

VOTER TURNOUT: THE OTHER CIVIL-MILITARY GAP

By

SARAH EGERTON VALENTIN

A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL  
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF ARTS

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2013

© 2013 Sarah Egerton Valentin

To my husband, whose service inspires me and whose love sustains me

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am deeply grateful to Dr. Ken Wald for shepherding me through this process with care and patience. I'd also like to thank Dr. Marcus Hendershot and Mr. Jim Kane for helping me develop the skills necessary to undertake this project and for serving on my committee. Finally, I want to thank my parents, who raised me to love learning and the Gators.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>page</u>
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	4
LIST OF TABLES.....	7
ABSTRACT .....	10
CHAPTER	
1 INTRODUCTION .....	12
2 LITERATURE REVIEW .....	15
Rational Choice Theory .....	15
Socio-Economic Status Models .....	16
Resource Theories .....	18
Mobilization Theories .....	23
Military-Specific Literature.....	23
3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY .....	26
NAES Surveys .....	26
Dependent Variable.....	28
Independent Variables .....	28
Pew Surveys.....	31
Dependent Variable.....	32
Independent Variables .....	32
4 RESULTS FROM 2004 NAES DATA.....	35
NAES Merged Samples .....	35
NAES Panel Sample.....	43
NAES Active Duty Sample.....	48
5 RESULTS FROM 2011 PEW DATA .....	62
Pew Merged Samples.....	62
Pew Veteran Sample .....	65
6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION .....	76
APPENDIX	
A VARIABLE CODING RULES .....	85
Dependent Variables .....	85

Socio-Economic and Demographic Independent Variables .....	85
Political Independent Variables.....	86
Military-Specific Independent Variables .....	88
<b>B DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR MODELS.....</b>	<b>90</b>
LIST OF REFERENCES .....	105
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.....	113

## LIST OF TABLES

<u>Table</u>	<u>page</u>
4-1	Frequencies for Voter Turnout in 2000: Civilians, Veterans, and Active Duty Members (NAES) ..... 51
4-2	One Way ANOVA Test of Means for Turnout and Demographics: Civilians, Veterans and Active Duty (NAES) ..... 51
4-3	Effects of Demographic Variables on Voter Turnout: Civilians, Veterans, and Active Duty (NAES) ..... 52
4-4	Effects of Attention to Political News on Voter Turnout: Civilians, Veterans, and Active Duty (NAES) ..... 53
4-5	Effects of Interest in Campaign on Voter Turnout: Civilians, Veterans, and Active Duty (NAES) ..... 54
4-6	Effects of Trust in Government on Voter Turnout: Civilians, Veterans, and Active Duty (NAES) ..... 55
4-7	Effects of Demographics on Voter Turnout: Civilians and Military (NAES) ..... 56
4-8	Effects of Political Interest and Internal Efficacy on Voter Turnout: Civilians and Military (NAES) ..... 57
4-9	Effects of External Efficacy on Voter Turnout: Civilians and Military (NAES) .... 58
4-10	Effects of Civic Duty on Voter Turnout: Civilians and Military (NAES) ..... 59
4-11	Effects of Government Employment on Voter Turnout: Civilians and Veterans (NAES) ..... 60
4-12	Effects of Demographics on Voter Turnout: Active Duty Military (NAES) ..... 61
4-13	Effects of Military Service on Voter Turnout: Active Duty Military (NAES) ..... 61
5-1	One-Way ANOVA Test of Means for Registration and Demographics: Civilians and Veterans (Pew)..... 70
5-2	Effects of Demographics on Voter Registration: Civilians and Veterans (Pew) .. 71
5-3	Effects of Patriotism on Voter Registration: Civilians and Veterans (Pew) ..... 72
5-4	Effects of Government Employment on Voter Registration: Civilians and Veterans (PEW)..... 73
5-5	Effects of Demographics on Voter Registration: Veterans (Pew) ..... 74

5-6	Effects of Military Service on Voter Registration: Veterans (Pew) .....	74
5-7	Effects of Draft versus Volunteer Status on Voter Registration: Veterans (Pew) .....	75
5-8	Effects of Military Response to Needs During Service on Registration: Veterans (Pew).....	75
6-1	Significance of Variables: Number and Percentage of Models .....	83
6-2	Significance of Service Variables .....	84
B-1	Descriptive Statistics for Demographics Model: Civilians, Veterans, and Active Duty (NAES) .....	90
B-2	Descriptive Statistics for Attention to Politics: Civilians, Veterans, and Active Duty (NAES).....	91
B-3	Descriptive Statistics for Political Interest Model: Civilian, Veterans, and Active Duty (NAES) .....	92
B-4	Descriptive Statistics for Trust in Government Model: Civilians, Veterans, and Active Duty (NAES) .....	93
B-5	Descriptive Statistics for Demographic Model: Civilians and Military (NAES).....	94
B-6	Descriptive Statistics for Political Interest and Internal Efficacy: Civilians and Military (NAES) .....	95
B-7	Descriptive Statistics for External Efficacy Model: Civilians and Military (NAES) .....	96
B-8	Descriptive Statistics for Civic Duty Model: Civilians and Military (NAES) .....	97
B-9	Descriptive Statistics for Government Employment: Civilians and Veterans (NAES) .....	98
B-10	Descriptive Statistics for Demographic Model: Active Duty (NAES) .....	99
B-11	Descriptive Statistics for Military Service Model: Active Duty (NAES) .....	99
B-12	Descriptive Statistics for Demographic Model: Civilians and Veterans (PEW) .	100
B-13	Descriptive Statistics for Patriotism Model: Civilians and Veterans (Pew) .....	101
B-14	Descriptive Statistics for Government Employment Model: Civilians and Veterans (Pew).....	102
B-15	Descriptive Statistics for Demographic Model: Veterans (Pew).....	103

B-16	Descriptive Statistics for Service Model: Veterans (Pew) .....	103
B-17	Descriptive Statistics for Draftee or Volunteer Model: Veterans (Pew).....	104
B-18	Descriptive Statistics for Military Met Needs During Service Model: Veterans (Pew) .....	104

Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School  
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

VOTER TURNOUT: THE OTHER CIVIL-MILITARY GAP

By

Sarah Egerton Valentin

May 2013

Chair: Kenneth D. Wald  
Major: Political Science

The electoral chaos that erupted following the 2000 presidential contest and a decade of sustained warfare have ushered in a new era of research about the political attitudes and activity of military members. Much of this work has focused on a) the potential disenfranchisement of service members or b) the so-called civil-military gap. Very little emphasis has been placed on *why* those in uniform bother to vote at all, or the fact that they appear to do so at higher rates than their civilian counterparts. This thesis seeks to fill a hole in the literature by placing recent survey data in a theoretical context. Two sets of companion studies conducted by the NAES (2004) and Pew Research Center (2011) allow for direct comparisons between civilians, veterans and active duty members. Using these data, it is possible to assess how well prevailing theories of electoral behavior account for elevated participation rates among service members, as well as whether specific military factors might be responsible. Overall, the results suggest that there are substantive differences between civilians, veterans and active duty members, especially regarding the influence of socio-economic, demographic, and political identity variables. However, no such discrepancies were detected for the effects of political resources such as interest, attention and efficacy.

Finally, service-related variables such as rank, combat experience, military responsiveness to needs, and draftee status do not appear to exert significant influence on the electoral participation of current or former members.

## CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Scholars, journalists and politicians have devoted increasing attention to uniformed voters in recent years, much of which has focused on two main areas. Concerns about military disenfranchisement are hardly a new phenomenon, but in the wake of the 2000 presidential debacle in Florida, they have risen to the fore of political discourse during every election cycle. News outlets, candidates, government entities, and non-profit organizations routinely highlight the unique hardships service members face when voting and assess whether we are doing enough to alleviate them. A few authors have questioned whether such efforts go too far (Mazur 2007, McNamara 2006), although Mazur's own analysis underscores the complex and often contradictory state and federal laws that govern the voting process, especially by absentee. Accurate or not, the notion that active duty voters encounter additional obstacles at the ballot box is pervasive and much-discussed.

The establishment of an all-volunteer force (AVF) and a decade of sustained warfare have also generated renewed interest in the political attitudes and behavior of our men and women in uniform. Numerous studies have sought to validate or discredit the perception of a growing partisan/ideological gap between the military and civilians, often exploring its potential consequences for government, society, and force effectiveness (Huntington 1957, Janowitz 1960, Szayna et al. 2007, Feaver & Kohn 2000 and 2001, Ricks 1997, Sarkesian & Connor 2006, to name a few). Other scholars have attempted to measure and explain attitudinal differences between the two populations, specifically distinguishing between self-selection and socialization effects

(Jennings & Markus 1977, Schreiber 1979, Teigen 2007, Franke 2001, Wald & Feinstein 2012, Bachman et al. 2000).

Given the vast amount of research regarding *how* military personnel vote (both procedurally and as partisans), it is perplexing that there is so little about *why* they vote, especially considering they generally do so in greater percentages than civilians (Betros 2001; Inbody 2009; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 2000-2010). This thesis will attempt to fill a gap in the literature by examining military and civilian electoral participation in a theoretical context.

Turnout was proportionally higher among service members in every presidential general election between 1984 and 2004, sometimes by as much as fifteen percent (Inbody 2009), and there is evidence of a similar trend in the primaries from 2000 and 2004 (Teigen 2006). Despite the consistent and sometimes striking differences between uniformed voters and civilians, many scholars simply mention it in passing. Others credit government efforts to reduce the “costs” for military voters (Betros 2001), but fail to note that similar programs have had little impact on civilian turnout rates (Giammo and Brox 2010, Neeley & Richardson 2001, Fitzgerald 2005, Rabon 2006). I contend that understanding military participation, identifying which characteristics (if any) set this population apart, can make important contributions to a variety of fields. Most obviously, it should be of great interest to the plethora of scholars investigating why turnout declined steadily after the 1960s and remains relatively low (Converse 1972, Boyd 1981, Abramson, Aldrich & Rohde 2010, Rosenstone & Hansen 1993, Miller & Shanks 1996). In addition to testing theories of political participation, there are implications for those regarding collective identity, personality, socialization, behavior,

and attitude formation. Candidates and campaigns that want to mobilize uniformed voters, and the elected officials who call them constituents, also have good reason to explore this phenomenon. Finally, it should be pertinent to military, legal and policy analysts, as well as students of democracy and civil-military relations.

This thesis will endeavor to answer two primary research questions. First, how well do existing theories of voting behavior account for elevated participation rates among uniformed voters? Second, are there unique “military” factors that can account for the turnout differential? Chapter 2 will provide an overview of the literature regarding voter turnout and military political participation. Chapter 3 discusses the data and methodology that were used for this study. Chapter 4 presents the regression results from the NAES data, while Chapter 5 does the same for the Pew surveys. Chapter 6 discusses my overall findings and conclusions.

## CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter will provide an overview of existing literature regarding voter behavior, as well as relevant findings pertaining to the political attitudes and participation of military members. Robert Lane defines the basic requirements for electoral participation as follows: “energy and time for going to the polls, capacity to decide among conflicting claims, sufficient relatedness to society for awareness of the election, capacity to implement emotional dispositions, an affirmative view of the electoral process” (1959:51). His statement, concise and aged by more than half a century, reflects much of the contemporary thinking about voting behavior. I will briefly summarize rational choice, socio-economic, resource and mobilization theories and then introduce some of the most prominent studies of military personnel.

### **Rational Choice Theory**

The basic premise of Anthony Downs’ (1957) theory is that citizens conduct a cost-benefit analysis when deciding whether or not to vote. Costs are typically defined as the time and effort required to register, gather information, and cast a ballot, as well as the forfeiture of benefits that might be gained by doing something other than voting (Downs 1957, Riker & Ordeshook 1968, Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980). A strict interpretation of the model includes only “investment” or “instrumental” benefits that are linked directly to the outcome of the election (Downs 1957, Blais 2000, Meehl 1977). Since the probability that a single ballot will determine the electoral balance or the future of democracy is miniscule, it is generally irrational for a citizen to vote. And yet many of them do, including a disproportionate number of service members. Given the additional administrative obstacles they encounter (Wright 2008, Eversole 2010, Federal Voting

Assistance Program 2011), this theory would seem to predict lower turnout among active duty members and little or no difference between veterans and civilians; neither is the case in reality. The “puzzle of participation” has inspired both the criticism (Green & Shapiro 1994; Niemi 1976; Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995) and expansion (Blais 2000, Riker & Ordeshook 1968, Jackman 1993) of rational choice theory.

### **Socio-Economic Status Models**

Although some authors have suggested the costs of voting are minimal (Niemi 1976, Aldrich 1993), scores of others have noted that the burdens are unequally distributed across socio-economic lines. Age, income, education, race and gender are among the most consistent and widely-accepted correlates of voting, which makes intuitive sense from a rational choice perspective. Converse once proclaimed that “education is everywhere the universal solvent” (1972:324); several others concur and credit schooling with the cultivation of political interest and efficacy, as well as civic knowledge, skills and values (Rosenstone & Hansen 1993, Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980, Verba et al. 1993). In addition to material wealth and the ability to meet opportunity costs, income often connotes status within and a connection to society (Lane 1959; Rosenstone & Hansen 1993; Walsh, Jennings & Stoker 2004). Both education and income are positively correlated to voting and, more often than not, one another. They are also associated with age and race, which considering the relationships described above, helps explain why youths and minorities are less likely to participate (Milbrath & Goel 1977, Calvo & Rosenstone 1989, Verba et al.1993,

Converse & Niemi 1971, Abramson, Aldrich & Rohde 2010.).<sup>1</sup> Finally, although earlier studies generally (and unsurprisingly) found that men were more likely to vote (Lane 1959, Campbell et al. 1960, Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980), that trend has reversed as of late, with women turning out at higher rates than men (Baxter and Lansing 1983; Beckwith, 1986; Firebaugh and Chen 1995).

There are significant differences on some of these socio-economic measures between active duty members, veterans, and the civilian population. For the sake of consistency, all demographic data reported here were drawn from government analyses and reflect conditions as of 2009-2010. As a group, veterans tend to be older, have slightly higher income, and are more likely to be white and male than civilians (National Center for Veterans Analysis and Statistics 2011a, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 2010). They are also more likely to have a high school diploma, some college, or an advanced degree, but interestingly, less likely to have a bachelor's degree (National Center for Veterans Analysis and Statistics 2011b).

Those currently in uniform, by contrast, are typically younger than their counterparts: 9.6% of civilians are between 18 and 24 years old, while 44.2% of active duty members fall in the same range (ICF International 2010, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 2010). Although a fairly large majority of the active duty force is white and male, the gaps have been shrinking in recent years as increasing numbers of women and minorities have joined the ranks. In terms of education, military members as a whole are more likely to obtain a high school diploma,

---

<sup>1</sup> Although pre-adolescent socialization and experiences are often deemed important contributors to political participation (Beck & Jennings 1982, Kam & Palmer 2008), they are beyond the scope of this analysis.

but less likely to have a bachelor's or advanced degree. However, there are notable differences between officers and enlistees; the former are more than twice as likely to have a bachelor's and six times more likely to have an advanced degree compared to civilians.

Assessing the income levels of active duty members is extremely difficult, as noted by just about every study that undertakes such an analysis. In addition to base pay, service members receive a number of allowances and benefits, many of which are determined by geographical location, number of dependents, rank, years of service, duties performed and a variety of other factors that must be taken into account. Despite the complexity, recent government reports tend to agree that military pay compares favorably with civilian (including federal) salaries (U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office 2011 and U.S. Government Accountability Office 2010).

The discovery that socio-economic factors are related to military turnout is almost inevitable, but the interesting question is whether or not these factors will exert the same influence as they do among civilians. If not, we must question whether SES theories are sufficient to the task at hand. As Verba et al. (1995) point out, these models are predictive rather than explanatory; they can tell us who will vote but not why.

### **Resource Theories**

This approach expands the rational choice model beyond SES factors by including the resources they provide as separate variables. In other words, the common correlates are broken down into their individual components to see how they reduce (or increase) the costs of voting. For example, Brady, Verba & Schlozman (1995), some of the scholars most closely associated with this theory, determined that education was significantly related to voting primarily as a conduit for interest. This

relationship would have been concealed in a standard SES model. That is also true of the results from an earlier study conducted by the same team (Verba, Schlozman, Brady & Nie 1993); racial disparities in participation largely evaporated after controlling for political resources such as civic skills and engagement. They concluded that social, religious and voluntary organizations can act as surrogate “educators” or resource providers, thereby mitigating the effects of socio-economic disadvantages. Earlier works suggested that public service occupations and government employment can also foster political skills and participation (Lane 1959, Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980). It is certainly conceivable that the military, which has been described as “the largest vocational school in the nation as well as a primary school for its disadvantaged recruits” (Morton 1973:54), might have a similar impact on members. It should be noted, however, that Leal (1999) dismissed this possibility after detecting differences in participation between Latino veterans who were drafted and those who volunteered.

Resource models also incorporate “consumption” or “expressive” benefits, such as civic duty (Riker & Ordeshook 1968, Blais 2000, Campbell et al. 1960), social gratification (Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995, Rosenstone & Hansen 1993) and, altruism (Fowler & Kam 2007). These rewards are derived solely from engaging in the act of voting, irrespective of the outcome. Some scholars have argued that such theories are tautological and distort or violate the tenets of rational choice theory (Blais 2000). If anything can be considered a benefit, what does the theory actually reveal? There are merits to this criticism, but it encourages cautious interpretation rather than exclusion of the rewards above, which are fairly well-established in the literature.

Given the nature of their profession, it is possible that selflessness and a sense of citizen duty are more prevalent among military members. Although I am unaware of any efforts to test this notion directly with regard to voting, scholars have suggested that those in uniform are more patriotic (Bachman et al. 2000, Teigen 2006) and less self-oriented than their civilian counterparts (Franke 2001).<sup>2</sup> Franke also reports that 75% of West Point cadets agreed that “the Army is a calling”, while only 10% disagreed, suggesting an inclination toward service and duty.

Several other political and social characteristics can be credited with motivating and facilitating electoral participation. For example, marriage and community integration, as measured by home ownership, length of residence, and religious attendance, are believed to reduce information costs and provide social reinforcement (Stoker & Jennings 1995, Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980; Miller & Shanks 1996; Abramson, Aldrich & Rohde 2010; Squire, Wolfinger & Glass 1987). Despite some debate about the magnitude of their independent effects, political trust, efficacy, and interest also appear to play a dual role, both decreasing costs and giving individuals a “stake in the game” (Southwell 2008, Lane 1959, Campbell et al. 1960, Almond & Verba 1963, Brady, Verba & Schlozman 1995). Finally, there is widespread agreement that strength of partisan identification operates in much the same manner and exerts a direct and powerful influence on the propensity to vote (Abramson, Aldrich & Rohde 2010, Campbell et al. 1960, Rosenstone & Hansen 1993, Verba et al. 1995).

---

<sup>2</sup> Franke composed a scale of six “patriotism” questions: the military as a calling, allegiance to country (as opposed to the world), military service as the strongest indicator of good citizenship, the promotion of patriotism in citizen education, willingness to fight for country, and loyalty to country.

