To Kendall and Kiefer
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Dissertations have their conventions: the introduction, the bibliographic review, the chapters of dense, tedious, and often turgid text, the conclusions, and the bibliography. It all begins, of course, with the acknowledgements and, unfortunately, this dissertation is no different. I have tried to write an exciting and interesting history (and the history of the Caiapó is exciting and interesting), but I have, in many ways, produced yet another conventional dissertation that shall generate little interest, have few readers, and gather much dust. So I embrace the conventions and begin with the acknowledgements, then move on to the introduction, the bibliographic review, etc. And, so it goes.

Because research is impossible without money, I begin with funding. The Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Florida generously funded my academic career with two summer Foreign Language and Areas Studies Fellowships, two yearlong Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowships, as well as a Tinker Travel Grant in 2002, and a Charles Wagley Research Fellowship in 2003. A Fulbright-Hayes Doctoral Dissertation Research Fellowship made possible a year of archival research in Brazil in 2005. I never imagined that I would be so lucky to earn so many prestigious grants and awards as I have in my graduate career.

Many people inspired and supported my academic career at the University of Florida. There is Michael J. Heckenberger. He took me to work in the Xingú and introduced me to Brazil. Michael E. Moseley inspired me as an undergraduate—his classes on the Andes ultimately led to my graduate studies; much to my parents’ dismay—and he continued to inspire me as a graduate student. It is one of the great pleasures of my life to have known him, conversed with him on so many occasions. Jeffery Needell showed me what the phrase “a scholar and a gentleman” means. His
knowledge, forthrightness, and professionalism served as a guiding light during some truly dark hours in my life. I can only hope someday to be as professional and personable as he. I doubt he will ever really know what one particular phone call meant to me. John Moore, without hesitation, stepped onto my doctoral committee on short notice. Charles Perrone, of the Department of Romance Languages, aided me with some difficult translations of archaic Portuguese. Christian Russell provided me with a place to stay and made me feel at home. Outside of the University of Florida, many special thanks must be offered to Mary Karasch. She kindly read this entire dissertation and offered perceptive criticism and commentary. Her efforts produced a much better study. Stephen Schwartzman told me about collections of Caiapó artifacts and wordlists that exist in Europe.

There are many to whom I owe thanks in Brazil, which has become my second home. I begin with Carlos Fausto. I first met Carlos in the Xingú, and he impressed me immensely with his vast knowledge of Brazilian ethnography (as well as his ability to learn Kuikuru, a language I found difficult and perplexing). He sponsored my 2005 doctoral research in Brazil, for which I thank him. I worked in numerous archives throughout Brazil in my hunt for documents relating to the Southern Caiapó. I must thank all of the archival staffs that tolerated my badgering for documents and copies. In Rio de Janeiro, I especially want to thank the staffs at Arquivo Nacional, the Biblioteca Nacional, Instituto Históirigrafico and Geográfico Brasileiro (a magnificent place to conduct research), and the Arquivo Histórico do Exército. In Goiás, I wish to thank the staff at the Museu das Bandeiras. This was, from an architectural and historical perspective, a most interesting of archive: the building was the old jail, and I have often
wondered if Manoel da Cunha met his end there, perhaps in the very room where I sat scribbling notes. At the Arquivo Histórico Estadual de Goiânia, I would particularly like to thank Maria Carmen Lisita and Sávia Barros Diniz. Carmen and Sávia opened their archive, offered their friendship, and made me feel extremely welcome. My stay in Goiânia was perhaps the most profitable in terms of volume of documents recovered. After Goiânia, I went to Ouro Preto, chasing down references to the Caiapó at the Abelhas River, and the staff at the Casa dos Contos welcomed me but, as they warned me, everything was in Belo Horizonte. Nonetheless, I spent two weeks in Ouro Preto, enjoying the spectacular vermillion sunsets, stunning churches, and, best of all, drinking Mineiro cachaca. Belo Horizonte followed. The staff at the Arquivo Público Mineiro helped me track down references to the Caiapó in their massive holdings. Along the way, I discovered Belo Horizonte is a marvelous city.

Cuiabá gets its own paragraph, as I had my most enjoyable experiences there. Before I left Rio for Cuiabá, numerous people told me how hot the city would be, how lonely I would be, and how tiresome living in the interior would become. It was not so. The people of Cuiabá are known for their hospitality, and the reputation is well deserved. At the Arquivo Público de Mato Grosso, the archive director, Eliane Fernandes, and her colleagues, especially Carlos Gonçalves and Luzinete Correa, embraced my research and aided in finding many interesting documents. I would especially like to thank Vanda da Silva, also of the archive staff, who went out of her way to find a valuable reference in another (then closed) archive. Vanda was, and is, a great friend, whose help was more appreciated than she knows. I also wish to thank Nauk Maria Jesus, an incredible scholar with an encyclopedic knowledge of the history
of Mato Grosso, for her assistance and friendship. My (then) fellow UF graduate student Luís Symanski was in Cuiabá while I was there and deserves thanks for his companionship. I would lack many unforgettable memories without the friendship of Vanda, Nauk, and Luís.

Finally, I must say something about Kendall Campbell, my friend, companion, and spouse. She suffered through many of my graduate papers, numerous drafts of this dissertation, and graciously listened as I bloviated endlessly about the Caiapó, Brazil, and whatever other subject caught my fancy. Kendall accompanied me around Brazil, trekking from Goiânia to Ouro Preto and down to Rio de Janeiro; she helped me lug suitcases of documents and books, laughed at me when I bought more books, and made life all the more enjoyable. She had fun too—at least, so she claims. I know not how she survived my blathering, diatribes, and, lately, typos. I never would have finished this dissertation without her strength and support. And, most importantly of all, she gave me my son.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**ACKNOWLEDGMENTS** ........................................................................................................... 4

**LIST OF TABLES** .................................................................................................................. 11

**LIST OF FIGURES** ................................................................................................................ 12

**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS** .................................................................................................. 13

**ABSTRACT** ............................................................................................................................. 14

**CHAPTER**  ................................................................................................................................

1 **INTRODUCTION** ................................................................................................................. 16

The Kreen-Akrore ...................................................................................................................... 16  
From Kreen-Akrore to Panará ................................................................................................. 26  
From Panará to Caiapó............................................................................................................. 32  
From Caiapó to Kreen-Akrore ............................................................................................... 38  
A Brief Historiography .......................................................................................................... 42  
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 49

2 **THE EARLY CAIAPÓ-COLONIAL CONTACT (1590–1720)** ............................................ 61

Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 61  
Ibirajara and Bilreiros ............................................................................................................. 64  
The Ibirajara ........................................................................................................................... 67  
The Bilreiros ............................................................................................................................ 71  
The Ibirajara, Bilreiros, and Caiapó: Analysis ........................................................................ 77  
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 85

3 **TERRITORY, VILLAGES, WAR, AND CAPTIVES** ............................................................ 90

Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 90  
Caiapó Territory and Colonial Image .................................................................................... 91  
Caiapó War: Tactics, Weapons, Pillage, and Terror ............................................................ 99  
Intensification of Warfare, Inter-Village Conflicts, and Village Stability ......................... 108  
Cannibals and Captives .......................................................................................................... 118  
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 126

4 **THE WARS: A NARRATIVE (1720–1780)** .......................................................................... 130

Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 130  
Cuiabá: The Monção Route .................................................................................................... 130  
The Attack at Médico ................................................................................................................ 135
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>List of Caiapó arrivals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5-1</td>
<td>..................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-1</td>
<td>Reproduction of José Luís Pereira’s 1783 census of Maria I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHEGO</td>
<td>Arquivo Histórico Estadual de Goiás</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APM</td>
<td>Arquivo Público Mineiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APMT</td>
<td>Arquivo Público de Mato Grosso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APMT-ASCC</td>
<td>Arquivo Público de Mato Grosso-Anais do Senado da Câmara de Cuiabá</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>Arquivo Nacional, Rio de Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BN</td>
<td>Biblioteca Nacional, Rio de Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG</td>
<td>Correio Oficial de Goiás</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI</td>
<td>Documentos Interessantes para a História e Customes de São Paulo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHGB</td>
<td>Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, Rio de Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHGB-CU</td>
<td>Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, Arquivo do Conselho Ultramarino</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHGMT</td>
<td>Instituto Histórico e Geográfico de Mato Grosso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPL-LDR</td>
<td>Instituto de Memoria do Poder Legislativo, Livro de Decretos e Resoluções</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MB</td>
<td>Museu das Bandeiras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MM</td>
<td>Matutina Meyapontense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCT</td>
<td>Pacote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAHE</td>
<td>Revista do Arquivo Histórico Estadual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAPMT</td>
<td>Revista do Arquivo Público de Mato Grosso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIHGB</td>
<td>Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIHG-GO</td>
<td>Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico de Goiás</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIHGSP</td>
<td>Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico de São Paulo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMP</td>
<td>Revista do Museu Paulista</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The present study is an attempt to write an ethnohistory of the Southern Caiapó, a Gê-speaking people of Central Brazil, whose modern descendants are the Panará (also called the Kreen-Akrore). It examines the Caiapó encounter with the Portuguese and, later, Brazilians, beginning in the early seventeenth century, when the Caiapó were known as the Bilreiros, until they disappeared as an autonomous people in the beginning of the twentieth century, at which point the Caiapó were believed extinct. It draws on a number of previously ignored or unexamined documents, as well as the available ethnography of the Panará, to flesh out three centuries of Caiapó contact, confrontation, and accommodation to the frontier that expanded into their territory. It is argued that the Caiapó took captives in their raids, something they supposedly did not do, and, unlike other Gê-speakers, most notoriously the Northern Kaiapó, their villages were surprisingly stable during contact and conflict, did not fission into mutually antagonistic entities that warred with one another, and participated in large inter-village raids against Portuguese and Brazilian settlements. The traditional narrative of the so-called "pacification" of the Caiapó is challenged by detailing how remarkably violent,
even frightening, the Portuguese found this “conquest” to be. Finally, it is also argued that the Caiapó, like their Panará descendants, possessed matrilineal clans and divided the social universe into panará ("people"), hipe ("enemies/others"), and Índios ("Indians"), and that this had important ramifications for the historical trajectory of their encounter with the frontier.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The Kreen-Akrore

This is an ethnohistory of the Southern Caiapó, one of the great native peoples of Central Brazil. Their history of contact, conflict, and accommodation with Europeans stretches from the late sixteenth century until the present; much of this history has been largely forgotten, even lost. This was, in part, because the Southern Caiapó—hereafter referred to as the Caiapó—were long thought to have gone extinct in the first decades of the twentieth century (e.g., Lowie 1963). But the Caiapó were not extinct. Their ancestors survived in a remote and largely unexplored corner of southern Amazonia. Called the Peixoto de Azevedo, this was a region of rugged forests far away from the sun-soaked savannahs and shadowy gallery forests the Caiapó had once roamed east of the Araguaia River; but their presence in the Peixoto de Azevedo was unknown in the middle of the twentieth century.

Although the Peixoto de Azevedo was explored briefly in the early nineteenth century (Azevedo 1885), it remained a little known and largely unexplored region and, because of this, was believed uninhabited by Indians. This belief was shattered after hostile Indians killed Richard Mason, the leader of a British expedition mapping the Iriri River, in 1961. Mason was ambushed while walking alone on a trail, so no one from the expedition team witnessed the attack, but it was obviously violent: he was “hit by eight arrows, and his skull and thigh were smashed by club blows,” one member of the expedition, historian John Hemming (2005:416), recalled. “Some forty arrows and seventeen heavy clubs were arranged around the body.” The terrified expedition fled
the Iriri. Troops, a medical team, and some *sertanistas* ("pathfinders") were sent in to recover the body.

No one knew who was responsible for the murder until the Mekragnoti Kaiapó (also called the Txukahamei), a tough and recently pacified people living to the east of the Iriri, identified the clubs and arrows recovered from the attack.³ They said the Kreen-Akrore were responsible. In the Gê language of the Kaiapó, Kreen-Akrore means the "people with little round haircuts" (Heelas 1979:iv), a pejorative reference to the bowl-shaped hairstyle worn by the men of this people.⁴ (Kaiapó men, in contrast, often let their hair grow past the shoulder and either shaved the front from the forehead to the crown or left a short fringe that framed the face). The Mekragnoti attributed enormous strength and stature to the Kreen-Akrore. They claimed "a Kreen-Akrore bow was as thick as a man's wrist, a Kreen-Akrore bicep as thick as a thigh," and a man could not reach as high as a Kreen-Akrore stood (Cowell 1974:75). There seemed to be some truth to these allegations, since a Kreen-Akrore man, who had been captured as a child and raised by the Kaiapó, stood just over two meters tall. These apparently towering Indians, it was said, possessed a ferocious disposition—and, indeed, the Kreen-Akrore were the most formidable indigenous enemy that the Mekragnoti had fought in recent memory.

Unlike the tales of immense strength and gigantic stature—which, ultimately, proved untrue—there was some truth to the Mekragnoti reports of Kreen-Akrore aggressiveness. An anthropologist working among the Mekragnoti, Verswijver (1992:136), collected oral histories describing a war between the two peoples that lasted more than 40 years. In around 1920, the Mekragnoti encountered Kreen-Akrore
villages for the first time, and, the following year, they launched a raid, which marked
the beginning of hostilities between the two peoples. The Mekragnoti, a notoriously
hostile and warlike people, whose raids terrified even gun-toting Brazilians for much of
the first half of the twentieth century, soon learned they faced an aggressive and
fearless enemy: Mekragnoti warriors attacked the Kreen-Akrore three times, and they,
in turn, were attacked six times.\(^5\) In the days before the Mekragnoti acquired firearms
and ammunition, Kreen-Akrore attacks were “massive onslaughts” wherein “the [club-
wielding] assailants bluntly entered the Mekragnoti village and promptly provoked man-
to-man fights.” In their attacks, the Kreen-Akrore killed; they never offered quarter or
took captives. The black-painted Kreen-Akrore became, for the Mekragnoti, a kind of
archetypical enemy: on treks through the forests, Mekragnoti admonished men who
slept in late: “Wake up! Do you want the Kreen-Akrore to attack you in your sleep?”
(Werner 1978:48). Out of fear and respect of the Kreen-Akrore, they moved their village
several times, trying to put distance between themselves and this formidable enemy.

Nor were the Mekragnoti the only people that feared these club-fighters. A
neighboring, though unrelated, people, the Tupi-speaking Juruna, reported that they
had suffered raids from an enemy they called the Ipwei, the “men with clubs” (Heelas
1979:xiv). Some suspected these Ipwei were the same Kreen-Akrore that had killed
Richard Mason and battled with the Mekragnoti (Cowell 1974:237). And so it was that
the outside world learned that, far from an uninhabited region, the Peixoto de Azevedo
was occupied by aggressive and club-fighting Indians.

Little more was uncovered about the Kreen-Akrore for several years after the
murder of Richard Mason. Then, in June of 1967, Indians unexpectedly appeared at an
isolated Brazilian Air Force base called Cachimbo ("Pipe"), some distance from where Richard Mason was murdered. A group of warriors walked onto the runway and approached the outpost, infelicitously choosing to do this just as a pilot prepared to land a plane. The pilot “radioed [the base] that some animal was blocking the runway. As the base had no cattle, someone [was] sent to look” (Cowell 1974:83). Instead of an animal, a group of Indians was discovered blocking the runway. There was a panic: a frantic radio call for help went out; a shot was fired into the air; the Indians fled for the safety of the forest; women and children sprung up from the underbrush and joined the men’s hasty retreat—just as the aircraft pilot hurtled the bulk of his C-47 across their path, not once but twice. Fired on and buzzed by the propellers of an airplane, it was no surprise that “the Indians fled like deer and were not seen [at the base] again” (Cowell 1974:83).

The Brazilian military read provocation in the Indians’ approach and responded with overwhelming force. Reinforcements were dispatched to Cachimbo, and the out-of-the-way military outpost was soon heavily fortified with trenches defended by grim-faced paratroopers peering over the sights of machineguns. But the Indian men, who were accompanied by their women and children, had not wished to attack the base, and, later, it was discovered that the Brazilian military had inadvertently set the entire debacle in motion: the fleeing Indians had dropped whatever they were carrying when the plane hurtled over their heads, including bits of parachute cord that a jungle rescue unit on maneuvers had left in the forests near where Richard Mason was killed. These and other small items were left for the Indians known to haunt those forests, and “it looked as if the Kreen-Akrore had accepted the presents and had come to make
friends” (Cowell 1974:84). An anthropologist who later worked with the Kreen-Akrore, Stephen Schwartzman (1988:290), learned that, after this unfortunate encounter, they unsurprisingly concluded the strangers who had left these gifts were “wild” and dangerous enemies; they were best avoided, despite their gifts.

A catastrophe soon followed this debacle. By 1968, the Mekragnoti Kaiapó had acquired a large quantity of firearms and sought to settle their decades-long war with the Kreen-Akrore. Warriors obtained ammunition from a missionary—duping him with a tale that they needed to go hunting for an upcoming festival—and, heavily armed, set off to attack their old enemy. The rifle-toting Kaiapó surprised a Kreen-Akrore village early one morning. Many Kreen-Akrore warriors stood their ground and confronted the invaders, but their bows, arrows, and clubs fared poorly against bullets fired from lever-action rifles; these brave men were mercilessly shot down. A massacre ensued, in which the Kaiapó warriors wrought their terrible vengeance.

The immediate results of the attack remain difficult to judge, and there is no consensus about how many Kreen-Akrore died much less how many were wounded. The filmmaker Adrian Cowell (1974:118), who visited the Mekragnoti soon after the attack, was told of “eighteen separate killings, but,” he cautioned, “there were probably more.” Cowell witnessed a frightening reenactment of the attack, which was performed by many of the responsible warriors, and he saw four Kreen-Akrore children—three girls and a boy—abducted by the Mekragnoti. There had also been two women unfortunate enough to fall into the clutches of the Kaiapó, but they were murdered on the return voyage. The Mekragnoti warriors told the filmmaker, “they bite very much, so, club, club!” One of the first anthropologists to study the Kreen-Akrore, Richard Heelas
(1979:11), believed the Mekragnoti slaughtered 27 men, two women, and a child and abducted eight others, including the two women clubbed for biting too much. Another anthropologist, Stephen Schwartzman (1988:292), thought around a dozen Kreen-Akrore fell before the Mekragnoti firearms, which was “many more than in any previous attack, and many more than is common in lowland Amazonian warfare carried on without guns.” No matter how many Kreen-Akrore died in the attack, a terrible slaughter had occurred; it was unprecedented in the conflict between the two peoples.

A second Kaiapó village soon heard about the massacre and sent a raiding party to attack the Kreen-Akrore, but the raiders discovered the village—formerly known as Sonkanasan—abandoned and burned. The terrified survivors had fled to another village. There, they organized a war party and sent it after the Mekragnoti, but the Kreen-Akrore warriors failed to track down the fleeing Kaiapó. The Kreen-Akrore would never avenge their losses, and the 1968 attack on their village was the last armed confrontation between their people and the Kaiapó.

Things soon became worse for the Kreen-Akrore. Following the massacre at Sonkanasan, strange and unknown diseases—perhaps better thought of as forgotten diseases, since this was not the first time they had appeared in their villages—began decimating them. Many of the Kreen-Akrore died from epidemic flu, fevers, and diarrhea. These epidemics reduced their population by 80 percent in less than a decade (Schwartzman 1988:292), and their arrival was associated with the penetration of the outside world into the Peixoto de Azevedo.

After the Mekragnoti attack, the Brazilian government launched a serious effort to contact the Kreen-Akrore. In 1968, the Villas-Bôas brothers, Cláudio and Orlando, who
were famous for their work with other un-contacted peoples in Brazil, began flights over the Peixoto de Azevedo to locate the Kreen-Akrore villages. They first sighted gardens. The filmmaker Adrian Cowell (1974:122) documented some of these flights and witnessed the “geometric” pattern of the Kreen-Akrore gardens: their crops, when spied on from above, appeared to be planted in “circles and ellipses” that were “bisected and subdivided” with different kinds of crops. “The outer rings consisted of single rows of banana trees, in beautiful curves and circles. The crosses and double avenues were straight lines of maize, looking like paths over lawns of grass.” Nothing comparable had ever been seen in gardens planted by Brazilian Indians. “It was,” Cowell marveled, “as if we had stumbled on a Versailles.”

The astonishing sight of the Kreen-Akrore gardens contrasted with their villages, which, when finally located, proved to be unassuming and smallish. They were made up of a circular plaza with two drab structures in the center; a few thatched houses with low roofs and narrow entranceways squatted around the perimeter; and footpaths, leading to gardens and hunting spots, radiated into the forests. Dramatic photos were taken of Kreen-Akrore men, naked and painted black, firing arrows at the passing planes; they were heroically defending their homes and families (see e.g., Arnt 1998). Presents—knives, small pots and pans, cloth, and a few rubber balls—were tied to balloons and dropped from the planes to show the Indians that the visitors were not hostile. At one such drop, the Kreen-Akrore responded by lighting large fires, sending up smoky signals in what the Villas-Bôas brothers thought was a greeting (Cowell 1974:124).
Once the locations of the Kreen-Akrore villages were known, an expedition—led by the Villas-Bôas brothers and manned largely by Indians from the Xingú Indigenous Park and some Mekragnoti—headed overland in an attempt to contact the inhabitants. Months passed as the expedition hacked trails and airstrips to bring in supplies; it was a Herculean effort conducted with a sense of urgency, as the Villas-Bôas feared gold prospectors and land-settlers might push into the region and contact the Kreen-Akrore first. They knew this meant the inevitable arrival of deadly microbes and foresaw conflicts between settlers and the Kreen-Akrore, which could easily destroy them. The expedition encountered abandoned villages, found abundant signs of Indians watching them, but no Kreen-Akrore appeared. Small gifts of machetes, pots, and mirrors were left in abandoned villages and along trails in the forest. Some of these gifts were accepted, but still no Indians showed themselves.

Work continued, and the expedition waited for the Indians to approach them. Then, in October of 1969, some Kreen-Akrore stepped out from the undergrowth onto a riverbank, surprising the expedition team. Indians from the Xingú Indigenous Park, who were assisting the expedition as laborers and pathfinders, shouted nervous greetings in their native languages and waved presents. “Across the water on the yellow sandbank, the three black figures stood like a line of Toltec statues,” Adrian Cowell (1974:167), startled by the sight of the silent Kreen-Akrore, recalled. “They did not call. They made no gesture. And after a few minutes of tension, they just turned and vanished into the jungle.” The Kreen-Akrore never again presented themselves so clearly to the expedition. They were so reclusive that Adrian Cowell named his book and documentary film about the expedition “The Tribe that Hides from Man.” Years later,
the reason for the Kreen-Akrore’s reluctance to accept contact was learned: they believed these outsiders had played some part in the devastating Mekragnoti attack and the terrible epidemics affecting them (Schwartzman 1988:293).

By late 1969, government funding for the first expedition to contact the Kreen-Akrore had dried-up and the effort was abandoned without an actual face-to-face encounter occurring. A second attempt to contact the Kreen-Akrore followed in 1972. Again led by the Villas-Bôas brothers, this expedition struck out hoping to contact them before two roads bisected their territory: one road, BR-163, a highway stretching from Cuiabá to Santarem (a city on the main body of the Amazon), was cut from the south; the other road, BR-80, approached from the southeast; both roads intersected near where Kreen-Akrore villages had been located in 1968. Road construction, the Villas-Bôas brothers knew, would transform Peixoto de Azevedo from an isolated region into a burgeoning frontier: greedy gold miners, land-hungry ranchers, and settlers would descend on the region hoping to stake a claim or grab some land; there would be inevitable conflicts with road-builders and settlers. The brothers believed it necessary to establish contact before these invaders and their diseases arrived, so they again set off in search of the Kreen-Akrore. There were more sightings, and presents left for the Indians were surreptitiously carried off, and, as before, months passed without a successful encounter. Then, in February of 1973, the Kreen-Akrore accepted contact: gifts were exchanged with a group of perhaps 20 Indians; more contact and gift exchanges followed; there was a visit to a village. Continuous contact between the Kreen-Akrore and Brazilian national society has continued ever since.
But contact, in the form of an official expedition sent to “pacify” the Kreen-Akrore, had come too late. BR-163 opened in December of 1974, and it soon attracted the naturally inquisitive Indians. They observed the passing traffic with interest and begged or traded items for the motorists’ exotic goods and food. There were lurid tales in the Brazilian press, which the Indians now deny, of Kreen-Akrore women trading sexual favors with the motorists. The spectacle of the road drew men and women away from their villages; the forests were not felled for gardens; crops went unplanted; and important rituals were ignored. Worse, as the Villas-Bôas brothers had expected and feared, there were further outbreaks of lethal disease: fevers, coughs, and colds, which had begun assailing the Kreen-Akrore well before contact was established, spread rapidly and claimed many new victims. There was hunger, great misery, and massive social disruption. The Kreen-Akrore population collapsed precipitously: in 1968, there were, perhaps, 750 Kreen-Akrore living in the Peixoto de Azevedo, of whom a mere 79 remained in January of 1975 (Schwartzman 1988:295–296). Many observers felt this formerly formidable warrior people, whose raids had once frightened the tough and warlike Mekragnoti Kaiapó, was on the brink of vanishing.

But the Kreen-Akrore did not disappear. They were relocated to the Xingú Indigenous Park, where they struggled through many trying and difficult years, including a period of time in which they resided with the Mekragnoti (their erstwhile enemies made an attempt to assimilate the few survivors). They eventually returned to a small corner of their lands in the Peixoto de Azevedo in 1997. And, though the mining, farming, and ranching had destroyed much of their former territory, the Peixoto de Azevedo is where they live to this day.
From Kreen-Akrore to Panará

When the Villas-Bôas brothers launched their expeditions to contact the Kreen-Akrore, there was a lot of debate about the identity of this little known and mysterious people. Juruna Indians participating in the pacification teams insisted the Kreen-Akrore were an uncontacted and hostile group of Apiaká, a Tupi-speaking people, whom rubber-tappers had attacked and driven into the remote backlands earlier in the century (Cowell 1974:134). The Villas-Bôas brothers, however, noted similarities in village-shape, house construction, sleeping mats, basketry, cooking methods, and even the weapons of the Kreen-Akrore and the Gê-speaking Mekragnoti. The Kreen-Akrore appeared to lack pottery, much like the Mekragnoti, and the initial pacification team sent in search of them had discovered more than 50 heavy logs scattered about one of their villages, evidence of the sort of log races for which Gê-speakers are famous. So the brothers suspected the Kreen-Akrore were Gê-speakers. They thought they might be chasing after an uncontacted Timbira people, Gê-speakers who historically lived far to the east in the north of what is now the state of Tocantins and the interior of the Maranhão; perhaps, the brothers thought, the Kreen-Akrore were one of the Timbira sub-groups whom anthropologists had long believed extinct, but who had, in fact, survived and fled west from settlers sometime in the early nineteenth century (Cowell 1974:177-179). And, indeed, soon after contact was established, anthropologists determined the Kreen-Akrore spoke a Gê language.

Gê is one of the largest indigenous language families found in Brazil. Most Gê-speakers, today, live in the interior of Brazil, south of the main body of the Amazon in the great expanse of rugged savannahs, known as the cerrado (literally, “closed”), and forests found in the central Brazilian plateau. Until the early twentieth century, that is,
relatively recently, very little was known about the Gê. They often lived in remote and inaccessible locations and were generally considered extremely hostile by the Portuguese and their Brazilian heirs. So little was known about the Gê-speakers that the identification of a family of languages common to many of the central Brazilian peoples came about only in the middle of the nineteenth century (Maybury-Lewis 1979:1). In 1867, a German naturalist and scientific voyager, Carl Friedrich Phillip von Martius, who had travelled throughout Brazil with the German naturalist Johann Baptist von Spix in the years between 1818 and 1820, roughly analyzed the languages of several inland peoples and classified them as a family he named Gê.

Since then, increased contact with, and further research among, the Gê-speakers has led to the language family being divided into three great branches (Nimuendajú 1942:1-2; Maybury-Lewis 1979:4). There are speakers of what is called Northern Gê, including the Eastern Timbira (Krahó, Canela, etc.), the Western Timbira (Apinayé), the Northern Kaiapó (Mebengokre), and the Suya. Central Gê includes the Akwe (the Xavante and Xerente) and the Xacriabá; and it formerly included the now extinct Acroá peoples, the Acroá-Açu (“Big Acroá”), Acroá-Mirim (“Little Acroá”), and the Guegué. And, finally, there are the Southern Gê: the Kaingang. The Kreen-Akrore language belongs to the Northern Gê branch; however, their language proved to be related more closely to that spoken by the Kaiapó than to the Timbira whom the Villas-Bôas had suspected them to be.

Although divided by linguistic differences and separated by immense distance, stretching from the modern state of the Maranhão in the north to Santa Catarina in the south, Gê-speakers all share certain cultural characteristics (Maybury-Lewis 1979).
They live in circular or semi-circular villages, and the populations of their villages, modern observers noted, could grow quite large and exceed several hundred or even a thousand persons. These villages, however, often broke apart: the residents dividing into families and groups of families to trek and hunt game, fish, and gather resources. They possessed simple material cultures, lacked pottery—valuables, after all, had to be portable to allow for lengthy seasonal and ceremonial treks—and did not plant large gardens or rely heavily on domesticated crops. Yet, Gê-speakers possessed extremely complex social structures, which included moieties and clans, and a rich complex of ceremonies and rituals (see e.g., Nimuendajú 1939, 1942, 1946). They are so-called “dialectical societies” (Maybury-Lewis 1979), prone to conceiving of the world in terms of dichotomies, often of unequal value. And many Gê-speakers, at least those who survived the conquest of Brazil, were, until recently, very hostile toward outsiders, whether of indigenous or European extraction. Julian Steward (1946), in his attempt to classify the native peoples of South America, included the Gê-speakers among the so-called “marginals,” people whom he conceived of in terms of lacking certain important cultural traits, such as pottery and hammocks, and who did not practice sophisticated agriculture or horticulture, preferring instead to hunt game and gather resources; marginals were peripatetic nomads who ranged widely across large territories; they were often quite warlike. They were remnant populations of peoples driven out of the forests and into harsh landscapes by more sophisticated and complex societies of agriculturalists. “Marginals,” like the Gê-speakers, often were survivors of terrible conflicts, but many of the commonalities Steward thought he perceived owed more to adaptation to, and inability to find refuge from, a dangerous colonial frontier, not ancient
wars. The Kreen-Akrore were Gê-speakers who found some refuge, if but briefly, from the frontier, and this, we shall see, had important ramifications for their society.

Since contact was established in 1973, the so-called “tribe that hides from man” has been the subject of anthropological scrutiny (Heelas 1979; Schwartzman 1984, 1988; Ewart 2000, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2008). In one way or another, all anthropologists studying the Panará have examined the various ways they have dealt with outsiders in the re-interpretation and re-construction of their society after the terrible population collapse of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Ethnography, thus, provides a powerful lens through which to interpret documents dealing with the ancestors of the Kreen-Akrore and their interaction with outsiders.

Anthropologists working with the Kreen-Akrore quickly learned that these people called themselves the Panará. In their language, this word, like the auto-denominations of so many indigenous peoples, means “people.” Ethnographers have identified two aspects of Panará culture critical to understanding them: clans and the panará/hipe (“people/enemies or others”) dichotomy. All Panará belong to one of four clans (Heelas 1979:79–81; Schwartzman 1988:106; Ewart 2003:263). Clan membership is inherited through the mother, or matrilineal, and the clans are exogamous, meaning one cannot marry a member of the same clan. Clan membership is critical to the Panarah concept of self (Ewart 2003:263). A person is born with clan membership and retains that membership for life. One cannot choose or change their clan membership. Being born to a Panará mother and possessing clan membership marks a person as a member of the society; such a person is considered panará, a person. There is no means of obtain membership other than birth to a Panará mother. All those without clan membership,
meaning all individuals not born to a Panará mother, are considered hipe (“enemies or others”).

Clans are important to the conceptual layout of Panará villages. The Panará clans possess a fixed position relative to one another on the village periphery (Heelas 1979:79–81; Schwartzman 1988:106; Ewart 2003:263). The positions of the clans vis-à-vis one another on the periphery is rigorously observed: when there were several Panará villages in the Peixoto de Azevedo, all villages had all four clans and always in the same location relative to one another on the village periphery. Because the Panará are uxorilocal, that is, a married couple lives with the husband’s wife’s parents, the village periphery is composed of houses that belong to women of the same clan, their husbands (with different clan membership), and their children (who possess their mother’s clan membership). Since every member of the Panará belongs to a clan and each clan is always located on the same location on the village periphery, every Panará person possesses a spatial location in relation to every other member and in every village. Thus, Panará traveling from one village to another could always orient themselves socially within a Panará village, since their clan would always possess the same position on the village periphery. Because a non-Panará can never obtain clan membership and become panará, they are always considered hipe and can never possess a social or spatial relationship within the village.

This division of the social world into panará (“people”) and hipe (“enemies or others”) is the most basic social distinction made by the Panará (Heelas 1979:64; Schwartzman 1988:105; Ewart 2000, 2003). All Panará are panará, meaning they have clan affiliation; all non-Panará are hipe or enemies, because they lack clan
affiliation. When they lived in isolation in the Peixoto de Azevedo, the Panará recognized no distinction between hipe: all outsiders, non-indigenous or indigenous, were hipe, irrespective of their cultural differences. The Panará believed all hipe to be hostile and dangerous and, therefore, attacked them to drive them away. At the same time, the things that hipe made or possessed were interesting and exotic, so raids on hipe also sought to capture interesting and exotic goods. The capture of such plunder was extremely important, and successful raids were those that captured large quantities of goods from hipe as well as drove them away (Ewart 2000:81).

Heelas (1979:80) was the first to see a link between Panará clans, the panará/hipe dichotomy, and the particular trajectory of Panará warfare. In their raids against rival native groups and the Brazilians, the Panará never took prisoners. This is extremely uncommon in indigenous warfare, and Heelas suggested that captives, who possessed no clan membership, could never be assimilated. To become panará (i.e., a person) and a member of their society meant acquiring membership in a clan, but, because there was no means to acquire clan membership, a captive was forever hipe, an enemy or outsider. Such a person could never have a place in the village, and, therefore, the Panará did not take captives.

With the decline of warfare and the establishing of peaceful relations with outsiders, the panará/hipe dichotomy has changed significantly. A person without clan membership can still never obtain membership and always remains an outsider. In this sense, the distinction remains much the same as it was in the Peixoto de Azevedo; however, the Panará now distinguish between different types of non-Panará (Ewart 2003:262). The Panará now call other indigenous groups indios (“Indians”) or
sotangka, a Panará word meaning “ugly things” (Ewart 2003:273). In certain situations that contrast the differences between non-Indians and Indians, the Panará now recognize that they are culturally more similar to other indigenous groups and consider themselves índios (Ewart 2003:262). Hipe now refers to the non-Indians—the Brazilians and Europeans—who are culturally very dissimilar to the Panará. Thus, within the context of peaceful interaction with outsiders, the panará/hipe dichotomy has transformed into panará (“people”), hipe (“non-Indians”), and índios or sotangka (“non-Panará Indians” and, sometimes, the Panará).

The panará/hipe dichotomy that anthropologists originally observed among the Panará was, in part, a product of the extreme isolation of the Peixoto de Azevedo, a region where the Panará were in infrequent—even ahistorical—contact with outsiders. The closest neighbors to a Panará village were other Panará villages; villages of neighboring groups, like the Mekragnoti, and Brazilian settlements were extremely distant and required many days of difficult travel to reach. Such isolation was a somewhat recent advent in their history, since the ancestors of the Panará had been in near continuous and often calamitous contact with indigenous groups, the Portuguese, and the Brazilians. These ancestors called themselves the Panará, and they too thought of outsiders as hipe; but, unlike their descendants isolated in the Peixoto de Azevedo, they recognized the differences between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples.

**From Panará to Caiapó**

In the mid-1970s, Richard Heelas (1979:1–3), then a graduate student at Oxford and one of the first anthropologists to work among the Panará, made an important, even startling, discovery about this (then) mysterious people. He recognized the name
Panará and, importantly, found wordlists of their language that dated to the early nineteenth century. Heelas realized that the Panará Indians of the Peixoto de Azevedo were formerly known as the Caiapó. The surprising denouement of the enigma of the Kreen-Akrore’s historical identity meant this so-called “recently” contacted people possessed a history of interaction with Europeans that extended back to the first decades of the seventeenth century, if not earlier. It also meant the Panará were the descendants of one of the largest, most notorious, and formidable native peoples of those ever encountered in colonial Brazil.

