

DEMOCRATIZATION OF WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF  
THE COMMUNITY BASED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (CBNRM)  
PROGRAMS IN BOTSWANA AND ZAMBIA

By

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To my parents Charity and David

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>page</u>
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....	4
LIST OF TABLES .....	11
LIST OF FIGURES .....	12
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .....	13
ABSTRACT .....	14
 CHAPTER	
<b>1 INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>16</b>
CBNRM The Democratic Experiment .....	16
The CBNRM Discourse in Southern Africa.....	16
Statement of the Problem .....	18
Literature Review .....	19
The CBNRM Debate.....	19
Democracy in CBNRM: Ideals or Actuality? .....	22
Scholarship On Decentralization and Democracy .....	27
What Makes Democracy Work? .....	30
CBNRM Economic Incentives a Means for Increasing Democratic Governance.....	38
Economic measures of effective CBNRM .....	38
Cost-benefit analysis at the household level .....	41
Cost-benefit analysis at the community level .....	42
Governance in Common Property Regimes .....	44
The common pool resource .....	44
Common property rights institutions.....	45
Common property “rules” .....	47
Situating CBNRM Governance within Common Property Theory and Democratic Governance .....	48
<b>2 METHODOLOGY .....</b>	<b>53</b>
The Study Area .....	53
Botswana.....	53
Zambia .....	54
Case selection Why Botswana and Zambia .....	57
Sample Selection .....	58
Sampling Design .....	58
Data Collection.....	59
Demographic Characteristics .....	59

Age.....	60
Gender .....	60
Education.....	60
Gender of household head.....	60
Head of household.....	61
Period of stay in village .....	61
Position in CBO.....	61
<b>3 BRINGING DECISIONS TO THE GRASSROOTS: THE ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING .....</b>	<b>66</b>
Significance of Micro Institutions in Participatory CBNRM Governance.....	66
Annual General Meetings .....	67
The Institutional Importance of AGMs in CBNRM Programs in Botswana and Zambia: .....	72
Theoretical Framework .....	75
Promoting ‘Town-Hall’ Style Democracy in AGMs.....	75
Participation in Town-hall Meetings and its Importance in AGMs.....	79
Research Question.....	81
Research Sites .....	82
Methods .....	84
Data Collection .....	84
Sampling Design .....	85
Results.....	87
Attendance in CBNRM AGM .....	88
Demographic Characteristics and AGM Attendance .....	88
AGM attendance and age .....	88
AGM attendance and gender.....	89
AGM attendance and education.....	89
AGM attendance and household head.....	89
CBNRM Social and Economic Benefits and AGM Attendance.....	89
Cash benefits and AGM attendance .....	90
Employment benefits and AGM attendance.....	90
Social benefits and AGM attendance .....	90
Institutional Characteristics and AGM attendance.....	90
Age of community and AGM attendance.....	91
Size of community and AGM attendance .....	91
Factors Predicting AGM Participation .....	91
Results .....	92
Education, benefits and size as predictors of AGM participation .....	92
Interpretations of key findings .....	93
Qualitative Data .....	94
Community Records of AGMs Held.....	94
Factors Contributing to Non-Participation in AGMs .....	95
Poor consultation of communities by Trust and CRB leaders .....	96
Poor transfer of information to the communities by leaders .....	97
Absent from AGM due to work related engagements .....	97

Lack of trust in leadership .....	98
AGMs not held .....	98
Discussion .....	99
Factors that Influence Community Member's Attendance at AGMs .....	99
Education .....	99
CBNRM benefits .....	100
Size of community.....	103
Community characteristic.....	104
Factors that Contribute to Non-Participation in AGMs.....	106
<b>4 THE IMPORTANCE OF DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS IN PROMOTING CBNRM GOOD GOVERNANCE .....</b>	<b>118</b>
Role of Elections in Improving CBNRM Micro Governance .....	118
Board Elections in Botswana and Zambia .....	120
Theory on Participation in Elections.....	121
Voter Turnout: Participation in Elections.....	123
Quality of Elections Free and Fairness.....	124
Factors Influencing Participation in Elections .....	124
Methods.....	127
Results .....	127
Voter turnout .....	127
Who votes in CBNRM elections? .....	128
Education and voter turnout .....	128
Gender and voter turnout .....	129
Age and voter turnout .....	129
Do CBNRM Benefits Influence Participation in Elections? .....	129
Cash benefits and voter turnout .....	129
Employment benefit and voter turnout .....	129
Social benefits and voter turnout.....	130
Preference of voting method .....	130
Factors Predicting Voter Turn out.....	130
Model One - Does the provision of CBNRM incentives predict participation in elections? .....	131
Summary of results .....	132
Interpretation of results .....	132
Model Two - Does the size of the community predict participation in CBNRM elections? .....	133
Summary of results .....	133
Interpretation of results .....	134
Quality of Elections.....	134
Discussion .....	136
Participation in Elections .....	136
Factor Predicting Participation in Elections .....	140
<b>5 DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALIZATION THE ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR CBNRM.....</b>	<b>148</b>

Performance of CBNRM Programs in Southern Africa .....	148
Theoretical Framework .....	150
Decentralization in CBNRM: Exploring the Concepts and Principles .....	150
Decentralization - the big picture.....	150
Devolution a form of decentralization.....	152
Decentralization and devolution in natural resources management.....	154
Devolution an enabling condition of CBNRM governance .....	156
Institutional Changes that have Shaped CBNRM in Botswana.....	161
Institutional Changes that have Shaped CBNRM in Zambia .....	167
A Comparative Assessment of Devolution in Botswana and Zambia.....	173
How Have Efforts To Decentralize Wildlife Management in Botswana and Zambia, Affected Micro-level Governance Performance? .....	177
Integrating Democratic Governance and Socioeconomic Indicators to Assess Performance of CBNRM Communities within Uncertain Macro Institutional Frameworks .....	177
Methods and Data Analysis.....	178
Results .....	180
Assessment of democratic governance performance .....	180
Political participation .....	180
Political rights.....	180
Accountability.....	181
Provision of information.....	181
Assessing socioeconomic performance.....	182
The Zambian cases: why Kasempa community has had governance success and Mulendema continues to struggle .....	182
The case of OCT and why it continues to perform poorly when compared to single village communities in Botswana.....	183
Economic viability of resource: community's ability to generate revenues .....	184
Methods and Data Collection .....	184
Revenue trends - Khwai trust (2000 – 2005).....	185
Revenue trends - Mababe trust (2000 – 2005) .....	185
Revenue trends - Sankuyo trust (2000 – 2005) .....	186
Revenue trends - Mulendema CRB (2003 – 2008).....	186
Revenue trends - Kasempa CRB (2005 – 2010).....	187
Discussion .....	187
<b>6 CONCLUSIONS.....</b>	<b>198</b>
The Importance of Micro and Macro Governance Institutions in Shaping CBNRM Performance .....	198
Role of Micro Governance Institutions and Recommendations for Improved CBNRM governance .....	199
Macro Enabling Conditions for CBNRM Governance .....	201
Lessons from Namibia and Zimbabwe and Future Implications for CBNRM in Botswana and Zambia.....	202

## APPENDIX

A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE QUESTIONNAIRE BOTSWANA .....	206
B DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE QUESTIONNAIRE ZAMBIA .....	229
LIST OF REFERENCES .....	248
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .....	264

## LIST OF TABLES

<u>Table</u>		<u>page</u>
2-1	Demographic characteristics .....	62
2-2	CBO characteristics.....	63
3-1	Typologies of participation.....	110
3-2	CBO characteristics.....	111
3-3	AGM attendance variables measured .....	112
3-4	Crosstab AGM attendance .....	113
3-5	Description of variables in model.....	115
3-6	Logistic regression model on factors that predict AGM attendance.....	115
3-7	Record of AGMs held .....	116
3-8	Reasons for not attending AGM .....	117
4-1	Crosstabs of voter turnout .....	142
4-2	Voter turnout & benefits.....	143
4-3	Frequency of elections .....	143
4-4	Preference of voting method.....	144
4-5	Variables in model.....	145
4-6	Binary equation: factor change in odds of voting .....	145
4-7	Binary Equation: factor Change in Odds of Voting .....	146
4-8	Quality of elections .....	147
5-1	Devolved rights and micro governance of natural resources, income, benefits and political participation .....	191
5-3	Indicators for CBNRM socio economic benefits.....	192
5-4	Democratic governance performance.....	193
5-5	Socioeconomic performance .....	194

## LIST OF FIGURES

<u>Figure</u>		<u>page</u>
1-1	Institutional change: devolution and collective action in commons governance .....	52
1-2	Actors and institutional change.....	52
2-1	Map of the Okavango delta (source Dr. Lin Cassidy, using GIS layers housed at the Okavango Research Institute) .....	64
2-2	Map of Kafue National Park & surrounding game management areas (Source: Zambia Wildlife Authority GIS Database - 2011).....	65
5-1	Khwai revenue .....	195
5-2	Mababe revenue.....	195
5-3	Sankuyo revenue.....	196
5-4	OCT revenue .....	196
5-5	Mulendema revenue.....	197
5-6	Kasempa revenue .....	197

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADMADE	Administrative Management Design
AGM	Annual General Meeting
CAMPFIRE	Community Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources
CBNRM	Community Based Natural Resource Management
CBO	Community Based Organization
CPR	Common Pool Resources
CRB	Community Resource Board
CSO	Central Statistics Office
DWNPS	Department of Wildlife and National Parks
GMA	Game Management Area
GRZ	Government Republic of Zambia
KNP	Kafue National Park
LIRD	Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCT	Okavango Community Trust
ODMP	Okavango Development Management Plan
VAG	Village Action Group
ZAWA	Zambia Wildlife Authority

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Decentralization of wildlife management in southern Africa has largely taken place through the Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) programs.

Transfer of rights from state actors to local communities has been at the core of this institutional change. Following two decades of implementation however, a growing concern has been the need for establishing micro community governance systems that enable improved wildlife management, increase community incomes, provide equitable share of benefits, and promote democratic principles of governance. This study examines whether this has taken place in six communities in Botswana and Zambia.

The study's objectives include: examining the importance of Annual General Meetings as platforms for improved democratic governance; examining the factors that influence community participation in CBNRM elections and its role in improved CBNRM governance, and finally examining the macro enabling conditions that shape micro CBNRM governance and the provision of public goods.

Using survey and interview data that compares single and multi-village models of governance, the study examines factors that influence community member's participation in two democratic institutions namely Annual General meetings (AGMs) and elections. In addition, the study examines how these six communities perform within macro policy environments that have shaped decentralization of wildlife management in the two countries of study. The findings show that single villages perform better than multi village communities in providing more equitable shares of CBNRM benefits and increasing political participation of its members at AGMs and elections. The study further reveals that despite recentralized policy directives shaping wildlife management in Botswana and Zambia, single village communities have been able to sustain their rights to manage, sell, and benefit from the resources when compared to multi villages that have experienced deterioration of these outcomes.

## CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

### **CBNRM The Democratic Experiment**

#### **The CBNRM Discourse in Southern Africa**

The Community Based Natural Resource Management (from this point CBNRM) approach is a democratic experiment aimed at achieving both conservation and development objectives in common property regimes (Anstey 2009). Informed by general scholarship on property rights and institutions, it is institutional change that devolves the power to manage common pool natural resources to democratically elected local communities (Ostrom 1999, Murphree 2000). This institutional change, known as democratic decentralization, has shifted the traditional role of the State from that of centralized management to more participatory democratic approaches (Mohan 2000, Larson 2004). This change has been implemented against a global backdrop of change in the way conservation and development is addressed. It is a response to the many challenges that have surfaced in the conservation of common pool resources in nearly all parts of the world. National governments in nearly all developing countries have turned to local-level common property institutions in the past few decades as a new policy thrust to decentralize the governance of the environment (Agrawal 2001a, Agrawal 2001b).

Increasing evidence shows us that the sustainability of the world's natural resources ultimately depends on sustainable institutions that can effectively manage these resources. Institutions of collective action such as CBNRM are critical in shaping this. Comprehensive studies have been undertaken to support this in different parts of the world which support theoretical findings of collective action and identify conditions

under which groups of self-organized users are successful in managing their commons (Ostrom 1990, Baland and Platteau 1996) and (Agrawal 2001 p. 1650). Scholarship on the governance of the commons shows that this response is necessary (Agrawal 2001p. 1649) and reflects on larger scholarship of the commons that have over time illustrated that resource users often create institutional arrangements and management regimes that help allocate benefits equitably over long periods of time (McKean 1992, Ostrom and Schlager 1992, Agrawal and Gibson 1999, Acheson 2006). Countering the “tragedy of the commons” argument, they argue that social groups have struggled successfully against threats of resource degradation by developing and maintaining self-governing institutions (McCay and Acheson 1987, Ostrom 1990, Baland and Platteau 1996). Often using informal strategies for achieving compliance that rely on participants’ commitment to rules and subtle social sanctions, community-based institutions can navigate these governance systems (Deitz, Ostrom et al. 2003). However, in as much as there is an advocacy for such self-governing community groups, it is important to acknowledge that there are limitations to this model too. Barrett and colleagues caution that community based natural resource management overemphasizes the place of local communities in tropical conservation efforts, just as the previous top-down model underemphasized communities’ prospective roles. They propose a more realistic model, one that matches scales and institutional landscapes to suit the biophysical and socioeconomic context and commonly involving distributing authority across multiple institutions rather than concentrating on one (Barrett and Arcese 1995, Barrett, Brandon et al. 2001 p. 497). Marshall Murphree, in his seminal piece on “multiple boundaries, borders and scale” articulates this same argument, emphasizing the importance of having a systematic

approach, which provides for congruence and connectivity in matching functional, ecological and jurisdictional scales (Murphree 2000 p. 15). These scholars thus convince us not to view commons governance in isolation, and to retract from previous works that have overemphasized the role of local communities but to understand that this form of governance operates within other nested institutions (Ostrom 1990). Agrawal also points out shortcomings in how commons regimes have been studied thus far (Agrawal 2001 p. 1650). He argues that existing studies of sustainable institutions around common-pool resources suffer from the lack of being substantive in their single focus on local institutions and resources. These studies have not articulated well enough aspects of resource systems, some aspects of user group membership and the external social, physical and institutional environment that affect institutional durability and long term management (Agrawal 2001 p. 1650 - 1651). This scholarship has come a long way and through an adaptive process institutions of governance for common property regimes are being better understood than they were over two decades ago when this form of resource governance was first advocated.

### **Statement of the Problem**

The African continent has not been excluded in the global challenges of developing democratic institutions for the management of their common pool resources (Murphree 2000, Hutton, Adams et al. 2005). Africa is a vast continent, and home to some of the world's largest natural resource systems. Following failed postcolonial policies of 'fences and fines' conservation, Sub Saharan Africa has seen a number of countries embrace this institutional change of democratic decentralized natural resource management. Two decades of implementing this resource governance regime in

regions of both Southern and East Africa has scored some results in meeting both conservation and development objectives, but has also received huge criticism. Among the many criticisms of these programs has been the issue of poor institutional development, coined the “governance problem”. The current impasse in CBNRM in southern Africa is the incomplete devolution of rights that allow communities to govern and benefit from their natural resources. Very few studies exist that explore the main factors that have led to this incomplete devolution of rights and how in turn this has affected the target communities. This doctoral research examines governance systems in CBNRM and their role in providing public goods. The study, presented as three coauthored papers focuses on three objectives: -

- Determining the importance of Annual General Meetings as platforms for improved democratic governance;
- Identifying the factors that influence community participation in CBNRM elections and its role in improved CBNRM governance;
- Determining the macro enabling conditions that shape micro CBNRM governance and the provision of public goods.

## **Literature Review**

### **The CBNRM Debate**

In the wake of failed fortress conservation strategies and policies, a new narrative termed ‘community conservation’ has been advocated for over the past two decades. This new conservation narrative is based on the premise that conservation cannot and should not be pursued against the interests and wishes of local people (Ghimire and Pimbert 1997). It has become so widely accepted that it is now almost everywhere dominant, the obvious answer to the dilemmas and disappointments of conservation policy particularly in the Third World (Adams and Hulme 2001).

There are many approaches to ‘community conservation,’ one of them being Community Based Natural Resource Management (from this point on CBNRM), which aims to achieve rural development through the use of wildlife or other natural resources in places connected to protected areas (Adams and Hulme 2001). Other scholars such as (Barrow and Murphree 2001) argue that CBNRM is community conservation that seeks to create an enabling legal and policy context for local people to: manage their own resources sustainably and encourage the development of wildlife off take, safari-hunting and tourism in communal lands; establish institutions for effective local management of natural resources; and ensure the benefits accrue on a sustainable and equitable basis. For the purpose of this research I focus on the latter two objectives of CBNRM.

So regardless of these definitions and objectives of CBNRM, what is this concept that has been promoted in both conservation and development arenas, and is gaining ground almost as a panacea of solving conservation and development issues, particularly in developing countries. CBNRM can be theoretically explained as a common property arrangement that aims to understand how humans behave when resource rights to manage common pool resources such as wildlife, fisheries, water, etc. are devolved. It attempts to solve “collective action problems” by focusing on the conditions under which users of renewable resources cooperate to achieve efficient management (Agrawal 2003). Deitz and his colleagues argue that humans using resources of this type face at least two underlying incentive problems, the first is the problem of overuse, congestion or even destruction and the second is the free rider problem that stems from the cost or difficulty of excluding some individuals from the

benefits generated by the resource (Deitz, Dolsak et al. 2002). Incentives are thus a crucial element in the sustainability of programs that involve CBNRM.

With as many proponents as it has attracted, CBNRM has also gained extreme criticisms (Noss 1991, Wells and Brandon 1992, Barrett and Arcese 1995, Oates 1995). Critics of this new conservation approach come from two very different positions. Some come from a tradition that is highly suspicious of the principles and practices of conservation, and detect ‘community conservation’ as a trivial and perhaps falsehearted facade designed to hide old-style preservation, with its harsh colonial legacy of policing, eviction and misanthropy (MacKenzie 1988, Neumann 1998) . This view holds that, at best, community conservation is but a poor imitation of a genuinely democratic conservation strategy, which would center on (and be driven by) local people’s ideas about and uses of nature. These critics, from a broadly human-rights position, are in an alliance with other opponents of community conservation whose interests are very different, and who see in community conservation a fatal weakening of resolve on the part of conservationists and who fear that the preservation of species and ecosystems will be compromised by placing any measure of control in the hands of wildlife/resources greatest enemy – local people (Spinage 1998).

Others have positively criticized CBNRM from within, such as (Murphree 2000) whose work outlines conditions in which CBNRM may work, and those in which they would not. Scholar-practitioners, (Murphree 2000, Child 2004) propose similar conditions that are similar to (Ostrom 1990) design principles of the conditions that would enable CBNRM to work most effectively. Among the factors that sustain CBNRM are strong incentive structures for constituents involved in managing common pool

resources. Ostrom, explores the importance of incentive structures for the user groups, in order to achieve both economic and environmental sustainability (Ostrom 1990), and (Murphree 2000, Child 2004) have outlined the importance of the link between production and benefit for the user/ community groups.

Another rarely explored area that contributes to success in CBNRM programs is its role in increasing rural residents' democratic rights in the governance of natural resources. CBNRM governance is promoted on the principles of participatory democracy where ordinary citizens actively participate, hold their leaders accountable and are included in the management and governance of their resources. Ostrom (2007) indirectly argues that this form of governance is a key to solving commons problems. In her experimental work on commons management, she explores how face-to-face interactions of group members ultimately lead to socially optimal harvesting levels. Despite the importance of these principles on democracy, there have been few studies of this kind in the context of CBNRM. In this next section, I explore the literature on the meaning of democracy in CBNRM.

### **Democracy in CBNRM: Ideals or Actuality?**

**What is democracy?** As a starting point to understand what democracy is, I focus first on some of the work undertaken by (Dahl 1989). Dahl begins by conceptualizing democracy as both an ideal and an actuality. These are two important starting points as they help in understanding what democracy is. The ideals of democracy, as Dahl explains them, are the values people believe democracy should be able to achieve. He outlines how democracy creates opportunities for effective participation of citizens in political processes; contributes to equality of voting; allows for citizens to control policy agendas; and how it allows for the inclusion of adults in the process. In addition he

outlines some of the reasons why democracy is ideal. Dahl poses the question of ‘why have democracies?’ This is an important question and a good distinguishing point to understand why democracy may be an ideal. He outlines eight reasons why it is important to have democracy:

- Democracy helps to prevent governments by cruel and vicious autocrat.
- Democracy respects basic human rights
- Democracy guarantees its citizens a number of fundamental rights that non-democratic systems do not and cannot guarantee.
- Democracy ensures its citizens have a broader range of personal freedoms than other governance systems.
- Democracy helps people to protect their own fundamental interests such as food, health, shelter etc.
- Democratic governments provide maximum freedom of self-determination for people to live under laws of their own choosing.
- Democratic governments can provide a maximum opportunity for exercising moral responsibility.
- Democracy fosters human development more fully than any feasible alternatives (Dahl 1971 p. 2 - 10).

Dahl explains that this is an empirical assertion in principle this should be able to be tested by devising an appropriate way of measuring “human development” among people who live in non-democratic regimes. Only a democratic government can foster a relatively high degree of political equality. One of the most important reasons for preference of a democratic government is that it can achieve political equality among citizens to a much greater extent than any feasible alternative.

As outlined above, (Dahl 1971 p. 257) outlines what describes democracy by illustrating the ideals of what democracy aims to achieve in society. These attributes are thus very instrumental in distinguishing what democracy is when this concept is being explored.

Sartori explores the definition of democracy by explaining that democracy can be defined as a high-flown name for something that does not exist. He explains that if defining democracy merely signifies the meaning of the word, examining the Greek definition of democracy i.e. “power of the people” quickly solves the problem (Sartori 1962). This limits it only to a word definition. However, the problem of defining this word is more complicated than that and he advises that when the term is used it clearly stands for something. The question is not only: What does it mean? But also: What is the thing? Again, Sartori presents a clear distinguishing angle in terms of how democracy is conceptualized in terms of meaning. He outlines that it not only defines a descriptive or denotative function, but also a normative and persuasive function. Sartori examines the word democracy as a starting point: “power of the people”. He outlines the definition as majority rule that protects minority rights – he proposes this as a correct interpretation and a working solution. In sum, he describes modern democracies as hinging on the following: -

- Majority rule
- Elective mechanisms
- Representative transmission of power.

This means that the section of people who count are above all those who constitute the victorious voting majority; that as far as the actual wielding of power goes even they count only partially; and that a series of mechanisms modifies and reduces the degree of control that is left in the hands of the governed who are further removed from the levers of authority. In his conclusions, Sartori cautions that, whenever we judge democracy by the standard of etymological definition, the inadequacies that emerge lie in the definition and not in the reality. The etymological definition provides us a start. For

the phrase “power belongs to the people” establishes a principle concerning the sources and the legitimacy of power. It means that in a democracy power is legitimate only if it is attributed from below, only if it is an emanation of popular will – in other words only if it is granted freely (Sartori 1962).

Adcock and Collier in their work on the democracies and dichotomies, also contribute to the debate on what democracy is. They examine how scholarship on democracy has been one based on defining it as a graded versus a dichotomous concept (Adcock and Collier 2001). They examine work by scholars of democracy and ask the basic question of whether democracy is viewed as a concept that is graded or one that is dichotomous. In using the graded approach to defining democracy, an understanding of what democracy is, is thus examined using different degrees of democracy. Therefore one democracy would be different from another based on the degree of whether minimal standards such as the ones proposed by in his work on polyarchy are met (Dahl 1989). The other option is to define democracy in terms of dichotomies, i.e. comparing what a democracy looks like and what it does not look like. In their conclusions, they propose that when examining the meaning of democracy it is important to understand the conceptual requirements for understanding subtypes of democracy.

Schmitter and Karl are concerned with four important elements in their definition of what democracy is. These include: -

- The contestation over policy and political competition for the office.
- Participation of citizenry through partisan forms of collective action;
- Accountability of rulers through mechanisms of representation and the rule of law;
- Protection of rights for meaningful contestation, participation and accountability. (Schmitter and Karl 1991 p. 75 - 88).

Schmitter and Karl express that these are key attributes in defining democracy (Schmitter and Karl 1991). O'Donnell presents another approach to examining democracy in terms of its ideals and its actuality. He points out that all definitions of democracy are a distillation of the historical trajectory and the present situation of the originating countries. He thus points out the need to study democracy across different historical/ contextual settings (O'Donnell 1998). He proposes how the emergence of democracy in different settings may generate specific characteristics. In turn, these characteristics may make it useful to distinguish among subtypes within the universe of relevant cases. In line with this argument O'Donnell invokes a realistic definition of democracy based on polyarchy (Dahl 1989). The polyarchy traits consist of: -

- Elected officials
- Free and fair elections
- Inclusive suffrage.
- Right to run for office.
- Freedom of expression.
- Alternative information (including that) alternative sources of information exist and are protected by law.
- Associational autonomy.

In summary, this definition of democracy stipulates some attributes of elections (clause 1 to 4) and lists certain freedoms (clause 5 to 7) that are deemed necessary for elections to be democratic. The freedoms are dubbed “primary political rights integral in the political process (Dahl 1971).

O'Donnell thus outlines that a realistic definition of democracy should therefore contain two things: -

- The first identifies the attributes of elections that are considered free and fair.
- Second should list conditions, designated as freedoms, guarantees, or “primary political rights”, which surround fair elections (O'Donnell, 1998).

These various definitions of democracy can be confusing, particularly when conceptualizing what is meant by the term “democracy”. However, some of the basic attributes outlined by these scholars inform one on what a democracy looks like and what it is not (O'Donnell 1998). As (Lindberg 2006) summarizes this, “the use of democracy as a variable attribute to political systems should include an empirically oriented definition of representative liberal democracy that is general enough to apply to a variety of contexts but specific enough to discriminate against clearly nondemocratic political systems and to facilitate an unambiguous operationalization”.

### **Scholarship On Decentralization and Democracy**

Democracy as outlined in the above arguments is centrally situated in terms of its ideals and its actuality. The definitional discussion of democracy expresses what it tends to achieve in terms of ensuring that collective action is achieved and public goods are realized. The democratic political science theorists outline some of the important attributes that democracy has in terms of contributing to how this is achieved. A question therefore would be how do these compare or contrast with those of decentralization or local governance. With respect to CBNRM governance, how do micro level democratic institutions function within the broader macro institutional changes such as decentralization? CBNRM is an institutional change that is initiated through the decentralization of natural resources from the state to non-state actors. A key question to explore therefore is whether the same ideals and attributes of democracy hold in decentralization of natural resources? This section explores some of the meanings that have been put forward in terms of decentralization. Upon outlining this concept, we will then outline how this compares to what theorists of democracy have outlined.

By definition, decentralization involves the transfer of power from the central government to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy (Mawhood 1983). The mechanisms through which theorists believe that efficiency and equity should increase is by public decisions being brought closer and made more open and accountable to local populations (Mawhood 1983, Manor 1999, Smoke 2003, Manor 2004). For this to happen, some authors argue that some form of downwardly accountable local representation is necessary (Smoke 2003). This brings in the concept and ideology of democracy. The political process that enables this is thus one that is premised on democratic principles and ideals.

Other authors such as (Larson 2004) have argued that in as much as decentralization describes a transfer of power to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy, this definition is only convenient as it relates to the formal, legal process of decentralization. It does not include the way in which local actors make decisions without specific central authority to do so, or the way in which legitimacy of local elected authorities grows outside of any decentralization as an iterative process that appears to require grass roots and local governments' pressure in order to advance. Larson argues that this dynamic reality represents decentralization 'from below' and is precisely the foundation upon which greater participation and democracy are forged. It is then the foundation of democratic decentralization.

Bardham & Mookherjee argue that from a standpoint of politics, decentralization is viewed as an important element of participatory democracy that allows citizens to have an opportunity to communicate their preferences and views to elected officials who are

subsequently rendered accountable for their performance to citizens (Bardham and Mookherjee 2007).

Blair outlines that the devolutionary form of decentralization (in which real authority and responsibility are transferred to local bodies) is termed democratic local governance. This process involves meaningful authority devolved to local units of governance that are accessible and accountable to the local citizenry, who enjoy full political rights and liberty. He cautions that it differs from earlier efforts of decentralization, which were largely initiatives in public administration without any serious democratic component (Blair 2000 p. 21 - 39).

Rondinelli, one of the distinguishing scholars on the subject of decentralization, affords some distinctions within the broad term decentralization. He outlines three distinct forms of decentralization: -

- Deconcentration, seeks to shift administrative responsibilities from central ministries and departments to regional and local administrative levels.
- Delegation, this allows national governments to shift management authority for specific functions to semiautonomous or parastatal organizations and state enterprises, regional planning and area development agencies, multi and single-purpose public authorities.
- Devolution: where higher-level authorities recognize the formal permanent control by lower level governmental on non-governmental actors (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007 p. 2 - 4).

Devolution is closely premised on the foundations of democracy. It involves the transfer of powers and resources to local governments or actors and has been the foundation of sustainable decentralization in developing countries. Political devolution provides a legal basis for the exercise of power at the local level and enables citizens to influence local policymaking and priority setting (Grindle 2007).

Rondinelli regards the decentralization/ devolution – democracy connection as a hypothesis. He lists four possible democratic benefits of decentralization:

- It could institutionalize citizen participation in development planning and management;
- It could allow for greater participation of “non dominants” for greater equity in the allocation of government resources and investments;
- It could increase political stability and unity by giving more groups a greater stake in maintaining the political system; and
- It could overcome the control of local elites who may not be sensitive to the needs of the poor (Rondinelli 1981 p. 133 - 145).

Rondinelli in his hypothesis presents us with some important points of comparison between mainstream scholarship on democracy and decentralization. The ideals of democracy as outlined by the political science scholars are important in ensuring that issues surrounding collective action in the political process are addressed. There is very little departure between what democracy is, and how it links in with the political process of decentralization. Democracy and its principles form the underlying foundation on which decentralization is exercised. It addresses the most basic need that of involving people in the political process be it through elections, policy implementation or exercise of rights and freedoms. Decentralization as a political process therefore should be exercised on the foundations of democratic principles if it is to be effective. The transfer of power from the state to the local level actors, should provide an enabling environment that ensures the attributes of democracy outlined by scholars such as O'Donnell, Sartori, Dahl et al., are promoted. It may not necessarily lead to democracy; however its exercise should start an institutionalization of the democratic process.

### **What Makes Democracy Work?**

To explore this question, a useful starting point is to examine the conditions that enable democracy to work in terms of producing different kinds of public/ collective

goods or solving collective action problems. This section will thus examine scholarship on democracy on the conditions that enable it to work and this will be presented to how it compares or contrasts to local governance and decentralization.

Dahl outlines some broad conditions that enable democracy to work. He proposes that in order for democracy to work there should be democratic institutions that ensure control of military and police by elected officials; that would ensure democratic beliefs and political culture and that would ensure there is no strong foreign control hostile to democracy. These conditions focus primarily on ensuring that institutions in place are creating this enabling environment for democracy to work (Dahl 1989).

Secondly, Dahl (1989) proposes the importance of a modern market economy in order to enable democracy to work. He argues that a market-capitalist economy, the society it produces, and the economic growth it typically engenders are all highly favorable conditions for developing and maintaining democratic political institutions.

Przeworski et al., in their article on “What makes democracy endure?” explain that the conditions should be such that there is a regime that has competitive elections for presidency, rotation in the presidential office, and more than one party. They caution that while some regimes are more democratic than others, unless offices are contested, they should not be considered democratic (Przeworski, Alvarez et al. 1996).

Putnam in his work on “Making Democracy Work” seeks to understand the conditions for developing “strong, responsive, effective representative institutions.” Putnam undertook an intensive comparative study of Italy’s regional governments, and came to some interesting conclusions. In some way he counters Dahl’s assertion on the importance of market based economies as necessary conditions for democracy.

Overall, Putnam services the larger debate on democratization by forwarding his views on civic virtue as a motivator for the success of democratic institutions (Putnam 1993).

Powell examines elections as instruments of democracy, and a core attribute to the success of whether democracy works or not. He outlines how elections are critical democratic instruments that establish connections that compel or greatly encourage the policy makers to pay attention to citizens. He reinforces this position by arguing that there is a widespread consensus that the presence of competitive elections, more than any feature, identifies a contemporary nation-state as a democratic political system (Powell 2000).

Other scholars that have focused on elections and democracy such as (Lindberg 2006) outline three important dimensions that are necessary instruments for the realization of self-government (or government by the people). He proposes equality of political participation; freedom of political competition; and legitimacy of the idea of self-government. These dimensions constitute what he proposes as central democratic qualities that are examined in elections.

So how then do these attributes and conditions of democracy ensure that public/ collective goods are provided for, or collective action problems are solved? Douglas North in his work on institutions provides us with some guidance. In his chapter on political and formal rules, he explains how political rules broadly define the hierarchical structure of the polity, its basic decision structure and the explicit characteristics of agenda control. He explains that the evolution of single absolute rulers to democratic governments is typically conceived as a move towards greater political efficiency. In the sense that democratic government gives greater and greater percentage of the

populace access to the political decision making process, eliminates the capricious capacity of a ruler to confiscate wealth, and develops third-party enforcement contracts with an independent judiciary, resulting in a move towards greater political efficiency (North 1990). This greater political efficiency can be expressed as the improvement in the provision of public goods, and one where collective action problems are solved. Democracy is thus a political institution that enables this. In order for this political institution to work however, the conditions outlined above such as societies in market economies; the role of civil society in the process; free and fair elections; political competition; political participation; legitimacy; the promotion of political freedoms; universal suffrage; etc. should be met.

So how then do the attributes of democracy, contribute to the provision of public goods or solve collective action problems in local governance and decentralization? Manor, points to three essential conditions that enable democratic local governance/ decentralization to work. These include: -

- A considerable amount of resources (especially financial resources) from higher levels of government;
- The devolution of substantial powers to local authorities and
- Mechanisms that ensure accountability of bureaucrats to elected representatives and in turn the elected officials' accountability to voters (Manor 2004).

These conditions should be enabling factors in ensuring that democratic decentralization at local level is effective. However, most of these practices are undertaken in rural areas, where the provisions of public goods are weakened by certain conditions in the systems. Some scholars of decentralization have thus challenged the concept of democracy in providing rural people public goods and its usefulness in the area.

Johnson examines the question of whether decentralized local governance achieves goals such as poverty reduction. This relationship parallels the question on what conditions of democracy allow for the provision of public goods. Johnson explains that democracy and decentralization are often presented as necessary conditions for effective rural development (Johnson 2001). Democratic decentralization it is argued, results in a state apparatus more exposed and therefore more responsive to local needs and aspirations (Crook and Manor 1998). However, he cautions that the idea that democratic decentralization will necessarily produce gains for the poor is not entirely consistent with evidence on the ground. This is explained in the disharmony that can exist between democratic decentralization and rural poverty/ how public goods are provided for to the poor. Johnson considers the challenge of encouraging decentralization and democracy in rural areas where political agency and access to information are frequently limited by traditional and modern-bureaucratic systems of hierarchy and control (Johnson 2001). This raises concern on some the attributes of political freedoms as key standards in the concept of democracy. In rural areas, if those conditions are not there, how then can the practice of democracy within local decentralized governance be exercised?

An emerging theme from a sizeable body of literature on democratic decentralization is the weak correlation that exists between democratic decentralization and poverty reduction (Crook and Manor 1998, Manor 1999, Blair 2000, Crook and Sverrisson 2001). First they suggest that even the most successful forms of democratic decentralization have been unable to overcome economic and political disparities both

within and among regions. This highlights the problem of raising public revenue in rural areas where economic surplus is typically sparse.

Secondly, these authors imply an underlying tension between rural inequality and local democracy. An important concern they raise is that poverty would have a debilitating effect on the ability to engage in formal political processes. A direct illustration of this is the relationship between basic literacy and political action. As Drez and Sen have forcefully argued, the ability to obtain and understand information about laws, policies and the rights to which one is entitled is often dependent on the ability to read (Drez and Sen 1995).

Thirdly, is the dilemma of encouraging poor people to assume the costs of engaging in direct political action? As Moore and Putzel have argued, agrarian institutions may be structured in a way that prevents poor people from participating in political rallies and the like. Moreover the costs of political action may deter them from pursuing or sustaining coherent political movements (Moore and Putzel 1999).

Finally, there is the problem of local elite capture. As numerous studies have pointed out, one of the dangers of decentralization is that it may simply empower local elites and perpetuate poverty and inequality (Drez and Sen 1995, Crook and Manor 1998, Manor 1999, Moore and Putzel 1999, Blair 2000).

These factors outlined above may cause one to retract to whether democracy is an ideal political institution when it comes to decentralized local governance. The above scholars on decentralization pose some thought provoking studies on some of the challenges democracy as a political institution faces when being undertaken in areas with high poverty levels. Here the provision of public goods becomes primary; however

the problems of collective action are perpetuated due to conditions on the ground. When comparing how democracy works therefore in the case of decentralized local governance, it is very important to be mindful that unlike in liberal democracies where freedoms are promoted, there are: market based capitalistic economies; elections are free and fair; there is political participation and competition; self-governance is legitimate. In contrast, rural areas with high poverty levels would not usually have those conditions. The ideals of democracy may be promoted, and should be emphasized but achieving them at local level, in decentralized forms of governance is slightly more challenging.

So do we ‘throw away the baby with the bath water’? Not at all, scholarship in decentralization has also shown that democratic ideals in decentralization can contribute in a number of ways to enhancing rural livelihoods/ or providing public goods to rural communities. Baland and Platteau, have explored how empowerment of local resource user groups can improve the ways in which local people manage and use natural resources (Baland and Platteau 1996). Implicit in this process of decentralization is that local people possess the knowledge, information and incentives to manage and conserve their resources on which they depend.

Democratization and empowerment of local administrative bodies can enhance participation in decision making forums, particularly among groups that have been traditionally marginalized by local political processes (Blair 2000, Crook and Sverrisson 2001). Studies from Africa, Asia and Latin America have shown that the introduction of elections, systems of transparency and rights of expression and association can empower poor people, enhancing their ability to participate in local decision-making and

encouraging them to hold public officials to account (Rondinelli, McCullough et al. 1989, Blair 2000).

This section pursued the dual objective of describing “what democracy is?” and what makes democracy work in the context of providing collective public goods and solving collective action problems. The definitions of democracy from contemporary scholarship were presented, with some varying degrees in the way democracy is defined. A recurring thread in the definitions is the way the different scholars characterize what democracy is, and the most basic minimal attributes that should be met in defining this term. The definition of decentralization in local governance was also explored, and here, democratic ideals, were highlighted as underlying measures in the decentralization process, particularly decentralization in the form of devolution.