A number of these factors could contribute to or detract from military voter participation. Veterans and active duty members are, on average, slightly more likely to be married than the general public (ICF International 2010; National Center for Veterans Analysis and Statistics 2011a; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 2010). However, it should be noted that 39.1% of the current force reports never having been married. While this might be attributable to the relative youth of those now in uniform, Lundquist (2007) found that both the marriage and divorce rates among young enlistees tend to exceed those of their civilian peers. Veterans appear to be similar to the general public in their religious affiliations and attendance rates (Princeton Survey Research Associates International 2011), while Feaver and Kohn (2000, 2001) report that active duty officers were only slightly more religious than civilian elites. Finally, veterans are more likely to own their home than civilians (National Center for Veterans Analysis and Statistics 2011a). And while frequent relocation would seem to imply a nomadic and rootless existence for active duty members, Charles Moskos asserts that, for most of them, “the military is understood and experienced as a social organization (2010: 23). As such, it might provide a sort of stability in motion.

Although much of the politico-military literature suggests only minor (or inconsistent) attitudinal differences between service members and civilians on a variety of issues (Szayna et al. 2007, Jennings & Markus 1977, Bachman et al. 2000, Schreiber 1979, Franke 2001), there are always exceptions to the rule. A few of them are particularly relevant to this paper. For example, some studies indicate that people who have donned the uniform exhibit greater political efficacy (Inbody 2009, Mettler 2005) and “trust in government” (Jennings & Markus 1977, Feaver & Kohn 2000, 2001).

Others, however, have detected no such difference (Schreiber 1979). On the other hand, the finding that service members are more likely to identify as Republicans and conservative is nearly unanimous. However, the degree to which this is true largely depends on the sample composition and is worthy of closer inspection.

Early studies were primarily interested in military “professionals” and therefore compared officers to civilian elites; they typically found that the former were far more likely to espouse conservative values (Huntington 1957, Janowitz 1960). More recently, Feaver & Kohn (2000, 2001) expanded this design to include the general public and obtained somewhat different results. They conclude that, although officers are far more conservative than civilian elites, they are actually less so than the general public. The partisan divide, however, is much larger; officers reported Republican affiliation by a margin of 8 to 1, while the other two groups were approximately evenly split.

Inbody (2009) divided his sample to discriminate between officers, enlisted active duty, enlisted veterans, and civilians. All three military groups are less likely to identify themselves as Democrats than the general public. However, he found that neither sample of enlistees was any more likely than civilians to be Republican, and both were far more likely to report being Independent (or other). In each case, the tendencies were reversed for officers. He reports similar results regarding ideology, with enlistees being more likely than both the public and officers to report being “moderate”. In the aggregate, these studies suggest there is a Republican and conservative leaning within the armed forces, at least among the officer corps. However, they also underscore the fact that the uniformed community is not homogeneous; there are important differences that must be taken into account.

## **Mobilization Theories**

Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) posit that mobilization by political parties, campaigns, and other organizations is just as important as individual resources in determining who votes and who abstains. Because this theory is not empirically testable with the available data, I will merely offer a few thoughts for the reader to bear in mind. Active duty members are less likely to be contacted by political parties, campaigns, and non-partisan organizations for several reasons: 1) they are geographically dispersed around the globe 2) they change addresses frequently, and 3) they often live outside the state and district in which they are registered. However, it is also possible that the proliferation of government programs and media/public attention has made participation more salient and has activated a sense of collective identity or citizen duty. Finally, one could hypothesize that military members are indirectly mobilized by integration in the community, while veterans are similarly affected by involvement in service-related organizations or benefit programs, as well as their civilian social networks.

## **Military-Specific Literature**

Scholars have long been interested in the degree to which the military, as a “total institution”, instills distinct values and attitudes in its members, but the introduction of the AVF has reinvigorated efforts to discriminate between self-selection and socialization effects. Collectively, the evidence suggests that the former is a much more powerful determinant of political attitudes and opinions among military members (Jennings & Markus 1977, Betros 2001, Teigen 2007, Schreiber 1979). Socialization effects, when they are detected at all, typically augment rather than alter pre-existing

inclinations (Bachman et al. 2000, Franke 2001). However, it is entirely possible that socialization has a significant impact on political behavior but not attitudes or opinions.

Unfortunately, there is a relative dearth of literature that specifically addresses political participation among those on active duty, presumably because of legal restrictions and a culture that encourages them to be apolitical (Hatch Act 1939, DOD Directive 1344.10 2008, Betros 2001, McNernney 2006). Therefore, most studies have relied on samples of veterans, who are far more accessible and numerous than active duty members. As the previous discussion regarding demographics and partisanship makes clear, it is important to recognize that such data might conceal significant differences within the community. Nevertheless, the available results are instructive.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, Bishin and Incantalupo (2008) found that uniformed voters are not more likely to support a candidate who has military experience and do not appear to vote as a consistent or cohesive bloc. Teigen (2007) examined the 2004 presidential election and found that veterans did not differ significantly from civilians in terms of partisan allegiance, affect for candidates, or vote choice. It appears that military service exerts little independent or enduring influence on individuals' political choices, although the evidence regarding their participation is somewhat more mixed.

Turnout has been disproportionately high among military members, especially in recent years (Teigan 2006, Inbody 2009, Betros 2001). Although Franzich (1982) reported that graduates of service academies were actually less likely to cast a vote than their civilian counterparts, his results appear to be unusual. Teigen (2006) compared electoral participation over a 32 year period and determined that veterans

consistently vote at moderately higher rates than civilians, except for those who served during the Vietnam era. Because participation was elevated for both WWII vets and those who joined an all-volunteer force, he concludes that socialization effects are at least partially responsible for the intra-cohort variations.

With regard to race, Ellison (1992) found no difference in low-level activities such as voting between African American vets and non-vets, but he did detect a greater likelihood of engaging in high-level activities, especially among those with combat experience. He also discovered that African Americans who served exhibited lower levels of racial identification than their civilian counterparts, indicating that membership in the armed forces could supplant such group identities. Overall, his results are similar to those obtained by Jennings and Markus (1976) regarding the electoral participation of Vietnam era veterans. Leal (1999), on the other hand, reported that veteran (and specifically draftee) status had a greater positive association with voting and registration among Latinos who served than their white counterparts.

It is difficult to draw general conclusions from these studies, many of which focus entirely on specific subpopulations within the military community or, alternately, ignore any distinctions between the groups that compose it. This study will attempt to fill in some of the gaps by comparing civilian, veteran and active duty populations. When possible, I will also include dummy variables for officer/enlistee and volunteer versus draftee, as well as measures of length of service. By doing so, I hope to gain a clearer understanding of which military members are responsible for the higher turnout and why they participate.

## CHAPTER 3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY

The data are drawn from two sets of companion surveys that permit direct comparisons between military and civilian populations. Each has its own advantages and disadvantages regarding composition of the military samples and the questions asked. In combination, however, they allow a fairly detailed analysis of military voting behavior. All variables have sound theoretical justifications for their inclusion in the models. “Don’t know” and “refusal” responses have been re-coded as missing values, and great care was taken to ensure that measures from the two sets of studies were as similar as possible.

### **NAES Surveys**

In 2004, the National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) randomly selected 656 active U.S. military households from the national rolling cross-section for a special study. Interviews were conducted between September 22 and October 5, 2004. The sample contained 372 active duty members and 284 family members. Several of the questions asked are identical to those included in the 2004 General Election Panel survey conducted by NAES. A random sample of 8,664 adults (including 1537 veterans and 65 active duty members) was interviewed between July 15 and November 1, 2004; although the same respondents were re-interviewed after the election, equivalent data is not available for the larger military sample. I have chosen to rely on the pre-election panel, as opposed to the far more extensive national rolling cross-section data, because the time frame, political context, and questionnaire content of the former are more compatible with the military survey.

This study will use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to estimate the effects of relevant independent variables on voting or registration to vote. Although probit or logit analysis is often favored for dichotomous dependent variables of this sort, OLS has proven rather robust to violations of linear regression assumptions, yielding similar results that are far easier to interpret and understand (Hellevik 2009, Wald & Feinstein 2012, Cleary & Angel 1984, Noreen 1988). For large samples like those considered here, linear models are comparable to other methods and therefore appropriate.

Analysis of these data will be presented in three sections. The first combines and re-codes the samples from both studies by introducing a dummy variable. Military family members and civilians were coded as 0, while service members (active and former) were coded as 1. Although the possibility that military life socializes dependents as well as members is fascinating, it is beyond the scope of this analysis because the Pew survey does not include an equivalent sample. An additional dummy codes veterans as 0 and current members as 1, allowing for comparisons between the two. The second section will compare the veteran and civilian samples from the panel study on a number of questions that were, unfortunately, excluded from the military survey. (Note: because the military sample only includes 65 active duty members, they will not be separated from veterans in this section.) Finally, I will analyze the active duty members from the military study to explore service-specific variables, such as rank and length of service. It is regrettable that direct comparisons between veterans and active duty members are not possible on these measures.

## **Dependent Variable**

Because the 2004 election had not yet concluded when the survey was taken and turnout in midterm elections is consistently lower, I will use self-reports of voting (or abstention) in the 2000 general presidential election as my dependent variable. Despite the well-known tendency for social desirability effects to inflate such reports (Bernstein, Chahda and Montjoy 2001; Silver, Anderson & Abramson 1986; Traugott & Katosh 1979; Karp & Brockington 2005) they provide the best available data for comparing the two populations. And although one could hypothesize that military members experience greater social pressure to vote, I am not aware of any evidence suggesting they are more or less inclined to overreport than civilians. Approximately 2.3% of the overall sample was ineligible to vote in 2000 due to age.

## **Independent Variables**

Age is coded as an ordinal scale that includes five categories: 18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-64 and 65 or older. The education variable also has five levels: less than high school diploma, high school diploma or GED, some college (or technical/vocational school), bachelor's degree, and graduate or professional school. Simple dummy variables are included for Hispanic (0=no, 1=yes), race (0=white, 1=non-white or mixed race), and sex (0=male, 1=female).

Income is measured on an ordinal scale with the following categories: a) less than \$25,000, b) \$25-50,000, c) \$50-75,000, d) \$75-100,000, e) \$100-150,000 and f) \$150,000 or higher. Marital status has been re-coded into a dummy variable so that 0=unmarried and 1=married; this is in keeping with the literature which suggests that *currently* being married exerts an influence on political participation (Stoker & Jennings

1995). The ordinal scale for religious attendance includes seldom/never, a few times a year, once or twice a month, once a week, or more than once a week.

In addition to demographic and SES variables, this analysis will examine several political and attitudinal measures. Party ID has been recoded into a dummy with 0 indicating Independent, Other, or No Preference and 1 representing Republican or Democrat. I did this for two reasons. First, the literature suggests that Independents, leaners and those who do not identify with one of the major parties are generally less likely to vote (Abramson, Aldrich & Rohde 2010, Campbell et al. 1960, Rosenstone & Hansen 1993, Verba et al. 1995). Although strength of party ID would provide a much better measure, no such question was asked in the military survey. Second, this grouping allows for a test of Inbody's (2009) finding that enlistees are more likely to be Independent than civilians or officers. Two measures of ideology are also included in the models. The first is a standard five-point scale ranging from very conservative to very liberal. The second has been re-coded as a measure of ideological strength, where 1=moderate, 2=liberal or conservative, and 3=very liberal or conservative. Two scales capture how much attention respondents had paid to political news on television or in the newspaper over the past week; both have four levels and range from none to a great deal, with higher scores indicating more attention.

Certain subsamples in the panel and all respondents in the military survey were asked about their interest in the campaign and how much of the time the federal government can be trusted to do what is right. Responses regarding interest include some, not much and very; the trust scale consists of never, sometimes, most times and always. Unfortunately, the limited Ns for these variables require running separate

regressions to reduce the standard errors. Any conclusions will therefore be tentative because it is impossible to see how the two interact and because there is only one measure for each trait.

The panel survey included a number of additional political questions that are particularly relevant to this paper. Among them is strength of party ID, which is coded as 0 for not strong and 1 for strong. Two additional interest variables measure how closely the campaign and politics in general are followed; both are coded into four part scales on which a higher value indicates greater interest or attention. I have also included a dummy variable for government employment, where 0=no and 1= yes. The survey also contained two measures of political efficacy and a variable for civic duty. The belief that politics is too complicated is measured on a 5-point scale that ranges from strongly disagree (low score) to strongly agree (high score). A similar item assesses how often candidates try to keep their promises, but a higher score in this case reflects greater trust. Respondents who indicated they vote because of candidates, issues or other reasons are coded as 0; those motivated by civic duty or a combination of factors are coded as 1. (Responses of “do not vote” were re-coded as missing values). Unfortunately, a number of these variables are also limited by small Ns and must be run separately. Consequently, results must be interpreted cautiously.

The final section of this analysis will examine service-specific variables among active duty members from the military cross-section. Reasons for joining the armed forces were re-coded so that 0 reflects personal benefits (such as education, job training, pay, new experiences, travel etc.) and 1 indicates service to country or fighting terrorism. If the latter group is more likely to vote, it could suggest that self-selection

exerts greater influence on electoral participation than socialization. In order to assess effects of the military's "apolitical" culture, I have included questions about whether it is never (1), sometimes (2), or always (3) appropriate for military members to advocate for candidates. Because much of the literature finds differences according to rank, I have recoded pay grade so that 0=Enlisted and 1=Officer. This variable could be classified in a variety of ways, but I have chosen a simple dummy for two reasons. First, the sample is not necessarily large or representative enough to permit narrower subdivisions. Second, the NAES and Pew surveys include different categories; applying these broad designations makes comparisons between them possible. Finally, I have included years of service in the model because it is possible that socialization effects emerge only after an extended period. Although the survey provided different response options for the regular military and those serving in the National Guard or Reserves, they have been re-coded to match: one= less than a year; two =1-2 years; three equals 2-3 years; four = 3-5 years; five =5-10 years and six = 10 or more years. Respondents who did not serve in that particular branch are coded as 0 to preserve a sufficient N for analysis.

### **Pew Surveys**

In 2011, the Pew Research Center conducted companion surveys to investigate how the attitudes of pre and post 9-11 veterans compare to one another, as well as those of civilians. Active duty members were specifically excluded from the military sample, which was composed of 1,853 veterans. Telephone and internet interviews were conducted between July 28 and September 4, 2011. The civilian survey interviewed 2,003 members of the general public via telephone between September 1 and September 15, 2011. This sample included 256 veterans (12.8%) and 31 current active duty members (1.5%), who will be coded as "military" and combined with the

veteran sample. However, these respondents will be excluded from a separate analysis of the veteran survey because the civilian questionnaire did not include pertinent service-related variables. Unfortunately, the active duty sample is small and likely unrepresentative, precluding detailed comparisons like those yielded by the NAES surveys.

### **Dependent Variable**

This survey did not include any questions regarding voting behavior; therefore a dummy variable coded 0 for not registered to vote and 1 for registered will be used as an approximation. Although this is not a perfect measure, registration is a prerequisite for casting a ballot and is therefore a suitable substitute for the purposes of this paper.

### **Independent Variables**

Socio-economic and demographic variables have been coded to match the NAES data. Party ID, ideology and government employment are also identical. The response sets for household income are slightly different, but the following categories mirror the NAES as closely as possible: a) less than \$20,000, b) \$20-40,000, c) \$40-75,000, d) \$75-100,000, e) \$100-150,000 and f) \$150,000 or higher. The survey also includes a measure of whether the respondent is (1) less, (2) about as, or (3) more patriotic than most people in the country. Although the lack of questions regarding political behavior, interest and efficacy is disappointing, this survey does provide a replication of sorts for the SES and demographic regressions using NAES data.

The military instrument contains a number of service-related variables that appear throughout the literature. Dummies are included for draftee (0) or volunteer (1) status, combat experience (no=0, yes=1), and rank at time of discharge (0=enlistee, 1=officer, 5= still in National Guard/ Reserves and is coded as missing). To align with

the NAES data, the scale for years in service includes the following categories: one= less than a year; two =1-2 years; three equals 2-3 years; four = 3-5 years; five =5-10 years and six = 10 or more years. Measures of how useful military experience was for teaching cooperation, building self-confidence, job/career preparation and personal growth were combined into a four-point scale ranging from not at all useful to very useful. A separate item regarding whether military service helped or hurt the respondent get ahead in life contains five categories: hurt a lot, hurt a little, made no difference, helped a little and helped a lot. Although not specifically political, these variables allow an indirect test of the possibility that the military fosters skills and efficacy. A dummy variable is included for service to country as a motivation for joining the armed forces, where 0=not important and 1= important. A third category, not applicable, identifies draftees and is coded as missing. Finally, Verba et al. (1993) have suggested that recipients of non-means tested benefits (including veterans) tend to be more politically active than those who receive means-tested benefits. This raises the possibility that high turnout among veterans is partly motivated by their participation in such programs. Dummy variables are included for whether the respondents have received any benefits from the VA and whether the government has given them all the help it should (0=no, 1= yes in both cases). Four point scales running from poor to excellent rate how well the VA is meeting needs of veterans and how well the military cared for the member and family while on active duty. One could also interpret these variables as partial (and indirect) measures of external political efficacy. For example, Mettler (2005) concluded that the GI Bill encouraged political participation among recipients because it demonstrated government responsiveness to their needs.

As I said before, each set of survey sets has its own advantages and drawbacks. The NAES data provide a relatively rare opportunity to compare current and former members to one another as well as civilians. They also contain a number of interesting and theoretically relevant political variables. Unfortunately, many of them were excluded from the active duty instrument and/or were limited to certain interview dates and subsamples. The Pew surveys, on the other hand, do not include any items directly related to political behavior (aside from party ID and ideology). However, they permit an exploration of which (if any) specific characteristics of military service are most correlated with electoral participation. Despite their limitations, these data represent the best available resources for addressing the primary research questions of this thesis.

## CHAPTER 4 RESULTS FROM 2004 NAES DATA

This chapter will present the results from three separate analyses of the 2004 NAES data. In each case, an initial model comprised of socio-economic factors, as well as demographic and political identity variables, provides a baseline for comparisons between groups and across models:

$$\text{Voter Participation} = \alpha + \beta_1(\text{Age}) + \beta_2(\text{Education}) + \beta_3(\text{Income}) + \beta_4(\text{Hispanic}) + \beta_5(\text{Race}) + \beta_6(\text{Sex}) + \beta_7(\text{Religious Attendance}) + \beta_8(\text{Marital Status}) + \beta_9(\text{Party ID}) + \beta_{10}(\text{Ideology}) + \beta_{11}(\text{Ideology Strength}) + e$$

The tolerance levels for all of these variables, as well as those introduced in subsequent models, fall well above the 0.5 threshold for multicollinearity and the bivariate correlations do not exceed 0.7. The residuals for the dependent variable are normally distributed around a mean of zero for each regression. Collectively, these tests confirm that the data satisfy many of the linear regression assumptions and verify that OLS is an appropriate method for these analyses.

