DOMESTIC PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, PUBLIC RELATIONS STRATEGY
AND FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE PERSIAN GULF WAR –
IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY

By
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A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS IN MASS COMMUNICATION

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2004
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by

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to first and foremost thank my committee chair, Dr. Juan-Carlos Molleda, for his commitment, support and personal guidance during the development of this thesis. I would also like to thank Dr. Michael Leslie, Dr. Marilyn Roberts and Dr. Sheryl Kroen for their continued support and counsel. Finally, I would like to thank my parents, my brother and my friends for always being my biggest fans.
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Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

DOMESTIC PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, PUBLIC RELATIONS STRATEGY AND FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE PERSIAN GULF WAR – IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY

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May 2004

Chair: Juan-Carlos Molleda
Major Department: Journalism and Communications

The study is designed to analyze domestic public diplomacy strategies used by the U.S. government during the Persian Gulf War. The study’s examination will reveal the fit between those strategies and the propaganda and public relations models. The analysis is conducted in order to answer the following research questions:

- What principal strategies in U.S. domestic public diplomacy and public relations during the Gulf War were used to sell the U.S. government’s foreign policy agenda domestically?
- To what degree have the propaganda model and the public relations model converged?

The results of this analysis will lead to conclusions about the relative prominence of each model during the conflict and the implications for democratic control of government.

In order to analyze the U.S. government’s domestic public diplomacy efforts during the selected period and to make inferences as to the possible effects on the formation of public opinion and foreign policy, a case study research format is used.
The units of analysis are presidential speeches and statements used in domestic public diplomacy between November 1990 and January 1991. These materials are retrieved from the public papers of President Bush at the George Bush Presidential Library and Museum at http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu. The data drawn from these statements is based on distinct public relations and propaganda attributes.

After the analysis revealed the unique attributes of each model in President Bush’s statements and speeches, the prevalence of each model and of specific attributes was examined. The findings prove the existence of propaganda and public relations attributes in the Bush administration’s domestic public diplomacy efforts during the study period. The findings also reveal the overlap of the public relations model and the propaganda model, as well as a distinct line of divergence between the two.

The study addresses the issue that the government is predisposed to use unethical tactics to alter public opinion for the purpose of achieving their foreign policy initiatives. It also reveals that the use of the public relations attributes and some propaganda attributes identified in the study is useful and harmless to the domestic public diplomacy process. In some cases, harm is determined more by how ethically the attributes are applied than whether or not they exist at all.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Overview

The advancement of liberal democracy and related ideologies has been the chief thrust of U.S. political communication both abroad and at home. By marketing the U.S. economic approach, political system and “image” through public relations tactics during times of conflict, government communication directed at the domestic public has been altered in such a way that it has become an essential tool for molding public opinion to support government policies. This implies that the “informed public,” an essential component of democracy, may be manipulated by the government’s use of public relations tactics, which may be more propagandistic than informational.

Noam Chomsky (2003), Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, stated the following concerning the government-media activities in relation to the 2003 War in Iraq during an interview with Z Magazine:

In the last few months, there has been a spectacular achievement of government-media propaganda, very visible in the polls. The international polls show that support for the war is higher in the United States than in other countries. That is, however, quite misleading, because if you look a little closer, you find that the United States is also different in another respect from the rest of the world. Since September 2002, the United States is the only country in the world where 60 per cent of the population believes that Iraq is an imminent threat - something that people do not believe even in Kuwait or Iran.

Furthermore, about 50 per cent of the population now believes that Iraq was responsible for the attack on the World Trade Centre. This has happened since September 2002. In fact, after the September 11 attack, the figure was about 3 per cent. Government-media propaganda has managed to raise that to about 50 per cent. Now if people genuinely believe that Iraq has carried out major terrorist
attacks against the United States and is planning to do so again, well, in that case people will support the war.

He goes on to say:

More interesting is what happened in the build-up to war. The fact that government-media propaganda was able to convince the people that Iraq is an imminent threat and that Iraq was responsible for September 11 is a spectacular achievement and, as I said, was accomplished in about four months. If you ask people in the media about this, they will say, "Well, we never said that," and it is true, they did not. There was never a statement that Iraq is going to invade the United States or that it carried out the World Trade Centre attack. It was just insinuated, hint after hint, until they finally got people to believe it. (Z Magazine Web Site, 2003)

Although this may be an extreme point of view, it does illustrate the concerns that will be investigated in this study.

**Research Purpose**

The purpose of this study is to illustrate how and to what extent public relations strategies are employed by public policy framers in their domestic public diplomacy efforts to ratify their foreign policy initiatives. This study is also constructed to determine to what extent public relations is propagandistic through examining the distinction between the public relations and propaganda models.

The current study will use a case study format in order to analyze a government campaign for domestic support of a foreign policy issue, the Persian Gulf War, for public relations and propaganda attributes. The units of analysis are statements and speeches made by U.S. President George Bush during a select period of time in 1990 and 1991 during Operation Desert Shield and the onslaught of Operation Desert Storm.

The goal of this research is to reveal and better comprehend the strategies with which the government pursues the alteration of public opinion to support foreign policy agendas and the implications of those strategies on the democratic process. If the
strategies employed are pursuant to veritably informing the public, then they are democratic. However, if the strategies are actually tactics to manipulate the public, they threaten the tenants of democracy and will be exposed as such.

**The Gulf War**

August 2, 1990, Iraq and its president, Saddam Hussein, invaded the nation of Kuwait on the grounds that Kuwait had been taking oil from Iraq illegally, and that Kuwait was rightfully the territory of Iraq. The United States and its allies believed otherwise. They believed Iraq’s invasion was primarily a play to acquire Kuwait’s oil fields. Based on this belief and a fear for the security of the region, the U.S., its NATO allies and some Arab nations began to build troops in Saudi Arabia. The U.N. Security Council agreed with the response and set a deadline for Iraq's withdrawal. During the buildup for war President Bush and his administration executed a campaign to rally support through domestic and foreign diplomacy efforts. When the deadline was ignored in January 1991, the military offensive, Operation Desert Storm, ensued. The air and ground military attack on Saddam Hussein quickly achieved victory in late February with little loss of Allied life. Although Kuwait’s sovereignty was secured, Saddam Hussein remained the leader of Iraq.

**Study Outline**

The present study will reveal the strategies employed by President Bush during his campaign for support during the Persian Gulf Crisis and subsequent war. The analysis will be constructed to answer the following research questions:

- What principal strategies in U.S. domestic public diplomacy and public relations during the Gulf War were used to sell the U.S. government’s foreign policy agenda domestically?
• To what degree have the propaganda model and the public relations model converged?

Before beginning the investigation of the data, the researcher will take an in-depth look at the background elements of the study in the next chapter. This chapter will take a closer look at how government communication, public opinion and foreign policy are interrelated, and how that relation affects democracy. This will be done by looking at the development of government communication over time and what roles the media, public relations and propaganda have played in its regulation.

The third chapter will be a literature review citing academics in the fields of public diplomacy, public relations and propaganda analysis, as well as professionals in the fields of sociology, psychology and political science. This chapter will attempt to define the public relations model and propaganda model, as well as all their strategies, in order to have a more definite idea of what each model entails. It will also provide the pool of public relations and propaganda attributes from which the researcher will choose the distinct attributes for the analysis of President Bush’s speeches and statements.

The fourth chapter defines the public relations and propaganda attributes that will be used in the case study and describes the method of the analysis. The fifth chapter presents the findings of the study, and the final chapter discusses the findings, summarizes the results, describes limitations of the study and makes suggestions for future research related to the study.
The danger posed by the manipulation of government communications to influence public opinion for foreign policy initiatives is very real. This chapter will explore how such practices are undemocratic and how government information, public opinion and foreign policy are interrelated.

Democracy, Public Opinion and Policy

The United States government is a democracy based on policies developed and sanctioned by the representatives of its citizens. Such representation is assumed to be fair, however Democratic governments have been known to use “devices” of representation that allegedly affect public opinion (Lasswell, 1941, p. 29). According to Lasswell (1941), a leading political scientist during the early 20th century, a democratic government relies heavily on discussion, so much so, in fact, there have been “deliberate efforts to improve the democratic process by perfecting the process of discussion” (p. 28). These innovations are intended not only to “maximize the role of thought” but also to “minimize the play of emotion” (p. 28). However, this ideal form of discussion is not always the most effective when controversial issues are at hand.

Lasswell (1941) contends that in order to have sound public opinion, which will breed sensible policies, the collective and private opinions of the people must be targeted through methods of education. He states the following:

We can affect the behavior of the public opinion variable by affecting the whole level of intelligence in society; thus if we spread sound methods of using the mind
throughout the community, we increase the probability that when the community acts as a public, the results will be compatible with the public interest. (1941, p. 27)

Spreading intelligence seems to be a just method for ensuring that democratic policies are secured. However, the manner in which this intelligence is spread and the source of the information complicate the fairness of its objective. Lasswell (1941) explains further:

The danger springs from the deliberate control of news by modern propagandists. The citizen depends upon what he can see and hear, and if his supply of information is poisoned at the source for partisan purposes, the conscientious democrat may be the innocent dupe of interests for which he has no sympathy. An axiom of democracy is that it depends upon public opinion founded on free access to facts. (p. 34)

This “free access to facts” is undermined when the facts are manipulated. Tampering with the information leads to the tampering of public opinion and public policy. Free access to facts is more commonly referred to in recent times as the “marketplace of ideas.” Entman (1989) explains this concept in the following:

In theory, democracy in the United States benefits from a vigorous marketplace of ideas created by an energetic “free press.” The press is supposed to enhance democracy both by stimulating the citizenry’s political interest and by providing the specific information they need to hold government accountable. (p. 3)

Entman (1989), however, goes on to challenge this idea by arguing that America’s “free press” cannot be free:

Restricted by the limited tastes of the audience and reliant upon political elites for most information, journalists participate in an interdependent news system, not a free market of ideas. In practice, then, the news media fall short of a free press as civic educator and guardian of democracy. (p. 3)

Therefore, according to Entman, the democratic system’s concept of free press and access to information indirectly undermines itself through a complicated mechanism of government control and manipulation.

According to Lasswell (1941), “The achievement of an opinion capable of sustaining democracy depends upon no single variable, but rather upon a vital balance of
many significant factors in the whole pattern of private and collective life” (p. 34). This chapter will examine those factors and consider how the system is undermined through the relationship of government information, public opinion and public and foreign policy.

Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs

The leading mechanism of the U.S. government in disseminating information to the American public is the Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, which was created by the merger of the U.S. Information Agency and the Department of State. According to the State Department’s Web site:

U.S. engagement in the world and the Department of State's engagement of the American public are indispensable to the conduct of foreign policy. The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs helps ensure that public diplomacy (engaging, informing, and influencing key international audiences) is practiced in harmony with public affairs (outreach to Americans) and traditional diplomacy to advance U.S. interests and security and to provide the moral basis for U.S. leadership in the world.

The role of the State Department in educating and influencing foreign and domestic publics in regard to foreign policy is clear. However, for the purpose of this study we will be focusing on the government’s communication of foreign policy objectives to the domestic public. The division of the State Department most responsible for this communication is the Bureau of Public Affairs.

The Bureau of Public Affairs

The purpose of the Bureau of Public Affairs is to execute the Secretary's directive to help Americans understand foreign affairs. According to the State Department’s Web site, “It vigorously pursues the Secretary's vision to get the Department's message to the American people and to feed their concerns and comments back to the policymakers.” The Web site describes how it accomplishes this in the following ways:
• Strategic and tactical planning to advance the Administration's priority foreign policy goals;
• Conducting press briefings for domestic and foreign press corps;
• Pursuing media outreach, enabling Americans everywhere to hear directly from key Department officials through local, regional and national media interviews;
• Managing the State Department's web site at state.gov and developing web pages with up-to-date information about U.S. foreign policy;
• Answering questions from the public about current foreign policy issues by phone, email, or letter;
• Arranging town meetings and scheduling speakers to visit communities to discuss U.S. foreign policy and why it is important to all Americans;
• Producing and coordinating audio-visual products and services in the U.S. and abroad for the public, the press, the Secretary of State, and Department bureaus and offices;
• Preparing historical studies on U.S. diplomacy and foreign affairs matters.

These objectives are achieved through the use of the Bureau’s many different offices: the Office of Press Relations, Office of Regional Media and Press Outreach, Office of Public and Intergovernmental Liaison, Strategic Planning, Office of Broadcast Services, Office of Electronic Information and the Office of the Historian.

**Regulation**

The majority of the regulations of the U.S. government’s dissemination of information were developed during and after World War I, and can be seen as a response to the rise of the Nazis. The resolution to launch counterpropaganda efforts by the U.S. led to regulations to protect the public from both foreign and domestic propaganda. These regulations exist even today.

In 1913, Section 3107 of Title V of the United States Code stated, “appropriated funds may not be used to pay a publicity expert unless specifically appropriated for that
“purpose” (Wilcox et. al, 2003, p. 263). In this law, also called the Gillett Amendment, Congress banned all federal agencies from using appropriated funds for employing a “publicity expert” (Lee, 2002, p. 87). Four years later, a similar ban was imposed for “publicity or propaganda purposes designed to support or defeat legislation pending before Congress” (87).

The Foreign Agent’s Registration Act (FARA), passed in 1934 in response to Congressional concerns over representation of Hitler’s government by American firms, “requires representatives of foreign governments – including public relations practitioners – to register and label the material they issue, originally with the State Department, and later with the Justice Department” (J. Grunig, 1993, p. 152). The act has been amended four times to include regulations on materials issued by foreign agents and is still in force. In 1939, Congress also prohibited federal agencies from “using the US mail to send out free information material unless the citizen had expressly requested it” (Lee, 2002, p. 88).


By law, USIA is prohibited from distributing its products within the United States, although an exception was made for a scholarly journal called Problems of
Communism that perished with communism. The purpose is to keep the agency from becoming a domestic propaganda arm of the president, but it works to USIA’s advantage. A large part of the material distributed overseas is reprinted from domestic sources that are willing to authorize us further as long as it does not compete with their own sales at home. (p. 350)

Laws and regulations have been made to protect the American people from being exposed to propaganda and public relations techniques that may manipulate them. However, the government’s ability to subvert these laws has been increasingly apparent.

**Government Objectives**

Regardless of prohibitions, many still felt that the government was overstepping its boundaries in its efforts to “educate” the public during the two World Wars. A cabinet secretary noted in the 1960s that “there is considerable criticism of the federal government’s information program on the grounds that it is ‘public relations,’ a term still unmentionable around government offices and officially forbidden by law” (Lee, 2002, p. 87). Lee (2002) explained Congress’ efforts: “Congress tried futilely to reduce public relations in the Defense Department while other initiatives focused on reducing, controlling and auditing public relations activities in federal agencies. At times, presidents have joined in with Congress’s PR-bashing, such as Nixon and Reagan” (Lee, 2002, p. 88). An explanation of the reasoning behind the public relations debate is made by Pimlott (1951) in his book, *Public Relations and American Democracy*:

The reasons go deep into the American political system. The controversy over the limitations which should be set upon federal government public relations springs from the fear lest programs undertaken in the name of administrative efficiency should result in an excessive concentration of power in the Executive. This fear is shared by Congress, the states, and the pressure and other groups which, though unrecognized by the Constitution, compete with the constitutional organs in the *de facto* exercise of power. What is more, government public relations threatens the members of Congress not only in Washington but in his constituency where he has traditionally been the chief spokesman of the central government and the chief medium of communication with the capital. (p. 72)
Therefore, given these hostile sentiments toward public relations, it is surprising that the government came close to establishing a wartime agency called the Public Relations Administration (PRA) as part of its administrative structure to handle the necessities of World War II (Lee, 2002, p. 88).

The initial plan of the PRA, the Industrial Mobilization Plan (IMP), was drafted by the War Department and presented to the War Policies Commission in 1931. In General Douglas MacArthur’s opening statement to the Commission he stated:

> Public opinion is the most potent force in war. The US will never enter a war except in response to insistent popular demand, incited by foreign aggression, and consequently the government will have initially the complete support of a high national morale. Maintenance of this morale will depend on the effectiveness of national efforts against the external enemy and upon the justice and fairness of government programs as applied to our own population. (War Policies Commission, 1931, p. 376)

In order to preserve a “high national morale” the PRA was resolved to use public relations tactics to target public opinion. The plan for the PRA changed many times over the course of eight years (1931-1939), but its divisions and professionals resembled those of a public relations firm. Ultimately, the PRA was dissolved under the authority of FDR upon its final submission in 1939 due to his concerns of losing control because of its centralization (Lee, 2002, p. 94). Even though the PRA never entered into existence, its objectives live on in the modern-day goals of the State Department’s Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

Public diplomacy and public affairs can be seen as mechanisms to enforce “soft power,” described by Nye and Owens (1996) in the following:

> “Soft power” is the ability to achieve desired outcomes in international affairs through attraction rather than coercion. It works by convincing others to follow, or getting them to agree to, norms and institutions that produce the desired behavior. Soft power can rest on the appeal of one’s ideas or the ability to set the agenda in ways that shape the preferences of others. If a state can make its power legitimate
in the perception of others and establish international institutions that encourage
them to channel or limit their activities, it may not need to expend as many of its
costly traditional economic or military resources. (Ostick, 2002, p.3)

This “soft power” ideal uses gentle convincing to stimulate choice. Ostick (2002) agrees
with such strategies when he writes, “Done properly, public diplomacy reinforces
positive images of the United States and engenders greater understanding of its interests
and objectives. Favorable, or at least informed, public opinion will then make easier the
jobs of men and women working at traditional state-to-state diplomacy” (p. 3). However,
not all agree that this is always the case in the government’s strategies to influence public
opinion.

Signitzer and Coombs (1992) find that public diplomacy is the way activist groups
(including governments and pressure groups) influence public opinion to shape a
government’s foreign policy decisions (p. 138). More specifically, they show how public
opinion is swayed by using persuasion and propaganda through the dissemination of
political information by way of the news media (p. 138). They address the “truth” of this
information in the following: “Objectivity and truth are considered important tools of
persuasion but not extolled as virtues themselves . . . the supreme criterion for public
diplomacy is the raison d’état defined in terms of fairly short-term policy end” (p. 140).
Therefore, the role of public relations and propaganda in public diplomacy and public
affairs must be questioned. L’Etang says that public relations is “influential and
interventionist in national policies” and that how it is received depends on “one’s
political position, one’s culture and the case in hand” (p. 23). However, at its core, public
diplomacy is “the process by which a government can contribute to a public opinion
environment favorable to the accomplishment of its foreign policy objectives” (Ostick,
As long as public opinion is being affected in relation to foreign affairs so are foreign policies.

**Public Opinion**

Public opinion is integral in the development of messages and is approached differently according to the intended purpose. Nelson (1995) defines public opinion in the following:

Oral and visual expression of individual views about issues of common concern that collectively contribute to the steady stream of competing ideas. Public opinion involves arousal of latent attitudes to the point that they affect internal thought or external behavior . . . . Public opinion is usually measured by tracking polls, ranging from intercept studies in which citizens are buttonholed on the street to more sophisticated random surveys designed to scientifically measure a predetermined range of error. The results play an important role in formulating policy . . . . Some social scientists make a distinction between long-term public opinion which exhibits stability and shorter-term public opinion, which is volatile and more subject to propagandistic manipulation. (p. 242)

Nelson’s definition encompasses all that public opinion represents and what it affects. However, public opinion can manifest itself in different forms depending upon the issue and the population. Mitchell (1970) offers four forms of public opinion: (a) popular opinion as generalized support for an institution, regime, or political system (as opposed to apathy, withdrawal or alienation); (b) patterns of group loyalties and identifications; (c) public preferences for select leaders; and (d) intensely held opinions prevalent among a large public regarding public issues and current affairs (pp. 60-61). Each form has an impact on public policy and political agendas in general. In this section we will look at how public opinion is targeted and its relationship with public relations and the media.

**Targeting Public Opinion**

As we have already seen, managing public opinion is one of the primary roles of public diplomats, public affairs officers and public relations practitioners. Realizing the
power of public opinion is nothing new. The diplomat Sir Harold Nicolson credited Richelieu as being the first to realize that “no policy could succeed unless it had national opinion behind it” (L’Etang, 1996, p. 17). Richelieu acknowledged the concept of “opinion leaders” or “opinion formers” since he sought to “inform, and above all to instruct, those who influenced the thoughts and feelings of the people as a whole. He was the first to introduce a system of domestic propaganda” (p. 17). This domestic propaganda took the form of pamphlets intended to educate and “create a body of informed opinion favourable [sic] to his policies” (p. 17). Today, the system of targeting public opinion has not changed substantially.

One of the first steps to targeting public opinion is identifying the target audience or public and determining their opinion. Public opinion polling, started in the 1930s, has “come to play an increasingly critical role in the political process” (Altschull, 1995, p. 166). It has been utilized primarily as a tool of the “image-making process” (p. 166). However, according to Atschull (1995), the concept’s pioneer, George H. Gallup, “was convinced when he launched his Institute of Public Opinion in 1935 that he would provide a tool to learn what American people truly believed, not, he said, the lies they were being fed by vested interests” (p. 166).

Furthermore, it is not just private organizations and the media that take opinion polls. Political pollsters use polling as a strategy to reach a desired ends in political campaigns. Altschull (1995) points out, however, “the media’s purpose in conducting polls is different from the goals of pollsters for politicians” (p. 168). He quotes Wirthlin of the Reagan campaign, “Our concern is to predict movement and how to make the movement occur in whatever direction we want them to move and to attenuate movement
in the wrong direction” (p. 168). It can be assumed then that the goal of the political pollsters is to create images to shape public opinion rather than to find facts (p. 168).