In the second section, we explored what makes democracy work, by focusing on some of the conditions that scholars in democracy have outlined as crucial in ensuring that democracy works. As a follow, we contrasted and compared what conditions in decentralization allowed for the provision of public/ collective goods, and presented some of the studies that have been undertaken in democratic decentralization and rural poverty. Poverty alleviation is a particular focus, as it presents an excellent comparative variable, when addressing the question of how decentralization ensures that public goods for the poor are delivered. Decentralization as a political process has also been implemented mostly in rural underdeveloped areas, as a measure of ensuring that Government gets closer to the people. In this section, we demonstrated how democratic ideals as defined and elaborated in the political science literature have been brought and practiced in the decentralization of local governance literature. These two areas

have close comparison in terms of the use of a political institution such as democracy to provide collective public goods and solving collective action problems. However, there is some point of departure when it comes to the enabling conditions that ensure that democracy is achieved. In ensuring that democracy is institutionalized in decentralization process, it is therefore very important to be aware of the conditions that may or may not allow it to be pursued.

### **CBNRM Economic Incentives a Means for Increasing Democratic Governance**

CBNRM governance is dependent on ensuring that the right incentive structures are in place and that ultimately the user groups sustainably manage the resource. In this section, we will therefore pursue two objectives. Firstly, we identify the important economic measures at both household and community level that are important in ensuring effective CBNRM governance. Secondly, we determine how these measures can be incorporated into adaptive management system that creates more effective CBNRM performance.

#### **Economic measures of effective CBNRM**

The assumption underlying CBNRM effectiveness is that if community/ user groups act collectively, they will ensure sustainability of the resources, and they will benefit from it (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001, Agrawal 2003). CBNRM effectiveness is thus ensuring that collective action is achieved in commons arrangements; however in the process community groups benefit from it economically both at their household and communal level. The important starting point in developing economic household and community measures for effective CBNRM is thus to ensure the incentive structures created in this arrangement can sustainably contribute to collective action.

Ensuring that economic sustainability is achieved in CBNRM, involves particularly understanding four important variables. Baland and Wade, in their studies on what can contribute to collective action in the commons, have outlined four main variables that should be addressed (Wade 1987, Baland and Plateau 1996). These include: (a) an understanding of the characteristic of the resource; (b) understanding the nature of the groups (group size, heterogeneity, levels of poverty) that depend on the resource; (c) the particulars of the institutional regimes through which resources are managed; and (d) the nature of the relationship between a group and external forces and authorities such as markets, states and technology (Wade 1987, Baland and Plateau 1996).

Agrawal contributes further to this, by proposing the recognition of power within the community user groups and how this will ultimately affect distribution of benefits both at household and community level (Agrawal 2003). Secondly, he proposes recognition of the importance of the changing relationship between the environment and human beings who use environmental resources. Developing measures for effective CBNRM therefore require that one understands these important nuances that could either contribute to collective action on the commons or prevent it. Riding on this is the importance of ensuring that a 'collective good' is produced for the user group involved.

So what are then are the economic measures at household and community level that would contribute to effective CBNRM? We will explore this question by focusing on economic measures in wildlife as a common property resource. In Southern Africa, CBNRM has gained ground, as both a conservation and development programme, based on the transfer of property rights from the State to local communities residing around wildlife areas (Adams and Hulme 2001, Hulme and Murphree 2001). High value

resources such as wildlife and forestry are commoditized to produce revenue for both Central Governments and local communities. Proprietorship is central to CBNRM, and includes the rights to allocate, apportion and sell resources (e.g. set, use and sell quotas); the rights to benefit; the authority to make general management decisions and the rights of exclusion and control (Murphree 1991, Murphree 1997, Emerton 2001, Murombedzi 2001, Child 2004).

In CBNRM, there has been suspicion raised that material benefits resulting from tourism and consumptive wildlife use are inadequate to compensate communities for all the costs of investing in wildlife (Barrett and Arcese 1995, Infield and Namara 2001). Apart from a few studies (Jansen 1990, Barnes 1995c, Barnes 2001, Bond 2001) no rigorous analysis has been done of the financial and/ or economic benefits at the household and community levels in CBNRM. In developing measures of economic sustainability at both these levels, it is important to begin by undertaking a simple cost-benefit analysis of a program. In the case of CBNRM, the basic question is whether the costs incurred at the household/ community exceeds the benefits. If this is the case, then the incentive to manage the resource sustainably is weakened, and free riding will ultimately lead to the depletion of the resource (Deitz, Ostrom et al. 2003).

Emerton argues that benefit-based models of CBNRM are based on incomplete understanding of economics of community conservation (Emerton 2001). Secondly there is a misunderstanding on the nature of wildlife benefits. Benefit distribution is necessary, but in itself may not be a sufficient condition for communities to engage in conservation. This is dependent on: the economic costs that wildlife incurs; the form in which wildlife benefits are received; the economic activities which compete with wildlife;

the intra-inter household distribution of costs and benefits; and on a range of external factors which all limit the extent to which communities are able to appropriate wildlife benefits as real livelihood gains (Murombedzi 2001).

Assessing the economic effectiveness of CBNRM will be delineated first at the household and then at the community level.

### **Cost-benefit analysis at the household level**

For household measures, economic effectiveness can be measured using three indicators. If the costs outweigh the benefits, this is an indication of weak CBNRM effectiveness. Studies have shown that communities residing in wildlife areas usually lose crops and livestock to wildlife (DeMotts and Hoon 2012). These costs often outweigh the benefits that the household gains from wildlife common property arrangements.

Cost can also be measured by assessing the opportunity costs that households incur through living in wildlife areas. Households forfeit the opportunity costs of farming when they enter into common property arrangements such as CBNRM. If this is high, this would also lead to an ineffective CBNRM program.

To measure economic effectiveness at the household level, a focus on the benefits received by each household is also important. Benefit-based approaches to community conservation are based on the economic rationale that although wildlife has a high economic value, local communities receive little and therefore have no incentive to conserve (Emerton 2001). The financial impacts of such programs are a useful measure of benefits at the household level (Ashley 1998). The key questions here are: (a) how much cash is generated locally? (b) how many local people benefit? and (c) who benefits? (particularly do the poorest and marginalized in the group benefit?). In

her studies in Namibia, explains that there are three types of local cash income, which are quite different in their amount and distribution: wages of full time employees; casual earning from selling products and labour (informal sector earnings); and collective income earned by community institutions, either from profits of community enterprises or leases and other fees paid by private enterprises (Ashley 1998).

### **Cost-benefit analysis at the community level**

As important as it is to ensure that household's benefit - and this should be the primary benefactor in any successful CBNRM program - the community should also benefit collectively. Communal benefits have typically been the main focus of most CBNRM programs (Barnes 1994, Emerton 2001) and this has attracted criticism as a narrow focus on communal benefits does not address distributional aspects at the household level.

CBNRM programs should thus aim to simultaneously establish both household and community incentive based structures to be successful. Benefit-based approaches have allocated substantial amounts of money to community development activities and have managed to involve local people in wildlife conservation. However, it is not self-evident that sharing wildlife revenues as development benefits will by itself lead to a net economic gain for communities in wildlife areas. These only partially address the economic issues. They do not take into account the local economic forces motivating wildlife loss. Community development projects such as infrastructure construction (e.g. schools, clinics, etc.) can lead to short-term improvements in conservation. However, they do not address reasons why people engage in economic activities that would destroy wildlife, which lies at the core of developing benefit-based community incentives. It has been proposed that two main areas need to be addressed when

examining benefits that accrue at community level (Barnes, MacGregor et al. 2002). They propose a measure of financial impacts using models based on empirical data that examines financial data in CBNRM programs in Namibia. They measure financial profitability (annual net income, financial rate of return, financial net present value) at the HH level as well as the economic contribution, CBNRM programs make at the community level. Economic efficiency is measured as the annual contribution to gross and net national income, economic rate return, and economic net present.

Aside from only gaining benefits, another important way of measuring economic sustainability at the community level is to assess its entrepreneurial capabilities. Antinori and Bray, suggest that this is an important indicator of whether CBNRM is successful in the commons (Antinori and Bray 2005). In their study on community forestry in Mexico, they identify the need, to ensure that entrepreneurial capabilities are assessed for each community.

These economic measures proposed by (Barnes, MacGregor et al. 2002) and (Antinori and Bray 2005) are designed to directly measure economic sustainability at the community level in CBNRM. These are important indicators, and are core to the sustainability of CBNRM governance and it's economically viability. If both financial and economic measures are met from a community standpoint, then this should contribute to sustaining the CBNRM commons regime and reduce the costs that most communities living with wildlife incur. It is imperative that CBNRM communities be economically efficient and for benefits outweighs costs in order for their members to meaningfully participate in democratic processes.

## **Governance in Common Property Regimes**

Global concerns about environmental degradation and resource depletion have stimulated the growth of scholarship on common pool resources and common property in the last two decades (Deitz, Dolsak et al. 2002). Failures attributed to state management and market-oriented policies have made communities attractive to many policy makers as an alternatives actor to govern forests, pastures, water, fisheries and wildlife areas (Agrawal 2003). Governance of wildlife commons in southern Africa has been practiced under the auspices of CBNRM programs. So what then are these common property arrangements, and what is the foundation of the problems they attempt to solve in resource management? Focusing on commons governance with a particular focus on governance defined as “the formation and stewardship of both the formal and informal rules that regulate the public realm (Hyden, Court et al. 2005) - we examine how common property literature distinguishes between rules, property rights and restrictions. Within the framework of rules and property rights, we examine why these rules in the commons are developed and what sustains them.

### **The common pool resource**

Common-pool resources (CPRs), such as a lake or ocean, an irrigation system, a fishing ground, a forest, is a natural or man-made resource from which it is difficult to exclude or limit use of and one person's consumption of resource units makes those units unavailable to others (Deitz, Dolsak et al. 2002). When the resource units produced by a common-pool resource have a high value and institutional constraints do not restrict the way resource units are appropriated, individuals face strong incentives to appropriate resource units, leading to congestion, overuse and even the destruction of the resource itself (the ‘tragedy of the commons’). Consequently, one important problem

facing the joint users of a common pool resource is known as the appropriation problem. - incentives exist in all jointly used common pool resources for individuals to appropriate more resource units when acting independently than they would if they could find some way of coordinating their activities (Ostrom 1999). Solving the appropriation problem is therefore a matter of solving collective action problems.

### **Common property rights institutions**

The term common property implies a kind of management arrangement created by humans to manage a common pool. The diversity of property rights regimes that can be used to regulate the use of common-pool resources is very large including the broad categories of government ownership, private ownership and ownership by a community (Deitz, Dolsak et al. 2002). When valuable CPRs are left to an open-access regime, degradation and potential destruction are potential results. The proposition in past arguments that resource users cannot themselves change from no property rights (open access) to group or individual property, however can be strongly rejected on the basis of empirical evidence. Resource users through the ages have done just that (McCay and Acheson 1987, Wade 1987, Feeny, Berkes et al. 1990).

In our context, we focus on the property rights arrangements that humans devise in common pool resources held by communities. Commons theorists have identified how community and common ownership management styles attempt to solve “collective action problems”. This is done by focusing on conditions under which users of renewable resources cooperate to achieve efficient management or fail to do so (Agrawal 2001). The property rights in common pools held by a community, are rights transferred from the state to local resource managers to manage a common pool resource. Property rights are instruments of society that derive their significance from

the fact that they help some individuals form those expectations, which they can reasonably hold in dealing with others. These expectations find expressions in the laws, customs and morals of society. An owner of property rights possesses the consent of fellowmen to allow him/her to act in a particular way (Demsetz 1967, Schlager and Ostrom 1992). In common property rights therefore, these are the rights that frame what community owners are entitled to in the management of common pool resources. For commons theorists, property rights as institutions are seen as sets of rules that define access, use, exclusion, management, monitoring, sanctioning and arbitration behaviour of users with respect to specific resources (Schlager and Ostrom 1992). At the same time as such rules are significant in governing patterns of use, they are also the principle mechanisms through which policies regarding resource management work (Demsetz 1967, Furubotn and Pejovich 1974). In investigating the impact of different institutional structures on resource management, commons theorists have also shown the importance of both formal and informal institutions as they influence human behavior (Ostrom, Gardner et al. 1994).

In light of these arguments, understanding governance from the perspective of stewardship of both formal and informal rules, common property rights are thus the formal rules that define the management of common pool resources. Common property rights may be articulated in the form of Government policies that explain the rights communities have access to when managing a resource. A typical example would be the common property rights that are designed in the Wildlife Act of Zambia No. 12, 1998. In this Act, the common property rights provided to local communities in Zambia are conditional and include partial rights of access to wildlife commons. The

communities have rights to earn revenue generated from wildlife tourism. On the other hand, the communities do not have the rights to sell, manage, benefit or own this land. They therefore have only partial property rights to the wildlife commons.

### **Common property “rules”**

So once common property rights are defined, what are the rules in a common property arrangement and why are they devised? In general, humans using common pool resources face at least two underlying incentive problems (Ostrom, Gardner et al. 1994). The first is the problem of overuse or even destruction because one person's use subtracts from the benefits available to others. Secondly, is the free rider problem that comes from the cost or difficulty of excluding some individuals from the benefits generated by the resource? The benefits of maintaining and enforcing rules of access and exclusion go to all users regardless of whether they have paid a fair share of the costs. The institutions that humans devise to regulate the use of common-pool resources must somehow try to cope with these two basic incentive problems. They struggle with how to avoid overuse and how to ensure contributions to the strategies used to maintain both the resource and institution itself (Deitz, Dolsak et al. 2002). In this sense, “institutions” are the rules that people develop to specify the “do’s and don’ts” related to a particular situation. In regard to common pool resources, rules define: who has access to a resource; what can be harvested from, dumped into, or engineered within a resource; who participates in key decisions about these issues and about transferring rights and duties to others (Deitz, Dolsak et al. 2002). These latter rules, on who makes decisions, are the main focus of understanding governance in the commons.

These are the political rules that decide issues of power, accountability, transparency and decision-making in the commons. The study of the stewardship of these rules, which may be both formal (e.g. local constitutions) and informal (e.g. norms of behavior) is thus where we focus our understanding of governance in common property arrangements. Scholars of the commons emphasize the importance of these political institutions/ rules in the commons and that institutions change mainly as a result of attempts by specific social actors, and therefore institutional change is likely to occur when relevant political actors perceive gains from such change. The emergence of new institutions is thus a highly political affair (Gibson 1999). Further, whether new political institutions that emerge will also be efficient for a society depends on the extent to which the interest groups attempting institutional change intersect or overlap with those of the larger collective (Agrawal 2003).

### **Situating CBNRM Governance within Common Property Theory and Democratic Governance**

Understanding CBNRM governance (CBNRMG) begins, by understanding the theories that define this concept. What is the causal link between Common Property and Democratic governance, and how do these apply to CBNRMG?

CBNRM is a common property regime. Understanding the CBNRMG concept using decentralization/ devolution and common property theory presents various challenges. To tease out a little more and gain some common denominator variables, we argue that at the core of understanding CBNRMG is the knowledge of how institutional change unfolds. How do both formal and informal institutions interact to lead to collective action on the commons? Scholars such as (Hyden, Court et al. 2005) provide a useful broad definition of the term governance as the “stewardship of both the

formal and informal rules that define the public realm.” Understanding CBNRM governance therefore involves understanding how both the formal and informal rules are used and managed on the CBNRM commons.

As outlined earlier, decentralization policies create the structural institutions that shape how commons are governed. In particular the institutional change enabled through devolution is fundamentally built on democratic principles that should lead to collective action on the commons. This may or may not happen; therefore causation in the context of CBNRMG is not deterministic but probabilistic. Secondly, decentralization may create institutional changes that have outcomes that are non-linear in nature (Figure 1-1). As shown in the diagram below, state elites begin this process by creating new formal institutions. In the case of CBNRM in Southern Africa, this is usually decentralization of wildlife management. At the core of these institutional changes is to understand how elite state actors weigh the costs and benefits of devolving power, and depending on this, whether they choose either to centralize or partially decentralize wildlife management to local actors.

Once this institutional change has been initiated, policy directives are developed, either through administrative policy changes or new legislation, depending on the context. The formal institutions created in the case of CBNRM promote decentralization in the form of devolved wildlife management power to local actors. CBNRM formal institutions therefore interact with informal ones such as norms and culture that were practiced prior to the introduction of these formal rules. The outcome of this institutional change is a hybrid of both formal and informal institutions and this outcome varies in

different contexts. This interaction of both formal and informal institutions may or may not lead to collective action on the commons.

In addition to understanding CBNRMG using an institutional change lens, it is important to also identify how the actors interact and how their actions lead to certain outcomes on the Commons. Ostrom in her work on “Governing the Commons” outlines the importance of understanding how various actors interact within institutional constraints (Ostrom 1990). Other scholars such as (North 1990) emphasize the importance of understanding “the rules of the game” and “who the actors” are in the institutional changes that take place. Figure 1-2 illustrates how this interaction takes place in CBNRMG. There are four main actors that influence this institutional change on the CBNRM commons. The primary relationship is between state actors and local communities. Other actors who indirectly influence this institutional change include: local government; tribal authorities and special interest groups such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the private sector. Figure 1-2 illustrates how the actions of the various Actors (in particular state and CBNRM communities) interact, and how this could possibly lead to collective action on the Commons. As Figure 1-2 illustrates, institutional change on the CBNRM commons, can lead to three outcomes, namely (a) provision of CBNRM economic benefits; (b) protection of the natural resources, in this case wildlife; and (c) improved CBNRM governance. These three outcomes can broadly be defined under the term CBNRM performance as it leads to collective action.

A combination of these two conceptual models (Figure 1-1 & 1-2) thus provides us with the causal relationship on CBNRMG that this doctoral research examines. In

CBNRMG both formal and informal institutions shape how collective action is achieved on the commons. In addition, key actors shape how these institutions will evolve in the management of wildlife commons.




Figure 1-1. Institutional change: devolution and collective action in commons governance




Figure 1-2. Actors and institutional change

## CHAPTER 2 METHODOLOGY

### The Study Area

#### Botswana

The study was conducted in the north west of Botswana in and around the Okavango Delta (Figure 2-1). The Okavango Delta is a vast inland delta in the northern Kalahari that boasts a unique ecosystem and supports large and varied wildlife populations. It is an endorheic (a large internal drainage basin) in central southern Africa and is a basin that extends across three countries namely Angola, Botswana and Namibia (DEA 2008 p.11 - 19). The basin, which has been coined ‘the jewel of the Kalahari’, includes the Okavango and Kwando/ Linyanti River which is located within the Ngamiland District of Botswana. A large majority of people living in these areas derive their livelihoods from this basin and it is economically valuable as it offers both sources of revenue from tourism and water for the region (DEA 2008 p. 30).

The Delta is home to high densities of large mammals, particularly elephants and is the habitat of one of the largest remaining populations of African wild dogs’ in the region. It is also habitat to a total of 1300 identified plant species, 71 fish, 33 amphibians, 64 reptiles, 444 birds and 122 mammals. The Delta has a large variation of habitat types over small distances despite it being very flat and being made up of homogeneous sand. Due to small differences in altitude of 1 -2 meters, there are large differences in the frequency and duration of flooding that creates habitat gradients from permanent rivers and lagoons to permanent swamps with reeds and papyrus, seasonally flooded grasslands and riverine and dry woodlands (DEA 2008).

Various ethnically and culturally diverse groups reside in the Delta, and these include the San (Basarwa), Bayeyi, Bambukushu, Baherero, Batawana, Bakgalagadi and Basubiya (DEA 2008). The San are considered the ‘first peoples’ of the southern African subcontinent and in Botswana and make up to 50, 000 of the country’s total population of 1.6 million (Taylor 2002 p. 469). Livelihood activities of communities in the Delta comprise tourism, livestock farming, arable agriculture, fishing, collection of veld products, crafts and provision of various other services (DEA 2008). These areas have remained areas of economic hardships, despite them also being lucrative sites of capitalist production with the tourism industry (Taylor 2002). To address some of the economic hardships faced by communities on the periphery of the Delta, the Government of Botswana introduced the CBNRM program in 1989. Since its inception, the program has been implemented in a total of 19 community based organizations in the Ngamiland District (Schuster 2007). Our study included 4 out of the 19 communities and these were Khwai, Mababe and Sankuyo in the north east, and Okavango Community Trust in the North West panhandle of the Delta. Sankuyo and OCT were registered as Trusts in 1995 and were among the first communities to practice CBNRM. Khwai and Mababe Trusts were established in the year 2000. These communities are sparsely populated with populations fewer than one thousand in Khwai, Mababe and Sankuyo and approximately just over three thousand in OCT. The main source of revenue for CBNRM activities for all four communities is from both safari hunting and photographic tourism (Table 2-2 for CBO characteristics).

### **Zambia**

In Zambia, the study was conducted in the Greater Kafue National Park (KNP), Zambia’s largest protected area consisting of the Park and surrounding it are nine buffer

zone areas known as Game Management Areas (GMAs). With an area size of approximately 68, 000km<sup>2</sup> (22, 480 km<sup>2</sup> of the National Park and 45, 406 km<sup>2</sup> of the GMA) this huge ecosystem makes up 36% of Zambia's protected area estates. The park and its GMAs extend approximately 306 km from north to south and 145km from east to west. The Kafue River is the dominant landscape, together with various other tributaries. The River, has well established rapids, sandy shallows, deep pools, grassy sandbanks, palm-covered islands and mature evergreen riparian woodlands on levees. The PAs relatively undisturbed ecosystem supports a vast array of various flora and fauna. It has at least 11 main vegetation types, extensive floodplains and dambos, grasslands and thickets and both Miombo and Mopane woodlands. These diverse habitats support approximately 158 species of mammals; 515 birds; 70 reptiles; 36 amphibians and 58 species of fish. The PA particularly the Park, houses among the largest antelope species (21) in Africa (ZAWA 2011).

Its boundaries spread across five districts and four provinces and is home to a human population of approximately 200 000 people. Over the past decade, human populations in the GMA have increased specifically settlements and encroachments along the Park boundaries. This rise in human populations in the GMAs, has led to an increase in unsustainable harvesting of natural resources. Following a long spell of poor management and funding in the 1980s and 90s, the Park and its surrounding GMAs experienced drastic declines of wildlife populations due to high levels of both commercial and subsistence poaching. In 2004 the Park's managing authority, Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) received funding from the World Bank and the Norwegian Government to the improve the management of the Parks resources through both

infrastructure and law enforcement support. Over the past eight years, this has improved the status of the park and tourism numbers have increased, as well as increased levels of wildlife populations (Simasiku, Simwanza et al. 2008).

Two communities around the KNP were included in our study i.e. Kasempa community in Lunga Luswishi GMA that is on the north east border of the Park and Mulendema community in Mumbwa GMA which is located on the Park's eastern central boundary (Figure 2-2 & 2-3). These two communities were among one of Zambia's pioneer communities to implement CBNRM in the Kafue system through the Administrative Management Design (ADMADE) program. The Kasempa community is ethnically and culturally homogeneous with the predominant group being the Kaondes. In comparison, Mulendema community is a relatively mixed heterogeneous community with ethnic groups that include the Lenje and Kaonde-Ila who are the oldest inhabitants of the area. The Tonga's, Lozi and Shona's (from Zimbabwe) are ethnic groups that migrated to the area later to seek farming opportunities by taking advantage of the close proximity of the area to the capital city Lusaka (ZAWA 2011). The livelihoods of both Kasempa and Mulendema residents largely include small scale agriculture, fishing, and hunting and gathering of forest products. These areas are characterized by high levels of poverty, food insecurity and lack of basic social services such as schools or healthcare centers. Community members previously had resource user rights through negotiated terms with their traditional leaders; these however were declared redundant through new institutional rules that emphasized non-consumptive utilization of the Park. Despite these restrictions, the CBNRM program was developed as a strategy to provide communities in GMAs user rights of the wildlife resource, where they are supposed to

benefit from its sale through the safari hunting industry. Under the Wildlife Act of 1998, this resource is held by Government even though the community has partial rights. The Government holds its custodial rights on behalf of the public through competitive tender for hunting concessions in the GMAs.

### **Case selection Why Botswana and Zambia**

Both Botswana and Zambia, have been implementing the CBNRM program since the late 1980s. In determining how to explore the relationship of CBNRM governance, selecting country cases that had a substantial period of CBNRM implementation was an important criterion. These two countries, though different in various macro factors i.e. GDP, population they do however share some commonalities such as being former British colonies, have shared boundaries, culture particularly in communities residing in the north west of Botswana and Southern parts of Zambia. These macro factors were however not the main focus of comparing the two country programs. On the basis of CBNRM, both countries began the implementation of this program 20 years ago; received initial funding through USAID; focus predominantly on wildlife as the resource (some variation in Botswana where veld products are also used, however for the purpose of this study we limited it to wildlife); target marginalized rural communities with little or no Government presence, and both programs were modeled on the CAMPFIRE program of Zimbabwe. These factors therefore provide reasonable comparative elements at the macro level. As much as similar comparative elements are important in a study such as this, it is important that there be variation in the case selection, in order to provide a rich analytical comparative design for the study (George and Bennett 2005). To gain a rich comparative design, selection of the communities was based on how individual communities in the study varied on the following:-

- Sources of CBNRM revenues;
- The population size of the communities;
- The numbers of households;
- The number of years individual communities had been implementing CBNRM,
- Revenues earned from CBNRM tourism;
- Area size of the Protected Area and
- Finally the ethnic diversity of the communities included in the sample (Table 2-2).

### **Sample Selection**

Purposive sampling was used to select the six community cases. Three multi village communities were included (Kasempa, Mumbwa and Okavango Community Trust) and three single village communities (Khwai, Sankuyo and Mababe). Multi village communities consist of five villages that make up the CBNRM community. Village areas are the basic unit of governance in the CBNRM structure and in a participatory form of governance is pivotal in decision-making. Single village communities consist of households as the main units that make up the CBNRM community. The multi village communities had an average population of between 300 – 1500 households (Zambia CSO 2010, Botswana CSO 2011). Single village communities had an average of approximately 50 households (Schuster 2007).

### **Sampling Design**

Questionnaire surveys were administered in a total of 526 households between May – August, 2009 in Botswana and August – December, 2009 in Zambia. The survey was later administered in OCT in June 2010 and was included to improve on the comparative elements of the study. The questionnaire was initially piloted in one of the study communities. In our survey development and administration, we ensured that our questionnaire went through rigorous reliability tests, such as piloting whether the questions included in the final survey addressed the concepts in the research design.

Due to lack of community registers or membership lists, probability sampling was used. Mababe was the only village in the sample with a register however all the households in Mababe village were included in the survey. Geographical stratification for each village was first undertaken followed by random sample selection of households within the stratified areas of the village (Kearl 1976). At the selected household, only one member of the household was interviewed and the criteria included those who were 18 years and above. This included both head and non-heads of households.

### **Data Collection**

Data was collected using three methods, democratic governance survey; review of documents; and in-depth interviews (Appendix A). Secondary/ high school graduates were trained in each of the villages in the study and they administered the final questionnaires at the household level (Grooves, Fowler Jnr et al. 2004). For Botswana the survey was translated into Setswana and in Zambia they were translated into Bemba the predominantly spoken languages in the village communities. Community records included budgets, financial reports, project reports, operational reports, records of meetings held and correspondences. In-depth interviews were also conducted with key informants to assess various issues around both incentives of CBNRM and participatory democracy.

### **Demographic Characteristics**

Demographic data collected included age; sex; gender; level of education; household heads versus non household heads; length of stay and the position in the CBO (Table 2-1).

## **Age**

Data was collected from randomly selected adults of 18 years and above. The sample included adults who were 18 years and above. This was in accordance with community constitutions that stipulated that universal suffrage criteria. This has been used as age cap in other studies that have examined democracy at national level (see Bratton). This was then grouped in six different age categories (Table 2-1). The largest majority of respondents were in the 18 – 28 year old category (27.1%). The age group with the least number of respondents was in the 73 and above category (5.9%).

## **Gender**

Gender of respondents was relatively balanced with 49.4% females and 50.6% males.

## **Education**

Education grade of respondents was categorized in six groups. These ranged from those with no education to those with college education. The majority of respondents sampled had junior secondary education (Grade 8 – 10) with 28.6% of all respondents having attained at least some form of junior secondary education. 27.6% of respondents had no education and the group with the least number of respondents was those with college education (5.2%).

## **Gender of household head**

Respondents were asked to state whether they were heads of households or not. This demographic variable is important, as household heads are instrumental participants in CBNRM activities. The premise underlying the selection of this variable is that differences in gender of household heads can influence the democratic process. 67.7% of respondents were male headed of households where as 30.5% were female

headed and 1.8% was female headed where the male was absent for six months or more in the year.

### **Head of household**

Respondents were asked whether they were heads of households or not. This survey included both groups as stipulated in the community constitutions, all members of the community regardless of status was eligible to be part of the CBNRM program. Of those that responded to this question, 52.4% were heads of households and 47.6% were not.

### **Period of stay in village**

Scholarship on collective action on commons, has articulated that community members that are born or have lived longer in the village are bound to be more actively involved in commons governance than new comers (Ostrom 1990). Understanding democratic participation in CBNRM therefore requires, testing whether the length of stay in a CBNRM community affects how members participate in democracy. Respondents were therefore asked to state the number of years they had lived in the village. These were then grouped into three main categories, i.e. those born in the village; those that had lived there for more than 10 years and those that had lived in the village for less than 10 years. 71% of those interviewed had been born in the village.

### **Position in CBO**

78.8% of respondents indicated that they were ordinary members of the community and 12.8% were members of the CBO committee. The main objective of the study was to ensure that a large percentage of respondents included ordinary members of the community as its aim is to examine how ordinary members perceive CBNRM democratic governance.

Table 2-1. Demographic characteristics

VARIABLE	FREQUENCY (N)	PERCENTAGE (%)
Age:		
18 – 28	138	27.1
29 – 39	136	26.7
40 – 50	90	17.7
51 – 61	69	13.6
62 – 72	46	8.7
73 +	30	5.7
TOTAL	509	100
Education:		
No education	139	27.6
Primary	130	25.8
Secondary	208	41.3
College	26	5.1
TOTAL	503	
Gender of head of household:		
	262	68.5
Male	118	30.5
Female	7	1.8
Female (male missing for 6 months +)		
TOTAL	387	
Head of household:		
Yes	119	32.2
No	250	67.8
TOTAL	369	

Table 2-2. CBO characteristics

	KHWAI	MABABE	SANKUYO	KASEMPA	MULENDEMA	OCT
Year Established	2000	2000	1995	2003	2003	1995
No. of Years of CBNRM	9	9	14	6	6	14
No. of Households +/-	52	55	56	1479	2500	300
No. of People +/-	600	500	700	9, 000	12, 000	3, 043
No. of Villages	1	1	1	5	5	5
No. of Ethnic Groups Protected	1	1	3	1	5+	3+
Area Size (Km <sup>2</sup> )	1918	2181	860	13, 340	3, 091	92, 200
CBNRM Revenue Source	Photographic & Hunting	Photographic & Hunting	Photographic & Hunting	Hunting	Hunting	Photographic & Hunting

Ethnic groups: Khwai (Basarwa), Mababe (Basarwa), Sankuyo (Bayeyi, Basubiya & Mbukushu), Kasempa (Kaonde), Mulendema (Kaonde-Ila, Lenje, Tonga, Shona & Lozi), OCT (Basarwa, Mbukushu & Bayeyi)




Figure 2-1. Map of the Okavango delta (source Dr. Lin Cassidy, using GIS layers housed at the Okavango Research Institute)

# KAFUE NATIONAL PARK




Figure 2-2. Map of Kafue National Park & surrounding game management areas  
(Source: Zambia Wildlife Authority GIS Database - 2011)

## CHAPTER 3

### BRINGING DECISIONS TO THE GRASSROOTS: THE ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

#### **Significance of Micro Institutions in Participatory CBNRM Governance**

In many areas, biodiversity and poverty co-exist, as the livelihoods of the rural poor depend on the use of natural resources. While protected areas are said to be the cornerstone of conservation (MacKinnon, MacKinnon et al. 1986), even with the rapid expansion of protected areas since the 1960s, only 5% of land surfaces are strictly protected. A further 7.1% are protected through IUCN Protected Area categories that imply human habitation and sustainable use (Jenkins and Joppa 2009). Thus we have no option but to simultaneously address the challenges poverty and the environment and will need to learn how to work with local people if we want to achieve biodiversity objectives.

Since the 1970s, CBNRM has emerged globally for different resources and in different regions of the world to address the failure of centralized conservation (Pomeroy 1995, Arnold 2001, Poffenberger 2006, Charnley and Poe 2007), and is centered on the idea of collective action, local participation, benefit sharing and control. A clear requirement of CBNRM is that “most individuals …can participate” in making the rules and, we would argue, financial and other decisions, that affect them (Ostrom 1990), and that bottom-up accountability is important (Ribot 2003, Ribot 2008). While these principles are clear, the operational mechanisms for achieving these outcomes are discussed far less often, including in the numerous developmental projects that have attempted to implement CBNRM (McShane and Wells 2004).

In general, two local mechanisms are invoked to encourage participatory decision-making and accountability. These include elections to the committee that manages the CBNRM program and the Annual General Meeting through which the members of the community meet to discuss and manage their affairs. In this paper we assess what factors at both the individual and community level enhance or hinder levels of attendance at AGMs using both quantitative and qualitative data from six communities in Botswana and Zambia.

### **Annual General Meetings**

CBNRM Annual General Meetings (AGMs) are the institution most commonly created to encourage participatory governance and accountability. Once a year<sup>1</sup> decisions related to CBNRM are deliberated on by a significant number of the community in a manner that should be both open and participatory. CBNRM practitioners/ scholars such as suggest that the face-to-face deliberation of decisions within communities is among one of the core compliance principles for effective CBNRM (Murphree 1997, Murphree 2000, Child 2004). In common property theory, the principles articulated by (Ostrom 1990 p. 180) state that “most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules”. While the AGM is often not focused on rule making, it is anticipated to be the primary mechanism for making decisions about how a community allocates its scarce resources.

AGMS are incorporated into many CBNRM programs, at least in southern Africa (i.e. Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia), for the purpose of encouraging high

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<sup>1</sup> We argue elsewhere that meeting only once a year is insufficient to create democracy or accountability in communities that are new to democratic practices.

levels of participation and to achieve the goals of transparency, accountability, democracy and equity. Some proponents of CBNRM argue that CBNRM will be effective only if decisions are made face-to-face at village level, i.e. participatory democracy (Child and Dalal-Clayton 2004). However, in practice most CBNRM communities comprise several (multi-) villages, and the locus of decision-making is in the committee elected to represent the community, rather than the community as a whole. In such programs, the linkage between the committee and the community is operationalized primarily through the AGM where the committee theoretically seeks approval for the decisions that it recommends, and reports back to the community on its performance.

Despite their importance in CBNRM programs, very little is known about how AGMs actually function, and in turn how they could be managed to improve CBNRM governance. An array of studies on CBNRM have focused on benefits (Barrett and Arcese 1995, Bond 2001, Emerton 2001, Hulme and Murphree 2001, Infield and Namara 2001) and natural resource management, but few studies have examined the relationship between CBNRM performance and issues of micro level governance such as AGMs (Anstey 2009, Child and Barnes 2010). and natural resource management, but few studies have examined the relationship between CBNRM performance and issues of micro level governance such as AGMs (Anstey 2009, Child and Barnes 2010). The objective of this chapter, therefore, is to examine this relationship.

As we have conceptualized elsewhere (Child, Mupeta et al. In review), CBNRM requires that we simultaneously scale up to achieve economies and ecologies of scale , but we need simultaneously to scale down because equitable benefit sharing and

genuine participation are easier to achieve with fewer people. In southern Africa, improved revenue generation and wildlife management associated with CBNRM reflects progress in scaling up. However, the generally low level of benefit sharing and participation that we observe in CBNRM communities in southern Africa, and the problems of elite capture that are widely reported (Charnley and Poe 2007, Fritzen 2007, Ribot 2008), suggest that we do not yet understand how to operationalize the process of scaling down.

A major challenge facing CBNRM is to improve the distribution of benefits and levels of participation. In this chapter we examine factors that affect participation in AGMs. AGMs provide a potential mechanism<sup>2</sup> for deliberative participatory democracy, much in the manner of town-hall democracy in the USA (Zimmerman 1999, Bryan 2004). Face-to-face meetings like AGMS are intended to achieve participatory democracy, and this intention is often enshrined in the rules defining CBNRM governance even if it is practiced much less often. Borrowing several concepts from scholars of democracy such as (Dahl 1971), town hall democracy (Zimmerman 1999, Bryan 2004), participation (Agrawal and Goyal 2001), and CBNRM (Murphree 1991, Murombedzi 2001, Child 2005) we explore the factors that incentivize ordinary members of CBNRM communities to participate in AGMs. This study assesses which demographic, socio-economic and institutional factors predict attendance in AGMS. This study was undertaken using a comparative study of six communities in Botswana (Khwai, Mababe, Sankuyo and Okavango Community Trust) and Zambia (Kasempa

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<sup>2</sup> This depends on how they are managed. AGMS can be used to facilitate democracy and accountability, but they can also be a smokescreen to legitimize elite capture.

and Mulendema). A total of 526 questionnaire surveys were administered between May – June, 2009 and follow ups in June, 2010.

**Bringing decisions to the grassroots.** So why bring decision-making to the grassroots? Leading scholars of common property or CBNRM governance broadly agree that participatory models of democratic governance are important in ensuring decisions are brought close to the main constituents of the CBNRM programs, i.e. the households (Murphree 1997, Child 2005, Anstey 2009). Thus (Murphree 2000), in emphasizing the importance of small local jurisdictions, suggests that the fewer members the better, the closer they live together the better, and the more they interact together on a daily basis the better. In comparison, large groups with weak resource bases or small disperse groups will have difficulty acting in cohesion. Similarly, Ostrom notes that in laboratory experiments on ‘tragedy of the commons’ one small change had major impacts on outcomes, “simply enabling subjects to engage in face-to-face communication … enables them to approach socially optimal harvesting levels rather than severely overharvesting the commons” (Ostrom 2007). Decisions made in a participatory manner allow for reduced transaction costs, controls via peer pressure are tighter and more efficient when compared to larger jurisdictions (Murphree 2000), and there is the likelihood that improved decision can be made in the management of complex social ecological systems<sup>3</sup>. While not explicitly stated, local democracy is also enshrined in the principles of CBNRM. Murphree repeatedly emphasizes the importance

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<sup>3</sup> . Interestingly, Ostrom does not specifically mention democracy in her design principles for long-enduring common property resource institutions (p90), though her third principle (collective choice arrangements) does state that “most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules”

of scale, face-to-face decision-making and accountability. He suggests that there is a close inter-relationship between local democracy, tenure rights and local political activism (Murphree 1995).

