript{4}The term "Native Reserves" was used to designate the
land legally reserved for blacks until the 1970's. Then the
name became "Tribal Trust Lands" (TTL's). Since
independence in 1980, the accepted name is "Communal Areas."
Still, these are the same lands with different names, and
the fact that they are qualitatively inferior to white
commercial farming land is neither a fact influenced by name
changes, nor is it an accident of history, as will be seen
in Chapter Eight.
Native Land Husbandry Act of 1950, conservation has not shed completely its unpopular associations with coercion and restriction (Katerere et al., 1991). Not surprisingly, in 1950 the Department of National Parks was established under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which in British and British colonial terminology means "the police."

The Parks and Wildlife Act of 1975 marked a change in government policy toward ownership of wildlife resources. Still the basis of Zimbabwe's wildlife conservation regime, it officially recognized that wildlife was the property of those who lived on the land with it. In theory, it transfers ownership of wildlife living in the communal areas of Zimbabwe to the rural farmers living there. Owing to the nature of land tenure, the owners of large commercial ranches have seen more material benefits from this legislation than have the rural farmers. Nevertheless, the 1975 Act does offer a potential watershed transition for human-wildlife relations in the communal areas. The Parks Act marked a reversal of the royal game principle, which had been operating in the communal areas since 1898 (Taylor, 1992). In both the commercial and the communal areas, the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNP) can place restrictions on the use (hunting or ranching) of threatened or endangered species, but generally the DNP restricts itself to giving technical advice to commercial
farmers and to encouraging the development of wildlife management in agriculturally marginal communal areas.

Since the attitudes of rural farmers toward wildlife conservation were formed in the context of colonialist schemes to alienate the rural farmers from the land, these negative attitudes must be seen within the context of a political culture of resistance to colonialism. Indeed, the nationalist movement, led by ZANU and ZAPU, openly campaigned among the rural farmers to resist the implementation of wildlife conservation policies. Thus, those who were to become the leaders of Zimbabwe in 1980 played a part in enhancing the culture of resistance to wildlife conservation, as part of the overall anti-colonialist struggle. How effectively the post-independence government transforms the values and norms of resistance to conservation into support for conservation will depend very much on how conservation attitudes and motivations are affected by current environmental policies.


According to Shadrack Gutto, former lecturer in law at the University of Zimbabwe: "conservation is a religion through which a wealthy elite worship nature" (Zimbabwe Wildlife, 1989b, 22). In the Zimbabwean context, the word "whites" could safely be substituted for "a wealthy elite."
The history of wildlife conservation does carry elements of racism, particularly the early land conservation laws. This legislation left an anti-conservationist legacy among local people, to which Dr. Callistus Ndlovu, MP, referred in Parliament in 1981:

let me say that during the struggle for independence, and in fact as far back as the 1950s, there was a great deal of resistance from the African population to any conservation programme. This was not because the African majority was opposed to conservation as a principle, or as a means of preserving the natural resources of this country. It was in part their political resistance. I say this, because at a certain point in time, those of us who were involved in the struggle for independence did encourage people not to cooperate with certain programmes for conservation, and thus might have created an impression not only among our own supporters but also among those who are charged with this responsibility that we are not interested in conservation.

(Parliament, 1981, 943)

In independent Zimbabwe, these attitudes still affect the policy environment in which any conservation program must operate. Immediately after independence in 1980, a wave of elephant poaching swept the communal lands and national parks. According to one game warden, as much as 90% of this poaching was not for ivory, but because the preservation of wildlife, especially those in the national parks, was associated with white rule (Timberlake, 1985).

This suspicion of conservation on racial grounds has carried over into the governmental attitude toward NGOs and to some conservation legislation. One example of the latter is the debate over the Natural Resources Amendment Bill in 1981. Part of this bill sought to curtail the authority of
the Natural Resources Board, an advisory board to the Department of National Parks traditionally dominated by whites. Previously, the NRB had the authority to block large public works projects if they were deemed by the Board to be harmful to the environment, under the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1950. In an act of mistrust, the amendment took this power out of the hands of the NRB, because, the Minister of Natural Resources and Tourism said, "[such power] could be obstructionist to development in areas neglected by previous governments" (Parliament, 1981, 1564). Further, the nature of relations between Government and Zimbabwean conservation groups is tainted by the dichotomous racial makeup of the two parties. This was noted in a December 1987 editorial by veteran conservationist Dick Pittman, who said:

   let's be quite blunt; we only have to look at the ethnic composition of most voluntary [conservation] organizations to recognize that we may be in danger of becoming irrelevant. (Pittman, 1987, 5)

Indeed, of the ten members of the Zimbabwe National Conservation Trust coordinating committee who represent conservation NGOs as late as 1989, all ten were white.

The seemingly disproportionate white interest in conservation issues is strikingly borne out in the Zimbabwe Parliament. Table 5.1 presents a logistic regression which analyzes black and white parliamentarians' speaking patterns on both conservation and non-conservation issues for the
years 1980-1982, and 1988-1989. These speeches (N=190) were
drawn from a random sample of all House debates as published
by the Government. The dependent variable--issue type--is
coded zero for a non-environmental speech,
and one for a speech related in some way to environmental
conservation. The independent variable--race of speaker--is
also a dummy variable, with coding zero for black and one
for white. Thus, this logistic regression has a logit or
log-linear interpretation, which with one independent
variable is straightforward. Exponentiating the B
coefficient for race, one sees that, all else being equal,
whites are 3.57 times more likely to speak on environmental
issues than are blacks. The test for the magnitude of this
coefficient is highly significant in predicting speech type
by race. Clearly, then, whites retain a more obvious
interest in conservation issues than do black elites and, by
association, the millions of black rural farmers. This
situation, and the historical reasons for it, certainly
serve to constrain successful implementation of any
conservation scheme, and inhibits the establishment popular
participation in conservation and human-wildlife relations.

The Contemporary Legal and Institutional Setting

The previously mentioned Parks and Wildlife Act of 1975
serves as the basis of contemporary Zimbabwean wildlife
Table 5.1

Predicting Who Makes Environmental Speeches in Parliament: A Racial Holdover from the Colonial Era

Logistic Regression Analysis: Issue Type as Dependent Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EXP (B)</th>
<th>Chi-Square</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.29</td>
<td>18.89***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>14.51***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p < 0.001

0 = Non Environmental; 1 = Environmental
policy. As of 1992, wildlife generated US$60 million in tourism for the Zimbabwean economy (Taylor, 1992). Although not an insubstantial figure, this amounts to less than three percent of Zimbabwe's GDP. Thus, wildlife policies which depend only on tourism and parks are probably not economically tenable. Recognizing this fact, the Zimbabwe National Conservation Strategy of 1987 states:

wildlife and protected areas are accepted as renewable resources that can and should be used correctly on a sustainable basis for the benefits of both the people and the resources. These benefits may take aesthetic forms such as scientific, cultural, and recreational values, or they may take material forms such as enhanced productivity from land. (Government of Zimbabwe, 1987, 4)

Figures 5.1 and 5.2 display the same data in two different formats, to illustrate the problem with depending solely on tourism to fund the protection for wildlife. Figure 5.1 displays the trend lines for both the annual National Parks budget and for tourism receipts, both normalized in 1980 US dollars to indicate real change. As can be seen, while tourism receipts fluctuated largely due to the civil war fought in Rhodesia in the 1970s, the National Parks budget has remained relatively flat, experiencing no real increase or decline, although the trend for 20 years is slightly positive. Figure 5.2 presents this data in a different fashion, taking as the dependent variable the National Parks budget, with tourism receipts from the previous year as the independent variable. As can be seen, there is a slight
positive relationship between the two: as tourism receipts
for the previous year rise by US$1 million, the National
Parks budget rises by US$112,000. This relationship is,
however, statistically insignificant, and has an r-square of
only 0.08. Still, since this is population, and not sample,
data one can still interpret the b coefficient with some
meaning. Depending on tourism receipts to increase the
National Parks budget by around 12 percent (excluding the
time factor), is not wise public budgeting, especially given
the volatile nature of tourism as seen in Figure 5.1.

The Wild Life Estate--National Parks, Safari Areas,
Recreational Areas, and Botanical Reserves--covers 12.7
percent of Zimbabwe's land area. In addition, DNP is given
oversight status for those commercial farms and ranches
which have wildlife populations, and the wildlife in
communal areas. Thus, the potential jurisdiction of the DNP
is quite large, and this part of government is potentially a
very powerful entity. The Parks themselves allow absolutely
no consumptive use, and are based on the preservationist
motivation so pervasive amongst environmentalists in the
North (see Chapter Three). The Safari Areas cover almost as
much acreage as do the National Parks, and are usually
contiguous with parks. They allow camping, hiking, fishing,
game viewing, and of course licenses hunting of plains game
and big game--elephants, lion, buffalo, and leopard.
Figure 5.1
National Park Budget and Tourism Receipts
National Parks Budget in Millions US$

$11.0

$10.0

$9.0

$8.0

$7.0

$6.0

$5.0

$4.0

$3.0

$2.0

$1.0

$0.0

Tourism Receipts in Millions US$

$5.0

$10.0

$15.0

$20.0

$25.0

$30.0

y = 3.54
+0.112 X

R2 = 0.08

Figure 5.2
National Parks Budget by Tourism Receipts
In its "Policy for Wildlife," the government of Zimbabwe recognizes that economic returns are an important part of conservation when mixed with the imperatives of economic development (Government of Zimbabwe, 1987). And with a 3 percent population growth rate and severe overcrowding of many existing communal areas, there are likely to be calls for the return of some National Parks and Safari Areas to agriculture. Even the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET), the parent ministry for the Department of National Parks, recognizes this fact, but presently supports a policy of not opening any parks to agricultural development (Government of Zimbabwe, 1987). Further, with the dwindling of financial resources for the DNP, the complete protection (and even the effective protection of some important areas) may have to be reexamined in the future, given the political imperatives of massive land hunger, and the practicalities of dwindling government expenditure. If government is the only source of income for wildlife conservation, then this situation can only be worse. Figure 5.3 presents data on the National Parks budget, both over time and as a percentage of the overall annual budget of government. As can be seen from the trend (which was also seen in Figure 5.1, there is a positive relationship between time and the National Parks budget, although recently that trend has slowed down and even reversed for two years in real dollar terms. The size of the bubbles in Figure 5.3 represent the
percentage of the overall governmental budget that is devoted to National Parks, with larger bubbles indicating a larger proportion of money going to the DNP. As can be seen, the trend over time is for the DNP's share of the governmental budget to decrease. This should not be surprising, given the historical inequities in job access, education, and welfare provided to blacks versus whites, which the present government has tried to redress partially. Still, it does signal a warning to those who advocate exclusively preservationist environmental policies. This is not a practical option in light of both Zimbabwe's historical experience with conservation, and its post-independence current budgetary climate. As Taylor states:

> traditional forms of conservation are still often perceived as a minority pre-occupation. The result is a tendency to underfund activities designed solely to maintain biodiversity. The future of wildlife and natural ecosystems ultimately depends on an electoral consensus that their survival is beneficial. In Zimbabwe, this consensus has, until recently, only existed among a small sector of a [white] urban elite--the sector that pays the least costs, and enjoys the most benefits--from wildlife conservation. (Taylor, 1992, 4)

The practical policy-oriented task, then, is for government to find alternative means of financing preservationist policies, or to opt for policies that involve the sustainable utilization of species. Further, given the political culture of hostility to conservation, the successful environmental policy will seek to redress and reverse this opposition to wildlife conservation prevalent
in the black population of Zimbabwe. This kind of policy, which Zimbabwe's Parks Act and National Conservation Strategy openly embrace, also has political ramifications. Since wildlife conservation takes place in parks, safari areas, communal areas, and on commercial farms, government must engage a broad spectrum of organized interests with very different motivations and organizational capacities. Before examining two policies—one a success and one a failure—one must come to grips with the explicitly political problems facing any wildlife conservation policy regime in Zimbabwe.

At least three major political problems confront successful sustainable development. First, the differences of access by social groups to the benefits and costs of natural resources will influence the ways those groups perceive the benefits of a given wildlife policy, regardless of its technical and economic merit in the aggregate. Second, the historical polarization of attitudes toward wildlife between people with a preservationist perspective and those with a socio-economic approach discussed in Chapter Three will hinder the successful implementation of Zimbabwe's wildlife policies. In a related vein, the polarization of attitudes between those "comfortably concerned with ecosystems and sustainability" (Katerere et al., 1991, 67), and those concerned with their own safety
Figure 5.3
National Parks Budget by Year, and as % of Overall Budget:
A Dwindling Financial Priority for National Government?
Table 5.2
Nyaminyami CAMPFIRE Program Income (in percent)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safari Hunting</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>90.1</td>
<td>80.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cropping</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem Animal Control</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Murombedzi, 1992
and survival vis wildlife will cause obvious problems for the design and implementation of sustainable utilization policies. Third, the tendency by international agencies and regulatory bodies to impose environmental conditionality on developing nations without a full comprehension of and commitment to the developmental implications of these conditions, will affect Zimbabwe's policies when they interact with the international community. All these issues are addressed in the three case studies to follow in this chapter, and in Chapters Six and Seven, especially as they involve interactions between the state and organized interests.

Comparative Perspectives on Changing Conservational Attitudes: Zimbabwe's Rhino and Elephant Conservation Policies

With the colonial background to conservation fully in mind, let us now examine how the current government has tried to change the rural political culture surrounding wildlife conservation from hostility to cooperation, namely, in the reorientation of proper, workable, and relevant conservation attitudes at the grassroots level. In approaching this subject, we will examine two sets of conservation policies: the Operation Windfall and CAMPFIRE wildlife utilization schemes, and the Operation Stronghold
rhino anti-poaching program currently operating in the Zambezi Valley.

**Operation Windfall and the CAMPFIRE Program**

Under the previously mentioned Parks and Wildlife Act of 1975, hunting and ranching of non-endangered wildlife are allowed in both communal and commercial farming areas, under the logic of sustainable utilization (the use it or lose it philosophy). Zimbabwean parks authorities and conservationists assert that only through this approach to game conservation will the long term survivability of species like the elephant be insured.

The rational choice-based thinking is behind Zimbabwe's opposition to the current worldwide ivory ban. Timberlake (1985) gives evidence that the policy of controlled elephant hunting is insuring the species' survival in Zimbabwe. Operation Windfall, which began in 1981, required that the revenues derived from hunting elephants in the communal lands or in the safari areas near these lands be plowed back into development projects in the affected areas. In the first year of the program, the ivory and meat of elephants produced Z$960,000 to build local infrastructure, schools, and clinics. Further, Zimbabwe's elephant population is now growing, and is a large foreign exchange earner as well. It must be recognized, however, that Windfall was a limited
program in that it only applied in one area of the country, and to only one species--the elephant.

A broader program complementary to Operation Windfall is CAMPFIRE: the Communal Area Management Programme for Indigenous Resources. CAMPFIRE, created by National Parks ecologists, acknowledges that when local natural resources begin to dwindle, communities will move toward a rational system of resource allocation, if allowed to do so. Whereas the colonial conservation scheme specifically prohibited rural farmers from managing their own wildlife resources, CAMPFIRE seeks to have national government work in conjunction with local communities to broaden local ownership and management of wildlife and other resources. The program also mandates that any benefits which result from local custody and exploitation of natural resources should accrue to that community directly (Martin, 1986).

The institutional structure for the management of wildlife and other resources is centered on District Councils, Ward Development Committees (WADCO's), and Village Development Committees (VIDCO's). These are forms of local government established after independence in 1980, with 55 District Councils subdivided into Wards and Villages, the latter with about 100 households (Helmsling, 1989). Under CAMPFIRE, all adults in the community become shareholders in the cooperative. Ideally, they receive benefits from income, employment, and production generated by tourism,
ivory culling, meat marketing, and problem animal control (PAC).

The current worldwide ban on ivory threatens the successful operation of Windfall and CAMPFIRE. If Zimbabwe cannot sell its ivory on the world market, argues former Natural Resources Minister Victoria Chitepo, people living near these potentially dangerous and destructive animals will see no benefit in preserving them, and may consequently either allow poachers to operate in the areas or wantonly kill the animals as they grow in number and threaten the local livelihood (Meldrum, 1989). Meldrum also reports on an interview with Mr. Ephraim Chafesuka, chairman of the Guruve District Council, an area which borders the large Zambezi Valley concentrations of elephants, and which was one of the first of 26 communities to participate in CAMPFIRE. "Why should Zimbabwe get the blame for Kenya's inability to manage its wildlife?" (Meldrum, 1989, 25). In October, 1990, the Zimbabwean government acknowledged that no widespread culls had taken place since the ivory ban went into effect. Chapter Six more thoroughly covers the international political economy of ivory. Clearly, Windfall and CAMPFIRE are vast improvements in resource management over the colonial era practices of divorcing the rural farmers from wildlife, at least in theory. Further, they are evidence of Zimbabwe's attempt to create a well integrated conservation system which will hopefully
ameliorate the colonial legacy of open rural hostility among farmers toward wildlife conservation. Under the ideal CAMPFIRE program, there would be at least four major political benefits to government.

First, the authority of the government in directing conservation would be recognized and respected by the local communities participating in the Windfall and CAMPFIRE programs. National Parks officials provide guidance to the local wildlife conservation regimes, and distribute to them profits made from wildlife. Yet the local units would be autonomous in their administration of their own conservation programs.

Second, some measure of earned trust between the local resource committees and the national authorities would develop within a framework based as closely as possible on traditional (pre-colonial) methods of wildlife management (IUCN, 1988). Thus, not only are localities integrated into the national conservation scheme, but the local cooperatives may also engage the national authorities within the context of a traditional local conservation metaphor based on the trust that pervades traditional, local societies. Here, the locality, if successfully integrated into the national conservation scheme, may actually internalize the values behind the whole conservation system, thus integrating rural farmers, elephants, and National Parks authorities into the same system.
Third, economic reciprocity would ideally develop between locality and government, since monetary gains that come from locally-culled ivory and hunted animals are returned to the local level after the ivory is auctioned by the national authorities, and trophy fees distributed to the District Councils. Here obvious monetary benefits accrue to all involved, whereas in the colonial era rural farmers realized no profit from these resources; in fact, they were a drain on local monetary resources through fines from hunting.

Finally, local conservation officials operating through the resource cooperatives would be accountable to their members for the distribution of resources, and the members accountable to each other in their provision of inputs to the cooperative. Likewise, National Parks authorities would be accountable to these local cooperatives in providing expertise, and in the distribution of proceeds from wildlife products. In the colonial era, no such double accountability linkages existed.

Clearly, these major linkages between rural farmers, wildlife, and conservation officers can at least be potentially successful in breaking the culture of resistance to wildlife conservation created among the rural farmers in the colonial era. But the record on the 12 current CAMPFIRE projects is decidedly mixed. The problem from an academic point of view, however, is that none of the current or past
research on CAMPFIRE has directly addressed the program from the central government's point of view. Rather, most research has focused on CAMPFIRE's ability to deliver financial benefits to local people, and to exclude central government as much as possible from the analysis. In the extreme, as in anthropologist John Peterson's writings (1991), the analysis does not go beyond cheerleading for local empowerment, and for cash to simply be handed out at the end of the year to villagers. Indeed, very little research exists on the ability of CAMPFIRE to being about true institutional change and local decisionmaking in the rural areas, with the notable exception of Murombedzi's analysis of the Nyaminyami Wildlife Management Trust (1992).

