THE U.S. EIGHTH AIR FORCE AND ITS BRITISH WORLD WAR II HOSTS: A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC RELATIONS

By

KERRY ANDERSON CROOKS

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During the titanic struggle that was World War II, thousands of young men and women came from the United States to Great Britain to form what was to be a mighty air armada. This aerial fleet, the U.S. Eighth Air Force, was obligated by the nature of their mission, the availability of airfields and the design strengths and limitations of their aircraft to support and fly missions against Nazi Germany from the fields of England. As the Eighth Air Force was the most potent striking force potentially available to the United States in the early days of the U.S. involvement in the war, there was a strong commitment to supplying personnel and material to this organization in the shortest time possible. This meant that thousands of Americans,
from every part of the United States, were transported into the midst of a well-populated foreign country from which to conduct their war. What the U.S. and British authorities attempted to provide as a means of preserving domestic tranquility for the British residents and morale support for the personnel of the Eighth Air Force while also seeking to build positive public relations between the two groups is the focus of this study.

This paper proposes to discuss the issues relating to the reasons for bringing U.S. airmen and support personnel to Britain, the potential and real problems created by such a deployment, the programs both British and American authorities employed to enhance cross-cultural relations and U.S. air forces personnel morale, and the obstacles these programs faced.

The scope of the total public relations efforts was significant in its size, the political level of attention and the effect on Anglo-American relations during the war. In the end, however, it appears that the efforts of highly organized British government programs probably had less consequence than existing cultural dynamics and the simple decency inherent in the peoples of the two lands.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

In the large Nissen hut used for briefing, now deserted and covered with dust, he saw foregathering a ghostly company of 250 pilots, navigators, bombardiers and gunners encumbered with bulky clothes, life vests and oxygen masks, straining to hear the words of a ghostly Intelligence officer as he indicated a target on the map.
-Beirne Lay, Jr., and Sy Bartlett, 12 O’Clock High!, 10.

Arriving in teeming, dank troop ships, Second Lieutenant Joseph J. Del’Marmol, Jr., and Corporal Aida Friedland disembarked onto the soil of a 1940s Britain well into its fifth year of total war. Lieutenant Del’Marmol would join the veteran 381st Bomb Group as a B-17G Flying Fortress bombardier and survive thirty-five missions over hostile European skies. Corporal Friedland would be assigned as a public relations liaison at the Eighth Air Force Headquarters at High Wycombe. As a public relations specialist, Corporal Friedland would be responsible for performing the duties typical of the image of public relations personnel of that period -- media liaison. She would later work with Holocaust survivors in Germany, teaching them enough English to emigrate to America.
Lieutenant Del'Marmol and Corporal Friedland's experiences, as thrilling or as fascinating as they were, could not be considered extraordinary in a time of remarkable events. Indeed, they were but two of the more than 350,000 American men and women assigned to one of history's unique organizations, the Eighth Air Force of the United States Army Air Forces.

The Eighth Air Force was an amalgamation of bombing and fighter planes with the assigned duty of destroying German industry and morale. For the bombing crews, their life was a surreal and severe contrast of activities. For these aviators, the average work day was an early breakfast and morning briefing, a five-hour flight penetrating deadly fighter plane and anti-aircraft artillery (flak) opposition to reach a point in the sky to rain destruction on an unseen enemy below, and back through the gauntlet to arrive at their peaceful base in time for dinner.

The activities of the aviators separated them from those with whom they shared base facilities and nights out on the town. The casualty rates for U.S. bomber crews exceeded that of any American force of arms during the war. Statistically, if a crewmember arrived in Britain to fly Fortresses or B-24 Liberators when the Eighth was first deployed to England in 1942, the odds were against
him surviving until his 25th mission, the official rotation point.⁵

Eighth Air Force bases were odd oases of Americans, mostly men, whose transient status was certain, but the length of time of that visit depended on an individual's job -- and luck. The U.S.A.A.F. ground support personnel endured days that were long, fatiguing, but generally safe. On the other hand, aircrews knew their lives were hanging in a grim balance -- often here at breakfast, dead by dinner. Some dealt with this reality better than did their comrades. The seemingly arbitrary nature of death was a horror to some, a savior to others.⁶ Because of its effect on the communicator/receiver, this shadow of death is a very real variable in any communication equation. The bottom rungs of Maslow's hierarchy of needs model are hardly the realm of proactive relationships.⁷ The sheer horror experienced by aircrews was terribly unique due to the rapid in-and-out-of-danger cycle. Even so, relationships between aviators and the local population existed -- and in some cases existed quite well.⁸

Some, such as historian Roger Freeman, have called this episode of 1940s-Americans-on-British-soil a "friendly invasion," but, in reality, it was more similar to a Gastarbeiter (guest worker) situation. The guest workers were expected to do their job, behave well, and
when their peculiar work was done, go home. The members of the Eighth Air Force were neither invited on tourist visas, nor were they diplomats on missions of state. They were, according to Eighth Air Force Major General Ira Eaker, in England to do a job. 9

In the cities, towns, and villages of East Anglia, in whose nearby grain fields the scores of Eighth Air Force bases were constructed, the population also was a statistical oddity. The effects of a protracted war had dramatically altered the demographics of British communities. With the British men of military service age gone off to war, the population consisted mostly of children, the elderly, and women. 10

While relations between base personnel and locals was structured by the necessity of base security and the self-contained nature of U.S. military bases, there were few restrictions on what base ground personnel did during their time off. This offered opportunities for these personnel to interact with the local English population and, at times, with the British people residing or working in those popular destinations of Americans on three-day passes or leave. For aviators, the case was slightly different, as restrictions to base often occurred due to the capricious nature of English takeoff/landing conditions and Continental enroute weather. As a result,
Bomber Command was reluctant to release crews and miss the possibility of good bombing weather.  

The social dynamics between the Americans and their British "cousins" were significant.  The U.S. Army Air Forces was an officer-heavy organization. This was due to Air Forces requirements that pilots, navigators, and bombardiers be officers -- roughly 40-50 percent of a bomber crew and nearly 100 percent of fighter pilots. American service personnel, particularly American aviators earning additional flight pay, were generally better paid than were British soldiers. This meant free-spending, middle-class young American men appeared in working-class English communities that were enduring strict rationing.

To some in the British community, American servicemen were "over-paid, over-sexed, and over here." Both U.S. and British authorities realized that problems would emerge due to unbalanced social conditions created by exotic foreigners with more pocket money. Those problems did occur. Yet popular American mythology of that period leads us to believe no problems existed at all. Motion pictures regarding the Eighth Air Force, including such movies as "The War Lover" and "The Memphis Belle," portray U.S. and British relations as being extremely cordial and, in some cases, very romantic. To some degree, the facts support the over-generalized myth. Thousands of British
women became "G.I. brides," which suggests that some
British families were, at the very least, grudgingly
accepting of American sons-in-law. While the years apart
make for great differences in circumstances, the relative
congeniality of the British population stood in stark
contrast to Colonial New England some 170 years earlier.
British soldiers then stationed in Massachusetts became
unbearable so much so that prohibition against quartering
of troops in civilian homes became protected by the Third
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. As a
result of their intolerance of British occupation and
other issues, the "embattled farmers" of Lexington,
Concord, Bedford and Lincoln fired their hunting pieces at
British soldiers executing their duties. 15

When the aircrews and ground support personnel of the
Eighth Air Force finally left Great Britain after the
European War had ended, they left a legacy that bespeaks a
favorable relationship between members of the Eighth and
their British hosts. The monuments placed by the people
of the home country were memorials to their guest workers,
the airmen of the Eighth Air Force. 16

The Eighth Air Force was sent to do a job. The
limitations of their equipment meant the job required them
to be in England; England was the only safe land mass from
which the Eighth could launch their bombing missions. The
British wanted the job done as well. The basic motivation was there to create a favorable environment in which the Eighth Air Force could better perform its mission. Part of that environment would be favorable relations between the Eighth Air Force personnel and their British hosts. But motivation is not execution.

Prior to the 20th century, the Americans and the British rarely enjoyed cordial relationships. Beginning with the American revolutionary War, there were sporadic conflicts with the British throughout American history. The War of 1812 and the intense negotiations between the United States and Britain over the U.S./Canadian border are only two, though prime, examples of strained U.S./British relations. The favorable relationship that developed between the U.S. and Britain during World War I almost completely eroded when the British lagged in repaying American war loans. Exacerbating American mistrust of Britain was the American perception that the British maneuvered them into a European war where U.S. interests were minimal.

There was little history to indicate the Eighth’s deployment would be taken well by the local British population, let alone become a smooth integration into the British social fabric. That relatively harmonious, though not perfect, relations existed throughout the
entire 1942-1945 period may have been the result of two peoples just getting along naturally, or it may have been the result of a well-planned public relations campaign to ensure harmonious relations were created.

This research is designed to investigate institutionalized public relations programs designed to enhance Eighth Air Force and British relations. This research is based on the following questions:

What was the nature of any public relations campaign, whether American or British, that was designed to promote positive relations between Eighth Air Force personnel and the British residents of the cities, towns, and villages surrounding the American bomber bases? And what, if anything, is the legacy of that campaign?

Purpose of this study

In the last years of the 20th century, the Department of Defense employed thousands of public relations professionals to perform a wide variety of activities, including public information, recruiting, press relations, and internal communications. With this level of commitment, the military's emphasis on the need for effective public relations cannot be doubted. The U.S. military system of this period cannot afford for it to be otherwise. The entire structure depends on the
understanding of its mission by the people of the United States and their elected representative. This understanding cannot endure continuous conflicts created by improper communication. When the role of the military comes into disfavor or citizens are apathetic about it, funding dries up and military effectiveness suffers. This cycling of funding has been a long tradition in the United States, and some argue that it reached the bottom of the cycle as recently as the latter years of the 1990s. 

In the creation of the Eighth Air Force, a number of factors became congruent. The factors included war, the advent and development of airpower, and the allied relationship of the United States and Great Britain for the purpose of defeating Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. All three factors were essential. The Eighth Air Force was created as a result of America's entry in the war. It did not exist until after that event. Without the rapid development of powered, heavier-than-air craft, plus airpower doctrine and the sophisticated organizational structure possible by 1942, the whole concept of airpower would have been different and the Eighth Air Force would not have been a conception, much less a reality. Unless Great Britain had successfully resisted Nazi Germany during the latter's attempt to effect air superiority over Britain, if not an invasion, then the United States could
not have operated out of Great Britain against Nazi Germany. Indeed, there may not have been an American war against Nazi Germany at that time. Those strategists who envisioned the defeat of Great Britain and saw the U.S. waging war against Nazi Germany foresaw the need for intercontinental bombers.\textsuperscript{23} This was the strategic reason behind building the massive B-36, later to become the backbone of the post-war U.S. Strategic Air Command. In any case, these bombers would have operated out of the United States or other sites in the western Atlantic. Thus, they would have been the air arm of the Continental Air Forces, and not a newly created Eighth Air Force.\textsuperscript{24}

Perhaps it is also well to mention the publicly expressed reason for the creation of the B-17, later to become the main striking machine of the Eighth Air Force. When the B-17 was first proposed, it was to be as a "fortress" against an invasion fleet heading for the United States. Therefore, publicly at least, the B-17 was a defensive weapon, not the offensive weapon as used by the Eighth Air Force.\textsuperscript{25}

When Britain stood its ground, and air, against the Germans in 1940, the island of Great Britain became a secure "aircraft carrier" from which to strike Germany using the bombers available at the time. Since it was in Britain's interest to end the war against Nazi Germany as
quickly as possible, there became a natural alliance in purpose between the U.S. and the U.K. Part of that alliance was to support the efforts of each other in their military efforts.  

One of the stated strategies of the United States was to wage bombing missions against industrial targets in Nazi Germany. This fit British overall planning, and since Britain was a nearly ideal place from which to wage that air campaign, the agreement between the British and Americans assured the development and deployment of the newly formed Eighth Air Force to Great Britain.  

Within these major factors, there existed some very significant issues that required resolution to ensure the creation, effective deployment, and successful use of the Eighth Air Force as the weapon it was envisioned. One of the essential requirements, as stated by American commanders for successful operations against Nazi Germany, was successful Anglo-American relations. The British were equally as keen to ensure the two nations cooperated as best as they could. Whether these relations could have run smoothly, or even if they were necessary, could be debated. It is enough, for the purposes of this study, to take the American commanders at their word. Once "good Anglo-American relations" as a goal became policy, that policy affected operations. In some ways, those
operations were adjusted to meet the perceived requirements of good Anglo-American relations. In some other occasions, this policy dictated new operations. That is, the need for good Anglo-American relations caused the creation or enhancement of activities that, as planned, directly resulted in improved U.S./U.K. relations.²⁹

In the period leading up to World War II, the fledgling air arm of the U.S. military understood the requirement of public support for its mission. Those who were to lead the U.S. air effort in Europe were old hands in understanding the requirements for proactive public relations to advance the cause of aviation as an effective weapon of war.³⁰ Their pre-war public relations campaign to promote the new air arm was waged on all fronts and prepared them for the public relations efforts needed during World War II. During the war, these commanders were as aggressive in achieving support -- both in the United States and in Great Britain -- for their aims as they were in the period leading up to the war and even more successful in results. In the end, Nazi Germany was defeated and an independent United States Air Force was created.

Set in the period of 1942 to 1945, this study will examine evidence from various sources to detect and
categorize programs designed to build rapport between U.S. airmen and members of the British population. The scope of this investigation will center upon those efforts made by U.S. and British authorities to establish and maintain successful relations between those involved in Eighth Air Force operations and the general English population who would potentially have contact with personnel of the Eighth Air Force. Such efforts will include American command policies, British political decrees and directives, local American air base programs and British activities designed to build better relations between the Americans on the air bases and their British hosts, or even those British activities that, through their execution, built such rapport. This study will also identify various organizations that were designated to support U.S./U.K. relations and how their activities fit within the overall public relations effort. Further, the efforts of those not normally associated with public relations activities, such as military chaplains, will be reviewed.

The purpose for such an investigation is this: to place within the body of knowledge of the field of public relations a history of a period of time when international relations came down to a very personal level on a very massive scale. During the period covering 1942-1945,
planned public relations programs and impromptu public relations activities combined to build localized American and British relations to help ensure the successful execution of the strategic bombing campaign of the U.S. Eighth Air Force. The human dynamics of hundreds of thousands of Americans involved with the largest air armada in history relating with the peoples of a nation, which hosted them for a three-year period, makes for a compelling chapter of public relations history. It is not the purpose of this study, however, to gauge the effectiveness of such a program on the mission of the Eighth Air Force. The variables affecting the mission effectiveness of such a vast military undertaking are far too many to even attempt such an effort, particularly from the vantage of nearly fifty-five years from the end of the war.

Unable to prove causality, this dissertation has as a purpose the goal of pinpointing contributing factors to the building of cordial relations between members of the Eighth Air Force and their British hosts. Many of the tools of modern public relations were in their infancy during this time, and no particular effort seems to have been made to make any contemporary measurements of U.S.A.A.F. attitudes toward British subjects with whom they came in contact. Also, while measurements were made
of general British and American attitudes toward each other, and some of these measurements are presented within this study, such measurements serve only as cultural backdrop to the relations between the personnel of the Eighth Air Force and the British.

**Significance of this study**

There are several arguments for establishing the significance of any study dealing with this subject. One argument can easily be supported. The history of the period of World War II has been covered extensively, but generally through military histories, biographical works, and more recently, social studies. Communication studies of the period have centered on issues of propaganda effectiveness or the role of mass media, while scarcely touching military-civilian relations at basic military unit levels. While this is understandable when considering the numerous units of the U.S. military, it is a bit puzzling when the size and scope of the Eighth Air Force is considered. When hundreds of thousands of Americans, many of whom had never before met a foreigner, suddenly came in contact with a people who, in many cases, had never met an American and may have formed their opinions of that nationality from motion pictures, there were bound to be some problems. 31
There can be no assumption that any two people will coexist merrily, much less masses of peoples from two sides of the Atlantic. While culture is one consideration when analyzing relations between two different peoples, the relationship between the American personnel of the Eighth Air Force and their British hosts was more complicated, and in some ways simpler, than can be explained by culture studies. There were numerous factors influencing those relations. Some of these influences may have been strong enough to affect missions, and even more probably, post-war relations between the two countries. In any event, the result of those relations was the creation of a generally favorable impression between the two peoples of that time and that has created a legacy between the two countries.

However, other factors add to the potential importance of this study. Public relations historian Scott Cutlip admitted that military PR practitioners formed much of the backbone of the post-war practice. Thus, public relations activities practiced by military public information staff members during World War II becomes a probable link in the chain of the development of the field -- certainly of military public relations. The insight into cross-cultural relations, albeit in rare enough circumstances, also is worth any research effort.
In addition, post-war U.S. Air Force leaders were Eighth Air Force veterans and were strongly influenced by the developments of wartime public relations. Indeed, until the era of Kennedy/McNamara, the U.S. Air Force’s desires and defense mantras became one with national defense policies and budget priorities. Evidence of rather wily PR efforts of U.S. Air Force line officers appears to be a cornerstone of the development of U.S. airpower since the days of Kittyhawk, with particular acceleration in the war and post-war period.

Understanding and appreciating the public relations efforts made during World War II aids in understanding the nature of our defense decisions and some conventional wisdom that came after hostilities ended in 1945.

Finally, the timing of this research is at an important point when research sources shift from a mixture of oral histories and archival evidence to purely archival. Those who remember the period of study as participants are rapidly dwindling in population. While this particular research effort is based mainly on archival information, the recollections and directions of World War II veterans have aided the process quite considerably.

Between 1942 and 1945, people were engaged in international relations on a massive scale, and those
relations were, perhaps, affected deliberately by systematic programs. This study is based upon the assumption that any public relations endeavor of this scope is worth examination as an integral part of the heritage of the field of public relations.

Notes

1 Joseph Del'Marmol, "Sovereigns of the Conquered Sky," unpublished typewritten book manuscript, 18. Provided to author by Joseph Del'Marmol. According to Del'Marmol, he traveled across on the U.S.S. Edmund B. Alexander, which he described as "tightly crammed, jam packed full of young American soldiers." Interestingly enough, his ship had a "miniature gambling casino" to include roulette equipment.

2 Aida Friedland Kaye, Miami, Florida, phone conversation with author. May 1, 1998. The conversation was not set up as an interview, but as a fact-finding discussion. Ex-Corporal Friedland Kaye's role in World War II was verified by historian Roger Freeman during a phone conversation with Freeman in London, England, on May 23, 1998.


4 David Reynolds, Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain 1942-1945 (New York: Random House, 1995), 296-297, and Philip Kaplan and Rex Alan Smith, One Last Look (New York: Artabras, 1983), 63-72. However, lead crews had slightly longer days (due to more mission planning), but received better breakfasts. See Alexander DiSanto, Appendix H.

5 See Jeffrey Ethell, Air Command: Fighters and Bombers of World War II (Ann Arbor, MI: Lowe and B. Hould, 1997), 7. "... Of all the combat jobs in the American services during World War II, from infantryman to submariner, no job was

6 George Henderson, Human Relations: From Theory to Practice (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974), 236-238. Individuals handle the potential of death in different ways. Some can deny death will happen to them, while others may be obsessed by the thought of an early demise. Historian John Keegan has described the ability of most warriors to "compartmentalize" their minds in normal circumstances. Interestingly, Keegan asserts that the soldier who faces death with stoicism and kills without remorse is rare, and they are even rarer in American and German armies than those of the British and French. John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York: Barnes & Nobel, 1976), 25-27.

7 Henderson, Human Relations, 237-238.


9 Astor, The Mighty Eighth, 435. In an effective public relations speech of few words, Eaker stated early in his tenure to his British hosts: "We won't do much talking until we've done more fighting. After we've gone, we hope you'll be glad we came." And Walter Boyne, Clash of Wings: World War II In The Air (New York: Touchstone, 1994), 304.

10 Reynolds, Rich Relations, 404-406.


12 Ibid., 4-6, 23-27.

14 Freeman, *The Friendly Invasion*, 61. According to Freeman, this quip, based on the World War I song "Over There," was "the cruelest, yet most enduring comment on the (Americans)."


16 Kaplan and Smith, *One Last Look*, 206-207.


18 Ibid.

19 Ibid., 154-157.

20 See Fraser Seitel, *The Practice of Public Relations 6th Edition* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), 377. Seitel gives a figure of "more than one thousand." However, as early military units often assigned additional duties, public relations type responsibilities are carried out throughout the military down to squadron levels or their equivalent.

21 Tom Clancy and General Chuck Horner, *Every Man A Tiger* (New York: Putnam, 1999), x-xi, 124. Paul Jackson, "Raptor Spreads Its Wings" *United States Air Force Yearbook 1999* (R.A.F. Benevolent Fund, 1999), 6-9. See also Appendix F of "The Economic and Budget Outlook: Fiscal Years 2000-2009" published by the Congressional Budget Office (January 29, 1999). The Congressional Budget Office figures on defense spending which shows a marked decrease in actual spending and spending as a percentage of GDP since 1989. In 1989, discretionary outlays for defense were $304.0 billion, while in 1998, the figure dropped to $269.6 billion. As a percentage of GDP, discretionary spending on the military dropped from 9.3 in


29 Ibid., 150-174.


31 Freeman, The Friendly Invasion, 1.


CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

The volumes written about World War II are far too numerous to mention. From such works such as Samuel Eliot Morrison’s classic on the role of the U.S. Navy\(^1\) to the autobiographies such as Winston Churchill’s massive Second World War series,\(^2\) this titanic six-year struggle was followed by an equally massive collection of books about the war years.

There is no body of literature that deals specifically with the public relations between the members of the Eighth Air Force and their British World War II hosts. There are, however, histories that cover various aspects of the factors relating to Eighth Air Force operations and personnel and British society during the period. For the convenience of this study, the literature will be categorized into general histories of the war, which may include larger histories in which World War II merits considerable discussion; histories on aviation and its development; social histories of the war to include histories of local regions; and, finally, histories which give an accounting of the public relations efforts during World War II.
General histories of the war offer the overall context of the war period. Aviation histories generally cover the development of aerodynamics and aerial warfare doctrine. Doctrine drives aerodynamic development and vice versa. Without the development of each to the state in which they existed in 1942, the Eighth Air Force would not have existed and, if it did, its methods would have been different with results that may have prevented or altered any deployment to Britain. Aviation histories, therefore, describe the various paths leading the personnel and material of the Eighth Air Force to Britain in 1942.

Social histories of the war offer insights to the construction of the social fabric which tied the various people together even under stress. They also reveal the tears in that fabric and suggest the causes of those problems. The social histories reviewed include various levels of discussion of the interaction between the U.S. and British people during the war, with some works giving the dynamics of this relationship more attention than others. Typically, social histories describe the phenomena relating to U.S. and British interactions without much attention paid to the systematic communications process abetting such relations. Yet, without noting the interactions, discussion of the public
relations programs becomes an exercise in theoretical supposition.

Histories of public relations during World War II are virtually non-existent, with those few who have commented on the subject ignoring the Eighth Air Force operations entirely. What is said in these histories is notable for an emphasis on the war itself producing numerous public relations professionals for the post war expansion of the PR field.

**General Military Histories**

Few histories of World War II can be credible without mentioning John Keegan, A.J.P. Taylor or Stephen Ambrose. Each is often cited by other military historians and, particularly in the case of Keegan and Ambrose, are prolific authors. Further, no collection of books on warfare can be complete without the addition of Lynn Montross’ 1,063-page work, *War Through the Ages*, nor can any tales of the experiences of the Eighth Air Force in Europe be told without referring to the research of Britain’s Roger Freeman. All are quoted herein, as well as the biographers of the architects of American airpower, the strategists of pre-war strategic bombing, and the social historians who have reflected on the British-American relations during the war.
To select a comprehensive history of warfare, there are few works as thoroughly and logically developed as *War Through the Ages* by Lynn Montross. This large, single volume was clearly written with descriptive phrasing through the more than 1,000 pages of text. The reader is provided a well-developed, logical progression of the art of war. Montross both recounted the theories of Sun-Tzu, Clausewitz, Mahan, and Douhet and applied them to the military activities of their time and their influence on later generations of politicians and warriors. As diplomacy and war are but two tools of the state to achieve similar aims, Montross outlined diplomatic initiatives as they affected the balance of power and encouraged or relieved international strife.

Montross, who wrote from the close vantage point of the early post-World War II period, could write about that struggle only from what materials were then available to lay historians. He gave solid coverage of the pre-war writings of Giulio Douhet on strategic bombing and its potential effect on civilian morale, as well as providing an assertion that Douhet's strategies influenced many aviation enthusiasts. The application of Douhet's theories found little validation in the results of the actual fighting of the war, but they influenced how the war was fought. Without the influence of the pre-war
aviation theorists, the Eighth Air Force would not have been created. Also, the R.A.F. would have been structured differently. An emphasis on defensive rather than offensive strategies would not have put the Eighth Air Force in Britain and would not have created the U.S./U.K. cohesion in the concept of strategic bombing, which helped to cement their relationship. Even though he was writing shortly after the war, Montross was able to read the famed Strategic Bombing Survey, which was being compiled even as the final raids on Germany were being conducted. Although critics of the U.S./U.K. strategic bombing campaigns over Europe seized upon the fact that German war production actually increased during the latter years of the war, just when American and British bombing was at its height, Montross was quick to point out that this is merely a statistical phenomenon. What the bombing did, Montross claimed, was create specific shortfalls that seriously crimped Germany’s strategic capabilities.4

This ambiguity served to muddle the understanding of the role of airpower, leaving the discussion unresolved as recently as the Kosovo air campaign of 1999.5

However, as poetic or insightful as Montross was in writing War Through the Ages, he failed, as he had to fail, to bring much of a social balance to his writings, particularly his section on World War II. To cover the
social side of the war would have required Montross to
deviate from the science and art of warfare theme of his
work. Thus, Montross only could provide a single
dimension of the war.

**Military History of World War II**

John Keegan, renowned British historian, wrote *The
Battle for History: Re-fighting World War II*, in which he
provided his recommendations for histories of World War
II. While he recommended the previously mentioned
Morrison series, and a host of other volumes on the Second
World War, his stated belief regarding the dubious value
of the Allies' strategic bombing effort corresponded with
his failure to list even one book dedicated to the
personalities, events, tactics and hardware regarding that
mission. Further, Keegan, though given to psychological
and even moral assessments of the war, failed to make
direct mention of any work dedicated to the social
persuasive or mass media efforts in Britain or the U.S.,
even though a full chapter was given to books about
resistance movements in occupied countries. In his own
World War II history, *The Second World War*, Keegan does
provide operational analyses of the strategic bombing
program, granting that the Eighth Air Force was able to
create strategic shortages in fuel and transportation
stock. He was less charitable to his own country’s efforts, quoting Lord Salisbury who lambasted British area bombing missions, "that of course the Germans began it, but we do not take the devil as our example." While American bombing crews and their leaders earned favor through various public relations efforts, Air Chief Marshall Arthur "Bomber" Harris was the only major British military leader not granted a peerage and his bomber command troops the only service not granted a campaign medal of their own. To the British, Keegan claimed, area bombing was "certainly not fair play." U.S. bombing guru, General Curtis E. LeMay’s condemnation came much later and for totally different reasons.

Keegan dismissed the famous historian A.J.P. Taylor’s Origins of the Second World War as "notorious." Calling Taylor a "pyrotechnician" and "gadfly," Keegan was even caustic enough to write that Taylor’s "verdict on the Second World War may be judged his greatest perversity." Certainly, Taylor’s book is controversial. Taylor insisted that Hitler never considered Japanese aid against Russia -- an assertion that flies in the face of counter-claims by other historians and even common sense. Taylor’s claim that Roosevelt had meant it when he said in the autumn of 1940 "Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars" was not even believed by his
barely more isolationist opponent, Wendell Wilkie, who knew a hypocritical statement when he heard one. Further, Taylor made a rather inflammatory assertion that the Soviet Union's "title to the Baltic states and eastern Poland was a good deal better than that of the United States to New Mexico." While such a Soviet claim may not have been much less than that of the Americans, to state beyond that is to conveniently forget a thousand years of eastern European history.

It should not come as a surprise, then, that Taylor felt Germany's invasion of Russia was the most significant act of the war -- neglecting such events as Germany's invasion of Poland, the Battle of Britain, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Battle of Midway, and the dropping of the atomic bomb on Japan. The curious "alliance" behavior between the Axis powers is as much a significant series of activities as anything else in the war. This review of Taylor, as wide-ranging and as far afield from the topic of this paper as it is, is done so with the full intent to explain what would otherwise seem to be Taylor's inexplicable lack of discussion of U.S./U.K. relations and any efforts made to enhance them.

How a nation perceives its political functions in operation (and war is political) is critical to understanding that nation and, to some extent through the
contrast, one's own. For a rather different perspective on World War II, *The Russian Version of the Second World War*,\(^{14}\) edited by Graham Lyons and translated by Marjorie Vanston, provided an intriguing view inside the Soviet system as the work seeks to explain the events of World War II to its young scholars. Perhaps it is not surprising to note that the publishers of the book included A.J.P. Taylor's assertion that "the Soviet version is nearer the truth than most versions current in the West," which was printed on the back cover. This book, however, acknowledged the weakness of the Soviets' moral positions regarding their 1939 war with Finland and the Soviet-Polish relations throughout World War II.

To explain the Soviet perspectives of these controversial events, "summarized Western positions" were given, then countered by Soviet accounts of these episodes. The war with Finland, for example, was excused as buttressing the Soviet western borders to protect Leningrad. While no doubt the Soviets were concerned with their own national security, the morality of their decisions remain very questionable. On the other hand, the account explaining the failure of the Soviets to aid the Polish uprising in Warsaw toward the end of the war can be taken as more reasonable. Then again, the cynics may be right, but we will, in all probably, never know.
This perspective to the war serves as a valuable counterweight to typical western histories, but like them, concentrated on policies, strategies, and weaponry, largely ignoring sociological phenomena. Thus, the Soviet author spent zero ink on discussing close cooperation efforts between U.S./U.K. relations -- at any level.

**Aviation History of World War II**

There are several histories pertaining to the development of U.S. military aviation. Some are used by the United States Air Force as part of its professional officer development programs, while others are written by and for aviation enthusiasts. The former concentrate on the development of doctrine, while the latter emphasize an anecdotal style. Curiously, there were several histories written by British historians on the American air forces, and much of the more recent histories on U.S. war aviation were, in fact, written and published by the British for the British. Such histories are valuable as they provide the reasons for the deployment of the Eighth Air Force to Britain and describe the conditions facing these personnel.

*The U.S.A.A.F. Handbook: 1939-1945* by Martin W. Bowman is one of several U.S. aviation histories written by an Englishman. Bowman is among the most prolific,
having written some 20 or more U.S.A.A.F. histories. This particular book was selected for inclusion in this review due to its comprehensive nature, which included the U.S.A.A.F.'s wartime organizational structure. To put it in Bowman's words, the work was designed to "fill in some of the gaps." However, for the purposes of this study, Bowman added precious little mention of any systematic program for building underlining public relations support for strategic bombing missions in Britain. Further, Bowman's account contrasted with other sources on a couple of minor facts that have achieved some degree of lore. While one of General Mitchell's biographers described Mitchell's award of a special medal, Bowman stated that Mitchell earned the Medal of Honor. Further, Bowman contended that the B-17 Flying Fortress was so named due to its role as an aerial fortress against invading ships. There does not seem to be any evidence to support this contention, while other publications refer to the aircraft's defensive armament, though fairly modest in the beginning, as the cause for the nickname.

Bowman did draw some illuminating comparisons useful for understanding strategic issues. For instance, in June 1939, while Hitler was carving up Czechoslovakia, the Army Air Corps possessed only 13 B-17s (its main heavy bomber)
and just over 22,000 personnel, only twice the number of its cavalry troopers.\textsuperscript{21}

Heavily a "dates, designs and doctrine" history, Bowman remarked on U.S./U.K. relations as they affect aircraft/technology designs or development of doctrine and tactics. For instance, the U.S. sent operational aircraft such as the B-17, A-20, and other aircraft to Britain, while the U.K. reciprocated by forwarding technological advances in radar and jet engines, as well as operational reports needed to assess current battlefield operations.

