ANTIHAITIANISMO IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

By

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In the Dominican Republic, history and geography have combined to give rise to a racial-sociocultural credo designed to sharply differentiate between Haitians and Dominicans. This credo, which for all practical purposes negates and plays down all black elements within Dominican society, has come to be known in the Dominican Republic as antihaitianismo and is the object of this dissertation. Antihaitianismo consists of the creation and reproduction of negative attitudes, symbols, and stereotypes, among Dominicans directed toward Haitians living in the Dominican Republic.

The main thesis of this dissertation is that the causes of the existing anti-Haitian attitudes (antihaitianismo) among Dominicans lie, first, in the generally tense and
historically conflictive nature of Haitian-Dominican relations and, second, in the deliberate development and social reproduction by members of the Dominican elites of an anti-Haitian ideology. It has been the deliberate work of some Dominican elites that, based on political interests, nationalism, racism, or their combination, has given rise to a multi-faceted ideology of anti-Haitian attitudes, symbols, and stereotypes known as antihaitianismo.

This thesis was examined through a comprehensive analysis of the history of Haitian-Dominican relations, field work in the Dominican Republic, library research, elite interviews, and an examination of the Dominican media. The resulting conclusion is that antihaitianismo is the consequence of the manipulation of the tense Haitian-Dominican relationship by Dominican elites for the achievement of political ends, distorting Dominican history and popular culture, and effectively transforming antihaitianismo into a dominant ideology. Furthermore, antihaitianismo is not an individual attitude, as most Dominicans have actually very little daily contact with Haitian migrants, but a socially shared and reproduced attitude, deeply embedded in Dominican culture through the efforts of Dominican elites.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Racism, prejudice, and intolerance are still major problems in the contemporary world. Even in countries where laws have been enacted to protect racial and ethnic minorities (e.g. United States), there is still much to be done, as social tensions remain latent under a surface of apparent calm. These problems are magnified in Third World countries, where the paucity of resources and the lack of institutionalized channels for dissent further exacerbates social tensions. But when the scenario is a small Caribbean island divided in two independent countries, these issues can take on enormous proportions. That is the case of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, the two nations that share the Caribbean island of Hispaniola, and the object of this dissertation.

Relations between these two countries have usually been tense, as Haiti has invaded the Dominican Republic on several occasions, and the Dominican Republic has responded in kind by interfering in Haitian affairs and killing thousands of Haitians in 1937. This conflictive relationship has led to the development of an anti-Haitian credo, a somewhat-vague ideology known as antihaitianismo.
As an ideology, *antihaitianismo* has turned Haitians into the scapegoats of a society that considers them inferior, barbaric, and undesirable. This dissertation is an examination of this Caribbean phenomenon, a kind of ideological apartheid within the confines of a small island. The implications of this study, however, extend well beyond Haiti and the Dominican Republic to other countries in Latin America and the world with similar racial or ethnic conflictive situations.

This introductory chapter is divided into three parts. The first one will serve as an introduction to Haiti and the Dominican Republic. It will describe the main characteristics of these two countries regarding their geography, society, economy, political system, and relations with each other, in order to familiarize the reader with the two countries and the problems to be analyzed in this dissertation. The second part will describe the problems to be analyzed in this dissertation, namely the existence of *antihaitianismo* in the Dominican Republic. Finally, the last part will briefly outline the contents and organization of the remainder of the dissertation.

**Haiti and the Dominican Republic**

**The Land**

The island of Hispaniola (originally known as *La Española*) comprises the two independent countries of Haiti
FIGURE 1-1
Political Map of Hispaniola
Source: Kearney 1985, 13.
and the Dominican Republic in a geographic area of 29,628 square miles, including some small adjacent islands (see Figure 1-1). Haiti occupies the western part of the island and with 10,714 square miles, a little over a third of the island's territory (Goodwin 1984, 180). The Dominican Republic, with 18,914 square miles, occupies the eastern two-thirds (Goodwin 1984, 176). Though the island of Hispaniola is the second largest island in the Caribbean (after Cuba), it has the highest (Pico Duarte 10,249 feet) and lowest (Lake Enriquillo -131 feet) elevation points of the region. These geographic extremes help to represent the geographic diversity of the island. While the northeast is humid and fertile, the southwest is dry and arid. Rain is usually brought by the trade winds from the northeast, but Hispaniola's tall peaks serve as a barrier, trapping most of the rain and leaving very little to fall on the southwest side of the island. Moreover, a look at the topographic maps of Haiti (see Figure 1-2) and the Dominican Republic (see Figure 1-3) reveals other important geographic characteristics. As seen in Figure 1-2, Haiti's territory is mostly covered with mountains, with thin strips of coastal plains and the Cul-de-Sac valley in the south-central portion. Notice in particular the long southern peninsula mostly covered by a mountain range. This particular topography has hampered communications to this day and has promoted the isolation of the Haitian
FIGURE 1-2
Topographic Map of Haiti
FIGURE 1-3
Topographic Map of the Dominican Republic
countryside. Certainly, it is still easier to travel by boat from the south to Port-au-Prince than by car. The Dominican Republic, on the other hand, enjoys a smoother topography. As seen in Figure 1-3, the central mountain range still presents a formidable barrier. However, this mountain range is flanked by two fertile valleys, the Cibao valley in the north and the San Juan valley in the south. These two valleys, besides making communications easier, have become the breadbaskets of the Dominican Republic and produce most of the agricultural products consumed by the Dominican people. Moreover, the eastern peninsula is a wide, fertile plain covered by cattle ranches and sugar plantations. This unique geography has made east-west communications simple and effortless, while north-south communications are only particularly difficult when one encounters the central mountain range.

The People

The population of Haiti and the Dominican Republic also presents some interesting characteristics.\(^1\) Based on official population estimates for 1990, Haiti had at the time 6.513 million inhabitants, while the Dominican Republic had 7.170 million (IDB 1991, 271). When one compares this population difference of less than one million inhabitants with the large difference in size between the two countries, Haiti's extreme population density becomes obvious. For
1990, Haiti had approximately 590 inhabitants per square mile, as compared to 378 for the Dominican Republic (PC Globe 1990). True, other Caribbean nations have an even higher population density, such as Puerto Rico (with 939 inhabitants per square mile) and Barbados (with 1,554 inhabitants per square mile). However, these nations have small territories, high urbanization rates and per capita incomes well above Haiti's. Haiti's overpopulation, then, is only one of its problems, that when coupled with other problems, creates a vicious circle that has kept Haiti as the poorest country of the Western Hemisphere. Most of Haiti's population lives in the countryside, with only about 25% of the population living in urban centers, most notably in Port-au-Prince with 473,000 inhabitants (PC Globe 1990). Other major cities are Cap Haïtien, Pétionville (now considered a suburb of Port-au-Prince), Gonaïves, Les Cayes, Port-de-Paix, Jacmel and Jérémie (see Figure 1-1). The Dominican Republic has recently become an urbanized country, with 52% of its population now living in towns and cities. This is mostly due to the fact that Santo Domingo's population has swollen in recent years to 1.4 million inhabitants (PC Globe 1990). Other important urban centers include Santiago de los Caballeros, La Romana, San Pedro de Macorís, San Francisco de Macorís, La Vega, San Juan de la Maguana, Barahona and Puerto Plata (see Figure 1-1).
Haiti and the Dominican Republic have relatively young populations. For example, half of Haiti's population is 19 years old or less, while 48% of Dominicans are 19 or under (CEPAL 1991, 168). This fact presents a great challenge for both nations, as these youngsters will soon be joining a labor market that cannot assimilate them. Racially, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, though geographically close, display sharp differences (see Figure 1-4). While in Haiti blacks constitute the overwhelming majority of the population, the Dominican Republic has an heterogeneous racial composition. Almost three-quarters of all Dominicans are mulatto (of black and white mixed ancestry), with skin tones ranging across the spectrum, while pure blacks and whites represent substantial racial minorities. In Haiti, mulattoes, besides being a small minority, also constitute a social and economic elite. Nevertheless, Haiti can be considered a truly racially homogenous country, a "Black Republic," as Selden Rodman (1984) put it. The Dominican Republic, on the other hand, defies easy classification. Its racially-mixed population is most similar in composition to Venezuela's or Panama's, but without the Amerindian element. These facts should be kept in mind when we analyze, in the following chapters, the historical development of Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

From the linguistic point of view, Haiti's population faces an impasse that has lasted for centuries: while the
FIGURE 1-4
Racial Composition of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, 1990
Haitian people speak Creole, French is Haiti's official language. French is the language of politics, business, culture, and of course, power and prestige. As a consequence, the 90% of Haiti's population that is monolingual (Creole-speaking) is effectively barred from full participation in contemporary Haitian society. Haiti can be described then, "as a nation composed of two linguistic communities: the bilingual elite [that speaks Creole plus French] and the monolingual rural and urban masses" (Valdman 1984, 80). No such conflict exists in the Dominican Republic, where Spanish has always been the dominant--and sometimes the only--language of the land.

Even more important than population figures is the quality of life of the inhabitants of these two nations. Table 1-1 provides some appalling statistics.

| TABLE 1-1 |
| Qualities of Life in Haiti and the Dominican Republic |

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<th>Dominican Republic</th>
<th>Haiti</th>
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<td>Life Expectancy at Birth</td>
<td>61 years</td>
<td>53 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality</td>
<td>68/1,000</td>
<td>115/1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Literacy Rate</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Caloric Intake*</td>
<td>102% of FAO</td>
<td>92% of FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Safe Water</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>14%</td>
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Source: Goodwin 1984, 176, 180.

*Based on a minimum diet set by the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization.

Both Haiti and the Dominican Republic are poor, Third World countries and this fact is reflected in their quality of life statistics, as seen in Table 1-1. For example, life
expectancy in the Dominican Republic is about ten years less than in the developed world. In the case of Haiti it is about twenty years less! Infant mortality levels are high, and even more dramatic when they are compared to neighboring Cuba with 21/1,000 and Jamaica with 16/1,000 (Goodwin 1984, 170, 182). Adult literacy is particularly low in Haiti and it is compounded by an educational system that mainly teaches in French, while the totality of Haiti's population speaks Creole. Malnutrition remains a serious problem for both countries, where large segments of the population are undernourished and eat when they can, not when they want. Again, this is more evident in Haiti, where an estimated 10,000 malheureux (the unfortunate) sleep out on the streets of Port-au-Prince at night and struggle just to survive another day (Prince 1985, 59). In the Haitian countryside, prolonged droughts and the total lack of government aid have driven peasants to the brink of starvation, particularly in the dry northwest region. Finally, access to safe water, something that is taken for granted in the majority of the developed countries, is a luxury for the inhabitants of Hispaniola. While in the Dominican Republic a little over half the population can enjoy it, in Haiti only a meager 14% of the population (and most of them in Port-au-Prince) has access to it (Goodwin 1984, 180).

These apparently unsurmountable problems have spurred a migration wave in both countries. New York City has the
second largest concentration of Dominicans after Santo Domingo, and Miami the second largest concentration of Haitians after Port-au-Prince. There are an estimated 750,000 Dominicans and a slightly smaller number of Haitians living in the United States (Corten 1993, 129). Dominicans also migrate to Puerto Rico and Spain, while Haitian migrants have established large communities in Canada and the Bahamas. One can then conclude that both Haiti and the Dominican Republic face enormous human problems, particularly in the areas of health, education, and quality of life. Problems that need to be taken care of, but for which there are very little resources to do so, as we shall see next.

The Economy

The wealth (or lack of wealth) of a country is not only measured by the well-being of its inhabitants. It also takes into account the available resources to promote that common well-being or healthy standard of living. In this sense, Haiti and the Dominican Republic are impoverished countries that are struggling to develop their respective economies given the limited resources available to them. Haiti, the smallest and poorest of the two nations, is also the poorest nation of the Americas. Even when compared to the Dominican Republic--a developing country--Haiti's economic atrophy is marked (see Figure 1-5). With almost
FIGURE 1-5
Gross National Product of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, 1990
the same population size as the Dominican Republic (though in a smaller territory), Haiti's Gross National Product (GNP) is less than half that of its neighbor's. As a matter of fact, the economic activity of just the services sector of the Dominican Republic surpasses in monetary volume Haiti's GNP for 1990, as it can be easily observed in Figure 1-5. The question, then, is why? Why has Haiti's economy remained so small and undeveloped? The answers are multiple:

Haiti's economic system is characterized by a paucity of resources, poorly developed production systems, low technological levels, unskilled labor, capital deficiency, and low productivity of all factors of production [Tata 1982, 39].

This is not a new phenomenon, but rather a continuing trend in Haitian history. Along different decades, Crist (1952), Pierre-Charles (1965), Leyburn (1966), Logan (1968), Andic (1978), Lundahl (1979, 1984), Prince (1985), and other Haitian and foreign observers have commented on Haiti's economic problems. The main trend has been towards economic decline and, at best, economic stagnation. To be fair, not all of Haiti's economic problems have economic roots. As Mats Lundahl (1984, 1989) has shown, many of Haiti's current economic problems are rooted in its history and contemporary politics. First, Haiti's economic infrastructure was destroyed as a result of its revolution. Second, the country's economy was burdened for decades by the payment of a large indemnity to France in exchange for diplomatic
recognition. Still, Haiti was considered a pariah state and was diplomatically isolated by the international community until the late 1960s. Finally, Haiti's revolutionary leaders developed the Haitian state into a corrupt predatory state, solely concerned with reaping the country's riches by taxing or seizing them, a trend that continues into the present (Rotberg 1971).

Haiti's economy has always been based mainly on agriculture. Agriculture contributed 49% of the GNP in 1955, 45% of the GNP in 1975, and 32% of the GNP in 1990 (Andic 1978, 117; PC Globe 1990). Moreover, agriculture employs more than 75% of the work force (Tata 1982, 54), including many women and children. Haiti (outside of Port-au-Prince) is a country of peasants with particular characteristics. The Latin American legacy of haciendas, large plantations, latifundia, and monoculture is alien to the Haitian peasantry. Haiti's rural structure, on the contrary, is characterized by minifundia and polyculture, as a direct result of post-revolutionary policies (see Chapter III). Most of Haiti's agricultural land is divided in small plots of less than five acres on the average (Tata 1982, 54), which are intensively cultivated by their owners. These plots produce tropical foodstuffs for domestic consumption, plus cash crops such as coffee and cocoa. The Haitian peasant's main objective is to feed his family (at least barely) and to obtain a little cash to purchase food
or manufactured goods. In his daily struggle, he faces numerous obstacles: lack of modern farming tools (including plows) and techniques, small plots that are further subdivided by inheritance, and most important of all, erosion. As Jacques Cousteau (1986) has dramatically shown, Haiti's topsoil is being literally washed away by heavy tropical rains into the sea. Decades of cutting trees for farming (even in marginal lands) and for the production of charcoal (Haiti's main cooking fuel) have denuded the Haitian landscape (Murray 1984). That has created a vicious circle of ecological degradation. The removal of Haiti's tree cover leaves its thin layer of topsoil unprotected and it is easily washed away by the rain. This decreases agricultural yields and forces the peasant to clear another tree patch for farming or charcoal (to obtain much needed cash), starting the cycle all over again. For example, in 1938, Haiti had 540,000 hectares of arable lands, by 1970 this figure was down to 225,700 hectares (Báez Evertsz 1986, 30). Furthermore, the topsoil that is being washed away (and that will take nature decades to replace) becomes silt that clogs Haiti's water sources, literally suffocating fish and water plants (Cousteau 1986).

Amid these serious problems, agriculture remains a vital part of Haiti's economy. For over 150 years, agricultural products, in particular coffee, were Haiti's main exports. As shown in Figure 1-6, even with the advent
FIGURE 1-6

Source: Tata 1982, 76.
FIGURE 1-7
Source: Tata 1982, 76.
of industry to Haiti in the 1970s, the dollar amount of agricultural exports has remained constant. That is easily explained by the previous examination of Haiti's peasantry. Industry is an urban activity, mainly limited to Port-au-Prince. In the countryside, the Haitian peasant maintains his usual lifestyle, producing foodstuffs and cash crops (usually coffee). This is corroborated by Figure 1-7. Even with its ups and downs, coffee exports account for about US$20 million every year.

Mining was a minor economic activity in Haiti, in the sense that less than 1,000 were employed by it (Tata 1982, 57) and that it was controlled by foreign companies. Regarding exports, however, mining became a valuable and steady source of income. Figure 1-6 shows how mining contributed to Haiti's exports in the 1970s. Bauxite is the most important mineral in Haiti and it was exploited by the Reynolds Company, until it closed down its operation in 1983 because it was no longer profitable (Prince 1985, 48). Copper is also found and it was exported in small quantities (Andic 1978, 121). Bauxite's importance is shown by Figure 1-7. Even when coffee exports declined, bauxite provided a steady source of foreign exchange, as was the case in 1979, when bauxite exports reached US$20.7 million (Prince 1985, 54).

Another economic sector is manufacturing, which has become Haiti's most important economic sector in terms of
exports. Manufacturing is also mostly in the hands of foreign corporations that take advantage of Haiti's low wages (the lowest in the Caribbean, US$3.00 a day in 1985) and tax breaks (Prince 1985, 47). They are called offshore assembly industries because they import most of the materials that they use, and in turn, export most of what they produce. Haiti basically provides them only with labor, utilities, and a place to assemble. About 60,000 Haitians worked at one time in these labor-intensive industries, producing garments and underwear, baseballs and other sporting goods, toys, and some electronic components (Prince 1985, 48). The rapid growth of Haiti's industrial sector during the 1970s can be seen in Figure 1-6.

Industrial exports, negligible in 1960, grew to surpass agricultural and mining exports, more than doubling the value of the latter in 1976. Figure 1-7 clearly shows how this incredible growth was in direct proportion to the growth of the assembly industry. As a result, coffee was displaced as Haiti's number one export by the assembly industries' exports. Just recently, however, international sanctions levied against Haiti's military government (for the overthrown of democratically-elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991) have seriously affected these assembly industries. The OAS-imposed embargo has forced many of Haiti's assembly industries to shut down their operations and others to dramatically reduce their personnel.
The Dominican Republic presents a different economic picture. Up to the early 20th century, the main economic activities of the Dominican Republic were cattle ranching and subsistence agriculture. The development of the sugar industry abruptly changed the economic panorama. Like Cuba and Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic became a large-scale sugar producer, and today is the second largest of the Caribbean after Cuba (Hagelberg 1985, 94; OEA 1990, 48).

Ownership of the sugar industry is divided between the Dominican government and private consortia. Sugar cultivation has some obvious advantages: "it has been recognized that sugar cane is the best (or even the only) suitable crop in many parts of the Caribbean" (Hagelberg 1985, 115). On the other hand, it also has some serious drawbacks. World sugar prices can fluctuate wildly, and a system of quotas limits the amount of sugar that the Dominican Republic may sell to its main buyer, the United States. Since these two factors are beyond the control of the Dominican government, the country's excessive dependence on sugar (i.e. sugar monoculture) has created a roller coaster effect on its economy. When sugar prices are high and production is good, the result is an economic bonanza. But when prices plummet, the economy hurts badly. For example, Figure 1-8 shows how the value of sugar exports has moved up and down along with sugar prices. While in 1975 sugar export earnings were over US$500 million, in 1978,
FIGURE 1-8
Value of Sugar Exports and Sugar Prices for the Dominican Republic, 1966-1991
Source: Caba 1993, D-1; Lozano 1985, 277.
just three years later, sugar exports earnings dropped to less than US$200 million, 40% of 1975's nominal earnings. This situation creates economic uncertainty—not to mention economic chaos—for policy makers in the Dominican Republic. That has led several Dominican administrations to embark on economic diversification programs, in an effort to reduce the country's dependence on sugar. As Figure 1-8 shows, from the mid-1980s on, sugar earnings have not kept up with sugar prices. That has been the result of decreased sugar production, as the Dominican government tries to diversify its exports. A fitting example of these efforts is the government-owned Caturey sugar mill in Villa Altagracia (near Santo Domingo). The operation was closed down and the lands are now being used for the cultivation of citrus and winter vegetables for export.

Other export crops of importance are coffee, tobacco, and cocoa (see Figure 1-9). Their importance, nowadays, is becoming a thing of the past. Exports of these three traditional crops have declined considerably from their peak in the 1970s. In fact, agriculture as an economic activity is losing ground in the contemporary Dominican Republic. In 1990, agriculture accounted for only 15.5% of the country's GNP (EIU 1993, 11). Then, what economic activities are substituting for agriculture?

Mining is one of them, and in the 1980s it became the most important foreign exchange earner ( EIU 1993, 17).
FIGURE 1-9
Value of Other Traditional Exports of the Dominican Republic, 1975-1991
Source: Caba 1993, D-1.
FIGURE 1-10

Dominican Republic has deposits of gold, silver, bauxite and, in particular, ferronickel. These are exploited by the government alone (e.g. Rosario Dominicana in Cotui) or in agreement with foreign companies (e.g. Falconbridge in Bonao). As Figure 1-10 shows, by 1985 mining exports had surpassed sugar exports in value, a trend that still continues. By 1989, mining accounted for 47% of all Dominican exports (Wiarda and Kryzanek 1992, 82).

Tourism has also become a vital economic activity for the Dominican Republic. Political stability, recent infrastructural developments, cheap prices, and its many tropical enchantments have turned the Dominican Republic into one of the favorite tropical destinies of European tourists. In 1992 alone, 1.6 million tourists visited the country, although half a million of those were Dominicans that live overseas. Tourism (including visiting Dominicans) now accounts for 12% of the country's GNP and 60% of foreign exchange earnings ("Luis" 1993, 9), and tourism has now surpassed remittances from Dominicans living abroad as the number one source of foreign exchange.

The last, and rapidly becoming a very important economic activity in the Dominican Republic, is industry. Past and present administrations have encouraged the industrialization of the country through vigorous infrastructure development, export promotion, public investment, and particularly, attracting foreign capital.
FIGURE 1-11

Figure 1-11 shows how foreign investment boomed in the 1970s. Though it remained constant for mining (there are only a couple of mines to invest in), it increased in finance, commerce, services, and, most dramatically, in industry. Most major multinationals, such as Colgate Palmolive, Philip Morris, Alcoa, Esso, 3M, Gilette, and Xerox have subsidiaries in the Dominican Republic (Wiarda and Kryzanek 1982, 77). There is a Sheraton Hotel, Club Med, Chase Manhattan Bank, Radio Shack, and even Domino's Pizza. Though these foreign investments provide jobs and capital, there have been problems, too. That was the case with Gulf and Western, the country's number one investor, owner of the Central Romana sugar mill (the largest in the country), the Casa de Campo resort complex, and other important investments in the financial sector (Lozano 1985, 209-213). According to Jan K. Black (1986),

Gulf and Western had more than $200 million invested in some 90 businesses in the Dominican Republic. It was the country's largest private landowner, with about 8 percent of all arable land, and its largest employer. Global annual sales of Gulf and Western are larger than the GNP of the Dominican Republic . . . [and it] was accused of employing repressive tactics against labor leaders and political antagonists and of outright bribery [J. Black 1986, 67].

Thus, Gulf and Western became a state within the state. A force that the Dominican Republic could not control, but, on the other hand, could not live without. Finally, in 1985 the Fanjul family, a group of Cuban Americans who control most of Florida's sugar cane production, bought Gulf and
Western's properties in the Dominican Republic and Florida. Regardless of the actions of some of these multinationals, the fact is that industry and foreign investment are in the country to stay. Starting with the Balaguer administration in the 1970s, the government has implemented a dynamic program of zonas francas industriales (industrial free trade zones) in the capital and most major towns, in order to attract labor-intensive assembly industries. Figure 1-11 shows the spectacular growth of foreign investment in industry at that time. These companies are offered tax exemptions for a number of years, import incentives, and export exemptions (Wiarda and Kryzanek 1982, 83). The government's goal is to create as many jobs as possible, thus helping to replace those that are being lost in agriculture, and to alleviate the country's unemployment and underemployment problems.

The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), developed during the first administration of US president Ronald Reagan (and followed by the Bush administration), gave industrialization a further push. Besides enhancing trade and promoting investment, the Caribbean Basin Initiative also provided the Dominican Republic with over $100 million per year in economic aid. In the early 1990s, however, and in spite of intense lobbying by the Balaguer administration, that figure was reduced to about $25 to $35 million per year (Wiarda and Kryzanek 1992, 93, 137).
In conclusion, both Haiti and the Dominican Republic face enormous economic problems, but the Dominican Republic has achieved a greater degree of economic development. This is particularly reflected in a commonly-employed statistical measure: GNP per capita. While GNP per capita for Haiti in 1990 was US$324, in the Dominican Republic it stood at US$716 in the same year (IDB 1991, 273), over twice as much! While the Dominican Republic is no economic paradise, it may look as such for the thousands of impoverished Haitians who live on the other side of the border, a fact that must be kept in mind when the multiple facets of the Haitian-Dominican relationship are examined later in this work.

The Political System

Both Haiti and the Dominican Republic have suffered under authoritarian regimes for most of their lives as colonies and independent countries. This will be covered later, in greater detail, in Chapters III and IV, but, needless to say, this tradition has been an additional obstacle in the countries' social and economic development.

Except for very brief and isolated interludes, Haiti has never had a truly democratic government. Elections, when they have taken place, have traditionally been manipulated (not to say fraudulent) and/or have excluded large segments of the population. The election of 16 December 1990 is considered Haiti's first free election,
under the auspices and close monitoring of the United Nations. Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president with 67% of the vote, only to be deposed by the military on 30 September 1991 (Pierre-Charles 1993). Haiti's political system is thus characterized by the intervention of the military corps, widespread corruption, the repression of dissent, and the exclusion of the majority of the people from the system.

The Dominican Republic has not fared much better. It did not have its first free elections in modern times until 20 December 1962. The elected president, Juan Bosch of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD), was overthrown by the Dominican military on 25 September 1963. On 1 July 1966, after a civil war, elections were held under US supervision, and Joaquin Balaguer of the Partido Reformista (PR) won with 57% of the vote (J. Black 1986, 40). Balaguer was reelected in 1970 and 1974, with most of the opposition abstaining. In 1978, for the first time in contemporary Dominican politics, an orderly transfer of power from the governing party to the opposition took place, with the victory of Antonio Guzmán. Ever since, the Dominican Republic has been considered a democratic country. Still, democracy in the Dominican Republic is a very young and developing institution to consider it as an established trend.
The Uneasy Relationship

Besides their social and economic disparities, Haiti and the Dominican Republic have also had different historical legacies that have contributed in great part to the make-up of their relationship. The Haitian-Dominican relationship has traditionally been fraught with tension, and occasionally, violence. The colonies of Saint-Domingue and Santo Domingo represented the two sides of the colonial coin. Two modes of economic exploitation coexisted side by side on the same island, each developing different social, economic and even racial structures. On the western side of the island, the French successfully established a plantation system based on the forced labor of imported African slaves. On the other side of the island, the Spanish had practically forgotten about their colony by the late 16th century. The small, mixed creole population survived on cattle ranching and the cultivation of foodstuffs.

On 1 January 1804, the French colony of Saint-Domingue became the independent state of Haiti. The whites, the mulattoes and the black slaves fought each other in a prolonged and bloody struggle that the slaves ultimately won, and that left Haiti devastated and diplomatically isolated for decades to come. The other side of the island did not fare better. It was occupied by the French, the British, the Spanish, and finally, by the Haitians for 22 years (between 1822 and 1844). The Dominican Republic was
formally established on 27 February 1844, by declaring its independence from Haiti.

The republican life of Haiti and the Dominican Republic in the 19th century saw the development of early animosities based on the 1822-1844 Haitian occupation and Haiti's subsequent attempts to annex the Dominican Republic. In the 20th century, the new American military presence in the Caribbean forced, in the military sense, the unification of the island. American troops occupied Haiti from 1915 to 1934, and the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924. In the Dominican Republic, American commercial interests invested in large-scale sugar production and started the practice of importing Haitian workers to cut sugar cane. Another result of the American occupation was the final definition of the Haitian-Dominican border by a treaty in 1929 (later amended in 1936). In 1937, dictator Rafael Trujillo—a fierce nationalist—ordered the massacre of thousands of Haitians who resided and worked in the Dominican Republic, mainly in the border region and the Cibao valley. The 1937 massacre, however, did not stop the flow of Haitian migrants, which continues to this day.

Haiti's presence and that of a substantial number of Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic still affect the Dominican Republic in several ways. Just to mention a couple of examples, in a country with high unemployment and emigration rates like the Dominican Republic, Haitian labor
is used extensively throughout the rural areas (ONAPLAN 1981), while the presence of Haitian workers in the cities is increasingly becoming more apparent. Moreover, recent food shortages in the Dominican Republic have been attributed to the uncontrolled outflow of foodstuffs to Haiti, as the Haitian gourde (at the official fixed rate of five gourdes per dollar) is now a stronger currency than the Dominican peso. Finally, estimates of the Haitian population in the Dominican Republic (including their descendants that often are not considered as full-fledged Dominican citizens) range from 200,000 (Madruga 1986, 137; Veras 1983, 34) to over a million (Gautier 1993, 6; Guerrero 1989).

All of the above circumstances, plus the long history of animosity between both countries, have turned Haitians into the favorite scapegoats of Dominican society. Haitians in the Dominican Republic are the subjects of everyday discrimination, both semiofficially and unofficially, and appeals for solutions to "the Haitian problem" (la problemática haitiana) are common in the Dominican news media. Today, Haitian governments no longer plan to invade the Dominican Republic and few Dominicans would consider repeating the 1937 massacre. Still, the same conditions that produced these terrible events remain in place: unregulated migration, border disputes, historical animosities, and cultural conflicts.
The Problem: Antihaitianismo

This brief account has served to illustrate two basic points. First, the Haitian-Dominican relationship is biased by a heavy historical burden, stretching back to colonial times, that acts as an obstacle to the normalization and equalization of relations between Haitians and Dominicans. And second, geographical proximity links Haitians and Dominicans, even against their will, as events on one side of the island affect the other. To these two objective, unavoidable, ever-present elements we must add a third one: the creation and reproduction--deliberately or not--of negative attitudes, symbols, and stereotypes, among Dominicans and directed toward Haitians living in the Dominican Republic. That is, in the Dominican Republic, history and geography have combined to give rise to a racial-sociocultural credo designed not only to sharply differentiate between Haitians and Dominicans, but that for all practical purposes negates and downplays all black (read Haitian) elements within Dominican society. This "ideology" has come to be known in the Dominican Republic as antihaitianismo and will be the object of this analysis.

This dissertation addresses two different, but intertwined issues: the politics of Haitian-Dominican relations, and the causes and consequences of antihaitianismo in the Dominican Republic. The first issue serves as background to the main problem of examining
antihaitianismo, thus helping to understand it. I will analyze the general characteristics of the Haitian-Dominican relationship, characteristics that, by their particular nature, have promoted the creation and persistence of antihaitianismo. My objective is to present an exhaustive, yet coherent, review of the different aspects of the Haitian-Dominican relationship, while concentrating on the particular issue of the development of antihaitianismo in the Dominican Republic. My second concern, the "ideology" of antihaitianismo, is not an isolated problem. It has to be examined in the general context of Haiti-Dominican relations in order to be clearly understood.

Outline of the Dissertation

This dissertation has the potential to make a real and valuable contribution to Dominican social science by examining an issue with current relevance to Dominican politics. The seemingly increasing presence of Haitians in the Dominican Republic, as well as the ecological and economic deterioration of Haiti, concern both common and elite Dominicans. My dissertation, therefore, strives to provide a more complete understanding of the forces at work in the long-standing, but precarious relationship between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

The following chapters analyze the issues presented here and examine this study's main thesis. Chapter II
contains a review of the literature relevant to this work, the main thesis of this study, the theoretical framework on which my analysis is based, and the methodology employed in my research. Chapters III and IV are an examination of Haiti-Dominican relations. Chapter III covers the history of Hispaniola from 1492 to 1961, while Chapter IV looks at contemporary issues in Haitian-Dominican relations. Chapter V is an overview of anti-Haitian attitudes and their expression in Dominican society, and it presents the results of data collected while conducting field research in the Dominican Republic. Chapter VI examines how anti-Haitian attitudes are created and reproduced, as well as how good they fit existing theoretical constructs. Finally, Chapter VII serves as conclusion to this work by analyzing the consequences of antihaitianismo both for Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

Notes

1Statistics for Haiti and the Dominican Republic must be used with care and only as general references, never as truly accurate representations. In Haiti, statistics have always been almost nonexistent. The last population census was in 1950, and it was not considered very accurate. Most of the statistics for Haiti are to be found in foreign publications, such as the reports from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, and even these are only estimates. The case of the Dominican Republic is similar to Haiti's up to the late 1960s, when accurate government statistics became the norm. Although the Dominican government collected statistical data as far back as the 1930s, much of that information was subjected to manipulation by the dictatorial regime of Rafael L. Trujillo.
For an excellent study of Gulf and Western's operations in the Dominican Republic please refer to Castillo (1974).

Notice the use of "ideology" in quotation marks. This is because we still have to judge whether antihaitianismo really qualifies as an ideology, something that will be done in the following chapters. Ideology is defined as "ideas that are logically related, and that identify those principles or values that lend legitimacy to political institutions and behavior" (Rodee et al. 1983, 77).
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter serves four purposes. First, it will review the general literature on Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and more specifically, the literature on the different issues of the Haitian-Dominican relationship. Second, I will present and discuss the theoretical framework used in this dissertation for the purpose of fitting my research work into the general body of theories on racism, prejudice, and discrimination. Third, I will introduce the thesis examined in this work. Finally, I will present and justify the methodology employed during my research for this dissertation.

Literature Review

Though a respectable number of works have been written about Haiti and the Dominican Republic, their importance among Latinamericanists remains secondary at best. Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and other large Latin American countries command more scholarly attention. Even among Caribbeanists, Haiti and the Dominican Republic are overshadowed by Cuba's preeminent position in the literature. Therefore, compared
to other Latin American countries, very little is written on Haiti and the Dominican Republic by foreign intellectuals. Most of what is written, then, is produced by native intellectuals locally or at foreign institutions. Of the two countries, Haiti is the one that has received more attention. Haiti's unique history and very particular characteristics make it a distinctive case in Latin American studies, plus it is also studied by some Africanists. The Dominican Republic, on the other hand, is considered just another "typical" small Latin American country, and does not command much outside attention.

