CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR EFFORTS TO COUNTER THE PERPETUATION OF SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN BRAZIL

By

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To all the people of Brazil who strive for social justice and equality –
And to my Parents,
Gayle and Dan
whose support is immeasurable
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My dissertation examines social capital creation in poor communities as a reaction to the lack of access to education and the perpetuation of social inequality among Brazilians. This study examines the social capital creation during 2008-2009 in Rio de Janeiro and Salvador, Brazil. The main research question includes: *Are poorly educated citizens in developing nations able to establish strong civic associations despite their low educational levels?* This study examines how the residents of lower-income communities interact with the government on all levels with regard to the distribution of resources. I argue that the lack of attention and investment in education by the Brazilian government fosters and reproduces social injustice among Brazilian citizens and that, while not achieving greater social change, their creation of social capital has improved the lives of the beneficiaries of these civil society organizations. Many of these grassroots organizations offer education and have subsequently created more social capital. In addition to working against social injustice and inequality, these organizations help to create social capital affording inclusion which greater society prevents.
CHAPTER 1
RISE OF CIVIC CULTURE: EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CAPITAL CREATION IN BRAZIL

Inequality and injustice are common themes that plague many struggling democratic societies in the developing world. The critique of inequality in developing countries is based on economics, class, and race. A great majority of the populations of these countries experience this social inequality and therefore endure exclusion from the benefits of democratic citizenship. Benefits that many excluded citizens fail to receive include access to voting, clean water, housing, healthcare, adequate nutrition, and security, and more specifically education. Many of these benefits are considered basic elements of life for many of us residing outside the developing world, thus existence is almost unimaginable without these rights. How are excluded citizens able to focus on anything but improving their access to the basic elements of existence? How can leaders in the developing world perpetuate this façade of democracy while tolerating and promoting such flagrant inequalities among citizens?

With the obvious exclusion from power of the lower classes and, for the most part, non-white citizens, Brazil has been identified as one of the world’s most unequal countries. Therefore, Brazil’s inequality is not easily avoided or ignored, yet as Brazil strives for a democratic existence, the state still practices, accepts, and ignores discrimination and repression of the poor, the non-white, favela\(^1\)-dwellers, the uneducated, and women. While Brazil is a relatively wealthy country, its wealth lies in the hands of a minority of its citizens, the elite class. “Pronounced social inequality poses its own challenges to democratic ideals. Levels of income inequality in Brazil are among the highest in the world” (Hunter 2003, 158). To study inequality and injustice in Brazil is to study the plight of a vast majority of the Brazilian citizenry.

\(^1\) Favela is the generic Portuguese term for a shantytown and favelados are those who reside in these areas. These words will be treated as English words and only italicized in their first occurrence.
Even though inequality exists among races and classes throughout Brazil, there also exists inequality among the many states and cities of Brazil. In this study, I aim to elucidate this situation through my selection of case studies, with Salvador, a poor, high Afro-Brazilian populated city located in the Northeast state of Bahia and Rio de Janeiro, a wealthy, cosmopolitan city located in the Southeast state of Rio de Janeiro. This comparison will enable us to look at the differences between the associational trends among citizens. We will study the citizens who are participating in the creation of social capital. Social capital is defined by Robert Putnam as characteristics of society such as “trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (1993, 167). Finally, we will examine the social injustices that the citizens endure and the responsiveness of the governments.

Brazil maintains many practices, values, and beliefs that originated during the colonial era. These historical practices that systematically exclude citizens originated with the Portuguese in colonial Brazil. Even after nearly two hundred years, the government exists as an updated version of its colonial ghost. The power and voice of the country has remained under the control of the elite class, its every beck and call answered by the Brazilian government. Although once excluded citizens now have a voice through the enfranchisement guaranteed by the Constitution of 1988 and are required to use it, the majority of society has no power to support that voice. Additionally, the poor who essentially have no voice and no power to support or challenge the government have very little political space to express that voice. Essentially, the state gives the citizenry the right to participate; however, that right cannot be realized without receiving other basic rights, such as quality education, healthcare, security, and habitable housing.

For many Brazilians, this exclusion begins on a basic level in that there is a deep divide regarding the differences in the quality of public education the state provides its citizens. A more
in-depth look at Brazil’s education divide is provided in Chapter 3. This educational barrier, indicative of the elites’ desire to perpetuate social inequality through poor public education, helping the elite class to maintain their status and power within society while leaving many Brazilians to advocate on their own behalf or to accept the minimal power and rights they possess based upon their position in the societal hierarchy.

This study does not evade the uncomfortable themes of the developing world, but rather confronts and analyzes the unjust, unequal, undemocratic practices in the story of a fledgling democracy. This study examines the recurrent discrimination and repression of citizens through the lack of equal rights in a country touting itself as a democracy. This study aims to discuss social capital in a democratic country, whereas other countries may have more equality under a non-democratic government, this study views that a democratic government is desirable. This study of inequality in Brazil is also a study of the creation of social capital among Brazilian citizens to eradicate these injustices while offering inclusion to the citizens who have been previously ignored by the state. Civil society will be examined in order to assess citizen’s participation in voluntary organizations and, to what extent that participation results in a more active citizenry that is able to effectively make demands on the government. One of the major injustices faced by Brazilian citizens is the inequality of access to education. While studying the excluded Brazilian citizens’ condition, it was necessary to focus on the injustices and inequalities encountered to understand how those affect Brazilian roles as citizens.

The fieldwork for this research project was conducted in multiple communities within the cities of Rio de Janeiro and Salvador, Brazil where citizens encounter similar injustices but at different levels. This dissertation will show how the experiences of inequality and injustice endured by non-elite Brazilians are instrumental in the creation of social capital to addressing
their lack of inclusion. The civil society organizations are a major source of the social capital created in Brazil. Many of the civil society organizations where social capital is created, focus on educating the members, communities, and greater societies. These accounts from the communities and organizations in the cities of Rio de Janeiro and Salvador will elucidate the experiences of injustices, lack of state responsiveness, and subsequent citizen reaction to the exclusionary citizenship that a majority of Brazilians face.

**Research Questions**

The social and racial injustices that are perpetuated through the inequality of education across the nation of Brazil and the lack of government response to such injustices provoke a number of theoretically pertinent questions. The main puzzle addressed in this study is to determine if a certain level of education is required for the creation of social capital among low-income Brazilian citizens. What is the role of social capital in a developing democracy like Brazil where the overriding characteristics of the society is inequality? Are poorly educated citizens in developing countries able to establish strong civic associations despite their low educational levels or do citizens need higher educational levels in order to make the government respond to the demands of civic associations? Do civil society organizations play a role in the creation of social capital and the improvement of access and quality of education? Have the governments of Rio de Janeiro and Salvador demonstrated responsiveness to the demands and needs of the civil society organizations functioning on behalf of the citizens of these two cities? Is social capital creation restricted to members of the same social class or can they create social capital bridging class and race? Answering these questions contributes to the broader knowledge and understanding of how a country, suffering from historical and contextual conditions, develops and practices democracy. Moreover, an examination of how, when and what types of
social capital are developed in excluded parts of society is an important to aid in bringing the citizens back into the state, thus granting inclusive rights to everyone.

Brazilian society demonstrates extreme inequality among its citizens across social class and race. I argue in this study that the lack of attention to public education has perpetuated social inequality and injustice among Brazilian citizens. Even though this inequality may not be intentional on the part of the Brazilian government, their inaction to address and improve the ailing education system and ultimately to address social inequality is evident. The Brazilian government has only implemented education reforms that have provided short-term solutions to this endemic problem. This continuing state of inequality among citizens has delayed Brazil’s progress toward a highly functioning democratic government. Despite social and economic programs to alleviate this ongoing state of discrimination, inequality remains entrenched in Brazilian culture. Due to an extended history of social and racial disparity among Brazilians and insufficient government response to those citizens of the lower class, the amount of citizen involvement has been limited in scope. Even with limited citizen involvement, there has been an increase in social organizational behavior since Brazil re-democratized in 1988. Many of these civil society organizations have focused on creating bridging social capital; however this bridging social capital remains in its developmental stages. The lack of government response to these organizations has limited their capability to advance their bridging social capital, thus restricting the extent of social change achieved. This resurgence, limitations, and aim to improve citizen education within civil society organizations are explored more thoroughly in Chapter 4.

Chapters 5 and 6, the empirical chapters of this dissertation, are framed utilizing a theoretical context. This theoretical context draws upon the literature on democracy and education that will contribute to an understanding of Brazil’s slow movement toward a more
equal society. The literature on social capital production in relation to education and the subsequent increases in democracy will also be examined in order to provide more insight regarding the necessity for education to create a vibrant civil society. The following is a brief survey of the relevant works pertaining to the relationships among education, social capital, and the creation of a democratic society. Among these scholars, many discuss the necessity for social capital and a vibrant civil society in the success of democracy. Many of these scholars indicate the important role civil society plays in the improvement of equality through the provision of quality education. Though a correlation has been identified between a strong civil society and equality of education, the necessity for educated individuals to foster the growth of social capital to form the basis of a vibrant civil society is not well understood.

**Theoretical Context**

As previously mentioned, Brazil suffers from deep inequality among its citizens perpetuated by the lack of access to quality education. One of the central goals of this study is illustrated by this injustice shown to the majority of Brazilian citizens and how some excluded Brazilians have worked to counter this exclusion through the formation of civil society organizations. In the provision of a theoretical context for this study, I link these Brazilian accounts to various scholarly works that provide observations into the relationship among social capital, education, and democracy. Severe inequality among citizens and inequality of education both work to influence the social capital creation and further slow the development of democracy in Brazil. My aim is to review the key theoretical works that strive to answer the question of whether education is necessary to produce social capital and thus necessary for democratization?

These key theoretical works discussing social capital production and its effect on democratization offer some insight regarding the types of social capital creation occurring in Brazil’s nascent democratic society. Questions remain, however, as to what citizen attributes are
necessary for the creation of social capital that will benefit democratization. The main characteristic that will be examined is the education level of the citizens, which has yet to be determined as a necessary attribute of those citizens contributing to social capital creation. While performing my fieldwork for this dissertation, I discovered that social capital creation is a result of and in response to the extreme social injustice, caused by poor quality education that a majority of Brazilian citizens endure. Grassroots organizations such as community organizations, non-governmental organizations, and resident organizations help to augment education, which induces an increase in social capital creation among the members and beneficiaries of those organizations. The social capital created in Rio de Janeiro and Salvador is in direct response to government failure to tackle the entrenched crisis of social inequality, especially in education.

The creation of social capital among citizens serves to further ideals and goals. Some societies are more conducive to the creation of social capital than others due to the cultural and political circumstances of the countries. For example, most of the social capital I observed in my Brazilian case studies reflected that of a hierarchical society with deep social cleavages, which is detailed in Chapter 2 with a discussion of Brazil’s political and social history. Thus the exclusionary practices that occur in Brazil’s societal and political arenas have been transported and rejected by the citizens who create social capital. The state fails to embrace many citizens in its democratic practices, thus causing many citizens to withdraw further from any inclusion that is extended by the state.

This withdrawal can and has contributed to the instability of the institutions of the state because there exist other institutions, both formal and informal, that provide inclusion to the excluded citizens. I delve further into the discussion of the progression of social capital creation
among Brazilians, especially through the formation of civil society organizations in Chapter 4. These civil society organizations work to improve equality among citizens through education, thus creating more social capital and increasing the education of the citizens. Although the hopes, and ultimate goals of many civil society organizations are to force social change, many have resigned themselves to focus on improving the lives of the citizens within their organizations and communities. This is measured by organizational goals, creation of social capital across normal social cleavages, and, ultimately, the degree of response by the government to their needs and goals. Utilizing organizations created by social capital among Brazilian community members to provide education to their members is examined in Chapter 5 and 6.

In this dissertation, I demonstrate that the social capital created among Brazilians however, is weakened due to the perpetuation of social injustice that the state has yet to address with vigor. The negative historical and societal aspects that plague Brazil, such as a hierarchical society and a short and problematic democratic history, also hinder the creation of social capital. Citizens who are creating social capital to improve their lives are also gaining inclusion in an organization or community, something they are not afforded by the state and greater society.

While I argue in this study that education is an important component of the formation of social capital, it may not be necessary. For many developing democracies, like Brazil, education is many times inaccessible and this may restrict many population segments from creating certain types of social capital. Through a careful consideration of the existing literature and thorough discussion of my field research, I will endeavor to determine the role of education in the creation of social capital in a developing democracy like Brazil where the overriding characteristic of society is inequality. I will further address how educating citizens influences the quality of
social capital, what types of social capital are being created and, to what extent the role of social capital creation plays in democratization.

**Democracy: Is Brazil a Candidate?**

First a discussion of the definition of democracy must be fleshed out to establish a basis for the arguments in this examination of education, and social capital and their affects on democratization. There are many definitions of democracy and its components; some, however are more applicable to the developing world than others. Thus, the concept of democracy with its relation to a strong civil society and social capital creation has long been debated among scholars and this will provide a glimpse into the existing literature on developing democracies. This study does not examine non-democratic or command societies. Due to these non-democratic political structures, many aspects examined by this study are effectively imposed upon the populations. The following discussion will present an examination of the definition of democracy as applied to developing democracies as well as help to indicate the quality of social capital creation among the citizens.

Robert Dahl, in his book, *Polyarchy*, describes the processes toward his idea of a more attainable form of democracy a “polyarchy.” His key to a functioning democracy is that the government continually responds to the preferences of its constituents who in turn must have the rights to “formulate their preferences; signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action; and to have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government, that is, weighted with no discrimination because of the content or source of the preference” (Dahl 1971). The element of collective action that Dahl refers to indicates a vibrant civil society, which the civil society organizations in Brazil establish to further many of their goals for gaining equality before the government. The existence and the success of a polyarchy are dependent upon the fulfillment of the three criteria, which give value
to human agency within a society and government. In addition to giving value to human agency, he includes variables of socioeconomic order, level of development, amount of equality within a society, and political activists’ beliefs.

Guillermo O’Donnell has made additions to Dahl’s definition and then ultimately considered it insufficient. O’Donnell has produced multiple solo and co-authored works regarding the prospect for democracy in Latin America. In “Illusions about Consolidation”, he calls for the eradication of the illusion of democracy for Latin America because we will better understand that the quality of social life that accompanies polyarchy is grim; however, he remains hopeful for the development of other ways to study democratic consolidation (O’Donnell 1996).

O’Donnell has built on his definition and assessment of democratic consolidation in Latin America. In 2004, he collaborated with other Latin America democratization scholars in *The Quality of Democracy: Theory and Applications*, in which he presented a revised idea of how democracy should be approached in consolidating countries. “The presumption of agency constitutes every individual as a legal person, a carrier of subjective rights. The legal person makes choices, and is assigned responsibility for them, because the legal system presupposes that she is autonomous, responsible and reasonable—that is, that she is an agent” (O’Donnell 2004, 26). The agent as a citizen thus indicates she is connected to social and civil rights. In the case of Brazil, many citizens fail to realize the connection between citizenship and social and civil rights due to the apparent inequality among citizens and the inadequacies of the Brazilian government to address such inequalities. The elected authority of the state derives its power and legitimacy from its citizens because “democracy is from the people . . . it should be for the people, too” (O’Donnell 2004, 34). This progression toward a more encompassing definition
and enhanced requirements indicate there could be progress in the quality of democracy in Latin America necessitating a reconsideration of stringency of definition.

Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) also contribute to the discussion of democracy and the importance of human agency to the development of democracy. They emphasize a strong civil society is a necessary component of a consolidated democracy. With that, civil society is an “arena of polity where self-organizing and relatively autonomous groups, movements, and individuals attempt to articulate values, to create associations and solidarities, and to advance their interests” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 17). Within this civil society that Linz and Stepan call for in their definition, social capital is created among citizens to communicate more effectively with the government. However, the deep social divides among the members inhibited the full realization of the civil society needed for consolidation. “A robust civil society, with the capacity to generate political alternatives and to monitor government and state can help start transitions, help resist reversals, help push transitions to their completion, and help consolidate and deepen democracy” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 18). Utilizing these definitions of democracy, it is evident there is a strong connection between democratization and the need for an active civil society where social capital is formed among citizens.

Though many of the scholars’ definitions of democracy include social capital as a necessary element in the process of democratization, Robert Putnam places importance on the strength of civil society in establishing democracy. Described in *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Robert Putnam explains how social capital helps the success or failure in the democratic governments based on the “civic-ness” of the communities under observation. Putnam measured the “civic-ness” of communities by the number of associations the constituents belonged to, activity in public affairs, more publicly spirited participants, and the
citizens’ knowledge of politics (Putnam 1993, 88). The amount of social capital is the
determinant in the development of democracy, according to Putnam, which separates his
concepts from the scholars previously mentioned regarding democratic development.

A more applicable technique to study the development of democracy is to utilize a broad
and flexible framework encompassing many variables in which to categorize the democratizing
of already democratized countries. This said, I agree with the necessity of a strong, vibrant civil
society for democratic development because they give power to the people in their struggle for
equality and justice. This study will utilize a combination of the aforementioned theories of
democratization to better address the case of Brazil, while the importance of the strength of civil
society for democracy is the heart of this study.

**Social Capital and Democracy**

There is abundant literature discussing the relationship between social capital and
democratization. This relationship between the two includes concepts of trust, reciprocity, and
harmony among citizenry that produce democratic ideals and practices. This idea of social
capital originated in Alexis de Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America* (1864). In this recipe for
democracy, Tocqueville states, “The only way opinions and ideas can be renewed, hearts
enlarged, and human minds developed is through the reciprocal influence of men upon each
other. I have shown how these influences are practically non-existent in democratic countries.
Thus, they have to be created artificially, which is what associations alone can achieve”
(Tocqueville 2003). Tocqueville indicates that associational behavior among citizens of a
democratic or democratizing country needs to be evident to create relationships among citizens
who will work to guarantee the maintenance and practice of democratic principles.

Historical experiences of a country’s citizens help to determine the strength of the civil
society decades later. Tocqueville attributes the ease of implementation of associations in
society to a history of associational behavior among the citizens (Anderson 2010, 6). This historical basis needed for successful association and organization among citizens requires that Brazilian history be taken into account when examining the creation of its social capital. Brazil does not have a long associational history of countries, such as the United States, that possess stronger, more entrenched democracies and have implemented democratic practices. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, Brazil’s short associational history and relatively lackluster civil society have affected the strength of the citizens’ participation and the reluctance to unite across social barriers to achieve a more developed democracy. This short associational history and rather nascent civil society has indeed affected the amount and level of social capital created in Brazil. Even though Tocqueville addressed this idea of social capital with regard to the development and success of democracy in the United States, this idea has been continually revisited, revamped, and applied to other cases throughout contemporary U.S. history.

Continuing down the path forged by Tocqueville, the idea of social capital gained momentum with Putnam’s *Making Democracy Work* (1993). This scholarly work focuses on the correlation that as social capital is created among citizens, there is increased movement toward democratization. His work is based on the principles set forth by Tocqueville in that, based on historical and contextual underpinnings, the development and success of social organizations or associations is determined. According to Putnam, “Social patterns plainly traceable from early medieval Italy to today turn out to be decisive in explaining why, on the verge of the twenty-first century, some communities are better able than others to manage collective life and sustain effective institutions” (Putnam 1993, 121). This is evident in the case of Brazil because many current practices and beliefs, including issues of inequality stem from the hierarchical society established during the colonial era. Theda Skocpol, in her *Diminished Democracy: From*
Membership to Management in American Civic Life (2003), reiterates the idea that history plays an integral part in the creation and success of civil society in a democracy. She examines the progress of the United States’ civil society throughout previous decades. She believes that for the United States some “critical aspects of the classic civic America we have lost need to be reinvented—including shared democratic values, a measure of fellowship across class lines, and opportunities for the many to participate in organized endeavors alongside the elite few” (Skocpol 2003, 254). Skocpol believes that involvement and the willingness to participate in associations in American civic life has been reduced to making contributions to organizations. Given this, countries without a past active civil society will experience more difficulty or resistance in the formation of a vibrant civil society due to the lack of a history of a strong civil society. Brazilians have encountered resistance from the government and society, in efforts to retain the status quo, in the formation of a strong civil society that can overcome the inequalities and injustices from the past. However, even though a country has had a history of strong civil society, it does not guarantee that the strength of that civil society still exists because societies evolve. Thus, the civic mindedness of the citizens also must evolve. This indicates that in much of the developing world and other previously non-democratic societies where the rights of the citizens were restricted, countries will most likely encounter hindrances in the creation of social capital, thus hindering the democratization of these societies.

Even though Brazil and many similar countries that suffer from historical constraints that make the creation of social capital difficult, it is still developing but at a slower pace than others with strong associational behavior among their citizens. Brazil has a past of vertical relationships among citizens in a hierarchical society, which makes creating social capital across normal channels a challenge and in some cases seemingly impossible. Additionally, Brazil
experiences clientelism, a major competitor to democracy, which prevents the positive type of social capital creation needed for the establishment of a vibrant civil society. In Chapter 3, I provide a detailed explanation of Brazil’s experience with clientelism and how it affects the creation of social capital among citizens. According to Anderson (2010), “Clientelism competes with democracy by undermining political institutions and processes that would otherwise allow problems to be solved in an open and transparent manner. It also encourages individualistic self-help responses to problems, rather than cooperative self-help mechanisms which foster bridging social capital” (150).

The creation of social capital among citizens in a society makes for a more democratic society through connecting citizens and compelling the government to be responsive to the needs of the citizens. Pamela Paxton in her 2002 article, “Social Capital and Democracy: An Interdependent Relationship,” agrees with Putnam in that social capital not only aids non-democratic state’s progress toward democracy, but also fosters improvement and maintenance of existing democracies (Paxton 2002, 257). Social capital is created when members of a community choose to join associations, display trust and tolerance, aid their fellow citizens, and participate in public affairs. Brazilians have created social capital to combat government actions and more effectively participate in government, however this social capital is often created among members of the same demographics. According to Putnam (1993), “Citizenship in the civic community entails equal rights and obligations for all. Such a community is bound together by horizontal relations of reciprocity and cooperation, not by vertical relations of authority and dependency” (88). This positive movement toward democratization is demonstrated when government institutions pay more attention to the citizens’ concerns and public business is carried out more efficiently. Putnam (1993) states, “Good democratic government not only
considers the demands of its citizenry (that is, is responsive), but also acts efficaciously upon these demands (that is, is effective)” (63). Thus the formation of trust networks, civic associations, and the display of reciprocity among citizens has the possibility of inducing the production of good democracies. Due to the high incidence of inequality among citizens in Brazil, can a civic community exist?

Social capital creation is shown to increase democratic practices within governments. According to Putnam, two types of social capital, bridging and bonding, can form among citizens. In many societies that do not possess histories of strong civic involvement, the citizens may create “bonding” social capital. Bonding social capital among citizens acts as a “sociological superglue” that adheres members of the same group together but also does not allow members outside that group to enter (Putnam 2000, 23). Bonding among citizens occurs in an exclusive fashion, where if you differ from the group you will not gain the trust or contribute to the binding of the group. The groups that form bonding social capital are hostile regarding the entrance of members outside the group. According to Putnam (2000, 22), bonding social capital “reinforces exclusive identities and homogenous groups,” which is beneficial to creating “reciprocity and mobilizing solidarity” among members of the exclusive community. Social capital by bonding can be detrimental to the positive effect that the creation of social capital can have on the democratization of a country because the “bonding” creates divisions among citizens by aligning citizens or members of certain organizations together, while excluding non-members. Anderson (2010) suggests that, “The incompatibility of bonding social capital and democracy rests in the fact that [bonding] emphasizes divisions within society rather than bridging differences among citizens and enhancing their ability to work together and respect each other” (9). This exclusion of other members within a society fails to uphold the principles of equality
among citizens in a democracy; therefore, these bonding relationships among citizens can play a self-defeating role in civil society. Do these societies that lack associational histories and suffer from deep societal divides have no hope of creating bridging social capital?

Although bonding social capital exists in every society, bridging social capital is the social capital that is beneficial to improving democratic principles because it encourages connections among citizens who normally would not have a connection to one another. According to Putnam (2000) “Other [bridging] networks are outward looking and encompass people across diverse social cleavages” (22). The creation of bridging social capital is more difficult to achieve because the people involved may come from different backgrounds with no previous linkages. “Bridging social capital can generate broader identities and reciprocity. . . . Bonding social capital constitutes a kind of sociological superglue, whereas bridging social capital provides a sociological WD-40” (Putnam 2000, 23). This unification of citizens aids to increase democratic practices because citizens of different, often dividing characteristics unite to achieve a common goal. “Ties that cut across such natural divisions reduce conflict in society. Reduced conflict enhances the possibilities of compromise and non-violent conflict resolution” (Anderson 2010, 8). Societies that have an associational history among their citizens enable the formation of this bridging social capital; however, for those countries that have less history of a vibrant civil society these bridging ties may prove more difficult to create. Is bridging social capital an impossible feat for the citizens of Brazil who, first, live in a country with some of the greatest social and racial divides in the world and, second have a brief associational history due to institutional restrictions set forth by the former colonial and military regimes?

Putnam writes (2000), “Under many circumstances both bridging and bonding social capital can have powerfully positive effects” (23). Even though social capital creation aids in
democratization, not all social capital has been proven effective in the advancement of
democratic practices. Some societies are more prone to the creation of one type of social capital
versus the other due to the social context. According to Anderson (2010), “Some societies have
cultures conducive to relatively egalitarian ties and interactions. There, associations that develop
are more likely to build horizontal ties among members and to encourage mutual respect among
equals. But other societies have strong traditions of hierarchy, vertical ties, and deference by
those at the bottom to those at the top” (9).

I argue in this study that historical and societal context influence the stage of social capital
creation among citizens of Brazil. Thus, I suggest that Brazil must overcome those
circumstances, including the social injustice and repression demonstrated toward the excluded
sections of society that have restrained the country from realizing a democratic government.
However, not only does the discussion of social capital help to explain Brazil’s case, but we can
further address the main hindrance to social equity among citizens, a lack of equality of access to
quality education, citizen education, or lack thereof, which influences the success of
democratization, which necessitates a review of the literature linking education and social
capital. Does inequality of education influence the creation of social capital? Does this
education inequality thus aid in creating unequal social capital in Brazil?

**Education and Social Capital**

As we continue our discussion of social capital, types of societies that create positive social
capital, and effects of its creation on democratization, we must also visit the issue of citizen
education as a variable in the creation of social capital for democratic development. Putnam,
Skocpol, and Anderson all posit that increased education of citizens helps to create positive
social capital. With this basic knowledge, do democratizing countries offer substandard
education to the masses to preserve antiquated social divides therefore preventing the creation of the necessary bridging social capital essential to the realization of democracy?

According to many scholars, education and the creation of social capital among citizens show an intrinsic positive relationship. Increasing responsiveness to citizen need, can result in a possible improvement in the provision of education, along with social programs, by a country’s government. According to Robert Putnam (2001), there has been a decrease in social capital in the United States over the past decades which can be linked to poor school performance as exhibited by standardized student test scores. Therefore the decrease in social capital in the United States has affected the educational performance of the students. Yet while the decrease in social capital has been linked to school performance, Putnam indicates that other forms of social capital, such as youth and religious organizations, have had positive outcomes with regard to educational improvements. In Putnam’s article, he continues his ideas from *Bowling Alone* that social capital that formed among community members increases the responsiveness of institutions in addressing concerns. With that said, Putnam (2001) views a positive relationship between the creation of community-based social capital and the improvement of educational outcomes (65). Thus Putnam asserts that, along with the need to create social capital to improve democracy, the creation of social capital can also lend itself well to the improvement of education. Does Brazil’s inequality of social capital creation hinder the performance of students?

Education is shown to increase with an increase in social capital among citizens; it also can create social capital in societies. In concurrence with Putnam, Peter John also believes there to be an important causal link between the existence of social capital and public policy outcomes. “There is a clear causal story through which social capital improves well-being, reduces stress,
improves collective action through providing communication and facilitates the exchange of resources throughout society” (John 2002, 3). Although John agrees with Putnam that a positive correlation exists between an increase in social capital and improved education, he also believes the causal arrow can face the other way as well. Social capital does not have to initiate the improvement of education, but education can foster the creation of social capital. “Schools are themselves sites for the creation of social capital, so if a clear link can be shown between social capital and policy performance, it would be tempting to alter aspects of school provision and management which can be thought to create social capital to try to increase public values” (John 2002, 5). The validity of the casual arrow originating in education and ending with social capital creation is still debatable. Can Brazil expect its citizens to create social capital without an increase of equality of access to education?

Social capital creation is believed to originate or increase with the achievement of education. Both Suzanne Mettler and John Preston indicate that education exerts a positive effect on the creation of social capital. Mettler, in her examination of the results of the G.I. Bill in post World War II United States, determined that the soldiers who achieved an advanced education became more active citizens. As active citizens, the beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill, “participated more in civic life and in politics, thus democratizing the active citizenry and making those in public office become more representative of the general public” (Mettler 2005, 134). Though Mettler presents an isolated case study of the beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill in the United States, Preston appears less convinced that education induces social capital creation in a broader perspective. Preston suggests in his 2004 article, “A Continuous Effort of Sociability: Learning and Social Capital in Adult Life”, that “social networks are influenced by learning, which acts as a personal resource, although the extension of networks is not always a consequence of learning”
(Preston 2004). Even though Preston suggests there is an influential relationship between learning and social capital, social capital is not always a guaranteed result of education.

The majority of scholars support social capital’s improvement of government practices through participation in associations and fostering trust among community members, but express dubiety regarding the idea that education creates social capital. There has been some study of the opposite causal link of social capital and education. This research focuses on the provision of education and how educated citizens can create social capital.

The causal arrow’s direction from education to social capital is further suggested through the focus of public institutions. Mark Schneider, Paul Teske, and Melissa Marschall (1997) place the origin of the causal arrow with education in the relationship between education and social capital. They focus on public institutions and how these institutions deliver education as influential on the creation of social capital (Schneider, Teske and Marschall 1997, 82). They recognize that little research exists as to the effect of public institutions on social capital present among the members of a community or society. They reference the practice of school choice to demonstrate the influence that public institutions can have on social capital because school choice places control in the hands of the citizens. “Schools provide important evidence that government or community-initiated policies can indeed ratchet up the preexisting levels of social capital and enhance the social fabric necessary for building and maintaining effective democracy” (Schneider, Teske and Marschall 1997, 83). They develop a “virtuous cycle” that connects education to social capital and vice-versa. The cycle begins with high quality education, which is dependent upon community and parental involvement. When this high quality education is achieved, the community members are more likely to partake in activities that are associated with the construction of social capital (Schneider, Teske and Marschall 1997,
This approaches a chicken-egg relationship, but is remedied by their use of a cycle that does not indicate an exact origin of social capital production in education or that social capital fosters better education. If Brazilian public institutions fail to deliver education to its citizens, can social capital still develop? If the education system is substandard, does that translate to the level of social capital created among citizens?

Like Mettler’s discussion of the impact of education on social capital with regard to the G.I. Bill, Anderson suggests in her recently published *Social Capital in Developing Democracies: Nicaragua and Argentina Compared* (2010), that education plays an integral role in social capital creation. Anderson discovers “in both samples [Argentina and Nicaragua] education had a strong, positive relationship [on] the tendency to join organizations” (Anderson 2010, 127). This tendency to join organizations indicates that horizontal ties are being fostered among the citizens with more education. According to Anderson, “If societies can increase organizational membership by providing access to education, they can increase social interaction even more by providing access to more education, in particular, access to high school education” (Anderson 2010, 131). This observed relationship between education and organizational activity demonstrates a possible avenue for struggling democracies to increase social capital production among citizens. Is horizontal social capital creation reserved only for those educated citizens?

In this exploration of the literature, discussion of the correlation between education and the creation of social capital indicates a dearth of experiments to look more closely at the origin of the causal arrow. Though there is support for the conclusion that education is needed to foster the creation of social capital, there yet remains uncertainty regarding the direction of the causal arrow. There may be no distinct origin, in that education and social capital formulate a “virtuous cycle” that strives to establish horizontal connections with other citizens while promoting more...
democratic practices. As we discuss the connection of education and democracy, the necessity for an educated citizenry to produce social capital, and therefore democracy, becomes more apparent.