The American generals responsible for building up an operational air force were not pleased with handing over to the British the crème of the aviation production lines in the years between 1939 and the end of 1941. Bowman, although an Englishman, gave strong sympathy to the American air commanders, but in all probability, the British put the American material to more effective, more direct use than mere training.\textsuperscript{22} Further, as any veteran of U.S. Air Force Squadron Officer School wargaming knows, in a technological war, having later model weapons at a crucial point can make all the difference. Some of the material the Americans sold to the British in 1940 proved woefully inadequate for 1942 warfare.\textsuperscript{23} The British, in other words, kept the aviation production lines open, used the material to great effect, and forced the Yanks to re-
tool with more modern aircraft when the U.S. finally entered the war. At the time, the Americans did not seem to appreciate the contributions of the British to this aspect of the development of U.S. airpower. The fact is, aerial warfare is military Darwinism. Only the most modern and fittest survive. The Stukas and P-40s that were hot birds in 1939 were clay pigeons by 1942. With British assistance the Americans adjusted; the Luftwaffe did not. The Germans, who were beginning to introduce jet/rocket technology in late 1944, found the cold truth regarding technology timing when their Me-262 jets were taking off from runways far too deep within Germany to stop the swarms of American machines raining death from 30,000 feet above.\(^{24}\) British and American cooperation on aircraft and technology development ensured Allied success. Cooperation at this level was indicative of the overall Anglo-American effort.

However, other than the strategic discussions and exchange of airframes outlined above, Bowman completely neglected the human relations aspects of the air war, leaving such discussions to others.

Geoffrey Perret, a dual U.S./U.K. citizen, devoted 468 pages of well-researched efforts to *Winged Victory: The Army Air Forces in World War II.*\(^ {25}\) Perret did lend some
discussion to U.S./U.K. relations at the higher level, relating the angst senior American airmen felt about selling American aviation assets to the British prior to America’s entry into the war and the "close but tense" relations during that entire period. Once into an active alliance after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the relations strengthened.

Perret added that some senior U.S. air officials were masters of public relations, particularly General Hap Arnold. Further, Perret included an entire chapter on U.S. aviation morale, but he made no mention of British efforts to build relations other than the willingness of British women to date American aviators. This "hands across the sea" effort, however, was recounted behind such morale boosters as good bombing results, commanding officers who flew combat missions, beer, mail, Bob Hope, mission limits, food, poker games, and the Glenn Miller Band.  

The Foundations of U.S. Air Doctrine by Lieutenant Colonel Barry Watts is another example of a doctrine-drives-development book. Colonel Watts intended to demonstrate how current Air Force doctrine became such. In World War II, the pre-war assumptions of the
superiority of self-protected manned bombers in bringing
the war to the enemy was handed a rude welcome to reality.
In turn, the Germans, the British, and then the Americans
found strategic bombing to be a difficult campaign at
best. No nation was able to execute strategic bombing
without fearsome losses to their own bomber fleet. The
strategic phenomenon labeled as "friction of war" is the
degree of variation of actual events from anticipated
activities. According to Watts, friction was in effect
when the Germans, acting somewhat more varied than
statistical models, created mission success problems for
U.S. bombers. The answer to German defenses were resolved
only by the serendipitous joining of British Rolls-Royce
Merlin engines to American P-51s, thus allowing U.S.
strategic bombers to criss-cross the skies of Europe in a
much safer fashion.28

Unfortunately, Watts seemed to make a point, then
wander off in an altogether new direction. Where Watts
made a valiant effort was not in his historical methods,
but his conclusion. According to Watts, instead of war
being a science, as attempted by McNamara in Vietnam, or
even an art form, as proposed by Sun Tzu, it is little
more than semi-organized chaos. The side that builds more
flexibility into its structure and in its mindset has a greater chance of success. This is critically important to the success of the frontline troops. To go into battle as "masters of chaos" is infinitely superior than wondering why nothing ever seems to go as planned. Seeming to be in control of the uncontrollable is psychologically superior to uncertainty. To quote from the novel, *12 O'Clock High*, "'Consider yourself already dead,' the general said." For the men of the Eighth Air Force, survivability and sanity both rested upon being masters of chaos. It was counter-intuitive, but, according to Watts, critical.

Gerald Astor's *The Mighty Eighth* is dedicated to weaving oral interviews into a history, using archival information as documentation. Of wild tales of the wild-blue yonder, Astor's book fills the bill. However, it is woefully short on forwarding knowledge on the building of relations between U.S./U.K. populations at the local level. Some information, particularly recounted on pages 233-237, provided some anecdotal insight on localized relations to include "boy-meets-girl routines" and "liberty runs." Astor did not dwell on this subject and did not try to cubbyhole relationships into some
convenient stereotype. He left the little information provided to be of the anecdotal sort—a "flyer about town" story—rarely supporting more than the fact that each American seemed to have his own routine. Astor's work is no more, nor any less, than what it purports to be—an oral history.

Social and Local Histories of World War II

There are several books that localize World War II. In this genre, authors describe the activities of the war as they affect a particular region. Two books typical of this kind are Philip Ziegler's acclaimed London at War: 1939-194531 and the Norwich-published East Anglia at War: 1939-194532 by Derek E. Johnson.

Ziegler's work owes much of its primary source materials to the U.K. Public Records Office at Kew, outside of London, as well as the British Imperial War Museum. Therefore, due to the excellent archival resources of those two establishments, there is a natural inclination to infer the utility of this work. The problem, though, for the purposes of understanding the American presence in Britain, was the rather extreme method of introducing his chapter on the Americans by
giving it the chapter title: "The girls here walk out with niggers!" The chapter made a point about demonstrating the differences between Americans and the natives, even recounting a Mass Observation poll that while Londoners favored the Dutch by 73 percent, the Czechs by 64 percent and the Free French by 52 percent, the Americans were liked by only 33 percent. Of course, Ziegler did not mention a possible sympathy factor as only the Americans, in that grouping, were from a country unconquered by the Nazis.

Yet, Ziegler did seem to give the "American problem" an even hand, blaming members of all corners for exacerbating what unpleasantness that did exist. Ziegler admitted that even given the standards of the day, any American-caused crime wave was more of a "ripple."

Another, more modest example of localized history of the war is Johnson's work on the effects of the war on East Anglia. Since that region was the site of the greatest concentration of air fields, the flying aspect of the war received considerable mention. Johnson mentioned the American involvement with the region's infrastructure to some limited degree, but gave far more attention to rather lurid speculations about the death of Lieutenant
Joseph Kennedy, Jr. regarding Lt. Kennedy piloting what was, in effect, a flying bomb.

Many histories of World War II developed from a military history perspective, while some as previously mentioned, tied the events of the war to a specific region. Another form of relating the past is through social histories. In the case of World War II, social histories have dealt with the social interactions of people tied together by the overarching socially environmental condition that was the war.


Unfortunately, neither Reynolds' title, "Rich Relations," nor subtitle, "The American Occupation of Britain," accurately described the phenomena of U.S./U.K. relations in 1942-45. In seeming contradiction to his own title, Reynolds pointed out that America had just emerged from a severe depression that hit the country far harder than was the case in Britain. Further, while U.S. pay was
superior to most British servicemen of the same rank, this neither meant that Americans were in any sense "rich," nor were they "occupiers" any more than were those of the British commonwealth or exiled warriors of conquered countries. The disservice his title provided to the illumination of the subject cannot be ignored.

Further, while he did add much to the body of knowledge on U.S./U.K. relations, he failed to fully understand the total dynamics of U.S.A.A.F. relations with their local populations.

Britisher Roger Freeman's *The Friendly Invasion* was written to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the beginning of U.S.A.A.F. operations out of England. As such, it was not designed to be a critical piece on the American and English relations, although Freeman did not pull any punches regarding the worst transgressions of either side. He did gloss over the problems of American racial issues, particularly U.S. white and black relations in Britain. According to Freeman, these relations were far better than has been the common perception.

Considering that there were no black aviators and few black on-site ground support personnel in the Eighth Air Force, this is hardly a ringing endorsement of white/black
relations during the war as a whole. The famed Tuskegee Airmen, for example, flew with the 15th Air Force from the Mediterranean theater of operations.

Freeman is a master of the anecdotal tale, but he provided some statistical analysis to back up his assertions that, by and large, the Yanks and Brits got along. Freeman’s folly, which may be intentional, was not investigating, or at least reporting the reasons for a lack of airman enthusiasm for British home visits. This seeming aloofness by the Americans received no analysis. Freeman also spent little time on the planned public relations aspects of the relationships.

Public Relations Histories of World War II

Those who enjoy taking photographs are often the very people left out of most of the pictures in the album. The same phenomenon may be suggested for those whose job was to publicize others during World War II.

Individuals who have made the history of the practice of public relations their area of expertise have failed to include the relations of the Eighth Air Force with their British hosts. In his rather extensive book on the history of public relations, The Unseen Power, 36
communications historian Scott Cutlip virtually ignored the role of public relations not directly involved with domestic consumption. Almost no research indicated a determination of common practices within the field during this time, except that which was done by practitioners employed by the president or by major corporations at senior advisory levels. Cutlip's version of the history of public relations remains the primer in the field. His version is used by the Public Relations Society of America and the Universal Accreditation Board for their Accredited in Public Relations examinations. Further, Cutlip's version of the history of public relations has been widely quoted by others, to include Fraser Seitel in his college textbook, The Practice of Public Relations.

Vanessa Murphree in William Sloan's Perspectives on Mass Communication History provided scant comment on public relations histories and historians save those involved with "great men" studies such as Cutlip, or those concentrating on public relations' role in the economy or operating from an economic perspective.

This dissertation has the goal of expanding the accounting of the history of public relations to include a significant period of international public relations. This period was from 1942 through 1945, and the people
involved were hundreds of thousands of Americans and the population of Britain. While this dissertation includes information on military development and doctrine necessary to provide context to the public relations activities, it is not a military history. Instead, this is a communications history, more specifically a history of the field of public relations.

Notes


4 Ibid., 919-923.


8 Ibid., 433.

9 Coffey, Iron Eagle, 3.


12 Taylor, The Second World War, 81.

13 Ibid., 82.


16 Ibid., iv.


19 Ibid., 9.


22 Ibid., 12-25.

23 Ibid., 121.

24 Ibid., 16, 27, 54.

25 Perret, Winged Victory.

26 Ibid., 408-414.


28 Perret, Winged Victory, 375.

30 Astor, *The Mighty Eighth.*


34 Reynolds, *Rich Relations.*

35 Freeman, *The Friendly Invasion.*

36 Cutlip, *The Unseen Power.*

37 When the Public Relations Society of America “APR” accreditation program was merged with those of other public relations associations, such as the Florida Public Relations Association’s “APRP” accreditation program, the Cutlip, Center and Broom textbook, *Effective Public Relations*, was adopted as the basis for the accreditation examination. See the “Study Guide for the Accreditation in Public Relations (APR) Examination.” Public Relations Society of America, 1999.


CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

This study intends to discover and categorize public relations activities as they related to and affected the personnel of the Eighth Air Force in their relations with the British population serving as their hosts during the period of 1942-1945. This study used information from both archival and personal interview sources to determine the existence and scope of public relations activities during this period. As an objective of the research, information sought included any U.S. governmental and military programs established for the express purpose of building positive relations between U.S.A.A.F. personnel and their British hosts. Other information was sought on British government or military public relations programs to aid in U.S./U.K. relations, programs established outside of U.S. or British government or military headquarters that were designed to promote U.S./U.K. relations, and any program that, by its nature, would have the effect of improving U.S./U.K. relations.

Like many historical studies, this dissertation relies, primarily, on written sources. Primary sources include diaries, military manuals, military orders and
similar documents, public relations brochures and booklets, unit histories, newspapers, abstracts of police records, oral statements, and, perhaps most important, the original national government documents. These sources provide background information, suggest different avenues for research, and offer the facts from which to form conclusions.

Diaries provide the thoughts of an individual at the time of an event, rather than recollections challenged by time. Military manuals and other military documents show the level of training and the military thought and constraints of the period. The published and printed public relations brochures and booklets provide insight to the state of the art in 1940s public relations. Unit histories contribute a worm’s eye view of the effects of programs on a particular group of individuals. Police records can reveal the extremes of activities of local groups. Oral statements serve to fill gaps in records and give a sense of the time and how and why events of that time affected individuals.

The British government and American military files are particularly important as these are the two official entities charged with establishing structured public relations programs to aid relations between U.S. military personnel and the British citizenry.
As the primary sources were obtained from official British or American government agencies, their validity is as assured as such documents can be. The files of the British Foreign Office are of particular value as it was this agency that initiated many of the formal U.S./U.K. programs. The British Ministry of Information and U.S. Air Force records are critical as well. However, due to the need by intelligence agencies to determine public and military morale, some rather extraordinary primary documentation of personal sentiments is available -- intercepted/censored mail. As all mail was intercepted, a fairly substantial body of data was developed.

While the facts of particular public relations programs are provided by primary sources, secondary sources, particularly military histories, are invaluable as assets from which to forward a synthesis upon various events. Military historians also may note, for example, that the BOLERO committee, which was conceived to aid the American forces buildup in Britain, made a strenuous effort to build adequate housing for American servicemen. The energy of the BOLERO committee was not duplicated by earlier efforts on behalf of the hundreds of thousands of Canadian troops who arrived in Britain two years earlier. As a consequence, many Canadians lived with their British hosts. How did this affect U.S./U.K. and U.K./Canadian relations?
For the Americans, they lived in small oases of Yankee communities nestled in the British countryside -- more isolated from the neighboring English. This style of U.S. troop deployments for war has continued from World War II through the 1991 Desert Storm operation in the Persian Gulf. However, after World War II, U.S. families permanently assigned to overseas locations generally lived amongst their hosts. According to Dimbleby and Reynolds,¹ in post-war Great Britain, the East Anglia communities and the U.S. Air Force personnel have enjoyed very harmonious relations -- in sharp contrast to the early post-war experience of the U.S. Navy at Holy Loch in Scotland. What did the Air Force learn that the Navy did not?

When considering the various facets of U.S. Army Air Forces relations with the British during World War II, it can easily be argued that there are public relations lessons to be learned for modern military operations. Examination of data will pay particular attention to the formation of British public relations activities, particularly how the British organized their official public relations programs. Also, attention will be paid to the obstructions to these programs and to providing evidence that suggests the overall success of these programs. The American military effort to provide public relations training to their own personnel will be examined, particularly by accounting the various methods
of conducting such training. Further, there will be an examination of American efforts to provide their troops the services to support morale similar to British programs.

Implications

In seeking information to discover and categorize public relations activities as they affected U.S. Eighth Air Force personnel and their relations with their British hosts, a variety of sources were used. Sources were selected to reveal the extent of the British government’s role in setting up public relations programs on a broad scale to enhance U.S./U.K. relations. Other sources were sought to show the extent the American military leadership fomented good U.S./U.K. relations. Also, sources were sought that could suggest the many effective public relations programs conducted by those not normally associated with public relations activities.

The potential implications of the research are several. If Anglo-American public relations programs were planned by the British government, and if several organizations and individuals to promote and enhance good relations between Eighth Air Force personnel and their British hosts were formed, how were these organizations formed and organized? The answer to that question advances our understanding of the British government's
role and commitment to building effective public relations between their people and their American guests. Further, were the leaders of the Eighth Air Force adept at practicing effective public relations and did they practice this craft during the war? If the leadership understood the role of public relations, this may explain any evidence of positive relations between their personnel and the British, particularly if they actively put their knowledge into policy. Did public relations programs that were created vary in size and organization? If so, this speaks to the sophistication of the overall effort, but may also suggest uncoordinated activities.

In total, the investigation and accounting of the public relations activities of this period will fill gaps in the body of knowledge of public relations history.

A Note on Style and Terms

Since there are, essentially, some very distinct cross-culture and sub-cultural differences in usage of the English language between the various sources used for this study, some decisions on style had to be accomplished. The document itself is written in what is commonly called American Standard English. However, so as not to taint original meanings of various phrases, British English, to
include British-style spelling, is often used in direct quotes. Where it seems Britons are being quoted with Americanized spellings, it is probably due to the source from where the quote was derived. Dates are given in the standard American civilian month-day-year format unless presented as part of a document. Generally speaking, the British and the American military both use the day-month-year format.

U.S. Air Force terms are used for Air Force phrases and areas of protocol. This includes issues of abbreviations for rank and capitalization of various military operations. Because it is the custom to refer to or abbreviate the United States Air Force as U.S.A.F. or USAF, both are used herein as appropriate. In other matters of usage, the United States is abbreviated as "U.S." and the United Kingdom is abbreviated as "U.K." A list of U.S. Air Force rank abbreviations is attached as an appendix. When conflicts occur between American and British military terminology, the American format will be favored unless specifically noted.

Contemporary terms that enhance the understanding of the period will be used, but explained in endnotes to avoid confusion. The terms for World War II troops
included G.I. (Government Issue) for U.S. soldiers and airmen and "Tommies" for British ground forces only. Both GI and G.I. are used interchangeably due to quotes and book titles, although the G.I. abbreviation is favored in the narrative. The term "troops" is used for both air and ground personnel. Where air force personnel need to be distinguished from ground forces, they will be more clearly delineated with terms such as aircrew, Eighth Air Forces personnel and the like. Because it is common usage in the United States Air Force for "aircrew" to be a combined word, it is done here as well.

Since the American Red Cross is a distinctive organization from its British counterpart, it will always be identified as the American Red Cross or ARC. A list of British organizations and their abbreviations also is provided as an appendix. Since Britain was a more centrally governed entity than is the United States, "government" as a noun or adjective will refer to the central government headed by the Prime Minister, unless otherwise noted.

A number of pieces of correspondence are cited. Since the British during this period showed a remarkable degree of informality, probably due to the crush of the
responsibilities of that time, a piece of correspondence was often typed, with personal handwritten notes attached, and internal memos were often handwritten with initials, rather than signatures, serving to identify the writer. Therefore, some degree of standardization is attempted herein to identify types and origins of correspondence. Letters are identified as such if they are signed and go from one office or ministry to another. Memoranda are labeled as such if that piece of correspondence is initialed rather than signed, or is intra-office, or is actually called a "memorandum," even though intended for external use.

For the sake of convenience, the British honors abbreviated and attached after names in correspondence are deleted herein. However, the honors "Rt. Hon." and "Sir," plus military ranks, etc. are rendered as these help to identify the roles of these persons.

Notes

1 Dimbleby and Reynolds, An Ocean Apart, 294.

CHAPTER 4
BACKGROUND

History of U.S./U.K. Relations

For those Americans born after the beginning of World War II, Anglo-American relations have generally been regarded as close and compatriotic. Even post-war falling-outs such as the Suez crisis and the Vietnam War have been supplanted in the public's eye by more recent demonstrations of U.S./U.K. geopolitical cooperation to include the raid on Libya in the early 1980s, the 1991 Gulf War, and 1990s U.S./U.K. joint missions over Iraq and the Balkans. Until World War II, mutual suspicion was about as good as relations got. There are differences between Americans and the British that transcend the common language. These differences have been created by different histories, different challenges, and even a different military tradition.

The early explorers, trappers, pilgrims, and planters who left Britain to stake a claim in the New World, were, on occasion, the shining sons of the rising empire.
However, the vast majority of those splashing ashore at Plymouth Bay or tidewater Virginia were the lower-ordered sons of nobility, marginalized merchants, Highlanders fleeing the "Clearances," or the religiously outcast. In short, they had more of a stake in where they were going than where they had been. They were the new Americans. New World energy built the mighty cities, its waterways, and its transcontinental railroads. Americans were even the first to conquer the air. Sheer power and aggressive "can do" attitude overwhelmed the Rockies, the Alaskan cold, and Death Valley.

The patriots in 1776 did not outfox the British terribly often. Instead, they blundered at battle more often than they were able to stage brilliant set-piece victories. Up to World War II, Americans had been relatively successful in their wars, if not always in their battles. Perhaps this had to do with the non-professional nature of its military. Perhaps, as a democracy, America just took too long to get ready for war. But it can be argued that the democracy builds better "teamwork" than dictatorships. To Americans, it is not as important to outsmart your opponent as it is to demonstrate a stronger will.
The War of 1812, waged between the new American nation and the British Empire, holds four images for posterity. The first is the mythical durability of the oak hull of the U.S.S. Constitution (Old Ironsides). The second is the resilience and stubbornness of Oliver Hazard Perry at the Battle of Lake Erie who, even though losing his flagship, held out long enough to send the oddly eloquent message: "We have met the enemy and they are ours..." Third, it was watching the dandies get chased by the British out of Washington long enough to have them torch the president's house -- and then have Fort McHenry withstand "the bombs bursting in air" to thwart the further advance of the British. Finally, as the crowning glory, a handful of good old boys and bayou pirates sending the flower of Wellington's troops packing with unseemly alacrity from New Orleans.⁸

That the British army generally performed better than the American was not of particular concern to the young country as it did not alter its military structures appreciably until World War II.⁹

Historically, when the Americans met the British, whether during their revolutionary struggle, the exercising of the prerogatives of a new republic,
establishing western boundaries or proclaiming hemispheric hegemony, the U.S. could rightly feel they had taken the weight of British power and found the British failed to exert the moral fiber to finish the game.  

Other Anglo-American issues were of more concern. The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 had the potential to bring the U.S. and Britain into conflict if the Japanese were to aggressively pursue their own Pacific interests. The militant nature of the Japanese in the first 20 years of the 20th century worried the Americans.

Indeed, when World War I began, Americans were fairly ambivalent about their own loyalties unless they had an ethnic stake in the struggle. Certainly, the rather politically strong enclaves of German- and Irish-Americans were strongly anti-British. Only the government and big business ties to Great Britain tilted the balance toward American intervention on the side of the allies. Even then, the rallying cry was "Lafayette, we have returned." Americans were not interested in preserving the British Empire and considered British sacrifices in the early days of the war as upper-class callousness toward their own men - not a sacrifice made to make the world safe for democracy. That was the role of the Americans. And when
they were done, they bade good bye and good riddance to the horrors and decaying embers that remained of the moral fire of the Old World. Americans turned their back on Europe and from World War I to World War II dealt with their own concerns.

From the time of the American Revolution, the British left the temperate middle of North America to the ex-colonists. The British then cast their eyes to other sectors of the world. By the time of World War I, Britain controlled the vast majority of world trade, and her subjects were beneficiaries of the toil of colonial labor. So while British citizens abhorred American Jim Crow, many Americans felt the British Empire was an immoral structure, constructed and maintained by the backs of colonists. Of course the average Brit was not a colonial master any more than every American was a flaming racist.

**U.S./U.K. During the War**

To meet their obligations within the December 23, 1941 Arcadia accords, the U.S. agreed to send G.I.s to the British Isles. Considering that the U.S. Army envisioned a five-million men (and women) force for Europe, this was going to be quite a deployment.
The U.S. Army realized that morale may be a problem with this amount of ground troops and airmen deployed far from home. The U.S. Army pushed for the authorization of overseas service ribbons, a source of amusement to British soldiers who felt that the Yanks getting a medal for merely arriving at the plot of soil the British called "home" was a bit ridiculous.\textsuperscript{17}

The British, from their experience of hosting other nationalities, were aware of the difficulties of foreign troops quartered on British soil. The Americans, on the other hand, were not terribly experienced with this sort of phenomena, having sent troops overseas only reluctantly in the 150-year history of the country. This is not to say the Americans did not anticipate problems. They did—and they were quick to learn and adapt. There were several factors that influenced the U.S./British relations in World War II, some reaching other theaters of operation outside of Western Europe. However, both sides were keen to minimize problems of relationships at whatever level such relationships emerged.\textsuperscript{18}

At the top, the Americans and the British enjoyed cordial relations, but were wary of political intrigue and submerged agenda. While it may be assumed easily enough
that U.S. leaders were unwilling to support British efforts to maintain British imperial hegemony in various parts of the world, this does not appear to be a national goal. Although the preservation of the British Empire took a distant back seat to other political and military missions, there is little to suggest that the top U.S. planners were very interested in upsetting whatever balance may still exist after the war.\textsuperscript{19}

Therefore, U.S./U.K. relations were not much affected by vague anti-colonial philosophies at the top of the Roosevelt government. One can, perhaps easily enough, argue that it was in the U.S. interest to see a known and reliable ally help maintain post-war stability that would be along the line of the known pre-war structure. Naturally, this was not a strongly articulated goal by any member of government bowing to businessmen and populists. British hegemony meant a British control of certain markets and a loss of freedom for free international trade. Although trade was in the national interest, other issues around the world were not. To Americans of the late 1930s and early 1940s, the "white man's burden" was heavy enough at home.\textsuperscript{20} So, all in all, the Washington power structure had no real plans to aid the dismantling of
British power. That the British lost their empire after the war and Americans rushed in to fill much of the void was more a factor of British decisions, British domestic pressures, colonial unrest and natural international market tendencies. Aside from some issues of trade, there were no political or economic reasons in 1941 to keep the British at arm's length.\textsuperscript{21}

Though some senior American officers seemed unaware of the fact, in strategic aims of military operations, the cards of both the Americans and the British were laying pretty much face up. While the British emphasis on the Mediterranean theater of operations was held with some suspicion by American planners, the British had other than the preservation of a post-war empire in their thoughts. Both sides realized numerous factors weighed heavily on British military decisions throughout the war, and these factors were often at odds with the aims and strategies of the Americans. But while some strain between the allies was caused by adverse opinions regarding the aims, strategies and conduct of the war, post-war aims were roughly in congruence, that is, the maintenance of peace and a minimum of international disturbance to trade.\textsuperscript{22}
Therefore, the overall differences were minor enough. The social, political, strategic, and psychological forces that cause political leaders to gravitate to each other were certainly in effect with the top U.S./U.K. leadership. There were cases where U.S./U.K. factions were split along other lines rather than national, with the joint position of the leaders of the U.S. and U.K. strategic bomber forces adverse to ground command priorities prior to D-Day being an excellent example.23

There were far more reasons for the two nations to cooperate than otherwise. The primary reason was the sheer military necessity. On her own, Britain did not have the resources to dislodge Hitler from Europe. Even the current Russian successes were uncertain to be permanent or decisive, if the U.S. decided to contain its fight to the Pacific.24

Prior to 1942, Britain had little to show for its military efforts other than to resist being overwhelmed.25 It could not launch offensive actions directly at the Germans with the exception of aerial assault. British efforts at the periphery of German military power were not terribly encouraging. While Britain executed an astounding retreat/evacuation at Dunkirk and a superbly
executed defense over her own skies, other operations seem to meet with success against those enemy forces that were not German. 26

Britain did succeed brilliantly in sinking both French and Italian navies, which, ironically, proved to the Japanese such tactics were possible. 27 Although the British, heretofore, had proved it could defeat Italian armies, they lost battle after battle to German troops whenever ground was contested. Defeats in Norway, France, Greece, Crete, and North Africa were striking examples. The British Tommy knew his German counterpart and felt the frustration of meeting a foe superior in both tactics and training. 28 While the pendulum did eventually swing the other way, it was not until the power of the Soviet Union and the United States were brought to bear. To the British, it would have been wonderful to have handled the task themselves, but since they could not, they clearly had to make the best of the situation. 29

The operation for the U.S. to ship, and the British to accept, American troops and airmen for the purposes of the invasion of Europe and its supporting activities was titled "BOLERO." The Maurice Ravel piece was selected due
to its steady amplification or crescendo -- implying an ever-increasing supply of American troops and supplies. However, despite the Army’s visions, Churchill and Roosevelt, while establishing the framework for an expanding deployment, personally decided on little more than the U.S. buildup of its bomber fleet and American troops assuming the defense of Northern Ireland, thus releasing British “Tommies” for deployment elsewhere. Thus, BOLERO began with an uncertain rhythm.

Churchill set policy; his field marshals carried them out. Churchill was not blind to the manpower equation of Allied versus Axis strength once America was in the war. Save some massive strategic blunder, U.S. and U.S.S.R. economic power would overwhelm the Axis military at some future point in time. Churchill understood that eventuality on the day Japanese bombs rained down on Oahu. The question wasn’t whether the Allies would win. It was a question of the final effect of that inevitable victory. To a patriot and politician with Churchill’s vision, where Britain stood after the war’s dust cleared was critically important. Britain could not afford the massive losses of lives of more populous nations. It could not afford a loss of perceived power and still hope to retain its
overseas possessions. And, for Churchill and his political party to have any standing after the war, success must be as painless as possible.\textsuperscript{33}

There was, therefore, nothing in all that to recommend a cross-channel invasion of France in 1942 or even 1943.\textsuperscript{34} The nightmare of the ignominious retreat of the British Expeditionary Force from France in 1940 was enough of a reminder that any duplication of failure would be a catastrophe of national and timeless proportions. Victories build morale. Churchill appreciated that fact of warfare and saw opportunities for victory in North Africa, where extended supply lines for the Germans made them vulnerable. The British strength was in its navy. It could control the sea-lanes and supply its forces -- so long as those forces were small facing similar numbers. Churchill, again, understood such grand strategy and made his thoughts clear to his marshals. The Americans, on the other hand, knew that British foreign interests lay, in part, in the Arab world and were, thus, a bit leery of supporting British operations in that region.\textsuperscript{35}

The Americans faced an extended war on two fronts, with one adversary already demonstrating an ability to strike effectively at U.S. possessions.\textsuperscript{36} U.S. forces were
committed from Iceland to Alaska, and from Northern Ireland to Australia. Scurrying around the Mediterranean after pockets of German and Italian troops seemed to Americans to be a further dissipation of troops, going against a premier doctrine of war: generals win when their troops are massed at the point of attack. The Americans felt a dissipation rather than a massing. The U.S. generals deciding U.S. military and therefore geopolitical issues had deep-felt fundamental problems with any leakage in troop concentration against the German center.

The British, though, were possessed by their demons of military failures. They had a palatable fear of the real possibility of the entire war being a Pyrric victory with Britain collapsing on the field of conquest. Therefore, the British were as a Greek phalanx against American opposition to a North African campaign in lieu of a cross-channel invasion.

Due to the inability of American generals to present a coherent position in the face of British insistence on North African diversion as the first step to Berlin, the "TORCH" invasion of North Africa was agreed upon. The British acquiesced to the overall command of General
Dwight Eisenhower for the North Africa campaign, but his whole layer of deputies were British. The Americans were to have, initially, a rough time in North Africa, but eventually proved to be competent enough to help drive the Germans out. The British, far more veteran at this point, forgot their own long road to military competency and much talk was made by the British soldier commented on the lack of American ability. British feeling of martial superiority was to be a recurring theme in many quarters as the war progressed.\(^4\)\(^1\)

On 20 February 1942, General Ira C. Eaker and six officers arrived in Britain to begin the arduous task of creating what was to become the "Mighty" Eighth Air Force.\(^4\)\(^2\) Eaker arranged with his British counterparts to assume the occupation of eight airfields, upon which the British had begun construction.\(^4\)\(^3\)

However, the Battle for Midway in the Pacific did much to waylay the combat crews, with the first not arriving until May 11. At that point, the British were providing the chief supply and construction support, but that would change.\(^4\)\(^4\) The British favored this gradual approach, confident at this point for her own safety, and reluctant to commit ground troops to an early cross-
channel invasion. Rather, the British pushed for, and were eventually successful in opening U.S./British joint operations against the European Axis powers in North Africa, then in Italy.

The U.S.-favored operation, titled "ROUNDUP," was a 1943 cross-channel concentrated invasion of France, rather than parceling out American troops around the world. An emergency plan, "SLEDGEHAMMER," was even drawn up to deploy invasion troops as early as the autumn of 1942 in the event the Eastern Front struggles between Germany and Russia provided either an extraordinary opportunity or a threat of a complete Russian disaster. Both evaporated in favor of TORCH. So, in the end, the British prevailed, and it was not until June 1944 that U.S./U.K./Canadian troops finally crossed the English Channel as an invasion force. That operation became known well to history as "OVERLORD." By that time, much water traveled under the Anglo-American bridge of relations.

As soon as the initial American deployment began in 1942, two special BOLERO committees were formed to sort out the various problems and issues inevitable with cross-cultural logistics of any size. The requirements of the various invasion plans meant BOLERO was a tricky affair.
Eventually, the quickly deployed combat troops were followed up by the support functions, but SLEDGEHAMMER meant the cutting edge had to be in place quickly. Since air power was a critical aspect of SLEDGEHAMMER, U.S. aircrews were a top priority, and to maintain active aviation functions, maintenance assets and other support services were required. Unfortunately, the conflicting requirements resulted in patchy, confused logistics, making life fairly miserable for Americans existing in hastily constructed facilities. 47

Further complicating matters was the rivalry between General James E. Chaney, the man-in-place for the American contingent, and the U.S.A.A.F. senior aviators headed by Generals Arnold, Spaatz, and Eaker. Chaney assumed the U.S. Air Forces would operate under British "directions" without its own headquarters function. To subordinate the U.S. Air Forces to the British was an anathema to Arnold, who resolved to tear the air arm away from the U.S. Army once conditions favored such a move. A separate acting U.S. air operation in Europe was central to that vision, and Arnold would have nothing to do with British control of U.S. air assets. 48
Chaney lost this battle, and for him, the war was over. He was relieved in mid-June 1942 and replaced by General Dwight Eisenhower. Eisenhower’s marching orders were not to allow U.S. forces to be employed piecemeal into allied armies. This General Pershing non-integration doctrine of 1917 was to be carried through in 1942. Eisenhower was a fortuitous choice for U.S./U.K. relations. He was seen as “less nationalistic than ... Eaker and Spaatz.” Eisenhower established his policy early. Eisenhower told his staff: “Gentlemen, we have one chance and only one of winning this war and it is in complete and unqualified partnership with the British...”

