

MAPPING GERMANY'S *VERZERRTES BILD*:
WORLD WAR II AND THE POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION OF SPATIAL IDENTITY

By

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To Lindsey

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This essay proposes a history about maps, the interests behind their (re)production, and the consequences they generate. Particularly, this is a story about one of the largest mapmaking and map dissemination projects in the history of the world – a moment which literally re-defined Germany and emphasized the value of cartography to the governments, corporations, and people operating within its borders (and sometimes, problematically, on them). My focus, then, is on the production of maps during World War II and the reproduction of German mapped space after the war. I investigate this reproduction through both the postwar American occupation of West Germany and the relationship between the West German government and public relations firms. I also discuss the importance of postwar map dissemination and the role government agencies (such as the Army Map Service) and public relations firms played in distributing particular cartographies. I argue that Germany serves as a perfect historical example for studying and understanding the fluid and narrative nature of maps because of its unique cartographic history, the constant spatial (re)negotiations it has consistently grappled with, the radical shift in cartographic control it experienced after losing the war, and the re-production of its space by an occupying military force.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Soon enough we have forgotten [the map] is a picture someone has arranged for us (chopped and manipulated, selected and coded). Soon enough . . . it is the world, it is real, it is . . . reality.¹

On the fifth of December 1948, a young German named Theodor typed a letter to his teacher, Mr. Schmidt. In broken English, Theodor thanked his teacher for a recently received care package and praised the American military's "gentleness" as a postwar occupying force. As a resident living in the town of Kelsterbach, Theodor's home stood just within the Hesse region and, as of 1945, the American zone of occupation. Attached to the letter is a hand-drawn map (Figure 1-1).² The map is simple; its assertion is obvious: here is where Mr. Schmidt lives. It was drawn to show someone how to get somewhere. Indeed, this is *what maps do*: they offer propositions.³ There is no scale and no legend affixed to Theodor's rendering of space. Nor can his map accurately operate within any mathematical projections. Yet the map, as is the case with all maps, makes a claim. In a sense, the map is unique – a subjective and abstract proposition of real, lived space. It is the place of Mr. Schmidt according-to-Theodor. This map is unique in another sense as well: it is a surviving representation of late-1940s German space as produced by a German. Whereas the vast majority of German maps from this period in history were created by agents of the Allied powers, Theodor's

¹ Denis Wood. *The Power of Maps* (New York: Guilford Press, 1992), 70.

² In my citations of maps, I will attempt to adhere as consistently as possible to the standards established in Christine Kollen, Wangyal Shawa, and Mary Larsgaard's *Cartographic Citations: A Style Guide, Second Edition*. Chicago: American Library Association, 2010.

³ John Krygier and Denis Wood. "Ce n'est pas le Monde [This is not the world]" in *Rethinking Maps: New Frontiers in Cartographic Theory*, ed. Martin Dodge, Rob Kitchin, and Chris Perkins (New York: Routledge, 2009), 198-199.

map – as blatantly unscientific as it is – stands as a stark reminder that Germans could and did map their own spaces. However, as an occupational force the Allied powers had a vested interest in controlling the reconstruction and re-mapping of German space. From the earliest days of the Second World War, the creation and maintenance of a carefully plotted German spatial identity was a priority for the Allied military and, throughout the postwar era, became a serious point of contention between the Germans and their Allied occupiers.

This essay proposes a history about maps, the interests behind their (re)production, and the consequences they generate. Particularly, this is a story about one of the largest mapmaking and map dissemination projects in the history of the world – a moment which literally re-defined Germany and emphasized the value of cartography to the governments, corporations, and people operating within its borders (and sometimes, problematically, on them). It should come as no surprise that this moment occurs alongside the Second World War, one of the largest conflicts in history (both geographically and militarily). As John K. Wright, the International Geographical Union President on the Committee of Cartography, so astutely observed in 1949, “modern war is the most powerful of all stimulants to human mobility.”⁴ Wright might have also mentioned that those forces most heavily invested in modern war were also those most interested in the subsequent stimulation of mobility. Obviously, the nation-state with the greatest interest in all postwar German cartographic projects was the United States, the most powerful military and economic force involved in the German occupation. Yet the beginning of the Second World War caught the American military

⁴ John K. Wright. “Highlights in American Cartography, 1939-1949” in *Comptes Rendus du Congrès International de Géographie: Lisbon 1949, Vol. 1* (Lisbon: Centro Tip. Colonial, 1950), 299.

spatially off-guard. With practically no maps with which to wage the massive conflict they had committed to, the United States became obsessed with standardizing and centralizing its mapmaking efforts. The consequences of this prioritization were two incredibly well-funded and highly respected military mapping agencies: the Army Map Service and the Office of Strategic Service's Map Division. Together, they would collect, analyze, and produce maps of the various world regions in which the United States was militarily involved on a scale never before realized. Whereas the United States had produced roughly 9,000,000 maps during the First World War (few, if any, of which were ever catalogued or stored by the government after the end of the conflict), they would produce over 500,000,000 maps between 1941 and 1945.⁵

But it was not simply the Second World War itself which spurred the production of maps. The postwar period in which the American military, alongside the French, British, and Soviet forces, demanded the re-territorializing of a defeated Germany prompted the difficult process of drafting, interpreting, and publicly explaining a very consciously constructed cartographic narrative. Furthermore, freshly proposed projections of this newly oriented Germany needed to be disseminated to the rest of the world. Perhaps most important, however, was the dissemination of mapped material to the United States' domestic libraries – an insurance that never again would the U.S. military be caught with their cartographic pants down. The government, however, was not the only agent of map dissemination after World War II. The rise of international public relations firms in the early twentieth century provided a unique outlet through which to effectively

⁵ Mary Murphy. "History of the Army Map Service Map Collection" in *Federal Government Map Collecting: A Brief History*, ed. Richard W. Stephenson (Washington, D.C.: Special Libraries Association, 1969), 3.

convince the world and its nation-states of Germany's new boundaries. Coupled together, the efforts of the American military, the postwar German government(s), and the PR firms they hired would attempt to impose a purposeful and carefully prepared cartographic narrative tailored to perpetuate a cultural occupation of spatial perception.

As much as this is a story of American history, it is just as much a story of an active and continuously self-mapping Germany, a nation-state and culture with a long and influential cartographic history. While many colonies and previously unexplored regions were exploited through becoming mapped for the first time by an occupying force, Germany had been one of the most technologically advanced nation-states to consistently contribute to the creation of the cartographic and geographic disciplines. Its mapmakers, government land surveyors, and academic cartographers/geographers are all vitally important to this study if we are to understand how a nation-state is authoritatively and (for the most part) unquestionably re-drawn. Moreover, it is only through a study of postwar Germany that we can begin to see the cultural effects that radical cartographic change at a level never before attempted can have on individuals who suddenly do not know (in the abstract sense) where they are, but have long been taught to defer to the authority of the map. In order to achieve such insight without abandoning narrative continuity, I will address this issue chronologically and episodically, focusing on particular moments in an effort to tease out larger cartographic trends. First I will offer the historical context within which German maps prior to the Second World War were developed. Then, the political imperative of imposing one's nation-state on the modern map will be explored. Once these contexts have been made apparent, the various agents, associations, and governments involved in

collecting and re-creating literal maps of Germany during and after World War II, as well as the problems they faced and the consequences of their maps, can more easily be assessed. Next I will investigate the planning and enacting of one of the largest movements of cartographic material in history – the Army Map Depository Program.⁶ Finally, the transition of postwar mapping from the military to public relations firms and the consequences of that development will be studied. By evaluating the spatial relationships of governments, universities, private corporations, and other institutions in such a way, I hope to emphasize the importance of understanding history in spatial terms and force historians of all stripes to recognize not only the constant spatial narratives within which they operate, but also those narratives (both past and present) within which their histories take shape.

The discipline of history is spatializing itself and it would be misleading to suggest that this thesis offers a new methodological approach to studying the past. As contemporary culture grows increasingly dependent on location-based media and an ever-“globalizing” economy, historians have begun to recognize the importance of spatial constructions when building their respective narratives. Of particular interest are the early modern and modern periods – eras in which a cartographic explosion of navigational charts, colonialism, and nation-state building demanded the abstraction, production, and dissemination of real space through the instrumental medium of the map. While ancient Greek and Roman societies could (and did) use maps to orient themselves and exploit natural resources, and while various religions took turns

⁶ In a somewhat different form, this section of the paper has been published elsewhere as: Matthew D. Mingus. “Disseminating the Maps of a Postwar World: A Case Study of the University of Florida’s Participation in Government Depository Programs” in *Journal of Map & Geography Libraries*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Summer 2011).

depicting the medieval world according to their heavenly (and truly) imagined communities, it was only during the European Enlightenment that cartography gained the scientific confidence it defends to this day. Moreover, the necessity of disseminating cartographic material and, consequently, popularizing particular orientations only became imperative in the modern world – where to be left off of the map might mean the loss of one’s place in real-space.⁷

Many historians have understood the importance of studying these spatial developments and have investigated them through several different thematic lenses. The history of cartography as an academic discipline, as an art, as a technological development, and as an instrument of exploration (and, subsequently, exploitation) has become the subject of hundreds, if not thousands, of published histories. Space itself has also recently been a well-worn subject of interest, invoking the concepts of borders, bodies, geopolitics, environmental history, and (perhaps most relevant to this project) imperialism. Journals such as *Imago Mundi*, *Cartographica*, and *The Portolan* (among others) have provided an academic forum in which to investigate these particular issues. Maps, however, have also appealed to a more broadly theoretical body of scholarship. Henri Lefebvre’s *Production of Space*, Michel Foucault’s call for a “history of spaces”, and David Harvey’s attempts to hammer out critical readings of various geographies are a few of the more famous and interdisciplinary examples of useful academic exercises undertaken so as to deconstruct our respective perceptions of our environments. More recently, the geographers Neil Smith, Dalia Varanka, and Jeremy

⁷ In fact, one scholar has argued (correctly, in my opinion) that “there were no maps before 1500” in the sense of the term that we understand today. The function of the map as a site of discourse and contention directly coincides with the production of the early modern state, an institution that necessarily depends upon the authority we grant to the map. For more on this see Denis Wood’s *Rethinking the Power of Maps* (New York: Guilford Press, 2010), pp. 22-25.

Crampton have offered important histories of how society has mapped itself. Critical cartographers such as Denis Wood, John Krygier, John Pickles, and Mark Monmonier have chosen to focus on the institutionalization, professionalization, and political/economic interests involved in mapmaking and the academic disciplines of geography and cartography. By undertaking deconstructive projects, historians, theorists, geographers, and cartographers alike call the map's assumed objectivity and scientism into question. As I will point out throughout this essay, many scholars (in German and in English) have examined the cartographic history of Germany. So far as I can tell, however, few have examined its postwar developments and none have discussed these developments within the context of American occupation.⁸

The lack of attention to postwar Germany is surprising. The history of cartographic development throughout Europe and its role in determining sovereignty, defining the concept of the nation-state, and coping with contentious territories has been fruitful. Yet there is still much to be done, and while I cannot offer a comprehensive analysis of postwar German cartography here, I can (and will) attempt to answer some important questions raised by other scholars studying other historical periods and geographic areas. How, for example, have particular nation-states relied upon maps for their sovereignty? Does a state's sovereignty require control over its cartographic development? Does a map matter if no one grants it any authority? How is a public convinced of a map's authority? How can a nation-state re-assert its place on the map, and how can it convince foreign powers that it belongs there? These are not original

⁸ I am not the only one pointing out this lack of scholarship, or the "strange aversion to maps" historians seem to have. See Helmut Walser Smith's *The Continuities of German History: Nation, Religion, and Race across the Long Nineteenth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 47.

questions. I will be relying on the efforts of previous historians and geographers. I will, however, be applying their deconstructive insight to what I believe to be an exceptional period of obvious cartographic fluidity, a period in which a country full of incredibly skilled modern mapmakers was re-mapped by a foreign occupation force. While my access to sources is limited, I hope that this project will serve as the foundation for further research. Much more needs to be done on this particular period and region so that we might better understand the relationship between governance and maps.

Such critical approaches to cartographic history are hardly universal. While many historians, particularly those interested in the modern era, might understand their chosen temporal category of “modernity” as being full of consciously self-creating subjects,⁹ too often cartographies are overlooked in favor of more traditional literary forms. Furthermore, the contemporary student of history is hard pressed to find any scholastic work in which early modern or modern maps are used as explanatory narratives alongside text and, simultaneously, cited as narratives. The geospatial information and software utilized to create such narratives, the mathematical projections assumed, and the professionals or amateur cartographers who drew the narratives are rarely ever exposed. Rather, the map is too often used as an aesthetic representation of the past, ready to perpetuate the student’s undying loyalty to the combination of spatial abstraction, cartographic objectivity, and Truth.

Spatial relationships are tricky, especially when they are being mediated by an occupying force. The means by which such relationships were forged, their continuous renegotiation, and the perpetuation of these relationships into our contemporary era

⁹ Carla Hesse. *The Other Enlightenment: How French Women Became Modern* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), xii.

shed light on how the narratives within which we find our respective places are built and maintained. Maps, the United States, and Germany blended into a triune which would recast and redefine one another in a complex orgy of manipulation, politics, war, and capital. This is one spatial relationship, during one historical period, which saturated the world with maps and, through constant self-affirmation, erected a new world. The result would be an artificial rendering of the real, a deeply interested proposition created for mass consumption and rooted in the cartographic development of Europe: it is the world in which we find ourselves today – but it did not have to be. And that is the most important part of (this) history.

CHAPTER 2 MAPPING OUT GERMANY'S CARTOGRAPHIC HISTORY

While the outbreak of the Second World War offered interesting new cartographic opportunities for the Allied and Axis Powers in the mid-twentieth century, Germans had played an integral role in establishing the “scientific” discipline of map-making itself. Their ability to map resources (particularly forests),¹ publish the largest number of historical atlases in Europe,² and create early mathematical projections for the sake of navigation (both on sea and on land)³ are all a testament to Germany's serious contributions to the development of mapping.

As a conglomeration of typically small territorial landholdings, German states were in a unique position to help shape the development of state-sponsored cadastral (i.e. multi-property) maps. Unlike many of the other well-established European territories, pre-twentieth-century German states would often represent both a political unit and private estate simultaneously, especially prior to the 1806 collapse of the Holy Roman Empire.⁴ The small size of these states/estates made the impetus for solidifying claims of land ownership urgent. Yet several other factors also led many of these states' governments to investigate mapping strategies.

The Thirty Years' War, for example, had brought many German nobles to the brink of financial collapse by the mid-seventeenth century. Moreover, the subsequent need

¹ Roger J.P. Kain and Elizabeth Baigent. *The Cadastral Map in the Service of the State: A History of Property Mapping* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 132.

² Wladyslaw Palucki. “Poland in Postwar German Historical Cartography” in *Acta Poloniae Historica*, Vol. 37 (1978), 175.

³ John P. Snyder. *Map Projections – A Working Manual* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1987), 48, 76, 98, 104, 182, 249, and 253.

⁴ Kain, 125-126 and 120.

for maintaining a standing army forced many small German states to recognize their need for a continuous source of reliable income. After reorganizing and centralizing their financial ministries, several states (particularly Bavaria, Brunswick, Hessen, and Saxony-Weimar) undertook cartographic projects for the purpose of accurate and efficient taxation – maps that could, in effect, be used to combat the local control of finances by various estate owners.⁵ For many regions, opposition from the nobility was the crucial obstacle to drawing a complete, state-wide cadastral map. Wealthy residents were reluctant to cede their respective spatial narratives to the state (especially if it potentially meant higher taxes). For many governments, any type of comprehensive cartographic enterprise would have to be postponed until the nineteenth century.⁶

Greater Germany's position in Europe also made cartographic efforts imperative. Many of the smaller states within the Holy Roman Empire had actually been mapped during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by previous ruling governments. Sweden had drafted nearly comprehensive cadastral surveys of Western Pomerania and Mecklenberg; France had produced maps of Westphalia, the Rhineland, and (unsurprisingly) Alsace-Lorraine; Denmark had created partial maps of the Schleswig-Holstein territory.⁷ While several full-scale “national” maps were produced in the 1840s,⁸ and while several states (particularly Prussia) had adopted fairly accurate

⁵ Ibid., 146-147.

⁶ Ibid., 160.

⁷ Ibid., 120-121.

⁸ Guntram Henrik Herb. *Under the Map of Germany: Nationalism and Propaganda 1918-1945* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 9.

French and Dutch methods and technology,⁹ only after the establishment of Bismarck's Second Reich could Germany itself produce an autonomous territorial narrative.¹⁰

In fact by 1900, each individual Reich state had installed its own respective mapping program.¹¹ Furthermore, several German thinkers became extremely prominent in the fields of cartography and geography. One of these – Max Eckert – laid the academic groundwork for the eventual autonomous establishment of cartography as a separate “science” from geography.¹² The German geographer Albrecht Penck proposed the first ever International Map of the World.¹³ Several international cartographic and geographic academic organizations “warmly received” German thinkers such as these prior to the First World War.¹⁴

However, Germany's eventual transformation into a centralized, self-mapped geopolitical nation-state made its neighbors nervous. At the Paris 1900 Exposition Russia, France, and England all displayed maps directly contradicting Germany's perception (one which was legally and internationally acknowledged by these three nations) of its territorial boundaries. The Russian map, for example, emphasized France's 1870 border which enclosed the regions of Alsace and Lorraine. Both the English and the French (of course!) embraced this representation in hopes of ending

⁹ Kain, 170.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 166.