The communicator also must consider the type of publics targeted in order to ensure the successful reception of a message that will ideally affect public opinion. A public’s reception can be categorized as one of two types of publics: an “active” and a “passive” public. J. Grunig (1993) characterizes these groups in the following:

**Passive** publics are exposed to news haphazardly and seldom develop broad or deep cognitions from the exposure. They can be influenced by biased and manipulated media coverage, but the effect is not deep and does not last long. On hot issues, such as the Gulf War, passive publics can be influenced enough to affect opinion polls or to produce expressions of support or opposition – but seldom to affect behaviors. (p. 159)

**Active** publics, in contrast, seek out information on problems or issues that involve them and that they recognize as problems. They seek information from the media, but they seek it from other sources as well – such as interest groups or personal contacts. Limited or biased media coverage thus is more of a hindrance to active publics than an influence on their behavior. It simply makes the development of understanding more difficult. (p. 159)

It can be assumed, then, that in order to sway public opinion for short-term gratifications, the message would be manipulated and targeted at a passive public. Sometimes this can be accomplished by targeting opinion leaders in the active public who have direct influence on the passive public.

There are other theories as to how political opinions are developed. The audience autonomy assumption, for example, “provides the basis for the minimal consequences position that audiences develop their political opinions in relative independence from the media” (Entman, 1989, p. 76). However, there are two variations on this view: (1) “audiences think about communications selectively, screening out information they do not like” and (2) “audiences pay so little attention and understand so little that the news cannot influence them” (Entman, 1989, p. 76). On the other hand, in response to this
“minimal effects” model, Entman points out that “the only means of influencing what people think is precisely to control what they think about” (p. 77). This is accomplished through agenda setting, which states, “The menu of news and other information made available to audiences by media decision-makers ultimately defines what is considered significant” (Nelson, 1995, p. 118).

Another approach is the information processing theory, which is founded on the idea that a message is processed based on its salience to the audience member. If it is processed it is either stored or discarded, but only if it is stored can it stimulate new beliefs or change old beliefs (Entman, 1989, p. 78). In this case, an active public would be the most likely to change their beliefs or behavior.

Finally, whether or not public opinion is targeted to achieve a behavior change, or simply a change in that opinion, depends on the objectives of the communicator. Chapter three will discuss the various strategies and techniques taken by public relations practitioners and propagandists to influence opinion. But first, we must look at how public relations and the press relate to public opinion.

**Public Relations and Public Opinion**

According to Lasswell (1941), “The most specialized propagandist is the ‘public relations counsel’ who serves several clients. Often he is an ‘idea man’ and works with a small staff. Or he may run a shop large enough to turn out a metropolitan newspaper” (p. 38). In any case, public relations practitioners are hired to make an impact on a group of people by certain means of their craft. These means manifest themselves in different ways, but all are aimed at altering the opinion of a certain group of people. This section will look at how public relations strategists and scholars approach public opinion.
When targeting opinion, public relations, advertising and political campaigns must first identify a “public” or “target audience.” A British author, Frank Jefkins (1994), makes the argument that advertising is directed at target audiences while public relations objectives are directed toward publics (p. 104). However, Nelson (1995) defines the word “public” in the following:

From the standpoint of public opinion, a public is a group of people with common interests or similar opinions on an issue capable of controversy. Generally, publics are not so much self-defined by their background and life-style profiles, as measured by demographics and psychographics, but rather identified as stakeholders by an organization seeking to influence them as a “target audience.” Something can be “made public” if it appears in the news. (p. 238)

This definition approaches “public” and “target audience” as one and the same.

More importantly, Jefkins (1994) stresses the influence that opinion leaders or “formers” have on the public. He defines opinion leaders as “any people who, whether well- or ill-informed, may express opinions and influence people because of their apparent authority” (p. 104). He goes on to divide opinion leaders into the following groups:

- Parents, teachers, academics, doctors, clergymen.
- Central and local government politicians, political party politicians, trade union leaders.
- Civil servants and local government officers, officials of quangos.¹
- Commentators, presenters.
- Journalists and authors, radio and TV personalities.
- Authorities on specialized subjects, who may write, lecture or broadcast.
- Advisory services and information bureaux [sic].
- Officials of societies, institutions, trade associations and professional bodies.

(p. 104)

¹“quasi autonomous non government organizations” in the UK government
The use of these opinion leaders gives the message credibility and, possibly, more exposure. A passive public might pay even more attention to information disseminated by a leader as opposed to an unknown source that cannot relate to their self-interest.

Self-interest is another factor of public opinion that public relations practitioners consider. All too often a public may bypass certain information that does not impact them directly. This is relevant especially in the case of foreign affairs. According to Wilcox, Ault and Agee (2003) self-interest is inherent in all definitions of public opinion (p. 209):

1. Public opinion is the collective expression of opinion of many individuals bound into a group by common aims, aspirations, needs, and ideals.

2. People who are interested or who have a vested or self-interest in an issue—or who can be affected by the outcome of the issue—form public opinion on that particular item.

3. Psychologically, opinion basically is determined by self-interest. Events, words, or any other stimuli affect public opinion only insofar as their relationship to self-interest or a general concern is apparent.

4. Opinion does not remain aroused for any long period of time unless people feel their self-interest is acutely involved or unless opinion—aroused by words—is sustained by events.

5. Once self-interest is involved, opinion is not easily changed. (p. 209)

It is logical that an organization would try to appeal to a particular audience that shares the interest of its objective, or that it would alter its own objectives to include interests of the public being targeted in order to receive a desired outcome. According to Kunczik (1990), “In all countries the great majority of people are totally disinterested in international affairs and a small group of people are well-informed. It is these opinion leaders and decision makers one has to reach” (p.254).
Finally, the factor most relevant to periods of conflict is how events affect public opinion. Wilcox et al. (2003) point out how events affect public opinion in the following:

1. Opinion is highly sensitive to events that have an impact on the public at large or a particular segment of the public.

2. By and large, public opinion does not anticipate events. It only reacts to them.

3. Events trigger formation of public opinion. Unless people are aware of an issue, they are not likely to be concerned or have an opinion. Awareness and discussion lead to crystallizing of opinions and often a consensus among the public.

4. Events of unusual magnitude are likely to swing public opinion temporarily from one extreme to another. Opinion does not stabilize until the implication of the event with some perspective. (p. 210)

Although some smaller staged events (like speeches, conventions, etc.) can have an impact on public opinion, “Events of unusual magnitude are likely to swing public opinion temporarily from one extreme to another. Opinion does not stabilize until the implication of the event is seen with some perspective” (p. 231). The outbreak of war and terrorism are only some of these events with “unusual magnitude” that can push opinion in a direction that either supports or challenges the policy objectives of the government.

The media is present in most if not all methods of reaching the public to influence public opinion. Public relations practitioners are often able to develop relationships with reporters to get their message across. Noam Chomsky (MIT) puts this relationship under scrutiny in the following:

In a liberal-democratic society like the United States the combined interests of the state and organized economic concerns prefer (and require) the instrument of propaganda, rather than coercion, to bring the mass of people into line with establishment objectives. The mass media, especially network television, serve as the government’s and corporate business’ main pipeline in creating public consensus. They do this by giving the widest possible coverage to a narrow list of
approved and reliable ‘experts’ who know all too well who butters their bread. (Sussman, 1997, p. 153)

The media plays an integral role in reaching out to the mass population and, therefore, is an invaluable tool in pushing through policy objectives. Some agree with the idea that media is simply a tool; others do not.

**Public Opinion and the Media**

In his book *Agents of Power*, Altschull (1995) argues that the only way the “wielders of power” or the “shapers of public policy” can be effective is to “maintain control over their populations in the macro arena of ideas and beliefs and in the micro arena composed of the channels of communication—newspapers, radio, and television” (p. xi). In her book *The Other Side of the Story*, Powell (1984) tells the following story to illustrate the power of the press over public opinion and foreign policy-making:

At the conclusion of a half-hour CBS news special on the status of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam in March 1968, Walter Cronkite concluded that the war was not winnable and the U.S. government should negotiate its way out of Vietnam. As the story goes, President Johnson turned to his aids and declared that if Walter Cronkite thought the war was over, so would the rest of the country. (p. 233 quoted in Davis, 1992, p. 216)

The power of media over the public is irrefutable. However, the question is: who has power over the media?

Many scholars believe that the media have the power to change public opinion and, in turn, shape public policy independent from the government (O’Heffernan, 1991 & Kelly, 1993). However, Altschull (1995) argues, “It is not the media that shape public opinion. It is, rather, the holders of power who shape public opinion by using the media as their agents. If the media were to attempt to move public opinion into a position contrary to what is desired by the holders of power, the power holders would
counterattack” (p. 155). He uses the following quote from Tönnies (1963) to further illustrate his point:

The press is the real instrument of public opinion, a weapon and tool in the hands of those who know how to use it and have to use it; it possesses universal power as the dreaded critic of events and changes in social conditions. It is comparable and, in some respects, superior to the material power which the states possess through their armies, their treasuries, and their bureaucratic service. (Altschull, 1995, p. 145)

Atschull (1995) says that Tönnies believed, “Only a press that was financed by circulation alone, free of advertising and not in the control of paymasters of any kind, could be expected to be free of propaganda and psychological pressures” (p. 145).

Regardless of how the government uses the media to manipulate public opinion, it is important to remember the role that the media plays in government. Altschull (1995) calls this the AWA role—adversary, watchdog, and agenda setter (p. 150). In this sense the media can be seen as a close observer of the government’s activities, an adversary to those activities if need be, and the government’s competition in setting the agenda of public opinion. Davis (1991) contends that the media also may act as a “participant” in policymaking through the actual “advocacy of policy options” (p. 198). This is done through the editorial page and other subtler advocacy measures such as framing and the omission of “available alternatives” (p. 198). It is clear that the media are the direct link between the government and the domestic and foreign publics; therein lays their power.

Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

The link between opinion and policy is at the very heart of the democratic process.

The public policy process is explained by Nelson (1995) in the following:

At the nexus of politics and policy development lies persistent conflict over problem definition: where issues come from, what they signify for public opinion, and what kinds of solutions should be pursued. The greater the impact a proposed governmental action may have on particular individuals and institutions, the more
likely an issue is to be contested. In a representative democracy, the public policy process thus involves the resolution of the toughest issues through lobbying, debate and compromise between interest groups, government officials, journalists, political analysts, and other activists. The consensus eventually reached is reflected in laws and regulations that members of a society are expected to obey. (p. 242)

Before such a consensus can be reached in a democratic government the citizenry must be consulted and offer their support. Speier (1950) states the following regarding this “right”:

In its most attenuated form this right asserts itself as the expectation that the government will reveal and explain its decisions in order to enable people outside the government to think and talk about these decisions, or to put it in terms of democratic amenities, in order to assure “the success” of the government’s policy. (Jowett & O’Donnell, 1999, p. 44)

It can be assumed that a “successful” government policy is one that has been mandated through the approval of the people whom it affects. We have discussed already how the government can influence public opinion by means of the media. Now we will look at how public opinion transfers to the creation of foreign policy.

In his (1978) book, The Public and American Foreign policy, 1918-1978, Ralph B. Levering puts forward that even though the importance of public opinion to American foreign policy is clear, “critics of public involvement have tended to overlook the strong influence that governmental officials can have on public opinion” (Preface). For example, in World War II the Roosevelt administration was integral in developing more amiable attitudes toward Russia (Preface). Just as after the war, “the Truman administration helped to create and solidify the image of Russia as an enemy of the United States” (Preface). Levering goes on to say that in order to influence public opinion, “officials often have received invaluable assistance from the news media, which normally devote much of their coverage of foreign affairs to transmitting information about official policies and the rationales for them” (Preface).
Regarding war and the images of nations between 1918 and 1978, Levering (1978) suggests, “public officials have been able to ‘educate’ the majority of the American people in regard to attitudes toward particular foreign nations” (p. 151). He uses Russia and Japan as examples. Russia was treated with “extreme hostility” in the late 1910s and 1940s and came into a “relative friendship” in the early 1940s and 1970s (p. 151). Both the American government and the public viewed Japan as an enemy in 1931 and 1945, but since World War II, economic, military and diplomatic ties have resulted in favorable attitudes (p.151). This suggests that foreign policy also can be a determinant of public opinion.

According to Destler, Gelb and Lake (1988), a model of public opinion developed in the late 1970s by political scientist John E. Mueller maintained that until the late 1960s public opinion of foreign policy fell into three categories:

- A leadership stratum of small numbers with shared views on ends and means;
- An attentive and educated group who “followed” Presidential and elite leadership in their internationalism and Cold War interventionist policies;
- A noninternationalist mass public that knew and cared little for foreign affairs and generally backed a two-track policy of peace and strength. (p. 23)

However, in his 1984 analysis, William Schneider found that in the 1960s “this pattern began to come apart . . . because of ideological polarization within the leadership stratum.” (Destler et al., 1988, p. 23). According to Schneider, “Counter-elites emerged on both the right and the left to challenge the supremacy of the old foreign-policy establishment” (p. 23). This split the followers and ended consensus while increased television news of foreign affairs caused the mass public to become more “activist and difficult to lead” (p. 23). This can be considered a turning point at which public opinion
stopped existing simply to be manipulated and became a greater consideration in the development of foreign policy.

Furthermore, a series of Gallup polls taken between 1940 and 1973 found that American leaders and the public, in ranking ‘the most important problems facing the country,’ almost always assigned highest priority to foreign-policy and security issues. The surveys taken 10 years after 1973 revealed a shift toward domestic issues—especially inflation and unemployment and access to energy supplies. (Rielly, 1988, p. 46)

However, at the time this material was published (1988), there had been a shift back toward sensitivity to foreign affairs. In simpler terms, foreign policy problems “more than doubled in importance” for the American people and leaders in the 1980s (p. 46).

In a study conducted by Page & Shapiro in 1983, an examination of U.S. public opinion and policy data was conducted for the period between 1935 and 1979 (p. 175). They found “considerable congruence between changes in preferences and in policies, especially for large, stable opinion changes on salient issues” and they “present evidence that public opinion is often a proximate cause of policy, affecting policy more than policy influences opinion” (p. 175). The study was “based on 357 instances of opinion change, for all of which we have been able to code covariational congruence (or noncongruence) using at least one suitable measure of government policy” (p. 177) between 1935 and 1979. These included both domestic and foreign policies.

Their findings found that, in general, policy change was congruent with opinion change in 66 percent of the 231 cases. The following is one of their findings:

Among cases of very large change in public opinion, by contrast (to small changes), policy almost always goes in the same direction as opinion. When there is opinion change of 20 percentage points or more, policy change is congruent an overwhelming 90 percent of the time. (p. 180)

Page and Shapiro (1983) also found, unexpectedly, that there was no difference between domestic and foreign issues. They write, “One might think congruence should be more
frequent on domestic than foreign policy issues, since the public presumably tends to care more about matters close to home and is more insistent that politicians follow its wishes on domestic policy” (p. 182). On the other hand, they continue, “We might expect congruence of a different sort on foreign policy issues. Precisely because the public tends to be less involved and has less information, it might be easier for officials to change policy and get citizens to go along” (p. 182). They found, however, that the congruence for domestic issues (70 percent) was only slightly larger than foreign issues (62 percent), which reversed their preliminary data set (p. 182).

Page and Shapiro (1983) also consider a third factor that may affect opinion and policy in foreign affairs. However, they argue, “When some third factor affects both opinion and policy, it tends to affect policy through opinion; policy changes only because opinion changes” (p. 186). They use the following examples:

From April 1948 to June 1949, public opposition to military aid for the Nationalist China rose 16 percentage points; during the period from March to September 1949, disapproval of the Marshall Plan rose 14 percentage points; and from March of that year to April 1950, more people thought we were spending too much on European recovery (a change of 19 percentage points). From November 1950 to August 1952 (continuing through March 1955), more of the public thought that aid to “backward” countries was a good idea (a 15 percentage-point shift in opinion). In all of these cases government-assistance expenditures, in constant dollars moved contrary to opinion until the year after a significant opinion shift had occurred, and then moved congruently . . . . A more striking case of policy following the lead of opinion was the United States’ support for the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. Support among Americans for admission rose 33 percentage points from January 1964 to May 1971, with a 13 percentage-point shift by 1966. (pp. 186-187)

The study conducted by Page and Shapiro supports both sides of the argument: policy affects opinion and opinion affects policy. Nonetheless, the study provides a significant amount of support for the argument that foreign policy is affected by public opinion.
James Kelly of *Time* makes the point that even the President of the United States is not immune to the effects of the media in making policy decisions. He uses the example of how President Reagan was said to be “touched by coverage of the plight of families of the hostages held in Lebanon, which spurred the Iran arms-for-hostages deal. Also, Reagan reportedly acted to limit Israeli bombing in Lebanon after viewing highly emotional film clips of civilian casualties from the bombing” (Davis, 1992, p. 217). The images of war have often inspired action. This action can be as simple as a citizen’s enrollment in the armed forces or as complex as the declaration of war. In either case, public opinion is a fundamental component of the decision to take action and to ultimately develop foreign policy.

**Conclusion**

The use of propagandistic tactics in government communications with the domestic public may have an adverse effect on the process of foreign policy formulation. Although public policy is fashioned by Congress, the will of the people is the ultimate justification for its legitimacy. Manipulation of public opinion through the use of public relations tactics, which may be less informational than propagandistic, may contribute to an uninformed citizenry incapable of making responsible decisions concerning the development of foreign policy. Editor of *Public Relations Review*, Ray E. Hiebert (1991) argues the following:

> I would suggest that to insure some continuity, which is essential for stable government, and especially for winning a war, public officials must exercise leadership in winning the collective mind of the people. And political leaders today use public communication and public relations to do just that – to inform, influence, change, or at least neutralize public opinion. (p. 108)
Rather than the public determining the direction of foreign policy, agenda setters within government often use propagandistic public relations techniques to manipulate public opinion to support special interest foreign policy initiatives.

According to Lasswell (1941), “Democracy needs citizens who believe that they can understand what is going on in the world; Democracy needs citizens who believe that they can influence public life, either by individual or collective expression” (p. 40). In the 1940s Lasswell made the claim that the American public had a “light anxiety neurosis” on the subject of propaganda and being misled in general. He states the following concerning this:

Citizens may convince themselves that it is hopeless to get the truth about public affairs. If magazines, newspapers, radio reports and news reels are believed to be manipulated by powerful influences for selfish ends, the effect on attitudes may be this: “If you can’t believe anything you read in the papers, or hear over the radio, or see on the screen, what’s the use of trying to use your mind at all?” (p. 40)

He goes on to suggest the following questions to cure citizens of this “neurosis”:

1. What of it? That is, how is this communication probably affected by deliberate efforts to influence opinion in controversial questions?

2. Is it propaganda? That is, how is this communication probably affected by deliberate efforts to influence opinion on controversial questions?

3. Is it true? By comparing several independent reports, we may select the account of the reported event that is most accurate.

4. Are the sentences consistent with one another? Are the meanings economically expressed? (pp. 42-43)

These questions offer an aid in identifying possible propagandistic forms of communication. However, it is important to take a more detailed look at what entails propaganda and public relations. The next chapter will take a closer look at some of the strategies and techniques that the government might use to sway public opinion in order to achieve their policymaking objectives.
CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW: THE STRATEGIES, TECHNIQUES AND MODELS OF PUBLIC RELATIONS AND PROPAGANDA

Overview

The effects of public diplomacy and public affairs on public opinion that were discussed in the previous chapter brings into question what strategies and techniques are being used by the government to reach their policymaking goals. One could contend that public relations is the same as public diplomacy and public affairs, but it can be argued also that public relations is propaganda. The danger is in linking public diplomacy and public affairs with propaganda. Ostick (2002) explains that in reality the reasoning behind the separation is “the activity we call public diplomacy has more prestige than the work of the mere public relations or partisan political strategic communications, which are often portrayed as ignoble and vulgar when compared with the public service inherent in public diplomacy” (pp. 6-7). However, according to J. Grunig (1993), “Although concern about the effects and ethics of international public relations activities seems to be recent, public relations firms and counselors have in fact been working for governments and other international organizations at least throughout this century” (p. 149). If public relations is present in the government, then can it be assumed that propaganda is too? The communication techniques and models used by public relations practitioners and propagandists will be discussed in this chapter for the basis of comparison in the study.

The Interchangeability of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Techniques

Philip C. Habib, a veteran diplomat, states, “The word diplomacy means ‘outside’ and has nothing to do with the American people” (Ostic, 2002, p. 6). In discussing and
analyzing political communication, many authors exclude the domestic audience when addressing public diplomacy. Although in most cases public diplomacy is defined in terms of government communications with a foreign audience, alternative views have become apparent in the literature. Signitzer and Coombs (1992) define public diplomacy as “the way in which both government and private individuals and groups influence directly or indirectly those public attitudes and opinions which bear directly on another government’s foreign policy decisions” (p. 138). In this definition they do not specify whether the attitudes and opinion targeted belong to a domestic or foreign audience. Signitzer and Coombs (1992) further point out this discrepancy in the following description of public diplomacy by German author Koschwitz (1986):

> Interestingly, Koschwitz, a German, appears to be the only public diplomacy theorist to make explicit use of the term ‘public relations’ when describing public diplomacy activities, albeit in its German meaning as Öffentlichkeitsarbeit (work done in/for/by the public). Koschwitz also adds the adjective auslansgerichtet which is meant to specify that he is talking (only) about public relations “directed at foreign publics” which seems to exclude the logical possibility of any “domestic public diplomacy.” (p. 140)

Furthermore, while Tuch (1988) argues that those public affairs programs aimed at domestic audiences and public diplomacy directed at foreign audiences “are not the same in concept, intent, audience or method” (p. 8), Ostick (2002) maintains that the “functions differ only in audience and all other differences spring from the necessary adapting of message and medium to suit the target audience” (p. 5). According to Ostick (2002), many agree with Tuch’s ideals—that public diplomacy is “separate and unique” (p. 6).

