

THE EFFECT OF DRUGS, GANGS AND FEAR OF CRIME ON ATTITUDES ABOUT  
DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNMENT IN JAMAICA

By

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A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL  
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF ARTS IN LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2010

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To Mami and Papi

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research would not have been feasible without the help of the faculty and staff at the Center for Latin American Studies and the Latin American Collection Library at the University of Florida, who provided so many of the necessary resources over my course of study. I would like to thank Dr. Ron Akers and Dr. Tim Clark who provided some much needed early assistance towards completing my project. Finally and most importantly, I would like to thank my thesis committee members, Dr. Leann Brown and Dr. Charles Wood, whose patience and encouragement was of monumental importance in both finishing this thesis and completing the master's program.

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May 2010

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Major: Latin American Studies

Political culture has re-established itself as an important factor in deciding when and where democracies can flourish. Crime and violence have become major concerns for policy-makers and citizens in the Caribbean and throughout Latin America. As crime rates have increased, the fear of crime has become, at least anecdotally, an important determinant in the daily choices of citizens living throughout the region.

For the purposes of this paper, Jamaica presents itself as a perfect case to study the effect that drugs, gangs, and the fear of crime have on support for abstract ideas about democracy. Qualitative research on Jamaica has shown that much of the crime on the island is related to illegal drug trafficking, production, and consumption, which are at the neighborhood level, controlled by gangs. Some literature suggests that high crime rates can and do cause problems for democratic governance, but few studies use large sample quantitative analyses to present their findings.

Using data collected by the Latin American Public Opinion Poll in Jamaica, regression analyses were run to ascertain respondents' views on a variety of questions related to political culture. Of particular importance were those questions that address

attitudes and preferences which the literature on political culture posits as important for democracy. The resulting regression models show that within Jamaica, exposure to crime has a negative effect on the majority of variables tested. The results show that the high levels of crime are a threat to ideals necessary for democracy.

## CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

The Caribbean islands are a major transshipment point for drugs sold to markets in the United States, Canada, and Europe (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 2007). The drug problems in the Caribbean include production, trafficking, drug use and abuse, as well as drug-related money laundering. Illicit drugs have had the affect of stifling development in the Caribbean, as drugs have been a primary cause of the increases in violent crime. The upsurge in crime has led to reduced investment in the region, declines in export revenues, and the loss of job opportunities for citizens. This in turn, has led many Caribbean people to turn to the informal economy as a means of sustenance. Given the limited prospects of finding a well-paid job, and the profits to be earned in the drug trade, it is not surprising that many people then decide to engage in illegal activities (Griffith 2004:113–4).

The Caribbean has traditionally been seen as an important strategic location in the world economy dating back to the colonial period. Yet, despite its importance, there has been relatively little general research done on this region and, in particular, its role as a transshipment point (Jones 2002:117; Castellano 2007:598; Griffith 2004:106). The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reports that two-thirds of all cocaine produced in South America passes through Caribbean and that approximately 75% of all cocaine destined for Europe is trafficked through the Caribbean (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2006).

It is not surprising that drug trafficking and the culture of corruption and illegality that is associated with it poses a new and significant threat to the deepening of democracy in developing countries. The definition of democracy has come to mean

more than simply the execution of competitive elections and many countries, including Jamaica, seem to lack the requirements of a “liberal democracy.” The broader concept of a “liberal democracy” encompasses factors such as constitutional protections, participation, separation of powers, civilian control of the military, and human rights protections, among others (Diamond 1997:13).

The West Indian Commission in one of its Reports in the early 1990s stated that, “nothing poses a greater threat to civil society in Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) countries than the drug problem. The damage...to democratic society itself from the drug problem is as great a menace as any dictator’s repression... CARICOM countries are threatened today by an onslaught from illegal drugs as crushing as any military repression” (West Indian Commission 1992:343–52). At a special meeting of the CARICOM heads of government held in December 1996, leaders pushed to draw attention to the link between the development of the region and its vulnerability to drug trafficking.

### **The Importance of Jamaica**

The implications of crime, corruption, and violence for the prospects of democratic consolidation are particularly evident in Jamaica. Jamaica continues to be a country where high levels of crime and violence are a primary concern. The period between the 1970s and the 1990s showed an increase in accessibility to firearms and in gang violence (de Albuquerque and McElroy 1999). Traditionally criminal offenses in the Caribbean have been characterized by low rates of violent crime and relatively high rates of property crime. In most states of the Caribbean region the violent crime makes up only around 10% to 20% of all crime, which is similar to crime rates in most industrialized countries. This pattern changed, however, in 2000 in Jamaica when

violent crimes made up 41% of all reported crimes, a figure which puts Jamaica among the highest in levels of violent crime in the Caribbean. The murder rate in 2008 was 58 murders per 100,000 Jamaican citizens, with a total of around 1611 total murders, the second highest murder rate for Jamaica on record (Jamaica Observer 2009). The low level of trust in the police and the courts has meant that only about 20% of all crimes are reported (Harriott, Brathwaite and Wortley 2004 as cited in Boxill, Lewis, Russell, and Arlene Bailey 2007:113–115). In addition to the lack of trust in state institutions, over 70% of the population regards violence and crime as the most serious problem facing the country (Seligson 2006). Criminal networks involved in illicit drug trafficking are a particular problem in the region because they have fueled the rise in associated crimes including arms trafficking, political corruption, gang violence, money laundering, extortion, kidnapping, and various white-collar crime that are funded through capital that is raised through the drug trade (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2006).

### **Hypotheses**

The literature on crime in Jamaica suggests that today the major factors that promote violence are drug trafficking and gangs, although these two factors are not mutually exclusive. While there are inherent difficulties in ascertaining how much these two factors overlap, drug trafficking is often carried out by gangs and gangs reap benefits from the drug trade. Some of the literature on crime in Jamaica and weakened democracies in general posits that gangs are having an effect on government through electoral coercion and by capturing state services. The prevalence of gangs and drugs in communities, among other factors, has led to fear falling victim to crime.

Based on the research of Wood and Ribeiro (2009), Harriott (2008) and Perez (2004) it is clear that crime, violence and corruption can undermine the prospects for

democratic governance for countries in Latin American and the Caribbean. In this thesis I will limit the focus to the effect that exposure to criminality and deviant behavior has on political culture. By political culture I mean the attitudes and values that people have with respect to democracy as a form of government, with respect to their trust in state institutions, with respect to their perceptions of the efficacy of the state, and with respect to the degree to which they trust their neighbors. The research design is predicated on the large body of literature, mainly in political science (Almond and Verba 1963, 1989; Diamond 1993, 2005; Linz and Stepan 1996; Linz 2000; Munck 2003), which concludes that people's perception of democracy and the level of confidence that they have in state institutions has profound implications for the stability of democratic governance.

To explore these relationships I will use a 2006 social survey called the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), which I describe in more detail in Chapter 4.<sup>1</sup> As my analyses of these data will show, various measures of exposure to crime have a consistent and statistically significant effect on key measures of political culture, and, by implication, on the status and challenges to democracy in Jamaica. The following table shows the dependent variables and independent variables that I will use, indicating also the hypothesized association between the variables.

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<sup>1</sup>For more information on data collection please see Ian Boxill, Balford Lewis, Roy Russell, and Arlene Bailey, "The Political Culture of Democracy in Jamaica: 2006," July 2007, available from <http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/files/dGkQa4/Jamaica1.pdf>.

Table 1-1. Hypotheses

Independent variables	Hypothesized relationship	Dependent variables
1. Seeing drugs in one's neighborhood 2. Living in a neighborhood affected by gangs 3. Fear of crime	-	Support for democracy Satisfaction with democracy Preference for democracy Trust in state Institutions Efficacy of the government Trust in one's neighbors
	+	7. Acceptance of military overthrow

### Outline

In this thesis, I seek to go from broader concepts to specific concepts. As such the main narrative of this thesis in chapters 2, 3 and 4 will go from broader concepts to more specific concepts. In the following chapter I will discuss the history of Jamaica, specifically of crime and corruption in Jamaica, this is included not to insinuate that Jamaica's population is somehow violent by nature, but to describe historically the factions, or groups, that have fueled the problems that are visible in Jamaica contemporarily. Those groups can be of legitimate nature such as unions or political parties or of illegitimate nature such as organized crime networks and gangs, although, as chapters 2 and 3 will show, illegitimate and legitimate groups are not always completely separate entities. Chapter 3, the literature review, will discuss specifically the literature on the independent variables of drugs, gangs, and crime in Jamaica. This section will also include literature on the independent variables' effect on the dependent variables of democracy and government. The findings are contained in Chapter 4 which describes the way each of the variables are operationalized and presents statistical tests of the hypotheses noted in the table above. I will primarily use regression models as my method of analysis, but will also use means tables and frequency tables to present some preliminary data. Finally, in the concluding chapter will begin with a

discussion of clientelism in Jamaica and what some of the literature finds necessary for a functioning democracy, ending with some brief concluding remarks concerning this logic of this thesis.

## CHAPTER 2 THE HISTORY OF CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND CONFLICT IN JAMAICA

To understand the crime problem that exists in Jamaica today it is helpful to understand the history that has shaped it. While it is outside of the scope of this paper to extensively discuss all of the complexities of Jamaican and greater Caribbean history, briefly discussing some of the island nation's major conflicts can help to illuminate the violent crime for which the larger urban areas of Jamaica, in particular, have become notorious.