¹¹ Peter Collier. “The Impact on Topographic Mapping of Developments in Land and Air Survey” in *Cartography and Geographic Information Science*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2002), 155.

¹² Wolfgang Scharfe. “Max Eckert's *Kartenwissenschaft* – The Turning Point in German Cartography” in *Imago Mundi*, Vol. 38 (1986), pp. 61-66.

¹³ Michael Heffernan. “The Politics of the Map in the Early Twentieth Century” in *Cartography and Geographic Information Science*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2002), 209-210.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 218.

“the Bismarckian balance of power in Europe.” Such cartographically charged anti-Germanism became the norm rather than the exception (especially in France) during the early twentieth century prior to the First World War.¹⁵

World War I changed everything – not only in terms of how German academicians were treated and how Germans undertook cartographic activity, but also the map of Germany itself. During and after the War, international communities of geospatial theorists and practitioners criticized their German counterparts “as supine agents of German imperial expansion” and effectively turned their backs on them.¹⁶ German cartographers further lost face during the postwar Paris Peace Conference by failing to propose any concrete territorial claims in time to be considered before the Allied Powers had signed the Treaty of Versailles in 1919.¹⁷ Prior to the Treaty, the majority of mapping programs had been funded and operated by their respective state militaries. On 18 June 1919 (ten days before the signing of the Treaty of Versailles) cartographic responsibilities were ceded to a civilian branch of the government known as the Federal Land Survey Office (*Reichsamt für Landesaufnahme*). This Office was charged with producing a “universally acceptable [and] gradual simplification” (“*eine allseitig tragbare, allmähliche Vereinfachung*”) of the nation’s varied cartographic efforts.¹⁸ While all German states were required to adhere to the standards and framework of the new Survey Office, the southern states in particular (i.e. Bavaria, Württemberg, Hessen, and Baden) established their own individual mapping agencies and continued to largely

¹⁵ Ibid., 212.

¹⁶ Ibid., 218.

¹⁷ *Under the Map of Germany*, 27.

¹⁸ Von Konrad Röhr. “Soldat und Karte” in *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau*, Vol. 6 (1955), 267.

control their own geospatial information and, therefore, the maps on which such information was represented without any significant threat of federal reprimand.¹⁹

While the study of cartography continued to expand in German-speaking nations,²⁰ the results of the Treaty were devastating for the German public. A significant portion of their national territory had been ceded to several foreign powers (Figure 2-1). Indeed, some of the techniques established by the Germans during the War (such as “perspective grid” mapping – a technique which allowed for the transfer of cartographic detail, by eye, from aerial photography to a gridded map) had been adopted by the Allies after the war,²¹ and it can be reasonably assumed,²¹ that these cartographic practices were used to revise their postwar maps of Europe.

The Treaty of Versailles, then, marked a significant turning point in how German cartographers approached their discipline. Many of them understood the treaty as a spatial attempt at revisionism which they themselves could adopt in order to combat the cartographic constructions of the Allied Powers. Thus, maps became a force with which to subvert the power structures thrown into place by Germany’s victors. Maps had the potential to “establish a clear German consensus on national territorial claims . . . As a consequence, the discourse on German national territory became cartographic.”²²

While a few American intellectuals (notably Dr. Walter Ristow, the Chief of the New York Public Library’s Map Division and eventual Chair of the Army’s Geography

¹⁹ *Department of the Army Technical Manual No. 5-248: Foreign Maps* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 12 June 1956), 206.

²⁰ Sara Irina Fabrikant. “Commentary on ‘A History of Twentieth-Century American Academic Cartography’ by Robert McMaster and Susanna McMaster” in *Cartography and Geographic Information Science*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (2003), 82.

²¹ Collier, 161.

²² *Under the Map of Germany*, 33.

Section) attempted to instill the importance of maps in the “war of ideas” among their publics at large,²³ nearly all German geographers and cartographers focused their efforts on popularizing mapmaking. In effect, Germany’s map-makers turned a critical eye toward the activity to which they had dedicated their lives. This was to be a very public two-fold deconstruction – both a critique of the “political processes that had destroyed Germany” and an attempt to understand “the geographical roots of Germany’s failure in the war.” German cartographers were poised to become “the vanguard” in establishing the former place of their nation on the world’s map.²⁴ A popular means through which to undertake this project was the concept of *Geopolitik*.

Perhaps one of the most serious failures in the historiography surrounding twentieth-century German cartography has been the assumption that Nazism and the concept of *Geopolitik* were complementary and that a fusion of the two was made manifest in a massive, concerted effort to systematically distribute maps as tools of propaganda.²⁵ In fact, as pointed out by two of the leading scholars on this topic (David Thomas Murphy and Guntram Henrik Herb), the opposite is true. Geopolitical concepts were much more popular during the Weimar era than during that of the Nazis. Weimar Germany created an atmosphere in which anyone, regardless of political affiliation, would be tempted to accept the concept of *Geopolitik*.²⁶ The Weimar governments

²³ Alice C. Hudson. “The New York Public Library’s Map Division Goes to War, 1941-45” in *Bulletin: Special Libraries Association Geography and Map Division*, No. 182 (Spring 1996), 17.

²⁴ David Murphy. *The Heroic Earth: Geopolitical Thought in Weimar Germany, 1918-1933* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1997), 17.

²⁵ For more on how the myth of centralized Nazi geopolitical dissemination became popularized, especially in American culture, see Gearóid O Tuathail’s chapter “‘It’s Smart to Be Geopolitical’: Narrating German Geopolitics in U.S. Political Discourse, 1939-1943” in his book *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space*. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1996.

²⁶ David Murphy, 2.

cared little about centralized cartographic undertakings and nearly all of the material from the 1920s and early 1930s was created by isolated individuals.²⁷ Many of the maps distributed during this time focused on convincing the German public that the “accurate” maps of the Allies did not adequately portray the dire geopolitical situation Germany was going to have to confront.²⁸ They would typically emphasize that “ethnically German” territories were in danger of being swallowed by the cultures surrounding them.²⁹ Some even went so far as to suggest that because of Germany’s new post-WWI shape, its core was more vulnerable to foreign invasion.³⁰

By the early 1920s, German cartographers were drawing explicitly “suggestive” cartography based on an analysis of Great Britain’s maps and how much more “persuasive” they were during the war than Germany’s.³¹ While there was no sustained, government effort to create such maps, and while the “persuasiveness” of the maps was largely based upon trial-and-error, the isolated depictions of the German nation-state were hugely successful and increased in popularity throughout the 1920s and 1930s.³²

When the Nazi government took power in 1933, they made good use of “suggestive” mapping and printed them “extensively in Nazi publications.”³³ While a few

²⁷ *Under the Map of Germany*, 40.

²⁸ David Murphy, 165.

²⁹ *Under the Map of Germany*, 51.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 61-62.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 78.

³² *Ibid.*, 88, 91, 93.

³³ Guntram Henrik Herb. “Persuasive Cartography in *Geopolitik* and National Socialism” in *Political Geography Quarterly*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (July 1989), 294.

established mapmakers helped the National Socialists with this effort, most of the maps produced for the use of propaganda were not created by prominent Germans committed to the concept of *Geopolitik*.³⁴ This allowed for an important difference between geopolitical maps and Nazi maps to be made evident: Nazi cartography was only interested in “persuading” its audience through racial justification whereas the idea of *Geopolitik* had always emphasized the importance of linguistic and cultural values when mapping nation-states (Figure 2-2 and Figure 2-3). Moreover, the Nazi maps were usually substantially “less sophisticated” in design than those drawn by the adherents of geopolitics.³⁵

While both National Socialism and *Geopolitik* had common interests, Nazism adopted a purely racialized version of “suggestive” mapping. Nazi policies also made manifest geopolitical ideas in an aggressive assertion of place both domestically (through the compulsory hanging of approved maps in schools) and abroad (through invasion). There was, it should be noted, no centralized or specialized channel through which the Nazis funneled their maps. To cite a pair of American professors who had worked closely with German geographers before and immediately after World War II:

Recent analyses of the German war effort have indicated that the general economic and military mobilization under the Nazis was not as complete during the early years of the war as had previously been believed. This is true also of geography.³⁶

In fact, cartographic research projects were not in any way funded by Göring’s *Reichsforschungsrat* until 1943 and even then such undertakings were rarely

³⁴ Ibid., 299.

³⁵ Ibid., 300.

³⁶ Thomas R. Smith and Lloyd D. Black. “German Geography: War Work and Present Status” in *Geographical Review*, Vol. 36, No. 6 (July 1946), 405.

approved.³⁷ It should also be noted that the infamous German geographer Karl Haushofer had little influence on the wartime cartography of his nation-state, serving in no official capacity to any of the mapmaking institutions and only rarely being cited by German geographers and cartographers during the war.³⁸ Yet, while there was no systematic dissemination of propaganda which specifically emphasized maps by the Nazi leadership, they were certainly more than happy to encourage and popularize the individuals drawing them.³⁹ This is not to say that maps were not produced by the Third Reich. Obviously, road maps and school maps were just as prevalent in Hitler's Germany as any other modern Western nation-state. These maps, however, were not drawn using the hyper-racialized "suggestive" cartographic method described above.

As maps could be more easily re-produced and disseminated by a centralized government (or, as argued later below, a public relations strategy), the European cultural concept of space itself began to change. No longer was space a container in which individuals acted or simply a Kantian *a priori* framework in which perception took place, but rather space itself became a product.⁴⁰ Moreover, as various nation-states

³⁷ Ibid., 404.

³⁸ Ibid. For more on Karl Haushofer's cartographic influence on German academic/scientific mapmaking see Andreas Dorpalen's *The World of General Haushofer: Geopolitics in Action*. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1942. For more on how the Allied Powers, particularly the United States, may have understood Haushofer see Joseph J. Thorndike, Jr.'s "Geopolitics: The Lurid Career of a Scientific System which a Briton Invented, the Germans Used and Americans Need to Study" in *Life* (21 December 1942), pp. 106-115.

³⁹ "Persuasive Cartography", 301.

⁴⁰ A wonderful example of this development in the United States can be traced through the history of state road maps. Although never seriously undertaken at the federal level prior to the 1950s, road maps were obvious constructions made possible only through the merger of state governments and commercial cartographers. They were also widely distributed and, by 1926, were often given out for free. It should be no surprise that, like many European nation-states, the state governments often used these maps to assert their position in various border disputes. For more on this see James R. Akerman's "Blazing a Well-worn Path: Cartographic Commercialism, Highway Promotion, and Automobile Tourism in the United States, 1880-1930" in *Cartographica*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 10-20.

and cultures began to become more aware of their geopolitical environment and the need to interact with one another – both culturally and economically – the imperative to make spatial structures absolute became more urgent. Somewhat ironically, such efforts made even clearer the understanding of “the absoluteness of such spaces [as] a social product, not a feature of natural space.”⁴¹ Yet in the modern era – the only period in which maps could saturate the imaginative landscapes of any particular citizenry – the natural-ness of space became integral to its own production and, furthermore, to the existence of the state which perpetuated it. The French theorist Henri Lefebvre claimed that the creation of absolute space is strategic and that it “seeks to impose itself as reality despite the fact that it is an abstraction . . .” The modern nation-state had become (and still remains) dependent upon the mapping of absolute spaces as “the locus and medium of [its] power.”⁴²

While only one of many “imagined communities”, the modern nation-state has been incredibly successful at making the concreteness of its spatiality *real*, its natural-ness seemingly inherent. A shift, however, began to take place in the mid-twentieth century. Plenty of maps prior to this period were created by individual entrepreneurs, land owners, and commercial entities. Many states were also more than happy to fund private-enterprise mapping projects, so long as they adhered to the instructions of each respective state’s government. But there is no evidence to suggest that any – not even cartographic undertakings produced by governments (and the Third Reich was no exception) – had explicit and centralized marketing plans. None, that is, until one of the

⁴¹ Neil Smith. *Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space*, Third Edition (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2008), 116-117.

⁴² Henri Lefebvre. *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Blackwell, 2008), 94.

most massive nation-building ventures in world history collided with the emergence of “public relations.” While advertising and PR campaigns had been around since the dawn of the twentieth century, and while marketing – in some form or other – had always played an important part in early modern mapping projects, the merger between public relations marketing and government sponsored state-building after the Second World War would seek to re-configure a map of Europe which had experienced a near-total upheaval. Getting to that postwar point, however, would demand a very deliberate series of re-orientations.

CHAPTER 3 MAPPING GERMANY DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The somewhat abrupt entry of the United States into the Second World War left the American military with little time to prepare cartographically for a worldwide conflict. Even after the explicit reliance of Allied Powers on maps during World War I, the United States had failed to organize any semblance of “systematic map collecting” or cataloging. Captured maps from the Central Powers were largely discarded or allowed to be clumsily stored in various unidentified libraries throughout the world. Even if the U.S. military had cared to begin building a major cartographic archive after the Great War, most of the participants’ maps were limited to areas of “relatively static trench warfare” and fairly useless more than twenty years after the enactment of the Treaty of Versailles.¹ Shortly before (and certainly after) the United States Congress declared war against the Axis Powers in December 1941, a state of near-cartographic panic enveloped all branches of the United States military as they realized that they needed to begin deploying troops into various theaters for which they “had virtually no maps.”²

It was almost immediately clear that the American military was not even bureaucratically prepared for the acquisition and production of the much-needed cartographic material. The Army’s Geographic Section and Engineer Reproduction Plant – the organization initially responsible for map collection and dissemination – was hastily renamed “The Army Map Service” and moved from its out-dated and relatively

¹ Mary Murphy. “History of the Army Map Service Map Collection” in *Federal Government Map Collecting: A Brief History*, ed. Richard W. Stephenson (Washington, D.C.: Special Libraries Association, 1969), 1.

² Alice C. Hudson. “The New York Public Library’s Map Division Goes to War, 1941-1945” in *Bulletin: Special Library Association, Geography and Map Division*, No. 182 (Spring 1996), 2.

small facility at the Army War College in Pennsylvania to a new, much larger plant in Brookmont, Maryland, a few months after the announcement of war. Over the next few years, its staff would expand from 150 servicemen and women to 3500.³ Charged with mapping what would eventually become the most geographically extensive military conflict ever undertaken, the initial acquisition procedure of the Army Map Service (AMS) was easy and straightforward: take “any map from any one kind enough to give or lend it.”⁴

The most obvious domestic source for recent foreign maps were large public and university libraries, many of which had departments or divisions dedicated to cartography and geography. In fact, during the build-up to war the Army’s Geographic Section had already begun making isolated requests for maps from libraries to use during various Army maneuvers in the fall of 1941.⁵ They had also begun borrowing material related to Germany from the New York Public Library’s (NYPL) Map Division as early as August 1941. Unfortunately most, if not all, of the maps received from libraries were somewhat out-dated. For example, the two most well used and authoritative documents borrowed from the NYPL were Westermann’s *Plan von Gross-Berlin* (dated 1938) and the *London Times Atlas* (dated 1922), both of which were considered to be “primary reference atlas[es] of the period.”⁶ To make matters worse, the material being lent to the military by various libraries was under constant demand by regular patrons,

³ *A Brief History of U.S. Military Mapmaking – and the First Decade of the Defense Mapping Agency* (Washington D.C.: Defense Mapping Agency, July 1982), 11.

⁴ Mary Murphy, 2.

⁵ John M. Anderson. “Forgotten Battles, Forgotten Maps: Resources for Reconstructing Historical Topographical Intelligence Using Army Map Service Materials” in *Historical Geography*, Vol. 29 (2001), 80.

⁶ Hudson, 9.

particularly those immigrants from Czechoslovakia and the Sudeten area who, after the crisis of 1938, were hard-pressed to discover their exact political status for the purposes of naturalization, voting, and Social Security registration.⁷ Moreover, the lack of authoritative cartographic resources and their seemingly random placement in libraries across the globe resulted in what could be described as a “competitive scramble” between London and Berlin to both guard their own territorial representations and gain information concerning each other’s counterpart.⁸ Such efforts took a serious toll on those librarians and archivists expected to keep map materials accessible to the public and their own military while simultaneously scouring their resources for potentially dangerous cartographic information.

Fortunately, individuals were another source of valuable (and sometimes not so valuable) cartographies. So desperate was the American military for material during the first few months of 1942 that Major General William J. Donovan, Director of Strategic Services (the institutional predecessor to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency) made a nationwide appeal for maps on the radio. The response was overwhelming and lasted throughout the War.⁹ Among these were Austrian-American veterans of the First World War who sent Italian maps they had used in collaboration with the German military¹⁰ and a seemingly overzealous Italian-American who wished to be contacted by a “trusted

⁷ Ibid., 13-14.

