

THE UTILITY AND EFFICACY OF HUMAN MATERIALISM AS AN
ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH STRATEGY FOR THE ANALYSIS OF
SOCIOCULTURAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL HISTORY

By

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A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2010

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To Professor Paul Magnarella for staying with me long enough to see this dissertation completed.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First, I need to thank Paul Magnarella for his patience, encouragement, mentorship and for the model, Human Materialism. Without Paul's unending help I would have never finished this long process. I also would like to thank Robert Carneiro for his unfailing friendship and all the private lessons in the history and theory of anthropology over the last 16 years. I very much need to thank Elizabeth A. "Buzzy" Guillette for being willing to jump in late in the game and co-chair my dissertation committee. I thank Pedro Malavet for remembering who I was after so long and still being willing to be my outside member. I also thank Lonn Lanza-Kaduce for being a great boss in the Criminology Department and for his membership on my committee. I also need to thank Lance Gravlee for also being willing to join the committee late and for being helpful and eager to do so. I would also like to thank my brother for accompanying me on numerous agonizing trips to the Florida Keys for field work. I owe a very special thanks to my day boss Susan Stewart for allowing me to finish my dissertation while I was supposed to be working. I also owe a special thanks to Jennifer Todd for some early typing help as well as other support and assistance along the way. And finally, my gratitude to Marvin Harris for his friendship and allowing me the honor of being the last research assistant he would have in his half century in anthropology.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>page</u>
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	4
LIST OF TABLES.....	7
ABSTRACT	8
CHAPTER	
1 HUMAN MATERIALISM AND ANTHROPOLOGY.....	11
Introduction.....	11
Why Human Materialism?.....	15
Epistemological Issues.....	17
What is a Paradigm?.....	18
The Central Theoretical Struggle of Cultural Anthropology	20
The Plan of the Dissertation	25
A Note Concerning Personal Method.....	27
2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH STRATEGY HUMAN MATERIALISM.....	28
Introduction.....	28
A Brief History of Materialist Theories of Culture	28
Historical Materialism	29
Dialectical Materialism.....	31
Materialist Theories of Leslie White and Julian Steward	32
Cultural Materialism.....	34
Human Materialism and Teleology	39
Human Materialism and the Universal Model of Sociocultural Systems.....	40
Infrastructure and its Subcomponents.....	40
The Social Structure.....	41
The Superstructure.....	41
Some New Thinking in the Application of Human Materialist Analysis.....	43
Front Loaded and Back Loaded Ideological Systems	45
Case Study: Saudi Arabia's Ikhwan Movement.....	46
Human Materialist Analysis of the Case.....	49
Case Study: Nicaragua versus the United States.....	56
Human Materialist Analysis of the Case.....	60
3 JACOB HOUSMAN AND INDIAN KEY.....	67
Analysis	72
4 HUMAN MATERIALISM AND NINETEENTH CENTURY SIOUX LAW.....	78

Introduction	78
Names and Divisions.....	79
Linguistic Distinctions	80
Early History	80
A Human Materialist Analysis of Sioux Law.....	82
Sioux Formal Law and the Canadian Dakota	87
The Plains Sioux	88
Akicita: The Sioux Police	90
5 THE SEARCH FOR A THEORY OF TERRORISM	95
Introduction	95
Phase One: Early Law Enforcement Period.....	97
Phase Two: Definitions, Literature Review and Early Applications	99
Academic Definitions.....	102
Government Definitions	104
Band, Tribe, Chiefdom, and State and Other Evolutionary Concepts.....	110
Circumscription theory	113
The principle of competitive exclusion	114
Resource concentration	115
Aggression theory and revolution theory.....	117
Warfare theory	121
The rise of modern Israel	124
Analysis	127
Phase Three: Theory Making and Cultural Materialism.....	128
The Basic Propositions.....	129
The Basque Separatists	130
Analysis	132
The Case of the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka	133
Analysis	135
Phase Four: Human Materialism and the Search for a Theory of Terrorism ..	138
Defining What Terrorism is and What it Is Not.....	139
Setting out a Basic Theory	141
6 CONCLUSIONS	146
REFERENCES CITED	156
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.....	162

LIST OF TABLES

<u>Table</u>		<u>page</u>
2-1	Comparison of the Human and Cultural Materialism Models.....	42
2-2	Component Arrangement of the Ikhwan Case Study.....	55
2-3	Component Arrangement of the Nicaragua Case Study.....	66
3-1	Component Summary of the Indian Key Case Study	77
4-1	Component Summary of the Sioux Law Case Study.....	94

Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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May 2010

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Major: Anthropology

The purpose of this dissertation is to answer four principal questions: 1) are sociocultural systems a proper domain for research utilizing a research strategy founded in scientific principles?; 2) does the anthropological research strategy, Human Materialism, possess sufficient analytical power to address questions arising in the research of sociocultural systems?; 3) can Human Materialism be extended or enriched to improve its efficacy and power in the study of sociocultural systems? 4) The answer to all four of these questions is yes.

Human Materialism is an anthropological research strategy based in scientific principles and presenting a universal model of sociocultural systems. The universal model is comprised of an infrastructure, a structure, and a superstructure. The infrastructure is further divided into material, human, and social infrastructural components. The material infrastructure contains the modes of production, technology, tools among other elements. The human infrastructure contains demographic factors such as population, fertility and so on. The social infrastructure contains effective ownership and control of the forces of production as well as persons in positions of

political and economic power and their positions. The social structure includes all social organization: family and kinship, as well as political and economic organization and so on. The social infrastructure overlaps and extends into the social structure. This is the location where those persons with political and economic power direct and control cultural transactions. The superstructure contains all ideological components including religion, philosophy, symbols, and rituals among other elements.

The author has extended the concept of faction in Human Materialist analysis to include three types of factions and two statuses. Faction types are simple, bridging, or shifting according to their sociocultural role. I classify factions that have been coerced into compliance with the persons of political and economic power as having the status of annexed. I classify all other factions as having voluntary status. Simple factions are voluntary and may be tightly organized or loosely organized. Bridging factions are the most powerful type faction and possess enough political power to bridge over other factions and bind them to the persons of political and economic power who control the bridging faction. Shifting factions are those that shift their loyalty or political influence from one interest to another. Factions take on greater or lesser power and influence in sociocultural systems depending on their manipulation by political and economic leaders or by the mitigation of such manipulation by other participants in the system.

The above methodological elements are demonstrated by numerous case studies. These case studies begin with the Ikhwan Movement in Arabia and the case of Nicaragua's 1984 suit against the United States in the International Court of Justice. The cases then proceed to Jacob Housman and Indian Key to 19th century Sioux law and finally to terrorism.

Regarding terrorism the author recounts his 40 year journey in his quest to understand terrorism. This journey proceeds from the narrow thinking of the young deputy to the more mature thinking of the older anthropologist. The author presents the first ever Human Materialist theory of terrorism. This theory posits that the collision between a state and a terrorist group is really about the struggle over entry into control over the social infrastructure. This is because it is the social infrastructure where the persons of political and economic power reside and where their control of the sociocultural system is directed. This dissertation contributes to anthropological theory, social analysis, terrorism research, and to Florida's historical record with the study of Indian Key.

CHAPTER 1 HUMAN MATERIALISM AND ANTHROPOLOGY

Introduction

The purpose of this dissertation is to answer the following principal questions: 1) Are sociocultural systems a proper domain for research utilizing a paradigmatic approach or research strategy? 2) If so, does the anthropological research strategy, Human Materialism, provide sufficient analytical power to address the cultural, economic, political, and historical questions raised in the research of sociocultural systems? 3) If yes to the second question, methodologically speaking, might Human Materialism be augmented or extended so as to improve or amplify its facility and power in the analysis of cultural, economic, political, and historical questions arising from the study of sociocultural systems? 4) Finally, if yes to the third question, then what are the concepts that would augment, extend, or improve the facility of Human Materialism in the research of sociocultural systems?

I begin here by answering all four of the above questions in the affirmative. I will then proceed to explain why I have answered as I have. As to the first question, in spite of the current dominance of interpretive, post-modern approaches in cultural anthropology, it is my working assumption that sociocultural systems are a proper domain for empirical or theoretically structured research. As to the second question, the anthropological research strategy Human Materialism does provide sufficient analytical power to answer all questions arising in the research of sociocultural systems. I further believe that Human Materialism, as originally stated was sufficiently powerful in its own right for the study and analysis of any and all sociocultural questions. This last statement lays the predicate for why I also answer the third question in the affirmative.

Therefore, as to the third question, though sufficiently powerful in its own right, I believe that its facility and analytical power can be enhanced by the use of additional tools and concepts of my own design. This does not fundamentally change the operability of Human Materialism but does, I believe, place additional tools in the tool box. Finally then, what are these tools?

At this point, the reader may have either no understanding or a very limited understanding of Human Materialism and how it operates. For this reason, I will briefly introduce the new analytical elements referred to above. For the most complete explanation of Human Materialism, excluding the new concepts added here, the reader is encouraged to read Magnarella's 1993 book *Human Materialism: a Model of Sociocultural Systems and a Strategy for Analysis*.

Human Materialism posits that all sociocultural systems are built upon an asymmetrical arrangement of three primary elements: 1) the infrastructure, 2) the social structure, and 3) the superstructure. The infrastructure component is itself divided into three subcomponents: 1) the material infrastructure, 2) the human infrastructure, and 3) the social infrastructure. Taken as a whole the infrastructure includes the modes of productions and reproduction as well as the persons in key positions of economic and political power and the positions those persons hold. The social structure component includes all elements of social organization like family and kinship relations as well as political and economic organization. Finally, the superstructure component includes all ideological elements such as religion, rituals, art, and all the symbols associated with the other components of the model. Further, the superstructure also includes any rival ideologies, symbols preferred by minority members of the sociocultural system

(Magnarella 1999:242). The arrangement is asymmetrical in that, the infrastructure exercises more influence in the sociocultural system than the social structure which in turn exercises more influence than the superstructure. By influence I mean the power or ability of each respective component to influence culture behavior and historical outcomes. Further, Human Materialism recognizes that in all sociocultural systems there are persons in positions of political and economic power and that these persons are teleologically or goal driven in their behavior. Human Materialism also recognizes that social actors form relationships, and that they create, join, leave, and dissolve factions or special interest arrangements. Among the analytical concepts that I have added to human materialist analysis is a somewhat greater methodological emphasis on factional arrangements and how they operate with, against, or perhaps neutrally with reference to the persons in positions of political and economic power and the sociocultural system as a whole. A faction is a group of persons in sociocultural systems that are organized either loosely or firmly around common political or economic interests and act to further those interests. Over time I observed that factional elements in sociocultural systems take on various characteristics and function accordingly. In my application of human materialist analysis, I have created a typology to categorize factions and to assist in understanding their form and function within a sociocultural system. The categories are simple factions, bridging factions, and shifting factions. I further categorize factions as either voluntary or annexed.

In addition I have added an additional dimension to understanding how ideological factors operate within sociocultural systems. In my own analyses I observed that ideological factors can play an important role in deciding historical outcomes. This is

particularly the case in synchronic or short-term historical analyses. I have therefore, come to classify the ideological factors of sociocultural systems as being either front-loaded or back-loaded. An essential element of my analysis is to determine how ideologies or sets of ideological factors are utilized by persons in positions of political and economic power. How these persons portray and utilize ideology plays a significant role in how effective a particular ideology will be in actual use. If the particular set of ideological factors is present in the sociocultural system prior to the events under investigation then it is front-loaded. That is, it is already the dominant ideological system at work in the sociocultural system and the events under investigation are operating within that ideological framework. However, if the set of ideological factors is introduced or superimposed by key persons in positions of political or economic power to assist them in directing events and outcomes then it is back-loaded. That is, it is not previously in place and the events under investigation are not operating under the superimposed ideological framework. Ideological factors may or may not be of particular significance in a given case. However, in any case the ideological factors should be “screened” for in order to assess their relative level of importance.

Before leaving the current discussion of ideological systems it should be noted that I am not implying an “all or nothing” approach to how a back-loaded ideology fits into an existing sociocultural system. Ideological systems are dynamic systems comprised of numerous elements and are in turn part of the larger sociocultural system. Therefore, the introduction of a new ideological element would not likely replace an entire ideological system but merely a part of that system. In fact, a new element or set of elements might simply modify some portion of the preexisting system. Further, back-

loaded elements do not have to be completely new but may merely reflect some modification of or a change of emphasis in certain preexisting elements. Essential to a Human Materialist analysis is the degree to which the back-loaded elements effect outcomes and how the persons in positions of political power make use of the back-loaded elements to direct the outcomes.

Why Human Materialism?

I arrived at graduate school some 15 years ago a dedicated adherent to Cultural Materialism. I will be leaving a dedicated adherent to Human Materialism. What happened in the intervening years was a multifaceted process of discovery. First, I became Marvin Harris' research assistant. Harris was the anthropologist who formulated Cultural Materialism that emphasized the primacy of the material infrastructure. Second, Paul Magnarella, the anthropologist that formulated Human Materialism was my graduate committee chair. Thus, I worked directly with both of the anthropologists responsible for the formulation of their respective research strategies. At this point it must be stated that Cultural Materialism is the research strategy closest to and most likely to be confused with Human Materialism.

When I first read Magnarella's, *Human Materialism: a Model of Sociocultural Systems and a Strategy for Analysis* (1993), I did not fully understand it. I thought that I did but it became clear over time that I really did not, at least not fully. This was partly because I was predisposed to Cultural Materialism and partly because I did not yet grasp the distinctions between the two models. Then, I found myself being confronted by historical problems in my research that could not be adequately explained from a purely cultural materialist framework. For example, in 1995 I did fieldwork with Nicaraguan families in Miami concerning the impact that changes to U.S. Immigration

law would have on their chances of remaining in the United States. I read, in preparation, about Nicaraguan history including the recent United States' involvement in supporting anti-communist revolutionaries who were opposed to Nicaragua's new Sandinista government. Three years later while doing fieldwork in Hungary, I began studying the 1990's breakup of the former Yugoslavia. Again I could not adequately explain the events using the relatively pure infrastructural determinacy of Cultural Materialism. I was however, able to explain both cases in terms of Human Materialism. It was however, a largely mechanical exercise as I still did not fully understand the distinctions between the two research models, nor was I yet fluent in the operability of the elements of Human Materialism.

Between 1996 and 2001 Marvin Harris and I had a number of conversations about what I call the "synchronic" problem. That is, the study of some system or event at a single point in time or over a short period of time. That is, a problem occurring over historical rather than an evolutionary time scale. According to Harris (1980:245), "it is a cardinal principle of cultural materialism that such explanations cannot be given in a purely synchronic frame." Harris (1980:246) went on to say that, "cultural materialists insist upon the indispensability of diachronic processes for the explanation of existing systems." Here Harris opts out of synchronic analyses in favor of long term diachronic processes. Harris dedicated a great deal of analysis to phenomena occurring over diachronic periods of time encompassing evolutionary scale. Thus his avoidance of synchronic analyses is understandable. However, as an anthropologist dealing with historical cases playing themselves out over much shorter, synchronic periods of time I needed a research framework that could better assist me in that endeavor. For

example, trying to explain a synchronic event purely in terms of natural resource conflicts, modes of production or reproduction, environmental factors or territorial acquisition can lead to circular explanation; one country wanted land so they fought for land. In such cases I could see the clear imprint of human action taking place outside the context of pure infrastructural determination and I needed a different means of explanation.

However, as I was confronted by other cases and as I continued to apply the Human Materialist framework my fluency with the model improved and I began to develop the necessary skills for the proper application of the research strategy. Over time I also began to see the importance of factions in sociocultural systems, how they operated, and how they differed from case to case. This resulted in the development of my own methodological tools in the application of Human Materialism as my research strategy of choice. Therefore, Human Materialism, at least in my case, has proven to be more capable and possesses a competitive advantage over any other research strategy including its closest competitor, Cultural Materialism. But before moving on to a more complete explanation of Human Materialism and its antecedents, I will address some epistemological issues and take a brief look at the confusing nature of the word paradigm.

Epistemological Issues

Epistemology is concerned with the systematic study of how human beings learn what they know. It is in essence, the study of studying the methods of obtaining knowledge itself. *Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary* (2006:421) defines epistemology as “the theory or science of the method and grounds of knowledge, especially with reference to its limits and validity”. How human beings think about,

organize, and pursue knowledge is, whether consciously or subconsciously and whether recognized or unrecognized, grounded in an epistemology of some type. By extension, any academic discipline or systematic study, whether scientific or unscientific, is not only grounded epistemologically but continually grapples with it. Part of this grappling revolves around how people model systems of knowledge in a strategic or paradigmatic sense. For example, Magnarella (Magnarella 1993:viii) explains that “Human Materialism is a systematic paradigm designed to bridge the gap between scientific and humanistic approaches to understanding human behavior, culture and society”. This is a concise definition of Human Materialism that effectively conveys the goals of the model and uses the term paradigm. However, the word paradigm itself can be problematic and confusing; hence there is a need for a better understanding of it.

What is a Paradigm?

I have already used the term paradigm or paradigmatic a number of times and I promise the reader that this is a temporary malady. In spite of its confusing nature, I have chosen to use the term in the introduction because it is still so frequently used when describing scientific or, for that matter, any research model. The word carries with it a considerable amount baggage. So what do I mean exactly, when I use the word paradigm? Thomas Kuhn (1970:viii) described paradigms as “universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners”. In *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* Kuhn writes that paradigms share two essential characteristics. First, they must represent “sufficiently unprecedented” achievement that attracts “an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity” (1970:10). Second, they must also be “sufficiently

open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to resolve” (1970:10). Kuhn (1970:10) defines, what he calls, “normal science,” as “research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice. Kuhn believes that a paradigm’s adherents pursue their scientific work over significant periods of time as “normal science” and that this is qualitatively different from periods of scientific revolution. That is, “normal science” is scientific practice in relative stasis. The productive life of a paradigm exists during this period of stasis and continues until it is replaced. On this point, Marvin Harris (Harris 1980:19) explains that “the existence of a paradigm guarantees that at any given moment a mature science will devote itself to puzzle solving along limited but productive lines”. Therefore, in order for there to be a scientific revolution there must be an accompanying shift in the existing paradigm.

To Kuhn, the paradigm performs a confining or restrictive function that limits innovation. Over time the practice of science becomes increasingly rigid. However, the paradigm also focuses, disciplines, and directs scientific investigations and this in turn leads to the observation of anomalies (1970:64). Accordingly the “anomaly only appears against the background of the paradigm” (1970:65). Harris (1980:20) explains that “practitioners find themselves unable to solve a growing number of problems, which leads to a crisis, which in turn provides for the opportunity for the rise of a new paradigm.”

If we base our understanding upon the above discussion, a paradigm appears to be an open-ended process with an enduring group of practitioners devoted to limited but

productive puzzle solving. But does this, in and of itself, get us any closer to actually solving the puzzles of sociocultural systems? To me the answer is an obvious no. It would appear to me that, at least according to Kuhn, a paradigm is but a current manifestation of an accumulation of earlier achievements that has attracted a group of practitioners. This does not provide any clue as to the actual processes utilized by the group of practitioners but implies that the achievements leading to the existence of the paradigm were based upon something else. If the above attempt to define the term paradigm seems somewhat confusing, it is. Attempting to escape the Kuhnian definitional morass, Marvin Harris (1980:5) preferred the term “research strategy” and referred to Cultural Materialism as exactly that, a “scientific research strategy.” Magnarella (1993:2) also prefers the term research strategy and describes Human Materialism as “an integrative research strategy that accommodates the confluence of a variety of existing sociocultural theories without being hopelessly eclectic or random.” In a footnote, Harris (1980:26) explains that Kuhn himself suggested using either “disciplinary matrix” or “exemplars” instead of the word paradigm. Also wishing to avoid the definitional morass from this point forward I will utilize the term research strategy while acknowledging the historical significance of the term paradigm.

The Central Theoretical Struggle of Cultural Anthropology

The central intellectual struggle within cultural anthropology, as I see it, is determining how we know what we know and how that relates to the researcher’s context. Stripped of that context I am not sure how a researcher could, without arbitrariness, determine or apply anything he or she considers useful knowledge. According to Magnarella (1993:133), “seeing involves context, inference, concepts, experience, and interpretation”. This is a difficult problem in anthropology and one not

easily brushed aside. At least thirty years of debate within anthropology attests to this. As a discipline, cultural anthropology has struggled with long standing epistemological divisions among its scholars. These divisions generally fall between anthropologists preferring empirically based, scientific approaches and anthropologists preferring interpretive, postmodernist or postprocessualist approaches. Postprocessualism is most commonly associated with archaeology but will be considered synonymous for the current discussion. According to anthropologist James Lett (1997:11) “the premises and goals of postprocessual archaeology are virtually identical with those of post modern ethnography.” Quoting Albert Spaulding (1988) Lett goes on to write that “the salient feature [of post processualism] appears to be the rejection of science and positivism, including rejection of the possibility of objective observation” (1997:11). Lett goes on to explain that interpretive anthropological approaches follow two premises. First, is that the “goal of cultural anthropology should be the evocation and interpretation of cultural variability.” While the scientific approach maintains that description and explanation should be the goals of cultural anthropology. The second is that obtaining “scientific knowledge of human affairs, which entails the description and explanation of objective fact, is unobtainable” (1997:12). On the other hand, the scientific approach prefers the exact opposite, that objective fact is knowable and should be the basis of description and explanation.

Magnarella (1993:135) explains postmodern anthropology as follows:

“Postmodern anthropologists assume a self-consciously reflexive stance toward their subjects. Their ethnographic discourse does not aim at creating universal knowledge but to present the joint experience of the ethnographer of his or her native partners in an evocative text. The interpretationists generally hold to a position of epistemological relativism that maintains that each culture is unique and incommensurable with any other.”

Anthropologist George Marcus (1986:166) one of the leaders of the postmodern movement in anthropology, writes that

“in anthropology and all other human sciences at the moment, “high” theoretical discourse—the body of ideas that authoritatively unify a field—is in disarray. The most interesting and provocative theoretical works now are precisely those that point to practice, that is, to a bottom-up reformulation of classic questions, which hinges on how the previously taken-for-granted facts of high theory are to be presented. These works constitute renewed assaults on positivist perspectives.”

Marcus tells us that “high theoretical” positivist discourse (meaning scientific), are the targets of a renewed assault. This has not changed since 1986 when this was published. Marcus (1986:166) goes on to explain that anthropologists

“rearmed by the postwar hermeneutic, phenomenological, and semiotic fashions in Continental philosophy that are finally having an impact on Anglo-American social thought.”

Marcus is referring broadly to the European Postmodern philosophy of writers such as Paul De Man, Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault finally having an impact in America and with it a movement from scientific perspectives toward postmodern perspectives. In the quotations above Marcus also calls attention to the disarray in the human sciences then gives us a list of the postwar fashions in Continental philosophy. The list includes hermeneutic, phenomenological, and semiotic approaches. I would argue that the disarray is actually with postmodern approaches to the human sciences and not necessarily to the human sciences as a whole. Interpretive or postmodern approaches do not equate to a single body of field unifying theory at all but seems to be represented by disarray itself. In a footnote Marcus explains that the

“critique has moved to a suspension of paradigmatic authority and a questioning of the utility of system building in favor of free play and experimentation in the specific rendering of accounts of social life.”

It would seem therefore, that Marcus agrees with the disarray in interpretive anthropology and actually embraces it.

However, practitioners of the interpretive approaches do have a valid point, at least as to ethnography. Robert Carneiro (1993:12) explains

“Ethnographers have traditionally tended to round things off, to smooth things up. Their monographs often present a single “authoritative” statement of a particular custom or belief, as if it were all there was to it. Yet anyone who has done fieldwork knows that informants’ versions of a custom or belief often vary all over the map. Thus, presenting only one version masks the actual complexity.”

This statement brings to light the legitimate problem of single voice ethnography and explains why interpretive anthropologists emphasize multi-voice narratives in their ethnographies. Empirical anthropologists are not acting in a sinister attempt to silence other voices but are making practical choices about how much they can represent in a single ethnography. However, I would ask, is not the voice of the empirical anthropologist another valid voice on the long list of possible voices?

Anthropologists preferring empirical approaches do not deny the uniqueness of each culture but in observing the similarities and differences between cultures do find them commensurable with one another. It seems to me that the most fundamental difference between the postmodern or interpretive anthropologist and the empirical or scientific anthropologist boils down to an epistemological argument over the validity of objective knowledge as applied to the study of cultures.

Anthropologists preferring scientific approaches seek to apply a methodology that they hope will lead to probabilistic knowledge not absolute knowledge. It is the process that attempts to be objective. Empirical anthropologists never claim to have achieved perfect objectivity but merely to have applied an objective approach to the attempt at

gaining probabilistic knowledge. Methodologically, a theory is devised to explain a given set of facts or observations and to make predictions as to likely outcomes. The theory is then subjected to testing operations in order to establish the theory's utility or lack of utility in explaining the observed set of facts and in predicting likely outcomes. The number of times a theory accurately predicts an outcome is compared against the number of times that it fails to do so. This yields a probabilistic result not an absolute result. The strength of a given theory is based upon its ability to predict, with the highest degree of probability, that which it was designed to predict.

Theories may also be competitive. That is, there may exist, at any given time, more than one theory designed to make predictions concerning the same or a similar set of observations. The continued success of a given theory therefore, depends upon how well its predictive powers hold up in comparison with those of competing theories. According to Barbara Price (1982:712), "the stronger of two competing theories is the competitor that yields the higher correlations between the expected and the observed".