The Caiapó first appear in seventeenth-century documents dealing with slaving expeditions, called *bandeiras* (literally, “flags”), that left the Portuguese settlement of São Paulo to attack Indians living somewhere beyond the middle Tietê River (Neme 1969). A somewhat amicable relationship existed between the slavers, called *bandeirantes* (“slaver-pathfinders”) and the Caiapó, whom the bandeirantes then called the Bilreiros (“Clubbers”). Bandeiras carried manufactured goods—the ubiquitous knives, axes, various metal tools, fishhooks, cloth, and other small items around which Europeans and Indians have so frequently structured their relationships in the New World—to trade to the Bilreiros for captives. But, as happened so frequently in Brazil, the bandeiras attacked the Bilreiros. They soon acquired a reputation as formidable adversaries—reportedly, they were club-hurling cannibals—not allies in the distant fringe of the indigenous slave trade around São Paulo. By the middle of the seventeenth century, contact with the Bilreiros and the Portuguese had largely ceased. This was partly because bandeiras did not travel to their territory, since the slavers preferred to enslave the less hostile peoples to the south, and partly because the
Bilreiros appear to have abandoned the southern periphery of their territory and retreated into the remote *sertões* ("backlands") beyond the Tietê and Paraná Rivers. By the early eighteenth century, when the Bilreiros living northwest of São Paulo again entered into contact and conflict with the bandeirantes, they were named, for reasons not entirely understood, the Caiapó.⁹

The famous seventeenth-century gold strikes in Minas Gerais (c. 1695–1697) initiated a series of gold rushes that once again brought these allies-turned-enemies into contact and conflict. Before gold was discovered in Minas Gerais, the kings of Portugal had jealously watched their Iberian rival, Spain, grow rich on the plundered treasure of the New World. Portugal had found no wondrous empires to conquer and plunder in the Americas: her possessions were populated by numerous peoples—some large, some small, some cannibalistic, some peaceful, and some warlike—that possessed nothing like the riches plundered from the empires toppled by Cortés and Pizarro. But with the discovery of gold—and soon after diamonds—the Portuguese possessions began producing incredible wealth (see e.g., Boxer 1962). Gold fever propelled intrepid (and sometimes foolish) adventurers into the interior. The mines reoriented the Portuguese settlement of Brazil away from the sugar fields of the coast and toward the interior. Prospectors scrambled along streams and rivers, panning the banks in search of gold; new settlements sprung up in the formerly trackless wilds, and Old World greed soon pushed the search for gold and diamonds into the distant corners of the *sertões*. There were discoveries at distant Cuiabá (c. 1717–1718) and Goiás (c. 1724–1726), and the once forbidding interior of the continent became gold country and, by default, of great importance to the Portuguese Crown.
All of this was an incredible disaster for the Indians of the interior. The miners, adventurers, settlers, and merchants heading inland brought with them new diseases and European-style warfare and slavery (Hemming 1978:377–405). They set about attacking the natives to remove them from lands believed to possess gold and to supply labor for the mines. Many Indians—about whom we know practically nothing more than a name—were displaced and destroyed in the ensuing conflicts. The Portuguese discovered that several peoples living in the vicinity of the Cuiabá and Goiás mines were formidable opponents, especially the Paiaguá, Guiacuru, and Caiapó. They fought ferociously against the Portuguese and often inflicting serious defeats on them. The Paiaguá, for example, annihilated most of a flotilla of canoes traveling from Cuiabá to São Paulo and carried off 150 kilos (330 pounds) of gold belonging to the Crown, which they traded in Spanish Asunción (Hemming 1978:397–398); and the horse-mounted warriors of the Guiacuru, whose territory encompassed lands claimed by the crowns of Spain and Portugal, raided Spanish and Portuguese settlements with impunity. But the Caiapó were arguably the most notorious of these warrior peoples. Their raids were extremely violent: Caiapó warriors killed without distinction and never offered quarter, murdering men, women, and children; they tortured their victims, mutilated and burned corpses, and even unearthed graves to defile the earthly remains; war parties plundered and then burned structures and fields, destroyed any goods they could not haul off, and slaughtered the livestock.10

Fear of the Caiapó depopulated whole regions of the auriferous lands east of the Araguaia River—then and now known as Goiás—and miners seeking to strike it rich in the gold fields of Cuiabá faced the gnawing threat of Caiapó ambush for much of the
difficult five- to seven-month fluvial voyage to the mines. Caiapó destruction of farms and their slaughter the livestock greatly limited the amount of food available to miners in Goiás and forced the adventurers traveling to Cuiabá to carry sufficient provisions for much of their voyage. Raiders specifically targeted slaves—who were often unarmed and, therefore, easy targets—desperately needed to extract alluvial deposits or plant fields and tend herds. When news or rumor of a Caiapó attack spread, frightened settlers and miners, scared of losing their slaves, abandoned their possessions for the safety of the larger mining camps; other slave-owners armed their slaves; much-needed labor was stripped from mining or agriculture. But little safety was found in fleeing to the larger settlements or arming slaves. Audacious Caiapó raiders penetrated the suburbs of Vila Boa, the colonial capital of Goiás, and one of the largest settlements in the captaincy, to kill and plunder. Vast numbers of Caiapó appeared in southern Goiás and attacked slaves, besieged garrisons of troops, and severed, if briefly, the roads to the coast. The frequent assaults interrupted commerce and impeded the royal fifth, greatly angering the Portuguese Crown.

Settlers, miners, and Crown officials called for retribution, and, in the early- and mid-1740s, the Crown responded by sanctioning a series of official and remorseless campaigns—most famously under the command of a bandeirante named António Pires de Campos—that saw allied Bororo Indians relocated from Cuiabá specifically to fight the club-wielding Caiapó. There were terrible depredations and atrocities—royal governors sanctioned the murder of all Caiapó men capable of carrying arms—and many pitiful captives were taken in the resulting conflicts; but a decisive defeat was never inflicted upon the Caiapó. Although many of their villages were destroyed, great
numbers of their men, women, and children slaughtered, and their territory roamed by musket-toting Bororo, the Caiapó refused to submit. Even after years of heavy fighting, the Caiapó still raided, still killed Portuguese women and children, still murdered slaves, and still plundered. One governor of Goiás, João Manoel de Mello, was so angered by the repeated assaults of the Caiapó that he declared them to be “the most barbarous and indomitable tribe of the many America produced” (Anonymous 1918:61).

But the conflict eventually passed to accommodation and co-operation. In the early 1780s, some Caiapó decided to settle on a Crown-supported settlement—such settlements were called *aldeias* or *aldeamentos* (“villages”)—near Vila Boa, Maria I. For the next fifty years, various groups of Caiapó lived in close proximity to the Portuguese in Goiás, first at Maria I and later at an aldeia called São José de Mossâmedes. Many of those residing at the Goiás aldeias learned the Portuguese language, were baptized, took Christian names, and worked as canoe rowers, cowboys, farmhands, and servants. The Goiás aldeias were eventually abandoned, but other aldeias sprung up in Mato Grosso and Minas Gerais. The aldeia Caiapó lived more or less peacefully with nearby settlers and only occasionally raided their neighbors. Other Caiapó, however, retreated from contact: some plunged deep into the headwaters of the Araguaia River, which became coveted by Brazilian ranchers and farmers in the middle of the nineteenth century; a savage conflict was fought to wrestle this last stronghold away from the Caiapó. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Caiapó were a marginalized people who lived in small, isolated settlements in Mato Grosso and a few scattered communities in eastern Minas Gerais.
In the first decade of the twentieth century, the last known survivors of the Caiapó lived along the Grande River in Minas Gerais. The fear the Caiapó had once evoked had long since passed, and local farmers and ranchers knew them as a peaceful farming and fishing people. Many of the Caiapó were detribalized—they had lost much of their indigenous culture—and were practically indistinguishable from rural Brazilians. These Caiapó, the last of those who tenaciously clung to their territories east of the Araguaia, were quietly assimilated into the ranks of the rural poor; they disappeared without fanfare or much notice. And sometime in the early- or mid-1920s, the Caiapó, one of the most feared peoples in colonial Brazil, took their place on the long list of indigenous casualties of the New World conquest.

From Caiapó to Kreen-Akrore

In the 1960s, when Richard Mason was murdered and the Villas-Bôas brothers mounted their expeditions to contact the Kreen-Akrore, no one could have guessed that they were chasing the descendants of the Caiapó. In the first place, there were still Indians whom the Brazilians called the Kaiapó. They included the Mekragnoti who participated in the pacification teams sent to contact the Kreen-Akrore, the people who identified the Kreen-Akrore as their fiercest enemies and who committed the 1968 massacre. Although distantly related to the Kreen-Akrore, the Northern Kaiapó or, as they call themselves, the Mebengokre, are a distinct people with a history of violent confrontations with settlers and miners (Verswijver 1992), but many of these confrontations occurred in the early twentieth century and were within recent memory. So when people spoke of Kaiapó Indians in the 1960s, they referred to the Mebengokre, not the historic Caiapó to whom the name originally belonged. In addition, the jungle territory of the Peixoto de Azevedo sits far to the northwest of the vast expanse of
riparian forests, rugged campo, and scrub savannah the Caiapó had once dominated to the south and east of the Araguaia. The historic territory of the Caiapó included parts of the modern Brazilian states of southern Mato Grosso, eastern Mato Grosso do Sul, northern São Paulo, western Minas Gerais, and southern Goiás; while this was a truly immense territory, it did not stretch north into the Peixoto de Azevedo. How a group of Caiapó arrived and survived at the Peixoto de Azevedo, far away from their traditional territory, needs to be explained.

The violent history of contact with settlers and miners explains why some Caiapó sought refuge in the vastness of the unexplored interior: they were escaping conflicts with the Portuguese and, later, Brazilians who occupied the mining regions of Goiás and Cuiabá. Indeed, the Panará have oral traditions describing an east-west migration: they told anthropologist Stephen Schwartzman (1988:286) “that their ancestors had moved from the east, from an area of open country to the heavily forested Peixoto region, and that to the east there were many “enemies” (hi’pe), while to the west there were not.” The Panará migration away from their enemies and the savannahs east of the Araguaia, Schwartzman (1988:286) hypothesized, had occurred in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century. To support his hypothesis, Schwartzman (1984:286, 232) pointed to the “unassimilated” nature of the Panará culture: they spoke no Portuguese and had no Portuguese loan words in their vocabulary; they lacked canoes and crossed rivers supported by floating tree trunks; and, they fished by the traditional method of bow and arrow, not by hook and line. Importantly, the Panará possessed no oral traditions of peaceful contact with outsiders. They had either forgotten that their
ancestors had lived on the aldeias, or they were the descendants of Caiapó who had never lived on an aldeia.

Schwartzman (1988:288) suspected Caiapó groups had arrived in the region of the Peixoto de Azevedo by 1820. In that year, the explorer António Peixoto de Azevedo (1885), for whom the river and the region were named, descended the Paranatinga River (also called the Teles Pires or São Manoel), a tributary of the Tapajós River. Below the Verde River (a left-bank tributary of the Teles Pires), Azevedo (1885:31) observed “many Indian ports and in each one of them immense logs lay propped on the riverbanks, which served to facilitate the swim from one side to the other.” Munduruku guides traveling with the expedition claimed the logs belonged to their enemies, but, unfortunately, they did not identify this non-canoe using people by name. The Panará, Schwartzman (1988:288) argued, may have used these ports and the logs to cross the river; however, he rightly viewed Azevedo’s report as equivocal evidence of the Panará presence, since logs were (and are) a common means for crossing rivers without canoes, and the region where Peixoto de Azevedo saw the logs was south of the historic Panará territory.11

At the time he was writing, Schwartzman did not have much in the way of ethnohistoric research on which to base his hypothesis, but subsequent ethnohistoric research has supported him. A Brazilian scholar, Odair Giraldin (1997:133–136), who wrote an excellent ethnohistory of the Caiapó, proposed various groups of Caiapó, originally from Camapuã and the headwaters of the Araguaia River, had migrated to the Peixoto de Azevedo by way of the Teles Pires River Valley. He believed the Caiapó followed this route while searching for land suitable for the growing of peanuts (an
important ritual crop) and fleeing the Portuguese and Brazilians. And there does indeed appear to be a diachronic association between the Caiapó and the Teles Pires River Valley. We know the Panará were living in or near the Peixoto de Azevedo by 1920, which was when they first came to the attention of the Mekragnoti Kaiapó (Verswijver 1992:137). In 1884, Karl von den Steinen, a German anthropologist and the first modern European to visit the Upper Xingú, recorded reports of various hostile people near the headwaters of the Xingú, and some of these reports undoubtedly referred to the Caiapó (Turner 1992:312–313). Vague reports mention the Caiapó living near the headwaters of the Xingú, slightly north and east of the Teles Pires, in 1834 and 1843. And, of course, there were the logs the explorer Peixoto de Azevedo encountered on the Teles Pires in 1820. None of these examples definitively connect the Caiapó with the Tele Pires River Valley, but, taken together, they strongly indicate their presence in the wilds north of Cuiabá from 1820 until 1920.

Although the exact time of the Caiapó arrival in the Peixoto de Azevedo remains difficult to determine, the admittedly scanty historical evidence indicates their east-west migration began in the late 1760s and early 1770s. At this time, Caiapó living in western Goiás and Camapuã were hard pressed by bandeiras. The captaincies of Goiás, Mato Grosso, and São Paulo were coordinating attacks and sending armed expeditions deep into Caiapó territory; the military situation declined under the widespread attacks, as Caiapó fleeing the Portuguese were unable to move into territories free of troops (or rival native peoples). There is evidence to indicate the Caiapó recognized the worsening of their military position vis-à-vis the Portuguese. In the early 1770s, there was a sudden outbreak of attacks near Cuiabá, which began with
a massive assault that killed several overseers and a large number of slaves in 1771. Although Caiapó raids had always threatened the arduous fluvial routes to the Cuiabá mines, their raiders had not previously attacked so close to Cuiabá, nor on such a massive scale. This was, in part, because the territory southeast of Cuiabá was home to various groups of Bororo (see Campos 1862:446–448). The Bororo were numerous, hostile to the Caiapó—indeed, the Portuguese manipulated this animosity to recruit some Bororo into fighting the Caiapó in Goiás—and their villages served as a bulwark, intentionally or not, against Caiapó aggressions against Cuiabá. By the 1770s, the Bororo had suffered heavily from Portuguese slaving, and the sertões southeast of Cuiabá appear to have become increasingly depopulated. This, it appears, permitted some hard-pressed Caiapó villages to move northwest, away from Camapuã and the Araguaia River, where they faced intense Portuguese aggressions, and through Bororo territory. They raided Cuiabá, which was unprepared for their attacks. This provoked the usual retaliatory expeditions from bandeiras that eventually pushed these Caiapó to the northwest. They began moving up the Teles Pires River Valley and eventually into the Peixoto de Azevedo, where there was little reason for the Portuguese or Brazilians to venture. There, deep in the backlands northwest of Cuiabá, the Caiapó found a refuge, until the Mekragnoti encountered their villages in the first quarter of the twentieth century, at which point they became known as the Kreen-Akrore.

A Brief Historiography

Surprisingly, considering their prominence as one of the primary antagonists of the Portuguese Crown during the eighteenth-century, the Caiapó have received relatively little in-depth historical scrutiny. Scattered references to the Caiapó appear in a number of secondary sources, beginning in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. Barbosa de Sá (1904:54–55), a late eighteenth-century chronicler of Cuiabá, for example, discussed a number of Caiapó attacks, including a massive onslaught outside of Cuiabá that, by his tally, left more than 150 people dead. The Caiapó appeared in the works of early nineteenth-century historians Manoel Aryres do Casal (1817:330–331, 337), who included a useful description of their famous war clubs, and José de Souza Azevedo Pizarro e Araujo (1948:147–151). The early chronicler of Goiás, Father Silva e Souza (1872:447, 459–460, 494–495), recorded a short narrative of the conflicts around Vila Boa, the effort to pacify the Caiapó at the end of the eighteenth century, and a brief description of the Goiás aldeias. Various references to the Caiapó appear in the works of Cunha Mattos (1874, 1875, 2005), a soldier-chronicler who traveled throughout Goiás in the early 1820s, and Alencastre (1864a:77–84, 160–161, 1864b:314–319). Alencastre based his account on many documents that were subsequently lost or destroyed, making his work an invaluable source of information. These early accounts, especially those written the middle of the nineteenth century, when the immediate threat the Caiapó had once represented faded, tend to portray them as both unsympathetic victims of Portuguese aggression and frightening savages who impeded the expanding frontier (e.g., Souza 1872:447, 452).

Numerous modern historians have also touched on the history of the Caiapó. The Jesuit historian Serafim Leite (e.g., 1949, vol. 8:396) briefly discussed the Caiapó and their Bilreiros ancestors. In his discussion of the exploits of the bandeirantes, Carvalho Franco (1940:256–262) narrated the back-and-forth fighting in Goiás, especially Pires de Campos’s depredations at the head of a Bororo army in the 1740s. The Caiapó also appear frequently throughout Carvalho Franco’s (1989) biographical “dictionary” of the
various bandeirantes and sertanistas of Brazil. Taunay (1950, vol. 11:235–263) recounted the conflicts in Goiás in his magnum opus on the bandeirantes of São Paulo, providing one of the most complete narratives of the armed-struggle Pires de Campos and the Bororo waged in the backlands of Goiás. The Caiapó were a skulking, club-hurling threat to the miners and adventures traveling to the mines at Cuiabá in several of the works of Sergio Buarque de Holanda (e.g., 1945:146, 170, 1986:65–69). Hemming discussed the Caiapó clash with Pires de Campos in the first volume of his metanarrative of the Brazilian conquest, *Red Gold* (1978:405–408, 630, n. 406), as well as their settling on Maria I and subsequent armed-struggles in the late nineteenth century in the follow-up volume, *Amazon Frontier* (1987: 70–72, 75–79, 397–398). Sympathetic to the plight of the Caiapó, Hemming saw them as victims inexorably driven from their territory by the force of Portuguese arms. In a work on the various indigenous groups of Goiás, Zoroastro Artiaga (N.d.:98–107, 180) narrated the Portuguese clash with the Caiapó, the settling and eventual abandonment of the aldeias at Maria I and Mossâmedes, and, interestingly, identified their autodenomination as the Panará. We learn much about the conflicts between the Caiapó, the Portuguese, and the Brazilian in these works; however, the Caiapó, reflecting bias in the available sources, remain largely a shadowy menace stalking the backlands, waiting to pounce on unsuspecting miners or people valiantly defending their territory from the Portuguese invaders. An exception to this trend can be found in the work of Mary Karasch (1981, 1998:129–131, 2000:65–68, 2002, 2005:468–472). Karasch has written numerous articles about the indigenous inhabitants of Goiás, including the Caiapó, in which she
has emphasized their various attempts and strategies to maintain an independent identity on the frontier.

Unlike their brief, yet frequent, appearances in larger historical works, the Caiapó have had relatively few scholarly articles and monographs dedicated to their history. José Joaquim Machado de Oliveira (1861) published an early work which synthesized much of what was then known about the Caiapó in the middle of the nineteenth century; he included a number of valuable references to peaceful contacts between them and riverboats on the Panará and Tietê Rivers. Norberto (1861) narrated the expeditions of Damiana da Cunha, a Caiapó woman who voyaged to and returned from the sertões with Caiapó. This important work drew on documents that have long since been lost or destroyed, as well as contemporary folk traditions told about Damiana’s life, and so recorded for posterity many critical details about this admirable woman’s life which otherwise would have been lost. Several late nineteenth-century letters written by a priest, Father Raymundo Henriques Desgenettes (1906), corresponding with a military officer interested in the history of the Caiapó were published in the early twentieth century. These letters contain many important details about the Caiapó, including ethnographic information concerning how they slept around their campfires and hunted for game; however, Desgenettes, who appears to have had experience working among Caiapó converts, conflated various groups, for example, the Chavante, with the Caiapó and his writings must be approached critically. Robert Lowie (1963) wrote a brief article, less than two pages long, which provided a few cultural details about the Caiapó culled from observations made by early nineteenth-century European voyagers to Goiás. In a perceptive and interesting article, Mário Neme (1969) examined the contact
between the Bilreiros and the bandeirantes in the early seventeenth century: he argued that the ancestors of the Caiapó had exchanged, if only briefly, captives for Paulista manufactured goods. Oswaldo Ravagnani (1987/88/89; 1996) has discussed Caiapó attacks in Goiás and the Portuguese efforts to relocate Bororo villages from Cuiabá to serve as a bulwark against raids. Importantly, Ravagnani (1996:230–231) has argued that, contrary to the traditional accounts of the Bororo participation in the wars against the Caiapó, Pires de Campos used coercion and force to maintain his native army in the field. Indeed, the Bororo, far from being held in thrall of this bandeirante’s charismatic personality, often refused to fight and fled back to the sertões of Cuiabá; repeated expeditions returned to Cuiabá to gather new levies of native troops, a process that resembled slaving expeditions. Mary Karasch (1981) wrote a brief biography of Damiana da Cunha, which also narrated the final days and eventual abandonment of the last Caiapó aldeia in Goiás, São José de Mossâmedes; this work, though now dated, remains a classic in the extant historiography. Jézus Marco de Ataídes (2006) published an account of the wars against the Caiapó in Goiás, in which he also included a discussion of various descriptions of their daily routines, such as their use of log races, various ceremonies, as well as their much-feared weapons.

In addition to these articles, two monographs have been published about the Caiapó. In terms of collecting and publishing the sundry eighteenth- and nineteenth-century descriptions of the Caiapó, the best available monograph was written by Ataídes (1998). This work focused, however, primarily on the Caiapó in Goiás and ignored the larger conflict that extended into Camapuã and outside of Cuiabá. The best overall history of the Caiapó was the monograph published by Odair Giraldin (1997), a
Brazilian scholar, whose important research we shall shortly have much more to say about. Throughout all of these works, war has dominated the narrative and analysis—the present study being no exception—and this is no surprising for a people whose raids were renowned for unbridled ferocity and sheer destructiveness.

In his examination of the extent historiography, Giraldin (1997:19) perceived two basic perspectives authors have adopted regarding Caiapó war: first, there are those authors who adopt the conquerors’ perspective and see the Caiapó as bloodthirsty savages who never offered quarter and who fought fanatically for the sake of fighting alone (e.g., Taunay 1950); and, second, there are those authors who see an “indomitable” defense of territory in Caiapó depredations (e.g., Ataídes 1998). A problem with both approaches, which Giraldin correctly identified, lies with a priori defining Caiapó actions without analyzing the underlying indigenous rationale. Understanding the Caiapó in terms of an innate savagery transforms their history into a clash between the savage and the civilized, in which the savage were gradually and relentlessly driven back by the civilized Portuguese and Brazilians. Similarly, seeing the Caiapó struggle tenaciously to defend their territory sets them up as an impediment to the expansion of the frontier; this provides the savagery and bloodthirstiness with, to our eyes, a noble rationale of hurling the wicked invaders from ancestral territories. Both approaches tell us more about a particular author’s biases than the Caiapó. Such a critique, of course, necessarily must be tempered by the understanding that, until Heelas identified the Panará with the Caiapó, very little was known about them beyond colonial descriptions of their bellicose nature. Descriptions of their day-to-day affairs were practically nonexistent—approaching Caiapó villages was, after all, an extremely
dangerous undertaking, one best left to Indian-fighters; and such men left few records—and the accessible documents emphasized a perceived ferocious disposition, frightening raiding tactics, and the size, beauty, and lethality of Caiapó weapons.

Giraldin (1997), recognizing a significant weakness in the historiography, attempted to research Caiapó history through a comprehensive and innovative analysis and comparison of historical documents and the available ethnographic literature. The result of his labor was an admirable work that traced the transformation of the Caiapó from a formidable regional power at the beginning of the eighteenth-century gold rushes to a reduced, impoverished, and marginalized people who were last reported in the Triângulo Mineiro in 1910–1920. Giraldin’s main contribution lies not as much with the scope of his work—in itself an admirable achievement—but in his judicious examination of the ethnographic record for clues to aid his interpretation of Caiapó behavior, especially their particularly violent form of war. Giraldin (1997:50) was the first to apply the internal structures of Panará society to documents in an attempt to discover the “logic” of Caiapó warfare: the Caiapó, accordingly, saw the Portuguese and Brazilians as hipe (“enemies”) who had to be killed; killing enemies permitted men to accumulate symbolic power necessary to complete important rituals and provided a means for acquiring goods; the death of a family member required retribution, and the constant back-and-forth cycle of raiding was the product of a Caiapó need to avenge their losses; and, the Caiapó did not take captives in the raids, because no means existed for incorporating them into the clan system. Neither innately bloodthirsty nor merely defending their territory, the Caiapó avenged the death or capture of family members with their raids. Bandeiras dispatched with the intent of ending Caiapó raids by
punishing them actually provoked the reverse: aggression created calls for vengeance in Caiapó village that propelled new counterattacks, which, in turn, escalated the violence by causing the Portuguese to dispatch yet another punitive bandeira to the sertões.

Giraldin’s explanation moved the narrative away from previous approaches that uncritically accepted the facile view of the conquerors or viewed the Caiapó as heroic, if violent, defenders of territories overrun by a rapacious frontier. Undoubtedly, Giraldin produced a more nuanced cultural understanding of Caiapó warfare and the violent trajectory of their colonial encounter; his achievement in the archives, where he discovered numerous documents unknown or ignored by previous researchers, and his contribution to understanding a largely forgotten corner of indigenous history are undeniable. His research, unfortunately, has not attracted more interest, despite the new perspectives it offered into the colonial experience of an important, yet largely ignored, central Brazilian people.

Conclusion

Our study is an attempt to write ethnohistory, meaning it is the history of an indigenous people from their perspective as best as may be reconstructed from documents written by Europeans. It deals with the unique ways the Caiapó employed native innovation and native traditions on the Brazilian frontier. James Axtell (2001:2) has written that ethnohistory involves “the use of historical and ethnological methods and materials to gain knowledge of the nature and cause of change in a culture.” When ethnohistorians, like Axtell, speak of change in cultures, they speak of ethnogenesis, the “simultaneous cultural and political struggles to create enduring identities in general contexts of radical change and discontinuity” (Hill 1996:1). Creating and maintaining an
identity on a frontier involved the adaptation and novel application of native traditions to new situations, a process that involved, among other things, accommodation, subterfuge, flight, and armed resistance. Sometimes old traditions were adapted and employed in new ways, sometimes they were abandoned, and new traditions were invented, and aspects of other cultures—indigenous, European, and African—were experimented with, adopted, modified, and rejected. This was a diachronic and continuing process and one that, though largely unknown and unexamined in the Caiapó historiography, never really stopped; ethnogenesis continues among the Panará to this day.

Our study attempts to show the ethnogenesis that Caiapó culture experienced and, at the same time, highlight the aspects of their culture that were resilient to change. As such, a broad and comparative reading of primary sources (Axtell’s historical methods) combined with a critical and comparative analysis of the extent ethnography (his ethnological methods) is employed. Our study draws heavily on primary sources, contemporary ethnographic research, and secondary historical literature: primary sources were gathered during archival research conducted in 2005 in Brazil, which included archives in Rio de Janeiro (Arquivo Nacional, Biblioteca Nacional, and Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro), Cuiabá (Arquivo Público de Mato Grosso and Instituto Histórico e Geográfico de Mato Grosso), Goiás Velho (Museu das Bandeiras), Goiânia (Arquivo Histórico Estadual de Goiás) and Belo Horizonte (Arquivo Público Mineiro); digitized documents from Portuguese archives in Lisbon (Archivo Histórico Ultramarino); ethnographic literature on the Paraná includes the work of Heelas (1979), Schwartzman (1984, 1988) and Ewart (2000, 2003, 2005); secondary works include

War is an ever-present companion in this story; it often drives the narrative. Bellicosity was what the Portuguese and Brazilians knew best about the Caiapó, so it was what they described most frequently; indeed, the conquest of such a formidable foe was more glorious than the rampant slaving and unprovoked attacks on less bellicose and less feared natives. Representations of extreme bellicosity, so frequent in the documents consulted, have had the effect of heavily biasing the sources, which, when used unjudiciously, leads to a narrative of near endless fighting, mass murder, and bloody backland savagery. There should be no doubt, however, that the Caiapó could be violent, incredibly so, and the violence still shocks, even when we are able to place it within an indigenous rationale and, thereby, bury the old mindless accusations of innate and inexplicable savagery. But they were more than pure warriors, and there were also moments of accommodation and cooperation, which, though just as important as the bloody conflicts, were often ignored or downplayed by those who wished to glorify the contest of arms or, more recently, to see the Caiapó heroically resist the invasion of their lands. The moments of “peaceful contact,” play a critical role in the narrative that follows: the Caiapó aldeia experience and their gradual incorporation into frontier society, as much as the violent and dramatic confrontations in the sertões, are discussed and subjected to exegesis. The Caiapó were not only club-wielding, skull-crushing, and terrifying warriors, but also a people who sought out and adopted a multiplicity of options to meet the challenges of the frontier. War—resistance—was not
the only, nor necessarily the proper, course of action available to them. The Caiapó who lived quiet lives on aldeias, worked for ranchers and farmers, and, occasionally, sold their woodland skills, lived no less interesting lives than those entrenched in the distant sertões fighting bitter battles against the creeping frontier.

A purposeful effort is made to humanize the Caiapó: to transform them from the lurking and feared threat found in the documents into people caught in difficult times, making difficult decisions, and trying their best to survive and live meaningful lives. This shifts the historical exegesis, if ever so slightly, away from the high drama of armed conflict and bold acts of derring-do and toward an attempt to find and recover details of Caiapó daily life and culture long thought lost. For example, we shall see the kinds of villages the Caiapó constructed, the homes they raised and how they lived in them, how they spoke; we shall see how mothers carried their children and cooked food for their families. The Caiapó, like their Kreen-Akrore descendants, were skilled gardeners: the men felled the forests and the women planted and maintained gardens; gardens that must have looked remarkably like those the Villa-Bôas brothers and Adrian Cowell marveled at in the 1960s. From a bandeirante, who spent more than a decade fighting in Goiás, we learn the Caiapó cooked food in earth ovens and that food cooked in this manner, though smelling slightly of ash, was tasty. We shall see that Caiapó men lavished great attention on their wooden weapons of war and that even the haughty Portuguese thought these beautiful weapons impressive, if in a terrifying sense. We will learn the Caiapó language, to the ears of one chronicler, was mellifluous sounding; but it gave them a disagreeable and heavy accent when speaking Portuguese. Caiapó women, one nineteenth-century visitor to their aldeias learned, loved red cloth and their
husbands worked assiduously to bring this treasured item to their wives. We even have an idea what the nineteenth-century Caiapó looked like. Sometime in 1825 or 1826, a young Frenchman named Hércules Florence (n.d.) sketched a picture of Caiapó woman that he encountered. The surprisingly complex drawing shows an old woman with a strap casually tossed across her shoulder, perhaps part of a simple cotton dress or a handle for carrying a basket, whose head sits heavily on her shoulders, her face wrinkled by age and framed by close-cropped hair. She has strong features: a square jaw, wide nose, a stern mouth, and broad ears. But it is her eyes that captivate. In this woman's eyes Florence captured a deep, defiant sadness. It is a poignant drawing.

Nine chapters, organized chronologically, follow this introduction. They cover the period from the first appearance of the ancestors of the Caiapó in historical documents (c. 1590–1610) until the last detailed description of them in 1910. The narrative begins in chapter 2, which examines two people often considered the ancestors of the Caiapó, the Ibirajara and Bilreiros. In the case of the Ibirajara traditionally cited as Caiapó ancestors, however, there is little to merit the connection: they shared neither territory, nor fighting techniques, nor cultural characteristics with what we know about the later historic Caiapó. In contrast, the Bilreiros shared territory and fighting techniques with the historic Caiapó: they lived on the middle and lower Tietê River (territory associated with Caiapó villages) and fought with throwing-clubs and used arrows so large the Portuguese referred to them as “harpoons” (the Caiapó used throwing-clubs and their arrows were unusually large). The similarities in territory and weapons strongly suggest the Bilreiros and Caiapó were the same people.
Chapters 3 and 4 investigate the Caiapó in the early- and mid-eighteenth century, the best-known period of their history. Chapter 3 employs previously unknown or ignored documents to demonstrate the extent of Caiapó territory and recover aspects of their culture, for example, it is shown that Caiapó horticulture impressed the bandeirantes assailing their villages; and that their villages were large and cooperated in attacking the Portuguese. A close reading of the available documents also reveals that the capture of plunder was an important component of Caiapó raids; indeed, we find that within a generation of the Portuguese arrival in Central Brazil that the Caiapó were literally addicted to raiding for booty. This chapter also discusses the Caiapó practice of raiding to abduct of women and children; these unfortunate captives have, because of source bias and accusations of cannibalism, been unfairly cast into historical oblivion. Chapter 4 chronicles the conflicts between the Caiapó and the miners and settlers in the mining regions of Goiás and Cuiabá, as well as northern São Paulo. The chapter examines the Portuguese attempts to secure indigenous allies to fight the Caiapó in Goiás: such efforts included not only the well-known relocation of the Bororo but also numerous failed, and little-known, efforts to enlist Tupi-speaking peoples living on the west bank of the Araguaia River. It is also shown that António Pires de Campos’s death occurred as a result of the effort to acquire these allies: the redoubtable “scourge of the heathen Caiapó” was wounded in an ambush sprung by a wise chief of a peaceful people, known as the Cururû, not gloriously fighting the Caiapó as has been commonly believed. In addition, the argument that the sudden outbreak of fighting around Cuiabá in the 1770s was part of a northwestern Caiapó migration into backlands is further developed.
Chapter 5 deals with the so-called “pacification” of the Caiapó. Between 1781 and 1785, large numbers of Caiapó settled onto the Crown-supported aldeia of Maria I. Traditional narratives of the events surrounding Maria I have stressed that the Caiapó were attracted to the aldeia without the use of force, and that its early days were remarkably peaceful (e.g., Souza 1872:459–461). However, violence and coercion played an important role in convincing the Caiapó to accept an aldeia, and many of the Caiapó settling at Maria I were extremely hostile and antagonistic. In fact, the early days of the aldeia were remarkably violent: the Caiapó refused soldiers’ orders, destroyed communal fields, demanded presents, openly threatened soldiers, and left the aldeia to raid nearby farms and ranches; there was murder and fear of a rebellion. The “pacification,” for a time, seemed to have gone awry.

The narrative pauses briefly in chapter 6 to examine the Caiapó aldeias in Goiás, Maria I and São José de Mossâmedes. Two excellent descriptions of the Caiapó aldeias exist: that of a French naturalist, Auguste François César (better known by his title, the provençal de Saint-Hilaire); and that of an Austrian botanist, Johann Emanuel Pohl (1951:351–368). Both men independently visited Maria I and São José de Mossâmedes in 1819, and their descriptions, combined with archived documents, permit us to develop a detailed sketch of the Caiapó aldeias in the early nineteenth century.

In chapter 7, we meet the two most famous residents of the Caiapó aldeias, the siblings Damiana and Manoel da Cunha. Damiana and Manoel were powerful intermediaries with considerable influence on and off the aldeias. Damiana famously traveled several times to the Araguaia River and Camapuã, entered Caiapó aldeias,
and convinced the inhabitants to accompany her back to the aldeia; she died from a fever acquired while on one of these expeditions and has since passed into the regional hagiography of Goiás. Although less renowned, Manoel began his career as a soldier and eventually rose to the position of the interim director of the Mossâmêdes aldeia; he was in charge of the aldeia when, shortly after his sister’s death, the majority of the Caiapó finally abandoned it. The analysis examines how Damiana and Manoel maintained privileged positions of power vis-à-vis the Caiapó and Brazilians.

Damiana and Manoel were not the only important Caiapó intermediaries. Chapter 8 examines several equally important, though largely forgotten and ignored, Caiapó leaders who negotiated positions of influence and power for themselves on the frontier. In the years between 1810 and 1826, there was considerable contact between the Caiapó and boatmen and missionaries on the Paraná and Sucuriú Rivers. The contact on these rivers was an alternative pole of Caiapó ethnogenesis that rivaled the Goiás aldeias in importance; however, it has received much less historical analysis despite a rich corpus of documents describing prolonged interactions between missionaries and Caiapó intermediaries, chiefs, and commoners. This interaction and trade helped reinforce forms of social hierarchy, which were introduced at the Goiás aldeias, and strengthened indigenous patterns of inter-village cooperation: previously egalitarian and independent villages merged into a loosely organized regional system that was controlled by Portuguese-speaking Caiapó intermediaries.

In chapter 9, we examine the Caiapó in the middle- and late-nineteenth century. After the Mossâmêdes aldeia was abandoned, there was a proliferation of aldeias in Mato Grosso and western Minas Gerais. Many Caiapó gradually lost their indigenous
identity and, through a process of detribalization, vanished into the great mass of rural poor. Other Caiapó shunned the aldeias and retreated to the headwaters of the Araguaia; these were fertile lands, coveted by ranchers and farmers, and a series of savage conflicts erupted when the Brazilians invaded the last redoubt of the once vast Caiapó territory. The chapter closes with the last detailed glimpse of the Caiapó. In 1911, a surveyor named Alexandre de Sousa Barbosa encountered three Caiapó siblings from the Água Vermelho aldeia in the Triângulo Mineiro (the land between the Grande and Paranaiba Rivers in western Minas Gerais). Intrigued by their people’s history, he interviewed them and discovered the Caiapó were greatly reduced—only around fifty lived at the aldeia—and in the advanced stages of detribalization. Many Caiapó living at the aldeia were practically identical to the Brazilians in culture; to their neighbors, they were known as hardworking laborers, not the formidable raiders of yore. This was the last detailed, first-hand description of the Caiapó: they disappeared soon after Sousa Barbosa passed through the Triângulo Mineiro, and the Caiapó were believed extinct until Heelas’s denouement of the mysterious origins of the Panará in the 1970s.

Chapter 10 leaves the historical narrative and attempts to reconcile history and ethnography. This chapter summarizes salient points about the Caiapó and, building on Giraldin’s research, argues their warfare can be understood best by examining the internal structures of the Panará, as well as the related (and better documented) Northern Kaiapó. Evidence of the panará/hipe dichotomy exists in the wordlists and writings of various nineteenth-century Europeans who visited the Caiapó; the existence of clans must be inferred from several lines of evidence, for example, the village
structure and an apparent lack of inter-village warfare. It is argued that both institutions played an important role in Caiapó warfare: they provided Caiapó villages with a level of stability, not seen in other Gê societies, by muting centrifugal tendencies, particularly those found in the moiety system, which enabled a high degree of inter-village communication and co-operation, and provided a means for projecting internal tensions onto a readily identifiable outside group; all of which meant the Caiapó confrontation with the Portuguese and Brazilians was often prolonged, hostile, and incredibly bloody.

1 Following Giraldin (1997), our study distinguishes Caiapó from Kaiapó. Caiapó should be understood as referring to the historic people whose modern descendants are now known as the Panará or Kreen-Akrore. Kaiapó, in contrast, refers to the related, though distinct, groups calling themselves the Mebengokre, e.g., the Xikrin, Mekranoti, Gorotire, etc. This convention of using older or archaic spellings of tribal denominations is followed throughout our study. Thus, Chavante is used for the ancestors of the modern Xavante; Cherente is used for the ancestors of the Xerente; and Crayá is used for the ancestors of the modern Karajá. When discussing a modern people, the more recent spelling is used. Although this is somewhat confusing, it helps emphasize that important differences, sometimes vast, existed between modern peoples and their eighteenth- and nineteenth-century ancestors.

2 In Brazil, the Portuguese word for Indian, “Índio,” lacks much of the pejorative baggage that it is often associated with in North America. Many contemporary Brazilian Indigenous peoples, for example, those living in the Xingu Indigenous Park, among whom this author has conducted research, refer to themselves as “Indians,” especially in situations contrasting native peoples with non-native peoples. The term is not used here in any sort of pejorative sense.

3 Txukahamei comes from the Juruna, a Tupi-speaking people, and means “people without bows.” It refers to the Kaiapó preference for fighting with clubs, see Verswijver (1992:127).

4 The Gê language family is one of the most important indigenous language families in Brazil. Other important language families include: Carib (generally found in northern Brazil), Arawak (found in north and western Brazil), and Tupi-Guarani (spoken from the center-west of Brazil, along the main body of the Amazon, and from that river’s mouth south to Paraguay and the interior); there are also a number of smaller, isolated languages, generally found in the west and the northeast. For a discussion of native languages in Brazil, see Urban (2002).

5 Some might object to the characterization of Indians as hostile or warlike. However, there were, and are, bellicose peoples in Brazil (and the Americas), and the Mekragnoti most certainly may be included among their number (see Verswijver 1992). In our study, it should be understood that bellicosity and aggressiveness are not emphasized, as was common in the past, to demonize native peoples or justify their conquest; rather, warrior traditions and warfare are seen as an aspect, however disagreeable some may find them, of the human experience. It is important to avoid the victimization of the Brazilian natives, sometimes found in the historiography (e.g. Hemming 1978), especially as some of the indigenous peoples, like the Caiapó, who admittedly suffered tremendously, inflicted significant reverses and even defeats on their European enemies.