### **Europeans arrive in the Caribbean**

The island of Jamaica was encountered by Europeans in 1494 and was to be renamed "Santiago," but over time the original name given to the island by its original inhabitants proved more popular and it remained Jamaica (Mason 1999:12). While very little is known about the indigenous inhabitants of the island, the Taino people, sometimes called Arawak, were found throughout the Greater Antilles. It is known that the Tainos considered theft a particularly heinous crime. Although it was rare in Taino society, theft was punished with a slow, torturous death by sharp pole (Black 1961:9–13).

Crimes were first recorded on the island in the early days of European exploration, when disheartened men mutinied as they awaited supplies from the island of Hispaniola, present day Haiti and the Dominican Republic (Mason 1999:12–4). When Europeans first arrived, the Taino's believed that these newcomers were benevolent gods that could be trusted. The indigenous people helped the Spanish gather food and other resources during their stay, a practice that proved short lived. Thus the conflictual nature of early Caribbean societies can be traced to the subjugation

of the indigenous Taino people by the newly arrived Europeans. In Hispaniola for instance, the European settlers are said to have murdered the natives in sport hunting, in an attempt to see who could best strike off one of their heads. The Spanish Crown granted large swaths of land to colonist during this period and colonist were permitted to “compel” natives to work the land. The slavery of the indigenous people was not sustainable, however, as many died as a result of exposure to European disease or from suicide or infanticide that was, for the natives, a method of escape from enslavement (Black 1961:34–5).

The settlers from Spain came in search of one thing, gold. After working most of the indigenous population to death and finding little or no gold, the majority of the settlers in Jamaica soon found themselves very poor. The primary economic activity on the island at the time was trade of provisions with passing ships. Although some sugar and tobacco was grown, these commodities were primarily used locally. This poor economic situation was further exacerbated by the earthquake, hurricanes, and droughts (Black 1961:36–40).

Following the discovery of the islands, the Pope issued a proclamation that sought to divide the West Indies between Spain and Portugal. This action led to nationalist rivalry in Europe which was the impetus for attempts to loosen Spain’s grip on the Caribbean islands. The English, Dutch, Italians, Portuguese, and French began using pirate attacks to provoke and arouse fear among the Spanish colonists. Although it was illegal to do so, Spanish colonists traded with these pirates for lack of other ways to support themselves. Here we have the first example of smuggling in the region, used to bring in a variety of goods. This smuggling was allowed, by all accounts, because of

the inability to stop it. Through piracy, the English continued to challenge Spanish hegemony in the region. In 1643 the English attacked Spanish Town in the southeastern part of Jamaica. The event proved important as many of the English sailors who participated in the raid opted to desert and to remain in the Spanish colony. The civil war that soon followed in England in 1650 changed the country's political landscape, leading to the decision to bring the colonies in the Americas under the control of the British Parliament. Plans soon formed to capture Jamaica (Black 1961:42–6).

Throughout the 17th century, relations between the Spanish and English were at best tepid. The Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell put into action the “Western Design,” a plan to take control of parts of the vast territories in the Americas that were under Spanish rule. Originally the English planned to take the island of Hispaniola, but were defeated and retreated from the island before they were able to enter and capture the capital city of Santo Domingo. Fearing punishment, the English soldiers moved on to Jamaica, which was known, at the time, to be less populated and not as well defended as Hispaniola. Jamaica was taken relatively easily as the Spanish assumed that these pirates simply wanted to plunder the towns of the island. The Spaniards were given time to consider the terms of surrender. This gave them the opportunity to pack their valuables and escape, leaving little behind when the English finally marched on the capital of Spanish Town. While not happy about the loss in Hispaniola, the leadership in England sought to make Jamaica as fruitful a colony as possible (Black 1961:46–56).

### **Slavery and the Maroons**

Among the areas that instituted large systems of African slavery, the Caribbean and the Guianas (current day Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana) can be credited

with playing host to the highest per capita number of slave revolts. While there are many reasons for the high number of slave revolts, of particular importance was the ratio of slave to white population in those areas. In Jamaica, for example, slaves comprised around 80% of the population. This figure was well below that found in the slave states in the U.S. South where less than half of the population was enslaved.

The demographic imbalance was not the only reason that Jamaica saw so many slave revolts, as the economic situation of Jamaica also had a marked influence. Given that the colonial system was at times weakened by the world economy, slaves would suffer additional hardships of food rationing and starvation. Additionally, as one historian explained, in Jamaica, “whites talked too much, and the slaves heard everything.” The knowledge of abolitionist movements in the metropole gave another reason for the preponderance of revolts (Genovese 1979:10–24). It should be clarified that while slavery represented a grave moral injustice, the government in Jamaica and in England saw these revolts, small and large, as criminal offenses. The practices of Jamaican magistrates in particular stressed the difference between people who were enslaved and free, allowing much more space for legal protest by the poor or landless. The magistrates’ decisions emphasized the value of slaveholder’s private rights which were enforced through violence and repression (Paton 2001:923–5).

While small slave revolts presented the English colonists in Jamaica with a host of problems, the Maroons, groups of escaped slaves who formed their own societies, would prove to be an even more formidable challenge to white dominance on the island. The Maroons in Jamaica began as freed or runaway slaves of Spaniards that had withdrawn to the thick forests of the interior parts of the island. History shows that these

groups were prevalent throughout the Americas as long as there was terrain that could support and hide their societies (Genovese 1979:51–3). As the perceived power of Maroon settlements increased, colonial administrators established agreements with the Maroons in 1738, offering peace treaties in return for allegiance to the Crown and colonial government, and obtaining commitment of aid in any wars against foreign powers. In actuality, all of the fighting between the Maroons and British colonials had taken its toll on the Maroons who were near surrender. The Maroons also agreed to return any runaway slaves and aid in squashing slave revolts (Black 1961:86–7). Although seemingly contrary to their mission, this last point was especially important because Jamaican Maroons exemplified a “well-known African respect for treaty obligations and words of honor,” a trait that was hardly evident among their English counterparts. This hostility between the different oppressed groups, whether slave, Maroon, or Amerindian, was a function of the “divide and rule” strategy of European colonial leadership. Maroons, however, provided another enticing attraction in the minds of slaves who wished to escape bondage (Genovese 1979: 55–8). The Maroon chiefs were delegated the right to punish as they saw fit any criminal acts committed within their territory, except those crimes that would require the death sentence (Black 1961:87).

The second Maroon War began in 1795 and was fought in Jamaica during the Haitian Revolution and in the wake of the United States (U.S.) Revolution. As such, a great fear of similar uprising had taken hold in Jamaica. There are several reasons that the war was fought, including a dislike by new leadership of the rights and land granted to the Maroons. The catalyst was the punishment, by flogging, of two Maroons for

allegedly stealing pigs near Montego Bay, while prisoners, including attempted runaway slaves who had been caught and returned by Maroons, looked on. This was taken as an “unbearable insult,” by Maroons and caused an instant uproar among them. It was thought by colonial leadership in Jamaica that the Maroons planned a revolution in much the same manner as slaves had done in Hispaniola. This second Maroon war did not end well for the vast majority of Maroons, although some prospered from the conflict. Maroons from Accompong, who battled against those who had been agitated by the “insult,” were granted tracks of land that once belonged to the Maroons who participated in the revolt. Others who surrendered were sent to Nova Scotia and later to Sierra Leone (Black 1961:135–43).

### **The Movement Towards Abolition**

The end of the slave trade, but not slavery, in British colonies came on the first day of 1808, as a result of political and social movement that worked towards abolition. The bill did not stop some English citizens from trading and dealing in slaves until more severe laws were passed that treated trading in slaves as piracy, a crime punishable by death (Black 1961:144–50). Emancipation brought with it a host of new problems for the legal system, including a new set of revolts. One in particular, the Sam Sharpe rebellion of Christmas 1831, played a particularly important role in the minds of British abolitionists. The rebellion started as a strike, but soon spread into rioting that resulted in the burning of many sugar estates in Montego Bay and weeks of rebellion throughout the island. The response to the rebellion was one of extreme violence with floggings and hangings for all those suspected of transgressions. This would work to garner sympathy for slaves in the British metropole.

August 1, 1834 marked the day that ended slavery in British colonies, but it was a common belief among political elites that slaves would simply retire to the mountains for sustenance living was (Mason 1999:21–22). To counter this threat to the colony’s economy, a system of “apprenticeship” was devised which would tie the slaves to the land. Although slaves were now granted more rights as near-free men, their labor would still be at the disposal of their former masters, while they “learned the necessary skills” for their survival. New judicial councils were established to deal with disputes between master and apprentice, but their ability to enforce their decisions was at best weak. New and harsher forms of punishment were also devised. While tying the labor to the land was to be expected, planters were supposed to provide housing and food allowances, but rarely did so. In addition, workers were subjected to a number of charges that often exceeded the amount they earned, thereby creating a kind of indentured slavery on the island.

This period saw the introduction of other immigrant workers from other parts of Europe and then in large numbers from India and China under the indenture system. , The latter immigrant groups were also drawn in larger numbers to British Guiana and Trinidad (Black 1961:167). Abuses of these new laborers by contractors, who assumed the role of slave master, were common (Figueredo and Argote-Freye 2008:104–5). The year 1838 saw the end of the apprenticeship system and for the first time full citizenship rights were given to former slaves including, for some, the right to vote in elections (Mason 1999:22).