For the purpose of this study, we will approach public affairs and public diplomacy as one in the same in terms of their strategies and techniques. L’Etang (1996) makes the point, “Diplomacy, it seems, is only interesting insofar as it contributes to specific political decisions or crises and is treated descriptively rather than analytically” (p. 24).
Therefore, according to L’Etang, diplomacy is not “a field of study in itself,” but is “a technique used to achieve certain ends” (p. 24). By maintaining that the “ends” are the same—to change public opinion—we can assume that the strategies of public diplomacy and public affairs are interchangeable.

**Public Affairs**

The previous chapter examined the current U.S. Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs under the State Department. It is clear from the structure of the office that its function is to communicate with both the domestic and foreign publics in order to reach foreign policymaking goals. However, the public affairs divisions of government in general have set objectives that should be explored further. The *Public Affairs Handbook*, edited by Joseph Nagelschmidt (1982), says that public affairs is “a management function concerned with the relationship between the organization and its external environment, and involving the key tasks of intelligence gathering and analysis, internal communication, and external action programs directed at government, communities, and the general public” (p. 290). William Ragan, former director of public affairs for the United States Civil Service Commission, summarizes the general objectives of government information efforts in the following:

1. Inform the public about the public’s business. In other words, communicate the work of government agencies.

2. Improve the effectiveness of agency operations through appropriate public information techniques. In other words, explain agency programs so that citizens understand and can take actions necessary to benefit from them.

3. Provide feedback to government administrators so that programs and policies can be modified, amended, or continued.

4. Advise management on how best to communicate a decision or a program to the widest number of citizens.
5. Serve as an ombudsman. Represent the public and listen to its representatives. Make sure that the individual problems of the taxpayer are satisfactorily solved.
6. Educate administrators with media representatives. (Wilcox et al., 2003, pp. 362-363)

In order to deliver these messages, it is common for the government to use news releases, news conferences, reports, information bulletins, posters, special events, exhibits, broadcast public service announcements, brochures, and even paid advertising by government bodies (Wilcox et al., 1989, p. 375). However, as already discussed, such modes of delivery and the content of each message are regulated by laws and codes.

The objectives described by Ragan could be substituted easily for the goals of any public relations campaign. However, instead of titling it “public relations” the titles of public information officer, director of public affairs, press secretary, or administrative aid are used (Wilcox et al., 2003, p. 362). Government agencies are the same. They usually have a public affairs office, an office of communication, an external affairs office (FBI) or even an office of public awareness (EPA). Wilcox et al. (2003) state, “Such euphemisms serve to reconcile two essentially contradictory facts: (1) the government needs to inform its citizens and (2) it is against the law to use appropriated money for the employment of ‘publicity experts’” (p. 263). The Gillett Amendment reads, “appropriated funds may not be used to pay a publicity expert unless specifically appropriated for that purpose” (p. 263). This law is enough for government organizations to avoid labeling public affairs as public relations, although this does not prevent them from using the same strategies.

**Public Diplomacy**

William A. Ostick (2002), a Foreign Service officer with the U.S. Department of State, argues the following in his paper “Public Relations, U.S. Public Diplomacy and Foreign Policy Public Affairs”: “public diplomacy – as an aspect of U.S. foreign policy –
should properly be seen as public relations focused on building long-term relationships with foreign audiences and providing policy explication and advocacy for the United States” (p. 2). As we will see, the models of public diplomacy do, in fact, bear a striking resemblance to public relations. It is important to remember, however, that the public diplomacy models and their attributes can be applied easily as techniques of public affairs.

**Tough-Minded vs. Tender-Minded School of Public Diplomacy**

Signitzer and Coombs (1992) use the “tough-minded” and the “tender-minded” distinction of public diplomacy developed by James (1955) and Deibel and Roberts (1976) to broadly explain the two extremes of public diplomacy. Signitzer and Coombs (1992) explain the tough-minded school in the following:

The tough-minded hold that the purpose of public diplomacy is to exert an influence on attitudes of foreign audiences using persuasion and propaganda. Hard political information is considered more important than cultural programs. Fast media such as radio, television, newspapers, and news magazines are given preference over other forms of communication. Objectivity and the truth are considered important tools of persuasion but not extolled as virtues in themselves. Supreme criterion for public diplomacy is the raison d’État defined in terms of fairly short-term policy ends. (p. 140)

Whereas the tough-minded approach may be seen as the political function of public diplomacy, the tender-minded approach is more concerned with the cultural communication function as seen in the following:

The tender-minded school argues that information and cultural programs must bypass current foreign policy goals to concentrate on the highest long-range national objectives. The goal is to create a climate of mutual understanding. Public diplomacy is seen as a predominately cultural function as opposed to the conveying of hard political information. Slow media such as films, exhibitions, language instruction, academic and artistic exchanges with a view toward transmitting messages about lifestyles, political and economic systems, and artistic achievements are used. Truth and veracity are considered essential, much more than a mere persuasive act. (p. 140)
Viewed individually, the tough-minded and tender-minded schools of public diplomacy are two very different approaches to communicating with the public. However, Deibel and Robert (1976) clearly point out that for public diplomacy programs to be effective the two schools should be synthesized. They say that the first and primary responsibility of public diplomacy is to “explain and defend government policies to foreign audiences,” and secondarily, that of “portraying that national society in total to foreign audiences” (p. 15).


The discussion of the media and public opinion in the previous chapter elucidated the government’s use of the media as a device or tool for influencing public opinion to meet policymaking goals. Gilboa (2000) contributes to the claim that the media is necessary to communicate messages in public affairs and public diplomacy and can be manipulated to serve their purposes. Gilboa’s (2000) study on media and diplomacy offers six conceptual models that “serve in defining and analyzing the role of the media in contemporary diplomacy” (p. 275). He explains the study further in the following:

In this study diplomacy refers to a communication system through which representatives of states and international or global actors, including elected and appointed officials, express and defend their interests, state their grievances, and issue threats and ultimatums. It is a channel of contact for clarifying positions, probing for information, and convincing states and other actors to support one’s position. (p. 275)

The study divides the models into two groups. The first group consists of three models - secret diplomacy, closed-door diplomacy and open diplomacy. Each deal with “the limitations officials impose on media coverage and the degree to which negotiations are exposed to the media and public opinion” (p. 275). The second group includes public diplomacy, media diplomacy, and media-broker diplomacy, which “deal with extensive
utilization of the media by officials and sometimes by journalists to promote negotiations” (p. 275).

In the first group, the secret diplomacy and closed-door diplomacy models are excluded from this discussion due to the tactical exclusion of the media from negotiations and, therefore, the exclusion of communication with the public. Secret diplomacy is the “total isolation and exclusion of the media and the public from negotiations and related policymaking” (Gilboa, 2000, p. 278). Closed-door diplomacy “refers to the method of limiting the media to exposure of mostly technical aspects of the negotiating process, but excluding the more substantive aspects” (p. 282). Although the government has some level of communication with the public “participants are effectively isolated from their respective domestic public opinions, from opposition forces, pressure groups, other states, international organizations, and transnational actors, as long as the negotiations continue” (p. 283). These models are, in fact, diplomatic strategies utilized by the government, but they lack the public relations/propagandistic qualities being studied in this analysis.

The open diplomacy model, on the other hand, “refers to negotiations that are readily accessible to the media and to public scrutiny and debate” (Gilboa, 2000, p. 286). It is “open” in the respect that it includes “extensive and direct media coverage of international negotiations [. . . where] negotiators frequently conduct official press conferences, hold briefings, grant interviews, and even allow reporters access to conference rooms” (p. 286). Whereas government officials shy away from the media in the secretive and closed-door models, they “invest considerable energy and resources, directly or indirectly through spokespersons and communication directors, in efforts to shape media coverage according to their interests and needs” (p. 287). Strategies such as
frequent press conferences, press and video releases, background meetings, briefings, official reports released to the media, events staged for the media, media tours and arrangements for traveling media, meetings with editors and editorial boards, leaks, supported op-ed articles and results of public opinion polls all contribute to an open-diplomacy model (p. 287).

The second group of models, composed of public diplomacy, media diplomacy and media-broker diplomacy, illustrate the instrumental use of the media for foreign policy goals. Again, while all of these are viable strategies of diplomacy, the media-broker diplomacy model excludes government-public interaction. This model illustrates situations in which “journalists temporarily assume the role of diplomats and serve as mediators in international negotiations” (Gilboa, 2000, p. 290). However, this interaction is apparent in public diplomacy, “where state and nonstate actors use the media and other channels of communication to influence public opinion in foreign societies,” and media diplomacy, “where officials use the media to promote conflict resolution” (p. 290).

Gilboa’s (2000) analysis of the strategies of public diplomacy is similar to those already discussed except that he specifies the “channels” used for their delivery. For political communication the chosen channel is the mass media, especially international broadcasting (p. 291). Cultural communication includes channels such as student/scholar exchanges, festivals and exhibitions, teaching a language, establishing friendship leagues, trade associations, cultural centers, etc. (p. 291). He states, “The mass media channels are used to affect the mass public directly; the other mostly cultural channels are oriented toward elite audiences believed to have influence on public opinion” (p. 291). Not only does this model condone the hiring of public relations firms and professionals to achieve
its aims, but it also includes the utilization of scientific knowledge and public opinion research or “strategic public diplomacy” (p. 292).

Media diplomacy, similar to public diplomacy, is “pursued through various routine and special media activities, including press conferences, interviews, and leaks, as well as visits of heads of state and mediators in rival countries and spectacular media events organized to usher in a new era” (Gilboa, 2000, p. 295). Gilboa (2000) explains the difference: “public diplomacy, when the sides are involved in a confrontation and their goal is propaganda, and media diplomacy, when they seek, sometimes jointly, rapprochement and wish to end the conflict through negotiations” (p. 294). Furthermore, he expounds, “In many ways, public diplomacy precedes media diplomacy and prepares the respective publics for conflict resolution” (p. 294).

According to Gilboa (2000) and several other authors (Claude, 1965; Pearce, 1995; Hindell, 1995; Eban, 1998), “Exposing diplomacy to the media and public opinion created a ‘new diplomacy’ with new rules, techniques, and immense implications for government officials, diplomats, journalists, and the public. Many of these techniques can be found in the models of public relations and propaganda” (p. 275).

**Public Relations**

There have been a myriad of definitions of public relations and public relations practitioners. The definitions range from the neutral and functional: “public relations is the attempt by information, persuasion and adjustment to engineer public support for an activity, cause, movement or institution” (Bernays, 1955) to the more widely held critical definition that it is “the manipulation of public behavior for the benefit of the manipulated publics as well as the sponsoring organizations” (J. Grunig, 1989, p. 18-19).
Regardless of how it is defined its objectives and methods are fairly straightforward and universal.

Bernays (1955) suggests the following steps to carry out public relations effectively: 1) define your objectives, 2) research your publics, 3) modify the objectives, 4) decide upon a strategy, 5) set up a theme, 6) establish an effective organization, 7) chart a tactical plan and 8) carry out the tactics. This process is fundamentally part of any organization’s problem-solving function (Cutlip et al., 1994). Cutlip, Center and Broom (1994) suggest another version of Bernays’ steps into a shorter four-step process: 1) Situational analysis—what is happening now? 2) Strategy—what should we do, say and why? 3) Implementation—how and when do we say it? 4) Assessment—how did we do (Cutlip et al., 1994)? The general criticisms of public relations are not derivative of a negative view of these processes, but rather from the way with which they are executed. That is to say, it is not the practice, it is the practitioner.

There are several versions of how and why the public relations practitioner came into existence. Pimlott (1951) came up with three reasons:

Firstly, as we have seen, one of the reasons for their existence is the gulf between “big institutions” and their “publics.” Secondly, the measure of their success is their ability to communicate effectively with popular audiences. Thirdly, public relations is being used by those who deliberately set out to raise the level of information and interest in serious subjects. (p. 240)

Others may say it was the exponential growth of the media that created a need for practitioners. However, Pimlott (1951) contradicts this belief in the following: “The mere existence of the mass media did not create the specialist in public relations. He developed because of the demands of other people upon the media, and the latter became indispensable to all who had messages to communicate to large groups” (p. 237). The
origin of public relations practitioners may be impossible to determine, but their role and tactics are at the center of debate and criticism.

Public relations organizations such as the Public Relations Society of America (PRSA) and the Institute of Public Relations (IPR) have set out to classify the public relations profession through definitions of duties and codes of conduct. The PRSA defines public relations as the following: “Public relations helps an organization and its publics adapt mutually to each other” (PRSA, 2004). This simplistic definition relies on implied meaning. The PRSA supplies the following explanation:

In this definition, the essential functions of research, planning, communications dialogue and evaluation are implied. Key words are “organization” rather than the limiting implication of “company” or “business”, and “publics” which recognizes that all organizations have multiple publics from which they must earn consent and support. (PRSA, 2004)

Similarly, the IPR uses implied meaning in their definition:

Public relations is the discipline which looks after reputation, with the aim of earning understanding and support and influencing opinion and behaviour [sic]. It is the planned and sustained effort to establish and maintain goodwill and mutual understanding between an organization and its publics. (IPR, 2004)

The use of “organization” implies the same meaning as the PRSA definition that the practitioner can be “any corporate or voluntary body large or small” (IPR, 2004). Like the PRSA, the IPR also uses the word “publics” to indicate that the recipients include any audience deemed important by the organization. Finally, the IPR uses the word “understanding” to imply that the communication is a two-way process, meaning that the purpose is not purely to relay information but to allow the opinions of the audience to be expressed (IPR, 2004).

The function of public relations practitioners is to help an organization adjust and adapt to their environments by monitoring public opinion, social change and cultural shifts (Cutlip et al., 1994). This seemingly simple and amiable explanation of the public
relations practitioner’s function focuses upon the “monitoring” function of the role.

Culbertson (1996) uses Broom and Dozier’s description of the following four roles of public relations practitioners to provide a wider scope of their functions:

- At the lowest level is the **communications technician**. This person provides the nuts and bolts service of communications and media techniques and technology. He writes press releases, organizes events, posts web pages, essentially conducting all the message preparation required by institutional public relations. This role mirrors numerous individuals who participate in the public diplomacy process.

- Another role is the **problem-solving process facilitator**. In this role, a PR practitioner guides institutional management through a rational problem-solving process to seek communications responses to management challenges. This would reflect the role of public diplomacy planning and audience analysis.

- Next we find the **communications facilitator** who acts as a mediator between an organization and its publics. This role reflects the spokesperson position. Although the figure behind the podium is the most familiar view of this role, we see people acting as mediators with target audiences throughout an organization at many different levels.

- Finally, the most sophisticated role is that of the **expert prescriber**. This is the role that Murrow imagined when he advised that public diplomacy should be pursued during policy takeoffs not just crash landings. The expert prescriber is not just an agent of the institution, but is an active member of management, providing policy advice based on an understanding of an institution’s various publics. This role corresponds to the planning and policy function of strategic public diplomacy (pp. 3-4; directly quoted from Ostick, 2002, pp. 14-15).

Ellul (1973) uses the more derogatory term, “spin doctor,” to describe practitioners. He explains, “The role of the spin doctor is similar to that of the ‘sociological propagandist . . . to hide political reality by talking about it” and to give the public the opposite impression — “that it understands everything clearly” (p. 59). Ellul goes on to say that they “must give the public distorted news and intentions, knowing clearly beforehand what conclusions the public will draw from them” (p. 59). This more critical view is the one most manifest when denying the presence of public relations in government communications. However, as we will see, the models and techniques of public relations illustrate a substantial overlap of the two.
The Public Relations Model

The five management models developed by James E. Grunig and Todd Hunt in their book, *Managing Public Relations* (1984), has become one of the most widely accepted and circulated models in the study of public relations. Through the use of a systems theory approach they were able to analyze the organizational structures and communication strategies most widely used by practitioners in the following models (Nelson, 1995, p. 245):

- **Press Agentry – One-Way Asymmetrical Communication:** The press agentry model or what J. Grunig (1993) calls “hype” is what he describes as “public relations programs aimed solely at attaining favorable publicity for an organization in the mass media – often in a misleading way” (p. 143). Ostick (2002) contends that the press agent or publicist’s role is to “promote an individual, cause or institution” (p. 16). He goes on to say that “the publicist is the agent of spin, seeking to gain press play and positive chatter in the mass media” in an “undifferentiated fashion that does not take into account the communications context or the target audience” (p. 16). This is the one-way asymmetrical aspect of the model. J. Grunig (1993) uses P.T. Barnum’s promotion of his circus in the 1800s as one of the earliest examples of press agentry as “he made up stories about Jumbo the elephant, the midget Tom Thumb and a 100-year-old nursemaid to George Washington” (p. 143).

- **Public Information – One-Way Asymmetrical Communication:** According to J. Grunig (1993), “The public information model is similar to press agentry because it too is a one-way model that sees public relations only as the dissemination of information” (p. 144). However, this information may be accurate, but it is only favorable. He goes on to explain the role of the practitioner: “an organization uses so-called journalists-in-residence – public relations practitioners who act as though they are journalists – to disseminate relatively objective information through the mass media and controlled media such as newsletters, brochures and direct mail” (p. 144). Although communications is still one-way, it is concentrated on comprehension instead of persuasion (Ostick, 2002, p. 16). Ostick also makes the point that even though Internet Web pages have some level of interactivity, they would largely fall into this category along with international broadcasting (p. 16).

- **Two-Way Asymmetrical:** The more sophisticated two-way asymmetrical model, or what Nelson (1995) calls the “Propaganda Model,” (p. 244) uses social science research to “identify attitudes and to develop messages that appeal to those attitudes that persuade publics to behave as the organization wants” (J. Grunig, 1993, p. 144). Ostick (2002) relates this to public diplomacy when he says, “This approach mirrors many of the speaker and exchange programs conducted by U.S. public diplomacy offices. The programs are intended to create understanding and
sympathy but rarely lead to changes in the behavior of the message originator” (Ostick, 2002, pp. 16-17). However, J. Grunig (1993) points out that this model works well only when there is little conflict with the public, but when the organization and public are in disagreement “the model usually exacerbates the conflict and often leads to campaigning against one another, litigation and regulation” (p. 145).

- **Two-Way Symmetrical:** The two-way symmetrical model is what Nelson calls the “Conflict Resolution Model” because it “establishes mutually-beneficial partnerships with strategic publics [. . . where] manipulation is minimized” (p. 244). J. Grunig (1993) explains further when he describes it as “public relations that is based on research and that uses communication to manage conflict and improve understanding with strategic publics. It is symmetrical because it assumes that both the organization and practitioner may change their behavior as a result of a communication program” (p. 145). Ostick (2002) points out that this model produces a behavior change (p. 17).

- **Relationship Building/Personal Influence Model:** The relationship building model is when “practitioners try to establish personal relationships – friendships, if possible – with key individuals in the media, government or political and activist groups” (J. Grunig, 1993, p. 145). The relationships formed with these “key people” are referred to as “contacts from whom favors can be sought” (p. 146). For the most part this model is an asymmetric model and can often be an unethical practice. However, when it is practiced ethically and symmetrically it becomes a model of interpersonal relations rather than personal influence (p. 146). Ostick (2002) relates this model with public diplomacy in the following:

> In this process, persuasion is not the primary goal. Much of our long-term, educational exchange activities fall into this category or between it and the two-way asymmetric model. The bulk of our public diplomacy budget is spent on programs like the Fulbright academic exchange, student programs, and professional visits, which are long-term commitments to engagement with a foreign audience detached from any short-term policy goals. The Peace Corps could also be seen as an example of relationship building in which persuasion is a side benefit but no the primary purpose of the activity. (p. 17)

In considering how these models affect political events and public opinion, J. Grunig (1993) contends, “Asymmetrical public relations is associated with, if not actually defined as, propaganda: The terms ‘promoters, propagandists, and lobbyists’ seems to describe the press agentry, two-way asymmetrical and personal influence models of public relations respectively” (p. 147). However, L’Etang responds to this when he says,
“The role for public relations can be seen as influential and interventionist in national policies. Depending on one’s political position, one’s culture and the case in hand, such intervention might not ‘obfuscate’ or ‘corrupt’ (J. Grunig, 1993, p. 130) international communication but it clearly is intended to effect change and influence public relations practice in one way or another” (L’Etang, 1996, p. 23). It is clear that there is a consensus that public relations has some level of influence on government communication. Although we cannot yet measure what level of influence that may be, we can look at various public relations strategies and techniques in order to recognize their use by the government.

Public Relations Strategies and Techniques

Once a public relations problem has been identified, a program of action must be put into place. The Management By Objectives (MBO) program created by Norman R. Nager and T. Harrell Allen, in their book *Public Relations Management by Objectives*, discusses nine approaches “that can help a practitioner conceptualize everything from a simple news release to a multi-faceted communications program” (Wilcox et al., 2003, p. 145). Wilcox et al. (2003) have adapted the steps in the following:

1. **Client/employer objectives**: What is the purpose of the communication, and how does it help promote or achieve the objectives of the organization? Specific objectives such as “to position the product as the leading one in the market” are more meaningful than “to make people aware of the product.”