In *Hypothesis and Perception* Errol Harris (1970:19) writes that "whereas other types of human speculation are based upon mere opinion, science pursues and sticks to the facts." This describes, in a nutshell, the real difference between the two approaches. Whereas science seeks to collect and test observable facts others seek to understand, describe, and interpret. The latter is based largely on opinion. It may be the opinion of the anthropologist or the native informant but it is still opinion. The former is based on the attempt to describe observed facts with reference to as little opinion as possible.

I readily admit that cultural behavior, economic realities, or historical events are not the same as blood samples, insects, or photons. The phenomena studied by cultural anthropologists are often not composed of physical matter, whereas the material studied by the natural scientist generally is. That said I do believe that a well organized and structured research strategy can be properly applied to the study of sociocultural systems. I also believe that Human Materialism supplies the organization and structure necessary to do so. In the next chapter I will present a brief history of the materialist traditions of anthropological interest and introduce in greater detail the research strategy Human Materialism.

The Plan of the Dissertation

Here in Chapter One, I will briefly introduce the research strategy Human Materialism as well as some new concepts of my own construction. These new concepts include conceptualizing factions differently with reference to how they operate in sociocultural systems. Also presented is my conception of how ideological systems operate within the larger sociocultural system as a whole.

In Chapter Two I briefly discuss epistemology and present a brief history of materialist theories in anthropology. In this chapter I also present a more complete explanation of Human Materialism. I then present the first two case studies of this dissertation. These demonstrate the basic operation of Human Materialism in historical case analysis. The first case concerns the Ikhwan Movement in Saudi Arabia during the early twentieth century. The Second case pertains to a case in international law between Nicaragua and the United States.

In Chapter Three, I provide a Human Materialist analysis of the history of Jacob Housman and Indian Key, Florida in the 1830's. This case represents a small scale

socio-historical case study with interesting environmental factors as well as a remarkable and interesting human agent, Jacob Housman. I provide a general Human Materialist analysis and an expanded analysis that isolates my own concepts and shows how they fit into Human Materialism.

Chapter Four looks at an historical ethnographic case involving the formal law and custom of the 19th Century Sioux Indians. This chapter also presents a Human Materialist definition of law and shows how that definition assists in determining the differences between custom and formal law.

In Chapter Five I turn to terrorism and my 40 year journey attempting to understand this dangerous and complex phenomenon. I accomplish this by dividing my journey into four phases. The first phase covers my early life and law enforcement career. Phase two takes me to the University of Central Florida as an undergraduate. It was during this period that I realized the importance of defining terrorism and describes the intensive literature review I undertook. Phase three began in graduate school and saw my first attempt at offering a theory of terrorism. My first theory was based in Cultural Materialism and attempted to explain violent ethno-nationalist movements in terms of territory and the desire of self determination. I used three cases to illustrate the theory: 1) the rise of modern Israel, 2) the Basque separatists, and 3) the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka.

Finally, in chapter six I present a comprehensive set of conclusions referencing each of the principal case studies and all of the theoretical concepts presented in the first five chapters.

A Note Concerning Personal Method

My personal method of investigation is simple and straightforward. I choose an historical case of interest and figure out what question I want answered. I next begin locating source materials. I attempt to identify primary sources that can provide a reasonably detailed overview of the entire case. I then locate secondary sources that address specific persons and specific events from within the larger case. I then identify the key persons of political and economic power and identify their relationship interests. I look to see if any of the relationships qualify as factions and determine what type of factions they are and how these factions operated within the overall problem. I next look to see if there are any ideological factors significant enough to influence historical outcomes. Having taken notes during the research period I begin assembling a final report using Human Materialist principles. During this report period I try to spot holes and gaps in the historical record or my analysis. If there are gaps or holes I then attempt to locate additional materials to assist in plugging the holes. Though there is nothing particularly unique about my process I assert only that it functions well for my own work. I admit that my process is influenced by and is merely a modification of the method I employed investigating major crimes many years ago.

CHAPTER 2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH STRATEGY HUMAN MATERIALISM

Introduction

Human Materialism, is based upon scientific principles, is logically organized to present a model of all socio-cultural systems and provides the analytical framework necessary to solve the puzzles presented by any cultural, historical, political, or economic problem. How then does Human Materialism function? Human Materialism was formulated by anthropologist Paul Magnarella (1993:viii) to go beyond the limitations of other research strategies and to bridge the gap between scientific and humanistic approaches to anthropological research. I would also submit that Human Materialism is particularly well suited to interdisciplinary studies. Whether conceived of in anthropological terms, economic terms, or philosophical terms Human Materialism will assist the investigator in organizing research and describing results.

In order to best understand Human Materialism it is necessary to first understand its antecedents. Human Materialism is the current culmination in the history of materialist theory in cultural anthropology. In the next section I will present a brief history of materialist theory beginning with Karl Marx and ending with Cultural Materialism.

A Brief History of Materialist Theories of Culture

The materialist research tradition emphasizes the material conditions of human existence. That is, such factors as environmental constraints, resource availability, existing technology, modes of production, are those possessing the greatest causal influence in the shaping of cultural behavior and outcomes. The research strategies of Cultural and Human Materialism share common ancestry with the social theory of Karl

Marx. Marx (1970:20-21) believed that “the mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political, and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.”

Further, Marx (1970:20) believed that

“in the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social conscious.”

In these two passages the foundation of the materialist tradition in anthropology was born. First, the primacy of the material conditions of life and second, the existence of an economic base over which there arises a superstructure comprised of legal and political structures. Although in differing forms, this same foundation is present in later materialist formulations including both Cultural Materialism and Human Materialism. Looking closely at the second passage above, Marx alludes to a stage of development of the material forces of production. This refers to Marx’s belief that history follows a definite path or direction. Important to Marx was the development of a theory of history applicable to all historical periods. Marx’s theoretical framework is called historical materialism.

Historical Materialism

According to Fluehr-Lobban (1989:42), historical materialism is “the science of humanity which generates laws of social development viewing the history of humanity

as a series of successive socioeconomic formations from primitive communalist through ancient and feudal epochs to contemporary capitalism and socialism.”

Karl Marx and his intellectual partner Friedrich Engels were profoundly influenced by American anthropologist Louis Henry Morgan's (1877) *Ancient Society*. Morgan believed that human history was characterized by an evolutionary progress through various ethnical periods. These periods were lower, middle and upper savagery; lower, middle and upper barbarism; and finally civilization. Central to his theory was the idea of progress. That is, each successive stage was believed to have progressed from its antecedent stage eventually arriving at the period of “civilization” that Morgan himself (and Marx) lived. Marx and Engels seized upon this evolutionary framework and formulated economic periods ending with socialism followed by the arrival of the ultimate economic stage, that of communism. To Marx and Engels these economic periods were characterized by class struggles that ultimately led to each successive period's collapse and its replacement by the next.

The economic period of capitalism was the period that had evolved just prior to and existed during Marx's lifetime. Marx saw the class struggle of his time, as being between the capitalist owners of the means of production and the proletarian class of workers. Marx theorized that this struggle would lead to the rise of the next economic period, that of socialism. Politically, Marx struggled during much of his life attempting to force this transition to occur sooner than later. Important in understanding Marx's theory of history is that the progressive march of evolutionary stages is inevitable. The inherent contradictions within the existing class struggles always lead inexorably to the next stage (Harris 1980:66). Marx framed these contradictions by use of a dialectic

methodology. This theoretical formulation is referred to simply as, Dialectical Materialism.

Dialectical Materialism

Dialectical materialism is closely related to and, in fact, part of the overall theoretical framework of historical materialism. Once again, according to Fluehr-Lobban (1989:44),

“Dialectical and historical materialism is the only theory with which the Marxist theory of social development is compatible. Beyond this, there is a profound internal connection between dialectical materialism and historical materialism, which are at once separate bodies of thought, yet inseparable as they constitute the science of humanity.”

The basic difference between historical and dialectical materialism is the application of the dialectic method itself. Dialectics are a system of negative inferences drawn from and applied to the inference under consideration. Stated differently, the inference under consideration may be referred to as the thesis while its negative may be referred to as the antithesis. The resolution of the dialectic contradiction may be referred to as the synthesis. Marx saw history as a series of conflicts between economic classes (Harris 1980:144). Consider for example, the conflict between the owners of the means of production and the proletarian working class. Capitalism is therefore the thesis under consideration. The dialectic negative to the thesis is the proletarian working class. The ensuing class struggle resolves itself with the emergence of the next historical stage; the synthesis. In this example the synthesis is socialism.

The weakness of historical and dialectical materialism is not its emphasis upon material causation but the arbitrariness of its predictive qualities. In other words, why should socialism follow capitalism? The dialectic conflict presupposes the class conflict as the dependent variable upon which all evolutionary change revolves. But why is this

necessarily so? What is the precise cause of the class struggle? Why is the engine of change not something completely different, like improved technology or more efficient means of production and distribution? Dialectic materialism relies on an internal system of logic to dictate what the critical “conflicts” are. Anthropologist Marvin Harris (1979:145) refers to the epistemological problems inherent in the dialectical method as Marx’s Hegelian Monkey.” Harris (1979:145) explains that

“the central weakness of dialectical epistemology is the lack of operational instructions for identifying causally decisive “negations.” If every event has a negation, then every component in that event also has a negation. However, every event contains an indefinite number of components; therefore every event contains an indefinite number of negations. Which negation is the crucial contradiction?”

The dialectic method is, in fact, arbitrary and relies on subjective judgment in deciding what the oppositions are. For this reason every individual could substitute their own dialectic oppositions leaving a less than satisfactory mess.

Materialist Theories of Leslie White and Julian Steward

Though not the only materialist anthropologists to follow in the decades after the development of the Marxian influenced theory above, Leslie White and Julian Steward were arguably the most influential successors and were direct influences upon the materialist theory that would follow. Leslie White was the anthropologist most responsible for the return to the study of cultural evolution in cultural anthropology and is probably best known for his thermodynamic theory of cultural development. According to White (1975:19) this thermodynamic theory, sometimes called the fuel hypothesis, states that

“cultural systems evolve when and as the amount of energy per capita per year is increased, and as the efficiency of the tools and machines with which it is utilized is increased.”

This is a purely material based theory that emphasizes the capacity of the external world or environment in providing the energy necessary for the evolutionary needs of the societies that reside within. Less well known is that White also conceived of culture in terms of a tripartite or three component model similar to those employed by Cultural and Human Materialism. White (1975:17) recognized the existence of technological, sociological, and ideological components. White expounded upon this basic framework as follows.

“Technology consists of tools and weapons and techniques of using them. Sociology includes customs, institutions, codes, etc. Ideology consists of ideas (concepts) and beliefs.”

This basic arrangement is similar to both Cultural Materialism and Human Materialism though less fully developed. White believed that all three components were part of an interrelated system with each being meaningful only in relation to the other two but that the technological component was the basic component upon which the other two depended upon (1975:17-18).

Another materialist in anthropology, Julian Steward is known as the founder of the cultural ecology approach. According to Steward (1972:5) he developed “a method for recognizing the ways in which culture change is induced by adaptation to environment.”

Steward (1972:5) also states that,

“this adaptation, an important creative process, is called *cultural ecology*, a concept which is to be distinguished from the sociological concept, ‘human ecology’ or ‘social ecology.’ The cross-cultural regularities which arise from similar adaptive processes in similar environments are functional or synchronic in nature.”

Steward (1972:37) believed that “all aspects of culture were interdependent upon one another” but that “the degree and kind of interdependency, however, are not the same

with all features.” Steward provided his concept of culture core which included the cultural features most related to subsistence and economic arrangements. According to Steward (1972:37), “the core includes such social, political, political, and religious patterns as are empirically determined to be closely connected with these arrangements.” Steward also referred to other or secondary features largely determined by cultural or historical factors such as diffusion or innovation. If this core is thought of as the base or infrastructure as it seems to be, then it would appear that nearly anything could be placed in the core depending upon the choices made by the researcher. It would seem to Steward that it wasn’t the features themselves but relationship to the environment. According to Steward (1972:37),

“Cultural ecology pays primary attention to those features which empirical analysis shows to be most closely involved in the utilization of environment in culturally prescribed ways.”

Therefore, though clearly a materialist, Steward does not provide a clearly formulated universal model of sociocultural systems.

Both White and Steward in their theory were somewhat interested in the processes that drove cultural evolution rather than the development of a universal model. Later materialist theories in anthropology, though remaining interested in evolutionary processes, were additionally interested in developing a universal model of sociocultural systems from which to analyze the puzzles and problems arising from their study.

Cultural Materialism

Cultural Materialism is the materialist paradigm developed by anthropologist Marvin Harris as a comprehensive research strategy designed to enable the development of testable scientific theories to explain the causes of the similarities and

differences in observed cultural behaviors. Harris (1979:ix), speaking from the materialist tradition, writes “that all human social life is a response to the practical problems of earthly existence. Cultural Materialism was developed around and adheres to principles of scientific method. Additionally, Cultural Materialism attempts to account for the thoughts and meanings of the human actors within a given sociocultural context. These mechanisms, as methodological components of Cultural Materialism, are known as emics and etics. In understanding emic and etic operations in a sociocultural setting, it is important to remember that all cultures have underlying rules and rules for breaking those rules and rules for making new rules. Everything may not be as it appears upon first observation. Thus, the emic and etic component of Cultural Materialism is designed to help the researcher get at the rules that will allow them to obtain an accurate analysis of the cultural behavior observed. Each are divided into four separate categories: thought emics, behavioral emics, thought etics, and behavioral etics.

According to Harris (1980:32) emic operations have as their hallmark, the elevation of the native informant to the status of ultimate judge of the adequacy of the observer’s descriptions and analyses. The test of the adequacy of emic analyses is their ability to generate statements the native accepts as real, meaningful, or appropriate.

Etic operations have as their hallmark, the elevation of observers to the status of ultimate judges of the categories and concepts used in descriptions and analyses. The test of the adequacy of etic accounts is simply their ability to generate scientifically productive theories about the causes of socio cultural differences and similarities (1980:32). As an aside, the reader should note that etic operations (those used by the researcher) are filtered, if you will, through the observers own emic perspective. This

requires extra rigor on the part of the researcher. I was never able to become comfortable with the application of emic and etic analysis and this was due in large part to the nature of the historical cases I was interested in studying.

In historical studies one relies on the written or verbal accounts of numerous other individuals. Each of those individuals has their own emic perspective and they may be reporting or referencing information provided by still more individuals with their emic perspectives. On top of this the researcher has their own emic perspective. I call this stacking emics. The exercise quickly becomes unwieldy and loses its validity. If used at all emic and etic analyses are best applied in situations involving live informants. However, to illustrate how these principles do function I will draw upon an example from my past career as a Florida deputy sheriff.

A common complaint among drivers is that police officers, troopers, and deputy sheriffs write tickets in order to meet established quotas. The Florida Highway Patrol provides a good example of how this belief arose in the first place. If you were to call and ask the Highway Patrol if they had ticket quotas they would respond with an emphatic no. If you were to ask them why, they would tell you that they believed that such quotas were wrong. On the other hand a little insider information would reveal that working troopers are sometimes written up or disciplined for writing too few tickets. If you were to ask the Highway patrol about this, they would explain that this is not reflective of a quota but an instrument designed to ensure that a trooper is working and not wasting time. In other words, a working trooper will write on average a certain number of tickets per month. The operations break down as follows: 1) in the category of thought emics, insiders will state that ticket quotas are wrong; the emic behavioral

corollary is that there is simply no such thing as a ticket quota. These two statements are derived from information gleaned from inside participants and are thus emic in nature. On the other hand, as an outside observer I derived the following statements: 1) in the category of thought etics I posit that an effective trooper will, on average, write a certain number of tickets per month; the behavioral etic corollary to this statement is that if a trooper fails to meet that average, discipline will likely result. Thus, you can see how a law enforcement agency can emphatically deny having quotas while simultaneously enforcing one.

The curious reader may be interested in how it is that 25 came to be the “quota” number. The calculus as explained to me by a number of sources was that a Trooper works 22 or 23 eight hour shifts in a full calendar month and that an effective Trooper should write at least one ticket per shift. That of course would mean 22 or 23 tickets not the 25 indicated above. As a result, the policy simply rounded up to 25 tickets and that happens to match exactly the number of tickets in a traffic citation book.

Cultural Materialism provides a universal model of sociocultural systems comprised of three primary components: an infrastructure, a structure, and a superstructure. This formulation is more complete than Marx’s incomplete formulation of an economic base or foundation and superstructure as well as White’s three layered formulation comprising technological, sociological, and ideological components. Harris (1979:51-54) set out his universal model as follows.

- Infrastructure includes the mode of production: the technology of subsistence, and the techno environmental relationships, ecosystems, and work patterns. The infrastructure also includes the mode of reproduction: demography, mating patterns, fertility, natality, mortality, infant nurturance, contraception, abortion, infanticide.

- Structure includes the domestic economy: family structure, domestic division of labor, domestic socialization, enculturation, education, age and sex roles, domestic discipline, hierarchies, and sanctions. The structure also includes political economy: political organization, factions, clubs, associations, corporations, division of labor, taxation, tribute, political socialization, enculturation, education, class, caste, urban, rural hierarchies, discipline, police and military control, and war.
- Superstructure includes art, music, dance, literature, advertising, religion, rituals, sports, games, hobbies, and science.

This universal model is asymmetrical in application, meaning that each of the three primary components does not exert equal influence upon the sociocultural system.

Cultural Materialism emphasizes infrastructural factors. Therefore, the primacy of the material exigencies of life, the central element in all materialist paradigms, is the major determinant of the similarities and differences in cultural systems.

What does this say about the causal importance of the structure and superstructure? Cultural materialists do not deny the importance of the factors of human and ideological agency in the structure and superstructure, but instead subordinates them to the infrastructure. Cultural materialists always look to the infrastructure when searching for the ultimate causal forces in a sociocultural system. In personal communication with me Harris (1997) explained that causal forces within the structure and superstructure are only capable of only short term causality. Harris was quite clear that short term (synchronic) problems were less appropriate for Cultural Materialist analysis than were long term (diachronic) problems. Cultural materialists maintain that if a human agent, such as a great leader, is responsible for some observable change or changes that conflict with the underlying material (infrastructural) factors, then those changes must be, evolutionarily speaking, selected against. In my thinking, it is this strident insistence upon infrastructural determinacy that leads to a

departure of Human Materialism with Cultural Materialism. It was largely this conflict that led to my adoption of Human Materialism. Human Materialism permits greater facility in determining the causal influences of both structural and superstructural factors while maintaining the inherent asymmetry in the universal model.

Human Materialism and Teleology

Human Materialism combines the asymmetry of Cultural Materialism's universal pattern but restructures the infrastructural component in such a way as to permit a less strident infrastructural primacy that accounts for human agency in sociocultural systems. This is the first significant distinction between the two research strategies. Magnarella (1993:5) explains that "by including persons in positions of power and the structural positions they occupy, human materialism assumes that the personality characteristics of powerful individuals and the positions they hold must be taken into account. Additionally, Magnarella (1993:ix) states that

"Human Materialism conceptualizes human beings as realistically human, that is, as rational, cost/benefit calculating, scheming, emotional, loving and hating, social creatures who are indoctrinated to some degree in ideological, ritual, and symbolic systems that influence their thought, behavior, and perceptions of their natural and socio cultural environments."

Stated differently, human beings are goal oriented or teleological. Human beings manipulate their environments and each other seeking ever greater advantage and better position. Further, human beings create, use, and modify elements of the cultural systems of which they are part. Human materialists argue that certain powerful and or charismatic persons will emerge in sociocultural systems and then occupy positions of political and economic power. Cultural Materialism argues that such person may only affect cultural change in the short term and that such change must be selected against. Human Materialism does not insist that this be the case. The influences of the persons

in positions of power are attributable to factors of human agency in conjunction with other actors in the systems. Human teleology is but one of the points of difference between the Human Materialist and the Cultural Materialist strategies. Other significant distinctions are apparent in Human Materialism's universal pattern of sociocultural systems.

Human Materialism and the Universal Model of Sociocultural Systems

Human Materialism consists of three primary components similar to those in Cultural Materialism. However, the content of the three primary components differ as do the systemic relationships among them. Human Materialism consists of an infrastructure, a social structure (rather than structure), and a superstructure. The major components are laid out as follows.

Infrastructure and its Subcomponents

Unlike Cultural Materialism the Infrastructural component of Human Materialism is itself comprised of three subcomponents: the material infrastructure, the human infrastructure, and the social infrastructure. Each of these subcomponents contain discrete elements or factors as described below.

- Material Infrastructure includes the technology, tools, machinery, productive capital equipment, modes of production, and the productively relevant parts of science. The material infrastructure also includes the physical environment, including natural resources as well as factors that enable and constrain the sociocultural system.
- Human Infrastructure includes demographic factors such as population size, growth rates, sex ratio, age profile, life expectancy, immigration and emigration rates, as well as the psycho-biological characteristics of people.
- Social Infrastructure includes the effective ownership and control of the forces of production including the persons in positions of economic and political power and the positions they hold.

The Social Structure

The Social Structural component of Human Materialism includes all forms of social organization: family and kinship organization; political, religious, and economic organization; as well as work relations. Although most of the members of the population of the sociocultural system reside in the social structure, the social structure does not include those persons in positions of political and economic power. Those members of the sociocultural system are included in the social infrastructure as shown above.

The Superstructure

The third primary component of the Human Materialist universal model is the superstructure. The superstructure consists of all ideologies and ideological elements including religion, rituals, philosophy, art, and the symbols associated with the various organizations found in the social structure. The superstructure also includes the rival ideological elements, rituals, and symbols of importance to minority or marginal members of society (Magnarella 1993:4-8). Table 2.1, on page 39, shows a side by side comparison of the primary components of both Human Materialism and Cultural Materialism and what factors comprises each.

2-1 Comparison of the Human and Cultural Materialism Models

Human Materialism	Cultural Materialism
<p style="text-align: center;">Infrastructure</p> <p><i>Material Infrastructure: includes the technology, tools, machinery, productive capital equipment, modes of production, and the productively relevant parts of science. The material infrastructure also includes the physical environment, including natural resources as well as factors that enable and constrain the sociocultural system</i></p> <p><i>Human Infrastructure: includes demographic factors such as population size, growth rates, sex ratio, age profile, life expectancy, immigration and emigration rates, as well as the psycho-biological characteristics of people.</i></p> <p><i>Social Infrastructure: includes the effective ownership and control of the forces of production including the persons in positions of economic and political power and the positions they hold.</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Infrastructure</p> <p><i>Includes the modes of production: the technology of subsistence, and the techno-environmental relationships, ecosystems, and work patterns. The infrastructure also includes the mode of reproduction: demography, mating patterns, fertility, natality, mortality, infant nurturance, contraception, abortion, infanticide.</i></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Social Structure</p> <p><i>Includes all forms of social organization: family and kinship organization; political, religious, and economic organization; as well as work relations. The social structure does not include those persons in positions of political and economic power. Those persons reside in the social infrastructure above.</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Structure</p> <p><i>Includes the domestic economy: family structure, domestic division of labor, domestic socialization, enculturation, education, age and sex roles, domestic discipline, hierarchies, and sanctions. Also includes political economy: political organization, factions, clubs, associations, corporations, division of labor, taxation, tribute, political socialization, enculturation, education, class, caste, urban, rural hierarchies, discipline, police and military control, and war.</i></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Superstructure</p> <p><i>Includes all religion, rituals, philosophy, art, and symbols associated with the organizations found in the social structure. Also includes rival ideological elements, rituals, and symbols of importance to minority or marginal members of society.</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Superstructure</p> <p><i>Includes art, music, dance, literature, advertising, religion, rituals, sports, games, hobbies, and science.</i></p>

Some New Thinking in the Application of Human Materialist Analysis

As I have continued to work with Human Materialism over the years I began to take special note of the factional arrangements in sociocultural systems. I observed the differing forms that they took from case to case. In some instances factions seemed simple enough. That is, I could see the existence of factional relationships but they lacked size, complexity, or extended powers to influence the sociocultural system in more than nominal ways. Factions of this type appear to be special interests possessing a minimal level of influence limited primarily to its own members or their local community. On the other hand, there were factions that did seem to possess greater systemic influence and, in effect, seemed to bridge across other factional units in the sociocultural system. Still other factional groups seemed to shift and move as their own interests changed over time. As I observed these differing factions at work I began thinking of them in terms of their functional characteristics and consequently assigned them corresponding terms. The simplest of factional arrangements I call simple factions. Factions having greater systemic influence that reaches across other factional groups and social units of the system I call bridging factions. Finally, factions that shift their relationship vis-à-vis other factions and units of the sociocultural system I call shifting factions. How these factional arrangements function in actual cases will be illustrated more fully throughout this dissertation. The first two case studies will be presented in this chapter.

According to Marxist social theory the inherent conflicts in socioeconomic systems are class related. The concept of class is an important one and relates to horizontal slices of society in which all members of the class share the same socioeconomic status. It is common for example, to think of the United States as being comprised of

three horizontal socioeconomic slices; upper, middle, and lower classes. This is an oversimplification but serves to illustrate the point. A faction may be comprised of either horizontal or vertical slices of a sociocultural system. If the faction is comprised of a vertical slice then it cuts across and draws its membership from differing socioeconomic classes. For example, members of lower economic classes may align themselves with members of the ruling class out of the belief that it will best suit their overall circumstances. As indicated earlier, I classify factions as simple, bridging, or shifting. I will now define these faction types in more detail.