### **The Beginnings of Independence and Party Politics**

This would not mean an end to the political turmoil, however, as free blacks still found themselves excluded from power and continued to suffer from unemployment and

severe underemployment. The Morant Bay Rebellion of October 1865 proved to be another instance of harsh reaction to a small group of rioters. The rebellion began as a protest of the trial for one supporter of Paul Bogle, who was a Baptist Deacon and political leader. After some scuffling outside the courthouse where the trial was taking place an arrest warrant was issued for Bogle, but Bogle's supporters hindered police efforts to apprehend him. After a few days a larger group led by Bogle returned to Morant Bay and rioting erupted shortly thereafter. In retaliation the colonial government had 430 people put to death and another 600 flogged. In response, the British government removed the Governor and instituted a "crown colony government" that improved access to education, infrastructure, and led to the overhauling of the judicial system (Mason 1999:22–4). In contrast to the political turmoil and the rule of caudillo autocrats that followed independence in much of the former Spanish empire, British colonialism represented an alternative to authoritarian governance (Huber 1993:79).

In the early 1900s, Jamaica proved itself to be a valuable holding for the British during both World War I and II, as it acted as a naval base, source of food, and source of soldiers. As the world dealt with the problems of the Great Depression, Jamaica was hit particularly hard, which led to crime, especially in the cities. Trade Unions formed after the Depression and rioting linked to strikes for higher wages occurred all over the island in 1938. These strikes, coupled with growing nationalist sentiment, would eventually lead to the formation of the People's National Party (PNP) (Mason 1999:25–7). Animosity between the black Jamaicans who owned little if any land, and whites that owned about two-thirds of the land continued to grow (Figueredo and Argote-Freye 2008:200–1).

Before Norman Manley and Alexander Bustamante came on to the political scene, Jamaica had no official political parties. The two cousins, although of different ideological minds, helped each other in personal and political affairs. By 1942 Bustamante and Manley's ideological divide became an intense political rivalry (Sives 2003:54–5). The PNP, under Manley, began as a left leaning and intellectually inclined party that called for the end of British rule in Jamaica. As an outgrowth of the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union, Bustamante formed the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) in 1943. Their focus was a more populist appeal to working class blacks in Jamaica.

In time the PNP formed the Trade Union Congress and tensions between the two groups quickly escalated into violent conflict in 1947 through 1949. Manley and Bustamante signed a peace accord that committed their supporter to forsake the “use force in political campaigning.” The agreement was publicized as a way that Jamaica could “now move forward, politically, socially and spiritually without the... brutality.” The violence between them can be seen as JLP using violence and intimidation to keep the PNP out of the public sphere and off the streets, especially in Kingston, and the PNP using violence to force their way back in so that they could campaign for their party (Sives 2003:49–59). Neither party was particularly radical at their founding. However, after Jamaica became independent in 1962, the struggle for power became more confrontational as the PNP moved farther to the left and the JLP moved to the right of the political spectrum (Mason 1999:29–30).

### **Party Politics beget Gang Violence**

These years were formative in developing the factionalized violence that has come to divide Jamaica. In the run-up to the 1976 elections, the dangerous polarization took

on an additional meaning as the animosities between two groups came to be interpreted as “communist” inspired, or as taking aid from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency that was bent on “deliberately destabilizing” Jamaica. Party leaders on both sides began to arm their constituents, and the urban poor began to engage in shoot-outs, arson, and bombings. By June of that year, 100 people had been killed in politically motivated violence (Mason 1999:31).

As a consequence of a poor economic situation and at the behest of the International Monetary Fund, Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) were introduced to Jamaica in 1977. While it is outside of the scope of the paper to go into much detail about SAP, the economic policies should be understood as attempts to attract foreign capital to Jamaica through the exploitation of cheap labor and currency devaluation. The SAP had the effect of pushing people out of the formal economy into self-employment and the informal economy. While this in itself did not lead to criminal activity it did, at a minimum, make criminal activity acceptable and justifiable (Harriott 1996:63; Griffith 2004:114).

Elections held in 1980 showed a jump in political violence when an estimated 800 people were killed in politically motivated attacks (Mason 1999:32). Gangs linked to the major political parties became the embodiment of the factionalized political culture of Jamaica. When the state was unable to provide social services in the late 1990s, gangs stepped in to fill the void to provide. In the virtual absence of state authority, gang organizations instituted “their own system of law and order, complete with holding cells... and street corner courts.” They would further step in to aid citizens with “school

fees, lunch money and employment,” all with money collected from “taxing” businesses through protection rackets (Figueredo and Argote-Freye 2008:204–7).

Gang activity was rooted in the urban Garrisons, the government subsidized affordable and free housing complexes that became safe havens for criminal activity associated with drug trafficking and political corruption. Through bribery, coercion, and intimidation, voters in the garrisons cast their ballots either for the PNP or the JLP. Garrisons have been argued to be the institutions in Jamaica most responsible for creating the violence and political corruption that threaten democratic governance on the island (Harriott 2008:143–4; Figueroa and Sives 2003:63–5). Over time the garrisons became a method of granting favors in exchange for political support through a patronage system that was practiced by both of the major political parties (Harriott 2000:1–16 as cited in, Figueroa and Sives 2003:65). Nonetheless, it is worth noting that, long before the advent of the garrisons, Jamaica’s population showed intensely partisan identities without receiving political spoils (Sives 2003:59).

Garrisons, as their name suggests, came to be political strongholds where a variety of electoral crimes were committed with relative impunity. Tracking the electoral patterns of the period after independence, some scholars have noted that in many cases opposition parties received fewer than 10 and sometimes no votes at all in some areas, an outcome that only added credibility to claims that people’s vote were being coerced. The election of 1997 represented a important and ominous shift in the role played by crime bosses in the electoral process as the wealth garnered through the international drug trade meant that the leadership within organized crime networks became less dependent on political patronage (Figueroa and Sives 2003:65–83). How

crime, gangs, and drug trafficking entered the political process in Jamaica is the focus of the next chapter.

## CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW

Drugs and crime are problems that can have many serious negative effects on individuals and on society. Obvious effects of drug addiction and violence are the destruction that it causes to people. Much less obvious but equally, if not more, troubling are the consequences of crime and corruption on the democratic system, and on the economy (West Indian Commission 1992:343–4). Many studies document the effects of organized crime and drug trafficking on the island of Jamaica and on the greater Caribbean. The majority of these works, however, tend to speak in abstract terms without empirically testing the arguments they present. Rather they most often cite governmental reports and news articles that agree with their argument giving us anecdotal evidence of the problems that are created by crime and illicit drugs. The work comes from a variety of fields including most prominently criminology, sociology, history and political science. Studies from other parts of the Caribbean, Latin America and the world can illuminate the complexities of problems related to crime and its effects on democracy and governance.

### **Jamaica's Crime and Drug Trafficking in an Inter-American Context**

Crime has become one of the biggest problems in the region, one of the major causes of public outcry, and one of the greatest concerns for the region's government administrations since the 1990s (Harriott, Farley and Wortley 2004 as cited in, Boxill, et al. 2007). Problems associated with narcotics and crime are often placed within the framework of national or international security and security studies. The dissertation of Joseph M. Rogers at Florida International University devotes a chapter to the problems that drug cartels cause in the Dominican Republic. From Rogers' perspective, it is an

issue of national security both within the Dominican Republic and with regards to people from the Dominican Republic within the United States. The author points out the nearly every other island in the Caribbean faces many of the same issues, but the Caribbean conception of national security is much different than that of the United States. The national security interests in the Caribbean, as the author's view, are strongly intertwined with economic interest or economic security. Economic liberalization has inevitably aided in the growth of illegal activities which, in turn, has the effect of broadening the security agenda, often to a point where security can neither be understood nor achieved. The author also argues that, as drugs become a problem, there is a marked increase in police and military presence, a trend that can erode people's civil and political rights (Rogers 1999:236–44).

Marlyn J. Jones (2002), firmly locates Jamaica within this story of the drug trade and explains the effects in Jamaica of the U.S. foreign drug control policy. The article gives attention to the “unintended consequences” that U.S. drug policy is having in Jamaica, noting the effect of the deportation of Jamaican-born criminals in the U.S. to Jamaica. Repatriated offenders “return with a bag of tricks learned in the United States.” As a result, major crimes, such as murder, rape, and robberies have all increased in periods following mass deportations from the United States to Jamaica. Crimes such as drive-by shootings, which were at one time unheard of in Jamaica, have become more commonplace.

Interlinked drug networks between Jamaicans and other Caribbean peoples with Colombian drug cartels have also increased in recent years. Military and police resources are stretched thin, sometimes because of corruption, but more often because

of lack of resources to combat well funded and well armed drug traffickers. This explains the seeming lack of action on the part of the Jamaican government to deal with the problems that drug trafficking has created within their country. Jones and Rodgers seem to disagree here; does police presence increase or are they stretched then. It seems that both indeed may be the case for their respective areas of study, but it may also hold true that both are correct for different parts of their respective countries of interests depending on the timing and budgetary limitations of particular moments in time.

Another problem Jones identifies in her article lies in the concept of “displacement,” which implies that any effort to stem criminal activity will result in some form of compensating behavior, which can occur spatially, temporally, or qualitatively. Specifically, when criminal enterprises are pressed in one geographic location, the locus of activity will simply move; if they are pressed during one specific point in time, they will simply wait and stockpile products; and if all else fails, they will simply move to a different type of criminal activity. When the interception of drugs traversing Mexico was at a high point, drugs were merely routed through the Caribbean. Such patterns underscore the idea that understanding policy impositions in other regions of the America help to understand drug trafficking and related crimes in the Caribbean. Jones notes that little if any research exists on drug transit points, meaning that the feasibility of imposing anti-drug targets has not been tested, nor has it been determined if benchmarks can even be met. This leaves Jamaica vulnerable to the process of “decertification” by International foreign aid agencies. Decertification would eliminate all aid except that which is for humanitarian and anti-narcotic purpose. It would also lead

U.S. officials to withhold their vote from international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (Jones 2002:120–9).