6 Heelas (1979) used the term kahen rather than proper word hipe. Schwartzman (1988:105) learned that kahen was a loan word learned from the attraction teams sent to the Peixoto de Azevedo.

7 Ewart (2000) most closely examined the daily life of the Panará. A discussion of what this constitutes is beyond the scope of our study but the reader is directed to examine Ewart’s work.

8 The term bandeirante has no equivalent in English, it is sometimes glossed as “frontiersman” or “backwoodsman,” but neither term accurately captures what it meant to be a bandeirante. They were, first and foremost, slavers of Indian, but also struck out from São Paulo in search of mineral wealth, and fought as militiamen in colonial wars, principally against the Indians. Often the progeny of Portuguese fathers and native women, the bandeirantes freely slaved people with whom they shared culture and kinship. They wandered far and wide in search of slaves, gold,
and adventure. An immense body of literature has developed around them, most notably Taunay’s 11 volume História Geral das Bandeirantes. In contrast, very little has been written about Bandeirantes in English. For a discussion of bandeirantes in English, see Morse (1965). New studies of the bandeirantes are desperately needed.

9 There is some disagreement about the origin and meaning of the word Caiapó. An early attempt at translating the term was made by Desgenettes (1906:221), a nineteenth-century priest, who believed Caiapó was Tupi for “humid land abundant in water,” which referred to the type of lands the Caiapó preferred. It was certainly true that the Caiapó preferred lands abounding in water, and this translation, interestingly, falls somewhat close to the Northern Kaiapó auto-denomination Me-be-ngo-krê, the “people of the watery place.” However, this understanding of “Caiapó” rarely appears in the secondary literature; and, it is probably incorrect. Much more commonly, the term is translated as “like a monkey” or “resembles a monkey” (Senna 1909:161; Turner 1965:2; 1992:309; Werner 1984:173). This supposedly is a pejorative reference to a popular ceremonial mask shaped like a monkey and worn by Caiapó men. Some authors (e.g., Werner 1984:173) have suggested a Tupi origin for the word; others authors (e.g., Hemming 2005:110) find a non-Tupi origin, often Karajá (a Macro-Gê language). However, in all these examples, the discussion of the origin and meaning of the word “Caiapó” often involves the Northern Kaiapó (the Mebengokre) not the Southern Caiapó, to whom the name originally referred. How and why the Southern Caiapó resembled monkeys is never explained. One possible explanation: Verswijver (1992:155, 313) mentioned the Northern Kaiapó ceremony in which the monkey mask appears—the mebijôk ceremony—was introduced from females captured from the “Krâjôkà-re” who were possibly the Kreen-Akore, i.e., the Southern Caiapó. It would truly be fortuitous for the Northern Kaiapó to have acquired the very ceremony from which the name Caiapó was derived from the very people originally known as the Caiapó. This explanation seems unlikely.

It is more likely that “Caiapó” meant “carrier or fire” or “Indian arsonists,” a definition that appears in at least one dictionary of Tupi-Guarani (Mello 1879:72), and which referred to their use of fire during raids. Tupi-speaking Indians, then, most probably gave the Caiapó their name, which was a pejorative reference to the firebrands these Indians carried into war. Historically, the Caiapó did make frequent use of fire in their raids, especially at the portage of Camapuã on the river route to Cuiabá. It was possibly because of these attacks that, sometime in the early eighteenth century, this appellation replaced the earlier Bileiros name.

Whatever the real meaning of “Caiapó,” the term was not extended to the Mebengokre until the early nineteenth century (Turner 1965:1). In 1824, a Portuguese engineer and soldier named Cunha Mattos (1875:18) described a people on the Araguaia whom he called the “Gradaús.” (Gradaus is the Karajá name for the Mebengokre [Turner 1992:314].) Of this people, Cunha Mattos wrote: “they are of Caiapó origin.” This suggests the name “Caiapó” retained its older meaning, i.e., it referred to the southern Caiapó, since Cunha Mattos believed the “Gradaús” were culturally similar to, though distinct from, the “Caiapó.” Subsequently, the name Gradaús was replaced, in Goiás at least, by Caiapó, which could refer to either the Southern Caiapó or the Northern Kaiapó. After Cunha Mattos, the Count of Castelnau, a French aristocrat who visited Brazil in the 1840s, employed the term Caiapó in his discussion of the Northern Kaiapó; subsequent nineteenth-century travel writers of travel accounts have followed his example ever since (Verswijver 1992:81).

10 E.g., AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023.

11 A group of Coroás (Northern Kaiapó) was later reported living in the area in the 1840s. They were the enemies of the Munduruku and did not use canoes, preferring to float across rivers on tree trunks (see chapter 8). Some of these river ports and tree trunks may have belonged to them.

12 For the 1834 document, see Biblioteca Nacional (Hereafter BN) I-29, 31, 006. This document clearly distinguishes between the Caiapó and the Northern Kaiapó; the latter were called the Coroás or Coroados, see e.g., Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro (Hereafter, IHGB) Lata 763, pasta 19.

13 AHU_ACL_CU_010, Cx. 15 D. 931.

14 This discussion of the secondary literature is by no means complete, as the Caiapó inevitably appear, if but briefly, in almost any historical discussion of Goiás and Mato Grosso. Rarely, however, were they discussed to any great degree. The paucity of historical work on the Caiapó becomes obvious when compared to that conducted on other indigenous groups in Brazil, e.g. the coastal Tupian peoples.

Until recently, it could be said that there was a dearth of historical research on the indigenous peoples of Brazil compared to regions of a similar size (e.g., the Andes) (see Barickman 1995). This has started to change, however, with a number of excellent or interesting works emerging (e.g., Almeida 2003; Langfur 2005a, 2005b, 2006; Apolinário 2006). General regional ethnohistories do not exist apart from Hemming’s Red Gold (1978), Amazon Frontier (1987), and Die If You Must (2005). Ethnohistories focusing on specific native peoples, especially those living in Central Brazil are also lacking; the works of Curt Nimuendajú (1942) and Verswijver (1992) being the exception rather than the rule. Most ethnohistoric work in the region consists of MA or PhD work, which
frequently (and unfortunately) remains unpublished and difficult to access. This, however, is changing with the internet.

The paucity of ethnohistoric research contrasts with the existing corpus of published ethnographic research, which is almost bewildering in its volume. The existence of such a robust corpus of ethnographic research is one reason for the lack of ethnohistoric research; ethnography, by default, has taken the place of ethnohistory, with the assumption being that the ethnographic present is a reasonable representation of the historic past. A second reason for the lack of ethnohistory, particularly in Central Brazil, is the availability of sources. Primary documents are diffuse and scattered in numerous archives in distant locales, e.g., the present study draws upon documents located in Rio de Janeiro, Cuiabá, Goiânia, Goiás, Belo Horizonte, and even Portugal. Many documents are in poor condition, often badly preserved, written on paper the color of tobacco-stained teeth, were scribbled by time-pressed scribes or the near-illiterate, and, thus, difficult to read. Even after deciphering the documents, researchers (sadly) discover that they often say very little. Documents that are rich in detail are rare. In the case of Central Brazil, for example, there exists almost nothing comparable to the copious and detailed letters of the Jesuits or their mission archives. This forces researchers to rely on royal correspondence and the occasional report dictated by (frequently illiterate or, at best, semi-literate) bandeirantes and Indian-fighters, like António Pires de Campos.

The efforts to contact the Kreen-Akrore, their subsequent experiences in the Xingú, and their return to the Peixoto de Azevedo can be found in John Hemming (2003:414-433).

While our study draws on ethnography to aid in the interpretation of documents, this is not ethnography or a work primarily intended for ethnographic specialists, hence, where necessary, common ethnographic terms are explained, often in the simplest way possible. It might be somewhat jarring for anthropologists to read definitions of commonly used terms, such as matrilineal or uxorilocal, the more so in an anthropology dissertation, but this is done for the sake of ethnographic nonspecialists, specially historians, who might be unfamiliar with the apposite terminology.
CHAPTER 2
THE EARLY CAIAPÓ-COLONIAL CONTACT (1590–1720)

Introduction

It is difficult, if not impossible, to state precisely when the ancestors of the Caiapó first encountered Europeans. They almost certainly experienced the effects of the European colonial presence—for example, disease and pressure from dislocated indigenous groups—long before face-to-face encounters occurred. When Europeans first encountered the Caiapó, unfortunately, very little was recorded. The Portuguese kept few records about the people living inland, and those records that have survived are often vague, contradictory, and confusing. Much in this initial contact period is shadowy and obscured by the fluid nature of the early colonial era: a time in which the Portuguese sense of geography was far from fixed, the names and perceived locations of regions and rivers changed frequently, and appellations given for a particular people shifted between Portuguese, Spanish, Tupi, and native auto-denominations. This was a period of protohistory, that is, a “misty period in Native American history which begins at the time of the first direct or indirect influence from European civilization—and ends with the establishment of permanent institutions and regular historical record-keeping by resident Europeans” (Sweet 1974:x). Caiapó protohistory covers more than 150 years: it began when the ancestors of the Caiapó first encountered the effects of the Portuguese occupation of the coast in the 1550s, and it ended with the permanent Portuguese settlement of Mato Grosso and Goiás in the first quarter of the eighteenth century. This chapter examines Caiapó protohistory, analyzing the existing claims about the early contacts between the Portuguese and those peoples whom historians have believed to be the ancestors of the historic Caiapó.
Despite the limitations of the available sources, it is possible to sketch a rough outline of Caiapó protohistory. We can speculate that the Portuguese presence on the coast began affecting peoples, like the Caiapó, living inland long before actual face-to-face encounters occurred (Ferguson and Whitehead 1992b): such contact was indirect, that is, more the effects of colonialism penetrating the backlands than the actual interaction between the colonizers and the colonized. For instance, communicable European diseases, which traveled rapidly along existing routes of inter-ethnic and inter-village communication, appeared in Indian villages before the Portuguese themselves (cf. Posey 2002:17-18). We also can speculate that the peoples pushed inland by the Portuguese presence competed against and fought with those already living inland for control of territory and resources. We cannot, however, say much about the specifics of how epidemics and inter-ethnic conflicts played out, though both very likely contributed to the extreme aggressiveness of the Caiapó which Pires de Campos (1862:437–438) and other bandeirantes later described in the eighteenth century.

Once the Caiapó entered into direct contact with the Portuguese, it appears that their history of interaction was, at least on the surface, very similar to that of many other Brazilian peoples. There was an initial period of cooperation and trade that, if not amicable, was marked by a lack of overt hostilities (Neme 1969). And, as occurred with other native peoples, this early interaction rapidly degenerated into conflicts because of Portuguese perfidy and slaving. A period of avoidance followed these conflicts. Some historians (e.g., Monteiro 1994:60, 236 n. 18) have placed the beginnings of this contact as early as the mid-1550s. The Caiapó, according to this narrative, were then known as the Ibirajara (various spellings), a name the coastal Tupi used to describe the club-
fighting peoples living inland. In the mid-sixteenth century, rumors of the Ibirajara reached Jesuit missionaries in São Paulo, on the Piratininga plain. Favorably impressed by what they heard, they attempted to contact the Ibirajara. The effort failed, however, and the Jesuits in São Paulo learned little more about the Ibirajara for many years. We shall see that, though the Tupi probably called the Caiapó by the name Ibirajara, as this was their generic term for the in-land club-fighters, but the Ibirajara whom the Jesuits unsuccessfully attempted to contact were not related to the historic Caiapó: the geographic location of the Ibirajara and the few details recorded about them show little in common with the historic Caiapó. And, importantly, Spanish Jesuits later catechized some Ibirajara in the same region; these Ibirajara were also called the Gualachos, the ancestors of the modern Kaingang.

The first actual Portuguese-Caiapó encounters revolved around the settlement of São Paulo. We know almost nothing about these first encounters, which probably began around 1590. It appears that bandeiras from São Paulo passed through sertões later associated with the Caiapó and, years later, some of the participants in these expeditions returned to trade with the inhabitants (Neme 1969). The people with whom the Paulistas (as the residents of São Paulo were called) traded were called the Bilreiros (“Clubbers”). The Paulistas were slavers—and, frequently, illiterate slavers at that—who found little worth commemorating in the peoples they traded with or attacked. They left very little information about what occurred in the sertões, so we must rely on a few brief passages, which tell us only a little about the Bilreiros, and a text written by a Jesuit (and likely based on information gleaned from the Paulistas). These tell us the
Bilreiros shared territory and weapons with the Caiapó. And, much like their
descendants, the Bilreiros were formidable fighters and not easy to enslave.

The Portuguese-Bilreiros trade collapsed rapidly—probably in less than 20 years,
it was over—and contact between them and the Paulistas soon ceased (Neme 1969).
Few bandeiras plunged into the sertões north of São Paulo. These were largely
depopulated and the remaining peoples, like the Bilreiros, were difficult to slave. The
Bilreiros, having abandoned the southern periphery of their territory, appear to have
avoided the Paulistas. In the late-seventeenth century, as bandeiras once again began
heading north, there were conflicts with so-called “Bilreiros.” Reports placed so-called
“Bilreiros” near the confluence of the Tocantins and Araguaia Rivers; but these
“Clubbers,” who lived far to the north of territories associated with the historic Caiapó,
were unlikely the ancestors of the Bilreiros earlier encountered by the Paulistas. It was
not until the early eighteenth century, when miners and adventurers began flooding into
the mining regions of Cuiabá and Goiás, that reliable reports of the Caiapó again emerged.

Ibirajara and Bilreiros

One of the major problems with attempting to clarify the picture of the earliest
Portuguese-Caiapó contact is that the names the Portuguese called the various native
peoples often lacked clear ethnological meaning. When the Portuguese first landed on
the coast of Brazil, they found much of the littoral and interior occupied by peoples
belonging to the Tupi-Guarani linguistic stock (Monteiro 1994:19–21). The Portuguese
found allies among some of the coastal Tupi and acquired much of their knowledge of
those living inland—who were often the enemies of the Tupi—from their native allies.
The Tupi called non-Tupi speakers tapuia (“enemies”). This was a generic and
pejorative term that did not describe an identifiable set of cultural characteristics as much as a lack of Tupi language and culture (Maybury-Lewis 1965:340-344). Tapuia, as used by Tupi-speakers and, later, their Portuguese allies, often meant little more than that a particular people did not speak a Tupi language and was considered hostile. Nonetheless, we can make some generalizations about the tapuia: they lived inland and in remote locations, shifted their villages frequently, practiced some form of slash-and-burn horticulture, and were almost always warlike.¹ Gê-speaking peoples, like the Caiapó, were considered tapuia, but so were other non-Tupi speakers. This creates considerable confusion in the historical record.

The Tupi and Portuguese also called the tapuia by other names. For instance, the Portuguese sometimes called them by the name corso (“pillagers”), a demeaning reference to their (perceived) peripatetic and violent lifestyle; this term, like Tapuia, had no clear ethnological meaning and was widely used. Demeaning or pejorative names that described a perceived trait or characteristic, or the lack thereof, were legion in the colonial period. For our purpose, the two most important such names were Ibirajara and Bilreiros. Ibirajara, a Tupi word, meant something akin to “masters of the war club” or “lords of the club” (Neme 1969:140). It referred to a preference for fighting with clubs. Bilreiros, similarly, appears to have referred to club fighting and translates as “clubbers” or “club-wielders” (see e.g., Verswijver 1992:81). The term, however, did not have a native origin; it came from the Portuguese word bilro (“bobbin”)—a long and tapered cylinder of wood used in sewing—and, according to some sources (Leite 1949, vol. 8:396), described the shape of clubs used in combat. A bilro club roughly resembled a large baseball bat or pool cue, and pictures of such clubs can be found in
the ethnographic literature of contemporary native peoples (e.g., Nimuendajú 1946:279). However, one historian, Porto (1954:52), without offering a sixteenth- or seventeenth-century source, suggested this term referred to the lengthy labrets worn by some groups, not clubs. This is a plausible enough explanation—many native peoples, after all, used labrets that could be said to resemble a bobbin—and it is completely possible that “Bilreiros” could have been used to describe both club-fighting and labret-wearing natives.

That Bilreiros described club-fighting or labret-wearing groups possibly explains why this term, much like Tapuia and Ibirajara, was applied widely and often simultaneously to describe a number of distinct peoples in different regions. References to Ibirajara and Bilreiros appear throughout much of what is now Brazil. At various times, there were reports of Ibirajara or Bilreiros living in the lands north of the Paranapanema River, to the east of the Uruguay River, north and northeast of the Tietê River (also called the Anhemby), in the sertões east of the Araguaia River, and the sertões west of Piauí and Bahia. These are far-flung territories and, even accounting for the displacement and movement of people in the colonial period, it is not possible that we are dealing with the same group in all of these places. Yet, numerous authors have connected references to Ibirajara and Bilreiros scattered across immense territories with the historic Caiapó. Senna (1909:182), for instance, identified the Bilreiros, Ibirajara, and the Caiapó as a people whose raids stretched from Pará in the north, to Bahia, and deep into Goiás and Mato Grosso. Porto (1954:49, 53) suggested a possible identification between the Ibirajara and Gualachos east of the Uruguay River and Caiapó of Goiás and Mato Grosso. Neme (1969), our best authority on the early
Caiapó, argued the Bilreiros living beyond the middle- and lower-Tietê River were the ancestor of the Caiapó. And Monteiro (1994:60, 236 n. 18) has identified the Ibirajara and Bilreiros discussed by the Jesuits of São Paulo with the eighteenth-century Caiapó. Although frequently asserted in the secondary literature, the relationship between the Ibirajara, Bilreiros, and the Caiapó has not been subjected to rigorous analysis. Giraldin (1997:55) has argued insufficient evidence exists to establish a historical relationship based largely on the meaning of names used by the Portuguese and their Tupi allies. He correctly pointed out that calling a people the Ibirajara or the Bilreiros indicated nothing more than a preference for fighting with heavy war clubs; but clubs were common among many Brazilian Indians and not sufficient evidence to establish a reliable historical affinity with the Caiapó. Unfortunately, after somewhat cavalierly dismissing the possibility of a meaningful relationship between the Ibirajara, Bilreiros, and Caiapó, Giraldin left the issue unanalyzed. But a close reading of the limited sources suggests that, in the case of the Bilreiros living beyond the lower- and middle Tietê River, the Portuguese were dealing with the ancestors of the Caiapó. To understand this, we must closely examine the early references to the Ibirajara and Bilreiros.

**The Ibirajara**

References to peoples called the Ibirajara appear in some of the earliest missionary accounts of São Paulo. José de Anchieta, an early Jesuit missionary in São Paulo, described Tapuia known as the “Ibraiara” in a 1554 letter sent to the founder of the Society of Jesus, Inácio de Loyola. The Jesuits in São Paulo knew very little about the Ibirajara, as they had yet to encounter them, but what they had learned from rumors caused them to “deem [the Ibirajara] better than all the others [i.e., the Indians] in the
use of reason, intelligence, and docility of customs.” Of the Ibirajara, Father Anchieta wrote:

All of them obey only a single chief, have a horror of eating human flesh, are content with a single wife, [they] diligently guard their virgin daughters—something that the others do not look after—and do not turn them over to anyone but their proper husband. If a wife commits adultery, her husband kills her, but if she flees from her husband’s clutches and finds refuge in the house of the chief, she is received with kindness and remains there until the husband’s anger passes. If someone takes another’s property, he is brought before the chief, who orders him whipped by an executioner. They do not believe in any idolatry or shaman and are superior to the vast majority in terms of good customs and manners, which appear very near natural law. Their only aspect deserving of reprehension is occasionally killing captives in war and keeping their heads as trophies. [Serafim Leite 1954, vol. 2:117–118]

This information, much of which was likely gleamed from native catechumens and captives, suggested a fertile mission field awaited somewhere inland and “far from the sea.” Unlike the Tupi, who followed many chiefs and cussedly refused to abandon their shamans, idols, and cannibalism, the Ibirajara possessed traits the Jesuits valued: they abhorred cannibalism, were prudish with their monogamous marriages and respect for virginity, chastised licentious women, and their chiefs were powerful and capable of punishing followers (and, incidentally, forcing their conversion); most importantly, the Ibirajara lacked idolatry and shamans, which meant the Jesuits would face no competition while proselytizing among them. Much of this information was pure fantasy: very few, if any at all, native peoples possessed chiefs capable of whipping their followers, and all of them possessed native beliefs in spirits; but the Jesuits wanted to believe a mission of easy converts was waiting just beyond the horizon.

Because of what they believed about the Ibirajara, the Jesuits decided to contact them and, if possible, open a mission among them. At the time Anchieta was writing, the Society was opening a mission among the Carijó (the sixteenth-century term for the
Guarani), a group of populous and related peoples occupying an immense territory of inland and coastal Brazil. Three Jesuits, Pedro Correia—a missionary known for his ability to master indigenous languages—João de Sousa, and Fabiano de Lucena were assigned the formidable task of converting the Carijó, specifically those living beyond the of the Island of Cananéia (southwest of São Paulo). They were also ordered to gather information on and, if possible, contact the Ibirajara. Although Anchieta did not specifically identify the location of the Ibirajara—he likely did not have more than a general idea of where they lived; and that was inland and far away—the Jesuits must have traveled south to find the Carijó living beyond Cananéia, implying the Ibirajara lived southwest of São Paulo. The most likely area was north of the Uruguay River and east of the Paraná River (Leite 1954, vol. 2:117 n. 63). This was a rugged hilly region “far from the sea” and, importantly, occupied by people known as the Ibirajara later in the sixteenth century.

The 1554 mission produced little in the way of tangible information about the Ibirajara. Before contact with the Ibirajara could be established, the Carijó martyred two of the Jesuits, Pedro Correia and João de Sousa. The Jesuits of São Paulo apparently made no further attempts to reach the Ibirajara.

Catechizing the Ibirajara fell to the Spanish Jesuits (Porto 1954:54–63). In the 1580s, a Jesuit named Manuel de Ortega spearheaded a mission among an Ibirajara group living south of the Iguaçu River, near the region of the famous Spanish missions of Guiará (between the Paraná and Uruguay Rivers). This mission opened as a result of a plague that had struck the Ibirajara. Weakened by the contagion, they permitted the Jesuits to enter their villages and proved so receptive to the Gospel that, according
to some reports, Father Ortega alone baptized some 2,800 plague-stricken Ibirajara. More Jesuits followed and found similar success catechizing several groups of “Birajaras” over the next few decades.

There is little doubt that these Ibirajara were the same people whom Anchieta had attempted to contact in 1554: they were Tapuia, lived to the southwest of São Paulo, and were located inland and beyond the Carijó. Unsurprisingly, much of what the Jesuits of São Paulo had heard about them proved to be incorrect. The Ibirajara possessed native religions and cosmologies and followed shamans who, despite the mass baptisms of the Spanish Jesuits, wielded considerable influence over their followers. The Ibirajara were also warlike. Their warriors followed powerful chiefs and fought in phalanx-like formations: they surrounded enemy villages and blew terrible-sounding horns and other instruments to announce their presence and sow discord and terror. On their raids, Ibirajara warriors often took prisoners: the Tape (a sub-group of the Guarani) were frequently attacked and sold as slaves to the Paulistas.

The Paulistas called the slave-trading Ibirajara by the name Bilreiros. According to the seventeenth-century Jesuit chronicler Simão de Vasconcelos (1977:262), the martyred Jesuits Pedro Correia and João de Sousa were propelled by “[the] fame of a nation that lived beyond the Carijó, whom the Indians call Igbiraiairas, and the Portuguese Bilreiros.” But the Ibirajara living southwest of São Paulo were not the only group whom the seventeenth-century Paulistas called the Bilreiros. There was another Tapuia people of so-called “Clubbers,” but they lived far to the north, and, though known to trade captives to the Paulistas, the Bilreiros were not related to the Ibirajara living to the southwest.
The Bilreiros

In 1610, a Jesuit, Father Jácome Monteiro, wrote a brief account of a hostile group, whom he called the Bilreiros, living in the sertões of São Paulo. The secretary to the Jesuit Visitador (“Inspector”) Manuel de Lima, who had been sent to investigate the Brazilian captaincies, Father Monteiro had traveled extensively throughout Portuguese America in the years between 1607 and 1610. He recorded his observations in a lengthy and detailed report that described many of the native peoples the Portuguese had encountered (Leite 1949, vol. 8: 393–425). These included three living around São Paulo: the Moromomins, the Bilreiros, and the Carijó. Here, we briefly discuss what Father Monteiro wrote about these peoples, which will allow us to see that the Bilreiros he described were not the Ibirajara whom Anchieta had described in 1554.

The first people Monteiro described, the Moromomins, were tapuia (Leite 1949, vol. 8: 395). “Only a few” of this Moromomins had accepted Catholicism, largely because of a linguistic barrier: “their language,” according to Monteiro, was “very difficult: none understand them,” though one linguistically gifted Jesuit named Sebastião Gomes, through “immense effort and diligence,” had managed to learn their language. Despite the linguistic difficulties, the Jesuits were extremely familiar with the Moromomins: Monteiro described in detail their (limited) agriculture, sleeping mats, and “outdoor games” where “bows, arrows, and any other things they use” were won or lost.

Unlike the Moromomins, the Jesuits had yet to study the language or customs of the next people Monteiro described: the Bilreiros. They, like the Moromomins, were Tapuia, and they lived in the sertões outside of São Paulo, though exactly where the Jesuit did not say. These people, Monteiro wrote, had acquired their name:
...because they fight with a type of round club fashioned like a bilro. They battle with these with such dexterity, as if with arquebuses, and are so certain with the shot that they rarely miss, hurling the club with such force that even the bones crush with the blow. They also use in their battles some barbed clubs, like harpoons, throwing them with great force and [by using] large cords, they take captives, harpooning them like fish, and fetching them with such speed that it is the same to harpoon them and carrying them away on their backs to eat. And, in the time we were in Piratininga, they had succeeded in killing a few whites by this art. [Leite 1949, vol. 8:396]

This was the extent of Monteiro’s account of the Bilreiros: clubs hurled like a shot from a musket, captives hauled away “like fish,” an accusation of cannibalism, and hostility to “whites.” The impression Monteiro left was that the Bilreiros were hostile and extremely dangerous, enemies not allies, and a people best approached with extreme caution, if not violence.

Monteiro closed his account of the peoples around São Paulo with the Carijó, the same group that had martyred the Jesuits Pedro Correia and João de Sousa. The Jesuits had since then found no small success among the Carijó, as “thousands” of them had settled on the Society’s missions. The Carijó, Monteiro had learned, were “more familiar and artful” that the other peoples: they lived in villages with houses, planted “manioc and vegetables,” and their men and women wore cotton clothing and possessed “a good appearance and graceful exterior.” This was a people with whom the Jesuits were extremely familiar.

Monteiro’s description of the Moromomins, Bilreiros, and Carijó contains several important pieces of information useful toward deciphering whether or not he was describing the ancestors of the Caiapó. It is possible to judge how familiar the Jesuits were with each group from Monteiro’s descriptions. The Jesuits had worked with the Moromomins and the Carijó, since Monteiro described their crops, houses, games,
styles of dress, and, in the case of the latter, even their comportment. In contrast, Monteiro related practically nothing about the Bilreiros. He described neither their gardens, nor their crops, nor their villages, nor their comportment. All he related was that they fought with throwing clubs and “harpoons,” took captives, whom they ate, and had killed “whites.” Although some of these details ring true—especially the gory description of the club’s bone-crushing blow—there was no mention of converts, or a Jesuit attempting to learn their language, or even the possibility of opening a mission among the Bilreiros (precisely the kinds of information the Jesuits found interesting and preferred to relate to their Crown and Papal supporters back home). Further, this does not sound like a people demoralized by plagues into inviting missionaries into their villages, as occurred with the Ibirajara in the 1580s. Nothing indicates the Bilreiros actively traded captives to the Paulistas for manufactured goods. In contrast, the Bilreiros living southwest of São Paulo—the Ibirajara Anchieta had attempted to contact—had been demoralized by plagues, catechized by Spanish Jesuits, and traded, if only occasionally, Tape-Guarani captives to the Paulistas. This strongly suggests that Father Monteiro was describing a different group of so-called “Clubbers,” one hostile to the spread of the Gospel and the Paulistas (cf. Neme 1969:139).5

These Bilreiros appear to have been a people living to the north of São Paulo, near the middle- or lower-Tietê. Their contact with the Paulistas probably began in the last decade of the sixteenth century, when several Paulista bandeiras entered the northern sertões: these bandeiras included those led by António Macedo and Domingos Luís Grou (1590–1593) and Domingues Rodrigues (1596). There were, undoubtedly, other unrecorded or forgotten expeditions, and, though these early bandeiras did not
record their actions in the sertões, the initial encounters between the Bilreiros and the Paulistas appear to have been peaceful (Neme 1969). We know of this peaceful contact largely because of a bandeira that left São Paulo in 1607. In that year, a Paulista named Belchoir Dias Carneiro led 500 Paulistas and many Indians retainers to slave north of São Paulo (Carvalho Franco 1989:107–108). On his way to slave, this bandeirante planned to trade with the Bilreiros. He had obviously encountered them before, perhaps when he participated in the bandeira commanded by António Macedo, his uncle, and Domingos Luis Grou, since the bandeira carried a number of goods destined for specific Bilreiros, including a uniform for a chief and a bundle of cloth for someone called “Old Temocauna” (Neme 1969:113–115). Also found among the trade goods the bandeira carried were a number of knives to trade for captives. These trade goods strongly indicate a pre-existing relationship between the Paulistas and the Bilreiros; a relationship that involved the exchange of cheap Portuguese manufactures for captives taken by the Bilreiros in wars against their neighbors.

This participation in the Paulista slave trade did not last very long (Neme 1969:115–117). Conflicts possibly began with Belchoir Dias Carneiro. His bandeira disappeared in the sertões—much like his uncle’s earlier bandeira, also destroyed north of São Paulo—a few participants straggled home, but most fell in conflicts with hostile groups; the bandeira may even have tried to slave the Bilreiros and suffered for it (see e.g., Carvalho Franco 1989:108). In 1608, a bandeira commanded by Martim Rodrigues Tenório de Aguilar, a Spaniard, left São Paulo for the Bilreiros (Carvalho Franco 1989:21). This bandeira was destroyed, probably by the Bilreiros. Two years later, Father Monteiro described the Bilreiros as formidable club-fighters and frightening
cannibals, not the allies of passing bandeiras, so they had acquired a different reputation. In 1612, Garcia Rodrigues Velho led a bandeira that attacked the Bilreiros and, unlike his predecessors, managed to return to São Paulo with many captives (Carvalho Franco 1940:54). This attack was later denounced for antagonizing formerly friendly natives (Neme 1969:117).

Contact between bandeiras and the Bilreiros soon ceased. André Fernandes, for example, in the years between 1613 and 1615, reportedly pushed into the sertões of southern Goiás, apparently without encountering the Bilreiros. It was the same for Francisco Prêto and Lázaro da Costa: they passed through those backlands in 1616, but without reporting conflicts with the Bilreiros. The Spanish governor of Paraguay, Dom Luís Céspedes Xeria, descended the Tietê River on his way to Paraguay in 1628: he reported the Tietê was completely depopulated of its indigenous inhabitants and made no mention of the Bilreiros (Taunay 1981b:81, 96). In fact, there were no further reports of encounters between the Paulistas and the Bilreiros between 1613 and 1650. This was probably because the Bilreiros had abandoned the territories to which the Paulistas had once traveled to trade and slave. At least as early as 1650, one of the routes along the Tietê that was previously used to voyage to Bilreiros villages was known as the “old road to the sertões of the Bilreiros.” This route was not “old” because of its age, according to Neme (1969:122, 125), but because it no longer steered Paulistas to territories occupied by the Bilreiros.

The Bilreiros abandoned the territories traversed by the Paulistas at a propitious moment in history. The interior was still un-occupied by the Portuguese—gold had yet to draw them permanently into its remote depths—and it was still possible for groups,
like the Bilreiros, to find lands unoccupied and unvisited by slavers. Paulista slaving, by the early- and mid-seventeenth century, had denuded the sertões north of São Paulo of many of the indigenous inhabitants. Those who remained, like the Bilreiros, were hostile and difficult to slave. This forced slavers either to tackle warlike natives willing to fight back, and thereby risk being destroyed like the bandeiras of Belchoir Dias Carneiro and Martim Rodrigues Tenório de Aguilar, or to travel farther afield in search of less formidable and hostile people. Many slavers retreated from the challenges of bellicose peoples and distant sertões and struck south to attack the populous and pacific (and therefore vulnerable) Spanish Guarani missions (Hemming 1978:250–273). This predation of the Jesuit missions lasted until 1641, when Guarani mission Indians, armed by their Jesuit masters, inflicted a serious defeat on the Paulistas in a battle at Mbororé (Monteiro 1994:76).

With the Paulista defeat at Mbororé, slaving expeditions to the Guarani declined. The slavers turned north, pushing into the sertões of what would become Goiás and Mato Grosso, and there were again reports of Bilreiros. In the 1670s, a Paulista named Sebastião Pais de Barros led a bandeira of 800 men to slave a group of Tupi-speaking “Guajará” Indians living somewhere at the headwaters of the “Tocantins and Grão-Pará River” (Carvalho Franco 1989:66–67). In 1671, this bandeira attracted the attention of the governor of the Maranhão after eight “Arauqueres,” who had fled from the Paulista slavers, arrived at the city of Belém do Pará (near the mouth of the Amazon). The governor dispatched a force of troops to the sertões to demand the Paulista release their captives and return to São Paulo.\(^8\) Unsurprisingly, the Paulistas refused, and, outnumbered and outgunned, the governor’s troops were forced to retreat. Around the
same time, rumors of gold strikes on the Tocantins River had reached Portugal. A priest, Father António Raposo, was dispatched to the Maranhão with orders to investigate and confirm the existence of these mines. Father Raposo made his way to the Tocantins and learned that Pais de Barros, “by his carelessness or ambition to capture heathen,” had died along with many of his fellow Paulistas while battling “two nations”: the “Aruaqueres,” and the “cruel and bellicose” Bilreiros (quoted in Carvalho Franco 1989:67). These Bilreiros, like those described by Father Monteiro earlier in the century, have been seen as the ancestors of the Caiapó (e.g., Neme 1969:126). We shall see, however, that these Bilreiros lived too far to the north and were unlikely to have been related to the Caiapó.

The Ibirajara, Bilreiros, and Caiapó: Analysis

It is from these vague references to the Ibirajara and Bilreiros that we must attempt to reconstruct the earliest Portuguese encounters with the ancestors of the Caiapó. There is very little evidence to suggest the Ibirajara, of whom Anchieta wrote in 1554, were related to the Caiapó. They shared no territory with the Caiapó. They lived far to the south of the historic Caiapó territory in a region of rugged hills and mountains quite unlike the riparian forests and savannahs preferred by the Caiapó. The descriptions of the Ibirajara, whether the rumors recorded by Anchieta or the information left by Spanish Jesuits working among them, does not suggest a meaningful relationship. For instance, there were no reliable reports of the Caiapó taking trophy heads from captives in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. The Ibirajara were demoralized and invited the Jesuits into their villages after a plague, but nothing indicates the Caiapó ever received missionaries in their villages. There is nothing, in
sum, to suggest a meaningful historical connection between the Ibirajara of 1554 and the historic Caiapó.

A clue to the identity of these Ibirajara comes from the mid-seventeenth century, when this name was, for unknown reasons, in the process of being replaced (Neme 1969:140). In 1628, António Ruiz de Montoya, a Spanish Jesuit, wrote about salt mines rumored to exist south of Guiará and near the territory of a people called the “Ybíraiyara or Gualachos” (see Cortesão 1952:259). That the Ibirajara were also called the Gualachos is significant, as the Gualachos, today, are commonly believed to be the ancestors of the Gê-speaking Kaingang (see e.g., Monteiro 1994:70). Further evidence of this connection comes from rudimentary linguistic analysis, which indicates the Ibirajara spoke a Gê language related to that of the modern Kaingang (Porto 1954:55). The region where the Ibirajara lived, the western portions of the Brazilian state of Paraná, was (and continues to be) associated with the Kaingang. And, while not overly distant from the southern periphery of historic Caiapó lands (specifically the lands north and east of the confluence of the Paraná and Pardo Rivers), this region was not strongly associated with the Caiapó in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries.\footnote{Finally, the tactics described by the Spanish Jesuits, particularly the playing of instruments of war, are reminiscent of those the Kaingang used against Brazilian pacification teams in the early twentieth century (see Hemming 2003:29). This evidence indicates the Ibirajara living southwest of São Paulo were the Gualachos, the ancestors of the Kaingang, not the ancestors of the Caiapó.}

The confusion between the Ibirajara and the historic Caiapó appears to have originated because the Portuguese called both by the same name, Bilreiros. In the
early eighteenth century, for example, one chronicler wrote: “From Itu [i.e., just outside of São Paulo] to the Grande River [i.e., the Paraná], one does not easily encounter the Caiepós [sic]—called by another name Bilreiros—because they cross the Grande with difficulty” (Taunay 1981a:205). Historians assumed that the Ibirajara, whom the Jesuit chronicler Vasconcelos called the Bilreiros, were the same Bilreiros whom Father Monteiro described and the early eighteenth-century chroniclers warned against approaching. In fact, these peoples were unrelated: the Ibirajara-Bilreiros described by Anchieta and later catechized by Spanish Jesuits were the Gualachos, the ancestors of the Kaingang.

This is not to say, nor should it be understood, that Tupi Indians never called the Caiapó by the name Ibirajara. In fact, the Tupi probably knew the Caiapó as the Ibirajara—the Caiapó were, after all, excellent club-fighters; and they were a Tapuia people—but we cannot point to any definitive examples of this. For example, the Jesuits of São Paulo reported so-called “Ibirabaquiyara” Indians living in two of their missions in 1585. Ibirabaquiyara appears to be a Tupi word similar to Ibirajara, so these Indians, as Monteiro (1994:43) has suggested, could have been ancestors of the Caiapó; but they just as easily might not have been. What we can say for certain is that the club-fighters southwest of São Paulo—whether called the Ibirajara or the Bilreiros—of whom Anchieta wrote in the mid-1550s, and whom Spanish Jesuits catechized in the 1580s, were not the ancestors of the Caiapó.

In contrast, the club-fighters described by Father Monteiro and visited by Belchoir Dias Carneiro were the same “Caiepós” whom the aforementioned eighteenth-century chronicler mentioned. These peoples, unlike the Ibirajara, shared geographical
proximity. The evidence indicates the Bilreiros lived north of São Paulo: Belchoir Dias Carneiro traveled north to trade with the Bilreiros; Martim Rodrigues Tenório de Aguilar and his cohort met their end to the north; and, finally, a series of trails from the Tietê River (north of São Paulo) were known as the “old road to the Sertões of the Bilreiros.” Neme (1969:124) correctly believed the Bilreiros territory was somewhere within between the Tietê and the headwaters of the São Francisco River. This is a vast area, but one that can be narrowed down slightly. The seventeenth-century “sertões dos Bilreiros,” it would seem, were north of the Tietê River and south of the Grande, probably somewhere near the lower course of the Mogi-Guaçu River. This was the reason the Caiapó had penetrated as far south as Jundaií, since, having crossed the lands outside of the settlement on raids and treks for many years before, they were already familiar with the trails and resources available there (cf. Neme 1969). Much later, in the 1760s and 1770s, Caiapó villages were encountered in this region, though a military officer thought they had been driven south of the Grande by bandeiras from Goiás and Mato Grosso. If this officer was correct, and nothing suggests he was not, then, these Caiapó were returning to lands from which Paulista slaving had driven their ancestors from more than a century before.