A simple faction is more than a mere social or economic relationship and is an arrangement of persons possessing related interests and goals, along or across class lines. As long as the faction in question lacks political power sufficient to compel or coerce other sociocultural units to its will it is a simple faction. A simple faction may be as simple and small as a local civic organization with local political involvement or as complex as an alignment of differing factions or sociocultural units organizing together, perhaps temporarily, around some common interest. In these two examples the factional relationships are most likely voluntary with members participating because they choose to do so. A bridging faction, on the other hand, possesses greater political and/or economic power and reaches across other factional interests binding them together inside the social structure component of the sociocultural system. An example of a bridging faction is the military in a totalitarian regime that creates a powerful bridge from the leadership class across other less powerful factional and social units, binding them together under a powerful umbrella. A factional arrangement of this type is likely involuntary and I would further classify the less powerful “bridged” factions as being

annexed factions. Finally, there is the shifting faction. In cases where a faction shifts its alignment from one focus to another that faction is a shifting faction. An example of a shifting faction could be a labor union that shifts its political support from one political party to another depending on the current political climate.

A faction may be, but does not have to be, formally represented by a particular leader or leaders. Factions such as labor unions, political parties, lobby groups, and civic organizations tend to be formally organized with formally recognized leaders but this does not have to be the case. More loosely organized groups can also be factions. The Tea Party Movement in the U.S. at the time of this writing (2010) is a loosely organized coalition of differing, generally conservative, factions that cross class and party lines and possesses no formal leadership. A number of American public figures are affiliated with the Tea Party Movement although none has been formally selected as the leader. Former vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin is one such public figure as are conservative radio hosts Mark Williams and Glen Beck. How effective the Tea Party is at acting to further their goals remains to be seen.

Front Loaded and Back Loaded Ideological Systems

Just as I had observed the differing types of factional arrangements in sociocultural systems I also began noticing that ideological factors played greater or lesser roles in given cases and that they seemed to take on a different complexion based upon whether they existed prior to or were added in order to facilitate given events. Ideological factors may emanate from a number of possible sources and among other things may be based in religious, political, philosophical, economic, or some combination of possibilities.

For example, in the case concerning the Ikhwan Movement in early 20th century Arabia, 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud introduced a puritanical form of Islam to the Bedouin tribes he needed to help him conquer the Arabian Peninsula. Islam had existed in Arabia for hundreds of years. Wahhabi Islam itself dated from the 18th century but was not previously practiced by many of the fiercely independent Bedouin (Magnarella 1993:41). Sa'ud was able to use this "back-loaded" ideological system to help justify his own goals and to fashion a reliable army out of the Bedouin who became known as Ikhwan or brethren. Though already Muslim, most Bedouin did not become Wahhabi Muslims until this period. Therefore, Wahhabism is a back-loaded ideological system introduced by a key political leader to further his own goals. A more complete presentation and analysis of the Ikhwan Movement is presented later in this chapter.

An example of a front-loaded ideological system is found in the history of Jacob Housman and Indian Key. Though Jacob Housman is the key political and economic figure in the history of Indian Key he did not bring with him a new ideology to superimpose on his followers to further his own ambitions. Everyone in this case study operated from essentially the same superstructural arrangements. That is, everyone had similar understandings and preconceptions of commerce, the wrecking industry, and life in the Florida Keys in the 1830's. Housman simply operated within the existing set of superstructural arrangements.

If the proof of the pudding is in the tasting then the proof of the research strategy is in its use as the following historical cases will illustrate.

Case Study: Saudi Arabia's Ikhwan Movement

Magnarella (1993:35-52) illustrates the operational characteristics of the research strategy by applying it to the historical case of the Ikhwan movement in Arabia. In Arabic

Ikhwan simply means brothers or brethren but this particular band of brothers played a very important role in the history of modern Saudi Arabia. The events of the Ikhwan movement occurred during the early part of the twentieth century. The founder of the modern Saudi Kingdom, 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud, began an ambitious political program in 1910 to unite the Arabian Peninsula under his rule. Sa'ud engaged the services of several highly competitive Bedouin tribes to act as his military force. Full of zeal for combat and possessing a ready fighting spirit, Sa'ud's Ikhwan army was recruited to accomplish Sa'ud's personal political goals. The reader should note that it is Sa'ud's goals being brought to fulfillment not those of the Ikhwan. Although, the Ikhwan had not yet realized it they would be severely affected in the future. However, before the real fighting began Sa'ud had more planned for them; they would have to be religiously indoctrinated first and Sa'ud had a plan to accomplish this very task. Sa'ud realized that in order to realistically unify groups of competing tribes, who had spent generations fighting each other, they would need a common ideology. Sa'ud knew also that they needed something to sink their teeth into, something to provide focus, direction, and justification for their upcoming martial exploits.

Thus, as part of his plan, Sa'ud sent out special religious teachers who would tell the Bedouin tribes about the teachings of Abd al-Wahhab (Magnarella1993:40). According to John Esposito (2002:6), Sa'ud "framed the development of Saudi Arabia using stories and symbols drawn from the life and struggles of Muhammad." Today Saudi Arabia's dominant school of Islam remains the Wahhabism introduced by Sa'ud nearly 100 years ago. In addition to the teachings of Wahhab, Sa'ud offered them financial support if they agreed to settle into new villages called *hujar* (Magnarella

1993:40). For the Bedouin that refused to settle in the new villages Sa'ud would have the religious teachers tell them that they were *juhl* and thus, ignorant of Allah. Once convinced they were able to correct their religious defects by abandoning their traditional camel herds and moving into the special villages. It was only after acceptance of Sa'ud's full program that the Bedouin became Ikhwan or Brethren. In fact, Sa'ud's strategy worked remarkable well; the Bedouin abandoned their camels, moved into their respective towns and became Ikhwan. Sa'ud now had his army. The Ikhwan received the promised financial support from Sa'ud now recognized him as their imam, or supreme religious leader. Sa'ud purposefully constituted the Ikhwan as a distinct warrior class. The perks were considerable. During the period in which the Ikhwan conquered Arabia they were rewarded by taking plunder from the towns and cities they defeated and their families in the designated towns were to be subsidized by Sa'ud. Sa'ud received only a portion of the plunder as a tax or tribute (1993:40-41). Esposito (2002:7) explains that 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud "used the banner of the puritanical Wahhabi to legitimate fighting other Muslim tribal leaders and seizing Mecca and Medina." At the end of the conquest period Sa'ud realized that he needed to pull in the reins of his zealous fighting force before they were able to destroy the social and political stability he would need to govern the new state. Because of the Ikhwan's fierce reputation and the possible loss of revenue Sa'ud had to stop the Ikhwan from entering and destroying the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Once Sa'ud was sure that these cities were going to surrender he turned the Ikhwan away (Magnarella 1993:46).

After enjoying their success in Central Arabia two of the most important Ikhwan leaders expected appointments to significant positions in the Sa'ud government

(1993:48). The appointments did not materialize. Instead the Ikhwan were told to return to their designated villages. When they did return they found the living conditions dismal. Drought had killed their camels and sheep leaving their wives and children to beg from door to door. This is interesting because as Magnarella (1993:48) notes, “these expectations evince that the top Ikhwan leaders did not plan to live out their lives in the dismal *hujar*.” In spite of a religious indoctrination that promised heavenly rewards for self sacrifice, these two leaders wanted something more and they wanted it in the current life. As a result, the Ikhwan rebelled against Sa’ud with some early success. The desire of the Ikhwan was to return to the glory of their past nomadic way of life as well as collect some of what they thought Sa’ud owed them. However, their traditional grazing ranges were cut by new international borders agreed upon by Sa’ud and the British (1993:48).

It was not all the Ikhwan that rebelled but three of the more militant tribes. The leaders of these three tribes had agreed to divide Sa’ud’s domain amongst them. They had a three pronged strategy; return to their old way of life, defeat Sa’ud, and form alliances with Iraq and Kuwait. They failed on all three counts. The Ikhwan raided across the new international borders and recouped some of their sheep and camel losses. However, after conducting a raid against some of Sa’ud’s own merchants and camel sellers the sedentary population along with elements of the British army rallied to the call of the new king and defeated the Ikhwan. The rebellion was over (1993:49-50).

Human Materialist Analysis of the Case

Human Materialism, in analyzing the Ikhwan movement and the subsequent rebellion, calls attention first to the existing infrastructural factors and then to the conflict between the competing goals and strategies of the Ikhwan and Sa’ud. At the outset

Sa'ud needed territorial consolidation and control. This is a powerful material prerequisite for an emerging state. There can be no state without a territory to control. To accomplish this he had to raise an army, and the Bedouin pastoralists made apt candidates. To create an army Sa'ud needed to create and empower factional arrangements of personal use to him and his goals and he sought out the warlike Bedouin to accomplish part of this process. The Bedouin were fierce, proud, and warlike, but also fiercely independent. However, Sa'ud prevailed upon them to adopt his program and they became willing factional participants, at least for the short term.

Ideologically, Sa'ud implemented a back-loaded plan of religious indoctrination which accomplished the dual goals of bringing the Bedouin into the fold and getting the masses to accept Sa'ud as their imam. In the end, the Ikhwan leaders demanded rewards in the form of government positions thus, rejecting the more ascetic ideals taught in their new Islamic code. Sa'ud's position of political power, combined with the Wahhabi religious code, gave him what he needed in both the short and long term. In the short term he received the military services of the Ikhwan. In the long term he received the loyalty of the masses and control of the territory conquered by his Ikhwan army. The masses of non Bedouin Arabs were initially insignificant to Sa'ud's plans. In the long term they rallied to Sa'ud's aid when the Ikhwan rebelled and became an important faction that helped secure Sa'ud's power.

As mentioned above the leaders of the Ikhwan rebellion had been indoctrinated in Wahhabi Islam. They were thus fully aware of the teachings concerning self sacrifice based as it was in the earthly struggles of the Prophet Muhammad. Still, they wanted immediate rewards from Sa'ud for having done his bidding. They began raiding in

attempt to collect against their perceived debts. They alienated the sedentary population which rallied to Sa'ud's side and ultimately lost the conflict. According to Magnarella (1993:48-49),

“Apparently a dual system of ideologies existed. The elite promoted an ideology for the masses that stressed the elite's sacred right to rule and the masses' duty to engage in holy war and sacrifice themselves, if need be, for the goal of creating a true Islamic state. The elite's own ideology was self-serving: exploit religious fervor to secure and enhance positions of political/economic power.”

In the final analysis, a number of key factors were at play. Sa'ud possessed considerable political and economic power as well as the force of his personality and bearing. Additionally, the superior execution of his strategy led to the defeat of the Ikhwan and the founding of the modern Saudi state.

This analysis differs from earlier materialist analyses which would have sought explanation in the material constraints and exigencies of human existence. Sa'ud's needs for territorial consolidation in order to form a government and control the land's resources are indeed traditional infrastructural factors. Also, the Bedouin's need to provide for their families and themselves are also traditional infrastructural factors. However, the Ikhwan were meeting these needs according to their own cultural practices prior to their alliance with Sa'ud and their conversion both to Wahhabi Islam and Sa'ud's program. What prompted them to give up a harsh but generally successful existence and adopt a completely different one? This is the more difficult question particularly given the synchronic time frame of the case. However, Human Materialism addresses the questions very efficiently. The desires, aspirations and strategic goals of the participants help to supply answers. The Ikhwan acted under the influenced of their needs and goals and bought into Sa'ud's program. This may have been driven by short

term greed but they still chose to participate. They must have thought, “What could possibly be better than to be able to fight, plunder and enrich ourselves with complete religious and legal impunity while having our families subsidized by the state at the same time?” Given the harsh physical realities of life in the Arabian desert, the sell was likely an easy one. Consequently, they allied themselves with Sa’ud and became an essential faction though a shifting one. Later the goals and desires of a few Ikhwan leaders came into direct conflict with those of Sa’ud. Perhaps this speaks to differences between the near sighted goals of the Ikhwan and the combined short and long term strategy of Sa’ud.

In this case, factors of human agency played a determinate role in the historical outcome. However, this is still an infrastructurally driven case as Sa’ud and his position of power are themselves infrastructural factors in Human Materialist analysis. If Harris’ contention that human actions taken against the prevailing infrastructural constraints, like those of Sa’ud, must be evolutionarily selected against is true, then there must be evidence of this in the present case. Sa’ud lured the Ikhwan out of a difficult but proven existence into towns of his designation that would require considerable subsidy to maintain. The new towns were not maintained as Sa’ud had promised and this was a point of contention to the Ikhwan leaders when they returned home to see for themselves. The synchronic nature of the case may seem to prevent us from finding evidence that Sa’ud’s actions were evolutionarily selected against. To the contrary, it is the rebelling Ikhwan leaders acting in their own interests but against the human agency of Sa’ud that have been selected against. But the Ikhwan were not rebelling against prevailing infrastructural or environmental constraints but to Sa’ud’s authority and to his

new social structural institutions. It was Sa'ud who acted against prevailing infrastructural and environmental conditions when he moved to relocate the Ikhwan tribes into designated villages needing financial assistance to function.

To the argument that there has not been enough time, in evolutionary terms, to witness the negative evolutionary selection, I would assert that there has been more than enough time. Although time in historical terms can be long it cannot be properly compared with biological or longer evolutionary time scales. The Saudi state still exists. It is still ruled by the Sa'ud family and nearly 100 years have passed. However, there is nothing on the horizon that would suggest the eminent demise of the Saudi state and in any event even if the Saudi state collapsed tomorrow too many other intervening historical factors would have to be ruled out before it could be declared that the actions of 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud's were to be blamed for the collapse. In historical terms Sa'ud's program succeeded.

Sa'ud very cleverly created and manipulated his factional arrangements. Creating first his military faction, the Ikhwan, then when elements of that faction shifted he solidified his faction with the masses and the remaining loyal Bedouin. He was then able to defeat the rebellious new faction and solidify his control of the new Saudi state. Sa'ud was able to superimpose a new back-loaded religious ideology, Wahhabi Islam, to justify his leadership and goals of conquering the Arabian Peninsula. Through his factional arrangements and the ideological discipline and justification of Wahhabi Islam Sa'ud seized then solidified his position in the social infrastructure. This allowed Sa'ud to create the conditions necessary to enable him to direct the essential cultural

transactions in the social structure of the sociocultural system. With this level of control Sa'ud succeeded in achieving his goals.

Had the Bedouin tribes chosen to ignore the entreaties of Sa'ud and maintained their old cultural ways, in spite of short term losses, the history of Saudi Arabia might be different today. Had they remained Bedouin they may have lost out on "true religion" but it is very possible that Sa'ud would have lost out on his united kingdom. But such is the speculative nature of history. This case illustrates that Human Materialism allows greater facility in determining the causal influences of both social structural and superstructural factors while maintaining the inherent asymmetry in the universal model. Table 2-2, on page 52, summarizes the relevant factors of this case study and follows the organizational structure of the Human Materialist universal model of sociocultural systems.

2-2 Component Arrangement of the Ikhwan Case Study

Component or Subcomponent	The Relevant Factors in each Component and Subcomponent of the Human Materialist Model in the Ikhwan Case Study
Material Infrastructure	The mode of production and available technology of the Bedouin tribes including their ability and experience in waging war on behalf of Sa'ud and to thrive on the Arabian Peninsula. The total set of the environmental conditions of the Arabian Peninsula as they enable, constrain, and provide for the sociocultural systems residing there.
Human Infrastructure	The strong, independent psycho-biological makeup of the Bedouin tribesmen as well as their population size and other demographic factors that facilitated their readiness to become Sa'ud's army.
Social Infrastructure	Both Sa'ud and his position of political and economic power was able to execute his plans and succeeded in fulfilling his own goals. It is from here that Sa'ud directed important cultural transactions with organizational elements inside the social structure. One key cultural transaction was to convince the Bedouin to give up much of their existing cultural ways and to "buy in" to Sa'ud's program.
Social Structure	All family, political, economic, social, work, and religious organization resides here in the social structure. The Bedouin tribes possessed their own organizational elements prior to their alliance with Sa'ud. The sedentary, non-Bedouin Arab populations that lived in Arabia also had their own organizational elements. Here also were the factions both utilized and defeated by Sa'ud. These included the Ikhwan as a whole, then those Ikhwan remaining loyal along with the sedentary population that defeated the rebelling Ikhwan faction. The rebelling Ikhwan represented a shifting faction. The loyal Ikhwan and the sedentary populations became a bridging faction.
Superstructure	The superstructure includes all of the ideological components of pertinence to the case study. In this case the superimposition of Wahhabi Islam by Sa'ud helped him to cement his alliance with the Bedouin. This represents a back-loaded set of ideological components laid over the top of the existing ones.

Case Study: Nicaragua versus the United States

In this case study I will attempt to demonstrate the usefulness of Human Materialism in the analysis of cases in International Law. The case under investigation involves Nicaragua's suit in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against the United States in 1986 (*Nicaragua v. The United States of America*, I.C.J.1 [June 27, 1986]). Among, the primary issues in the case are that of jurisdiction. In order for the ICJ to rule on a case it must have jurisdiction to do so. By filing the action, Nicaragua was accepting the court's jurisdiction and asking the court for a favorable judgment. The United States, for its part, denied that the court had jurisdiction and later, having lost that argument, withdrew itself from participation in the case on the merits.

The main U.S. argument against jurisdiction was that Nicaragua had never fully ratified the documents establishing the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and its compulsory jurisdiction. The PCIJ was the antecedent international court to the ICJ. In 1929 Nicaragua had accepted the PCIJ's compulsory jurisdiction without condition. Nicaragua signed the signature protocol and all necessary organs of the Nicaraguan government had chosen to ratify. Further, a telegram declaring the completion of the ratification process had been sent to the League of Nations indicating that delivery of the official instrument was forth coming. However, final delivery was never made. The U.S. argument was that since Nicaragua had failed to actually deliver the documents they had never fully accepted the binding compulsory jurisdiction of the PCIJ. Therefore, the provision allowing the automatic carryover of compulsory jurisdiction to the new court, the ICJ, had never occurred (Shaw 1991:668-669). In 1946, the U.S. signed the declaration accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. The declaration states

“that the United States recognizes as compulsory *ipso facto* and without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in all legal disputes hereafter arising.” [Anthony D’Amato 1985:385]

The only real difference between Nicaragua’s acceptance in 1929 and the U.S. acceptance in 1946 was that the U.S. had actually delivered the official documents confirming ratifications. In spite of such a thin difference, the U.S. argued that it was only bound to the jurisdiction of the ICJ in cases where the other party state was likewise bound.

The ICJ rejected this argument and assumed jurisdiction of the case. The court ruled that the effect of Nicaragua’s actions were sufficient evidence of ratification and acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the PCIJ. If the U.S. had prevailed, there would likely have been no case on the merits. Nicaragua would simply have lost in the pretrial phase and that would have been the end of it. That however, is not what happened and the case proceeded (Briggs 1985:375-378).

The next issue pertains to the international law of aggression and non-Intervention. On January 18, 1985 the United States withdrew from further proceedings in the case (1985:246-249). Nicaragua claimed that its political and territorial integrity had been violated by the U.S. by the latter’s open military support of the Contra rebels. The U.S. claimed that Nicaragua had conducted an armed attack on El Salvador provoking that country to ask the U.S. for assistance under the legal rubric of “collective self defense.” In its final decision, the ICJ rejected this argument and concluded that “for the Court to conclude that the United States was lawfully exercising its right of collective self defense, it must first find that Nicaragua engaged in an armed attack against El Salvador.” Regarding El Salvador in its final judgment, the Court (*Nicaragua* 1986:118-

119) found “that it is satisfied that between July 1979 and the early months of 1981, an intermittent flow of arms was routed via the territory of Nicaragua to the armed opposition in that country.” Further, the Court (1986:118-119) was not satisfied “that assistance had reached the Salvadoran armed opposition, on a scale of any significance, since the early months of 1981, or that the Government of Nicaragua was responsible for any flow of arms at either period.” The Court (1986:118-119) continued by stating that even if such a flow of arms could be imputed to Nicaragua, it was not prepared to rule that this action was an armed attack against El Salvador. Therefore, it was the judgment of the court that Nicaragua was not guilty of an act of aggression. On the other hand, the Court (1986:123) did decide that the United States had in fact “violated the principle prohibiting recourse to the threat or use of force” by “its assistance to the contras to the extent that this assistance involves a threat or use of force”.

As to the U.S. claim that their actions were justified because Nicaragua was involved in aggressive actions against El Salvador, Nicaragua did make certain concessions. Nicaragua admitted on the record that it had provided an intermittent arms supply of arms into El Salvador from 1979 until early 1981. The Court decided that this was not sufficient in itself to be an act of war according to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) definition. As to Nicaragua’s claims against the United States however, considerable evidence was submitted by Nicaragua in open court. This evidence pertained to the U.S. mining of Nicaragua’s harbors and would figure prominently in the Court’s judgment. Additional evidence was available to the Court through standard press sources. From the evidence the court found that the U.S. had in

fact, mined Nicaragua's harbors. This was the most damaging and most flagrant evidence of U.S. aggression. However, the Court also found that the U.S. had supplied the contras with arms and training and directly supplied them with intelligence from aircraft flyovers of Nicaraguan territory. The Court considered this evidence sufficient to meet the criteria of the United Nations' definition of an act of war and adjudicated accordingly.

As indicated above, the ICJ adopted the UNGA resolution 3314 defining aggression and used it in reaching their final judgment. According to the UNGA (1974:142) definition, aggression is "the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this definition." The Court found that Nicaragua was innocent of any aggression as set out by the above definition. The U.S. on the other hand was guilty of unauthorized aggression against Nicaragua. By a vote of 12 to 3, the Court rejected the U.S. claim of collective self defense and ordered reparations. By the same vote the court ruled that "the training, equipping, arming, financing and supplying the contra forces or otherwise encouraging, supporting and aiding military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, has acted against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of another state" (*Nicaragua* 1986:146). Also by the same 12 to 3 vote, the court ruled that "certain actions by the U. S. had been acts of aggression and in violation of the principles of non-intervention adhering in customary international law" and finally, that "the mining of Nicaraguan harbors was a specific act of aggression and in violation of the same principles" (1986:146).

Perhaps most importantly the Court made a significant statement about its own jurisdiction and then ruled against a major super power in a matter that might otherwise have seemed purely political.

Human Materialist Analysis of the Case

The previous section provides only a brief summary of the facts and primary issues involved in Nicaragua's suit against the United States. It is not my purpose here to provide a comprehensive legal analysis of this case, but to use the case as a means of analyzing a case in international law applying the Human Materialist research strategy.

Human Materialism is an anthropological research strategy and as such, would not likely be used by legal scholars, international lawyers, historians, or political scientists. I believe this to be unfortunate because the model possesses considerable utility for undertaking analyses involving the complex interplay of history, the material conditions of the world and key human actors. Human Materialism allows greater facility in determining the causal influences attributable to the structure and superstructure while maintaining the inherent asymmetry of the universal model of sociocultural systems. At heart, my purpose here is to look inside the historical context and into the particular impact that President Ronald Reagan had on the events that led to the suit.

What material or infrastructural factors were at play for the U.S.? Except for the Panama Canal, since returned to Panama, the U.S. did not have any direct territorial claims in Nicaragua nor anywhere in Central America, for that matter. Historically, the U.S. has maintained a policy of regional dominance over Central America and the hemisphere as a whole. Throughout its history the U.S. has intervened in Mexico (1840's), Cuba (1890's & 1961), Guatemala (1920's) the Dominican Republic (1960's),

Haiti (1990's), Chile (1970's), Nicaragua (1980's) and El Salvador (1980's). From 1823 until the Cold War era the primary defining U.S. policy for the region has been the Monroe Doctrine. In 1823, in his annual address to Congress, President James Monroe laid the foundation for all subsequent regional policy. The basic idea is simple, the U.S. would not interfere in matters of concern to Europe within Europe's sphere of influence, and the U. S. would not tolerate European meddling in the their sphere of influence. In his address to congress President James Monroe (1823) set out what is now referred to as the Monroe Doctrine,

“In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, we owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.”
[Cited in U.S. Historical Documents online 2009]

In 1823 the infrastructural demands on the U.S. were almost overwhelming. Florida had only been acquired from Spain 1821 and was far from fully settled or defended. Only twenty years prior the U.S. had completed the Louisiana Purchase and it was still largely unsettled and undefended, at least by U.S. citizens. In a period of just twenty years the U.S. had dramatically increased its land mass and, if secured, all rights to the natural resources thereon. In 1823 the U.S. still had reasons to feel insecure and potentially threatened. The War of 1812 with Britain had only ended nine years before and Britain remained a threat and competitor. Both Great Britain and Spain had until recently, had territorial interests in lands now claimed by the United States. President Jefferson had hastily sent out Louis and Clark to survey and to solidify U.S. claims on all the lands west of the Mississippi River. In 1821 Andrew Jackson had completed military

excursions in the southeast by taking Florida and had instituted an American territorial government with himself as the first governor. In the Pacific Northwest, Russia had made incursions and small settlements as far south as California. In the time of James Monroe, these threats were perceived as very real and as directly impacting upon national security of the United States. I would argue that in 1823 the material infrastructural pressures were determinate in matters of U.S. territorial policy and related foreign policy.