One important question to ask is: why would central government support CAMPFIRE in the first place? The traditional answer to this question is that government wishes to improve the lives of people living in marginal areas, and wildlife utilization is often the most efficient use of marginal lands. Of course this is one reason for government to encourage CAMPFIRE programs. Another reason has been proposed by Katerere et al. (1991). Since the earliest CAMPFIRE programs were instituted in the Zambezi Valley, which has also been the target of existing and proposed massive rural resettlement, one must wonder how CAMPFIRE fits into the overall land redistribution policies of the Zimbabwean government. This question will be
addressed fully in Chapter Seven, especially as it pertains to commercial wildlife ranching. Still, these scholars suspect that CAMPFIRE wildlife utilization programs are designed as a stop-gap measure to allow as many people as possible to be packed into the Zambezi Valley and earn a living off, among other things, wildlife. This dumping of settlers⁵ could be a way of alleviating land pressures in the short term, thus putting off massive expropriation of white-owned commercial farms, which are the economic lifeline of Zimbabwe.

There are, however, counterarguments to the perspective that CAMPFIRE allows government to put off resolving "the land question." In her 1990 study of two Zambezi Valley CAMPFIRE projects in Nyaminyami and Guruve districts, Jansen argued that wildlife utilization projects were being opposed by members of what Murphree calls "the resettlement lobby" (Murphree, 1990, 3). This group of people, composed of international aid agencies, agricultural extension workers, and even commercial farmers, seems to regard the Valley as a dumping ground for resettlement, as a convenient solution to demands for land reform. On this point, then, Jansen agrees with Gore et al. However, the important point is that this resettlement lobby, along with the strong bias toward cash

⁵Sometimes settlers are literally "dumped" in these resettlement areas by government-hired buses that drop them off without tools miles away from any meaningful infrastructure.
agriculture among government extension workers, also works as an opposition to the establishment of CAMPFIRE wildlife utilization programs in the Zambezi Valley.

Assessing the Impact of CAMPFIRE on Zimbabwean State Power

Why, then, do these CAMPFIRE programs exist, and what benefit does central government derive from them? Certainly much credit for the development and maintenance of these wildlife utilization programs lies within the research unit of the Department of National Parks. Rowan Martin, the Assistant Director for Research, and Brian Child, the DNPWLMEconomist who oversees CAMPFIRE, were the driving forces behind integrating communal areas into the conservation regime first promulgated under the Parks and Wildlife Act of 1975. These and other National Parks officials view wildlife utilization as not only an appropriate development project for communal areas, but also as an integral part of Zimbabwe's "master plan" for country-wide wildlife conservation. Since many communal areas (especially those in the Zambezi Valley and the Southeastern Lowveld) are adjacent to established parks, a large percentage of Zimbabwe's wildlife lives in these areas. As a practical management philosophy, then, CAMPFIRE is a wise part of a national conservation strategy.

There are, however, broader reasons why districts and wards would welcome CAMPFIRE programs, and why central
government would support them. Importantly for this dissertation, these reasons may be fruitfully analyzed within the state-interest group framework proposed in Chapter Four.

At independence in 1980, there was a substantial extension of the central government presence in the communal areas. Rapid extension of education and primary health care to all rural areas was a major part of the new government's policy for rural development. Further, an effort was made to extend agricultural extension services to farmers in the communal areas, to not only improve subsistence agriculture, but also to extend cash cropping to the communal areas. Both of these objectives in turn were supported by infrastructural development projects involving the building of roads and water supplies (Helmsling, 1989). As Peterson observes, the more remote areas which were among the last to receive these new services were among the first in which CAMPFIRE projects were discussed and eventually developed (1991).

To accomplish this extension of rural services, central government grants to district councils tripled in the three years after independence in 1980. Local district council-generated revenues were only 41 cents per capita in 1981, while central government grants averaged $2.41 per capita. By 1986, locally-generated revenues went to $5 per capita, while central government grants were down to $3.97. Thus,
by 1986, district council revenues outstripped central government grants on average (Peterson, 1991). Most district council funds are used to construct schools and clinics, while central government itself pays teachers' salaries. Thus, as far as education is concerned, national government pays the teachers, but local government must build the schools and teachers' accommodations.

Since central government grants to district councils have been declining since 1984, there is obviously a strong need for district councils to raise funds for their responsibilities. The two most lucrative ways for local governments to generate funds are through business licenses and district council beer halls (Helmsling, 1989). With these revenues obviously lower in poorer areas which need educational and health services the most, district councils with abundant wildlife resources obviously have a compelling financial interest in the development of CAMPFIRE programs. In the two original Zambezi Valley Projects—Nyaminyami and Guruve—CAMPFIRE is the most important source of revenues for their respective District Councils (Jansen, 1990).

The general guidelines for CAMPFIRE, however, hold that monies from wildlife utilization must be directed toward those people living in areas of wildlife. Thus, the majority of funds should go to the wards in a district that have the largest concentrations of wildlife (Government of Zimbabwe, 1987). These same government guidelines, however,
also allow a maximum 15% "council levy" and a 35% "management fund" reserve, leaving 50% of the net revenues from wildlife utilization for local projects in affected wards. Interestingly, this 50% local government holdback of funds is equal to the 50% top income tax rate in Zimbabwe. Thus, in this way, not only does wildlife become a financial benefit for people living in rural areas alongside wildlife; it also provides a tax on a commodity that would otherwise have provided no financial benefit to government, either.

CAMPFIRE, then, not only is a wildlife program; it is also very much a rural taxation program, which is creating new layers of government at the local level through the establishment of Wildlife Committees that manage these new monies (Murombedzi, 1992).

Table 5.2 presents a typical breakdown of CAMPFIRE revenues, in this case for the Nyaminyami project at Lake Kariba. As can be seen, safari hunting, led by two white-controlled professional hunting agencies, provided between 80% and 90% of the district's wildlife revenues. This percentage is typical of the 12 established CAMPFIRE districts, and points to both a management problem and an historical problem. First, since white hunters bringing in other white foreign clients to hunt are the prime generators of revenue for CAMPFIRE, through trophy fees for the animals and the daily charges attached to such hunts, safari hunting is preferred to black subsistence hunting, which in fact is
still illegal. Thus, this aspect of the CAMPFIRE program does not break the previously mentioned racial patterns evident in hunting and conservation in Rhodesia. Second, since the safari operators deposit their trophy fees and a percentage of their daily fees with the district council, little is done for the institutionalization of ward or village level management decisions being made by local people. As Murombedzi concluded in his study of the Nyaminyami CAMPFIRE program, local people are limited in their participation to merely receiving money or projects, rather than managing the resource itself, which is one of the goal of the CAMPFIRE philosophy (Murombedzi, 1992). Table 5.3 demonstrates the taxation potential of CAMPFIRE for the Gaza Khomanani District, a Lowveld district which in early 1993 was in the process of inviting hunting tenders for its CAMPFIRE program. If the district were to make 100% of its allotted quota, it would generate US$121,400, or approximately Z$728,400 in trophy fees and daily fees. Using the guidelines of a 15% District Council levy and a 35% management fund, then the District Council would be able to gross a tax level of Z$309,570, a huge financial windfall. Of course the actual net realized may be considerably lower owing to district expenditures on equipment and salaries, but the fact remains that this truly represents "found money" for poor District Councils, thus
demonstrating the fiscal benefits of CAMPFIRE not only to local people, but also to new levels of government.

What of the interest groups involved in the CAMPFIRE program? There are three major groups involved in the implementation of CAMPFIRE: The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) office in Harare, the Zimbabwe Trust (ZIMTRUST)—a local interest group that provided funding and management training, and the Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS) at the University of Zimbabwe, which provides socio-economic research to CAMPFIRE districts. All three of these groups are officially affiliated with the Department of National Parks in the implementation of CAMPFIRE. Thus, they are in many ways extensions of the government's main implementing agency for CAMPFIRE, and thus constitute an "issue network" in terms of Heclo's terminology from Chapter Three, since these interest groups regularly interact with the state in a rather fluid exchange of ideas. Further, once a district gains permission to implement a CAMPFIRE program, then the District Council is the appropriate management authority, not National Parks. Since all District Councils are supervised by the Ministry of Local Government, then technically DNP loses its local authority to another ministry. By using the services of CASS, WWF, and ZIMTRUST, the Department of National Parks can thus maintain a presence in these areas over which it has jurisdiction over only the wildlife, and not the people.
### Table 5.3
Total Potential Revenue and Taxation from Gaza Khomanani CAMPFIRE Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Animal</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elephant</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$61,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bufallo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$8,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lion</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$43,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crocodile</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zebra</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kudu</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impala</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$3,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bushbuck</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duiker</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Potential Revenue: 25 $121,400
Total Potential Taxation: 50% $60,700
Interestingly, a CAMPFIRE Association has also been established, with a permanent presence in Harare. This is an association of all district councils involved in the CAMPFIRE program, and any districts interested in establishing such a program. It meets regularly to share local information about CAMPFIRE projects, and has actively lobbied the Ministry of Local Government to recognize its status as an association of local governments. Thus, it is largely analogous to the U.S. Conference of Mayors in the United States, and is an attempt by local governments with relatively low organizational capacity to share common interests and represent their interests to central government. For its part, the central government, through the Ministry of Local Government and the Department of National Parks, has stated that the CAMPFIRE Association should become the leading organization in the country in charge of CAMPFIRE. Thus, central government has attempted to confer on the Association, which is semi-government, semi-interest group, a fully legal status in the implementation of this government project, just as it has coopted three research and development groups to help it construct and implement these policies. The creation of an interest group made up of District Councillors, while the development of Ward and Village level institutional capacity under CAMPFIRE simply does not extend beyond receiving money, is significant. Since CAMPFIRE has been accused of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Animal</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Z$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elephant</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bufallo</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lion</td>
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<td>288,100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crocodile</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zebra</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kudu</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12,060</td>
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<tr>
<td>Impala</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bushbuck</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duiker</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Potential Revenue: 25 $813,380

Total Potential Taxation: 50% $406,690
merely creating mini-civil services in the rural areas through financially strengthening District Councils, central government's desire that the CAMPFIRE Association become the "official" CAMPFIRE interest group in dealings with government indicates national level approval of existing taxation and management arrangements. In other words, central government, being at the pinnacle of a corporatist policy regime, seeks to bargain with a group of its District Councillors, rather than with wards or villages through the disproportionately white Department of National Parks.

Thus, at the local level interest group access to even the District Council is largely limited to receiving money and drawing up lists of potential projects. Village and Ward level attitudes toward government policy vary owing to whether or not they perceive District Councils as managing wildlife funds for their own benefit. If not, then one could argue that old anti-conservation attitudes have transferred their focus from National Parks to District Councils. Finally, local group strength to engage the state, either nationally or through District Councils, is usually limited to the subservient role of receiving funds, less of course the maximum 50% taxation through council "levies" and "management funds."

The verdict on whether or not these CAMPFIRE policies affect state power is a mixed one. Certainly, by merely providing money to rural people from locally-derived
wildlife resources, some of the old colonial hostility to wildlife conservation has been ameliorated. Any change in this direction would be most welcome at the local level. Still, the existence of what amounts to a 50% tax on wildlife which was not taxed previously does provide District Council governments with monies that have not been coming regularly from the central treasury. Since District governments are not autonomous in a federal sense (The Ministry of Local Government oversees them), then the Zimbabwean state truly is, in the short run, financially benefitting from CAMPFIRE. Whether these benefits last or not is largely dependent on how much cynicism is generated among rural people who receive money from CAMPFIRE, but largely do not manage it. The total lack of local level interest groups, and the establishment of a District level CAMPFIRE Association interest group, give the state much leeway in further development of CAMPFIRE as a new tax program.

**Operation Stronghold**

By way of a brief contrast, one must examine Zimbabwe's black rhino conservation strategy. Estimates put the number of black rhinos at 1,000,000 continent-wide in 1900 (Pink, 1988, 3). At that time they were widely dispersed over all tropical parts of Africa. By the 1920s, agricultural and human settlements in Southern Rhodesia were gradually
pushing the species into the arid, tsetse-infested western areas. By 1960, their last great refuge in Southern Rhodesia became the Zambezi Valley, with a few inhabiting the Chipinge area of the Eastern Highlands. By 1980 there were only about 15,000 black rhinos left in Africa, and by 1985 only 4,500, half of which were in Zimbabwe. In fact, the Zambezi Valley contains the world's only contiguous population of over 500 black rhinos (IUCN, 1988, 27).


In 1985, National Parks quickly established Operation Stronghold, a system of patrols by armed game scouts in the Zambezi Valley (IUCN, 1988). The rationale behind Stronghold is not to kill poachers, but to detect them before they kill ("Zimbabwe Wild News", 1989).

A recent Department of National Parks report estimated that Z$750 per square km must be spent for Stronghold to
succeed if indeed only 500 black rhinos are left in the Zambezi Valley. This figure, however, is twice the 1990 National Parks operating budget; thus, a successful continuation of Stronghold is in severe financial doubt ("More Men, More Money," 1989).

Unfortunately for the black rhino and the wildlife utilization argument, the rhino in its dwindling numbers cannot fit into the present scheme of conservation which is making Windfall and CAMPFIRE a success, since the economic use of rhinos through hunting would appear detrimental to the species' survival. So, whereas rural people can easily see the primarily economic benefits of elephant conservation, an altogether different attitudinal and policy environment surrounds rhino protection. Rural people, under the present policy with Stronghold at its center, see no economic incentive in helping to protect rhinos. The situation in fact is often the opposite, since poaching gangs sometimes engage in banditry against local people or bribe them to look the other way. "If only people could see some sort of benefit for helping in the fight against rhino poaching a significant part of the battle would be won" ("More Men, More Money," 1989, 5).

Recognizing that the Windfall/CAMPFIRE scheme cannot work with rhino protection, some conservationists have sought to concentrate resources in rhino education campaigns among rural people, particularly school children. Through
these campaigns, NGOs and government officials try to imbue in communal people either the nebulous "conservation ethic" for the sake of cultural heritage, or the idea that rhino poaching is an act of economic sabotage against the state. But such platitudes and principles have very little priority for people who derive no direct benefit from rhino conservation. Further, they either depend on the ecological ethic discussed at the beginning of this paper as wholly inadequate as an orientation toward environmental conservation in the developing world; or they create an image of negative state-rural farmer linkages based on sanctions, and thus are a continuation of colonial practices.

Zimbabwean NGOs have also waged public awareness campaigns about the black rhino, to audiences overseas and among those immediately interested in conservation in Zimbabwe. *Wild Kingdom* and *National Geographic* have both produced videos on the rhino, with the former highlighting Operation Stronghold in particular. Articles on the black rhino have appeared in several magazines and newspapers all over the world, with help from information provided by the Zimbabwean NGOs. At home, these organizations have produced and endorsed such things as rhino t-shirts, stickers, sew-on patches, pamphlets, key chains, and even a Z$85 board game in which players try to get rhinos safely out of the Zambezi Valley without being shot by poachers! How effective such
measures are with rural people who live in close proximity with rhinos and poachers is questionable.

One can, therefore discern a much bleaker picture of Stronghold than it does of Windfall and CAMPFIRE, even with all of the latter's management problems. Whereas the main political actors in the latter programs are the rural farmers and local and national conservation authorities, Stronghold's implementation is limited to armed anti-poaching squads, game wardens, and Harare-based Parks authorities, with some input by urban-based, exclusively white-controlled, conservation NGO's. The rural farmers who live close to the rhinos (and poachers) play no part in the management of black rhinos, nor do they derive any tangible benefits from the program. Stronghold, then, is hardly discernible from colonial conservation practices. The culture of hostility created by colonial land and resource alienation has not been ameliorated by Stronghold, even though the former nationalist guerrillas are now in control of the government.

Conclusion

In terms of Chapter Four's Hypotheses, what is the importance and significance of the CAMPFIRE program to Zimbabwe's system of state-interest group interaction? Hypothesis One proposed that the more a group supported local utilization of wildlife, the stronger its bargaining
position with the state would be. Peasants living in rural areas alongside wildlife have had their attitudes toward game changed somewhat by the portion of money which stays in rural areas from wildlife proceeds. Still, these attitudes are tempered by the fact that only 50% of the money from CAMPFIRE at most stays in the area from which the animals came. One must wonder, then, how attitudes of peasants affect their relationship with government. Of course these attitudes are supposed to make them appreciative of the CAMPFIRE system, and in theory change their attitudes toward wildlife utilization. Surely some changes in attitudes have taken place among peasants as a result of CAMPFIRE.

More importantly than attitudes in this case, Hypotheses Two and Three hold that well organized groups will have better bargaining powers vis-a-vis the state than less well organized groups. Further, Hypothesis Three proposes that black groups will have more bargaining success with government than white ones. Surely the CAMPFIRE Association and District Council governments, each of which were established by the central government, and which are the existing regional and national groups in charge of CAMPFIRE, have more access to the central government that do peasants living in CAMPFIRE villages. This is an important point, given the fact that District Councils often keep 50% of CAMPFIRE proceeds in district coffers. Group organizational capacity does indeed play an important role in a CAMPFIRE-
related group having bargaining powers with government. Hypothesis Four is largely irrelevant to the CAMPFIRE case study, since peasants, District Council governments, and the CAMPFIRE Association are made up of blacks exclusively.

Hypotheses Four and Five deal with the central role of the state in Zimbabwe's wildlife conservation regime. They hold that the more the state interacts in a corporatist bargaining fashion with relevant interest groups, the stronger its position becomes vis-a-vis those groups. Further, these hypotheses contend that the state seeks public involvement in its policies to test those policies' viability, and to implement them. Since the District Council government and the CAMPFIRE Association are the groups most intimately involved with central government under this regime, and since government is attempting to expand the CAMPFIRE philosophy to other rural areas, one must indeed conclude that state-interest group interaction is important here. Further, the state is indeed using rural farmers to test out its CAMPFIRE philosophy to extend the program to other areas. In the end, most of these hypotheses are important insights into state-interest group interaction in Zimbabwe, and the answers to them indicate the state is firmly atop this conservation issue network.

This chapter has demonstrated that no analysis of ecological conservation in the developing world is complete if it does not incorporate a cultural and attitudinal
component. In countries where conservation was used as an instrument of colonial land and resource alienation, an understandable hostility to wildlife conservation is bound to develop among the rural farmers who have suffered from these schemes. Therefore, post-colonial conservation policies must be examined in light of these historical realities, and must be oriented toward breaking such attitudes of hostility.

Two interesting political variables could potentially derail Zimbabwe's limited but undeniable successes in using sustainable utilization as a strategy to conserve the nation's wildlife population. First, if the worldwide ivory ban remains in effect for the foreseeable future, the commoditization of the elephant would be severely hampered. Thus, the immediate economic value for rural farmers to conserve elephants would be lost, if Zimbabwe could not sell its elephant products on the international market. Further, if the Zimbabwean conservation authorities are correct in their belief that the non-economic utilization of species would be detrimental to that species' survival, the ivory ban would actually hasten the elephant's demise in Zimbabwe's countryside. Under these circumstances, although Zimbabwe's point would have been proved, the results would be devastating for the African elephant.