Not only did the Bilreiros and Caiapó share geographical proximity, they also both fought with similar weapons. Father Monteiro emphasized the peculiar character of the Bilreiros’s club, a weapon hurled with lethal accuracy: “they rarely miss” an opponent, the Jesuit claimed of these clubs, and the blow was such that “even the bones crush.” Caiapó warriors too carried a short club that they threw. “[W]ith these,” Antônio Pires de Campos (1862:437) warned in 1728, “they shoot a great distance and so surely that
they never miss the head: it is the weapon they trust and value the most.” Another bandeirante, speaking around the same time as Pires de Campos, recounted how the Caiapó hurled these clubs so accurately that moving one's head or dodging was futile (Taunay 1981b:186). These chroniclers were describing the same weapon and fighting technique. Although more than a century had passed between Father Monteiro and the eighteenth-century bandeirantes, this throwing club was a weapon that left an indelible impression on those who witnessed its use—and survived.

Father Monteiro also described “barbed clubs.” These “harpoons,” he believed, were used to impale victims before tying them up and carrying them away, “like fish,” to be eaten. The Bilreiros “barbed clubs” present a more difficult problem than the throwing clubs: no accounts of the Caiapó using such a weapon exist. However, Father Monteiro may have left a cryptic reference to enormous arrows. Pires de Campos, for example, thought Caiapó arrows were “very long and thick.” Another bandeirante, João Godói Pinto da Silveira, observed: “the bows of these heathen are extremely large and perfectly made. Their arrows are as long as their bows; they are 12 palms in length.”

A palm, an archaic measure of length, was roughly equivalent to 22 cm (8.6 inches), so a Caiapó bow and the arrow it fired were around 264 cm long (nearly nine feet). These lengthy and formidable missiles were tipped with a truly wicked point. One eighteenth-century traveler to Camapuã had the opportunity to examine some Caiapó arrows and remarked that the point was “a lance of rigid wood or bone full of barbs along its length of two palms” (Almeida 1944:80–81). This “lance” was 44 centimeters (17 inches) of hardwood or bone barbs, which, when hafted to the incredibly long arrows the Caiapó fired, must have been an awful sight—especially, when propelled through the air by a
hardwood bow almost three meters in length. Long, lethal, and tipped with a huge barbed point, Caiapó arrows could easily be considered a harpoon by those lucky enough to survive an ambush and tell the tale.

The geographical proximity, throwing clubs, and huge harpoon-like arrows strongly suggest the Bilreiros were the ancestors of the Caiapó. There is one more commonality that links the two: captives. Both the Bilreiros and the Caiapó raided neighboring indigenous groups for captives and traded them for manufactured goods. The taking of captives in war was an indigenous practice, common throughout the tropical lowlands, transformed, if not exacerbated, by the Portuguese willingness to trade goods for captives. The Paulistas were happy to engage in this sort of trade, since it shifted the dangerous work of attacking and slaving to an intermediary, and this trade was why the doomed Belchoir Dias Carneiro traveled to the Bilreiros. Father Monteiro hints at these abductions—if not the indigenous slave trade with the Paulistas—when he described the Bilreiros harpooning and tying up their enemies to carry away for cannibal feasts (Monteiro 1994:63–64).

Importantly, in the late-eighteenth century, Caiapó warriors, who were allied with the Portuguese, participated in bandeiras attacking neighboring peoples and abducted prisoners. In 1784, for example, the governor of Goiás, Tristão da Cunha Menezes, used recently “pacified” Caiapó against the Chavante. He dispatched a bandeira of 40 pedestres (“foot soldiers”) and 40 Caiapó to convince the Chavante to accept peace. This bandeira attacked a group of Chavante and seized five women and five children. This feat, according to a contemporaneous account, was “easily managed through the skill of the domesticated heathen Caiapó” (Freire 1951:14). Around the same time, the
Portuguese employed the Caiapó to run down fugitive slaves. The Caiapó, much like the Bilreiros before them, were capable of attacking, abducting prisoners, and turning these unfortunate captives over to the Portuguese.

The eighteenth-century example is important because, unlike the slave trade between the Paulistas and the Bilreiros, we have a good idea of how the Portuguese convinced the Caiapó to abduct the unfortunate Chavante, namely, through manipulating ethnic rivalries and, perhaps more importantly, providing the warriors with trade goods. According to the aforementioned account, the Caiapó “voluntarily accompanied us on this expedition” because of an “ancient and irreconcilable hatred” of the Chavante (Freire 1951:14). This animosity, nonetheless, was insufficient to gain the warriors’ support. The Caiapó, “not wanting to walk nude,” demanded and grudgingly received 40 shirts and 40 pairs of short pants from the Portuguese. The bandeira also carried numerous manufactured goods, including awls, hooks, needles, roughs-spun cloth, dried meat, farinha (“manioc flour”), firewood, pots and pans, and tobacco. These goods were available to the Caiapó participating in the bandeira. Obviously, the analogy to the seventeenth century is not complete. For example, Governor Cunha Menezes did not intend to use these Chavante captives as slaves; instead, he had the Chavante brought to Vila Boa, where they experienced his largesse and witness the life awaiting them on the aldeias, and permitted them to return to the sertões to convey his goodwill (and threats) to their villages. In this way, the governor hoped the other Chavante would decide to settle on an aldeia (and, incidentally, provide the captaincy with a new source of labor). But the Paulistas almost certainly employed similar methods to lure the Bilreiros into participating in their slave trade.
Finally, we must deal with the Bilreiros who destroyed Sebastião Pais de Barros and his bandeira in the early 1670s. These Bilreiros were probably not related to the Caiapó. The bandeira in question was slaving the “Guajará” and “Arauqueres” near the headwaters of the “Tocantins and Grão-Pará River” (Carvalho Franco 1989:66–67). This probably referred to the confluence of the Araguaia and Tocantins River (Ataídes 1998:69), a region north of the historic territory of the Caiapó, not the actual headwaters of the Araguaia and Tocantins Rivers. The vast majority of the native peoples living in Goiás in the eighteenth century were Gê-speakers; Tupi-speakers were not found in the sertões east of the Araguaia (the Tupi-speaking Canoeiro being a notable exception).\(^{18}\) Guajará appears to be a Portuguese corruption of the Tupi word Awá (“people”), and there are modern Tupi-speaking people known by similar names, for example, the modern Guajá and Guajajara, who occupied territories somewhat north and east of the confluence of the Araguaia and Tocantins Rivers.\(^{19}\) Assuming the Gê dominated the sertões of Goiás in the late seventeenth century—and there is no reason to suspect they did not—it would appear that Sebastião Pais de Barros was slaving somewhere north of the lower Araguaia and its confluence with the Tocantins. While possible that the Caiapó were pushed south of the Araguaia-Tocantins confluence by peoples fleeing inland from the coast, or that their raiders had traveled far to the north to attack the Paulistas, perhaps to avenge an attack on one of their villages, it would seem more likely that the “Bilreiros” in question were not related to the Caiapó. More likely, these Bilreiros were the ancestors of other peoples known to live in northern Goiás. The Chavante, the Acroá, Chacriabá, Guapindayé (Apinayé), or the Coroá (Northern Kaiapó) were Gê speakers, possessed cultures in many ways similar to the Caiapó, and
any of them could be called “Clubbers” in their own right. It was one of these peoples, or some other so-called “clubbers,” who destroyed Sebastião Pais de Barros, not the Caiapó.

Conclusion

This discussion of Caiapó protohistory has shown that the early Portuguese documents referring to the Ibirajara living to the southwest of São Paulo described the Gualachos, the ancestors of the Kaingang, not the ancestors of the historic Caiapó. The first reliable documents describing face-to-face encounters between the ancestors of the Caiapó and the Portuguese date to the early seventeenth century. The Bilreiros, as the Paulistas called them, were a formidable club-fighters that participated, however briefly, in the indigenous slave trade around São Paulo. By 1610, when Father Monteiro wrote, the trade between the Bilreiros and Paulistas was collapsing. The hostilities resulted in the Bilreiros abandoning contact—they appear to have moved from the southern periphery of their territory—and avoiding the Paulistas for much of the century. This was possible until the Jesuit missions to the southwest were exhausted as a source of easy captives, which forced the Paulistas into the northern sertões, and, most dramatically, the gold strikes in Minas Gerais propelled expeditions deep into what would become Goiás and Mato Grosso. By the end of the 1720s, conflicts had erupted between the Portuguese and Bilreiros. Having already suffered contact with bandeiras, the Bilreiros fought, rather than traded with, the outsiders arriving in their lands, and, in the course of these sanguinary conflicts, they became known as the Caiapó.

Neme (1969:134–135) has argued that the Caiapó of the eighteenth century were, in part, a product of the early contact and conflicts with the Paulistas. The clashes with the Paulistas initiated transformations in the Bilreiros, making them more the peripatetic
hunter-gatherers and ferocious club-fighters whom governors of Goiás and Mato Grosso described than the semi-sedentary and horticultural-practicing people with whom the seventeenth-century bandeiras traded. There is much merit to Neme’s perceptive argument. Although no detailed descriptions of the seventeenth-century Bilreiros exist, the impression we have is that they lived in large, semi-sedentary villages, practiced horticulture, and raided their neighbors. The Bilreiros, after all, were numerous enough for the Paulistas to name sertões after them; their villages occupied an area long enough for the Paulistas to expect to return and trade with specific individuals; and they traded food and captives for Portuguese manufactures. The eighteenth-century Caiapó, as we shall see, were frequently denounced for possessing no villages, for forever wandering the sertões hunting and gathering, for possessing few crops, and for ceaselessly warring on their indigenous neighboring and the Portuguese. While true that the Caiapó were extremely bellicose and raided with great frequency, especially in those places where they encountered and fought the Portuguese, closely examining the historic record indicates they too occupied certain well-known territories, lived in large villages, and practiced a well-developed form of horticulture. Much as the Paulistas had once traveled to the “sertões of the Bilreiros,” those traveling to the mines of Goiás and Cuiabá had to pass the “sertões of the heathen Caiapó.” There were so many Caiapó villages in southwestern Goiás and southern Mato Grosso that some Portuguese spoke of “kingdoms.” These were places that only the foolhardy or brave entered—and none did so lightly—and where the Portuguese fought difficult military campaigns to destroy the Caiapó. Bandeiras attacking the Caiapó frequently assaulted large villages that were surrounded by
gardens filled with an array of crops, including corn, manioc, potatoes, peanuts, and fruits. The burning of gardens for these crops created great thunderheads of smoke that obscured the horizon and frightened many miners, ranchers, and voyagers to the mines. But the incessant fighting, the parties of wandering raiders outfitted for murder, and the difficulty in tracking Caiapó warriors and assaulting their villages led the Portuguese to assume they were dealing with a people who lacked villages and horticulture. It appeared, to the biased Portuguese eye, that the Caiapó forever wandered the sertões, hunting, gathering, and making war, but this was only an image—and one the following chapters challenge.

---

1 It was common in the past, especially in the nineteenth century, to identify the tapuia with the Gê. There were good reasons for this, as some of the tapuia divided themselves into teams to race log races, trekked, hunted, gathered, and fished, and lived what sounds remarkably like the lives of modern Gê societies (see Flowers 1983:78-83). This association, however, has had considerable doubt cast on it (Maybury-Lewis 1965). Maybury-Lewis (1965:344), based of his ethnographic experience with the Xavante, the long-standing adaptation of the Gê to the savannahs, and his reading of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century sources, believed the term tapuia did not originally refer to Gê-speakers; rather, he thought, it referred to a separate people who lived inland from the coastal Tupi and the little known Gê-speakers of the more distant interior. One must wonder, then, as has often been wondered, who were the tapuia? Some of the evidence used to dismiss the Gê-Tapuia connection, analyzed by Maybury-Lewis (1965:341-342), is in need of reappraisal. For example, the tapuia, according to some sources, had taken to riding horses, which Gê-speakers supposedly had not adopted, even into the twentieth century. Maybury-Lewis rightly suggests there is no reason to believe Gê-speakers incapable of acquiring horses, and, in fact, the Gê-speaking Acroá of northern Goiás and western Piauí had adopted the horse to raid and rustle cattle at least by the 1740s (Apolinário 2006). The tapuia used hammocks, which Gê-speakers did not use; however, some modern modern Gê-speakers, like the Panará, have adopted the hammock, if only for purposes of relaxation, after having come into more-or-less sustained contact with hammock-using peoples in the Xingú Indigenous Park. Chroniclers attributed to the tapuia other practices that modern Gê-speakers apparently lacked, such as drinking fermented honey and rituals involving the blowing of tobacco smoke, but whose presence can easily be attributed to contact with the coastal Tupi. The modern Gê were not keen horticulturalists, whereas the tapuia supposedly had complex rituals dedicated to gardening and, somewhat contradictorily, were thought to be very nomadic. We have already seen that the Villas-Bôas brothers were surprised by sophistication of the Panará gardens, and ethnographers have subsequently documented complicated Panará rituals dedicated to gardening (e.g. Ewart 2005). Yet, the Panará were also a people prone to trekking, though never as widely or for as long as the peripatetic Xavante, who spent most of the year trekking at the time of Maybury-Lewis’s research in the 1950s. Such extreme nomadism, it should be remembered, was the product of contact and conflict with the frontier, after all, the Xavante’s eighteenth-century ancestors, before they entered into intense conflicts with the Portuguese in Goiás, were known as “heathen of many gardens,” see AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023. Although vague, this description suggests they practiced a more developed form of horticulture than their descendants. It was probably the case that the the ancestor of the Xavante practiced a more advanced form of horticulture in the eighteenth century. Much like the Caiapó ancestors of the Panará, the Xavante fled west to escape the creeping frontier, with its diseases and conflicts, and crossed the Araguaia River into what is now Mato Grosso. But, unlike the Caiapó who fled into the Peixoto de Azevedo, they crashed into the Bororo, fought the Karajá, and never really escaped the pernicious frontier that spread east from Cuiabá; they found,
essentially, no peace in the lands where they fled. Nomadism was an adaptation that permitted the Xavante to survive just off the march of the frontiers. One suspects that, if the ancestors of the Panará had not found isolation in the Peixoto de Azevedo, where they could plant and harvest their gardens in peace, the Villas-Bôas brothers would have chased after a more peripatetic, and thus elusive, people. It seems possible, thus, that some of the sixteenth-century tapuia might have indeed been Gê-speakers.

2 Here, a labret refers to a long cylindrical ornament worn dangling from the lower lip. This should be distinguished from a “lip disk,” often referred to as a batoque (literally, “stopper”), such as those worn by a number of Gê-speaking people, e.g., the Northern Kaiapó (see e.g., Verswijver 1996).

3 Porto was specifically referring to indigenous peoples encountered by the Spanish-speaking Jesuits. It may be that the Spanish used “Bilreiros” to refer to labrets, while the Portuguese used the term to describe clubs.

4 Maps locating the Ibirajara in this region can be found in map 3 of Hemming (1978) and in Cortesão (1951).

5 Indeed, Father Monteiro’s description can be read as a precursor for the conquest of the Bilreiros, since interfering with the free propagation of the Faith—one of the Portuguese rationales for colonizing the New World and its inhabitants—and anthropophagy were two factors that Crown and ecclesiastical authorities considered when declaring a so-called “just war.” In theory, just wars were defensive campaigns, fought against peoples deemed hostile; any captives taken during the conflict belonged to their captors (after the crown took its royal fifth, of course). On the concept of “just war,” see Cagle (2001).

6 Neme (1969:114-115) believed other native groups were responsible.

7 This interpretation of Jácome Monteiro’s description differs from that of Neme (1969:139). He believed the “whites” were Spaniards, not the Portuguese, because, in his view, the Bilreiros were enemies of the Spanish and allies of the Portuguese. This, however, confuses the Bilreiros living southwest of São Paulo (between the Spanish missions and the Paulistas; catechized by the Spanish Jesuits) with those living to the north (those formerly trading with the Paulistas). Monteiro’s description of club-fighting and cannibalistic Bilreiros certainly does not lend itself to the notion that the Bilreiros were a friendly and allied people; nor did the Jesuit suggest the Bilreiros were allies of either the Spanish or the Portuguese. The relationship between the Bilreiros and Portuguese in this early contact context, like those of many other indigenous peoples in Brazil, was much more complicated than a simple notion of allies and enemies. Periods of wary friendship oscillated with outright hostilities; hostile or peaceful interaction relied heavily on the personalities of the individuals involved in the face-to-face interaction. An aggressive Paulista slaver, like Garcia Rodrigues Velho, obviously provoked warfare and initiated hostilities, whereas less aggressive Paulistas or those who intended to trade were able to interact and carry on some form of discourse.

8 Colonial Brazil, owing to its immense size, was divided into two administrative units: the Estado do Maranhão e Grão Pará (“State of the Maranhão and Grão Pará”), which encompassed the territories of the modern states of the Maranhão, Pará, and Amazonas; and the Estado do Brasil (“State of Brazil”), which encompassed territories from Bahia south to Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. These two administrative units, while subjected to the ultimate authority of the Portuguese Crown, were autonomous from one another. Although the western borders of the two “states” were loosely defined, a Paulista bandeira, which hailed from what was technically the State of Brazil, pushing into territories the governor of the Maranhão considered his own was, technically, an invasion. Hence, the governor dispatched these troops to send the Paulistas home.

9 A lone reference to Caiapó in these lands was Father Silva e Souza (1872:494), an early nineteenth-century chronicler of Goiás; he mentioned Caiapó raids occasionally reached the “sertões of Curitiba,” which would place Caiapó raiders in the region of the Ibirajara. It appears he was confusing the Caiapó with the so-called “Goanhanaz” (Kaingang) living in the sertões southeast of the Paraná River (see chapter 8).

10 BN I-30, 12, 17 nº 40.
11 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023.
12 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 35, D. 2156.
13 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 35, D. 2168.
14 IHGB Lata 397, pasta 2; AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 35, D. 2131.
15 This interaction suggests the panará/hipe dichotomy, if it existed, was not “fixed” in the same sense that it was among the modern Panará in the Peixoto de Azevedo. This dichotomy almost certainly had begun to change into something approximating the division that recognized differences and similarities between panará (“people”), hipe (enemies—i.e., non-Indians), and Ídios (indigenous people). This transformation had its roots in the early seventeenth century.
16 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 35, D. 2156.
17 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 35, D. 2156.
18 It is possible that this bandeira, or a similar slaving expedition from the north, drove the ancestors of the Canoeiro south and into the sertões of the Tocantins River.
19 The name “Aruaqueres” appears to indicate these were Arawak Indians, or speakers of the Arawak language group, but the documents cited by Carvalho Franco (1989:66-67) state that these “Aruaqueres” spoke the “lingua geral,” i.e., a Tupi-based language. In the 1760s, there were reports of so-called “Arauqe” Indians in the north of Goiás. For a description of them, see AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023.
20 See e.g., AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 14, D. 856.
21 A 1751 map showing the location of these sertões can be found in Chaim (1983:39).
22 Pedro Taques de Almeida Paes Leme (1980:179) said “this nation has many kingdoms and numerous villages in a circumference of more than 800 leagues.” The eighteenth-century genealogist probably never saw a Caiapó village, but António Pires de Campos certainly did, and, in 1750, the governor of Goiás, Dom Marcos de Noronha, remarked that “not even António Pires de Campos presently has the number of weapons needed for this task [of attacking the Caiapó], as the aldeias of the Indians are [so] numerous that he calls them kingdoms.” See also, Arquivo Histórico Estadual de Goiás (Hereafter, AHEGO) Livro 3 (1735-1753), fls. 87-89v, 87v.
23 See e.g., AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023.
CHAPTER 3
TERRITORY, VILLAGES, WAR, AND CAPTIVES

Introduction

In the late seventeenth, a series of gold strikes in the region of Brazil called Minas Gerais created, in the words of one historian, “an immediate gold rush of epic proportions” (Hemming 1978:380). After the gold strikes in Minas Gerais (c. 1695), prospectors scoured the interior and struck pay dirt at Cuiabá (1717–1718) and Goiás (1722–1724). Rude mining camps, harboring hundreds and even thousands of rough prospectors and adventurers, sprung up and became the first permanent settlements in the interior (Boxer 1975:246–270). This was a great cataclysm for the Indians; they were enslaved, destroyed, or put to flight by miners seeking to clear the land and secure the auriferous deposits. But the fortune-seekers discovered that this was a difficult enterprise, as many of the indigenous groups they faced were warrior peoples accustomed to the backlands and capable of confronting and even defeating the Portuguese in battle.

The Caiapó were one of the largest and most formidable of these native peoples, and their conflicts with the Portuguese produced a large corpus of documents. However, these documents have yet to receive comprehensive and critical analysis. This chapter presents a comprehensive analysis of these documents, and we shall see: that the Caiapó occupied a vast territory; that they lived in large semi-sedentary villages surrounded by gardens; that these villages did not fight one another; and that Portuguese attacks led to inter-village cooperation. We shall also see that the Caiapó, unlike their Panará descendants, took captives when raiding—though the Portuguese
frequently claimed otherwise and denounced their practice of killing men, women, and children.

**Caiapó Territory and Colonial Image**

The Caiapó possessed one of the largest territories in eighteenth-century colonial Brazil. According to one contemporary commentator, they occupied an immense territory of “many kingdoms and numerous villages in a circumference of more than 800 leagues [4960 kilometers or 3080 miles]” (Leme 1980, vol. 2:179). Caiapó lands sprawled across parts of the modern-day Brazilian states of Minas Gerais, Goiás, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, and São Paulo. A rough outline of the Caiapó territory, as it existed in the early eighteenth century, can be sketched from rivers and “mountain ranges” (actually, hilly regions). Much of this territory sat east of the Araguaia River, which can be considered the northwestern border of their lands. Caiapó villages were found from the Serra Dourada (“Gilded Mountains”) east of the Araguaia to the sertões south of the Grande River. The eastern border of their territory was somewhere east of the Rio das Velhas (also called the Araguari River) in the Triângulo Mineiro (the land between the Paranaíba and Grande Rivers). To the west, the Caiapó dominated the entire length of the east bank of the Pardo River, a large right-bank tributary of the Paraná, and much of the rugged hill-country known as Camapuã. In the south, Caiapó villages were encountered along the north bank of the Paraná River from the confluence of the Paranaíba and Grande Rivers to the Pardo.

This vast territory was thickly inhabited by Caiapó villages, which tended to be clustered in certain regions. Documents speak of Caiapó “kingdoms,” regions that miners, adventurers, and even tough bandeirante slavers approached with extreme caution because of the numerous villages. One such “kingdom” was west of the upper
Adventurers and miners entered this region warily, even at the height of the gold rush, and sad mnemonic reminders of the plentiful presence of the Caiapó are still found in the geography—the Serra do Caiapó ("Caiapó Mountains"), the Rio Caiapó ("Caiapó River"), and Caiapônia ("Land of the Caiapó"). Another thickly inhabited region was found in the sertões of the Sucuriú and Verde Rivers (Taunay 1981b:120, 157–158). The Portuguese believed these rivers offered a quicker route to the gold mines of Cuiabá, but the numerous Caiapó villages made exploration of this route so dangerous that it was unexplored until the early nineteenth century. Caiapó villages dominated the Triângulo Mineiro, especially the sertões of the Araguaí River, which saw some of the worst fighting in the middle of the century (Giraldin 1997:67). It was only in the early nineteenth century, when the Caiapó population had declined greatly, that farms and ranches moved into this region (cf. McCreery 2006).

The Caiapó were the sole occupants of their territory and neither shared nor tolerated others in their lands (Giraldin 1997:57). An early description of the Caiapó left by António Pires de Campos (1862:438) described how they depopulated whole stretches of rivers: the Sucuriú and Verde Rivers, right-bank tributaries of the Paraná, had “no inhabitants on them but are crossed and raided by the heathen Caiapó,” and “along all the Pardo, Camapuã, and Coxim Rivers, there are no other nations of heathen inhabitants because the said Caiapó infest all.” So aggressive were Caiapó raids that the bandeirantes, miners, and adventurers entering the vastness of their territory encountered only their villages. The other indigenous inhabitants of the sertões east of the Araguaia had been driven off or destroyed by Caiapó raids, though, we shall
see, some remnants of their populations remained scattered along the edges of their
territory, especially on its northeastern and eastern borders. Increasing pressure
brought about by the dislocation of native peoples fleeing from the mining regions
produced violent and bloody conflicts, as these peoples pushed up against Caiapó
territory.

Until recently, very little was known about the people whose territory sprawled
across much of the plateau east of the Araguaia. Because anthropologists and
historians believed the Caiapó were extinct, they were forced to rely on documents
written by the Portuguese and Brazilians. Such documents, unfortunately, said very
little. Aside from a few exceptions (e.g., Campos 1862:437–438), most descriptions of
the Caiapó were hyperbolic denunciations. For instance, as early as 1726, the Caiapó
were named “the worst heathen of those sertões [of the Paraná River]” (cited in Taunay
“that among the heathen, they are the most cruel, indomitable, and treacherous.” One
governor of Goiás declared: “Not only are they the irreconcilable enemy of the
Portuguese but of all the other tribes.” João António Cabral Camello (1863:488), who
survived a round-trip voyage to the mines at Cuiabá, pronounced the Caiapó “the most
treacherous of all” the inhabitants of the mines. António Pires de Campos (1862:437)
declared them cannibals who killed “for no other reason than to eat those they kill, as
they greatly enjoy human flesh.” Clearly, the Caiapó aroused great animosity and,
because of their aggressiveness and hostility to outsiders, very little was known about
them.
Even where the Portuguese offered more detailed descriptions of the Caiapó, they stressed the lack of villages, peripatetic life, and extremely violent disposition. In the Portuguese mind, the Caiapó were a corso people who lived by wandering, warring, and pillaging others. “[T]hey have neither a fixed place of residence nor crops nor fields,” wrote one chronicler, “they are errant and pillagers, sustaining themselves from the forest filth; and when they do plant, they bring the food with them, carrying it from one place to another” (Taunay 1981b:158–159). “These barbarians, as they have no other occupation other than pillaging, neither need provisions nor carry anything more in their hands than their bows, arrows, and a club of singular enormity [used] to kill; which is their entire disposition and inclination,” huffed the town council of Vila Boa in a letter to the Crown.3 Such descriptions of peripatetic and violent “pillagers,” of course, served the interest of Crown officials and settlers. They believed the Caiapó obstructed the extraction of gold and the remittance of the Crown’s fifth—Caiapó attacks, in fact, did have that effect—and, because they wished to see the Caiapó conquered or driven from the mining regions, officials routinely portrayed them as violent and errant, which, to their minds, legitimated conquests (Giraldin 1997:69). Early historians relied on such descriptions—they had, after all, little else available to them—and adopted the Portuguese image of the Caiapó as semi-sedentary hunter-gatherers who lacked villages, practiced little agriculture, and fought ceaseless wars (e.g., Taunay 1950).

But many of the chroniclers had little contact with the Caiapó, and they neither knew nor cared that they described only a particular aspect of their culture. Those producing the documents—miners, adventurers, governors, and assorted Crown bureaucrats—were most familiar with Caiapó raids. And, truth be told, Caiapó war
parties were wide-ranging and aggressive. Of this there is no doubt, and the
Portuguese descriptions of warriors, armed with clubs and arrows, and traveling great
distances to attack isolated settlements were accurate in this regard. Many Portuguese,
however, erroneously assumed Caiapó raids were representative of their day-to-day
life—undoubtedly, the occasional appearance of women in raids contributed to this
assumption—but the bandeirantes and soldiers sent to fight the Caiapó frequently
encountered large villages surrounded by well-worn trails and sprawling gardens hewed
out of the forests. Occasionally, these men recorded their observations. In 1728, for
example, António Pires de Campos dictated a famous description of the Caiapó, one
that emphasized their bellicosity, but also described their villages and fields:

These heathen are of aldeias [i.e., they live in villages] and populate much
land, as they are many people, each aldeia with its cacique [...] who rules
them. They live from their fields, and [the crops] they plant most are [sweet]
potatoes, corn, and other vegetables. The garb of these barbarians is to
live nude, as much the men as the women, and their greatest practice is to
be raiders of various nations and they esteem most among them who has
killed the most, for no other reason than to eat those they kill, as they
greatly enjoy human flesh, and in the assaults and captures they make,
they save the children whom they raise as their captives. The weapons
they use are very large bows and very long and thick arrows, and they also
make much use of garrotes [clubs] four or five palms [in length] with a large
well-made head, and [it is] thrown, with these they shoot a great distance
and so surely that they never miss the head: it is the weapon they trust and
value the most. These heathen do not fight battles, as the others [i.e.
natives] do, everything is by treachery and plunder, and in their country they
course many lands of other heathens, whom they greatly disturb with their
treacheries. [Campos 1862:437–438]

This passage, part of a larger work detailing the people’s encountered on the route
to Cuiabá, was a warning to travelers that stressed Caiapó bellicosity, their lethal
weapons, and their skilled fighting techniques. Pires de Campos left no doubt that
Caiapó war parties ranged widely and attacked other groups—in fact, he seems to have
thought their aggression unrivaled when compared to their neighbors—but he also
made it clear that they lived in villages surrounded by gardens filled with many types of crops. There were a great many of these villages spread across a territory that stretched from the Paranaíba River to northern Camapuã. Formidable warriors, aggressive, wide-ranging raiders, the Caiapó also lived in large villages and planted crops. They were not an “errant” and “pillaging” people forever wandering the sertões, despite what many officials and settlers wanted to believe.

Another bandeirante left a similar, though more detailed, account of the Caiapó in 1760. João Godói Pinto da Silveira—a ruthless and tireless campaigner whom we shall meet in the next chapter—described Caiapó villages, gardens, different crops, weapons, log races, ceremonies, and the shifting of political alliances. His beautiful description, unfortunately, was bundled together with unrelated documents and sent to Portugal; it languished forgotten and unused by historians for more than 200 years. It is here quoted at length:

The climate of the sertão of the heathen Caiapó is very benevolent with very copious waters from springs from which many river headwaters originate. They cultivate with abundance and spruceness. The men clear the forests and, later, the women take as their responsibility all the remaining labor of gardening while the men wander pillaging. Their crops include hard corn like those we have which they eat on the cob and another soft [corn] that they call porurũça, which they eat roasted. They also plant many branches of sweet and domestic manioc, which they call aypim: these they use fresh and roast to eat and, after steeping in water, which they call puva, it is dried in the sun like carimã [manioc flour] to store and use on their journeys, roasting it after softening again in water for 15 or 30 minutes. And they plant potatoes that they eat roasted on a base of stones heated until red, after covering them with leaves, they lay on top earth dug from all around, such that everything below cooks within a hour. Into this stew they add everything that they wish to roast even the flesh of whatever game or fish; the flavor is very good but always has slight smell of ash. And they plant white and purple yams and tayás, which is a type of yam. They also use pumpkins and squashes, which they cook by the same means. Peanuts are a legume they greatly esteem; the vases that they store them after peeling are gourds: these are their belongings of the highest regard for
storing their small items of bone, stone, and shell with which they attend the ministry of the small instruments of metal which we use.

When they go on a journey, they carry roasted and preserved potatoes and also dried manioc: and they march with gourds of water to drink in the springs. They drink little water, but two small sips each time so not to swell the belly. When they halt on their journeys, it is always far from the gullies and brooks as much because the water fumes are prejudicial to them as so the sound of the water does not impede their hearing and they may be vigilant to any attack. Their villages are similarly situated far from waters.

They make their beds on the ground in the manner of a grave with a palm [22 cm] [of earth] carried away for the feet and head. It is the custom of couples to sleep in these, and the bachelors sleep on the ground on mats and cover themselves with other mats: these mats the men make from Buriti [palm] fronds, from which they also make good sacks woven like pouches, which are very curiously manufactured: and for this reason they take advantage of all kinds of old metals because from blades they form a knife and from nails they make their fishhooks and awls.

The bows of these heathen are extremely large and perfectly made. Their arrows are as long as their bows; they are 12 palms in length. The clubs or sword cudgels they use to kill people and forest pigs are six palms [in length] and proportionately thick for the hand [at the handle] but thicker toward the point. Other cudgels they carry only serve as emblems in their villages. These have the form of paddles of almost four palms in length and are very finely made.

They have a great many dogs of the species with ears and tails cut through the middle: when one attacks [their villages] they howl so much that attackers cannot advance [unnoticed], and the heathen run from their huts at any bark. Because of this battles are always disorderly and confusing, some resist at one place and others at another [place] without order like the other heathen who present themselves in the battlefield and discuss whether they desire war or peace. They do not close their ears nor the doors of their desire as these [heathen] neither offer quarter in their lands when we assault them nor in ours when they attack us.

The men are well made and nimble on account of being thin [and] they walk without any modesty [i.e., without clothing] and do not use batoques in their lower lip nor the ears. They cut the hair from the forehead to the crown of the head in a pyramidal fashion. The beard they let grow to the length of a palm and only have a handful grown from the chin […]. The women likewise walk without any modesty other than cutting their hair at the forehead and leaving the rest loose and long.
When there is some happy occasion, whether from good hunting or a raid against us, they paint themselves with their flesh-colored paints of urucum and perform dances, leaping from one place to another giving *poupadas* [hoots?] of happiness until they tire and this exercise leaves a track in their camp that lasts for a long time. They also have a game of strength in their villages to make them more agile in their tyrannies, [by] carrying the dead bodies or sick relatives, because of this the boys customarily carry logs of Buriti wood according to the strength and age of each one. After every morning and afternoon, teams of runners quickly enter [the village] and the first to arrive wins the competition; their villages have wide roads at each side for this [purpose]: in the first village I observed, I counted in the village plaza 200 trunks, extraordinarily thick and from 6 to 16 palms in length, some were so heavy that the Bororo could not lift them from the ground.

These heathen have no chiefs with absolute power who govern them because among them he who lives subjugates and governs is most capable without resorting to punishment and if some of their subjects disobey with hidden allies he remains in possession of the post until there is another who deposes him: if these [chiefs] they follow fail to administer well [then] their vassals, who pay them homage, switch to other leaders like traitors because among these heathen there is no principle of fidelity or any law as such; they do not adore any idols nor believe in superstitions like the many other heathen.⁶

Pinto da Silveira’s description leaves no doubt that the Caiapó lived in villages and planted fecund gardens. He clearly described how they divided agricultural labor between the sexes—men cleared the fields and women planted and maintained the crops—and grew a large array of crops, including different varieties of yams, manioc, corn, pumpkins, gourds, and peanuts. They preserved bitter manioc by soaking it in water and drying it, which produced a type of flour that stored well and remained edible; Caiapó men carried this manioc flour with them on their raids.

Such extensive horticulture suggests the Caiapó were not as peripatetic as some of the modern Gê-speakers, for example, the Xavante and Northern Kaiapó, who spend much of the year oscillating between residence in villages and wide-ranging trekking expeditions to hunt and gather in the sertões. Garden plots needed to be cut from the forest (a laborious task without metal blades; acquiring such blades through raids was
important to the Caiapó; steel tools doubtlessly allowed them to plant larger gardens and, thus, support larger villages discussed below). Such heavy reliance on gardening limited the ability of Caiapó men to stay away from their villages for extended periods of time on military campaigns, since they had to return and help clear the forests for planting. Pinto da Silveira’s description also tells us that Caiapó chiefs led by persuasion and could lose their followers, so there was little a Caiapó war chief could do to keep warriors from returning to help their wives. Gardens also meant that their villages were easier to locate: garden plots were burned to clear them and prepare the soil for planting and the billowing clouds of smoke were easily spied from great distances by bandeirás; and gardens revealed a village’s presence and the trails women used to plant and harvest could be followed back to the village. But extensive gardening meant Caiapó villages could more easily accept and feed refuges fleeing bandeira attacks, explaining, in part, why their villages were commonly large in places where they fought the Portuguese.

A populous people, occupying a vast territory, and living in large villages surrounded by gardens, the Caiapó were not, as so many Portuguese adventurers and Crown officials believed, ceaseless wanderers who lacked villages and gardens and lived “from the forest filth.” Such images of the Caiapó originated from their raiding practices, whose violence and aggression dismayed even soldiers accustomed to violence and murder in colonial Indian wars. To understand why this was, we must examine the Caiapó at war.

**Caiapó War: Tactics, Weapons, Pillage, and Terror**

In war against the musket-toting Portuguese, the Caiapó generally favored guerilla tactics, excelling at hit-and-run raids, stealthy ambushes, and surprise night
attacks. This gave rise to the Portuguese belief that they were fighting a particularly “treacherous” opponent, one who skulked in the underbrush and murdered only when possessing an advantage (cf. Campos 1862:437–438). Such fighting tactics were a response to black-powder weapons: a gaping injury blasted by lead ball shot from a heavy musket, unlike an arrow wound, was almost always lethal; the advantages of flat-trajectory firepower, range, and lethality muskets possessed were neutralized by Caiapó “treachery.” The Caiapó also launched devastating frontal attacks: they would appear in great numbers, confront their enemies, and fight skillfully and up-close with clubs. Although onslaughts were used most commonly against indigenous neighbors, the Caiapó turned such tactics against the Portuguese with great effect. Both types of tactics were very successful and permitted the Caiapó to acquire, dominate, and defend an immense territory against indigenous and European enemies.

Because the Caiapó provoked such fear, excellent descriptions of their fighting tactics were recorded. Caiapó warriors carefully scouted locations from hilltops and tall trees, occasionally following their victims for days. Such scouting could last for months. Miners and slaves, for example, noticed Caiapó observing them several times in the months preceding an attack near Cuiabá in 1771. It was well known that sighting Caiapó observers, or discovering evidence of their presence, foreboded an attack, but discovering lurking raiders was not easy. “These heathen are accustomed to hiding themselves in whatever forest thicket, all painted with earth such that [when] looking at them, one does not easily distinguish if it is a person or earth,” one chronicler warned (Taunay 1981b:186). And Caiapó warriors also “covered their heads with grass from
the fields in order not to be seen.” Such carefully concealed warriors proved over and over again to be formidable and lethal opponents.