While the U.S.A.A.F. commanders were very conscious of needing British support and did well during the war in obtaining it, the airmen stated their positions in stark terms. Their agenda was clear: there could be no appearance of subordinating U.S. Air Forces missions and assets into any other organization or program if the air arm was to make a post war case for independence from the U.S. Army. In keeping with this aim, Ira Eaker allegedly told an Army staff member, “I’ll never take an order from a Britisher,” while Spaatz insisted that U.S. airmen “must
not be permitted to lose their identity through integration into the British command system."  

Meanwhile, the British kept their own counsel regarding the SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP schemes so long as the Yanks did not do anything rash and kept the supplies coming. Eventually, the gig was up and the British owned up to the fact they were not keen in having a go at a cross-channel invasion that would be ill-supported by the Americans. Considering the BOLERO logistics, the British had a point. The Americans attempted to bluff or otherwise persuade the British that if no cross-channel invasion were in the works, then the U.S. would pack up its troops and deploy them in the Pacific. The British were unimpressed by the ploy. The Americans gave in and supported British plans for Mediterranean operations until such time as a proper buildup of American forces meant a more-impressive U.S./U.K. cross-channel showing.

American polls showed a relative lack of support for U.S. operations against Germany, as compared to what there was against the Japanese. Even so, the U.S. leadership had committed to a "Europe first" policy, and the British intended to hold them to it -- so long as that policy followed British guidelines.
In terms of prestige and military leverage with its ally, the TORCH invasion was a British high water mark. The turnabout from earlier North African defeats provided British planners the shot in the national psyche for which they had hoped. A succession of British defeats in North Africa and the Pacific did not leave them eager for a debacle on the scale of the retreat at Dunkirk. British morale called for British victories - and North Africa was a good place to start.  

When the U.S./U.K. invasion of Northwest Africa, Operation TORCH, began in late 1942, even the Eighth Air Force, along with its commander, Tooey Spaatz, fell victim to losing resources to North Africa. The Eighth lost 25,000 men, 75 percent of its supplies, and some 1,000 aircraft to TORCH by June 1943. Also leaving was Brit-friendly Eisenhower, who was described as possessing a "talent for public relations and (a) passion about Anglo-American harmony." Left behind was General Russell P. "Scrappy" Hartle, a less-dynamic character who, it appears, was given the caretaker position instead of a battlefield command due to previous "mediocre performance."
The TORCH operations and its effects deeply touched Eighth Air Force operations. Of considerable importance was the drainage of men, weapons, and supplies to support the TORCH invasion. Ira Eaker, seeing his aviators and assets heading south, complained: "It is a heart-breaking business to see our bomber force going downhill instead of uphill." What massing of bombers that may have occurred without TORCH was soon a forgotten dream. The Eighth Air Force, therefore, started slowly. Without a massed aerial armada, results were difficult to judge. Any deficiencies in operations could be attributed to a lack of proper mass and the flexibility massive support provides. What also may have occurred, though one can only speculate, is that TORCH prevented a greater slaughter of Eighth Air Force aviators as the P-51 and advances in B-17 armament were still a year and a half way. Whether one can win an argument that TORCH was worth the effort, Eighth Air Force assets sent to TORCH, one can counter argue, may have been better used there than ineffective thrusts against the European Continent in 1942.

Another byproduct of the TORCH diversions was a slowing of the buildup of the human tsunami that was to become Eighth Air Force personnel in East Anglia. While
the waves of Americans still overwhelmed Britain, TORCH operations and the subsequent Sicily/Italy campaigns relieved a bit of the pressure. One can only imagine the effect of these troops spending two years in training for D-Day on British soil.\textsuperscript{62}

When senior U.S. officials and their British counterparts convened in Casablanca in January 1943, Churchill pushed for an invasion of Sicily, leading to an Italian campaign. The Americans, once again, were not pleased to see forces suctioned away from the cross-channel invasion. However, American internal squabbling left them presenting a less-than-united front to the calm, pre-sorted British. "One might say we came, we listened and we were conquered," lamented General Albert Wedemeyer.\textsuperscript{63}

Adding to the weakened American position was the simple math of numbers of available forces. It would take until D-Day 1944 before there were more American divisions in place against the European Axis than that of the British Empire. Odd as it may seem, there were more U.S. Army troops in action, at the end of 1942, against the Japanese than actively facing German and Italian troops. That equation did not change until May 1943.\textsuperscript{64}
Only at the Teheran Conference, after TORCH was secured, with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin siding with the American position, was Churchill brought to bay regarding the setting of an invasion of France. The period set was May 1944. Various logistical hang-ups would eventually move that date to June 6 -- a day when weather tides and the lunar cycle were ideal, at least enough.65

While ground actions impacted air operations directly, they also affected all aspects of air force activities. The ground operations dragged air assets for an African excursion and then, prior to the Normandy invasion in 1944, joined in swamping England with sheer numbers of ground troops that led to direct competition for supplies and other benefits. For a short period after the end of TORCH and with the Army ground troops crawling up the hard backbone of Italy supported by a separate air force entity, the 15th Air Force, U.K.-based American airmen saw their own numbers begin to increase. In the period between May to December 1943, "the number of operational heavy bomber groups...jumped from 16 to nearly 38."66 Included in the buildup were an additional 3,000 aircraft, operating out of 66 airbases by the end of 1943. Adding to the congestion were 75,000 support personnel
sent over on "casual status," that is, as individuals rather than in units. Plugged in wherever needed, these soldiers-without-portfolio were ill-trained, ill-disciplined, and a problem for American authorities. ⁶⁷

By the time of the D-Day invasion in mid-1944, U.S. airmen saw their population percentage, vis a vis the entire American contingent, decrease until only 28 percent were U.S.A.A.F. personnel. Ground troops awaiting D-Day constituted 40 percent, while support personnel rounded out most of the remainder. ⁶⁸

When General Hartle outlived his usefulness he was replaced by U.S.A.A.F.'s General Frank Andrews. A solid leader with a sensitivity for Anglo-American relations, Andrews spent much of his time assisting in the buildup of the Eighth Air Force, during this time being the only "big show" in Britain. However, in May 1943, Andrews may have demonstrated the old adage about there never being "old, bold pilots" when it appears he disregarded warnings about poor weather in Iceland and flew into a mountain -- killing himself and his entire on-board staff. ⁶⁹

When Andrews was replaced by General Jacob Devers, new programs between U.S. and U.K. troops were created. However, Devers was not going to be the Supreme Commander
of the D-Day invasion, and, therefore, his power and prestige were limited.\textsuperscript{70}

The ebb and flow of ground troops meant the steady population in Britain remained the support personnel, usually a section of the Army prone to morale problems, and the personnel of the U.S.A.A.F., with its ground echelons living a totally benign existence compared to the surreal war facing the aircrews with their lifestyle of breakfast, war, and dinner.\textsuperscript{71}

The bulk of Eighth Air Force units and its hundreds of thousands of airmen were located in Norfolk and Suffolk. "It was as if 130 airbases had been dropped down in the state of Vermont," stated Reynolds.\textsuperscript{72} Indeed, in Suffolk there was one G.I. for every six civilians. In Wiltshire, located in Southwestern England, the ratio began approaching one American to two Brits, reaching near parity just before D-Day.\textsuperscript{73} Aside from the social strain caused by the saturation of English soil by foreign troops, there were logistic problems as well. Traffic accidents probably were inevitable. When young men behind the steering wheels of big trucks began to motor along on narrow English lanes, driving on the left side of the road rather than on the right as in North America, accidents
occurred, with 372 fatalities between June 1942 to March 1944.74

Accommodations for Eighth Air Force began with their headquarters. To ease communications between the airfields, the British air forces and the center of power that was London, the Daws Hill Lodge near the R.A.F. headquarters at High Wycombe, northwest of London, was selected. The needs of the U.S.A.A.F. outweighed the current occupiers of the lodge -- the Wycombe Abbey girls' school. The school protested, but the British Defense Regulations of the period permitted the government to clear out the girls.75 The officers took over the offices; the enlisted bunked in the student dormitories. It is a common enough story that the young enlisted men began to rouse the officers with a cacophony of message bells. Puzzled, the officers tracked down the ringing. What they discovered quickly became another in the lore of the U.S. Air Force. In the dorms, above the push buttons for message bells were the signs: "If Mistress is desired, Ring Bell."76

The concern of Britons for the welfare of their American cousins was, perhaps, best exemplified by "a flood" of offers for the Yanks to occupy their homes for
hospital beds. As it turned out, there was a need for beds, but otherwise nothing the British infrastructure was unable to handle.  

What was desperately needed to build up the Eighth were airfields - plenty of runways and support facilities. Existing airfields were given over by the British, or the Americans took over during British construction, or the Yanks built the remainder themselves. Some 500 airfields in total were built in Britain during World War II, using enough concrete, one historian claimed, to build a three-lane highway 4,000 miles long. At the height of the construction flurry, in 1942, "a new airfield was being started, on average, every three days."  

Not all Anglo-American relations regarding real estate assets were congenial. Negotiations for a transit hospital, where critically wounded would receive treatment that could not wait for a regular hospital, came to an impasse. The Americans had very specific requirements, due to the nature of the hospital. Since it was a transit hospital, it needed to be near a railhead and good roads close to an English port, where casualties would be expected to flow on D-Day. The British offered up swampland and the like. The Americans, quite naturally,
were not keen to locate where transportation would bog down. One suitable meadow meeting all the U.S. requirements hit a snag when the farmer enlisted the help of the Ministry of Agriculture. The farmer worried that the hospital would destroy the grazing ground for his 80 head of cattle. The British War Office offered up some more swampland until the American colonel in charge of negotiations made the point that he could not understand the British preference for the fourscore of cows over thousands of wounded Americans. Some weak reassurances of an eventual agreement did not suit the indignant colonel, who followed up with a warning that either the issue got solved within 24 hours or U.S. authorities above his pay grade would take the matter up with senior British authorities. While the British took 23 of the 24 hours to sort out the issue, the colonel got his pasture.79

Other American construction needs were given, to British eyes, reasonable effort, but U.S. officials were often enough put off by civilian contract work.80 Labor shortages and poor workmanship added to the problems, as did differing electrical currents and other variations between U.S. and U.K. supplies and equipment. To the Americans, the British just were not “can do” enough,
while the Americans, to the British eye, held to excessively high standards. Add weather, plus mud, and the accommodation situation became a real headache.\textsuperscript{81}

In spite of labor and other construction woes, the Americans and British coordination and cooperation at the highest levels were forged by TORCH and would strengthen as the war progressed. Deviations from that degree of cooperation were more caused by individuals than by disagreements over grand strategy.\textsuperscript{82}

\textbf{U.S./U.K. Civilian Leadership}

While there are several biographies, and even Winston Churchill’s massive autobiography, worth accessing to describe the civilian leadership of the war years, a contemporary, popular mass media portrayal was provided by Time magazine's "Man of the Year" feature. The Time pieces are useful partly as a standardized comparison and partly as commonly read portrayals. What they potentially reveal is both the journalistic standard of the day and the U.S. journalistic perception of the two leaders, at least for the editors of one highly popular news weekly. From 1940 through 1942, Time featured the three leaders of the major allied powers as their "Man of the Year."
Churchill was featured in 1940, Franklin Roosevelt in 1941, and Joseph Stalin in 1942. Time's annual selection is generally based on the individual who had the greatest impact on world events. Thus, those whose impact was blatantly anti-social, such as the 1938 selection of Adolph Hitler, still merited consideration in 1940. Americans received Time's 1940 essay and tribute to Winston Churchill in language clearly unabashed. Churchill, according to Time, was the right man, at the right time leading a righteous cause. Churchill was a vital link between peacetime, and fretful America and embattled Britain. According to Churchill himself in a later comment, he was an ardent suitor of America as if she were a reluctant, but very eligible débutante. Born of an American mother and the heir of one of Britain's leading families, Churchill was the ideal image for Americans, and he rarely failed to enhance that image through brilliant oratory and dramatic gestures.

Churchill, according to the article, was backed by a nation of "small men." These men were simple, rough around the edges, but resilient. To pick an American equivalent to Time's characterization of the average Briton, it would be the common Pittsburgh steelworker -
not the typical American image of Hollywood actor or Western cowboy. And that was, perhaps, the strength of the article. It downplayed the glamorous R.A.F. rake or the haughty arrogance of the Regular Army brigadier. Time reinforced an uncommon stereotype, the equanimous Britisher whose resiliency was to be both admired and counted upon. And if you were a steelworker from Clairton or Bethlehem, or a miner from New Castle, Pennsylvania or the iron shield of Minnesota, or even a Maine fisherman, you knew this "typical" Englishman. You saw him every day in the shaving mirror. Your kids called him "Dad." Thus, while Churchill was larger than life, the people he governed were like many Depression-era Americans. It was the right imagery at the right time.87

Contrasting the Time 1940 article to 1941's reveals some common points for comparison.88 In 1940, Churchill is portrayed as multi-dimensional - with a personal history, a stacked-deck of talents and a leader representing people of lesser abilities, but of plain and resolute character. FDR, on the other hand, is only a sketch, noted more for his pivotal role as the U.S. president than any personal quality. Most of the article argued why others were unworthy of the honor of Time's "Man of the Year" honor.
Only three paragraphs of the more than 25 paragraphs were dedicated to Roosevelt and his contributions. *Time*'s selection was based, as it states rather bluntly in its closing statement, on the opinion that "he was the man of 1941 because the country he leads stands for the hopes of the world." 89

FDR's fellow countrymen were not mentioned as a striking, stereotypical whole as was the case with Britons in the 1940 article. While some Americans were portrayed as blind to the signals of the onrushing tide of war, the Chinese and Russian people were long-suffering, but resolute in the face of evil enemies. 90

One point is important to make here, though. The following year, *Time* failed to renew the credentials of Winston Churchill as "Man of the Year" largely, it said, because "after more than two years of war under his leadership, Britain was still losing campaigns." In essence, Churchill the politician was a bit betrayed by Churchill the defense minister. 91

Because Winston Churchill served as both head of government and as the defense minister for the United Kingdom, he held a prominent role in U.S. military relations with the British. Winston Churchill is,
perhaps, more an image of World War II than any other person save, perhaps, Adolph Hitler. Roosevelt was already in his third term by the time America entered the war. Churchill's ascent to power was a result of the war, and he fell from power just as the war waned.92

For the British, the tone and tempo, as well as the direction, of the war came from its Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. The British parliamentary system allows for a far stronger and singular governmental structure than is the case in America. Given certain demographics, the party in power can remain in power for quite a considerable length of time. The Prime Minister also enjoys a number of luxuries the American president does not have. First, the division of power that Americans take for granted does not exist in Britain. There is no separation between the legislative and executive branches of national government. The judiciary does not possess the judicial review powers of its American counterpart, and the strongly divided roles included in the federalism system of the U.S. is not experienced in Great Britain.93 It is an oddity that the American state of Florida enjoyed a far more independent structure than the Kingdom of Scotland -- and even more so
than Wales. It has only been in the last year of the 20th century that Scotland wrestled some semblance of independence with the limited-powers parliament of its own.\footnote{94}

The Prime Minister did not even have to deal with the time-consuming panoply of chief of state the U.S. president faces. That ceremonial role is reserved for the King or Queen.\footnote{95} Thus, the Prime Minister was able to operate in almost perfect autonomy under the cover of the Royal Family.\footnote{96}

Other leaders, such as Neville Chamberlain, did not possess the internal vision and energy to transform political opportunity to political power the way Churchill managed to do.\footnote{97} For the purposes of this study, Churchill’s administration, spanning from 1940-1945, is the only one considered. By the time he was unseated by Atlee, Churchill’s power had waxed, waned, and left an indelible mark on the course of the war. His is the force that guided his nation’s military and civil fortunes as probably no Western leader since Napoleon. Indeed, Stalin chided Churchill that the British leader was, in fact, a dictator.\footnote{98}
Churchill was the son of a British blueblood with a glorious lineage that stretched back to the legendary John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, victor at the battle of Blenheim against the forces of Louis XIV. Churchill’s mother was an American heiress who brought more charm than money to the marriage. However, prior to a late '20s visit to the States, Churchill had an animosity toward the United States. But traveling the vast country and being treated like royalty -- including making a killing in the U.S. stock exchange -- changed his mind.

Churchill spent quite a bit of energy in the years leading up to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor trying to woo the U.S. into the fray. From the fall of France until the German invasion of the Soviet Union in mid-1941, Britain stood as the only major power actively opposed to Nazi Germany. To the British, and their leader, the math was chilling. Their small island nation had its resources spread out throughout its colonial empire. Japanese saber rattling and German submarine and surface raiders threatened to cut Britain off from all potential help. Sitting idle was the U.S. Navy, one of the world’s largest and most professional naval forces, as well as the world’s largest industrial base in America.
Churchill traveled across the Atlantic to personally meet with Roosevelt in the sheltered waters off the Canadian coast. The British came with hat in hand and left with no engagement commitment, but the United States had begun a series of escalated moves to aid the British. There were the famous destroyers for navy bases trade and then the quasi-legal lend-lease scheme. In light of the isolationist movement in the U.S., Roosevelt could not overstep his authority to bring the U.S. into the war, so he gave all support short of the war, even stationing U.S. troops in Iceland and placing U.S. destroyers in harm’s way. Some of the destroyers fell afoul of German U-boats, including the U.S.S. Reuben James.

Despite the best efforts of Churchill, the Americans would not bite. It would take the Japanese to push the United States into the war. Once the Americans entered the fray, the British attitude shifted. No longer courting the Americans, Churchill now felt that the Yanks were to be partners -- with the British leading the dance.

Early U.S./British meetings found the Americans in organizational disarray, with the British better prepared to negotiate grand strategy. Churchill’s relationship
with the Americans is worth a closer examination as it set the tone for the entire U.K./U.S. relationship.

Churchill was a prodigious consumer of alcohol, and Americans responsible for official publications and documents, according to historian David Irving, were kind enough to have purged any reference of this vice from their pages. However, private observers were not so circumspect in their own papers. Irving stated that Churchill seemed indifferent to the effects of his actions on the enemy - and barely more sensitive to his own people. Churchill displayed stereoscopic pictures of the British firebombing of Dresden, which Irving melodramatically compared to Hitler pinning "up color photographs of Auschwitz or Buchenwald for visiting celebrities." He was a famous orator, brightening drab parliamentary debate - and when sober, an exceptional, inspiring speaker.

Between the wars, Churchill's personal and political fortunes ebbed and flowed, and when it was at its lowest, friend Brendan Bracken landed him a 7,800-pound salary job. Churchill would return Bracken the favor by making him his Minister of Information, an appointment that would
have a huge impact on U.S./U.K. national and local relations.\textsuperscript{110}

Making a few more pounds, he wrote reviews for the tabloid \textit{News of the World}. He also earned a few dollars from selling articles to an American publisher.\textsuperscript{111}

As a 1930s outsider, Churchill took on the government’s lack of attention to air defense. His dire predictions of national disaster due to German air forces were grossly premature - and may have helped to create an atmosphere of undue fear of German prowess. This exaggerated perception came to roost at Munich in 1939.\textsuperscript{112}

After continuous miscues by Chamberlain, including the Munich crisis, Churchill was selected to succeed him just in time to watch France fall to the German onslaught. Churchill would remain the Prime Minister for the next five years, successfully integrating the Americans into the British scheme for winning the war, but losing his influence over events as the years wore on. But, in 1942, when the Americans began to arrive in Britain in numbers, Churchill’s shadow loomed large over the entire Anglo-American relationship.
U.S. Military relations

Military historian Samuel Huntington contemplated the evolution of the U.S. military's relationship with the U.S. government and found that World War II created a significant change in that relationship. According to Huntington, the three key aspects of American civil-military relations in World War II may be stated baldly with only minor oversimplifications.

First. So far as the major decisions in policy and strategy were concerned, the military ran the war.

Second. In this area of policy and strategy, the military ran the war just the way the American people and American statesmen wanted it run.

Third. On the domestic front, control over economic mobilization was shared between military and civilian agencies.¹¹³

This alteration between what was a fairly placid, rather ignored pre-war military and the version that fought World War II was a result of a number of factors perhaps best seen from the vantage of the post-war years. Until the era of the "military-industrial complex," the phenomenon of America lavishing supplies on its own
defense is, outside of perhaps the Civil War, totally without precedent. Therefore, American post-war observers can understand from that latter-day perspective the modern U.S. military often given the tools and leeway needed to finish the job it started.114

According to Stephen Ambrose, "one of the more striking aspects of American foreign policy during the war was the almost complete failure to use any formal structure within the government to set national policy."115 Filling this void was the U.S. military. To Huntington, however, the military lost its insularity and apparently a degree of professionalism when, having assumed this leadership, it accepted the nation's value system as its own. Huntington wrote, "The power of the professional military leaders reached unprecedented heights in World War II. But they scaled these summits only by sacrificing their military outlook and accepting the national values. The military leaders blended with the liberal environment; they lost their alien and aloof character and emerged as the supreme embodiment of the national purpose."116

But the military stood omnipotent only on foreign soil. The influence of the military was felt more with respect to external policy and grand strategy, where the
military easily moved in to fill a government vacuum. On the domestic front, on the other hand, the original decision was for civilian control of economic mobilization, and powerful civilian interest groups rivaled the military. Although the military carved out a broad sphere of influence, they were never able to establish the same supremacy that they did on the international side. This was not, in retrospect, completely unfathomable. The U.S. prior to World War II was not really an international presence. However, its military leaders were about as worldly as officers from any other nation. Many of the leaders of World War II already had served overseas or were used to overseas deployments.

But the military was rapidly filling its ranks with civilian recruits and officers from ROTC or straight commissions. Huntington said, "The wartime power of the military leaders was rooted in the American liberal attitude toward war and the military. War was sharply differentiated from peace. When the nation went to war, it went wholeheartedly, turning the direction of the conflict over to those who made that their business. The national aim of total victory superseded all else."
In FDR, the military had a savvy politician who was adept at getting his major schemes into play and letting the players perform. This went for the military experts. FDR also was fortunate in that General Marshall was a brilliant organizer.\textsuperscript{121} Huntington stated that the U.S. military leadership during World War II had as a center of gravity a corporate-style structure consisting of the senior military chiefs. Until just after the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor, this organization was a Joint Board of four senior officers from each of the services. Huntington said, "The Board had been established in 1903 but during most of its history, its duties had been minor. From 1939 on, however, it played an increasingly significant role in the preparation of the joint Army-Navy Rainbow war plans. Its influence and functions quickly expanded.\textsuperscript {122}"

In dealing with the allies, a coherent policy and a strong unified structure was imperative. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were combined with the representatives from the British War Cabinet to create the Combined Chiefs of Staff.\textsuperscript{123} Huntington argued, "At the first British-American meeting after Pearl Harbor, the Arcadia Conference of December 1941-January 1942, it was obvious
that military exigencies required the creation of a unified theater command for American, British, Dutch, and Australian forces in southeast Asia. The theater commander had to report to someone." As Huntington stated, it was at that time that the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization was formed and staffed by the American chiefs and representatives of the British chiefs.  

The Americans, however, suffered from the divisions created by fighting a two-front war, with the Army predominating on one front and the Navy on the other. This created divisiveness often in front of their British counterparts. The Americans strengthened the Joint Chiefs by organizing it along ground, sea, and air lines of responsibility and equalizing representation between Army and Navy.  

Huntington added, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff became, next to the President, the single most important force in the overall conduct of the war, the level and the scope of their activities for transcending those of a purely professional body."  

Unlike the British, who ran, basically, an integrated "old school tie" foreign policy throughout the war,
Roosevelt kept Secretary of State Hull away from participating in the major decisions of the war. 127

Huntington saw that the U.S. government’s lack of professional foreign policy direction was, initially, a problem to military men not used to donning diplomatic clothes. Huntington explained, "In the early years of the war, the formulation of American policy was handicapped by the absence of any coordinating agency at the top. The military floundered about without any clear notion as to the policy of government." 128 When the military finally realized that they had to furnish themselves with political guidance, the JCS administered national policy decisions. 129

This, of course, created a structure far different from that of the British. The U.S. Joint Chiefs directed a range of activities that was "truly impressive." 130 Comparing the British and American systems, the British military joint planners did not have to worry about issues of economics, social problems, or bureaucracies -- unlike their American counterparts. Such support and side issues were handled by British civil agencies. The British officers were generally ignorant of many of the
administrative tasks routinely handled by U.S. general officers, said Huntington.¹³¹

The Americans, of course, began to integrate themselves more and more into Britain - and began to understand the nuances of the Anglo-American relationship. Huntington said,

"Viewing the war from a military point of view, the British chiefs differed from their government which looked at it from a political point of view. As good military men, however, they supported the government decisions with which they disagreed. The American Chiefs, on the other hand, supported their government's policies because, as political directors of the war, they played a major role in formulating them."¹³²

The Americans did not go into their early strategic deliberations too wide-eyed. According to Huntington, Americans understood the importance of forming an overarching U.S. position during the January 1941 staff meetings with the British, as well as fine-tuning the "Joint Board Estimate of United States Over-all Production Requirements" as established in September 1941.¹³³ The military had fears that the American government would give in to British war and post-war direction, with results that may not be in America's best interests. The Americans felt any planning by U.S. staff members should be based upon American interests. Clearly and
understandably, the British would attend to their own post-war interests as well. Consequently, it was necessary that Americans, too, should "safeguard our own eventual interests."\(^{134}\)

Eventually, by the time the war was over, the Americans learned how to run the show -- leaving Britain outside looking in.

**U.S. Air Chiefs: PR at the Top**

The United States sent to England an air force initially barely worthy of the name, but placed in command of that fledgling operation some of the keenest public relations minds the U.S. military had ever commissioned. Leading the U.S. Army Air forces was General Henry "Hap" Arnold.

One thing Henry H. Arnold rarely seemed to be was happy. Although he was nicknamed "Hap" for the seemingly permanent upturned corners of his mouth, it was a genetic phenomenon, not an indicator of emotion. Arnold was a man possessed of more energy than he could expend externally, thus suffering a series of heart attacks -- dying of the sixth at the age of 64.\(^{135}\)
Hap Arnold's life was a long series of what 1990s psychologists would call "stress factors." His father was an extremely stern, austere, and unbending man. Arnold's older sister was overbearing. His initial Army assignment in infantry was probably given to the dashing horseman out of spite, and his own family life was a mess -- to include a daughter one biographer assumed was highly neurotic, if not worse. Add to that, the man who became the commander of the U.S. Air Force and had a period where he suffered from a debilitating fear of flying. In the midst of all this, Arnold had to create a modern, highly technical air armada almost from scratch.\(^\text{136}\)

Arnold was a witness to the beginning of the U.S. military aviation effort, and lived long enough to see his dream of a modern U.S. Air Force become reality.

Like any organization in its embryonic period, the flying corps of the U.S. Army began with flying craft little better than motorized kites, and a couple of young Army officers, one at least (Arnold) who joined the fledgling aerial forces to get out of the infantry. The new service was so foolhardy a career move that Arnold received advice from his infantry commanding officer who warned Lieutenant Arnold about flying: "Young man, I know
of no better way for a person to commit suicide." In 1911, Arnold was sent with 2nd Lieutenant Thomas DeW. Milling, a cavalry volunteer, to be personally trained in flying from the famous Wright brothers. While Arnold, it appeared, never received much, if any in-flight instruction from the Wrights, the brothers were extremely strong influences during "hangar flying" sessions and campfire-style chats.