When reviewing the specific literature on Haitian-Dominican relations, two things can be immediately noticed. First, that most of the literature is of Dominican origin. The latter is not surprising, since Dominicans traditionally consider themselves as the affected part in the relationship. It was the Dominican Republic who was invaded and occupied by Haiti in the 19th century, who has lost territory to Haiti on several occasions, and who receives the influx of thousands of poor Haitian migrants every year. Consequently, the topic has received much more attention on the part of Dominican writers. The second thing that can be noticed is the proliferation of propaganda works, again coming mostly from the Dominican side. This was particularly true during the Trujillo Era, though even today we might still find some of these kinds of works.
Certainly, if one thing characterizes the literature on Haitian-Dominican relations, it is that it varies greatly in quality.

This literature review will only cover books and articles dealing exclusively with Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and their relationship. Works dealing with the theoretical framework to be used in my dissertation will be covered later. I have divided the literature review in sections, and works have been arranged by their subject and/or specificity.

General Introductory Works

This category includes those works that serve as an introduction to the country, its history, and culture. Although their treatment of the Haitian-Dominican relationship is superficial, they fulfill their purpose well as introductions to the non-specialist. Not surprisingly, most of these works are written by foreigners, or by local intellectuals but published abroad. On Haiti, there are Haiti: The Breached Citadel (Bellegarde-Smith 1990), Haiti: Family Business (Prince 1985), and Haiti: Land of Poverty (Tata 1982). On the Dominican Republic, we have The Dominican Republic: Beyond the Lighthouse (Ferguson 1992), The Dominican Republic: Politics and Development in an Unsovereign State (J. Black 1986), and The Dominican Republic: A Caribbean Crucible (Wiarda and Kryzanek 1982).
A classic worth mentioning is *Haiti and the Dominican Republic* (Logan 1968). Although outdated, it is still an excellent comparative study of the two countries. It offers a good review of Dominican and Haitian history and emphasizes their socioeconomic differences.

Also included as general works are the national histories of each country. These are books that summarize the countries' history from their Amerindian past to the present. They are usually written by local historians and many are used as history textbooks at schools and universities. Haiti has its *Manuel d'Histoire d'Haiti* (Dorsainvil 1958), *La Nación Haitiana* (Bellegarde 1984), *Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People, 1492-1971* (Heinl and Heinl 1978), and *From Dessalines to Duvalier: Race, Colour and National Independence in Haiti* (Nicholls 1979). The Dominican Republic has *Manual de Historia Dominicana* (Moya Pons 1984), *Historia Social y Económica de la República Dominicana* (Cassa 1992), and the early 20th century classic *Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic, 1844-1924* (Welles 1928).

**Opposing Viewpoints**

This section looks at works that deal more specifically with the Haitian-Dominican relationship. As mentioned above, many books and articles that analyze Haitian-Dominican relations do so from a biased, nationalist
perspective. These have several things in common. First, they are strongly nationalistic. They defend their nation, race, or culture, to the point of considering it superior to their neighbor's. Second, they claim to represent and endorse the so-called "official line" of their respective country with its particular views of the Dominican-Haitian relationship. Third, although rhetorical in nature, they try to justify their arguments under the mantle of scientific objectivity. And fourth, they were written by historian-ideologists, highly respected and recognized in their own countries. These intellectuals formed new schools of though bent on reinterpreting their countries' past and on defending their "true" national culture from foreign influences.

In the Dominican Republic, this fiercely nationalist (and anti-Haitian) school reached its heyday during the dictatorship of Rafael L. Trujillo, particularly after the 1937 massacre. It was represented by the literary production of Sócrates Nolasco (1955), Angel S. del Rosario Pérez (1957), Manuel A. Peña Batlle (1954), and Joaquín Balaguer (1947). Trujillo, who by that time had practically eliminated all forms of internal opposition, recruited these intellectuals to provide a moral justification for his dictatorial regime and his authoritarian policies. These intellectuals, in turn, saw in Trujillo either the nation's savior, or the best choice at a moment when options were
limited. Anyway, these Trujillista intellectuals portrayed Trujillo as the messiah who had come to save the country from its social decay. They wrote political and historical studies (sometimes xenophobic, but always nationalist) that praised the Hispanic heritage of the Dominican Republic and downplayed the obvious, strong African influence that is a main feature of Dominican culture. Good examples of this kind of literature are the works of Peña Batlle (1954) and Balaguer (1947). Peña Batlle (1954) reproduces in Política de Trujillo his famous speech of 1942, "El Sentido de Una Política." There he describes common Haitians as undesirable and says of them, "of pure African race, they cannot represent for us an ethnic incentive of any kind" (Peña Batlle 1954, 67). Joaquin Balaguer wrote in 1947 what is considered the most brilliant defense of the Trujillo regime and its Haitian policy: La Realidad Dominicana. There, Balaguer argued for the right of the Dominican people to maintain their Hispanic culture and traditions, and to protect them vigorously from foreign (read Haitian) influences.

Almost forty years later, in 1984, Balaguer basically repeats the same arguments in La Isla al Revés. In a sense, very little has changed in Balaguer's world view, as the same old arguments are redefined and fed to a new generation of Dominican intellectuals. These "new nationalists," who claim not to be racist or xenophobic, use cultural and
economic arguments in defending their ideas. Among this new generation of anti-Haitian, nationalist works are the writings of Carlos Cornielle (1980), Luis Julián Pérez (1990), and Manuel Núñez (1990). Alarmist in nature, they appeal to the Dominican people's nationalism and traditional fear of Haiti. They portray the Dominican Republic as a country in decline, unless the present trends of illegal Haitian migration and national disunity are drastically reversed. Manuel Núñez (1990), in particular, in El Ocaso de la Nación Dominicana, defends the position of Peña Batlle from a nationalist point of view. He also undertakes a virulent (and personal) attack of Dominican Marxist historians, whom he accuses of distorting historical facts with the intention of advancing their doctrine, of being Haitianophiles (Haitian sympathizers), and even of being anti-nationalists (Núñez 1990, 65-70, 78-79).

Haitians, on the other hand, are not free from these prejudices, either. Many of their studies share a noiriste theme, further defined by the development of négritude in the 20th century. As a result of the American military occupation of Haiti (1915-1934), Haitian elites began to seriously reexamine themselves. Led by ethnologist Jean Price-Mars, the indigéniste movement sought to revalorize Haiti's real culture: the black peasant culture whose origins lie in Africa (Trouillot 1990, 131). Négritude took these ideas one big step further by endowing them with a
political character. They believed in the inherent supremacy of the black race (proven by Haiti's independence in 1804) and on the universal brotherhood of all black nations and peoples around the world. Lorimer Denis and François Duvalier (1938) in Le Problème des classes à travers l'histoire d'Haiti even interpreted Haiti's history as a struggle between blacks and mulattoes for power (an interpretation rejected by Price-Mars). Not surprisingly, when François Duvalier came to power in 1957 he used négritude as the state's ideology in order to justify his dictatorial regime.

Regarding relations with the Dominican Republic, these ideologists have sought to reinterpret Haiti's troubled relation with its neighbor. They view the Haitian occupation of 1822-1844 in a favorable light and feel that all inhabitants of Hispaniola must share a common destiny. One example of this kind of literature is Jean Price-Mars' (1953) La República de Haití y la República Dominicana. Price-Mars defends the Haitian idea (written in the nation's first constitution) that the island of Hispaniola is "one and indivisible," and urges his Dominican brothers to accept their common destiny and unite with Haiti. Other arguments presented by Price-Mars, and that many Dominican intellectuals have furiously attacked, were that the Haitian occupation of 1822-1844 was beneficial for the Dominican people. Some of the benefits that it produced were the
abolition of slavery, the integration of the island, and the "fact" that Haitian authorities acted for the common good of all the island's inhabitants. Daniel Fignolé (1948) in *Notre Neybe ou Leur Bahoruco?* lays claim to the Dominican province of Bahoruco, based on his particular interpretation of history and on the fact that it contained a large number of Haitian residents. More recently, Haitian governments have been accused of using the Haitian-Dominican "crisis" in order to manipulate Haitian nationalism for political purposes and to present destabilization as coming from the other side of the border. In this same newspaper article, the author reports that on Haiti's national radio Dominican president Joaquín Balaguer was called--among other things--a "racist blind man" and "a dictator protector of macoutes" (Louis 1991, 3).

**Haitian Migration, Sugar, and Border Conflicts**

The issues of Haitian migration and sugar, two of the most controversial (and interrelated) topics in Haitian-Dominican relations, are also the two best covered in the literature. Again, this is a reflection of the larger number of works having been written by Dominicans. For most Dominicans, Haitian migration is the most visible component of the Haitian-Dominican relationship. Sugar, on the other hand, has been the most important crop of the Dominican Republic for decades and one of the mainstays of the
Dominican economy. Its almost exclusive reliance on Haitian labor links it to the issue of migration, and until recently, it was difficult to separate one from the other. Furthermore, Haitian labor has become indispensable for the harvest of Dominican coffee, and it is widely employed in the Dominican countryside for menial or hard tasks. Even in the cities, Haitians are found engaged in low-paying jobs, such as construction workers, domestic servants, or street peddlers.

Sociological and anthropological studies of Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic and its use as labor force by the sugar industry provide some of the most balanced analyses of Haitian-Dominican relations. The literature is particularly rich on the issue of Haitian semi-slave labor in the Dominican sugar industry, a situation that has been widely denounced in international forums. Most of these works show careful research, objective analysis, and an understanding of the particular historical and cultural dimensions of the relationship. These studies have focused on the structural causes that compel Haitians to emigrate (Castor 1987; Stepick 1987), the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the migrating groups (Hernández 1973a, 1973b; Veras 1983, 1985), and their insertion into the sugar economy (Ferrán 1986). Studies dealing specifically with the use of Haitian labor in the Dominican sugar industry abound. These include scholarly
analyses (Báez Evertsz 1986; Corten 1986; Grasmuck 1982, 1983; Madruga 1985, 1986; Murphy 1984), studies commissioned by local government agencies (Moya Pons 1986, ONAPLAN 1981), by international organizations (Plant 1987; Sociedad Anti-Esclavitud para la Protección de los Derechos Humanos 1982), and some journalistic accounts (Cruz 1989; Fink 1979; García 1983; Latortue 1985b). Most of these studies, however, do not concern themselves with the formation of racial attitudes toward Haitians, or the social and political consequences of these attitudes.

The Haitian-Dominican border question and the diplomatic relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic have also encouraged literary production on these topics. Most works argue the historical viewpoints of either Haiti (Fignolé 1948, 1957; Matteis 1987; Price-Mars 1953) or the Dominican Republic (Balaguer 1984; Machado Báez 1955; Peña Batlle 1946). On the other hand, there are some objective studies (mostly by foreign scholars) that examine the border question and life in the borderlands (Augelli 1980; Box and de la Rive Box-Lasocki 1989; Casals Victoria 1973; Palmer 1980). Diplomatic relations between both countries have also been analyzed by both local and foreign scholars, sometimes using as sources document collections in the United States and other foreign countries (Bellegarde-Smith 1974, 1984; Castor 1987; Fauriol 1979; Louis 1991;

One other important contribution to the literature on Haitian-Dominican relations has been the recent publication of historical studies (Castillo 1978; Gardiner 1979; Vega 1988) and collections of documents (Cuello 1985), that have helped to complement older works (Peña Batlle 1946; Price-Mars 1953; Rodriguez Demorizi 1955). Finally, though no less important, has been the development of a rich narrative tradition (Alexis 1986; Lemoine 1987; Prestol Castillo 1987) that provides an insight and "feeling" for Haitian-Dominican relations that many scholarly works cannot get across.

**Antihaitianismo**

As seen above, literary production on the topics of Haiti migration to the Dominican Republic, its relation to the sugar industry, the Haitian-Dominican border, and their diplomatic relations, has been plentiful. Dozens of works, in the form of books and articles, have been written on these issues. This is not the case, however, with the issue of antihaitianismo. Works dealing specifically with the problem of anti-Haitian attitudes in the Dominican Republic are actually rather limited.

Agapito B. Betances (1985), Lil Despradel (1974), Franklin J. Franco (1973, 1979a), and Pedro A. Pérez Cabral (1967) have specifically explored the presence of anti-
Haitian attitudes and the practice of racial segregation in Dominican society. They have done it from a historical perspective; that is, they have traced the historical development of anti-Haitian prejudices in Dominican society. The book by Pérez Cabral (1967) focuses on the 19th century, and on how Dominican leaders sought foreign protection from the Haitian "threat." He argues that most Dominican leaders were anti-national opportunists that manipulated the fear of Haiti for their own personal reasons (money, power, racism). The works by A. Betances (1985), Despradel (1974), and Franco (1973, 1979a) also emphasize the 19th century, in particular the Haitian occupation of 1822-1844, but conclude with the Trujillo dictatorship.

The article by Despradel (1974), "Las Etapas del Antihaitianismo en la República Dominicana: El Papel de los Historiadores," merits separate attention here, since it is a path-breaking study. In this article, Despradel examines the role of Dominican historians in re-interpreting and distorting Dominican history. She argues that, for a number of reasons (including racism), Dominican historians deliberately downplayed the Dominican Republic's African heritage, substituting it for a false and concocted indian heritage. That gave (and still gives) Dominicans the false impression that they are not black or mulatto, but indian. Then, by extension, only Haitians are black (and Africanized). The indian heritage myth becomes even more
paradoxical when one considers the fact that the Amerindian population of Hispaniola disappeared quickly; just about 11,000 remained by 1517 (Moya Pons 1977, 67).

Two other authors that examine antihaitianismo are Fennema and Loewenthal (1987), and Dore Cabral (1985). In their work, the authors analyze the racist discourse of Balaguer (1984) in *La Isla al Revés* and Fennema and Loewenthal (1987) introduce the concept of neo-racism to describe it. Neo-racism differs from old-fashioned biological racism in the fact that it stresses the cultural differences of racial groups. Haitians and Dominicans are culturally different: the Haitian people are of African origin, while the Dominican people are of Spanish origin. Therefore, they should not mix (Fennema and Loewenthal 1987, 43-45). This concept of neo-racism is very similar to the concept of "symbolic racism," that will be described in detail in the next section.

Finally, Carlos Dore Cabral (1987), in "Los Dominicanos de Origen Haitiano y la Segregación Social en la República Dominicana," examines antihaitianismo from a different and unique perspective: the plight of Dominicans of Haitian origin. In the Dominican Republic, the first and even second-generation descendants of Haitian migrants are not considered Dominicans. Though they are legally Dominican citizens, for all practical purposes they are treated as Haitians by Dominican society. This constant rejection
forces them to internalize their situation. They consider themselves Haitians, even though they probably have never been to Haiti and they do not speak Creole like a native. Dore Cabral, besides identifying and describing this phenomenon, also analyzes the causes behind the persistence of these attitudes in the Dominican Republic. Haitians and their descendants, Dore Cabral argues, are a cheap source of labor for most of the Dominican population, from the Haitian maid that works in an upper-class home, to the Haitian laborer that harvests coffee for a small Dominican farmer (Dore Cabral 1987, 70-71). Therefore, it is in the best interest of the majority of the Dominican population to keep Haitians subjugated as a cheap, docile labor force.

As this review of the literature has shown, the research question that this dissertation addresses has just begun to be examined in the literature on Haitian-Dominican relations. Only a few articles have been devoted to it, and they cover the issue of antihaitianismo superficially. That being the case, this dissertation will be making a unique contribution to this problem. The formation of these discriminatory attitudes, on the other hand, is also an integral part of an ample, well-established literature on race and prejudice. It is from this literature that I have developed the theoretical framework for this dissertation.
Theoretical Framework

Causes of racial and ethnic prejudice in the literature range from general, socio-historical interpretations, to individual psychological causes. The socio-historical (or structural) approach looks for the causes of racism and prejudice at the national or supra-national level. By examining a country's history, society, and culture, it tries to explain the prejudice of one group (nation) towards another as based on deep-seated historical, political, or cultural differences. Individual explanations, on the other hand, look at personal attitudes as the main cause of prejudice. Racism and prejudice, it is claimed, are individual acts caused by individual attitudes. For example, the local worker hates and discriminates against the illegal migrant workers that take away his job or that lower wages.

Caribbean Race Relations: A Study of Two Variants, the work of Hoetink (1971) on the two variants of the somatic norm image in Caribbean societies, is an excellent example of the socio-historical approach. Hoetink contrasts the Iberian somatic norm image that is prevalent in the Spanish-speaking Caribbean with the Northern European somatic norm image of the rest of the islands. He concludes that there is a smaller somatic distance in the formerly Iberian colonies than in the other colonies. For example, a light mulatto is considered white (or white-like) in countries
within the Iberian somatic norm (Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic), while that same person would be labeled as black in countries within the Northern European somatic norm (other Caribbean islands, the United States). That leads to a reduction (but not elimination) of racial prejudice in the former countries, plus it also encouraged miscegenation. Another good example of the socio-historical approach is *Raza e Historia en Santo Domingo* by Hugo Tolentino Dipp (1992). This work analyzes the formation of racial prejudices in the first colony of the New World: Santo Domingo. The main thesis of Tolentino Dipp is that the origins of racial prejudice had nothing to do with skin color. Rather, these prejudices had an economic basis, sugar production. The profitable production of sugar demanded a cheap and docile labor force (either Indians or African slaves), and racial prejudice helped justify and maintain this status quo (Tolentino Dipp 1992, 223-224). It separated the white master from the black slave, the powerful from the powerless, the wealthy from the destitute. Even more important, it justified this separation and provided an easily identifiable reference sign: skin color.

The study of racial relations and prejudice is not limited to historical times. Anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists, both in the United States and Europe, have conducted valuable research on contemporary cases of racial and ethnic conflict. From these, I have
drawn on those whose research most closely parallels the research objectives of this dissertation.

The work of Teun A. van Dijk (1987) is central to this theoretical framework. In *Communicating Racism: Ethnic Prejudice in Thought and Talk*, he shows that prejudice is a group attitude and that these attitudes are "acquired, used, and transformed in social contexts" (van Dijk 1987, 195). More explicitly,

prejudice is not a personal, individual attitude toward ethnic minority groups, but socially acquired, shared, and enacted within the dominant in-group [van Dijk 1987, 345].

In this respect, van Dijk also follows the socio-cultural approach, but from a different perspective. He interviewed individuals in order to assess whether their prejudices were mainly personal or social. What he found out, as mentioned above, is that racism and prejudice are social phenomena. But, who are responsible for creating and transmitting these ideas? Or are they simply spontaneous?

Van Dijk singles out elites1 as providing the initial (pre)formulations of ethnic prejudices in society, and the media as their major channel for the reproduction of these ethnic attitudes (van Dijk 1987, 360-361).

People do not spontaneously "invent" negative opinions about ethnic minority groups, nor do they express and communicate them in everyday talk without sociocultural constraints. Prejudice and its reproduction in (verbal or other) interaction has specific social functions, which may simply be summarized as the maintenance of dominance or power for the in-group and its members [van Dijk 1987, 359].
For van Dijk, elites create (or maintain) most of these negative opinions with the aim of preserving their status quo, and they are in turn reproduced by the news media—also controlled by elite groups (van Dijk 1987, 360). Other media, such as magazines and textbooks, provide an additional background for ethnic prejudice. The general literature on socialization supports these claims, and mentions schools, parents, and the mass media as the main agents of socialization (Orum 1983, 266-272). These arguments are also reflected in the literature on Haitian-Dominican relations by Despradel (1974), who argues that it was the work of many Dominican historians to keep alive and even create new versions of antihaitianismo, as well as to arouse nationalist feelings by exalting the "purely" Hispanic heritage of the Dominican people. The general public tends to adopt these dominant elite opinions given "the absence or scarcity of alternative forms of discourse and information, antiracist models, and positive information" (van Dijk 1987, 363). In the Dominican Republic, authoritarian power structures have reinforced these trends.

Van Dijk has also classified prejudice as based on three dimensions of "threat," that is, the supposed threat that foreigners or minorities represent to their host society (see Figure 2-1). These threats are interpreted as economic, cultural, and/or social. Foreigners/minorities
represent an unfair economic competition, are culturally different and do not seem to adapt to the host society's cultural norms, and are social misfits who wreak the established social order (van Dijk 1987, 58-60). In simpler terms, they are "different" from the "established order," and that makes them the subject of prejudice.

Finally, van Dijk establishes five prejudice categories, based on elite (pre)formulations and their reproduction by the media. These are: immigration, crime and aggression, unfair competition, cultural conflicts, and personal characteristics (van Dijk 1987, 364-366). Under these five categories, different prejudices are expressed that try both to denigrate (or dehumanize) immigrants and to portray them as a threat. The majority of these prejudices are also found regarding Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic, as seen in Chapters V and VI. For example, under the immigration category van Dijk mentions the constant references to a "flood" of immigrants as one of the main
prejudices found in the media (van Dijk 1987, 364). Under the crime and aggression category, he condemns the common media practice of specifying the ethnic background of crime suspects (van Dijk 1987, 364). In the unfair competition category, the main prejudice is the widespread belief that migrant workers "steal" jobs from native residents and burden socioeconomic resources, without ever mentioning the fact that they are employed in activities that natives refuse to do (e.g. farm work, domestic work), or that they contribute to the country's economic well-being (van Dijk 1987, 364-365). In the cultural conflicts category, most prejudices depict foreign cultures as "strange," "different," or "inferior" (van Dijk 1987, 365-366). Finally, the personal characteristics category includes descriptive allusions regarding immigrants, that are portrayed as stupid, lazy, uneducated, backward, childish, etc. These attributed characteristics then become, in the country's popular culture, the "typical" and everyday behavior of minority groups (van Dijk 1987, 366).

My use of individual-level explanations in this dissertation follows Kinder and Sears' (1981) theoretical debate on racial threats versus symbolic racism. According to them, the racial threat hypothesis originates in the competition between blacks and whites for a share of the "Good Life" and leads to rational choice-type decisions (Kinder and Sears 1981, 415). That is, whites will
discriminate blacks in the measure that they, as individuals, feel that their share of the "Good Life" is being threatened by this out-group. A similar argument is commonly made in the Dominican Republic about Haitian migrants, who are accused of "stealing" jobs and lowering wages (see Chapter V). The symbolic racism hypothesis, on the other hand, stresses early life socialization processes which influence adult attitudes and perceptions later in life. This results in affective responses to symbols regardless of tangible consequences for the adult's personal life. For example, many adults in the United States opposed busing black and white children together to integrated schools, even though they did not have any children that could have been affected by that decision (Sears, Hensler, and Speer 1979). McConahay and Hough (1976) probably present the best definition of symbolic racism,

... it is the expression in terms of abstract ideological symbols and symbolic behaviors of the feeling that blacks are violating cherished values and making illegitimate demands for changes in the racial status quo [McConahay and Hough 1976, 38].

Again, this argument can be made for the Dominican Republic, where Haitians are accused of "tainting" the racial make-up and Hispanic values of the Dominican people. For those reasons, these two constructs are utilized in this dissertation as the main instruments to examine the causes of the individual-level attitudes of Dominicans toward Haitian migrants.
Summing up, two theoretical approaches are employed in this dissertation in order to test the main thesis. First, the socio-historical approach, as used by Hoetink (1971), Despradel (1974), Tolentino Dipp (1992), and above all, van Dijk (1987) on the reproduction of elite discourse and the social context of prejudice. And second, the individual-level approach, using the two constructs of racial threats and symbolic racism and applying them to the Dominican case.

Main Thesis

The main thesis of this dissertation then is that the causes of the existing anti-Haitian attitudes (antihaitianismo) among Dominicans lie, first, in the generally tense and historically conflictive nature of Haitian-Dominican relations and, second, in the deliberate development and social reproduction by members of the Dominican elites, of an anti-Haitian "ideology." The conflictive Haitian-Dominican relationship, in its numerous dimensions (social, political, cultural, historical, economic, etc.) has repeatedly given rise to tensions and even clashes on both sides of the border. That has provided a fertile ground for the development of biased judgements. As a result, prejudiced opinions and stereotypes are created regarding the opposite camp. However, these by themselves are not enough to support the long-standing, powerful "ideology" of antihaitianismo. As history shows, long-
standing disputes (e.g. France and Germany) do not always lead to the creation of strong, long-standing, prejudiced attitudes. Even in the case of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, the Haitian-Dominican relationship has not always been tense and conflictive. As a matter of fact, on several occasions Haitian-Dominican relations have been cordial and amicable. The problem lies in that the relationship has generally been presented as conflictive, and here the second part of my thesis comes into play. It has been the deliberate work of some Dominican elites that, based on political interests, nationalism, racist ideologies, or their combination, has given rise to a multi-faceted "ideology" of anti-Haitian attitudes, symbols, and stereotypes known as antihaitianismo. In other words, though the general conditions for these attitudes have usually been there (i.e. a conflictive relationship), it has been elites who have shaped, preserved, and socially reproduced these attitudes until they have become part an intrinsic of Dominican culture.

**Research Methodology**

The two approaches presented in the theoretical framework section, the socio-historical approach and the individual-level approach, demand different methodologies. In order to be consistent with the works discussed in the previous section, I have tried to follow their methodologies
to the greatest extent possible. The socio-historical approach employs an interdisciplinary methodology that is characterized by its emphasis on the study of a nation's history, politics, culture, and society. Therefore, it is mostly based on the examination of written materials (books, articles, documents) regarding those issues and, as is the case in the work of van Dijk (1987), on field interviews. The individual-level approach, on the other hand, is based exclusively on interviews.

The first research strategy for this work consisted of library research and participant observation. Given the broad scope of the Haitian-Dominican relationship, its study required a thorough examination of the literature on Haitian-Dominican relations, as well as an in-depth analysis of present-day issues, such as the social, economic, political, historical, cultural, racial, and ecological issues of the Haitian-Dominican relationship. The main part of the essential library research on these issues was conducted during a two-year period at the University of Florida's Latin American Collection, which has specially strong holdings on the Caribbean area. This research was complemented with my own sources that include rare or unpublished works not available outside the Dominican Republic (e.g. Ginebra 1940). The bibliography at the end of this dissertation contains most of the over five hundred references on Haiti and the Dominican Republic that I have
examined and cataloged myself in a database program. The remainder of the library research was completed in the Dominican Republic using library sources and newspaper archives. Libraries consulted included the Biblioteca Nacional de la República Dominicana, the library of the Banco Central de la República Dominicana, the library of the Dirección General de Migración, the Dominican Collection at the Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo (UASD), and the libraries of the Pontificia Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra (PUCMM) in Santiago and Santo Domingo. Newspapers articles, from dailies or weeklies such as El Siglo, El Listín Diario, El Nacional, El Sol, Ultima Hora, Haiti-Observateur, and other prominent Dominican and foreign newspapers, were also used.

History textbooks, particularly those sections that deal with the Haitian theme, are also important sources for the study of the origin of attitudes. Education is a fundamental part of the socialization process (Orum 1983, 267-269), and most educated Dominicans (even college students) draw their knowledge of Haiti and Haitians from their history or social studies courses. I examined history textbooks dating as far back as the early 20th century in order to study their anti-Haitian biases, if any. An analysis of those particular sections dealing with Haiti revealed what Dominicans learned (or still learn) about the
Haitian people in school (see Chapter VI for more information).

Another of my research strategies consisted of participant observation and personal assessment. It involved visits to the three regions of major interaction between Haitians and Dominicans: the borderlands, the sugar industry, and the cities of Santo Domingo and Santiago. There, I examined the nature and daily manifestations of the Haitian-Dominican relationship on a personal level, thus helping me get a close "feel" for my research topic. I visited these contrasting regions, personally saw what took place there, and talked to dozens of people, some of them personal friends and relatives. Participant observation has long been one of the favorite research tools of anthropologists and sociologists, and it is still considered as one of the basic research devices of the social scientist doing field work. And with good justification, since participant observation often lets one get insights into the issues that are otherwise impossible to grasp. Definitively, no amount of reading or library research compares to the living reality of being "there," seeing what Haitian-Dominican relations are really about at the personal level. As a result, participant observation has been used in this study to validate, on an individual basis, the assertions presented here. For example, one thing is to write about Haitians in the Dominican sugar industry, and
another is to go to a sugar mill and actually see them at work and talk to them.

The next step in my research was to interview elites. Elites in the Dominican Republic are a rather small group, but they have been attributed with exerting a great influence in the creation and reproduction of anti-Haitian attitudes (A. Betances 1985; Despradel 1974; Franco 1973). In the Dominican Republic, elites control policy making and the media, therefore exerting considerable influence on public opinion. Therefore, beliefs, opinions, and ideologies held by Dominican elites permeate popular opinion by way of the media and authoritarian power structures. If we also include educators in the definition of elites, then the influence of elite attitudes reaches mass proportions. It would not be an exaggeration to say that elite attitudes in the Dominican Republic regarding the Haitian-Dominican relationship are fairly representative of the general population's views, given their control (and manipulation) of information sources (news media, education, politics, etc.). That fact alone justifies and demands the study of Dominican elites. Finally, a study of Dominican elites is considerably cheaper, less complicated, and probably as reliable as its logical alternative, a general population survey, which might cost thousands of dollars.

The methodology for this portion of my research is based on a set of semistructured elite interviews. I
conducted these semistructured interviews with members of the Dominican elites, such as politicians, government officials, journalists, media figures (both of the printed and broadcast media), military officers, educators, and intellectuals. Interviews were also conducted with Haitian leaders, such as community or church leaders, living in the Dominican Republic in order to compare their perspective of "the Haitian problem" with that of Dominican elites. Interviews with Dominicans were conducted in Spanish, while interviews with Haitians were conducted either in Spanish or Haitian Creole. The interviews were recorded, when possible and practical, and confidentiality for all sources was assured. Elite interviews were arranged through my personal contacts in the Dominican Republic, particularly with journalists and intellectuals. These interviews were carried out during my visits to the Dominican Republic in 1989, and 1991 to 1993.

The semistructured interview format consisted of a set of eight to ten open-ended questions that were administered in 20 to 30 minutes, more if necessary. Of course, a longer time frame and additional questions are always more desirable, but long interviews tend to become repetitive and many of my subjects had limited time. The semistructured format differs from the structured interview in that it allows for more leeway in responses while maintaining a coherent, ordered pattern of questions. Questions do not
have to follow a precise order, as long as one is getting the desired information—one can always go back later to the unanswered ones. Also, the use of open-ended questions allows for further, more precise inquiries when additional information is needed (Peabody et al. 1990).

A copy of the original elite questionnaire in Spanish and a translation into English are in Appendix A. The questions followed a thematic order, covering topics such as migration, the impact of Haitians on the Dominican economy, cultural and racial clashes, political implications, etc. Since the questionnaire should not contain more than ten questions, some questions (marked with an asterisk) were only asked when time allowed, or on a second interview. While the first twelve questions are thematic, it should be noted that question thirteen tries to pinpoint the source(s) of the respondent's anti-Haitian attitudes, if any. The first part targets symbolic racism, while the second part targets self-interest. Finally, question fourteen deals with possible solutions to the "Haitian problem," and is designed to evaluate the use of authoritarian measures regarding it. Besides giving me information on the different topics, the questionnaire was designed to provide general insights into the respondent's attitudes towards Haitians. The data collected was of a qualitative nature and the results are used in order to determine whether
antihaitianismo is present among the Dominican elites and what forms it takes.

Finally, I conducted focus group interviews with local people in the three regions that I visited: the borderlands, the sugar industry, and the cities of Santo Domingo and Santiago. The focus group methodology consisted of the selection of seven to ten participants who were given a couple of "topics" (sometimes in the form of questions) and then allowed to discuss their experiences, feelings, and reactions in a group setting. In the literature, it has been defined as "a carefully planned discussion designed to obtain perceptions on a defined area of interest in a permissive, nonthreatening environment" (Krueger 1988, 18). In the case of my research work, I was interested in their perceptions of the Haitian-Dominican relationship, that is, their attitudes, stereotypes, and prejudices. These discussions usually extended for over an hour, but all lasted less than two hours. The majority of focus group interviews were conducted among Dominicans, though a smaller portion consisted of Haitians and their offspring (many of whom are Dominican citizens by birthright). The latter is to confirm the employment and effect of stereotypes and discrimination against those who are most affected by their use. Furthermore, Haitians themselves, and particularly their offspring, are believed to suffer from identity crises as a result of living in a society that does not accept them
as equals. As such, their attitudes are a valuable source of information about Haitian-Dominican relations, as they are the most affected group in this scenario.

The focus group interview format consisted of the discussion of topics dealing with Haitian-Dominican relations. In the case of focus groups made up of Dominican subjects, the topics centered around the question "How are Haitians generally treated?" and discussions on "Haiti and/or Haitians residing in the Dominican Republic." For Haitians and their offspring, the topics were modified to "How do Dominicans treat Haitians in general?" and discussions about "Dominicans and Haitians." The original focus group questionnaires, in Spanish and Haitian Creole, are in Appendices B, C, and D. These focus group interviews were carried out in 1989, during a five-week field research period. For simplification, I restricted my groups to lower and lower-middle class Dominicans, as they represent the majority of the population. Groups included both sexes, as well as different age groups. Participants were selected on location (convenience sampling), a technique substantiated in the literature (Krueger 1988, 96) and dictated by field realities. Again, the interviews were recorded, and the participants' confidentiality was assured. The data collected in this focus groups interviews was qualitative in nature and will be used to illustrate the nature and diversity of anti-Haitian attitudes among common Dominicans.
In conclusion, for my research I developed a methodology that combined the perceptions of the nations' leaders (through elite interviews and literary sources), with that of the common citizen (through focus group interviews and participant observation). This qualitative data will be used in ways. First, to document the presence of antihaitianismo at both the elite and the popular levels. Second, to illustrate that prejudice is not an individual, but a social phenomenon. And third, to show how elites have utilized antihaitianismo for political purposes.

Notes

1Elites are defined in van Dijk's work as "social (minority) groups that have various types of power and control, whether political, economic, social, cultural, or personal" (van Dijk 1987, 367).

2Both the elite and the focus group interviews were conducted either in Spanish or in Creole. English translations of the original questionnaires are included in the appendices for the reader's convenience.
CHAPTER III
A HISTORY OF HAITIAN-DOMINICAN RELATIONS

The origin of the present-day states of Haiti and the Dominican Republic lies in the unique and convoluted history of this island. The island of Hispaniola is a special case in that two independent states share the same small island, but trace their origins to entirely different colonial traditions. To the casual observer, Haiti and the Dominican Republic offer a startling contrast, difficult to interpret. History is the key to decipher this social, cultural, political, and economic dualism.