Carefully concealed, Caiapó warriors observed places they knew the Portuguese would appear, for example, fields near isolated settlements or a difficult river portage. They preferred to strike when their victims were occupied and inattentive with some task, like hunting, gathering wood, or mining, and, then, suddenly, warriors sprang from the undergrowth and, roaring battle cries, fired arrows and swung clubs at their victims. They quickly overwhelmed their victims, grabbed any valuables, and disappeared into the undergrowth. Hunting parties and porters were warned: the Caiapó “suddenly attack those who pass [the concealed warriors], firing arrows at them and then breaking their heads up close with clubs” (Taunay 1981b:209). These attacks were extremely dangerous “because hidden along the trail, they attack the last man of the rearguard and quickly flee, running more swiftly than a horse, and return to hide themselves and decimate the troops” (Taunay 1981b:186). It was because of such tactics that António Pires de Campos (1862:449) claimed, perhaps with a bit of exaggeration, “a single Caiapó is enough to destroy and entire troop of 500 muskets.”

Traveling in groups and remaining vigilant at all times was the best defense against a Caiapó ambush. In 1792, Francisco de Oliveira Barbosa (1863:27) warned “those that go hunting [must] do so with great care to escape the tyrannies of these barbarians.” Dom António Rolim (1856:488), the governor of Mato Grosso, advised no less than three or four men should hunt or gather firewood; and they should use extra vigilance when returning from the forest, since “on the return is when [the Caiapó] are most accustom to launch their attacks.” But vigilance and numbers did not offer total
security. A group of slaves moving cargo across the difficult portage at Camapuã was attacked while two heavily-armed Paulistas kept watch for the Caiapó (Taunay 1981b:122). The raiders struck the middle of the column, killed three or four slaves, and disappeared “so rapidly that by the time the [Paulistas] had raised their muskets, they saw no more of them.”

Caiapó weapons were eminently suited to their tactics: they fought with clubs and bows and arrows. Johannes Pohl (1951:365), an Austrian who visited the Caiapó living at the Mossâmedes aldeia in the early nineteenth century, learned that their word for a club was “kó.” There were a number of different clubs varying in lengths and workmanship. Some were expedient clubs of raw or barely-worked wood. Pinto da Silveira called these cajados ("shepherds’ sticks") because the ball of the tree root was left on the club, which provided more mass for a killing blow, and this gave the club a crooked shape reminiscent of the sort of walking stick shepherds carried.¹¹ This kind of club could be very large. There were the famous round bilros ("bats") and also sword-shaped clubs. Chiefs carried a special club as a sign of their office. But the Caiapó club the Portuguese dreaded the most was the throwing club. Pires de Campos (1862:437) called these clubs “garrotes” ("garrotes," meaning the stick used to tighten a garrote), because of their short length. This club was carved from tropical hardwoods—difficult to work even with Portuguese steel—and lavished with great attention. “[These] are clubs a côvado in length [66 centimeters or 26 inches], more or less, with a round end where it is held and the other end flaring like the head of a paddle,” wrote Governor Rolim (Taunay 1981b:209).¹² “They adorn these, covering them with their textiles made from tree bark of various colors and in imitation of [woven] mats but tightly fitting and
attached to the club.” These shorter clubs were very typical of the Caiapó, so typical, in fact, that Pinto da Silveira used them as a sort of reference when describing the war clubs and even paddles of other native peoples. Highly esteemed and even beautiful, Caiapó weapons, despite the time and effort required to make them, were abandoned with the victims, suggesting a strong ritual component of exchange in Caiapó warfare.13

Caiapó bows were large and dexterously handled. Both António Pires de Campos and João Godói Pinto da Silveira commented on the great length and thickness of the Caiapó longbow. Pohl (1951:365) was equally impressed and witnessed the Caiapó firing their bows: “with their six-foot long bows drawn to a half circle, they [loosed an arrow that] securely reached the target at a distance of 80 steps.” The skilled Caiapó archers hit the luckless target, a bound chicken, four out of five times. This impressive accuracy, the Austrian observed, was accomplished using a peculiar archery style: the Caiapó loosed their arrows into the sky and let gravity pull the missile onto the target; this permitted the archer to remain concealed within the underbrush while raining arrows down upon an opponent. Wives sometimes aided their husbands in firing arrows.14 “In war, the woman stands behind the man with a bundle of arrows, animating him with incessant howls,” Pohl (1951:365) learned. “Soon as the arrow is loosed, the Indian reaches his hand back and immediately receives from the woman a new arrow [pointing] in the most convenient direction for the shot.” Caiapó arrows, Pohl believed, were made by binding several long bamboo strips together with small vines to produce a thick shaft. (The Panará use cane to construct arrow shafts and strengthen the joints with small wrappings of vines [Schwartzman 1988:282].) And arrows were tipped with different points for different game. A long barbed-point was
used to kill monkeys (and people), and there was an arrow with a round tip that was used to stun birds without damaging their plumage (Pohl 1951:365–366).

Another favorite Caiapó weapon was fire. Indeed, their use of fire was so typical that the coastal Tupi-speakers named them the “Caiapó,” the “carriers of fire” or “arsonists” (Mello 1879:72; see also Atáides 1998:68). On the savannahs, the Caiapó lit grass and underbrush and let breezes propel the flames into Portuguese camps (Taunay 1981b:122–123). This was a technique the Caiapó used while hunting to chase game from forest thickets. The Portuguese tried to light counter fires and tear away at the grass and underbrush, but they often had to flee the flames. Caiapó raiders also loosed flaming arrows into camps, igniting fires that sowed confusion, spread terror, and destroyed valuables (Taunay 1981b:140). These fire attacks were especially terrifying at night. One survivor of a night attack, Ignácio Correia Pamplona, left a graphic description: “In the wee hours, they sneak up and light fire to the grass huts, and wait nearby with arrows. Everything happens in an instant, the fire suddenly breaks out, and they shoot everyone fleeing the flames.”  

This wily bandeirante survived such an attack by constructing a hut and sneaking out after dark. When the Caiapó attacked, he and his hidden companions fired their muskets into the raiders’ backs. Arson also had an economic purpose: torching buildings aided in plundering valuables, since the coveted metal implements survived the flames and could be reclaimed from the ashes.

The capture of plunder was an important aspect of Caiapó warfare. The Portuguese routinely denounced “thefts” that occurred during attacks. For example, a Caiapó attack, in the mid-1730s, left 15 horses dead and their cargo scattered, but the raiders paused to pillage the tools. In 1757, the Caiapó killed a “mulatto and his wife,
robbing all the tools that they had in their home.”¹⁷ There were many such attacks and subsequent denunciations. Bandeiras often recaptured goods carried off by Caiapó raiders. When a bandeira ambushed a raiding party in 1764, most of the Caiapó fled, “leaving in the victors’ hands the spoils they carried and all of their bows and arrows and other arms.”¹⁸ In 1771, a bandeira from Cuiabá attacked Caiapó raiders, killing three and “recapturing at the same time a large part of the goods that they had robbed.”¹⁹ Lacking sustained peaceful contacts with the Portuguese, at least until 1780, and apparently possessing no allies among the other natives with whom they could trade, the Caiapó were forced to acquire manufactured goods through plunder. Successful raids, undoubtedly, were those that provided the largest quantities of goods, and raiders often returned to those places where they had acquired significant quantities of plunder (see appendix-a). This gave the impression that Caiapo attacks were, to the Portuguese mind, invasions.

One of the more frightening aspects of Caiapó war was its extreme violence. When attacking Portuguese settlements and convoys, the Caiapó offered no quarter—they killed men, women, and children—slaughtered livestock, burned fields and buildings, and scattered goods.²⁰ After a Caiapó attack, the bodies of the victims were often found riddled with arrows and smashed by numerous blows from clubs. For Caiapó warriors, much like the Northern Kaiapó (Verswijver 1992:178–179), the killing of an enemy was a collective act in which several raiders attacked a fallen victim, striking him or her with their clubs and firing arrows into the body; all warriors who struck the body of a fallen enemy acquired prestige for the kill. The Caiapó also were known to toss bodies into fires and even unearth graves to desecrate corpses. After burying
the bodies of soldiers killed in an ambush, the Portuguese later returned and discovered
the graves “open and some remains of the corpses cooked on grills as they do with
game.” While the Portuguese believed they had stumbled upon the grisly remains of
an anthropophagus feast, ethnography suggests that, by exhuming the graves and
roasting the remains, the Caiapó were treating their enemies as non-human “witches”
(cf. Schwartzman 1988:270). Torture was common as well. Among the bodies of 14
murdered slaves, the Portuguese discovered a woman with “a thick wooden spit
introduced into her womb until it passed up through her mouth,” and a man “with a large
ear of corn stuffed down into his throat.” The distinctive Caiapó arrows and clubs
always accompanied the mutilated corpses, slaughtered livestock, burnt fields, and
torched structures; it was an unsubtle reminder of the perpetrators’ identity—and an
effective means of sowing terror.

The specter of ambush, death, and desecration created palpable paranoia in the
far-flung and isolated Portuguese settlements. In Camapuã, on the route to Cuiabá,
Caiapó attacks were frequent. Farmers existed “like in a fortress, with arms always at
hand; to go in search of water, despite having it close by, they always travel with
guards: in clearing the fields, planting, or collecting the crops, they always carry
weapons; while some watch, others work, but always with weapons at hand” (Taunay
1981b:122). In Goiás, Indian sightings or the rumor of an actual or imagined attack
often resulted in panics. Jittery miners, planters, and farmers pulled up stakes retreated
to the larger mining settlements, while the more hardy and aggressive settlers armed
their slaves and patrolled the backlands. In 1760, settlers at the Arraial das Antas
were “on constant guard with weapons at hand, occupying with this task, half their

106
slaves that could serve to extract gold or cultivate fields.”  

Four years later, the Caiapó struck again, and a similar panic ensued.  

Governors blamed Caiapó attacks (along with those of other peoples) for slow economic growth and declining mining revenues.  

In Goiás, the destruction of farms and ranches left mining camps with little food; provisions had to be brought into the captaincy, carried over trails prowled and, at times, blocked by Caiapó.  

Panics exacerbated food scarcity by flooding settlements with frightened settlers and slaves: extra mouths, crowded conditions, and scarce food meant high prices and misery.  

Caiapó attacks forced the Portuguese traveling to the mines at Cuiabá to carry provisions sufficient for much of the voyage, which could last up to seven month.  

The entire length of the Pardo River was devoid of Portuguese settlement owing to “the heathen Caiapó, who availing themselves of the nights, burn houses and kill people; no one attempts to plant fields and live in such place, save a powerful man, living entrenched with sufficient arms” (Taunay 1981:160).  

Such men were in short supply, so convoys suffered great deprivation.  

Caiapó raids amounted to a crippling attack on the Portuguese supply routes to the mining regions, disrupted gold shipments, worried governors, and angered kings.  

The resulting fear and resentment were unleashed in the backlands where the Portuguese practiced a cruel form of war.  

Governors condoned and encouraged massacres: “to such heathens, you shall not give quarter save for those requesting peace,” Governor Luís de Mascarenhas angrily declared in 1741 (DI 1896, vol. 22:159–160).  

He ordered Caiapó men put to the sword, but spared women, girls, and boys under the age of ten “because these have not offended us and it does not agree with
Christian piety to spill innocent blood.” A governor of Mato Grosso licensed a bandeira to “put fire and steel to everything encountered without giving quarter to any adult male Indian who can carry weapons and use them against our forces.”29 This was to be done “without using cruelty like some sertanistas do by cutting off limbs and committing other similar barbarities to the dead.” Inadvertently, the governor provided an idea of the cruel character of colonial Indian wars. Barbarities occurred with or without government sanction, and even explicit orders to spare men “requesting peace,” avoid “cruelty,” and show “Christian piety” were easily brushed aide. When a bandeira attacked a Caiapó village in 1767, they did so “without pardoning even those that surrendered themselves and begged for their lives” (Silva e Souza 1872:452).30 The elderly, the pregnant, and the young—those people most incapable of resisting or fleeing—were frequently the victims of “great slaughters,” which governors matter-of-factly reported to the Crown.

**Intensification of Warfare, Inter-Village Conflicts, and Village Stability**

Interestingly, hidden within the accounts of the fighting, there are subtle clues suggesting shifting patterns of warfare and complex social relations between Caiapó villages. In Goiás, Caiapó raids became more violent through time, increasing in frequency and size, especially in the early 1740s, when they saw their villages repeatedly and successfully attacked. It appears that villages, motivated by a need to avenge losses, cooperated to attack the Portuguese. The intensification of Caiapó warfare appears to have been a product of the Portuguese presence. It is well known that state societies often forces indigenous peoples to adopt new strategies for dealing with the vicissitudes of contact (disease, war, slaving, etc) (Ferguson and Whitehead 1992a). It results in significant socio-political reorganization within a so-called “tribal zone,” an “area continuously affected by the proximity of a state, but not under state
administration” (Ferguson and Whitehead 1992b:3). Within the tribal zone, native peoples adopt new tactics and strategies, they often become more bellicose, and, in some cases, weak regional networks of political integration emerge.

In the case of the Caiapó, their entire territory could be considered a “tribal zone.” They were hemmed in by Portuguese settlements to the east (Minas Gerais), to the west (Cuiabá), and to the south (northern São Paulo), and Vila Boa sat on the northern border of their territory. Immense distances separated Portuguese settlements, and Crown officials possessed little administrative control over the sertões. Indigenous peoples, like the Caiapó, were driven into these areas, as one governor of Goiás described it, “searching for those places most accommodating to their way of life.” But areas free from Portuguese domination were not free from the deleterious effects of their presence: prospectors scoured rivers and streams for pay dirt; bandeiras roamed the backlands attacking Indian villages and slaving; cattlemen and farmers moved into and cleared land; groups displaced by the Portuguese battled for access to land and resources; and epidemics spread widely before the Portuguese.

For the Caiapó, one of the most important and visible effects of living in a tribal zone was their militarization. This began in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the Bilreiros started trading captives to the Paulistas for manufactured goods, which provided a new incentive for the Bilreiros to attack their neighbors. And when the Caiapó began appearing in eighteenth-century documents, approximately a decade after the discovery of gold in Cuiabá, attacks on neighboring peoples were, according to Pires de Campos (1862:437), “their greatest practice.” One of the victims of these native wars was the Goiá Indians (after whom the mines of Goiás were named). In the
last quarter of the seventeenth century, a bandeirante named Bartholomeu Bueno da Silva, nicknamed Anhangüera (Tupi for “Old Devil”) for his ruthlessness, passed through the sertões east of the Araguaia River and attacked the Goiá. They were a populous people who lived in many villages spread throughout the rugged hills of the Vermelho River Valley; they must have been so populous, perhaps even aggressive, that the elder Anhangüera did not pause long among them, even after glimpsing gold jewelry worn by the Goiá women. In the 1720s, Anhangüera’s son, the younger Bartholomeu Bueno da Silva—also nicknamed Anhangüera—remembered seeing the gold. After the discovery of the Cuiabá mines, Bueno da Silva returned to the sertões in search of the Goiá and their gold, but “he did not find more than one group of around 100 souls living on the Bugres River.”32 In the years since the younger Anhangüera had seen the gold-wearing Goiá women, Pinto da Silveira claimed, Caiapó attacks had reduced their once “vast settlements” to a single fortified village.

The destruction of the Goiá was a product of the Portuguese presence. Pushed from the southern fringe of their territory by the Paulistas and blocked to the west by the powerful Bororo, the Caiapó expanded north at the expense of their weaker neighbors. This interethnic strife intensified in the wake of Anhangüera’s discovery of gold. In his search for the mines, the younger Bueno da Silva famously attacked a village of Crixá Indians. They were a populous people in the early eighteenth century—the village Anhangüera attacked had 19 houses and population of “a little than 600 souls” (Taunay 1981a:131)—but, soon after the discovery of the mines, “a bandeira of various Paulistas […] on the task of collecting these heathen by peace, found nothing but a little group of
them on the headwaters of the Crixá-Açu River."\textsuperscript{33} Most of the Crixá, it was said, had
died in battles with the Caiapó.

The remnants of both the Goiá and Crixá fled from the Portuguese camps and
slaving expeditions and, according to one governor, moved "into the western part of this
captaincy, in whose sertões they encountered the Caiapó."\textsuperscript{34} There were terrible
conflicts, the governor explained, and both the Goiá and Crixá disappeared.
Undoubtedly, many of the children of the Goiá and Crixá became captives, like those
Pires de Campos observed in Caiapó villages. The destruction of these two peoples led
João Godói Pinto da Silveira to declared that the Caiapó "have never had friendship nor
correspondence, not even with their neighboring heathen, but they extinguished various
nations before in the same way that they attack the whites."\textsuperscript{35}

Indeed, the Portuguese traveling to Cuiabá and Vila Boa to strike it rich soon
found themselves attacked like the other peoples. At first, Caiapó raids against the
Portuguese were small. The Caiapó, after all, had begun experiencing musket fire a
century before, so they well knew to avoid fusillades with ambuscades and ambushes.
Typical of these raids were those miners and adventurers denounced along the Pardo
River and the Camapuã portage in the 1720s: a few warriors, hidden in the underbrush,
ambushed small parties hunting and gathering firewood, killing quickly and vanishing
just as quickly into the undergrowth. Such raiding grew in frequency where the
Portuguese settled near Caiapó villages, becoming a constant menace in Camapuã and
along the road to Goiás. And, once the Caiapó had begun attacking Vila Boa in the mid
1730s, a crescendo of fighting developed: raiders appeared several times each year,
attacked settlements over and over again, and killed more than 130 settlers and
slaves. Despite the growing intensity of the fighting, an official investigation, which was read before the king in 1744, revealed the majority of Caiapó attacks were the work of small groups of raiders who ambushed the unwary and isolated (Giraldin 1997:70).

For the Portuguese in Goiás, the fighting around Vila Boa was intolerable. An effort was made to fight the Caiapó with soldiers, but this proved wholly ineffective. Settlers began requesting aid from Cuiabá, where a number of bandeirantes had formed personal armies of Bororo Indians, and, in 1742, António Pires de Campos brought 120 of these Indians to Goiás (see chapter 4). Pires de Campos and the Bororo immediately began attacking Caiapó villages, and with great success. This produced a period of calm around Vila Boa for several years, but Pires de Campos’s attacks had the opposite effect and provoked a furious response in southern Goiás. In 1744–1746, huge Caiapó war parties appeared. They attacked the settlement at Lanhoso (modern Indianapolis) and briefly severed the road to São Paulo (Taunay 1950, vol. 11:246–247). Confident in the power of their muskets and their superiority over the “heathen,” the Portuguese marched against the Caiapó and were dismayed to discover the Indians did not flee. A fazendeiro (“large landholder”) named Manoel Raso rallied some men and fought a battle with the Caiapó. Raso lost—badly. While the Caiapó plundered the slain, the defeated men escaped to the Rio das Velhas. More soldiers marched to battle the Caiapó, but they too were defeated. Later, the garrison at the Rio das Velhas was “besieged by a great number of heathen.”37 Men armed with muskets cowered in expedient fortifications, refused to fight, and hoped the Caiapó would disperse. Goiás, for a short time, was cut off from the coast.
It remains difficult to know with certainty how many warriors participated in these onslaughts. The sources suggest hundreds of warriors descending from the sertões to raid. The sight of these jeering, black-painted warriors wielding clubs and loosing flaming arrows must have been horrendous to behold. Pinto da Silveira, for one, tells us the beleaguered troops at the Velhas lost heart and refused to give battle. These warriors were the survivors of many conflicts with the Portuguese and other native peoples, and they were courageous and skilled at war. Heavy fighting and the destruction of many villages occurred before Pires de Campos and the Bororo defeated them, driving them into the distant sertões.

To the Portuguese, the massive onslaughts of 1744–1746 were a frightening transformation of Caiapó raids. There had been a lot of fighting in Goiás before 1744–1746, but nothing similar to the hordes of warriors that appeared and attacked troops, besieged garrisons, and fought pitched battles at the Lanhoso and Rio das Velhas. Such open aggression by the Caiapó was unknown in the years when press-ganged, unenthusiastic, and poorly led soldiers marched against them. But these troops failed miserably and produced few victories against the fleet-footed club-fighters, whereas Pires de Campos ably led the Bororo and savaged Caiapó villages, murdering and slaving on a scale not seen before in Goiás. This success in the sertões produced a furious backlash propelled by Caiapó notions of vengeance. (Among Gê-speakers, including the Northern Kaiapó and Panará, vengeance and the need to settle vendettas played an important role in motivating warriors to raid [see e.g., Verswijver 1992:173].) Caiapó leaders called for their followers to avenge family members lost in the fighting and to retaliate against the Portuguese and Bororo aggressors (cf. Giraldin 1997:50).
It took several years to organize a response—a year or two passed after each one of Pires de Campos’s campaigns (see chapter 4)—but Caiapó villages came together, rallied their warriors, and organized huge raids: “they came in great lots,” Pinto da Silveira said, “aiding one another to repeat their hostilities.” Such cooperation between villages was not unknown later in the century: in 1781 or 1782, a bandeira attacked a large Caiapó village in Camapuã, and captives taken during the assault later recounted that “the men from their aldeia and from another went along the Goiás road to plunder” (Taunay 1981b:226). The networks of inter-village communication and cooperation that loosely liked villages within and between regions, and around which the massive raids of 1744–1746 were organized, were probably an autochthonous feature of Caiapó society. In fact, the massive onslaughts in southern Goiás were more representative of traditional Caiapó warfare—the sort of attacks that destroyed the Goiá and Crixá—than the “treacherous” ambuses and hit-and-run raids used against the Portuguese, which were tactics adopted to nullify the lethal advantage black-powder weapons possessed. Pires de Campos’s campaigns, by their shear murderous success, had caused the reinterpretation and transformation of traditional warfare into a powerful weapon of resistance, while simultaneously reinforcing and expanding pre-existing networks of inter-village communication and cooperation. Pires de Campos and the Bororo, through their depredations, had made the Caiapó a more formidable foe.

The cooperation of Caiapó villages to attack Portuguese settlements hints at an interesting, but previously ignored, aspect of their society. The evidence is admittedly vague and largely derived from closely reading descriptions of attacks and chroniclers...
accounts, but there appears to have been an absence of intra-ethnic warfare among the Caiapó. At no point in the eighteenth century—or, for that matter, the nineteenth century—do we find reports of Caiapó villages attacking one another. While this may be a product of source bias, as the Portuguese (and Brazilians) had little knowledge of village rivalries in the sertões, intra-ethnic warfare occasionally was observed—often after native peoples had entered into sustained contact with Portuguese settlements—nothing, however, suggests Caiapó villages attacked one another during their conflicts with settlers or after their so-called “pacification.”

A possible reason that intra-ethnic warfare was not prevalent among the Caiapó—and such “internal” wars are well document among other Gê-speaking societies, for example, the Northern Kaiapó (Verswijver 1992:163–171)—was because their villages remained large and remarkably stable, even when thrust into violent clashes with the Portuguese. Consider, for instance, that António Pires de Campos confronted a Caiapó village in the sertões of Camapuã so immense that “he dared not attack for being innumerable its inhabitants” (Souza 1872:447). Later in the century, bandeiras routinely encountered large Caiapó village in those places where the fighting was fiercest. In Goiás, the leader of a 1767 bandeira, which was composed of musket-toting pedestres and Bororo, claimed his men had discovered gold deposits but were unable to investigate these more fully because of a nearby and frighteningly large Caiapó village. In the early 1770s, a bandeira prospecting on the Rico River encountered a Caiapó village “of 400 or more beds” (Souza 1872:455). In 1782, a Caiapó village near the Camapuã River was large enough to frighten 12 men armed with muskets into abandoning an assault. Admittedly, this bandeira was a small and
hastily organized expedition—more a mob of angry boatmen than a bandeira akin to those Pires de Campos led—spoil for an easy attack and whose mettle evaporated at the prospect of confronting well-armed warriors; however, this village was probably the same one later attacked and, “from only one large house, they captured more than 80 people” (Taunay 1981:226). This suggests that this particular village was large, and, as the other examples cited above indicate, such large Caiapó villages were by no means unusual.

It may have been that big Caiapó villages were the product of conflicts with the Portuguese (cf. Gross 1979:330–331; Flowers 1994:261–262). Large villages had the benefit of offering their inhabitants security, as even the bandeiras Pires de Campos commanded were unwilling to chance an assault against their numerous club-wielding defenders. No less important, large villages were capable of fielding more warriors, giving them greater offensive capacity and the ability to acquire more plunder through bigger raids. Bigger raids and more looted goods meant successful war chiefs acquired more prestige and capacity to rally greater numbers of warriors; and more tools, which made clearing forests easier, meant larger gardens to feed more people (cf. Coimbra et al 2004:64).

The apparent stability of Caiapó villages appears somewhat anomalous compared to other eighteenth-century Gê societies, whose villages were prone to fissioning at times of conflict. For example, the villages of the Gê-speaking Acroá split apart during times of social stress brought about by contact and conflict: when a village of Acroá-Açu surrendered to a bandeira in the 1740s, they told their captors that they “were spread throughout their lands” because of fighting with the Portuguese and “other
nations,” and a soldier involved in this conflict recounted how the Acroá had no fields
and “only two times in the course of the year [did] they go to their aldeias.” 43 Highly
mobile and less reliant on gardens, the Acroá wandered widely to hunt and gather
resources, which made them difficult to track and defeat in battle. This extreme
mobility, however, likely did not reflect an aboriginal settlement or subsistence patterns,
rather it was a response to conflicts with the Portuguese and other peoples.

Ethnographers of the modern Gê have documented a similar pattern of village
fissioning, increased mobility, and decreased reliance on gardens associated with
contact and conflicts with Brazilians (e.g., Turner 1979, 1992). Importantly, the lack of
village stability in Gê societies was associated with a concomitant outbreak of intra-
ethnic warfare. For example, Northern Kaiapó villages were prone to political
factionalism and strife in the period preceding contact with Brazilians, when epidemic
diseases, unequal access to manufactured goods, and political disputes concerning
leadership caused significant social stress. Conflicts between competing political
factions often culminated in club-fights, which splintered villages when the losing faction
decamped and established a new village. In such cases, the two villages were mutually
antagonistic, owing to the vendettas provoked by the club fight, and began attacking
one another. This led to smaller Kaiapó villages, increased village mobile, less reliance
on garden products, and a high incidence of intra-ethnic warfare. Indeed, from
approximately 1870 to 1935, the Mekragnoti Kaiapó had lived in an incredibly large
village—the population has been estimated at between 3,700 and 5,400—that
splintered into warring factions as they entered into contact and conflict with the
There is no evidence of a similar pattern of village fissioning and intra-ethnic violence among the Caiapó. Quite the contrary, their villages appear to have assisted one another in attacking the Portuguese and remained large—or possibly became larger—in places where they encountered the Portuguese most frequently. The documents suggest a high incidence of inter-village communication and cooperation, with individuals, information, and goods moving between villages and between villages of different regions (see chapter 5). Ethnographic information supports this conclusion: among the Panará, individuals moved between villages; these villages did not splinter apart in the course of political disputes; and intra-ethnic warfare was “prohibited” (Schwartzman 1988:108, 258, 279). Similarly, inter-village mobility, cooperation between villages in warfare, and a lack of intra-ethnic warfare were characteristic of the Bororo (Crocker 1979:251–252, 1985:71–72). For both the Panará and Bororo, these phenomena appear related to their rigorous adherence to a normative village settlement pattern and clan system; the final chapter of our study argues it was much the same for the Caiapó.

**Cannibals and Captives**

Even more than the massive onslaughts, what struck the most terror into settlers and enraged Crown officials was the Caiapó practice of killing anyone and everyone who fell into their clutches, regardless of age or sex. Governor Luís de Assis Mascarenhas (DI 22 1896, vol. 22:185), for example, railed against the “barbaric cruelty” of Caiapó and decried that “they pardoned neither the children nor gave quarter to any person.” This belief was common in the eighteenth century, when Caiapó raids were at their most violent, and it passed into lore: the Caiapó were so ferocious that,
unlike other natives, they never took captives. This was good propaganda for those seeking to remove, or justify the removal of, the Caiapó.

The eighteenth-century belief that the Caiapó never took captives gained empirical support in the twentieth century. Soon after contact was established with the Kreen-Akrore, it was learned that they had never taken captives in their raids (Heelas 1979:65; Verswijver 1992:138). Considering the prominence of kidnapping women and children in native warfare, this was, in the words of one of the Panará ethnographers, Elizabeth Ewart (2000:145), “somewhat unusual.” But the internal structures of Panará society, especially their emphasis on matrilineal clans, provided a rational explanation (Heelas 1979:65, 80). Since captives, who lacked membership in a clan, could never acquire clan membership, they were incapable of being incorporated into the social fabric of a Panará village and, therefore, never abducted by raiders. The Caiapó, like their Panará ancestors, never abducted women and children, so they too must have been incapable of incorporating prisoners into village life (Giraldin 1997:47). The old tale of inexplicable ferocity and innate barbaric brutality was waylaid by Panará ethnography, which provided a rational explanation for the apparent atrocities. Although brutal and ferocious, the killings, which provided officials with so much propaganda to demonized the Caiapó and legitimating their conquest, were explainable and rational according to an indigenous worldview.

However, unlike the Panará, there were occasional reports of the Caiapó taking prisoners. In 1749, for example, the Caiapó attacked and destroyed a village of Tupi-speaking Araxá, a people who had then recently agreed to accept missionaries. The reports of the attack—dispatched from the Triângulo Mineiro by no less than António
Pires de Campos—that reached Vila Boa indicated the Caiapó had killed the Araxá men but, uncharacteristically, abducted the women and children. To explain these captives, whose mere existence contradicted what had then been experienced with the Caiapó, the governor of Goiás, Dom Marcos de Noronha, averred to the Crown that these women and children were destined to be the main course in a cannibal feast. This allegation of anthropophagy, combined with the ethnographic example of the Panará, resulted in the existence of these unfortunate Araxá women and children being dismissed (Giraldin 1997:46). Accordingly, they were little more than a disingenuous detail added by a bellicose governor looking to vilify the Caiapó and legitimate a war of conquest (and possibly acting under the undue influence of Jesuits angered by the loss of converts), since “in all the other information about Caiapó attacks, the norm is maintained: they kill everyone, pillage the goods they could carry, and burned the houses.”

But such a conclusion ignores a number of other instances of the Caiapó abducting prisoners. Take, for instance, the famous description that António Pires de Campos (1862:437–438) dictated in 1728. In an extremely unflattering portrait of the Caiapó, this bandeirante described how they waged ceaseless wars on their neighbors; wars in which they took many prisoners, specifically “children.” Much like Governor Noronha, Pires de Campos believed the Caiapó were cannibals—supposedly, they relished the supple flavor of human flesh—but the captives their raiders carried off, as Pires de Campos saw it, were not eaten but raised as “captives.”

There is no reason to dismiss these abducted children out of hand, despite the ghastly allegation of anthropophagy and the Panará ethnographic example.
Denunciations of cannibalism were legion in the colonial period, and, because cannibalism was one factor that legitimated the legal conquest of native peoples, it often had little merit beyond serving to justify military campaigns.47 For the Caiapó, this sort of allegation was neither new—they were accused of anthropophagy in the early seventeenth century—nor truthful—anthropophagy was not widespread among Gê-speakers, like the Caiapó. One would not dismiss the other details Pires de Campos provided: his descriptions of Caiapó chiefs, their gardens, and their weapons were some of the most detailed recorded in the eighteenth century. Similarly, Governor Noronha left useful accounts of the Caiapó, which, though not nearly as detailed as Pires de Campos’s description, provide us with valuable and useful information. Although they hurled the accusation of cannibalism at the Caiapó, much of the information these men recorded conforms to our ethnographic understanding of the Panará specifically (cf. Schwartzman 1988) and Gê societies generally (cf. Maybury-Lewis 1979). This propels one to conclude that we can trust much of what Pires de Campos and Governor Noronha had to say about the Caiapó. And, while we should approach reports of captives with great caution, we should not dismiss them out of hand simply because of the accompanying obloquy of Caiapó anthropophagy.

James Axtell (2001:4), the eminent ethnohistorian of the eastern native peoples of North America, has written that, “while ethnohistorians should always be skeptical of the interpretations placed on the natives’ words and actions, the outsiders’ descriptions of that behavior are usually indispensable and often trustworthy, if never as thorough or encompassing as we might wish.” This precisely describes the situation with the women and children abducted by the Caiapó. The reported cannibalism was an
interpretation: Pires de Campos never saw a cannibal feast in a Caiapó village—they did not practice anthropophagy, after all—and an aristocrat of Governor Noronha’s station—he was the Count of Arcos—never visited a Caiapó village, much less witnessed one of their warriors contently munching on a savory haunch of an unfortunate Araxá captive. We should reject, it seems, allegations of Caiapó cannibalism as nothing more than specious calumny; but if Pires de Campos and Governor Noronha were offering interpretations—admittedly bigoted and misconstrued—of actual events, then these unfortunate captives might have existed. Interpretations of events warped by cultural bias, bigotry, or misinterpretation, according to Axtell, should be tested for reliability through critical comparison to the ethnographic record, surviving and related native languages, oral traditions, and archaeology. We know that the taking of prisoners in warfare, especially women and children, was extremely common throughout the tropical lowlands and practiced, unlike cannibalism, by many Gê societies (see e.g., Verswijver 1992). And the Panará example has been described as “somewhat unusual,” even though it fits with much of what the Portuguese claimed about the Caiapó. Accepting that the accusation of cannibalism was an interpretation of actual events, recalling Axtell’s reminder that descriptions of behavior are “indispensable” and “often trustworthy,” and keeping in mind the near universal occurrence of raiding for women and children in lowland warfare, it seems possible that the Caiapó abducted women and children.

In fact, closely reading the sources reveals good reasons to believe the Caiapó did take captives, but one must look at the context of Pires de Campos’s and Governor Noronha’s descriptions: Pires de Campos reported the Caiapó raided for children in
In 1728; Governor Noronha accused the them of eating the Araxá women and children in 1749; and both men described Caiapó involved in deleterious contact with the Portuguese. In 1728, the Caiapó faced the brunt of the gold rushes in Cuiabá and Goiás, as Portuguese greed thrust them into permanent contact with noxious outsiders: their territories were invaded by thousands of miners, adventurers, and settlers, which created new opportunities for the spread of lethal pathogens, and subjected their villages to new and more violent forms of warfare and slavery. Added to this was the rapid expansion of the frontier, which displaced other native peoples and pushed them inland and into competition for resources; ethnic conflict, such as described by Pires de Campos (1862:437)—he said of the Caiapó that “their greatest practice is to be raiders of various nations”—was inevitable. The resulting social upheaval and loss of life must have been incredible, and raiding to abduct children was one means to recoup some of these losses, which was precisely what Pires de Campos was describing—“children” abducted and raised as “captives” in Caiapó villages. The destruction of the Araxá occurred for similar reasons. In 1749, the Caiapó were hard pressed by the military campaigns of António Pires de Campos. He led an army of Bororo Indians across a broad swath of Caiapó territory, destroying villages, pillaging and burning gardens, and killing or enslaving all of the men, women, and children who fell into his clutches. Attacking the Araxá to abduct their women and children was, in part, a Caiapó attempt to replenish village populations depleted by war (women and children, after all, were the most common victims of Pires de Campos and other bandeira leaders). The social disruption, territorial dislocation, and population loss associated with Portuguese contact and war made abducting women and children a viable alternative for the Caiapó. Some
mechanism—lost or forgotten by the Paraná; their population collapse was so rapid and
dramatic that there was no time for some sort of “rediscovery”—for incorporating
captives into Caiapó villages during times of extreme stress must have once existed.48

The Portuguese and their diseases, slavery, and war, not some alleged taste for
human flesh, forced the Caiapó to take prisoners. There were other reports of the
Caiapó raiding and taking prisoners, but these always occurred in the context of contact
with the Portuguese. There was the aforementioned trade in captives between the
Bilreiros and the bandeirantes in the early seventeenth century. The Caiapó were again
involved in a similar trade during the 1780s, when some of their warriors participated in
bandeiras persecuting the Chavante in northern Goiás. In 1784, a bandeira, which
included allied Caiapó warriors, attacked a group of trekking Chavante, seizing a
warrior, five women, and five children—a feat “easily managed through the skill of the
domesticated heathen Caiapó” (Freire 1951:14).49 The Caiapó effort contributed to the
eventual “pacification” of the Chavante in 1788, but, more importantly, their participation
in this bandeira showed that they possessed the knowledge and capacity to take
captives. Further, the ease with which they captured the Chavante showed that this
was nothing exceptional: the Caiapó had raided and abducted women and children
many times beforehand. And an anonymous chronicler of Goiás also told how these
allied Caiapó “wandered the immense countryside for hundreds of leagues [where] they
captured many fugitive slaves, whom they conducted to the villages of the captaincy.”50
Again, we find evidence of the Caiapó using their woodland skills and military prowess
to take captives. Clearly, despite numerous denunciations to the contrary, the Caiapó
did take captives.
So the eighteenth century closed with reliable reports of the Caiapó taking captives. In these cases, however, unlike those described by Governor Noronha and Pires de Campos, the Portuguese instigated the abductions. Presumably, because they were describing an allied people, the chroniclers were loath to attribute these abductions to anthropophagy, much less accuse the Caiapó of savoring the flesh of captives. They knew the Caiapó were remunerated for their martial service—in the case of the Caiapó aiding the bandeira against the Chavante, 40 pairs of shirts and short pants were provided to the warriors—and not launching these attacks out of a bestial craving to eat their fellow humans.

But, if the Caiapó took captives, why did the Portuguese routinely and consistently declare otherwise? A close reading of the sources reveals that there was, in fact, no contradiction. Where we have reports of Caiapó abductions in the early- and mid-eighteenth century, the captives were always women and children, precisely the pattern expected in lowland warfare; however, these prisoners were natives, not the Portuguese or enslaved Africans. António Pires de Campos and Governor Noronha described Caiapó attacks on indigenous peoples and the taking of indigenous captives. Outside of one possible incident involving a child in the 1740s (see appendix-a), there were no reliable reports of the Caiapó abducting non-natives in the consulted sources. Further evidence of this comes from the so-called Caiapó “pacification” of the early 1780s: when villages began arriving at Vila Boa and Maria I, the first Caiapó aldeia in Goiás, the Portuguese recorded no instances of captive Portuguese or Africans living among them. This was quite unlike other so-called “pacified” peoples. The Chavante, for example, arrived at an aldeia with a number of captives, Portuguese and former
slaves, living among them in 1788 (see Freire 1951:19). There was, it appears, something about the Portuguese and their slaves that made them incapable of being assimilated into the social fabric of Caiapó villages.

The difference in raiding behavior is extremely provocative and suggests the Caiapó, unlike the Panará of the Peixoto de Azevedo, distinguished between indigenous people and the Portuguese and their African slaves. Undoubtedly, this was because the Caiapó were in contact with indigenous and non-indigenous people for many, many years; they must have recognized the vast differences in culture, appearance, and material goods. It also suggests why many contemporaries believed the Caiapó never abducted women and children: chroniclers simply did not know about Caiapó attacks on other indigenous groups, nor, for that matter, did they care much about such assaults—interethnic violence weakened native opposition to the Portuguese and, as in the case of the Bororo, sometimes led to the acquisition of powerful allies—unless an allied people, like the Araxá, was involved. In such cases, the Caiapó, to the Portuguese mind, must have attacked out of a desire to eat their enemies.