Interestingly enough, during this time, a fellow Army officer, R. E. Scott, brought to Milling and Arnold's little operation a crude bomb sight he had developed. Arnold never flew with Scott due to Arnold's weight of 160 pounds being too heavy for Arnold, Scott and the device to take off. Milling, who seems to have been a jockey in the cavalry, weighed only 125 pounds -- and with Scott became the first pilot/bombardier crew. The U.S. War Department was not interested in the device, so Scott took it overseas. It was assumed by Arnold to have reached German aviation in time to be used on American troops during World War I. However, Arnold and Lieutenant Jake Fickel won the first aerial gunnery competition in 1911, beating the British Sopwith team when Fickel fired six rifle bullets from 200 feet through a dinner plate lying on the
ground. He, also, won the first Mackay Trophy, given annually since for the most outstanding aerial feat of the year. His accomplishment was minor: finding a troop of cavalry heading toward Washington, D.C. While Arnold could do little more than sight the troops and fly back with only the vaguest idea of the precise location of the force, this was the first time an aircraft proved its worth in the reconnaissance role — and the new trophy was his. 139

On November 2, 1912, Arnold and an artillery spotter, Lieutenant A.L.P. Sands, were caught in a flat spin that Arnold could not control. Only some act of Providence or fluke of aerodynamics found them in controlled power flight just before they hit the ground. Sands, oblivious to the danger, was thrilled, it seems, by the experience. Arnold, on the other hand, developed what his biographer called "fear of flying." 140 "In one short afternoon, all his enthusiasm for aviation had been wiped from his mind," said his biographer, Thomas Coffey. 141 It is not clear that Arnold actually suffered from "fear of flying," a phobia, or a strong case of post-traumatic stress disorder, a stress-caused anxiety. 142 Arnold requested, and was granted, a 20-day leave — and then found himself
behind a desk in Washington, D.C. His fear of flying activities, and possibly its professional ramifications and personal revelations, developed or expanded into "a depressing phobia." 143

Since Army flying was extremely hazardous, Arnold wasn’t the only one who became too distraught to fly again. The Army recognized the dangers to its aviators and treated its emotionally wounded eaglets with great sympathy. Since he was assigned duties dealing with aviation, each day was a constant reminder of his fears -- and to a soldier -- his cowardice. It was like picking at a scab that made emotional reconciliation harder to heal. 144 Of little consolation to Arnold was the fact that Congress, appalled at the accident rate in military aviation, established "flight pay" -- adding more than an extra third of basic pay to the pockets of airmen. 145

The American aviators, however, seemed to crash their aircraft at a rate (20 percent of the approximately 30 aviators in 1913 could expect to die in a crash) that, compared to European statistics, could lead observers to assume the Europeans were leaving the Americans behind in advancing aerial technologies. For example, French casualty rates were one death per 54,000 miles flown,
while the Yanks could expect to lose a flyer before 13,000 aerial miles were reached since the last fatality.\textsuperscript{146}

Since Arnold had about 25,000 miles of flying to his credit, he had already beaten the odds. Arnold had married and settled into his life as an infantry officer when famed aviation advocate Major William “Billy” Mitchell placed a by-name request to have Arnold reassigned to the aviation section of the Signal Corps. Even though Mitchell knew about Arnold’s phobia, he gave him an ultimatum -- volunteer, and be welcomed as a new captain, or be “detailed,” and come aboard as a first lieutenant. Arnold saw the handwriting on the wall -- volunteered and never looked back.\textsuperscript{147}

About four years after his near crash, Arnold yearned to shake off his fear. The new Curtiss JN (Jennys) seemed a far sturdier airframe. He went up, enjoyed the flight, and thereby conquered, if not eliminated, his fear.\textsuperscript{148}

Arnold’s chance to prove his mettle in battle during World War I was deflected by the bureaucracy in Washington, where his experience in aviation matters was deemed more valuable in a staff position than his value as a pilot in a pursuit aircraft. Because of his position and the need to have him nearby, which, at Washington
housing rates, was an expensive requirement, he was promoted to brevet major - then to full colonel.\textsuperscript{149}

Only 31, Arnold did not feel "old enough" to wear the eagles of that rank and even took the "back streets" to his office, fearing others would look at him as a phony. With the rank came the responsibility, and he was selected as the executive officer of the "entire Signal Corps Air Division." This position meant he had to leave his post as the Chief Air Division Information Officer - thereby taking with him the experience of communications and public relations that would provide him at least an appreciation for the needs, challenges and problems associated with that field.\textsuperscript{150}

Meanwhile, General Billy Mitchell "inspired" a May 1917, telegram from French Premier Ribot to President Wilson requesting the Americans send 4,500 aircraft and 5,000 pilots by June 1918 to the Western Front.\textsuperscript{151} Everyone from the U.S. president on down approved this request until the price tag was attached. The U.S. military authorities choked on the figures. At a minimum, the French request would cost nearly $640 million. Considering the U.S. pre-war aviation expense -- since the days of the Wright brothers -- had been only $0.9 million;
this was quite a leap. The General Staff, in stunned silence, did absolutely nothing. Congress took action, passed the bill, but it was too late. Faced with no aviation infrastructure of any sort, the Air Service "built from scratch" program never came out of the oven in time to materially affect the conduct of the war. While Arnold was tapped to help direct the money to material effort, this experience served only as an object lesson for his command role in World War II.\textsuperscript{152}

Arnold developed a strong antipathy toward car makers building aircraft as a result of the failures of production during this period. In any case, his staff work kept him from active combat -- his only exposure a trip to the Western Front in a British staff car -- leaving the base at 9 a.m. on November 11, 1918. As historians recall, World War I ended at 11 a.m. that very day. When Arnold arrived at the front, he made it just in time to hear the guns fire in salute of the 11 a.m. cease-fire. He had just missed the entire war.\textsuperscript{153}

Arnold finally received his operational command only to be the director of the demobilization of his airmen. However, at this point, he was assigned Major Carl "Tooey" Spaatz and 1\textsuperscript{st} Lieutenant Ira C. Eaker, both of whom would
play major roles in the formation and command of the Eighth Air Force in Britain some 20 years later.\textsuperscript{154}

At the age of 36, Arnold had already been a veteran of command. He had become a self-assured officer and exuded this assurance in his dealings with others. He was not timid in exercising his command or his opinions, and his personality and military bearing gave weight to his words.\textsuperscript{155}

During the interwar years, Arnold would continue to promote air power, once racing pigeons in 1922 just to prove aircraft could carry a message faster.\textsuperscript{156}

Perhaps even more importantly to his development as a public relations practitioner, Arnold was assigned in the mid-1920s as the chief public information officer of the Air Service. This position he held just as the Air Service began waging a strong public relations campaign against the Navy. Arnold found that the Navy had doctored a bombing test and exposed the test to the public.\textsuperscript{157} In 1930, he commanded a huge Air Corps mass maneuver, which showed such could be accomplished. Of course, by this time Lindbergh’s flight had done its part for aviation advocacy.\textsuperscript{158}
Stationed at March air base in Riverside, California, Arnold sensed that the base-town relations were not what they should be, and he went to correct the situation. In a very proactive move, Arnold told each of his officers to join at least one of the town's service organizations, such as the Lion's, Kiwanis, etc.\textsuperscript{159}

Arnold was described by historian Geoffrey Perret as "a master of public relations." Not merely a publicity expert, Arnold understood media relations. When the press poor-mouthed American aircraft versus German machines, Arnold had a chart drawn up with performance curves showing the qualities of various unidentified aircraft. Arnold challenged an aviation writer who had been a chief critic to pick the top three airframes. The writer picked the American P-47, P-38, and P-51 aircraft. End of discussion.\textsuperscript{160}

When he finally arrived as the U.S.A.A.F. commander in England, he got along extremely well with the British, and he was impressed with their hospitality.\textsuperscript{161} Of vital importance was the lead the British gave Arnold regarding their jet aircraft program, which was to give the Americans a much-needed boost to create their own.\textsuperscript{162}
Indeed, Arnold was not above playing the British off against his own navy to secure needed supplies.\(^{163}\)

While Arnold was involved with enough of the hard decisions which, in all probability, led to the stress that probably aggravated his heart condition, he was not above doing the small public relations activities to include writing a book about flying to stimulate enlistment and even brought Clark Gable on board as an Air Forces officer.\(^{164}\)

Perhaps Arnold’s greatest contribution to the joint Anglo-American war effort was not to give in to the British request that the U.S. join them in night bombing. U.S. aircraft were not designed for such. Arnold sent his bomber officers to Churchill in waves, and finally the Prime Minister gave in, whereby the joint U.S.-U.K. effort was coined, "Bombing around the clock."\(^{165}\) It is interesting to note that once the British realized the Americans could only engage in daylight bombing at that point, they gave the concept of around the clock bombing their entire support.\(^{166}\)

Since General Arnold had overall command of Army Air Forces, he had to rely on his theater commanders to direct operational activities in their region. For Europe, that
commander was General Carl Andrew "Tooey" Spaatz. Tooey Spaatz served as the commander of the strategic air forces in Europe throughout most of the American involvement in World War II. Spaatz was, according to one biographer, "a great man, air pioneer, (and) outstanding operational commander." Spaatz was the son of a newspaper publisher and two-time Pennsylvania legislator. Carl Spaatz' first claim to fame was being noted as "Pennsylvania's youngest linotype operator." 

In January 1908, Spaatz and another employee took over running the entire paper when the elder Spaatz was seriously injured and the paper lost two others. Biographer Metz reported that the quality of the Berks County Democrat suffered little under Spaatz's editing and mechanical maintenance. 

Upon the recovery of his father, Spaatz went back to his college prep school, and he earned an appointment to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1910. His military conduct at West Point was bad enough that the young cadet was still marching off demerits on graduation day. The rigors of the academy life did not deter Spaatz from enhancing what was to be a life-long indulgence in the three vices of drink, gambling and cigarettes. While
the drinking never got the better of him, and his tobacco habit did not result in an early demise, Spaatz was reported to have been a poor poker player.  

Otherwise, nothing in Spaatz's life at West Point indicated his potential to be a leading air power architect, excluding, perhaps, his presidency of the Dialectic Society, a comedy troupe. However, on May 31, 1910, young cadet Spaatz was one of several who gazed skyward to catch Glenn Curtiss' successful attempt to fly the length of the Hudson River. From that point on, Spaatz was to gamble his military career on aviation. Although initially as risky a choice as drawing to an inside straight, the gamble for Spaatz proved to pay off handsomely.

While Spaatz's early flying career was of historical interest, including pestering American World War I commander General J. Pershing to go flying with him, perhaps of greatest interest was Spaatz learning aerobatics from Marjorie Stinson, a leading aviatrix.

Spaatz's tour as an air commander during World War I demonstrated his ability to lead, handle problems and seek innovative solutions. His concern for his men was apparent, but so was his dedication to the mission. In
sum, Spaatz showed by performance that he was a man with the ability to command. 173

Another legacy of the period was the persistent reputation the air arm had for officers that were overpaid for their officership and too many sergeants without "proper" non-commissioned officer qualities of leadership. In other words, the air boys had life too easy for the liking of the ground troops. 174

To Spaatz’s credit, his training program and the training base of Issoudun, France, were developed to a degree that visiting VIPs were treated to dazzling displays of aerobatics, formation flying, marching bands, Red Cross dances and simulated dogfights. This promotional program for American airpower demonstrated Spaatz’s early grasp of public relations techniques. Compared to what Spaatz had inherited just a few months earlier, the turnaround was significant. Even more important, the pilots graduating from his training facility had a near 3-to-1 kill rate against German air opposition. 175

Coincidentally, Spaatz had the same personal ratio as the overall success rate of his aviators. Spaatz was credited with shooting down a total of three German
Fokkers during his tour, while once allowing himself to run out of fuel while being too absorbed in his quarry. A sympathetic General William Mitchell awarded the chagrined Spaatz the Distinguished Flying Cross, even though Spaatz himself admitted to a newspaper reporter that he was responsible for three aircraft losses on one day -- two German and his own.176

Spaatz was an aviation innovator and publicist in the interwar years. The list of his activities to promote airpower is as remarkable as any in the annals of public relations.177 While General Mitchell took the heat for advocating airpower, his junior supporters were protected and continued his work.178 Mitchell, who had criticized the Navy's PR disasters when the dirigible Shenandoah and a Navy aircraft trying to fly to Hawaii both crashed, was court-martialed.179 Spaatz, who testified at the trial, made a national name for himself. The air corps followed with special planning for airshows and air races, a flight of B-17s to Argentina, and a simulated interception of the Italian liner Rex -- with a pack of journalists on board.180 Perhaps one of Spaatz's most dramatic PR demonstrations was the Question Mark refueling endurance flight on January 1, 1929, over the Rose Bowl -- taking
with him on board Ira Eaker and Pete Quesada, both to play leading roles in Europe during World War II.¹⁸¹

Eaker, who was to guide the Eighth Air Force bombing effort in the early years of the war, was a student of law at Columbia and another air commander with a journalistic background, earning a degree in journalism at the University of Southern California. Eaker, who piloted goodwill flights to South America, was in the Question Mark flight and became the first pilot to fly coast-to-coast on instruments only. Historian Astor said Eaker was "recognized for his skillful handling of political powers and as an artful propagandist for the Air Corps (and) gained the confidence of both Spaatz and Arnold. When the latter tapped the former to open up shop in England, Spaatz chose Eaker as his second in command."¹⁸²

Eaker’s successor at the Eighth Air Force, famed aviator Jimmy Doolittle, was not a trained journalist as Spaatz and Eaker, but he had a natural gift for promotion. Doolittle grew up in rough and tumble gold-rush Nome, Alaska, and became adept in both aerial and physical acrobatics. A night before a major aerial demonstration before a South American audience, he proved his physical prowess to a gathering of dignitaries, doing gymnastics in
imitation of swashbuckling Hollywood actors. He ended up breaking both ankles when the structure he was performing on gave way.\textsuperscript{183} With two ankles in plaster casts, he flew the next day anyway and "defeated" a German flyer in mock combat.\textsuperscript{184} A leading navigator before the war, Doolittle earned fame as the leader of the B-25 raid on Tokyo during the early months of the war. For this mission, he earned the Medal of Honor.\textsuperscript{185}

Curtis LeMay worked his way up through the Eighth Air Force command ranks to finally take over B-29 operations in the Pacific. LeMay had earned his reputation as the chief navigator during one of the promotional intercepts of ships off the U.S. coast. LeMay led from the front, flying the dangerous missions to determine the effectiveness of bombing tactics. His innovative nature was demonstrated in his cooperative work in designing combat formations. His demand that aircrews fly straight in the run up to the bomb-release point increased bomb accuracy.\textsuperscript{186} LeMay later went on to become the architect of the post war Strategic Air Command and later Chief of the Air Force.\textsuperscript{187}
These air force leaders came to England in the early 1940s to run the bomber program and cooperate with the British to pursue strategic warfare against Nazi Germany.

**British Air War Experience**

To understand the potential for problems between the British Royal Air Force and the U.S.A.A.F., it is instructive to review what the British faced prior to the American entry into the war. It should be remembered that Britain entered the war in September 1939, while it took the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, before the U.S. would be in the struggle.

In 1940, after the collapse of France, most of Europe was under German or Italian domain. Soviet Russia had a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany. The lesser powers, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Holland, Belgium, and Norway, were all conquered by German forces. This left Britain alone and isolated. Japan, then officially neutral, was on the move in Asia and thereby threatening British Far East interests. Britain’s small army had left a great deal of its heavy armaments and equipment on the soil outside Dunkirk when the British Expeditionary Force sent to the continent had to evacuate ahead of German tanks. As
Churchill told the cabinet in September 1940, "the bombers alone provide any means for victory." 188 By concentrating on providing the technology, production, manpower, doctrine, and training necessary, a nation of only 50 million could hope to wreak enough havoc to overcome the military power of a greatly expanded Germany.189

President Franklin Roosevelt, upon learning of the German attack on Poland, asked all concerned to refrain from bombing cities. Immediately the British agreed, as did the French the following day. The Germans waited until September 18 when the Polish war was no longer in question. The R.A.F. took to dropping public relations leaflets, a hated practice by aircrew members.190 Arthur "Bomber" Harris stated that dropping leaflets was worthless, where "the only thing achieved was largely to supply the continent's requirement of toilet paper for the five long years of war."191 Strangely, the R.A.F. leaflet packages were labeled "Secret" so R.A.F. flight crew could not read them — only the enemy.

The British leaflet program was a comedy of aerials. The Armstrong Whitworth "Whitley" bomber, a.k.a. "Flying Barn Door," had an operational ceiling of only 17,000 feet.192 With snow-imbedded clouds above them and no
oxygen for the walk-around leaflet crew, those crewmen tasked to stuff the papers through a hole, faced both hypoxia and hypothermia, the latter due to the severe sub-zero temperatures at higher altitudes. One of the Whitleys had its navigator and radio operator pass out from lack of oxygen. Another crew found out its oxygen bottles were all empty save one during another leaflet run. On another, the aircrew members were falling like flies from various maladies, including loss of consciousness by the navigator due to exhaustion, the pilot from the same problem, the front gunner from a hit in the head by an unstored ammunition magazine, and the rear gunner knocked out by his own turret. Luckily for them, they were able to land on a field, where they skidded until they hit a tree. A local French farmer, figuring this to be a standard British landing, asked when they planned to take off. In a still further “bumphlet” raid, a crewmember was forced to abandon ship with his $O_2$ bottle frozen to his fingers. He landed in full flight panoply, but had the athleticism to do a credible 100-yard dash and hurtle a 4-foot bush -- all to avoid a rampaging bull. Even when bombs fell for real, British results were little better than dropping paper.
Early missions against German shipping did negligible damage, while early German missions against western European targets fared little better. Once the Germans began their blitzkrieg through France, the missions were of a tactical nature – attacking armies or interdiction missions – blowing up bridges, supply trains, etc. The French and British airforces were mauled, and it wasn’t until the British evacuation of Dunkirk, when the British Army was in range of home-based fighters, could the R.A.F. gain any measure of superiority over the Luftwaffe. Even then, the ground troops wondered, “Where’s the R.A.F.?” when a German bomber would break through to make life on the beach hell. French incompetence in mass producing its excellent Detwoitine 520s fighter aircraft to thwart Luftwaffe bombers was just part of the whole ineffective allied effort.

The experience of the next phase, the Battle of Britain, was a harbinger of the problems of strategic bombing, with the Germans providing the object lesson. German two-engine bombers had neither bomb load nor defensive armament to be suitable strategic bombers. That the Germans may have won the Battle for Britain, if their strategies and tactics were not as faulty as their
aircraft, was a fact not lost on the British. The Americans, in turn, felt, given the right aircraft and doctrine, strategic bombing was still possible. Hitler was not an early advocate of terror bomber, figuring, one can suppose, that what works for one side can work for the other. He made it forbidden to terror bomb, except on his specific orders as a reprisal. It was a German mistake when the first German bombs hit London residential areas instead of the planned target of an aircraft factory and oil tanks. Churchill ordered an R.A.F. reprisal raid on Berlin, which did not accomplish much except to escalate the barbarism. With the gloves off, it was only a matter of time before German leaders were to put aviation strategist Guilio Douhet’s theories of decisive civilian terror to the test. The decision to shift their bombsights to Greater London aided the R.A.F., whose airfields could now begin to recover from the weeks of German poundings. As devastating as the London raids were, they achieved strategic victories for the British in several ways. They took the pressure off the air defense infrastructure and they brought by the magic of radio the image of German barbarity and British courage right into the living rooms of Americans safe 3,000 miles away, and
they created a resolve in the British to "give it (to) 'em back." 

The British Air Staff, as military men, are paid to think in military terms. Objectives, such as "getting even," are poorly conceived. The Air Staff sought something a bit more measurable, such as strategically important targets that destroy the enemy's ability to wage war. Such targets may include oil refineries, aircraft and ammunition factories, electric power generators, etc. However, the early experiences of daylight bombing disasters led the British to bomb at night. To do so meant sacrificing any hope of laying bombs on a specific target - so area bombing was a final recourse. Since factories were located near people (and vice versa), civilian casualties were a part of the equation. Thus, by strategic default, the "give it to them back" crowd got their way - and German families were bombed, just as had been British.

U.S. Strategic Warfare Problems

The agreements between the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom established the primacy of the European Theater of Operations. This meant that the
defeat of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy had priority over the defeat of Japan in the Pacific. Beyond that grand strategy, the rest was, in essence, details. While Americans favored a cross-channel invasion, the British, for reasons long debated, wished to attack the Axis strength from the periphery. This disagreement, and the delay in arriving at it, caused a myriad of strategic and logistical problems. While there was no doubt by anyone that strategic bombing by both the United States and Great Britain was to be a key feature of any allied activities against Germany, the how, when, what, and where were yet to be resolved. A number of factors in deploying American strategic bombers needed solutions.

Such problems included deciding on the best means of deploying strategic bombers. Other issues that required solutions included stationing the aircraft and aircrews, determining the total number and disposition of aircraft, the length and type of aircrew rotations, the construction of runways and facilities, the targets of their bombs, establishing supply lines and depots and, finally, the line and support organization of the Eighth Air Force. 202

There were many issues to resolve - and not much time in which to accomplish them. Recognizing the problems of
employing American forces to begin the process of defeating the Germans, the British and Americans created the BOLERO committee to oversee American troop deployments to Britain. What remained to be resolved included whether American forces would be used for cross-channel invasion or to send on peripheral missions.

The initial decision to deploy some aircraft to England to learn the basics of Continental flying and the deployment to Northern Ireland to release British troops for other duties bought the U.S. planners some time to resolve their strategic questions.

The British, of course, had their own thoughts on how the American assets should be deployed and these thoughts were conveyed to American planners at several locations, including the home of the British prime minister.²⁰³

What was eventually decided upon was to forego any attempt at a cross-channel invasion and to begin to nibble at German forces in North Africa in what became Operation TORCH. TORCH was followed by the invasion of Sicily and then Italy before American, British, Canadian and other allied troops finally made the cross-channel invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944.
All during this period, the Eighth Air Force was to build to operational strength and begin strategic operations against German targets. Due to the TORCH invasion, the Eighth Air Force would be slow to build, and lack of suitable, long-distance fighter escort made daylight American strategic bombing very costly. In the early days of the American bombing program, the likelihood of an American bomber crewman surviving his required 25 missions were less than 50 percent. This potential was sobering to the American flyer, and both the British and American officials were well aware of the mathematics. The battle of attrition between the Americans and Germans over the skies of Europe was described as "the trench warfare of World War II." 

Notes


5 Richard Wheeler, Voices of 1776, 407. In the words of the Marquis de Lafayette after Yorktown "I was somewhat disturbed during the former acts, but my heart rejoices exceedingly at this last...."

6 Stephen Ambrose, Americans At War, x-xi.

7 Montross, War Through the Ages, 417-439.

8 Ibid., 559-564.

9 Ibid., 862.


11 John E. Wiltz, From Isolation To War 1931-1941 (New York: Cromwell, 1960). What ethnic antipathy regarding the British existed before World War I was further heightened after the war. See also Dimbleby and Reynolds An Ocean Apart, 47-49.


13 John E. Wiltz, From Isolation To War, 3-7.


15 Ibid., 30-39.

16 Reynolds, Rich Relations, 14.

17 Ibid., 87.


20 Wiltz, From Isolation to War, 66.


22 U.K.: FO 371/34127, O. C. Harvey, Foreign Office correspondence to J. M. Martin, 10 Downing Street June 18,
1943. PRO. In the letter Harvey discussed the specifics about post-war Anglo-American relations, particularly regarding defense arrangements. Also see George Gallup and Henry Durant FO 371/34127 "Public Opinion in Wartime Britain Toward U.S. and Russia." March 1943. PRO. The survey showed the British looking forward to post-war trade and a lack of fear of American dominance of that trade.


25 Montross, War through The Ages, 791-858.

26 There was not much British success against the Japanese either at this point with the loss of Singapore as the primary example. In a letter of July 6, 1942 from British Embassy (U.S.) official F. Hoyen Millar to the Foreign Office's Butler, a memo circulating about the British claimed that the British Army always seemed to be "defeated and having to retreat," and that they sat in Singapore "sipping tea" when the Japanese advanced. U.K.: Foreign Office Papers, FO 371/34127, PRO.

27 Boyne, Clash of Wings, 90.


29 Ibid., 142-172, 310-311.

30 Reynolds, Rich Relations, 90.

31 Ibid.

32 Winston Churchill, "The Hinge of Fate" The Second World War, 696-698. On May 22, 1943, Churchill made a presentation to a high level Anglo-American gathering at the British Embassy in Washington about his vision for a post-war world. He forwarded his argument for a "Supreme World Council," with Britain serving as one of three or four supreme powers.
The British were painfully aware of their weakening financial position as the war dragged on. Losses of lives and property depleted a strategically stretched nation trying to hold on to an Empire already under attack.

Churchill told Anthony Eden, "Remember that on my breast there are the medals of the Dardanelles, Antwerp, Dakar, and Greece," referring to British amphibious operations of the two world wars.

Carl von Clausewitz wrote *Vom Kriege* in 1832. It has served as a primer on military strategy since Von Clausewitz does not state that bigger battalions always win, but that victory often enough contains "a main factor (of) the possession of strength at the really vital point." 195.
48 Ibid., 93.
49 Ibid., 94.
50 Ibid., 93-95.
51 Ibid.
52 Keegan, The Second World War, 312-319.
53 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 76-77.
55 Ambrose, Americans At War, 93-99.
57 Ibid., 100.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.

60 Thomas Hughes, Overlord, 15. Due to existing Air Forces doctrine was heavily weighted towards strategic bombing, it took the TORCH operation, where strategic bombing missions were of limited use, to develop U.S. tactical air power techniques which were to prove useful in Europe in the days leading up to and after the Normandy invasion in 1944.

62 Reynolds, Rich Relations, 127-140. Discussion of negative effect on Canadian troops.
63 Dimbleby and Reynolds, An Ocean Apart, 158.
64 Reynolds, Rich Relations, 101
Reynolds, Rich Relations, 102.

Ibid.

Ibid., 393.

Ibid., 104; Andy Rooney, My War (Holbrook, MA: Essay Publications, 1995), 89; Perret, Winged Victory, 280.

Reynolds, Rich Relations, 103-105.

Freeman, The Friendly Invasion, 22-23.


Ibid., 112.

Ibid., 112.

Ibid., 114.

Ibid., 115. This story is found in numerous accounts of the war.

Ibid.

Ibid., 114-116.

Ibid., 116-118.

Roger Freeman, The Friendly Invasion, 12. Freeman relates a story where one "unmindful labourer" failed to pay attention to an advancing B-24 Liberator at Hethel Airport. The American aircraft's ground crew painted a teacup and saucer next to the other "kills" on the B-24's nose. More sensitive superiors ordered this example of gallows humor to be removed.

Ibid., 119.

Eisenhower, Eisenhower at War 1943-1945

"Man of the Year" Time
cqi.pathfinder.com/time/special/moy/1940-1-2
Ibid.

Dimbleby and Reynolds, An Ocean Apart, 150. According to the authors, Churchill alleged to have retorted to a suggestion that he present his new American allies a deferential tone. "Oh! That is the way we talked to her (America) while we were wooing her; now that she is in the harem, we talk to her differently."

"Winston Churchill - Man of the Year," Time January 6, 1941.

Ibid.

"Franklin D. Roosevelt - Man of the Year," Time January 5, 1942.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance, 184.

Sampson, The Changing Anatomy of Britain, 4-6, 15-17, 159.


Sampson, The Changing Anatomy of Britain, 4-11.

Ibid., 5-6.


Montross, War Through The Ages, 359-362. Montross stated that Marlborough had "a knack for smoothing out the differences of allies which has never been surpassed by any soldier." 359.
100 Ibid., 12-13.


102 H. V. Morton, Atlantic Meeting (London: Methuen, 1944). Morton, a journalist, was specifically selected by the Ministry of Information to go on this trip to record the event. The small 160-page book is his eye-witness accounting of that trip.

103 Ibid., Appendix A: The Atlantic Charter.


105 Dimbleby and Reynolds, An Ocean Apart, 150.

106 Reynolds, Rich Relations, 94-104.

107 Irving, Churchill's War, xvii.

108 Ibid.

109 Ibid., 3.


111 Ibid., 29.

112 Ibid., 40-41.


115 Ibid., 47.

116 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 315.

117 Montross, War Through The Ages, 862-863.

118 Ibid., 315-316.
Coffey, Hap, 82, 95, 221. Arnold had been to Europe in the last days of World War II, as had Spaatz. Arnold also had service in the Philippines, while Spaatz served as an "observer" in Britain prior to Pearl Harbor.

Ibid., 317.

Montross, War Through The Ages, 862.

Ibid., 317-318.

Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, 48-49.

Ibid., 318.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 322.

Huntington, Soldier and the State, 323.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 323.

Ibid., 329.

Ibid., 330.

Ibid., 330.

Ibid., 330.

Coffey, Hap, 1-416.

Ibid.

Ibid., 40.

Ibid., 42-47.

Ibid., 53-54.
Ibid., 63.

Ibid.


Ibid., 67.


Coffey, *Hap*, 86-87. See also Maslow and Mittelmann, *Principles of Abnormal Psychology*, 483. Maslow and Mittelmann, revising their 1941 book by adding wartime data, suggested that "combat fatigue" (now diagnosed as post-traumatic stress disorder) can be, and usually is, a temporary condition. Since their recommendation for treatment was for the afflicted to remove himself from the source, Arnold seemed to have been self-aware enough to have "treated" himself. However, see Real, *I Don't Want To Talk About It*, 105. Real believed that once afflicted, it is difficult to remove all aspects of post-traumatic stress disorder from the individual's emotional structure. According to Real, it took a study of Vietnam-era veterans to begin to fully understand the long-term effects of trauma.

Coffey, *Hap*, 90.

Ibid., 90-91.

Coffey, Hap, 91-93.

Ibid., 93-95.

Ibid., 95-96.

Ibid., 96-97.

Ibid., 107. Historian De Witt Copp called the pigeon caper "the Arnold zest for public relations (at) its wacky best...." Copp, A Few Great Captains, 29.

Coffey, Hap, 119.

Ibid., 141.

Ibid., 146.

Perret, Winged Victory, 132.

Coffey, Hap, 226-231.

Ibid., 231.

Ibid., 250.

Ibid., 267-8.

Ibid., 297-8. See also Boyne, Clash of Wings.


Mets, Master of Airpower, 1.

Ibid., 4-5.

Ibid., 5.

Ibid., 9.
Ibid., 8-11.

Ibid., 22.


Ibid.

Ibid., 34-36.

C. V. Glines, "An American Hero," *Air Force Magazine* November 1993, 20. Glines stated that 1920s army pilots "were encouraged to keep aviation in the news and make the public aware of what airplanes promised for the future."


189 Boyne, *Clash of Wings*, 288.


191 Ibid.

192 David Donald, *The Complete Encyclopedia of World Aircraft* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1997), 65. The encyclopedia researchers note, however, the aircraft could reach a ceiling of 26,000 feet -- at which point conditions aboard would have been even more intolerable.


194 Ibid., 47-51.


199 Nevin, *Architects of Air Power*, 143-165. According to Nevin, the Germans drew from their Spanish Civil War experience that airpower was best employed as flying artillery, rather than as a strategic weapon.

200 Jablonski, *Airwar*, 149.


On March 2, 1942, Richard Law, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, wrote: "Very high quarters in this country have interested themselves in the question of proper hospitality being shewn [sic] to Americans who have come to this country...." With these words, the British Government began its program to promote good relations between American military personnel as they arrived in Great Britain en masse.

American forces arriving in Britain had one of three destinations. They could be administration or support personnel, they could be soldiers and their support people preparing for the ground assault against Nazi troops at some off-island location, or they could be members of the Eighth Air Force. Outside of some administrative and support personnel, members of the Eighth Air Force held tenure rights to service longevity in Britain -- having arrived in 1942 and flying their last sorties right up to the end of the war in 1945. Generally speaking, therefore, if there were programs to build rapport between
U.S./U.K. people in Great Britain, the Eighth Air Force was affected.

There were exceptions. The Eighth did not participate, for example, in the joint U.S./U.K. ground troops training programs, which brought the servicemen of the two countries closer together. And, of course, there were areas in Great Britain that were populated predominantly by support or ground forces, and whatever local public relations programs existed did not serve Eighth Air Force personnel. Other than the above, what served one American generally served another.³

The British public relations programs were serious and well-organized from the top down. There was a recognition by British authorities that many local British initiatives would be created to help the nearby airmen and soldiers. To the credit of the British government, this was not only acceptable, but encouraged and recognized. The British authorities knew and understood immediately that the Americans would not come totally unprepared. The role of the American Red Cross as a primary source of moral support for the American serviceman or woman was acknowledged, even though certain Red Cross directives were seen as too rigid for the tastes of many in Britain.⁴
The British did not merely begin with a plan and attempt to implement it. They recognized that Americans would be scattered throughout Britain, and they wished to ensure all were accounted for and treated well. The British Government conducted surveys and sent out investigative representatives from the Foreign Office to local British groups to determine the type and degree of support for Americans that could be expected.\(^5\)

The Richard Law correspondence of March 2, 1942 showed a recognition that "the average American is very prone to home-sickness," an observation that was fairly sensitive and rather bold considering relatively few Americans had reached British shores by the end of February 1942.\(^6\)

In March 1942, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs established the "Grigg Committee" to do the following:

1. Provide for the "welfare of American civilians in British employment,"
2. Provide "assistance to American Authorities in making arrangements for looking after the American Expeditionary Force,"
3. Coordinate "arrangements made under the auspices of unofficial organizations to provide private hospitality for Americans in this country."

Serving on this committee were the chairman, Sir Edward Grigg; MP, Mr. Ronald Tree, MP and Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Information; Mr. Morgan Price, MP; and Sir Harold Boulton.

However, by July 9, 1942, in a memorandum of a meeting between Mr. Neville Butler and the Lord President, the mission of the Grigg Committee was "complicated" by the establishment of the BOLERO organization, which had the responsibility of "bedding down" American servicemen entering the U.K., and "the decision by the United States Chief of Staff that the American Red Cross should be responsible for the welfare and recreational services for all American Armed Forces in (Britain)."

The American Red Cross (ARC) was seen to be sensitive to its mission, not likely to brook interference in its activities. However, the British made clear their intentions to have the ARC conduct its activities in cooperation with the appropriate British Authorities. In any case, the Grigg Committee was still the point
organization for coordinating "all activities connected
with the welfare of American civilians in this country."\textsuperscript{10}

The British saw the responsibilities conflict between
the Grigg Committee's charter and the BOLERO group
regarding "welfare and entertainment" of the U.S. service
personnel to include: receiving and welcoming American
Forces on arrival at their bases; assisting the American
Red Cross as they created clubs near U.S. bases; and
assisting the ARC in founding "hostels" at resorts where
Americans were likely to visit, and "coordination of
arrangements for private hospitality" for U.S. troops.\textsuperscript{11}

BOLERO's Sir Findlater Stewart and the Grigg
Committee's Sir Edward Grigg agreed to divide the
responsibilities between themselves. Receiving and
welcoming U.S. forces upon arrival was given to BOLERO,
while coordinating arrangements for private hospitality
for Americans was to be a Grigg Committee function.
BOLERO's opinion was that they should be responsible for
official U.S. requests, while the Grigg Committee served
to coordinate local agency initiatives. In any case, the
ARC was getting impatient, requiring someone with whom to
coordinate its activities.\textsuperscript{12}
In a July 17 handwritten note over the memo of the minutes of the BOLERO Panel in July 1942, Stewart mentioned to W.L. Gorell Barnes, of the Privy Council Office, that the division of responsibilities between the British and American Red Cross was beginning to get fuzzy in what the British called the "concentration areas." Those areas near concentration of American troops were being conceded to the ARC, but questions remained concerning other areas of Britain. Stewart assumed the ARC would want to build centers in large areas of likely American visits, of which Stewart noted Edinburgh, Scotland, as one. While he assumed London would be an area of intense U.S. Army and American Red Cross interest, he mused whether both would wish to forfeit leadership of hospitality in the capital city to the British.13

By August of 1942, the British began to consolidate their public relations operations. The Minister of Information had assumed overall responsibility for coordinating hospitality for U.S. forces in Britain. All British aid agencies working on behalf of supporting the U.S. contingent were brought under one agency, "close contact was already being maintained with General Eisenhower on all these questions," and the MOI was to
keep in close liaison with Sir Findlater Stewart, chair of the BOLERO Committee.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{Evaluating U.S./U.K. Relations}

While the British were engaging in discussion, debates and political maneuverings regarding their American guests, the Americans were engaging in some survey work. One survey was conducted in September 1942, just as the initial wave of troops had some time to settle in and the initial shock had a chance to wear off. This survey looked at the activities of American enlisted men (not officers, not women) who were now stationed "somewhere in Britain." The survey sought to discover what the G.I.s were doing during their "off duty" time in Britain and comparing the percentage of individuals engaging in particular activities with activities at stateside military bases. Not included as items surveyed were some other activities such as sightseeing, hobbies, or attending worship services. Also, the duty rotation cycles were not included. This may have skewed the results in that Eighth Air Force aircraft maintenance personnel work on the aircraft after missions, meaning some night work while their fellow enlisted aviators may
have needed to "just get away" after a bad mission - or just go to sleep. All in all, the survey did show some marked differences in behavior between U.S. stationed troops and those in Britain.