2. **Audience/publics**: Who exactly should be reached with the message, and how can that audience help achieve the organization’s objectives? What are the characteristics of the audience, and how can demographic information be used to structure the message?

3. **Audience Objectives**: What is it that the audience wants to know, and how can the message be tailored to audience self-interest?

4. **Media channels**: What is the appropriate channel for reaching the audience, and how can multiple channels (news, media, brochures, special events, direct mail, etc.) reinforce the message among key publics?
5. **Media channel objectives:** What is the media gatekeeper looking for in a news angle, and why would a particular publication be interested in the information?

6. **Sources and questions:** What primary and secondary sources of information are required to provide a factual base for the message? What experts should be interviewed? What data bank searches should be conducted?

7. **Communication strategies:** What environmental factors will affect the dissemination and acceptance of the message? Are the target publics hostile or favorably disposed to the essence of the message? What other events or pieces of information negate or reinforce the message?

8. **Essence of message:** What is the planned communications’ impact on the audience? Is the message designed merely to inform, or is it designed to change attitudes and behavioral patterns? Are organizational expectations realistic?

9. **Nonverbal support:** How can photographs, graphs, films, artwork, etc. clarify and add interest to the written message? (pp. 145-146)

There is no limitation as to the types of organizations that would be able to use this program in a communication strategy. These objectives all support influencing public opinion, but Wilcox et al. (2003) distinguish between what they call informational and motivational objectives (pp. 150-151). The difference is that informational objectives seek to inform, introduce or to enhance perception, while motivational objectives seek a desired outcome. In order to achieve such objectives it is necessary to employ persuasive communication.

Persuasive communication often vacillates between ethical persuasive communication and propaganda. The persuasive techniques of propaganda will be discussed later. The persuasive communication in public relations is the focus when we look at an adaptation of some of the factors of persuasive communication outlined by Wilcox et al. (2003) in the following:

1. **Audience analysis (channeling):** Knowledge of audience characteristics such as beliefs, attitudes, concerns, and lifestyles helps the communicator tailor messages that are salient, answer a felt need, and provide a logical course of action. Tools for analysis include demographic research, polling, surveys and “psychographics” lifestyle, attitude and belief classification). One tactic is appealing to patriotism –
Lyndon Johnson’s “support our boys” and Ronald Reagan’s America is “the hope of the free world.”

2. **Source credibility:** This is based on three factors – expertise (perception by the audience of the person as an expert), sincerity (the person coming across as believing what they are saying) and charisma (the person is attractive, self-assured, and articulate, projecting the image of confidence and leadership). In the case of celebrity use the technique is called “transfer” where the purpose is to associate the popularity and public recognition of the celebrity with the product. Also, using visual symbols like a speaker surrounded by people representing the target audience, a school or an American flag can contribute to credibility.

3. **Appeal to self-interest:** This deals with the ability to tailor information to fill or reduce psychic or economic needs. These appeals are based on psychologist Abraham Maslow’s “hierarchy of needs.” The first level is basic needs like food, water and shelter. The second level is security needs whether it is at home or in their employment. The third level is “belonging” needs – to be part of something. The final level is the “love” needs – fulfilling the desire for self-esteem.

4. **Clarity of message:** The message should not be unnecessarily complex in language or content. The most persuasive messages are direct, simply expressed, and contain only one primary idea.

5. **Timing and context:** A message is more persuasive if environmental factors support the message or if it is received within the context of other messages and situations with which the individual is familiar. The value of information and its newsworthiness are based on timing and context. It is best to disseminate information at the time it is most highly valued.

6. **Audience participation:** Audience involvement increases commitment to making the solution work because it came from them. A sample of a product gives the consumer the option to make a judgment about its quality and is more likely to purchase it. Rallies and demonstrations give people a sense of belonging and can reinforce their beliefs.

7. **Suggestions for action:** This is accomplished by not only making recommendations for action but also accompanying them with detailed data and ideas on how to do it.

8. **Content and structure of messages:** Devices include drama, statistics, surveys and polls, examples, testimonials, mass media endorsements and emotional appeals.

9. **Persuasive speaking:** These devices, and the advice given are as follows:
   
a. **Yes-yes:** Start with points with which the audience agrees, to develop a pattern of “yes” answers. Getting agreement to a basic premise often means that the receiver will agree to the logically developed conclusion.

b. **Offer structured choice:** Give choices that force the audience to choose between A and B. Political candidates or cause-oriented organizations often use this
technique. College officials may ask, “Do you want to raise taxes or raise tuition?” Political candidates may ask, “Do you want more free enterprise or government telling you what to do?”

c. **Seek partial commitment:** Get a commitment for some action on the part of the receiver. This leaves the door open for commitment to other parts of the proposal at a later date. “You don’t need to decide on the new insurance plan now, but please attend the employee orientation program on Thursday.”

d. **Ask for more/settle for less:** Submit a complete public relations program to management, but be prepared to compromise by dropping certain parts of the program. Ask for more than you expect to receive. (pp. 216-228)

Before utilizing persuasive communication, the direction of a public relations campaign relies heavily on defining the target audience or public and the opinion leaders who influence their opinions. In his book, *Public Relations Techniques*, British author Frank Jefkins (1994) defines opinion leaders as “any people who, whether well or ill informed, may express opinions and influence people because of their apparent authority” (p. 104). He goes on to divide opinion leaders into the following groups:

- Parents, teachers, academics, doctors, clergymen.
- Central and local government politicians, political party politicians, trade union leaders.
- Civil servants and local government officers, officials of quangos.2
- Commentators, presenters.
- Journalists and authors, radio and TV personalities.
- Authorities on specialized subjects, who may write, lecture or broadcast.
- Advisory services and information bureaux [sic].
- Officials of societies, institutions, trade associations and professional bodies.

(p. 104)

As we saw in the previous chapter, the importance of public opinion is paramount. Identifying the public, whether opinion leaders or target audience, can directly impact the effectiveness of a communications program. Although these factors, techniques, programs and the like were developed for public relations purposes, it is all too apparent that there has been a convergence between public relations and public diplomacy, and

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2 These are “quasi autonomous non government organizations” in the UK government
public affairs strategies and techniques. Furthermore, as these strategies and techniques have progressed through history, their convergence has become even more obvious.

The Convergence of Public Relations and Diplomacy

In L’Etang’s (1996) article “Public Relations as Diplomacy” she draws parallels between several characteristics of public relations and diplomacy. She states, “Both public relations and diplomacy deal in trust and use strategies of negotiation and impression management while guarding the reputation of their clients. Thus it can be seen that diplomacy and public relations are comparable occupations and have certain similarities in their development as disciplines” (L’Etang, 1996, p. 27). She points out that as “occupations” they both have “interpretive and presentational roles” and both “attempt to manage communication about issues” (p. 16). Furthermore, the relationship with the media holds the same value for both. She states, “Both diplomats and public relations practitioners conduct much of their business via the media and are media-trained to provide appropriate ‘sound-bites’ on the issues of the day” (L’Etang, 1996, p. 16). Likewise, the methods and functions of the two hold a great deal of resemblance.

L’Etang (1996) explains further:

It is possible to trace a number of related functions in public relations and diplomacy in the existing public relations literature: rhetoric, oratory, advocacy, negotiation, peacemaking, counselling [sic], intelligence gathering. There appear to be three orders of function here: representational (rhetoric, oratory, advocacy), dialogic (negotiation, peacemaking), advisory (counselling) [sic]. The function of intelligence gathering describes research and environmental scanning and underpins the issues management function. This is a very interesting function because it carries with it connotations of a military function carried out at least part secretly. The representational functions acknowledge self-interest and suggest strategies of promotion and persuasion. They also imply processes of planning and impression management, and possibly a degree of rigidity in terms of maintaining one’s own position. (p. 15)

Although these similarities exist, government agencies shy away from any association with the public relations industry. The extent of government regulation and the great
lengths taken to avoid labeling any agency office “public relations” only proves this point. Why is there a fear of the evil “spin doctor” in the U.S. government?

**Public Relations Implications**

A favorable description of the public relations function is made by J. Grunig (1993) in the following:

Public relations is an essential management function, therefore because of its contribution to the long-term, strategic management of the organization. Organizations use strategic management to identify opportunities and dangers in the environment; to develop strategies for exploiting the opportunities and minimizing the dangers; and to develop, implement and evaluate their choices . . . . Public relations contributes to the planning process by communicating and building relationships with publics that support the mission of the organization, or that can constructively divert it from its mission (pp. 140-141).

Therefore, if J. Grunig is right and public relations is essential and beneficial to an organization, why is it so frightening to some, specifically the government? Dozier and L. Grunig (1992) point out that regardless of the initial intentions behind the development of a strategic public relations program for an organization, the organization may lose sight of the original motivation and resort to what J. Grunig (1993) describes as “mindless attempts to gain media exposure with no particular public in mind” (p. 141). These mindless and not-so mindless (intentional) attempts are the degradation of the public relations field.

The unethical public relations practitioners and programs that attempt to achieve their self-interested goals through the manipulation of the public threaten the public’s trust and their well-being. However, J. Grunig points out the following:

In contrast to the popular view of the field, public relations theorists emphasize the importance of social responsibility and ethics in public relations. Social responsibility enters the theory because of the nature of relationships between organizations and publics. Relationships occur because an organization’s actions have consequences for the public and they in turn affect the organization. (J. Grunig, 1993, p. 146).
These relationships must have a level of trust based on honest discourse. Without such a relationship there could be concern and skepticism as to the motive of the communicator.

The government and others call public relations propaganda, but what constitutes propaganda? Some social scientists say it “should be used only to denote activity that sells a belief system or constitutes political or ideological dogma” (Wilcox et al., 1989, p. 247). Therefore, in this sense commercial advertising and public relations would not be propaganda. Furthermore, “The experts also say that propaganda intentionally misleads an audience by concealing (1) the source of information, (2) the source’s goal, (3) other sides of the story, and (4) the consequences if the message is adopted” (p. 247). In that case, it only makes sense that “some advertising and public relations activities—those that utilize concealment—not only are unethical but have aspects of propaganda” (Wilcox et al., 1989, p. 247). We will now take a closer look at propaganda to have a better understanding of some of these aspects.

**Propaganda**

The “Old Propaganda,” according to Edelstein (1997), “gave rise to many of the principles of effective propaganda that are prevalent today in advertising, public relations, politics, and various means of public communication and persuasion” (Edelstein, 1997, p. 17). This association made between public relations and propaganda is based on the tactical manipulation of public opinion made by both. J. Grunig (1993) states, “At first glance, asymmetrical—and unethical—public relations seems to have been prevalent in international public relations throughout history, especially during times of conflict. Propaganda—defined here as one-sided, usually half-truthful communication designed to persuade public opinion—is not a new aspect of warfare or of international politics” (p. 147). We are most interested, here, in the propaganda used during conflict.
However, we will look at propaganda in both wartime and peace to better understand its models and techniques.

Propaganda can be described in many ways. The esteemed political scientist, Harold D. Lasswell, says the following about Propaganda in his book, *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (1927):

Propaganda refers solely to the control of opinion by significant symbols, or, to speak more concretely and less accurately, by stories, rumors, reports, pictures and other forms of social communication. Propaganda is concerned with the management of opinions and attitudes by the direct manipulation of social suggestion rather than by altering other conditions in the environment or in the organism. (p. 9)

Propaganda is a reflex to the immensity, the rationality and willfulness of the modern world. It is the new dynamic of society, for power is subdivided and diffused, and more can be won by illusion than by coercion. It has all the prestige of the new and provokes all the animosity of the baffled. To illuminate the mechanisms of propaganda is to reveal the secret springs of social action, and to expose to the most searching criticism our prevailing dogmas of sovereignty, of democracy, of honesty, and of the sanctity of individual opinion. (p. 222)

In considering the media, Lasswell (1941) also says that a news report is only propaganda if it is “deliberately circulated to influence attitudes on controversial issues” (p. 41). He argues that propaganda is an act of intention in which “someone deliberately sets out to influence attitudes by manipulating symbols (that is, words and word substitutes)” (pp. 41-42). Lasswell’s view is only one of many, and we will look at several other more contemporary views throughout the remainder of this chapter. First, it is important to take a broad look at its history and its presence in the communications of the United States Government.

**Propaganda in the Government**

It is because of a natural aversion created by our culture to the word “propaganda” that it cannot be found in any U.S. agencies. Instead, it is masked under the title of “information” or “communication” (Edelstein, 1997, p. 18). This is even more prevalent
during periods of war and conflict. Propaganda becomes almost a necessity to control the
information being dispersed to the public at home and abroad. Kris and Leites (1947), in
their article “Trends in Twentieth Century Propaganda,” say the following about this
unique situation:

> Wartime propaganda is enacted in a situation with strictly limited goals. Under
whatever conditions, the objective of propagandists in wartime is to maximize
social participation among members of their own group and to minimize
participation among members of the enemy group. Social participation is
characterized by concern for the objectives of the group, the sharing of its
activities, and the preparedness to accept deprivations on its behalf. (p. 39)

Edelstein (1997) traces the masking of propaganda agencies back to World War I when
propaganda was conducted under the “umbrella” of the Committee on Public information
(p. 18). In World War II, it was the Office of War Information, and today it is the U.S.
Information Agency (USIA) at home and the United States Information Service (USIS)
abroad (p. 18).

Evidence that propaganda existed during World War I was well documented.
Kunczik (1990) reviewed studies of British propaganda by J.A.C. Brown and Harold
Lasswell, who reported “tales” of Germans cutting off the hands of children, boiling
corpses to make soap and using priests as clappers in cathedral bells (J. Grunig, 1993, p.
147). “The United States also had a propaganda agency during the war, called the
Committee on Public Information or the Creel Commission, whose job it was to ‘issue
propaganda and censor the news’” (Cutlip, 1990, p. 13). J. Grunig (1993) points out that
“many of the early leaders of American public relations, including Edward L. Bernays
and Carl Byoir, began their careers with that commission” (p. 148).

Before World War II, the Institute for Propaganda Analysis was created to translate
propaganda to the public (Edelstein, 1997, p. 18). They developed techniques for
identifying propaganda, but after World War II no consensus could be made on
definitions. Instead, propaganda’s attributes became the most relevant and useful (p. 18).

Table 1 is an example of some of these attributes. Kris and Leites (1947) say that this “manifestation of distrust” can be traced back to the propaganda tactics in World War I:

The first mentioned manifestation of distrust can be traced back to the last war. Propaganda operated then on a new level of technological perfection; the latent possibilities of the mass communication media became suddenly manifest; in all belligerent countries, outbursts of enthusiasm for war occurred. Propagandists, like children playing with a new toy, charged their messages with many manufactured contents – sometimes exaggerating the extent to which they had distorted events. These reports helped to create the aura of secret power that ever since has surrounded propagandists. In Britain and the United States, some of this prestige was transferred from the propagandist to the public relations counsel; some of the men who had successfully worked in government agencies became pioneers of modern advertising. Beliefs in the power of propaganda led to the phobia of political persuasion: propaganda became a ‘bad name,’ an influence against which the common man had to guard himself. (pp. 43-44)

The manifestation of fear and distrust contributed to the regulations discussed in previous chapter and the continued denial of labels such as propaganda and public relations in the U.S. government to this day. However, just because the words are not used, does not mean the strategies do not live on under a different name.

Parenti (1986) supports this idea in arguing, “Government agencies that are supposedly dedicated to intelligence gathering and national defense are just as often involved in propagandizing the American public” (p. 232). His evidence is in released government documents, which prove that in the late sixties the FBI planted stories in “friendly news media” designed to “discredit the New Left” (p. 232). He goes on to say, “The Pentagon sends out hundreds of stories and canned editorials each week that are picked up by newspapers and broadcast stations across the country and presented to the public as trustworthy products of independent journalism” (Parenti, 1986, p. 232).

Another agency is the CIA, which “turns journalists into paid agents and plants CIA agents in news organizations in order to disseminate stories that support the policies of
the national security state” (Parenti, 1986, p. 232). In the ex-CIA agent’s book, *Deadly Deceits*, he contends that in the 1950’s some 400 to 600 journalists were on the CIA’s payroll (p. 232). In addition to journalists he finds, “At least twenty-five news organizations have served the CIA” (Parenti, 1986, p. 232), including the *Washington Post*, the *New York Times*, CBS, ABC, NBC, *Time, Newsweek*, The Associated Press, United Press International, etc.

**Defining Propaganda**

We have already discussed how propaganda is viewed and maneuvered into society’s sources of information, but now we will look at the myriad of definitions of propaganda from a multitude of scholars and theorists. The word propaganda originates from the 17th century *congretio de propaganda de fide*, which was the committee of cardinals established by Pope Gregory XV to “propagate the Catholic faith worldwide” (Ostic, 2002, p. 4). According to Edelstein (1997), “A cornucopia of definitions emerged, each reflecting the unique interests of the definers. Political scientists defined propaganda as an instrument of power, sociologists pointed to group processes, psychologists looked at learning and motivation, and communication scholars explored the prevalence of propaganda in the mass media and society” (p. 18). Regardless of the approach, the definitions of propaganda generally include words such as “public opinion,” “manipulation,” “influence,” “deception,” etc. Such words manifest negativity, but as we will see, not all propaganda is so negatively charged.

Jowett and O’Donnell (1999) highlight several definitions of propaganda from a variety of sources in their book, *Propaganda and Persuasion*. They point out that some synonyms used for propaganda are lies, distortion, manipulation, mind control, psychological warfare, brainwashing, and palaver (p. 3). Kurtz (1998) uses the familiar
term *spin* “referring to a coordinated strategy to minimize negative information and present in a favorable light a story that could be damaging” (p. 3). This term is most often used when public relations officers are referred to as “spin doctors” when they attempt to “launder” the news (p. 3). DeVito (p. 286) uses the description “organized persuasion” (p. 239). In the same way, Sproule (1994) uses the idea of organized mass persuasion: “Propaganda represents the work of large organizations or groups to win over the public for special interests through a massive orchestration of attractive conclusions packaged to conceal both their persuasive purpose and lack of sound supporting reasons” (p. 8). These definitions are negative, in general, but some believe that neutrality exists.

According to Ostick (2002), “Used in its technical sense, propaganda consists of words or ideas transmitted for the purpose of helping one’s own cause or harming the cause of one’s opponents. In this sense, propaganda can be either true or false” (p. 4). This suggests that propaganda can be used in a reasonably honest way. Stevenson (1994) argues, “If propaganda is defined, minus the historical baggage, as an effort to inform and persuade, it takes on a less sinister connotation and embraces a range of activities that we consider normal and reasonable” (p. 346). In most cases, he says, “other words are preferred to describe these activities: public relations, public information, even education and advertising” (pp. 346-347).

Finally Kris and Leites (1947) define propaganda along the lines of political regimes: totalitarian and democratic. They describe totalitarian propaganda as trying to “sway” the audience into participation (p. 47). They say, “its preferred setting is the visible leader talking to the masses; it is modeled after the relations between the hypnotist and the medium” (p. 47). On the other hand, democratic propaganda, “gives greater weight to insight as a basis for participation; it is to a greater extent modeled after the
principles of guidance or education” (Kris & Leites, 1947, pp. 47-48). This implies that
democratic propaganda exists on a higher level of righteousness. Ostick (2002) applies a
similarly idealistic approach to diplomacy when he argues, “In current usage, the term
propaganda indicates elements of social control and coercion whereas public diplomacy
uses persuasion and argument to influence attitude and behavior” (Ostick, 2002, p. 4).
Although he separates diplomacy from propaganda, his description of diplomacy does not
stray far from previous definitions of propaganda. The definition diverges in the way that
the practice has developed over time into a more acceptable and modern form of
propaganda. This delineation and more can be found in the categories developed for
propaganda by various authors.

**Categorizing Propaganda**

Just as authors provide definitions for propaganda, they also have divided
propaganda into different categories based on levels of intensity, values and the like.
This is important to distinguish between the levels that propaganda takes in its
manipulation of public opinion and/or behavior, as well as its levels of acceptability.

1. **The Old vs. the New**

   Alex Edelstein (1997), in his book *Total Propaganda*, separates propaganda into
old propaganda and new propaganda:

   - “If the rhetoric or actions limit the functioning of individuals in a popular culture, it
     is an old propaganda.
   - If the rhetoric sustains or enhances participation in the popular culture, it is a new
     propaganda” (pp. 4-5).

He says, “The modern origins of the old propaganda are linked to the control and
manipulation of mass cultures in the early and mid-20th century, culminating in World
War II and the Cold War. Charismatic leaders directed propaganda to mass publics and
mass media amplified those messages” (p. 4). He outlines the attributes of the old propaganda in Figure 3-1. On the other hand, new propaganda is defined as the following:

New propaganda is a product of the more egalitarian, participant forces that emerged in the post-World War II period. Unlike members of mass cultures, who were almost wholly dependent on their leaders for propaganda, members of the popular culture have gained the ability to initiate messages as well as respond to them. (p. 4)

Therefore, according to this approach, the entire culture has the ability to participate in propaganda because of increased access to media. This new propaganda levels the playing field.