As Ivelaw L. Griffith explains in his chapter of The Political Economy of the Drug Industry: Latin America in the International System, it is often too simplistic to frame the problems of drugs crimes as a military matter if only because the use of military force is impractical. He uses the term geo-narcotics to frame the wide range of issues that have become the heart of the “War on Drugs” debate. He further cautions against looking at the Caribbean as merely a transitory stage in the drug commodity chain. As a result of the drug trade, the region has come to be involved in organized crime, arms trafficking, and in the production and consumption of drugs (Griffith 2004:107). As a result of the rises in gang activity, the personal freedoms in the Caribbean have come under attack (Jones 2002:123–5).

As there has been a history of military led coups within the Caribbean and throughout Latin America, there has been a willingness to accept U.S. security assistance to eliminate the threat of internal insurrection. Leaders have endorsed the idea that a well-trained and well-funded military will not attempt to rule the country, but will instead remain loyal to the government. The U.S. military has had a profound influence on law enforcement and military personnel in host countries. Eugene Bouley explains that in the late 1990s in Latin America, a group consisting of Special Forces and military intelligence personnel called Tactical Training Teams (TATS) was instrumental in selecting which intelligence to collect and managing that information to then use to direct local police and military. Within the Caribbean specifically, U.S. foreign policy-makers have pushed to allow U.S. naval vessels to enter territorial waters

and to allow for U.S. aircraft to enter foreign airspace without permission from Caribbean governments (Bouley 2001:171–180).

Griffith's (1997:5–6) book Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege, places the term security outside of the Cold War era realist conception of security in terms of "high politics." Instead, he understands these security issues as problems that are so large that a single actor could not possibly be able to fix the problem. One of the problems created by the trade in illicit drugs is that traffickers in some countries have been able to amass so much wealth that they often have much more sophisticated means of attack than the military or police in the country in which they live. This undermines the sovereignty of the state and poses a threat to democratic institutions.<sup>1</sup> In the book, Griffith also points out that if many of the concerns with drug trafficking are similar throughout the Caribbean, and as such it would seem wise to create partnerships between countries to combat the problems that arise from the drug trade. Some of these partnerships have been created within the context of the CARICOM project. He states:

Sometimes the political elites of countries are unwilling to commit resources to the cooperative effort when it is unclear that there will be commensurate returns. Many times political leaders are unable to see the national-interest value in participating in some ventures. Paradoxically, however, those ventures themselves may be jeopardized because of capability dilemmas... often, domestic considerations, such as changes in the national leadership, public opinion, and timing may make it difficult for the country with the least deficiency to honor earlier pledges (Griffith 1997:240).

This type of entanglement seems necessary in the world that is much more open and much easier to traverse than that of past decades.

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<sup>1</sup>This problem is also mentioned by Jones (2002:129)

In Jamaica, which was for many years the world's top producer of cannabis, the literature suggests that the growth in levels of violence and associated crimes has to do with drug trafficking moving from cannabis to cocaine.

Homicide statistics indicate a strong relationship between drug trafficking and homicidal violence. A dramatic shift has occurred in drug trafficking with cocaine superseding Cannabis Sativa (Marijuana) as the primary drug. The period of rapid acceleration in the murder rate corresponds with the period of the greatest expansion (and competitiveness) in the cocaine and cocaine derivative business and their transshipment through the region. Associated with the cocaine distribution are organized crimes and more complex inter-island and international crime network. The literature has indicated that there is a strong association between the drug problem and gun use in criminal activity (Harriott, Farley and Wortley 2004 as cited in, Boxill, et al. 2007:114).

This study also suggests that the drug trafficking network created by the cannabis trade could be activated for the trade in heroine and cocaine, thereby making Jamaica an easy target for becoming a major transshipment point.

William C. Prillaman's policy report, "Crime, Democracy, and Development in Latin America," is at once bleak and hopeful. On the one hand he suggests many ways in which the "crime problem" can be dealt with yet, on the other hand, he lists many reasons why the problem is likely to persist. For Prillaman crime is not regarded as a problem in and of itself, but as something that causes a variety of problems for countries that face high crime rates. These problems can be grouped into three main categories: economic, social, and political. Economic problems caused by crime can be both macro and microeconomic in scale. Estimates from the Inter-American Development Bank, for example, indicate that if the region of Latin America had a crime rate that was closer to the global average, per capita gross domestic product would be around 25% higher. Estimates from the World Bank indicate that at similar global crime rates per capita income for the region would be 25% higher. Crime has also decreased the amount of

foreign direct investment in the region. On a microeconomic scale, there are increased economic costs caused by decreased worker productivity, increased insurance costs, and decreases in commercial transactions and in tourism (Prillaman 2003:3–7). In the social realm, there is a decrease in interpersonal trust in the general population. Low levels of trust, in turn, are associated with low political participation, unwillingness to attend school, and lack of a sense of safety in the community. Politically, there is a decrease in trust people have in state institutions, such as courts or police, which often compels business enterprises and individuals to procure security from private security firms, which are not accountable to popularly elected officials.

Table 3-1. Do police protect people from criminals or are they the ones that are involved in crime

Protect	N	880
	%	63.50%
Involved	N	505
	%	36.50%
Total	N	1385
	%	100.00%

Source: LAPOP survey—Jamaica, 2006

Table 3-1 shows responses to the question “Some people say that the police in this neighborhood protect people from criminals while others say that the police are the ones that are involved in crime. What do you think?” In Jamaica 36.50% of respondents believe that the police are involved in the crime in their neighborhood. This shows some empirical evidence for the idea that trust in police has been damaged. However, in Prillaman’s view, one of the more troubling of political problems caused by crime is the lack of political will to meaningfully deter crime. Prillaman explains that in many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean the state has been “captured” by organized crime. Force coupled with the power to influence government at all levels

makes it possible for criminal networks to carry out their activities. The fact remains that some political parties in the region receive large amounts of their political contributions from illicit organizations and individuals. This has led many government officials to turn a blind eye to criminal elements, especially those who hold positions of power within criminal networks (Prillaman 2003:18–28). These observations point to the corrosive effects of crime and corruption on democratic governance.

### **Democratic Consolidation and Corruption**

In Jamaica, it seems that the needs of those who are oppressed or excluded from the processes of democracy are represented better by non-governmental organizations than they are by the political parties that they elect to seats of power. In a chapter by Evelyne Huber, entitled the “The Future of Democracy in the Caribbean” in the book Democracy in the Caribbean: Political, Economic, and Social Perspectives, Huber discusses many of the aspects of government that must be taken into account for the style of governance to be called democratic. Although the piece was written over fifteen years ago, it still offers insight into the problems that continue to hinder democratic consolidation in the Caribbean. As stated in the introduction, the definition of democracy has come to mean more than simply a competitive electoral process. Elections must be free and fair, held at regular intervals, and executed in the context of guaranteed civil and political rights. All parts of the government must be accountable to the both elected representatives and the general populace (Huber 1993:74–6; Diamond 1997:13).

Huber points to drug production and transshipment, and drug money laundering as major challenges to democracy stating that they “endanger the capacity of democratic states to uphold the rule of law because of corrupting influence on the state.” The

threats to the rule of law are further eroded by the “violence by those involved in the drug business.” (Huber 1993:83) This statement is consistent with Prillaman’s claim that crime has a corrupting effect on the state, and the idea is echoed in a book edited by Griffith and Betty N. Sedoc-Dahlberg (1997), Democracy and Human Rights in the Caribbean, who state specifically that gangs have connections to both major political parties and within the state’s many bureaucracies.

Table 3-2. Do gangs affect your neighborhood

Yes	N	621
	%	58.70%
No	N	881
	%	55.20%
Total	N	1502
	%	100.00%

Source: LAPOP survey—Jamaica, 2006

Table 3-2 shows responses to the question, “Do gangs effect your neighborhood?” It shows that 41.30% of respondents in Jamaica feel that their neighborhoods are effected by gangs either “a great deal,” “somewhat,” or “little.” The prevalence of gangs in so many of the neighborhoods in Jamaica led Griffith and Trevor Munroe (1997) to offer a chapter entitled “Drugs and Democratic Governance in the Caribbean.” The text that cites a variety sources including police reports and news articles that explain the troubling relationship between drug gangs and the government.

Table 3-3. In your neighborhood have you seen anyone selling drugs in the past 12 months

Yes	N	212
	%	14.70%
No	N	1233
	%	85.30%
Total	N	1445
	%	100.00%

Source: LAPOP survey—Jamaica, 2006

Table 3-3 shows responses table for the question, “In your neighborhood, have you seen anyone selling drugs in the past year?” The money raised from selling drugs can be used for a host of insidious causes. Griffith and Munroe give particular importance to the idea that “political, economic, and social institutions are threatened when drug money can be used to bribe or eliminate... customs officials, police officers, prison guards, politicians, ministers, judges, bankers, jurors, witnesses, prosecutors, and, not least, voters.” They state that this can lead to a new “powder elite,” or drug dons who are able to subjugate state power for their own personal gain. The result is a kind of “narco-democracy,” where power is shifted from elected officials and the general populace to this “powder elite” that is able to buy political influence (Griffith and Munroe 1997:85–8). Anthony Harriott, in Organized Crime and Politics in Jamaica: Breaking the Nexus, further notes that Jamaica’s criminal justice system as at best weak because it is unable to convict the powerful elites including the “drug dons” cited by Griffith and Munroe. One consequence is the low levels of confidence people have in public institutions, knowing that the state is largely unable to protect the population whom it has a mandate to serve (Harriott 2008:6). Clifford Griffin’s book Democracy and Neoliberalism in the Developing World: Lessons from the Anglophone Caribbean cites very similar situations that have occurred in other parts of the Anglophone Caribbean.