### **NAES Merged Samples**

The first NAES analysis combines the samples from the panel and military surveys, yielding a total N of almost eight thousand. Both veterans (1293) and active duty members (384) are fairly well-represented in the sample, permitting separate analyses for each group. As noted earlier, there are several demographic differences between the three subsamples that might influence the interpretation of regression results. Therefore, it is important to assess whether these samples differ from what would be expected based on the population data presented above. The descriptive statistics for these variables (as well as those introduced in subsequent models) can be

found in Appendix B, and I will supplement this information with frequencies (not reported here).

The most notable disparities, at least for the purposes of this paper, are found on the dependent variable. The frequencies are displayed in Table 4-1. Consistent with the literature, veterans are by far the highest turnout group at approximately 90%. They are followed by civilians, 83% of whom participated, while those currently in uniform lag behind by a full ten points. The lower rate among active duty members is not entirely surprising, given the administrative costs discussed earlier. However, the size of the gap is quite striking and results from a one-way ANOVA test in Table 4-2 confirm that the differences between groups are statistically significant. This suggests that veterans are primarily responsible for overrepresentation of the military at the polls.

The independent variables reveal both similarities and differences between samples. Age and sex conform to expectations, with veterans being older and current service members being younger than civilians on average. The two military groups are overwhelmingly male, while women made up 65 percent of the civilian sample. Educational disparities are modest, however, and appear to be concentrated at the lower end of the scale; six percent of civilians report having less than a high school diploma, as opposed to approximately three percent of veterans and only one percent of active duty members. Income follows a similar pattern. Although veterans have a higher mean, less than a single percent of variation remains between the three groups among those earning more than \$50,000 per year. Finally, more than eighty percent of civilians and both types of military members are white. Hispanics represent a small and fairly similar portion of each sample (less than 7%), while non-whites are slightly more

prevalent among active duty members than the other two groups. Aside from the predictable differences for age and sex, the three subsets appear to be socio-economically comparable overall.

The demographic and political variables also suggest a mixture of shared and singular tendencies, as evidenced by the one-way ANOVA results in Table 4-2. For example, the data reveal no substantial differences in terms of religious attendance, as a majority of each subsample attends only occasionally or not at all. On the other hand, active duty members and veterans are both more likely than civilians to be married, and those currently in uniform exceed their predecessors by an additional seven percent. There are also significant differences on the political identity variables. Although a majority of all three groups identifies with one of the major parties, civilians are more likely than respondents in either military set to label themselves as liberal or very liberal, in keeping with the literature. And while the frequencies regarding ideological strength are almost identical for civilians and veterans, active duty members are more inclined to be moderate and less likely to identify as very liberal or conservative by several points. Although they clearly diverge on certain individual items, the three groups are generally similar, and the disparities that emerge are consistent with the statistics and empirical data reported earlier.

Table 4-3 presents the results for the base model, which was regressed separately for each of the subsamples to allow comparisons. To recapitulate, this model includes the core variables included in standard models of political participation. For civilians, almost all of the included variables were statistically significant ( $p \leq .01$ ) and related to voting in the predicted direction. The only exceptions, the two measures

of ideology, produced results that might be obtained by simple chance for all three groups (and across all models). Age, education and income were all positive and significant at the  $p \leq .05$  level for the military groups as well, but there are somewhat notable differences in magnitude. For example, the unstandardized coefficient for age is nearly twice as large among active duty members as veterans, with civilians falling in between the two. Education, on the other hand, exerts similar influence among civilians and current service members but a great deal less among veterans. In both cases, the measurement scales were identical and yet the size of the gaps exceeds the standard deviations, suggesting a substantive difference (Miller 2005). Although the income coefficients also vary across groups, they do not meet this criterion. Finally, sex is negative for both military groups, indicating that uniformed females are less likely to vote than their male counterparts, but the relationship is not statistically significant. These findings are fairly intuitive, given the relationships between them and the demographics of the sub-samples, but others are not so easily explained.

Coefficients for the racial/ethnic variables in Table 4-3 present something of a paradox. Being non-white is negatively related to voting for both veterans and active duty members, but it is not statistically significant for either group at the  $p \leq .05$  level. (The p-value of .076 for the veteran sample does satisfy less stringent requirements, however). Hispanic lineage, on the other hand, performs as expected (and quite strongly) among those currently in the service by depressing turnout, but is actually positive and insignificant for former members. Hispanics encounter additional barriers to political participation; controlling for citizenship and English proficiency might shed

additional light on these results, but no such measures were available.<sup>3</sup> On the whole, however, it appears that military service does mitigate some racial effects, if a bit inconsistently.

Finally, religious attendance and party ID have positive and significant effects on the voting behavior of veterans, as predicted by the literature, but the p-values for both relationships are well outside the acceptable range for those presently in uniform. Despite these variations across sub-samples, the base model confirms the well-documented fact that socio-economic factors (specifically age, education and income) play a pivotal role in determining who votes and who abstains.

Model 2 in Table 4-4 introduces measures of how much attention respondents paid to political news on national television or in the newspaper during the previous week. Although the split-sampling procedures and multiple questionnaire forms employed by NAES reduce the Ns somewhat for each group, there are still 4,350 civilians, 988 veterans and 267 active duty members included in the overall sample. Responses fall on a four point scale that ranges from “none at all” to “a great deal”, with a higher score indicating more attention paid. The descriptive statistics suggest only minor differences on these measures across groups; the frequencies (not reported here) indicate the same. However, the results of the regression presented in Table 4-4 reveal very different effects for each subsample. Both attention variables are positive and significant at the  $p \leq .05$  level for civilians, as the literature predicts. However, for veterans neither result differs from chance and increased attention to political news on

---

<sup>3</sup> A citizenship question was included in the panel questionnaire, but response rates were far too anemic for analysis. Opting to conduct the interview in Spanish could arguably be a proxy for proficiency, but it might also reflect simple preference rather than ability and was therefore excluded.

TV actually has a negative coefficient. Among current service members, both effects are positive, but only the newspaper variable satisfies the more lenient  $p \leq 0.1$  conditions for significance. It appears that attention to political news via these media does not have as much influence among military members as it does among civilians.

However, the addition of these variables does alter some of the socio-economic effects from the base model. Interestingly, the changes are least dramatic among civilians, for whom nearly all of the variables remain significant, even though some of the coefficients decline slightly. The only exception is marital status, which drops out as a statistically important predictor for civilians and veterans alike and retains this negligible status among active duty members. Similarly, the p-value for religious attendance rises above the .05 level for veterans ( $p=.068$ ) and is still insignificant for those currently in uniform. Income is also no longer significant for veterans and, while the p-value increases to .063 for active duty members, it remains extremely low for civilians.

Finally party ID, one of the most heralded predictors of electoral participation, continues to be significant for veterans and civilians but has no such statistical association for those on active duty. The variable was coded as a dummy, with a one indicating affiliation with either major party. It seems that uniformed independents and those who identify with other parties are not any less likely to vote than their Republican and Democratic counterparts. These results align with Inbody's (2009) findings regarding the middle-of-the-road partisan and ideological preferences of current and former enlistees, as well as their propensity to participate.

Model 3, presented in Table 4-5, returns to the base model and expands it by adding a specific measure of interest in the ongoing 2004 presidential campaign. Ideally, this variable would be run in the same model as the attention items just discussed, but the limited number of respondents who were asked all three questions precludes this course of action. A combined regression (not reported here) resulted in higher standard errors for all variables, indicating less reliable results. Even without including the attention variables, the Ns for this model are smaller than the base, but sample sizes of 2,315 civilians, 446 veterans, and 341 active duty members are more than adequate.

The descriptives suggest that veterans are the most likely to be very interested in the campaign, followed by civilians, while active duty members bring up the rear. Once again, however, the regression results in Table 4-5 seem to defy logical and theoretical predictions regarding the effects. Veterans might indeed be more interested, but it does not appear to influence whether or not they participate at the polls, since the p-value is well outside the accepted parameters. At the same time, there is a positive and significant association for civilians and active duty members. In fact, interest surpasses the effects of education in both groups, supporting Brady, Verba & Schlozman's (1995) assertion that the latter functions primarily as a conduit for the former. The coefficient for those currently in service is almost one and a half times larger than for civilians, suggesting that interest is a more important resource for them when all other factors are held constant. However, these results must be interpreted cautiously for two reasons. First, a single item of interest, especially one that is limited to the campaign, is not necessarily a reliable indicator. Second, the dependent variable measures voting

behavior in 2000, four years prior to the campaign about which respondents are being asked.

These limitations notwithstanding, the interest variable exerts an indirect influence on the socio-economic factors in the model, most notably rendering income insignificant for all three subsamples. For civilians, being female is no longer statistically associated with higher turnout, but all of the other base variables retain their significance, despite diminished magnitude (except for marital status, which actually increased). Among veterans, party ID, religious attendance and race now exceed the acceptable range for p-values. Interestingly marital status, which was not significant in the base, now satisfies this requirement and has a much larger coefficient. For the most part, there were only modest changes in the active duty results. Income was the lone item that crossed out of (or into) significance, and although the age coefficient declined and education increased, neither shift was very large. The Hispanic variable, on the other hand, exhibits much greater magnitude in this model than the base and continues to be by far the most powerful predictor for this group.

Model 4 in Table 4-6 tests the hypothesis that greater trust in the federal government might contribute to higher turnout rates among military members. Although this model too is limited by the inclusion of a single measure and dramatically reduced Ns, it at least allows for a preliminary investigation. The sample contains 1,396 civilians, 220 veterans, and 326 active duty members. Respondents were asked how much of the time they trust the government to do the right thing; a higher score on this scale indicates greater trust. The means suggest, and the frequencies verify, that active duty members do in fact exhibit higher levels of trust, while the other two groups are

rather similar in their distribution. Considering their integration in and dependence on the government, it is not terribly surprising that current service members are more trusting of it. However, one would not expect this quality to be negatively and significantly associated with voting, which is exactly what the regression results in Table 4-6 indicate. The coefficients for civilians and veterans, on the other hand, are positive and the p-values are quite high. Bi-variate correlations between trust and voting (not shown here) confirm these somewhat baffling findings. It is possible that the limitations of the model are at least partially responsible; more extensive measures of trust and larger active duty samples might yield more predictable results. Or it could be that active duty members equate “government” and the military, but that still would not explain why positive evaluations diminish turnout.

### **NAES Panel Sample**

This section will examine a number of pertinent political questions that were excluded from the active duty survey. The analysis is therefore limited to the sixty five current service members, 1,193 veterans and 5,601 civilians who were part of the panel sample. As a result, it is no longer possible to regress the two military groups separately and uniformed respondents have been combined with veterans. The descriptives for the base model, which now includes a measure for strength of party ID, are located in the appendix. The new variable is coded as a dummy, with one indicating a strong partisan affiliation. The mean for military members is 0.72, while the civilian average is slightly lower 0.67. Interestingly, the means for Party ID are nearly identical but reversed. The rest of the figures are quite similar to those obtained for the merged sample and will therefore not be discussed in great detail here.

For the most part, the regression results presented in Table 4-7 are also comparable to the initial base model. Among civilians, all of the variables continue to be significant with only minor fluctuations in magnitude. (Again, ideology is the exception.) The only notable difference for military members occurs on the race variable, which shifted from borderline to clearly significant ( $p=.004$ ) and increased in magnitude from  $-.043$  to  $-.070$ . As before, being female, married and Hispanic are all insignificant, and the coefficient for the latter remains positive. The new strength of party ID measure performs quite well for both groups; the p-values are extremely small and the coefficients are identical at  $.056$ .

Model 2, located in Table 4-8, includes two measures of political interest and one for internal efficacy. The sample is comprised of 1,860 civilians and 445 military members. Although the reduced Ns are disappointing, running these three items separately did not improve the sample sizes; nor did it substantively alter the results or reduce the standard errors. The interest variables indicate how closely respondents are following the campaign and how often they follow politics in general. Both are measured on a four-tier scale that increases from not at all to a great deal. Although these two items are positively and significantly related to one another and to voting, the correlations do not exceed acceptable limits. A five point efficacy scale measures respondents' belief that politics are too complicated to understand, with a higher score indicating greater agreement with that statement.

The descriptives presented in the Appendix suggest that military members are more inclined to follow political matters and less likely to believe they are too complicated. Both of these trends are evident in the frequencies as well. Table 4-8

displays the regression results for this model. While the coefficient for the efficacy measure is negative, as expected, it also fails to achieve significance for both groups. Holding a low level of what scholars call internal political efficacy does not appear to prevent these individuals from voting. The two interest variables, on the other hand, are significant at the  $p \leq .05$  level and positive for both groups. Interest and attention to politics are logically and theoretically linked to political participation, so these findings are not exactly shocking. However, it is interesting to note that the magnitude of both variables is greater among military members; the coefficient for following politics is twice as large as that for civilians. This contrasts with the attention to political news and interest in campaign variables, which were not significant for the veterans who make up a vast majority of this military sample. It could be that the previous measures were too specific and narrow; or perhaps question wording and order contributed to the discrepancies.

The two samples also differ in terms of the consequences that result from adding these items to the equation. Among civilians, income and being female are no longer significant predictors of voting behavior. Race, which has been consistently and highly significant in every model up to this point, now has a borderline p-value of 0.73 and the coefficient dropped by half to -.042. For military members, race and education are no longer even remotely significant (both p-values approach or exceed .500), while income actually increases its positive and powerful influence. Because income and education are so closely related, it is difficult to determine why they behave differently for the two groups, or if it even matters. Party ID and strength of attachment both perform as

expected among civilians, while the latter is insignificant for military members and the former has an increased p-value of .077.

Model 3 in Table 4-9 adds a measure of external political efficacy to the base model. Respondents were asked how much of the time candidates try to keep their promises and the five-point scale ranges from never (low) to always (high). Again, this would ideally have been included with the model above or combined with the trust government variable, but the reduced Ns of 601 civilians and 136 military members require a separate analysis. The descriptives reveal means that are almost identical for the general public (3.24) and military members (3.22), indicating that “sometimes” is the average answer. The frequencies (not reported) show that the distributions are fairly similar for higher and lower scores in both groups. Table 4-9 displays the results of the regression. The coefficient for this variable is positive but insignificant across the board, which is not surprising for a single item that is quite narrow in focus. Despite its poor performance, adding this item does drop sex and marital status as significant predictors for civilians. Among military members, the p-values for religious attendance, being Hispanic, and education no longer fall within an acceptable range. The rest of the independent variables show minor variations in the coefficients, but do not differ substantially from the base model.

Returning to the base, Model 4 adds a dummy variable indicating whether civic duty motivated respondents' decision to vote. Civic duty was coded as a one, while candidates, issues and “other” were coded as a zero. (Respondents who said both were equal are coded as one; those who replied they do not vote were excluded from the analysis.) While the mean for civilians falls just above the midpoint at .54, military

members have an average of .62. The frequencies, which reveal an 8% discrepancy between the two groups, also suggest that more service members are driven by a sense of duty. But there is yet another disconnect between the answers given and the effects of the variable, as evidenced by the results in Table 4-10. Although the coefficient for civic duty was positive for both groups, it only attained significance among civilians ( $p=.025$ ). The magnitude is fairly large at .054 and renders race, marital status and party ID insignificant. For military members, the only significant predictors were age, being married, and the party ID measures. However, it should be noted that there are once again substantially reduced Ns of 595 civilians and 138 military. It is difficult to be certain that these respondents are representative of the 7,000 who were not asked this question.

The final model for the panel survey data tests whether government employment facilitates or encourages political participation, as suggested by Lane (1959) and Wolfinger & Rosenstone (1980). A simple dummy variable was coded 1 for government employees. The sixty five active duty respondents, who obviously meet this criterion, were excluded to avoid skewing the results. A separate analysis (not reported here) indicated their inclusion had just that effect, as discussed below. There are thus 3,057 civilians in the regression, approximately 26% of whom work for the government. A slightly higher 31% of the 470 veterans are so employed. The results, which appear in Table 4-11, show that government work is positively associated with voting for both groups at the  $p\leq.05$  level. It is somewhat surprising that the coefficient is twice as large for former service members (.056), since they have prior as well as current experience. However, this relationship could simply reflect self-selection effects and does not

necessarily imply causation. The coefficient was also positive in the regression that included active duty members but it did not attain significance. (Obviously civilian results were unaffected.)

Having included this item in the model, marital status no longer even approaches significance for civilians and the p-value for being female increases to .056. All of the other base variables continue to exert significant influence. For veterans, education and strength of party ID drop out, while party ID clings to the last remnants of significance with a p-value of .094. Income, being non-white, and religious attendance all continue to be significant predictors of voting, although the latter now only satisfies the more lenient criterion ( $p=.062$ ).

### **NAES Active Duty Sample**

This section examines the internal differences among active duty members, rather than comparing them with civilians or veterans. The demographic characteristics of the 321 active duty members from the military cross-section were discussed above and will not be repeated here. However, a separate descriptives table is provided in the appendix. Results from the base model are presented in Table 4-12 and closely resemble those obtained in previous sections. There is, however, one noteworthy exception: for the first time, income is positive but insignificant right from the start. This is even more striking considering the coefficients for education and age are nearly identical to those from the merged base model. In that instance, income had a p-value of 0.46 for active duty members while those for the other two groups hovered around zero. There appears to be a pattern, and yet the complete absence of significance is surprising. The other variables behave more predictably; race, sex, and all of the demographic and political variables are insignificant. Age, education and being

Hispanic are all influential as expected and the coefficient for the latter remains extremely high at -.232.

Model 2 in Table 4-13 introduces several service-related variables and includes 300 respondents. A dummy for rank is coded so that 0 denotes an enlistee and 1 an officer, with just over a quarter of respondents falling into the latter category. A similar variable measures whether service members joined the military to obtain personal benefits such as education and job training (0) or to serve the country or fight terrorism (1). A majority (73%) of subjects selected the former. Two questions regarding whether it is appropriate for a military member to advocate for local or presidential candidates were combined into a three point scale, with a high score indicating either behavior is appropriate. A mean score of 1.71 suggests that the average service member believes it is acceptable some of the time or not at all. Finally, separate variables were included for years in the regular military or the National Guard/Reserves, with members who did not serve in that branch coded as zero.

Table 4-13 reveals that none of the military variables were significantly related to voting, except for years in service. Both of these items were positive and significant, although the p-value for the National Guard/Reserves measure is much lower (.008 versus .072) and the coefficient is one and a half times larger (0.50). These results are fairly compelling since the tolerance levels were well below the .500 cutoff point that hints at multicollinearity and the model controls for age, making this a strict test. A separate regression that excluded years of service (not reported here) confirms the poor predictive powers of the other military variables.

Adding these service-related variables increases the p-values for age and education from almost zero to .056 and .070, respectively, and reduces the magnitude of both by quite a bit. The impact is reversed and even more dramatic for the Hispanic variable, which now has a coefficient of -.333. Finally, religious attendance, which was insignificant in the base model, becomes borderline significant with a p-value of .070.