**Education and Democracy**

Having reviewed the relationship between education and social capital creation, we must also consider the relationship between education and democracy. Anderson suggests in her examination of Nicaragua, “A higher level of education was significantly related to a higher level of democratic values, either liberal democracy, or radical democratic values, while lower education levels were associated with greater authoritarianism” (Anderson 2010, 144). This relationship between education and democracy appears symbiotic in that they both positively reinforce one another. There is little dispute that an educated citizenry is a citizenry that will promote democratic principles and be able to protect its freedoms from a power-hungry government. According to Ravitch and Viteritti (2001), “Ever since the late nineteenth century, American’s have relied upon government schools as a principle purveyor of deeply cherished democratic values” (3). Gutmann, in *Democratic Education*, further emphasizes that this sentiment regarding the symbiotic relationship between education and democracy is widely held among scholars. Gutmann states that education is a part of political socializations where “Political socialization is typically understood to include the processes by which democratic societies transmit political values, attitudes and modes of behavior” (Gutmann 1987, 15). This reliance on education to form the future citizens who produce social capital can determine the amount of democracy a government practices. Does the Brazilian government rely upon the provision of substandard public education to have more control over its citizens in order to maintain the status quo?
While many other developing countries have followed an American-style reliance on the provision of public education, due to the developing nature of these countries, the quality and access to this public education may hinder social capital production. According to Gutmann (1987), the “democratic theory of education focuses on what might be called ‘conscious social reproduction’—the way in which citizens are or should be empowered to influence the education that in turn shapes the political values, attitudes, and modes of behaviors of future citizens” (14). The provision of education by the state places the responsibility on the state to offer quality education to instill in the children and future adults the democratic values, principles, and the like. “A democratic state is therefore committed to allocating educational authority in such a way as to provide its members with an education adequate to participating in democratic politics, to choosing among (a limited range) of good lives, and to sharing in the several subcommunities, such as families, that impart identity to the lives of its citizens” (Gutmann 1987, 40). Even though the government provides public education, this may not afford citizens the right or capability to partake in a democratic government. This right may be hindered by historically and socially accepted norms that repress the “conscious social reproduction” among citizens.

Although many countries practice universal education for all citizens, even in the most democratic and developed of states some citizens fall by the wayside. These countries may be practicing undemocratic education “if citizens do not collectively influence the purposes of primary schooling nor if they control the content of classroom teaching so as to repress reasonable challenges to dominant political perspectives” (Gutmann 1987, 75). However, if we compare those developed states with the lesser developed and the even more underdeveloped states, there is a notable correlation with regard to how many citizens have not received an education. Some developing countries’ citizens experience inequality and repression because
they encounter a lack of access to education. Anderson discovers in her study that “Argentine citizens who are isolated from other—either by virtue of a socially isolated job as a housewife, or by the intellectual isolation of never having received much education—are significantly more inclined toward non-democratic or less democratic political values, and have a preference for clientelism or authoritarianism” (Anderson 2010, 157). These less developed countries practice something less than democratic authority with regard to education, which has resulted in the exclusion of many citizens from quality education.

As numerous countries continue to democratize, the governments have implemented public education systems. The universal education that the developed states practice for the most part is nonrepressive and nondiscriminatory education. As Gutmann notes (1987), “For democratic education to support conscious social reproduction, all educable children must be educated. . . since states and families can be selectively repressive by excluding entire groups of children from schooling or by denying them an education conducive to deliberation among conceptions of the good life and the good of society” (45). This ensures that all citizens will be able to partake in contributing and participating in democracy, therefore increasing more “conscious social reproduction” of democratic practices. Is Brazil restricted in democratic development because the public schools are inherently discriminatory?

However, sometimes these states along with many developing democracies practice repression or discrimination to limit the power of certain sects of society. Many of these repressive or discriminatory practices realized through limited quality or a lack of access to public education may originate from historical and societal practices. According to Gutmann (1987), “The value of critical deliberation among good lives and good societies would be neglected by a society that inculcated in children uncritical acceptance of any particular way or
ways of [personal and political] life. . .children might then be taught to accept uncritically [a] set of beliefs” (44). Societies such as Brazil and other developing countries with undemocratic pasts and hierarchical societies may experience difficulties in fostering “social consciousness” because many personal and political ways of life, including the acceptance of social injustice and inequality among citizens, have been ingrained in the psyches of the country’s future, their children. Can Brazil overcome the lack of critical deliberation among their children so as to implement a more democratic government or must a more democratic government already be in place to force critical deliberation by future generations?

To thwart this perpetuation of “social unconsciousness” among citizens, a step in the direction of universal education for all citizens to be able to participate in and internalize the democratic principles the states hope to instill. “All citizens must be educated so as to have a chance to share in self-consciously shaping the structure of their society. . . . Democratic education supports choice among those ways of life that are compatible with conscious social reproduction” (Gutmann 1987, 46). These developing countries are failing to prepare the poor, socially excluded section of society for democratic citizenship. Training in democratic citizenship allows the citizens to accept good principles and increase the democratic practices of their states by utilizing their right to participate and contest political actions taken by their government. Finally, education allows the citizens to stop the vicious cycle by allowing the reproduction of democratic practices rather than the perpetuation of social inequality and injustice. Is democracy created in Brazil even though there is unequal provision of education which can slow the horizontal ties or “bridging social capital ” among citizens?

**A Gap in the Literature**

Scholars disagree about how social capital, education, and democracy are connected, due to the ever-evolving nature of the human race, societies, and democracies. This dissertation
provides a meticulous study and application of Robert Putnam’s theoretical argument of social capital creation. Even though scholars, such as Mettler and Anderson, have begun to scrutinize the relationship between education and social capital creation in democratic societies there is still more space to explore this question. This study provides an examination of the process of education aiding in the creation of social capital in civil society organizations in the shantytowns in Rio de Janeiro and Salvador, Brazil.

I agree with Putnam, Mettler, and Anderson that an educated citizenry is better equipped to create social capital; however, it is not exclusive to those educated citizens. Also, I believe that grassroots and civil society organizations induce more education or more attention to education, which generates more social capital among the citizens who benefit from these education programs. There is a virtuous cycle that is generated among education, social capital, and democracy: a more educated citizenry translates to more potential to create “bridging” social capital across economic and social differences, which in turn should empower the citizens to mold a government that abides by democratic principles. “Bridging” social capital is considered to be a positive development in society to augment democracy.

Many of the organizations that participated in this study have yet to create complete “bridging” social capital, where membership includes citizens across racial, social and economic cleavages. These organizations in Brazil’s relatively young democracy are in the nascent stages of creation and do not maintain a hostile nature to the acceptance of members outside their communities, races, or social classes. Even though these organizations are relatively new, there is more social capital now than in the past. These organizations which are experiencing the early stages of “bridging” social capital may be slow to progress due to historically accepted norms within society, such as racism, classism or other divisions within society. Until the society
progresses toward more practices of equality, we may see many of these groups continuing to
provide inclusion and a voice for these excluded members of society in the Brazilian political
arena. As these civil society organizations continue to offer educational opportunities to their
members and communities, as well as inclusion and representation in politics, they are paving
the way for the continuation and expansion of social capital creation in Brazil.

**Seeing Social Capital on The Ground**

Social capital has been measured by various scholars through the use of different
indicators. The measures differ due to the circumstances of each case, such as affluence, social
equality, national economic situation, or political climate. Robert Putnam (1993), measured
social capital in Italy by examining trust, cooperation or reciprocity, among community
members, and the creation of networks or associations (171). Leslie Anderson’s *Social Capital
in Developing Democracies: Nicaragua and Argentina Compared* (2010), studied trust and
network or voluntary association creation among Nicaraguans was discovered however these
same measures were not applicable in Argentina which presented different circumstances (136).
I chose to utilize these same measures of social capital creation among members of lower income
communities in both Rio de Janeiro and Salvador, Brazil. Trust and reciprocity among neighbors
as well as propensity to join volunteer associations or organizations were investigated in this
study to assess the amount of social capital created in each case study.

In addition to using theoretically based indicators of social capital, The *Latinobarómetro*
public opinion survey also utilizes trust in neighbors as well as tendency to join associations or
organizations for the public good to empirically examine social capital creation. According to
the public opinion survey results for Brazil between the years of 1995-2009, over half of the
respondents had at least some confidence in their neighbors (Latinobarómetro, 1995-2009).
Almost 60% of respondents between 1995-2009 of the Latinobarómetro public opinion survey
confirmed participation in organizations for the public good. Among these organizations, about 10% of the organizations respondents indicated they participated in community or neighborhood associations (Latinobarómetro 1995-2009). These empirical indicators of social capital creation in Brazil provide the bases for the measurement of social capital created among the respondents for this study.

The cities selected for this study of education and social capital creation were selected on the knowledge that because Rio de Janeiro and Salvador would provide an interesting comparison. This study will provide an urban examination of social capital creation in Brazil. These two cities demonstrate differences in population demographics, historical experiences, and distribution of resources on the state level allocated to public expenditures but are similar in population size. In addition to the similarity in city population, the selected organizations of examination also provided a comparative variable. The city of Rio de Janeiro has the second largest population in Brazil and Salvador follows third in rank. Rio de Janeiro’s demographics are more diverse in that even though the number of citizens who self report as white covers over fifty percent. Salvador has a less diverse population, where a majority of its residents claim their racial identity to be Afro-Brazilian or black. Rio de Janeiro has a higher concentration of wealth among its residents in comparison to Salvador, which directly affects the states’ available revenue. Salvador and Rio also have different historical experiences, one of archaic practices and slavery and the other, a cosmopolitan and modern city. Based on these differences, this study hypothesized there would be more social capital creation in Rio de Janeiro due to the more diverse population demographics, fewer historical experiences caused by social and racial cleavages as well as access to higher state revenue for public expenditure, more specifically
education funding. If the findings gathered from this study exhibit a different outcome, then additional explanations to this question will be explored.

**Discussion**

The following chapters present an examination of the Brazilian case with regard to political, societal, and education histories. These principles are examined and explained with the use of empirical cases of social capital creation in multiple communities and sites in two Brazilian cities: Rio de Janeiro and Salvador. The reaction to the state’s perpetuation of social injustice presents an interesting case where citizens have assumed the responsibility of the state and have found security within their civil society organizations, rather than competing to share in the benefits of citizens within the upper class. We will see that social capital is currently being created among some of Brazil’s most excluded citizens, within civil society organizations. In Chapters 5 and 6, we will examine that social capital is created in Brazil to substitute for the shortcomings of the state in regard to education. We will examine if there is a positive relationship between education levels and the production of social capital among the Brazilian citizens studied.

We will determine if social capital is being created in these poor communities within two case studies, Rio de Janeiro and Salvador, Brazil. In this discovery of social capital production among these citizens, these groups maintain strong motives to induce social change and work toward attaining more positive democratic elements within Brazil. These groups are working to improve the lives of the members therefore invoking inward-looking goals and programs. This is a reaction to the lack of inclusion within the greater society due to their social class or race. While some of the more entrenched organizations interviewed are able to focus on encouraging social change, others focus on keeping children off the streets, providing skills education for women, and work to avoid relocation by the government from their communities.
To account for the actions of these citizens working to give the members of their organizations a better existence within the unequal society, I drew on important works that involve the role of social capital and civil society within a country. The history of each country and the experiences of the corresponding society play a determining factor in how much social capital is produced and what types of social capital is created among citizens. With regard to the Brazilian case, I argue that its history of political instability and past government repression has influenced the vibrancy of the civil society. In addition to examining Brazil as an entire country, the regional difference between Rio de Janeiro and Salvador have also aided in shaping the civil society. I also discuss how colonial experiences have divided the society into those included affluent citizens and those excluded poor citizens. The society formed by exclusion is one that supports a hierarchical ranking among citizens, which has also influenced citizen education and social capital creation in my Brazilian cases.

Historical experiences have not only conditioned the creation of social capital, but also the quality, access, and equality of education among citizens. This withholding of such a basic right as education has influenced the amount of social capital created among citizens. This disparity between the education of the included citizens versus those who are excluded represents social injustice that is ignored or accepted by the state and endured by many of the citizens, due to their lack of a strong political voice.

Brazil’s democracy is still developing and there are many imperfections that have inhibited democratization. The state continues to perpetuate social injustice and a hierarchical society, perhaps inadvertently, due to the historical underpinnings of clientelism through the public service of education. This social injustice that affects a majority of the citizens is sustained because poor children are excluded from receiving a good education, which allows the
continuation of a vicious cycle. This study argues that grassroots organizations are acting to provide more education, which works to increase the amount of social capital created among citizens. Also this study considers the viewpoint that social capital is being created among citizens to find belonging, improve their impoverished lives, and to provide education that the state is unwilling to or cannot deliver.

In the following chapters, I examine the research questions and arguments that I have set forth in this Chapter 1. A history of Brazil’s exclusionary politics that established the foundation for Brazil’s democracy and explains some of the major hindrances to democratization is provided in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, I present the discussion of Brazil’s public education system that has proved influential with regard to the grave inequality among citizens.

A discussion of organizations creating social capital is provided in Chapter 4, many groups of which are offering education to the members, thus connecting the goal of social capital creation to the need for improved education. Chapter 4 reveals that associational behavior in Brazil is essentially nascent, which explains the relative powerlessness of many of these organizational groups. The discussion of civil society organization in Brazil is necessary to examine where social capital creation began and where it is headed because much of the social capital creation occurs in these organizations.

In Chapter 5, I introduce my first empirical case study, Rio de Janeiro where I find that the civil society organizations participating in this study are focused on education. The demographics from my Rio de Janeiro study can be located in Table A-1. There is a micro-study comparison between Cidade de Deus which exhibits social capital creation among organizations in the community to gain more political voice whereas the organizations in Rocinha create social capital but not collaboratively with other organizations in the community.
In Chapter 6, my Salvador case study is presented and juxtaposed with the results from Rio. Many of the organizations interviewed in my Salvador study had a focus on education, but were also driven by an emphasis on embracing the Afro-Brazilian history of many of Salvador’s citizens. A demographic overview of the respondents in this study is provided in Table A-2. This emphasis on the Afro-Brazilian history is examined because a majority of Salvador’s inhabitants are Afro-Brazilian descendants who still experience social injustice even though they constitute the majority of the population. This indicates that a difference in the types of social capital created within the same country may depend upon the histories of the regions. The organizations that participated in this study are presented in detail in Table A-3. A regional map of Brazil is provided in Appendix D of This study.

In Chapter 7, I conclude the study by revisiting the puzzle and arguments presented in this introductory chapter. In addition, Chapter 7 will present a section discussing the further implications and suggestions for future research on this topic, as well as some applications for the conclusions of this study. The research methodology for this study can be found in Appendix A.
CHAPTER 2
ROOTS OF INEQUALITY: POLITICS AND SOCIETY

Brazil’s democracy, though not without obstacles in its quest toward democratization, “looks considerably stronger than democratic rule in many other Latin American nations” (Kingstone and Power 2008). Although Brazil may be considered one of the front-runners in Latin America with regard to advancements toward democratization, its successes and difficulties are based in colonial experiences, oscillations between authoritarian governments and democracy, and severe inequality among citizens.

Brazil’s past and current issues with democracy can be attributed to the deeply rooted socio-economic inequality among citizens. The social hierarchy that came with colonization has evolved over hundreds of years and has become entrenched in the politics of Brazil. Social inequality has been supported by unspoken policies that reinforce the cleavages within society. “Nearly every national problem had a racial sub-text: Brazil’s mixed-race and nonwhite underclasses were, by all account, culturally backward, and by some account racially degenerate” (Dávila 2003, 24). The government that exists now is confronted with many barriers that are formed due to the close relationship between politicians and the white elite “included” section of society. The rampant clientelism, fragmented party system, poor education system, and strong impetus to retain the social hierarchy in Brazil have plagued its democratization and maintenance of government stability.

In order to discuss education’s influence on the formation and prominence of social organization in Brazil, it is important to reflect upon colonial experiences as well as involvement in the slave trade juxtaposed with the current policies implemented to reduce social inequality. This will demonstrate the perpetuation and pervasive nature of inequality among Brazilian
citizens. The educational background will aid in explaining how the government and society’s relationship manifests itself in public policies.

**Brazil’s Political History**

Brazil’s democracy has been challenged since the installation of the colony to subsequent independence from the Portuguese Crown in 1822 and then the military coup of Monarch Dom Pedro II. The Brazilian government has emulated a pendulum with its movement between non-democratic and democratic governments. Brazil is a young and relatively new democratic state that has only functioned as such for roughly twenty years. Even though Brazil is now acting a democracy there is a high incidence of social inequality, which stems from the Portuguese colonization and the subsequent policies implemented to build the state. The first non-military president was not elected by the popular vote, whereas this current government has functioned since 1990. Brazil’s colonial past, democratic and non-democratic governance experiences have constructed and reinforced the government and society that we see occurring.

Society in colonial Brazil reflected the feudal systems of their European founders. A description of how the state was organized is provided and this state organization also translated to the organizations of society in colonial Brazil. The unequal distribution of colonial land and resources, as well as rights to govern, placed power in the hands of very few and left many without.

In the early sixteenth century, the distribution of land only to the wealthy began an acceptance and perpetuation of social inequality among Brazilians. The practice of feudalism was instituted in early colonial Brazil and traces are still visible today. “Those land grants . . . brought to the New World some of the residue of a feudalism long on the wane on the Iberian Peninsula. In effect, the donatary system interposed between the king and his subjects a hierarchy of landlords who enjoyed certain attributes of government: they could tax, impose law
and justice, make appointments, and distribute the land in their captaincies in *sesmarias* (Burns 1993, 28). The feudal state that formed during Brazilian colonialism helped to establish the social hierarchy still embedded in society.

As the Portuguese settled Brazil, King João III divided the land and distributed it to select Portuguese immigrants. “The national government depended heavily on local elites—primarily large landholders—to exercise powers of state” (Holston 2008, 65). These local elites acted as administrators among the large cities. With this power entrusted to them, the practice of *coronelismo* or traditional clientelism emerged. “They represented ‘the law’ and this representation was thoroughly conflated with private interests and their application through thuggery” leaving the rest of the population to serve the affluent inhabitants’ needs (Holston 2008, 65). Not only did the *coroneis* (large landowners) control the state and their land, they also controlled the inhabitants of that land.

**Discovery, Colonization, and Imperial Monarchy: 1500-1808**

Brazil’s history offers a different experience from that of the rest of Latin America due to its discovery by the Portuguese navigator Pedro Alvarez Cabral in 1500. In addition to this difference, Brazil functioned as an imperial monarchy after declaring independence from Portugal, whereas other Latin American colonies gained their independence from monarchical rule much earlier and with more struggle. Brazil gained independence from Portugal in 1822 though the formation of the Brazilian monarchy. The Brazilian Royal family reigned until 1889 when the power of the country was ceded to the military and the Old Republic was formed.

After 1500, Brazil became an important resource haven for the Portuguese Crown and King João III decided to colonize this territory. With the decision to establish a colony instead of temporary ports, unlike other locations of Portuguese exploits, came the distribution of this immense amount of land to Portuguese colonists who came to cultivate and settle Brazil. The
traditional land grants that were customarily distributed to individuals were not implemented in Brazil. Martim Afonso, founder of the first colonial settlement at São Vicente, initiated a different land distribution plan that is still visible today. According to E. Bradford Burns (1993),

The good coastal land was quickly divided into immense sugar plantations, and not many more decades elapsed before huge sesmarias for cattle ranches in the interior put much of the backlands under claim as well… Realizing that the gigantic estates created a type of semi-feudalism in practice, not in name, and that they kept most of the best land fallow and hence unproductive, the king belatedly tried to reverse the course (28).

The sesmaria system implemented by Afonso was altered when King João III distributed land in Brazil to twelve different aristocratic recipients between the years of 1534 and 1536. These donors governed and distributed land grants within fifteen captaincies, which further entrenched this feudal type state in colonial Brazil. This system of captaincies did not enjoy much success, as only two of the fifteen established captaincies flourished, which spurred the Portuguese Crown to expropriate one captaincy located where the general government would be established.

Brazil continued its territorial expansion encountering resistance from the Spanish, Dutch, and French. “The Luso-Brazilian sweep across the South American continent from the Atlantic to the Andes constituted one of the greatest epics of Brazilian history” (Burns 1993, 48). This expansion of the colony was not only in pursuit of more land to cultivate but also to reap the rich natural resources. The Treaty of Madrid was thrown out in 1777 and the Treaty of San Ildefonso promulgated further the expansion of Brazil and the annexation of land into Portuguese possession.

As the Brazilian colony grew and became more prosperous in its cultivation of the land, there was a shortage of labor due to the few Portuguese who immigrated and the dwindling indigenes. With this large territorial expansion, increase in resource and agricultural extraction,
and export, the need for the importation of slaves became apparent. These slaves not only worked on the sugar plantations, but also in the gold fields, tobacco plantations, and cotton fields until nearly 1890.

**The Slave Trade:** The Portuguese led the slave trade searching for manual labor for their plantation society that had formed during colonization. “This enormous and centuries-long transatlantic exchange left a profound imprint on Brazilian society and culture. The old plantation regions of the Northeast, especially Bahia, retain striking influences from Africa” (Eakin 1996, 19). This introduction of slaves to the society further divided the inhabitants and produced more inequality because it added an even lower class of people. “Already in the early seventeenth century, the implantation and expansion of sugar had put in place the fundamental patterns that continue to plague Brazil: a small white elite controlling vast landholdings and dominating an economic and political system with a non-white majority” (Eakin 1996, 20). Additionally, the slaves were not viewed as citizens, therefore giving the Portuguese immigrants and government more strength to continue the social inequality.

As the land was divided and settled, the Portuguese Crown’s main objective for the local elites was to produce raw materials for export, thus fueling the Portuguese economy. Coffee and sugar became important exports for Brazil and the Portuguese. The Portuguese needed more manpower to harvest sugarcane in the sixteenth century, and to mine gold and other natural resources during the eighteenth century and grow and process coffee in the nineteenth century. The Portuguese were able to enslave some indigenes but the Jesuits converted them and ultimately defended them (Eakin 1996, 18). Even though the Portuguese were able to utilize some for sugarcane harvests, European disease ravaged the villages, forcing the Portuguese to enter the slave trade beginning in 1549 and continuing until 1850.
Due to the high importation of African slaves, the number of slaves greatly outnumbered the European settlers and indigenous peoples. “The entry of 3.5 million Africans into Brazil in a process that had accelerated in volume right up until 1850 fundamentally shaped the composition of Brazilian society” (Eakin 1996, 32). Even though the Portuguese coroneis viewed themselves as more accepting and inclusive of the Africans into their society, the freed, escaped, and indentured Afro-Brazilians were without rights and were relegated to the lowest stratum of society. According to Skidmore, “The comparison of slave systems in terms of their relative ‘mildness’ or ‘harshness’ has proved a false lead in the understanding of the dynamics of social change, yet by documenting the facts about the Brazilian slave system, scholars have served to erode the Brazilian elite’s belief in the uniqueness of their slave history” (Skidmore 1993, 217). Even though the Afro-Brazilians were incorporated into society, the white Portuguese elites were concerned that the Africans held a racial majority in the country. Along with the slave uprisings and external pressures this racial majority also helped to spur the emancipation of slaves. “Rather than face the anarchy and upheaval of massive slave unrest and flight, slave owners grudgingly accepted abolition” (Eakin 1996, 34). While slaves along with abolitionists worked to gain freedom from servitude, this did not win freed slaves and their descendants an increase in rights or access to the societal ladder, which has translated to the current state of inequality of education among citizens.

**Emancipation**

On Princess-Regent Isabel’s 1888 order, slavery ended in Brazil and all people of African descent were freed from servitude. “With the passage of the Golden Law of 1888, slavery finally disappeared from the Western Hemisphere. . . .The crowds shouted their approval” (Burns 1993, 224). This sentiment was not held by all inhabitants of Brazil, especially those slave owners who after the approval of this edict feared loss of social status due to less productivity. This act
of emancipation was a step toward forming a more just society in Brazil, but the freed slaves still occupied that bottom rung of the social ladder. Emancipation was also the first state action to address social inequality without granting rights as citizens. According to Reiter, “Brazil did not provide for any mechanisms to further their [emancipated slaves] integration into the rapidly modernizing nation” (Reiter 2009, 32). They did not gain the same rights as those citizens of European descent, although the constitution did not explicitly exclude them from citizenship, as did the United States’ Constitution during the slavery era. “The exclusion of Afro-Brazilians was so absolute and their position within social hierarchies so firmly anchored at the bottom during post-abolition” (Reiter 2009, 33). It restrained the forward progress of Afro-Brazilians with restrictions on employment and to access education. This lack of a right to education was used to maintain the racial divide between races and to perpetuate the social hierarchy. This strong sense of segregation of Afro-Brazilians by Brazilians of European descent has been maintained in today’s society even though there is no legal precedent or justification.

The “Whitening” of Black Brazil

Before the abolition of slavery, the Emperor had realized the number of Afro-Brazilians greatly outweighed the number of Brazilians of European descent. Following emancipation, former slaves and the poor were still not afforded an equal education by the state. During the Imperial Monarchy and into the Early Old Republic, many Europeans were encouraged to immigrate to Brazil to mask the reality of a population with an Afro-Brazilian majority. “Brazil is profoundly stratified by color, and for decades, the state did nothing to alter the situation. In fact, it suppressed efforts to challenge the racial democracy myth and sought to whiten the population by encouraging European immigration” (Htun 2004, 61).

During the second half of the nineteenth century, the influx of white immigrants helped to maintain Afro-Brazilians at the bottom of the social hierarchy because the white immigrants
entered Brazilian society with a higher status and better employment opportunities than the recently emancipated slaves. “By the turn of the century, the majority of the citizens of São Paulo were immigrants or their children. These immigrants gradually replaced slaves as the labor force in the coffee fields, and they turned southern Brazil into a branch of European civilization” (Eakin 1996, 34). Even though the Afro-Brazilians were emancipated, they remained third-class citizens, forced to work jobs similar to those they as they performed as slaves and with few options to improve their social and economic situations. In addition to the lack of jobs available to those members of society who were not of “decent” appearance, educational opportunities did not exist for the lowest class. “Many employment advertisements in newspapers speak of ‘good appearance,’ a widely understood code phrase for light skin” (Eakin 1996, 117). Thus abolition of slavery brought additional difficult times for Afro-Brazilians due to the importation of Europeans whites.

Beginning in the early 1800s, the Braganzas, the Portuguese Royal Family, relocated its Empire to Brazil in efforts to escape Napoleon’s conquest of the Iberian Peninsula. “The event remains unique in history: the Braganzas were the only European monarchs to rule in an empire from one of the colonies rather than from the metropolis, the only royal family to set foot on its American domains” (Burns 1993,112). Though the Portuguese royal family did not stay in Brazil after the fall of Napoleon, the Crown Prince of Portugal elected to remain and claimed Brazil for himself.

In 1822, Brazil gained independence from the Portuguese Crown and entered its Imperial Era under Dom Pedro I and his son, Dom Pedro II. After Dom Pedro I abdicated his throne to his son, it was not without inhabitant unrest regarding Braganza family rule in Brazil due to the regents who ruled before Dom Pedro II reached his majority. Dom Pedro II ascended the throne
in 1840, which helped to reunify the Empire that was withering away from the lack of authority of the regents. “As Brazil moved from its ambivalent neofeudalistic/neocapitalistic stage toward a more fully developed capitalism, the emperor served as both a symbolic and effective guarantee of order and prosperity for the varied regional, rural groups” (Burns 1993, 172).

However, Pedro II’s rule was not supportive of the increasing modernity, which during the last years of his rule became problematic as he failed to address concerns of the increasing city-dweller sector of the Brazilian population. This, along with the abolition of slavery instituted by Princess Isabel in 1888, further removed Pedro II from his supporters, including the military.

“Under Deodoro’s orders, on March 15, 1889, the army marched from the barracks, surrounded the Royal Palace, occupied the principal government buildings, and silenced Rio de Janeiro. In a dry, authoritative tone the marshal informed a surprised nation, ‘The people, the army and the navy in perfect harmony of sentiment with our fellow citizens resident in the provinces, have just decreed the dethronement of the imperial dynast, and consequently the extinction of the representative monarchical system of government’” (Burns 1993, 232). From 1889, the empire had fallen and the Old Republic was established. It rescinded much power from the former supporters of the monarchy and transferred the maintenance and control of the Brazilian state to military officials until the promulgation of the Constitution of 1891.

**A Question of Race**

Even today, there exists a discussion regarding the definition of race because there still exists a strict view of which race is more acceptable. Beliefs in support of white supremacy began in the slavery era and aspects of this white supremacy are still visible. “This paternalistic hierarchy, in which social classification correlated highly with color, had developed as an integral part of the slave-based colonial economy” (Skidmore 1972, 6-7). Even though there is this idea of white supremacy, beginning in the colonial era, the practice of miscegenation was
widely accepted and viewed as another way to ‘whiten’ Brazil’s population. “Brazilians consistently advocated race mixing as the way to perfect the inferior races and achieve national unity out of Brazil’s disparate peoples” (Holston 2008, 69). Though Brazilians believed this practice was whitening the population, it was creating an intermediary race, which made the black/white divide less well defined. The *pardo*¹, or brown Brazilians held a higher position on the societal ladder than their unmixed black counterparts, though they were still relegated to employment opportunities that the white immigrant population would refuse to accept.

According to Skidmore (1993)

“Miscegenation had worked to promote the declared goal, white genes ‘must be’ stronger. Furthermore, during the high period of racist thought—1880 to 1920—the ‘whitening’ ideology gained scientific legitimacy, because racist doctrines came to be interpreted by Brazilians as supporting the view that the ‘superior’ white race would prevail in the process of racial amalgamation” (46).

Even though the adults who were products of miscegenation held a higher position in society, education was still restricted and remained only for white citizens.

Before the institution of the Estado Novo, nearing the end of the World War I, Brazil aimed to improve its level of modernity among citizens in terms of provision of public services. The provision of services was to correct the “cultural backwardness” exhibited by a majority of its population. This cultural backwardness was used in reference to the racial and socioeconomic differences among citizens. Many elite Brazilians viewed members of the non-white and poor sectors of society as degenerates. “They [Brazilian elites] treated schools as clinics wherein the national maladies they associated with Brazil’s mix of races could be cured” (Dávila 2003, 3).

These imperfections of the Brazilian nationality based on race and socioeconomic status aimed to whiten the population through public education. However the education system was

¹ *Pardo* is the Portuguese word for brown or mixed race. This term will be treated as an English word and only italicized in the first occurrence.
and is still flawed because it has maintained the disparity among the rich and poor, white and non-white citizens. According to Dávila (2003),

Educators working in Rio de Janeiro established a formula for bringing to fruition the school system that could perfect the race. This school system used whiteness as its baseline. The white and affluent were awarded with innovative educational opportunities. Conversely, the school system provided a remedial experience for children who did not meet the white and affluent standards. These educators offered Brazil a diploma of whiteness, giving new shape to enduring inequalities (243).

This practice of eugenics reached its height during the Estado Novo and this practice is now embedded into the social policies and practices of present.

**Estado Novo**

After the 1920s when racist thought was at its height, Getulio Vargas constructed the “Estado Novo” or New State. “Getulio Vargas governed… first as chief of the provisional government (1930-1934), next as constitutional president elected by Congress (1934-1937), then as dictator (1937-1945)” (Burns 1993, 347). During Vargas’ leadership of Brazil, he enacted many social policies. Included in these policies, Vargas advocated: “…state-directed reforms to promote national development, and a wide range of social legislation that would include a labor code, a social security system, a public health system, universal education, and more equitable distribution of income” (Burns 1993, 348). Within these social legislative policies, the attention paid to improving public education was intended to attract the members of the middle class. Under Vargas’ regime, the educational system was overhauled under Minister Francisco Campos. Campos aimed to modernize education through increased and improved teacher education as well as infrastructure (Burns 1993, 364). Vargas used improved education to not only gain supporters but to unify the many different ethnicities residing in Brazil. In addition to implementing the provision for universal education, under Vargas the first university was created. Even though colleges or *faculdades* have existed in Brazil since the nineteenth century
in law, medicine, and engineering (Eakin 1996, 109). According to Burns (1993), the first university created in Rio de Janeiro in 1920, combined the previously separate colleges under a single administrative body (364). Following the centralization of these colleges in Rio de Janeiro and University of São Paulo formed in 1934, during Vargas’ regime.