This chapter is divided in three sections. The first section covers the colonial history of Hispaniola from Columbus' arrival in 1492 to the creation of the independent state of Haiti on the western part of the island. The second section follows events from the Haitian Revolution up to the assassination of Dominican dictator Rafael L. Trujillo in 1961. The third and final section will examine the influence of the historical legacy on the national development of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and on the relationship between them.
From 1492 to the Haitian Revolution

The Haitian Revolution marks the beginning of the end of colonial domination in Hispaniola, and the eventual development of two separate states in the island. This section will also follow a chronological order whenever possible, as it will be divided into topics. More precisely, this section will cover: the devastaciones, the French settlement in Hispaniola, border problems and the Spanish recognition of Saint-Domingue, trade between the two colonies, the Haitian Revolution and French occupation, and finally, the triumph of the Haitian Revolution and the attempted unification of the island under the rule of Dessalines. We begin with a brief look at Hispaniola's political and economic decline from its discovery by Columbus to the 17th century.

From Prized Colony to Forgotten Territory

In a little over two centuries, Hispaniola went from being Spain's first and most prized colony in the New World to a forgotten backwater of the declining Spanish Empire. In 1492, during the first of his voyages to the New World, Columbus discovered an island that the native indians called Ayti. He named that island La Española (later anglicized to Hispaniola), because it reminded him so much of Spain. The island had three things the Spanish were looking for: size, resources (gold in particular), and a docile domestic labor
force to be exploited. The combination of gold and indians was too good to resist. Hispaniola quickly became the focus of the Spanish presence in the Americas and it gained notoriety through a series of first events: first European settlement, first church, first university, but also first indian massacre, first plundering in the New World, etc. In this way, Hispaniola became the stage and testing ground for a colonization strategy that would be repeated by the Spanish throughout the New World. By the sword and the cross—in that order—the Spanish quickly transformed Santo Domingo into a mining enclave, and the Taino indians into virtual slaves.

With gold—and the Tainos—quickly exhausted, Spanish interest in the colony of Santo Domingo declined rapidly. Between 1515 and 1517, over 800 colonists left Hispaniola, leaving about only 715 behind (Moya Pons 1984, 28). The discovery of greater riches in the American mainland relegated it to a minor position in the Spanish Empire. Without gold and indians, Santo Domingo had little to offer to the Spanish. Economically, it could not compete with the territories of New Spain and Perú. And strategically, Cuba (in particular La Habana) replaced it. This steady loss of population became the trend, and with only about 3,000 indians left by 1519, the colony was steadily becoming depopulated (Moya Pons 1984, 29).
Short economic booms in sugar (after 1521), and later, ginger cultivation (after 1581), along with the extermination of the indians, led to the importation of black slaves from Africa, beginning in the early 16th century (Moya Pons 1984, 32-38). These economic booms, however, were short. After their decline, depopulation and economic stagnation again followed. Thus Santo Domingo became a forgotten colony in the extensive—but already decaying—Spanish Empire. Spain's limited export capacity and its monopolistic policies prevented it from effectively supplying its colonies with the products they needed.

According to chronicler Sánchez Valverde,

... only about every three years could a Spanish ship be seen in those ports. Foreign nations, specially the Dutch, took advantage of this calm. They brought in their clandestine goods and carried out our products and in this manner the colony maintained itself until the beginning of the past century [Sánchez Valverde 1947, 109].

Furthermore, the new European presence in the Americas was a threat to Spain, but the colonists of Hispaniola, faced with economic stagnation and in dire need of European goods, had no qualms about dealing with the foreigners. Soon, contraband developed into the main source of European products for the colonists of Santo Domingo, and by extension, the main economic activity of Santo Domingo (Moya Pons 1984, 39-49).

All this economic activity was triggered by cattle ranching. The cattle brought by the Spanish to the island
had found a perfect place to multiply in the plains of Hispaniola, where wild herds of cattle soon roamed by the thousands in plains devoid of human habitation. Cattle and contraband naturally blended together, as one gave way to the other. The colonists supplied foreign merchants (mostly Portuguese, Dutch and French) with cheap hides, and in turn, they were supplied with European products (Moya Pons 1984, 51-53). The Spanish Crown, of course, did not approve it, and took drastic steps to reduce--and eventually try to eliminate--contraband. It was in this formative historical stage when the economic bases of the colony of Santo Domingo were set.

The cattle ranching economy of Hispaniola led to the development of a product--hides--that could not find an outlet in the Spanish market. An acute lack of transportation (few ships had any interest on Hispaniola), plus little demand in Spain, meant that the inhabitants of Hispaniola could not rely on the Spanish market to solve their economic problems. Contraband naturally became the only way out of the economic deadlock. The recognition, by the colonists, of this economic reality, would eventually lead them to accept (and adapt to) other circumstances, most of which were not favorable to Spain's colonial interest. The Spanish authorities, therefore, decided that contraband had to be stopped.
The Devastaciones

The most extreme of the measures taken by the Spanish Crown to protect Hispaniola was the abandonment and destruction of the towns in the northwestern part of the island in 1605 and the resettling of those colonists in new towns built near the capital (see Figure 3-1). The devastaciones, as they were known, were to have unforeseeable consequences for the future development of the colony of Santo Domingo.

The devastaciones were more than a protectionist economic measure. The Spanish authorities had doubts about the loyalty of colonists whose subsistence depended on trade with foreign powers. The Catholic Church was also particularly concerned with the spread of the Protestant faith, brought into the island by the foreigners. Thus, Church and State joined forces to put an end to the situation. Both a bureaucrat in Hispaniola, Baltasar López de Castro, and the new archbishop, Fray Agustín Dávila y Padilla, wrote to the Crown complaining about the illegal activities taking place in the island and recommending solutions to the problem (Moya Pons 1984, 54-56).

Ultimately, it was the recommendations by López de Castro, calling for the uprooting and relocation of towns, people and cattle, that were followed by the Spanish Crown. His plan was approved in 1603, and in 1604 López de Castro himself arrived in Santo Domingo with royal orders for the
FIGURE 3-1

Devastaciones, 1605-1606
Source: Moya Pons 1984, 582.
governor, Antonio de Osorio, to carry out the relocations.

The process of relocating the inhabitants of the towns doomed for eradication was a harsh and bitter one, but in spite of the complaints brought forward by the colonists of Hispaniola, the royal orders were dutifully carried out by Osorio in 1605. Homes, churches, and crops were burned to the ground, and the inhabitants were forced to move with all their belongings. To the towns originally marked for eradication, Puerto Plata, Bayahá and La Yaguana, Osorio added Montecristi and other colonists living in the countryside. Two new towns were created to the north of Santo Domingo, Monte Plata and Bayaguana, for the inhabitants of Montecristi and Puerto Plata, and Bayahá and La Yaguana, respectively.

Not surprisingly, the colonists tried to avoid being relocated, and in some instances, even rebelled against the Spanish authorities. Cattle ranching, moreover, suffered the most, as it is estimated that less than ten percent of the cattle was successfully relocated; the rest died, were lost, or left behind (Moya Pons 1977, 127). Even after the cattle reached the new towns, the colonists complained that . . . because the pastures are so bad, in which there is only a grass that is very harmful to cattle, it has died and has been consumed so much, that it will not be found among all those that arrived two thousand heads of cattle [Moya Pons 1977, 128].

Ironically, the devastaciones never eliminated the problem of contraband. In an isolated, forgotten colony,
such as Santo Domingo, contraband provided an unique opportunity to improve a meager living standard. The devastaciones, furthermore, opened the door wide for the free intrusion of foreigners into Hispaniola. The open spaces of northwestern Hispaniola, packed with wild cattle, were too tempting for foreign powers. The devastaciones simply gave them the carte blanche they needed. From the vantage point of history, we can see now that the relocation of towns was a policy doomed from the beginning (Peña Batlle 1946, 63-69). As we shall see, these two features of the colony of Santo Domingo, the contraband lifestyle and the devastaciones, were destined to have unforeseeable consequences. They became the first two—but most important—links in the chain of events eventually leading to the establishment of the French colony of Saint-Domingue in western Hispaniola.

Foreigners in La Tortuga

The origins of the French colony in Hispaniola date back to 1630, when the French and the English were expelled from St. Kitts by a Spanish fleet. Barred from St. Kitts, these French and English colonists-adventurers decided to establish themselves elsewhere in the West Indies. A group landed in Tortuga island, off the coast of northwestern Hispaniola (see Figure 1-1), which they found deserted. Equally empty—except for the herds of wild cattle—was the
northwestern part of Hispaniola, a result of the devastaciones. They quickly adjusted to the local conditions and soon adopted a suitable modus vivendi that allowed them to survive. In Hispaniola,

because in the forests and in the plains pigs and cattle roamed everywhere, they felt comfortable and, after the Dutch offered to assist them with everything necessary in exchange for the hides that they obtained from cattle hunting, they ended up by settling under this assurance [Sánchez Valverde 1947, 119].

These adventurers survived by hunting wild cattle and trading their hides for European goods, the same thing the devastaciones prevented the Spanish colonists from doing. From their base in Tortuga they went into Hispaniola for months at a time, and despite the efforts of the Spanish to oust them, the foreigners clung to the island.¹ They became known as buccaneers or filibusters, and included various nationalities, though as time passed, the French took over the administration of Tortuga. They also occupied the Samaná peninsula, from which they were forcefully expelled by the Spanish colonists (Sánchez Valverde 1947, 120). This last incident helps explain why the French were able to cling to Tortuga and northwestern Hispaniola, but failed to hold the Samaná peninsula. The attitude of the Spanish colonists made the difference. While Tortuga and northwestern Hispaniola were outlying territories, the Samaná peninsula was close to several Spanish settlements, particularly the town of Cotuí. Thus, the latter was easier
to defend, as the colonists were more willing to participate in military campaigns in which their own well-being was clearly at stake.

Border Conflicts and the Official Recognition of Saint-Domingue by the Spanish Crown

By 1676, besides Tortuga, the French controlled the northwestern coast of Hispaniola from Port-de-Paix to the Rebouc river (Moreau de Saint-Méry 1944, 11). And they were determined to stay. The Spanish colonial authorities did not officially recognize the French settlements, but clearly understood the fact that they did not have the military capability to eradicate them. Thus, a fragile understanding took place. The Spanish tolerated the French presence as long as they did not threaten the Spanish settlements. However, as the French kept expanding along the northern plain, border clashes were inevitable.

In 1678, France and Spain signed the Treaty of Nimega, again restoring peace in Europe. In the colony of Santo Domingo, the treaty led to the first official demarcation of limits between the two colonies. In 1680, after friendly talks, the Rebouc river was established as the agreed border (Peña Batlle 1946, 73-77). Peace, however, did not last very long, either in Hispaniola or in Europe.

The French kept expanding their settlements, while the Spanish tried to stop them. The Rebouc river limit was never really recognized by the French colonists, who wanted
more land and resources. As a consequence, border clashes between French and Spanish colonists were frequent. In 1689 France and Spain were again at war, and in 1690 the French, led by Governor de Cussy, attacked and sacked the Spanish town of Santiago de los Caballeros. The Spanish responded by invading the French colony in 1691, attacking Cap François (capital of the French colony), killing Governor de Cussy in battle (Peña Batlle 1946, 78-80). In 1695, the Spanish again invaded the western part, this time with the help of an English fleet. England was also at war with France and the French, from their colony in western Hispaniola, had been carrying out raids against Jamaica (Moya Pons 1977, 197-198). Although the French suffered heavy losses, the expedition did not eradicate the French presence in northwestern Hispaniola.

By 1697, peace had been restored in Europe, and the Treaty of Ryswick reestablished the status quo ante bellum (Moreau de Saint-Méry 1944, 12-13). Things went back to normal, that is, to the French trying to expand their possessions, and the Spanish trying to contain them. This tense situation went on for almost eighty years. During that time, the French and the Spanish quarrelled constantly, with occasional loss of lives. The object of their contention was usually the same: land (Moreau de Saint-Méry 1944, 13-27). Finally, in 1777, Spain and France signed the Treaty of Aranjuez, formalizing French colonial claims in
FIGURE 3-2
Treaty of Aranjuez, 1777
Source: Moya Pons 1984, 586.
the island of Hispaniola (see Figure 3-2). The treaty did two things. First, it officially recognized--for the first time in almost 150 years of French occupation--French sovereignty over the western part of Hispaniola. And second, it established a fixed and permanent border between the two colonies. The latter assured the Spanish colonists, who now felt secure in their possessions, and annoyed their French counterparts, who could not continue expanding to the east (Peña Batlle 1946, 94-97). For the time being, relations between the two colonies normalized.

Trade between the Two Colonies

By the mid-18th century, the economies of the two colonies in Hispaniola were strikingly different, in size, composition, production, and rhythm. While the Spanish colony remained tied to its traditional cattle ranching economy, the French colony had prospered. The French settlers developed Saint-Domingue from a cattle ranching subsistence economy in the early 17th century to a full-grown plantation colony by the mid-1800s, the pride of the French Empire. As related by chronicler Sánchez Valverde,

... presently one may count in Santo Domingo [i.e. Saint-Domingue] 723 sugar mills, that produced in 1773 two hundred and forty millions of unrefined and brown sugar, an infinity of coffee farms, that produced 84 millions of coffee, they also produced four millions of cotton, more than 150,000 pounds of indigo, about the same for cocoa, 30,000 barrels of syrup and 15,000 of rum. To these known riches one must add more than its
sixth part that has been traded in contraband [Sánchez Valverde 1947, 158-159].

Of course, a plantation economy, such as Saint-Domingue's, left little room for cattle ranching. Intensive hunting had practically eliminated wild cattle in the French colony, yet meat was needed to feed the population—mainly slaves who worked the plantations. The expansion of the plantation economy precluded the establishment of the large, open ranches needed for raising cattle. The problem was solved by turning to the Spanish colonists. Starting in the late 17th century, Santo Domingo became the main supplier of meat and animals for the French colony. This trade, of course, was not always legal, nor stable. War and the Spanish authorities curtailed the trade on several occasions, but could not stop it completely (Moreau de Saint-Méry 1944, 359-392). The supply of cattle, which never could keep up with French demand, benefitted the Spanish colony. Later on, during the 18th century, the Spanish authorities taxed the trade, which added a considerable income to the coffers of the local colonial administration. The influx of money that resulted from the cattle trade infused life back into the stagnant economy of Santo Domingo, and allowed the Spanish colonists to acquire the manufactured products that they needed from the French. In this way, the two economies became complementary. The Spanish colonists sold their cattle to the French that, in turn, offered them the goods Spain could not supply. This
situation would probably have continued had it not been for an event that drastically changed the face of the Caribbean forever: the Haitian Revolution.

The Haitian Revolution and French Occupation

In less than a century the French transformed the colony of Saint-Domingue into a huge plantation that produced sugar, coffee, cocoa, cotton and other tropical products for European markets. Large amounts of labor were required to achieve that kind of production. That meant the massive importation of a slave labor force from Africa that, by 1789, was estimated at almost half a million slaves (Knight 1978, 149). In general, the plantations—and the slaves—belonged to absentee owners and French colonists, known as grand blancs. Together with their poorer countrymen, the petits blancs, they numbered about 25,000 (Knight 1978, 149). Between them and the slaves, were the gens de couleur; ex-slaves, mulattoes, some of them even plantation owners themselves. In total, there were only about 60,000 free men in Saint-Domingue, overseeing half a million slaves. In contrast, there were 110,000 free men in the Spanish colony of Santo Domingo, with about 15,000 slaves, as shown in Figure 3-3. The disparate and precarious social balance of the Saint-Domingue colony was maintained until 1789.
FIGURE 3-3
Population of Saint-Domingue and Santo Domingo, 1789
Source: Knight 1978; Logan 1968.
In 1789, the repercussions of the French Revolution made themselves felt at the colony. All three ruling minorities rallied behind the motto of "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity," though each one for its own reasons. The grand blancs wanted autonomy, while the petits blancs and the gens de couleur demanded equality with the richer group. Demands increased, and with them, conflict. Soon all three groups were mobilizing their slaves as troops for their cause. At one point, however, things got out of control. The slaves, realizing their strength in numbers, revolted in 1791. What began as a conflict between elites turned into the largest slave revolt in history. Chaos soon engulfed Saint-Domingue. The slaves, under the direction of Toussaint Louverture, an ex-slave himself, defeated the white and mulatto armies in a bloody 10-year struggle that destroyed the colony's economic infrastructure. In France, Napoleon Bonaparte, encouraged by his victories in Europe, then decided to recover his Caribbean colony. Louverture was tricked, captured and sent to France, where he died.

The imprisonment and death of Toussaint Louverture marks a turning point in the history of the Haitian Revolution. Toussaint was not only the ablest military commander in Saint-Domingue and a skilled negotiator but also the most beloved figure in the colony.² His exile was a terrible blow to his followers. But rather than demoralizing the slaves, it fueled in them a hatred such as
Napoleon had never seen. Under the leadership of Louverture's ablest officer, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, the slaves continued their furious struggle, and in late 1803, the French army was soundly defeated. On 1 January 1804, Haiti became the first black republic of the world. As a result of that costly colonial campaign, Napoleon lost 40,000 of his best troops, their commander, Gen. Leclerc, the colony of Saint-Domingue, and ultimately, his imperial dreams (Knight 1978, 155).

The war left the country destroyed. Anything reminiscent of France or the white man (buildings, plantations, irrigation systems, etc.) had disappeared. But more important, were the social consequences of the war. This was not a simple war of independence, like those that were to follow in Latin America during the 19th century, but a true social revolution, the first of the Americas. As such, it had traumatic effects on the country. The plantation system, based exclusively on the exploitation of slave labor, collapsed. The white ruling elites, and even some of the gens de couleur, were massacred and replaced by blacks and mulattoes. And the colonial government gave way to an independent republic. So, in all three aspects, social, economical and political, revolutionary changes were effected through the use of violence.

All these events, of course, had not gone unnoticed in Spanish Santo Domingo. When fighting against the French,
Toussaint sought refuge in the East, and even fought along with the Spanish for some time, before finally turning against them for their continuing support of slavery (Korngold 1965, 95-107). Furthermore, the Spanish colony supplied the huge amounts of cattle that the war effort demanded. Food became scarce in Saint-Domingue, both as a result of the lack of slave labor to grow crops and the slaves' guerrilla tactics of burning the fields to starve the French. Finally, Santo Domingo itself became fully involved in the Haitian Revolution since it had been ceded to France in 1795.

Spain, having been defeated by France in Europe, had to cede its Santo Domingo colony to the French in order to regain the territory that it had lost in the Iberian peninsula during the war (Peña Batlle 1946, 100-101). That cession was rendered official by the Treaty of Basel. However, France had no way of occupying Santo Domingo. They could not even control their own colony of Saint-Domingue, now under the effective control of Toussaint. It was Toussaint himself who finally enforced the Treaty of Basel, occupying the former Spanish colony in 1801 (Peña Batlle 1946, 102-103). The Spanish and the French, in particular Napoleon, tried to delay Toussaint, but to no avail. Napoleon—who did not trust Toussaint—wanted a French army to occupy Santo Domingo, not Toussaint's black army. To the inhabitants of Santo Domingo, who were well aware of the
chaotic situation in Saint-Domingue, the presence of Toussaint's black troops was horrifying. The Santo Domingo colonists did not like the French, but they feared Toussaint's troops more. Many residents decided to leave the Santo Domingo colony and moved to the Spanish possessions of Cuba, Venezuela, and Puerto Rico, both before and after the arrival of Toussaint's army (Moya Pons 1984, 179-181, 191-192).

For the first time since the French landed in Tortuga the whole island was under a single administration. In this fashion, Toussaint's annexation also led to the creation of the notion of the indivisibility of the island. The unification of the whole island seemed to Haitian revolutionary leaders like the ideal conclusion for the transcendental revolution just taking place. The annexation of the eastern part of the island also provided the revolutionary armies with an additional margin of security when the French decided to invade.

Dessalines Takes Over and Tries Again

Toussaint, however, never had the chance to make his dream come true. In 1802, the expected French invasion finally arrived. The French occupied all of Hispaniola and, as we know, shipped Toussaint to France, where he died. When the independence of the Republic of Haiti was declared in 1804, there remained little of the French army in Santo
Domingo. French General Louis Ferrand, however, decided not to surrender. He took over Santo Domingo city and prepared it for a long siege. That came in 1805, when Dessalines decided to annex the eastern part of the island. Divided in two columns, the Haitian armies advanced through the north and the south, meeting outside the city of Santo Domingo. For three weeks Dessalines laid siege to the city, but had to abandon it when French ships appeared on the horizon. Believing that they represented a potential French invasion of Haiti, he raced back to the west to prepare his defense. The invasion never took place; it was a deceptive tactical move by the French (Moya Pons 1984, 201-203). During their retreat, however, the Haitian armies left a trail of blood. They ransacked all the towns in their path, killing many of their inhabitants. According to Haitian historian Price-Mars,

And so it was that the retreat of the Haitian army was one of the most dramatic and bloodiest episodes of a dramatic and bloody history. Burnings of farms, destructions of cattle, execution of hostages, arrests of women and children, the brutal transfer of them to the West, after the army; nothing was missing in such a sad portrait of futile horrors. For Dessalines, the people of the East resembled the French whites, his eternal enemies [Price-Mars 1953, 1:97-98].

This was the state of things in the island of Hispaniola at the beginning of the 19th century. An originally Spanish colony had witnessed the emergence of a flourishing French plantation colony in their island. That colony later gave way to the first independent black state
in the world; a nation made up of former slaves. These developments had transcendental consequences for both sides of the island--especially the bloodshed which had already occurred.

From the Haitian Revolution to 1961

This section will cover the events from the Haitian revolution to the ephemeral Dominican independence of 1821, the subsequent Haitian occupation and the birth of the Dominican Republic, the 19th century turmoil, the American occupations, the border settlement, the Trujillo dictatorship, and the 1937 massacre. The chapter then concludes with Trujillo's assassination in 1961, as events after that year are more recent and deserve to be examined separately.

From the Haitian Revolution to the Haitian Occupation

The triumph of the Haitian Revolution on 1 January 1804 found the colony of Santo Domingo in the hands of the French, who had obtained it from Spain in 1795. A Haitian attempt to drive the French out in 1805 failed, even though the Haitian armies--under Dessalines--made it to outskirts of Santo Domingo city. General Louis Ferrand successfully resisted a three-week siege with the support of the native population, who feared the Haitian armies more than the French occupation forces.
That was the situation in Hispaniola immediately after the Haitian Revolution. An independent state had emerged on the western third of the island—from the former colony of Saint-Domingue—while on the eastern part an ambiguous colonial situation remained in place. The "French Era" lasted only a short period. By late 1808, Dominican conspirators, aided by Spanish troops from Puerto Rico, revolted against the French. The conspirators, led by Juan Sánchez Ramírez, had even the moral support of the Haitian president, Alexandre Pétion, who saw the continued French presence in Hispaniola as a threat to Haitian independence. The Dominicans soundly defeated the French troops at the battle of Palo Hincado and laid siege to the city of Santo Domingo, the last French stronghold (Moya Pons 1977, 396-397). The French resisted for eight months, until the British joined the struggle on the side of Spain. A naval blockade by the British navy finally forced the French to surrender the city. With the French defeated, the native troops had to arrange with the British commander to return the city. To recover Santo Domingo, Sánchez Ramírez had to agree to repay the British all the expenses incurred by them during the blockage, as well as giving British ships and products free access to Santo Domingo (Moya Pons 1977, 398-400). The Reconquest War, as it was called, left the country devastated. Food was scarce, as troops consumed crops and cattle in vast quantities. Huge tracts of
tropical woods were cut in order to repay the British, who took as well cannons and bells from the city of Santo Domingo. But more important, the colony went back to its "mother country," who proved that it could not manage it effectively.

This next period is called La España Boba (Foolish Spain) by historians because it refers to Spain's inability to rule again in its former colony. Economic stagnation characterized this period. Several mutinies took place in the colony among soldiers who had not been paid in months, sometimes years. Spain's gross mismanagement proved fertile ground for the development of various conspiracies that sought to declare independence and annex the colony to Haiti or Simón Bolívar's Gran Colombia. In late 1821, sporadic rebellions took place in various towns and that forced the main conspirator, José Núñez de Cáceres, to take action. On the night of 30 November 1821, he took over the Spanish garrison, arrested Governor Pascual Real, and the next day proclaimed the independence of the state of "Spanish Haiti" (Moya Pons 1977, 418-420).

The new Haitian president, Jean-Pierre Boyer, alarmed by recent rumors of a new French invasion, saw Núñez de Cáceres' action as an opportunity to finally unify the whole island. Boyer had previously unified Haiti, which had been divided between the northern kingdom of Henri Christophe and the southern republic of Pétion, and he was very popular
among the masses for his policy of giving away state lands in reward for services rendered to the Haitian state. That policy, and his commitment to the abolition of slavery on the eastern part of the island, caused a favorable impression among the poor classes in Santo Domingo. On January 1822, Boyer sent a letter to Núñez de Cáceres informing him of his intentions to annex the eastern part peacefully, and requesting him not to display any futile opposition.

Núñez de Cáceres clearly understood that his position was hopeless. He had no army to match Boyer's, the policies of the Haitian president were popular among large sectors of the population, and he himself was being attacked by pro-Spanish elements. He decided to capitulate. On the morning of 9 February 1822, and at the head of an army of 12,000 men, Boyer took possession of the former Spanish colony of Santo Domingo (Moya Pons 1977, 421-424). Once again, the island of Hispaniola became a single political entity, this time as the Republic of Haiti (see Figure 3-4).

The Haitian Occupation and Dominican Independence

The occupation got off to a good start. Boyer's first decrees were to abolish slavery and to divide landholdings among the freedmen. That, as in Haiti, made him popular among the common people. Still, conspiracies developed. Several were discovered during the 22 years of Haitian
FIGURE 3-4
Political Map of Hispaniola, 1822-1844
Source: Moya Pons 1984, 589.
occupation, many involving some of the most respectable members of society. Boyer's unsolvable problem was how to undermine practices and institutions that had been in place for centuries. Saint-Domingue had been a plantation society, Santo Domingo a cattle ranching society. The Haitians spoke French and Creole, the Dominicans Spanish. The Haitians were proud of their revolution and independence, the Dominicans feared that revolution and still felt themselves attached to Spain culturally and spiritually. Consequently, laws designed to promote economic development in the west had different effects in the east. Other laws, like the imposition of the French language and the breakdown of large cattle estates, were also unpopular. Thus, Boyer faced innumerable obstacles—and the scorn of many Dominicans—when he tried to make a reality his dream of one nation in one island. According to diplomat and historian Sumner Welles, the Haitian occupation was disastrous for Dominicans. His description is eloquent:

Public administration was Haitianized to an extreme degree. Those families that still possessed anything, abandoned it and left the country. Agriculture was paralyzed; commerce ceased to exist; the public spirit was in a comatose state; all forms of intellectual progress, that even under the regime of the España Boba had received certain stimulus, perished during the first year of the Haitian domination, with the closing of the university and most of the churches, that were left without priests [Welles 1986, 1:61].

In 1825, the government of France finally recognized the independence of Haiti. That carried a heavy price for
the newly-emerging nation. Boyer had to make multiple commercial concessions to the French, plus he agreed to indemnify the ex-French planters for their loses during the war of independence (Dorsainvil 1958, 187-190). The debt to France proved to be a heavy burden, not just for Boyer, but also for future Haitian administration who had to devote a large part of their expenditures to service the debt. It is still argued that Haiti never recovered from it.

Naturally, the eastern departments, as part of the Haitian nation, had to contribute to the payment of the debt. That infuriated many Dominicans, who felt that they did not have to pay for a debt they did not incur. The economy also stagnated as new taxes burdened the subjects in the eastern part. By the 1840s a conspiracy to overthrow the Haitian administration was slowly--but surely--taking shape in the east. A group of Dominicans, led by Juan Pablo Duarte, formed La Trinitaria, a secret society committed to Dominican independence. In Haiti, Boyer's own men were plotting against him. His administration, on both sides of the island, had become extremely unpopular (Heinl and Heinl 1978, 172-179). Events on one side of the island were to have almost immediate effects on the other side.

On 13 March 1843 Boyer, after unsuccessfully trying to suppress a large-scale revolt in the south, fled the country. He was succeeded by Charles Hérard, one of the main conspirators (Dorsainvil 1958, 194-195). After more
than 22 years in power, Boyer's disappearance from the political scene caused a power vacuum that could not be filled at once. The chaotic nature of Haitian politics during the post-Boyer period helped the Dominican conspirators, who increased in number and popularity. Four tendencies were distinguished among the separatist groups. The first (Duarte's) supported total independence, while the other three supported some kind of protectorate or colonial arrangement with Spain, France, or England (Moya Pons 1984, 269-270). This search for a foreign protector against the Haitians would become a conspicuous feature of Dominican politics in the years to come.

On 27 February 1844, the expected rebellion took place. The rebels took the city of Santo Domingo and forced the Haitian authorities to capitulate. In about fifteen days, the rest of the country joined the rebel forces and declared their separation from Haiti. Thus was born the second independent state in the island of Hispaniola, the Dominican Republic. In Haiti, the news of the rebellion and proclamation of independence caused "stupor, anger, and finally an admirable patriotic spirit" (Dorsainvil 1958, 201). Hérard himself organized and led a military expedition to recapture the eastern part. With 25,000 men under arms, the Haitian army attacked from the north (under General Pierrot) and the south. In the south, Hérard was stopped in Azua, while Pierrot was soundly defeated in
Santiago on 30 March 1844. Then, the erratic course of Haitian politics once again aided the Dominicans. Pierrot, believing Hérard to be dead, returned to Cap Haitien, only to find that he was still alive, but that a conspiracy to overthrow him was in place. On 3 May 1844, Hérard was substituted by General Philippe Guerrier. Hérard, still in Azua, received the news while he retreated from the east and immediately went into exile (Moya Pons 1984, 282-286). In that way, the independence of the newly-emerging Dominican Republic was safe for a while.

The Chaotic 19th Century

The 19th century marks the beginning of the republican era in both countries--Haiti since 1804, the Dominican Republic since 1844. It also marked two other trends in the island. The first one was the chaotic and unstable nature of domestic politics. In both Haiti and the Dominican Republic, most governments were ephemeral, authoritarian, and based on military strength. This was the era of the caudillos, self-proclaimed military men who rose to the presidency through the use of force. In Haiti, as in the Dominican Republic, one "general" toppled another by means of a "revolution" that amounted to little more than a mobilization of irregular bands of followers. These regional armies played an important part in the chaos of
19th century politics, and were only eliminated after the creation of a national military in the early 20th century.

The second trend consisted of the pursuit of two irreconcilable policies by the two nations that shared the island of Hispaniola. Haiti, a pariah state in diplomatic terms, still feared an European invasion and the restoration of slavery. It must be kept in mind that most of the great powers did not recognize the Haitian state, and that it was not until after the American Civil War that the United States finally granted diplomatic recognition to Haiti. Therefore, Haitian leaders visualized the eastern part of the island as Haiti's exposed flank, from where the eventual invasion would certainly come. They also could not accept the fact of Dominican independence and still clung to the idea of "the island is one and indivisible" (Price-Mars 1953, 1:189-191). Dominicans, on the contrary, feared the Haitians more than the Europeans. To them, Europe meant protection and their guarantee of liberty in face of the claims by Haiti. Thus, while Haiti feared the great powers and tried to prepare for an invasion, the Dominican leaders feared Haiti and tried to obtain the protection of a great power against their western neighbor.

In 1845, General Pierrot, the new Haitian president, decided to reincorporate the eastern part and attacked the Dominican Republic by land. Before the invasion, he had warned: "National unity must be reconstituted . . . Never
shall I renounce the indivisibility of the territory of Haiti" (Heinl and Heinl 1978, 189). His armies were defeated by the Dominicans, who were now better prepared than in 1844. Pierrot then tried a naval attack, but the fleet ran aground and the troops were taken prisoner (Moya Pons 1984, 299-300). On 1 March 1847, a former African slave, Faustin Soulouque, became the president of Haiti. He would eventually assume the title of Emperor Faustin I and rule for twelve years, a lengthy term in an era of caudillos (Dorsainvil 1958, 210-227). He also was the last Haitian ruler to try to annex the Dominican Republic by military means.

In 1848, the French recognized the Dominican Republic as a sovereign state. This immediately prompted diplomatic complaints by the Haitians, who saw in the French presence in the Dominican Republic a grave danger to their territorial claims over the eastern part and to their own independence. On 9 March 1849, Soulouque's armies invaded the Dominican Republic. He was defeated and six years later, in late 1855, he tried again. This time he was badly beaten in a campaign that caused much bitterness among his followers—many of whom Soulouque accused of treason and had executed (Dorsainvil 1958, 226-227). The constant threat of a Haitian invasion had caused large portions of the border region to become depopulated (see Figure 3-5). The depopulated border region became a kind of "buffer zone"
FIGURE 3-5
Haiti and the Dominican Republic, 1844-1861
Source: Moya Pons 1984, 590.
that kept Haiti at some distance away from the Dominican Republic. Meanwhile, the Dominicans kept looking for a foreign protector. Even though the likelihood of a new Haitian invasion diminished considerably after Soulouque's overthrow, overtures were made to France, England, Spain, and the United States.

On 18 March 1861, the search for a foreign protector came to an end. On that day, the Dominican Republic reverted to being a Spanish colony—this time by choice. This was the culmination of several attempts at securing protection from Haiti by General Pedro Santana and other Dominican leaders. Thus, the Dominican Republic went to the point of committing political suicide in order to protect itself from Haiti. The annexation to Spain lasted only four years, in part due to Spain's weakness, and in part thanks to the efforts of Dominican patriots who fought to restore the republic. A noticeable circumstance was that in their struggle against Spain, the Dominican rebels were supported by the Haitian government, who feared Spain's commitment to restoring slavery (Moya Pons 1984, 350-358).

The search for a foreign protector nevertheless continued. In 1871, the United States considered annexing the Dominican Republic as a state of the Union, but the measure was defeated in the Senate by a few votes (Welles 1986, 1:374). By then, a Haitian invasion was very unlikely, but the anti-Haitian mentality was preserved by
the alternation in power of the same old caudillos, Pedro Santana and Buenaventura Báez. They, and others like them, slowly dragged the Dominican Republic into political disarray and economic indebtedness. A similar situation took place in Haiti, where military caudillos used the cacos (bands of armed peasants) to gain the presidency.