⁸ Leonard S. Wilson. “Lessons from the Experience of the Map Information Section, OSS” in *Geographical Review*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (April 1949), 298. An interesting example of the consequences of this “scramble” is the Royal Canadian Air Force’s borrowing of the New York Public Library’s most recent copy of Berlin’s telephone book in order to plan on bombing particular addresses. For more on this see Hudson, 11.

⁹ Wilson, 302.

¹⁰ InterOffice Memo entitled “Maps of Italy and Corsica” from Mr. Lester Rouck to R. DeVecci (September 4, 1943), NARA RG 226, Stack 190 5/30/7, Box #229.

agent” so that he could disclose information regarding the area of his birth (the province of Aquila).¹¹ The military often replied to such responses with gratitude, thanking various citizens and acknowledging their help in filling cartographic “blank spots.”¹²

Filling in the “blank spots”, however, helped little if the cartographers receiving these maps were unable to translate and/or understand foreign mapping processes. Very few American geographers and cartographers had any experience with different methods of creating cartographies. Often, the military requested irrelevant maps simply because it misunderstood the “sources of supply or the nature of the material.”¹³ Such requests added an unnecessary burden to the already overworked staffs of map collections and prompted several attempts to collect and organize all of the major mapmaking nation-states’ cartographic systems into one publication. One of these projects, *Foreign Maps* by Everett C. Olson and Agnes Whitmarsh, even made explicit the immediacy of its content, claiming that its publication “had to be advanced because of the urgent wartime need for [its] information.”¹⁴

Fortunately, several other Allied Powers (particularly the British, French, and Dutch) had a more eclectic and cosmopolitan understanding of cartography. Throughout the war, the United States would consistently turn to a variety of

¹¹ Letter from B.J. De Chanso to the War Department (November 6, 1943), NARA RG 165, Stack 390 35/22/05-07, Box #784.

¹² Letter from C.C. Jadwin to Lt. R.S.G. Hall (22 September 1943), NARA RG 165, Stack 390 35/22/05-07, Box #784.

¹³ Wilson, 298 and 307.

¹⁴ Everett C. Olson and Agnes Whitmarsh. *Foreign Maps* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944), xi.

international sources for its maps including the Netherlands Economic Mission,¹⁵ the French military (Figure 3-1),¹⁶ and the British Geographical Section, General Staff. In fact, the American military's lack of maps was so painfully apparent that the British agreed to "assume responsibility for the production of all tactical, operational, and strategic maps" of areas in which they were already operating while the United States shouldered the burden of mapping "the remaining areas of the world." The British, then, supplied the United States with a limited collection of their map sets while also providing them with the equipment, material, and data needed to reproduce any maps which they could not, at the time, spare.¹⁷

So, then, while historians have typically portrayed the U.S. as the Allied pillar of production during the Second World War, this was certainly not the case regarding maps. The Americans were irrevocably dependent upon the cartographic expertise and experience of their veterans, libraries, and European counterparts.

The coordination of mapped materials, however, was not the only way in which Germany and the nation-states it occupied could be mapped. By the end of the Second World War, Germany would be in a state of cartographic disarray – in part because of cartographic sabotage. Not only would its national territory become occupied by four different foreign governments, but its geographic memory had been decimated. It should come as no surprise that the United States and the other Allied Powers had a

¹⁵ This Mission had a branch in New York City, where it happened to keep a set of Dutch atlases which were eventually purchased by the American military. See "Letter from Unknown to Mr. N.A. de Voogd" (13 April 1944), NARA RG 226, Stack 190 5/30/7, Box #229.

¹⁶ The United States found French maps of Syria particularly useful. See OSS Memo "Syria: French Military Dispositions" (5 February 1945), NARA RG 226, Stack 190 5/30/7, Box #230.

¹⁷ Wilson, 303.

very serious interest in capturing and exploiting “indigenously produced map stocks” so as to improve their cartographic intelligence and test the information they had already gathered/mapped by “ground-truthing [that is, physically surveying] the terrain” after invading a particular territory.¹⁸ The U.S. military would occasionally re-distribute these captured maps to various agencies and military units in order to confirm their European orientation. According to military records, some of these captured German maps included roadmaps of Russia, Italy, and Czechoslovakia (“*Europäisches Russland Strassenkarte*”, “*Strassenkarte von Italien*”, and “*Deutsche Reich, Germany and Czechoslovakia Strassenkarte*”), maps for pilots (“*Fliegerkarte und deutsche Weltkarte*” and “*World, Fliegerkarte*”), as well as various maps of Eastern and Southern Europe (“*Osteuropa*” and “*Südeuropa, Ostblatt*” among others).¹⁹ Of course, the Axis Powers also participated in the capture and re-distribution of maps, sometimes making re-claimed cartographic information incredibly difficult to read. In July 1943, a little less than a year before the Allied invasion of Normandy, maps smuggled out of German-occupied Cherbourg retained both their original French calligraphy and the German cartographic abbreviations which had been added to them – a clear indication “that the material had been re-handled.”²⁰

Sometimes re-captured maps could indicate much more than simply how one’s enemies cartographically understood their surroundings. A German map of central Italy (Figure 3-2) captured by the Office of Strategic Services in July 1944 seems to suggest

¹⁸ Anderson, 82-83.

¹⁹ “Captured Map Distribution”, NARA RG 226, Stack 190 5/30/7, Box #229.

²⁰ Letter to Lester C. Houck from Dr. S.A. Callisen (16 July 1943), NARA RG 226, Stack 190 5/30/7, Box #229.

that resistance groups had been causing enough trouble for the occupation forces that they were worth the time and energy necessary to draw up a strategic map pinpointing their locations. The map is also well-labeled and clearly dated (31 March 1944), giving the Allied cartographic liberators a sense of how German mapmaking had been developing (including the evolution of cartographic semiotics), what the German occupation forces were focusing on, and the timeframe within which they were working.

By October 1944, the United States Military Intelligence Division of the Office of the Chief of Engineers of the Army had enlisted the expertise of geodesy specialist Floyd Hough to sift through the maps and cartographic material of the European theater (with special emphasis, of course, on Germany). Hough and his top-secret twenty-one member HOUGHTTEAM “captured vast quantities of cartographic and photogrammetric equipment, map series at all scales, and geodetic and cartographic data.”²¹ Some of these pieces of equipment may well have included various versions of the aerocartograph and types of aircraft cameras.²² By the end of the Second World War the United States alone would capture over nine hundred tons of German and Japanese mapped material ([Figure 3-3](#) and [Figure 3-4](#)).²³

Not all of the maps made available to the Allied Forces of their belligerent counterparts were captured. As governments-in-exile escaped their respective continental nation-states and poured into London, their geographic data was

²¹ John Cloud. “American Cartographic Transformations during the Cold War” in *Cartography and Geographic Information Science*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2002), 264.

²² The Map & Geography Department of NARA has a collection of military photographs displaying hundreds of captured pieces of equipment from German cartographers and their institutions. NARA RG 77, Stack 3331 76/04/04.

²³ Mary Murphy, 3.

immediately “delivered to the Cartography Section of the [Office of Strategic Services] Map Division in London and made into maps.” While the primary function of these maps was to aid in the military struggle against Germany, copies were always provided to the exiled governments as a “good-will investment” which would eventually result in long-term relationships and data exchanges between the OSS Map Division and European governments.²⁴ Spies were also an essential instrument in making foreign maps accessible to the Allies. Throughout the Second World War various “observers” would draw maps to accompany their reports to the Allies from within German-occupied zones. Often, these would be the only way the Allied military could stay up-to-date on the construction of German shelters or defense mechanisms.²⁵ Even the famous Allied secret agent Fritz Kolbe regularly attached maps to his reports – perhaps the most exciting of which depicted Hitler’s “Wolf’s Lair”.²⁶

The potential negative effects of the loss, capture, and distribution of some of the country’s most important cartographic material and equipment were quickly recognized by Germany’s mapmaking institutions which immediately began reinstating their academic and community programs. An explosion of creative research was undertaken, resulting in the coining of the term “thematic map” (i.e. maps that tie particular themes like literacy or income to geography), the founding of several new

²⁴ Wilson, 305. Many of these relationships lasted well into the postwar world and provided the OSS with opportunities to expand their field operations.

²⁵ See, particularly, Lt. Marcel. “Belgian Political Picture” (10 June 1943), NARA RG 226, Stack 190 5/30/7, Box #229.

²⁶ Greg Bradsher. “The Beginning of the Fritz Kolbe Story, 1900-1943” in *Prologue*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Spring 2002), 17.

cartographic societies, and the establishment of today's most prominent German journal of cartography, *Kartographische Nachrichten*.²⁷

The success of the HOUGHTTEAM, the OSS Map Division, and the cartographic saboteurs living under German occupation created mixed results in the United States. While the investigation and subsequent “capturing” of German geospatial technology and data began to make the Soviet Union – a nation-state which had had its maps copied extensively by German invaders during the war – nervous,²⁸ it also created an explosion of academic graduate programs in the United States. Moreover, cartography began to become a more established discipline in the U.S. – separate from geography.²⁹ While America would doubtless rely on geographers throughout the postwar era,³⁰ it would also acknowledge the usefulness of mapping specialists. The importance of these cartographers became obvious at the dawn of the American entry into the Second World War – geographers might study the shapes of the world and the imaginary structures of its human inhabitants, but the cartographers were the ones who could literally draw the lines. Ergo, after acquiring enough cartographic information to serve as a foundation upon which to build (or, that is, trace), the Allied Powers quickly began to project their own propositional cartographies onto the established map of Germany. Such tasks, however, could only be legitimately undertaken if done so

²⁷ Sara Irina Fabrikant. “Commentary on ‘A History of Twentieth-Century American Academic Cartography’ by Robert McMaster and Susanna McMaster” in *Cartography and Geographic Information Science*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (2003), 82-83.

²⁸ Cloud, 264-267.

²⁹ Robert McMaster and Susanna McMaster. “A History of Twentieth-Century American Academic Cartography” in *Cartography and Geographic Information Science*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2002), 309.

³⁰ See Neil Smith's *American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.

systematically and within an established bureaucratic/military structure which had the authority to re-draw Germany's place on the map and cartographically interfere with the boundaries of Europe.

One such structure was the Office of Strategic Services' Map Division of the Research & Analysis (R&A) Branch. As an institution, the OSS employed 129 geographers and cartographers during World War II – most of whom worked within its Map Division.³¹ Originally named the “Geography Division”, this section of the Research & Analysis Branch had been organized in November 1941 to centralize the “procurement, evaluation, and distribution of maps” that were flowing in and out of the OSS.³² During the war this Division kept a watchful eye on the military's cartographic material, constantly reminding unit commanders to only request and utilize maps which had been approved by and sent to them by the Map Division.³³ They were also instrumental in both acquiring necessary maps for the government and armed services should other cartographic media (such as atlases, spies, etc.) be unavailable,³⁴ and drafting maps which indicated the locations of various secret intelligence agents.³⁵

The Geography Division was a fairly insular department, requiring little interdisciplinary or inter-agency conversation. However, in January 1943 the R&A

³¹ Trevor Barnes. “Geographical Intelligence: American Geographers and Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Service, 1941-1945” in *Journal of Historical Geography*, Vol. 32 (2006), 150.

³² Wilson, 298-299.

³³ Arthur H. Robinson. “OSS Memorandum: Maps on Cloth” (11 August 1944), NARA RG 226, Stack 190 5/30/7, Box #229.

³⁴ For an example of this acquisition process see Letter to Mr. Whitney Shepardson from George G. Shor (3 February 1944), NARA RG 226, Stack 190 5/30/7, Box #229.

³⁵ “OSS Interoffice Memo” to All SI Section Heads from A.M. Scaife (9 March 1944), NARA RG 226, Stack 190 5/30/7, Box #229.

Branch was reorganized and Geography was no longer an autonomous division but one of many within the Map Division – a more “team-based, problem-oriented science model [within which] geographers [and cartographers] were compelled to interact with others, and to try to translate their vocabularies and skills into . . . military intelligence.”³⁶ This re-organization brought with it a great deal of internal dispute, a well-established occurrence between the R&A administrators and the academicians working for them. One such dispute, which might be of interest to the historian, was a particularly telling disagreement between the political subsection of the “Europe-Africa” Division and Richard Hartshorne, Chair of the Projects Committee (which gave OSS reports final approval for publication). In June 1945, a report – in part authored by Herbert Marcuse – was released by the subsection concerning Germany’s Social Democratic Party. Hartshorne berated the document as lacking “sound, mature and objective scholarship” and claimed it did not meet “R&A standards.”³⁷ The authors of the report argued that, in fact, no standards had ever been made clear to them and that such an oversight reflected the poor institutional leadership with the R&A Branch. Carl Schorske (a former acting director of the Europe-Africa Division) wrote to the Director of the R&A without Hartshorne’s knowledge, complaining about the subjective nature of the Project Committee leader’s “standards.” Within one month Hartshorne was no longer employed by the OSS.³⁸ Such disputes make clear the internal dissatisfaction many within the

³⁶ Barnes, 158. For the sake of simplicity, I will use the term “Map Division” to describe the institutional successor to the “Geography Division” although it is referred to often by a variety of names including “Map Section”, “Map Information Section”, and “Cartography Section.” All refer to the same institution within the Research & Analysis Branch.

³⁷ Barnes, 156.

³⁸ Ibid.

Research & Analysis Branch had with their administrative supervisors, as well as how quickly a supervisor could be overthrown if the right individuals got involved.

The OSS Map Division, however, expanded a great deal during the Second World War, both financially and geographically. Its leadership remained constant (Arthur H. Robinson served as its Chief from October 1941 through the end of the war) and, by the R&A reorganization in 1943, its value was so widely recognized that the Map Division was granted equal status with every other intelligence subdivision of the R&A Branch.³⁹ By the end of the war, map offices had been infused into the “OSS headquarters in Paris, Vienna, Bari [an Italian city on the Adriatic Sea], Bern . . . Biebrich . . . Cairo, Algiers, Kandy [a city in Sri Lanka], New Delhi, and Kunming [a city in southwest China].”⁴⁰ The result of such a “significant expansion in the scale, bureaucratization, systematic application, and funding of war-directed research and analysis”⁴¹ allowed the Map Division of the OSS (and, subsequently, the Central Intelligence Agency) to achieve geographic footholds throughout much of the world, regulating and evaluating the cartographic propositions of “sovereign” nation-states.

The most active mapping organization in the United States military, however, and (arguably) the most important was the Army Map Service (AMS). A subsection of the Army Corp of Engineers, the AMS was responsible for the initial analysis of every map captured in the field. Whereas the Map Division of the OSS Research & Analysis Branch drafted, reproduced, analyzed, and distributed maps deemed necessary for intelligence operations, the AMS designated which maps were important enough to

³⁹ Ibid., 162.

⁴⁰ Wilson, 306.

⁴¹ Barnes, 150.

forward to the OSS, which could be discarded, and which needed to be kept in the Army Map Service Library for storage.⁴² The AMS was also the largest producer and reproducer of maps during the Second World War, creating “more than 500 million copies of more than 40,000 different maps – covering some 400,000 square miles.” The Normandy invasion alone required the production of more “than 70 million copies of 3000 different maps.”⁴³ Needless to say, the production capacity of the AMS was massive and its staff was constantly working to project an up-to-date and accurate world picture to the United States military.

Shortly before the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, the freshly re-organized AMS was instructed to focus on foreign maps and the creation of a standardized system with which Allied cartographers could easily read and reproduce such maps. The foreign maps which served as the foundation for Allied military operations maps had usually been borrowed from domestic libraries or individuals, captured, or leaked to Allied mapmakers. Many of these maps had initially been created as parts of larger map series and could only serve as partial representations of the land. The AMS, then, had to construct a system which would allow for various partial map series to be combined and redrawn into a new and cohesive map, while remaining as accurate and readable as possible.⁴⁴ Moreover, different nation-states and, in fact, different agencies within the same nation-state would often use different mathematical projections for depicting the three-dimensional world onto a two-dimensional sheet of paper or cloth. It

⁴² Mary Murphy, 3.

⁴³ *A Brief History of U.S. Military Mapping* . . . , 12.

⁴⁴ *AMS Memorandum No. 443, (January 1945): Notes on Map Identification* (Washington, D.C.: War Department, 1945), 2.

became necessary, then, for the AMS to devise a method in which to standardize projections, grids, and magnetic declinations (the projected angle between magnetic north and “true north”).⁴⁵ These complex semiotic and mathematical systems took years to devise and still had not been universally adopted by every mapmaking agency at the war’s end.⁴⁶ In order to, at the very least, standardize the American military’s maps, all foreign maps which were being used in combat operations during the war – even those created or reproduced by the OSS Map Division – had to adhere to the standards of the AMS and, typically, could only be disseminated with the AMS’s approval.⁴⁷ These would be the maps which would literally project Germany into the minds of the American military and a large part of the Allied forces, in general.

Of course, Germany had institutional counterparts to the Army Map Service and OSS Map Division. While Germany had, in the same way as the Allies, scrambled to find maps after the outbreak of war, it had a much deeper domestic cartographic tradition than many of the Allies (especially the Americans). By 1937, the German military had universally standardized its maps and had established the *Reichsamt für Landesaufnahme* to take over map production from the various German states (although this office had been publishing cartographic histories and historical maps as

⁴⁵ AMS Memorandum No. 425, (February 1945): *Grids and Magnetic Declinations (Fourth Edition)*. Washington, D.C.: War Department, 1945.