It is because of the increased access to media that the modern day popular culture perceives, according to Edelstein (1997), propaganda to be “moral rather than immoral, they are indigenous rather than alien in their genesis and diffusion, and they defend them as truthful rather than exaggerated or falsified” (p. 5). The mass culture, on the other hand, found old propaganda to be defined as “alien, immoral, and lying” (p. 5), but it is important to remember that each of these definitions is not constrained to the time periods of development. Old propaganda continues to be practiced today. Edelstein fuses the process with the “attributional” approach to further his definition:

- **The Process Approach**: If the communication enhances the abilities of individuals and groups to participate in the popular culture, it is a new propaganda, but if it limits such functioning, it is the old propaganda. This clearly is a value orientation, and we justify it on the basis of democratic traditions and theory.

- **The Attributional Approach**: We have listed a number of representative attributes of the old and the new propaganda [Figure 3-1], but these are not exclusive or exhaustive. In fact, the author assumes that the other attributes for both the old and the new propaganda will emerge as we discuss a variety of situations and foci of social and political action. (Edelstein, 1997, p. 14)

He goes on to offer evidence that propaganda can be both old and new:
The President’s messages – a new propaganda because of the accessibility and intimacy of the technologies that convey them – are penetrating households and offices in nontraditional ways. Indeed, the author has contracted the President via these networks. But many of the messages that are being trafficked on the superhighways are imposing themselves on unwilling participants and threatening their values; these factors of exclusion and domination introduce elements of the old propaganda. (Edelstein, 1997, p. 14)

Edelstein offers valuable insight into the development of propaganda attributes. In Figure 3-2 he illustrates a comparison of the Old Propaganda and the New according to their actor values, media values, contextual variables and attitudinal values. By comparing Old Propaganda (traditional) with the New Propaganda (nontraditional), he is opening the argument for those who believe that modern day propaganda is more advanced and, at times, less harmful than the traditional approaches to influencing public opinion.

2. **Agitative vs. Integrative**

The contrast between *Agitative* vs. *Integrative* propaganda is presented by Jowett and O’Donnell (1999). They describe agitative as “attempting to rouse an audience to certain ends and usually resulting in significant change,” while integrative is “attempting to render an audience passive, accepting, and nonchallenging” (p. 12). In the language alone we can see a difference in intensity. The words “rousing” and “rendering” take on different levels of force. While they may both be used to achieve the same ends, the agitative form denotes a stronger feeling of coercion.

3. **Black, Gray and White**

The Black, Gray and White categorization of propaganda is used by many authors to partition its actions based on truthfulness and the identification of the source of the information (Ostick, 2000, p. 4).

- **White Propaganda**: Jowett and O’Donnell (1999) describe this as propaganda that “comes from a source that is identified correctly, and the information in the
message tends to be accurate…and…is presented in a manner that attempts to convince the audience that the sender is the ‘good guy’ with the best ideas and political ideology” (p. 12). This is what one hears on Radio Moscow and VOA during peacetime. National celebrations (4th of July), international sport competitions (Olympics) and other events covered by the media that inspire national pride (p. 12). According to Ostick (2002), public diplomacy can only be considered propaganda in this sense (p. 4).

- **Gray Propaganda:** “Gray propaganda is somewhere between white and black propaganda. The source may or may not be correctly identified, and the accuracy of the information is uncertain” (Jowett & O’Donnell, 1999, p. 15). For example, “In 1961, when the Bay of Pigs invasion took place in Cuba, VOA moved over into the gray area when it denied any U.S. involvement in the CIA-backed activities. When they Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Radio Moscow used gray propaganda when it attempted to justify the action” (p. 15).

- **Black Propaganda:** “Black propaganda is credited to a false source and spreads lies, fabrications, and deceptions” (Jowett & O’Donnell, 1999, p. 13). “The success or failure of black propaganda depends on the receiver’s willingness to accept the credibility of the source and the content of the message. Care has to be taken to place the sources and messages within a social, cultural, and political framework of the target audience” (p. 15). For example, “During World War II, prior to Hitler’s planned invasion of Britain, a radio station known as ‘The New English Broadcasting Station,’ supposedly run by discontented British subjects, ran half-hour programs throughout the day…This was actually a German undercover operation determined to reduce the morale of the British people throughout the Battle of Britain” (p. 13). According to Ostick (2002), “Black propaganda is the attribution of allegations–whether true or false–to a third party. Black propaganda is often used during wartime and attributes to the opposing side (Ostick, 2002, p. 4).

Disinformation is also considered black propaganda. Disinformation means “false, incomplete or misleading information that is passed, fed, or confirmed to a targeted individual, group, or country” (Shultz & Godson, 1984, p. 41). An example is when the Soviets charged the U.S. with developing the virus responsible for AIDS for biological warfare in an October 1985 issue of the Soviet weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta (p. 19).

Jowett and O’Donnell have developed the following two models (Figure 3-3 and Figure 3-4) to illustrate disinformation as a communication process (pp. 20-21):
Figure 3-3: Deflective Source Model
The propagandist (P) creates a deflective source (P1), which becomes the apparent source of the message (M). The receiver (R) perceives the information as coming directly from P1 and does not associate it with the original propagandist (P).

Figure 3-4: Legitimating Source Model
The propagandist secretly places the original message (M1) in a legitimating source (P2). This message (now M2), as interpreted by P2, is then picked up by the propagandist (P) and communicated to the receiver (R) in the form of M3, as having come from P2. This legitimates the message and at the same time dissociates the propagandist (P) from its origination.

Black propaganda and its models of disinformation may be the greatest threat to what may be considered the ethical practice of U.S. public affairs and public diplomacy. However, the attributes of the Gray and White genres also are questionable. Each involves some level of deception in its means to reach a desired end.

Jowett & O’Donnell Purpose Model of Propaganda
The Jowett and O’Donnell (1999) Purpose Model of Propaganda recreated in Figure 3-5 was developed in order to differentiate between persuasion and propaganda according to purpose and process (p. 23). They write, “Propaganda tends to be linked with a general societal process, whereas persuasion is regarded as an individual psychological process. Propaganda has not been successfully differentiated from persuasion by other writers” (p. 23). Beyond making the differentiation, they also use the model to reveal the similarities between the two “with subtle differences of technique used according to purpose” (p. 23). The difference lies in the beneficiaries of the information. If it is mutually beneficial it is persuasion, whereas if it is beneficial only for the communicator, it is propaganda (p. 41).

Jowett and O’Donnell list some other characteristics of propagandistic communication in the following:

- **Concealed Purpose:** The true purpose is concealed, even though the stated purpose is that it satisfies mutual needs (p. 42).
• **Concealed Identity:** The objectives like controlling the flow of information, managing public opinion and manipulating behavioral patterns may not be achieved if true intent or the real source is revealed (p. 42).

• **Control of Information Flow:** “Takes the form of withholding information, releasing information at predetermined times, releasing information in juxtaposition with other information that may influence public perception, manufacturing information, communicating information to selective audiences, and distorting information. The propagandist tries to control information flow in two major ways: (a) controlling the media as a source of information distribution and (b) presenting distorted information from what appears to be a credible source” (p. 42).

• **Management of Public Opinion:** “Propaganda is most often associated with the management of public opinion” (p. 44). Mitchell (1970), related the management of public opinion by propagandists to “a burning glass which collects and focuses the diffused warmth of popular emotions, concentrating them upon a specific issue on which the warmth becomes heat and may reach the firing point of revivals, risings, revolts, revolutions” (p. 111).

• **Manipulation of Behavior:** “Ultimately, the goal of propaganda is to manipulate behavior and behavioral patterns; external rather than internal public opinion is sought. Voting, buying products, selecting entertainment, joining organizations, displaying symbols, fighting for a cause, donating to an organization, and other forms of action responses are sought from the audiences who are addressed by the persuader and the propagandist. These are overt behaviors that can be observed as both verbal and nonverbal responses” (p. 45).

The characteristics described here, as well as those discussed in previous discussions, can be seen as strategies and techniques of propagandistic communication. However, these are all very general. In order to have a better understanding of the techniques used to achieve these objectives, we will take a closer look at some techniques in the next section.

**Propaganda Techniques**

Jowett and O’Donnell (1999) state, “Propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (p. 6). This shaping of perceptions is achieved through “language and images, which is why slogans, posters, symbols, and even architectural structures are developed during wartime” (p. 6). These
specific tactics have been identified consistently over time for propaganda and counterpropaganda uses in periods of war and peace.

The Institute for Propaganda Analysis (IPA), initiated in October 1937 by Colombia University Professor Clyde R. Miller, was created to identify propaganda for the purpose of counterpropaganda strategy (Jowett & O’Donnell, 1999, p. 232). Miller was a reporter during World War I, who was convinced that he had been “hoodwinked” by propaganda (p. 232). In the November 1937 issue of the IPA’s publication *Propaganda Analysis*, the article “How to Detect Propaganda” outlined seven common “devices” or “ABC’s of propaganda analysis”:

- **Name Calling.** Giving an idea a bad label and therefore rejecting and condemning it without examining the evidence.
- **Glittering Generality.** Associating something with a “virtue word” and creating acceptance and approval without examination of the evidence.
- **Transfer.** Carries the respect and authority of something respected to something else to make the latter accepted. Also works with something that is disrespected to make the latter rejected.
- **Testimonial.** Consists in having some respected or hated person say that a given idea or program or product or person is good or bad.
- **Plain Folks.** The method by which a speaker attempts to convince the audience that he or she and his or her ideas are good because they are “of the people,” the “plain folks.”
- **Card Stacking.** Involves the selection and use of facts or falsehoods, illustrations or distractions, and logical or illogical statements to give the best or the worst possible case for an idea, program, person, or product.
- **Band Wagon.** Has its theme “everybody – at least all of us – is doing it!” and thereby tries to convince the members of a group that their peers are accepting the program and that we should all jump on the band wagon rather than be left out. (Lee & Lee, 1979 as quoted in Jowett & McDonnell, 1999, p. 232)

These devices were not merely for war propaganda. Domestic propaganda produced by the Ku Klux Klan, Communists, domestic Fascism, and advertising were all perceived as “possible threats to the democratic way of life” (Jowett & O’Donnell, 1999, p. 232).
Jowett and O’Donnell (1999, pp. 290-296) also provide this list of “special techniques to maximize effect” in order to identify certain variables concerning the identification of the source and the target of the propaganda:

- **Predispositions of the Audience; Creating Resonance:** Messages have greater impact when they are in line with existing opinions, beliefs, and dispositions. . . . . The propagandist uses belief to create belief by linking or reinforcing audience predispositions to reinforce propagandistic ideology or, in some cases, to create new attitudes or behaviors or both. Rather than try to change political loyalties, racial and religious attitudes, and other deeply held beliefs, the propagandist voices the propagandee’s feelings about these things. Messages appear to be resonant, for they seem to be coming from within the audience rather than from without. (p. 290)

- **Source Credibility:** People have a tendency to look up to authority figures for knowledge and direction. Expert opinion is effective in establishing the legitimacy of change and is tied to information control. Once a source is accepted on one issue, another issue may be established as well on the basis of prior acceptance of the source. (p. 291)

- **Opinion Leaders:** Another technique is to work through those who have credibility in a community – the opinion leaders . . . . The analyst should identify the opinion leaders and examine the ways propaganda appeals to their status and influence. (p. 292)

- **Face-To-Face Contact:** The analyst should look for face-to-face contact by themselves or following an event or the screening of a film. For example, does the propaganda institution provide local organization or places to go for “information”? Is the environment of the place symbolically manipulated? Traditionally, propagandists have provided listening stations, ‘reading huts,’ ‘red corners,’ libraries, and cultural events. (p. 292) [These all can be used as “bait” to draw the public in].

- **Group Norms:** Group norms are both beliefs, values, and behaviors derived from membership in groups. They may be culturally derived norms or social and professional norms. Research on group behavior has shown that people will go along with the group when the group makes a decision contrary to privately held beliefs and values (Karlin & Abelson, 1970, pp. 41-67; Pratkanis & Aronson, 1991, pp. 167-173). The propagandist exploits people’s conforming tendencies….The propagandist may manipulate the environment to create crowded conditions to achieve a more homogeneous effect. It is common practice to hold large meetings in halls too small to accommodate the crowd in order to create the impression of a groundswell of support. (pp. 292-293)

- **Reward and Punishment:** A propagandist may even use threats and physical inducements toward compliance. *Propaganda of the deed* is when a nonsymbolic act is presented for its symbolic effect on an audience. For example, public torture of a criminal has been practiced for its presumable effect on others. Giving “foreign aid” with more of an eye to influencing a recipient’s attitudes than to building the economy of a country is an example of symbolic reward. (p. 293)
• **Monopoly of the Communication Source:** Whenever a communication source is a monopoly, such as a single newspaper or television network, and the message is consistent and repetitious, people are unlikely to challenge the message. (p. 293)

• **Visual Symbols of Power:** The analysts should look at the media messages to examine the visual symbolization of power. Do visual representations have an iconographic denotation of power and ubiquity? For example, when a speaker stands in front of a huge flag, an emotional association is transferred to the speaker. Sometimes, a speaker will stand in front of a huge poster of her- or himself. This symbolizes a larger-than-life feeling and creates a sense of potency . . . . Whether a complex of buildings, an office, a photograph, or a logo, a visual symbol is key to a propagandist’s desired image. (p. 293)

• **Language Usage:** Verbal symbolization can also create a sense of power. The use of language associated with authority figures such as parents, teachers, heroes, and gods renders authority to that which the language describes – ‘the fatherland,’ ‘Mother Church,’ ‘Uncle Sam’. . . . Propaganda uses language that tends to deify a cause and satanize opponents . . . . In wartime, the enemy is often symbolized as subhuman or animal-like to soften the killing process linguistically. Metaphors of hunting down animals or exterminating vermin were common in the rhetoric of both sides during World War II. (pp. 293-294) [Exaggeration and innuendo are also devices used by propagandists]

• **Music as Propaganda:** From stirring patriotic anthems to protest songs, music and lyrics are important propaganda techniques . . . . Music is an effective propaganda technique because it touches the emotions easily, suggests associations and past experiences, invites us to sing along, and embraces ideology in the lyrics. (p. 295)

• **Arousal of Emotions:** Propaganda is also associated with emotional language and presentations. Although this is sometimes true, many agents believe that dispassionate reporting is more effective. (p. 295) [More intelligent people may be offended by dispassionate reporting – policy makers]

**Journalistic Methods of Misrepresentation (Framing):**

Parenti (1986) argues that the most effective propaganda is “that which relies on framing rather than on falsehood” (p. 220). He contends that by bending the truth through the use of emphasis, nuance, innuendo, and peripheral embellishments, communicators “can create a desired impression without resorting to explicit advocacy and without departing too far from the appearance of objectivity” (p. 220). He defines framing as “the way the news is packaged, the amount of exposure, the placement (front page or back, lead story or last), the tone of presentation (sympathetic or slighting), the accompanying headlines and visual effects, and the labeling and vocabulary” (p. 220).
The following are some of the methods of framing outlined by Parenti (1986, pp. 213-225):

- **Labeling:** “One common framing method is to select labels and other vocabulary designed to convey politically loaded images” (p. 220). They “convey positive or negative clues regarding events and persona, often without benefit of – and usually as a substitute for – supportive information” (p. 220). For example, “Throughout the 1984 press coverage of the Lebanon crisis, the press incessantly referred to the “Soviet-made” anti-aircraft missiles and other arms possessed by the Syrians and Lebanese. But at no time were the Israeli arms described as ‘U.S.-made’ – which they were” (pp. 220-221).

- **Neutralizing:** Neutralizing can be achieved either by “scanting the content” or giving subject matter “innocence it may not deserve” by “applying gloss-over euphemisms and passive phrases” (p. 222). “The Times demonstrated how it could turn the 1973 Chilean coup – in which tens of thousands were victimized – into a neutral event by using muted phrases like “the armed forces took power,” and telling us the “chaos” caused by the Communists “brought in the military” (p. 222).

- **Headlines:** Headlines can “mislead anyone who skims a page without reading the story; they can create the dominant slant on a story, establishing a mind-set that influences how we do read the story’s text” (p. 223).

- **Political cartoons and caricatures:** For example, “the hammer and sickle symbol has been so frequently used as a sinister embellishment (sometimes adorning a menacing bear) in newspaper illustrations as a visual backdrop in television news reports that it now evokes a feeling of distaste and alarm in many Americans – even as it remains a symbol of hope and betterment to millions of others in various parts of the world” (p. 224).

- **Photographs:** Photographs send “us a cue about what to think of a story before we get a chance to read it. For example, pictures of political leaders can be very political. The president of the U.S. almost always has favorable pictures in media, but those defined as adversaries are less likely to have similar treatment” (p. 224).

- **Music:** “Such use of thematic background music is designed to ‘set the mood,’ eliciting receptive feelings and deterring resistant thoughts” (p. 225).

According to Nelson (1995) “Framing devices are narrative mechanisms which condition audience reactions to particular news, information, or entertainment media programming” (p. 170). They include the following:

- **Contextualizing:** how fully the background is developed and through which interpretive lens this information is filtered.

- **Demonizing:** how persuasive the use of “good versus evil” categorizing language and images are in elevating or deflating particular persons, organizations, movements, ideas, or nations.

- **Equalizing:** how puffed up or deflated are the sides in terms of their implicit strength in importance, especially when contrasted with one another.
• **Excising**: what information is left in or taken out and why.

• **Ordering**: how the narrative is organized to favor one or another side.

• **Personalizing**: how humanly are the protagonists developed and are they portrayed as “others” or “like us.”

• **Sanitizing**: how censored is negative information about real costs in damaged lives and social devastation.

• **Timing**: how much attention is devoted to a particular agenda, issue, or group.

(p. 170)

**Propaganda Implications**

The government fears the use of public relations. Their fear is born from a great disgust of the word and the idea: PROPAGANDA. Propaganda has plagued government worldwide for hundreds of years and has been a device in swaying public opinion to rally support or to ignite aversion in times of war and in peace. L’Etang (1996) discusses the plight of public relations in the following:

Public relations is profoundly concerned with the establishment and maintenance of the reputation and credibility of client organizations and this is done explicitly to maintain the client’s ability to influence key publics and to be identified by the media as a contributor to debate on particular issues. Furthermore, as has been noted, governments themselves employ such techniques – though in this case these are sometimes referred to as information or propaganda. (p. 23)

The overlap of the techniques utilized by public relations practitioners and propagandists is apparent as we have seen in the explanation of their models of strategy and organization. The implications of the government’s use of such strategies are vast.

However, it is safe to say, that many forms of propaganda (those that use disinformation and coercion) threaten democracy’s notion of a government ruled by the people. If the people are subjected to government propaganda, then are they making the decisions or are those who hold the power of the media making the decisions for them?

**Conclusion**

The propaganda and public relations models and techniques discussed can be seen today and throughout American history from government campaigns to support a war
effort to advertisements to sell a tube of toothpaste. Some may be harmful, others are not, but they all have the same purpose: to change the opinion or the behavior of the masses or a group of people. Stevenson (1994) supports this point in the following:

. . . even the ‘limited’ effects of modern communication can have profound implications. In most democracies, elections are won or lost by the shift of a tiny segment of the electorate. Advertising campaigns are judged successes if only the smallest part of the target audience responds. And a public relations campaign – propaganda campaign, if you prefer – aims for minute shifts in public opinion. These shifts, of course, lead to important changes in the distribution of wealth and power. (p. 344)

With the help of the media and propaganda professionals, these techniques are being perfected and becoming part of mainstream American democracy and culture.

Foreign Service Officer William Ostick even believes, “In order to take full advantage of the lessons and experience of the public relations discipline, we must consciously adopt a public relations paradigm and approach. If we continue to view public diplomacy as exceptional, we deny ourselves access to a wealth of information and tried techniques used in public relations around the world” (Ostick, 2002, p. 2). J. Grunig (1993) agrees when he says, “When practiced ethically and responsibly, public relations provides a vital communication function for organizations, nations and even the world, helping to develop an understanding among groups and eventually reduce conflict. When practiced unethically and irresponsibly, however, public relations can manipulate and deceive” (p. 138). The techniques of public relations and propaganda vary. It is the objective of this study to determine which of these techniques are manipulative and dishonest and how they were used by the Bush Administration during the Persian Gulf War in 1991 to persuade the domestic public to support their foreign policy goals.
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<th><strong>It Is Propaganda If It Is</strong></th>
<th><strong>It Is Not Propaganda If It Is</strong></th>
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<td>Not truthful</td>
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</table>

*Note.* These attributes were abstracted from definitions of propaganda that are common referents in social science.