Due to the promotion of miscegenation, a lack of definition of races developed and thus has a complex racial history in Brazil. Due to the close differentiation of skin color among the pardo citizens it was difficult to institute a dual race society like that which formed post-emancipation in the United States. “Skin color, hair texture, facial and other visible physical characteristics were the determinants of the racial category into which a person would be placed by those he met. . . . The strict observation of color-based endogamy, which became sanctified in the United States, had never existed in Brazil” (Skidmore 1993, 39). Thus the country adopted an informal tri-racial racial definition that included white, black and pardo. This tri-racial delineation among races was not formalized and the Brazilian population is “color conscious and use hundreds of terms to classify one another according to skin tone” (Htun 2004, 64). Due to this relatively informal demarcation of the races, Brazil embraced a more inclusionary response to the differentiation in race. This idea of was developed by Gilberto Freyre to claim that “Brazilians could take great pride in the racially and culturally mixed heritage as an example for other nations to follow” (Eakin 1996, 104). This idea was later coined as a racial democracy. Brazil wanted and currently wants to retain a façade of inclusion of all races even though, in practice, it has yet to materialize. Thus, the idea that there is a superior and inferior race is coupled with the strict social hierarchy was widely accepted and practiced in Brazil.

The association of race and class status dispelled much ambition for acceptance of race and unification in Brazil. The idea of a racial democracy allowed the white population to decrease
the possible strength the Afro-Brazilians could have had collectively post-emancipation, thus strengthening the white population (Johnson 2008, 214). Afro-Brazilians have only recently begun to embrace their “blackness” but in the past a darker skin tone indicated a lower class. “Brazilians forged a racially mixed society instead of racially divided one. Brazilians discriminated, but on the basis of color, and there were many shades” (Eakin 1996, 116). This idea that race is an indication of social status persists in twenty-first century Brazil. Even though, this idea of race is indicative of social status, this is changing as the Afro-Brazilian section of society has come to embrace of their descent and begun to demand more rights from the Brazilian government. According to Reiter (2009), Afro-Brazilians have adopted the following approach:

   to achieve upward mobility, after scientific racism, racial democracy, and ‘order and progress,’ was to disassociate from anything African and black to gradually assimilate into the hegemonic mainstream, structured as it was and is by white supremacy. Afro-Brazilians have been transformed into a minority despite their numerical majority (47).

In addition to the acceptance by the Afro-Brazilians, the Lula government has begun to respond to these demands for equal political, social and economic rights.

Social Inequality and Noncitizenship

Today, due to the high amount of racial mixing among Brazilians, the lines of race have blurred but the color rank remains constant. The question of race is often connected with the lower stratum of society; however, this phenomenon is constantly evolving as Brazilian citizens continue to practice miscegenation and skin color becomes less and less well defined. Abdias do Nascimento “argues that 350 years of racial slavery, 100 years of racist legislation and public policy, and more than 60 years of ideology of racial democracy have led to deep and systematic racial prejudice and discrimination against Afro-Brazilians, resulting in their subordinate and impoverished position in Brazilian society” (Johnson 2008, 211). In Brazil today, citizens with
phenotypic traits ranging from black to white are found inhabiting the lowest rung of the societal ladder. Through the further mixing of races and descent has become more obsolete, Afro-Brazilians, continue to constitute a majority of the citizens with fewest rights, ranking just at or above the indigenes with the lowest economic opportunities and restricted social mobility. An example of this continuation of the plight of the Afro-Brazilian citizen among offspring from the same family is well described by Janice Perlman during an interview with a couple residing in a Rio de Janeiro favela. The couple has nine children, and while the father claimed there is no racial discrimination in Brazil, his wife reminded him about the economic successes of their children “all of our light-skinned children are employed, and all of our darker-skinned children are unemployed” (Perlman 2010, 170). “Brazilians have thought of themselves not as a people composed of distinct ‘races’ but as a multi-colored national race” (Htun 2004, 61). Brazilians utilize this idea of to sustain the fable that all citizens are considered equal and to dispel the obvious racial discrimination that exists. Thus, with this false notion that everyone is equal regardless of color, which is evident by the above example, the reality is that inequality exists based on economic resources and political influence and power, mostly skewed to those with the most European features and heredity.

**Economic Inequality**

The perpetuation of inequality among Brazilians is glaringly clear and has translated into economic power. Beyond the question of racism, Brazil has been characterized as one of the most unequal countries in the world. “In fact, 34 percent of the Brazilian population was considered poor in 1999 – some fifty-four million persons, [of] whom twenty-two million were considered indigent” (Luna and Klein 2006, 201). This indicates that not only Afro-Brazilians are suffering from the strict societal caste but also those of European, pardo and indigenous descent, although Afro-Brazilians constitute an overwhelming majority of the lowest class in
society, comprising up seventy percent of the poorest Brazilians (Htun 2004, 63). According to the Human Development Report of 2007, the richest twenty percent of Brazil’s population received 61.1% of the nation’s income, whereas the poorest twenty percent received only 2.8%.

Often these disparities in income are attributed to a history of indigence and inequality. Additionally the inequality of educational opportunities afforded to a majority of Brazilians aid in the determination of economic prosperity and power. Brazil provides limited public education to the population, although “80% of Brazilian children of school age attend” (Reiter 2009, 57). Thus a high majority of Brazilian citizens are receiving a public school education and that produces a citizenry that comprises the lowest rungs of the societal ladder. Even though the population has a rather fluid definition of race, there exists a clear differentiation among the races with regard to the amount of education. According to Htun (2004), “Education is the major predictor of income, and, though average educational levels of both black and white Brazilians have increased significantly over the twentieth century, the gap between them has remained relatively constant” (63). Thus there not only exists disparity among rich and poor, but also among races with regard to education and income relative to such education. The indigent population of Brazil is restricted to employment that produces less income due to their less than competitive public education. This employment seals them to their position in society, which presents little opportunity for increased mobility. The whites are symbols of “education, holding a regular job, and most Brazilians almost automatically associate it with being middle class, having money, owning a car, and having access to other private services, most importantly private education” (Reiter 2009, 47). These disparities in economic opportunity stemming from differences in education are often reflected in the amount of political power a citizen holds. This inability of poor citizens to access quality public education based upon their economic ability
restricts them from partaking in many of their rights as citizens, which maintains the prevalent inequality among Brazilian citizens.

**Political Inequality**

Social status within a stratified society like that which exists in Brazil also plays a large part in determining the political status and influence of the individual. As Brazil developed from the colonial era to the present day, there has been an evolution of Brazilian political citizenship. As in many countries, this political citizenship was one of exclusion and there exists, even today, an informal level of exclusion regarding the rights the government affords its citizens. Racial and social inequality have been reproduced throughout Brazil’s history with the greatest political power retained by the elite class. According to the Brazilian 2010 Census over 50% of Brazilians identified as either black or pardo, which surpasses the population that identifies as white (IBGE 2010). Even though a majority of the population identifies as either black or pardo, they fail to gain strength in the political arena because they are effectively excluded due either to their social status or race.

In Brazil, in its transition from a Portuguese colony, to empire and finally to a federative republic, citizenship was once restricted by race, gender, financial ability, and educational level. In the colonial era much of the Brazilian population did not have political rights, including suffrage, right to own property, or education. *Homens bons*, or “good men”, which constituted, “people of noble lineage or particular kinds of property who had, in either case, ‘clean blood’ . . . racial whiteness” were the only men allowed to vote in the Brazilian colony (Holston 2008, 85). These men were recorded as having cast votes, which indicates they had political rights in Brazil. The record of political participation in the Brazilian colonial era attributed to social status. “The bureaucratic qualification of voters was a means of social ascension during the colonial period for those who had the means to achieve ‘an aristocracy of resemblance’” (Holston 2008, 85).
Restrictions remained as to who could and could not vote. Most of these depended on race and gender, but they were also based on income markers. “The electorate continued to be but a fraction of the total population. In 1881 it numbered only 142,000 out of a population of approximately 15 million” (Burns 1993, 182). In the colonial era though most Brazilians were denied political rights, especially voting rights, independence brought more restrictions that remained active until after the military dictatorship fell.

As Brazil moved toward democracy, even though there were more measures taken to extend political rights to the majority of the population, more restrictions were instituted following the adoption of the 1891 Brazilian Constitution, which only addressed the wealthy elite in the powerful Southeastern states. The main restriction of income level was lifted, though a stricter literacy requirement was instituted, which affected a majority of Brazilian voters. “The masses, of course, played no role in the political process, their interests being subordinated, as they always had been, to the well-being of the oligarchy” (Burns 1993, 267). The use of literacy to restrict voters was utilized until the current Constitution of 1988 was enacted. “Mass exclusion through mass illiteracy also reflects also reflects the failure of public education as a means to build an informed citizenry. It even suggests a motive for neglecting this fundamental means for achieving greater equality among citizens” (Holston 2008, 102). Thus, education and the state play yet another role in the inequality that many Brazilian citizens experience. The state offered and still offers a substandard public education. Today this substandard public education system is simply maintaining the previous social, racial, and economic status of its students, and even though the rate of literacy has improved, Brazil is now allowing more uneducated voters to decide the future of the country, although they often do not act without manipulation of some
kind. Brazil has extended more political rights to its citizens in the struggle for equality by Afro-Brazilians, with the implementation of affirmative action policies.

**Affirmative Action & Black Social Movements**

Since the 1930s, Brazil has viewed itself as a country of inclusion, in terms of acceptance of ethnicity. The ca. 1933 concept of races in a peaceful co-existence, developed by Brazilian social scientist Gilberto Freyre set forth the idea that “there would never be racial conflict in Brazil, but rather integration of blacks and whites, both of whom would in the future be surpassed by a vast generation of miscegenates” (Pitanga 1999, 35). There has been a “so-called” harmonious interaction among races, embracement of “racial democracy,” with a consequent resistance to accept reality that racism still exists in Brazil. Even though racism does exist, many Brazilians assert that discrimination occurs in reaction to the differences in social status rather than among the different races or hues of skin tone. Due to this mindset, many Brazilians fail to see a necessity for programs that promote the advancement of people with darker skin tone. Although there does not exist much support for public policies that favor Afro-Brazilians, there has been a recent realization that not only does discrimination occur among social classes, but even more so among races. According to Htun (2004)

> Change in policy discourse happened because greater numbers of people begin to be convinced by an idea advanced for decades by Afro-Brazilian activists and social science researchers— that racism is pervasive and something needs to be done about racial inequalities. Armed only with arguments, critics of Brazil’s racial order appealed to reason and a sense of justice to advance their case (62).

In the 1990s a change of heart occurred to challenge the widely accepted idea of a racial democracy, even though the affirmative action policies have been met with opposition. “The majority of Brazilians do not know what affirmative action is, and the few who have any idea believe it is synonymous with quotas, something used the United States to benefit only blacks” (Martins et al. 2004, 809). Actions promoting equality among races through policies that favor
the previously underrepresented sections of society in Brazil range now from laws applicable to the worker and those for students.

**Black Movements Before Cardoso**

The concept of affirmative action in Brazil has been known since the inception of affirmative action in the United States, though unfortunately has only recently gained strength and visibility in government and society. Social movements, politicians, academics, and citizens have worked and are working to demystify the long accepted and embraced idea of “racial democracy”. Work toward equality for Afro-Brazilians began in the 1930s; although the two authoritarian regimes that ruled Brazil severely interfered with the work of these black social movements. In the 1930s, the *Frente Negra Brasileira* (Brazilian Black Front) founded in São Paulo expanded throughout the country to raise awareness regarding the racism and racial inequality that was occurring in Brazil. “The FNB was the largest organization of the Black Movement during in the Republican period, and it spread throughout Brazil with more than 70,000 members” (Pitanga 1999, 33). During Vargas’ regime and the military dictatorship there was little organization by the black movement and not until the fall of the military dictatorship was there a significant resurgence in fighting for equality among races.

With the reinstatement of democracy came more movement toward racial equality, including clauses in the Constitution of 1988 providing a definition of racism, repercussions for racist acts, and others recognizing Afro-Brazilian heritage. Also, with the return to democracy, in 1978 the *Movimento Negro Unificado* (MNU) was established in São Paulo and began to fight for equal rights. Though the heritage bill was passed and enacted, other bills proposed to Congress regarding other measures intended to equalize races, never reached fruition. “Senator Nascimento proposed many bills, supported every piece of legislation pushing for the betterment of the black population. . . .As a prominent member of the Unified Black Movement (Movimento
Negro Unificado), he cooperated with comrades from across the country to draft proposals for presentation in political forums” (Ojo-Ade 1999, 178). Until recently, the Congress did not recognize aspects of this bill, which were supported by the Brazilian Constitution. Even though this bill and others were not passed into constitutional law, many black leaders across the country worked toward raising awareness regarding racism and support for affirmative action (Johnson 2008, 223). Due to this raised awareness for black rights and affirmative action across Brazil, organizations offering aid to Afro-Brazilians began to develop and gain strength which substituted for the lack of governmental attention and action regarding racial inequality. The development of organizations in Brazil to provide support for underrepresented groups in society will be covered in more detail in Chapter 6.

**Cardoso’s Affirmative Action**

In 1995, following the inauguration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso as President of Brazil, racial awareness increased and the myth of the “harmonious interaction among races” was discredited. “In the mid-1990s, the president of the country, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, officially acknowledged the existence of racial discrimination in Brazil” (Skidmore 2003, 1394). Along with increased pressure from Afro-Brazilians in Congress and grass root activists, President Cardoso launched programs promoting a more racially conscious government and state. In addition to the increased action by the state, Brazil was also preparing to participate in the World Conference on Racism in Durban, South Africa, which had a positive effect on the implementation on policies regarding affirmative action and equality.

The major move toward the acceptance that racism exists in Brazil was President Cardoso’s action to address the rampant discrimination that previously masqueraded as a racial democracy. “The president announced the creation of an Interministerial Working Group for the Black Population (GTI) and made an unprecedented official statement recognizing the existence
of racial discrimination and the need for policy measures to combat it” (Martins et al. 2004, 797). Though the president publicly recognized that racism existed in Brazil, there was much resistance to this new state-supported affirmative action. An inadvertent action of resistance was that the group was formed but lacked financial support, but this lack of support did not hinder the members from gaining more support from the public through lobbying and research. President Cardoso was revered because he took initiative to reverse racial discrimination in Brazil, but even he was experiencing difficulty with some aspects of affirmative action. “These principles were not accepted by the general public, however, and the president himself contributed to the bias against affirmative action by identifying it with quotas and alleging that it ‘implies ignoring the evaluation of merit,’ one of the foremost points of Brazilian society’s resistance to antidiscrimination policy” (Martins et al. 2004, 797). Even with this setback, the Afro-Brazilian activists continued to push forward in hopes of establishing a more equal Brazil.

Along with the initiation of the working group to promote antidiscrimination, Brazil planned to participate in the World Conference against Racism. Many pro-affirmative action policies were implemented in preparation for participation in the conference in 2001 (Johnson 2008, 225). As preparation continued for this conference, debate intensified and many recommendations were offered to move toward future racial equality and the end of racial discrimination. “The official report submitted, produced by a large committee composed of state officials and representatives of various civic organizations, recommended that the government adopt quotas or other ‘affirmative mechanisms’ to expand the access of black students to public universities” (Htun 2004, 68). In addition to the call for “affirmative mechanisms” other improvements were recommended for consideration by the conference, such as increased revenue spending for education, healthcare, and potable drinking water (Martins et al. 2004,
This presentation of the recommendations at the conference began a whirlwind of affirmative action policies countrywide. There was an increased implementation of quotas to ensure equal opportunity for black applicants for government employment, university entrance, and employment in the private sector as well.

Not only did these quotas benefit Afro-Brazilians but also those underrepresented in the workplace and universities. Following the Durban Conference, the Brazilian Government made some conscious efforts to implement the recommendations. In May 2002, President Cardoso established by presidential decree the Federal Council to Combat Racism to receive complaints as well as to produce a national affirmative action program to guarantee underrepresented groups opportunity for employment (Martins et al. 2004, 804). Many of the affirmative action programs implemented following the Durban Conference included not requirements to benefit Afro-Brazilians, but also for women and handicapped persons. In addition to these two actions to improve equality, the Lei de Quotas (Quotas Law) was presented to Congress to reserve university admissions for Afro-Brazilians and positions in the civil service, and to reward private companies who abided by affirmative action guidelines (Johnson 2008, 225). Some believed that the culprit was not only the inequality of access to these positions, but also the conditions that many Afro-Brazilians endure, which would necessitate an improvement in everyday life. This attempt to address a longer-term solution, brought the enactment of the Estatuto de Igualdade Racial (Racial Equality Statute) that “requires the government to take specific steps to promote racial equality, diminish racial discrimination, and increase the education, employment, health care, and cultural opportunities of Afro-Brazilians” (Johnson 2008, 225). Even though these laws presented possibilities to reduce the racial inequality, they were not implemented due to their ambiguous nature. This failure to pass legislation to address racial disparities has
increased the discussion and necessity for more attention to this ever-growing issue. Even though the affirmation action initiatives in Brazil have worked to improve access to work and university admissions, these programs have failed to break the hold on society of the white upper class, therefore failing to increase equality among all Brazilian citizens.

**Opponents to Affirmative Action**

The opponents to affirmative action mainly object to the quotas for university admissions. The opposition utilizes the arguments that the lack of access is based on society and not race, which would indicate beliefs associated with the “racial democracy”, which has been exposed as false and was utilized to practice racial discrimination. Many citizens, academics, and politicians alike view the existence of quotas as a disregard of admissions standards on the basis of merit. “Peter Fry and Yvonne Maggie of the Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro are two of the leading academic critics of racial quotas. They have criticized quotas publicly and repeatedly as being counterproductive” (Johnson 2008). Even though this may be true, these underrepresented groups have little to no access to university education outside these quotas. Thus, without these quotas and other programs that offer tuition grants, Afro-Brazilians are “virtually excluded from free higher education” (Martins et al. 2004, 807). Other opponents to racial quotas for employment and university admissions believe it will be difficult to implement and that results will not be consistent.

Since race remains loosely defined in Brazil due to the high occurrence of miscegenation, most Brazilian citizens could claim African heritage. “The answer to ‘who is black’ is simple: self-declaration, used by the ministries of justice and agrarian development, as well as researchers and census enumerators at the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE)” (Htun 2004, 74). The implementation of the race-based quotas met opposition from many members of society because this society has not yet fully accepted the concept of such
societal relations as racial discrimination. “Some 300 white candidates denied placement in the State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) in early 2003 went to the courts and won injunctions” (Martins et al. 2004, 808). White students have filed for injunctions because they feel like they are victims of reverse racial discrimination by these imposed quotas to eradicate racism. These injunctions represent the idea of superiority retained by white citizens, which indicates a lack of citizen-espoused equality. Some white students have self-identified themselves as “brown” to gain acceptance at the State University of Rio de Janeiro in order to take advantage of the quota system as well (Bailey 2004, 730). Thus, self-identification of race has brought forth opponents to affirmative action based upon race as well as those attempting to manipulate the system for their benefit. Even though the state has acted against race and social status inequality, the implementation of quotas and affirmative action have failed to make great strides among citizens or to alter their concept of a social hierarchy that includes equality.

**President Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva: Increased Equality?**

President Luiz “Lula” da Silva continued Cardoso’s reform policies, maintaining the economic stability that Cardoso achieved and committing his presidency to addressing the social issues that plagued the country (Luna and Klein 2006, 34). One of the major issues Lula hoped to tackle in during his presidency was the problem of social inequality, a major problem in Brazil. With the election of Lula, who had a similar background as many Brazilians, the voters had high expectations for monumental change. He created social programs such as *Bolsa Familia*, which gave indigent families additional funds to augment their family incomes. There were requirements paired with this social program, which awarded funds on a scale dependent on income and stipulated school attendance and regular medical attention for a family’s children (Amann and Baer 2009, 36). *Bolsa Escola* the accompanying conditional cash transfer program
to *Bolsa Família*, gives parents an additional incentive to keep their children in school, forgoing child labor (Hunter 2010, 85).

Another social program that Lula addressed was the dire situation that the public schools experience was the *Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento do Ensino Fundamental e Valorização do Magisterio* (Fund for Maintenance and Support of Basic Education), or (FUNDEF) has decentralized schools, increased teacher’s salaries, and improved education indicators since its implementation in 1996 (Melo 2008, 164). This program has been replaced by another program FUNDEB (Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica) in 2007 (MEC). FUNDEB focuses and allocates federal revenue not only for elementary education but also pre-school and middle level education.

Lula however, was unable to escape scandals and corruption and only delivered on some of his promises. Following the scandal, which the Lula government utilized bribes to gain legislative votes, Lula refocused his efforts to make the program *Bolsa Família* more universal to reach the most indigent citizens. “Greatly expanding coverage of this concrete benefit allowed Lula to consolidate a social base among the poor, who had responded only weakly to the party’s previous promise of redistributive change through collective mobilization” (Hunter 2010, 148). However these expansions to the social programs to extend coverage to citizens, Hunter (2010), notes

the government made no significant effort to redistribute existing funds to produce more progressive social effect in these areas….The combination of fiscal constraints and the manifest desire to avoid challenging privileged interest apparently inhibited the government from instituting major redistributive reforms in the key ministries of education and health (153).

Even though he focused on social programs, such as *Bolsa Família*, the five hundred years of social inequality has prevailed, and the established social determinants are still visible.
Discussion

President Lula attempted to address the perpetuation of Brazil’s social inequality through the implementation of socially progressive programs. His government embraced “clean government, transparency, redistributive social policy, an end to egregious clientelism of Brazilian politics, and a return to nationalist and state-led economic growth policies” (Kingstone and Power 2008, 3). Negative aspects still afflict Brazil, such as clientelism, political party fragmentation, and deep inequality among classes, which translates to every aspect of society and politics. Even though President Lula’s social programs represented action toward a more democratic and egalitarian society in Brazil, the status quo persists and social inequality is perpetuated by the inequality in education and lack of access by non-elites to higher education. With this continuation of poor public education in Brazil, the country will remain stagnant in its progress towards democratization. Social mobility has been greatly slowed by the perpetuation of inequality and social injustice through disparities in education, which the Brazilian government has failed to adequately address, thus condemning many citizens to a life of poverty. The poor are more disempowered and less able to press their interests before the state, thus allowing policies of discrimination to continue. By offering deficient public education, this restriction placed upon the lower class by the government works to maintain the stark divide among citizens.
CHAPTER 3
EDUCATION OF BRAZIL: A REPETITION OF HISTORY

The Brazilian public education system perpetuates the great disparity among the classes in Brazilian society. The Brazilian government offers public education at all levels of instruction, but only invests revenue in higher education. This investment is important because higher education makes a unique contribution to democracy by providing a sanctuary for freedom of thought and critical thinking but more needs to be done. Due to the decentralization of public education, it is difficult if impossible to transfer funds among the federal, state, and local governments, which enables the continuation of utilizing public goods for private interests.

“Unfortunately such circumstances, education becomes a means to create and protect social prestige, potentially losing all of its emancipating potential and its ability to produce knowledge and reducing educational degrees to mere emblems that are displayed as a marker of social distinction and status” (Reiter 2009, 60). The elite attend private preparatory schools to gain entrance in the prestigious public universities, while the poor students attend public secondary schools that fail to provide them with preparation to compete with the elite. Though there are government programs to improve the chances of a university education for poor students, the affluent students are continually rewarded for being privileged. A combination of historical, societal, and political aspects of Brazil has hindered the improvement and equalization of education for its citizens.

History of Education in Brazil

The social programs that need to be implemented to improve the lives of many Brazilians do not receive enough attention or are not addressed because these programs would begin to breakdown the social hierarchy that is so prominent and well preserved in Brazilian society.

“The Brazilian school system has long served historically included groups to reproduce their
privileged positions in Brazilian social hierarchies. The dominant strategy to achieve this goals has been to use education as a tool to construct social status” (Reiter 2009, 53). Brazil began as a state where education was a privilege, only for children of the elite. Until the present, this privilege had not experienced much change from Brazil’s colonial and imperial past. Great importance is placed on education as a means to improve one’s livelihood, but is now also viewed as a route for the impoverished to move up the social ladder. “Over the last five decades, private schools have thus become important institutions for reproducing privilege, while public schools have become places for the reproduction of exclusion. Public schools provide poor education for the poor” (Reiter 2009, 54). Social policies to improve the basics of life as health and education have met resistance because the revenue that would fund these programs would be extracted additional taxation from the elites of society, who do not benefit from such program improvements. Often the implementation of social policy, in this case education, indicates responsiveness or lack thereof by the government to its citizens’ needs. “Brazil, for the most of its imperial and Republican history, was a relatively backward nation in terms of providing public education for its population” (Luna and Klein 2006, 182). Much like Brazil’s government experiences, today’s educational situation is the result of the past experiences in political instability and an impermeable, almost inescapable social hierarchy.

**Brazil’s Regional Differences on Education**

Due to Brazil’s immense size as the fifth largest nation in the world, only slightly smaller than the United States, great regional differences exist. The differences in the regions across this vast country influence the resources allocated for education thus causing large disparities among the different states’ and regions’ public education system. These regions include the North, Northeast, Center West, South, and Southeast. The regions differ in many areas, including wealth, population, industry, geography, and culture.
Though the country was established in the Northeast Region, this region today lacks the wealth and power it once held. The remnants of colonial slavery still remain visible in the Northeast Region with a high Afro-Brazilian population and integration of African customs into Brazilian culture. The Northeast region has suffered from low wages and unemployment, which has induced migration to the prosperous Southeast Region.

Due to the economic success of the Southeast region, the population is a melting pot of immigrants from within the country and all over the world bringing higher revenues available for state use. “Like other nations of continental dimensions, Brazil is really several countries within a country” (Eakin 1996, 101). These disparities among regions or “countries” need to be addressed to unify Brazil in efforts toward a successful and equal provision of education to increase and improve movement toward equal social capital creation. Due to the entrenched disparity among regions in Brazil, with the decentralization of the education system more inequalities are unearthed among citizens.

**Decentralized Public Education**

The first Brazilian public schools were developed in the mid-nineteenth century with the financial support of municipal and state governments. However, this most current decentralization of the public education system occurred during the dissolution of the military dictatorship. Throughout the early Brazilian Republic, much of the population did not attend school and the country was largely illiterate. “The illiteracy rate during the imperial period never dropped below 85 percent among the free population, and it was considerably higher if one took into account the slaves” (Burns 1993, 206). Over time, the number of students attending school increased thought the quality of education remained stagnant and poor. “In addition, between 1940 and 1960, the Brazilian population with more than four years of elementary education grew from 681,000 to 3.7 million in São Paulo and from 429,000 to 2.3 million in Rio de Janeiro”
An effort to reduce illiteracy by Vargas increased access to public education succeeded in that more students attended school.

As the majority of the population gained access to public education, the elite classes, who were the only people properly educated, began to enroll in private institutions because they had to maintain the differentiation among the classes. During the 1970s and 1980s, while more students from a greater range of economic abilities were attending public schools that the government funded, this flight of affluent students allowed the quality of education offered by the public institutions to decline (Birdsall, Bruns and Sabot 1996, 8). “Because the wider pool of students gaining access to the system was generally not as well prepared as those students already enrolled, it cost more per child to maintain quality. But lacking the resources to meet these costs, the increase in quantity meant an erosion of quality” (Birdsall, Bruns and Sabot 1996, 15). This increase in student population, continued poor school quality, and ongoing need for educational reform has yet to see real progress. “Indeed, enrollment in primary and secondary education expanded by 32 percent from 1970 to 1989. Nevertheless, Brazil failed to match the progress of other developing countries during this period, particularly the high-performing East Asian economies, in expanding the quantity and improving the quality of schooling” (Birdsall, Bruns and Sabot 1996, 7). Therefore, the provision of state funded education proved a failed effort by the state to extend equal rights to all citizens of Brazil.

The 1988 Constitution entrusted municipal governments with the responsibility to provide primary education, and the state and federal governments were responsible for provision of public secondary and tertiary education institutions. With this responsibility, the federal government of Brazil surrendered the control of twenty-three states and within the states, 4,500 municipalities to these state and local politicians and policymakers (Birdsall, Bruns and Sabot
With the control left to the state and municipal governments, the federal government could exhibit less control and distribute fewer funds. According to Luna and Klein (2006),

In the [1988] Constitution, not only was universal free primary and secondary education declared a right of all citizens but the government now required that 25 percent of all state and municipal income had to be expended on education along with the 18 percent by the federal government in support of state and municipal expenditures in this area. This was accomplished by setting up a fund – the FUNDEF, which collected 15 percent of the 25 percent from the taxes of the states and municipalities and redistributed then within each state according to the number of students in state and local public schools (187).

Assessments of public education have been instituted, as well as federal programs that help to offset the disparity of revenues among the states, increase teacher salaries, acquire classroom materials, and fund other programs to improve the quality of education. However, this decentralized public education system introduced some possible impediments to the provision of quality education to the majority of Brazilian children. Even though the responsibilities delineated by the Constitution were reduced, the division of duties increased the difficulty in determining where responsibility lies in ensuring the right to education (Plank, Sobrinho and da Resurreição Xavier 1996, 30). Additionally, there could be differing oversight by the Brazilian federal government to ensure that funds are spent as directed and not utilized for other purposes such as special interest demands.

The Ministry of Education of Brazil was created in 1930 when Getulio Vargas entered the presidency, however it was originally named the Ministry of Education and Public Health (Ministerio da Educação 2011). The Ministry of Education and Public Health of Brazil remained until after Vargas’ final return to the presidential seat. In 1953, this arm of government became the Ministry of Education and Culture. In 2003, the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Education were restructured by President Lula according to Decreto 4.805, which separated these two ministries (Ministerio da Cultura 2007).
The quality of education among the states also differs due to the disparity of tax revenues between the northern and southern states of Brazil. The Ministry of Education and Culture is unable to evaluate the performance of the schools or projects at the state or local levels due to the lack of administrative capacity within the MEC (Plank 1990, 547). As state and local governments gained more control over the revenue to provide public education, the southern and Southeastern states of Brazil embraced this increase in local control, but the Northeastern states wanted to retain the constant transfer from the federal government (Plank, Sobrinho and da Resurreição Xavier 1996, 130). The states in the Southeastern region of Brazil were aware that this decentralization would benefit them because the revenue for education would be derived from their own states, which produce considerably more wealth than the states of the Northeast. This would indicate a more extensive budget, which the politicians would control to allocate funds to complete their necessary educational responsibilities, but more importantly they could also preserve their position in office with the maintenance of their clientelist relationships. The hindrances touched on previously, do not indicate an efficient public education system, which in turn causes the quality of education provided to Brazilian citizens to be substandard in comparison to private education institutions. This seemingly positive effort by the Brazilian Government to provide public education to increase equality among citizens resulted in yet another action to reproduce and perpetuate the social inequality that is evident today.

**Northeast vs. Southeast: Inequality Between Regions in Education**

Decentralization of the public education system involves entrusting the responsibility of providing primary and secondary education to local and state governments in Brazil. It also has the potential to differentiate the quality of education offered among the states of the Northeast and Southeast Brazil. “This decentralization – coupled with the large regional variations in per capita income and limited redistribution – has resulted in tremendous variance in spending per
student across municipalities and even between states and municipal systems in the same municipality” (Birdsall, Bruns and Sabot 1996, 27). The disparity that exists among states has translated into differences in education expenditures due to the amount of state revenue collected from the citizens.

The two regions of Brazil examined for this study differ greatly in that the Southeastern region possesses a majority of the country’s industry and wealth and the Northeastern region is more rural and less economically successful. “Not surprisingly, the major industrial states of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro have the highest per capita income, literacy, and levels of education, while the northern, more rural states of Bahia, Paraiba, and Ceara have the lowest levels of income, education and the highest levels of illiteracy” (Kempner and Jurema 2002, 336). Because of the great disparity in the tax base, the poorer Northeastern states of Brazil have less revenue to hire and retain teachers, maintain infrastructure, and provide student resources than the Southeastern states. According to Simon Schwartzman (2003), “As a rule, public school in poor regions, municipalities and neighborhoods tend to be of worse quality, and school achievement depends heavily on the family’s economic, social and cultural background” (6).