However, during the course of later U.S. history these material factors become less determinative on unfolding historical outcomes. By the end of World War II the United States had become the wealthiest, strongest, and most technologically advanced nation in the world. Consequently, legitimate threats against the territorial sovereignty of the United States and its regional interests have been limited to the Cold War generally and the Cuban Missile crisis specifically. The U.S. insistence upon maintaining its hegemonic dominance was, by the Ronald Reagan era, largely ideological in nature. Perhaps this reflects how deeply the idea of MAD, or Mutually Assured Destruction, had become as a normalizing factor in the U.S. policy concerning the balance of nuclear power. None of this denies the impact of infrastructural factors but my purpose here is to illustrate how much less determinative these infrastructural factors had become, for purposes of national security, relative to their influence in 1823.

What about the material conditions of Nicaragua? I will consider only those material conditions existing at the time of the fall of Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza-DeBayle in 1979 through the end of the Reagan presidency in 1989. Anastasio

Somoza-DeBayle is generally characterized as a despotic dictator. According to E. Bradford Burns (1987:2),

“most assessments indicate that venality and violence characterized the Somoza governments. While a tiny minority waxed wealthy and enjoyed every privilege during those decades, the nation remained underdeveloped. The overwhelming majority of its citizens lived in abject poverty, bearing most of the burdens of society.”

During the last years of the Somoza regime the Nicaraguan population as a whole lacked adequate healthcare, education, proper housing, proper diet and sufficient work. In 1975, just four years prior to the Sandinista revolution, the 20% at the bottom of the economic scale controlled only 4% of the nation's income. At the same time the 20% on the top of the scale enjoyed 55% of the nation's income. The peasants found themselves being continually pushed off of their lands by an ever growing agricultural export industry. The majority of available arable land was left fallow and unproductive, thereby creating a large, cheap labor pool (1987:2-3). From a purely infrastructural standpoint, the 1979 revolution is easily understood. The crucial question then is this: why did the Reagan government, knowing about the horrors of Somoza, spend lavishly in the attempt to overthrow a new government that desperately wanted to do better? Further, why was the Reagan government so determined to accomplish this task even if the costs far exceeded the gains? In other words why spend millions of dollars of tax payer's money for a virtually zero financial return, in clear violation of sound economic policy? Human materialists would argue that the principal answer is Ronald Reagan himself.

As President of the United States, Ronald Reagan was clearly a person in a position of economic and political power. From a pure Cultural Materialism approach such negative cost to benefit actions would have to be selected against. Reagan, a

rational, cost and benefit calculating person prosecuted this war in spite of the financial and potential political costs. Ronald Reagan, the Great Communicator as he was called, possessed a personal charm, polish, and charisma that allowed him to pursue his policy goals with the general cooperation of a congress controlled by the opposing party. Further, Reagan remained dedicated to this policy even after politically damaging scandals were exposed to the public. Ideologically, Ronald Reagan believed that the Sandinistas were part of communist empire intent upon world domination. I remember being amazed that the President could have such a simplistic, black and white view of the world, but he did. I am not implying that Reagan was simple minded or lacked complexity. He was anything but these things. However, I contend that it was, in fact, Reagan's simplistic but sincere world view that accounted for his success with the American people and congress.

A Human Materialist analysis accounts for human agency like Reagan's as exhibited in this case. I would suggest that Reagan's actions are unreasonable in light of the U.S. economic conditions at the time. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics U.S. unemployment at the time Reagan become president in 1981 stood at 7.6% and would rise a further 2.0% by 1983. Reagan's operations against Nicaragua did not create U.S. jobs nor did they improve the economy. Reagan's actions were executed in a largely clandestine manner, did not have congressional approval, damaged U.S. prestige and were undertaken for purely ideological reasons. However, to a country as rich as the United States it would take an enormous economic burden to overextend the country's ability to support its actions. Reagan's actions in Nicaragua were far from an overwhelming economic burden. The impact of Reagan's personal characteristics

coupled with the wealth and might of the United States made it possible for him to pursue policies that could break or at least damage smaller or poorer countries.

Concerning faction analysis, Reagan enjoyed significant support from the Republican Party and conservative voters. Further, due to the cold war, there was fairly broad support in the United States for “anti-communist” activities wherever they might be. That said, Reagan’s adventures in Central America concerning Nicaragua had their problems. Reagan even incurred the ire of his mentor Senator Barry Goldwater for mining Nicaraguan harbors without notice. In his book, *Came the Revolution* (1988:178-79), Senator Patrick Moynihan reprints Goldwater’s 1984 letter to CIA Director William Casey in which Goldwater stated the he was “pissed off” at Reagan’s mining operations and that they were a violation of international law. Reagan also had to weather the Iran-Contra scandal that included the trial of popular Marine Corps Major Oliver North and a CIA aircraft being shot down in Nicaragua. All in all, the entire affair was laden with baggage and political fallout for President Reagan. Still Reagan weathered the storm. Perhaps the most telling statistic concerning Reagan’s popularity was that his approval rating dropped no lower than 47% after the Iran-Contra affair made the headlines. Further, just prior to leaving office in 1989 Reagan’s approval had risen again to 63% (Gallup 2004). In the case of Ronald Reagan and U.S. activities against Nicaragua it was Reagan himself and his very significant position of political and economic power more than his factional arrangements or any other factors that led to the historical outcome observed. Table 2-3, on page 63, summarizes the relevant factors of this case study while following the organizational structure of the Human Materialist universal model of sociocultural systems.

2-3 Component Arrangement of the Nicaragua Case Study

Component or Subcomponent	The Relevant Factors of each Component and Subcomponent of the Human Materialist Model in the Nicaragua v. United States Case Study	
Material Infrastructure	The United States possessed a highly advanced and diversified capitalist industrial mode of production including an advanced military and great financial wealth in support.	Nicaragua was a country recently converted to a socialist mode of production and possessed limited military resources and financial support.
Human Infrastructure	The psychobiological makeup of the American people was reflected in the generally high level of support given to Reagan even in the face of scandal including secret operations that circumvented congress.	The psychological makeup of the Nicaraguan leadership and people was reflected in their confident belief that their sovereignty had been violated and the lawsuit against the United States.
Social Infrastructure	It is from here that Ronald Reagan and his position as President of the United States was able to direct the sociocultural transactions with political and economic organizational structures inside the social structure below.	
Social Structure	Though all forms of social organization reside here the most essential social infrastructural factors in the case were the economic and political institutions utilized by Reagan as he directed United States involvement in violating Nicaraguan sovereignty. Reagan controlled a faction comprised of U.S. political, financial, military, and intelligence personnel. This faction acted as a bridging faction during this case.	
Superstructure	The superstructure includes all of the ideological components of pertinence to the case study. In this case Reagan tapped into a preexisting ideological set surrounding the U.S. position in the Cold War, its deterrence of communist aggression and the Monroe Doctrine. This represents a front-loaded ideological system.	

CHAPTER 3 JACOB HOUSMAN AND INDIAN KEY

In the early 1820's a young Staten Island man named Jacob Housman "borrowed" one of his father's sailing boats, a small schooner, and headed south. After working his way down the east coast and shortly after arriving in the Florida Keys he struck a reef and had to put in at Key West for repairs. This was Housman's first contact with the "wrecking trade" or ship's salvage. Watching and learning quickly, Housman believed that he too could make a lively living in the same business. The waters around the Florida Keys are shallow, the weather fickle, and the reefs treacherous. As a wrecking ship's Captain, Housman would steadily patrol the reefs around the Florida Keys looking for sailing vessels in trouble. Mishaps in these treacherous waters were not uncommon but Housman knew that if he wanted the spoils he would have to get there first. This is simply how it was in the wrecking business.

The process was extraordinarily dangerous but fairly straight forward. When encountering a wrecked sailing vessel the salvage ship and crew would come along side as closely as possible and, if they were still present, communicate with the wrecked crew. Where the crew was present or not, they would then attempt to assess the damages, and the extent of the cargo. In some cases, the vessel itself would be a total loss and only the cargo mattered. In other cases a wreck could be floated off of the reef or shoal and with temporary repairs it could sail to the nearest harbor. In this region the nearest port was Key West. Housman, as a wrecking captain, would facilitate the entire process. He and his crew would offload some or all of the wreck's cargo and accompany it to port.

In the 1820's Key West was the only port close enough and large enough to handle full scale salvage operations. Key West was also the designated U.S. port of entry for paying cargo duties and tariffs and was also the location of the local Maritime courts. It was, for all practical purposes, a one-stop shopping center for the Ship's salvage business in the Florida Keys. It should be noted that in the 1820's Key West was the largest city in South Florida. Miami did not yet exist and Ft. Lauderdale was a tiny settlement called New River. Further north on Florida's east coast, St. Augustine was the next Port of Entry and city of consequence.

Wrecking Captains, after making contact with a wrecked vessel, entered in arrangements with the wreck's owner or captain to receive a percentage of the cargo in exchange for salvage assistance. In some cases the wreck might have been found abandoned, the crew having made it safely away. In such a case the salvor would initiate salvage operations without an agreement and take the bounty to the next port of entry, declare it, and arrange for storage. In the Florida Keys that meant returning to the "One Stop Salvage Shop" in Key West. Perhaps the captain or owner of the wrecked vessel could catch up with their cargo in Key West and place their claim against the recovered cargo. The claims would then be adjudicated by a judge of proper jurisdiction with the owner and salvager each receiving a share. Though a functioning system was in place in Key West it was not to Jacob Housman's liking. Housman had dreams of success and great wealth but believed that for his dreams to come true he would have to find a way to operate outside the reach of Key West merchants and salvage operators who controlled the salvage business. According to historian John Viele (1996:41), "At the time Housman began patrolling the reef, the wrecking business was

controlled by a few Key West merchants who owned all the wharves, warehouses, and ship repair facilities in town”.

There were too many hands reaching into Housman’s pocket and he was not a man inclined to share. By having to operate out of Key West Housman was forced to pay not only cargo duties and court costs but warehousing costs, supply costs, and repair costs and all to members of the local wrecking “monopoly.” Housman figured if Key West could be a one stop shopping center for wreckers then there was no reason he could not do the same. One particular instance illustrates Housman’s determination to avoid the Key West merchants and their tight grip on the wrecking business.

In 1825 Housman found an abandoned French Brig wrecked upon a reef. This date is important because it shows how early Housman began his attempt to free himself of the Key West wrecking monopoly. Florida had only been acquired by the United States from Spain in 1821. Until then the Keys had been controlled by pirates and by Bahamian wreckers. After 1821 the U.S. Navy made American control possible and with it the rise of the American Wrecking trade. After finding the French Brig, Housman and crew offloaded the cargo to his schooner and then sailed to St. Augustine. By sailing to St. Augustine, Housman was able to avoid Key West and to also enrage the merchants there in the process. One such merchant, Fielding Brown, even charged Housman with robbery (1996:42). Although still new to the business Housman was obviously a quick study. He understood that in St. Augustine he could seek a judgment on his salvage cargo via a five man jury rather than the Maritime court in Key West. In fact, for reasons unknown, the St. Augustine jury awarded Housman 95% of his haul. This was not only generous but most unusual. Unfortunately for

Housman, the French consul happened to be in St. Augustine on other business. When he heard about the award he became incensed and complained to the court. As a result, Housman's award was reduced. Still, this was a victory for Housman in that he had successfully circumvented the dominance of Key West.

Over his years of sailing the waters of the Keys Housman had become familiar with a small, eleven acre island in the Upper Keys called Indian Key. Indian Key is located in the Atlantic, just off the eastern shore Lower Matecumbe Island. If you know what to look for, Indian Key can be seen today from the Highway as you drive by. According to the online archives of local historian Jerry Wilkerson (N.d.), Housman purchased his first section of Indian Key in 1831 when "Thomas and Ann Gibson sold to Jacob Housman a two-story house, a store, 9-pin alley, billiard room and table, outhouse and kitchen for \$5,000." As Housman began to visit Indian Key more frequently he began to see it as a successful wrecking port (Viele 1996:43). Housman would acquire the remainder of the tiny island in 1835. Again according to Keys Historian Jerry Wilkerson's (N. d.) online archives

"There is little doubt that Housman was the political and economic force for the development of the small island. Had the island been larger and a source of at least brackish water it would have been a force to be reckoned with. One must remember that both it and Key West were developing almost together, Key West having a slight head start, size, military, deep water port, etc. As small as Indian Key is, had Housman been able to maintain his on-site militia and prevented the massacre, history could have been significantly different."

Wilkerson's description is illuminating on a number of levels. First, it provides a snapshot of the material conditions of the island at the time Housman acquired it. Indian key was small and lacked a supply of fresh water. The lack of fresh water created the permanent challenge of acquiring it and bringing it to the island by boat or barge. The

small size of the island would forever limit possible growth. Second, it shows that Housman was in direct competition with Key West and third, it shows that Housman was the driving force behind Indian Keys rapid rise to local prominence.

On February 4, 1836 the legislative council of the Florida Territory created Dade County and named Indian Key as its first county seat. This was the high water mark for Indian Key and shows how persuasive Housman could be.

However, though he tried three separate times, he was unable to persuade the U.S. Congress to designate Indian Key as a port of entry (Viele 1996:48).

Housman was notorious throughout the Keys region during the years that saw the rise of his wrecking business at Indian Key. Housman was an ambitious man, an energetic man, and could be an unscrupulous man. But in spite of his lack of scruples he suffered few significant failures. For a decade Jacob Housman did as he pleased and pretty much got what he wanted. This was not always the case in the courts. Of course, he did during the course of business, sometimes receive smaller judgments than expected in his salvage cases, but this happened to everyone in the business. That said, his lack of scruples did not place him in good stead with the Federal Courts. In one particular case involving the ship *North Carolina* the Federal trial court found his arrangement fraudulent and ordered Housman to return the salvaged goods he had in storage. Housman appealed to the Territorial Court of Appeals where again he lost. Housman then proceeded to the U.S. Supreme Court and completed a hat trick, losing once again (Viele 2001:146-147).

Housman's time was running out. His purchase of Indian Key coincided with the beginning of the Second Seminole War. The outbreak of hostilities with the Indians

reduced the level of military security throughout the upper keys. Housman continually pleaded with the Federal Government to place troops at Indian Key. This was done briefly but as needs changed the Navy reassigned the men elsewhere. Due to the increasing threats of attack Housman spent \$9,000.00 of his own money on defense. The increasing costs coupled with increasing fear and reduced business began to take its toll on his wrecking empire. By March 1840 Housman mortgaged the Island to not one but two different men in Charleston, South Carolina. Given Housman's prior success, ambition, and sheer force of will he may have survived the financial setbacks but for the upcoming Indian raid.

At about 2:00 a.m. on the morning of August 7, 1840 a raiding party of Indians set out from Lower Matecumbe in canoes headed for Indian Key. After the raid five residents were dead, including famous botanist Henry Perrine, and the entire Key was left a smoking ruin. Housman was able to escape his house from the backdoor just as Indians entered the front. Housman swam out to one of his boats and sailed away. This was the end of the Housman wrecking empire and he was now forced to return to Key West and seek employment with another wrecker. A few months later he was killed in a salving accident by being crushed between two sailing vessels. Housman was only forty-one.

Analysis

A cultural materialist analysis would explain Housman's case only in terms of its pure infrastructural variables. The likely infrastructural variables would be: the small size of the island, the lack of fresh water, and the heavy impact the increasing costs of defense placed upon the means of production. These are legitimate variables but they did not by themselves cost Housman his wrecking empire. In this case Human

Materialism will allow greater facility in teasing out the causal influences of the infrastructure and social structure while maintaining the inherent asymmetry in the universal pattern.

Housman acquired Indian Key in 1835 after having worked from that location for about four years. Though at times unscrupulous, Housman forged a very successful enterprise from virtually nothing. He succeeded against considerable resistance from his Key West competitors and in spite of the marginal environmental conditions of the island itself. Other men were already operating out of Indian Key when Housman arrived and were doing so without the growth and success of Jacob Housman. Housman created his own faction of local tradesmen and competed head to head against the Key West monopoly. But for the Second Seminole War Housman would likely have succeeded for a longer period of time. How long this might have been we cannot know but it is conceivable that he could have continued his success for the remainder of his life. Housman was highly competitive, highly motivated, and very persuasive. In short, he was a calculating goal driven human being with ambitions he wanted to fulfill. For at least ten years he was successful in the face of his hostile competitors and the difficult environmental conditions he faced. A cultural materialist analysis might concede that Housman's short term success was the result of his own efforts and abilities. However, they would likely default to an emphasis on marginal environmental conditions and the economic stresses caused by the sudden need for additional defenses as the reason for his demise. Cultural materialists would argue that Housman's actions were in direct conflict with the prevailing environmental

infrastructural conditions and were destined to be selected against. I disagree and will detail why in the following expanded analysis.

In Key West Housman was neither able to form any meaningful business relationships nor develop a factional arrangement that would support his ambitions. Perhaps, he made no effort, there's no way for us to know. What we do know is that Housman was smitten by professional salvaging and was determined to make a go of it. In need of factional and business relationships to support his ambitions, he set about creating them at Indian Key. What's more, he succeeded. Ultimately, Housman bought the entire island and controlled the businesses on it. Housman found appropriate sources of fresh water and supplies had them brought to the island. Housman formed relationships with Florida Territorial legislators and succeeded in having Dade County formed and Indian Key designated the county seat. He formed meaningful relationships with important persons in St. Augustine, including the courts and enjoyed some success there.

Housman clearly operated from a driving set of personal goals and motivations but he did not operate alone. Competitive goal oriented behavior was exhibited by all the players in the case study and many were in direct conflict with Housman. The Key West wrecking operators, the Key West courts, the Federal legislative bodies, and the warring Seminole Indians all had their own sets of goals and their own factions all of which are reflected in their individual actions. Most of Housman's success was against his trade competitors in Key West. Further, he avoided their courts by going to St. Augustine where he received more favorable judgments. All of these examples illustrate competing teleological elements within a complex historical problem. Human Materialism is, at its

core, precisely about teleological conflict and the interrelationships between the various competing factions. If Cultural Materialism can be seen as a logical extension of the theoretical legacy of Marxian materialism then Human Materialism can be seen as a logical extension of Cultural Materialism.

There is another but important phase to a Human Materialist analysis and that deals how the infrastructure itself is conceived and operates. In Human Materialism the infrastructural component is comprised of three categories. These categories are the material, the human, and the social infrastructure. Of importance in the current analysis is the social infrastructure. The social infrastructure is comprised of significant and important persons and leaders and the economic and political positions they hold. These components are directly contained within the infrastructure itself. On the other hand, the social structure contains family and kinship relations as well as economic and political organizations. Further, the social infrastructure and the social structure join in a two-way communications process. The key persons as well as the political and economic positions they hold in a sociocultural system, engage in the two-way communication process, mentioned above, exchanging cultural information and engaging in cultural transactions. This is the point where the infrastructure and the social structure meet.

In the current case study, Housman was clearly a key player in the sociocultural system. He held positions of both economic and political power and engaged exchanges of cultural information and conducted cultural transactions that communicated through to the social structure as he developed political and economic organizations. Housman's faction was, in my terminology, a simple faction comprised of

those salvagers who did business with him and those persons working on or in direct support of Indian Key and its few residents. Though Housman established relationships with politicians, judges and other persons of importance to his goals they were not part of his faction. However small Housman's faction, it appears to have been relatively stable. In this case its stability rather than its size is of greater importance. Indian Key was very small and could not support a large population. Housman did not have access to a large faction and did not need one. When the end finally came it was not his inability to deal with difficult material variables or conflicts with them; it was his conflict with another sociocultural system; the Seminole Indians. Absent the attack at Indian Key Housman's fall may never have occurred. Table 3-1, on page 74, summarizes the relevant factors of this case study following the organizational structure of the Human Materialist universal model of sociocultural systems.

3-1 Component Summary of the Indian Key Case Study

Component or Subcomponent	Summary of Relevant Factors in each Component and Subcomponent of the Human Materialist Model in the Indian Key Case Study
Material Infrastructure	<p>The relevant material factors were the environmental conditions of the Indian Key region that had to be both utilized and over come.</p> <p>The mode of production including sailing ships, related technologies, and Housman’s financial support made it possible to provide sufficient fresh water, provision, and monetary resources for the island for ten years.</p>
Human Infrastructure	<p>Though they were few the strong, resilient psycho-biological makeup of Indian Key residents, salvagers, and residents were essential in overcoming the difficulties of life and to thrive.</p>
Social Infrastructure	<p>Jacob Housman and his key position of political and economic power allowed him to create, expand and build his small salvage empire. Financially he was able to buy the entire island and even garrison a military unit briefly. Politically he was able to create a new county, establish Indian Key as its seat.</p>
Social Structure	<p>All family, political, economic, social, work, and religious organization resides here in the social structure. Important here were salvaging operations, suppliers, merchants and residents and their loyal membership in Housman’s support faction. This faction is a simple faction.</p>
Superstructure	<p>The superstructure includes all of the ideological components of pertinence to the case study. In this case Housman and his Indian Key faction operated under the preexisting front-loaded ideological set. This ideology encompassed belief in commerce, U.S. expansion into the Florida Territory and economic competition.</p>

CHAPTER 4 HUMAN MATERIALISM AND NINETEENTH CENTURY SIOUX LAW

Introduction

One-hundred and fifty years ago the Sioux Indians were the most powerful nation on the Northern Plains of the American west. The arrival of the Spanish horse between 1740 and 1790 hastened a rapid cultural transition. Prior to the horse, the Sioux had been more localized hunters, fishers, and gatherers but after the horse they became highly mobile, nomadic, equestrian warriors. It is the Sioux, or more properly the Lakota that captured the imaginations of 19th century novelists and Twentieth Century moviemakers. The Sioux are also the people that the United States Army would have to go to war with during the mid and late 19th century. If you have seen many of the old Western movies that depict Native Americans, you have seen them depicted on horseback wearing feathered war bonnets, war paint, and attacking wagon trains of settlers with lances, rifles, and bows and arrows. Often, in these films, the particular tribe remains unnamed but the material culture depicted is frequently that of the Sioux. In fact, it was not at all uncommon for a filmmaker to depict some Southeast Woodlands tribe, like the Cherokee, in Sioux dress. Whatever your feelings about Hollywood's depiction of Native Americans, in recent films they have been depicted more accurately. In the 1990's the Sioux of 1864 were immortalized in a culturally and historically accurate portrayal in Kevin Costner's film *Dances with Wolves*. However, in spite of its more accurate physical portrayal, the film has been criticized for furthering the notion of the "noble savage." This remains, I think, a legitimate point of concern. However noble an indigenous people are portrayed, it is generally set against the backdrop of the allegedly more advanced and civilized group in power. I do not see the film *Dances with*

Wolves in this light but I do appreciate the value of the point. For current purposes however the reader should try and picture the Lakota as they were 150 years ago.

I will use the term Sioux throughout this chapter to refer to all of the above groups. There are several reasons for this. First, it is the term most commonly used and recognized and is even used by the Sioux themselves, at least in external contexts. Second, the terms Lakota, Nakota, and Dakota, although accurate, are associated with specific geographical areas and since this chapter utilizes information from more than one geographical area the term Sioux is less confusing.

Names and Divisions

The word Sioux is a corruption of the Ojibwa word *Nadowe-is-iw*, meaning lesser adders or lesser snake people (Powers 1977:5). The Ojibwa used this word to differentiate the Sioux from the big adders, or Iroquois. The word is an Ojibwa pejorative and came into common usage through early European contact. At their height the Sioux nation extended from the Platte River in modern Nebraska, west to Wyoming and north to the Heart River in South Dakota. Their territory covered the northwest quarter of Nebraska, the northeast quarter of Wyoming, the southeast corner of Montana, and most of the western half of South Dakota (Hassrick 1964:3). Other smaller populations ranged from eastern South Dakota to upper Minnesota and into Canada. The Sioux were comprised of seven other designations that likely refer to the legendary Seven Council Fires of the Sioux. However, these additional designations are not germane to this dissertation (1964:3). I use the term legendary because time and the imperfections of oral history have obscured the original identities of the people referred to as the Seven Council Fires (1964:3).

Linguistic Distinctions

All Sioux, regardless of tribal name or division, spoke mutually intelligible dialects of the same language. Sioux languages are all of the Siouan linguistic family. In the region of the Great Plains the Winnebago, Assiniboine, Minitaris, and Osage all spoke Siouan languages. However, only the languages spoken by the Lakota, Dakota and Nakota are mutually intelligible (Powers 1977:7). These three designations are commonly used to delineate the Sioux geographically. The Eastern or Santee Sioux speak the Dakota dialect. Today the Santee have very small reservations in Minnesota. The Middle or Yankton Sioux speak the Nakota dialect and are found in the Eastern part of South Dakota. Finally, the Western or Teton Sioux speak the Lakota dialect. The Teton Sioux are the most famous of the Sioux divisions and have maintained the largest population even until today. The Lakota Sioux dwell in the western part of South Dakota and Nebraska (1977:11).

In summary, the problems of establishing precise linguistic relationships and a fully accurate portrayal of political divisions between Sioux groups remain today. There is no consensus among historians and anthropologists as to the precise origins and identity of the various divisions. However, what I have presented here does briefly relate the most commonly accepted Sioux designations.