⁴⁶ “AMS Memorandum No. 443” was the military guide to Map Identification. It went through several revisions from January 1943 through the end of the Second World War. To see this evolution, take a look at *Notes on Map Identification: Series, Editions, & Issues, AMS Memo 443* (November 1945), NARA RG 77, Stack 331 76/04/05, Box #1.

⁴⁷ “Federal Surveys”, 287, NARA RG 77, Stack 390 1/07/02-03, Box #2.

early as 1933).⁴⁸ By 1944, the *Reichsamt für Landesaufnahme* was regulating Germany's "official" map production and distribution in its entirety.⁴⁹ Militarily, three German agencies hired the most cartographers/geographers and produced the bulk of Germany's wartime maps: the German Army's department of *Militärische Geographie* ("Mil-Geo"), the Navy's *Marine Geographie* ("Mar-Geo"), and the *Forschungstaffel* of the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces). The Mil-Geo, which was the largest mapping organization in the German military, created fold-out maps for military handbooks (*Militärgeographische Angaben*) which they published and distributed to troops entering newly invaded or occupied territory.⁵⁰ While the Mil-Geo had been established prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, the Mar-Geo was created by the German Naval High Command in 1942 "to prepare special nautical-geographical maps of selected coastal areas . . . not found on existing topographical maps and nautical charts." It was also utilized to evaluate the floodability of land in northern Germany and the Netherlands after the British Royal Air Force bombed the Walcheren dikes in 1944.⁵¹ The third agency, the *Forschungsstaffel*, primarily dealt with aerial photography and the mapping of terrain elevation. It had its own airplanes, cartographic equipment, and ground reconnaissance vehicles. By early 1943, the *Forschungsstaffel* completed the most comprehensive physical atlas of Germany ever

⁴⁸ Emilie Neunhöffer. *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Karten des Rhein-Main-Gebietes unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Arbeiten von Johann Heinrich Hass*. Frankfurt: Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, 1933.

⁴⁹ *Notes on G.S.G.S. Maps of Germany, Denmark, and Central Europe*, 28 (1942), NARA RG 77, Stack 331 76/04/05, Box #1.

⁵⁰ Smith/Black, 398-399.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 400.

published.⁵² In effect, both Germany and the Allies were creating some of their most accurate and most beautiful maps in an effort to produce a particular world-picture. Their respective visions may have been different, but the methods through which they were attempting to accomplish this task were eerily similar.

After the Second World War, the concepts of geopolitics and geodeterminism continued to have many American and European adherents, even after the Third Reich had utilized them in its massive attempt at *Lebensraum*.⁵³ Land-use information systems became hugely popular during the late 1960s⁵⁴ and such instruments of geospatial data have yet to see any of their rapid popularity, perceived objectivity, and strangle-hold on government-sponsored mapping projects diminish.⁵⁵ In fact, the impetus for global standardization of cartographic data and general reference maps – and the reliance on the private sector for such material – has significantly increased since the Second World War. The various American and European politicians who attempt to grapple with such problems are usually quick to justify their decisions and arguments by deferring to cartographic experts who a mere century before would have had to compete for funding from an academic geography department.⁵⁶ In the postwar

⁵² Ibid., 401-402.

⁵³ David Murphy. *The Heroic Earth: Geopolitical Thought in Weimar Germany, 1918-1933* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1997), 251-252.

⁵⁴ Jack Dangermond and Lowell Kent Smith. "Geographic Information Systems and the Revolution in Cartography: The Nature of the Role Played by a Commercial Organization" in *The American Cartographer*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (July 1988), pp. 301-310.

⁵⁵ See John O'Looney's *Beyond Maps: GIS and Decision Making in Local Government*. Redlands, CA: ESRI Press, 2003. Also see Robert Widz's "Land in a New Space: Robert Widz Explores the Impact Technology is Having on the Historic World of Cadastre or Land Management" in *GEO: connexion*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (March 2007), pp. 32-34.

⁵⁶ Frank Costigliola. "An 'Arm Around the Shoulder': The United States, NATO and German reunification, 1989-1990" in *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1994), 103. Also see Joseph Breu's "The

era, however, cartography had just begun to become a very profitable business – particularly for the United States – and its status as a discipline in its own right paralleled its emergence as a means through which to shape an audience’s perception of space, place, and power. Cartography could not accomplish this task alone – not, at least, on a grand scale. It needed a medium through which to disseminate and produce its maps. It needed to gain legitimacy through publication in authoritative journals, popular magazines, and schoolrooms. It needed, in a word, a salesman

Standardization of Geographical Names within the Framework of the United Nations” in the *International Yearbook of Cartography*, Vol. 22 (1982), pp. 42-47.

CHAPTER 4 ORIENTING A POSTWAR GERMANY

A little advertising goes a long way. - Arthur H. Robinson¹

One medium through which to “sell” the new German map would be, unsurprisingly, the United States government. As the Allied forces reclaimed and redistributed the abstract territorial renderings of European nation-states, very real individuals suddenly found themselves living radically different cartographic propositions (Figure 4-1). Moreover, each Allied power had very different ideas about how these lines should be drawn on the postwar world map. Potentially catastrophic consequences of re-drawing Europe’s internal boundaries such as these were not unforeseen by the American chief of the OSS Map Division, Arthur H. Robinson. By 1944 Robinson was writing letters to the Director of OSS Research & Analysis, William Langer, arguing that the R&A Branch needed to be more direct when presenting to the Joint Chiefs of Staff justification for their administrative existence in a postwar environment. Robinson claimed that “post-peace intelligence work is likely to be favorable for the R&A”, especially when one considered the difficulty the United States was bound to have in redrafting the borders of Poland, the Balkans, Turkey, and China hand-in-hand with the Soviet Union.²

While Robinson was concerned with such issues, he was also anxious about the United States maintaining a continuous cartographic presence in Europe and Asia. The day before submitting his suggestions above to William Langer, Robinson sent the

¹ Letter to Dr. William L. Langer from Arthur H. Robinson (9 August 1944), NARA RG 226, Stack 190 03/02/7, Box #9.

² Ibid.

Executive Committee of the R&A Branch a “brief outline of the general program and future actions as conceived in the Map Division.” He emphasized two main goals of his Division: 1) to have Map Division representatives on hand at the eventual Peace Conference of the Second World War and 2) to establish the Map Division as a permanent government agency. In favor of his first objective, Robinson argued that “more than a year and a half ago preliminary plans were laid for the development of a system of base maps, pointed . . . toward use at a Peace Conference.”³ To deny attendance at such a conference to the Map Division would be antithetical to one of its original reasons for organization: to re-map a postwar Europe. Robinson went on to justify his aim at permanently establishing the Map Division as a quasi-independent intelligence program, claiming that map intelligence throughout the Second World War “has been haphazard and poorly administered . . . [The Map Division has] had ample opportunity to examine the shortcomings of the [mapping intelligence within the] military system.” According to Robinson, a comprehensive map intelligence program was needed – but one separate from the military which could objectively critique military map collection, creation, and storage. He realized this would be a difficult sell to the Joint Chiefs and advised Director Langer to make “such a recommendation . . . appear to come from the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] themselves.”⁴

Robinson’s efforts were not made in vain. The OSS R&A Branch report presented to the Joint Chiefs on 16 August 1944 included the recommendation to begin producing topographical maps of “potentially critical areas” and to also update their

³ Letter to Dr. William L. Langer from Arthur H. Robinson (8 August 1944), NARA RG 226, Stack 190 03/02/7, Box #9.

⁴ Ibid.

“base maps” of Upper Silesia, the Polish corridor, the Baltic nations, Polish-Russian borderlands, and the Balkan territories, among others.⁵ Two days later, on 18 August, the Joint Chiefs agreed with the R&A Branch’s assessment of postwar mapping: the Map Division needed to prepare for “conflicts of territorial claim”. While they also agreed that cartographical issues such as the German-Polish borderland, the Sudetenland, and the Italian-Yugoslav border needed to eventually be addressed, the Joint Chiefs were more concerned with mapping problems that had a bit more “strategic importance”: the proximity of Finland to Leningrad, the territorial control of the Kiel Canal (the German canal that links the Baltic Sea with the North Sea), control of East Indian waters, Iran and the Persian Gulf, and the location of Latin American air and naval bases for the sake of “hemisphere defense.”⁶ And so the Map Division had its new assignment and some reasserted value to the postwar efforts of the Allies – straight from the Joint Chiefs:

Delimitation and demarcation of new boundary lines raise problems of major military as well as political importance, requiring detailed studies preparatory to settlement. Such studies should be undertaken at the earliest possible moment for all project boundary areas.⁷

And the planning began.

The postwar reconstruction of Germany was an obvious priority for the Allied forces and by 1945 the Map Division had drawn a series of seventy-five administrative maps, each depicting a different German state and focusing on “certain administrative

⁵ “Suggested Progress of OSS Post-Hostilities Studies” (drafted 14 August 1944), , NARA RG 226, Stack 190 03/02/7, Box #9.

⁶ “Post-Hostilities Problems of Military Import” (18 August 1944), , NARA RG 226, Stack 190 03/02/7, Box #9.

⁷ Ibid.

aspects, such as transportation, public health, public safety, legal, labor, and finance.”⁸

Unfortunately, neither Robinson nor Langer could have anticipated the problems the Allies would face during the four-power occupation of Germany and how unprepared their maps truly were.

As much as nation-state boundaries mattered during the Second World War, they seemed to have become all the more important when the war came to an end. Emigration was, unsurprisingly, a difficult issue for the various consulates in Germany, complicated even more by the lack of communication and cooperation between the French, British, American, and Soviet governments (Figure 4-2).

In many cases, geography would become the only factor deciding whether or not a family or individual could emigrate and, if they could, where they were allowed to emigrate. As noted by one American consulate staffer:

It is one thing to say to a man in Hamburg that he can not go to America although his friend in Frankfurt can; it is quite another thing to say to a man in Berlin-Wilmersdorf that he cannot go to America while his friend and neighbor one-half or one-fourth or one-eighth of a mile away in Berlin-Schoeneberg can. And it is near tragedy to say, as has actually occurred in several instances, that one family on the south side of a street may qualify, while their friends and neighbors on the north side of the street, which happens to be the British sector, may not . . .⁹

Originally, in September 1945, the United States military had split its respective occupation zone – which largely consisted of southern German states – into three provisional Länder (excluding Berlin): one encompassing nearly the entire state of Bavaria according to its pre-occupation administrative boundaries and the other two incorporating sections of Württemberg-Baden, Hesse, and Bremen with little regard for

⁸ NARA Microfilm M1949, Roll #8.

⁹ “Memorandum: Problems Arising in Berlin in Connection with Immigration to USA Under the Truman Directive” (29 June 1946), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 58/11/05, Box #2.

“traditional administrative lines”.¹⁰ But by March 1946, the U.S. State Department had established six consular districts meant to make resettlement within Germany and emigration from Germany more efficient in accordance with President Truman’s Directive (22 December 1945) which emphasized the importance of allowing European displaced persons to apply for emigration to the United States. The new consulate offices were based in Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and Munich which, in theory, allowed for the expanded ability of the United States to cope with territorially sensitive issues (i.e. resettlement and emigration).¹¹

The fluid nature of these provisional administrative boundaries, however, often resulted in confusion for the administrators and frustration for those individuals living within the artificial lines. For example, one particularly problematic section of Germany was the “Bremen Enclave”, a small slice of land smack in the middle of the British occupation zone. The U.S. had requested control of Bremen because the city-state acted as a convenient port on the Weser River, which flowed into the North Sea, giving the American military a foothold in northern Germany. Prior to 10 January 1946, the American-occupied “Bremen Enclave” consisted not only of Bremen, but also of three surrounding districts: Osterholtz, Wesermarsch, and Wesermünde. After January 10th, the administrative authority over these three districts was transferred to the British Military Government and, subsequently, became subject to British resettlement and immigration policies. Problematically, however, many individuals living in the

¹⁰ “Questions Relating to Germany Territorial Reorganization: Statement by the Head of the U.S. Delegation” in *The Council of Foreign Ministers: Documents on Germany, Sessions I-VI, 1945-1949* (Washington, D.C.: Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, March 1950), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #3.

¹¹ “Memorandum No. 55” (8 March 1946), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 58/11/05, Box #2.

Osterholtz, Wesermarsch, and Wesermünde districts appealed to the U.S. consulate in Frankfurt (which was responsible for the “Bremen Enclave” until the March 1946 territorial reorganization) for immigration to the United States on the basis that they had been occupied by the American Military Government when the Truman Directive was issued in December 1945. After all, it was typical American military policy to accept the registrations and visas from “qualified displaced persons and persecutees who resided in the American zones of occupation prior to December 22, 1945.”¹² Apparently, the Consul General in Frankfurt did not know the territorial history of the “Bremen Enclave” and requested from his superiors information on the actual boundaries of American-occupied Bremen. He was told to concern himself only with those persons living within the new American “Bremen Enclave”, and that individuals living in the three districts which had in December 1945 been under American occupation were no longer eligible to be considered for immigration to the United States, despite what the immigration policy might have been elsewhere in Germany. A map was, of course, sent to the Consul General, clearly delineating the four sections of the old “Bremen Enclave” to serve as a bit of cartographic memory and make clear exactly what territories were no longer under American control ([Figure 4-3](#)).¹³

By the spring of 1947 the immediacy of establishing administrative control over Germany had waned. Having etched into the German map their respective occupation zones, the four Allied powers sent foreign policy representatives (named, appropriately enough, the “Control Council”) to a series of meetings in which they were charged with

¹² Letter to John Stone from George Haering (15 June 1946), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 58/11/05, Box #2.

¹³ Letter to Travers from Haering (8 April 1946) and Letter from Altaffer to Haering (10 April 1946), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 58/11/05, Box #2.

rebuilding “a Europe better than it replaces.”¹⁴ Furthermore, they were commissioned to “establish a precise definition of the administrative and territorial division of Germany as of May 1, 1947, indicating boundaries of lands and provinces.” Such a task would not be an easy accomplishment, especially when they were required to only solidify cartographic propositions of Germany that were met with approval from all four Allied powers.¹⁵

On 15 March 1947, the Control Council met for the first time with position papers in-hand. From the outset it was clear that problems were going to arise – even before the mapping could begin. The delegation from the Soviet Union began their statement by railing against what they perceived to be the conceptual basis behind territorial re-allocation by the British. According to the Soviets, the U.K. had made it clear during an Allied meeting in November 1946 that “the territorial frontiers of the Lands in the British Zone were determined in such a way that the Lands should not be very small and consequently could not be swallowed by the future central government.” The Soviet delegates found this type of attitude wholly unacceptable. In their eyes, the British were attempting to “predetermine the future structure of the State of Germany in the direction of federalization.” How, asked the Soviets, could re-territorialization even begin to take place if the British were already trying to rig the eventual political environment in a way

¹⁴ “Questions Relating to Germany: Statement by U.S. Delegation, Polish-German Frontier” (9 April 1947) in *The Council of Foreign Ministers: Documents on Germany, Sessions I-VI, 1945-1949* (Washington, D.C.: Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, March 1950), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #3.

¹⁵ “Territorial Reorganization” (2 April 1947) in *The Council of Foreign Ministers: Documents on Germany, Sessions I-VI, 1945-1949* (Washington, D.C.: Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, March 1950), pg. 299, NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #3.

favorable to their own ideology?¹⁶ Yet the French released a statement not one week later supporting the British position and emphasizing the necessity of a German map which would encourage de-centralization and “local responsibility.”¹⁷ Somewhat surprisingly, however, the United States agreed with the Soviet delegation that Germany should eventually be free to determine its own political environment and that all amendments to the German map had to be met with unanimous consent.¹⁸ Having not really at all resolved the various underlying sentiments of each Allied power regarding German re-territorialization, the Control Council trudged on to more tangible problems

One such concern was the Polish-German border. It had already been established at the Potsdam Conference (July-August 1945) that Poland would gain a considerable amount of eastern German territory. What still needed to be worked out was “how and where to draw the final line so as to avoid unnecessary and unjustified economic upset and to minimize inescapable irredentist pressure in Germany.” The Allies projected that some sixty-six million people would be residing in Germany by 1950 and were concerned about squeezing them all into a smaller nation-state. Simultaneously, however, the Allies easily admitted that Poland needed to be

¹⁶ “Questions Relating to Germany: Territorial Reorganization of Germany, Statement by the Soviet Delegation” (15 March 1947) in *The Council of Foreign Ministers: Documents on Germany, Sessions I-VI, 1945-1949* (Washington, D.C.: Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, March 1950), pg. 106, NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #3.

¹⁷ “Questions Relating to Germany: Form and Scope of the Provisional Political Organization of Germany, Statement by the Head of the French Delegation” (22 March 1947) in *The Council of Foreign Ministers: Documents on Germany, Sessions I-VI, 1945-1949* (Washington, D.C.: Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, March 1950), pg. 205, NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #3.