This study of micro institutions in CBNRM experiences in Southern Africa also contributes to our broader understanding of the institutions of decentralization. However, we note that the literature on decentralization usually interprets governance in terms of the delivery of services (Rondinelli, McCullough et al. 1989, Manor 2004), which may differ from decentralization intended to empower communities to manage their resources profitably and sustainably in the manner of private game ranchers (i.e. private-community proprietorship). The importance of decentralization and participation has caught on in discussion on effective local environmental decision-making (Ribot 2004), including the important concept of upward and downward accountability (Ribot and Agrawal 2006). However, it seems to us that the details of downward accountability have not really been thought through<sup>4</sup>. Nonetheless, both decentralized governance (aiming to deliver services), and devolved natural resource management are predicated upon the assumption of citizen empowerment, be this as voters in local government bodies or shareholders in natural resource production enterprises.

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<sup>4</sup> Scholars with as much experience as Ribot, for example, suggest that elections have some equivalency with democratic accountability Ribot, J. C. (2008). Building Local Democracy through Natural Resource Interventions. An Environmentalist's Responsibility, World Resources Institute..Ibid.. Our experience in the field suggests that elections on their own may be weak mechanisms for accountability, and even mechanisms that legitimize processes of cooption. If our purpose is to measure democracy we should use Dahl's criteria, namely effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda, inclusion of all adults Dahl, R. (1989). Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven, Yale University Press. noting, incidentally, that his criteria do not mention elections. Ibid. noting, incidentally, that his criteria do not mention elections.

So how do supposedly understand that participatory or democratic institutions, including general meetings, work? Natural resources play a very important role in local livelihoods, so how do we configure democratic governance to enhance people's voice and leverage over their natural resources? In the longer term we hope that 'participatory models of governance' will improve natural resources management, and empower rural subjects democratically. Although much of the literature mentions issues like local level corruption or elite capture as serious problems in CBNRM (Arnold 2001, Charnley and Poe 2007), there is surprisingly little research on these community level institutions and organization, a gap that we hope to begin to rectify.

### **The Institutional Importance of AGMs in CBNRM Programs in Botswana and Zambia:**

A formal requirement in Botswana and Zambia CBNRM policies (GRZ 1998, Schuster 2007) is that local communities hold AGMs each year. The AGM is the mechanism through which communities are supposed to make key decisions about policy and resource allocation. The specifications for these meetings vary within each community, but some features are salient to CBNRM AGMs in both Botswana and Zambia. These meetings are generally supposed to be held a month after each financial year. Agenda items include the annual financial report; the projected budget; annual work plans; community projects; elections of Board members; and reports on natural resources. However, the locus and mechanism of decision-making is seldom clearly specified and varies, especially at village level. In ideal circumstances, these meetings are highly interactive and community members are well informed about the issues and engage in productive discussions; reports are presented; recommendations are made to

prioritize the needs of the community; and decision-making power over budgets is exercised.

Two factors are critical for categorizing AGMs: the scale at which decisions are made and the type of participation by ordinary people (ranging from passive to interactive, (Agarwal 2001). We have already noted the crucial distinction between communities that are structured as single-village or multi village community. With multi village communities comprising five to eight component villages, this creates logistical challenges for all 2,000 members or so to meet face to face to deliberate at the AGM. This problem has been addressed by adopting representational forms of governance, with village participation occurring either by sending recommendations to the overall CBO via elected members or by a proportion of the ordinary members attending large central AGMs<sup>5</sup>.

Participation also varies greatly in the sample communities, ranging from an elected committee making decisions on behalf of the community and informing them of this decision, or even not informing them properly about decisions taken, to a highly participatory process where the whole community debates the decision together. Participation can be seen structurally in the form of the meeting, with the former being characterized by big men standing at the front and telling communities what is going to

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<sup>5</sup> While representational governance may nominally be a form of democracy, we have concerns that scaling up may have significant costs in terms of the efficacy and equity of participation and benefit sharing. In other words, there is considerable merit in deconstructing multi villages so that single villages are the primary units of decision making and benefit-sharing (receiving the majority of the budget) while the multi-level forum becomes a coordination (rather than a doing) level Dalal-Clayton, B. and B. Child (2003). Lessons from Luangwa. The story of the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project, Zambia. London, International Institute for Environment and Development..Ibid.. Here, for reasons of scale it is relatively easy for all the members or households within a single village to meet face-to-face to make decisions, and recommendations made by members don't have to be bargained through a representational body such as the Board in multi village communities.

happen, and the latter being more circular and discursive. However, the quality of the information available to community members, the way issues are presented, the time at which they are presented, and so on also greatly affect participation. These factors are highly varied and difficult to measure. In one AGM in north-east Caprivi we observed for example, the managers employed by the community ran the meeting, relegating elected representatives into the background. Despite there being considerable confusion and concern about the finances of this community, almost two days of the meeting were taken up in talking about minor issues (e.g. over an hour about a goat killed by a leopard). Just as it was getting dark on the second day and people were ready to eat and walk home, the budget was rapidly read off a typed sheet in a manner that people could not possibly have understood. Officially, an AGM was held and people had been involved in the budget process, and the minutes may well reflect this, but clearly this was not really the case.

The exact mechanisms by which AGMs are managed vary. According to the community constitutions in Botswana, members of the elected Board send out a written notice specifying the date, location and time of the AGMs. This announcement is published in the Kgotla (traditional village meeting place presided by the chief) notice board 21 days before the date of the proposed AGM. It is a requirement that the Chairperson presides over the meeting and if not available his Vice Chair can undertake this role. Before the meeting is called to order, a quorum should be reached, and though this varies in the 4 communities sampled in this survey the average requirements is that six trustees and 40 general members of the community constitute the quorum. AGM decisions are voted on using a “simple majority” rule. Each member present is entitled

to one vote. AGM agenda items vary but usually cover adoption of minutes, annual budget; work plans; policies on natural resources; financial reports, community projects, and elections of Board members (Sankuyo Trust 1995, Khwai Trust 2007).

In Zambia, AGMs are held at the level of the Village Action Group (cluster of villages made of 75-300 households) so that a multi-village “Community Resource Board” will hold five or so AGMs. According to the VAG constitutions, notice for the AGM is given 14 days prior to the meeting. The meeting agenda is announced either by word of mouth or a posting on a notice board. Similar to the case in Botswana, the meeting is overseen by the Chairperson and in his absence by the Vice Chairperson. In order for the meeting to progress it is a requirement that at least 60% of the member households or of 75 members are present. Decisions at the AGM are decided by a majority of votes. Voting is undertaken by show of hands, however if more than five members request it, voting is by secret ballot. Agenda items discussed include adoption of previous AGM minutes, sub-committee reports (community projects e.g. school construction, performance of game-guards etc), audit/ financial reports, work plans, budgets, bye-law amendments, elections and other general business of the institution (ZAWA 2003).

### **Theoretical Framework**

#### **Promoting ‘Town-Hall’ Style Democracy in AGMs**

Literature that examines micro-institutions such as ‘town-hall participation’ in liberal democracy is remarkably thin (Zimmerman 1999, Bryan 2004). In CBNRM, studies of these institutions are almost non-existent. Most studies of governance of CBNRM focus on macro factors such as the process of decentralization and the reluctance of central bureaucracies to really devolve rights, responsibilities and benefits

to local communities (Rihoy and Maguranyanga 2007, Larson and Soto 2008, Nelson and Agrawal 2008). There is considerable emphasis on the importance of the devolution of rights to use, manage and benefit from resources to the local level, but little analysis of what is required to make this local level work.

Thus even the best CBNRM programmes appear to be content with representational forms of governance at the local level, yet our (unpublished) research from over twenty communities suggests that ordinary people are largely excluded from benefit and participation by these mechanisms (Child and Barnes 2010).

Nonetheless, the primary mechanism for community participation and accountability in many CBNRM programmes is the Annual General Meeting. In most guidelines and constitutions, AGMs are the primary mechanism for constituents to interact in decision-making processes. Theoretically they are fundamental democratic institutions/ platforms for decision-making where citizens are in sync with their governance systems at three levels. The first is where they are able to formulate their preferences, second are able to signify their preferences, and third they are able to have their preference weighted equally in the conduct of their governance system (Dahl 1971 p. 2).

AGMs can be equated to ‘town-hall’ democracy, albeit at an earlier stage in the genesis of a democratic culture and with less experience and capacity to use written instruments of participation like notices, minutes, financial accounts, and the press. Town hall meetings are modeled on the principles of deliberative or participatory democracy. This form of democracy arose as a response to perceived shortcomings of representative democracy (Bohman 1998). Deliberative democracy as it practiced in

town hall meetings, strengthens citizen voices in governance as a consequence of including people of all races, classes, ages and geographies in deliberations that directly affect public decisions (Deliberative Democracy Consortium, 2003). It allows face-to-face deliberations on policy issues affecting both constituents and leaders. Scholars studying ‘town-hall’ meetings in the US, argue that these are the purest forms of democracy that ensure all policy decisions are in the public interest (Zimmerman 1999, Bryan 2004). No intermediaries are placed between voters and the public decisions. In addition, these meetings maximize citizen/ constituent participation, allow ordinary voters to hold administrative officers directly accountable, provide psychological benefits to attendees, preserve local customs and perform citizen education and community building functions (Zimmerman 1999 p. ix).

Critics of participatory democracy, present the counter arguments that an assembly of voters can become an ochlocracy with fears of mob rule (Madison 1787 p. 342), tyranny of the majority and the rule of passion over reason. Others suggest that technical inefficiencies arise, because at this small scale a community can’t afford to employ competent people (Overdevest 2000). Proponents of ‘town-hall’ democracy however have challenged the reasoning that this promotes mob rule or tyranny of the majority, arguing that the effectiveness of these town hall meetings is dependent on the actual quality of the meetings (Zimmerman 1999). This argument can be extended to the CBNRM debate. AGMs are instrumental in maximizing citizen participation, allowing ordinary voters to hold administrative officers directly accountable, providing psychological benefits to attendees, preserving local customs and performing citizen education and community building functions. This is enhanced by two factors: people

meeting together to discuss issues, and clear procedural guidelines for governing debate and decision-making.

Based on the assumption that ‘town-hall style’ democracy increases participation of citizenry, it is therefore important to understand what factors actually enhance these forms of participation. The first level involves the demographic characteristics of the people attending. According to (Zimmerman 1999, Bryan 2004) there is variation in what influences people to attend these ‘town-hall style’ democracies. Depending on the issue on the agenda, there is variation in attendance from different gender groups. Different education levels also predict which members of the community would be more likely to attend or not. The general assumption is that members with higher levels of education are more likely to attend. Finally, age has been shown to be another important predictor of attendance at ‘town-hall style’ meeting, and attendance by younger members of the community is generally higher than older members.

Attendance at ‘town-hall style’ meetings is also affected by the incentive that motivate individual to attend. CBNRM, likewise, anticipates that providing incentives to community members in the form of social and economic benefits should increase interest in the CBNRM program and ultimately encourage the protection of natural resources (Murphree 2000, Child 2005). Thus, incentives are a key factor in determining who attends AGMs, so we would expect members of communities who receive more social and economic benefits to attend meetings more enthusiastically than where benefits are fewer.

Finally, institutional characteristics such as size, history and character of the community affect participation at ‘town hall’ meetings. In CBNRM, we would expect

factors such as the size of the community, the participant's perception of his or her influence on the meeting, or levels trust in decision-making and information, to increase participation. These factors are often subtle and complex, but smaller communities are easier to organize and collective action can therefore be achieved more effectively (Olson 1971).

### **Participation in Town-hall Meetings and its Importance in AGMs**

CBNRM in Southern Africa uses two primary models of governance. In single village communities, AGMs are held at the village level, and all decisions are deliberated in one forum. This is described for Chikwarakwara Village in Beitbridge (Child and Peterson 1991) and also for the Luangwa Valley in Zambia (Dalal-Clayton and Child 2003). In contrast, multi village communities hold their AGMs in a representational manner. This also takes two primary forms. In the Okavango Community Trust, for example, each of the five component villages holds its own AGM, and recommendations are taken forward to the Trust (meso-level) where elected representatives make the final decision. In Namibia's well-known CBNRM Conservancy programme, considerable logistical effort is invested in bringing a selection of people from each constituent village to a single, central AGM where matters of community management are discussed, usually for two days.

The way AGMs are run also affects outcomes and participation, but differences are subtle, we were not able to attend enough AGMs to measure them. For example, the way people place their chairs, merits more prominence. This ranges from communities sitting in a circle in which people are more equal, to the situation where the leadership has considerable prominence at the front of a meeting that enhances the authority of the leadership relative to the followership. Another factor, which receives

relatively, little attention, is the content of participation, including the agenda, the timing of agenda items, and the way information is presented. In some cases we have observed, considerable time is allocated to financial matters, and great care is taken to explain budgets and expenditure using flipcharts and even role plays. In other AGMs, the finances have been read off a piece of paper rapidly and incoherently, and in a great rush as the sun sets after two days of meeting.

**Quality of participation in ‘town-hall style’ meetings.** Scholars of participation have argued that participation in AGMs should not only be measured in the passive form, i.e. numbers attending, but should include who is attending (Pretty 1995), as well as their level of active participation though, again we did not measure this complex variable<sup>6</sup>. The level of active participation provides insight into the quality of these meetings (Table 3-1).

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<sup>6</sup> Some authors argue that interactive participation is instrumental and allows members of the group at meetings to have voice and influence the group's decisions Narayan, D. (1996). The contribution of people's participation: Evidence from 21 rural water supply projects. . Occassional Paper Series No. 1 Environmentally Sustainable Development. Washington DC, World Bank. White, S. (1996). "Depoliticising development: The uses and abuses of participation." Development in Practice 6(1): 6 - 15. and Pretty, J. N. (1995). "Participatory learning for sustainable agriculture." World Development 23(8): 1247 - 1263.. Agarwal, 2001, expanding on earlier work by Arnstein, S. R. (1969). "A Ladder of Citizen Participation." American Institute of Planners Journal 35(4): 216-224, Pimbert, M. P. and J. N. Pretty (1995). Parks, People and Professionals: Putting 'Participation' into Protected Area Management. Discussion Paper No 57, February 1995. . Geneva, UNITED NATIONS RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD WIDE FUND FOR NATURE. provides a useful broad typology on participation ranging from nominal, passive, consultative, activity specific, through to active and interactive participation Some authors argue that interactive participation is instrumental and allows members of the group at meetings to have voice and influence the group's decisions Narayan, D. (1996). The contribution of people's participation: Evidence from 21 rural water supply projects. . Occassional Paper Series No. 1 Environmentally Sustainable Development. Washington DC, World Bank. White, S. (1996). "Depoliticising development: The uses and abuses of participation." Development in Practice 6(1): 6 - 15. and Pretty, J. N. (1995). "Participatory learning for sustainable agriculture." World Development 23(8): 1247 - 1263.. Agarwal, 2001, expanding on earlier work by Arnstein, S. R. (1969). "A Ladder of Citizen Participation." American Institute of Planners Journal 35(4): 216-224, Pimbert, M. P. and J. N. Pretty (1995). Parks, People and Professionals: Putting 'Participation' into Protected Area Management. Discussion Paper No 57, February 1995. . Geneva, UNITED NATIONS RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD WIDE FUND FOR

Research on associations, interest groups, and collective action also emphasizes the importance of taking costs and benefits of participation into account (Olson 1971, Olson 1996, Olson 1998 p. 39 - 50, Moe 2005). In addition, some of the earliest research on participation in 'town – meetings' suggests that an individual's social status, education, and organizational membership have a strong effect on the propensity to participate in political activities (Almond and Verba 1963) and (Dahl 1971). Other studies are concerned with questions of equity and distribution in participation (Agarwal 2001, Botchway 2001) and (Teklu and Asefa 1999). Some argue that participation can also be nominal only requiring members to be part of the group but not requiring active participation in debates or meeting agendas (Chopra, Kadekodi et al. 1990, Molinas 1998). Thus participation is a complex issue. It is a basic element of collective action, but just as important are the degrees of participation, as they provide the basis to move beyond the simple act of participating to participation becoming more instrumental and allowing for marginalized groups in a society to have voice, decision-making power and sanctions over the actions of the implementing committee. Measuring participation is even more difficult - it requires understanding the factors that influence how individuals participate.

### **Research Question**

Notwithstanding the complexity of the issue of participation, the purpose of our study is to understand:

Which demographic groupings in CBNRM communities attend AGMs?  
Is AGM participation related to the scale of individual or collective benefits?

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NATURE. provides a useful broad typology on participation ranging from nominal, passive, consultative, activity specific, through to active and interactive participation

Does the size of the community affect attendance?  
What factors impede participation in AGMs?

## Research Sites

We conducted our research in three small single villages (Khwai, Mababe and Sankuyo) and one large multi village (Okavango Community Trust) in Botswana. In Zambia, the study was conducted in two large multi-village communities (Kasempa and Mulendema).

To the east of the Okavango Delta in Botswana lie three small villages, which make up the Sankuyo Tshwaragano Management Trust of predominantly Bayei ethnicity, and Mababe Zokosana Community Trust and Khwai Development Trust where the people say they are proud to call themselves Bushmen. These communities were given the rights to the benefits from wildlife through the granting of a Head Lease. Wildlife now provides at least half of the livelihood of these villages. Most households have one or more members employed by the hunting and tourism outfitters, and also by their Trusts where they are employed as game guards or to manage campsites. These communities each receive some P2 million (\$300,000) annually which they use variably to cover management costs, for community projects, for employment and sometimes for cash benefits, with most of this being in the form of pensions for the elderly or indigent who can't benefit from jobs. A major benefit is that some twenty elephant and some 100 other animals are killed annually, and this meat is delivered to the communities. The governance of these villages varies with time and circumstances, but in general people are moderately to well satisfied with their collective affairs.

The Okavango Community Trust (OCT) comprises of some 5, 000 people in five villages located in northwest of the Okavango Delta. Although there are some 14,000

elephants in this area, hunting is no longer practiced, and the community receives its revenues (Pula 2.5m annually) from a nearby tourism concession in the Okavango Delta. This money is managed centrally, and few benefits get to ordinary people or even the five villages, so people are generally either unaware or dissatisfied with their Trust.

Mulendema Community Resource Board (CRB) is located in Mumbwa GMA, and is one of the nine GMAs (buffer zones) surrounding the Kafue National Park in Zambia. It comprises some 1500 households in 5 Village Action Groups. The area was traditionally settled by the Kaonda-ila ethnic groups, but due to its close proximity to the capital city, it has had numerous migrations from city retirees of different ethnic backgrounds. It is thus comprised of a highly heterogeneous community that has been organized to implement CBNRM. Wildlife in this area is threatened by poaching, and also by considerable recent in-migration for the purpose of agriculture. The hunting is managed by the Zambia Wildlife Authority, which is supposed to return 50% of trophy fees and 20% of concession fees to the CRB, though records to support this are not available. Although there have been a large number of donor and NGO CBNRM initiatives in this area, progress has been negligible and people are largely unaware of or disinterested in CBRNM (Simasiku et al., 2008)

Kasempa CRB is a very remote community and is located in the Lunga Luswishi GMA that lies to the north east of Kafue National Park. It comprises approximately 700 households in 5 VAGs. Kasempa community is ethnically homogeneous and is dominated by the Kaonde tribes who settled in these areas prior to 1900's. It has a good wildlife population that support significant safari hunting revenues though, as in

Mulendama, this is collected by ZAWA and far less is returned to the community than in neighbouring countries. Although Kasempa has generally not benefitted from donor support, it appears to have been lucky in the quality of government officials from both ZAWA and Forestry, and procedural support of CBNRM may be a positive factor (Table 3 – 2).

## **Methods**

### **Data Collection**

Literature on participation and natural resource management suggest several factors that influence this (see theory section). These factors include social status of individuals; education; organizational membership (Almond and Verba 1963); incentives/benefits for participating; household socioeconomic factors; institutional and structural factors (Verba, Schlozman et al. 1995); costs and benefits of participation (Olson 1971, Moe 2005); issues of equity and distribution (Teklu and Asefa 1999, Agarwal 2001, Botchway 2001); incentives/benefits for participating, and institutional and structural factors (Verba, Schlozman et al. 1995). Based on the theoretical framework on participation in democratic institutions three key factors were identified that could most likely predict participation in AGMs. These include demographic characteristics, the incentives that motivate individuals to attend, and the structure and size of the community. The overall hypothesis tested is that the likelihood of participation in AGMs is higher for individuals who: -

- Have higher levels of education
- Enjoy a greater level of both social and economic CBNRM benefits;
- Are from single village governance units

Notwithstanding the complexity of participation (Agarwal 2001) AGM participation was operationalized using the categorical responses to attendance, of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (Table 3-2) (Agarwal 2001). The independent variables describe three broad factors: demographic characteristics, CBNRM incentives, and institutional characteristics of the community, especially size.

To examine factors influencing CBNRM AGM participation, both quantitative and qualitative data was collected. The first part of data collection and analysis includes survey data gathered using questionnaires. Survey data was collected from six communities where CBNRM has been implemented in both Botswana and Zambia. Questionnaires were pilot tested in each community prior to the survey, in order to contextualize them. Purposive sampling was used to select the six community cases. This involved purposely-selecting single village and multi village communities in the two countries. In addition, only communities that had been practicing CBNRM for over ten years were selected to provide a reasonable timeline for implementation and to assess whether CBNRM had been institutionalized.

Qualitative data was further collected in the form of secondary data (community reports, correspondence, meeting minutes), in depth interviews and personal observation.

### **Sampling Design**

A total of 526 questionnaire interviews were conducted between May – December 2009 (Khwai, Sankuyo, Mababe, Kasempa & Mulendema communities) and May – June 2010 (OCT). Due to lack of community registers or membership lists, probability sampling of households was undertaken (quota sampling but with random or systematic

selection within groups was used) (Kearl 1976 p.27 - 30) and (Grooves, Fowler Jnr et al. 2004 p. 92 - 93). For the multi village communities, geographical stratification for each village was first undertaken and then a random household sample was taken of one member per household who was 18 years or older. This included both head and non-heads of households. For the single village communities, interviews were conducted in all the households.

**Analysis of survey/ questionnaire data.** Data collected was analyzed using SPSS 16 and STATA 9. Analysis included both descriptive and logistical regression statistics (Table 3-14, for variables included in analysis).

The first stage of the analysis included an assessment using the chi square test of association using SPSS 16. This statistical test is used to test the null hypothesis that variables are independent. It compares the observed data to a model that distributes the data according to the expectation that the variables are independent. This method only tests the probability (p-value) of independence of distribution of data, however it does not tell one specific details about the relationships between variables (Pallant 2007). Chi square tests were therefore conducted for this study to examine whether there was an association between AGM attendance and the three categories of independent variables (demography; CBNRM benefits and institutional characteristics of the community).

As outlined above, the chi square test of association is a useful preliminary statistic; however it is limited in providing details about the relationship between variables. For further analysis in identifying the interaction of the variables that were related or had association, logistic regression tests were conducted using STATA 9

software. This method of analysis determines the impact of multiple independent variables presented simultaneously to predict membership of one or the other of two dependent variables. Logistic regression has several assumptions among which are that it does not assume a linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables; the dependent variable must be a dichotomy (e.g. Yes/ No) responses; the independent variables are not interval, nor normally distributed data; the categories are mutually exclusive and the sample size has a minimum of 50 cases per predictor (Pallant 2007, Wuensch 2009).

In our analysis of factors that predict AGM participation all the predictor variables were categorical (Table 3-2). Interpreting the odds ratio assessed the relative importance of each predictor variable or the interaction among predictor variables. The odds ratio is a statistic that compares whether the probability of a certain event is the same for two groups. The odds of an event or outcome happening are the probability that the event will happen divided by the probability that the event will not happen (Westergren, Karlsson et al. 2001). It is calculated by using the regression coefficient of the predictor as the exponent or exp. Furthermore; it allows the calculation of the sensitivity and specificity of the model and the positive and negative predictive values (Pallant 2007 p. 169). For a logistic regression, the predicted dependent variable in our case, AGM participation is a function of the probability that a particular subject will be in one of the categories (Wuensch 2009).

## Results

## **Attendance in CBNRM AGM**

There was higher attendance by respondents in all three single villages (Khwai 96.2%; Mababe 82.7% and Sankuyo 76.5%), whereas in multi village communities fewer respondents attended the meeting (Kasempa 46.5%; Mulendema 9.9% and OCT 45%) (Table 3-3).

At the 5% significance level, the percentage of respondents who attended the AGM differed amongst the different villages ( $\chi^2 (1, N = 502) = 158.52, p = .000$ ) indicating a statistically measurable difference in AGM attendance between the six villages.

## **Demographic Characteristics and AGM Attendance**

CBNRM programs are said to favor more affluent elite members of the community while sidelining disadvantaged groups (Agarwal 2001). To test whether this was the case in our sample, demographic characteristics of who attended were analyzed to determine what groups of people in the community were attending AGMs (Bryan 2004 p. 107 - 138). We therefore conducted a chi square test of association to determine if there was any significant difference in attendance at AGMs associated with four demographic variables i.e. gender; age; education and whether they were head of households or not. These characteristics have been used in other studies that examine democratic participation (Table 3-3).

### **AGM attendance and age**

Age was categorized into six different groups (18 – 28; 29 – 39; 40 – 50; 51 – 61; 62 – 72; and above 73). Results show the lowest attendance at the AGM was within the 73 years and above age group (44.4%) and the highest attendance was within the 62 – 72 year old age group (64.4%), but at the 5% significance level, the percentage of

respondents attending the AGM did not differ by age group,  $\chi^2 (1, N = 486) = 6.71$ ,  $p = 0.23$ .

### **AGM attendance and gender**

Out of the 244 male respondents, 121 (49%) attended the AGM, in comparison to 125 (51%) out of the 245 females. Similarly, at the 5% significance level, the percentage of respondents attending the AGM did not differ by gender,  $\chi^2 (1, N = 489) = 0.100$ ,  $p = 0.75$ .

### **AGM attendance and education**

Education was categorized into four groups (no education, primary, secondary, and college). 62% of respondents with no education attended the AGM, compared to 41% with primary education, 49% with secondary education and 32% with college education.

At the 5% level of significance, the percentage of respondents attending the AGM did differ by level of education,  $\chi^2 (1, N = 478) = 15.94$ ,  $p = 0.007$ , but in ways opposite to that expected from the literature – a higher percentage of respondents with no education attended AGMs when compared those with some education.

### **AGM attendance and household head**

Of the 196 heads of household interviewed, 92 attended the AGM (47%) compared to 59% of interviewees who were not a head of household. Attendance at AGMs by heads of households was lower at the 5% significance level,  $\chi^2 (1, N = 375) = 5.66$ ,  $p = 0.02$ , a result that is unexpected and difficult to explain

### **CBNRM Social and Economic Benefits and AGM Attendance**

Next we assessed if there was an association between attendance at AGMs and the provision of CBNRM benefits, namely cash, employment, and social benefits in

varied forms including meat, community projects, orphanage funds, assistance to old people or destitute and so on.

### **Cash benefits and AGM attendance**

Of 144 respondents who got cash benefits, 116 (80.5%) attended the AGM. Of the 349 respondents who did not get cash benefits, 113 (32%) attended the AGM. This difference is highly significant at the 1% level ( $\chi^2 (1, N = 493) = 73.47, p = 0.000$ ). Respondents receiving cash benefits were much more likely to attend AGMs. However, we know that cash benefits are also strongly associated with three single villages where attendance was also far higher (Khwai, Mababe and Sankuyo).

### **Employment benefits and AGM attendance**

Similarly, of the 162 respondents who reported getting employment benefits, 122 (75%) attended the AGM, compared to only 32% (i.e. 97 out of 295) who did not get benefits. This is also significant at the 0.1% level ( $\chi^2 (1, N = 457) = 75.43, p = 0.000$ ). Again, high employment and attendance is also associated with the three single villages (Khwai, Mababe and Sankuyo).

### **Social benefits and AGM attendance**

Results for social benefits are similar but not as stark with 72% (i.e. 125 out of 173 respondents) of people who got social benefits attended the AGM, compared to 61% (199 out of 324) who don't perceive getting social benefits. This difference is also significant at the 0.1% level and associated with the three single villages ( $\chi^2 (1, N = 497) = 52.93, p = 0.000$ ).

### **Institutional Characteristics and AGM attendance**

According to (Ostrom 1990), the age and size of the community are important factors to consider when examining the success of governance on the commons, while

institutional theorists such as (Olson 1971) argue that the smaller the community the easier it is to achieve collective action. We therefore categorized the institutional characteristics of each community according to age of the CBNRM programme (> 10 years old versus and < 10 years old) and whether the community was either a single or multi village community.

### **Age of community and AGM attendance**

In CBNRM programmes that were older than ten years, 68% of respondents (199 out of 292) attended the AGM compared to 27% (57 out of 210) in newer programmes, a difference that is significant at the 0.1% level ( $\chi^2 (1, N = 502) = 82.2, p = 0.000$ ). The older communities are also the smaller communities, and we suspect size and history are more important variables than age.

### **Size of community and AGM attendance**

In single village communities, 84% of respondents (145 out of 172) attended AGMs compared to 33.6% (111 out of 330) in multi-village communities. This difference is significant at the 0.1% level ( $\chi^2 (1, N = 502) = 116.1, p = 0.000$ ).

### **Factors Predicting AGM Participation**

Based on the theory of participation in democratic institutions (see theoretical framework) and the results of the chi square tests of association, logistical regression statistics was used to identify variables that predicted attendance at AGMs in the six communities. The logistic regression model analyzed the predictive values of three categories of variables

- Demographic characteristics; age, education and gender
- Benefits: cash, employment and social
- Institutional and Structural characteristics: size of community (Table 3 – 5).

## **Results**

The dependent variable, AGM participation a binary categorical variable was coded as 1 = Yes and 0 = No. The predictor variables included age (continuous), education (categorical variable with 4 levels, with the reference category = 1 = no education), sex (binary 1 = Yes and 0 = No), cash, employment and social benefits categorized as (1 = Yes and No = ), community effect ( categorical variable with 1 = Mulendema and 0 = the rest of the five villages<sup>7</sup>) and size (1 = single and 0 = multi village).

### **Education, benefits and size as predictors of AGM participation**

The following Hypothesis was tested, “*The likelihood of participation in AGMs is greater for respondents with higher levels of education, who enjoy a greater level of both economic and social CBNRM benefits and are from single village communities.*”

The logistic regression model reflects the results of the simple Chi2 tests (Table 3-3). The likelihood ratio chi-square of 103.08 with a p-value of 0.000 tells us that our model as a whole fits significantly better than an empty model (i.e. model with no predictors). From the model (Table 3-5) eight of the variables were statistically significant. These included education (*primary, secondary and college*), which had a moderate predictive effect, CBNRM benefits (*cash, employment and social*) and finally institutional characteristics (*community effect and size*). Of the demographic variables, age and sex did not predict AGM participation. The three CBNRM benefits (*cash,*

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<sup>7</sup> Mulendema was used as reference as it had the lowest levels of participation and proved to be the outlier in the sample of six communities. The community effect compares results of Mulendema respondents with other respondents from all five communities.

*employment and social)* showed strong statistical significance. Cash effect had a substantially large predictive effect when compared to the others. Finally both *community effect* and *size* indicated statistical significance in predicting participation in AGMs.

### **Interpretations of key findings**

The results show that if respondents had a primary, secondary or college education, they were less likely to participate in the AGM when compared to those who had no education. When one has a primary education, the odds of attending the AGM decrease by 58%. The odds for those with a secondary education decrease by 60% and finally odds decrease by 68% for those with a college education holding all other variables constant.

Regards to CBNRM benefits, the results show that the odds of participating in the AGM increase by 215% for those who received cash benefits. It increases by 65% for those who received employment benefits. Finally it shows that for those who received any social benefits, the odds increase by a factor of 106%.

With respect to the community effect, the model demonstrates that the odds for participating in the AGM decreased by a factor of 91% if respondents were from Mulendema community when compared to those who were from Khwai, Mababe, Sankuyo, Kasempa and OCT communities.

Finally, the model shows that the odds of participating in multi village community AGMs decreases by a factor of 82% when compared to those held in single village communities.

Overall, the results show, that the predictor variable with the strongest effect on participation at AGMs is cash benefits. Attendance at AGMs therefore is more likely to be influenced if members received some cash benefit from the CBNRM program.

### **Qualitative Data**

#### **Community Records of AGMs Held**

To further understand the descriptive statistics and the regression models, qualitative data was collected from community records of five communities (Khwai, Mababe, Sankuyo, Kasempa and Mulendema). Retrieving community records for OCT was not possible. For the Botswana communities, data was accessed from the Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP). Access to the community files in Zambia was obtained from the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA). This source of data is more likely to be objective and is particularly important for cross checking survey data as it is the record of what occurred. Survey data has various limitations, among them perceptions of respondents maybe bias. Subjective phenomena such as opinions, values and knowledge when compared to objective measures have the larger of what the survey mostly measure (Groves, Fowler Jnr et al. 2004).

Each community is required to keep a record of the meeting agenda, minutes of the AGM and number of people who attended. This is important for monitoring aspects of community governance and whether institutional rules are being followed.

According to community records, the Khwai, Mababe and Sankuyo communities had held AGMs each year, according to their constitutional requirements. Records for Khwai community indicate that AGMs were held each year from 2005 – 2009. The records further indicated the number of people who had participated for some on the AGMs. In 2005 for example a total of 92 people had participated and in 2006 the

number reduced with 74 people attending. Records for Mababe and Sankuyo didn't indicate the number of people that had attended, however both communities had held the meetings each year from 2005 – 2008.

In the case of Kasempa, the records indicate the last AGM was held in 2006 in all of the five VAGs in the area. Each VAG had a record of between 68 – 374 participants attending.

The records for Mulendema show there were no AGMs held from 2002 – 2008. The only meetings that had been held on a quarterly basis were the Board meetings. There was a higher frequency of these meetings in some years when compared to others, for example 3 Board meetings were held in 2005.

The statistical analysis on perceptions of AGM participation corroborates with the records kept for AGMs held. There were a larger percentage of respondents in the three small communities (Khwai, Mababe and Sankuyo) who indicated they had attended the AGMs. This is supported by the records kept by each of these communities.

### **Factors Contributing to Non-Participation in AGMs**

The first part of the analysis involved understanding factors that predict participation in AGMs. This was analyzed using both descriptive statistics, logistic regression models and examining community records of AGMs held. The overall conclusion in this first part of the analysis indicates that education, CBNRM benefits and both institutional and structural elements of the community predict AGM participation. This part of the analysis focused on respondents that participated, however it falls short in informing the study on reasons why other respondents did not participate. Apart from understanding factors that contribute to AGM participation, an equally important question is why people don't participate. Understanding the factors that undermine

these institutions provide insights on how democratic governance in rural communities managing natural resources can be improved upon.

The focus of this section of analysis was to understand the reasons why some respondents didn't participate in the AGM. The question was structured using an open-ended format. Respondents were asked to list reasons why they didn't participate in the AGM. All individual responses for the five communities (Khwai, Mababe, Sankuyo, Kasempa and Mulendema) were analyzed. Data for the OCT community was not available. The data was organized by identifying consistencies and differences of each the respondent's answer. The data was then categorized using themes that emerged listing reasons why members of the community were less likely to attend the AGMs. A number of themes emerged from the initial categorization process. Five themes were cited as the major reasons for non-participation in AGMs. These included poor consultation of the community by Trust and CRB leaders, poor transfer of information to the communities by leaders, absenteeism due to work related commitments, lack of trust in leadership and AGMs not being held so community members could not participate.

### **Poor consultation of communities by Trust and CRB leaders**

This theme emerged from the majority of responses ( $N = 22$ ) from two of the single village communities and from Kasempa (Table 3 - 7). It was evident among the responses, that leaders from Mababe, Sankuyo and Kasempa were not adequately consulting the community prior and during the AGMs. As a consequence of this poor consultation by leaders, some community members did not see the need to attend AGMs. None of the respondents from Khwai identified this as a reason, so it is evident that community leaders in Khwai have some form of dialogue with their constituents.

A few quotes from the open ended responses are presented below.

Sankuyo: I always raise my concern but nothing is done leading me to giving up and seeing no use of attending the meeting.

Kasempa: We are not informed by the members of the CRB, so that I can know that there are meetings.

Kasempa: I don't have any interest; the Trust leaders don't want anybody but themselves only

Though this theme emerged among the non-participating respondents in the single villages, the majority did however attend the AGM (quantitative data), so this is evidently not a major problem in single village communities and in the Kasempa community.

### **Poor transfer of information to the communities by leaders**

Poor communication by Trust/ CRB leaders was also highlighted as another reason why some members didn't participate in the AGMs. This emerged as an important theme among the Kasempa respondents, and a few from Mababe community.

Mababe: They take long to call a meeting, and let them know about how the situation in the Trust.

Mababe: People were not told the date when the meeting would be held and that is why I didn't attend the AGM.

Kasempa: I was not notified

Kasempa: I am not informed

Kasempa: The CRB does not inform people when and what time the community will have the meeting. We just heard that there was a meeting, and we are not informed.

### **Absent from AGM due to work related engagements**

Non-participation due to work related engagements was cited as one of the major reasons. This reason was referred to in 24 responses from the single villages, and 3 from Kasempa. Among the single villages, Sankuyo had the largest number of these responses. AGM meetings, in the single villages are usually held during peak tourism

season, and since the majority of residents are employed in this industry, they are usually absent during the AGMs. This was also corroborated with participatory observation data that was gathered during an AGM held in Sankuyo in June 2009 AGM. The majority of participants were the older and younger members of the community who were not in any formal.

### **Lack of trust in leadership**

Lack of trust in leaders, was provided as a reason by respondents from both Kasempa and Mulendema. This was not referred to among any of the responses from the single villages and indicates a general trust in the leadership in these communities when compared to the two multi villages. Some of the responses include: -

Kasempa: Because the members of the CRB are not trusted. They don't allow anybody else to be free to do what they want. They take long to call a meeting, and let them know about how the situation in the Trust.

Kasempa: Since members of the CRB are not good, so I can't participate in the AGM.

Mulendema: Because the leaders are selfish. They just give to their relatives

Mulendema: They don't pay attention to the community in the AGMs decisions. Members are selfish

The lack of trust in leadership shows governance systems that are less participatory and more aligned towards the top leaders in the CRB. In Zambia, this has emerged as a major factor that hinders participatory forms of CRB governance.

### **AGMs not held**

The majority of Mulendema residents indicated that no AGM had been held in Mulendema and this was primarily the reason they didn't attend. Both the descriptive data (91% didn't attend) and the open ended responses confirm that no AGM was held. Interview data indicate that most community members don't even remember the last

time these meetings were held in their individual VAGs. What is evident is that CRB leaders have been holding Board meetings each year (Table 3 – 6). A total of 7 board meetings had been held from 2002 – 2008, however no record of an AGM was found.