This allowance of more state involvement in the Southeast is why that region surpasses the Northeast region in all social indicators. An example of a social indicator that displays the inequality among regions is the difference between the rate of adult illiteracy among regions and races. According to the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios of 2008, the Northeast Region of Brazil has an illiteracy rate of 19.4% whereas the Southeast Region’s illiteracy rate is 5.8% (IBGE 2008). This inequality further is illustrated by a breakdown of races with regard to illiteracy rates where two-thirds of the country’s illiterate population is made up by pardo or Afro-Brazilians (IBGE 2006). The disparity among races is even more visible when examining
the university graduation rate between white Brazilians and Brazilians who identify as black or mixed descent. According to Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios of 2008, in the Northeast Region the proportion of white Brazilians twenty-five years or older who have graduated from university is 10.2%, whereas the rate for non-white Brazilians is only 3.8% (IBGE 2008). The Southeast’s Region surpasses both of the Northeast’s figures, in that 16.2% of the university graduates are white and only 5.0% are non-white (IBGE 2008). The literacy rate in this part of Brazil can now be compared to that of the United States where almost all citizens are considered literate and now a university diploma has become the norm with 489,184 bachelor’s degrees conferred by degree-granting institutions between 2008-2009 according to the U.S. Department of Education Institute of Education Sciences. However, in the Northeastern Region, “much of the responsibility for providing school is left to the municipios, which have limited administrative capacity and few independent sources of revenues” (Plank 1990, 543).

Even though there exists great inequality between of the Southeast and Northeast regions of Brazil, there also exists inequality within states and municipalities, and as a result, there is no equality in public education in Brazil. An example of the differences between Salvador and Rio de Janeiro is demonstrated by the measure of illiteracy of Brazilians over fifteen years of age. The illiteracy rate in Salvador is 4.8% of the Metropolitan population where the illiteracy rate of Rio de Janeiro is 3.6% (IBGE 2008). “Specialists agree that the main problems of basic education in Brazil are not of quantity but of quality and of social and regional inequalities, combined with a pattern that penalizes the poor” (de Souza 1997, 111). However, the main inequality that exists in the Brazilian education system is in the quality of education offered by public school and private schools.
Education Policy Initiatives toward Equality

The great disparity among the poorest and most prosperous states in Brazil with regards to education policy has implications that correlate to other qualitative differences. These disparities have placed nine states of Northeastern Brazil among the poorest regions of the world (Harbison 1992, 30). With decentralization in Brazil and the federal government’s groundwork for the implementation of education policies to ameliorate the conditions of the educational system, the necessity for supplementary programs has developed. “Policies aimed at improving their welfare are often proclaimed but rarely implemented, even by avowedly reformist regimes, because the obstacles to reform are many and the political advantages of change are few” (Plank 1990, 540). Decentralization in most cases has brought more inequality and inefficiency in policy implementation in the Northeast Region, therefore the federal government and non-governmental agencies have stepped in to provide much needed revenue and alternative strategies in provision of quality education to Brazilian citizens. With these policy initiatives or additional revenue borrowed from an international lender, the product has left much to be desired.

The state and local governments of the Northeast Region of Brazil do not necessarily need more resources, but an improved technique of distribution of the funds among recipients. “They key issue is how new resources are distributed within the region. Simply increasing the quantity of funds transferred to the Northeast may in fact increase the advantages of the relatively privileged” (Plank, Sobrinho, Ressureição Xavier 1996, 133). There is a great need for efficiency and for the politicians to ignore their clientelist tendencies to genuinely want for their state or municipality’s schools to improve in quality, thus allowing for the youth to aid in the future prosperity of the region. This move toward less clientelism and more efficiency is one of the more imminent problems because the politicians have resisted the change even though the
current policies manifest ineffectiveness. Politicians are reticent to these changes because it would restrict their ability to partake in patron/client relationships. “The Brazilian government today, according to many observers, has become merely a problem-management agency, in charge only of transferring money from the federal government and international agencies to the states and cities” (Kempner and Jurema 2002, 339). This role that the Brazilian federal government plays does not alleviate problems with distributing aid and making sure that it utilized in the anticipated manner by the state and local governments.

An example of an internal development project developed to improve circumstances that plague the Northeast region of Brazil is the Northeast Basic Education Project (EDURURAL). The Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC) developed and implemented the EDURURAL Project in the 1980s. The Brazilian Federal Government and the World Bank funded the EDURURAL project. The project goal was to extend improved educational opportunities in quality and quantity to the region; however, the program was instituted in only eighteen percent of the counties. The main objectives to achieve increased quality and quantity included extending access to primary education, reducing grade repetition and the dropout rate to diminish costs and hire more qualified instructors for the schools in the municipalities involved (Birdsall Bruns and Sabot 1996, 34-5). This project did not achieve what it was expected to achieve with the additional multi-million dollar augmentation in their budget for improvement of the dire circumstance of the Northeast region’s schools. The Northeast Region of Brazil continues to come in last place with regards to accessibility to education and overall quality of education.

Brazil continues to borrow money from the World Bank to fund educational initiatives, most of which are based in the Northeast Region. The first main problem lies with the complexity of Brazil, in that the initiatives presented and implemented by international
development banks have a great possibility of being rejected by some of the states or cities. Another main problem, especially in the Northeast, is that almost half of the borrowed resources go to the bureaucratic management making the project inefficient before it is implemented and these resources are lost and do not go toward the anticipated goals. Even though, World Bank loans have not proved successful for advancement of educational programs in the Northeast region of Brazil, Brazil continues to borrow money and has increased the amount by almost twenty percent between 1987 and 1994 (Kempner and Jurema 2002, 342). Brazil continues to incur external debt with the loans that have not made any improvements in the educational quality in the Northeast, thus making the loans an unnecessary expenditure because around half of the money received is not even allocated to the targeted recipients.

**The Public and Private Divide in Education**

Throughout the developing and developed worlds, we find many countries utilizing education as a means for reproducing social inequality thus creating many divides within the institution of education. In Brazil, nationwide there is a distinct line drawn between the quality of public and private preparatory schools. Unlike other countries, education is not utilized in Brazil as an effort toward increased egalitarianism among Brazilian citizens. Education in Brazil is viewed as a privilege, thus necessitating differentiation between the private and public schools. Although, a majority of private schools serve middle to upper class children, there are some private schools of decidedly lesser quality that have been established to alleviate educational deficiencies in rural areas and the urban periphery (Plank, Sobrinho, Ressureição Xavier 1996, 124).

The inequality among citizens is further reinforced by the disparity in quality between private and public schools in Brazil. The wealthy do not access the public education institutions therefore they have “resisted paying the additional taxes necessary to increase the supply and
quality of subsidized education for children from poor families” (Birdsall, Bruns, and Sabot 1996, 9). Even though they also receive revenue from the Brazilian state and federal government. The government also has instituted policies that allow them to fulfill their clientelist relationships and to redirect funds originally destined for public schools to their elite counterparts, private schools. In addition to these policies, there have been actions to maintain middle class students at private schools rather than have their status be reduced by public school attendance. According to Plank, Sobrinho and Ressureição Xavier (1996),

Over the protests of private school directors, the series of economic “plans” decreed by the Sarney and Collor governments have included the regulation of private school fees, in a relatively successful effort to keep them in line with [likewise regulated] salaries. The main effect of this policy has been to spare middle-class parents from the obligation of sending their children to public schools (126).

These middle and upper class Brazilians receive the best preparatory education, which allows them to access the best universities both public and private. The majority of the population who attend public secondary schools experience difficulty accessing these tertiary educational institutions, which allows the elite to maintain their status and the disparity among classes to endure.

**Clientelism Strikes: Education**

The lack of transparency that has accompanied the decentralization of the Brazilian education system has allowed clientelism to enter this political sphere. Clientelism further exacerbates the vast disparity and lack of access to quality education for Brazilians. Due to the decentralization of the Brazilian education system, there is considerable opportunity for administrators to fall victim to corruption, utilizing education funds to pursue personal goals. “Clientelismo in education comprises a variety of practices, including the provision of jobs for clients and supporters, the awarding of public contracts to political allies, and the distribution of
public resources in accordance with the exigencies of electoral politics” (Plank, Sobrinho and da Resurreição Xavier 1996, 122). This practice of rewarding supporters with jobs, contracts, and resources does not necessarily indicate the revenue is being spent wisely or legally since there is no effective way to regulate the clientelism that occurs because there is little if any oversight over the secretary of education of each state due to the decentralization. An example of clientelism within the educational system is that with each installation of a new Secretary of Education in Rio de Janeiro, there are approximately four thousand new appointments to positions in the education system (Plank, Sobrinho and da Resurreição Xavier 1996, 123). As a result of the investment in time and money required to appoint new people to positions within the educational system, draw up new contracts, and allocate resources to continue the political relationships among government officials and their personal supporters, public education and the majority of Brazil’s population continues to suffer from the neglect of the people who are elected or hired to support and improve it.

Higher Education

Federal and state universities and private colleges constitute the higher education system in Brazil. While this looks very similar to the United States and other developed countries, the higher education system in Brazil is quite different. Federal and state universities offer many fields of study, research opportunities, and a free education to whoever passes the entrance exam, the Vestibular. Private colleges, not including the prestigious religious institutions, offer few fields of study, more vocational-type training, and lesser quality education. These private institutions charge tuition, which restricts entrance for many applicants. Some private institutions offer higher education opportunities comparable to the universities, such as the several Pontificio Universidade Catolica institutions located across Brazil and Latin America.
The tertiary education system has aided in the maintenance of the social hierarchy that has survived in Brazil since the colonial era. The first public college was instituted in the Nineteenth century, following Brazil’s independence from Portugal. Often the investment in public universities is viewed as an effort to increase accessibility to higher education. However, university acceptance and attendance has been largely reserved for the elite. The federal and state governments and private institutions have worked to preserve the social and economic disparity that exists among the classes in Brazil. The federal government has retained the power over allocation of funds for the federal universities, which creates yet another problem for the Brazilian education system. It gives another opportunity to participate in clientelist relationships with the affluent of Brazilian society by maintaining control of tertiary education, further restricting the accessibility to the middle and upper classes.

Even though the federal and state universities in Brazil do not charge tuition for citizens, the majority of the population cannot access university education. According to IBGE (2008), throughout Brazil, the average proportion of citizens twenty-five years of age or older who have completed education at the tertiary level is 9.7%. The proportion of white tertiary level graduates exceeds this average of all races, totaling 14.3%, surpassing the non-white population by 9.6% (IBGE 2008). The provision of free education for all Brazilian citizens fails to increase accessibility to achieve higher education but is successful in broadening the divide among the elite and poor classes. These institutions of higher learning that are funded by federal and states budgets offer the highest level of tertiary education and only a few private universities equal the quality of the “free” universities. Therefore tertiary education is the only part of Brazil’s education system that has yet to be decentralized to the states. “Despite the priority universally accorded to primary education and the conquest of illiteracy in political manifestos and policy
documents, about sixty percent of the federal education budget continues to be devoted to the support of federal universities” (Plank, Sobrinho, Ressureição Xavier 1996, 126). Even though disparity still exists with regards to the investment between education at the basic levels and the tertiary level, there has been an increase in budget to decrease this gap. In 2000 the tertiary education budget was eleven times larger than the budget for basic education. By 2008, this figure had decreased by over half where the spending for tertiary education exceeded basic education by only 5.6 times (MEC 2010). According to Ministerio da Educação (MEC), “The government has tripled the budget for education in the last eight years, from 17.4 billion Reais in 2003 to 51 billion Reais in 2010. Additionally the amount spent on each student at the basic level has increased from 1,600 Reais in 2000 to 3,000” (MEC 2010). This allocation of federal and state revenue for higher education only benefits a small portion of the students who are attending educational institutions at all levels. The federal government devotes nine times the revenue on an average university student as it does on a student attending a public secondary school (Roett 1999, 225). The government has chosen to focus on the education of the elite students by investing revenue in higher education rather than improving the primary and secondary education institutions attended by the great majority of the population. The decentralization of the education system allows the government to continue investing revenue in universities without the ability to reallocate this money to address deficiencies at the basic levels of public education.

Admittance to Brazilian federal and state universities is extremely competitive. The federal and state universities have become quite desirable, not only because they offer some of the best university education in Brazil, but also because there is no is tuition. The select private universities that offer educational quality equivalent to that of the public universities also have
competitive admissions but have costly tuition fees. In addition to these prestigious universities, there are many private institutions of lesser quality called *faculdades* that offer few fields of study. To cope with and evaluate the sheer numbers of students competing for these coveted seats in public and private institutions, Brazilian universities utilize an extensive entrance exam, called the *vestibular*, to select candidates.

Due to the highly competitive nature of admissions for free university education, the majority are students from affluent families. The perception of increased accessibility to higher education due to free tuition ignores the fact that the costs for these public university students lie in their preparatory education. Affluent families of Brazil have the resources available to them to enable their children to receive quality preparatory education at elite private schools. Students who attend private primary and secondary education institutions take preparatory courses to prepare them for these entrance exams and many also enroll in courses outside of the schools to prepare them directly for the exams. These students’ less fortunate counterparts, who attend public secondary institutions, do not receive the same quality of preparation for the *Vestibular*. These poorer students who want a university education but who are unable to compete with the affluent students, may apply to a lesser quality private college where they will have to pay tuition fees. In point of fact, the existence of public universities in Brazil works to maintain the inequality among citizens because only the elite class, with proper preparatory education, can realistically compete for admissions.

The question of equality of access to university education is a situation that the Brazilian federal government has only just begun to address. Since 2001, the government has instituted programs and quotas to help rectify the disparity among races and socio-economic groups. “In 2001, the Rio de Janeiro state legislature approved an affirmative action policy requiring the two
state universities to reserve 40 percent of their incoming class for blacks and browns” (Johnson 2008, 224). The Diversity in Education program was developed to offer poor, often black, students courses in preparation for the Vestibular. In addition to this program to help level the playing field, there have been quotas set at many federal and state universities to hold seats for poor, black, indigenous, and public school students. Since 2003, “more than thirty public universities have reserved a specific percentage or number of places in their entering undergraduate class for underrepresented groups” (Johnson 2008, 225). Although, quotas for underrepresented groups appear popular and present a relatively quick fix to a serious problem rooted in basic education, some do not agree with the institution of quotas. Former Education Minister Paulo Renato Souza believes that poor preparatory training handicaps the student in competition for entrance to university (Htun 2004, 70). Souza is not alone in his disagreement with the institution of university quotas. Though the quotas do alleviate some of the disparity and inequality among students vying for the desired public university admission, the need for the quotas will not be lessened in the immediate future.

**Education and Society**

“Education is considered a strong social class proxy in Brazil, where it plays a decisive role in the maldistribution of wealth” (Bailey 2004, 739). Education affects incomes that play an important role in determination of a citizen’s class status. Additionally, there is a correlation between the race of a citizen and his or her education level. According to Bailey (2004), as well as acting as an indicator of social class, education also explains the racial inequality in Brazil (739). Thus, there is a great divide among the races that affects their access to education at all levels. “In short, the Brazilian education system, as it is now constituted, reinforces the process of concentration of wealth and increases inequality rather than reducing it” (Luna and Klein 2006, 215). Brazilian society experiences a vicious cyclical repetition of the past with its lack of
attention to the deficiencies of the education system and its direct effects on the societal and racial hierarchy.

**Discussion**

In Brazil’s move toward a developed democracy, the central government has dramatically decentralized much of control over social policies in hopes of more success with implementation at a more localized level. This decentralization of control over the educational system has only exacerbated and increased the prevalence of clientelism and inequality among Brazilians, which proves to be the main competitor to the success of education policy throughout the country. The politicians are able to use education budgets to maintain their clientelistic relationships because there exists little supervision by the Ministry of Education that the revenues are being used to accomplish what the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 has delineated. Decentralization has not only fueled clientelism between politicians and constituents but it has also increased inequalities among states and between the Northern and Southern regions of Brazil. Inequalities are increased because the revenue used to fund primary and secondary education originates from the populace of the states where the policy is to be instituted. The revenue base in Northern region is markedly less than that of the Southern region, thus allowing for the governments of the Southern regions to offer schools of better quality to their constituents. To improve the educational system in the impoverished Northern and Northeastern region, many projects have been implemented to equalize the two regions by the Federal government and organizations such as the World Bank. Even though these projects have presented alternative directives and additional funds to improve education the projects have been unsuccessful due to the high expenditures in bureaucratic management and the unwillingness of the politicians to implement suggestions by the donors or Federal government. The additional resources fail to reach the students who are in need of improved quality of education.
The combination of cultural and political aspects of Brazil has hindered the extent to which educational policies can be successfully implemented and inequality can be properly addressed. The Brazilian government only has a few options to thwart the repetition of failed past policy initiative implementation: recentralize the educational system lessening the inequality and increasing redistribution among states, institute more supervision from the MEC without recentralization, or institute a more stringent set of goals that need to be achieved through the passage of new laws. Without restructuring of the educational system, Brazil is on track to maintain its current situation where the poor receive less than a desirable education, thus lessening the possibility for upward mobilization and the wealthy retain their social status without having to make compromises for the greater good.
CHAPTER 4
CIVIL SOCIETY AT WORK: THE ANSWER TO INCREASED EQUALITY?

Although the Brazilian government is working toward more democratic practices, the accepted exclusionary practices with regard to social policy have left many Brazilian citizens championing their own causes. “Brazilian society has new potential at the civic level, particularly the strong drive for autonomy and the emergence of democratic practices at the societal level” (Avritzer 2000, 61). These Brazilians, among many, most of whom occupy in the lowest societal rank, have assumed responsibility to represent and fulfill the needs of Brazilians that the state failed to provide. In Chapters 5 and 6, an examination of the work of selected civil society organizations in both Rio de Janeiro and Salvador is presented. Many of these civil society organizations have been established to work to equalize the grave social disparities stemming from antiquated colonial practices and beliefs. In their work toward equality, many of the civil society organization’s participants in this study focused their work on education.

In addition to working for equality by citizens of social organizations, these activist Brazilians are calling for changes in the Brazilian government and society. This move toward a more associative society has been a recent development within Brazilian society, indicating that the citizenry is ready for the rest of Brazil to transition to more representative, equal, and democratic policies and practices. The Brazilian state may not be willing or able to follow these organizations’ leads due to entrenched clientelism and its ubiquitous hierarchical society. Thus the Brazilian government’s inadequate actions regarding decreasing inequality and injustice perpetuates inequality that impelled the development of social organizations to give a better voice to the heretofore virtually voiceless.

Organizations representing active members of the civic community or civil society have a recent history in Brazil. In Brazil there are a 16,089 non-profit entities of social assistance,
according to the *Pesquisa das Entidades de Assistencia Social Privadas sem Fins Lucrativos* (PEAS) (IBGE 2006). Over half of these non-profit organizations are concentrated in the Southeast Region of Brazil alone, in comparison with the Northeast Region, which has only 14.8% of the non-profit organizations (IBGE 2006). “The civic community is marked by an active, public-spirited citizenry, by egalitarian political relations, by a social fabric of trust and cooperation” (Putnam 1993, 88). These groups have manifested themselves in forms of social movements, urban movements, participatory institutions, voluntary associations, and nongovernmental organizations. According to Hochstetler (2000), “In the ‘social apartheid’ that characterizes Brazil, the efforts social movements make to share and extend citizenship do make them, perhaps, incubators of new social and political relations” (169). Even though citizens are receiving benefits from civil society organizations, these organizations are limited in that they function on a micro level, many focusing on addressing the needs of their community members. These organizations often fail to retain substantial power to make any real progress toward social and racial inequality.

**Societal Influence on Social Organizations**

Until recently Brazilian society, rooted in decades of social inequality has not lent itself well to a vibrant civil society. Brazil’s society, discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 2, is based on relationships among citizens that do not reflect an egalitarian society, but rather a society based on a social hierarchy. “Brazilian society was built on a lack of differentiation between public and private. Relations between individuals have been predominantly hierarchical and political mediators have assumed the role of connecting society and the state” (Avritzer 2000, 64). The hierarchical nature of Brazilian society still hinders the organization of citizens in search of a common good. Even though Brazil has this history of an individualistic, hierarchical
society, citizens, since the end of the military dictatorship in 1985, have come together to
demand recourse for the effects of decades of inequality and social injustice.

**Government Influence on Social Organizations**

The Brazilian state has played a pivotal role in the strength of civil society and formation
and participation in social organizations, which has hindered the creation of social capital among
citizens. “The development of the state and the persistence of oligarchical rule as reflected in
formal political institutions and economic structures have cultivated a political culture in Brazil
that places personal and particularistic relationships above programmatic and universalistic
identities” (Montero 2005, 97). Even though Brazil experienced a democratic interlude from
1945 to 1964 preceding the military dictatorship, there was little mobilization and organization
during this period. Along with other factors, this lack of associative impetus among the citizenry
allowed democracy to decline for the military dictatorship to rise in power (Avritzer 2000, 66).
The military regime repressed much of the possible associative behavior among citizens, with
restriction on parties and contestation. “The bureaucratic-authoritarian regime deepened these
erstwhile tendencies by attempting to depoliticize civil society through co-optation, corporatism,
and outright repression” (Montero 2005, 95). This repression of citizen participation impeded
the formation of civil societal organizations, which allowed the government to control the
citizens with little possibility of redress. For many years, Brazil was without a public space for
democratic participation. Brazil has a relatively short history of an active civil society mostly
due to the twenty-one year reign of the military that eliminated the right to participate in and
oppose the then current government. The military dictatorship was instituted to aid in
elimination of the corruption and clientelism that was still pervasive in the political and social
sphere in Brazil. Even though the military regime succeeded in evading the central
government’s fall to Communism the regime failed to fulfill one of its goals, eradication of
clientelism. The military regime played a decisive role in restricting civil society during its reign and its legacy has only recently lost influence on the formation and success of civil societal organizations.

**Clientelism’s Influence on Social Organization**

Brazilian society and the political arena are closely connected under the auspices of the clientelism that still exists. Brazilian society is based upon informal relationships existing in a hierarchical organization that retard the creation of social capital because necessary horizontal relationships fail to form. “The most complex organizations in Brazil can be reduced to the existence of certain core personal networks. The glue that holds these networks together is a set of informal understandings . . . the clientelist networks” (Montero 2005, 97). Clientelism, discussed in Chapter 2, widely affects social and political arenas in Brazil. The clientelistic relationships allow the poor to have some function in the political sector, although they gain inclusion through an unequal relationship among the actors (Montero 2005, 97). The formation of associations has worked toward reducing the clientelism that exists among many members of society. “Voluntary associations and new social movements . . . renovated the Brazilian political space . . . [and] challenged the tradition of clientelistic political intermediation” (Avritzer 2000, 66). Even though these clientelistic networks are common in Brazil as means to gain inclusion in politics, since 1985 there have been strides to gaining more horizontal organization among citizens social actors.

**Social Movements**

As the Brazilian military government’s regime began its decline, citizens began to activate and press for re-democratization. These growing social movements created social capital to pressure the Brazilian government and helped to usher in the new democracy. This advocacy for re-democratization was led by members of civil society organizations, such as social movements,
nongovernmental organizations, and voluntary associations, who joined together to form Brazil’s Partido dos Trabalhadores (Worker’s Party) (Hochstetler 2008, 33). These citizens called for not just the transition to democracy, but social change. These actors hoped for increased rights, justice, and equality among Brazilian citizens and their actions influenced the future creation of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 (Paoli and Telles 1998, 64). Even though this relationship between political parties and civil society organizations existed, it had created a contentious relationship among groups and they now serve different purposes with different objectives. “These movements brought a deepened conception of rights and citizenship to public debate and the political sphere, incorporating demands for equity and justice in the social and cultural dimensions that affect identities, existence and way of life” (Paoli and Telles 1998, 68). Many of these social movements that originated during the decline of the military regime during the 1970s until the return to democratization after 1985, have evolved into civil society organizations, thus assuming a more permanent role in society. This formation of civil society organizations from social movements has “continued to play a key role in deepening democratic citizenship and enforcing accountability” (Montero 2005). These social movements that have transformed into civil society organizations include urban movements, non-governmental organizations, participatory institutions, and community organizations. Though all constitute groups with the objective to gain material or non-material goods from the government, all play different roles within Brazilian political society.

**Urban Movements**

The urban movements that developed during Brazil’s transition to democracy, from 1974 until 1985, proved to be influential in the formation of civil society organizations and the increase of political participation at the municipal level. “Urban social movements not only broke with the existing tradition of heteronomous action, they also became sources of policy
innovation and formal political innovation through their capacity to propose new political and administrative bodies” (Avritzer 2002, 95). These urban social movements erupted across Brazil, as the country was decentralized and discrepancies in revenue distribution were apparent. The urban movements that fought municipal relocation efforts also created bonding social capital among the citizens in Rio de Janeiro and Salvador, Brazil. Even though migration to Southeast Brazil has occurred since 1898, the 1960s saw an explosion of migrants to the Southeastern cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. “Since the 1940s, when Brazilians from the countryside, and particularly the Northeast, began pouring into the city in search of jobs and a better life, Rio has been transformed in way never envisioned by planners” (Eakin 1996, 79). These urban movements mainly appeared in the favelas which developed following the Canudos War in Bahia. According to Perlman (2010),

The decommissioned soldiers returning from the Canudos war disembarked in Rio and, waiting in vain for the land grants promised by the army, pitched their tents on a hillside alongside the former slaves and street vendors already camping there. This hillside later became known as the Morro da Providência, and the people there gradually built shacks to replace their tents (24).

Thus with this flood of migrants, the newly instated mayors needed to address the issue of providing acceptable housing and services for this indigent population inhabiting these precarious squatter settlements.

The mayors of these such cities as Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Brasília among others that experienced urban explosion, were determined, as the previous military dictatorship had been, to tackle this problem of urban poverty by transplanting these marginalized citizens to the periphery of the city. Though many people were relocated to the outskirts, many rejected the relocation because the new location presented worse conditions than their current housing, the favelas. “Even where some of the urban poor accepted resettlement, new conflicts emerged
because most of the areas they were sent to were poorly served by transportation systems and public sanitation barely existed; many places were not even connected to water mains or power lines” (Avritzer 2002, 93). Even though efforts to reduce crime and provide less precarious housing for urban dwellers were not entirely successful, urban movements reformed municipal politics and initiated the formation other movements, neighborhood associations, and NGOs.

**Resident Associations**

Although the resident associations, or *associações de moradores*, are not new in Brazil, they grew directly as a response to the relocation efforts in attempted by the municipal governments beginning in the 1960s. According to the Latinobarómetro (1995-2009), of the people surveyed in Brazil, just under 10% of the respondents indicated they participated in a community or neighborhood association. Citizens residing in these neighborhoods create social capital in that their participation in associações de moradores work to protect the rights and educate the residents regarding politics, rights, health, etc. In the 1970s Rio de Janeiro’s eradication efforts “forcibly removed more than one hundred thousand people to public housing projects or sent them back to the countryside” (Perlman 2006, 155). Associações de moradores provided a place for the residents of favelas to voice their concerns and the president of an associação de moradores often acted as an intermediary between the residents and the municipal government. The resident associations in the South, Southeast, and Northeast, were created in response to the interaction between the formation of illegal cities and those already established legal cities (Avritzer 2009, 142). These resident associations worked originally to ensure the rights of Brazilian citizens inhabiting the favelas in Brazil’s major cites. According to Avritzer, “In Brazil there was a huge increase in the number of neighborhood associations. In Rio de Janeiro, 166 resident associations were created between 1979 and 1981, more than the total number of associations created in the entire previous democratic period” (Avritzer 2002, 93).
This demonstrates that, as the military dictatorship continued to decline in power and during the transition to re-democratization, the civil society re-emerged. Though there was an explosion of resident associations with democratization, these groups experienced a change from their previous existence.

Following what the urban movements worked to accomplish, the resident associations acted autonomously to make demands on the municipal governments in Brazil. “In the 20 years of authoritarian rule that began in 1964, AMs (associações de moradores) worked to protect favelados from removal and provided government services in large areas” (Arias 2004, 2). Through post-democratization and the institution of free elections in Brazil, clientelism evolved into the neighborhood associations’ relationships with politicians. This clientelistic relationship between the neighborhood associations and local politicians has interfered and lessened the accountability of the leaders, though improved some social services. Additionally, clientelist ties has allowed the drug traffickers to enter the relationship among neighborhood associations and politicians, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

Even though the resident associations have lost some credibility due to the clientelist relationships, they still play an important role in Brazilian urban politics. These resident associations provide a space for political participation by many. Resident associations give usually excluded members of society, an opportunity to demand material and non-material benefits from the municipal government. These demands mostly include infrastructural improvements, including paved roads, clean water, electricity, school upgrades, and health care. According to Goirand (2003), “[t]he neighborhood associations express their demands not in terms of universal principles but with the aim of making up for a lack of rights—of filling a

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1 AMs (associações de moradores) is Portuguese for residents’ associations.
void—or coping with an emergency” (26). Though the government meets some of these citizens’ demands, the improvements have been insufficient to meet the favelados’ needs thus impelling other actors to assume responsibility to provide for the less fortunate. Social movements, along with resident associations, have worked simultaneously with non-governmental organizations because non-governmental organizations have more resources (Hochstetler 2000, 179).

**Non-Governmental Organizations**

Formation of non-governmental organizations, resulting from the urban movements that occurred in Brazil during the gradual decline of the military dictatorship, entered the social political arena. These non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were developed to increase social and political rights among Brazilian citizens. NGOs stay in the private sector and normally do not interfere with government action, although many NGOs have taken it upon themselves to fulfill public duties (Hochstetler 2000, 178). These groups have similar objectives to those of the social movements from which they originated, but these groups are “longer-term and institutionalized entities with established and enduring leadership systems, financial and logistical functions, and a core set of ideological or otherwise normative principles that are used to sustain them” (Montero 2005, 100). Instead of focusing solely on the relocation of urban dwellers like most of the urban movements, these NGOs focused and currently focus on a portion of the rights to which Brazilians are now entitled under their democratic Constitution of 1988. Many of these NGOs focus on securing goods and services for the less fortunate sector of the population, for which the government fails to provide. However, there are divergent beliefs about the integration of these NGOs into greater society, which indicates that many exclude the poor population from participation (Reiter 2009, 90). Many of the NGOs not only work to increase social and political rights, but also to protect rights, work as political intermediaries, and
garner material and non-material good and services from the Brazilian government. They are able to do this because they act as intermediaries between the state and the people.

NGOs play an important role in civil society organization in Brazil due to two major factors, revenue and government alliances. NGOs often are instituted by international funding agencies, such as the Ford Foundation, Johnson & Johnson, UNICEF, and the like and receive constant reliable funds to continue to realize their missions. Though non-governmental organizations normally receive money from private entities, the government has also contributed to the revenue of these organizations. “Brazil’s nongovernmental organizations have received major funding from international sources: $400 million went annually to 5,500 Brazilian nongovernmental organizations in the mid 1990s” (Friedman and Hochstetler 2002, 29). With this additional funding, the NGOs are able to continue to represent the excluded members of society and play a connecting role between grass roots organizations and the government. According to Scott Mainwaring (1989), “these movements are likely to continue acting as the ‘conscience’ of the society, placing on the agenda issues of socio-economic justice, rights for the popular classes and minority groups, and popular participation” (197). Due to this close relationship, the government might be tempted to have the non-governmental organizations overstep their bounds and fulfill the role of the state (Hochstetler 2000, 180). Additionally, this alliance among NGOs and government actors allows for clientelism to enter the relationship. This addition of clientelism to the support of the NGOs by government actors in Brazil would detract from the democratic nature of the NGOs’ work to gain political and social rights for the excluded members of society. Even though the non-governmental organizations have the opportunity to participate in clientelistic relationships, there are many who do not receive funds from the government, thus evading the possibility entirely. Following the period of 1978 to 1985
during re-democratization, the state viewed the relationships of the government actors with NGOs and instituted participatory institutions to give the citizens acting on behalf of resident associations and social movements more say in how public policy was conducted at a local level.