Specifically in Antigua and Barbuda, and St. Kitts and Nevis, we find that the troubling relationships between the government and suspected drug traffickers, gang leaders, and organized crime is a part of daily life for many of the governments of the Caribbean (Griffin 1997:141–97). Harriott (2008:143) agrees, stating that it is understood that illicit funds have influenced politics within Colombia, Honduras, Guatemala, Haiti and Jamaica<sup>2</sup>—all countries “where organized crime networks are well established and fairly powerful.”

The ability of moneyed interests to gain political influence within society can, however, come from a variety of parties. The sense of favoritism for moneyed interests has been echoed by a World Bank report that stated:

While Jamaica scores near the worldwide average in cross-country surveys of corruption, bribery and lack of transparency in government contracts are considered by Jamaicans to be important problems. Jamaica ranks poorly in perceptions of favoritism shown by government officials towards well-connected firms and individuals when deciding on policies and contracts. This is closely linked with the pressure exerted on businesses by protection rackets, and reflected in the high perceived costs imposed on businesses by organized crime. (World Bank, Latin America and Caribbean Social Protection Unit 2004 as cited in United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2007: 24).

Harriott classifies political funding into three distinct categories, “clean,” “tainted,” and “dirty.” “Clean” or legitimate money, does not seek influence over policy, but may cause anti-democratic favoritism for specific interests groups within the society. “Tainted” or legitimate money used for illegitimate purposes, refers to funding that is given to politicians to ensure a specific ends, such as a government contract or a favorable shift in policy. And finally “dirty” or illegitimate money, refers to the resources that come from criminal elements within society in order to insure both the election of sympathetic

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<sup>2</sup>See Corruption Perceptions Index at <http://www.transparency.org>.

representatives to seats of power and that, once in office, those elected officials will continue to favor their interests (Harriott 2008:142–4). The book presents readers with Harriott's integral connection of the fields of criminology and political science. Treating them as separate domains, he says, has been largely the norm in scholarship but, in his view, organized crime has such a perverse effect on the political process that they must be studied together.

While Harriott (2008:143–4) sees problems in the voting process as mostly alleviated (e.g., gerrymandering or electoral fraud), he does state that “intimidatory violence... and the garrison problem,” still raise concerns within the democratic process. The close connection between criminals and politicians is hardly limited to Jamaica. Harriott (2008:116–8) cites the works of Peter Lupsha (1988) and M.E. Beare (1997) as proof that the use of “criminal gangs... to harass opposition was commonplace,” and that political actors “chose to collude with organized crime in order to stay in power, eliminate opposition, or fund-raise through the involvement of illegal commodities.” The work of Lupsha specifically states that this intermingling was seen in the history of China, Japan, and France and was beneficial to both parties (Lupsha 1988:2–8 as cited in Harriott 2008:118).

The chapter that follows brings empirical evidence to bear on many of the relationships noted above. The focus is specifically on the negative effects that drug trafficking, fear of crime and gangs have on people's perception of democracy and the legitimacy of the state.

## CHAPTER 4 DATA ANALYSIS

The Latin American Public Opinion Poll (LAPOP) for Jamaica 2006 is a joint venture undertaken by the University of West Indies and Vanderbilt University. The survey asks respondents a variety of questions that range from political participation to type of employment, and from the person's region of residence to his or her level of support for democracy. Many of the responses to the survey are recorded in the form of an ordinal scale where the intensity of the person's opinion varies along a four-point continuum (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree). Other questions generate answers that are nominal in scale, recording a simple "yes" or "no" response. With a total of 1595 randomly selected respondents in Jamaica aged 18 or older, the results of the survey can be generalized to the island. In 2006, the LAPOP survey was conducted in 15 countries, including Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Peru.

Table 4-1. What is the most serious problem facing Jamaica

Delinquency, crime, violence	50.20%
Unemployment, lack of job opportunity	18.90%
Violence	12.40%
Poverty	4.20%
Economy, problems with, crisis of	3.70%
Corruption	2.20%
Bad Government	2.00%
Human Rights Violations	0.20%
Drug Addiction	0.10%
Drug Trafficking	0.10%
Armed Conflict	0.10%
Kidnapping	0.10%
Terrorism	0.10%
All Others	5.70%
Total	100.00%

Source: LAPOP survey—Jamaica, 2006

In 2008 the murder rate in Jamaica was around 58 persons per 100,000 persons (Jamaica Observer 2009). Chapter 3 showed that the literature on crime in Jamaica tends to agree with the idea that much of the violence in Jamaica stems from crime and confrontation related to drug trafficking and gangs. The LAPOP survey asks directly “What is the most serious problem facing the country right now?” Within the survey this question is left open-ended, allowing for variance in the answers of respondents. Table 4-1 shows that delinquency, crime, and violence make up a slight majority of the responses. Another 12.4% believe that violence is the most serious problem, and 2.2% feel that corruption is most serious. Taken together, crime and violence related issues are considered the most serious problems to 65.5% of all respondents.

Previous chapters in this thesis noted that drug traffickers, gangs and criminals have infiltrated the realm of politics in Jamaica and that the link between criminality and politics is widely thought to have corrosive effects on democratic governance. The

objective in this chapter is to use the LAPOP 2006 public opinion survey to test the hypothesis that crime, deviant behavior and fear of crime have negative effects on various measures of political culture. The three primary independent variables are: (1) seeing drugs sold in one's neighborhood (hereafter, *seen drugs*), (2) feeling that gangs effect one's neighborhood (hereafter, *gangs*), and (3) fear of falling victim to crime (hereafter, *fear crime*).

Table 4-2. Overview of coding for dependent variables

Variable	Questionnaire item	Range
Support for democracy ( <i>sfd</i> )	<i>"Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?"</i>	0 (low) – 6 (high)
Satisfaction with democracy ( <i>swd</i> )	<i>"In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way in which democracy works in Jamaica?"</i>	0 (low) – 3 (high)
Preference for democracy ( <i>pdf</i> )	<i>"Democracy is preferable to any other form of government."</i>	0=no 1=yes
Trust in state	<i>"To what extent do you trust the following state entities?"</i>	0 (low) – 90 (high)
Efficacy of state	<i>"To what extent do you have confidence in the state's ability to aid in the following democratic society issues?"</i>	0 (low) – 24 (high)
Trust amongst neighbors	<i>"Now, speaking of the people from this community, would you say that they are generally very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy?"</i>	0 (low) – 3 (high)
Acceptance of military overthrow	<i>"Would a military take over be justified when there is...?"</i>	0 (low) – 5 (high)

I hypothesize that each of these variables will have a statistically significant negative effect on people's perception of democracy, their trust in state institutions, and their trust in one another, as measured by six variables: (1) agreement with the statement "democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of

government,” (2) preference for democracy, (3) satisfaction with democracy, (4) trust in state institutions, (5) the view of the state’s ability to solve societal problems, and (6) trust among citizens. I further hypothesize that the three independent variables will cause respondents to seek authoritarian forms of government and therefore exposure to drug trafficking, gangs, and fear of falling victim to crime will have a statistically significant positive effect on their willingness to accept a military takeover of the government. On the assumption that other factors may also affect people’s opinions; the multivariate procedures will introduce statistical controls for sex, age, education level, subjective income, and place of residence. Table 4-2 describes the six dependent variables and the way that each indicator was coded.

### Preliminary Analysis

#### Dependent Variables

Responses in Table 4-3 show average responses to the three questions. Agreement with *sfd* at 4.602 is in the middle to high range. The mean for *swd* shows satisfaction in the middle range, just outside of the slightly dissatisfied range. The mean for *pdf* shows a very high preference for democracy.

Table 4-3. Means for “Support for, Satisfaction with, and Preference for Democracy”

Concept	Mean	Std. Dev.	Range	N
Support Democracy	4.602	1.645	0–6	1481
Satisfaction with Democracy	1.561	0.494	0–3	1457
Preference for Democracy	0.763	0.425	0–1	1462

Source: LAPOP survey—Jamaica, 2006

The second research question will analyze the effect of *seen drugs*, *gangs* and *fear crime* on respondents’ trust and confidence in state institutions. To complete this task I have created an index of people’s trust in various state institutions. The index allows respondents’ to rate 15 public institutions on a scale that ranges from 0 (low), to

6 (high). The sum of the 15 scores produces a composite index that I will call “trust in state institutions.”