Early History

In spite of their acclaim as equestrian hunters and warriors, the Sioux of the Great Plains originated in the Western Great Lakes region in what is present day Minnesota. In their early history, they were not an equestrian people at all. As mentioned in the introduction, the horse did not reach the upper Plains until the mid to later part of the 18th century. The Sioux began leaving their homeland and migrating west due to

economic considerations and warfare pressures with nearby Algonquian groups around the year 1700. Algonquian speaking tribes such as the Chippewa had become armed with French muskets acquired through trade. Thus, due to having acquire firearms first, they outgunned the Sioux. Their superior weaponry allowed the Chippewa to force the Sioux out of their Minnesota homelands and they began migrating out along the rivers to the south and west, eventually reaching the Great Plains (1977:19).

Up until their arrival in the Great Plains the Sioux had been a semi-sedentary people, hunting small game and fishing. As groups began arriving on the upper Plains they found a different environment and were forced to adapt by adopting a different way of life. The Plains were more arid and there were fewer available rivers and fishing streams. But most importantly, it was on the Plains that they first encountered the tens of thousands of buffalo that become the centerpiece of their survival and culture. It was here on the plains, that they began taking full advantage of the horse for hunting, nomadic movement and warfare.

In their early history, the Sioux had to hunt on foot. Somewhere between 1740 and 1790 the Sioux of the Great Plains had acquired the horse and made the transition to a nomadic equestrian culture. It was the horse that allowed the Sioux to control much larger territory and to hunt buffalo with much greater efficiency. Having the horse required considerable cultural adaptation including the development of a legal apparatus to govern communal hunts.

Prior to this period the Sioux had used dogs for hunting as well as traction animals. Small travois were attached to a harness and placed around the dog's neck at the shoulders. Each dog then carried a small part of the owner's belongings. After the

horse arrived the dogs were no longer needed. Dogs would remain around as pets and sentries but the days of a dog-based culture were over. A horse could drag a much larger travois and thus carry a much larger load. Anthropologist Robert H. Lowie (1953:43-45) explained that

“The introduction of horses revolutionized the natives’ economic conceptions. It created great differences in wealth and correlatively in prestige. Paupers in a settlement, and those who had no more than one or two head, would trudge along on foot when a camp moved, while favored tribesman owned herds of 70 or 100.”

Clearly, the importance of the horse in the development of Sioux culture cannot be underestimated. The above introduction sets the provenance for a study of Sioux that follows in the next section of this chapter.

A Human Materialist Analysis of Sioux Law

What distinguishes law from informal or customary norms? Before answering this question I will address the use of the word custom. Custom or customary, as in the current case study refers to commonly accepted social practices. For example, in the United States we can say that it is our custom to shake hands when we greet people. It might be considered impolite if we do not but there is no fixed obligation to shake hands nor is there a fixed sanction for not shaking hands. However, there is a second use of the term found in international law. In this sense, referring to customary international law, it refers to a well developed body of legal principles that applies to nations and may be the basis of litigation in the International Court of Justice or other courts.

According to anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski (1932:15), a law is any behavior that is defined by a rule and from which a sanction will arise if it is violated. Malinowski was attempting to discern the presence of law among the primitive peoples of the Trobriand Islands, near New Guinea. Malinowski believed that in looking for law he

would try “to discover and analyze all the rules conceived and acted upon as binding obligations”, and then proceed “to find out the nature of the binding forces, and to classify the rules according to the manner in which they are made valid” (1932:15). Malinowski believed that through such inquiry primitive law could be identified and separated from custom. Malinowski (1932:55) went on to provide an anthropological definition of law as

“The rules of law stand out from the rest in that they are felt and regarded as the obligations of one person and the rightful claims of another. They are sanctioned not by mere psychological motive, but by a definite social machinery of binding force, based, as we know, upon mutual dependence, and realized in the equivalent arrangement of reciprocal services, as well as in the combination of such claims into strands of multiple relationships.”

Malinowski (1932:55) thus believed that group sentiment was not the primary force that guaranteed compliance with a society's legal rules. Malinowski gives us here a working definition of law and a method of finding both custom and law. Malinowski used the following basic formula, rule plus sanction, in his search for law in primitive societies. But Malinowski's definition is over-inclusive. In using his definition one could find law in almost anything a given people found important enough to be reasonably binding. For example, in the United States we cover our mouths when we sneeze. Not to do so is considered a significant breach of social protocol. Although tenuous, an argument could be made that breaking this rule is breaking a binding obligation between people. To do so would certainly raise the eyebrows and comments of anyone nearby. We back this custom with a reference to health concerns making a violation more serious than talking in church. In times of potential epidemic, like the H1N1 flu, covering your mouth becomes even more important. A violator would likely be subjected to some people walking away while others proclaimed loudly that the violator was rude. Others might

say "bless you" as a courtesy but there is a sense of embarrassment in most of us when a sneeze sneaks past the barricades. Are these reactions automatic in the Malinowski sense? At least according to Malinowski's definition of law I think the answer is yes. Perhaps so if the parties involved feel both a rightful claim and a sense of obligation. But does this make the sneeze rule a law? I would argue no and perhaps Malinowski would agree. My criticism of his definition is that in his attempt at precision he became over inclusive. However, imagine if you will a society where the results of such a violation would be more severe. The Japanese, for example, feel a very strong sense of obligation in protecting each other from colds and flu. In Japan people wear surgical masks openly to protect themselves and others in public and in the workplace. Is this a law? Again, my answer is no but it is easy to see how far a small violation could be taken. Given the particulars of a given sociocultural system, Malinowski's definition could be considered an appropriate definition of law. Given the unsatisfactory aspects of Malinowski's definition, is there a definition of greater analytical value for use in analyses such as those attempted in this chapter? In personal communication, Magnarella (1998) defines law as

"a cognitive construct of norms and rules designed by persons in positions of political and economic power to promote certain political, economic, and social policies that they deem desirable by controlling behavior, especially as it pertains to the control, use and allocation of values, such as people's services, social relations, ideology, symbol, ritual, political power, land wealth and other economic resources."

As it was designed for use in Human Materialist analyses I will employ this definition in the following analysis of Sioux custom and law.

According to a Human Materialist position no law would be found in the above sneeze example. There is neither the presence of significant economic concerns nor the

presence of socio-economic elites to dictate the nature and degree of sanctions. The sanctions are informal and unfixed and they tend to take the form of mere social mores or custom.

Another example of custom, from the Canadian Dakota Sioux, pertains to the inheritance of property. A number of somewhat arbitrary methods of inheritance existed in Canadian Dakota society. If the deceased were a member of a certain tribal social organization then their property, upon death, would most likely be divided up among the other members of the organization (Wallis 1947:45). If the deceased were not a member of such a social organization then their property would be divided among other persons in the tribe of the same age and sex as the deceased. There was no preference shown to relatives (1947:45). On some occasions the survivors would gamble for the property of the deceased (1947:45). In all these cases there is no associated sanction. Further, what might be the most common result would not necessarily be the actual result in a particular situation, implying some flexibility in the rules. Clearly, there is no elite member of society promoting any political, economic, or social policy desirable for the control of the behavior of members of the society. This example, pertaining to inheritance, does not possess any of the qualities of law necessary for our working definition.

Customary law differs from formal law in that it is, by its very name, driven by accepted custom. All societies have morals, mores and customs by which all members must behave. This of course includes all modern western nations like the United States. However, the United States also has a highly formalized legal system with legal codes, formal legal procedures, and rules of evidence. In a less complex society such formality

is generally unnecessary. It is a common saying that "the United States is not a nation of people but a nation of laws." If this is true then the Sioux were still a nation of people. But though they lacked the highly developed formal legal system of the United States, they still present an interesting case study because they did indeed have a few legal structures. Evolutionarily speaking, the Sioux fall somewhere between societies completely governed by custom and those governed by modern legal systems.

What is law then? What makes a behavior a law rather than just another accepted custom? When a person breaks a custom or moral precept the punishments or sanctions are informal, irregular, and unfixed. For example, one may decide to whistle in the middle of a church service. This is certainly unacceptable behavior but what will be the likely outcome as to the violator? It is easy to imagine. Immediately after the whistle is heard everyone in church will turn, scowl, or shake their heads at the offender. Some people will whisper to their neighbor about the violator's lack of appropriate behavior or their ignorance of custom. If the whistler continues, someone, perhaps a deacon, will come and ask the person to stop whistling or to leave the service. Regardless of the outcome, there will be no fine or imprisonment unless, of course, a fight breaks out. The sanctions are informal and do not require the use of courts, procedures or judges. The community of churchgoers will take care of the problem themselves. Before proceeding, the reader should note that the examples that follow should be understood in the historical and cultural context of the 19th century Sioux.

In most situations the Sioux would handle violations of conduct by similarly informal means. For example, to the Sioux gossip was thought to be improper behavior and yet they engaged in it regularly. There is certainly nothing unusual about this, as

gossip seems to be a cultural universal. In Sioux culture gossip was inextricably linked with the important virtue of truthfulness. An individual was to always tell the truth; no matter what. But in small communities where everyone knows everyone else how could someone lie and get away with it in the first place? The fact is no one can or at least it would be very difficult. Thus, the Sioux gossiped freely but did so while always speaking the truth. Thus, gossip served a valuable social purpose because it helped reinforce the importance of group values and virtues. Further, gossip acted as a check against deviation from acceptable conduct. When people are aware that their deviations of normal behavior are going to be talked about they are less likely to deviate (Hassrick 1964:40). On occasion however, more than informal law or custom was required. For example, violations surrounding the communal buffalo hunt were considered serious would bring into play these formal structures.

Sioux Formal Law and the Canadian Dakota

Remaining in the region close to the Great Lakes the Canadian Dakota were an eastern branch of the Sioux. Adultery by women was a severely sanctioned violation among these people. Anthropologist Wilson Wallis (1947:3) recounts examples in the *Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History*. First, the punishment for marital infidelity might be to cut off the tip of woman's nose. Or, a woman might even be shot for infidelity or have her entire nose cut off (1947:3). Wallis (1947:3) reports that "in the old days, when warlike virtues were at a premium, men turned their thoughts to other things than women, and breaches of the marital bond, or unchastity on the part of the unmarried, were very rare. If men broke the marital bond the sanctions were less severe but culturally significant. A man could either be

prevented from joining or thrown out of their police societies or other positions of honor (Hassrick 1964:48).

Thus, although a not frequent occurrence, infidelity by a woman was a more serious offense. Analyzed using the Human Materialist definition, a law can be seen emerging here. First, the sanctions for adultery are severe. Second, they are less serious for men. This reflects the fact that men as a group, were generally more socially and economically powerful. It was men who occupied significant roles of political and economic power and men whose policies were deemed sufficiently important to enforce. In point of fact, this meets our definition of law fairly closely. There were important issues of social relations at stake here. Issues like marriage, kinship, propagation and maintaining the ideological underpinnings of the social order were involved. I would conclude that rules and sanctions for adultery by women were based in law as opposed to custom.

The Plains Sioux

Murder was considered a very serious offense. However, it was considered a crime against the individual, and it was the family of the victim who was responsible for atonement rather than the society as a whole. The punishment for murder was death but would be carried out as blood vengeance by some member of the offended family. Further, the death penalty was not a given. The victim's family could accept some other arrangement or ignore the offense altogether (Hassrick 1964:46). This would again appear to be transitional cultural form falling somewhere between pure custom and formal law as defined by Human Materialism.

In this case there are potentially serious sanctions, but punishment, though potentially severe, are neither absolute nor consistently administered. Cases involving

murder appear to be resolved according to the given circumstances and the families involved. No particular social or economic elite acts to enforce a standard of sanction in murder cases. Further, sanctions if given at all are at the whim of the offended family. Many offended families with little if any socio-economic power still possessed the power to exact vengeance. It was not a given that a murderer would be punished at all. Sometimes the killer would have a powerful reputation that would keep the victims family from exacting revenge. Additionally, a murderer could purge himself by taking a purifying sweat bath. Then an intermediary like a chief or shaman would intercede to make peace with the victim's family (Hassrick 1964:48-50). In any case I conclude that there is no formal legal structure at work concerning murder.

Theft was also considered a serious offense. However, theft offenses were quite rare. The rules against theft were so completely ingrained that the need for enforcement almost never occurred. If a person was caught stealing and they possessed no legitimate excuse for having committed the act the punishment could be a serious beating by the Akicita (police society) or even banishment (1964:47). Police societies were social institutions responsible for organizing Buffalo hunts and keeping order in the group when needed. In theft cases the tribe's formal policing powers were brought into play. The police societies were specially selected men who had shown particular skill in warfare or in buffalo hunts. These men were powerful political elites given the task of enforcing matters of economic and political importance. I conclude therefore, that the offense of theft does meet our working definition of law.

Wife stealing presents a special case. This offense was obviously committed only by men and was not the functional equivalent of female adultery. Women were

considered property but to take another man's wife could also be considered as counting coups rather than merely theft. Counting coups was a great honor for a warrior. It was a means to prove his bravery in battle. Counting coups occurred in battle when a warrior was able, through gallantry, to get close enough to his enemy to strike him. Still, if a man breached the marital bond and stole another man's wife the sanctions could be serious. At the very least, a man would be thrown out of his police society and censored by tribal elders. Further, the theft could be avenged by the woman's husband or brothers (1964:48). Here, as in cases of murder, there is a lack of any social or economic elite providing firm direction as to the proper punishment given. Individual members decided for themselves what actions to take if any. This was the case for the famous Sioux warrior, Crazy Horse. Crazy Horse had attained tremendous fame by his dramatic victories over the U. S. Army. Because of his battle prowess, Crazy Horse was chosen as a "shirt wearer", a very high honor. Shirt wearers were given considerable responsibilities and their word was taken very seriously. But Crazy Horse fell in love with another warrior's wife and took her. The other warrior avenged his loss by shooting Crazy horse in the face. Crazy Horse recovered from his wound but his status as shirt wearer was taken away. Given the highly respected status of Crazy Horse it can be seen how serious this offense and sanction were. Still, although the offended warriors actions were acceptable by the group it was an individual action not an action involving an elite person possessing political or economic power and therefore, not a formal law.

Akicita: The Sioux Police

Although not uncommon among other Plains tribes the Sioux had a legal institution analogous to a civil police force. These were called *Akicita* societies. In Sioux culture there were two basic types of fraternal societies: civil societies and the *Akicita*. The civil

societies were comprised of elders and former chiefs, while *the Akicita*, or policing societies, were open to all able young men (1964:16 n). The meaning of *Akicita* is rather complex. Translated into English it means, “those who see that there is general order in Camp when traveling from one place to another; those who attend to the duties of overseeing the buffalo hunt” (Wissler 1912:4). Warriors from different men's clubs would be selected each hunting season to provide the manpower for the *Akicita* whose responsibility it would be to police the communal hunts and major camp movements. Although they could be called upon for police duties at other times it was these two situations that made up the vast majority of their duties. Young Sioux men could be asked to become *Akicita* as early as age sixteen. As a rule they had to have been on at least one war party, even if only in a minor role. If they had been to war and had already killed an enemy it would have been even better for the young man's qualifications (Hassrick 1964:17 n). If a man were a poor hunter or warrior he would not be asked to join the *Akicita* (1964:17 n).

The importance of the communal hunt cannot be over emphasized. The very survival of the tribe depended upon its success. If any band or individual went out ahead or scared the buffalo away they would be jeopardizing the survival of the entire population. Thus, the *Akicita* were given the job of maintaining order during the hunt and punishing those that violated that order. The justification for their powers was survival itself. Anthropologist Clark Wissler (1912:9) wrote a detailed account of these societies and how they functioned. Wissler reports that Oglala Chief High Bear said that “if anyone goes out alone and scares up buffalo, charges them, and brings meat home, the braves go to him, strike him senseless and cut up his tipi cover and the poles.”

Further, Chief High Bear indicated that the *Akicita* would also kill someone who committed a murder during the hunt (1912:9). Interestingly, the *Akicita* were also asked to kill anyone who went out among the white people. This occurred during the period of early contact with whites on the Plains. The Sioux believed that the smell of coffee and bacon would scare away the buffalo and ruin the hunt (1912:9).

Utilizing Human Materialist analysis we can explain the nature of law as it relates to the *Akicita* institution. The communal hunts were the single most important cultural activity engaged in by the Sioux. Tribal survival hinged upon the successful hunt. The relative severity of sanctions can be seen in the offenses dealing with the communal hunt. The *Akicita* were given extraordinary powers during times of active duty and were able to punish violators at the point of the infraction. The *Akicita* were the police or marshals of the Sioux nation (1912:10). Except for the "on the spot" powers to punish, this is a surprisingly close analogy to modern civil police.

The *Akicita* as a group and as individuals held positions of considerable political power and possessed both considerable and consistent enforcement powers within the Sioux tribes. There is also here an interesting analogy to subject matter jurisdiction. In modern law courts are empowered for specific locations and types of actions. The type of action, whether civil or criminal is the subject matter a given court may hear cases on. Although the *Akicita*'s powers could be called upon at any time the *Akicita*'s jurisdiction was limited primarily to the hunt and tribal movements. Matters arising with regards to the communal hunt were their subject matter. Important economic factors and social values were at stake during the buffalo hunts. The *Akicita* institution therefore, passes muster as both law and legal institution by Human Materialist analysis.

The *Akicita* were also an important faction within the Sioux sociocultural system. Using my own terminology I classify the *Akicita* as a bridging faction. The *Akicita* possessed powers that bridged the divide between the tribal leaders and the people as a whole. Interestingly, the members of the *Akicita* could, depending on tribal needs, step into and then out of the social infrastructure. Although they could be called upon at any time the hunt was their primary domain, when not needed, they acted as members of the general population of the tribal group.

In summary, Sioux legal and extralegal traditions present an interesting mix of custom and fully formed law. Human Materialism provides an analytical framework for identifying the differences between custom and law and provides its own definition of law. Certain violations of conduct, like gossip, are custom because they lack consistent enforcement and consistent sanctions by the persons in positions of political power. Other violations fall in between custom and law. An example is wife stealing which may have severe consequences or none. There is a lack of consistency to sanction, and punishment falls to the offended husband without any involvement of politically powerful persons. However, there are violations that do qualify as law. For example, violations of the hunt, arguably the most serious violations of the Sioux cultural order clearly qualify. The importance of the hunt was such that the Sioux created police societies, or *Akicita*, to enforce violations on the spot. Members of these societies were selected by and became themselves persons of political power possessing the power to immediately punish violators at the point of the infraction. Table 4-1, on page 91, summarizes the relevant factors of this case study while following the organizational structure of the Human Materialist universal model of sociocultural systems.

4-1 Component Summary of the Sioux Law Case Study

Component or Subcomponent	Summary of Relevant Factors in each Component and Subcomponent of the Human Materialist Model in the Sioux Law Case Study
Material Infrastructure	The environmental conditions of the Great Plains, the Buffalo as the most important subsistence resource were the most important environmental factors. The technologies of the Sioux including the horse were also important material infrastructure factors that permitted the equestrian, nomadic, hunter–gatherer mode of production.
Human Infrastructure	The complete psychobiological make up of the Sioux people including their resilience to the difficult environmental conditions of life in the Great Plains.
Social Infrastructure	Key leaders including the Akicita police societies and their positions of political and economic power directed and maintained order in the tribal groups especially during the all important buffalo hunts. These persons directed essential cultural activities and transactions in the social structure below.
Social Structure	All forms of social organization reside here. However, this would exclude leaders as individuals and, as in this case, the Akicita police societies that would reside in the social infrastructure above. The social organizational aspects of Sioux law and custom reside here in the social structure. Of note in this case, were the Akicita police societies who formed an important bridging faction particularly during the periods in which they operate.
Superstructure	The complete ideological systems of the Sioux people reside here. The ideological aspects of the social norms, social customs, and laws of the Sioux people are affected upon the other system components from here. The Sioux ideological system is a front-loaded system.

CHAPTER 5 THE SEARCH FOR A THEORY OF TERRORISM

Introduction

My interest in terrorism dates back more than 40 years. It began in 1968 when a group of Palestinians, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, skyjacked El Al Flight 426 (*Time Magazine* 1968). For some reason I was intrigued. Until then I had no clue what terrorism was and even afterwards I had only the faintest idea. Still, listening to the story on the evening news I was curious as to why anyone would commit such an act. Especially given the ferocious efficiency recently displayed by the Israeli military. In this case the skyjackers seized the aircraft shortly after its departure in Rome and forced the crew to fly to Algiers. The Algerian authorities later released the 10-crew members and 38 passengers and no one was hurt. I can't explain exactly why but my interest was piqued by the incident and I began "collecting" skyjackings as I learned about them in the news. For example, in November of 1968 Pan American Flight 281 was skyjacked and became the first U.S. airliner taken to Cuba. Interestingly, a suspect in this case, Luis Armando Peña Soltren, was arrested more than 40 years after the crime (CNN 2009). Again no one was killed but it would not stay that way for long. Then, on March 17, 1970 Eastern Airlines Shuttle Flight 1320 was skyjacked while traveling from Newark to Boston. In a letter to the editor, J.P. Tristani (2009), a retired Eastern Airline pilot, recently retold this story in the March 30, 2009 edition of the *Boston Globe* and it bears repeating here.

"Captain Robert Wilbur Jr., 35, a former Air Force pilot who had only been promoted to captain six months prior, was shot in his arm by the suicidal hijacker. And yet with a .38 slug in his arm and bleeding profusely, he flew his aircraft safely to a landing while talking to the tower, telling them his copilot was shot (but not himself) and needed an ambulance. His copilot, First Officer James Hartley, 31, was mortally shot without warning by John

J. Divivo and he collapsed. Divivo then turned the gun on the captain, wounding him when suddenly Hartley arose, ripped the gun from Divivo's hand, and shot him three times before (*Hartley*) relapsing into unconsciousness. Although wounded and slumped between the seats, Divivo arose and began clawing at Captain Wilbur, attempting to force a crash. That's why Wilbur hit him over the head with the gun he had retrieved from where it had fallen on the center console." [Italics added]

It was this skyjacking that turned the page for me as what had seemed an almost nonsensical act designed to gain attention had now turned violent. Interestingly, Divivo was not a political terrorist. According to an online article by Adrian Walker (2009) of the *Boston Globe*, Divivo had no destination for the skyjacking and told the pilots to "fly overseas until they ran out of fuel." Also according to the same online article by Walker (2009), Divivo was arrested after plane landed and was later indicted. However, he committed suicide in his cell before standing trial. It seems ironic to me now that the incident that most fueled my early interest in terrorism was not committed by a terrorist at all but by an apparently suicidal man with no political agenda of any kind. But I did not know all of this at the time.

This chapter will recount the personal trajectory of my thinking on the subject of terrorism. Thus it is partly an intellectual journey beginning with my early days in law enforcement and ending with my current status as an anthropologist. This journey takes place over more than 35 years and is divided in to four phases or periods: my early law enforcement period, my undergraduate period, my first attempts at theory making, and my current period. During my first phase I merely filed my material according to a simple classification system based on what type of terrorist organization I was dealing with. After retiring and moving on to the university I began an intensive anthropological literature review and began applying analogues to terrorist organizations with concepts I had derived from the literature review. During my third phase I actually attempted to

construct a theory to explain the causes of ethno-nationalist terrorist movements using a set of material variables influenced by Cultural Materialism. Finally, in my current phase I analyze my research utilizing the anthropological research strategy Human Materialism. The reader should note here that in each phase I am describing how I conceived of terrorism at that time. I will be taking the reader on a journey through each phase ultimately leading to a Human Materialist conception of terrorism. Therefore, in phases one through three no Human Materialist references will be made. First however, I need to explain my usage of the words terrorism and terrorist.

Both of these terms can stir up emotion and controversy. For example, who decides who a terrorist is? Is it not true that one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter? These are valid concerns but the words terrorism and terrorist are the words most commonly used by the media and in political discourse so I will stay with those terms here. Readers can decide for themselves what they think about these words and choose whether to use them or to replace them with terms more to their liking.

Phase One: Early Law Enforcement Period

Ironically, though I had previously had absolutely no interest in law enforcement, I became a Deputy Sheriff in 1973. Although only three years after the Eastern Airline's Shuttle skyjacking my decision was not influenced by it. It should be noted at the outset, that my law enforcement career did not place me on the front lines of some mythical war against skyjackers. In fact, it was some four or five years before I began to have access to criminal intelligence bulletins disseminated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). These bulletins covered a wide range of criminal activities and only few pertained directly to terrorists and terrorist organizations. On my own I began to collect copies of

the bulletins that pertained to terrorism and filed them away for later reference. Initially, I kept the copies in my locker but as the amount of material grew I co-opted a file drawer and placed them there. By the time I retired more than 15 years later, the material had grown to an archive of bankers' boxes and a file drawer of the most current material. No longer just FBI bulletins, I had collected newspaper articles, magazine articles, books, military manuals, terrorist manifestos, as well as video documentaries and news programs. In any event, the problem of terrorism throughout the world remained and I found that I understood the phenomenon no better than I had a decade before. However, it was during this period that I began to make an earnest effort to study and understand the phenomenon most commonly referred to as terrorism.

I have learned that in order to begin understanding something the research must be organized in some meaningful way. Thus, my earliest attempts at getting inside the topic of international terrorism were to simply classify all the material I had collected and file it away. For example, I placed European leftist groups, like the German Red Army Faction and the Italian Red Brigade, in the same classification. Likewise I placed the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in the same classification as the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka and the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Basque Spain. This system was very simple and it was generally effective but was emblematic of my thinking this period. I also realized then that I had never settled on a definition of terrorism, the topic I had spent so much time reading about. What I did not realize was exactly how difficult it would be to settle upon a working definition. Up until this point I simply took an, "I'll know it when I see it" stance. Still, I slowly came to understand that it's difficult to properly study something if you cannot define what it is. To say that there

are a lot of definitions of terrorism could be gross understatement. However, I did not actually begin the process of finding a definition until I had moved on to the university and that is the next step in my journey.