¹⁸ “Territorial Reorganization” (26 March 1947) in *The Council of Foreign Ministers: Documents on Germany, Sessions I-VI, 1945-1949* (Washington, D.C.: Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, March 1950), pg. 239, NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #3.

compensated for what had happened to it during the Second World War and for its most eastern territory which had been permanently consumed by the Soviet government.

Thus, the Council agreed to cede southern East Prussia and German Upper Silesia to Poland, effectively granting Poland all German territory east of the Oder River.¹⁹

The French delegation was willing to go along with such cartographic addenda so long as the other Powers supported the transfer of German territories which would be advantageous to them. The Saar territory (or, as it would be known after this date and until 1957, the Saar Protectorate) was ceded to France in April 1947, its large deposits of coal downplayed by the French who claimed that such an act of re-territorialization was a humanitarian endeavor, depriving “Germany of a portion of her war potential.”²⁰ In fact, if the French delegation was to be believed, France only ever acted out of the impulse to “offer to the world a genuine guarantee of security . . . guided by no spirit of private ambition.”²¹ Somehow, though, France could not help but benefit by playing world-savior along with the Americans, British, and Soviets. They managed to gain substantial economic advantages in the Ruhr region and along the Rhine River, pushing for their internationalization under the watchful eye of the French

¹⁹ “Questions Relating to Germany: Statement by the U.S. Delegation, Polish-German Frontier” (9 April 1947) in *The Council of Foreign Ministers: Documents on Germany, Sessions I-VI, 1945-1949* (Washington, D.C.: Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, March 1950), pp. 359-362, NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #3.

²⁰ “Questions Relating to Germany: Memorandum by the French Delegation, Regime for the Saar” (10 April 1947) in *The Council of Foreign Ministers: Documents on Germany, Sessions I-VI, 1945-1949* (Washington, D.C.: Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, March 1950), pg. 365, NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #3.

²¹ “Questions Relating to Germany: Future Frontiers of Germany, Statement by the Head of the French Delegation” (9 April 1947) in *The Council of Foreign Ministers: Documents on Germany, Sessions I-VI, 1945-1949* (Washington, D.C.: Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, March 1950), pp. 362-365, NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #3.

government.²² Even when supporting the claims to territory by other Allied nation-states – such as Belgian settlement claims and the re-drafting of Czechoslovakian borders to their 1938 boundaries – the French could not help but “say a few words about the Franco-German frontier”, barraging their colleagues with tales of the many historical “vicissitudes” suffered by the French at the hands of the ever-aggressive Germans.²³ Such an attitude on the part of the French would create territorial problems later after the war, allowing the Saar protectorate to consistently serve as a potential “stumbling block to [the] establishment of a European Defense Community” throughout the early 1950s.²⁴

The majority of the Control Council’s work had been completed by 1 May, in accordance with their mandate. Talks lasted well into the fall of 1947, but few things changed (including each nation-state’s rhetoric). In November 1947, the Control Council officially concluded territorial talks, allocating any further re-mapping problems to each Allies’ respective German Deputy for study and report.²⁵ What followed,

²² Ibid.

²³ “Questions Relating to Germany: Statement by the Head of the French Delegation in Regard to Frontier Rectifications Claimed by Several Allied Countries” (11 April 1947) in *The Council of Foreign Ministers: Documents on Germany, Sessions I-VI, 1945-1949* (Washington, D.C.: Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, March 1950), pp. 413-415, NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #3.

²⁴ “Weekly Foreign Information Policy Guidance, No. 101” (12 March 1952), pg. 2, NARA RG 335, Stack 631 46/43/05, Box #1.

²⁵ “Council of Foreign Ministers (Questions relating to Germany): Frontiers of Germany, Proposal of the U.K. Delegation” (28 November 1947) in *The Council of Foreign Ministers: Documents on Germany, Sessions I-VI, 1945-1949* (Washington, D.C.: Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, March 1950), pg. 516, NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #3. Also see “Council of Foreign Ministers: Questions Relating to Germany: Preparation of the German Peace Treaty Frontiers, Statement Made by M. Georges Bidault, Chief of the French Delegation” (27 November 1947) in *The Council of Foreign Ministers: Documents on Germany, Sessions I-VI, 1945-1949* (Washington, D.C.: Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, March 1950), pp. 511-515, NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #3.

obviously, would permanently divide Germany into two states. The Berlin Blockade of 1948 and the subsequent year-long Airlift resulted in Stalin's proclamation of East Germany as its own nation-state, separate from the West.²⁶ This is a familiar story, but how did the Americans, British, and French respond administratively to this permanent division? How did they utilize their influence in West Germany and the polarization of East-West European politics to their advantage? What happened after the division? While I will deal primarily with West Germany and only peripherally with its Eastern counterpart, I hope to eventually incorporate more about the GDR into a larger project on this topic in the future.

Most historians recognize 1949 as the year West Germany became a sovereign nation-state. If this true, then there must be different degrees of "sovereignty" that I am unfamiliar with because both East and West Germany were clearly still administratively occupied. Both states were certainly not "sovereign" in the same sense that Germany had been prior to 1946. By 1951, West Germany had clearly regained some semblance of sovereignty. On 9 July, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France all terminated their states of war with Germany²⁷ and by October 1951 they had seriously relaxed their commercial oversight of the country per an agreement signed between Allied Foreign Ministers in September 1950.²⁸ None of this, of course, meant that West Germany had been relieved of Allied military government control, but such quasi-

²⁶ For more on this period and the development of the permanent division, see Carolyn Eisenberg's *Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

²⁷ "Weekly Foreign Information Policy Guidance, No. 66" (5 July 1951), pg. 3, NARA RG 335, Stack 631 46/43/05, Box #1.

²⁸ "Weekly Foreign Information Policy Guidance, No. 74" (28 August 1951), pg. 2, NARA RG 335, Stack 631 46/43/05, Box #1.

independence lent itself to problematic circumstances – particularly in regard to mapmaking.

The ability for a modern nation-state to map itself is an issue of sovereignty, self-preservation, and administrative control. As has been explained above, until the 1950s Germany was not mapping itself but, rather, being cartographically controlled by its Allied occupiers. As Allied regulations relaxed and as quasi-sovereignty was granted to the government of West Germany, it seems understandable that the government would wish to begin mapping itself, especially in a cultural and academic environment which had, before World War II, been on the cutting edge of geographic and cartographic research. Academically, German map-making and map-studying professors had begun to be re-employed by their educational institutions in the summer of 1945 and, in fact, many quickly found postwar employment in private companies and bureaucratic agencies. Those who had moved back into their universities began “organizing within their respective zones”, sharing cartographic information with one another and attempting to hold academic conferences.²⁹ By the 1950s, aerial photography had become an indispensable aspect of producing large-scale topographic maps. Since the end of the war, German cartographers had been compiling and using aerial photographs in close cooperation with the Allied Civil Aviation Board. By 1953 the German Ministry of Transport created procedural guidelines “on the permission, supervision, and release” of aerial photographs which were to be followed by both the

²⁹ Thomas R. Smith and Lloyd D. Black. “German Geography: War Work and Present Status” in *Geographical Review*, Vol. 36, No. 6 (July 1946), 405 & 407. This was an explicit organizing effort. Walter Behrmann and Hermann Lautensach were in charge of the Soviet Zone, Carl Troll was in charge of the British Zone, Emil Meynen was in charge of Northern Bavaria, Wilhelm Credner was in charge of Southern Bavaria, Gerhart Bartsch was in charge of Hesse, and Heinrich Schmitthenner was in charge of Baden-Württemberg.

Allied Powers and the German government. After the Allied Civil Aviation Board was dissolved in May 1955, the German government was still more than happy to work alongside the Allied powers in producing aerial photos, so long as everyone followed the clear procedures as laid out by the Ministry of Transport.³⁰ This worked out incredibly well, without any complaints from either side until the British and Americans began to get nervous about Cold War tensions and the possibility of aerial photographs falling into the hands of a hostile world power.

On 30 November 1955, the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) released a memo to the “National Military Representatives” of Germany explaining how important it was for aerial photographs to be given a certain level of protection.³¹ The American and British forces promised that they were not interested in “blanket approval” to regulate “all conceivable activities” undertaken by West Germany’s aerial photographs, but they did feel as though they needed to begin supervising the production and dissemination of aerial photographs taken around certain areas of Germany in which the Western Allies had a particular interest. Any such activities, the Allies again promised, “would be [of a] character of which [the] Germans would approve.”³² The Germans, however, did not approve.

Nor did the Germans become more receptive when, in December 1955, a British delegate demanded that the German laws surrounding aerial photography become

³⁰ “Aerial Photography: Statement made by the German Delegate at the Meeting of the Steering Committee on 3 December 1955” (3 December 1955), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #7.

³¹ “Classification of Aerial Photographs” (30 November 1955), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #1.

³² “German Forces Arrangements – Surveys” (12 November 1955), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #14.

“more stringent . . . with a view to achieving stricter [Allied] control.” These new restrictions would include the permission of the Western Allied Forces “before disposing of prints or negatives in any way” and would require Allied approval of any sensitive topographical photographs which might be “of considerable strategic value to a potential enemy.”³³ In effect, the British delegate was demanding that the German aerial photographers be constantly subject to Allied security clearance and supervision.

In response, the Germans argued that to re-draft their aerial photography laws would be a violation of their sovereignty. Moreover, they claimed, laws concerning the protection of aerial photography already existed under the “German Aviation Law” of 1953. On 9 December 1955, the Allied Forces ordered that the “German Aviation Law” be evaluated.³⁴ The Allies found the Aviation Law acceptable, for the most part, and understood the German desire to control their own maps. However, a compromise was reached on 11 April 1956, after months of negotiations, requiring the mutual exchange of cartographic information important to a “common defense” and allowing the United States to make its own map surveys of West Germany under German supervision, if the Germans so desired (unless, of course, the Allies wanted to make these maps in secret – then they were allowed to do so according to the new agreement).³⁵ Eventually this agreement was amended, renamed, and ratified in July 1957 as the “U.S.-German

³³ “Aerial Photography: Summary of the British Delegate’s Statement at the Meeting of the Steering Committee on 5 December 1955” (14 December 1955), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #1.

³⁴ “Status Report on the New Forces Arrangements” (31 December 1955), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #1.

³⁵ “German Forces Arrangements – Surveys” (18 April 1956), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #14.

Bilateral Administrative Agreement on Aerial Photography”³⁶ which required little more than that the West German Ministry of Transport send “copies of all applications for aerial photography licenses which the German authorities intend to approve” to the Allied Forces for review. The Allies could, at any time and for any reason, veto a license.³⁷ The Allies also created a “Central Inspection Zone” between East and West Germany which allowed for fly-over aerial photographs to be taken by both the Soviet Union and the U.S./U.K. as an act of mutual confidence in one another.³⁸ These agreements remained in effect until the March 1991 ratification of the “Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany” which eliminated all restrictions on German sovereignty and eventually resulted in the reunification of East and West Germany. If a nation-state must have control over its own mapping projects (including the mapping of its own territory) in order to truly be a sovereign state, then it could be argued that West Germany was never truly sovereign.

The division of Germany into East and West was a striking consequence of the territorial re-arrangement of the Second World War, especially if we consider Germany’s historical-geographic context. For most of its history, the German balance of power oscillated between North (Prussia) and South (Bavaria and Austria) and was largely a self-conscious juxtaposition based on cultural differences and ethnocentrism. The East/West divide cartographically contributed to the Cold War between Eastern and

³⁶ Telegram to SeoState Washington from John Hay” (6 February 1959), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #1.

³⁷ “Draft US-German Bilateral Administrative Agreement on Aerial Photography” (July 1957), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #1.

³⁸ Letter to David K. Bruce from Ray L. Thurston (12 March 1958), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 56/35/04, Box #1.

Western Europe. Ironically, the United States was initially concerned about restoring Germany to its pre-WWII boundaries because of its central position in Europe – a prime spot to “play off the East and West against each other.”³⁹ In reality, as the Soviet Union distanced itself from the other Three Powers, the Allies ended up playing Germany’s political and cartographic juxtaposition off of each other so as to benefit themselves.

The Three-Power Alliance in West Germany (the U.S., the U.K., and France) had a difficult time creating a consistent narrative into which they could fit a divided Germany. In 1950, the Three-Powers released a report claiming that the “principal propaganda weapons of the DDR Government and of the Soviets in Germany at present are, the progress of the Two and Five Year Economic Plans and the call for German unity.”⁴⁰ Moreover, the Allies wished to emphasize the importance (referred to, in fact, as their “primary objective”) of West Germany’s solidarity with the West – a much more imperative relationship to forge than any semblance of solidarity with its other half.⁴¹ Yet, not two years later the Allies were pushing hard for German reunification and spinning the East/West split as some kind of geographic Soviet scheme to infiltrate the West.⁴² This type of cartographic schizophrenia not only laid the terrain for the Cold War, but fueled an understanding of insurmountable hemispheric conflict and cultural difference. In this sense, maps and geographic orientation were used to

³⁹ “Notes as to Agreed U.S. Policy Respecting Germany and Action by the U.S. in Accordance with Such Policy for Western European Security” (1949), Pg. 3, NARA RG 335, Stack 490 8/35/03-07, Box #1.

⁴⁰ “Paper on the Iron and Steel Foundries and Forges in the Soviet Zone” (31 December 1950), pg. 3, NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/31/02, Box #4.

⁴¹ “Weekly Information Policy Guidance, No. 23 (6 September 1950), NARA RG 335, Stack 631 46/43/05, Box #1.

⁴² “Weekly Foreign Information Policy Guidance, No. 103” (26 March 1952), NARA RG 335, Stack 631 46/43/05, Box #1.

“sell” a particular political narrative in the hope of simultaneously forcing the map (a narrative itself) to fit into that same story. The maps of government agencies were only one medium of cartographic narrative-building and while it would take the cooperation of the government with private enterprise to shape (and distribute) an entirely different projection of the world, the most obvious medium through which to disseminate such maps were public libraries.

CHAPTER 5 HOW TO DISSEMINATE YOUR MAP

Shortly after engaging in the Second World War and realizing the inadequacy of its cartographic holdings, the American military recognized the importance of centralizing its maps and making sure that they would be easily accessible, well maintained, and accurately catalogued. While public relations firms and other corporate entities offered a convenient medium through which to distribute copies of its maps, the U.S. military wanted a more systematized and orderly dissemination of its cartographic information. In fact, any dissemination of this kind, if it was going to accomplish what the military wanted, would need to be the most well organized and executed allocation of mapped material in the history of the world. While the institutionalization of cartography may have occurred alongside the invention of the modern nation-state, the necessity of institutionalizing the continuous dissemination of maps was only recognized after the world's largest cartographic upheaval.

As is so often the case in historical studies which attempt to poke and prod at massive government undertakings, this essay cannot hope to comprehensively deal with this project. Certainly, though, by contextualizing even one thread – one case-study – of its execution, the largest and most well thought-through movement of mapped material in the world becomes not simply more easily understood, but also more interesting, more provocative, and more likely to inspire further academic conversation and research.

During the 1930s, the University of Florida's library system was struggling. Having only established a building to house its collective holdings in 1925 and suffering from the economic problems of the Great Depression, the system was small,

underfunded, and skeletally staffed. Whereas today's University of Florida libraries hold over 4,000,000 books, in 1925 that figure was sitting stagnant at 40,000.¹ The past and present appear to be even more at odds when comparing the map holdings of the university in the early twentieth century with the contemporary Map & Imagery Library – a center which, with over 500,000 catalogued maps, is the largest cartographic library in the southeastern United States and the second largest university map library in the country.² As one Florida librarian wrote to a potential donor in 1934: “You ask us about our map collection. We, unfortunately, have no maps, or so few that it is best to say we have none.”³ The name of this potential donor was John C. Cooper, Jr., a fellow of the American Geographical Society and Vice-President of the New York City based Pan American Airways, Inc. (or Pan Am, as it was known until its 1991 collapse).⁴ Cooper had a deep appreciation and interest in cartography and owned a home in Florida where he kept various maps, most of which represented the state. Some of these were incredibly rare and valuable at the time, including a sixteenth-century map from Ortelius' *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum* depicting Florida and an 1806 map of Florida drawn by John Carey.⁵ In total, Cooper loaned at least thirty-six maps to the University of Florida from early 1934 through the spring of 1935,⁶ allowing the library staff to hold several exhibits

¹ Vernon N. Kisling, Jr. “George A. Smathers Libraries History, 1853-2007”. Available online at the George A. Smathers website: <http://www.uflib.ufl.edu/msl/LibraryHistory.html>

² Christopher J.J. Thiry, ed. *Guide to U.S. Map Resources, Third Edition* (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2006), 74-75 and 309.

³ Letter to Mr. John C. Cooper, Jr. from Cora Miltimore (14 March 1934), UFUA Series 08a, Box #3.

⁴ Letter to Miss Cora Miltimore from Mr. John C. Cooper, Jr. (5 October 1934), UFUA Series 08a, Box #3.

⁵ “List of Maps Loaned the University of Florida Library by Mr. John C. Cooper, Jr., 1934” (21 September? 1934), UFUA Series 08a, Box #3.