Second, the major political question for Zimbabwe has always been the land question. In a country where the one
percent white minority still controls almost forty percent of the arable land of the nation, questions of redistribution are obviously crucial to rural farmers and white commercial farmers alike. Since the Zimbabwean conservation authorities have been actively encouraging white commercial farmers to use some of their land for keeping wildlife, including relocated black rhinos, some of the land which the government would potentially redistribute has been utilized to support a defined government policy. Politically, this question is extremely interesting. If the more populist of Zimbabwe's politicians are arguing for land redistribution, while simultaneously the Department of National Parks and Wildlife management is encouraging white farmers to use underutilized land to hold part of the national wildlife estate, a political collision course may be set. Which political faction or arm of the bureaucratic state wins this outcome remains to be seen. Meanwhile, thousands of landless rural people and some endangered or protected species continue to compete for the same scarce land resources. This question will be more explicitly addressed in Chapter Seven.
CHAPTER SIX
NORTH-SOUTH AND SOUTH-SOUTH CONFLICTS OVER DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES: THE INTERNATIONAL IVORY TRADE

What are the implications of the current globalization of environmental interest? If the 1990s will indeed be the International Decade of Environmental Awareness, who will be aware of what? If the plight of the African elephant captures the attention of the Western public and interest groups through episodes of Wild Kingdom and National Geographic specials, what orients those attitudes in the West? Consequently, if Western governments' policies to some degree represent these views and the views of environmental interest groups, what are the political effects of these environmental attitudes on environmental policy and national autonomy in the developing world? How does the state in the developing world orient its environmental policies, and how much of this orientation is based on fear of reprisals by Northern organized interests? Further, Northern public attitudes toward African, Asian, and Latin American national environments may well influence how these developing nations administer their national ecosystems. Indeed, one can posit that people from the developing nations, often the object of environmental
tirades and sentiment in the West, orient their environmental attitudes (in as much as they exist) according to a very different set of values or priorities than do those living in the developed world. If so, well meaning international environmental movements could be construed as practicing cultural or value-based imperialism, in which one wealthy group of nations imposes its ethical will on another set of lesser developed nations, and in which the state in the developing world has its policy preferences underminded by Northern interest groups. In any event, the protestations of Northern governments and environmentalists could severely circumscribe the policy domains in which developing world governments operate vis-à-vis their natural environments.

This chapter will use the 1989-1992 debate over the international ivory trade as a case study with which to explore these questions. It is thus the second of the dissertation's three case studies, and deals with international interest groups, the Zimbabwean state, local interest groups, and other governments. It finds that public and interest group pressure based on preservationist values guide the Northern nations in their support of the ivory ban in 1989. The chapter explains how the portrayal of the African elephant in the Western media and by Western interest groups played on these values. It further explains how Kenya and Tanzania, each suffering severe declines in
their elephant populations due to poaching, exploited this store of values to push the ivory ban in the international arena. From an environmental policy perspective informed by the corporatist model developed in Chapter Four, the chapter investigates why Zimbabwe and other southern African nations, which have large, growing herds of elephants and pursue policies of sustainable utilization (including ivory culling), failed in successfully presenting their case against the ivory ban in the world media and at the ivory trade meetings.

The Environment on the International Agenda

The literature on international regulation and regimes is voluminous, and itself has been the subject of many books and articles. For our present purposes, we are interested in the mechanisms by which international environmental tasks and concerns are regulated, and specifically how environmental agreements are made and enforced at the international level. While there is no space here to fully discuss the matter, two political scientists have written recently specifically on this issue: John Dryzek (1987) and Oran Young (1989). Their insights into why international environmental agreements are reached and how they are enforced, largely inform this section of the dissertation. With some illustrations from the case of the ivory ban, they
form a theoretical linchpin with which to analyze North-South relations concerning the environment.

It should not be surprising that actors in the international arena will attempt to escape the Hobbesian state of nature, in favor of a more regulated, stable form of society. Of course, the kind of international regulation needed to bring about cooperation need not involve elaborate organizational structures, or an all-encompassing one world government. This is why regimes are constructed to regulate international behavior, and provide some measure of rational expectations of the actions of others (Young, 1989). Usually, mechanisms designed to enforce compliance with the rules of regimes are highly decentralized. Owing to the fact that military force is rarely brought to bear by international actors on each other (especially concerning the environment), compliance mechanisms usually stress self-interest, which encourages self-regulation (Young, 1989). Of course in the case of the ivory trade, market mechanisms are used to insure compliance—shutting down demand markets will surely limit the latitude of otherwise willing suppliers, such as the southern African nations with an abundance of elephants.
Regimes, Common Property, and the Collective Action Problem

According to Young:

regimes are social institutions governing the actions of those involved in specifiable activities or sets of activities. Like all social institutions, they are practices consisting of recognized roles linked together by clusters of rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles. International regimes are more specialized arrangements that pertain to well-defined activities, resources, or geographical areas and often involve only some subset of the members of international society. The core of every international regime is a cluster of rights and rules. Though they may be more or less extensive or formally articulated, some such institutional arrangements structure the opportunities available to actors, and their exact content is a matter of intense interest to actors. (Young, 1989, 12)

International regimes are rarely constructed in an institutional vacuum. On the contrary, they are built upon existing foundations. Thus, The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), which regulates the international elephant products trade, is built upon the broader foundation of international trade, and also upon a more recent moral/ethical foundation of preserving species for preservation's sake. Writers in the field of international regulation also are concerned with questions of common property. Since there are so many common property arrangements at the international level (especially natural resources), regimes often focus on use and enjoyment rights (Young, 1989). But the elephant is not a common property, at least internationally, since a given elephant only exists within the borders of one country at one time; further, the
whole population of African elephants is found in a few African nations. So, regardless of statements about the elephant being a property and concern for all human kind, technically (and legally) this is not the case.

A related concern about the collective action problem in the international environment is a major concern to big game conservation, particularly since organized international poaching could be considered a collective action problem. Usually, matters of international relations involve a particularly nasty form of prisoner's dilemma, with little enforcement of compliance. Of course, enforcement at the international level does occur, most notably through armed conflict and subjugation. Further, some regimes involving markets will work out of self-interest, although such agreements will often be far from unanimous. Nevertheless, if a substantial group of nations negotiate an agreement, especially one involving economic regulation, dissenting nations may have little or no choice but to comply, especially if they do not hold some economic comparative advantage (Dryzek, 1987). For example, if everyone else in the trading system gets together and agrees not to buy the goods produced by a handful of nations, the producers are severely constrained in their actions, to say the least.
Forms of International Environmental Persuasion and Regulation

Surely there are many ways for nations and groups of nations to attempt to regulate cross-national or cross regional environmental problems. John Dryzek's book *Rational Ecology* (1987) is a rich elaboration of the "social mechanisms" used in the international arena in attempts to regulate ecological integrity. According to Dryzek, the world has nine major types of social choice mechanisms, existing at various levels: the market, administered systems, law, moral persuasion, polyarchy, bargaining, armed conflict, radical decentralization, and practical reason. The latter two of these are Dryzek's own constructs, but they are elaborated and modeled in a somewhat disappointing manner. Nevertheless, common sense tells us that mechanisms one, two, and three are ubiquitous. The first two mechanisms, the market and systems of administration, are almost always present in any attempt at national or international regulation. While ubiquitous, the market is at its weakest when confronted with rationally regulating common property resources, as discussed above. Further, when theorizing about ecological politics and policy, moral persuasion through campaigns mounted by environmental groups have taken on importance, particularly in recent years. When combined with the international components of mechanisms six and seven (bargaining and armed conflict),
one can discern an important theoretical interaction between moral persuasion and international bargaining and conflict over ecological problems of transnational scope. This interaction becomes especially politically important when one nation or group of nations perceives its environmental policy interests are in jeopardy. This is precisely the concern expressed by the southern African nations after the 1989 and 1992 ivory bans were imposed against their strenuous objections that such bans were not only unnecessary for their herds, but may actually be injurious to their own countries' ecological integrity.

Indeed, the idea of moral persuasion as a mechanism of international and national social control is intriguing, and deserves some more elaboration, since it is a key to the debate over elephant conservation internationally. As an instrument of policy, moral persuasion usually takes the form of: education, propaganda, linguistic manipulation, and bully-pulpitting. All these mechanisms aim to induce people to voluntarily engage in (or refrain from) undesirable practices which they would normally undertake (Dryzek, 1987). Goodin (1978) divides these moral sentiments into three spheres:

1. "prudential morality", or enlightened self-interest,
2. internalized norms, which govern everyday behavior, and
3. "seriously held principles," which are inviolate, and the moral consequences reprehensible to society and the individual (e.g., murder).

Obviously, "seriously held principles" are the most enduring and effective tools of moral persuasion, although they require a substantial and long term investment by political and moral leaders to construct.

Evidence of large scale moral persuasion, even involving "seriously held principles", can be found in recent history. For example, the apparent sea-change in (at least manifest) racial tolerance that took place after the 1960s civil rights movement, shows that massive social learning can take place with the guidance of government and opinion leaders (Dryzek, 1987). Obviously, an awakening of an environmental consciousness, especially a preservationist one, would be an example of large scale moral persuasion. Of course, if environmental conservation is presented in a utilitarian manner by government and opinion leaders, as it is in many development projects of small and large scale in the Third World, then is this a form of moral persuasion, or a reaffirmation of the market? Clearly, if Dryzek's theoretical distinction between the market and moral persuasion as methods of social control is valid, then a potential conflict of different methods of social control may be created over environmental problems and policy. When these differences of philosophy are combined with more
traditional authoritative social control mechanisms, like law, government regulation, and international bargaining and conflict, large scale conflict over approaches to the environment take on much larger roles in politics.

In the extreme, an ecological regime of moral persuasion would require a Platonic elite. For the environment, many ecologists have implicitly proclaimed themselves the proper elite to govern the environment and its inhabitants (see Ophuls, 1977). At the level of nation states, when ecological problems are involved, do forms of these elites exist? If not, do some international actors, paranoid or not, believe that other nations and groups are behaving in this manner, trying to impose an economic will disguised as a moral exhortation?

Developing World Suspicions of International Environmentalism

When the original global environmental conferences were held in the 1970s, many officials from the developing world, both leftists and rightists, viewed Western calls for environmental protection and restrictions with skepticism. Some thought the West was trying to stymie the economic development of the Southern nations, leaving it perpetually underdeveloped. Similarly, some noted that the already affluent West was trying to garner more affluence for itself at the expense of the developing world: clean air, open
spaces, and legally preserved natural settings, many of which were in the South (Agarwal, 1988). Speaking specifically of ecological and scientific specialists, Robert Chambers said "normal professionals suffer many 'first' biases which are variously urban, industrial, mechanical, high technology, capital-intensive, quantifying, large scale, and deriving from temperate climate conditions" (Chambers, 1988, 76).

Some scholars and politicians are even more direct than either Agarwal or Chambers, arguing that environmentalism is actually a plot by a wealthy elite who have already obtained their money, who now want to fulfill higher needs of having aesthetically pleasing environments. Thus, they advocate policies which slow down economic growth, and thus throw those less economically fortunate into further poverty (Schaiberg et al., 1986). Taken to its logical conclusion, this assertion would be right at home with dependency theorists. Finally, speaking specifically of recent attempts by Northern environmentalists to frame the loss of Southern rainforests as a moral issue, Anzovin asserts:

the big problem with all the new found concern about the rainforests is that almost all those expressing concern about the forests live in the West, and the forests are elsewhere. It's important to remember that conscience alone won't save a single tree, and the forested countries are unlikely to respond favorably to stirring moral pleas or self-righteous demands. (Anzovin, 1990, 98)
Indeed, the proceeding three sections have outlined the theoretical problem to be explored here: international disputes over the environment, especially those in which Northern and Southern nations take different sides, must be analyzed as potential conflicts over an interaction of moral values, economic development, and perceptions by some nations (founded or not) that such environmental disputes are really disputes over the extension of Northern power over Southern nations. Now that the broader framework has been laid out, the chapter turns to the illustrative case at hand: the ongoing dispute over the international ivory trade.

The International Ivory Trade: Clashing Values and Policy Priorities

The markets for ivory are mainly in the Far East. The Japanese use ivory to make hankos, which are personal seals often used in place of signatures (Bradstock, 1990). Hong Kong, China, and Taiwan also have had extensive ivory carving industries for several centuries. There has also traditionally been consumer demand for ivory in Europe and North America as well, although consumers usually purchased their ivory indirectly, through the carving industries of East Asia.

Most observers agree the population of African elephants has been halved in the past 12 years (Barbier, 1991). What is not commonly appreciated, however, is that the decline of
the elephant has not been consistent across the continent. In fact, while Kenya and Tanzania have seen their elephant populations decimated by poaching, the southern African nations of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Botswana, and South Africa have seen their herds grow over that period. In fact, Zimbabwe and Botswana claim their elephant herd growth is actually too high, and that if left unchecked, the elephant will destroy its own environment and physically threaten the people living close to them. Figure 6.1 shows the trend in the growth of the Zimbabwean elephant population. As can be seen, there has recently been quite an explosion if elephant, and the national herd has now far exceeded the stated national carrying capacity of 37,000 animals.

Indeed, poaching in eastern and central Africa has been the elephant's major menace.¹ Elephant and rhino poachers in Africa are often armed with AK-47 rifles, chain saws, and even rocket propelled grenades (Booth, 1989). Before Dr.

¹ Unlike the case with almost all other threatened species, who are in risk because of habitat loss, the elephant and the black rhino are directly threatened by poaching. Further, as mentioned above, the concentrations of elephants in southern Africa are actually a threat to themselves, since the elephant, owing to its size and eating habits, will destroy a finite environment is populations grow unchecked. This is precisely what happened in Kenya's Amboseli National Park in the early 1970's, when, instead of prosecuting controlled culls of elephants, parks officials and ecologists let the herds grow unchecked. The result was that savanna land was turned into near desert, and thousands of elephants starved.
Richard Leakey\(^2\) took over the helm of the Kenya Wildlife Service in 1989, (when he convinced the government to burn $3 million in ivory), corruption was rife in the Kenyan government, with wildlife employees allegedly involved in poaching activities. To compensate, Kenya called for a total worldwide ban on ivory. Through lectures, television programs, and press interviews, Dr. Leakey became a high profile spokesperson for the worldwide ivory ban in 1989. Thus, this dramatic policy shift away from government sanctioned (or at least government condoned) poaching to a complete ban on ivory occurred over a very short period (Morell, 1990). Further, Kenya instituted a shoot-on-sight policy for dealing with poachers. Zimbabwe has been doing this for over five years (Booth, 1989). In January 1989, after having seen its herds poached from 300,000 in 1979 to 100,000 ten years later, Tanzania began to crack down on illegal ivory trading by arresting the Indonesian ambassador, who was caught trying to smuggle 184 tusks out of Dar es Salaam. In April 1989, two game wardens were arrested for possessing 89 poached tusks (The Economist, 1989). Tanzania followed this with its own shoot-on-sight policy, while Zimbabwe went on culling excess elephants, auctioning the ivory, selling the meat and skin, and plowing

\(^2\) A paleontologist by training, and the son of the famous archaeological team of Louis and Mary Leakey.
Figure 6.1
Explosive Growth in Zimbabwe's Elephant Population

Number of Elephants in Zimbabwe


75000 70000 65000 60000 55000 50000 45000 40000 35000

1986 1988 1990
substantial proceeds from these products back into the rural areas from which the elephants came.

The international regime which oversees the trade in species products is the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), which has over 100 members. CITES is an unusual international organization, since its daily administration has been delegated by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) to a semi-private conservation organization, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) based in Lausanne, Switzerland (Sands and Bedecarre, 1990). CITES member nations usually convene every two to three years to consider proposals by members, and to review the level of international protection given to various plant and animal species. CITES offers three levels of protection for a species. Appendix One listing includes species threatened with extinction, and prohibits all trade in their products. The elephant has been listed here since 1989. Appendix Two is for "threatened" species, and international trade in their products is only allowed with carefully monitored export permits from the producer countries. The elephant was on Appendix Two from 1974 to 1989. Appendix Three includes species locally

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3 The IUCN is more or less a scientific organization, made up of wildlife ecologists, among others. The WWF, on the other hand, is actually a public lobby in the United States. William Reilley, the Bush appointed administrator of the US Environmental Protection Agency, was once the head of WWF.
endangered, and the listing of a species here constitutes a request for help from the host country to save the particular plant or animal. All parties to CITES may take reservations to listings in these areas, effectively opting themselves out of regulation. From strictly a regulatory standpoint, therefore, CITES is open to free rider problems (Sands and Bedecarre, 1990). CITES's structure is important to understand, since the ivory ban debate of 1989-1992 was acted out on the CITES stage. As far as linkages between the Zimbabwean state and international interest groups are concerned, the 1989 and 1992 CITES meetings are the main point of investigation.

Conflicting Approaches to Saving the African Elephant

The two different approaches advanced by environmentalists and conservationists to saving the elephant neatly coincide with the approaches of preservationism and sustainable utilization outlined in Chapter Three. After a chilly April 1989 meeting of African wildlife officials on the elephant, CITES Deputy Secretary-General Jacques Berney neatly phrased this distinction:

on the one side you have those who believe in conservation, which implies utilization of wildlife as an economic resource [the southern African nations]; on the other you have those who believe purely in protection, and their pressure on public opinion in the West is enormous... [Kenya and Tanzania]. You have people who would still want to ban the ivory trade tomorrow even if there were three million elephants in Africa instead of 650,000. (Morrison, 1989, 94)
Of course those who adopted a preservationist stance on the elephant were in favor of a complete ban on ivory trading, in order to shut down the demand for elephant products, and thus hopefully save the species. After the 1989 CITES worldwide ban on the ivory trade was imposed (as discussed below), the east African nations, along with nearly all the Northern nations, opposed any reopening of the ivory trade, even a partial one which would allow those countries who managed their herds efficiently to sell their elephant products. Even after the total ivory ban of 1989, the CITES Secretariat still acknowledged that Botswana and Zimbabwe had highly successful wildlife utilization schemes, which had resulted in rising elephant populations over a period of fifteen years. Even WWF and Greenpeace acknowledged the importance of constructing limited trade in species products, but said these philosophies "did not apply to the African elephant" ("Four Southern African Nations", 1992). Pagel and Mace (1991) claim that sustainable utilization schemes which monetize the elephant will not work, because the elephant is a non-excludable good, since it roams wild over vast areas.

The argument that developing nations should be able to profit from their own natural resources was one supported in principle by the World Wildlife Fund at the 1992 CITES meeting, but they continued to voice concern about the free
rider problems associated with attempting to police a partial ivory trade. Also, when they speak of sustainable utilization of big game mammals such as elephants, Western conservationists usually refer to some form of high-priced eco-tourism, in which Northerners pay large fees to African governments for the privilege of viewing the animals in relatively pristine environments (Moffett, 1992). Clearly, as seen in Chapter Five, eco-tourism is not the preferred wildlife policy stance of the Zimbabwean state; instead, sustainable utilization of the elephant in the communal, commercial, and safari areas is the main policy preference there.

On the other hand, those conservationists and nations which attempt to practice sustainable utilization of wildlife view the situation very differently indeed. Zimbabwe and other southern African nations have been highly disturbed by the tendency of Western conservationists to rely on the force of law and the implementation of sanctions to protect the environment. Zimbabwe's philosophy of sustainable utilization does not rest on enforcement of punitive law or moral persuasion, but on the fact that people who live near wildlife must be given an economic stake in its management (Parrish, 1989). As a result of a safari hunt by one wealthy American businessman, nearly $20,000 was raised for the Dande, Zimbabwe communal land, the area in which the safari took place. Most of the
$20,000 trophy fee paid by the hunter built two new school buildings and a health clinic. In 1989, Dande made over $250,000 on carefully supervised elephant hunts; there is no poaching in this area, since local people have a firm economic stake in sustained management of the local elephant population (Morrison, 1989). Evidence of the relative success of Zimbabwe's elephant conservation plans can be seen in Figure 6.2, which gives comparative data on the amount of ivory revenues staying with harvesting nations, as compared to Japan. Clearly, Zimbabwe up until 1989 was keeping nearly as much money as carvers in Japan were making on ivory, whereas the other four African nations in the figure were adding very little value to ivory locally. Thus, Zimbabwe's sustainable utilization philosophy, at least as it pertained to the African elephant, was keeping a comparatively large amount of money in the nation, and thus adding much value to raw ivory. This pre-ban situation accords well with state policy preferences, which seek to keep as much revenue as possible from ivory in country.