Conclusion

The Caiapó began the eighteenth century in a position of strength: their territory stretched from the Triângulo Mineiro to Camapuã; their villages were numerous, populous, surrounded by gardens, and brimmed with formidable club-fighting warriors; and their raids had depopulated entire rivers, reduced a formerly populous neighboring people to single villages, and struck terror among the Portuguese miners, slavers, and adventurers pressing into the interior. By the middle of the century, the Caiapó were a serious threat along much of the route to the mines at Cuiabá and their aggressive raids
had put the Portuguese in Goiás on the defensive. The Portuguese responded by sending soldiers to fight the Caiapó, but these troops proved ineffective at confronting the nimble raiders, so aid was sought from capable commanders with native allies from distant Cuiabá. António Pires de Campos and his Bororo arrived and attacked the Caiapó, but their aggression galvanized them. The Caiapó rallied, reorganized, and struck back with incredible aggression, transforming their raids from ambushes into onslaughts that sought to settle bloody vendettas and resist their Portuguese enemies. The Portuguese eventually beat back these offensives, but only at great cost and with much effort, and never with the conclusive results they expected or sought, since the fighting continue until the end of the century. In the course of these conflicts, a myth developed that the Caiapó never offered quarter to their enemies—they never took captives, they never spared “the innocents” and remorselessly slaughtered women and children. But the Caiapó did raid for captives, just never the Portuguese and their slaves, and lost in the conflicts that raged across the sertões was the fact that Caiapó warriors, as in so many other peoples in the tropical lowlands, attacked neighboring indigenous groups and abducted women and children. A narrative of these conflicts, which have been imperfectly understood until now, is the subject of the next chapter.

1 AHEGO Livro 3 (1735-1751), fls. 87-89v.
2 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 983.
3 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 14, D. 856.
4 Reports of women appearing among raiders often reflects an interpretation, admittedly biased, of Caiapó trekking behavior. Trekking is discussed more fully below, however, it is important to mention here that, in certain seasons, and like other Gê-speaking peoples, such as the Northern Kaiapó, the Caiapó trekked, leaving their villages and wandering through the sertões to hunt, fish, and gather. Such treks were often done with the intention of acquiring a certain resource. Soldiers, who encountered groups of trekking Caiapó, inevitably believed that Indians away from their villages represented a war party. This was not always the case, as trekking Caiapó were not raiders, despite what soldiers may have thought. This helps explain the occasional appearance of women in war parties. However, historical evidence, discussed later in our study, exists that explicitly places Caiapó women in raids and aiding warriors during battles, and ethnography strongly suggests that there is good reason to believe Caiapó women did participate in raids. Ewart (2000:77-79) records “two older women” accompanied Panará men in what amounted to
a raid in 1997, leaving their village with men who went to confront and chase off loggers illegally working on Panará lands. One of the women later recounted how she and the other woman had verbally confronted the loggers. Much like a Caiapó raid, the Panará returned to their village laden with a large haul of booty taken from the loggers. Further, Ewart (2000:116) discusses a Panará myth of the origin of witcraft. According to the myth she recounted, two women accompanied Panará men on their way to attack the Northern Kaiapó. This would suggest, it seems, that Panará women have a tradition, in fact and in myth, of accompanying their men to attack enemies, and even participating in the fighting.

5 The published version of Pires de Campos is cited throughout our study. For the original document, see IHGB Lata 129, pasta 9.
6 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023. Much of this information matches what is known ethnographically about Gê-speaking societies generally (see e.g., Maybury-Lewis) and the Panará specifically (e.g., Ewart 2000).
7 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 32, D. 2005.
8 Arquivo Público de Mato Grosso (Hereafter, APMT) Fundo: Governadoria (31-3-1771) Doc.336.
9 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023.
10 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 32, D. 2005.
11 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023.
12 According to Ewart (2000:66), well-made and blade-shaped clubs similar to this were “ceremonial” clubs called “ko.” The rougher, knobbed-ended clubs, called “kwakrit tu,” were “war clubs.”
13 Ewart (2000:68, 76-77) found a strong ritual component in Panará warfare, noting parallels between seasonal hunting parties and war parties: both left their villages to hunt (game or victims); both returned bearing goods (game or booty); and, in some cases, the Panará painted game in a manner reminiscent of people. On the ontological interplay between hunting and warfare, see Fausto (2007).
14 From the Mekragnoti, Heelas (1979:236) learned that “Panará women were not above joining in a fight if the need arose.”
15 Arquivo Público Mineiro (Hereafter, APM) FDF-CC Rolo 546, #969.
16 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023.
17 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023.
18 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 20, D. 1220.
19 AHU_ACL_CU_010, Cx. 17, D. 931.
20 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023; see also, DI 1896, vol. 22:185.
21 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023. In the late 1960s, when the VillaBôas brothers spearheaded the attempt to contact the Kreen-Akrore, they discovered burnt and charred bones on the outskirts of an abandoned village. At the time, the bones were believed to belong to the victim of a Kreen-Akrore attack (Cowell 1974:176), but actually they belonged to Panará individuals killed for practicing witchcraft. The Panará call witches hipe, a term also used to describe enemies, and burned the bodies of witches. See Ewart (2000, especially chapter 3). The Caiapó practice of deliberately burning bodies, including those of the dead, suggests that they viewed the Portuguese as a form of hipe.
22 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023.
23 E.g., AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 27, D. 1776.
24 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 983.
25 AHU_ACL_008, Cx. 20, D. 1220.
26 E.g., AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 15, D. 933.
27 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17m D. 1023. For a discussion of a phenomenon in Minas Gerais, see Langfur (2005b:266-270).
28 These instructions applied to all hostile Indians but were representative of similar orders issued to bandeiras fighting the Caiapó.
30 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 23, D. 1440.
31 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 983.
32 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023.
33 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023.
34 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 983.
35 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023.
36 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023.
In the twentieth century, Panará assaults on the Northern Kaiapó “had the characteristic more of massive onslaughts, during which the assailants bluntly entered the [...] village and promptly provoked man-to-man fights,” but their attacks became ambushes on isolated individuals once the Kaiapó had acquired firearms (Verswijver 1992:138).

For another example, see AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023.

A memory, however faint, of the taking of captives did survive among the Panará. Heelas (1979:219-223, esp. 222) described a ritual in which Panará men attacked a wasp nest; a ritual that symbolically and physically resembled a Panará raid (e.g., the participants were painted; the nest was attacked with arrows and clubbed). After attacking the wasp nest, the participants in the ritual returned to the village and brought an axe and a “doll” into the village center. The axe, obviously, symbolized the kind of booty that Panará warriors, much like their Caiapó ancestors, had once brought into the village center after a raid. The meaning of the doll was less clear to Heelas, understandably so, since the Panará did not take captives. Thus, at least in ritual, it appears the Panará recalled their ancestors’ practice of abducting woman and children.

In theory, at least, it was illegal to attack Indians in Brazil, unless certain conditions were met, e.g., the people in question practiced cannibalism or impeded the propagation of the Faith. On so-called “just wars,” see Kieman (1954).

Indeed, if the doll brought into the village after the wasp-nest ritual was a distant memory of the practice of abducting women and children, but for the outbreaks of epidemics that reduced the Panará to less than 100 persons in less than a decade, the ability to incorporate captives into village life might have been “rediscovered.”

This requires a slight caveat. Beginning in the 1780s, some Caiapó were employed to hunt fugitive slaves, whom they captured and brought back to Portuguese settlements for a reward, see IHGB Lata 397, pasta 2). These captives, from what we can tell, were never assimilated into Caiapó villages, unlike these native captives. Occasionally, one comes across reports of disappearance occurring around Cuiabá. Although often attributed to the Caiapó, these abductions were probably the work of the Bororo.
CHAPTER 4
THE WARS: A NARRATIVE (1720–1780)

Introduction

At the end of the seventeenth century, word of gold strikes in the interior quickly spread, and adventurers, prospectors, slavers, and various sorts of nefarious characters headed with reckless abandon to Minas Gerais, the “General Mines.” These strikes spurred new discoveries in territories to the west and deep within the continent, first at Cuiabá and later Goiás. The Caiapó threatened these two mining regions for most of the eighteenth century, and the conflicts that developed from the Portuguese attempts to secure the mines are well known. This chapter offers a more complete narrative of these conflicts as they evolved in Goiás, Mato Grosso, and São Paulo, with a particular emphasis on the Portuguese struggle to acquire native allies to fight the Caiapó in Goiás.

Cuiabá: The Monção Route

The first gold strikes following those in Minas Gerais, those at Cuiabá, were the most distant and remote of all. These mines were discovered when Pascoal Moreira Cabral and António Pires de Campos—the father of the famous Caiapó fighter—encountered Indians wearing gold ornaments on the Coxipó and Cuiabá Rivers in 1719. The slavers—now turned prospectors—sent word of their felicitous discovery to São Paulo and the second gold rush in a generation was on.

Traveling to these mines was unlike any other voyage in the New World. Those seeking their fortunes in Cuiabá made an epic trek of at least five months that pitted them against deprivation, hunger, rapids, whirlpools, and difficult portages. They began by traveling overland from São Paulo to the port of Araritaguaba (Porto Feliz) on the...
Tietê River, which they descended in canoes to the Panará. This river carried the flotillas southwest before they began a difficult northwest ascent into the interior along the Pardo River and its headwaters. When the adventurers arrived at Camapuã, they made a difficult portage of several days before descending the Camapuã, Coxim, and Taquari Rivers. They then passed through the Pantanal (the world’s largest swamp) and ascended the Paraguay and Porrudos Rivers to the Cuiabá River before finally arriving at the mines.

Conflicts with the Caiapó began on the lower Tietê River. From the Tietê to the Pardo, the entire north bank of the Panará was dominated by the Caiapó, with the region near the Verde and Sucuriú Rivers being particularly thickly inhabited (Taunay 1981b:122). The Verde was believed to offer a quicker route to Cuiabá, but the Caiapó made traveling on this river so perilous the Portuguese avoided exploring this river until the early nineteenth century (Taunay 1981b:158). Arriving at the Pardo brought no relief from Caiapó attack, since, as one chronicler noted, “all along this great river the Caiapó are accustomed to wander” (Taunay 1981b:122). Much of the Pardo, however, was not home to Caiapó villages. Those voyaging to Cuiabá noted Caiapó war parties “reach the Pardo River, but they are few” (Taunay 1981b:122, 158). Nonetheless, even small numbers of Caiapó were “enough to depopulated fields there, by killing the people and burning their houses.” Farmers were unable to raise crops to supply the passing flotillas and a canoe stopping on the banks to hunt or gather firewood risked attack, so sufficient provisions had to be carried for the several weeks required to ascend this river. This made the journey more difficult and expensive. Hunger was often the voyagers’ constant companion.
At the headwaters of the Pardo, the flotillas were forced to make a difficult portage across Camapuã, the rugged hill country between the Pardo and Coxim Rivers. The canoes were unloaded and transported across the campo on four-wheeled carts pulled by slaves. Because of the constant threat of Caiapó attack, these caravans were accompanied by heavy escort and “march[ed] always together with weapons in the vanguard and rearguard and the cargo in the center” (Taunay 1981b:138). The last two days of the portage, where the trail descended into a narrow gully whose overhanging banks were thickly shrouded in undergrowth, were particularly dangerous because the Caiapó lit the surrounding brush on fire before attacking (Taunay 1981:122).

In the early days of the gold rush, Camapuã quickly emerged as a principal battlefield. In February of 1728, Dom Rodrigo Cesar de Menezes, the Capitão-General of São Paulo, demanded an investigation of Indian attacks and sanctioned the slaving of the Paiaguá, Guaicurú, and “others that infest the place of Camapuã, invading the fields in that place, killing slaves [and] intimidating the rest to depopulate that place” (DI 1895, vol. 13:135). The “others,” against whom Dom Rodrigo railed, were the Caiapó. Two years later, in August of 1730, the Crown, incensed over the killing 40 slaves in Camapuã, licensed the slaving of the Caiapó by declaring the captives taken while attacking their villages were slaves (DI 1896, vol. 24:27–28). The Crown also ordered a fort established and a force of 70 cavalry to sweep the sertões in search of hostile Indians. Another declaration of war followed on March 5, 1732, this time granting permission to attack the Paiaguá (DI 1896, vol. 22:12–13), but the Guiacuru and Caiapó were included in the conflict the following September (Giraldin 1997:63). By December of 1733, slaving in Camapuã was so rampant and widespread that a priest denounced
the Paulistas for extending their attacks to all the neighboring native peoples (Giralde
1997:63). Slavers liked to claim those they attacked were allied with the Caiapó, which
ostensibly legitimated their assaults, and even went so far as to assert an alliance
between the Caiapó and the Bororo, despite it being well known that these two peoples
despised one another. The Crown responded by ordering an investigation; the slaving
continued regardless of this command.

Because of the fighting and slaving, Caiapó captives were numerous and a
common sight inCamapuá. In 1788, there were so many captive Caiapó that a
Portuguese engineer and surveyor, Francisco José de Lacerda e Almeida (1944:81),
felt the Portuguese spoken in the region was permeated with “an accent so tedious and
unrecognizable that I considered fleeing.” Many of these Caiapó had come from a
slaving expedition in 1781 or 1782, which one traveler, Diogo de Toledo Lara e
Ordonhes, described (Taunay 1981b:226). One of the settlers, “seeing that these
[Caiapó] had caused him various losses in his clearings and cattle and had killed some
people from the fazenda when they left [to work] without arms, dispatched a troop that
wandered for four days and encountered an aldeia six or eight leagues from the
fazenda.” The men attacked the village, captured over 80 “women, children and young
boys, because all the others fled, except two old women that remained.” The bandeira
pillaged “many things, pieces of metal, knives, etc., things they [the Caiapó] had stolen
on other occasions.” Lacerda e Almeida (1944:81) thought the Caiapó children were
“happy, and pacific,” and the two women impressed him with their strength: both had
attempted to flee twice and, when captured, “each one [was] carrying a child of five or
six years of age on her back.” From what both chroniclers could tell, the Caiapó appeared content with their lot.

After passing through the campo of Camapuã, the flotillas found little safety from Caiapó attacks. The Camapuã and Coxim Rivers were narrow and rocky with high and overhanging banks. Occasionally, the Caiapó occupied the high ground along the Coxim and hurled rocks onto the passing canoes (Holanda 1945:161). In 1782, one convoy was attacked three times on the Camapuã River. After the third attack, the aggressive flotilla commander, Manoel Manço, decided to attack the Caiapó. He landed 12 men on the riverbanks, and they pushed inland for three leagues, but their bravado faded when confronted with the sight of a huge Caiapó village. The bandeira slinked back to their canoes and continued on to Cuiabá, where they denounced the attacks and called for retaliation. Even late in the century, many rivers in northern Camapuã were simply avoided out of fear of the Caiapó. Francisco de Oliveira Barbosa (1863:34) reported in 1792 that the Selado River, a tributary of the Coxim, was avoided because of the many Caiapó aldeias situated near its banks.

The clash-of-arms between the Portuguese and the Caiapó along the river route to Cuiabá grew in intensity through the early eighteenth century. The threat was so serious that a council was convened in Cuiabá in the early 1730s to discuss how to defeat the Caiapó (Giraldin 1997:63). On the advice of various bandeirantes, including António Pires de Campos, this council decided to concentrate on attacking the Caiapó from Vila Boa. Goiás was closer to lands occupied by the Caiapó and a furious war raged there. Settlers in Goiás, unable to halt the Caiapó raids, had sought assistance from Cuiabá, summoning an old bandeirante named Ángelo Preto de Godói to come
and fight for them. Preto de Godói possessed a personal army of Bororo Indians, and he was famous for the great slaughters he had committed against the Paiaguá. But he was a hoary campaigner and so advanced in years that he declined the invitation. The miners in Goiás were forced to fight the Caiapó without assistance from Cuiabá for several more years.

The Caiapó raids worsened in Goiás, and aid was again solicited from Cuiabá in 1740–1741. This time António Pires de Campos answered the call and agreed to fight the Caiapó. This redoubtable Indian-fighter would spend the rest of his life slaving and terrorizing the Caiapó in Goiás. These conflicts, as well as those that followed the death of Pires de Campos, would overshadowed the ambushes and back-and-forth raiding on the Pardo and in Camapuã for the rest of the century. There was one important exception—the Caiapó attack at Médico.

**The Attack at Médico**

In 1771, the Caiapó attacked a large group of slaves working a mine near Médico, six leagues (37 kilometers or 23 miles) outside of Cuiabá. Around 4 p.m. on March 21, approximately 200 Caiapó descended a cart track leading into the mine. Caught off guard and unarmed, close to 400 slaves and their overseers scrambled to flee before the onrushing attackers. There was a great slaughter. A large number of slaves and at least one overseer were slain in the mine, and more slaves and at least two overseers were run down in the surrounding campo. The victorious Caiapó looted the mine and attacked a nearby ranch, killing several head of cattle, before retreating into the sertões with their plunder. They left behind a scene of incredible carnage: bodies, bloated from the sun and humidity, were still being recovered from the campo several days after the attack.
The Caiapó assault was a complete surprise, despite the discovery of trails and sightings of Indian scouts quietly observing settlements in the preceding months, as many years had passed since an attack on Cuiabá (Almeida 1944:65). Rumors of an invasion of thousands of hostile Indians and incredible carnage—the death toll was grossly exaggerated to more than 70 dead slaves—fueled a panic: isolated miners, ranchers, and farmers, terrified by the rumors, abandoned their lands and fled to the safety of Cuiabá. The obligatory calls for vengeance were heard; a posse of aldeia Indians, hastily armed with a dozen muskets, was sent after the retreating Caiapó. The bandeira managed to overtake the raiders and fight a brief skirmish: three Caiapó were killed and a great quantity of plundered items recaptured and returned to Cuiabá.

But neither the governor nor the settlers were content with killing three Caiapó and recovering some plundered goods, so a second expedition was organized under the command of Capitão António Soares de Gódoi. Once a tough Indian-fighter, this bandeirante’s youth was long gone, and the captain was old, tired, and of dubious capacity. His reputation, however, still commanded enough respect that he was charged with leading 71 men, including 14 Bororo—the native pathfinders and troops favored for fighting the Caiapó—into the sertões. Soares de Gódoi received instructions ordering his bandeira to search first for an aldeia of Bororo-Araripoconé known to be somewhere on the Porrudos River and convince them to move closer to Cuiabá. The Bororo, it was believed, would help locate the perpetrators of the recent attack and serve as a barrier against future Caiapó aggression. If the Bororo balked, resisted, or there was reason to suspect their involvement in the Médico massacre, then the governor considered them aggressors and ordered Soares de Gódoi to attack them.
After contacting the Bororo, and hopefully acquiring guides and allies, the Bandeira was to proceed to Camapuã and the headwaters of the Araguaia River and attack “any heathen Caiapó village.” As an incentive to spare the women and children from the envisioned slaughter, the governor declared that any captives taken by the bandeira belonged to their victors. These instructions, by authorizing the bandeira to attack the Bororo and any located Caiapó villages, expanded the conflict to peoples and villages not involved in the recent slaughter.

The geriatric Soares de Gódoi, despite his formidable reputation, had little success in the sertões: the bandeira, as one governor later put it, was “without effect.” Slow in preparing and tardy in leaving, the bandeira was plagued by desertion before it had begun its march. The desertions continued and, before reaching the Porrudos, the ranks were thinned by the loss of an additional 16 men. The bandeira found the Bororo and fought a brief battle that the Indians won. The defeated remnants of Soares de Gódoi’s bandeira scattered into the sertões and, over the course of a few months, limped back to Cuiabá (Carvalho Franco 1989:185).

This was bad news for the governor and the settlers crowded into Cuiabá. While the Soares de Gódoi bandeira had prepared, there were new attacks on the outskirts of the capital. An ill-received report reached Cuiabá that raiders had killed four slaves on July 23. The next day, raiders attacked a group of slaves working fields on a plantation belonging to Salvador Rodrigues de Algueira, killing seven “adults and children” and an Indian woman. The survivors of this attack reported woman and children mixed in among the warriors, and, since no women and children were seen at the Médico slaughter, this provoked a fear that a second group of Caiapó was
marauding outside of Cuiabá. Officials acted swiftly. Pascoal Delgado Lobo, another elderly Indian-fighter, was sent after these Caiapó. This hoary bandeirante was more successful than Soares de Gódoi. After spending only 21 or 22 days in the sertões, Delgado Lobo returned and reported discovering many abandoned camps, shelters, and other evidence of the Caiapó moving through the sertões outside of Cuiabá. And he had ambushed a small camp of 22 “beds” near the Taquari River, killing a few Caiapó.

But Delgado Lobo’s success was fleeting. Over the next few months, there were Bororo attacks to the north and south of Cuiabá, and the Paiaguá, formidable canoe-borne fluvial raiders, attacked farms and ranches. The threat of ambush by the Caiapó, Bororo, and Paiaguá hung over the mines. In August of 1772, the governor of Mato Grosso, Luís Pinto de Sousa Coutinho, called for the captaincies of São Paulo, Goiás, and Mato Grosso to coordinate their military efforts. This appeal was repeated that December by his successor, Luís de Albuquerque Pereira e Cáceres. Despite the hostilities of several native peoples, both men singled out the Caiapó as the most formidable and pressing threat: Caiapó territory, they argued, was too vast for any one captaincy to conquer and the recent bandeiras had done little to reduce hostilities near Cuiabá. “[C]lose to 200 persons” had died in the fighting, the new governor claimed, and 80 armed men dispatched after Caiapó had produced no results; there were still raids.

Bandeiras and calls for cooperation between the captaincies did little to assuage the growing fears in Cuiabá. In March of 1773, an officer, Francisco Lopes de Araújo, informed the governor that settlers expected more Indian attacks in the coming year.
Such fears proved correct: the outskirts of the capital were attacked again. The survivors of one raid reported their assailants wore penis-sheaths.\textsuperscript{25} This identified the attackers as Bororo—the Caiapó fought naked and did not wear this particular accoutrement—and it was clear that two native peoples were attacking Cuiabá. Worse yet, these Bororo attacks were most likely the product of the ill-fated Soares de Gódoi bandeira: the government’s acting upon the settlers’ calls for action to end the hostilities had produced the opposite result.

In response, the governor devised a plan for a 100-man expedition to spend up to a year slaving on the Porrudos and Taquari Rivers.\textsuperscript{26} In March of 1773, a junta convened to debate the hostilities and recommended a similar course of action: a bandeira of 80 to 100 men, paid by the treasury and contributions from threatened miners, to attack Indian villages north of Camapuã.\textsuperscript{27} João Leme do Prado and Pascoal Delgado Lobo, the same slaver who had early attacked the Caiapó and the recent victor in a battle with the Paiaguá Indians, were given command of this expedition and ordered to divide their forces by land and river.\textsuperscript{28} Their first goal, according to the junta, was to investigate if the Bororo, whom Soares de Gódoi had attacked, were responsible for the recent attacks.

This bandeira set off for the sertões on August 9, 1773. A few weeks earlier, there had been an attack that killed three outside of Cuiabá, so the men left with a sense of urgency and had vengeance on their minds.\textsuperscript{29} The bandeira attacked and destroyed a small Caiapó aldeia. It then attacked a Bororo village on the Porrudos River.\textsuperscript{30} The commanders justified their assault by claiming they had discovered in the village some rough cloth, a sack of cotton, and other odds-and-ends stolen from settlements. At
least 80 captives were taken in the attack. Mixed in among the Bororo prisoners, the bandeira discovered two captive Caiapó boys. So the Caiapó and Bororo, as had been suspected in Cuiabá, were attacking one another. The bandeira left the Porrudos River with their captives and headed back to Cuiabá, but the two Caiapó youths and most of the Bororo managed to escape (Fonseca 1881:77).\textsuperscript{31} This bandeira, much like those that had recently preceded it, was without effect in beating back the Caiapó.

A brief period of calm followed. There were no reports of Caiapó or Bororo attacks until 1776 and 1777.\textsuperscript{32} Even then, the Portuguese were unsure of the perpetrators’ identity: for example, the governor, in 1778, reported dispatching a bandeira after hostile Indians “that one supposes to be the Caiapó.”\textsuperscript{33} Despite the bandeiras, authorities had been unable to halt the raids. The cost of the failure was high: an investigation revealed the Caiapó and Bororo had killed 183 people, mostly slaves, between the March of 1771 and January of 1778.\textsuperscript{34}

At first glance, the raids near Cuiabá appear to be part of the larger pattern of back-and-forth fighting that had occurred around the mines. On closer examination, however, it appears that something far more interesting was occurring. Caiapó raiders had appeared where they were rarely seen before; reports indicated that, on at least one occasion, women and children accompanied the raiders; and bandeiras reported encountering evidence of Caiapó moving through the sertões outside of Cuiabá. After 1773, there was a sudden decline in hostilities followed by an outbreak of fighting, but the identity of the offenders was in doubt, and, since Caiapó attacks were easy to identify, it seems reasonable that these attacks were the work of the Bororo or another
people. This suggests the Caiapó had quit attacking Cuiabá. The Caiapó responsible for the attacks, it appears, had migrated past the mines.

By the late 1760s and early 1770s, raiding in Goiás had become too dangerous for the Caiapó. Attacks, even small ones, almost always propelled a heavily armed bandeira into the sertões. These later bandeiras were manned by skilled Bororo troops who frequently tracked down and attacked Caiapó villages. Some of these villages tried to escape the Bororo by relocating. Driven from Camapuã and the headwaters of Araguaia, the Caiapó crossed Bororo territory and, extremely aggressive after two generations of back-and-forth raiding, began attacking Cuiabá to capture the manufactured goods they were dependent upon. Conflicts with bandeiras, as well as the Bororo (suggested by the two captive Caiapó boys found in a Bororo village), eventually pushed the Caiapó on their way. This movement was part of a larger pattern of migrations out of Goiás: there was a sudden outbreak of fighting in northern São Paulo during the 1760s. Military officers believed the fighting was brought about by the flight of Caiapó from Goiás (see below). But the Caiapó seeking refuge to the south of Goiás found no relief from the fighting. The villages driven into the northwest, however, eventually discovered sertões free of settlements of miners, ranchers, and farmers. Lost in the vastness of the interior, these Caiapó were forgotten—until they were again contacted as the Kreen-Akrore.

**Goiás**

The most famous and sanguinary of the Caiapó conflicts were those of Goiás (Taunay 1950; Hemming 1978:405–408). The search for the mines of Goiás was inspired by the discovery of gold at Cuiabá. The younger Bartholomeu Bueno da Silva remembered that, while on a bandeira with his father—a craggy-faced, one-eyed Indian
slaver whose name he shared—there were Indians wearing gold trinkets somewhere east of the Araguaia River. Anhangüera solicited and received permission to find the Goiá, and he and a retinue of adventurers, Indian auxiliaries, and slaves marched north from São Paulo in 1722. They entered the sertões to the east of the Araguaia River, a harsh and unforgiving landscape, where men died of hunger while marching across endless sun-soaked scrub and savannah (Taunay 1981:124–141). The bandeira was saved when it stumbled upon a village of Crixá Indians, which Anhangüera ordered attacked and pillaged for food. Although saved from starvation, the frustrated expedition soon split apart and failed to locate the gold-wearing Indians. Bueno da Silva survived this trek, returned to São Paulo, raised a new cohort, and returned to the sertões in 1726. Fortune favored this second bandeira, which finally located the unfortunate Goiá Indians—whose women decorated themselves with delicate gold leaflets—near the Bugres and Vermelho Rivers. Anhangüera sent word of his good fortune to São Paulo and established a rude mining camp, which he named Sant’ Anna, in the hills near the Goiá village.

The lands between the Araguaia and Tocantins Rivers were soon overrun by prospectors, and the mining camp of Sant’ Anna became the colonial center of Vila Boa; now a charming tourist town called Goiás Velho (“Old Goiás”). The miners and their slaves worked in lonely and inhospitable places, isolated from the larger settlements and spread across a vast region of rolling savannah and thick riparian forests. Much of the territory south of the “Gilded Mountains” was home to Caiapó villages. When Anhangüera established the first mining camp, he infelicitously chose a place bordered, if distantly, by two densely inhabited regions. To the southwest, the Caiapó completely
dominated the Claro, Caiapó, and Pilões Rivers, and, south of Vila Boa, their villages were numerous in the sertões around and between the Paranaíba and Grande Rivers; prospectors soon learned the right bank tributaries of the Paranaíba, especially the Corumbá and Rio dos Bois, were dangerous places. Caiapó from these regions knew well the sertões around Vila Boa, since they had often attacked the Goiá in the years before Anhangüera’s return. And, to arrive at the mines, adventurers traveled overland along the trails blazed by Bueno da Silva: these ran northwest from São Paulo through Mogi-Mirim, forded the Grande and Paranaíba Rivers, before winding their way to Vila Boa. Travelers risked attack along much of the route, especially where the trail passed through the eastern sertões between the Paranaíba and Grande Rivers. Known as the sertões of Farinha Podre ("Rotten Manioc Flour"), these backlands were so dominated by the Caiapó that their villages served as a sort of frontier between the captaincies of Goiás and Minas Gerais (Langfur 1998:1).

Unfortunately, the initial conflicts that occurred along the overland passage to the mines were very poorly documented, and practically nothing is known about them. We know that Anhangüera, while on his first march in search of the Goiá, fought the Caiapó and abducted several women, including one later known as “Thereza” (Souza 1872:434 n.2). Better documented and better known are the conflicts that erupted around Vila Boa. This settlement, surprisingly, saw a few years pass before the Caiapó began attacking it in the early 1730s. The cause of the attacks was the avid expansion of prospectors into the headwaters of the Araguaia.

In 1732–1733, the governor of São Paulo—Goiás was not yet a separate captaincy—ordered Bartholomeu Bueno da Silva to investigate rumors of mines on the
Claro and Pilões Rivers. The old bandeirante and a small contingent of men found gold and diamonds on these rivers, but they were ambushed by the Caiapó and forced to abandon their discoveries (RAHE 1980:43). Around the same time, prospectors on the Caiapó River discovered signs of lurking Indians and fled to the safety of a large mining camp on the nearby Claro River; but the Caiapó followed their trails and ambushed two men herding cows outside of the settlement, killing them.36 Despite the danger of the Caiapó, the lure of gold and diamonds drew prospectors back. Someone named João de Veiga Bueno prospected on the Caiapó River, but his party was ambushed and forced to retreat by raiders concealed in the tall grass.37 Later, a mining camp named Bom Fim sprung up near the Claro and Pilões rivers: Caiapó attacks quickly depopulated this settlement (Souza 1872:441). The trails these expeditions left behind led the Caiapó back to what is now Vila Boa. Groups of Caiapó warriors began traveling these trails to attack the mines and farms on the outskirts of the settlement.

Most of the early attacks were ambushes: small raiding parties appeared suddenly, killed quickly, grabbed up any loot, and fled back to their villages. Word spread between Caiapó villages of the easy picking to be found outside of Vila Boa, and the conflict rapidly expanded into a veritable onslaught (see appendix-a). There was panic and paranoia, as the fleet-footed Caiapó appeared to kill and plunder and disappear just as rapidly into the sertões. Even surviving an attack left miners in debt and ruined owing to the loss of valuable slaves and their labor.38 In the early 1730s, Governor António Luís Távora, the Count of Sarzedas, ordered Agostino Pacheco Teles, the Superintendent of the Goiás Mines, to investigate these attacks (Taunay 1950:238). In December of 1736, Governor Távora, based on what Pacheco Teles had
learned, requested Crown authorization to attack the Caiapó in their villages (DI 1896, vol. 22:120). Raiding, he said, had become a serious impediment to the successful extraction of bullion, and the miners demanded an offensive to smash the Caiapó, even offering to pay the cost. But the Crown declined to authorize an offensive and, instead, ordered the creation of troops to defend the mines (Giraldin 1997:68).

By 1739, Caiapó attacks were seriously affecting the gold mines, and the new governor, Dom Luís de Mascarenhas, decided it was time to eliminate their hostilities. He sent letters to Ángelo Preto in Cuiabá requesting aid; but the elderly campaigner declined (Alencastre 1864:77). The governor was forced to raise two companies of 20 pedestres in 1741 (DI 1896, vol. 22:166). He issued brutal order to these troops: “put those taken captive in battle to the sword, without regard to sex, only saving from the penalty of death the boys and girls under the age of ten years and bring these to this town to take a fifth for the Crown and the others to be distributed amongst those who captured them” (DI 1896, vol. 22:168). The war against the Caiapó, as the governor envisioned it, was to be a brutal offensive to drive them, and their hostilities, forever from the mines.

But the two companies Governor Mascarenhas raised had little impact. One company reportedly spent its time catching and drying fish to sell in the mining settlements. The other company was commanded by Capitão António de Lemos e Faria, an aggressive officer, who was completely unprepared for the task at hand. He and his men stumbled on a Caiapó raiding party and killed two raiders, whose heads they promptly carried to Vila Boa. The settlers rejoiced, “being the first time that they
saw the blood of these heathen,” and applauded the captain and his men. It was only a small victory, however, and one the captain was unable to repeat.

Capitão Lemos e Faria was a bungler. He once located a Caiapó village and ordered it surrounded for an early morning assault. At dawn, it appeared the village would be slaughtered, but Capitão Lemos e Faria urged his troops forward with loud shouts. These parade-ground antics warned the Caiapó, and they hastily fled into the surrounding bush. The bandeira only murdered a few luckless individuals, took a few captives, captured some weapons, and burned the village. The Caiapó later ambushed and dispersed a bandeira, in which Lemos e Faria participated, supposedly while the bumbling captain was shaving and unable to lead a counterattack.

Poorly trained, poorly equipped, and lacking the tactics and leadership needed for fighting in the sertões, soldiers were unable to defeat the formidable Caiapó. Raids grew in size and ferocity. The Caiapó impetuously assaulted the suburbs of Vila Boa, scattered and destroyed convoys carrying needed food and goods, and “more than 200 leagues” of the road to São Paulo were “impeded by these barbarians [...] to the complete ruin of commerce and royal rights” (Leme 1980:178). There were frustrated calls for vengeance, appeals for succor, and much justified fear in Vila Boa; the mining camp brimmed with terrified settlers seeking safety. And then, with surprising rapidity, the situation changed. In 1742, António Pires de Campos, a bandeirante from Itu, famous even in his time for his exploits in the sertões, arrived from Cuiabá with a contingent of Bororo warriors.

**António Pires de Campos**

António Pires de Campos is a name indelibly linked to the Caiapó. The son of the great bandeirante of the same name, called *Pai Pirá* (“Father of All”) by his private
army of Bororo Indians, rumored to be “Adonis in the plaza, and Mars in the sertão,” he was, for much of the 1740s, the “the scourge of the heathen Caiapó” (Leme 1980, vol. 2:178). Pires de Campos was a mendacious, wicked, and cruel man, practiced in the art of slaughtering the young, the old, the pregnant, and the helpless. In mid-1740s, he commanded a host of almost 500 Bororo Indians—skilled pathfinders and tough native soldiers, the Bororo hailed from the mines of Cuiabá and easily the equal of the Caiapó in war—equipped with uniforms and muskets at Crown expense to fight the Caiapó in Goiás. And with the Crown’s blessing, Pires de Campos and the Bororo waged three pitiless scorched-earth campaigns over the course of nine years. They left a swath of devastation, which stretched from the headwaters of the Araguaia to the Triângulo Mineiro, and embodied the Crown’s ability to bring massive and sustained force against its indigenous opponents.43

In August of 1742, Pires de Campos arrived in Goiás with a force of 120 Bororo. Bororo—a native word referring to a ceremonial area in their village plazas (see Crocker 1985:32)—was a name the Portuguese called a number of related peoples. They spoke dialects of a similar language (related to, but distinct from, the Gê language) and occupied the sertões around Cuiabá (see e.g., Viertler 1990). In fact, Cuiabá was the name of the Bororo subgroup on whose village the mining settlement was raised. The Bororo were very numerous, lived in large villages, and were considered redoubtable fighters (see Campos 1862:447–449). After the discovery of gold at Cuiabá, some Bororo chose to ally with the Portuguese, and several bandeirantes acquired large armies of these tough warriors; they would play important roles in fighting and
conquering various native peoples, including the Paiaguá and the Caiapó, living around Cuiabá and even distant Goiás.

The bandeirantes and adventurers who arrived at Cuiabá discovered a great enmity existed between the Bororo and Caiapó. This was callously, if not ingeniously, manipulated to acquire a powerful and effective fighting force in Goiás. Capitão Lemos e Faria, who briefly commanded the Bororo in Goiás, said it was “on account of these two nations being enemies of one another” that they agreed to come and fight.44 We do not know when or how this rivalry began, but much of the enmity was due to the Portuguese presence. The Caiapó, as we have seen, were driven from the southern periphery of their territory by the Paulistas in the early sixteenth century, and they expanded north and into conflict with the Bororo. The Caiapó were unable to overpower this numerous people, unlike the Goiá farther to the east, and a furious war raged between the two. Later, the settlements at Cuiabá and Vila Boa squeezed the Bororo and Caiapó into competition for land and resources at the headwaters of the Araguaia River and northern Camapuã.45 Pires de Campos, who had already acquired a large following of Bororo when the governor’s offer arrived, was well aware of this enmity and exploited it. He offered the Bororo the opportunity to settle old scores with the aid of Portuguese arms. Indeed, the first lot of Bororo to arrive in Goiás was composed entirely of warriors, suggesting they saw this action as a traditional raid and planned on returning to their sertões once the Caiapó were defeated.

When Pires de Campos arrived in Vila Boa, he found the settlers demoralized by a recent rout of a bandeira near the Anicuns River (south of Vila Boa). He quickly led the Bororo into the sertões, rallied the remnants of the defeated bandeira, and attacked
a Caiapó village. There was a terrible slaughter and many Caiapó were shackled and led away as slaves—this attack was so devastating that the Caiapó did not again approach Vila Boa for seven years.\textsuperscript{46} On October 12, 1742, the triumphant Pires de Campos stood before Governor Mascarenhas and signed an agreement to smash the Caiapó (DI 1895, vol. 13:259–261). For an \textit{arroba} (c. 15 kilograms or 33.07 pounds) of gold, he agreed to campaign in the sertões of the Serra Dourado and headwaters of the Araguaia River. He would attack Caiapó villages (theoretically, this was prohibited), kill the inhabitants, put them to flight, and free the mines of the “heathen.” The contract was good for two years and included an option to extend the campaign into new regions and against new native peoples. Three days later, on October 15, Governor Mascarenhas proudly informed the Crown that Pai Pirá was in the sertões, and he sought permission to raise another company of 20 or 30 soldiers to assist with the conquest (DI 1896, vol. 22:175). Pires de Campos and the Bororo destroyed at least three Caiapó villages in this first campaign.

