DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC NORMS

By

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Although the United States (U.S.) has generally emphasized democracy in its international relations, the evidence suggests that in the post World War II era U.S. policy increasingly displayed a tendency to promote actively the spread of democracy globally. I contend that the primary source of policy change originates from changing domestic norms regarding political and civil rights. As the commitment to political and civil rights increased in the domestic arena, the commitment to political and civil rights internationally increased. Before the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and other accomplishments of the Civil Rights Movement, U.S. foreign policy decision makers cared little for regime type in their policy orientations. After the social upheavals of 1960s, I have found a greater sensitivity in U.S. policy toward democracy promotion. The early 1970s is a transition period in the
prevailing norms regarding civil and political rights in the United States and U.S. foreign policy toward the promotion of human rights and democracy. The changes in norms led to a change in identity. In the early 1970s, we find the basic U.S. identity shifting from a Euro-American identity to a multicultural identity.

Theoretically my analysis originates from a constructivist approach to the study of world politics. The constructivist approach emphasizes the impact of ideas, rather than material considerations. This research specifically analyzes the changing normative structure in the United States and the concurrent change in identity. This study links these transformations to changes in foreign policy. The actions of the U.S. Congress regarding human rights and democracy promotion are specifically analyzed. Congress represents the link between domestic norms and foreign policy orientations.

The findings suggest that we must consider domestic level factors in our explanations of international behavior and foreign policy. Particularly for the United States, a human rights agenda and a policy of democracy promotion are associated with domestic societal changes regarding political and civil rights and a general growth in tolerance.
CHAPTER 1
FOREIGN POLICY AND SOCIETAL CHANGE

This study seeks to explain the sources of democracy promotion in U.S. foreign policy. Although the United States has generally emphasized democracy in its international relations, the evidence suggests that in the post World War II era U.S. policy increasingly displayed a greater involvement in advancing the spread of democracy globally. I contend that the primary source of policy change originates from changing domestic norms regarding political and civil rights. As the commitment to political and civil rights increased in the domestic arena, the commitment to political and civil rights internationally increased. Before the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and other accomplishments of the Civil Rights Movement, U.S. foreign policy decision makers cared little for regime type in their policy orientations. After the social upheavals of 1960s, I have found a greater sensitivity in U.S. policy toward democracy promotion. The early 1970s is a transition period in the prevailing norms regarding civil and political rights in the United States. It is during this period that U.S. foreign policy toward the promotion of human rights and democracy changes. The change in norms leads to changes in identity.1 In the early 1970s we find the basic U.S. ethnic/racial identity shifting from a

1Identity is a multifaceted concept covering notions of the relation of the individual to society, politics, and general world views such as fatalism or optimism. In this study the change in identity is limited to that of racial/ethnic classification.
Euro-American identity to a multicultural identity. The multicultural identity includes not only the acceptance of multiple racial and ethnic groups, but is also generally tolerant of all forms of diversity. How the United States sees itself impacts on how it relates to the rest of the world.

This study is important in how it analyzes domestic level factors on foreign policy. Other works have examined the relationship between racism in the United States and U.S. foreign policy (Hunt 1987, DeConde 1992). These works, for the most part, have shown the deleterious effects of American racism in U.S. foreign relations. Recent research has shown how advances in civil rights are related to the level of threat the United States faced in the world system (Klinker and Smith 1999, Dudziak 2000). For the most part, these works have neglected to examine the impact of declining domestic levels of racism and U.S. foreign policy.

Some detractors will decry that the view of declining prejudices and increasing tolerance presented in this study is pollyannaish. They will say that racism is alive and well in the U.S. Others will claim that U.S. foreign policy does not consider human rights and consistently violates human concerns for the larger “national interest.” I am not at all suggesting that racism or discrimination no longer plagues the United States. Neither am I intimating that American foreign policy consistently supports democracy and human rights. What I do suggest is that there have been changes in the U.S. domestic norms. These changes have brought about an increase in respect for political and civil rights and a tolerance for diversity at the domestic level. Moreover, U.S. foreign policy reflects these changes.
To what extent has the United States changed? As a brief illustration we need only to look at the United States and the actions of U.S. presidents during two different periods of wartime. The actions of President Woodrow Wilson during World War I and George W. Bush in the present “War against Terrorism” provide a study in contrast. As the United States mobilized for war against Germany and the Central Powers, extensive attacks occurred against German culture and German-Americans. German foods were stripped of their names. Hamburgers became liberty sandwiches. Attacks on German-Americans were prevalent.

Unique forms of violence were often devised by mobs to punish those charged with disloyalty or pro-Germanism. For instance, in San Rafael, California, a man had his hair clipped in the form of a cross, after which he was tied to a tree on the courthouse lawn. A person of German birth in Salt Lake City was thrown into a bin of dough where he almost suffocated. In Pennsylvania a man was taken from a hotel room, “severely beaten, made to walk up and down the street with a dog chain around his neck, forced to kiss the flag and doused into a large watering trough” (Peterson and Fite 1957, 197).

In one case, near St. Louis in 1918, a mob bound a man in an American flag before they lynched him (Kennedy 1980, 68). President Wilson remained mute to the attack on German-Americans by Americans. David Kennedy (1980, 88) relates that Wilson “persistently ignored pleas to speak out against attacks on German-Americans.”

The actions of President George W. Bush after the attack of September 11, 2001 by Islamic extremists on the United States are in sharp contrast to the actions of Wilson. The first hint of retaliatory attacks on Arab-Americans or Americans of the Islamic faith brought a sharp and quick condemnation from the President. Standing barefoot in a tiled prayer alcove in the Washington Islamic Center, President Bush declared that those “who
feel like they can intimidate our fellow citizens to take out their anger don’t represent the best of America. They represent the worst of humankind” (Lewis 2001, A5). Instead of fanning the flames of bigotry and hatred, Bush declared that Islam is a religion of peace and that the war was against terrorism, not Islam.

Cases of violence against Muslims did occur in the weeks after the attacks of 11 September. The American Islamic Council reports more than 625 complaints of violence and harassment against Muslims and Islamic places of worship, and gunmen murdered two individuals because they were Muslim or perceived as Muslim.² Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation were directed to investigate more than 40 potential hate crimes including the two homicides. Nevertheless, the cases of violence were isolated and usually solitary acts. The absence of any case of mob killing of Muslim Americans represents a positive contrast to the actions of Americans in 1917. Professor Amitai Etzioni of George Washington University, writing in the Christian Science Monitor, declared that among the “many reasons these days to be proud to be American ... is the concerted effort to suppress expressions of anger against the terrorists from spilling over to the religious group from which they hail” (Etzioni 2001, 9)

No American leader or journalist sought to excuse the attacks on Muslim Americans as products of a thirst for revenge. In contrast, comments made by the Washington Post in response to the killings of German-Americans at the onset of the U.S. involvement in World War I were clearly exculpatory. Regarding the violent nationalism

²In Mesa, Arizona, a gunman murdered a Sikh owner of a gas station and in Dallas, Texas, a Pakistani Muslim was gunned down in his grocery store.
of the time, the Washington Post declared: "In spite of the excess such as lynching, it is healthful and wholesome awakening in the interior of the country" (quoted in Kennedy 1980, 68).

Woodrow Wilson was a bigot and a racist; George W. Bush cannot be so considered. With that understood we can explain the differing responses of these two men. Most apologists for historical figures with racist dispositions argue that we must understand these individuals in the context of their times. The societal norms of the time in which Wilson lived supported his world view. George W. Bush's outlook reflects the American society today.

How are the domestic norms of a country reflected in its foreign policy? As I will argue in the next chapter, we cannot separate state-level factors from the external policy of a state. Individuals are shaped by the society in which they live. Norms that govern and shape domestic behavior influence decision makers as they direct foreign policy.

Again we must turn to President Wilson. Wilson disliked the idea of hyphenated Americanisms. He viciously attacked the foreign-born as "creatures of passion, disloyalty, and anarchy" (quoted in Kennedy 1980, 67). In his third annual message to Congress, Wilson proclaimed that those "born under other flags but welcomed under generous naturalization laws to the full freedom and opportunity of America . . . have poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life . . . [T]he hand of

\[3\] Wilson did not object to the Postmaster General widening the practice of segregation among federal employees in 1913. "He had screened the film The Birth of a Nation in the White House, and had endorsed its pro-Ku Klux Klan interpretation of post-Civil War Reconstruction as 'history written with lightning'" (Kennedy 1980, 281).
our power should close over them at once” (quoted in Kennedy 1980, 24). Wilson viewed the United States as one nation with one racial/ethnic identity, that is, white, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant. Holding to the view that all nations should have their own state, it is understandable that Wilson promoted a policy of national self-determination and a break up of the multiethnic state of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. From the early twentieth century to the late twentieth century the American identity changes from a monocultural identity to a multicultural identity. American policy toward the break up of Yugoslavia did not reflect a Wilsonian view of national self-determination. Instead, policy makers pursued a multiethnic solution. From the Vance-Owen plan to the Dayton Accords, U.S. policy makers consistently aspired to develop a state composed of multiple ethnic groups in war ravaged Bosnia. In the summer of 2001, ethnic conflict between Albanians and Macedonians suggested a break up of Macedonia. The United States under the aegis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) refused to support the ethnic Albanian claims to sovereignty and committed troops in the peaceful settlement of the ethnic conflict.

In this study, the foreign policy area investigated is that of the promotion of democracy. Most of the literature on democracy promotion suggests it to be a longstanding U.S. policy. Gregory Fossedal (1989) in The Democratic Imperative argues that the U.S. promotes democracy abroad as an embodiment of its democratic nature.

4Similar sentiment of this can still be found today in the works of writers like Patrick Buchanan. These sentiments also exist in academia. Samuel Huntington (1997) calls for immigrants to accept English as the national language and commit “to the Principles of the American creed and the Protestant work ethic.”
According to Joshua Muravchik (1992) in *Exporting Democracy*, a foreign policy that links an American identity with the cause of democracy finds deep roots in American history. In *America’s Mission*, Tony Smith (1994) ties the promotion of democracy with U.S. security interests and traces its origins to the U.S. Civil War. Most scholars attribute the absence of democracy promotion to the absence of strong domestic political leadership or to international security factors. Domestic and societal normative changes in the United States are for the most part ignored in the literature on democracy promotion.

One attempt to develop a nuanced explanation for U.S. democracy promotion and account for an evolution and change in policy can be found in William Robinson’s (1996) *Promoting Polyarchy*. Robinson suggests that with a globalized world economy the core countries led by the United States can no longer use coercive measures to control the poor states in the periphery. To limit calls for greater economic participation in the developing world, the United States promotes “low intensity democracy” or polyarchy as a way to relieve pressure from subordinate groups for more fundamental political, social, and economic change. “Low intensity democracy” or polyarchy is political democracy under capitalism which maintains “elite minority rule and socioeconomic inequalities alongside formal political freedom and elections involving universal suffrage” (Robinson 1996, 356). Whereas most scholars view democracy promotion as a long-standing tradition in U.S. policy, Robinson correctly understands that it is a recent phenomenon. This study agrees with Robinson's contention that the U.S. promotes polyarchy. The U.S. political system is best characterized as a polyarchy. Therefore, it makes sense that U.S. policy makers would seek to promote the form of democracy that characterizes their own political
structure. Where he claims that policy change is a product of globalization and transnational forces, my research suggests that we must turn to domestic sources in the United States.

I argue that change in U.S. norms regarding domestic political and civil rights translates into changes in foreign policy regarding the promotion of political and civil rights externally (i.e., democracy promotion). The independent variable is the domestic normative structure. Norms are culturally defined rules of conduct that specify what is appropriate and what is proper or necessary behavior within groups, organizations and institutions. Changes in this variable are considered permanent or at least not readily reversible. The intervening variables are the avenues of transmission of domestic norms to the policymaking apparatus. Domestic norms on foreign policy (here democracy promotion) affect the policy making apparatus from many sources including the polls, the media and interest groups. An examination of these sources is incorporated in the following analysis. However, this study concentrates on policy changes originating from the U.S. Congress as the primary indicator of change in domestic norms. The assumption is that the legislative branch is closest to the electorate and thus will be the first to reflect changes in the broader society. By examining the activities of Congress we can link change at the domestic level to changes in foreign policy. The dependent or outcome variable is democracy promotion. The conception of democracy embraced in this study is compatible with the conception of polyarchy. Promoting democracy encompasses the promotion of regular, free, and fair elections and universal suffrage, informational pluralism, civil liberties and human rights, functional autonomy for legislative, executive
and judicial branches, and effective power and accountability for elected officials (Dahl 1971).

The temporal domain of the study covers the post World War II era, 1945-2000. This study is composed of seven chapters. After this brief introduction, chapter 2 provides the theoretical background for the dissertation. Theoretically my analysis originates from a constructivist approach to the study of world politics. The constructivist approach emphasizes the impact of ideas, rather than material considerations. A constructivist theory suggests that norms are a constitutive component of a state’s interests. My approach differs from standard constructivism regarding where norms come from and how they emerge to influence world politics. The tendency among constructivist scholars is to suggest that states are socialized to accept new norms and perceptions of interests through international interactions. This study takes a state level view to the constructivist approach. Instead of norms being the sole product of international interaction, change in the domestic normative structure is offered as the origin of international behavior.

In chapter 3, I discuss the importance of norms for the social sciences and examine how norms constitute identity. This leads to a discussion of changes in the normative structure in the United States and the changes in the American identity. Although norms often change gradually, the data suggest that the early 1970s mark the point at which domestic norms change. The context in which change occurs is through the presence of protest movements organized with respect to issues of political and civil rights. I use data from the National Elections Studies and national survey groups such as Gallup to show a
change over time in the American public's attitudes toward political and civil rights. Also, I analyze cultural and political changes during the period.

Beginning with a focus on the presidency, Chapter 4 examines changes in U.S. foreign policy toward the promotion of human rights and democracy. Through contextual evidence and the use of the last twenty-five years of quantitative research, I assess the relationship between U.S. foreign assistance and the violation of human rights by recipient countries. The evidence suggests that U.S. foreign policy has changed with that change taking place in the 1970s. This change occurs concurrently with the change in domestic norms that has produced a multicultural American identity identified in the previous chapter.

In chapter 5, I flesh out the indicator variable of Congress and show how the change in domestic norms influences changes in foreign policy. This leads to a discussion of the role of constituent influence on members of Congress. More than any other branch of government, the Congress most accurately reflects the norms of the United States. With members facing reelection every two years, the House of Representatives most immediately reveals changes at the domestic level in the governing structure.

Congress exerts significant power over foreign policy through legislative and nonlegislative tools such as public hearings. Taking a cue from the "new institutionalist" literature on American government, I address the mechanisms beyond the legislative process by which Congress can influence foreign policy. I show how the civil rights movement influenced members of Congress in their thinking toward foreign policy.
Finally, I confront the legislative and procedural changes that Congress has undertaken to incorporate the promotion of democracy and human rights into U.S. foreign policy. I integrate my findings on the change in domestic norms into the analysis of Congressional activity.

In Chapter 6 I discuss two cases, South African sanctions and the Contra aid debates, where the President and Congress differed over promoting human rights and democracy and the Congress actually constrained presidential action. Chapter 7 of the dissertation summarizes my findings and draws conclusions from the study. I find a significant change in the domestic normative structure regarding political and civil rights over the duration of the period studied. U.S. foreign policy has reflected this change in public norms in the direction of greater concern for political and civil rights. In the next chapter I discuss the importance of locating an understanding of foreign policy at the domestic level and address the relevance of norms to foreign policy.
CHAPTER 2
THEORY OF FOREIGN POLICY AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

Introduction

Although the United States has generally emphasized democracy in its international relations, the evidence suggests that in the post World War II era U.S. policy increasingly emphasized good relations with democratic states and a greater involvement in advancing the spread of democracy globally. The primary source of policy change emanates from changing domestic norms regarding political and civil rights. As the commitment to political and civil rights increases in the domestic arena, the commitment to political and civil rights internationally increases. The basic puzzle of my research is to what extent do changes in domestic norms result in changes in foreign policy?

In this chapter, I present my theoretical approach in understanding this question. The study is grounded in a constructivist perspective. I also address the relevance of norms in the study of foreign policy. Second, I review the literature addressing democracy promotion and U.S. foreign policy. Third, I discuss the importance of locating this analysis at the domestic level and in doing so consider the relationship of domestic norms to the formation of foreign policy.

Theoretical Approach

Theoretically my analysis originates from a constructivist approach to the study of world politics. The constructivist approach emphasizes the impact of ideas, rather than
material considerations. Primarily, constructivism is a way of studying social relations. Human beings are social beings and would not be human but for social relations. Social relations and individual identities are mutually constitutive. Norms of behavior link individuals to society and society to individuals (Onuf 1998). This study defines a norm as a standard of behavior taken to be proper and acceptable. A norm is a principle of right action binding on the members of a group. In societal relations, norms guide the behavior of actors and set regularities of action. Society is a system made up of the interaction of human individuals in which “each member is both actor (having goals, ideas, attitudes, etc.) and object of orientation for both other actors and himself.” With this assumption, we may understand how the system behaves based on broadly shared goals, ideas, and attitudes of the individuals. These goals, ideas and attitudes constitute norms of behavior. “The core of a society, as a system, is the patterned normative order through which life of a population is collectively organized” (Parsons 1966, 8-10).

The state is the political expression of the society. From a social contract theory of the origins of the state, we can understand the state as a product of the society. Thomas Hobbes, one of the first social contract theorists, argued that individuals gave up some of their freedoms and agreed to be bound by the rule of the King. In return, the King provided order, thus removing the individual from the state of nature in which Hobbes described life as “nasty, brutish and short” (quoted in Coulter 1984, 35). Jean Jacques Rousseau’s version of the social contract further connects society to the state. With his notion of the ‘general will’ Rousseau makes this connection explicit: “So long as several men together consider themselves to be a single body, they have but a single will,
which is concerned with their common preservation and the general well-being” (Rousseau 1992, 966). The norms that bind the individuals together in a single body shape their collective perceptions regarding the necessities for preservation and what constitutes the general well-being. We can understand many behaviors of the state by reflecting on the basic construction of a particular state’s society.

A constructivist approach to foreign policy is better understood when juxtaposed to its theoretical antithesis, rational-materialism. A rational-materialist theory of foreign policy such as Classical Realism suggests that a state be understood as a rational unitary actor seeking to maximize its own interests or national objectives in world politics. For Realism, a state’s foreign policy is a response to changes in relative capabilities of other states. Realism contends that states do and must respond to the outside world without moral consideration. Realism proposes an amoral foreign policy with material power being the immediate concern (Morgenthau 1985). A rationalist-materialist approach can explain many state behaviors. However, we cannot account some aspects of state behavior for based on material interests. Conversely, I do not claim that we can explain all state behaviors through an examination of norms and state identities. Nevertheless, a focus on norms best accounts some behaviors such as the promotion of democracy for through a constructivist approach. A theory of foreign policy from a constructivist approach posits that a state’s national interests derive from a collective understanding within a state and an intersubjective understanding among states, rather than an understanding derived from the distribution of material capabilities. A state’s interest is closely tied with its identity and the societal norms shape that identity. Whereas Realism
assumes that all actors in global politics have one meaningful identity, that of a self-interested actor, “constructivism treats identity as an empirical question to be theorized within a historical context . . . ” (Hopf 1998, 175).

The constructivist approach to the study of world politics emphasizes the process of interaction that leads to state identity and interest formation. The model of behavior is one of rule-governed action. Instead of a calculus of rational action based on ends and means, actors’ (i.e., states) behavior is based on the situation and the designated appropriate behavior for the given situation. Norms produce guidelines that shape the actors’ understanding of their interests. A constructivist theory suggests that norms are a constitutive component of a state’s interests.

Norms are relevant, to some extent, in all schools of international relations theory; however, only the constructivist approach views norms as fundamental. Jeffrey Checkel (1998, 327-328) informs that:

While realists see norms as lacking causal force, neoliberal regime theory argues that they play an influential role in certain issue areas. However, even for neoliberals, norms are still a superstructure built upon a material base: they serve a regulative function, helping actors with given interests maximizing utility. Agents (states) create structures (norms and institutions). For constructivists, by contrast, norms are collective understandings that make behavior claims on actors. Their efforts reach deeper: they constitute actor identities and interest and do not simply regulate behavior.

From the constructivist perspective the building blocks of reality are not only material but ideational. State interaction creates the normative base that forms the social milieu. For most constructivists, the level of analysis is the system. State and nonstate interaction creates intersubjective understandings and frames identity.
The approach taken in this study differs from standard constructivism in regards to where norms come from and how they emerge to influence world politics. Most constructivist scholars assume that states are socialized to accept new norms and perceptions of interests through international interactions. Alexander Wendt (1996, 48) offers constructivism as a structural theory of world politics. The core claims of a structural constructivism are the following: (1) states are the principal actors in the system; (2) the key structures in the system are intersubjective not material; and (3) those structures construct interests and identities, rather than determined by exogenous factors to the system such as human nature or domestic politics. This follows in an identification of world politics as a larger society in which values are mutually given (Bull 1977). A society of states exists when a group of states is conscious of and maintains certain common interests and common values. A common set of norms binds these states in their relations with each other. States maintain certain norms and construct norms through interaction with other states creating larger societal norms that reconstitute state level norms.

Some scholars argue that international norms appear when they are welcomed and championed by a hegemon (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). Other scholars argue that agents for global normative change are not states, but nonstate actors. These scholars have focused on the role of international institutions (Finnemore 1996) or transnational groups (Sikkink 1993, Klotz 1995) in the diffusion of norms. Along with a focus on transnational actors the origin of new norms of behavior is often linked to principled ideas held by individuals (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Ethan Nadleman (1990) has
emphasized the influence of individuals, with firmly held beliefs of right and wrong and a
desire to convert others to those ideas, who act as transnational moral entrepreneurs. I
contend that these scholars do not place enough emphasis on state level factors in the
development of norms. Individuals are important, but how can we explain why some gain
legitimacy in their views while others do not? Of course transnational organizations help
diffuse norms throughout an international society; however, a hegemon enhances this
diffusion when it embraces the same norms. This study takes a state level view to the
constructivist approach. Instead of norms being the sole product of international
interaction, changes in the domestic normative structure will be offered as the origin of
international behavior.

Scholars in the constructivist vein suggest that the international normative
environment alters the character of states and state behavior (Jepperson et al. 1996).
Nevertheless, these scholars have failed to indicate the origin of the normative structure
other than being produced by the intersubjective understandings of the states. Thomas
Rise-Kappen reminds us that norms do not “float freely” and are at a minimum mediated
through the individual state’s domestic structure (Risse-Kappen 1994). Stephen Krasner
further argues that the domestic structures of states determine the international
environment, particularly the domestic structures of the most powerful states. “In the
contemporary world transnational fascist and racist organizations are weak; this would
hardly be the case if Germany had won the Second World War” (Krasner 1995, 266). The
same line of reasoning would lead to the assumption that the supremacy of market
solutions to economic problems and the dominance of multinational corporations in the
global economy would not exist if the United States had collapsed in 1991 rather than the Soviet Union. Therefore, we must examine the domestic normative structure of a state to understand its external behavior. Moreover, if the state is a powerful one, it has the capacity to shape the general international normative environment. U.S. foreign policy behavior is more influenced by domestic norms than by the norms propagated by less powerful states or institutionalized in systemic bodies.

**Domestic Norms in Foreign Policy**

A state's foreign policy decisions emerge from three levels of influence: (1) external or international influences; (2) internal or state influences; and (3) individual influences (Kegley and Wittkopf 1996). At the first level we find the external sources of foreign policy, or international influences. This includes systemic factors, such as the prevalence of conflict, the extent of trade interdependence, or the intersubjective understandings states develop through the process of interaction. The second level of internal influences brings in the domestic sources of foreign policy. The broadest category includes the state’s societal environment, which contains the values, beliefs, norms, and self-images widely shared by the broader culture. These factors in the state’s societal environment compose its identity. A second category at the internal level is the institutional setting. This includes the governmental structures, the division of authority, and the decision-making process. The third level represents the characteristics of individual decision makers. This level focuses on how individual personality characteristics explain how decision makers choose to conduct foreign policy.
All three levels can account for variations in a state’s foreign policy. At the systemic level, a state’s foreign policy options are directly related to the global distribution of power (Waltz 1979). Some states, based on their relative power capabilities, have greater leeway in their choices. Nevertheless, as the extant literature on the democratic peace suggests, the type of political regime is an important predictor of a state’s foreign policy (see Chan 1997 for an excellent review). The type of political regime circumscribes a state’s options irrespective of power capabilities. The institutional structure of the foreign policy making process and organizational procedures shape foreign policy outcomes (Allison and Zelikow 1999, Nisley 1999). At the individual level psychological and personality differences account for variance in decision making behavior (Jervis 1976, McDermott 1998). This study argues that the prevailing domestic norms at the societal level will provide a robust account of a state’s foreign policy behavior regarding the promotion of democracy. Norms set boundaries on behavior, restricting some and mandating others.

Societal norms structure all three levels of influence in some way. Societal norms dictate how a state will respond to systemic constraints. Although the structure of the system limits choices, choices do remain. State institutions and organizational structure are derived from and influenced by larger societal norms. Democratic institutions are legitimated through democratic norms. Individual decision makers are products of the societies to which they are born. For example, Adolf Hilter’s anti-Semitism and xenophobia were not far removed from the rural Austro-German culture in which he was reared and were widely embraced by the broader German culture.
As a factor in a state’s foreign policy, norms are fundamental. Societal norms and ideas held by individuals help shape a state’s foreign policy. Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane (1993) provide a framework that explains how ideas (beliefs held by individuals) explain policy outcomes. Although Goldstein and Keohane emphasize ideas, their framework is relevant for this study since norms are in essence the collective ideas of proper and improper behavior held by the larger society. Goldstein and Keohane offer three types of ideas: world views, principled beliefs, and causal beliefs. World views address the concept of what is possible and “are embedded in the symbolism of a culture and deeply affect modes of thought and discourse” (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 8). Principled beliefs specify the criteria of right and wrong and are often justified in terms of world views (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 9). The third category of ideas, causal beliefs “are beliefs about cause-effect relationships which derive authority from the shared consensus of recognized elites . . .” (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 10).

Goldstein and Keohane identify three causal pathways through which ideas influence policy. Ideas may serve as road maps assisting individuals in the determination of their own preferences or to understand relationships (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 13). Ideas serve as focal points and help individuals choose from among multiple outcomes (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 17). Finally, ideas influence policy as they become “institutionalized” (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 20). Ideas influence organization design and the development of political institutions, administrative agencies, legal structures and operating procedures, that mediate between ideas and outcomes.
John Ruggie suggests that the Goldstein and Keohane typology does not advance us far from the neo-utilitarian precepts of neoliberal regime theory (Ruggie 1998, 17). Goldstein and Keohane seek to use ideas to account for unexplained variance in their rationalist models. Beliefs are not independent variables, they are intervening variables that explain anomalies in a rational-materialistic account. Goldstein and Keohane (1993, 7) declare that “we do not seek to explain the sources of these ideas; we focus on their effects.” The Goldstein and Keohane typology provides a starting point, but we must move further and account for norms as independent causal variables. Individual ideas are translated through intersubjective beliefs into social facts. This is what the philosopher Searle calls collective intentionality. Intentionality remains an individual event, “[b]ut within those individual heads it exists in the form ‘we intend’ and ‘I intend only as part of our intending’” (quoted in Ruggie 1998, 20). Broad societal norms are important explanatory variables in the study of world politics.

Domestic norms are the most important part of the explanation of the democratic peace. In matters of war and peace, the empirical evidence strongly suggests that democracies are more peaceful in their relations with other democracies (Maoz and Abdolali 1989, Russett 1993, Ray 1995). Some scholars have found evidence to suggest that democracies are more peaceful in international relations overall. Stuart Bremer finds that democratic states are less likely than nondemocratic states to engage in militarized interstate disputes (Bremer 1992). David Rousseau and his colleagues (1996, 527) present evidence suggesting that “democracies are less likely to initiate crisis with all other types of states.” R. J. Rummel (1983) has gone far as to assert that democracies are less
warlike than other types of regimes. Moreover, he concludes that the more democratic a regime the less severe will be its foreign violence (Rummel 1996, 71). Rummel further extends the pacific benefits of democracy to a state’s internal relations. Democracies are the most internally peaceful regimes, or as Rummel declares “democracies don’t murder their citizens” (Rummel 1996, 91).