## **Discussion**

### **Factors that Influence Community Member's Attendance at AGMs**

Participatory models of democratic governance suggest that forums such as AGMs are an important mechanism for involving members in the governance of CBNRM programs (Murphree 1997, Deitz, Dolsak et al. 2002, Child 2005, Anstey 2009). Understanding how these micro institutions work, contributes to an improved understanding of the mechanics of decentralization and bottom-up approaches to development (Mohan 2000, Larson 2004). In CBNRM, AGMs are the institution created to encourage participatory governance and accountability. Despite their stated importance for ensuring equitable benefit distribution and participation at the micro level, very little research shows how they actually function. Our work contributes to this scholarship by examining the factors that affect levels of participation in AGMs. Our research suggests that participation in democratic institutions such as AGMs is determined by demographic characteristics such as education, the individual and collective CBNRM benefits, the size of the community and the specific characteristic of the community.

## **Education**

Our results show that the level of education an individual has attained is a moderate predictor of participation, but that less educated people are more likely to attend meetings than more educated people. The effect of an individual's social status, such as education, on participation in associations or meetings has been examined in

earlier studies of participation (Almond and Verba 1963, Agarwal 2001). Studies of ‘town-hall’ democracy show that education is an important predictor of participation. The general assumption is that members with high levels of education are more likely to attend when compared to those with little education (Bryan 2004). While, intuitively, participation in community AGMs, favors those with higher levels of education that are capable of accessing information, and questioning their leaders the empirical evidence in our study indicates this is not the case. Agarwal, emphasizes that meaningful participation in natural resource management at the village level should include marginalized groups such as women and the less educated (Agarwal 2001). Our results show that this may be happening in AGMs, but also support the concern that CBNRM institutions are undermined because more educated people tend to leave these communities for better opportunities.

### **CBNRM benefits**

Participation in collective action, including attendance at AGMs, depends on the incentives, including costs and benefits, that motivate individuals to attend or not (Ostrom 1990, Murphree 1991, Adhikari 2005). It is the assumptions that communities are prepared to invest in the collective management of local resources because the benefits derived through collective management outweighs the transaction costs of collective action (Adhikari 2003). In addition, individual benefits that accrue at the household level also determine whether communities participate in governance or not (Adhikari 2005). Our results indicate that the scale of individual and collective benefits community members receive has a powerful influence on whether they attend or not. A higher percentage of respondents getting cash benefits participated in meetings (80.6%) when compared to those who attended but got no cash (38.1%). Similar results

were obtained for those who had employment benefits (75.35 versus 32.9%). There was however a much smaller difference between those that had participated in the meeting and had received social benefits and those that had attended and received none (72.3% versus 61.4%). These differences were all statistically significant. This relationship is also indicative in the logistic regression analysis which suggests that the likelihood of a member of the community participating in the AGM increases by a factor of 215% if they got cash, by 101% if they got social benefits (such as meat, funding of orphans, old people or other in kind benefits) and finally by a factor of 81% if they were employed in any of the CBNRM ventures such as tourism, or administrative duties for the community organization.

Theorists (Child 2006) argue that the provision of cash as a direct benefit to households captures part of the value of natural resources at the private level, and symbolizes local ownership and discretionary rights to wild resources, and is therefore a critical factor in promoting sustainable natural resource management in ways that treating wild resources entirely as a social good cannot reach. The option of cash provides a direct incentive to households to participate in community governance. One of the main agenda items discussed in AGMs is the distribution of benefits and in particular cash. As our results show, cash benefits are an important predictor of whether one attends AGMs or not, even though the level of cash benefits in the study area has been on the whole quite low compared to sites where it is made quite explicit that individuals have the primary right to use wildlife incomes for cash (Child and Peterson 1991, Dalal-Clayton and Child 2003). If members have received cash benefits in previous AGMs, it is highly likely that they would attend the AGMs for this purpose.

Thus, even if cash benefits are small, they have a big impact in encouraging attendance. We can also hypothesize that where participants have genuine discretionary choice to allocate benefits between the options of cash as well as to projects, administration and natural resource management, the debate on resource allocation will be rigorous.

Attendance at AGMs increases by a factor of 101% if the respondents received any form of social benefits. The allocation and prioritization of funding to social benefits such as pensions for old people or orphans, or community projects, is usually done at the AGM. The qualitative data gathered from community records suggests that this is much more participatory in the three single villages, where the benefits are clear to see – water stand pipes, toilets, houses provided to old and destitute people. Where community members have received social benefits at previous AGMs, and particularly where the magnitude of these and the debate over these is significant, it increases the likelihood that respondents will attend AGMs.

Finally, the likelihood of attending the AGM if one received any form of employment from CBNRM activities increases by a factor of 81%. Both push and pull factors are affecting this variable. We expect that, like cash and social benefits, employment encourages people to attend AGMs. But we have also observed that community members who are employed in CBNRM activities often poorly attend AGMs. AGMs take place during peak tourism periods, so those employed in the industry are restricted from attending because they are at places of work, and in tourism this often implies being located in remote areas. This argument may also be the reason why there is slightly lower attendance of working age people (Table 3-3). Employment is

statistically significant in predicting attendance, but is a weaker predictor compared to cash and social benefits presumably because of these influences.

### **Size of community**

The size and characteristic of the community are both important institutional and structural predictors of community governance. According to commons theorists the size and homogeneity of the community are among some of the factors that increase governance success on the commons(Wade 1987, Baland and Platteau 1996). This is reflected in CBNRM governance where, ideally, the deliberation of decisions within smaller producer communities permits members to participate in a face-to-face manner (Murphree 2000, Child and Barnes 2010).

Out of our sample of six communities, the results show that there was generally larger attendance in the three small sized communities (Khwai, Mababe and Sankuyo) when compared to the multi-village communities (Kasempa, Mulendema and OCT). The odds of participating in the AGM decreased by a factor of 81.6% if respondents were from multivillages when compared to those from single village. Organizing meetings in multi village communities has huge transaction costs primarily due to the large numbers of households and distances members have to travel. Meetings in some communities last for two days with the larger part of the discussion being driven by the leaders in the community. For communities that have not held meetings on a regular annual basis, when they do meet, a number of issues have to be deliberated on. These are usually emotional debates that involve members accusing their leaders of various atrocities. This usually derails the agenda and at the end of two days, very little constructive deliberation would have taken place.

## **Community characteristic**

In multi village communities, particularly where leaders have things to hide, not holding AGMs is a way of avoiding being accountable to their constituents. The cases of Mulendema and OCT communities particularly reflect this. In these communities leaders have deliberately not held AGMs in many years; however they are able to hold Board meetings and gain allowances from them. These leaders manipulate these democratic institutions that are supposed to be open and participatory for own personal gains. Both these communities are relatively large, and heterogeneous for ethnic and other reasons. CBNRM in these communities has been organized by bringing together villages that consist of different tribal groups, and the assumption is that these will work together. In Mulendema, retired farmers who have formed an elite group that dictate how the program is managed have dominated the leadership in the CBNRM programs. This has left out the earlier settlers of the area who are Kaonde-IIa and have lived in the area since the establishment of the National Park. In OCT, members of the Seronga community have dominated CBNRM governance, and hindered members from other villages from participating. In both communities, few benefits get to the constituent villages, and there is suspicion about the management of funds.

Community characteristics such as population of the community, size of the area, number of villages, revenues earned and type of traditional authority are other institutional factors that influence AGM participation (Table 3 -2).

All the single villages had low human populations (approximately 500 – 700 residents) and households ranging from 52 for Khwai, 55 Mababe and 56 for Sankuyo. These are mostly members of the same families so social networks in these

communities are very strong and it is evident that distribution of CBNRM benefits is fairly equitable.

The size of the area of the Controlled Hunting area where the single villages are located is not a huge expanse of land, and most of the villages are located within 5 – 20 km stretches. This therefore makes it easier for residents to easily congregate at AGMs as they don't have huge distances to walk.

The traditional leaders/ Chiefs for all three single villages in the sample were all relatively progressive. The Khwai Chief can be characterized as more passive, and though he partakes in CBNRM activities, he has left the majority of decisions to the community. The Chiefs in Mababe and Sankuyo were more actively involved with CBNRM affairs, and in particular the Sankuyo Chief has always been a big player during AGM meetings. Chief Timex of the Sankuyo community has played a key role in ensuring community leaders are accountable to the residents and this has positively impacted the CBNRM governance structures and decisions. The Mababe Chief is young and western educated and interviews with him indicated that he was pro indigenous rights and very supportive of the community programs.

Another community characteristic that enhanced participation at the AGM was the quality of the Manager the community had employed. The employment of Trust Managers in Botswana was a need identified following huge mismanagement of community funds. Trust Managers are professional staff employed to manage operations and finances on behalf of the community and are required to report to the community Board. In Zambia, the position of Community Extension staff has been piloted in a number of CRB communities. Kasempa was one of the communities where

this model is currently being practiced. An officer from the Zambia Wildlife Authority has been employed to provide extension services, similar to what the Trust Manager in Botswana does. These Managers/ Extension officers have provided support to communities particularly in organization of AGMs and other meetings. Our results show that all the communities (single villages and Kasempa) that had higher levels of participation at the AGMs, also had good professional Trust Managers /Extension staff facilitating these processes. Employing these staff members has enabled some level of professionalism in how community meetings are organized. Trust Managers/ Extension staff prepare annual reports that provide an objective view of status of affairs in the community, unlike the traditional way the Board presents these reports. They also provide a neutral platform as they are not members of the community, so are not necessarily involved in village politics that sometimes drives the AGMs. Finally, they are professionally trained staff and are key in helping the community strategically work through their day to day operations, and ensure that more households are included in the process.

The characteristics of the three single villages outlined above, therefore positively reinforce why there has been higher participation at the AGMs when compared to the multi village communities. These factors should therefore be considered as important elements for improving CBNRM governance and project implementation.

### **Factors that Contribute to Non-Participation in AGMs**

Aside from understanding factors that influenced AGM participation, the study further examined factors that hindered participation. Understanding these factors is as equally important as it contributes to understanding the contextual factors that would not be normally captured using questionnaire data.

Poor community consultation and transfer of information by CRB/ Trust leaders were among the reasons given for non-participation in AGMs. This indicates that the community leaders were making decisions without informing the communities. These concerns were raised by respondents from both single and multi-villages. Studies of other CBNRM communities have shown that this is a common trend in other programs in the southern Africa (Collomb, Mupeta et al. 2010), Child et al., unpublished/ Dashboard). Leaders rarely consult or transfer the necessary information that is needed by their constituents. This can be attributed to poor capacity of leaders in understanding their roles and responsibilities. Future initiatives that support improved CBNRM governance would therefore need to target how these bottlenecks that hinder consultation and information transfer and ultimately deter members from attending could be addressed.

The lack of trust in leadership was another major reason identified as reasons for non-participation in AGMs. This was referred to by majority of respondents from both Kasempa and Mulendema community. A general perception among communities in the CBNRM programs in Zambia is that leaders cannot be trusted. This is particularly evident when it comes to financial matters. CRB board members, are the primarily agents that handle financial matters in the communities. This includes signing on tenders given to safari hunting companies, accessing revenues earned from hunting (CRB chairperson is a signatory to community account and a ZAWA officer is a second signatory), distributing and paying salaries of wildlife village scouts and making decisions on how funds for community projects are spent. Over the past decade, these roles have become the prestige of CRB leaders and communities therefore are rarely

privy to information on how their finances are managed or utilized. Based on these prevailing circumstances, communities have grown to distrust their leaders. As a result of this, the need to participate in institutions such as AGMs therefore proves to be futile. This is a major contributing factor in a number of the communities in Zambia and in order to reverse this trend, strict measures on how funds should be managed and distributed in CBNRM programs needs to be addressed.

Common property theorists and CBNRM practitioners broadly agree that participatory models of democratic governance are important in ensuring decisions are brought close to the main constituents of the CBNRM programs (Ostrom 1990, Murphree 1997, Murphree 2000, Anstey 2009, Child and Barnes 2010). The past two decades of CBNRM implementation in Southern Africa, has shown that top down models of governance have translated poorly at the grassroots. Households that are meant to be the main target beneficiaries of these programs have received very few benefits particularly in Zambia and the governance systems have been eroded to the point of where only 10 Board members manage and make decisions with little no consultation of their constituents.

This study examined the factors that either enhanced or hindered participation in AGMs in six communities in Botswana and Zambia. The broader goal was to gain some understanding on how performance of micro democratic institutions such as AGMs could be improved upon. In order to see more successful CBNRM programs, participatory models of governance need to explored and replicated in other programs. The study shows that the small size of the community and higher levels of cash, social and employment benefits enhance participation in community governance. Participation

is further enhanced by stronger facilitation of democratic process as we have seen in Kasempa, and which we also observe in Khwai and Sankuyo (good managers) compared to Mababe (where managers are absent or changing). It is weakened where communities are large, organized using multi-village governance structures, and where organizational and financial management is weak. However, we also need to point out that where an organization appears to be running quite smoothly, as in the case of Sankuyo, levels of participation may fall slightly, whereas we suspect that high levels of participation in Khwai and Mababe might also be linked to internal conflicts and contestation within these communities.

Table 3-1. Typologies of participation

Forms/ Level of Participation	Characteristic features
1. Nominal Participation	1. Membership in the group
2. Passive Participation	2. Being informed of decisions ex post facto, or attending meetings and listening in on decision-making, without speaking.
3. Consultative Participation	3. Being asked an opinion in specific matters without guarantee of influencing decisions.
4. Activity-specific Participation	4. Being asked to (or volunteering to) undertake specific tasks
5. Active Participation	5. Expressing opinions, whether or not solicited, or taking initiatives of other sorts.
6. Interactive (empowering) participation	6. Having voice and influence in the group's decisions.

Source: (Agarwal 2001 p.1624) "Typologies of participation"

Table 3-2. CBO characteristics

	KHWAI	MABABE	SANKUYO	KASEMPA	MULENDEMA	OCT
Year Established	2000	2000	1995	2003	2003	1995
Number of Households +/-	52	55	56	1479	2500	300
Number of People +/-	600	500	700	9, 000	12, 000	3, 043
Size of Area (Km2)	1918	2181	860	13, 340	3091	92,200
Number of Villages	1	1	1	5	5	5
CBNRM Revenue Source	Photographic & Hunting	Photographic & Hunting	Photographic & Hunting	Hunting	Hunting	Photographic & Hunting

Table 3-3. AGM attendance variables measured

VARIABLE	VARIABLE TYPE	TYPE
AGM attendance	Dependent	Passive participation (Being informed of decisions ex post facto, or attending meetings and listening in on decision-making, without speaking. Agarwal, 2001)
Yes		
No		
Demographic characteristics:	Independent	Measures of individual and household characteristics that influence participation. ( <i>Almond &amp; Verba, 1963; Dahl, 1961</i> )
Age		
Education		
Gender		
Household Head		
Gender		
Household head		
# of years in village		
CBNRM		
Benefits:	Independent	Measure of incentives to participate in AGM ( <i>Moe, 1980; Olson, 1965</i> )
Cash		
Jobs		
Social		
Institutional characteristics:	Independent	Measure of structural design of CBO ( <i>Ostrom, 1990; Murphree, 2000</i> )
Size of CBO		
Age of CBO		

Table 3-4. Crosstab AGM attendance

Attendance	Did you attend AGM			% OF AGM ATTENDEES	Chi2 (p<)		
	YES (N)	NO (N)	TOTAL (N)				
<b>VARIABLE</b>							
<b>COMMUNITY</b>							
Khwai	50	2	52	96.2	158.52		
Mababe	43	9	52	82.7	0.000		
Sankuyo	52	16	68	76.5			
Kasempa	46	53	99	46.5			
Mulendema	11	100	111	9.9			
OCT	54	66	120	45.0			
<b>TOTAL (N)</b>			<b>502</b>				
<b>AGE</b>							
18 - 28	75	60	135	55.6	6.71 0.243		
29 - 39	63	65	128	49.2			
40 - 50	39	46	85	45.9			
51 - 61	30	36	66	45.5			
62 - 72	29	16	45	64.4			
73+	12	15	27	44.4			
<b>TOTAL (N)</b>			<b>486</b>				
<b>GENDER</b>							
Male	121	123	244	49.6	0.100		
Female	125	120	245	51.0	0.752		
<b>TOTAL (N)</b>			<b>489</b>				
<b>HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD</b>							
Yes	92	104	196	46.9	5.66		
No	106	73	179	59.2	0.017		
<b>TOTAL (N)</b>			<b>375</b>				
<b>EDUCATION</b>							
No Education	82	50	132	62.1	15.935		
Primary	51	72	123	41.5	0.007		
Secondary	98	100	198	49.5			
College	8	17	25	32.0			
<b>TOTAL (N)</b>			<b>478</b>				

Table 3-4. Continued

CBNRM Cash Benefits						
Yes	116	28	144		80.6	73.47
No	133	216	349		38.1	0.000
TOTAL (N)			493			
CBNRM Employment Benefits						
Yes	122	40	162		75.3	75.43
No	97	198	295		32.9	0.000
TOTAL (N)			457			
CBNRM Social Benefits						
Yes	125	48	173	72.3		52.93
No	199	125	324	61.4		0.000
TOTAL (N)			497			
AGE OF CBNRM PROGRAM						
< 10 years old	57	153	210	27.1		82.19
> 10 years old	199	93	292	68.2		0.000
TOTAL (N)			502			
SIZE OF CBNRM COMMUNITY						
Single	145	27	172	84.3		116.15
Multi	111	219	330	33.6		0.000
TOTAL (N)			502			

Table 3-5. Description of variables in model

Variable	Description
Dependent:	
Participation_AGM	Did you attend the last AGM?
Independent:	
age	How old are you?
primary	Primary education
secondary	Secondary education
college	College education
Gender	Gender of respondent
Cbnrm_Cash	CBNRM cash benefits
Cbnrm_Employment	CBNRM employment benefits
Cbnrm_Social	CBNRM social benefits
kasemp	Kasempa community
khwai	Khwai community
mababe	Mababe community
sankuyo	Sankuyo community
OCT	OCT community
cbo_scale	Size of community

Table 3-6. Logistic regression model on factors that predict AGM attendance

Participation_AGM	b	P>z	e^b**	%
<i>Demographic</i>				
age	-0.009	0.219	0.99	-0.9
primary	-0.879	0.003	0.42	-58.5
secondary	-0.920	0.002	0.40	-60.1
college	-1.136	0.034	0.32	-67.9
sexf	0.061	0.767	1.06	6.2
<i>Benefits</i>				
cash_benefit	1.147	0.000	3.15	214.8
employment	0.498	0.052	1.65	64.6
social_benefit	0.724	0.002	2.06	106.3
<i>Institutional characteristics</i>				
cbo_scale	-1.694	0.000	0.18	-81.6
mumbw	-2.435	0.000	0.09	-91.2

\*\* e^b = exp(b) = factor change in odds for unit increase in X

aa percentage change in odds for unit increase in X

No. of observations = 492, \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 & \*p<0.1

Table 3-7. Record of AGMs held

CBO	<b>Record of AGMs, General Meetings, Special General Meetings and Board Meetings</b>
Khwai	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ AGM: 1<sup>st</sup> of April, 2005 (92 people attended).</li> <li>▪ AGM: 27<sup>th</sup> – 28<sup>th</sup> April, 2006 (74 people attended).</li> <li>▪ Special General Meeting: 12<sup>th</sup> November, 2006</li> <li>▪ AGM: 2007</li> <li>▪ AGM: 2008</li> <li>▪ Special General Meeting: 8<sup>th</sup> April 2009</li> </ul>
Mababe	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ AGM: 10<sup>th</sup> – 11<sup>th</sup> March 2005</li> <li>▪ AGM: 24<sup>th</sup> – 25<sup>th</sup> March 2006</li> <li>▪ Special General Meeting: 25<sup>th</sup> January 2007</li> <li>▪ AGM: 15<sup>th</sup> – 16<sup>th</sup> March 2007</li> <li>▪ AGM: 28<sup>th</sup> – 29<sup>th</sup> February 2008</li> <li>▪ </li> </ul>
Sankuyo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ AGM: 14<sup>th</sup> – 15<sup>th</sup> February 2005</li> <li>▪ AGM: 23<sup>rd</sup> August 2006</li> <li>▪ AGM: 26<sup>th</sup> – 27<sup>th</sup> February 2007</li> </ul>
Kasempa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Shimuka VAG meeting: 25<sup>th</sup> July 2006 (92 men and 127 women attended)</li> <li>▪ Kamfwe VAG meeting: 24<sup>th</sup> July 2006 (374 people attended).</li> <li>▪ Kamakechi VAG meeting: 28<sup>th</sup> July 2006 (287 people attended).</li> <li>▪ Lunga VAG meeting: 29<sup>th</sup> July 2006 (68 members attended)</li> </ul>
Mulendema	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Board Meeting: 25<sup>th</sup> November 2002</li> <li>▪ Interim Board meeting: 13<sup>th</sup> January 2003</li> <li>▪ Extraordinary Board meeting: 6<sup>th</sup> August 2003</li> <li>▪ Board Meeting: 30<sup>th</sup> March 2005</li> <li>▪ Board Meeting: 13<sup>th</sup> July 2005</li> <li>▪ Board Meeting: 21<sup>st</sup> December 2005</li> <li>▪ Board Meeting: 4<sup>th</sup> January 2008</li> </ul>
OCT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Records not accessed.</li> </ul>

**Table 3-8. Reasons for not attending AGM**

CATEGORY	No.	SOME RESPONSES
Not consulted by Leaders	1 6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ “I always raise any concern but nothing is done leading to me giving up and seeing no use of attending the meeting.”</li> <li>❖ If I don’t understand the headings I end up asking things which are out of the topic to forbid me to ask and again they carry on with other issues or they start old headings and other things.”</li> </ul>
Absent: Work	2 4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ “Sometimes I will be at the bush to cut grass for building.”</li> <li>❖ “I was looking for jobs in Maun.”</li> <li>❖ “Because I was busy working at my fields.”</li> </ul>
Absent: Sick	1 4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ “I was not feeling well.”</li> <li>❖ “I was sick admitted in Maun.”</li> </ul>
Absent: Age	3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ “It is because I am old, and they said I am no use for anything, and they build a house for so it is ok.”</li> <li>❖ “As an old person I know that young people down the in the village will work hard and make everything perfect as I trust them, they grew in front of my eyes.”</li> <li>❖ “I am an older person I cannot walk from my place to the Kgotsa for the AGM.”</li> </ul>
Absent: Personal reasons	1 8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ “I was not around.”</li> <li>❖ “I was in jail custody.”</li> <li>❖ “I was at school.”</li> <li>❖ “I was in town.”</li> <li>❖ “I was at a workshop in Maun.”</li> <li>❖ “I was not in Sankuyo.”</li> <li>❖ “I am not a resident of the village.”</li> </ul>
Lack of consultation by leadership	6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ “We are not informed by the member of the CRB, so that I can know that there are meetings.”</li> <li>❖ “Because the members of AGM are</li> </ul>
Lack of trust in leadership	4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ “Because the members of AGM are not trusted. They don’t allow anybody else to be free to do what they want.”</li> <li>▪ “Since members of the CRB are not good, so I can’t participate in the AGM.”</li> <li>▪ “Because the leaders are selfish. They just give to their relatives.”</li> <li>▪ “They don’t pay attention to the community in the AGM decision. Members are selfish.”</li> </ul>
Poor communication of meeting	5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ “I was not notified.”</li> <li>▪ “I am not informed.”</li> <li>▪ “The CRB does not inform people when and what time the community will have the meeting. We just heard that there was a meeting, and we are not informed.”</li> <li>▪ “No information was communicated to us.”</li> </ul>
Absent: Not interested	2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ “Lack of time. Not interested.”</li> </ul>
Absent: Sick	2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ “I was out. I was not feeling well.”</li> </ul>
Absent: Age	4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ “I am too young.”</li> <li>▪ “I am old.”</li> </ul>
Absent: Work	3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ “Antipoaching.”</li> <li>▪ “I was out of the place doing other things in the National Park with Wilderness safaris.”</li> </ul>
Absent: No benefits	3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ “We don’t share money.”</li> <li>▪ “No improvement.”</li> <li>▪ “I can’t be involved in the AGM because animals can’t save us in the VAG. Participating in the AGM is not good since there’s nothing which you can get from there unless you depend on farming.”</li> </ul>

## CHAPTER 4

# THE IMPORTANCE OF DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS IN PROMOTING CBNRM GOOD GOVERNANCE

### **Role of Elections in Improving CBNRM Micro Governance**

The AGM as outlined in the earlier chapter is the democratic institution in CBNRM that supports direct deliberative democracy. This general assembly is the platform where ALL major decisions on CBNRM are discussed. One of the activities that take place during this meeting is the election of board members. Elections in CBNRM are important indicators of levels of constituents' participation in choosing their leaders (Child and Dalal-Clayton 2004). Enshrining regular elections in community constitutions allows for change of leadership, within constitutional rules. Despite their importance as instruments for participatory democracy in micro CBNRM institutions, elections are an understudied area.

The importance of elections as democratic institutions has been studied by political scientists in macro elections (Kaminski 2002, Hyden 2005, Lindberg 2006). These studies include aspects of what motivates voter turnout, whether incentives drive higher participation or not or, which members of society are more likely to vote, etc. These studies provide analytical tools that can be used to understand natural resource governance and examine which factors drive participation in CBNRM elections.

The importance of elections as democratic institutions has been broadly studied at the macro level (Kaminski 2002, Hyden 2005, Lindberg 2006), included aspects of what motivates voter turnout, whether incentives drive higher participation or not or, which members of society are more likely to vote, etc. These studies provide empirical

evidence that can be used to understand what factors drive participation in CBNRM elections.

Over the past two decades, CBNRM programs in Southern Africa have promoted elections as the instrument for change of leadership and leadership accountability, but there is lack of empirical studies that assess what actually characterizes participation in elections in communities practicing CBNRM. For example, do elections in smaller communities elicit higher levels of participation when compared to those in larger ones? Secondly, do communities that are receiving direct benefits such as cash, employment or social benefits have higher participation in elections when compared to those receiving fewer benefits? Finally, which members of the community are more likely to participate in elections? By studying elections as an institution that enables good governance in CBNRM, we begin to understand how leadership in local community institutions responsible for governing and managing natural resource can be more accountable to their constituents and consequently allow for more equitable distribution of benefits attained from CBNRM.

This section examines the importance of elections in CBNRM governance. Using empirical data from household surveys conducted in six CBNRM communities, the study examines factors that influence household members' participation in elections. The study argues that in CBNRM, participation of the majority of community members in elections is an essential part of improving democratic governance. The study further argues that in CBNRM, elections are the instruments that enable change of leadership and allow constituents the privilege of choosing which members of the community represent their interests.

## **Board Elections in Botswana and Zambia**

Elections of board members in CBNRM programs are postulated in community constitutions, and may vary based on context. They do however have salient features that are practiced in most CBNRM communities in Southern Africa. In Botswana, each CBO elects Boards of Trustees who are given the responsibility to make decisions on behalf of the community and provide guidance for the overall management of CBNRM projects (Schuster 2007). A study conducted on CBOs in Botswana showed that a majority of these Boards consist of 10 members who are elected for terms of office that range from one to three years depending on the community. The constitutions of almost all the CBOs allowed for re-election of Board members, and that at least 64 board members had been re-elected in active communities in two years (2004 – 2006). This study concluded that even though re-election of Board members was an important tool for retaining institutional memory in the Board of Trustees, there was a danger of power accumulation in only a few people of the community, a rise that was pronounced in communities where the constitution did not restrict the number of terms per board members, which was the case for 50% of the active CBOs (Schuster 2007 p. 44).

In Zambia, the Wildlife Act of 1998 No. 12 upholds the importance of elections in CRBs governance. The Act stipulates that each CRB hold democratic elections to select their Board members. These elections are primarily held at the VAG level, with each VAG electing a representative to a ten-member board. Employees of the Zambia Wildlife Authority such as senior wildlife or extension officers oversee the electoral process. According to the manual on CRB formation, this process is divided in two categories. The first stage begins by holding of elections at the VAG level. A team composed of ZAWA officials; teachers or a representative of the local district council

facilitates this process. Members at the village level select leaders to represent them at the main CRB board elections. Secret ballot is the method of voting used and this works more transparently in the communities where the marginalized may not be free enough to vote by show of hands. At the second level the 10 board members elect from amongst themselves the chairperson and vice, the secretary and vice, the treasurer and five board members.

Theoretically, both countries emphasize the importance of the institution of elections in CBNRM governance. In Botswana, the importance of CBNRM elections is promoted so that powerful members of the community do not hold onto power. In Zambia, in practice, CRBs elections have almost become non-existent due to poor institutional and financial support for holding elections. CRB board members have used the excuse of poor flow of financial revenues from ZAWA for not holding elections. This has thus created powerful elites who have held onto power and has created non-participatory governance systems that do not allow for members to actively participate in the process.

### **Theory on Participation in Elections**

Dahl in his work on democracy, argues that the meaning of democracy as self-government requires not only equality of political participation but also free political competition (Dahl 1971). Dahl, measures democracy using two key attributes i.e. participation and contestation. This, he argues, requires eight institutional guarantees i.e. freedom of organization; freedom of expression; the right to vote; broad eligibility for public office; the right to compete for support and votes; the availability of alternative sources of information; free and fair elections and the dependence of public policies on

citizens' preferences (Dahl 1961, Dahl 1971). To understand the theory of participation in CBNRM community elections, this study uses three of these institutional guarantees i.e. 'the right to vote'; 'the right to compete for support and votes' and the guarantee of free and fair elections. These three attributes should be guaranteed in order to ensure that the two key attributes of Dahlian democracy, i.e. participation and contestation, are achieved.

Dahl provides us with some useful starting points for understanding participation in elections. The institutional guarantees of democracy can thus be empirically measured in any form of elections to understand whether they are met or not. Do citizens have the right to vote? Do leaders have the right to compete for support and votes? Finally, if elections are held, are they held in a free and fair manner? A measure of these three institutions would provide empirical evidence that allows examining the degree of democratic practice in different communities in CBNRM.

Various political science scholars have broadly studied the role elections play in democratic practice. Most studies concern broader national elections and democratization, but the concept is the same, and can be applied to CBNRM communities. Within the two attributes of participation and competition that Dahl argued for, several scholars have made strides in studying the importance of elections in achieving these attributes. Proponents of political participation such as Dahl, argue that in a democracy, the people should rule over themselves, that is, the people are sovereign (Dahl 1989 p. 85). Dahl refers to this as the "idea of intrinsic equality". In the same vain, scholars such as (Ake 1993) have noted that it is the equal opportunity to be part of the decision-making process rather than the approval of each substantial

decision by everyone, which satisfies the right to self-government. Other scholars such as Bratton and van de Walle argue that elections alone are not sufficient to make a democracy, however no other institution heralds participatory, competitive and legitimate elections in instrumental importance for self-government (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). Regardless of the many views of what democracy is or should be though, there is one common denominator among modern democracies, and that is elections (Lindberg 2006 p. 1). Lindberg has argued that elections are an institutionalized attempt to actualize the essence of democracy: rule of the people, by the people (Lindberg 2006 p. 1). The institution of elections is important for selecting leadership and disposing of old governments in a political system (Lindberg 2006 p. 1). Lindberg furthers argues that elections are concrete occurrences with institutional expressions, rules and regulations. They can be observed directly and are concrete in the form of indelible ink, ballot papers, boxes, election officials and voters. They are thus a necessary component for any aspiring representative democratic system. Further, they guarantee by law equality of participation and free competition. In essence, therefore, both voters and political elites should guarantee the holding of legitimate periodic elections (Lindberg 2006 p. 1).

### **Voter Turnout: Participation in Elections**

Participation in the voting process is a useful starting point in understanding the role elections plays in enhancing democracy. In a representative system, popular participation is achieved through voting. This provides legal guarantee of universal suffrage, which could be limited by citizenship, age or mental sanity (Lindberg 2006 p. 1). The percentage of an electorate that actually participates is used an indicator of the comprehension of equal popular participation. Further, participatory elections imply that

individuals have equal rights to participate and to field candidates. Voter turnout is therefore considered a classical indicator of popular participation that is considered an important dimension of the quality of the democracy of a system (Altman and Perez-Linan 2002). A higher turnout of voters is therefore a preferred vantage point of democratic quality as the realization of equal political participation (Lindberg 2006 p. 37). “People rule by selection of leaders through elections, hence the larger the share of voters actually turning up for the polls the more popular power is actualized” (Lindberg 2006 p. 37) .

### **Quality of Elections Free and Fairness**

Understanding what elections are and what role they play in promoting improving democratic governance is a first step. Elections usher in new leadership through the voice of the people, but it is paramount to also understand the quality of the elections themselves. The fundamental question to be asked is whether the elections were free and fair. This particular variable is crucial in ensuring an important distinction is made between whether processes are acceptable or not (Lindberg 2006 p. 37).

### **Factors Influencing Participation in Elections**

Measuring the quality of elections is not limited to voter turnout or whether or not they are free and fair. The role of elections in enhancing a democratic system can also be understood by examining the factors that influence voters to participate. Blair examines how in large national elections voter turnout is correlated with the expected closeness of the election (Blair 2000). He further argues that a sense of duty plays an important role in the decision to vote for a large segment of voters. He concludes, “for many people voting is not only a right, it is also a duty. And the belief that in a democracy every citizen should feel obliged to vote induces many people to vote in

almost all elections. Everyone does not share that sense of duty. It may vary from one country to another. It can also vary over time" (Blaise 2000 p. 113).

Riker and Ordeshook examine how the cost and benefits of participation can affect turnout. They argue that small increases in costs to vote can have a significant impact on turnout levels (Riker and Ordeshook 1968). Other scholars argue that high levels of democratic participation are associated with more equal distributions of income (Mueller and Stratmann 2003). This builds from a larger debate on effects of participation in elections and whether this improves the quality of the democratic process.

Some scholars have opposed the broadening of the franchise of participation on the grounds that it would "place the principle power in the hands of classes more and more below the highest level of instruction in the community," and thus lead "toward collective mediocrity". In contrast (Lijphart 1997 p. 1) argues that low participation in elections is detrimental in that it leads to inequality of representation and that this influence is not randomly distributed but systematically biased in favor of more privileged citizens such as those with higher incomes, greater wealth, and better education and against less advantaged citizens. Both scholars recognize that suffrage and citizen participation have similar consequences in their effects on the composition of the active electorate, however they draw opposite inferences about the desirability of greater citizen participation (Mueller and Stratmann 2003). Lijphart, takes on an elitist point of identifying 'who' should be part of the electorate, whereas Lijphart argues for a higher participation from an electorate representing various members of society (Lijphart 1997). Mueller & Stratmann expand on this argument by examining the correlation between participation in elections and the economic status of the individuals voting in

national elections (Mueller and Stratmann 2003). They illustrate how, as the fraction of voters with low incomes increases, government policies shift in favor of lower-income groups. However, they also show that when the fraction of uninformed or uneducated voters increases, government policies worsen. They show a strong association between education and voting, and argue that better educated people gather more information about government policies and candidates during work and leisure time, so the cost of becoming informed and voting are lower for better educated citizens (Filer, Kenny et al. 1993).

The scholarship on elections is broad and has largely been studied in macro level political systems. Many writings, like those presented, identify the importance of elections in the democratic process<sup>1</sup>. To bring us back to Dahlian democracy, they show how elections are a fundamental component in achieving both participation and competition in a democratic system and ultimately ‘rule by the people, for the people’. CBNRM promotes elections at the micro level. CBNRM policies explicitly argue for selection of leaders through a democratic process i.e. elections. Understanding CBNRM governance therefore requires understanding three key attributes encapsulated within the concept of elections i.e. voter turnout, factors that influence participation in elections, and the quality of elections. This study pursues three objectives: -

- Assessing voter turnout by examining the numbers of community members who voted in previous CBNRM elections, their frequency of voting and their understanding of voting methods according to their community constitutions.

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<sup>1</sup>Interestingly, Dahl does not mention elections in his five principles of democracy. This implies that elections are an outcome of processes that incorporate effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda and inclusion of all adults. Elections may, on the one hand, measure the extent to which these processes are in place, but we also know that elections, or apparent elections, on their own are no guarantee of democracy and can even be used as a tool to legitimize elite capture.

- Examining the factors both at individual household and community level that influence participation in elections.
- Examining the quality of elections, by assessing how free and fair elections held have been.

## **Methods**

The study uses quantitative data from 514 household surveys conducted in six CBNRM communities in Botswana and Zambia (See full method description in methods chapter).

**Data analysis.** To examine participation in elections (voter turnout) and factors influencing this, two levels of analysis were undertaken. We used descriptive statistics (using SPSS 16) to describe who voted, and whether this was statistically different from those who didn't. Then (using STATA 9) we developed logistic regression statistics to analyze the factors that influence participation in elections. SPSS was used to finally analyze descriptive statistics of 'free and fairness' of the elections.

## **Results**

### **Voter turnout**

To assess the variable of voter turnout, respondents were asked whether they had voted in the last CBO election or not. According to the survey results, the community with the highest voter turnout was Khwai (89.1%), followed by Kasempa (76.8%), Sankuyo (59.4%) and the lowest voter turnout was in Mulendema (42.5%), differences that were statistically significant at the 1% level (Table 4-1).

To further examine voter turnout, respondents were asked the number of times they had voted in CBNRM elections. Frequency of voting is used as an indicator of whether communities were holding regular elections or not. The premise for this assessment is that communities that have held regular elections should have a large

percentage of respondents with higher frequency of voting when compared to those that have not held regular elections. Responses were categorical and included options of whether respondents had voted “once”, “twice”, “more than three times” or “never voted”. According to the community constitutions, each community should hold elections every three years. Within the sample, Sankuyo and OCT were the oldest communities, established in 1995. These two communities should therefore have held a total of five elections. In comparison, the other four communities were all established after 2000 so on average should have held at least three elections. The results show that the community with the highest frequency of voting was Khwai where 90.9% of respondents had voted three times or more; followed by Mababe 75.5; Sankuyo 69.6%; Kasempa 38.3%; OCT 23.6 and finally Mulendema 6.4%. The results indicate that voting frequency for the three multi villages was lower when compared to the single villages. This also indicates that elections are held more frequently in the single village communities.

### **Who votes in CBNRM elections?**

Aside from understanding the numbers who turn out for voting in CBNRM elections, we examined what groups of people vote using demographic characteristics of respondents including education levels, gender, and age of the respondents, and conducted chi square tests of association to determine if differences were statistically significant. These demographic variables have been used in previous studies on elections (Filer, Kenny et al. 1993).

### **Education and voter turnout**

The results indicate that out of 132 respondents with no education, 56.3% voted; compared to 60.5% with primary education, and 51.1% and 40% with secondary and

college education respectively. These differences were not statistically significantly ( $\chi^2$  (1, N = 469) = 9.37, p = 0.497).

### **Gender and voter turnout**

Out of the 248 males, 54% of voted, and out of the 244 females, 56.6% voted, again not significant at the 5% level of confidence ( $\chi^2$  (1, N= 492) = 1.99, p = 0.37).