Table 4-4. To what extent do you trust the following entities

Entity	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
1. Courts of justice (in regards to guaranteeing a fair trial)	3.13	1.676	1307
2. Political system (in regards to protecting basic rights)	2.63	1.707	1521
3. System of justice	2.68	1.779	1529
4. Electoral office	3.04	1.933	1498
5. Parliament	2.48	1.860	1524
6. Central Government	2.52	1.788	1457
7. Public Defender's Office	3.07	1.845	1114
8. Police	2.68	1.915	1570
9. Political Parties	2.16	1.753	1543
10. Supreme Court	3.06	1.803	1327
11. Parish Councilor's Office (Local)	2.50	1.803	1445
12. Attorney General	3.02	1.830	1146
13. Office of the Auditor General	2.99	1.815	1079
14. Tax Office	3.09	1.956	1499
15. Elections	2.34	1.901	1536
Total	40.75	18.900	725
Cronbach's Alpha	0.921		15

Source: LAPOP survey—Jamaica, 2006

Table 4-4 presents the mean values of each of the source variables that compose the index. The country average for the composite index, which is variable that I will use in the analyses that follows, is 40.75. When individual measures and summed to construct a single indicator, as I have done here, it is important to determine whether the composite index is internally consistent. The test often used to determine the reliability of a composite measure is Cronbach’s Alpha. Analysts conventionally consider an Alpha score of .70 or higher to be an acceptable level of index reliability. As noted at the bottom of the table, the Alpha score for trust in state institutions is 0.92, a value that considerably exceeds the acceptable minimum.

For the third research question I have created an index to measure the level of confidence in the efficacy of the state in dealing with issues which are important in a democracy. These are ideas that are framed in different ways, as noted in Table 4-5, but all further the understanding of the respondents' confidence in the state. Here again respondents' rate from 0, for a low level of confidence to 6, for a high level of confidence. There are four variables in the index.

Table 4-5. To what extent do you have confidence in the state's ability to aid in the following democratic society issues

Issue	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
1. Protecting Democratic Principles	2.98	1.716	1451
2. Combating Government Corruption	1.82	1.726	1522
3. Protecting of Human Rights	2.77	1.765	1512
4. Improving Citizen Security	2.42	1.706	1511
Total	9.93	7.631	1390
Cronbach's Alpha	0.795		4

Source: LAPOP survey—Jamaica, 2006

The mean for the composite index, the principle variable of interest, is 9.93.. The reliability for this index of 0.795 is acceptable since it is above the .70 cut off point.

Table 4-6. Trust among neighbors

Untrustworthy	7.14%	
Not Very Trustworthy	21.62%	
Somewhat Trustworthy	57.14%	
Very Trustworthy	14.08%	
Mean		1.78 (0.772)
N		1498

Standard deviation in parentheses

Source: LAPOP survey—Jamaica, 2006

Another important factor in the success of a participatory democracy is trust in other citizens. It is widely assumed that some level of trust in the judgment of others

contributes to democratic governance (Almond and Verba 1963:356–60). As such it is important to test the effect of the independent variables on trust amongst citizens. The LAPOP poll asks the question “Now, speaking of the people from this community, would you say that they are generally very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy?” Answers are coded 0, for “Untrustworthy” to 3, for “Very Trustworthy.” The majority of respondents, 57.14%, feel that their neighbors are “somewhat trustworthy.” The mean for this variable at 1.78, shows that respondents feel that their neighbors are closest to being “somewhat trustworthy.”

Table 4-7. Would a military take over be justified when there is

Issue	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
1. High Unemployment	0.15	0.354	1462
2. Many Social Protests	0.31	0.462	1486
3. High Crime	0.48	0.500	1488
4. High inflation, with excessive price rises?	0.14	0.347	1490
5. A lot of Corruption	0.31	0.465	1494
Total	1.33	1.551	1334
Cronbach's Alpha	0.778		5

Source: LAPOP survey—Jamaica, 2006

As important as support for the abstract idea of democracy may be, the willingness to justify a military overthrow of a democratically elected government may be as telling a measure of the degree to which people support of democratic ideals. Table 4-7 presents responses to the question “Would a military takeover be justified when there is...?” The questionnaire item then stipulated the five conditions noted in the table. “No” responses were code 0; “yes” responses were coded 1. Row 3 shows that “High Crime” has the highest mean (0.48) for any of the questions, meaning that about 48% of respondents believe that a high level of crime would be enough of a reason to allow a

military takeover of the government. Although, high crime is the condition most relevant to this study, I created a composite index of the five variables. I did so in order to generate a measure that was a more general reflection of the degree to which respondents were amenable to a government run by the military—something that has never taken place in Jamaica. For the sample as a whole, the average value of the index was 1.33, with an acceptable Alpha score of 0.778.

### **Control Variables**

For the regression models I have decided to control for the following variables: age, sex, subjective income, and place of residence, as it is assumed that these variables may have an effect on the dependent variables. A similar study commissioned by Orlando J. Pérez concerning a similar topic of crime's effects on democracy, but focusing on Guatemala and El Salvador, also used these variables. That analysis also included race in its analysis of Guatemala but in Jamaica it would be difficult to say that race would have effect on the dependent variable as the racial make up of the country and of the data set falls heavily in to one group. That is coupled with the data showing no statistically significant link of race to the dependent variables (Perez 2004:627–44).

### **Independent Variables**

Anecdotal evidence tends to focus on the Kingston as the primary parish where drug trafficking, gangs, and crime are an issue, but Table 4-8 shows that these problems are widespread.

Table 4-8. Means for variables *seen drugs, gangs, and fear crime* by parish and locale

Parish	% Urban	(1) Seen Drugs	(2) Gangs	(3) Fear Crime
Kingston	1.00	0.19 (0.399)	0.67 (0.473)	0.27 (0.448)
St. Catherine	1.00	0.18 (0.384)	0.67 (0.475)	0.34 (0.476)
St. Andrew	0.73	0.22 (0.415)	0.61 (0.490)	0.37 (0.484)
St. James	0.50	0.01 (0.113)	0.27 (0.446)	0.14 (0.350)
Hanover	0.44	0.06 (0.236)	0.08 (0.280)	0.11 (0.319)
Clarendon	0.38	0.08 (0.277)	0.53 (0.501)	0.14 (0.353)
Manchester	0.34	0.04 (0.193)	0.18 (0.387)	0.05 (0.220)
Westmoreland	0.34	0.20 (0.399)	0.22 (0.418)	0.33 (0.473)
Portland	0.31	0.20 (0.404)	0.27 (0.446)	0.27 (0.447)
St. Elizabeth	0.29	0.02 (0.128)	0.12 (0.327)	0.22 (0.417)
St. Mary	0.27	0.18 (0.388)	0.39 (0.490)	0.28 (0.450)
Trelawny	0.18	0.30 (0.462)	0.47 (0.502)	0.59 (0.495)
St. Ann	0.17	0.05 (0.214)	0.44 (0.498)	0.24 (0.429)
St. Thomas	0.00	0.25 (0.438)	0.42 (0.497)	0.22 (0.417)
Total	0.43	0.15 (0.354)	0.41 (0.493)	0.27 (0.442)
N		1445	1502	1570

Standard deviation in parentheses

Statistical Significance: 0.001

Source: LAPOP survey—Jamaica, 2006

Jamaica is divided into 15 sections called parishes that are separated by geographical boundaries rather than population. Table 4-8 shows whether parishes are urban or rural. Also included is the mean for respondents' "having seen drugs sold in their neighborhood", the mean for respondents' "feeling that gangs affect their neighborhood" and the mean for respondents' "feeling safe in their neighborhood." The first column labeled "% Urban" shows whether the residents of that particular parish are considered to be living in an urban, coded 1, or rural, coded 0, area of the country. Kingston parish is scored a 1.00 because it is considered to be fully urban area. St. Thomas parish, which scores a 0.00 in the third column, is considered a fully rural area.

Regarding the other three variables, the higher the value the greater the problem in that parish. Column 1, labeled “Seen Drugs,” shows the means for respondents having seen drugs sold in their neighborhood. An answer of “Yes” is coded 1; an answer of “No” is coded 0. Here we see that the highest mean (0.30) is for the parish of Trelawny, which is considered mostly rural. The lowest mean is for St. Elizabeth, a parish that also considered mostly rural. Column 2, labeled “Gangs” asks, “Do you think your neighborhood is affected by gangs?” Answers are coded, 0 for “No,” or 1 for “Yes.” Column 2 shows that gangs effect neighborhoods the most in Kingston and St. Catherine, both of which are mostly urban areas. Column 3, labeled “Fear Crime,” asks “Speaking of the place or neighborhood where you live, and thinking of the possibility of falling victim to an assault or a robbery, do you feel safe or unsafe?” Answers are coded, 0 for “Unsafe” or 1 for “Safe.” This table shows that concerns of Jamaicans over drug crime and gang activity is not simply a problem facing the urban areas but has indeed manifest in the minds of Jamaican people regardless of where they live.

### **Regression Analysis**

A multivariate statistical method, such as Ordinary Least Squares regression, is the appropriate technique for testing the various research hypotheses. The advantage of OLS is that it allows me to test for the effects of the main independent variable after introducing statistical controls for other factors that may also influence the dependent variable (i.e., the attitude of interest). The results shown in Table 4-9 present two OLS models for each dependent variable. Model 1 includes only the control variables, followed by Model 2, which adds to the equation the main variables of interest. Table 4-9 shows the regression analysis for hypothesis 1; that *seen drugs*, *gangs*, and *fear crime* will have a negative effect on *sfd*, *swd*, and *pdf*.