By the early 20th century, both countries had politically degenerated to the point of anarchy. Their ephemeral governments had little real power outside the capital or the region of origin of the caudillo in power. Furthermore, these "revolutions" were financed with loans from foreign merchants (mostly Europeans) and, once power was secured and diplomatic recognition granted, further loans from foreign powers were procured. That practice kept Haiti and the Dominican Republic at the brink of bankruptcy. These two circumstances, political instability and economic indebtedness, gave the United States the justification it was seeking to further its security and economic aims in the Caribbean region (Langley 1982, 68, 77-78).

The American Occupation

With the situation going out of control, and foreign creditors--particularly the Germans in Haiti--making threatening demands, the United States decided to intervene in Haiti (1915-1934) and the Dominican Republic (1916-1924). These two military occupations briefly reunified the island
under one flag, though each occupied country had its separate military command structure. The occupations also had more lasting consequences. On the plus side, the military government forcefully imposed order in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, developed a basic infrastructure (roads, bridges, canals, etc.), centralized the administration of the nation, improved living conditions by promoting sanitation and education, disarmed the population, and subdued the local caudillos. On the other hand, the US occupation forces discriminated, degraded (particularly in Haiti), and repressed the locals (Langley 1982, 73-85).

The economies of both countries also became more dependent on the US economy as a result of the military occupation. American businessmen invested in both countries, particularly in sugar. In Haiti, the HASCO (Haitian American Sugar Company) and the Dauphin sisal plantation were among the largest foreign investments, while in the Dominican Republic the collapse of the European beet sugar market--due to World War I--led to heavy investments in sugar production and refinement (Castor 1974, 55-56). This sugar boom also led to the importation of cheap laborers from the Virgin Islands and the Lesser Antilles. Soon, it was discovered that it was cheaper--and easier--to bring Haitian workers. Thus, the needs of the sugar industry and the realities of the military occupation combined to initiate the large-scale importation of Haitian
workers into the Dominican Republic—a process that continues to this day (Plant 1987, 18-19).

Finally, as part of their occupation policy, the US military forces established modern domestic military corps in Haiti (Garde d'Haiti) and the Dominican Republic (Policía Nacional Dominicana). Knowing that the military occupation would someday end, these constabulary forces were to keep order in the absence of the US occupation forces and prevent a return to the politics of chaos. As new roads integrated the countries physically and politically, they made it possible for the government to exert control over previously isolated regions and centralize political power in the capital. For the first time in the countries' history, whoever controlled the capital and, most important, the constabulary, could rule the country (Castor 1974, 63-64). As it turned out, somebody did. Both in Haiti and in the Dominican Republic, powers seekers used the military to further their ambitions, leading to the notorious dictatorships of Rafael L. Trujillo (Armed Forces Commander) in the Dominican Republic, and François Duvalier (the Army's candidate) in Haiti. Eventually, the United States occupation forces departed, but it is highly debatable whether they really left things better than they were before, as their achievements were overwhelmed by their gross mistakes.
The Border Settlement, Trujillo, and the 1937 Massacre

Throughout the late 19th century and the first decade of the 20th century, the governments of Haiti and the Dominican Republic had been discussing the issue of the delimitation of a fixed and permanent border between the two countries. The talks did not progress much, as there were diverging interpretations about the exact delineation of the border and conflicting territorial claims. It was not until both countries were under US military occupation that the border question was again reconsidered. That came about as a result of US security concerns in the Caribbean area. An undefined border was a potential war issue and it could contribute to political instability in the strategic Caribbean region.

On 21 January 1929, a border settlement was signed between the governments of Horacio Vásquez and Louis Borno (Price-Mars 1953, 3:209-213). In 1935 and 1936, Presidents Rafael L. Trujillo and Sténio Vincent signed additional clauses and amendments to the 1929 treaty, finally establishing a permanent and clearly delimited border, the same that still stands today (see Figure 1-1). It now seemed as if the issue of Haitian-Dominican relations would take a turn for the better. Trujillo, however, apparently had other plans.

Rafael L. Trujillo had grandiose plans for the Dominican Republic and himself. He was elected in 1930,
after an electoral campaign marred by terror and intimidation. Thereafter, he ruled as a dictator by various means for 31 years (1930-1961). Trujillo rebuilt the capital (destroyed by a hurricane) and changed its name to Ciudad Trujillo, reduced and finally eliminated the external debt, controlled governmental spending, established the Dominican peso as the national currency, improved the country's infrastructure, modernized the armed forces, and eliminated the threat to stability posed by regional caudillos.

In general terms, Trujillo built the foundation of the modern Dominican state, unifying the country and bringing it into the 20th century. On the other hand, he was a bloody dictator who used his military might to impose order, enrich himself, and eliminate any opposition. In the international arena, Trujillo's staunch anti-Communism secured him the support of the United States. Regionally, he periodically intervened in the affairs of various Central American and Caribbean countries, most notably Haiti--where he used to subsidize presidential campaigns and bribe politicians (Crassweller 1966).

Trujillo also embodied the worst traits of the long-standing Dominican hatred and distrust of Haitians. Even though Trujillo displayed great fanfare and extreme friendliness during the signing of the border treaty with Haiti, he still had a hidden agenda to be carried out in the
future. It is a well-known fact that Trujillo hated Haitians and tried to conceal his own black (and Haitian) ancestry—to the point of using make-up to lighten his skin tone (Crassweller 1966, 95; Diederich 1986, 12). Although the border was now a fixed feature in Haitian-Dominican relations, many Haitians were still living in the Dominican Republic. They worked in the sugar industry or cultivated plots of land along the border. Furthermore, Haitians traded all along the border and with the major cities, to the point that the Haitian gourde became acceptable currency in many parts of the Dominican Republic (Crassweller 1966, chap. 11). Trujillo, the centralizing dictator that he was, could not allow this infringement on his power.

In October of 1937, he visited the northern border town of Dajabón, and after an impassioned speech, ordered the massacre of all Haitians residing in the Dominican Republic. Thousands of Haitians and their offspring were assassinated by Trujillo's troops during the approximately three days that el corte (the slaughter) lasted. It has been impossible to determinate the exact numbers of Haitians killed in the massacre, but estimates range from a couple of thousand to close to 25,000 (Vega 1988, 385-387). However, for obvious reasons, none of the Haitian workers in American-owned sugar mills were killed.

The exact cause of the 1937 massacre will probably never be known, though several have been suggested. Besides
Trujillo's obvious racism and desire to "whiten" the Dominican population, there were considerations of another nature. Haitians represented a large foreign socioeconomic force living in an area of strategic interest to the Dominican Republic. The presence of these Haitians, and facts like the extensive use of the Haitian gourde, undermined Trujillo's authority and control over the country. The border settlement had solved a diplomatic problem, but the continued Haitian presence in the Dominican Republic still represented an unsolved problem to Trujillo. He thus solved it in a ruthless way. Besides blatant racism, Vega (1988) suggests six additional and three peripheral causes of the 1937 massacre. Among those were Trujillo's 1937 tour of the border (where he examined first-hand the border situation), the failure of the Dominicanization program along the border, and the lax attitude of many Dominican military officers who profited from contraband (Vega 1988, 390-395).

After the 1937 massacre, Trujillo started a Dominicanization program along the border. This time, he gave land to the settlers, built roads and canals, cordoned off the border towns with military guard posts, and integrated politically the border region (Moya Pons 1984, 520). International outrage over the massacre forced Trujillo to pay a $750,000 indemnity to Haiti--a ridiculous sum when compared to the huge loss of human lives that took
place. Trujillo outmaneuvered and outlived many of his opponents who thought that the international scandal over the massacre would force Trujillo to step down.

Trujillo's long dictatorship represents the turn of the tide in Haitian-Dominican relations. The Trujillo Era witnessed the rise of the Dominican Republic as the main power in the island. No longer would the Dominican Republic have to search for a foreign protector in order to keep Haiti at bay. Moreover, it was now Haiti who had to fear the growing power of the Dominican Republic. As mentioned above, the delimitation of the border, the 1937 massacre and the border region settlement program helped "clean" the border region of Haitian influences and integrated the region into the national mainstream. Furthermore, Trujillo's immigration policies and imposed "peace" in the countryside enabled the Dominican people to finally achieve the necessary population growth rates to start catching up to Haiti's larger population. Hefty budget allocations of over 20% of the national budget transformed the Dominican Armed Forces into one of the better armed and most efficient in Latin America (Sagás 1988, 25), capable of easily defeating the Haitian army.

Finally, through a combination of bribery and intimidation, Trujillo influenced Haitian politics. He bribed and kept on his personal payroll dozens of Haitian politicians, administrators, ambassadors, and military
officers. Even some Haitian presidents (e.g. Elie Lescot) were rumored to have been in Trujillo's payroll since the beginning of their political careers (Crassweller 1966, chap. 11). Trujillo's agents also roamed Haiti's territory carrying out his orders and keeping at bay Dominican exiles that pretended to use Haiti as a base of operations against Trujillo's dictatorship (Vega 1988). This constant infringement of Haiti's sovereignty was just another of Trujillo's tactics to exert control and to demonstrate to Haitians and Dominicans alike who was the "boss" in Hispaniola. This is particularly important because it represented a new and particular style in Haitian-Dominican relations, a style characterized by the preeminence of the Dominican Republic and its active meddling in Haitian affairs. This manipulative style had no precedent in Haitian-Dominican relations, and has not been repeated again.

For 31 long years Trujillo ruled the Dominican Republic as his own personal estate. On 30 May 1961, the Trujillo Era came to an abrupt end when he was ambushed and killed by a group of former army officers in conspiracy with the armed forces secretary, General José Román Fernández.

Conclusion: The Historical Legacy

It would be simplistic to solely blame the 1605 devastaciones for all the future predicaments of the Spanish
colony of Santo Domingo. Though according to some historians, like Peña Batlle (1946), they had a major impact on the colony's future. The Spanish Crown had woefully neglected its former premier colony long before the devastaciones took place. Spain, incapable of managing and defending its vast empire, soon became an easy target for its European enemies. Thus, the devastaciones were but the reflection of a decaying empire with unsuitable and long-delayed policies. Rather than confronting the facts, the Crown decided to withdraw within itself. This ostrich policy is what really gave way to the eventual presence of the French in Tortuga.

From then on, misery and depopulation did the rest. The French thrived in Hispaniola and--through the inhuman exploitation of slave labor--converted it into the richest colony of the world. By that time, really, the Spanish no longer had any control over the future of Hispaniola. The socioeconomic system imposed by the French in Saint-Domingue decided its fate. Violence breeds more violence, and the wealth of Saint-Domingue was grounded on coercion. The bloody backlash came during the Haitian Revolution. The revolutionary storm affected not only Saint-Domingue, but also the practically helpless eastern part. And as the French decided to hold on to the east, the former Spanish colony became a security threat from the point of view of the Haitian military leaders.
At this point it is important to recall that the socioeconomic differences between French Saint-Domingue and Spanish Santo Domingo were not only quantitative, but also qualitative, and it is there where one can find the origin of their present-day disparity. Though slavery was prevalent in both colonies, it is noticeable that both the main economic activity of Santo Domingo—cattle ranching—and its underlying poverty, lent themselves to a less exploitative system (Cassá 1992, 1:132). Most people in Santo Domingo did not have many slaves, nor the capital to buy more. Thus, they had to take care of those few they had. Furthermore, cattle ranching is an egalitarian and land-extensive economic activity. That meant that masters had to trust those few slaves that they owned, and with whom they regularly spent many days alone in the pasture fields. Most masters endured the same hardships in the field as their slaves who, as part of their jobs, were armed with lances. Racially, most of the colonists of Santo Domingo were of mixed blood, and the prevalent poverty helped reduce racial tensions. They also developed—black and white alike—an intensive feeling of *hispanidad*, a result of their constant struggle against the encroaching French. According to historian Moya Pons: "Being Spanish, for the inhabitants of Santo Domingo during the 18th century, meant not to be French" (Moya Pons 1977, 344).
The life of a slave in Saint-Domingue, on the other hand, was very harsh (Fouchard 1972). The foremost French plantation colony was labor-intensive and exploitative. Armed with credit and capital, the French planters could keep on replacing slaves as they died, since the oppressive nature of plantation labor produced very high mortality rates. Furthermore, social relations in the colony were regimented by a strict code of laws. Social mobility was difficult (though not impossible, as some mulattoes had demonstrated) and racial tensions high. Not surprisingly, this social time bomb finally exploded in 1789.

The existence of those two disparate socioeconomic colonial systems in the same geographic entity—in this case a small island—predisposed each one to the influence of the other. Actions or policies by one of the colonial governments had immediate consequences for the other. The devastaciones led to the establishment of the French, the needs of the French colony fostered cattle ranching in the east, the Haitian Revolution involved the Spanish colonial army, the French annexation brought about the Haitian invasion of the east, and so on. The basic underlying characteristic is that, from the time two separate colonial entities were established in the island of Hispaniola, there has been no escape from the fact that events on one side of the island will affect the other. Hispaniola's colonial duality transformed a geographical element into a political
fact. East and West were no longer simple geographic terms, they represented the opposite sides of the coin. This situation polarized east-west relations in Hispaniola and influenced the development of its peoples.

The birth of the independent states of Haiti and the Dominican Republic from these two distinct colonial traditions further predisposed much of their future development. Haiti, born from a violent and destructive social revolution, diplomatically isolated, and burdened with a large foreign debt (in exchange for diplomatic recognition from France) never had a real chance to succeed. Furthermore, the existence of a Spanish colony to the east reinforced the Haitian leaders' "state of siege" mentality. The Dominican Republic, sharing the island of Hispaniola with Haiti, could not escape the realities of geography and had to endure its consequences. Its independence, gained from Haiti, gave rise to the development of two antagonistic states on the same island and to the adoption of mutually-contradicting national policies. The Haitians wanted the unification of the island as a safeguard from an European invasion, while the Dominicans wanted foreign protection from the threat of Haitian invasions.

As we have seen in this chapter, that led to multiple confrontations and plenty of bloodshed on both sides, as Haitian-Dominican relations were further polarized. It was not until the late 19th century that a modus vivendi was
agreed on, and not until the 20th century that a border treaty was finally signed. Still, tensions remained, and the 1937 massacre was a case in point of how conflictive the Haitian-Dominican relation could still be. Furthermore, Trujillo's rise to power ushered in a new era in Haitian-Dominican relations. Not only did Trujillo develop the Dominican Republic into a nation more powerful than Haiti, but he also sought to influence Haitian politics. At a very high price in lives and liberties Trujillo transformed the Dominican Republic into a modern state and its military corps into the most powerful institution in the country (Sagas 1988). Nationalistic pride and the traditional fear of Haiti provided the necessary justification for these developments. The argument went like this: for the first time in almost a hundred years of independent life, the Dominican Republic had become powerful enough (thanks to Trujillo), so that it no longer had to fear its more densely populated neighbor. Not surprisingly, for those "services" rendered to the nation, Trujillo received the title of Padre de la Nueva Patria (Father of the New Fatherland) (Crassweller 1966, 301).

Moreover, Trujillo's interference in Haitian affairs reversed existing trends in Hispaniola. Now it was Haiti who had to fear the more powerful Dominican Republic. Dominican superiority vis-à-vis Haiti thus constituted the
main characteristic of the Trujillo Era, regarding relations with its neighbor.

Finally, this analysis would be incomplete without mentioning Trujillo's ideological legacy. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Trujillo's ideologues developed an anti-Haitian ideology based on nationalism, hispanidad, and the manipulation of Dominican history. This ideology is examined in detail in Chapter 6. At this time, however, it is important to keep in mind the fact that trujillismo did not go away with Trujillo's death in 1961. The works of Balaguer (1984), Cornielle (1980), and others are a case in point. Furthermore, these ideas became ingrained in Dominican culture, as a result of Trujillo's efforts to disseminate them among the Dominican people. Unfortunately, most Dominican administrations after Trujillo have continued this practice, in particular the administrations of Joaquin Balaguer (Chapter 5 provides ample evidence on this matter). As a result, most of the discourse on Haiti and Haitians in the Dominican Republic is still influenced by this trujillista ideology.

In conclusion, Haitian-Dominican relations really cannot be examined in their proper context unless this influential historical baggage is taken into account, since it burdens heavily the Haitian-Dominican relationship. The establishment of a French colony in western Hispaniola polarized the island's politics along an east-west plane, a
situation that continues into the present. Whether we are talking about France and Spain, or Haiti and the Dominican Republic, the fact is that Hispaniola remains a divided island, and that east-west relations are as polarized today as ever. This is the main idea that this historical description has tried to convey. As it has been shown, this historical baggage is negative for the most part. Consequently, history, probably more than any other issue, has been a main cause of discord and resentment in Haitian-Dominican relations. Haitians and Dominicans have feared, hated, and killed each other for decades. Dominicans still recall the 1822 Haitian occupation and Dessalines' massacre of the inhabitants of the towns of Moca and Santiago, while Haitians bitterly recriminate Dominicans for the 1937 massacre and the constant mistreatment to which Haitian cane cutters are subjected. There have been instances of cooperation, but they have been rare and infrequent. Therefore, if anything can be predicted from this conflictive history, is that the future of Haitian-Dominican relations is dim. Not until Haitians and Dominicans learn to set aside their historical qualms, will there be mutual respect, cooperation, and understanding in the island of Hispaniola.

I would not like to be a prophet of misfortunes. But, just like it happened to Cassandra, I see the horizon darkened by ominous storm clouds [Price-Mars 1953, 3:251].
Notes

1 Moreau de Saint-Méry provides a detailed chronological account of the development of the Tortuga settlement up to the official Spanish recognition of the French colony of Saint-Domingue (Moreau de Saint-Méry 1944, 7-27).

2 The heroic figure of Toussaint Louverture has become a favorite among Caribbean historians and biographers. Two of the best biographies about Toussaint are C.L.R. James' (1963) *The Black Jacobins*, and Ralph Korngold's (1965) *Citizen Toussaint*.

3 Trujillo's figure has also been a favorite topic among writers. Loved by some, hated by others, Trujillo has been the subject of numerous biographies and analyses of his regime. Among the best are Robert D. Crassweller's (1966) *Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator*, and Jesús de Galindez' (1973) *The Era of Trujillo* (writing it cost the author his life in 1956).
Chapter III showed that history has played a major role in shaping and influencing the contemporary nature of Haitian-Dominican relations. The examination of how this historical legacy has impinged on the Haitian-Dominican relationship from 1961 to the present is the main focus of this chapter, which is divided in two parts. The first part reviews Haitian-Dominican relations from Rafael L. Trujillo's assassination in 1961 to President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's overthrown in 1991, a period of 30 years in which both Haiti and the Dominican Republic have had their shares of democracy and repression, and in which the nature of their relationship has been modified. The second part is an analysis of the main issues in contemporary Haitian-Dominican relations, from the point of view of the Dominican Republic. Current issues include: trade and contraband between both countries, the legal and social status of Dominicans of Haitian origin (Haitian-Dominicans or arrayanos\(^1\)), Dominican national identity conflict, international concerns over the mistreatment of Haitian workers in the Dominican sugar industry, the new role of Haitian labor in the Dominican Republic, Haiti's severe
ecological problems, and the repercussion of Haiti's recurrent political crises on the Dominican Republic.

**The Post-Trujillo Period**

The dictatorial regime of Rafael L. Trujillo ushered in a new era in Haitian-Dominican relations, a period characterized by the military preeminence of the Dominican Republic, and by Trujillo's active meddling in Haitian politics. While the Dominican Republic has remained militarily more powerful than Haiti, Dominican administrations after Trujillo have not followed his aggression toward Haiti. But even before Trujillo was assassinated in 1961, his influence in Haiti sharply declined as a result of two factors. First, the gradual isolation of his regime by the growing community of Latin American democracies, and belatedly, by the United States. And second and more important, by the election in 1957 of a nationalist president in Haiti, François Duvalier, who was hostile to Trujillo.

"Papa Doc" Duvalier assumed the presidency of Haiti in 1957 with the blessing of the Haitian army, and its commander, General Antonio Kébreau. The American Embassy, though it had its reservations about Duvalier, never expressed any opposition to his candidacy—a fact that Duvalier cleverly manipulated as an indication of American support (Heinl and Heinl 1978, 582). The Haitian military
saw in Duvalier a malleable and harmless doctor. They were quickly proven wrong. Once installed in power, Duvalier proceeded to systematically eliminate all forms of real or perceived opposition to his regime, including some of his closest associates. Rallying the Haitian people under the mantle of nationalism and noirisme (black consciousness), Duvalier killed, exiled, or imprisoned his political opponents, closed the university and repressed the students, broke the economic power of the business sector and the upper classes, forced the Catholic Church into obedience, and undermined the power of the Haitian Armed Forces with the creation of a paramilitary corps absolutely loyal to his person: the Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale or Tonton Macoutes (Diederich and Burt 1986; Ferguson 1988; Heinl and Heinl 1978). Duvalier's nightmarish regime soon surpassed Trujillo's in unpredictable terror and cruelty, though Trujillo's 31-year-long regime was definitely more efficient and better institutionalized.

Relations between Duvalier and Trujillo, two power-hungry dictators who allowed no adversaries, were initially hostile. Gen. Kébreau, who had fled to the Dominican Embassy after Duvalier suddenly replaced him as army commander, had been a close associate of Trujillo and ended up in exile in the Dominican Republic. Both dictators soon realized that their common interests were better served if they could agree on an acceptable modus vivendi. After all,
they were both under pressure from exile groups who could use the neighbor's territory to stage an invasion. On 22 December 1958, Trujillo and Duvalier met at Malpasse (on the southern end of the Haitian-Dominican border) and signed a mutual-assistance pact (J. Black 1986, 120; Heinl and Heinl 1978, 599). Besides their security concerns, Trujillo and Duvalier also arranged for the official importation of Haitian cane-cutters into the Dominican Republic, thus renewing a six-year accord signed on 1952 (Castor 1987, 130-131) Duvalier reportedly made $7 million a year under this agreement (Heinl and Heinl 1978, 590).

The 1963 Crisis

Trujillo's assassination in 1961 brought instability to the Dominican Republic as political and military factions tried to fill in the vacuum of power left by Trujillo. Under US supervision, free and democratic elections were held in 1962, resulting in the victory of Juan Bosch, presidential candidate of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano. Bosch, an ardent anti-trujillista, had been in exile for over two decades and was part of the Latin American social democrat movement that had previously established democratic governments in Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Puerto Rico. Bosch, sworn in on 27 February 1963 (Dominican Independence Day), was deposed by a military coup
less than seven months later, on 25 September 1963 (Moya Pons 1992, 529-531).

The Bosch administration represents one of the most tense and conflictive periods in Haitian-Dominican relations. Bosch's relations with Haiti, or more specifically, with Duvalier, were tense, if not outright hostile. Bosch considered Duvalier a ruthless dictator in the same vein of Trujillo, and hinted at the possibility of overthrowing his regime. According to Bosch,

Duvalier constitutes a threat to the peace of the whole continent, and he has demonstrated it when he declared that only God could take power away from him.

I am going to take the initiative of demanding that the nations of the Americas break their diplomatic relations with the Haitian tyrant. Upon the next aggression perpetrated by Haiti, we will inform the OAS [Organization of American States] of our reaction, but we will not do it from here, but from a neighboring capital [Diederich and Burt 1986, 214].

Duvalier, who considered Bosch "an irresponsible madman," had plotted to have Bosch assassinated and offered asylum in Haiti to notorious trujillistas and members of the Trujillo family (Heinl and Heinl 1978, 629).

On 28 April 1963, the Haitian-Dominican crisis reached new heights. Two days before, the Duvalier children (Simone and Jean-Claude) were shot at while arriving at school. In the attack, only the children's Macoute bodyguards were killed with precisely aimed shots—a clear warning to Duvalier. Delirious with rage, Duvalier ordered the
elimination of former Lieutenant François Benoît, star member of the army rifle team, notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the incident Benoît was in asylum inside the Dominican Embassy (Heinl and Heinl 1978, 630). After killing most of Benoît's family, a group of Macoutes penetrated into the Dominican chancery looking for him, a clear violation of international law. When they could not find Benoît, they moved to the grounds of the Dominican residence, which they surrounded. Bosch reacted by calling on the OAS to invoke the Rio Treaty, presenting Duvalier with a 24-hour ultimatum, and mobilizing Dominican troops to the Haitian border (Tomasek 1968, 294-297). In Santo Domingo, a crowd of students stoned the Haitian Embassy, while newspaper editorials gave their unconditional support to Bosch. Even the Haitian consul, Jean-Louis Charles, resigns and request political asylum in Santo Domingo (Diederich and Burt 1986, 206-209). Only the withdrawal of the troops surrounding the Dominican diplomatic mission and the intervention of the OAS prevented the outbreak of hostilities.

Following the incident, Duvalier strengthened his position, while Bosch began to confront serious internal problems. The Dominican military, who had always distrusted Bosch and branded him a "Leftist," resented his handling of the crisis. They felt that Bosch had manipulated--and exacerbated--the crisis for domestic political gains, while
the military had to endure all the hardships and risks (Diederich and Burt 1986, 220-221).

Thereafter, with or without Bosch's knowledge,² Haitian exiles began training in the Dominican Republic, with the help of the Dominican Armed Forces. The activities of these exile groups had the effect of further intensifying the Haitian-Dominican crisis. Haiti countered the Dominican allegations with charges, at the United Nations, of a Dominican conspiracy with Haitian exiles to overthrow the Haitian government. Duvalier also decided to protect his regime with more extreme measures. He closed the border and ordered the creation of a "war zone," a three-mile deep strip of scorched earth along the border, where anyone caught crossing it without authorization was to be shot on sight (Diederich and Burt 1986, 236; Heinl and Heinl 1978, 638). Meanwhile, in the Dominican Republic, the different groups of Haitian exiles prepared themselves for the overthrown of Duvalier, under the leadership of former general Léon Cantave. On August and September of 1963, Cantave's irregular forces launched a series of small attacks on Haitian villages, all of them unsuccessful, and after which they retreated back to Dominican territory. The last attack took place on the morning of 23 September 1963, and was directed toward the Haitian army outpost at Ouanaminthe (across the Masacre river from the Dominican town of Dajabón). Apparently, the government troops had
been alerted in advance. Cantave's men retreated across the river into the Dominican Republic. In hot pursuit, the Haitian troops fired into the town of Dajabón, an action interpreted by the Bosch administration as an act of war. Bosch sent an ultimatum to Duvalier, ordering him to cease all hostilities and warning that he might attack Port-au-Prince in response. Bosch also ordered an investigation into the incident by a commission of the Dominican Armed Forces and by the OAS (Diederich and Burt 1986, 256-258). Neither inquiry got past the preliminary stage, as Juan Bosch was overthrown by a military coup on 25 September 1963.

Balaguer and the Duvaliers

Although Haitian-Dominican relations did not fully normalize until 1966, Bosch's removal defused a potentially explosive situation. Not since 1937 had Haiti and the Dominican Republic been so close to the brink.

The unstable nature of Dominican politics, from Bosch's overthrown in 1963 to the US military intervention in 1965, was a major factor in delaying the normalization of Haitian-Dominican relations. After the US military intervention, elections were held, and the winner was Joaquin Balaguer. Balaguer, a former high-level public official and puppet president during the Trujillo dictatorship, was inaugurated in 1966. Thereafter, he was reelected on two consecutive
terms, extending his period in office until 1978—a period commonly known in Dominican politics as Los Doce Años de Balaguer (Balaguer's twelve years).

With Balaguer, Haitian-Dominican relations took a new turn. Balaguer had professed an intensive anti-Haitian prejudice, coupled with a strong nationalist zeal (Balaguer 1947, 1984), but he is a pragmatic politician, with a vast experience in public affairs acquired during the Trujillo years. Balaguer clearly understood the practicality of reestablishing diplomatic relations with Haiti. Based on these common needs, Haiti and the Dominican Republic resumed diplomatic relations in 1966 (J. Black 1986, 121). Relations between both countries during Balaguer's twelve years were correct if not cordial. Balaguer and Duvalier had another common interest: regulating through accords the importation of Haitian cane-cutters for the Dominican sugar harvest. The Duvalier administration made huge profits from this practice, while it provided the Dominican government had a stable and guaranteed source of laborers. According to the 1966 agreement, part of the workers' salary was retained and given to the Haitian government as a savings fund, to be returned to the workers upon their arrival on Haiti. Of course, the Haitian government never gave the money back to the workers, nor were they foolish enough to ask for it (Lundahl 1979, 346).
When François Duvalier, president-for-life, died in 1971, his son, Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier, inherited the presidency-for-life in a smooth transition of power. Jean-Claude surrounded himself with a coterie of technocrats, a fact reflected in his foreign policy. In an effort to create a humane facade for his dictatorship and develop the country, Baby Doc sought to attract foreign investment. In 1972, he signed an agreement with the Balaguer administration to establish a joint free zone, reduce tariffs, simplify trade transactions, and improve transportation between both countries (J. Black 1986, 121).

The PRD and Haiti

Balaguer's defeat in the 1978 elections paved the way for an opening in Dominican politics. Although it was not without problems (a faction of the Dominican military tried to stage a coup to keep Balaguer in office), it represented the first peaceful transition of power to an opposition party in contemporary times in the Dominican Republic. The opposition Partido Revolucionario Dominicano's (PRD--Juan Bosch's former party) candidate, Antonio Guzmán, was elected president. Guzmán, besides inaugurating a new era in Dominican politics, also sought to improve relations with Haiti. He concentrated, in particular, on expanding trade between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and on reducing their traditional cultural and racial antagonisms (Wiarda
and Kryzanek 1982, 131). Both leaders met in 1979 and then later to inaugurate a joint irrigation project. A similar approach was used by Guzmán's PRD successor, Salvador Jorge Blanco, who won the 1982 elections.

Unfortunately, and in spite of their liberal rhetoric, the PRD administrations did little to alleviate the plight of Haitian *braceros* (cane-cutters) in the Dominican Republic. Low sugar prices, combined with their unwillingness to accept Duvalier's contract terms, meant that for some years, the sugar harvest had to be carried out without contract workers. The government then resorted to the use of *amba fil* (illegal) workers. When the *amba fil* proved not to be enough, the Consejo Estatal del Azúcar (CEA), the government's sugar corporation, resorted to the forced "recruitment" (i.e. kidnapping) of Haitians living in the Dominican Republic, regardless of their legal status. The Dominican military, in charge of recruiting, developed a highly profitable traffic of forced laborers, a situation denounced internationally by the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the Anti-Slavery Society (Plant 1987, chap. 6). Haitians, or any black-skinned male who could not prove that he was Dominican, were rounded up in coffee farms, small villages, road checkpoints, and even in the capital city of Santo Domingo. They were then taken, under the cover of darkness, to the CEA's sugar mills or "sold" to private sugar mills (Plant 1987, 74-84; Veras 1983, 62-63).
The fall of the Duvalier dictatorship on 7 February 1986 ended the practice of bilateral accords, but created an urgent problem for the Dominican sugar industry. Two million dollars had been paid to the Duvalier administration at the end of 1985, as part of that year's accord. The rapidly deteriorating situation in Haiti, however, precluded the recruitment of any *braceros* by the Haitian authorities. After the fall of Duvalier, the CEA found itself with no money, no *braceros*, and a worthless contract (Plant 1987, 88). Again, the large-scale roundup of Haitians was resorted to.

**Balaguer Returns**

Nineteen eighty-six was a transcendental year in Hispaniola. Besides the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship in Haiti, the Dominican people witnessed the incredible: Joaquin Balaguer, nearly blind, eighty years' old, and discarded by the opposition as a viable candidate, won a fifth presidential term. Even more inconceivable was the fact that in 1990 he was reelected for a sixth term by less than 25,000 votes (D'Agostino 1992). The scandalous graft and corruption of the two PRD administrations, plus the economic crisis and the mellowing effects of time, made "Los Doce Años de Balaguer" look rather rosy for many Dominicans.

In 1986, Balaguer confronted a new Haiti. Haiti was no longer under the Duvalier dictatorship. After the fall of
Duvalier, Haiti entered into a period of social and political instability as different groups competed for power in order to fill the vacuum left by the Duvalier's. Among these groups were the military, the former Duvalierists, the popular organizations, the low-ranking church (ti legliz), and exiles who had returned after Duvalier's fall (Abbott 1988; Wilentz 1989). During the period from 1986 to 1991, Haiti had several de facto governments, including two army commanders, Henri Namphy and Prosper Avril, who ruled by decree. Balaguer's diplomatic approach during that turbulent period was a cautious one, as he feared that events in Haiti may have unexpected consequences for the Dominican Republic. Severe civil unrest in Haiti could provoke a flood of Haitian refugees fleeing into the Dominican Republic, a nightmarish situation that the Dominican government was not prepared to handle. Balaguer maintained correct relations with the Haitian administration of turn, and even granted asylum to Haitian leaders after they were overthrown. That was the case, for example, with General and President-de-facto Henri Namphy, overthrown on 17 September 1988 and flown to the Dominican Republic with his family, where they still live comfortably (Wilentz 1989, 359).

The election of Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1990 caused a public relations problem for the Balaguer administration. Aristide, inaugurated on 7 February 1991
**Jean-Bertrand did not attack President Joaquin Balaguer, "he went to the international forums to harshly attack the Dominican Republic."**

(five years after the Duvalier's fall), is an outspoken leader of the lower classes. A devout follower of liberation theology, Aristide and his Lavalas' movement sought to profoundly transform Haitian society. Aristide also openly denounced in international forums (like the United Nations) the slave-like working conditions of Haitians in the Dominican Republic. These accusations came in the midst of a wave of reports from human-rights organizations (such as Americas Watch), US television news, and the ILO, in which the Dominican Republic was depicted as a human rights' violator. To make matters worse, the US Trade Representative decided to review these allegations before certifying the Dominican Republic as eligible for the US Generalized System of Preferences (Ferguson 1992, 87-88). An unfavorable decision would have certainly meant economic disaster for the Dominican Republic, as the GSP guarantees preferential access to the US market. Not surprisingly, Aristide became a persona non grata for the Balaguer administration, as well as for most of the Dominican economic elites. He was the target of personal attacks, in an effort to destroy his credibility. Even opposition politicians, such as Jacobo Majluta (a wealthy businessman of Arab ancestry and presidential candidate), have launched vicious attacks against Aristide.
... on the day of his inauguration "he took along a witch and walked the Bishop of that nation through the streets of Port-au-Prince in a shameful manner and committed anti-democratic acts."