⁶ Letter to Mr. John C. Cooper, Jr. from Cora Miltimore (21 September 1934), UFUA Series 08a, Box #3.

of Florida maps and slowly building an institutional appreciation for cartography in general.⁷ It would take about ten more years, however, before the University of Florida would again commit to the collection of cartographic information.

As one of the more prominent universities in the state of Florida, the University of Florida had become a Regional Depository Library for the United States government in 1907. Established by the 1895 Printing Act, the depository program of the Government Printing Office was responsible for efficiently distributing government documents to selected libraries “for public use without charge.”⁸ For a university interested in expanding its library collections, such a program offered a great deal of opportunity. As a 1942 report to the Library Committee explained, “The United States government documents in particular are reliable, up-to-date and inexpensive sources of information on practically every subject of interest.”⁹ The year this statement was written, the University of Florida library system received over 500 documents a month through this program.¹⁰ Moreover, the library had agreed to keep a collection of the Library of Congress’s Depository Cards (which served as a duplicate copy so as to minimize the risk of misplacing or losing material). By early 1943 the University of Florida, which had agreed to catalogue 50,000 cards a year, was attempting to file nearly 12,500 a month –

⁷ Letter to Miss Cora Miltimore from Mr. John C. Cooper, Jr. (6 June 1934) and Letter to Mr. J.C. Cooper, Jr. from Cora Miltimore (1934), UFUA Series 08a, Box #3. Apparently Mr. Cooper’s daughter, Jane, was also influenced into an appreciation of cartography by her father. She would go on to become a fairly well-known poet (who had an obituary in the New York Times on 9 November 2007) and wrote a collection named *Maps And Windows* (New York: MacMillan, 1974).

⁸ Jeffrey M. Wilhite. “The Evolution of Public Printing in the United States”. Available: <http://libraries.ou.edu/locations/docs/govdocs/federal.ppt> (Accessed 29 January 2011)

⁹ Memorandum to the Members of the Library Committee from H.W. Chandler (28 May 1942) with an attached report written by Walter J. Matherly, pg. 1 of report. University of Florida University Archive (Gainesville, Florida) Series 124, Box #1.

¹⁰ Memorandum to the Members of the Library Committee from H.W. Chandler (28 May 1942) with an attached report written by Walter J. Matherly, pg. 1 of report. UFUA Series 124, Box #1.

an impossible feat for their small staff (which consisted of one part-time and three full-time cataloguers).¹¹ Such circumstances brought about the addition of a full-time “documents librarian” later that year who was charged with organizing the institution’s government Depository Cards and documents.¹² The hiring was not done a moment too soon, as the amount of documents flowing from the federal government to the University of Florida was increasing at an incredible level as each year of the Second World War passed. From September 1943 through June 1944, the Library received 5607 documents through the depository program.¹³ The next year that number increased to 7477.¹⁴

Very little of the information being processed through the depository program, however, had anything to do with maps or mapped material. However, soon after the end of the war the Army Map Service, under the leadership of Colonel A.G. Matthews,¹⁵ emulated the organizational structure and dissemination model of the United States Federal Depository Program in order to re-allocate the maps that they had reproduced, captured, and sometimes even hand-drawn during the war. By doing so they hoped to protect the cartographic information of the United States and to project a particular mapped narrative of the world so intensely that its acceptance would seem common-

¹¹ “Memorandum on the Situation in the Catalog Department” (15 January 1943), UFUA Series 17, Box #1.

¹² “University of Florida Library Documents Department, Annual Report”, pg. 1 (July 1943 – June 1944), UFUA Series 17, Box #1.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pg. 4.

¹⁴ “University of Florida Library Documents Department, Annual Report”, pg. 4 (July 1944 – June 1945), UFUA Series 17, Box #1.

¹⁵ Marvin W. Sears. *Effectiveness of the Army Map Service Map Depository Program and Methods for Promoting Map Use*. Dissertation for the Catholic University of America (July 1960), 4.

place and unquestionable. After all, military mapping agencies had been established to, in part, help re-map a postwar Europe.¹⁶ Rather than keep their maps locked up and protected from the scrutiny of its populace, the goal of the American Army Map Service was to inundate the public with its maps in order to make its spatial orientations so accessible that there would be no question concerning their authority and accuracy. Having already observed the “competitive scramble” for maps shortly after Great Britain declared war on Germany, keeping maps on-hand made sense.¹⁷ Moreover, the naturalization of émigrés¹⁸ and the postwar division of Germany made the production and distribution of government maps imperative.

It must have been exciting, then, for Nelle Barmore, Acting Librarian at the University of Florida since early 1945, to receive a letter from the Army Map Service in September of that same year requesting that her library act as a depository for the thousands of maps and charts produced and captured by the AMS during the Second World War. Certainly, the excitement of participating in building a stronger cartographic library at the University of Florida and, as the AMS made clear, “for the United States Government” made the Army Map Service Depository Program’s offer incredibly attractive (particularly, of course, when such an offer included the delivery and

¹⁶ Letter to Dr. William L. Langer from Arthur H. Robinson (8 August 1944), NARA RG 226, Stack 190 03/02/7, Box #9.

¹⁷ Leonard S. Wilson. “Lessons from the Experience of the Map Information Section, OSS” in *Geographical Review*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (April 1949), 298.

¹⁸ Alice C. Hudson. “The New York Public Library’s Map Division Goes to War, 1941-1945” in *Bulletin: Special Library Association, Geography and Map Division*, No. 182 (Spring 1996), 13-14.

acquisition of materials “free of charge”).¹⁹ She would almost immediately respond to them and agree to the following terms, as outlined by the AMS:

To index or catalog and place in an active file all items which we ship to your institution.

To hold the material for necessary reference purposes making it available through your normal circulation channel and loan facilities.

To not copy or distribute material received from the Army Map Service without prior approval of the AMS. Likewise, to handle the material in accordance with any protective security regulations imposed by the Army Map Service.

To keep the Army Map Service informed of any and all of your institution’s acquisitions of maps and geographical data by means of complete accessions lists.

To make available to the Army Map Service duplicate copies (beyond your needs) of maps and geographical data which your institution may receive from sources other than the U.S. Government.²⁰

While their conditions seemed to suggest that the AMS was more interested in having access to mapped materials than in disseminating them, no “protective security regulations” were ever put into practice and nearly every map distributed to the University of Florida was available for public consumption and, often, for loan.

In 1942 Barmore had moved from her position as the Librarian of the Rockefeller Foundation in New York to become the Head Cataloguer at the University of Florida.²¹ Yet, after nearly three years at the University of Florida Library as Head Cataloguer (and, as one of her co-workers commented, she was by far the “most experienced

¹⁹ Letter to “Librarian, University of Florida” from W.D. Milne (19 September 1945), University of Florida University Archive (Gainesville, Florida) Series 08a, Box #6.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Dorothy M. Cramer. “Obituary: Nelle Barmore, 1899-1957” in *Bulletin of the Medical Library Association*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (July 1957), 456.

cataloguer” in the library system)²² and after being appointed “Acting Director” of the University Library, she had not been allowed to apply for the permanent Directorship. The President of the university at the time, John Tigert, had made it clear to Barmore that he “wanted a man” to serve as the official head of the library and that she was simply acting in that capacity until a man for the position could be found. She took great personal offense to this and eventually cited such sentiment as the reason she would leave her post in 1946.²³ It should be noted, however, that Barmore laid much of the foundation for the University of Florida’s contemporary Map & Imagery Library by working with the Army Map Service’s Depository Program.

On 1 November 1945 Barmore received a letter from the AMS stating that the distribution of the maps would begin “on or about” the 15th of that month. According to the letter, this distribution would take three years and would involve around 50,000 maps (to the University of Florida library alone). Obviously, the sheer number of maps needing cataloging and storage was monumental. Barmore and her staff urgently searched for inexpensive filing cabinets and drawer units to hold the coming acquisitions.²⁴ Unfortunately, the University of Florida library staff was not the only one in the country which was struggling to find the funds or space to store the AMS’s map collection. In fact, about forty-five other major universities had joined the AMS

²² “Interview with Vivian C. Prince” (April 27, 1979), 8. SPOHP Digital Collections: <http://www.uflib.ufl.edu/ufdc/?b=UF00006019&v=00001>

²³ “Interview with Vivian C. Prince” (April 27, 1979), 5. SPOHP Digital Collections: <http://www.uflib.ufl.edu/ufdc/?b=UF00006019&v=00001> ; Also see “Interview with Ms. Frances Apperson” (1 November 1976), 20-21. SPOHP Digital Collections: <http://www.uflib.ufl.edu/ufdc/?b=UF00005936&v=00001>

²⁴ Letter to Librarian, University of Florida from W.D. Wilne (1 November 1945), UFUA Series 08a, Box #6.

Depository Program²⁵ and many had complained about the unforeseen expenses they were expected to cope with in order to participate. In January 1946 the American Library Association created an Army Map Service committee to deal with questions and complaints Depository Program library staffs might have. The most pressing, of course, was how to inexpensively acquire shelves and cabinets for all of the maps they were receiving. By June 1946 the Committee sent out its report on the matter:

To libraries receiving Army Map Service maps: The Committee on the Army Map Service project has corresponded with leading manufacturers of map filing equipment and has the following report to make: 1) No manufacturer of map files is willing to negotiate on a cooperative purchasing arrangement. 2) No manufacturer is willing to enter into a 5 year contract guaranteeing delivery and price. 3) No manufacturer is willing to design special equipment for this project . . . This leaves no choice except to recommend that equipment be bought on the open market through regular channels of trade.²⁶

For the University of Florida Library, funding was starting to run out and this kind of news seemed devastating – especially as more and more government institutions and programs began sending their cartographic information to member libraries of the AMS Depository Program. From 1946-1951, the University of Florida added more material (including maps) to its library than nearly any other public university in the United States.²⁷ While an inter-library loan system was set up for the most interesting maps (particularly, those captured by Allied forces during the War), the vast majority of the

²⁵ Mary Murphy. "History of the Army Map Service Map Collection" in *Federal Government Map Collecting: A Brief History*, ed. Richard W. Stephenson (Washington, D.C.: Special Libraries Association, 1969), 4.

²⁶ Letter to Libraries Receiving Army Map Service Maps from Homer Halvorson (5 June 1946), UFUA Series 08a, Box #6.

²⁷ "Average Holdings of Fifteen Selected Colleges and University Libraries Compared with the University of Florida Library", UFUA Series 17, Box #3. The "Fifteen Selected Colleges and Universit[ies]" included California, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Iowa State, Louisiana State, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio State, Purdue, Texas, Washington (Seattle), and Wisconsin.

maps being disseminated by the AMS and other government agencies were largely uninteresting to most students and members of the public, but were still required to be kept in storage and accessible²⁸ unless expressed permission from the AMS was received to destroy them.²⁹

Besides the Army Map Service, perhaps the most active contributor of cartographic material to the University of Florida's Library was the Government Printing Office which had been sending the university its regular bibliographic shipments of books and card catalogs as a U.S. Document Depository. In June 1946, shortly before leaving the University of Florida to become the Librarian of the Communicable Disease Center in Atlanta,³⁰ Barmore received a letter from Luther H. Evans (the tenth Librarian of Congress and a man who "felt deeply" for wartime American soldiers killed because of his Library's "inadequate" map collection)³¹ confirming that the University of Florida was, in fact, an AMS depository and promising to send "2000 aeronautical and hydrographical charts" over a period of two to three years for storage. While these charts were, admitted Evans, "obsolete" and "should never be used for planning or operational purposes", he promised that some of them had been used by the U.S. military during Japanese naval bombardments and should "be so filed and serviced as to be available to persons using your library."³²

²⁸ Letter to Gentlemen from Charles F. Steele (23 January 1946), University of Florida University Archive (Gainesville, Florida) Series 08a, Box #6.

²⁹ Frank T. Nicoletti. "U.S. Army Topographic Command College Depository Program" in *Bulletin: Geography and Map Division*, No. 86 (December 1971), 7.

³⁰ Cramer, 456.

³¹ Luther H. Evans. *The Reminiscences of Luther Evans* (New York: Oral History Research Office, Columbia University, 1972), 190.

³² Letter to Librarian, University of Florida from Luther H. Evans (7 June 1946), UFUA Series 08a, Box #6.

The Library of Congress also established a Foreign Acquisitions program, through which it fed the university the various maps, atlases, and charts it had somehow acquired from foreign sources. Prior to 1946, the Library of Congress had failed to send anything foreign to the University of Florida through its U.S. Depository Program.³³ However, in May 1946 the university's Library Committee voted to join the "Library of Congress Cooperative Acquisition of Recent Foreign Publications" and in that year alone over 2800 foreign documents were allocated to the University,³⁴ many of which came from "Nazi party libraries" with Germany and Austria serving as the "principle sources" for such material.³⁵ The result of this relationship between the university and the Library of Congress was, however, underwhelming. By July 1947, the Library Committee received word that the Foreign Acquisitions Project was running out of money and needed some funding from the universities utilizing it in order to continue functioning. After surveying the acquisitions received by the University of Florida, the Library Committee reported that "probably not more than 1 in 6 [acquisitions] would have been selected if we had been ordering them in the regular manner." Thus, the Committee voted against sending any funds to the Library of Congress and only tentatively continued its relationship with the Foreign Acquisitions Project, which ended entirely within the next few years.³⁶

³³ "Statistics of Documents, 1945/1946", UFUA Series 08a, Box #3.

³⁴ Vivian C. Prince. "Report of the Acting University Librarian" (29 August 1946), pg. 3, UFUA Series 17, Box #3.

³⁵ "Library Committee Meeting" (17 May 1946), UFUA Series 62, Box #5. Also see the "Cooperative Acquisition of Recent Foreign Publications (A National Plan)", UFUA Series 08b, Box #17.

³⁶ "Library Committee Meeting Minutes" (21 July 1947), UFUA Series 62, Box #5.

The AMS Map Depository Program, however, continued to play a primary role in the acquisition of foreign and domestic cartographic material, despite the many name changes and organizational re-structuring that occurred within the cartographic bureaucracies of the United States. In 1969 the Army Map Service was reorganized into the U.S. Army Topographic Command, an action on which Depository libraries were kept up-to-date.³⁷ In only three years the government agency operating the Depository program was again re-structured into the Defense Mapping Agency and was operating a network of 195 map depositories.³⁸ By this time the University of Florida Library had accrued an estimated 250,000 maps through the depository programs it had taken part in³⁹ and had been singled out by Map Depository program administrators as a model of participatory excellence.⁴⁰ However, only about 125,000 of their maps had been catalogued when the University of Florida officially established its Map Library in 1973 and hired Dr. HelenJane Armstrong, the institution's first Map Librarian.⁴¹ Armstrong immediately implemented national cataloguing standards for maps and successfully began digitizing the library's cartographic collection. She was so successful, in fact, that she was asked to contribute an article describing her methods and experience to one of

³⁷ "Depository Newsletter No. 9" from H.E. Sewell to All Depository Members (11 December 1969), UFUA Series 08d, Box #17.

³⁸ Nicoletti, 3.

³⁹ Raymond Toner. "Description of the Map Collection" (5 January 1972), University of Florida University Archive (Gainesville, Florida) Series 08d, Box #17.

⁴⁰ Nicoletti, 5.

⁴¹ *A Survey of the Holdings of the University of Florida Libraries* (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida, 1974), 21.

her discipline's leading academic journals.⁴² Today the University of Florida remains a depository for maps from various federal and state government agencies and, as mentioned earlier, has compiled over 500,000 sheet maps.

While this section has primarily dealt with the impact of the Map Depository program on the University of Florida, the program has made (and continues to make) positive contributions to both public and academic libraries across the country. In fact, it has persisted to serve as the core source of map acquisition for many institutions to this day.⁴³ Many large university map libraries have hugely disproportionate map collections in terms of chronology, a likely result of depending upon government depository programs such as that of the Army Map Service. Those institutions with collections consisting largely of maps published after 1940 include: the University of Georgia (94%),⁴⁴ the University of California – Santa Barbara (95%),⁴⁵ the University of Wisconsin – Madison (70%),⁴⁶ the University of Washington – Seattle (89%),⁴⁷ the Ohio State University (90%),⁴⁸ the University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill (93%),⁴⁹ the

⁴² HelenJane Armstrong. "An Academic Library Loads GPO Cataloguing Tapes: A Case Study of Plans and Impacts" in *Bulletin: Special Library Association, Geography and Map Division*, No. 177 (September 1994), pp. 2-34.

⁴³ John Abresch, Ardis Hanson, Susan Heron, and Pete Reehling. *Integrating Geographic Information Systems into Library Services: A Guide for Academic Librarians* (New York: Information Science Publishing, 2008), 209.

⁴⁴ Thiry, 78-79.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 50-51.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 285-286.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 280-281.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 204-205.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 189-190

University of Michigan (86%),⁵⁰ Louisiana State University (80%),⁵¹ and the University of California – Los Angeles (75%),⁵² among others. These are some of the largest and most accessible map libraries in the United States. I do not think it is any coincidence that they are each also depository libraries for the National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency, the agency which continues the program the AMS began after the Second World War. The incredible access to cartographic information the public currently enjoys is largely predicated on the continuation of this map depository program.