Phase Two: Definitions, Literature Review and Early Applications

I had recently retired from law enforcement and was pursuing a bachelors' degree in anthropology. I soon learned that the process of defining something involves an attempt to describe one term by the use of other terms. As simple as this may seem, I had never considered it before. For example, Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (2009:327) defines the word definition itself as "a statement of the meaning of a word or word group" or the "act or process of defining". In terrorism research I found an almost innumerable amount of published definitions but few attempts at selecting a single unified definition. I confined my efforts, at that time, in selecting a definition by a single criterion. The "terrorism" I was interested in was what I called "resistance terrorism." Hazarding an early definition I believed resistance terrorism to be a form of active, violent political resistance to existing state or extra-state powers. That is, the terrorist employs high profile violence in the act of resisting the perceived dominant order. However, I found that a number of existing definitions of terrorism included state terrorism (oppressive regimes), state sponsored terrorism, and all other sub-types of terrorism as part of a single "macro" phenomenon. I did not agree with that approach. I believed that although all of these sub-types result in the terrorizing of human beings each was a qualitatively different phenomenon.

Dozens of definitions have been written to describe the term terrorism. The definitions I found could be roughly classified into two categories: academic and government definitions. Academic definitions are written by university professors,

university researchers, or members of some private think tanks. Government definitions are written by or for the use of governments and government agencies. The latter may be written by politicians, bureaucrats, military personnel or people commissioned by them to report on the topic. I thought that the remarkable number of definitions had to indicate something. A closer look revealed that it is actually indicative of several things. For example, researchers who choose to write a definition but also choose to ignore the existing ones and to write their own. Alternatively, government agencies compete with one another for position in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Budget dollars are at stake after all. Each agency therefore, wants to sell its information and definition to congress, or to the president, or to the state department, or to whatever other entity that might be interested. Success in selling such information today might make the difference in funding tomorrow. I do not mean to imply that the work is not serious or that the people involved are not well intentioned for the most part, but, like it or not, this is the reality of government. Most importantly, the number of definitions is primarily indicative of a lack of consensus among the experts. In their book, *Political Terrorism*, Schmid, et al (1988), highlight this fact by reviewing the debate over the attempt to agree on a single definition of terrorism. This book is a sourcebook with an enormous amount of material in it. I rely upon this book a great deal in the following pages of this dissertation and commend it to anyone interested in this field. I will now provide an overview of the debate concerning a unified definition of terrorism and present a few of the definitions collected in the sourcebook. I find the process employed by Schmid, et al both illuminating and informative.

Schmid, et al (1988:1) explains the process they undertook in their search for a unified definition. First, they created and disseminated a questionnaire to a significant number of researchers and experts in the field of terrorism research and theory. In the questionnaire they present their own definition and asked each respondent to comment on what they thought about the definition and how they would go about improving it. The following is their definition as presented on the questionnaire,

“Terrorism is a method of combat in which random or symbolic victims serve as an instrumental *target of violence*. These instrumental victims share group or class characteristics which form the basis for their selection for victimization. Through previous use of violence or the credible threat of violence other members of that group or class are put in a *state of chronic fear (terror)*. This group or class, whose members' sense of security is purposefully undermined, is the *target of terror*. The victimization of the target of violence is considered extra normal by most observers from the witnessing audience on the basis of its atrocity, the time (e.g., peacetime) or place (not a battlefield) of victimization, or the disregard for the rules of combat accepted in conventional warfare. The norm violation creates an attentive audience beyond the target of terror; sectors of this audience might in turn form the main object of manipulation. The purpose of this indirect method of combat is either to immobilize the target of terror in order to produce disorientation and/or compliance, or to mobilize secondary *targets of demands* (e.g., a government) or *targets of attention* (e.g., public opinion) to changes of attitude or behavior favoring the short or long term interests of the users of this method of combat.” [1988:1-2]

I found this definition pervasive but much too long to use as a general working definition. Schmid, et al (1988:4) indicates that the length of the definition was problematic to some of the respondents to their questionnaire. Schmid, et al (1988:4) responded to this criticism by stating that though "a simple definition is unquestionably preferable to a wordy one, yet the price of parsimony should not be a substitute for lack of precision." I agree that there is a need for precision but I would also argue that parsimony should not obfuscate the precision and render it irrelevant. If possible, parsimony and precision should be mutually supportive.

So what about alternatives? I mentioned at the outset that the number of definitions is very high. How are these definitions structured? Do they possess any commonalities? Schmid, et al (1988:5-6) report that the terms "violence and force" are found most often at 83.5%. These terms are followed by the word "political," which appears 65% of the time. Political is followed words "fear or terror," coming in at 51%. In all Schmid, et al (1988:5-6) lists 22 terms, by declining frequency, beginning with a high of 83.5% then down to the least used term at 4% (1988:5-6). The term least used in their study was "demands made on third parties" (1988:6). These frequencies were calculated using a collection 109 different definitions. Below is a sampling of some of the definitions to provide a sense of scope and commonalities. The definitions are divided into the two categories mentioned above: academic and government definitions.

Academic Definitions

Schmid's (1988:1-2) original definition presented above is an academic definition. The next definition, also composed by Schmid, et al (1988:28), is the result of their modifying the original definition after analyzing the input received from their questionnaire.

"Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby--in contrast to assassination--the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audiences(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought."

This new definition is shorter and more accessible. It comes closer to the goal of parsimony with precision. However, this definition makes an exception to the inclusion of political assassination, an exception that I do not agree with. The assumption is that assassination is somehow qualitatively different than other forms of terrorism because it is a direct assault upon the state. Political assassination may be chosen for the exact same reasons as any another form of terrorism and may have the exact the same effects on the population as other acts of terrorism. Therefore, it is not qualitatively different in this respect and should not be excluded from the definition.

Margaret O. Hyde and Elizabeth H. Forsyth (1987:7) define terrorism quite dramatically as a "disease of modern society, a condition of life, a science, an art, an unsurpassed weapon of psychological warfare, the ugliest word in the English language, undeclared warfare, and the antithesis of democracy and the democratic spirit." The same authors refer to another somewhat dramatic definition used by the Rand Corporation that

"terrorism is violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm. It is often directed against innocent targets, and the acts are intended to produce effects beyond the immediate physical damage they cause. It is an act of the weak against the strong". [1987:7]

In their collection of definitions Schmid, et al (1988:35) also quote Martha Crenshaw who defines terrorism as

"the systematic use of unorthodox violence by small conspiratorial groups with the purpose of manipulating political attitudes rather than physically defeating an enemy. The intent of terrorist violence is psychological and symbolic, not material. Terrorism is premeditated and purposeful violence, employed in a struggle for political power."

Schmid, et al (1988:34) cites Alvin H. Buckalew's definition of terrorism "as violent, criminal behavior designed primarily to generate fear in the community, or in a

substantial segment of the community, for political purposes." Buckalew incidentally was a military intelligence office turned academic and is now affiliated with the American Public University. Here now is a sampling of government definitions.

Government Definitions

In his essay "Defining Terrorism", Benjamin Netanyahu (1986:9) wrote, "I am prepared, at the risk of belaboring the point, to offer a formal definition, "terrorism is the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends." Schmid, et al (1988:32) provide a 1977 definition composed the United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs stating that,

"terrorism includes any other...unlawful act which results in the death, bodily harm, or forcible deprivation of liberty to any person, or in the violent destruction of property, or an attempt or credible threat to commit any such act, if the act, threat, or attempt is committed or takes effect (A) outside the territory of a state of which the alleged offender is a national; or (B) outside the territory of the state against which the act is directed; or (C) within the territory of the state against which the act is directed and the alleged offender knows or has reason to know that a person against whom the act is directed is not a national of that state; or (D) within the territory of any state when found to have been supported by a foreign state irrespective of the nationality of the alleged offender: provided, that the act of international terrorism is (i) intended to damage or threaten the interests of or obtain concessions from a state or an international organization; and (ii) not committed in the course of military and paramilitary operations directed essentially against military targets of a state or an organized armed group."

Other countries have also provided definitions. As provided by Schmid, et al (1988:33-34), in 1985 Germany provided the following definition.

"Terrorism is the enduringly conducted struggle for political goals, which are intended to be achieved by means of assaults on the life and property of other persons, especially by means of severe crimes as detailed in article 129a, section 1 of the penal law book (above all: murder, homicide, extortionist kidnapping, arson, setting off a blast by explosives) or by some means of other acts of violence, which serve as preparation of such criminal acts."

Returning to the United States, a number of other agencies have provided their own definitions. For example, in 1984 the U.S. Department of Justice defined terrorism as

“violent criminal conduct apparently intended: (1) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (2) to influence the conduct of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (3) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping.” [Schmid, et al 1988:33]

At around the same time the U.S. Department of Defense defined terrorism as “the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a revolutionary organization against individuals or property with the intention of coercing or intimidating governments or societies, often for political or ideological purposes” (1988:33).

The Department of Defense later changed its mind and in 1986 proposed a new definition. The new definition stated that "terrorism is the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives" (1988:33). The new definition is basically a slightly shortened version of the old one.

A review of these definitions shows two things: the variety of contributors and the lack of consensus as to a single definition of choice by all. A closer look yields some additional observations. For example, most government definitions contain a direct reference to illegality. The term criminal behavior as well as the words unlawful or illegal makes the government’s position quite clear. The government is fully legal while terrorists, vis-à-vis the government, are not. This is understandable given a government’s compelling interest in providing security and in maintaining order. Academic contributors are less likely to use terms indicating criminality and tend to be more "value neutral." In the samples above only Buckalew’s definition uses the word

criminal. However, Buckalew was a military intelligence officer who later became an academic. This may explain his position.

Before moving beyond the definitional debate, I will present one more definition that caught my attention. This definition does not define terrorism but instead describes a terrorist. The definition does not pertain to a specific individual but describes a terrorist in the general terms. This description of a terrorist was written by author Gayle Rivers (1986:2-3), who was a soldier and is now a counter terrorism expert. I find this description particularly illuminating because it reflects Rivers' years in the trenches.

"A terrorist is a male or female person, adolescent or adult, who willfully embarks on missions to kill or maim persons usually unknown to him...the terrorist capitalizes most on outrages in which people are killed at random in a department store they happen to be in when a bomb goes off or in an airport when a check-in or baggage area is sprayed with machine-gun fire or hand grenades."

This passage captures the very personal nature of terrorism and shows that it is everyday people who are both perpetrator and victim. The terrorist acts in the furtherance of a cause they believe to be righteous. The counter-terrorist acts to stop the terrorist in furtherance of their righteous cause.

The real difference between academic and government definitions is fairly clear and merely reflects the differing goals of each. States and their governments are self legitimizing phenomenon that create and maintain their legality through the machinery of power. As a result, any entity that resists the machinery of the self legitimating state will and threatens the equilibrium of power will quickly marked for elimination.

Terrorism is a cultural phenomenon that cannot be brushed aside as merely deviant social behavior. Terrorism, like conventional warfare, is ultimately about human beings engaging in violent conflict with other human beings. Conventional warfare

enjoys varying degrees of social acceptance depending upon the social or historical context. World War II largely remains a socially and historically acceptable war. It is, after all, difficult to reject a war that put an end to aggression and genocide. By contrast the War in Viet Nam remains a largely unacceptable war. Except for violence and death, the U.S. involvement in Viet Nam lacked all the qualities of its involvement in World War II. Viet Nam was fought primarily on the ideological grounds of the Cold War. At the time of this writing, 2010, the war in Afghanistan is thought to be the justifiable war while the war in Iraq is thought to be unjustifiable. Whereas, the United States is escalating its involvement in Afghanistan, it is looking to get out of Iraq. In any case, where conventional warfare does enjoy some contextual acceptance, terrorism never does. Ironically, because of the contextual basis both terrorist groups and states will agree that terrorism is not appropriate. Terrorist groups and states will not agree that their own actions are wrong because to them they are involved in just actions. Therefore, terrorist groups and states will decry terror while committing it. Each side in the struggle may use similar rhetoric but only the state has the law on its side.

Having studied the definitional process I believed it was time to define terrorism for my own research. I either needed to accept one of the existing definitions or create one myself. I did neither, but rather I described Resistance terrorism diagnostically in the context of how I was going to proceed. Perhaps I thought that through the magic of pure induction a definition would suddenly become clear. Needless to say this not happen but the question I asked myself was, what terms or characteristics do I think are important in my research of resistance terrorism? The following is a list of the key characteristics of resistance terrorism as I saw them at the time.

Resistance terrorism is a cultural phenomenon and is subject to the same evolutionary forces that act upon society in general. These forces include socio-political circumscription and the principle of competitive exclusion. Resistance terrorism groups adopt and maintain some form of strategic identity based primarily upon their socio-political positions concerning their ethnic, ideological, economic, or religious beliefs or upon combination of the these elements.

Resistance terrorism is a form of violence, aggression and warfare although fought by other than conventional means. Further, resistance terrorism is revolutionary, in that, terrorists whether thought of as revolutionaries or not are seeking to change or replace the dominant social order. At the heart of political resistance is a perceived need and desire to change something in the existing order. Terrorism is one of the means utilized by human beings to affect the change they desire. The definition would have to wait as I was about to discover many new ideas and concepts.

The study of anthropology was steadily filling my head with new ideas, categories, and concepts. I felt empowered because I had found new ways to think about an old topic and could now move away from the simple categorical thinking of my law enforcement days. From this new arsenal of ideas I began to make comparisons and derive analogues from the anthropological literature and to apply them to the study of terrorism. What follows is a description of these theoretical analogues and how I applied them.

The theoretical approach I began taking at this time was founded in cultural evolutionary theory. I saw terrorist groups, though insular and isolated from, as being analogous to societies themselves. I saw these groups as self defining subsets that

came into being, developed and then functioned and competed for resources and survival in ways similar to that of the societies they had emerged from. Terrorist groups stake out and strive to maintain identities and goals, that differ from the identity and goals of the sociocultural system from which they emerged. They compete for the political resources necessary for their survival and claim legitimacy based in opposition to the societies they wish to subvert. Generally, beginning small, they may if all factors fall in to place evolve into more sophisticated and complex social groups or perhaps evolve into states themselves. The successful groups will progressively change and adapt to their evolving circumstances. The process of adaptation may lead a terrorist group through differing stages of increasing organizational complexity in much the same way societies are thought to have progressed. By this I did not mean to infer that they must follow a precise set of stages in a linear progression but rather, that if they evolve they will at some point resemble a more complex socio-political structure. Anthropology provided a convenient set of socio-political structures and I applied them to terrorist organizations. These categories are band, tribe, chiefdom and state.

In this section I will briefly explain the meaning of the terms band, tribe, chiefdom, and state and illustrate how I applied them to corresponding terrorist organizations. In cultural evolutionary theory societies are believed to evolve from smaller to larger, increasing in not only population but in degree of social complexity. It is to degree that these four terms apply. Using a continuum or scale these classifications proceed from bands, to tribes, to chiefdom and then to the state. This explanation is an oversimplification but for my needs, it was sufficient.

Band, Tribe, Chiefdom, and State and Other Evolutionary Concepts

Bands are the smallest unit on the scale and are thought to be the earliest political structure to have developed in human social evolution. Bands tend to be nomadic and are politically autonomous. Leadership in a band is informal and egalitarian. The sizes of bands vary from micro bands having about eight people to the largest bands having about 500 people. The average size is between 25 and 50 peoples (Ember 1988:376). I compared the smallest terrorist organizations analogously with the social organization of bands. For example, the German Red Army Faction (RAF) began and remained small in size, was mobile and rudimentarily organized. This same level of organization I applied to the Italian Red Brigade and the other European Leftist terror organizations. f organization nearly caused group extinction and forced reorganization.

The next level of social organization and complexity is the tribe. Tribes, though larger, are primarily set apart from bands by the existence of pan tribal associations. Such associations may be age sets, warrior societies, or other integrating associations (1988:378). William Haviland (1991:532) defines a tribe as "a group of bands occupying a specific region, which speak a common language, share a common culture, and are integrated by some unifying factor". Leadership still tends to be less centralized than more complex forms of social structure.

Anthropologist Morton Fried (1975:100) disputed the validity the term tribe and stated that it was a secondary phenomenon created by the state. He wrote "as I have indicated previously, tribalism can be seen as a reaction to the presence of one or more complex political structures, which is to say states, in its direct or indirect environment" (1975:101). Fried further explained that as states come into existence they encompass the territories of many different people. Some people will become citizens while others

would become slaves. However, some group would resist "and in the struggle find new organization as tribes: secondary tribes"(1975:101). To Fried the tribe was purely a secondary phenomenon arising because of the state rather than merely before the state. Fried (1975:101) believed the process "may parallel the development of political parties or manifest itself in bloc politics". In essence, it was Fried's contention that people living in, what we call tribes did not look at themselves that way at all. The term tribe, therefore, was an extra cultural category that lacked internal meaning. In spite of Fried's hesitancy to adopt the term tribe as a primary phenomenon, the secondary nature of terrorist organizations makes it ideal for application.

I adopted Fried's usage and applied it to terrorist group organization. It would apply during the early growth phase of a given terrorist organization. Once again the RAF serves as an example. According to an online Hartford Web Publishing (1997) article on two separate occasions in the 1970's German authorities were able to locate and arrest several members of the RAF. Virtually wiping out the group leadership had a devastating effect. Additionally, a number of members were killed or committed suicide, damaging the group even further. This forced group reorganization and after 1977 the RAF divided itself into a number of band size units or cells, placing one in each major German city. By analogue, the RAF after reorganization resembled a tribe comprised of several semi-autonomous bands linked together ideologically to the larger organization. This resembles rather closely the tribe as a secondary phenomenon as proposed by Fried.

The next political structure on the scale is that of the chiefdom. Haviland (1991:536) defines the chiefdom as "a ranked society in which every member has a

position in the hierarchy". Chiefdoms are led by strong personal leaders who sit on top of a hierarchy. By example two historical chiefdoms are the Hawaii Islands culture under Kamehameha and the Zulu under Shaka, both from the late 18th and early 19th century. In these cases the leaders raised armies and demanded tribute illustrating the degree to which centralization existed in their systems.

By analogue a terrorist organization at this level would be the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) under Yasir Arafat. Here a single leader sits atop the organizational structure, has maintained that status for many years and possess powers similar to those of the leader of a state. However the organization does not possess its own territory and has been in continuous conflict with Israel for decades. The PLO and by extension the whole of the Palestinian authorities are currently closer to statehood than at most anytime in their history. This is cultural evolution on the evening news. It may not occur but the opportunity to observe the process is invaluable.

The highest level of complexity is the state. There is less argument over the definition of the state than there is over either tribe or chiefdom. Robert Carneiro (1987:1) defines the state as "an autonomous political unit, encompassing many communities within its territory, and having a centralized government with the power to draft men for war or work, levy and collect taxes, and decree and enforce laws." Carneiro (1987:2) explains that if a society has these attributes then it is a state and if it does not have these attributes then it is not a state. I believed that the state's possession of coercive to be the most important aspect of the state political structure.

As I continued to be exposed to new concepts my theoretical thinking took another turn. Whereas the categories, band, tribe, chiefdom and state, were mere extensions of

my earliest categorical thinking and applied only to organizational size and sophistication. I now looked to apply additional concepts I had gleaned from evolutionary theory. As I became aware of them, I was impressed by the possibilities of three ideas in particular. These ideas were circumscription theory, the principle of competitive exclusion, and the principle of resource concentration.

Circumscription theory

Carneiro proposes circumscription theory as a means of explaining the evolutionary rise of the state. In short, circumscription theory is a coercive or conflict theory proposes that states that the original states arose in geographic regions that were environmentally circumscribed by natural barriers, such as mountains or oceans. As a result of this circumscription, and at a point when population has increased enough to use up the available arable land, conflicts begin to occur between competing villages that leads to the subjugation of the loser by the winner. The winners could then demand tribute and enslave the defeated villagers who would be swallowed up by the victors. As the process continued the winners continued to grow ever larger. Greater social complexity was needed by the larger political units in order to control and manage their growing populations and greater resources. Given sufficient circumscription pressure and time a state would eventually emerge. It is theorized that states arose in places like Mesopotamia, Egypt, early China, the Indus Valley, the mountains Peru, and Mesoamerica by this process. It is my hypothesis that the process extends to secondary phenomena such as terrorism.

The operation of circumscription theory was extended by anthropologist Napoleon Chagnon (1968). Chagnon observed that the villages nearest the center of the Yanomamö territory in the Amazon tended to be larger and more warlike. Chagnon

theorized that this was due to the process of social circumscription. The villages in the center of the territory are closer together than those at the periphery and tend "to impinge on one another more" (Carneiro 1970:5). The resulting villages are larger and possess stronger headmen or leaders.

I believed that it was social circumscription that applied to secondary phenomena like terrorism. I then extended the concept of social circumscription to what I called political circumscription. In environmental circumscription natural barriers are the circumscribing variable. In social circumscription it is the close proximity of other competing groups all impinging on the groups at the center. However, in political circumscription it is the state and all its machinery of power that circumscribes and impinges on secondary phenomena like terrorist groups. In environmental and social circumscription the circumscribing variables are very tangible. With political circumscribing presence of the state, though real, is less tangible.

A state circumscribes by laws, taxes, military conscription and the ability to force compliance with its will. The state also circumscribes by its bureaucracy and the inability of most people to efficiently access it and find redress for their grievances. In some cases, secondary political phenomena begin to act upon their circumstances by resisting and when the resistance becomes calculated and violent we may have witnessed the birth of a terrorist organization.

The principle of competitive exclusion

Carneiro (1978) borrowed an idea from biology called the principle of competitive exclusion. Simply stated it refers to the condition found when two organisms are competing in the same environmental niche then only one will survive to the exclusion of the other. Carneiro (1978:208) writes that "two species occupying and exploiting the

same portion of the habitat cannot coexist indefinitely. Sooner or later one of them will eliminate the other". Carneiro (1978:208-209) further elaborates that in biology the application is between different species while in human societies the application is between members of the same species.

"But merely because the principle is ordinarily stated in terms of inter-specific competition does not mean that it does not also apply to competing groups of the same species...in fact biologists agree that the stiffest competition of all occurs between individuals of the same species".

What this meant to me was that in addition to the theory of circumscription there was at least one other force at work. As the arable land was settled by increasing populations there was more intense competition for it. Under conditions of increasing competition there occurred increased warfare. However, with all the land in use and combined with natural barriers and other human groups preventing easy escape, the loser of a particular conflict was conquered. Without an escape route a village could not simply pick up and move. Therefore, where two or more villages are competing for the same land and resources one will succeed to the exclusion of the other. This could mean that the excluded group will be completely wiped out or enslaved or perhaps they acquiesce and simply merge.

Resource concentration

Circumscription and competitive exclusion were not the last of the evolutionary ideas to catch my eye. I also sought to apply the concept of resource concentration to my analysis of terrorist organizations. Carneiro (1970:4) observed that chiefdoms had been found along the banks of the Amazon. Dating back to the early explorers, larger and more complex settlements were reported along the river banks than in land. Along the river banks there is a type of land called *varzea* which, due to annual floods, is

highly fertile and needs no fallow periods. *Varzea* is highly prized and the populations along these riverine areas were higher in density. Carneiro (1970:4) asked "with unbroken stretches of arable land extending back for hundreds of miles, why were there chiefdoms here"? The answer lies with *varzea* land itself. The high soil fertility plus the bounty of the river itself provided a marked concentration of resources (1970:4). The high concentration of resources "amounted almost to a kind of circumscription" (1970:4). Carneiro (1970:4-5) further explained that

"while there was no sharp cleavage between productive and unproductive land, as there was in Peru, there was at least a steep ecological gradient. So much more rewarding was the Amazon River than adjacent areas, and so desirable did it become as a habitat, that peoples were drawn to it from surrounding regions."

It was a combination of resource concentration and social circumscription that acted to increase populations and warfare along the river. The natural result was larger more complex populations that eventually reached the chiefdom level.

Resource concentration before the advent of agriculture led to increased populations along the river. With the advent of agriculture and the utilization of the inexhaustible soils, came social circumscription. Although brought on by resource concentration it is social circumscription that increased conflict and led to the development of greater social complexity among the riverine cultures.

Applying this to terrorism, I saw resource concentration as the concentration of political power and wealth in the state. The state holds the larger percentage of political power and tremendous amounts of wealth and these reserves are not readily available to its citizens. In the case of terrorism it is the combination of resource concentration and political circumscription that leads to analogous results. These evolutionary forces

provide a potent source of pressure on competing social groups, some of which resort to terrorist violence.

After studying and applying the above evolutionary concepts I realized that I needed to review another significant area of the theoretical literature, namely the existing theories attempting to explain terrorism. Up until this point I had derived all of the new concepts from the anthropological literature. However there was a considerable body of literature available from other fields that would prove valuable. The following is a brief review of the pertinent ideas.

Aggression theory and revolution theory

Aggression theory is one of the more widely studied behavioral phenomena. It is of interest in the study of both animals and humans. Aggression applies to the study of all types of human violence; warfare, criminal, and domestic. Aggression and violence may be studied psychologically, bio-genetically, anthropologically, and socially and has application to the study of terrorism.