The question we must ask is why do democracies appear to be more pacific in all of their relations? Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett (1993) offer two alternative explanations for the democratic peace: a structural/institutional account that suggests that bellicose executives in democracies are constrained by elected representative institutions and a normative account that emphasizes certain aspects of liberal democracy – market economies, nonviolent resolution of differences, the rule of law – as guiding relations between democratic states. Scholars differ about which factors are more important. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman (1992, 156) dismiss the normative account since democracies will still fight nondemocratic countries; “[b]eing a liberal democracy does not guarantee that a nation behaves like a dove, just as failing to be a liberal democracy does not guarantee that a nation is hawk like.” Christopher Layne (1994) also makes this argument. Maoz and Russett (1993) demonstrate that both the structural/institutional and normative accounts offer explanations of the democratic peace, however, democratic norms are even more positively correlated with low conflict than democratic institutions.

The division of the explanation into a structural and a normative account is a false dichotomy. Even Bruce Russett (1993, 40) recognizes that the two models are not neatly
separable and that "[i]nstitutions depend on norms and procedures." John Owen (1994) argues that liberal ideas (norms) produce both democratic ideology and institutions, which work together to constraint government and produce the democratic peace. Liberal states "trust those states they consider fellow liberal democracies and see no reason to fight them" (Owen 1996, 153). The problem with the broader normative argument is that most scholars researching the democratic peace assume that domestic norms are static rather than dynamic. Any state that meets the scholar's definition of democracy is considered imbued with democratic norms. However, our conceptions of democracy have changed over time so why should we not consider that democratic norms have changed also?¹

In quantitative studies on the democratic peace, the indicators for norms have a limited capacity to capture the dynamic concept of domestic norms. For example, in his test of the democratic peace in the post World War II era, Russett (1993) uses two proxy variables to capture domestic norms: the persistence of a political regime and the level of domestic political violence measured by the number of violent political deaths and the number of political executions. Russett proposes that a society with strong democratic norms would be characterized by a political regime of some duration and with little or no

¹For a tightly reasoned argument to the changing nature of democracy see C.H. Macpherson (1977), The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy. Macpherson argues that Western liberal democracy did not emerge until the nineteenth century when liberal theorists came to believe that one man one vote would not be dangerous to private property. Democracy has moved through four identifiable phases: (1) Protective Democracy that only protected the governed from abuses of the government; (2) Developmental Democracy that brought a moral dimension to democracy seeing democracy as a means to individual self-development; (3) Equilibrium Democracy that rejects individual self-development and instead provides a justification for a competition between elites, and finally (4) Participatory Democracy that is an emerging phase of democratic life with more extensive individual inputs into the governing process.
political violence.

Both are behavioral indicators that cannot capture the concept of democratic norms. One can easily imagine a society in which a thoroughgoing anti-democratic attitude dominates the culture, such a religious community. This may be a long-standing regime in which political violence need not exist. The Puritan colony of early America comes to mind as an example, as well the Kingdom of Bhutan today. Although the absolute monarchy in Bhutan was changed to a form of democratic monarchy in 1969, democratic norms do not characterize the society. Rather, a subservience to traditional culture and Buddhism characterize Bhutan. No political violence is necessary to maintain order.

A further problem with democratic norms is the potential for a subjective bias. Ido Oren (1995) contends that the democratic peace is subjective and the United States over the years has redefined its definition of democracy “to keep our self-image consistent with our friends’ attributes and inconsistent with those of our adversaries” (Oren 1996, 263). Although Oren does recognized internal changes to the U.S.’s definition of democracy, he puts more emphasis on external influences of foreign policy. According to Oren, President Woodrow Wilson’s image of Imperial Germany changed as a function of the foreign policy process. Wilson once considered Germany an ideal democracy with an advanced and effective political system. It is only when relations turned bellicose in 1917 that Wilson developed a negative perception of Germany. Oren’s argument is compatible with Owen’s. For a democratic peace to be maintained liberal states must perceive other states as liberal. External threats do appear to play role, nevertheless, the prevailing domestic
normative structure energizes the linkages of perception. Domestic norms change, often profoundly over time. To illustrate such deep changes one only has to think of President Wilson. If Woodrow Wilson were a politician today, given his Anglo-Saxonist views and racist disposition, he would not be considered a mainstream, viable candidate for national office.

Norms are important explanatory variables. Clearly, a state’s foreign policy emerges from multiple levels of influence and multiple variables. All social phenomena derive from plural causes (Mill 1846). However, if we embrace the idea that the state is a product, a reflection, and the expression of society, we can understand state behavior by understanding the norms held by that society. Broad societal norms stimulate actions at all levels of influence. Norms change over time and with a change in norms we find changes in state policies and actions. The next section considers the literature about a particular U.S. policy, the promotion of democracy and human rights abroad.

Explanations for U.S. Efforts to Promote Democracy and Human Rights

The preponderance of the literature on democracy promotion by the United States has tended toward a normative policy approach. Exemplars of this type are Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy, a four-volume collection edited by Guillermo O’Donnell, Philip C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, and Democracy in Developing Countries, another four volume series, edited by Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset. Both volumes were commissioned by organizations funded by
the U.S. Congress. This type of literature is less an academic explanation and more a policy handbook. Larry Diamond's (1995) report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperative is the ultimate guide for the policymaker seeking to promote democracy. The report provides a justification for promoting democracy (as a means to global order and U.S. national security) and presents all of the actors and instruments needed to promote democracy. In seeking to understand U.S. foreign policy this type of literature provides no explanation except as objects of inquiry themselves.

A body of literature on U.S. democracy promotion that seeks to explain the phenomenon does exist. Some of this literature perceives the policy as a natural manifestation of a democracy. For example, Gregory Fossedal (1989) argues that the U.S. promotes democracy abroad as an embodiment of its democratic nature. Contrary to the perception of isolationism within the American public, Fossedal contends that public opinion since the end of World War II has consistently remained interventionist. The promotion of democracy aboard is a necessary product of a democratic state. Fossedal (1989, 220) declares that “to argue against a foreign policy to promote the rights of man, then, is to argue against the rights themselves, and thus against our own institutions.”

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2 The Diamond et al. volumes were commissioned by the National Endowment for Democracy and the O'Donnell et al. series were funded by the Woodrow Wilson Center.

Joshua Muravchik (1992), much like Francis Fukuyama (1992), sees the triumph of the U.S. in the Cold War as a victory of democratic ideology over other ideologies. According to Muravchik, democratic ideas have been indefatigably connected with the United States since its inception and a foreign policy that emphasizes an American identity with the cause of democracy finds deep roots in American history. Muravchik explains the absence of a policy toward democracy promotion to the absence of strong domestic leadership. The spirit of democracy has always existed in the American soul, all it needed was a leader to revive it. Muravchik links the rekindled spirit of democracy to President Ronald Reagan. Therefore, democracy promotion is a product of America's spirit and the general elan of democracy. The absence of democracy promotion is attributed to currents of isolationism in U.S. foreign policy that have obviated the natural tendency of the democracy spirit. It is isolationism that Muravchik decries and instead exhorts a policy of "democratic internationalism" in which the U.S. pursues peace by making more countries democratic and actively shapes the international climate to one that is congenial to the United States.

Tony Smith (1994) also ties the promotion of democracy with U.S. security interests. Smith chronicles the U.S. efforts to promote democracy beginning with the reconstruction of the South after the Civil War. For Smith, the progenitor of a global policy of democracy promotion is President Wilson. It is Wilson who lays the groundwork for U.S. security policy for the twentieth century with the tenets developed in his Fourteen Points: that nationalism should be respected; that democracy is the only legitimate form of government; that the United States has an interest and an obligation to
further democracy abroad; that democracy and capitalism are mutually reenforcing systems; and that in a world of many states there is a need for international law encouraged by multilateral institutional arrangements.4

Smith characterizes U.S. policy to promote democracy as one that waxes and wanes depending on the individual presidential administration. F.D. Roosevelt is said to have backed away from Wilson’s ambition to promote democracy in the Western Hemisphere. After the Second World War, the democratization of the conquered Axis states and the general support for democracy in Europe through the Marshall plan is hailed as a Wilsonian triumph. However, Eisenhower is regarded as stepping back from democracy and even overthrowing democratically elected governments. Although characterized as an abysmal failure, Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress is lauded as an exemplary program in the Wilsonian vein. Surprisingly, Smith leaves a gapping hole in his analysis and fails to address an entire decade with the Johnson and Nixon administrations. The only discussion of these two administrations is to conclude that they were a reassertion of realism from the Eisenhower years. Smith portrays Carter as naively promoting human rights but failing to understand the deeper significance of Wilsonianism as a means to establish U.S. security through the promotion of democracy. It is Ronald

4 In contrast to Smith’s claim that Wilson established the paradigm for U.S. foreign policy that is still applicable today, Frank Ninkovich (1999) in The Wilsonian Century suggests that Wilsonian internationalism was only a response to crisis in world politics. Wilsonian internationalism was based on the assumption that the world had stumbled into a new and dangerous phase which obliged U.S. policy makers to abandon traditional diplomacy. With the end of the Cold War, Ninkovich predicts that U.S. policy will revert to a normal internationalism based less on ideological orientations and more traditional notions of national interests.
Wilson Reagan whom Smith crowns as the heir to the true liberal internationalism of Wilson. "Reagan emerges as the direct descendent of Wilson, for to an extent unmatched since Wilson's days, the promotion of democracy was both a means and an end in Reagan's foreign policy" (Smith 1994, 269).

A significant weakness of Smith's analysis is his privileging the individual level of analysis. The foundation of Smith's analysis rests on the differences between particular presidents and their abilities to perceive correctly Wilson's notions of U.S. security and the promotion of democracy. Smith fails to address adequately why the exigencies of the Cold War compelled Eisenhower to work with and support authoritarian allies and come to an understanding with the Soviet Union, while for Reagan the same conflict obligated him to promote a democratic revolution and confront the "evil empire" ruled from Moscow.

Domestic level changes in the United States are for the most part ignored in the literature on democracy promotion. This failure on Smith's part is puzzling since he advocates injecting a comparative politics approach to the study of the spread of democracy globally. Smith wants us to understand the international origins of democracy by systematically analyzing the impact of U.S. foreign policy on other state's domestic structure. Nevertheless, changes in U.S. domestic structure are not accounted for in U.S. policy changes.

G. John Ikenberry (2000) sees the promotion of democracy by the United States, particularly in the post World War II era, as a learned strategy to maintain a congenial security environment. This is a recognition by U.S. policy makers of the democratic
peace. To his credit, Ikenberry does not suggest democracy promotion to be long-standing U.S. policy. The recent U.S. preoccupation with democracy and human rights “is part of a larger liberal view about the sources of a stable, legitimate, secure, and remunerative international order” (Ikenberry 2000, 104). Like Smith, Ikenberry links U.S. policy to issues of security and grand strategy. Both of their arguments are compatible with the neoclassic realist position that posits that intentions as well as capabilities shape a state’s foreign policy (Walt 1987). As Randall Schweller informs us, “according to this realist school, threat does not inhere in power alone, the relative distribution of capabilities among states is less important than assessments of others’ intentions in determining how states interact with each other” (Schweller 2000, 42). Associated with the grand strategy of democracy is the promotion of economic openness and market economies. As Ikenberry states in the U.S. system of democracy enlargement “[i]nternational business is a coalition partner” (Ikenberry 2000, 126). The association with economic issues raises questions of economic motivations for democracy promotion by the United States.

William Robinson’s (1996) provides a nuanced explanation for U.S. democracy promotion and accounts for an evolution and change in policy. Arguing from a Gramscian perspective of politics and a Wisconsin School of diplomatic history, Robinson suggests that the core countries led by the United States have realized that in a globalized world economy successful control of the periphery is not possible through coercive measures. In an attempt to limit calls for greater participation and high intensity democracy by countries in the developing world, the United States has promoted low intensity democracy or polyarchy. Polyarchy is “a way to relieve pressure from subordinate groups for more
fundamental political, social and economic change” (Robinson 1996, 6). The democracy agenda by the United States is a cover for more basic economic objectives.

Whereas most of the other scholars discussed above view democracy promotion as a long-standing tradition in U.S. policy, Robinson correctly understands that it is a recent phenomenon. However, one has to remain skeptical of his thesis that a transnational managerial class has appeared at the pinnacle of a global class structure. According to Robinson, the power of globalization has reduced the power of states to control and regulate economic activity within national borders, nevertheless, a transnational elite has set out to create a global civil society to further its own interests. Globalization deconcentrates power and limits the ability of any single actor state or nonstate from dominating political and economic activities. Nevertheless, Robinson would have us believe that the transnational managerial class, which has penetrated civil society and gained command over popular mobilization and mass movements, is now controlling the global order (Robinson 1996, 69).

As with most Marxists’ analyses, which focus on material forces, control over those forces is linked to a nameless and faceless elite. Robinson’s real problem is with the failure of socialism as an economic system and the developing acceptance that markets are natural occurring products of human interaction. Robinson concludes that capitalism is dangerous for democracy and a “democratic socialism founded on a popular democracy may be humanity’s ‘last best,’ and perhaps only hope” (Robinson 1996, 384). Robinson’s conclusions are suspect, however, he does accurately point to a significant change in U.S. policy toward the promotion of democracy abroad beginning in the 1970s. Where he
claims that policy change is a product of globalization and transnational forces, this study suggests that we must turn to domestic sources within the United States.

Before we turn to domestic sources, we must deal with a basic Realist explanation for the change in U.S. foreign policy toward the promotion of democracy and human rights. From a Realist perspective with a focus on relative power capabilities one may explain the variance U.S. foreign policy toward the promotion of human rights and democracy by examining the distribution of power between the U.S. and Soviet Union.

Immediately after the Second World War, the United States had a preponderance of power in the global system. Allied aircraft had bombed Europe and Japan to ruins. Although the Soviet Union had significant military capabilities, its ability to project power was limited. Clearly Soviet military capabilities did not threaten the U.S. homeland. The United States had the luxury to promote human rights and democracy. The United States helped establish democratic regimes in Japan and Western Germany.

By 1949 the Soviet Union ended the U.S. atomic monopoly. Furthermore, the development of long range missiles by the Soviets in the late 1950s clearly put the U.S. homeland in striking distance. With this high level of threat and a balance of power tilting away from the United States, the luxury to promote human rights and democracy ended. Detente and the stability of mutual assured destruction in the early 1970s allowed the United States to reinstate a luxury policy such as human rights.

As we will see in a later chapter, the U.S. policy toward human rights and the promotion of democracy does not match the ebbs and flows of the Cold War hostilities

I want to thank Christopher Gelpi for suggesting this argument.
with the Soviet Union. In the early phase of the Cold War when the U.S. maintained a preponderance of power over the Soviet Union, U.S. support for democracy and human rights was uncertain. This uncertain support rapidly evolved into overt neglect and outright support for authoritarian regimes long before the Soviet developed the capability to strike the United States. The period of detente was transitory and quickly emerged into renewed Cold War tensions with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the election of President Reagan. Nevertheless, increased support for human rights and a formal program of democracy promotion developed in U.S. foreign policy during the Reagan administration. Clearly, we must examine other sources for policy change in the United States. In the next section we turn to domestic theories of foreign policy.

**Domestic Theories of Foreign Policy**

The idea that domestic activities are a source of foreign policy is one that has a long tradition in the study of world politics. Thucydides (1903) reports how the internal activities of the Greek city states shaped their external behavior. In addition to the growth of Athenian power and the fear that it caused Sparta, the domestic political machinations of Pericles also cause war. Niccolo Machiavelli (1910) located state behavior with the behavior of political leaders and Immanuel Kant (1795) distinguished a difference in the behavior of monarchies from republics. In the twentieth century, prior to Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) revision of realism, many realist explanations for international outcomes relied on national or subnational attributes. Henry Kissinger’s (1964) theory of international relations linked the domestic political structure of the state to the nature of international politics, either stable or revolutionary. George Kennan attributed Soviet behavior to
factors rooted deep within Russian society (Gaddis 1982, 48). The work on decision making in foreign policy, such as Irving Janis (1972) and Robert Jervis (1976) clearly locate their causal analysis at the domestic level. Janis examines the links of social pressure to the enforcement of conformity and consensus in decision making. Jervis investigates the impact of historical learning on individual decision makers. The events that political leaders experience shape their particular image of the world and the particular lessons learned from history. The diversionary theory of war suggests the importance of domestic factors. This hypothesis posits that leaders with domestic problems undertake risky foreign policies they otherwise would not attempt (Levy 1989; Smith 1996). Robert Putnam (1988) suggests that political leaders have two audiences, one domestic and one foreign, and find themselves compelled to play “two-level games.”

The concept of two-level games assumes that leaders are trying to do two things at once, that is, manipulate domestic and international politics. Despite the dominance of systemic approaches, encompassed in the neorealist/neoliberal debate, a tradition exists that emphasizes state-level factors in the study of world politics.

We can divide domestic theories of foreign policy into three broad categories: (1) society-centered domestic theories, which stress the influence of domestic interest groups, elections and public opinion; (2) state-centered domestic theories where the source of foreign policy behavior is within the administrative and decision making apparatus of the executive branch; and (3) state-society domestic theories where foreign policy behavior

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originates from an interaction of institutions of representation, education, and administration linking society and the state (Moravcsik 1993). Which type of theory is most appropriate depends on the state’s domestic structure.

States vary in their type of domestic structure. Thomas Risse-Kappen (1994, 240) informs us that the “notion of domestic structure refers to the institutional characteristics of the state, to societal structures, and to the policy networks linking state and society.” Society-dominated domestic structures exist in countries with strong societal organizations, a high degree of mobilization of interest groups, and decentralized and fragmented political institutions. State dominated domestic structures embrace centralized political institutions with strong national executives able to manipulate the political process.

The United States is an example of a society-dominated domestic structure. The U.S. Constitution provides the environment for a society-dominated structure. Its provisions of free speech, association, and the right to petition the government are basic to the strong society structure. Compared to many states, the United States has a decentralized foreign policy decision making process. The U.S. Congress has more authority over foreign policy than other legislative bodies. Congress influences policy through its general legislative, budgetary and oversight powers. Although Congress relies on blunt foreign policy tools that are essentially negative, they are still formidable tools nonetheless (Hastedt 2000, 198). The decentralized nature of the U.S. Congress provides
multiple access points for mobilized groups and as conduits of societal influences. Given the openness of the U.S. political system we can expect that societal demands, including public attitudes, should reach decision makers in the Congress and the executive. Moreover, we should assume that the political leaders monitored public sentiments and patterns of attitude formation.

**Public Opinion and Foreign Policy**

The influence of public opinion in matters of foreign policy has relevance for democratic polities. The masses can revolt under any governmental structure, but it is only in a democratic polity, where political leaders need the consent of the governed that public opinion has relevance, or even be worth studying. One causal factor identified for the pacific nature of democracies (at least with other democracies) is the need to mobilize public opinion to move a state to war. In his essay "Perpetual Peace," Kant (1795) reasoned that states founded on a republican constitution must gain the consent of the citizenry to decide if there will be war.

In the twentieth century, we can view President Wilson as propagating the view that infuses the necessary aspect of public opinion into a state's conduct of foreign policy. The first of Wilson's Fourteen Points argues for open negotiations among states with no private international understandings. Wilson forcefully asserts that "diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view." The implication of this statement is that

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7Traditionally, Congressional work was done in committees, however, in the 1970s the focus of decision making changed from the full committee to the subcommittee. This has resulted in a greater decentralization of the Congress. Furthermore, the 1970s witnessed a weakening of party discipline, an erosion of the seniority system, and the growth in congressional staff. See Davidson and Oleszek (1977) *Congress Against Itself*.
the public is a part of a government's policy formation. In a democracy, not only should policy proceed with the consent of the governed, but the governed themselves will form an opinion on policy to the extent that matters affect their personal lives.

Whereas Wilson assigned an imperative to the common man, the journalist Walter Lippmann saw only the opprobrium of public opinion in policy making. Lippmann (1922) maintained that people are too fully engaged in the day to day requirements of earning a living to pay much attention to what is going on around them. According to Ole Holsti (1992, 441), Lippmann doubted the ability of the media to inform the public and to serve as a valid source of information about the world. People are too busy to be engaged in foreign policy issues, and if they wanted to be engaged the avenues for information are inadequate. The outbreak of World War II appeared to offer evidence for Lippmann's position, an inattentive American public refused to engage in world politics, allowing the rise of predator states in the system.

Following World War II, a consensus emerged on public opinion and foreign policy. Gabriel Almond's (1950) *The American People and Foreign Policy* help to solidify the perception of the American public that Lippmann had developed. Almond depicted public opinion as an erratic and mood driven constraint on foreign policy. For the most part, the public's "characteristic response to questions of foreign policy was one of indifference" (Almond 1960, 53). Moreover, the public's attitude toward foreign policy was often volatile to the point that it provided no foundation for policy formation. Almond went as far as suggesting that public opinion, besides being erratic, provided the wrong advice for policy makers. "Often the public is apathetic when it should be
concerned, and panicky when it should be calm" (quoted in Holsti 1992, 442). The scholarly consensus on the Wilsonian idealization of the American public was far from sanguine.

The behavioralist scholarship emerging out of the University of Michigan further buttressed the Lippmann-Almond consensus on public opinion. Philip Converse's (1964) "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics" suggested that the public lacked any real structure or coherence to their political beliefs. From panel studies in which surveyors asked the same people the same questions about public policy repeatedly in 1956, 1958, and 1960, Converse found that the answers varied from survey to survey without a predictable pattern. He concluded that "large portions of the electorate do not have meaningful beliefs, even on issues that have formed the basis of intense political controversy among elites for substantial period of time" (Converse 1993, 60). According to Converse, the mass public's attitudes toward foreign policy issues are in essence "nonattitudes."

Converse's study and others that support his conclusion (Erskine 1963, Converse and Markus 1979) have lead to a tripartite view of the American public when it comes to foreign policy. The idea of multiple publics was first expounded by James Rosenau (1961), in which he conceived of the foreign policy publics as occupying a concentric circle with a pinpoint representing the core decision makers. Outside the core decision makers are the elite public that directly influences the core and compose about 5 percent of the overall population. Next on the rings of the circle are the informed public, which includes ten to 20 percent of the population. The informed public as the name implies
seeks out information on international affairs. Their contact with the foreign policy process is indirect and they have limited or no contact with the policy process. Outside the informed public are the "great unwashed" of the uninformed public. This is the 80 percent of the public that knows little or nothing about foreign affairs and never reads stories about international affairs. It is within this domain that Converse's nonattitudes of the mass public develop.

The hegemony of the Converse model of the mass public fades with the Vietnam war. Increasing opposition to the war was seen as a response to the rising number of causalities and the polarization of elites (Mueller 1973). In a reassessment of the influence of public opinion, Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro (1992, 284) find that public opinion is not only rational but an autonomous force that can have a substantial impact on policy. John Aldrich, John Sullivan and Eugene Borgida (1989) found that citizens were equally as able to identify their policy positions on foreign and domestic policy issues, suggesting that Converse's characterization of public attitudes as unstructured was misinformed. These works challenge the assumption that foreign policy attitudes of the general public are random and disorganized without any consideration of ideological orientation (such as a liberal/conservative frame) in their formation and structure.

Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley (1987) challenge Converse by drawing from the theoretical literature on schemata, which suggests a structure to foreign policy political attitudes. The structure must be uncovered by focusing on domain specific information

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8Page and Shapiro's findings include not only the post-Vietnam era, but extend back to 1935.
and how the domain shapes the relationship between general and specific attitudes toward policy. The foreign policy domain cannot be studied in the same fashion as a domestic policy domain. Other studies suggest that foreign policy attitudes may be more stable than previously believed (see Maggiotto and Wittkopf 1981, Wittkopf 1981). The evidence suggests that foreign policy attitudes are structured not unidimensionally along the liberal/conservative continuum on which attitudes in other domains fall, but on domain specific dimensions of foreign policy.

According to Hurwitz and Peffley, people employ cognitive heuristics (shortcuts) to process foreign policy information and to decide foreign policy issues. People cope with uncertainty in foreign policy decisions by relying on their own store of general knowledge to help process information. We can imagine foreign policy attitudes as shaped by a hierarchical structure where abstract ideas inform and shape more specific and concrete ones. At the bottom level of the structure we find preferences referring to specific policy attitudes such as defense spending, international trade, etc. The middle level contains attitudes of a more abstract nature such as the appropriate role of the government in handling foreign affairs. Normative belief postures denote the general position the individual would like the government to take in foreign relations, such as aggressive versus accommodating postures in policy or internationalist versus isolationist positions. People rely on these general postures to render specific decisions about policy. At the uppermost part of the hierarchy are the individual's core values such as ethnocentrism or the morality of warfare, which then guide the direction of all the other relations within the structure. It is the change in the uppermost part of the hierarchy, the
core values or norms of behavior, that guide the interests of this study.

In contrast to the image of an uninformed public, Catherine Kelleher (quoted in Hastedt 2000, 127) finds “almost every general foreign policy survey . . . [now] shows that the American public is increasingly well-informed about global issues . . .” Page and Shapiro (1992, 45) find “a remarkable degree of stability in Americans’ collective policy preferences” during the last fifty years. If public opinion on issues of foreign policy is structured and coherent as recent studies suggest, we must account for the influence of public attitudes on foreign policy. Furthermore, stability in public opinion allows for the possibility of a coherent change in attitudes and orientation toward policy issues. If as Hurwitz and Peffley suggest, that people employ cognitive shortcuts of general normative beliefs to process information and to make decisions, we can link changes in the normative beliefs to changes in policy.

Causal Hypothesis

The theoretical causal relationship posited in this study is that a state’s domestic normative structure ‘causes’ its foreign policy behavior. The independent variable in this theory is the collectively held domestic norms in a state and the dependent variable is the foreign policy behavior. I argue that change in U.S. domestic norms regarding domestic political and civil rights translates into changes in foreign policy regarding the promotion of political and civil rights externally (i.e., democracy promotion).9

9 This type of argument follows Lumsdaine’s (1993) Moral Vision in International Politics. Lumsdaine argues that political or economic interests cannot explain economic foreign aid. Instead, humanitarian concerns and a systematic transfer of domestic conceptions of justice provide a better explanation. The change of attitudes toward poverty in the developed world and the creation of the social welfare state paved the way
Change in the domestic normative structure does not arise spontaneously and without cause. Change emerges from domestic disturbances and social protests agitating for a transformation in the normative status quo. These social protests may not be directed at foreign policy, although they can be, nevertheless, their impact and the changes wrought are felt at all policy levels. For example, the civil rights movement in the United States sought political and civil rights for African-American in the domestic realm. We see success of the movement in the passage of legislation guaranteeing access to political participation and the legal prevention of discrimination. Changes in the normative structure condition the successful operation of the legislation at multiple levels of society from political elites to the general public. Changes in the general normative structure of society have spillover effects for other areas of policy. For example, as the domestic normative structure changes from considering it correct behavior to disenfranchise a segment of the population (African-Americans) to one that accepts only universal enfranchisement, we will find in the foreign policy realm a shift in policy from maintaining it proper policy to support authoritarian dictatorships to one that embraces political regimes that reflect and respect the political wishes of a state's population. The change in the normative structure induces a change in general public opinion, and it influences elite opinion and the behavior of policymakers. For economic assistance to developing countries. For an explanation accounting for difference in aid levels based on domestic factors see Noel and Therien (1995). They suggest that the values (nonmarket income distribution) embedded in a state's social democratic institutions have a clear impact on the foreign aid regime.

For a reversal in this causal argument see Klinker and Smith (1999) The Unsteady March. Klinker and Smith argue that the exigencies of foreign affairs prompted
The specific model for this theory is as follows: social movements → domestic norms → transmission of societal norms (Congress) → Foreign Policy (democracy promotion). In this model, the antecedent phenomenon that activates the independent variable is the presence of protest and social movements. The independent variable represents the domestic normative structure. The normative structure is measured by attitudes toward civil and political rights and issues of tolerance and respect for diversity. This variable is considered progressive with changes in the normative structure being permanent or at least not readily changeable. For example, if a social movement creates through social protest, a new norm that a certain group should have an equal role in society, society will maintain the norm even without a continued organized movement. A counter social movement must develop for the norm to return to an earlier position. The intervening variable represents the avenues of transmission of public attitudes to foreign policy. This study concentrates on the Congress as the indicator of domestic norms. The dependent or outcome variable is democracy promotion. Promoting democracy encompasses the promotion of regular, free, and fair elections and universal suffrage, informational pluralism, civil liberties and human rights, functional autonomy for domestic elites to allow progress toward racial equality. As the United States needed to mobilize African-Americans for war and justify such wars and the sacrifices incurred in the name of freedom, progress in racial equality occurred. They further argue that as the dangers of the Cold War have receded, the commitment to "racial progress" has also declined. This, according to Klinker and Smith is exemplified by the erosion of the commitment to affirmative action. This dissertation will demonstrate that this conclusion is wrong. There have been long term and significant change in Americans' attitudes toward civil rights and racial equality. We should not necessarily see the opposition to affirmative action as opposition to equal rights. Rather, we can view it as a greater commitment to individual rights over group rights.
legislative, executive and judicial branches, and effective power and accountability for elected officials.