Figure 3-1. Sampling of Attributes of the Old Propaganda  
(Edelstein, 1997, p. 19)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor Values</th>
<th>Newprop is Essentially</th>
<th>Oldprop is Essentially</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totalitarian</td>
<td>Claims</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many to many</td>
<td>Few to Many</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>Marginalization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outsider initiatives</td>
<td>Insider decisions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant concerns</td>
<td>Control concerns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal enhancement</td>
<td>Demonization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-actualization</td>
<td>Minimization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Values</th>
<th>Newprop is Essentially</th>
<th>Oldprop is Essentially</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Broad access</td>
<td>Limited access</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity</td>
<td>Homogeneity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitated by high-tech</td>
<td>Manipulated by high-tech</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global output</td>
<td>Constrained output</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High density of output</td>
<td>Attenuated output</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High speed of output</td>
<td>Variable speed in output</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>Control and censorship</td>
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</tr>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Contextual Variables</th>
<th>Newprop is Essentially</th>
<th>Oldprop is Essentially</th>
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<tr>
<td>Communication rules</td>
<td>Controller rules</td>
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<td>Contemporary</td>
<td>Historical</td>
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<tr>
<td>Convergent</td>
<td>Divergent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of audiences</td>
<td>Homogeneity of audiences</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhances choices</td>
<td>Limits choices</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovation</td>
<td>Redundancy</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Interactive</td>
<td>One way</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Global cooperation</td>
<td>International conflict</td>
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<td>Nonideological</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
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<td>Inclusive</td>
<td>Exclusive</td>
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<td>Intimacy</td>
<td>Anonymity</td>
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<td>Closedness</td>
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<td>Proactive</td>
<td>Reactive</td>
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<td>Accessibility to knowledge</td>
<td>Exclusivity to knowledge</td>
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<td>Complexity of messages</td>
<td>Simplicity of messages</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>New language forms</td>
<td>Protection of forms</td>
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<table>
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<th>Attitudinal Values</th>
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<th>Oldprop is Essentially</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Consumption values</td>
<td>Defined by consensus</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defined by leaders</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defined by generations</td>
<td>Manipulated generations</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Ethical concerns</td>
<td>Moral concerns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity concerns</td>
<td>Protective concerns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Governed by situations</td>
<td>Governed by rules</td>
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<td>Cognitive Attitudinally</td>
<td>Affective attitudinally</td>
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</table>

Figure 3-2. Comparing Newprop with Oldprop
(Edelstein, 1997, p. 15)
Figure 3-3. Deflective Source Model
(Jowett & O’Donnell, 1999, p. 20)

Figure 3-4. Legitimating Source Model
(Jowett & O’Donnell, 1999, p. 20)
A TO B ABOUT X

COMMUNICATION

INFORMATION

S - share ideas
E - explain
I - instruct

S-E-I

Purpose:
To promote mutual understanding for A and B

PERSUASION

R-s — R-r — R-c

Purpose:
To promote mutual fulfillment of needs for A and B

A - C - B

mediated

A - sender
B - receiver
C - gatekeeper

INFORMATION

PROPAGANDA

C-M-M

Purpose:
To promote the objectives of A, not necessarily in the best interest of B.

C - control information flow
M - manage public opinion
M - manipulate behavior patterns

Figure 3-5. The Jowett/O’Donnell Purpose Model of Propaganda (Jowett & O’Donnell, 1999, p. 20)
CHAPTER 4
METHOD

It is the purpose of this study to analyze the communication of the U.S government with the domestic public during a selected period of conflict. The study will focus on an examination of the textual content of public statements made in speeches by the U.S. president directly relating to his administration’s foreign policy initiatives. The research questions to be addressed are as follows:

• What principal strategies in U.S. domestic public diplomacy and public relations during the Gulf War were used to sell the U.S. government’s foreign policy agenda domestically?

• To what degree have the propaganda model and the public relations model converged?

In order to analyze the U.S. government’s domestic public diplomacy efforts during the selected period and to make inferences as to the possible effects on the formation of public opinion and foreign policy, a case study research format will be used.

Case Study

The definition of a case study is at the very least ambiguous due to the variations of its use by different disciplines. It is most commonly used by social scientists. From the perspective of psychology, Runyan (1982) defines a case study as “the presentation and interpretation of detailed information about a single subject, an event, culture or individual” (Burton, 2000, p. 216). Platt (1988) defines it from a sociological perspective as “one or more cases, but the number of cases in each category is not significant; the unit case may be a person, small group, community or event” (p. 216). Mitchell (1983) takes
an anthropological approach, defining a case study as, “A detailed examination of an event or events which the researcher believes exhibit the operation of some identified theoretical principle” (p. 216). Although different, each definition shares the common goal to analyze and interpret one or more events. However, it is the application of such an analysis where the definitions digress. While Platt (1988) makes no provisions for the application of the analysis, Runyan (1982) suggests the analysis be “interpreted” and Mitchell (1983) suggests it be the operation of a principle. In short, the “case” in a case study can be an event, and the analysis of such an event can be generalized and/or applied to a predetermined principle.

In their book, *Mass Media Research: An Introduction*, Wimmer and Dominick (2000) state that a case study “uses as many data sources as possible to systematically investigate individuals, groups, organizations, or events” (p. 124). This description is in accordance with the definitions created by social scientists. For the purpose of this study, Wimmer and Dominick’s (2000) five stages for carrying out a case study will be used. These five stages are as follows:

1. **Design:** This stage identifies the research question(s) and defines the case(s) to be analyzed.

2. **Protocol and the Pilot Study:** A study protocol describing the instruments and procedures of the study and a list of sources to answer the study’s questions must be developed. After the protocol, the pilot study or a trial run is performed. A pilot study will not be conducted for this study.

3. **Data Collection:** This stage uses any or all of the following sources for the collection of data: documents, interviews, observation/participation, physical artifacts.

4. **Data Analysis:** This stage describes the use of three analytic strategies as suggested by Yin (1994).
   a) **Pattern-matching strategy:** an empirically based pattern is compared with one or more predicted patterns.
b) Time series analysis: the investigator tries to compare a series of data points to some theoretic trend that was predicted before the research
c) Explanation building: an analytic strategy, the researcher tries to construct an explanation about the case by making statements about the cause or causes of the phenomenon under study. This is the strategy that will be used in the current study.

5. Report Writing: This can take the traditional form (problem, methods, findings, and discussion) or a non-traditional form depending on the intended audience. (pp. 125-127)

The remainder of this chapter will use these five stages as an outline for the method of this study.

**Study Design**

The study is designed to analyze domestic public diplomacy strategies used by the U.S. government during the case for this study, the Gulf War. The study’s examination will reveal the fit between those strategies and the propaganda and public relations models. The results of this analysis will lead to conclusions about the relative prominence of each model during the conflict and its implications for democratic control for government.

**Protocol and Data Collection**

The study period will begin in November 1990 and will end with January 1991. Although the conflict began before November and ended after January, the quality and volume of the statements and speeches made by President Bush during the holidays are best suited for the analysis. The unit of analysis will be individual speeches and statements used in the period’s domestic public diplomacy retrieved from the public papers of President Bush at the George Bush Presidential Library and Museum at http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu under the National Archives and Records Administration.
The data drawn from these statements will be based on the public relations and propaganda models outlined in the previous chapter.

**Data Analysis: Explanation Building**

The explanation building analytic strategy will allow the research questions about the use of public relations and/or propaganda strategies during the Gulf War in order to influence public opinion and foreign policy to be answered. Rather than attempting to identify all the attributes of both models in the sources, the analysis will be limited to the distinct attributes of each model. In other words, the overlapping or shared attributes of the models will not be identified. The unique attributes of the public relations and propaganda models that will be identified are as follows:

**Public Relations Attributes:**

- **Truthful** (IPR, 2003; PRSA; 2003): The communicator’s message is accurate information based on supported fact.
- **Two-Way** (IPR, 2003; PRSA, 2003; Wilcox et al., 2003; J. Grunig, 1993; J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984): The communicator takes into consideration the opinions of the audience and develops a mutually beneficial relationship, rather than simply providing information.
- **Scientific** (PRSA, 2003; Wilcox et al., 2003): The message is created to suit the audience based on research of their opinions and is supported by statistical/scientific fact.
- **Informational** (PRSA, 2003; IPR, 2003): The message is information based on fact and research – not opinion.
- **Involves Publics** (PRSA, 2003; IPR, 2003; J. Grunig, 1993): The message is constructed for particular audiences or publics – not just the masses.
- **Source Revealed** (Wilcox et al., 2003): The source of information is clearly identified and reliable.
- **Continuing, Systematic Process** (PRSA, 2003; IPR, 2003): The message is created as part of a long-term plan to alter the opinions or behaviors of the audience.
Propaganda Attributes:

- **Not Truthful** (Edelstein, 1997; Miller 1937): The communicator bends the truth or lies to sway the opinion of the audience.

- **One-Way** (Edelstein, 1997): The message is delivered without offering the audience the option for their participation or feedback.

- **Unscientific** (Edelstein, 1997; Jowett & O’Donnell, 1999; Miller, 1937): The message is not scientifically constructed to target a particular public, nor is it based on statistical/scientific fact.

- **Opinionated** (Edelstein, 1997): The communicator uses opinion rather than fact.

- **Involves Masses** (Edelstein, 1997): The message is not delivered to a certain, identified target public based on a demographic, an interest group, etc. Rather, the message is unscientifically directed at a throng of dissimilar individuals.


- **One-Time, Single Activity, Random** (Edelstein, 1997): The communication is not a mechanism of a larger, long-term plan.

- **Reward and Punishment** (Jowett & O’Donnell, 1999): The audience is either bribed or threatened to comply with the communicator’s agenda.

- **Good vs. Evil Language, Labeling** (Nelson, 1995; Jowett & O’Donnell, 1999; Miller, 1937): The communicator compartmentalizes or labels certain actors in a scenario as “good” or “evil” to delineate their objective from its opponents or themselves from a foe.

The symmetrical communication (audience and communicator behavioral change) public relations attribute and the asymmetrical communication (only audience behavior changes) propaganda attribute have been omitted from this list. It is impossible to identify what behavioral changes occurred after each speech/statement made by President Bush. After the analysis reveals the unique attributes of each model in the sources, then the extent of divergence or convergence of the two models will be discussed.
The findings will be divided in the next chapter according to month. Presidential speeches and statements made preceding news conferences or as direct addresses will be examined collectively for public relations and propaganda strategies. Following the analysis, inferences will be made as to the effects of the findings on foreign policy and the implications for democracy.

**Report Writing**

The report of the analysis will take on a traditional format. The introduction and the second and third chapters defined the problem, the fourth chapter explains the method, the fifth chapter will report the findings, and the final chapter will discuss the findings and make inferences.
Although the deployment of Operation Desert Shield took place in the summer of 1990, President Bush’s campaign for aggressive action did not accelerate until the latter part of the year when Iraq’s President Saddam Hussein had continuously ignored warnings and sanctions ordering the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait issued by the United States and the United Nations. The speeches and statements made by President Bush during November 1990 reflect his frustration with Hussein’s refusal to reach a peaceful resolution to the conflict. As President Bush voices his frustrations, however, he fuels his argument for action, which is initiated in January 1991.

The statements also include strong nationalistic tones as Bush addresses troops for the holidays in November and December. The inclusion of these addresses is based on the assumption that the troops, who are stationed both domestically and abroad, are still a part of the domestic public and are able to form opinions that will influence foreign policy. These opinions may have been transferred through interpersonal communication to relatives and friends to whom the addresses did not reach directly. Furthermore, these addresses often reached the domestic public via reports made by the national and international mass media.

The following analysis for the month of November, 1990 will include three statements preceding news conferences, five speeches directed at U.S. troops stationed abroad and one statement on the UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of
force against Iraq. Each will be analyzed for the distinct attributes of public relations and propaganda as outlined in the previous chapter.

**November 1990**

**Continuing, Systematic Process/Two-Way Communication and One-Time, Random/One-Way Communication Attributes**

Each statement is part of an ongoing campaign for foreign policy initiatives. Therefore, they are all part of a continuing systematic process characterizing public relations strategies. Because the news conferences are, in general, a statement by President Bush followed by a question and answer session for news media reporters, they are two-way communications – a public relations attribute. The speeches, messages and remarks made by the president offer no opportunity for participation or feedback and are, therefore, one-way communications – a propaganda attribute.

**Involves Publics and Involves Masses Attributes**

The statements preceding the news conferences made on the 1st, 8th, 22nd and 30th all address the masses, which is a propaganda attribute. At the news conference in Orlando, Florida on the 1st, President Bush directly addresses the “American people,” which cannot be considered a specific audience or “public.” Without tailoring the message to a specific public, the message is considered as having an unfocused target (that is, unscientific), which is another propaganda attribute. This is not to say that every news conference is unscientific and propagandistic because it addresses only the masses. It is reasonable that the president would want to reach the American people as effectively as possible through a single media conference rather than several individual statements strategically constructed to suit different audiences. However, according to the models of propaganda, appealing to the masses is propagandistic in nature, and such devices will be
labeled throughout the analysis according to the aforementioned attributes and their definitions.

On the other hand, President Bush made several statements tailored for a specific public, namely the military, during the month of November. These speeches were made on the 21st and 22nd with the Thanksgiving holiday in mind. On the 21st, his speech was broadcasted on the Armed Forces Radio Network to U.S. troops worldwide. On the 22nd, he addressed the military airlift command in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, the U.S. Army troops near Dhahran, the U.S.S. Nassau in the Persian Gulf and the allied armed forces near Dhahran. All the speeches are similar in nature in that they are more personal than factual. President Bush speaks of his family and the Thanksgiving tradition while he makes jokes, slanders Saddam Hussein (discussed later) and quotes the patriotic and uplifting words of soldiers. On the 22nd, he said the following to U.S. Army troops near Dhahran:

I hope you’ll excuse a personal reference, but seeing you all here brings back a personal memory of another Thanksgiving – another group of young Americans far from home – and for me it was November 23, 1944. And I was 20 years old and 6 days away from my last mission as a carrier pilot. And our ship, the San Jacinto, laid off the coast of the Philippines. And while we celebrated without family that year, like you, we all came together as friends and as part of something bigger then, as you are now, as part of a proud force for freedom. (Bush Library Web Site, 1990, para. 5)

These “pep talks,” for the most part, do not contain information. The deficiency of information makes these speeches propagandistic. As the analysis continues, the lack of information relayed in statements directed at specific publics will be revealed as a pattern.
Unlike the military addresses, the President’s news conferences are primarily informational, which is a public relations attribute. At the news conference on the 1st, Bush goes over the “key points about our efforts to turn back aggression in the Persian Gulf” before fielding questions from the press (Bush Library Web Site, 1990, para. 2).

Similarly, on the 8th, he goes into greater detail by describing progress made by the troops, UN resolutions and alliances made with other countries in the campaign against Saddam Hussein. For example:

The framework of this strategy is laid out in 10 United Nations resolutions, overwhelmingly supported by the United Nations Security Council. In 3 months, the U.S. troop contribution to the multinational force in Saudi Arabia has gone from 10,000 to 230,000 as part of desert shield. (Bush Library Web Site, 1990, para. 6)

The details used in this statement make it more informational and scientific, which are both public relations attributes. However, Bush often infuses similar statements with propaganda attributes making the statement less fact and more opinion, not truthful and unscientific.

Frequently repeated attributes in the President’s communications during the period are the “source not revealed” and “opinion” propaganda attributes. These attributes are found in every speech and in all statements preceding news conferences except for his remarks on board the U.S.S. Nassau on the 22nd. Often, opinion statements included “I believe” (1st news conference, para. 2) or “I think” (22nd U.S. Army address, para. 20) making them easily identifiable. For example, in a speech made to the U.S. Army near Dhahran on the 22nd he said, “The world cannot, must not and, in my view, will not let this aggression stand” (para.10). By inserting phrases like “in my view” the statements automatically lose any resemblance to fact.
At other times Bush uses generalizations without a source, which results in opinion and untrue information. For example, he makes the assumption that the entire United States and the world are “united” against Iraq (1st news conference, para. 3) or that “there is a common stance and determination in the world” (29th statement on UN resolution, para. 1). On the 8th, he says, “What we’ve done is right, and I’m happy to say that most Members of Congress and the majority of Americans agree” (para. 2). On the 21st, President Bush tells the U.S. troops all over the world, “You have the full support of the American people” (para. 2). He even promises the American public on the 30th, “This will not be another Vietnam” (para. 16), a phrase he repeats throughout his war campaign. Most of these statements are obviously untrue or bending the truth (propaganda), and even if they are fact, they do not have a source revealed to support them.

President Bush’s account of “Iraq’s brutality” is another use of opinion, and a point frequently lacking sources (1st news conference, Bush Library Web Site, 1990, para. 5). On the 8th, the president tells the media how Iraq has abused Kuwaitis and other countries without sources for his statements. When considering the effects on other countries he speaks of “skyrocketing oil prices” (22nd U.S Army address, para. 9) and of some small countries in Eastern Europe and Africa being “severely damaged economically” (30th news conference, para. 8). He also speaks of the “raping, brutalizing, kidnapping and killing of innocent civilians” (22nd U.S. Army address, para. 8) and claims, “We’ve seen him use chemical weapons on his own people” (30th, para. 14). The most surprising and incriminating statement is made on the 22nd to the Allied Forces:
Mass hangings. Babies pulled from incubators and scattered like firewood across the floor. Kids shot for failing to display the photos of Saddam Hussein. And he has unleashed a horror on the people of Kuwait. (para. 15)

This particular statement and similar ones were based on the testimony of an eye witness, who was later exposed by the New York Times, “60 Minutes” and “20-20” as the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the United States (J. Grunig, 1991, p. 137). The Citizens for a Free Kuwait – an organization funded by the exiled government of Kuwait – hired the Hill and Knowlton public relations firm to arrange a hearing for the girl to testify (p. 137). Three months later the United States attacked Iraq and the firm was $10.7 million richer.

In addition, all of these harsh accusations were discredited even by President Bush himself on the 30th when he stated, “The tales of rape and assassination, of cold-blooded murder and rampant looting are almost beyond belief” (para. 13). By using the words “tales” and “beyond belief,” the president diminishes the authenticity of his prior statements.

Furthermore, the President makes claims of Saddam’s possession of weapons of mass destruction without sources when he says, “And every day that passes brings Saddam Hussein one step closer to realizing his goal of a nuclear weapons arsenal” (22nd Military Airlift Command address, para. 11), “we all know that Saddam Hussein has never possessed a weapon that he hasn’t used” (22nd U.S. Army address, para. 15) and that he “has weapons of mass destruction and is seeking new ones” (30th news conference, para. 2). Each of these statements without sources may be true (public relations), but without a reliable source to support their validity they remain propagandistic.
On the other hand, President Bush does make statements with the support of reliable sources during the November study period. At a news conference on the 8th, the President includes a report by General Schwarzkopf, commander of the U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf, saying, “Our forces, in conjunction with other coalition forces, now have the capability to defend successfully against any further Iraqi aggression” (Bush Library Web Site, 1990, para. 6). On the 22nd address of the Allied Forces, he uses President Havel of Czechoslovakia as a source saying, “Saddam’s aggression is having a severe effect on his struggling economy” (para. 12). Finally, at the news conference on the 30th, he cites Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, as a source to support his claim that Saddam’s invasion increased oil prices in the United States (para. 9). By simply adding a source to his claims, the president accomplishes a reliability that is scientific – a public relations attribute.

**Reward and Punishment Attribute**

The following statement of opinion at a news conference on the 8th doubles as a “Reward and Punishment” attribute:

. . . we’ve been called upon to help. The consequences of our not doing so would be incalculable because Iraq’s aggression is not just a challenge to the security of Kuwait and other Gulf nations but to the better world that we have hoped to build in the wake of the Cold War . . . . The state of Kuwait must be restored, or no nation will be safe and the promising future we anticipate will indeed be jeopardized. (para. 9)

The statement’s assumption of “incalculable consequences” and a “promising future” that will be “jeopardized” if Kuwait is not helped is in accordance with the Reward and Punishment’s explanation based on the audience’s being threatened to comply with the communicator’s agenda.
Labeling and Good vs. Evil Attribute

Contributing to the opinion attribute and the most common of the propaganda attributes, the “Labeling and Good vs. Evil” attribute is a popular communicating technique employed by President Bush during the study period. The Labeling and the Good vs. Evil attribute is used in the President’s communications to establish a distinction between Saddam Hussein and Kuwait, placing the latter in company with the rest of the world. During the November period of analysis President Saddam Hussein is referred to as the “dictator” (1st news conference, para. 3; 22nd address to U.S. Army, para. 10; the 30th news conference, para. 2), “bully” (22nd address to Military Airlift Command, para. 11; 22nd address to Allied Forces, para. 9), “aggressor” (22nd address to Airlift Command, para. 13), “invader” (22nd address to Airlift Command, para. 14; 22nd address to Allied Forces, para. 15), and the “tyrant” (22nd address to U.S. Army, para. 8). To further his point, the president makes reference to the “aggressor” of World War II and then labels Hussein an “aggressor” to draw a parallel between Adolph Hitler and Saddam Hussein (22nd address to Airlift Command, para. 13). These labels go hand-in-hand with the Good vs. Evil device. The following are some examples:

- “What we’re confronting is a classic bully who thinks he can get away with kicking sand in the face of the world” (22nd address to the Military Airlift Command, para. 11).
- “And Kuwait, a little, tiny country, awoke to the flashing guns of cold-blooded troops, to the fire and ice of Saddam Hussein’s invasion” (22nd address to Allied Forces, para. 9).
- “The fact is that it is not the United States against Iraq; it is Iraq against the world” (30th news conference, para. 5).

By labeling the U.S. and the world “good” and labeling Hussein and Iraq “evil,” the president is setting the two sides in opposition in preparation for war.
December 1990

The speeches and statements made by President Bush concerning the Persian Gulf Crisis during December 1990 were scarce in comparison with November 1990 and January 1991. This month can be considered “the calm before the storm.” For the most part, Bush voices his frustrations with Iraq’s disinterest in meeting with U.S. representatives to negotiate withdrawal from Kuwait. The December analysis will include only three statements preceding news conferences on the 14th, 17th and 18th and a Christmas message to American troops broadcasted over the Armed Forces Radio on the 24th.