It is disappointing, but not surprising, that the military variables performed so poorly. Only rank had even a bi-variate correlation with voting that attained significance; and a close association with age and income meant it was unlikely to exert much independent influence. The reason for joining variable was included as a secondary measure of civic duty, which was also insignificant. And the question about advocating for candidates was an intriguing but hardly all-encompassing attempt to capture the apolitical culture that is so prominent in the literature. After all, there is a big difference between advocating and exercising one's right to vote. The Pew studies allow for replication of some, but not all, of these variables and are the subject of the next chapter.

Table 4-1. Frequencies for Voter Turnout in 2000: Civilians, Veterans, and Active Duty Members (NAES)

		Frequency	Percent
Civilian	Did not Vote	1112	15.1
	Voted	6101	82.9
	Total	7213	98.0
Veteran	Did not Vote	112	7.6
	Voted	1321	89.7
	Total	1433	97.4
Active Duty	Did not Vote	107	24.5
	Voted	318	72.8
	Total	425	97.3

Table 4-2. One Way ANOVA Test of Means for Turnout and Demographics: Civilians, Veterans and Active Duty (NAES)

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Voted in 2000 General	Between Groups	11.826	2	5.913	47.708	.000
	Within Groups	1123.875	9068	.124		
	Total	1135.701	9070			
Religious Attendance	Between Groups	2.308	2	1.154	.643	.526
	Within Groups	16564.503	9229	1.795		
	Total	16566.811	9231			
Marital Status	Between Groups	15.936	2	7.968	33.752	.000
	Within Groups	2183.507	9249	.236		
	Total	2199.443	9251			
Party ID	Between Groups	2.039	2	1.019	4.605	.010
	Within Groups	2001.031	9040	.221		
	Total	2003.070	9042			
Ideology	Between Groups	97.115	2	48.558	47.551	.000
	Within Groups	9241.562	9050	1.021		
	Total	9338.678	9052			
Ideology Strength	Between Groups	7.622	2	3.811	8.017	.000
	Within Groups	4302.150	9050	.475		
	Total	4309.772	9052			

Table 4-3. Effects of Demographic Variables on Voter Turnout: Civilians, Veterans, and Active Duty (NAES)

		Coef.	Std. Error	Std. Coef.	Sig.
Civilian <sup>a</sup>	(Constant)	.278	.026		.000
	Age Group	.071	.003	.252	.000
	Education	.053	.004	.185	.000
	Income	.015	.003	.065	.000
	Hispanic	-.154	.018	-.103	.000
	Race	-.068	.013	-.062	.000
	Sex	.027	.009	.038	.001
	Religious Attendance	.024	.003	.092	.000
	Marital Status	.027	.009	.037	.003
	Party ID	.064	.009	.086	.000
	Ideology Strength	.000	.006	.001	.953
	Ideology	-.001	.004	-.002	.866
Veteran <sup>b</sup>	(Constant)	.578	.055		.000
	Age Group	.044	.007	.165	.000
	Education	.024	.007	.104	.000
	Income	.016	.006	.088	.004
	Hispanic	.028	.038	.020	.461
	Race	-.043	.024	-.048	.076
	Sex	-.033	.024	-.037	.183
	Religious Attendance	.012	.006	.061	.033
	Marital Status	.006	.016	.010	.726
	Party ID	.057	.015	.103	.000
	Ideology Strength	-.002	.011	-.006	.851
	Ideology	-.011	.009	-.040	.192
Active Duty <sup>c</sup>	(Constant)	.050	.171		.769
	Age Group	.089	.022	.201	.000
	Education	.076	.022	.188	.001
	Income	.038	.019	.113	.046
	Hispanic	-.213	.085	-.118	.012
	Race	-.088	.055	-.075	.110
	Sex	-.069	.054	-.060	.203
	Religious Attendance	.021	.017	.061	.220
	Marital Status	.044	.048	.045	.357
	Party ID	-.011	.044	-.012	.797
	Ideology Strength	.030	.039	.045	.448
	Ideology	.016	.033	.031	.613

a. N=6,308; R-Square=.172; b. N=1,293; R-Square=.083; c. N=384; R-Square=.212; Estimated by OLS.

Table 4-4. Effects of Attention to Political News on Voter Turnout: Civilians, Veterans, and Active Duty (NAES)

	Coef.	Std. Error	Std. Coef.	Sig.	
Civilian <sup>a</sup>	(Constant)	.329	.033	.000	
	Age Group	.063	.004	.244	.000
	Education	.038	.004	.143	.000
	Income	.013	.003	.062	.000
	Hispanic	-.114	.022	-.074	.000
	Race	-.071	.015	-.070	.000
	Sex	.027	.010	.042	.004
	Religious Attendance	.023	.004	.097	.000
	Marital Status	.012	.010	.019	.229
	Party ID	.051	.010	.076	.000
	Ideology Strength	8.954E-005	.007	.000	.989
	Ideology	-.004	.005	-.012	.424
	Attention to Pol. News - TV	.011	.005	.032	.038
	Attention to Pol. News - Paper	.015	.005	.043	.005
	Veteran <sup>b</sup>	(Constant)	.693	.057	.000
Age Group		.031	.008	.136	.000
Education		.015	.007	.076	.025
Income		.007	.005	.049	.164
Hispanic		.007	.040	.006	.855
Race		-.012	.024	-.016	.624
Sex		-.018	.025	-.023	.465
Religious Attendance		.010	.006	.060	.068
Marital Status		-.002	.016	-.005	.889
Party ID		.037	.015	.080	.013
Ideology Strength		.002	.011	.006	.851
Ideology		-.006	.008	-.025	.484
Attention to Pol. News - TV		-.005	.009	-.021	.544
Attention to Pol. News - Paper		.011	.008	.048	.162
Active Duty <sup>c</sup>		(Constant)	.176	.219	.423
	Age Group	.059	.026	.142	.026
	Education	.067	.027	.167	.014
	Income	.042	.023	.128	.063
	Hispanic	.027	.106	.015	.798
	Race	-.048	.070	-.040	.492
	Sex	-.101	.066	-.090	.126
	Religious Attendance	.027	.020	.084	.168
	Marital Status	-.017	.058	-.018	.770
	Party ID	-.059	.052	-.069	.257
	Ideology Strength	.001	.045	.002	.977
	Ideology	-.043	.037	-.087	.243
	Attention to Pol. News - TV	.029	.031	.060	.341
	Attention to Pol. News - Paper	.047	.026	.112	.076

a. N=4,350; R-Square=.146; b. N=988; R-Square=.051; c. N=267; R-Square=.174; Estimated by OLS.

Table 4-5. Effects of Interest in Campaign on Voter Turnout: Civilians, Veterans, and Active Duty (NAES)

	Coef.	Std. Error	Std. Coef.	Sig.	
Civilian <sup>a</sup>	(Constant)	.279	.047	.000	
	Age Group	.062	.005	.224	.000
	Education	.046	.006	.162	.000
	Income	.006	.005	.025	.273
	Hispanic	-.144	.029	-.098	.000
	Race	-.061	.021	-.057	.003
	Sex	.018	.014	.026	.193
	Religious Attendance	.017	.005	.067	.001
	Marital Status	.034	.015	.048	.023
	Party ID	.062	.014	.085	.000
	Ideology Strength	-.012	.010	-.024	.230
	Ideology	-.006	.007	-.018	.379
	Interested in Campaign	.058	.010	.110	.000
	Veteran <sup>b</sup>	(Constant)	.536	.096	.000
Age Group		.043	.013	.154	.001
Education		.024	.012	.100	.046
Income		.003	.009	.017	.748
Hispanic		.041	.076	.025	.589
Race		.001	.041	.001	.977
Sex		-.036	.044	-.038	.414
Religious Attendance		.012	.010	.060	.233
Marital Status		.072	.029	.127	.014
Party ID		.042	.026	.076	.109
Ideology Strength		-.002	.019	-.006	.907
Ideology		-.019	.014	-.068	.186
Interested in Campaign		.027	.019	.070	.144
Active Duty <sup>c</sup>		(Constant)	-.069	.191	.718
	Age Group	.091	.024	.204	.000
	Education	.068	.025	.165	.006
	Income	.028	.021	.081	.179
	Hispanic	-.244	.089	-.139	.007
	Race	-.067	.059	-.057	.256
	Sex	-.062	.058	-.054	.285
	Religious Attendance	.020	.018	.057	.283
	Marital Status	.042	.052	.042	.422
	Party ID	-.017	.047	-.019	.717
	Ideology Strength	.021	.042	.032	.607
	Ideology	.009	.034	.018	.784
	Interested in Campaign	.083	.034	.123	.016

a. N= 2315; R-Square=.160; b. N=446; R-Square=.101; c. N=341; R-Square=.208; Estimated by OLS.

Table 4-6. Effects of Trust in Government on Voter Turnout: Civilians, Veterans, and Active Duty (NAES)

		Coef.	Std. Error	Std. Coef.	Sig.
Civilian <sup>a</sup>	(Constant)	.376	.067		.000
	Age Group	.081	.007	.286	.000
	Education	.042	.008	.142	.000
	Income	.011	.007	.044	.129
	Hispanic	-.194	.039	-.126	.000
	Race	-.061	.027	-.057	.022
	Sex	.014	.018	.019	.442
	Religious Attendance	.018	.007	.069	.012
	Marital Status	.023	.019	.032	.236
	Party ID	.058	.019	.076	.002
	Ideology	-.013	.009	-.037	.186
	Ideology Strength	.006	.013	.012	.631
	Trust Government	-.009	.015	-.016	.526
	Veteran <sup>b</sup>	(Constant)	.341	.152	
Age Group		.078	.021	.255	.000
Education		.020	.018	.086	.250
Income		.023	.015	.120	.139
Hispanic		.203	.132	.107	.125
Race		-.096	.068	-.094	.159
Sex		-.032	.058	-.038	.578
Religious Attendance		.011	.015	.054	.470
Marital Status		-.019	.046	-.031	.682
Party ID		.052	.041	.089	.199
Ideology		.014	.024	.046	.555
Ideology Strength		-.001	.031	-.001	.985
Trust Government		.017	.030	.038	.578
Active Duty <sup>c</sup>		(Constant)	.272	.205	
	Age Group	.073	.024	.166	.003
	Education	.079	.025	.194	.001
	Income	.036	.021	.106	.085
	Hispanic	-.192	.092	-.108	.038
	Race	-.087	.060	-.075	.148
	Sex	-.070	.058	-.062	.228
	Religious Attendance	.031	.018	.091	.091
	Marital Status	.049	.053	.049	.364
	Party ID	.007	.047	.007	.889
	Ideology	.006	.034	.011	.870
	Ideology Strength	.017	.042	.026	.690
	Trust Government	-.077	.035	-.115	.028

a. N=1,396; R-Square=.172; b. N=220; R-Square=.133; c. N=326; R-Square=.215; Estimated by OLS.

Table 4-7. Effects of Demographics on Voter Turnout: Civilians and Military (NAES)

		Coef.	Std. Error	Std. Coef.	Sig.
Civilian <sup>a</sup>	(Constant)	.268	.028		.000
	Age Group	.066	.003	.242	.000
	Education	.052	.004	.182	.000
	Income	.014	.003	.064	.000
	Hispanic	-.159	.018	-.108	.000
	Race	-.085	.014	-.078	.000
	Sex	.025	.009	.035	.005
	Religious Attendance	.023	.003	.092	.000
	Marital Status	.030	.009	.043	.001
	Party ID	.063	.010	.082	.000
	Party ID Strength	.056	.009	.077	.000
	Ideology	.003	.004	.009	.522
	Ideology Strength	-.005	.006	-.010	.423
	Military <sup>b</sup>	(Constant)	.493	.056	
Age Group		.052	.007	.204	.000
Education		.026	.007	.107	.000
Income		.019	.006	.103	.001
Hispanic		.031	.037	.023	.403
Race		-.070	.024	-.079	.004
Sex		-.039	.025	-.044	.110
Religious Attendance		.012	.006	.056	.048
Marital Status		.009	.017	.016	.578
Party ID		.059	.016	.101	.000
Party ID Strength		.056	.017	.093	.001
Ideology		-.010	.009	-.036	.239
Ideology Strength		-.005	.012	-.014	.647

a. N=5,601; R-Square=.177; b. N=1,258; R-Square=.111; Estimated by OLS.

Table 4-8. Effects of Political Interest and Internal Efficacy on Voter Turnout: Civilians and Military (NAES)

	Coef.	Std. Error	Std. Coef.	Sig.	
Civilian <sup>a</sup>	(Constant)	.123	.058	.033	
	Age Group	.055	.006	.211	.000
	Education	.050	.007	.181	.000
	Income	.007	.006	.034	.183
	Hispanic	-.138	.030	-.100	.000
	Race	-.042	.024	-.039	.073
	Sex	.020	.015	.029	.188
	Religious Attendance	.026	.006	.107	.000
	Marital Status	.040	.015	.061	.009
	Party ID	.073	.016	.099	.000
	Party ID Strength	.040	.015	.057	.010
	Ideology	.009	.007	.030	.202
	Ideology Strength	.004	.010	.008	.698
	Following Campaign Closely	.022	.011	.051	.050
	Follow Politics	.031	.011	.078	.005
Politics Too Complicated	-.001	.005	-.006	.793	
Military <sup>b</sup>	(Constant)	.382	.107	.000	
	Age Group	.026	.011	.110	.018
	Education	.003	.011	.014	.774
	Income	.028	.009	.152	.003
	Hispanic	.011	.049	.010	.825
	Race	-.027	.037	-.032	.473
	Sex	-.053	.039	-.063	.176
	Religious Attendance	.013	.009	.069	.141
	Marital Status	-.019	.026	-.035	.460
	Party ID	.043	.024	.079	.077
	Party ID Strength	.037	.026	.065	.155
	Ideology	-.015	.014	-.056	.276
	Ideology Strength	-.030	.019	-.080	.107
	Following Campaign Closely	.037	.018	.104	.040
	Follow Politics	.075	.019	.213	.000
Politics Too Complicated	-.007	.008	-.042	.379	

a. N=1,860; R-Square=.192; b. N=445; R-Square=.194; Estimated by OLS.

Table 4-9. Effects of External Efficacy on Voter Turnout: Civilians and Military (NAES)

	Coef.	Std. Error	Std. Coef.	Sig.	
Civilian <sup>a</sup>	(Constant)	.206	.102	.045	
	Age Group	.067	.010	.246	.000
	Education	.049	.011	.184	.000
	Income	.021	.010	.095	.039
	Hispanic	-.149	.056	-.103	.008
	Race	-.059	.040	-.057	.138
	Sex	.056	.026	.084	.033
	Religious Attendance	.020	.010	.083	.044
	Marital Status	-.036	.029	-.054	.208
	Party ID	.057	.029	.077	.048
	Party ID Strength	.053	.028	.073	.057
	Ideology	.009	.014	.028	.505
	Ideology Strength	-.008	.019	-.017	.661
	Candidates Keep Promises	.025	.017	.056	.147
	Military <sup>b</sup>	(Constant)	.492	.204	.017
Age Group		.069	.021	.297	.001
Education		.004	.019	.020	.821
Income		.012	.016	.072	.452
Hispanic		.040	.082	.043	.624
Race		-.104	.066	-.139	.119
Sex		.020	.065	.027	.757
Religious Attendance		.011	.017	.054	.524
Marital Status		-.035	.043	-.071	.417
Party ID		.101	.041	.204	.014
Party ID Strength		.072	.043	.142	.095
Ideology		-.030	.021	-.125	.167
Ideology Strength		-.006	.033	-.016	.866
Candidates Keep Promises		.028	.026	.089	.279

a. N=600; R-Square=.171; b. N=136; R-Square=.242; Estimated by OLS.

Table 4-10. Effects of Civic Duty on Voter Turnout: Civilians and Military (NAES)

	Coef.	Std. Error	Std. Coef.	Sig.
Civilian <sup>a</sup>	(Constant)	.324	.086	.000
	Age Group	.061	.010	.239
	Education	.039	.011	.150
	Income	.018	.010	.090
	Hispanic	-.122	.057	-.084
	Race	-.061	.039	-.062
	Sex	.056	.026	.087
	Religious Attendance	.021	.010	.089
	Marital Status	-.029	.028	-.046
	Party ID	.046	.028	.065
	Party ID Strength	.058	.027	.085
	Ideology	.010	.013	.032
	Ideology Strength	-.008	.018	-.017
	Vote Because of Civic Duty	.054	.024	.087
Military <sup>b</sup>	(Constant)	.603	.176	.001
	Age Group	.065	.020	.283
	Education	.002	.019	.011
	Income	.012	.016	.070
	Hispanic	.043	.082	.046
	Race	-.103	.064	-.141
	Sex	.027	.064	.036
	Religious Attendance	.011	.016	.055
	Marital Status	-.033	.043	-.066
	Party ID	.103	.040	.209
	Party ID Strength	.075	.042	.149
	Ideology	-.032	.021	-.137
	Ideology Strength	-.008	.032	-.023
	Vote Because of Civic Duty	.009	.040	.019

a. N=595; R-Square=.146; b. N=138; R-Square=.235; Estimated by OLS

Table 4-11. Effects of Government Employment on Voter Turnout: Civilians and Veterans (NAES)

	Coef.	Std. Error	Std. Coef.	Sig.	
Civilian <sup>a</sup>	(Constant)	.266	.038	.000	
	Age Group	.069	.005	.216	.000
	Education	.051	.006	.166	.000
	Income	.016	.005	.064	.001
	Hispanic	-.172	.024	-.120	.000
	Race	-.103	.018	-.094	.000
	Sex	.023	.012	.032	.056
	Religious Attendance	.028	.005	.104	.000
	Marital Status	.006	.013	.008	.665
	Party ID	.066	.013	.084	.000
	Party ID Strength	.069	.012	.093	.000
	Ideology	.002	.006	.006	.748
	Ideology Strength	-.008	.009	-.016	.357
	Government Employee	.028	.013	.035	.037
Veteran <sup>b</sup>	(Constant)	.611	.096	.000	
	Age Group	.046	.014	.158	.001
	Education	.017	.013	.067	.170
	Income	.022	.010	.112	.032
	Hispanic	-.018	.058	-.014	.751
	Race	-.085	.040	-.097	.034
	Sex	-.050	.041	-.056	.224
	Religious Attendance	.019	.010	.088	.062
	Marital Status	-.029	.030	-.048	.333
	Party ID	.046	.028	.077	.094
	Party ID Strength	.040	.027	.068	.141
	Ideology	-.021	.016	-.071	.174
	Ideology Strength	-.017	.020	-.041	.418
	Government Employee	.056	.027	.094	.041

a. N=3,057; R-Square=.187; b. N=470; R-Square=.113; Estimated by OLS.