... he [Aristide] accused us [the Dominican Republic] in front of the OAS, ILO and the UN of all the evils of the world [Sarita 1993, 4].

Fabio Herrera Cabral, Balaguer's Subsecretary of Foreign Relations, warned that "Dominicans must be ready to counter any intrusion that he [Aristide] pretends in order to impose his ideas over the Dominican Republic" (Carvajal 1993, 16).

Balaguer responded to Aristide's accusations with decree 233-91 (see Appendix E) in retaliation. The decree ordered the immediate deportation of all illegal Haitians under the age of 16 or over 60. Within three months, about 50,000 Haitians were deported (Ferguson 1992, 89). The Dominican military profited from this operation by confiscating the possessions of deported Haitians. The deportation decree was clearly aimed at further de-stabilizing the Aristide administration, and on 30 September 1991, Aristide was overthrown by a military coup led by General Raoul Cédras. It is noteworthy that the Balaguer administration did not condemn the coup.

Furthermore, though the Balaguer administration has publicly offered to help in the resolution of the Haitian impasse and has officially supported the OAS embargo against the Haitian military government, it has taken actions to prevent, or at least delay, a resolution of the crisis. In a clear
violation of OAS-imposed sanctions, goods are carried over the border and into Haiti, in full view of the Dominican military, who profit from this trade. Recently, the Balaguer administration authorized the sale of foodstuffs and fuel to Haiti for "humanitarian reasons" (M. Pérez 1993b, 1, 16).

Dimensions of the "Haitian Problem" in the Dominican Republic

The last section examined contemporary Haitian-Dominican relations up to the current Balaguer administration (1990-1994). As we have seen so far, Haitian-Dominican relations are a multi-faceted question, that is, they revolve about several dimensions of what is called the "Haitian problem" in the Dominican Republic. Here, we link the historical background presented in the past chapters with an analysis of the different dimensions that shape the Haitian-Dominican relationship today, from the point of view of the Dominican Republic. Most of these issues have become points of contention within both countries. However, they are the subject of much more controversial and frequent public debate in the Dominican Republic than in Haiti, as Dominicans feel that they are the most affected party in the Haitian-Dominican relationship. Furthermore, since this dissertation examines antihaitianismo in the Dominican Republic, it is the viewpoints of Dominicans which really are of relevance to
this study. For purposes of clarity and organization, these dimensions of the "Haitian problem" will be presented in ascending order of importance, as determined by my research findings in the Dominican Republic.

The Border and the Borderlands

The Haitian-Dominican border has always been a point of contention between both countries. During colonial times, the definition of a border between the colonies of Santo Domingo and Saint-Domingue was considered as a major obstacle in the normalization of relations. After independence, the definition of a border became an issue of national security, particularly for the Dominican Republic, which felt threatened by Haiti. Eventually, it led, first, to a formal border treaty in 1929 (with subsequent modifications), and second, to the 1937 massacre, Trujillo's brutal way of enforcing his perception of national sovereignty. Today, a shifting border is no longer a policy concern. The border is now well-defined, with cement markers or ditches visible over the mountains indicating where the two countries meet. The border is also being constantly patrolled by the Dominican and Haitian military, so the likelihood of future border claims by either country appears to be negligible.

The border, however, is more than a line. It is part of a geographical area with particular socio-economic
characteristics: the borderlands. As Michiel Baud has suggested, borders and borderlands often represent clashing interests (Baud 1993, 51). Borders are usually far removed from the national centers of power, and the government's authority in these remote regions is limited at best. On the other hand, the strategic and ideological importance of borders is great. It is at the border where national sovereignty begins and ends. It establishes the state's legal and geographical radius of action. The borderlands, however, are usually sparsely populated, economically depressed, and not well-integrated into the national mainstream. These particular characteristics lead to an interesting contradiction in the Haitian-Dominican case: the borderlands have become a region whose strategic and ideological prominence far overshadow its social and economic importance. For example, in the Dominican Republic, the borderlands account for 22.1% of the national territory, but only 7% of the country's total population. The borderlands only comprise 12.5% of the total land under cultivation and 6.5% of the country's grasslands, while their contribution to the country's GNP was a meager 4.1% ("Reseñan" 1990, 7).

Only during times of national crises (such as a Haitian invasion), have the borderlands been of any importance to their national governments. Furthermore, during the Haitian-Dominican wars, the borderlands became a no-man's
land, where the state practically ceased to exist. These two facets of border life added a new social dimension to the borderlands: the border region as refuge (Baud 1993). The borderlands have traditionally been the refuge of rebellious indians, maroon slaves, buccaneers, disgruntled colonists, traders specializing in contraband, and anyone wishing to escape the hold of the state. Over the centuries, fronterizos (as the inhabitants of the borderlands are commonly known in the Dominican Republic) developed a unique way of life based on illegal trade, bilingualism (most speak Spanish and Creole), unlimited mobility across national borders, and disregard for the state's authority and control. Before the American occupation (1916-1924), Haitians and Dominicans traded freely across the border, the Haitian gourde was the main monetary instrument as far away as Santiago, and fronterizos successfully resisted all efforts from the national government to subdue them (Baud 1993, 44-50). The American occupation finally "pacified" the borderlands and the Trujillo dictatorship brought them under control, as part of its anti-Haitian and nationalist ideology. The development of the modern state meant the beginning of the end of the fronterizo lifestyle. The border became a matter of national security, trade was restricted and taxed, and the fronterizos became the "defenders" of Dominican nationality against Haiti, finally culminating in the 1937 massacre.
Today, in spite of the state's efforts, the Haitian-Dominican border is as porous as ever. Even though the Dominican military patrol the border constantly, contraband remains the way of life in the borderlands, and the military have been the first to recognize and take advantage of this. The intervention of the modern state has only forced *fronterizos* to employ new strategies. During my field research in the borderlands, I witnessed the variety of consumer goods that are brought in from Haiti as contraband: radios, televisions, VCR's, clothes, perfumes, and even weapons and ammunition. Into Haiti, Dominican *fronterizos* take all kinds of cheap plastic articles (sandals, washbasins, etc.) and, above all, food. From peasants to custom officers to the military, *fronterizos* try to get a piece of this lucrative business. While some supply the merchandise (foodstuffs, consumer goods, weapons, etc.), others provide the transportation (over difficult terrain and at night), and then there is a small, but important, group, whose participation just consists of looking the other way (e.g. the military, customs officials, local leaders).

Physically, The Haitian-Dominican border is nothing more than a line in the ground dotted with scattered guard posts. Crossing it at night represents no major obstacle for the locals. Furthermore, contraband is an activity that is carried out under the discreet complicity of local
authorities (civil and military), who receive their share of the profits. Though officially downplayed (or not mentioned), contraband still remains a main element in the social fabric of the borderlands. Government officials, rather than fight it, have learned to live with it and benefit from it. Besides that particularly lucrative economic aspect, however, the Haitian-Dominican borderlands are characterized by their underdevelopment, severe transportation problems, and isolation from the national mainstream.

The Haitian-Dominican border is no longer a major concern in Haitian-Dominican relations. The borderline has remained fixed for decades now, and nothing seems to indicate that there is any inclination to revise it. The borderlands, on the other hand, remain as areas where the control of the state weakens and is rendered less effective. Though Haiti and the Dominican Republic are (geographically speaking) clearly differentiated, fronterizos move back and forth across the border with ease. For that reason, the borderlands are a "nobody's land," a fact that concerns both states who want to exercise more control over their national territory.

The Ecological Dilemma

Haiti is slowly but inexorably moving towards ecological disaster. The Dominican Republic is also
currently experiencing its own ecological problems. This fact deeply worries Dominican politicians for two important reasons. First, due to its geographical proximity, the consequences of ecological decline affect not only Haiti, but also the Dominican Republic. Pollution, erosion, and the mismanagement of water resources are bound to have dire consequences for both countries. Those most affected, of course, will be the inhabitants of the borderlands. A look at the Haitian-Dominican border from the air presents a clear contrast between both countries. The border actually looks like a deep scar. While the Dominican side has retained some of its tree cover, the Haitian side is barren and desolate, a result of indiscriminate tree-cutting. Furthermore, primitive agricultural techniques and lack of government aid (in the form of loans, machinery, improved seeds, agronomists, etc.) result in low yields that reinforce the vicious circle of tree cutting (Box and de la Rive Box-Lasocki 1989). Second, ecological disaster would force the migration of thousands of starving Haitian peasants, most likely to the neighboring Dominican Republic. This worst-case scenario worries Dominican government officials. They feel, first, that the Dominican Republic should not have to assume Haiti's burden, and second, that the Dominican Republic is not prepared to absorb such an influx of refugees.
Trade

Trade between the two countries reached its highest point during the colonial period. After independence, there was little official trade, though contraband prevailed. Trujillo's nationalization (and personalization) of the Dominican economy further restricted any trade between both countries. After the fall of Trujillo and the inauguration of Balaguer's "correct" foreign policy towards Haiti, official trade began to grow. As Figure 4-1 shows, trade with Haiti during the 1960s was practically negligible. That was as a result of the unstable political situation in Haiti and the Dominican Republic during that time. In Haiti, "Papa Doc" Duvalier suffered a series of political crises that concentrated all his attention on domestic politics. In the Dominican Republic, the country went through the last stages of the Trujillo dictatorship, elections and the short Bosch administration, the 1965 civil war, and American military intervention. It was not until the 1970s that Haitian-Dominican trade really developed into a prominent part of the economies of both countries. The trade, besides dramatically increasing in the 1970s, also became favorable for the Dominican Republic, which only imports from Haiti about half the value of its exports to that country (see Figure 4-1). The Dominican Republic sells to Haiti: sugar, foodstuffs (rice, poultry, tomato paste, etc.), fertilizers, salt, cattle, fuel, propane gas,
FIGURE 4-1
cardboard, cement, plastic products, and pharmaceutical products. Furthermore, Dominican firms now provide technical services for the Haitian government on matters such as construction and electrification (Vicens 1981, 29).

Haiti exports to the Dominican Republic: sisal cloth, fruit juices, and handicrafts. Today, many economists consider Haiti as one of the Dominican Republic's most important potential markets (Alemán 1993, 7). Haiti needs most of what the Dominican Republic produces, very little transportation of the products is involved, and the Haitian market is not as demanding in terms of quality as, for example, the US market.

Some obstacles exist, however. More trade accords need to be negotiated that will ease the flow of products between the two countries, roads linking the two nations need to be repaired and given regular maintenance, and the Dominican Republic should contribute to the economic development of Haiti by leveling, as much as possible, the unequal trade balance between Haiti and the Dominican Republic (Casals Victoria 1973, 64-66). Trade, so far, represents one of the most promising elements that will help towards reducing historical frictions and animosities between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

Trade with Haiti has not been entirely free of problems, though. Shortages of basic foodstuffs in the Dominican Republic, such as refined sugar and tomato paste,
have been attributed to the uncontrolled sale of these products to Haiti (Vicens 1981, 29). Strong nationalist criticisms have been levied against the widespread practice of supplying the Haitian market with products that have become temporarily scarce in the Dominican Republic. For example, it is not uncommon for refined sugar to be scarce in a sugar-producing country such as the Dominican Republic. There is an underlying explanation for this practice, of course. The Haitian gourde is officially pegged to the US dollar at a fixed rate of five gourdes per dollar. The Dominican peso, on the other hand, is subject to regular devaluations. Consequently, exporting to the Haitian market is a very lucrative activity, as it brings in return hard currency, while selling to the Dominican market only provides merchants with devalued pesos.

Dual-Nationals or Arrayanos?

Another important issue of Haitian-Dominican relations has been the presence of a population of undefined nature in the Dominican Republic: the arrayanos. These Haitian-Dominicans are rejected by both countries. They have no defined rights, and very little group identity. Furthermore, they exist in a legal limbo; they are not considered "true" Dominicans and are often denied the rights and privileges of Dominican citizenship (Dore 1987, 62). This does not happen with other foreign, or even black,
groups in the Dominican Republic. The ancestry of Dominicans of Arab, Spanish, Jewish, or Chinese origin is rarely questioned. Even the descendants of cocolos, black laborers from the Lesser Antilles that were brought as cane-cutters during the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Cassá 1992, 2:139), are considered full-fledged Dominicans.\(^6\)

The case of the cocolos provides additional evidence to my claim that antihaitianismo is not exclusively a racial phenomenon. The cocolos were English-speaking black foreigners that worked as low-paid cane-cutters. Just like the Haitians, they were part of the lower social strata. Unlike Haitians, however, they did not come from a "hostile" or "threatening" neighboring country. Thus, they were accepted and incorporated into Dominican society. The case of the Samaná blacks is a similar one. Brought during the Haitian occupation (1822-1844) by Boyer, the descendants of these English-speaking, Protestant, black Americans are today considered as part of Dominican society (Cerruti 1977, 538-544; Hoetink 1962). Haitians, and arrayanos, are discriminated because, in addition to being black and poor, they come (or descend) from Haiti, the Dominican Republic's traditional enemy. Antihaitianismo portrays Haitians and arrayanos alike, not as just another foreign migration, but as the spearhead of a silent invasion of the Dominican Republic by Haiti. That, by itself, is used to justify the fact that they (and their descendants) are not considered
Dominican nationals, but undesirable, invading foreigners. This stereotype, of course, also serves to justify their economic exploitation and subordinate place in Dominican society.

On several occasions, arrayanos have been deported to Haiti, a country that they do not know, that does not consider them as Haitians, and that also rejects them as foreigners. While most Dominican politicians have strongly opposed the granting of Dominican citizenship to long-time Haitian residents, the case of the arrayanos is less clear-cut. After all, they have been born in the Dominican Republic, therefore, they legally are Dominican citizens. Their detractors, however, argue that they do not have a Dominican culture and are not part of the national life. They live in sugar enclaves, where their lives go on as if they were living in Haiti (Dore 1987, 63). Fortunately, human rights groups and religious organizations have sought to help them, not only to defend their case in national forums, but also to develop in them the group consciousness that they are lacking.

Haitians and Dominican Sugar

Even more debatable than the case of the arrayanos, has been the case of Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic. The numerous works written on the subject are a clear indication of the importance of this issue in Haitian-
Dominican relations. Certainly, Haitians in the Dominican Republic are the most visible aspect of the Haitian-Dominican relationship. The Dominican conception of what Haiti is, at least for common Dominicans, is in part derived from this physical Haitian presence. Haitians are feared and hated, but at the same time essential. In spite of the fact that the Haitian presence is rejected by many nationalist politicians, most of them acknowledge that Haitians are sorely needed by the Dominican sugar industry. Haitians, like most illegal migrants elsewhere, do the jobs that no national would do, or they do similar jobs, but for a considerably lower wage.

The relation between Haitians and the Dominican sugar industry dates back to the early 20th century. Modern sugar plantations began to be developed in the Dominican Republic in the late 19th century, well behind most other Caribbean countries. But it was not until the American occupation of Haiti (1915-1934) and the Dominican Republic (1916-1924) that Haitians began to be imported in large numbers as cheap laborers (Castor 1987, 70-71). Thousands of laborers were needed in the sugar plantations and it was getting more difficult (and expensive) everyday to get cocolos or Dominican laborers. Ever since, Haitians have constituted the overwhelming majority of cane-cutters in the Dominican Republic.
For cultural and economic reasons, Dominicans simply refuse to cut sugar cane. Cutting sugar cane is an arduous, back-breaking job, which in the Dominican Republic is perceived as degrading and reserved for "slaves." Wages are also very low. While in 1980 the minimum wage for rural work was set at RD$3.50 per day, wages in the sugar industry averaged RD$2.50 per day, about 30% less (ONAPLAN 1981, 25). Cane-cutting, besides being low-paid, carries with it a social stigma: it a job for Haitians. Haitians, on the other hand, like most migrants elsewhere, do not have the range of choices nor the social mobility that natives enjoy. They either have to accept low-paid jobs or starve. Furthermore, the great majority of Haitian cane-cutters are hired in Haiti through a network of Haitian and Dominican agents. Once in the sugar plantation, they cannot leave or quit. They are supervised by armed guards and must work until the end of their contracts (Plant 1987).

A Dominican government study by the Oficina Nacional de Planificación (ONAPLAN) estimates that 16,000 Haitians are brought in legally into the Dominican Republic as contract workers for the sugar industry, and in addition, another 15,000 come as ambá fil (illegal) workers every year (ONAPLAN 1981, 7). The Dominican sugar industry's dependency on Haitian labor is so great that, for example, in the sugar plantations of the south about 98% of the cane-cutters are Haitian (ONAPLAN 1981, 8). Periodic efforts and
even nationalist appeals to replace Haitians workers with Dominicans have failed miserably, while others have argued for the mechanization of the sugar harvest with similar results (Bourginal 1980, 7; "Consideran" 1980, 2; Mata Vargas 1980, 4; "Seminario" 1980, 10-A; "Ve" 1980, 2;). Studies on the subject have always reached the same conclusion: in spite of high levels of unemployment and underemployment in the Dominican Republic, most Dominicans will not cut sugar cane for economic, social, and cultural reasons (Moya Pons 1986; Ysaiguez 1980). And given the precarious economic condition of the CEA, which has a current debt of RD$2,630 million (Vega 1993, 6), mechanization is definitely out of the question.

Still, mechanization would only reduce, not eliminate, the need for imported labor, as harvesting machines are limited to flat, dry terrain. Two ongoing developments, however, may change this picture in the near future. One is the declining importance of the sugar industry in the Dominican economy. As was shown on Chapter I, industry, tourism, and even cash remittances bring more hard currency into the country than sugar. Furthermore, sugar prices have never returned to their 1970s high, and sugar sales are restricted by overflowing markets and import quotas. Thus, the era of "king sugar" seems to be a thing of the past in the Dominican Republic. As a result, and due to the complications inherent in the establishment of bilateral
Haiti for the importation of Haitian workers into the Dominican Republic, Haitian migrant labor is no longer "recruited" by the Dominican government. The other important development is the diversification of Haitian labor in the Dominican Republic, away from sugar and into new sectors of the Dominican economy. This new development is the next issue of discussion.

Haitian Labor in the Dominican Republic

Haitian labor in the Dominican Republic is no longer limited to the sugar industry. Haitians can be found throughout the Dominican countryside engaged in all kinds of manual labor. They work in haciendas picking and processing coffee, planting and harvesting rice, clearing farmlands, digging irrigation canals, etc. For example, the ONAPLAN study found out that in the southern region 80% of the coffee workers were Haitians, while even in the northern Cibao region (where the presence of Haitian workers was rare) 19% of coffee workers were Haitian (ONAPLAN 1981, 14). Originally, Haitian cane-cutters resorted to coffee harvesting as a means of supplementing their income during the tiempo muerto (the off-season between sugar harvests). This "intrusion" into a traditional Dominican activity resulted in numerous complaints, particularly in the Cibao region, where Haitian labor has rarely been used (Bretón 1980, 11). Again, the allegations seemed contradictory at a
time when the government and private landowners were desperately seeking rural laborers for the coffee and rice harvests, which were in danger of suffering great losses (E. Rodríguez 1980, 4). Internal migration from the countryside to the cities, and migration to the United States, is slowly siphoning away Dominican rural laborers. Most rural Dominicans prefer a city job or the chance to emigrate to the United States. For Haitians, wages and working conditions in the Dominican countryside are far better than in the sugar industry. For example, while sugar wages averaged RD$2.50 per day, clearing farmland paid between RD$3.00 and RD$3.50 per day, and working in plantain or rice plantations paid about RD$4.00 per day (ONAPLAN 1981, 25-26). Sometimes, rural workers also receive lunch and a place to spend the night. Not surprisingly, Haitian migrants have turned away from sugar and gone into manual work in the Dominican countryside.

In the cities, the Haitian presence is even more noticeable. Haitians do strenuous construction work, such as pounding stones, excavating streets, cutting steel rods, and mixing cement. Like in the rural areas, these Haitians are former cane-cutters who seek better wages in the cities. In 1989, according to my own findings, a Haitian construction worker received a flat fee of RD$30.00 per day. Wages in the sugar industry at that time averaged less than RD$10.00 per day (E. Cruz 1989, 8-B). Haitians with
construction skills (carpenters, masons, etc.) earned considerably more, as well as those that worked on ajuste, that is, they were paid by the amount of work done (e.g. digging on a rock surface is paid by the cubic meter). Some Haitian construction workers that I interviewed complained that they were being paid less than Dominican workers, an allegation that I could not corroborate, but which is also prevalent in the rural areas (ONAPLAN 1981, 27).

Still, the fact is that employers in the rural and urban areas prefer Haitian workers because they work harder, do not cause trouble, and rarely miss a workday. Furthermore, the use of imported labor tends to lower wages, as Haitian workers would work for a wage that most Dominicans would find unacceptable. Finally, the generalized opinion among Haitian workers that I interviewed in the cities was that they would never return to the cane fields. Construction work is much more profitable, less subject to exploitative practices, and allows them to live in the city (that means running water, electricity, better housing, and the chance for their children to attend school).

Haitians also engage in various types of street peddling and now even occupy a part of Santo Domingo's Mercado Modelo (a centrally-located and busy marketplace). This area, known as "Little Haiti," has become the obligatory stopping point of the buses that serve the Santo
Domingo-Port-au-Prince route. There, Haitian petty traders (most of them women) sell their merchandise and buy products to take back to Haiti. Haitian food is sold on street corners and there are about 12 boarding houses and hotels where the newly-arrived can stay (Jiménez 1990, 1-C). These developments, of course, have not been to the liking of Dominican nationalist politicians. Haitians are perceived as trespassers, who have taken over traditional low-income occupations, and who are taking jobs away from Dominicans. Furthermore, they are "Haitianazing" the country, as the case of the Mercado Modelo shows. According to their view, Haitians should remain within their assigned economic sphere (cutting sugar cane) and not expand into other sectors of the Dominican economy from there (Bournigal 1980, 7; Trejo 1980, 10-A). If they do not want to continue working as cane-cutters, then they should be repatriated back to Haiti.

Haiti's Political Instability

Probably one of the current issues that worries Dominican policy makers the most is Haiti's political instability. After the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship, Haiti has been ruled by a succession of de facto governments. Most of them seized power through a coup d'etat, only to be themselves overthrown by another coup months later. As with the ecological issue, Dominican officials fear that civil unrest in Haiti, due to its
constant political instability, would trigger a mass exodus of refugees into the Dominican Republic. Again, Dominican officials argue that they should not have to pay for Haiti's problems, and that the Dominican Republic cannot afford a Haitian refugee problem.

The Clinton administration's decision to maintain the US policy of returning Haitian boat people back to Haiti was reflected in the Dominican press with a dose of concern for the consequences of that decision for the Dominican Republic. Dominican columnists argued that such a decision could have an unintended effect in Haiti. After weeks of waiting for a reversal of US policy, a fact that had raised considerable expectations among would-be Haitian migrants, these same migrants now found themselves with their boats ready, but with no place to go. Many of them would then consider their second migration option and go to the Dominican Republic, further exacerbating the problem of illegal Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic. "Each Haitian that seeks asylum in the United States is one Haitian less with the possibility of entering Dominican territory," it was argued in the Dominican press (Gautier 1993, 6). The Balaguer administration quickly reinforced the border with army patrols "to avoid an eventual massive flow of Haitians towards the Dominican Republic" (M. Pérez 1993a, 13).
Haitian politics evoke images of instability, barbarism, and bloodshed in the Dominican Republic. The indiscriminate repression of the Duvaliers and of the military administrations that succeeded them disgusted most Dominicans and worried government officials. On 29 November 1987, the death of Dominican journalist Carlos Grullón at the hands of the Tonton Macoutes, and the aborted elections of what came to be known as "Black Sunday," further reinforced negative stereotypes about Haitian politics (Abbott 1988, 4). Haiti is perceived as a "dangerous" place for Dominicans, not only in the popular culture, but also among elite circles.

When the UN and the OAS requested the Dominican government to provide human rights observers for their fact-finding mission, the Subsecretary of Foreign Relations, Fabio Herrera Cabral, pointed out that "there would be no risks involved for those chosen," but then added that he personally wished that no Dominican would consider participating in the observers' group "for historical reasons" (Navarrete 1993a, 14). Opinion polls have shown that a large segment of the Dominican population is not satisfied with the system (Cross Beras 1985). Still, most Dominicans proudly contrast the Dominican Republic's democratic system as opposed to Haiti's anarchy. When respondents in a 1980 survey were asked which countries the Dominican Republic should imitate, none answered Haiti.
Even when they were asked with what countries should the Dominican Republic work more closely, the same results were obtained (Cross Beras 1985, 76-77). At least in the second question, Haiti should have seemed like a logical alternative, given Haiti's trade with the Dominican Republic and its geographical proximity. Still, Haiti is stigmatized. Haiti is perceived as the underdeveloped, unstable, dangerous country, that even its own citizens want to leave. The Dominican Republic, on the other hand, is seem as the rapidly developing, stable, and safe country that must be protected from the pernicious influence of its troubled neighbor.

Population Pressure

Haiti's larger population has traditionally been a source of concern for Dominican authorities, dating as far back as the 18th century. As shown on Chapter III, in 1789 Saint-Domingue had over five times the population of Santo Domingo. After the colony of Santo Domingo was ceded to France in 1795, many families left, reducing the total population even more. After the Dominican Republic achieved its independence in 1844, Dominicans constantly feared Haiti's numerical strength. Figure 4-2 shows the marked difference in size between the population of Haiti and the Dominican Republic for the last 200 years. As it can be seen, it was not until the 1970s that the Dominican
FIGURE 4-2
Total Population of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, 1789-1990

Republic, the larger of the two countries, also became the one with the larger population. However, the Dominican Republic had achieved military superiority a long time ago, and the fear of a Haitian invasion was by then practically nonexistent.

Today, Dominicans fear a different kind of invasion. Although the Dominican Republic has a larger population than Haiti, Haiti has a greater population density, 590 inhabitants per square mile versus 378 inhabitants per square mile for the Dominican Republic. Haiti's high population density, coupled with economic, political, and ecological problems, creates the conditions for a constant outflow of migrants seeking a better life elsewhere. Naturally, many will opt for the closest country with a higher standard of living than Haiti's: the Dominican Republic. Though migration has always been a recognized and long-standing trend among Caribbean societies, Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic is fraught with controversy, animosities, and conflict.

Just how many Haitians are currently residing in the Dominican Republic is extremely difficult to determine. One problem is the very own definition of what is a Haitian migrant. Are arrayanos to be counted as Haitians or not? How to count illegal Haitians? The second and major problem is which source to believe in. Estimates fluctuate wildly from 200,000 (Madruga 1986, 137; Veras 1983, 34) to over a
million Haitians, a figure that seems by all means exaggerated (Gautier 1993, 6; Guerrero 1989). Regardless of what source one uses, Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic has been portrayed as a "flood," a "wave of migrants," a "pacific invasion." According to President Joaquín Balaguer,

> It is possible, then, that this danger [Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic], if it is not stopped in time, would finally facilitate the absorption of the Dominican Republic by Haiti [Balaguer 1983, 156].

Accusations like Balaguer's are common among Dominican politicians, and the Dominican news media periodically present reports about the Haitian "penetration," the Haitian "exodus," and the "alarm" and "concern" that it produces in the general population. Following are some excerpts from the press declarations of a handful of Dominican politicians from different parts of the country and diverging political orientations.

**Francisco A. Lora** (former vicepresident 1966-1970, current president of the Movimiento de Integración Democrática, Santiago):

> ... the massive immigration of Haitian illegals into the national territory represents a serious and imminent danger for Dominican nationality and for the security of the nation ... and the inflow from the neighboring country could be intentional and calculated. The massive exodus of Haitian illegals through the border region constitutes a pacific invasion of the national territory, coldly calculated and developed in a gradual, but inexorable way by certain Haitian and Haitianizing interests [Saint Hilaire 1980, 1].
Dr. Silverio López (Diputado of the Partido Reformista [PR] for the Espaillat Province, Moca):

Peasants are scared and terrified, and in spite of the complaints that we have made about the issue, the Secretariat of Public Health does nothing, and Haitians, besides taking away jobs from Dominicans, continue to spread diseases because they have no control [Trejo 1980, 10-A].

Terencio Cepeda (Diputado of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano [PRD] for the Espaillat Province):

... the work fields are being pacifically occupied by Haitians, in detriment of my province's peasants [Alvarez Castellanos 1980, 10].

Dr. Herminio Pichardo de León (Diputado of the PR for the Valverde Province):

... people are starving in the municipality of Mao ... lately we have received there a true wave of [Haitian] immigrants that have displaced Mao's residents from agricultural jobs [Alvarez Castellanos 1980, 10].

Manuel Casado Díaz (Diputado of the PR for the El Seybo Province):

... in my province, gangs of Haitians have formed to steal, kidnap, and rape women ... many Haitians have been issued permits to drive motor vehicles, and others work as raffle peddlers, lottery sellers, etc. [Alvarez Castellanos 1980, 10].

Dr. Rafael Socías Grullón (member of the National Council of the Border, Justice of the Peace in Montecristi):

... the Haitian cultural penetration in the country is terrible ... it is a grave issue ... we must put an end to this problem [Sigarán 1980b, 1].

Luz Aidee de Carrasco (Senator for the Dajabón Province):
Haitians enter [the Dominican Republic] through my province and then move to other towns to avoid military patrols. . . . if malaria has spread in the border region it is because Haitians have transmitted it, as well as other diseases [Sigarán 1980, 12].

It becomes quite clear from the preceding examples that Haitian migration is a largely politicized issue in the Dominican Republic. As such, it is subject to political manipulation. Haitian migrants are presented as the causing agents of the Dominican countryside's economic woes. Haitian migrants take away jobs from Dominicans peasants, spread infectious diseases, and even "steal, kidnap, and rape women." For political purposes at least, Haitian migrants have become the scapegoats of Dominican society. Furthermore, Haitian migration is not viewed as a long-standing trend, but as a "new" phenomenon. "Waves" of Haitian migrants are coming into the country; a "pacific invasion." These alarmist declarations are rooted, first, on short-range political objectives; and second, on long-range, ideological motivations.

First, most of these declarations were made by members of Balaguer's Partido Reformista, then in the opposition after having been defeated in the 1978 elections. They periodically resorted to rallying up nationalism and manipulating the Haitian issue in order to present the official party (the PRD) as "weak" and even pro-Haitian. Moreover, the PRD's General Secretary, José Francisco Peña Gómez is a black radical of Haitian ancestry. He has been
accused of being pro-Haitian, of allowing the unrestricted penetration of Haitians illegals into the Dominican Republic, and of being their "flagbearer, the defender of their supposed rights" (Guerrero 1989). By blaming Haitian migrants, these politicians not only distanced themselves from their provinces' economic problems, but also placed the responsibility squarely on the central government and its faulty handling of the "Haitian problem." Second, from the long-range perspective, these declarations are part of the official anti-Haitian discourse prevalent in the Dominican Republic from the Trujillo Era. How this "official" antihaitianismo came into being, and is still being successfully used by Dominican politicians, will be examined in Chapters VI and VII.

National Identity and Cultural Conflicts

The most passionate issue in Haitian-Dominican relations is, without any doubt, that of the impact of the Haitian presence on Dominican culture and nationality. Though this issue is covered in greater detail in Chapter VI, it must be at least briefly commented here. First, of all, according to antihaitianismo ideology, Haitian (or black African) culture has not contributed anything to Dominican culture, as other cultures (Amerindian, Spanish, American, etc.) have done. Rather, Haitian culture has diluted Dominican culture. Haitian culture is viewed as
just another dimension of Haitian penetration into Dominican society, with the "objective" of eroding traditional Dominican values. Antihaitianismo disregards time and space, as it acknowledges the contributions of other cultures that have appeared before and after the creation of the Haitian nation, and that have been less influential in Dominican culture, but downplays or negates all Haitian cultural influences as "foreign" or anti-Dominican.

Many Dominican intellectuals, past and present, have contributed to the formation of this anti-Haitian national culture. Manuel A. Peña Batlle, on a speech glorifying Trujillo's border policy, presented the problem in the following way:

Nobody can convince him [Trujillo] nor convince the Dominican people to look with resignation at the sources of our nationality being irreversibly contaminated by elements strange to its nature and its constitution. Let us not forget that this Spanish, Christian and Catholic nation that we Dominicans are, rose, pure and homogeneous, in the geographic unity of the island and that it would have remained like that until today had it not been for the implant that since the late XVII century was grafted into the pristine trunk, to contaminate its sap with that of agents profoundly and fatally different to those that in the beginning grew up in Hispaniola [Peña Batlle 1954, 66].

Joaquin Balaguer deals further on the issue and is even more specific (and crude):

The de-nationalization of Santo Domingo, persistently realized for over a century through trading with the worst of the Haitian population, has made a alarming progress. Our racial origin and our Hispanic nation's tradition, must not deviate us from recognizing that our nationality
is in danger of disintegrating if drastic measures are not employed against the menace that represents the neighboring Haitian nation. The first sign of this de-nationalization is constituted by the increasing ethnic decadence of the Dominican population. Contact with the [Haitian] negro has contributed, without any doubt, to the slackening of our public manners [Balaguer 1984, 45].

The influence of Haiti has also had a disintegrative effect on the Dominican soul. The continuous flow of foreigners of the black race, constantly mixing with the lower classes of society . . . has broken down patriotic feelings and the feeling of national solidarity [Balaguer 1984, 48].

Finally, and more recently, Manuel Núñez, in El Ocaso de la Nación Dominicana (The Twilight of the Dominican Nation) portrays the problem from a very similar--though presented as new--perspective:

We have lived turning our backs to an essential, crucial problem in the future, a problem not only of nationality, but for the future of that which has constituted up to now an authentic safeguard and strength: for dominicanidad [Dominicaness]. The Haitian [migrant] does not adapt to our culture, but penetrates and transforms it, revolutionizes its customs, its language, its values, its habits, its beliefs. From the contact between both cultures, the Haitian [culture] comes out unscathed. We are facing a process of mutation that has all the characteristics of an irreversible fact. Not because the prevalent tendencies cannot be bent, but because the causes that provoke the Haitian exodus towards the Dominican Republic do not seem to cease [Núñez 1990, 310-311].