Among the more popular and widely read works in the area of terrorism and violence is Ted Gurr's *Why Men Rebel* (1970). Gurr proposes that relative deprivation is the underlying cause of political violence. Gurr specifically addresses resistance violence. Gurr's approach was influenced by Freudian psychoanalysis and John Dollard's frustration and aggression. According to Schmid, et al (1988:63), Dollard and his colleagues held

"that aggression was always the result of frustration. More specifically the proposition is that the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression"

In effect Gurr simply replaced frustration aggression with his concept of relative deprivation (1988:63). According to Morales (1973:5) Gurr "argues that revolution is best understood within the context of a general theory of civil violence." Further Morales (1973:5) wrote that "the independent variable in the theory, which stimulates frustration or is itself a specific manifestation of frustration, is the concept of relative deprivation."

Gurr (1970:13) defines relative deprivation

"as a perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightly entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining and maintaining given the social means available to them. Societal conditions that increase the average level or intensity of expectations without increasing capabilities increase the intensity of discontent."

Gurr and Dollard both seem to place a heavy reliance on the presumption that either frustration or relative deprivation will result in some form of aggressive behavior. This has been shown to be untrue in by psychological studies and ethnographic studies from around the globe. Gurr (1970:34) reports that other responses besides aggression result in frustration. For example, regression rather than aggression can be the result with children. Gurr (1970:34) also cites Whiting's 1944 studies of New Guinea tribesmen in which four response patterns were identified: "submission, dependence, avoidance, and aggression." Gurr (1970:34) considered the non-aggressive responses as a confirmation of his theory rather than a refutation. He explains that aggression as a response will not occur unless it can be directed at the source of frustration itself and further, that an "angered person is not likely to strike out at any object in his environment, but only at the targets he thinks are responsible."

In the study of aggression theory I have been most influenced by Gurr's concept of relative deprivation. However, the concept does beg the answer to a few key questions. For example, whose definition of deprivation matters? Is relative deprivation an objective or subjective concept? Is relative deprivation a collective or individual phenomenon? As to whose definition to apply I would argue that both the insider and the outsider perspectives should be sought. At the end of the day the terrorist may be claiming a level of deprivation that does not seem to meet with the empirical evidence and yet they still commit violent acts. The terrorist's perspective is thus important to understand. At the same time attempting to determine the actual or empirical level of deprivation may assist in finding some type of solution to the problem. A government may based upon this knowledge decide to allow the disenfranchised group a greater level of autonomy and control of their own destinies. I'm not saying that this is the answer but it could be one possible answer. As to whether relative deprivation is objective or subjective again the answer is both. The objective or subjective nature of relative deprivation is the underlying component of the question above concerning whose definition is valid. The terrorist adopts their own subjective definition while a counter-terrorism researcher should apply objective methods in the attempt to understand what it is the terrorist actually wants. Finally, regarding the collective or individual nature of the concept it is again both. In trying to understand the individual terrorist's mind the individual conception is most appropriate. Few terrorists work alone however and because they organize in groups and act in groups the collective concept will be appropriate most often. That is, what does this group really want? What do they

seek to accomplish? Therefore, discovering what it is that the terrorist group wants, however irrational it may seem, should be learned and understood.

Terrorism is commonly thought of as revolutionary behavior being expressed violently. Terrorism as a revolutionary form may be expressed by those actions undertaken to achieve the perceived need to change society. Prior to 1917 Lenin was considered a revolutionary and terrorist by the Tsarist government. Lenin, the revolutionary, led a successful rebellion and overthrew the Tsarist government of Russia. In the late 1950's Fidel Castro accomplished the same thing in Cuba. Both of these events are referred to as revolutions. In both cases a need for change was perceived, resistance groups were organized, plans were executed and successful regime change was the result. In both cases the leaders and their followings had been, prior to their success, considered terrorists and enemies of the state. Finally, in both of cases the terrorists became the state. Were they revolutionaries or terrorists? The answer is both, depending upon perspective.

Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language (1987:513) defines the words revolution as the "overthrow of a government, social system, etc." New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (1984:822-823) defines the same word as "a sudden and violent change of the government or the political constitution of a country, usu. by internal instigation." Although the word may apply to numerous non-political contexts it is the political context that is pertinent here. Neither of these definitions is particularly helpful and we therefore must look elsewhere for some assistance in understanding what is meant by the word revolution in its political context.

According to Waltraud Q. Morales (1973:2), political scientist Chalmers Johnson defined revolution as either total or simple revolution. "Total revolution aims at supplanting the entire structure of values and at recasting the entire division of labor" while "simple revolution involves only the regime; that is, it is concerned with 'the fundamental rules of the political game in a society: democracy, dictatorship, monarchy and so on'".

The connection between terrorism as strategy and action and revolution as a set of political goals and precepts is a close one. Clearly, depending on context, a revolutionary through his or her actions may be a terrorist and a terrorist through his or her political foundation and goals may be a revolutionary. Both categories are overlapping and the edges may not always be clear. As I became aware of this it occurred to me that terrorism could, with some justification, be defined as warfare, albeit irregular warfare. This realization led me to review literature on warfare theory looking for possible applications.

Warfare theory

As the largest and most complex political structure, the state enjoys a position that allows it to declare any resistance to it illegal. Likewise, if that resistance turns violent the state may call those responsible terrorists. The state confronted by what it calls terrorism will recognize that threat as anything but legitimate warfare. That said, the state will certainly declare war against any such resistance. Who is right? Is terrorism warfare or not? Again, the answer is both depending upon the context. The terrorist and the state will identify a particular conflict in opposing terms. The fact that unarmed civilians are so often the target of terrorist violence is one of the primary arguments against terrorism being legitimate warfare. I believed this last argument to be valid but I

needed to know if the literature contained any guidance on this point. This was my motivation for taking a look at the theory of warfare.

Anthropologist Keith Otterbein (1985:3) writes that "warfare is a vital activity performed for a political community by its military organization." Further, Otterbein (1985:3) defines a political community as "a group of people whose membership is defined in terms of occupancy of a common territory and who have an official with the special function of announcing group decisions". Otterbein (1985:3) additionally defined warfare as "armed combat between political communities." When warfare is between culturally similar political communities it is called internal warfare and when is between culturally different political communities it is called external warfare. Finally, when a political community has more than one military organization and they are at war, the result is civil war (1985:3).

Otterbein focuses on the degree of political centralization as manifesting the level of complexity in the social evolutionary sense. Otterbein believes that the best prepared and most efficient military organizations will succeed most often. Further, this military success will carry with it greater survival chances for the political community in the future. Stated slightly differently, the military organization that uses the greatest number of efficient practices will defeat the military organization that uses fewer efficient practices.

Though secondary phenomenon, terrorist organizations are discreet political communities unto themselves and function as independently as they are able to within the political circumscription of the state. Part of the function, if not the central function, of terrorist groups is military in nature in opposition to the state. In this way it resembles

internal or civil war. Terrorist organizations may also export their warfare to cultural units other than their own and in this way resembles external war. Understanding this, I began to draw comparisons from known terrorist organizations.

The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) provides an example of an ethnically and religiously identified terrorist organization. The PIRA is also an identifiable political community and as such is engaged in warfare with Great Britain. If Great Britain is defined as a non-Irish external colonial power then the state of warfare can be considered external. If we define Northern Ireland as part of Great Britain then the state of warfare can be considered internal. Additionally, when we consider the PIRA's hostile position against the Protestant loyalist within Northern Ireland then this too resembles an internal or civil state of warfare. I found, confusingly, that all of Otterbein's (1985) separate conditions of warfare could be found in this one case. Further, if the PIRA can be defined as political community then warfare can be thought of as a necessary activity to that community. These points of analysis suggested to me that terrorism could, with well-reasoned support, be thought of as warfare. This represented another personal turning point; a turning point that simply sent me back to square one. I still did not have a definition but I did have several new concepts that provided me with a deeper foundation. I now had to figure out how to use the new information I had. I would like to be able to say that I put together a unified theory that explained terrorism while utilizing all the concepts I had learned. I did not, and in fact what I did put forward was both hopelessly eclectic and rather arbitrary. It was not a theory but rather a set of analyses and comparisons that reflected my ongoing attempt to define the field of study and my lack of theoretical depth. But this begs the question: how did I analyze a historical case

at that time in my career? What follows should give the reader some idea of where my thinking was by the end of this period.

In order to illustrate how I applied these evolutionary principles in the analysis of a particular case I will provide a brief example. The case involves the rise of the modern State of Israel.

The rise of modern Israel

Beginning with the edict of Ferdinand and Isabella in 1492 the Jews began their forced expulsion from the Iberian Peninsula. The resulting Diaspora led Jews to migrate into a number of other lands including Europe. Some 400 years later the Zionist movement began with the central goal of finding the Jews a national homeland. Although not the only location considered, Palestine, the Jews ancestral homeland, was the final choice (Marcus 2007:54).

After their initial arrival in Palestine new groups of Jews enjoyed amicable relations between themselves and their Arab neighbors. In this early period relations between the Jews and the ruling Ottoman Empire were also generally amicable. However, as the Jewish populations increased, tensions with their Arab neighbors also increased and conflict became inevitable. Howard Sachar (1989:19) writes that "between 1882 and 1903, fully 25,000 Jews entered Palestine". As a result of the increasing conflict with the Arabs the Jewish settlements formed self defense organizations for protection. It is these self defense organizations that eventually become terrorist organizations.

During World War I the Arabs allied themselves with the British and revolted against the Turks. The Jewish immigrants also fought with the British during the First World War. After the war the British had replaced the Ottomans as the governing power and accepted, in principle, a Jewish national homeland as part of the Balfour

Declaration (Marcus 2007:156). The Arabs were allowed to form the Trans-Jordan Emirate as a national territory for independent Arab peoples. In the early days of this arrangement there was not much trouble between the Arabs of Trans-Jordan and the Jews but as immigration continued to increase conflicts returned. In 1919 the Arabs engaged in terrorist attacks to remove the Jewish presence, prevent the formation of a Jewish state, and attain Arab independence. The Jewish defense force Haganah was created in 1920 as a response to this violence. Between 1920 and the beginning of World War II there would be considerable reciprocal violence between the two populations (Alexander 1976:218-229). Both Jews and Arabs would participate in terrorist violence, performing raids all over the country.

In 1933 the Arabs extended their terrorist activities and began attacking the British. Seeking an independent Arab state they believed this to be necessary step. This outbreak of terrorist violence would lead to the Arab revolt of 1936 through 1939. The Arab Mufti of Jerusalem, El-Husseini, realized that "terrorism must become a new kind of warfare in the form of organized and efficient bands of fighters replacing mob outbursts" (Alexander 1976:224).

The escalation of violence would continue up to the beginning of WW II. The Haganah responded and began organizing at a greater pace. The Haganah trained troops, imposed self taxation and developed an arms industry. They also began practicing, in earnest, the art of diplomacy, negotiating continually with the British and the Arabs (1976:226-229). At the outset of WW II the British trained the Haganah's "commando" units for resistance activities in the event that Palestine became occupied by enemy troops (1976:228).

In 1937 the Haganah splintered and a small, more radical group was formed, the Irgun Zvai Leumi or Etzel. Etzel would engage in much more terrorist violence than the Haganah. David Ben-Gurion, leader of the Haganah stated that, "Until now, we have acted according to the spirit of the law. From now on some of our activities will be directed against the law and with an aim of making that law powerless" (1976:228). The law referred to here was that of the British. The Jews had come to the same realization the Arabs had earlier: attack the British and force change.

At the beginning of WWII the Etzel called off all operations and remained inactive until 1942. As a result a third and still more radical group was formed. Lehi or the Stern Gang, as they were called, was by far the most violent terrorist group to emerge from the Jewish resistance. The Stern Gang even attempted to ally themselves with the axis powers against the British. Although this attempt failed it is indicative of how radical this group really was (Alexander 1976:229). In 1941 the Palestinian Arabs did ally themselves with the axis powers. This move, in light of the axis defeat, certainly served to speed up the statehood process for Israel.

Throughout the war the Stern Gang would continue to terrorize, even taking their activities outside Palestine. On November 6, 1944 they assassinated Lord Moyne, of Great Britain, in Cairo, Egypt. According to Alexander (1976:231) "the Haganah, not wanting to lose its respectability in relation to the mandate authorities, undertook some strong action against Jewish terrorist groups, including the surrender to the British police of a number of Etzel and Lehi members." After the war the violence would continue. The Jewish resistance was now more determined than ever to end British rule and achieve independence. On July 22, 1946 members of the Etzel, would commit

arguably their biggest atrocity, they bombed the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. On this day

"a group of armed Etzel members entered the kitchen of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. The saboteurs deposited heavy milk cans, packed with gelignite, in the hotels lower quarters. Time fuses were set and the men departed." [Sachar 1989:267]

After the bombs exploded 91 British, Arab, and Israeli people were dead with another 45 persons injured (Alexander 1976:235).

In 1948 the British would leave Palestine, succumbing to the high financial and political costs. On May 14, 1948 the United Nations voted to accept Israeli statehood. Thus ending the first phase of the struggle, that against the British. After World War II the three terrorist groups; Haganah, Etzel, and Lehi agreed to set aside their differences and concentrate on the formation of the new government.

Analysis

My primary focus on this case during this phase was evolutionary. The Haganah, Etzel, and Lehi were the terrorist organizations under consideration and their evolutionary path led them to eventually unite in statehood. The first group to emerge, the Haganah, was organized to provide security for the Jewish settlements. The Haganah and the other groups were politically circumscribed by first the Ottoman government and later the British government. Throughout the entire period they were socially circumscribed by the competing Arab population. As the Jewish population increased the number of conflicts increased. The Haganah was forced to adapt and evolve becoming more efficient in their employment of their military skills.

Dissatisfaction with policy led to a group split with a more radicalized group, the Etzel forming. Though Haganah and Etzel had differing positions regarding the use of

violence they did not have debilitating conflicts with each other. At the outset of World War II the Etzel called off operations. This caused a third group to emerge, Lehi or the Stern Gang. Increasingly, the violence was directed at the British in order to force Great Britain to withdraw from Palestine. The British did eventually depart Palestine and Israel emerged as the new Jewish homeland in 1948. The British were outcompeted and thus competitively excluded for the political power and control of Palestine. All three groups set aside their differences to form a new government in 1948.

I did not continue to use the categories band, tribe, chiefdom, or state. These categories were descriptive but had no value beyond referring to group size and relative complexity. Size and complexity can be handled without the use of those particular categories. I did recognize some potential value in relative deprivation and in warfare theory but did not make use of them during this time period. Though not presenting a unified theory I had managed to add a layer of descriptive analysis to my understanding of terrorism. After entering graduate school I then began the next phase of the journey.

Phase Three: Theory Making and Cultural Materialism

During my years with him, anthropologist Marvin Harris pushed me to do research focusing on the law enforcement field. Since I had been a deputy sheriff he thought I should play to my strength. However, after retiring from law enforcement I wanted nothing more to do with it. As a compromise he agreed that I would attempt to build a theory explaining terrorism or some well defined area of it. I was still at that time a cultural materialist so it was a given that I would stress material causation. In this section I will review the results of that effort. I did not deal with all forms of terrorism but confined my theory to one particular area, that of long term, ethno-nationalistic terrorist movements. I attempted to answer the following questions. Under what conditions will a

long term, ethno-nationalist terrorist movements arise? Can these movements be differentiated from nationalist movements that do not become violent or resort to terrorist acts?

Resistance terrorism is the term I use to describe any form of terrorist behavior that acts violently toward a state or states that it is opposed. However, in this section I will narrow the focus to those terrorist movements that are ethno-nationalist and that are engaged in long term conflicts with their target states. Such terrorist regimes as those in the Basque region of Spain, or in Sri Lanka were the type of movements I focused on. However, before proceeding with case studies, here are the basic propositions.

The Basic Propositions

After years of studying terrorism I noticed a basic pattern in the conditions that seemed to exist in cases fitting the long term, ethno-nationalist category. It was my theory therefore, that a violent ethno-nationalist movement would likely arise in cases where all four of the following conditions is met. First, in all such cases the ethno-nationalist group in question must have a well defined and clearly perceived geographic homeland. Second, in all such cases the ethno-nationalist group in question seeks and increased level of autonomous self rule or independence. Third, in all such cases the ethno-nationalist group in question believes that they have been the victims of some type of invasion, whether military, political, or other, by an outside state. Fourth, in all such cases the ethno-nationalist group in question feels compelled to act violently in their competition for the resources or opportunities that they believe to be rightfully theirs.

These four propositions formed the basic theoretical structure upon which I attempted to build my first theory of terrorism. I will present two case studies that

illustrate how I applied this structure. The first case concerns the Basque Separatists of Spain; the second case concerns the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka.

The Basque Separatists

The Basque people occupy the mountainous region of Northern Spain and Southern France. Approximately 20,600 square kilometers of land comprise the Basque homeland. Only 3,000 square kilometers are on the French side of the border thus, 85% of the Basque region is in Spain. The Basque people speak *Euskera*, a distinct and non-Indo-European language. Their language is their most distinguishing cultural trait. Considerable friction with Spain has, over the years, been caused by the Spanish government's attempts to control the use and teaching of the Basque language. For millennia this region remained isolated, but beginning in the 10th century A.D. various regional kingdoms began laying claim to the area. Despite these claims the various kingdoms allowed the Basque people to remain essentially autonomous. However, the relationship of Spain to the Basque people changed after the discovery of the New World. Spain now needed ports from which to carry out New World exploration and commerce; the Basque had such ports. The result was the creation of a class of Basque merchants who now had motivation to ally themselves with Spain (Clark 1984:8-14).

The conflict between liberal centralists who supported a strong central government and traditional conservative regionalists, who did not, began in 1812. This conflict would not end until the Spanish Constitution was enacted in 1978. In the 19th century two wars, called the *Carlist Wars*, were fought by these factions. As a result of the *Carlist Wars*, the Basque lost the majority of their autonomy and the region fell under complete Spanish domination. In the 20th century the Spanish Civil War led to the 40 year dictatorship of Francisco Franco (Clark 1984:14).

The Basque region is the richest in Spain. From the ports in Vizcaya to the modern nuclear power plants, weapons production plants, and banking assets, the Basque region has provided strong commercial reasons for conflict. Spain needed these resources and the Basque people know it. For example, after the second *Carlist War* the Basque lost control of iron exportation. Prior to the war these exports had been prohibited. After the war Spain granted an export license to Great Britain. Spain also dramatically increased taxes to the Basque Provinces after the war. The makings of the struggle were born (1984:15-17).

In 1959 the *Euskadi ta Askatasuna*, or ETA, was formed. Their first terrorist act was attempted this same year when they tried to derail a train. The ETA began organizing and participating in labor strikes and they formulated their philosophy of direct action. In 1965 the ETA would commit their first armed action by robbing a bank courier. ETA violence continued to escalate. In 1968 they committed their first bank robberies (1984:290-91). Spain consistently reacted with mass arrests, deportations and even killings. The violence still continued.

After Franco's death in 1975 the movement for political amnesty began. The struggle for amnesty led to greater conflict and violence. In 1976 ETA assassinated the president of the *Guipozcoa* provincial assembly. In 1977 the first post Franco parliament was elected and a more rapid movement toward democracy began. The new Spanish constitution becomes effective in 1978 but most Basque voters abstain because the issue of autonomy is not sufficiently addressed. The Basque proposed an autonomy statute and ETA began a renewed offensive. In 1979 the autonomy statute is approved and the Basque elect their parliament in 1980. Although the violence would continue for

a time it would eventually begin to decrease as the Basque became more secure in their relationship within the Spanish constitution (1984:292-93).

Analysis

Within the framework of the proposed model, does the Basque case meet the requirements of all four conditions?

First, do the Basque have a clearly identifiable homeland? Yes, the Basque people have occupied this same region since before written history. The Basque region in the Pyrenees is highly distinct and identifiable.

Second, did the Basque nationalists desire greater autonomy or independence? Yes, this was the very reason for the struggle. When autonomy was lost after the second *Carlist War* the battle lines were drawn. The Spanish constitution of 1978 and the Basque autonomy statute of 1979 have however, provided a greater degree of autonomy within the constitutional one–state framework.

Third, was there some type of military, political or commercial invasion of the Basque region by an outside state? Yes, primarily by Spain as occupiers but also by the French and the British in a commercial sense. Here the invasion appears quite clear in every respect; it was military, political, and commercial.

Finally, did the Basque nationalists feel compelled to openly compete for resources that they believed to be their own? Yes, the Basque clearly understood and understand the value of their region to outside powers. The loss of autonomy and control of these resources was the first step toward the modern struggle.

In summation, the Basque case tends to support the basic theory that the cause of long term, ethno-nationalist violence centers around the factors enumerated and the

need for greater self rule. In the next case I applied the same framework to the Tamil ethno-nationalist movement in Sri Lanka.

The Case of the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka

The Island of Sri Lanka, formerly Ceylon, is less than twenty-six miles off the southeast tip of India. Sri Lanka is approximately 61,610 square kilometers in area and is divided into coastal lowlands with a central highland region. The Tamil people occupy the northern end of the island and the eastern coast. The remainder of the island including the highlands is occupied by the Sinhalese. Both of these peoples trace their cultural heritage to India but the separation from India allowed both to develop distinct identities. Chelvadurai Manogaran (1987:1) writes that

“the physical separation of the island from the subcontinent fostered the development of a Sri Lankan society with its own historical and cultural traditions. Each of these communities developed its own sense of group identity, differentiated from the other on the basis of ethnic origin, ancestral territory, language, religion, and cultural attributes.”

The Tamil are dark skinned people of Dravidian extraction from Southern India and are practitioners of the Hindu religion. The Tamil language is of the Dravidian linguistic family. The Sinhalese, on the other hand, are a light skinned people originating in northern India. Most are Buddhists. The Sinhalese language is of Indo European origin (1987:2).

Both groups claim that they arrived on the island first. History however, would seem to favor the Tamil claim as there is evidence of a long Tamil presence on the Island. The Tamil also established an independent kingdom in the north part of the island prior to European contact (1987:3). The root of the modern conflict seems to begin under British rule in the 19th century. Initially, the British Governor exercised complete control with assistance from an advisory council. This council was made up of

Ceylonese elites possessing British education. The three members were nominated communally with one Eurasian burgher, one Tamil, and one Sinhalese (1987:8). By 1924 the size and arrangement of the council had changed but communal representation remained intact. However, in 1931 the new constitution provided for the holding of at-large, territory wide elections. Soon the Sinhalese had obtained a majority. With independence in 1948 the Sinhalese majority strengthened its position and the first targets of discrimination were the Tamil. The Tamil were denied citizenship in Ceylon and within a few years the government had selected Sinhala as the official language (1987:11).

In 1972 a new constitution was enacted. This constitution reaffirmed Sinhala as the official language and refused to grant recognition to Tamil as an official minority language. Further, Buddhism was installed as the state religion (1987:13). In response to these Sinhalese moves the Tamil dissolved all existing parties and formed a single party, the Tamil United Liberation Front. Many young Tamil became impatient with the peaceful political process and began taking up arms. By 1976 the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, an underground movement, was formed and the violence began (1987:13-14). The escalation of reciprocal violence continued and efforts at providing the Tamil with meaningful autonomy seem to be the best hope of curbing the violence and settling the conflict. In 2009, extensive military efforts by the Sinhalese government have led to the defeat of the Tamil insurgency. According to Amal Jayasinghe of the Sydney Morning Herald in May 2009, "Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers were facing total elimination, with the island's president declaring them 'defeated' and defense officials predicting a 'mass suicide' of the rebel leadership." Whether or not the movement is

dead or not is not yet known and it may be some years before we know if the movement can regain momentum.

Analysis

Does the case of the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka meet the criteria of the model?

The response is again in the affirmative.

First, do the ethno-nationalist Tamil of Sri Lanka have a defined homeland? Yes, not only is the island of Sri Lanka clearly defined but the Tamil provinces within the island are also well defined. Further, history may support the Tamil claim to have been the first to occupy the island.

Second, do the Tamil of Sri Lanka desire and seek some form of greater self governance? Yes, in fact the continued discrimination against the Tamil led them to change from peacefully asking for autonomy to violence (1987:13).

Third, was there some form of military, political, or commercial invasion in Sri Lanka? Yes, here the British, as the final colonial power, controlled the entire island through a governor. Further, it was the British that put into place the political mechanisms that allowed for the creation of a majority versus minority showdown. To the Tamil the Sinhalese are also considered invaders or interlopers both because the Tamil believe the island was theirs first and due to the Sinhalese relationship with the British.

Finally, did the Tamil feel compelled to compete openly for resources or opportunities they believe to be rightfully theirs? Yes, by the actions of the British in establishing the modern Ceylon (Sri Lanka), the Tamil lost the opportunity to govern on equal standing with the Sinhalese. Up until that point they had enjoyed equal representation. The at-large electorate was dominated by the majority population which

then took control of the government. The case study of the Tamil of Sri Lanka does meet the criteria of the proposed theory.

There is one additional issue to be investigated. How does the theory proposed here account for cases in which all four propositions appear to be present and yet no prolonged and intensive conflict exists?

I believe that the level of real autonomy present in the case mitigates in favor of stability rather than conflict. In ethno-nationalist movements such as those involving the Québécois in Canada, the Welsh, or the Native Americans, there seems to be a degree of autonomy sufficient to satisfy the need of self rule. In Québec, French Canadian nationalism has existed for a long time. The question of independence has been brought to a vote and defeated. This occurred as recently as 1995. It appears that even though a significant number of French Canadians desire independence, a narrow majority still do not. Of course the vote includes non-French voters as well. Still, as a whole, French Canadians appear satisfied with their participation in the Canadian national government and with the level of autonomy they enjoy in their province. French nationalists intent to do violence remains a minority.