The 1989 and 1992 CITES Meetings: Moral and Economic Confrontations

Now that the motivations of preservationists and utilizationists are understood, let us move on to the case study at hand. Before the CITES meeting of October 1989, most wildlife conservation organizations supported a slowing
of ivory demand and a rationalization of trade controls, fearing that a complete ivory ban would force the trade completely underground and deny African nations the right to monetarily benefit from elephant products under sustainable utilization schemes (Ezzell, 1988). As recently as 1988, the US Congress had rejected an all-or-nothing approach to elephant protection, when it rejected attempts to impose a complete trade embargo on ivory, opting instead to allow ivory imports from countries which had sustainable wildlife policies. President Bush, in quite a reversal of policy, issued an Executive Order in June 1989 banning all importation of ivory products to the United States (Booth, 1989).

What led to this reversal of policy, and the subsequent worldwide ban on elephant products trading in October 1989? Interest group pressure, especially in the North, were an important factor in the 1989 decision to put the elephant on CITES Appendix I, banning all trade in elephant products (Bradstock, 1990). Sensing a change in Northern public opinion over the environment, and having seen their own elephant populations decimated due to poaching with implicit governmental approval, Kenya had a sudden change of heart, with Richard Leakey persuading President Moi to make a dramatic policy change, and burn a 1.5 ton stockpile of poached ivory. The point of burning $3.6 million in poached tusks, according to Dr. Leakey, was to shame other
governments into supporting a complete ban on the ivory trade (Bartholet, 1989). This Kenyan lobbying for an all-out ban on ivory did not sit well with the southern African nations, who had been pursuing successful policies of sustained culls of elephants. At the April 1989 meeting of African conservation officials on the African elephant, the delegations of Zimbabwe and Kenya barely exchanged words. Zimbabwe accused Kenya of manipulating statistics to support its argument that the elephant was on the verge of extinction, even though 750,000 were still roaming Africa, many in southern Africa (Morrison, 1989). Subsequently, in June 1989, Kenya, Tanzania, Gambia, and Somalia formally petitioned the CITES secretariat to place the African elephant on Appendix One, effectively prohibiting any trade in any elephant products by member nations (Joyce, 1989).

At the October 1989 CITES meeting in Switzerland, a complete worldwide ban on the ivory trade was passed overwhelmingly, the protestations of the southern African nations that they had sustainable programs of elephant culling notwithstanding. Figure 6.3 summarizes the voting at the 1989 CITES meeting, breaking down the votes by two categories: whether or not a country was an African nation, and whether or not the country was an elephant range state, meaning it contained naturally occurring elephant populations. Clearly, the voting was not uniform, with 97
Figure 6.2
Revenues per kg Going to African Harvesters versus Japanese Dealers
percent and 95 percent, respectively, of Non-African and Non-Range states voting in favor of the ban. On the other hand, 32 percent of all African nations voted against the ivory trade ban, while 35 percent of Range states opposed the international ban on ivory. Of the eight range states voting against the ban, five were in southern Africa.

The proposal by southern African nations to make an exception to the ban for them was shelved, with further discussion put off until the 1992 meeting of CITES in Kyoto, Japan. In the aftermath of the 1989 meeting, and in the run-up to the Kyoto conference, a war of words between southern Africa on the one hand, and east Africa and Northern environmentalists on the other, escalated to proportions rarely seen at scientific or diplomatic conferences. Recalling Dryzek's distinctions between different forms of social control, these verbal (and increasingly monetary) wars between people with different philosophies toward wildlife conservation are fascinating indicators of not only the importance that environmental protection has taken on in the global debate, but also of the conflict between using moralistic, economic, and regulatory mechanisms to bring about a mutually desired international policy outcome. Indeed, a detached analysis would acknowledge that all the parties involved in this dispute truly want to save the African elephant from extinction, but the mechanisms by which they attempt to
achieve this goal on the international stage are in extreme conflict. After its proposal to market ivory from carefully managed herds was rejected at the 1989 CITES meeting, Zimbabwe was painted by some conservationists in the Northern press as uncaring conspirators with elephant poachers (Parrish, 1989). Greenpeace further condemned Zimbabwean culling operations, and accused the country of vastly over counting its elephant population (Contreras, 1991). For its part, Zimbabwe joined in the verbal escalation. The semi-official Herald newspaper in Harare denounced "well-fed and prosperous Europeans and North Americans, wearing leather shoes and tucking into high-priced meat dishes, telling African peasants that basically they are only on earth as picturesque extras in a huge zoo" (Morrison, 1990, 93).

In the intervening three years between the October 1989 ban and the 1992 CITES meeting in Kyoto to review the ivory ban, much scientific and political maneuvering by both sides in the conflict took place. Zimbabwe announced plans to cull 5,000 elephants per year for the next 14 years to achieve the country's carrying capacity of 35,000 elephant (Contreras, 1991). Greenpeace again accused Zimbabwe of vastly over counting its elephant population, which was claimed to be 70,000. 'Figure 6.4 shows the effect the ban

* There have been varying estimates by Zimbabwean National Parks officials and local Zimbabwean conservationists about the census of elephants in the
has had on Zimbabwe's elephant management program. The figure shows two sets of data simultaneously. First, the trend is the same as Figure 6.1, indicating an explosive elephant population growth. At the same time, the size of the bubbles in this figure shows the amount of ivory culled that year (in kilograms) as opposed to other years. In other words, smaller bubbles signify less ivory culled than the larger ones. The striking aspect of this trend is that, as the amount of elephants in Zimbabwe grows, and thus exceeds national carrying capacity, the number of elephants culled declines. This leads to two effects on state management policy. First, the elephant population continues to grow almost out of control, with subsequent environmental degradation becoming more increasingly imminent. Second, revenues for the state treasury and rural communities from ivory culling is lost, since the international ivory ban leaves no legal outlets for its sale. Thus, the ivory ban pushed by Northern environmental interest groups and governments has clearly impinged upon the Zimbabwean state's elephant management policies, both from a monetary and ultimately future environmental standpoint. In addition, Zimbabwe in 1992 had 21 tons of ivory stockpiled before the 1992 CITES meeting ("Four Southern African States", 1992).

country, with an interval of between 60,000 and 70,000 taking in almost all estimates. The author believes that these statistics are basically accurate, as a trip to Hwange National Park or Lake Kariba will attest.
Figure 6.3

1989 CITES Voting on the Ivory Trade Ban

Chi-Square = 16.25 p<0.001

Non-Africa

Non-Range

Range

Africa

No

Yes

3% 97% 68%

5% 35% 32%

5% No

95% Yes
The southern African nations again threatened to form SACIM, Southern African Cartel for Ivory Marketing, but announced they would suspend these plans until the 1992 Kyoto meeting.

During this intercession between CITES meetings, there were some hints of a reconsideration of the total worldwide ivory ban, particularly among some Western scientists and environmentalists. Similar to the case before the 1989 Lausanne meeting, a committee of scientists commissioned by CITES itself concluded that, because of the efficient wildlife management practices of the southern African nations, trade in southern ivory and elephant products should be allowed ("Four Southern African States", 1992).

Literally on the eve of the 1992 CITES convention, a source in the CITES secretariat speculated that the conferees may go along with a compromise plan by southern Africa to sell elephant meat and hides, but not ivory. But interest groups such as the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and Greenpeace feared any resumption of the trade would lead to a boost in the illegal market for ivory ("Endangered Species Meeting", 1992).

Figure 6.5 shows that, at least as far as Zimbabwe was concerned, illegal ivory poaching had already grown in that nation. The points in Figure 6.5 indicate the amount of ivory in kilograms poached or confiscated from illegal
Figure 6.4

Elephant Population Growth Increases as Population Control Decreases

Size of bubble indicates kilograms of ivory culled that year
operations in Zimbabwe, from 1985 to 1991. The parabolic curve in Figure 6.5 was fit to the data, as was a line and an exponential curve. The parabola yielded the best fit with the data, both in terms of the significance of b (in this case year) and in the magnitude of r-square. The intriguing fact about this curve fitting is that poaching went on the increase in 1990, the year the ban took effect. Still, the relationship here is not very strong as presented.

Figures 6.6 and 6.7 bring these relationships into a sharper focus. Figure 6.6 presents data on the total amount of Zimbabwean ivory poached, divided by the total amount produced through both legal and illegal means. In other words, the trend line shows the percentage of Zimbabwean ivory that is illegally obtained each year. Using the equation $y=e^{0.44 \cdot \text{year}}$, with $t(\text{year})=3.29$, and $r^2=0.80$, one sees that before the 1989 ivory ban took place, only 5.2% of all the ivory produced by dead elephant in Zimbabwe had been poached, whereas an average of 24.2% of Zimbabwean ivory was poached in the 1990-1991 post-ban period. Thus, Zimbabwe's arguments that the ban would only lead to an increase in poaching and a decrease in revenues from carefully managed herds, are borne out here.

Figure 6.7 is a slightly different look at the same data. Here, the data presented is the ratio of poached ivory to culled ivory for the years 1985 to 1991. Thus, a
number less than one indicates that more ivory was legally culled than was poached, whereas a number greater than one means more ivory was illegally poached than legally culled. The data are so striking in Figure 6.7 that it has been put onto a logarithmic scale for clarity. Since Zimbabwe's elephant management program, through both CAMPFIRE and operations in the National Parks and Safari areas, depends to a major extent on ivory revenue from culls, any decrease would be financially detrimental to government's preferred wildlife policy. Further, a relative decrease in culling accompanied by a relative increase in poaching indicates that the opportunity costs of the ivory ban are extremely high; not only is money not being realized from culling, but the frequency of poaching siphons otherwise legally obtained funds into the criminal world. The trend in Figure 6.7 bears this out in a striking way.

Backing their government, several Zimbabwean conservation interest groups announced their continued support for elephant culling operations. The Zimbabwe National Conservation Trust, an umbrella group of Zimbabwe wildlife conservationist professionals and wildlife enthusiasts, backed resumption of ivory trade based on Zimbabwe's philosophy of sustainably utilizing the elephant, and plowing the proceeds back into rural areas and anti-poaching activities ("Conservation Trust Backs", 1991).
Kilograms Poached

Figure 6.5
Ivory Poached in Zimbabwe, 1985-1991
Figure 6.6
Illegal Ivory as a Percentage of Total Ivory Production in Zimbabwe

Illegal Ivory = e^{0.44 \times \text{Year}}
R-Square = 0.8
Pre-ban average illegal ivory = 5.2%
Post-ban average illegal ivory = 24.6%
t(ban) = 3.29 \text{ p<0.02}
Figure 6.7
Ratio of Illegal Ivory to Culled Ivory in Zimbabwe
The wars of words, however, resurfaced in the months preceding the Kyoto meeting to reconsider the ivory trade ban. Putting the ivory debate into explicitly economic terms, Zimbabwean Minister of Environment and Tourism, Herbert Murerwa, said that the southern African countries "are agreed to treat the coming conference as a watershed event in the context of conservation and development issues facing southern Africa" ("Japanese Experts Call", 1992). A trip by members of the US Fish and Wildlife Service to Africa in 1990 had concluded that poaching had actually increased since the ivory ban was implemented in 1989, and that FWS would supposedly propose that the total ivory ban be lifted. Then, immediately prior to the 1992 CITES meeting, the Service announced that it would classify the African elephant as endangered, a move which gives the African elephant no more protection than the 1989 ivory ban, since the Fish and Wildlife Service has no jurisdiction over African governments (except in vetoing wildlife aid projects, none of which were in place at the time). Suggs claimed that this was easy election year politics, harmless to the Bush administration and aimed at appeasing the environmental establishment\(^5\) (Suggs, 1992). It did, however, allow Northern interest groups to overwhelm and ultimately defeat the Zimbabwean state's policy preferences.

\(^5\) Of course events at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio may have rendered this assessment illogical.
Further, a study by the WWF's (pro-ivory ban) African Elephant Conservation Coordinating Group found that renewed commitments to stop poaching by African governments who formerly looked the other way, and not the ban on ivory trading, was behind the recent decline in poaching (The Economist, 1992).

The Environmental Investigation Agency and the International Wildlife Coalition, on the eve of the 1992 CITES meeting, claimed that Zimbabwe's Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management was demoralized, inefficient, and weakened by corruption. Further, Zimbabwean military personnel were supposedly involved in a massive ivory smuggling scheme through South Africa, and that top government officials in both countries were cooperatively engaged in an official cover-up of the matter (Orenstein, 1992). It is revealing of the moral/economic side of this whole debate how skillfully Zimbabwe is vilified by being lumped officially with South Africa, a country with whom it still has no diplomatic relations, and whom South Africa accused at the time of still harboring ANC guerrillas. The UK Elephant Group, an umbrella organization of British conservation groups, urged the British Overseas Development Agency to withdraw its funding for the post of Botswana's Director of Wildlife, as punishment for that country having joined Zimbabwe's crusade for a limited resumption of the southern African ivory trade, based on

To counter southern African claims that sustainable utilization of the elephant is the only economically feasible way of funding the animals' survival, Western conservation organizations were seeking to raise $300 million for anti-poaching operations to give to pro-ivory ban nations ("Botswana Wildlife Job", 1991). Correspondingly, in the months leading up to the 1992 CITES meeting, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zaire emerged as vocal opponents of any partial resumption in the ivory trade from southern Africa. Instead, these countries admitted they did not have the resources to control poaching should a trade start anew, and were seeking Western financial aid for this purpose (Aldhous, 1991).

Originally six southern African nations--South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, Namibia, and Malawi--were prepared to argue at the 1992 CITES convention that their elephant populations be downlisted to Appendix II, thereby allowing a controlled trade in their elephant products. In a turnabout from the Kaunda government's former policies, the new Zambian government under Frederick Chiluba turned from the southern African pro-ivory trade camp, and advocated a total elephant products ban in January 1992. The government then held a Kenya-style tusk bonfire. The very next day, three Western conservation organizations gave
the Zambian government $200,000, and promised to raise more for anti-poaching activities ("Zambia Joins Crusade", 1992). At the meeting, the remaining five nations were to propose a compromise, whereby they would trade in the meat and hides of their elephants for two years, while waiting until the 1994 CITES meeting to review their ivory trading policies. In the face of stiff opposition to this led by the United States, South Africa, hyper-sensitive at the time to Western opinions about itself, withdrew its support for the non-ivory elephant trade, leaving the other four countries and Switzerland the only countries prepared to accept such a utilization policy. The compromise proposal was withdrawn, and the war of words between southern Africa (led by Zimbabwe) on the one hand, and East Africa and the West on the other, continued ("Four Southern African Nations", 1992).

Indeed, Switzerland was the only country outside of southern Africa to openly support the Zimbabwean-Botswanan argument that favored a controlled trade in southern African ivory as an effective means of elephant conservation. The head of the Swiss delegation said "many delegations took positions dictated by their home politics more than by scientific considerations" (Zingg, 1992, 3). He also used the term eco-colonialism to refer to the character of the whole debate on the southern African proposal (Zingg, 1992). Similar comments were made by conservation professionals
from other countries. The 1992 CITES meeting, normally made up of conservation and wildlife management professionals from mid level government bureaucracies, was in 1992 attended by an extraordinary number of government ministers who sat at the conference tables in front of their wildlife managers. According to Jorgan Thomsen, head of CITES' policy implementation arm:

CITES has become a political machine rather than a conservation machine. The meeting was not a success from our point of view and we may as well not do it again because most of the [scientific] advice given to countries attending was largely ignored." (McCarthy, 1992, 8).

As an illustration, McCarthy (1992) claims that the UK Environment Secretary Michael Heseltine had determined that Britain would support a continued ban on ivory at the 1992 meeting, no matter what the quality of debate on southern Africa's wildlife utilization proposals. According to The Independent, this decision was taken because the Conservative Party did not want the ivory ban to become a no-win election year issue. In an interesting contrast, Japan and the United States were successful at heading off a proposed ban on blue-fin tuna fishing, arguing industries in their countries would be adversely affected. Conversely, pointed out Michael Sutton of the WWF, "these same countries did not think twice about supporting a total ban on the ivory trade despite a passionate plea by southern African states for much the same reasons" (Kakuchi, 1992, 2).
In the aftermath of the 1992 Kyoto meeting, in what was apparently a reaction to the events of the meeting, at which the southern African nations were rebuffed in their attempt to reopen a controlled trade in elephant products, new rules adopted by the body call for formal consultations with affected states before CITES trade bans can go into effect. The southern African nations, particularly Zimbabwe, had complained of "eco-colonialism", in that they saw outsiders telling them how to utilize their natural resources. Further, the theory of sustainable utilization of species was positively acknowledged by many present, which may be an indication that CITES is questioning the wisdom of total trade bans as a means of protecting species ("Four Southern African Nations, 1992). Undaunted, Namibia, Malawi, Botswana, and Zimbabwe announced they would make preparations to set up a southern African ivory trade, but did not outright commit themselves to an immediate resumption of the elephant products trade. The pro-ivory trade states also declared they would all remain members of CITES and said they would plead their case at the Earth Summit meeting in Rio ("U.S. to Help Zimbabwe", 1992), although the ivory trade was not in fact a major point of discussion at that meeting.

Further, Zimbabwe announced in July 1992 that, due to serious drought and the imperiled living conditions of both humans and wildlife, 2000 elephant in southeastern Zimbabwe
would be shot, and the meat distributed free of charge among those in need of drought relief. Even in the face of serious human suffering, Western governments and conservation organizations have refused to provide funds for this culling operation. Instead, they have committed $1900 per elephant to tranquilize and relocate 1000 of these elephants to local private ranch lands, to set up new "eco-tourism" industries ("U.S. to Help Zimbabwe", 1992).

Assessing the Impact of the Ivory Ban on Zimbabwean Environmental Policy and State Power

Taking this case study in the context of this dissertation's theoretical model, what effect did the ivory ban have on the state's environmental policy preferences, and consequently on the state's power? Much more than the case study to follow in Chapter Seven, Chapter Six's conclusions in this regard are clear cut and dramatic.

Starting with the effects of group access, attitudes, and strength on the state's environmental policy, and the concomitant reciprocal linkages originating with state preferences, several significant findings come to light. First, it must be noted that all the groups which significantly engaged the state on this question of the ivory trade ban were non-Zimbabwean. To be sure, locally based interests such as the Wildlife Society of Zimbabwe and more generally the Zimbabwe National Conservation Trust
supported the state's defined policies of elephant culling and ivory marketing. Their role in engaging the state, and ultimately shaping elephant policy, however, were quite trivial. This debate over the ivory trade was largely carried out in the international arena, specifically at the CITES meetings of 1989 and 1992. Therefore, the impact of both other governments and international organizations like the IUCN, WWF, and Greenpeace had far more efficacy in making international ivory policy. By the very nature of the international environmental regime, which in this case meant CITES, the impact of local organizations would be minimal. So, the Zimbabwean government's local allies were largely irrelevant, and the state had to engage groups over which it had comparatively little control. In Chapter Four, Hypothesis One proposed that those groups who were more concerned with the local economic utilization of wildlife would have a stronger bargaining position with the state. While this was certainly true in this case, with Zimbabwean interest groups having bargaining relationships with the state because of shared attitudes, the really powerful international interest groups did not share this attitudinal congruence with Zimbabwe.

Second, international interest group access to the Zimbabwean state, and vice versa, were also largely irrelevant, since the major decisions regarding the international marketing of ivory were made in an
international body, at not at the national level. This ultimately had a large impact on the direction of policy, since as was outlined above, the decision to ban the ivory trade wholesale explicitly rejected evidence of sustainable utilization in southern Africa. In terms of Hypotheses Two and Three in Chapter Four, the groups with better organizations did indeed succeed in winning the debate with Zimbabwe in the end, given the sheer political power international preservationists exercised at the CITES meetings. However, the linkages between Zimbabwe and these international interest groups were clearly not corporatist in nature, since the state was completely overwhelmed in the ivory trade ban dispute. Further, all these international preservationist interest groups are predominantly white, which did not help their legitimacy in the eyes of the Zimbabwean representatives at the 1989 and 1992 CITES meetings.