According to the research, in Britain, American men were more likely to drink beer or liquor (36 percent to 28 percent), play cards (25 percent to 8 percent) and date a girl (21 percent to 13 percent). Fewer enlisted troops wrote letters (49 percent to 60 percent), saw a movie (24 percent to 33 percent), read a magazine (21 percent to 43 percent), participated in sports (15 percent to 21 percent), listened to the radio (11 percent to 53 percent), read a book (10 percent to 14 percent) and went to a dance (8 percent to 10 percent). ¹⁵

These figures lead to some interesting questions. For example, if fewer were going to movies or a dance, yet more were dating, one could ask the obvious question: "What did they do?" Of course, with Britain's "stygian" blackout rules and the venereal disease rates, which exceeded the norm for both the local British area prewar and the U.S. norm of the same period, the answer could be considered obvious. But not too much should be read into these statistics. According to the survey, the vast
majority of the soldiers were not engaged in any dating activities on either continent - so while only 21 percent were dating women, that figure could be totally submerged with the 24 percent seeing a movie - meaning that unattached men may not be bothering to do anything at all. Is this possible? In 1942 England, it could have been entirely possible, as base infrastructures were at a primitive stage. To go see a British movie probably meant going on a date. Thus, Americans in Britain may have been more sedentary than the statistics indicated.

Indeed, there were several factors influencing U.S. troop movie-watching attendance. One, Americans tended not to like British movies, which were, in the production sense, inferior to Hollywood's finest. Second, transportation to a movie off the base could be a problem, as movies tend to be evening entertainment, and riding a bike back to base in the dark was hardly worth the effort. Finally, the U.S. had yet to set up local theaters in great numbers. This would occur later.

The other survey results had similar explanations. The survey result showing a lesser radio audience in Great Britain amongst the troops could be readily explained by several reasons. One reason was that all personal radios
were confiscated by American military authorities prior to shipping the soldier to his assignment. The military then planned to issue G.I. radios. Demand for G.I. radios outstripped supply by some considerable margin. Second, the Americans did not particularly like the BBC programming. The BBC embraced a culture mandate that self-imposed a requirement that its programming ought to enhance British culture. The G.I.s were not much interested in absorbing British culture through radio sets. Radio was for entertainment, and BBC entertainment did not live up to American popular standards. The American authorities rectified this situation, at least as far as the Eighth Air Force was concerned, by installing local transmitters for the American Forces Radio network later in the war. This is better covered later.18

It may seem a reasonable assumption that letter writing is more comfortable when a third party is not reading your mail. While letters written at home went through the U.S. Mail, soldiers overseas had to have their letters opened and censored -- by their own officers. This may explain the lack of enthusiasm to do this activity as a form of leisure. Also, Eighth Air Force mail was a constant problem to the degree that U.S.A.A.F.
commander Hap Arnold claimed, tongue in cheek, that he thought putting mail in bottles ought "to speed things up." 19

Although stateside U.S. military bases were not lavish accommodations, Americans in Britain were crammed into crude Quonset huts where privacy was at a premium. If someone in the hut had obnoxious habits, the quiet solitude necessary for more sedate activities such as reading and writing may be compromised. In addition, there were constant complaints about lack of timely reading materials. There were book drives to get more volumes to U.S. troops. U.S. magazines and newspapers became an attraction at the ARC when those clubs began to open. 20

The Eighth Air Force recognized the lack of facilities for sports and other leisurely pursuits. While transportation space on the early ships were taken up with weapons, troops, and food, the importance of morale supplies finally received enough attention to get space in subsequent ship loads. Perhaps it is a legacy of his experience in the Eighth Air Force that when General Curtis E. LeMay assumed command of the U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC), he put a premium on getting first-class
leisure facilities at SAC bases to include better housing, sports complexes, machine shops, woodworking and car maintenance facilities and so on.  

To some G.I.s of the early days of the war, their stateside military base was superior accommodation compared to their Depression-era homesites. The later in the war the soldier experienced the military life, the further he was from the Depression era. Thus, the conscripted hoards that followed the professional soldiers who enlisted prior to the Pearl Harbor attack may not be entirely of the same background and would have enjoyed a bit more time in post-Depression America.

In so far as beer-drinking was concerned, British beer tends to be of a higher alcoholic content than American lager-style refreshments. However, it appears that there is some debate on which was stronger during the war years. In any case, what served to the British as "entertainment" in East Anglia was a trip to the "local", the neighborhood pub, after work. Prior to the war, pubs were male bastions of dark bitter and darts. While during the war women increasingly went into pubs, by and large, in East Anglia, men would go to pubs to "get away." For an American, the pub, therefore, served as the entrée into
British (predominately male) society and served as the chief form of distraction after a hard day at the airbase. Since a customer drank alcohol at the pub, the American drank alcohol. While the flat, robust and room-temperature stouts and bitters took some getting used to, alcohol was still alcohol. Coming from a people known for bathtub gin and backcountry stills, the complaints about British refreshments could not have been too strenuous. The American lager, chilled and light, is a suitable drink for the often-hot American climate; if Britain was anything, it wasn't hot. A "cold one" after a day in the damp, bone-chilling drizzle could not have been a high priority.23

In any case, the British planned efforts to enhance Anglo-American relations met with limited results. Observers, such as anthropologist Margaret Mead, examined the issue and found several reasons inhibiting the success of British planned public relations programs. Mead described the British programs as essentially boiling down to history, the land, and the British home.24

In fact, the British engaged a Canadian consultant, Graham Spry, during the spring of 1943 to advise on Americans in Britain. Spry hypothesized that American
service personnel were not unlike any other tourist in Britain. In general, they went through the same stages regarding the development of their relationship to their host country and its people. Spry said that essentially there were "three stages which visitors pass through - the antiquities, old cottage, sightseeing stage (a brief period dominated by garrulous guides); the anti-coffee, anti-climate, anti-slowness stage (a longer period [which is perhaps] punctuated with rude encounters in trains and buses, and for the lighter-headed or stronger-armed perhaps a fight or two in a pub); and finally the adjusted stage when friendships begin to form."

Mead was unimpressed with the first stage as planned by the British. To show off the history, traditions and culture in a tourist fashion was not to lead off with the best side of the British experience, according to Mead. Tours of cathedrals and colleges would be as tedious to a young American as Reynolds suggested a "similar promenade around Harvard or Yale." To an American, Mead said, the British fascination with their past "seems to him merely a premium on bad plumbing and crooked staircases." While crooked staircases have a particular military tactic behind their design, the British internal plumbing system
had been a noticeable point of complaint of American tourists long after World War II.\textsuperscript{27}

To Mead, the British countryside offered a limited attraction as well. Americans saw the countryside as wide-open spaces "where you can do something." These "somethings" included driving, hiking, swimming, fishing, skiing and even hunting, though the last was not mentioned. To the British, the countryside was merely "a place to be in." Home hospitality was never to be what it was envisioned.\textsuperscript{28}

While the effort was there, the intended targets of planned British hospitality wasn't always ready to be gracious guests. The Eighth Air Force Provost Marshal concluded in a November 1943 report that: "The British home, the one instrument through which a stronger bond could be forged, is not entered as much as would be desired. Only 2 percent of American troops are accepting existing hospitality."\textsuperscript{29}

There were several possible reasons for the lack of Americans participating in home hospitality invitations. The Eighth Air Force provost suggested that "being a guest demands a certain amount of discipline from which the soldiers are trying to get away from in their spare
time."\textsuperscript{30} Other factors included the lack of daughters, thereby lessening the reasons to stop in, teatime rituals, and the requirement strongly suggested by American authorities to bring foodstuffs with them as their hosts would have only meager fare. After a hard day of work, it is not hard to see why an American serviceman would not rather take a nap than put himself through a visit that promised additional stress.\textsuperscript{31}

Since it was rare enough that a British East Anglia house had a telephone, last minute "bailouts" by U.S. servicemen would have left a British family ready for company that did not show.\textsuperscript{32} In fact, one American's "see you later" was taken by the British hosts as a self-invitation that they stayed awake into the wee small hours to honor. The Yank reported that it took awhile to regain this family's trust after that misunderstanding.\textsuperscript{33}

This is not to say home visits were not enjoyed at all. Many Americans took advantage of invitations and life-long friendships were the result. It is, however, worth noting that disappointment by potential British hosts was probably fairly common -- particularly in East Anglia where telephones were scarce and the evening's invitee may be the latest casualty over Schweinfurt.
For flight crews finishing a mission, either a drunken blow-out or self-reflective "cocooning" may be the psychological response to the stimuli of the day's combat. Neither impulse is compatible with visiting someone's home.

While Americans were, on average, reluctant to participate in British-planned local activities, this does not mean that they did not interact with the British. Official hospitality programs were less likely to get Americans and British together than simple chance meetings. In a series of questionnaires conducted in March 1944, less than one G.I. in 20 had "met most of the English people he knew that way." Instead, the majority of his British friends and acquaintances were a result of chance meetings. The survey showed that time was a major factor in meeting British families. By the time the serviceman or woman had served in Britain for six months, two-thirds had gotten to know at least one British family. But by the time they served one year or more, 89 percent had gotten to know at least one British family.³⁴

What the survey, and one taken in 1943, showed is that familiarity did not greatly alter pre-existing opinions. The 1943 survey showed 73 percent had a
“favorable” opinion of the British and 83 percent had a generally "favorable" opinion of the British in March 1944. However, these figures, complimentary as they appear, are leavened with the result that since coming to Britain, one-third of those asked in the first survey and one-fourth of those in the second had a more favorable opinion of the British and an equal percentage had less of a regard for them. This may mean that considering the favorable percentages, a psychological "regression to the mean" may have taken place for some whose incoming expectations of the British could not have been enhanced so that even though they regarded them somewhat less than before arriving in Britain, they still felt favorable toward them. If the survey had any validity at all, much of what was being accomplished in Britain had perhaps less effect than hoped. Further, the 1943 survey revealed that 43 percent of those surveyed "attached little or no importance to Anglo-American relations," leaving one to ponder the degree of effect of even basic allied propaganda.\textsuperscript{35}

However, the surveys themselves may be tainted due to the circumstances of the time they were taken. In the one survey, the American troops were participating in an Army
program designed to propagate the official Army policy.36
Were the soldiers being honest or rebelling when one-quarter were stating they felt less regard for the British once they were in Britain, or, conversely, did some give the answer they thought they should give?

Notes
1 U.K.: CAB 123/176 Lord President’s Office “BOLERO Panel Welfare of American Forces in Great Britain” PRO.
4 Ibid.
5 U.K.: CAB 123/176, Richard Law correspondence, 2 March 1942 “BOLERO Panel” papers. PRO.
6 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 U.K.: CAB 123/176, July 9, 1942, memorandum of a meeting between Mr. Neville Butler and the Lord President. PRO.
10 Ibid.
11 U.K.: CAB 123/176 “BOLERO Committee notes. PRO. In Stewart’s memorandum of July 1942, (B.P. (42)), he stated that Grigg will work, through his committee and the regional offices of the Ministry of Information to conduct British assistance to American troops. The American Red
Cross was to, in the hopeful opinion of Stewart, "keep in touch" with the regional offices of the MOI. Grigg's Committee will coordinate activities throughout the rest of Britain for those services of a local nature, with the cooperation of the MOI regional offices. The Foreign Office was to be kept fully in the loop, particularly regarding political issues and relations with the Red Cross. "Special arrangements" were to be made to form a liaison between the Foreign Office and the Grigg Committee. Finally, since Scotland lay outside of Home Office purview, they were specifically mentioned as a liaison issue.

12 Ibid.

13 U.K.: CAB 123/176 "BOLERO Committee notes (S.F.S. note of July 18, 1942). PRO.


15 Ibid., 248.


17 Ibid.

18 Kirby and Harris, Star-Spangled Radio (Chicago: Ziff-Davis, 1948), 54-57.

19 Reynolds, Rich Relations, 165.


21 Coffey, Hap, 293-301.

22 Reynolds, Rich Relations, 74.

23 Del'Marmol, "Sovereigns of the Conquered Sky," 84.


27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., 176.

29 Ibid., 258-259.

30 Ibid., 259.

31 Ibid., 254-259.

32 William Maher, Fated To Survive (Spartanburg, SC: Honoribus, 1992), 52. Maher had made a date with a young British woman the next night. Unfortunately for both, Maher was shot down and taken prisoner. He never saw the young British woman again.

33 Freeman, Friendly Invasion, 25-30.

34 Reynolds, Rich Relations, 259.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.
The problems of U.S. airmen arriving in Britain had as much to do with where they were to live as anything else. To amass an air armada, the infrastructure had to be in place. This included living quarters, sanitary facilities, cookhouses and dining rooms, offices, briefing huts, ammunition and fuel depots, air traffic control towers, and runways.

In their meeting of May 28, 1942, the chief air officers of the R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. discussed the actual beddown of U.S.A.A.F. aircraft and crews. Already the grim math of combat was calculated into the logistics. General Eaker, assuming a mission loss rate of 5 percent a mission and 10 missions a month, argued for a significant number of crew replacement centers to enable the Eighth to keep replacements quickly at hand. The British were a bit
taken aback by the general's pessimism and suggested the total was a bit on "the high side." Eaker "was inclined to agree." Later, he would prove to have been somewhat optimistic in his figuring.

Due to the problems of accommodations, the U.S. and U.K. airmen made some singular agreements. As a token of comradeship, the R.A.F. would cram more men, from the current 12 to up to 18 into each Nissen (Quonset) hut and the Americans, who would have had to deal with such crowded accommodations anyway, would house in similar fashion. The R.A.F. officers offered to step down the R.A.F.'s standard of comfort to whatever level the U.S.A.A.F. was forced by constraints to accept. The Yanks, on the other hand, acknowledged that proper sewerage was an engineering task that would delay unit beddowns, so they offered to forego such "frills" as necessary. The Americans, realizing the dire straits of their deployment situation, committed to increasing construction battalion assets as rapidly as possible.

The numbers of Americans due to arrive in the first wave were staggering. Each heavy bomber squadron would consist of 38 officers, 275 enlisted, plus "various auxiliary" troops. Fighter squadrons were similar, with
34 officers, 287 enlisted, plus others. Generally, there were three bomber squadrons per group, one group per base. Therefore, the operational edge of each base's manpower was close to 1,000 men - not including group headquarters. Along with the men came their aircraft - with approximately 35 heavy bombers per group or 80 fighters. The Americans and British planned for the arrival of four groups of various aircraft to total 247 planes by June 1, an arrival of 15 groups by July 1, 35 groups by November 1, and 66 groups by March 1, 1943.

In a "Most Secret" document, Appendix F to LM/409/DDOP of June 4, 1942, the British were given extremely short notice of the arrival time of U.S. air units. Even though only six days separated the report date and the arrival of the first unit, the aircraft type listed, the P-39 Airacobra, was wrong. These aircraft never flew combat missions from Britain. The aircraft types of following units, even though due to arrive days later, were even less certain. Even the number of squadrons was an uncertainty. One squadron's potential location was in doubt, even though it was due to arrive within days.
The rapid deployment for U.S.A.A.F. units and the rather unpleasant accommodations awaiting them finally caught the eye of the Prime Minister in July 1943. According to the minutes of a senior staff meeting of that month, Churchill was reported to have been "disturbed" by reports describing the accommodations of U.S.A.A.F. personnel in East Anglia. "Everything possible should be done to give our American Allies as good accommodation as possible," ordered the Prime Minister. The Chief of the Air Staff was "invited" to examine the matter and sort it out.\footnote{7}

Even by July 8, 1943, the members of the units of the Eighth Air Force often found themselves bounced around, cramming into R.A.F. facilities on a "lodger basis."\footnote{8}

**U.S./U.K. troops comparison**

There are several factors to consider when addressing the relations between U.S. and British troops. An initial issue to consider is whether such a relationship mattered at all. The insistence of the Americans to maintain the integrity of their command structures and keep U.S. troops under field control of U.S. commanders kept lower echelon relations more on a social than military basis. Outside
of special circumstances, operational soldiers and airmen were rather segregated from their British counterparts. Where contact was made generally centered on social contact during training in Britain or, in the case of the Eighth Air Force and their counterparts, between ground support personnel.\(^9\)

For the airmen, the lives of U.S. and British bomber crews were as different as larks and owls. The Americans flew during the day, the British at night. Fighter pilots were generally day aviators, but ground maintenance crews worked around the schedule of their aircraft. Throughout the war, the relationship between U.S.A.A.F. and R.A.F. aircrew, when in contact, was cordial. There were little in the way of points of contention, and certainly in the case of bomber crews, both parties probably felt some sympathy for the other.\(^10\)

While some Americans flew on multi-crew British aircraft before the U.S. entered the war, the fighter pilots of the "Eagle Squadron" gave Americans and British a stronger example of U.S./U.K. military relationships amongst aviators.

The Eagle Squadrons were created by a soldier of fortune, Charles Sweeney, who had hoped to form a latter-
day Lafayette Escadrille to aid the Finns in their battle against the Russians. However, Finland’s defense collapsed too quickly and the team went to France. They soon had to be pulled out of there as well. Eventually they ended up in England like many of Europe’s flotsam and jetsam collection of warriors. While a handful of Americans participated as fighter pilots in the Battle of Britain, it was between that period and the Pearl Harbor attack that the Eagle Squadrons, initially Nos. 71, 133 and 121, were formed, beginning a rather short, but colorful, tenure. The Eagles, slow to adapt to British training methods, showed a “different” grasp of discipline. The fighting record of the Eagles in the first nine months of operation was only haphazard, with the first "score" being a flight leader's wing man accidentally shot up by his own side. Once proper leadership was installed, the Eagles began to produce - finally credited with destroying more than 70 German airframes - enough to supply approximately six German squadrons. Shortly after Pearl Harbor, the Eagle Squadrons were transferred to the 4th Fighter Group of the Eighth Air Force.11
Otherwise, Eighth Air Force personnel and the R.A.F. got along on a fairly professional basis. This tradition of goodwill between U.S. and U.K. aviators carries through to present day.

U.S.A.A.F. and British Army relations

There have been quite a number of mentions over the years regarding the relationship of the British "Tommies" (ground troops) and the American G.I.s. Not all of the comments have reflected cordial relations. However, the relationship between U.S. aviators and British ground troops has not been separated from the overall perceptions. It should be. What relationship existed here can best be described as social, since U.S. airmen and British Tommies rarely interacted in any other setting except at the highest levels. Any social contact would be hard to separate from the overall U.S./U.K. military relations. The big difference would be the fact that U.S. airmen would be operationally engaged (since they flew out of England), while any Tommy they met would be in training. Therefore, prolonged relations were not to be expected. As aircrews were more officer-heavy than infantry squads in any army, the anti-fraternization
policies would limit contact. And, of course, U.S. airmen received flight pay over and above the base pay, which was already weighted in favor of Americans.¹²

"Flyboys" and "grunts" rarely mixed in any military structure, and it seems unlikely U.S. aviators and British soldiers had much history of relations. U.S. bombers were maintained by U.S. mechanics. Indeed, the British military presence on an American base in World War II was extremely rare. For example, R.A.F. Mildenhall in East Anglia had its R.A.F. commander, but was, for all intents and purposes, an American oasis in England. With the exception of driving on the left side of the road, there was little on base evidence to American military personnel assigned to Eighth Air Force bases of actually living in England.¹³

The Pay Issue

Much was made of the pay of U.S. military compared, to the British. Indeed, it was a chief complaint - and if order in cliches mean anything, it even exceeded other British complaints about the Yanks, who were "over paid, oversexed and over here." Compared to the British Tommy, American G.I.s enjoyed superior pay. It seemed even greater than it was, though, due to the American penchant
of tipping and being careless about money. However, a closer examination of pay as of June 1942, (Appendix G), shows the pay rates do not seem so out of line between the servicemen of the two countries.\(^\text{14}\)

At the very low end, American private soldiers earned just $56 a month, while the British private's pay was just $12 a month. Therefore, an American private, who did not lose his week's pay in a bad hand of poker, had $11 over his British competition when hitting the town at the end of the week. To a Tommy, the difference must have been a terrific obstacle. The $11 meant the Yank had a better meal, a taxi ride, and tickets to the theatre.

Moving up the ranks, the observer would note that the British enlisted did not separate as much as the Americans. They had only five enlisted ranks, while the Yanks had seven. However, the top U.S. enlisted rank (Master Sergeant) and the Colour-Sergeant rank of the British Army shows a difference of nearly $17 a week, or approximately $70 a month. This does not show much more of a difference between them as between the private soldiers - meaning, as a percentage of base salaries, the British were "catching up." At the top of the ranks, British generals and lieutenant generals surpassed their
American counterparts. Only U.S. five star generals, of whom at the beginning of the war there were none, exceed their British counterparts. There was one significant difference - flight pay. At the time, flight pay added some extra $50-60 or so into each air forces captain’s pocket each month. Thus, an U.S.A.A.F. captain, in his sharp "Pinks," and 50 mission crush service cap had a month’s salary of approximately $275, as compared to his counterpart’s $100. Not only did a Yank flyboy have this advantage, but the rapid promotion of American aviators was legendary -- with baby-faced majors a common-enough observation. Considering that such advancement in rank came due to the horrific losses of those ranking just above, the extra bar came with a warning. By the end of the war, American losses equaled, almost exactly by some odd coincidence, that of British and German airmen -- both of whom had fought each other for two years before the Yanks arrived on the scene.15

Regarding the pay issue, there are several points worth consideration. First, the Americans were not overpaid, by any stretch of the imagination. To handle a state-of-the-art machine in hostile skies where there was little mathematical chance of surviving a tour of duty
should not have come cheaply in 1942. In any case, few enlisted for the pay. Second, the British pay was very low -- particularly for their private soldiers. Clearly their attitude was that a private soldier should stay on the post and thereby receive three square meals a day and a roof over his head. Third, both U.S. and U.K. leaders understood this pay difference would be an issue. The British had already had the embarrassing experience of having their own Commonwealth troops (Canadian and Australian) land on British soil with more pay than their hosts. 16

In the end, the American government encouraged their troops to save their money and conducted public relations programs to at least sensitize them to the British point of view. 17

G.I. and Civilian Relations

The British civilians had much to say about the Americans in their midst. However, polls taken during the war gave generally favorable responses to the concept of positive U.S./U.K. relations.

Dr. George Gallup of the American Institute of Public Opinion and his British associate, Dr. Henry Durant,
director of the U.S.-affiliate British Institute of Public Opinion, attempted to track attitudes of Americans and British regarding issues and each other during the war. What they reported in a March 1943 memorandum to the Foreign Office was "the attitudes of the British people toward the United States is friendly on the whole, and considerably less critical than the attitudes of many Americans toward Britain." The ramifications of this was, of course, that if true, American G.I.s came to Britain more likely to have an unfavorable view of Britain than their hosts would have of their guests. While the pollsters reported that Russia enjoyed friendly support of the working class Labour Party supporters, any political division did not particularly disfavor the U.S. They stated, "as a general rule, Britons in the upper economic brackets, members of the Government Party, and men more than women are most friendly toward the U.S." Other findings included that "President Roosevelt enjoys widespread personal popularity in Great Britain and his administration seems to be in large measure responsible for the considerable feeling of cordiality between the countries—or should one say two empires?"
Tracked against pre-war opinions, there seemed reasonable support for the U.S., but the insistence by many Americans for repayment of World War I irked Britons. Even before the war, the British desired friendly economic and geopolitical relations between the U.S. and Britain. However, the question of British war debts incurred during World War I, hung like a cloud over potentially sunnier relations. The pollsters provided a history of polls dating back to 1937 when they asked, "Would you like to see a trade agreement reached with the U.S.?" Some 65 percent said 'Yes,' while only three percent gave a 'No' answer. In January 1938, Britons expressed confidence that the Americans would not leave them alone in a future war. A figure of 71 percent said 'No' to "If there is another world war, do you think the U.S. will stay out?"

As stated earlier, polls showed the British were a bit miserly regarding their war debt to the U.S. In answering the question, "How should our war debts to the U.S. be settled?" 18 percent answered "Payment in full," 32 percent suggested "Reduced by agreement," while 50 percent argued it should be cancelled altogether. Women (25 percent) more than men voted for "Payment in full."
The British reciprocated the American appreciation for Winston Churchill for FDR. In January 1939, 74 percent of those polled stated that the "world would benefit" if FDR were elected a third time, even though such was contrary to American tradition.25

Even when the U.S. was out of the war and Britain was fighting for its survival, 65 percent said 'Yes' and only 15 percent said 'No' to the question, "Do you think the U.S.A. should take part in the peace settlement after the war?" This was a remarkable concession given that the U.S. had not even passed the "Lend-Lease Act" yet to assist Great Britain.26

In July 1942, more than one half of a year after the U.S. entered the war, and before the Eighth Air Force had even flown a heavy bomber sortie into German airspace, the question was asked, "Do you feel that as a result of taking part in the war the U.S. will or will not want more than their fair share of credit for helping win the war? The answers: will-36 percent, will not-44 percent, and no opinion-20 percent. Even slightly more favorable responses came from questions regarding U.S. and foreign markets, U.S. expectations during any peace terms, and the sharing of post-war global power.27
However, while the quantitative methods reported out a generally favorable attitude toward Americans, other indicators were not as obvious an indicator of overall feelings for the Yanks. The observations by Britons regarding their American guests fairly stretched across the spectrum from idolatry to outright disgust. Much of the information gathered on the topic is from intercepted mail, saved correspondence or diaries of the period. Such sources offer a window into the attitudes of the time.

The Times of London was amazed at the ant nests that American bases became. The Times stated, "The Americans brought everything with them -- aircraft, jeeps, mobile workshops, even dustbins (garbage cans, they call them)."28

On the other hand, historian David Reynolds commented, "What grated most about the American occupation for the British people in 1942-44 was the Yanks' inactivity."29 By this, Reynolds meant the ground troops training for the assault on Continental Europe. The same scenario held for the Canadian troops until their Dieppe fiasco. But, he added, "U.S. bases made an enormous impact on the nearby communities -- their size and technology, their proximity and audibility, the independence and continuity of their residents. Most of
all, they were at war. This set the airmen in East Anglia apart from G.I.s in the rest of Britain."

There exists a wealth of anecdotal examples of the mixed relationship between the U.S. service personnel and their British hosts. The cartoonist, Stil, in his foreword to his collection of cartoons about Americans, *Any Gum -- Chum?*, penned a good-natured introduction: "the 'Yanks' are a warm-hearted lot. I shall always remember with admiration their kindness to the "bombed-out" evacuee children of this country, and, speaking as an Englishman, it is my sincere hope that the spirit of good fellowship which now exists between America and Britain will never be broken."\(^31\)

Kathleen Lowe Ball, a WAAF, wrote a personal diary donated to the Imperial War Museum and included in her diary were impressions of the Americans she met. She wrote: "The Americans had arrived in the area in their hundreds, and soon had the common land around Wiltshire ploughed up with big special implements they brought from U.S.A. and had wheat and other cereals growing in places that never before had been cultivated. It all helped with the Dig for Victory plan."\(^32\)
In a summer 1943 entry, she wrote, (in Scotland, Stranraer)—"We eat with the Americans, so of course we fared very well, as we had their rations. Also we had a P.X. card for their cigarettes and chocolates, etc. Independence Day was celebrated by a big party in the American Red Cross Canteen on Camp. It was declared a holiday and in the day coaches ran to the beaches for a swim at Ayr for those who could get off duty."

The Eighth Air Force also provided to the local communities glimpses of famous movie stars, as aircrew, or when they came over to film movies, entertain the troops, or celebrate some event. Michael Downes wrote in Oundle's War: Memories of a Northamptonshire Town, 1939-1945, Captain Clark Gable's "posting gave Polebrook in particular a somewhat glamorous aura." The locals found him "affable and obliging." He signed autographs for schoolboys and workers alike. He drank in local pubs and was a "keen softball player." Gable, in town to film a training picture for aerial gunners, flew five combat sorties and earned himself an Air Medal.

Mrs. E.M. Kup's diary of her wartime years does not paint a particularly flattering portrait of American servicemen. In her duties as a WAAF, she came in contact
with U.S. personnel both on and off the base. Her initial contact was favorable, though. She wrote how a fact-finding team of American officers came into her operations room, handed out compliments to the British men and women working there and sent flowers. This kind gesture was soured, according to Kup, when the Americans required the use of their own phonetic alphabet when being contacted. 36

Mrs. G. Page, however, noted in her diary of the war that she enjoyed American movies such as "Casablanca" and the "Wizard of Oz," and she and her father enjoyed the music of Glenn Miller. But the biggest thrill was hitching a ride with two Yanks in their jeep. According to Mrs. Page, "Barbara and I were picked up by two G.I.s in a jeep (and were) blown about!" 37

Foreign Office "Intelligence reports," usually cobbled from intercepted mail or crime reports, gave a mixed review of British citizen/American service personnel relations. One Briton commented sourly on the public relations effort on behalf of the Americans, wondering "why they are fussed over so much more than our boys?" 38

The aircrew and ground support troops in East Anglia were received happily enough by publicans in the region, but the local drinkers complained that the Yanks drank all
the spirits and bottled beer, and their tipping "had a bad effect on British soldiers in the pub who have to count their pennies." However, the report also mentioned that price-gouging of the Yanks happened as well, and the locals hated to see it happen.³⁹

During that same period, while the British were lauding the Americans for holding holiday parties and feasts for the local children, the British also groused about the Yanks buying up all the turkeys. According to one complaint,

"Considerable feeling has been aroused in this neighborhood by the practice of American officers touring the countryside and buying up turkeys and poultry at fantastic prices. Already the American Forces are far better fed than our own or the civilian population, and it is felt that strong action should be taken to bring the matter to the notice of higher authorities of the American Army. As a matter of fact, one of the members of our own Committee has been visited by American Army officers who offered her five pounds for a turkey..."⁴⁰

The British authorities added, "This (turkey buying spree) has already been reported to the U.S. Military liaison officer at Regional HQ who is in touch with Commanding Officers."⁴¹

There seems to have been an opportunity for proactive public relations by both American and British authorities that went missing. This assessment is reinforced by one
commentator who put the turkey crisis in a public relations perspective: "A great deal of interest and sympathy was shown in the Thanksgiving Day celebrations, and this would have been even wider if the significance of the occasion had been more widely appreciated." 42

After the New Year, things seemed to settle down. The weekly report was fairly tame: "Little comment is made on the American troops this week, but criticism is still reported of their heavy drinking, high pay, dangerous driving and boastfulness." 43

However, one Briton griped that the Yanks got special favors. The offer of college courses at Oxford to Americans seemed too much for this complainer to take: "better paid...special food...best buildings...pick up the girls...and now on top of it all they are to get special University courses." 44

Some complaints hardly seemed worth reporting. One woman wrote that while attending a U.S. church service, the singing was not up to British standards. According to her, the Americans needed lessons "from us about choir and unison singing." 45

Some, however, were perfectly willing to give credit where credit was due: "Marlborough area farmers are said
to consider that the Yanks are better workers than our own troops and comments have been heard in Bristol this week on how vigorously and hard they seem to work."\textsuperscript{46} And the following was reported: "Postal censorship and Police duty reports indicate that the U.S. troops are, on the whole, well-liked and well-behaved."\textsuperscript{47}

Whether that happy report was a result of the next is only conjecture: "Greater activity by U.S. Military Police where in the Cheltenham area...the vigilance of the extra numbers drafted in to the town has been much welcomed."\textsuperscript{48} So, either the Americans seemed to behave or were forced to do so by a strong police presence.

One continuing report seemed to indicate, however, a degree of insensibility from the American side. Invitations offered by British families to American servicemen seemed to be "getting the cold shoulder," as one report put it. One MOI analyst reported, "Laxness in not turning up was mentioned in 5-12 January 1943 as well."\textsuperscript{49}

One commentator offered up some pity for the Yanks while indicating some shortfalls in the British government's hospitality programs:

"I feel very sorry for the Americans here, both black and white, from what I can see here, there
doesn't seem to be much organized entertainment here for them. I bet they do think Derby is a dump. I wouldn't mind having any of them at our house sometimes, but I hardly know how to go about it, you can hardly pick anybody up in the street. If there were some organization like your D. of B. Empire, it would be easy."