**Participatory Institutions**

As these civil society organizations proliferated throughout Brazil, the state noticed their emergence and responded to them. “A changed associative pattern gave rise to new claims for rights and urban services and allowed the state to join in participatory arrangements, a mode of social action called participatory publics” (Avritzer 2009, 12). The state connected with these civil society organizations to better respond to the needs of the citizens and answer the call for social and political change. These new institutions, allying the Brazilian state with civil society organizations, which have so often entered the political sphere, make clientelistic tendencies less apparent. These participatory institutions allowed the citizens of municipalities to contribute to the government through direct representation. This representation of neighborhood groups in municipal government allowed revenue to be allocated to address needs of the residents. The initiation of participatory institutions in some Brazilian cities gave access to citizens who formerly had few tangible rights or little access to public goods. According to Wampler (2004), “[t]hese institutions are designed to overcome numerous social and political problems, such as low levels of accountability, inefficiencies in social service provisions, and corruption, all of which hamper efforts to improve the quality of democratic governance” (74). As participatory institutions developed, they initiated participatory budgeting, which allowed a collaborative relationship between the neighborhood representatives and municipal government to determine revenue spending. These participatory budgeting institutions have forced municipal governments to become more accountable for the revenue spent and have provided more public goods for the populace.
Participatory Budgeting

Participatory budgeting (PB) began as a part of the program that developed in response to the activated civil society organizations and their necessity for inclusion in municipal political action in Brazil. “During democratization, the issue of a better access of the poor population to urban services was on the top of the agenda of the civil society and political society actors. Participatory budgeting would emerge to address this issue” (Avritzer 2009, 88). In addition, the poor would have better access to urban services and the community would gain inclusion in the decision-making regarding public spending. Due to community involvement concerning the distribution of revenue, participatory budgeting helped to reduce clientelism between community actors and politicians regarding public goods. Participatory budgeting has been implemented in many cities across Brazil, utilizing a bottom up design that allows participation of members of civil society organizations with less government control. According to Wampler (2004), “[f]rom the standpoint of societal accountability, it is clear that through PB, citizens can engage in meaningful deliberation and negotiation. This allows the citizen to pressure their government to implement changes in public policies” (90). Participatory budgeting has mainly focused on public works projects, as well as addressing education and health care. Although participatory budgeting has enjoyed much success in a handful of cities, including Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte, some cities where it was implemented did not experience as much success due to the flexibility of the civil society organizations. Prior to the existence of PB in Brazil, many citizens would never venture to request public goods and services except through clientelistic relationships with a politician. Now many citizens do not only collaborate with the government through participatory institutions to gain goods and services, they also participate in community groups and networks that play important societal roles.
Community Organizations

Although such cities as Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre in Brazil have implemented participatory institutions and budgeting, many communities lack this avenue to democratic participation. Many citizens have little or no access to public goods and services. Wheeler (2003) asserts that many citizens who live in favelas have little or no access to public services and goods, such as education, health care, housing, and other urban services (41). Additionally, many communities located on peripheries metropolitan areas are neglected by the governing municipality because they are out of mainstream view, therefore sometimes forgotten. Due to this neglect, many citizens residing in communities on the periphery or precarious areas in major cities often have to look to community groups, to rely upon themselves, or to go without. According to Goirand (2003), “Fueled by poverty, this process is the result of the disqualification suffered by the poor, the unfair deprivation of material and cultural goods, and especially the indignity of the situation of the most deprived of the big cities” (25). With this necessity to demand rights from the government or to get services for the community; various associations, community groups, and trust networks have formed to represent the collective good of those poor citizens residing on the periphery or precarious urban communities. In addition to demanding that needs be met by the Brazilian government, these groups maintain a goal to gain not only equal citizen rights, but also human dignity. Along with NGOs, these community groups, functioning in Brazil’s favelas play another role, which is to reduce the amount of similar services provided by drug traffickers, thus reducing the residents’ dependence on the traffickers (Arias 2004). Although these groups demand rights from the local governments, some members have become disillusioned due to the slow response and minimal recognition of their needs. This disillusionment sometimes induces a rejection of their role as Brazilian citizens and an acceptance of their exclusion from the society due to socioeconomic status.
Community organizations focus on providing goods and services, to which Brazilian citizens usually have little or no access to outside of the community. These groups have a community mindset, rather than an all-encompassing goal to gain more rights and inclusion for the poor of Brazil. “This civic spirit is limited to the neighborhood community itself, and it occurs among families and residents, among citizens or Brazilians” (Arias 2004, 35). Community members and groups “have redefined democratic practices in terms of their own values and beliefs, moving away from the national discourse of individual rights-based democratic practices. Instead they focus on practices that ensure the survival and well-being of their own families and communities” (Wheeler 2003, 37). While the joining of residents within a community allows the members to focus on needs of their own community, these residents are less inclined to participate in society outside this limited domain. They exchange inclusion and acceptance in their local community for exclusion from the greater society. Due to the mentality held by many favelados that they do not possess citizen rights, community organizations often institute their own rules, standards of conduct, and system of conflict resolution, in effect creating a mini-state within the Brazilian state (Goirand 2003, 28). Thus, in response to the Brazilian state’s lack of attention and recognition of the rights of these citizens, they have formed informal “states” to provide inclusion and belonging for its citizens.

Community organization members view participation in improvement projects in their community as important and as their personal action as citizens because they rarely see government take an interest in community improvement outside the periods of political campaigning in Brazil. These community organizations are often formed to address problems in the community. The citizens form trust networks and solidarity with their fellow community members based on survival. They offer programs for children and adults alike, as well as
programs to improve the overall appearance of the locale. “In some communities, these
institutions offer support and school reinforcement, introduction to sports and work through
professionalization, artistic activities and leisure complementing schoolchildren’s schedules” (de
Oliveira 1993, 39). NGOs, along with community organizations, provide programs for
community members. Additionally, these community organizations provide outlets for leisure,
which may seem scarce due to these citizens’ socioeconomic situation. The programs for
children are designed to offer positive options in order to draw children away from entering the
burgeoning illicit economy, based on drug and arms trafficking, often headquartered in these
lower class communities. Even though these community organizations exist to aid community
members with basic needs and offer programs to children, unsavory elements such as drug
trafficking organizations, have entered this socio-political sphere.

Illegitimate Organizations

Along with the formation of civil society organizations, illegitimate organizations, mainly
drug trafficking mafias, have also developed. Drug trafficking in Rio de Janeiro and other large
cities poses a significant threat to the democratization that civil society organizations have
worked to achieve. The drug trafficking rings in Brazil has meant less state control and less
ability to provide protection for the citizens. Ultimately the citizens suffer more exclusion
because the state has less access to these precarious communities when resident associations
come under drug mafia control, and the drug traffickers have formed informal states.

Beginning in the 1990s, the civil society organizations work to form alliances and
relationships with political actors to obtain needs for their poor populations, but the emergence
of drug trafficking organizations has detracted from this progress. According to Wheeler, “There
has been an accompanying informalization of political activity, as drug-related violence has
further eroded the link between poor communities and formal democratic mechanisms” (Wheeler
Drug traffickers inhabit and control many precarious communities in Brazilian large cities such as Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Salvador.

Many of the drug mafias in Brazil’s favelas have replaced the resident associations that once fought for retention of their land and provision of social and material goods. These resident associations, for the most part, no longer play an intermediary role between the government and the residents. “Narcotics trafficking broke the already fragile political links between government and the poor” (Arias 2004, 3). Now the drug traffickers play an intermediary role, along with the resident associations, between the citizens and the politicians, although this relationship between politicians and drug traffickers is based in clientelistic exchanges.

These clientelistic exchanges have furthered retarded progress toward democratization. The drug trafficking mafias generate “bonding” social capital, which is hostile to people outside their group. This creates a hierarchical relationship among the drug traffickers and the residents of the favelas they control. This “bonding” social capital is impenetrable and hostile to the extreme that if an outsider would want to enter the organization or even the neighborhood they would be met with much resistance or violence. This hierarchical relationship is also one of power, where the people benefit from protection and other goods and services; however, they are bound to respect the traffickers rules. This hierarchical and power relationship forced on many citizens of Brazil creates a situation of parallel power where citizens have to often make a choice regarding whose rules to follow, the government or the drug traffickers. This regression has allowed some politicians to circumvent democratic campaign techniques and to address only the concerns of their individual clients. “Politicians, seeing the AMs’ [associação de moradores] growing fragility, worked more directly with the traffickers to secure votes. . . . Many bureaucrats, police, and politicians take kickbacks or otherwise work with traffickers to
accomplish personal objectives” (Arias 2004, 1-2). Often the favelados will receive attention from the politicians only during campaign periods or when the drug traffickers place a demand upon them. These clientelistic relationships, involving money have allowed the traffickers to wield considerable power that enables them to act outside the law creating informal states that function alongside the formal state. “This is nowhere clearer than in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas, where years of neglect and broken promises have caused the Brazilian state to appear to lose control of these communities to gangs of highly organized drug traffickers who enforce order, provide social services, and adjudicate disputes” (Arias 2004, 1). This power poses threats to the residents of the favelas in that there is a dearth of legitimate policing to regulate the residents and drug traffickers. This situation is detrimental to many favelados because crime and violence runs rampant there, endangering lives and interrupting the daily activities of the residents (Wheeler 2003, 40). This lack of the state to provide protection to the favelados, due to drug traffickers’ de facto control of the favelas, further excludes these Brazilians from reaping the same quality public goods and services accessible to those residing outside many favelas.

The drug traffickers also play other roles normally assumed by the formal state, including providing public services, such as inexpensive utilities to the residents. Many drug trafficking rings provide goods and services to the residents of the communities in exchange for alliance. In addition to the goods and services, drug traffickers provide economic assistance to community members. These illegal organizations moved into these favelas because the state had failed to address the residents’ needs. The traffickers’ control has contributed to this neglect because there are now barriers to government and for those who reside within the favelas. Though not all favelados utilize services or support the drug traffickers, they are still subjected to rules and violence of the traffickers.
Discussion

Historically Brazil lacked an active civil society due to societal structure, a repressive regime and rampant clientelism, but a transformation occurred during the Brazilian military regime’s decline between 1978 and 1985. Today, considerable organizational behavior is evident in Brazil. Both legitimate and illegitimate groups exist, many of which offer educational opportunities, and most function to serve the poor communities. During the final years of the military dictatorship, as the regime slowly returned to an electoral system, associations of different types formed to provide services for members and demand social and political reform and accountability. Citizens occupied the public space that opened during Brazil’s democratization, with the organization of voluntary associations and social movements (Avritzer 2002, 81). Such groups as community associations, professional associations, and social movements were created to attempt to reap those material and social benefits from the Brazilian state that had been unavailable during the military dictatorship. Participatory institutions and budgeting represent a solution to maintaining transparency in the revenue distribution of the government, although the issue of long-standing clientelism hindered this step toward democratization. Many civil society organizations, including NGOs and community organizations, now work to combat drug-trafficking networks by providing similar goods and services, as the traffickers offer to gain residents’ alliance. Though there has been an explosion of civil society organizations in Brazil, there are many citizens without access to basic public goods and services, relying upon self-provision or drug traffickers to meet basic needs. There is considerable room for state response, although these civil society organizations still strive for positive government reaction so the citizens can live a life of dignity.

Even though these civil society organizations provide services for their members, they have yet to attain the goal of real societal change. Many of these groups work to fulfill the
responsibilities ordinarily assumed by state, but many are unable to reach everyone in the community. Many of these civil society organizations are limited in the amount of people they are able to serve, which leaves many Brazilian citizens without benefits, from either the state or civil society organizations. Additionally, these organizations have yet to gain wide recognition from political officials, so the efforts of many organizations to gain state support are frustrated. This lack of recognition by the state further indicates the exclusion of members of these civil society organizations from the rest of society. Social and racial inequality is evident in the lack of attention paid to these civil society organizations by political officials and the Brazilian state.
CHAPTER 5
RIO DE JANEIRO: A TALE OF TWO CITIES

This study asks if Brazil’s extreme racial and social inequality will continue at all levels of society. In Rio de Janeiro discrimination remains acceptable to even the dispossessed. The reproduction of this mentality is fostered by the lack of attention to, and informal exclusion of, a section of society to basic rights that should be held by all. Even though civil society organizations are making a difference in the lives of their members, most of whom are poor, are unable to change over five-hundred years of acceptance of inequality, so it persists among citizens. The story of the civil society organizations in Rio de Janeiro represents hopeful but realistic Brazilians striving to provide inclusion to the members and communities that access the programs of their civil society organization. These Brazilians involved in civil society organizations in Rio de Janeiro come from different backgrounds, though all possess the same motivation to improve the lives of the members of their organizations. Through this improvement, the beneficiaries of the services and programs offered by the civil society organizations can gain inclusion in their communities, something that they fail to receive from all levels of the Brazilian government. This chapter will cover some of the many civil society organizations in Rio de Janeiro, their members, what services and programs are provided, and the response of the government to these organizations’ work.

A Cidade Maravilhosa (The Marvelous City)

Rio de Janeiro is located in the Southeastern region of Brazil. It is Brazil’s second largest city after São Paulo, also in the Southeastern Region. This city lies on the coast of the Atlantic Ocean and the Guanabara Bay, among mountains, and forests, and is outlined by expansive beaches. Among these wonders of nature, reside millions of inhabitants who live and partake in many different professions, both formal and informal. The metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro
has over 11 million inhabitants, and the surrounding state boasts upwards of 15 million (IBGE 2007). Among these 11 million urban inhabitants, over half are identified as white and only 10 percent are officially considered Afro-descendant (IBGE 2008). There is a great disparity in income, education, citizen rights, residences, access to public services, and employment.

Rio de Janeiro’s upper-middle and upper classes reside in the areas described as the “postcards” of the city, the most desirable areas, with the best views of Rio’s natural beauty, easiest access to the commercial districts, access to the city’s public services, and the most convenient access to transportation. These sought-after locations are, for the most part, located in Rio de Janeiro’s Zona Sul (South Zone). As the city expanded, there was movement of the middle and upper classes to the lesser populated, Zona Oeste (West Zone) of Rio, mostly to the neighborhood of Barra da Tijuca. Many members of the middle and upper-class sections of Rio de Janeiro’s society live in high-rise apartment buildings with access to all developed world amenities.

The upper section of Rio de Janeiro’s society has access to many of the formal commercial and leisure areas of the city. Excluding the neighborhood of Barra da Tijuca, there are many shopping malls, grocery stores, restaurants, athletic clubs, and cinemas within walking distance of many of the residences. These citizens are not restricted by location or social class to places of commerce and leisure.

These citizens enjoy amenities that citizens of developed countries believe are basic necessities, including clean municipal water, sewer, electricity, gas, telephone, and garbage collection. Beyond these perceived basic necessities, many members of this section of the society have private access to the Internet, cable television, and other advanced technologies that
have become part of standard urban services. This part of society enjoys an existence similar to what one would encounter in any developed country.

In these urban areas there are paved streets with sidewalks. The Municipality of Rio de Janeiro directs attention to the maintenance of the streets and sidewalks to comply with the inhabitants’ expectation as well as those of the many tourists who visit the city each year. Mechanized street cleaners, as well as municipal workers, strive to maintain the city’s natural beauty. In addition to the modern roads, these areas boast excellent public transportation that provides the domestic and other employees serving these upper sectors of society easy access to their place of work. Taxis, buses, and subway are accessible to many of these areas inhabited by the privileged classes.

In addition to the basic necessities of life, Rio de Janeiro’s middle and upper class citizens have access to public schools, most of their children take advantage of superior private education. Many of these private schools provide comparable or better education than private schools in developed countries. In addition to preparatory education, the middle and upper classes have more access to admission to free public universities.

Rio de Janeiro’s upper classes also have better access to the city’s public healthcare institutions as well the many private healthcare centers. Many of the healthcare institutions are located in Zona Sul or Centro (Downtown). Much like the situation with public education in Rio de Janeiro, the upper classes often bypass the publicly offered healthcare and utilize private healthcare providers. Although, the state offers healthcare, the upper classes prefer to be examined by specialists and to take advantage of the latest medical technology. Additionally, private healthcare allows these members of society to bypass the long queue of those seeking care, which often appears in the early hours of the morning outside Rio’s hospitals.
The description of middle and upper-class life in Rio de Janeiro appears similar to that which many citizens enjoy in the United States or other highly developed countries. However, in Rio, there is a stark difference between the lives lived by the privileged classes and what lies below. The main difference between the United States or other highly developed countries and Rio de Janeiro is that many residents in Rio de Janeiro have limited access to the basics of life, let alone the luxuries enjoyed by a minority of citizens.

*A Cidade Menos Maravilhosa (The City Less Marvelous)*

Rio de Janeiro, like many of Brazil’s large cities, as well as the country in general, is plagued with a visible disparity amongst social classes. These less economically privileged classes inhabit Rio’s less desirable areas, the favelas or shantytowns, and peripheral areas throughout all zones of the city. The favelas are mostly situated in the hillsides that stretch from *Zona Sul* (South Zone) to the beginning of *Zona Oeste* (West Zone), but they are also found in areas on the periphery of *Zona Oeste* and *Zona Norte* (North Zone). These favelas increased as a response to an influx of migrants from other Brazilian states who came to pursue an easier life than agricultural labor and take advantage of Rio’s economic opportunities. Additionally, state provided housing developments have also taken on the identity of favelas in Rio, which was the city’s response to the illegal construction of the favelas in the hillsides.

Many of these less fortunate citizens inhabit illegal squatter settlements that have recently been acknowledged as “neighborhoods,” rather than favelas. This transformation of favela into *bairro* (borough) was to place a lesser negative connotation on these locations where much violence and illegal activity occurs. However, according to José Martins de Oliveira, a resident of Rocinha, Rocinha is a favela instead of a bairro because it lacks basic sanitation and the authorities are not interested in what is on paper rather what is concrete (Chaves Pandolfi and Grynszpan 2003, 54). The residential structures of favelas vary from apartments or houses to
shacks made from cardboard. Many of these residences are constructed using materials available to the inhabitants and range from bricks, wood, and aluminum sheets to salvaged sheetrock and cardboard. In the favela/bairros, even though some enjoy apartments or homes of relative comfort, many citizens inhabit residences that most developed world people would deem uninhabitable. The citizens who inhabit these less savory areas experience restricted or no access to most public services, less developed and under maintained infrastructure, less access to commercial areas and centers of leisure, and have less access to reliable transportation.

The poorer citizens are not guaranteed access to standard public services. Some favelas or lower class communities lack some of the following: water, sewer, gas, electricity, and garbage collection. Many of these communities have open sewers running through the communities and those who do not utilize makeshift waste removal systems, which pose a serious health risk. Access to electricity is another necessity that not all citizens of Rio share. Many citizens’ access to electricity is from pirated lines because the power company has not installed the infrastructure to supply each residence with electricity. While garbage collection occurs in these less fortunate areas, it is insufficient for the number of inhabitants. The excess garbage further lessens the quality of life for these citizens and also poses a public health concern. Even though lower-class citizens lack most or all of these basic necessities, many have access to the Internet and cable television, though a considerable amount of these services are also illegally accessed.

While many of the communities may have a few of paved roads and few almost none have sidewalks, most communities have dirt roads. Those paved roads within these communities are often in a poor state of repair. The street cleaners that sweep the city roads are never seen within these communities. Due to the illegal status of most of these communities, many residents lack a
permanent address recognized by the postal service; however this is being remedied through the recent favela-bairro transformation that legally changes known favelas into neighborhoods.

These citizens also lack access to public education at both preparatory and tertiary levels. In areas where there are schools, the student-teacher ratio is extremely high. In others, the physical structures have deteriorated or the schools have ceased to exist altogether. In some heavily populated communities, both space and teachers are limited thus the high numbers of students in the classrooms, which negatively affects the learning environment. Many students have to travel to attend school, as some communities do not have public schools within their boundaries, which limits access to public education because most residents lack personal transportation or are unable to accompany their children to school. The general lack of security and the violence around schools present obstacles to teacher retention. Thus many children lack access to school within or outside the community, which in turn affects their chances to gain a higher education.

Many qualified students who reside in favelas also lack access to higher education due to their location in the city and/or their financial situation. Some of these students live far from the universities and may not be able to afford the public transportation. Additionally, many lower-class people need to work to help sustain themselves or their families and this negatively affects their ability to attend classes and spend adequate time studying. However, the quality of the education they receive in the public primary and secondary schools is the main factor that inhibits access to higher education for this sector of society.

In addition to education, the lower classes lack adequate access to public health care. There are few public hospitals and, for those that exist, there is a shortage of doctors and technology. Though some communities have healthcare centers to provide basic medical care,
these are insufficient centers to address the multitudes of residents. If a community lacks a healthcare center, then residents must go elsewhere, where there are long lines and wait times. Often, citizens are not seen at all due to a lack of healthcare professionals or hospital beds and, as a result, many poor citizens die waiting to be seen by a doctor. Additionally, there is a lack of appropriate preventative care provided to the lower classes.

Many of Rio de Janeiro’s citizens lack access to public services and goods that the government fails to provide. Due to this lack of provision, a majority of the citizens of Rio are victims of the social inequality that is pervasive throughout Brazil. To remedy this lack of attention by the state and municipal government of Rio de Janeiro to the many deficiencies in the lives of the indigent citizens, civil society organization have formed to address the needs of this sector of society. Although through the work of these civil society organizations, citizens may gain access to programs in their communities, these citizens have yet to gain social and racial equality in the greater society of Rio de Janeiro or Brazil.

The Rio de Janeiro Case Study

In Rio de Janeiro, there are many civil society organizations representing many aspects of life. Many of these civil society organizations are located and functioning in many of Rio de Janeiro’s 600 favelas (Berg-Schlosser and Kersting 2003). Easily one-fifth of the over 5 million residents of the city of Rio de Janeiro reside in favelas (IBGE 2000). These residents of favelas suffer from government inattention and exclusion from the rest of the city.

These civil society organizations, such as Associação Semente da Vida da Cidade de Deus, REDES, and Ação Social Padre Anchieta, among many others, are located in communities because often the needs of these citizens are ignored. Though some of these civil society organizations are not located in the favelas, many function on behalf of the favela residents. This section of society has been depoliticized because there are so few returns on their citizenship.
they fail to demand rights from the government. Often these citizens possess a fatalistic attitude regarding receiving the benefits of their citizenship. Many of Rio de Janeiro’s poor wait until the government bestows rights upon the citizens, which allows the government to be selective regarding the rights these citizens can access. In order to reverse this cycle of accepting a lesser citizenship from the government, civil society organizations formed either to provide services that the government fails to provide or to compel the government to recognize the lower class’s citizenship. Active community members, international activists, and philanthropists, among others, create and fund these organizations that address problems and educate the greater community. Can the perpetuation of extreme social and racial inequality be reversed? What can be done to tackle this pervasive problem throughout Brazil?

**Civil Society Organizations in Rio de Janeiro**

As many of these civil society organizations are located in favelas this study required entrance to Cidade de Deus, Rocinha, Nova Holanda, and Complexo do Alemão to conduct these interviews. This entrance was restricted due to the relative volatility and lack of security in these areas of the city. There were occasions when my research was halted and entrance to the communities was not allowed due to police raids and subsequent community unrest. This research was based on data compiled in three major favelas, which are: Cidade de Deus, Rocinha, and Nova Holanda within the Complexo do Maré. These favelas do not represent the traditional hillside squatter settlements but rather an area of flat land, Cidade de Deus on the edge of Zona Oeste; a city, Rocinha in Zona Sul; and a wetland, Nova Holanda in Zona Norte. Although, this study was performed mainly in three major favelas in Rio de Janeiro, there were a few of interviews conducted with interviewees residing in Complexo do Alemão, in Zona Norte.

Cidade de Deus is located on the edge of Zona Oeste, on the periphery of the municipality of Rio de Janeiro. The state government constructed this housing project in 1960 to offer
residences to relocated residents from Leblon, which is today’s most coveted neighborhood for
the upper class. Cidade de Deus has some basic amenities, including running water, sewer,
electricity, and access to public transportation. Though the community has access to these
modern amenities, the sewers remain open and there is a lack of adequate garbage removal for
the community of roughly 38,000 inhabitants (IBGE 2000). The economic and material status of
the residents of Cidade de Deus is quite disparate, ranging from people with university degrees
and comfortable homes constructed of standard building materials to those with only elementary
educations or less and homes made from permeable materials, such as cardboard, and having no
access to water or electricity. These homes of non-traditional materials were built after the
original construction of Cidade de Deus. Thus there is differing access to public services among
the inhabitants, Cidade de Deus who struggle with the presence of drug-trafficking cartels, which
adds to the precarious nature of this community.

Rocinha was once known as South America’s largest shantytown. Today, however,
classified as a community, although it retains many characteristics of a shantytown despite
modern improvements. Rocinha is located in Zona Sul, close to the affluent upper classes. Even
though technically Rocinha is located in Zona Sul, some say where Rocinha begins, Zona Sul
ends. While some residents reside in apartments in Rocinha, there are those living in who poorer
quality housing. Residents have access to water, sewer (open), garbage collection, telephone,
healthcare, and schools, but many of these are inadequate for Rocinha’s expanding population.
Like Cidade de Deus, drug cartels have inundated this community, invading its economy and
threatening the citizens’ safety.

Nova Holanda lies in Zona Norte. It is mostly composed of lower income housing; much
like what is found in Cidade de Deus. Nova Holanda is a favela that is a part of the Complexo da
Maré (Tide Complex). Unlike traditional favelas this, like Cidade de Deus, is not located on a hillside. The Complexo da Maré stretches for miles and has many residents. Similar to that of Cidade de Deus and Rocinha, Nova Holanda offers amenities which are many times inadequate and not available to everyone. Drug traffickers have also invaded this community.

Organizations’ Members and Leaders

This Rio de Janeiro case study was initiated with only a few contacts with community agitators, then expanded to 42 respondents. Respondents were selected because they were either leaders or members of the many civil society organizations currently operating in Rio de Janeiro. A majority of these respondents live in the communities where the civil society organizations are located. Table 5-1 shows that out of 42 respondents, 32 indicated that they reside in the communities where they participate in civil society organizations. The number of respondents who reside in the communities where their organizations operate in Rio de Janeiro is compared with the respondents in the Salvador case for this study. Table 5-1 also indicates a larger percentage of respondents in Rio de Janeiro versus respondents Salvador who both lived and worked in the communities. This indicates that a majority of the respondents in my Rio de Janeiro study are part of the lower class.

This difference in the amount of people residing in the communities where they work may have an effect on the amount of trust they perceive from their neighbors. In Rio de Janeiro, more of the respondents who live in the communities, exhibited higher percentages of trust in their neighbors versus those respondents in Salvador, as shown in Table 5-2. Because many Salvador respondents do not live in the lower-income communities, they have less interaction with their neighbors and those members in the communities.
Not only were the levels of trust higher in Rio de Janeiro, but also the perception of reciprocity among community members out-ranked Salvador. This can also be related to the location of residence of the respondents, because less interaction with neighbors would most likely inhibit willingness to exchange favors. According to Table 5-3, less than 15% of Rio de Janeiro’s respondents did not perceive reciprocity among community members whereas this number in Salvador constituted over 25% of the respondents in this study.

Some of the respondents who only worked in communities and did not reside there indicated that they grew up in the community, but left because other communities offered more security and better environments, but, they viewed their former communities as places where they still needed to contribute in order to improve the conditions. Much like some of the respondents from Rio, many Salvador respondents did not reside in the communities their organizations services. However the respondents representing resident associations in Salvador indicated that they lived in the same communities where the organizations operate. The formation of and participation in these civil society organizations included in this study grew from active members of the communities who felt the need to address the needs of communities that extend beyond what the state and municipal governments provide.

The respondents in this study of from Rio de Janeiro’s civil society organizations differed in the amount of formal education they had completed, as shown by Table 5-4. Table 5-4 also indicates the level of education completed by the respondents in this study in Salvador. There were more respondents in Rio with more formal education than in Salvador. Rio de Janeiro presented with a more equal society, which was positively related to a higher level of education than what was indicated by the respondents of Salvador, as indicated in Figure 5-1. According to IBGE (2006), of the 519,152 people in Brazil who work in non-profit organizations, 45.5% have
completed high school and 26.8% have a university degree. Many organization members and leaders had completed at least a secondary education, although this was not true across all organizations.

The relation between social class and level of education completed for both cities examined for this study is shown by Table 5-5. Even though many organization members had completed at least a secondary education in Rio de Janeiro, it did not always positively affect the social class of the respondent, as shown by Table 5-5. Some group leaders had an elementary or incomplete secondary education, but had practical knowledge and motivation to provide services and programs to help the community. Among the respondents in both cities, whether they had an elementary education or advanced degrees, most viewed having a formal education as integral to the success and maintenance of the organizations in the communities as indicated by Table 5-6.

Many respondents indicated that they worked and lived in the communities. All the respondents who indicated that they had lower levels of education resided in the communities where their organizations were active. Even though a number of respondents possessed higher levels of education, many continued to live in their communities. This included one of the respondents with a master’s degree who both lived and worked in one of the communities. This indicates that educational level does not always directly affect social class or a propensity to relocate from the communities.

Among these respondents, some played voluntary roles while others were paid for their work within the civil society organizations. In Brazil, according to the PEAS study by IBGE in 2006, 277,301 people who work in non-profit organizations do so voluntarily. The non-profit organizations in Rio de Janeiro average 18.7 volunteers (IBGE 2006). Table 5-7 shows that many of the respondents from both cities, played voluntary roles in the organizations and did not
receive any money even though they contributed much of their time to the organizations. Some volunteers received meals from the organizations, although many received nothing for their work.

Across the 73 respondents from both cities, many similarities were apparent in the characteristics of the leader and members. In Chapter 6, a more in-depth discussion of Salvador’s members is provided. There is a high level of volunteerism among the participants of these civil society organizations. Most of these volunteers serve the members of the community where they reside. Though many members or leaders lacked a high level of formal education, they compensated for their lack of education with experience. This lack of formal education did not negatively effect the creation of social capital in Salvador or Rio de Janeiro. As shown by Figure 5-2, Rio displayed a higher level of education among respondents however had less success in the creation of social capital than in Salvador which indicated a lower level of education among respondents. All of these respondents viewed the activities of the these organizations as necessary to provide services and programs to these excluded communities because the government provides insufficient programs or fails to provide such services.

**Services and Programs**

For both cities examined in this study, Rio de Janeiro and Salvador, respondents indicated they participated in similar types of organizations, of which most are non-profit entities. Many organizations in both Rio de Janeiro and Salvador provided education to less fortunate youth and adult community members, as shown by Table 5-8. According to IBGE (2006), in Brazil, of the 16,089 non-profit organizations, 5,859 offer education. In addition to offering educational opportunities, many organizations also offer recreation and cultural programs. According to IBGE (2006), 5,947 non-profit organizations in Brazil offer recreation and cultural activities. The organizations participant to this study have been organized into
categories based on age of beneficiary including: youth focused groups, adult focused groups, and groups that offer programs for both youth and adults. In addition to these categories delineated by age of beneficiaries offering education and recreation or leisure programs, the Salvador case in this study presented organizations that also addressed race-based rights issues. Chapter 6 details the organizations interviewed in Salvador.

**Education and Services**

Twenty-two of the civil society organizations in Rio de Janeiro that participated in the study offered programs and services to marginalized children and adults, as shown in Table 5-8. Many of these organizations are focused on educating their participants, some of whom depend on this education for their livelihood because they have had little access to public education. Some of these organizations provide opportunities for children to experience activities outside of school and life at home. Most of these organizations aim to help improve their fellow community members’ lives, to allow them, through provided services, to live with dignity.

**Child-Focused Organizations.** Some civil society organizations offered educational services for the children of the communities. Associação Semente da Vida da Cidade de Deus (ASVI-CDD), Projeto REI - Restituição Educacional Interativa, Instituto Vida Real, and Redes de Desenvolvimento da Maré, provide educational services to compliment and supplement the public school education. These organizations view the public schools, which a majority of the children attend, as unsatisfactory. This provision of education includes tutoring students who are struggling with required schoolwork. Many of the parents in these communities are often unable or unavailable to provide this type of remedial work for their children due to their lack of education or a lack of time because they work.

These organizations also provide education in other subjects, such as civics and ethics, to educate these children about rights and citizenship. Additionally, these organizations offer
courses and guidance in sex education to older children for the prevention of teenage pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases. Anti-drug and anti-violence education is also taught by these organizations in an attempt to dissuade them from taking up drug-trafficking with the cartels that are so prevalent in lower-class communities.

Apart from offering courses to help students with schoolwork and augmenting the curriculum, the complementary after-school program of Associação de Dança Estilo de Rua em Movimento, Grupo Teatral Raíz da Liberdade, Projeto REI, and Redes de Desenvolvimento da Maré – REDES offer leisure activities, such as dance, music, art, and theatre. These organizations offer these courses because many of these children lack opportunities to participate in these activities due to cost and lack of access. Meals are also provided to those less fortunate children in the programs. Many of the interviewees indicated that their organizations offer children an escape from the reality of their dire situations and allow them to be children. In a personal interview with Ana, she indicated that ASVI-CDD formed to help mothers generate an income and Projeto REI was formed to help children to sports and leisure activities in order to keep them off the streets. Additionally, these activities give the children a safe place to be after school. Roughly 5,000 children join the ubiquitous drug-trafficking cartels in the communities in Rio de Janeiro (Hindman 2009, 351).