As we have seen in these examples, Haitian culture is perceived by antihaitianismo, first, as alien, and, second, as pernicious and contaminating. Dominican culture is Spanish, Christian, and Catholic, not African and Voodooist.
In other words, Dominican culture has its roots firmly planted in the white and progressive Western civilization, and more specifically, in the Hispanic world, while Haitian culture represents the black and backward civilizations of a primitive (not to say barbaric) Africa. Thus, Dominican culture, as seen by antihaitianismo, is clearly "superior," and any contact with or influence from the Haitian culture can only have detrimental effects for the Dominican Republic. The causing agent of this cultural penetration is, of course, the Haitian migrant that enters the Dominican Republic and stays in the country.

In conclusion, this examination of the several dimensions of the "Haitian problem" in the Dominican Republic reinforces the main thesis of this dissertation: antihaitianismo has been an ideological tool created and used by Dominican elites to achieve political goals. Given the long-standing historical animosity between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, given Haiti's status as the poorest country in the hemisphere, and given a racial standard in the Dominican Republic that places whiteness at the top of the scale and denigrates anything black, then it comes as no surprise that Haiti has become the Dominican Republic's scapegoat by excellence. Haiti and Haitian migrants are blamed for many of the Dominican Republic's internal problems, whether they have actually being a causing agent or not. Furthermore, Haitian migrants are convenient
scapegoats. They have no rights, no voice, and very few defenders in the Dominican Republic. Even the Haitian government pays little attention to their plight.

In this sense, these dimensions of the "Haitian problem" in the Dominican Republic actually represent more of a perceived problem than a tangible problem. The point here is not whether Haitian migrants are a problem for the Dominican Republic or not, but how the problem has been manipulated by Dominican elites for political gains. In the next chapter, we will see how antihaitianismo's manipulation of the "Haitian problem" has led to the creation of prejudiced anti-Haitian attitudes among the Dominican people.

Notes

1 The term arrayano is used in the Dominican Republic to designate a person born in the Dominican Republic, but of Haitian origin. That is, at least one parent (usually the mother), or even grandparents, are Haitian. The word arrayano comes from the Spanish raya (line), a reference to the border line. Dore (1987) uses the formal term rayano, which has been popularly transformed into arrayano. Arrayanos are a living border line; half-Haitian, half-Dominican. For practical purposes, however, they are neither one nor the other. Most Dominicans consider them as Haitians (even though they were born in the Dominican Republic and most of them do not know Haiti), while Haitians do not consider them as their fellow countrymen since, again, most of them do not know Haiti and/or they cannot speak fluent Creole.

2 Whether Bosch had any knowledge of the activities of Haitian exiles on Dominican territory has been fiercely debated. Bosch himself has subsequently denied it (see Bosch 1965). Historian Roberto Cassá, on the other hand, finds it extremely doubtful (not to say distressing) for a Dominican president to be completely unaware of such
activities taking place within the national territory (Cassá 1991, 96-97). Less clear is the role played by the Kennedy administration and the CIA, who wanted to get rid of Duvalier. According to the version of journalist Victor Grimaldi (an apologist of Bosch), it was the CIA and the Kennedy administration who prompted Bosch's overthrown, so as to cover their role in this affair (see Grimaldi 1985).

Amba fil, a Haitian Creole term, literally means "under the wire," an obvious reference to the surreptitious way in which these Haitian migrant workers illegally cross the border.

Lavalas means torrential rain, an analogy to the movement's popular strength and its ability (just like rain) to clean. In this case, they sought to "clean" the Haitian political system of Duvalierist elements and practices.

Life in the southern part of the borderlands is economically oriented towards Port-au-Prince. From the Dominican border town of Jimaní, Port-au-Prince is a little over 30 miles (close to a two-hour drive), while Santo Domingo is 189 miles away (an over six-hour drive). Fronterizos shop at Port-au-Prince and mention it constantly in their daily conversations. Santo Domingo, on the other hand, or even Neiba or Barahona (the closest major towns), are rarely mentioned.

The case of the cocolos represents one of the most interesting facets of foreign migrations into the Dominican Republic. Along with the cocolos and Haitian cane-cutters, sugar cultivation and the American occupation (1916-1924) also brought baseball into the country. Dominican cocolos have excelled in this sport. Today, the Dominican Republic's national pastime and the US Major Leagues have Dominican stars with names like Alfredo Griffin and George Bell; descendants of the original cocolos. Just with the major league players from the sugar town of San Pedro de Macoris a complete baseball team can be made. These cocolo players have given fame and recognition to the Dominican Republic and nobody questions their ancestry, nor the fact that they are black.

The Dominican Congress is divided in Senate and Chamber of Deputies. A diputado would be the equivalent of a US representative.
CHAPTER V
PERCEPTIONS OF ANTIHAITIANISMO
IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

This chapter is the result of interviews carried out in the Dominican Republic from 1989 to 1993. Its main objective is to examine the spectrum of prevailing attitudes regarding Haitians in the Dominican Republic. This chapter has been divided in three sections. The first section examines the anti-Haitian attitudes of the general public in the Dominican Republic. It reports on interviews conducted in the cities, the sugar industry, and the borderlands. The second section analyzes elite attitudes. It reports on interviews conducted among elites in the cities of Santo Domingo and Santiago. The third and final section looks at prejudice from the receiving end: the Haitian migrant. This section is based on interviews conducted in the cities and in the sugar industry. It is included in order to show to what extent are Haitians aware of the prejudices levied against them and to demonstrate how antihaitianismo affects them (and their arrayano children) on a day-to-day basis.
Anti-Haitian Attitudes in the General Public

The field research interviews on which this section reports were mainly carried out in the Dominican Republic during a five-week research period between July and August of 1989. That research was financed by a grant from the Tinker Foundation and the Center for Latin American Studies of the University of Florida. Other interviews and participant observation took place during my frequent visits to the Dominican Republic from 1989 to 1993. My research goals were, first, to establish the existence of antihaitianismo in different parts of the Dominican Republic (a fact that is still denied by some prominent Dominican politicians), and second, to cover the wide spectrum of anti-Haitian attitudes among the general public. This research had never been done before in the Dominican Republic, and the next obvious step, a general population survey on anti-Haitian attitudes, is part of my future plans.

Given my specific research goals, I followed a qualitative approach, as detailed in Chapter II. I conducted focus groups interviews in three parts of the Dominican Republic: the cities, the sugar industry, and the borderlands. Interviews in the cities were conducted in Santo Domingo and Santiago, interviews in the sugar industry were conducted in the Barahona sugar mill in the southwestern part of the country (see Figure 1-1), while
interviews in the borderlands were conducted in the border towns of Jimaní and Mal Paso. I conducted five focus group sessions in each of the three parts of the country, for a total of 15 focus group interviews. Each focus group had from 8 to 10 participants, though sometimes up to 14 participated. Care was exercised to select groups who were as homogeneous as possible, in order to facilitate the discussion. Participants were selected on the spot (convenience sampling), with the help of my field assistants, a technique substantiated in the literature (Krueger 1988, 96). Each focus group session lasted about two hours and the confidentiality of all opinions was guaranteed to the participants. Furthermore, the sessions were moderated so that all participants would have an equal chance to talk and no single participant would monopolize the discussion. Participants in the focus groups were not paid, but they were served refreshments during the sessions. Participants were mostly low class or lower middle-class Dominicans. In the cities, groups were composed of neighbors of both sexes; in the sugar industry, of lower class male workers; and in the borderlands, of neighbors and high school students of both sexes. Though this sample is by no means representative of the general population, my goal was to gather qualitative data on anti-Haitian attitudes. That is, I wanted to know what antihaitianismo
was really like, not how intense, widespread, or prevalent it was among the general population.

The Socio-Cultural Model

During my field research I found that attitudes towards Haiti and Haitians in the Dominican Republic are mostly negative, as expressed by low and lower middle-class Dominicans in the cities, the borderlands, and the sugar industry. Most Dominicans, even those that live and work close with Haitians, personally dislike and distrust them. They seek to justify their antihaitianismo in different ways, but all their explanations have one element in common: Haiti and Haitians living in the Dominican Republic represented a threat in one way or another.

Of the three models discussed in the theoretical framework, the socio-cultural model, the symbolic racism model, and the racial threats model, I found that anti-Haitian attitudes among the general public in the Dominican Republic were better represented by the socio-cultural model first, and then, by the symbolic racism model. History and culture have clearly played an important part in the development of antihaitianismo in the Dominican Republic, which is a truly social phenomenon. Therefore, I have divided the data collected during my interviews according to van Dijk's (1987) model, which treats prejudice as a socially-shared and reproduced phenomenon.
As discussed in Chapter II, prejudice can be classified as based on three dimensions of threat: economic, cultural, and social (van Dijk 1987, 58-60). These three dimensions surfaced during my interviews, in particular the last two. Furthermore, anti-Haitian attitudes expressed by lower class Dominicans mostly conformed to van Dijk's five prejudice categories: immigration, crime and aggression, unfair competition, cultural conflicts, and personal characteristics (van Dijk 1987, 364-366). In the immigration category van Dijk mentions the constant references to a "flood" of immigrants; under the crime and aggression category are references to the migrants as the causing agents of increasing crime rates; in the unfair competition category the main prejudice is the widespread belief that migrant workers "steal" jobs from native residents; in the cultural conflicts category, most prejudices depict foreign cultures as "strange," "different," or "inferior"; finally, the personal characteristics category includes descriptive allusions regarding immigrants, that are portrayed as stupid, lazy, uneducated, backward, childish, etc. (van Dijk 1987, 364-366). Following van Dijk's approach, I have divided the results of my focus group interviews along these same five categories.

It is noticeable, however, that in comparison with van Dijk's study of the Netherlands, Dominicans had more intense
and overtly racist attitudes. Even though van Dijk interviewed lower class Dutch, their opinions seem "soft" and even moderate when compared to lower class Dominicans. This is even more remarkable when we consider the fact that Dominicans have more in common with Haitians due to geographical proximity, history and miscegenation, than the Dutch with Turkish, Moroccan or Surinamese migrants. There seems to be reasons for that. First, van Dijk's lower class Dutch respondents were probably more educated than most of my Dominican respondents, and would be then less inclined to express overtly racist opinions. Second, it is precisely these commonalities between Haitians and Dominicans that antihaitianismo aims to eradicate. For most antihaitianistas, Haiti and the Dominican Republic have too much in common, more than they would like to acknowledge. Now, let us examine each one of van Dijk's prejudice categories in the context of my research findings among the general public in the Dominican Republic.

**Immigration.** Immigration prejudices were, as expected, some of the most obvious. Some groups, such as Dominicans in the sugar industry, live in a social setting where they are numerically inferior vis-à-vis Haitians. During the sugar harvest season, the great majority of workers are Haitians, while Dominicans perform specialized (drivers, guards, mechanics) or administrative tasks. Still, all
groups perceive Haitian migration as an out-of-control situation, a kind of invasion threatening them and their country.

We are being invaded!

Half the country's population [the Dominican Republic] is already Haitian. They [Haitians] are preparing [to take over]. They are close to a million and they are surrounding the whole country.

We are afraid that they [Haitians] may invade us [the Dominican Republic].

This place [the Dominican Republic] is theirs, they are going to take over this country.

They [Haitians] say that [the territory] from Azua to the border belongs to Haiti. Every day more of them arrive, it is a massive invasion.

They [Haitians] live here like in paradise, they have become the owners of this country.

These typical examples of the immigration prejudice are alarmist in nature and were not supported by facts. They seem more like general allegations based on hearsay or simplistic reproductions of the antihaitianismo ideology. For example, when asked about the number of Haitians that were living in the Dominican Republic, most respondents said "a lot," "too many," or the loose figure of "more than a million." It must be kept in mind that for many Dominicans, who have not had the benefit of a formal education, a million is not a number, but a way of indicating a very large quantity, in other words, a lot.

Besides indicating the large number of Haitians living in the Dominican Republic, lower class Dominicans also
perceive that Haitians migrants were staking a claim on Dominican territory. According to them, Haitians felt that they owned the border region up to Azua. This prejudice originates in the long-standing dispute over the borderlands between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. While some Dominicans claim the Haitian Central Plateau as a former part of the Dominican Republic, some Haitian leaders claim the southern borderlands as part of Haiti (Fignolé 1948). Therefore, this prejudice clearly originates in official discourse and is reproduced, in a very loose and imprecise manner, by lower class Dominicans.

Finally, Haitians migrants are perceived as being part of a conspiracy to take over the Dominican Republic. According to this notion, since Haiti lacks the military means to enforce its territorial claims in the Dominican Republic, it has resorted to a different strategy: a demographic invasion. Simply put, Haitians will continue to spill over the border until they outnumber Dominicans and then they would realize their long-standing dream of unifying the island. Again, this perception is part of the antihaitianismo ideology and has little to do with the everyday experience of the respondents. Most of the respondents fail to perceive Haitian migration as a natural phenomenon of Caribbean societies, or as a purely economic event. Rather, they interpret Haitian migration through the distorted lens of antihaitianismo ideology. That is,
Haitian migration is part of a hidden agenda. It has to be planned or organized in some way, it could not be an individual thing.

Crime and Aggression. Crime and aggression prejudices were the least reported. Crime rates are very low in the Dominican Republic, even when compared to other Latin American countries (e.g. El Salvador, Colombia, Brazil). Only among sugar industry workers did this prejudice surface in a consistent manner. This is easily understood when one considers that working and living conditions in the sugar industry are among the worst in the country, and both Haitians and Dominicans must struggle very hard to make a living, often coming in conflict with the other group. Though the prejudice of these Dominicans (in particular in the sugar industry) was often based on personal experiences (quarrels with Haitians, work-related conflicts), their justification was not.

They [Haitians] are a kind of people that if a Dominican offends one of them, then they would all beat up the Dominican to defend their fellowmen, their nation.

They [Haitians] want to kill you even with a machete or with witchcraft. Evil is in their nationality. That [evil] comes from Haiti.

Haitians mistreat women, they beat them.

Fights and quarrels among Haitians and Dominicans are a common occurrence in the harsh world of the sugar plantation. Dominicans, however, utilize antihaitianismo to
portray Haitians as the sole wrongdoers and the root of all problems. Furthermore, they perceive Haitians as being inherently evil, just for being Haitians. Finally, though most Dominicans denied believing in witchcraft, they did admit that evil exists and that Haitians, as the carriers of this evil into the Dominican Republic, were capable of harming them. None of the respondents could provide conclusive evidence of these allegations. Rather many report: "I heard that it happen to someone."

In the Dominican Republic, the crime and aggression prejudice differs from van Dijk's findings. Haitians are not perceived as the cause of a rising crime wave. Rather, they are perceived as potential criminals, not only because they fight as a group, but also because they know the secrets of voodoo and witchcraft, which they could use to carry out a painful vengeance. These popular notions of Haitian witchcraft and voodoo are even found in the Dominican media, in newspapers as prestigious as the Listín Diario (Dario Vallejo 1993). For most of the respondents, voodoo and witchcraft were the same thing. Few, if any, had any precise notions of what voodoo really was. Still, lower class Dominicans fear the potential harm that Haitians are capable of inflicting on them, even though many of them have not actually witnessed such a case. In conclusion, given the little correspondence of this prejudice with the everyday experience of the respondents, it can then only be
assumed that they are just reproducing a prejudice that they have acquired by other means.

Unfair Competition. The report of unfair competition is again more pronounced in Dominicans in the sugar industry, where living conditions were the worst. It did surface in the cities (particularly among construction workers) and in the borderlands, but those Dominicans had several employment options not available to Dominicans in the sugar industry. For example, urban Dominicans could work in other economic sectors (free trade zones, street peddling, etc.) and borderland Dominicans had agriculture and contraband as income sources. But those Dominicans in the sugar industry had no choice but to work for "the company," where they had to interact with Haitians on a daily basis and under stressful conditions. Most of those interviewed view Haitians as foreigners who had come illegally and were "stealing" jobs from Dominicans.

If someone pays 30 pesos for some work, a Haitian does it for 10.

The CEA [Comisión Estatal del Azúcar] brings in amba fil [illegal] Haitians and that is why we Dominicans are starving; we just cannot compete. There are Haitian masters that earn more money than Dominicans. They earn 50 pesos everyday and I only earn twenty something.

Haitians take away jobs from us because they are in need.

They [Haitians], with the money that they make here, they buy foodstuffs, carry them away [to Haiti], and then these products become more
As seen above, unfair competition is one of the few prejudices that is grounded on the everyday experiences of the respondents. For example, Dominican sugar workers feel that the use of Haitian migrant workers lowered wages, since Haitians would work for wages that most Dominicans would reject. They even argued that they were willing to cut sugar cane, but not at the current wages. So, according to their view, and indirectly at least, Haitians are not only lowering wages, but also effectively barrng Dominicans from jobs as sugar cane cutters.

The perception of unfair competition, however, is not entirely economic. The problem is two-fold: Dominicans are "losing" jobs (economic justification), and they are "losing" them to Haitians (anti-Haitian prejudice). The fact that it is Haitians who are "stealing" those jobs is, for most of these groups, like adding insult to the injury. As shown in Chapter IV, the use of Haitian labor force has been publicly blamed by Dominican leaders for lowering wages and depopulating the Dominican countryside, among other evils. On the other hand, studies have shown: first, that Dominicans simply refuse to cut sugar cane, not only for economic, but also for cultural reasons (e.g. hard work, slave-like working conditions), and second, that Haitians, in most cases, have inserted themselves in segments of the job market that Dominicans are abandoning in search of
better opportunities elsewhere (Grasmuck 1983; Moya Pons 1986). Thus, antihaitianismo also plays an important role in the unfair competition prejudice by magnifying and distorting an existing labor condition. According to this nationalist, anti-Haitian view, it is unfair that a Haitian can earn more money than a Dominican (regardless of his experience, skills, or job performance). Apparently, Haitians, by their condition, are restricted to hard, manual work, and condemned to always earn less than a Dominican.

Finally, there is the widespread notion that Haitians, in their indiscriminate search for foodstuffs to take back to Haiti, are causing shortages in the Dominican Republic. But the reality is more complicated. First, as discussed in Chapter IV, Dominicans merchants have a powerful economic incentive when selling merchandise to Haiti. Second, the Dominican military and government officials, who are responsible for controlling trade with Haiti, do not always do their job, as they profit from this trade and from contraband. And third, if anything, the sale of products to Haitians only benefits the Dominican economy, and brings in much-needed hard currency. Here, antihaitianismo comes into an apparent contradiction, as it blindly condemns, in its nationalist zeal, a practice that redounds in benefits for the Dominican economy and powerful groups.
Cultural Conflicts. Cultural prejudices are some of the more widespread manifestations of antihaitianismo. Even those lower class Dominicans that had little day-to-day interaction with Haitians displayed a strong degree of cultural prejudices. As shown below, Dominican notions of Haitian culture are plagued by racial stereotypes, cultural misperceptions, and even blatant bigotry.

Every illegal Haitian should be sent back to his country. [Because] that nation has no friends. It is an evil nation. They [Haitians] are animals.

They [Haitians] are an ungrateful nation by instinct, they would like to be the owners of these bateyes.¹

Every 27th of February² the [Dominican] government should kill at least 500 Haitians!

Racism does exist [in the Dominican Republic], but against the Haitian black. Dominicans hate that nationality, that race. Not because they are black, but because of history. That dates from the time of Trujillo's eviction [of Haitians].³

They [Haitians] have bad intentions, due to their race, their nationality.

[Referring to arrayanos] even if they were born here [in the Dominican Republic], if their parents are Haitians, they are Haitians. This is by their race and their black blood.

Haitians hate Dominicans. They cannot share anything with anyone. It is an evil nation, they even hate each other. It is the most pernicious nation that there is.

That [tension with Haiti] comes from history. Those [history] books cannot be destroyed by no one. Haitians used to throw babies up in the air and to spike them with their bayonets.⁴

They [Haitians] are dumb and stupid because they are blacks.
Haitians belong to one race and Dominicans to another.

A Haitian cannot be a soldier in the Dominican Republic, because they bear malice [against Dominicans] that is in their blood.

The tenets of these particular aspects of antihaitianismo are widely shared and taken as undisputed truths by many lower class Dominicans. First, Haiti is visualized as an intrinsically evil nation, from which nothing good could come. Haitians, by their nationality, are the carriers of this evil into the Dominican Republic. Second, the concepts of race, nation, and culture lose their meaning until they become one. Haitians are black, backward, dumb, and evil, while Dominicans are the opposite. These characteristics become the trademark of the black race, which is identified with Haiti. Evil equals black that equals Haiti. Black race and black (evil) nation are the same. Moreover, the Haitian evil is instinctive, animal-like, "it is in their blood." By juxtaposition, Dominicans are the opposite. Dominicans, even black Dominicans, belong to another "race."

This is clearly a popular reproduction of pro-Hispanic antihaitianismo, that tries to portray the Dominican Republic as a white Hispanic nation and Haiti as a black African nation. Thus, in the case of the Dominican Republic, even Dominicans blacks are "whitened" by Hispanic culture until they become clearly differentiated from the "real" blacks: the Haitians. When nation becomes equated with race, as antihaitianismo ideology has done, the end
result is that no Dominican would ever consider himself black, while all Haitians would be labeled as such.

Third, history is manipulated and even distorted by antihaitianismo to support its allegations. Haitian atrocities are emphasized, so as to portray Haitians as evil, as former invaders who could at any time in the future repeat their barbaric acts. Clearly, these perceptions and stereotypes are not supported by the respondents' immediate reality, but are rather the result of anti-Haitian notions learned from other sources and imperfectly reproduced at the local level. Moreover, due to most of the respondents' limited educational background, they had no way of refuting these historical distortions and accepted them as unquestionable truths. Finally, antihaitianismo provides lower class Dominicans with a convenient way of dealing with their conflictive immediate reality. It lets them blame everything bad on the Haitians, and makes even the poorest Dominican feel vastly superior when compared to a poor, black Haitian migrant.

**Personal Characteristics.** Personal characteristics prejudices are closely related to cultural prejudices, but in this case the target is more the Haitian individual than the Haitian nation. These prejudices target the way Haitians look, dress, talk, or act. That is, those personal things that make them "different" from Dominicans.
I would rather throw away the food in my house and not give it to one of them [Haitians]. They will not appreciate it.

They [Haitians] think that we [Dominicans] live here like them [in Haiti].

They [Haitians] have particular characteristics like the color of their skin and their hair. They come from Africa. Dominicans have a well-formed head. They [Haitians], the majority of them, are darker than us [Dominicans]. Their race is African and ours is Spanish. The Spanish race is refined. There is a Haitian genetic, they tend to be darker. I recognize them [Haitians] by their head and their yellow eyes, the color of embers.

There are cultural differences: the way they [Haitians] dress, dance, walk, and their food.

In order for me to marry a Haitian he must have a good [economic] position. The black race is less refined. I would not marry a person darker than I am. Good [straight] hair is better than bad [curly] hair. I prefer a poor Dominican over a poor Haitian [for marriage].

Haitians stink, no amount of perfume would do.

These prejudices, as with cultural conflict prejudices, bear little relation to everyday experiences, and seek to support Dominican "racial" superiority. Haitians can be readily identified by their skin color, their curly hair, and even by the shape of their head! Moreover, they dress different and smell of body odor. The clear objective of this brand of antihaitianismo is to make Haitians easily classifiable. Dark skin and curly hair would surely equate one with a Haitian. As a result, lower class Dominicans seek to "whiten" themselves by marrying lighter-skinned people. Furthermore, antihaitianismo has imposed a distorted somatic norm in the Dominican Republic where white is beautiful and
desirable, while black is ugly, barbaric, and African-like. Regardless of the fact that the great majority of the Dominican population is of a mixed origin, the black elements of the Dominican racial composition are seem as shameful, undesirable, or just plain ugly. Again, Haitians and Dominicans are treated as belonging to different "races," so as to separate them even further in the mind of the speaker.

In conclusion, the ideology of antihaitianismo is well-entrenched among the general public in the Dominican Republic. To a greater or lesser degree, the majority of respondents expressed deep anti-Haitian feelings, or in a more veiled form, a marked preference for "whiteness" at the expense of denigrating the black (i.e. Haitian) race. Although racism is a major component of antihaitianismo as expressed by the respondents, race was but one of the issues in the discussion. History and culture were also important issues. The main fact is that lower class Dominicans reproduce anti-Haitian prejudices in an imperfect, but effective way. Even though most of them could not go into details on historical issues such as the Haitian occupation of 1822-1844, they nevertheless knew the essential "facts" that allowed them to reproduce the popular myths and stereotypes that surrounds these events. Those response patterns closely fit van Dijk's (1987) socio-cultural model. In the Dominican Republic, antihaitianismo is socially-
shared and reproduced by the general public, with little reference to their everyday experience. If ignorance is bad, half-truths, stereotypes, and the distortion of history are even worse.

The Symbolic Racism Model

The symbolic racism model also helps explain the lack of fit between anti-Haitian attitudes in the general public and their everyday experience. Symbolic racism stresses early life socialization processes in the creation of attitudes and the manipulation and use of abstract ideological symbols (Kinder and Sears 1981; McConahay and Hough 1976; Sears, Hensler, and Speer 1979). As a matter of fact, it is often difficult to distinguish between the socio-cultural model and the symbolic racism model, as both relate to prejudiced attitudes that bear little correspondence to the immediate reality of respondents. Therefore, from now on, I will treat the socio-cultural model and the symbolic racism model as one. Both models contribute to explain the reality of antihaitianismo and it is difficult to tell where one ends and the other one begins. The combined use of these two models is a reflection of antihaitianismo's complexity. Antihaitianismo can be a lot of things, as it comprises history, culture, race, politics, and economics, and deliberately manipulates and confuses those issues.
The Racial Threats Model

The racial threats model proved to be of little value in the examination of antihaitianismo in the Dominican Republic. The reason was simple; the racial threats model is based on actual economic competition between racial groups and leads to rational choice-type decisions (Kinder and Sears 1981, 415). That is not the case in the Dominican Republic. Few of the respondents were actually engaged in any sort of direct economic competition with Haitian migrants. Only Dominican workers in the sugar industry saw themselves as sometimes being displaced from their jobs by Haitian migrants. Still, these Dominican workers were not employed as cane-cutters, which is the activity that utilizes Haitian labor the most. Furthermore, their unfair economic competition arguments were full of references to racial stereotypes and prejudices, further reinforcing the socio-cultural and symbolic racism models. The fact is that the "threat" that Haitians migrants represent is more of a perceived and symbolic thing than actual economic competition. Again, this is what antihaitianismo is all about. Antihaitianismo has thrived on the creation of myths and stereotypes designed to clearly differentiate between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, Haitian migrants and Dominican nationals, and black African culture versus white Hispanic values.
Attitudes of the Dominican Elites

According to the main thesis of this dissertation, elites are responsible for the creation and reproduction of anti-Haitian attitudes in the Dominican Republic, attitudes that are in turn reproduced by the rest of the Dominican people. The Dominican Republic is a democratic country (with free elections, respect for civil rights, etc.), but controlled by authoritarian power structures (personalism, corruption, clientelism, etc.). The general public has very little input into the system, except at election time. Therefore, elites generally influence mass attitudes, and not the other way around. As a result, the basic prejudices and attitudes that are found in the general public should be present, at least in a more sophisticated way, at the elite level.

The data for this section came from 31 formal and informal elite interviews conducted between 1989 and 1993 in the cities of Santo Domingo and Santiago. The respondents were selected through the efforts of my personal contacts in the Dominican Republic and the sample is by no means representative of the general population. Again, my main objective was to gather qualitative information on antihaitianismo, not to measure attitudes. These interviews lasted between 30 minutes and an hour, and rarely more than that. During that time they were asked the questions shown in Appendix A. Though some of the interviews were carried
out in a formal setting, field realities (and local tradition) dictated that most of them were carried out in an informal manner.

The formal interviews with Dominican elites distinguished two opinion groups. First, a group that I have labelled the traditionalists, and second, a group that I have labelled the progressives. Though it was sometimes difficult to place an individual in one group or the other, I have used the following criteria to distinguish between them. The traditionalists held, in one form or another, different anti-Haitian attitudes. Most sought to justify their antihaitianismo in terms of history, culture, or the Dominican national interest. This group consisted of 20 individuals, most of them government bureaucrats, intellectuals, and journalists. The progressives (a minority), on the other hand, held mostly balanced and objective ideas about Haitians, based either on a revisionist (sometimes Marxist) interpretation of Dominican history, or on notions of human rights and solidarity. This group consisted of 11 individuals, all of them intellectuals. Both groups had one thing in common: they were composed of opinion-makers, that is, individuals who had access to the media and who could make their views known. Table 5-1 summarizes the views of these two groups as determined by their general responses to the elite
questionnaire (see Appendix A). To simplify their presentation, I have arranged their views by topics.

**TABLE 5-1**

**VIEWS OF DOMINICAN ELITES REGARDING ISSUES IN HAITIAN-DOMINICAN RELATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Traditionalists</th>
<th>Progressives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haitian Migration</td>
<td>Serious problem for the Dominican Republic.</td>
<td>Natural trend of Caribbean societies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade with Haiti</td>
<td>Mixed opinions: some in favor, some against it.</td>
<td>Beneficial to the Dominican economy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti's Environmental</td>
<td>Serious problem that the Dominican Republic should not have to burden.</td>
<td>The Dominican Republic should help Haiti in solving this problem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degradation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrayanos</td>
<td>Haitians by culture.</td>
<td>Dominican citizens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>Haitians are &quot;darkening&quot; the Dominican Republic.</td>
<td>No racial prejudice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haitian Culture</td>
<td>Detrimental to the cultural values of Dominicans.</td>
<td>Tolerant attitude.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Relations</td>
<td>Grim outlook.</td>
<td>Hopeful outlook.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the issue of Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic, traditionalists view it as a serious and long-standing problem. Haitians take away jobs from Dominicans and are not needed in a country with an already high unemployment rate. Progressives see migration as part of a natural trend of Caribbean societies. Just like Dominicans emigrate to the United States and Puerto Rico, so do Haitians come to the Dominican Republic in search of improving their living
conditions. Trade became a debatable issue among the traditionalist camp. While nationalists condemned trade with Haiti, entrepreneurial-minded elites saw it as a sound economic strategy, as Haiti needs practically everything that the Dominican Republic produces. There was no dissension on this issue among the progressives, who favored trade with Haiti. Haiti's environmental degradation was a thorny issue. While both groups acknowledged Haiti's ecological problems, the traditionalist wanted no part in them. According to their view, the Dominican Republic had enough problems of its own to worry about its neighbor's problems. Progressives thought that helping Haiti was a humanitarian cause, and one that in the long term would benefit the Dominican Republic. After all, the first country to be affected by Haiti's problems would be the Dominican Republic. The plight of *arrayanos* was an even more sensible matter. For most traditionalists, the *arrayanos* are but Haitians who happened to have been born in the Dominican Republic. Progressives, on the other hand, see them as full-fledged Dominican citizens whose rights have to be acknowledged and respected. Race and culture were, without any doubt, the two issues that raised the strongest responses in the traditionalist camp. For many traditionalists, the Dominican Republic is not only being physically invaded by Haitian migrants, but its culture and values are being contaminated by alien (i.e. Haitian)
influences. Some of these traditionalists even subscribe to old racial prejudices and see Haitians as inferior just for being black. The majority, however, raised cultural and nationalist objections against the Haitian presence in the Dominican Republic. As racism and bigotry have become outdated and discredited in today's society, many of these elites have resorted to new forms of discrimination and prejudice. Culture, more than any other thing, has been the target of this renovated antihaitianismo. The progressives showed no racial prejudice and were tolerant of Haitian culture. Finally, when asked about the future outlook of Haitian-Dominican relations, the traditionalists tended to be cautious and reserved, if not pessimistic. For them, Haiti only represented more problems in the Dominican Republic's future. Progressives were more optimistic, and pointed to a new era in Haitian-Dominican relations, where mutual cooperation would help dispel old tensions.

The traditionalist and progressive groups are by no means monolithic. Particularly in the traditionalist camp, variations can be quite extensive, as was the case regarding the trade issue. All traditionalists, however, expressed some degree of antihaitianismo in their discourse, and that was the deciding factor to include them in one camp or the other. These findings are supported by Despradel's (1974) study of ten Dominican historians. Despradel, besides clearly identifying two ideological camps (traditionalists
and progressives), also found a clearly defined generation gap. The "old guard," those 62 to 85 years old, belonged to the traditionalist group. While the "new generation," those 34 to 57 years old, belonged to the progressive camp (Despradel 1974, 106-107). My research did not corroborate that age correlation, probably due to two reasons. First, Despradel's study was conducted twenty years ago. By now, most of the "old guard" has disappeared and has been replaced by new group members. And second, Despradel's "new generation" now falls in the age bracket of the "old guard."

If there is anything that maybe could account for differences between the groups, it could be education. The large majority of the progressives were highly-educated individuals with very liberal views. Still, highly-educated individuals could also be found in the traditionalist camp.

This traditional elite, that for decades has occupied positions of power and carried out policy decisions in the Dominican Republic, has been responsible for creating, nurturing, and reproducing antihaitianismo. Even though they are not a very large group, from their positions of power they have for decades influenced education, popular culture, and the Dominican political culture. In particular during the Trujillo dictatorship and the Balaguer administrations, these elites have imposed their particular brand of nationalism, and have transformed antihaitianismo.
into an ideology for popular consumption. How they have accomplished this is the subject of Chapter VI.

The Haitian Perspective on Antihaitianismo

In order to ascertain how aware were Haitian migrants of antihaitianismo I also carried out focus groups interviews with Haitians in the Dominican Republic. I conducted two focus group interviews in Santo Domingo and two in the Barahona sugar mill, for a total of four focus group interviews with Haitians. These interviews were carried out in Creole and followed the same format as with the other focus groups.

My interviews of Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic revealed two things immediately: first, that they were keenly aware of antihaitianismo in all of its forms, and, second, that they were as prejudiced as most Dominicans. These prejudices were also based on historical distortions, but in part were the result of the same discrimination to which Dominicans subject them.