Table 4-9. Predictors for support for (A), satisfaction with (B), and preference for (C), democracy

Model	A1	A2	B1	B2	C1	C2
Constant	4.122***	4.188***	0.438***	0.533***	0.707***	0.744***
Sex (Male)^	-0.096	-0.089	-0.045	-0.039	-0.018	-0.014
Age	0.012***	0.011***	0.002	0.001	0.003**	0.002**
Education	0.007	0.010	-0.002	-0.001	-0.004	-0.003
Income	0.010	0.026	0.068***	0.061***	0.010	0.007
Region (Urban)^	-0.034	-0.013	-0.156***	-0.133***	-0.057*	-0.051*
Seen Drugs^	—	-0.29*	—	-0.094*	—	-0.063
Gangs^	—	-0.310**	—	-0.015	—	-0.008
Fear Crime^	—	0.197	—	-0.200***	—	-0.062*
R <sup>2</sup>	0.013	0.027	0.045	0.085	0.017	0.025

\*\*\* $p \leq 0.001$ ; \*\* $p \leq 0.010$ ; \* $p \leq 0.050$

^ = Dummy Variable (Yes = 1, No = 0)

— = not included in model

Source: LAPOP survey—Jamaica, 2006

For hypothesis 1, the most important numbers are given in columns A2, B2, and C2. For *sfd* in column A2, variables *seen drug* and *gangs* are statistically significant and have a negative effect on *sfd*, while *fear crime* has no statistically significant effect. The hypothesized statistically significant negative effect on *sfd* is only observed for two of the independent variables. The  $R^2$  values for model A2 shows that about 2.7% of the variance in *sfd* can be explained by all variables listed. Compared to model A1, the 3 crime related variables add about 1.4% more explanatory power.

The values presented in column B2 indicate that both *seen drugs* and *fear crime* have a statistically significant negative effect on satisfaction with democracy. The variable called *gangs* also has a negative effect but it is not statistically significant. The hypothesized statistically significant negative effect on *swd* is only observed for two of the independent variables. The  $R^2$  values for model B2 show that about 8.5% of the variance in satisfaction with democracy can be explained by all variables listed, about 4.0% more explanatory power is added through the addition of the 3 independent variables.

In column C2, all three independent variables have a negative effect on preference for democracy but only *fear crime* is statistically significant. The  $R^2$  values for model C shows that about 2.5% of the variance in *pdf* can be explained by all variables listed, about 0.8% more explanatory power is added through the addition of the three independent variables.

Although the three crime related independent variables were not always statistically significant, the findings given in Table 4-9 indicate that people who are

exposed to gangs and drugs, as well as people who are fearful of falling victim to crime, have lower scores on the three indicators of support for democracy.

Table 4-10. Predictors for trust in state burueacracy index

Model	1	2
Constant	31.199***	36.432***
Sex (Male)^	2.218	2.402
Age	0.142**	0.109*
Education	0.107	0.147
Income	1.165	1.307
Region (Urban)^	-1.968	-1.756
Seen Drugs^	—	-6.495**
Gangs^	—	-6.099***
Fear Crime^	—	-3.853*
R <sup>2</sup>	0.023	0.085

\*\*\* $p \leq 0.001$ ; \*\* $p \leq 0.010$ ; \* $p \leq 0.050$

^ = Dummy Variable (Yes = 1, No = 0)

— = not included in model

Source: LAPOP survey—Jamaica, 2006

In Table 4-10, I have tested the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable presented in Table 4-4. Given that the results for all three independent variables are statistically significant, the regression model shows that exposure to the independent variables have a negative effect on trust in the state bureaucracy. Again, this index includes trust in political parties, trust in the police, and many other state institutions. Variable *seen drugs* has the largest effect in this regression model, followed closely by *gangs*. As stated in the literature review of in this thesis, underscores the connections between drug traffickers, criminals and gang members have and the police, politicians, and other state bureaucrats (Harriott 2008:6). In the case of Jamaica, the data shows that those connections are also on the minds of respondents. The argument that the “powder elite,” that was mentioned in the literature

review, has corrupted parts of the government is strengthened by the results of the regression analysis (Griffith and Sedoc-Dahlberg 1997:85–8).

Table 4-11. Predictors for trust in government's ability to aid with democratic societal issues index

Model	1	2
Constant	9.525***	10.056***
Sex (Male)^	-0.344	-0.311
Age	0.022*	0.018**
Education	-0.041	-0.035
Income	0.097	0.08
Region (Urban)^	-0.552	-0.434
Seen Drugs^	—	-0.491
Gangs^	—	-0.420
Fear Crime^	—	-0.869*
R <sup>2</sup>	0.009	0.019

\*\*\* $p \leq 0.001$ ; \*\* $p \leq 0.010$ ; \* $p \leq 0.050$

^ = Dummy Variable (Yes = 1, No = 0)

— = not included in model

Source: LAPOP survey—Jamaica, 2006

Table 4-11 tests the relationship between the independent variables and the variables presented in Table 4-5. Model 2 shows that all three independent variables have a negative effect on the dependent variable, but only the *fear crime* is statistically significant. The R<sup>2</sup> value for the model indicates that we are only able to explain less than 2% of the variance. Although the amount of variance explained is low, the variable *fear crime* nonetheless has a negative and statistically significant effect on people's assessment of the government's ability to solve societal problems. The finding is important inasmuch as 27% of respondents fear that they may fall victim to crime within their community.

Table 4-12. Predictors for "trust among neighbors"

Model	1	2
Constant	1.179***	1.458***
Sex (Male)^	0.040	0.064
Age	0.009***	0.007***
Education	0.012	0.015*
Income	0.062**	0.055**
Region (Urban)^	-0.170***	-0.111*
Seen Drugs^	—	-0.234***
Gangs^	—	-0.262***
Fear Crime^	—	-0.377***
R <sup>2</sup>	0.043	0.146

\*\*\* $p \leq 0.001$ ; \*\* $p \leq 0.010$ ; \* $p \leq 0.050$

^ = Dummy Variable (Yes = 1, No = 0)

— = not included in model

Source: LAPOP survey—Jamaica, 2006

The regression analysis in Table 4-12 tests the effect of the crime variables on the level of trust people have in their neighbors, which was introduced in Table 4-6. The table shows that all three of the crime related variables have a statistically significant negative effect on people's sense of interpersonal trust. In model 2, the R<sup>2</sup> value shows that 14.6% of the variance for "trust among neighbors," can be explained by the model which includes the independent variables.

Table 4-13. Predictors for "when is military overthrow okay" index

Model	1	2
Constant	2.076***	1.831***
Sex (Male)^	0.075	0.060
Age	-0.017***	-0.015***
Education	-0.012	-0.016
Income	-0.026	-0.022
Region (Urban)^	0.270**	0.225*
Seen Drugs^	—	0.297*
Gangs^	—	0.316**
Fear Crime^	—	0.198
R <sup>2</sup>	0.032	0.055

\*\*\* $p \leq 0.001$ ; \*\* $p \leq 0.010$ ; \* $p \leq 0.050$

^ = Dummy Variable (Yes = 1, No = 0)

— = not included in model

Source: LAPOP survey—Jamaica, 2006

The final regression analysis, shown in Table 4-13, uses as the dependent variable the degree to which respondents believe that, under certain circumstances (noted in Table 4-7), a military takeover of the government is warranted. The results in model 2 show that, of the three indicators of interest, the variables seen drugs and gangs have the predicted and statistically significant positive effect. Respondents who indicate that gangs are present in their neighborhoods are more likely to accept a military regime. The R<sup>2</sup> value shows that 5.5% of the variance in the tested index is explained by model 2. For similar reasons that were explained in regards to Table 4-10, this is a troubling statistic. If the “powder elite” has corrupted government, respondents who have been exposed to seeing drugs sold or having gangs in their neighborhoods, see that the best method of correcting the problem is to oust the current regime in favor of military rule. Jamaica has no history of coups, but the willingness to accept such action is a potential threat to democratic governance.

The questions raised in this chapter are important for understanding the effect of criminal and deviant behavior on democratic governance in Jamaica. In the concluding chapter I will discuss some of the literature on democracy and democratic governance both generally and specifically in Jamaica. I will also discuss clientelistic relationships in Jamaica.

## CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION

Parliamentary democracy has long been the method of governance in Jamaica, as it has been in the other countries that were once British colonies. Anthony Payne noted that “every single country in the Third World that emerged from colonial rule since the second world war with a population of at least one million... with a continuous democratic experience is a former British colony” (Payne 1988:4). Political tradition in any country is shaped by the institutional structures alongside the values, beliefs, ideas, behaviors, and attitudes of the people who form the political community (Stone 1986:48). Parliamentary democracy has been the tradition in Jamaica since the pre-Independence era. While much can be said about the merits of democracy, democracy is foremost a relationship between organized power and those for whom it is organized (Chazan 1993:69). As such, the stability of democracy depends in part on the degree to which the political culture of its citizenry supports the structure and the practices of liberal democratic governance.

Larry Diamond (1993:7–8) defines political culture as “a people’s predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations of the political system of its country, and the role of the self in that system.” If prospects of democratic stability are contingent on political culture, it follows that it is important to investigate the factors that strengthen or weaken the cognitive dispositions thought to support a democratic system. In this thesis I have argued that the factor that most seriously erodes democratic attitudes and values in Jamaica is the increase in crime, criminal gangs, and drug trafficking. The effect of criminal behavior on political culture is of special importance in Jamaica given the fragile state of democracy in that country. As many

analysts have noted, Jamaica is characterized as an example of a weakened democracy that is unable to provide many features of a “liberal democracy” which emphasizes constitutional protections, separation of powers, civilian control of the military, and human rights protections, among others (Diamond 1997:13).