Third, the *attitudes* of Northern environmental groups had a very large impact on the state's policy of ivory culling, in that those attitudes carried the day at the CITES meetings and in the public and media debate that led up to those meetings. Zimbabwe's wildlife conservation authorities had very little luck at influencing the *attitudes* of these groups, or the attitudes of the voting states who were members of CITES. Fourth, the *strength* of the salient Northern environmental interest groups simply
overwhelmed the Zimbabwean state's policy preferences, and
nothing these authorities argued at the meetings had any
ultimate impact on the outcome of those votes which shut
down the ivory trade. Clearly, then, the ratio of
theoretical coefficients outlined in Chapter Four
overwhelmingly favored the Northern interest groups who
sought to halt the international ivory trade.

Finally, the crucial link between the resulting
environmental policy—a complete banning of the elephant
products trade—and state power, is easily assessed. As was
seen in Figures 6.4 through 6.7, Zimbabwe lost, or has had
to postpone, the benefits of its elephant utilization
policy, which previously provided some level of funding for
wildlife management programs, and which gave rural people
some tangible economic benefit from living in close
proximity with elephants. So both the fiscal power of the
conservation authorities, and the efforts at making
conservation more relevant to rural farmers, were strongly
diminished by the ivory trade ban which resulted from the
CITES meetings. In the end, the theoretical coefficient
linking environmental policy to state power is strong, and
negative, with the ivory ban affecting state power in the
opposite direction of the state's wishes. In terms of
Hypotheses Four and Five presented in Chapter Four, the
state did not become stronger in its position vis-a-vis
international interest groups by interacting with those
groups. On the contrary, since the preservationist environmental interest groups at the CITES meetings were so powerful, Zimbabwe's position was simply overwhelmed.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has addressed the same question in different ways—how and why are international environmental agreements reached and implemented? First, the chapter has had a broader interest in theory-building: international environmental policies are increasingly the results of an interaction of moral, regulatory, and economic attempts at large scale transnational persuasion. This has been an attempt to move important pioneering work by Oran Young and John Dryzek forward, by critically examining the interaction between these forms of policy persuasion, and by extending international environmental policy analysis to include the possibility of acrimonious conflict over ecological concerns. As environmental consciousness (however defined) moves people for various reasons in various parts of the world to form strong opinions about the global environment, and as economic development issues in the South potentially clash with this consciousness, such a theoretical rubric is needed by analysts concerned with global ecological policymaking. When combined with the traditional concerns of nation-states over sovereignty, this mix of variously-
defined morality and economic development has a truly explosive potential. Further, future research should address any emerging South-South conflicts over the environment. Indeed, as the CITES debate shows, the southern African nations came into conflict with the east African nations in particular over the banning of the international ivory trade. While these countries have far more in common economically that do the North and the South, international environmental conflicts are obviously still possible between countries with similar economic status. Specifically, what are the implications of such environmental conflicts for organizations such as the Non-Aligned Movement, in which Zimbabwe has taken a leadership role? Will South-South environmental conflicts take on an increasingly political dimension in the years to come, as the North-South environmental debate has?

Second, this chapter has sought to put the specific question of elephant conservation into a framework which addresses the conflicts outlined above. Clearly, important ecological issues such as the survival of Earth's largest land mammal are not solely scientific, but are clouded by both moral concerns over the species' right to survive, and by the economic and safety concerns of those who must live near these potentially destructive creatures. As the above case study has shown, neither scientific nor economic arguments over how to best protect the species can remain
untouched by appeals to morality, and attempts by international interest groups to elevate elephant survival to this new level. Clearly, interest group politics is at work in this debate over how to best save the African elephant, and the question of the animal's survival is surely a larger issue. Indeed, the 1989-1992 (and continuing) debate over the international ivory trade is likely a harbinger of other international environmental debates, some of which will undoubtedly be more acrimonious than this one. The study of international ecological politics surely must seriously address this interaction of moral persuasion, administrative regulation, and economic development further, particularly when elements North and South take opposing sides, and the autonomy and power of developing states is influenced by foreign interest groups, no matter how well meaning.
CHAPTER SEVEN
COMMERCIAL WILDLIFE RANCHING AND THE POLITICS OF LAND

Introduction

In June, 1993, the Minister of the Environment and Tourism, Dr. Herbert Murerwa, stated publicly:

The wildlife industry has many facets: photographic tourism, safari hunting, crocodile and ostrich farming, game capture and the sale of live animals, kapenta fishing, and so on. It is becoming a very lucrative industry: as the third biggest foreign currency earner in the economy, it grosses three to four billion dollars annually. And to put it bluntly, most of this income ends up in the bank accounts of whites. This is now a political problem. I am expected to alter the situation. I must shift the balance. But it is far from easy. (Murerwa, 1993, 7)

Indeed, the Honorable Minister has stated the crux of the problem with wildlife oriented policies in Zimbabwe. Although whites at most comprise 2 percent of the country's population, they generate not only the bulk of the wildlife industry's supply, but also a substantial part of its demand, through tourism and the fast developing wildlife ranching industry.

In 1993, wildlife ranching was one of the fastest growing relatively new uses of commercial farming land, along with horticulture and the extension of Zimbabwe's economically crucial tobacco industry. While in the early 1960s there were only a handful of game ranches on private
land, now the Wildlife Producer's Association has over 400 members, half of which are actively engaged in raising wildlife on their holdings. This privatization of what was once a fugitive environmental resource has obvious ecological implications which will be addressed in the third section of this chapter. While these ecological ramifications of private wildlife rearing have been addressed in the environmental literature, there are three other important areas of inquiry. First, in a developing economy like Zimbabwe's, what is the realized and potential economic role of wildlife, both for the individual farmer and the national economy as a whole? Second, and more importantly for this dissertation's theoretical framework, what is the political fallout of wildlife ranching? Further, a hybrid question of tradeoffs can be proposed. If wildlife ranching is economically efficient for the nation, but politically opposed by government and the populace, will economic efficiency or political considerations ultimately prevail in determining the future of this industry?

To answer these last political questions, one must thoroughly imbed any inquiry in what is known in Zimbabwe as "The Land Question." Given the historical patterns of land alienation, under which 40 percent of Zimbabwe's farm land is still in the hands of 4,000 whites, any inquiry which fails to squarely address the problems of land tenure will fail to see the political significance of private wildlife
ranching. The current government came to power in 1980 promising to redress this large scale land alienation problem. Thirteen years later, while there has been some acquisition of land for resettling peasant farmers, colonial land tenure patterns remain largely intact. One must also recall Chapter Five, which presented evidence that the current government, when it was a guerilla movement, opposed the wildlife industry as a whole. Further, as farmers move into wildlife ranching, which many in government and the populace consider a waste of agricultural and ranching land, they create political problems for themselves and the government. This chapter begins with the firm conviction that, as with the CAMPFIRE and international ivory trade cases, any analysis of wildlife ranching that does not include a political component, specifically the effect of the policy on the power of the state and relevant interest groups, fails.

The Land Question in Zimbabwe

Colonial and Post-Independence Land Tenure

In the civil war of the 1960s and 1970s, land distribution was the central issue amongst the peasants. Owing to the fact that similar racially-based land tenure patterns exist today, the land question is still a burning topic in the polity. This land tenure pattern had its roots
in the early colonial days, when large tracts of land were alienated from the Shona and Ndebele, and handed over to white settlers. Ownership of large tracts of land guaranteed the economic domination of whites over blacks, yielding the current racially-based economic imbalance in Zimbabwe's political economy (Mandaza, 1986). On the eve of independence in 1979, the burning question among whites and blacks was the uncertainty over continued white domination of the country's best agricultural and range lands (Herbst, 1990).

The independence agreement negotiated between Britain, the black liberation movements, and representatives of the white-dominated Rhodesian government, has come to be known as the Lancaster House agreement, named after the place where negotiations were held in London. Before Lancaster House, Rhodesia's lands were divided into European areas, African Purchase Area freehold farms held by blacks, and the Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs), where the large bulk of Zimbabwe's population lived in marginal lands. By 1979, the population of the TTLs (now known as Communal Areas) exceeded their carrying capacity by nearly two million people (Jordan, 1979). The Communal Areas, and continue to have, a mean population density of 28 people per square

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1 "European" was the colonial euphemism for "whites," even though many of these people were born in Africa.
kilometer, compared to 9 people per square kilometer in white-held farming lands (Whitsun Foundation, 1983).

The independence constitution yielded by the Lancaster House negotiations put severe restrictions on the new black government's ability to redress the land tenure problems facing the country. The constitution required that all land acquired by government must be purchased on the "willing buyer-willing seller" premise, and that compensation be paid in foreign currency. This provision of the constitution was effectively entrenched for ten years, since this part of the constitution could not be amended without the acquiescence of all the whites in Zimbabwe's House of Assembly. Still, Britain had promised to provide half of the foreign currency required to purchase white farming land on the willing buyer-willing seller premise. Writing a few years before Zimbabwe's independence, Michael Bratton argued that "a Zimbabwe dependent on development funds from aid donors to purchase white land will undergo the same process which led to the neo-colonization of Kenya" (Bratton, 1977, 611). This in fact did not happen, since relatively little productive land was actually purchased under this scheme.

At independence in April 1980, Prime Minister Mugabe proposed to resettle 18,000 families on 1,100,000 hectares of land at a cost of $60 million (Kinsey, 1983). Of course 800,000 families lived in the ecologically-pressured Communal Areas, so such a program would only scratch the
surface of Zimbabwe's land tenure problem. The next step in government land tenure policy was a plan to resettle 162,000 families, requiring the purchase of 57 percent of the white-held farming land (Government of Zimbabwe, 1982; Kinsey, 1983). Clearly, this was an ambitious plan, given both the constitutional prohibition against compulsory acquisition of white lands, and the obvious budgetary constraints on a developing country.

The Land Acquisition Act of 1985 gave the government right of first refusal over land, meaning that any commercial farms must be offered to the government for purchase before passing into new private ownership. The Act also established a Derelict Lands Board that gave government the right to seize abandoned lands (Government of Zimbabwe, 1985). By 1988, a total of 42,000 families had been resettled on 2,500,000 hectares of land (Meldrum, 1988).

While no small feat, this level of resettlement barely keeps pace with natural population growth in the Communal Areas. Table 7.1 presents data on Zimbabwe's current land tenure patterns. While resettlement lands now comprise 8.5 percent

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2 Between 20 and 25 percent of Zimbabwe's Communal Area population.

3 This act did not alter the crucial willing buyer-willing seller principle, so it did not result in any appreciable increase in government's ability to acquire white farming land. Nearly all the land taken by government had been abandoned by whites fleeing Zimbabwe before and immediately after independence. This exodus has been dubbed "the chicken run" by many of the remaining white Zimbabweans.
of Zimbabwe's total land area, the overwhelming majority of the black population lives in 41.9 percent of the land, while 4,000 white commercial farmers still own nearly 35 percent of Zimbabwe's agricultural and ranching lands. Clearly, then, land tenure is still a potent political and economic issue to be addressed in Zimbabwe.

The Lancaster House Constitution's restrictions on massive redistribution of land has not been the only factor in the maintenance of disproportionate white domination of agricultural lands. The Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) is the very potent interest group representing the white commercial farming sector of Zimbabwe's economy. Established as the Rhodesia National Farmers Union (RNFU) in 1942, white farmers were able to have the colonial government pass the Farmers Licensing Act, requiring all white farmers to buy a license from the Union, thus giving it immediate and long term access to financial resources from farmers. This allowed the RNFU to develop into a politically and economically powerful interest group which could negotiate pricing and land use policy with the government (Herbst, 1990). To this day, all commercial farmers are still required by Zimbabwean law to purchase a license from the CFU. Thus, the economic and potential political power of the white farming community has continued after independence, and the CFU is still a force to be reckoned with by government. This explicitly corporatist
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Tenure Patterns in Zimbabwe</th>
<th>% of Total Nation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communal Areas</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resettlement Areas</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Farms</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Parks and Safari Areas</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
arrangement of requiring all participants in one economic sector to join one group to present their arguments to government is a crucial point. It gave commercial farmers economic power and political legitimacy in the colonial days. In post-independence Zimbabwe, it at least gives this economic sector strong economic and organizational powers to deal with government, if not some measure of political and administrative legitimacy.

The Expiry of the Lancaster House Constitution

The entrenched provision of the willing buyer-willing seller principle on land acquisition expired on April 18, 1990, Zimbabwe's tenth independence anniversary. From that date, government was not bound by any provisions of the independence constitution, and could now legally amend it in any way. Further, 1990 was an election year. President Mugabe in August 1989 declared his government would give new attention to the land tenure issue after the expiry of the independence constitution. He promised to keep the willing buyer-willing seller premise alive, but said that his government may have to use coercion to make farmers willing to sell ("The President's Heroes' Day Speech", 1989).

This seemingly contradictory statement left open a range of possibilities for his government which made political sense. Going into a national election ten years after independence, a period in which large scale land
appropriation did not take place, the ZANU-(PF) government had to appease its large peasant constituency by appealing to their long-standing grievances on land alienation. At the same time, the Mugabe government did not want to thoroughly disrupt the white commercial farming sector, which plays such an important role in Zimbabwe's cash economy. This "not killing the goose that laid the golden egg" premise has been part of both government and CFU rhetoric for many years. In the sometimes uneasy and acrimonious public exchanges between government and the white farmers, both still agree that if Zimbabwe's commercial farms are destabilized, the country's economy would pay a heavy, perhaps suicidal, price.

Table 7.2 presents government's 1993 estimates of agricultural output, broken down between the 4,000 mostly white commercial farmers and the 8,000,000 black communal farmers. Clearly, the white commercial farming sector is an economically strategic one, producing almost all of Zimbabwe's tobacco crop, which is the country's largest foreign exchange earner. It also produces nearly half of the country's marketed maize and almost all soyabeans. The ability for the white commercial farming sector to bring products to market, in both absolute and relative terms, is

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4 Even though Zimbabwe is the world's eighth largest supplier of the world's gold, tobacco still earns more money for the country than does gold.
Table 7.2
Agricultural Products Marketed by Communal and Commercial Farmers, 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Commercial</th>
<th>Communal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Food Crops and Oilseeds</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
<td>47.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>75.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>80.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millets</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soyabeans</td>
<td>94.7%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunflowers</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>85.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Edible Crops</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
<td>57.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flue-Cured Tobacco</td>
<td>98.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
a fact that can simply not be challenged. In a country heavily dependent on agriculture for both food self sufficiency\(^5\) and foreign currency from exports, the white commercial farming sector is a crucial economic force indeed.

**The Land Acquisition Act of 1992**

Despite the expiry of the Lancaster House Constitution in 1990, very little action on active land resettlement took place before or after the 1990 general election, which ZANU-(PF) swept. The year 1992 changed this situation, with the passage of the controversial Land Acquisition Act of 1992. This law, which caused much consternation for the Commercial Farmers Union and some international aid donors, removed the willing buyer-willing seller principle that had operated since 1980. The act holds that any lands can be designated for resettlement by the President and the Minister of Lands, Agriculture, and Water Development, although compensation must be paid for productive lands. It continued the Derelict Lands Board established by the similar act of 1985, allowing government to seize without compensation underutilized or misutilized land.

\(^5\) In non-drought years, Zimbabwe is one of the only countries in Africa which can feed itself and produce a significant amount of food products for export.
There are two major controversial aspects to the act, besides the removal of the willing buyer-willing seller principle. First, the level of financial compensation is determined by the Ministry of Lands. Second, the Land Acquisition Act removes access to the courts for any appeal against government decisions to acquire land. In other words, farmers may challenge neither the designation of their land nor the level of financial compensation in court. This part of the act is constitutionally suspect to all the lawyers whom I interviewed, and is currently being challenged at the High Court and Supreme Court levels. Nevertheless, President Mugabe recently stated in a television interview that no court would stop government's program to acquire land, and if any court attempted to rule on the matter, it would be ignored by government. The avenue of appeal against expropriation of land for farmers is the Administrative Court within the Ministry of Lands. Thus, this ministry operates as prosecutor, judge, and appellate board in all questions relating to land acquisition.

These terms of the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 are certainly departures from both previous laws and government's low key rhetoric on the matter before 1990 (Herbst, 1990). When the act was published, government

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6 Compensation is paid in Zimbabwe dollars, not in foreign currency as the Lancaster House Constitution required.
promised that Land Committees would be established in each province, consisting of members from the Ministry of Lands, the Agricultural Technical Extension Service (AGRITEEX), and the Commercial Farmers Union. These Committees have in fact drawn up proposals for which lands and types of lands should be designated for acquisition, although the criteria for what is "misutilized," "underutilized," or "appropriately utilized" land in terms of the Land Acquisition Act, remain unclear ("Farmers Blast Land Committee", 1993).

Nevertheless, the establishment of such Land Committees was seen as a partial attempt to assure white farmers that the land acquisition program would be adopted in a logical manner which would keep destabilization of commercial farming to a minimum. Still, all farmers whom I interviewed expressed concern over their continued land tenure, since government would not tell them under what circumstances land was in danger of designation.

May 1993 saw the first mass designation of commercial farming land in Zimbabwe's post independence history. Over 80 farms were designated for compulsory acquisition in May and June ("MP's Urge State", 1993). These designations have been seemingly random to members of the Commercial Farmers Union, which has blasted the program. "We believe the decision to designate the farms to be more political rather than an economic decision," said one farmer ("Editorial", 1993,4). On the other hand, the recommendations of the Land
Committee for Matebeleland North province were completely accepted, leading credence to the argument that such designations have been random if not politically motivated.

Indeed, farms of all types were designated in 1993, including tobacco farms, horticultural plots, and, most significantly for this dissertation, some wildlife ranches. To be sure, some derelict farms have also been designated, and the CFU has made no protest about this. In fact, the Commercial Farmers Union has stated "we are not against designation of farms but we want it to be done in such a way that the agricultural sector will not collapse" ("Editorial", 1993). Herbst cites similar statements being made by CFU and its members in the mid 1980s. The CFU leadership seems to have tried to make its public image a cooperative one with government over the years, since the interests of its membership are indeed served best when a climate of land tenure security prevails.

In terms of Chapter Four's model, CFU is of course a powerful organization which has both regularized access to government and a high organizational capacity. Its attitudes are also quite well known, being circulated widely through briefing papers and newspaper interviews. Significantly, however, government seems intent on breaking down the corporatist links with the white farming community which it inherited from the Rhodesian government. By publicly challenging the CFU's legitimacy to be involved in
the final details of land acquisition, and by designating farms in a seemingly random fashion, government has gone a long way toward severing at least its overt, public corporatist ties with this sector of the political economy.

As Minister of Lands Kumburai Kangai stated in response to the CFU's public outrage at many of the farm designations, "There is nothing that stops the minister from acquiring even fully utilized land if it is deemed necessary that the land is needed for national interests [emphasis added] ("Kangai Dismisses Farmers' Protests", 1993, 1). These sorts of statements and actions lead one to believe that the 1993 land acquisition program is designed precisely to strike uncertainty into the commercial farming community, to the broader political end of altering the corporatist nature of Zimbabwean commercial farming. The fact that 250,000 acres of land were purchased prior to the 1992 act in Matabeleland South, but that to date no communal farmers have been resettled on that land, is also a significant point in this light ("Government Designates", 1993).