In Wales the explanation is similar although historically older. Over a very long period of time Wales has become assimilated into the scheme of British government. I do not mean to imply that there is not a nationalist movement there, merely that the level of autonomy is sufficient to mitigate the possibilities of violence emerging. The Welsh have even contributed to the English monarchy. The Tudor monarchs were originally a Welsh family line ascending the throne after Henry VII's victory over Richard III at the Battle of Bosworth. This battle ended the Wars of the Roses and led to

considerable patronage for the Welsh (Jones:47). Vestiges of this can be seen today, as the Crown Prince of England and heir apparent to the throne is always the Prince of Wales.

In the Native American case the story is less tasteful. Military conquest and massive population reduction by disease and genocide left only small pockets of diverse populations spread throughout the United States. These small pockets were then placed onto reservations which made it easier for the United States to manage these people. The reservation Indians were given autonomous nation status and a palpable degree of self governance within the United States constitutional system. There has been some terrorist activity from small Native groups but nothing intense or sustained. I believe that the cultural beating taken by Native American populations beginning with European contact and their eventual assimilation into the United States has been fairly complete and to a significant degree accepted by the Native American populations. At least significant enough to mitigate organized violence.

In all three of these cases an acceptance by the people of the level of self governance in their lives accounts for why these groups do not engage in violent conflict. As long as the four conditions remain and in the absence of unforeseen events, it seems unlikely that such terrorist regimes will develop in these places. I now move on the final phase in the development of my thinking on the subject of terrorism.

In the years immediately following this theory making phase, I began a paradigm shift of my own; I began a wholesale shift to Human Materialism as the reference strategy of choice. This shift leads therefore, to the final phase in my journey.

Phase Four: Human Materialism and the Search for a Theory of Terrorism

As I entered this phase of my journey I began to reassess the complex whole of everything I had learned and thought during the previous three decades. I must confess, as I reflected I was rather embarrassed by most of what I saw. Consequently, I kept all of it to myself. It has only been very recently that I began to reassess my earlier ideas again and realized that I did not need to throw everything away. In fact, I now find much of the ideas and concepts useful. If for no other reason, they are useful because they provided me with much needed background. What I needed to do next then, was to determine what ideas to keep, which ones to discard and then decide how they might operate within the human materialist framework.

First, I discarded the band, tribe, chiefdom, state terminology. Although, easily applicable to primary cultural phenomena, these concepts do not work well with secondary phenomena such as terrorist groups. What I had observed was that terrorist groups like primary human social groups vary in complexity and size. Today, due primarily to the exponential increase in communications technology, even small groups can behave with remarkable sophistication. The Internet makes it possible for hard lessons to be learned by any organization even new ones. Terrorist groups can communicate in near real time and offer ideas, training and assistance to one another. In other words, high level complexity and sophistication can be quickly attained by any group interested in doing so. Therefore, I no longer see a need to categorize terrorist groups by such tightly bounded terms and no longer use them. Other concepts, on the other hand, do have potential value and operate to influence how I think about terrorism.

According to Magnarella (1993:1) the development of Human Materialism was stimulated by a number of influences including both ideas and persons. These stimuli

include for example, the social theory of Karl Marx, the psychological theories of Sigmund Freud and Alfred Adler, the paradigm building of Marvin Harris, and a number of others. I have been similarly stimulated and influenced in my attempts to understand terrorism. From the *Relative Deprivation* of Gurr and the revolution theory of Morales and Johnson, to the evolutionary theory of Carneiro and the warfare theory of Otterbein I have been influenced and pushed further down the road of understanding. Although, I may not refer to or utilize any of these influences directly in a given case they still have assisted me in my quest to understand terrorism as a social phenomenon. I can best illustrate how this process of intellectual stimulation and influence has worked by providing an example. I have yet to set out my definition of terrorism but will do so now in order to illustrate the above process. Further, I will begin by delimiting the phenomenon and define what terrorism is not.

Defining What Terrorism is and What it Is Not

If an individual or a group of individuals seeking some level of revolutionary change in the social, political, or economic balance of a sociocultural system or systems declares war or provides some sufficient notice and turns to planned violence and directs that violence only against the formal aggressive military assets of the sociocultural system or systems, then these acts are warfare and not terrorism. The form of warfare may be irregular or insurgency based but as long as the victims are armed and the violence is reasonably anticipated by the military in question then the actions are warfare.

If an individual or group of individuals seeking change, as above, turns to planned violence and if they direct that violence against unarmed members of the civilian population, even if the civilians are government employees or officials, or if they direct

the violence against legitimate civilian, non-military law enforcement officers, then the actors are terrorists and their actions are terrorism. Similarly planned violent actions against property may also be acts of terror if committed with that intent and if the acts are likely to evoke actual fear or terror.

I have centered my definitions upon the status of the victims. If the victims are unarmed, non-aggressive, or legitimate civilian law enforcement then the act against them is terrorism. How do these definitions reflect my intellectual influences and how does this provide the foundation of a Human Materialist theory of terrorism? However, before moving on there is an additional special case I need to address, that of cyber terror.

Cyber terror is affected by use of electronic means or through the Internet. My problem with including it in a definition of terrorism is determining whether it actually evokes fear or terror or actually kills or injures human victims. That said, I do see possibilities that could lead to all of the above possibilities. If the cyber act led to mass confusion, hysteria, interruption of public utilities or transit systems and so on, then fear, terror, death, and injury could be a direct result. In such cases then clearly the act would be an act of terrorism. Again, I emphasize the victim rather than the perpetrator or the act itself.

Among the influences are Gurr's Relative Deprivation and revolution theory. Relative Deprivation highlights the perceived imbalances between the state and those that oppose it and those potential imbalances are reflected in my definitions. All terrorist groups are seeking change in the social order that they see as broken and are therefore

revolutionary in nature. But, how does this provide the foundation of a Human Materialist theory of terrorism?

Setting out a Basic Theory

Perceived social, political, and economic imbalances are potentially powerful motivators. Add to the mix a rallying ideology and violence can be the result. This is clearly the case with organized terrorism. But there is much more to the equation than perceived imbalances and a revolutionary will. As I have come to conceive terrorism, it is a collision between a state system or systems, as primary sociocultural phenomena and the terrorist organization or organizations as secondary sociocultural phenomena. The terrorist group or groups are secondary phenomena because they arise out of states. All the individual participants came from existing state systems and reject all or some part of their state order. States are directed and controlled by governments and governments are led by persons in key positions of political and economic power. If the disparity, whether perceived or real, between the state and the terrorist group provides sufficient complaints and insufficient redress the terrorist group will act in violent opposition to the state system or systems they oppose. Ideological disparities whether perceived or real, may serve to provide justification to the terrorist group or groups in question. I will now apply this theoretical framework to the case of the Basque ETA from earlier in this chapter.

In my earlier theory I set out four basic propositions or factors to explain the existence of long term ethno-terrorist movements. Those four factors are that there must be a well defined geographical homeland or territory; the revolutionary thrust must be towards a greater level of autonomy or self rule; the terrorist group must perceive themselves as victims of some type of invasion by an outside power; and the group

therefore feels compelled to act violently in an attempt to achieve their goals. These factors are valid but insufficient to fully explain a general theory of terrorism. Further, my earlier theory was directed as ethno nationalist movements and all terrorist groups are not ethno-nationalist groups. A better theory will therefore be broader, more general in application, and succeed in explaining more phenomena.

Territory is an exceedingly powerful infrastructural factor. It is the basis of everything of environmental importance to a sociocultural system. It is easy to see how the very land of a people could be the basis of violence. If that land falls subject to the rule and control of another power, the potential for violence becomes even more likely.

The desire of a people to control their own territory and determine their own is also a very strong sociocultural motivator. It is in the effort to control territory and self determination that leads sociocultural systems to develop cultural institutions to carry out that control. These institutions represent the kinship, political and economic organizational elements of a cultural system and are located in the social structure of that system. Further, in the process of developing these organizational institutions persons in key positions of political and economic power will emerge to execute the mandates of those institutions. It is these persons who, having attained a position in the social infrastructure of their cultural system, will then direct the cultural transactions between the infrastructure and the social structure. Add to this an ideological system and the complete outline of an entire cultural system can be seen. My description here would seem to suggest that these processes are occurring in linear fashion over time. This is not the case and I would posit that all of these processes are occurring

simultaneously in a series of actions, reactions, adjustments, and feedbacks. Human Materialism is not about attempting to place dynamic systems into static boxes.

In the Basque case there is a well defined physical territory covering approximately 20,600 square kilometers of Spain and France. Beginning in the 10th century A.D. outside powers began to impinge upon and lay claim to the region. Initially the Basque remained largely autonomous. However, this changed after the discovery of the new world. Spain in need of ports began using Basque ports. As commerce developed so did a Basque merchant class affiliated with Spain. The fault line was now established. In the 19th century the Carlist Wars eventually led to the Basque region falling under the complete control of Spain. The Basque region is the richest region in all of Spain. The ports are still there but today there is nuclear energy, weapons production, and banking. In other words, there is a great deal to fight over and the Basque separatists believe it is theirs. The Basque ETA terrorist group arose at the end of a long series of late 19th century and 20th century nationalist organizations. In 1949 the ETA, tired of waiting to reclaim their land from Spain, organized to put an end to this domination. Their campaign of violence arose from the above historical predicate.

A Human Materialist theory to explain the Basque case will look something like this. Basque terror arose at the fault line between two cultural systems: Spain and the ethnic Basque. Spain has stood in control of Basque territory for well over 100 years. The richness of the territory naturally made the Spanish unwilling to leave, at least voluntarily. Basque nationalist resistance has been directed at forcing the Spanish out of their territory. The Basque ETA arose out of the Basque and Spanish populations as a secondary cultural phenomenon. The ETA organized themselves as a sort of shadow

state within the Spanish state. Both Spain and the ETA have persons in key positions of economic and political power who direct cultural transactions between their respective social infrastructures and social structures. The collision between the existing Spanish social order and the ETA should be conceived of as the collision between two social infrastructures in opposition, each with their own persons in key positions of political and economic power. Further, each system has its own goals, factions, rules, ideologies, and institutional structures. The rich Basque territory provided ample environmental and economic motivation and 50 years of conflict has resulted. Ideologically, the Basque are driven by a potent nationalism. Unable to call a formal army into the struggle with Spain the ETA engaged in bombing, kidnapping, and assassination, the hallmarks of terrorism. The ETA calls their system Direct Action.

From their creation in 1959 until the 1980's the ETA enjoyed a high level of popular support among Basque adults. According to Assia Alexieva (2006:58), in 1978 nearly half of Basque adults perceived ETA as patriots and only 7% thought of ETA members as criminals. During the periods when Spanish repression was highest virtually every Basque household was open to them (2006:58). During this period the most important faction to the ETA, beyond their own membership, was the Basque population itself. However, ETA violence coupled with the consolidation of Spanish democracy has dramatically reduced that support. By 2006 only 4% considered them to be patriots and nearly 60% totally reject ETA's activities. Further, 70% of Basque adults appear satisfied with their autonomy (2006:58).

A presentation of the theory in more general terms is as follows. Terror can be explained as the collision of two goal driven sociocultural systems. One of the two

colliding systems will be a primary cultural system, generally a state, and the other will have emerged from the former as a secondary cultural phenomenon. Each is an organized cultural system and possesses persons in key positions of political and economic power who direct the modes of cultural transactions between their respective places in the social infrastructure and the institutional arrangements in the social structure. The real struggle is for control of the social infrastructure because it is there that the leadership class directs cultural transactions with the social structure. The secondary cultural system becomes a terrorist organization when they perceive that their goals and desires cannot be sufficiently fulfilled and turn to violence directed at innocent victims. Each of the opposed systems conduct their actions justified by their own ideological principles. State ideology is couched in self preservation and the claim of a legal right to maintain social order. The terrorist group will adopt an oppositional ideology such as Marxism, Jihadism, or Nationalism to justify their actions accordingly.

In certain instances the terrorist group is not in opposition to a single state but to several states. This is the case with radical Islamic groups, like al Qaeda, who have declared war on the entire alignment of western capitalist democracies. This does not operationally affect the theory. A terrorist organization itself, as secondary cultural phenomena, may have members emerging from several states that then form into a single terrorist group. The basic theoretical elements remain as they are; only the complexity of description changes. This theory is not perfect as no theory is but after 40 years of seeking I have found a mental and theoretical framework that functions effectively for the cases I have chosen to study: a theory based upon the principles of Human Materialism.

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation set out to answer the following principal questions: 1) Are sociocultural systems a proper domain for research utilizing a paradigmatic approach or research strategy? 2) If so, does the anthropological research strategy, Human Materialism, provide sufficient analytical power to address the cultural, economic, political, and historical questions raised in the research of sociocultural systems? 3) If yes to the second question, methodologically speaking, might Human Materialism be augmented or extended so as to improve or amplify its facility and power in the analysis of cultural, economic, political, and historical questions arising from the study of sociocultural systems? 4) Finally, if yes to the third question, then what are the concepts that might augment, extend, or improve the facility of Human Materialism in the research of sociocultural systems?

As to the first question regarding the appropriateness of paradigmatic approaches to the study of sociocultural systems, the answer is yes. This has been illustrated by the use of a number of case studies. Each case study represents the study of a sociocultural system and is presented and analyzed in terms of the universal model of sociocultural systems utilized by Human Materialism. Further, the cases presented in this dissertation are taken from anthropology, law, ethnography, and history and show that not only are they the domain of research by application of an anthropological research strategy but that Human Materialism is an effective research strategy for such studies.

As to questions two through four they are best answered together as each question is in turn linked with the one that follows. As an initial matter I answer all three

of these questions in the affirmative. To appropriately summarize this dissertation and to provide a proper set of conclusions the following pages will emphasize the theoretical ideas and concepts rather than merely regurgitate the case studies again. One of the reviewers of this dissertation asked why I chose the cases that appear in the preceding chapters. This was an excellent question and the answer provides a convenient format for presenting my concluding statements. I will briefly explain the reason for inclusion of each case study then use that as a stepping stone in summarizing the case with emphasis on the primary concepts, theoretical ideas, and my own theoretical additions to Human Materialist applications. The cases chosen were not and could not represent every potential type of case that might interest an anthropologist or other researcher.

The Ikhwan case was chosen because of its use by anthropologist Paul Magnarella (1993) in his initial formulation of Human Materialism. This case is instructive in how the principles of Human Materialism operate as applied to an actual case study. For example, the Ikhwan case study illustrates the significance of persons of political and economic power and how those persons direct the unfolding of historical events. This case further illustrates the formation and utilization of factions within historical cases. The potential significance of persons in positions of political power and the positions they hold inside the social infrastructure is fundamental to Human Materialism. Additionally, the analysis of factions as part of the social structure is both fundamental to Human Materialism generally and to my own theoretical and methodological additions as well.

This case study was also chosen as a means of illustrating how my own methodological additions to Human Materialism work to expand Magnarella's original

formulation. My additions center upon the determination and classification of the nature of the factions found in case studies as well as the classification and determination of how ideological factors affect historical outcomes. In the Ikhwan case the key leader was Sa'ud himself. Sa'ud occupied the key position of political and economic power and used his position, in the social infrastructure, to execute his goals in uniting the Arabian Peninsula under his control. Sa'ud accomplished his goals by the direction of essential cultural transactions vis-à-vis organizational elements in the social structure. This demonstrates the important interplay between the infrastructure and social structure of the Human Materialist model. The human teleological or goal driven behavior, as exhibited by Sa'ud, is another fundamental aspect of Human Materialist analyses. In the execution of his plans Sa'ud organized a faction suitable to his need for an army. The Bedouin or Ikhwan became that army. Sa'ud also utilized a religious ideological component to justify acquiescence to his authority and the aggressive actions of his new army. Further, this case study demonstrates how I apply my own theoretical additions to Human Materialism.

Sa'ud organized an important faction, the Ikhwan, gave them religious justification and turned them loose to conquer the Arabian Peninsula. I classify the initial factional arrangement as a bridging faction because it possessed sufficient political and military power to extend Sa'ud's rule over an ever increasing area of Arabia. Later, and to suit his changing goals, Sa'ud pulled the Ikhwan back so they wouldn't attack the holy cities of Medina and Mecca. This pulling back caused the Ikhwan to lose out on their share of plunder. After returning to their families and finding that Sa'ud had not properly subsidized them some of the Ikhwan leaders withdrew from Sa'ud's faction and formed

their own. At this point the new faction of rebelling Ikhwan became a shifting faction having moved from one interest set to another. Sa'ud was however able to defeat the rebelling faction by forming another bridging faction comprised of loyal Ikhwan with members of the sedentary Arab populations. This second bridging faction was sufficiently powerful to overcome and "bridge" the gap between the rebellious faction and Sa'ud.

Sa'ud's religious program as an ideology and part of the superstructure was superimposed over the existing set of ideologies and effectively used by Sa'ud to further his own goals. This type of ideological superimposition I call a back-loaded ideological system. This case is very illustrative of how ideological processes can work to assist in the direction of outcomes in an historical setting. Both the classification and operation of factions and the operation of ideologies are fundamental to my own analyses and fit the existing framework of Human Materialism without conflict.

The next case study involved Nicaragua's suit against the United States in the International court of Justice was chosen because it provides an opportunity to analyze both an historical case and a case in international law. Over the years a number of my non-lawyer colleagues in the social sciences expressed the difficulty they have reading legal cases and legal analysis.

In this case study President Ronald Reagan is the key person in a position of political and economic power. Again, this is fundamental to a Human Materialist analysis. From his position in the social infrastructure he was able to direct, essentially order, important organizational elements of the social structure to support of his goals of anticommunist intervention in Nicaragua. Reagan operated from his own preset

ideological beliefs that were based in Cold War notions of preventing communist aggression and aspects of the Monroe Doctrine that justified American intervention anywhere in the Americas if the United States saw fit to do so. Reagan's principle faction was comprised of members of his own government including military, financial, and intelligence assets. This factional arrangement was both strong and effective in carrying out Reagan's policy goals and weathering the storm of scandal and political fallout.

Regarding my theoretical additions to Human Materialist analysis I come to the following conclusions. I classify Reagan's faction as a bridging faction powerful enough to act with virtual disregard for political debate and initially without congressional knowledge or support. Reagan also enjoyed considerable popular support even in the face of the scandals that occurred during the Nicaraguan intervention. A significant part of Reagan's popular support was based in the same Cold War ideology that Reagan himself espoused. Ideologically, this case represents a preexisting front-loaded system. That is, the Cold War, Monroe Doctrine sensibilities of the United States predated Reagan's use of them for his own purposes.

This case study again demonstrates and further reinforces the interrelated nature of Human Materialism's major components. This is reflected in the relationship between Reagan in the social infrastructure and his direction of important organizational elements in the social structure. The case further demonstrates the use of ideology and the relationship therefore between the superstructure and the other components of the sociocultural system.

This next case study was chosen because it presents an interesting small scale historical case, in terms of both time and population size and because it demonstrates the potential power of a small simple faction in the satisfaction of the goals of a person in a position of political or economic power. Jacob Housman was the key person in a position of political and economic power. Housman, by an almost sheer force of will and ambition created his own ship's salvage empire on Indian Key, Florida in the 1830's. Housman had found himself unable to compete directly with the larger salvage operations in Key West, and not wishing to be their employee he set about creating his own empire and succeeded remarkably well for ten years. From his position in the social infrastructure he directed essential cultural transactions with organizational elements, including his factional relations, inside the social structure of the system. As previously stated this is a hallmark of Human Materialist analysis.

Utilizing my own classificatory system, I see Housman's faction as a simple faction comprised of his salvage crews, his suppliers and the resident's of Indian Key. Though small in number Housman's faction appears to have been loyal and effective in supporting Housman's goals and were themselves the benefactors of remarkable success over the decade that they and Housman were in business. In 1840 Indian Key was raided by Seminole Indians, much of it the island was burned and Housman was ruined. He was never able to rebuild and died in 1841 an employee of the Key West salvage trade.

This case study again demonstrates the importance of the key persons of political and economic power as fundamental process in Human Materialist analysis. This case

study also shows how the formation and stability of a small simple faction can support the goals of the key person or persons in positions of political power.

The next case study was chosen because it relies upon ethnographic data from the anthropological record concerning the customs and formal law of the 19th century Sioux Indians of the Great Plains. This case demonstrates the facility of Human Materialism to be used in the analysis of ethnographic material. This case also demonstrates how a Human Materialist definition of law assists in identifying and understanding the differences between custom and formal law. Magnarella (1998) provides the Human Materialist definition of law as

“a cognitive construct of norms and rules designed by persons in positions of political and economic power to promote certain political, economic, and social policies that they deem desirable by controlling behavior, especially as it pertains to the control, use and allocation of values, such as people’s services, social relations, ideology, symbol, ritual, political power, land wealth and other economic resources.”

This definition emphasizes the design or adoption of rules and norms by persons in positions of political or economic power to promote their own goals or policies. It is through this lens that this case study was undertaken.

If applied to various “offenses” the nature of the particular offense is illuminated. Where untruthful gossip is considered wrong by the Sioux, the sanctions are informal. These informal sanctions bear no imprint of any persons of political or economic power attempting to promote some desired policy goal. Therefore, using the Human Materialist definition of law, gossip is a custom and not a law. However, violations or conduct by anyone during the important communal hunts were considered severe and could be punished at the point of the infraction by members of the *Akicita* or police societies. The

Akicita were themselves persons of political importance and this imprint upon violations of proper hunt conduct do raise to the level of law as opposed to being mere custom.

In terms of my own theoretical additions to Human Materialism I see the *Akicita* police societies as an important factional organization residing in the social infrastructure and possessing considerable powers of enforcement that could be applied to everyone in the group. I classify the *Akicita* as a bridging faction. The *Akicita* could step into the social infrastructure then back in to the social structure depending on whether they were in service or not. The ideological system in the case of the Sioux was a front-loaded system. That is, it existed without the superimposition of any new or external ideological factors.

The final case study concerning terrorism and my life long study of it was chosen due to the timely importance of the subject and in order to propose a new theory of terrorism based in Human Materialist principles. Secondly I wanted to present the story or journey of my interest in the subject and how I have changed my thinking over a period of some 40 years. Many experts arrive on the scene as pundits seemingly fully formed and mature in their thinking. I am neither a pundit nor do I claim expert status and I do not arrive fully formed. That however, is the point. I have struggled to learn what I know and to make sense of it. I propose here the first Human Materialist theory of terrorism.

I define terrorism as an individual or group of individuals seeking change in what they perceive as an imbalance in the social order. If this individual or group turns to planned violence and directs that violence against unarmed members of the civilian population, even if the civilians are government employees or officials, or if they direct

the violence against legitimate civilian, non-military law enforcement officers, then the actors are terrorists and their actions are terrorism. Similarly planned violent actions against property may also be acts of terror if committed with that intent and if the acts are likely to evoke actual fear or terror.

As I have come to see it terrorism it is a conflict between two cultural systems. The first is generally a state or states. States are primary cultural phenomena. The second cultural system emerges out of a state or states as a secondary cultural phenomenon. This is the terrorist group. The terrorist group organizes itself to oppose the state and acts violently against innocent victims. Though the terrorist group seeks to change perceived imbalances in the social order it is violence against the innocent that identifies it as terrorist rather than merely revolutionary. It is the friction point between the two systems that leads to violence.

Both the state and the terrorist group possess a leadership class comprised of key persons in positions of political and economic power. This is a fundamental of Human Materialist analysis. According to the Human Materialist model of sociocultural systems these persons in positions of power reside within the social infrastructure. From there these persons direct certain actions or cultural transactions with organizational structures residing in the social structures of their respective systems. My theory of terrorism stresses the struggle occurring at the point where the social infrastructure and the social structure bear upon one another. It is on the "high ground" of the social infrastructure that power resides and it is from here that change is commanded or rejected. It is from a position in the social infrastructure where the greatest degree human causal influence can be exerted.

The key persons of political power inside the terrorist group understand that in order to affect change they must gain control of or directly influence the key persons of political and economic power in the state systems they are trying to change. It is by seizing control of the key positions of political and economic power or directly influencing important cultural transactions there that may lead to change in the perceived imbalances of the existing social order.

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Burton J. Brown, or BJ as he's known at the University of Florida, is a Florida native and resident of Gainesville, Florida. BJ was born in Dania, Florida and grew up in Titusville, Florida. While BJ was in high school, the Brown family lived in Everett, Washington for two years before they returned to Titusville for BJ's senior year. A year after graduation from high school, BJ went to work for the Brevard County Sheriff's Department where he remained for two decades before retiring as a patrol sergeant in 1993. BJ obtained his Associate of Arts degree from Brevard Community College in Cocoa, Florida in 1991. After retiring, BJ attended the University of Central Florida where he received his Bachelor of Arts degree in anthropology in 1994. BJ then began a combined graduate school and law school program at the University of Florida where he received his Master of Arts degree in anthropology in 1997 and his Juris Doctor degree in 1999. Burton's doctoral committee included professors Buzzy Guillette, Paul J. Magnarella, Lance Gravlee, Pedro Malavet, and Lon Lanza-Kaduce all of the University of Florida and Robert L. Carneiro of the American Museum of Natural History in New York City. BJ is the father of three grown children, Stephanie, Paul, and Valerie and one grandson James all of whom live in the Seattle–Tacoma area of Washington.