### **Age and voter turnout**

Within the four age categories (18 -28; 29 – 39; 40 – 50; 51 – 61; 62 – 72 and 73 years and above), the 40 – 50 year old category had the highest voter turn (72.9%) and the group with the lowest voter turnout was people over 73 years in age (36.7%). These differences were significant at the 1% level ( $\chi^2$  (1, N = 477) = 22.16, p = 0.0140 suggesting that there is a relationship between voting in CBNRM elections and the age of the respondents.

## **Do CBNRM Benefits Influence Participation in Elections?**

Similar to AGM attendance analysis, (chapter 3) the relationship between provision of CBNRM benefits and voting was examined.

### **Cash benefits and voter turnout**

Of the 279 respondents who got cash benefits, 99 (35.5%) voted in the CBNRM elections. Of the 205 who didn't get cash benefits, 42 (20.5%) voted in the elections. This difference was statistically significant at the 0.1% level ( $\chi^2$  (1, N = 484) = 14.13, p = 0.001), confirming a strong association between respondents receiving cash and voting in CBNRM elections.

### **Employment benefit and voter turnout**

Similarly, of the 252 respondents who had some form of employment within the CBNRM programs, 101(40.1%) voted in the elections, compared to only 30% (i.e.58 out

of 194) who didn't have any employment in the programs. This difference was nearly significant at the 5% significance level ( $\chi^2 (1, N = 446) = 5.13, p = 0.077$ ).

### **Social benefits and voter turnout**

Of the 278 respondents who received some form of social benefits 42.4% had voted, compared to 25% (53 out of 209) who had not received social benefits but still voted. Although this difference was smaller, it was significant at the 0.15 level ( $\chi^2 (1, N = 487) = 15.4, p = 0.000$ ).

### **Preference of voting method**

In addition to assessing the frequency of voting, respondents were asked to rank the method of voting they preferred (Table 4-3). The majority of respondents from Khwai (92.3%), Mababe (68%) and Sankuyo (77.1%) preferred voting by show of hands. The majority of respondents from Kasempa (85.7%) and Mulendema (85.1%) preferred voting by secret ballot. Responses from OCT community were not included in this part of the analysis as this data was not collected in the OCT case study. These results show that the majority of respondents had knowledge on the voting methods as articulated in their community constitutions. Very few respondents ranked appointment by Headman and Wildlife authority as a method of voting. This is another indication of the acceptance of the election method for the communities practicing CBNRM.

### **Factors Predicting Voter Turn out**

Studies on macro level elections show that various factors predict voter turnout at elections. For this study, two models were developed to gain an understanding on what factors predict participation in CBNRM elections. These factors are examined at both the community and the individual level using logistic regression analysis.

## **Model One - Does the provision of CBNRM incentives predict participation in elections?**

This model was developed with the objective of understanding whether CBNRM incentives given at the individual household are predictors of participation in CBNRM elections. Similar to the analysis of AGM attendance, CBNRM benefits of cash, employment and social were included in the model as predictors. According to (Mueller and Stratmann 2003) high levels of participation in elections are associated with more equal distribution of income. According to (Mueller and Stratmann 2003) high levels of participation in elections are associated with more equal distribution of income. Based on this theoretical argument therefore, respondents who receive any form of CBNRM household benefits should therefore participate in CBRNM elections.

Secondly there ought to be higher levels of participation in CBNRM elections among community members with higher socioeconomic status (i.e. higher education) when compared to those with little or no education.

The two Hypotheses for the first model therefore included: -

- Hypothesis 1: Community members who receive either social or economic benefits from CBNRM are more likely to participate in elections.
- Hypothesis 2: Community members with higher education (higher socioeconomic status) are more likely to participate in elections when compared to members with little or no education (lower socioeconomic status).

The dependent variable in the first model was 'participation in elections' (did you vote in CBO elections?) categorized as either 'yes' or 'no' (Table 4-4). Independent variables included the demographic variables of age, gender, education levels and three variables for CBNRM benefits (cash, employment and social).

## **Summary of results**

Results in the model (Table 4-5) show five of the variables are statistically significant. These include age (40 – 50 & 51 – 61 year olds), education (*secondary*) and CBNRM cash and social benefits. The variables of gender, several age groups (29 – 39, 62 – 73 years and above) and CBNRM employment benefits are not statistically significant.

The effect of being in the 40 – 50 year old age group was substantively higher when compared to the effect of other independent variables.

## **Interpretation of results**

The results of the model show that respondents from age groups between 40 – 50 & 51 – 61 years old are more likely to vote in CBNRM elections when compared to respondents who are between the ages of 18 – 28. Respondents between 40 – 51 years old are 126% more likely to vote in CBNRM elections when compared to those between the ages of 18 – 28 years old. Further respondents between the ages of 51 – 61 years old are 111% more likely to vote in CBNRM elections when compared to those between the ages of 18 – 28 years old.

Regards to education, the results show that respondents with secondary education are less likely to vote in CBNRM elections when compared to those with no education. The results show that the odds of respondents with secondary education voting decrease by 43% when compared to those with no education.

Finally the results indicate that the odds of respondents who receive cash and social benefits voting, increases by 99% and 96% respectively. These results show that based on our hypothesis, CBNRM incentives are important indicators of predicting voter turnout in CBNRM elections. Specifically they disclose that cash and social benefits are

significant incentives that predict voter turnout. In contrast, employment benefits do not have an effect on predicting voter turnout.

### **Model Two - Does the size of the community predict participation in CBNRM elections?**

Riker and Ordeshook, argue that the cost of participating in elections is an important predictor of voter turnout. Small increases in the cost of voting can have significant impact on voter turnout levels (Riker and Ordeshook 1968). In our sample, the single-village communities are smaller than the component villages in the multi-village communities. Not only is it therefore logically easier to meet, but we also know that single villages had much higher levels of benefit so elections were more meaningful. In our sample therefore, the cost of participating in elections in single villages should be lower when compared to that of participating in multi village communities. Based on this premise we proposed the following hypothesis: -

- Hypothesis 3: Single village CBNRM communities are more likely to have higher levels of participation in elections when compared to multi village CBNRM communities.

The second model tests whether size and community characteristics of the villages add explanatory power to the first model. This model predicts participation in elections from size of the village (a dichotomy variable), and community characteristics (a categorical variable with 5 levels, with the reference variable = Mulendema). The likelihood ratio chi-square of 94.71 with a p-value of 0.000 tells us that our model as a whole fits significantly better than an empty model.

### **Summary of results**

Results show that election participation of members between the ages of 40 – 50, and 51 – 61 are statistically significant when compared to those in the 18 – 28 age

groups. Further the model shows that participation in elections of respondents from Kasempa, Khwai and Sankuyo community is statistically significant when compared to participation in elections of respondents from Mulendema community.

There is no statistical difference between election participation of respondents from Mababe and OCT when compared to those from Mulendema. Further there is no statistical significant difference of males and females' regards voter turnout.

### **Interpretation of results**

Regards to age and voter turnout, the model illustrates, that the odds of voting increases by 151.5% and 280% respectively for respondents who are between the ages of 40 – 50 and 51 – 61. This shows that participation in CBNRM elections is higher for members of the community who are in the 40 – 61 year old age range. The results show that younger members of the community are not participating as much as the middle-aged members.

With respect to the CBNRM community and voter turnout, the results show that the odds of participating in elections increases by 151% for respondents from Sankuyo; 131% for Khwai and 56% for Kasempa residents when compared to those voting in Mulendema community (reference community). Among the CBNRM communities included in the sample, Mulendema had the lowest voter turnout.

### **Quality of Elections**

In addition to understanding voter turnout and factors influencing it, the quality of the elections is another important attribute of democratic elections. In this study, quality of elections was operationalized as how free and fair the last CBNRM elections were. This particular variable is key in ensuring an important distinction is made between whether processes are acceptable or not (Lindberg 2006 p. 35). Respondents had the

option of choosing from six categories of answers that included ‘very fair’, ‘somewhat fair’, ‘not fair’, ‘bad’, ‘not interested’ and ‘don’t know’. Each of the first four options had an explanation to help the respondents with clarifying what was meant by ‘free and fair’ elections (Table 4-8).

The results show (Table 4-8) that a larger percentage of respondents from Khwai (61.8%), Sankuyo (61.4%) and Kasempa (59%) community chose the option of elections being very free and fair i.e. they were able to choose their candidates with freedom. In comparison, fewer respondents from Mababe (17%) and Mulendema (12.5%) responded that the elections were free and fair.

Regarding the option of elections being ‘not fair’ (i.e. not able to choose my candidate well), 27.3% of Khwai respondents, 15.1% from Sankuyo, 15% from Mababe, 10.9% from OCT, 4.3% from Kasempa and 0.8% from Mulendema chose this option. In the case of Mulendema however over 50% of respondents answered ‘don’t know’. This further supports the responses that only 42.5% of respondents had voted in the elections.

This data suggests complex underlying factors. Khwai has a bimodal distribution of satisfaction with election, probably reflecting the two factions vying for power. At the time of the surveys, Mababe was struggling with leadership issues and the AGM had broken up because of conflicts, though people were satisfied with general meetings. Sankuyo is coasting along nicely, and we observed that Kasempa was well supported by ZAWA’s community facilitators. We have already mentioned elite capture in both OCT and Mulendema, which probably accounts for lower levels of satisfaction in election, and some 40% or more of respondents not ranking elections at all.

## **Discussion**

This study's objective was to understand participation in CBNRM elections.

According to Dahl three institutional attributes enhance participation and contestation in actual democracies, i.e. 'the right to vote'; 'the right to compete for support and vote'; and 'the guarantee for free and fair elections' (Dahl 1971). Our study examined these attributes by assessing participation in CBNRM elections, factors that influenced this participation, and finally the quality of CBNRM elections.

### **Participation in Elections**

Our results show that participation in elections was good (above 60%), in Khwai and Sankuyo (single villages) and Kasempa (multi) community. On average, these three communities should have had at least three elections since their establishment, and supporting secondary documentation suggests that these communities have held regular elections according to their constitutions and members in the community show a strong indication that they are participating in these elections. Leadership positions in Khwai are particularly highly contested, with community records and interviews confirming four changes of leadership since its establishment. Khwai community had one powerful family in CBNRM leadership from its inception (2002 – 2006). In 2007 at a special general meeting, community members used a vote of no confidence to vote out the family that had ties to the Ward councilor and one of the more influential Head men in the community. A new Board was elected in 2007, and at the time of this research in 2009, community members were generally confident in this Board<sup>2</sup>. This backdrop of

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<sup>2</sup> However, in 2011, this board was entirely replaced, and interviews with the Manager revealed concerns that the new board was comprised of young people who may be radical and inexperienced in CBNRM management. Indeed, while the managers of Khwai, Sankuyo and Mababe generally supported the

contestation among community members in Khwai provides further understanding of why there was higher participation in elections in Khwai when compared to the other communities in the sample. This community, through its own internal village dynamics, has managed to create a system of governance that allows members the right to vote and chose their leaders. They have further learned to use democratic institutions such as elections to hold their leaders accountable, and when they don't perform vote them out of office. However, there are also signs that in the absence of oversight and support from NGOs and other CBNRM support organizations there is a risk of ochlocracy, and the rule of passion over reason (Madison 1787 p. 342)<sup>3</sup>.

For Kasempa, interviews show that this community has been having regular elections at the village level. Since its establishment in 2003, this community has held a total of three elections. According to interviews, these elections have been highly contested with campaign's being characterized by candidates wooing voters through provision of buckets of maize, cooking oil and seeds (pers comm). Interviews in all the five village area groups in Kasempa indicate that elections held at the village level are highly contested and, in turn, large numbers of community members vote in these elections. Unfortunately due to lack of records of voter numbers, it was difficult to verify this. The survey results are therefore our main source of information on levels of

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rights of communities to elect their leaders, they also noted how hard it was to work in such small communities where outcomes were often associated with bickering and decisions affected by personality differences. Specifically, managers noted that conflicts of interest were almost unavoidable in small communities. They employed community members as a social benefit, but it was extremely hard to discipline these community employees who might have significant power in (or to influence) the board, and therefore 'get their own back' on the managers.

<sup>3</sup> For instance, when communities were first empowered to partner with the private sector to manage hunting and tourism, they often replaced partners willy-nilly for ad-hoc or personal reasons, creating significant turbulence in the sector without any clear or logical benefits.

participation in CBNRM elections; in future; it would be useful to assess this data using more objective data such as a list of voters.

Results for Sankuyo indicate that approximately 59.4% of respondents voted in CBNRM elections. Within the sample, Sankuyo was one of the oldest communities, established in 1995. Since its inception, this community should have held a total of over five elections. The results however indicate that voter turnout was a bit mediocre. As part of this research, Sankuyo elections were observed in June 2009. Participation at these elections was relatively low and consisted of mostly elderly women and men (above 50 years old), a few young men and women, the Kgosi (Chief), and National Parks staff (who facilitated the elections) and some local district council representatives. Elections were included as part of a broader meeting agenda that included discussion of a marketing strategy, new policies and procedures and a new land use plan. Elections for new Trust leaders were the last agenda item. National parks staff facilitated the elections and members voted by show of hands. One of the notable features of this election was that a large group of the members of the working age (30 – 50) was not present. Through interviews it was discovered that a larger number of households were not represented as the heads were working in tourism camps as this was peak tourism period. Both results from the survey and observation of an actual election in Sankuyo demonstrate that though this community is having elections, participation is relatively poor, with mainly the elderly and young unemployed members of the community participating in elections. However, the results of “Dashboard” surveys and familiarity with CBNRM communities in the region by the University of Florida research group suggest that people in Sankuyo are generally satisfied with their programme, and more

satisfied than any other community that was surveyed. Sankuyo is generally well managed, money is accounted for, and people are benefiting widely, suggesting that in such circumstances AGMs and elections become routine, and that moderate levels of satisfied voters may indicate an optimal position.

Voter participation in elections in Mababe (46%), Mulendema (42%) and OCT (43.9%) was relatively low. This was particularly interesting for the Mababe community which was established in 2000. This community should have held an average of more than three elections since its inception. According to community records a total of five Boards had been in office since 2000. The only period with a stable Board according to constitutional rules was between February 2004 and 2006. At the time of the research in June 2009, a new Board had just been voted in. Interviews indicated that this had been done through a vote of no confidence in the 2006 – 2009 Board. Participation in Mababe elections demonstrates that there is some level of contestation for leadership positions. This community has held more elections than they are required to constitutionally. This in turn should reflect the levels of community members voting, but our survey results indicate that in the last five years only 46.5% of the respondents had voted. Other records suggest that this community is not well organized, but is nonetheless benefiting from a lot of jobs and meat from hunting.

Finally, the results for Mulendema and OCT reflect the poor governance systems in both communities. Both Mulendema and OCT are multi village communities where governance has been hijacked by a few elite members who have deliberately manipulated democratic institutions such as elections. Both Mulendema and OCT have had the same Board Chairperson's since their inception in 2003 and 1995 respectively.

## **Factor Predicting Participation in Elections**

In addition to assessing participation in CBNRM elections, our study examined the factors that influence participation using two logistic regression models. Results of the chi square tests of association and the logistic regression show a strong statistical significance in how CBNRM benefits (cash and social) influence voting. Mueller and Stratmann argue that participation in democratic institutions such as macro elections are associated with more equal distribution of incomes or revenues (Mueller and Stratmann 2003). In the sample of 492 respondents, the odds of voting in CBNRM elections by respondents are much higher for respondents who had received cash, and social benefits. This implies that community participation in democratic institutions increases if they are economically meaningful. Improving democratic governance in CBNRM communities therefore is linked to the overall level of benefit, the influence of participatory process on the distribution of these benefits, and the accrual or perception of benefits at the household level. Communities that are distributing benefits more effectively are more likely to have constituents engage in selecting their leaders and ultimately improving accountability in these systems.

Finally, another factor that has influenced participation in macro elections is the cost of participation (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). We assessed this by comparing participation in voting between single and multi-villages on the premise that the cost of participating in elections in single villages is lower. Our results indicate there is no statistical difference between voting in single and multi-villages. However there is a statistical difference in individual community effects. Both Khwai and Sankuyo show a higher percentage of voting when compared to the multi village communities in the sample.

Participation in elections tends to be higher in small villages where the benefits of participation are higher and the costs of participation are lower. However, sound organization can increase the level of participation above what our models predict (e.g. Kasempa), and conversely poor organization can reduce the level below what we hope (e.g. Mababe). Very high levels of participation may be linked to conflict or contestation, and perhaps even ochlocracy (e.g. Khwai) and smooth running democracies may be associated with good but not exceptional levels of participation in elections (e.g. Sankuyo). However, democratic institutions such as elections are more prone to being manipulated by leaders, and this risk of elite capture appears to be higher in multi village communities, occurring in two of our three multi-villages but not being sustained in any of the three single village communities. Such risks can be addressed by encouraging more decentralized forms of governance right at the household and village level.

In conclusion, participation in elections increases where democratic institutions become more meaningful to the community and are trusted, at least to some extent. This occurs where they are associated with the management and distribution of higher levels of benefits, as we see with cash, social benefits and, to some extent, employment. It also occurs where participation itself is meaningful through either the small size of the community, situations where sound democratic processes enhance participation, or both.

Table 4-1. Crosstabs of voter turnout

	Did you vote in CBO elections		% VOTED		Chi2 (p<)	
	YES (N)	NO (N)	TOTAL (N)	ATTENDEES		
<b>VARIABLE</b>						
<b>COMMUNITY</b>						
Khwai	49	6	55	89.1	75.33	
Mababe	23	27	50	46.0	0.00	
Sankuyo	41	28	69	59.4		
Kasempa	73	22	95	76.8		
Mulendema	48	65	113	42.5		
OCT	54	69	123	43.9		
<b>EDUCATION</b>						
No Education	76	56	132	56.3	9.37	
Primary	75	44	119	60.5	0.497	
Secondary	101	92	193	51.1		
College	10	15	25	40.0		
<b>GENDER</b>						
Male	134	105	248	54.03	1.99	
Female	138	102	244	56.6	0.37	
<b>AGE</b>						
18 - 28	70	59	129	52.6	22.16	
29 - 39	66	60	126	51.6	0.014	
40 - 50	62	23	85	72.9		
51 - 61	38	26	64	57.6		
62 - 72	27	16	43	58.7		
73+	11	17	30	36.7		

Table 4-2. Voter turnout & benefits

Cross-tabulations on Voting in CBO elections

Did you vote in CBO elections?

	YES (N)	NO (N)	TOTAL (N)	% VOTED	ATTENDEES	Chi2 (p<)
CBNRM Cash Benefits						
Yes	99	180	279	35.4	14.13	
No	42	163	205		0.001	
TOTAL (N)	141	343				
CBNRM Employment Benefits						
Yes	101	151	252	40.1	5.13	
No	58	136	194		0.077	
CBNRM Social Benefits						
Yes	118	160	278	42.4	15.4	
No	53	156	209		0.000	

Table 4-3. Frequency of elections

How many times have you voted in CBO Elections?

	Khwai	Mababe	Sankuyo	Kasempa	Mulendema	OCT
Once (N)	1	7	7	29	25	40
Twice (N)	4	5	8	29	44	13
Three times or more (N)	50	37	48	36	7	29
Never voted (N)	0	0	6	0	32	41
Total	55	49	69	94	109	123
% Voted more than four times	90.9	75.5	69.6	38.3	6.4	23.6

Table 4-4. Preference of voting method

Please rank the method of voting you prefer, starting with your highest preference first

	Khwai (%)	Mababe (%)	Sankuyo (%)	Kasempa (%)	Mulendema (%)
Appointed by Headman	0.0	0.0	1.4	3.1	0.0
Appointed by Wildlife department	0.0	4.0	7.1	2.0	0.0
Vote by hand	92.3	68.0	77.1	9.2	0.0
Vote by secret ballot	7.7	28.0	14.3	85.7	85.1
Don't know	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	14.2
N	52	50	70	98	94

Table 4-5. Variables in model

Variable	Description
Dependent: didyouvote~w	Did you vote in the last CBO elections? (Yes or No)
Independent:	
Age	How old are you?
Age1	18 – 28
Age 2	29 – 39
Age 3	40 – 50
Age 4	51 – 61
Age 5	62 – 72
Age 6	73+
primary	Primary education
secondary	Secondary education
college	College education
sexf	Gender of respondent
Cbnrm_cash	CBNRM cash benefits
Cbnrm_employment	CBNRM employment benefits
Cbnrm_social	CBNRM social benefits
Kasemp	Kasempa
Khwai	Khwai
Mababe	mababe
Sankuyo	Sankuyo
OCT	OCT
Cbo_scale	Size of village

Table 4-6. Binary equation: factor change in odds of voting

didyouvote	b	P>z	e^b**	%aa
Age: 29 - 39	0.295	0.317	-1.221	34
Age: 40 - 50	0.817	0.015	-0.202	126
Age: 51 - 61	0.749	0.043	-0.289	111
Age: 62 - 72	-0.032	0.937	3.442	-3
Age: 73+	-0.369	0.377	0.997	-31
Education: Primary	-0.048	0.87	3.037	-5
Education: Secondary	-0.555	0.055	0.589	-43
Education: College	-0.550	0.285	0.598	-42
Gender (Male = 1)	0.013	0.945	4.343	1
Benefit_Cash	0.688	0.014	0.374	99
Benefit_Employment	-0.239	0.357	-1.431	-21
Benefit_Social	0.672	0.005	-0.397	96

\*\* e^b = exp(b) = factor change in odds for unit increase in X

aa percentage change in odds for unit increase in X

No. of observations = 492, \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05 & \*p<0.1

Table 4-7. Binary Equation: factor Change in Odds of Voting

didyouvote	b	P>z $e^b^{**}$		% <sup>aa</sup>
Age: 29 - 39	0.333	0.271	-1.099	41
Age: 40 - 50	0.864	0.011***	-0.146	151
Age: 51 - 61	1.224	0.003***	0.202	280
Age: 62 - 72	0.113	0.798	-2.18	17
Age: 73+	-0.096	0.975	-2.343	-1
Education: Primary	-0.336	0.810	-1.091	-8
Education:				
Secondary	-0.491	0.494	-0.711	-20
Education: College	-0.133	0.891	-2.017	-7
Gender (Male = 1)	-0.078	0.855	-2.551	-4
Benefit_Cash	0.825	0.019	-0.192	717
Benefit_Employment	0.016	0.960	-4.135	523
Benefit_Social	0.342	0.211	-1.073	-6
cbo_scale	0.075	0.942	-2.59	80
kasemp	1.822	0.000***	0.5999	56
khwai	1.465	0.035***	0.382	131
mababe	-0.231	0.271	-1.465	41
sankuyo	0.506	0.011***	-0.681	151
OCT	0.184	0.575	-1.693	280

\*\*  $e^b = \exp(b)$  = factor change in odds for unit increase in X

<sup>aa</sup> percentage change in odds for unit increase in X

No. of observations = 492, \*\*\* $p<0.01$ , \*\* $p<0.05$  & \* $p<0.1$

Table 4-8. Quality of elections

Do you think the elections were free and fair?	Khwai (%)	Mababe (%)	Sankuyo (%)	Kasempa (%)	Mulendema (%)	OCT (%)
Very fair (was able to choose my candidate with freedom)	61.8	17.0	61.4	59.0	12.5	38.8
Somewhat fair (free to choose my candidate ok)	9.1	34.0	11.4	5.0	25.8	10.1
Not fair (not able to choose my candidate well)	27.3	15.1	4.3	15.0	0.8	10.9
Bad (only a few people participated)	-	7.5	1.4	7.0	-	3.1
Not interested	1.8	17.0	20.0	6.0	8.3	17.1
Don't know	-	9.4	1.4	8.0	52.5	20.2
N	55	53	70	100	120	129

## CHAPTER 5

### DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALIZATION THE ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR CBNRM

#### **Performance of CBNRM Programs in Southern Africa**

The performance of CBNRM programs in Southern Africa has received criticism in its poor delivery of social, economic and conservation measures (Bond 2001, Emerton 2001). The basis of this criticism ranges from its lack of downward accountability to its intended for constituents (Shackleton, Campbell et al. 2002, Dalal-Clayton 2003, Jones and Murphree 2004, Murphree 2004) its limitation to achieve market-based solutions for improved efficiency in the management of natural resources (Dressler, Buscher et al. 2010); and its failure to deliver to both to communities and the environment (Blaike 2006 p. 1947). These criticisms broadly address the challenges of implementing CBNRM and in recent years, scholarship has grown in understanding these challenges through adaptive learning processes (Armitage 2005).

These macro challenges have been examined primarily through the processes of natural resource decentralization (Agrawal and Ribot 1999, Agrawal 2001). These studies focus on factors that motivate states to devolve power to the periphery and the outcomes of these institutional changes and motivations (Agrawal and Ribot 1999, Blair 2000, Cheema 2007, Grindle 2007). These studies in their aim to understand the transfer of resource rights from the state to local communities fall short in understanding how micro level community institutions to which power is decentralized work. Ostrom advocates for a broader understanding of the interaction between macro and micro institutions involved in this institutional transfer of resource rights. She argues that understanding how social ecological systems function begins by understanding the multi-level nested framework that examines interactions and outcomes of four

subsystems (resource systems, resource units, governance systems and users) (Ostrom 2009 p. 419 - 422). Understanding the interaction and outcomes of governance systems in CBNRM therefore requires a clear examination of the relationship between macro, meso and micro level processes and institutions (Child and Barnes 2010). In the case of CBNRM, this requires not only understanding what motivates states to decentralize resource rights to local communities, but further to understand how these communities perform within these institutional changes. In Southern Africa, assessment of CBNRM programs, rarely takes into consideration, how communities organize or govern themselves and the enabling environment that creates these conditions. First and second generation CBNRM programs mainly focused on macro level factors such as the process of decentralization and ensuring the communities were provided with economic incentives in order to achieve conservation outcomes. This approach was particularly evident during the donor funded initial projects in southern Africa, and there are few studies during this period that actually examined how these micro community institutions of governance perform within broader macro conditions.

In this chapter, we broadly examine the institutional changes that have taken place in CBNRM in Botswana and Zambia. We ask the question: "*Has CBNRM created the institutional change that decentralizes wildlife management in Botswana and Zambia?*"

The first section of this chapter explores the question of decentralization as it relates to Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) performance and the macro political factors that have shaped the performance of CBNRM in the two countries of study i.e. Botswana and Zambia. This is undertaken by examining factors that influenced policy directives that decentralized power from the state to local

communities in wildlife areas. Finally the paper examines how these policy directives have affected the performance of six CBNRM communities in Botswana and Zambia on measures of democratic governance and distribution of CBNRM benefits.

## **Theoretical Framework**

### **Decentralization in CBNRM: Exploring the Concepts and Principles**

In CBNRM decentralization, the devolution of authority over and responsibility for wildlife resources outside the national parks to land owners and occupiers was an imperative which had to be achieved in its formative stages. Coupled with long-term economic incentives this was aimed at improving habitat and species status (Hulme and Murphree 2001). The extent to which devolution in CBNRM has delivered its intended goals is understudied. Is devolution simply rhetorical in CBNRM, or does it contribute to CBNRM governance and how does it shape itself in proprietorship communities? This section is a literature review that explores the scholarship undertaken, on decentralization in the broader sense; on devolution; democratic governance and democratic decentralization in natural resource management. The primary objective is to gain a clearer understanding of these concepts; to develop hypotheses in the context of CBNRM governance; and in turn identify indicators for testing these hypotheses. This is undertaken by asking two questions: -

- What is the purpose of decentralization in CBNRM?
- What type of devolution has been undertaken in CBNRM in the countries of study, and what are the key indicator variables that can be used to measure its performance?

### **Decentralization - the big picture**

Decentralization is a broad concept. As a means it can improve efficiency and effectiveness of public services. As an end itself, it can promote the basic principles of

democratic governance (Cheema 2007). Most authors agree that decentralization within the state involves the transfer of authority to perform some services from an individual or an agency in central government to some other individual or agency which is closer to the public to be served. The basis for transfer is often territorial however it can also be made functionally: that is transferring authority to an agency that is functionally specialized. Such transfers are of three main types: -

- First is when the delegation is within formal political structures (for example when the central government delegates additional authority to local government).
- Second is the transfer within the public administrative or parastatal structures.
- Third is when the transfer is from an institution of the state to a non-state state agency (Turner and Hulme 1997).

This criterion is similar to that earlier proposed by Rondinelli. Rondinelli distinguishes the concept of decentralization into three types, namely: -

- “Deconcentration: through which central government personnel are assigned to localities away from the governmental centre;
- Delegation: through which control is granted to state enterprises, lower-level governmental actors, or non-governmental actors, but the higher-level authorities retain the discretion to reassert their control;
- Devolution: through which higher-level authorities grant or recognize the formal permanent control by lower-level governmental or nongovernmental actors (Rondinelli 1981 p. 133 - 145). ”

It is important to note here, that in the case of decentralization in (CB) NRM, the third criterion proposed by Turner and Hulme in 1997, and Rondenelli in 1981 is what has taken place. The state institution i.e. the Department of Wildlife and National Parks enabled the transfer of wildlife management to local communities residing on wildlife estates. This process has taken place in several Southern African countries, beginning with Zimbabwe under the CAMPFIRE program, and more recently in Namibia. These three categories of decentralization provide useful analytical tools for assessing (CB) NRM outcomes. Using the above criterion, one could then take a country by country

case study and examine the forms of decentralization that have been undertaken and the outcomes that result as a consequence of this process.

Decentralization where implemented, however does not always operate in the same manner. Grindle in her work on decentralization and local governments in Latin America confirms that decentralization is a process that unfolds over time; more important it is neither a linear process nor one that necessarily results in similar outcomes (Grindle 2007). In her work on the effects of decentralization on thirty Mexican municipalities, she examines how local governments respond when they are assigned new responsibilities and resources. In the 1980s, the government of Mexico transferred control over property taxes, and the responsibility of services such as sewage, and solid waste management to municipal governments. Grindle shows how with this transfer of financial power, there was increasing competition among opposition candidates to contest for positions in the municipal offices, particularly for local elites. Grindle argues that decentralization increased opportunities for new groups to gain political power. The outcome of this however was this didn't create an enabling environment for good governance; instead it resulted in higher competition among interest groups that stalled development.

### **Devolution a form of decentralization**

Devolution is the ideal form of decentralization that is advocated for in (CB) NRM in southern Africa. Devolution of powers and resources to local governments and actors has been the foundation for promoting sustainable decentralization in developing countries. Advocates argue that local governments and actors with decision making power, authority and resources play a more catalytic role in economic and social development. The premise is that citizens are more likely to participate actively in local

political processes where local governments are perceived to have the capacity to make political and financial decisions affecting their economic and social welfare. Transferring power and authority from the central government to sub national administrative and local government units and opening the political process to widespread participation provide an institutional framework for local autonomy and empower communities to pursue local aspirations (Grindle 2007). Devolution is aimed at creating or strengthening independent units of government or non-state actors by devolving functions and authority. Its fundamental characteristics are the autonomous nature of local units of government, legally recognized geographical boundaries within which they exercise their authority, and the power of local governments to mobilize resources to perform their tasks (Cheema 2007).

The classical model of devolved local government was advocated in the 1960s as the blueprint that newly-independent countries should pursue (Hicks and Hicks 1961, Maddick 1963) . It had five main features: -

- “A local body that was constitutionally separate from central government and responsible for a range of significant local services.
- It should have its own treasury, budget and accounts along with subnational authority to raise its own revenue.
- It should employ its own competent staff who it can hire, fire and promote.
- A majority-elected council, operating on party lines, should decide policy and determine internal procedures.
- Central government administrators should serve purely as external advisors and inspectors and have no role within the local authority (Mawhood 1983 p. 12). ”

It can be said that these principles are still being used to define devolution at local government level. These five features maybe several decades old, however, they are still relevant to the devolution process. What would be strikingly interesting is to assess if these measures would also apply to devolution of natural resources in CBNRM.

Two forms of devolution in local governments have been implemented in developing countries. The first is political devolution which provides a legal basis for the exercise of power at the local level and enables citizens to influence local policy making and priority setting. The second is fiscal devolution which assigns functions and revenues to subnational and local governments the resources by which to implement local policies and programs (Grindle 2007). There are however many challenges that hinder effective devolution of financial and political authority to local governments. Both supporters and opponents of devolution agree that without adequate mechanisms of accountability and for combating corruption at the local level, devolution could lead to inefficiencies, misuse of resources and loss of citizens' trust in the local political process (Cheema 2007).

### **Decentralization and devolution in natural resources management**

So how then are these principles elaborated in natural resource management? Scholars of decentralization and natural resources argue that decentralization through the lens of natural resources provide sharp optic insights into decentralization writ large – not just into natural resources (Ribot and Larson 2004). They elaborate that this optic is particularly powerful since natural resources differ from other sectors in ways that augment and throw into relief decentralization's potential and risks as a lever for local democratization and development. Natural resources are at once critical for local livelihoods (subsistence and income generation) and are also the basis of significant wealth for governments and national elites. As such they have historically been a point of struggle between rural people and these elites. With decentralization, natural resource transfers is a great opportunity for increasing the relevance of local authorities

to local people, yet is simultaneously a threat to central authorities and elites who fear loss of income or patronage resources.

Other scholars focusing on governance of natural resources on the commons elaborate on the importance of institutions for governing the commons. They outline that in the absence of effective governance institutions at the appropriate scale, natural resources and the environment are in peril from increasing human population, consumption, and development of advanced technology for resource use, all of which have reached unprecedented levels (Deitz, Ostrom et al. 2003).

In natural resource management, democratic decentralization is premised on new local institutions that are representative of and accountable to local populations and have secure autonomous domains of powers to make and implement meaningful decisions (Ribot 2002). This should be the most effective and efficient way of encouraging the local authorities to serve the needs and desires of their constituents. With regard to natural resources however democratic decentralization has proven difficult to find and the results of existing policies are highly varied (Ribot 2004). Measuring the impact of decentralization policies is particularly hard, however (Agrawal and Ribot 1999) provide a framework called the actor, powers and accountability framework for analyzing the type and extent of decentralization that has taken place in a specific country. In particular the framework considers: -

- The powers and accompanying resources actually transferred to lower-level actors to determine an autonomous domain of decision making actually exists around issues of local significance.
- The local-level entities receiving powers and their relation to the population in order to understand the extent to which these are both representative of and downwardly accountable to local peoples.

Other authors such as (Ascher 2007) emphasize the continued role of government following devolution of natural resource management to local communities. Ascher argues that devolution by no means implies that Government should withdraw completely, despite the temptation for the Government to reduce accountability and costs. The abandonment of Government responsibilities can easily undermine the reestablishment of sound community-based resource management. Government's role should be maintained to uphold appropriate boundaries and the user rights of the community, making it clear that the Government is recognizing user rights rather than granting such rights; enforces rules against spillover damage, when communities cannot resolve these problems; increase the availability of market-rate credit; and support research and development, provide technical assistance and training (Ascher 2007).

### **Devolution an enabling condition of CBNRM governance**

The success of CBNRM is highly dependent on several factors, key among which is the importance of a macro level-enabling environment. In CBNRM, this includes policy and legislative changes that support devolution of the governance and management of natural resources to the local level, the building of local level capacities to take on these responsibilities, and the tracking of performance (to support adaptive management) and conformance with CBNRM principles (to protect the conditions in which CBNRM is theorized to be most successful). Ideally, local control over decisions and sources of revenue is intended to increase the autonomy of local communities from central government and other powerful actors, to empower communities economically, and to engender local resourcefulness. The decentralization of natural resource management in southern Africa is particularly evident in the wildlife sector. Ideally these

conditions are achieved by devolving rights, benefits, authority and responsibility from the State to local non-state actors (Murphree 2000). This has rarely been achieved in Southern Africa. Conceptually, southern African scholar-practitioners have defined the ideal end point as a situation where the rights to use, manage and benefit from natural resources are fully devolved to the level of a “Village Company”, thus replicating the devolution of rights to use wildlife to private landholders (Martin 1986). The second challenge is to develop systems of micro-governance whereby these rights are managed to provide public benefits in the form of improved natural resource management, increased income, equitable benefit sharing and political participation. The only place where devolution has fulfilled the first set of conditions is on private land in Zimbabwe through the bold Parks and Wild Life Act of 1975, as even in South Africa and Namibia the state places considerably more restrictions on private wildlife management than on the management of livestock.

The intention to replicate the success of private land conservation in southern Africa on communal lands was led by Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE programme, which set out to implement the theoretically ideal conditions outlined above in key government documents (Martin 1986). While the wildlife agency fully intended to replicate full devolution as had occurred on private land on communal lands, its power was limited by the need to cooperate with the powerful ministry of local government. The Parks and Wild Life Act was amended in 1982 to allow full devolution to district councils, with an understanding that these rights would be withdrawn if the district councils failed to further devolve benefits and authority to communities. This ‘strategic compromise’ is explained in lucid detail by (Murphree 2005, Murphree 2005). Working through district

councils was a two-edged sword. On the one hand, it provided long term capacity support still evident in some districts today where community revenue distribution and quota setting still takes place more than ten years after donor and NGO support was withdrawn. On the other, the wildlife agency made a crucial mistake right at the beginning of CAMPFIRE when it issued a letter stating that at least 50% of revenues should be devolved to communities, and subsequent attempts to increase this amount to 80% were strongly resisted. These lessons were shared with Namibia and Botswana in particular. Thus, when both of these programmes were developed they bypassed district government structures. Like Zimbabwe, Namibia encased its CBNRM intentions in legislation which allowed communities to voluntarily create “conservancies” which then retained 100% of the income from wildlife tourism and hunting. Initially, there were strong concerns that the ministry was undermining CBNRM, for example, by retaining the control of quotas but this was addressed through advocacy. Botswana’s CBNRM programme was neither initiated nor protected through national legislation. Rather, communities were given 15 year Head Leases through the Land Boards which allowed them to retain most income from wildlife. The wildlife department sets quotas and has not devolved any responsibility for wildlife management such as patrolling, and it also charges the standard (albeit low) permit fees for hunting that takes place in communal lands. In the case of elephants this is currently P20, 000 compared to a trophy fee for elephants that varies around P90, 000. Nelson and Agrawal claim that the only CBNRM program that comes remotely close to achieving devolution is Namibia where a legislative transfer of rights to local communities has taken place (Nelson and Agrawal 2008), but this is not strictly true as CAMPFIRE was based on legislative rights in the

Parks and Wild Life Act of 1975 (as amended in 1982). Indeed, it was players like Rowan Martin in Zimbabwe that convinced the Namibians of the necessity of legislation who advocated the power of the legislative pen.