Finally, it must be emphasized that some designations have taken place for patently obvious political reasons. The Churu farm, owned by opposition party leader Ndabaningi Sithole, was designated in the May-June 1993 wave, evidently for health reasons ("Government Designates", 1993). Why the Porta Farm in Norton, which is arguably an even greater threat to Harare's water quality than Churu, has not been
cleared of squatters makes the designation of Sithole's farms seem all the more political. Further, James Chikerema, another opposition party leader, has also seen his farm designated for compulsory acquisition ("The Tobacco Tragedy", 1993). Finally, Henry Ellsworth, a parliamentarian from the Rhodesia days, had his farm designated in late June after allegedly forcing women who were collecting firewood on his farm to strip naked and walk home. 7 Clearly, the current government is using its newly-found powers over private land to achieve political ends as much as the resettlement of peasant farmers. This chapter now turns specifically to the wildlife ranching industry, and the unique set of political problems it and government face over the fast development of this commercial use of private land, keeping in mind the historical and very current setting outlined in this section.

7 According to one commercial farmer whom I have interviewed, Ellsworth's security guards caught the women picking up loose firewood on the farm, and called the police. According to this story, the police told the guard to take an article of clothing from each of the women so that they could be identified by police later. Ellsworth was supposedly not even involved in this decision. Nevertheless, he has been charged with assault, and faces a court date in August.
Wildlife Ranching as a Political Gambit

The wildlife ranching industry in Zimbabwe began in the early 1960s, when the three Fulbright Scholars Dasmann, Mossman, and Riney first seriously explored commercial ranching of wildlife as a viable economic enterprise. They first tried meat production, but this game meat could not compete with the government subsidized beef industry. Then mini-safaris, or hunting on private land, began on a few ranches in the 1960s, helping game ranchers become economically viable (Cumming, 1989). The late 1980s and early 1990s saw a veritable boom in commercial wildlife ranching, with the Wildlife Producers Association8 gaining 450 members, half of whom were actively engaged in wildlife ranching. This second wave of private wildlife rearing has further diversified into hunting and non-hunting safaris, meat and hide production, and the live sale of animals by the Department of National Parks to interested game ranchers.

The legal framework which allowed for this expansion was of course the Parks and Wildlife Act of 1975 discussed in Chapter Five. The act gave private farmers control over the

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8 A producers' subunit of the Commercial Farmers Union.
wildlife on their land, as long as this control did not compromise endangered species or result in animal cruelty.⁹

The current wildlife ranching industry is a diversified one. The ranches around Harare, as well as those close to the tourist attractions of Hwange National Park and the Victoria Falls, have largely concentrated on non-consumptive (photographic) tourism, taking advantage of the concentration of tourists in their areas. These ranchers have often converted their farm buildings into bed and breakfasts, and offer infrastructure comparable to that offered in the national parks, without the crowds. Thus, these tourist farms can capture high-value, high-priced portions of the tourist market, a large portion of which is based on foreign currency through international visitors.

Sport hunting, or consumptive tourism, remains the economic backbone of most commercial wildlife ranching in Zimbabwe. The southeastern Lowveld, the Matetsi area of northwestern Zimbabwe, and the Gwaii River valley bordering Hwange National Park are the major areas where sport hunting takes place on commercial farms (Cumming, 1990; Child,

⁹ Under the Roman-Dutch legal system, which operates widely in southern Africa, no one but the state can technically own wildlife. However, Roman-Dutch law makes a theoretical distinction between ownership and control of a resource. If one can demonstrate physical control over a resource, then he or she can exploit it. Thus, if a farmer pays $5,000 for a sable, only to see it wander into the property of the next farmer, who shoots it the next day, then the purchasing farmer has lost all rights to that resource.
These farms are generally in agro-ecological zones that are not suitable for any form of intensive, non-irrigated agriculture, and many of these farms were formally cattle producers. In 1990, the safari hunting industry, dominated by white commercial game ranchers and white professional hunters, grossed US$9.3 million in foreign currency for the Zimbabwean economy (Jansen et al., 1992).

The income from meat sales, as was the case in the 1960s, is quite low, given stringent veterinary and meat hygiene controls, competition from the partially subsidized beef industry, and general consumer reluctance to consume game meat. Hides and skins are also in direct, and losing, competition with leather tanning, which is cheaper and generally of higher quality that game skins (Jansen, et al., 1992).

Finally, there are about 170 ranchers engaged in either crocodile or ostrich ranching. This seemingly bizarre set of industries in fact has large economic potential. In 1991, 40,000 crocodiles were produced, primarily for their skins, which were exported to Europe for hard currency, and

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10 Consumer resistance to plains game meat consumption, such as eland, impala, and kudu, is attributable to three causes. First, many black Zimbabweans simply cannot eat certain animals for cultural reasons. One does not consume one's totem animal. Second, white Zimbabweans generally prefer beef over game for reasons of cost. Finally, international tourists are often offended when places such as the Hwange Safari Lodge, with its beautiful natural setting amongst many animals, serves warthog loin or eland steak (which, by the way, are quite tasty).
their tail meat, which largely remains in Zimbabwe. In fact, Zimbabwe is the world's second largest producer of alligator or crocodile products, behind of course the United States (CFAZ, 1991). Ostrich ranching is the newest development in the commercial wildlife ranching industry. Having started around 1985, there are now over 150 ostrich ranchers, raising the birds for their meat, which will be exported en masse to Europe once EEC-approved slaughter houses are established. In the meantime, much of the meat shows up in Zimbabwean supermarkets alongside t-bone steaks.11

For an industry barely 15 years old, commercial wildlife ranching has thrived quite well in Zimbabwe. There are three primary reasons for this, and all have strenuous detractors. First, commercial wildlife ranching does serve a conservation function, if only for the sheer numbers of animals living on white farm land. Second, wildlife ranching is a substantial component in the country's tourism industry, and also competes at the micro-economic (farm) level favorably with beef production. Third, wildlife ranching serves a risky political function for the white farmers who adopt it as a practice, which will be discussed

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11 Ostrich meat is deep red, just like beef. This seemingly odd sort of meat from the world's largest land bird is actually quite tasty, and completely devoid of fat and low density cholesterol. The problem for local consumption of ostrich, besides those mentioned in the previous footnote, is that it costs Z$20 per kilogram, compared to $17 per kilogram for t-bone steak.
in the subsection to follow, within the framework of the current land debate outlined in the previous section.

The Ecological Importance of Commercial Wildlife Ranching

By weight of numbers of head of species and land area, commercial wildlife ranches contribute substantially to the general wildlife estate in Zimbabwe. Table 7.3 presents the percentages of several species of wildlife present on commercial ranches, as a percentage of the total number of that species in Zimbabwe. Although white farms have less than one percent of the country's buffalo and elephant populations\(^\text{12}\), they have a majority of every plains game species except for zebra (45.8\%). They also serve an important conservation function for two endangered species: the black rhino (24\%), which is on the verge of extinction, and the cheetah (56.1\%), which is locally endangered. Thus, commercial game ranchers serve an undeniable ecological function in the bulk of animals they carry.

Table 7.4 presents a different array of data to answer the same question. Here, one can see that, of the total land area allocated to wildlife, commercial ranches comprise 31.3\% of total game area, second only to the National Parks and Safari Areas themselves. Clearly, then, nearly one

\(^{12}\) Buffalo are largely excluded from private farms because they carry foot and mouth disease. Elephants are absent because of their destructiveness.
third of the game area in Zimbabwe is privately controlled, a unique situation indeed in a global context. Further, commercial game ranches actually provide a plurality of the safari hunting land for Zimbabwe, even more that the state controlled safari concessions.

There are, however, ecological objections to private wildlife rearing. Mac Nab (1992) and Geist (1990), are against commercial wildlife ranching because: its high value conserves poaching of private land, it has general negative effects on captive breeding, and the market for it is subject to economic and preservationist whim. Similarly, these scholars condemn private wildlife ranching as a polluter of the gene pool for some species and for its reliance on a very uncertain market. Still, given the sheer size of Zimbabwe's private wildlife estate, and particularly its conservation function for the cheetah and the black rhino, the importance of the industry is undeniable.

The Economic Importance of Commercial Wildlife Ranching

From a macro-economic point of view, commercial wildlife ranching is an important part of the wildlife industry, which is Zimbabwe's third largest foreign exchange earner. From the micro-economic point of view of the individual farmer, it is also a competitive industry, especially when placed alongside its current rival, cattle
Table 7.3
Percentages of National Species in Commercial Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Species</th>
<th>% Species in Commercial Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elephant</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bufalo</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lion</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leopard</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Rhino</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheetah</td>
<td>56.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giraffe</td>
<td>62.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sable</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eland</td>
<td>73.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kudu</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impala</td>
<td>52.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zebra</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7.4
National Allocations of Game Land and Safari Land

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% of Total Game Area</th>
<th>% Total Safari Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Parks</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Reserves</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal Land</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Land</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
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</table>
production. Since much of the wildlife ranching industry is situated in land that were either formerly used for cattle production or are still used for cattle mixed with wildlife, a comparison to cattle ranching is appropriate. Jansen, Bond, and Child (1992) carried out a survey of nearly 100 ranches in the agriculturally marginal areas of Zimbabwe in 1989 and 1990. They compared the financial and general economic aspects of cattle ranching versus wildlife ranching versus mixed ranching.\textsuperscript{13} Jansen et al. found that, on average, the return on investment for cattle ranches was 2.9\% ($2.94 per hectare), for mixed ranches was 3.6\% ($3.02 per hectare), and for wildlife only enterprises was 9.7\% ($6.09 per hectare). Ignoring inter-regional and inter-ranch variation, then, wildlife enterprises are much more economically efficient, and return more per investment dollar, than do either cattle or mixed enterprises.

Simple return on investment is not the only economic consideration for the farmer interested in wildlife ranching. Because of Zimbabwe's Export Retention Scheme (ERS), producers who export their commodities or who generate foreign currency are allowed to keep a portion of their earnings in hard currency. For the wildlife ranching industry, this figure was 25\% in 1993. In other words, a

\textsuperscript{13} In their jargon, financial profitability is measured roughly in inputs and outputs, and forms of depreciation. Economic profitability removes the effects of government policies, including protectionism, exchange rate policies, interest rates, and industry subsidies.
farmer who made Z$100,000 for the country from hosting safari hunts or tourists got to keep the equivalent of Z$25,000 in foreign currency rights (about US$4000 in 1993). He or she could then use this money to help buy inputs for his or her foreign currency producing enterprise, such as trucks, spare parts, or Scotch whiskey.\textsuperscript{14} There is currently no ERS fund provision for cattle ranchers, because the government-owned Cold Storage Commission has a monopoly on exporting beef. Hard currency, then, is another reason that farmers may go into game ranching and away from cattle.

Finally, one must mention that Jansen, Bond, and Child (1992) found that, on average, commercial wildlife ranchers employ approximately half the staff that cattle ranches do. In a recession-strapped economy, this sort of labor cost-cutting is controversial, and has obvious political ramifications in any conflict with government.

The Political Controversy Over Commercial Wildlife Ranching

Even if commercial wildlife ranching is ecologically and economically efficient (both at the micro and macro-economic levels), it would not necessarily be politically supported by the government. This statement only makes sense in light of the current debate about land acquisition, as outlined in the first section of this chapter. The state in Zimbabwe

\textsuperscript{14} Many ranchers indeed do purchase Scotch and other imported spirits for their clients.
has several imperatives to consider in its commercial land use policies (both official and unofficial).

First, government must ensure that it is seen "doing something" regarding historical land alienation. Such an imperative seems to be the drive behind 1993's mass designation of over 80 farms for acquisition. Second, and less drastically in absence of land designation, government must be seen enforcing discipline on commercial farmers without disrupting their key role in food and cash crop production. Such enforcements have usually taken the form of government openly criticizing certain land use practices on the commercial farms. These exportations, along with the designations that took place in 1993, can also be seen as government attempts to sever or drastically alter its corporatist relationship with the Commercial Farmers Union which it inherited from colonial days. Finally, and related to this second point, government must insure the general food security status of Zimbabwe by making sure with both market and nonmarket mechanisms that both commercial and communal farmers supply the nation with enough food for national consumption. These three state imperatives form the motivation for this inquiry into the politics of wildlife ranching.

Before the 1993 wave of farm designations as part of the Land Acquisition Act of 1992, government often used the press and its own position papers to persuade commercial
farmers to utilize their land in a way favored by government. For instance, in early 1992 government openly expressed "dismay" that commercial farmers were diversifying away from maize production into flower production, tobacco ranching, and game ranching in particular. According to government representatives:

> each farmer in this country should regard maize as the food of the people and, in drawing up their production plans, should take this fact into consideration. We expect them [commercial farmers] to be guided by morality, but we know that [economic] rationality and morality do not always go hand in hand. This we do not appreciate, since land which should be utilized for production of food is now being utilized for growing flowers, tobacco, and/or game ranching. This is not in keeping with the morality expected of them. (Bloch, 1992)

This is a case of government using its bully pulpit to castigate commercial farmers politically for arguably responding to economic circumstances. In the 1990-1991 growing season, maize was a crop which suffered greatly in economic comparative advantage to game ranching, tobacco farming, and horticulture, since all the latter had prices not fixed by government, a portion of which is now retainable in foreign currency. Thus, even before the Land Acquisition Act came into law, government economic incentives and political incentives to diversify into game ranching were at complete odds with each other. Here on can see the beginnings of government's attempt to sever its corporatist bonds with the commercial farming community, by sending out mixed political and economic signals on the
appropriate uses of agricultural lands. But before the 1993 wave of farm designations, rhetoric was all commercial farmers had to worry about in deciding what kind of land use to pursue.

This public debate and airing of laundry over commercial farm land use is especially important given the current division of agricultural land. As shown in Table 7.1, commercial farmers still control more than one third of Zimbabwe's total land area. Table 7.5 breaks this down into five agro-ecological zones. Natural Regions I and II are suitable for nearly all types of intensive agriculture. Natural Region III, primarily in the Midlands Province of Zimbabwe, is suitable for semi-extensive agriculture and ranching. Natural Region IV is considered suitable for only extensive agriculture and ranching, while Natural Region V is only suitable for ranching, and even that is risky (Katerere et al., 1991). As the table indicated, commercial farmers control well over two-thirds of Zimbabwe's finest agricultural lands in Natural Regions I and II, while communal farmers only control around 20% of this prime land. Clearly, communal farmers still are concentrated in Natural Regions IV and V, where intensive farming simply is not possible. Thus, when government rails about food security being dependent on commercial farmers growing enough food, they have a good point.
Table 7.6 brings this food security argument into sharper focus, by indicating the percentage of commercial farms in each Natural Region pursuing wildlife ranching. One must remember that, besides deploiring commercial farmer diversification into wildlife ranching because of declining maize production, government is also concerned that wildlife ranching in Regions III, IV, and V will lead to a shortage of beef, as farmers diversify away from cattle ranching (Jansen et al., 1992). In total, 20.7% of Zimbabwe's white commercial farms are under some sort of wildlife utilization. From this number alone, one can see that the political, economic, and ecological stakes are high in any debate between government and farmers over wildlife ranching. If government truly does deplore wildlife ranching as a food security problem or even as a general abuse of land, then their powers under the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 could conceivably result in the appropriation of some or all of this land. This would severely alter the commercial farming sector in general and the wildlife estate in particular. Further, Table 7.6 show that only 3.38% of the best farming lands in Natural Regions I and II are under wildlife, and thus represent a minimal threat to food security through their displacement of maize cropping. However, Zimbabwe's prime cattle country, Natural Regions III and IV, are heavily under wildlife use, with 15.6% and
<table>
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<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Land</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal Areas</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
<td>63.0%</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Farms</td>
<td>74.9%</td>
<td>68.6%</td>
<td>45.1%</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resettlement Areas</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agro-Ecological Zone</td>
<td>% Under Wildlife</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>----------------------</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>NR I and II</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NR III</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NR IV</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>NR V</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>20.7%</strong></td>
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44.3%, respectively, under commercial wildlife ranching.\textsuperscript{15} If government has legitimate reservation about wildlife ranching displacing food security (in this case, beef production), then the development of wildlife enterprises in Regions III and IV would be their most legitimate target.

Before the Land Acquisition Act of 1992, government railings against wildlife ranching would have been no immediate threat to the land tenure of white commercial wildlife ranchers. Now, government can simply step in and seize any farm it wishes. Statements made by the state after the Land Acquisition Act must surely now be taken by farmers as immediate indications of government policy, or at least with more seriousness than protests made by government about wildlife ranching before the act was passed.

In dismissing the protests of commercial farmers over government's acquisition of over 80 properties in May and June 1993, the Ministry of Lands also claimed that some farmers were diversifying into game ranching to escape designation. Presumably, the Ministry of Lands thinks that farmers perceive they will be "politically covered" by the Department of National Parks, whose conservation philosophy encourages private wildlife ranching ("Matabeleland Farms Designated", 1993, 12). In response, the CFU claimed that

\textsuperscript{15} These data ignore multispecies cropping of cattle and wildlife on the same ranches, so reading this data as wildlife use to the expense of beef production would not be fully honest.
wildlife ranching was one of the only economically viable uses of ranching land, since cattle production offered comparatively smaller economic returns. Given the data presented by Jansen et al., there is some evidence for this economic statement.

Still, one must wonder whether the Department of National Parks has sufficient political clout within government to "save" wildlife ranchers from designation. In March 1993, as the Deputy Minister of Environment and Tourism\(^\text{16}\) was guiding the Trapping of Animals (Control) Amendment Bill through Parliament, members condemned the bill, and it actually failed to pass. This rare reversal for a government ministry in a Parliament thoroughly controlled by the ruling party is particularly instructive in assessing the power of National Parks versus the Ministry of Lands. The bill was condemned as just another ploy to give white commercial farmers more power over their lands (through government prohibitions of animal snares), while ignoring the food requirements of rural peasants ("MP's Dispel", 1993). In an interview with a high ranking official of the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, I was told that the Ministry is currently operating an in-house debate on whether or not to actively support commercial wildlife ranching on white farms. This debate is still

\(^{16}\) The Ministry of Environment and Tourism is the parent Ministry of the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management.
unresolved, but in light of statements made by the Minister himself (as quoted at the beginning of this paper), one must conclude that National Parks' continued commitment to private game ranching is at best equivocal.

In May 1993 another parliamentary attack was launched on the commercial wildlife ranching industry. During a debate on natural resources, a parliamentarian attacked The Ostrich Producers Association of Zimbabwe (TOPAZ) for racial discrimination, saying the industry did not serve the interests of blacks, since it had only 8 black members out of 174 (Daily Gazette, 1993b).

If food security is one argument used by government to take lands, then one must wonder why a commercial farmer would risk designation of his or her land by openly flaunting government's desires on land use. About one-half of the commercial farmers I interviewed said that they thought wildlife ranching was a successful strategy to pursue to avoid having one's farm designated for acquisition. These farmers operated under the assumption that if they put up a game fence around unused sections of their property and allowed people to hunt the area, then government would see this as not only a property improvement, but also an economically acceptable use of land. Strikingly, the other farmers I interviewed thought that wildlife ranching was a risky enterprise, since government had openly opposed it on several occasions.
These farmers, then, were using a political rationale to guide their land use practices, while the former group were still operating primarily with an economic rationale. These differing attitudes toward government policy by members of the same interest group surely undermine the CFU's representations to government, and in doing so jeopardize the future of the corporatist relationship they enjoy with government.