Continuing, Systematic Process/Two-Way Communication and One-Time, Random/One-Way Communication Attributes

Again, each statement and speech made by President Bush is part of an ongoing campaign, which is an example of the public relations attribute that the communication be part of a continuing systematic process. The statements preceding news conferences are followed by a question-and-answer period, which indicates two-way communication – a public relations attribute. On the other hand, the Christmas message to the troops is not followed by an opportunity for feedback and is therefore one-way communication – a propaganda attribute.

Involves Publics and Involves Masses Attributes

The news conferences on the 14th, 17th and 18th involve addressing the masses, which is unscientific and a propaganda attribute. Even though President Bush does not directly address the “American people” like he did in November, without an identified audience his address is considered to be directed toward the masses. However, the Christmas message on the 24th is addressing the American troops via the Armed Forces
Radio. This addresses a specific public within the masses and is therefore a public relations attribute.

**Informational/Truthful/Source Revealed/Scientific and Opinionated/Not Truthful/Source Not Revealed/Unscientific Attributes**

The statements made by President Bush before news conferences on the 14th, 17th and 18th were, in general, more informational and scientific (public relations) than the Christmas message to the troops made on the 24th. The remarks made at the news conference on the 14th update the status of negotiations, or lack thereof, with Iraq. Bush states the following:

> On November 30th, in offering direct meetings between the United States and Iraq, I offered to go the extra mile for a peaceful solution to the Gulf question. And I wanted to make clear to Saddam Hussein the absolute determination of the coalition that he comply fully with the Security Council resolutions. Iraqi aggression cannot be rewarded.

> And so, I have asked the Secretary of State to be available to go to Baghdad anytime, up to and including 3d [sic], which is over 5 months after the invasion of Kuwait and only 12 days before the United Nations deadline for withdrawal. That deadline is real. (para. 5-6)

Bush’s detailed account of his attempts at negotiations makes the scientific and informational attributes clear.

However, a similar informational statement is surrounded by untruthful information. At the news conference following a meeting with allies on the Persian Gulf Crisis on the 17th, Bush states the following:

> What you see here is living proof that the international coalition arrayed against Saddam’s aggression remains deep and wide. We’re talking now about some 28 countries that have committed their forces of one kind or another to this extraordinarily historical effort. Every country represented agrees that the 12 Security Council resolutions that are now on the books make clear what is required: Iraq’s complete, immediate, and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. (Bush Library Web Site, para. 2)
Although this statement is informational and truthful, it is immediately followed by an untruthful, propagandistic statement. After speaking of only 28 countries united in the cause, he states, “As has been the case from August 2d [sic] on, it is not simply the United States against Iraq; it is really Iraq against the world” (para. 2). Bush repeats this sentiment at the news conference on the 18th when he says, “Saddam against the rest of the world” (para. 2). The 28 countries may represent a large portion of the world, but their support is not representative of all the countries in the world. These statements are therefore considered propaganda.

In addition, other opinionated and potentially untrue statements are made when President Bush uses the phrase “I think” and “I believe” in his messages. At the news conference following the allies meeting on the 17th, Bush states, “I think maybe all 28 of us – are contributing over 200,000 individuals to the military effort against Iraq” (para. 2) and “Iraq’s behavior underscores what I think is its lack of interest in a peaceful settlement of this crisis” (para. 4). Similarly, at the news conference on the 18th he says “I believe it was – the Ambassadors from other countries, the 28 standing together in the Gulf – represented a solidarity that I think was read loud and clear halfway around the world” (para. 5). These statements are strongly opinionated, which is a propaganda attribute.

Unlike the news conferences, the Christmas message to American troops made by Bush on the 24th is not the least bit informational. It is also opinionated and greatly lacking sources. The strong nationalistic tones and the testaments of American support are the primary characteristics of this “pep talk.” The following are examples:

- It’s distant in time, but close within our hearts; because on this Christmas Day, hour by hour, hand in hand, Americans will send their prayers eastward across the
ocean and halfway across the world not only to the town of Bethlehem but to the sands and shores where you stand in harm’s way. (Bush Library Web Site, para. 4)

- America is behind you, the world is behind you, and history is behind you. When you come home – and we hope it’s soon – you’ll be welcomed as what you are: all-American heroes. (para. 7)

- Today at the White House and all across America, candles burn in remembrance of you and all our troops across the country and around the world. There is no way Americans can forget the contribution you are making to world peace and to our country. Whenever we see Old Glory snapping in the breeze, we think of you. Whenever we hear the inspirational words of “The Star-Spangled Banner,” we think of you. And whenever we enjoy the boundless opportunities of a free country, we think of you. (para. 8)

Again, there is no possible way the President could know what the public was praying or thinking about. These statements are not informational, not scientific, untruthful, opinion and without sources, which are all propaganda attributes.

The only instances in which sources are revealed in President Bush’s communications during the month of December are at the news conference with regional reporters on the 18th. Bush makes reference to President Bendjedid of Algeria when discussing “new initiatives” to resolve the conflict with Iraq (para. 3). He also cites the European Community regarding a visit by Tariq `Aziz, “they said there would be no point his coming to see them unless the visits with the United States have taken place” (para. 4). Each of these statements represent public relations’ source revealed attribute because the President makes an effort to support his position with reliable sources.

**Reward and Punishment Attribute**

The reward and punishment attribute was not found during the December period of study.
Labeling and Good vs. Evil Attribute

In addition to being untruthful, the statements made by President Bush that the Persian Gulf Conflict is “Iraq against the world” (17th news conference, para. 2) or “Saddam Hussein against the rest of the world” (18th news conference, para. 2) are also examples of the Good vs. Evil attribute, which is also propaganda. As pointed out in November’s analysis, the use of this attribute is an ideal strategy for delineating between the “good” or “right” and the “evil” or “wrong” in preparation for war.

There are also several instances of labeling during December. At the news conference with regional reporters on the 18th, Bush explains how President Bendjadjid of Algeria was “unable to talk sense to Iraq’s dictator.” In his Christmas message to the troops on the 14th, Bush also refers to Hussein as a “ruthless despot” and an “international outlaw” while labeling Kuwait a “volatile and critical region” in the following:

I said I was deeply concerned about what has happened and is happening there, concerned about a ruthless despot’s attempt to dominate a volatile and critical region, concerned about his effort to acquire nuclear arms, and concerned that a promising era is threatened by an international outlaw. (Bush Library Web Site, para. 6)

His statement that a “ruthless despot” is attempting to dominate a “volatile and critical region” is also an example of good vs. evil.

January 1991

President Bush’s communications supporting Operation Desert Storm reach their peak during January 1991. The volume and intensity of the communications increase as the January 22 deadline set by the U.N. for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait quickly approaches. The events leading up to the deadline and the subsequent conflict are reflected in Bush’s communications, which become more specific and emotionally charged.
Continuing, Systematic Process/Two-Way Communication and One-Time, Random/One-Way Communication Attributes

Once again, the communications in their entirety during January 1991 are part of a continuing, systematic campaign for the support of the Bush Administration’s policy in the Middle East (public relations). The seventeen communications relating to the conflict with Iraq include twelve statements, speeches or addresses on the 3rd, 5th, 9th, 14th, 16th, 23rd, 25th, 28th, 29th, 30th and 31st without the opportunity for feedback, which are in line with the one-way communication, propaganda attribute. The remaining five are statements preceding news conferences on the 2nd, 9th, 12th, 18th and 21st, which do allow feedback and therefore are two-way communications – a public relations attribute. However, Bush does not really allow the press to ask questions at the news conference on the 21st. After making a statement he declines to answer questions but does answer one reporter’s inquiry into whether or not Hussein will be charged with war crimes with the statement, “You can count on it” (Bush Library Web Site, para. 9). With the brevity of the opportunity for the press to ask questions, this cannot truly be considered a two-way communication or a public relations attribute.

Involves Publics and Involves Masses Attributes

Although the news conferences during January 1991 all involve the masses and are propagandistic, the statements and speeches made by Bush during the period are a combination of involving the masses as well as involving a variety of publics. The statements on the 3rd, 5th, 12th, 14th, 16th and 29th are all directed to a non-specific audience, which is propagandistic. However, on the 9th, 23rd, 25th, 28th, 30th and 31st the statements are made to a specific audience or public. On the 9th, President Bush sent an open letter to college students on the Persian Gulf Crisis to 460 college newspapers. This
is the only instance that a communication is written during the period of analysis. Bush addresses the Reserve Officers Association on the 23rd, the Arab-American Leaders on the 25th, makes remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Religious Broadcasters on the 28th, makes remarks at the 50th anniversary observance of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms Speech on the 30th and makes remarks at the National Prayer Breakfast on the 31st. In addition to fulfilling the public relations attribute of involving publics, addressing a specific audience is also scientific, which is another public relations attribute.

**Informational/Truthful/Source Revealed/Scientific and Opinionated/Not Truthful/Source Not Revealed/Unscientific Attributes**

Most of the statements made by President Bush in January were a combination of informational and non-informational. However, communications on the 3rd, 4th, 9th, 12th, 14th, 16th, 18th and 21st are examples of purely informational communications. For example, Bush makes a statement about a proposed meeting between Foreign Minister Tariq `Aziz of Iraq and Secretary of State James A. Baker III on the 3rd. On the 14th, he makes a statement about signing the Resolution Authorizing the Use of Military Force Against Iraq. Press Secretary Fitzwater reads a statement by President Bush on the allied military action in the Persian Gulf on the 16th. Similarly, at the news conferences on the 4th, 9th, 12th, 18th and 21st Bush discusses the twelve UN Security Council Resolutions, diplomatic efforts made by his administration and the status of the troops abroad. The informational nature of these statements is in accordance with the public relations model of attributes.

Propaganda attributes such as opinion, no source revealed and untrue and unscientific information greatly disintegrate a communicator’s ability to produce
communications that are informational. Although communications such as the address to the nation announcing allied military action in the Persian Gulf on the 16th and the State of the Union Address on the 29th both include very detailed information (public relations), they also contain a great deal of opinion and often lack sources, making them unscientific and propagandistic as well. For example, the State of the Union, which is primarily an informational address, contains the following statement:

  We all have something to give. So, if you know how to read, find someone who can’t. If you’ve got a hammer, find a nail. If you’re not hungry, not lonely, not in trouble, seek out someone who is. Join the community of conscience. Do the hard work of freedom. And that will define the state of our Union. (Bush Library Web Site, 29th, para. 15).

That which “defines the state of our union” should not be based on a flowery call to action such as this statement implies. Granted, the address does offer strong informational grounding on the state of the union, but this particular statement does not contribute to that informational foundation.

  Reminiscent of the previous months’ analyses, the opinion attribute is easily identifiable in January when the statement is preceded by “I think” or “I believe.” At the address to the nation announcing allied military action in the Persian Gulf on the 16th, Bush states, “I am convinced not only that we will prevail but that out of the horror of combat will come the recognition that no nation can stand against a world united, no nation will be permitted to brutally assault its neighbor” (Bush Library Web Site, para. 19). Bush does not reveal how he has been convinced or by whom, indicating that the source of his conviction is unknown and propagandistic. At the Annual Convention of the National Religious Broadcasters on the 28th, Bush went even as far to say, “My fellow Americans, I firmly believe in my heart of hearts that times will soon be on the side of peace because the world is overwhelmingly on the side of God” (para. 25). Although the
statement is scientifically constructed to suite a religious audience (public relations), it is also heavily opinionated since it is based on his “belief,” not fact, which is a propaganda attribute.

Another variety of the opinion attribute takes the form of statements that profess knowledge of what others know or are feeling. President Bush uses this format several times during January. The following two statements use “we know” with “we” meaning the American people:

- And we know that, God willing, this is a war we will win. But most of all, we know that ours would not be the land of the free if it were not also the home of the brave. No one wanted war less than I did. No one is more determined to seize from battle the real peace that can offer hope, that can create a new world order. (Bush Library Web Site, 28th remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Religious Broadcasters, para. 23).

- Most Americans know instinctively why we are in the Gulf. They know we had to stop Saddam now, not later. They know that this brutal dictator will do anything, will use any weapon, will commit any outrage, no matter how many innocents suffer.

  They know we must make sure that control of the world’s oil resources does not fall into his hands, only to finance further aggression. They know that we need to build a new, enduring peace, based not on arms races and confrontation but on shared principles and the rule of law.

  And we all realize that our responsibility to be the catalyst for peace in the region does not end with the successful conclusion of this war. (29th State of the Union Address, para. 50-52)

In addition to these statements qualifying as opinion, they also lack sources and are unscientific, which are also propaganda attributes. Bush ends the State of the Union Address ends with, “This we do know: Our cause is just; our cause is moral; our cause is right” (para. 65). Telling the public what they “know” is not informational but a strategy for manipulation. Further support of the manipulation during the State of the Union Address can be found in the following opinion statements: “We’ll succeed in the Gulf”
(para. 61), “Only the United States has both the moral standing and the means to back it up” (para. 63) and “This nation has never found glory in war” (para. 64).

Similarly, President Bush professes knowledge of what the troops, Hussein and the world think or feel. At the address to the nation announcing Allied Military action in the Gulf on the 16th, Bush states, “Saddam clearly felt that by stalling and threatening and defying the United Nations, he could weaken the forces arrayed against him” (para. 11) and “The troops know why they’re there” (para. 20). He also speaks for the world when he says that sending forces to the Gulf was the “will of the world community” (23rd address to the Reserve Officers Association, para. 6), that “Saddam has sickened the world” (para. 13) and that Saddam has “outraged the world [with] what he has done” (28th address to National Religious Broadcasters, para. 18). During the address on the 16th Bush also says, “America and the world are deeply grateful to them and to their families” (para. 25), which is similar to other statements made in the previous months that the troops are both nationally and globally supported. Again he makes this claim on the 23rd to the Reserve Officers Association when he says that there is support for servicemen and women “from every one of us here at home” (para. 16).

However, President Bush discredits these proclamations with statements that encourage the public to unite and stand together. For example, at the radio address to the nation on the 5th, Bush states, “That is why we must stand together, not as Republicans and Democrats, conservatives or liberals, but as Americans” (para. 10). In addition, he points out that people are not supporting the war when he says, “Yes, there’s some protest, but this country is fundamentally united” (18th news conference, para. 7), “I know – that some disagree with the course I’ve taken” (28th address to National Religious
Broadcasters, para. 22) and “we’ve heard dissenting voices here at home” (29th State of the Union Address, para. 53). Throughout the analysis Bush makes claims that the “American people” and the “international community” fully support the troops and the war effort in the Gulf, but contradicts these testaments with statements such as those listed here.

Correspondingly, President Bush repeats other opinionated statements in January that are similar to those outlined in November and December. Bush speaks of Saddam’s possession of weapons of mass destruction without proof when he says, “Each day that passes brings Saddam Hussein further on the path to developing biological and nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them” (5th Radio Address to the Nation, para. 5).

Bush repeats this sentiment in the following statement made in the open letter to college students on the 9th:

Each day that passes means another day for Iraq’s forces to dig deeper into their stolen land. Another day Saddam Hussein can work toward building his nuclear arsenal and perfecting his chemical and biological weapons compatibility. Another day of atrocities for Amnesty International to document. Another day of international outlaws, instead of international law. (para. 11)

In the same message Bush speaks of the use of chemical warfare on Saddam’s own people and “public hangings of dissenters” (para. 4) without a source. Similarly, he speaks of how the Kuwaiti people were subjected to “unspeakable atrocities – and among those maimed and murdered, innocent children” in an address to the nation on the 16th (para. 8), and he tells the story of two Kuwaiti boys who were killed for not lowering a Kuwaiti flag at the Annual Convention of the National Religious Broadcasters on the 28th (para. 14). Bush also speaks of the economic impact on the U.S. and “newborn democracies” during the radio address to the nation on the 5th (para. 6) and again on the 9th in his open letter to college students (para. 13). Finally, the statement, “There will be
no more Vietnams” resurfaces during the Radio Address to the Nation on the 5th (para. 1), the address to the nation on the 16th (para. 16), the address to the Reserve Officers Association on the 23rd (para. 16) and the address to the National Religious Broadcasters on the 28th (para. 19). This statement, along with the others, fulfills the opinion, unscientific and no source revealed propaganda attributes.

On the other hand, President Bush does make a concerted effort to include sources in his messages during January 1991. During the statement on the third about the proposed meeting between Foreign Minister Tariq `Aziz of Iraq and Secretary of State James A. Baker III, Bush uses quotes from the U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 to illustrate the structured path to resolving the conflict in Iraq (para. 1). Bush also quotes the Amir of Kuwait saying, “those who advocate waiting longer for sanctions to work do not have to live under such brutal occupation” (Radio Address to the Nation on the 5th, para. 8). At the news conference on the 9th, Bush used information gathered by Secretary Baker to relay evidence that Iraq was not “willing to comply with the international community’s demand to withdraw from Kuwait” (para. 2) and that the Iraqi Foreign Minister rejected Bush’s letter to Saddam Hussein – “example that the Iraqi Government is not interested in direct communications designed to settle the Persian Gulf situation” (para. 3). In the open letter to college students on the 9th there is documentation of human rights abuses by Amnesty International (para. 3). Similar to the 3rd, the U.N. Security Council Resolution was used to support the fact that the “international community” is determined to stop Iraq’s aggression and occupation of Kuwait during a statement on the resolution authorizing the use of military force against Iraq on the 14th (para. 2). In the address to the nation on the 16th, Bush states, “operations are proceeding
to plan” in the Gulf based on reports made by General Norman Schwarzkopf (para. 5).

Finally, at the news conference on the 21st, Bush speaks of the mistreatment of allied pilots and that “it is very clear that this is a direct violation of every convention that protects prisoners,” which he says has been certified by the International Red Cross (para. 1).

**Reward and Punishment Attribute**

The reward and punishment propaganda attribute occurs when the audience is either bribed or threatened to comply with the agenda of the communicator. Although bribery was not found in any of the months of analysis, each month did include a type of threat to the security of the American or international way of life if the public did not support the foreign policy agenda in the Gulf. The following two statements made by President Bush are examples from January 1991:

- We have seen too often in this century how quickly any threat to one becomes a threat to all. At this critical moment in history, at a time the cold war is fading into the past. At stake is not simply some distant country called Kuwait. At stake is the kind of world we will inhabit. (5th Radio Address to the Nation, para. 9)

- This brutality has reverberated throughout the entire world. If we do not follow the dictates of our inner moral compass and stand up for human life, then his lawlessness will threaten the peace and democracy of the emerging new world order we now see: this long dreamed-of vision we’ve worked toward for so long. (9th Open Letter to College Students, para. 5)

These are not personal threats, but they do imply a shared threat if action is not taken in the Gulf. Regardless of whether or not the “punishment” is personal or shared, the strategy applied is propagandistic.

**Labeling and Good vs. Evil Attribute**

Similar to the analyses of November and December 1990, the Labeling and Good vs. Evil propaganda attributes are frequently used in tandem in January 1991. However,
unlike the previous months’ analyses, President Bush actually uses the phrase “Good vs. Evil.” In his open letter to college students on the 9th, Bush states, “there’s no horror that could make this a more obvious conflict of good vs. evil” (para. 4). The following phrases are more examples of the attributes at work:

- It’s the regime of Saddam Hussein against the rest of the world. Saddam tried to cast this conflict as a religious war, but it has nothing to do with religion per se. It has, on the other hand, everything to do with what religion embodies: good versus evil, right versus wrong, human dignity and freedom versus tyranny and oppression. (28th Address to National Religious Broadcasters, para. 8)

- There is much in the modern world that is subject to doubts or questions – washed in shades of gray. But not the brutal aggression of Saddam Hussein against a peaceful, sovereign nation and its people. It’s black and white. The facts are clear. The choice unambiguous – right vs. wrong. (9th Open Letter to College Students, para. 2)

- The terrible crimes and tortures committed by Saddam’s henchman against the innocent people of Kuwait are an affront to mankind and a challenge to the freedom of all. (16th Address to Nation, para. 21)

In drawing a divide between the two sides, one side “good” and the other “evil,” Bush is making the audience choose a side, namely, his. The public is asked to choose between “good,” “right” and “human dignity,” which is how Bush’s foreign policy initiatives are labeled, and “evil,” “wrong,” “tyranny and oppression,” which is how Saddam’s agenda is labeled.

Saddam is also labeled as “dictator” (16th Address to the Nation, para. 2 & 18; 23rd Address to the Reserve Officers Association, para. 13; 29th State of the Union Address, para. 50 & 60), “international terrorist” (9th Open Letter to College Students, para. 9), “tyrant” (29th State of the Union Address, para. 49) and “evil” (30th Remarks at Observance of Four Freedoms Speech, para. 8). Meanwhile, Kuwait is referred to as “small and helpless neighbor” (16th Address to Nation, para. 2), “peaceful neighbor”
(29th State of the Union, para. 4) and “small, defenseless neighbor” (29th State of the Union, para. 46).
CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The case study of the Persian Gulf War generated results that respond to the inquiries stated by the research questions. The research questions were constructed in order to identify public relations attributes in the domestic public diplomacy of President Bush during the Persian Gulf War and to reveal to what extent the public relations and propaganda models converge. The findings prove the existence of propaganda and public relations attributes in the Bush administration’s domestic public diplomacy efforts during the study period. The findings also reveal the overlap of the public relations model and the propaganda model as well as a distinct line of divergence between the two. The study was successful in that it supports prior research and opens the door for future research. By looking at the present study, the public and the government can decide whether or not the communication strategies employed to sway public opinion to support foreign policy, specifically war, are democratic.