The Nature of the American Flyer

The purpose of this study is to reflect on the public relations between members of the Eighth Air Force and their British hosts. To place the proper context on the study, a description of some factors that separate the members of the Eighth Air Force from other Americans in Britain is warranted. Americans who fly military aircraft are a self-selected breed altogether. They are, first and foremost, volunteers. They possess specific qualities, which place them somewhere away from the American social center of gravity. If interest were to drive a social scientist to draw comparisons between U.S. military aviators as an aggregate and that of the U.S. taken as a whole, it would not take much measuring to discern a difference. U.S. Air Force aviators have generally fallen within the 18-50 range, and have traditionally been skewed toward being healthier, more educated, less diverse, far more male and even wealthier than would be, in statistical
probability, an "average" group of Americans of a similar-sized population.

There are several reasons for the unique nature of American military aviators. Air Force aviators must be older than 17. They must be physically fit to fly, and the up or out policies of the military, as well as a generous retirement program, mean most had left the Air Force at or prior to their 50th birthday. An enlisted airman who signed up on his 18th birthday can retire at half pay at the age of 38. An officer who came in after four years of college could retire as early as 41 or 42. Considering the retirement benefits, this was a fairly attractive separation point.51

Due to the requirements of a flight physical to be administered to the Air Force flyer prior to entry on active duty and on a yearly basis thereafter, aviators were physically fit and the Air Force’s stringent flight standards and procedures ensured a maintenance program to continue a degree of good health was continued. They could not neglect their health and be expected to maintain their flying status. Therefore, statistically, aviators could be among the healthiest of Americans, but not the unhealthiest. From World War II on, aviators must have
had at least a high school education and passed certain entrance examinations. This eliminated those in the general population at the lower end of the education scale. Further, over and above the general military, flying was heavily an officer occupation.\textsuperscript{52}

While the Air Force in later years was fully integrated and women were performing almost every task the service has to offer, flying in World War II's U.S.A.A.F. was dominated by white males. Women who flew did so as members of auxiliary organizations. African Americans did fly, but they were assigned to the Mediterranean area. Social causes of these phenomena extended beyond the Air Force. If certain groups were underrepresented in colleges, then this would affect recruiting. The same applied to the other factors, including health. Some additional reasons might account for the disparity. If, for example, children had any tendency of following the career paths of their parents, women had little in the way of air force role models, while African Americans were Air Force aviators a full generation or so behind their white counterparts.\textsuperscript{53}

In 1942, military aviators were not paid significantly different than civilians, but they earned
more than their counterparts in any service, anywhere. Considering the rapid advancement possibilities, due in large part to the expansion of the air arm, as well as the casualties amongst their senior officers, some promising young officers found themselves with rank not normally associated with their age. With rank came better pay. Fighter pilots generally, but not always, were officers and the same went for roughly 40 percent of bomber crews. Compared to an Army squad, where some dozen men were led by a non-commissioned officer, the sergeant, a 10-man bomber crew was commanded by men up to the rank of brigadier general, though usually a captain. In the infantry, lieutenants rated platoons - which meant an "entry-level" ground officer led enough men to fly three to four B-17s - and a whole formation of fighters. Thus, in operational units, the air force put its officers in harm's way to a greater percentage than other services. Promotions would follow such performance - either for the officer if the performance merited success or for being the next in line when the senior officer failed to return.  

In World War II, education was higher for most airmen than other counterparts. Air officers, at least
initially, had to have at least two years of college. Even when recruitment goals outstripped the college output, an entrance examination was given. In any case, the technical nature of the aircraft, particularly bombers, required a fair degree of intelligence. For pilots, an ability to quickly convert observations of instruments and surrounding airspace to decisions was critical. For navigators, the problems were even more mentally challenging. The understanding of calculus, physics, meteorology, and geometry made this "chair of mathematics" on the aircraft a very challenging position. The navigator was, usually, a young man whose background might have been from any vocation or college program. He was thrust into a responsibility, particularly lead navigators, where his decisions had the potential to save the lives of fellow crewmembers, or, indeed, the entire mission. However, the proper performance of his efforts caused death below, and his calculations were made on a table bounced around by air pockets and flak. Between his calculations, he had to man a machine gun designed to protect the aircraft from frontal assaults coming at a closing rate of nearly 700 miles an hour -- with him having only a limited range of motion or field of view.
His calculations had to take into account variables such as time, air pressure, temperature, speed through air (which is different from speed over ground), air currents, the variations and deviations relating to his magnetic compass readings, and whatever means he could use to determine whether his dead-reckoning has any validity or not.\(^5\)

Flying at night, not normally an Eighth Air Force bombing operation, involved celestial navigation, which factors in such variables as the wobble of the earth on its axis, the differing movements of planets and the moon to stars, and all the other factors previously listed while hoping the sextant did not freeze up. Failure often meant death, while successful calculations did not assure anything -- the aircraft still might get shot down or the pilot might blow the landing. For navigators, it was truly a job that separated the quick from the dead.\(^6\)

To an even greater degree, though less on the intellectual than the instinctive, was the need for quick decisions by the fighter pilot. There was no one to help within the cozy confines of his airframe. Mathematical calculations did play a role for the best of this breed. In shooting the enemy, the best approach was the zero
deflection attack. This occurred in only two circumstances - directly behind and directly head-on. 

To address the latter first is to acknowledge the premium position of instinct in the fighter pilot's world. Face-to-face with an enemy aircraft was a rather uncomfortable place to be. True, there was an excellent chance the pilot's bullets would strike his opponent's aircraft. The enemy was, after all, rapidly filling the gunsight. However, the enemy was probably having similar success on the pilot's own craft. Unless at least one of them moved, the bullets would be the least of the worries.

Chasing the tail was the best position and strongly preferred. Otherwise, guide calculations were necessary to shoot bullets in a place in the sky ahead of the current position of the enemy so as to ensure the bullets and the enemy aircraft arrived at the same point in the sky at the same time.

The bombardier had problems of his own. His job was to program the Norden bombsight with the flight variables so as to align the sight to correctly anticipate the proper position and release time of the bombs. Steady thinking and steady hands while fighters and flak sought
out his aircraft for destruction marked a rather cool customer.⁶⁰

Other technically advanced positions on the aircraft included the flight engineer, usually assigned the top turret, and the radio operator. To round out the demographic profiles, flight crew were probably more aligned with population norms in one area - height. Fighter pilots were traditionally shorter than their bomber counterparts as the former had to operate in quarters far more cramped. Traditionally, as well, fighter pilots did not have to be as strong physically as “heavies” pilots since the force required to move wing surfaces was far less on fighter aircraft.⁶¹ In World War II, the B-24, for example, was a “bear” to fly, requiring constant attention and force. Fighters were responsive creatures, where over control was as great a sin as under control. Six-foot-four Major James Stewart was a B-24 pilot. At the extreme was the belly turret gunner. While he did not have to be the smallest man on the crew, the cramped confines of the position precluded men of above-average height. The shorter the belly turret gunner, the better. This individual hung outside the aircraft in a
rotating Plexiglas fishbowl. It was not a job for the bulky or the claustrophobic.\textsuperscript{62}

From an outsider’s perspective, the aviators were in a glamorous job. They got the press (although never enough as far as top air forces brass were concerned), they got the pay, and they got the prestige. They also got the war -- day in and day out. Some 60,000 of America’s brightest, fittest, and best were casualties of their very demographic nature.\textsuperscript{63}

**Psychological Issues**

Another set of factors separated many members of the Eighth Air Force from other Americans posted to Britain. The aircrew of the Eighth were on operational status, while other Americans (and British civilians) were not. While German random bombing and V-1 and V-2 strikes did occur on the British population during the years the Eighth operated out of England, these events were scattered and never reached the intensity of the 1940 bombing of London. Therefore, while most in Britain were relatively safe, the airmen of the Eighth Air Force faced a high probability of death, injury, or German imprisonment during any given sortie. This situation must
have placed tremendous stress on aircrew. If so, stress may have grown to psychological trauma with results that could affect normal human relations. Freeman noted that Eighth Air Force personnel did not often take advantage of invitations to the homes of British neighbors. This phenomenon deserves a closer examination.  

Major Joseph Del'Marmol stated that he suffered from what was then described as combat fatigue or being "flak happy." In his case, he spent about a week in the hospital to convalesce. Others might have been so affected, and if so, it would have had an effect on relationships between Eighth Air Force aviators and the British.

Table 10-8 of the Pocket Handbook of Clinical Psychiatry gives the DSM-IV Diagnostic Criteria for Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (or PTSD). The definition of PTSD: "The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both the following were present":

1. The person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others,
2. The person's response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror. 

As a result, "persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness (not present before the trauma), as indicated by three (or more) of the following:

1. Efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings or conversations associated with the trauma.
2. Efforts to avoid activities, places or people that arouse recollections of the trauma.
3. Inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma.
4. Markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities.
5. Feeling of detachment or estrangement from others.
6. Restricted range of affect.
7. Sense of foreshortened future (no career, family, kids, normal life span)."

Also, the symptoms could include "persistent symptoms of increased arousal as indicated by two (or more) of the following:

1. Difficulty falling or staying asleep
2. Irritability or outbursts of anger
3. Difficulty concentrating

4. Hypervigilance and exaggerated startle response.⁶⁸

The epidemiology of anxiety disorders, on Table 10-9, page 119, states that lifetime prevalence of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder is only about 1-3 percent of the population - but significantly 30 percent of Vietnam veterans. The age of onset, unlike other anxiety disorders, can occur at "any age, including childhood."⁶⁹

Table 10-10, Psychodynamics of Anxiety Disorders identifies psychological defenses of these suffering from PTSD as "regression, repression, denial and undoing - trauma reactivates unconscious conflicts, ego relives anxiety and tries to master it."⁷⁰ Basically, PTSD "follows extraordinary life stress (war, catastrophe) and is characterized by anxiety, nightmares, agitation, and sometimes depression."⁷¹

These symptoms, if widespread, could go a long way to explaining the seemingly callous indifference the Eighth Air Force crews had toward establishing and maintaining relationships with the British.⁷² Certainly, normal social interchange would be difficult and the lack of effective behavior and emotional numbing may explain a lack of commitment to women in which the aircrew member may have
had a physical relationship. The comment that the idea of something as benign as "tea time" being frightening to aircrew members is, perhaps, explained by PTSD symptoms of avoiding stress and significant activities -- plus the feeling of detachment from others.

Del'Marmol stated his belief that nearly every aircrew had some degree of PTSD. If so, and given the symptoms of the affliction, little wonder the public relations efforts to bring Eighth Air Force personnel and their British hosts together faced an uphill climb. Psychotherapist Terrence Real, co-director of the Harvard University Gender Research project, asserted that males are not only prone to keep personal depression states from others, but actually conceal the depression from themselves. Thus, any Eighth Air Force depression statistics would probably be underrepresented even if they existed. 73

In what John Keegan called the "centripetal" (vs. the centrifugal) forces of "rear links," warriors and their armies were, throughout the history of organized warfare, drawn back to their own base. For ground troops in the industrial age, it was the attraction and dependence on ammunition dumps, water points, telephone centers,
railheads, etc. These supply and support centers were designed to extend the reach of an army, but according to Keegan, they had the reverse psychological effect. "There is," Keegan noted, "a very powerful resistance to movement in all modern armies, which is partly material and partly psychological in nature, and so strong that it may even be compared in its effect to that offered by the enemy." In other words, psychological resistance, perhaps aided and abetted or excused by any logistical hang up, would stop an army as much as enemy action.74

Another problem faced by armies of World War II was the length of exposure to battle. The American, Russian, and Japanese soldiers were "in for the duration." This created, according to Keegan, feelings of "endlessness" and "hopelessness." Keegan noted the American experience resulted in the Vietnam era over-compensation of the "one year and out" policy, which became controversial. The Eighth Air Force did rotate its aviators, though not ground personnel. Such rotations in were somewhat individualistic as were rotations out. Often, rotations were at the flight crew level, but missed missions and "lead crew" assignments played havoc with such plans.75 Other countries rotated units.76
One possible manifestation of the human urge to avoid battle is the phenomenon of some Eighth Air Force crews, whether forced or more freely selected, to land in neutral countries. With Axis control of most of continental Europe within the flight duration capability of American bombers, aircrews had only two real choices: Sweden or Switzerland. The other neutral countries were either not accessible or, like Ireland, more prone to pack the Americans back into their aircraft and send them on their way.

Keegan, in *The Face of Battle*, noted the phenomenon of combat personnel lighting out for sanctuary. Citing as examples the flight of French cavalry into the woods at Agincourt and Belgium troops at Waterloo, Keegan stated that the availability of an ultimate escape route was frowned upon by the generals, but might have the effect of maintaining morale since the soldier felt a degree of control, that "his presence on the battlefield was ultimately voluntary...he who fights and runs away lives to fight another day."

For ground armies, retreat that could not be exploited was frustrating for attacking armies. General George Washington in the late 1770s and Vietnamese General
Vo Nguyen Giap in the 1970s made such tactics a grand strategy. However, for the slowly developing Eighth Air Force, losing aircraft to neutral Switzerland or Sweden had to hurt. The problem with the 2nd Air Division, flying B-24s rather than B-17s, was that the B-24, with its greater range, often enough came within landing distance of neutral territory. It wasn’t, as far the Air Forces could tell, an exceptional morale problem in the 2nd Air Division. It was merely desire meeting opportunity -- or vice versa. What effect this "choice" had on morale is outside of the realm of this report, but if Keegan is correct, such an option might have created either a relief for some aircrew or just created another dilemma. In any case, for quite a few airmen the lure of internment in Sweden and Switzerland overcame the desire to return "home" to England and again face the horrors of combat.

Conversely, there were those to whom combat was a personal crusade. Robert Scott, who wrote *God is My Co-Pilot*, described how fellow P-40 pilot, Tex Hill, attacked a Japanese Zero head-to-head like ancient knights at the joust. Neither gave an inch, but Hill’s better aim and the stout nature of the American craft allowed Hill to flash past the exploding Zero. Upon landing, Hill strode
over to the burning wreck and kicked the severed head and shoulders of the Japanese pilot back into the inferno, stating, "All right mister - if that's the way you want to fight, it's alright with me." Hill then walked into the alert shed for a cup of tea.  

Clearly air battle had differing psychological effects on various individuals. Some coped better than did others. The totality of the problem will, in all probability, never be known.

Given the various obstacles placed between them by military operations, disparities in background, lack of opportunity to mix, and even the likelihood of psychological barriers created by combat, any British effort to create an effective public relations program to promote better U.S./U.K. relations between members of the Eighth Air Force and the British population had much to overcome. It is not clear if the British appreciated the degree of difficulty or whether they understandably reasoned the Americans could take care of themselves with British support, if not leadership.
Notes

1 Alice Duer Miller, The White Cliffs (New York: Coward-McCann, 1940).

2 U.K.: Appendix B to LM/409/DDOF/ June 4, 1942. PRO.


4 U.K.: Appendix B to LM/409/DDOF/ June 4, 1942. PRO.


6 U.K.: Appendix F to LM/409/DDOF/ June 4, 1942. PRO.

7 U.K.: COS (43) 1520 meeting of July 1943, AIR 20/4596. PRO.

8 U.K.: Appendix B to LM/S 78340/ADO (U.S.) July 8, 1943. PRO.

9 Freeman, Friendly Invasion, 31, 62.

10 Reynolds, Rich Relations, 301. See also Boyne, Clash of Wings, 310-327.

11 Freeman, The Friendly Invasion, 4. See also Perret, Winged Victory, 66-67.

12 Ibid., 61-64. See also see Appendix G, and Bowman, U.S.A.A.F. Handbook, 152.


14 Freeman, The Friendly Invasion, 61-62. See also Appendix G.


17 Ibid., 173.
18 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
35 Ibid.

36 Mrs. E.M. Kup, WAAF, personal diary. Imperial War Museum.

37 Mrs. G. Page, personal diary. Imperial War Museum.


39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 U.K.: FO 371-34124 "U.S. Troops in the U.K." Extracts from Regional Weekly Intelligence reports. Digest of November Reports. PRO.

43 U.K.: FO 371-34124 "U.S. Troops in the U.K." Extracts from Regional Weekly Intelligence reports, 5 January 1943, 24 November-1 December. PRO.

44 Ibid

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 U.K.: FO 371-34124 "U.S. Troops in the U.K." Extracts from Regional Weekly Intelligence reports, 26 February-10 March 1943. PRO.

51 Del'Marmol, E-mail correspondence with author, September 27, 1999.

53 Ibid., 158-162.

54 Ibid., 228-231.


57 Stephen Coonts, ed. War in the Air (New York: Pocket, 1996). In Coonts's book, several leading aces of World War I and II give accounts of "dogfights." In most cases, the pilots preferred riding the tail of their adversary until the bullets or shells from their guns had a telling effect. German ace, Adolph Galland described a head-on attack against U.S. Marauder medium bombers. His Me-262 jet was equipped with a terrific array of firepower that scoring hits on the Marauders was fairly easy, even with a very short approach on target. Galland, 210.

58 Ibid. See also Charles Watry and Duane Hall, Aerial Gunners: The Unknown Aces of World War II (Carlsbad, CA: California Aero Press, 1986), 74-75. German fighter pilots found that B-17s were easier to strike, without return fire, from the front. The later model, B-17Gs, were equipped with a chin turret housing two .50 caliber machine guns to thwart this tactic.


24. See also Andy Rooney, *My War*, 94-95. On these two pages, Rooney describes the horror of watching a B-17 land, gear up, with the ball turret gunner trapped inside his turret. With a belly landing, the ball turret is the first piece of a B-17 to come in contact with the runway.

63 Bowman, *U.S.A.A.F. Handbook*, 236. See also Rooney, *My War*, 108-110. From a reporter's standpoint, Rooney stated, "There were more heroes in flight than will ever be known to anyone but themselves. The circumstances were right for heroism in a bomber. Ten men, all well known to each other, were fighting for their lives, in close proximity, in a situation that demanded physical and technical skill." (108).

64 Freeman, *The Friendly Invasion*, 36. See also James G. Brown, *The Mighty Men of the 381st: Heroes All - a chaplain's inside story on the men of the 381st Bomber Group* 2nd Edition (Salt Lake City, UT: Publishers Press, 1986), 258. Here Chaplain Brown stated that he was puzzled that invitations to visit British homes were not accepted by the American aviators at his base.

65 Del'Marmol, Phone conversation with author. August 15, 1999.


67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid., 119.

70 Ibid., 120.

71 Ibid., 5.

72 Maslow and Mittelmann, *Principles of Abnormal Psychology*, 476-477. According to the authors, there were 918,961 neuropsychiatric hospital admissions. Also, 256,134 persons "were discharged with the diagnosis of psychoneurosis." The authors warn that these figures probably do not reflect the actual totals. One side of
the equation, an individual who was admitted more than once was counted as multiple admissions. On the other hand, outpatients and many who suffered "operational fatigue, combat fatigue or combat exhaustion" and whose condition "cleared up quickly" were not counted.

73 Real, I Don't Want To Talk About It, 55.


75 Del'Marmol, "Sovereigns of the Conquered Sky," 295

76 Ibid., 303-304.


78 Keegan, The Face of Battle, 309.

79 Davis, Carl A. Spaatz, 448-9.

80 Ibid. During June 1944, internee aircraft increased from 18 during May to 38.

81 Gerald Linderman, The World Within War: America's Combat Experience in World War II (London, England: Harvard University Press, 1997), 11. Also, as a final note, John Keegan wrote that discussion of the human element of war is complex and certainly has psychological aspects that must be explored. He believed, however, that historians ought not to take the option of abandoning such psychological discussion to psychologists. Keegan wrote: "What battles have in common is human: the behaviour of men struggling to reconcile their instinct for self-preservation, their sense of honour and the achievement of some aim over which other men are ready to kill them. The study of battle is therefore always a study of fear and usually of courage; always of leadership, usually of obedience; always compulsion, sometimes of insubordination; always of anxiety, sometimes of elation or catharsis; always of uncertainty and doubt, misinformation and misapprehension, usually also of faith and sometimes of vision; always of violence, sometimes also of cruelty, self-sacrifice, compassion; above all, it
is always a study of solidarity and usually also of
disintegration - for it is towards the disintegration of
human groups that battle is directed. It is necessarily a
social and psychological study. But it is not a study
only for the sociologist or the psychologist, and indeed
ought not perhaps to be properly a study for either. For
the human group in battle, and the quality and source of
the stress it undergoes, are drained of life and meaning
by the laboratory approach which social scientists
practice. Battles belong to finite moments in history, to
the societies which raise the armies which fight them, to
the economies and technologies which those societies
sustain. Battle is a historical subject, whose nature and
trend of development can only be understood down a long
historical perspective." John Keegan, *The Face of Battle*,
297-298.
CHAPTER 7
U.S. MORALE PROGRAMS

U.S. Public Information Officers

While the British made their efforts to welcome the American forces, develop good relations between U.S. personnel and the U.K. population, and enhance American military morale, the U.S. authorities made their own public relations efforts. Some of these efforts were more institutionalized, while others tended to be ad hoc. Some programs sought to build better U.K. relations, while others had good U.S. morale as a goal. The Office of Public Relations, Director of Information, Headquarters Army Air Forces was not formed until March 1946 under its new director, Lt. General Harold L. George in accordance with General Order 37, March 22, 1946. This does not mean that the Army Air Forces did not have officially tasked public relations functions. Public relations was a function of the Intelligence Division, along with Evaluation and Counter Intelligence. While this, at first blush, seems an odd combination, closer examination
of a number of factors makes this placement somewhat less startling.

First is the common enough view of the period of public relations as a rather benign form of propaganda. Second, the air arm of the U.S. Army was severely understaffed until the war years, and Air Corps bureaucracy demanded that there be a place for everything and everything in its place. Since intelligence was a traditional military art and worthy of its own organization within the military structure, and since intelligence was allied as a communications art, placing the newer function of public information into the intelligence branch was fairly natural. Finally, though it might not have been a cognitive decision, public information officers and staff provided feedback on mass media information as reaction. This rather overt and crude intelligence work provided command with an assessment of the amount of elbowroom in which they could operate. Public relations in its media and political roles carried great weight in the Air Corps.

In March 1941, while the U.S. was beginning to be placed on a wartime footing, even though still some nine months away from the Pearl Harbor attack, Intelligence
chief Colonel R. C. Candee realized that his eight officers and nine civilians were not going to be enough to support the entire public relations demands of the Army's growing air force. However, an attempt to get Major Harold W. Bowman, who became the Air Force's chief public relations man after the war, to head the new, expanding program went unheeded by the top brass at Army Air Corps.²

Issues of aircraft design, for various security reasons and otherwise, were coming to be a headache for the Air Corps. In April 1941, the Public Relations Section assumed a primary role of clearing "all material prepared by newspapermen, magazine writers, private industry or other parties, concerning the Army Air Forces."³

The public relations section split into four main branches by May 1941. These were the Press Relations Branch, which made the initial news releases coming from the Section and handled phone questions; the Review Branch, which published Air Corps News Letter and reviewed all news reels, photos and articles submitted for release; the Special Assignment Branch, which compiled reference material and assisted in the writing of speeches and articles for senior commanders; and the News Analysis
Branch, which helped the Intelligence and Analysis Branch of the War Department's Bureau of Public Relations and published a "daily review of news that had special interest to the Air Corps."  

There was neither a "community relations" branch nor anything resembling a more public-oriented program. This public relations design reflects a very mission-oriented, top-down, message-propagating and impact-analysis structure. Also in May, those operating "in the field" under whatever hat approximated public relations-type activities convened at Randolph Field, Texas to "iron out public relations problems and create a unified public relations organization throughout the Air Corps training commands."  

A main stimulant for this gathering was to "augment" the Army's recruiting service, which was now tasked to induct and train 30,000 pilots in 1941 alone.  

In the meantime, the Air Corps rebuffed an attempt by the War Department to absorb Air Corps public relations functions, arguing that Corps-level public relations served two functions that are necessarily better served at that level: air power propaganda and intelligence-gathering regarding air issues. In his letter to General Hap Arnold, Colonel Candee had cheek enough to suggest
Arnold demand the War Department divest more resources to the Corps level.⁸

Cooperation between the Corps and War Department public relations branches was not always smooth. The War Department released information not always favorable to the Air Force, while the War Department wished that the Air Corps would keep it better informed on flying issues and activities. When the system worked as designed, that is, both War Department and the Corps reviewing documents, the mass media received rather stale material. However, by the beginning of the war, Air Forces public relations began to assert some independence, shake itself from its subservient position to Air Force Intelligence, and standardize the practice of Air Force public relations.⁹ European U.S. air forces public relations functions and structures were dictated by an August 12, 1942, edict from Lieutenant General Eisenhower to the Eighth Air Force Commander, which gave priority to establishing official public relations positions down to air force wing level. Eisenhower's order ranged from the broad directive to establish "rapid and reliable channels of communications," to the exact timing of the "release of operational and other news." Public relations duties were described in
the two-page document as coordinating news information, receiving VIPs, and coordinating support for "press parties."\textsuperscript{10}

Yet public relations activities were not conducted only by traditional public relations personnel. Commanders tended to freelance, particularly at the top where General Hap Arnold could call up Jack Warner and have him produce a propaganda movie. Even so, the Public Relations Officer was a focal point for telling the local story to the greater audience. In doing so, the story had to be worth telling, so PR officers had quite a hand in ensuring "good news" stories were covered, if not created.\textsuperscript{11}

In a late 1943 memorandum for the Chief of Air Staff, Brigadier General Thomas D. White, U.S. Army Intelligence, outlined the challenges, successes and failures of AAF PR up to that point. General White relayed his finding that "many senior AAF officers here and overseas believe Army Air Forces overseas do not have the planned and skilled public relations operation required for the objective(s) (of creating positive public opinion and building morale)."\textsuperscript{12}
In short, General White argued for the following changes: PR manual revisions, "organic" changes to the PR officer position, adequate training and supply of PR and censor officers, and an "expanded liaison function" to provide a greater array of information and materials to target publics. White stated that the Army Air Forces had much to brag about in the Italian campaign, but had failed to get the message out. According to General White, "it is likely that if the next six civilians and next six (non-staff) officers met were asked, five of the civilians and at least half the officers would say: 'Salerno was saved by Navy shelling.'" This, White stated, would be contrary to the vast preponderance of Air Forces bombs over Navy shells on target. To White, the continual inadequate publicity accorded to air power would serve to be detrimental to both the current mission and future operations. A "lack of such continuity of orderly information is, by its absence, unfavorable to the morale and therefore the efficiency of AAF personnel itself, both at home and abroad," White wrote.¹³

White argued that public relations has a domino or cyclical effect in that "proper public relations should result in a chain of letters and clippings to air troops
in the theaters, which in turn, greatly and visibly improves morale, which, in turn, visibly and demonstrably improves operational efficiency." 14

White took pains to separate the inadequate nature of in-theater public relations from blaming the War Department's Air PR chief, Colonel William Westlake, who the general claimed "has done a remarkable job." 15 The problems lay, White said, with HQ U.S.A.A.F. to properly organize and adequately train public relations officers.

White also recommended a number of other solutions. These included separating public relations from the intelligence staff and giving public relations officers direct access to the commanding officer. White's recommendation addressed the problem typical of staff officer functions - that of qualified supervision. While still under the command of the air group commander, a public relations officer would be under the "technical supervision" of a senior PR officer. Thus, poor performers could not hide behind the ignorance of a pilot commander. White also recommended an increase in PR officer support at AAF headquarters and that PR officers were made eligible for rank equal to other staff officers of similar duty loads and expertise. 16 White also
recommended that command and staff officers be provided a non-specialist PR manual so they can have an appreciation of PR personnel, tactics and the requirements of the field.\[17\]

White suggested that the type of person best suited for PR work would be newspaper editorial workers. White did qualify this recommendation by adding that such candidates need to be "taught the difference between the urge to get a story into the paper come what may and planning and executing an AAF PR program under a mission directive." Alternative choices, in order, were "young lawyers," industrial PR executives, advertising executives, and "possibly former teachers of history or English." It is interesting to note the general's preference for newspaper people and young lawyers over personnel who already had industrial public relations experience.\[18\]

Part of White's review included a recommendation of how the AAF should conduct its public relations training. This recommendation suggested the "students" should be offered different courses depending on the student's prior experience.\[19\]
White argued for an easy-to-read manual for public relations officers, which covered very practical items such as "how to get his office and furniture, etc."²⁰

White's list also included a PR liaison function, which would provide the following services: create a mission statement, state AAF current and long-term PR policies, critique theater PR officers and guide their performance, analyze U.S. media needs and AAF publicity requirements, assist in answering queries about theater PR functions, and provide full support to researching, writing, and sending hometown news stories and clippings.²¹

General White's recommendations were followed some months later by a memorandum from General Arnold to General Spaatz in Europe that the Air Forces in Europe were not being covered by the media adequately compared to the other services.²² Spaatz defended his public relations personnel by stating they were providing "correspondents in London with a constant flow of news and feature material," and he planned to move PR personnel to Paris as well. His PR people had been escorting the press to bomb damage at strategic targets in France, resulting in "excellent articles." Newsreels were also in the works, according to Spaatz. General Spaatz did recognize that
Ninth Air Force units in France needed better on-site PR support and Spaatz took the opportunity to request more PR officers.23

War Department Bureau of Public Relations "Liaison Bulletins" that followed General White's report demonstrated the AAF took White's suggestions to heart -- particularly his liaison recommendation. The bulletins provide short, to-the-point instructions and directives to AAF PR personnel on such issues as cooperating with reporters covering air crashes, war loan drives, newsreel updates, media accreditation and so on. White's policy book recommendation was not only accepted, but also infield PR personnel were requested to provide their input.24 Significantly, Bulletin 31 warned, "no statistics, percentage rates, or numbers of neuropsychiatric casualties will be released."25 This edict makes accurate assessment of U.S.A.A.F. psychological statistics difficult. Also of note is the mention in the same Bulletin regarding U.S.A.A.F. cooperation with the March of Time newsreel production staff on the two-reel film, "The Unknown Battle," about U.S.A.A.F. strategic bombing, largely based on the U.S.A.A.F. official film "Target for Today." PR officers were requested to assist in promoting
this film "within the limits of existing regulations and good taste." Interestingly, the Bulletin recommended the employment of "overseas veterans" to make personal appearances to "relate their experiences." This rather sophisticated integrated marketing program demonstrates the rapidly advancing art of PR during this period.26

U.S. programs promoting U.S./U.K. relations

The American military authorities understood that to enhance British-American relations required education of American troops. This was done in several ways. Perhaps one of the most ubiquitous PR pieces was A Short Guide to Great Britain, published by the War and Navy Departments in 1942.27 In the booklet, a rather frank but colloquial narrative advises Britain-bound G.I.s to "be friendly, don't brag," "never criticize the King or Queen," and "use common sense."28 Warns the booklet (twice): "It is always impolite to criticize your hosts; it is militarily stupid to criticize your allies."29

The original booklet was seven pages of succinct advice printed on cheap paper. The booklet received favorable press, including an editorial in The Times of London, which on July 14, 1942, suggested it become a
bestseller "which ought to be acquired by British readers."³⁰

The booklet stated its purpose in stark words: "You are going to Great Britain as part of an Allied offensive - to meet Hitler and beat him on his own ground. For the time being you will be Britain's guest. The purpose of this guide is to start getting you acquainted with the British, their country, and their ways."³¹

The booklet took aim at Irish Americans in that it was "no time to fight an old war." The same went for those who had a view of British Tommies as the Lobsterbacks of Paul Revere's ride. The British were, the booklet advised, reserved, thrifty, dedicated democrats, and, above all, "tough." The British and their country were "shopworn," prizing age over size, and working hard to eke out a decent life while serving the war effort.

Other advice included not eating a British host family's entire food allotment when invited over and appreciating the military valor of the women in uniform. The American soldier was advised that the average housewife and kid in knickers had probably seen more action than an American doughboy of World War I.
That some British acquired the little booklet is evident in the diary of Brigadier Charles E. de Wolf, who wrote about a dressing down he gave a G.I. "I commenced, 'When you left America you were given a booklet telling you how to behave and get on with the British.' 'Sure I did,' he said. 'Then,' I continued, 'you do not appear to have turned over the first page.'"  