In this chapter, I have discussed the importance of locating an understanding of U.S. foreign policy at the domestic level. I have shown, regarding the policy of democracy promotion, the existing literature is lacking a sound causal explanation. In the next chapter, I present the changing normative structure in the United States and discuss how norms are tied with the American identity.
CHAPTER 3
NORMS AND THE GROWTH OF TOLERANCE

Introduction

Norms are important in the explanation of social phenomena. Norms are culturally defined rules of conduct. They specify how people should behave and what they should do. They indicate what is proper or necessary behavior within groups, organizations and institutions. Norms are the fundamental building blocks of social order (Newman 2000, 34). They govern much of our political and social lives. In politics, norms contribute to the protection of civil rights and liberties as much as the formal legal system (Axelrod 1986, 1095).

I begin this chapter with an explanation of the importance of norms for the social sciences. Next, I present the changing normative structure in the United States and discuss how norms constitute the American identity. Specifically, I am concerned with norms regarding political and civil rights and tolerance for diversity. As the American identity expands, the range of groups incorporated into the political process concurrently expands. As we will see in later chapters, these changes lead to changes in U.S. foreign policy. The expanding U.S. democracy leads to the promotion of democratic forms of government in countries that contained groups and cultures once considered incapable of democratic practices. Finally, I present empirical data showing how the American identity has changed with the elevated acceptance for diversity and increased tolerance within the
United States. What we find with the increased respect for diversity is a changed American identity. The exclusive male-dominated, white, Christian/Protestant identity of America has changed to what is often call a multicultural American identity. A multicultural identity does not necessarily lead to fragmentation and “cultural wars” as some have claimed (Royal 1995, Huntington 1997). Instead, a multicultural identity allows for diversity under the liberal framework that protects individual rights.

**Social Sciences, Norms and Explanation**

Mark Risjord (1998) informs us that norms play a pivotal role in the philosophy of social science. The role of norms makes humans a distinct subject of study and any attempt to understand and explain human behavior must take into account the normative aspects of human life. Models of explanation drawn from the natural sciences do not assign a role to norms and thus are not appropriate for the social scientist.

Not all agree. Carl Hempel (1963) and David Henderson (1993), for example, deny that norms have an explanatory role. For these scholars explanations must be causal. Henderson asserts that explanations are answers to why-questions. “[I]n asking a why-question (regarding a particular event or state) we seek responses that allow us to appreciate what it was in or about the antecedent course of events that brought about (or helped to bring about) some particular aspect of certain subsequent events” (Henderson 1993, 168-169). The antecedent event needs to be present in terms of its causally fitting features. For Henderson, appeals to norms are only useful if we understood them to be causally relevant to the action and thus translated into a causal disposition. This is a psychologically oriented explanation. In this orientation, we collapse norms into the
dispositions of the agent and therefore norms _qua_ norms will not be found among the agent’s reasons. Risjord (1998, 235) suggests that we must understand norms along a second dimension, a sociological one. The psychological-orientation attributes intentional actions to the goals of the agent. This is what motivates the agent. Therefore, the agent heeds such motives to be sufficient reasons for action. Nevertheless, we must recognize that the agent acts in accordance with some norm by which some reasons are good in and of themselves.

What I have described above is the old cleavage in social science between Adam Smith’s conception of humans as economic creatures and Emile Durkheim’s idea of social humans. Instrumental rationality guides the former with the promise of reward. The forces of proscribed behavior pushes the latter. Neither view is totally wrong nor completely right. Some behaviors maybe explained on the basis of human rationality. Nevertheless, social forces construct the milieus in which the rational actor must operate. Moreover, norms are subject to change creating evolving environments in which rational action has different meanings.

Cultural norms shape the behavior of the overwhelming majority of a given population. Philip Pettit (1993, 336) gives us the formal definition of norms.

A regularity, R, in the behaviour [sic] of members of a population, P, is a cultural norm if and only if, in any instance of a certain situation S among members P:

1. Nearly everyone conforms to R.
2. Nearly everyone approves of nearly anyone else’s conforming and disapproves of the deviating.
3. The fact that nearly everyone approves and disapproves on this pattern helps ensure that nearly everyone conforms.

In this definition of a norm we find that most of the population has accepted the behavior and practices it widely. Therefore, norms are social in that other people help to enforce them by expressing their approval or disapproval. Norms are real and autonomous. They possess independent motivating power. "Norms are not merely ex post rationalizations of self-interest, although they can certainly be that sometimes. They are capable of being ex ante sources of action" (Elster 1989, 125).

Norms are more than shared beliefs of appropriate behavior. This definition is overly broad and includes beliefs that no one takes seriously and does not affect action. Not all norms are treated with equal seriousness. One should get six to eight hours of sleep a night and mothers need to care for their babies are both norms of behavior. The former is often violated, the latter rarely. Norms are connected to beliefs related to some sort of sanction (Cancian 1975, 7). A mother who neglects her child will receive the reproach of society, not to mention possible criminal sanctions. The person who does not get enough sleep will only suffer the individual consequence of sleep deprivation.

Society supports norms through multiple mechanisms.¹ The first mechanism for supporting norms is dominance. Dominance simply means that one group has power over another and the violation of a norm invites some sort of punishment. Power can be exerted through economic and political means. The majority often imposes its norms upon the society as a whole. Within society, norms often become individually internalized.

¹The following is largely derived from Axelrod (1986).
Internalization means that the violation of an established norm creates psychological uneasiness within individuals. Therefore, even if the individual has accrued material benefits, the violation of the norm elicits pain. Another psychological principle supporting norms is known as social validation. As Robert Cialdini (1984, 117) explains, “we view a behavior as more correct in a given situation to the degree that we see others performing it.” Therefore, the more people practice the act the more is it considered correct. Social validation applies simply to what people decide is correct behavior. Finally, norms are supported through legal structures. Norms usually precede laws, but laws can maintain and extend them. We can understand laws as the institutionalization of cultural norms.

Norms are subject to change. When a critical mass of people change their values and behavior, what was once normal becomes deviant. The history of human civilization is replete with examples of social institutions that have passed from normality to deviance. Even single events can lead to the reversal of normal practices. In the early days of the United States dueling was an accepted, if not often practiced, institution. Alexander Hamilton felt compelled to take up Aaron Burr’s challenge to duel. Early in the morning of July 11, 1804, Hamilton and Burr faced on the New Jersey shore of the Hudson River. Burr's first shot mortally wounded Hamilton, and he died the next day (see Flemming 1999). The event itself and the negative public reaction it generated toward Burr helped change the norms that supported the institution of dueling in the United States.
Slavery is an example of another human practice that has passed from normality to deviance. Human slavery existed as an institution dating back to times of antiquity. With the fall of the Roman Empire and the rise of the feudal system, slavery fell into disuse in Europe. However, slavery was revitalized in the 15th century when Europeans first came into close and continued contact with the peoples of Africa. Slavery continued as a practice in the Western world well into the 19th century. Strong evidence suggests that slavery's demise originated from changing societal norms. James Lee Ray (1989) finds that the abolition of slavery did not come from an economic imperative. We can trace the abolition of slavery to "moral progress" and changes in ideas about ethics and morality. In a large part to domestic abolitionist movements led by the Quakers on both sides of the Atlantic, England (1807) and the United States (1808) abolished the slave trade. At the Congress of Vienna (1814) through the influence of England, the assembled powers agreed that the slave trade should be abolished when possible (Thomas 1997, 584-586). The Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, obligated Great Britain and the United States to keep a naval squadron on the African coast to prevent shipment of slaves (Thomas 1997, 671). By 1862, international treaties allowing the right to search ocean vessels had been

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2Slavery continues to exist in various parts of the world despite the change in global norms.

3For example, Ray (1989, 411) cites the case that sugar production in the British West Indies, which dropped by a third overall after the abolition of slavery. As for slavery in the United States, Temperley (1977, 101-2) reminds us that "[n]orthern cotton manufactures were dependent on Southern plantation agriculture for their raw materials. New York finance houses gave Southerners much of their capital and reaped their reward in interest." In contrast to the claims the slavery as an economic system was declining in the South prior to the Civil War, Fogel and Engerman (1974) claim that the Southern economy was robust and growing.
signed by most Western nations, including the United States. Within a few years the slave trade was destroyed. None of this could have been possible without a change in domestic societal norms. In fact, we cannot understand societal changes without taking to account the changes in the underlying norms that govern society.

Norms and a State's Identity

A state's identity may be fluid and multidimensional. It is a product of the social environment and the nature of power relations. We must understand a state's identity in these terms of environment and power. On one level, the environment determines the broader cultural identity, that is, the characteristics of the state's population. However, the norms of behavior held by the population also constitute the broader identity of a state. Elites also determine the identity within the state. For example, Jordan as a state identifies itself as Jordanian, although two-thirds of the population is Palestinian. After the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, many Palestinian refugees "found employment -- and middle-class status -- as civil servants in the Jordanian government" (Cleveland 1994, 327). Nevertheless, Jordan is not the homeland for Palestinians and the state's identity is not Palestinian. This reflects the power status of the Hashemite rulers and the lack of popular control. If Jordan were to democratize and shift power to the people and away from the Hashemite king, it may suffer an identity crisis. This leads to discussion of identity in a social and cultural context.

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4Over half a million refugees arrived on Jordanian soil after the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. The annexation of the West Bank in 1948 by King Abdallah added another half a million Palestinians to the population of Jordan.
Social identity theory, which has recently been popular in the study of international relations (Hermann and Kegley 1995, Mercer 1995, Geva and Hanson 1999, and Schafer 1999), can help us understand how and why individuals develop larger identities. Social identity theory developed out of the psychological study of group behavior and had its origins in the early work by Henri Tajfel on social factors in perception (Tajfel 1959). Tajfel further explicated the theory with his colleagues at Bristol University in the late 1970s (Tajfel 1978, 1982; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner 1982). The core idea of the theory is that a self-inclusive social category provides a category dependent self-definition that comprises an element of the self-concept (Hogg 1996, 66). This means that individuals try to achieve a positive sense of social identity in a way that makes their group favorably distinct from other groups on valued dimensions. For Tajfel, the “social identity of individuals is linked to their awareness of membership of certain social groups, and to the emotional and evaluative significance of that membership” (quoted in Deschamps 1982, 86).

The social group exists in a system of mutual dependence and acquires a reality defined through group interdependence. “The social group is both a psychological process and a social product” (Turner and Giles 1981, 26). Individuals within groups may attempt a redefinition of the existing social situation to achieve a more positive social identity. The group identification may be based on a common set of traditions or may stimulate the creation of a unique set of traditions. John Turner’s (1985) self-categorization component of social identity theory suggests that categorization “accentuates both similarities among stimuli (physical, social, or aspects of the self)
belonging to the same category and differences belonging to different categories . . . ” (Hogg 1996, 68). This creates a perceptual bias that leads to an evaluative preference for individuals and groups that are similar to themselves. If individuals share common objective elements (such as physical characteristics, common language, and historical experiences) they can transform these elements into a common subjective identification facilitating in-group creation. Language is an important aspect of group identification, more salient than inherited physical characteristic (see Giles and Johnson 1981). Social identity theory allows us to understand that an individual's identity is not static, locked into a primordial pattern. The individual's group identity often forms based on relatively enduring factors (physical characteristics and language), but it does not have to be. A process of interaction can produce new common elements that lead to the formation of a new common social identity.

A state's identity, as with an individual's identity, is constructed. It is open to contestation and negotiation. One can think of nationality as another term for a state's identity. This conception of nationalism is not the ideological version of nationalism that "holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are know by their characteristics . . . and that the only legitimate type of government is a national (emphasis in the original) self-government" (Kedourie quoted in Macridis 1992, 192). Nations are, as Benedict Anderson (1991) suggests, "imagined communities" propelled by the state claiming to be the legitimate guardian of the nation. National identities are constructed and reconstructed in connection to the transforming social context (Renwich 1999, 5). As Ernest Gellner (1964, 169) argues, "[n]ationalism is not the awakening of the nation to
self consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist." For example, the French Revolution (1792) asserted the sovereignty of the people, and for the first time linked the identity of the people to the state. As French nationalism turned aggressive with the rule of Napoleon, other peoples in Europe constructed their own national identities in response to the victories of the French nation and for self-defense.

The norms of society tell us much about the nation and define who is part of the nation and has claim to the national identity. Norms set the collective expectation for a given identity and thus constitute the state's identity. "Actors conform to norms in order to validate social identities, and it is in the process of validating identities that interests are constituted" (Price and Tannenwald 1996, 125). Furthermore, norms regulate behavior for a constituted identity (see Cancian 1975, 137-138). These norms may be socially accepted patterns of behavior or law may sanction them. What is important to understand is that norms set the confines of the imagined community. As with all social constructs, norms are subject to change, and with change the confines of the imagined community are thus subject to rearrangement.

**American Identity**

If all states are "imagined communities," then the United States is the perfect example of an "imagined community" (Campbell 1996, 166). Social forces and time have reconstructed this imagined community often. The confines of the U.S. identity is not static. As I discuss below, the borders of his community are often changed to incorporate different groups of people.
In contrast to this image of a changing identity other scholars contend that the U.S. has a fixed identity. From a geopolitical perspective, America's relative isolation has lead to an identity defined through its uniqueness from the rest of the world. This uniqueness often expresses itself as exceptionalism. "The United States is exceptional in starting from a revolutionary event, in being 'the first new nation,' the first colony, other than Iceland to become independent." (Lipset 1992, 18). Seymour Martin Lipset defines American identity ideologically in terms of liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism, and laissez-faire. Concurring, John Gerard Ruggie argues that U.S. identity is a fixed identity following the principles of liberalism. American identity is embodied through "a set of inclusive core values: intrinsic individual as opposed to group rights, equality of opportunity for all, antistatism, the rule of law, and a revolutionary legacy which holds that human betterment can be achieved by means of deliberate human actions..." (Ruggie 1997, 110). In one sense these scholars are correct in their definitions of U.S. identity. What they miss is the identification of who has had access to that identity. Today, Richard J. Payne correctly argues: "[d]espite America's ethnic, religious, and racial diversity, and its plethora of subcultures, there is widespread agreement that an American culture exists, and there is consensus on its fundamental attributes (Payne 1995, 8)." This accommodation of diversity to the cultural identity of the U.S. is one that has developed over the years. We can say that the United States moved through three phases of identity, and changes in the norms that govern the identity, an Anglo-American, Euro-American, and

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5Payne defines culture as a set of shared learned values, beliefs, perceptions, attitudes, modes of living, customs, and symbols (Payne 1995, 7). This definition is compatible with my definition of norms.
and a Multicultural identity (Lind 1995).

**Changing American Identity**

The United States for the most part has always contained peoples of multiple ethnic and racial groups. The English were far from the only people in colonial America. Other groups included the Dutch, French, Germans, Irish, Spanish, Swedes, blacks from Africa, and of course the native population. The first Africans arrived as slaves in the Jamestown colony in 1619. Slavery continued to expand in North America and by the time of the first census in 1790, one out of six Americans was a slave (Perkins 1993, 14). Mass immigration of German-speaking people into the Pennsylvania colony so concerned Benjamin Franklin that he supported measures to keep them out. In 1751, Franklin wrote that Pennsylvania "will in a few Years [sic] become a German Colony: Instead of their learning our Language, we must learn their's or live as in a foreign Country [sic]" (Franklin ([1751] 1961, 120). He further declared that the Germans "will never adopt our Language or Customs, any more than they can acquire our Complexion [sic]" (Franklin papers quoted in DeConde 1992, 12). After the Germans, the Irish constituted the next largest group and between 1789 and 1800 they composed 55 percent of all aliens naturalized (DeConde 1992, 21).

This does not mean that the U.S. has always had a multicultural identity. Following the American revolution the American population was multiethnic and multiracial, which set it apart from the generally homogeneous countries of Europe. "No ethnic group in the United States could claim a clear majority, but among whites almost sixty percent were of English origin" (DeConde 1992, 16). These Anglo-Americans set
the standard for the American identity that governed political behavior and defined the
United States after independence and well into the 19th century (Hunt 1987, 46-91).

Despite the empirical realities of a diverse population in the new American state, John Jay
in the Federalist Papers, number 2, shows the perceived American identity by many in
leadership positions. He writes:

I have as often taken notice that Providence has been pleased to give this one
connected country to one united people -- a people descended from the same
ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to
the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs, and
who, by their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a
long and bloody war, have nobly established their general liberty and
independence.

However, the construct of the Anglo-American identity remained under constant attack
from non-English immigrants, particularly Irish and German immigrants.

Between 1846 and 1855, more than a million Germans entered the United States.
Many fled political upheaval and revolution in Europe, and many who had been
revolutionaries, gravitated to political activity in their new country. "This reaching out for
political power hardened whatever antagonism the old-stock nativists felt toward the
German-Americans" (DeConde 1992, 36). One of the most prominent anti-immigrant
groups during the period was the American Party, or better known as the Know Nothings.
According to Michael Holt (1973, 311), "[b]etween 1853 and 1856 the fastest growing
political force in many parts of the United States was not the anti-slavery Republican
party, but the secret anti-Catholic and anti-foreign Know Nothing movement." This group
defined itself in nativist terms of being anti-immigrant and particularly anti-Catholic. The American party achieved some electoral success in 1854 when it elected eight governors and more than one hundred members of Congress (Lind 1995, 50).

In the mid-nineteenth century America the “cult of Anglo-Saxonism” developed along with “scientific racism” used to justify American expansionism (Hietala 1999, 171). According to Michael Hunt (1987, 78), the arrival of many foreign immigrants increased the sensitivity among the Anglo elites in the United States. Ethnic Anglos sought to preserve their cultural hegemony against the Irish and German immigrants. The anxiety of the Anglo elites sharpened as more immigrants came from other parts of Europe at the close of the century. Hierarchical racial thinking influenced foreign policy:

The elite’s preoccupation with differences among whites carried over to into the fabric of thinking on world affairs. Anglo-Saxons clearly dominated the international stage. The Germans came next. They had the same qualities as their racial cousins save one – they had lost their love of liberty. This single serious defect set Germans just beyond the Anglo-Saxon pale and made this still-formidable people into a threatening global competitor . . . The Slavs, half European and half Asiatic, were also formidable racial competitors on the international stage . . . Lower down in the hierarchy were the Latin peoples of Europe, defined to include the French as well as the Italians and Spaniards . . . Still farther back among the ranks of the unworthy appeared the Jews . . . Predictably, farthest back were the people of Africa. (Hunt 1987, 78-79)

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6The Whig party lost support among the American nativists with the nomination of Winfield Scott in 1852. Many perceived Scott as actively pro-Catholic. Nativists within and without the Whig party were alienated by Scott’s lenient policy toward Catholic churches during the Mexican War and by his willingness to educate his daughters in convents (Holt 1973, 315).

7The American party also gained popular support from its anti-slavery position. Its electoral strength waned with the rise of the Republican party, which captured the anti-slavery position without the anti-immigrant trappings.
The change from a United States with an Anglo-American identity to a Euro-American one began with the American Civil War. A third of the Union Army was composed of foreign-born troops with large German and Irish contingents. Michael Lind (1995, 54) argues that the Civil War "can be described without much exaggeration as a conflict between the Anglo-American South and a new Euro-American society emerging in the north." After the Civil War, immigration from Europe continued apace. Some four million people immigrated from Italy alone between 1880 and 1920 (Aguirre and Turner 1998, 213).

In 1891, the U.S. Congress passed legislation that created a permanent administrative structure to control immigration. The statute also placed immigration under the control of the federal government (Higham 1971, 99). During the same period, the U.S. Congress curtailed immigration from non-European parts of the world (see McKenzie 1928; Miller 1969). The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 suspended immigration of Chinese laborers for ten years and prevented persons of Chinese ancestry residing in the U.S. from acquiring citizenship. Congress extended the act for ten years in 1892, for two years in 1902, and finally extended indefinitely in 1904 (Aguirre and Turner 1998, 180). In the early part of the 20th century the Congress took further action to prevent immigration from Asia. The 1917 Immigration Act stopped Japanese immigration and immigration from other parts of Asia (Matthews 1964).

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8The act was not repealed by Congress until 1943 when it was replaced by a quota system for Chinese immigrants.
In the late 1800s, immigrants of Irish and German origin began to assert their influence at the voting booth. Many members of Congress from Western states owned their position to the support of German immigrants. The Irish Catholic vote in Eastern cities also had to be considered by politicians when they formulated immigration policy. In 1891, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge took up a proposal that would restrict the immigration of all males who could not read or write in their own language. German-American lobby groups were able to thwart these restrictive legislative efforts. The Senate passed the legislation, but the House of Representatives kept postponing consideration of it (Higham 1971, 106-107).

The eugenic movement and scientific racism at the dawn of the 20th century sought to recast the distinctions among the immigrants of Europe origin. William J. Ripley, who taught economics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and lectured at Columbia University on the role of geography in human affairs, wrote a weighty tome in 1899 titled The Races of Europe. His analysis linked physiological traits to geographical and social conditions. John Higham relates in his classic text Strangers in the Land:

For the first time, American readers learned that Europe was not the land of "Aryans" or Goths subdivided into vaguely national races such as the Anglo-Saxons, but rather the seat of three races discernable by physical measurements: a northern race of tall, blond longheads which Ripley called Teutonic; a central race of stocky roundheads which he called Alpine; and a southern race of slender, dark, longheads which he called Mediterranean. (Higham 1971, 154)

9The absurdity of Ripply's classification system is apparent when one understands that Europe is the polyglot par excellence. The people of Europe have been associating for thousands of years to an extent that would disallow any type tripartite evolution. Mediterranean peoples called Romans conquered lands as far north as the British Isles. Norsemen or Vikings journeyed as far east as modern Russia and as far south as modern Italy and Spain.
Ripley's tripartite classification allowed for the distinction between new and old immigrant groups. Irish and German immigrants were reclassified as Teutonic along with the Anglo-Saxon English. New Italian and Eastern European immigrants were reclassified as "others" with the labels of Alpine and Mediterranean. Nevertheless, this classification was not an enduring structure in the United States and instead a new type of identity developed. Toward the end of the 19th century we find in the United States the development of the Euro-American identity or White America. This is an identity constructed in contrast to the hyphenation of Americans of immigrant origin. Early in the 20th century we find the development of the melting pot idea of American identity.

Frederick Jackson Turner, in his famous 1893 essay on the importance of the frontier in U.S. history, saw the formation of a composite nationality of American people. Turner declared, "In the crucible of the frontier the immigrants were Americanized, liberated, and fused into a mixed race, English in neither nationality nor characteristics" (Turner 1947, 23). A new type of identity, an American, was formed in the crucible of the melting pot. However, this identity extended only to those who could easily be incorporated under the Euro-American identity. The melting pot idea did not apply to peoples who originated from continents other than Europe. Legal restrictions on immigrants from non-European parts of the world were enforced and state governments restricted nonwhites in most parts of the United States from participation in the civil society, such as the Jim Crow laws applied to African-Americans in the South.

10It should be noted that Israel Zangwill's 1909 play The Melting Pot from which the term was derived, was about the amalgamation of European ethnic groups in the United States.
Typical of the sentiments of the time, Henry Pratt Fairchild in *The Melting Pot Mistake* (1926) argued for the inevitability of a homogenous community given his belief in the biological origins of racial hatred. Fairchild ([1926] 1977, 239) declared that "Racial discrimination is inherent in biological fact and in human nature." Fairchild's work provides a snapshot of the broader normative structure in the U.S. at the time. He argued that assimilation, or the idea of the melting pot, worked but only for those peoples of the "White Race." Fairchild writes:

> At the present time, the average American, whatever his origin, has become habituated to representatives of almost every variety of the white race that it is very doubtful whether there is more than an infinitesimal amount of true race antipathy felt toward any branches of the white race in this country ... If we see a tall, blue-eyed, blond giant leading up to the altar a sparkling brunette with dusky hair and darkly glowing cheeks we do not ordinarily bewail the horrible case of race miscegenation, but exclaim, "What a stunning couple!" (Fairchild [1926] 1977, 72-73)

For Fairchild, the mixing of peoples from different "racial" backgrounds is analogous to "pouring together various chemically inert liquids -- water, milk, wine, ink, ect." (Fairchild [1926] 1977, 119). This creates a mixture but not a new substance. The inclusion of a mixed racial structure in the U.S. (i.e., non European) diluted the "typical American mixture" (Fairchild [1926] 1977, 130). Thus, Fairchild argued not only for a reduction of immigration, but for a reapportionment of immigration to "leave the racial proportion of American people intact" (Fairchild [1926] 1977, 131). Writing in the early 20th century, Fairchild argued for a Euro-American identity. "There can be no doubt that if America is to remain a stable nation it must continue a white man's country for an indefinite period to

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11Fairchild graduated from Yale where he studied under William Graham Sumner and later achieved the presidency of the American Sociological Society.
Fairchild applauded the permanent exclusion of Asian immigration to the United States.

Fairchild's argument viewed from the position of the early 21st century appears alien and atavistic. The United States has experienced a massive shift in norms regarding political and civil rights and a reshaping of its identity. The United States has rid itself of the notion that the American identity synonymous with White European, or the Euro-American identity that characterized American society for much of the 20th century. A steady growth of tolerance has developed in the United States since the end of the Second World War. This growth of tolerance and acceptance of others extends not only to ethnic and racial groups, but it also included the expanded acceptance of the equality of women with men. What has emerged is a multicultural American identity.

Social Movements and Identity Change

Social movements are pivotal in identity change. A social movement refers to a relational network of actors who are collectively involved in broader purposes and/or conflicts (Diani 1992; Tarrow 1994). These continuous, large-scale, organized, collective actions can lead to transformed state structures (Quadagno 1992) or to broader societal change (d'Anjou 1996). If we describe human history as a concurrence of events, as Max Weber maintained, we must remain sensitive to social movements as they shape the direction of events. Human actions shape the direction of history. According to Weber, "frequently the 'world images' that have been created by ideas have, like switchmen [at railroad junctions], determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest" (quoted in Hall 1993, 48). Social movements may serve as a decisive
moment in the process of changing norms. We can view social movements as Weber's switchmen operating the "switch in the 'choice' between reproducing or transforming the extant cultural and social system" (d'Anjou 1996, 35).

The Civil Rights movement has had a significant impact on the normative structure in the United States. The American Civil War ended the institution of slavery, but did not end institutional racism. With the close of reconstruction in 1877 and the withdrawal of federal troops from the South, whites regained power and established racial segregation and laws that denied African-American's their civil and political rights. In *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896) the U.S. Supreme Court gave its endorsement to the system of American Apartheid.

Meanwhile, African-American leaders began to emerge and organize for civil rights. At a meeting in Niagara Falls, in 1905, W.E.B. Du Bois and other civil rights leaders founded the Niagara Movement. Members of the Niagara group connected with concerned liberal and radical whites to establish the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in 1910. The NAACP journal *Crisis*, edited by Du Bois, became an effective organ of communication for African-American rights. The NAACP pursued a strategy of litigation "as a way of testing and shaping public opinion which could facilitate policy change . . . " (Stewart 1991, 169). The NAACP won its first major legal case in 1915, when the United States Supreme Court outlawed the "grandfather clause," a constitutional device used in the South to disfranchise blacks.

The battle for civil rights went forward in the 1940s and 1950s in determined and deliberate steps. In the courts the NAACP successfully attacked racially restrictive
covenants in housing, segregation in interstate transportation, and discrimination in public recreational facilities (see Bell 1987). In 1954, the Supreme Court issued one of its most significant rulings. With *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka*, the court overturned the "separate but equal" ruling of 1896 and outlawed segregation in the country's school systems.

After *Brown v. Board of Education* the struggle for civil rights became a political movement. African-Americans organized nonviolent action and the movement achieved its first major success in the Montgomery, Alabama bus boycott of 1955-56. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) was established in 1957 under Martin Luther King Jr's leadership. Other groups organized to fight for civil rights included the Congress for Racial Equality (CORE) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). Together these groups held demonstrations, led boycotts, and undertook voter registration drives (see Morris 1984). Public opinion turned against segregation as the national attention focused on Birmingham, Alabama in the Spring of 1963. The Birmingham authorities used dogs and fire hoses on a peaceful march of civil rights demonstrators. Police officers shown attacking peaceful protesters with dogs and cattle prods provoked horror and disbelief across the country.