An interesting case study in the political astuteness of some commercial wildlife ranchers in light of the data presented in the tables above comes from the Save Conservancy. This is a grouping of 13 commercial wildlife ranches in the southeastern lowveld area of Zimbabwe, in which all internal fencing between the ranches is being torn down, and a large electrified perimeter fence is being placed around the whole property of 320,000 hectares. This ranching complex hosts nearly 100 endangered black rhinos, and in the wake of the 1991-1992 drought, also took on 2000 animals from the Gona re Zhou National Park, 400 of which were elephants ("Mission Launched", 1992). The conservancy was established with help from the Department of National Parks Game Ranching Research Unit, and is the most important sanctuary for the black rhino in Zimbabwe. Recognizing the political opposition to extensive wildlife ranching due to land hunger, the Save Conservancy only contains ranches lying in Natural Region V, which is only suitable for
rangeland activities without irrigation. Thus, the conservancy has not been in the practice of extensifying agricultural lands suitable to intensive or semi-extensive farming, so that they could be labelled by government as wasting land (Du Toit, 1992). Since they play an important role in lowveld conservation, the Save Conservancy is recognized by many in government as an asset to Zimbabwe's environment.

What makes this case study all the more interesting is that, even though the Save Conservancy specifically does not use land that would put it into conflict with government, it has still lost a land tenure battle. In March 1993, 72 peasant families who were squatting on 600 hectares of the Save Conservancy were granted right to that land by government, forcing the conservancy to push back its electric game fence. Thus, even well though out, environmentally suitable plans for wildlife ranching and conserving species threatened with extinction cannot escape government's opposition to wildlife ranching.

Conclusion: Assessing the Role of Wildlife Ranching in Influencing Government and Interest Group Power

Clearly, Zimbabwe's corporatist system is in a transitional phase. As government now has powers to redistribute land under the Land Acquisition Act of 1992, and apparently the will to do so, the power of the
Commercial Farmers Union is diminishing. In a country where they formerly had the power to negotiate pricing policies with the government, and even have the state require all commercial farmers to buy a license from the CFU, the state of Zimbabwean commercial farming is in flux. As a subset of this commercial farming system, and indeed one of the fastest growing parts of it, the wildlife ranching industry is faced with an even more uncertain future than is commercial farming in general. Even though private game ranches serve an obvious ecological role in not only utilizing plains game, but in the preservation of endangered species, this fact will evidently not stop the state from taking productive and unproductive lands, some of which will of course be game farms. Further, despite the fact that wildlife ranching is more economically viable than cattle farming, and contributes to Zimbabwe's hard currency-earning tourism industry, the interests of food security and bringing land distribution justice to Zimbabwe seem much more important to the Ministry of Lands and the ruling party ZANU-(PF). Even the Department of National Parks and its parent Ministry of Environment and Tourism are not willing to stick their political necks out even for places such as the Save Conservancy.

In terms of the hypotheses generated in Chapter Four, and the model constructed from them, one definitely sees corporatism being altered in this field. Hypothesis One
conjectured that the more a group is explicitly concerned with wildlife utilization, the stronger its bargaining position would be with the state, which itself actively encourages local wildlife utilization in principle. Clearly, attitudinal congruence between white game ranchers and government's overall conservation philosophy is not operating to the benefit of the Wildlife Producers Association, the CFU, or game ranching in general. In fact, private wildlife ranching is a detriment to the future of one's farm tenure, given all the evidence presented in the previous section. Thus, while government may sing the praises of the CAMPFIRE program and its elephant culling practices as sensible wildlife utilization, such practices and philosophies are only digging a deeper hole for the commercial farming sector.

Hypotheses Two and Three proposed a paradox: that well organized, long enduring groups would have the most success bargaining with the state, but that black groups would have more success than their white counterparts. Given the complete absence of countervailing pressure to the CFU from black farming organizations (Herbst, 1990), Hypotheses Two and Three are nevertheless important to consider in this third and final dissertation case study. Hypothesis Three is certainly right: white farming groups hold little legitimacy in the eyes of government or the peasant population. But the countervailing pressure of Hypothesis
Two does not save commercial wildlife ranchers, either. Even the impressive organizational power of the Commercial Farmers Union and its subsidiary Wildlife Producers Association has made little if any impact on government land policy since the LAA of 1992 was passed. Government has simply begun to ignore the powerful commercial farming sector's protests against land acquisition, so that the attitudinal and organizational power variables specified in Chapter Four are irrelevant. When a government such as Zimbabwe's begins to tear down the former corporatist links between itself and the country's most powerful interest group (CFU), those who formerly had access to government are simply frozen out.

Hypotheses Four and Five deal with the central role of the state in any policy regime. Hypothesis Four proposed that the state would seek interest group involvement in its policymaking when it wanted to test plans, get public approval for a pre-existing policy, or assistance in policy implementation. Even though the Ministry of Lands sought CFU input into the land acquisition process, this advice was largely ignored, and government has publicly blasted commercial farming in general, and wildlife ranching in particular, in the press recently. On the other hand, Hypothesis Five proposed that the more the state used its bargaining linkages with relevant interest groups, the more powerful it would become vis-a-vis those groups. In this
case study, however, since the Zimbabwean government is trying specifically to tear down an inherited corporatist arrangement, such a hypothesis is clearly rejected, since the very action of not interacting with commercial wildlife ranchers in this case helps government with its goal.

Any analysis of commercial wildlife ranching which is solely based on ecological or economic considerations, as indeed most analyses have been in the past, would have completely missed the significance of wildlife ranching in Zimbabwe. The pages of this section simply would not exist for either an economist or an ecologist. Given the historically-based problem of land tenure in Zimbabwe, however, any analysis of private game farming which does not include as its focus the land distribution issue fails. In the end, commercial wildlife ranching's importance as an ecological or even economic sector pales in comparison to its being a point of political controversy in Zimbabwe. Further, since this case study is squarely focused on an extremely important sector of Zimbabwe's political economy, it has also given us a unique insight into the changing nature of corporatist policymaking. When compared with the previous two case studies presented, one can gain an appreciation of variability in government policy, not only in the same policy sector, but also at different levels of analysis.
CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION: UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS IN AFRICA

This dissertation has been about wildlife policy in Zimbabwe. To be sure, the analyses presented in these chapters have shed new light on several important questions about environmental policy in that country. First, why does the state pursue certain wildlife policies? Second, how do these policies affect the power of the state? Third, how do the interest groups involved in the three policies analyzed here interact with the state? Fourth, how are these three policy case studies different, and why are they so?

The concluding chapter will tie the analyses presented in the dissertation together, to give a broader picture of the Zimbabwean wildlife conservation regime than have the three case studies individually. Then, the chapter will turn to a broader, more theoretical question: what do these results and the literatures reviewed have to say about the political process in Africa? The final section of this conclusion will briefly assess the immediate political future of Zimbabwe, especially in light of the new "democratization" literature springing up in academic circles. Finally, this concluding section proposes
questions for further research which have been generated by this study of wildlife politics in Zimbabwe.

Environmental Policy as Politics

This dissertation has presented analyses of three case studies: the CAMPFIRE wildlife utilization plan for Zimbabwe's communal areas, the international ivory trade, and the politics of commercial wildlife ranching by white farmers. All three cases are obviously studies of three different wildlife policies. However, they all have different things to say about the five group-state interaction hypotheses generated in Chapter Four. Specifically, each case study has its own dynamics regarding state interests in environmental policy, the impact of such policies on the power of the state (and its subparts), the historical context of environmentalism in Zimbabwe and globally, and the specific impact of wildlife policies on economic development. I will examine the variability of each of these dynamics in this section, paying close attention to tying the lessons of all three case studies together.

The Variability of State Interests in Environmental Policy

The case studies presented in Chapters Five through Seven have each addressed a wildlife policy at a different
level of physical and academic analysis. Whereas the CAMPFIRE case study is embedded in the context of 12 specific local communal areas (peasant farmer) development, the commercial wildlife ranching case is primarily a national land distribution question in its scope, while the international ivory trade case is obviously one that transcends Zimbabwe's boundaries. Further, while each of these cases has an explicitly financial component, because all three deal with the economic utilization of wildlife, the importance of economics to the individual cases is variable.

First, the interest of the state in CAMPFIRE had been one of establishing a new program and new interest groups to maintain and extend that program. Regarding the state's interests in environmental policy, CAMPFIRE is an example of building a new program from scratch. In the corporatist framework of this dissertation, the CAMPFIRE program is an example of establishing a corporatist system of policy implementation. Chapter Four proposed in Hypothesis Four that the state desires interaction with interest groups when the state seeks to test the viability of a policy, seeks interest group help in implementing that policy, and wants public acquiescence to a policy already implemented.

Since the CAMPFIRE program's roots only go back to 1986, and the program has just recently extended to twelve communal areas, it is obviously a new program. Recalling
Chapter Five, the government's interests in inventing and extending the CAMPFIRE philosophy are rooted in not only the desire to establish wildlife utilization as an economically viable development project in agriculturally marginal peasant lands. These state interests are also in increasing central government presence in peripheral rural areas. Indeed, all the CAMPFIRE programs implemented to date have been in the border areas of Zimbabwe, where state influence has been at a comparatively low level. Thus, government's influence is extended when sustainable wildlife utilization can be implemented in these areas under the auspices of the already existing, and central government-controlled, district councils. Further, the government-inspired founding of the CAMPFIRE Association of District Councils is a closely controlled interest group set up to evangelize for the CAMPFIRE philosophy. In terms of interest group-state interaction, then, CAMPFIRE is a good example of government establishment of interest groups under a corporatist policy regime.

Second, while the CAMPFIRE program is an example of government founding a new policy area to fit under its environmental policy regime, the international ivory trade case is an example of government macro-economic interests coming into sharp conflict with externally-based environmental philosophies. So, the dispute over the international ivory trade discussed in Chapter Six is a case
of the central government's economic interests coming into open conflict with the environmentally preservationist interests of external, powerful interest groups.

Because the ivory trade debate in 1989-1992 was a debate played out in an international forum in which the government of Zimbabwe was merely one state actor among over 100 other state actors, its level of control over the rules of the game\(^1\) was orders of magnitude below the state's level of control in the CAMPFIRE case. One may wonder why this dissertation, whose theoretical framework is based on corporatist bargaining, would even include a case study involving international fora such as CITES, since international relations are usually by no means corporatist. This question is only answerable in comparative terms; one must compare and contrast different cases, such as the three policies in this dissertation, to grasp the uniqueness of the state's interests in various environmental policies. The ivory trade case, then, is by no means a straw man constructed to show that corporatist policymaking does not exist regarding international wildlife disputes. Rather, this case of international conflict over fugitive environmental resources such as the African elephant demonstrates the variability of state-conceived goals in three seemingly related environmental policy case studies.

\(^1\) The classic definition of a "regime," especially an international regime in the words of Oran Young and John Dryzek.
The state, especially in the developing world, may have a wide degree of latitude to construct new policies, such as in the CAMPFIRE case. But when that same state with the same environmental philosophy comes into conflict with powerful external interest groups, the playing field changes dramatically for the governmental actors involved in policymaking and implementation.

Third, the Zimbabwean state's interests in commercial wildlife ranching are the most expressly political to be found among these three case studies. The government had latitude to construct a brand new policy arena with CAMPFIRE, right down to constructing new interest groups. That same government saw its elephant conservation policies based on explicitly economic wildlife utilization shot down in the international arena. Regarding white commercial wildlife ranching, the state inherited a corporatist system of government-farmer bargaining that it now wishes to opt out of. So while the Zimbabwean state actively pursued economic utilization of species in the CAMPFIRE and ivory trade case studies, it is seeking to curtail commercial utilization of wildlife by farmers, completely within the broader political context of land redistribution.

The Land Acquisition Act of 1992 gave the Zimbabwean central government new powers to appropriate commercial farming lands to redress the country's racially-imbalanced land tenure system. Thus, the interests of the state in
commercial farming in general are to tear down the inherited corporatist marriage with the white commercial farming community. As a growing, economically important subset of that commercial farming community, game ranching has become a political threat to the state or at least a thorn in the side of government. The same state that argued with other governments and interest groups such as Greenpeace over its rights to cull elephants and sell ivory because of the succeeding practice of sustainable utilization, now finds itself taking land away from a sector of the political economy which controls 20.7% of Zimbabwe's wildlife area. An analysis of government policy toward commercial wildlife ranching which is not based in comparative politics, as this dissertation has been, would have seen the state's policies toward game ranchers as hypocritical. On the contrary, when seen in the theoretical light of group-state interaction, the state's opposition to commercial wildlife ranching is logically rooted in its political interests to redress the land tenure problem and to simultaneously extricate itself from a corporatist marriage with the white commercial farmers.

The Impact of Environmental Policy on the State's Power

Now that the state's interests in pursuing certain wildlife policies have been comparatively examined, a more politically important question arises. How do these three
environmental policy cases impact the power of the state? In a corporatist policymaking regime, policies are the result of group-state bargaining, and the resulting policy product impacts the state's power, as seen in Figure 4.1. Thus, the interesting and ultimate political question to be asked is not about the mere interests of the state in a policy, but what ultimately results from that policy.

Politically speaking, the CAMPFIRE program of sustainable wildlife utilization in the poorer communal areas had enhanced the power of the state by extending central government presence to these marginal areas. By using the existing system of district councils and tacking on new district and ward wildlife committees, the Zimbabwean government has managed to extend its reach and make money at the same time. Ostensibly a decentralization project, CAMPFIRE has in fact resulted in a proliferation of new governmental posts in CAMPFIRE district councils, including district and ward wildlife officers. So, peasants living in the more lucrative CAMPFIRE areas are now receiving a portion of the financial benefits from wildlife utilization that they would have otherwise not received. The concomitant fact that central government and district councils are also receiving tax monies from wildlife utilization means CAMPFIRE offers something for everyone.

While many peasants would like to have more control over the funds generated from safari hunting in their CAMPFIRE
districts, they are in fact receiving cash, schools, clinics, and roads. Almost by default, the central government is extending its power in the CAMPFIRE districts, while at the same time not having to contribute more funds to district councils because of the money generated by wildlife utilization projects.

In the international arena, as discussed in the previous section, one state from the developing world usually has very little influence. Even in the ivory trade case, where some scientists and interested individuals thought Zimbabwe was correct in its arguments in favor of ivory culling as a conservation exercise, one state can do very little in the face of overwhelming opposition. The CITES meetings of 1989 and 1992 showed the international weakness of a few states pursuing a controversial environmental policy. The power of the Zimbabwean state, the same state that has benefitted politically from the CAMPFIRE program, was of absolutely no use in the ivory trade debate. In fact, the acrimonious exchanges that took place at the CITES meetings and in the media probably diminished the standing of Zimbabwe in the international environmental community. So, the international ivory trade debate is a case of central governmental power being diminished as a result of pursuing a certain wildlife policy. Because of the non-corporatist nature of the CITES organization and indeed the international community in general, Zimbabwe had little
control over the proceedings of the debate, and suffered accordingly.

As with the raw interests of the state mentioned in the previous section, the power of the Zimbabwean central government was on the line in the commercial wildlife ranching case. Since it passed the Land Acquisition Act of 1992, the central government has been empowered to squarely address Zimbabwe's land distribution problem. By tearing down the corporatist agricultural pricing and tenure system inherited from Rhodesia, the political interests of the central government will be served by limiting or even curtailing commercial wildlife ranching by white farmers.

Again, this case of commercial wildlife ranching from a political point of view has much less to do with environmental policy than do the ivory trade and CAMPFIRE case studies. On the contrary, given the long standing and politicized problem of land distribution, the designation or threat of designation for compulsory acquisition of game ranches has much more to do with land distribution than it does with the sustainable utilization of wildlife. The power and legitimacy of the state is very much on the line with the land question, and commercial wildlife ranching is simply another part of that complicated problem.
The Economic Importance of Wildlife Policy to the State

When this dissertation was being conceived and written in the early stages, I thought that economics would be at the crux of Zimbabwe's various wildlife policies. The analyses presented in Chapters Five through Seven when taken together give the lie to that assertion. Indeed, the effects of environmental policies on the state's power, as mentions in the previous section, are the primary reasons the state pursues its environmental policies. To be sure, economic gains, whether at the level of the individual farm or the nation as a whole, are important variables for the analyst to consider.

The case of CAMPFIRE points to this problem with relying solely on an economic or even ecological analysis. While almost all academic inquiry into CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe has been directed at the economic incentives given the peasants to conserve wildlife, the political motivations for CAMPFIRE first explored by Murombedzi (1992) are also important. The state indeed does realize a 50% return from wildlife in CAMPFIRE: 35% for the district council levy and 15% for the wildlife management fund.

But the political linkages with agriculturally marginal areas that result from this money and the other 50% that go back to the CAMPFIRE wards themselves are the important result of CAMPFIRE for the interests of the state. Further, the relevant interest groups involved, the district councils
and the CAMPFIRE Association, derive their political benefits from the money produced by CAMPFIRE. Any analysis which only pays attention to the potential environmental attitudes of peasants resulting from CAMPFIRE monies, or see government taking 50% of those monies as a problem, miss the important political point of the state extending its power in these hinterland districts.

The ivory trade case, which showed that Zimbabwe's lucrative ivory trade was shut down as a result of the CITES meetings, is also on the surface a question on money. Indeed, the losses the ivory carving industry and related fields have suffered have had a financial impact on them, as well as the government, which previously earned money from ivory auctions. But Zimbabwe's real loss in this case was over the broader argument that the sustainable utilization of the African elephant was the best way for southern Africa to manage its large elephant herds. The loss of finance for central government that resulted from the ivory trade ban actually was seen by Zimbabwe as a problem for the idea and practice of sustainable utilization itself. If the government were deprived of these funds, the state reasoned, then the future of the national elephant herd would be in doubt. Thus, economic considerations were again very important here, but primarily for these ecological reasons. Further, the humiliation Zimbabwe suffered form its highly-publicized ivory debate losses at the CITES meetings surely
lower its political clout in the international conservation arena.

Finally, the problem of commercial wildlife ranching is one in which the state has actually ignored the economic considerations of that growing industry. As demonstrated in Chapter Seven, the commercial use of wildlife yields higher returns on investment, and also more foreign currency per head, than does cattle ranching. Even though commercial wildlife ranching's safari hunting and photographic tourism component are important parts of Zimbabwe's important tourism industry, government is still discouraging and even destabilizing the game ranching industry. Of course the reason for this is that the government desires land reform more than it does the micro and macroeconomic benefits of commercial wildlife ranching. Again, a solely ecological or especially economic analysis of the game ranching industry would not have come to these conclusions. In fact, these analyses probably would have largely ignored the political significance of the wildlife ranching industry in light of the Land Acquisition Act of 1992.

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2 Or at least the appearance that it is serious about land reform.
The Historical Context of Environmentalism

As seen in Chapters Three and Five, the historical and social contexts of environmentalism and environmental policy are important variables to consider in any study of the subject. Zimbabwe is certainly no exception; in fact, the oppressive history of "conservation" in Rhodesia has created unique problems for the Zimbabwean state in its construction and implementation of its wildlife policies. Further, the character of the current international debate over environmental preservationism versus sustainable development and sustainable utilization have a clear impact on Zimbabwe's elephant culling policies.

Regarding CAMPFIRE, the Department of National Parks has had to try to change the political culture of resistance to conservation. In attempting to do this, the conservation authorities have tried to link conservation of living resources to economic gains for those impacted by fugitive wildlife resources. By giving people at least some money at the end of the day for their having to put up with crop raiding wildlife, which has also been a traditional source of protein for rural people, CAMPFIRE has attempted to change the nature of environmental policy implementation in Zimbabwe's communal areas.

The success of failure of this attempt, as illustrated in Chapter Five, will depend on not only how much money these peasants receive, but also how much authority they are
given over the management of wildlife resources. The complaints that people have over district councils keeping too much wildlife money and central control over the implementation of CAMPFIRE, is a problem whose roots are also in history. If a ward or village with abundant wildlife resources is only given a check at the end of the year, then one must wonder how much the top-down approach to wildlife has really changed since the Rhodesia days.