Prior to the Second World War, the University of Florida Library had a collection easily described as “especially behind in physical geography [and] cartography.”⁵³ By participating in the U.S. Depository Program, the Foreign Acquisitions Program, and especially the AMS Map Depository Program the University of Florida (spurred by the industrious Nelle Barmore) was able to exponentially increase the size of its cartographic holdings. The willingness of the Army Map Service to “preclude a recurrence of the situation which obtained at the beginning of World War II” regarding maps⁵⁴ coupled with the university’s desire to inexpensively add to its collection created a perfect moment in which both could contribute to one of the world’s largest deliberate movement of mapped materials. These maps are still used today as base maps for various scientific projects, as the arbiters of territorial memory, and as reference maps

⁵⁰ Ibid., 143-144.

⁵¹ Ibid., 123-124.

⁵² Ibid., 37.

⁵³ “Report to Library Committee from the Special Sub-Committee” (18 October 1941), pg. 21, UFUA Series 124, Box #1.

⁵⁴ Letter to Librarian, University of Florida from W.D. Phillips (16 October 1946), UFUA Series 08a, Box #6.

during natural disasters.⁵⁵ It is, of course, no accident that such a symbiotic relationship continues to exist. While the danger of entering into military combat without accurate and relevant maps has become all but extinct, economic globalization has brought with it the absolute imperative of cartographically asserting the spatial control of the nation-state as clearly and as loudly as possible. Mapped spatial existence, after all, is only useful if it is recognized as authoritative. By creating and sustaining vast collections of cartographic propositions, the United States government has stored up for itself a historical reference of space and multiple evidential claims to global spaces. It has, in fact, managed to perpetuate the same massive tautological claim of legitimacy every other nation-state in today's world participates in: we are mapped, therefore we are mapped, therefore we are mapped. As the world grows "smaller" and as spatial claims grow more hotly disputed and economically significant, the emphasis on maps and the importance of proving one's spatial territories will grow as well. It was the Second World War, however, which instigated this emphasis and made the constant dissemination of a government's mapped narrative proposition so obviously vital to its survival. While scholars have been quick to recognize this shift and the importance of mapped space, most have failed to study the maps themselves and few (if any) have turned to postwar maps for clarity on this subject. Only by turning to the maps can we

⁵⁵ Much of the geospatial data used by relief agencies after Hurricane Katrina and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti was based on earlier aerial and satellite imagery. For an example of how earlier spatial data was important regarding Hurricane Katrina, see M.T. Abel, S.M. Presley, T.R. Rainwater, et al. "Spatial Distribution of Lead Concentrations in Urban Surface Soils of New Orleans, Louisiana, USA" in *Environmental Geochemistry and Health*, Vol. 32, No. 5 (September 2010), pp. 379-389. For an example regarding Haiti, see B. Theilen-Willige's "Detection of Local Site Conditions Influencing Earthquake Shaking and Secondary Effects in Southwest-Haiti Using Remote Sensing and GIS-methods" in *Natural Hazards and Earth System Science*, Vol. 10, No. 6 (June 2010), pp. 1183-1196.

see how they *propose* space in ways that words cannot, and *project* a carefully crafted image of the world onto a culture of mass consumption.

CHAPTER 6 HOW TO SELL YOUR MAP

Maps sell in two ways. Maps are, obviously enough, textual commodities that can be produced, re-produced, purchased, and sold. More than this, though, they are themselves propositional narratives.¹ In effect, then, they are commodities which can be bought or discarded selling a story which can be bought or discarded. This understanding of cartography has led to a great deal of scholarship on touristic mapping and how spaces and places are “sold” to potential customers (Figure 6-1).² Most of this literature, however, fails to examine the specific “public relations” firms deeply entrenched in the creation and diffusion of such maps (although it usually does harbor fairly staunch critiques of the shades of capitalism which allow such (re)productions).

The concept of “public relations” as a practice arose during the early twentieth century. Perhaps its most famous adherent was a nephew of Sigmund Freud named Edward Bernays (1891-1995). His 1928 book *Propaganda* attempted to combine psychoanalysis with marketing strategy so that a “new propaganda” could be undertaken by those individuals (or governments or corporations) who might seek to “create public acceptance for a particular idea or commodity.”³ During the Second World War, Bernays created a handbook for potential acolytes entitled *Speak Up for Democracy!* in which he declared that democracy itself depended upon his readers’

¹ John Krygier and Denis Wood. “Ce n’est pas le Monde [This is not the world]” in *Rethinking Maps: New Frontiers in Cartographic Theory*, ed. Martin Dodge, Rob Kitchin, and Chris Perkins (New York: Routledge, 2009), 198-199.

² For example, see Stephen P. Hanna and Vincent J. Del Casino, Jr. “Introduction: Tourism Spaces, Mapped Representations, and the Practices of Identity” in *Mapping Tourism*, ed. Stephen P. Hanna and Vincent J. Del Casino, Jr. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2003. Also see Jonathan Culler’s “The Semiotics of Tourism” in his essay compilation *Framing the Sign: Criticism and Its Institutions* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988).

³ Edward Bernays. *Propaganda* (New York: Ig Publishing, 2004), 44-45.

abilities to incorporate a kind of public relations strategy which would sell American democracy to those who might seek to sabotage it or those ignorant of its greatness.⁴

He concludes his text with an urgent plea:

Twenty years ago, the phrase “public relations” was unknown in its current sense. Today we know leadership is largely the result of effective planning, techniques, and methods . . . Democracy depends upon you . . . It is up to you. You will help decide whether Democracy is to live or die. You are the country’s most important figure. You occupy the highest office in the land – American citizen. You determine our destiny. Now is the time to act. Speak up for Democracy!⁵

In 1952 Bernays produced his book *Public Relations*, which sought to establish the origins of PR campaigns, the development of public relations throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and how one could “chart” the “hidden urges” of postwar individuals for the sake of making a sale.⁶

Such publications inspired the creation of many public relations firms in the United States. Several of them, in fact, could not help but see the postwar era as one of immense opportunity, especially when newly formed West Germany (FRG) decided that it needed to change the American public’s opinion of German culture. Public opinion had been emphasized by Bernays as a “vital” part of “rearmament, economic mobilization, and national defense.”⁷ In the FRG “several German officials observed that public opinion played an uncommonly large role in the formulation of American

⁴ Edward Bernays. *Speak Up for Democracy!: What You Can Do – a Practical Plan of Action for Every American Citizen* (New York: Viking Press, 1940), 20. It should be noted that Bernays was “no democrat” and “expressed little respect for the average person’s ability to think out, understand, or act upon the world in which he or she lives.” For more on Bernays, see Stuart Ewen’s *PR!: A Social History of Spin* (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 10.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 80.

⁶ Edward Bernays. *Public Relations* (Norman, OK: Oklahoma University Press, 1952), 217.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 293.

foreign policy, and thus reasoned that the manipulation of representations of Germans in the United States should constitute a major element of their broader plan to win American friendship.”⁸ Who better to undertake this task than an American PR firm – one which could “sidestep American fears about renewed German propaganda in the United States”?⁹ It had been, after all, American PR firms which had first so successfully represented the interests of Germans in the 1930s, attempting to mitigate the “hostility being bred by Germany’s racial and military policies”: Carl Byoir & Associates which had worked on behalf of tourism in the Third Reich and Ivy Lee & T.J. Ross and Associates which had represented I.G. Farben.¹⁰

American businesses and map publishers also already had plenty of experience working with their own government during the Second World War. The Office of Strategic Services had purchased some of the maps it had used for intelligence operations from corporations such as the International Map Company, Inc.¹¹ and Rand McNally & Co.¹² Of course, such interactions were always done in secret, prompting the repetition of one addendum sentence at the end of each series of correspondence:

⁸ Brian C. Etheridge. “The Anti-German Wave, Public Diplomacy and Intercultural Relations in Cold War America” in *Decentering America*, ed. Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 2008), 79.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Scott M. Cutlip. *The Unseen Power: Public Relations. A History* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1994), 73-74.

¹¹ Letter to W.L. Rehm from the International Map Company, Inc. (25 August 1942), NARA RG 226, Stack 190 5/30/7, Box #229.

¹² Letter to Mr. William M. Drummond from Rand McNally & Co. (12 April 1943), NARA RG 226, Stack 190 5/30/7, Box #229.

“As is usual in this sort of work, these maps should not be stamped ‘Office of Strategic Services’.”¹³

The American military had begun to use the burgeoning discipline of public relations during World War II as well. District engineers (who, prior to the 1942 organization of the Army Map Service, controlled the bulk of U.S. Maps) had been among the first members of the military to be assigned a PR officer in May 1941 and were already told prior to the bombing of Pearl Harbor to avoid giving any information to foreign audiences without first consulting the War Department’s Public Relations Division.¹⁴ By 21 September 1942, the Public Relations Division had been reorganized into the seemingly more efficient and, at the very least, much more authoritatively sounding “Office of Technical Information.”¹⁵ By 1944, this office was organizing several promotional events concerning cartography and geography, one of which – the Map Reproduction Train – was a well-planned parade of “ten truck-mounted units . . . [with] both lithographic and photographic . . . field mapping units.” The train was demonstrated in front of the news press at Wisconsin’s Camp McCoy on the 24th of August 1944.¹⁶

The American military’s employment of PR firms, and their use of maps, continued into the postwar period. Many of the U.S. European Recovery Program’s publications

¹³ Letter to Mr. Charles V. Crittenden from D.W.G. (14 December 1943), NARA RG 226, Stack 190 5/30/7, Box #229.

¹⁴ “Public Relations Organization” (30 April 1941) and “Memorandum for Colonel Hardin: Press Relations” (21 November 1941), NARA RG 77, Stack 390 1/07/02-03, Box #1.

¹⁵ “Memorandum: Reorganization of Public Relations Agencies” (21 September 1942), NARA RG 77, Stack 390 1/07/02-03, Box #1.

¹⁶ “Work Order No. DGN-3801: Demonstration of Equipment for Members of the Press” (17 August 1944), NARA RG 77, Stack 390 1/07/02-03, Box #2.

incorporated maps to help illustrate the rebuilding of Europe's economy (Figure 6-2, Figure 6-3, and Figure 6-4) in order to more effectively disseminate material which would "develop [a] sense of common effort and mutual aid."¹⁷ Note, however, that the United States is absent from much of this literature, particularly as a geographic presence. In Figure 6-2 there is also no "Germany", per se, but zones of occupation. Furthermore, Figure 6-2 is a publication of the United States and discusses the importance of "direct help" in re-building European nation-states but avoids cartographically representing America in favor of emphasizing the importance of a self-reestablishing Europe (even when such an emphasis is funded by a non-European power). Figure 6-4 also attempts to portray a cartographically reconstructed Europe without depicting the United States. Part of Europe's recovery, in fact, is the absence of an American imposition on its continental map. Figure 6-3 is, however, a different example of the use of maps in re-spatializing postwar Europe. Rather than completely leave out the United States, this map portrays (with arrows and ships) the movement of economic assistance from Washington D.C. to Europe. America has drawn itself not as an occupational force, but as a source of economic recovery! None of these maps have any strictly scientific value, but each one counts on the reader to recognize the authority and objectivity of maps so as to establish the spatial reality of various nation-states and the movement of economic resources to/from those nation-states.

While the West German government was looking to hire American public relations firms, the United States was more than happy to encourage West German corporations like Inter Nationes (which merged with the Goethe-Institut in 2001) to distribute its

¹⁷ "Outgoing Classified Message No. WAR 84979" (30 June 1948), NARA RG 335, Stack 490 8/35/03-07, Box #1.

information in the U.S. Inter Naciones, which had mastered the art of depicting a carefully constructed West Germany to non-German audiences since 1952, was not interested in presenting to its foreign publics an “*official* image of Germany or even *the* image of Germany *per se*. The reason for this is quite simple: such an image of Germany [did and still does] not exist.”¹⁸ In the absence of an official picture, the opportunity was left open for the West German government to cartographically propose a self-consciously drawn nation-state purposefully produced for mass consumption.

Several firms applied to represent the FRG’s public relations interests and the freshly quasi-autonomous government was more than happy to entertain various “plans” for West Germany. John Maynahan & Associates, for example, sent the government a fifteen-page strategy meant to prove that by choosing them “as public relations representative, [they could] obtain the greatest effectiveness within the shortest possible space of time, with the least expenditure of money.”¹⁹ The Hamilton Wright Organization, Inc., which during the war had been forced to stop its activities in continental Europe,²⁰ promised to make Americans more “conscious” of the themes of German recovery and new-found appreciation for democracy by utilizing “large information media.” They offered to work on behalf of the FRG government for six

¹⁸ Rainer Epbinder. “The Role of Inter Naciones in Propagating an Image of Germany Abroad” in *Images of Germany: Perceptions and Conceptions*, ed. Peter M. Daly, Hans Walter Frischkopf, Trudis E. Goldsmith-Reber, and Horst Richter (New York: Peter Lang, 2000), 11.

¹⁹ “Memorandum Concerning a Plan of Public Relations for Advancing the Interests of WEST GERMANY” (25 February 1953), Appendix A, Pg. 5. BA B145/777, Bd. I. All of the source information from the Bundesarchive (BA) at Koblenz was generously made available to me by Dr. Sheryl Kroen, a history professor at the University of Florida working on her forthcoming book *The Recovery*. This project would not have been possible without her guidance and assistance.

²⁰ Cutlip, 83.

months at the price of \$50,000.²¹ Stephen Goerl Associates sent in their plan with an attached article from *Advertising Age* which was written for their client, the German Travel Association.²² In fact, all of these plans/applications focus on getting prominent Americans to travel to Germany and write favorably about their experiences. *The New York Times*, *Fortune*, *Seventeen*, and *Cosmopolitan* are just a few of the publications which regularly show up in their exchanges as being integral to American culture and, therefore, important to influence.

Yet by the time most of these applications reached the FRG, the government was already working with the Roy Bernard Company, Inc. This American firm had signed a three-month, interim contract (which would later be continuously extended) with the German government beginning on 1 January 1952 for which they would be paid \$12,500 in advance, with another \$12,125 to be given to them for up-front printing costs.²³ This contract specified that

The Roy Bernard Co., Inc. shall represent the Federal Republic of Germany as public relations counsel in *all* matters falling within the general area of public relations that shall be considered by The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany conducive to the promotion of harmony, understanding, industrial and cultural intercourse and tourism between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States.²⁴

²¹ "Memorandum on: Editorial Publicity in the United States for the Federal Republic of Germany" (19 December 1952), 2-3 [B145/777, Bd. I].

²² Letter to Willi Ritter, Chief of Press Department – Federal Republic of Germany from Stephen Goerl (10 September 1952), 1-2. BA B145/777, Bd. I.

²³ "Beglaubigte Abschrift: Contract Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Roy Bernard Co., Inc." (8 January 1952), 3. BA B145/3226, Bd. I.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 1. Emphasis added.

One such “matter” was the preparation of “finished art work for . . . literature, pamphlets, brochures and other materials . . .”.²⁵ As one can imagine, this included maps.

In a 1955 letter to the Press Office for the Embassy of the Federal Republic, a Roy Bernard Co. representative lamented the sorry state of German maps in the United States, most of which were “either too complicated or too old.” In fact, “even [their] top newspapers [carried] maps that were copyrighted in 1928 or 1933.” As this representative went on to explain, the Roy Bernard Co. had “been concerned with this map for almost four years” and it had been one of “the first projects” they had recommended producing. From its conception, they had envisioned it as a “simple map designed to do a very big public relations job, namely, to show the present size of the Federal Republic of Germany and how it has been divided and where the important areas are.”²⁶ In other words, to namely create a map which would provoke American sympathy and business. It would cost the Federal Republic \$300 to make the printing plates, but the payoff would be worth it.

By May of 1956, the Roy Bernard Co. made sure that over 10,000 American schools and libraries received the map ([Figure 6-5](#) and [Figure 6-6](#)). The first edition had already been sold out by June. It was one of the only maps produced since the collapse of the Third Reich to depict all of Germany’s national territory.²⁷ Moreover, the

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Letter to Baron Axel von dem Bussche, Press Office for the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany from Bernard Gittelson (18 July 1955), 1. BA B145/1277, Bd. I.

²⁷ Guntram Henrik Herb. *Under the Map of Germany: Nationalism and Propaganda 1918-1945* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 184-185. Only in the 1980s would such maps again become regularly published in the FRG.

German press covered the map's dissemination as an objective rendering of a divided Germany – a map that made its cartographic situation a bit more urgent to the typical American. After all, writes one German newspaper, “*Es ist ein Unterschied, ob man von der Teilung Deutschlands gelegentlich hört, oder ob man sie sieht.*”²⁸ Yet the paper also criticized the map for not somehow representing the expulsion of the Germans from the eastern territories and the Sudetenland. This, argued the journalist, left the map incomplete (*unvollständig*).²⁹

Surrounding Roy Bernard's map were emblems of the German states, implying not only their existence, but their autonomy and importance – although none are as large and bold as the Federal German crest. The most glaring symbols within the version of the map included in the newspaper article are the lines of division in Germany. This, of course, is what the FRG wanted to emphasize at the time, and it is what they paid the Roy Bernard Co. to produce. As the map's advocate from the Roy Bernard Co. made clear to the Federal Republic's Press Office, “. . . this map is a public relations map. It is not intended for accurate geographical studies.”³⁰ Such transparency was, of course, omitted from the map itself and the news article covering its incorporation into American educational institutions.