Along with the booklets, Eighth Air Force personnel were given lectures on site regarding their behavior, cautioning them against "excessive drinking" when out and about the British population.  

One clearly innovative and distinctive education program was the 50-minute film, "A Welcome to Britain," which starred Burgess Meredith as a G.I. letting the audience in on the proper and improper behaviors around the British. The movie led with General Adam of the War Office and featured a cameo by Bob Hope.  

Incoming aircrews also received lectures from veteran crews, thus preventing some adjustment problems.  

Perhaps the efforts began to make an effect. The intelligence summary of October 1-31, 1943, noted: "It is very evident from the many comments on the subject that many Americans now have a greater understanding of the
British people, and are getting to know them better. Adverse criticism is seldom seen and there is scarcely any evidence of the existence of bad relations to be found in the mail read. 36

The American Red Cross

During World War II, the American Red Cross (ARC) held a unique role in providing morale services. Unlike World War I, where several organizations provided morale and recreational support, the ARC was granted an exclusive role. 37 The ARC was given the role of taking care of morale of U.S. service personnel off base, while the Army took care of on-base programs. The ARC then expanded on an incredible basis. By 1943, the ARC was operating "the largest hotel chain in the world." 38

The ARC would organize leave programs, set up doughnut carts, and operate hotels and hostels. At first it was envisioned that the ARC would be free, but since U.S. troops were already getting more money than their counterparts, a small 50-cent charge for services was applied. Then, in Londonderry, the Club was opened to Allied troops as well. Shortly, the British Tommies swamped the club. Similar problems occurred at the
Salisbury Club. The G.I.s were unhappy to lose their havens, and the ARC, depending on home-front funding, did not want the home front seeing their boys not enjoying the fruits of their donations. \(^{39}\) Back came the Yanks-only restriction.

British efforts to provide other morale programs left Eisenhower cold. He felt secure in allowing the ARC to run Army morale and made his preference clear. \(^{40}\) While Eisenhower did support an in-home hospitality program, he wasn’t around much longer to lend it his support. Thus, the British program to invite Americans into their homes on an organized level swamped the ARC. The Brit/ARC home hospitality effort died at birth. \(^{41}\)

British women staffed the ARC clubs, for the most part, and they often felt at odds with ARC policies. Early volunteers were from the Women’s Voluntary Service (WVS), who already possessed distinctive uniforms. This would not do. The ARC was unhesitant to insist ARC workers wore ARC uniforms — again due to the home front image. Although this created some hard feelings, the ARC won this round. \(^{42}\)

One American ARC woman felt the rules for Americans-only were a minor irritant, and she let in the few British
soldiers passing through. "There are a few British troops around who use the club (they’re not supposed to) but we shut our eyes to them as they’re no problem and really add a lot," she wrote.43

In the meantime, the ARC went on wheels, from providing Aeroclub mobiles to Eighth Air Force bases to providing especially constructed trolleys to serve refreshments to service personnel at train stations and ship docks.44

Red Cross clubs had other problems, one being magnets to prostitutes. This became a problem large enough to warrant a memorandum from the Foreign Office to Minister Osbert Peake at the Home Office. In the letter, the prostitutes were described as "swarming around" Red Cross hotels. A meeting was requested with representatives from the Home Office, Foreign Office, War Office, the U.S. Army’s headquarters, and the Canadians.45 Eventually, the ARC, according to the New York Times, faced the pressures of reality and opened up several prophylactic stations in London, thus responding to the increased rates of venereal disease.46
In the end, the American servicemen appreciated the work of the ARC. Said one writer, "We don't see much of the USO here, but the Red Cross really do a lot for us." When the war wound down, the women who were so helpful to the cause were sent the following letter and dismissed from their duties at a rather rapid pace:

June 1945
To the British Volunteers Working with the American Red Cross:
We salute you and we thank you - from the bottom of our hearts we thank you. You have done more than you know for the American servicemen, and we who are charged with the responsibility for the American Red Cross operations in Great Britain are deeply grateful. Information desks, answered questions, worked in canteens, sewed on buttons and insignia 'until your fingers must have been stiff,' first aid, drove cars, advised on shopping, brought flowers to new in hospitals, cheered then when sick or wounded, other kindnesses to 'lonely men 3,000 miles from home.'
Again we thank you, and again we salute you.
(signed) Mrs. (Margaret) M. Sloan Colt, Deputy Commissioner, American Red Cross in Great Britain and Western Europe Grosvenor Square, London

The role of the American Red Cross became integral to U.S. morale initiatives. It was a successful program as a morale booster and demonstrated that British volunteer assistance was invaluable when meshed with American needs and organizations. The ARC had a difficult time in
balancing the demands of British and American public opinion and some of its policies undoubtedly upset British sensibilities. However, by providing an escape or relief for U.S. service personnel, it probably did a favor to local British communities.

U.S. Chaplains: Public Relations from the Pulpit

"Now you may find it strange that a man of peace is asking you to fight. But the church is known to change, embracing half the wrongs it hopes to right. I can't describe the times I've wrestled with my conscience to the core. Now blessings from the chaplain of war."

--Phil Ochs "Chaplain of the War" (1966).

Public relations programs promoting U.S./U.K. relations and enhancing U.S. personnel morale were not only the result of British civil servants, assigned U.S. PR professionals, or the American Red Cross. Ad Hoc public relations activities were also practiced, with the airbase chaplain often taking the lead. The work of military chaplains is a legacy begun in 1942 when young (and old) American chaplains found themselves tending to their aerial flock at U.S.A.A.F. bases scattered throughout the East Anglia countryside.

In the decade after World War I, the total chaplains in the military stood at approximately 200. By the time
World War II had ended, there were nearly 9,000 serving throughout the globe.\textsuperscript{49} 

Upon America's impending entrance into World War II, the clergy of America concerned themselves with whether the draft would lead American youth to "syphilis and slavery" and the dispensing of prophylactics on military bases.\textsuperscript{50} National clergy worried about the effects of war propaganda on the population and the sin cities surrounding military and naval bases on the morals of the freshly inducted young men.\textsuperscript{51}

The bombing of Pearl Harbor seemed to push the social issues aside and clarified the moral picture. The churches "shared the national consensus on war."\textsuperscript{52} The evils of Nazism and militaristic Japanese aggression were recognized as humanly unstoppable, except by military arms. "Totalitarian aggression" stated Protestant leaders, "must be halted or there will be no peace and order in the world."\textsuperscript{53}

When chaplains came into the 1941 U.S. Army, some were already serving in the reserves, while some received temporary appointments in the Army of the United States (AUS), and there were the 137 chaplains in the Regular Army. While draft boards began processing others into the
military, chaplains entered through the "Jewish Welfare Board, the Military Ordinariate, and the General Commission on Army and Navy Chaplains" for the three main faiths in the U.S. Each of the boards had different structures and different results - from the tiny Jewish Welfare Board, and the hugely successful efforts of Bishops Spellman and O'Hara, to the rather large and ungainly organization seeking to recruit Protestant clergy - which eventually broke down into denominational commissions that could meet the vast demands of the expanding American effort.\textsuperscript{54}

Regarding potential chaplains, Army Regulations 605-30 of December 1941 required those eligible for "original appointments in the Regular Army" to be:

a. A male citizen of the U.S.
b. Between the ages of 23 and 34 years. (Those appointed in the Army of the United States could be up to 55 years old).\textsuperscript{55}
c. Regularly ordained, duly accredited by and in good standing with some religious denomination or organization that holds an apportionment of Chaplain appointments in accordance with the needs of the service.
d. A graduate of both 4-year college and 3-year theological seminary courses.

e. Actively engaged in the ministry as the principal occupation in life and be credited with 3 years experience therein.\textsuperscript{56}

In his account of the war, James Good Brown, who served as the Protestant Chaplain for the 381st squadron at Ridgewell, provided 763 pages of his account of the chaplain’s role at an Eighth Air Force installation during World War II.\textsuperscript{57} Chaplain Brown received his air force commission and training via the chaplain’s school, which was located at Harvard University during the war years.\textsuperscript{58}

Brown believed the chaplain was a stern shepherd, guiding and protecting his flock. In this, he echoed the attitude of the 381st Bomb Group’s initial commander, Colonel Joseph J. Nazzaro, a hard-bitten ex-West Point football player. Nazzaro was a typical air force lieutenant colonel, young (in his late 20s) but with many hours of flight-time in a multitude of aircraft.\textsuperscript{59} Nazzaro handpicked his first crews and drove them hard.

Brown saw his role as supporting the commander and maintaining a coherent psycho/social, and spiritual, structure. In Brown’s words, “I was not easy with my men
at any time during the war, whether they worked in the mess hall, as mechanics on the line, as M.P.s or as combat aviators. I was tough with my men because I believed it was essential to strong character, and because I knew the Colonel Nazzaro expected no less than the very highest from all his men." 60

According to Brown, his role was non-denominational. He was the chaplain assigned to the 381st, with the responsibility of being all faiths to all the faithful. This changed a bit later when a Roman Catholic chaplain, Captain Martin Collet, was added to the roster of the 381st. 61

Brown’s attitude reflected that of Major General William R. Arnold, Chief of the Army Chaplain Corps. A "big-framed, tough-muscled, graying blond," Chaplain Arnold was a Roman Catholic priest "with the mind of a practical fighting man." 62

Brown listed several responsibilities of the chaplain to include preparing and delivering a "high quality" sermon each week, while also keeping busy on the typewriter writing letters to the families regarding their loved ones who were either missing or killed in action and producing reports, correspondence and other publications.
In the 381st the chaplain was also to give a pre-brief talk and a prayer before the first combat mission the men would fly. Brown noted that for the first mission, the young men looked up with "a stillness in their faces, a dreading to leave the briefing room. No exuberance was there. All the fun had gone out of flying. This was war. This was death. And they knew it." 63

General Marshall, Army Chief of Staff "promised" that chaplains would be protected from extra duties so they could devote full time to religious responsibilities. 64 Even so, two additional ad hoc roles of chaplains in World War II are pertinent: one, the chaplain's role in promoting and enhancing U.S. Eighth Air Force relations with the British people; and, second, their role in providing an environment favorable for Eighth Air Force personnel so the troops could relate to their hosts in a manner deemed acceptable. In this second role, the chaplain's role as an amateur psychiatrist and morale advisor is key. Brown put it this way when discussing one airman with problems, "a psychiatrist was needed. When this occurs, the fellows are always sent to me. I am supposed to straighten out their minds. In most cases I can do it." 65
In issues of British relations, Brown makes several references. On one occasion, the Lord Bishop of Chelmsford was invited, and accepted the invitation, to give a guest sermon. Conversely, Americans gave sermons at St. Paul's cathedral and Westminster Abbey. 66

However, it was during the holidays where the chaplain’s office really initiated U.S./U.K. local relations. In December 1943, Brown was called upon to organize a Christmas celebration. He requested assistance from the Enlisted Men’s Council, Special Services, the Red Cross, representatives from the base’s officer corps and his own staff. However, he got little in the way of assistance. According to him, the Enlisted Men’s Council, composed primarily of young, single men, were not interested in “working with children.” The officers begged off, citing their workload. The Special Services said this was not their job. It took the “Red Cross girl” to respond with “Well, I like children.” 67

A combined British women and American men’s “Festival of Music” fell through when the Americans failed to show up at practices. The unhappy duty of telling the women their services were not needed fell to the chaplain’s assistant. Instead, the 381st formed a quartet of
musicians who were of professional quality, but hardly a highlight of U.S./U.K. relations. However, the Christmas Day party, with the 381st hosting the local children, was an outstanding success.68

Brown went to the various communities around the airbase to build interest in his programs and to meet the families surrounding his base—and his relationship appeared, from his account at least, to be excellent. It is interesting to note the reverence Chaplain Brown received (and still receives) from his aircrews. He is constantly mentioned in e-mail message traffic, and there are numerous photographs of him in the CD published by the 381st memorial group.69

Although special events were not in the chaplain's job description, Chaplain Brown was not the only public relations-minded chaplain in the ETO. Special event after special event made the lives of the local children easier and their parents appreciative of the efforts of the boys from overseas.

Chaplain Lawrence Conway commented that individual chaplains in World War II made Christmas parties and other local aid forays a personal duty. It was, Conway wrote, "a very localized and ad hoc arrangement, as individual
chaplains saw a need and sought to address it in their situations." Conway pointed out that the Good Samaritan parable had parallel messages in other faiths as well.

However, the chief duty of the chaplain was to attend to his assigned flock. Bombardier Del'Marmol commented that while Brown was his outfit's chief chaplain, as a Roman Catholic, Del'Marmol had little contact with Brown. There was a Roman Catholic chaplain assigned to cover Brown's unit and Del'Marmol went to him.

Del'Marmol commented that he found religion to be of comfort. It was not, at least to him, an issue of "lucky superstition," but a strong degree of faith. His religious training helped in other matters. He found meditation and praying to assist him in keeping his mind occupied and providing a calming influence. This did not prevent Del'Marmol from experiencing post-traumatic stress disorder, which kept him from flying for four days, but it did, according to him, help his recovery. Articles of assistance to help keep his focus, Del'Marmol said, were his rosary beads and a religious medal. He attached no special "powers" to these items, but they helped in his concentration.
The Role Of Radio

"As the tide of battle turned radio's role in the war had assumed significant proportions. No other medium had done an equal propaganda and morale job." 74

Edward Kirby, the co-author of the above quote and of the book, *Star-Spangled Radio*, was the Public Relations Chief of the National Association of Broadcasters, and he was appointed as advisor for radio to the Secretary of War. He picked Jack Harris to be his assistant. The two were directly responsible for many of the radio programs of the war. 75

No medium is as associated with World War II as is radio. While movies and newspapers provided news and images of the war for later generations, it was the radio that kept the contemporary military in touch with their world, and the home front in touch with their military.

Radio began to make its impact on the American view of the war when American broadcasters, such as Edward R. Murrow, described in vivid detail German bombing raids on Britain. Through the airwaves and out of the tinny-sounding speakers, Americans became enraptured listeners to the greatest drama of the day. 76
Those of the World War II generation can vividly recollect the moment they heard about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, word that came either directly or indirectly from radio broadcasts. Radio provided instant news. It also provided entertainment -- and this was a critical element to building morale.

When the Japanese bombs and torpedoes sank the battlewagons of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, radio did a grand job in getting out the initial word, then went into a manic frenzy. Although some legislation was passed regarding the role of radio during war, it was too vague. The known ability of potential enemies to listen in and home in on radio waves made west coast radio stations frantic. Do they broadcast news and messages, or do they shutdown to prevent the enemy from taking whatever advantage they could from a broadcast? Radio stations up and down the coast went up and down until some directives finally made their way to each station.

While radio was a mass audience medium, it could be used to target specific groups with specific messages. The Army Air Forces were quick to grasp the unique abilities of the medium. Air Forces authorities saw needs
to "sell the idea of air-fighting as an effective arm of warfare."\textsuperscript{80}

Other Air Forces-related issues where radio had a planned role included promoting air power as a protector of ground troops. The radio also was used for convincing wives that the act of flying itself was not as inherently dangerous as popular conception created after the casualty rates of World War I and inter-war aviation disasters, and to retain those potential aircrew whose eyesight or other abilities prevented them from piloting an aircraft, but would be useful in other aviation or aviation-related fields, such as navigator, etc.\textsuperscript{81}

General Henry "Hap" Arnold tapped Rex Smith, a former editor of \textit{Newsweek}, and TWA's public relations director William Westlake to map out a strategy and series of activities to assist the Army Air Forces to promote their operations.\textsuperscript{82}

The team of Colonel James Higgs and Captains Freddie Brisson, Ted Sleek and Eddie Dunstedter created a west coast on-the-air recruiting program that included "Soldiers with Wings," "Hello Mom," the drama series "Roosty of the AAF," and the music and promotion program "Wings over America." Several top Hollywood screenwriters
lent their services to these programs as did Tinseltown personalities. 83

East coast listeners received their Air Forces promotional messages courtesy of Glenn Miller, whose program, "I Sustain the Wings," was targeted to young men from whose ranks future aviators would be drawn. 84 Later, Captain Glenn Miller, U.S.A.A.F., would take his act overseas to the European Theatre of Operations, where he was immensely popular, but would lose his life when his aircraft was lost somewhere over the English channel. 85

Later in the war, when the public, feeling victory was assured, drifted away from war features, the AAF decided to go for a bolder tone. They recorded and transmitted the recordings of actual air sorties, reported by handpicked crews. This program, called "The Fighting AAF," had as its guest on its final broadcast General Arnold, himself, who said to his audience:

"I have always regarded our Air Force radio broadcast as a strictly military operation, whose objective, of public understanding and support, is just as vital as a mission in a theater of war. It enables us to write 'mission accomplished' in the log of our wartime programs." 86

Radio also served to bridge the gap between America and its allies. When an American station prepared to
leave New Zealand, as the forces had deployed out into the Pacific, a hue and cry rang out from the New Zealanders who got hooked on the new music from America. One depressed listener wrote:

"Your (final) broadcast last evening caused pain to my whole family. We know you must leave, and that your leaving means that the war is going well...but my whole family feels that a sense of real personal loss pervades our household when the voices of all you fine announcers are no longer with us. We shall miss you. And we shall miss your fine programs, especially Bob Hope and 'People Are Funny.' You brought us an America we knew only distantly before."

In Britain, U.S. programming to its troops grew in fits and starts, and it had a major obstacle in the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). In the beginning, as Americans began to be deployed overseas to locations as varied as Iceland and Alaska to the north and the Panama Canal and Australia to the south, and many isolated locales in between, the attempt to broadcast programs via long-range, short-wave equipment could not cope. It took some enterprising G.I.s in Kodiak, Alaska, to provide the solution. They set up a low-powered transmitter to rebroadcast to local troops. Once the Army became what would much later be called a "private" station, there was some angst that the station was a Japanese operation. That sorted out, the usual efforts to regulate the G.I.s'
little operation created the usual red tape, but finally the Alaskan troops were getting full Army support. And their brilliant idea of low-power transmitters soon dotted the globe whenever Americans could be found. In one mail intercept, an American G.I. gushed about American Forces radio: "It's a terrific morale builder and the fellows love it." For the Eighth Air Force stationed in England, there were other listening sources. The Americans in England could listen to, of course, the BBC. However, staid BBC programming was not to their liking. A number of reasons might explain their lack of enthusiasm for British radio. One, oddly enough, may have been the BBC's lack of advertising. American overseas listeners of American programs claimed they missed the ads, and some military public service announcements were installed -- such as warnings of malaria pills, venereal disease, trenchfoot, etc. Adding to the different, non-commercial format, the BBC's lack of American swing and other up-beat music did little to attract the attention of a Yank on K.P. Whether Americans were entertained during a war does not, on the face of it, seem important. But morale aside, the Office of War Information's Brewster Morgan, a former
CBS executive, noted that the socialization problems of bored G.I.s pouring into English pubs might have been abated by having them back on base, listening to good American programming. The idea of low-powered U.S. Army transmitters near Army bases was instituted. The Americans were careful not to step on the toes of the BBC, and they did not have any transmission strong enough to reach London. By the end of the war, approximately 30 officers and 300 enlisted men developed a 55-station network in England. The plan was to have American shows broadcast in frequencies out of range of normal British home receivers. However, by mid-1944, some five million Britons were enjoying the American programming.

The American Broadcasting Station in Europe (ABSIE) was established to broadcast to the peoples of Europe prior to the D-Day invasion -- and kept busy afterwards. Among ABSIE broadcast programming choices, actual reports of U.S. bombing raids were used -- fresh from aircrew debriefings.

Advancing British-American relations took a back seat to the concerns of the BBC when it came to the use of transmitters for broadcasting messages to U.S. invasion troops and airmen. BBC strenuously objected to a blended
program, with MOI's Brendan Bracken speaking for them by suggesting "that fellow Bob Hope, very funny to your people, not funny to ours." 95

While the U.S. sent their request upstairs to Churchill, who backed the American plan, Kirby and Harris examined why the BBC acted in such a manner. According to Kirby and Harris, BBC's board of governors, traditionally-bound, had a policy of providing their listeners with programs "they ought to want to hear." 96 Market-oriented American radio was more listener-oriented, with regulatory oversight keeping the lid on excesses. Kirby and Harris concluded that the BBC did not want to have direct comparisons made between their drab programming and that of the U.S. 97

While Kirby and Harris may have been correct in their assumption regarding BBC motives, the BBC was not totally disliked by its listeners. To the British, a big part of their environment was the BBC. For the Americans to assume U.S. programming was superior due to its market appeal in the U.S. seems a bit ethnocentric. Still, the British soldiers did get "used" to American music, and its upbeat tempo made work conditions on the invasion beaches just a bit more tolerable. 98
The Army Air Forces Major Glenn Miller was a hit with both U.S. and U.K. forces, and his impact was felt everywhere. He made special trips to U.S.A.A.F. bases, and a Miller trip usually meant high-ranking brass, high entertainment, or both. When Miller's band was the feature for the opening of the London Stage Door Canteen, it drew a very enthusiastic welcome and ovation from Londoners. The BBC recognized the attraction of Major Miller and his music, and Miller broadcasts went to British troops, with excellent response. A Miller fan club in Birmingham, England, had a 2,000 strong membership. Eventually, the BBC stopped the Miller home broadcasts, with the excuse that his music was "unsuitable" for the home audience.

Interestingly, after the European joint U.S./U.K. broadcasts were so successful, the BBC was loathe to have the Americans split away. The BBC made other curious decisions regarding U.S./U.K. issues, including not releasing information on U.S./Canadian buildup in the U.K. in its programs to British forces deployed overseas. Since the newspaper and letters from home mentioned the presence of their English-speaking cousins on "the blessed plot," British troops actually became more suspicious.
Other BBC regulations included forbidding the "swinging of classics" — that is, putting a faster beat and tonal changes to traditional songs. The BBC also sought to eliminate songs that seemed overly sentimental. Transmitting from across the Atlantic, U.S. shortwave had been doing "Command Performance" programs where everyday sounds from home, such as a baby's gurgling, were being broadcast. In the end, despite BBC efforts to the contrary, continental radio stations were being established, slicing the BBC out of the picture.\textsuperscript{102}

According to Kirby and Harris, when the war began for the U.S. in late 1941, "no plan existed for the use of radio as an instrument of either defense or offense, or for anything else, for that manner."\textsuperscript{103} The authors warned,

"The armed services themselves should undertake serious self-examination with respect to their public relations policies and procedures. These gradually improved during the course of the war, but little has yet been done to assure the elevation of public relations to a position of respectability at the war council tables."\textsuperscript{104}

The authors contended that Army public relations at the Pentagon were not even tied into their own theater operations. Kirby and Harris said, "Each commander set up his own public relations organizations, and, to a large
extent, formulated the policies he deemed most satisfactory."

Writing from the vantage point of the early post-war period, the authors regarded the U.S. Army’s relations with the BBC as “warped,” and they called for planning international cooperation of broadcast media in times of war. They asserted for American sources to build credibility, information must flow as freely as possible. Only through this manner is enemy propaganda defeated. Underpinning effective media broadcasts to U.S. troops is to understand that American military personnel and the American general public are essentially the same type.

Wartime Pictures and Propaganda

The World War II Office of War Information was no World War I Creel Committee, the powerful Committee on Public Information, led by George Creel. During World War I, the Creel Committee and British propaganda ministries generated effective messages while the war was ongoing. But in the war's aftermath, both the British and American publics felt manipulated. The excesses of the British overseas effort in portraying the Germans of World War I as rapacious, murdering beasts revolted post-war
Americans when the horrors of that war, and its obscure causes, created an emotional backlash. Even the Creel Committee's emphasis on patriotism seemed merely propaganda. The Creel Committee's accent on selling U.S. involvement as helping to "end the war that will end all wars" led to disenchantment when that proved not to be the case. ¹⁰⁶

Consequently, World War II efforts to rally to the cause were far more subtle until the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. Even then, the excesses of 1917-18 were barely approached. While some war hysteria on the coasts were evident, and the Japanese-American internment actions demonstrated institutionalized racism (though not to any degree approaching America's enemies), these were not actions borne out of a propaganda campaign. One public relations observer suggested that FDR deliberately wanted to keep wartime public relations efforts rather fragmented to reduce any concentration of power. ¹⁰⁷ Indeed, wartime public relations efforts were spread out, emanating publicity campaigns from all directions, with the military a large producer. ¹⁰⁸

Hollywood was a different element to the whole propaganda mix this time around.¹⁰⁹ During WWI, movies
were a herky-jerky visual medium, without sound or color. Movies did not come into their own until after the war. Between World War I and II, most modern countries had a movie-producing center, but none rivaled the glitz, glamour and power of Hollywood. Even British actors forsook their own successful Westend production companies for the great studios in Southern California. Perhaps the two greatest wartime movies, certainly in affecting how Americans (and others) perceived the war and its protagonists are "Mrs. Miniver" and "Casablanca."**

The former was a tale of a British middle-class family in a class-conscious pre-war Britain, coming to grips with the horrors of the 1940 German victories and the Battle of Britain. The transition of lead actress Greer Garson as Mrs. Miniver from a shallow, but kind, housewife to sturdy symbol of British resistance to Nazi terror bombings was so natural in its evolution and powerful in its imagery that Americans were quite taken by the stoicism of the average Briton as portrayed. One American wrote in a letter that this was terrific stuff, strong enough to be planned government propaganda.**

While not government-sponsored, the movie’s director, William Wyler, had every intention of manipulating his
audience toward supporting the British. To him, it was propaganda, and he was damn proud of it.\textsuperscript{112}

The second selection, "Casablanca", had an international cast of film stars including Humphrey Bogart, stepping out of his normal gangster role, Ingrid Bergman, Claude Raines, Peter Lorre and Sidney Greenstreet. This 1942 production won several Academy Awards, and it was released as U.S. troops were meeting the Germans in North Africa for the first time. While this particular movie had little to do with U.S./U.K. relations. It does provide a clear picture of the goal of the war - to provide safety and security to allies then suffering under the heel of Nazi oppression.\textsuperscript{113}

There were other movies that demonstrated the British effort. "Yank in the R.A.F." and "The Way Ahead" were strong films in their effect.\textsuperscript{114} On the flip side, there was a furor over the Warner Brothers 1944 film, "Objective Burma," which the British withdrew from their theaters. Their objections were several, but basically came down to the movie showing only Americans making a daring thrust into Burma, an area of mostly British military efforts - similar to showing a movie about the siege of Yorktown and not mentioning the French.\textsuperscript{115}
To conclude, American programs to advance U.S./U.K. relations and to support U.S. troop morale were diverse and consisted of both well-organized and ad hoc efforts. The U.S. began to develop a strong military public relations program within its air force that matured upon the end of the war. The Americans realized that effective U.S./U.K. relations needed to have an educational element and they produced both printed and moving pictures to promote understanding. Some efforts by the Eighth Air Force units to build rapport between the airbase and locals was spearheaded by military chaplains, while a nation-wide effort to provide for U.S. troop morale was handled by the American Red Cross, staffed in large part by British women. The media of radio and movies served to enhance American morale and helped to create cultural understanding between U.S. and British audiences. A particular favorite was U.S. Army Air Forces Major Glenn Miller, who brought his popular music style to Europe.

Notes

2 Ibid., 19.
3 Ibid., 20.
5 Ibid., 22.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., 22-23.
8 Ibid., 22.
9 Ibid., 24-25.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., I-2.
16 Ibid., Tab II.
17 Ibid., II-2.
18 Ibid., Tab III.
19 Ibid., Tab IV.
20 Ibid., Tab V.
21 Ibid., Tab IV.


26 Ibid.


28 Ibid., 15.

29 Ibid.

30 John Pinfold, "Foreword," Over There.

31 Ibid., 1.


34 Ibid., 174-5. A copy of the film is available for showing at the Imperial War Museum in London. For purposes of this research, the film was reviewed at that location in May 1998.
The problem with British women accosting American G.I.s in London received considerable attention in both official British correspondence and in the press. Author Truman Smith, an ex-Eighth Air Force pilot, described in his autobiography his experience with the "Piccadilly Commandos," the British prostitutes whose base of operations centered upon Piccadilly Square, near the Red Cross Rainbow Club. While that experience was unnerving to Smith, it was not as bad as being grabbed by the rear by a British ATS sergeant, while the rest of the ATS women laughed. "I was actually more frightened than shocked," Truman confessed. (122) Truman Smith, The Wrong Stuff. (St. Petersburg, FL: Southern Heritage, 1996) 121-130.

48 Mrs. M. (Margaret) Sloan Colt, Deputy Commissioner. Letter to the British Volunteers Working with the American Red Cross in Great Britain and Western Europe June 1945. Imperial War Museum.


50 Ibid., 90-93.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid., 93-95.

53 Ibid., 96.

54 Ibid., 97-98.

55 Ibid., 98-99.

56 Ibid., 99-101.

57 Brown, The Mighty Men of the 381st.

58 Ibid., 2.

59 Ibid., 3-5.

60 Ibid., 3.

61 Ibid., 53.


U.S. Army Booklet: "U.S. Army Chaplaincy", 116

Brown, *The Mighty Men of the 381st*, 243-244

Ibid., 245-256.

Various e-mail messages to include Del'Marmol. See also Frank Slomzenski, "Historical Photos CD-ROM of the 381st Bomb Group, World War II -- Ridgewell Field, England." (381st Bomb Group Association, 1999). The CD features photographs of the group during its war years.


Ibid.


Del'Marmol, E-mail to author, March 28, 1999.


Stanley Cloud and Lynn Olson, *The Murrow Boys* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1996) 33-144. Actually "Murrow's Boys" and a couple of women reporters began making their mark with the German invasion of Poland. However, it was during the "Blitz" of London that Murrow earned his fame. One of "The Boys," William Shirer, was a well-established print journalist who had as his beat Nazi Germany. He met Murrow in the Adlon Hotel lobby in Berlin on August 27, 1937, and, although the CBS management were not real pleased with Shirer's voice, he became their man in Germany. See both Murrow Boys, 28-30, and William L. Shirer, *The Nightmare Years: 1930-1940*. (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1984) 274-281.


Ibid., 1-15.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., 67.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., 67-68.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid., 70.
85 Perret, Winged Victory, 412-413.
86 Kirby and Harris, Star Spangled Radio, 70-71.
87 Ibid., 65.
88 Ibid., 50-56.
90 Ibid., 59-61.
91 Ibid., 58.
92 Ibid., 59.
93 Ibid., 70-87.
94 Ibid., 129.
95 Ibid., 138-139.
96 Ibid., 140.
97 Ibid., 140-141.
98 Ibid., 145-146.
99 Ibid., 144-150.
100 Ibid., 143-155.
101 Ibid., 159.

102 Ibid., 159-162.

103 Ibid., 254.

104 Ibid., 257.

105 Ibid., 257-260.


108 Sietel, The Practice of Public Relations, 34.

109 Wilcox, Public Relations Strategies and Tactics, 50.


111 U.K.: FO 371/34126, U.S. Soldier Mail Intercepts. September 1-20, 1943. PRO. However, one soldier commented, "the only time when I feel slightly uncomfortable about being an American is when I sit in an English theater, conspicuous in my uniform, watching Hollywood being ridiculous, or maudlin, or waving the flag."

112 Ibid., 235.


114 Ibid., 235-239.

115 Ibid., 242.
The public relations activities to enhance or cause the enhancement of relations between the members of the Eighth Air Force and their British hosts during the World War II period of 1942-1945 were considerable in number and variety.

The British and American authorities, both civilian and military, believed good relations between the Americans stationed in Britain and the British people with whom they came into contact were important. Because of this belief, a strong, proactive relationship doctrine was established and served as the impetus to a myriad of public relations programs designed to create and enhance positive U.S./U.K. relations.

The literature review chapter of this study described some of the existing works on World War II. While much of that literature centers on issues of doctrine, strategies, tactics, and weaponry, there are studies on the social aspects of the war. Historians such as Reynolds and Freeman have chronicled wartime U.S./U.K. relations. What
is missing is an in-depth review of the challenges facing public relations programs designed to enhance relations and rapport between two peoples who have experienced and were experiencing strikingly different lifestyles, particularly from an American perspective. This study was designed to begin to fill that need.