The ivory trade policy study in Chapter Six has clear, unmistakable lessons to tell about the context in which environmental policies, and indeed values, are constructed. Zimbabwe's policies of sustainable elephant culling obviously run against the preservationist pattern currently operating in the international debate over saving "endangered" species. This was made clear by the overwhelming defeat of the southern African position at the CITES meetings, where those countries with an unsustainable population of elephant argued for an exemption from the worldwide ivory ban.

At least in 1989, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Malawi, and Botswana miscalculated the power of the preservationist ethic, and especially the power of those interest groups who pushed such an ethic on CITES, a heretofore scientific body. Morality, non-relative value positions, and in some measure political expediency militated against the southern African position, no matter how well documented. The sorts of
international conflicts generated at the CITES meetings in 1989 and 1992 will in all likelihood continue to be important political conflicts in today's world, which has become for more North-South in character than during the Cold War. The historical and economic contexts in which environmental values are constructed will remain a key variable in any analysis of international environmental policy, particularly those as emotional as the debate over the African elephant.

The political environment in which white commercial wildlife ranching operates is clearly one rooted in Zimbabwe's history. The pattern of land tenure in which 4,000 white farmers own almost one-third of Zimbabwe's land is most definitely a product of Zimbabwe's colonial history. Studies which neglect the significance of the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 in this historical context miss the point of the current governmental opposition to game ranching. By attempting to redress the long-held land distribution grievances of peasant farmers, the central government is using a much more political and historical logic than its detractors give it credit for. The government's opposition to commercial game ranching, as mentioned in the previous section, has much more to do with history and politics than with either ecology or economics.

Environmental policy in Zimbabwe, then, does not operate in either a political or historical vacuum. Any analysis
that treats game ranching, peasant wildlife utilization programs, or the ivory trade debate in purely ecological or even traditional policy analysis terms simply misses the broader significance of wildlife policy.

Lessons Learned About General Politics in Africa

If this dissertation were just about the politicization of wildlife policies in Zimbabwe, then it would not tell us much about the political process in general. Fortunately, this dissertation has situated its analyses in a specific theoretical context: corporatist linkages between the state and relevant interest groups. This theoretical framework not only allows us to analyze the three case studies in a logical, overarching context. The dissertation also allows us to make some cautious generalizations about the nature of politics in Zimbabwe and Africa from the point of view of how the state and interest groups interact in other policy areas for future research.

Chapter Two was an attempt to marry three bodies of theory into a coherent mesh. That Chapter was necessarily somewhat unwieldy, given the fact that it included not only traditional and recent theories of the state and interest groups in Africa, but also a large measure of American interest group theory. This unwieldiness was hopefully worth the effort, since some remedy was needed in the literature about African politics, because few concepts or methods
specified what the researcher should analyze regarding internal and external interest group dynamics and linkages with the state.

Chapter Two then went on to synthesize these literatures under a corporatist rubric, which does pay specific analytical attention to the linkages between the state and groups within a framework which has particular expectations about the character of those linkages. Corporatist analysis starts with the hypothesis that the state is at the pinnacle of a system of limited and structured, though politically meaningful, policy arena in which relevant interest groups are established, licensed, and recognized by the state as the official groups to represent functional parts of society. While by no means a perfect theory for analyzing politics in general or Zimbabwean wildlife policy in particular, this approach does impose theoretical rigor, giving the researcher specific types of group-state linkages for which to look. Falsifying a meaningful, though not perfect, theory is certainly a more worthy enterprise than merely describing a policy regime in depth.

The problem with many academic studies of the developing world is their misunderstanding of what a theory is. The state-society literature, especially the late 1980s work of Rothchild and Chazan (1989) and Migdal (1988), was a reaction to the state autonomy literature of Skocpol (1979) and others. The state autonomy school was concerned with
whether or not the state was autonomous vis a vis the society in which it operated. The concept thus submerged itself in generalizations about "state" and "society," looking for evidence of either state autonomy or not.

The idea of conceptualizing the state as a monolith and an unbreakable historical force of course not only defies the lessons learned in this dissertation; it also defies common sense. Analyzing the state as if it were some monolithic force led to the overdue death of this first generation of state autonomy literature. Even the otherwise insightful, well-written work of Herbst (1990) on the state in Zimbabwe looked at state autonomy as an "either-or" situation, although he did break the concept down somewhat into situational autonomy and structural autonomy. This breakdown still does not salvage the long term usefulness of the state autonomy concept. Books and articles that make dichotomous statements about the state being either autonomous or not autonomous really do miss a larger political point: what are the linkages between the state (and its subparts), and relevant interest groups? So, even though Herbst analyzes the state and interest groups in Zimbabwe in detail, all this analysis is ultimately meant to answer the question: when is the state autonomous? He thus misses broader political questions about how and why the state operates policy regimes, and the variable cause and
effect linkages between the state and relevant interest groups.

The state-society literature of the late 1980s purported to remedy this pre-occupation with the state by concentrating on societal groups. Unfortunately, the state-society school makes the same mistakes as the state autonomy writers about making "either-or" statements. Writing about Africa and South and Southeast Asia suddenly rediscovered that there are indeed organized interests embedded in these societies. To the state-society school, these groups could be ethnically, religiously, class, or regionally-based. Still, the state-society relations scholars, led by Chazan and Rothchild's edited volume The Precarious Balance, fell overboard in their desire to correct the defects of the state autonomy school.

Rather than shift the debate to some new theoretical level, as would be required for a more meaningful reading of society than allowed for by the state autonomy school, these scholars merely contented themselves with looking at state autonomy from the ground up. By this I mean that the state-society school analyzed organized interests in society to see whether or not their actions made the state autonomous. Although people in the state-society relations school would probably never admit to this point, they simply took the empty state autonomy hour glass and turned it upside down. In this way, the same tired approach of "either the state
[society] is strong and autonomous or the state [society] is weak and not autonomous. Depending on whether one used the bracketed or unbracketed word, the analysis was the same, and has moved the field in no new direction.

Further, the methodology of the state-society relations school has been completely inappropriate to answer even the limited questions they posed. The Precarious Balance and Migdal's Strong Societies and Weak States suffer from their "travel agent" approach, in which each chapter deals with a different country to measure "comparatively" the nature of state-society relations. The problem with this should be clear from this dissertation. In these pages I have found that the nature of state-interest group linkages varies not from policy area to policy area, but also within policy areas. Here we have learned that the same state with the same conservation philosophy pursues three very different wildlife policies. If this is possible, then surely Zimbabwean state-interest group relations must vary from education to environment to defense to health. On top of all this, the method of the state-society relations school was to take several countries and describe them, which would of course lead to gross, and probably wrong, generalizations about state and society.

The reader would notice that I never use this "state-society" wording to describe the three Zimbabwean case studies, nor in the construction of Chapter Four's
theoretical model. I have adopted the terms "interest groups" and "organized interests" to name those groups in society whom I consider relevant to each policy area. This is because I wish to avoid the generalization trap into which the state autonomy and state-society relations schools have fallen. Not only do they adopt "either-or" theoretical approaches, but they also overgeneralize about society in particular. In politics, only organized interests could be logically expected to impact public policy in a meaningful way.

As mentioned in a footnote in Chapter Two, it is easy, sometimes exceedingly easy, to bash such poor theoretical analysis as that found in the unadulterated versions of the state autonomy and state-society relations literatures. It is quite another thing, however, to propose a new theory that works. In a sense, I have actually not proposed a new theory, but merely resurrected an old one (corporatism) and married it with some American interest group theory which gives the analysis more methodological and theoretical vigor. In have been careful, however, to not fall into the easy "either-or" trap. I do not propose that the Zimbabwean political economy is either corporatist or not. To do so would simply not capture the range of possibilities in the polity. Rather, in the three case studies on wildlife policy contained in Chapters Five though Seven, I have
concentrated on the degree of state-interest group corporatism present in the country.

This is a crucial distinction, and is one of the reasons that academic analysis in comparative politics has been characterized by a "shotgun" approach to theory building, in which one theory after the other is discarded because it fails to capture the nuances of politics, while at the same time saying something meaningfully general at the level of middle range theory. Theories constructed in an "either-or" fashion will often fail because they give inadequate pictures of what is really happening in politics. On the other hand, theories which propose to test the degree to which something political is happening are more robust, in that they can often capture the nuances of politics. Saying that the Zimbabwean state is or is not corporatist would at first blush seem easy. The problem is that, depending on which policy area one selects, using this approach seven different scholars analyzing seven different policy areas would probably come up with different answers to the question of whether or not the polity is corporatist.

Indeed, if my analysis had used this "either the polity is corporatist or it is not" approach, it would have resulted in a confused mess. In the CAMPFIRE case, one using this "either-or" approach would have probably concluded that the state does operate in a corporatist manner, given that groups were actually established by the
state to implement a central government policy. Those analyzing the international ivory trade case in isolation would have not even bothered with corporatist theory in the first place, since by definition international society is a system of ad hoc coalitions. Finally, someone using the "either the polity is corporatist or it is not" approach would have found in the case of white game ranching that the state is actually trying to end corporatist relations inherited from Rhodesia.

My analysis, however, has concentrated on the degree to which the state and interest groups enter into corporatist bargaining arrangements, which in the end will give us a broader picture of the way the polity works.

The lessons of this dissertation, when one steps back to take a broad view of the three case studies, is that the Zimbabwean state indeed does operate in an historical background of structured relations with interest groups, and policies are pursued accordingly. The building of new groups, and the sanctioning of district councils to implement government policies, in the CAMPFIRE case, is an example of government extending its corporatist operating system to the marginal rural areas. The ivory trade case study is an example of the state losing and international environmental battle precisely because the more or less corporatist framework to which it has become accustomed at home does not operate in the international realm. Finally,
the extremely politicized nature of the state's approach to white commercial wildlife ranchers points to the state extending its broader political interests by dismantling corporatist relations with private white farmers which run against its broader political goals of land redistribution.

Neither of these case studies would have made much sense had they adopted an "either-or" path to falsifying corporatist theory. Using the path of measuring the degree of corporatism that exists in group-state bargaining linkages, this dissertation has been able to see the group-state linkage system as one which varies from policy area to policy area. This system of linkages between the state, its subparts, and relevant interest groups varies depending on the state's abilities to marshall support from existing groups, cut powerful groups out of the decisionmaking loop, and receive acquiescence from more powerful organized interests.

As seen in Chapters Five to Seven, the state has been variable in its abilities to accomplish these political goals. A state-society or state autonomy approach would have missed the variable nature of these political linkages between the state and organized interests, and eight books on the subject situated in either school would have probably arrived at eight different answers. All this is not to say that my dissertation has discovered the one truth about the way the state and interest groups interact to produce
wilde policy in Zimbabwe. Nor does it claim that I have applied the perfect theory to the cases at hand. Rather, the theoretical rigor imposed by the theoretical framework used here has allowed, and even required, me to focus a common theoretical inquiry about state-group interaction onto three seemingly similar but actually different policy cases.3

Political Democratization in Zimbabwe

This section will briefly analyze the lessons that can be learned from this dissertation about democratization in Zimbabwe. The country is currently witnessing the formation or new opposition parties. In a nation in which the ruling ZANU-(PF) party has traditionally wanted to establish a one party state, the development of these parties is significant. Up to 1990, President Robert Mugabe was

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3 Finally, this dissertation has rendered lessons about what Hugh Heclo calls "issue networks," as cited in Chapter Two. The issue network concept, though I have not used that term explicitly all throughout the dissertation, comes the closest of all traditional American interest group approaches to modelling corporatism in the developing world. The issue network concept, as Heclo points out, allows for more structure on the linkages between the state and interest groups than does the "coalition" approach of ad hoc coalitions. Further, the issue network concept is more testable than the "subgovernment" concept which sees the state and interest groups in the United States as organized into almost sinister shadowy groups making policy. The unique lessons of this dissertation for scholars of American politics is that the issue network concept travels well over international boundaries. Further use should be made of Heclo's issue network concept, both in analyses of the developing world and in the United States.
adamant in his desire to create a one party state, with his ZANU-(PF) being that one legal party. The president faced strong opposition to this plan from within the ruling party itself, and dropped the plan in late 1990.

Since then, several parties have arisen. The first was Edgar Tekere's Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), which contested the presidential and parliamentary elections of 1990. Although ZUM won about 30 percent of the national vote, owing to Zimbabwe's first past the post majoritarian electoral structure, ZUM only gained two seats in Parliament. Tekere also lost the presidential election to Mugabe in a landslide defeat. Other opposition parties have existed since independence in 1980, including Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole's ZANU-Ndonga, and Bishop Abel Muzowera's African National Congress of Zimbabwe. These parties, however, have been tainted by their participation in the discredited Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government of 1979, which the whites through Prime Minister Ian Smith continued to dominate up until independence in 1980 (Meldrum, 1992). Even though the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government has not been in existence for nearly 15 years, the ZANU-(PF) politicians, especially President Mugabe, still use these past connections between Smith, Muzowera, and Sithole as effective political rhetoric against those politicians. With the rise of new opposition parties who have no real linkages to that former government, the effectiveness of
such rhetoric may diminish, even though it is still being employed as a political weapon.

The years 1991 and 1992 saw the formation of several new opposition parties, including the Forum Party, led by former Chief Justice Enock Dumbutchena. This party was formed in late 1992, and claims that it will start contesting local and parliamentary by-elections in October 1993. The Forum further claims that it will fully contest the parliamentary and presidential elections in 1995. Forum may indeed be the most potent opposition force to arise in Zimbabwe since independence, but its leadership has disproportionate numbers of whites and Ndebele speakers, the latter of which comprise 19% of Zimbabwe's population. One must wonder, then, how effective the Forum Party would be in a national election in a country which is 80% Shona. Before 1989, when ZANU-(PF) and the Ndebele dominated (PF)-ZAPU merged, ethnic political parties were a fact of life in Zimbabwe. Ethnic warfare nearly broke out in Zimbabwe after independence, with several thousand Ndebele civilians killed by the Fifth Brigade, which held allegiance to ZANU-(PF).

Jonathan Moyo, a professor at the University of Zimbabwe, has written that elections are the essence of democracy (1991). On the other hand, Jeffrey Herbst's *State Politics in Zimbabwe* (1990) argues that since elections are rarely held in Africa, or are rarely contested by meaningful opposition parties, that democracy is to be found in the
broader linkages between the state, bureaucracy, and interest groups in society. Herbst, however, was writing in 1987, before the Unity Accord between the two major parties, and before the current crop of opposition parties arose. Still, his point about democracy being found in the linkages between party, Cabinet, bureaucracy, and interest groups is an important one, though the importance of elections surely cannot be discounted in the current political environment in Africa, where ruling parties are actually losing elections.

This dissertation has of course been more similar in its analysis to Herbst than to Moyo. This is not because I discount the value of elections. Rather, the dissertation had not been about elections or even democracy; it has been about linkages between the state and relevant interest groups.

Elections in 1995 may indeed change the nature of some of the policies examined in this dissertation. Forum has explicitly criticized the Land Acquisition Act as a power grab which makes a mockery of the power of courts. Since Forum has promised to restore the right to appeal to courts for farmers who have had their lands designated for acquisition, then if Forum wins in 1995 the immediate pressure may be taken off of wildlife ranchers." Further,

"Even if the current government is not sacked at the polls in 1995, one must remember that ZANU-(PF) is not a monolith. As shown by Libby and Herbst, to whose writings I refer in Chapters Two and Four, the current government is comprised of the party, the Cabinet, the President,
when the Mass Democratic Movement of Frederick Chiluba took power in Zambia in 1991, it reversed that government's long standing opposition to the international ivory trade ban. One cannot discount the possibility that a new government which takes power in 1995 would also alter Zimbabwe's virulent opposition to the international ivory trade ban, in order to improve the country's image with other nations and powerful environmental interest groups. At the same time, the complaints voiced by peasants living in CAMPFIRE areas that they have no control over the money generated by wildlife resources may also lead to decentralization of the program under any new government. One can also speculate on the effect of Zimbabwe's defeat at the 1989 and 1992 CITES meetings on domestic politics. Has the shutting down of the ivory trade actually given the current government more leeway to designate white commercial wildlife ranches? Such a connection, while untestable with the data at hand, is an interesting variable to ponder.

Besides possible electoral consequences for the future of these three policy case studies, what do they themselves say about democracy in Zimbabwe? The answer to this question must remain mixed. One could argue that the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 is inherently undemocratic, since it

Parliament, and the various sectors of the bureaucracy. The effect of a marginal ZANU-(PF) victory in 1995 may alter the current political landscape in ways that are thoroughly unpredictable in 1993.
flouts the Constitution's bill of rights, and disallows appeals to the courts against government actions. On the other hand, how democratic is a situation in which 4,000 white farmers control 31.3% of Zimbabwe's agricultural lands? Further, the provision that peasant farmers can make money from wildlife living in their areas is certainly more democratic than the colonial practice of making criminals out of peasants who shot a kudu for food. Still, central government puts restrictions on the way in which these monies are handled, and who ultimately controls them. Finally, I can think of absolutely no lesson that the ivory trade has for democracy.

This dissertation may seem an inappropriate forum for the discussion of democratization in Zimbabwe, given the fact that it deals with wildlife policy. I would largely agree with this assertion, though this section has shown some hypothetical outcomes of future election scenarios. In the end, the author would leave academic analysis about democratization in Africa to the authors and editors of Governance and Politics in Africa. Hyden and Bratton (1992) and the contributors to their book are far better equipped to engage in such analysis than the author of a dissertation on interest groups, the state, and wildlife policy in Zimbabwe. Still, the importance of democratization should be trivialized by no one, and the speculations about
democracy in this sections have some small lessons for these scholars, if one stretches the analysis somewhat.

This dissertation has been about wildlife policy in Zimbabwe. Given the theoretical framework, it could also have concerned itself with wildlife policy in Botswana, health policy in Nigeria, or interest rate policies in Equatorial Guinea. The lessons learned from applying corporatist concepts to state-interest group interactions in Zimbabwe are hopefully generalizable. Further research could analyze other policies in Zimbabwe or elsewhere. Whatever theoretical framework one adopts, studies of the state and interest groups in Africa should always pay attention to the linkages between those groups, and not just be content with analyzing the state and organized interests separately. The bargaining that takes place between these political actors and structures is extremely interesting, and politically important in developing polities.

Regarding more explicit lessons for environmental policy, surely the wisdom of examining these policies in purely ecological or economic terms has been compromised here. In the three case studies explored in this dissertation, a fundamentally political nature has been detected in all policies explored. Whether local, national, or international in scope, environmental policies are fundamentally products of the polities in which they are constructed and implemented. These policies also operate in
a specific historical context which one simply cannot ignore. In the end, one must restate the first sentence of this dissertation: wild mammals may seem out of place in any discussion of interest group politics. Actually, they are not.
REFERENCES


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Kevin Hill was born in Greenwood, South Carolina, in 1966, and educated at Greenwood High School, from which he graduated in 1984. He then entered Furman University in Greenville, South Carolina, graduating magna cum laude in political science and history in 1988. While at Furman, he won the Ulmer Political Science Medal and the Bradshaw-Feaster Award for General Excellence by a Male Undergraduate. He was also inducted into Phi Beta Kappa in 1988. He enrolled in the Ph.D. program in political science at the University of Florida in 1988, and was financially supported by a graduate assistantship and the Manning Dauer Fellowship. In 1989, he travelled to Zimbabwe for nine months on a Rotary International Scholarship. He returned to Zimbabwe in 1992 and 1993 to complete his dissertation fieldwork and writeup with fellowships from Fulbright and the National Science Foundation.
I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Goran Hyden, Chair
Professor of Political Science

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

M. Margaret Conway
Professor of Political Science

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Walter A. Rosenbaum
Professor of Political Science

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Michael Martinez
Associate Professor of Political Science

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

R. Hunt Davis
Professor of History
This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Dean, Graduate School