Table 4-12. Effects of Demographics on Voter Turnout: Active Duty Military (NAES)

	Coef.	Std. Error	Std. Coef.	Sig.
(Constant)	.084	.187		.653
Age Group	.087	.025	.196	.000
Education	.078	.025	.188	.002
Income	.032	.021	.092	.143
Hispanic	-.232	.092	-.131	.012
Race	-.074	.060	-.064	.222
Sex	-.072	.059	-.064	.225
Religious Attendance	.028	.019	.081	.134
Marital Status	.030	.055	.030	.580
Party ID	-.001	.048	-.001	.987
Ideology	.009	.035	.018	.792
Ideology Strength	.021	.042	.032	.616

N= 321; R-Square =.198; Estimated by OLS

Table 4-13. Effects of Military Service on Voter Turnout: Active Duty Military (NAES)

	Coef.	Std. Error	Std. Coef.	Sig.
(Constant)	.035	.207		.867
Age Group	.054	.028	.121	.056
Education	.053	.029	.128	.070
Income	.018	.022	.054	.410
Hispanic	-.333	.101	-.177	.001
Race	-.081	.061	-.072	.184
Sex	-.077	.061	-.069	.206
Religious Attendance	.034	.019	.100	.070
Marital Status	.022	.056	.022	.691
Party ID	.049	.049	.055	.311
Ideology	-.004	.035	-.008	.910
Ideology Strength	-.007	.043	-.010	.877
Rank	.067	.064	.073	.299
Reason for Joining	.018	.047	.021	.696
Appropriate for Member to Advocate for a Candidate	.037	.024	.081	.134
Years in Guard or Reserves	.050	.019	.313	.008
Years in Regular Military	.032	.018	.200	.072

N=300; R-Square=.241; Estimated by OLS

## CHAPTER 5 RESULTS FROM 2011 PEW DATA

This chapter will present results from the 2011 data collected by the Pew Research Center. Although the primary intent of both surveys was to assess generational change and attitudinal differences regarding military matters, the instruments permit limited replication of the regressions just discussed. The veteran survey also includes additional service variables that appear in the literature, such as draft status and combat experience. In all of the regressions that follow, the dependent variable is registration to vote and all independent variables have been coded to match the NAES values as closely as possible (see coding table in Appendix 2 for details).

### **Pew Merged Samples**

Combining the samples from the two surveys produced 1,295 civilians and 1,932 military members for inclusion in the base model. Although the latter group is composed overwhelmingly of veterans, it also contains thirty-two active duty members who obviously could not be regressed separately. The descriptive statistics, located in Appendix 1, suggest these samples are generally similar to their NAES counterparts. A vast majority of both groups report being registered to vote, although the 91% of service members who do so exceeds civilians by ten points. Table 5-1 presents the results from a one-way ANOVA test, which confirms that the differences are statistically significant. These numbers are so high as to arouse a bit of suspicion that social desirability effects are at work, but I am unaware of any reason to suppose they operate differently across groups and the data do not permit an empirical test of this possibility.

In keeping with official statistics, a greater percentage of civilians fall on the lower end of the educational scale, although they are more likely to have a four-year degree.

Military members, by contrast, are more likely to have attended graduate or professional school. Overall, however, the differences are fairly small. Similarly, the gaps in income are minimal for those earning more than \$20,000 a year, but there are twice as many civilians (21.2%) who fall below that point. Hispanics are slightly more prevalent in the general public sample, as are non-whites by nearly ten points. Females compose over half of civilians (61%) but only twelve percent of service members. As before, the latter are far more likely to be married and, although the differences on the other demographic and political variables are fairly minor, they are all significant with the exception of party ID.

The results from the base model are presented in Table 5-2. Most of the variables are once again significant for civilians, but there are a few noteworthy differences. The p-values for race and religious attendance exceed acceptable limits for the first time in a base model, and those for income (.030) and marital status (.070) are quite a bit higher than before. By contrast, the effects of Hispanic heritage and affiliating with a major party continue to exert significant influence in opposite (and expected) directions. For military members, the only variables that even approached significance were age, marital status, and interestingly enough, ideology. The latter squeaks by with a p-value of .099, and the negative coefficient suggests that liberal service members are less likely to vote than conservatives. However, the consistently poor performance of the two ideology measures and the razor thin margin of significance raise questions about whether the results have any substantive value. Finally, it is interesting to note that the coefficients for race and Hispanic heritage are both positive, if insignificant.

The second model in Table 5-3 incorporates a measure of patriotism, an elusive concept that can nevertheless be loosely interpreted as a distant relative of civic duty. Respondents were asked whether they are less (1), about as (2), or more (3) patriotic than most of the country. The regression includes the 1,272 civilians and 1,895 military members who provided valid answers. The frequencies for this measure are rather interesting, as less than 10% of either group chose the neutral ground. Instead, a somewhat striking 53.7% of civilians reported they are less patriotic than most, as opposed to the 60.8% of service members who claimed to be more so. The results of the regression are displayed in Table 5-3. Although patriotism was positively associated with registration for both groups, it was only significant for civilians ( $p=.023$ ). It seems that military members are more likely to possess (or at least believe they have) this quality and yet less likely to be influenced by it.

Adding this item to the equation had relatively little impact on the other independent variables for either sample. Among civilians, although there were minor fluctuations in coefficients and p-values, the same predictors from the base model remain significant. For military members, the results are nearly identical except that party ID and, far more predictably, ideology are no longer statistically associated with registration.

The final model for the merged samples, presented in Table 5-4, attempts to replicate the NAES results regarding the effects of government employment. A dummy variable is coded 1 for those who satisfy this criterion and 0 for those who are otherwise employed. Of the 809 civilians in the sample, approximately 20% work for the government, as opposed to 30% of the 930 veterans in the sample. (For the sake of

consistency, active duty members were excluded from this analysis. However, a separate regression shows that, in this case, their inclusion made no difference.) Table 5-4 displays the results of the analysis, which contrast sharply with those obtained using the NAES data. This time, government employment was positively related to registration but quite insignificant for both groups, with p-values above .400. These differences are fairly dramatic and do not appear to be the product of sample size; although there were three times as many civilians in the NAES regression, the veteran sample was reduced by half compared to the Pew analysis. The mere existence of these contradictory findings makes it unwise to draw firm conclusions about the effects of this variable for either civilians or military members based on these data.

There were relatively few changes to the other independent variables. Among civilians, education and income are now significant only at the 0.1 level (p-values = .087 and .086 respectively), and marital status no longer satisfies even this criterion. For veterans, age continues to be extremely influential, while the positive coefficients for being non-white or Hispanic take on significance for the first time. Both p-values just miss the 0.5 cutoff point and the magnitudes of .111 for Hispanics and .077 for non-whites are rather impressive. This could simply reflect the reduced Ns in the model, but the positive (if insignificant) relationship for Hispanics was also noted in the NAES study and the base model above.

### **Pew Veteran Sample**

Three hundred thirty military members, including those on active duty, were interviewed as part of the general public survey. Because they were not asked any of the service-related questions, they have been excluded, leaving 1,602 veterans for this analysis. The results of the base model regression appear in Table 5-5. Age,

education, religious attendance, marital status and party ID are all extremely significant, while income has a borderline p-value of .059. The Hispanic variable once again has a positive coefficient and the association is negative for non-whites, but neither effect is significant. Overall, these results are fairly consistent with those discussed above.

Model 2 in Table 5-6 introduces a number of service-related variables that can be loosely classified as military demographics, experience and benefits. The first category consists of rank, years of service, combat experience and motivation for joining the armed forces. The measures for rank and years of service are identical to those in the NAES regression, while dummy variables are included for the other two. Respondents with combat experience were coded (1), as were those who said serving the country or fighting terrorism were important reasons they joined.

There are two military experience variables. The first is a five point scale measuring whether service hurt or helped respondents get ahead in life, with a higher score indicating the latter. The second measure combines four questions about how useful military experience was for teaching cooperation, building self-confidence, job/career preparation and personal growth. This four-point scale ranges from not at all useful (1) to very useful (4).

Three types of military benefits are included in this model, the first two of which are dummies. Respondents were asked whether the government has given veterans all the help that it should and whether they have received VA benefits. In both cases, a response of “yes” was coded one. A scale indicating how well the VA is meeting veterans’ needs runs from poor (1) to excellent (4).

The results are displayed in Table 5-6 and reveal that overall the service-specific variables once again perform poorly. They also have relatively little impact on the other independent variables; although education and income drop out as significant predictors, the rest of the base variables retain their influence. None of the military demographics were significant, including years of service, and all of them have negative coefficients. For combat and years of service, this direction is confirmed by significant bi-variate correlations with registration. Previous studies have yielded conflicting results regarding the effects of combat on political participation, and in some ways a negative relationship makes intuitive sense.

The effects of length of service, however, are a bit more puzzling. In addition to being positive and significant, the NAES data showed a difference between years served in one of the four major branches and time in the National Guard or Reserves. The Pew survey allowed respondents to list as many branches as apply, a practice I heartily endorse, but it did not separate out length of service for each. It is also possible that the different findings reflect sample composition, as the NAES survey was limited to active duty members. If that is the case, recency of service might explain the results obtained among veterans.

The military experience variables yielded mixed results, as the scale for usefulness of service did not attain significance. This was not all that surprising since only one of the original items, that for building confidence, had a significant zero-order correlation with registration ( $p=.021$ ). However, the measure for whether military experience helped respondents get ahead in life performed quite well ( $p=.001$ ) and has a greater magnitude (.036) than age in this model (.034). The two experience

measures are highly correlated (.443), so it is interesting that one should outshine the other so dramatically. It might be that the usefulness measures were too specific or excluded relevant response options, while the question about getting ahead allowed respondents to decide exactly what was being asked. Of course, such vague question wording also leaves researchers to wonder what the response actually means. Nevertheless, it seems that military service does provide resources that are positively associated with political participation.

Both receipt of VA benefits and respondent evaluations of that department were insignificant and, while the coefficients were negative, they were also minute (-.008 and -.006, respectively). It is possible that those who need VA assistance are more likely to be disadvantaged, disabled or infirm and therefore incur higher administrative costs, but this cannot be confirmed with the available data. The measure for whether respondents are receiving sufficient help from the government, on the other hand, was borderline significant ( $p=.080$ ) and the coefficient of .034 is identical to that for age. Once again, however, the question is so ambiguous as to provide little information about exactly what this “help” consists of or why it is positively related to voter registration. One could hypothesize that this variable provides an indirect measure of political efficacy or simply reflects self-interest, but it is difficult to say for sure without additional information.

Separate regressions were run for two additional variables that, ideally, would have been included in the model above. Doing so, however, would have reduced the Ns by several hundred and increased standard errors quite a bit. Model 3 in Table 5-7 therefore returns to the base model and adds a dummy for status as a draftee or volunteer. Just over a quarter of the sample (26.3%) falls into the former category and

is coded as 0; the vast majority of the 840 respondents who volunteered are coded as 1. Both the bi-variate correlation and regression coefficient are insignificant ( $p=.464$  and  $.398$ , respectively), although the first value is positive and the second negative. It is unclear why volunteering for service would be negatively associated with registration or why sex attains borderline significance ( $p=.065$ ) in this model, despite the fact that females represent only three percent of the sample. The rest of the regression results in Table 5-7, however, are entirely consistent with the base model, indicating the introduction of this additional variable had relatively little overall impact.

The final model in Table 5-8 expands the base to include a measure of how well the military met the respondent's needs (and those of his/her family) while on active duty. The mean for the 907 veterans included in the regression is 2.96 on a scale that ranges from poor (1) to excellent (4). Although the bi-variate correlation is positive and significant ( $p=.043$ ), the regression results presented in Table 5-8 are similar to those obtained for the other military benefits. Recency effects could be partially responsible for the extremely large p-value ( $.834$ ) and miniscule magnitude ( $.002$ ), but the sample included a large number of veterans who served after September 11, 2001 (ten years prior to the survey). It might also be that such evaluations are simply no longer relevant to former service members. Either way, the rest of the independent variables are identical to the base model, except for sex, which is once again significant ( $p=.007$ ). Comparisons between these findings and those from the NAES survey will be discussed in the next chapter.

Table 5-1. One-Way ANOVA Test of Means for Registration and Demographics:  
 Civilians and Veterans (Pew)

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Registered to Vote	Between Groups	13.835	1	13.835	71.960	.000
	Within Groups	738.455	3841	.192		
	Total	752.289	3842			
Religious Attendance	Between Groups	8.206	1	8.206	3.919	.048
	Within Groups	7997.082	3819	2.094		
	Total	8005.288	3820			
Marital Status	Between Groups	38.964	1	38.964	169.247	.000
	Within Groups	883.110	3836	.230		
	Total	922.074	3837			
Party ID	Between Groups	.360	1	.360	.834	.361
	Within Groups	1620.646	3756	.431		
	Total	1621.006	3757			
Ideology	Between Groups	33.470	1	33.470	26.700	.000
	Within Groups	4648.219	3708	1.254		
	Total	4681.689	3709			
Ideology Strength	Between Groups	18.600	1	18.600	21.330	.000
	Within Groups	3233.510	3708	.872		
	Total	3252.110	3709			

Table 5-2. Effects of Demographics on Voter Registration: Civilians and Veterans (Pew)

	Coef.	Std. Error	Std. Coef.	Sig.
Civilian <sup>a</sup>	(Constant)	.548	.057	.000
	Age Group	.001	.001	.273
	Education	.033	.009	.103
	Income	.014	.008	.054
	Hispanic	-.285	.035	-.216
	Race	-.052	.024	-.058
	Sex	.102	.021	.129
	Religious Attendance	.012	.007	.044
	Marital Status	.067	.022	.087
	Party ID	.094	.021	.119
	Ideology	-.009	.011	-.025
	Ideology Strength	.001	.015	.002
				.942
Military <sup>b</sup>	(Constant)	.613	.042	.000
	Age Group	.010	.003	.090
	Education	.029	.006	.112
	Income	.005	.005	.025
	Hispanic	.001	.027	.001
	Race	-.032	.018	-.040
	Sex	.009	.020	.010
	Religious Attendance	.017	.005	.084
	Marital Status	.089	.015	.146
	Party ID	.067	.013	.115
	Ideology	-.007	.008	-.023
	Ideology Strength	.013	.010	.032
				.198

a. N=1,309; R-square = .153; b. N=1,881; R-square = .091; Estimated by OLS.

Table 5-3. Effects of Patriotism on Voter Registration: Civilians and Veterans (Pew)

	Coef.	Std. Error	Std. Coef.	Sig.
(Constant)	.383	.063		.000
Age Group	.045	.008	.163	.000
Education	.034	.009	.106	.000
Income	.016	.008	.065	.038
Hispanic	-.272	.035	-.207	.000
Race	-.024	.024	-.027	.319
Civilian <sup>a</sup> Sex	.080	.021	.102	.000
Religious Attendance	.009	.007	.035	.201
Marital Status	.039	.022	.051	.080
Party ID	.081	.021	.103	.000
Ideology	-.006	.011	-.016	.565
Ideology Strength	-.002	.015	-.003	.914
Patriotic	.025	.011	.060	.023
(Constant)	.634	.068		.000
Age Group	.053	.009	.143	.000
Education	.007	.011	.015	.560
Income	.009	.009	.025	.339
Hispanic	.056	.048	.027	.241
Race	.026	.033	.019	.418
Veteran <sup>b</sup> Sex	.054	.036	.036	.133
Religious Attendance	.009	.008	.026	.268
Marital Status	.069	.026	.065	.008
Party ID	-.005	.015	-.007	.753
Ideology	-.015	.010	-.035	.152
Ideology Strength	.000	.011	-.001	.973
Patriotic	.002	.011	.005	.204

a. N=1,272; R-Square=.182; b. N=1895; R-Square=.033; Estimated by OLS.

Table 5-4 Effects of Government Employment on Voter Registration: Civilians and Veterans (PEW)

	Coef.	Std. Error	Std. Coef.	Sig.	
Civilian <sup>a</sup>	(Constant)	.502	.078		.000
	Age Group	.040	.011	.132	.000
	Education	.021	.012	.064	.087
	Income	.017	.010	.068	.086
	Hispanic	-.289	.044	-.222	.000
	Race	-.029	.032	-.031	.366
	Sex	.076	.026	.098	.004
	Religious Attendance	.010	.010	.037	.295
	Marital Status	.022	.028	.029	.432
	Party ID	.099	.026	.126	.000
	Ideology	-.007	.014	-.018	.600
	Ideology Strength	-.011	.019	-.019	.575
	Government Employee	.026	.033	.027	.422
Veteran <sup>b</sup>	(Constant)	.697	.074		.000
	Age Group	.045	.012	.129	.000
	Education	.025	.015	.060	.108
	Income	.001	.012	.004	.914
	Hispanic	.111	.057	.065	.051
	Race	.077	.040	.066	.056
	Sex	-.023	.043	-.018	.593
	Religious Attendance	-.001	.011	-.002	.954
	Marital Status	.016	.035	.017	.644
	Party ID	.002	.019	.003	.931
	Ideology	-.015	.013	-.041	.262
	Ideology Strength	.001	.014	.003	.923
	Government Employee	.002	.025	.003	.931

a. N=809; R-Square=.167; b. N=930; R-Square=.033; Estimated by OLS.

Table 5-5. Effects of Demographics on Voter Registration: Veterans (Pew)

	Coef.	Std. Error	Std. Coef.	Sig.
(Constant)	.527	.048		.000
Age Group	.038	.006	.173	.000
Education	.020	.007	.075	.005
Income	.011	.006	.052	.059
Hispanic	.022	.030	.018	.471
Race	-.011	.020	-.013	.596
Sex	.029	.023	.031	.215
Religious Attendance	.014	.005	.069	.006
Marital Status	.096	.016	.153	.000
Party ID	.065	.014	.110	.000
Ideology	-.007	.009	-.023	.408
Ideology Strength	.007	.011	.016	.554

N=1602; R-Square = .114; Estimated by OLS.

Table 5-6. Effects of Military Service on Voter Registration: Veterans (Pew)

	Coef.	Std. Error	Std. Coef.	Sig.
(Constant)	.419	.090		.000
Age Group	.034	.007	.149	.000
Education	.015	.009	.054	.107
Income	.006	.007	.029	.379
Hispanic	.034	.035	.027	.334
Race	-.012	.024	-.015	.610
Sex	.041	.027	.045	.128
Religious Attendance	.017	.006	.083	.005
Marital Status	.110	.020	.167	.000
Party ID	.071	.017	.116	.000
Ideology	-.009	.011	-.027	.409
Ideology Strength	.008	.014	.018	.571
Rank	-.017	.026	-.020	.531
Years of Service	-.003	.004	-.021	.462
Combat	-.019	.018	-.032	.284
Reason for Joining – Serve Country	-.010	.035	-.008	.770
Service Helped Get Ahead	.036	.011	.107	.001
Received Gov. Help as Veteran	.034	.020	.054	.080
Received VA Benefits	-.008	.018	-.014	.636
Veterans Affairs Evaluation	-.006	.011	-.016	.607
Service Useful	.000	.005	-.001	.966

N=1,167; R-Square = .147; Estimated by OLS.

Table 5-7. Effects of Draft versus Volunteer Status on Voter Registration: Veterans (Pew)

	Coef.	Std. Error	Std. Coef.	Sig.
(Constant)	.524	.091		.000
Age Group	.039	.016	.081	.018
Education	.020	.007	.107	.004
Income	.012	.006	.073	.063
Hispanic	-.017	.039	-.015	.668
Race	.007	.026	.009	.790
Sex	.087	.047	.062	.065
Religious Attendance	.016	.005	.107	.002
Marital Status	.097	.017	.199	.000
Party ID	.043	.015	.095	.005
Ideology	.000	.009	.002	.969
Ideology Strength	.005	.012	.016	.682
Draftee or Volunteer	-.014	.017	-.028	.398

N=840; R-square=.112; Estimated by OLS.