**Adult-Focused Organizations.** Five organizations offered daycare services for the community. The organizations that participated in This study included Centro Comunitário Alegria das Crianças, Ação Social Padre Anchieta, Creche de Tio João, Centro Social é aí, Como é que fica? and Casa São Francisco. This provision allows parents to hold a daytime job, finish school, and further contribute to their family’s income. This not only helps the parents care

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1 Respondents’ names have been changed to preserve their anonymity. Name changes have been applied to all personal interviews. These interviews were conducted between October 2008 and April 2009.
for their children, but these daycare institutions often also teach pre-school material, bathe and feed the children. Additionally, these daycare centers provide extra attention and instruction to those students with developmental and learning problems. The municipal government of Rio de Janeiro offers public daycare facilities, but not all families in need of this service can be or are accommodated. Many of the civil society organizations, not public entities, receive a subsidy from the municipal government for each child enrolled at an organizational daycare. In a personal interview with Gabriela, she indicated the subsidy they receive from the government. We have a partnership with the Municipal Government of Rio de Janeiro. “We receive 130 Reais per month, per child, however this does not pay for much. Some parents contribute very little and many parents cannot afford to pay”. Even though organizations such as Centro Comunitário Alegria das Crianças, Ação Social Padre Anchieta, Centro Social E ai, Como e que fica? and Casa São Francisco receive this subsidy, the organization subsidizes the cost for the many parents who are unable to contribute.

Some community organizations also provide education for adult community members. The focus on adult education by some of the community organizations is to instill upon these citizens the desire and capability to actively improve their lives. These organizations provide formal education and training in practical skills.

Grupo Alfazendo e o Instituto Rio offers courses for women to finish their primary and secondary education. Many times the women do not take advantage of the courses offered by the government to finish their education because of shame, the course schedules create time conflicts, or the courses are not offered in their areas. Women, are more likely to fail to finish their education due to family issues, this lessens their ability to secure a job, therefore limiting their capability to contribute to their families. These organizations allow these women to gain
self-esteem and contribute to their households, which is important because many women are the main source of income in these communities.

*Redes de Desenvolvimento da Maré* indicated that they provided a preparatory course for the university entrance exams for students of the communities. These courses, called *pre-vestibular*, prepare students to take the *vestibular*, the exam required for admittance to most universities in Brazil. For students who attended public secondary schools passing this entrance exam is one of the main inhibitors to gaining admittance to the universities. These courses help students to reduce the comparative advantage held by affluent students with private preparatory educations. Marco described the educational opportunities offered to the poor students in his community.

We offer opportunities to the residents of Maré. We work with the students for one year to prepare for the entrance exam. This helps society because the poor students are entering the universities not only the upper middle class, which offers a different perspective. After completing the entrance exam course, 40% of the students enter a public university.

Although these *pre-vestibular* courses are not free, the cost is nominal for the lower-class students and much less than private preparatory courses. Upon completion of these entrance exams, the graduates have had success in being accepted to the coveted, competitive, free public universities in Brazil. There are a couple of students who attended the pre-vestibular program at *Redes*, who now work there. These former participants, now university students, represent the full cycle of grassroots organization offering education then creating more social capital.

Formal education may not be of interest to some community members, thus some of the organizations offer courses in job skills, as well as forming cooperatives among community members. *Grupo Alfazendo e o Instituto Rio, Obra Social de Apoio o Menor e Idosos*, and *Associação Semente da Vida da Cidade de Deus* offer classes in arts and crafts to uneducated
women to teach them job skills in order to provide them with the ability to augment their
incomes. These organizations offer a practical skill to women to elevate their self-esteem and
improve their lives. These organizations that provide practical skill training often function on
the proceeds from sales of goods, such as jewelry, clothing, and other arts and crafts produced in
these courses. CoopForte CDD and Cooperativa Eu Quero Liberdade offer representation and
belonging for people with already acquired practical skills, thus supporting their profession.

Apart from educating the adults of the communities, Casa de Santana provides education
and programs for the communities’ elderly. The elderly in this Cidade de Deus facility are able
to engage in classes in health education, especially for this age range because many do not or
cannot access health care regularly. Additionally, this organization provides activities and group
therapy for these elderly community members in an effort to include recreation and moral
support in their lives.

Many of these organizations focus on educating individuals to gain civil consciousness and
become active community members. Among the associations interviewed for this study, Grupo
Sócio Cultural Raízes em Movimento, based in Complexo do Alemão, and Rocinha Sem
Fronteiras focused on raising political and community awareness. Rafael identified how he
worked to increase political consciousness within his community.

I teach a class in the community and saw the situation of the community. I
developed a group, a cooperative, called Raiz e Movimento to overcome poverty.
Within this cooperative, we focus on local development, offer youth mobilization
programs, address human rights because we lack access to healthcare, education,
and there is drug trafficking without state security.

Some of the organizations offer education on citizens’ and human rights, which are often
overlooked in these areas of high crime and little government attention. These organizations
seek increased visibility in the political arena, which is the key to garnering government response
to the demands and needs of these citizens. The organizations press the government for attention to provide health care, better education, public safety, and the reduction of poverty. In addition, these organizations work to eliminate the stigma of a community or favela as a place of violence and misery.

The respondents indicated that they often provide material assistance to some of the less fortunate families in the communities. This additional assistance includes basic provisions such as food as well as basic hygiene and cleaning products.

**Funding**

One of the biggest obstacles for these organizations, in both Rio and Salvador is to overcome is that of acquiring and retaining funding sources. Respondents in this study reported various funding sources, including both private and government contributions. The main funding sources include donations, government funding, government subsidies, and member contributions, as shown by Table 5-9. During an interview with Sara, “ASVI-CDD does not have help from the municipal government of Rio de Janeiro. We are registering to gain help from the government. We function by way of donations from the children’s mothers”.

The majority of the organizations operate solely on donations. Many of the respondents indicated that the members, including themselves, contributed to fund activities and programs for the children of the communities. About 60% of the non-profit organizations functioning in Brazil operate solely on private funds (IBGE 2006). Within some of the organizations interviewed for this study, the parents of the children accessing the programs make contributions, although these contributions are usually small and do not cover the cost for the child. Some of the adult education programs operate on funds earned from the sale of their arts and crafts.

Some of the organizations that participated in this study receive donations from private enterprises or international funding agencies, such as UNICEF and Johnson & Johnson. Many
international funding agencies only provide limited assistance, which leaves the organizations
dependent upon other funding sources. According to IBGE (2006), 2.1% of non-profit entities in
Brazil are funded by international donors. Insufficient funding is a constant struggle and causes
some organizations to reduce services and programs to the communities. Study respondents
indicated that many organizations and programs fail because the international agencies
implement the programs in the communities, but have limited time and resources to sustain them.
Often the donations from private funds decline and the organization leaders must depend on the
members or themselves to keep the organizations functioning. Although a majority of these civil
society organizations are self-funded or receive private donations to continue providing services,
some groups have received governmental support.

_Centro Comunitário Alegria das crianças, Ação Social Padre Anchieta, Creche de Tio João, Casa São Francisco, and Centro Social E aí, Como é que fica?_ receive funding from the
state or municipal governments of Rio. Government support primarily consists of subsidies to
help children attend daycare. Other groups remain unfunded due to the difficulty of gaining
government support. To receive public money, the government requires substantial
documentation for applications. According to IBGE (2006), 32.6% of the 16,089 non-profit
organizations receive public funds. Many leaders, without higher education, cannot complete the
paperwork themselves and they do not possess the financial means to hire attorneys.

Even though many organizations have sought out government assistance, many others
choose to remain autonomous from the government. Some organizations indicated that they
choose to fund their civil society organizations without the help of government officials because
they want to remove themselves from the pervasive corruption. Additionally, many drug
traffickers are connected to politicians, which in turn connects the organizations with the drug
traffickers. The government inadvertently receives help from these civil society organizations due to the reluctance of these groups to become involved with the clientelistic nature of politics.

Many civil society organizations that participated in this study expressed interest in gaining government assistance for the maintenance of their organizations, yet few had contacted their elected officials to investigate this possibility and even fewer indicated an affiliation with a political party as shown in Table 5-10. Many indicated that political officials were only available and interested in their communities or organizations during election periods, and at other times were inaccessible. David spoke about his contact with politicians during our interview.

I don’t contact government officials. I have never had this habit because politicians close their doors and generally there are no results when you seek out the politicians. There are mechanisms to complain- the media. However, many people don’t complain because they don’t know how.

Although the elected political officials serving these lower class communities were not available to their constituents, the respondents in this study still participated in elections, but many times only because voting is a mandatory requirement of Brazilian citizens. As shown in Table 5-11, many civil society organizations, in both Rio de Janeiro and Salvador, members viewed their contribution to their community through their work in the organization as more important than their vote because there are visible results compared to actions or inactions by their elected representatives.

**Web of Organizations vs. Solitary Organizations: Cidade de Deus and Rocinha**

A majority of the respondents in this study came from Rocinha and Cidade de Deus. The atmosphere of civil society organizations differed between the two communities. A diverse selection of organizations was interviewed in both communities and a trend was visible among the respondents with regard to the inclination to coordinate with other community organizations.
Between these two communities, Cidade de Deus functioned more as a web of organizations comparted to the organizations located in Rocinha, where a more disconnected attitude seemed to govern operations. These attitudes of collaboration versus solitary for organizations were expected to increase the government response to collaborative organizations. The detached attitude was expected from Rocinha because it represented an exponentially larger community thus possibly making the collaborative efforts difficult.

Cidade de Deus

The respondents representing the civil society organizations of Cidade de Deus demonstrated a positive inclination toward coordination with other organizations functioning in the community. These organizations view cooperation with other organizations as important to the success of both the organization and the community as a whole. Many of This study’s respondents indicated that their organizations had partnerships with other organizations. These partnerships included participation of members of an organization in other organizations’ activities.

All of the organizations located and functioning in Cidade de Deus that participated in this study participate in the Comité Comunitário da Cidade de Deus (Community Committee of the City of God). The groups that are members of the Comité Comunitário hold meetings, offer organized community events, provide information regarding politics, health advisories, and other issues concerning the members of the community, and work together to improve life in the community as a whole. The Comité Comunitário da Cidade de Deus coordinated events that would help some organizations gain greater visibility and strength. Maria-Paula indicated during her interview that associations function in webs because they have more power. “You have more visibility as a web of associations or a large NGO. The Comité Comunitário da Cidade de Deus demonstrated the first step towards “bridging” social capital because these entities organized
with other entities, even though these were all functioning in the same community”. With this visibility, they hope to gain more recognition by the municipal government and, as a result, visible improvements to the community.

The Comité Comunitário da Cidade de Deus coordinates with other organizations outside Cidade de Deus to share and offer greater services and programs for their residents. A good example of this organizational coordination is the Feira de Artesão (artisan fair). At this Feira de Artesão, members from groups that produce arts and crafts come together with other groups to show and sell their products. This allows the organizations of Cidade de Deus to access the other communities’ organizations and generates additional income for the members as well as the maintenance of their organizations. Another example of what the Comité Comunitário da Cidade de Deus coordinates for the residents of Cidade de Deus is the Feira da Saúde na Cidade de Deus (Health Fair in the City of God). This health fair, presented by a group of organizations in the Comité Comunitário, informs the residents about the prevention of communicable diseases and the reduction of community waste in an effort to improve sanitation and prevent illness among the community members. The participants of the civil society organizations of Cidade de Deus are welcome to partake in courses and events offered by other organizations in the community.

“A net of local institutions form the Community Committee, with the objective to promote a broad assembly of programs and public policies relating to environmental, cultural, economic, and social development of the neighborhood” (www.cidadededeus.org.br). This web of organizations has provided an opportunity for the members of the community to become active in improving their living conditions as well those of their fellow community members. This
collaborative group is working to gain recognition from the government in an effort to gain inclusion in the rest of the society.

The respondents’ organizations in Cidade de Deus represented a web of civil society organizations working to gain recognition and support of the municipal and state governments of Rio de Janeiro. Due to the fact that Cidade de Deus is a smaller community, it is most likely easier to develop a collaborative attitude among civil society organizations. This community utilizes a collaborative effort to gain more visibility and strength when requiring the government to act on its promises. Even though these organizations have garnered funding from external and private entities, they have yet to gain support from the government. This community’s civil society organizations will continue to address the immediate needs of the community members despite their limited scope due to lack of government acknowledgment and help.

Rocinha

In comparison to the civil society organizations located in Cidade de Deus, the organizations in Rocinha did not display the same tendency to assemble and coordinate with other organizations. All of the organizations that participated in this study in Cidade de Deus were a part of a greater community organization, unlike those organizations located in Rocinha, as shown in Table 5-12. Rather than acting in a collaborative manner like Cidade de Deus, this tendency toward more detached action by civil society organization may be because of the sheer size of Rocinha. Rocinha is a much larger community, with between 100,000 and 200,000 residents (Mundo Real). This size differential may inhibit civil society organizations from collaborating so as to not lose sight of their own organizations’ objectives. Rocinha does not offer a community committee that assembles to provide and offer programs or events to benefit the community as a whole, although it does have an organization that meets to discuss trash
removal, education, and possible youth programs. The organization acted as a secondary resident association not connected with the drug trafficking cartel based in Rocinha.

The organizations that participated in this study had more resistance to organizational cooperation. One study respondent, a member of a group called *Rocinha Sem Fronteiras* (Rocinha without Borders), indicated that, although there are many organizations located in Rocinha, they are not interrelated, rather they maintain their organizations in an individual manner. Additionally, this respondent indicated that external researchers fund many organizations in Rocinha. Once the individual research projects are complete, resources cease, personnel depart, and the specific groups ultimately disband.

Even though the respondents from Rocinha for the most part indicated that their organizations did not have the propensity to act collectively some had partnerships with one of the main organizations and offered some events. One Rocinha organization offering courses in hip hop dance would partner with another organization offering a daycare program to the community to help those with children to participate in the dance instruction. These events, however, do not compare to those in frequency of occurrence or depth of participation in Cidade de Deus. Although some of Rocinha’s organizations have partnerships with other organizations, it is not an integral part of their existence.

**Discussion**

In Rio de Janeiro, the civil society organizations strive to combat social inequality. Many of these civil society organizations remain unnoticed by the government, much like the citizens of communities that are beneficiaries of the civil society organizations. The government has forgotten or ignored these organizations and citizens because they comprise the lower class, which is often excluded from the rights afforded to those upper class members of society. A duality exists between the two cities of Rio de Janeiro, between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’,
where inequality is ever-present in the mindset of those groups working to create social capital. In this struggle, many organizations work to provide programs and goods to less fortunate citizens residing in the communities where these civil society organizations function.

Most of these programs focus on providing education inadequately addressed by the state, therefore leaving the indigent citizens to assume the responsibility for their children’s futures. Without these civil society organizations, many of the residents of poor communities in Rio de Janeiro would continue to receive substandard education without the knowledge or motivation to provide for themselves or the ability to demand improvements from the state. However, the civil society organizations located in the poor communities of Rio de Janeiro led by individuals with higher levels of education have demonstrated more relative success and prospects for longevity. Progress in the creation of “bridging” social capital was observed in Cidade de Deus with the formation of the committee of organizations whereas the other communities studied in Rio de Janeiro have not yet reached this point in the development of bridging social capital. These successful civil society organizations have begun to develop bridging social capital at its very nascent stages which is needed to induce more social change.
Table 5-1. Breakdown of respondents living and working in communities by city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Employment</th>
<th>Rio De Janeiro</th>
<th>Salvador</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Live/Work in community</td>
<td>32 (76%)</td>
<td>15 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work in community</td>
<td>10 (24%)</td>
<td>16 (46.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42 (100%)</td>
<td>31 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-2. Respondents trust in neighbors by city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rio De Janeiro</th>
<th>Salvador</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>28 (66.6%)</td>
<td>19 (61.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not trust</td>
<td>14 (33.3%)</td>
<td>12 (38.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42 (100%)</td>
<td>31 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-3. Respondents perceived reciprocity among neighbors by city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rio De Janeiro</th>
<th>Salvador</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocity exists</td>
<td>36 (85.7%)</td>
<td>23 (74.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reciprocity evident</td>
<td>6 (14.3%)</td>
<td>8 (25.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42 (100%)</td>
<td>31 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-4. Education level of Respondents of both cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education level</th>
<th>Rio de Janeiro</th>
<th>Salvador</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>10 (23.8%)</td>
<td>3 (9.7%)</td>
<td>13 (17.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>11 (26.2%)</td>
<td>12 (38.7%)</td>
<td>23 (31.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College</td>
<td>4 (9.5%)</td>
<td>5 (16.1%)</td>
<td>9 (12.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Degree</td>
<td>13 (31.0%)</td>
<td>7 (22.6%)</td>
<td>20 (27.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced degree</td>
<td>4 (9.5%)</td>
<td>4 (12.9%)</td>
<td>8 (10.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42 (100%)</td>
<td>31 (100%)</td>
<td>73 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-5. Social class based on Level of Education by city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Rio De Janeiro</th>
<th>Salvador</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower Class</td>
<td>7 (23.3%)</td>
<td>2 (11.8%)</td>
<td>1 (7.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>3 (25%)</td>
<td>3 (21.4%)</td>
<td>5 (35.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Class</td>
<td>2 (11.8%)</td>
<td>3 (14.4%)</td>
<td>1 (5.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>9 (52.9%)</td>
<td>5 (35.7%)</td>
<td>5 (35.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30 (100%)</td>
<td>17 (100%)</td>
<td>14 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5-6. Perception of Organization success based on Education level by city

| Level of Education | Education Necessary | | Motivation Necessary | | Both Necessary | |
|-------------------|----------------------|----------------|----------------------|----------------|----------------|
| Rio               | Salvador             | Rio | Salvador | Rio | Salvador | |
| Elementary        | 6 (21.4%)            | 3 (16.7%) | 1 (25%) | 0 | 3 (30%) | 0 |
| Secondary         | 7 (25%)              | 9 (50%) | 3 (75%) | 0 | 1 (10%) | 3 (25%) |
| Some College      | 3 (10.7%)            | 2 (11.1%) | 0 | 0 | 1 (10%) | 3 (25%) |
| College Degree    | 9 (32.1%)            | 4 (22.2%) | 0 | 1 (100%) | 4 (40%) | 2 (16.7%) |
| Advanced Degree   | 3 (10.7%)            | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 (10%) | 4 (33.3%) |
| Total             | 28 (100%)            | 18 (100%) | 4 | 1 | 10 (100%) | 12 (100%) |

Table 5-7. Respondents performing volunteer v. remunerated work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Rio de Janeiro Respondents</th>
<th>Salvador Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>23 (54.8%)</td>
<td>24 (75.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remunerated</td>
<td>19 (45.2%)</td>
<td>7 (21.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42 (100%)</td>
<td>31 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-8. Organization focus of services offered by city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Organizations in Rio</th>
<th>Organizations in Salvador</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Child Focus</td>
<td>13 (31%)</td>
<td>6 (19.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Focus</td>
<td>22 (54.2%)</td>
<td>14 (45.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child &amp; Adult Focus</td>
<td>7 (16.7%)</td>
<td>11 (35.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42 (100%)</td>
<td>31 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-9. Organization Funding by city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Organizations in Rio</th>
<th>Organizations in Salvador</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donations</td>
<td>25 (59.5%)</td>
<td>21 (67.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Subsidies</td>
<td>10 (23.8%)</td>
<td>5 (16.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members</td>
<td>7 (16.7%)</td>
<td>5 (16.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42 (100%)</td>
<td>31 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-10. Respondents contacted elected official based on party membership by city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Membership</th>
<th>Contact Official</th>
<th>Did not contact Official</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rio</td>
<td>Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>5 (26.3%)</td>
<td>8 (30.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-member</td>
<td>14 (73.7%)</td>
<td>18 (69.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19 (100%)</td>
<td>26 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5-11. Importance of Participation by city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Participation</th>
<th>Organizations in Rio</th>
<th>Organizations in Salvador</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voting</td>
<td>14 (33.3%)</td>
<td>11 (35.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization participation</td>
<td>19 (45.2%)</td>
<td>12 (38.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote and Organization participation</td>
<td>9 (21.4%)</td>
<td>8 (28.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42 (100%)</td>
<td>31 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-12. Participation of Organizations by Community in Rio de Janeiro

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation</th>
<th>Cidade de Deus</th>
<th>Rocinha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>20 (100%)</td>
<td>2 (16.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Participants</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10 (83.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20 (100%)</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5-1. Relationship between Equality and levels of Education in Rio and Salvador

Figure 5-2. Relationship between levels of Social Capital and Education in Rio and Salvador
CHAPTER 6
SALVADOR: VIBRANT FORMER SLAVE SOCIETY

Although the story of Salvador appears similar to that of Rio de Janeiro, Salvador’s excluded population battles more with the factor of racism so prevalent in this Northeast city and region. Both Salvador and Rio de Janeiro experience inequality in their cities, but Salvador suffers worse from both class and racial discrimination. Even though Salvador’s society is largely Afro-descendant, the long accepted racial inequality is still evident despite are civil society organizations working to thwart this social and racial disparity. This chapter is a story of the many civil society organizations in Salvador providing programs and services to the excluded in efforts to gain more equality among citizens. Many of these civil society organizations are based on racial heritage and embracing their ancestors’ origins. The members of these organizations come from different social, racial, and educational backgrounds, though all share the dedication to respond to citizens’ needs and assume many responsibilities shirked by the government. This chapter will provide an examination of Brazilians who are striving for inclusion in the greater Salvador society and who fight to retain their homes and communities. Will the history of Salvador repeat itself in Brazil’s current democratic government? In the creation of social capital, why is Salvador successful whereas other former slaves societies are not? Are these civil society organizations the answer to reducing or ending racial discrimination and will they eventually halt this inequality that exists among Brazilians living in Salvador and the rest of the country?
Salvador da Bahia lies on the Atlantic Ocean in the Northeastern region of Brazil. Salvador is Brazil’s third largest city and the largest city in the Northeast region. This city, Brazil’s first capital, has an antiquated design. This city also has a beautiful natural landscape of beaches and hills.

Salvador’s affluent class inhabits the desirable areas along the coast. These citizens reside in the areas with good security, ocean views, and access to Salvador’s public services and areas of commercial and leisure interest. Many of these inhabitants reside in secure high-rise apartments or condominiums.

Much like the affluent of Rio de Janeiro, these upper-class members of Salvador’s society enjoy the basic amenities of the developed world. In addition to modern sewer, water, electricity, gas, and telephone, most middle and upper-class citizens have access to the Internet and cable television. The streets and sidewalks are paved and maintained, much like those in Rio de Janeiro, to please the tourists as well as the residents of the city. The government of Salvador has placed the needs of the included section of society and tourists ahead of the excluded lower class.

In addition to the basic services as well as the conveniences of the developed world, the affluent members of Salvador’s society have access to public schools and public healthcare, both of which are offered throughout the country. Upper-class residents of Salvador often shun the state-provided education for a more expensive and superior private preparatory education for their children, private education better prepares them to compete for coveted seats in the public
and private universities, both in Brazil and in international universities. This access to higher education ultimately results in perpetuating the status quo where the rich stay rich and the poor continue to inhabit the lower rungs of society.

The middle and upper classes have access to the universal health care program which includes receiving immediate care and visiting healthcare centers that employ more recent medical technology. Citizens utilizing public healthcare often do not experience these luxuries.

Salvador’s affluent citizens, much like those who reside in Rio de Janeiro, mimic those who live in developed nations and cultivate aspects of life enjoyed by many citizens of the developed world. However, they are only a small segment of Salvador’s population. The severe divides among social classes, a phenomenon found throughout much of Brazil, is very evident in Salvador.

_**Terra da Infelicidade (Land of Unhappiness)**_

Salvador’s less affluent section of society is similar to the lower classes that exist in Rio de Janeiro, _Menos Maravilhosa_. Migration to Salvador occurred much like in Rio de Janeiro. During the twentieth century many flocked to this metropolis to secure more permanent employment, access better public services, and improve their quality of life. With the influx of migrants to Salvador, illegal squatter settlements began to appear, but later than those in Rio de Janeiro. These squatter settlements have cropped up among the many high-rise apartment complexes, in the hills and in the historic center of the city, as well as on the city’s periphery. Many of these squatter settlements are not legally recognized by the city, which alleviates them of the requirement to install public works in communities. Many of these shantytowns or _invasões_ lack the basic infrastructural necessities of life such as public sewer, water, electricity,

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2 _Invasões_ is the expression in Salvador to indicate squatter villages. These areas are similar to Rio de Janeiro’s _favelas_.

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and gas. Some who reside in the popular squatter settlements of Salvador pirate electricity and construct makeshift sewer drainage systems because the city fails to provide these basic necessities.

These communities in Salvador not only lack basic public services, but there is also a lack of adequate dwellings in these areas. While some homes are constructed of common building supplies, such as wood or brick, others consist of simple shacks built from scavenged supplies, as the residents do not possess the financial resources to purchase proper building materials. Often these communities lack paved roads and sidewalks. Since the city the presence of these roads, citizens have assumed the responsibility to maintain and improve them. This lack of government attention has placed an additional burden upon the members of these communities and has further excluded them from mainstream society.

The citizens residing in the lower class communities not only have limited access to public services, but also experience limited access to public education. Much like the education issues in Rio de Janeiro, public education in Salvador presents a great problem. The schools in Salvador suffer from a lack of funding for both teachers and resources, consequently one of the main problems experienced by Salvador’s public schools is a lack of qualified teachers. Additionally, they sometimes fail to attend their assigned classes or lack the resources to run an organized classroom. Many poorer children lack the access to public education because they must work to provide financial assistance to their families. Some of the squatter settlements do not even have schools located in the community. This requires students to travel significant distances from their homes to attend school. A result of this lack of access to education is that many students have diminished hopes of attending and achieving a university education in Salvador, even though the state and federal universities in the State of Bahia have implemented
quotas to address these lesser fortunate students’ ability to enter universities. The lack of access to public education perpetuates the gap between the rich and poor in Salvador.

Lack of access to education is not the only issue many poor residents of Salvador encounter, they also face a lack of available healthcare. Although many poor citizens of Salvador utilize the universal public healthcare system provided by the government, many of the communities that were settled illegally within the city do not have public clinics, which requires these members of society to travel to receive medical care often including a lengthy wait. Much like public healthcare in Rio de Janeiro, the hospitals and clinics in Salvador lack many modern resources, thus many of its citizens suffer from untreated illnesses that in many developed countries would be easily resolved.

Civil Society Organizations in Salvador

Salvador presented a different interview situation in comparison with my Rio de Janeiro case study. While some interviews were conducted in communities, like those in Rio de Janeiro, many of my Salvador interviews were conducted outside of the subject communities. The interviews conducted in the communities took place in the Centro Histórico (Historical Center), Comércio (Business District), Calabar, a popular community in Salvador, and Marechal Rondon, a community on the periphery. While conducting research in Salvador, I found that these organizations offered similar but more diversified services than the organizations in Rio de Janeiro. These organizations provide services which include education, advocation for the rights of community residents, and groups representing the rights of selected groups of citizens, as well as cultural organizations.

Salvador Organizations’ Members and Leaders

The research conducted for my Salvador case study began with a directory of organizations from the Ministry of Culture of the State of Bahia, which was not available from the Ministry of
Culture in Rio. I did not have similar access to such a directory for the Ministry of Culture in Rio de Janeiro. Additional respondents were organization leaders who had connections with Universidade Federal da Bahia. My Salvador case study is composed of responses from 31 interviews. Like my Rio de Janeiro case study, these respondents were selected because they were members or leaders of civil society organizations. Unlike my Rio de Janeiro study, many of my respondents did not live or work in the same community. Only about half of the respondents lived and worked in the same communities compared with Rio, as shown in Table 6-1. Of those indicating that they both worked and lived in the communities of their civil society organizations, all considered themselves citizens of lower class status (Refer to Table 5-1). Some of the respondents indicated that they grew up in the sordid areas of Salvador, but when they were able to relocate, they chose to do so for safety reasons and the ability to access more goods and services. As in my Rio de Janeiro case study, the members and leaders of these civil society organizations, regardless of whether or not they resided status in the communities they served, indicated that they observed deficiencies and needs among the people, groups, or causes supported by their groups.

Salvador’s higher percentage of Brazilians of African descent was evident in this study where over half the respondents identified their race as Afro-Brazilian or black, as shown in Table 6-1. This percentage of respondents differed substantially from Rio de Janeiro where Afro-Brazilians constituted one-third of the respondents. Rio de Janeiro also presented a more even racial dispersal than Salvador where Afro-Brazilian or black respondents were three times greater than white respondents. Race as a determinant for social class was evident among my respondents, in both cities where a majority of the black and pardo respondents indicated that they held lower class status, as shown by Table 6-2. In Salvador, race was a more definitive
indicator of success with regards to social class however was less evident in Rio because the amount of white respondents representing both lower and middle classes were roughly the same.

Among the respondents in my Salvador study, race also affected the level of education attained by a respondent in that just over one-third of the black respondents had some level of college education. This statistic among black respondents in Rio was similar however, more respondents in Rio had completed college whereas in Salvador a majority of the respondents had incomplete college education. All white respondents in Salvador had some level of college education, as shown in Table 6-3. However, this was not true in the Rio de Janeiro case because 20% of the white respondents indicated they had only completed a secondary education.

The Salvador respondents, as in my Rio de Janeiro study had varied levels of formal education. These respondents indicated an educational range from incomplete elementary education to an advanced or professional degree. Many of the respondents from both cities in this study indicated they had at least completed some secondary education (refer to Table 5-3). Even though the respondents from my Salvador study represented a range of levels of formal education, many of the respondents indicated formal education was essential to the success of civil society organizations, as indicated by Table 5-4. In addition to the necessity for formal education, respondents also viewed motivation and passion for their work as important to an organizations’ success. As shown by Figure 5-2, even though Salvador had a lower level of education this did not hinder the amount of social capital creation among citizens. Salvador had a lower level of education but had a higher amount of social capital.

Unlike my Rio de Janeiro case study, social class indicated a positive relationship with level of formal education completed in Salvador (refer to Table 5-3). The Salvador respondents who identified with a lower-class status indicated they had less advanced education than the
respondents with middle-class status. While over half of the respondents identifying themselves as lower-class had at most completed a secondary education, more than two-thirds of the middle class respondents in Salvador had completed at least some post secondary education, as shown in Table 5-3. It is evident that the middle class respondents had experienced better access to higher education, while fewer, albeit some lower-class respondents also indicated they had had access to higher education. The relationship between inequality and education is shown by Figure 5-1, which indicates that Salvador has a lower level of education and less equality than what was observed in Rio de Janeiro. This confirms that social inequality is reinforced by lack of access to education among the lower-social class.

Salvador respondents participated in civil society organizations as either volunteers or in remunerated positions. A majority of the respondents of my Salvador study indicated they held a volunteer position in the civil society organization, as displayed by Table 5-5. Those members who were compensated for their organizational work, they reported the pay was quite low. Many of the directors of organizations received no monetary compensation at all for their work.

The respondents in this study from Salvador represented a less homogenous sample in comparison Rio. In Salvador, the inequality of access to education and its subsequent result in class elevation was more apparent than in Rio. Lower-class and middle-class respondents alike displayed a high propensity for volunteerism. Even though there were more middle-class and more highly educated respondents in Salvador, this did not affect the rate of their volunteerism. Similar to Rio de Janeiro, those members without higher levels of formal education relied on their life experience and motivation to lead and contribute to their civil society organizations. All the respondents viewed their organizations as integral to the groups they represented or
provided services to and viewed that, without the existence of their group, the quality of life of their members and communities would decline.

**Education, Services, and Rights – Salvador**

Much as in Rio de Janeiro, many of Salvador civil society organizations that participated in this study provide services for both children and adults, as shown in Table 5-6. Even though many of these civil society organizations were not located in the poor communities, they provided programs to this marginalized sector of society. Many citizens of Salvador utilize these programs and services offered by civil society organizations because they have limited access to government programs or because similarly focused government programs do not exist. These civil society organizations offer programs focusing on education, leisure instruction, resident rights, and re-creation of ethnic heritage.