For the first time, Caiapó raiding around Vila Boa ceased, the São Paulo road appeared secure, and, to the governor’s great relief, the royal fifth passed south unmolested. Pires de Campos contemplated heading north to fight the powerful Acroá and Chacriabá peoples, whose wide-ranging raids threatened the settlements at Natividade, Terras Novas, Remédios, and along the banks of the Paranã River (a right tributary of the Tocantins) (Alencastre 1864:90). The settlers offered Pires de Campos 500 head of cattle and proposed a special tax to help defray the cost of subjugating the Indians. On May 12, 1743, Antônio Pires de Campos accepted this contract, but the Bororo, “frightened of never again being able to return to their lands by Cuiabá,” refused
to head north (Alencastre 1864:91). The settlers, disappointed by Pires de Campos’s henchmen, established two companies of soldiers in what proved to be an ineffective attempt to halt the raiding.

As Pires de Campos discovered, the manipulation of indigenous rivalries limited Bororo participation in Portuguese wars. Although Pires de Campos’s warriors affectionately proclaimed him the “Father of All,” they would not fight any enemy he chose and refused to stay in the field indefinitely under his command. Because the Bororo viewed the Goiás campaign as an extension of their own wars with the Caiapó, not a European-style war of annihilation, they refused Pai Pirá when he tried to cajole them into a campaign against the Acroá and Chacriabá, both of whom were unfamiliar peoples with whom they had little or no contact. There was no reason to fight them, and the Bororo were not mercenaries willing to fight for lucrative contracts and profit, despite Pires de Campo’s protests. And, though powerful vendettas and the need to avenge long-harbored wrongs propelled the Bororo into Goiás, and several hundred kilometers from their villages, wives, and children, Pai Pirá soon found that, when his campaign dragged on for too long, his allies tired of the fighting and returned home to Cuiabá.47 Bororo affection for Pai Pirá was tempered by their need to see their wives and children, plant gardens, a travel familiar sertões; there were limits to the scope and duration of what they were willing to do for their leader.

Despite the success of Pires de Campos’s first campaign, the security of the Goiás mines deteriorated in 1744 and 1745. Immense Caiapó war parties attacked convoys, besieged settlements, and looted impetuously across southern Goiás. The governor had acted without Crown authorization when he signed his first contract with
António Pires de Campos, and the king and his ministers debated how best to resolve the conflict in the years since 1742. On March 23, 1744, the Crown authorized the contract but, contradictorily, declared the offensive at an end: the king ordered the governor to use “persuasive” and “peaceful” means to attract the Caiapó to the Church and civilization. Only if the Caiapó rejected offers of peace, civilization, and salvation was an offensive war permitted. The governor used this decree to authorize a second offensive in February of 1745. This was a Crown-supported campaign of terror: “to avoid future damage by giving [the Caiapó] such punishment that it shall serve as a terror to them and all the other inhabitants of the sertões” (DI 1896, vol. 22:185). The governor raised two more companies of soldiers, paid and provisioned by the royal treasury, and spread the word that the participants in his war would keep the captives—after the Crown took its royal fifth, of course—and possibly receive honors from the Crown.

As before, Pires de Campos agreed to fight the Caiapó. Many of the Bororo had died or fled back to Cuiabá, so Pai Pirá needed to recruit new troops. The miners agreed to provide Pires de Campos with half an oitava (“eighth”) of gold to relocate Bororo from Cuiabá to Goiás; the governor sweetened the deal with an induction into the Order of Christ, a prestigious Portuguese military order, and a lucrative pension (Brasil 1980:118). With the Bororo having already refused a long campaign that violated their understanding of warfare, and facing what he knew would be a sustained effort, Pires de Campos changed his tactics. He returned to Cuiabá and gathered a new host of Bororo that included the warriors’ wives and children. This was a permanent relocation of an entire village, or villages, not a raiding party, and the
difference could not have been lost on the Bororo warriors: their wives and children were in unfamiliar territory and surrounded by hostile Caiapó and Portuguese soldiers. If the Bororo decided to abandon Pai Pirá, they had to take their women and children with them or leave them behind with the Portuguese and Caiapó—not known for showing mercy.

Pires de Campos established two aldeias near the Araguari River (the Rio das Velhas) with his new levies of Bororo: Sant’ Anna do Rio das Velhas and Rio das Pedras. The latter aldeia was his base, and, “from that fort of the conquest, António Pires de Campos first attempted to reduce the heathen [Caiapó] by persuasive means, sending [to their villages] some of the first men he had captured.” This was an old trick bandeirantes in Cuiabá had used “to gather the multitude of heathen that they have domesticated in those mines.” The idea was that the freed captives, called línguas (“tongues”), returned to their villages bearing presents and promises, which seduced the Indians into an alliance. But Pires de Campos was dismayed when none of the freed Caiapó returned. This first group of captives was composed entirely of men, including the son of a chief, so Pai Pirá changed gears and released two women, hoping they would convince their villages to accept peace; but the women, like the men, also disappeared.

Having failed to seduce the Caiapó with gifts and promises, Pires de Campos set out to batter their villages into submission. He began attacking villages along the overland passage from Vila Boa to São Paulo. This provoked a furious response. Caiapó villages joined together to raid; huge groups of Caiapó attacked settlements along the road. The attacks culminated in a siege of a small garrison of troops at the
Rio das Velhas. The beleaguered troops were too frightened to face the club-wielding warriors surrounding them, and they despaired when the Caiapó began firing flaming arrows into their fort. Pires de Campos rescued the troops and broke the siege, sending a contingent of Bororo across the campo and another group by canoe, but the Caiapó realized they were about to be surrounded and fled. Pai Pirá followed. A terrible campaign commenced that crossed 150 leagues and captured at least a thousand slaves (Alencastre 1864:76). From these prisoners, Pires de Campos learned “the heathen had killed his envoys, and that it was their custom not to accept peace,” as those Caiapó escaping from Portuguese captivity were considered “traitors for having stayed so long in the company of the whites.”

Women, whom the Caiapó considered “less agile,” were forgiven and not killed upon returning to their villages. The only way to “pacify” the Caiapó, it appeared, was through a long and bloody war.

Then, unexpectedly, Caiapó raiders approached a farm south of the Grande River. They surprised the farmer with their “treacherous and feigned peace and the said resident [of the farm] was so sincere and affable that he not only concede to them all the small things in his house but politely exposed his wife and children to them, giving them knives and others goods for the promise that they would again return and visit him.”

One cannot say for sure whether the farmer truly was “sincere and affable” in trading his belongings or anxiously gave the Caiapó presents in the hope they would move on, though the latter certainly seems more probable. The appearance of these Caiapó at a farm appears to have been an attempt to acquire goods without killing the inhabitants and burning the farm, which inevitably attracted Pires de Campos’s wrath and propelled a bandeira of musket-toting Bororo into the sertões. If so, the experiment
was not repeated, perhaps it was seen as unproductive. The Caiapó, Pinto da Silveira recalled years later, had promised to return, and they did—attacking the generous farmer a few months later. Although a passing convoy witnessed the attack and managed to save the farmer and his family, the Caiapó regrouped and assaulted a neighboring farm where they killed some slaves and their owner, burning the unfortunate man in a barn where he had hidden himself. And we hear no more of the Caiapó appearing at farms to be greeted, entertained, and gifted by farmers and their wives and children.

New hostilities soon raged across southern Goiás. On July 15, 1748, António Pires de Campos signed his third and last contract to fight the Caiapó. He agreed to bring more Bororo from Cuiabá to bolster the garrison at Rio das Pedras and establish a new aldeia, Lanhoso (DI 1896, vol. 22:210–213). From his three aldeias, he would send the Bororo to patrol places where the Caiapó were known to attack and “punish them such that they do not return and repeat their insults” (DI 1896, vol. 22:211). In the event that his troops encountered a large aldeia or raiding party, Pires de Campos could summon 20 or 30 soldiers. If a year passed without an attack, he would be inducted in the Order of Christ, become a royal notary of the mines, and gain a pension of 50$000 reis.

Now possessing an overwhelming force of 500 Bororo and pedestres, Pires de Campos set off to crush the Caiapó for once and for all. An incredibly savage campaign developed. “One cannot count the number of kills and captures taken in the assaults that they have done,” the new and aggressive governor of Goiás, Dom Marcos de Noronha, boasted to the Crown in 1749, “every month bandeiras continue to leave for
one place or another where there is word that the heathen wander.” As the conflict widened and intensified, Pires de Campos pushed deep into Camapuã, where he encountered an immense Caiapó village, but the innumerable club-fighters in the village frightened even the musket-toting Bororo away (Souza 1872:447). Nonetheless, the destruction of so many villages impacted the whole of Caiapó territory, and attacks on Portuguese convoys and settlements ceased, the governor claimed, for nearly two years (Brasil 1982:46).

Then, in 1749, during the height of this campaign, the Caiapó destroyed an Araxá village. Early in the year, Pires de Campos reported that the Araxá had requested missionaries. The governor dispatched supplies and ordered two Jesuits to begin a mission among these new allies, whom he envisioned relocating to the aldeia at Rio das Velhas to assist the Bororo with fighting the Caiapó. In November of 1749, the two Jesuits, escorted by Pires de Campos and his Bororo, left Vila Boa for the Araxá and arrived only to discover the village destroyed by the Caiapó. The governor had lost his allies, as the Caiapó had slaughtered the Araxá men and carried the women and children off into captivity, so he angrily denounced the attack to the Crown, claiming unsated cannibalism had driven the Caiapó to destroy the unfortunate village. But it was the success of Pires de Campos’s campaigns and the governor’s own largesse that had provoked this attack. The Triângulo Mineiro was the locus of Pires de Campos’s campaigns, and the Caiapó there were the hardest pressed, suffering numerous bandeira attacks and the loss of many men, women, and children. Raiding a Portuguese settlement provoked Bororo retaliation, so the Caiapó attacked a weak neighbor that, because of the governor’s gifts, possessed the goods they normally
acquired through raiding. They murdered the men, kidnapped the women and children to replace those lost to Pires de Campos, and stole the goods the governor had sent hoping to forge an alliance against them.

By 1750, bandeiras of Bororo tracked Caiapó raiders and destroyed villages across a vast swath of territory stretching from the Triângulo Mineiro to Camapuã. Raiding decline, as it had become extremely dangerous, and the effect of so many attacks forced the Caiapó to modify their tactics: they attempted to approach Portuguese settlements peacefully and attacked the Araxá to acquire goods (without, incidentally, attracting a bandeira). The Portuguese effort to destroy the Caiapó appeared to be on the verge of victory, but the Caiapó gained a reprieve—António Pires de Campos died, the victim of a festering arrow wound obtained while searching the sertões for new allies to replace the destroyed Araxá.

The Death of António Pires de Campos

Pires de Campos died in the mining camp at Paracatú (Minas Gerais) in 1751. He had fallen ill while guarding the Crown’s fifth. There is a famous and heroic tale that relates how Pai Pirá came to suffer the grievous injury that killed him so far away from his base at the Rio das Pedras, which the eighteenth-century Paulista genealogist Pedro Taques de Almeida Paes Leme (1980:179) appears to have been the first to promote. According to this story, António Pires de Campos marched from Rio das Pedras to battle the Caiapó sometime in 1750. At the head of his faithful Bororo, he followed raiders’ trails into the southern Goiás and eventually surprised his quarry. There was a big battle and a terrible slaughter: the Caiapó had turned on their pursuers and, standing ground against the thunder of the Bororo muskets, fought back with desperate fury. Pires de Campos charged his horse at a “daring” Caiapó warrior who
stood his ground and fired an arrow into his attacker’s shoulder, but “this misfortune was not enough, even shot through by an arrow, to keep him [Pires de Campos] from taking the life [of the Caiapó] with his cutlass.” Their leader grievously injured, the Bororo broke off the engagement and carried Pai Pirá to Vila Boa. This was a dramatic tale fit for a conqueror—a great slaughter of “heathen,” a daring enemy standing alone against a charging horse, and a wounded warlord triumphing over a barbaric enemy. But a dramatic tale is all it was. Pires de Campos was shot through the shoulder, but the arrow was fired from a bow belonging to a peaceful people living on the Araguaia River. There were no feats of derring-do or horse charges, only illegal slaving, Portuguese perfidy, and a wily chief defending his people.

Pires de Campos’s end began with the Caiapó destruction of the Araxá in 1749. If ever a Caiapó raid had produced an unexpected outcome, this was it: the attack set in motion a series of events that eventually killed their most formidable persecutor. The news of the Araxá destruction was greeted with much chagrin in Vila Boa. It was made worse by the arrival of word that the Caiapó had attacked the small garrison on the Rio Claro in January of 1750. News of this second attack arrived in Vila Boa at the same time that Pires de Campos was returning from his failed expedition to the Araxá. As he was without his Bororo, Pai Pirá took commanded of a troop of 28 soldiers and four dragoons (mounted infantry), and they plunged into the sertões on the heels of the retreating Caiapó. They tracked and attacked an aldeia in Camapuã, which took them 38 days of trailing to locate, and killed 16 men and captured 32, “almost all of this number women and children.” The destruction of the Araxá and the sudden reappearance of the Caiapó on the Claro River appeared to foreshadow the resumption
of hostilities. The governor decided a concerted effort to acquire new native allies was needed, as there simply were not enough Bororo for garrisons in the Triângulo Mineiro and the headwaters of the Araguaia.

What the settlers needed was an alliance with one of the local peoples of Goiás. For many years, the governors of Goiás cited pressing reasons for acquiring Indian allies (Ravagnani 1996: 222–244, 230). In terms of economics, fighting with native auxiliaries was cheaper than manning bandeiras with soldiers, stationing tropas ("military forces") in presídios ("garrisons"), all of which required the treasury to bear the heavy burden of purchasing weapons, munitions, provisions, and paying salaries.58 Indians, in contrast, were paid with cheap gifts of cloth, tools, and other small items; unless equipped with muskets or swords, they made their own weapons; and they lived off the land or the products of their own gardens, thus requiring little provisioning. Importantly, using Indians to fight their wars permitted the Portuguese to leave scarce labor on economically productive tasks; officials routinely pointed to the arming of slaves as contributor to the growing economic stagnation of the captaincy.59

But cost alone does not explain why native allies were needed. Indians also possessed the skills and endurance needed to fight in the sertões. Soldiers, who were often press-ganged into service and unwilling to face combat, and slaves, armed out of expediency, found the backlands forbidding and difficult places. In June of 1750, after a second Caiapó attack near the Rio Claro, the bumbling António de Lemos e Faria led some soldiers after the retreating raiders.60 Although these were the same troops Pires de Campos had commanded with great success earlier in the year, they quickly returned to Vila Boa without attacking the Caiapó, loath to push into the sertões without
competent leadership and Bororo support. Only a year before, in 1749, Governor Noronha remarked “that it is impossible to wage war against the barbarous Indians except with domesticated Indians [...] neither the natives of this country [i.e. the Brazilian-born Portuguese] nor even the slaves [...] are capable of such an enterprise, because in entering the forests, which lack their accustomed foods, they quickly return.” Indians were “accustomed to the hardships of the forests,” he said, and survived on “the game they kill, and the fruits and wild honey they collect” and, therefore, capable of traveling the long distances necessary to track raiding parties and find their villages.

Native auxiliaries were desperately needed in Goiás, but nowhere to be found. The Gê-speakers, such as the Acroá and Chacriabá, were almost uniformly hostile. There were, of course, the Bororo. But they required constant relocations owing to losses to combat, epidemic diseases, and flights, and Pires de Campos was forced to make costly trips to Cuiabá to gather new forces in 1745–1746, 1748, and 1749–1750. He continuously requested payments of gold to gather new troops, which the miners grudgingly paid, but this made the Bororo expensive allies. And the Bororo brought from Cuiabá were never sufficient in numbers to patrol the whole of Goiás. New allies were needed to supplant or replace the Bororo, which was the reason the governor had jumped at the chance to acquire Araxá assistance; but his plans were thwarted by the Caiapó.

Then, a Paulista named Amaro Leite Moreiro told the frustrated governor about rumors circulating the settlements of northern Goiás. Several of the Tupi-speaking peoples living on the Araguaia River, it was said, sought missionaries and an alliance
with the Portuguese (Brasil 1982:44–45). Unknown to the governor, the rumors originated from a slaver who hailed from Cuiabá, João Leme. This treacherous man had convinced the Tupi-speaking Tapirapé and Cururú of his goodwill with presents and promises. Leme spent several days in a village, lulling the inhabitants into a sense of security, before he and his men launched a surprise attack on his hosts one morning. Most of the Indians were asleep, and the slavers killed a great many and carried off more than 200 captives, whom they sold or traded to miners and ranchers in the north of Goiás. It was probably from these captives that Amaro Leite had learned the Araguaia Tupi-speakers desired missionaries.

Based on what he had heard, Governor Noronha decided to send Pires de Campos north to sojourn with the Araguaia Tupi-speakers, provide them with presents, and cajole them with promises of an alliance. When the misinformed Pires de Campos arrived on the west bank of the Araguaia bearing gifts and the governor’s promises, he probably did not expect a fight; the Araguaia Tupi-speakers, after all, were well known as reclusive and peaceful. Unfortunately, Pai Pirá stumbled upon the same village João Leme had slaved, and he discovered the Indians were unwilling to trust the promises he carried or accept the gifts he offered. Their cacique politely listened to Pai Pirá’s offer and then told the grizzled slaver “that the whites had already treated them as if they were deer or other beasts, and what they had already done, he would not permit them to do again.” With a sweep of his arms, the cacique sprung a trap—warriors, lying in wait, rushed from the underbrush and attacked the bandeira. In the melee that followed, an arrow pierced Pires de Campos’s shoulder, but the Indians broke off the
engagement and fled so quickly that “there was no chance to take revenge for the infelicity that they had done.”  

Pai Pirá was a hard man, and, even with an arrow wound, he refused to return to Vila Boa empty handed. So the “Father of All” crossed the Araguaia to the Bananal Island and encountered an aldeia of Curumaré Indians (now known as the Karajá do Norte or Xambioá). He later told the governor that he spoke with the Curumaré chiefs, gave them presents, and “they agreed in desiring to accept missionaries and more than 150 persons came.” Sadly, he related, because of “the severity of the season and a great epidemic that ordinarily occurs when the rivers overflow more than 100 persons died,” and only a mere 60 Curumaré had arrived; nonetheless, Governor Dom Marcos de Noronha was enthused by their arrival, and he once again planned a new aldeia to serve as a bulwark against the Caiapó.

The governor’s plan, however, was frustrated by the Indians’ repeated escape attempts (Brasil 1980: 124, 129). He began to suspect Pires de Campos had lied about his peaceful encounter with the Curumaré. “António Pires de Campos swears he reduced them by peace and civil words,” he wrote, “[but] I always believed that shot and powder obliged them to leave their lands” (Brasil 1980:130). So the governor ordered an investigation and, unsurprisingly, learned Pires de Campos had attacked the Curumaré, killing and abducting many Indians, selling some in shackles, and bringing the remainder to Vila Boa. Many years later, one of the unfortunate captives told how she was abducted. Pires de Campos, she said, had stayed “in peace and friendship for some days [with the Curumaré], at the end of which he made a surprise attack on their principal village and did not spare the lives of the innocent, whose wailing still echo
even to this day [25 years later]” and “he took many prisoners, whom he led off in chains as his prisoners [...] the cruelty of this man went so far as to order these prisoners tied to trees along the trail [and] giving them many lashes, saying that this was so that they would understand what captivity meant.” Abuse, not plague, killed many of the Curumaré. Those unfortunates who survived were traded for cattle and horses at farms on the trails winding through northern Goiás. Many of those brought to Vila Boa eventually escaped, and the governor was left with no new allies, and the natives living on the Araguaia were newly antagonized.

The governor’s attempt to recruit allies from the Araguaia was a costly failure: the investment in gifts and provisions was lost; the Araguaia Tupi-speakers and the Curumaré were antagonized and hostile; and Pires de Campos’s injury eventually killed the most effective warlord the governor had in Goiás. Pai Pirá retired to Rio das Pedras, but rumors of a conspiracy to steal the royal fifth reached the governor who cajoled Pires de Campos and his Bororo into providing extra security (Brasil 1980:141). They made it to Paracatú. The arrow wound reopened, suppurated, and, despite daily remedies from Bororo healers, it killed Pai Pirá. António Pires de Campos, the “scourge of the heathen Caiapó,” was buried with Portuguese military honors in Paracatú—his Bororo, as was their custom, lamented the passing of the “Father of All” in a month-long ceremony performed for their important chiefs (Casal 1845, vol. 1:292)—far away from his Bororo aldeias and the Caiapó he had assailed for so many years.

**João Godói Pinto da Silveira**

The death of António Pires de Campos was a severe blow to the settlers in Goiás. Governor Marcos de Noronha felt that “it shall be not only difficult but summarily impossible to find another with such a great number of Bororo to defend the road [to
São Paulo] and, I am certain, that once they [the Bororo] flee the road, the ancient hostilities of the heathen Caiapó shall commence again.” Pires de Campos died intestate, apparently without issue, and deeply in debt. His creditors immediately moved to collect on the debts, eyeing his lands, personal possessions, slaves, and even the Bororo aldeias. The governor neither wished to see the Bororo distributed to creditors to pay off Pires de Campos’s debts, nor did he want them divided among Pai Pirá’s surviving kin, a pair of quarrelsome brothers. The “custom of the Paulistas,” the governor wrote, dictated the “administration” of the Bororo to fall to Pires de Campos’s elder brother, Manoel Campos Bicudo. The governor had heard rumors that Manoel Campos Bicudo was a “true misanthrope and unfit to be trusted with any task,” and it seemed, in his opinion, that the Bororo command should not fall to an ineffective commander. The other brother, Claudio, was an unknown entity. Both brothers lived in the Bororo aldeias in southern Goiás, so the governor summoned them to Vila Boa to investigate their character and capacity to carry on Pires de Campos’s work.

The governor’s principal concern was that Pires de Campos’s death had created an opportunity for the Bororo to flee. He had heard that some of the Bororo had become very dissatisfied with the aldeias and Pires de Campos. The Jesuits, who had established a mission among the Bororo at the Rio das Velhas aldeia, had fought Pires de Campos over the spiritual and temporal administration of the Indians, leveling accusations that there was “a troop of Bororo and these were not catechized and many died without the sacraments,” and that the Rio das Pedras was “nothing other than a harem [where] they live by the laws of nature, as much him [Pires de Campos] as his friends and supporters.” The governor, citing royal decrees, had supported the Jesuits.
right to work among the Indians. This enraged Pires de Campos; he resented the Jesuit presence and their influence over the aldeia Indians. When some Bororo women, including the daughter of a chief, attended confession and requested the Church marry them, Pires de Campos ordered them viciously whipped (one of the unfortunate women reportedly received 600 lashes). Other Bororo had told the governor that Pires de Campos “gave them many tasks and, at the same time, little or nothing to eat and no clothing,” and they claimed he abused their wives and daughters. When the governor dispatched troops to the aldeias to “administer” the Bororo while Manoel and Claudio traveled to Vila Boa, he advised their commander, the bungling António de Lemos e Faria, to use “great caution not to let [the Bororo] leave all together so that they do not flee.” He also ordered the captain to provide the Bororo adults and children with cloth and the chiefs and their wives cloth and small gifts. These gifts were intended to keep the Bororo in the aldeias.

But the Bororo did not flee, and the task of leading them fell to Manoel de Campos Bicudo. He was not a ferocious Indian fighter and soon gave up his leadership of the Bororo (Leme 1980:180). The command passed to António de Lemos e Faria. In a letter to Manoel de Campos Bicudo, the governor had lauded the bungling captain as someone capable of leading the Bororo, informing Manoel that the captain “was well known by your brother and has sufficient practice with the customs of the Bororo and knows how to treat them with the affability they require.” The captain’s leadership yet again proved ineffective. Caiapó raids, despite the captain’s efforts at the head of the Bororo, soon became a constant threat throughout southern Goiás. The governor replaced Lemos e Faria after three Bororo deserted their aldeia and traveled to Vila Boa...
to complain that the captain traveled with too much equipage, treated them with contempt, and punished them harshly. The command passed to the man the Bororo requested, João Godói Pinto da Silveira.

João Godói Pinto da Silveira was a Paulista, a former cavalry officer, and a veteran of António Pires de Campos’s sanguinary campaigns. He had a long history of slaving and prospecting in Goiás and was credited with discovering the gold deposits at Pilar (northeast of Vila Boa) (Carvalho Franco 1989:388–389). While in the north, he had fought against the Chavante, Acroá, and Chacriabá, and he spent his later years fighting the Caiapó. He is largely forgotten today, though in his day he was a renowned Indian-fighter—one governor called him “the most intelligent and resolute Paulista in the captaincy” (Anonymous 1918:84). The Jesuits, however, had a lower opinion of Pinto da Silveira, declaring him “a disguised Caiapó” because he kept captives as slaves, interfered with the Society’s missions, preferred prospecting to fighting, and refused to provide convoys with supplies. Despite the denunciations, Pinto da Silveira commanded the Bororo against the Caiapó into the early 1760s. His last expedition was at the head of a motley crew of mercenaries and press-ganged soldiers sent to Mato Grosso in 1763 (Giraldin 1997:79). By then, Pinto da Silveira’s violence had begun to outgrow his usefulness. In a public dispute, he grabbed and threw a judge’s wig back into the surprised official’s face, and he threatened the participants of a procession with a saber; these acts led to his being banished and exiled to Angola. This grizzled campaigner had more than 20 years experience in the sertões, and he evaded the law and fled Goiás along trails that he had once traversed in search of the Caiapó. The stains of Pinto da Silveira’s transgressions and scandals never really
passed, and one nineteenth-century chronicler, Cunha Mattos (1874:262 n. 18), thought him "one of the [captaincy's] great adventurers" who had "served in various expeditions in which he neither acquired fortune nor benefited humanity."

Requested by the Bororo and obviously skilled in the sertões, Pinto da Silveira was not as effective against the Caiapó as Pires de Campos had been. In 1753, he led the Bororo into the sertões of the Pilões and Claro Rivers, where "the heathen were very populous," but his bandeira lost six of "the most capable of those [Bororo] carrying arms" and failed to take many captives. Soon Indian attacks threatened settlements along the entire breadth of Goiás. In the south, the Caiapó had regrouped and vigorously attacked convoys and farms; the Acroá and Chacriabá attacked northern settlements with firearms acquired after they massacred the garrison of an aldeia that they had briefly lived on. In a short time, hostile Indians had killed almost 100 people, mostly slaves, and it was patently clear that there were not enough Bororo to fight all of the hostiles. New native allies were becoming desperately needed, and a mere three years after Pai Pirá had died searching for them.

There were the usual calls for succor, vengeance, and bandeiras. The spectacular slaughter of 43 slaves and their owner, Manoel da Costa Portela, propelled Pinto da Silveira and a bandeira into the sertões. They attacked a large group of trekking Caiapó. Most of the Caiapó managed to escape, and they retaliated by attacking and burning a nearby farm. The bandeira returned to Vila Boa in December of 1755, hauling a lot of six women and 25 children, mostly infants and toddlers. One of the women had given birth in the sertões; another died in childbirth soon after arriving in Vila Boa. A third woman fled with two of the children, and it took the Bororo four days to
find her. The governor decided to send the women south to the aldeia at Rio das Velhas, where escapes would be difficult, but an illness struck them and three died soon after they left Vila Boa. The survivors were returned: one escaped, another died giving birth, and the lonely survivor was given to a settler. The Caiapó children were baptized and distributed to locals and for a period of ten years, after which they would be considered good Christians and Portuguese subjects.87

There were more attacks at the Arraial das Antas in the following years (appendix-a). A large bandeira was readied in 1756, but months passed securing supplies and readying arms, and it was obvious the Caiapó had long since returned to their aldeias.88 Since attacking an Indian village was an act of “offensive” war that ostensibly required Crown permission, the new Governor of Goiás, Dom Álvaro José Xavier Botelho de Távora, decided to cancel the bandeira. In response, João Godói Pinto da Silveira clamored that he had expended great sums on preparations and faced financial ruin if the bandeira did not set off for the sertões. He suggested the bandeira travel to the Araguaia River, contact the Tupi-speakers, and convince them to help fight the Caiapó. It was a woefully unoriginal plan, one the new governor himself had proposed only a year before.89 Unsurprisingly, the governor thought the Bororo commander’s plan offered “great utility [and] benefits for the people and the propagation of the faith,” and he ordered Pinto da Silveira to the Araguaia “with the condition that he perform the catechism without offending the liberty of the heathen.”90 If the bandeira found success, as the governor hoped, the Araguaia Tupi-speakers would provide labor for the settlers and troops to fight the Caiapó. Just as importantly, there were rumors of untapped gold deposits in the regions, and the ailing mining economy might recover if
the bandeira managed to locate new mines. Pires de Campos had been ambushed on the Araguaia, of course, but the Portuguese were stubborn and wanted to believe the Tupi-speakers were open to an alliance. Events would prove their hopes correct.

The bandeira set forth on October 27, 1756. 91 It spent a month traveling overland to the Araguaia and then descended the river to the Bananal Island. The bandeira encountered some Crayá (modern, Karajá) Indians, whom Pinto da Silveira lured to the riverbanks with presents. But the memory of Pires de Campos’s attack on the related Curumaré Indians appear to have been fresh in the minds of the Crayá, and they ambushed the bandeira “with a rain of arrows,” grabbed the goods, and, “availing themselves of the velocity of their canoes,” fled. It was an inauspicious beginning.

After this clash, the bandeira searched for the Curumará aldeia that Pires de Campos had slaved, but it found only abandoned gardens on the Bananal Island. While Pinto da Silveira and the Bororo probed the western riverbanks for “signs” of the Curumará, they encountered a “very strange trail” heading into the interior. For three days, the bandeira followed this trail through “solid” forests until it arrived at a Tapirapé village. Pinto da Silveira ordered the village surrounded; the following morning, he ordered it attacked. Most of the Indians fled, but 27 women and children were captured in the assault. They were given knives, axes, and other odds-and-ends, and released to summon the fugitives from the woods. 92 The Tapirapé slowly returned and received more gifts. Word spread, and other villages began to arrive, including two aldeias of Cururú Indians. The bandeira was soon outnumbered by “four times as many heathen.” 93
Pinto da Silveira feared an ambush—it was, after all, the Cururû who had bushwhacked Pires de Campos—but the Tupi-speakers did not attack, and the bandeira spent two months on the Araguaia recovering from diseases “contracted on the voyage” and convincing their hosts of their goodwill. Pinto da Silveira discovered that he had visited the Araguaia at a propitious moment, since slavers no longer were the most immediate threat the Tupi-speakers’ villages faced. They were fighting wars against two powerful rivals, and losing. From the north, two villages of Guapindayé (now known as the Apinayé) had attacked them with such ferocity that Pinto da Silveira declared them to be “none other than the Caiapó of those sertões.” Along the Araguaia, flotillas of Crayá canoes prowled, attacking the Tupi-speakers for control of the riverbanks where turtles nested and laid their eggs.

These inter-ethnic hostilities trumped the earlier slaving, and Pinto da Silveira found that, even after he had attacked Tapirapé village, the Tupi-speakers were disposed to an alliance. He requested that they settle nearer Vila Boa, but, as he later recalled, “their whole desire was to remain in their lands with our aid in opposition to their enemies.” Pinto da Silveira made many promises, gave many gifts, and two months was a long time, and, eventually, his hosts agreed to send dignitaries to Vila Boa. At first, perhaps fearing another raid, they all wanted to go, but “the lack of axes, powder, and shot to sustain them on the voyage” forced many to remain behind, and Pinto da Silveira was accompanied by “the chiefs of two villages, the son of another chief, and [their] various relatives” as well as another 20 couples.

After spending more than a year in the sertões, the bandeira arrived in Vila Boa on November 13, 1757. The Tapirapé and Cururû entered the city “with such harmony that
they excited the people with their charm and their attire of paints and various feathers of diverse colors." A great public celebration was organized: the governor distributed gifts of tools, clothing, and food; and the Tupi-speakers performed an impressive dance in their regalia. The reception, the gifts, and the governor’s “infallible promise of aid” so pleased the chiefs that they agreed to relocate their villages. It appeared the governor had finally acquired local allies to fight the Caiapó. Unfortunately, as happened so frequently in Brazil, an epidemic erupted among the Indians, “the greater part of them died without remedy [and] displeased by this misfortune, the chiefs fled to their lands, taking with them some of their surviving relations, and all my work,” João Godói Pinto da Silveira lamented, “came to naught.”

Pinto da Silveira’s bandeira, much like that of António Pires de Campos, produced no allies for the Portuguese. Worse, it appears to have caused the Araguaia Tupi great harm. The bandeira had spent two months on the great river recovering from illnesses, and it does not seem unreasonable to suppose these were passed to the Indians. Considering the inter-village communication Pinto da Silveira witnessed, these epidemics likely spread widely. And the epidemic in Vila Boa had killed chiefs and other important persons; if any of the survivors managed to return to their villages, they could have carried the contagion with them, inadvertently spreading it further. Such losses would have been devastating on their own, but their effects were likely exacerbated by the ongoing hostilities with the Guapindayé and Crayá. The gifts the bandeira brought, like those given to the Araxá, may have attracted raiders, further escalating the violence. We do not know exactly what happened, but the Cururù soon disappeared from documents. The Tapirapé survived, possibly after absorbing the Cururù, and a
small group of them appeared in Vila Boa sometime during the governorship of Tristão da Cunha Menezes (1783–1800) (Souza 1872: 496). In return for gifts, they promised to return with baskets of gold, but they wisely never returned and avoided seeking further contact with the Portuguese and Brazilians. The Tapirapé would remain a reclusive people into the early twentieth century (see Wagley 1983).

The exploits of António Pires de Campos and João Godói Pinto da Silveira indicate the great lengths the settlers and authorities in Goiás went to acquire allies. Finding no allies among the Gê-speakers, they reached out to the Araguaia Tupi-speakers. But the success and failures of native alliances were contingent upon events over which the Portuguese had no control: native rivalries, clandestine slaving, and epidemic diseases could make or break an alliance. In the end, because military assistance from the Tupi-speakers never materialized, and the Gê-speakers had to be conquered and forced into an alliance, the Bororo remained the most reliable allies the settlers had in Goiás. In the 1770s, the Acroá and Chacriabá were finally battered into submission, and they began participating in bandeiras; even then, fighting the Caiapó fell most heavily on the descendents of the Bororo relocated by Pires de Campos in the 1740s.

The Bororo, despite continuing fears that they would flee, remained in Goiás. The French scientific-voyager Saint-Hilaire (1975:129, 132, 143, 150) visited Pai Pirá’s aldeias in 1819. The Bororo at the Rio das Pedras aldeia were by then almost entirely the progeny of many years intermingling of Indian women and African slave men; they had lost much of their native culture. They spoke Portuguese and the Língua Geral (“common tongue”), a Tupi-based language Pires de Campos had first taught their
ancestors; however, they had lost their native language. Many of the Bororo worked to sell food and other supplies to mule trains passing on the dusty trails to Vila Boa or settlements in Minas Gerais. The aldeia at Rio das Velhas still existed, but the Bororo were almost nonexistent, having been replaced by the Chacriabá in 1775. The aldeia at Lanhoso—built near where the modern town of Indianópolis sits today—was almost completely abandoned; only a few descendents of the Bororo lived scattered about the old aldeia. The “excellent harquebusiers,” whose fighting skills were so renowned during the eighteenth century, were long gone in 1819. Their importance had long since past; their work beating back Caiapó assaults nearly finished. The Caiapó had lived at Maria I and São José de Mossâmedes, both government-supported aldeias, for almost 40 years when Saint-Hilaire visited, and the ever-curious Frenchman made it a point to visit them.

Many years later, in 1850, a president of Goiás boasted Pires de Campos, Pinto da Silveira, and the Bororo had cleared Caiapó villages from nearly 100 leagues of territory (Olimpio Machado 1850:10). Horrible atrocities were committed, he easily admitted, villages burned, men, women, and children murdered and enslaved, all to secure mines that were failing. In the process of clearing the land and securing the mines, the Bororo had forced some villages to cross the Grande River and enter sertões in what was northern São Paulo. They returned to lands where, a century and a half before, their Bilreiros ancestors had first encountered, traded with, and, eventually, fought Paulistas.

São Paulo

The campaigns against the Caiapó in São Paulo centered on the territory between the Pardo—a right tributary of the Moji-Guaçu River—and Grande Rivers, just
south of the Triângulo Mineiro. The overland route from São Paulo to Vila Boa passed through this region, and Caiapó raiders appeared there and attacked convoys and farms beginning around 1765 (Giraldin 1997:83). José Gomes de Gouvea, an officer in command of the bandeiras sent into this region, believed these Caiapó were refugees fleeing bandeiras.

The Caiapó raids provoked the usual Portuguese response of armed bandeiras. The governor of São Paulo, Dom Luís António de Souza Botelho Mouro ordered the formation of the first official bandeira in January of 1767 (Giraldin 1997:82). This bandeira fought a skirmish and captured a few Caiapó. The raids continued, and the conflict simmered for several years. Attacks on Caiapó villages were frequent: the Portuguese considered concealing preparations to destroy a quilombo (“escaped slave community”) by spreading a rumor that the bandeira was destined to attack the Caiapó. This suggests that expeditions against the Caiapó were sufficiently frequent not to arouse the suspicions of local informants who betrayed bandeiras to the quilombo. There was no refuge for the Caiapó who had fled south from the Bororo in Goiás.

The fighting and slaving was soon reinforced by events in Cuiabá. When, in the wake of the Médico massacre, the governor of Mato Grosso called for the captaincies of Mato Grosso, Goiás, and São Paulo to cooperate and defeat the Caiapó, he provided an excuse for more slaving expeditions. Two well-equipped bandeiras were planned (DI 1894, vol. 7:138–187; Giraldin 1997:83). Capitão José Gomes de Gouvea, the local military commander, pressed two Caiapó captives into service as interpreters, stating that: “with them, I shall go to the [Caiapó] villages to catechize them to conduct
them [here] imprisoning those I fear as traitors for they are very traitorous." The preparations went slowly, and many of the press-ganged soldiers deserted, so the governor ordered the families of shirkers and deserters imprisoned in a draconian attempt to ensure his troops faithfully served (DI 1894, vol. 7:143).

While these bandeiras prepared, there was an attack near Mogi-Guaçu. Soldiers were unable to track the raiders, because of the recent rains and a lack of supplies, but they discovered signs of Caiapó groups moving through the sertões. Frightful rumors of the Caiapó attack at Médico had by this time spread, and anxious settlers were relieved when the two bandeiras finally got under way at the end of 1772. One of the bandeiras fought a skirmish sometime between October and November, but the majority of the Caiapó escaped (Giraldin 1997:84). The línguas, as happened with Pires de Campos, once again failed to convince the Caiapó of the benefits of settling nearer the Portuguese. Before more could be accomplished, a rumor of an imminent Caiapó attack resulted in authorities recalling the bandeiras to Mogi-Mirim.