Table 5-8. Effects of Military Response to Needs During Service on Registration: Veterans (Pew)

	Coef.	Std. Error	Std. Coef.	Sig.
(Constant)	.449	.076		.000
Age Group	.043	.008	.179	.000
Education	.021	.009	.080	.027
Income	.018	.008	.089	.018
Hispanic	.067	.042	.051	.112
Race	-.025	.025	-.032	.327
Sex	.076	.028	.090	.007
Religious Attendance	.012	.007	.061	.069
Marital Status	.098	.023	.144	.000
Party ID	.068	.019	.117	.000
Ideology	-.009	.012	-.030	.440
Ideology Strength	.014	.016	.033	.378
Military Met Needs on Active Duty	.002	.011	.007	.834

N=907; R-Square=.125; Estimated by OLS.

## CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This thesis has explored a number of possible explanations for the higher turnout rate among military members. The large samples in the NAES and Pew survey sets provided a relatively rare opportunity to compare veterans and active duty members to one another, as well as the general public. Although there are limitations to these data, as discussed below, my results suggest both similarities and differences across all three groups. Table 6-1 details the number and percentage of models in which each variable was significant at the  $p \leq .10$  level. I chose this more generous parameter because some of the most interesting findings involve items that were *not* statistically influential, including most of the service-related variables. The samples that combined former and current military members were overwhelmingly comprised of veterans, but the fact that active duty members were included warrants a separate category.

One of the primary research questions for this thesis was how well existing theories explain military turnout. Although the data do not permit an empirical test relating to rational choice, the active duty members in the NAES sample were less likely to report having voted than either civilians or veterans. There is a good bit of literature suggesting that higher administrative costs and institutional factors are at least partially responsible for their lower participation rates (Wright 2008; Eversole 2010; Alvarez, Hall & Roberts 2007; Inbody 2009). The fact that the federal government has implemented assistance programs, revised voting laws, and sued a number of states for noncompliance lends credence to this assertion. According to Smith (2010), reports of higher turnout among this group are inflated because the Federal Voter Assistance Program (FVAP) tallies *attempts* to vote rather than counted ballots. If this is the case,

then active duty members might not be abstaining after all. Either way, it is extremely difficult to obtain an accurate total of active duty voters because states and government agencies use a variety of sampling and reporting procedures.

Socio-economic theories perform fairly well for the civilian samples: age, education, income, and being Hispanic or female are significantly related to voting or registration in at least 75% of the models. Age exerts this statistical influence in all models for all groups, but the other SES variables yield mixed results for the military samples. For example, income is significant in only half of the models for both veterans and active duty members, while education is a far more consistent predictor for the latter (who are similar to civilians). Hispanics were significantly less likely to vote than whites in 83% of the active duty models, but the relationship is positive and rarely significant among veterans. Being non-white, on the other hand, did not have a p-value below 0.1 in a single model for those currently in uniform. This is fairly striking considering race was significant in almost 60% of the civilian regressions, with veterans and the combined samples falling in between. It is unclear why military service should mitigate the effects of being non-white but not Hispanic; past literature has found the reverse to be true, at least with regard to voting (Leal 1999, Ellison 1992). This variable's greater impact among veterans could reflect generational differences or it might indicate that military socialization (if any) is indeed temporary. Finally, females were more likely to participate in 75% of civilian models, but sex was never significant for active duty members and rarely so for veterans. Apparently women in uniform are no more or less likely to vote than their far more numerous male counterparts. At least one of the military groups is fairly distinctive on every socio-economic variable except

for age, suggesting that SES theories do not provide sufficient explanation for military participation.

The rest of the variables can be considered resources that theoretically reduce the costs or increase the benefits of voting. In terms of demographic and political identity variables, veterans resemble civilians much more closely than their successors. Religious attendance was significant in twice as many models for the general public and veterans (70-75%) as for those on active duty (33%). And even though current service members are more likely to be married, this status did not attain significance in a single regression; it was a statistical predictor in half of the models for the other two groups. Similarly, the party ID variable (coded 1 for Republican or Democrat) behaved predictably for civilians and veterans a majority of the time but was insignificant in every active duty analysis. Unfortunately, this sample was not asked about strength of party ID, which was significant in 75% of the models for the combined military samples, as opposed to 100% for civilians. With one anomalous exception, both of the ideological scales were insignificant across the board. Frankly, I can offer no explanation since they are common measures and have only been re-coded to reverse direction. Overall, however, the results suggest that the effects of demographic variables are less powerful and consistent for those currently in uniform.

The results pertaining to political resources are conflicting. Attention to political news and interest in the campaign were positive and significant for civilians and current service members but apparently had little impact on veterans. At the same time, measures of how closely respondents followed politics and the campaign *were* significant for the combined military sample, which was primarily composed of those

exact same veterans. It is difficult to account for this discrepancy other than to note that single measures which cannot be combined into a comprehensive scale are notoriously unreliable. Given the vast literature attesting to the power of interest and attention and the overall pattern of my results, it seems safe to conclude that these are important political resources for military members and the general public alike.

The political efficacy variables, by contrast, were insignificant across all groups. (The exception for trust in government among active duty members was previously discussed). Their lack of influence is not terribly surprising since such concepts are difficult to capture, especially with a single item. Even if there was a significant difference in the efficacy of each group, it is unlikely the available measures would reflect it. Conflicting results from the two studies make it difficult to assess the impact of government employment; however, the results were either significant or not for both civilians and veterans, suggesting little difference between them. Finally, despite frequencies that favor service members and my own expectations, the patriotism and civic duty variables were significant only for civilians.

Overall, the results suggest that there are substantive differences between civilians, veterans and active duty members, especially regarding the influence of SES, demographic, and political identity variables. However, no such discrepancies were detected for the effects of political resources such as interest, attention and efficacy. If the usual suspects are, at best, equally powerful for military members, what accounts for their higher rate of turnout? To test whether service in the armed forces is responsible, I regressed a number of military-specific variables for active duty members from the NAES survey and veterans from the Pew study. The results were

disappointing, as most of the items were insignificant and “years in service” was inconsistent across the two studies. There is, however, one interesting finding: those who reported that service helped them get ahead in life were statistically more likely to be registered to vote. Although the question was infuriatingly vague, it does suggest that military service can foster political skills and participation. Veterans who said the government had given them all the help it should were also more likely to vote, but this seems to reflect external efficacy, i.e. constituent service as opposed to military service.

There are significant limitations to both the NAES and Pew surveys. The NAES data measured voting behavior four years prior to the survey and, because self-reports cannot be verified, there is likely a good bit of measurement error. The Pew study measured current registration rather than voting. This was an acceptable approximation for the purposes of this paper, but more recent and precise measures would have been preferable. In addition to the drawbacks of using single measures discussed above, split-sampling and reduced response rates often required separate regressions. Such analyses might conceal relationships or interactions with variables from another model. In other words, the results paint a partial picture. Several of the most interesting questions were limited to relatively few respondents or were excluded from the military instruments altogether. Additionally, about half of the veterans in the Pew sample had served (and separated) since September 11, 2001. Although such oversampling was perfectly appropriate and probably necessary for their purposes, it might have skewed the results obtained in my analyses. Finally, uniformed voters serving overseas were excluded from both survey sets, a reasonable practice considering the logistics of

obtaining a representative sample here in the states. However, a discussion of the costs of military voting should probably include those who are most likely to pay them.

Future research could shed additional light on military turnout, first and foremost, by conducting a study specifically dedicated to that topic. The data used here were collected almost as an afterthought; the primary purpose of the surveys was to assess political attitudes and opinions regarding the campaign and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is scant literature regarding whether or not military members actually act on these preferences or why they choose to do so. Expanding the sample composition to include service members who are stationed overseas would allow for an empirical test of the conventional wisdom that uniformed voters are disenfranchised. Government agencies attempt to track whether or not they vote and if they make use of available programs but seldom address *why* they want to cast a ballot in the first place. Open-ended follow ups regarding how military service helped respondents get ahead in life could help design better questions and response options. In addition to measuring rank, it might be useful to include questions about specialty or type of service in the armed forces. Additionally, this study suggests there are a number of differences between former and current military members that warrant a more thorough investigation, and measuring recency of service could help distinguish between self-selection and socialization effects. Military members could be placed in a broader theoretical context if background information were collected, a practice that might also reveal whether military provision of resources or socialization is greater among the disadvantaged. Finally, future efforts to compare civilians and the military should ask comparable and thorough questions of each sample.

Ultimately, this study found that veterans do indeed register and vote at higher rates than civilians, while the opposite is true of active duty members. References to “military” voters can therefore be misleading and it is important to distinguish between former and current service members. Why these two groups differ from one another, as well as civilians, is not yet clear. However, the distinctions are both impressive and consistent and warrant further exploration.

Table 6-1. Significance of Variables: Number and Percentage of Models

	Civilians		Veterans		Active Duty		Former & Current Military	
	Num.	Pct.	Num.	Pct.	Num.	Pct.	Num.	Pct.
Age	12	100%	10	100%	6	100%	6	100%
Education	12	100%	6	60%	6	100%	1	17%
Income	9	75%	5	50%	3	50%	2	33%
Hispanic	12	100%	1	10%	5	83%	0	0%
Race (Non-White)	7	58%	3	30%	0	0%	1	17%
Sex (Female)	9	75%	2	20%	0	0%	0	0%
Religious Attendance	9	75%	7	70%	2	33%	1	17%
Married	6	50%	5	50%	0	0%	2	33%
Party ID (Major Party)	11	92%	7	70%	0	0%	4	66%
Party ID Strength	5	100%	0	0%	0	N/A	3	75%
Ideology (Very Liberal)	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1	17%
Ideology Strength	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Attention to Pol. News - TV	1	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	N/A
Attention to Pol. News - Paper	1	100%	0	0%	1	100%	0	N/A
Interested in Camp	1	100%	0	0%	1	100%	0	N/A
Trust in Government	0	0%	0	0%	1	100%	0	N/A
Following Camp	1	100%	0	N/A	0	N/A	1	100%
Follow Politics	1	100%	0	N/A	0	N/A	1	100%
Politics Too Complicated	0	0%	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	0%
Candidates Try to Keep Promises	0	0%	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	0%
Civic Duty	1	100%	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	0%
Gov. Employment	1	50%	1	50%	0	N/A	0	N/A
Patriotism	1	100%	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	0%

Variables significant at  $p \leq 0.1$

Table 6-2. Significance of Service Variables

	Significant
Active Duty Members	
Rank	No
Years of Service	Yes
Reason for Joining - To Serve Country/Fight Terrorism	No
Appropriate to Advocate for Candidates	No
Veterans	
Rank	No
Years of Service	No
Reason for Joining - To Serve Country/Fight Terrorism	No
Combat Experience	No
Service Useful	No
Service Helped Get Ahead	Yes
Received Government Help as a Veteran	Yes
Received Veterans Affairs Benefits	No
Veterans Affairs Evaluation	No
Drafted	No
Military Met Needs	No

## APPENDIX A VARIABLE CODING RULES

This appendix lists the coding rules for each variable included in the analyses. Independent variables have been subdivided into socio-economic factors and demographics, political identity and attitudes, and military-specific variables. Within each section, items appear in alphabetical order. Unless otherwise noted, the scales and measures used in my regressions are identical for both studies.

### **Dependent Variables**

*Voted in the 2000 General Election (NAES) and currently registered to vote (Pew)* were both coded as dummies: 0=no; 1= yes.

### **Socio-Economic and Demographic Independent Variables**

*Age* is coded as an ordinal scale that includes five categories: one =18-29; two= 30-39; three= 40-49; four= 50-64; and five = 65 or older.

*Education* also has five levels: 1= less than high school diploma; 2=high school diploma or GED; 3= some college (or technical/vocational school); 4= bachelor's degree and 5= graduate or professional school.

*Hispanic* heritage is denoted by a dummy variable: 0=no, 1=yes. The two surveys differ slightly, as the Pew question includes Spanish as well as Latino descent, but are otherwise identical.

*Income* is measured differently in the two studies, but the ordinal scales have been aligned as closely as possible. For the NAES surveys, income includes the following categories: one= less than \$25,000; two = \$25-50,000; three= \$50-75,000, four= \$75-100,000; five = \$100-150,000 and six= \$150,000 or higher. The Pew scale

also has six levels, which include: one=less than \$20,000; two= \$20-40,000; three= \$40-75,000; four= \$75-100,000; five= \$100-150,000 and six =\$150,000 or higher.

*Marital status* has been re-coded into a dummy variable so that 0=unmarried and 1=married.

*Race* is also captured by a dummy, with 0 indicating white and 1 non-white or mixed race. The two surveys provided different response categories, but are thus coded to match.

*Religious attendance* is measured on an ordinal scale that includes: 1=seldom or never; 2= a few times a year; 3= once or twice a month; 4= once a week, or 5=more than once a week.

### **Political Independent Variables**

*Attention to political news* during the past week (via cable/network television or newspaper) was measured on four-tier scales: none at all (1), not much (2), some (3) and a great deal (4).

*Candidates try to keep promises* is a reflection of how often respondents believe candidates try to follow through once elected: 1=never, 2=rarely, 3=sometimes, 4=most times, 5= always.

*Civic duty* measures respondents' reported motivations for voting. Those who vote because of candidates, issues or other reasons are coded as 0; those motivated by civic duty or a combination of factors are coded as 1. (Responses of "do not vote" were re-coded as missing values).

*Following campaign closely* is also captured by an ordinal scale with four levels: 1=not at all, 2= not too, 3=somewhat, 4=very.

*Follow politics* is a more general assessment of interest, with possible options including: 1=hardly at all, 2=now and then, 3=sometimes, and 4=most times.

*Government employment* is measured on a simple dummy variable: 0= not employed by government, 1=employed by government. The Pew question asks whether respondents are employed by government or the military, while the NAES excluded the latter.

*Ideology* is measured on a standard five-point scale ranging from very conservative (1) to very liberal (5), with self-reported moderates coded as a three.

*Ideological strength* falls on a three-point scale: 1=moderate, 2=liberal or conservative, and 3=very liberal or conservative.

*Interest in the campaign* includes three possible response options: 1=not much, 2=somewhat, 3 = very.

*Party ID* has been recoded into a dummy with 0 indicating Independent, Other, or No Preference and 1 representing Republican or Democrat.

*Party ID strength* was measured only in the NAES panel survey. It is coded so that 0 reflects “not strong” and 1 indicates “strong” party affiliation.

*Patriotism* is a subjective measure of whether respondents believe they are (1) less, (2) about as, or (3) more patriotic than most people in the country.

*Politics are too complicated* measures whether respondents believe people like themselves can understand political matters. A standard 5-point agree/disagree scale is used, with 1 representing strong disagreement with that statement and 5 denoting strong agreement.

*Trust in government* measures how much of the time respondents trust the federal government to do the right thing. There are four possible responses on this ordinal scale: 1= never, 2= sometimes, 3= most times and 4=always.

### **Military-Specific Independent Variables**

*Appropriate for military member to advocate* for local or presidential candidates is coded as follows: 1=never inappropriate, 2=appropriate sometimes (i.e. for one or the other), and 3= always appropriate.

*Combat experience* is coded so that 0 reflects a lack of experience and 1 identifies those who did engage in combat.

*Draft* indicates whether respondents were selected for duty (0) or volunteered for service in the armed forces (1).

*Government help as veteran* assesses whether respondents believe the government has provided them all the assistance it should. It is a simple dummy coded as 0=no and 1=yes.

*Military responsiveness* assesses how well veterans believe the military responded to their needs and those of their families while on active duty. Possible responses included: 1=poor, 2=only fair, 3=good, 4= excellent.

*Rank* is coded as a dummy, with 0 denoting enlistee and 1 indicating officer. In the Pew study, this reflects veterans' rank at the time of discharge, while the NAES measures the current rank of active duty members.

*Service to country/fighting terrorism* as reasons for joining the military are coded as 1, while personal benefits such as education and career training are coded as 0.

*Service helped get ahead in life* is measured on a 5-point scale that includes: 1=hurt a lot, 2= hurt a little, 3=made no difference, 4=helped a little or 5=helped a lot. Those who indicated it was too soon to tell were re-coded as missing.

*Service useful* measures whether respondents believe military experience helped them develop self-confidence, personal growth, cooperation and job skills. The original four scales were combined into one that has four possible categories: 1=not at all useful, 2=not too useful, 3=somewhat useful and 4=very useful.

*VA benefits* distinguishes those who have received veterans' benefits (1) from those who have not (0).

*VA evaluation* notes how well that department has cared for veterans and can take the following values: 1=poor, 2=only fair, 3=good, 4=excellent.

*Years of service* fall on a six point scale that includes: one= less than a year; two =1-2 years; three equals 2-3 years; four = 3-5 years; five =5-10 years and six = 10 or more years. The NAES survey includes separate measures for regular military versus National/Guard Reserves; respondents who did not serve in that particular branch are coded as 0.