This study also covered the reasons why Americans were in Britain in the first place. The strategic situation dictated by the operational limitations of American assets necessitated the use of Great Britain as the key staging area for both ground and air operations against Nazi Germany. While Britain served as a staging area for the ground armies of several nations, it was the launch pad for on-going combat missions for the strategic bombers and escorting fighters of the Eighth Air Force. Along with the aviators of the Royal Air Force Bomber Command, the aircrew members of the Eighth Air Force were unique residents of Britain. The use of British territory by Americans served the strategic war aims of both Britain and the United States. Even though both nations shared British land, it was not assumed by U.S. or U.K. authorities that good U.S./U.K. relations would occur without instituting effective public relations programs.
The British were quick to establish the Grigg Committee to coordinate U.S./U.K. public relations programs, but were a bit premature as American politics, policies and experience mandated a strong, singular and autonomous American program to take care of U.S. service personnel needs. Nevertheless, the British adjusted on both the national and local levels, with a variety of programs to include tourist trips, home visits, service centers, and educational programs.¹

This study examined documents to discover that the public relations program instituted by the British government was highly politicized, with the Foreign Office giving way to the Ministry of Information.² The Americans preferred, however, to have the American Red Cross conduct much of the morale activities for American troops.³

As the guests, the Americans did not presume to reciprocate in kind regarding U.S./U.K. morale programs to the degree of the British, although they did host quite a number of joint activities.⁴ Such activities included children’s holiday parties and band concerts. On the other hand, there was a concerted official effort to play the role of grateful guests. Training and publications were designed to help Americans adapt to their new
surroundings and strong directives from above made U.S./U.K. cooperation an American priority. The pamphlet, "A Short Guide to Great Britain," serves as an excellent example of the American attention to fostering good U.S./U.K. relations between the American troops and their British hosts.\(^5\)

The proactive public relations process was aided by the appreciation of effective public relations by the senior officers, particularly by Eisenhower and the top commanders in the air arm. The Air Forces commanders, Hap Arnold, Carl Spaatz, Ira Eaker and Jimmy Doolittle, were well experienced in the art of promotion.\(^6\) Their barnstorming pre-war activities gave them an appreciation of the value of positive, proactive public relations.\(^7\) Unlike the established military services, the young Air Corps had to prove itself to U.S. policy makers and members of the senior military staff. Towards this end, this junior service conducted an on-going series of public relations events to publicize the capabilities of the aviation branch as well as strongly countering arguments made by its critics. Those who were to command the air arm in Europe came to that theater well prepared. Along with the experience of being leaders in the overall pre-war
aviation publicity program, General Arnold had served as a senior public relations officer and both Generals Spaatz and Eaker had formal journalistic training.

Although the senior commanders had strong public relations skills and an appreciation for the need of effective PR, their efforts were more personal and did not immediately translate into revisions of structure. U.S.A.A.F. documents showed that lower echelon-level public relations was a work-in-progress. The 1944 letter from Arnold to Spaatz complaining about the lack of coverage of air forces efforts as compared to other branches showed that the air chief wasn’t quite happy with air forces public relations even at that late stage of the war. Institutional U.S.A.A.F. public relations did not reach maturity until the final year of the war. Furthermore, institutional public relations tended to be geared towards home front consumption, particularly to support air force independence after the war. Building good U.S./U.K. relations was a means, not a final goal, to U.S.A.A.F. institutional public relations.

There were complications to the American/British relationship, exacerbated by as many factors as any that assisted the process. There were problems of culture,
problems of envy due to American advantages in pay and benefits, and the problems whenever organizations try to cooperate on as vast a scale as the Eighth Air Force buildup. With the massive influx of American personnel, local communities experienced the effects of the buildup in ways that bordered on the strange, including the Americans' run on turkeys during the holidays that created complaints from the British locals.

For the flight members of the Eighth Air Force, their combat flying status made for limited opportunities for relations with their British hosts, and what opportunities existed were complicated by the operational and psychological problems somewhat unique to their organization. Colonel Alexander DiSanto commented that Eighth Air Force personnel seemed to mix with the locals on a rather ad hoc basis. For him, the one conduit to the local community was the Roman Catholic Church. Since there was no Roman Catholic Church on base, he would go to the local church with "three nice older women."

The members of the Eighth Air Force exposed to combat conditions may have been psychologically stressed to the degree that inhibited normal interpersonal interchange. Major Joseph Del'Marmol commented on the pervasive degree
of "combat fatigue" in his unit and recent research on the symptoms of such a condition seems to show that a/anti-social behavior is common.

Still, both British and American public relations efforts appear to have made an impact and left a legacy.¹⁴

There were successes that were clear and tangible, particularly the British women volunteering for American Red Cross duties. Other successes were more localized, such as a chaplain's organization of a children's holiday party, and instances of cooperation on cross-cultural activities such as music concerts and religious services.¹⁵ The British national government enjoyed limited success as well, taking up the slack in providing tours and materials for American service personnel.¹⁶

Anglo-American cooperation existed on all levels, although such cooperation tended to be stratified. That is, the American commanders cooperated with their British counterparts, while lower-level personnel tended to have more incidental social contact with the British, particularly in the Eighth Air Force.¹⁷

While contemporary indications of relations between U.S. service personnel and their British hosts are somewhat mixed, there seems to exist a persistently
favorable impression of those relations as seen from the vantage of the turn of the 21st century. The American ground troops who died in the European Theater of Operations during World War II have their memorials and, indeed, their burial sites on the Continent of Europe. In contrast, those who gave their lives over the skies of Germany were, often as not, buried in the American cemetery near Cambridge, England -- with a long wall inscribed with the names of those whose remains were never found. And dotted throughout England are those small memorials to the Yanks who ate their breakfast, climbed on board their aircraft and fought the enemy in the rarified air high over Europe. While almost forgotten in their American homeland, these airmen are remembered throughout England, from Duxford to Norwich, from Ridgewell to Cambridge, by the people who served as their very gracious hosts.18

While this study serves to identify and categorize those public relations efforts, it is a study that opens the door for follow on research. Additional research may wish to explore, far more fully than was done here, the effects of air battle-related trauma and its effect on
relationships as another direction of explaining the potential for wartime public relations efforts.

This study is a synthesis of the various schools of history examining the phenomena within the colossal event that was World War II. There was an examination of the effect of senior individuals on the effectiveness of U.S./U.K. relations. There also was a review of the development of both British and American public relations programs to meet the needs of various publics involved with the war effort in the European Theater of Operations. The political context played a vital role in the public relations efforts of the war. The desire by various British politicians to provide aid to the Americans seemed to be equaled by the political desire to be the leader in that effort. To the chiefs of the U.S. air arm, their desire to create a separate air force after the war colored their efforts.

The social contexts of the various public relations efforts also were examined as it was found that the various cultures played a role in the effectiveness of U.S./U.K. relations. The two "macro" cultures of Britain and America were subdivided into sub-cultures. These sub-cultures included the American military, which had a
further sub-culture in its Eighth Air Force aviators, and the British military.

To explain the public relations between the personnel of the Eighth Air Force and their British hosts, a number of factors had to be considered. Such factors included basic assumptions by the authorities of that period towards troops, the differences in demographics between airmen and the standard population, the differences in opportunities between ground and air personnel to meet the British people, and the effects of trauma on the ability of airmen to engage in mutually satisfying relationships. These factors were introduced to provide the reader some understanding of the complexity of the dynamics facing anyone attempting to engage in building positive multicultural relations in that particular environment.

It is clear this study offers the opportunity for others to engage in more in-depth analysis of each of a number of those factors.

One very American military tradition is to isolate its servicemen and women from the local population -- often to the degree of American food, American entertainment, and American money on American oases in the host countries. Determining the validity of this
philosophy of operations and judging its suitability in a
post-Cold War environment is worth a closer examination.

The Americans came to Britain with a full-load of
baggage developed from U.S. history and recent national
policies. Further, U.S. entertainment activities, media
reports, ethnic backgrounds, religious training, regional
influences, social standing, and education may have, to
varying degrees, influenced the potential for positive
relationships.

While several historians have called the American
presence in England "an occupation" or "friendly
invasion," the Americans were a fairly benign lot for an
"invading" army. While this study holds as a matter of
philosophy that effective proactive public relations is a
powerful aid to the accomplishment of overall missions,
whether civilian or military, it is left for others to
debate whether the British and Americans in World War II
needed to have bothered with intercultural public
relations at all. While Eisenhower and other U.S./U.K.
authorities clearly valued pro-active public relations
between the two peoples, that, by itself, does not prove
the point.
This study offers other points worth consideration. The public relations efforts of senior U.S. Air Forces officials, particularly Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker and Doolittle, were considerable. It may be argued that their public relations expertise, forged in pre-war America and honed in wartime Europe, helped to create and sustain the image of the post-war U.S. Air Force. Such an effort may have been aided by those Eighth Air Force public relations officers, trained during the war, remaining in the service after the war. Clearly, the image of the Cold War U.S. Air Force was of strategic bombers on alert, serving as a demonstration of the power of strategic bombing so cultured and nourished by the Eighth Air Force. If so, then the effects of some of the public relations as practiced by the Eighth Air Force had a lingering impact.

It is hoped that the belated attempts to conduct oral histories will serve to enrich our understanding of the period of World War II. With the loss of thousands of veterans each year who served in that struggle, the potential for fuller knowledge and appreciation of that remarkable time diminishes.\textsuperscript{19} It is the intent of this study to encourage others to test the opinions held here against competing perceptions. The less time spent with
veterans to annotate their experiences, the less data will exist to make those tests.

While this study is limited, it is hoped that further research will give the tremendous degree of public relations activities during the World War II years the attention this dynamic period deserves.

Notes


3 Reynolds, Rich Relations, 156.


6 C. V. Glines, "An American Hero," Air Force Magazine November 1993, 20. Glines stated that 1920s army pilots were requested to be both aviators and promoters of aviation. This was unlike service personnel in the traditional U.S. Army units and members of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps.

7 Historian De Witt Copp called the pigeon caper "the Arnold zest for public relations (at) its wacky best..." Copp, A Few Great Captains, 29. See also Lt. General J.H.
Doolittle, Foreword, "As One-To Win." (Headquarters, Eighth Air Force, January 10, 1945). In his foreword to a rather blunt internal public relations pamphlet extolling the Eighth Air Force achievements, Doolittle, or his ghostwriter, demonstrated a nice touch for rhetoric. "Forces of tyranny," Doolittle exclaimed, are being "steadily compressed into bastions from which there is no escape." In a statement as modern in phrasing as any 1990s corporate mission statement, Doolittle offers to "share" his vision of the tasks ahead.


9 Hughes, Over Lord, 296-297, 304-307. As tactical air force expert General Pete Quesada’s biographer, Hughes relates how just at the moment tactical air support (a.k.a. "close air support" or direct air support of ground operations) of the Ninth Air Force had achieved tremendous success to turn the tide during and after the Battle of the Bulge, the strategic bomber clique in the U.S.A.A.F. began to "slight" the contributions of tac air. According to Hughes, the air chiefs "had never forgotten the importance of strategic bombardment in the struggle for their own Air Force." 296. To the various air leaders, creating an independent air force was the brass ring they had worked for their entire careers.

10 See Appendix G.


12 Freeman, The Friendly Invasion. Also see Del’Marmol, Phone conversation with author. August 15, 1999.

13 Appendix H.

14 The numerous U.S.A.A.F. memorials around Great Britain speak to that legacy. Of particular note is the modern American aviation museum at Duxford, England, near Cambridge.

15 U.S. Army Booklet: "U.S. Army Chaplaincy", 116 and see Brown, The Mighty Men of the 381st, 243-244. For another
side to planned U.S./U.K. relations, see also Appendix H.

Colonel DiSanto provides a description of the Officers' Club dances which includes a sentence about bringing English women to the dance. According to DiSanto, "they would truck in girls from the local region."


Ex-Staff Sergeant Bob Singleton. E-mail to author, March 28, 1999. While this study chronicles several episodes of lateral social contact, Singleton’s story seems archtypic. He describes how local English workers, on base to do civil engineering duties, would "mingle" with the U.S. personnel, even to the point where both groups would sit down for a pot of tea and "chat."

Several of the Cambridge tour "coaches" make it a point to travel to the American cemetery outside the city. The tour directors encourage passengers to disembark and visit the grounds -- and catch a later bus back to the town center.

# APPENDIX A
## MILITARY RANK ABBREVIATIONS

### Officer Rank

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General of the Air Forces</td>
<td>Gen. of the Air Force*</td>
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<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>Gen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
<td>Lt. Gen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General</td>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
<td>B. Gen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Col.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Maj.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Capt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
<td>1st Lt. - or Lieutenant (Lt.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
<td>2nd Lt. - or Lieutenant (Lt.)</td>
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### Warrant Officers

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<th>Rank</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>Chief Warrant Officer</td>
<td>CWO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer</td>
<td>WO**</td>
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### Enlisted

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<th>Rank</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Master Sergeant</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Technical Sergeant</td>
<td>TSgt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Sergeant</td>
<td>SSgt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>Sgt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>Corp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private First Class</td>
<td>PFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Pvt.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note - there are no current Generals of the Air Force and the enlisted ranks have changed considerably during the years after World War II.*

**This abbreviation was avoided in this text due to the more commonly referred to British War Officer papers that began with WO.

APPENDIX B
BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND U.S. PERSONNEL

British Personnel
Office of Prime Minister
The Rt. Hon. Sir Winston Churchill, Prime Minister
J.M. Martin, Assistant to the Prime Minister
Privy Council
Rt. Hon. Sir John Anderson, Lord President
W.L. Gonell Barnes
Foreign Office
Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Nevile M. Butler
Richard Law, Undersecretary for State for Foreign Affairs
Griggs Committee
Sir Edward Grigg, Chair
Mr. Ronald Tree, Mr. Morgan Price, Sir Harold Boulton
BOLERO Committee
Sir Findlater Stewart, Chair
Ministry of Information
Rt. Hon. Sir Br. Bracken, Minister
A.S. Hodge
B.C. Sendell
Ambassador to U.S.: Lord Halifax

American Military Personnel
Joint Chiefs of Staff:
U.S. Army Chief General George C. Marshall
U.S.A.A.F. Chief General Henry "Hap" Arnold
U.S.A.A.F. ETO/Eighth Air Force:
Lt. Gen. Carl Tooey Spaatz
Maj. Gen. Ira Eaker
Maj. Gen. James Doolittle
Col. Curtis E. LeMay
Maj. James Stewart
1st Lt. Joseph Del'Marmol, Jr.
1st Lt. Alexander DiSanto

Source: Foreign Office Papers, PRO; Various U.S. documents.
APPENDIX C
LIST OF TERMS AND NON-RANK ABBREVIATIONS

10 Downing Street – Home residence of the Prime Minister where some of his personal staff are located.

Eighth Air Force -- the organization comprised of bombers and fighters and other assigned units and assets of the military aviation organization flying from bases in Britain. While the bombers and fighters had different command structures within the Eighth Air Force, often identified by Roman numerals, the Roman numeral designations are not used herein. Groups and squadrons are identified by their numeric designations, such as the 4th Fighter Group.

Aircrew – Used as one word in its military fashion to identify members of a team whose job it was to fly an aircraft. In usage, “an aircrew” will identify a particular set of men, “aircrews” serves to identify more than one set of airmen, but “aircrew” used as one adjective such as “aircrew discipline” refers to all.

ARC – American Red Cross

B-17 – Bomber type 17 or the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress. Bombers begin with the letter “B,” pursuit or fighter aircraft (e.g. P-51) begin with the letter “P,” attack aircraft (usually aircraft designed to attack ground targets of a non-strategic nature such as troop formations, etc.) begin with an “A” prefix, T=trainer aircraft, C=cargo planes, O=observation. The U.S. Navy has their own designations during this period while the British were prone to merely refer to their planes by manufacturer and aircraft nickname such as Supermarine Spitfire although certain modifications are delineated by “marks.” Recent (1999) U.S. designations of aircraft may have created some confusion. For example, the current B-1 and B-2 bomber aircraft were clearly designed and built after the B-17, for example, just as the F-15 was constructed years after the P-51 (later F-51) was retired. For reasons not entirely military, these “new generation” aircraft have been issued smaller numbers, even though the relatively new “stealth fighter” F-117 retained the old
Base - U.S. military installation. While the U.S. Army typically refers to its installation as "posts," while the U.S. Air Force refers to its facilities as "air bases," the term "base" is used interchangeably throughout this paper for convenience when referring to any military installation.

BOLERO - The joint U.S./U.K. program to bed down U.S. troops in Britain during the early stages of the U.S. deployments to Europe. There is a common practice in military operations to give a title to specified operations, such as "OVERLORD" was the code word for the Normandy invasion. Such code words are fully capitalized in normal military usage and herein.

Commonwealth - The various associated countries of the British Empire.

CONUS - Continental United States - the contiguous 48 U.S. states. Also referred to as Zone of the Interior, or ZI. Of course, in 1942-1945, there were only 48 states, with Alaska and Hawaii still U.S. territories.

D-Day - The invasion of France by allied forces on June 6, 1944. D-Day actually is a term of military convenience for a target day. The term, however, has been popularly assigned to the June 6, 1944 cross-channel Normandy beaches invasion and is used as such herein.

England - Specifically refers only to the Kingdom of England, is not used to equate to the term "Britain" which is used to include Scotland and Wales. However, it is noted here that commentators of the period, including the British, were not always careful in making this distinction.

ETO - European Theater of Operations. This is used in this report as military operations not originating in the Pacific or Asian areas, but does include for the purposes of convenience in this paper only the operations in support of the North African campaign. ETOUSA is the abbreviation for the American operations in Europe.

Flak - Anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). The term, Flak, is a corruption of the German word for AAA, Flieger Abwehr Kannonen (flyer defense cannon).

FO - British Foreign Office

HO - British Home Office
IWM - The British Imperial War Museum located in Greater London.

Leave - Vacation time off for U.S. military. It is different mainly in length, but, also administratively from "passes" which are, usually, of shorter length of time. Thus, a 3-day pass to London is different than "taking leave" to go home to "The States."

Minister - Roughly an executive member of Parliament. Person in charge of certain ministries of government such as War or the Foreign Office.

MOI - British Ministry of Information

MP - Members of Parliament. The abbreviation, M.P., for Military Police is used with the periods to avoid confusion.

Nazis - National Socialist party of Germany led by Adolph Hitler. "Nazi Germany" is used as term of convenience to refer to the German state during the period of Hitler's leadership.

PM - Prime Minister. The afternoon/evening periods of the day (post meridian) are abbreviated as "p.m."

PRO - The British Public Records Office, located at Kew, England, outside of London. Public relations officers are referred to herein as "PR officers."

PTSD - Post-traumatic stress disorder. Commonly called "combat fatigue" in World War II. Differs from such phobia as "Fear of Flying" or FOF, but may result from the same cause. Often brought on by single or multiple exposures to severely traumatic experiences. Symptoms vary in breadth and degree.

RIO - Regional Information Officer of the British Ministry of Information.

ROTC - Reserve Officer Training Corps. This is the program by which officers are commissioned after receiving a civilian education and some military or naval training at a civilian institution rather than a military academy. Officers so commissioned are designated Reserve Officers even though generally committed to active duty service. After a period of time, the reserve officer may be offered a "Regular" commission.

SO - Scottish Office
SOSS - Secretary of State for Scotland

U.K. - United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

U.S. or U.S.A. - United States of America. The U.S. Army is not abbreviated USA or U.S.A., although the U.S. Army Air Forces is abbreviated U.S.A.A.F.
APPENDIX D
AGENDA FOR MOI MEETING ON U.S. TROOPS IN U.K.

Source: Ministry of Information
5 January 1943
On 24 November-1 December
U.S. Troops in U.K.
SECRET
FO 371/34124

Section 1—Reaction of British Civil Population
a. Clippings from British papers
b. M.O.I. report
c. Civilian letter censorship report
d. Other reports

Section 2—Reaction of British Armed Forces
a. Military letter censorship report
b. Reports from Military Welfare Officers
c. Other reports

Section 3—Reaction of U.S. Troops
a. U.S. censorship of U.S. Military Mail
b. British censorship reports of U.S. Military Mail
c. Reports of surveys by HQ ETO USA
d. Other reports from U.S. sources
e. Other reports from other sources

Section 4—Reaction of U.S. Civilian Population
a. Clippings of U.S. papers
b. British censorship reports of incoming mail from U.S.
c. Reports from British sources in Washington, D.C.
d. Foreign Office cables from Washington, D.C.

Section 5—Monthly digest of above reports
Section 6—Propaganda issued by U.S. Forces in ETO

APPENDIX E
MINUTES OF BOLERO COMMITTEE

Source: Secret document
1 March 1943
A 2254-5 March 1943
War Cabinet: BOLERO Combined Committee (London)
Revised Terms of Reference
FO 371/34124

"BOLERO Committee to:

i. To co-ordinate the policy governing plans and administrative preparations for the reception, accommodation and maintenance of U.S. Forces in the U.K., and for the development of the U.K. in accordance with the requirements of plans for the invasion of Europe.

ii. To provide the channel whereby problems concerning the subjects specified in para (i) above involving British Departments and the U.S. authorities may be resolved when difficulties arise which cannot be settled by direct discussion with the Department concerned."

The London Committee comprised of:
Sir S. Findlater Stewart (Chair)
Maj. Gen. R. M. Wootten (War Office)
Maj. Gen. R. H. Lorie (Home Forces)
Capt. C. F. W. Norris (Admiralty)
Air Vice Marshall R. P. Musgrave Whitman (Air Ministry)
Sir Harold A. Werner (CO HQ)
Sir Reginald Hill (Ministry of War Transport)
Mr. T. H. Sheepshanks (Ministry of Home Security)
U.S. Representatives
Others as needed.

Coordinate closely with opposite No.# in Washington, D.C.
Special series of telegram: blacks and pinks – designed to channel communications.
APPENDIX F
BOLERO COMBINED COMMITTEE

June 7, 1943 on “Solicitation of U.S. Troops in London”

SECRET
8 June 1943
War Cabinet
Bolero Combined Committee (London)
Solicitation of U.S. Troops in London
5 p.m. on Monday 7th June in Conference Room
6th Floor Norfolk House

Present:
Sir Findlater Stewart (in the chair)

U.K.
Sir Frank Newsam—Home Office
Mr. T. Mathew—Home Office
Air Vice Marshall Sir Philip Gane—Metro Police
Mr. T. Linsay—Ministry of Health
Mr. E. St. J. Bamford—Ministry of Information
Mr. F.E. Evans—Foreign Office
Mr. A.J. Aglen—Scottish Home Department
Mr. E.A. Hogan—Department of Health for Scotland
Brig. R. Riddell—Q(L) War Office
Lt. Col. A.E. Campbell—A.M.D.S. War Office
Mr. G.W. Lambert—War Office
Lt. Col. J.P. Douglas—Q(L) War Office
Lt. Col. T.E. Osmaond—Consultant, War Office
Air Commodore A.C. Sanderson—D.W.O. Air Ministry

U.S.
Col. Ed. C. Betts—J.A. Theater ETO USA
Col. E.F. Straub—GI ETO USA
Col. J.E. Gordon—Division of Preventative Medicine, ETOUSA
Mr. H. Crump—American Red Cross
APPENDIX G
RATES OF PAY

As of June 1, 1942

**BRITISH ARMY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Per Month</th>
<th>$</th>
<th>£</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field Marshall</td>
<td>1109.26</td>
<td>275.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>998.01</td>
<td>247.65</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-General</td>
<td>832.52</td>
<td>206.58</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major-General</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier</td>
<td>357.50</td>
<td>88.71</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>305.42</td>
<td>75.79</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel</td>
<td>263.54</td>
<td>65.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>174.67</td>
<td>43.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>101.15</td>
<td>25.10</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>79.68</td>
<td>19.77</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-Lieutenant</td>
<td>67.42</td>
<td>16.73</td>
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</table>

**Warrant Officers**

| Warrant Officers, Class I  | 73.55     | 18.25 |
| Warrant Officers, Class II | 53.09     | 12.93 |

**Other Ranks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other Ranks</th>
<th>Per Week</th>
<th>$</th>
<th>£</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff-Sergeant or Colour Sergeant</td>
<td>11.28</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>8.46</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal or Bombardier</td>
<td>5.64</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lance-Corporal or Lance-Bombardier</td>
<td>4.58</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>0.70</td>
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# THE U.S. ARMY

As of June 1, 1942

## Officers Per Month

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>$ c.</th>
<th>£ p.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General of the Army</td>
<td>1135.42</td>
<td>281.74</td>
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<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>722.22</td>
<td>179.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
<td>722.22</td>
<td>179.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General</td>
<td>722.22</td>
<td>179.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
<td>722.22</td>
<td>179.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>375.00</td>
<td>93.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel</td>
<td>315.97</td>
<td>78.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>270.83</td>
<td>67.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>216.67</td>
<td>53.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
<td>180.56</td>
<td>44.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
<td>162.50</td>
<td>40.32</td>
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</table>

## Warrant Officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>$ c.</th>
<th>£ p.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief Warrant Officers</td>
<td>175.00</td>
<td>43.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officers Junior Grade</td>
<td>150.00</td>
<td>37.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Enlisted Men Per Week

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>$ c.</th>
<th>£ p.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Master Sergeant</td>
<td>38.21</td>
<td>9.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Sergeant</td>
<td>31.57</td>
<td>7.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Sergeant/Technical 3rd grade</td>
<td>26.58</td>
<td>6.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant/Technical 4th grade</td>
<td>21.60</td>
<td>5.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal/Technical 5th grade</td>
<td>18.28</td>
<td>4.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private first class</td>
<td>14.95</td>
<td>3.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>13.85</td>
<td>3.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX H

INTERVIEW WITH COLONEL ALEXANDER DISANTO
Lead Navigator, Kimbolton B-17s.
April 30, 1998

Colonel Alexander DiSanto served as a navigator on board B-17Gs during World War II. He later served as a Master Navigator flying KC-135s before he retired. Col. DiSanto was interviewed over the phone at his house in Virginia. He was informed that this interview was for the purposes of providing information regarding graduate research leading to a published dissertation at the University of Florida. Col. DiSanto was advised that there would be no taping of the conversation and that only the sections of the discussion directly pertaining to his time in the Eighth Air Force during World War II may be quoted within the dissertation. He was advised, as well, that he may terminate the conversation at any time at his discretion or refuse to answer any question without prejudice. Col. DiSanto stated that he understood all the above and gave permission for the interview. The interview began with an exchange of pleasantries and the pre-conditions stated above. Then he was asked about his living conditions while he was stationed at Kimbolton Air Base, England in 1944-1945.

Q: Colonel DiSanto -- Could you describe your living conditions while you were stationed in Britain?  
A: Sure. We lived in Quonset huts. The English crews lived in permanent facilities with proper masonry construction.

Q: What was that like?  
A: Well, we had one stove that you really had to work to keep going. It was pretty cold sometimes.

Q: How did you get around? How did you get to town, for example?  
A: We rode bikes. Now they weren’t really bikes you would own. They just seemed to be community bikes. Need one, take one. You could get over to the local community that way. If you had to do something official, you got a truck.
Q: What was your local area? Were you treated as special?
A: Well, the closest real town was Bedford. Anything you wanted to do socially, you went to Bedford. Nearby, of course, was the village of Kimbolton. It was pretty quaint. Understand that there was an airbase about every 3-4 miles. There were a great number of bomber units. Americans weren’t exactly unique in our area.

Q: How did the war affect the area where you lived?
A: Well, we were a bit further west than a lot of units and the area wasn’t much noticed during the German raids. Therefore, locally people weren’t affected much by destruction. However, loved ones went to war so they were eager to have the thing end soon. The local people seemed to love the Americans. London, however, seemed to get everything it could from Americans.

Q: Did you get to meet the locals socially?
A: Well, not much, no. However, there was no Catholic Church on base so I would go visit these three nice, older women for Sundays. Would walk them home.

Q: Could you talk a bit about these ladies?
A: I can’t remember their names. I do recall that they had pretty severe rationing - a couple of potatoes, a piece of meat, that sort of thing. We gave a lot of our rations to the local people. They were delighted as they couldn’t get some of our stuff locally - especially bananas.

Q: What sort of training or briefings did you get regarding relationships with the locals?
A: Well, just some general guidance. We were told, “It’s their home, so be considerate.”

Q: What did you and the other aircrew do for entertainment?
A: There were dances at the O’club. They would truck in girls from the local region. Since the quality seemed varied, you wanted to be the first to greet the truck.

Q: In the recent movie, Memphis Belle, the big dance was held in a hangar, with officers and enlisted co-mingling. Is that how it worked?
A: I don’t think so. I can’t recall any enlisted at a dance.

Q: How was the quality of the crews?
A: Well it was much like SAC. You had some degree of crew integrity. Good crews, good outfits tended to have lower loss rates.

Q: Let’s talk about the missions.
A: Well, I was in the lead crew in the lead squadron.

Q: Did your whole crew stay together?
A: No. Just the lead pilot, navigator and bombardier. I was in the 524th squadron of the 379th Bomb Group. You sent out 3 squadrons per mission, 13 ships per squadron. There was the bombing formation of high, low and lead.

Q: When were you over there?
A: From October ’44 ’til April ’45.

Q: What missions did you fly?
A: Dresden, Berlin...

Q: Did you ever see a German jet?
A: Yeah, I remember seeing a ME 262. We flew a good, tight formation - the German fighters, just stayed away. They just went somewhere else.

Q: So missions were pretty standard?
A: Well, we got most of our damage from flak. The fighters - generally one pass. We just didn’t give them anything too inviting to shoot at.

Q: Can we talk a bit more about the local communities? Did crews tend to go out locally?
A: No, not really as crews - as far as I know.

Q: What about you? What was your relationship with the locals?
A: I got along with the English. They would stop and chat. They always seemed grateful.

Q: What about going to the pubs?
A: Yeah, Americans would go to the local pubs.

Q: How did that go?
A: Pubs? Well it depended on the Yank. If you recognized it was their pub, they chatted with you fine. However, if you go in to have some fun, start chattering and saying, "We are the salvation of England" - well then there could be trouble.

Q: When you traveled or went out, where or what would you eat?
A: Actually we went to the American Red Cross. In the city, you went to the hotel for food. It may have been horsemeat, but it tasted all right.

Q: What about mission mornings?
A: Remember, I was on the lead crew. Our breakfasts were good. We could eat in the colonels' mess - so we had fresh eggs and ham. The rest of the crews got powered eggs.

Q: So, how often have you been back to England?
A: Never been back.

Q: Never?
A: No. There have been Association reunions such as the 50th Anniversary of VE day. I've just never gone to England.

Q: Do you keep touch with the old crews?
A: At times. In fact, let me give you a name of our association liaison. (Gives name and address.) And you might want to go visit that new Eighth Air Force Museum in Savannah.

Q: Thanks, Colonel DiSanto.
REFERENCES


Del'Marmol, Joseph J. *Sovereigns of the Conquered Sky* (unpublished.)


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Kerry Anderson Crooks, APR, CPRC, was born May 23, 1955, at Castle Air Force Base, California. Son of a career Air Force command pilot, he traveled throughout the United States before he joined the U.S. Navy Submarine Service. After his naval service, he enrolled at The Ohio State University where he received a bachelor of science degree in education, an Ohio Secondary School Teaching Certificate, and a commission in the U.S. Air Force.

As an aircrew commander flying on board strategic reconnaissance aircraft, he served for eight years with distinction, earning awards for valor, aeronautical achievement, and service to the field of strategic intelligence. While in the service, he traveled to several countries in Europe, including the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey, Germany, France, Denmark, The Netherlands, Spain and Ireland. During his service, he wrote, photographed, and produced the multimedia history program, "A History of Strategic Reconnaissance: The Story of the 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing."
which became Florida's largest water/wastewater utility company. He received several public relations and environmental education awards while serving in this capacity. As a doctoral student at the University of Florida, his research on international issues has earned him various awards, including the Susanne A. Roschwalb Grant presented by the Public Relations Division of the Association of Educators in Journalism and Mass Communications. He served on the faculty of the UF Department of Agricultural Education and Communications and was instrumental in the creation of the Office of Public Relations for the University of Florida. He has taught university courses on public relations principles, public relations and technical writing, magazine layout, public relations cases and campaigns, and public speaking.

He and his wife, Viviene, of Lanarkshire, Scotland, have two daughters, Katharine and Victoria.
I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Marilyn Roberts, Chair
Associate Professor of Journalism and Communications

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Bernell Tripp, Cochair
Associate Professor of Journalism and Communications

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Robert L. Kendall
Professor Emeritus of Journalism and Communications

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Frank Courts
Associate Professor of Dental Sciences

This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the College of Journalism and Communications and to the Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

December 1999

Dean, College of Journalism and Communications

Dean, Graduate School
THE U.S. RESEARCH AIR FORCE AND THE BRETTON WOODS AGREEMENT

A HISTORY OF MILITARIZED INTELLIGENCE

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA