STRATEGIC POLICY ASSESSMENT AND CONGRESSIONAL REFORM:
THE FUTURE IN COMMITTEE

by

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### Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACIR</td>
<td>Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations</td>
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<td>ACP</td>
<td>Academy for Contemporary Problems</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIP</td>
<td>American Institute of Planners</td>
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<tr>
<td>BoB</td>
<td>Bureau of the Budget (in 1970 the Office of Management and Budget), Executive Office of the President</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, U.S. Senate</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Committee on Banking and Currency, U.S. House of Representatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEA</td>
<td>Council of Economic Advisers, Executive Office of the President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CED</td>
<td>Committee for Economic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGO</td>
<td>Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, U.S. Senate</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLPW</td>
<td>Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, U.S. Senate</td>
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<tr>
<td>COPP</td>
<td>Congressional Office of Policy and Planning (proposed in S. 3050, 93rd Congress)</td>
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<td>CPW</td>
<td>Committee on Public Works, U.S. House</td>
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<tr>
<td>CQ</td>
<td>Congressional Quarterly</td>
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<tr>
<td>CR</td>
<td>Congressional Record (daily edition)</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Congressional Research Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Council of Social Advisers (proposed in S. 5, 93rd Congress)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>Federal Register</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEW</td>
<td>Department of Health, Education and Welfare</td>
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<td>ISTA</td>
<td>International Society for Technology Assessment</td>
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<td>JCAE</td>
<td>Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, U.S. Congress</td>
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<td>JCCO</td>
<td>Joint Committee on Congressional Operations, U.S. Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCER</td>
<td>Joint Committee on the Economic Report (established by 1946 Employment Act; became Joint Economic Committee), U.S. Congress</td>
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<td>JCSR</td>
<td>Joint Committee on the Social Report (proposed in S. 5, 93rd Congress)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JEC</td>
<td>Joint Economic Committee (formerly JCER), U.S. Congress</td>
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LRA  Legislative Reorganization Act (of 1946 and 1970)

NAS  National Academy of Sciences

NASA  National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NGRS  National Goals Research Staff, Executive Office of the President, 1969-1970

NSF  National Science Foundation

OBNGD  Office of Balanced National Growth and Development (proposed in S. 3050, 93rd Congress)

OEO  Office of Economic Opportunity, Executive Office of the President

OGPA  Office of Goals and Priorities Analysis (proposed in S. 5, 93rd Congress)

OTA  Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress

PPBS  Planning, programming, budgeting system

R&D  Research and development

SCC  Select Committee on Committees, U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress

SPA  Strategic policy assessment

UAC  Urban Advisory Committee, Executive Office of the President, 1969-1970

WWICS  Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
During the 93rd Congress several reforms were proposed to make Congress better able to anticipate emerging problems and to deal with them before they reach a crisis stage. Three of these reform proposals have been examined in this research in order to understand the nature of congressional reform in a technical, analytical area.


The term strategic policy assessment has been used to mean the analysis of emerging trends and conditions and the clarification
of policy goals and options in relation to these trends and conditions. Depending on context, a strategic policy assessment reform may have three effects on congressional decision making: (1) to increase the ability of Congress to search for emerging issues that should be on the congressional agenda; (2) to provide information for current decisions on relevant future trends, events, or conditions; and (3) to force the conscious interrelation of decisions taken at different times or places within government.

Hypotheses were formulated relating committee and member factors to the legislative processing of three proposals. Stages of processing analyzed were: (1) instigating and publicizing, (2) information gathering, (3) formulation, (4) interest aggregation, (5) mobilization, and (6) modification. Analyses were based on documentary research and extensive interviews of sponsors, committee members, staff, and other officials and experts.

Findings showed that successful processing required a supportive committee chairman; staff with expertise in policy analysis or decision-making processes and, where the reform involved significant changes, skill in political information gathering and bargaining; interest group support; and favorable bureaucratic activity. Interest group support was generated only if the reform was linked to another, more immediately relevant issue or to professional benefit; favorable activity from bureaucratic entities occurred when the strategic policy assessment reform would benefit the entity. Bureaucratic opposition occurred where a
competing unit would be established by a reform. Strategic policy assessment reforms were found to generate opposition in relation to the degree of change to be required in present decision-making structures, in procedures, and in distribution of power.

Sponsors of strategic policy assessment legislation were found to be motivated by conceptions of good policy rather than by the benefits of reelection or a career beyond the chamber. Like their colleagues in committee, sponsors expressed dissatisfaction with the ways in which Congress normally searches for problems, but they were more optimistic than fellow committee members regarding the ability of government to anticipate emerging problems and to deal with them before they reach a crisis stage.

It was suggested that further research is necessary on policy analysis and strategic policy assessment activities in Congress so that the impact of strategic policy assessment reforms may be better understood. S. 5 and S. 3050 had effects on other reform efforts despite the fact that neither was enacted. It was also suggested that other attempts at strategic policy assessment reform should focus on the specific operation of existing units, and where reforms would require significant changes, more attention should be given to generating public awareness and support for strategic policy assessment reforms.
CHAPTER 1

CONGRESS AND STRATEGIC POLICY ASSESSMENT
INTRODUCTION

Calls for reform of the decision-making processes of the U.S. Congress are not new. Neither are the social and economic problems that generate such calls. In recent years, however, the problems have more frequently developed into crises, and the calls for reform have become numerous and urgent. During the 93rd Congress a serious monetary crisis, a food shortage crisis, an unemployment and welfare crisis, and most important, an energy crisis beset the nation (Harman, 1973: 475; WWICS, 1973). These crises were accompanied by proposals to reform congressional processes in response to these changing social and economic conditions and thereby to strengthen the policy-making function of national government.

Our research has concerned three of these efforts at reforming congressional processes and strengthening the ability of Congress to perform more comprehensive analytic functions basic to the making of policy. A House resolution and two Senate bills proposed mechanisms that would enhance the ability of members of Congress and committees to analyze trends and conditions, and to clarify policy goals and legislative options relative to these trends and conditions; that is, to assess policy strategically in order to anticipate emerging issues and deal with problems
before they reach the crisis stage. The reforms chosen for study would require increased legislative responsibility for strategic policy assessment, increased staffing and new committees for more comprehensive analysis, and additional techniques for anticipating the future. Thus, information of social and economic realities, the effects of governmental action, and the inter-relatedness of decisions taken at many locations within Congress and other parts of the government might be marshaled. In such reforms "futures analysis" is expected to provide the information, if not the political will, to keep the "institutional agenda" (what Congress is considering) consistent with the "systematic agenda" (issues within the polity that deserve consideration).

First, the societal-institutional context of Congress is explained as it relates to policy making, including the institutional capacity of Congress as a representative assembly to anticipate emerging problems effectively. These questions are then examined in terms of policy analysis--ways of knowing--within Congress. Strategic policy assessment--the analysis of emerging trends and conditions and the clarification of policy goals and options in relation to these conditions--is then considered in the context of congressional policy analysis. Finally, the historical development of analytical functions and responsibilities in Congress through major reforms of the past thirty years is traced before describing three reforms of the 93rd Congress that supply our case studies of the varieties of the congressional will to reform in this analytical area.
CONGRESSIONAL POLICY MAKING

The bases of national policy making in the United States have precluded treatment of basic or chronic problems. Working in a context of social and legislative pluralism, both Congress and the President deal with problems immediately thrust on them by pressures of the calendar, problems that can be handled quickly, and problems in an acute, or crisis, stage (Polsby, 1971: 5-6).

This tendency is accentuated in Congress by the recognized and legitimate pluralism of goals which accompanies the members of this representative assembly. Lack of focus characterizes congressional policy making because of the pluralism of goals, the tendency to pay attention to organized interests, the absence of effective policy leadership coupled with "scatteration of responsibility" as committees and subcommittees become principal sources of policy formulation.

A count made during the 93rd Congress "showed 57 standing and special committees--a total of 345 work units for 535 members" (Davidson, 1974: 4). This fragmentation of legislative work units contributed to fragmented policy.

Committees and subcommittees rarely consult or cooperate among themselves on matters of mutual concern. Thus there is rarely an opportunity to examine comprehensive approaches to national problems, much less the cumulative effects of piecemeal approaches. (Davidson, 1974: 4)
In addition, the multiplicity of committees offers many opportunities for delays in committee work, in floor amendments and votes, in conference committee action.

Lack of political focus, structural fragmentation, and procedural complexity tend to slow the progress of Congress through the institutional agenda and to reduce the number of new issues that may be added to it. The crowded congressional agenda is set by current and past issues reflected in existing legislation (Cobb & Elder, 1972). The agenda-building process is reinforced by congressional procedures, executive branch structures, and interest group configurations. Given such a setting, Congress and its committees seldom monitor changing conditions. If changing conditions generate a problem for a politically relevant group, if a problem is severe enough to generate constituent demands, the problem will likely find a place on the agenda. This kind of agenda-building process results in the "quick fix, crisis management, and damage limitation" syndrome. In addition, it underrepresents those affected by emerging problems but lacking interest-group structures to translate their concern to members of Congress.

CONGRESSIONAL ABILITY TO ANTICIPATE PROBLEMS

These problems of congressional agenda-setting raise questions about the ability of Congress to anticipate emerging problems and deal with them before they reach a crisis stage. These questions
involve the fundamental aspects of democratic governments. The self-centered, individualistic nature of a liberal democracy is reflected in a legislative inability to anticipate emerging problems and to direct the allocation of resources to combat them. At the level of the individual, anticipating problems may require foregoing current satisfactions. As a member of Congress put it, "Forcing the country to meet problems before they reach a crisis stage necessitates foregoing current expenditures and satisfactions. This requires a discipline that isn't in the personal or political lives of the people." This lack of discipline poses a problem for legislators. As another member of Congress put it:

There is a problem with legislating in advance: programs cost money. The public does not want something they don't think they need and they don't see the current need for anticipated problems. . . . Congress has a representative function. The public which is represented is not interested in the future in any specific terms. In effect a member has to become a salesman for the problem; a crisis helps sell the urgency of the need to deal with the problem.

The role of Congress, rather than the executive, in anticipating problems has also been questioned. Congress has barely responded to the twentieth century, it has been suggested, and its decline vis-a-vis the executive will continue (Huntington, 1972, 1974). Congress has dispersed power to committees during this century and has gradually insulated itself from new political
forces that social change has generated. Simultaneously, legis-
lation has become "much too complex politically to be effectively
handled by a representative assembly" (Huntington, 1972). In the
view of such commentators, Congress may take the initiative only
to obstruct executive proposals and must be relegated to an in-
creasingly marginal role in national policy making.

But few members of the 93rd Congress, whose prerogatives and
constitutional powers were severely threatened by a hostile Re-
publican administration, were ready to accept so marginal a role.
Recognizing at least some of the problems of a representative
assembly, most members of Congress were ready to meet the challenge
presented to the Congress by the Nixon impoundments. Several mem-
bers were ready to propose changes to remedy congressional dis-
abilities as a policy-making body. While members of Congress did
not use such a term as strategic policy assessment, the reforms
proposed would add to the capacity of Congress to perform the
functions this term denotes by requiring futures research and
forecasting, a social reporting system, and mechanisms to set
national growth policy within Congress.

POLICY ANALYSIS IN CONGRESS

The reforms that were proposed in Congress and chosen for
our research would adjust the policy analysis for congressional
policy making. Policy is a statement of choice of a goal and,
often, some means or set of means to attain the chosen goal.
Policy analysis is the gathering and processing of information according to well-known criteria and the matching of this information against certain goals (Polsby, 1969).

Congress has not been renowned for systematic policy analysis. Some committees, particularly the Joint Economic Committee and the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue and Taxation, are known for thorough analysis (Manley, 1968), but "all knowledge on a particular topic is rarely collected in a single spot or systematically marshalled" (Polsby, 1969: 101). Even less commonly made are attempts to collect or synthesize information systematically across several policy areas.

One reason for the relative absence of thorough policy analysis is that members of Congress have traditionally seen themselves as self-sufficient legislators. As we shall see, the suggestion that Congress should add more staff for policy analysis was thought, until recently, to be a slur on the capacity of members for competent decision making. A more fundamental reason, however, lies in the pluralism of goals and bargaining processes.

Much congressional policy analysis takes place under adversary circumstances. Thus congressional decision-makers ordinarily cannot enjoy the luxury of examining alternative means to stipulated ends. In an adversary process ends are not stipulated but contested. Agreement on means is often sought as a substitute for agreement on ends. Ends are scaled down, pulled out of shape, or otherwise transformed.

(Polsby, 1969: 104)
As specific policies become more complex, this problem is compounded.

Means and ends are hopelessly intertwined. The real choice is between rival policies that encapsulate somewhat different mixes of means and ends. . . . The principal participants [in the political process] may not be clear about their goals. What we call goals or objectives may, in large part, be operationally determined by the policies we can agree on. The mixtures of values found in complex policies may have to be taken in packages, so that policies may determine goals at least as much as general objectives determine policies.

(Wildavsky, 1966: 307-308)

Strategic policy assessment is a type of policy analysis which is concerned with the conditions underlying policy choices and with clarifying policy goals and options in relation to these conditions. *Strategic* in this context refers to major or fundamental policy questions—those which are often obscured by the continual mixing of ends and means.

**POLICY ANALYSIS AND STRATEGIC POLICY ASSESSMENT**

The mixing of ends and means is important for congressional policy making in that it adds to the problem of crisis decision making. As we shall see, this mixing of ends and means affects congressional reform efforts without stopping attempts to provide more effective means of analyzing emerging conditions and
dealing with problems before the crisis stage. One group concerned with increasing the anticipatory capacity of Congress coined the term *strategic policy assessment*.

Officials of the executive branch, several members of Congress and staff, and outside experts met in 1973 under the auspices of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (WWICS). They recommended that specific mechanisms be established to perform strategic policy assessment in both the executive and legislative branches. No one from Congress belonged to the subgroup that drafted the WWICS proposal, and it was not turned into a specific legislative proposal--it had no "policy entrepreneur" within Congress. However, participating members of Congress had been actively interested in policy-making reform, and as we shall see, some had already become entrepreneurs for their own proposals.

For our purposes *strategic policy assessment* entails the analysis of emerging trends and conditions and the clarification of policy goals and options in relation to these conditions. The WWICS group did not develop a rigorous conceptual or operational definition of this term. Justifying the need for strategic policy assessment in terms of the crisis management syndrome, the group formulated this statement:

[Such assessments] endeavor to identify emerging long-term trends and problems, formulate and evaluate alternative courses of action to deal with them, and evaluate the effects of actions that have been put in train. This objective presupposes a continued assessment of social values and preferences.

(WWICS, 1973: S2117)
If governmental mechanisms are to enhance the capability for strategic policy assessment, they must direct attention and generate alternatives (Simon, 1966) during the "intelligence" stage of the decision-making process (Lasswell, 1971). Strategic policy assessment may also be a component of what agenda-building theories call the "predecisional" or "prepolitical" process determining the issues and alternatives considered and influencing the choices made (Cobb & Elder, 1972).

Recognizing the similarity between planning and the activity being advocated, the WWICS group differentiated between strategic policy assessment and centralized economic planning.

What is conceived of here is not the development of detailed tactics and closely adhered-to targets, which often accompany plans, but rather a more analytical and conceptual process of identifying and assessing options available from a long-range perspective.

(WWICS, 1973: S2116-17)

While a full definition of strategic policy assessment must include its relation to planning and to an adequate taxonomy of federal policies and programs in terms of the ends-means chain as well as the decision process, our definition will suffice for an exploration of congressional reform efforts related to strategic policy assessment.

Strategic policy assessment (SPA), depending on the particular reform whereby it is adopted, may provide three functions for congressional policy making: (1) to search for emerging issues,
(2) to inform current decisions with relevant futures analysis,
(3) to force the conscious interrelationship of decisions made at different locations in Congress or the government. The search for emerging issues—a crucial, early-warning function for any organization (Downs, 1967: 169-91)—concerns additions that should be made to the institutional agenda. Current decisions are informed by knowledge of likely future trends, events, or conditions that may affect the goals sought by decision makers and the potential impact of a decision on its policy environment. Both these functions are analytic, and analysis may or may not be used to make a specific decision. Strategic policy assessment, through the use of futures analysis to search for emerging issues and inform current decisions, would tend to encourage a systematic consideration of the range of issues on the agenda at a given time and to force the interrelationship of individual decisions. The conscious interrelationship of decisions is forced when the decision process is so structured that analytic functions must be performed.

A fourth function, one beyond the realm of SPA, is to provide the political will, whether expressed in popular support or political leadership, necessary for anticipating problems. We are concerned with reforms affecting analysis rather than the exercise of political will or leadership, such as strengthening the parties or leadership within Congress.
The analytical techniques for acquiring and processing information essential to strategic policy assessment may be summarized by the term *futures analysis*. Futures analysis may include such activities as futures research, forecasting, and technology assessment. All these activities are aimed at exploring the uncertainties of what is to come, and some of them were specifically mentioned in congressional reform proposals. The future is composed of "a large set of alternatives." Futures research and forecasting, then, are "means of discovering and articulating the more important of the alternative futures and estimating the trajectory likely to be produced by contemplated policies" (Gordon, 1974: 90). Among futures techniques are genius forecasting, trend extrapolation, consensus or Delphi methods, simulation, cross-impact analysis, scenario generation, decision trees, and econometric forecasting (Gordon, 1974: 90-113).

"As a process of ordering certainties and uncertainties and their implications with regard to public policy decision-making," technology assessment is

the name for a class of policy studies which attempt to look at the widest possible scope of impacts in society of the introduction of a new technology or the extension of an established technology in new and different ways. Its goal is to inform the policy process by putting before the decision maker an analyzed set of options, alternatives, and consequences. (Coates, forthcoming)
Thus, "technology assessment is a most general and important form of applied futures research" (Coates, forthcoming).

Having defined the important terms of our discussion and described the operative processes of information and analysis in decision making, let us consider reforms that have improved congressional policy-making ability by providing increased staffing, changes in committee structure, and new responsibilities for analyzing current and future conditions.

CONGRESSIONAL REFORM

Reforms strengthening the search, decision-informing, and decision-interrelating functions of the legislative process have been proposed in the past, and some have been enacted. These reforms have been crucial to the development of the policy analysis capability in Congress, and our discussion supplies the background preliminary to consideration of four important reforms of recent date. Among historical reforms affecting the information and analysis capability have been

... the establishment of the standing committee system in 1825, periodic reform of the House and Senate rules to expedite legislative business, ... and the fiscal reforms following World War I that unified the Appropriations Committees and established the General Accounting Office. (Saloma, 1969: 134)
Adding to its information resources, the Congress established the Legislative Reference Service in 1914, providing a central staff for some analytical functions. The Office of Legislative Counsel was set up in 1919 to insure the consistency of legislative proposals with existing law. A more technical, policy-relevant staff was added with the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation in 1926. This staff has earned a reputation for competent analysis of tax policy matters, in the service of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees (Manley, 1968).

In addition to such analysis reforms, other reforms have affected the interrelating function.

The most important rationalization [interrelationship of decisions] in congressional organization and procedure since 1921 has been the indirect discipline in the legislative and administrative processes introduced by executive reform such as the executive budget and legislative clearance. (Saloma, 1969: 134)

Analysis capacity per se has not been a major concern within Congress. For most of its history Congress worked in the tradition that "each member of Congress was a statesman capable of handling all legislative problems himself" (Gross, 1953: 282). Thus, proposals to add professional staff were taken as a slur on the capacities of members themselves; yet the increasing activity of the federal government required increasing legislative analysis. Committees frequently borrowed officials of the executive branch,
sometimes for lengthy periods and particularly when one party controlled Congress and the White House (Kofmehl, 1962: 3; Gross, 1953: 280-81). Lobbyists were also often important in providing policy analysis to Congress in support of lobby group interests. Only in the last thirty years has this tradition of the self-informed statesman been seriously challenged by increased congressional staffing.


THE LEGISLATIVE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1946

An omnibus reform bill, the Legislative Reorganization Act (LRA) of 1946 allowed each committee four professional staff members, under the direction of the chairman and the ranking minority member, and expanded the informational services that the Legislative Reference Service and the General Accounting Office (GAO) might provide Congress. But these provisions amounted to only a few among thirty-eight provisions including pay raises and a retirement system for members of Congress. The committee staffing provision resulted not only from the realization of need but also
from a conservative Republican effort to prohibit the formal assignment of executive personnel to committees without the permission of the Senate Rules and Administration or House Administration Committees (Gross, 1953: 281).

The most important renovation was the "rationalization" of committee jurisdictions to make them parallel to executive departments and to reduce the number of committees from thirty-three to fifteen in the Senate and from forty-eight to nineteen in the House. The number of subcommittees, however, was little changed. Before the passage of the act, there were 140 subcommittees; afterward, 131 and 146 depending on the count (Gross, 1953: 270). The change, buried in a large legislative package, was not so severe as it might have been. It has been stated that these changes did little to modernize jurisdictional categories and that the act had unanticipated consequences: "... strengthening the seniority system, reinforcing committee autonomy, and inhibiting the ability of Congress to adapt to changing configurations of public issues" (Davidson, 1974: 4).

THE EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1946

Another legislative initiative relevant to policy assessment concerns was passed in 1946: the Employment Act of 1946 (P.L. 304, 79th Congress). Beyond setting maximum employment as a goal of the federal government, the act was a congressionally initiated
change in the national decision-making process. Two of its four purposes are of paramount concern:

Second, to place the responsibility on the President for seeing to it that the economy was purposively analyzed at regular intervals and that the Congress was informed of economic trends and of the President's program to meet the challenge of those trends; . . . And finally [fourth], to establish a mechanism in Congress which would facilitate legislative analysis and action, and fix legislative responsibility for the carrying out of a full employment policy. (Bailey, 1950: 14-15)

This act added to the federal government's strategic policy assessment functions, but principally through the executive branch; the responsibility for economic analysis and planning initiative for full employment programs rested with the President.

The original intent of the act's sponsors was to use the budget process to achieve full employment, but this intent was weakened during its passage. In earlier versions the Bureau of the Budget (BoB) was to prepare a national production and employment budget based on economic planning within the BoB (Bailey, 1950: 164-70). This budget was to be considered by a joint congressional committee on the budget. Proponents of this version saw it as an extension of

... responsibility in the field of economic planning and policy integration [and] as instruments of potential reform which might
ramify into the entire pattern of governmental operations, increasing efficiency and clarifying political responsibility and accountability. (Bailey, 1950: 53)

Business and other conservative groups saw accountability otherwise. Partly because of their pressure for an identifiable group whose appointment Congress would have to approve (Bailey, 1950: 165-70), a Council of Economic Advisers assumed the functions contemplated for the BoB:

To aid the President in preparation of the annual economic report; to gather and analyze on current and prospective trends and their effect on the achievement of full employment; to appraise federal programs in terms of their contribution to full employment; to develop and recommend policies to achieve the stated policy.

(P.L. 304, 79th Congress, Sec. 4c)

The second function explicitly requires the government to recognize and analyze long-term trends and emerging issues and thereby commits the Congress to receive this analysis. However, when economic analysis was shifted to the CEA from the BoB, a corresponding shift was made in the pertinent congressional committee, changing the proposed budget committee to the Joint Committee on the Economic Report (JCER). Thus the analytical functions were isolated from the budget-making process.

The JCER was to increase the analytical capacity of Congress by examining the annual economic report issued by the President
in December and by reporting to other committees of Congress by May 1. Its recommendations were to guide congressional committees "dealing with legislation affecting employment, production, and purchasing power." The joint committee was also to "study means of coordinating programs in order to further the policy of this act." In its early years, however, the Joint Committee on the Economic Report did not take the assertive role mandated by the Employment Act of 1946 (Gross, 1953: 334). It did not force the conscious interrelationship of decisions across committees; it did not perform this assessment-related function. The establishment in Congress of decision-forcing mechanisms in the budget process waited until the 93rd Congress.

THE LEGISLATIVE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1970

The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (LRA) (P.L. 90-510) was the product of six years of development following hearings and activities prompted by Senator Mike Monroney (D., Okla.), a sponsor of the 1946 LRA. Most of this activity took place in the privacy of Congress. Inclusion of antisecrecy amendments attracted some media attention, but otherwise press coverage was virtually nonexistent, demonstrating, in the words of former Representative Donald Rumsfeld (R., Ill.), that "Congressional reform is an issue without a constituency" (Bibby & Davidson, 1972: 259).

The act added personnel to the staffs of committees, and the data resources of Congress were increased including access to
information from the executive branch. Committees were encouraged to make their rules explicit. Congressional responsibility to oversee the executive branch, added as an explicit function in 1946, was reiterated in the 1970 LRA. Although staff resources were increased in the Congressional Research Service (CRS) as well as in committee, no mention was made of the type of policy analysis that congressional committee staff should perform. However, the CRS was given expanded responsibility for policy analysis for committees (Beckman, 1974b): The CRS became responsible for an in-house search for emerging issues that produces subject lists of issues and policy areas meriting CRS analysis and committee attention. Committee response to this increased capability was mixed during the 93rd Congress. Many committees were not interested in Congressional Research Service suggestions; others requested information on a large number of issues and acted on them (Bezold, 1974: 460-61).

THE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT ACT OF 1972

The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) was established by the Technology Assessment Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-484). The product of efforts in the House Science and Astronautics Committee, particularly by Representative Emilio Daddario (D., Conn.), chairman of the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development, OTA's purpose was to provide information on the physical, biological, economic, social, and political effects of technological
applications. OTA is directed by a Technology Assessment Board, essentially a joint congressional committee composed of five representatives and five senators.

This technology assessment activity was placed in a congressional support organization primarily because the President seemed uninterested in issues of science and technology. During the Nixon administration the Office of Science and Technology in the Executive Office of the President had been abolished, and the function of advising the President on scientific matters was transferred to the head of the National Science Foundation (NSF). This decrease in presidential interest in science coincided with popular interest, particularly among environmentalists, in examining the likely consequences of a new scientific or technological application like the supersonic transport plane, the SST.

OTA had just begun operation in 1973, during the 93rd Congress, having chosen six initial assessments, or reports, to be made. Discussion within OTA suggested that the agency perform an "early warning" function for Congress, and the WWICS proposal listed OTA as a likely place to establish the policy assessment activities proposed. It is still too soon to evaluate OTA's contribution, but this office may play an important role in SPA in Congress.

SPA REFORMS IN THE 93RD CONGRESS

In order to understand the process of congressional reform in relation to strategic policy assessment, our discussion will focus
on three legislatively initiated proposals during the 93rd Congress. The bills chosen represent a cross-section of congressional approaches to SPA: the foresight provision of House Resolution 988 (the Committee Reform Amendments of 1974), Senate bill 5 (the Full Opportunity and National Goals and Priorities Act), and Senate bill 3050 (the Balanced National Growth and Development Act of 1974).

The foresight provision of the Committee Reform Amendments of 1974 (H. Res. 988) was proposed during the 93rd Congress by the House Select Committee on Committees (the Bolling committee) along with several other reforms bearing on SPA functions in the House. Because of the efforts of Representative John C. Culver (D., Iowa), a "foresight responsibility" was included for committees of the House, whereby they would

... review and study any conditions or circumstances which may indicate the necessity or desirability of enacting new or additional legislation within the jurisdiction of that committee (whether or not any bill or resolution has been introduced with respect thereto), and shall on a continuing basis undertake futures research and forecasting on matters within the jurisdiction of that committee.

(SCC, 1974e: 389)

The Full Opportunity and National Goals and Priorities Act (S. 5) was proposed by Senator Walter F. Mondale (D., Minn.) and favorably reported by the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee (CLPW). A Council of Social Advisers (CSA) was to be
established to gather information and analyze social conditions, trends, and programs in a fashion similar to that of the Council of Economic Advisers. A congressional Office of Goals and Priorities Analysis (OGPA) was to examine national priority judgments found in the President's proposed budget and to formulate recommendations for congressional goals and priorities.

As proposed by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D., Minn.) and referred to the Senate Government Operations Committee (CGO), the Balanced National Growth and Development Act of 1974 (S. 3050) would establish an office within the Executive Office of the President to assess national needs, goals, and priorities and to prepare an annual report on national growth and development policy. The annual report would include "appropriate projections and forecasts regarding future social, economic, environmental, and scientific developments affecting the growth of the Nation stated in five-, ten-, and twenty-five-year time frames..." (S. 3050). The proposed executive office would also force policy coordination among various departments by contributing directly to the formulation of the presidential budget. Within Congress an Office of Policy and Planning would conduct "a continuing, nonpartisan analysis of national goals, priorities, and urban and rural growth policies." This office was to provide Congress "with the data and analyses necessary for enlightened decisions with respect to such matters." Further, the office was to recommend interrelated policies and programs to the Congress. The bill also proposed an independent
Foundation for America's Future and a national citizens' advisory network to provide independent research and citizen input for national growth policy.

The three bills chosen for study bear on different aspects of strategic policy assessment functions. They represent a diversity of congressional approaches to the problem of creating and reconciling policy legislatively. The foresight provision of H. Res. 988 was aimed at searching for emerging problems and informing current decisions within the jurisdiction of individual committees. The Mondale bill (S. 5) was aimed at forcing analysis across the field of social policy and, to a limited extent, forcing the conscious interrelationship of decisions within the Council of Social Advisers and in an Office of Goals and Priorities Analysis within Congress. The Humphrey proposal (S. 3050) would augment the search for emerging issues, inform current decisions regarding future developments, and force the conscious interrelationship of decisions across broad areas of policy made both in Congress and in the White House. Examination of these three SPA reform proposals has shown how Congress does and does not bring about change in its own operations, particularly in its ability to adjust its crisis decision making. To demonstrate the successes and failures of certain approaches may be useful to future efforts to add to the anticipatory capacity of national decision making.

In order to present case studies of these bills, a set of factors, relationships, and hypotheses have been developed to
evaluate comparative legislative responsibility in the development of each bill. In Chapter 2 we have set forth criteria for the development of legislative enactments and the operative goals of legislators, along with hypotheses necessary to examine each proposal. In Chapter 3 we have presented a case study of H. Res. 988; in Chapter 4, of the Mondale bill; in Chapter 5, of the Humphrey proposal. In Chapter 6 the hypotheses have been reevaluated in light of these case studies. In Chapter 7 conclusions for the maturity and viability of SPA reforms and implications for congressional reform have been summarized.

NOTES

1. Statements throughout the text that are quoted without attribution have been drawn from more than seventy-five confidential interviews with members of Congress, congressional and executive staff members, outside experts, and public and private interest-group representatives.


3. The WWICS group recommended that the congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) be broadly mandated to include social concerns and that a strategic assessment staff, a distinct entity with a deputy director, be added to OTA. An executive office of strategic policy assessment was to be added to the Office of Management and Budget, to address selected major problems from a multidisciplinary and long-term perspective. To maximize its impact on emergent policy considerations, this office was to "review and comment on the President's budget as well as longer term implications of resource allocation decisions ... and legislation which has significant long-term policy implications" (WWICS, 1973: S2117-18).

4. For a listing of steps in technology assessment, see Coates, 1975 and forthcoming.
5. That the call for reforms in national decision making to cope with the future is not new is shown by the prefatory comments to a major work on the Employment Act of 1946:

The day of policy planning by haphazard pressures and personal and political whim is fast running out, for the basic assumption underlying such irresponsible policymaking has been that our society was resilient enough to stand it. What if a needed policy were warped out of shape by the nature of our political processes? No great and lasting harm was done. There was always time to start again, to explore new paths, skip around in a labyrinth of blind alleys. But what if we guess wrong today? The power and problems of government may result in physical destruction or economic disaster.

(Bailey, 1950: viii-ix)

6. The Joint Committee on the Economic Report became the Joint Economic Committee. Its staff has a reputation as one of the best analytical staffs of any congressional committee.

7. For an evaluation of OTA's operations during the 93rd Congress, see Craig Decker's attempt to "assess the assessors" (Decker, 1975).
CHAPTER 2

STRATEGIC POLICY ASSESSMENT PROPOSALS
PURPOSIVE BEHAVIOR AT THE COMMITTEE LEVEL
INTRODUCTION

Our examination of three legislative initiatives has been structured in order to understand strategic policy assessment reforms in Congress that were aimed at making government better able to cope with the future. The legislative initiatives examined are the foresight provision of the Committee Reform Amendments of 1974 (H. Res. 988), the Full Opportunity and National Goals and Priorities Act (S. 5), and the Balanced National Growth and Development Act of 1974 (S. 3050). At the level of the major operating group within Congress, the committees, certain key resources, or factors, have been selected for consideration. These key factors at the committee level have been chosen in order to allow an identification of "who was responsible for a bill's enactment."

The research on Congress most relevant to our purposes examined thirteen bills handled by three Senate committees in order to "ascertain what aspects of committee life best help us understand the characteristic patterns of legislative action and inaction, initiative and deference" (Price, 1972: x). The issues address were the "decline" of parliaments in the face of ascendant executives and the sources and conditions of legislative
independence and creativity in the U.S. Congress. In other relevant research the functioning of six House committees from 1955 to 1966 was examined in order to describe and generalize about committee similarities and differences (Fenno, 1973).

The following preliminary questions derived from the work of Price and Fenno have guided this research: (1) *What are the determinants of activity by an individual member of Congress on SPA proposals?* The member's perception of the need to anticipate problems and his perception of the relation of strategic policy assessment to this need was examined. Personal background factors and committee incentives were identified that would lead a member to take an initiative and so become a policy entrepreneur in this area. We asked how strategic policy assessment would affect the member's institutional position and how he thought strategic policy assessment would change patterns of congressional decision making or the distribution of power within Congress. (2) *What factors condition successful activity by a committee on Congress on the SPA provisions?* The impact of different legislative packages in which strategic policy assessment has been proposed was studied as well as the differences in committee handling of these packages. Factors were sought to explain these differences. Finally, we sought to identify the types of interest group and administration activity that accompanied these proposals or were generated by them. The methods used to gather information to answer these questions are discussed below.
STAGES OF SUCCESSFUL ACTIVITY ON A BILL

While these questions deal with member and committee factors at the committee level of analysis, it is necessary to consider the meaning of successful committee action for our unit of analysis, namely legislative initiatives. Successful committee action on a bill has been considered in terms of the degree of development of six stages involved in processing any bill; those suggested by Price.

Several attempts have been made to define the stages of decision making, or policy making, that a bill ordinarily goes through (Lasswell, 1963; Robinson, 1962; Gergen, 1968; Almond, 1960). In surveying these stages, David Price rejected a "rational actor" approach to policy making (see Allison, 1971):

The introduction, publicizing, legitimizing, and processing of a piece of legislation involves a great deal more than the "gentle" rationalistic, problem-solving process of intelligence, recommendation, and prescription. The process entails gathering "intelligence" and responding to articulated needs and sentiments, but it also requires stimulating those sentiments, activating and mollifying groups, and precipitating and participating in conflicts.

(Price, 1972: 5)

Price postulated six stages or functions in the processing of a piece of legislation:
1. **Instigation and publicizing.** The public or private advocacy of an issue as one worthy of attention and ameliorative action. Typical instigators include the staff man or lower-level bureaucrat who calls a problem to his superior's attention, the Congressman who highlights an issue through investigative hearings, or the author who documents and dramatizes a social need.

2. **Formulation.** Devising and advocating a specific legislative remedy for a supposed need. The formulator draws boundaries around an issue and establishes a focal point for its further consideration.

3. **Information gathering.** Collecting data on the nature of hazards and abuses; the alternative schemes for solving problems and their costs; benefits; and inherent difficulties; the likely political impact of each scheme; and the feasibility of various compromises. Information gathering is crucial to each of the other functions—to devising a workable proposal, as well as to plotting its political course and building a sense of need and legitimacy.

4. **Interest aggregation.** Responding to the needs and wishes of individuals or groups affected by a given proposal. In one instance, it might mean the championing of one group over or against others, in another the assumption of a mediating, "balancing" role, in yet another the stimulating of latent group sentiments. Such activities may both resolve and exacerbate conflict; they may, on the one hand, contribute to the instigation and mobilization effort or, on the other, give rise to attempts at modification or obstruction.

5. **Mobilization.** The exertion of pressure, persuasion, or control on behalf of a measure by one who is able, often by virtue of his institutional position, to take effective and relatively direct action to secure enactment. Whether an issue goes beyond the publicizing and formulating stages usually depends on the support it receives from individuals, groups, or governmental units that possess authority and legitimacy in the policy area and on the extent of the "intra-elite organizing" by key leaders. Mobilizers may become involved in other functions as a part of these efforts, but they may benefit from, or be stimulated by, those who were active at the "earlier" stages as well.
6. Modification. The marginal alteration of a proposal, sometimes "strengthening" it, sometimes granting certain concessions to its opponents in order to facilitate final passage. Modification may or may not complement actions taken at earlier points, but in any case the modifier shares responsibility for a bill's final form. (Price, 1972: 4-5)

A bill's passage, in Price's schema, will depend on its maturity and viability. A bill's maturity corresponds to its progress through these stages. The viability of a bill (whether or not "it will fly") depends on the degree of responsiveness and support for the bill in the parent body (Price, 1972: 304).

The three bills chosen reached a variety of levels of maturity and viability. The foresight provision was adopted by the House; the full opportunity proposal passed the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee (it had passed this committee and the Senate in two previous congresses); the Humphrey proposal was not even considered by the Senate Government Operations Committee. In this research we explored factors affecting the developmental process for three legislative initiatives and the context that conditioned their viability or nonviability.

One contextual factor that conditions a bill's viability in the House or Senate, Price noted, is the presence of a crisis or sense of need in a relevant sector. A variety of crises, most notably the energy crisis, demanded notice in the 93rd Congress (SCC, 1973b: 475; WWICS, 1973). The extent to which events such as the energy crisis were translated into a sense of need for
changes through strategic policy assessment reforms in the decision-making system has been examined in our research. The member and committee factors that may have affected the maturity of these SPA proposals must first be identified specifically. Then we may hypothesize the relationship of these factors to the processing of three proposals.

MEMBER FACTORS: GOALS

The viability of a proposal is determined by the level of support it receives in the parent chamber and by other enabling conditions, but the birth and growth of a bill--its maturity in terms of Price's six stages--depends on the "irreducibility of legislative initiative"--the need for a policy entrepreneur (Price, 1972: 306-11). Then, what determines a politician's actions, as a sponsor, a supporter, or an opponent of legislation? Research on the general determinants of political activity have focused on the predispositions, perceptions, roles, and motivations of politicians (Barber, 1965; Payne, 1968; Davidson, 1969; Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, & Ferguson, 1962; Putnam, 1973). A recent approach by Richard Fenno resolved some of the difficulty of linking such general factors to legislative activity. There are certain basic goals pursued by congressmen; Fenno (1973) suggested (1) reelection, (2) good public policy, (3) power in the House, (4) a career beyond the House, and (5) private gain.
Fenno showed that membership on different committees enhances some goals more than others (Fenno, 1973). Research on freshman representatives in the 92nd Congress yielded similar results (Bullock, 1973). Our research was concerned with the question how SPA reform was related to member goals. These goals are not finely sorted in the daily activity of Congressmen. A member's actions must reach a threshold before he will relate his activity to a personal version of these five goals. More than a member who merely votes yes or no, the sponsors of bills were more likely to be able to express how the various aspects of their work on bills related to their goals.

GOOD POLICY AND A POLICY ATTITUDE TOWARD SPA

Previous research has not eliminated the difficulty of determining what constitutes the pursuit of good policy. Being concerned with the relative importance of policy goals against re-election, power in the chamber, etc., Fenno and Bullock did not provide a set of dimensions for good policy.

Faced with this substantive question, we have specified what may be involved in a Congressman's policy attitude, as John Kingdon called the background attitudes which inform a member's activity apart from other external sources such as constituents, party leaders, etc. (Kingdon, 1973: 345-54). A set of factors relevant to a policy attitude toward SPA has been developed based on preliminary research and congressional testimony and discussion in this area. The elements of a policy attitude include:
Satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the ways in which Congress normally searches for problems to consider.

Judgments of the extent to which major problems can be anticipated.

Opinions on the ability to predict social trends or activity.

Judgments of the ability to direct or control future conditions.

Judgments of the role of Congress in providing a "positive, inspiring vision" of the future.

Familiarity with future-oriented information (e.g., five-, ten-, and twenty-five-year forecasts) in legislative work.

These elements reflect the fact that SPA is a meta-issue. It deals with the policy process; with the analysis of conditions, goals, and means involved in substantive policy issues such as health or transportation. While a member's good policy goal may move him to stand for or against a particular SPA reform, a high level of activity will probably enable the member to articulate the background elements of his policy attitude. The significance of each of these elements and the expected position of those supporting SPA reforms have yet to be considered.

TO SEARCH FOR PROBLEMS. The ways in which Congress normally searches for problems have been described as sufficient to include all politically relevant issues (Schneier, 1970) and wide ranging, if not systematic (Beckman, 1974a). Political in this context means that if an emerging issue has sufficient importance because of interest group or constituent support, it is put on the agenda. Yet the absence of a more systematic search for emerging problems
is one of the causes of recurrent crisis. Presumably, a member active on behalf of SPA reforms will be dissatisfied with the normal ways in which Congress searches for problems. This dissatisfaction may be coupled with a high degree of search activity on his own.\(^2\)

TO ANTICIPATE EMERGING PROBLEMS. SPA involves searching for emerging issues and informing current decision, presumably activity that will encourage the Congress to deal with emerging problems. The existence of a crisis eases the burdens of political decision makers by providing a consensus that the particular problem must be confronted. As we have said, it is difficult for democratic governments, particularly representative assemblies, to anticipate problems. Proponents of SPA reforms may recognize this, but they will probably feel that the government can anticipate problems or, at least, must attempt to do so.

TO PREDICT SOCIAL TRENDS. One of the arguments against the analysis functions of SPA proposals was that Congress is unable to predict social trends and conditions. This argument was raised particularly in the debate over establishment of the Council of Social Advisers. Presumably, members supporting SPA will believe that the government does have some ability to predict social trends and conditions effectively or that a definite need exists to develop this ability.

TO DIRECT OR CONTROL THE FUTURE. SPA functions imply a commitment by the government to make a more effective and conscious
impact on the future. Presumably, those in favor of SPA reforms, especially reforms which would force decisions, will favor greater governmental activity to direct or control the future. This attitude involves an implicit or explicit response to the ideological implications of government activity in a "free," i.e., uncontrolled, society.

A "POSITIVE, INSPIRING VISION." Preliminary interviews with staff and members of Congress and testimony on SPA issues brought occasional references to the need for the government to provide a "positive, inspiring vision" for the country (SCC, 1973b: 472-79; Harman, 1972). The specific policy dimensions of a particular member's vision are beyond this research, yet members concerned with SPA may realize that with 535 members and 345 work groups (Davidson, 1974: 8), Congress is at a comparative disadvantage to the President in enunciating large-scale, comprehensive goals.

FUTURES INFORMATION. Two aspects of congressional information sources may help us understand a member's policy attitude in relation to SPA. First is an awareness of future-oriented information, in terms of trends or conditions five, ten, or twenty-five years in the future, for use in day-to-day legislative activities. Members proposing SPA reforms will likely be conscious of or seek out this type of information.

Second is an awareness of the existence of the subject lists of emerging issues produced by the Congressional Research Service
for each congressional committee. While distribution of these lists is made by committee chairmen and therefore may be somewhat skewed, members supporting SPA reforms are like to know and make use of these lists.

Several categories have been used to explore what may be called the members' policy attitude toward strategic policy assessment. Regardless of the exact composition of "good policy," it is likely to be a dominant goal for members actively pursuing SPA reforms. Good policy as a goal must be posited to explain their activity, given the complexity of the issue, the lack of constituent attention, and the absence of significant interest group pressure.

THE INSTITUTIONAL POWER GOAL

Power in the chamber is important as a goal of representatives. This goal affects the operation of certain committees and their desirability, particularly the taxing and spending committees. Whether the goal of institutional power moves a representative or a senator to support SPA reforms will depend on the member's estimation of the reform's impact on his position. If, for instance, a reform bill creates a new committee and the sponsor may become chairman of it, this goal might come into play. Although the Humphrey (S. 3050) and Mondale (S. 5) bills (more appropriately Senator Jacob Javits' amendment) would establish new committees, given the doubtfulness of their passage, the institutional power goal hardly explains the actions of the sponsors. Similarly, the
Bolling committee proposed to create a separate oversight/foresight subcommittee in each committee. Oversight is not one of the more sought-after operations within Congress, and foresight is an unknown quantity. Therefore the foresight provision probably offered little power-in-the-chamber incentive to those who might become chairmen of these subcommittees.

However, institutional power considerations may have stirred opponents to the SPA reforms. It is likely that SPA reforms which shift the least power will generate the least opposition from the chairmen of the 345 committees and subcommittees of the 93rd Congress. The Humphrey proposal might seriously affect the power of the standing committees through the formation of the Joint Committee on National Growth and Development, basically a leadership committee for both houses, and thus it would tend to generate opposition from committee members whose power was threatened. Mondale's Title I would set up a social reporting system without any change in the committee structure, while Senator Javits' Title II would create an Office of Goals and Priorities Analysis. This office would analyze federal programs and priorities, but it would have no power to change committee activities. The futures research and forecasting required by the foresight provision could not affect the distribution of power within committees unless it occurred in conjunction with shifts caused by the existence of an oversight subcommittee.
THE GOAL OF REELECTION

Recent work on Congress has stressed the reelection goal in motivating members' behavior that results in patterns of congressional operation (Mayhew, 1974). Yet it is unlikely that the reelection goal played an important part in the member actions either for or against the SPA reforms because complex technical issues like structural and procedural change in Congress are often beyond the comprehension of the voters and almost always beyond their interest. Thus, there is usually little constituent attention to such issues. As a member of Congress put it, "Congressional reform is an issue without a constituency" (Bibby & Davidson, 1972: 252). Since relatively little outside pressure builds for or against congressional reform proposals, little hope of reelection can be ascribed to a member's actions on such reforms. In 1974 issue-hungry Republicans in the House were unsuccessful in making the Bolling committee proposal a reelection issue.

CAREERS BEYOND THE CHAMBER

Some SPA-related issues, such as national growth policy or a council of social advisers, have national appeal, and these issues may help generate support, beyond a particular congressional district or state, which would be of value to a senator building a national constituency.

Representative John C. Culver (D., Iowa) ran successfully for the Senate at the end of the 93rd Congress, but the foresight
provision probably had little, if any, effect on his race. However, both Senator Mondale and Senator Humphrey were presidential aspirants during the 93rd Congress. Humphrey unveiled the outlines of his growth policy proposal in the presidential primary campaign in California in 1972. Both the Mondale and the Humphrey proposals were of the type which might interest a national constituency, and therefore the career-beyond-the-chamber goal may have had some impact on their advocacy of SPA reform.

PRIVATE GAIN

Given the incipient nature of these reforms and the lack of interest group involvement, there was probably little opportunity for private gain. Therefore this goal--also absent in other research on member goals (Fenno, 1973; Bullock, 1973)--probably had a negligible effect on the actions of supporters and opponents. Because of the awkwardness--and slight chance of an affirmative answer--of asking a member if he expected any private gain, no such questions were asked during our interviews.

Other member factors, principally various resources and costs (see Wildavsky, 1966; Adrian & Press, 1968), are involved in a member's actions, and these factors have been noted in describing member's goal pursuits and the context of the committee factors.
COMMITTEE FACTORS

This research, like that of Price, concerns the activity of certain committees on specific proposals; Fenno concentrated on general committee behavior. In their work the following major committee factors affected the processing of a bill:

The role of the committee and subcommittee chairmen.
The experience and orientation of the staff.
The membership of the committee in terms of partisan or ideological composition.
The lobbying and influence of executive and congressional bureaucrats and interest groups.
The resultant patterns of conflict.

A favorable committee chairman is essential to the expeditious processing of a bill. This factor probably was involved in the case of the Mondale bill (S. 5) in the Labor and Public Welfare Committee, where Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr. (D., N.J.) was chairman, and for the foresight provision, although Representative Richard Bolling's (D., Mo.) select committee operated more collegially than most standing committees. The opposition of Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (D., N.C.), chairman of the Government Operations Committee, was probably a major reason why Senator Humphrey's bill was not considered in this committee. Subcommittee chairmen are particularly important in the Senate, Price noted, because of the decentralization of power there. Senator Mondale's proposal was undoubtedly aided by the fact that in previous Congresses it had been handled by his special subcommittee.
Staff activity is essential in formulating proposals and gathering information or overseeing these processes. The earlier reforms, particularly the Employment Act of 1946 (Bailey, 1950) and the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (Bibby & Davidson, 1972) enjoyed a variety of crucial staff input throughout the six stages of processing. Among the determinants of a bill's maturity, Price noted the accessibility, quality, and roles and orientations of the staff members performing the information-gathering function, especially for a technical procedural issue. Given the nature of SPA reforms, it is likely that background experience or interest in SPA-related matters or techniques will be essential for effective formulation and information gathering. Equally important, if a bill is to move beyond the early stages of maturity, will be the political information-gathering and bargaining skills of the staff. Thus, the experience as well as the amount of policy entrepreneurship of the staff should be important for the maturity of these three reforms.

The bureaucratic and interest group activity directed at a committee considering a bill is generally important. A bill that potentially infringes on bureaucratic structures often brings out powerful government lobbying (Price, 1972). Also, bureaucratic structures may anticipate the bill's importance to their operations and actually play an important part in its drafting. Since the major focus of this research is congressional reform, a major concern is how these SPA reforms would affect the congressional
bureaucracy, and this concern requires an examination of the role, if any, of the committee staff, the Congressional Research Service, the General Accounting Office, and the Office of Technology Assessment.

The successful processing of a bill requires effective interest aggregation and mobilization of support. Because SPA is a complex issue whose effects are indirect or uncertain, these proposals have not generated widespread support or opposition. Just as constituent attention to congressional reforms is slight, so too is interest group activity. One exception occurred among those academic and professional groups whose members would benefit from greater use of particular techniques and an implied increase in employment for the group. It is likely that SPA proposals, particularly where they portend conflict in forcing decisions, will not mature if interest-group support is limited to academic and professional groups. A bill is not likely to mature if interest groups oppose it out of fear of adverse effects, given the uncertainty of the impact of these reforms on established contacts and relationships with Congress as well as on policy questions. This proposition should hold true especially where the decision-forcing function is involved. The history of the 1946 Employment Act suggests that major interest groups will enter the process if a significant SPA reform is seriously considered.

The impact of the ideological and partisan composition of a committee will be shown depending on the type of bill. Partisan voting
is often most pronounced when the vote deals with internal procedural matters in the House or Senate. To the extent that SPA is likely to affect the relative positions of the majority and minority parties, this impact will be reflected in the voting. Likewise, votes on Democratic proposals to make changes in an unwilling Republican executive will show partisan division, as the vote showed in the case of the Mondale bill (S. 5).

Ideological factors and patterns of conflict on SPA reforms may not be directed at the SPA provisions, particularly if the SPA provisions are a relatively small part of a larger legislative package. These factors and patterns were not directed at the foresight provision—a relatively small procedural issue alongside larger and more controversial procedural and jurisdictional issues.

SPA provisions may also be perceived and dealt with in terms of the issues SPA may suggest for the agenda or in terms of its impact on proposals already being considered. There are historical examples of federal government agencies performing SPA functions. The National Resources Planning Board under President Roosevelt in the late 1930s and early 1940s provided SPA functions in support of the President's programs. Congress did not appreciate goals being enunciated by Presidential bureaucrats. Congress was particularly unhappy with the board's "new bill of rights" and its social welfare implications (Roth, 1959; 242-51; Bailey, 1950: 25-28). Partly for this reason the Council of Economic Advisers was established to advise rather than plan. President Nixon formed
a National Goals Research Staff, but this staff was never allowed to have any impact, somewhat because of the issues it was expected to raise (Full Opportunity, 1971: 71; Bezold, 1974: 465). Senator Mondale's proposal of the Council of Social Advisers and Senator Humphrey's Office of Balanced Growth and Development may have been viewed in these terms by committee members.

In addition to the impact of historical analogues, the committee that handles a proposal may have an impact on the issue potential of an SPA provision in its larger legislative package. Certain committees promote the active and partisan pursuit of good policy (Fenno, 1973), and most of the bills of these committees reflect what Aage Clausen would call the social welfare voting pattern (Fenno, 1973; Clausen, 1973). Senator Mondale's proposal was produced in the Labor and Public Welfare Committee, a major source of social welfare votes in the Senate. In this sense, activity by other members for or against the bill may be conditioned by its committee's (and its sponsor's) reputation, in this case for liberal, welfare-oriented proposals.

Conflict in Congress generally deals with means, and it is resolved by agreement on specific programs (Wildavsky, 1966; Polsby, 1972). SPA reforms which raise the conflict to higher levels on the ends-means chain, to larger goals, may be seen as shifting the policy battleground onto unknown territory. Thus, the greater the potential impact of SPA on the types of conflicts within Congress, the more opposition may be expected. In terms
of the ends-means chain the foresight provision promised the least change and hence generated the least opposition. The Office of Goals and Priorities Analysis in the Mondale proposal (S. 5) and the Office of Policy and Planning in the Humphrey proposal (S. 3050) may have been supported or opposed on their potential to shift congressional focus toward higher-level goals.

Also, SPA proposals may be consciously considered, not in terms of substantive issues, but in terms of distribution of power in the chamber or in committees. Thus the institutional power goal operates in the format of committee influence. In the original Bolling committee proposal the foresight provision was to be performed by an oversight subcommittee. The requirement for this subcommittee was eliminated in the modification stage of the bill's processing, perhaps because of the potential impact of an oversight subcommittee on a full committee's operations and distribution of power.

HYPOTHESES

The factors affecting the processing of a bill can be thought of in terms of member factors--goals and attitudes--and committee factors--personal, political, and informational resources focused at the committee level. In the case studies in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 we have examined some hypothetical relationships among these factors:
MEMBER FACTORS

Action in sponsoring SPA legislation will be directly related to the predominance of the good policy goal over re-election, power in the chamber, or a career beyond the chamber. Favorable activity on behalf of SPA legislation by sponsors and supporters will be accompanied by the following beliefs or judgments as elements of the SPA policy attitude:

1. That the ways in which Congress searches for problems to consider are inadequate.
2. That emerging problems can be anticipated before they reach a crisis stage.
3. That social events and conditions can be predicted or that the capability to do so should be developed.
4. That the government should attempt to direct or control future developments.
5. That Congress is at a comparative disadvantage to the President in providing a large-scale "positive, inspiring vision" for the nation.
6. That information on likely future conditions including Congressional Research Service lists of emerging issues is available.

COMMITTEE FACTORS

Favorable committee action will be directly related to the following factors:

1. A supportive committee or subcommittee chairman.
2. Staff interest or experience with SPA-related activities as well as political information-gathering and bargaining skills.
3. An ideologically liberal or Democratic majority which perceives that SPA will raise social welfare or
government management issues or a congressional reform majority which perceives that its institutional position will be helped or at least not hurt by congressional adoption of SPA techniques.

4. Constituent-oriented and/or broadly based interest-group support and support from those groups with a professional stake in SPA-related activity.

5. Positive activity from bureaucratic structures (executive agencies and congressional support organizations) based on potential benefit from conducting SPA activity or from its policy implications.

6. The extent to which the SPA proposal affects lower levels of the ends-means chain: does not attempt to analyze and force decisions across policy areas, uses the existing committee structure without changes, and offers no significant threat to the prevailing distribution of power among members.

Favorable action by the parent chamber will depend on similar factors.

METHODOLOGY

In order to examine our hypotheses through case studies of SPA-related proposals, information was gathered through documentary research and personal interviews.

The interviews were conducted with members of Congress, personal and committee staffs, and persons in congressional support organizations and executive agencies as well as persons in research institutes, universities, and elsewhere, who were involved with the three bills or general SPA areas. The interviewing approach and techniques owe much to David Price (1972). That is, interviewing was committee focused, with structured questions for committee
members and less structured interviews for staff members and others. To this basic format were added questions on the member's goals and his policy attitude. In arranging interviews, if the member was unavailable, the questions were asked of a relevant staff person.

Thus, committee-focused interviewing sought three types of information: (1) Details of the origin and processing of the three bills were gathered in terms of six stages: instigation and publicizing, formulation, information gathering, interest aggregation, mobilization, and modification. (2) Information was sought on member goals of good policy, power in the chamber, and reelection, and the relation of goals to activity for or against the SPA bills. A high level of activity on the part of the member was required for this information. (3) General questions were used to explore the background dimensions of the member's policy attitude toward SPA.

Originally, one questionnaire was developed which contained all three categories of questions (see Appendix 1), but preliminary testing showed that members who had not actively supported or opposed the bills could not answer questions about the bills' processing or about their goals in relation to the bill. Therefore, a shorter set of questions was taken from the first questionnaire (see Appendix 2). These questions were used to gather information on the member's policy attitude and position toward the relevant bills. The first questionnaire was used for
most of the interviewing of Bolling committee members. The shorter set of questions was used in most of the Senate interviews.

The shortened interviews took from ten minutes to half an hour; interviews from the original form took from twenty minutes to one hour. The time involved in arranging the interview, preparing any additional specific questions, conducting the interview, and writing it up varied from approximately one to four hours. Several staff persons were interviewed on multiple occasions.

A letter was sent to each committee member stating the purpose of the research, asking for an interview, and stating that if the member were unavailable, the relevant staff member would do for the purpose. Interviewing a "staff surrogate" about member goals was found more effective than interviewing the member himself, because the staff was more accessible, usually gave more time, and in some cases were more frank (Bullock, 1973). The interviews, held during the months of June, July, August, September, and December of 1974, confirmed Bullock's observations, although some senators and representatives proved to be both accessible and frank.

Access to members and staff for the interviews varied widely. On the Senate side the higher in seniority or the more opposed to the bills, the more difficult it was to arrange an interview. Particularly for key members, repeated calls were necessary to arrange the interviews. Access to some offices was aided by our association with the Brookings Institution through its visiting
scholars program. Most interviews were located in members' offices, but many took place in committee and congressional support organization offices, rooms off the House and Senate floor, Capitol Hill restaurants, etc.

Committee-focused interviews produced seven interviews with Bolling committee members (4 Democrats, 3 Republicans), nine interviews with Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee members (5 Democrats, 4 Republicans), and nine with Senate Government Operations Committee members (6 Democrats, 3 Republicans). In addition, member interviews were conducted for the Hansen committee, which provided the major amendment in the form of a substitute to the Bolling committee product.

Fifty unstructured interviews, many of extensive length, were used to gather information from the staffs of each of the committees, from congressional support organizations, particularly CRS, from the executive branch, from experts outside Congress associated with social indicators, the futurist movement, and technology assessment, as well as from persons involved with such groups as the National Goals Research Staff, the Commission on Critical Choices for Americans, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Documentary research made use of the publicly available hearings and other relevant documents as well as of unpublished materials in the files of sponsors and most active supporters of the three bills.
The interviews were announced as confidential, and statements quoted in the text will not be attributed when taken from interviews. Exceptions to confidentiality were made for responses by sponsors of SPA proposals regarding their policy attitudes. During the interview key words or phrases in each response were recorded on the interview form. As soon as possible after the interview, these notes were expanded to their original form.

In Chapters 3, 4, and 5 the results of this interviewing and documentary research have been described in order to illuminate the processing of each SPA proposal through the stages of maturation. In Chapter 6 the three cases are compared in relation to the hypotheses stated above. In Chapter 7 the conclusions of the research and its implications for congressional reform are considered.

NOTES

1. Price said of responsibility:
The use of the concept of responsibility is also appropriate ... in light of the connotations it has in modern ethics. The term ... came into prominence in the nineteenth century with the collapse of the cosmic or natural structures of obligation. ... Responsibility was, in this sense, the ethical corollary of man as the maker of history; placed in a world where he had to fashion his future, man identified himself as one who was answerable for that future (Winter, 1968: 255). The term thus seems particularly appropriate to denote innovative or assertive political action.

(Price, 1972: 337)
2. Anthony Downs has suggested that patterns of organizational innovation and change will be "highly dependent on the perspectives of those responsible for the search function" (1967: 23). In Congress research on member's voting decisions suggests that Congressmen "rarely seek out new information sources," yet those who do "have a disproportionate influence on Congressional outcomes" (Kingdon, 1973: 220).

3. Mayhew's "mono-goal" description of members of Congress preoccupied almost exclusively with reelection is an imaginative treatment and explains the symbolic nature of much behavior. However, Mayhew's treatment is of little value in understanding how or why many members of Congress become deeply involved in the policy questions they deal with, apparently irrespective of their reelection value. This question is particularly interesting for SPA issues, which as yet have little reelection value.
CHAPTER 3

THE FORESIGHT PROVISION OF THE COMMITTEE REFORM AMENDMENTS OF 1974
BUILDING STRATEGIC POLICY ASSESSMENT INTO THE HOUSE COMMITTEE SYSTEM

Thus far, strategic policy assessment has been conceptualized in terms of three functions of policy making: (1) to search out emerging issues and to put such issues on the agenda, (2) to provide futures information for current decisions, (3) to force decisions or conscious interrelationship of various decisions. The first two functions in Congress should be enhanced by the foresight provision of the Committee Reform Amendments of 1974 (H. Res. 988). The foresight provision is an explicit statement that House Committees must monitor conditions in their policy areas and undertake "futures research and forecasting." This chapter examines the Bolling committee, the stages of the foresight provision's establishment, and member goals and attitudes. The discussion includes the variety of options considered by the committee and its staff.

THE BOLLING COMMITTEE

The Select Committee on Committees (SCC) of the House, generally called the Bolling committee after its chairman, Richard Bolling (D., Mo.), was an intensive bipartisan effort to modernize the House committee system. The establishment of the committee was
preceded by sentiment variously located within the House in favor of congressional reform, and the idea of the committee originated in talks among Carl Albert, the Speaker; Gerald Ford, the minority leader; and Richard Bolling (Davidson, 1974; SCC, 1973a: 526).

Even at the beginning the Bolling Committee's mandate stirred controversy. During floor debate, questions were raised about the cost as well as the need for a select committee when a Joint Committee on Congressional Operations was already in existence (CR, 1973: S.591-603). However, H. Res. 132, establishing the committee, was passed on January 31, 1973, in the 93rd Congress. This resolution gave the committee the task of a "thorough and complete" study of House Rules X and XI, establishing the committee system, defining jurisdictions, and regulating procedures.

The five Democrats and five Republicans chosen for the select committee were a relatively accurate reflection of the ideological composition of the House, but they were distinguished by their commitment to Congress as an institution. The seven Bolling committee members interviewed responded easily to questions on SPA. Senators on the Governmental Operations Committee and those on the Labor and Public Welfare Committee were generally not able to reply as easily. A Bolling committee member and staff person attributed this facility to the thinking that members had done as a result of their attachment to Congress as an institution and of their work on the Bolling committee.
A diversified committee staff was recruited from congressional committees, representatives' offices, the Congressional Research Service (CRS), executive agencies, and universities. Its director was Charles Sheldon, who had been director of the science policy division of CRS. Walter Oleszek had taken leave from the government division of CRS to work for the Bolling committee. Two lawyers on the staff brought experience as legislative aides: Linda Kamm and Robert Ketchum. Two political scientists, Roger Davidson and Terry Finn, also had previous legislative or campaign staff experience, and Davidson had written extensively on Congress (Davidson, 1969; Davidson, Kovenock & O'Leary, 1971; Bibby & Davidson, 1972). From the executive came Spencer Beresford, an attorney with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. This staff provided significant input to the Bolling committee's efforts at congressional reform.

PROPOSALS IN THE BOLLING COMMITTEE

The Select Committee on Committees considered several possibilities for centralizing either the information gathering and analysis or the decision making of Congress. A central goals or planning committee was rejected for reasons to be discussed. Instead, the Bolling committee gave each committee a "foresight responsibility," as it was termed (SCC, 1974e: 65). Significantly, the foresight provision made one of the first explicit statements that congressional committees in policy making must show a
systematic concern for likely future conditions. Committees, as we have said, are the principal centers of policy making in Congress; the foresight provision placed the responsibility for legislative anticipation at that level.

Specifically it was proposed:

Each committee [other than Budget and Appropriations] shall review and study any conditions or circumstances which may indicate the necessity or desirability of enacting any new or additional legislation within the jurisdiction of that committee. [Whether or not any bill or resolution has been introduced with respect thereto], and shall on a continuing basis undertake futures research and forecasting on matters within the jurisdiction of that committee.

(SCC, 1974e: 389)

In reporting on this section, the Bolling committee stated that foresight activities would use forecasts to anticipate emerging issues and futures research to identify future options and assess the costs, benefits, and effects of various options (SCC, 1974e: 65).

Other of the Bolling committee's recommendations would influence the strategic policy assessment functions, although these recommendations were not aimed directly at systematic assessment of future needs and alternatives. Procedural reforms were recommended such as the joint and sequential referral of bills to different committees, the periodic review of the House committee structure, and, most important, the jurisdictional changes proposed in the committee system.
The implications of these reforms for SPA concerns are examined following examination of the foresight provision's development through the six stages: (1) instigation and publicizing, (2) information gathering, (3) formulation, (4) interest aggregation, (5) mobilization, and (6) modification. Finally, member goals and SPA policy attitudes have been considered in relation to the foresight provision.

STAGE 1: INSTIGATION AND PUBLICIZING

Instigation and publicizing involves the public and private advocacy of an issue as worthy of attention and ameliorative action (Price, 1972: 4). Typical instigators include members of Congress, staff members or bureaucrats, and writers, and these instigators were active in publicizing the types of concerns that led to the foresight provision.

Writers may perform the role of describing, in terms to catch the popular imagination, the probable nature of the future. During the period 1970-1973 various works were published that brought the future into the news: the Club of Rome's *The Limits to Growth* (Meadows, Meadows, Randers & Behrens, 1972), the work of Herman Kahn (Kahn & Bruce-Briggs, 1972), and Alvin Toffler's *Future Shock*. The most direct relevance of these authors to the foresight provision is Alvin Toffler's friendship with Representative John C. Culver (D., Iowa). Culver and Toffler met shortly after *Future Shock* was published and found that they shared similar concerns, and they
have maintained an ongoing discussion of the political implications of Toffler's work and the meaning of "anticipatory democracy."²

Among members of Congress, Representative Culver was the important figure in publicizing SPA concerns in the context of the House committee reforms, as interviews showed. Culver saw the structuring of committees as a major hindrance to congressional ability to confront the future. In December, 1972, he wrote to members of the House, urging the formation of a select committee to look at this question. In a "Dear Colleague" letter he noted that the twenty-five years since the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act "have seen a revolution in the areas of public policy and concern and have added dimensions to congressional responsibility which were not--and in many instances could not--be foreseen in 1946" (Culver, 1972b). Thus, Culver was important in instigating the larger congressional reform efforts as well as its SPA aspects. Once on the Bolling Committee he suggested to his fellow committee members that their work should provide a "systematic basis of policy formulation in the context of an anticipation of future as well as reactive time frame." The committee must be able "to cast the analysis into a context that envisions society as it may emerge by say 1980, 1990" (Culver, 1973b).

Other persons involved in instigating and publicizing for the foresight responsibility were committee staff members and certain congressional bureaucrats. In the congressional bureaucracy the unit most involved with futures analysis groups and
with types of SPA problems before the Bolling committee was the Science Policy Research Division of the Congressional Research Service. The Bolling committee's staff director, Charles Sheldon, had left the staff of the House Science and Astronautics Committee to become the division's director. Walter Hahn, formerly on the staff of President Nixon's short-lived National Goals Research Staff, had joined the science policy division as acting director. Members of the division had been involved in a variety of efforts to examine the information needs of Congress (CRS, 1971; SCC, 1974f) and national goals (Huddle, 1971), and the work of Sheldon and Hahn was important for the specific outcome of the foresight provision.

These staff members and bureaucrats were interested in specific techniques, particularly in regard to policy analysis, to be used in governmental decision making. A source of experts in this regard was the technology assessment movement. Forecasting techniques developed in the space industry were called on by the advocates of technology assessment to question the advance of technology and its unanticipated effects on the environment. Thus, technology assessment represented an attempt to estimate likely second- and third-order consequences of the application of a technology (Coates, 1975). A professional society, the International Society for Technology Assessment, had been founded by Walter Hahn and others in 1972, and several journals, such as Technology Assessment and Futures, supported the advancement of the methodology. On a more popular
level the problems of confronting the future were discussed by members of the World Future Society and in its publication *The Futurist*.

**STAGE 2: INFORMATION GATHERING**

Information gathering was a massive undertaking for the Bolling committee. Committee members and staff interviewed other representatives and committee staff and held hearings, the traditional form of information gathering in committees.

... Each member of the House received a letter of invitation; and great pains were taken to accommodate Members in scheduling testimony. Fifty-two Members (including 12 committee chairmen) appeared before the Committee, and 16 members submitted written statements for the record. Thirty-nine experts participated in a dozen panels on such topics as committee dynamics, the budgetary process, informational resources, staffing and executive and State legislative developments. Sixteen public witnesses—representing labor, business, and citizen groups—also presented their views. The 1,765 pages of record, fully indexed, offer a detailed portrait of the contemporary House of Representatives, as seen by insiders and outsiders alike.

(Davidson, 1974: 11)

In addition, staff and consultant studies of specific topics were commissioned including seven committee plans based on various assumptions.

In the course of all this testimony and study, several problems relevant to strategic policy assessment were raised, and a few
solutions were offered. Our discussion has been organized to show the response of members of Congress to SPA-related problems and the testimony of various panels of experts in regard to SPA issues as well as the committee response to this testimony. The alternative committee plans generated to gather further information are then considered. The most important proposals for our concerns dealt with futures analysis by committees, a central goals or growth committee, and a shift in committee jurisdictions.

MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE COMMENT

Testimony by members of Congress most often focused on the activities of specific committees; however, several members raised SPA-relevant problems. Peter W. Rodino (D., N.J.) pointed out that a major information problem is the "failure to provide the synthesis needed to overcome committee fragmentation" (SCC, 1973a: 151). Dante B. Fascell (D., Fla.) stressed the fact that the committees' main responsibility is to meet new needs. To do so effectively, legislative committees must develop "the resources to anticipate the legislative needs of the future" (SCC, 1973a: 511). Fortney H. Stark (D., Calif.) suggested that Congress use "foresight, not hindsight" in its policy making. Stark's major suggestion was to restructure committee jurisdictions (SCC, 1973c: 334-40). Chet Holfield (D., Calif.) provided a specific, yet provincial, use of forecasts in a presentation on the "national energy dilemma." His purpose was to suggest that the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy, which had prepared the forecasts, take jurisdiction over energy research and development.

Serious and articulate testimony offering specific remedies came from John W. Davis (D., Ga.), then chairman of the Subcommittee on Research and Development of the Space and Astronautics Committee. Davis stressed the need to view Congress as a system: "Congress should seek out and be more responsible to the needs of the Nation. The Congressional 'system' needs more so-called feedback, suggesting more in-house expertise, and more responsive structure" in terms of committee jurisdictions. He noted that a responsive Congress--"any responsive organization--must approach the future as an environmental unknown that needs systematic evaluation" (SCC, 1973a: 200).

On the search for problems he commented that "if the House could develop and institutionalize a method of evaluating possible future developments more systematically and thoroughly than has been the case to date, legislation might perhaps be more preventive than curative" (SCC, 1973a: 199-200). Davis even raised the question of control of the future: "The future will never be completely determinable. But if we become more familiar with the probability, we can perhaps do a better job of shaping it the way we think it should be. Indeed it is incumbent upon us to do so if we do not wish to bestow a deteriorating world on posterity" (SCC, 1973a: 219).

Davis specifically suggested that the emerging issues service (see Chapter 1) of the Congressional Research Service be expanded "to provide more comprehensive information on fundamental trends
and likely decision points in economic, social, environmental, scientific, technological, and other areas of concern" (SCC, 1973a: 200). Davis' testimony generated little reaction from the Bolling committee members present at the time he testified. Culver and Bolling, who were most interested in Davis' topic, were absent.

THE EXPERTS SPEAK

Testimony contributing most directly to the foresight provision came from panel discussions with experts (SCC, 1973b, 1973c). The effectiveness of any particular set of panelists varied widely depending on the witness, the Bolling committee members present, the relationship between the witness and the staff, and the content of testimony. Effective testimony for SPA reforms must suggest how committees may survey emerging conditions and relate this information to a choice of their legislative goals and options. Panels varied widely in regard to effective content.

THE FUTURIST PANEL. Culver had wanted some consideration of "how to cast the analysis into a context that envisions the society as it may emerge by say, 1980 and 1990" (Culver, 1973b). To supply this consideration, futurists were empaneled to testify on congressional reform for the first time as futurists (Cornish & Schmalz, 1973).

Victor Ferkiss, professor of government at Georgetown University and author of Technological Man (1969), noted trends in the United States toward scarcity in an absolute and a relative sense,
particularly in food and energy. Problems the government must confront, he testified, include dealing with scarcity and allocation priorities, the impact of science and technology, environmental problems, and the increasingly close interrelation of domestic and international affairs. Ferkiss recommended that the House become more flexible in its committee jurisdictions, using broader gauged, ad hoc committees, and that it confront the problem of national development policy. "It seems to me we have to get into the area of long-range economic planning, not just fiscal planning or planning in terms of wages and prices, but planning in terms of resource allocation" (SCC, 1973b: 468-42).

Another futurist, Willis Harman, of the Stanford Research Institute, suggested that Congress have more cross-cutting or horizontal committees, perhaps a committee on the nation's future, and the formation of a network type of relationship to allow a "loose but effective coordination of the activities of a large number of autonomous agencies" (public and private). Most needed in the six to eight years to come, Harman noted, "is a positive, inspiring vision of where this Nation, where this society, where the world can go" (SCC, 1973b: 472-79).

Charles Williams, in the Virginia office of the Stanford Research Institute, formerly staff director of the National Goals Research Staff, made similar statements and, in particular, reiterated the notion that "the utmost priority of national leadership . . . is a vision of a workable future." His recommendations
for the committee system were to list emerging problems and to
match the committee structure to these problems; to list the
opportunities inherent in a "high quality future," defined by
the believable vision he called for; and to structure the commit-
etees to optimize the likelihood of bringing that vision into
being (SCC, 1973b: 479-87).

The reaction of committee members and staffers was mixed.
Some were enthusiastic; others, interested but unsatisfied; and
one member and two staffers interviewed expressed dissatisfac-
tion with the futurist panel. John Culver thought the futurist panel
provocative and challenging. They raised, Culver believed, the most
difficult aspect of the Bolling committee's responsibility:

... that is to give consideration struct-
urally here in the Congress as to how we
equip ourselves better to anticipate the
problems that our country and the world are
going to be forced, necessarily, to deal
with.

(SCC, 1973b: 507)

The futurist panel, Culver went on, forced a confrontation be-
tween "rather basic judgments about whether we want to be able
to shape and influence various trends in society." Culver
stressed that "futurism" "should be instilled as a responsibility
within any committee jurisdictional inquiry." Otherwise, with
futurism isolated in one committee, "it reduces itself all too
easily into esoteric irrelevance" (SCC, 1973b: 509).
The lack of prediction of political activity in the futurists' testimony was noted by Paul S. Sarbanes (D., Md.), especially in relation to their social and economic predictions. He tried three times unsuccessfully to get the futurists to "relate these trends to the kinds of pressures or strains that may appear in our political life" (SCC, 1973b: 53).

THE BUDGET PROCESS PANELS. The panels on the budget process raised some issues of forcing the conscious interrelationship of decisions by using the budget to set national priorities. Alice Rivlin, of the Brookings Institution, suggested that forcing could occur in terms of three-year budgets; that this year's votes on the third year to come would focus the attention of Congress, the executive, and the public on "the big decisions that must be made now if the budget priorities are to be altered two or three years in the future" (SCC, 1973b: 151). During these panels scattered mention was made of other SPA functions, but these were not pursued. For example: Bolling had been influenced while on the Joint Economic Committee by his chairmanship of a subcommittee concerned with macro-economic analysis and by his part in the joint committee's activity on "the restoration of sovereignty to solve social problems," which had proposed a national planning system (JEC, 1971), and so he raised the question of the need for national planning:

It seems to me . . . that . . . we are going to have to insist on the development of national planning for policy. . . . The
great gap in governmental institutions is that we simply don't ever take the trouble to look ahead and see what kind of trouble we are going to be in on energy or education until after we have had the crisis. I am not trying to cut off discussion [of budget, tax expenditures, and the appropriations process], but we are really talking in a vacuum. We are trying to deal with a piece of the problem.

(SCC, 1973b: 179-80)

No one on the budget panel responded to his inquiry, and the discussion returned to the subject of tax expenditures (SCC, 1973b: 179-80).

THE COMMITTEE INFORMATION SOURCES PANEL. While the futurists interpreted general trends in society, the panel on committee information sources told the Bolling committee how committees might alter their decision-making activities to better search for emerging problems and to be cognizant of trends in policy areas.

Bertram Gross, a formulator of the Employment Act of 1946 and early advocate of developing social indicators, suggested that committees and subcommittees of the House be given a mandate to keep ahead of the docket:

The kinds of studies that would look at these [basic trends and emerging problems] in terms of the new kinds of legislation needed, the adjustments in the existing status, this kind of review would go beyond the mere post audit operation in the monitoring and surveillance functions discharged by various committees. It would go beyond
that by trying to help to keep the various members of Congress ahead of the game.
A little advance intelligence which goes beyond looking at the past and the bills ahead of you, that kind of intelligence is perfectly feasible in properly staffed subcommittees and committees.

(SCC, 1973b: 335)

Through futures analyses or scenario generation or goal projections, Gross suggested that committees would build a framework for looking at measures that would or should come before them (SCC, 1973b: 335).

In testimony close to the terms actually used in the foresight provision, "futures research and forecasting," Walter Hahn, senior specialist in science and technology and acting director of the science policy division of CRS, agreed with other panelists that Congress had too little information on the larger or more comprehensive context of current decisions. Hahn offered several suggestions, among them the greater use of forecasts, technology forecasts in particular, and consideration of a larger range of options, or future alternatives, through futures research. "Whereas technology forecasting addresses the question of where are we likely to go and emphasizes the technological element," Hahn noted, "futures research talks more about where we can go and it deals more with social aspects of the situation and the larger concept in which we are seeing the events that are going on" (SCC, 1973b: 338). Hahn had noted that nowhere in Congress were technological
forecasts synthesized and assessed for potential legislative impact. 3

The panel on information sources produced some interesting statements on Congress and its information needs, prompting Representative William A. Steiger (R., Wis.) to remark that the information systems of Congress might be less at fault than incurious members:

Perhaps what bothers me about this panel is that it doesn't answer the significant question of whether or not Congress doesn't already have all the resources available to it dependent on one fact, the initiative of the Member to search out and find people, groups, individuals, who can help guide and direct him or her in doing this work.

(SCC, 1973b: 352)

Speaking of the generalist role of members of Congress, Bertram Gross cautioned against reforms that would convert Congress into a bureaucracy and destroy the generalist function, but "the real answer to your question," Gross replied, "has to go into the more difficult area of values and interest." Once a congressman's values and interests are known, the question becomes how he may "escape being flooded by information and misinformation and outright deception and unintended deception on all sorts of very critical issues" (SCC, 1973b: 354). Walter Hahn answered comment by saying that Congress would profit from better synthesis and packaging of the information available to it, so that this information would be "more easily grasped and more purposefully used"
Edward Schneier, political scientist and former Senate staffer, answered in terms of the impact of information systems on congressional use of time. The larger the number of critical and well-known issues, the less time Congress has for "creative intelligence." He advised that Congress should keep its information sources pluralistic and diverse, not defining how to spend time because of an over-defined system of information resources (SCC, 1973b: 354-55).

THE STATE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE PANEL. The panel on state legislative committees made useful suggestions for the foresight provision. The panelists agreed that three functions deserved special attention: budgeting, oversight, and foresight or policy planning, but they disagreed whether to make these functions mandatory in each committee or in separate committees set up for the purpose.

Larry Margolis, of the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, suggested a task force on policy planning within substantive committees as well as task forces on fiscal and oversight matters and governmental structure. The task forces were to result in a "platoon system where a team of Members and a staff is working on long-range policy studies while the same Members differently staffed and organized, are working on the immediate concerns of legislation in the session." A separate task force was needed, Margolis said, because "it simply does not contribute to the effectiveness of long-range policy deliberations to conduct them in the same atmosphere as specific legislation is made" (SCC, 1973b: 376).
Alan Rosenthal, a political scientist at Rutgers associated with the Eagleton Institute of Politics, would have a separate functional committee for policy planning. The fact that standing committees have not done policy planning may mean that they won't: "... there is no way to jazz up the present structure. ... Let the committees do what they want to do and create other committees to do what should be done" (SCC, 1973b: 382). Oversight should have a separate committee because oversight "gets lost in the hurly-burly of manufacturing bills and raising batting averages" and because "you can't really expect congressmen who devised a program and enacted it to look at that and say, 'it is lousy'" (SCC, 1973b: 383).

Representative Culver responded in a manner indicative of things to come, on the idea of futures committees or anticipatory planning. Every committee should be "anticipating impact and alternative policy choices. We should try to develop that type of rigor as part and parcel of the operation of each of these committees," Culver noted (SCC, 1973b: 384).

THE EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION PANEL. The panel on executive organization brought lively and thoughtful discussion of strategic policy assessment issues but often left questions of SPA in Congress unanswered. For instance, Representative Sarbanes asked whether Congress should have an institution such as the Office of Management and Budget to develop policy, anticipate policy judgments, and coordinate policy, but the subject was quickly changed
Likewise, in response to testimony favoring a national goals and policies committee for each house, Culver asked how we may "require this type of systematic attention to future requirements and needs in all of the various areas of public policy under [the committee's] consideration" (SCC, 1973b: 450). Robert Seamans, president of the National Academy of Engineering, replied that research and development should be considered planning for the future, but he was not able to be more specific about what committees should do (SCC, 1973b: 450).

In the fall, hearings were again held, this time for representatives of citizen interest groups and members of the House who had not testified in the spring. The major exchange relevant to the Bolling committee's work on strategic policy assessment took place between John Culver and John Gardner, speaking as chairman of Common Cause. Culver pressed Gardner to describe the "futurist components" in committee policy making. Gardner replied that sophisticated forecasting was essential for national policy making. He suggested that each committee, rather than generate its own forecasts, should have someone to keep in touch with forecasting in the executive branch, the private sector, and the universities. Gardner concurred with Culver on the decentralized approach for this "futurist" function.

Thus ended the hearing phase of the Bolling committee's work. Some information relevant to strategic policy assessment had been gathered, but at the wrong time, as with Representative John
Davis. The futurists presented much information on conditions, but little on specific congressional strategies. The panels on information systems and state legislative committees provided information that was later to be used in drafting the foresight provision and, at the time, sparked discussion. The panels on budget and executive organization raised the decision-forcing questions relevant to a central committee. Despite some interest in the centralized approach, Representative Culver was searching for means to decentralize policy planning into the committees. Most experts could not respond, although the testimony of Bertram Gross, Walter Hahn, Alan Rosenthal, Larry Margolis, and John Gardner supplied some specific ideas.

COMMITTEE SYSTEM PLANS

Besides topic-oriented hearings, a way to gather information on the committee system is to design such a system. Seven committee plans were prepared in order to examine various assumptions or theoretical approaches. Whereas the panel discussions dealt with all three SPA functions, the committee system plans dealt mainly with the third function: forcing the conscious interrelationship of decisions. The alternative committee systems were designed either by Bolling committee members or staffers or outside consultants--prior to the Sarbanes-Steiger draft prepared for the committee mark-up sessions.
THE BOLLING-SHELDON PLAN. The first plan was introduced "for the record" by Richard Bolling on June 26, 1973, during the futurist testimony, the last summer panel. SPA activities figured prominently in this document. A House central policy committee, basically a leadership committee, would set overall revenue and budget goals to "deal with broad issues of policy extending beyond any simple grouping of committees." In addition, the plan provided for a budget committee and a national policy planning committee. The latter would have a major role in supporting the work of the House Central Policy Committee by identifying national goals emerging from the work of their committees, and other sources by providing early warning on emerging issues and trends, by providing oversight and program analysis. In addition it would be responsible for most matters involving advanced technology and futures work. Hence its concern with technology assessment, its support of basic science, its responsibility for the space program.

(SCC, 1973b: 495; emphasis added)

The first plan would create four primarily substantive and four primarily functional committees presided over by the House central policy committee:

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<th>Primarily Substantive</th>
<th>Primarily Functional</th>
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<tr>
<td>Economics committee</td>
<td>Budget committee</td>
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<td>Human resources committee</td>
<td>National policy planning committee</td>
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<td>National resources and environmental committee</td>
<td>Intergovernmental affairs committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>International affairs and defense committee</td>
<td>Legislative branch policy and management committee</td>
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This first plan grew out of informal discussions between chairman Richard Bolling and chief of staff Charles Sheldon, who wrote the plan (SCC, 1973b: 413), and it reflects Sheldon's science policy background: a rationalistic, problem-solving approach.

THE AUGUST STUDY: THE STAFF GAME. The staff simulated the work of the actual committee by debating and formulating their own policies and plans. In the major staff plan, SPA concerns were shown in the formation of a budget committee, but a proposed long-range study committee was voted down 4 to 4 with two abstentions. In terms of activity within committees the staff recommended that each subcommittee have an oversight subcommittee, a budget subcommittee, and no more than three subcommittees (SCC, 1973c: 419). No foresight activities were mentioned for the committees.

Within the staff was a rough division between the lawyers or "political types," Linda Kamm and Robert Ketchum; the political scientists, Roger Davidson and Terry Finn; and the science policy or "hard science types," Spencer Beresford and Charles Sheldon. While all had various kinds of operational experience with legislatures, they came with diverse backgrounds and orientations. Beresford, joined by Gerald Grady and Charles Sheldon, was pushing national goals or growth policy activities by a central committee with more enthusiasm than was shown for foresight by each committee. The political types saw little value in futures research and forecasting activities in either approach. As one
staff member put it, this view resulted from the problem of linking general goals to the specifics of implementation. "This problem," the staffer noted, "exists within planning groups. . . . Planning that is done by nonoperational types often is looked on as pious hopes and thoughts not related to needs or day-to-day activities." 5

In making additional comments on the staff report, Spencer Beresford and Gerald Grady urged that the long-range study committee be reconsidered:

The proposed committee would provide a mechanism for coordinating the work of the standing committees so as to develop coherent and comprehensive House positions and policies. It would not have legislative authority. Its responsibilities would include future legislative problems and options, long-range planning, and evaluation of major federal activities in terms of their long-range effectiveness and cost.

(SCC, 1973c: 438)

Beresford noted that this type of activity was performed in various places within Congress but was narrowly focused and occurred principally in response to requests and inquiries rather than to meet recognized needs. Gerald Grady, who was familiar with the SPA proposal of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (WWICS) agreed with Beresford and used a description similar to that provided by WWICS: the governmental units should analyze, more thoroughly and systematically, long-term trends
and problems, to identify the key issues, to formulate and evaluate policy choices and courses of action, and to evaluate the effects of actions that have been taken" (SCC, 1973c: 442).

While there was disagreement over the role and utility of futures analysis and a central committee, the staff showed more agreement on the need to force decisions, and this agreement was reflected in three other plans, based on assumptions of a small number of committees, a large number of committees, and minimal change.

THE PLAN FOR A SMALL NUMBER OF COMMITTEES. While the plan drawn by the political scientists Davidson and Finn for a small number of committees did not mention foresight for either subcommittee or committee, it did attempt to force the conscious interrelationship of decisions by establishing a small number of multi-interest committees and strengthening the Office of the Speaker as a coordinating mechanism. Davidson and Finn, as one staffer put it, were "intrigued with the possibilities to achieve politically what Beresford and, to some extent, Grady proposed doing with a special body. In that sense [Davidson & Finn] fell between the politicos, Kamm and Ketchum, and the science types, Beresford and Sheldon."

THE PLAN FOR A LARGE NUMBER OF COMMITTEES. The plan based on a large number of committees contained thirty-six committees and six select committees. In addition to the budget committee, it would establish a national goals and growth policies committee.
This new committee, which would not have legislative authority, would be responsible for long-range studies and plans of alternative national goals, and growth policies. It would analyze long-term trends, problems, and evaluate the major Federal activities in terms of their long-range effectiveness, cost, and impact on national growth.

(SCC, 1973c: 469)

THE MINIMAL CHANGE PLAN. The plan assuming minimal change from the existing situation made no committee or subcommittee changes relevant to SPA although it did suggest that growth policy could be added by leadership, joint, or select committee or by an independent office similar to the Office of Technology Assessment. In a paper appended to this plan, Spencer Beresford described this option in some detail. Noting that the present congressional approach to national problems was typically short-sighted and fragmented, that Congress as an institution seemed reluctant to make, often even to recognize, hard choices, Beresford described what is needed:

... an arrangement for the systematic, long-range, integrated study of our principal future national problems. Such studies could identify and analyze these problems, on a time scale of five to fifteen years or longer, formulate alternative courses of action for dealing with them, and consider the probable effects of such alternatives and of any relevant programs and other actions that are already underway.

(SCC, 1973c: 483)
THE DICK PLAN. The next committee plan was suggested by Bess E. Dick, former staff director of the Judiciary Committee:

... watching the House of Representatives in action, one would almost conclude that Mother Chaos was married to Father Time. The House of Representatives looks at what is before it and behind it. It does not look ahead; it responds to crises but does not foresee them. It lacks the strength of simplicity and it lacks direction.

(SCC, 1973c: 487)

Dick called for more active partisan leadership that would be accomplished by a congressional policy committee manned "entirely by the majority party." It would set congressional priorities and draw a direct line from the leadership to the committees.

THE HUDDLE PLAN. The last plan in the information-gathering efforts of the Bolling committee was, according to a staff member, the most theoretical, the most futurist, and the least attended to. Walter Huddle, senior specialist in the science policy division of the Congressional Research Service, tried to develop theoretically a system that would organize committees around function rather than substantive categories. In introducing the plan, Lester Jayson, director of the Congressional Research Service, noted that the distinction between functional and substantive organization is that functional requirements do not seem to change as rapidly or radically as substantive requirements. A leadership committee was also suggested by the plan, presumably to force coordination among decisions.
The Huddle plan, Jayson noted, was based on the assumption that "the substantive problems facing the Congress would be subject to radical and increasing rates of change; given this assumption it was then proposed that a target concept of organization (perhaps toward the year 2000) might help to provide some insights as to the general and incremental changes in a coherent way (SCC, 1973c: 558). In discussing the need for this approach Huddle raised the problem of constituent attitude:

Whatever the mechanism that determines how long-term the future outlook of the Congress, the point can be offered that there is a tendency for the public at large to be concerned with short-range problems, needs, and goals.

The problem facing the House, then, is to strike a proper balance in legislative actions between short-range and long-range effects. To do this requires, in turn, the identification of both short- and long-range concerns, even though the public attends mainly to the former.

(SCC, 1973c: 562)

Huddle spoke of the goal of continuous planning for the House and its organizational requirements:

The function of anticipating the future and providing for it cannot be safely neglected in a modern and rapidly changing world. Two elements are indispensable for this purpose: (1) an institution charged with looking ahead, defining future problems, estimating their probability, and exploring the ways of coping with them; and (2) an organization that is flexible and adaptable enough to take up these future problems legislatively before they turn into catastrophic certainties.

(SCC, 1973c: 571)
Huddle's first element entails the SPA function of searching for emerging problems. His second element implicitly includes informing current decisions and forcing their conscious interrelationship.

What pictures emerge from these seven committee plans regarding the treatment of strategic policy assessment in this aspect of the Bolling committee's information gathering? Those plans formulated in whole (Huddle) or in large part (Sheldon) by CRS science policy personnel included explicit mention of the SPA functions. However, in both cases there was a detached quality about the analysis. Sheldon's plan would place the national goals function in a central committee that did not have the power to act on those goals. Huddle's "systems analysis" approach to the House tended to ignore the legitimate clash of values and the need to structure this conflict; rather it would simply solve problems. The plan for a small number of committees tried to force decisions by aggregating jurisdictions, and the plan for a large number included a budget committee and a national goals and growth policy committee. Spencer Beresford's suggestions for the SPA functions were appended to the other two staff plans. The plan by Bess Dick was concerned with SPA only from the perspective of stronger party leadership.

How much and what parts of the information gathered by the Bolling committee through hearings, panel discussions, and committee plans were actually used? On what basis were the options chosen? The answers to these questions were found in the formulation stage of House Resolution 988.
STAGE 3: FORMULATION

In the formulation stage, specific legislative remedies are devised and advocated. In the process, boundaries are drawn around an issue, and a focal point is established. Formulation of House Resolution 988 was concentrated into the last two months of 1973 and the early months of 1974:

The transition from an advanced seminar in the legislative process to a working group willing to make hard political choices was a critical one, and was accomplished during the fall of 1973 through a series of three steps. First, an intensive working session was held one weekend at the Chairman's home. Second, Paul Sarbanes (D-Md) and William Steiger (R-Wis) were delegated to work with the staff on a draft report to serve as a basis for discussion. The full Committee then refined this draft in a series of informal sessions, releasing the preliminary proposal just before legislators scattered for the Christmas recess. (Davidson, 1974: 11)

In February and March, open mark-up sessions (SCC, 1974b) were held to work on adjustments to the Steiger-Sarbanes draft (SCC, 1974a).

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE QUESTION

The formulation of the foresight provision can be seen in two stages: (1) the decision against any central planning, goals, or futures committee and (2) the decision to add foresight to each committee's oversight responsibility by requiring futures research and forecasting.
Representative Culver was interested in the central approach early in the work of the Bolling committee; yet the problem of leadership was often raised. As a staff member put it, "You can't put a steel rod in a plate of spaghetti." Therefore Culver raised questions, as we have said, regarding the decentralization of foresight. The central committee issue remained alive, however, until the weekend meeting at Bolling's home, when it was rejected in a close vote.

Another reason the central committee question was rejected stemmed from the simultaneous consideration of budget reform elsewhere in Congress. The possibility of the formation of budget committees and a budget office displaced much of the Bolling committee's concern for a central committee, although Culver and, to a lesser extent, Bolling and Lloyd Meeds (D., Wash.) were still interested in a central committee, which was intensely interesting to Spencer Beresford and other staff members.

An outcome of their interest, despite the decision against such a committee, was Appendix L of the final report, entitled "National Goals Function." This brief statement written by Spencer Beresford suggested that when budget committees were established, they should work in the context of national goals and priorities and long-range cost projections. "National goals can provide a framework for priorities and budget allocations, as well as for program selection, emphasis and timing" (SCC, 1974e: 353). In Chapters 4 and 5 we have considered the question
of the national goals approach in the 1974 budget reform, for the Senate was much more concerned to use the budget to set national goals and priorities than the House.

THE FORESIGHT PROVISION: THE DECENTRALIZED APPROACH

Two major components of the decision to decentralize futures concern were (1) making it part of the oversight responsibility of committees and (2) describing specifically what was required, namely futures research and forecasting.

THE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES. The foresight provision, as a staffer put it, was "not a hot issue." Culver remained intensely interested in some type of SPA or futurist reform, as was evident during the hearings. On the staff Beresford and Sheldon continued to be concerned about it. Among other committee members and staff, these were not major issues; generally, the realization was that the irrational structure of committee jurisdictions posed a major problem. Restructuring committee jurisdictions would force a more coherent consideration of interrelated decisions; this problem occupied the largest amount of committee member and staff time (Davidson & Oleszek, 1975: 16). This jurisdictional issue would prove most influential for the course and ultimate product of the Bolling committee.

Another background factor was the generally strong interest in oversight among committee members. Much discussion throughout the course of hearings and panels had centered on how to make committees more effective in overseeing programs and policies.
Among several approaches to oversight, most members agreed with Larry Margolis that each committee should be given an explicit oversight responsibility. They were opposed to leaving oversight as solely the responsibility of the Committee on Government Operations. This activity should be taken more seriously by the authorizing committees, they agreed, but a dispute occurred over the establishment of separate oversight subcommittees. Some, particularly William Steiger, felt that some committee members should not be isolated in an oversight subcommittee to watchdog the products of other committee members. However, the majority of the Bolling committee favored separate oversight subcommittees.

A problem with the foresight provision was that it called for analysis not directly related to the day-to-day committee activity of considering specific bills. Oversight suffered from a similar problem. The immediate incentives in Congress are for processing bills—"raising one's batting average," to paraphrase Rosenthal (SCC, 1973b: 383). Although oversight and foresight may be viewed as separate operations, given the political support for oversight, it made sense to attach foresight to it. Culver and David Martin were the leading advocates of greater oversight (Davidson & Oleszek, 1975: 26), and Culver persuaded Martin that foresight should be part of the separate oversight subcommittee's responsibilities.

FUTURES RESEARCH AND FORECASTING. The foresight provision could be heard in amorphous form in John Culver's comments and questions throughout the hearings and panel discussions. The
committees, Culver thought, should be "anticipating impact and alternative policy choices" and doing "anticipatory planning." Culver's concerns took specific form under the hand of Spencer Beresford, with the aid of Charles Sheldon and Walter Hahn. The language of the Steiger-Sarbanes draft and House Resolution 988 added to committee duties a review of "the application, administration, execution and effectiveness of the laws within the committee's jurisdiction," and an obligation to "review and study any conditions or circumstances which may indicate the necessity or desirability of enacting new or additional legislation within the jurisdiction of that committee" (SCC, 1974e: 388-89). Thus committees or subcommittees would gain the responsibility to search for emerging issues. The second part of that lengthy sentence (see Appendix 1) required that each committee "shall on a continuing basis undertake futures research and forecasting on matters within the jurisdiction of that committee" (SCC, 1974e: 389). Futures research and forecasting were chosen as the "terms of art," meaningful to experts in that field and thus giving a more explicit statement of what was expected of committees.

During the February and March mark-up sessions there was extensive discussion on how oversight would be conducted, funded, and structured into the committee system. The foresight section was seldom mentioned. As one member said, "They had overkill on oversight and neglected foresight." On Thursday, February 28, the committee voted to have committees establish oversight subcommittees. After the vote had been taken, Culver stated:
At that point in the record, could it also be clear that we are, of course, incorporating the future [sic] research and forecasting responsibility as part of that? I gather that is included in the language. Chairman Bolling: It is here. (SCC, 1974b: 337)

In the report accompanying House Resolution 988, Beresford prepared a description of the foresight provision to clarify its meaning. He called it a "foresight responsibility" and stated that it should aid the House in becoming "more responsible to national needs, anticipating problems before they become crises. The proposed 'foresight' function should provide a better basis for substantive legislation as well as oversight. It should also assist in setting national priorities and making budget allocations" (SCC, 1974e: 65).

The recommendation of the select committee also includes a "foresight" responsibility for each standing committee, which will probably be assigned to the oversight subcommittees. That is, these legislative units would have the additional responsibility of identifying and assessing conditions and trends that might require future legislative action. More specifically, this would provide a locus for the systematic, long-range, and integrated study of our principal future national problems. Such studies would include forecasting so that, to some degree, relevant circumstances could be foreseen and the relevant decisions anticipated. They would also make probabilistic estimates that certain events would occur by certain times or within specific time periods. In addition, by means of futures research, future options and times could be identified; and the costs, benefits, and effects of the various options, including present programs, could be assessed and compared.

(SCC, 1974e: 65)
Thus the term *foresight* appeared in the report, but not in the language of the resolution. While a mechanism was established to coordinate committee oversight, no such device was created for foresight activities. Each committee is required to submit an oversight report on its plans for that Congress by April 15. No counterpart foresight report was established. The foresight language was made the second half of the oversight paragraph, Rule X, Sec. 2b(1). This section requires all standing committees (other than the Committee on Appropriations) to do oversight and foresight. Appropriations was excluded "because that Committee's subcommittees already function to review and examine agency requests for funds" (SCC, 1974e: 63), one of the most effective forms of oversight.

**COMMITTEE JURISDICTIONS.** Because of the importance of the committee's decision on the jurisdictional question for the later treatment of its report and its approach to forcing the conscious interrelationship of decision, the jurisdictional decision is here briefly stated. According to a staffer, the committee reasoned that

... every topic is interrelated, and these relationships--not to mention priorities--are constantly changing. Thus, we can't rationalize a distribution of workload that will be valid for all time. Thus, we will (a) focus on a manageable number of currently "hot" issues and try to rationalize the structure around them, letting other things fall into place as
best we can; and (b) we will build in some basic flexibility, so that future Congresses (mainly the Speakers and their advisers) won't have to go through this kind of trauma in shifting the structure to meet new congeries of problems.

The major problem areas which this reorganization tried to confront were energy, the environment, transportation, health, and international economic affairs. Focusing on these pressing problems led the committee to suggest the following changes in jurisdictions:

Energy and environmental concerns would be consolidated in a committee built from the existing Interior Committee, with research and development brought together in the Science and Technology Committee. Transportation would be the vortex of an expanded Public Works Committee, with key segments transferred from Commerce (surface transportation and aviation) and Banking and Currency (mass transit). The Commerce Committee would gain a stronger grasp on health problems with new responsibilities including the non-tax aspects of medicare (from Ways and Means). International economic affairs would be primarily the province of the Foreign Affairs Committee, which would gain jurisdiction from Banking (export controls and trade) and Ways and Means (tariffs). In most areas, the Select Committee contented itself with correcting the most glaring anachronisms which had crept into jurisdictional alignments.

(Davidson & Oleszek, 1975: 18-19)

The Bolling committee recommended fifteen committees whose jurisdictions were relatively broad and equal to those of other
committees in the group. Each representative could serve on only one of these "exclusive committees." In addition, seven functional or less important committees were recommended:

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<tr>
<th>Exclusive Committees</th>
<th>Nonexclusive Committees</th>
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<tr>
<td>Agriculture and Forestry</td>
<td>Budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>Appropriations</td>
<td>House Administration</td>
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<td>Armed Services</td>
<td>Standards of Official Conduct</td>
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<tr>
<td>Banking, Currency, and Housing</td>
<td>Merchant Marine and Fisheries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commerce and Health</td>
<td>Small Business</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>District of Columbia</td>
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<td>Energy and Environment</td>
<td>Veterans Affairs</td>
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<td>Science and Technology</td>
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<td>Ways and Means</td>
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The notion of coherence in five pressing problem areas was "designed to foster greater consistency in public policy by forcing trade-offs among contending interests to be made directly as a result of committee deliberation and bargaining" (Davidson & Oleszek, 1975: 19). The remainder of the House was not as concerned about this notion of policy coherence.

INTEREST AGGREGATION

The nature of interest aggregation on congressional reform issues is distinctive from other types of conflict, of which more will be said later. Suffice it here to say that the primary
constituencies for these bills were not public and private interest groups outside Congress, although these groups were involved, but rather committees, members, and groups within Congress.

On the foresight provision little interest aggregation was necessary. John Culver had David Martin agree to include the foresight language in the oversight section. Martin was the leading advocate of a separate oversight committee, and Culver's support for the separate subcommittee in exchange for Martin's inclusion of the foresight language aggregated the most important interests at this point, Culver's and Martin's. Other Bolling committee members either supported Culver or were indifferent. One member expressed his support and explained his lack of direct involvement by saying:

The foresight provision came about because Culver wanted it intensely. Martin wanted the oversight subcommittees and didn't mind putting it [foresight provision] with his proposal [for an oversight subcommittee] for the support. I was for it but knew that it did not need any more work. Other committee members did not really oppose it, because of Culver's intensity, brilliance, eloquence, and bullheaded stubbornness.

The other interest that effectively aggregated itself was the Congressional Research Service, or more specifically, the science policy division. To the extent that the foresight provision dealt with their area of technical expertise, they were very concerned that something be included. As we have noted, the
language ultimately used was formulated by Beresford in conjunction with Sheldon and Hahn, and it is very similar to language in Hahn's testimony. As another staff member put it:

... there was an undercurrent of pushing for foresight by the big science types, Beresford and Sheldon. Sheldon recognized the potential benefit it would have for the science part of CRS. Culver and the other members weren't aware or did not care about this.

MOBILIZATION

The entire Bolling package mobilized much opposition and some support. The patterns of mobilization are interesting because of what they show about congressional reform issues. Opponents were (1) members of Congress who would lose power or who feared the possibility of losing it if the jurisdictional changes were made, (2) staff members who feared job losses, and (3) interest groups who feared loss of established and known lines of contact. Davidson noted the essential difference between mobilization on this bill and on other types of issues.

Individual legislators and staff aides lost little time in communicating their concerns to those organizations and groups outside Congress with which they deal. Here it was a case of lobbyists being lobbied by Capitol Hill personnel.

(Davidson, 1974: 17; emphasis added)
This opposition was manifested in the Democratic caucus, a majority of whose members in the 93rd Congress were committee and subcommittee chairmen (Davidson, 1974: 16). On May 19th the caucus decided by a narrow margin to refer the Bolling committee bill to its Committee on Organization Study and Review, generally called the Hansen committee after its chairman, Julia Butler Hansen (D., Wash.). Members of the Hansen committee included Philip Burton (D., Calif.), a member of the Committees on Education and Labor and on Interior and Insular Affairs; James G. O'Hara (D., Mich.), a friend of labor and chairman of the Education Subcommittee; and Frank Thompson (D., N.J.), chairman of the Labor Subcommittee. A major point of opposition to H. Res. 988 was the separation of the Education and Labor Committee into two different committees. Another was the elimination of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. Thus, the Hansen committee was likely from the beginning to look critically at the jurisdictional changes in the Bolling report.

MODIFICATION

The major modification to H. Res. 988 was the amendment offered as a substitute and produced by the Hansen committee: H. Res. 1248. H. Res. 988 and the accompanying report had been produced by a ten-person committee with a sixteen-person staff, an expenditure of more than $1 million, and more than a year of work. The Hansen report was based on the work of an eleven-person
committee with two part-time staff members: Joe Carter, of Representative Hansen's office, and Bill Cable, of the staff of the Education and Labor Committee. Since they could not duplicate the effort of the Bolling committee, the Hansen committee and these staffers concentrated on the sections to which there was some objection. As a result, most of their attention was given to jurisdictional disputes. In the procedural area some changes were made; enough, in fact, to earn Representative Bolling's favorable comments (CR, 1974, E6364).

Yet the foresight provision was basically untouched. A single change made the formation of a specific oversight subcommittee optional rather than mandatory. All committees with more than fifteen members (later all committees with more than twenty members) had to have at least four subcommittees, although subcommittee functions and jurisdictions were not specified. No one on the Hansen committee gave the foresight provision much attention; it was simply assumed as part of oversight. Exclusion of the Appropriations Committee reinforced the treatment of foresight as simply part of oversight. While the mandate to oversee and foresee was retained, the requirement for an oversight subcommittee was dropped.

The other major modification to H. Res. 988 and to the foresight provision was the exclusion of the Budget Committee from coverage under the oversight (and foresight) provision, Rule X, Sec. 2b(1). The budget committees were not established at the
time of the formulation of H. Res. 988 but had been by the time it was considered on the floor. On the floor, Representative Neal Smith (D., Iowa) offered several technical amendments dealing with the Budget Committee. These amendments handled the oversight question in the same fashion as the Appropriations Committee (CR, 1974: H10106-07). Thus the House oversight/foresight rule applies to "each standing committee (other than the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on the Budget)."

Modification of the jurisdictional provisions was more severe.

Education and Labor was kept intact, Post Office and Civil Service was retained, and Merchant Marine and Fisheries strengthened rather than emasculated--a package designed to appease key labor unions. Ways and Means lost very little of its vast authority. . . . Committees which the Bolling plan sought to strengthen--mainly Foreign Affairs, Public Works, Science and Astronautics, and Government Operations--gained certain new duties but fewer than under the earlier scheme.

(Davidson & Oleszek, 1975: 21)

MEMBERS GOALS AND POLICY ATTITUDES

What was the relevance to the foresight provision of the goals and policy attitudes of the members of the Bolling committee? Interviews with members showed that questions about goals were meaningful only when the member had exceeded a certain threshold level of activity. Thus, members below this threshold could not
answer questions on how the foresight provision related to their goals. However, these members could express some of the policy attitudes which, it was suggested in Chapter 2, may underlie the good policy goal relative to strategic policy assessment. Therefore, in this section the goals of Representative Culver, the only member who crossed the activity threshold, are examined as well as some attitudes expressed by other members of the committee.

THE GOALS OF JOHN C. CULVER

There was unanimous agreement among members of the Bolling committee interviewed that John Culver was the person responsible for the foresight provision. What were Culver's goals in relation to his advocacy of the provision? The pursuit of good policy, or more appropriately the pursuit of better policy-making structures and procedures, was clearly Culver's major goal in establishing the foresight provision. Culver's attitudes included a dissatisfaction with "antiquated" congressional methods of searching for problems; confidence that, given better methods of raising issues, the government could anticipate problems more effectively; and the belief that the government should be ready to exert positive influence or direction where it is useful to achieve national goals or objectives.

It should be recalled that much of Culver's time in 1974 was spent pursuing a career beyond the House, namely, the Iowa Senate seat of retiring Harold Hughes. Thus Culver's work on the Bolling
committee occurred in the context of other activities and other goals. In 1972, when Culver considered running for the Senate, his speeches mentioned congressional committee reform as well as state-level, citizen-oriented SPA activities. In a speech entitled "As We Move into the Future, Which Way Do We Go?" (1972a), Culver proposed that a conference be sponsored by the Governor of Iowa on the future of the state. Later in 1972 Culver decided against the Senate race; yet the state conference idea did not move that year because of its connection with his incipient candidacy. However, Culver kept up the pressure, this time to no apparent electoral advantage, and in 1973 Republican Governor Robert Ray did sponsor an Iowa 2000 project (Ray, 1974). In 1974 Culver ran for the Senate and won. In this race Culver did not use the need for better mechanisms for confronting the future as a campaign issue, although his opponent did; an "echo effect" according to a Culver staff member. Thus it appears that Culver would use SPA concerns to his electoral advantage when possible, but infrequently, and this goal was not significant in determining whether or not Culver pursued SPA issues.

OTHER MEMBERS' ATTITUDES

The policy attitudes of the other committee members were generally favorable toward strategic policy assessment. Virtually all expressed dissatisfaction with the ways in which Congress normally searches for problems. "Congress doesn't search much
until problems become acute," one member stated. Because of this failure, another member, paraphrasing Emerson, noted that "events are in the saddle and riding mankind." Among the dissatisfied, most mentioned that some committees were better than others in searching out emerging issues. The one member who was not unhappy with congressional search for problems believed that while Congress could do more, congressional activity fit in with its role as a representative legislature.

The ability of the government to anticipate and deal with problems before the crisis stage was questioned by many members. Their comments raised some fundamental problems for the anticipatory role of legislatures. More information of a type that specifies emerging problems "may be enough for a first step, but it depends on what the members and committees want," one member pointed out. Another stated that "change in the sense of using future-oriented information to prevent crisis will only come when present institutions are changed. Crises are often necessary to get something done." A third member suggested that Congress is ill equipped to anticipate problems because of the lack of political and personal discipline on the part of the people and their representatives. Another justified congressional inability to anticipate by pointing out that "part of our representative system is that the representatives have a limited view." Thus, Culver's optimism for the anticipatory capacity of Congress was not widespread among his colleagues on the Bolling committee.
Members' attitudes about the ability to predict social and economic activity varied inversely with their familiarity with macro-economic analysis. Two members familiar with aggregate economic questions said they were not familiar with the current state of the art of forecasting. Others were less hesitant, and two mentioned education forecasts as having been useful in their committee work. Another member familiar with economic analysis pointed out that predictive ability was not the only concern: "Given a great amount of information and good intuition, you can predict a little, but more importantly, you can provide alternative predictions." A generally conservative member linked attempts at prediction to planning and stated that "any prediction is an uncertain business, but this is no reason not to attempt to predict. Planning is part of rational behavior." Another raised the problem that at times the government cannot make accurate predictions and at other times cannot learn from them: " Officials have their jobs and positions by virtue of their relationship to the status quo or the nature of the status quo. Predictions which might adversely affect this are not welcome."

When members were asked to reveal their attitudes toward the extent to which the government should direct or control the future, the most partisan division was raised. Two of the four Democrats interviewed said that the purpose of government was to provide direction. A third agreed but noted that control in terms of planning should not be seen as taking a straitjacket
approach; rather planning should be seen as a continual adjustment of goals in relation to assessments of current and future conditions. A fourth went on to specify that "if the future is to be controlled or directed, there must be political leadership, [and] the people's faith must be restored in the process." The Republicans were less accepting. "I don't like the word control," said one. Another could not "give any answer. . . . [It] depends on the individual circumstances. We may be able to control the future in the area of energy self-sufficiency, [but] not many areas are like that." The third Republican was "not sure that the authority should be wielded by the federal government. The federal government is better as a catalyst. . . . The alternative [to control by business] of government management is worse than any present problems."

What effect did these policy attitudes have on the member's activity regarding the foresight provision? The interviews suggested that other members were generally less optimistic than Culver about the government's anticipatory capacity, particularly that of Congress. Among members least interested in the foresight provision was the least optimism found; yet these attitudes did not prompt them to oppose the foresight provision. Favorable attitudes, however, led some members to support the central goals initiatives that Culver made until the October vote at Representative Bolling's home and to support the decentralized approach that became the foresight provision. Culver's preeminent
role made action other than tacit support for the foresight provision unnecessary.

CONCLUSION

House Resolution 988 established the foresight responsibility of House committees, thereby requiring a decentralized form of strategic policy assessment which would involve an increased search for emerging issues and more futures information for current decisions through "futures research and forecasting." Although they may make committees more aware of the interrelationship between their decisions and those of other committees, the foresight activities will not force the conscious interrelationship of decisions across committees.

The passage of the foresight provision conformed to one pattern of factors suggested by the hypotheses in Chapter 2. The basic need for a policy entrepreneur was met in John Culver, whose "intensity, brilliance, eloquence, and bullheaded stubbornness" assured the provision's existence. His basic goal in the process was good policy.

The committee chairman, Richard Bolling, was favorable to the foresight provision. The staff, in this case Spencer Beresford and Charles Sheldon, had background and expertise in the forecasting and futures research area. The major bureaucratic entity involved was the science policy division of the Congressional Research Service. Walter Hahn, acting as director while
Sheldon worked as staff director of the Bolling committee, contributed through testimony and comments to the specific language used. Just as a member, wanting to pass legislation in a given area but unfamiliar with specific programmatic or substantive details, will often turn to the executive agency responsible for implementing the legislation, Congress turned for information to a bureaucratic agency of its own, the Congressional Research Service.

Active lobbying on the foresight provision by other interests was lacking. John Gardner of Common Cause supported the principle of the foresight provision during Culver's questioning. Various experts suggested similar activities; yet interest group support and opposition was directed at other sections of House Resolution 988.

The committee's members either supported the provision or were indifferent. No consideration was given to types of issues that futures research and forecasting might raise or to changes such activity might cause in the internal distribution of power. The central goals committee had been rejected, partly because it would have required more leadership in the House and a change in the distribution and use of power that Bolling committee members felt was beyond their ability to effectively propose—even had they agreed on its desirability. Once the language of the foresight provision reached the Steiger-Sarbanes draft, it remained unchanged, except for the requirement of a separate oversight committee, which was later made optional for reasons not involving the foresight
provision. Once the provision was thus packaged, it received little attention because it would not force decisions across committee boundaries, it would be used by existing committees, and it would pose no threat to the distribution of power within committees.

Thus, the foresight provision sprang from Culver's intense advocacy, was formulated by the science policy types, placed in the larger legislative package, and left unchanged. What may be a very significant reform for the anticipatory capacity of the House was given a quiet birth.

NOTES

1. The Democrats were Richard Bolling (Mo.), Robert C. Stephens, Jr. (Ga.), John C. Culver (Iowa), Lloyd Meeds (Wash.), and Paul S. Sarbanes (Md.). The Republicans were David T. Martin (Neb.), Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen (N.J.), Charles E. Wiggins (Calif.), William Stergh (Wis.), and C. W. Bill Young (Fla.).

2. At the end of his book, Toffler discusses the implications of "future shock" for government:

   Political democracy, by incorporating larger and larger numbers in social decision making, facilitates feedback. And it is precisely this feedback that is essential to control. To assess control over accelerated change, we shall need still more advanced and more democratic feedback mechanisms. . . . To master change, we shall therefore need both a clarification of important long-range social goals and a democratization of the way in which we arrive at them.

   (1970: 476-77)

To achieve this, Toffler suggested a continuing plebiscite on the future, through social future assemblies. These would not replace the system of policy making by elected officials but "would produce temporary direction indicators, broad objectives good for a limited time only, and intended as advisory to the elected political representatives or the community or nation" (1970: 483). This would begin to provide "anticipatory democracy"--the political remedy for future shock.
More recently Toffler has stated that the need for anticipatory democracy stems from two crucial problems:

First, lack of future consciousness: Instead of anticipating the problems and opportunities of the future, we lurch from crisis to crisis. Our political system is "future blind."

Second, lack of participation: Our government and other institutions have grown so large and complicated that most people feel powerless. They complained of being "planned upon." (1975b: 224)

He went on to list several specific activities that might be useful, but noted that "There is no single or magical way to build a truly anticipatory democracy. In general we need to support any program that increases future awareness in the society, while simultaneously creating new channels for genuine, broad-based citizen participation." (1975b: 224)

3. In response to interest in Congress, particularly to the foresight provision, CRS established a futures research group within CRS, partly to fulfill this function of synthesizing forecasts (Jayson, 1974: 8). One of the early projects of this group was to contract a study with the Futures Group, a think-tank in Connecticut to design a "futures information system" for Congress.

4. Margolis added to budgeting, oversight, and policy planning a concern for governmental structure.

5. In the words of a less favorable staffer, futures research is "intellectual bullshit."

6. Beresford defended the choice of the term "long-range studies" as less offensive than the more descriptive term "policy planning." However, he conceded "that an apter name than 'long-range studies' may be found. The Woodrow Wilson Center refers to the same function as 'strategic assessment.' A number of other names have been suggested ranging from 'the Committee on Legislative Coordination' to 'the Committee on National Issues,' and 'the Committee on the Future'" (SCC, 1973c: 482).

7. The foresight provision next gained attention near the end of the mark-up process when Representative Frelinghuysen, one of the least active members of the committee, showed a lack of familiarity:

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN: On Page 23, I notice there is a typo on Line 5. It says Futures Research.

Chairman BOLLING: Not future research. It is Futures Research.

Mr. SHELDON: It is explained in the report.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN: Commodity futures?
Mr. SHELDON: No; it is a study of alternate futures. One can have the option of going down one path of planning and program on [sic] another path. These are alternative futures among which one can select.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN: That sounds like painful jargon.
Chairman BOLLING: It is pretty well accepted jargon.

(SCC, 1974b: 665)
CHAPTER 4

THE BALANCED NATIONAL GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1974
INTRODUCTION

The Balanced National Growth and Development Act of 1974 (S. 3050) was introduced by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D., Minn.) during the second session of the 93rd Congress. This major reform bill provided for each of the three strategic policy assessment functions: (1) to search for emerging problems, (2) to inform current decisions on likely developments, and (3) to force conscious interrelationship of decisions. In terms of the last set of factors affecting committee treatment (see Chapter 2), this bill would affect higher and lower levels of the ends-means chain; it would adjust the existing committee structures and could seriously affect the distribution of power among members of Congress. In terms of congressional reform, this bill would bring about decision forcing, not in terms of the budget, as through the 1974 budget reform, but in terms of specific growth and development policy goals rather than through budget totals per se. Because formal hearings were not held on the bill, nor was it considered on the Senate floor, Senator Humphrey used a variety of other means to advocate the bill or its concepts. The organization of this chapter reflects the incipient nature of the bill's processing, suggested by these noncommittee activities.
S. 3050 declared sixteen national goals in its statement of purpose, among them the expansion of the Employment Act of 1946 to include income distribution that would assure for all the nation's people income for adequate levels of nutrition, health, education, housing, and cultural opportunity. Yet the major thrust of the bill was not toward specific policies but toward the framework and process by which national growth policy might be developed.

In the Executive Office of the President, the bill would establish an Office of Balanced National Growth and Development (OBNGD), which was to prepare an annual report on national growth. This office was to operate under the direction of the President with the advice of the Council on National Growth and Development. Operating basically as a supercabinet, the office would take over some coordinative functions of the Office of Management and Budget and provide for greater national growth planning.

By the provisions of S. 3050, multistate regional planning networks composed of governors and representatives of state legislatures would direct interstate planning, assure the compatibility of comprehensive state plans, and advise the President through the Office of Balanced National Growth and Development. A National Citizen's Council on America's Future would advise Congress and the President, and establish a national network of state and regional citizen's councils. A Foundation on the
American Future was to guide policy research on the effects of national development policy, or the lack of such policy, and the effects of individual programs on alternative patterns of development.

In Congress the bill would create a Joint Committee on Balanced National Growth and Development and a Congressional Office of Policy and Planning. Composing the joint committee, twenty-six committee chairmen or their designates and one half of the ranking minority members would be drawn from twelve House, twelve Senate, and two joint committees, the most powerful and the most relevant to growth and development policy in Congress. The ranking minority members of these committees were to be represented in alternating Congresses. The joint committee would be empowered to formulate and refer to appropriate committees "such proposals or recommendations as will promote the purposes of this Act." The Congressional Office of Policy and Planning, another central staff organization for Congress, was to prepare an annual Balanced National Goals, Priorities, and Growth Policy Report.

In the remainder of this chapter we have considered in detail the relationship of growth policy to strategic policy assessment and the specifics of S. 3050. Senator Humphrey's advocacy of the bill without the benefit of normal committee resources required a variety of activities: amendments to the budget reform bill and
to a bill establishing a commission on supplies and shortages, introduction of the bill in the House, comments on the President's biennial growth report, and hearings on related matters in other congressional committees. These activities are briefly examined. The support outside Congress for the bill and Humphrey's goals and committee member attitudes are considered. Finally the six stages of the bill's processing are used to provide a summary of the chapter.

**GROWTH POLICY AND STRATEGIC POLICY ASSESSMENT**

There is an ongoing debate over the meaning of a growth policy: what is included, what is not. Without entering this debate over the definition of growth policy, we have used one presentation of it to suggest the potential of such policy. A group whose work is respected by congressional committees working in the growth policy area, the Academy for Contemporary Problems (formerly part of the Batelle Institute, Columbus, Ohio), described the first requirement of a growth policy as

the provision of procedures and horizontal organization necessary to orchestrate the activities of vertically structured specialized agencies so that separate programs, projects, and policies are harmonized to achieve the larger ends of policies on growth and development.

(Hartley, Patton, Widner, Rainey, Findley & Petersilia, 1974: 21)
The academy group likened growth policy to a three-legged stool standing on social, environmental, and economic policy legs (see Figure 1). These broad categories were refined into four substantive elements within growth policy: (1) a population policy intended to influence the demographic growth of a region; (2) a policy on technology intended to influence the way technologies are introduced into the social and physical environment; (3) resource and environmental policies intended to influence the way the population utilizes land, air, water, and other natural resources through technology; and (4) development policies intended to influence the geographic distribution of population, economic activity, services, and social well-being (Hartley et al., 1974: 24). Growth policy so defined includes all major aspects of domestic policy and presumes a forcing of the conscious interrelationship of decisions.

**INSTIGATING AND PUBLICIZING FOR GROWTH POLICY**

A major source of publicity for growth policy questions on a national and international scale was *The Limits to Growth* (Meadows, Meadows, Randers & Behrens, 1972), a work sponsored by the Club of Rome, seventy-five scientists, industrialists, economists, and educators whose purpose is to spur action on major world problems through research projects. The first report was prepared by a team of computer systems experts who used a simulation model (Forrester, 1971), to examine the likely trajectory of world
Figure 1. The Structure of Growth Policy.

TO ASSURE
EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY
FOR ALL AMERICANS

SOCIAL POLICY
(Civil Rights Act of 1964, et al.)

TO BALANCE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES
WITH ENVIRONMENTAL OBJECTIVES

GROWTH POLICY

DEVELOPMENT POLICY
POPULATION POLICY

Technology Policy
Resource and Environmental Policy

TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM EMPLOYMENT
AND PRODUCTION WITH STABLE PRICES

ECONOMIC POLICY
(Employment Act of 1946, et al.)

TO ACHIEVE PRODUCTIVE HARMONY
BETWEEN MAN AND THE ENVIRONMENT

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
(Environmental Policy Act of 1969, et al.)
growth. The results, based largely on the assumption of continued exponential growth, indicated a major collapse of the world system preceded by a precipitous decline in population during the next century (Meadows et al., 1972). The Limits to Growth was released with much fanfare and little preliminary argument over methods. It prompted significant exchanges and comments among experts in various fields (Kaysen, 1972; Heilbroner, 1972; Mishan, 1972; Schwartz & Foin, 1972). The debate was carried over into the popular press (Church, 1972; Klein, 1972), and was used as an argument for greater concern for the environment (Ulph, 1973).

During the 93rd Congress another report sponsored by the Club of Rome was published: Mankind at the Turning Point (Mesarovic & Pestel, 1974). The "turning point" occurs at recognition of the need for "organic growth" rather than the prevailing unbalanced and undifferentiated growth. Although the second work was based on a more sophisticated model, which disaggregates the world into ten regions, its pessimism about the outcome of continuing current actions is similar to that of the first report:

Rather than collapse of the world system as such [as suggested by The Limits to Growth], catastrophes or collapses on a regional level could occur, possibly long before the middle of the next century, although in different regions, for different reasons, and at different times. Since the world is a system, such catastrophes will be felt profoundly throughout the entire world.

(Mesarovic & Pestel, 1974: 55)
These Club of Rome reports found their way into the activities of the 93rd Congress on several paths. One was the project on sustainable growth of the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars (WWICS, 1973). The WWICS project, under the direction of Chester Cooper, a fellow during 1973 and 1974, held several meetings for government officials and academics. The project produced a directory of national and international research efforts (WWICS, 1974) and prepared a "Proposal for Developing Capacities at the National Level for Strategic Policy Assessments" (WWICS, 1973). The project made officials in Congress and the executive branch, as well as researchers, aware of various efforts in the growth policy area and reinforced many of these efforts. Humphrey praised the work of the WWICS group and included their proposal with S. 3050 in the Congressional Record (CR, 1974: S2116-19). Similar work was done by the Academy for Contemporary Problems. Meetings were held which involved research and committee staff in defining growth policy and the mechanisms needed to establish it.

These activities by research groups were preceded by a variety of governmental activity which considered growth policy from two perspectives: rural problems and urban growth problems. Urban development and the lack of policies to guide urban growth were an ongoing concern of the 1960s. Rural growth problems received increasing attention, because of the concerns of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, through programs like the Appalachian regional effort and through various government reports.²
The incident that joined such concern for urban and rural growth, according to James Sundquist, was the Watts riot in 1965: "More and more they [politicians] came to talk of national growth policy as the context in which all of the more limited policies would be rationalized" (Sundquist, 1975: 3). President Nixon referred to urban and rural problems in the State of the Union message and in other speeches and messages of 1970 and 1971 (Sundquist, 1975: 3); yet he did little beyond speaking. Despite the realization of common interests, the principal initiatives toward growth policy have come from committees dealing with housing and urban growth or with agricultural and rural development. Major advances waited until 1970, and they were made in Congress.

In Title IX of the Agricultural Act of 1970, Congress declared its commitment "to a sound balance between urban and rural America" and urged the highest priority for revitalization and development of rural areas (P.L. 91-524, Sec. 901a). In the Urban Growth and New Community Development section of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-609, Sec. 702) Congress declared a commitment to national growth policy:

It declared that "the federal government must assume responsibility for the development of a national urban growth policy" that would . . . "help reverse trends in migration and physical growth which reinforce disparities among states, regions, and cities." The policy would . . . "as a guide in making specific decisions at the
national level, provide a framework for development of interstate, state, and local growth and stabilization policy."

(Sundquist, 1975: 4-5)

Title VII of this act also called for the President to issue a biennial Report on National Growth.

These presidential growth reports became a focus for instigating and publicizing the need for national growth policies. The first report (Report on National Growth, 1972) caused Representative Thomas L. Ashley (D., Ohio), the principal author of Title VII, to hold hearings in the Committee on Banking and Currency (CBC) to attract comments on the report and to consider what federal action should be taken on growth policy. Most testimony in these hearings was critical of the first report.

For example:

Report on National Growth 1972 is no more than a survey of problems and a commitment to two obvious goals of growth policy: first, to the idea of balance between the nation's urban and rural environments; and second, to the idea of "orderly" correction of existing problems. The report, however, fails to examine the implications of the giving up of federal categorical programs in favor of state and local priorities and procedures, fails to explain how affirmative federal policies will be made to work, fails to state what resources will be made available and whether such resources will be adequate for the stated purposes; it also fails to establish mechanisms by which citizens of the United States can become involved in the process. (CBC, 1972a: 385)
Ashley followed up these hearings with the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1972. In reporting on this bill, the House Committee on Banking and Currency concluded that there was no alternative to continued congressional leadership in the growth policy area. The committee set out three tasks for itself in developing this growth policy: (1) to define specific development goals for the nation, (2) to recommend programs and techniques to achieve these goals, and (3) to construct decision-making and implementing mechanisms to define and carry out the nation's growth policy on a continuing basis (CBC, 1972c: 8). S. 3050 was to take on the third task. Humphrey and Thornton were aware of Ashley's work, particularly in criticizing the President's growth reports. Yet Ashley thought Humphrey's approach to growth policy too broad. Therefore Ashley gave no more support to S. 3050 than publicizing the need for mechanisms to set growth policy.

The Committee on Banking and Currency was not alone in the 93rd Congress in instigating and publicizing the need for national growth policy. Another source was Representative John D. Dingell's (D., Mich.) Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife Conservation, and the Environment, of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. Based on observations of the implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970, Representative Dingell concluded that the federal government had only begun to conduct full and adequate environmental assessments of growth-oriented programs and policies. To encourage a "continuing and open dialogue in
the Congress," but with no immediate legislative purpose, Dingell began hearings on growth and its implications for the future (Growth and Its Implications, 1973, 1974a, 1974b). The three volumes produced by Dingell's subcommittee catalogued many of the major sources of the growth debate; the bulk of the volumes is in the appendices. Hearings on growth and its implications for the future have become an ongoing feature of the subcommittee. Representative Dingell also introduced during the 93rd Congress a proposal (H.R. 14468) for the establishment of a National Environmental Policy Institute to do strategic policy analysis on environmental problems. In June, 1974, Dingell held more hearings on growth policy and in July a round of hearings on his proposals (H.R. 35 and H.R. 14468) for environmental research centers (Growth and Its Implications, 1975). Dingell's work aided S. 3050 as Representative Ashley's hearings had done, by publicizing the need. Dingell also was not interested in becoming the House sponsor of the Humphrey proposal.

Another approach to national growth policy came from the Joint Economic Committee (JEC). Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D., Tex.) had urged the establishment of the Subcommittee on Economic Growth because "a failure of the government to look ahead and to equip itself to deal with emerging problems had assumed the proportions of an acute crisis of public policy" (JEC, 1974: 12). As chairman of this subcommittee, Bentsen proceeded to hold hearings on long-term economic growth. Still another approach to examining national
growth questions within Congress occurred in the formation of a science advisory panel by the House Committee on Public Works (CPW), to examine the relevance of issues raised within the national growth question to a national public works investment policy (CPW, 1974a, 1974b, 1974c).

Humphrey was more involved in the Bentsen and House Public Works Committee hearings. He testified on S. 3050 during both sets of hearings. Sen. Humphrey had also been part of an earlier effort by the JEC Subcommittee on Urban Affairs, to consider the "restoration of sovereignty to solve social problems" (JEC, 1971). This subcommittee produced several proposals, including one for a national planning system. Another member of the subcommittee suggested that although Humphrey did not initiate this aspect of the bill, his exposure to it made his sponsorship of the similar growth bill more likely.

These instigation and publicizing activities were relevant for S. 3050 in several ways: (1) Activities such as the limits to growth debate raised public awareness of the growth problem. (2) A loose network of government officials, academics, research institute personnel, and others familiar with the problems and with each other's activities was created. (3) Senator Humphrey was made more aware of the problem and more ready to propose specific and remedial structural changes. (4) These activities reinforced the work of the congressional staff person most involved in formulating S. 3050.
FORMULATION

James E. Thornton's work in formulating S. 3050 was the culmination of years of interest in growth policy and the policy process generally. When Thornton had worked for Orville Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture in the Johnson Administration, he had been involved in the promotion of the concept of rural-urban balance articulated by Freeman. Thornton was also involved in formulating plans for the symposium "Communities of Tomorrow--National Growth and Its Distribution," held in Washington, D.C., in 1967 under the sponsorship of six members of President Johnson's cabinet and attended by Humphrey. Thus, Thornton was party to early and major attempts to raise the question of national growth policy. While in private business during 1969, Thornton was involved in drafting what became Title IX of the Agriculture Act of 1970, one of two major statements on growth policy that year. In 1970 Thornton came to the Hill as staff director of the Rural Development Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Hubert Humphrey had pledged himself to seek appointment to this committee while campaigning for a return to the Senate in 1970. Once on the committee, Senator Humphrey requested and received the chairmanship of the Subcommittee on Rural Development. James E. Thornton believed, and persuaded Humphrey, that despite growing public discussion of urban and national growth policy, there had been little serious work to define specific mechanisms necessary to formulate national
growth policy. Since such an attempt did not fit directly into the subcommittee's jurisdiction, Thornton spent much of his own time during 1971 and 1972 drafting a proposal that would become S. 3050 in 1974.

The major concern in putting S. 3050 together was to make explicit the process by which national growth policy would be formulated. Rather than focus on national growth policy per se, the bill was to set out a process, encompassing relevant institutional factors and actors, by which policy would be established. Thornton focused on changes in the executive, in Congress, among independent research agencies, and in state and multistate regional councils of government. Thornton modeled parts of the Humphrey bill after similar proposals already before Congress. S. 3050's concern for priority setting in Congress paralleled that of proposals for a congressional budget as well as Senator Javits' proposal for a congressional office of Goals and Priorities Analysis, Title II of S. 5 (See Chapter 5), although priority setting would make use of growth and development goals to evaluate budget figures.

Thornton had worked on the proposal for several months when Humphrey first announced his intention to introduce the bill during his presidential campaign in the California primary. After losing his bid for the Democratic nomination, Humphrey used the idea of S. 3050 in a speech to the American Institute of Planners (AIP), a potentially supportive interest group, in
October, 1972. By February, 1973, some four hundred copies of
the bill had been distributed to the AIP members. Ultimately,
the AIP made a statement on national planning which supported the
major concepts of S. 3050.

As it was published in 1973, the bill would provide "a more
explicit and rational formulation of goals and priorities. Con-
gress needs more detailed economic, social, environmental, and
program analysis in order to make more informed priority deci-
sions among alternative programs and courses of action to formu-
late policies" (CR, 1974: S.2107). Specific findings of need for
the legislation included: (1) the decline in life quality standards
and resource management because of a lack of coordinated policies
for federal programs and of incentives to foster balanced growth
in private enterprise; (2) the imbalance in needs and resources
based on rapid urban growth at the expense of rural areas; (3)
unsound land use policies based on expediency, tradition, short-
term practices; and (4) the need for coordinated policies dealing
with transportation, public services and facilities, energy,
housing, food and fiber, health services, sewage and solid waste
disposal, public education, crime, poverty, racial inequity, fiscal
and monetary policies, and capital and credit availability (CR,
1974: S.2107).

To overcome these shortcomings, a process was formulated which
would significantly adjust policy making in the executive branch
and in Congress. In the executive branch an Office of Balanced
National Growth and Development (OBNGD) would assume analytical functions analogous to those of the Council of Economic Advisers and some policy review and budget preparation functions of the Office of Management and Budget. Functions of the OBNGD were to be carried out by a director under the supervision of the President and with the advice of the Council of Balanced National Growth and Development, which was to be a supercabinet.  

The Office would provide "policy direction and coordination of all Federal and Federally assisted programs for planning and land use development, programs designed to improve human resources, and programs designed to allocate resources, and programs designed to develop, allocate, or conserve energy resources" by agencies designated by the President.  

(S. 3050, Sec. 202a(1))

To do so, the office was mandated to "establish national growth policies."

The office was to be responsible for establishing national growth policies, approved by the President, which "would require the office to participate in the review of agency and departmental budgets after they are submitted to the President or the Office of Management and Budget, but before they are submitted to Congress" (S. 3050, Sec. 202a(16). The office was also given the task of establishing a "nationally coordinated multijurisdictional comprehensive planning process," including the formation of a system of multistate regional commissions to review planning requirements for all existing and proposed federal programs.
The major vehicle of publicity and evaluation of national growth policy was to be the office's Annual Report on Balanced National Growth and Development, which would identify significant trends and problems; evaluate the progress and effectiveness of federal, regional, and local efforts; provide projections and forecasts of social, economic, environmental, and scientific development in five-, ten-, and twenty-five-year time frames. This report was also to provide policy recommendations, including necessary draft legislation, transmitted through the Congressional Office of Policy and Planning to the Joint Committee on National Growth and Development, the Joint Economic Committee, the Committees on Governmental Operations and Appropriations of each house, as well as such other standing committees as the presiding officer of each house might designate (S. 3050, Sec. 203b).

S. 3050 gave the OBNGD a direct line to the budget process. A corresponding phenomenon is visible in the changes proposed for Congress by S. 3050. The Congressional Office of Policy and Planning (COPP) was to provide the analysis and overview of priority and growth policy considerations within which meaningful consideration of individual measures could occur. The COPP was to issue a report, The Balanced National Goals, Priorities, and Growth Policy Report. This provision reflects the need felt in Congress, not only to establish growth policy, but to establish in a visible way a congressional version of national budget priorities. Thus, the report would include an analysis of the
President's proposed budget in terms of national goals, priorities, and growth policies and an analysis of the President's growth report as well as priority recommendations for Congress in light of COPP analysis (S. 3050, Sec. 804d).

James Thornton was aware of the magnitude of changes that S. 3050 was proposing; yet his purpose was to assemble all the pieces necessary to realize the establishment of a national growth policy process. Thornton and Humphrey were not concerned, as the events described will show, with formulating a bill that would pass the 93rd Congress. Their objective was to draw up a bill containing all the major elements of national policy making that, in their judgment, should be confronted.

MOVING A BILL WITHOUT A COMMITTEE

Given the importance of committee resources for successful treatment of a bill (see Chapter 2), S. 3050 was doomed from the start. Senator Humphrey was no longer a member of the Government Operations Committee by the time the bill was introduced. Committee chairman Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (D., N.C.), was opposed to the bill, and no other member was interested in pushing Humphrey's bill. Humphrey was committed to the issue, however, and he moved on several fronts to gather information on what growth policy should be, to publicize the need, to gather support, and to structure a definite concern for growth policy into other forms of national decision making. His efforts indicate the style of
action for success in Congress that Humphrey preaches to his staff: Be there and be persistent.

Early in the 93rd Congress, Humphrey had the Subcommittee on Economic Progress of the Joint Economic Committee print three thousand copies of *A Proposal for Achieving Balanced National Growth and Development* (JEC, 1973). In a letter of transmittal to Wright Patman (D., Tex.), chairman of both subcommittee and JEC, Humphrey stated his hope that the proposal would be carefully reviewed, "not as a proposal which is being suggested to solve all of our nation's many complex and difficult problems, but rather as a proposal to begin focusing national attention on the urgent need of the nation to get its policy-making house in order" (JEC, 1973: iii-iv). The special committee printing of the bill contained a section-by-section analysis and a foldout chart showing how the new policy-making structure would be integrated into the existing governmental structure. The bill itself was printed with the right-hand pages left blank for comments. The entire volume, more than two hundred pages, was used to spread information on the bill, and some three thousand copies were distributed within a year (CR, 1974: S.2104).

In lieu of hearings on the proposal, Senator Humphrey had relied since 1972 on the Congressional Research Service (CRS) to monitor state, local, and federal activities relevant to the development of a national growth policy (CRS, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975). These reports provided a major information source and a framework for considering the diverse issues affecting growth policy questions.
Humphrey devised other ways to gather information and to stimulate interest in growth policy. Among these were (1) a requirement that the Congressional Budget Office's annual report comment on the impact of budget alternatives on balanced national growth and development (P.L. 93-344, Sec. 202f). He promoted (2) the adoption of the general "process notion" in S. 3050 in the Forest and Rangelands Renewable Resources Planning Act (P.L. 93-378) and (3) the inclusion of a mandate to develop recommendations for new policy development mechanisms relevant to growth policy for the executive and Congress as part of the responsibility of the National Commission on Supplies and Shortages (P.L. 93-426, Sec. 720). Senator Humphrey encouraged Representative George Brown (D., Calif.) to introduce (4) a companion bill to S. 3050 on the House side; he provided (5) running commentary on the President's national growth report, used (6) hearings of the Subcommittee on Economic Development of the Joint Economic Committee and the House Public Works Committee, to further publicize the subject of national growth policy in general and S. 3050 in particular.

NATIONAL GROWTH AND THE BUDGET REPORT

A major reform of the 93rd Congress, which would effect SPA, thereby forcing the conscious interrelationship of decisions, was the congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344). S. 3050 had been written prior to the furor caused
by President Nixon's impoundment of funds, that resulted in a concerted drive in Congress to reform the budget process. In the course of developing the budget reform, the Senate was primarily concerned with establishing a congressional budget so that Congress would be more effective in setting national priorities; the House was somewhat more concerned about eliminating the threat posed by impoundment to the "power of the purse."

If Congress wouldn't bring the budget to growth policy, Humphrey would take growth policy to the budget. It arrived in the form of an amendment to the major Senate budget bill (S. 1541) which mandated the Budget Committees and the Congressional Budget Office to consider the impact of budget alternatives on national growth. Specifically, the amendment would force the newly formed committee to receive and review all information, data, analyses, and reports prepared by the Congressional Office of the Budget on the subjects of long-range national growth and development, goals, and priorities, reviewing such material and using them as a guide during the deliberation on concurrent resolutions on the budget and in carrying out other duties assigned in Title IV of this act.

(CR, 1975: S.3770)

A second part of the amendment required that the budget office submit a National Growth Development, Goals, and Priorities Report. Humphrey prevailed in the budget bill, which passed the Senate on March 22, 1974. The budget report, due on or before May 1 of each year, would include
an assessment of the probable effect of such proposed budget outlays and budget authority and of such allocation of resources, upon the balanced growth and development of the nation, such assessment to be drawn from information, data, reports, and analyses which shall be furnished to the Director upon his request by such Federal departments, agencies, and bureaus, as he may determine and as may have such requested subject matter within their official jurisdiction.

(CG0, 1974: 1946)

In conference with the House, that paragraph was reduced to a phrase. Thus, the Congressional Budget Office's report on alternatives to the President's proposal should take "into account how such alternative allocations will meet national needs and affect balanced growth and development of the United States" (P.L. 93-344, Sec. 202f). How the CBO will fulfill this mandate has yet to be seen, but Humphrey's amendment was a logical way to build concern for national growth into this addition to congressional decision making, namely, into its own budget process.

THE GROWTH POLICY PROCESS IN A SINGLE POLICY AREA

Senator Humphrey was able to practice his notion of a future-oriented policy development process through the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 (S. 2296; P.L. 93-378). James Thornton had persuaded Humphrey to provide leadership in experimenting with this process-oriented approach, over the objections of personal staff who were fearful that Humphrey would be caught in a major battle between preservationists and forest resource users.
The report on this bill noted that a sizable portion of the country's forest and rangeland is owned by the national government. The report stated:

However, to reach conclusions about what ought to be done on the Federal lands, we need knowledge about the current and likely private actions. Reaching conclusions on how the public effort can help the private effort requires a comprehensive understanding of the whole picture.

In preparing this legislation, the Committee refrained from attempting to determine in advance what National Policy ought to be. That is not the goal of this legislation.

Instead a course was charted which is designed to produce a National Assessment of the total picture and of specific needs. When the facts of the Assessment are in, a Program will be developed with full public participation, resulting in a common base for subsequent budget requests and action.

The process of fact-finding and goal setting is to be followed up by a detailed process of program evaluation which will determine if the effort being made is accomplishing the mission set forth.

(CAF, 1974: 3)

The report went on to say that a key feature of the legislation was its attempt to prevent short-sighted current actions. The bill provided for an assessment of situations and needs, established an explicit goal-setting process including public participation, tied budgetary and appropriations processes to the goals established, and then set up a method of evaluating program performance. The act set the year 2000 as the target year for full implementation of planned, intensive, multiple-use, sustained
yield management procedures operating on an environmentally sound basis. S. 2296 provided an exercise in developing a long-range policy development process for this particular renewable resources area. Humphrey and Thornton began using it as an example of what was necessary across all major functional policy areas, as suggested by S. 3050.

THE LARGER CONTEXT OF THE COMMISSION ON SUPPLIES AND SHORTAGES

In June, 1974, Humphrey made another effort to gather support for mechanisms for setting national growth policy, this time by appending an advisory committee to a proposed National Commission on Supplies and Shortages. The commission's task was to examine the issue of long-term policy making in the resources and materials area and to propose, at a minimum, ways to establish a national resources and materials information system.

"In order to establish a means to integrate the study of supplies and shortages of resources and commodities into the total problem of balanced national growth and development," Humphrey's first approach was to have the commission report to Congress and President on the most appropriate means, within government, multi-state networks, and state jurisdictions, to set national growth policy. Humphrey's original amendment enumerated the aspects of national policy making to be studied by the commission. When Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.) objected to this additional
freight, Humphrey dropped the amendment's second sentence and a staggering array of topics:

The principal function of such policy-making process and coordinating system is to develop specific national policies relating to the achievement of a more balanced regional distribution of economic growth and development, income distribution, environmental protection, supply and conservation of fuels and energy transportation systems, employment, housing, health care services, food and fiber production, recreation and cultural opportunities, communication systems, land use, human care and development, technology assessment and transfer, and monetary and fiscal policy.

(CR, 1974: S10396)

After further objections Humphrey asked "to huddle for a few moments." Despite Senator John V. Tunney's last-minute cautions against amendments, he caucused with Humphrey and Brock, and Humphrey won out.

Tunney and Brock agreed to accept Humphrey's amendment, now a proposal to set up a special advisory committee to the commission, with its own authorization for appropriation, $75,000. It was to study how the problems of supplies and shortages could be integrated into larger questions of national growth and development. The advisory committee was to produce "recommendations regarding the establishment of a policy-making process and structure within the executive and legislative branches of the Federal Government and a system for coordinating these efforts with appropriate multistate, regional, and State governmental
jurisdiction" (CR, 1974: S10399). Thus Humphrey won endorsement of the need to integrate materials questions into national growth policy, a need S. 3050 would meet, and he established a funded advisory committee to examine the solutions which S. 3050 offered.6

INTRODUCTION IN THE HOUSE

S. 3050 was introduced in the House by Representative George E. Brown, Jr. (D., Calif.), a member of the Committee on Science and Astronautics. Brown was interested in long-range planning, and he had come in contact with proposals similar to Humphrey's through the committee's hearings on federal policy, plans, and organizations for science and technology. As he introduced the bill, Brown pointed out the process aspect--that it "does not specifically prescribe policy, but rather attempts to refocus national institutions so as to approach virtually the entire spectrum of domestic policies in relation to growth and development" (CR, 1974: H8947). In the House the bill was referred to the Rules Committee because its scope was so broad that it fell in no single committee's jurisdiction. Although Brown introduced the bill, because it was late in the session, he did not push it. The House then had no mechanism for dealing with large-scale proposals overlapping several jurisdictions. A provision of the Bolling committee reform allows the Speaker to refer bills which overlap to each committee, either jointly or sequentially. Thus,
according to a staff member, in the 94th Congress a companion measure to S. 3050 would be referred to six committees in the House.

THE PRESIDENT'S BIENNIAL GROWTH REPORT

A major item in the ongoing debate over national growth has been the report which the President must make by February of each even-numbered year. The discussion and report produced by Representative Ashley's hearings on the first report put the issue in terms of presidential reluctance to take an active and forceful leadership role in developing a national growth policy (CBC, 1972b, 1972c). Congress, then, would have to continue its initiatives toward a growth policy. In this spirit Humphrey upstaged Ashley and other interested members of Congress in 1974 by criticizing the President's second growth report. Humphrey received a copy of the draft report as it was being submitted by the Department of Housing and Urban Development to the White House. In October he produced his own analysis of the draft report, using this analysis as a forum for parts of S. 3050 which would remedy the defects he found in the report (CR, 1974: S19281-82).

JEC AND HOUSE PUBLIC WORKS COMMITTEE HEARINGS

Because no hearings were held specifically on S. 3050, Humphrey used related hearings to push the bill: hearings on national growth by the Subcommittee on Economic Development of JEC (JEC,
1974) and hearings on the need for a national public works investment policy by the House Public Works Committee (CPW, 1974c).

INTEREST AND SUPPORT OUTSIDE CONGRESS

Senator Humphrey and James Thornton were busy gathering support outside Congress, and during the 93rd Congress general support for mechanisms to set national growth policy was given by several groups: among them the National Governors Conference, the Conference of Mayors, the National Association of Counties, the American Institute of Architects, and the American Institute of Planners. Many of these groups supported one or more concepts or structures in S. 3050, although none addressed the bill itself because it was not getting serious consideration in Congress and because other proposals for national growth policy had been introduced by Senator Vance Hartke (D., Ind.), although these proposals were not so thorough or inclusive as S. 3050.

The American Institute of Planners (AIP), for instance, in a statement on national planning policy, asked that the federal regional councils be upgraded and a central planning office be established in the Executive Office of the President, similar to the Office of Balanced National Growth and Development proposed in S. 3050. AIP called on Congress to form a Joint Committee on National Development Policy to give Congress a planning and policy analysis capacity related to national development. This joint committee was to examine the national policy implications of the
national budget and review the President's growth report, with the aid of an additional central staff organization analyzing major legislative programs in relation to national goals, priorities, and development trends (AIP, 1974).

Other groups gave support more by their analyses and conferences than by the endorsement of their professional membership. Thus, the work of the Academy for Contemporary Problems and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars reinforced the staff members working for Representatives Dingell and Ashley as well as for James Thornton.

Because S. 3050 was not seriously considered, little was heard from those in opposition to growth policy, and the conflicts among its supporters were not made obvious. For instance, rural interests may be more concerned with interregional migration and stimulating economic growth in rural areas, Sundquist suggested (1975: 11), while urban interests are more concerned with solving urban-suburban and racial conflicts and developing declining urban areas; yet these conflicts never really surfaced during the 93rd Congress.

THE SENATE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE

S. 3050 was referred on introduction to the Senate Government Operations Committee (CGO). Up to this time Humphrey had continued to work on the bill, but he had not moved to introduce it, because he was no longer a member of the committee that would consider it. Finally, in February, 1974, he introduced the bill, whereupon it was sent to the Government Operations Committee.
Among the fifteen members of this committee, interviews revealed some interest in response to SPA questions, but little or no thought of specific remedies to the problems of anticipation, of searching for emerging issues. All expressed some dissatisfaction with the normal ways that Congress searches for problems. Most of the members were not sanguine about congressional ability to anticipate crises, expressing concern about organizational mechanisms, particularly for identifying and forcing action on problems. Others noted the value of crises in allowing for changes in direction, "major shifts." One member, who had been involved in a state attempt to anticipate problems and to articulate long-range goals, believed that this type of planning and assessment is done for military issues but not for social ones. He thought that Congress may be able to anticipate problems and that, regardless, the attempt to anticipate is valuable in itself.

Yet few of these members had thought about potential changes or about S. 3050. As a staffer put it after learning that S. 3050 was not going to move, "Pushing it would do no good; no amount of pushing will overcome opposition of [committee] staff and the chairman."

Senator Ervin, chairman of the committee, was not particularly interested in growth policy questions; he did not want to consider S. 3050. During the 93rd Congress he spent much of his time chairing the Watergate hearings as well as engaging in a few major legislative activities such as budget reform.
Senator Humphrey's Goals

Senator Hubert Humphrey is one of the more legislatively innovative members of the Senate; yet he is also a perennial contender for the presidency. The good policy goal is likely to be the dominant reason for a member's pursuit of SPA reforms (see Chapter 2), as it was in Representative Culver's pursuit of the foresight provision (see Chapter 3). For Senator Humphrey the relative importance of good policy versus a career beyond the chamber is difficult to determine, although our hypothesis appears to be confirmed. S. 3050 was unveiled during Humphrey's bid for the presidential nomination in 1972; yet James Thornton did not learn of Humphrey's campaign uses for the proposal until shortly before the California speech and well after he had devoted much time to it. Similarly, Culver was suspected of using an Iowa futures conference to benefit his senatorial aspirations in 1972. However, Humphrey, like Culver, continued to press for SPA reform after the election cycle was over, most immediately in his address to the American Institute of Planners.

Humphrey's persistence in using various forums to publicize the need for national growth policy and to build a concern for it into other aspects of national decision making suggest that good policy was his dominant goal during the 93rd Congress. This contention is supported by the relatively minor value to Humphrey of an increase in power in the Senate. If S. 3050 passed, Humphrey probably would become chairman of the new Joint Committee on
Balanced National Growth and Development created by the bill, but given Humphrey's position in the Senate (in the 94th Congress he became chairman of the Joint Economic Committee) and the tentative nature of this particular incentive, power in the Senate was probably not a significant goal in determining Humphrey's advocacy of S. 3050. Humphrey's actions during the 94th Congress prolonged this dilemma of the predominant goal. Humphrey switched from S. 3050, which provides for national planning by focusing on growth and development policy process, to a bill which stressed a more economic approach (S. 1795; 94th Congress). Critics have said that this shift involved an implicit downgrading of concern for environmental problems. These critics also suggested that Humphrey's change was prompted in part by his need for labor support if he made a last-minute bid for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1976. The planning bill has been supported by the Initiative Committee for National Planning, a group of notables headed by Wassily Leontief, Harvard economist, and Leonard Woodcock, president of the United Auto Workers Union.

SUMMARY: INCUBATING AN SPA REFORM

INSTIGATION AND PUBLICIZING. The need for national growth policy was instigated and publicized from diverse sources: the limits to growth debate; governmental concern for urban and rural growth, expressed in programs such as Appalachia, the Rural Development Act of 1972, and a variety of reports; work by academic and
policy research institutes; and activity by other congressional committees. S. 3050 proposed the mechanisms necessary to establish national growth policy. While most publicizing activity included some mention of specific mechanisms, this concern was usually minor. Thus, Humphrey was an important instigator of the need for mechanisms, working through amendments to budget process legislation and on the National Commission on Supplies and Shortages and through commentary on the President's growth report.

FORMULATION. The large, complex S. 3050 package was formulated through the interest and persistence of James E. Thornton and at Humphrey's direction. The formulator "draws boundaries around an issue and establishes a focal point for its further consideration" (Price, 1972: 4). Thornton's boundaries in the bill were nothing short of the whole range of domestic, and some international, policies as well as the agencies which deal with policy. In addition to providing for the analytical units in the executive and in Congress, which would search for emerging issues and inform current decisions, Thornton made explicit the governmental forums which may force the conscious interrelationship of decisions. Working without significant committee resources, but with significant help from the Congressional Research Service, Thornton spent a year and a half, much of it his own time, in formulating the bill, while his major legislative responsibilities for Humphrey involved the Agriculture Committee. Humphrey could not command the luxury of a special subcommittee to consider the growth issue.
INFORMATION GATHERING. Information was gathered, but not by a committee handling the bill. The Government Operations Committee would not consider it. Senator Humphrey's activities in relation to budget legislation, the supplies and shortages commission, and the President's growth report aided in the information-gathering process. A major source of information has been the CRS summaries of developments in the growth policy area. An important difference between S. 3050 and the other legislation we have studied is the lack of a hearing record reflecting at least some of these efforts, because of the out-of-committee nature of this stage of S. 3050's development.

INTEREST AGGREGATION. Little interest aggregation took place during the 93rd Congress when considered in relation to the interests potentially affected by the bill. Humphrey and Thornton were in touch with various groups likely to support their efforts, such as the American Institute of Planners and the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. A major factor conditioning the ultimate disposition of a bill, Price (1972) noted, is its impingement on bureaucratic structures. This major category of interests was not dealt with in the 93rd Congress: the executive branch agencies, departments, and offices. Given the effect S. 3050 would have on policy coordination, and hence agency autonomy, it will never be passed without presidential support, and presidential support often requires inclusion of the interests of major bureaucratic actors at the time a bill is seriously considered.
MOBILIZATION AND MODIFICATION. Stages 5 and 6, must wait for development in another Congress. "Whether an issue goes beyond the publicizing and formulating stages usually depends on the support it receives from individuals, groups, or governmental units that possess authority and legitimacy in the policy area and on the extent of 'intraelite organizing' by key leaders" (Price, 1972: 5). Because the bill stuck at the enabling committee level, Humphrey realized that mobilization efforts would be wasted. As a result of this lack of consideration, opposition to S. 3050 was not generated. Likewise, there were no modifications of S. 3050 during the 93rd Congress because it was not seriously considered. The establishment of a congressional budget process and the accompanying Congressional Budget Office will necessitate much modification if the bill is to be reintroduced.

Unlike the foresight provision--a small change which was considered and passed--S. 3050 remained a large, and largely unexamined, reform during the 93rd Congress. While the energy crisis was at its peak, while several other crises occurred, these events had little impact on support for mechanisms to set national growth policy. The bill that reflected Humphrey's interests and his staffer's commitment and expertise had been dead in committee from the beginning, but Senator Humphrey persisted in promoting the concepts of S. 3050 and, whenever possible, the bill itself. Still, the Balanced National Growth and Development Act of 1974 was doomed to remain in its incubation period.
NOTES


2. People Left Behind (1968) for example.

3. Among these sources were The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al., 1972), Blueprint for Survival (Goldsmith, Allen, Allaby, Davoll & Lawrence, 1972), and government reports on Population and the American Future (1972) and Resources and Man (National Academy of Sciences, 1969b).

4. The Council shall be composed of the Attorney General; the Secretaries of Housing and Urban Development, Agriculture, Health, Education and Welfare, Interior, Commerce, Defense, Labor, Transportation, Treasury; and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Director of the Foundation on the American Future, the Chairman of the Domestic Council, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, the Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations, the Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, the Administrator of the Federal Energy Office, the Administrator of the General Services Administration, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, the Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Power Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Director and Deputy Director of the Office of Balanced National Growth and Development.

(S. 3050, Sec. 201a)

5. Amendment 1030 to S. 1541:
The Office shall review on a continuing basis all legislation, trends, and developments in government at the Federal, State, and Local levels, and related trends and developments in the private sector, including available national resources, which affect the Nation's growth and development, goals, and
priorities. Once each year the Office shall submit to the Committees on the Budget of both Houses and to each House of Congress a "National Growth, Development, Goals, and Priorities Report" containing such information, data, and analysis as the Director shall deem necessary to enable Congress to consider fiscal and budgetary matters in terms of balanced national growth and development policies and national goals and priorities.

(CR, 1974: S3769-71)

6. The act creating both the commission and the special advisory committee (P.L. 93-426) was later amended twice because of delays on the part of the executive branch in submitting its nominations for public members. Both the commission and the advisory committee are required to submit their recommendations to the Congress by December 31, 1976. In addition, the authorized funding levels for both were increased to $1.5 million and $150,000, respectively. Thornton was appointed executive director of the advisory committee, with several long-time advocates of national policy planning named to serve on the committee: Norman Beckman, assistant director of the Congressional Research Service (responsible for CRS publications on growth policy); Wasyly Leontief, Harvard economist, and Leonard Woodcock, president of the United Auto Workers (cochairmen of the Initiative Committee for National Planning); Ralph Widner, director of the Academy for Contemporary Problems.


8. To a letter asking for an interview with him or an aide, Ervin replied thus:

As you may know, I have been continuously occupied with matters of equal national importance including legislation to require confirmation of the Director and Deputy Director of OMB, the Congressional budget measure, the establishment of the Federal Energy Administration, energy research, Presidential impoundment, executive privilege, and last but not least, the Watergate matter.

The bills you refer to, which are before this Committee are S. 1286 (Sen. Hartke's Growth Bill) and S. 3050, and they are all being processed by the Committee staff in accordance with usual Committee procedures. The press of work on the matters mentioned above has prevented me from familiarizing myself with these bills, and I have not formulated any beliefs and perceptions with respect to them. Also, further Committee action on these bills during the balance of this Congress is doubtful.
9. Culver's campaign and election to the Senate suggest that a career beyond the chamber was a major goal determining much of his activity beyond his Bolling committee work during that period.
INTRODUCTION

Early in 1967 Senator Walter F. Mondale (D., Minn.) introduced the Full Opportunity and Social Accounting Act (S. 843) in the 90th Congress. In the ensuing eight years the bill went through several minor changes and a major addition, and emerged in the 93rd Congress as the Full Opportunity and National Goals and Priorities Act (S. 5).

At its inception in 1967 the Mondale bill (S. 843) called for a procedure analogous to that established by the Employment Act of 1946. S. 843 declared full opportunity and social accounting as national goals, called on the President to submit an annual social report similar to the economic report prepared by the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA). The social report was to set forth progress toward full opportunity and also current and foreseeable needs in various social areas. S. 843 would establish a Council of Social Advisers (CSA) to the President to develop and maintain the reliable information, or social indicators, necessary to determine current social conditions. The Council of Social Advisers would also recommend program priorities in light of this social data. S. 843 would create a Joint Committee on the Social Report in Congress to examine the President's social report. The major addition to this proposal came in 1969 in the form of an amendment
by Senator Jacob Javits (R., N.Y.), cosponsored by Mondale, to establish a congressional Office of Goals and Priorities Analysis (OGPA), similar to the President's Bureau of the Budget. Appendix 5 presents S. 5 as introduced with these changes in the 93rd Congress.

Several factors make the Full Opportunity Act (S. 5) a significant case in the examination of SPA reforms. (1) The bill has been around for a long time. It has been considered in four Congresses, the 90th through the 93rd, passing the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare three times and the Senate twice. Thus, its history allows more consideration of committee and Senate treatment of an SPA reform than did S. 3050. (2) Mondale's proposal dealt primarily with analysis in the executive branch. With the addition of Senator Javits' Title II, analysis in Congress was seriously addressed for the first time. Even then, Title I and Title II were never adequately intermeshed. Analysis of the bill's history will show the impact of this lack of original concern. (3) The bill contemplated the use of social science for SPA and other policy-related activities. Its history provides some insight into the debate over the adequacy of social science concepts and research, and conversely, the role of the government in developing the social sciences for policy purposes. (4) The proposal dealt with the involvement of social scientists as political actors promoting their own interests, and it illustrates the divisions among individuals and groups involved. It also
suggests how the existence of a proposal can become a symbolic reinforcement, in this case, of the work of those in the social indicators field.

In the following sections we have considered the bill's origin, its treatment in four Congresses, and the member goals and attitudes of its sponsor and the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare members. The discussion is summarized in terms of the six stages of the bill's processing.

INSTIGATION AND PUBLICIZING

On the morning of January 4, 1967, Senator Mondale noticed an article by Joseph Kraft in the Washington Post which began:

> With one notable exception, practically everything that Americans do gets officially measured at this time of year. The exception, the thing that is not measured, is the social effect or impact on daily life of all the other things that are measured.

> But probably nowhere else is there a more pressing need to take regular readings, and accordingly, some of the most perceptive men inside and outside the government have begun work for a social counterpart to the annual economic report made to the President and the Congress by the Council of Economic Advisers. (Kraft, 1967: A11)

This article prompted Senator Mondale to schedule a speech. Mondale's interest grew quickly. The speech became a legislative proposal, the Full Opportunity and Social Accounting Act (S. 843) in the 90th Congress.
Joseph Kraft thus linked academic and executive branch activity and Mondale's initiative. A year of critical mass for the social indicators movement had been 1966. Bertram Gross' *The State of the Nation: Social Systems Accounting* (1966) made a conceptual statement on the use of social data for social analysis. A study funded by NASA to determine the impact of the space program on domestic society produced *Social Indicators*, edited by Raymond Bauer (1966). Another specific aid to the cause was the report of the National Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress in 1966. The commission released its findings in February, noting the lack of knowledge of the systematic causes of social problems and urged research on this question.\(^2\)

A major advance for social indicators within the government took place in 1966, when President Johnson assigned the task of developing social indicators to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). In a March 1 message on domestic health and education President Johnson stated:

> To improve our ability to chart our progress, I have asked the Secretary of HEW to establish, within his office, the resources to develop the necessary social statistics and indicators to supplement those prepared by the Department of Labor Statistics, and the Council of Economic Advisers. With these yardsticks, we can better measure the distance we have come, and plan the way ahead.

*(Full Opportunity, 1967: 264)*

HEW implemented this task by forming a panel on social indicators headed by William Gorham, then assistant secretary for program
coordination, who gave the actual working task to Mancur Olson, an economist. These assignments were accorded favorable publicity and discussion within the social indicators movement. News of these efforts filtered through the liberal columnist Joseph Kraft to Senator Mondale. Kraft was familiar with the work of Gross and Bauer, and he had been impressed by similar ideas expressed by Daniel Bell (1966). Kraft was prompted to put his thoughts into an article by a discussion with Olson about the work at HEW.

No one can assert with confidence the consequence of having all this information [economic and population information] readily and regularly available. Certainly, it does not make men agree, any more than they used to, about such things as taxes and wages . . . but at a minimum, the statistics act as warning signals . . . . [The] lack of regular information fosters an innocence and irresponsibility that is positively terrifying . . . .

An annual social report . . . can create a climate of continuing self-correction; a barrier of irrevocable mistakes, not to say disasters, such as the loss of the Negro generation, [the postwar generation of poor Negroes who grew up hostile to American society] . . . and that, it seems to me, is perhaps the most important business now before the nation.

(Kraft, 1966: All)

FORMULATION

Kraft's article touched on matters that concerned Mondale, and it prompted him to move on the question of a council of social advisers. Developing the full opportunity bill filled a
policy void for Senator Mondale; it allowed him to express himself. His committee assignments did not give him the opportunity to work on social welfare issues, and he had been looking for something imaginative and futuristic. The Council of Social Advisers filled that role. He raised the issue at a meeting with his staff shortly thereafter. Bill Shands, a journalist who was on Mondale's staff as a congressional fellow of the American Political Science Association, began preparing a speech for Mondale on social accounting. Shands' assignment went through several drafts. In the process Mondale became more interested and decided to sponsor legislation on the issue. Shands and Gary Avery, a political scientist on Mondale's staff, formulated a bill with the help of the Office of Legislative Counsel for actual drafting.

Shands reviewed the research on social indicators and long-range forecasting exercises. Major assistance in developing the bill and the case for it came from Bertram Gross, the principal staff person involved in the passage of the Employment Act of 1946, which established the Council of Economic Advisers. Gross, a professor at Syracuse University, was preparing the first of two issues in the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* on social indicators (Gross & Springer, 1967). He suggested that Mondale's proposal be virtually identical to the 1946 act, and his idea was accepted.
On February 6, 1967, Senator Mondale introduced for himself and ten other senators the Full Opportunity and Social Accounting Act (S. 843). Mondale expressed a hope that "this act might accomplish in the area of national social policy what the Employment Act of 1946 has accomplished in the field of economic policy" (Full Opportunity, 1967: 478). Mondale went on to praise the "sophisticated capability [of the Council of Economic Advisers] to register every quiver in the U.S. economy," and he noted that the Council of Social Advisers would tend toward similar development of social analysis.3

Mondale's bill was referred to the Government Operations Committee, where Senator Fred Harris (D., Okla.) was waiting to hold hearings in the Subcommittee on Government Research. Harris had a related proposal for a National Foundation of the Social Sciences, and he agreed to use his subcommittee for hearings on Mondale's bill. Hearings were held on five days in June and July, 1967 (Full Opportunity, 1967: Pts. I, II, III). Thirty-five persons testified or took part in the seminar; thirty-seven others submitted written testimony or comments. More than two-thirds of them were academic or professional researchers. Seven executive branch agencies presented unified support for the objectives for S. 843, but virtually unified disagreement with the means proposed, as we shall see.
STRATEGIC POLICY ASSESSMENT ISSUES AND THE MOOD OF THE TIMES

The war on poverty had begun. A commitment by liberals like Mondale had been made to deal with poverty and to formulate other social programs. Urban riots, particularly during the summer of the hearings, brought support to S. 843, since the Council of Social Advisers was presumably to face such problems. For example, as William Taylor, the staff director of the Equal Rights Commission, noted:

The subcommittee is meeting at a time when our nation is reaping the fight for harvest of a century of neglect and deprivation.

... the establishment of a system of social accounting is not an end in itself, but rather a means to assist in establishing the conditions for economic and social justice if the will to do so exists. But it is an important technique because the rapidly changing conditions of urban life have created problems of poverty, deprivation, and discrimination more intransigent than before, because piecemeal approaches will not be sufficient, because we need to establish our goals with much more clarity and to apply the rigorous test of progress toward true equality, determining whether we are fulfilling our goals.

(Full Opportunity, 1967: 368)

Another major aspect of the prevailing mood was confidence in economic growth and the positive role the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) presumably played in that growth. It was thought that the effectiveness of the CEA in advising the President how
to "fine tune" the economy could be duplicated in the social area, but this analogy was not universally accepted. While few challenged the usefulness of the CEA in 1967, objections were raised about the need for a Council of Social Advisers because of CEA's existence and because of the inadequacies of social science. In addition, two other objections relevant to SPA concerns were raised: namely, the bill failed to distinguish between policy analysis and actual decision making and priority setting, and the bill would exacerbate the executive-legislative imbalance in analytical ability.

Gerhard Colm, chief economist of the National Planning Association and first expert to testify on the bill, agreed that social programs had not been adequately related to national goals, but he objected that other aspects of the Mondale proposal were already covered by existing agencies. Colm stated that there was no need for a Council of Social Advisers. He suggested that the Council of Economic Advisers be expanded to become a council of economic and social advisers; likewise, the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) would become a joint economic and social committee (Full Opportunity, 1967: 35-48). This recommendation was to be repeated by several persons throughout the history of the proposal, particularly by economists.

In objecting that the social sciences were not ready for the responsibility, most persons testifying admitted the need to develop more adequate social indicators, but others, such as Charles
Zwick, assistant director of the Bureau of the Budget, pointed out that the comprehensive theoretical framework available to the draftees of the Employment Act of 1946 was not available in the social area in 1966 (Full Opportunity, 1967: 266). William Gorham, then assistant secretary for program coordination in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, noted that social scientists, by training, language, and professional reinforcements, were "inclined to plead for further research before committing themselves. . . . [therefore] it might be better to have a body composed of elder statesmen, clergymen, civil rights activists, and others distinguished by their sympathy for the disadvantaged than social scientists" (Full Opportunity, 1967: 254).

Gorham's comments also touched on the objection that the bill confused analysis and policy recommendation. The problem arose because the Council of Social Advisers was to be assigned the task of recommending program priorities in light of the data it would gather. As Kenneth Boulding, then with the American Economic Association, pointed out:

It should certainly be the business of the Council of Social Advisers to develop social indicators, and to process information about the society in ways that will assist very materially, the process of appraisal of various programs. The final appraisal of programs, however, must take place as a result of a political process, involving a subtle weighing and evaluating of many different variables. I am sure that Congress understands this very well, and it will be tragic if any misunderstanding of the purpose of the bill were to prevent it from being passed. (Full Opportunity, 1967: 491)
Douglas Rae, a political scientist at Yale testifying in support of the bill, tried to clarify this part of the language by saying that the Council of Social Advisers would comment on programs not policies (Full Opportunity, 1967: 417-18). In written comments Harold Orlans, at the Brookings Institution, suggested that even the task of evaluating program effectiveness and recommending priorities based on this evaluation would place too great a strain on the Council of Social Advisers and would hinder its improvement of available data on social problems. Orlans noted that "... the scientific pretentiousness and political obliviousness of some (not all) proponents of national social accounting are an obstacle to the achievement of the more modest but more realistic goal of improving our data on significant national problems" (Full Opportunity, 1967: 510).

Finally, a significant objection was made to the executive orientation of the bill. Mondale's proposal would establish an analytical staff in the White House without a comparable unit within Congress. Amitai Etzioni, a sociologist at Columbia University, stressed the need for competing centers of analysis.

The rapid growth of the federal R & D sector left our society with ... very sizable imbalances in our knowledge-producing capacity ... [including one] between the executive branch and the Congress. The pending act would further exacerbate this imbalance in favor of the executive ... by making Congress even more dependent on the executive for information about the state of society and the effects of the executive programs on
the state of the nation. . . . [Therefore] the analysis of the data [at least in part] should be done in a facility attached to Congress. Without such a close link, social accounting will be largely the executive's account.

(Full Opportunity, 1967: 151-52)

During 1967 and 1968, with a Democratic Congress and an activist Democratic President, little concern was given to the institutional capability of Congress vis-à-vis the executive.

THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH POSITION

Seven executive branch agencies testified or supplied comments, generally agreeing with the objectives of S. 843 and disagreeing with the means. After all, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare had been working on social indicators (Full Opportunity, 1967: 249-54, 495), and PPBS had been instituted to evaluate and compare program effectiveness (Full Opportunity, 1967: 515-16). The administrative agencies noted the difference between the mandate of the Council of Economic Advisers and of the proposed Council of Social Advisers. For example, Charles Zwick, whose Bureau of the Budget coordinated agency testimony on the bill, pointed out that in 1946 specific objectives could be listed for the President's economic report. In contrast, the goals of S. 843 were overly general. Gardner Ackley, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, agreed noting that the statement of purpose of the 1946 Act
can be and has been translated into a fairly unambiguous goal of maximum growth of total output that is consistent with price stability; and an essentially private economy, without direct controls. Further, there is general agreement on fiscal and monetary policies as tools. . . .

The declaration of purpose in S. 843 is far from parallel to that of the employment act. No substantial body of expert or public opinion would today agree on what it means to give "every American the opportunity to live in decency and dignity. . . ." Nor is there any body even of expert opinion that can today prescribe a set of policies that will assuredly advance rather than inhibit opportunities to live in decency and dignity in all of the dimensions suggested. (Full Opportunity, 1967: 484)

MONDALE'S RESPONSE AND MODIFICATION

Mondale responded to the suggestion to add social concerns to the mandate of the Council of Economic Advisers by saying that the Council of Economic Advisers does not want to, nor can it, deal with a broad spectrum of social issues; social concerns would remain subordinate to economic concerns in a council of economic and social advisers. Mondale suggested that a merger was possible after the Council of Social Advisers had been established and the social sciences nurtured (Full Opportunity, 1967: 132).

Mondale did make a few minor modifications in the first round of hearings. The most important for strategic policy assessment concerns was the addition of a statement on the analysis of the long-range aspects of social policies as part of the responsibility of the Council of Social Advisers. Mondale had wanted a "futurist"
reform, and his staff had examined most of the available literature; yet the bill did not sufficiently reflect their concerns. Added to the duties of the Council of Social Advisers, then, was the mandate "to make and furnish such studies, reports, thereon, and recommendations with respect to programs, activities, and legislation that the President may request and appraising long-range aspects of social policy consistent with the policy declared in Section 2" (Full Opportunity, 1970a: 6-7).

But the Mondale proposal was destined no further than the hearing room in the 90th Congress. Realizing there was insufficient support in the full Government Operations Committee, Senator Harris avoided bringing the bill to a vote in his subcommittee.

However, events worked changes in the distribution of committee assignments in the Senate. The assassination of Robert F. Kennedy (D., N.Y.) left an opening in 1968 in the Labor and Public Welfare Committee (CLPW), and it was filled by Mondale. Special subcommittees were used by CLPW's chairman, Senator Hill, to facilitate the spirit of decentralized initiative prevalent on that committee. In 1964 Senator Hill had created a Special Subcommittee on Poverty to handle Office of Economic Opportunity legislation (Price, 1972: 249). When Hill left at the end of 1968, he was succeeded by Senator Ralph Yarborough (D., Tex.), who continued the tradition of encouraging decentralized initiative. In the 91st Congress Senator Mondale became chairman of CLPW's Subcommittee on Migratory Labor as well as of the Special Subcommittee
for Planning and Evaluation of Social Programs, specially created to handle Mondale's bill.

THE 91ST CONGRESS

Senator Mondale introduced his bill early in the 91st Congress (hence the low number, S. 5), dropping the term social accounting; the bill was simply the Full Opportunity Act. The bill was cosponsored by twenty-three other senators and referred to the Labor and Public Welfare Committee, where Mondale waited as chairman of the special subcommittee. While the special subcommittee was not equipped with a staff, it allowed Mondale to hold hearings and to assign Herb Jasper, originally on Mondale's personal staff, from 1970 through 1972 on his Migratory Labor Subcommittee staff, to work part time on the bill and act as counsel to the special subcommittee.

THE ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSE TO SOCIAL REPORTING

One of the last official acts of the Johnson administration, on January 19, 1969, had been to issue Toward a Social Report (1969), the result of work in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare on social indicators. Not to be outdone in the field of social reporting, President Nixon made three major changes relevant to S. 5.

(1) The centralized responsibility for government-wide social indicators was moved to the Bureau of the Budget. The Office of
Statistical Policy in the Bureau of the Budget was to assemble in a single periodic publication the major social measures available (Full Opportunity, 1970a: 142).

(2) The Urban Advisory Committee was established and given the task of policy coordination analogous to the task of the proposed Council of Social Advisers. Under the direction of Daniel Patrick Moynihan, this cabinet-level group was to devise a national urban policy. In his message on the UAC, the President said that the United States has never had a policy "coherent, consistent, positive as to what the national government would hope to see happen; what it will encourage, what it will discourage" (FR Vol. 34: 1223). The committee was to define that policy. In the executive reorganization of 1970, the UAC was replaced by the Domestic Council. With more working staff and agency support than the committee, the Domestic Council was to fulfill five functions: clarification of goals, development of alternatives, formulation of policy, coordination of policy, and review of policy (Graham, forthcoming). In the process it would be recommending integrated sets of policy choices in relation to national priorities. Thus, the description of its functions (though not, in reality, its operations) was similar to that of the Council of Social Advisers.

(3) The Nixon administration established the National Goals Research Staff. As Otis Graham pointed out, "Moynihan understood that policy coordination required some thought about national goals, and under his prodding a National Goals Research Staff was set up
in the White House" (Graham, forthcoming). In his statement establishing the goals staff, Nixon said that its purpose was "to assemble data that could help illumine the possible range of choices for 1976--our 200th Anniversary . . . setting forth some of the key choices open to us and examining the consequences of these choices" (Nixon, 1970). As an official involved in producing the Democrat's *Toward a Social Report* put it, "national goals" is a congenial phrase for Republicans. President Eisenhower had a Commission on Goals for Americans. President Nixon used it to express Republican interest in both social indicators and futures-type programs.

However, the Nixon administration's commitment to the three changes was not as strong as their speedy establishment might suggest. The social indicators publication begun by the Bureau of the Budget in 1969 was not printed until 1973 (*Social Indicators*, 1973). The Domestic Council, despite its mandate, was never adequately staffed to do the analysis necessary for overall domestic policy coordination. The National Goals Research Staff ended abruptly after one year, its first report, *Toward Balanced Growth--Quantity with Quality* (1970), presenting little more than bland descriptions of trends without confronting the hard policy choices or questioning underlying assumptions.

**THE FALL AND WINTER HEARINGS**

Hearings in the 91st Congress reflected the same academic bias as in the previous Congress. Mondale arranged for nine academics
to testify, and twelve others sent comments. Also represented were one person from organized labor and one from the civil rights movement. Mondale had six former Democratic officials give testimony or provide comments in support of S. 5. Eight agencies presented the united opposition of the Nixon administration. The arguments for and against were basically similar to those given during the previous Congress.

However, some major statements did emerge. For example, Joseph Califano, former special assistant to President Johnson, gave his often-quoted summary of the information used to make social policy in the Johnson administration:

> The disturbing truth is that the basis of recommendations by an American Cabinet officer of whether to begin, eliminate, or expand vast social programs, more nearly resembles the intuitive judgment of a benevolent tribal chief in remote Africa, than the elaborate sophisticated data with which the Secretary of Defense supports a new major weapons system.

(Full Opportunity, 1970a: 204)

The need of better analysis for social programs found support from research groups. Ernest Hilgard, a professor of psychology and education at Stanford, chairman of the Behavioral and Social Sciences Survey Committee of the Social Science Research Council (the BASS committee), reported basic recommendations (NAS, 1968). First, a system of social indicators should be developed by the federal government as part of the national data system. Second,
the National Academy of Sciences and National Research Council
should be used to coordinate efforts to develop, on a provisional
basis, an annual social report. Third, the Council of Social Ad-
visers should be established when "it has been demonstrated that
a useful and objective report is feasible, one that will set forth
alternatives relatively independent of the immediate political
climate" (Full Opportunity, 1970a: 226). This recommendation
underlined a split within the social science communities over the
direction of social indicators research. One faction, led by
Eleanor Sheldon, from the Russell Sage Foundation, took the posi-
tion that indicators research should be directed at developing
measures useful for determining social change. Other social
scientists were more interested in the applied purposes of social
indicators, such as policy evaluation. Thus, the BASS committee,
taking the position of less immediate policy relevance, gave more
qualified support for the Council of Social Advisers than might
otherwise be expected of the social science community. Reports
from the Committee on Government Programs of the National Academy
of Sciences (NAS, 1968) and from the National Science Foundation
(NSF, 1969) also called for more analysis for government programs. 4

One of the politicians who testified in the 91st Congress
was Representative Claude Pepper (D., Fla.). During the 91st
Congress and the next two, Pepper introduced a companion measure
to S. 5 (as a senator, Pepper had encouraged the passage of the
Employment Act of 1946) where the bill was assigned to the Rules Committee, of which Pepper was a member. When he became chairman of a Select Committee on Crime and involved in that work, Pepper no longer pushed the Mondale proposal although he did reintroduce it subsequently.

TITLE II, SENATOR JAVITS, AND PRIORITY SETTING

During the 91st Congress, marked by the continuing war in Vietnam and the beginning of a Republican administration, the Democratic Congress, especially liberal members of the Senate, became more concerned with the role of Congress in setting national priorities. Senator William Proxmire (D., Wis.) used his subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee to hold hearings on "changing national priorities" (JEC, 1970). He also proposed establishing a national priorities staff within the Joint Economic Committee. Meanwhile, Senator Gaylord Nelson (D., Wis.) had proposed a Joint Congressional Committee on National Priorities, and Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D., Conn.) had held hearings on the possible extension of the role of the comptroller general in the priority-setting area. In addition to these proposed reforms, there were some increases in the analytical capacity of Congress provided by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (see Chapter 1).

The legislative initiatives most important for S. 5 were those of Senator Jacob Javits (R., N.Y.). In the 90th Congress Javits had proposed a committee on federal budget priorities and expenditures
policy. Failing to have the bill considered in the 90th and 91st Congresses by the Government Operations Committee, Javits had tried to append his proposal to a bill on the floor of the Senate. The amendment failed by a narrow margin, and Javits was looking for another bill to which he could add his proposal. The Senate rules made it advantageous to find a bill that might be amended in committee, S. 5 was a likely candidate, and Senator Mondale agreed.

Senator Javits noted that congressional attempts to shape national priorities through appropriations bills had "made manifest the great need to provide Congress with the requisite data and analytic tools for critical and sophisticated analysis of both existing and proposed national programs, and on national resources" (Full Opportunity, 1970a: 234). His Title II of the expanded S. 5 would establish an Office of National Goals and Priorities Analysis (OGPA) for Congress. The office would submit to Congress each year a national priorities report which would include, but not be limited to:


An examination of the resources available to the nation, the foreseeable costs and expected benefits of existing and proposed federal programs, and the resource and cost implications of alternative sets of national priorities.
Recommendations concerning spending priorities among federal programs, and courses of action, including identification of those programs and courses of action which should be given the greatest priority, and those which could be more properly deferred.

(Full Opportunity, 1971: 13)

The Joint Economic Committee would hold hearings on the national goals and priorities report and on other studies produced by the office. In effect Congress would be supplying itself with an institution analogous to the President's Bureau of the Budget. Thus, to Mondale's proposal for an executive Council of Social Advisers was added Javits' proposal for a congressional Bureau of the Budget.

On March 13, 1970, another day of hearings was held on the amended bill. In addition to Senator Javits, Senator Charles H. Percy (R., Ill.), now the twenty-fifth cosponsor of the bill, joined in supporting S. 5. Charles Zwick, who as assistant director of the Bureau of the Budget led the Johnson administration's opposition to the proposal in 1967, now testified in support of S. 5. Zwick reviewed his 1967 testimony and pointed out that the Johnson administration had been in agreement with the objectives of the bill but had thought the Council of Social Advisers premature. Developments since then in social indicators had changed this objection. Zwick supported establishment of the Council of Social Advisers and criticized the Nixon administration for the "retrogression" of their position. He added that the Nixon reorganization plan, revealed on March 12, made a Council of Social Advisers even
more important. The Domestic Council created by the President and staffed by his appointees would be unavailable to Congress because of executive privilege. The lack of congressional access would make the advisers' annual social report more important for judging executive actions on social programs (Full Opportunity, 1970a: 250). Other Democrats out of the administration also supported Mondale's proposal, either in whole or part: Wilbur Cohen, former Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; Mancur Olson; Joseph Califano; Charles Barr, former Secretary of the Treasury; and Leonard Keyserling, former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers.

The Nixon administration's opposition, led by Maurice Mann, assistant director of the Bureau of the Budget, was similar to that of the Johnson administration; namely, that social science analysis was currently inadequate. The opposition argued that extensive activities were being undertaken within the administration by the Urban Affairs Committee, the Bureau of the Budget, and several departments. S. 5, they claimed, represented Congress telling the President how he should structure his executive office: "The proliferation of statutory units in the executive office would impair the flexibility of the President to organize his office as he sees fit. Moreover, an increase in such units could create a major coordination problem for the President and the White House staff" (Full Opportunity, 1970a: 145).
COMMITTEE AND SENATE ACTION

On April 8, 1970, S. 5 was considered and passed by Senator Mondale's subcommittee. On July 1 it was passed by the full Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. In both cases the twenty-five members cosponsoring the bill included a majority of the subcommittee and the full committee; there was never any question of passage.

However, a significant change was made at the committee level. In executive session, after the members had agreed to the bill, Senator Claiborne Pell (D., R.I.) suggested to Mondale that it might not be a good idea to have another congressional committee. Although Mondale favored keeping the Joint Committee on the Social Report in the bill, he replied that its inclusion had somewhat bothered him and put it to the members as they were leaving. The full committee agreed to drop it. Thus, the report issued by the Council of Social Advisers--rather than going to a joint committee created to give it special attention--would be referred to the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and the House Committees on Education and Labor and on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.6

The committee report recommending Senate passage of S. 5 (Full Opportunity, 1970b) gave the normal justifications that Mondale and others had made since 1967 and added in defense of Title I that the Council of Social Advisers would fit in with President Nixon's reorganization plan for the Executive Office of the
President by providing the Domestic Council with the information necessary to make policy recommendations to the President (Full Opportunity, 1970b: 3). Title II, on the other hand, was justified as the counterpart to the Council of Social Advisers, "serving Congress in its examination of budget proposals, program costs and effectiveness, and national priorities revealed in the spending." The report also noted that it would aid Congress as the Domestic Council, the Office of Management and Budget, the National Security Council, the Office and Council of Environment Quality, and the Council of Economic Advisers aid the President by supplying analysis for programs. The report then incorporated some major discussions from hearings of the 90th as well as the 91st Congress (Full Opportunity, 1970b: 6-11).

On September 10, 1970, the Senate considered S. 5. Senators Mondale, Javits, and Proxmire spoke for the bill. Senators Peter H. Dominick (R., Colo.), Robert Griffin (R., Mich.) and John T. Williams (R., Del.) spoke against it. Dominick raised several objections:

S. 5 would mandate an office the President did not want. . . . The proposed amount, $900,000, would mean a large staff in addition to the three members of the CSA. . . . The council would be involved in overseeing activities of every state and local government. . . . The CSA would act as a general overseer group for all federal government action, designed to establish for the White House and for Congress the "social order" as they see it. . . . Congress would not be able to coordinate the February 15th social
The proposal would give money to staff people, and not the poor and needy.

(CR, 1970: S15164)

Senator John Williams commented "perhaps they got the Title 'Full Opportunity Act' from the fact that it would give an opportunity to the Commissioners to promote their own welfare by giving them a job" (CR, 1970: S15166). Despite these objections, S. 5 was passed by a vote of 31 to 24, divided along partisan and ideological lines; of the 24 opposed, all were either Republicans or Southern Democrats. Meanwhile in the House, the companion bill did not move. Representative Pepper had been distracted by other legislative work.

THE 92ND CONGRESS

On January 25, 1971, Mondale introduced S. 5 for himself and twenty-four other senators (CR, 1971: S119-27). The SPA functions of his proposal were the same, except that the section creating a Joint Committee on the Social Report had been deleted. The social report prepared by the Council of Social Advisers would be referred to the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and the House Committees on Education and Labor and on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Thus, Title I was even more executive oriented
than when it was first introduced; the imbalance in analytical capability was increased. The imbalance was mitigated, however, by Title II, which would create an Office of Goals and Priorities Analysis (OGPA).

With the addition of the Office of Goals and Priorities Analysis, the date of the President's annual social report was moved from March 20 to February 15. The Council of Social Advisers had to report to the President in January rather than February. Thus, the office, as critics pointed out, had only two weeks, February 15 to March 1, to examine the President's social report and add its comments on this report to its comments on the President's budget and economic report.

No action by any committee was required in response to the OGPA report. No committee was required to propose a set of congressional goals or budget priorities. However, the fact that the Senate had gone on record in the 91st and again in the 92nd Congress in support of better priority-setting mechanisms for Congress was to have an important impact on the ultimate budget reform adopted in the 93rd Congress.7

HEARINGS

The 92nd Congress continued the trend toward shortened hearings. In one day of hearings five witnesses represented the major positions during that Congress. The administration's position, presented by Dwight Ink of the OMB, remained unchanged: developments

In the 91st Congress, Senator Proxmire had defended S. 5 during floor debate after assurances that the Office of Goals and Priorities Analysis would not infringe on the prerogatives of the Joint Economic Committee; the proposed Joint Committee on the Social Report had already been dropped. During the 92nd Congress Proxmire was chairman of the Joint Economic Committee and more concerned with retaining its dominant role in discussing national priorities within Congress. During 1971 he had recommended enlarging the staff of the Joint Economic Committee to include a national priorities section. In the 1971 hearings Proxmire raised his objections about S. 5's infringing on the work of the Joint Economic Committee to Mondale, but without satisfaction. They agreed to discuss their disagreements on the Senate floor (*Full Opportunity*, 1971: 35).

Raymond Bauer, editor of the ground-breaking *Social Indicators* (1966), was brought to testify on behalf of the bill despite his initial reluctance to endorse the Council of Social Advisers because of the short life of the National Goals Research Staff, to which he had been senior consultant. In his testimony Bauer reviewed the fate of the goals staff and noted that had they been a statutory body as the council would be, the goals
staff would have been more secure. Bauer suggested that several executive branch developments and a growing body of social indicators knowledge had no "central nervous system," "no point of coordination"; that the council would perform this role. Even if the Council of Social Advisers was a statutory body, Bauer went on, the White House had a tremendous power over it: the "power to ignore." Social reporting would occur in the context of programs and policies of the administration in office, and in that sense the annual social report would be a political document. According to Bauer, the requisites for success of the Council of Social Advisers, in addition to useful social indicators and social reporting, would include "diplomacy, skill, opportunism, and luck" (Full Opportunity, 1971: 69).

Meanwhile, changes were taking place within the social science community. Mondale noted after the hearings that he was pleased that support from the social science community had increased for the Council of Social Advisers (CR, 1971: S13107). He pointed out that those attending a symposium on "Applying Knowledge from the Behavioral Sciences to Social Legislation" had come to support what S. 5 called for, although they had not been as supportive in the beginning. Nicholas Demerath, the executive officer of the American Sociological Association, happily reported that "what has been a mood of uncertainty has given way recently to one of greater confidence, indeed a kind of restlessness to get on with the task of fulfilling our promise to the Nation" (Full Opportunity,

Another development during the period of the 92nd Congress was the Counterbudget effort of the National Urban Coalition (Benson & Wolman, 1971). Realizing that changing priorities had to be rooted ultimately in federal expenditures, the National Urban Coalition provided an alternative budget which offered "careful estimates of the dimensions of national needs, and the resources required to pay for them for each of the next five fiscal years" (Full Opportunity, 1971: 56). Sol Linowitz, chairman of the National Urban Coalition, noted in testimony how similar the coalition's task was to that proposed for the Office of Goals and Priorities Analysis. The absence of that ability in Congress, he noted, "engenders Congressional dependence on the executive branch with respect to the major contours of the budget, and hence, the shape of our priorities" (Full Opportunity, 1971: 61).
COMMITTEE AND SENATE ACTION

S. 5 passed the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on June 5 by a vote of 13 to 2. Senator Dominick and Senator Robert Taft, Jr. (R., Ohio), voted against it. In the report on S. 5, Taft and Dominick supplied minority views reiterating most of Dominick's objections at the time of the passage of S. 5 in the previous Congress (Full Opportunity, 1972: 15-16).

S. 5 was considered by the Senate on July 25, 1972. Mondale and Javits led the debate, aided at the end by Senator Humphrey and Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D., Mass.). The opposition was led by Taft and Dominick, aided by Senators Carl T. Curtis (R., Neb.) and Marlow W. Cook (R., Ky.).

Mondale took more seriously the opposition of Senator Proxmire. As a tactic to placate Proxmire's objections, Mondale had seriously considered amending S. 5 so that the Council of Economic Advisers would be expanded to a council of economic and social advisers. This expanded council would put out an economic report in December and a social report in January to be considered by the joint economic and social committee, an expanded Joint Economic Committee. However, another arrangement was worked out between Mondale and Proxmire as a floor amendment. Four amendments were offered. The first was Mondale's compromise with Proxmire. The Proxmire amendment would make the Joint Economic Committee responsible for overseeing the operations of the Office of Goals
and Priorities Analysis. In addition, the office would "to the maximum extent consistent with the provisions of this title, accord priority to requests made by the JEC..." (CR, 1972: S25233). Thus, Proxmire would effectively gain the enlarged priorities staff he had proposed for the Joint Economic Committee. Mondale and Javits supported Proxmire's amendment, but Taft offered an amendment to Proxmire's amendment, to eliminate any reference to the Joint Economic Committee, including the original assignment that the joint committee hold hearings on the report of the Office of Goals and Priorities Analysis. Faced with this threat, Proxmire backed down, withdrawing his amendment in favor of the original language giving the joint committee the duty to hold hearings.

Senator William E. Brock (R., Tenn.) offered an amendment to have the OGPA's assistant director appointed by the minority leaders of the House and Senate, in the same fashion that the Senate majority leader and House Speaker appoint the director. Mondale and Javits supported this amendment as consistent with strengthening the legislature in a bipartisan sense, and the amendment was accepted by the Senate (CR, 1972: S25240). The amendment was, however, not included in the version of S. 5 introduced in the next Congress.

Taft made one last attempt to amend the bill, by dropping Title I. This amendment was quickly dispensed with. In the final vote the bill passed 51 to 40. Those opposed were again either Republicans or Southern Democrats (CR, 1972: S25244).
THE 93RD CONGRESS

In 1973, at the beginning of the 93rd Congress, Title I of S. 5 was six years old; Title II was four years old; both had passed the Senate twice. As the hearing record shows, support came primarily from the academic community. As a Mondale staffer put it; "It represents the interests of academicians about 90 percent; the people and the politicians do not understand the need for it." The arguments for and against the Council of Social Advisers had changed little, although there was more social indicators work available to discuss. Also, as the economy began its downturn, there was less praise for the ability of the Council of Economic Advisers to tell the President how to "fine tune" the economy. Titles I and II of S. 5 remained disjointed contributions to the strategic policy assessment capabilities of Congress. The titles' relationship would change during this Congress; rather than continuing as uncoordinated parts of the one proposal, they were totally separated.

THE POLITICAL SETTING: NIXON

At the beginning of the 93rd Congress President Nixon was riding the crest of his landslide victory over George McGovern. Nixon criticized Congress as "do nothing," and his aides talked of being able to govern with the support of a one-third minority of members in Congress, just enough to prevent veto overrides. Nixon's assault on Congress led the Senate to forego the practice of delaying the
introduction of bills until the President has the opportunity to unveil his program in conjunction with the State of the Union Address. In a flurry of activity during the first week of the 93rd Congress bills were introduced to show that Congress in fact had its own programs. As a result, Mondale introduced S. 5 with only five sponsors, counting himself and Javits. The bill by this time had a low priority for Mondale. Therafter no work was done to acquire cosponsors, and the bill was left with five sponsors, rather than the twenty-five cosponsors of the 92nd Congress.

One reason for the lack of effort was the political climate for social programs engendered by the Nixon presidency. As one staffer put it, it "took the oomph out of the need for a Council of Social Advisers." What liberal, he noted, would get excited about establishing a Council of Social Advisers, only to have Nixon appoint its members? Actions during the 93rd Congress were intended to keep the bill alive for future times and better Presidents.

Hearings on S. 5 during the 90th, 91st, and 92nd Congresses had become progressively shorter. This trend continued in the 93rd Congress: there were no hearings at all. On July 18, 1973, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare passed S. 5 by a vote of 13 to 3. Senator J. Glenn Beall, Jr. (R., Md.), joined Dominick and Taft in opposition. The report was virtually identical to that of the 92nd Congress, with an additional paragraph noting the work of the Joint Study Committee on Budget
Control and its recommendation for a congressional budget office similar in function to the Office of Goals and Priorities Analysis (Full Opportunity, 1973: 2).

Shortly thereafter, Senator Javits, with Mondale's agreement, amended S. 5 by deleting Title II. Javits pointed out the similarities between the Office of Goals and Priorities Analysis and the Congressional Office of the Budget proposed by the Congressional Budgetary Procedures Act of 1973, S. 1541 (CGO, 1974: 6-25). As a member of the Committee on Government Operations, Javits had his title offered as an amendment to S. 1541, Senator Ervin's budget proposal, for Javits realized that this committee was the forum for Title II. Mondale concurred. Part of the credit for the Senate's emphasis on priority setting through the budget process must go to Javits' and Mondale's S. 5. Javits' persistence in attempting to give Congress a mechanism for focusing on priorities made the Senate more amenable to this function of the budget than the House was.

So Mondale's proposal was returned to nearly its original condition, namely, to establish the Council of Social Advisers and its annual social report. The Joint Committee on the Social Report had been eliminated. Information was still gathered on the bill and related developments, but in a form similar to that for S. 3050, namely, a compendium of sources developed by the CRS. Genevieve Knezo, in the science policy division, had prepared annotated bibliographies incorporated into the hearings in the
91st and the 92nd Congress (Full Opportunity, 1970a: 327-439; 1971: 113-90). In the 93rd Congress these bibliographies were circulated in the form of a Congressional Research Service "multilith" on social indicators (Knezo, 1973).

On September 11, 1973, S. 5 was considered on the Senate floor. An important question was raised about which committee should have jurisdiction over it. Senator Taft, realizing that the Government Operations Committee was more conservative and therefore less likely to accept the social awareness proposal, consulted with its chairman, Sam Ervin, who agreed to demand that the bill be referred to his committee for consideration. On the floor Ervin stated that "this bill is clearly within the jurisdiction of the Government Operations Committee" (CR, 1973: S29200). As Mondale well knew, S. 843 had been considered by the Government Operations Committee in the 90th Congress. Only artful drafting by Senator Mondale and timely intercession of the parliamentarian had sent it to the Labor and Public Welfare Committee in the 91st Congress. With the provision that the bill remain in committee for only sixty days, Mondale agreed. Javits, a member of the Government Operations Committee, concurred although he pointed out that sending it there "will turn out perhaps not the optimum way to get this particular bill passed" (CR, 1973: S29200).

That ended the floor debate; the bill was referred to the Government Operations Committee. On November 24 the bill was called up from the committee and placed on the calendar. Senator Ervin
had taken no action on the bill, and Mondale did not push for reconsideration during the 93rd Congress. Thus, S. 5 received favorable action in committee, but no action from the full Senate.

MEMBER GOALS AND ATTITUDES

It appears that Mondale's predominant goal in pursuing S. 5 was good policy. Mondale was interested in social programs and social policy generally. The Council of Social Advisers represented a way to provide the information necessary for better social programs, although Mondale's conception of the good policy process never adequately considered Congress as an institution.

In Mondale's bid for the presidency, his proposal for a Council of Social Advisers would be listed as one of many legislative initiatives. Yet here, as with the foresight provision and S. 3050, the goal of power beyond the chamber was not a major concern. As a Mondale staffer put it, presidential aspirations were not among Mondale's original considerations, or if they were, "he kept it a good secret." In terms of institutional power Mondale, after he eliminated the Joint Committee on the Social Report, had his proposal modified so that the social report went to the Labor and Public Welfare Committee, of which he was a member. However, this change is not very significant for Mondale's institutional position. In terms of reelection, as opposed to a career beyond the chamber, only the normal press releases went out when Mondale introduced the bill in each Congress, when it passed the Senate,
and when an endorsement came from an academic group or government commission. However, such activity was not very significant for his reelection efforts.

Good policy was the predominant reason for Javits' activities. Other members of the committee had not reached the threshold level of activity that would allow them to relate their actions to specific goals, but they were able to respond to some of the strategic policy assessment policy attitude questions. Other members of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare were less hopeful than Mondale about the anticipatory capacity of the government, particularly Congress. Five of the eight responding on level of satisfaction with congressional search were dissatisfied. Most of these members related the search question to a particular area of concern, i.e., planning, individual initiatives by senators, priority coordination. One committee member gave a useful description of the search for problems in the political context of Congress:

Search results from attempts to anticipate future needs and issues so you can steal them from somebody else. This works because of the generally accepted gentlemen's agreement [in the Senate] that once you establish a lead on an issue, others recognize it as yours. Thus, the future is searched by Senators' staff members looking for issues. Less is done in this regard by committee staffers unless it is at the direction of the chairman. This search is related to presidential aspirations, though not always or necessarily so. You need to have your own initiatives in order to get power in the Senate and to make it look as if you are working in the Senate for your constituents.
Three members were generally satisfied with congressional search although they noted that subcommittee work spread members too think and that search varied widely across the 535 members of Congress.

Attitudes about the ability of the government to anticipate problems before the crisis stage were consistently pessimistic. Three members specifically mentioned human nature as the reason for crisis decision making: "History shows that it is part of the human beast." One Senator raised the fundamental question of the role of the representative assembly:

There is a problem with legislating in advance: programs cost money, the public does not want something they don't think they need, and they don't see the current need for anticipated problems. . . . Congress has a representative function. The public which is represented is not interested in the future in any specific terms. In effect a member has to become a salesman for the problem; a crisis helps sell the urgency of the need to deal with the problem.

Some members, principally those with legislative proposals in this area, noted that structural or institutional factors would help raise issues more effectively. On the ability of the government to predict emerging problems, three members said they had not thought about it. Another was impressed by the attempts at forecasting in *The Limits to Growth* but lamented the fact that these attempts could not be translated into specific policy
recommendations. Others noted the greater facility of making predictions in physical rather than social areas.

Several members agreed that they did not receive or use much in the way of forecasts or other future-oriented information. One office surveyed the staff in response to this question and found that the futures information received was primarily from lobbyists and was disregarded when it did not agree with the staff's position. Other members, however, mentioned that they received and used forecasts, specifically from the Joint Economic Committee and the Congressional Research Service educational data system. Among Labor and Public Welfare Committee members, there was little familiarity with the subject lists, or emerging issues service, of the Congressional Research Service.

The extent to which the government should direct or control society drew a more complicated partisan division than was drawn from the Bolling committee (see Chapter 3). One Democrat favored heavy government involvement, while another was more cautious and explicit, stating that the government should provide information on options as well as leadership and advocacy but it should not control tastes, wants, and desires. A liberal Republican who responded noted that as a policy matter, the role of the government is to give direction. More conservative Republicans noted that the government can exert control in certain areas and does so by its programs, but according to one of them, this control should occur in response to a need and not as "an intervention."
All the members responding to the question of the ability of Congress to present a positive, inspiring vision of the future agreed that Congress cannot do so except in specific areas. A coherent vision is not possible "with 100 senatorial egomaniacs." One, however, did note that Congress could play a more definite part in presenting an inspiring and positive vision given a context of responsible parties with a large majority in Congress and a president of the same party.

SUMMARY: SIX STAGES

The summary of S. 5's history in terms of six stages of maturity is as follows:

STAGE 1: INSTIGATION AND PUBLICIZING. Instigation and publicizing of the need for S. 5 began in the context of the Great Society's concern for social problems, a concern fueled by the riots from 1965 to 1967. Thus, highly visible social problems coincided with large government programs and academic discussions calling for social indicators and systems for social reporting and social accounting. These schemes were discussed by columnists, particularly liberal columnists such as Joseph Kraft. During the next six years, publicity of the need for great social analysis and more specifically, a council of social advisers and an annual social report, came from several sources, primarily professional associations and government commissions. Several government
commissions, such as the Population Commission, called for a council of social advisers. Several academic studies called for better social analysis and, in some cases, supported the Council of Social Advisers. Mondale during these years made efforts to publicize these occurrences on behalf of S. 5. However, social analysis is not a "sexy" issue; it is not usually covered by the press. News coverage was confined largely to specialized journals, particularly in the social sciences. The arguments for a council were seldom carried over into the popular press and thereby into the development of a popular opinion about the Council of Social Advisers.

STAGE 2: FORMULATION. Title I of S. 5 was written in 1967, and its original formulation was only marginally modified in the ensuing years. It had been formulated by Bill Shands and other Mondale staffers. The principal outside person from whom Shands sought advice was Bertram Gross, an academic who had been a key staff person in the formulation of the Employment Act of 1946. Throughout the early stage, there was no in-house source on Mondale's staff to supply expertise on social science analysis or the mechanism of national policy formulation.

The resulting formulation was a relatively simple duplication of the process of economic reporting established by the Employment Act of 1946. Namely, there would be a Council of Social Advisers to provide an annual social report to Congress. In Congress a joint committee would be created to handle the
report. Through this process the function of the Council of Social Advisers would be to encourage the development of social analysis and social reporting, much in the way that the Council of Economic Advisers encouraged the growth of economic data and analysis.

Title II was formulated by Senator Javits' staff in order to provide Congress with the technical budgetary expertise the President received from the Office of Management and Budget. The proposed congressional office would analyze goals and budget priorities and report in March of each year. While this report would be considered by the Joint Economic Committee, no other changes were to be made in congressional decision making.

STAGE 3: INFORMATION GATHERING. Mondale profited from the decentralization practiced in the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare (Price, 1972). Beginning in 1969, Mondale had a special subcommittee as the forum in which to consider S. 5. In 1973, when the special subcommittee was eliminated, Mondale was still allowed to gather information on S. 5 with the staff of his Subcommittee on Children and Youth. Information was gathered in hearings during the 90th, 91st, and 92nd Congress. These hearings became progressively shorter, primarily because the arguments remained basically similar during this period. The major new information provided was the product of developments in the social science community and in the executive branch relevant to S. 5. Also during this time, in a manner similar to that noted for S. 3050, the Congressional
Research Service prepared an analysis of developments in the social indicators field, and this analysis was incorporated into the hearing record in the 91st and 92nd Congress. For the 93rd Congress there was a separate Congressional Research Service publication on social indicators (Knezo, 1973). Herb Jasper, the major staff person on Mondale's special subcommittee, was most responsible for information gathered during its existence. The political information, in terms of support and opposition that Jasper needed, followed predictable partisan and ideological lines. Other opposition came from Senator Proxmire because of the bill's implications for his Joint Economic Committee. Jasper also monitored activities in the House, but once Representative Pepper lost interest in pushing the bill, there was nothing to be monitored. During the 93rd Congress no hearings were held, and little political information was gathered.

STAGE 4: INTEREST AGGREGATION. One of the factors necessary for passage of a major strategic policy assessment reform, the hypotheses of this research suggest, is a spectrum of support extending beyond the professional interests most directly affected. S. 5 fell short on this range. As one staff member put it, the interests represented by S. 5 were 90 percent academic. Even this support was weakened by disagreements within the social science community over both the direction of social indicators research and the use of a Council of Social Advisers to link social science more directly to government. Academic support was further weakened
by the reluctance of social science organizations to endorse legislation as other professional organizations do, such as the medical and bar associations. Labor expressed very little support for S. 5, although the labor representative who testified had been involved in questions of social and policy analysis as a member of the Commission on Automation, Technology, and Economic Progress. Likewise, one of the few businessmen to testify on S. 5 was lobbying for his own profession by suggesting that persons familiar with the field of business management should be included among members of the Council of Social Advisers (Full Opportunity, 1971: 102-111).

STAGE 5: MOBILIZATION. S. 5 passed the Senate twice, the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare three times, indicating some mobilization by Mondale and his staff; however, by the 93rd Congress, very little had been accomplished. The bill passed the committee, but Mondale was more concerned with keeping the bill alive than having it actually enacted into law. The opposition, principally conservative Senators Taft and Dominick, were not too concerned about mobilizing support to prevent the bill's passage. Taft did ask Senator Sam Ervin to insure that the bill be referred to the Committee on Government Operations in hope that if the bill approached the point of enactment, the precedent would require consideration by the more conservative Government Operations Committee, as well as by the liberal Labor and Public Welfare Committee.
The lack of organized support or opposition, either inside or outside Congress, is a significant aspect of the bill's history. Enough support was mobilized for S. 5 to pass the Senate twice; yet the House never seriously considered the bill. Apparently, Mondale and his staff made little effort to mobilize in the House. As Mondale's staff pointed out, there was no real incentive for Representative Pepper or other members to get involved so long as the bill was considered almost exclusively a Mondale initiative. Pepper's interest sprang from his involvement as a senator with the passage of the Employment Act of 1946; yet he was distracted by other legislative duties and left the bill with no champion on the House side.

STAGE 6: MODIFICATION. An early strategic policy assessment modification added to the duties of the Council of Social Advisors an explicit reference to a responsibility for long-term analysis. A second modification eliminated the Joint Committee on the Social Report at the suggestion of a member of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee that a new committee for Congress was unnecessary. Mondale was not very attached to the joint committee idea, and he agreed to drop it. Another modification, considered but not brought about, was to amend the bill, as many had suggested, so that it would add to or expand the Joint Economic Committee. The major modifications in the bill's history were the addition and later deletion of Title II, Senator Javits' proposal for a congressional Office of Goals and Priorities Analysis.
Although the procedures in Title I and Title II were never really intermeshed, the effect of Senator Javits' amendment was to counteract the executive orientation of Title I.

Thus, the Mondale proposal for a Council of Social Advisers, the "social policy in the White House" approach to strategic policy assessment, had a long history in the Senate. It was spawned in the right environment to keep it alive: a liberal Labor and Public Welfare Committee and a Democratic and sufficiently liberal Senate. Yet the proposal would go no further than the Senate because the academic and research community was too divided to supply significant outside support. Even those social scientists who did endorse it were never effective in broadening support for the bill.

The Democratic and Republican administrations were both opposed, although the Nixon administration tried to co-opt some features of the proposal through the Social Indicators (1973) publication, the National Research Goals Staff, and the Domestic Council. However, realization of the inadequacy or failure of these efforts coincided with realization of the futility of giving a Council of Social Advisers to a President opposed to social programs and to congressional prerogatives.

NOTES

1. S. 843 declared:
   In order to promote the general welfare, the Congress declares that it is the continuing policy and responsibility of the
federal government, consistent with the primary responsibilities of state and local governments and the private sector, to promote and encourage such conditions as will give every American the opportunity to live in decency and dignity, and to provide a clear and precise picture of whether such conditions are promoted and encouraged in such areas as health, education, and training, rehabilitation, housing vocational opportunities, the arts and humanities, and specialists for the mentally ill and retarded, the deprived, the abandoned, and the criminal, and by measuring progress in meeting such needs.

(S. 843, Sec. 2, in Full Opportunity, 1967: 1-3)

2. Technological advances create new investment opportunities which expect to be paid out of the enhanced earnings that they produce. But there are clearly losses, e.g., the displacement to the worker caused by technological change. There is often a divergence between the private costs borne by an entrepreneur and the social cost of production.

Although data on crime, health, dependent children, and the like are collected by federal agencies, there is rarely any effort to link these problems to underlying conditions, nor is there full measure of the cost of these ills. Systematic analysis of such data might suggest possible courses of remedial action.

( Technology and the American Economy, 1966: 97-98)

3. Mondale added:

... for just as we thrash around in the area of social policy today, so too did we thrash around in the area of economic policy before 1946--making decisions on the basis of untested theories and inadequate information, and assuming that cyclical ways of boom and bust were inevitable.

But 20 years ago, the Congress enacted the Employment Act of 1946, establishing the Council of Economic Advisers and requiring the President to deliver to Congress an annual report to Congress on the progress of the economy on the year past, and prospects for the year ahead. In the two decades since the enactment of that law, we have developed the sophisticated capability to register every quiver in the U.S. economy. . . . The sophisticated data of the Council of Economic Advisers, and through the annual report of the President, the President's policies and programs, have been given broad public exposure while the report statistics accurately measure the performance of the economy in comparison with past years.

We still debate economic policy, of course, but our decisions are now shaped on the basis of hard, factual information, and our economy is doing far better than it has ever done before. (Full Opportunity, 1967: 478)
4. The three reports provided mixed support for S. 5 beyond their endorsement of advancing social science analysis. The BASS committee called for a Council of Social Advisers only after it had been shown that a social report was feasible and could be done in a nonpolitical manner (NAS, 1969a). The National Academy of Sciences Advisory Committee on Government Programs recommended that the Office of Science and Technology be used for coordinating information and that an institute for advanced research on public policy be developed to stimulate better research and analysis (NAS, 1968). The National Science Foundation's board called for the expansion of the Council of Economic Advisers to include social scientists (NSF, 1969).

In addition to the mixed support from these groups, the establishment of the Council of Social Advisers was endorsed by the President's Commission on the Causes of Violence.

5. Mondale commented to Zwick and Barr that since leaving office, all of you come up now and said that enlightenment, fresh air, and the honesty of not having to serve in the executive has caused you to confess your error [in opposing the establishment of a Council of Social Advisers]. Being a politician, this has happened to me many times, so I think that it is good for the soul. Mr. Califano came up and said the same thing. He used to be like a snake in the grass on this issue, raising up to bite me everytime I tried to get support for it, but he gave, as you know, excellent testimony here recently in support of the bill.

(Full Opportunity, 1970a:255)

6. Congressman Pepper kept the Joint Committee on the Social Report in his version of the bill. Mondale hoped that if the bills ever moved through the House and Senate, the Joint Committee would be in the House version and included in the conference committee revision.

7. The Senate would approach budget reform largely as a means to allow Congress to be more effective in setting national priorities, while the House would be more concerned with impoundment control (CGO, 1974: xv). This Senate emphasis on policy and priorities was later reflected in the choice of the director for the Congressional Budget Office. "In general, House Committee members saw the Office as a neutral, analytical arm of Congress similar to the General Accounting Office. Many Senate members, however, preferred a more policy oriented agency that would actively recommend alternatives to the Administration's budget" (CQ, 1975: 59). The Senate won, and Alice Rivlin, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and coauthor of Setting National Priorities, was chosen.
8. However, Mondale's interpretation of support from the 1971 conference was not reflected in the listing of its recommendations in the S. 5 hearing text (Full Opportunity, 1971: 125).

9. In an influential article Peter Henriot raised the following "political questions about social indicators":

(I) Is the root of contemporary social problems a lack of information or a conflict of interests? (2) What are the consequences of the political orientation of the proponents of social indicators? (3) What political consequences follow from the fact that social indicator systems are modeled upon economic systems? (4) Can there be value neutrality in the choice of questions asked in developing social indicator systems? (5) What political consequences follow from the fact that some phenomena can more readily be measured than others? (6) What influences will lobbying pressures have on the data gathering? (7) What influence will the character of a particular agency have upon the gathering of the data? (8) What is the political importance of the presentation of a social report which utilizes systems of social indicators? (9) What safeguards are necessary to prevent the "management of data?" (10) Is it possible or desirable to prevent indicators from being used as vindicators and indicators? (11) To how wide an audience will the data for social indicators be available? (12) What are the dangers to privacy that a system of social indicators might involve? (13) What impact upon administration will the use of social indicators have? (Henriot, 1970)

10. An annual report similar to the Counterbudget was the Brookings series on Setting National Priorities (Schultze, Hamilton & Schick, 1970; Schultze, Fried, Rivlin & Teeters, 1971). These reports presented alternatives to the President's budget proposal and were referred to during the hearings and floor debate as an example of the type of analysis that Congress should be able to do for itself (e.g., Full Opportunity, 1971; CR, 1972: S2541).

11. Herb Jasper left Mondale's staff in March, and the responsibilities for S. 5 were transferred to Jim Verdier and another congressional fellow from the American Academy for the Advancement of Science, Pamela Ebert.
CHAPTER 6

HYPOTHESES AND COMPARISONS
INTRODUCTION

In this chapter the degree of maturity of the three proposals in terms of the six stages of legislative processing has been used to test the hypotheses given in Chapter 2. A brief summary of these stages for each bill precedes a consideration of the hypotheses on committee factors and a comparison with previous descriptions of the committees examined. The importance of member goals and attitudes is then considered. Finally, the results of these findings at the committee and member levels are summarized.

SIX STAGES IN LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY

How successfully were these strategic policy assessment (SPA) proposals processed? How "mature" were they in terms of the six stages of processing: (1) instigation and publicizing, (2) formulation, (3) information gathering, (4) interest aggregation, (5) mobilization, and (6) modification?

Among these proposals only the foresight provision of the Committee Reform Amendments of 1974 (H. Res. 988) was passed during the 93rd Congress. The effects of crisis decision making and the inadequacies of Congress in handling emerging problems were well publicized in 1972 and early 1973. The issue of congressional reform, including SPA reforms, was instigated by the party leadership in the House as well as by Representatives Richard
Bolling and John Culver. Information gathering was a rich and involved process, the second major effort for the House since 1946. Information on the potential approaches to foresight by committees came from a number of sources. The formulation of the foresight provision, after the decision against a central committee, was done by "hard science" staffers in conjunction with testimony from the science policy division of the Congressional Research Service (CRS). The major interests involved were Representative Culver's persistent demands, Representative David Martin's acceptance of foresight as part of the responsibilities of a separate oversight subcommittee for each committee, and the bureaucratic interests of the Congressional Research Service. Support in the committee was unanimous for the provision—if not for the separate subcommittee—and once it was in the Bolling committee's proposal, no further mobilization was necessary. There was much mobilization for and against other parts of the bill, but the foresight provision remained untouched. The only modification, and one not aimed at the foresight provision, was to retain the oversight-foresight mandate for committees while leaving the establishment of a separate subcommittee to the discretion of each committee.

The Full Opportunity and National Goals and Priorities Act (S. 5) passed the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare for the third time. The need for Title I, Senator Walter Mondale's proposal for a Council of Social Advisers, received much publicity
in 1966 and 1967. During the height of Great Society programs, urban riots, and much discussion of social indicators and social reporting, Mondale and others wanted to do for social data and social programs what the Employment Act of 1946 had done for economic data and programs. Formulation came easily: a virtual section-by-section duplication of the 1946 act, this time creating a Council of Social Advisers. Information gathering continued for the next six years as hearings were held in the 90th, 91st, and 92nd Congress; each time progressively shorter, for the basic issues had already been made clear. The Congressional Research Service updated information on social indicators activity for each Congress. Interest aggregation was a major failure in the bill's history. Even in the early years, support never went much beyond academic and professional groups. Opinion within the social science community diverged on the need for the Council of Social Advisers, and an effective lobbying campaign was never mounted. Mobilization in the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare required little effort, and little effort was likewise required for Senate passage in the two previous Congresses, as Democrats and liberal Republicans lined up against Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats. In the 93rd Congress no effort was made after the bill was sent back to the Senate floor from the Committee on Government Operations. Another major shortcoming throughout the bill's history, both in interest aggregation and mobilization, was the failure to find an effective sponsor of
the bill on the House side. Finally, the bill was modified by deletion of the proposed Joint Committee on the Social Report and by addition, then deletion in the 93rd Congress, of Senator Jacob Javits' proposal for a congressional Office of Goals and Priority Analysis.

Senator Humphrey's Balanced National Growth and Development Act of 1974 (S. 3050), an SPA reform of major proportions, was still-born. Despite much publicity on the limits to growth, the energy crisis, and related problems, the concern generated was seldom translated into a concern for governmental decision-making machinery. Some government commissions and reports publicized the need in this area, but they did not provide much political benefit for S. 3050. The issue was formulated by an ambitious Humphrey staffer who was personally committed to it: James E. Thornton. The impact of the changes in national decision making would be felt in virtually every congressional committee and government agency if national policy were developed in conscious relation to growth and development goals. Given the fact that Humphrey was not a member of the Committee on Government Operations and that Sam Ervin, its chairman, was not interested in the bill, Humphrey was behooved to use his own and Thornton's imagination. They had the Congressional Research Service compile annual lists of developments in the area of growth and development policy. A variety of means were used simultaneously to publicize and gather support for the need for growth policy and for
S. 3050. These means included amendments to bills reforming the budget process and establishing a commission on supplies and shortages, the establishment of a long-range policy development process in the single policy area of national forests and range-lands, commentary on the President's growth report, and testimony used to advocate S. 3050 at hearings on other bills. Had the bill been seriously considered, it would have brought out significant private and bureaucratic interests because of its scope, and it would have been modified as a result. Since it was not taken seriously, no modifications were made.

HYPOTHESES

In Chapter 2 the following hypotheses were presented:

MEMBER FACTORS

Action in sponsoring SPA legislation will be directly related to the predominance of the good policy goal over reelection, power in the chamber, or a career beyond the chamber.

Favorable activity on behalf of SPA legislation by sponsors and supporters will be accompanied by the following beliefs or judgments as elements of the SPA policy attitude:

1. That the ways in which Congress searches for problems to consider are inadequate.
2. That emerging problems can be anticipated before they reach a crisis stage.
3. That social events and conditions can be predicted or that the capability to do so should be developed.
4. That the government should attempt to direct or control future developments.

5. That Congress is at a comparative disadvantage to the President in providing a large-scale "positive, inspiring vision" for the nation.

6. That information on likely future conditions including Congressional Research Service lists of emerging issues is available.

COMMITTEE FACTORS

Favorable committee action will be directly related to the following factors:

1. A supportive committee or subcommittee chairman.
2. Staff interest or experience with SPA-related activities as well as political information-gathering and bargaining skills.
3. An ideologically liberal or Democratic majority which perceives that SPA will raise social welfare or government management issues or a congressional reform majority which perceives that its institutional position will be helped or at least not hurt by congressional adoption of SPA techniques.
4. Constituent-oriented and/or broadly based interest group support and support from those groups with a professional stake in SPA-related activity.
5. Positive activity from bureaucratic structures (executive agencies and congressional support organizations) based on potential benefit from conducting SPA activity or from its policy implications.
6. The extent to which the SPA proposal affects lower levels of the ends-means chain; does not attempt to analyze and force decisions across policy areas; uses the existing committee structure without changes; and offers no significant threat to the prevailing distribution of power among members.

Correspondence of SPA proposals to these hypotheses will be examined in terms of committee factors, then committee member goals and elements of the SPA policy attitude.
COMMITTEE FACTORS

COMMITTEE AND SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMEN

The three SPA proposals indicated a favorable committee chairman is a necessary but not sufficient factor in a proposal's success. Representative Bolling favored the foresight provision, although his support as chairman was less important because the select committee operated more collegially than most standing committees. Senator Harrison Williams supported Senator Mondale's S. 5. Williams maintained the committee's pattern of allowing the decentralization of power and the encouragement of personal initiatives among members (Price, 1972). Williams had been preceded as chairman by Senator Ralph Yarborough, who had given Mondale his own special subcommittee to handle S. 5 in 1969. In the 93rd Congress the special subcommittee was eliminated. Mondale was able to use his standing subcommittee staff for work on S. 5, although keeping the bill alive required little effort. S. 3050 suffered from an unreceptive chairman, Sam Ervin, in the Committee on Government Operations.

STAFF

Staff work on the three bills supported the hypothesized need for SPA-relevant knowledge to formulate the proposals and for political information-gathering and bargaining skills to mature proposals that entail significant changes in the distribution of power.
The Bolling committee staff contained at least three types of members: hard science or science policy, political science, and lawyer/politicos. Most important for the foresight provision were the hard science types who translated the call for policy planning and monitoring emerging conditions at the committee level into the specific assignment of futures research and forecasting. This translation occurred in conjunction with the efforts of the science policy division of the Congressional Research Service. Thus, background experience or familiarity with futures research and forecasting were made available to other staff members more skilled at political information gathering. However, once the foresight provision entered the Bolling committee's major draft, it stayed there, and no further support was necessary as it was carried along with the bill. It would cause little change in the distribution of power, either within or across the House committees, and therefore required little political information gathering or bargaining.

Originally, S. 5 was drafted by a journalist working as an American Political Science Association congressional fellow, with help from other Mondale staffers and from Bertram Gross, a political scientist and former Senate staff person essential to the Employment Act of 1946. Thus, knowledgeable persons were involved in drafting the original bill. With a change in staff in the 91st Congress came some political information and bargaining skills, but not enough to aid in widening support beyond academic
groups. By the 93rd Congress little staff effort was required in order to keep the bill alive, although some additional information gathering was done.

No committee staff worked on S. 3050. Instead, James E. Thornton, originally staff director of Humphrey's Rural Development Subcommittee, was its formulator and entrepreneur. With background experience in policy formulation, Thornton had developed an expertise and a commitment to "process thinking." Because he had formulated the massive and complex bill, he also knew where it might be fit into congressional activities. This knowledge became particularly important to Humphrey's need to push S. 3050 in forums other than the Senate Committee on Government Operations. Information-gathering staff work was also provided by annual CRS publications on developments in the growth policy area (CRS, 1972; 1973; 1974; 1975). Interest aggregation work was directed toward various professional groups, such as the American Institute of Planners, and government groups or associations, such as the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations and the National League of Cities. But the full-scale efforts necessary for so far-reaching a bill as S. 3050 were premature during the 93rd Congress.

COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP

In the two committees where the SPA proposals were dealt with, one involved an ideologically liberal majority and the other, a
congressional reform majority. Yet these majorities were not activated by potential effects of the SPA provisions.

The Democrats among Bolling committee members were more liberal than average for House Democrats; the Republicans, as conservative as their party's average in the House (Davidson, 1974: 10); but committee members did not perceive SPA as raising social welfare or government management issues. They were a congressional reform majority. In fact, their distinguishing characteristic was institutional commitment to the Congress. What Roger Davidson (1969) called marginal members, those who remain in Washington from Tuesday to Thursday, were not represented on the committee. Committee members thought foresight beneficial or at least not harmful, and they were supportive of Culver's foresight concerns. The congressional reform nature of the Bolling committee was quickly made evident by the actions of the Democratic caucus and the Hansen committee in amending the bill.

The membership of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare (CLPW) was also more liberal than the average for the Senate, yet only one member perceived that SPA by the Council of Social Advisers would aid liberal programs. Most thought that SPA would have no systematic bias toward liberal or conservative programs, and some had not considered the question at all. Still, an important factor in S. 5's committee passage was the support of Mondale's friends on Labor and Public Welfare. This support adhered to the pattern of decentralized initiative, deference,
and reciprocity among this committee's activists (Fenno, 1973; Price, 1972). In the 93rd Congress Mondale brought Title I to the floor after Senator Javits had separated his proposal. The bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Government Operations (CGO) because of an agreement between a conservative Republican and a committee chairman. The conservative realized that CGO's membership was more conservative than CLPW's, and the committee chairman was ready to maintain his committee's institutional prerogatives. CGO members who ventured an opinion of the effects of SPA from either Humphrey's S. 3050 or Mondale's S. 5 did not see any systematic bias from the analysis. Their attitudes did not move them to push either bill. Given the chairman's opposition, it was unlikely that effort would have made a difference. Thus, the composition of the committee was never an important factor, although Senator Taft's action suggests that it might have been if the SPA bills had been seriously considered.

INTEREST GROUP SUPPORT

The studies of the three bills tend to confirm the hypothesis of interest group support to the extent that a proposal involved changes in structural arrangements in Congress or the executive. The foresight provision, which did not involve such changes, was passed without direct effort on its behalf. S. 5 made it through the Senate twice, more from Mondale's efforts and from Democratic
and liberal support for both the Council of Social Advisers and Javits' Office of Goals and Priorities Analysis than from interest group activity. Interest group support never extended much beyond academic or related professional groups. S. 5 was modeled after the Employment Act of 1946. As noted in Chapter 1, "peak associations" lined up on both sides of the 1946 act, and this lineup was sufficient to insure sponsors and opponents in the Senate and in the House, a level of activity resulting from fears of unemployment following World War II and involving large segments of society. No such force was behind Mondale's proposal, despite the Great Society programs, the urban riots of the 1960s, and the social activism of the period. Support for the concepts, if not the specifics, of S. 3050 came from national associations of planners and architects, the cities, and the state governors. Thus, some interest aggregation was effected despite the lack of serious consideration of S. 3050 in Congress, but not enough to force its consideration by the Committee on Government Operations.

BUREAUCRATIC ACTIVITY

The hypothesized need for positive bureaucratic activity was supported by two proposals, the foresight provision and S. 3050, although the latter did so conversely, by the absence of bureaucratic activity. However, S. 5 refuted the hypothesis by passing the Senate despite persistent opposition from the executive branch.
The foresight provision engendered favorable activity from a relevant bureaucracy: the Congressional Research Service science policy division. The staff director of the Bolling committee and the most relevant testimony for the foresight provision came from the science policy division. The situation was analogous to a committee asking the executive agency that will implement a bill to become involved in drafting it. In this case the congressional bureaucracy had realized from the beginning that its interests were at stake.

S. 5 met with opposition from the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Although the Democrats were concerned to express their support of the bill's objectives, both Republicans and Democrats were concerned that another coordinating group was not needed in the White House, that the social sciences were not yet ready, and that other existing units might perform the necessary data gathering and social analysis. The Council of Economic Advisers was adamant about the inability of a Council of Social Advisers to meet the assigned task. There were some chinks in the governmental opposition: Non-bureaucratic government commissions recommended the establishment of such a council. Indeed, the lack of a significant bureaucratic support did not deter committee and Senate passage of S. 5.

S. 3050 never progressed far enough to warrant executive branch comment. The only reports filed with the Committee on Government Operations came from the General Accounting Office,
which commented on technical questions, and the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, which endorsed the concept of the bill and reiterated its endorsement of many specific provisions.

**SPA AS AN ISSUE**

In Chapter 2 it was noted that SPA reforms may generate patterns of conflict reflecting substantive issues that the analysis may aid, or the SPA reforms may generate conflict because of changes to be made in the decision-making system. SPA reforms were thought to generate conflict based on four related effects that could result from an SPA reform: (1) a rise in the level of the ends-means chain at which policy disputes take place; (2) the degree to which the analysis forces the conscious interrelationship of decisions across policy areas or across committees; (3) the changes required in existing structures; and (4) the redistribution of power that is threatened.

The cases tended to support the expected relationships where the proposal was seriously considered. Thus the minimal change proposal (the foresight provision) raised no objections, while the moderate change proposal (S. 5) generated some objections and the maximal change proposal (S. 3050) was not considered.

The foresight provision calls for futures research and forecasting which may clarify the relationship among means and ends within a committee's policy areas. No committee is forced, nor
is any empowered, to enter the jurisdiction of another committee, although committee analysis may raise the cross-committee impact of actions on related policies. The foresight provision did not require a change in the distribution of power within or among committees. A central goals or growth committee had been considered but was rejected because the Bolling committee felt that members of the House would be opposed to any centralization of power other than through a budget committee, which was being considered elsewhere in the House during the 93rd Congress. The foresight provision was untouched while other sections of the Bolling committee proposal, particularly on committee jurisdictions, were ultimately defeated because of changes to be wrought in power distribution. Thus, the foresight provision was not perceived as requiring any significant shift in power.

S. 5 would tend to shift policy battles to higher levels on the ends-means chain. In the executive the shift would occur through the annual social report and the social advisers' recommendations on the President's budget and on specific means to achieve stated ends. In Congress the shift would occur through Senator Javits' Office of Goals and Priorities Analysis. The office would clarify the choices facing Congress and the interrelation of specific programs and congressional priorities. The conscious interrelationship of decisions would be forced in the executive and in Congress although the analysis would occur in the context of existing organizations. The Office of Goals and Priorities Analysis would operate with the current committee
structure and procedures, issuing its analysis of the President's budget proposals and economic and social reports for the consideration of existing committees. Mondale's Title I was amended so that the social reporting system would operate totally within the context of existing committees. Thus, both titles would force analysis of the interrelationship of decisions, but the use of that analysis within existing structures would remain discretionary.

S. 3050 would raise policy disputes to higher levels of the ends-means chain, expressing programs in terms of their impact on growth policy goals. Such a rise inherently involves cross-policy and cross-committee analysis, and it establishes a process which makes it difficult to ignore the analysis. S. 3050 would make major changes in structures for policy coordination in the executive branch and Congress. The bill would create a network of official and citizens advisory groups throughout the country and establish a separate independent research foundation. Some of these changes, such as the joint congressional committee, were designed to sit on top of the existing structure of committees and would include their chairmen; yet it is likely that this and other changes proposed in the bill would affect the distribution of power.

The impact of these factors inherent in any SPA reform had a differing impact on the handling of the three proposals examined here. The minimal change and discretionary analysis aspects of the foresight provision aided in its passage; it aroused little
attention on these grounds. S. 5 generated opposition from both Democratic and Republican administrations because of the changes it would bring about. The Senate committee accepted the changes in the executive, but eliminated the Joint Committee on the Social Report; so there would be minimal change in Congress. The fact that S. 3050 would cause significant changes was not widely known, because the bill was not seriously considered, yet it may have been one of the reasons for Senator Ervin's lack of interest in the bill.

COMMITTEE COMPARISONS

How does the activity of the three committees on the bills compare with the patterns of committee action described by Price and Fenno? Price noted that the Senate Government Operations Committee's "strengths" lay in instigation and publicizing and in information gathering (1972: 312). In this sense, while the Senate committee was jurisdictionally most relevant to changing government structures to provide for SPA, it was ill prepared to formulate and mobilize for SPA bills. S. 3050 found the committee reluctant to perform even its "strong" functions on an already formulated bill. While the committee did pursue certain specific reforms, such as the establishment of a Consumer Protection Agency, it did not seek out wide-scale changes in the executive branch. Senator Ervin was not interested in this issue, and his time was taken up with the consumer protection issue, budget reform, and the Watergate committee.
Humphrey's actions, when faced with an unresponsive Committee on Government Operations, show another characteristic of the Senate: the importance of individual, non-committee action.

Decision-making inside the Senate is much less of a committee dominated process than in the House. . . . [Senators] want to, can, and do sustain a decision-making process that is more individualistic and gives greater influence to the individual legislator than is the case in the House.

(Fenno, 1973: 146, 147)

Humphrey promoted S. 3050 through diverse activities (see Chapter 4). While Humphrey was individually effective during the early stages of the bill's history, committee action will ultimately return to prominence if the bill is ever seriously considered.

The Select Committee on Committees, the Bolling committee, differed from major standing committees of the House and Senate in a number of respects that are relevant to our SPA concerns. Select committees have been created in the House: to serve interest groups lacking access to standing committees; to serve individual congressmen and make use of particular talents; to evade standing committees when circumstances make it necessary; to perform specific duties in areas of overlapping committee jurisdiction (Jewell & Patterson, 1973: 273). For the period of the 93rd Congress the Bolling committee was to review and recommend changes in committee jurisdictions and procedures, including overlapping committee jurisdictions. Since the Joint Committee
on Congressional Operations, whose ongoing duty is to consider committee operations, would not consider the problem of committee jurisdictions, the select committee was chosen to examine them.

In addition to its singular purpose and bounded lifespan, the Bolling committee was distinguished by the collegiality and bipartisanship of its operation as well as by the quality of its staff. The policy individualism and policy partisanship of the House Education and Labor and Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committees were absent. The Bolling committee resembled the non-partisan and less individualistic House Committee on Foreign Affairs. As this committee during the period of Fenno's research, then, dealt with one major bill a year, the foreign aid bill, the Bolling committee similarly produced only one large proposal. Policy initiatives for members thus meant the incorporation of a desired change into the larger proposal. Culver insured the presence of the foresight provision in H. Res. 988, the large proposal and the object of attention.

Another distinction relevant to SPA reform was the nature of good policy as pursued by the Bolling committee. The House Committees on Education and Labor and on Foreign Affairs have been described as dominated by the pursuit of good policy (Fenno, 1973). The Bolling committee's good policy goal dealt with House procedures and jurisdictions rather than with substantive policy. Committee members had a greater commitment to effective House operations and the reforms implied than the remainder of the
House. The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and the House Committee on Education and Labor often produce bills which are too liberal for the parent chamber. Rather than too liberal or too conservative, the Bolling committee product was too "congressional reform" oriented, and sections dealing with committee jurisdictions were rejected. The opposition to proposed changes in House processes came, not from the partisan or ideological groupings evident in response to good policy initiatives in the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, but from a stake in the system, or seniority alignment. The foresight provision, a potentially important reform, did not require any shifts in power and never became a target of the "congressional reform" opposition to the jurisdictional changes.

The treatment of S. 5 by the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare permits the greatest amount of comparison with previous research. Price and Fenno ascribed general patterns of decentralization, partisanship (muted by the presence of liberal Republicans), and active pursuit of policy individualism to this committee, and these patterns were reflected in the case of S. 5. Liberal Republicans, particularly Senator Jacob Javits, showed muted partisanship while encouraging liberal policy individualism. As liberals and activists, the committee's Democrats were "even more supportive of policy individualism and in no sense view[ed] themselves as merely responding to initiatives taken in the policy environment" (Fenno, 1973: 169). Control of committee staff augmented this liberal predominance. Javits' control over minority
staff in the Labor and Public Welfare Committee often left con-
servative Republic Peter Dominick to muster the opposition without
aid from committee staff (Price, 1972). Conservatives suffered
similarly in Mondale's special subcommittee on S. 5, where Javits
was the ranking minority member.

S. 5 also fits the pattern of liberal senatorial activism
and "public" style (Price, 1972). That members of the Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare at times assume policy leadership
puts them in the position of creating a demand for their legis-
lation. This committee's members have been known to prod outside
groups to support a senatorial initiative--"the echo creating
the yell" (Price, 1972: 229). Mondale tried to do so with S. 5
and the aid of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee and the
full Senate. That the "yell" was never loud enough is reflected
by the fact that the House would not consider S. 5.

MEMBER GOALS

Our discussion has suggested numerous factors at the committee
level that are relevant to SPA proposals, but the focus on com-
mittees should not obscure the importance of the policy entre-
preneur. The case approach was chosen because it gives some clues
why the phenomenon of "policy making remains singularly resistant
to theory building and generalization" (Price, 1972: 306).

The notion of role has been widely used in studies of Congress,
but few attempts have been made to link role orientations to the
legislative efforts that individuals and committees do or do not undertake (Price, 1972: 339). In this study member goals have been used to understand the nature of legislative responsibility shown in the three SPA proposals. By use of goal categories suggested by Fenno (1973), it was hypothesized that the goal of good policy would predominate over goals like reelection or power in the chamber. The case studies have supported this hypothesis that the goal of good policy would be predominant over the goals of reelection or power in the chamber in determining SPA-related action. However, this support and the information gathered on the relative importance of goals does not adequately explain the initiatives taken in the SPA area.

Fenno used the goal categories to understand the general patterns of reinforcement which differentiate certain committees. The behavior involved in processing legislative initiatives is too specific to be fully understood by categories aimed at more diffuse or aggregate forms of behavior. Why Culver, Humphrey, and Mondale chose to pursue SPA-related changes has been among our concerns. In each case study there was a particular set of circumstances that led these members to pursue the specific SPA proposals.

For Mondale a Joseph Kraft column struck a responsive chord: the idea of social reporting and the mechanism of a Council of Social Advisers fell neatly together. At the time Mondale did not belong to the Labor and Public Welfare Committee, and he was dissatisfied with his inability to work more actively on social
issues. The social advisers idea allowed him to fill a personal void as a policy maker with something he thought imaginative and futuristic. He used his personal staff resources and advice necessary to formulate the bill, and he had a favorable colleague, Senator Fred Harris, ready to hold hearings in the 90th Congress. From the 91st Congress on, Mondale had his own special subcommittee for the bill.

Hubert Humphrey returned to the Senate in 1970 after four years as Vice-President. Working in the Subcommittee on Rural Development, Humphrey began to be concerned with the larger context of the problems of rural areas: national growth policy. His subcommittee staff director was experienced and committed to the idea of a more coherent national policy-making process. As a member of the Government Operations Committee, Humphrey found that the growth policy bill offered a significant initiative to be taken in that committee. His bid for the presidency in 1972 led him from the Government Operations Committee to the Foreign Relations Committee. However, this switch did not stop Humphrey's or his staff member's efforts to formulate an SPA proposal and then publicize the need for it in a variety of forums.

John Culver had shown a variety of policy and organizational skills, both as chairman of the House Democratic Study Group and in the Democratic Party's national policy committee. In the House he was frustrated by the small amount of creative work done by the Government Operations Committee, of which he was a member.
Culver had a driving concern for the problems of crisis decision making and the outmoded habits of Congress, reinforced by his friendship with Alvin Toffler. Culver was one of the representatives who prompted the formation of the Select Committee on Committees to address the questions of modernizing the House. Once the committee was formed and effectively staffed, the foresight provision developed as a logical progression of Culver's intense interest in the operations and choices of the Bolling committee.

**SPA POLICY ATTITUDE**

It was found that these attitudes were not sufficiently related to support or opposition of the SPA proposals to allow testing of the hypotheses across those interviewed, except for the response on the ability of the government to anticipate crises. Sponsors were more optimistic than others that the emerging problems could be dealt with before the crisis stage.

For Humphrey, Mondale, and Culver a variety of perceptions led them to advocate specific SPA reforms. What were their SPA policy attitudes? How do their attitudes compare with the attitudes of those who were not as active in the SPA areas? And what, if any, relation do these policy attitudes have to specific SPA formulations? In this section the responses have been examined to the questions on members' SPA policy attitudes. Since the focus of this research was committee activity, questions were asked of the members of the two Senate committees and one House
committee. The responses have been grouped, with distinctions made on the basis of partisanship, ideology, and level of SPA activity (principal sponsor or not). While the group interviewed was not a representative sample of members of Congress, the responses are useful for the issues they raised as well as for what is shown about the sponsors of SPA bills.

The questions used to explore the dimensions of the SPA policy attitude dealt with topics that are not in the normal range of discourse for most members of Congress, and these questions were open-ended rather than fixed response. Thus, a variety of responses and nonresponses were received. Consequently, some answers to these questions did not lend themselves to meaningful categorization. Other answers were more consistent. The presentation of the responses will reflect these variations. Senator Humphrey has been added as a sponsor although he was not a member of either of the two Senate committees.

Taken together, the responses to questions about the search for problems and the ability to anticipate problems provided an interesting picture of Congress and allowed some differentiation between those most active on SPA issues and others. Three-quarters of those who responded were dissatisfied with the ways in which Congress normally searches for problems. Those who were satisfied felt that Congress was successful in dealing with all the relevant, politically important issues. The sponsors of SPA legislation expressed dissatisfaction with congressional search procedures,
but they were in the minority in expressing optimism that the government could anticipate problems before the crisis stage. Only one-quarter of those responding thought the government could avoid crisis decision making. Of the pessimistic majority, one-third specifically mentioned human nature as a root cause: "... can't change human nature; the structure is there, it's the political will that is missing" and "History shows that it [crisis decision making] is part of the human beast."

Several of those both optimistic and pessimistic about anticipating crises mentioned the importance of institutional arrangements for identifying problems and forcing the government to confront emerging problems. One articulate conservative, who had expressed his satisfaction with the search for problems by the Congress, was pessimistic about the ability of Congress--and democratic government generally, regardless of institutional mechanisms--to anticipate crises:

Forcing the country to meet problems before they reach a crisis stage necessitates a discipline that isn't in the personal or political lives of the people. The people perceived energy to be a crisis and acted in a disciplined way for a short time; they showed self-discipline. Whether inflation will have the same result is unclear, especially if it means hurting the pocketbook.

... Congress is ill equipped emotionally to declare good policy ... [but] there is nothing functionally deficient with Congress; rather the problem is that in a democratic society the legislature cannot
really anticipate problems. There is a need for a public relations effort to sell the importance of future problems. Yet even then, if there were a PR effort from a committee, some public awareness might be generated, but neither Congress nor a committee could polarize the nation.

Another justified congressional inability to anticipate by pointing out that "part of our representative system is that the representative has a limited view." The sponsors of the three bills were not deterred by this kind of thinking. Something should be done to provide greater foresight, the sponsors said, and such foresight will have an impact on the capacity of the government to avert crises.

SPA evaluates information that will aid in searching for emerging issues and informing current decisions of future conditions and the likely interactions between current decisions and long-term trends and conditions. Thus it was assumed that members who were active in the SPA area had considered the ability to predict future trends and conditions. Many members had not, and most members avoided discussion of specific forecasts. Several members were familiar with economic forecasts, either as economists or through the Joint Economic Committee. Others noted that predictions in the social area are less developed and more uncertain than those dealing with physical resources. Most members were concerned with the relevance of predictions for policy making. A member familiar with economic forecasting,
for example, avoided any direct comment on the accuracy of predictions in the social area, but he added that predictive ability was not the only concern: "Given a great amount of information and good intuition, you can predict a little, but more importantly, you can provide alternative predictions." A conservative Republican who had been involved in local planning efforts in his district noted that "any prediction is an uncertain business, but this is no reason not to attempt to predict. Planning is part of rational behavior."

In discussing the ability of members to choose information sources, Edward Schneier (1970) commented that members of Congress, because of their profession as politicians, often excel in judging information by its source. Several members responded, not about the accuracy of predictions, but about the sources of predictions, noting that most predictions (and future information generally) are provided by lobbyists to support specific positions. Another commented on the problems of making and using predictions for the government: "Officials have their jobs and positions by virtue of their relationship to the status quo or the nature of the status quo. Predictions which might adversely affect this are not welcome."

A partisan division among responses by Bolling committee members to a question of government's role in directing or controlling the future was noted in Chapter 3. Interviews in the Senate confirmed this observation. Of the nine members, including
sponsors, who assigned the government a positive role, eight were moderate or liberal Democrats; the other was a liberal Republican. Most Republicans reacted to the word *control* in the question (in contrast many Democrats focused on the word *direct*). "I don't like the word *control*," said one Republican. Another could not "give an answer [on the general role of government]. . . . [It] depends on the individual circumstances. We may be able to control the future in the area of energy self-sufficiency, [but] not many areas are like that." Another Republican was "not sure that the authority is better as a catalyst. . . . the alternative [to control by business] of government management is worse than any present problems."

Few members had thought about the effect that SPA activity would have. The only member who expressly thought it would help liberal goals was a sponsor. Most members venturing an opinion expected no systematic bias for liberal or conservative programs. Some Bolling committee members thought that the futures research and forecasting of the foresight provision would have little impact on committee operations. Others thought that futures analysis in general was not likely to have much impact on crisis decision making.

Responses to the question of future-oriented information, in terms of conditions or events, five, ten, or twenty-five years into the future, suggested that a small number of members receive futures information and even fewer consciously assimilate it into
decision making. Some mentioned specific policy areas, such as agriculture, education, and the economy. Another mentioned the futures information in the Club of Rome reports (Meadows et al., 1972; Mesarovic & Pestel, 1974). As in the case of the accuracy of predictions, members and staff often spoke of the sources of futures information. An office which polled its staff members on this question found relatively little futures information that they were aware of; what the office did find was supplied by lobby groups.

In Chapter 2 it was suggested that knowledge and use of the emerging issues service of the Congressional Research Service might provide an indicator of the member's search for existing SPA resources within Congress. About half of those interviewed were familiar with the lists prepared for the 93rd Congress, yet the only member who had made use of them was a committee chairman. The remainder were unfamiliar with this service to committee chairman, undoubtedly because the lists are developed in consultation with chairmen and distributed at their discretion. All of the SPA sponsors were familiar with the subject lists.

The only unanimous response was given to the question of the role of Congress in providing a "positive, inspiring vision" for the nation's future. All members interviewed recognized the disadvantage of Congress, with "535 prima donnas" or "100 senatorial egomaniacs," compared to the President in effectively proposing large-scale goals. Many members said that Congress can and does
provide this type of leadership on some issues or in specific
areas, but not in terms of an over-all program.

What do the answers to questions on the policy attitude
toward SPA tell us? How useful were these answers in differen-
tiating sponsors from other members, and what are their impli-
cations? The questions on prediction, the role of Congress,
future-oriented information, and the subject lists did not sig-
nificantly differentiate sponsors from other members. The ques-
tions on search, the ability to anticipate, and the role of the
government in directing and controlling the future made a com-
posite picture. The sponsors of SPA bills are dissatisfied
with the normal patterns of congressional search; they feel that
the government has a positive role in directing or controlling
the future; and, most importantly, they are optimistic about
the ability of the government, including Congress, to anticipate
and deal with problems before the crisis stage. As the case
studies showed, these elements of an SPA policy attitude had
little determinable impact on the support or opposition for SPA
measures on the part of other committee members.

SUMMARY

The three cases studied here generally confirmed the hypo-
thesized relationships between committee factors and the successful
processing of SPA reforms. The composite picture emerged of a
legislatively active member of Congress who feels a need for structural reforms and optimism that such reforms will be effective. The successful member is accompanied by a supportive committee chairman, expert and entrepreneurial staff, liberal or congressional reform majorities in committee, and supportive interest group and bureaucratic activity. The degree of input from these various factors will depend on the amount of change in analysis of ends and means, in cross-policy analysis, in institutional structures, and in redistribution of power involved in the proposed reform. These factors are important in accomplishing the legislative tasks involved in the six stages of a bill's processing. However, these factors operate within committees or upon committee activity. Another set of factors affects the viability of a bill, whether "it will fly" in the parent chamber. In Chapter 7 the factors affecting the viability of our SPA reforms during the 93rd Congress have been considered along with the implications of these factors for other congressional reform efforts.

NOTES

1. Hypotheses on committee factors were taken principally from the works of David Price (1972) and Richard Fenno (1973) with additions relevant to strategic policy assessment, congressional reform, or policy process.

2. The fact that the Bolling committee members were different from most other members interviewed was quickly noticeable. The questions dealing with strategic policy assessment policy attitude were not within the normal range of discussion for most
members. Early interviewing in the Senate, particularly among members who were on the relevant committee but who did not have their own proposals in this area, revealed some hesitancy in answering the questions. Virtually all of the seven Bolling committee members were comfortable in answering strategic policy assessment questions and generally discussing the conceptual nature of congressional operations. A Bolling committee member and a staffer agreed that this conceptual orientation and institutional commitment would predispose these members toward strategic policy assessment to a greater degree than the average member of Congress.

3. Interest group activity on the Bolling committee proposal was primarily negative. Most interest groups, from Ralph Nader's group and environmentalists to the Chamber of Commerce, feared the loss of established relationships and therefore lobbied against the major jurisdictional changes proposed by the Bolling committee.

4. The exceptions were former Democratic officials of the Council of Economic Advisers who "saw the light" and testified in support of the Council of Social Advisers during the Republican administration.

5. The requirement of separate oversight-foresight subcommittees would have affected the distribution of power within committees in a way which some members argued would make effective oversight difficult by isolating the overseers. The ultimate decision was to leave the establishment of a separate oversight subcommittee to each committee.
CHAPTER 7

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
VIABILITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONGRESSIONAL REFORM

A bill's place in six stages of development reflects its maturity; the degree of responsiveness to a bill in the parent chamber marks its viability. A factor which augments a bill's viability is a sense of urgency among relevant sectors of the public and members of Congress.

The 93rd Congress produced for a variety of reforms a sense of urgency and a sense of need affecting the processing of the three strategic policy assessment (SPA) reforms in several ways. President Nixon's impoundment of appropriated funds, and other offenses to congressional prerogatives and sensibilities, sufficiently enraged the Congress to compel it to action. The actions of President Nixon and his assistants during and after the 1972 presidential campaign led to the Watergate scandal, the Watergate committee, impeachment proceedings, and ultimately the resignation of the President. Also, several economic and environmental crises were felt during the period, most notably the energy crisis. Thus, impoundment, Watergate, and the energy crisis were major events during the 93rd Congress that might have created a sense of urgency for congressional reform.

The impoundment controversy and crisis decision making prior to the energy crisis contributed to an agreement within the House over the need for reform and thus sufficient support to establish
the Bolling committee. Once established, the Bolling committee easily worked the foresight provision into its proposal. The viability of the foresight provision in the Hansen committee and in the House at large was assured by its presence among the procedural aspects of the Bolling proposal. The jurisdictional changes recommended by the Bolling committee were not so viable. The reform majority crumbled when a sufficient number of members felt that their current positions were threatened by changes in committee jurisdictions.

During the 93rd Congress, S. 5 was affected in two specific ways by congressional response to impoundment and Watergate. (1) During the budget reform debates Senator Jacob Javits separated his Title II in order to offer it as an amendment to the congressional budget proposals. This deletion left Senator Mondale with the Council of Social Advisers proposal. (2) Congress showed a decided lack of interest in giving a President so unreceptive to social programs as Richard Nixon a Council of Social Advisers. As one staffer put it, the "oomph" had gone out of the bill.

S. 3050 was affected to the extent that the Government Operations Committee was busy with budget reform proposals, and its chairman, Senator Sam Ervin, was distracted by his chairmanship of the Watergate committee. Equally important for S. 3050, the energy crisis and similar problems had no effect on responsiveness within Congress to the bill, and the bill's relevance to these issues was never effectively demonstrated.
IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH

The committee focus has lead to an understanding how these proposals did and did not move toward ultimate passage. Yet S. 5 and S. 3050 did affect strategic policy assessment activities despite their lack of success. S. 5, during its history, influenced executive branch actions under Presidents Johnson and Nixon in the social reporting field. The existence of S. 5 reinforced persons in the social indicators movement who favored greater government use of social indicators. Title II of S. 5 became part of the Senate's expression that a congressional budget should be used to develop a congressional set of national priorities. Likewise, the presence of S. 3050 resulted in Humphrey's persistent attempts to have growth policy become a more explicit concern of national decision making.

The committee focus has also allowed us to isolate key factors and shortcomings that are relevant to future efforts at strategic policy assessment reform in Congress. Within Congress the viability of SPA reforms will depend on the degree to which the analysis or its use is left to the relevant decision unit, i.e., the committees, or is incorporated into an explicit process, particularly if establishing the process involves a change in the current distribution of power.

Thus the foresight provision was viable because the change it required was minimal and because each committee would determine
its own level of activity on futures research and forecasting. Because of the incipient nature of S. 3050 and S. 5, it is useful to consider the budget reform, which included some provisions for strategic policy assessment and did cause changes in the distribution of power, alongside the jurisdictional sections of the Bolling committee report. The latter, while not explicitly concerned with analysis, would have accomplished the third SPA function by forcing the conscious interrelationship of decisions within policy areas by grouping coherent clusters of policy within the same committee. This change also would involve shifts in the current level of power. The difference in viability between the budget reform and the jurisdictional proposals stemmed from the direct link between the President's challenge to Congress and the realization of need for a congressional budget. The link between the challenges to Congress and its committee jurisdictions was not so obvious. The link between the energy crisis and committee jurisdictions was obvious, yet of low impact.

A second distinction between the budget reform and the Bolling committee proposals is to be made in the patterns of negotiation and bargaining among affected committees. Members of the Bolling committee solicited the opinions of colleagues and encouraged them to testify, but no full-scale bargaining session was held to work out committee jurisdictional changes. The Hansen committee was involved in some bargaining, but primarily among opponents to the Bolling committee plan in order to insure a sufficient
number of votes to amend the Bolling proposal. The budget reform proposals, particularly in the Senate, set off a great deal of negotiation among affected committees. One involved staffer described it as an example of Congress lobbying itself, as members and committee staff set out to protect their committee's interests.

The crucial role of interest groups, particularly where SPA reform did involve shifts in the distribution of power, has been mentioned. To a certain extent the budget reform is an exception to this rule, but it was prompted by a unique institutional challenge by the President and thus did not require the momentum normally given by interest group support. As we have seen, the history of S. 5 was marked by the absence of widespread interest group support that marked its historical model, the Employment Act of 1946.

SPA reforms pose an interesting question of the extent to which interest groups will advocate strategic policy assessment. Lobby groups have traditionally been a source of information, including futures information, for committees. Greater emphasis on strategic policy assessment and a consequent clarification of goals and policies in relation to likely trends and conditions might be detrimental to the interests of particular groups.

Thus, the pattern of interest group activity on the Bolling committee proposal may be the normal one when interest groups are not part of the formulation process. While some "process" or "good government" groups, such as Common Cause and the League
of Women Voters, supported the entire Bolling committee package, most interest groups, whether business, labor, environmental, or Ralph Nader organizations, were opposed out of concern for their own positions. In the case of the Employment Act of 1946, interest groups took part in the formulation stage—and therefore in the mobilization efforts—suggesting that major SPA reforms should include interest groups in the formulation stage or, for the case of S. 3050, in modification efforts.

Beyond organized interest groups lies general public support and, sometimes, constituent pressure. Congressional reform including SPA reforms are not the type that easily generate public support. The effects of crisis decision making, such as produced by the energy crisis, are opposed by the general public, but this opposition is seldom transferred into support for specific mechanisms to change the decision-making system. It is not likely that support for, interest in, or attention to specifics of the policy process will increase greatly among the general public. Thus, great public support will probably be forthcoming only if SPA reforms are linked to another concern of greater and more obvious importance to the public.

Entrepreneurial activity was needed from SPA sponsors and their staffs in order to link SPA reforms to problems which the reforms might be useful in correcting; sponsors and staffs made such efforts to an extent for S. 5 and S. 3050, but not sufficiently. Even if Senator Ervin had been more supportive and had
allowed Senator Humphrey to use the Committee on Government Operations to push S. 3050, this activity would have been only one among several events on a given day. SPA sponsors would be hard pressed to generate sufficient attention for large-scale reforms. Thus the role of the President is crucial, particularly for SPA reforms that are government-wide. The Employment Act of 1946 was instigated within Congress, but during its development the President gave his support to the full employment legislation and, at appropriate times, made public statements stressing its importance and chiding reluctant House committees (Bailey, 1950). Presidential support and ability to focus the country's attention are necessary for SPA reforms like S. 3050, which require important modifications in Congress and the executive.

This research has focused on the process of congressional reform in the SPA area. Implications for further research include the evaluation of the impact of several of the reforms studied: the House committee's foresight activities, the congressional budget process, the long-range policy process established in the National Forest and Rangelands Act, the futures research group in the Congressional Research Service, and the work of the Office of Technology Assessment and its impact on congressional committees. The process of adopting SPA reforms should be examined through the work of the advisory committee established at Senator Humphrey's insistence to the National Commission on Supplies and Shortages.
CONCLUSION

In this study three cases of legislative initiative by members of Congress have been examined. Although attention was concentrated on initiatives dealing with SPA reforms, the findings essentially concur with the conclusions about policy assertiveness drawn by David Price in studying legislative responsibility in the Senate (1972). Price noted a healthy assertiveness in the action of certain senators in initiating policies, and he expressed the belief that such creative behavior may become more prominent in the years ahead:

... these initiatives provide only a hint as to the kind of creativity and responsiveness that might result if legislators began to take full advantage of the resources and opportunities for leadership at their disposal.

(Price, 1972: 333)

The present study has shown some of the kinds of creativity and responsiveness that are open to legislators when they question the very processes of congressional policy making. For SPA reforms to be effective, this questioning will have to persist until the processes, particularly those by which Congress sets its agenda, informs its current decisions, and consciously considers the interrelationship of its scattered decision, are understood. This study concurs with Price in suggesting that the three SPA initiatives only hint at the possibilities for providing more effective
anticipatory decision making. The case studies suggest that the greatest areas for legislative assertiveness lie beyond Congress in informing popular opinion and organized groups of the importance of a process orientation and the value of strategic policy assessment.
APPENDIX 1

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Respondent #
Date

As you know, there has been much discussion inside and outside of Congress over such issues as the decline of Congress in relation to the executive, over what our national priorities should be and how they should be set, and over the ongoing series of crises which American society faces. Several changes in Congressional procedures have been proposed which relate to these problems. The Center for Governmental Responsibility at the University of Florida is concerned with several of these proposals. In my current research for the Center I am concentrating on committee activity on certain proposals which would give Congress the ability to assess long term needs and resources and use these assessments in its current decision making.

is one of these proposals. In my research I am trying to determine how these proposals came to be, how they are perceived by yourself and other committee members, and what impact they might have on Congress as an institution if they were passed.

As I mentioned in my letter, this interview will be considered confidential in the normal practice of this type of research; no personal or individual attributions of statements will be made when the results are reported.

Short summary of SPA provision(s) in the bill

I. Reconstruction of how SPA and the bill came to be

1. Are you familiar with how this (SPA activity) came to be part of the bill?

2. In relation to the bill as a whole, who was responsible for instigation and publicizing the fact that (problem confronted by the SPA activity or the bill)?
   (Probe as to how this was done, the role of the staff, members, interest groups.)

3. Who formulated (SPA activity) into this bill?
   (Exclude if answered in 1)

4A. Who gathered information on the level of support and opposition?
   (Probe as to the role of the staff, CRS, OTA,
administration, interest groups, members and chairman.)

4B. Who gathered information on the level of support and opposition?
   (Probe as to role of the staff, members, chairman.)

5. Whose interests or what interests does this bill and (SPA activity) represent?
   a. How did this come to be?
      (Probe as to who aggregated interest for the bill, whether interests beyond those with a professional stake were involved; what was the pattern of response to interest groups, the administration; were these interests anticipated without communication or was there some interaction?)

6. Who worked to mobilize support for this bill?
   (Probe as to role of the committee chairman, sponsor(s), proponents of amendments, staff, CRS, interest groups.)

7. What modifications were made on (SPA activity); on the bill as a whole?
   (Prove as to what effect this had on the substance of the bill, on its passage.)

II. Member activity in relation to member goals

8. How might (SPA activity) affect the policies or issues you are most concerned with?

9. How might (SPA activity) affect your reelection efforts if it were passed?

10. How might (SPA activity) affect your position within the (House/Senate)?

III. Background and other information related to SPA

11. Some proponents of this type of activity suggest that it would allow Congress to anticipate problems and thus prevent the recurrent series of crises which the nation has faced in the last few years. To what extent do you think it is possible to anticipate major problems and to deal with them before they reach a crisis stage?

12. The activity this bill proposes would imply that social trends, conditions, and events can be predicted. To what extent can social trends or activity be predicted?
   (Probe, if yes, into how and what types of predictions; if no, probe into why not.)
13. (SPA activity) implies that once likely future social activity could be predicted, it could also be changed or directed. To what extent can future conditions be directed or controlled? To what extent should the government be involved in this?

14. Would this activity affect the types of issues or problems which Congress normally considers? (If yes, how and what types; if no, why?)

15. In your opinion, how adequate or inadequate are the current ways in which Congress searches for issues or problems to consider?

16. If this activity were adopted would it change the internal distribution of power in Congress? (Probe as to how; whether it would affect the power of the committee chairman, the party, the party caucus, the policy committees, the DSG.)

17. In expert testimony on this subject and in my own discussions thus far with members of Congress, a recurring question has been raised, namely, the need for a positive, inspiring vision of the future or the direction in which the nation should move. Admitting the problems involved in defining what this positive vision might entail, to what extent do you think Congress can provide this type of large scale goal or goals?

18. Returning to the level of your own experience, what types of future oriented information do you have access to or use in your committee activity and floor voting? What sources provide you with this type of information?

Since this is a new area of Congressional activity it is difficult to be certain that I have covered all of the important aspects related to this issue. Can you think of anything which is relevant which we have not discussed?

Thank you very much. I appreciate the time you have given me.
APPENDIX 2
SHORTENED LIST OF QUESTIONS

1. In your opinion, how adequate or inadequate are the current ways in which Congress searches for issues or problems to consider?

2. If Congress were to adopt more systematic techniques for the assessment of the future, what affect might it have on the issues which are considered by Congress; on the goals which Congress chooses to pursue; or on other aspects of Congressional decision making?

3. Some proponents of this type of activity suggest that it would allow Congress to anticipate problems and thus prevent the recurrent series of crises which the nation has faced in the last few years. To what extent do you think it is possible to anticipate major problems and do deal with them before they reach a crisis stage?

4. On a more general level, to what extent do you think that social trends or activity can be predicted? In what areas?

5. The proposals in this area imply that future conditions can be directed or controlled. To what extent do you think that this is possible?

6. In expert testimony on this subject and in my own discussions thus far with members of Congress, a recurring question has been raised, namely, the need for a positive, inspiring vision of the future or the direction in which the nation should move. Admitting the problems involved in defining what this positive vision might entail, to what extent do you think Congress can provide this type of large scale goal or goals?

7. Returning to the level of your own experience, what types of future oriented information do you have access to or use in your committee activity and floor voting? What sources provide you with this type of information?

8. What is your position on (SPA proposal) or why do you (support or oppose) (SPA proposal)?
APPENDIX 3
THE FORESIGHT PROVISION OF THE HOUSE RULES
RULE 10  SECTION 2

2. (a) In order to assist the House in—

(1) its analysis, appraisal, and evaluation of (A) the application, administration, execution, and effectiveness of the laws enacted by the Congress, or (B) conditions and circumstances which may indicate the necessity or desirability of enacting new or additional legislation, and

(2) its formulation, consideration, and enactment of such modifications of or changes in those laws, and of such additional legislation, as may be necessary or appropriate, the various standing committees shall have oversight responsibilities as provided in paragraph (b).

(b) (1) Each standing committee (other than the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on the Budget) shall review and study, on a continuing basis, the application, administration, execution, and effectiveness of those laws, or parts of laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of that committee and the organization and operation of the Federal agencies and entities having responsibilities in or for the administration and execution thereof, in order to determine whether such laws and the programs thereunder are being implemented and carried out in accordance with the intent of the Congress and whether such programs should be continued, curtailed, or eliminated. In addition, each such committee shall review and study any conditions or circumstances
which may indicate the necessity or desirability of enacting new or additional legislation within the jurisdiction of that committee (whether or not any bill or resolution has been introduced with respect thereto), and shall on a continuing basis undertake future research and forecasting on matters within the jurisdiction of that committee. Each such committee having more than twenty members shall establish an oversight subcommittee, or require its subcommittees, if any, to conduct oversight in the area of their respective jurisdiction, to assist in carrying out its responsibilities under this subparagraph. The establishment of oversight subcommittees shall in no way limit the responsibility of the subcommittees with legislative jurisdiction from carrying out their oversight responsibilities.
APPENDIX 4

THE BALANCED NATIONAL GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1974 (S. 3050)

Summary

Title I: Statement of Policy; Findings; and Purpose - Declares that it is the responsibility of the Federal Government, in concert with State and local governments, to undertake the development of a balanced national growth and development policy. Expresses the findings of Congress and the purposes of this Act by setting out sixteen national goals.


Directs the Office to fulfill enumerated objectives, including to provide for: (1) the policy direction and coordination of all Federal and federally assisted programs for planning and land use development, human resources improvement and resource and energy allocation; (2) the preparation of an annual report, to be known as the Annual Report on Balanced National Growth and Development, detailing the progress made in carrying out the provisions of this Act; (3) the assessment of national needs, goals, and priorities; and (4) the evaluation of Federal and State tax policies upon the private industrial mix.

Outlines the content required in the Annual Report on Balanced National Growth and Development.

Directs the Council of Economic Advisors, the Council on Environmental Quality, the National Citizens Council on the American Future, and the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations to review all policies and report their recommendations to the Office.

Transfers all functions of the Domestic Council related to national growth and development policy to the Office. Provides for the consolidation of Federal comprehensive planning activities and planning assistance programs.


Title IV: Multi-State Regional Planning and Development Commissions - States that for purposes of this title the Nation shall be divided into a system of not less than eight, nor more than twelve, planning and development regions. Sets forth the
criteria to be taken into account by the President in establishing such regions.

Provides that for each region, there shall be established a multi-State regional planning and development commission. Specifies the composition of such commissions and outlines their functions and administrative powers.

Provides for the adjustment of boundaries of present regional commissions established under the Public Works and Economic Development Act.

Authorizes to be appropriated for the expenses of this title $10,000,000 for fiscal year 1975, and $20,000,000 for each fiscal year thereafter.

Title V: Comprehensive Planning Assistance - Directs the President to transfer the administration of the planning assistance program provided for in the Housing Act of 1954 from the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to the Office. Authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 1975 and each fiscal year thereafter for specified provisions of the Housing Act of 1954.

Title VI: Uniform Planning and Requirements for Grant-in-Aid Programs - States that it is the purpose of this title to eliminate inconsistent and overlapping grant requirements by providing a method of identifying development policy and by establishing a basis for the use of common data and information.

Requires Federal departments and agencies administering grant programs which require planning as a condition to making the grants to require: (1) that such planning be consistent with the policies of the Regional Planning and Development Commissions; and (2) that such planning utilize the same geographic areas, time periods, and base data as used by the Regional Commissions.

Title VII: National Citizens' Council on the American Future - Establishes a National Citizens Council on the American Future to advise the Office and Congress in the formulation, evaluation, and implementation of national growth policies and in carrying out its other activities pursuant to this Act. Prescribes the rates of compensation of Council members and the Council's administrative powers.

Directs the Office to encourage the formation of multistate and State citizens councils to advise Regional Planning and Development Commissions and governments and industry with respect to planning and development.

Title VIII: Joint Congressional Committee on Balanced National Growth and Development and Congressional Office on Policy and Planning - Establishes a joint committee of the Congress to be known as the Joint Committee on Balanced National Growth and Development. Specifies the membership composition of such committee and their administrative powers.
Creates a Congressional Office of Policy and Planning which shall conduct a continuing, non-partisan analysis of national goals, priorities, and urban, rural, and national growth policies and shall provide the Congress with the information, data, and analyses necessary for enlightened decisions with respect to such matters.

Authorizes the Librarian of Congress to make available to the Congressional Office such services and assistance by the Congressional Research Service as may be appropriate and feasible. Provides for: (1) the utilization of the Foundation of the American Future; (2) coordination with the Office of Technology Assessment; (3) coordination with the National Science Foundation; and (4) utilization of the General Accounting Office.

Title IX: Requirements with Respect to the Location Impact of Federal Facilities, Activities, and Federal Procurement - States that the Congress directs that to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this Act, and (2) all departments and agencies of the Federal Government shall include specified population, cost and time information in every report on proposals significantly affecting the growth of the United States.

Sets forth Federal procurement policies to be achieved under this Act.

Title X: Foundation on the American Future - Establishes an independent agency of the Federal Government to be known as the Foundation on the American Future: (1) to conduct projects to determine the interactions, social benefits and costs, rates of national change, and present and likely future patterns of important scientific, social, and economic programs and activities; (2) to evaluate the effects of national development policy, or its lack, on these interactions, social benefits and costs, rates of national change, and patterns; and (3) to determine and formulate alternative future national growth patterns, and development of policy recommendations which can bring them into existence.

Enumerates twelve administrative powers of the Foundation. Calls for coordination of the Foundation's activities with the National Science Foundation and other agencies and institutions.

Title XI: Establishment of Agency for Population and Demographic Analysis within the Bureau of Census, Department of Commerce - Directs the Secretary of Commerce to establish within the Bureau of Census an Agency for Population and Demographic Analysis to be headed by a Deputy Director for National Population and Demographic Analysis.

States that the Agency shall include Divisions of Demographic Analysis, Economic and Social Analysis, and Political and Fiscal Analysis. Sets forth the functions of the Agency.
Title XII: Authorization for Appropriations Authorization - States that in addition to specific authorizations in this Act, there are authorized to be appropriated such other amounts as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.
APPENDIX 5

THE FULL OPPORTUNITY AND NATIONAL GOALS AND PRIORITIES ACT (S. 5)

TITLE I—FULL OPPORTUNITY

Declaration of Policy

SEC. 101. In order to promote the general welfare, the Congress declares that it is the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal Government, consistent with the primary responsibilities of State and local governments and the private sector, to promote and encourage such conditions as will give every American a full opportunity to live in decency and dignity, and to provide a clear and precise picture of whether such conditions are promoted and encouraged in such areas as health, education and training, rehabilitation, housing, vocational opportunities, the arts and humanities, and special assistance for the mentally ill and retarded, the deprived, the abandoned, and the criminal, and by measuring progress in meeting such needs.

Social Report of the President

SEC. 102. (a) The President shall transmit to the Congress not later than February 15 of each year a report to be known as the social report, setting forth: (1) the overall progress and effectiveness of Federal efforts designed to carry out the policy declared in section 101 with particular emphasis upon the manner in which such efforts serve to meet national social needs in such areas as health, education, and training, rehabilitation, housing, vocational opportunities, the arts and humanities, and special assistance for the mentally ill and retarded, the deprived, the abandoned, and the criminal; (2) a review of State, local, and private efforts designed to create the conditions specified in section 101; (3) current and foreseeable needs in the areas served by such efforts and the progress of development of plans to meet such needs; and (4) programs and policies for carrying out the policy declared in section 101, together with such recommendations for legislation as he may deem necessary or desirable.

(b) The President may transmit from time to time to the Congress reports supplementary to the social report, each of which shall include such supplementary or revised recommendations as he may deem necessary or desirable to achieve the policy declared in section 101.

(c) The social report, and all supplementary reports transmitted under subsection (b) of this section, shall, when transmitted to Congress, be referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.
of the Senate and the Committees on Education and Labor and Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit the consideration of the report by any other committee of the Senate or the House of Representatives with respect to any matter within the jurisdiction of any such committee.

Council of Social Advisers to the President

SEC. 103. (a) There is created in the Executive Office of the President a Council of Social Advisers (hereinafter called the Council). The Council shall be composed of three members who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and each of whom shall be a person who, as a result of his training, experience, and attainments, is exceptionally qualified to appraise programs and activities of the Government in the light of the policy declared in section 101, and to formulate and recommend programs to carry out such policy. Each member of the Council, other than the Chairman, shall receive compensation at the rate prescribed for level IV of the Executive Schedule by section 5315 of title 5 of the United States Code. The President shall designate one of the members of the Council as Chairman who shall receive compensation at the rate prescribed by level II of such schedule.

(b) The Chairman of the Council is authorized to employ, and fix the compensation of, such specialists and other experts as may be necessary for the carrying out of its functions under this Act, without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, and is authorized, subject to such provisions, to employ such other officers and employees as may be necessary for carrying out its functions under this Act, and fix their compensation in accordance with the provisions of such chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53.

(c) It shall be the duty and function of the Council—

(1) to assist and advise the President in the preparation of the social report;

(2) to gather timely and authoritative information and statistical data concerning developments and programs designed to carry out the policy declared in section 101, both current and prospective, and to develop a series of social indicators to analyze and interpret such information and data in the light of the policy declared in section 101 and to compile and submit to the President studies relating to such developments and programs;

(3) to appraise the various programs and activities of the Federal Government in the light of the policy declared in section 101 of this Act for the purpose of determining the extent to which such programs and activities contribute to the achievement of such policy, and to make recommendations to the President with respect thereto;
(4) to develop priorities for programs designed to carry out the policy declared in section 101 and recommend to the President the most efficient way to allocate Federal resources and the level of government--Federal, State, or local--best suited to carry out such programs;

(5) to make and furnish such studies, reports thereon, and recommendations with respect to programs, activities, and legislation to carry out the policy declared in section 101 as the President may request.

(6) to make and furnish such studies, reports thereon, and recommendations with respect to programs, activities, and legislation as the President may request in appraising long-range aspects of social policy and programing consistent with the policy declared in section 101.

(d) Recognizing the predominance of State and local governments in the social area, the President shall, when appropriate, provide for the dissemination to such States and localities of information or data developed by the Council pursuant to subsection (c) of this section.

(e) The Council shall make an annual report to the President in January of each year.

(f) In exercising its powers, functions, and duties under this Act—

(1) the Council may constitute such advisory committees and may consult with such representatives of industry, agriculture, labor, consumers, State and local governments, and other groups, organizations and individuals as it deems advisable to insure the direct participation in the Council's planning of such interested parties;

(2) the Council shall, to the fullest extent possible, use the services, facilities, and information (including statistical information) of Federal, State, and local government agencies as well as of private research agencies, in order that duplication of effort and expense may be avoided;

(3) the Council shall, to the fullest extent possible, insure that the individual's right to privacy is not infringed by its activities; and

(4) (A) the Council may enter into essential contractual relationships with educational institutions, private research organizations, and other organizations as needed; and

(B) any reports, studies, or analyses resulting from such contractual relationships shall be made available to any person for purposes of study.

(g) To enable the Council to exercise its powers, functions, and duties under this Act, there are authorized to be appropriated (except for the salaries of the members and officers and employees of the Council) such sums as may be necessary. For the salaries of the members and salaries of officers and employees of the Council, there is authorized to be appropriated not exceeding $900,000 in the aggregate for each fiscal year.
TITLE II—NATIONAL GOALS AND PRIORITIES

Declaration of Purposes

SEC. 201. The Congress finds and declares that there is a need for a more explicit and rational formulation of national goals and priorities, and the Congress needs more detailed and current budget data and economic analysis in order to make informed priority decisions among alternative programs and courses of action. In order to meet these needs and establish a framework of national priorities within which individual decisions can be made in a consistent and considered manner, and to stimulate an informed awareness and discussion of national priorities, it is hereby declared to be the intent of Congress to establish an office within the Congress which will conduct a continuing analysis of national goals and priorities and will provide the Congress with the information, data, and analysis necessary for enlightened priority decisions.

Establishment

SEC. 202. (a) There is established an Office of Goals and Priorities Analysis (hereafter referred to as the "Office") which shall be within the Congress.

(b) There shall be in the Office a Director of Goals and Priorities Analysis (hereafter referred to as the "Director") and an Assistant Director of Goals and Priorities Analysis (hereafter referred to as the "Assistant Director"), each of whom shall be appointed jointly by the majority leader of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives and confirmed by a majority vote of each House. The Office shall be under the control and supervision of the Director, and shall have a seal adopted by him. The Assistant Director shall perform such duties as may be assigned to him by the Director, and, during the absence or incapacity of the Director, or during a vacancy in the office, shall act as the Director. The Director shall designate an employee of the Office to act as Director during the absence or incapacity of the Director and the Assistant Director, or during a vacancy in both of such offices.

(c) The annual compensation of the Director shall be equal to the annual compensation of the Comptroller General of the United States. The annual compensation of the Assistant Director shall be equal to that of the Assistant Comptroller General of the United States.

(d) The terms of office of the Director and the Assistant Director first appointed shall expire on January 31, 1977. The terms of office of Directors and Assistant Directors subsequently appointed shall expire on January 31 every four years thereafter. Except in the case of his removal under the provisions of subsection (e), a Director or Assistant Director may serve until his successor is appointed.
(e) The Director or Assistant Director may be removed at any
time by a resolution of the Senate or the House of Representatives.
A vacancy occurring during the term of the Director or Assistant
Director shall be filled by appointment, as provided in this section.

(f) The professional staff members, including the Director and
Assistant Director, shall be persons selected without regard to
political affiliations who, as a result of training, experience,
and attainments, are exceptionally qualified to analyze and inter-
pret public policies and programs.

Functions

SEC. 203. (a) The Office shall make such studies as it deems
necessary to carry out the purposes of section 201. Primary empha-
sis shall be given to supplying such analysis as will be most use-
ful to the Congress in voting on the measures and appropriations
which come before it, and on providing the framework and overview
of priority considerations within which a meaningful consideration
of individual measures can be undertaken.

(b) The Office shall submit to the Congress on March 1 of each
year a national goals and priorities report and copies of such
report shall be furnished to the Committee on Appropriations of
the Senate and of the House of Representatives, the Joint Economic
Committee, and other interested committees. The report shall
include, but not be limited to—

(1) an analysis, in terms of national goals and priorities of the
programs in the annual budget submitted by the President, the
Economic Report of the President, and the Social Report of the
President;

(2) an examination of resources available to the Nation, the
foreseeable costs and expected benefits of existing and proposed
Federal programs, and the resources and cost implications of
alternative sets of national priorities; and

(3) recommendations concerning spending priorities among Federal
programs and courses of action, including the identification of
those programs and courses of action which should be given greatest
priority and those which could more properly be deferred.

(c) In addition to the national goals and priorities report and
other reports and studies which the Office submits to the Congress,
the Office shall provide upon request to any Member of the Congress
further information, data, or analysis relevant to an informed
determination of national goals and priorities.

Powers of the Office

SEC. 204. (a) In the performance of its functions under this
title, the Office is authorized—

(1) to make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend rules and
regulations governing the manner of the operations of the Office;
(2) to employ and fix the compensation of such employees, and purchase or otherwise acquire such furniture, office equipment, books, stationery, and other supplies, as may be necessary for the proper performance of the duties of the Office and as may be appropriated by the Congress;

(3) to obtain the services of experts and consultants, in accordance with the provisions of section 3109 of title 5, United States Code; and

(4) to use the United States mails in the same manner and upon the same conditions as other departments and agencies of the United States.

(b) (1) Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive branch of the Government, including independent agencies, is authorized and directed, to the extent permitted by law, to furnish to the Office, upon request made by the Director, such information as the Director considers necessary to carry out the functions of the Office.

(2) The Comptroller General of the United States shall furnish to the Director copies of analyses of expenditures prepared by the General Accounting Office with respect to any department or agency in the executive branch.

(3) The Office of Management and Budget shall furnish to the Director copies of special analytic studies, program and financial plans, and such other reports of a similar nature as may be required under the planning-programing-budgeting system, or any other law.

(c) Section 2107 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by—

(1) striking out the "and" at the end of paragraph (7);

(2) striking the period at the end of paragraph (8) and inserting in lieu thereof a semicolon and the word "and"; and

(3) adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
"(9) the Director, Assistant Director, and employees of the Office of Goals and Priorities Analysis."

Joint Economic Committee Hearings

SEC. 205. The Joint Economic Committee of the Congress shall hold hearings on the national goals and priorities report and on such other reports and duties of the Office as it deems advisable.

Payment of Expenses

SEC. 206. All expenses and salaries of the Office shall be paid by the Secretary of the Senate from funds appropriated for the Office upon vouchers signed by the Director or, in the event of a vacancy in that Office, the Acting Director.
REFERENCES


Culver, John (1972b): Letter to members of the House, December 29.

(1973a): Letter to Representative Richard Bolling, February 27.


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Clement Bezold began his observations of congressional operations in 1968 as an elevator operator in the basement of the Longworth House Office Building. From there the only place to go was up.

The second of five sons of Henry and Katherine Bezold, Clement was born and reared in Miami, Florida. He attended the Foreign Service School at Georgetown University, Washington, D. C., earning a B.S.F.S. degree in 1970.

His non-academic experience and activities include community service projects in Roxbury, Massachusetts, and Medellin, Colombia. The experience in Colombia provided on a Lisle Fellowship led to a position as International Affairs Vice-President of the United States Youth Council and as United Nations Representative to the World Assembly of Youth. He was a congressional intern in the office of Representative Dante B. Fascell of Miami, and he has been involved in various election campaigns and voter registration efforts as well as local and state offices in Common Cause. In addition to elevator operator and professional campaign staff, his previous employment included free lance photography and teaching at Immaculata LaSalle High School in Miami, Florida.

His graduate training began at the University of Florida in 1971. International relations and comparative government in Latin
America were the focus of his work for the master's degree awarded in 1973. His doctoral work has focused on American government and politics, particularly the operations of Congress. He received the Graduate School Fellowship, various graduate assistantships, and other awards from the University of Florida. A graduate fellowship from the Center for Governmental Responsibility supported his dissertation research, during which time he participated in the Visiting Scholars Program at the Brookings Institution.

Because of the nature of Mr. Bezold's research, he has worked as a consultant for the Commission on Critical Choices for Americans, and his work has been published in congressional hearings, *The Futurist*, and elsewhere.

In 1974-75 Clement Bezold became Social Science Coordinator for the Center for Governmental Responsibility, and in 1975 he became Assistant Director, his present position. His work involves public interest research and education on issues of accountability and foresight in government.
I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Victor A. Thompson, Chairman
Professor of Political Science

John S. Fitch, III
Assistant Professor of Political Science

Keith R. Legg
Associate Professor of Political Science

William G. Munselle
Assistant Professor of Political Science
I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Ramonaf R. Rush
Associate Professor of Journalism and Communications

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Eric M. Uslaner
Assistant Professor of Political Science

This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Political Science and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

March, 1976

Dean, Graduate School