APPENDIX B  
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR MODELS

Table B-1. Descriptive Statistics for Demographics Model: Civilians, Veterans, and Active Duty (NAES)

		Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Civilian	Voted in 2000 General	0	1	.86	.348	6308
	Age Group	1	5	3.21	1.237	6308
	Education	1	5	3.38	1.201	6308
	Income	1	6	2.93	1.501	6308
	Hispanic	0	1	.06	.232	6308
	Race	0	1	.11	.314	6308
	Sex	0	1	.64	.479	6308
	Religious Attendance	1	5	2.91	1.337	6308
	Marital Status	0	1	.60	.490	6308
	Party ID	0	1	.68	.466	6308
	Ideology Strength	1	3	1.78	.689	6308
	Ideology	1	5	2.87	1.030	6308
Veteran	Voted in 2000 General	0	1	.92	.265	1293
	Age Group	1	5	4.02	.990	1293
	Education	1	5	3.40	1.126	1293
	Income	1	6	3.03	1.452	1293
	Hispanic	0	1	.04	.191	1293
	Race	0	1	.10	.299	1293
	Sex	0	1	.10	.298	1293
	Religious Attendance	1	5	2.89	1.328	1293
	Marital Status	0	1	.67	.470	1293
	Party ID	0	1	.65	.478	1293
	Ideology Strength	1	3	1.76	.696	1293
	Ideology	1	5	2.61	.954	1293
Active Duty	Voted in 2000 General	0	1	.76	.427	384
	Age Group	1	5	2.13	.964	384
	Education	1	5	3.49	1.055	384
	Income	1	6	3.00	1.259	384
	Hispanic	0	1	.06	.238	384
	Race	0	1	.16	.368	384
	Sex	0	1	.17	.373	384
	Religious Attendance	1	5	2.91	1.258	384
	Marital Status	0	1	.74	.437	384
	Party ID	0	1	.66	.473	384
	Ideology Strength	1	3	1.65	.652	384
	Ideology	1	5	2.55	.809	384

Table B-2. Descriptive Statistics for Attention to Politics: Civilians, Veterans, and Active Duty (NAES)

		Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Civilian	Voted in 2000 General	0	1	.89	.312	4350
	Age Group	1	5	3.33	1.214	4350
	Education	1	5	3.46	1.175	4350
	Income	1	6	3.05	1.514	4350
	Hispanic	0	1	.04	.203	4350
	Race	0	1	.11	.309	4350
	Sex	0	1	.65	.478	4350
	Religious Attendance	1	5	2.93	1.312	4350
	Marital Status	0	1	.62	.486	4350
	Party ID	0	1	.69	.462	4350
	Ideology Strength	1	3	1.76	.682	4350
	Ideology	1	5	2.87	1.010	4350
	Attention to Pol. News – Nat'l TV	1	4	3.05	.873	4350
	Attention to Pol. News - Paper	1	4	2.92	.906	4350
Veteran	Voted in 2000 General	0	1	.95	.219	988
	Age Group	1	5	4.08	.955	988
	Education	1	5	3.47	1.128	988
	Income	1	6	3.12	1.467	988
	Hispanic	0	1	.03	.174	988
	Race	0	1	.10	.294	988
	Sex	0	1	.09	.281	988
	Religious Attendance	1	5	2.90	1.306	988
	Marital Status	0	1	.69	.465	988
	Party ID	0	1	.65	.478	988
	Ideology Strength	1	5	1.73	.694	988
	Ideology	1	3	2.65	.946	988
	Attention to Pol. News – Nat'l TV	1	4	3.14	.868	988
	Attention to Pol. News - Paper	1	4	2.99	.935	988
Active Duty	Voted in 2000 General	0	1	.79	.408	267
	Age Group	1	5	2.17	.980	267
	Education	1	5	3.54	1.019	267
	Income	1	6	3.10	1.238	267
	Hispanic	0	1	.06	.231	267
	Race	0	1	.13	.342	267
	Sex	0	1	.16	.365	267
	Religious Attendance	1	5	2.98	1.264	267
	Marital Status	0	1	.76	.430	267
	Party ID	0	1	.64	.482	267
	Ideology Strength	1	5	1.63	.650	267
	Ideology	1	3	2.61	.813	267
	Attention to Pol. News – Nat'l TV	1	4	3.14	.833	267
	Attention to Pol. News - Paper	1	4	2.73	.974	267

Table B-3. Descriptive Statistics for Political Interest Model: Civilian, Veterans, and Active Duty (NAES)

		Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Civilian	Voted in 2000 General	0	1	.87	.341	2315
	Age Group	1	5	3.18	1.240	2315
	Education	1	5	3.37	1.213	2315
	Income	1	6	2.92	1.505	2315
	Hispanic	0	1	.06	.231	2315
	Race	0	1	.12	.322	2315
	Sex	0	1	.66	.475	2315
	Religious Attendance	1	5	2.91	1.321	2315
	Marital Status	0	1	.61	.487	2315
	Party ID	0	1	.68	.467	2315
	Ideology Strength	1	3	1.76	.675	2315
	Ideology	1	5	2.88	1.013	2315
	Interested in Campaign	1	3	2.55	.649	2315
Veteran	Voted in 2000 General	0	1	.92	.266	446
	Age Group	1	5	4.05	.948	446
	Education	1	5	3.39	1.128	446
	Income	1	6	3.04	1.494	446
	Hispanic	0	1	.03	.162	446
	Race	0	1	.11	.307	446
	Sex	0	1	.09	.279	446
	Religious Attendance	1	5	2.93	1.342	446
	Marital Status	0	1	.67	.471	446
	Party ID	0	1	.64	.481	446
	Ideology Strength	1	3	1.74	.698	446
	Ideology	1	5	2.65	.958	446
	Interested in Campaign	1	3	2.59	.674	446
Active Duty	Voted in 2000 General	0	1	.76	.430	341
	Age Group	1	5	2.13	.965	341
	Education	1	5	3.48	1.033	341
	Income	1	6	2.98	1.250	341
	Hispanic	0	1	.06	.246	341
	Race	0	1	.16	.363	341
	Sex	0	1	.16	.371	341
	Religious Attendance	1	5	2.94	1.246	341
	Marital Status	0	1	.75	.432	341
	Party ID	0	1	.66	.475	341
	Ideology Strength	1	3	1.65	.650	341
	Ideology	1	5	2.57	.814	341
	Interested in Campaign	1	3	2.51	.635	341

Table B-4. Descriptive Statistics for Trust in Government Model: Civilians, Veterans, and Active Duty (NAES)

		Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Civilian	Voted in 2000 General	0	1	.85	.353	1396
	Age Group	1	5	3.16	1.244	1396
	Education	1	5	3.35	1.195	1396
	Income	1	6	2.91	1.466	1396
	Hispanic	0	1	.06	.228	1396
	Race	0	1	.12	.329	1396
	Sex	0	1	.65	.478	1396
	Religious Attendance	1	5	2.88	1.349	1396
	Marital Status	0	1	.62	.487	1396
	Party ID	0	1	.68	.467	1396
	Ideology	1	5	2.85	1.034	1396
	Ideology Strength	1	3	1.78	.698	1396
	Trust Government	1	4	2.21	.600	1396
Veteran	Voted in 2000 General	0	1	.91	.282	220
	Age Group	1	5	4.00	.917	220
	Education	1	5	3.53	1.195	220
	Income	1	6	3.09	1.470	220
	Hispanic	0	1	.02	.149	220
	Race	0	1	.08	.275	220
	Sex	0	1	.13	.334	220
	Religious Attendance	1	5	2.81	1.380	220
	Marital Status	0	1	.70	.457	220
	Party ID	0	1	.64	.482	220
	Ideology	1	5	2.62	.911	220
	Ideology Strength	1	3	1.71	.687	220
	Trust Government	1	4	2.26	.636	220
Active Duty	Voted in 2000 General	0	1	.76	.427	326
	Age Group	1	5	2.14	.968	326
	Education	1	5	3.48	1.046	326
	Income	1	6	2.98	1.243	326
	Hispanic	0	1	.06	.240	326
	Race	0	1	.16	.367	326
	Sex	0	1	.17	.378	326
	Religious Attendance	1	5	2.95	1.253	326
	Marital Status	0	1	.76	.429	326
	Party ID	0	1	.66	.476	326
	Ideology	1	5	2.56	.823	326
	Ideology Strength	1	3	1.66	.654	326
	Trust Government	1	4	2.46	.640	326

Table B-5. Descriptive Statistics for Demographic Model: Civilians and Military (NAES)

		Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Civilian	Voted in 2000 General	0	1	.87	.340	5601
	Age Group	1	5	3.23	1.238	5601
	Education	1	5	3.39	1.200	5601
	Income	1	6	2.94	1.503	5601
	Hispanic	0	1	.06	.231	5601
	Race	0	1	.11	.312	5601
	Sex	0	1	.65	.477	5601
	Religious Attendance	1	5	2.92	1.333	5601
	Marital Status	0	1	.60	.490	5601
	Party ID	0	1	.73	.443	5601
	Party ID Strength	0	1	.67	.469	5601
	Ideology	1	5	2.87	1.035	5601
	Ideology Strength	1	3	1.78	.686	5601
	Military - Active or Veteran	Voted in 2000 General	0	1	.92	.273
Age Group		1	5	3.95	1.070	1258
Education		1	5	3.41	1.133	1258
Income		1	6	3.05	1.463	1258
Hispanic		0	1	.04	.197	1258
Race		0	1	.10	.306	1258
Sex		0	1	.10	.303	1258
Religious Attendance		1	5	2.91	1.328	1258
Marital Status		0	1	.68	.468	1258
Party ID		0	1	.68	.465	1258
Party ID Strength		0	1	.72	.450	1258
Ideology		1	5	2.61	.953	1258
Ideology Strength		1	3	1.76	.693	1258

Table B-6. Descriptive Statistics for Political Interest and Internal Efficacy: Civilians and Military (NAES)

		Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Civilian	Voted in 2000 General	0	1	.88	.326	1860
	Age Group	1	5	3.28	1.241	1860
	Education	1	5	3.38	1.182	1860
	Income	1	6	2.94	1.492	1860
	Hispanic	0	1	.06	.235	1860
	Race	0	1	.10	.297	1860
	Sex	0	1	.66	.475	1860
	Religious Attendance	1	5	2.95	1.329	1860
	Marital Status	0	1	.58	.493	1860
	Party ID	0	1	.73	.442	1860
	Party ID Strength	0	1	.68	.468	1860
	Ideology	1	5	2.84	1.044	1860
	Ideology Strength	1	3	1.80	.688	1860
	Following Campaign Closely	1	4	3.31	.770	1860
	Follow Politics	1	4	3.24	.829	1860
Politics Too Complicated	1	5	2.81	1.547	1860	
Military	Voted in 2000 General	0	1	.93	.259	445
	Age Group	1	5	3.89	1.101	445
	Education	1	5	3.38	1.112	445
	Income	1	6	3.03	1.409	445
	Hispanic	0	1	.06	.231	445
	Race	0	1	.10	.305	445
	Sex	0	1	.11	.308	445
	Religious Attendance	1	5	2.85	1.341	445
	Marital Status	0	1	.65	.477	445
	Party ID	0	1	.67	.470	445
	Party ID Strength	0	1	.71	.455	445
	Ideology	1	5	2.62	.953	445
	Ideology Strength	1	3	1.76	.685	445
	Following Campaign Closely	1	4	3.45	.732	445
	Follow Politics	1	4	3.49	.734	445
Politics Too Complicated	1	5	2.60	1.528	445	

Table B-7. Descriptive Statistics for External Efficacy Model: Civilians and Military (NAES)

	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.	N	
Civilian	Voted in 2000 General	0	1	.88	.325	600
	Age Group	1	5	3.19	1.203	600
	Education	1	5	3.40	1.210	600
	Income	1	6	3.01	1.505	600
	Hispanic	0	1	.05	.225	600
	Race	0	1	.11	.311	600
	Sex	0	1	.63	.484	600
	Religious Attendance	1	5	2.90	1.330	600
	Marital Status	0	1	.63	.484	600
	Party ID	0	1	.75	.435	600
	Party ID Strength	0	1	.71	.453	600
	Ideology	1	5	2.84	1.004	600
	Ideology Strength	1	3	1.75	.681	600
	Candidates Try to Keep Promises	1	5	3.24	.718	600
Military	Voted in 2000 General	0	1	.94	.236	136
	Age Group	1	5	4.05	1.021	136
	Education	1	5	3.51	1.095	136
	Income	1	6	2.89	1.381	136
	Hispanic	0	1	.07	.250	136
	Race	0	1	.11	.314	136
	Sex	0	1	.11	.314	136
	Religious Attendance	1	5	2.93	1.209	136
	Marital Status	0	1	.66	.475	136
	Party ID	0	1	.66	.475	136
	Party ID Strength	0	1	.68	.467	136
	Ideology	1	5	2.66	.990	136
	Ideology Strength	1	3	1.79	.679	136
	Candidates Try to Keep Promises	1	5	3.22	.737	136

Table B-8. Descriptive Statistics for Civic Duty Model: Civilians and Military (NAES)

	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.	N	
Civilian	Voted in 2000 General	0	1	.89	.308	595
	Age Group	1	5	3.22	1.199	595
	Education	1	5	3.42	1.190	595
	Income	1	6	3.02	1.507	595
	Hispanic	0	1	.05	.212	595
	Race	0	1	.11	.310	595
	Sex	0	1	.63	.483	595
	Religious Attendance	1	5	2.91	1.332	595
	Marital Status	0	1	.62	.485	595
	Party ID	0	1	.75	.436	595
	Party ID Strength	0	1	.72	.449	595
	Ideology	1	5	2.83	1.009	595
	Ideology Strength	1	3	1.76	.686	595
	Vote Because of Civic Duty	0	1	.54	.498	595
Military	Voted in 2000 General	0	1	.94	.235	138
	Age Group	1	5	4.06	1.016	138
	Education	1	5	3.50	1.089	138
	Income	1	6	2.92	1.394	138
	Hispanic	0	1	.07	.248	138
	Race	0	1	.12	.321	138
	Sex	0	1	.11	.312	138
	Religious Attendance	1	5	2.95	1.216	138
	Marital Status	0	1	.67	.473	138
	Party ID	0	1	.67	.473	138
	Party ID Strength	0	1	.68	.468	138
	Ideology	1	5	2.64	1.003	138
	Ideology Strength	1	3	1.81	.689	138
	Vote Because of Civic Duty	0	1	.62	.488	138

Table B-9. Descriptive Statistics for Government Employment: Civilians and Veterans (NAES)

		Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Civilian	Voted in 2000 General	0	1	.86	.351	3057
	Age Group	1	5	2.85	1.094	3057
	Education	1	5	3.55	1.152	3057
	Income	1	6	3.12	1.427	3057
	Hispanic	0	1	.06	.246	3057
	Race	0	1	.12	.320	3057
	Sex	0	1	.59	.491	3057
	Religious Attendance	1	5	2.82	1.308	3057
	Marital Status	0	1	.60	.489	3057
	Party ID	0	1	.72	.447	3057
	Party ID Strength	0	1	.66	.475	3057
	Ideology	1	5	2.95	1.035	3057
	Ideology Strength	1	3	1.78	.676	3057
	Government Employee	0	1	.26	.441	3057
	Veteran	Voted in 2000 General	0	1	.91	.279
Age Group		1	5	3.46	.958	470
Education		1	5	3.48	1.080	470
Income		1	6	3.41	1.391	470
Hispanic		0	1	.05	.216	470
Race		0	1	.11	.319	470
Sex		0	1	.11	.317	470
Religious Attendance		1	5	2.77	1.295	470
Marital Status		0	1	.69	.462	470
Party ID		0	1	.69	.464	470
Party ID Strength		0	1	.66	.474	470
Ideology		1	5	2.65	.923	470
Ideology Strength		1	3	1.71	.686	470
Government Employee		0	1	.31	.464	470

Table B-10. Descriptive Statistics for Demographic Model: Active Duty (NAES)

	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Voted in 2000 General	0	1	.76	.428	321
Age Group	1	5	2.15	.967	321
Education	1	5	3.48	1.037	321
Income	1	6	3.00	1.244	321
Hispanic	0	1	.06	.242	321
Race	0	1	.16	.369	321
Sex	0	1	.17	.377	321
Religious Attendance	1	5	2.94	1.250	321
Marital Status	0	1	.76	.426	321
Party ID	0	1	.66	.475	321
Ideology	1	5	2.57	.823	321
Ideology Strength	1	3	1.66	.653	321

Table B-11. Descriptive Statistics for Military Service Model: Active Duty (NAES)

	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Voted in 2000 General	0	1	.77	.424	300
Age Group	1	5	2.13	.940	300
Education	1	5	3.49	1.033	300
Income	1	6	2.99	1.242	300
Hispanic	0	1	.05	.225	300
Race	0	1	.17	.376	300
Sex	0	1	.17	.379	300
Religious Attendance	1	5	2.92	1.258	300
Marital Status	0	1	.77	.424	300
Party ID	0	1	.65	.478	300
Ideology	1	5	2.58	.812	300
Ideology Strength	1	3	1.65	.639	300
Rank	0	1	.31	.462	300
Reason for Joining	0	1	.38	.485	300
Appropriate to Advocate Candidate	1	3	1.71	.938	300
Years in Guard or Reserves	0	6	2.65	2.653	300
Years in Regular Military	0	6	2.24	2.627	300

Table B-12. Descriptive Statistics for Demographic Model: Civilians and Veterans (PEW)

		Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Civilian	Registered to Vote	0	1	.82	.387	1295
	Age Group	1	5	3.15	1.387	1295
	Education	1	5	3.14	1.194	1295
	Income	1	6	3.00	1.525	1295
	Hispanic	0	1	.09	.293	1295
	Race	0	1	.24	.430	1295
	Sex	0	1	.61	.489	1295
	Religious Attendance	1	5	2.80	1.436	1295
	Marital Status	0	1	.49	.500	1295
	Party ID	0	1	.61	.488	1295
	Ideology	1	5	2.84	1.003	1295
	Ideology Strength	1	3	1.75	.682	1295
	Military	Registered to Vote	0	1	.91	.286
Age Group		1	5	3.76	1.297	1880
Education		1	5	3.26	1.104	1880
Income		1	6	3.20	1.396	1880
Hispanic		0	1	.06	.241	1880
Race		0	1	.15	.360	1880
Sex		0	1	.12	.324	1880
Religious Attendance		1	5	2.71	1.439	1880
Marital Status		0	1	.68	.466	1880
Party ID		0	1	.59	.491	1880
Ideology		1	5	2.53	.937	1880
Ideology Strength		1	3	1.80	.682	1880

Table B-13. Descriptive Statistics for Patriotism Model: Civilians and Veterans (Pew)

Civilian or Military	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.	N	
Civilian	Registered to Vote	0	1	.82	.385	1272
	Age Group	1	5	3.15	1.389	1272
	Education	1	5	3.14	1.190	1272
	Income	1	6	3.01	1.527	1272
	Hispanic	0	1	.09	.292	1272
	Race	0	1	.24	.429	1272
	Sex	0	1	.61	.489	1272
	Religious Attendance	1	5	2.78	1.432	1272
	Marital Status	0	1	.50	.500	1272
	Party ID	0	1	.61	.488	1272
	Ideology	1	5	2.84	1.003	1272
	Ideology Strength	1	3	1.75	.682	1272
	Patriotic	1	3	1.81	.932	1272
	Military	Registered to Vote	0	1	.91	.286
Age Group		1	5	3.76	1.297	1856
Education		1	5	3.27	1.101	1856
Income		1	6	3.20	1.389	1856
Hispanic		0	1	.06	.239	1856
Race		0	1	.15	.359	1856
Sex		0	1	.12	.325	1856
Religious Attendance		1	5	2.71	1.439	1856
Marital Status		0	1	.68	.466	1856
Party ID		0	1	.59	.492	1856
Ideology		1	5	2.52	.934	1856
Ideology Strength		1	3	1.80	.680	1856
Patriotic		1	3	2.25	.956	1856

Table B-14. Descriptive Statistics for Government Employment Model: Civilians and Veterans (Pew)

		Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Civilian	Registered to Vote	0	1	.82	.385	809
	Age Group	1	5	2.91	1.273	809
	Education	1	5	3.31	1.181	809
	Income	1	6	3.37	1.516	809
	Hispanic	0	1	.10	.295	809
	Race	0	1	.22	.415	809
	Sex	0	1	.54	.499	809
	Religious Attendance	1	5	2.75	1.404	809
	Marital Status	0	1	.55	.498	809
	Party ID	0	1	.61	.488	809
	Ideology	1	5	2.86	.992	809
	Ideology Strength	1	3	1.74	.674	809
	Government Employee	0	1	.20	.400	809
Military	Registered to Vote	0	1	.91	.286	916
	Age Group	1	5	3.25	1.232	916
	Education	1	5	3.43	1.060	916
	Income	1	6	3.65	1.373	916
	Hispanic	0	1	.07	.257	916
	Race	0	1	.16	.370	916
	Sex	0	1	.13	.339	916
	Religious Attendance	1	5	2.71	1.417	916
	Marital Status	0	1	.72	.447	916
	Party ID	0	1	.60	.490	916
	Ideology	1	5	2.51	.912	916
	Ideology Strength	1	3	1.78	.684	916
	Government Employee	0	1	.29	.454	916