**Child-Focused Organizations.** In Salvador, a deficiency exists in public education, much like the rest of Brazil. With knowledge of this lack of access to quality education for all students due to inadequate public funds, civil society organizations have assumed some of this responsibility. Less fortunate children suffer from the lack of schools, ill-prepared teachers, dearth of supplies, and books, and limited space. Some of the civil society organizations in this study work to address these concerns involving the education of Salvador’s youth. Like some groups in my Rio de Janeiro study, some of Salvador’s civil society organizations offer additional help with required schoolwork for those students who are experiencing difficulty in public school classes. The parents of many of these students are often unable to assist their children with their schoolwork because they lack formal education, which is a serious problem in the Northeast Region of Brazil. According to the *Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística* (IBGE), there are roughly 7.6 million illiterate citizens residing in the Northeastern Region (IBGE 2006). This amounts to one of every seven persons in a population of almost 53 million
These civil society organizations encompassed by this study are contributing to the effort to reduce these rates of illiteracy among the nation’s youth.

In addition to those groups offering free tutoring services, Associação Ideologia Calabar/Biblioteca Comunitária do Calabar, working within one of the communities in the city of Salvador, built a library to facilitate learning outside the classroom. Many of the students attending public schools lack access to proper resources and books while in school and this free library offers the students an opportunity to practice reading without having to buy books, which most of these children cannot afford. This library also offers a poetry and theater group that connects the stories found in the books to the performance, thus offering yet another opportunity for children to learn outside the public school classroom.

Other organizations that participated in this study in Salvador offered additional educational opportunities that are not included in the Brazilian national public education curriculum. These courses include instruction in citizenship, health, and for older children, sex education. The organizations offering these services included: Associação de Moradores e Amigos do Carmo e Passo and Grupo Comunitário Cultural e Carnavalesco a Mulherada. These courses help the participants gain consciousness about their rights as citizens of Salvador and Brazil. Additionally, these courses cover health topics such as sexually transmitted disease prevention and wellness that the public health clinics fail to offer due to a shortage of services and personnel.

The civil society organizations of Salvador included in this study also offered supplementary programs for children that extended beyond the focus of remedial education. The following organizations provided programs in instruction of arts and leisure activities: Projeto Axé, Centro da Referencia Integral do Adolescente (CRIA), Associação Artística e Cultural.
Many marginalized children have few opportunities to partake in these types of activities, due to family financial limitations. Many of the children who reside in the precarious areas of Salvador, much like the children of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas and communities, would not have exposure to music, arts, and dance without these civil society organizations. In addition to providing the children with a chance at a more normal childhood, these programs and services are offered to children as a diversion from involvement in drug trafficking, which endangers the safety of all citizens in the city of Salvador.

**Adult-Focused Organizations.** In the Salvador study, many organizations provided services and programs that addressed the marginalized adult population in Salvador. These adult-focused civil society organizations offered a range of services and programs to help improve life for their participants. Within the range of services, these organizations offered education-based programs, practical skills courses, and services to support certain professions. These organizations’ work and objectives offer options for the marginal population of Salvador and freedom from reliance upon the government to improve their personal situations.

Some of the Salvador organizations participating in this study provide some formal education programs for adults. These programs serve adults who either want to finish their secondary education or progress beyond this. *Grupo Comunitário Cultural e Carnavalesco a Mulherada* offers a range of educational services from courses for returning adult students to finish secondary school to courses in information technology, as well as courses in English as a Second Language. Cecilia spoke about what the organization offered to benefit both youth and adults.
NGO Gremio Cultural Community works with both youth and adults. We work with technology to enter into business, sewing, tourism, adult literacy, and we teach against domestic violence. We offer remedial education during the day for children and the adult courses at night.

Many of the participants of these courses are women who need to contribute to their families’ support and have returned to education to aid themselves in that objective.

Some organizations also provided practical instructions to their members. These organizations focus on teaching members skills to increase their income and to give the participants a way to involve themselves in society. Some of the courses offered by these organizations include instruction in tourism, tailoring, and music technology. Additionally, among these groups teaching skills to their members, Associação do Grupo da 3ª Idade Eterna Juventude was founded with the primary purpose of empowering the elderly. This organization utilizes education in arts and crafts as a way to elevate their members’ self-esteem and participation in society. With these practical skills, these participants help to fund their organizations, improve their personal financial situations, and increase their self-esteem because they are gaining knowledge and skills.

Some organizations in Salvador that participated in this study offered services and represented certain groups of workers performing specific jobs. Associação das Baianas de Acarajé e Mingau do Estado da Bahia and Sindicato do Comércio Varejista de Feirantes e Ambulantes da Cidade de Salvador work to maintain rights for the groups of workers they represent. Some of these organizations require monthly dues from their members, other are free of charge. Some of these groups even secure benefits for their members, such as health insurance. Baianas do Acarajé do Salvador da Bahia\(^3\) works to sustain the cultural heritage of these food vendors and to ensure rights to this group. Additionally, these organizations work to

\(^3\) Baianas do Acarajé do Salvador da Bahia are women of the State of Bahia who sell acaraje, which is special street food often found in Salvador. These women have fought to formalize their profession.
increase the self-esteem of their members by increasing the importance of the work their members perform by legitimizing a previously informal profession.

**Salvador’s Race-based Civil Society Organizations**

In addition to representing and providing programs and services to these different sectors of society, many of the civil society organizations that participated in this study endeavor to spread political consciousness and lessen racism and discrimination of marginalized groups. *UNEGRO (União de Negros pela Igualdade)*\(^4\) and *Associação Cultural Aspiral do Reggae* focused on promoting the Afro-Brazilian heritage. These two groups have been able to create “bridging social capital” by that they have united members of society across social classes to champion their causes. The Black Movement in Bahia helps to lift the self-esteem of the black population. Blacks will not have the same rights without these social and racial movements.

During an interview with Leonardo, he stated that Blacks are still unequal and not well represented. This bridging of social classes in these two organizations greatly depends on the factor of race because, in Salvador, Afro-Brazilian descendants occupy all classes, not just the lower stratum, as in other cities across Brazil. These civil society organizations provided a wide range of services and programs educating about, embracing, and advocating for the maintenance of the rich African history that is evident in Brazil’s Northeastern Region, especially in Salvador, Bahia.

The local chapter of *UNEGRO* is an organization that participated in this study in Salvador. This civil society organization’s primary objective is to work against racism, which remains ubiquitous today in Salvador and throughout Brazil. There are chapters of UNEGRO located in twenty Brazilian state capitals. Apart from educating about racism, disseminating awareness, and advocating for equality among races in Brazil, this group fosters solidarity.

\(^4\) Black Union for Equality
among the Afro-descendants residing in Salvador, Bahia. This organization also provides courses in information technology and theater to the members of the communities to enrich their lives and further their objectives.

Some of the civil society organizations that participated in this study in Salvador also maintain the goal of educating the city’s youth about Brazilian culture and history through the programs they offer. Salvador has the highest percentage of negros (blacks) in all of Brazil, with 27% of the metropolitan region’s population self-designating that race (IBGE 2008). Salvador’s metropolitan region also has a high pardo population, which can also indicate African descent by the standards of the United States. According to IBGE, over 80% of Metropolitan Salvador’s residents have self-indicated they are either negro or pardo (IBGE 2008). Salvador’s population demographics are unlike those of Rio de Janeiro’s metropolitan region, where fewer than 50% of the population indentifying as negro or pardo (IBGE 2008). Unlike much of Brazil, the Northeast Region, and especially Salvador, has embraced their Afro-Brazilian cultural heritage and have worked to maintain remnants of it. This has become a major aspect of life in Salvador.

Many of these groups focus on the arts. The art-focused groups who participated in This study included Associação Cultural Aspiral do Reggae, Academia de Capoeira Angola da Bahia, Grupo Comunitário Cultural e Carnavalesco a Mulherada, Associação Artística e Cultural Diáspora, Projeto Axé, and Centro da Referencia Integral do Adolescente (CRIA). This educational endeavor is based on styles originating in Africa and is intended to keep the African heritage alive in Salvador. In addition to this motivation to educate the city’s youth about their heritage, these organizations aim to provide recreation in order to reroute at-risk youth away from entering drug trafficking. Many of these groups offer courses in capoeira\(^5\) and music.

\(^5\) Capoeira is combination of martial arts and dance with music that originated in former runaway slave communities.
training, where the children and adults of the lesser fortunate communities may participate free of charge.

Other groups in Salvador associated with the retention of African culture that provides services to community members are the Candomblezeiros and the Rastafari. The members of the Candomblé religion in Salvador have established an organization that serves the communities, not just the members of the religion. This organization distributes food and other donated items to disadvantaged families. The Candomblezeiros are not the only religion that serves the greater Salvador population. The members of the Rastafarian community also provide basic necessities and food for members of their community as well as other indigent Salvador inhabitants.

**Resident Associations**

Some of the organizations that participated in this study in Salvador were resident associations. The following associations have worked to retain their claim to land in Salvador even though they might technically be illegal squatters: Associação dos Moradores e Amigos da Chácara Santo Antonio, Associação dos Moradores e Amigos do Centro Histórico, Conselho Cultural dos Moradores da Comunidade Vila Nova Esperança, Associação de Moradores e Amigos do Carmo e Passo, Associação dos Moradores de Santa Luz do Pilar, Associação de Moradores do Centro Antigo, and Sociedade Beneficente e Recreativa do Calabar. These resident associations represent one of the older types of civil society organizations.

Resident associations also exist in Rio de Janeiro and other cities in Brazil. In Rio, the drug traffickers controlled all the resident associations in the participant communities of this study in Rio de Janeiro. This connection of associations with drug traffickers restricted access to

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6 *Candomblé* is an Afro-Brazilian religion that originated in Salvador; *Candomblezeiro* is one who practices *Candomblé*. 
the resident association members willing to be interviewed in my Rio de Janeiro case study. In Salvador, the residents have retained control of these associations. These associations formed in reaction to government efforts to relocate illegal squatters inhabiting city hills and precarious areas on the periphery of the city. The resident associations act as protector to the indigent citizens who reside within these communities. The resident associations that participated in this study provided a range of services for the residents of the communities in Salvador including advocating for resident rights, provision of courses for residents, programs for children, and aid for needy families.

These associations represent the residents of the lower-income communities and endeavor to bring dignity and resources to them. These resident associations that participated in this study in Salvador act also as intermediaries between the municipal government and the residents. These public services include running water, electricity, sewer, garbage collection, postal service, and street construction and repair. Because that most of these communities originated as squatter settlements, the city does not acknowledge the communities’ existence; therefore, it does not provide most of the social goods and services the rest of the city’s residents are entitled to receive. Beatriz explained the situation of her community during her interview.

We [Associação dos Moradores e Amigos da Chácara Santo Antonio] don’t have the documents to be considered a legal organization. We cannot have these documents because the government claims that the area doesn’t exist. We don’t have an address, postal code, we don’t receive mail, but we do receive the energy bill. We do have sanitation, energy and water, but the Municipal Government of Salvador has not come to fix the sewer so the residents must fix it.

This exclusion is but one of the many issues that these residents encounter in their daily lives as residents of invasões.

In addition to advocating for the rights of the residents of these invasões, some of these resident associations also offer courses to help improve their residents’ lives, offering courses in
education and leisure to the children and adults of the community. Many of the residents of these communities do not have access to similar courses, instruction, and experiences outside of their own communities.

Some of the resident associations that function as civil society organizations aim to educate the residents of their communities. These organizations provide the citizens with courses and presentations on significant topics. Sociedade Beneficente e Recreativa do Calabar, with the assistance of AVANTE, provides a pre-vestibular course preparing public school students to take the college entrance exam. Some of the communities offer courses in information technology to their residents to assist them to become more competitive on the job market. Additionally, some of these resident associations offer English language courses to their members. The resident associations inform the residents of political news and situations and also provide educational presentations and health-related topics. Many of the community members have little formal education, thus the resident associations work to increase awareness of communicable diseases and other health concerns that face these residents who live in substandard housing.

Resident associations provide these services for members of their communities because they cannot rely on the government for support or response. Although the government has made attempts to ameliorate living conditions for this lowest rung of society in Salvador, it has failed to include these citizens. At Vila Nova Esperança, located in Historic Pelourinho, the citizens declined relocation benefits from the municipal government. According to Felipe,

The Resident Association of Vila Nova Esperança was recently founded as a project to protect the families that have lived in the community for many years. The Municipal Government of Salvador wanted to remove us out of Vila Nova Esperança because we live in the historic district of Pelourinho. The government then decided to build new homes for us but this project was never finished.
This attempt began as a project of hope for these indigent and excluded citizens, but now it is a constant reminder of the lack of attention and denial of rights by the government. The project of new homes exists as concrete foundations and has remained as such for several years. This failure to follow through with commitments to improve the lives of the city’s most needy is yet another example of the perpetuation of inequality among citizens. Overall, these resident associations maintain the objective of gaining inclusion of the inhabitants of these communities into the rest of society despite the fact that the government and society fail to acknowledge their existence.

**Funding**

Insufficient civil society organization funding appears to be a problem common to the Southeast and Northeast. Much like This study in Rio de Janeiro, the civil society organizations interviewed in Salvador indicated that funding was the main inhibiting factor in providing services and programs to their participants. This inadequate funding has hindered these civil society organizations from completely assuming responsibility for gaining equality and inclusion for the citizens who benefit from these programs. As shown in Table 5-7, there are three different types of support, donations, subsidies from the government, and contributions from members. All goes to finance the programs they offer to the less fortunate members of Salvador’s society.

In my Salvador study, many of the organizations relied completely upon donations for their existence. These donations originate from the members themselves, who are rarely in financial positions to provide large amounts of disposable income. Many of the resident associations in my Salvador study indicated that the board of directors contributed to and assumed responsibility for providing the courses and activities for the community residents. These respondents indicated that the community members contributed when they were able to;
however, this did not often occur. For the organizations offering courses in arts or practical skills, they benefit from the sales of the products that are created as a result of the courses. Even though these groups work against the perpetuation of social and racial inequality, they are unable to move beyond addressing a small community due to inadequate resources.

Among the Salvador respondents in this study, some received support from national and international entities, similar to the organizations in my Rio de Janeiro study. Many of these funding resources have global visibility and local civil society organizations that have established these relationships have been more successful in the maintenance of their organizations, as well as the programs they offer. However, only a few of the civil society organizations that participated in this study in Salvador have secured this adequate and reliable funding. Projeto Axé, CRIA, and AVANTE have partnerships and receive funding from such agencies as UNICEF, the Ford Foundation, Johnson & Johnson, HSBC, and Petrobrás. Ricardo indicated that “Projeto Axé has international financial support from UNICEF as well as funds from the government. Contributions from both of these entities sustain our organization”. These groups have high visibility due to the receipt of support from national and international entities. As a result, these few select organizations have caught the attention of the governments of the city of Salvador, State of Bahia, and of the federal government of Brazil.

The civil society organizations in Salvador that participated in this study, such as CRIA and Projeto Axé, have also gained recognition from the municipal and state governments of Salvador and Bahia. Unfortunately, these are anomalies among the organizations included in this study. Fewer than 20% of the organizations interviewed received government subsidies for their programs (refer to Table 5-7). Those organizations that receive public funds these often insufficient. As in Rio, accessing public funds involves extensive paperwork and numerous
appearances before committees in order to gain the support of the government. Many groups cannot meet these requirements, thus they fail to receive public funds.

This amount of social capital creation in Salvador, with the ability to gain government recognition, is counterintuitive to this study’s hypothesis. This high amount of social capital creation in Salvador was not predicted due to the high levels of inequality among citizens as indicated by Figure 6-1. Due to the historical experiences, deep cleavages in society and the higher incidence of poverty it was expected that the civil society organizations would have less success in gaining attention from the government. This may indicate there is advancement in political culture that is more inclusive, however this advancement is not widespread among organizations. The Rio de Janeiro case was expected to have more access to public funds due to the higher amount of public revenue. However even though Rio de Janeiro has a relatively more equal society, it produced less social capital than the organizations examined for this study in Salvador, as indicated by Figure 6-1. Even though some of Rio’s civil society organizations examined for this study receive almost 60% of their funds from donations within the state and from international donors, the government appears to be reluctant in providing funds to these organizations. This reluctance is demonstrated by the inhibitive processes civil society organizations must go through to gain government funding. However, the Rio de Janeiro respondents may have become disillusioned in that many, unlike the Salvador respondents, do not see futility in making their presence known to elected officials.

Unlike the Rio de Janeiro respondents, a great majority of the Salvador respondents have contacted their elected officials to express concerns, grievances, or ask for assistance, even though few respondents indicated party alliance, as shown by Table 5-8. This, along with the idea that either the respondents’ votes were more important or equally important to their
contribution in their organization, suggests that Salvador is a participatory society, indicated in Table 5-9. Even though these respondents indicated that they have contacted their elected representatives, all respondents viewed the government as unresponsive to the needs of the population. Carolina explained her difficulty in contacting politicians to express concerns in her interview. “I contact my representatives and government offices but I only encounter these politicians during the election time. The politicians are not accessible and it is difficult and complicated to contact these officials”. Thus the efforts made by the people in attempting to be recognized and heard by the government bear few results for many of these organizations, communities, and citizens. If elected representatives address the needs of the people of Salvador, they tend to focus on the middle and upper classes, the included part of society.

Discussion

The perpetuation of inequality among races and social classes is pervasive throughout society in Salvador, even though many civil society organizations in Salvador are working to address these inequalities. Many of Salvador’s citizens cannot access basic rights, such as health care, education, and adequate housing. Like in Rio de Janeiro, inequality is not only expressed in societal contexts, it is also evident with the continuation of an unequal public education system. Salvador experiences yet another more glaring inequality that is not so evident in Rio de Janeiro. Racism is constant reminder of Salvador’s colonial past and inhibits a majority of the population from realizing the benefits of citizenship guaranteed by the Constitution of 1988.

The civil society organizations operating in Salvador maintain many similar goals to the Rio de Janeiro organizations, striving to gain government recognition while providing access to education where the state has fallen short. The organizations demonstrating the most success have also gained support from international funding agencies and have leaders with higher levels of education. While, only a few of the organizations have been recognized and rewarded with
government funding, most have not secured any government support and few believe much will change in the near future due to bureaucratic hurdles and inattention by the state to these issues. More organizations in Salvador demonstrated the creation of “bridging” social capital than in Rio de Janeiro. These organizations that have created “bridging” social capital have surpassed the nascent stages of the Comite Comunitário da Cidade de Deus of Rio de Janeiro. Many of these groups display the virtuous cycle of creation of civil society organizations that offer services such as education and often these members who accessed these services return to contribute to the organization that aided in their success. Even though some have not gained as much progress toward “bridging” social capital as the civil society organizations in Salvador and in the Comite Comunitário da Cidade de Deus of Rio de Janeiro, the beneficiaries are involved in the further creation of social capital. These select groups have bridged social and racial barriers to further their cause and gain support from both the State Government of Bahia and many international funding agencies.

Most of these organizations work to provide education to their beneficiaries in order augment their skills to improve their chances for advancement. Other civil society organizations in Salvador work to bestow upon the members of their organizations and the greater population of Salvador the knowledge of their rights, thus giving them power to demand civil rights, public services, and ultimately inclusion in the society of Salvador. The organizations focusing on improving civil rights, especially those organizations focusing on reducing racism, have created bridging social capital across class divides, unlike in Rio de Janeiro where the social capital created was among peers. Without these civil society organizations functioning in Salvador, the future would be dismal for many of the lower class, non-white citizens, perhaps reverting to a society more resembling that of the colonial era. Without the work and dedication by these civil
society organizations, the social and racial inequality among Brazilians would be even more pervasive than it is today.
Table 6-1. Breakdown of Respondents based on Race by city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Rio Respondents</th>
<th>Salvador Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>14 (33.3%)</td>
<td>17 (54.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>15 (35.7%)</td>
<td>9 (29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pardo</td>
<td>13 (31%)</td>
<td>5 (16.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42 (100%)</td>
<td>31 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6-2. Class based on Race by city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Pardo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rio</td>
<td>Salvador</td>
<td>Rio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>3 (21.4%)</td>
<td>5 (29.4%)</td>
<td>8 (53.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>11 (78.6%)</td>
<td>12 (70.6%)</td>
<td>7 (46.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14 (100%)</td>
<td>17 (100%)</td>
<td>15 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6-3. Level of Education Attained based on Race by city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Pardo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rio</td>
<td>Salvador</td>
<td>Rio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>4 (28.57%)</td>
<td>3 (17.6%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>5 (35.71%)</td>
<td>8 (47.1%)</td>
<td>3 (20.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College</td>
<td>1 (7.15%)</td>
<td>4 (23.5%)</td>
<td>2 (13.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Degree</td>
<td>4 (28.57%)</td>
<td>1 (5.9%)</td>
<td>6 (40.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Degree</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (5.9%)</td>
<td>4 (26.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14 (100%)</td>
<td>17 (100%)</td>
<td>15 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6-1. Relationship between levels of Social Capital and Equality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equality</th>
<th>Social Capital</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rio de Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS

This study originated with questions regarding the relationship between education and the creation of social capital. Concerns regarding social injustice and equality of access to education have also motivated this study of social capital creation in Brazil. The two case studies, Rio de Janeiro and Salvador Brazil have offered information, which makes substantial progress toward answering those questions. These answers help to apply Robert Putnam’s argument of social capital creation to the case study of Brazil. We are able to compare differences and similarities of education’s influence on social capital creation, as well as government response to civil society’s actions, between two socially and economically disparate cities. From the respondents’ contribution to this study, we can see grassroots organizations’ programs that offer education positively affect the creation of social capital aimed to reduce social injustice, which, in some cases, has translated into increased government response to citizen demand.

Even though education acts a positive influence on social capital creation, the education provided by the substandard public school system results in the creation of relatively weak social capital. As a result of the grave inequality between the private schools attended by the children of the privileged and the public schools by the children of the majority, education in Brazil leaves much to be desired for the underprivileged. This low quality education provided by the public education system has required many citizens, marginalized by social class, race, and residence, to assume the responsibility to offer educational opportunities when the government has failed to do so. These citizens who assume the responsibility to offer opportunities to marginalized children, create civil society organizations to address these educational inequalities. Although the civil society organizations are creating social capital as they unite to provide education to their members and communities, this social capital lacks strength. As a result, these
civil society organizations are creating social capital to meet immediate needs and lack the required time and resources to address the larger issue of social change in efforts to improve equality among citizens.

For many civil society organizations, the main source of social capital creation in Brazil, have been relegated to forming social capital with their peers, who are fellow community members and people of the same race or social status. This emerging “bridging” social capital formation has yet to bridge the deep divide among people of different races and socioeconomic situations. This developing “bridging” social capital provides inclusion and solidarity not previously granted due to the barriers of participation dictated by the social hierarchy. In addition to providing inclusion and community solidarity, these civil society organizations often focus on providing opportunities to improve citizens’ access to elements of basic needs to live a life of dignity. When these basic needs are met, citizens are better enabled to focus on their civic responsibilities such as conscious participation in politics. Field research conducted for this study demonstrates the prevalence of civil society organizations in both Rio de Janeiro and Salvador that produce social capital. The groups that provide inclusion frequently offer access to education that the state has failed to provide, including daycare, remedial education, adult education, and vocational training for members of the communities.

Many of these groups strive for government response in their work for the community, but are unsuccessful due to lack of education, resources, national or international visibility, or attention from a political actor or official. Even though these organizations strive for response from the government, the very inequality they endeavor to eliminate prevents their success. Due to the disparity among citizens, a great inequality in status, race, and political power, Brazil continues to operate as a democracy only at the basic level, merely offering universal suffrage to
all citizens. According to Roberto, “Democracy in Brazil exists in theory but not in practice. Politicians do not represent the people. We are doing the job the government”. Due to this limited democracy, many organizations focus on increasing awareness and even though there is inequality among citizens, they strive to equal the political voice of the underprivileged. The majority of civil society organization participants whom I interviewed considered education to be integral to their success, maintenance, and increased visibility within the political sphere. Though some organizations without educated members displayed successes, the organizations with the most educated members had more relative success in their endeavors, be it to provide education or gain government response. This demonstrates the positive influence of education on the creation of social capital especially where governmental response is concerned. This supports my claim that grassroots organizations that offer education aid in creating social capital, thus demonstrating a virtuous cycle in Brazil.

Even though many groups provide this inclusion to their members, some organizations have broken this trend and have not only gained inclusion, but have achieved government response. Often this governmental response is in the form of a subsidy for children to attend daycare, but it is rarely adequate and does not cover the entire cost of matriculation. Those groups most successful in creating an advanced version of bridging social capital across accepted social divisions have been fortunate to receive support from the state for their endeavors. With the social capital created by these organizations in efforts to improve education, the students have benefitted from these educational opportunities. These organizations are more often developed and administered by people with a high level of formal education. As previously discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, groups interviewed, such as Projecto Axé, CRIA, Centro Comunitário Alegria das Crianças, and Ação Social Padre Anchieta, among others have
received monetary support from the state because the state has placed the responsibility for the provision of services, such as daycare, on these organizations. The organizations that receive aid from international funding agencies such as the Ford Foundation, HSBC, and UNICEF also have gained visibility in the eyes of the state. Often the highly visible organizations receive support from both state and international agencies.

Social capital creation is burgeoning in Brazil along with the process of democratization. Brazil’s history of state-accepted inequality, lack of quality education, and continuing undemocratic practices has worked to maintain inequality. The Brazilian politicians, for the most part, respond on behalf of their monetary supporters, the elite, who feel that it is in their best interest to retain the status quo. The maintenance of the status quo can be viewed in the reticence of citizens to pay taxes to fund quality public education as well as to better ameliorate citizen inequality through state welfare provisions. In addition to this, the lack of action the government has taken to improve the public school system has not affected the elite because their children do not attend these schools. This repression has also served to induce the creation of social capital, especially among the most marginalized citizens. Members of the citizenry who have suffered social injustice have begun to work toward a more equal, representative, and inclusionary Brazil. This work has been facilitated through the provision of education by organizations fulfilling the role of the state. They have procured rights for marginalized citizens and educated those who have otherwise been forgotten even though they constitute the majority of the population. This demonstrates that even though the Brazilian state offer substandard education, social capital is created to fulfill the inadequacies of the public education system. However, due to the substandard educational opportunities afforded to the majority of the population and the positive relationship between education and social capital, the potential for
social capital creation bridging societal divides is delayed. The social capital created in these civil society organization have the immediate goal of improving citizen and community life in addition to increasing the citizens’ political awareness. Thus, these communities and organizations endeavor to increase the citizenship through an improvement of their members’ ability to participate in politics with knowledge of their rights and responsibilities as citizens.

The work of civil society organizations has not gone unnoticed by government officials and, for the most part, has served their immediate beneficiaries with increased government recognition. Even though the work of some civil society organizations has been recognized by the state, the amount of attention paid to these efforts to reduce inequality through actions such as the improvement of public education is inadequate. These inadequacies hinder Brazil from the progress toward a democracy that guarantees more than just an equal vote among citizens.

**Case One: Rio de Janeiro**

The first case chosen for this study represents a wealthy, racially, and economically diverse city where citizens form nascent bridging social capital to address their exclusion. In Rio de Janeiro, the poorest communities suffer exclusion from the greater society with regards to government response to demands and equality of access to education. In such a populous city, these poorest communities, though located among the skyscrapers, are systematically excluded or forgotten by the state. The exorbitant wealth of some residents of Rio de Janeiro sharply contrasts with the destitute socioeconomic situations afflicting the masses. These millions of people in Rio de Janeiro do not receive equal treatment in front of the law and have limited access to public services, especially education.

Social capital creation in Rio de Janeiro is plentiful in the poorer communities examined for this study. This social capital is often found created within community organizations and associations to provide a service or act on behalf of the members. The social capital created in
organizations in the poorer communities whose members included community residents are creating the beginnings of “bridging” social capital. This “bridging” social capital, though not connecting the community members with citizens outside these communities, provides inclusion and a voice for these excluded citizens. The citizens previously excluded are gaining the strength to enter society and gain more citizen rights, such as education.

Most, if not all, of the organizations in Rio de Janeiro participant to this study, offered additional opportunities for members and the community to access education. Education is important to cultivating a conscious and active citizen; therefore, these community organizations and associations operating in Rio de Janeiro aim to improve and increase the knowledge of their residents. Education is viewed as important to social capital creation, gaining government response and in the end inducing much needed social change. There were several instances of community or organization members who accessed organization services such as education and then returned to the organization as volunteers to continue the program that improved their lives. Many citizens residing in poorer communities have poor access to equal education, which inhibits their ability to rise within the social hierarchy that is so glaringly prevalent in Brazil.

The great number of civil society organizations partaking in the creation of social capital in Rio de Janeiro, provided an opportunity for this study to compare different communities’ extent of social capital creation. The two communities examined by this micro-study were Cidade de Deus and Rocinha, where many organizations were based. These communities offered different accounts of social capital creation and their work toward social justice and increased equality of education. Cidade de Deus represents a community of organizations that all have independent goals and missions but come together as a greater community organization to represent the community, as well as, offering events to gain visibility and contact with other
poor communities. The civil society organizations operating in Cidade de Deus unite in solidarity to include their residents in the greater society. Rocinha provides a different account of social capital creation because the groups lack the solidarity that Cidade de Deus offers. These organizations function on their own behalf; however, some organizations have partnerships for some programs. Additionally, Rocinha has received support from the State of Rio de Janeiro to contribute to their operations whereas civil society organizations in Cidade de Deus have yet to gain these government subsidies. Although these civil society organizations are creating social capital, their members still remain relatively isolated from inclusion in the greater society of Rio de Janeiro and Brazil.

Case Two: Salvador

For this study of social capital creation and education in Brazil, the second case presents a different situation than in Rio de Janeiro. Like in Rio, disparity among the wealthy and indigent exists; however, in Salvador, race plays a greater part in the motivation and goals of the civil society organizations. Not only do the citizens of Salvador often suffer socioeconomic discrimination but are also exposed to racism that can be traced back to the colonial era in Brazil. In Salvador, like Rio de Janeiro, the poorest citizens and Afro-Brazilians are often subject to exclusionary actions or non-actions by the government in response to demands.

Salvador displayed a vibrant society, where different levels of bridging social capital, were being created among citizens. Like Rio de Janeiro, the majority of the organizations in Salvador are creating the foundations for bridging social capital, however some groups have attained success in completing the creation bridging social capital across cleavages in society. Many of the civil society organizations operated both in and outside the poor communities. The social capital created within the communities enables the development of civil society organizations that focus on community education, increased rights for residents, and
infrastructural retention and improvement. This community generated social capital allows the civil society organization to express community-wide concerns and demands with regards to government policies. Additionally, these resident associations work to include their members in the greater society which they are marginalized from due to their location of residence.

Many of the members and beneficiaries of civil society organizations often have had poor access to equal education. Salvador, located in the State of Bahia, has less revenue to invest in education leaving many citizens in Salvador with a subpar education. Unfortunately, this is the reality in the urban areas while the equality of access to education is in the rural areas provides even fewer resources. This bleak reality in Salvador has motivated more civil society organizations to focus on education. The concentration on education in Salvador is in order to supplement the state provided education, as well as offer education in areas outside those set forth in the public school curriculum. Even though these civil society organizations aim to improve the lives and education of the members, some have gone beyond that goal and have created bridging social capital.

Along with improving the members’ education, many of these organizations aim to maintain the rich African heritage of Salvador. This focus on the maintenance of the Afro-Brazilian heritage is in part to educate the residents of Salvador and Brazil on their past, but also to help to reduce the incidence of racism. This mission to reduce racism is yet another way to create social capital because they are gradually eroding the prejudice that is ingrained in many citizens psyche due to past societal relations and acceptance of black inferiority. This reduction of prejudice provides the opportunity for increased trust, a prime factor of social capital development, among members of both the black and white cultures. The race-based
organizations have achieved success in bridging the deep-rooted gap between rich and poor, and white and black.

As we examine the cases of Rio de Janeiro and Salvador, we can see that social capital creation is occurring in both cities. Social capital in both case studies has motives to improve access to and quality of education and increase government response to demands by citizens. Often these organizations offered educational opportunities to the communities to help them improve their existence. In both case studies, the majority of the civil society organizations examined worked to gain the members inclusion in the greater society because they are either marginalized by their socioeconomic circumstance or by race. These marginalized citizens in many organizations examined for this study, generated the foundation for bridging social capital by forming relationships of trust and reciprocity among members of the same socioeconomic class therefore creating social capital similar to that created in Putnam’s case of Northern Italy. Even though these citizens, comprising the civil society organizations interviewed for this study, strive for increased inclusion indicating ultimate goals for social change, however many maintain community-oriented goals.