Scholar practitioners in CBNRM in southern Africa strongly advocate full devolution of proprietorship of wildlife to local communities. Anticipating (Schlager and Ostrom 1992), this is regularly conceptualized as the rights to (1) retain all benefit from wildlife (2) to allocate and sell wildlife to best advantage, and (3) to have the right to manage it, and even to replace it should this be in the interests of the community. Thus enabling conditions should, ideally, legislate for these rights. In addition, there was strong recognition that the capacity of communities to manage and take advantage of these rights needed to be developed, including through “participatory technology development” and locally implemented “management orientated monitoring systems” (Goredema, Bond et al. 2006, Bond, Goredema et al. 2007, Stuart-Hill, Diggle et al. 2007). This included natural resource management and institutional design and development, though with most support being provided by conservation agencies the latter tended to be neglected, with the main exception being CAMPFIRE. Finally, CBNRM was designed as a policy experiment, and the strong emphasis on adaptive management required macro-level monitoring of performance (natural resource management, benefits, etc.) and conformance to the principles of CBNRM including revenue sharing. With its emphasis on democratization and institutional development, this was most developed in the CAMPFIRE programme as we can see from various summary reports (Child 1996, Bond 2001, CAMPFIRE-Association 2007, Taylor 2009),

and is only beginning to be mentioned in Namibia's otherwise extremely comprehensive reporting systems (NACSO 2008).

This suggests that we can define the enabling environment using the following variables: -

The devolution of rights and these can be devolved legislatively, administratively or de facto and should include: -

- Right to benefit (measured by per cent of revenue getting to community)
- Right to allocate and sell resources (can the community own hunting and tourism joint ventures, or is this done by the government on their behalf?)
- Right to manage (can the community set quotas, exclude others from its resources through game-guards and patrolling, and so on?)

Capacity-building including for: -

- wildlife management (e.g. monitoring, quota-setting, managing safari hunting)
- Selling wildlife (e.g. marketing joint ventures themselves)
- Institutional development (e.g. constitutions, administrative and democratic processes, managing projects, etc.)

Performance and conformance monitoring including:

- Monitoring wildlife populations, income, community satisfaction, etc.
- Monitoring conformance including that budgets are set democratically by community, that finances are reported back to and controlled by the community on a regular basis, and that elections are held regularly.

Assessing the macro factors that enable this process of devolution is important in the broader scheme of measuring CBNRM performance (Child and Barnes 2010). This can be assessed at the country level, through the lenses described above. In the following section we describe the evolution of CBNRM programs in Botswana and Namibia with an emphasis on the macro factors that have shaped the devolution of CBNRM authority and responsibility, or the lack of it, to local communities.

## **Institutional Changes that have Shaped CBNRM in Botswana**

Following the early successes of CAMPFIRE, CBNRM was rapidly adopted in southern Africa. In 1989, the first CBNRM program was implemented under the Natural Resources Management Program (NRMP) in Botswana<sup>1</sup> and this was facilitated in part by the USAID-funded Natural Resource Management Project and played a particularly important role. This was largely managed by what USAID calls an Institutional Contractor, albeit in conjunction with the Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP). Through this project, the first concept of community trusts was implemented, and in line with the Wildlife Policy of 1986 communities could legally acquire benefits from the wildlife resource and manage them. This project focused on developing joint ventures between communities and the private sector as had been pioneered in Zimbabwe and Namibia (Child and Weaver 2006) and resulted in significant increases in revenues, especially from hunting. However, the importance of institutional development and processes was apparently not recognized, and to this day the absence of clear guidelines and capacity building related to community participation and benefit sharing are a serious weakness in the Botswana CBNRM programme. With US\$25 million funding, this project found an environment conducive for CBNRM in Botswana. It took a total of 10 years for CBNRM to evolve in the approach that is now functioning in Botswana. The NRMP was instrumental in shaping the policy directives

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<sup>1</sup> In Zimbabwe, USAID submitted a naïve proposal to support CAMPFIRE in 1989. This was rejected by the wildlife agency, and then rewritten overnight by the agency as the basis of \$30m support for the next 13 years. By 1986, it was noted that USAID supported districts tended to perform less well than those not getting aid, and USAID insisted that the mid-term review get re-written when the observation was made that top-down funding was probably undermining CAMPFIRE's ethos of self-reliance more than it was helping the programme. Namibia was similarly assertive when it came to their dealings with USAID and CBNRM, taking funding only strictly on their own terms.

that defined the CBNRM landscape. Policy development during the NRMP included development of the Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act in 1992, Joint Venture Guidelines 1996/ 1999, resource user leases, CBNRM implementation guidelines and the draft CBNRM policy (Rozemeijer 2003).

Despite the enactment of various policies in tourism and natural resource management, the main transformative policy that can be said to have contributed to the evolution of CBNRM in Botswana was the Wildlife Policy of 1986. The early CBNRM programme in Botswana was based on spirit of this 1986 policy which reflected similar trends in the region regarding using wildlife to generate revenues and devolving wildlife management to communities. This can be regarded as the pioneer policy that created the first directive that allowed local communities to benefit and manage wildlife in Botswana. The Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) through this policy established 20 percent of the country as Wildlife Management Areas where local people could obtain a wildlife quota and consume or sell it for profit (Cassidy 2000). It was designed to encourage local conservation practices by providing people benefits from wildlife and other resources.

At this time, the spirit of devolution and community management was strong, and was quickly reflected in other policies that also emphasized the involvement of local communities in wildlife and natural resource use and management. These included the National Conservation Strategy of 1990; the Tourism Policy of 1990; the Tourism Act of 1992 and the Wildlife and Conservation National Parks Act of 1992. These policies and acts indirectly created the institutional change that decentralized some form of power on natural resource management to the local communities. Despite their inclusion of the

rhetoric of local community participation, these policy directives however didn't contain any specific provisions on how greater community involvement was to be achieved.

In 1995, the Government of Botswana started to make more progressive steps to achieve greater community involvement in wildlife management. As noted, the Government's effort to decentralize wildlife management to local communities was based on administrative procedures rather than legislation and was facilitated by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry which at the time oversaw the Department of Wildlife and National Parks. Towards the end of 1995, the Government began a consultative process with the aim of developing a CBNRM policy. This was intended to begin to formalize the decentralization process, shifting from reliance on administrative decentralization towards entrenching the rights of communities in policy and legislation. From the onset of this institutional change, fiscal decentralization was a consistent directive. It was accepted and promoted by official and civil participants in the process, and indeed fiscal devolution has been a consistent feature of CBNRM and wildlife management in Botswana. As noted, the Government had used administrative decentralization to enable local communities to retain 100% of revenues from lease of land and wildlife quotas from the industry (less permit fees). Through Head Leases, communities acquired autonomy to generate revenue from tourism activities and full discretion over how to use this money. Indeed, problematically communities had been told it was their money to spend as they wished and, in the absence of guidelines or principles of participation, committees spent money freely, which eventually led to accusations that money was being wasted, misused and that ordinary people were not benefiting.

In 1997, the Government introduced the community-based strategy for rural development, within the National Policy for Rural Development. This strategy was driven by the ministry of local government and rural development (not the wildlife agency) and reflected a key shift in terms of Government's rhetoric of administrative decentralization to more devolution of rights to communities. The new approach to rural development was grounded in the principles of empowerment and community led development. This policy was later revised in 2002, and CBNRM was identified as an engine for rural development. In 2003, the Government developed the Poverty Reduction Strategy, and within this directive CBNRM was again expressed as a key strategy for reducing poverty in rural areas, with tourism potential.

While this was going on, the considerable stakeholder participation in developing a CBNRM policy had not yet led to this policy being formally adopted. Following 10 years of consultation and implementation of CBNRM, the Government finally revisited the CBNRM policy and made efforts to harmonize its goals. When the draft policy was initiated in 1996, devolution of natural resources was the agreed upon strategy by all stakeholders (IUCN, 2004). However, at this time Botswana was under-going political change with far-reaching implications for the wildlife sector. Ian Khama, with a long term interest in wildlife and the patrol of the Kalahari Conservation Society, had been elected Vice President from 1998 to 2008 and succeeded Festus Mogae as President in April 2008. Khama is rumored to have interests in photographic tourism operations, is anti-hunting, and was also impatient with the misuse of money by communities. A long term military commander, he quickly installed one of his military colleagues, Onkokame Mokaila, as Minister of Environment, Wildlife and Tourism. This transfer of power was

occurring at the same time as the finalizing of the CBNRM policy, with both the President and Minister actively participating.

In 2007, the CBNRM Policy of Botswana was enacted with the principle goal of integrating and creating an enabling environment for CBNRM. The 2007 policy links CBNRM to rural development (Arntzen 2003), includes a range of resources including wildlife, veld products, fisheries and wood resources, and clearly addresses the aspect of community benefits. This policy reaffirmed the legal basis of community management on one hand. But on the other it made provision for the diversion of fully 65% of the revenues generated in community-management areas into a National Environment fund. Interviews with stakeholders involved in these discussions indicate that the President, perhaps influenced by his friends on the photo-graphic tourism industry, was fed-up (legitimately) with the wastage of money by CBNRM Trusts. Even within some communities, many people supported this move because they were not seeing any of these benefits anyway and were resentful that leaders were squandering or stealing money. We were told that the initial intention was to take money away from communities to be managed by “more responsible” bodies, but that at the last minute a discretionary statement was added to the 65% clause, allowing but not insisting that this be implemented. In other words, the Minister could allow a community to retain 100% of revenues if he saw fit.

This policy has been viewed as one that reversed the process of decentralization. Interviews suggest that this reversal is perceived to be highly detrimental by the increasingly educated and capacitated cadre of officials and agents supporting Botswana’s CBNRM programme; it has almost no support within the civil service or

NGO support agencies and is perceived to reflect the interests of two men, the President and the Minister, and the largely white photo-tourism sector. Poteete & Ribot contribute to this debate and have argued that this policy replaces more or less unconditional revenue flows with conditional grants and represents a significant partial re-centralization (Poteete & Ribot, 2011).

Poteete, 2009 has attributed this partial recentralization to the rhetorical linking of natural resource policies with political identity. Poteete argues that the rights over natural resources gained by local communities in the CBNRM program created inconsistency with other natural resources, especially Botswana's all important diamonds and therefore created an opening for politically charged questions (Poteete 2009 p. 281 - 305) if communities that live with wildlife can retain all the revenue from wildlife, what about communities who live with diamonds? Intellectually, there are clear differences between the revenue sharing policies associated with a renewable resource like wildlife that has opportunity costs to local people and non-renewable below-ground diamonds. This is clearly understood by many local people one of who encapsulated the difference with the statement "diamonds don't eat goats". The question of whether wildlife could be treated as a national resource like diamonds, with the broader society gaining benefits from it, was used to support the position that led the Government of Botswana to partially re-centralize rights to wildlife resources through the CBNRM Policy of 2007.

The consensus among CBNRM practitioners in Botswana is that the misuse of money by CBNRM Trusts is worrying, but that the blame should be placed on government and other agencies (the NRMP project is sometime mentioned) for not

supporting the development of sound local institutional arrangements. These commentators likewise see the solution as strengthened local institutions, and feel that recentralizing will only undermine progress that has been made and return Botswana to the situation in the 1980s when local people were replacing wildlife with other land uses because it was a government asset.

Analytically, Botswana devolved the rights to benefit and negotiate joint ventures to community (through administrative arrangements) but not the right to manage, with the consequence that quotas are set centrally and communities are not protecting their resources. Capacity-building support to communities is very limited in Botswana and although government agents attend many meetings little effort has been placed in supporting wildlife and institutional management systems. Similarly, both performance and conformance monitoring are sporadic at best. Consequently, multi-village CBNRM communities are faring badly with very limited community participation of benefit sharing (e.g. OCT, Chobe Enclave, KALIPA), but interestingly the three single village Trusts (Mambwe, Khwai, Sankuyo) are muddling along reasonably well within the same macro-environment.

### **Institutional Changes that have Shaped CBNRM in Zambia**

Efforts to enable greater community participation in wildlife management in Zambia emerged in the early 1980s (Gibson 1999). These efforts were highly driven as a response to the rampant poaching that took place in some of Zambia's richest national parks, the South Luangwa and Kafue National Parks. In a period of 20 years (1973 – 1993), Zambia lost a total of 20,000 rhinos (every last one) and elephant populations were reduced from 31,000 – 7,000 in the South Luangwa National Park alone (Gibson 1999) and from 100,000 to about 10,000 in the Luangwa valley generally.

The underlying factor that led to such a vast decline in the elephant and rhino populations has been attributed to inadequate wildlife conservation policies inherited from the colonial Government (Gibson and Marks 1995) but the real reasons are more complex and linked to organized crime, regional conflicts, a weak state combined with opportunistic elites, and even poverty.

As a response to this downward spiral of wildlife populations, the Zambian Government, together with two donors, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), and a few dedicated conservationists, initiated two parallel programs to enable community participation in wildlife management. The USAID community project called ADMADE (Administrative Management Design) was a national program which channeled revenues from safari hunting to local communities across much of the country (Gibson 1999). ADMADE focused largely on protecting wildlife through a village scout programme, using and passing benefits to communities through a “35%” community development fund controlled through local chiefs and their Integrated Resource Development Committees. Officially 40% of revenues were used to support GMA management (i.e. Village Scouts) and a further 25% retained by National Parks and Wildlife Service to oversee this activity. However, what is seldom mentioned is that these percentages were only calculated after half the money had already been retained centrally, and further un-transparent marketing of hunting concessions generated far less revenue per unit area than in neighboring countries, by a factor of as much as ten.

The NORAD funded program was the Luangwa Integrated Resources and Development Program (LIRD) later known as South Luangwa Area Management Unit

(SLAMU). The LIRD/P SLAMU project was implemented in the Luangwa Valley and received funding from the Norwegian government. Initially, under LIRD/P 40% of hunting revenues and income from South Luangwa National Park were returned to the communities, through the same structures as described for ADMADE. When this did not work, LIRD/P's CBNRM programme was restructured, returning 80% of hunting revenues to 43 Village Action Groups and insisting on high levels of participation, transparency and accountability. This quickly resolved serious issues of financial mismanagement, resulted in over 200 projects being constructed, and over 21,000 people receiving cash benefits each year (Dalal-Clayton 2003).

Both programs were Zambia's initial efforts at decentralizing wildlife management to local communities. The ADMADE program granted local communities 35 – 40 percent of safari hunting revenues, while LIRD/P directed 100 percent of hunting concession revenues to locals (Gibson 1999, Child and Barnes 2010). The latter exemplifies a more deliberate effort at fiscally devolving power to communities.

Despite these effort, fiscal decentralization (ADMADE) and devolution (LIRD/P/SLAMU) was not supported by any statutory rights to wildlife or decision-making authority over wildlife uses (Nelson and Agrawal 2008 p. 570 - 571). LIRD/P initially decentralized revenues based on an administrative agreement between NORAD and GRZ embedded in project documents decisions. In 1996, the devolutionary approach was agreed by a meeting between the Project, five Permanent Secretaries and NORAD. This agreement was protected by a clause in the bilateral agreement between Norway and Zambia which emphasized the prioritization of "benefits and household level", but when the Norwegian officials who had negotiated this clause were rotated out

it was not enforced by their replacements, and so ZAWA was able to recentralize the majority of the finances (Lubilo and Child 2010)

Gibson and Marks have argued that instead of devolving managerial authority to communities, Zambia's two programs focused primarily on redistributing financial benefits from wildlife (Gibson and Marks 1995). This has been a major constraint and critics argue that these programs had little positive impact in terms of encouraging community investments in sustaining wildlife populations in Zambia (Gibson and Marks 1995). Proponents of both ADMADE and LIRDP are likely to make the counter claim that wildlife indeed was increasingly protected and began to recover (Child and Dalal-Clayton 2004).

The moderate successes of ADMADE and the significant success of LIRDP led to CBNRM being incorporated in legislation for the first time, with the irony that this same legislation was (mis) used to undermine CBNRM. The first formal recognition of the role of communities in wildlife management was the National Parks and Wildlife Act No, 12 of 1998. This followed a decade of implementing the two community programs, and was a result of a combination of detailed consultation with stakeholders in the wildlife industry. The Wildlife Act of 1998 No. 12 is the first legislative recognition of communities in decentralized wildlife management. However, the Wildlife Act had several flawed objectives. It reflected structural adjustment policies that Government would seek to transform all government departments whose activities had economic potential to function along commercial lines. Thus the Act was driven primarily by the intention of establishing the Zambia Wildlife Authority as a semi-autonomous agency (parastatal) and devolution was clearly not the primary motive that drove this

institutional change. Indeed, the Act is quite confused about CBNRM. It focuses on establishing in some detail the structures for managing CBNRM (which should rightly be included in subsidiary legislation), explicitly outlines the decentralization process as ‘co-management’ versus devolution of rights. Despite ‘co-management’ being the modus operandi, the Act did not specify which rights would be devolved to communities. Rather it established a system of representational governance based on Community Resource Boards, and ZAWA later held meetings at which it steamrollered communities to ‘agreeing’ that ZAWA, as their parent body, should retain 50% of trophy fees. In these meetings, ZAWA did not mention that it had decided to maintain 80% of hunting concession fees for itself, and therefore that the real share to communities would vary around 30%. ZAWA continued to be the primary agency allocating hunting concession and this was done centrally and all at one time with participation of one person from each CRB. While not ideal, the hunting allocation process was more competitive and transparent and prices increased significantly<sup>2</sup>. ZAWA continued to set quotas, often with limited local knowledge, and in general ZAWA’s capacity to provide capacity-building and performance monitoring was extremely limited; ZAWA, with expenditure of \$5-7 million and income of \$1-3 million, was expected to transform itself overnight into a financially self-sufficient organization. It often could not even pay salaries, and the temptation to retain money generated in community areas was strong. Consequently, a

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<sup>2</sup> According to Child, the absence of clearly defined rights had previously led to allocation of hunting concessions that are highly centralized and have been the subject of political manipulation. The use of “special licenses” issued in non-transparent circumstances was also a mechanism used for patronage and the subject of much concern amongst Zambia conservationists Child, B. (2004). Parks in transition: Biodiversity, rural development and the bottom line. UK, Earthscan, ibid.

situation arose where the poorest people in Zambia, those in the most remote wildlife areas, were effectively subsidizing a struggling parastatal structure in Lusaka.

In the past decade, CBNRM in Zambia has continued to deteriorate and has experienced resistance from powerful stakeholders with vested interests. This has led to the current status quo and impasse which is characterized by capture of community benefits by local elites, government, political officials and private sector actors (Mwape, 2003). Wynter Kabimba a Zambian lawyer who has been a keen proponent of community rights since the inception of CBNRM summarizes this status as follows

Kabimba: If you compare the functions of ZAWA and its relationship with CRBs you don't find anywhere any evidence of devolution of power in this piece of legislation. The CRB still works at the beck and call of ZAWA. Hunting companies have to pay ZAWA the money and then ZAWA decides when to pay the CRBs. CRBs have no way of verifying whether the amount of money paid to them is equivalent to the amount of money they should have been given. They are not given any audit reports by ZAWA unless they have started now.....ZAWA has accumulated arrears of payment to CRBs, apart from the slight mention of Chiefs as patron, there is no other structure regarding the CRB. There is also no form of regulation governing the CRB operations. The Act provides that ZAWA shall maintain a register of all CRBs that record is not at ZAWA. So... the whole thing is operating in an informal way, as if the local communities are begging from ZAWA and ultimately the State regarding the benefits. This conversely has made it difficult for the communities to appreciate why they should look after these natural resources. They really do not see how they are linked with the natural resources they are supposed to protect.

A decade after the enactment of the Wildlife Act, the Word Bank commissioned a study to evaluate the economic, social and ecological impacts of the wildlife policies on communities. The study explicitly attributed the failures of the CBNRM program in the communal areas to the wildlife management policy. Its recommendations highlighted the need for a policy environment that devolves resource rights to local communities. In particular, the study suggested that community participation should be formalized

through legal entities, and rights to all natural resources in the area should be granted upon fulfilling laid out conditions to participate in the program<sup>3</sup>. The study argues that devolved rights should include adequate authority and responsibility for the management, benefit and disposal of resources, as well as the right to exclude others (Simasiku, Simwanza et al. 2008). This study challenges the existing Act and its failures to fully devolve resource rights to local communities.

### **A Comparative Assessment of Devolution in Botswana and Zambia**

The CBNRM programs in both Botswana and Zambia were initiated in the late 1980s with support from donor partners. These programs were promoted under the auspices of decentralization of natural resource management to rural communities. The principle of devolution was the rhetoric of the programs, even though two decades later the outcomes are contrary. Both countries initiated CBNRM through donor funded projects funded and during this period it is clear in the objectives of the programs that both political and fiscal devolution was the principle of decentralization that was sought for rural communities managing wildlife. In Botswana the USAID funded CBNRM NRMP project, CBNRM was promoted “as one of the most decentralized natural resources management models in southern Africa” (Rozemeijer 2003 p. 3 - 4). In Zambia the USAID funded ADMADE program instituted some form of devolution of both political

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<sup>3</sup> This reflects the catch-22 situation that Martin and others warn about. Thus, Murphree's Principle of Rights and Responsibilities is that "Authority is a pre- requisite for responsible management and should not be held out as a reward for it". In other words, capacity is developed experientially through the process of managing one's rights. If communities have no rights, therefore they cannot manage their affairs, so they cannot develop or demonstrate their management capacity. This is rather like saying to someone that they can be granted the right to drive a car, once they can demonstrate that they are safe drivers – hence the reference to a catch-22 situation.

and fiscal devolution through transfer of 34 – 40% tourist revenues to local communities (Gibson 1999). This was even further devolved in the Norwegian funded LIRDIP/ SLAMU project where the state devolved both political and fiscal power to communities. Communities derived 100% of all benefits from wildlife (Child and Dalal-Clayton 2004).

Interestingly in both countries, decentralization or devolution occurred through administrative means, but when it came to formalizing these gains in policy or legislation, these instruments (or actor's interpretation of it) were used for recentralization. Although Zambia's Wildlife Act of 1998 No. 12 has been described as a pioneer act that transferred some wildlife user rights to local communities living in Zambia's Game Management Areas, and the intent of the Act was to shape the legal framework for devolution through CBNRM, the outcomes are characterized by increased recentralization by the state.

Other scholars have observed that management of rights given to communities by the Wildlife Act of 1998 are not specified (Jones 2007). Another factor that has contributed to recentralization outcomes is the fragmented sectoral legislation on how natural resources are managed. State actors have continued to centralize power of resources such as forests, using the weaknesses in the decentralization of wildlife as an excuse. This has reinforced state control over natural resources and undermined processes that effectively devolve power to the periphery. Despite the Act being interpreted as one providing strong devolution to communities, in the absence of specific provisions detailing community rights, government officials have manipulated its intent to avoid fiscal devolution and political empowerment. This is further corroborated by Child, who argues that "rhetoric of community empowerment in the Wildlife Act, is not

systematically matched by political will to pursue devolved resource management with vigor, (Child and Dalal-Clayton 2004). Child argues that the Zambia CBNRM approach relies on a model of revenue sharing that leaves only 50% (at best) of income with communities, threatening the CBNRM/ wildlife sector's potential growth and its contribution to national poverty reduction goals (Child and Dalal-Clayton 2004).

Zambia's Wildlife Act of 1998 No. 12 can be regarded as a legal instrument that inadequately addressed the question of devolution of community rights in the management of wildlife. As noted, the Act is poorly cast in that it gets into the detail of implementation, without outlining principles of devolution and revenue sharing. While such shortcomings in Acts can be addressed through subsidiary policies that give more detailed prescriptive mechanisms on implementation, this was never done. As happened also in Tanzania (Nelson 2007), the enlightened intentions of progressive CBNRM policies and experiences were undermined by formal legislation and by the (mis) interpretation of Acts and policies developed with considerable stakeholder input.

The Wildlife Policy of 1998 was developed to support the Wildlife Act of 1998. This policy is progressive regarding community rights and participation. The Policy advocates for increased rights through the creation of Integrated Resources Development Boards (IRDBs<sup>4</sup>), and advocates political and fiscal devolution of powers to local communities in GMAs. The policy advocates for political devolution through granting of legal rights to conservation, sustainable use and equitable distribution of benefits earned by wildlife outside the national parks. The policy explicitly advocates for full fiscal devolution by outlining that ALL revenues from resource use in the area would

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<sup>4</sup> These are referred to as Community Resource Boards (CRBs) in the Wildlife Act of 1998.

go to CRBs for socio-economic development. Despite this policy's progressive move towards devolution, it has never been fully utilized and is rarely referred to.

Like Zambia, Botswana initiated CBNRM administratively by promoting political and administrative devolution, and the intent to initiate devolution was noted in the Wildlife Conservation Policy of 1986; the National Conservation Policy of 1990; and the Tourism Policy of 1990. However, when the CBNRM Policy was finally adopted in 2007, and although it advocated rhetorically for devolved rights to communities through specified tenure rights and benefits, the clause allowing central retention of 65% of wildlife revenues does the complete opposite, and promoted partial recentralization compared to previous informal policies before 2007 (Poteete 2009). This partial recentralization is characterized by a reduction of fiscal powers to the communities. Where local communities formerly retained 100% of all revenues obtained from wildlife and other natural resource sales, the CBNRM 2007 policy splits this in to two streams i.e. 35% goes to communities and 65% is retained in a National Environment Fund (Ndlovu, 2007). The 65% revenues are therefore only accessed through an application process, and can be applied for by any community not necessarily the one from which the benefits derived. The Botswana Government's move towards recentralizing wildlife revenues contradicts the premise of CBNRM, weakens incentives for conservation, and ultimately disempowers the communities (Poteete 2007 p. 292). Note also that the Botswana Government's intent to ban hunting within 25km of protected areas is likely to greatly reduce the flow of revenues and meat to CBNRM communities. In Sankuyo for example, we estimated that average household incomes would decline by 40% for the period in which it took tourism to replace hunting, even assuming that this was possible.

Meat from some 22 elephants and roughly 100 other animals is provided to communities like Mababe, Khwai and Sankuyo each year, and is another important livelihood benefit especially for communities with origins in hunting and gathering.

The intent to devolve power to local communities in wildlife rich areas in Botswana and Zambia have taken over two decades and is still ongoing. At the onset of the programs in both countries partnerships between local conservationists and external agents (donors), plus the positive experience of CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe, convinced the state that this was the best option for achieving both conservation and development goals. In both countries, once donor funding was withdrawn CBNRM was deliberately recentralized even though the majority of stakeholders were opposed to this. Under these macro factors in both countries, it is highly unlikely to find communities that perform well within the circumstances.

### **How Have Efforts To Decentralize Wildlife Management in Botswana and Zambia, Affected Micro-level Governance Performance?**

To further examine the efforts made towards decentralization of wildlife management, I assess the performance of communities in Botswana and Zambia. The study assesses the performance of by answering the following question: “*How do current efforts to decentralize wildlife management in Botswana and Zambia affect the democratic governance and socioeconomic performance of CBNRM communities?*”

### **Integrating Democratic Governance and Socioeconomic Indicators to Assess Performance of CBNRM Communities within Uncertain Macro Institutional Frameworks**

To assess the performance of each of the six communities, indices were developed on measures of democratic governance (conformance) and the provision of CBNRM socioeconomic benefits. These two variables are examined on the premise that

communities whose members perceive higher social and economic benefits are more likely to practice the principles of democratic governance when compared to those that have poor democratic governance scores.

## **Methods and Data Analysis**

To obtain overall measures of the latent concepts of democratic governance and socioeconomic performance, composite indicators were developed. These latent concepts cannot be measured through direct observations and are better estimated using a combination of multiple indicators (Bernard 2002, DeVellis 2003). They are based on sub-indicators that have no common meaningful unit of measure and there is no obvious way of weighing these sub-indicators. These composite indicators can be used to summarize complex or multidimensional issues such as those of socioeconomic incentives as they relate to CBNRM governance. In addition, they reduce the size of a list of indicators to include more information within the existing size. The use of composite indicators also has certain weaknesses that may send misleading, non-robust policy message if they are poorly constructed or misinterpreted. To avoid this, sensitivity was measured using Cronbach's Alpha. This measures an acceptable internal consistency and a Cronbach's Alpha of anything above 0.80 is acceptable.

**Selection of indicators.** Indicators for measuring democratic governance were adapted from the concept of democracy as it relates to "power of people" in terms of increased political participation and competition (Dahl 1971, Coppedge 2005). The indicators for measures of CBNRM social and economic benefits were adapted from other previous studies that have examined the relationship of economic incentives in CBNRM (Emerton 2001, Barnes, MacGregor et al. 2002). We confirmed that these indicators measured a similar concept by calculating Cronbach Alpha as a measure of

the indices' internal consistency (Bernard 2002). The indicators were grouped into their respective index, following a simple averaging procedure, such as that used for the Index of Economic Freedom or CIFOR [Centre for International Forestry Research]'s well-being index (Cahyat, Gonner et al. 2007, Miller, Holmes et al. 2010). This approach assumes equal weighting for all indicators, which was adopted because of the ease of implementation and potential replication within community based monitoring schemes and the absence of additional data to determine appropriate weights.

For democratic governance, the index consisted of six items, including two on political participation, political rights, accountability, provision of information and satisfaction with democracy. For political participation, the two items measured whether respondents had attended the AGM and elections. For political rights, respondents were asked whether they perceived a right to seven items. A measure of accountability was assessed, on whether respondents demanded accountability of their leaders or not. Another indicator of democracy measured was whether respondents had received information from their leaders or not (Table 5-2).

Items were coded as 1 for 'yes' and 0 for 'no' responses. The scores were averaged for each of the six indicators and further normalized to 0 – 100 scale to generate a democratic governance index.

A similar procedure was used to develop a CBNRM socioeconomic index. A total of three items were used to measure CBNRM social and economic benefits i.e. cash, employment and social. Items were coded as 1 for having received the benefit in question, and 0 for not having received it. The index was built on a scale of 0 – 100, averaging binary responses from a set of 3 items.

The data gathered for both democratic governance and the socioeconomic measures were analyzed using SPSS 16 and STATA software. Analysis included crosstabs and ANOVA.

## **Results**

### **Assessment of democratic governance performance**

An assessment of the four indicators of democratic governance showed variation in the six communities.

#### **Political participation**

Two indicators were used to measure perceptions on political participation in CBNRM. These included participation in the AGM and secondly participation in elections of board members. The average percentage score of those who participated illustrate that Khwai had the largest aggregate score of 86.5% followed by Sankuyo 60%. The communities with lower aggregate percentage scores on participation included OCT (29.5%) and Mulendema (29%) respectively.

#### **Political rights**

Perceptions on respondent's political rights were measured using six indicators. These indicators included rights to be nominated for Board elections; to change the constitution; to join the CBNRM program; to make decisions on community finances; to participate in the AGM; to remove corrupt leaders and the right to vote. An aggregate percentage score was obtained for seven indicators for each community. The community with the highest score on political rights was Khwai (99%) followed by Mababe (95%), Sankuyo (95%), Mulendema (93%), Kasempa (78%) and the lowest score was OCT (69%) (Table 5-4).

## **Accountability**

Perceptions on accountability were measured by assessing the likelihood of community members questioning their leaders on concerns of how the program was being managed. This vertical form of accountability (Schedler 1999) examines the relationship between elected leaders and their constituents. The results show that a higher percentage of respondents from Khwai (67.2%) and Sankuyo (67%) were more likely to question their leaders when compared to the other four communities in the sample. Only 53% of respondents from OCT were likely to question their leaders (Table 5-4).

## **Provision of information**

The provision of information by leaders to their constituents is another important indicator in measuring democratic governance in CBNRM. Provision of information can be used a proxy indicator for measuring how accountable the leaders are to their constituents in terms of providing various types of information that is relevant for CBNRM management. Four indicators were used to measure provision of information and these included provisions of budget information, community projects, income from safari operators, and staff salaries (i.e. monies paid to staff working for the community trust or resource boards). An aggregate percentage score of those who received this information was obtained for each community. The results show the community with the highest score on provision of information was Sankuyo (83%), followed by Khwai (81.2%), Mababe (65%), Kasempa (65%), Mulendema (63%) and the lowest score was for OCT (43%) (Table 5-4).

## **Assessing socioeconomic performance**

The provision of both social and economic benefits to communities is an important indicator measure of CBNRM community performance. The benefits range from individual household benefits such as cash and employment to collective social benefits such as boreholes, community schools, etc. To assess the socioeconomic performance of each community, respondents were asked whether they had received any of cash, employment or social benefits from the CBNRM program. Aggregate percentages of those who responded yes were obtained for each community and then assessed on a scale of 1 – 100. The results show that the community with the highest perception score of having received CBNRM benefits was Mababe (89%) followed by Sankuyo (83%). The communities with poorest score with regards to provision of benefits were Mulendema (7%) and OCT (7%) (Table 5-5).

## **The Zambian cases: why Kasempa community has had governance success and Mulendema continues to struggle**

In Zambia, both Mulendema and Kasempa are multi-village Community Resource Boards. Despite a multitude of donor projects linked to CBNRM, almost no progress has been made in Mulendema. The CRB has been ‘captured’ by immigrant farmers, accounts are weak, participation is extremely low, and there is very little evidence of capacity-building efforts. By contrast, Kasempa is remote, smaller, and ethnically more homogenous. It has sound village-level participatory process in place, largely because it inherited a well-trained ZAWA community facilitator from LIRD and has energetic forestry officers.

## **The case of OCT and why it continues to perform poorly when compared to single village communities in Botswana**

In Botswana, OCT is a multi-village Trust that has been plagued by problems from the get-go. The constitution allowed a small group of elites to capture the programme, and levels of participation and benefit sharing are low. The experience in other multi-village Trusts in Botswana (i.e. Chobe and KALIPA) suggests that these conditions are general. Visitors to Chobe who meet the Trust are generally impressed, but this breaks down when one finds that ordinary people are largely excluded from the programme. KALIPA, consisting of three widely spaced villages along the Zimbabwe border is badly managed at all levels.

The interesting lesson from Botswana is that the three single village, all of which we worked in, are performing at much higher levels than the multi-village Trusts. People participate in AGMs and elections, and get cash, social and employment benefits. The performance of these villages does go up and down depending on the current nature of the committee or manager, and they may have an advantage in that they are close to Maun and more closely scrutinized by wildlife officials although we are not convinced this is the case. However, like the other Trusts (and unlike for example LIRD/SLAMU and CAMPFIRE) clear, democratic procedures are not in place. In other work (in preparation) we suggest that where small size is combined with sound procedures, some 80% of wildlife revenues are converted into cash dividends and community projects. We could only obtain financial expenditure data for Sakuyo which suggested that 59% of revenue directly benefitted communities, and we suspect that this was less so in Mababe and Khwai. Thus, we hypothesize that the absence of

sound institutional capacity building and conformance monitoring reduces equitable benefit sharing from over 80% to 60% or less.

### **Economic viability of resource: community's ability to generate revenues**

*"The level at which benefits accrue, should be the level at which management occurs." (Murphree 1991, Hulme and Murphree 2001 p. 294)*

Since its inception, revenues from CBNRM in Southern Africa are earned from two sources of tourism, both consumptive (trophy hunting) and non-consumptive (photographic tourism). Of the two forms, trophy hunting is particularly important for conservation and CBNRM as it creates incentives for conservation over vast areas of communal lands (Lindsey, Roulet et al. 2007). Trophy hunters also pay higher fees per client when compared to conventional tourists (Baker 1997, Lewis and Alpert 1997). Communities in Botswana earn revenues from both these sources whereas the major source of revenues for communities in Zambia is from trophy hunting.

The ability of ecosystems to provide economic returns through the sustainable use of natural resources is highly critical in CBNRM. Communities who are able to earn significant amounts of revenue from wildlife should in turn have more to share at both the household and communal level and therefore have higher participation in various aspects of governing their CBNRM community. Examining this relationship is therefore critical in assessing economic performance of individual communities.

### **Methods and Data Collection**

Secondary data was collected from community files on trophy hunting revenues earned by each community in the study within a period of five years. The trends on revenues earned are a good indicator for assessing the ability of the common pool resource to generate revenue. This section particularly seeks to answer the question of

whether revenues earned by individual communities are a good indicator of how well the community performs on governance aspects. The hypothesis is that communities with significant increases in wildlife revenues over time are more likely to perform better on democratic governance indicators such as increased participation, political rights, and accountability.

### **Revenue trends - Khwai trust (2000 – 2005)**

Revenue generated by the Khwai Development Trust (KDT) is obtained from joint venture partnership with a private company, Soren Lindstrom Safaris. Revenue is earned from fees paid to the Khwai Trust for land rental and for animal quotas that the Department of Wildlife National Parks in Botswana provides to the communities.

KDT was officially registered as a Trust in 2000, and it earned total revenues of US\$184, 615. Within six years (2000 – 2005) of its inception, Khwai community earned a total of US\$ 921, 842. The general trend of revenue for this community has been increasing over the years and even though the community had a decline in revenues in 2001 (US\$92, 307), and 2003 (US\$59, 846), this has not affected the community's ability to generate revenue (Figure 5-1).

### **Revenue trends - Mababe trust (2000 – 2005)**

Mababe Trust's source of revenue is from both land rentals and animal quotas for hunting. Mababe has a joint venture partnership with a private safari company, African Field safaris, and was established in 2000. In their first year of establishment Mababe earned a total of US\$103,846.15. Within six years of its establishment (2000 – 2005), Mababe community earned a total of US\$ 944,766.15. The only period the community experienced a decline in revenues was from 2006 to 2007, where there was a 40% decrease from US\$281,945 to US\$200,000. The general trend for this community is

that revenues have been increasing from the time of inception to the period when this data was obtained in 2007 (Figure 5-2).

### **Revenue trends - Sankuyo trust (2000 – 2005)**

Sankuyo Trust was one of the earliest CBNRM programs established in Botswana in 1995. This community has diversified its revenue base over the years. Initially, the revenue was from land rentals and animal quotas for safari hunting, however in recent years, Sankuyo Trust has ownership and manages a community campsite and the Santawani Lodge. Two years after its establishment, Sankuyo earned US\$53, 076.92. Within a period of six years (2000 – 2005), Sankuyo community earned a total of US\$1, 090,335. Revenue earned by Sankuyo since its inception show trends of increase over the years. The only period of decline was from 2000 – 2001 when there was a drastic decline of revenues from US\$91,609.23 to US\$10,769.23 (Figure 5 -3).

### **Revenues trends - OCT (2000 – 2005)**

OCT is among one of Botswana's pioneer CBNRM programs and was established in 1995. Its major source of revenue is photographic tourism, and currently sub leases its area to Wilderness Safaris, the largest tour operator in Southern Africa. Revenues earned by OCT from 2000 – 2005 amounts to a total of US\$1,369,230.78. OCT's revenue trends indicate that it has been increasing over the years. Comparisons of revenue earned in 1997, two years after the program was established, and 2005 last point of data collected, show a 77% increase (Figure 5-4).