Antihaitianismo is not new to Haitian migrants. Most of the respondents, even before coming to the Dominican Republic, were aware of the fact that Haitians were discriminated in the Dominican Republic. They knew that they were probably going to be harassed, deceived, and discriminated in the Dominican Republic, they just did not know to what extent. Even after coming to the Dominican
Republic, and experiencing antihaitianismo personally, they decided to stay. In their individual economic calculations, the hardships associated with staying (discrimination) clearly outweighed those associated with returning to Haiti.

Haitian migrants responded to antihaitianismo with their own brand of anti-Dominican prejudices. Haiti's history is not free from the same distortions and manipulations that plague Dominican history. For example, one of the events that Haitian respondents mentioned more often and with more intensity was the 1937 massacre. Most of them could not pinpoint the causes of the massacre or its development very well, but all of them had something to say about the brutality of Trujillo's army. Just as lower class Dominicans resorted to the Haitian occupation myth to drive home their viewpoints, so did Haitian migrants use the 1937 massacre as proof of the inherent brutality of Dominicans. According to their view, the Haitian occupation was a thing of the past, while the 1937 massacre took place in the 20th century, just a couple of generations ago. Even worse, many of these trujillista elements still remain in Dominican society, as is the case of Balaguer and its military cohorts.

In Haiti, anti-Dominican prejudice has also been manipulated to rally nationalism during times of political crises, as was shown in Chapter IV. Duvalier, in particular, was an adroit manipulator of nationalism and
black consciousness. More recently, Aristide played with Haitian nationalism in an effort to rally popular support for his regime, when he denounced the Dominican Republic at the United Nations. This comes to show that prejudice and the manipulation of the popular culture is not the exclusive possession of the Dominican dominant classes. However, it has been in the Dominican Republic where this prejudice has taken the form of an state ideology and has been molded by the dominant classes into the defining element of Dominican nationality. According to this view, being Dominican is irreconcilable with being pro-Haitian in any way.

In conclusion, antihaitianismo is an integral part of Dominican political culture. Both the general public and some Dominican elites (the traditionalists) exhibit varying degrees of antihaitianismo. Again, their antihaitianismo does not seem to correspond to their immediate reality, but plays an important role in their daily lives (for the general public) and in their political objectives (for elites). For the general public, antihaitianismo provides the perfect justification for an unjust state of things, and help soften their everyday struggle by making them feel superior to Haitian migrants, who are at the bottom of the social scale. For the traditionalist elites, antihaitianismo is an ideological tool for the achievement of political goals. Antihaitianismo is used, first, to deflect the people's attention from other issues by using
Haitians as scapegoats, second, to settle domestic political scores by using it against political opponents, and third, as the local expression of the pro-Hispanic racism that is so widespread among Latin American elites. Antihaitianismo, as we know it today, is the result of decades of anti-Haitian elite formulations. How this process took place is the focus of the next chapter.

Notes

1 Bateyes is the name given to the place where sugar cane workers live. A batey simply consist of a group of houses surrounded by the cane fields.

2 Dominican independence was achieved on 27 February 1844 from the Haitian occupation armies, that had been in Santo Domingo for 22 years. It is a very symbolic day, with all the fanfare of an American 4th of July, but charged with nationalist speeches focusing on the liberation struggle against the Haitian invaders.

3 The speaker was obviously referring to the 1937 massacre, when Trujillo ordered the assassination of thousands of Haitians living in the Dominican Republic.

4 Here the speaker was reproducing a popular myth widely employed in grade school to emphasize the atrocities committed during the Haitian occupation of the Dominican Republic. Although barbaric acts were certainly committed by the Haitian armies, only the worst aspects of the Haitian occupation are emphasized in school. As a result, this image of the barbaric Haitian invader has become an integral part of the popular culture and is quickly recalled by lower class Dominicans whenever they talk about the Haitian occupation of the Dominican Republic.
CHAPTER VI
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTIHAITIANISMO AS AN IDEOLOGY

The previous chapter has demonstrated how widespread antihaitianismo attitudes are in the Dominican Republic. In this chapter, we will examine how antihaitianismo came to be this way.

Antihaitianismo, as we know it today, is actually the present manifestation of a long-term evolution of racial prejudice, the selective interpretation of historical facts, and the creation of a nationalist Dominican false consciousness. That process, of course, did not take place spontaneously. It was orchestrated by powerful elite groups with strong interests to defend. How this "cultural brainwashing" process took place is the focus of this chapter. The first section examines the role played by Dominican elites in the creation and reproduction of antihaitianismo from colonial times to the present. It examines how elites have used popular culture, racial differences, and particularly history to develop a number of myths regarding Haitians and the Dominican Republic. The second section looks at the role of the media in reproducing, mostly at the popular level, anti-Haitian attitudes. It must be kept in mind that the Dominican
Republic, although it only has a 68% adult literacy rate, has nine daily newspapers, more than any other Caribbean or Central American nation (Goodwin 1992, 110). The third and final section analyzes whether antihaitianismo has (or has had) the structural coherency to be classified as an ideology or, on the contrary, is better represented by the symbolic racism model. Being a state-sponsored ideology, for example, clearly places antihaitianismo on a different theoretical level, and may even equate it to other racist ideologies, such as apartheid.

Elites and the Reproduction of Antihaitianismo

This section will be divided in four parts. The first part describes the development of antihaitianismo in Hispaniola from colonial times to the early 20th century; the second part examines the intellectual reformulation of antihaitianismo during the Trujillo Era (1930-1961) and its use as a powerful ideological tool by the dictator to further his political ambitions; the third part discusses the content of anti-Haitian thought in contemporary Dominican politics and society; and the fourth part analyzes how antihaitianismo has become an integral part of the Dominican socialization process through the distortion of history and the creation of myths in the Dominican educational system.
The Origins of Antihaitianismo

The early origins of what later came to be known as antihaitianismo is to be found in the racial prejudices of the Spanish inhabitants of the colony of Santo Domingo (Tolentino Dipp 1973, 1992). The Spanish colonization in the 16th century brought sugar and slavery into the island, and with them, racial prejudice. As mentioned in Chapter II, slavery led to the creation of racial prejudices to justify it, and not the other way around. For almost three centuries, the colony of Santo Domingo carried a social life not unlikely that of the other Spanish colonies in the Caribbean. The white Spanish elite controlled the colony's administration and ruled over a mixed population of criollos and slaves. Still, Santo Domingo's colonial society, given the influence of a generalized backwardness that tended to mitigate social tensions and reduce social distances, was probably more egalitarian than neighboring Cuba, then the seat of Spanish power in the Caribbean. We have seen in Chapter III how the dominance of cattle ranching as the colony's main economic activity further lessened racial tensions and even promoted miscegenation. That does not mean that slaves were treated as equals. Slavery existed, slaves were mistreated, and slave rebellions were severely punished. Plus, the color of one's skin indicated to a large degree one's social standing and economic position (Tolentino Dipp 1973, 1992).
This state of things changed with the spectacular growth of the French colony of Saint-Domingue in the 18th century. With half a million slaves and a stronger economy, the French colony changed forever the destiny of Santo Domingo. The Spanish authorities and other colonial elites fought constantly to maintain the political and cultural integrity of their territory. As a consequence, the first glimpses of Dominican nationalism emerged in the 18th century as part of a differentiation struggle from the French (Pierre-Charles 1974, 28). When Haiti became an independent state in 1804 (after a bloody revolution), this elite Hispanic nationalism not only persisted, but was reinforced by the brutal campaigns of Dessalines. The Santo Domingo colonists then not only saw themselves as different, but they preferred to be anything else before being Haitian. These feelings were conceived and reproduced by the colonial elites who sought to maintain Spain's sovereignty, even though the colony was ceded to France in 1795. In order to promote nationalist feelings, elites emphasized the "Spanishness" of the Santo Domingo colonists versus the French, and later, the Haitians. Like the Spanish, the colonists of Santo Domingo were white (at least somatically speaking), Catholic, and had a Hispanic culture. The Haitians, in particular, represented the opposite (and the worst of traits): they were black, voodoo practitioners, and had an African culture with a thin French veneer. Soon, the
Santo Domingo colonists, regardless of their color, started calling themselves blancos de la tierra, that is, creole (or local) whites (Moya Pons 1977, 280).

The Haitian occupation (1822-1844), though passively accepted by most of the population (and even celebrated by lower-class groups), was strongly rejected by the elites, who lost their privileges and administrative jobs to the occupation armies. The elites further resented being at the mercy of individuals whom they considered inferior, due to their skin color and social status. It must be kept in mind that the great majority of Haitian army officers were ex-slaves themselves, with little or no education, and lacking the finesse and manners that elites regarded so highly. During the period of the Haitian occupation, many of these elite families left the country, a fact deplored by Joaquín Balaguer, who comments that Santo Domingo lost most of its "best" families at that time (Balaguer 1984, 59-60.)

When the Dominican Republic became independent, elites portrayed this event as the realization of their efforts to maintain Hispanic-Catholic culture intact in the face of the Haitian occupation. As they put it in the independence manifesto of the Dominican Republic, "due to the difference of customs and the rivalry that exists between ones and the others [referring to Haiti and the Dominican Republic], there will never be a perfect union nor harmony" (Despradel 1974, 86). With the Haitians out of the scene, Dominican
elites regained their privileged social position and their high-level administrative posts.

In the face of repeated Haitian attempts to recover their former territory, the presence of antihaitianismo among the general Dominican population of the mid-19th century is understandable. The independence struggle was often expressed in an anti-Haitian form. What is more difficult to understand is the perpetuation of these anti-Haitian attitudes after independence. By the time of the War of Restoration (1865), Haiti no longer planned to re-annex the Dominican Republic. As a matter of fact, the Haitian government even helped Dominican patriots in their struggle against the Spanish. However, Dominican elites still professed their anti-Haitian prejudices, in part because they reflected their personal view of what Haiti was, and also because they employed antihaitianismo as an element of national cohesion and domination. These prejudices were reproduced at the popular level, and soon, being Dominican became identified with being anti-Haitian (Despradel 1974, 86). To this "nationalist" prejudice, Dominican elites added some of their old cultural and racial prejudices. Dominicans were portrayed as devout Catholics, while Haitians were voodoo sorcerers, who believed in spirits and utilized black magic in mysterious ceremonies (Hoetink 1982, 181-192). Finally, Dominicans were somatically "white," proud descendants of the Spanish
conquistadores, while Haitians were truly black, the sons and daughters of African slaves. It was not long before Dominicans started considering themselves, though sometimes (and unfortunately) dark, "not black." Only Haitians were considered black. Therefore, race, culture, and nation were made into one by the Dominican elites. Being Dominican was being Hispanic and not being black, regardless of one's skin tone.

The writings of important intellectuals of the late 19th century and early 20th century clearly reflect the anti-Haitian attitudes of the Dominican upper classes. José Gabriel García, Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal, and Américo Lugo, among others, express the general racial prejudices of the time, but with a strong anti-Haitian slant (Vega 1988, 26-30). Dominican literature at the turn of the century is even more prolific regarding anti-Haitian attitudes. Novels, short stories, and poems exalted "Dominican" traits, while denigrating, to the point of making them appear as barbaric, Haitian influences. Tulio M. Cestero, Francisco Gregorio Billini, César Nicolás Penson, Federico García Godoy, F.E. Moscoso Puello, and Juan Antonio Alix developed a nationalist narrative and poetry that contrasted Dominican Hispanic values with Haiti's African superstitions and customs (Vega 1988, 30-38).

One of the most important myths developed in the late 19th century which remains influential is that of the
Dominican indio. After the Dominican Republic regained its independence from Spain in 1865, Dominicans no longer looked at Spain as their fatherland. In their search for a new national identity, Dominicans elites looked at their Amerindian past, as some other Latin American nations had already done. The publication of the novel Enriquillo by Manuel de Jesús Galván (1909), a heroic portrayal of the indians' resistance against enslavement by the Spanish colonizers, marks the high point of this indigenista literary movement.

Even though the Amerindian population of Hispaniola was exterminated in less than a century, the Dominican elites portrayed the Dominican people as the descendants of these brave indians and the Spanish colonists. It was a greater honor to have a rebellious indian (like Enriquillo) as a predecessor than an African slave. Soon, Dominican mulattoes started considering themselves as indios (an obvious reference to their claimed indian ancestry). Mulattoes, who make up most of the Dominican population demographically, disappeared, to be replaced by the Dominican indio. Being indio also helped the mulatto to "whiten" his own perception of his color and race (Despradel 1974, 94-97). To hide their common African past, the words "black" and "mulatto" also disappeared from Dominican Spanish, and were replaced by the less traumatic and more
socially-desirable *indio*. "Black" and "mulatto" referred to Haitians, who were considered the real blacks.

**Antihaitianismo in the Trujillo Era**

Relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic from 1930 to 1937 were essentially correct. After the 1937 massacre, however, Trujillo's Haitian policy took a drastic turn. Relations between both countries were strained, and international outrage over the massacre forced Trujillo to resort to intensive lobbying to restore his international prestige. As a result, he had to abstain from running as presidential candidate for a third time. At the local level, Trujillo used the 1937 massacre as the starting point of his Dominicanization policy, designed to secure, develop, and transform the Dominican borderlands into a national showcase. On the other hand, this policy was also designed by Trujillo to bolster his control over the national territory and to develop Dominican nationalism into a cultural shield against "foreign" (i.e. Haitian) influences. In order to do so, Trujillo recruited the services of some of the most well-known intellectuals who remained in the Dominican Republic: particularly Manuel A. Peña Batlle and Joaquin Balaguer.

Trujillo's strategy was two-fold. First, it involved the creation of a myth to justify the horrendous 1937 massacre. And second, Trujillo encouraged the development
of a nationalist, anti-Haitian state ideology, designed to establish a clear and permanent separation between Haiti and the Dominican Republic in the minds of the Dominican people and thus build loyalty to his regime.

In his insightful new book, *Mito y Cultura en la Era de Trujillo*, Andrés L. Mateo (1993) argues that the uniqueness of the Trujillo regime lied in his use of myths and deception as political tools. To justify the 1937 massacre, Trujillo's ideologues created the myth of peace and national security. Only Trujillo's use of extreme measures saved the Dominican Republic from "the Haitian danger." If the border was still intact, it was thanks to Trujillo (Mateo 1993, 112-116). Furthermore, official references to the massacre were never made. It was as if never happened. And for many Dominicans, disinformed by Trujillo's propaganda machine, it never did. To reinforce this myth with facts, Trujillo inaugurated the vigorous program of Dominicanization of the borderlands, already discussed in Chapter III.

The elaboration of an antihaitianismo ideology was left to the Dominican Republic's best minds. Manuel A. Peña Batlle embarked on the task of distorting Haitian-Dominican history to portray Haitians as hostile foreigners, culturally and racially inferior to the Dominican people. In his famous address to the border town of Elías Piña, "El Sentido de una Política" (The Meaning of a Policy), Peña
Batlle clearly displays the state's official line regarding Haitians:

There is no feeling of humanity, nor political reason, nor any circumstantial convenience that can force us to look indifferently at the Haitian penetration. [Talking about the typical Haitian migrant] That type is frankly undesirable. Of pure African race, he cannot represent for us any ethnic incentive. Not well nourished and worse dressed, he is weak, though very prolific due to his low living conditions. For that same reason, the Haitian that enters [our country] lives afflicted by numerous and capital vices and is necessarily affected by diseases and physiological deficiencies which are endemic at the lowest levels of that society [Peña Batlle 1954, 67-68].

In his "Carta al Dr. Mañach" (Letter to Dr. Mañach), Peña Batlle defends Trujillo's Haitian policy, and places the Haitian-Dominican conflict in a distorted historical perspective. According to Peña Batlle, the current conflict between Haitians and Dominicans is just the modern version of the old conflict between the invading French buccaneers and the Spanish authorities. By doing so, Peña Batlle establishes a (rather flimsy) historical bond between the Haitian migrant of today and the French invaders of the past. Just like the French buccaneers, the Haitian migrants of Peña Batlle's time were portrayed as foreign invaders who coveted the whole island of Hispaniola. Based on these arguments, he then goes on to justify Trujillo's authoritarian methods:

In the Dominican Republic there should not be, there cannot be, a government so uninterested in the use of force that it turns itself, as it has happened many times, into an agent of Haitian
expansionism. Democracy, as understood and exercised in some countries, is a luxury that we cannot afford. When will you Cubans, our dearest neighbors, understand that truth? Know this well, Minister [Mañach], as soon as the Haitians stop fearing us, they will bite us: silently, quietly, without you or anyone knowing about it [Peña Batlle 1954, 96].

Just as Peña Batlle defended Trujillo's actions from a historical perspective, Joaquín Balaguer served as one of the regime's most efficient and outspoken apologists. In La Realidad Dominicana (Balaguer 1947), considered the most brilliant defense of the Trujillo regime, Balaguer justifies Trujillo's Haitian policy as part of the natural and inalienable right of the Dominican people to defend their culture and way of life.

Consequently, there is no reason of justice nor of humanity that can prevail over the right of the Dominican people to subsist as a Spanish nation and a Christian community.

The problem of race is, by consequence, the principal problem of the Dominican Republic. If the racial problem is of great importance for all countries, for Santo Domingo, by the reasons already mentioned, this issue is of an immense significance, since on it depends, in a certain way, the very existence of the nationality that for more than a century has been struggling against a more prolific race [Balaguer 1947, 123-125].

Notice again how Balaguer makes indistinct use of the terms race and nation, so as to pretend that Haitians and Dominicans not only belong to different nations, but also to completely different races. This argument became part of the official credo and was reproduced among the people
through the efforts of Trujillo's political machinery, particularly the official Partido Dominicano.

Critiques or attacks against the official ideology of antihaitianismo were dealt with swiftly and systematically by Trujillo's ideologues. For example, the publication of Jean Price-Mars' *La República de Haití y la República Dominicana* in 1953, an examination of Haitian-Dominican relations with a clear noiriste slant, provoked a barrage of vicious literary attacks against the study and its author. Sócrates Nolasco and Angel S. del Rosario Pérez wrote bitter criticisms to Price-Mars' work. In a provocative book entitled *La Exterminación Añorada* (The Desired Extermination) Rosario Pérez accuses Price-Mars of being racist, distorting history, and even of desiring that the Dominican people had been exterminated by the Haitian armies in the early 19th century (Rosario Pérez 1957).

Trujillo also supported antihaitianismo ideology with actions. In a handbook for alcaldes pedáneos (rural mayors), Trujillo instructs them to watch out for "Haitianizing influences whose consequences will always be extremely fatal for Dominican society" (Ginebra 1940, 8). Law 391 imposed jail terms, fines, and deportation (when appropriate), for those found practicing voudou or luá. Moreover, objects used in those rites were to be confiscated and destroyed (*Gaceta Oficial*, 20 September 1943). These measures were aimed at further curbing any Haitian (or
black) influences, and at legitimizing and institutionalizing antihaitianismo by giving it the full support of the judicial system and the state bureaucracy. For almost 31 years the Dominican people were subjected to this ideological bombardment. Not surprisingly, just as vestiges of trujillismo still show up in Dominican culture, so does antihaitianismo maintain a strong presence in the Dominican Republic.

Antihaitianismo Today

Though antihaitianismo is no longer part of the state's official ideology, as it was during the Trujillo Era, the tenets of antihaitianismo are still widely employed in contemporary political discourse in the Dominican Republic. Writers like Carlos Cornielle, Luis Julián Pérez, Manuel Núñez, and Joaquín Balaguer promote nationalism with heavy doses of antihaitianismo. Furthermore, they constantly and without reservations portray the Dominican Republic as the affected party in the Haitian-Dominican relationship and Haiti as the offending party. Although some of these writers, most notably Joaquín Balaguer, belong to the trujillista "old guard," others, like Manuel Núñez, are part of a new generation of anti-Haitian nationalists.

Luis Julián Pérez, for example, served in Trujillo's administration from 1945 to 1961. His book, Santo Domingo Frente al Destino (Santo Domingo Facing Destiny), presents
Haitians as the aggressors and the main cause of the Dominican Republic's historical conflicts. He even blames the 1937 massacre on the Haitians' unsatiable greed for land and resources (L. Pérez 1990, 91). He absolves Trujillo's bureaucrats from any responsibility of the massacre (thus cleaning his own hands) and blames the incident on Trujillo (who is dead). He then proceeds to partially absolve Trujillo himself, who Pérez sees as the victim of historical and political circumstances (L. Pérez 1990, 99). Finally, he warns the Dominican people that the "Haitian problem" is reaching alarming proportions, and unless something is done to stop it, then there could be a new wave of violence (L. Pérez 1990, 104).

Balaguer's "new" brand of antihaitianismo is detailed in his controversial best seller *La Isla al Revés* (The Upside Down Island). La *Isla al Revés* is basically a modified and updated version of *La Realidad Dominicana*, from which entire sections have been copied. In this new work, Balaguer once again defends the Dominican case. The Dominican Republic, he argues, has had the historical misfortune of living next to Haiti. Still, the Dominican Republic has been miraculously able to maintain its Hispanic-Catholic culture in the face of Haitian penetration (Balaguer 1984, 63). Balaguer then goes on to offer some distorted views of Dominican history:

The extinction of the indian race gave way for the population of Santo Domingo to be
integrally constituted by European families, specially Spanish and French. Before the Treaty of Basel (1795), the colony's population was formed by the best of the families that had migrated to America, attracted by gold or by the fascinating mystery of remote expeditions [Balaguer 1984, 59].

In this brief passage, Balaguer helps to perpetuate the myth of the white Dominican by ignoring the fact that there was a considerable number of blacks and mulattoes in the colony before 1795 (Moya Pons 1977, 378-379). Balaguer's romantic notion of Dominican history is, unfortunately, shared by many Dominicans. Also widely shared are his 19th century notions of racial differences:

... the negro, abandoned to his instincts, and without the restraint on reproduction that a relatively high level of living imposes on all countries, multiplies himself with a speed similar to that of vegetable species [Balaguer 1984, 36].

Balaguer's bigotry is not only limited to Haitians, but includes all members of the black race. It certainly seems incredible that these racial notions still persist in the late 20th century. More important, however, are two related facts. First, that Joaquin Balaguer has been president of the Dominican Republic on six occasions. His long tenure in power has only been outdone by Trujillo's. So, the author of this book is not an obscure writer, but a person who has power and influence to impose these views on the rest of the population. Second, La Isla al Reves became a national best seller, which suggests that many educated Dominicans share Balaguer's views.
Manuel Núñez in *El Ocaso de la Nación Dominicana* (The Twilight of the Dominican Nation) tries to rescue some of the old trujillista arguments of nationalism and antihaitianismo by using the cultural argument. In order for the Dominican Republic to survive as a cultural entity in the face of Haitian aggression, decisive steps must be taken (Núñez 1990, 310-311). Núñez attacks revisionist historians (such as Roberto Cassá), accusing them of being poor scholars, anti-Dominican, pro-Haitian, and even Marxist imperialists (Núñez 1990, 130-132). As it can be seen, antihaitianismo is far from over. New generations of Dominican intellectuals keep it alive by reproducing the same old myths and prejudiced arguments in slightly altered forms.

**Antihaitianismo in Dominican Culture**

Antihaitianismo permeates every aspect of Dominican culture, from everyday talk, to literature, to public education. A history of tense relations between the two countries, the creation of an anti-Haitian ideology by the 31-year-long Trujillo regime, and the reinforcement of these prejudices and distorted historical notions by subsequent administrations, has made of antihaitianismo an integral part of the Dominican popular (and political) culture. We have seen so far how Dominican literature has emphasized the indian theme at the expense of the Dominican Republic's
black heritage, and in Chapter V, we saw how lower class Dominicans reproduce these prejudices in their everyday talk. Antihaitianismo thus is a set of attitudes that are acquired early in life and reinforced by the socialization process. Family and friends are the first agents of this socialization process. They, just like they were taught, teach the child the basic tenets of antihaitianismo. Their actions therefore, are just a mere reflection of a process which is repeated from generation to generation. More important, however, is the role played by public education in this process. Public education, unlike the teachings of family and friends, is not a loose, uncoordinated, and incomplete process. Public education is a coordinated and formative process. It is institutionalized and supported by the state and has as its main objective the formation of tomorrow's Dominican citizens. It is school where Dominican children learn historical "facts" that they will identify with and reproduce later in life.

Unfortunately, what most Dominican children learn at school is a national history full of distortions, myths, and prejudices (Franco 1979a, 149). An analysis of Dominican history textbooks from the early 20th century to the present reveals a number of flagrant errors, romantic myths, and plenty of antihaitianismo. One of the most common myths is that of messiahism. Juan Pablo Duarte, the nation's leading hero and intellectual author of Dominican
independence, is glorified to extremes. Joaquin Balaguer even compares him to Jesus Christ:

The father of the Fatherland had a conscience enticed by the figure of Christ and made in the image of that sublime redeemer of the human family. In order to find a figure with moral traits comparable to Duarte's, it would be necessary to look at the history of saints and other blessed creatures. [Balaguer 1970, 201].

Another of the historical myths is that of the intervention of the Divine Providence on the side of Dominicans. After exalting the brilliant victories of the Dominican armies in the face of the more numerous Haitian armies, Balaguer adds: "the fact of [our] survival is one of those miracles that prove the wisdom and kindness with which Providence governs the events of the historic world" (Balaguer 1984, 63).

Dominican history textbooks also portray Haitians as the eternal enemies of the Dominican people. The Haitian invasions and the Haitian occupation (1822-1844) are the subjects of much discussion which emphasize gory examples of Haitian atrocities. Haitians are portrayed as barbaric savages who were the living incarnation of cruelty and whose only objective was to destroy any traces of the Hispanic culture in the Dominican Republic. Jean-Jacques Dessalines was a "heroic monster that surpassed with his boldness and cruelty the boundaries that separate man from beast" (Balaguer 1962, 12). The Haitian invasion of 1805 is graphically described by Dominican historians:
The destruction, the burning, and the killing were the wake that Haitians left in their retreat [Gimbernard 1974, 178].

The priest Don Juan Vásquez suffered a cruel death: he was burned alive in the chorus' balcony, using as tinder the benches and other combustible objects of the church [Monte y Tejada 1953, 244].

The road that goes from Santiago to Cap Haitien was covered with dead bodies, and like errant shadows, children that looked for their parents in vain were seen . . . [Pichardo 1966, 67].

. . . scenes of horror frequently alternated by death, infused anxiety and fear into those that survived to face new disgraces, and to give testimony of the consummation of horrendous crimes [Logroño 1912, 162].

. . . . quenching their brutal furor on that harmless attendance, from which very few were left alive, because even the officiating priest was spiked by their bayonets, in the middle of the horrendous uproar of that horde of savages [J.G. García 1968, 319].

In other cases, such as the Historia Gráfica de la República Dominicana (Illustrated History of the Dominican Republic), by José Ramón Estella ([1944] 1986), a Spanish immigrant, the text is accompanied by detailed drawings in which Haitians are always portrayed with crude and ape-like features, while Dominicans are always drawn light-skinned and with European features (Estella [1944] 1986, 71, 81, 85, 99, 101, 113, 115, 131, 135, 139, 157, 159, 161, 167, 179, 181). As a result of this manipulation and distortion of Dominican history in school, Dominican children acquire these attitudes and beliefs and make them their own. These future adults will grow up, first, despising and
### FIGURE 6-1
Dominican National Identity Card with the Term *Indio*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>DOMINICANA</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NACIONALIDAD</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARROYO DE LECHE PUERTO</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1-5-1965</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FECHA DE NACIMIENTO</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CASADA</strong></td>
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<td><strong>SI</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SI</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ESTADO CIVIL</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ESTUDIANTE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OCUPACION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SANTIAGO, R.D.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DOMICILIO (CALLE O PUEBLO)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CALLE 9 CASA # 79 GURAB</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RESIDENCIA (CALLE Y CASA N°)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BARRIO, SECTOR CUARTEL</strong></td>
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<td><strong>5 6</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PAREJE Y SECCION N°</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>145</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PER</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POLICIAS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ESTATURA</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PESO</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INDIO</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NEGRONEGROS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NEGROS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NINGUNAS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MARCAS O SEÑAS VISIBLES DE IDENTIFICACION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TIPO DE SANGRE</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ALERGICO A LA PENICILINA?</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
discriminating Haitians for their past atrocities, and second, perceiving themselves as white Hispanics vis-à-vis the Haitian black.

In order to perpetuate this false consciousness, the Dominican government has institutionalized many of the racist elements of Dominican culture. For example, the word indio is commonly used to describe the great majority of Dominican mulattoes. The Dominican government uses indio as a skin color descriptor in the national identity card that every adult Dominican must have (see Figure 6-1). That way, indio is no longer a slang term, but an official racial category, accepted and used by the Dominican government for identification and classification purposes. Most Dominicans fall into the indio category. Those with a darker skin tone are labeled as moreno, but actually very few Dominicans are labeled as black, due to the term's pejorative connotations.

The Role of the Media

The print and broadcast media have also contributed to the reproduction of antihaitianismo. Access to the media in the Dominican Republic is restricted; only the well-known, well-connected, or educated can communicate their ideas through the media. Other social groups either have no access to the media or their message is filtered, censored, and/or edited by those in control of the media. While the media play an important role in developing feelings of
national identity in many developing countries, in the Dominican Republic they also help to reproduce biased or prejudiced elite formulations, particularly *antihaitianismo*.

Not surprisingly, Haiti and Haitians are portrayed in the Dominican media in a very unfavorable way. Haitian news in Dominican media are of two types: news about the political situation in Haiti itself, and news about Haitian-Dominican relations and Haitians in the Dominican Republic. Given the importance that the Dominican media assigns to Haiti, it is surprising to know that not a single Dominican newspaper has a permanent correspondent in Port-au-Prince. News from Haiti reach the Dominican media by way of international press agencies (Caroit 1992, 29). These agencies, of course, only cover events that are relevant for their immediate public back home. As a result, the only kind of "news" about Haiti that is actually produced in the Dominican Republic, are the editorials and commentaries that appear in Dominican newspapers on an almost daily basis. That, of course, is not objective reporting. Most Dominican reporters know very little about Haiti, and they tend to write their stories from foreign or secondary sources. So far, there are only two Dominican reporters with some first-hand knowledge about Haiti: Leo Reyes from *El Nacional* and Germán Reyes from *Hoy*.

News about Haiti is also usually highlighted with alarmist headlines, so as to impact the reader (e.g. CIPROS...
This is a common practice, particularly among the afternoon papers, like *Ultima Hora*. The reason behind this practice, as confided to me by a Dominican journalist, is that Haitian news sell newspapers. The public likes to read about "the Haitian problem," and newspapers are in the business to make money. Therefore, news about Haiti are given priority, and news about violence in Haiti or controversies about Haitians in the Dominican Republic usually make it to the front pages.

Most of the editorials, commentaries, and letters to the editor dealing with the "Haitian problem" that I examined, contained an anti-Haitian bias. Though editorials are generally phrased in a moderate and tactful language, during times of conflict, such as when Aristide denounced the Dominican Republic in the United Nations, editorials have followed the official line of antihaitianismo. Commentaries and letters to the editor are even more anti-Haitian, since in that case the veracity of the newspaper is not at risk.

If a picture is worth a thousands words, then political cartoons are a relevant part of the written media. Political cartoons usually imply feelings that are too strong or controversial to be printed, and in the case of the Dominican media, they offer an interesting and perceptive insight into antihaitianismo. A selection of political cartoons from Dominican newspapers reflects again
a strong anti-Haitian bias. Moreover, some of these
cartoons are blatantly racist, with black characters
seemingly taken from the American Old South. Figure 6-2
shows two of these political cartoons. On the top one, a
destitute black Haitian is stopped from entering the
Dominican Republic by a well-dressed white Dominican hand.
On the bottom cartoon, Haiti, on two black feet, runs after
the Dominican Republic, whose feet are white and who is
running away trying to escape from Haiti's pursuit.

Figure 6-3 shows three more political cartoons. On the
top one, Haiti is a menacing black hand that is about to
grab the Dominican Republic, while a white Dominican signals
it to stop. On the bottom cartoon, a Haitian adult, with a
pacifier in his mouth, cuts sugar cane. In the background,
an observer comments: "How awful! They have children
working here." This is in obvious reference to accusations
made in international forums that the Dominican Republic had
minors working in the cane fields. Finally, in the last
cartoon (Figure 6-3 continued), a dove (representing peace)
is being pulled down by a heavy rock attached to one of its
wings, labeled "Haiti." This cartoon mocks Haitian
president Aristide's speech at the United Nations, in which,
building on a famous phrase by Cuban poet José Martí, he
referred to Haiti and the Dominican Republic as "two wings
of the same bird." However, with one of the wings being
pulled down by such a heavy load, it is very unlikely that
FIGURE 6-2
Political Cartoons from the Dominican Press
Source: Reprinted with permission of Rudi Núñez.
FIGURE 6-3
Political Cartoons from the Dominican Press
Source: Reprinted with permission of Cristian Hernández.
the dove would fly. The unwritten message clearly is: there cannot be normal relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

Since Haitians in the Dominican Republic have very little access to the media there is not much that they can do to defend themselves. Some Haitians do not speak or understand Spanish well, and the arrayanos, that even though they have mastered Dominican Spanish, are still considered Haitians and thus denied any access to the media. Only some individuals, human rights and religious groups have tried to voice their opinions. For their part, most of the Dominican media have chosen to ignore their plight.

**Antihaitianismo: Ideology or Symbolic Racism?**

An examination of the development of antihaitianismo throughout the 19th and 20th centuries has already shown (above) how it went through a series of stages, and how its intensity has gone up and down, depending on historical circumstances. From a high right after Dominican independence, antihaitianismo declined, but did not disappear. Right after the US occupation of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, relations between both countries have been described as essentially correct. It is not until the Trujillo Era and, more specifically, until the 1937 massacre, that antihaitianismo reaches its climax.
Probably the only moment in Dominican history when antihaitianismo can be classified as an ideology is during the Trujillo Era. Wiarda (1968) has examined in detail the Trujillo dictatorship and concluded that, under certain conditions, the Trujillo dictatorship did fit the totalitarian model. Totalitarian regimes require an ideology, and Trujillo's regime had one. Even though Trujillo was a trujillista first and foremost, he is also considered a nationalist. He cultivated Dominican intellectuals and made them the ideologues of his regime. These intellectuals, such as Joaquín Balaguer and Manuel A. Peña Batlle, developed a nationalist, Catholic, Hispanic, anti-Haitian, and anti-Communist state ideology (Franco 1973, 100-103). They molded antihaitianismo into a coherent, if weakly-based state ideology. In their discourse, Haitians not only represented the opposite of everything Dominican; Haiti and Haitian migrants were now considered an imminent danger to the nation's survival as a cultural entity. This grave danger demanded radical solutions and a strong leadership, that only Trujillo could provide. Trujillo's propaganda machine then drilled these tenets into the minds of common Dominicans. For 31 long years, generations of Dominicans were taught these ideas as unquestionable principles. The sponsorship of antihaitianismo by the Dominican Trujillista state marked the highest point in its long evolution and equated
antihaitianismo with other racist ideologies of the time, but that belonged to more developed nations, such as Nazism in Germany and apartheid in South Africa.