Civil rights activities in 1963 peaked with a march on Washington where King addressed a gathering of 250,000 demonstrators. The march helped galvanize public opinion that civil rights were the most important problem facing the country and helped

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12 The Supreme Court dealt a blow to perpetrators of racially segregated housing areas when it held in *Shelley v Kramer* (334 U.S. 1, 1948) and *Hurd V. Hodge* (334 U.S. 24, 1948) that privately executed restrictive covenants were unenforceable in the courts.
secure the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Survey data indicate that the percentage of Americans saying that the issue of civil rights was the most important problem facing the country rose more than forty-five percentage points from 1963 to 1964 (Fiorina and Peterson 1998, 560). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbade discrimination in voting, public accommodations, and employment and permitted the attorney general of the United States to deny federal funds to local agencies that practiced discrimination. The ratification of the 24th Amendment to the Constitution in 1964, which banned the poll tax, helped efforts to increase African-American voter turnouts. Attacks against civil rights demonstrators continued by police who used tear gas and clubs, however, the cause garnered national support. Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which abolished all discriminatory qualifying tests for voter registrants and provided for the appointment of federal registrars.

The narrative provided above suggests progress toward equality for African-Americans in the United States. Some scholars contend that such a portrayal suggests an inevitability of progress toward equality in the United States (Klinker and Smith 1999). Mary Dudziak (2000) argues that the Cold War, and necessity of the United States to maintain a positive image in the world to claim its leadership in the "free world," compelled political leaders to advance civil rights. "The need to address international criticism gave the federal government an incentive to promote social change at home" (Dudziak 2000, 12). The implication of this argument is that with the end of the Cold War no incentive to promote civil rights exists, possibly leading to a retraction of hard-fought gains.
This argument comports with Philip Klinker and Rogers Smith's (1999) important work *The Unsteady March*. The authors contend that racial equality in the United States has moved at an unstable pace, at times moving forward and other falling back. Like Dudziak, Klinker and Smith emphasize the importance of external threats to the advancement of civil rights. Progress in racial equality has come only

1. in the wake of a large scale war requiring extensive economic and military mobilization of African-Americans for success:

2. when the nature of America's enemies has prompted American leaders to justify such wars and their attendant sacrifices by emphasizing the nations inclusive, egalitarian, and democratic traditions; and

3. when the nation has possessed domestic political protest movements willing and able to bring pressure upon national leaders to live up to that justificatory rhetoric by instituting domestic reform (Klinker and Smith 1999, 3-4).

Following these criteria, we find only three eras of significant progress. The first era followed the Revolutionary War that saw slavery in the northern states put on a path of extinction. The second era was the reconstruction period after the Civil War. The third era of reform occurred following World War II and during the Cold War. The years 1941 to 1968 marked an extraordinarily prolonged period in which all three factors were present. Following the first and second eras the authors document extended periods of retraction of civil rights for African-Americans. "Hence the normal experience of the typical black person in U.S. history has been to live in a time of stagnation and decline in progress toward racial equality" (Klinker and Smith 1999, 5).
Like Dudziak, Klinker and Smith pessimistically expect a retrenchment now that the Cold War has ended. Granted, more can be done for racial equality in the United States, but it is impossible, given the changes that have occurred, for any regression in civil and political rights. As I will show below the basic normative structure has changed and today Americans no longer think and feel the same. The civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s helped foster an increased respect for the political and civil rights of not only African-Americans but of other groups such as Latinos and Asian-Americans. Legislative, judicial and constitutional advancement made by the civil rights movements applies to all groups including women.

One major problem with Klinker and Smith's analysis is a singular focus on African-Americans. Opposition to affirmative action programs as they are now constructed does not necessarily suggest an opposition to civil and political rights or opposition to racial equality. For example, in California recent referendums ending affirmative action and bilingual education had wide support among Hispanics. Hispanic residents of California saw these referendums as attempts to dismantle obstacles to assimilation into America (Economist April 7, 2001, U.S. Edition). Also, the California affirmative action programs in higher education adversely affected many Asian-Americans.

According the most recent census, the United States is becoming a majority minority country. This means that no single group represents the majority of the population. Those who categorize themselves as "white" will eventually represent less than half the country's population. Hispanics have already achieved parity with
African-Americans as the largest minority group in the United States (Schmitt 2001, 20). The 2000 census for the first time allowed for the category of multiracial. Nearly seven million people, or 2.4 percent of the total population described themselves as multiracial marking a trend that suggests that a single group identification may be losing importance.

The 1960s and early 1970s marked a period of intense social change in the United States that reconstructed American society. James Gilbert (1981) in Another Chance argues that the postwar period between 1945 and 1968 represents a distinct period in U.S. social and political history. The period witnessed changes in the family structure and social mores. The development of television changed the role of the media and the impact of advertising. These changes led to the development of mass culture, which changed the nature of social and political relations. In the early 1960s the major television networks produced the first half hour evening news programs (White 1982, 172-173). The development of the national news program gave large audiences access to stories across the country, exposing events and forcing politicians to deal with issues that they would not have chosen to handle. "More importantly, shifts in attitudes of women, blacks, and other minorities toward their own rights, and the general acceptance of these claims by the rest of society, allowed a minority of black Americans to enter the middle strata of employment and freed the vast majority from restrictions that had bound them since the

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13The Hispanic population grew 58 percent to 35.3 million people since 1990. The non-Hispanic white population dropped to 69 percent from 76 percent a decade ago. This trend is expected to continue. Non-Hispanic whites are now a minority in California and may soon be in Texas.
I have discussed the importance of the Civil Rights Movement. Other groups were active during this period including Latinos and native Americans and women. In 1969, the Stonewall riots in New York launched the Gay rights movement. Against the backdrop of these social movements, the Antiwar movement grew starting in 1965 when President Johnson escalated the war in Vietnam by sending in the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade to defend the air bases at Da Nang. U.S. troop levels rose from 23,000 in 1964 to more than 180,000 in 1965. U.S. military strength peaked in 1968 with more than 500,000 personnel in South Vietnam (Bonds 1979, 12-13).

Both the SNCC and CORE opposed U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War as early as 1966. In 1967, Martin Luther King publically voiced his opposition to the war in Vietnam and in some sense linked the civil rights and antiwar movements together. On February 25, 1967, with speech at a fund-raising dinner, King began to make the connection between the civil rights and antiwar movement. King declared that "we are engaged in a war that seeks to turn the clock of history back and perpetuate white colonialism." He further implored that "we must combine the fervor of the civil rights movement with the peace movement. We must demonstrate, teach and preach until the very foundations of our nation shake" (quoted in Levy 1999, 318).

In no sense should we assume that the social movements of the 1960s and early 1970s were integrated and coordinated in a collective desire to change the American identity. Some groups were hostile to each other, such as some civil rights groups and
women's groups. Hardly did these movements achieve all the goals they set for themselves. Nevertheless, these multiple social movements created a period of societal change that shifted the normative structure of the United States and ushered in a growth of tolerance for religious, cultural, and ethnic diversity.

**Multicultural and Tolerant America**

In this chapter, I argue that social movements have led to changes in the general normative structure of the United States regarding political and civil rights. In the following section I provide some evidence to support this assertion. I use polling data measuring public opinion on issues regarding race, religion and gender. I draw the data from the Gallup Organization and from the *American National Election Studies*, which measure mass opinion. For the most part, shifts in mass opinion have mirrored shifts in

\[\text{In 1964 SNCC leader Stokely Carmichael joked the "the only position for women in SNCC is prone" (Evans 1989, 282). The women's movement, made up predominately of white women, was viewed with suspicion by those in the Civil Rights movement.}

\[\text{For the most part, I have focused on the issue of racial ethnic and gender norms regarding civil and political rights. I choose to include the questions regarding religion since religion has been used to define groups as separate and distinct. A long tradition of anti-Catholicism and anti-Semitism existed in the United States (see Higham 1971). However, it appears that with the development of the Euro-American identity these distinctions are less important. Jews and Catholics are grouped with the Protestant sects as followers of a Judeo-Christian tradition.}

\[\text{Gallup provides polling result extending back to 1935. The Gallup Organization published most of these results in *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971*, 3 vols. The accuracy of the data in these volumes has been confirmed from the original surveys by William G. Mayer in *The Changing American Mind* (1992). Gallup data after 1971 is drawn from the annual updates through 1999. The University of Michigan conducts the American National Election Studies (NES). These surveys are based on representative samples of citizens of voting age, living in private homes. Interviewing for this series was first done after the election of 1948 and has been conducted before and after every presidential election since 1952. NES data used in this study can be found at}
elites' attitudes (Zaller 1992, 11). Since I am trying to gauge changes in societal norms, I have chosen to rely on measures of mass opinion. The data that I present represents the same questions asked repeatedly over the years. This allows for an estimation in long-term changes and general trends.

We are trying to understand societal norms. Recall, that norms are culturally defined rules of conduct and specify appropriate behavior. The Pettit (1993) definition stated above suggests that a regular behavior becomes a norm when an overwhelming majority of the population approves of the behavior. How do we define an overwhelming majority? In an assessment of the public opinion's impact of public policy, Thomas Graham (1994) finds that the magnitude of public support determines the degree of public influence. Attitudes held by less than 50 percent of the public rarely influences public policy. A majority opinion (50-59 percent) can shape public policy, but only with strong policy leadership. At this level of support fertile ground exists for counter attacks by political opposition.

Consensus level public opinion (60-69 percent) successfully influences the policy process even if powerful bureaucratic interests have to be overruled. Preponderant level public opinion (70 to 79 percent) not only "causes" the political system to act according to its dictates but also deters political opposition from challenging a specific decision. Nearly unanimous opinion (80 + percent) sweeps all political opposition away, dominating the entire political system so that decision appear to be automatic (Graham 1994, 196).

http://www.umich.edu/~nes/nesguide.

Graham develops his divisions based on a review of data from more than five hundred national surveys and an examination of primary documents from seven presidential administrations.
Using Graham's finding on public opinion and public policy, in analyzing the following data when a response to a question surpasses 60 percent we can consider it as an indicator of a societal norm. When opposition to a position drops below 30 percent, we assume that society generally accept the norm. Some contend that people lie on public opinion surveys. This does not influence our understanding of the societal norm. The pressure is on individuals to conform to the societal norms. If an individual knew that his/her personal opinion did not reflect the broader societal norm they would be inclined to make their response match the societal norm. For example, one might contend that all men are misogynists and chauvinists, however, if the broader societal norms say that women should have an equal role we will find the preponderance of men responding that women should have an equal role despite their immediate beliefs. The same applies for issues of race or religion.\textsuperscript{18}

The survey data strongly suggest that it has become less acceptable for Americans overly to take in to account characteristics of race, gender or religious preferences in their electoral decisions. In 1937, the Gallup Organization began asking Americans their willingness to vote for a presidential candidate with various demographic and religious characteristics. Over the years the question has taken the following form: \textit{If your party}

\textsuperscript{18}My discussion of religious tolerance has been limited. The United States is said to have been founded on religious freedom. However, one must recall that dissenting religious groups that immigrated to colonial America came only for their own religious freedom and not to promote tolerance for all religions. For most of U.S. history the Protestant forms of Christianity have been the accepted form for the American identity. Some scholars such as Samuel Huntington still consider it to be the prevailing religious form structuring the American identity (see Huntington 1997). Nevertheless, with the development of the Euro-American identity Catholicism and the Jewish faith have constituted the American identity with the so-called, Judeo-Christian tradition.
nominated a generally well-qualified person for President and he happened to be _________. would you vote for him? The willingness to vote for a candidate for president of a certain demographic background provides a strong indicator of prejudice in the United States. The Presidency is the top elected post in the United States and with the role as head of state provides the symbolic representation of the United States. Who Americans feel comfortable within that office can provide an indicator of how the broader society views itself. When an individual from a certain background is elected president, conventional wisdom suggests that the general population feel comfortable with that individual's background. For example, when Ronald Regan was elected president in 1980, pundits and commentators said that the American public had fully accepted the idea of divorces. Although Reagan had been married to his second wife Nancy for many years by the time of the campaign, some questioned the willingness of the electorate to vote for someone who had been married more than once. The issue turned out to be irrelevant to the election. This being the case, we can use the willingness to vote for an individual for president for a certain background as a barometer for societal norms regarding that characteristic.

Figure 1 shows support for a Catholic presidential candidate. Alfred E. Smith was the first Catholic who ran for the office of president. In the election of 1928 Smith received 41 percent of the popular vote and lost the election to Herbert Hoover, however, by 1937, 60 percent of those polled said that they would vote for a Catholic presidential candidate. In 1960, with the election of the first Catholic President, John F. Kennedy, opposition had fallen below 30 percent making it socially acceptable to vote for a Catholic
for President. These trends have continued to the point where Catholicism is no longer an issue for the American electorate.

Much media excitement occurred in 2000 with Senator Lieberman's nomination for vice-president as the first Jewish candidate for that office. However, from figure 2 we see that by 1960, 70 percent of those surveyed said they would have support a Jewish presidential candidate. This trend continues through the 1960s reaching a peak of 92 percent in 1999. Figure 1 and 2 suggest that by 1960 a candidate's religious association was not a major issue. U.S. society inculcated a tolerance for religious diversity.

Although religious diversity appears acceptable for Americans, societal norms still strongly insist that a presidential candidate hold some type of religious belief. In 1958, only 18 percent of those polled said they would vote for an atheist for president, while 75 percent said they would not. By 1978 this disparity had decreased to 40 percent saying yes and 53 percent saying no. In the latest survey in 1999, only 49 percent of those polled said that

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The absence of a question of the Islamic faith suggests a bias against that religion. An area for further study is to what extent does an anti-Islamic bias shape U.S. relation with Muslim countries?
Would you support a Catholic for president?

Support for a Catholic Presidential Candidate

Figure 1
Would you support a Jewish candidate for President?

Year: 37 58 59 61 63 65 67 69 78 83 87 99

Percent: 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Source: Gallup

- Yes
- No
- No opinion

Support for a Jewish Presidential Candidate

Figure 2
they would vote for a well-qualified person from their party if that person happened to be an atheist, while 48 percent said they would not. This falls short of the 60 percent support or less than 30 percent voicing resistance to an issue for it to be considered a norm. In the United States it is no longer considered correct behavior to discriminate against someone for their religious belief, but doing it is acceptable if an individual does not hold a religious belief.

When it comes to political choices and the growth of tolerance for African-Americans, the civil rights movement clearly shows its influence. Figure 3 confirms these dramatic results. The Gallup organization did not even consider asking whether anyone would be inclined to vote for a well-qualified black candidate until 1958. In that year only 37 percent said yes, while 53 percent responded no. The dramatic changes in 40 years show that by 1999, 95 percent said that they would vote for an African-American for president. As the 20th century closes only 4 percent of those polled said that they would not vote for an African-American for president. Examining figure 3 we see that those responding that they would support an African-American for president passes the 60 percent point by 1969. Resistance to an African-American candidate also drops below the 30 percent level in the same year. Following 1969 those responding yes only increases, while negative responses continue to decline. For African-Americans, 1969 clearly marks the point at which the societal norms change and that prejudice against African-Americans in one's political choice is no longer acceptable.

The decline in prejudice against women has followed a similar pattern to African-Americans (see figure 4). In 1937, only 37 percent of those polled said that they would
vote for a well-qualified female candidate for president. It is not until 1955 that support rises above resistance, yet still below the level needed to make it normatively acceptable. Figure 4 suggests that 1971 is a key year with support rising above the 60 percent threshold and opposition falling below the 30 percent level. As with the willingness to support an African-American presidential candidate, the willingness to support a woman follows the turbulence of the 1960s with the civil rights and woman's liberation movement. Over the next 30 years, support for a woman presidential candidate climbs steadily, reaching more than 90 percent by 1999.

Homosexuals as a group lag far behind others in societal acceptance. In 1978, when the question was first asked by Gallup, only 26 percent of those polled said that they would vote for a well-qualified homosexual for president. In 1999, the percentage responding yes had risen to 59 percent, however, 37 percent said that they would not vote for a homosexual. This level of resistance strongly suggests that Americans do not accept homosexuals in the broader society. Interestingly, with 59 percent saying that they would vote for a homosexual for president, homosexuals stand roughly in the same position that African-Americans did in the United States in 1965.
Would You Support a Black Presidential Candidate?

Source: Gallup

Support for a Black Presidential Candidate

Figure 3
Would you support a woman presidential candidate?

Source: Gallup

Support for a Woman Presidential Candidate

Figure 4
To display this general growth of tolerance in American society, we need to look to other indicators. In figure 5, we see a continued growth since 1972 in the percentage of those who believe that women should have an equal role in society. In figure 6, when questioned on school integration we find that by 1968, more than 70 percent believed that white students and black students should go to the same schools. By 1972, resistance to school integration had dropped to 14 percent. Figure 7 graphs the responses of those who approve or disapprove of marriage between whites and nonwhites. In the period from 1958 to 1991, the percentage of those who said they disapprove drops 52 percentage points. Finally in figure 8, when surveyors asked whites if they would move if blacks came to live in their neighborhood, 50 percent said yes in 1958. In 1967, those

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20°The text of the question asked is as follows: "Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry and government. Others feel that a woman's place is in the home. Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven't you thought much about this?" Respondents were asked to rate their answers on a 7-points scale with 1 being an equal role and 7 indicating that a woman's place is in the home. For figure 5, I coded a response of 1, 2, or 3 as equal role and 5, 6, or 7 as Women's place is in the home. I did not graph a response of 4, which consistently ranged between 11 and 21 percent or a response of don't know, which averaged 6.3 percent over the years.
Should women have an equal role in society with men?

Support for an Equal Role for Women

Figure 5
Do you think white students and black students should go to the same schools?

Source: NORC in (Mayer 1992, 369)

Support for Integrated Schools

Figure 6
Do you approve or disapprove of marriage between whites and non-whites?

Support for "Mixed" Marriage

Figure 7
Would you move if black people came to live in your neighborhood?

Source: Gallup

Support for Integrated Neighborhoods

Figure 8
responding positively had dropped to 40 percent. By 1990, 68 percent said that they would not move if blacks came to live in their neighborhood in significant numbers.

From the survey data reviewed above we can suggest that since the early 1970s, America is reaching a multicultural identity. Multiculturalism is an empirical and social reality, not some elite conspiracy as some have claimed.21 The survey evidence supports the thesis that the American identity has changed, becoming more inclusive of groups once shunned from the mainstream political and social culture. To support this finding further, I briefly provide evidence from two very different venues, presidential cabinets and television.

The composition of presidential cabinets also serves as an indicator for changing norms regarding diversity and the development of a multicultural identity. When President Clinton first took office in 1993, he wanted a Cabinet that looked like America. That is, he stated that he wanted a Cabinet made-up of more than white men. Clinton followed a pattern that had begun with President Johnson. Johnson appointed Robert C. Weaver, the first African-American to hold a cabinet level post, as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development in 1966. The administration of George W. Bush has continued and expanded this practice to such an extent that it goes without question that a

21Michael Lind (1995) argues that it is a mistake to assume that multiracial is synonymous with multicultural. For Lind, the United States can be multiracial without being multicultural. Lind maintains that the white overclass perpetuate the multicultural idea and buy social peace through affirmative action and tokenism. Lind further argues that the white overclass have pitted the white underclass against minority groups to maintain their position. Lind argues for something he calls a Liberal Nationalism that is "a cultural melting pot, and ultimately a racial melting pot" (1995, 298). Nevertheless, his insistence on American English leads one to suspect his idea is some reformation of White Euro-America.
presidential cabinet will be diverse. In fact, the entire Bush administration is more racially
diverse and contains more women than the Clinton administration.

In the post World War II era television has had a strong impact on the American
society. The content of television programs can also help gauge societal norms regarding
political and civil rights and a tolerance for diversity. Henry J. Perkinson in Getting
Better: Television and Moral Progress, argues that the content of television programs has
lead to social progress. It is likely that the causal relationship is reversed and television
programming reflects progress in society. If this is the case, changes in television serve as
an indicator of normative change.22

One of the first television shows to feature African-Americans was Amos and
Andy, which first premiered on June 28, 1951 (Blum 1959, 98). The program aired as
radio show for 20 years in which white actors portrayed African-Americans in a
stereotypical fashion. On the TV version African-Americans played the roles, but still in
the stereotypical fashion. Television programs portrayed African-Americans as lazy,
dumb, and dishonest (Lichter et al. 1994, 336).

In the mid-1960s the portrayal of racial minorities underwent major changes and
the "proportion of non-northern European roles doubled over the next decade" (Lichter et
al. 1994, 339). African-Americans moved into starring roles playing strong and
competent characters in such shows as I Spy and Mission Impossible. By the 1970s,
shows featuring African-Americans were numerous and varied from comedies like Sanford

22 There is also the possibility of reciprocal causation in which the values of the
explanatory variable are determined, at least in part, by the dependent variable (see King,
Keohane, and Verba 1994).
and Son and The Jeffersons to the epic drama and history of one family's tribulations through slavery, Roots. By the 1980s, television portrayed African-Americans on The Cosby Show as successful with the father as a medical doctor and the mother a lawyer. The portrayal of African-Americans has changed dramatically over the years. Today, imagining a show like Amos and Andy on a network's prime time lineup is difficult. Other minority groups such as Hispanics and Asian Americans show up in television programs in ever increasing numbers and with non-stereotypical portrayals.

Conclusion

Today, Americans generally tolerate diversity and understand that the United States is not a homogeneous society racially or ethnically. The overwhelming majority of the American people accept gender equality. More women attend college than men. Even conservative Christian groups like the Southern Baptists, who claim male leadership as a tenant of faith, are finding dissent among their ranks.23 Despite some latent prejudice, racism, and chauvinism, overt discrimination is not widely accepted. In a multicultural America acceptance of diversity is what all Americans share. Globalization or the expansion of economic, political, social and cultural relations across borders is an idea that has gained widespread endorsement among academics and policymakers. This

23 In October 2000 the largest single component, the Baptist organization in Texas, declared financial independence from the Southern Baptist Conference (SBC). Arguing that the convention had become authoritarian, the Texans decided that the more than $5 million they had been sending to Southern Baptist seminaries would be better spent on projects in Texas. The primary issue of divergence was the SBC's recent stands calling on women to be submissive to their husbands and forbidding women pastors (Lampman 2000, 15).
intensification of interaction is not only a global phenomenon, but it has been national as well. Regional cultures exist in the United States, however, the United States has seen an infusion of various cultures throughout the broader society. American society is more tolerant and respectful of this diversity. The violation of an individual's civil or political rights due to their racial or ethnic background is no longer socially acceptable. The norms have changed. Norms that govern domestic policy are the same norms that direct foreign policy. The next chapter begins an investigation of the promotion of human rights in U.S. foreign policy. We will see that the changes in domestic norms translates into changes in foreign policy.
CHAPTER 4
HUMAN RIGHTS IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I tried to establish that norms regarding political and civil rights in the United States have changed. In this chapter it is my task to show that these changes correspond to changes in U.S. foreign policy. The foreign policy issue I examine is U.S. policy toward human rights. Recall that this study looks at the promotion of democracy as U.S. foreign policy. Changing support for human rights represents a changing perception of the nature of democracy. First, I begin with an analysis of presidential rhetoric, drawn for the most part from inaugural addresses, and show the changing status of democracy and human rights in presidential speeches.1 An analysis of presidential rhetoric provides us an understanding of the general U.S. foreign policy orientation. As we will see, it does not provide the indicator for change in policy orientation toward the promotion of democracy and human rights. The executive branch lags behind the legislative branch in reflecting the change in domestic norms. Next, I examine the changing position of human rights in U.S. foreign policy in the post World War II period. I use contextual evidence and I utilize the last twenty five years of quantitative scientific research on the relationship between U.S. foreign assistance and the

1Since the inaugural is the first speech a president makes, it can provide the touchstone of that president’s term in office.
violation of human rights by recipient countries. Researchers have not integrated or assessed this literature longitudinally through any theoretical lense. The evidence suggests that U.S. foreign policy has changed with that change taking place in 1970s. This change occurs concurrently with the change in domestic norms that produced the new multicultural American identity identified in the previous chapter.

**Presidential Rhetoric**

Presidents of the United States have for the most part conformed to the rhetoric of idealism in their foreign policy principles. Words like democracy and freedom often adorn their public speeches. American exceptionalism, the idea that the United States represents a special phenomenon in the history of the world, clearly resounds in presidential inaugural addresses. This has caused Henry Kissinger to lament the triumph of Wilsonian idealism in America's singular approach to international affairs. Kissinger relates that "[d]uring the course of the twentieth century, one president after another proclaimed that America had no 'selfish' interests [the only goal] was universal peace and progress" (Kissinger 1994, 621). However, a detectable shift in the presidential rhetoric exists. From Truman to Nixon, when presidents spoke of governance in other parts of the world, they judge it as each individual country's choice. Like Wilson before them, these presidents appear dedicated to the principle of self-determination. In this line of reasoning, democratic governance is often limited to particular groups of states. Beginning with President Carter and continuing through to the current administration, human rights and democracy is couched in universal terms and available to all. In the following section, I analyze presidential inaugural addresses from Truman to George W. Bush and show how the
rhetoric has changed.

In his inaugural address of January 20, 1949 Harry Truman declared that in the U.S. "we believe that all men have a right to equal justice under law . . . " (Truman 1949, 112). For Truman, the American people wanted a world "in which all nations and peoples are free to govern themselves as they see fit . . . " Despite the argument for self-determination, Truman argued that the United States and other "like-minded nations" find themselves opposed to the "false philosophy" of communism. He assured the world that the U.S. would strengthen "freedom-loving nations" against aggression and provide technical and economic assistance to "peace-loving peoples" (Truman 1949, 112).

Granted, Truman made his speech in the context of the Cold War with the world divided into camps of good and evil, however, more can be drawn from the rhetoric. Clearly, Truman implied that some countries are peace and freedom loving while others are not. Eisenhower's inaugural address of 1953 follows this structure with freedom viewed as not universally desired. He declared that the United States holds "all continents and peoples in equal regard and honor" (Eisenhower 1953, 6). Nevertheless, Eisenhower marked as a fixed principle that the U.S. will never use its strength to "impress upon another people our own cherished political and economic institutions" (Eisenhower 1953, 5). The implication is that some peoples may not want democracy or be capable of it.

John F. Kennedy offered a slight twist on America idealism. In his inaugural address, Kennedy forthrightly declared that the U.S. was "unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this nation has always been committed . . . " (Kennedy 1961, 1). To America's "old allies whose cultural and spiritual
origins" the United States shared, Kennedy declared undying loyalty. To the new states, Kennedy promised not to impose control on them, but warned them to maintain their freedom. Nevertheless, the freedom he spoke of is not the freedom of democratic governance, but freedom from Soviet control. He warned the recently independent states to be wary of the Soviet Union, which he equated to a tiger ready to devour them. Kennedy said nothing about the self destruction of internal repression. In one aspect of his speech, Kennedy appears to proclaim the universality of democracy, but he only extends it to those of our “cultural kind” (Kennedy 1961, 1).

In President Lyndon Johnson’s inaugural address we find sweeping language calling for domestic tolerance and a quest for justice with a force that no prior president had used. For Johnson, justice required Americans not to deny any citizen their rights no matter their race or belief. In America, Johnson declared, children “must not go hungry, . . . [and] neighbors must not suffer and die untended . . .” (Johnson 1965, 72). In foreign policy, Johnson’s rhetoric applied the same principles abroad in very aggressive terms. He wanted to eradicate “tyranny and misery” in the world (Johnson 1965, 73). Sounding much like Pope Urban II when he called for the First Crusade, Johnson declared that “[i]f American lives must end . . . in countries that we barely know, then that is the price . . . of our enduring covenant” (Johnson 1965, 72). The position of democracy and human rights in Johnson’s crusade is not clear. The crusade in Vietnam was not a crusade for democracy. Although the United States fought against a communist and nondemocratic regime in the North that had an abysmally poor human rights record, it supported a regime
Richard M. Nixon left no ambiguity in his inaugural address when it came to foreign policy. He declared that he wanted negotiation and not confrontation. Nixon favored a world open to ideas in which “no people live in angry isolation” (Nixon 1969, 3). He did not praise democracy nor did he condemn tyranny. Nixon put forward an amoral foreign policy. He said “[w]e cannot expect to make everyone our friend, but we can try to make no one our enemy.” Nixon launched a realist foreign policy devoid of concerns of human rights. His rhetoric inferred that all political regimes are morally equivalent. Although the first American president to speak openly of realpolitik foreign policy, Nixon was in fact the last in a line of post World War II presidents. From Truman to Nixon, U.S. Presidents argued for freedom, but freedom only defined in terms of an absence of Soviet control. For the most part, these presidents saw democratic governance and human rights as a unique product of a certain group of states.