### **Revenue trends - Mulendema CRB (2003 – 2008)**

Mulendema community's major source of revenue is from safari hunting earned from Mumbwa game management area (GMA), a buffer zone located in the Kafue National Park. In Zambia, hunting revenues are obtained from both land rental and from

animals on quota. Mulendema community and the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA), have an agreement, which stipulates a 50 – 50 share of revenues from these two sources. The 50% share the community earns from the hunting block is further divided among three other community groups, who get a third of the 50% each. From 2005 – 2010, Mumbwa GMA earned a total of US\$ 857,880 from hunting revenues (Figure 5-5). Of this amount, Mulendema CRB received a total of US\$142,979, a share of 17% of the total revenue. During the six-year period of data collected, Mulendema community was paid an average of US\$ 23,839.95.

### **Revenue trends - Kasempa CRB (2005 – 2010)**

Kasempa CRB earns revenues from the Lunga Luswishi GMA and currently, has two hunting blocks leased to Prohunt and Royal Zambezi hunting outfitters. Kasempa CRB is entitled to 50% share of all revenues earned from safari hunting in this GMA and 20% from land rentals. From 2005 – 2010 the total revenues earned for the Lunga Luswishi GMA amounted to US\$ 656,220, of which a share of US\$ 328,110 was paid to Kasempa CRB. During the six-year period of data collected, the community earned an average of US\$ 54,685 (Figure 5 - 6).

### **Discussion**

**The enabling macro environment for CBNRM.** In this chapter we broadly examine the institutional changes that have taken place in CBNRM in Botswana and Zambia and how this has in turn affected both socio economic and democratic governance performance of six communities in these countries. Our study pursues the argument that the success of CBNRM is highly dependent on several factors, of which the macro-level enabling environment is paramount. We sought to understand how CBNRM communities performed in terms of democratic and socioeconomic attributes

within the uncertain macro policy environments that we described in some detail. This analysis and discussion was informed with more general scholarship on decentralization and devolution.

Table 5-1 summarizes our finding for the six communities; comparing our assessment of the macro-environment with the data we collected to describe outcomes. In the three single villages, technical support to improve joint venture negotiations (provided through the NRMP programme and later by the Ministry) coupled with the right to retain all revenues have resulted in a rapid increase in wildlife-derived revenues, and also in widespread benefits of the community. This is not the case in multi-village that we sampled in Botswana (OCT) with the increased level of benefits paid by the private sector getting no further than the elite who control the Trust. In Zambia, revenues were stagnant, partly because of un-transparent marketing on concessions, and partly because money was retained by ZAWA and reliable records are unavailable (see Wynter Kabimba quote above).

In an unsupportive macro-environment, participation appears to be dictated by micro-circumstances and is much higher in the three small communities and in Kasempa where we reported sound local facilitation. Similarly, people's sense of their political rights is higher in single villages (95-99%) than in multi-villages (69-78%) though for complex reasons people in the worst governed community of all have a high sense of their political rights (Mulendema = 93%). People's assessment of CBNRM accountability is also higher in single villages (82-83% versus 43-65%); with Mababe being different (65%) perhaps because we surveyed it during a time of conflict.

However, the performance of all these communities in terms of NRM is much lower than Zimbabwe and particularly Namibia, where NGOs placed particular emphasis on building these capacities. In terms of governance and benefit sharing, this and other (unpublished ) results showed that the level of participation and equitable benefit sharing in all multi-village communities in Botswana, Zambia and Namibia is low with less than 20% of wildlife revenues benefiting ordinary people through cash or projects. There are two exceptions. In single villages, as noted above, and as the respondent's opinions on benefits confirm, up to 60% of revenues get shared, even in the absence of sound procedures. If this is benchmarked against single village sites where sound procedures and external conformance monitoring are in place, such as CAMPFIRE and LIRD, this share rises to 80% or more (Child and Dalal-Clayton 2004). Multi-villages, benchmarking (where only unpublished data was available from CAMPFIRE, 60% of revenue is shared in multi-villages) suggests that external conformance monitoring increases revenue sharing very substantially from less than 20% to about 60%. Thus, external conformance monitoring adds considerable value in terms of equitable benefit sharing, especially in multi-village communities where governance is particularly prone to elite capture.

Finally, it was noted that improvements in NRM are correlated with NRM monitoring, with Namibia having excellent community based wildlife monitoring and rapidly rising wildlife populations (NACSO 2008), and Zimbabwe having a sound quota monitoring system and increasing wildlife populations (Child, Jones et al. 2003). Wildlife monitoring in Botswana is sporadic, and Zambia almost nonexistent and related to this action is not being taken to address what appear to be declining wildlife

populations. The correlation between monitoring and improvements also apply to governance and revenue sharing. Except for CAMPFIRE to some extent, and LIRDPA at project level, there is almost no monitoring of CBNRM benefits at household level, and performance is universally low except in the cases mentioned and in the three single villages. It is a bit of a jump, but this suggests that the adaptation of policy and implementation in CAMPFIRE (before 2002) and Namibia is linked to what data is monitored, and conversely that the failure of CBNRM to adapt in Botswana and Zambia, indeed the retrogression of these programmes, can be partly explained by the absence of performance monitoring.

Table 5-1. Devolved rights and micro governance of natural resources, income, benefits and political participation

	Khwai Single Village Botswana	Mababe Single Village Botswana	Sankuyo Single Village Botswana	Kasempa Multi- Village Zambia	Mulendema Multi- Village Zambia	OCT Multi- Village Botswana
<b>DESCRIPTION OF ENABLING ENVIRONMENT</b>						
Rights to benefit	100%	100%	100%	30%	30%	100%
Rights to sell	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Rights to manage	No	No	No	No	No	No
NRM capacity building	No	No	No	No	No	No
Marketing wildlife leases	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Institutional capacity building	No	No	No	No	No	No
NRM performance monitoring	No	No	No	No	No	No
Governance conformance monitoring	No	No	No	No	No	No
<b>OUTCOMES (Table 5-4 and Figures)</b>						
Revenue increase	2X	2.5X	3-4X	0.5X	No increase	3X
Participation	87%	55%	60%	57%	29%	29%
Political rights	99%	96%	95%	78%	93%	69%
Accountability	82%	65%	83%	65%	63%	43%
Benefits	66%	89%	83%	19%	7%	7%

**Table 5-2. Indicators for measuring democratic governance**

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE INDICATOR	RESPONSES
<b>POLITICAL PARTICIPATION</b>	
Participation in AGM	Yes/ No
Participation in Elections	Yes/ No
<b>POLITICAL RIGHTS</b>	
Right to be nominated for Board elections	Yes/ No
Right to change constitution	Yes/ No
Right to join CBNRM program	Yes/ No
Right to make decisions on CBNRM finances	Yes/ No
Right to participate in AGM	Yes/ No
Right to remove corrupt leaders	Yes/ No
Right to vote in elections	Yes/ No
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY</b>	
Demand for leadership accountability	Yes/ No
<b>PROVISION OF INFORMATION</b>	
Information on annual budget	Yes/ No
Information on community projects	Yes/ No
Information on hunting revenues	Yes/ No
Information on staff salaries	Yes/ No
<b>SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY</b>	
Satisfaction with 'power to the people' democracy	Yes/ No

**Table 5-3. Indicators for CBNRM socio economic benefits**

CBNRM SOCIOECONOMIC INDEX	RESPONSES
Cash benefit	Yes/ No
Employment benefit	Yes/ No
Social benefit	Yes/ No

Table 5-4. Democratic governance performance

	KHWAI % YES	N	MABABE % YES	N	SANKUYO % YES	N	KASEMPA % YES	N	MULENDEMA % YES	N	OCT % YES	N
<b>VARIABLES &amp; INDICATORS</b>												
Political participation												
Participation in AGM	84	46	64	34	61	43	37	37	19	23	15	19
Participation in elections	89	49	46	23	59	42	77	77	39	47	44	57
% Mean	86.5		55		60		57		29		29.5	
Total N		55		53		70		100		120		129
Political rights												
Right to be nominated for Board elections	100	55	94	48	100	70	72	71	98	118	76	98
Right to change constitution	96	53	94	48	100	70	72	71	98	118	41	53
Right to join CBO program	100	55	96	50	64	45	68	64	64	77	76	98
Right to make decisions on CBO finances	100	55	94	48	100	70	73	72	96	116	54	70
Right to participate in AGM	100	55	96	50	100	70	78		98	118	71	91
Right to remove corrupt leaders	100	55	96	50	100	70	90	89	98	118	70	90
Right to vote in elections	100	55	100	50	100	70	95	94	98	118	94	121
% Mean	99		96		95		78		93		69	
Total N		55		51		70		99		120		129
Accountability												
Likelihood of communities questioning Chairperson	67.2	55	54	52	59	70	67	98	61	113	53	122
Provision of information												
Annual Budget	80	44	75	38	86	55	68	64	59	61	53	65
Community Projects	76	42	61	31	83	53	78	73	68	70	42	51
Income from safari operator	89	49	65	33	83	53	59	55	64	66	48	59
Staff salaries	80	44	58	30	79	51	56	53	60	62	29	35
% Mean	81.2		65		83		65		63		43	
Total N		55		51		64		94		103		122

Table 5-5. Socioeconomic performance

CBNRM Benefits Index	Khwai		Mababe		Sankuyo		Kasempa		Mulendema		OCT	
	% Yes	N	% Yes	N	% Yes	N	% Yes	N	% Yes	N	% Yes	N
Cash	70	38	96	51	69	48	12	12	03	4	02	3
Employment	62	34	100	53	100	100	13	13	05	6	15	19
Social	65	36	71	38	80	56	33	33	13	16	04	5
SOE Score	65.7	55	89	53	83	70	19.33	100	7.00	120	7.00	129

## **KHWAI DEVELOPMENT TRUST - REVENUE EARNED**




Figure 5-1. Khwai revenue

## **MABABE TRUST REVENUE EARNED 2000 - 2007**




Figure 5-2 Mababe revenue

### **SANKUYO TRUST REVENUE EARNED 1997 - 2005**




Figure 5-3. Sankuyo revenue

### **OCT REVENUE EARNED 1997 - 2005**




Figure 5-4. OCT revenue

### REVENUES EARNED PER GMA & PAID TO MULENDEMA CRB




Figure 5-5. Mulendema revenue

### REVENUES EARNED PER GMA & PAID TO KASEMPA CRB




Figure 5-6. Kasempa revenue

## CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS

### **The Importance of Micro and Macro Governance Institutions in Shaping CBNRM Performance**

The concept and practice of CBNRM has over the past two decades attained a central role in how communal lands are managed in southern Africa. Initially started as experiments to address the challenges of poor management by the state of protected areas, it has gained recognition through development and conservation sectors, as the model for managing common pool resources such as wildlife, forests and fisheries. Institutions of collective action such as CBNRM are critical in shaping how communal lands in southern Africa can be better managed to ensure provision of benefits to rural communities, empowering them through transparent and participatory forms of governance and ultimately improving management of ecosystems. Despite these good intentions, very few cases of success are evident in the southern African context. Critics have been quick to view CBNRM as a failed model for conserving communal lands. These criticisms include the heavy reliance of most CBNRM programs on donor funding that is short term and sustainable, the continued depletion of the wildlife resources, the increasing practices of unsustainable use of natural resources and finally how these programs have continued to disempower local communities.

Regardless of these criticisms, CBNRM still continues to have champions both in the practitioner and academic world that believe in its success. Though few and far between, there has been a reexamination, on what factors actually make CBNRM work? After two decades of its implementation in southern Africa, a critical mass of scholars in the region, begun to ask key questions on how these programs could be

better evaluated. SASSUG, a group of scholar-practitioners in southern Africa, identified the important role that governance played in shaping performance of CBNRM. This was a response to concerns that the model advocated for in pioneer CBNRM programs had a narrow focus on governance. The implications of this were that the effects of poor macro and micro governance began to emerge. Of particular concern was what actually governance in CBNRM looked like, and how it impacted performance of CBNRM programs. Efforts towards understanding this have emerged over the past few years. As part of contributing to this debate, this doctoral research examined governance systems in CBNRM and their role in providing public goods. The study was undertaken by addressing three objectives: -

- Examining the importance of Annual General Meetings as platforms for improved democratic governance.
- Examining the factors that influence community participation in CBNRM elections and its role in improved CBNRM governance.
- Examining the macro enabling conditions that shape micro CBNRM governance and the provision of public goods.

### **Role of Micro Governance Institutions and Recommendations for Improved CBNRM governance**

With respect to AGMs, the study's findings show that AGMs are important platforms for increasing participatory forms of governance in CBNRM. These institutions play a critical role in ensuring that ordinary members of the communities participate in the governance and distribution of benefits from the CBNRM programs. The study shows that single village communities perform better in organizing these meetings when compared to multi village communities that have more representational forms of governance. In addition, that study shows that participation at these meetings is highly dependent on the incentives individuals receive from the CBNRM programs. Among the

incentives, cash benefits largely influenced whether members participated in AGMs or not.

The study further shows that elections in CBNRM are an important institution that increases accountability of leaders to their constituents. The findings show that among the six communities in the study, the single village communities have held more elections when compared to the multi village communities. It shows that there were higher numbers of community members from single villages who had participated in elections of their leaders when compared to their peers from multi villages. One of the contributing factors to low participation in multi villages is the high cost of organizing larger groups of people from different villages. Another factor was the lack of incentives for members to participate in elections. Community members from single villages were more likely to participate in elections as they received both cash and social benefits at the same meetings where elections were held.

Both AGMs and elections are important institutions for improving micro governance in CBNRM. These two institutions are proxy measures of participatory democracy, the main model of democracy advocated for in CBNRM. They are therefore important indicators for measuring governance both in programs and research that examine CBNRM performance. This study identifies how these institutions are better placed in single village communities that are homogeneous, but are poorly aligned to multi village, heterogeneous communities. This has huge implications for CBNRM going forward, as the majority of communities in southern Africa, are predominantly large village communities. It is crucial that more investment be made to strengthen conformance monitoring in future CBNRM programs. Conformance monitoring has

contributed to the improved performance of CBNRM programs in Namibia. This role has mainly been undertaken by civil society, and has shown to be critical in ensuring that the micro level is externally monitored. The question remains however, what happens in communities with very little civil society presence. How can governance be strengthened through conformance monitoring by external agents? An area that might need to be explored in future programs is the role of district councils. Despite poor records of this model in the CAMPFIRE program in Zimbabwe, they are still an important institution in providing checks and balances to micro level governance in CBNRM. Over the past few years, the move to decentralize development to local authorities has grown in importance and recognition. This debate has been taking place particularly in Zambia, and this could be an important institutional change for future developments in CBNRM. The role local authority's play in ensuring there is improved governance at the micro level in CBNRM could be the future of how these programs move forward.

### **Macro Enabling Conditions for CBNRM Governance**

The final objective of the study was to examine the macro enabling conditions that shape CBNRM micro governance and the provision of CBNRM public goods. The study's main findings are that in both Botswana and Zambia, the state has more recently moved towards macro policies that have recentralized wildlife management from the local communities. The study further shows that there is some variation in how these outcomes have been shaped in both countries, with Botswana having a milder form of recentralization as compared to Zambia. Our findings further show that despite these current macro factors shaping CBNRM, the three single villages in our study have been able to improve their natural resource base, increase incomes to livelihoods and

have shown increased democratic governance when compared to their peers from multi-village communities.

### **Lessons from Namibia and Zimbabwe and Future Implications for CBNRM in Botswana and Zambia**

In both Botswana and Zambia devolution was the intended form of decentralization, and this was advocated in the earlier stages of these CBNRM programs but for different reasons was not sustained. Devolution was promoted by a network of national and regional conservationists (SASUSG 1996) who gained the support of donors to support these programs, and in turn got buy in from state actors. As Murphree says, the Khaki shorts-brigade [i.e. conservationists] did an end run around the political process to initiate devolution, and maybe in some cases did not even know the political consequences of their actions to empower local communities. In Zimbabwe, the wildlife agency did recognize the political nature of CAMPFIRE, and quickly developed a grassroots political organization (the CAMPFIRE Association) to which it passed primary responsibility for the programme. The integration of CAMPFIRE into national political processes is, to a large extent, the reason why CAMPFIRE maintained its effectiveness well after donor support was withdrawn (Child, Jones et al. 2003) and, though not much written about today, is still operational.

Legislated devolution in Zimbabwe and Namibia are another strength of these programmes that is missing in Botswana and Zambia. Similar, attempts to develop such organizations in Botswana and Zambia were not successful, so with the withdrawal of donor projects or key personnel, no mechanism was in place to defend devolution even where most civil servants and many community members were in favor of it. Thus, we see devolution being undermined by state actors post the donor projects

and these outcomes has been shaped differently in both countries. In Zambia, the ‘co-management’ arrangement, lack of clearly defined rights, fragmented sectoral legislation, lack of subsidiary legislation to guide policy implementation, and above all the need of ZAWA to fund itself from community revenues, are factors that have enabled moves towards recentralization. In the case of Botswana, high level political actors have been able to reverse the devolutionary process against the will of the majority because the majority is not politically organized, because administratively devolved rights were coming up for their 15-year renewal, and because the poor performance of some communities was used to argue (in the absence of effective monitoring systems) that CBNRM was wasting money.

Despite these constraining factors, Botswana would rate higher in the move to devolve natural resource rights when compared to Zambia. This is evident in the manner Botswana pursued its CBNRM policy implementation. In Botswana, CBNRM was implemented legally and programmatically, and after several years of consultation (1995 – 2007), a policy was agreed by parliament to guide further implementation (even if the policy contained the highly unfavorable clause that communities lose 65% of their revenues). CBNRM is supported by many civil servants in Botswana who feel greatly disempowered by the present “Yes Sir Democracy”.

In comparison, Zambia is generally a much more personalized state than the more rule-following Botswana, and CBNRM similarly has been greatly affected by the influence of a few key actors, both positively and negatively. In other words, CBNRM in Zambia is not really managed through any formal programmatic process. It moved forward when certain conservationist and donors linked up with key government

officials, but rapidly went backwards if these individuals were relocated and especially after ZAWA began to perceive (however inequitably) that it could finance its activities from hunting in communal areas even though it is obvious that this strategy is unsustainable. Thus in Botswana, CBNRM was facilitated and implemented through Government with initial support from donors such as USAID and SNV. This support was later continued post donor funding and the Department of Wildlife and National Parks was the key implementer until 2009 when this role was realigned to the Botswana Tourism Board. In Zambia despite government being a ‘proponent’ of these programs initially, the support and commitment has over the years waned, the support for and capacity to implement CBNRM in government agencies is low, and there has been increased competition for resources between the Zambia Wildlife Authority (quasi government institution) and the communities. In Zambia the incentives for state actors to devolve power to local communities continue to diminish, because wildlife officials do not get salaries or allowances unless these are self-funded<sup>1</sup>. By contrast, in Botswana the level of direct competition between state actors and communities is relatively low as the wildlife department does not compete for funding with communities: it is relatively well funded from state coffers (diamonds) and community monies that are centralized are ring-fenced in Trust.

The future is hard to predict. Wildlife populations in Zambia are highly likely to continue to decline outside protected areas (and even inside them) unless the current policies are reversed, but individuals within ZAWA have strong short-term incentives to

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<sup>1</sup> Nelson and Agrawal, 2008 identify this as the reason why there is lack of a deliberate move towards decentralization in Zambia.

perpetuate the current inequitable situation. In Botswana, recent reports show a large decline in wildlife, especially in the Okavango delta (Chase 2011). There is also widespread support for CBNRM and democratization, but civil society is weak relative to government, indeed in this small country much civic activity appears to occur through government. Recentralization is driven strongly by one or two high level individuals against the will of the majority, and the outcome of CBNRM is likely to be determined by whether these individuals can be won over to the cause of devolution, or the outcome of the next election cycle.

**APPENDIX A**  
**DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE QUESTIONNAIRE BOTSWANA**

**Respondent Number**

**Research Assistant Name**

**QUESTIONNAIRE ON UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF DEMOCRATIC  
INSTITUTIONS IN CBNRM**

**Household Selection Procedure:**

Interviewer:

- From the membership list provided, we select respondents using a simple random sample procedure.
- Interview includes members that are 18 years and above.

**INFORMED CONSENT**

**Good day. My name is: \_\_\_\_\_ . I am a Researcher with  
the University of Florida and this is an independent research institution. I do not represent  
the Government or any Non-Governmental Organization.**

**STATEMENT ABOUT INFORMED CONSENT:**

1. The purpose of this study is to understand what you think about your how things are governed in your Community. [*Maikaelelo a patlisiso ee ke go batla go tlhaloganya ka fa dilo di dirwang ka teng mo morafeng wa lona*].
2. We would like to learn more on **how you vote; chose your leaders and participate in various political activities** in the Trust. [*Re eletsa go itse ka fa lo tlhophang moemedi wa lona wa lona wa tsamaiso ya mokgatlhong wa lona*]
3. This survey should take less than one hour [*Re solo fela fa patlisiso e tla tsaya nako e sa feteng oura*]
4. You do not have to answer any question you do not want to [*Ga o patelesege go araba dipotso tse fa o sa battle*]
5. All information is confidential [*Sepe se se o tla se buang e tla nna sephiri*].
6. You can stop the interview process at any time [*O lettelesega go ka emisa nako nngwe lenngwe*]
7. You can ask for clarification on any question at any time [*O ka kopa go tlholosediwa fa o sa tlhaloganyeng teng nako nngwe le nngwe fa o batla*]
8. There is no right or wrong answers, and most importantly candid and honest answers are most useful. [*Dikarabo tsotlhe di a amo lesega, se se bothokwa segolo bogolo ke dikarabo tse di boammaaruri ebile dina le mo mosola*].
9. There are no direct benefits, risks, or compensation to you for participating in the study [*Ga re solo fete dikatso dipe , mo go tseeng karolo mo patlisiso e*]

For questions about your rights as a research participant contact the IRB at Tel: 352-392-043

## 1. BACKGROUND

CBO	CBO VILLAGE	CONTROL HUNTING AREA (CHA)
Khwai Development Trust	Khwai	NG 18
Mababe Zokotsama Community Development Trust	Mababe	NG 41
Sankuyo Tshwaragano Management Trust	Sankuyo	NG 33 & NG 34

### 1.1 Household Check: Infrastructure [*Tshekatsheko ya malwapa: Dikago*]

	Please Tick [Tshwaa]	Please Tick [Tshwaa]
<b>1.1.1 House: [Ntlo]</b>		
▪ Traditional (Mud): [ <i>Ya ngwao ee agilweng ka mmu</i> ]	Yes [ee]: .....	No [nnyaa].....
▪ Cement Block: <i>Samente</i>	Yes [ee]: .....	No [nnyaa].....
<b>1.1.2 Roof: [Marulelo]</b>	Yes [ee].....	No [nnyaa].....
▪ Thatch [ <i>Bojang</i> ]		
▪ Tin [ <i>Senke</i> ]	Yes [ee].....	No [nnyaa].....

### 1.2 Are the following services present in the Village [*Interviewer determines*]

[*A ditlamelo tse di latelang di teng mo motseng*]

	Yes [ee]	No [nnyaa]	Can't Determine [Gakeitse]
Electricity grid that most houses could access [ <i>Kgokelo ya motlakase ee gaufi</i> ]			
Piped water system that most houses can access [ <i>Metsi a a phepa a a ka fitlhlelwang ke malwapa ka bontsi</i> ]			
Sewage system that most houses could access [ <i>Kgopo ya metsi a a leswe e e ka fitlhlelwang malapa a mantis</i> ]			
Cell phone service [ <i>Kgokelo ya megalala ya letheka</i> ]			

### 1.3 Are the following facilities in the Village, within easy walking distance?

[*A ditlamelo tse di latelang di gaufi?*]

[*Interviewer determines this*]

	Yes	No	Can't

	[ee]	[nnyaa]	Determine [Gakeitse]
School [Sekolo]			
Police Station [Diofisi tsa sepodise]			
Health Clinic [Kokelwana]			
Market Stalls (selling groceries and/ or clothing) [Marekisetso a dijo le diaparo]			

## 2. DEMOGRAPHICS

2.1 Let's begin by recording a few facts about you. [Are simolole ka go itse ka gag ago]

**[Interviewer record the age, for those that don't know ask for their identity card to determine age]** [Mmotsolotsi, kopa digwaga tsa ba o ba botsang, kopa dikarata tsa omang mo go ba ba sa itseng dingwaga tsa bone go bona dingwaga tsa bone]

2.2 How old are you? [O dingwaga di kae?]

2.3 How long have you lived in the village? [O nnile mo motseng o lebaka le le kae?]

[Please tick] <b>[Interviewer: Tick correct response number]</b>	Yes [1] [ee]	No [2] [nnyaa]	Don't Know [9] [Gakeitse]
2.4 Are you the Head of the Household? [A ke wena tlhogo ya lelwapa?]			

2.5 Which is your home language? [Ke teme/ puo efe e le e dirisang mo lwapeng?]

**[Interviewer: Prompt if necessary: That is the language of your group]**

	Please tick [Ka tsweetswee tshwaal]	Code [Letshwao]
English		101
Setswana		201
Seyei		202
Sembukushu		203
Sesarwa		204
Setswana		205
Seherero		206
No Response [Ga gona karabo]		207

<b>2.6 Sex [Bong]</b>	Male [Rre/ monna]: <input type="checkbox"/> Female [mme/mosadi]: <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>2.7 Education Grade [Tsa thuto]</b>	No Education [Ba basa tsenang sekolo]: <input type="checkbox"/> Some Primary School [Sekolo se se botlana] <input type="checkbox"/> Completed Primary School [Sekolo se se botlana]: <input type="checkbox"/> Junior Secondary (F1 F2 F3) [Sekolo se segolwane]: <input type="checkbox"/> Senior Secondary (F4 F5) [Sekolo se segolwane] <input type="checkbox"/> College [Sekolo se segolo/sa ithutelo ditiro] <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>2.8 Gender of Head of Household [Bong jwa tlhogo ya lelwapa]</b>	Male [Rre/monna]: <input type="checkbox"/> Female [Mme/ mosadi]: <input type="checkbox"/> Female (male away for 6 + months/ year: [mme (Rre a seo lebaka la kgwedi tse thataro kgotsa Ngwaga)] <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>2.9 No. of people in Household: [Palo ya ba ba nnang mo lwapeng]</b>	Adults: Male: ..... Female: ..... Children: Male: ..... Female: .....
<b>2.10 No. of people in Household employed in: [Palo ya ba ba thapilweng mo lwapeng]</b>	CBO: [Mokgatlho]..... Tourism [Tsa Bojanala]: ..... Hunting [Tsa letsomo]: ..... Other [Tse dingwe]: ..... <u>[Specify, prompt to get respondents to recall names in household in other employment]/[Rotloetsa baarabi go fa maina]</u>
<b>2.11 Position in CBO [Maemo mo Mokgatlho]:</b>	Manager/ Management Employee [Moeteledipele]..... <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

[Tick/Tshwaal]	Employee (Game Guard, Community Scout)..... [motlhokomedi wa diphologolo]	<input type="checkbox"/>
	CBO Committee..... [Komiti ya Mokgatlho]	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Ordinary Member..... [leloko fela]	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Other: [specify]..... [Tse dingwe [tlhalosa])]	<input type="checkbox"/>

### LIVELIHOOD STATUS AND PROVISION OF CBNRM GOODS

[Seemo sa itshetso/tse di abiwang ke ba CBNRM]

#### 3.1 In general, how do you rate the way you live compared to those of other members in this community?

[O kala jang ka fa o tshelang ka teng fa o itshwantsha le ba bangwe mo motseng]

[Read out response options, please tick]

		Tick [Tshwaal]	
☹☹	Much worse [Se kwa tlase thata]		5
☹	Worse [Se kwa tlase]		4
☺	Same [Di a tshwana]		3
😊	Better [Se botoka]		2
😊😊	Much Better [Se botoka thata]		1
	Don't Know [Ga ke itse]		9

#### 3.2 Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without:

[Mo dingwageng tse di fetileng a go na le mongwe mo lapeng yo o neng a nna a sena tse di latelang:]

[Read out options]

	Never [Nnyaa gotlhelele]	Just once or twice [Gangwe kgotsa gabedi]	Several times [Makgetho a mantsinyana]	Many times [Makgetho a mantsi]	Always [Nako tsotthe]	Don't Know [Ga keitse]
CODE [Letshwao]	5	4	3	2	1	9
3.2.1 Food to eat? [Dijo?]						

3.2.2 Clean water for home use? [Metsi a a phepa go dirisiwa mo lwapeng?]					
3.2.3 Medicines or medical treatment? [Melemo kgotsa tsa kalafi]					
3.2.4 Fuel to cook your food? [Tse di dirisiwang go apaya?]					
3.2.5 A cash income? [Madi a dituelo]					

3.3 Looking back 10years ago [1999 say year], is your community better off now, or before CBNRM started? [Fa o leba, mo dingwageng tse some tse di fetileng, a o bona tokafalo mo bathong ba motse wa gago gompieno, kgotsa pele ga CBNRM e simolola?]  [Read out response options & tick]		CODE [Letshwao]
	Tick [Tshwaa]	
☹☹	Much worse [Seemo se maswe thata]	5
☹	Worse [Seemo se maswe]	4
☺	Same [Go tshwana fela]	3
😊	Better [Go botoka]	2
😊😊	Much Better [Go botoka thata]	1
	Don't Know [Ga ke itse]	9

3.4 What would you say are the major changes that have been brought about by CBNRM?  
[Ke diphetogo dife tse di tsisitsweng ke CBNRM?(tse disiameng)]

[Interviewer: prompt good and bad changes]

.....  
.....

.....  
 .....

<b>3.5 Now let's talk about the benefits you have received from CBNRM. In the past 5 years, has anyone in your household received any of the following benefits?</b> <i>[Bomosola jwa CBNRM. A gona le mongwe mo lwapeng la lona yo o amogetseng tse di latelang, mo ngwageng tse tlhano tse di fetileng?]</i>		
<b>3.5.1 Employment [Tiro]</b>		
Safari Operator	<input type="checkbox"/>	No. Employed in HH.....
Tourism/ Lodges	<input type="checkbox"/>	No. Employed in HH.....
CBO Employment	<input type="checkbox"/>	No. Employed in HH.....
<b>3.5.2 Cash Dividends [Dituelo]</b>		
Yes [ee]	<input type="checkbox"/>	No [nnyaa] <input type="checkbox"/>
Amount [Selekanyo]: .....		
<b>3.5.3 Orphanage Fund [Dithuso tsa masiela]</b>		
Yes [ee]	<input type="checkbox"/>	No [nnyaa] <input type="checkbox"/>
Amount [Selekanyo]: .....		
<b>2. Old People's Fund [Dithuso tsa bagodi]</b>		
Yes [ee]	<input type="checkbox"/>	No [nnyaa] <input type="checkbox"/>
Amount [Selekanyo]: .....		

#### **4. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN CBNRM**

***Let's turn to how you participate in CBNRM Political activities***  
*[Go tsenya letsogo ga sepolotiki mo CBNRM]*

#### **4.1 Membership: [Boloko]**

**4.1.1 As a member of ..... village do you have a right to join the CBNRM program?**

[Jaaka leloko la motse wa ....., a o letlelelwa go nna leloko la lenaneo la CBNRM]

**[Interviewer mention the name of village]**

Yes [ee]:

No[nnyaa]:

Don't Know [Gake itse]:

**4.1.2 Here is a list of positions in the CBNRM community. For each one, could you tell me whether you are: -**

[Mo maemong a CBNRM a a latelang, ke afe a o mo go one?]

**[Tick box]**

	<b>Tick</b> [Tshwaa]	<b>CODE</b> [Letshwao]
a. Trust Leader [Moeteledipele wa lekgotla]		
b. Trust Employee [Mothapiwa/ mohiriwa wa lekgotla]		
c. Active Member [Leloko le le matlhagatlhaga]		
d. Not an active Member [Leloko le le seng matlhagatlhaga]		

**[If respondent ticks (d) ask question 4.2, if not proceed to question 4.3]**

[Fa karabo e le (d) botsa potsa 4.2, e seng jalo fetela kwa go 4.3]

**4.2 Please list the reasons why you are not an active member of the Trust?**

[Tsweetswe, bolela mabaka a a go tlhokisang matlhagatlhaga mo bolokong jwa gago?]

**[If respondent, ticks (a – c) ask the following set of questions]**

[Fa karabo e le (a – c) botsa dipotsa tse di latelang]

**4.3 Participation in Annual General Meetings:** [Tseo karolo mo kokoaong ya ngwaga le ngwaga]

**4.3.1 In the last year, have you attended any Annual General Meeting (AGM)?**

[A o kile wa tsenelela kokoa ya ngwaga le ngwaga mo ngwageng o o fetileng]

Yes [ee]:

No [nnyaa]:

**4.3.2 Here is a list of the decisions that are made at the CBNRM AGM. At the last AGM, please tell us your level of participation when the following was discussed?**

[*Tse di latelang ke megopolو e e tsewang kwa bokopanong jwa ngwaga le ngwaga.*

*Bolela boleng jwa karolo ya gago mo bokopanong jwa ngwaga o o fetilang]*]

		Often [Gangwe le gape] 	Several times [Kgapetsa kgapetsa] 	Once or twice [Gangwe kgotsa ga bedi] 	Would if I had the chance [Ke ka tsaya karolo fa ke filwe sebaka] 	Not interested [Ga ke na kgatlhego] 	Don't Know [Ga ke itse]
	<b>CODE</b> [ <i>Letshwao</i> ]	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>9</b>
a.	Reading and <b>adoption of minutes</b> for last AGM [ <i>Go bala le go amagela metsotso ya bokopano jo bofetileng</i> ]						[ <i>Ga ke itse</i> ]
b.	Annual Report on status of <b>Natural Resources</b> [ <i>Pego ya ngwaga ka disa tlhalego</i> ]						
c.	Annual Report on <b>Trust Projects</b> [ <i>Pego ya ngwaga ka ditiro tsa lekgotla</i> ]						
d.	<b>Financial Report</b> [ <i>Pego ya tsa madi</i> ]						

e	<b>Audit Report</b> [Pego ya tshekatsheko ya tsa madi]					
f.	<b>Elections of members of the Board</b> [Tlhopho ya maloko a botsamaisi]					
g.	<b>Review of membership register.</b> [Tshekatshelo ya dikwalo tsa loloko]					
h.	<b>Amendment of Constitution</b> [Paakanyo ya melaو]					

**4.4 What are some of the reasons why you didn't participate in the AGM decisions?**

[Ke mabaka afe a a ka tswang a dirile gore o seka wa tsaya karolo mo bokopanong jwa ngwaga le ngwaga?]

	<b>Please Tick</b> [Tshweetswee tshwaa]	<b>CODE</b>
Not interested [Gake na kgatlhego]		1
I am not consulted [Ga ke a rerisiwa]		2
My participation makes no difference [Boleng jwame gab o dire pharologanyo]		3
Only Trust Leaders can participate [Baeteledipele ba lekgotla ke bone fela ba tsayang karolo]		4

**4.5 Please tell us any other reasons why you have not participated in AGM decisions.**

[Ka tsweetswee re bolelele mabaka a mangwe a a dirileng gore o seka wa tsaya karolo mo  
bokopanong jwa ngwaga le ngwaga]

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## 5. RIGHTS [Ditshwanelo]

**5.1 Let's talk about the rights you have as a member of [Name of Community]. Do you have the following rights: -**

[Are bue ka ditshwanelo tsa gago jaaka leloka la ..... A o na le ditshwanelo tse di latelang: -]

[Rights here are restricted to rights provided for in the CBNRM constitution]

RIGHTS [Ditshwanelo]	YES [ee]	NO [nnyaa]	WHO GIVES RIGHTS [Kemang yo o rebolang ditshwanelo]	TICK [Tshwaa]
5.1.1 Right to stand in an election? [Tshwanelo ya go emela ditlhopho?]			Government [Goromente]	
			Trust Leaders [Baeteledi ba lekgotla]	
			Traditional Authority [Babusi ba ngwao/ dikgosi]	
			A few individuals in the Community [Palo ee seng ya sepe ya morafe]	
			The Community [Morafe ka kakaretso]	
5.1.2 Right to be nominated for			Government [Gotomente]	
			Trust Leaders [Baeteledi ba	

<p><b>election onto the Board?</b>  <i>[Tshwanelo ya go tlhopiwa go tsena mo lekgotleng la boeteledipele]</i></p>		<p><i>lekgotla]</i>  Traditional Authority [<i>Babusi ba ngwao/ dikgosi</i>]  A few individuals in the Community [<i>Palo ee seng ya sepe ya morafe</i>]  The Community [<i>Morafe ka kakaretso</i>]</p>	
<p><b>5.1.3 Right to vote?</b>  <i>[Tshwanelo ya go tlhopha]</i></p>		<p>Government [<i>Goromente</i>]  Trust Leaders [<i>Baeteledi ba lekgotla</i>]  Traditional Authority [<i>Babusi ba ngwao/ dikgosi</i>]  A few individuals in the Community [<i>Palo ee seng ya sepe ya morafe</i>]  The Community [<i>Morafe ka kakaretso</i>]</p>	
<p><b>5.1.4 Right to remove corrupt CBNRM Leaders?</b>  <i>[Tshwanelo ya go ntsha boeteledipele bo bo sokameng mo lekgotleng (CBNRM)]</i></p>		<p>Government [<i>Goromente</i>]  Trust Leaders [<i>Baeteledi ba lekgotla</i>]  Traditional Authority [<i>Babusi ba ngwao/ dikgosi</i>]  A few individuals in the Community [<i>Palo ee seng ya sepe ya morafe</i>]  The Community [<i>Morafe ka kakaretso</i>]</p>	
<p><b>5.1.5 Right to choose a Leader of your choice as Trust Representative?</b>  <i>[Tshwanelo ya go tlhopa moeteledipele yo o ratang jaaka moemedi wo gago kwa lekgotlaneng]</i></p>		<p>Government [<i>Goromente</i>]  Trust Leaders [<i>Baeteledi ba lekgotla</i>]  Traditional Authority [<i>Babusi ba ngwao/ dikgosi</i>]  A few individuals in the Community [<i>Palo ee seng ya sepe ya morafe</i>]  The Community [<i>Morafe ka kakaretso</i>]</p>	

5.1.6 Right to participate at AGM? [Tshwanelo ya go tsaya karolo mo bokopanong jwa ngwagwa le ngwagwa]			Government [ <i>Goromente</i> ] Trust Leaders [ <i>Baeteledi ba lekgotla</i> ] Traditional Authority [ <i>Babusi ba ngwao/ dikgosi</i> ] A few individuals in the Community [ <i>Palo ee seng ya sepe ya morafe</i> ] The Community [ <i>Morafe ka kakaretso</i> ]	
5.1.7 Right to make decision on CBNRM finances? [Tshwanelo ya go tsaya ditshwetso mo go tsa madi a lekgotlana (CBNRM)]			Government [ <i>Goromente</i> ] Trust Leaders [ <i>Baeteledi ba lekgotla</i> ] Traditional Authority [ <i>Babusi ba ngwao/ dikgosi</i> ] A few individuals in the Community [ <i>Palo ee seng ya sepe ya morafe</i> ] The Community [ <i>Morafe ka kakaretso</i> ]	
5.1.8 Right to change the constitution? [Tshwanelo ya go fetola molao motheo]			Government [ <i>Goromente</i> ] Trust Leaders [ <i>Baeteledi ba lekgotla</i> ] Traditional Authority [ <i>Babusi ba ngwao/ dikgosi</i> ] A few individuals in the Community [ <i>Palo ee seng ya sepe ya morafe</i> ] The Community [ <i>Morafe ka kakaretso</i> ]	

6. **RIGHTS OF POLITICAL LEADERS TO COMPETE FOR SUPPORT & COMPETE FOR VOTES** [Ditshwanelo tsa baeteledipele ba sepolotiki go gaisanela kemonokeng le ditlhopho]

**6.1 Leadership:** [*Boeteledipele*]

6.1.1 In your opinion, how likely is it that you could get together with others and make: [Read out options] [O bona le ka dira eng le ba bangwe go dira tse di latehangi]
---

[Balela megopololo kwa godimo]

	Very likely [Go ka kgonega thata] 😊😊	Somewhat likely [Go ka kgonega] 😊	Neutral [Go fa gare] ☺	Not very likely [Go ka se kgonege] 😊	Not at all likely [Go ka se kgonege gotlholele] 😊😊
CODE	5	4	3	2	1
a. The elected <b>Trust Chairperson</b> listen to your concerns about a matter of importance to the community? [Modulasetilo yo o tlhophilweng o reetsa dikeletso tsa gago tse di amang morafe?]					
b. The <b>Trust Manager</b> listen to your concerns about how money is spent? [Mogogi wa lekgotla o reetsa dikeletso/ megopololo tsa gago ka tsa tiri so ya modi]					

**6.1.2 Let's talk for a moment about the kind of community you would like to have in your CBNRM community [name the CBO e.g Khwai Trust]. Which of the following statement is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2 [How the community perceives Leadership]**

[Tla re tseye sebaka re bue ka komiti ye o batlang go nna le yone mo lekgotleng la CBNRM. Ke mulaetsa ofe o o gaufi le maikutho a gago? Tlhophapha molaetsa wa ntsha kana wa bobedi (Morafe o amogela jang boeteledipele)]

[

<b>Statement 1:</b> [Molaetsa wa ntsha:] “Members of .....[name of CBO] should be more active in questioning the actions of Leaders.” [Malokoa ....(lekgotla Trust) a tshwawetse go nna matlhagatlhaga ka go botsa ka ditiro tsa baeteledi]	<b>Statement 2:</b> [Malaetsa wa bobedi] “In this community, members should show more respect for authority.” [Mo motseng o, maloko a tshwanetse go itsaya itshupa maitseo mo bodireding jwa bone.
Agree very	Agree with

	<b>strongly</b> with Statement <b>1</b> [Ke dumalana thata le mulaetsa wa ntlha]	Statement <b>1</b> [Ke dumalana thata le mulaetsa wa ntlha]	<b>strongly</b> with Statement <b>2</b> [Ke dumalana thata le mulaetsa wa bobedi]	Statement <b>2</b> [Ke dumalana thata le mulaetsa wa bobedi]	with Neither <b>1</b> or <b>2</b> [Gke dumalana thata le mulaetsa wa ntlha kgotsa wa bobedi]	Know [Ga ke itse]
	😊😊	😊	😊😊	😊	😊	😊
<b>CODE</b> [Letswao]	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Tick</b> [Tshwaa]						

**6.1.3 Let's talk for a moment about the kind of society you would like to have in your CBNRM community [name the CBO e.g Khwai Trust]. Which of the following statement is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2**

[A re tseye sebaka re bue ka morafe o o batlang go nna le one mo lekgotleng la Khwai/ Mababe/ Sankuyo ke ofe molaetsa o o latelang o o gaufi le maikutlo a gago? Tlhophla molaetsa wa ntlha kgotsa wa bobedi.]

