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entrants seem to be socially marginal in the sense that they generally
did not participate in collective organizations in Cuba" (p. 52). He
finds this unusual in a society "... that actively promotes mass
membership in revolutionary organizations" (p. 52). As a result of
his study, Fernandez (1981-82) finds the only organizations with more
than 10% membership of the entrants he surveyed were the labor organi
zations which require membership. Participants of the Fernandez1 study
generally expressed suspicion and fear of Cuban authorities. Many of
this group came here with unrealistic expectations of good jobs and
economic security. When their expectations are not met, Fernandez
believes many Cubans may transfer the feelings of distrust to those in
authority in the U.S. Fernandez calls for special compassion and
assistance in helping these immigrants through the transition to a new
life in this country.
Two years after the 1980 immigration, the media began reporting
that the Mariel crime wave had peaked and was now dropping (Silva,
1982b). The most positive report is by McCoy and Gonzalez (1982) who
find that the crime attributed to the Mariel refugees "... has been
somewhat overestimated, while the crime increase attributable to other,
probably illegal aliens has been considerably underestimated" (p. 34).
The final grand jury report shows that Mariel Cubans' percent of
arrests is almost twice that of the pre-Mari el Cuban group; 16% as
compared to 9%. However, both groups are lower than all other com
parison groups which include whites, blacks, and other Latins or
Caribbeans. These researchers have very positive expectations that
the new arrivals are making the adjustment and are becoming positive
contributors to south Florida society. To understand the value of