When Jimmy Carter took the oath of office on January 22, 1977, he became the first American president openly to declare human rights as a component of U.S. foreign policy. Carter proclaimed that “our commitment to human rights must be absolute [and] we must not behave in foreign places so as to violate our rules and standards here at home . . . (Carter 1977, 2). In contrast to Nixon, who declared that the United States had

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Morris (1982) argues that U.S. intervention in Vietnam does have some moral standing when comparing the human rights violations of the North and the South. For Morris, although South Vietnam may have been authoritarian and imprisoned people who had committed no crimes, it did not reach the totalitarian scale of the North. The North Vietnamese engaged in mass executions and interned hundreds of thousands in reeducation camps.
no enemies and only interests, Carter sharply delineated “a clearcut [sic] preference for those societies which share an abiding respect for individual human rights” (Carter 1977, 3).

Ronald Reagan in his inaugural address appeared to harken back to an earlier time when he stated that United States would not “use our friendship to impose on their [other states] sovereignty” (Reagan 1981, 3). Unlike Nixon, Reagan did not hesitate to proclaim some states as enemies. To the “enemies of freedom,” he warned that the American people may be reluctant to fight, but they should never misunderstand “our forbearance” (Reagan 1981, 3). Many pundits and commentators voiced concern about Reagan’s commitment to human rights.³ The president responded in an interview with Walter Cronkite in March of 1981 that he though human rights were very much a part of American idealism. He suggested that the United States “ought to be more sincere about [its] position of human rights.” For Reagan, seeking better relations with states like the Soviet Union and Cuba while punishing others was hypocritical. Reagan flatly declared that the Soviet Union was the greatest violator of human rights (Reagan 1981, 196). By the end of Reagan’s first year in office he had proclaimed December 10, Human Rights Day (Reagan 1981, 1143). As his rhetoric suggested, Reagan continued with human rights as a part of U.S. foreign policy.

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Presiding over the West’s victory of the Cold War, George H. W. Bush declared in his inaugural address that the countries of the world were “moving toward democracy through the door of freedom” (Bush 1989, 1). Proclaiming the universalism of human rights and democracy, President Bush stated that for the first time in history “man does not have to invent a system by which to live” (Bush 1989, 1). Democracy and freedom have triumphed for post Cold War presidents. William J. Clinton emphasized the interdependence of the world with no clear division between the foreign and the domestic. Clinton presented America as a leader and a model for the world. The cause of democracy was America’s cause. He asserted that “[o]ur hopes, our hearts, our hands are with those on every continent who are building democracy and freedom” (Clinton 1993, 2). George W. Bush\textsuperscript{4} continued the rhetoric of his predecessors when he said the story of America was that of “friend and liberator.” Democracy, once the providence of the United States, was “taking root in many nations.” President Bush assigned a large role for the United States in foreign policy. He stated that “[i]f our country does not lead the cause of freedom, it will not be led . . . And to all nations, we will speak for the values that gave our nation birth.”

**Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy**

Changing support for human rights represents a changing perception of the nature of democracy. Since the end of World War II, U.S. policy has evolved becoming more sensitive to the content and quality of political regimes with which it interacts. As with the

\textsuperscript{4}The text of President George W. Bush’s inaugural address was found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/inaugural-address.html and accessed on March 25, 2001.
expansion of tolerance domestically, we find that American foreign policy becomes more sensitive and concerned with political and civil rights, specifically around the period of the 1970s. As an analytic device, I break down the post World War II era into successive periods characterized by their policy orientation toward human rights.

Uncertain Support 1945-1953

The massive scale of human atrocities that flowed from the Second World War provoked a global concern for human rights. The drafting of the United Nations charter at the San Francisco conference in 1945 saw the inclusion of human rights as a legitimate concern of international action. No fewer than seven references to human rights are found in the UN Charter (Riggs and Plano 1994, 204). Although the Charter did not develop specific legal obligations, it did assert an international interest in the rights of individuals. The U.S. foreign policy position on human rights was ambiguous. "The United States record on human rights at San Francisco was mixed," writes Kathryn Sikkink. The United States supported efforts to include human rights language in the Charter, yet expressed concern of possible U.N. infringement on domestic jurisdiction (Sikkink 1993, 147).5

The United States supported the nonbinding Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). However, it also worked to prevent the development of international regimes on human rights and authorized a self-denying ordinance of the U.N. Human Rights Commission ruling out specific review of state's human rights policies (Forsythe 1990, 437).

5The other major powers including both the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom expressed this concern.
Public policy from the State Department further illustrates this lack of concern for human rights and democracy. As a member of the U.S. State Department and director of the policy planning staff, George Kennan in 1950, espoused his disdain for Latin America. In a memorandum to the Secretary of State, Kennan characterized Latin America as a region like no other “in which nature and human behavior could have combined to produce a more unhappy and hopeless background for the conduct of human life . . .” (Kennan 1976, 600). His description of the Spanish settlers reads as if he lifted from the British propaganda of the 1700s. Kennan teaches the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, that the “Spaniards came to Latin America as the bearers of a national and cultural development which was itself nearing its end; a development in which many of the more hopeful origins had already died and little was left but religious fanaticism, a burning, frustrated energy, and an addiction to the most merciless cruelty” (Kennan 1976, 601). One has to think that Kennan is equating fanaticism with Catholicism. Kennan speaks as if the English colonists in North America were not religious fanatics. The colonists in New England exhibited deep devotion to their religious convictions.

Even more disturbing than Kennan’s apparent religious bias is his boldfaced, unashamed racism. Kennan blames the modern problems of Latin American on the interbreeding between the Spanish and the native peoples of in the colonial period. “Here is the true illustration of the crimes of the fathers being visited on their progeny; for, as the Spanish intermarried with these native peoples the course of whose history had so ruthlessly been interrupted, they came to share the scares and weaknesses which they themselves had inflicted” (Kennan 1976, 601). For Kennan, the problem of racial mixing
also extended to Africans. “[I]n Latin America, the large scale importation of Negro
slave elements into considerable parts of the Spanish and other colonial empires [Portugal
Brazil], and the extensive intermarriage of all these elements, produced other unfortunate
results which seemed to have weighed scarcely less heavily on the chances for human
progress” (Kennan 1976, 601).

Kennan’s racism is striking when viewed from the perspective of the early twenty-
first century. In the 1950s, however, his views still represented major segments
throughout the American society. Change was underway, but it had not permeated
though the broader society or the ruling elites. It would be difficult today imagining any
secretary of state, much less Colin Powell, decrying racial amalgamation as a culprit in the
region’s problems.

Kennan’s racial and cultural bias extended to his analysis of government for the
region. Lesser peoples may need repressive governments. Democratic governments for
Latin America would be nice “[b]ut where they do not exist, and where concepts and
traditions of popular government are too weak to absorb successfully the intensity of
communist attack, then we must concede that harsh governmental measures of repression
may be the only answer; that these measures may have to proceed from regimes whose
origins and methods would not stand the test of American concepts . . . “(Kennan 1976,
607). George Kennan’s ideas in the late 1940s and early 1950s directly shaped U.S.
policy. Democracy promotion in non-western, non-European states was not part of the
agenda. American foreign aid to many countries was not directed at liberalizing political
structures, but modernizing economically backward countries. The U.S. Congress’ role in
foreign policy supported this agenda.

**Overt Neglect 1953-1976**

The issue of human rights dropped from the U.S. foreign policy agenda between the 1950s and the early 1970s. As we saw from the presidential rhetoric, the Cold War and fear of communism dominated foreign policy concerns. Reference to human rights in the *Congressional Record* are non existent. United Nations efforts to promote human rights through covenants and treaties received dedicated disregard from the United States. In four cases over this period the United States assisted into power regimes that acted as gross violators of human rights.

In 1953, in Iran, the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) orchestrated an operation to overthrow the democratically-elected government of Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq. Musaddiq’s nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951 struck a chord of Western defiance. However, Musaddiq’s flirtations with the communist Tudeh party not only raised the concern of the United States, but also agitated Iran’s religious leaders (Munson 1988, 53). Musaddiq’s attempts at reform created chaos in the country. On August 16, 1953, crowds of Tudeh supporters rioted in Tehran and thwarted a coup attempted by troops loyal to the Shah. Three days later royalist forces struck again. Military forces captured the prime minister and returned the Shah to consolidate his monarchy. The Shah dealt harshly with groups who opposed his rule. Between 1953 and

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The Genocide Treaty, a response to the fascist atrocities in World War II, was adopted by the UN on December 9, 1948 and entered into force on January 12, 1951. Nevertheless, the treaty wasted away in the Senate until 1986. The International Covenant on Civil and Political rights was opened for ratification in 1966, but it was not submitted to the Senate until 1977.
1963 the United States gave Iran $500 million in military aid. The United States helped organize an internal security organization, SAVAK, notorious for its brutal treatment of political prisoners (Cleveland 1994, 276).

In 1954, a CIA-sponsored military force overthrew the democratically-elected government in Guatemala. Jacobo Arbenz, elected in 1951, lost power when a military force led by Castillo Armas forced him to resign. Arbenz’s aggressive posture toward the United Fruit Company (UFCO) with the nationalization of land belonging to the company, his legalization of the communist Guatemalan Labor party, and his promotion of agrarian reform raised the specter of communism in the perception of American officials. Although U.S. officials had little evidence that communism was gaining ground in Guatemala, the perceived threat was enough to spark a reaction (Schoultz 1998, 342). The American ambassador to Guatemala said of Arbenz, “the man thought like a Communist and talked like a Communist and if not actually one, would do until one came along” (quoted in Dallek 1983, 211). The CIA assisted a disloyal army faction and provided limited air support. Other military forces refused to defend the government and Arbenz had to resign (Immerman 1982). Castillo Armas assumed the presidency backed by the United States. He dismantled labor and peasant movements, jailing and killing thousands in the process, repressed political parties and rolled back agrarian reform (Booth and Walker 1993, 43). Guatemala was locked into an extended period of political repression and internal violence that was not to see respite until the 1990s.

In April 1965, rebel military forces and civilian groups ostensibly loyal to Juan Bosch moved to seize power from a civilian junta in the Dominican Republic. The civilian
junta had come to power two years earlier when the military overthrew the democratically-elected Bosch. After the rebel forces battled the regular army troops out of the capital city of Santo Domingo, the American Ambassador reported to officials in Washington on possible Communist infiltration in the rebel forces (Wiarda and Kryzanek 1992, 43). Fears of a Communist takeover prompted President Johnson to order troops into the Dominican Republic. The U.S. intervention allowed the regular military troops to regroup and snatch a decisive victory away from the rebel forces.  


Chile marks a final case in this period of U.S. policy supporting oppression. The United States strongly influenced the rise to power of the military regime led by Augusto

Pinochet. Recently declassified information on CIA activities in Chile clearly shows U.S. complicity. As we saw from the analysis of presidential rhetoric above, the Nixon administration represents the final stage of an American foreign policy in which considerations of human rights and democracy receive minimal considerations.

The left-wing politician Salvador Allende had for years drawn the concern of U.S. policymakers who feared the spread of communism. In the early 1960s, President Kennedy and Johnson had authorized almost $4,000,000 in expenditures by the CIA to prevent Allende and a left wing coalition from gaining power in Chile (Dallek, 1983, 277). By the late 1960s, the CIA developed a propaganda mechanism that placed stories in the media to discredit Allende. They also provided funding to “moderate candidates” running for office. Despite CIA efforts, Allende won a plurality in the presidential election of September 4, 1970. On September 15, 1970, President Nixon authorized the CIA to prevent Allende from taking office. Although the CIA-instigated coup failed, it led to the death of Army Commander Rene Schneider. Schneider had been an obstacle to a military takeover since he believed deeply that the Constitution required the Army to allow Allende to assume the office of the president.

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8Unless otherwise noted, information on CIA activities in Chile is drawn from the Hinchey Report, September 18, 2000. Under Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, the Intelligence Community, led by the National Intelligence Council was required to answer questions regarding the role of the United States in the assassination of President Allende, the accession of General Augusto Pinochet to the Presidency, and the violation of human rights by offices and agents of General Pinochet. The report can be found at http://foia.state.gov/HincheyReport.htm. It was accessed on February 24, 2001 at 9:47 a.m.
The CIA continued to funnel money to opposition parties and provided assistance to right-wing militant groups. They also continued their disinformation campaign to discredit Allende. According to the Hinchey report, “[t]he CIA was instructed to put the U.S. Government in a position to take future advantage of either a political or military solution to the Chilean dilemma, depending on how developments unfolded.” Finally, on September 11, 1973, the military launched a successful coup. Allende took his own life while the Presidential palace was under attack. The CIA did not instigate the coup, but American officials were aware of the plotting and did nothing to discourage the plotters’ activities. After the coup, the military junta led by General Pinochet arrested many people suspected of being leftists. Many of those arrested were tortured and some 3,000 were killed. Beyond these four cases, researchers have provided evidence supporting the thesis that U.S. foreign policy from the early 1950s to the early 1970s overtly neglected human rights and supported regimes abusive to the rights of their own people.

Writing in 1974, Steven J. Rosen (1974, 117) argued that both liberal and radical critics of American foreign policy agree in their criticism of U.S. support for reactionary regimes. Little debate occurred about whether the U.S. supported countries with repressive political regimes. Research questions sought to investigate if U.S. policies were a product of errors in judgement and an exaggerated fear of communism, or a logical outgrowth of the capitalist socioeconomic system. Rosen’s 1974 empirical study found evidence that in the period from 1954 to 1972, a rightward political shift in a country correlated with an increase in U.S. investment, trade and aid. In an early study on the relationship between military aid and economic interest John S. Odell (1974) found a
strong covariance between military assistance and economic interests. In contrast, R. D. McKinlay and R. Little (1977) in a longitudinal study of the allocation of aid over the years 1960-1970 found that U.S. security interests had an important influence in U.S. aid commitments. Minimal support was found to suggest that the aid was allocated based on a country's economic performance or to promote U.S. economic interests. Interestingly, in some years it was found that countries least likely to restrict political activity received the greatest absolute commitment in foreign aid. However, this finding was countered by the evidence that the U.S. supported states that repressed political activity if they were military regimes. During the period studied, military regimes often arose in response to civil disturbances and political unrest usually viewed as communist inspired. In a study on economic interests and U.S. foreign policy in Latin America from 1960 to 1969, John Peterson (1976) found no evidence that support for democracy or opposition to military regimes were factors in the distribution of foreign policy resources.\(^9\) Much research during the 1970s concluded that the distribution of U.S. aid supported nefarious outcomes and stemmed for self-interested motivations by U.S. policy makers (Pearson, 1976, Chomsky and Herman, 1979, Schoultz, 1980). Human rights and democracy did not appear to influence foreign policy decisions by the United States.

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\(^9\)Peterson defined foreign policy resources as the level of economic assistance, military assistance and the number of diplomatic personnel.
As will be more fully explicated in the next chapter, the U.S. Congress began to assert its influence on foreign policy and human rights in the early 1970s. In 1973, Minnesota Congressman Donald Fraser (D., Minnesota) began a series of hearings on human rights. Under his leadership the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations produced a report entitled *Human Rights in the World Community: A Call for U.S. Leadership*. Following the Fraser hearings, Congress expressed its belief that the United States should link security assistance to human rights concerns. Unlike security assistance, Congress legally linked the provision of development assistance and human rights (Forsythe 1988, 9-10).

The election of Jimmy Carter enlisted the executive branch into the Congress lead drive to make human rights part of U.S. foreign policy. As we saw above, President Carter was the first U.S. president to speak openly of human rights in foreign relations. By 1977, Congress created a new position of assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs. The Carter administration took some dramatic moves, by cutting off aid to some significant countries for human rights abuses. The administration

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10 Some scholars divide this period in two, with one period covering the Carter Administration, and another beginning with Reagan. (See Forsythe 1990 and Sikkink 1993). The enforcement of human rights in foreign policy was not perfect in either administration, nevertheless, human rights never left the agenda. The division by these scholars is based on the expectation that Reagan should have been different from Carter.

11 Congress created the Human Rights Office in 1975 as the Office of the Coordinator for Human Rights and Human Affairs. In 1976, Congress elevated the position to assistant secretary of state. Carter appointed the person to hold that position when he selected Patricia Derian, a former civil rights activist, to the post.
ended military aid to Argentina, Ethiopia, and Uruguay and successfully sought a repeal of the Byrd Amendment, which allowed imports of chrome from Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe).

Critics of Carter's human rights policy argued that his policy was inconsistent and represented a double standard. Although the Carter administration cut off military assistance to countries like Argentina, Chile, and Ethiopia for human rights violations, he continued such assistance to Iran, the Philippines and the Republic of Korea despite their human rights violations (Wilson 1983, 188-189). Other critics complained that a human rights policy was ineffective. The heterogenous nature of the world, some claimed, made common expectations of human rights impossible. Ernst Haas, reacting to Carter's human rights policy, declared that "international politics is not the politics of the American civil rights movement" (quoted in Wilson 1983, 189). Therefore, standards practiced domestically could not be applied to an international venue.

Ronald Reagan came to office with a different set of ideas regarding the relationship between human rights and foreign policy. Before becoming president Reagan's first Ambassador to the United Nations, Jean Kirkpatrick wrote a scathing critique of the Carter’s human rights policy in an article titled "Dictatorships and Double Standards." In the article she criticized the Carter administration for treating communist countries differently than traditional autocracies. She accused the Carter administration of preferring Soviet/Chinese/Cuban socialism over traditional autocracy. She argued that the politics of traditional autocracy "is nearly antithetical to our own – at both the symbolic and operational level – the rhetoric of progressive revolutionaries sound much better to us..." The reason "modern Americans prefer 'socialist' to traditional autocracies is that
the former have embraced modernity and have adopted modern modes and perspectives” (Kirkpatrick 1979, 42). For Kirkpatrick, this constituted a double standard in U.S. foreign policy that needed to be rectified. She counseled that U.S. foreign policy needed to take a harder line with the communist countries while being more understanding toward the traditional autocracies. Traditional autocracies were less intrusive and less brutal than the revolutionary autocracies like the Soviet Union. More important for Kirkpatrick, the believer in realpolitik, traditional autocracies readily conformed to the interests of the United States.

Reagan began his administration by ending some “double standards” regarding the Soviet Union and its allies and by removing some sanctions from allies in the Cold War. The Reagan administration altered the definition of human rights established under the Carter administration. Carter had established three categories: freedom from torture, civil and political liberties, and economic rights to food and shelter. Reagan homogenized the definition and eliminated the economic component of the human rights definition, a move consistent with his conservative ideology (Drezner 2000, 745). In May 1982, with National Security Decision Directive (NSDD), number 37, the Reagan administration overturned the Carter ban on military equipment for Guatemala and authorized the transfer of up to $10 million worth of U.S. origin military equipment for fiscal year 1983 (Simpson 1995, 128). The Reagan Administration also modified foreign policy toward the USSR and Eastern Europe. NSDD number 75, stated that the “primary U.S. objective in Eastern Europe is to loosen Moscow’s hold on the region while promoting the cause of human rights in individual Eastern European Countries (Simpson 1995, 258). In response
to the House of Representatives passing the Boland-Zablocki Amendments barring the CIA from continued funding of the Nicaraguan Contras, Reagan issued NSDD number 100, in July of 1983. The directive charged that the military efforts in Central America be linked with the ability to support democracy. Furthermore, an accompanying CIA memo dated September 19, 1983, directed funding not only for paramilitary activities in support of the Nicaraguan Contras, but assistance to “used to promote pluralism, human rights, freedom of the press, free elections, and democratic process inside Nicaragua and throughout the region” (Simpson, 1995, 316).

Reagan overturned some of Carter’s decisions to cut military assistance to a few countries. Alexander Haig, Reagan’s first Secretary of State, publically declared that combating terrorism would take priority over human rights (Dberdorfer 1981, A1). Nevertheless, human rights in foreign policy had originated in the U.S. Congress, and that institution did not relinquish its influence. Congress rejected the nomination of Ernest Lefever to the post of assistant secretary for human rights and humanitarian affairs. Lefever had publically advocated overturing human rights legislation. Moreover, he had received money from the Republic of South Africa to publish views favorable to that regime (Forsythe 1988, 121). The issue of human rights in American foreign policy would not be easily dismissed from the agenda. The evidence suggests that Reagan did not want to eviscerate the policy as a component of U.S. foreign policy. Double standards continued to exist. Much as Carter was reluctant to cutoff aid to Iran despite it human rights violations, Reagan increased aid to El Salvador while ignoring blatant human rights violations. What is important to understand, is that human rights as an issue was
becoming an institutionalized component of U.S. foreign policy. In 1981, Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick wrote “not only should human rights play a central role in U.S. foreign policy, no U.S. foreign policy can possibly succeed that does not accord them a major role” (Kirkpatrick 1981, 42).

Picking up on an idea introduced by Congress in the early 1970s, Reagan proposed “Project Democracy” (later to evolve into the National Endowment for Democracy) to promote democracy abroad. A democratic regime becomes a necessary factor to protect human rights. Human rights concerns have been subordinated to other foreign policy concerns at times, but have never left the agenda since the Carter administration. By the Clinton administration “human rights have become a relatively uncontroversial part of U.S. foreign policy” (Donnelly 1999, 242).

In the following section I examine the systematic research covering the period I have identified as one in which the U.S. supports human rights abroad. In the assessment of U.S. foreign policy, the provision of bilateral aid is often used as an indicator for general orientation of policy. Aid provision establishes commitment and dependency used to realize certain foreign policy utilities (McKinlay 1979). Conversely, the withholding or denial of aid can signal a change in policy orientation.

**Quantitative Analyses of U.S. Support for Human Rights**

David Cingranello and Thomas Pasquarello (1985) investigated the impact of legislation passed by the Congress between 1976 and 1979 explicitly linking human rights practices of foreign nations to U.S. foreign policy. The authors conducted a study of human rights practices and the distribution of aid to Latin American countries in fiscal year
1982. Their findings suggested an increased importance for human rights in bilateral aid considerations. The authors found a significant relationship between military aid and human rights. “Nations with poor human rights records tended to be excluded from the military aid recipient group, while those which had recently improved their human rights practices tended to be included” (Cigranello and Pasquarello 1985, 554). When policymakers made decisions on economic assistance, they provided higher levels of assistance to nations with “enlightened human rights practices” (Cigranello and Pasquarello, 560).^{12}

Despite some early rhetoric to overturn Carter’s emphasis on human rights, the Reagan administration continued the policy lines of the previous administration, and often the policy was more consistently applied. Daniel J.B. Hofrenning (1990) found that human rights remained a significant factor in aid allocation during the Reagan administration. Steven C. Poe, in an analysis of military aid to 26 Latin American states and a sample of 40 states in the world, concluded that the Carter administration in 1980 and the Reagan administration in 1984 tended not allocated aid to countries with poor human rights records (Poe 1991). In a study of economic aid to Africa from 1983 to 1988

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^{12}Some researchers have criticized Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s finding based on methodological concerns. Cingranelli and Pasquarello excluded El Salvador from their study since it received more than 27 percent of U.S. bilateral aid and thus considered a nonroutine case. Critics argue that the inclusion of El Salvador would wash out the significance of their findings (see Carleton and Stohl 1987). Nevertheless, Cingranelli and Pasquarello excluded Cuba from the analysis since U.S. policymakers did not define it as a potential recipient of aid. In the rating system of countries developed by Cingranelli and Pasquarello, Cuba received the second worst overall human rights score and the worst on civil and political rights. One would suspect that an inclusion of Cuba would buttress the evidence that U.S. aid levels vary with the level of human rights abuses.
Steven Poe and Rangsima Sirrangsi (1993) found evidence that human rights were one of many considerations entering into aid allocations. Their findings show that for every point increase on a five-point ordinal human rights abuse scale, a country was appropriated three million dollars less in economic aid. Other studies have continued to find that respect for human rights have been considered by U.S. policymakers, but even in the waning years of the Cold War strategic interests still had the strongest impact on aid allocation (Poe et al. 1994, Blanton 1994).

Of course, immediate security matters will still trump all other concerns. In the war against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, 2001-2002, the United States developed a working relationship with an oppressive regime in Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, denying that concerns with human rights has entered the equation of decision making is difficult. During the Reagan administration, the development of democracy building programs allowed engagement with human rights violators like El Salvador. The Reagan administration perceived human rights violations as a systematic problem rooted in the lack of democratic structures. According to Secretary of State George Shultz, the U.S. had "a duty not only to react to specific cases, but also to understand, and seek to shape, the basic structural conditions in which human rights are more likely to flourish" (Schultz 1984, 4). Moreover, military analysts are coming to understand the importance of human rights to security concerns.

In a study of the Salvadorian civil war, Ernest Evans (1997, 44) concluded that "the El Salvadoran civil war demonstrated that in counterinsurgency campaigns, allowing the foreign and local military and security personnel to engage in systematic human rights
violations such as the torture and killing of prisoners is totally counterproductive.”

Tortured and killed prisoners provided poor intelligence information and are less likely to cooperate in the future. Abused citizens as less likely to cooperate with the government that is abusing them and more likely to support insurgency. Therefore, American military advisors worked to curtail human rights abuses by the Salvadorian military. The United States also sought to promote and support democratically elected governments in El Salvador, even when the U.S. did not particularly agree with that government’s ideology.13 Evans (1997) argues that U.S. decision makers have learned from Ernesto "Che" Guevara in dealing with counter insurgency operations. Guevara insisted that when a government comes to power through some sort of popular vote, revolutionaries cannot promote a guerrilla outbreak, since the possibilities of a peaceful struggle have not been exhausted.

In a recent study of US foreign policy and foreign aid (Meernik et al. 1998) found that with the passing of the Cold War era security-driven goals in foreign aid have become less critical while ideological goals (i.e., human rights and democracy) have become more important. Shannon Lindsey Blanton (2000), focusing on U.S. arms exports to developing countries for the years 1990 through 1994, found that both human rights and democracy were very important in the initial decision making stage. Finally, in the one of

13 For example, when Jose Napoleon Duarte won the presidency in El Salvador in 1984, the Reagan administration cooperated closely with him despite the annoyance of many in Reagan's own party over Duarte's nationalization of the banking industry. When Alfredo Cristiani was elected president in 1989, the Bush administration strove to establish a working relationship with his government despite the hostility by many in the U.S. Congress to Cristiani's ARENA party.
the most comprehensive and statistically sophisticated analysis of the relationship between U.S. human rights policy and foreign assistance, Clair Apodaca and Michael Stohl (1999) find that human rights were a determining factor in the decision to grant economic aid.14

Conclusion

To argue that the United States is concerned with human rights and democracy may sound trivial to some. However, as we have seen this has not always been the case. Presidential rhetoric has changed with concepts of democracy recast from particular to universal. Some may argue that President Carter’s idealism was something unique to the man, a product of his religious upbringing. However, his successor Reagan was very similar in his idealism in foreign policy. Reagan continued and expanded idealism in foreign policy. Perhaps we can argue the demands of the Cold War shaped the rhetoric and actions of the presidents before Carter. However, both Carter and Reagan operated under the Cold War system. It is not until the Bush Administration that a president made foreign policy decisions in a post Cold War world.

The empirical evidence strongly suggests that from the 1950 though the mid 1970s the U.S. supported anti-democratic regimes and practiced policies antithetical to human rights. Furthermore, the empirical evidence suggests that in late 1970s human rights

14Apodaca and Stohl’s analysis covered the period 1976-1995. The Clinton administration is an exception to this finding. The authors contend that the Clinton administration was more concerned the U.S. economic interests. Samuel Huntington (1997, 37) argues that in Clinton’s foreign policy we find that “the dictates of commercialism have prevailed over other purposes, including human rights, democracy, alliance relationships, maintaining the balance of power, technology export controls, and other strategic and political considerations . . ." A full statistical analysis of his two terms has yet to be conducted. Clinton did continue the democracy program established under Reagan.
became a component of American foreign policy. Many studies have found a relationship between foreign aid and human rights. This is significant when one understands that for years researchers were bent on disproving the relationship between human rights and foreign policy. Understandably, most researchers held the belief that America supported oppression. The relationship is not perfect and sometimes other motives trump human rights. The U.S. relationship with China is one example. Today, democracy and the respect for human rights are considered in the realm of the possible for China. In the 1950s few would have thought it to be true.

I have shown that U.S. foreign policy regarding human rights has changed. How do we account for this change? It is not a change in political parties. Before the 1970s both Republicans and Democrats often supported authoritarian regimes. Carter, a Democrat, and Reagan, a Republican, both pushed a foreign policy with a focus on freedom. Carter began with human rights promotion and Reagan expanded that to include the promotion of democracy. We cannot blame it on the end of Cold War since the policy predates that event. Clearly something changed within American. In the previous chapter, I presented evidence suggesting the American identity has changed and that people are more tolerant of diversity and respectful of others’ political and civil rights. This being the case, we can understand that this respect for political and civil rights would bleed over to foreign policy. Recall, that the human rights issue originated in the U.S. Congress, the branch of government that is nearest to the people. Congress has a role in foreign policy if it chooses to act. Members of Congress such as Donald Fraser (D., Minnesota), Tom Harkin (D., Iowa), and Don Bonker (D., Washington) acted with the conviction that their
constituents supported a policy of human rights. When members of Congress voted to pass legislation tying foreign aid to the support for human rights, they reflected the general norms held by the American people. This connection is explored in more detail in chapter 6. Given the societal changes we can better understand President Carter’s emphasis on human rights. Moreover, we can understand why Reagan did not abandon idealism in foreign policy. True, Reagan modified Carter’s human rights policy, but his world view, the mood of the Congress, and the norms of the American people would not allow the abandonment of the promotion of freedom, human rights and democracy. In the next chapter, I will attempt flesh out the linkages between domestic norms and foreign policy. This will be done through an examination of Congressional action toward the promotion of democracy.
CHAPTER 5
CONGRESS AND THE TRANSMISSION OF NORMS TO FOREIGN POLICY

Introduction

In the United States, the transfer of domestic norms from the civil society to public policy is most clearly evidenced through the actions of Congress. This does not mean that other branches of the federal government are immune to changes at the domestic level. Nevertheless, it is the elected assembly in democratic governments that usually first shows the changes in society. Recall that we are discussing changes in societal norms regarding political and civil rights. Changes in norms have led to a growth in tolerance and a change in the U.S. identity. This change in the domestic normative structure leads to changed policy orientations. In this chapter, I will illustrate the transmission of the changed domestic norms regarding civil and political rights to the change in foreign policy regarding the promotion of human rights and democracy abroad via congressional action.

First, I discuss the process of foreign policy making in the United States as traditionally and constitutionally understood. Next, I will address the “two presidencies thesis.” As originally constructed, Aaron Wildavsky’s “two presidencies” thesis suggests that presidents have leeway in matters of foreign policy. In subsequent examinations of Wildavsky’s thesis, the concept of the “two presidencies” has not held up. Third, I consider the role of the resurgent Congress in the United States and end of the “two presidencies” which corresponds to the changing normative patterns in the United States.
This leads to a discussion of the role of constituent influence on members of Congress.

Taking a cue from the “new institutionalist” literature on American Government, I address the mechanisms in addition to the legislative process by which Congress can influence foreign policy. Finally, I confront the legislative and procedural changes that Congress has undertaken to incorporate the promotion of democracy and human rights into U.S. foreign policy. While the president was important in foreign policy action, Congress exerted more influence regarding human rights and democracy promotion. Congress more immediately transmitted societal norms to foreign policy.

**Constitutional Power and Foreign Policy**

The U.S. national government is based on a division of powers with three separate branches. However, separate institutions sharing power better describes the American system of governance. This constitutional sharing of power creates what Edward Corwin (1957, 171) called an invitation to struggle. The U.S. Constitution endows both the president and Congress with significant foreign policy responsibilities. The judicial branch has less influence in foreign policy and traditionally has followed a self-denying ordinance. Particularly in times of crisis the Court has allowed both branches to act more extensively in foreign policy than it has permitted in domestic policy. The Court has declared foreign policy matters political issues and not amenable to resolution by the judicial system and has upheld the authority of the executive branch (Crabb and Holt 1992, 1).

The president holds the primary position in foreign policy. Constitutional powers granted to the president in this realm are extensive and by tradition presidents have sought to gather power regarding foreign policy. The Constitution (Article II, Section 2)
designates the president as “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and of the Militia of the several States.” The conduct of military forces is an important tool of foreign policy and one that U.S. presidents have used to great effect. The Constitution grants to the Congress the power to declare war, but the president’s role as commander in chief gives the executive much latitude. Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist Papers, number 70, argued for “energy in the executive.” For Hamilton an energetic executive was essential “to the protection of the country against foreign attacks. . . .” Although Hamilton argued that only a surprise attack on the U.S. provided justification for war by presidential action, he nevertheless argued in the Federalist Papers, number 75, that an energetic executive in the conduct of war was “the bulwark of national security” (Kramnick 1987).

U.S. presidents have used their power to direct troops into action to shape U.S. foreign policy. Thomas Jefferson commanded military action against the Barbary pirates without congressional authorization. President James K. Polk ordered U.S. military forces in Texas into disputed territory with Mexico provoking a military reaction and providing the president with a justification for war (see Perkins 1993, 188-191). Since the founding of the republic, U.S. presidents have sent military forces into action more than 200 times.1 When a president can frame a policy decision in terms of security, the president’s liberty in action is initially extensive. The United States fought only five declared wars, that is, where the Congress has issued a formal declaration of war. These include the War of

1From 1928 to 1980, the United States engaged in 228 militarized interstate disputes (Bremer 1996).
1812, the Mexican War of 1846, the Spanish American War of 1898, World War I declared in 1917, and World War II declared in 1941. The United States has engaged in many extended military actions that might be considered undeclared wars. These include the Undeclared Naval War with France from 1798 to 1800, the First Barbary War from 1801 to 1805, the Second Barbary War of 1815, the Korean War of 1950-53, the Vietnam War from 1964 to 1973, and the Persian Gulf War of 1991. With the Persian Gulf War against Iraq, Congress authorized the military action although it did not declare war.

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the president has used extensive military force in the war against terrorism without a Congressional declaration of war. These “presidential wars” illustrate the power inherent in the role of commander in chief.

Presidential power in foreign affairs exists in the power to recognize foreign states and to make treaties with them. The president has the power to negotiate with other countries and make binding agreements with the “advice and consent” of the Senate. In the twentieth century presidents have found a means to circumvent the provision of Senatorial consent, the executive agreement. This tool allows the president to enter into agreements with others states while bypassing the Congress. The Supreme Court in United States v. Belmont (1937) ruled that an executive agreement carries the same legal force as a treaty. In a thirty-year period after the end of the Second World War, U.S.

On September 14, 2001, both houses of Congress did pass resolutions supporting the president’s use of force in response to the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001

The Soviet government nationalized the Petrograde Metal Works in 1918 and confiscated its properties and assets. Some of these assets were on deposit in Belmont’s bank in New York. In 1933, President Roosevelt recognized the Soviet government and concluded the Litvinov Assignments. This agreement was a final settlement of all claims
presidents entered 7,200 executive agreements compared to 451 treaties (Hastedt 2000, 165).

The modern president is *primus inter pares* in the foreign policy realm, or so it seems. Presidential power in foreign policy led Aaron Wildavsky, in 1966, to declare that the United States has two presidents, one for foreign policy and another for domestic policy. The foreign policy president is usually victorious on policy matters, while the domestic president must struggle with Congress. This apparent dichotomy in presidential power disappears in the 1970s, suggesting a resurgent Congress. In the next section, I will further explore the two presidencies thesis.

**The Two Presidencies**

In a 1966 issue of *Trans-Action*, Wildavsky proposed that the United States may have one president, but it has two presidencies; one presidency is for domestic affairs and the other for defense and foreign policy (Wildavsky 1991, 11). In an examination of Congressional action on presidential proposals from 1948-1964, Wildavsky found that presidents had significantly better records in matters of foreign and defense policy than in domestic policy issues. On average, presidents prevailed in more than 70 percent of their foreign policy requests compared to 40 percent of their domestic policy requests. For Wildavsky, the evidence pointed to a presidential preponderance in matters of foreign policy. Beyond the constitutional prerogatives of the president, Wildavsky found that increased presidential power in foreign policy resided in the changes in world politics in

and counterclaims between the two countries. It included the deposits in Belmont's bank. Belmount challenged the constitutionality of such an agreement made without the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate.
the post-World War II era (Wildavsky 1991, 13).

Wildavsky identifies six possible competitors for control of foreign policy: the public, special interest groups, the Congress, the military, the military-industrial complex, and the State Department. He found that none matched the president in the potential of control. The public is more "dependent on presidents in foreign affairs than in domestic matters" (Wildavsky 1991, 15). The public knows little about foreign affairs and usually defers to the president unless the action involves large numbers of troops engaged in hostile actions. In domestic affairs, special interest groups are strong and influential; however, in matters of foreign affairs, except for a few ethnic groups, little organized activity exists around issues concerning foreign policy (Wildavsky 1991, 16). According to Wildavsky, Congress has the ability to act in foreign policy, yet most often follows "a self-denying ordinance." In his 1966 study, Wildavsky found that when a foreign policy issue involved the use or threat of force Congress overwhelmingly supported the president's position (Wildavsky 1991, 17). Wildavsky also found that the military and the military-industrial complex were surprisingly ineffectual in policy formation. Wildavsky also concludes that the State department carries no threat to a president's control over policy. Modern presidents replace Secretaries of State that do not follow through on policy decisions. Furthermore, given the growth of the presidential staff and the development of the National Security Council the president is no longer dependent on the State Department for policy information (Wildavsky 1991, 23). If knowledge is power, then presidents are well place to be powerful.

Wildavsky's description of presidential power in foreign policy laid the foundations
for the conception of what Arthur Schlesinger Jr. (1973) called the “Imperial Presidency.”

In the post World War II period and prior the 1970s, the axiomatic expression for American politics was that “politics ends at the water’s edge.” In matters of foreign policy the country would unite behind the head of state and head of government, the president. The country spoke with one voice and only the president could make those vocalizations. This axiom is no longer valid and accepted. Therefore, our understanding of the process of action in American foreign policy has changed.

**Two Presidencies: Fact or Artifact**

In 1975, Donald Peppers reexamined Wildavsky's thesis and found it overstated and no longer applicable. The strength of Wildavsky's original proposition lost some of its vitality as a result of the Johnson and Nixon presidencies and the events of Vietnam and Watergate (Peppers 1991, 26). Peppers concedes that the president has more leeway in matters of foreign policy than in domestic issues; nonetheless, he finds the dichotomous division of the office of the president an exaggeration. Peppers argues that the rise of non-defense issues in foreign policy, such as trade issues, attracts greater attention of domestic interest groups. The deference in foreign policy matters that the president once received from the Congress and the public did not manifest in the post Vietnam and Watergate era. After the betrayal of the public trust, one the pillars of the "two presidencies thesis," the obeisance to the president on foreign policy issues, no longer existed (Peppers 1991, 28-29).

Lance LeLoup and Steven Shull (1991) reexamined Wildavsky's "two presidencies" thesis for the period 1965-1975. Like the earlier period that Wildavsky
examined (1948-1964) they found that the president does receive a higher approval rate of
policy initiative in matters of foreign policy than in domestic policy, however, for the latter
period they discovered that the difference between the two had narrowed. In Wildavsky's
study, Congress approved about 40 percent of the president's domestic initiatives while
approving 70 percent of his foreign policy initiatives. In the latter period of study, on the
domestic side the approval rate increased to 46 percent while approvals of foreign policy
matters declined to about 55 percent (LeLoup and Shull 1991, 38).

The "two presidencies" thesis as originally developed by Wildavsky in 1966 has
not withstood empirical testing over time. It does appear that the phenomena that
Wildavsky measured represented an artifact of a particular period in United States history.

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4 Other significant studies regarding the "two presidencies" thesis includes Richard
Fleisher and Jon Bond (1991) who found that the “two presidencies” was not time bound
to the period of Wildavsky study. However, they did find the phenomena only appeared
with Republican presidents (Fleisher and Bond 1991, 138-139). Russell Renka and
Bradford Jones found that the phenomena did not appear in the first Reagan
administration. When the Democrats regained control of the Senate in 1987, the
phenomenon reappeared. Interestingly, Renka and Jones consider the phenomena of the
"two presidencies" as a signal of presidential weakness that suggests the marginality of
presidential leadership in the Congress. "Leadership and influence are exercised within a
set of enabling conditions; when those conditions change, so does presidential program
success" (Renka and Jones: 1991, 174). Therefore, the “two presidencies” phenomenon
does not represent the increased success in foreign policy, but only a weakness of a
particular president's capabilities in the setting of a domestic agenda. In an analysis of
President Clinton’s first two years of office Richard Conley fails to confirm the "two
presidencies" effect. Clinton's success on purely domestic policy issues was higher than
his success on foreign policy issues, 82.6 percent for domestic policy and 75.9 percent for
foreign policy issues (Conley 1997, 233). Conley also included an intermestic category in
which the president gathers roughly the same support (77.7 percent). Conley does find
that the “two presidencies” surfaces among Republicans, but not among Democrats.
Republican support for the Democratic president is 15 percent higher on foreign policy
than on domestic issues. The phenomenon, according to Conley, is not a product of a
bipartisan consensus, rather a product of GOP . . . distaste for Clinton's domestic
policy. . . . "(Conley 1997, 234).
Analysis from Peppers (1975) to Conley (1997) have not produced evidence to support Wildavsky's original thesis. By 1989, Wildavsky himself agreed with his critics.

Wildavsky concluded that:

"The two presidencies" is time and culture bound. It succeeds in showing that the Eisenhower administration had greater support in foreign and defense than in domestic policy, and in explaining why. It fails in that both the patterns of behavior and the reasons for their maintenance did not exist in the decades before or after the 1950s. (Oldfield and Wildavsky 1991, 183)

This reduction of presidential power coincides with the changing domestic norms in the United States. Presidential foreign policy was out of line with the dominant societal context. The long conflict in Vietnam engendered a loss of trust between the American public and the government. The U.S. position toward Vietnam had always been paternalist, yet condescending. In 1956, the then Senator Kennedy in a speech about Vietnam made this point. "If we are not the parents of little Vietnam . . . then surely we are the godparents . . . this is our offspring" (quoted in McNamara, et al. 1999, 28). The increasing use of violence and force in the prosecution of the war and the revelations in the "Pentagon Papers" printed in the New York Times in June 1971 made it clear to the American people that the American government had not been forthright in what was being done in their name in Indochina. John Spanier writes: "[M]any Americans perceived the war to be morally ambiguous, if not downright immoral." Moreover, he argues that the undemocratic Saigon government and its apparent lack of popularity gave the perception that the civil war was against Saigon’s repression. The massive and sometimes indiscriminate use of American firepower that led to widespread destruction of civilian life “pricked the conscience of many Americans concerned with their nation's historic image as
a compassionate and humane country” (Spanier 1992, 179). By the late 1960s, U.S. foreign policy was out of line with the prevailing domestic norms. Through the Congress we find a reconnecting of foreign policy with domestic norms, therefore, the phenomena of the resurgent Congress.

A Resurgent Congress

The analysis above strongly suggests that presidential power has diminished in relation to Congress. Research on the “two presidencies” has been based on roll-call votes and there are difficulties with this type of data. Lindsay and Steger assert that the entire “two presidencies” debate is misspecified. "The two presidencies literature presumes to assess the power of the president on foreign versus domestic policy, but because scholars have examined roll-call votes it actually addresses the narrower issue of presidential success in Congress" (Lindsay and Steger 1993, 103). This methodological problem casts doubt on the entire thesis. By focusing on roll-call votes, scholars have failed to capture the full power of the president in foreign policy. Presidents often act without congressional approval in matters of foreign policy. Furthermore, many foreign policy statutes empower the president to waive the law if he believes it to be a matter of national security. Moreover, the use of the roll-call vote does not consider what happens to the proposal after it leaves the Congress.

Some scholars contend that the Congressional assertiveness has been overstated and so has its traditional subservience. According to John Rourke (1983, xiv), “Congress was never as weak as it was usually portrayed in the past nor is it as powerful as contemporary commentary often pictures it.” During periods of crisis the Congress is
reluctant to challenge presidential authority in foreign policy. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City, the U.S. Congress quickly rallied behind the president. However, when the administration’s policy is out of sync with the public or the president refuses to modify policy in the face of opposition, Congress will become more assertive (Blechman 1990).

The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution featured the U.S. Congress at its acquiescent best. With that 1964 resolution Congress handed President Johnson a blank check to use military force in the conduct of operations of Vietnam. After years of combat and growing domestic protest and an antiwar movement in the United States, the U.S. Congress reasserted itself and changed its position on supporting military efforts in Vietnam. The original resolution passed the House by a vote of 416 in favor and none opposed. In the Senate, 89 members voted to pass the resolution with only two senators opposed (Wiarda 1996, 266). By the early 1970s, the Congress used its most powerful policy tool, the power to spend, and scaled back funding for the war effort.

The Constitution grants the power of the purse to the Congress. This power is essentially twofold. Congress has power over revenue raised by the federal government and the power to decided how the revenue is spent. Policy is what gets funded (Snow and Brown 1997, 168-169). Congress enacted eight prohibitions on the use of funds for military operations in Indochina between 1970 and 1974 (Crabb and Holt 1992, 144).

Funding for operations in Vietnam dropped precipitously in the early 1970s. Congressional action reflected the public’s mood about the war. Despite the Nixon Administration’s attempts to gather some type of victory for the United States by
transferring fighting capabilities to the South Vietnamese with its “Vietnamization” program, Congress refused to acquiesce. Henry Kissinger relates that even “economic assistance to South Vietnam was being throttled. In 1972 the Congress had voted $2 billion in aid; in 1973, the amount was reduced to $1.4 billion, and in 1974 it was cut in half, even though oil prices had quadrupled” (Kissinger 1994, 697).

In his book No More Vietnams, President Nixon indicts the U.S. Congress for the collapse of South Vietnam. “We won the war” declares Nixon, “but we lost the peace. All that we had achieved in twelve years of fighting was thrown away in a spasm of congressional irresponsibility” (Nixon 1990, 278). In April 1975, President Ford went before a joint session of Congress and requested emergency assistance for the South Vietnamese to stave off a North Vietnamese victory. He requested $722 in military aid and $250 in economic and humanitarian aid. The president’s request died in committee. By this time both the Congress and the American public had soured on warfare in Southeast Asia. A Gallup poll conducted March 1975 revealed that 78 percent of those polled opposed any further assistance to Southeast Asian countries (Bowes 1979, 232). The spasm of congressional irresponsibility, as Nixon called it, illustrates two things. First, Congress can be very powerful and the ultimate power in foreign policy if it chooses. Second, when the overwhelming public mood differs from policy, that is, when the societal norms are at odds with public policy, Congress will be the first to show the disharmony in norms and seek to bring policy in line with the public. Congress was responsible and was not reacting to short-term changes in public sentiment. By the 1970s U.S. society had changed generally.
Constituent Influence on Congress

Constituency opinion plays a role in the behavior of members of the U.S. Congress. Constituency influence reaches members of Congress and shapes their behavior in many ways. First, the Congress is a representative body and candidates who run for elected office usually share the values and beliefs of their local electorates. Residency requirements exist for members of the House and Senate. Most often, members of Congress were born and raised in the district or the state that they represent. Second, in the election process a candidate’s position on issues and the candidate’s party affiliation provide cues for the voting public in their selection. Finally, once elected, the representative would presumably continue to give preference to district interests when casting their votes (Erikson 1978, 511).

The professionalization of the Congress provides further assistance to the influence of constituents. According to Morris Fiorina, the professionalization of Congress is a twentieth-century phenomenon. During the nineteenth-century the congressional turnover rate amounted to 40 or 50 percent of the membership at each election (Fiorina 1989, 7). As professionals, members of Congress are concerned with preserving their livelihoods. The primary way that they do this is by matching their voting behavior with the interests of constituents.

Of course there are exceptions, but these are usually limited to political “superstars.” Robert Kennedy served as the Senator from New York despite his limited residency in the state. His election was significantly helped by his status as the former U.S. Attorney General and brother of an assassinated president. Hillary Clinton, born in Illinois, was competitive in the 2000 New York Senatorial campaign largely due to her status as First Lady.
Some scholars have argued that constituent opinion does not determine congressional behavior. In the now classic study "Constituency Influence in Congress" Warren Miller and Donald Stokes (1963) purported to show empirically that constituent opinion did not matter much in Congressional roll-call voting. Using "path analysis" in an examination of three issue areas, Miller and Stokes reported a high correlation between constituency opinion and civil rights, a low correlation on social issues and a negative correlation between constituency opinion and foreign policy. They concluded that constituency opinion was not a major factor in roll-call voting and congressional behavior. Nevertheless, Robert Erikson (1978) clearly showed that the Miller and Stokes study suffered from measurement error and a biased sampling procedure. Erikson’s alternative study found considerable increases in the observed correlations between constituency opinion and congressional behavior. The relevance of the correlations was apparent when Erikson measured constituent opinion against the issue positions of candidates for political office. As one would expect, winners of elections matched their constituents more closely than losers. “[C]onstituencies control their Representatives’ attitudes via their electoral behavior . . . “ (Erikson 1978 532). Elections bring about much higher levels of policy representation than expected.

Professional politicians eager to attain and remain in office give the voters what they want. Although legislators may have a bit more leeway in developing their own approach to foreign policy, legislators do not like to be too far ahead of their constituents (see Erikson and Wright 1997). As discussed in an earlier chapter, the old folklore in
political science that the public is irrational and has no impact on foreign policy belongs to
the dustbin of history. In a reassessment of the influence of public opinion, Benjamin Page
and Robert Shapiro (1992, 284) find that public opinion is not only rational but an
autonomous force that can have a substantial impact on policy. Page and Shapiro (1992,
45) find that there has been “a remarkable degree of stability in Americans' collective
policy preferences” during the last fifty years. Other studies have found that citizens are
equally able to identify their policy positions on foreign and domestic policy issues
(Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida, 1989). Members of Congress do respond to societal
changes and the demands of the electorate (Clausen and Van Horne 1977).

It makes sense that Eileen Burgin (1993) finds that in foreign policy members of
Congress are motivated to involve themselves in issues that are of interest to their
constituents. Conversely, she finds that representatives do not generally involve
themselves in issues that are not salient to their constituents, even if the individual member
has a personal interest in the subject. “”[M]inimal supporter interest inhibits activities
regarding a foreign or defense policy issue because of the belief that involvement would
trigger adverse political consequences” (Burgin 1993, 73). With this understood we can
look to the U.S. Congress as an indicator of societal attitudes toward policy issues. More
than any other branch of government, the Congress most accurately reflects the norms of
the United States. The next section explores ways other than direct legislation that the
Congress can influence and shape foreign policy.
Congressional Influence

Beyond the direct power of the purse and the ability to control and regulate spending, Congress has other tools at its disposal to influence and shape foreign policy. Through procedural changes and other innovations Congress puts its indelible mark on U.S. international affairs. The “new institutionalists” literature in the study of American government suggests that we cannot understand policy separate from process. Institutions matter as they contribute or impede particular policy capabilities (Rockman 1994, 149).

The ability of the Congress to dictate structures and procedures gives members the ability to interject their preferences into the policy making process without passing substantive legislation on how the executive will conduct U.S. foreign relations. “Alterations in procedures will change the expected policy outcome of administrative agencies by affecting the relative influence of people who are affected by the policy” (McCubbins et al. 1987, 254).

James Lindsay (1992-93, 1994) has identified five types of procedural changes Congress uses to influence foreign policy. The first is the creation of new institutions within the executive branch. Congress creates posts in the established bureaucracy which may be sympathetic to its policy positions and preferences. This strategy “proceeds from the simple assumption about bureaucratic life: policies that don’t [sic] have champions in the bureaucracy are doomed . . . ” (Lindsay 1994, 286).

The second procedural innovation available to Congress is the legislative veto. Beginning in the 1930s, Congress gave the president the authority to propose shifts in the
organization of the bureaucracy. Changes could go into effect if the Congress did not “subsequently pass a resolution disallowing the president’s initiative” (Rourke 1993, 689). Congress could veto or block the executive’s actions by passing a simple (one-house) or concurrent (two-house) resolution. Neither type of resolution was subject to a presidential veto. In 1983, the Supreme Court limited the use of the legislative veto in *I.N.S. v. Chadha*. In response to the Supreme Court’s decision, Congress added many report-and-wait requirements giving Congress time to pass blocking resolutions to specific policies. The Supreme Court did not disallow all legislative vetoes. The Court’s ruling still permitted legislative vetoes that affect congressional procedures rather than policies (see Franck and Bob 1985).

A third procedural innovation involves the enfranchisement of new groups into the decision process. For example, Congress may require one agency to solicit recommendations from another agency before it enacts new policy. The assumption is “that the newly enfranchised groups will push policy in the direction Congress prefers” (Lindsay 1994, 286). The fourth procedural type entails the specification of new procedures for the executive branch to follow. Congress allows the executive branch to proceed as it sees fit but under the constraint of certain conditions.

The fifth and final procedural innovation is the reporting requirement. These include notification provisions which require the executive to notify the Congress if it takes certain actions. Congress can mandate that the executive make reports to the Congress on the status of policy or programs. These may be one-time reports or periodic reports where Congress requires the executive to report the status of given programs at
specified intervals.

Congress has many tools at its disposal to shape and direct policy. Binding legislation as we have seen is the traditional mechanism. In 1986, Congress imposed trade sanctions on South Africa overriding a presidential veto (see Klotz 1995). Congress can withhold or take away funding for programs, shaping policy through a process of affirmation or negation. As discussed above, Congress’s ability to shape policy is far more subtle. Through procedural innovations Congress can steer policy development and implementation.

Congress can pass nonbinding legislation in the form of resolutions. Resolutions have no force of law and do not require presidential action. They instead provide for a public declaration of the mood of the Congress and allow the legislature to make a statement on an issue without incurring obligation. Individual members of Congress also provide advice to the president through informal measures such as breakfast meetings or personal phone calls, or through formal consulting requirements (Burgin 1997, 300). In the age of mass communication the president is the not the only politician with the capability of “going public.” The development of televised communication and news programs such as Meet the Press provide members of Congress a forum to make public statements on policy issues to a wider audience. Congress can hold hearings on issues,

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According to Samuel Kernell “going public’ is a strategy for presidential leadership. It includes a class of activities that presidents use to promote themselves and their policies before the American public. “Some examples of going public are a televised press conference, a special prime-time address to the nation, a speech before a business convention on the West Coast, a visit to a day care center, and a White House ceremony to decorate a local hero that is broadcast via satellite to the hometown television station” (Kernell 1997, ix).
ostensibly for fact finding, but also as a means to shape policy perception through congressional selection of specific experts to testify before the committee. Floor statements and speeches in the House and the Senate by the members provide a forum to criticism or support of policy. Congress has a wide range of powers and capabilities.

**Congress, Human Rights and Democracy Promotion**

U.S. foreign policy on human rights and democracy originated from, and to a large extent was promulgated by the Congress. Various presidents picked up on these issues as relevant for U.S. foreign policy, such as Carter's crusade for human rights and Reagan's democracy mission. Nevertheless, these presidents followed initiatives begun by the U.S. Congress. The following section explores Congressional action in shaping U.S. foreign policy toward the promotion of human rights and democracy. We find that the Congressional activities mirror the changes within American society. The process of normative change in the United States regarding political and civil rights coincides with changes in foreign policy. The growth of domestic tolerance produced tolerance abroad. As discussed above, Congress is the branch of government closest the people and therefore the one that most closely matches the patterns of beliefs of the American people. Human rights and democracy only became embedded in foreign policy after the normative change in U.S. society, that is, in the period of the 1970s.

Following World War II, U.S. military victory translated into a program of democratization for the vanquished enemy states of Germany, Japan, Austria and Italy. However, most of these states had experienced a period of embryonic democratic governance in the decades before World War II. In 1925, the Japanese government lifted
tax qualifications for voting and established universal suffrage (Reischauer 1970, 221).

Following World War I, the Weimar system in Germany gave Germans an extensive structure of democratic government. Germany's democratization far exceeded Japan's liberalization (Muravchik 1992, 108). Austria like Germany had also experienced a period of democratic government before the Nazis seized power. The Italian government before the fascist's take-over resembles that of Japan with both authoritarian and democratic characteristics. The U.S. and Allied occupation of these countries and resulted in the reestablishment of democratic structures. U.S. occupation forces purged individuals associated with the former authoritarian regimes from public life.

Much as the Marshall plan was successful because it reconstructed formerly developed economies, the democratization programs in the former Axis countries succeeded in reinstating democratic government. Except Japan, all of the former Axis countries were Western in cultural orientation and of a European racial identity. The United States' enthusiasm for democracy did not extend beyond these countries. U.S. policy makers quickly accepted less than democratic regimes in its relations with other states, particularly in the newly independent states and former colonies. One may argue that the necessities of the Cold War drove U.S. policy choices. However, one has to think that populations identified as non western were considered not developed, modern, or capable of acting democratically.

The U.S. Congress in this period lacked enthusiasm for human rights in U.S. foreign policy. Many in the Congress feared that if the spotlight of concern for human rights were fully lit it would reflect back unfavorable on the United States (Van Dyke
As discussed above, Congressional sentiments match constituency expectations. From 1950 to 1955, the junior Senator from Ohio, John Bricker (R. Ohio) led a movement to amend the U.S. Constitution to make it impossible for the United States to adhere to human rights treaties. The bill listed forty-five of the forty-eight Republican Senators as sponsors, but only nineteen Democrats signed the resolution. Thirteen of those Democratic Senators were from Southern states (Schubert 1954, 256). Anti-civil-rights forces feared that an international treaty could end racial discrimination and segregation in the United States (Henkin 1995, 348).

Senator Bricker first introduced his resolution in September 1951. He sought to amend the Supremacy Clause (Article VI, clause 2) of the Constitution. The Bricker Amendment sought to limit the scope of the treaty making power and the use of executive agreements (Schubert 1954, 260). Many Senators feared that U.S. courts would interpret treaties to which the United States became a party in a way that would find segregation practices of some states unlawful. Section 2 of the proposed amendment specifically stated “A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation which would be valid in the absence of the treaty” (U.S. Senate 1953, 1). The amendment also subjected all executive agreements to approval by the Congress.

Support for the amendment continued to grow through 1953. Groups such as the American Medical Association, the Daughters of the American Revolution, and the American Bar Association actively promoted the passage of the Bricker Amendment. Stephen Garrett relates that one “particularly vocal organization, called the Vigilant Women for the Bricker Amendment, managed to collect some 200,000 petitions in
support of Senator Bricker, these being presented to him on January 25, 1954, in a melodramatic ceremony" (Garrett 1972, 196).

The Eisenhower Administration, although slow to mobilize against the Congressional attempt to take-away executive power, came out against the amendment in 1953. During a press conference in March 1953, President Eisenhower observed that the Bricker Amendment would restrict his conduct of foreign affairs and clearly stated his opposition to it (Schubert 1954, 273). The Eisenhower Administration’s opposition to the Bricker Amendment was only due to its restriction of executive power. Shortly after the president’s declared opposition to the Amendment, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles testified before Congress and promised that the United States would not sign the draft covenants on Human Rights or on the Political Rights of Women. The Secretary also pledged that the Administration would not press for the ratification of the Genocide Convention pending before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Schubert 1954, 273). This promise was enough to sway support against the Bricker Amendment. When the final version of the Amendment came to a vote in the Senate, it was defeated by a vote of 50 to 42 (Congressional Record 1954, 2262).

The Bricker Amendment had broad implications for Congressional/Presidential relations and for the future conduct on foreign policy. However, the driving factor for the proposed amendment was to prevent the United States from being subjected to international norms on civil rights. In the 1950s Congress declined to support international norms on human right for fear that it would impinge on the ability of the U.S. legally to violate the rights of its own citizens. These Congressional attitudes reflected the broader
American societal attitudes toward civil rights and human rights. Recall from chapter 3 that approximately to 60 percent of white Americans thought that white students and black students should go to separate schools (Mayer 1992, 369). In 1958, more than half the people polled would refuse to vote for a Black for president, even if their own party nominated that person. In that same year half of White Americans polled indicated they would move if Black people came to live in their neighborhood. Given this level of societal resistance, to have the United Nations condemn the United States for Ku Klux Klan activities in North Carolina or segregated housing in Detroit was not tolerable for many in Congress. Resistance to change was still strong. Many mainstream American interest groups supported the amendment. Some groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Federation of Labor opposed the Bricker Amendment, yet their power did not defeat the amendment. Only the Eisenhower Administration’s promise not to sign any of the covenants on human rights prevented the passage of the amendment. When it came to non Western/European/White people, the executive branch, like the Congress and the American society, was not much concerned for human rights and the exercise of democracy at the domestic or international levels.

As we have seen in chapter 3, the U.S. domestic structure was under going extensive change in the post World War II era, with the civil rights movement followed by the women’s rights movement and the broad-based growth of tolerance in the United States. As expected from the earlier discussion, evidence of this societal change in foreign policy first emerged from the U.S. Congress.

In the 1950s and 1960s the driving force in U.S. foreign aid was security concerns.
States opposed to the Soviet Union and friendly to the U.S. were likely to receive military and economic aid regardless of their human rights records or political structure. Regarding aid, the focus of U.S. programs was economic and not political. The operational paradigm of U.S. policy was the idea of modernization. Modernization theory conceives of development as a linear process with societies moving through stages until they reach a final stage of a high mass consumption society. At this final stage states would resemble the U.S. both politically and economically with democracy joined to capitalism (see Rostow 1960). According to the theory, before states could achieve democracy, economic development must occur. Although democracy might have been the future goal, it was not seriously considered in aid policy. The Kennedy administration’s aid programs such as the Alliance for Progress for Latin America did little to foster democracy. Instead the focus was on economic development and the strengthening of public administration (Carothers 1999, 22).

In the mid-1960s a nascent movement emerged from the U.S. House of Representatives seeking to give political development priority over economic development in the allocation of U.S. aid. Donald Fraser (D., Minnesota) and Bradford Morse (D., Massachusetts), members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, became leading advocates of this new orientation. They sought a reorientation in U.S. policy putting social and political evolution as the first concern of the U.S. foreign assistance program. In 1966, twenty-five members of the House of Representatives entered a statement in the Congressional Record calling for “New Direction and New Emphasis in Foreign Aid.” Led by Bradford Morse, the statement was a product of a six-month Congressional study.
The group argued that “prosperity, political stability, and political freedom are the surest path to peace” (Congressional Record 1966, 5852). They conceded that the United States could not insist on “carbon copies of western institutions.” Nevertheless, the group recommended “that no U.S. aid should be extended to any country that shows no interest in holding popular elections, establishing broad suffrage, or creating a civil service system based on merit” (Congressional Record 1966, 5853). Fraser, Morse, and their supporters were at the vanguard of foreign policy change as domestic norms regarding political and civil right were changing.

The same change in norms that prompted the Congress to pass the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 1965 Voting Rights Act also allowed the Congress in 1966 to add Title IX to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Title IX provided a legislative directive to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) stating that “[i]n carrying out programs authorized by this chapter, emphasis shall be placed on assuring maximum participation in the task of economic development on the part of the people of developing countries, through the encouragement of democratic private and local government institutions” (quoted in Carothers 1999, 25).

Despite the language of Title IX, USAID chose to continue with its prioritization of economic development over democracy. According to Thomas Carothers (1999, 26) “Title IX went against the grain of deeply held beliefs and well-established practices in the U.S. foreign aid bureaucracy.” USAID interpreted Title IX as directing them to foster greater popular participation in economic development projects, not to promote democracy per se. Societal changes, which by 1966 were evident in the Congress, had not
yet transferred to the executive branch and the bureaucracy. With the election of Richard
Nixon in 1968, Title IX faded from sight. The realpolitik of Nixon and Kissinger
advanced a strategy arguing that the external behavior of states and not their internal
caracter should be the focus of foreign policy. Efforts to seek detente with the Soviet
Union and closer ties with China led the Nixon administration to ignore human rights
violations in those countries. Nevertheless, the Congress had a different agenda.
Members of Congress thrust human rights issues into the agenda much to the
consternation of the Nixon and Kissinger.

Beginning in the early 1970s, Congressman Donald Fraser (D., Minnesota) led an
assault on U.S. foreign policy and the U.S. stand on human rights from his position on the
Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs. Fraser relates that “the Vietnam war motivated members of Congress and
the American public to take a fresh look at the role the United States played in the human
rights field” (Fraser 1979, 176). In addition to the war in Vietnam, Fraser relates that the
realization the United States had been actively involved in supporting repressive regimes
did not sit well with American values. “American foreign policy has to reflect basic
American values” argued Fraser. Linking the domestic to the international, Fraser
pronounced that “[i]f our foreign policy is incompatible with the way we treat people here
at home, it lessens the impact of that example” (Fraser 1979, 182). In testimony before
the House Subcommittee on International Organization Fraser warned that the United
States could not be self-righteous about human rights violations given the U.S.’s past
history of arbitrary detention of Americans of Japanese decent during World War II and
the legal segregation of schools (see House 1979, 298-317).

Fraser held multiple hearings on U.S. human rights policy. The 1973 military coup and the subsequent mass arrests in Chile sparked a reaction from the U.S. Congress. Although the prevention of the ascension to power by Salvador Allende had been a priority of U.S. presidents since the Kennedy Administration, by 1973 the mood had changed in Congress. Two provisions of Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 dealt with the general issue of political prisoners and the particular issue of human rights in Chile. In 1974, Congress passed a resolution expressing its belief that security assistance be linked to human rights concerns. Congress also directed that human rights concerns should be linked to development assistance. Congressman Tom Harken (D., Iowa) offered an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 that stipulated that “[n]o assistance may be provided . . . to the government of any country which engages in a pattern of gross violations of international recognized human rights . . .” (quoted in Forsythe 1988, 10). This provision was legally binding on the executive.

On the Senate side of Congress, recently elected members began the push for human rights in U.S. foreign policy. James G. Abourezk (R., South Dakota), first elected in 1972, introduced an amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill of 1973 that would deny aid to any country that violated the human rights of its citizens. The Senate defeated the amendment, however, the following year Abourezk introduced the same amendment and was joined by Senator Alan Cranston (D., California)\(^7\) with a similar amendment.

\(^7\)Cranston was elected to the Senate in 1969
Senator Henry Jackson (D., Washington) and Representative Charles Vanik (D., Ohio) championed a provision on human rights which caused the Nixon administration much discomfort. This provision amended the Trade Act of 1974 and prohibited the granting of most-favored-nation-treatment to a nonmarket economy country that denies its citizen the right to emigrate. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment was aimed directly at the Soviet Union which had placed restrictions on the emigration of Soviet Jews. The Jackson Amendment ran counter to the policy of detente as practiced by the Nixon Administration which sought to moderate Soviet foreign policy by developing more normal relations between the superpowers. Henry Kissinger claims that the Nixon Administration was seeking human rights through quiet diplomacy. However, Jackson and his supporters demanded that America commitment to human rights be publically affirmed. Congress imposed restrictions on loans to the Soviet Union (Kissinger 1994, 754).

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8The Senate defeated both Abourezk and Cranston’s amendments. The amendment offered by Tom Harkin in 1974 in the House of Representatives effectively incorporated Abourezk and Cranston’s position in the final bill.

9We cannot see the Jackson-Vanik Amendment only in terms public normative concerns over human rights. Henry Jackson had presidential ambitions. From a political standpoint Jackson sought to build a support from both Labor and Jewish-Americans by tying most-favor-nation status for the Soviet Union to the ability for Jews to emigrate (Rourke 1983, 268). Henry Kissinger (1994, 747), who characterizes Jackson as “a serious student of intentional affairs, especially the Soviet Union,” regards Jackson efforts as an attempt to scuttle Nixon’s pursuit of detente between the Soviet Union and the United States.
The influence of the U.S. Civil Rights movement was also apparent in the many Congressional hearings on human rights. A report prepared for the Subcommittee on International Organizations acknowledges the domestic level changes on the foreign policy of the U.S.

World War II marked the start of a revolution in the development of new approaches to human rights issues. Today, international legal practice accepts the protection of human rights as a matter of international concern. The 1969 report of the Special Committee of Lawyers for the President's Commission for the Observance of Human Rights Year 1968 confirmed the acceptance in the United States of human rights as a proper subject of U.S. treaty making. In addition, the enactment of substantial civil rights and welfare legislation at the national level has nullified the view that human rights are matters exclusively within the purview of the State within the U.S. federal system. (House 1977, 1)

Furthermore, we can see influence on the members of Congress of the American Civil Rights movement in one of the early proposals for incorporating human rights in U.S. foreign policy. A 1974 subcommittee report, "Human Rights in the World Community: A Call for U.S. Leadership," proposed to extend the legal functions of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission to include international human rights. The proposal was to have the Commission to "observe and comment upon the attention given to human rights by U.S. foreign policy, and comment on conditions in other countries" (House 1974, 4). These functions would later be picked up by the State Department and private organizations such as Freedom House.

By the end of the Nixon Administration the Congress had made significant strides on incorporating human rights into U.S. foreign policy. In 1976, with P.L. 94-302 Congress charged U.S. directors of Inter-American Bank and the African Development Fund "to vote against any loan, any extension of financial assistance, or any technical
assistance to any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights . . . unless such assistance will directly benefit the
needy people in such country” (quoted in Crabb and Holt 1992, 236). The Congress also
restructured the executive branch by creating a Bureau of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs within the State Department. With human rights a priority of his
foreign policy, the newly-elected president Jimmy Carter appointed people with civil rights
backgrounds to the newly created portions in the Bureau. Carter appointed Patricia
Derian, founder of the Mississippi Civil Liberties Union, as the first assistant secretary of
state for human rights and humanitarian affairs (Drezner 2000, 744).

Although an ally of the new normative trend in U.S. foreign policy, as we have
seen President Carter was not the originator of the trend. At times Congress still had
divisions based on ideology. Congress developed a series of specific country prohibitions
on aid to human rights violators. Donald Fraser relates that conservatives and liberals
went after each others favorite violator. Conservative members of Congress pushed
legislation to cut off aid to leftist countries such as Angola, Cambodia, Laos,
Mozambique, Tanzania, and Vietnam. Liberal members sought to cut aid to rightist
countries such as Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and the Philippines. Whatever the country’s
position on the ideological spectrum, by the late 1970s a stance against human rights
violations was a popular one by members of Congress.

This political position was strong enough that Congress was able to make a stand
against the newly-elected president Ronald Reagan when he nominated Ernest Lefever to
the post of assistant secretary for human rights and humanitarian affairs. Congress
rejected Lefever, who had publically advocated overturing human rights legislation. After a brief period of hostility toward human rights, the Reagan Administration began applying a human rights criterion to foreign policy, in fact, more consistently than the Carter Administration (Hofrenning 1990). Concerning human rights, the Reagan administration with its heightened role of anticommunism, began pushing for democracy assistance and programs to promote democracy. Many of these programs reflected back to Congressman Fraser’s Title IX initiative.

Democracy as a form of government has transformed from a moral prescription to a legal obligation. Democracy has emerged as a fundamental right (Franck 1992). The battle for democracy and civil rights in the United States readily transferred to a battle for democracy abroad. American political leadership regarded democracy not as a right of the few, but an emergent universal right. By the second Reagan administration, the American government and the preponderance of the American people had rejected “communist state socialism” and “modernization” as counter options to democratic governance.

The doctrine of state socialism argued that the state should control all aspects of the economy with all workers functioning as employees of the state. Modernization sought to suppress backward tribal and clan relations and suspend imported democratic values which Modernizers saw as meaningless to rural and illiterate societies. The goal for modernization is nation building and the creation of economies of scale. The Reagan administration opposed state socialism. Nevertheless, the Reagan administration implemented a policy which ran counter to the modernization perspective and in the 1980s pulled support for friendly tyrants in Chile, Haiti, Paraguay, the Philippines and South
Korea. Thomas Franck makes the following argument.

Since the middle of the 1980s, both [state socialism] . . . and the theory of “modernization” have collapsed under the weight of their evident failure. Throughout socialist Eastern Europe and in most of the dictatorships of Africa and Asia, the people have rejected both theories, together with the espousing governments . . . Instead, people almost everywhere now demand that government be validated by western-style parliamentary, multiparty democratic process. (Franck 1992, 49)

The Reagan administration promoted this belief in the universality of democracy with the support of the Congress. This universal right to democracy coincided with the universal acceptance for democratic rights for all groups in the United States. The Voting Rights Act of 1970 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Enforcement Act of 1972 followed the Voting Rights Act of 1965. By the early nineteen eighties, many debates continued over issues such as forced busing for school integration and legitimacy of affirmative action programs in employment. However, no one argued that groups should be democratic rights or equal treatment before the law based on their racial/ethnic characteristics. This normative perspective applied to Americans' view of democracy abroad. The peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America were equally capable of developing democratic governing structures as the people of Europe.

In 1981, President Reagan offered his “Project Democracy” as a form of public diplomacy and cultural outreach program on American democracy. During this period, a bill that Dante Fascell (D., Florida) had originally introduced in Congress in 1969 gained new life. This bill proposed a publicly funded, privately operated foundation to promote democracy abroad, which would become the National Endowment for Democracy (Carothers 1999, 30). Congress appropriated limited funding for Project Democracy.
The Reagan administration sought an initial $65 million budget authorization, but many members of Congress were uneasy with the strong ideological component in Reagan's proposal (Muravich 1992, 207). However, Congress did authorize $18 million for the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), which has continued in operation since then.

The Reagan administration did not give up on democracy assistance despite the loss of Project Democracy. As part of its foreign aid program, the Reagan administration sponsored electoral assistance and judicial reform measures in Latin America.10

Democracy promotion was brought within the purview USAID. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, USAID took its democracy program to other regions of the world. Except a brief period from 1995 to 1997, USAID funding for democracy assistance has expanded.11 Thomas Carothers, a longtime witness of U.S. democracy assistance, has noted a change in policy from the time when the U.S. sponsored anticommunist demonstration elections in the 1950s and 60s. He observes that “[d]emocracy promotion is now linked to some strategic ideas – such as ‘democratic peace’ theory – but democracy is now very much a foreign policy goal in and of itself, not merely a means to or a cover for underlying anticommunist ends” (Carothers 1999, 55).

Writing in the journal Foreign Affairs, Deputy Secretary of State in the Clinton Administration Strobe Talbott clearly connected domestic norms to norms in foreign

10USAID and NED sponsored electoral assistance programs in Guatemala and Honduras in 1985, Haiti in 1987, Chile in 1988, Paraguay in 1989, and Nicaragua in 1990. (See Carothers 1999 for detailed discussions of these projects).

11Budgeted expenditures for democracy assistance in 1991 amounted to $165.2 million. In 1999, this figured reached $637.1 million.
policy. He argued that to "sustain the support of the American Public for international leadership, American foreign policy must continue to be based on the nature of our society and on our character as a people as well as on our interests as a state" (Talbott 1996, 63).

While some critics have derided the practice of U.S. foreign policy as social work (see Mandelbaum 1996), certain aspects of American foreign policy must be shaped by the changes in domestic norms and the growth of tolerance and respect for civil and political rights in the U.S. Although disorganized at times, U.S. foreign policy toward the former Yugoslavia always focused on multiethnic solutions to the political problems of the region. The easy solution would have been to allow the strong to devour the weak. Although this was once the policy of the United States in its relations with the indigenous peoples in North America, after the vast societal change within the U.S., the American people could not tolerate such a policy. As the administration of George W. Bush prepares for the rebuilding of Afghanistan, it has already pushed for multiethnic solutions.

Matching the change in domestic norms regarding women, recent democracy programs have factored in empowerment of women in political solutions. In Nepal, USAID developed bottom-up programs giving training to rural women in basic legal rights and rights advocacy. In Eastern Europe, US aid officials have sought to stimulate the greater incorporation of women into political party activities. Similar programs exist in Guatemala. Although much more needs to be done to incorporate women in the democracy agenda, Thomas Carothers says that "U.S. aid does include a growing number of undertakings directly related to women..." (Carothers 1999, 345). After destroying the Taliban regime which persecuted women the Bush administration is pushing for the
inclusion of women in the future government of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{12} We might expect these developments given the advances of women in the United States.

\textbf{Conclusion}

As the United States entered the 1990s the U.S. Congress systematically began to ratify many multilateral conventions on human rights that Senator Bricker and the American people of the 1950s so loathed. In 1989, the U.S. ratified the Genocide Convention, and three years later the International Convention of Civil Rights. In 1994, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Convention against Torture received Congressional approval.\textsuperscript{13}

Human rights and the promotion of democracy have become normal procedures in U.S. foreign policy. As we have seen, the U.S. Congress was in the vanguard of policy change. This chapter has shown that the Congress can be very powerful in foreign policy it chooses to be. The Congress becomes most active when current policy is out of line with public norms on the conduct of policy. Members of Congress reflect the positions of their constituents and thus Congressional action most accurately serves as the indicator of societal norms. The pattern of normative change, outlined in chapter 2, mirrors the changes in foreign policy and congressional action in the realm of human rights and

\textsuperscript{12}President Bush has continually emphasized the untoward treatment of women by the Taliban regime to rally the American people to fight in Afghanistan. The First Lady, Laura Bush, gave a nationally broadcast speech about the cruel treatment of women by the Taliban regime. \textquotedblleft The fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women\textquotedblright\ declared the First Lady (Allen 2001, A14).

\textsuperscript{13}The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women is still pending before the Senate, May 2002.
democracy. This suggests that domestic norms apply to foreign policy. The late Congressman Donald Fraser demanded that foreign policy reflect domestic values. Throughout history U.S. foreign policy to a large extent has reflected domestic values. When political leaders denied human rights and political rights to certain domestic groups based on racial/ethnic characteristics, U.S. foreign policy makers saw no need to extend these rights other peoples in the world. Foreign policy matched domestic policy. Only as sweeping changes came at the domestic level did we see changes in foreign policy. In the next chapter I also discuss two cases, South African sanctions and the Contra aid debates, where the President and Congress differed over promoting human rights and the Congress actually constrained presidential action.
CHAPTER 6
CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY: CONTRA AID AND SOUTH AFRICAN SANCTIONS

Introduction

This chapter confirms the Congress' role as the primary transmitter of societal norms to foreign policy. I discuss two cases occurring after the change in domestic norms regarding political and civil rights. These cases include the Contra aid and South African sanction debates, where the President and Congress differed over promoting human rights and the Congress actually constrained presidential action. The influence of Congress, with the changed perception of its members as the proper policy the United States should follow, gives the best explanation for the outcome in these cases. The influence of public opinion is also a factor in the outcome of these cases. This again is an indicator of the changed norms.

Both of the cases take place in the context of the reinvigorated Cold War. In this heightened security environment one would expect a greater deference to the president in matters of foreign policy. Moreover, one would expect that security issues would triumph over human rights concerns. We do find calls by opponents to the pro-human rights position indicating the need for national security considerations to take precedent. In Nicaragua, the Sandinista regime clearly positioned itself in the Soviet camp. In the South African case, the African National Congress (ANC) has its foundation in Marxist ideology.
Despite this, members of Congress, from both political parties found the issues of human rights consideration to take precedence.

In both cases, I will discuss the background to the cases including a discussion of the security implications. I will then analyze the steps taken by the Congress to restrain presidential action and promote the interests of human rights. I will also discuss the influence of public opinion in shaping the outcome of each case. Although both cases take place in the context of divided government, we cannot assume that congressional actions were a purely partisan pretense to embarrass the president. Members of the president's own party were active in constraining and redirecting the original course of the executive's foreign policy. First, I will examine the Contra aid debate.

**Contra Aid**

The struggle over foreign policy in Central America in the 1980s was the archetype of the interbranch rivalry that occurs in American government (Scott 1997). Nevertheless, this struggle was more than a struggle for institutional power. Congressional limitation on military aid to the Contra rebels seeking to overthrow the Nicaraguan government represents one of the first cases in which the Congress redirects an executive out of line with the new norms that emerged in the 1970s.

The Sandinistas came to power in Nicaragua in July 1979 after a brutal war that killed more than 50,000 people (Booth and Walker 1993, 68). A key event in the Sandinista success came when the Carter administration cut foreign aid, including the preventing the delivery of arms to the Nicaraguan government of Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Somoza, a long time benefactor of U.S. good will, including an education at
West Point, had ruled Nicaragua had since 1967 (Skidmore and Smith 1992, 327).^1^ 

The Carter administration at first welcomed the change in government and the new Sandinista regime. The United States sent $8 million in emergency aid and authorized $75 million in economic aid. Nevertheless, the Marxist ideology of the Sandinistas and the arrival of more than 2000 Cubans, including medical, engineering, military, police, and intelligence advisors, distressed U.S. officials. In late 1980, the Sandinista government decided to provide military support to the Salvadoran rebels. This action provoked the Carter administration which suspended all aid to Nicaragua (Roth and Sobel 1993). The Reagan administration came to office with a new agenda concerning Nicaragua, to overthrow the Sandinista government. This initiates a series of struggles between the president and the Congress over aid to the Contras, the military force seeking to overthrow the Sandinista government. The struggle included a battle for public opinion. The Reagan administration would lose this battle and eventually resort to illegal means to supply the Contras. The Congress consistently refused to authorize the use of U.S. foreign aid to overthrow a sitting government.

In the zero-sum context of the Cold War with the focus on security issues, Nicaragua represented another country fallen into the enemy's camp. The Cuban presence in Nicaragua further exacerbated fears that Nicaragua would be used as a base from which to launch further Marxist revolutions. The Reagan administration's worst case scenario viewed all the countries of Central America falling under Soviet influence with Mexico

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^1^The Somoza family had ruled in Nicaragua since 1937 when Anastasio's father, Anastasio Somoza Garcia took power. The presidency was transferred to Anastasio's older brother Luis in 1956 when an assassin's bullet killed the elder Anastasio.
eventually succumbing, thus placing the enemy on the border with the United States.

Ronald Reagan ran on a platform that condemned the Sandinista takeover of Nicaragua and pledged to support efforts of the Nicaragua people to establish a free government (Scott 1997, 239). Beginning in March of 1981, the Reagan administration developed a plan to support domestic opposition groups in Nicaragua. By mid-1982, U.S. covert support had transformed the Contras into a well-equipped army of 4,000 (LeoGrande 1993, 30). Congressional endorsement for the covert aid came with the condition that the operation would be limited to the interdiction of Sandinista arms going to guerrillas fighting the government of El Salvador. In December 1982, the Congress allowed for covert aid to the Contras, but stipulated that aid could not be used to overthrow the Nicaraguan government.

As the evidence mounted that the Reagan administration's goal was indeed to overthrow the Sandinista government, support for aid to the Contras declined in the Congress. In 1984, when the CIA mined Nicaraguan harbors without congressional consultation and in defiance of congressional restrictions, support for Contra aid diminished. The CIA's actions incensed members of the president's political party. The Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman, Barry Goldwater (R. Arizona) called the CIA's actions a violation of international law and act of war (Scott 1997, 248). Both the House and the Senate passed resolutions condemning the mining of Nicaraguan harbors. Moreover, in May 1984 the House passed a bill suspending aid to the Contras. The
Senate, after much political negotiation, accepted the ban. The Contras were kept solvent through funds from third party countries and private donors co-ordinated by National Security Council staff member Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North. North's illegal activities would later erupt into the Iran-Contra scandal.

After his reelection for a second term of office, President Reagan worked assiduously to win Congressional funding for the Contras. The administration sought to rejuvenate the Contra image by portraying them as "freedom fighters" and the equivalent of the U.S.'s own "founding fathers." Attempts to portray Nicaragua as a battlefield in the Cold War was buttressed by the actions of Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega. In April 1985, Ortega visited Moscow substantiating the Reagan administration's view of the Sandinistas. Congress passed an aid proposal for $27 million in nonlethal aid for the Contras. Nevertheless, the Congress tried to direct the use of the aid for a political solution to the problem. Congress prohibited CIA or Defense Department involvement in the distribution of aid (Scott 1997, 250). In 1986, the Reagan administration sought to restore Contra aid with a request for $100 million in military and support aid to be administered by the CIA. However, in testimony before the Senate, Secretary of State George Schultz had to couch his argument justifying support for Contra aid as giving the "Sandinistas an incentive to negotiate seriously . . . " (Schultz 1986, 39). After much

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2 Members of the Senate accepted the ban in order save a popular summer jobs bill which was attached to the ban on Contra aid.

3 In total third parties gave the Contras about $54 million with Saudi Arabia providing $32 million of the sum in a series of donations (see Stobel 1995 for a complete breakdown on funding sources and suppliers.)
acrimonious debate and many defeated proposals for aid, the Congress passed an aid package for the Contras. The cross border raid by the Sandinistas into Honduras to attack Contra military camps was pivotal in swaying Congress to support the administration's position. Reagan's victory was short lived with the capture of the CIA contract worker Eugene Hasenfus by the Sandinistas. The capture of Hasenfus led to the revelation of the secret assistance provided by the White House during the congressional ban on aid.

Despite his reputation as the "great communicator," President Reagan could never convince the American public that the U.S. should overthrow the Sandinista government. Congressional initiatives to counter the president reflected the sentiments of the American public. The rhetoric of the Cold War and the security arguments expounded by the Reagan administration did little to convince the public that they should overthrow the government of Nicaragua. An ABC/WP poll which asked "Should the United States be involved in trying to overthrow the government of Nicaragua, or not?" consistently found the American public responding negatively. Those responding "no" never dropped below 62 percent from 1983 to 1987 (Sobel 1993, 62).