The analyses presented in Chapter 4, based on public opinion survey data, leave little doubt that the presence of drugs and gangs in one’s neighborhood and the fear of crime that people feel are variables that have a significant effect on key features of political culture: support for democracy, preference for democracy, trust in state institutions, trust in the efficacy of the democratic state, people’s willingness to accept military rule, and people’s trust in their neighbors. Political culture is nonetheless complex notion that is affected by a range of variables ranging from historical forces such as colonization and independence or contemporary forces such as religious movements and nationalism (Diamond 1993:9).

### **Jamaican Democracy**

In their often-cited book, A Civic Culture, Almond and Verba (1963), explore what the citizens of five different countries understand to be important to their lives in the context of participation within their respective governments’ system. Many of the questions asked in the LAPOP survey are related to concepts presented in their book.<sup>4</sup> So it is from that piece that the basis of the questions raised and the arguments that have been developed in this thesis have grown.

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<sup>4</sup>See Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1989).

Table 5-1. What does democracy mean

Voting related answers	57.20%
No Meaning	7.20%
Being independent	5.30%
Liberty	6.90%
Equality related answers	3.80%
All others	19.60%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Source: LAPOP survey—Jamaica, 2006

Using the logic of Almond and Verba’s work, it is clear that from the LAPOP survey that the most important aspect of democracy for Jamaicans is the ability to vote in popular elections. While they risk becoming victims of violence, intimidation or even death in order to cast their vote, respondents in the sample cherish the right to elect leadership above all others when describing what a democracy is. This have has been noted in other studies as well (Stone 1986:49; Edie 1994:3). But given the method by which questions regarding voting are posed, it would be imprudent to use regression models to test the relationships between the independent variables of exposure to criminal activities and the dependent variables of whether or not a respondent had voted.

Similar to the manner by which colonial rule was imposed in Africa, highly authoritarian with little popular rule, certain power relationship in Jamaica have existed in the past and continue to persist into the twenty first century (Chazan 1993:71–2). The difference in Jamaica is that there has been no history of authoritarianism or dictatorship, at least not in typical sense. Obika Gray (2003), a Jamaican scholar, suggests that Jamaica is democratic politically but authoritarian socially. This “social

authoritarianism,” would be best described as a clientelistic relationship between middle-class political elites and the masses in Jamaica.

For development of a strong democracy a sense of balance must be created. A balance that allows civility to control intensity, where social trust and cooperation, and a commitment to the system and the nation stand as a check of the conflicts and cleavages that are naturally created through the process of political competition (Diamond 1993:14). Liberal democracy also requires a sense of destiny which limits the inclination toward pursuing private gain over the greater public interest (Stone 1986:15). In this regard clientelism represents an important aspect of the political system, as it has become the system which has worked to limit conflict within Jamaican politics. These conflicts however, have not been limited in frequency, as in this regard they are well documented in local news reports, but limited in that they represent in-class conflict and not cross-class conflicts (Edie 1994:19). Far from improving relationship, clientelism has instilled a sense of disempowerment and only increased the level of dependency on patrons (Sives 2002:17).

As the regression analyses of chapter 4 showed, not only does crime affect the trust of respondents within their communities among their neighbors, it also effects the trust that respondents have in the state. If the state is seen as unable to provide basic security, what then is its utility, leading to more troubling results, as the passive acceptance of a military overthrow of the government. As shown in Table 4-6, which asked “Would a military take over be justified when there is...,” acceptance of a military overthrow was highest, around 48%, for the situation outlined as “high crime” in the country. The willingness to support non-democratic forms of government is problematic

especially given what are considered by respondents, Jamaican media, and politicians, among others, already high levels of crime.

Juan J. Linz (2000:35) argues that “the quality of democracy depends on the quality of the state,” and if that is the case, than the effect of crime on the levels of trust in state institutions is even more troubling. It is important to understand here how much of the violent crime in Jamaica is related to drugs and drug trafficking. Drug trafficking, as a crime, affects society at large not merely those involved in transactions. If police or state officials decide that repressive measures are justified, that repression will effect entire communities. If the effect of that repression is distrust in police or other legal institutions by law-abiding citizens than drug trafficking can indeed have a negative effect on the attitudes and beliefs that hold a democracy together.

What is clear in Jamaica is that the political leaders have a commitment to democracy or at a minimum the continuance of a democratic system. Regime transitions in Jamaica have progressed relatively smoothly, without any formalized interruptions between political party leadership (Payne 1988:5). The difference of course being the “means justifies the ends” mentality which has led to the well documented growth of political violence surrounding election periods among the populace.

### **Concluding Remarks**

It has been the aim of this thesis to illuminate the effects of a problem, while attempting to control for biases both of the respondents, through the use of control variables, and of the author. Controlling for the biases of the author, however, is a much more difficult task. This thesis is predicated on the idea that democracy, even with its shortcomings and issues, is still the best political system for the people of

Jamaica. Given the historical place of Jamaica, perhaps the quote attributed to famed British Prime Minister Winston Churchill is fitting in understanding why democracy has held such an important place in the development of Jamaica. In Churchill's (1947:206–207) words, "Democracy is the worst form of government except for all those others that have been tried." It is clear from the data that the people of Jamaica generally agree with the sentiment of the statement by Churchill.

The issues of crime in Jamaica which have been explored in this thesis are not issues which solely have effect in Jamaica. Drugs and the gangs that traffic them have grown to affect the Caribbean region and aid in supplying the world with illegal narcotics. Influences from organized crime syndicates from former Soviet States, the Middle East, and Asia have shown some influence in the region, making the problem one with global implications.

Eva Bertram and Kenneth Sharpe (1997:44) explain that the "enemy" is not a foreign army or an insurgency, but an economic market which demands illegal drugs. The global demand has created a new abundance of problems for Caribbean governments including foreign influence both within the illegal drug trade itself and within the drug policy-making arenas. From the view of many people in Latin America and the Caribbean the drug problem is rooted in demand from the United States. This argument, while popular in those regions, does leave out that drug producing and shipment ultimately leads to use and abuse of drugs in those producer and transshipment points. At one point it was thought that hard drugs were only being shipped through the Jamaica. The transshipment inevitably led to increases in drug use throughout the Jamaica, and with a political foothold it seems that drug trafficking will

continue to be problem for the citizens of Jamaica, the greater Caribbean region and Latin America. There is a well documented past of drug trafficking in Jamaica putting exports of cannabis as the most exported product from the country, during several years throughout the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Cannabis traffickers have now moved to trafficking cocaine and heroine (Klein, Day and Harriott 2004:17–34; Jones 2002).

An examination of history and more current debates within Jamaica led me to ask five basic questions: In Jamaica, what effect does exposure to drug trafficking, gangs, and fear of crime have on respondents' (1) support for, satisfaction with, and preference for democracy; (2) trust in state institutions; (3) view of the efficacy of the state; (4) level trust in the people in their communities, and; (5) view of situations leading to a military overthrow of a democratically elected government?

With the first four questions I found that exposure to drug trafficking, gangs, or fear of crime has a statistically significant negative effect. In some instances all were statistically significant in others only one variable was statistically significant. With question five I found that exposure to drug trafficking and gangs has a statistically significant positive effect.

There is a lack of political will to deter crime in any meaningful or effective manner and citizens have noticed. This “state capture” as some have framed, where criminals have found that force coupled with the power to influence government at all levels, makes for a more salient method of continuing illegal activities (Prillaman 2003:18). Amanda Sives (2002) noted that the “...distinction between a drug don and the political don is not necessarily a clear one. Many of those who later became involved in the drug trade were initially political dons.” Crime is seen as inert, in that any proposed

solutions do not seem to have any immediate influence on the prevalence of crime. This is exacerbated by the lack of political will to deal with problems that cause crime in the long-term (Prillaman 2003:15–8).

Much of the research in foreign policy as it relates to drug policy focuses its attention towards South American drug-producing countries, leaving out Caribbean countries which are known to be transshipment points and prone to money laundering. Within the current literature as noted by some of the authors cited in earlier chapters there seems to be a lack of focus on the Caribbean Basin, when it comes to analytical empirical research. The LAPOP survey serves as a tool to help fill the gaps that have been left in the literature.

Democracy is at risk in Jamaica because crime is having a negative effect. For all of the issues and problems that have been raised in this thesis, democracy in Jamaica has been stable since independence. Jamaica lacks the history of authoritarian, military backed leadership that have mired the history of other countries in the Caribbean and Latin America, but certain relationships between those who hold power and those who vote leaders into power are troubling. High levels of property crime, violent crime, drug crime, and gangs have all become part of the daily lives of citizens throughout Jamaica. Lawmakers should take note of the effect that crime is having on the support for abstract and more concrete ideas related to democracy if for no other reason than to serve their own electoral purposes, after all they are the ones who have benefited from the current democratic system. They may not fair as well under a popularly supported military coup. It is outside of the scope of this paper to attempt to find cures for the social ills which have arisen in Jamaica, but given that they are negatively effecting the

way Jamaicans view their countrymen and their government, hopefully this thesis will compel more focus on a set of problems which are effecting Jamaica now and may continue to in the future.

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## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Luis Alberto Caraballo was born in 1984, on a United States Army base in Ancon, Panama to Puerto Rican parents. The youngest of three children, he grew up throughout the east coast of the United States. He graduated from Terry Parker High School in Jacksonville, Florida in 2002. Upon graduating from High School, Luis entered the University of Central Florida, where he studied political science and business ultimately earning a Bachelor of Arts degree with honors in political science and a minor in general business in 2006. In 2007, Luis was accepted for graduate study in the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Florida. Luis plans to complete his Master of Arts degree in May 2010. He will continue his academic study toward a Ph.D. in Sociology at the University of Florida starting in 2010.