As we can see the motives that drive the social capital creation, many if not most to narrow the divides within society, vary only slightly between the two cities. The slight variations in the driving forces behind social capital creation are dependent on historical experiences and regional characteristics and politics. As evident from the two case studies, the organizations in Rio de Janeiro do not maintain the emphasis on improving racial relations whereas in Salvador racial equality and maintenance of heritage is integral to many organizations. This lack of attention to improving race relations may be a result of the long history of slavery and segregation that affected the Northeast more than the Southern states. The
organizations in Rio de Janeiro aim to bridge the socioeconomic divide whereas in Salvador, organizations are not only striving to bridge the socioeconomic gap but the race polarity as well. Due to the high percentage of Afro-Brazilians residing in Salvador and the city’s history with the slave trade, racial motives allow these groups to unite under one over-arching goal to reduce racism that has been accepted since Brazil’s colonial era. This focus on improvement of racial relations and maintenance of heritage has allowed the creation of bridging social capital. This bridging social capital connects citizens traditionally divided under the same goal to increase equality among races therefore bringing more visibility to their cause. This visibility is beneficial for these select civil society organizations operating in Salvador which enables them to demand the attention of government officials. The historically dividing factor of race in Salvador is now acting as a factor to bring citizens together.

Revisiting The Puzzle: Existing Explanations

The perpetuation of inequality among the citizens of Brazil due to the inadequate education going head to head with the formation of social capital to provide a political space and inclusion for these marginalized citizens sparks some relevant questions. How are the majority of citizens in Brazil with their lower levels of education able to create social capital? If these less-educated citizens create social capital, is the government taking notice of their organizations? Have the governments of Rio de Janeiro and Salvador responded to the demands of the civil society organizations? Due to the deep social cleavages that exist within Brazilian society, are people of Rio de Janeiro and Salvador restricted to the basic level of bridging social capital or are there instances and situations that allow civil society organizations to advance “bridging” social capital to induce social change? I begin my re-examination of these pertinent
questions regarding the perpetuation of social inequality through the unspoken policy of unequal education.

The existing literature, which has discussed the intersection of education and social capital creation and its implications and effects on democratization, has provided insight for my examination of civil society in Rio de Janeiro and Salvador. The contributions of Robert Dahl, with his elements needed for democracy in *Polyarchy*, call for the addition of human agency. The concept of human agency has been continued by scholars, including, Linz and Stepan, O’Donnell, and Putnam. Within this values-based or agency approach to explaining democracy, a strong, vibrant civil society is needed to further the process of democratization and to ultimately arrive at a consolidated democracy. Within this discussion of the necessity for a strong civil society, comes the need for social capital creation among the members of civil society. Toqueville, Putnam, Skocpol, Anderson, and Paxton all show the importance of the creation of social capital to the process of democratization, maintaining democratic practices and thwarting challenges to democracy. Within Tocqueville’s discussion of social capital, he attributes much of the probable strength of civil society to the history of associational behavior among citizens. This history of associational behavior in the creation of social capital among divergent segments of the population strengthens the civil society in its ability to make demands on its government. Brazil’s civil society has failed to fully develop due to the long rule of the military regime and past authoritarian values and practices. I have shown that, in Rio de Janeiro and Salvador, the civil society is gaining vibrancy with the numerous civil society organizations that create social capital. This social capital creation has been in response to a lack of government response to citizen demands or its exclusion of marginalized citizens. Even though a majority of the social capital created in the organizations examined for this study is among
citizens of the same class or race, this foundation for bridging social capital is still important in the provision of education and inclusion.

In this study, I extended my examination past the question of whether or not social capital is being created in Rio de Janeiro and Salvador and considered education as a pre-requisite for the creation of social capital. Putnam and Skocpol furthered their discussions of social capital creation that increased social capital aids in the improvement of education. John, Mettler, Schneider, Teske and Marschall, and Anderson found that the causal arrow did not have to originate with social capital, but rather with education, which resulted in the creation of more social capital. In the cases of Rio de Janeiro and Salvador the public education systems leave much to be desired with regard to the quality they provide to the majority of the citizens. This inadequacy of the education system in Brazil has stunted the growth of the civil society and lessened the creation of social capital. The discriminatory nature of the public education system in Brazil, which offers unequal education to the majority of the citizens, has restricted the development of democracy in that a vibrant civil society has yet to flourish and become respected by the government. Therefore Brazil maintains a limited democratic government and without increased equality whether it be through education or other avenues, it will make little progress toward the status as a developed democracy. However, these civil society organizations in Rio de Janeiro and Salvador continue working to improve the education of their members while strengthening social capital creation.

Finally, I connect the last two pieces of this puzzle, democracy and education. There appears, among the scholarly literature, much agreement regarding the positive relationship between education and democracy. Ravitch and Viteritti, Anderson, and Gutmann suggest that an educated citizenry will not allow an authoritarian government to rise to power, but will uphold
the values and freedoms of democracy. This is mainly a value of developed nations, although many developing nations, like Brazil, are following in the footsteps of their democratic elders with regard to the provision of universal public education. The government of Brazil offers an education to the poor citizens but this education is inferior, underfunded, and does not help to equalize classes. In fact, is it so substandard it perpetuates the widening gap between social classes. With the implementation of public education, Brazil and other developing countries encounter hindrances to the destruction of entrenched beliefs and values that deter social capital creation and equality. These hindrances include elements that stem from the hierarchical society the first Portuguese settlers imposed and after independence, non-democratic government practices that will most likely require generations to overcome.

Other Contributions of This Study

This project contributes to the extant scholarly literature with the discussion of social capital and its relationship to an educated citizenry, specifically in two urban cities in Brazil, Rio de Janeiro and Salvador. An educated citizenry is more apt to demand democratic practices in government. Social capital created by educated citizens has a better probability of creating bridges across social divides than social capital created among citizens with less or no education.

My research has determined that the grassroots organizations often provide education which aids in social capital creation. Usually it involves members who are united together by relations that eradicate such imperfections within the civic community (Putnam 2000). A hierarchical society, found in many developing countries, including Brazil, aids in stimulating the creation of bonding social capital that provides these citizens within a stratified society a group political space and voice. We see bonding social capital created among the drug-trafficking mafias that control many of Brazil’s lower income neighborhoods. However the citizens not connected with the drug-traffickers are creating different levels of “bridging” social
capital which has given these citizens more public visibility in support of their goals for equal benefits of citizenship. This dissertation concludes that bridging social capital can be achieved at different levels. This creation of bridging social capital is positive, though the people of the many civil society organizations in Brazil may not experience the complete “bridging” social capital for some time due to Brazil’s legacy of a strict hierarchical society.

Brazil does display a legacy of social divisions, however another contribution of this study is counterintuitive to literature regarding characteristics of society that aid in the production of social capital. The Salvador case presented many possible hindrances to successful social capital creation such as the experience with slavery, poor education system, a high amount of poverty and a divided society based on socioeconomic factors; however, its organizations displayed the most incidence of bridging social capital creation among the two cases. This indicates that even though a society has factors inhibiting social capital, citizens with education and motivation to improve their circumstances can gain attention and support from the state allowing the production and continuation of social capital.

Even though these citizens are marginalized due to their place of residence, socioeconomic status, skin color, or other defining factors, they are not reluctant to participate in the creation of social capital. Even though these citizens are excluded from the rest of society, they are not hostile to people of different races or classes joining their organizations. In fact, the urban citizens examined for this study create much social capital to reduce the woes of their marginalization. This creation of social capital helps the members of poor communities, discriminated groups, and other citizens not receiving attention from the government, to find their political voice in numbers within their communities, groups, and organizations.
Civil society organizations, such as resident associations, community organizations, and non-governmental organizations, have acted as intermediaries between the citizens and the government. Civil society organizations are integral to the creation of social capital in Brazil. Indicated by this study’s respondents, civil society organizations provide an arena for social capital creation with a collective goal of social justice. Many civil society organizations in Brazil are working toward increased equality and often times this is mitigated through education. In addition, the leaders of these groups act on behalf of members, neighborhoods, and communities to induce government response. I have discussed in detail the types of organizations found in Brazil as well as their influence in the political arena. Per the selection of interview respondents for this study, a discussion of these civil society organizations was necessary since social capital is created among members of these groups. These groups, though once repressed under the military dictatorship, are gaining momentum and visibility within the political sector; however, tangible results are hard won, not immediate, and, for some organizations, not realized at all. Not only do these civil society organizations work on behalf of the poor, marginalized citizens who have no true political voice, but they also provide a sense of inclusion for these members. These citizens are empowered within these organizations to be heard, not as individuals, but as a body of voices, thus improving the likelihood that their concerns and demands will be heard. Can a society with such deep inequalities driven by race and social status, exacerbated by inadequate public services, especially education, create bridging social capital that strives not only for inclusion but social change as well?

**Education and Social Injustice: Hindrances to Social Capital Creation**

The increased creation of civil society organizations in Brazil indicates that the society is primed and ready to gain the benefits of a democracy, including equality, representation in
government, and access to public goods and services, such as education. Even though Brazil is headed toward a more developed democracy, the many years spent under control of the colonial oligarchs, monarch, and the other non-democratic governments have influenced the social capital creation among citizens. Only for the last twenty-five years has Brazil espoused democratic practices despite the fact that remnants of recent past non-democratic governments are still visible. Brazil’s post-military-dictatorship history has been defined by its past political and societal setbacks. How has this influenced the creation of social capital and, even more so, democratization?

Brazil entered its current movement toward democratization when, in 1985, military rule ended and control of the government reverted back to the civilian sector. Since that time, the Brazilian government has afforded universal suffrage to its citizens. Even though universal suffrage exists, unfair the election results are often influenced by non-democratic practices of vote-buying and coercion. Many politicians resort to clientelism, bribery and many empty promises to secure their elected political positions.

The members of society who most often fall victim to the challenges to democracy occupy the lowest rungs of the social ladder. This sector of society, which constitutes the majority of the population, has suffered due to social, economic and political inequality. Brazil represents one of the most unequal nations in the world where a stark disparity exists between the elite and the poor, between the political voice heard and the political voice undeveloped, ignored, or silenced. The stratified society of Brazil is not only a matter of income inequality, but has been defined by skin color as well. Even though there are strides being made toward more racial equality, there is still an undeniable division between the citizens of lighter skin color and those with darker tones, and this can only be resolved by education or wealth attainment.
This inequality is demonstrated by the state through its inability to adequately provide for its citizens, especially those who do not have the means to provide for themselves.

The severe inequality in the provision of public education has left a majority of the population undereducated with little hope for social mobility or effective competition with the elites. The Brazilian citizens who have suffered from these grave inequalities have not remained inactive, in wait for the government to right the many years of social wrongs and the injustices born of inequality, rather, since the 1960s, have mobilized with and formed civil society organizations to represent the citizens who have had little or no political voice, to gain responses from elected officials, and to provide services where the state’s education programs have proven insufficient.

The Brazilian Government appears to respond only to demands of the aforementioned collective political voice if there has been previous international attention or if the organizations’ missions align with the current government’s goals. Often these organizations lack the resources to gain notice from the government without previous attention from other organizations. The civil society in Brazil has gained momentum and is in full swing, showing that citizens are ready for the government to begin to espouse more democratic practices, including providing social justice and equality for all citizens.

**Research Beyond This Study**

This study has provided the depth needed to understand the creation of social capital. I was able to conduct my fieldwork in the midst of the creation of social capital in both Rio de Janeiro and Salvador. I observed the struggle of neighborhood associations for rights to public services and the ability to remain living on land illegally obtained during the urban population explosions. I watched community organizations working to provide skill training to adults and better opportunities for the youth of the community through programs and additional education
as well as groups striving for equal rights and more visibility through community action. I also observed the networking skills my interviewees utilized with one another in their struggles to gain inclusion within this exclusionary, but otherwise democratic, society of Brazil.

My examination of social capital creation was based in lower income communities of Rio de Janeiro and Salvador, thus focusing my examination of social capital creation on two of the largest cities in Brazil. Additionally, this study accessed a limited sample of favelas (Rio) or invasões (Salvador) due primarily to the difficulty involved in non-residents gaining access for research. In addition, some of the communities posed imminent threats of violence that regularly occurred between the police and the resident narco-traffickers. This further constrained my access as well as my interviewee sample. Due to the social, political, and economic elements of this study, there have been groups added to the communities studied, as well as organizations that have experienced failed leadership, lost funding, or simply disbanded. Therefore, further research is needed to observe the progress and growth of those organizations that are successful in gaining inclusion to the greater society and recognition by the states’ governmental officials.

In addition to revisiting civil society organizations examined for this study, it would be beneficial to extend this research to communities in less visible, more remote locations within Brazil to ascertain if the social capital creation observed in two metropolitan centers is not solely an urban phenomenon. I chose to focus my research in Rio de Janeiro and Salvador to compare the impoverished Northeast with the wealthy Southeast. In addition to the disparities of wealth, the demographics of the populations studied varied greatly, with Salvador’s predominantly Afro-Brazilian population and Rio de Janeiro’s higher percentage of non-Afro-Brazilians. This research project should be extended to other states and regions and possibly complete the picture through providing more breadth to the research. These case selections made theoretical and
empirical sense at the time of my fieldwork because I had hypothesized they would render
different outcomes, which occurred but not in ways I had imagined or predicted. Salvador, the
more impoverished city with a higher percentage of marginalized citizens, was creating more
bridging social capital and gaining more government response than the wealthy city of Rio de
Janeiro.

To further explore this question of social capital creation among members of the lower
class, a large-N study would be helpful to discover how many citizens residing in these
communities contribute to the social capital created within these organizations. Within the large-
N study, a larger sample encompassing a range from the less educated to the well-educated
populace could be measured, which could further indicate the positive relationship education and
social capital creation.

A step beyond the examination of social capital creation in lower socioeconomic
communities in Brazil would be to examine the social capital created in communities of citizens
of middle- to upper-class status. This sector of society was not studied. With a study of those
residing outside of the lower income communities of these cities, it would expand upon the story
of political actors in Brazilian society, including their motives for creating social capital and their
success rates based upon socioeconomic status, as well as the government’s response to their
demands. This examination of the included sectors of Brazilian society could additionally
propose that Brazilian upper-class society more resembles American society in that social capital
is on the decline, therefore reinforcing the duality of Brazilian society with the circumstances of
the haves and the have-nots.

**Application For These Findings**

As the Brazilian Government continues to improve its system of Bolsa Familia and other
state-funded assistance programs for the majority of the citizens, the poor, it must also increase
their political voice through the reduction of corruption, clientelism, and other competitors to
democracy. While these undemocratic practices remain ubiquitous among citizens and political
officials, the outlook for social justice, equality, and, more importantly, democratization in a
socially and economically disparate country, appears bleak. In addition to these undemocratic
practices, the lack of state power to restrain and remove narco-traffickers inhibits the population
residing in areas controlled by such organizations, therefore further marginalizing these citizens.
The fact that many poor citizens live in areas where the illicit economy is thriving often excludes
those citizens from the mainstream society and economy.

This political exclusion often leaves a majority of the Brazilian citizens with no political
voice, therefore their demands are seldom heard and remain unmet. These citizens often fall
victim to clientelism, patrimonialism, and other non-democratic practices, especially during
elections. Due to many citizens’ lack of concern or knowledge regarding current politics, they
do not vote conscientiously. Many politicians seeking election and power prey upon these dire
realities and offer empty promises for improved circumstances in exchange for the impoverished
citizens’ votes.

Civil society’s call for more democratic practices demonstrates that the state needs to
take control of the illegitimate organizations that are prevalent in the countries’ poorest areas.
This control of the illegal organizations will help the citizens to trust in their political
representatives as well as allow the state to provide goods and services once supplied by the
narco-traffickers. One of the main goals of civil society organizations examined for this study is
to rid their communities of the narco-trafficker business to regain control because the very
presence of illegal activities in their communities augments their exclusion from the greater
society. Increased inclusion, through the activities of civil society organizations, to the greater
society will afford the ability to create bridging social capital with citizens of different races, socioeconomic status and communities.

**Conclusion**

However beneficial, the continuation of Lula’s social programs will not be enough to erase the entrenched norms that have become less accepted by the Brazilian citizenry, but still exist alongside the persistence of disparities among classes and races. There is a need for more attention and funding for public education at the lower levels in order to offer public school students an equal opportunity to gain entrance to the free public universities. The implementation of quotas at the university level is only a superficial and quick solution to a wider problem which is the exclusion of the majority of Brazilian citizens in the ability to access quality, state-sponsored public education at all levels. Of course, the overhaul of the public education system is a major task, one which probably will be undertaken in a gradual manner due to an ongoing lack of support by more affluent citizens and politicians for reallocation of state and federal revenues. This gradual action at the lower education levels needs to begin now to address the greater problem that university quotas will not eradicate. This necessary improvement of the public education system will offer more people an escape from poverty and crime, allowing them to become conscientious and contributing members of the Brazilian citizenry. As this study indicates, educated individuals experience more success in the creation of social capital. The ongoing lack of responsiveness from the Brazilian government continues to impede progress in this arena. If the inequality of the public education system maintains the status quo, Brazil has a bleak future for increased social capital, improved social equality and progress toward full democratization.

Educated individuals, who are fostering the creation of social capital within communities of Rio de Janeiro and Salvador, have encountered difficulties in the formulation of bridging
social capital across the deep social cleavages that exist among citizens. This bridging social
capital is bringing citizens together as a body to hold the government accountable and
responsible for its actions, thus forcing a more democratic approach to the governance of Brazil;
however, progress is very slow. The social capital that is created among Brazilian citizens in the
communities to address inadequacies of the government does not draw the citizens of different
social classes and races together, but rather has only provided inclusion and a political space for
the citizens of these marginalized communities.
This study of social capital creation in Rio de Janeiro and Salvador, Brazil provides a glimpse into the complexity that comprises Brazilian society and politics. I aimed to examine the social capital creation among marginalized citizens of the two case study cities, for which I selected to conduct my research by inserting myself into the organizations as well as speaking with members and leaders. Second, with the data I collected in both case studies, I quantified my results to better grasp the differences and similarities among the respondents from the different case studies.

Level of Analysis

This study utilized a small N approach to understanding the creation of social capital in Brazil and the response of the government to this social capital creation. Before I began to conduct my field research, I was aware of other researchers examining civil society organizations and social capital creation in Brazil. While those scholars’ research is important, accounts of social capital creation may differ among communities and cities. In addition, this study focused on education as a factor in social capital creation, an element not discussed in other studies. I addressed both the type of social capital being created and the factors important to its development. I thought it valuable to gain insight from different civil society organizations within each community that I visited in both Rio de Janeiro and Salvador, Brazil. With information obtained from the civil society organizations’ members and leaders as well as the response from the government to their demands and concerns, I have presented a comparative study of two disparate cities in Brazil which demonstrates different levels of social capital creation, the overwhelming necessity for education in the creation of social capital, and the response to civil society organizations’ work. This is, to my knowledge, the only study which
examines education as a factor in social capital creation in Rio de Janeiro and Salvador, Brazil. It is my aim to complement the other research conducted on social capital creation among marginalized citizens of Brazil.

**Methodology**

The research for this study was conducted utilizing both qualitative and quantitative tools of the social sciences to study social injustice, social capital creation, and education’s role in the creation of social capital. This research utilized different methodological approaches to best account for the circumstances, garner expansive information and further examine the respondents’ responses. The in-depth interviews and the participant observation would more effectively reflect the accounts of the civil society organizations’ experiences in creating social capital and interacting with the Brazilian government. The quantification of the interview results aided in generalizing the responses across the organizations, communities, and case studies.

I employed the semi-structured interview technique for my interviews with civil society organizations’ leaders and members. This technique allows the researcher to guide the interview with broad questions but gives the respondent flexibility to offer complex answers. Often these responses render more information than a structured interview question because the interviewee is able to venture beyond the scope of the question. According to Flick, “Semi-structured interviews, in particular, have attracted interest and are widely used. This interest is linked to the expectation that the interviewed subject’s view-points are more likely to be expressed in a relatively openly designed interview situation than in a standardized interview or questionnaire” (Flick 1998, 76). This departure from the guide questions was advantageous because the respondents raised subjects not discussed or guided by the questions which developed interesting and important aspects to this project.
This study also utilized participant observation to gather information regarding the civil society organizations’ social capital creation within the two case studies. This research was helpful to provide an accurate account regarding these marginalized citizens’ circumstances. Observation of the civil society organizations that participated in this study, also provided me with a tangible conception of the goals and programs offered to offset the social injustice that is prevalent in Brazil. Finally, I observed the social capital creation among the people such as trust and reciprocity.

The results of the semi-structured interviews were transcribed then coded to uncover differences and similarities among the respondents of the two case studies. The semi-structured interview questions were not constructed to be eventually quantitatively coded; however, the major questions often garnered similar responses from the interviewees. The coding of the responses allowed me to correlate responses with the demographics of the respondents, communities, and education levels, as well as the received response from the government. The quantification of interview results aided in making broader conclusions regarding the social capital creation in Rio de Janeiro and Salvador, Brazil.

**In-depth Interviews**

The in-depth, semi-structure interviews for this study were conducted in Rio de Janeiro and Salvador, Brazil in 2008 and 2009. Between the two case studies, a total of seventy-three interviews were conducted. Included in the group of interviewees were leaders and members of community organizations, non-governmental organizations, neighborhood associations, social movements, and other leaders of the communities. The sampling for this study was not random in selection of interview respondents. I gained contact with one community activator through a non-governmental organization aiding the creation of self-sustaining organizations to benefit the marginalized citizens in Rio de Janeiro. Through this community activator and other
interviewees, I employed the snowball technique in gaining interview respondents. In Salvador, through a connection within the Ministry of Culture, I was provided a list of the registered organizations in the city.

The duration of the interviews conducted in Rio de Janeiro and Salvador often varied due to the connection the respondent had with the civil society organization. The interviews occurred in the homes, offices of organizations, and sometimes during organization events. The interviews lasted from forty-five minutes to over an hour. I conducted these interviews in Portuguese the primary language of the majority of respondents. All of the interviews were recorded using a digital voice recorder which allowed the respondents to speak freely and allowed me to capture all the nuances of the interview. The questionnaire used to guide the interviews conducted for this study can be found in Appendix B. An English translation of the questionnaire administered in Portuguese can be found in Appendix C.

**Interviews in Rio de Janeiro**

The study began in Rio de Janeiro in October of 2008 and continued until early 2009. Gaining contacts for this case study proved laborious and extended the required time to attain an adequate sample size. The initiation of this case study took roughly one month but then advanced quickly as I was able to gain references from early respondents. The use of the individual reference approach to gain participants was not the only aspect inhibiting this research. Cidade de Deus experienced a police raid on the narco-traffickers making conditions unsafe for me to conduct research during that time. This situation required me to move on to other contacts and communities. Overall, while in Rio de Janeiro, I was limited to these contacts as potential interviewees due to the relative danger posed by entering a community controlled by narco-traffickers. Table A-1 provides the demographic data for the respondents in the Rio de Janeiro case study.
Interviews in Salvador

My research experience in Salvador proved a more efficient undertaking than in Rio de Janeiro. I gained a contact within the Ministry of Culture for the State of Bahia who supplied me with a list of civil society organizations, neighborhood associations and social movements. Due to the fact that this list only contained registered organizations, my interview sample was not random. Much like the Rio de Janeiro case study, I could not gain access to all areas of the city due to narco-trafficker control within the communities. However, the list enabled me to directly contact the leaders and members of these organizations without having to rely solely upon the use of references to gain participants for this study. This reduced the time required in Salvador in order to complete a total of thirty-one interviews from February 2009 to April 2009. Table A-2 depicts the demographic data collected from the Salvador study.

Participant Observation

In both Rio de Janeiro and Salvador, while conducting this research, I was able to couple participant observation with my semi-structured interviews. Entrance to these communities required permission or escort. I used my entrance into these excluded communities, often considered dangerous, to recount the stories of residents and view the social capital creation firsthand. Along with this observation of social capital creation, I was invited to participate in some of the programs and meetings offered by these organizations for their members. I observed how citizens, who are often excluded from the rest of society, gain inclusion among their fellow community, organization and even bridge the prejudice to work towards social justice.
Table A-1. Demographics of Rio de Janeiro Respondents

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* Rio de Janeiro: N= 42
Table A-2. Demographics of Salvador Respondents

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* Salvador: N= 31
Table A-3. Civil Society Organizations Interviewed and Type of Activities/Services

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<tr>
<td>Cidade de Deus</td>
<td>Raiz da Liberdade</td>
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<td>Cidade de Deus</td>
<td>Coopforte</td>
<td>construction cooperative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cidade de Deus</td>
<td>Alfazendo</td>
<td>adult literacy, eco-arts course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cidade de Deus</td>
<td>ASVI-CDD</td>
<td>art course, bazaar, technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cidade de Deus</td>
<td>Projeto – REI</td>
<td>capoeira, remedial education, technology courses</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Casa São Francisco</td>
<td>Daycare</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cidade de Deus</td>
<td>Casa de Santana</td>
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<td>Lente dos Sonhos</td>
<td>modeling, acting</td>
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<td>Nova Holanda</td>
<td>Observatório nas Favelas</td>
<td>create projects for and study favelas</td>
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<td>Raiz e Movimento</td>
<td>Music, dance, remedial coursework, pre-vestibular</td>
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<td>Cooperativa: Eu Quero</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salvador</td>
<td>SINDIFERA – Sindicato do Comércio Varejista de Feirants e Ambulantes da Cidade de Salvador</td>
<td>fair workers’ sindicate</td>
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<td>Salvador</td>
<td>Grêmio Comunitário Cultural e Carnavalesco e Mulherada</td>
<td>Technology, literacy, arts courses, music, English courses</td>
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<td>Salvador</td>
<td>Grupo Vontade de Viver de Apoio aos Portadores do Vírus da Hepatite C</td>
<td>support for people with Hepatitis C</td>
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<td>Salvador</td>
<td>Projeto Axé</td>
<td>cultural education/arts</td>
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Table A-3. Continued

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<th>Location</th>
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<th>Activities</th>
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<td>Salvador</td>
<td>Avante – Educação e Mobilização Social</td>
<td>assistance to organizations working for social mobilization and education</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Sociedade Beneficiente e Recreativa do Calabar</td>
<td>resident association</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS – PORTUGUESE

1. Nome?
2. Cor de pele?
3. Você é parte de qual classe social?
4. Qual é sua profissão?
5. Que é seu estado civil?
6. Tem filhos? Quantos?
7. Que nível de educação que você completou? se não completou escola, por que não?
8. Você acredita a cor da pele afeta a igualdade do acesso à educação em todos os níveis?
9. Você acha que educação é importante?
10. Se você tiver filhos, quer que eles completam a escola? (até segundo grau). Tem razões que eles não completaram a escola?
11. Acha que o Governo Brasileiro forneceu educação boa para os cidadãos?
12. O que é sua opinião da qualidade da educação que o municípios e o estado fornece?
13. Acha que o sistema da educação mudou até você atendeu a escola?
14. O que é sua opinião do acesso de ir pra uma universidade no seu estado?
15. Você acha que é fácil para estudantes pobres de ser aceitados em uma universidade pública?
16. O que é sua opinião das quotas para Afro-Brasileiros ou pobres nas universidades do estado no Rio, Bahia, e Minas Gerais?
17. Pra você, o que é democracia?
18. Você acha que o governo (estadual, municipal) é responsive às necessidades das cidadãos?
19. É participação nas eleições importante pra você? Acha que você faz um contribuição quando você vota?
20. Você é membro de um partido político?
21. Você participou num protesto político? Contribui dinheiro aos partidos políticos?
22. Você contata seus ofícios eleitos para comunicar interesses?
23. Acha que o corrupção é bem influente na política Brasileira?
24. Tem associações cívicas na sua comunidade?
25. Participa nestes grupos? O que que você faz dentro deste grupo(s)?
26. Por que sua associação cívica foi formado?
27. Sua associação cívica influenciou o governo (estadual/municipal)?
28. O que que a associacion cívica faz para seus membros? Forneces serviços? Se Sim, o governo (estadual/municipal) fornece os mesmos serviços? Por que seu grupo acha que é importante de fornecer os mesmos serviços que o governo fornece? Se o governo não fornecer o serviço, seu grupo pediu o governo para o serviço?
29. Quem dá o dinheiro a seu grupo? Esta conectado com um ONG ou traficantes de drogas?
30. Seu grupo tem uma afiliação com um grupo de traficantes? Se Sim, Que é sua opinião desta conexão? Acha que o tráfico vai parar na sua comunidade? Sua associação cívica é um intermediário entre os traficantes e governo?
31. Confia nos membros de sua comunidade? Tem reciprocidade entre os membros de sua comunidade?
32. O que é mais importante, sua participação no seu grupo ou eleições?
33. Quantos membros de seu grupo completaram a escola (até segundo grau)?
34. Você acha que educação é necessário para ter um grupo bem sucedido?
35. Você acha que se mais pessoas têm educação, o governo poderia ser mais responsive às necessidades que estão expressado pelas associações cívicas?
36. Se não tivesse organizações no Rio ou Salvador, como seria a vida?
APPENDIX C
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS – ENGLISH

1. Name
2. What is your race?
3. What social class do you place yourself?
4. What is your profession?
5. What is your family situation? Single, married, divorced?
6. Do you have children? If yes, how many?
7. What level of education have you completed? If you did not finish school, why did you not finish?
8. Do you believe that race is a factor in the equality of access to education at all levels?
9. Do you believe education is important to improving your current living situation?
10. If you have children, do you encourage your children to finish school (through high school)? If no, what is impeding them from finishing school?
11. Do you believe the Brazilian Government has sufficiently provided good educational opportunities to Brazilian citizens? If no, why not?
12. In your opinion, has the municipal, state, and federal government made an effort to improve schools and quality of education? If yes, how? If no, why not?
13. Do you think that the education system has changed since you attended school?
14. What do you think of the accessibility to university education in Brazil?
15. What do you think the outlook is for poor students to gain acceptance at a government funded university?
16. What is your opinion regarding the institution of quotas reserving spots for Afro and poor Brazilians at the state universities in Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, and Minas Gerais?
17. What does democracy mean to you?
18. Do you think the Brazilian state and municipal government is responsive to the needs of its citizens? If no, why not?
19. Is participation in elections important to you? If yes, why? Do you believe you make an important contribution when you vote?
20. Are you a member of a political party?
21. Have you participated in a political protest, do you contribute money to political parties?
22. Have you contacted your elected officials to communicate concerns?
23. Do you believe corruption plays an influential role in Brazilian politics?
24. Are there civic associations in your community?
25. Do you participate in these civic associations? If yes, what is your role?
26. Why was this civic association formed?
27. Has your civic association influenced the government? If yes, in what way?
28. Does your civic association provide services to its members? Does the Brazilian Federal or State government also provide these services? If the government provides the services, why does your civic association provide the same services? If the government does not provide the services that your civic association provides, has your association requested that it be provided?
29. How does your civic association acquire funds? Is it connected with an NGO or drug trafficking groups?
30. If your group is affiliated with drug traffickers, how do you feel about this connection? Do you think drug trafficking will end in your community? Do you think drug
trafficking aids in democracy or deters it? Does your civic association play an intermediary role between the drug traffickers and the government?

31. Do you trust the members of your community? Is there reciprocity that exists among the members of your association? If yes, what kind? If no, why not?

32. What do you give more importance to, your participation in your civic association or in elections? Why?

33. Have many of the members of your civic association finished school (through high school)?

34. Do you believe education is a necessary attribute that a person must possess to create successful civic associations?

35. Do you believe if the majority of Brazilians had better access to education the Brazilian government would be more responsive to citizen need expressed by these civic associations?

36. How do you think society would be without organizations?
APPENDIX D
MAP OF BRAZIL

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LIST OF REFERENCES

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Ingrid Lee Reader Erickson was born in Green Bay, Wisconsin. She received her Bachelor of Arts Degree in political science and Spanish language and literature from Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 2004. Ingrid began her study of Brazil in 2001 while on vacation in Rio de Janeiro. This holiday was the beginning of Ingrid’s fascination with the culture of Brazil and her search for explanations as to the inequality that she observed. She began her pursuit of a doctorate at the University of Florida in 2005. Since returning from her fieldwork in Brazil, Ingrid has taught advanced discipline writing courses as well as Latin American politics where she loves to impart her stories from her fieldwork upon her students. Ingrid received her Master of Arts Degree in political science from the University of Florida in 2008. She plans to continue to share her stories from Latin America in the classroom as well as continue her work to uncover and find cures for the social injustice and inequality among citizens of this Earth.