	<b>Statement 1:</b> [Molaetsa wa ntlha:]  “Since leaders represent everyone, they should not favour their own family or group.” [“Ka baeteledipele ba emetse mongwe le mongwe, gab a a tshwanela go tsaya lethakore la ba malwapa a bone”]	<b>Statement 2:</b> [Malaetsa wa bobedi]  “Once in office, leaders are expected to help their family and group.” [Baeteledi ba solo felwa go thusa ba malwapa a bone fa ba setse ba tsere marapho]				
	Agree very <b>strongly</b> with Statement <b>1</b> [Ke dumalana thata le mulaetsa wa ntlha]  <b>1</b> 😊😊	Agree with Statement <b>1</b> [Ke dumalana thata le mulaetsa wa ntlha]  😊	Agree very <b>strongly</b> with Statement <b>2</b> [Ke dumalana thata le mulaetsa wa bobedi]  😊😊	Agree with Statement <b>2</b> [Ke dumalana thata le mulaetsa wa bobedi]  😊	Agree with Neither <b>1</b> or <b>2</b> [Gke dumalana thata le mulaetsa wa ntlha kgotsa wa bobedi]  😊	Don't Know [Gakeitse]

<b>CODE</b> [Letswao]	1	2	3	4	5	9
<b>Tick</b> [Tshwaa]						

## 7. ELECTIONS [Ditlhopho]

Now let's talk about elections.

### 7.1 Let's talk about how you choose your Trust Leaders. Below is a list of voting methods, how was the Trust Leader chosen at the last AGM elections?

[A re bue kafa le tlhophang baeteledipele ba lekgotlana ka teng. Tse di latelang ke mekgwa e go tlhophilweng moeteledipele mo kokoanong ya ngwaga le ngwaga mo ngwageng o o fetileng:]

	<b>Yes</b> [ee]	<b>No</b> [nnyaa]	<b>CODE</b> [Letshwao]
a. Appointed by Headman/ Chief [A tlhophiwa ke kgosi/ kgosana]			1
b. Appointed by Wildlife Department [A tlhophiwa ke ba lephata la diphologolo]			2
c. Vote by Hands [Ba tlhopha ka go tsholetsa diatla]			3
d. Vote by Secret Ballot [Ba tlhopha ka tlhopho ya sephiri (secret ballot)]			4
			5
e. Other [Specify] [Tse dingwe]			

### 7.2 Please rank the method of voting that you prefer, starting with your highest preference first [1 is highest and 4 lowest].

[Tlhophapha mefuta e e dirisiwang go tlhopha e o bonang e le botoka, o simolole ka e e kwa godimo pele].

	<b>Rank [1 – 4]</b>	<b>CODE</b>
a. Appointed by Headman/ Chief [A tlhophiwa ke kgosi/ kgosana]		1
b. Appointed by Wildlife Department [A tlhophiwa ke ba lephata la diphologolo]		2
c. Vote by Hands [Ba tlhopha ka go tsholetsa seafla]		3
d. Vote by Secret Ballot [Ba tlhopha ka tlhopho ya sephiri]		4

### 7.3 How many times have you voted in the Trust elections? [O tlhophile ga kae moditlhophong tsa lekgotla?]

	<b>Circle</b>	<b>CODE</b>
Once [Gangwe]	1	1

Twice [Ga bedi]	2	2
Three times [Gararo]	3	3
Four times [Gane]	4	4
Five times [Gatlhano]	5	5
More than 5 times [Go feta botlhano]	➤ 5	6

**7.4 Did you vote for the current CBO Leaders in the last AGM elections?**

[A o tsere karolo mo tlhophong ya baeteledipele ba lekgotla (Trust) mo bokopanong jwa ngwage le ngwaga mo ngwageng o o fetileng?]

	Yes [ee]	No [nnyaa]	Refused to answer [Ga arabu]	Don't Know/ Can't Remember [Ga ke itse/ ga ke gakologelwe]
<b>CODE</b>	1	2	0	9
Chairperson [Modulasetilo]				
Treasurer [Motsholamadi]				
Secretary [Mokwaledi]				

**7.5 Do you think the last Trust Elections were free and fair?**

[A o akanya gore dithopho tsa bofelo di re di gololesegile]

	Very Fair [Was able to choose my candidate with freedom] [Gololsegile thata: ke ne ka tlhopa moemedi ka tshosologo] 😊😊	Somewhat Fair [Free to choose my candidate ok] [Golo lesegile nayana: ka tshosologo ka tlhopa moemedi sentle] 😊	Not Fair [Not able to choose my candidate well] [Ga ke a kgona go tlhopha moemedi sentle] 😊	Bad [Only a few people participated] [Batho ba se kae batsere karolo] 😊😊	Not interested in voting [Didn't participate] [Ga ke a tsaya karolo] 😊
<b>CODE</b>	1	2	3	4	5
Tick [Tshwaa]					

**7.6 As a member of [Name of CBO] would you be eligible to stand for a position in the Trust Committee?**

[Jaaka leloko la lekgotlana la Trust, a o kgatlhegela go nna le maemo mo komiting?]

Yes [ee][1]

No [nnyaa] [2]

**7.7 If no, what are the reasons why you would not stand for office?** [Trying to differentiate whether it because they just don't want to stand, or the "rules don't allow them"]

[Fa karabo e le nnyaa, fa lebaka la gore ke eng o sa eme mo komiting (O leke go tlhalosa gore a ke bone bas a batleng go tsaya maemo kgotsa ke melao e e sa ba letleng)]

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**7.8 In your opinion, WHO should for stand for a position in the Trust Committee?**

- [Ka kakanyo ya gago o bona e le mangy o o tshwanetseng go emela maemo mo komiting]

	<i>Please Tick [Tsweetswee tshwaa]</i>	<b>CODE [Letshwao]</b>
All Adults above 18 years [Bagolo botlhe ba ba dingwaga tse di kwa go dimo ga lesome le boferabobedi]		1
Only CBNRM Members [Maloko a lekgotlana la CBNRM fela]		2
All members of [Khwai] Community above 18 years [Maloko a Khwai/ Mababe/ Sankuyo a a dingwaga tse di kwa godimo g lesome le boferabobedi]		3
Members who can Read and Write [Maloko a a kgonang go bala le go kwala]		4

**7.9 If you voted, please provide three reasons why you voted for the Trust Chairperson**

[Fa o tlophile, tsweetswee fa mabaka a le mararo gore ke eng o tlophile modulasetilo wa komiti]

**Instructions:** Do not read out responses, circle the code that best fits the responses, ask respondent to rank them in order of importance and capture the rankings in the blank column.

[Ditaelo: O seka wa bala dikarabo, tshwaa letshwao le le siametseng karabo, kopa mmotsolotsi go di tlhomaganya ka maemo a tsone le botlhokwa jwa tsone, dikwale ka maemo a tsone fa go sa

<i>kwalwang sepe]</i>		
	<b>Code</b> [ <i>Letshwao</i> ]	<b>Ranking</b> [ <i>Maemo</i> ]
a. Not for any particular reason [ <i>E seka mabaka ape</i> ]	1	
b. He is a good person [ <i>Ke motho yo o siameng</i> ]	2	
c. He offered myself/my family personal assistance [ <i>O nthusitse le ba lelwapalome</i> ]	3	
d. He is a member of my ethnic group [ <i>Ke wa letso lame</i> ]	4	
e. My family always votes for him [ <i>Balelwapa lame ba motlhophha nako tsotlhe</i> ]	5	
f. My friends always vote for him [ <i>Ditsala tsame di motlhophha nako tsotlhe</i> ]	6	
g. He improved my community [ <i>O tlhabolotse motse wa rona</i> ]	7	
h. He performed well at the CBO meetings [ <i>O dira sentle mo bokopanong jwa lekgotla (Trust)</i> ]	8	
i. He listens to our community concerns [ <i>O reetsa dingongorego tsa motse</i> ]	11	
j. Other [ <i>Tse dingwe</i> ]	12	
k. Not Applicable [ <i>Ga go a tshwanela</i> ]	99	
l. Refused to answer [ <i>Ba ganne go araba</i> ]	999	
m. Don't know [ <i>Ga ba itse</i> ]	9	

**7.10 When you voted at the last AGM, what were the three most important things you hope the incoming Committee would do?**

[*Fa o tlhophha ko bokopanong jwa ngwaga jo bofetileng, ke dife dilo tse tharo tse di botlhokwa tse o neng o batla komiti e ntsha e di dira*]

- a. \_\_\_\_\_
- b. \_\_\_\_\_
- c. \_\_\_\_\_

**7.11 Let's talk about the CBNRM Board/ Committee. In the last 5 years, has there been a change in the members of the Board?**

[Are bue ka komiti kgolo ya lekgotla la (CBNRM). Mo dingwageng tse tlhano tse di fetileng, a gona le pharologanyo mo malokong a komiti kgolo]

Yes [ee] [1]

No [nnyaa][2]

[If no, continue to 7.13] [Fa karabo e le nnyaa tswelela ko go 7.13]

**7.12 If no, would you want a change of CBO Committee members?**

[Fa karabo e le nnyaa, a o botla pharologanyo mo malokong a Trust]

Yes [ee][1]

No [nnyaa][2]

## **8. CONSTITUTION AND VOTING [Molao motheo le tlhoppo]**

**8.1 Please rank the number of Terms of Office you would want your CBO Committee to serve. [1 – 5; 1 being highest]**

[Tsweetswee rulaganya di nomoro tsa boloko jwa Trust gore e tshwanetse go thusa leng]

[1 – 5; 1 e le e e kwa godimo]

	<b>Rank [1 – 5] [Maemo]</b>
5 years [5] [Ngwaga tse tlhano]	
4 years [4] [Ngwaga tse nne]	
3 years [3] [Ngwaga tse tharo]	
2 years [2] [Ngwaga tse pedi]	
1 year [1] [Ngwaga e nngwe]	

**8.2 Has any member of the Board of Trustees been removed from office by a majority vote at a Special General Meeting?**

[A gona le mongwe wa komiti kgolo ya mokgatlho yoo kileng a ntshiwa ka tlhopho mo phuthegong kgolo ya mokgatlho?]

Yes [ee] [1]

No [nnyaa] [2]

**8.3 Does your community follow the Constitution when removing a corrupt CBO Leader from Office?**

[A komiti ya lona e sala molao motheo morago, fa e ntsha leloko e le sa tshepegeeng/  
senyang mo komiting]

	All of the time [Nako tsotlhe] 😊😊	Sometimes [Fa gongwe] 😊	Don't Know [Gake itse] ☺	Not all the time [e seng nako tsotlhe] ☹	Never [Gaba nke] ☹☹
Tick [Tshwaa]					
<b>8.4 Please list some of the qualities you would want in the CBO Committee Leader:</b> [Tsweetswee kwala ditshetla tsa boleng jo o botlang go bo bona mo mseteledipelewa komiti ya lekgotla la Trust?]					
<hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/>					

**9. ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF INFORMATION [Metswedi ya kitsso e mengwe]**

**9.1 How often do you get the following information?**

[Bona kitsso ya tse di latelang ga kae?]

		Very Often [Gangwe le] 😊😊	Sometimes [Fa gongwe] 😊	Never [Ganke] ☹☹	Not Interested [Ga ke kgatlhege] ☺
9.1.1	Annual Budget [Lenaneo la ngwaga le ngwaga la madi]				
9.1.2	Information on Projects [Kitsso ya ditiro]				

9.1.3	Income from Safari Operator [Dipoelo ga tswa kwa batsamaisi ba safari]				
9.1.4	Money spent on Staff Salaries [Madi a a dirisitsweng mo dituelong tsa babereki]	😊😊	😊	😢😢	😑
9.1.5	Information on Trust Leadership activities [Kitso go tswa mo ditirong tsa bo eteledipele jwa lekgotla]				
9.1.6	Campaign material for Trust Elections [Dilo tsa ipapatso mo ditlhophong tsa lekgotla]				
9.1.7	Who voted in Elections [Ke mang yo o tlhophileng mo ditlhophong]				

**9.2 During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about concerns on how the Trust is being managed?**

[Mo dingwageng tse difitileng, a o kopane le batho ba ba latelang ka dingongorego tsa ka fa lekgotla le tsamaisiwang ka teng?]

	Often [Gantsi]	A few times [Gase gantsi]	Only once [Gangwe fela]	Never [Ga ke ise]	Don't Know [Ga ke itse]
The Kgosi [Dikgosi]					
Trust Chairperson [Moeteledipele wa lekgotla]					
Trust Manager [Mookamedi wa lekgotla/ motsamarse]					

**9.3 Do you think employing a Trust Manager has helped improve things in your community?**

[A o akanya gore go thapiwa go mookamedi wo lekgotla go fetotse dilo tse dintsi mo motseng?]

	Improved A lot [Go fetogile]	Improved things slightly	No change [Go gona phetogol]	Things are bad [Dilo/ ditiro]	Things are worse [Dilo di ile]

	<i>thata]</i> ☺☺	<i>[Go fetotse dilo go le gonnye]</i> ☺	<i>pharologanyo]</i> ☺	<i>di ile masweng]</i> ☹	<i>masweng thata]</i> ☹☹
<i>Tick [Tshwaa]</i>					

**9.4 Overall how satisfied are you with democracy [people having power to make decisions] in your CBNRM Community?**

*[Tshoboko ya tsamaiso (batho bana thata ya go tsaya tshwetso) mo lekgotleng la CBNRM]*

	Very satisfied <i>[Ke kgotsofetse thata]</i> ☺☺	Fairly satisfied <i>[kgotsofetse sentle]</i> ☺	Not very satisfied <i>[Ga ke a kgotsofala thata]</i> ☹	Not at all satisfied <i>[Ga ke a kgotsofala gotlhelele]</i> ☹☹	Do not know <i>[Ga ke itse]</i> ☺
<i>Tick [Tshwaa]</i>					

**What tribe do you belong to? O wa lotso lofe?**

[1] Bayei	[3] Basarwa	[5] Other (specify)	[8] Don't know
[2] Humbukushu	[4] Batawana	[6] None	[9] No response

**To what church or religious group do you belong? O tsena kereke efe?**

[1] United Congregational Church of South Africa (UCCSA)	[2] Zions Christian Church (ZCC)	[3] Morongwa (Twelve Apostle Church)	[4] Methodist	[5] Seventh Day Adventist	[6] Delta Cross Ministries	[7] New Jerusalem	[8] No Church	[98] Don't know	[9] Other
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**THE END THANK YOU FOR YOU TIME**

*[Bokhutlo ke lebogela nako ya gago]*

APPENDIX B  
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE QUESTIONNAIRE ZAMBIA

**Respondent Number**

**Research Assistant Name**

**QUESTIONNAIRE ON UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF DEMOCRATIC  
INSTITUTIONS IN CBNRM**

**Household Selection Procedure:**

Interviewer:

- We select respondents using a simple random sample procedure.
- Interview includes members that are 18 years and above.

**INFORMED CONSENT**

Good day. My name is: \_\_\_\_\_ . I am a Researcher with the University of Florida and this is an independent research institution. I do not represent the Government or any Non Governmental Organization.

**STATEMENT ABOUT INFORMED CONSENT:**

10. The purpose of this study is to understand what you think about how things are governed in your Community.
11. We would like to learn more on **how you vote; chose your leaders and participate in various political activities** in the Trust.
12. This survey should take less than one hour.
13. You do not have to answer any question you do not want to
14. All information is confidential.
15. You can stop the interview process at any time.
16. You can ask for clarification on any question at any time
17. There is no right or wrong answers, and most importantly candid and honest answers are most useful.
18. There are no direct benefits, risks, or compensation to you for participating in the study.

For questions about your rights as a research participant contact the IRB at Tel: 352-392-043

## 2. BACKGROUND

CBO/ CRB	TICK	CBO VILLAGE/ VAG	TICK
Kasempa		Kamfuwe	
		Mbusunte	
		Shimuka	
		Kamakechi	
		Lunga	
Mulendema		Mapoko	
		Isalama	
		Musapa	
		Katele	
		Kapepe	

### 2.1 Are the following services present in the Village [*Interviewer determines*]

	Yes	No	Can't Determine
Electricity grid that most houses could access			
Piped water system that most houses can access			
Sewage system that most houses could access			
Cell phone service			

### 2.3 Are the following facilities in the Village, within easy walking distance? [*Interviewer determines this*]

	Yes	No	Can't Determine
School			
Police Station			
Health Clinic			
Market Stalls (selling groceries and/ or clothing)			

### 1.3 Household Check: Infrastructure

Traditional mud house	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>
Cement block house	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>
Thatched roof (traditional)	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>
Tin roof	<input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>

### 1.4 Source of Energy

	Yes	No
Electricity		
Gas & Paraffin		
Wood		
Charcoal		

### 1.5 Household Assets

	Yes	No
--	-----	----

Radio		
Television		
Fridge		
Telephone		
Bicycle		
Motor Vehicle		
Motor cycle		
Plough		
Boat/ Canoe		
Scotch cart		
Donkeys		
Chickens		
Cows		

## 2. DEMOGRAPHICS

Let's begin by recording a few facts about you.

2.1 How old are you? .....

2.2 How long have you lived in the  
village?.....

2.3 Are you the head of the household? Yes No

3.5 Which is your home language [kituduka]?

[Interviewer: Prompt if necessary: That is the language of your group]

	TICK	Code
English		101
Bemba		209
Lala		210
Bisa		211
Lamba		212
Tonga		213
Lenje		214
Ila		215
Luvale		216
Lunda (N/ West)		217
Kaonde		218
Lozi		219
Chewa		220
Nsenga		221
Ngoni		222
Nyanja		223
Lungu		224
Mambwe		225

Namwanga		226
Tumbuka		227
Senga		228

**2.5 What is your tribal group? [Wi mushoboka]**

[Interviewer: Prompt if necessary: That is the language of your group]

	Please tick	Code
Bemba		229
Lunda (Luapula)		230
Lala Bisa		231
Ushi		232
Chishinga		233
Ng'umbo		234
Lamba		235
Tonga		236
Lenje		237
Ila		238
Luvale		239
Lunda (N/ West)		240
Mbunda		241
Kaonde		242
Lozi		243
Chewa		244
Nsenga		245
Ngoni		246
Lungu		247
Mambwe		248
Namwanga		249
Tumbuka		250
Senga		251

<b>3.6 Sex</b>	Male: <input type="checkbox"/>	Female: <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>3.7 Education Grade</b>	No Education: <input type="checkbox"/>	
	Some Primary School [Lower basic: Grades 1 - 4] <input type="checkbox"/>	
	Upper Primary School [Middle basic: Grades 5 - 7]: <input type="checkbox"/>	
	Junior Secondary [Grades 8 - 9]: <input type="checkbox"/>	
	Senior Secondary [Grades 10 - 12] <input type="checkbox"/>	
	College [Diploma holder] <input type="checkbox"/>	

	University [Degree holder]	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>3.8 Gender of Head of Household</b>	Male: <input type="checkbox"/>	Female: <input type="checkbox"/>
	Female (male away for 6 + months/ year): <input type="checkbox"/>	
<b>3.9 No. of people in Household:</b>	Adults: Male: ..... Female: .....	
	Children: Male: ..... Female: .....	
<b>3.10 No. of people in Household employed in:</b>	CRB: ..... Village Scouts: .....	
	Hunting [No of people]: ..... Type of Jobs: .....	
	Other employment [job]..... No. of people.....	
	Other employment [job]..... No. of people.....	
<b>Position in CRB</b>	CRB Board Member: .....	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Employee [Village Scout].....	<input type="checkbox"/>
	VAG Committee Member.....	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Ordinary Village Member.....	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Other: [specify].....	<input type="checkbox"/>

### **3. LIVELIHOOD STATUS AND PROVISION OF CBNRM GOODS**

4.1 In general, how do you rate the way you live compared to those of other members in this community?	Code
	Tick
 Much worse	5

(:(	Worse			4
:)	Same			3
:)	Better			2
:(:(	Much Better			1
	Don't Know			9

**4.2 Over the past year, how often, have you or anyone in your family gone without:**

[Read out options]

	Never	Just once or twice	Several times	Many times	Always	Don't Know
<b>4.2.1 Food to eat?</b>						
<b>4.2.2 Clean water for home use?</b>						
<b>4.2.3 Medicines or medical treatment?</b>						
<b>4.2.4 Fuel to cook your food?</b>						
<b>4.2.5 A cash income?</b>						

**4.3 Looking back 10years ago [1999 say year], is your community better off**

**now, or before CBNRM started?**

[Read out response options & tick]

**CODE**

		Tick	
:(:(	Much worse		5
:(	Worse		4
:)	Same		3
:)	Better		2
:(:(	Much Better		1
	Don't Know		9

**4.4 What would you say are the major changes that have been brought about by CBNRM?**

[Interviewer: prompt good and bad changes]

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....  
 .....  
 .....

**3.5 Now let's talk about the benefits you have received from CBNRM. In the past 5 years, has anyone in your household received any of the following benefits?**

**Please list the benefits you and your household got from wildlife in the last 12 months:**

Type of Benefit	Do you and your household receive benefit?	Amount/Describe
Cash	Yes / No	.....
Meat	Yes / No	.....
Employment	Yes / No	.....
Other [Specify]		..... .....

**3.6 PROJECTS:** Please name the projects being developed by your CRB and VAG:

Name of Project	Year Started	Is the Project Implemented Well?				
		Very Well	Well	Neutral	Badly	Very Badly
Write name	Year	@@	◎	⊖	⊗	⊗⊗
1.						
2.						
3.						
4.						
5.						
6.						
7.						

## **5. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN CBNRM**

### **5.1 Membership:**

**5.1.1 As a member of this community do you have a right to participate in CRB activities?**

**[Interviewer mention the name of village]**

Yes:

No

Don't Know:

**5.1.2 Here is a list of positions in the CRB community. For each one, could you tell me whether you are: -**

**TICK**

e. CRB Board Member

f. VAG Committee Member

g. Active CRB Member

h. Not an active CRB Member

**[If respondent ticks (d) ask question 4.2, if not proceed to question 4.3]**

**5.2 Please list the reasons why you are not an active member of the CRB?**

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

**[If respondent, ticks (a – c) ask the following set of questions]**

**5.3 Participation in Annual General Meetings:**

**5.3.1 In the last year, have you attended any Annual General Meeting (AGM)?**

Yes:

No:

**4.3.2 In the last year, have you attended any General Meeting (GM) in your VAG?**

Yes:

No:

**4.3.3 Here is a list of the decisions that are made at the CRB AGM. At the last AGM, please tell us your level of participation when the following was discussed?**

		Often 	Several times	Once or twice	Would if I had the	Not interested	Don't Know
--	--	--	---------------	---------------	--------------------	----------------	------------

			😊😊	😊	chance 😢😢	😐	
		😊😊😊	😊😊	😊	😢😢	😊	
a.	<b>Reading and adoption of minutes for last AGM</b>						
b.	<b>Annual Report on status of Natural Resources</b>						
c.	<b>Annual Report on Community Projects</b>						
d.	<b>Financial Report</b>						
		<b>Often</b> 😊😊😊	<b>Several times</b> 😊😊	<b>Once or twice</b> 😊	<b>Would if I had the chance</b> 😢😢	<b>Not interested</b> 😐	<b>Don't Know</b>
e	<b>Audit Report</b>						
f.	<b>Elections of members of the Board</b>						
g.	<b>Review of membership register.</b>						
h.	<b>Amendment of Constitution</b>						
<b>5.4 What are some of the reasons why you didn't participate in the AGM decisions?</b>							
							<b>Please Tick</b>
Not interested							
I am not consulted							
My participation makes no difference							
Only CRB and VAG Leaders can participate							
<b>5.5 Please list <u>OTHER</u> reasons for not participating in AGM decisions.</b>							


## 6. RIGHTS

6.1 Let's talk about the rights you have as a member of the CRB. Do you have the following rights:

*[Rights here are restricted to rights provided for in the CBNRM constitution]*

RIGHTS	YES	NO	WHO GIVES RIGHTS	TICK
6.1.1 Right to stand in an election?			Government CRB Leaders Traditional Authority/ Chief A few individuals in the Community The Community	
6.1.2 Right to be nominated for election onto the Board?			Government CRB Leaders Traditional Authority/ Chief A few individuals in the Community The Community	
6.1.3 Right to vote?			Government CRB Leaders Traditional Authority/ Chief A few individuals in the Community The Community	
6.1.4 Right to remove corrupt CRB Leaders?			Government CRB Leaders Traditional Authority/ Chief A few individuals in the Community	

			The Community	
6.1.5 Right to <b>choose a Leader of your choice as CRB Representative?</b>			Government	
			CRB Leaders	
			Traditional Authority/ Chief	
			A few individuals in the Community	
			The Community	
6.1.6 Right to <b>participate at AGM?</b>			Government	
			CRB Leaders	
			Traditional Authority/ Chief	
			A few individuals in the Community	
			The Community	
6.1.7 Right to <b>make decision on CRB finances?</b>			Government	
			CRB Leaders	
			Traditional Authority/ Chief	
			A few individuals in the Community	
			The Community	
6.1.8 Right to <b>change the constitution?</b>			Government	
			CRB Leaders	
			Traditional Authority/ Chief	
			A few individuals in the Community	
			The Community	

## 7. RIGHTS OF POLITICAL LEADERS TO COMPETE FOR SUPPORT & COMPETE FOR VOTES

### 7.1 Leadership:

7.1.1 In your opinion, how likely is it that you could get together with others and make:  
*[Read out options]*

	Very likely 😊😊	Somewhat likely 😊	Neutral 😐	Not very likely 🙁	Not at all likely 🙁🙁
	😊😊	😊	😐	🙁	🙁🙁
c. The elected CRB Chairperson listen to your concerns about a matter of importance to the community?					

	😊😊	😊	😐	🙁	🙁🙁
d. The VAG leaders listen to your concerns about how money is spent?					
7.1.2 Let's talk for a moment about the kind of community you would like to have in your CRB community. Which of the following statement is closest to your view? Choose <u>EITHER</u> Statement 1 or Statement 2					
<b>Statement 1:</b> <i>"Members of CRB community should be more active in questioning the actions of the CRB Leaders."</i>	<b>Statement 2:</b> <i>"In this community, members should show more respect for CRB leaders."</i>				
	Agree very <b>strongly</b> with Statement 1 😊😊	Agree with Statement 1 😊	Agree very <b>strongly</b> with Statement 2 😊😊	Agree with Statement 2 😊	Agree with Neither 1 or 2 🙁
Circle	😊😊	😊	😊😊	😊	🙁
7.1.3 Let's talk for a moment about the kind of society you would like to have in your CRB community. Which of the following statement is closest to your view? Choose <u>EITHER</u> Statement 1 or Statement 2					
<b>Statement 1:</b> <i>"Since leaders represent everyone, they should not favor their own family or group."</i>	<b>Statement 2:</b> <i>"Once in office, leaders are expected to help their family and group."</i>				
	Agree very <b>strongly</b> with Statement 1 😊😊	Agree with Statement 1 😊	Agree very <b>strongly</b> with Statement 2 😊😊	Agree with Statement 2 😊	Agree with Neither 1 or 2 🙁
CIRCLE	😊😊	😊	😊😊	😊	🙁

## 8. ELECTIONS

Now let's talk about elections.

**7.1 Let's talk about how you choose your CRB Leaders. Below is a list of voting methods, how was the CRB Leader chosen at the last elections?**

	Yes	No
f. Appointed by Headman/ Chief		
g. Appointed by ZAWA		
h. Vote by Hands		
i. Vote by Secret Ballot		
j. Other [Specify] _____		

**8.2 Please rank the method of voting that you prefer, starting with your highest preference first [1 is highest and 4 lowest].**

	Rank [1 – 4]
e. Appointed by Headman/ Chief	
f. Appointed by ZAWA	
g. Vote by Hands	
h. Vote by Secret Ballot	

**8.3 How many times have you voted in the CRB/VAG elections?**

	Circle	CODE
Once	1	1
Twice	2	2
Three times	3	3
Four times	4	4
Five times	5	5
More than 5 times	➤ 5	6

**8.4 Did you vote in the last CRB/VAG elections?**

	TICK
Yes	
No	
Refused to answer	
Can't Remember	

**8.5 Do you think the last elections were free and fair?**

	Very Fair 😊😊	Somewhat Fair	Not Fair	Very Unfair 😢😢	Not interested in voting

<b>CIRCLE</b>					

**8.6 As a member of this VAG would you be eligible to stand for a position in the CRB Committee?**

	<b>TICK</b>
<b>Yes</b>	
<b>No</b>	
<b>Don't Know</b>	
<b>Not interested</b>	

**8.7 If no, what are the reasons why you would not stand for office?**

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**8.8 In your opinion, WHO should stand for a position in the Committee?**

	<b>TICK</b>
<b>All</b> adults above 18 years in this village.	
Only members that have been <u>born</u> in this village.	
Only members who can <u>Read and Write</u> .	

**8.9 If you voted, please provide three reasons why you voted for the CRB Committee at the VAG elections?**

	<b>TICK</b>	<b>RANK</b>
n. Not for any particular reason.		
o. They are good people.		
p. They offered myself/my family personal assistance		
q. They are members of my tribal group		
r. My family always votes for them.		
s. My friends always vote for them.		
t. They improved my community.		

u. They performed well at the CRB meetings		
v. They listen to our community concerns.		
w. They are related to the Chief.		
x. They are related to the Village Headman.		
y. Refused to answer		
z. Don't know		

**8.10 When you voted at the last AGM, what were the three most important things you hope the incoming Committee would do?**

d. \_\_\_\_\_

e. \_\_\_\_\_

f. \_\_\_\_\_

**8.11 Let's talk about the CRB Board. In the last 5 years, has there been a change in the members of the Board?**

Yes

No

[If no, continue to 7.13]

**8.12 If no, would you want a change of CBO Committee members?**

Yes

No

**9. CONSTITUTION AND VOTING**

Has your constitution been explained to you in the last 12 months? YES   
NO

Were you consulted during the constitution building process?  YES   
NO

**Do you think your constitution organizes the community well?**

😊😊 The constitution works very well

	The constitution works reasonably well (just ok)	
	Neutral	
	The constitution is bad	
	The constitution is very bad.	
<b>???</b>	Don't know what it says	

<b>9.1 Please rank the number of Terms of Office you would want your CRB Committee to serve. [1 – 5; 1 being highest]</b>	
	<b>Rank [1 – 5]</b>
<b>5 years [5]</b>	
<b>4 years [4]</b>	
<b>3 years [3]</b>	
<b>2 years [2]</b>	
<b>1 year [1]</b>	

<b>9.2 Has any member of the CRB been removed from office by a majority vote at a Special General Meeting?</b>	
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Yes	No

<b>9.3 Does your community follow the Constitution when removing a corrupt CRB Leader from Office?</b>					
	All of the time 	Sometimes 	Don't know 	Not all the time 	Never 
<b>CIRCLE</b>					
<b>9.4 Please list some of the qualities you would want in the CBO Committee Leader:</b>					
<hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/>					

#### **10.4      ATTITUDES ABOUT WILDLIFE**

**9.1 Overall (taking into account positives and negatives) my attitude towards wildlife is:**

	<b>CIRCLE</b>
Strongly Positive	😊😊
Positive	😊
Neutral	😐
I do not support Wildlife	🙁
I strongly dislike Wildlife	🙁🙁
?? Not sure	
<b>9.2 What do you think of the Kafue National Park?</b>	
	<b>CIRCLE</b>
Strongly Support the Park	😊😊
Support the Park	😊
Neutral / Not sure	😐
I do not support the Park	🙁
I strongly dislike the Park	🙁🙁
<b>9.3 What do you think of the ZAWA Staff?</b>	
	<b>CIRCLE</b>
I like them a lot	😊😊
I like them	😊
Neutral / Not sure	😐
I do not like them	🙁
I strongly dislike them	🙁🙁

9. Why do you like wildlife? For each reason, indicate how important this is for you.

			<b>Very Important</b>	<b>Important</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Not Very Important</b>	<b>Not at All Important</b>
<b>REASON FOR LIKING WILDLIFE</b>	<b>YES</b>	<b>NO</b>	😊😊	😊	😐	🙁	🙁🙁
Conservation for non-financial reasons							
Household benefits							
Jobs							
Development projects / Community income							
Brings development (i.e. economic growth)							
Hunting / Meat							
Helps us get better organized/empowered							
Others reasons (Specify).....							

## **10. ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF INFORMATION**

<b>10.1 How often do you get the following information?</b>					
		<u>Very Often</u> 😊😊	<u>Sometimes</u> 😊	<u>Never</u> 😢😢	<u>Not Interested</u> 😐
10.1.1	<b>Annual Budget</b>				
10.1.2	<b>Information on Projects</b>				
10.1.3	<b>Income from Safari Operator</b>				
10.1.4	<b>Money spent on Staff Salaries</b>				
10.1.5	<b>Information on CRB Leadership activities</b>				
10.1.6	<b>Campaign material for CRB Elections</b>				
10.1.7	<b>Who voted in Elections</b>				

<b>10.2 During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about concerns on how the CRB is being managed?</b>					
	Often	A few times	Only once	Never	Don't Know
<b>The Chief</b>					
<b>The Village Headman</b>					
<b>CRB Leaders</b>					

<b>10.3 Do you think employing a <u>Unit Leader</u> has helped improve things in your CRB?</b>					
	Improved A lot 😊😊	Improved things slightly 😊	No change 😐	Things are bad 😢	Things are worse 😢😢

<b>CIRCLE</b>	😊😊	😊	😐	🙁	🙁🙁
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**10.4 Overall how satisfied are you with democracy [people having power to make decisions] in your CRB Community?**

	Very satisfied 😊😊	Fairly satisfied 😊	Not very satisfied 🙁	Not at all satisfied 🙁🙁	Do not know 😐
<b>Tick</b>					

**THE END THANK YOU FOR YOU TIME**

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## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Patricia Mupeta-Muyamwa is a natural resource governance specialist, with 13 years' of experience in the field of sustainable natural resource management, CBNRM, rural development and conservation. She has worked in several protected area systems in Southern Africa, utilizing the CBNRM approach as a means of reducing threats to large ecosystems and addressing rural poverty. Patricia grew up in the copper mining town, Kitwe in north-west Zambia in Southern Africa and received her bachelor's degree in biological sciences at the University of Zambia. Upon completing her first degree, she worked for the Environmental Council of Zambia and the Wildlife Conservation Society of New York from 1999 – 2004. It was during this period she found her career calling, and started working with rural communities in Southern Africa's wildlife rich areas. She has conducted research and worked in a total of fifteen rural communities in Botswana, Namibia and Zambia. Prior to her PhD, she attained her Master of Science degree in conservation and tourism at the Durrell Institute of Conservation and Ecology (DICE) at the University of Kent in the United Kingdom. For her masters program, she conducted research in sustainable tourism in northern Zambia. Her doctoral research examines the decentralization process in the wildlife sectors of Botswana and Zambia. The study examines, whether this has created an enabling environment for rural communities to benefit from wildlife revenues. She began her studies at the University of Florida in August 2006 and intends to receive her PhD in the fall of 2012.