After the fall of Trujillo, antihaitianismo did not disappear, though it was no longer a state ideology. Many of the intellectuals that formulated it lived on to occupy important political posts (e.g. Balaguer), from where they kept reproducing their prejudiced discourse. However, after Trujillo's disappearance, we cannot longer talk of an antihaitianismo ideology. If ideology is defined, as we did in Chapter I, as "ideas that are logically related, and that identify those principles or values that lend legitimacy to political institutions and behavior" (Rodee et al. 1983, 77), then only during the Trujillo Era did antihaitianismo become an ideology. Antihaitianismo, and the myths related to it, were a major source of legitimacy for the Trujillo dictatorship, thus helping to institutionalize it. As Mateo (1993) argues, "the discursive symbolism of the trujillista regime magically inhabited the totality of the citizen's life" (Mateo 1993, 14). Antihaitianismo even defended the undefendable: the 1937 massacre, diluting its repercussions under a mantle of myths and lies.

Throughout most of its history, antihaitianismo has corresponded more to the symbolic racism model (McConahay and Hough 1976). As mentioned in Chapter II, this model takes into account early life socialization processes that
result in affective responses to symbols regardless of tangible consequences for the adult's personal life (Sears, Hensler, and Speer 1979). This is what antihaitianismo is all about; the manipulation of symbols for political purposes--rallying nationalism, government support, undermining political enemies, etc. The other model, the racial threats' hypothesis, does not explain antihaitianismo as well as symbolic racism. Actually, very few Dominicans are really threatened by Haitian migrants. As it has been clearly demonstrated, Haitian migrants are not displacing, but rather replacing Dominican workers. Furthermore, for most Dominicans, Haiti and Haitians are a distant reality. Only in the borderlands and in the sugar plantations is the Haitian presence really noticeable. For the rest of the country, Haiti exists more in their attitudes and perceptions than in their immediate reality.

In conclusion, antihaitianismo has had a long and intricate evolution. From its origins as Hispanic racism, to its transformation into anti-Haitian nationalism, to its culmination as Trujillo's state ideology, antihaitianismo has had a main objective: the protection of powerful elite interests through the subjugation of the lower (and darker) sectors of the Dominican population. Antihaitianismo serves elite interests well and has even been accepted by the great majority of the Dominican people as part of the political
culture, thereby institutionalizing it and giving it the moral legitimacy that it lacks.

Notes

1 The alcalde pedáneo was a very important figure of the Trujillo regime. Selected from among the most loyal and most influential men of a rural section, the alcalde pedáneo was the representative of the trujillista state in the countryside. His duties included maintaining peace and order, settling disputes, and most important, keeping Trujillo informed of everything that was taking place in the Dominican countryside.

2 La Isla al Reves caused intense controversies when it was published. For some excellent reviews of La Isla al Reves see Dore 1985; Fennema and Loewenthal 1987; and Zaglul 1992.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION: ANTIHAITIANISMO
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

This chapter will be divided in two parts. In the first part, I will discuss the results of this study. In the second part, I will examine the consequences of antihaitianismo for Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

Results of the Study

This dissertation has developed around a main thesis: antihaitianismo has two distinct origins (or causes). These causes can be classified as objective and subjective. Objectively, antihaitianismo is the result of the generally tense and conflictive nature of the Haitian-Dominican relationship. Subjectively, antihaitianismo is the result of the manipulation of these objective causes by Dominican elites for the achievement of political ends, effectively transforming antihaitianismo into a dominant ideology. This thesis has been confirmed by this dissertation. Chapters III and IV have shown how tensions between the eastern and western sides of the island have led to a historically tense and conflictive relationship. On the other hand, Chapters IV, V, and VI have shown how Dominican elites have deliberately transformed antihaitianismo into an ideology.
that cuts across Dominican society, to the point of distorting Dominican history and popular culture. Most Dominicans share a number of prejudices and stereotypes about Haitians that are the result of an intense anti-Haitian socialization process. Perhaps the best example of this ideological manipulation is the widespread use of the word *indio* in the Dominican Republic, a country where Amerindians disappeared almost four centuries ago.

In addition, this dissertation has shown that *antihaitianismo* has been an ideology, sponsored and reproduced by the Trujillo regime. Currently, however, *antihaitianismo* is better defined by the symbolic racism model. Moreover, *antihaitianismo* is not an individual attitude, as most Dominicans have actually very little daily contact with Haitian migrants. *Antihaitianismo* is a socially shared and reproduced attitude, deeply embedded in Dominican culture through the work of Dominican elites.

Though *antihaitianismo* is a racist ideology, it cannot be said that Dominicans are essentially racist. Race is but one of the many aspects of *antihaitianismo*. Others are nation, culture, and history. *Antihaitianismo* is a prism where different prejudices are combined in such a way that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between them. That is precisely the intended effect of *antihaitianismo*. It is an ideology designed to confuse and mislead. As a result, race is confused with nation: Haitians are black, Dominicans
are indios. Haitians believe in voodoo, Dominicans are devout Catholics. Haiti's heritage is African, the Dominican Republic's is Hispanic. It is in these deliberate confusions that antihaitianismo thrives, and that is also why it has been so difficult to try to eradicate from Dominican culture. Furthermore, antihaitianismo is a very convenient ideology, both for the Dominican elites and for the masses. For the conservative elites, antihaitianismo helps protects their economic interests by providing a cheap and docile labor force, promotes Dominican nationalism and Hispanic values, serves as a political weapon against liberal opponents, and in general, is an excellent "divide and conquer" strategy. For the Dominican people, antihaitianismo, right or wrong, provides a feeling of security based on false ideas of racial and cultural superiority. No matter how bad things may look, Haitians are doing even worse. And no matter how poor or black a Dominican might be, he can always feel superior to any Haitian because he is Dominican, Hispanic, and indio.

Summing up, antihaitianismo is a powerful component of Dominican culture deeply embedded in it by the actions of Dominican elites. This antihaitianismo ideology has led to the creation of a number of anti-Haitian prejudices and to the widespread discrimination of Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic. Moreover, the implications of antihaitianismo go far beyond the confines of the island of
Hispaniola. Though the uniqueness of the Haitian-Dominican case has been highlighted in this study, prejudice is not limited to the Dominican Republic. The examination of racial and ethnic prejudice in other countries can gain from an analysis of antihaitianismo. The development of the ideology of antihaitianismo in the Dominican Republic is a good example of how elites manipulate racial and cultural issues to achieve nationalist and political goals. Latin America is also full of similar examples, where elites have downplayed the contribution of Indians and blacks to modern Latin American society. Nazi Germany developed anti-Semitism into an state ideology that sought to justify the elimination of all Jews. Perhaps the most extreme contemporary example is South Africa, where apartheid has become an official state ideology, and where racial and ethnic cleavages cut deeply across its social makeup. The case of the Dominican Republic is not as extreme, but it certainly warrants the attention of the racism and prejudice literature. Much can be learned from antihaitianismo ideology and its use in the Dominican Republic. Hopefully, this acquired knowledge will help heal old wounds and promote a better understanding between the two countries that share the island of Hispaniola.

This dissertation can also contribute to a better understanding of the symbolic racism model. Antihaitianismo in the Dominican Republic provides an excellent example of
symbolic racism, where everyday realities do not always correspond to racial and ethnic attitudes. In the Dominican Republic, antihaitianismo is more myth than reality, more talk than substance. Few Dominicans are actually threatened by the "Haitian problem," yet most of them hate and fear Haitians. A similar case could be argued for other Latin American and Third World countries, where the ruling elites have played on racial, ethnic, and cultural cleavages for their own political and economic gains. The use of the symbolic racism model in these cases could prove of great value.

Finally, the study of antihaitianismo in particular and prejudice in general can benefit much from the methodology employed in this dissertation. The use of focus groups for the study of racial and ethnic prejudice has proven to be of great value in this dissertation. Quantitative techniques, such as survey research, may provide more precise information on the source and intensity of these attitudes. However, focus group interviews represent a better starting point for several reasons. First, antihaitianismo is a cultural, socially-shared and reproduced phenomenon of Dominican society. Qualitative techniques, such as focus group interviews and participant observation, are better suited for the study of these phenomena. Second, focus group interviews generate large amounts of data that serve as general background information on the subject of
interest. This data, besides its own qualitative value, has the added value of helping to generate research hypotheses. And third, focus group interviews will help in the design of the next logical research step: a general population survey. From the data obtained in focus groups interviews questionnaires can be designed, populations chosen, and results better interpreted.

Antihaitianismo and its Consequences

In the Dominican Republic, antihaitianismo has played several roles. First, it has been used as the basis for the discrimination of Haitians, the country's largest minority (as shown in Chapter IV). Second, it has been employed as an ideological weapon of control and manipulation of the Dominican people (as shown in Chapter VI). And third, it has become an integral part of Dominican culture, so ingrained that antihaitianismo has become the norm, rather than the exception (as shown in Chapter V). However, what are the immediate and future consequences of antihaitianismo for the Dominican Republic, for Haitian migrants, and for the Haitian-Dominican relationship? The objective of this section is to answer those questions.

Antihaitianismo and International Relations

A continued policy of antihaitianismo is bound to affect the Dominican Republic in the international arena in
several ways, all of them detrimental to its national interest. A continued record of human-rights' abuses, in the form of semi-slave Haitian labor, could threaten US and European economic aid to the Dominican Republic. As we have seen, this has already happened once, providing substantial embarrassment to the Dominican authorities and forcing the country to expend valuable resources in restoring its public image. Prestigious international organizations, such as the International Labor Organization, America's Watch, the Anti-Slavery Society, and the AFL-CIO have investigated these allegations. Apparently, the mistreatment to which Haitians have been subjected for decades in the Dominican Republic will not be tolerated anymore by the rest of the world. In this issue, the Dominican Republic has very little to gain, but a lot to lose in the form of economic sanctions from its main trading partners.

Furthermore, antihaitianismo is still the major obstacle for a full normalization and relaxation of Haitian-Dominican relations. Not until Haitian and Dominican leaders learn to set aside their historical differences will the quality of Haitian-Dominican relations certainly improve. Leaders from both Haiti and the Dominican Republic have publicly expressed their desire to enhance the quality of the Haitian-Dominican relationship. However, their actions have been to the contrary. Such was the recent case of presidents Aristide and Balaguer. Aristide, in an effort
to improve his government's popularity, tried to arouse nationalist feelings among the Haitian people by denouncing antihaitianismo in the Dominican Republic at the UN forum. Balaguer, in order to appear stronger than Aristide, began the massive repatriation of illegal Haitians living in the Dominican Republic. Actions like these will only tend to exacerbate the already tense nature of the relationship and will provide little fertile ground for a new dialogue.

The Fate of Haitian Migrants

Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic will keep on being exploited as long as antihaitianismo prevails in Dominican culture. Antihaitianismo not only provides the necessary justification for the exploitation of Haitian labor, but also has the intended effect of dehumanizing Haitians. As seen in Chapter V, some Dominicans consider Haitians as less than human. A similar fate is suffered by arrayanos, who even though are Dominican citizens by birth, are treated, for all practical purposes, as Haitians.

Haitians are also the scapegoats of Dominican society. Haitians are periodically accused of some of the Dominican Republic's internal problems, such as AIDS, unemployment, and the scarcity of basic food products. These political ploys only worsen the already poor situation of Haitians in the Dominican Republic and serve as additional fuel for antihaitianismo.
Dominican Democracy and Antihaitianismo

Democracy is a relatively new feature in the Dominican political system. Even though there have been free elections since 1966, it is not until 1978 when, by most accounts, the Dominican Republic becomes a democratic nation. Democracy, however, cannot be complete if it only protects a sector of society. In order for Dominicans to live in a truly democratic system, then the rights of Haitian migrants must be recognized, not only in theory, but also in practice. Unless democratic rights are extended to the country's largest minority, the Dominican Republic will remain as a democracy only in name.

The fate of Haitian migrants also affects Dominican democracy in another way. As we have seen, most calls for a solution to "the Haitian problem" are authoritarian in nature—from forced repatriations to creating a new state in Africa (or somewhere else) to resettle Haiti's excess population. Authoritarian tendencies are already a feature of the Dominican political system which are being reinforced by this aspect of antihaitianismo. Though it cannot be assured that a more liberal handling of the Haitian issue will improve Dominican democracy, it seems clear that the present authoritarian methods will have a deleterious effect on democracy in the Dominican Republic.

Finally, antihaitianismo has been used for settling political scores and discrediting Dominican public figures.
Those who have defended the rights of Haitian migrants have been labeled as anti-Dominicans and their nationalism has been questioned. So far, the most extreme case has been that of politician José Francisco Peña Gómez. Peña Gómez, a social democrat, is a black Dominican whose nationality has been repeatedly questioned by his political opponents. Though there is ample evidence that he was born in the Dominican Republic of Dominican parents (Salmador 1990), Peña Gómez is portrayed as a Haitian by his opponents. Given the fact that Peña Gómez is black and that he was raised by an adoptive family, a rumor has been spread over the years that says that Peña Gómez is a Haitian who was raised by a Dominican family. Furthermore, given his "Haitian origins," Peña Gómez' opponents insist that, if elected president, he will fill the Dominican Republic with Haitians. Although these accusations seem ridiculous and unsubstantiated, the rumor mill has turned them into truths for many Dominicans. In a 1985 survey, 24.03% of respondents mentioned Peña Gómez' Haitian origins as his greatest problem as a presidential candidate (Alvarez Vega 1985, 35). Another 5.85% mentioned the fact that he was black as his greatest obstacle. As long as this mudslinging tactics keep working so effectively, antihaitianismo will remain an integral part of the Dominican political system and a favorite weapon in Dominican party politics.
APPENDIX A
ELITE QUESTIONNAIRE
(SPANISH)

1. ¿Qué entiende usted por el problema haitiano? ¿Es en verdad un problema para la República Dominicana?

2. De todos los aspectos de la relación dominico-haitiana, ¿cuál es el que usted cree que afecta más a la República Dominicana?

3. ¿Es un problema la inmigración haitiana? ¿Desplazan los inmigrantes haitianos a los trabajadores dominicanos? ¿Los inmigrantes haitianos, son un beneficio o una carga para la economía dominicana?

4. ¿Es el comercio con Haití beneficioso o dañino para la economía dominicana? ¿Qué tal la exportación de alimentos hacia Haití? ¿Qué tal el contrabando?

*5. ¿De qué manera preocupa a la República Dominicana la crisis ecológica de Haití?

6. ¿Son las costumbres haitianas una amenaza para la sociedad dominicana? ¿De qué manera?

7. ¿Son los inmigrantes haitianos una amenaza a la composición racial del pueblo dominicano? ¿De qué manera?

8. ¿Cuáles son las implicaciones políticas de la presencia haitiana?

*9. ¿Es la frontera segura? ¿Existe el peligro de que la República Dominicana pueda perder territorio frente a Haití?

*10. ¿Son los trabajadores haitianos vitales para la industria azucarera dominicana? ¿Qué tal para otros productos (café, arroz, etc.)?

11. ¿Cuál piensa usted que es la causa principal del antihaitianismo en la República Dominicana?

*12. ¿Piensa usted que Haití y la República Dominicana puedan olvidar sus diferencias históricas?
13. ¿Piensa usted que el pueblo dominicano es amenazado por la presencia haitiana? ¿Usted se siente personalmente amenazado en alguna manera por la presencia haitiana?

14a. ¿Se les debe otorgar la ciudadanía dominicana a los haitianos en la República Dominicana? ¿Qué tal a sus hijos nacidos aquí?
14b. ¿Decaeería la inmigración haitiana con más controles fronterizos?
14c. ¿Deben ser los haitianos repatriados por la fuerza?

*= estas preguntas se hicieron sólo cuando el tiempo lo permitió.

English Translation

1. What do you understand by el problema haitiano? Is it really a problem for the Dominican Republic?

2. Of all aspects of the Haitian-Dominican relationship, which one do you think affects the Dominican Republic the most?

3. Is Haitian migration a problem? Do Haitian migrants displace Dominican workers? Are Haitian migrants an asset or a burden to the Dominican economy?

4. Is commerce with Haiti beneficial or detrimental to the Dominican economy? What about food exports to Haiti? What about contraband?

*5. How does Haiti's environmental degradation concern the Dominican Republic?

6. Is the Haitian way of life a menace to Dominican society? In what way?

7. Are Haitian migrants a threat to the racial make-up of the Dominican people? In what way?

8. What are the political implications of the Haitian presence?

*9. Is the border secure? Is the Dominican Republic in danger of losing territory to Haiti?

*10. Are Haitian workers vital to the Dominican sugar industry? What about other crops (coffee, rice, etc.)?
11. What do you think is the main cause of antihaitianismo in the Dominican Republic?

*12. Do you think Haiti and the Dominican Republic can forget their historical differences?

13. Do you think the Dominican people are threatened by the Haitian presence? Do you feel personally threatened in any way by the Haitian presence?

14a. Should Haitians in the Dominican Republic be awarded Dominican citizenship? What about their children born here?

14b. Will migration decrease with greater control in the border?

14c. Should Haitians be forcibly repatriated?

*= these questions were asked only when time allowed.
Introduction

Buenas, señores. Mi nombre es Ernesto Sagás y soy un estudiante que estoy interesado en aprender sobre Haití y la República Dominicana. Por esa razón, he venido aquí a aprender de ustedes. Lo más que me interesaría conocer es cómo se llevan ustedes con los haitianos.

Vamos a hacer una cosa. En vez de ustedes hablarme a mí sobre esas cosas, quisiera que mejor las discutan en grupo. O sea, que hablen entre ustedes del tema. Yo me voy a sentar aquí y voy a escucharlos. Quisiera que todo el mundo hablara y diera su más sincera opinión. Comparen sus opiniones y experiencias. Todas las opiniones son importantes. Mientras más digan, más puedo aprender de ustedes. Así que recuerden, por favor, que todas las opiniones son importantes y vale la pena decirlas.

Un último favor. Por favor, sólo hable uno a la vez. Así es más fácil seguir la conversación y mantenernos dentro del tema. No hable con su vecino, tampoco. Diga todo frente al grupo. Así podré captarlo todo. Bueno, pero para estar seguro, voy a grabar la conversación, si es que a
nadie le molesta, y voy a tomar notas también. No se preocupen por la grabadora, yo voy a ser el único que va a oír esta cinta. Así que pueden decir lo que quieran.

Bueno, ya ustedes me conocen, pero yo aún no los conozco bien. Quisiera que antes de comenzar la discusión, cada uno se presente. Sólo tiene que decir cómo se llama (o cómo le dicen), de dónde es, a qué se dedica, cosas así.

*****

They introduce themselves.

*****

Bueno, esta discusión coge como unas dos horas. Antes de que empecemos, ¿alguien tiene una pregunta? ¿Cualquier pregunta?

*****

Questions are then answered.

*****

Vamos a empezar. Quisiera que discutiéramos cómo se llevan ustedes con los haitianos.

*****

The discussion begins.

*****

Related Questions

1a. ¿Cómo ustedes creen que se trata a los haitianos que viven en los bateyes? ¿Por qué?

1b. ¿Y a los que viven en otras partes del país? ¿Por qué?
2a. ¿Qué piensan ustedes de los haitianos que viven aquí en los bateyes?
2b. ¿Y qué piensan ustedes del resto de los haitianos en general?

****

Conclusion

Bueno, señores, yo creo que ya podemos acabar con la discusión. Ya es hora de terminar. Antes de que acabemos, ¿alguien quiere decir una última cosa? ¿Cualquier cosa?

****

After everyone has concluded.

****

Bueno, señores, me alegra mucho que hayan venido. Hoy he aprendido muchas cosas gracias a ustedes. Será hasta la próxima. Encantado de conocerlos y mil gracias a todos.

English Translation

Introduction

Hello, everybody. My name is Ernesto Sagás and I am a student who wants to learn about Haiti and the Dominican Republic. For that reason, I have come here to learn from you. What interests me the most is to know how do you get along with Haitians.

Let us do one thing. Instead of telling me about those things, I want you to discuss them as a group. That is, to
talk among yourselves about the topic. I am going to sit here and to listen. I would like everyone to talk and to give your most sincere opinion. Compare your opinions and experiences. All opinions are important. The more you say, the more I can learn. So, please remember that all opinions are important and it is worthwhile to say them.

One last favor. Please, only talk one at a time. That way it is easier to follow the conversation and to stick to the topic. Do not talk to the person sitting next to you, either. Say everything in front of the group. That way I can listen to all. But, to be sure, I am going to record this conversation, if nobody minds, and I am also going to take notes. Do not worry about the recorder, I am the only person who is going to listen to this tape. Thus, you can say anything that you want.

Well, you already know me, but I still do not know you. Before starting this conversation, I would like for each one of you to introduce yourselves. All you have to say is your name (or you are called), where are you from, what do you do, things like that.

*****

They introduce themselves.

*****

Well, this discussion takes about two hours. Before we start, does someone have a question? Any question?
Questions are then answered.

Let us begin. I would like you to discuss how do you get along with Haitians.

The discussion begins.

Related Questions

1a. How do you think are Haitians living in the bateyes treated? Why?
1b. And what about Haitians living in other parts of the country? Why?
2a. What do you think about those Haitians that live here in the bateyes?
2b. And what do you think about the rest of Haitians in general?

Conclusion

Well, everybody, I think that we can end the discussion at this time. It is already time to finish. Before we finish, does somebody want to say one last thing? Anything?

After everyone has concluded.
Well, everybody, I appreciated your presence. I have learned a lot of things today thanks to you. I will see you in the future. It has been a pleasure and thanks to all of you.
APPENDIX C
FOCUS GROUP QUESTIONNAIRE
FOR HAITIAN WORKERS IN THE
SUGAR PLANTATIONS (CREOLE)

Introduction


Kòm m pa pale anpil kreyòl tankou nou, ma mande nou yon lôt sèvis. Pale younn a la fwa, souple. Pa pale nou tout an mem tan. Pa pale andèyò de group-la. Si nou fè sa-m di-nou, ma kab konprann nou e ma kap aprann de nou. Men pou-m ka konprann tout sa nou di-m, map tepe konversasion-nou, e map ekri sa m pa konprann. Men pa trakase-nou, nan
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pwen lòt moun ki pral koute tèp sa-a, eksepte mwen-menm.
Donk, di sa nou vle.

Alò, nou konnen-m deja, men m pa konnen-nou bien.
Anvan nou kòmanse, m ta vle ke chak moun prezante têt-li.
Di sèlman kouman nou rele, ki kote nou fèt, ki metye-nou,
bagay konsa.

*****

They introduce themselves.

*****

Na pale pandan dezè konsa. Anvan nou kòmanse, eske nou
gen yon keksyon? Ninpòt keksyon?

*****

Questions are then answered.

*****

Ann komanse. Premyèman, m vle nou diskite younn ak lòt
poukisa nou kite Ayiti, e poukisa nou vini an Dominikani o
lie nale nan lòt peyi.

*****

The discussion begins.

*****

Related Questions

1a. Eske nou koupe kann? Poukisa?
1b. Eske nou ta koupe kann? Poukisa?
2. Sa ou fè le pa gen kann pou koupe (tiempo muerto)?

*****
Kounye-a, m vle nou diskite younn ak lòt kouman nou antann nou ak Dominiken-yo.

*****

The discussion begins

*****

Related Questions

1a. Kouman Dominiken ki travay nan izin sik-la trete Ayisyen-yo?
1b. E kouman rès Dominiken-yo trete Ayisyen-yo?
2. Sa nou-menm nou panse sou Dominiken-yo an jeneral?
Reponn-mwen younn a la fwa.

*****

Conclusion

En ben, mesie, nou kab rete konversasion-an la. Se pou-nou fini deja. Anvan nou fini, eske gen yon moun ki vle di kèk bagay? Ninpòt bagay?

*****

After everyone has concluded.

*****

Alò mesie, m kontan nou vini. M aprann anpil bagay enpòtan jodi-a de nou. Na wè pi ta. Anchante e mèsi anpil.

English Translation

Introduction

Hello, everybody. My name is Ernesto Sagás and I am a student who wants to learn about Haiti and the Dominican
Republic. For that reason, I went to the United States to learn Creole. Today, I have come here to learn from you. I would like to know mainly two things: why did you come to the Dominican Republic and how do you get along with Dominicans?.

Let us do one thing. Instead of telling me about those things, I want you to discuss them as a group. That is, to talk among yourselves about the topic. I am going to sit here and to listen. I would like everyone to talk and to give your most sincere opinion. Compare your opinions and experiences. All opinions are important. The more you say, the more I can learn. So, please remember that all opinions are important and it is worthwhile to say them.

Since I do not speak as much Creole as you do, I will ask you one last favor. Please, only talk one at a time. That way it is easier to follow the conversation and to stick to the topic. Do not talk to the person sitting next to you, either. Say everything in front of the group. That way I can listen to all. But, to be sure, I am going to record this conversation, if nobody minds, and I am also going to take notes. Do not worry about the recorder, I am the only person who is going to listen to this tape. Thus, you can say anything that you want.

Well, you already know me, but I still do not know you. Before starting this conversation, I would like for each one of you to introduce yourselves. All you have to say is your
name (or you are called), where are you from, what do you
do, things like that.

*****

They introduce themselves.

*****

Well, this discussion takes about two hours. Before we
start, does someone have a question? Any question?

*****

Questions are then answered.

*****

Let us begin. I would like you to discuss why you left
Haiti, and why did you come to the Dominican Republic
instead of going to another country.

*****

The discussion begins.

*****

Related Questions
1a. Do you work cutting sugar cane? Why?
1b. Have you ever worked cutting sugar cane? Why?
2. What do you do when there is no sugar cane to cut (tiempo
muerto)?

*****

Now, we are going to talk about how do you get along
with Dominicans.

*****

The discussion begins.
Related Questions

1a. How do Dominicans who work in the sugar industry treat Haitians?
1b. And how do the rest of Dominicans treat Haitians?
2. What do you think about Dominicans in general? Respond one at a time.

Conclusion

Well, everybody, I think that we can end the discussion at this time. It is already time to finish. Before we finish, does somebody want to say one last thing? Anything?

After everyone has concluded.

Well, everybody, I appreciated your presence. I have learned a lot of things today thanks to you. I will see you in the future. It has been a pleasure and thanks to all of you.
Buenas, señores. Yo me llamo Ernesto Sagás y soy un estudiante que estoy interesado en aprender sobre Haití y la República Dominicana. Por esa razón, he venido aquí a aprender de ustedes. Lo más que me interesaría conocer es cómo se llevan ustedes con los haitianos.

Vamos a hacer una cosa. En vez de ustedes hablarme a mí sobre esas cosas, quisiera que mejor las discutieran en grupo. O sea, que hablen entre ustedes del tema. Yo me voy a sentar aquí y voy a escucharlos. Quisiera que todo el mundo hablara y diera su más sincera opinión. Comparen sus opiniones y experiencias. Todas las opiniones son importantes. Mientras más digan, más puedo aprender de ustedes. Así que recuerden, por favor, que todas las opiniones son importantes y vale la pena decirlas.

Un último favor. Por favor, sólo hable uno a la vez. Así es más fácil seguir la conversación y mantenernos dentro del tema. No hable con su vecino, tampoco. Diga todo frente al grupo. Así podré captarlo todo. Bueno, pero para estar seguro, voy a grabar la conversación, si es que a
nadie le molesta, y voy a tomar notas también. No se preocupen por la grabadora, yo voy a ser el único que va a oír esta cinta. Así que pueden decir lo que quieran.

Bueno, ya ustedes me conocen, pero yo aún no los conozco bien. Quisiera que antes de comenzar la discusión, cada uno se presente. Sólo tiene que decir cómo se llama (o cómo le dicen), de dónde es, a qué se dedica, cosas así.

*****

They introduce themselves.

*****

Bueno, esta discusión coge como unas dos horas. Antes de que empecemos, ¿alguien tiene una pregunta? ¿Cualquier pregunta?

*****

Questions are then answered.

*****

Vamos a empezar. Quisiera que discutiéramos cómo se llevan ustedes con los haitianos.

*****

The discussion begins.

*****

Related Questions

1a. ¿Cómo ustedes creen que se trata a los haitianos que viven en la frontera? ¿Por qué?

1b. ¿Y a los que viven en otras partes del país? ¿Por qué?
2a. ¿Qué piensan ustedes de los haitianos que viven aquí en la zona fronteriza?
2b. ¿Y qué piensan ustedes del resto de los haitianos en general?

*****

Conclusion

Bueno, señores, yo creo que ya podemos acabar con la discusión. Ya es hora de terminar. Antes de que acabemos, ¿alguien quiere decir una última cosa? ¿Cualquier cosa?

*****

After everyone has concluded.

*****

Bueno, señores, me alegra mucho que hayan venido. Hoy he aprendido muchas cosas gracias a ustedes. Será hasta la próxima. Encantado de conocerlos y mil gracias a todos.

English Translation

Introduction

Hello, everybody. My name is Ernesto Sagás and I am a student who wants to learn about Haiti and the Dominican Republic. For that reason, I have come here to learn from you. What interests me the most is to know how do you get along with Haitians.

Let us do one thing. Instead of telling me about those things, I want you to discuss them as a group. That is, to talk among yourselves about the topic. I am going to sit
here and to listen. I would like everyone to talk and to give your most sincere opinion. Compare your opinions and experiences. All opinions are important. The more you say, the more I can learn. So, please remember that all opinions are important and it is worthwhile to say them.

One last favor. Please, only talk one at a time. That way it is easier to follow the conversation and to stick to the topic. Do not talk to the person sitting next to you, either. Say everything in front of the group. That way I can listen to all. But, to be sure, I am going to record this conversation, if nobody minds, and I am also going to take notes. Do not worry about the recorder, I am the only person who is going to listen to this tape. Thus, you can say anything that you want.

Well, you already know me, but I still do not know you. Before starting this conversation, I would like for each one of you to introduce yourselves. All you have to say is your name (or you are called), where are you from, what do you do, things like that.

*****

They introduce themselves.

*****

Well, this discussion takes about two hours. Before we start, does someone have a question? Any question?

*****

Questions are then answered.
Let us begin. I would like you to discuss how do you get along with Haitians.

The discussion begins.

Related Questions

1a. How do you think are Haitians living in the borderlands treated? Why?
1b. And what about Haitians living in other parts of the country? Why?
2a. What do you think about those Haitians that live here in the borderlands?
2b. And what do you think about the rest of Haitians in general?

Conclusion

Well, everybody, I think that we can end the discussion at this time. It is already time to finish. Before we finish, does somebody want to say one last thing? Anything?

After everyone has concluded.

Well, everybody, I appreciated your presence. I have learned a lot of things today thanks to you. I will see you
in the future. It has been a pleasure and thanks to all of you.
CONSIDERANDO que a consecuencia de las disposiciones contenidas en los Decretos Nos. 417-90 y 188-91 de fechas 15 de octubre de 1990 y 14 de mayo de 1991, respectivamente, se han venido produciendo mejorías considerables en las condiciones de trabajo de los obreros de la caña, tanto nacionales como extranjeros;

CONSIDERANDO que el Gobierno Nacional ha promovido la adopción de una serie de medidas tendientes a humanizar las labores en los bateyes, especialmente en los que son propiedad del Consejo Estatal del Azúcar (CEA);

En ejercicio de las atribuciones que me confiere el artículo 55 de la Constitución de la República, decreto:

Artículo 1: Se dispone la repatriación de todos los menores que hayan alcanzado la edad de dieciséis (16) años, de nacionalidad extranjera, que venían trabajando como braceros en la siembra, cultivo, corte y acarreo de la caña.

Artículo 2: La repatriación se realizará a expensas del estado, dispensándose a los repatriados las mayores consideraciones.
Artículo 3: Se dispone asimismo, la repatriación de todos los trabajadores extranjeros, mayores de sesenta (60) años de edad, de los bateyes, tanto los pertenecientes al Estado como los que son propiedad de empresas privadas. A estos trabajadores se les entregaran todas las prestaciones laborales que les correspondan, de conformidad con la legislación dominicana; prestaciones que estarán a cargo de las respectivas empresas privadas o del Estado en las que laboren dichos trabajadores.

Artículo 4: La Secretaría de Estado de Trabajo queda encargada de velar por el estricto cumplimiento del presente Decreto, para lo cual recibirá el más amplio concurso de las Secretarías de Estado, de las Fuerzas Armadas y de Relaciones Exteriores, de la Jefatura de la Policía Nacional y de la Dirección General de Migración.

Joaquín Balaguer, 13 de junio de 1991
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Ernesto Sagás was born in New York City on 26 April 1964, the only child of Aristides Sagás and Nancy Diaz. He attended grammar and high school at Colegio Nuestra Señora de la Merced, in Puerto Rico, graduating in 1982. In 1985, he married Amparo Balbuena in Santiago, Dominican Republic. He attended the University of Puerto Rico (Mayagüez Campus), where he graduated with a bachelor's degree (with high honors) in history of the Americas in 1986. With the help of a Graduate Minority Fellowship, he began graduate studies at the University of Florida that same year. In 1988, he obtained his master's degree in Latin American studies. His master's thesis was Politics and Praetorianism in the Dominican Republic: From Trujillo to Balaguer. He was then admitted into the Ph.D. program of the Department of Political Science of the University of Florida. In 1990, he took his qualifying examinations and was admitted into candidacy. In that same year, his first child, Antonio Ernesto, was born. After completing his Ph.D. he will start teaching at the Herbert H. Lehman College of the City University of New York.
I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Terry L. McCoy, Chairman
Professor of Political Science

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Steven E. Sanderson
Professor of Political Science

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Michael D. Martinez
Associate Professor of Political Science

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Richard K. Scher
Associate Professor of Political Science
I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

César N. Caviedes
Professor of Geography

This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

December 1993
Dean, Graduate School