Summary

The present study was a case study of the Persian Gulf War for the three month period of November 1, 1990 to January 31, 1991. The study analyzed the speeches and statements made by President Bush preceding news conferences. The communications were analyzed for the distinct attributes of the public relations and propaganda models according to various interpretations (IPR, 2003; PRSA, 2003; Wilcox et al., 2003; J. Grunig, 1993; J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984; Edelstein, 1997; Jowett & O'Donnell, 1999; Miller, 1937; Nelson, 1995).
The case of the Persian Gulf War was chosen due to its classification as a modern war. There was a considerable deal of relevance for the issue as the study coincided with issues revealed during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 and 2004. In addition, the modernity of its occurrence was helpful in retrieving publicized presidential communications via the Internet.

The communications used for the present study were found using the George Bush Presidential Library and Museum Web site at [http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/](http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/), which is part of the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. The source was, therefore, reliable and accessible for future research purposes. From the Web site homepage, the “Research” link was used to reach the “Public Papers” link for accessing the archived materials for the study. The public papers of each month revealed a variety of communications issued both verbally and in written form by the Bush Administration. There were a total of 143 communications for November 1990, 56 for December 1990, and 87 for January 1991. First, all communications directed at non-U.S. citizens were eliminated based on the study’s limited parameters, which included only the domestic public. Second, all of the communications made by anyone other than President Bush were eliminated to reduce the volume of material for the analysis. Third, all news conferences without a preceding statement were eliminated. Also, the question and answer portions of those news conferences that did include a preceding statement were not included in the analysis. Finally, all of the communications that did not directly address the Persian Gulf War, or what was considered the Persian Gulf Crisis before the war, were discarded from the analysis. The result was an analysis pool of 9 units for November 1990, 4 for December 1990, and 17 for January 1991.
Once the units for analysis were clearly identified, each unit was analyzed for the distinct attributes of the public relations and propaganda models. Once the first round of analysis was completed, a second round was made to verify that each attribute was identified in the text. The results were then documented in the findings chapter.

Discussion

The results of the study were able to build explanations for both research questions. The discussion of these results will open the door to several conclusions.

Research Question One

The first research question asked, “What principal strategies in U.S. domestic public diplomacy and public relations during the Gulf War were used to sell the U.S. government’s foreign policy agenda domestically?” The analysis revealed a series of patterns and extenuating attributes during the study period.

Continuing, systematic process/two-way communication and one-time, random/one-way communication attributes

Each statement seems to be a part of the key-messages of an ongoing campaign for foreign policy initiatives, which means it is part of a continuing systematic process and public relations. Each news conference, except for one on January 21, was two-way because the statement made by President Bush was followed by a question and answer session for news media reporters – a public relations attribute. The speeches, messages and remarks made by the president lacked the opportunity for participation or feedback and were, therefore, one-way communications – a propaganda attribute. The implications for democracy were not clear for these attributes. It is clear that the continuing and systematic process that the speeches/statements are a part of is not harmless. However,
one-way versus two-way communication during the study period did not reveal a clear threat to democracy. This will be explored further in the conclusions section.

**Involves publics and involves masses attributes**

For the most part, President Bush did not strategically address specific publics during the study period. Each of the news conferences addressed the American people without identifying a specific audience. Consequently, the news conferences were characterized as addressing the masses. Although this attribute falls under propaganda, it becomes almost a necessary device during a conflict period. In order to keep the American people updated on the most current events concerning the conflict in the Gulf, the President had no choice but to use the mass media as a channel to reach as many citizens as possible. This strategy cannot be considered a threat to democracy. Democracy would be more threatened if the public, albeit the masses, was kept in the dark about the events as they happened in the Gulf.

On the other hand, President Bush did make a concerted effort to address specific publics during the study period. Although the majority of the publics in this strategy were the military, Bush also addressed religious groups, college students, and military and political associations.

An interesting pattern was revealed in the analysis of the public versus masses attributes. While news conferences (addresses made to the masses) were prevalent in each of the months, there was a clear division in the use of the specified public attribute. All of the military addresses were during the months of November and December 1990, while all of the remaining specific publics identified in the study were found during January 1991. In January the president addressed college students, the Reserve Officers
Association, the Arab-American Leaders, the National Religious Broadcasters and the attendees of the Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Four Freedom’s Speech and the National Prayer Breakfast. This is a clear shift in President Bush’s domestic public diplomacy strategy. During the two months prior to the Persian Gulf War, Bush was primarily concerned with “rallying” the troops to support his foreign policy. It was not until war was imminent or already in progress during January that Bush made an effort to focus his public diplomatic efforts on specific groups outside the military.

**Informational/truthful/source revealed/scientific and opinionated/not truthful/source not revealed/unscientific attributes**

Each of these attributes went hand-in-hand and were, therefore, grouped together in the analysis. These attributes were the most problematic to maintaining the democratic process. For the most part, news conferences and statements to the masses were the most informational form of communication used by the president. Although some of the statements were infused with non-informational material, these addresses were primarily concerned with relaying updates on diplomatic efforts with Iraq and military progress.

However, it seemed the more specific the public, the less informational material was conveyed in the statement/speech. The specific public addresses were more scientific, in the sense that the message was constructed to appeal to the public’s self-interest and had strong nationalist undertones. This was most evident when President Bush used personal war stories and stories of fellow soldiers in his “pep talks” to the military. Bush also used religious references in his address to appeal to the Religious Broadcasters Association (December 28, 1990).

In most of the statements and speeches made by President Bush during the study period, the informational material was greatly compromised by propaganda attributes.
such as his neglecting to reveal a source and the use of his opinion, which both elicit untrue statements. Recurring statements or themes found in the study that encompass all three attributes can be categorized into the following:

- **“I think,” “I believe” and “in my view” Statements:** Statements that are preceded by any of these were automatically identified as opinion and potentially untrue because of their lack of a secondary source.

- **Generalizations:** These statements make false assumptions. For example, Bush repeatedly makes statements that the world and/or the American people support the war with Iraq. However, in other statements he contradicts himself by encouraging the public and the world to unite and stand together.

- **Impossible Knowledge Statements:** These statements profess knowledge of what others know or are feeling. Bush professes knowledge of what the American people, the troops, Saddam Hussein and the world think or feel. For example, Bush makes several statements that use “we know,” “we” meaning the American people, to tell the public that they know why American soldiers are in the Gulf and that they know the United States will win the war.

- **“This will not be another Vietnam,” “Weapons of mass destruction” and “Iraq’s brutality” Statements:** These themes were used by President Bush repeatedly to build a platform for U.S. involvement in Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Although many of these statements may have been true, all too often they were not supported by a source and were discredited in other statements.

These statements embody all that propaganda entails. The lack of verifiable evidence “sold” to the public by President Bush is a danger to the democratic process. Unless the public can disseminate between fact and fiction, they are in danger of forming opinion based on unsubstantiated and untrue information.

President Bush’s use of sources to support his statements and speeches during the study period was few and far between. However, when Bush did reveal a source the information was transformed into what can only be conceived as truthful, reliable and scientific information (public relations). Each month of the analysis included sources such as General Norman Schwarzkopf, Alan Greenspan, President Havel of Czechoslovakia, President Bendjadjid of Algeria, the Amir of Kuwait, Secretary Baker,
Amnesty International and the International Red Cross. Bush also cited UN Resolutions to prove the support of the “International community” and how Iraq was resisting a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Simply by revealing his source, President Bush accomplishes communications that are scientific and reliable (public relations).

**Reward and punishment attribute**

Reward and punishment was the least prevalent of all the attributes identified in the study. This attribute, which bribes or threatens the public for complacency, is highly propagandistic. The use of a “reward” or bribery was nonexistent while the “punishment” or threat attribute was not found in December and scarcely occurred in November and January. When President Bush did use this “scare tactic,” it never manifested in personal threats. The punishment was implied by a shared threat if action were not taken in the Gulf. When Bush insinuated that there would be immeasurable consequences to the United States and the world if action were not taken, he threatened the public to comply with his foreign policy goals. The use of this tactic is propagandistic and has strong implications for democracy. By instilling fear in the public and threatening their way of life, the public is no longer allowed to form opinions based on fact. Rather, their opinions will be formed based on the fear of a presumed future created by the president. The scarcity of the attribute’s occurrence in the study was extremely positive.

**Labeling and good vs. evil attribute**

Not surprisingly, the good vs. evil and labeling propaganda attributes were the most common propaganda attributes identified in the study. “Name calling” saturated President Bush’s speeches and statements. The most predominant use of labeling was
found in his speeches to the military but also was present in almost every other speech in the analysis made during the study period. Bush’s labeling of Hussein as a “dictator” was the most common. Although “dictator” is not as derogatory as the popular “tyrant” or “bully,” the recurrence of its use made it more significant. In one case in particular, Bush eluded to a similarity between Saddam Hussein and Adolph Hitler (November 22, address to Military Airlift Command, para. 13). This reference could have easily tapped into the emotional disgust and hatred of what Hitler represents to the audience. By establishing a relationship between the two in the minds of the public, Bush also attempted to instigate an equal hatred. This is similar to the attempt to associate Saddam Hussein with al Qaeda and the destruction of the World Trade Center in 2001 to fuel the emotions of the public to support another war with Iraq in 2003.

In addition to labeling, Bush’s tendency of pitting the “good” and “innocent” against the “evil” and “barbaric” became a mainstay of his rhetoric. This clearly was a tactic to separate the two sides of the conflict in position for a war mindset. Both tactics can be described as highly manipulative and a serious threat to the public’s capacity to be informed and to be accurately prepared to make an opinion about the decision to go to war.

**Research Question Two**

The second research question asked, “To what degree have the propaganda model and the public relations model converged?” Although the two models share many of the same attributes, the degree to which the two models diverged was revealed to be more important. The distinct attributes used for the study seemed to be divided along the lines of ethics. This line of divergence separates the two sides into ethical and unethical modes of communication. There were certainly gray areas in which some of the attributes, such
as one-way versus two-way and involves masses versus involves publics attributes, had characteristics that in some cases may have been a danger to democracy and other cases not. However, the attributes that were possibly a staunch threat to democracy were found under the manipulative tactics of propaganda.

The opinionated, not truthful, source not revealed, unscientific, reward and punishment, labeling and good versus evil propaganda attributes all were revealed in the study to be extremely unethical. These tactics were clearly manipulative devices to sway opinion. On the other hand, the truthful, scientific, source revealed and informational public relations attributes were clearly ethical and beneficial to the reliability of the president’s public diplomatic efforts. Each of these distinctly ethical or unethical attributes is more concerned with the content of the information being communicated than how and to whom it is delivered, which encompasses the “gray” area attributes already discussed. So, to answer the second research question, the study revealed that the two models converge to a point at which they diverge along lines of unethical communicative behavior in the disclosure of informational material.

**Conclusions**

The study is of importance for two main reasons. First, and foremost, it addresses the issue that the government is predisposed to use unethical tactics to sway public opinion for the purpose of achieving its foreign policy initiatives. The prevalence of tactics identified in the study, such as labeling, good vs. evil, opinion and the dissemination of dishonest information and information that does not reveal a source prove this fact. The public looks to their president and his constituents for information and direction. Not only is the president the figurehead of the executive, but he is also the most powerful source. When it comes to sources, none are more effective and
compelling than the President of the United States. Statements that purport that the world
and the entire American public supports the war and that Saddam Hussein is an evil
monster who tortures and brutally murders women and children, all contribute to the
picture that President Bush and his administration attempt to paint to create disdain
domestically and worldwide for Iraq and Hussein’s actions. These statements are not
informational, often opinionated and almost always never have a viable source to back
them up. These propagandistic devices do, in fact, contaminate the message being sent to
the public, which can sway opinion and ultimately generate support for the government’s
foreign policy objectives.

However, propaganda attributes such as one-way communication and
communication to the masses are often necessary and harmless. Although news
conferences are two-way because they open the communicator to feedback, the news
media does not represent the entire public and cannot possibly provide feedback
accurately for everyone. In addition, the questions the news media ask the president are
often controlled by the interests of their employers. Meanwhile, the president can not
only choose who asks the questions but he can also avoid answering the question at all.
Although the American public cannot expect the president to deliver messages of
importance to individual audiences, it would not be unreasonable to expect him to
address a combination of both specific and mass audiences.

Second, the study also reveals that the use of public relations attributes identified in
the study is useful and harmless to the domestic public diplomacy process. The two-way,
informational, truthful, scientific, specified audience, and source revealed attributes
provide a staunch ethical platform for communications made by the government. The
derogatory view of public relations as “spin doctoring” or a glamorized version of propaganda is a manipulation of the model and not a fair judgment of the profession in its intended form. This intended form of the public relations model is supported by current professional public relations organizations such as the Public Relations Society of America and the Institute of Public Relations in the United States as well as world-recognized organizations such as the U.K. Institute for Public Relations, the International Public Relations Association, and the Global Alliance for Public Relations and Communication Management. This “harmless” model also is found in J. Grunig and Hunt’s (1984) two-way symmetrical model and the relationship building/personal influence model of public relations. The unacceptable and unethical application of public relations strategies takes the form of J. Grunig and Hunt’s press agentry/one-way asymmetrical communication model, public information model and the two-way asymmetrical model. These models are more propagandistic than what professional organizations view as public relations today.

However, the “white” propaganda model, which uses accurate information from a reliable, identifiable source to inspire nationalism (Jowett & O’Donnell, 1999; Ostick, 2002), is more public relations than propaganda. Similarly, Edelstein (1997) defines a “new” propaganda that is essentially democratic and follows most of the rules of ethical public relations (Figure 3-2). From this we can see there is less of a distinction between public relations and propaganda than there is ethical and non-ethical communication. Whether or not domestic public diplomacy falls under either one of these depends on the communicator. The strategies employed by President Bush in his speeches during the time period cannot be categorized as one or the other, but rather as a blend of the two.
This study supports the idea that there are lines that can be crossed to achieve either a more or less ethical and democratic method of influencing public opinion. It is in the best interest of the U.S. citizens and government officials that those lines be clearly demarcated in order to secure a democratic method to instituting both domestic and foreign policy.

**Limitations**

Although the study was successful on the whole, some limitations were encountered along the way. The first limitation was the reliability of the written form of the speeches and statements made by President Bush. Unless the researcher obtained the audio versions of the materials used for the study, there is no way to be certain that they are accurate copies. The researcher, with the right amount of time and money, could have obtained recordings of the communications to circumvent this limitation.

Another limitation to the study was in the researcher’s inability to gain access to the pre- and post-communication process of the statements and speeches made by President Bush. Much of what contributes to communications that interfere with or enhance the public’s ability to be informed and with the democratic process in general, comes from the planning and interactions that happen before the message is delivered. Also, it was impossible to observe the attempts by the president and his administration to gather feedback (two-way communication) after the speech/statement. The level of symmetry achieved in the alteration of behavior by both the government and the audience as a result of each speech/statement also was impossible to observe.

The greatest limitation of the study was time. The time restrictions affected the depth of the study. If time were not an issue, the researcher would have been able to expand the research to include an analysis of all the months during the conflict period.
More time also would have permitted an analysis of all forms of diplomatic communications, as well as an expansion of the scope of attributes to include the shared attributes along with the distinct attributes of the models in the analysis. In addition, the public diplomacy efforts by different administrations during different conflicts could have been analyzed for the purpose of a comparative historical analysis if time had permitted. Some suggestions for future research will explore the possibilities of studies without these limitations.

**Future Research**

In identifying the limitations of the present study, several possibilities for future research emerged. These possibilities will examine the use of public relations and propaganda in communications at a greater depth than the current study. With an ample amount of time, each suggestion is plausible.

**Expansion of Current Study**

The present study is a case study, which is a form of qualitative analysis. While a case study was sufficient for the current study, a future study applying a quantitative method to similar research material would be extremely useful. A quantitative study could analyze the frequency of each of the attributes in the speeches and statements and produce statistical data. The data could then be explored to answer and be applied to the same or different research questions.

Additionally, the present study identified only the distinct attributes of the public relations and propaganda models. Future research could include all of the attributes of one of the models or both. The reasoning behind such research would provide a greater source of data for comparison of the two models and the prevalence of each in the units of analysis.
Similarly, the units of analysis could be expanded to include other forms of domestic public diplomacy materials. The present study analyzed only the speeches and statements made by President Bush, who is considered a main media and public agenda-setter in this country. Future analyses based on similar inquiries could include speeches and statements made by other members of the administration, published materials, audio/visual materials, etc. A similar analysis also could examine how the strategies in conjunction with the news media have evolved over time and to what extent the government uses and/or controls the news media. This type of study would be an important investigation into political communication development and government responsibility.

Also, the study period for the analysis could be expanded to include the entire conflict period of the Persian Gulf War. The analysis could be divided into pre-war, war and post-war periods. Each period could be analyzed for patterns and shifts in public diplomacy strategies by the administration. Each period also could be compared according to the prevalence of its public relations and propaganda strategies.

The present study focused on the impact of public relations and propaganda on political communication and society. Another study could be constructed to identify public relations and propaganda attributes in public relations materials that are produced by public relations professionals or institutions. This type of study would discern whether or not the public relations model is consistent with the accepted practices of public relations, or if it is more consistent with the propaganda model. This study would contribute to the field of public relations ethics and to a society that is subject to daily doses of public relations campaigns.
Finally, a historical study could be executed to include the analysis of other types of foreign policy campaigns throughout modern history. Materials could be analyzed from U.S. wars such as World Wars I and II, the Vietnam War and the Korean War and/or from conflicts such as the Cold War, the conflict in Panama and the multitude of U.S. “peacekeeping” missions. An analysis of the domestic public diplomatic strategies of several conflicts would be useful in mounting a comparative analysis of past and present strategies and in illustrating the development of strategies over time. The public diplomatic strategies for waging war by foreign democracies could also be analyzed and compared to the U.S. strategies.

Broad Studies for Liberal Democracy and Political Communication

The findings for the current study are helpful in answering the specific research questions for which it was designed. However, more importantly, the study inspires a much broader variety of questions concerning liberal democracy and political communication.

The current study finds that the true distinction between public relations and propaganda is really a distinction between ethical and unethical communication. However, research should be done to determine what ethical communication is and who is responsible for making the distinction. Experts in the fields of political communication and public relations like Bernays claimed to be mediators of democracy when they laid the foundation for their field. But were they ethical?

Furthermore, what laws have been put in place to maintain “ethical” political communication practice? When were these laws established and by whom? Are the laws developed and regulated by outmoded organizations, think tanks, front groups, private agencies, etc.? What are the political agendas of these organizations?
More importantly, research is needed to explore the ways in which the government circumvents these laws. How does the government make use of media channels like the Ad Council to sell their policies? Does the hiring of advertising and public relations professionals for government communications positions undermine the laws put in place to protect the public from propaganda?

Studies also need to be executed to analyze the techniques employed by government officials to control or influence the media during news conferences and the like. On what grounds are the reporters selected to attend news conferences? To what extent are the beliefs of the reporters chosen to pose questions in accordance with the official? How do the officials frame their answers and emphasize key messages? What restrictions, overt or implied, are imposed on the question and answer session?

Similarly, it is important to address the quality of the media’s coverage of such conferences and other media events. Are the reporters accurately conveying the statements and sentiments of the official to the public? Or is the coverage aligned with the presumed political orientation of the media outlet? What organizations are media outlets and professionals affiliated with?

More research on the impact of the messages constructed by the president and high-ranking government officials would also be beneficial to the area of study. To what extent does the “unethical” communication penetrate the public? How effective or persuasive are such communications? Are the communications successful in swaying public opinion?

On the other hand, it is important to address whether or not ethical communication serves democracy at all. In other words, in a conflict or war situation, when does it
become necessary to use “unethical” communications (the means) to justify a positive outcome (the ends)? Is wartime a special circumstance? Was President George W. Bush’s deception about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq (the means) justified by the liberation of the Iraqi people and the capture of Saddam Hussein (the ends)?

Finally, what should society be doing to improve their communications literacy? How can society become media savvy and aware of the difference between information and misinformation? Should children be learning how to be critical of the information they receive from the news media and the government? Is this what is necessary to ensure that society will be prepared to pressure government to revise the laws and to strictly abide by them?

**Implications**

The government and U.S. citizens can use the present study to evaluate and make decisions about the current methods of domestic public diplomacy strategy. The government now can see that a great deal of its strategies to sway public opinion may be harmful and unethical. And, contrary to what the government might believe, the exclusion of public relations strategies and even the 1913 Gillett Amendment’s exclusion of the use of the term “public relations” are not liberating them from a defamatory association with propaganda. Rather, by attempting to exclude public relations from their gamut of tactics, they are excluding a wide range of useful and ethical strategies from their otherwise unethical modes of public diplomacy.

Additionally, society can gain an immense amount of knowledge about the value of reliable information in forming their opinions about foreign policy issues. This study exposes the strategies that are employed by the government to manipulate citizens’ beliefs and emotions into supporting what the government believes is the right course of
This revelation is especially relevant to the current Bush Administration foreign policy agenda in Iraq. It is especially important in identifying the use of unethical devices during the current 2003-2004 conflict in Iraq. The same arguments were made, the same actions were taken. And again, the citizens of the United States are left wondering where the evidence is that supported the reasoning behind going to war in the first place. Perhaps the more the public knows about how the government is misrepresenting its intentions behind its foreign policy goals, the more they will pursue the truth.
LIST OF REFERENCES


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Megan VandeKerckhove was born and raised in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida. In 2001 she earned her B.A. from the University of Florida in political science with a specialization in international relations and a minor in French. She began her work on her master’s in mass communication with a specialization in international communication at the University of Florida in 2002 and graduated in May 2004.