Notwithstanding Reagan's efforts to portray them as "freedom fighters," the Contras maintained a tainted image and were associated with Somoza's National Guard. Energized by human rights issues, many church groups organized against the Reagan administration's policies. These included Baptists, Lutherans, Methodists, Presbyterians, 

4Congress provided $100 million in aid ($70 million in military and $30 million in humanitarian aid) to the Contras. This was the last time that Congress authorized military aid for the Contras. Limited funding in humanitarian and nonlethal aid was provided in 1987 and 1988.
Mennonites, Unitarians, and numerous Catholic orders, bishops and national organizations. Civil rights and humanitarian organization like the American Civil Liberty Union, Common Cause, and OXFAM America sought to organize constituents and lobbied Congress against Contra aid (Arason and Brenner 1993, 195-197). The mobilizations of these human rights groups and their ability to cast the argument in terms of human rights helped shape the debate over Contra aid. If it were not for the actions of the Sandinista government with the state visit to Moscow and the cross border incursion into Honduras, the Reagan administration would not have won the aid victories that it did. Moreover, we must also consider that the administration violated legal statutes with its clandestine program to fund the Contras. The lobbying activities of human rights groups against Contra aid forced the Reagan administration to assert that Contra aid supported human rights. Falling dominos heading to the Texas border could not provide the rationalization for Contra aid. The Reagan administration developed a litany of human rights offensives by the Sandinistas which included doing away with human rights generally, committing genocide against the Miskito Indians, and driving the Jewish community into exile with antisemitic pogroms (LeoGrande 1993, 44).

In the milieu of changed domestic norms, the Reagan administration had a difficult time conducting a policy of intervention in the affairs of a country within the U.S. sphere of influence. Prior to the normative change, this avenue of policy would have been largely uncontroversial. The prospect of another Vietnam-like quagmire restrained U.S. action. Nevertheless, public opinion never demonstrated any will to overthrow the Sandinista government. Despite the expenditure of large amounts of political capital with addresses
to Congress and the American people, Reagan could never reconfigure public opinion.\(^5\)

In the next section, I examine a second case which clearly shows the influence of the changed domestic normative structure and the role of Congress as transmitter of norms over the executive, the case of South African sanctions.

**South African Sanctions**

The enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 were a monumental first step toward pushing the United States toward racial justice. The Voting Rights Act with its enfranchisement of southern blacks did much to increase the policy influence of African-Americans in the United States. In a ten-year period between 1970 and 1980 the number of black elected officials more than tripled (Clark 1993, 17).\(^6\)

Black members of Congress formed the Congressional Black Caucus in 1971 to coordinated its members' efforts on not only domestic issues, but also on issues of foreign policy, particularly the of issue of apartheid.

Apartheid, an Afrikaans word for "separateness," is the name that South Africa's white government gave to its policy of discrimination against the country's nonwhite majority. In 1948, the Afrikaner National Party came to power in South Africa and legally enshrined the longstanding practice of racial discrimination. Domestic opposition to the

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\(^5\) President Reagan conducted an extensive public campaign for Contra aid. During the peak of the early Contra debate from February to June 1985, Reagan made four separate radio speeches on Nicaragua and one about Nicaragua and the federal budget. (see Storrs and Serafino 1993).

\(^6\) In 1970, there were 1469 black elected officials; in 1980 there were 4912.
Afrikaner government periodically erupted with some demonstrations turning bloody.\(^6\)

Initially, the United States viewed the South African government not as a moral degenerate, but as a resource rich ally in the Cold War. According to Audie Klotz (1995, 455), "U.S. policy makers generally considered South Africa's ruling whites, who shared their concern about communist expansion, as natural allies for maintaining stability within South Africa." Policy makers changed this support for the South African government as the domestic norms regarding political and civil rights changed in the United States. As early as 1962, Dr. Martin Luther King called for the imposition of international sanctions against South Africa (Magubane 1987, 216).\(^7\) The struggle for civil rights in the United States was a naturally associated with the movement against apartheid in South Africa.

The anti-apartheid movement has always been closely connected to the civil rights struggle. Many of the early leaders of the anti-apartheid movement participated in desegregation, and even those who were not actively involved were inspired by the civil rights struggle. (Metz 1986, 382).

African-American members of Congress exerted influence concerning the issue of sanctions against the apartheid regime of South Africa. The presence of African-Americans in the Congress was a direct result of the civil rights movement. In 1969, Charles Diggs (D., Michigan) became the first African-American chair of the House Subcommittee on Africa (Culverson 1996, 134). Expanding black participation in the electorate increased black congressional representation. In 1971, thirteen black members

\(^6\)In 1960, a wave of anti-apartheid protests climaxed with the Sharpsville massacre in which 69 protestors were killed by the police. The African National Congress (ANC) was banned and two years later its leader Nelson Mandela was jailed.

\(^7\)In 1963, during the Kennedy Administration, the U.S. imposed an arms embargo on South Africa.
of the Houses formed the Congressional Black Caucus. According to Ronald Dellums (D., California):

Most relationships between legislative colleagues, as important as they are, remain informal and largely centered on friendship or mutual respect. In 1971, the thirteen black members of the House decided to make our particular relationship more formal. Bound together by race -- and the experience of race in America -- we believed that we needed to work with each other [sic] to more forcefully advance our common agenda, and we announced the birth of the Congressional Black Caucus, know as the CBC. (Dellums 2000, 94).

One of the CBC's first actions in U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa came when representatives of the CBC met with workers of a U.S. based camera and film company, Polaroid. Polaroid workers had demanded an end to their company's sales of photographic equipment to the South African government. Polaroid cameras were used to take the photographs for the controversial pass books utilized for the control and oppression of millions of black South Africans (Dellums 2000, 123). Thus, began a program with members of Congress, workers, activists, church groups and progressive companies to divest economic interests with South Africa. The Sullivan principles, propagated by the Reverend Leon Sullivan, attempted an alternative path to divestment and sought to compel U.S. enterprises doing business in South Africa to adopt a code of conduct very similar to the principles advance during the U.S. civil rights struggle.

According to Dellums (2000, 124), companies "signing on to abide by the principle would agree to end work place segregation, adopt fair employment practices, pay equal wages for similar work, provide job training and advancement opportunities, and set out to improve the squalid conditions in which workers lived often separated from their families
because of the pass laws."

President Carter underscored the need to incorporate African-Americans in the foreign policy process, particularly regarding South Africa. Carter appointed the civil rights activist Andrew Young to be the ambassador to the United Nations. Under Carter, the United States joined in the UN arms embargo and in 1978 the U.S. barred export to South African military, policy, or apartheid enforcing agencies of the South African government. Nevertheless, Congress and activist continued to push the executive on tougher policies toward the South Africa. In 1977, TransAfrica was formed as a permanent foreign policy organization designed to pressure U.S. foreign policy on issues of concern to African-Americans (Culverson 1996, 141).

The consensus in the United States was that the system of apartheid in South Africa was morally repugnant. The overall normative change with the American public's belief in racial equality undergirded increasing support for sanctions against South Africa (see Hill 1993). However, President Reagan's election to office brought a different orientation toward South Africa. The U.S. Congress, with popular support, would dramatically overturn Reagan's policy.

President Reagan adopted a policy called "constructive engagement."

Constructive engagement was the brain child of Undersecretary of State, Chester Crocker. Crocker believed that the United States should stop excoriating the South African government and instead establish friendly relations with the white Afrikaner government.

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8Some in the anti-apartheid movement criticized the Sullivan principles as insufficient and argued for complete corporate withdraw.
and use quiet diplomacy to influence change. The Reagan policy did not have success in ending apartheid. The South African government did not understand the extent of disapproval in the U.S. of apartheid and interpreted the U.S. policy of "constructive engagement" as tacit approval (Lugar 1988, 209). Moreover, many domestic observers perceived Reagan's policy as blatantly supporting white-minority government.

Despite his landside victory in 1984, Reagan's policy toward South Africa came under direct attack. New waves of protest in South Africa were met by violence from the South African government. The violence in South Africa sparked protest in the U.S. with the first major demonstration at the South African embassy coming on Thanksgiving day 1984. These protest were organized by TransAfrica's Randall Robinson. The Congressional Black Caucus moved the issue of South Africa to the top of their agenda (Dellums 2000, 126-127).

The Congressional Black Caucus's influence in setting the agenda on South Africa was noteworthy. By 1985, many of its members had gained seniority and leadership positions in the Congress. However, public concern over the issue of apartheid also transformed the policy position of others in the Congress, including members of the president's own party. "Rising public concern over apartheid as an issue that could trigger domestic racial conflict even led many Republicans and conservative Democrats to distance themselves from and openly criticize the president's policy" (Culverson 1996, 144-145). In late 1984, 35 House Republicans publically criticized the president's policy on South Africa and signed an open letter to the South Africa ambassador threatening to impose sanctions unless certain economic and civil rights were put in place for all people
in South Africa. These "young turk" Republicans included Robert S. Walker (R., Pennsylvania), Vin Weber (R., Minnesota) and the future Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich (R., Georgia).

Recognizing a change in the United States, Congressman Vin Weber (R. Pennsylvania) warned the South African government that they could no longer rely on the support of conservatives as racists. Weber declared that "South Africa has been able to depend on conservatives in the United States . . . to treat them with benign neglect." He continued that "[W]e served notice that with the emerging generation of conservative leadership, that is not going to be the case" (Evans and Cannon 1984, A1). Newt Gingrich (R., Georgia), another of the Republicans advancing the idea of sanctions against South Africa clearly understood the normative changes within the U.S. regarding political and civil rights. When asked if his party was using the issue of sanction against South Africa as a way to get more African-American votes, Gingrich replied that "I think one of the great challenges to the Republican Party for the rest of the decade is to prove unequivocally that it is opposed to racism . . . " Although Gingrich did not expect to "convert black voters" to the Republican Party, he wanted "to maintain independent-minded white constituencies" because as he saw it "[m]ost of the white middle class and most of the younger generation are opposed to racism of any kind." He further added that "[t]here's a broad consensus for individual freedom without regard to race" (Shogan 1985, 1).

Throughout the spring of 1985, both the Senate and the House conducted hearings to discuss U.S. policy toward South Africa. In context of the Cold War, opponents of
sanctions against South Africa, such as Senator Jesse Helms (R., North Carolina) argued that sanctions could jeopardize the U.S. alliance with South Africa. This could cause the forfeit of access to valuable minerals and open the door for communist inroads to southern Africa. The White-minority government was a bulwark against communism, while the African National Congress (ANC), the lead group opposing white rule clearly contained many individuals with Marxist inclinations.

In 1985, the House passed sanctions legislation by a vote of 295 to 127 with the support of fifty-six Republicans (Klotz 1995, 473). In the Senate, Richard Lugar (R., Indiana) sought to overcome delaying tactics of Senator Helms. According to Lugar

We succeeded in one long and contentious day of debate on July 11, 1985, in gaining an 80-12 vote for final passage. A few conservative Republicans simply did not want any legislation but found it difficult to oppose a bill which encouraged American business to maintain and to increase a hands-on relationship in South Africa. Our bill imposed sanctions that were real for the first time, and sent significant messages to the South African government and to other nations. (Lugar 1988, 218)

The Reagan Administration responded to the actions of the House and Senate by issuing an executive order placing restrictions on government loans, military and police equipment, computers and nuclear related technologies. Moreover, the executive order encouraged corporations to follow principles similar to those expounded by the Reverend Sullivan.

The President's executive order temporary arrested efforts by the Congress to impose tougher sanctions on South Africa. The South African government continued its suppression of black dissent with 875 lives lost in 1985 and a doubling of that casualty
rate in 1986 (Lugar 1988, 223). On June 12, 1986, the South African government imposed a nationwide state of emergency. The House passed a new bill calling for more extensive sanctions in May 1986. The Senate followed suit. House leaders agreed to bypass conference committee negotiation and accept the Senate bill based on Senator Lugar's commitment to by the bill even if faced with a presidential veto. As expected President Reagan vetoed the bill. For the first time since 1973, the U.S. Congress overrode a presidential veto on a foreign policy issues. The House overrode the veto 313-83 with 81 Republicans voting to override (Lugar 1988, 238). In the Senate 78 members stood against the President. The overriding of the President's veto reflected the public opinion on the issues. A Gallup poll taken in September of 1986, asked: "Do you think that the South African government has or has not made significant progress during the last year in trying to resolve it racial problems?" Seventy-two percent responded that the South African government "has not" made progress. In the same poll fifty-five percent indicated that the United State should put more pressure on the South African government to end its apartheid racial system.

Conclusion

Both cases show the increased concern for the promotion of human rights and democracy by the United States. The U.S. public consistently opposed the violent overthrow of the Sandinista government. Eventually, the Sandinistas would be removed through democratic elections with the opposition receiving support from the United States. Reagan had insisted that the Sandinistas would never follow through on elections if the Congress did not provide the Contras military assistance. After his election in 1988,
George Bush decided to find a common policy on Nicaragua with the Congress which ended in a commitment to support the planned elections in Nicaragua. The peaceful resolution to the Nicaragua civil war with a democratic outcome represented the will of the Congress and by extension the norms of the American public.

In South Africa, President Reagan could not sustain support for a racist government in the new normative environment regarding political and civil rights in the United States. The weak efforts of "constructive engagement" by the Reagan administration sought to change the South Africa's system of apartheid while not endangering U.S./South African relations. Nevertheless, in the new normative environment in the United States the distance between South African apartheid norms and U.S. norms were so great as to compel members of the president's own party to break with his policy stance. One must recall that the "Jim Crow" laws of segregation in the American south before the 1970s were akin to South Africa's system of apartheid. It is significant that Newt Gingrich, a Republican representing a southern state would be one of the leaders against the president's policy. Reactionaries like Senator Jesse Helms could not withstand the onslaught of change that permeated the Congress. Moreover, overriding a presidential veto is a monumental event. Support that cut across party lines for a U.S. foreign policy that placed sanctions against South Africa demonstrates Congress as the more effective transmitter of societal norms than the executive. Regarding sanctions against South Africa, the Congress and not the President reflected the position of the American people.
CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

We can understand the change in U.S. foreign policy toward democracy promotion by understanding the change in the domestic normative structure. A state's domestic norms influence its international behavior. When the United States embraced a Euro-American identity and maintained a normative structure that allowed the negation of political and civil rights for those that did not match that identity, U.S. foreign policy did not promote democracy or human rights, particularly in the non Western/European world. Domestic level factors are important to understand a state's foreign policy. The findings of this study concur with the appeals of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (2002, 1) who has suggested “the urgency of refocusing our efforts on leaders and domestic affairs as the centerpiece for understanding the world of international relations.” We better understand the change in U.S. foreign policy toward democracy promotion and human rights when we consider the context of changing domestic norms regarding political and civil rights.

As we have seen, the expansion U.S. democracy and political and civil rights to groups once excluded from the political process, witnessed a concurrent expansion of human rights and democracy promotion in U.S. foreign policy to parts of the world once considered incapable of maintaining any form of democratic governance. The changes in domestic norms in the post World War II era, have led to a change in the American identity from a White, Euro-American identity to a multicultural identity. This change in
identity has altered the pattern of U.S. foreign policy in many parts of the world. The U.S. foreign policy orientation toward democracy promotion differs when it had a Euro-American identity as opposed to a multicultural identity. With a Euro-American identity only other states with a similar identity were considered capable of respecting human rights and developing democratic governing structures. As the American identity changed, the applicability of human rights and democracy to other societies became pervasive in U.S. foreign policy.

This study is important for many reasons. First, given U.S. hegemony in world affairs, its foreign policy behavior matters a great deal for everyone on the planet. Understanding the sources of U.S. foreign policy can help us understand the broader trends in world affairs. Second, for American citizens understanding how changes in domestic norms have influenced the direction of U.S. foreign policy punctuates the impact that they contribute to development of U.S. foreign policy. Norms of behavior that direct domestic affairs also influence foreign affairs.

Theoretically, this study has advanced a constructivist approach to understanding U.S. foreign policy. Constructivism focuses on the impact of ideas rather than material forces on policy outcomes. Constructivism seeks to understand the formation of state's interests and identity as molded by norms and culture rather than material conditions. What I have attempted to do in this study is support the constructivist position of a state's identity, which suggests that a state's identity is socially constructed and subject to change. Changes at the domestic level produce changes in a state's identity. The assumption is that humans are not creatures of constant behavior. We learn, we adapt, we
The analytic model for this study suggested that changes in foreign policy orientation are associated with changes in the domestic normative structure. Norms that guide behavior on the domestic level also guide behavior in foreign policy. The catalyst for change on the domestic level is through social movements organized to change specific societal norms. The explanation of the formation of social movements was beyond the scope of this study. The model also suggested that policy change would originate from the legislative branch. The argument is that legislative branch is closer to the people and would be more sensitive to domestic change. My study found this to be a valid claim. However, this does not mean that the legislative branch is always more progressive than the executive. As I showed, the executive branch quickly adapted to the domestic changes and supported a foreign policy consistent with the change in domestic norms.

What makes this study important is also the contrasting stand it takes to the traditional approach to understanding foreign policy. The central paradigm in the study of international affairs for the last fifty years, Classical realism, treats a state’s identity as a constant. It also attributes consistency to human behavior. The assumption is that humans are selfish and power seeking creatures. From this perspective we can understand state behavior based on a power seeking behavior and single-minded pursuit of self-preservation. Neorealism, the systemic variant of realism, enshrines this view of state identity in its theoretical structure. The neoliberal response challenges neorealism on its own grounds and seeks to explain state behavior through the construction of incentives. In the contemporary debate between neorealism and neoliberalism scholars have agreed on
much so as to give the appearance of scientific progress in theoretical development (see Baldwin 1993). Nevertheless, as Alexander Wendt astutely points out about the neorealist/neoliberal debate, it "seems to come down to no more than a discussion about the frequency with which states pursue relative rather than absolute gains" (Wendt 1999, 3). Both theoretical approaches follow a rational/materialist orientation.

In contrast to these recent systemic level debates in International Relations, I have tried to show the importance of domestic level factors in understanding state behavior. As shown in chapter 2, a focus on domestic level factors has deep roots in the study of international affairs. Nevertheless, this is an area that has received little investigation in recent decades in the discipline of International Relations. Students of International Relations have conducted the neorealism/neoliberalism debate exclusively at the systemic level.

I have not dismissed systemic level factors. The system does constrain the options that a state has available, nevertheless, choice remains. What choice a state accepts relates to its identity. How decision makers perceive themselves as members of a particular state and the norms of behavior that guide their actions are important factors in the selection of choices. Societal norms of behavior shape the construction of a state's identity.

The findings in this study have implications for the democratic peace, the well-known claim that democratic states do not fight wars against one another. Domestic norms are the most important part of the explanation of the democratic peace.⁹ As I

⁹For an argument supporting the institutional variant of the democratic peace see Bueno de Mesquita, et al., 1999.
discussed in chapter 2, most scholars researching the democratic peace have treated
domestic norms as a constant. Clearly, the findings in this study suggest that we must
understand norms within a historical context. Ido Oren (1995) suggests that the
democratic peace is subjective, and that the United States continually redefines its
definition of democracy to keep its self-image consistent with its allies and inconsistent
with the image of its adversaries. The findings of my study suggest that we must
understand how a state's changing self-image produces changes in its foreign policy.

What I have sought to do is to suggest that the norms held by a society are
important for public policy, including foreign policy. In the era of globalization, many
students of international affairs speak of intermestic issues, i.e., issues which have both
international and domestic content. This study contends that many responses to foreign
policy issues are reflections of the domestic society. What decision makers consider
correct behavior will influence the construction of foreign policy. This study is limited to
one foreign policy issue (the promotion of democracy) and changes on a specific domestic
normative belief (political and civil rights). As the U.S. domestic society has become more
tolerant of diversity and has expanded political and civil rights to more members of
society, we find an associated change in the foreign policy orientation toward the
promotion of democracy to more societies abroad. As I discussed earlier, most of the
literature on democracy promotion suggests it to be a long-standing U.S. policy. The
findings in this study discredit that claim. The evidence shows that in the decades before
the 1970s, the United States clearly subverted democracy and rewarded those who abused
democracy promotion is a recent phenomenon in U.S. foreign policy. However, Robinson's work places no importance on domestic level factors. Instead, Robinson suggests that democracy promotion is a product of a globalized transnational elite seeking to limit greater calls for participation through the promotion of low-intensity democracy. Although, this study does not directly overturn Robinson's thesis, it does call into question the singular emphasis on a transnational elite as the source of policy change. Domestic change must be considered.

In chapter 3, I discussed the importance of norms, which are culturally defined rules of correct behavior. The role of norms makes humans a distinct subject of study and any attempt to understand and explain human behavior must take into account the normative aspects of human life. This study links a state's identity to the norms of behavior which governs the individual members that constitute the state. The construction of the U.S. identity has changed through the years. In chapter 3, I attempted to provide evidence of a change in norms and a change identity.

In a broad sweep of U.S. history, I reviewed the evolution of the American identity from the Anglo-Saxon variant to the Euro-American form, to the current multicultural identity. The third change in the U.S. identity was the one of concern for the foreign policy question of democracy promotion. My theoretical model suggested that change occurred due to the actions of social movements organized around issues of political and civil rights. The cause for change was found in the domestic social moments. These movements have facilitated not only legal changes, but societal normative changes in tolerance and respect for diversity. I illustrated this through an exploration of broad
cultural changes and through survey data which suggested that since the end of World War II, Americans have become less likely to base political decisions on factors of race or gender. The use of the survey data provides striking evidence to support the thesis that norms regarding political and civil rights changed in the 1970s. In the early 1970s, those who said that they would support a qualified black candidate from their political party rose above the 60 percent level. By the late 1970s, this percentage approached the 80 percent mark.\textsuperscript{10} Similarly, changes were found in the support level for women as presidential candidates. I used the survey data as empirical indicators for the changing domestic norms. A shared norm that someone other than a non white male could serve as President of the United States suggests a broader change in the norm of who is worthy of participating in a democratic society. Clearly, white America is no longer “the America” and the U.S. identity has been opened up to people of various racial/ethnic origins. The survey data and the contextual evidence suggest that this change occurred sometime in the 1970s. The extensive social protest movements of the 1950s and 1960s stand as a catalyst of that change.

Certain behaviors once regarded as proper are not allowed. Certain actions once inconceivable are now essential. Although I can never show direct cause between the change in domestic norms and the change in foreign policy, amply evidence exists to suggest that we can connect the two changes. Many have observed a change in the

\textsuperscript{10} According to Thomas W. Graham (1994) when public opinion reaches 60 percent, it is enough to overcome entrenched bureaucratic opposition. When 79 percent of the American people are of one mind, the influence of public opinion will be nearly automatic.
American society around the 1970s, although not all have applauded the change. Groups once considered outside the American identity have now been incorporated and extended political and civil rights. Acts of intolerance remain, and bigotry and prejudice exist in all groups in the United States. Nevertheless, the U.S. society is vastly more accepting of diversity today.

To what extent has U.S. foreign policy changed? In chapter 4, I illustrated some of those changes. In chapter 4, I reviewed the existing research on the linkage between human rights and U.S. foreign aid. The promotion of human rights is a necessary component to the promotion of democracy. Although debate continues as to what extent the U.S. links its foreign aid with human rights, there is evidence that a state’s position on human rights does influence the level of aid it receives.\(^\text{11}\) What is striking for the thesis of this study is that no dispute exists among scholars whether the U.S. linked aid to human rights before the 1970s. The answer is resoundingly no. We can account for this foreign policy change through an examination of the domestic norms. Why would one expect the U.S. foreign policy to promote human rights in the non White developing world when the normative structure systematically denied human rights for non White Americans? The normative structure that allowed segregation allowed the negation of human rights in the developing world.

\(^{11}\)Many large N quantitative studies on foreign aid and human rights remove the two largest aid recipients from the calculations. Forty percent of U.S. foreign aid goes to Israel and Egypt. Egypt’s record on human rights is abysmal. Israel, the only democracy in the middle east, has been slowly losing its democratic nature as it seeks to suppress the Palestinian uprisings in the occupied territories. U.S. foreign aid can be used for many purposes. In the case of Egypt and Israel, the $5.1 billion that the U.S. sends to these two countries is a way to maintain peace between these former belligerent states.
Making direct links to changes in domestic norms to norms in foreign policy is difficult. In chapter 5, I tried to make this connection. In the United States, the transfer of domestic norms from the civil society to public policy is most clearly evidenced through the actions of Congress. We saw a sharp contrast in Congressional policy development to the promotion of democracy and human rights in the pre and post normative period. In the 1950s, Congress though the Bricker Amendment pushed to keep the U.S. from supporting human rights internationally. By the 1970s, Congress was on the forefront of policy change through the linkage of human rights to foreign aid. Moreover, the notion of promoting democracy in U.S. foreign policy originated with the U.S. Congress. President Carter grasped the Congressional initiative and made human rights a central focus of his foreign policy. Although he did not embrace human rights with the rhetorical clarity that Carter made, President Reagan did not remove human rights from the foreign policy agenda. However, Reagan embraced the democracy promotion agenda that first originated in the Congress.

One way to prove that U.S. norms have changed regarding the promotion of democracy and human rights would be to ask the American people directly. Pollsters have undertaken such surveys, however, not until 1974, was the first one conducted. The absence of survey questions before the period of normative change that I have identified supports my contention that the American normative structure did not place importance on promoting human rights or democracy. Most Americans did not think that democracy and human rights were compatible with non Western societies. The normative structure did not support such a notion, much as Gallup did not ask the American people if they
would support an African-American candidate for president before 1958. Supporting an African-American as the leader of the United States was not correct or proper behavior.

Survey data questioning whether the U.S. should promote human rights and democracy does exist for post normative period of change. Only since 1974, has the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) asked survey question regarding democracy promotion and only since 1978, for the promotion and defense of human rights. Ole Holsti (2000), using this data has tried to show that the American people no longer care much about promoting or defending human rights. In 1978, 39 percent of those surveyed rated promoting and defending human rights in other countries as “very important” goal in U.S. foreign policy. At the end of the Cold War this number increased to 58 percent. However, in 1994 this number dropped to 34 percent, leading Holsti to declare that “the post-cold war period has witnessed a precipitous decline in the priority accorded to human rights in American foreign policy” (Holsti 2000, 160). Holsti overstates his position. In 1996, those who said that they considered promoting and defending human rights in other countries as “very important” goal in U.S. foreign policy increased to 39 percent. Moreover, Holsti fails to note that throughout the period a very small minority said that human rights were not an important foreign policy goal. In a 1995, PIPA survey, 67 percent agreed that foreign aid to newly democratic countries is a good investment for the United States and that democracies have better human rights records.

In chapter 6, I made a further connection between the change in domestic norms and foreign policy through the examination of South African sanctions and Contra aid. In both cases Congress opposed and redirected the executive's policies in a direction that supported human rights and promoted democracy. Moreover, the Congress acted in response to organized domestic interests and reflected the position of public opinion.

Although my research has shown a general trend in the expansion of democracy promotion by the United States, the United States has not displayed this trend with equal vigor to all regions of the world. U.S. foreign policy toward the promotion of democracy in the Muslim world has been flaccid. Instead, U.S. policy has supported repressive regimes (Saudi Arabia) and remained mute when democracy is subverted (Algeria, Turkey). The Muslim world lacks any vibrant democratic regime. I have argued that a growth of tolerance and an expansion of the American identity has led to foreign policy changes that have expanded the group of peoples judged capable of maintaining democratic governments. Future research should investigate how domestic U.S. perceptions of the Islamic religion shape U.S. policymakers' attitudes toward democracy in the Muslim world. The events of 11 September have dramatically reoriented the foreign policy of the United States. To what extent have these acts changed the focus of U.S. foreign policy regarding democracy in Islamic countries? One way to understand how the United States will respond is to understand the domestic level factors.

Of course, external factors to a state are important in shaping that state's foreign policy. In international affairs security issues often take precedence over all other issues. Nevertheless, this study has suggested that domestic level facts are also important. Not all
states will respond identically to the same external stimulants. Moreover, the same state can change internally and thus change its foreign policy responses. When we seek to understand state behavior, we must understand the norms held by the citizens of that state.
REFERENCES


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Thomas Nisley completed his undergraduate studies at Christopher Newport College in Newport News, Virginia. After graduating with departmental honors in Criminal Justice Administration, Thomas joined the United States Peace Corps. He served as a Peace Corps Volunteer in the Dominican Republic from 1989 to 1991. Assigned to a small rural village called Vallejuelo, he worked in reforestation projects with the Dominican Secretary of Agriculture, developed a demonstration vegetable garden program, and organized a community youth group that conducted community improvement projects.

Following his Peace Corps service, he entered graduate studies at Old Dominion University where he earned an M.A. in International Studies in 1993. After teaching for a year as a substitute High School Spanish teacher, Thomas accepted a position at his alma mater, Christopher Newport. He held the position of Instructor in Government and Public Affairs from 1994 to 1996.

In 1996, Thomas Nisley began his doctoral studies in political science at the University of Florida. His primary field of study is International Relations and his secondary field is American Government. He has presented papers at many academic conferences and has published an article in the Political Chronicle.
I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

M. Legan Brown, Chair
Associate Professor of Political Science

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Ido Oren
Assistant Professor of Political Science

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Terry McCoy
Professor of Latin American Studies and Political Science

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Richard Conley
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This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Dean, Graduate School
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

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