Table B-15. Descriptive Statistics for Demographic Model: Veterans (Pew)

	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Registered to Vote	0	1	.91	.290	1602
Age Group	1	5	3.74	1.306	1602
Education	1	5	3.25	1.101	1602
Income	1	6	3.18	1.392	1602
Hispanic	0	1	.06	.236	1602
Race	0	1	.15	.361	1602
Sex	0	1	.11	.313	1602
Religious Attendance	1	5	2.67	1.445	1602
Marital Status	0	1	.69	.463	1602
Party ID	0	1	.59	.492	1602
Ideology	1	5	2.52	.925	1602
Ideology Strength	1	3	1.79	.681	1602

Table B-16. Descriptive Statistics for Service Model: Veterans (Pew)

	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Registered to Vote	0	1	.90	.303	1167
Age Group	1	5	3.56	1.321	1167
Education	1	5	3.25	1.072	1167
Income	1	6	3.21	1.391	1167
Hispanic	0	1	.07	.247	1167
Race	0	1	.17	.374	1167
Sex	0	1	.13	.337	1167
Religious Attendance	1	5	2.68	1.442	1167
Marital Status	0	1	.69	.461	1167
Party ID	0	1	.58	.493	1167
Ideology	1	5	2.51	.916	1167
Ideology Strength	1	3	1.78	.681	1167
Rank	0	1	.17	.372	1167
Years of Service	1	7	4.20	1.999	1167
Combat	0	1	.52	.500	1167
Serving Country Important Reason for Joining	0	1	.94	.244	1167
Service Helped Get Ahead	1	7	4.50	.904	1167
Service Useful	4	36	14.38	2.050	1167
Received Gov. Help as Veteran	0	1	.65	.478	1167
Received VA Benefits	0	1	.61	.488	1167
VA Evaluation	1	4	2.68	.846	1167

Table B-17. Descriptive Statistics for Draftee or Volunteer Model: Veterans (Pew)

	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Registered to Vote	0	1	.95	.218	840
Age Group	1	5	4.70	.456	840
Education	1	5	3.26	1.169	840
Income	1	6	3.05	1.346	840
Hispanic	0	1	.04	.192	840
Race	0	1	.10	.297	840
Sex	0	1	.03	.156	840
Religious Attendance	1	5	2.77	1.466	840
Marital Status	0	1	.72	.447	840
Party ID	0	1	.61	.489	840
Ideology	1	5	2.47	.950	840
Ideology Strength	1	3	1.85	.683	840
Draftee or Volunteer	0	1	.74	.439	840

Table B-18. Descriptive Statistics for Military Met Needs During Service Model: Veterans (Pew)

	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Registered to Vote	0	1	.91	.288	907
Age Group	1	5	3.70	1.189	907
Education	1	5	3.35	1.099	907
Income	1	6	3.38	1.392	907
Hispanic	0	1	.05	.220	907
Race	0	1	.17	.374	907
Sex	0	1	.14	.344	907
Religious Attendance	1	5	2.79	1.441	907
Marital Status	0	1	.77	.423	907
Party ID	1	5	.58	.493	907
Ideology	1	3	2.49	.910	907
Ideology Strength	1	4	1.79	.688	907
Military Met Needs on Active Duty	0	1	2.96	.860	907

## LIST OF REFERENCES

- Abramson, Paul R., John H. Aldrich and David W. Rhode. 2010. *Change and Continuity in the 2008 Elections*. Washington: CQ Press.
- Aldrich, John H. 1993. "Rational Choice and Turnout." *American Journal of Political Science* 37 (February): 246-278.
- Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Alvarez, R. Michael, Thad E. Hall, and Brian F. Roberts. 2007. "Military Voting and the Law: Procedural and Technical Solutions to the Ballot Transit Problem." *Fordham Urban Law Journal* 34 (3): 935-997.
- Alvarez, R. Michael, Thad E. Hall, and Betsy Sinclair. 2008. "Whose Absentee Votes Are Counted?" *Electoral Studies* 27 (4): 673-683.
- Annenberg Public Policy Center. 2006. *2004 National Annenberg Election Survey: General Election Panel Codebook*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania.
- . 2006. *2004 National Annenberg Election Survey: Military Cross-Section Codebook*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania.
- Bachman, Jerald G., Peter Freedman-Doan, David R. Segal and Patrick M. O'Malley. 2000. "Distinctive Military Attitudes Among U.S. Enlistees 1976-1997: Self-Selection Versus Socialization." *Armed Forces & Society* 26 (4): 561-585.
- Baxter, Sandra and Marjorie Lansing. 1983. *Women and Politics: The Visible Majority*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Beck, Paul Allen and M. Kent Jennings. 1982. "Pathways to Participation." *The American Political Science Review* 76 (March): 94-108.
- Beckwith, Karen. 1986. *American Women and Political Participation: The Impacts of Work, Generation, and Feminism*. New York: Greenwood.
- Bernstein, Robert, Anita Chadha, and Robert Montjoy. 2001. "Overreporting Voting: Why It Happens and Why It Matters." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 65 (Spring): 22-44.
- Betros, Lance. 2001. "Political Partisanship and the Military Ethic in America." *Armed Forces & Society* 27 (Summer): 501-523.
- Bishin, Benjamin G., and Matthew B. Incantalupo. 2008. *From Bullets to Ballots? The Role of Veterans in Contemporary Elections*. University of California, Riverside. Typescript.

- Blais, Andre. 2000. *To Vote or Not to Vote?: The Merits and Limits of Rational Choice Theory*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Boyd, Richard W. 1981. "Decline of U.S. Voter Turnout: Structural Explanations." *American Politics Quarterly* 9 (April): 133-159.
- Brady, Henry E., Sidney Verba and Kay Lehman Schlozman. 1995. "Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation." *The American Political Science Review* 89 (June): 271-294.
- C-SPAN. 2012. *Veterans Data from the American Community Survey and Decennial Censuses*. Washington, DC: United States Census Bureau.
- Calvo, Maria Antonio and Steven J. Rosenstone 1989. *Hispanic Political Participation*. San Antonio: Southwest Voter Research Institute.
- Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Cleary, Paul D. and Ronald Angel 1984. "The Analysis of Relationships Involving Dichotomous Dependent Variables." *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* 25 (September): 334-348.
- Cohn, Lindsay. 1999. "The Evolution of the Civil-Military "Gap" Debate." <http://www.lpcohn.squarespace.com> (October 11, 2012).
- Converse, Philip E., and Richard G. Niemi. 1971. "Non-voting Among Young Adults in the United States." In *Political Parties and Political Behavior*, eds. William J. Crotty, Donald A. Freeman, and Douglas S. Gatlin. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
- Converse, Phillip E. 1972. "Change in the American Electorate." In *The Human Meaning of Social Change*, eds. Angus Campbell and Phillip E. Converse. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- D'Agostino, Joseph A. 2004. "Conservative Spotlight: Military Voting Rights Project." *Human Events*, May.
- Defense Manpower Data Center. 2009. *2008 Post-Election Voting Survey of Uniformed Service Members: Tabulations of Responses: Active Duty Military*. Arlington, VA: U.S. Department of Defense.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper.
- Ellison, Christopher. 1992. "Military Background, Racial Orientations, and Political Participation among Black Adult Males." *Social Science Quarterly* 73 (2): 360-378.

- Eversole, Eric "Military Voting in 2010: A Step Forward, But a Long Way to Go". Military Families United Military Voter Protection Project and AMVETS Legal Clinic at the Chapman University School of Law.  
[www.mvpproject.org/MVPPProject\\_study\\_download.pdf](http://www.mvpproject.org/MVPPProject_study_download.pdf).(July 27, 2012).
- Feaver, Peter D. and Richard H. Kohn. 2000. "The Gap: Soldiers, Civilians and their Mutual Misunderstanding." *The National Interest* 61 (Fall): 29-37.
- . 2001. *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Federal Voting Assistance Program. 2011. *2010 Post-Election Survey Report to Congress*. Alexandria, VA: U.S. Department of Defense.
- Firebaugh, Glenn and Kevin Chen. 1995. "Vote Turnout of Nineteenth Amendment Women: The Enduring Effect of Disenfranchisement." *The American Journal of Sociology* 100 (January): 972-996.
- Fitzgerald, Mary. 2005. "Greater Convenience But Not Greater Turnout: The Impact of Alternative Voting Methods on Electoral Participation in the United States." *American Politics Research* 33 (November): 842-867.
- Fowler, James H. and Cindy D. Kam. 2007. "Beyond the Self: Social Identity, Altruism, and Political Participation." *Journal of Politics* 69 (August): 813-827.
- Franke, Volker C. 2001. "Generation X and the Military: A Comparison of Attitudes and Values between West Point Cadets and College Students." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 29 (Summer): 92-119.
- Franzich, S. E. 1982. Citizens in Uniform: Political Participation among Military and Civilian Samples. *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 10 (1): 15-28.
- Giammo, Joseph D., and Brian J. Brox. 2010. "Reducing the Costs of Participation: Are States Getting a Return on Early Voting?" *Political Research Quarterly* 63 (2): 295-303.
- Green, Donald P. and Ian Shapiro. 1994. *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Hellevik, Ottar. 2009. "Linear Versus Logistic Regression When the Dependent Variable is a Dichotomy." *Quality & Quantity* 43 (January): 59-74.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1957. *The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- ICF International. 2010. *Demographics 2010: Profile of the Military Community*. Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Military Community and Family Policy). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense.

- Inbody, Donald Stephen. 2009. "Grand Army of the Republic or Grand Army of the Republicans? Political Party and Ideological Preferences of American Enlisted Personnel" Ph.D. diss. University of Texas at Austin.
- Inspector General U.S. Department of Defense. 2012. *Assessment of the Federal Voting Assistance Program Office Implementation of the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act*. Alexandria, VA: U.S. Department of Defense.
- Jackman, Robert W. 1993. "Response to Aldrich's 'Rational Choice and Turnout': Rationality and Political Participation." *American Journal of Political Science* 37 (February): 279-290.
- Jacobson, Cardell K. and Tim B. Heaton. 2003. "Inter-Group Marriage and United States Military Service." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 31 (Summer): 1-22.
- Janowitz, Morris. 1960. *The Professional Soldier*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Jennings, M. Kent and Gregory B. Markus. 1976. "Political Participation and Vietnam War Veterans: A Longitudinal Study." In *The Social Psychology of Military Service*, eds. Nancy L. Goldman and David R. Segal. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- . 1977. "The Effect of Military Service on Political Attitudes: A Panel Study." *American Political Science Review* 71 (March): 131-147.
- Jennings, M. Kent and Laura Stoker. 2004. "Social Trust and Civic Engagement Across Time and Generations." *Acta Politica* 39 (December): 342-379.
- Kam, Cindy D. and Carl L. Palmer. 2008. "Reconsidering the Effects of Education on Political Participation." *Journal of Politics* 3 (July): 612-631.
- Karp, Jeffrey A. and David Brockington. 2005. "Social Desirability and Response Validity: A Comparative Analysis of Overreporting Voter Turnout in Five Countries." *The Journal of Politics* 67 (August): 825-840.
- Lane, Robert Edwards. 1959. *Political Life: Why People Get Involved in Politics*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
- Leal, David L. 1999. "It's Not Just a Job: Military Service and Latino Political Participation." *Political Behavior* 21 (2): 153-74.
- Lundquist, Jennifer Hicke. 2007. "A Comparison of Civillan and Enlisted Divorce Rates During the Early All Volunteer Force Era." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 35 (Winter): 199-217.
- Lutz, Amy. 2008. "Who Joins the Military?" *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 36 (Winter): 167-188.

- Manza, Jeff and Clem Brooks. 1998. "The Gender Gap in U.S. Presidential Elections: When? Why? Implications?" *American Journal of Sociology* 103 (March): 1235-1266.
- Mazur, Diane H. 2005. "The Bullying of America: A Cautionary Tale about Military Voting and Civil-Military Relations." *Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy* 4 (June): 105-131.
- McNamara, Paul 2006. "If it's Important for the Military, Why Not Us?" *Network World* 23 (37): 104.
- McNerney, Michael. 2006. "Military Partisanship." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 34 (Winter): 281-288.
- Meehl, Paul E. 1977. "The Selfish Voter and the Thrown-Away Vote Argument." *American Political Science Review*, 71 (March): 11-30.
- Mettler, Suzanne. 2005. *Soldiers to Citizens: The G.I. Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Milbrath, Lester W. and M. Goel. 1977. *Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics?* 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Boston: Rand McNally College Publishing.
- Miller, Jane E. 2005. *The Chicago Guide to Writing about Multivariate Analysis*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Miller, Warren E. and J. Merrill Shanks. 1996. *The New American Voter*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Morgan, Matthew J. 2003. "The Reconstruction of Culture, Citizenship, and Military Service." *Armed Forces and Society* 29 (Spring): 373-391.
- Morton, Louis. 1973. "Review of *The Military and American History*." *Reviews in American History* 1 (March): 53-59.
- Moskos, Charles C. Jr. [1977] 2010. "The All-Volunteer Military: Calling, Profession, or Occupation?" *Parameters* 40 (Winter): 23-31.
- National Center for Veterans Analysis and Statistics. 2011. *Educational Attainment of Veterans: 2000 to 2009*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs.
- . 2011. *Profile of Veterans: 2009 Data from the American Community Survey*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs.
- Neeley, Grant W., and Lilliard E. Richardson Jr. 2001. "Who is early voting? An Individual Level Examination." *Social Science Journal* 38 (July): 381-92.

- Niemi, Richard G. 1976. "Costs of Voting and Nonvoting." *Public Choice* 27 (Fall): 115-119.
- Noreen, Eric. 1988. "An Empirical Comparison of Probit and OLS Regression Hypothesis Tests." *Journal of Accounting Research* 26 (Spring): 119-133.
- Princeton Survey Research Associates International. 2011. *Generational Change/Veterans GP Survey*. Washington: Pew Social Trends.
- Rabon, John Stuart. 2006. "Efficacy of EV in US and Switzerland." Master's thesis. University of Florida.
- Ricks, Thomas E. 1997. "The Widening Gap Between the U.S. Military and U.S. Society," *The Atlantic Monthly*, July, 66-78.
- Riker, William H., and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1968. A Theory of the Calculus of Voting. *American Political Science Review* 62 (March): 25-42.
- Rosenstone, Steven J. and John Mark Hansen. 1993. *Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in America*. New York: MacMillian.
- Ryan, Garry D. & Timothy K. Nenninger, eds. 1987. *Soldiers and Civilians: The U.S. Army and the American People*. Washington: National Archives and Records Administration.
- Sarkesian, Sam C. and Robert E. Connor, Jr. 2006. *The US Military Profession into the Twenty-First Century: War, Peace and Politics*. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge.
- Schlozman, Kay Lehman, Sidney Verba, and Henry E. Brady. 2012. *The Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Schreiber, E. M. 1979. "Enduring Effects of Military Service? Opinion Differences between U.S. Veterans and Nonveterans." *Social Forces* 57 (3): 824-39.
- Silver, Brian D., Barbara A. Anderson, and Paul R. Abramson. 1986. "Who Overreports Voting?" *American Political Science Review* 80 (June): 613-624.
- Smith, Claire M. 2010. "Indicators for Success: Measuring Military Voter Turnout." *OVF Research Newsletter* 2 (May): 4-6.
- Southwell, Priscilla L. 2008. "The Effect of Political Alienation on Voter Turnout, 1964-2000." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 36 (Summer): 131-145.
- Stoker, Laura and M. Kent Jennings 1995. "Life-Cycle Transitions and Political Participation: The Case of Marriage." *American Political Science Review* 89 (June) 421-433.

- Squire, Peverill, Raymond E. Wolfinger and David P. Glass. 1987. "Residential Mobility and Voter Turnout." *American Political Science Review* 81 (March): 45-66.
- Szayna, Thomas S., Kevin F. McCarthy, Jerry M. Sollinger, Linda J. Demaine, Jefferson P. Marquis and Brett Steele. 2007. *The Civil-Military Gap in the United States: Does It Exist, Why, and Does It Matter?* Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.
- Teigen, Jeremy M. 2006. "Enduring Effects of Uniform: Previous Military Experience and Voting Turnout." *Political Research Quarterly* 59 (4): 601-607.
- Teigen, Jeremy M. 2007. "Veterans' Party Identification, Candidate Affect, and Vote Choice in 2004 U.S. Presidential Election." *Armed Forces & Society* 33 (April): 414-437.
- Traugott, Michael W. and John P. Katosh. 1979. "Response Validity in Surveys of Voting Behavior." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 43 (Autumn): 359-377.
- U.S. Congress. Congressional Budget Office. 2011. *Analysis of Federal Civilian and Military Compensation*. Washington, DC: CBO.
- U.S. Congress. Senate. 1939. *The Hatch Act*. 76th Cong. S. Rept. 76-1.
- U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. 2000. *Current Population Survey*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce.
- . 2002. *Current Population Survey*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce.
- . 2004. *Current Population Survey*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce.
- . 2006. *Current Population Survey*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce.
- . 2008. *Current Population Survey*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce.
- . 2010. *Current Population Survey*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce.
- U.S. Department of Defense. 2008. *DOD Directive 1344.10: Political Activities by Members of the Armed Forces*. Washington: U.S. Department of Defense.
- U.S. Election Assistance Commission. 2009. *Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act*. Washington: U.S. Election Assistance Commission.
- U.S. Government Accountability Office. 2010. *Military Personnel: Military and Civilian Pay Comparisons Present Challenges and Are One of Many Tools in Assessing Compensation*. Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office.
- Verba, Sydney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry E. Brady and Norman H. Nie. 1993. "Race, Ethnicity and Political Resources: Participation in the United States." *British Journal of Political Science* 23: 453-497

- . 1993. "Citizen Activity: Who Participates? What do they Say?" *American Political Science Review* 87 (June): 303-318.
- Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Wald, Kenneth and Danielle Feinstein. 2012. "Higher Education and Political Tolerance." University of Florida. Manuscript Draft.
- Walsh, Katherine C., M. Kent Jennings, and Laura Stoker. 2004. "Effects of Social Class Identification on Participatory Orientations toward Government." *British Journal of Political Science* 34 (July): 469-495.
- Wolfinger, Raymond E. and Steven J. Rosenstone. 1980. *Who Votes?* New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Wright, Samuel F. 2008. "Chapter 9: Americans Abroad and Voting at War." In *Voting in America*. Vol. 1 of *Praeger Perspectives*, ed. Morgan E. Felchner. Westport, CT: Praeger.

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Sarah Valentin earned her bachelor's degree in history with a minor in psychology from the College of Charleston in 1999. She received her Master of Arts in political science from the University of Florida in the spring of 2013. As a proud Navy wife, she has also lived and traveled extensively overseas.