The Roy Bernard Co. had undertaken smaller mapping projects prior to 1955. In a letter written in August 1952 and marked “Confidential”, Roy Bernard's employee Charles Campbell wrote to Georg von Lilienfeld (of Bonn's Press and Information

²⁸ “Amerika wird das geteilte Deutschland gezeigt” (9 June 1956), 1. BA B145/1277, Bd. I. My translation: “There is a difference between hearing about the division of Germany occasionally and actually seeing it.”

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.

³⁰ Letter to Bussche from Gittelson, 1. BA B145/1277, Bd. I.

Office) to alleviate his fears that Roy Bernard was not doing enough to publicize a friendly Germany in the U.S. As Campbell tried to make clear: “What is now beginning to appear in the pages of newspapers and magazines was put into the works months ago.” After rattling off the various publications (*Esquire*, *Scholastic*, *Cosmopolitan*, *Fortune*, etc.) which would soon be printing editorials, pictures of the Bavarian Alps, and articles, he took a moment to mention that a “Facts on Germany” booklet had been sent off to the printer. On the back cover of the booklet was a map of Germany which Campbell wanted to use as a barometer of cartographic public opinion. Apparently, Herr von Lilienfeld had been pestering him about “going ahead . . . [with] a schoolroom map”, but Campbell had remained fairly apprehensive.³¹ Undoubtedly the information gained from the map’s publication and subsequent reception would have been used in the four-year project that eventually ended up in schools and libraries across the United States. In a cordial effort to assuage any lingering doubts, Campbell ended his letter, “I have continued confidence in your understanding of this rather delicate business of molding public opinion . . . There is much at stake.”³²

The Roy Bernard Co. worked with the Federal Republic, filing quarterly reports, until 1961 when the FRG’s German Information Center took over, due to a growing wave of anti-German sentiment in America and the PR firm’s inability to quickly and efficiently deal with it. The publication of Anne Frank’s diary (1952) and its subsequent adaptation into a play (1955) and a movie (1959) as well as the Eichmann trial (1961)

³¹ Letter to Mr. Georg von Lilienfeld from Mr. Charles E. Campbell (20 August 1952), 1-3. BA B145/775, Bd. I.

³² *Ibid.*, 3.

were difficult issues to affix a positive “spin” to.³³ There had also been some investigative reporting done in 1960 by the American magazine *The Reporter* which had discussed the Roy Bernard Co. within a less-than-favorable evaluation of how foreign governments used private American enterprises to influence public opinion.³⁴ The FRG dumped Roy Bernard and West Germany was back to mapping itself (under the watchful eye of the American occupation forces).

Having to cope with cartographic decision-making, however, proved to be more strenuous than the government had been expecting. Choosing “not to become directly involved in the dispute over German territories”, the maps approved by the German Information Center “always included multiple boundary designations in the East” (Figure 6-7).³⁵ This led to a serious lack in territorial uniformity – just as East Germany (GDR) was cartographically solidifying its boundaries by using the technique of “island representation” (Figure 6-8). Such poor policy regarding its maps has led one geographer to claim that the 1960s and 1970s served as “the low point of the territorial script of the German nation in the FRG.”³⁶

³³ Etheridge, 81 and 85.

³⁴ Douglas Cater and Walter Pincus. “The Foreign Legion of U.S. Public Relations” in *The Reporter* (22 December 1960), 17. BA B145/9764, Bd. III.

³⁵ Guntram H. Herb. “Double Vision: Territorial Strategies in the Construction of National Identities in Germany, 1949-1979” in *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 94, No. 1 (2004), 149-150.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 158.

CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION

The enemies' armies approached the [United] States from the north in a broad front. The defenders lacked everything. Losses increased . . . and the enemy was pitiless . . . Things came to an end . . . All states were occupied. The military and political leaders had fully surrendered. The victors met in Washington, D.C. and conferred about the future of a nation that lay crushed and powerless at their feet.¹

So began a 1952 fictionalized historical account of how the United States lost an alternate version of the Second World War and was “quartered” into various fragments, one of which had been ceded back to Mexico while the other four existed under the occupation forces of the Soviet Union, South America, South Africa, and Canada. The narrative continued in great detail, explaining to the reader how various zones were carved up, how New York City and Washington D.C. became “divided into four sectors under allied administration”,² and how American place-names were effected (perhaps most alarming to Americans at the time was the changing of Seattle to “Pacificgrad”).³ Self-described as an illustration “of the situation in Germany transferred to the territory of the United States”, this story sought to render to an American audience the unimaginable humiliation, alienation, and suffering experienced under the very real circumstances a new postwar West German government was attempting to assuage.⁴

This account – aptly entitled “Democracy in Peril” – could not depend upon the written word alone. In order to more adequately project the cartographically catastrophic effects of the Allied Powers' redrafting of German territory, maps had to be

¹ “The United States Quartered / Democracy in Peril”, 1. BA B145 1277, Bd. I.

² Ibid., pg. 2.

³ Ibid., pg. 3.

⁴ Ibid., pg. 6.

included. The author provided two such maps to complement this unhappy fiction. The first (Figure 7-1) provided the reader with a clear picture of what a fragmented America might look like. While the boundaries and labels of the old states were clear, so too were the lines which divided them into occupied sectors. In the second map (Figure 7-2), the states as an American audience might know them had been erased, leaving only the labels and boundaries of the occupied zones and two dots meant to signify New York City and Washington D.C. – the two cities split between the four occupying powers. To add even further insult, New York City’s name had been changed on this map to “Four Power City”. Clearly, no cartographic referent in which Americans took great pride was safe from the geographic tyranny of their foreign invaders.

The author of this American dystopia is unknown. It was, however, submitted by Dr. Richard Mönnig to the Roy Bernard Co. for approval and subsequent public dissemination into the psyche of postwar Americans. Dr. Mönnig was employed by the Inter Nationes public relations firm. Located in Bonn, this firm occasionally worked in-tandem with the American-based Roy Bernard Co. – another public relations corporation. This particular project was rejected by Roy Bernard as “unusable in the United States,”⁵ but such collaboration between these two firms mirrors the mutually beneficial relationship between the West German government and several private public relations enterprises (most notably, however, was their heavy dependence on the Roy Bernard Co.).⁶

⁵ Letter from Charles E. Campbell to Dr. Richard Mönnig (16 September 1952). BA B145 1277, Bd. I.

⁶ “The Foreign Legion of U.S. Public Relations”, 17. BA B145 9764, Bd. III.

West Germany was interested in utilizing the “science” of PR to, among other things, assert itself cartographically. Only by establishing its territorial place in the imaginations of its domestic citizenry and its foreign audience, could West Germany fully recover from World War II. Only by legitimizing its territorial orientation could the freshly “imagined community”⁷ of the FRG rise from the abstract to the concrete – from the mind to the map.

This American-German postwar cartographic relationship was not wholly unique. Other nation-states have since utilized public relations firms, map depository programs, and economic/military disasters for the sake of shaping the spatial perception of a chosen audience.⁸ Cartographers have also developed several different ways in which to market their craft to private enterprises without dealing directly with public relations.⁹ That being said, this essay has attempted to describe a moment in history when the rise of public relations as a legitimate discipline, the autonomy of cartography as an academic field, and the imperative of re-mapping and re-envisioning a postwar German nation-state all came together to produce cartographic narratives drawn by a self-conscious combination of American private enterprise, a newly sovereign West German government, and an American/Allied military occupation force determined to maintain its cartographic legacy. By recognizing the importance of constructing an absolute space of Germany (particularly, West Germany) on the European map and transmitting that image to the various foreign and domestic audiences that continued to support its

⁷ For more on this particular term see Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Revised Edition. New York: Verso, 2006.

⁸ One excellent example is V. Feklyunina’s “Battle for Perceptions: Projecting Russia in the West” in *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 60, No. 4 (2008), pp. 605-629.

⁹ J. Staal. “Marketing the Cartographic Profession” in *Cartography*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1986), pp. 112-115.

cartographic place, these agents of re-spatialization and dissemination utilized the explicit manipulative influence of mass production and diffusion through corporate public relations and libraries. Perhaps for the first time in history, spatial narratives were imposed through maps onto German and American imaginations through the medium of a state-sponsored systematic federal public relations strategy and through the constant *re-mapping* efforts of an occupational power. Arguably, this was necessary for reconstructing a postwar West German culture palatable to the American public and subsequently avoiding an impending collapse had the United States discontinued financial and political support. It was also arguably necessary for the maintenance of a stable European map.

And now look at today's European map. The Euro currency is in "crisis" as nation-states attempt to retain their territorial sovereignty while simultaneously upholding the European Union. This balance between asserting a kind of nationalism and projecting a European identity is a difficult one, but also an extremely important one. It is necessarily expressed in different ways by the various EU members. Whereas today's Germany works to stabilize the European economy by centralizing the continent's budgetary practices,¹⁰ Hungary (a country which has not adopted the Euro, but has depended on bailouts from the EU in the past) has made a strange statement to its European colleagues by imposing an 1848 map of the Habsburg Empire onto the carpet

¹⁰ Michael Birnbaum. "Germany, France push euro-zone policy changes to help stabilize regional economy" in *The Washington Post* (5 February 2011). Available online: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/04/AR2011020406833.html> (Retrieved 5 February 2011).

of the European Council building in Brussels.¹¹ Similarly, Estonia – which adopted the Euro on January 1, 2011 – has depicted its national territory on its Euro coins, but the map's borders clearly include parts of Russia. When confronted with complaints from the Russians, Estonia's leaders explained that the map was simply a consequence of the artist's "artistic vision."¹² Examples such as these make it clear that maps remain important and contentious! Moreover, yesterday's counter-cartographers (i.e. Germany) can quickly become today's arbiters of the territorial status quo.

Furthermore, while West Germany may have been the first modern nation-state to have its map explicitly re-drawn, publicized, and sold by a foreign corporate entity, it has certainly not been the last. With the emergence of commercial giants such as the Environmental Systems Research Institute, NAVTEQ, and Integraph, the geospatial data which determines place within contemporary cartographic propositions is becoming increasingly dependent upon marketing strategies, technology, and corporate interests. Moreover, as maps become more displaced from the subjective datasets and cartographers which create them, their self-referential and tautological assertions of authority and objectivity flourish.

Considering the trends of cartographic development – from the individual cadastral maps of land to those sponsored by the state for the purpose of taxation – and its evolution (regression?) into a marketed and mass-produced narrative, strategically placed into particular publications, libraries, school rooms, and internet browsers for

¹¹ Valentina Pop. "Hungary heading for fresh EU controversy with 'history carpet'" in *EU Observer* (12 January 2011). Available Online: <http://euobserver.com/843/31629> (Retrieved 5 February 2011). Thanks to Johanna Mellis for pointing me to this story.

¹² Juhan Tere. "Russian embassy accuses Estonia of attempts to revise the state border" in *Baltic Course* (9 January 2011). Available Online: http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/baltic_states_cis/?doc=35797 (Retrieved 5 February 2011).

public consumption helps to de-mystify the mapped spaces of the nation-state.

Germany serves as a perfect example for such an undertaking because of its unique cartographic history, the constant spatial (re)negotiations it has consistently grappled with, and the re-production of its space by an occupying military force.

APPENDIX
THE MAPS / IMAGES




Figure 1-1. Theodor. Studienrat Kurt Schmidt [map]. No scale given. Kestlerbach, Hesse: 5 December 1948. NARA RG 335, Stack 490 8/35/03-07, Box #2.



Figure 2-1. Isaiah Bowman. Territorial Provisions of the Treaty of Versailles (1919) [map]. No scale given. In: Herb, Guntram Henrik. Under the Map of Germany: Nationalism and Propaganda, 1918-1945. New York: Routledge, 1997, p. 32.




Figure 2-2. *Frankreichs Bündnispolitik* (France's Political Alliance) [map]. Scale 1:12,000,000. 1937. In: H.H. Schacht. *Volk und Geschichte: Zugleich ein Beitrag zur nationalsozialistischen Erziehung*. Dortmund: W. Crüwell, 1937, pg. 105. Note how poorly Nazi mapmakers utilized the actual map, preferring in this case to explain the map's meaning through text. See Figure 2-3 for how geopolitical geographers approached the subject of hostile alliances.



Figure 2-3. Untitled [map]. No scale given. 1934. In: R. von Schumacher. "Zur Theorie der Raumdarstellung" in *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, Vol. 11 (1934), pp. 635-652. As in [Figure 2-2](#), the map is trying to make clear the eminent geo-political threat of Germany's neighbors. This map, produced by German political geographers, uses spatial perception in a much clearer attempt to make its point than the Nazi map in [Figure 2-2](#).




Figure 3-1. Daraiya Area [map]. Sheet B. 1268. No scale given. 16 February 1945. NARA RG 226, Stack 190 5/30/7, Box #230. This is a French map of the Daraya village in Lebanon obtained by the American World War II forces.




Figure 3-2. Captured by Intell OSS-AAI. *Bandenlage Mittel-Italien* [map]. 1:500,000. 31 March 1944. NARA RG 226, Stack 190 5/30/7, Box #229.



Figure 3-3. "Zeiss Aerotopograph Radial Triangulator" captured by American troops. NARA RG 77, Stack 3331 76/04/04, Picture #11.




Figure 3-4. "Aerocartograph" captured by American troops. The aerocartograph was invented by the German Dr. Reinhard Hegershoff and automatically mapped topography by re-projecting several overlapping layers of aerial photographs. NARA RG 77, Stack 3331 76/04/04, Picture #26.



Figure 4-1. Der Spiegel. 1946: Ein Jahr der Versprechungen [map]. No scale given. In: Der Spiegel. 21 December 1946.




Figure 4-2. *Emigration Process* [chart]. NARA RG 84, Stack 350 56/35/04, Box #1.




Figure 4-3. Geographical Section, General Staff. *Bremen Enclave* [map]. 1:250,000. GSGS 4346(A). NARA RG 84, Stack 350 58/11/05, Box #2.




Figure 6-1. Geography Division, O.S.S. *German Coke Production, 1938* [map]. Map No. 717. 10 July 1942. NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/6, Box #7.




Figure 6-2. European Recovery Program. Wie die direkte und die indirekte ERP-Hilfe 1948/49 verteilt wird [diagram]. No scale given. In: Sie Sollen es besser haben! [pamphlet]. NARA RG 335, Stack 490 8/35/03-07, Box #19. Note: There is no map of the United States.




Figure 6-3. European Recovery Program. Untitled [map]. No scale given. In: *Amerika Hilft Europa, Europa Hilft Sich Selbst* [pamphlet]. This map from another European Recovery Program pamphlet (see Fig. 15) emphasized the movement of economic resources across the planet. NARA RG 335, Stack 490 8/35/03-07, Box #19.




Figure 6-4. European Recovery Program. *Amerika Hilft Europa, Europa Hilft Sich Selbst* [pamphlet]. NARA RG 335, Stack 490 8/35/03-07, Box #19.




Figure 6-5. *Germany: boundaries of 1937* [map]. Scale 1:3,500,000. Bonn, Germany: Cartography Wilhelm Stollfuss Verlag. BA B145/1227, Bd. I. This is sent to the Roy Bernard Co. as an example of the kind of map which was to be published and disseminated in 1956.¹

¹This image, compiled from three separate photocopied portions of the map, was made digitally available in whole form by this author's terrible use of computer imaging software.




Figure 6-6. *Germany* [map]. Scale unknown. In: Walter Gong. "Amerika wird das geteilte Deutschland gezeigt." BA B145/1227, Bd. I. This was the published version of the Roy Bernard public relations map.



Figure 6-7. James Tweedie. *German Borders after 1945* [map]. 1:3,000,000. In: Guntram Henrik Herb. "Double Vision: Territorial Strategies in the Construction of National Identities in Germany, 1949-1979" in *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 94, No. 1 (2004), 150. Note the multiple boundary lines. This was a typical practice in the Federal Republic.




Figure 6-8. *Westdeutschland Bodennutzung, 23* [map]. 1:3,000,000. In: Guntram Henrik Herb. . "Double Vision: Territorial Strategies in the Construction of National Identities in Germany, 1949-1979" in *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 94, No. 1 (2004), 149-150. "Island Representation" was used by the GDR during the 1960s and 1970s. It basically ignored any surrounding areas in favor of simply solidifying its own nation-state borders.




Figure 7-1. *Sample 1* [ms. map]. No scale given. BA B145 1277, Bd. I. The United States split into occupation zones.




Figure 7-2. *Sample 2* [ms. map]. No scale given. BA B145 1277, Bd. I. A map of occupation without typical American state boundaries.

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¹ It should be noted that all material cited from the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz was only made available to me by Dr. Sheryl Kroen (University of Florida) who allowed me access to some of the research she had undertaken for her forthcoming book *The Recovery*.

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