Compared to the fighting north of the Grande River, these conflicts were small affairs and relatively insignificant. However, the fighting in northern São Paulo underscores the success of the campaigns in Goiás. By the middle of the century, raiding was extremely dangerous, and many Caiapó chose to abandon Goiás: some headed northwest to Cuiabá, where they massacred the slaves and overseers at Médico; other groups chose to move south. Both directions led to encounters with Portuguese settlements, and it must have become increasingly apparent that fleeing before the bandeiras was no longer an option. Hemmed in by settlements, increasingly under assault by bandeiras manned by Bororo, the Caiapó who remained in Goiás were
no longer dictating the course of events as they earlier had. By the mid- and late-
1770s, the Caiapó were cussedly clinging to their old territories, but a relentless tide
threatened to sweep them away.

Conclusion

One must marvel at the tenacity of the Caiapó in the eighteenth century. As the
century closed, adventurers traveling to Cuiabá still avoided the banks of the Paraná
and Pardo Rivers where Caiapó were known to lurk, and their aldeias were found
through much of Camapuã. In Goiás, the headwaters of the Araguaia and the land
between the Paranaíba and Grande Rivers were home to many Caiapó villages. Part of
this resilience was due to the ability of the Caiapó to adapt to the exigencies of the
frontier: they experimented with large and small raiding parties, raided for captives,
attempted peaceful interaction with their enemies, and, when necessary, moved their
aldeias. Even so, the fighting inevitably took its toll: great swaths of campo and long
stretches of riverbanks were depopulated or abandoned.

In Goiás, years passed during the 1760s and 1770s without reports of a Caiapó
attack. When the Caiapó did appear, bandeiras were dispatched and often successfully
tracked down the raiding party or destroyed a village. It took years for the Caiapó to
recover from these attacks. There was a big raid in early 1764. An estimated 100
Caiapó attacked a farm, killing two overseers and many slaves. A bandeira tracked
these raiders down and ambushed them, capturing some loot and some weapons. Two
years later, in 1766, the Caiapó reappeared, burning farms and killing slaves outside of
Santa Luzia. The attackers besieged a small garrison at São Bartholomeu, but two
dragoons and some soldiers counterattacked, and their muskets put the Caiapó to flight.

In 1767, the Caiapó attacked a convoy near the aldeia at Rio das Velhas. The Bororo
chased after them, pushed into the sertões, and destroyed two Caiapó villages. The bandeira sent into the sertões quelled the raiding for almost a decade. A generation before, bandeira success had provoked a furious response, but these Caiapó attacks, though frightening at the time, were a far cry from the great onslaughts that had terrified southern Goiás and cut the overland passage to the coast in the 1740s. The fragile tranquility was shattered in 1774. Caiapó raiders attacked and killed nine slaves working in a field.¹⁰⁸ Four years passed before the Caiapó returned in 1778.¹⁰⁹ They attacked and destroyed a farm near Vila Boa, killing an auxiliary cavalry officer and ten slaves. This was the last recorded attack in Goiás before September of 1780, when something unprecedented occurred: a group of Caiapó walked into Vila Boa to meet with the governor.

¹ These Indians were various sub-groups of the Bororo, the Coxipó, Cuiabá, and Aricoponé, see Carvalho Franco (1989:103).
² Monção (“monsoon”) is a Portuguese corruption of the Arabic word maušim (“appropriate season”), which refers to the time when the seasons were appropriate for voyaging. The Portuguese acquired this word from the timing of the tradewinds to sail to and from the Far East, e.g., India, while expanding their conquests there in the sixteenth century. The seasonal convoys of canoes to Cuiabá were named monsoons, as much for their great length and rigor as for their fluvial nature. The works of Sergio Buarque de Holanda (1945, 1949, 1986) best describe the “monção” route from São Paulo to Cuiabá. An exciting, if brief, description of the route is found in Hemming (1978:385-386). Contemporary eighteenth-century accounts of the route are found in Taunay (1981b).
³ Araritaguaba is Tupi for “the place where the Arara (“parrots”) land to eat.” The current name, Porto Feliz, means “Happy Haven” or “Prosperous Port.”
⁴ RAPMT 1982:45.
⁵ APMT: 1ª Lata de Doc. Avulsos, Doc. 43.
⁶ APMT Ano 1782, Doc. 145.
⁷ AHU_ACL_CU_010, Cx. 15 D. 931.
⁸ APMT Fundo: Governadoria (31-3-1771), Doc.336.
⁹ APMT Fundo: Governadoria (31-3-1771), Doc.336.
¹⁰ AHU_ACL_CU_010, Cx. 15 D. 931.
¹¹ APMT Fundo: Justiça (15-5-1771) Doc. 95; AHU_ACL_CU_010, Cx. 15 D. 931.
¹² IHGMT Pasta 101-Nº2311 (5-6-17771); IHGMT Pasta 97, n° 2128 (7-4-1771).
¹³ APMT Fundo: Justiça (28-6-1771), Doc. 92; RAPMT (1983:83).
¹⁴ IHGMT Pasta 97, n° 2128 (7-4-1771).
¹⁵ APMT Fundo: Câmara de Cuiabá (6-2-1773), Doc. 76.
¹⁶ APMT Fundo: Justiça (27-8-1771), Doc. 89.
¹⁷ There is some confusion about this bandeira. Carvalho Franco (1989:28) reported this bandeira was attacked and destroyed by the Paiaguá at Médico. The Paiaguá raided at the same time as the Caiapó attacks at Médico, but there does not appear to be information to support their destroying a bandeira. Giraldin (1997:65) claimed the bandeira
attacked and destroyed a Caiapó aldeia eight leagues outside of Cuiabá. The document Giraldin employed to support this conclusion refers to the bandeira initially sent after the Caiapó in the first week after the attack, which killed three Caiapó and recovered booty carried off from Médico. In 1773, the slaving of the Bororo on the Porrudos was suggested again, indicating António Soares de Gódoi had failed to carryout his instructions. Much of the bandeira’s equipment was sitting in storage two years later, and the governor proposed using these idle stores to outfit a new expedition, see APMT Fundo: Câmara de Cuiabá (6-2-1773), Doc. 76.

18 APMT Fundo: Justiça (28-7-1771), Doc. 91; see also, AHU_ACL_CU_010, Cx. 19, D. 1198.
19 APMT Fundo: Justiça (28-7-1771), Doc. 91.
20 APMT Fundo: Justiça (27-8-1771), Doc. 89.
21 AHU_ACL_CU_010, Cx. 19, D. 985.
22 AHU_ACL_CU_010, Cx. 19, D. 985.
23 AHU_ACL_CU_010, Cx. 19, D. 985.
24 APMT Ano 1773, Doc. 76.
25 APMT Ano 1773 (28-4-1773), Doc. 43.
26 APMT Fundo: Câmara de Cuiabá (6-2-1773), Doc. 76.
27 APMT Fundo: Câmara de Cuiabá (6-2-1773), Doc. 76.
28 APMT Fundo: Câmara de Cuiabá (6-2-1773), Doc. 76.
29 AHU_ACL_CU_010, Cx. 19, D. 1198; APMT Senado da Câmara-Vila Boa (27-11-1773), Doc. 56.
30 APMT Ano 1773, Doc. 18; APMT Ano 1773, Doc. 79.
31 The Portuguese were persistent. In 1781, Francisco Leme de Abraes led 75 men to the Bororo. The Indians convinced the bandeira that they wished to settle nearer Cuiabá, and some 203 Bororo, the vast majority warriors, began the return trip. But when the Portuguese were inattentive, the Bororo launched a surprise attack in which seven soldiers died and numerous muskets were captured. The attackers, now armed with muskets, fled to the sertões, and the bandeira returned to Cuiabá with 23 captives, see APMT Ano 1781, Doc. 40. Also found in Costa Siqueira (1850:11-12).
32 AHU_ACL_CU_010, Cx. 19, D. 1198.
33 AHU_ACL_CU_010, Cx. 21, D. 1257.
34 AHU_ACL_CU_010, Cx. 19, D. 1198. A list of these attacks is provided in the appendix.
35 A lucky Bileiro arrow had transformed the elder Bartholomeu Bueno da Silva into a Cyclops.
36 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023.
37 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023.
38 E.g., AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 18, D. 1072.
39 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023.
40 IHGB-AU 1.2.2., f. 248v.
41 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023; AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 6. D. 493.
42 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023. António de Lemos e Faria eventually ended up reduced in rank and imprisoned. An investigation of his soldierly merits left little to admire (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 32, D. 2005).
43 See Ferguson and Whitehead (1992:19-21) for a discussion of the ability of modern states to mobilize force against their tribal enemies; Karasch (1998:121), without citation, claimed 8,000 Caiapó were captured in 1741. This number appears elevated. Alencastre (1864:76) put the count at 1,000 captives taken within three months during the campaigns of 1748-1751.
44 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 32, D. 2005.
45 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023.
46 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023.
47 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 5, D. 417; Museu das Bandeiras (Hereafter, MB) Pacote (Hereafter, Pct) 413 (1749-1752), fls. 142-142v; DI 1896, vol. 22:210-213.
48 BN 01, 04, 001.
49 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023.
50 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023.
51 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023.
52 MB Pct 413 (1749-1752), fls. 142-142v.
53 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 6, D. 465.
54 AHEGO Livro 3 (1735-1751), f. 87v.
55 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 5. D. 427.
Contemporary Xinguano Indians have an oral tradition of killing a Portuguese slaver with an arrow (Heckenberger, personal communication). The Xingú is not overly far from the region where the Cururú wounded Pires de Campos, and this Xinguano tradition could refer to António Pires de Campos.

The *Ilha do Bananal* (*Banana Grove Island*), formed by a fork in the Araguaia River, is the largest river island in the world.

João Godói Pinto da Silveira identified the Cururú as the people who injured Pires de Campos, see AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023.

The Ilha do Bananal (*Banana Grove Island*), formed by a fork in the Araguaia River, is the largest river island in the world.
BN I-30, 12, 17 n° 40.
BN I-30, 12, 17 n° 39.
AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 20, D. 1220.
AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 23, D. 1440.
AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 27, D. 1776.
AHUG_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 32, D. 1996.
CHAPTER 5
THE “PACIFICATION” (1780–1785)

Introduction

On September 21, 1780, 36 Caiapó—an elderly man, six warriors, and 29 women and children—walked into Vila Boa. It was the first time Caiapó had entered the city peacefulely and the crowning event of Governor Luís da Cunha Menezes’s governorship, one that earned him acclaim with the Portuguese Crown. It remains one of the proudest moments in the history of Goiás. In his correspondence with the Crown, the governor went to great lengths to describe how he had employed “persuasion” to attract the Caiapó, explaining how he dispatched a bandeira bearing gifts and promises of peace to the sertões. The Caiapó accepted his gifts and listened to his promises, and it appeared Governor Cunha Menezes accomplished with words and gifts what brute force had failed to do, namely, “pacify” the Caiapó. When nineteenth-century chroniclers of Goiás codified the history of the captaincy, this “pacification” was portrayed as an event, in which the 36 Caiapó enjoyed their reception in Vila Boa, decided to accept an aldeia, and then summoned their villages from across the sertões. Caiapó heard the call and came to settle on an aldeia, which the Portuguese named after the Portuguese Queen, Maria I (Alencastre 1864a:314–319; Souza 1872:459–461). The burgeoning relationship between the erstwhile foes was amicable. According to Ayres do Casal (1817:537), the Caiapó “showed themselves grateful for the benefits, faithful to their promises, and without a notable inclination for theft.” The hostilities that had raged for most of the century ended, and the governor “advised the neighboring captaincies of the Caiapo friendship so not to treat them as enemies” (Souza 1872:461).
The pacification, however, was more complex than the early historians admitted or understood. There was little to distinguish the so-called “persuasive” means that Governor Cunha Menezes used from those the previous governors of Goiás had employed: his bandeira was heavily armed, manned by indigenous allies, and ordered to use violence against the Caiapó. Nor was the governor the first to attempt to attract the Caiapó with promises of peace and gifts of manufactured goods. Paulistas, including Pires de Campos, had tried the very same tactic in the 1740s, and there were later failed attempts in northern São Paulo. A close examination of the events following September of 1780 reveals the pacification was not an event but a participatory process (cf. Karasch 2005). The Caiapó sent emissaries to investigate the aldeia before deciding to settle there; some Caiapó decided to accept the aldeia, while others never left the sertões. Importantly, this process was not as peaceful as the chroniclers would have us believe. Previously ignored correspondence reveals the Caiapó not only continued to be feared, but that the early days of the aldeia were tumultuous and violent. The Caiapó were not “grateful” for their aldeia, as Ayres do Casal believed, but haughty and threatening toward their “conquerors.” The pacification was, in fact, not seamless and peaceful but difficult and even dangerous: suddenly, the governor and settlers had to deal with a large number of hostile Caiapó settled and living within easy striking distance of Vila Boa.

The Directorate

The Caiapó were not alone in settling on an aldeia at the end of the eighteenth century. Between 1770 and 1790, the Portuguese persuaded, cajoled, or battered all of the major peoples of Goiás—the Acroá, Chacriabá, Javaé and Karajá (the Crayás of the mid-century), and the Chavante—into settling on aldeias.¹ These so-called
“pacifications” occurred under the Diretório dos índios (“Indian Directorate”), part of a series of reforms promoted and promulgated by Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, better known by his later title, the marquis de Pombal. Pombal was an intelligent, pragmatic, and ruthless bureaucrat, who, in 1750, was appointed Portugal’s chief minister. Soon after, he initiated a series of vigorous reforms to reinvigorate the ailing Portuguese state and her overseas possessions. This ambitious reform program—referred to as the Pombaline Reforms—defined the reign of King José I (1750–1777).

Pombal believed Brazil was the most important possession in what remained of the once vast Portuguese empire, and he sought to reform the colony by securing its borders against incursions from Spain and by jumpstarting the lagging economy. In 1750, the Treaty of Madrid secured the borders of Brazil in the west, vastly extending the legal Portuguese possession of what was previously considered Spanish territory. Eleven years later, in 1761, the Treaty of Madrid, which had preceded Pombal’s ascension to power, was annulled by the Treaty of El Prado, which further delimitated Brazil’s western borders and left Portugal with an immense overseas possession; one poorly populated, weakly defended, and economically decrepit. Pombal recognized that it was impossible to populate Brazil with immigrants from tiny Portugal, so he turned to the natives as a solution to both defending the colony and rejuvenating the ailing economy. The Crown’s policy toward the Brazilian Indians when Pombal began his reforms emphasized converting the Indians to Catholicism (MacLachlan 1973). Indians were supposed to live in missions where, under the tutelage of the regular orders, they learned Christine doctrine and how to live a “civilized” life. The temporal and spiritual control over the mission Indians belonged to the missionaries, for example, the Jesuits,
Capuchins, and Dominicans. Portuguese settlers, in theory, were not supposed to enter the missions or interact with the Indians, except under certain circumstances. Pombal believed that the missionaries’ control over the Indians was a serious impediment to the economic growth of the colony. In his view, this severely restricted the labor available to settlers and prevented the Indians from incorporating into the economy and becoming useful vassals. Pombal resented the power of the Society of Jesus, the largest and most successful of the regular orders in Brazil, whom he believed used their wealth and control of the Indians in ways adverse to the Crown and economic development of the colony. By reforming Crown Indian policy, especially ending the missionaries’ temporal control over the Indians and breaking the power of the Jesuits, it was thought possible to transform the Brazilian natives into useful vassals, secure the colony’s borders, and reinvigorate the economy.

On June 6, 1755, under the influence of Pombal, King José I declared the Brazilian Indians free—especially, those living in the Jesuit Missions—and restored “the liberty of their persons, goods, and commerce” (Neto 1988:162).² With this declaration, all Indian slaves were freed, the future subjugation of them prohibited, and, in theory, Indians were to “enjoy all the honors, privileges, and liberties” of the free colonists. The law made the Indians the owners of their villages and lands, and, like the rest of the king’s vassals, gave them the right to decide where and how to labor and what constituted fair wages. The next day, June 7, 1755, the Crown stripped temporal control of the Indians from the Jesuits, limited the scope of the Society’s responsibilities to spiritual realm—effectively ending the Jesuit administration of missions—and opened the missions to settlers. The goal of these reforms was to facilitate the entry of the
Indians into colonial society to create a “stable yeoman class little different from [the] industrious peasant of Portugal” (MacLachlan 1972:361). These reforms of Portuguese Indian policy, however, originally applied only to the Indians living in Grão Pará and the Maranhão.

Pombal’s brother, Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado, the governor of Grão Pará and the Maranhão, took these reforms even farther. Sent to the New World to play the role of reformer, Governor Mendonça Furtado promulgated the Directorate in May of 1757. He stripped the Indians of their freedom, which had officially lasted less than two years, and placed the missions under the temporal control of lay “directors” (Hemming 1987:11–17). Ideally schools were to be established in the former missions, and administrators would teach useful skills—such as reading, writing, farming, and livestock breeding—and propagate Christianity and European civility. The governor envisioned the Directorate aldeias forging new subjects from the native population—subjects who would settle and secure the vast unpopulated backlands and contested frontiers with Spain—and their labor would finally eliminate the chronic labor shortages that had hitherto plagued Brazil. The Crown endorsed the Directorate, and, in 1758–1759, its principles were applied to the other captaincies. Far from ushering in a new era of prosperity for the Indians, the Directorate led to corruption and exploitation (Hemming 1987:40–61; Neto 1988). There was massive depopulation and social disruption, particularly along the Amazon basin, as the once populous Jesuit aldeias were opened to settlers’ labor demands.³ This reform remained the official Indian policy in Brazil until it was abolished in 1798.
In Goiás, the Directorate had a profound, if delayed, effect on the mission system and Indians. Before the implementation of Pombal’s reforms, there were few missions in Goiás: in the south, the Jesuits controlled the garrisons of Bororo established by Pires de Campos in the 1740s, and, in the north, the Society also worked among the Acroá and Chacriabá in the missions at Duro and Formiga (established, respectively, in 1751 and 1755; both were abandoned soon afterward). By the time the Directorate was abolished in 1798, there were, in addition to the Bororo aldeias, five aldeias in Goiás: São Francisco do Duro (Duro), São José do Duro (Formiga), Nova Beira, São José de Mossâmedes, Maria I, and Pedro III (known as Carretão). 4 These aldeias were “the most important official attempt to settle Indians anywhere in Brazil during the Directorate period,” historian John Hemming (1987:75) observed. “The authorities lavished expenditure to make these model villages: they wanted to show that they could be as successful in acculturating Indians as the expelled Jesuits had been.” The expansion of the Goiás aldeias and the creation of these “model villages,” however, took nearly 20 years and considerable effort on the part of the Portuguese. It also backfired early on: one of the first effects of the Directorate was to provoke a revolt in the Duro and Formiga aldeias. Throughout the 1750s and 1760s, there was heavy fighting against the Acroá and Chacriabá who had lived in these aldeias, and their warriors’ raids were made more formidable by muskets captured during the uprisings (Apolinário 2006). It was an inauspicious start for the Directorate in Goiás.

The major expansion of the Goiás aldeia system under the Directorate did not occur until Governor José de Almeida de Vasconcelos de Soveral e Carvalho, the later Baron of Mossâmedes, arrived in 1772. His instructions from the Crown recognized:
the impracticability of populating the said captaincy [of Goiás] or other parts of Portuguese America except with the American natives: and finding the sertão of that vast continent filled by Indians, it should principally be them who populate the places, towns, and cities that have formed, with the conviction that without them there shall be no civilization, nor commerce, nor opulence, nor security. [Alencastre 1864a:246]

This was a classic statement of the Directorate project; one which ordered the governor to view the natives as an opportunity—rather than an impediment—as it was their bodies that would populate the captaincy, provide the labor, revive the lagging economy, establish new towns, and convert the once forbidding sertões into civilized places.

To accomplish this, the governor was ordered to attract the Indians by “persuasive” means. The persuasive means Governor Almeida de Vasconcelos chose were bandeiras—armed expeditions little different from those previous governors had sent against the Indians—dispatched to the sertões with gifts and promises of peace. In 1774, the new governor sent a number of bandeiras to the Tocantins, Araguaia, Anicuns, and Corumbá Rivers “with the goal of pacifying the forest Indians and discovering new mines” (Alencastre 1864a:304). Although no new mines were discovered, the governor’s plan had some success with the Indians: several Acroá and Chacriabá villages accepted the governor’s offers of peace, manufactured goods, and a military support against their enemies. And, importantly, while prospecting on the Rico River, a bandeira entered and stayed in a Caiapó village “of 400 or more beds” (Souza 1872:455). That a bandeira had entered a Caiapó village without being attacked was read as a good omen in Vila Boa; nonetheless, the governor’s first instinct was to use his newfound Acroá and Chacriabá allies against the Caiapó. He relocated the Chacriabá to the Rio das Velhas, where they would assist the Bororo defending the
overland passage to Vila Boa from Caiapó attacks (Alencastre 1864a:308). For the Acroá, the governor decided to build a new aldeia south of Vila Boa: it was to be a bulwark against future Caiapó attacks, close enough to summon the club-fighting Acroá with short notice. He selected “a suitable place of campo, good waters, and forest” and began construction of what eventually became São José de Mossâmedes. The governor ambitiously envisioned a lavish aldeia with a central plaza and fronted by a baroque church and spacious living quarters for the Indians: this aldeia would become the showpiece of the Directorate aldeias. The mere sight of it, the governor believed, “would make all the forest Indians jealous” and influence them to leave the sertões and settle on his aldeia (Alencastre 1864a:306).

An even more spectacular success with the Indians followed in 1775. Governor Almeida de Vasconcelos, like his predecessors, believed the natives living on the Araguaia River—the Tapirapé, Cururú, Curumaré, and Crayás—were less hostile, if not amicable, so he dispatched a bandeira there. This bandeira met with great and, for Goiás, unprecedented success. Between 1,500 and 2,000 Carajá and Javaé (the Crayás, in the days of Pires de Campos), who faced aggression from the Chavante, agreed to settle on an aldeia named Nova Beira (Karasch 2005:472–477; Chaim 1983:121–123). This aldeia, situated on the Bananal Island, dissolved a few years later, the inhabitants slinking off because of disease and hostilities from neighboring peoples. Nonetheless, in less than three years, with little expense and no bloodshed, Governor Almeida de Vasconcelos had “pacified” four peoples in the north—the Acroá, Chacriabá, Carajá, and Javaé—reduced the Indian threat in the north, secured the middle course of the Araguaia for commerce, and (theoretically) created thousands of
new vassals for the Crown. In a captaincy where the Indians were almost uniformly hostile to the Portuguese, and where terrible wars had raged ever since the discovery of the mines, this was unexpected and unrivaled success.

Despite his successful pacifications, Governor Almeida de Vasconcelos was replaced. The new governor, Luís da Cunha Menezes, arrived in Vila Boa in October of 1778. Much like his predecessor, he set about attempting to reinvigorate the mining economy: he brought new mining methods to increase extraction of ore from old mines; and dispatched prospectors to the former territories of the Acroá and Chacriabá (Souza 1872:459). But his attempts to revitalize the mines failed: science drew precious little ore from the stale mines; and prospectors announced no major strikes in the territories of the Acroá and Chacriabá. The disappointed governor next turned his attention to the Indians. His predecessor had pacified the Acroá, Chacriabá, Carajá, and Javaé, which left Governor Cunha Menezes the Caiapó and Chavante, both of whom settlers considered extremely hostile. He decided to attempt the pacification of the Caiapó first, apparently because of the bandeira that had earlier entered one of their villages without being attacked, and because the Chavante had hitherto proved extremely hostile to overtures of peace. He issued orders for an expedition to prepare for a voyage to the headwaters of the Araguaia River, a region still dominated by Caiapó villages.

The Caiapó “Pacification”

On February 5, 1780, Governor Cunha Menezes ordered formation of a bandeira command by José Luís Pereira, a soldier of “great merit, intelligence, and experience with these services.” Despite what would later be written about this bandeira, there was very little to distinguish it from the many others that had plunged into the sertões in search of Caiapó raiders and their villages. It was manned by 12 pedestres and a large
contingent of native soldiers, including 26 Bororo from Rio das Pedras, and 12 Acroá from São José de Mossâmedes. The pedestres were armed with 12 muskets, lead shot, and three arrobas (43.8 kilos or 96 pounds) of powder; the Bororo and Acroá carried their bows, arrows, and clubs. The governor planned for this bandeira to sojourn for many months in the sertões, so he ordered it well supplied and equipped. Provisions included cattle, manioc flour, and dried meat, but the governor also ordered the Indians to bring food from their aldeia gardens and, as much as was possible, to live off the land. And, of course, the bandeira carried a great quantity of manufactured goods to give to the Caiapó, including various trinkets, such as mirrors and beads, and iron tools, scissors, and knives (Alencastre 1864:345; DI 1903, vol. 43:356). These gifts—and the prospect of more to come—were supposed to bribe the Caiapó into accepting the governor's peace.

Because the bandeira was supposed to contact a people not known for taking captives or having previously settled on an aldeia, the governor knew communication would be difficult. Therefore, the governor ordered several línguas to accompany José Luís Pereira to the sertões. The preceding years of warfare had left him with a large number of captives to draw on, including a recently captured Caiapó youth, whom the Portuguese believed was the son of a chief. When contacting natives, the Portuguese preferred to use children or wives of chiefs, believing such individuals would hold more sway with the Indians, so the governor ordered this Caiapó baptized—he was christened Feliciano José Luís—clothed, and shown the aldeia at São José de Mossâmedes (Souza 1872:459). The sight of the baroque church, plaza, and living quarters apparently convinced this youth to join two other Caiapó “couples” and convey
the governor’s promises to his village. There was nothing new about this tactic.

Earlier in the century, the Portuguese had tried to negotiate with the Caiapó through captives, including the children of chiefs, but these attempts had met with no success. The Portuguese were persistent, as experience had shown that most Indians were eventually lured into peace by promises of goods and military alliances. Furthermore, Governor Cunha Menezes’s predecessor had successfully used línguas during his tenure, so the tactic was dusted off and again employed against the Caiapó. As events unfolded, this proved to be a wise choice.

Before the bandeira left for the sertões, the governor issued a set of instructions to José Luis Pereira, a copy of which has survived. In order to avoid conflicts from breaking out in the bandeira, he ordered the Bororo, Acroá, and pedestres to be separated; no one was supposed to speak with the línguas. Once a Caiapó village was located, the bandeira should surround it and prepare for an attack, but, instead of assaulting the aldeia, the línguas should be release and sent forward bearing tools and trastes (“valueless items”). Once contact was established, José Luis Pereira was ordered to read a letter from the governor to the Caiapó. It pledged “to supply and give them all the tools that they need, including axes, sickles, and hoes to use in their fields” and proposed a military alliance against their enemies. The governor promised the Caiapó “that they shall be settled in places of their choosing with good house for their relatives and families to live in” and “that each [man] shall choose a wife at his pleasure and live together in separate houses with their children.” If the Caiapó did not believe or trust his offer, the Governor invited them to send “six or seven men and their wives and whoever else wishes to accompany the bandeira and personally examine everything I
propose to them.” These Caiapó could freely return and report on what they had seen and, hopefully impressed by the Mossâmedes aldeia, convince the others to accept peace. In the advent that the Caiapó completely rejected the governor’s offer and refused to send emissaries, then José Luis Pereira should attack them and “conduct five, six, or seven Indians to come [even] when they do not wish to by desire.” Like many commanders sent to hunt the Caiapó before him, José Luis Pereira was sanctioned to use violence. The governor’s “persuasive” means, thus, were backed up by force.

With his instructions in hand, José Luis Pereira led the bandeira from São José de Mossâmedes in early 1780. They wandered the sertões for three months before encountering a Caiapó village (Souza 1872:459). According to an anonymous chronicler, Feliciano stripped off his clothes, swore to return, and entered the village. For several hours, the bandeira tensely waited outside the village, until “the boy returned accompanied by more than 100 Indians, all disarmed as a sign of peace.” The Caiapó greeted the bandeira “with howls, smiles, whoops, and hugs,” before they all entered the village to meet with the chief. José Luis Pereira and his men spent many days in the village and, then, set off to Vila Boa with 36 Caiapó, including an old chief, six warriors, and their wives and children.

Giraldin (1997: 93) has suggested José Luis Pereira captured these Caiapó in a raid, but this was rather unlikely. Other governors attempting to pacify natives with persuasion had no qualms about recording the use of aggression and force. Governor Tristão da Cunha Menezes, for example, did not hesitate to inform the Crown that a bandeira sent to “persuade” the Chavante into accepting peace had attacked them,
taking several captives.  

If José Luís Pereira had attacked the Caiapó village, Governor Cunha Menezes would have reported it; instead he recorded the arriving Caiapó had “voluntarily” agreed to accompany the bandeira.  

This, however, does not mean coercion played no role in the Caiapó decision to send emissaries to Vila Boa. The Caiapó knew pedestres and native auxiliaries surrounded their village and, all too familiar with bandeira attacks, must have felt extremely threatened. The governor’s gifts and the promises the língua s carried, no doubt, made the decision to send the 36 Caiapó easier, but the looming threat of an attack certainly played a role in their “voluntarily” accompanying the bandeira.

The bandeira and the Caiapó arrived in Vila Boa on September 21, 1780. The governor ordered the Caiapó escorted through the streets with great pomp and circumstance. There was a show of Portuguese force: a company of infantry and two companies of cavalry paraded and, along with two artillery pieces, fired volleys in front of the Caiapó (DI 1903, vol. 43: 356). The governor and leading men of Vila Boa, dressed in their finest regalia, greeted the visitors and vowed to protect and defend them, distributed gifts; they and the Caiapó witnessed a Te Deum (a traditional mass giving thanks) celebrated in the beautiful baroque matriz church. The festivities were marred, however, by the untimely death of an elderly Caiapó woman. The governor turned this ill omen to his advantage by ordering the woman “to have the happiness of dying baptized and buried in the principal church, with ample solemnity,” a ceremony he though impressed the other Caiapó.  

Soon after the death of this unfortunate woman, the Caiapó children were baptized; the governor served as the godfather to the children.
of chiefs, which Catholics commonly believed created a patronage and a kin relationship with the birth parents.

The celebrations continued for 25 days. Governor Cunha Menezes feted and delighted the Caiapó, and the length of the celebration was a testament to the fear they evoked and the deep desire to see their raiding end. Accustomed to greeting visitors to their own villages with ceremonies, music, and gifts, the Caiapó greatly enjoyed their reception, especially the Catholic rituals—which still fascinated them forty years later (Pohl (1951: 361)—and were deeply impressed with the governor’s promises and his presents, primarily the latter. The Caiapó visited São José de Mossâmedes and marveled at the buildings and the abundance of tools and food the inhabitants enjoyed. According to the governor, they lost “the great horror that they had acquired through their hostilities” and agreed to return to the sertões and report favorably on what they had seen.20

On October 10, the emissaries, accompanied by an escort of troops, left Vila Boa and headed for the sertões. When they arrived at the garrison on the Claro River, the old chief decided that he and the women and children would go no further.21 He sent the six warriors on in his stead, promising the Portuguese an answer within eight months. The six warriors, accompanied by part of José Luís’s bandeira and the Caiapó línguas, headed to the sertões. Months passed without word, and it seemed like another attempt at wooing the Caiapó into accepting peace had failed. Then, on May 10, 1781, a messenger from the Claro River garrison arrived in Vila Boa—two “villages” had accepted the governor’s offer, some 237 Caiapó were on their way, though traveling slowly owing to the great number of elderly and children.22 There was also
news that a third “village” was on its way; its arrival greatly delayed because of the great distance it had to travel. On May 29, the first two villages arrived. The governor greeted them with a display of force and benevolence similar to that of the previous year: there were more parading troops, Church rituals, and distributions of presents; the celebrations lasted for 38 days. On June 12, a baptism was held for 113 children, including six born since the Caiapó arrived, and the governor and leading men of Vila Boa again served as the godparents to the children of the chiefs. One middle-aged woman, who had attached herself to the governor in the days preceding the baptism, implored the governor to baptize her. The governor permitted her to be baptized because of her ill health; this woman passed away shortly afterward. A number of the adult Caiapó also desired to be initiated into the mysteries of the Catholic Faith, and a priest attempted to catechize them, but the attempt was abandoned because none spoke Portuguese.

Despite the apparent Caiapó satisfaction with their reception, the governor was extremely worried about the security of Vila Boa. On the day of the children’s baptism, he dispatched a letter to Lisbon calling for more weapons and munitions to fight the remaining hostile Indians and quilombos. He requested the Crown provide 500 muskets and a suitable amount of shot and powder and used the recent Caiapó “pacification” to justify the cost of refurbishing the armory. According to the governor, the Caiapó were “descending in great number from the forests they inhabit, which makes the requested weapons and munitions more prudent, not only because of their great numbers but also because of the great caution one must maintain, as they have been a nation that caused the most dread with their hostilities.” The governor did not
trust the pacified Caiapó: he and the other settlers considered them extremely
treachery and dangerous.

The governor’s unease could only have worsened when a third “village” of 88
Caiapó arrived on September 29, 1781. They were followed by a fourth arrival of 200
Caiapó on September 27, 1782 (Souza 1872:460). These arrivals, like those preceding
them, were peaceful affairs, celebrated with pomp and ceremony in Vila Boa, but
Governor Cunha Menezes now had over 500 Caiapó, many of them redoubtable
warriors, living in or near the capital. (In contrast, his predecessor’s triumphs over the
Acroá and Chacriabá had involved fewer Indians, and most of the thousands of Carajá
and Javaé remained in their homelands, far away from Vila Boa.) If the Caiapó had
sprung one of their infamous surprise attacks, it could have resulted, as the governor
obviously feared, in a frightful massacre.

Despite the governor’s fears, the resettlement of the Caiapó moved forward. He
kept his promise and permitted them to select the location of their new aldeia, named
Maria I after the Queen of Portugal. They picked the top of a small rise overlooking a
bend in the Fartura River, 14 leagues (85 kilometers or 53 miles) south of Vila Boa.27
Situated at the transition between the forests of the riverbanks and the open savannah,
the new aldeia possessed plentiful resources. Even the governor recognized the
Caiapó had chosen well, informing the Crown that the Fartura River was full of fish, the
surrounding countryside abundant in game and good soils, and there was a cattle ranch
nearby to supply the Indians with beef.28 The Fartura was precisely the kind of place
the Caiapó preferred to build their villages; indeed, it had been considered “infested by
the heathen Caiapó” as recently as 1775.29 And, importantly, the Fartura was close
enough to manage the aldeia easily, since the governor could quickly address Caiapó desires and complaints or, if necessary, rush in troops to crush an uprising.\(^{30}\)

Until their fields began to produce, many of the Caiapó remained in Vila Boa. An excellent description of their day-to-day affairs, written by an anonymous chronicler and eyewitness, has survived.\(^ {31}\) Every morning, Caiapó families left for the surrounding countryside to hunt and collect food: “the men [carried] only their weapons, and the women carried on their backs all the game the men killed and everything else they found in the campo.” The women carried heavy loads, such as large game, the same way they carried their children, with a tumpline of cloth that passed across their foreheads and secured the load or child to their backs.\(^ {32}\) The chronicler lived near where the hunters passed each day, and he and his family, especially his wife, gave small cakes, biscuits and sweets to the passing children; the hunters returned the favor and left palm hearts, game, birds, honey, wax, and other forest goods at the chronicler’s door.

One Sunday morning, the chronicler witnessed a peculiar spectacle from his window.\(^ {33}\) A merchant had eight or more slaves moving a “large and heavy wooden beam.” The slaves were struggling to drag the beam, when a group of Caiapó warriors passed. The Indians grabbed the heavy beam, shouldered it “as if it was a stick,” and began carrying it to the merchant’s house. Fearing the governor would be angered and accuse him of exploiting the Caiapó, the merchant attempted to halt the warriors with frantic gestures. This only encouraged the Caiapó who, laughing heartily at the merchant’s antics, hauled the log for the slaves. The warriors, satisfied with their work, then continued on their way.
Though seemingly an unimportant and innocent event, perhaps even amusing, the warriors shouldering the merchant’s beams was, in fact, important to understanding how the Caiapó viewed their pacification. We have already seen how the Caiapó practiced races in which teams of men ran while carrying a heavy log. A log race started a outside of a village, and each racer on a team took a turn shouldering a Buriti log— these logs were so heavy that, according to Pinto da Silveira, the Bororo found lifting them difficult—and running as fast as possible under the load. When a racer tired, he slowed and passed the log to a teammate’s shoulder; in this way, the log was passed from shoulder to shoulder until the teams arrived in the village plaza. Little effort, then, was required for a group of Caiapó warriors to carry the merchant’s beam a short distance. They were, after all, accustomed to carrying heavy logs while running as fast as they could over long distances. More importantly, however, log races were spirited events in which men showed their strength and virility. In carrying the merchant’s beam, the Caiapó warriors were doing the same. These were not dispirited and defeated men forced to acquiesce to a humiliating subjugation; rather, they were warriors proud of their speed and strength, and they were just as willing to engage and defeat their erstwhile enemies in sport as they had in war. Although the anonymous chronicler did not know it, what he had witnessed foreshadowed ill events to come.

Problems of Pacification (1783–1784)

According to traditional narratives of the “pacification,” more than 500 Caiapó had settled at Maria I by the end of 1782, and, once there, they “ceased to constitute a threat to the caravans passing along the road to São Paulo” (Chaim 1983:124). But there were at least two more arrivals of Caiapó in early 1784, and, though these were poorly recorded, they swelled the aldeia population to such an immense size that the
soldiers stationed at Maria I found it impossible to control the Caiapó. In fact, the “pacification” began to unravel, the governor’s fears seemed justified, and the Caiapó remained a formidable threat to not only caravans but also Vila Boa itself.

We have a good idea of the Caiapó population at Maria I because a census, taken by José Luís Pereira, has survived (Figure 5-1). According to the census, there were 518 Caiapó at the aldeia in May of 1783, of whom almost half were children. Living in close proximity to the Portuguese had taken its inevitable toll: many Caiapó had died—11 men, 14 women, 10 boys, and 2 girls—most likely from colds and fevers, and the aldeia population had declined. Traumatic as these losses must have been to the Caiapó, they were nothing compared to the deaths caused by the epidemics that annihilated the Panará: colds, fevers, and diarrhea reduced them from a population of just under a 1000 to 79 demoralized survivors in less than a decade (Schwartzman 1988:296; Baruzzi et al. 1977:185). This suggests epidemics had already affected the Caiapó, and their population had acquired some measure of natural immunity—immunity that was lost or never acquired by the Caiapó villages that migrated into the Peixoto de Azevedo.

The early histories of the “pacification” ended with the arrival of these four villages. But the aldeia population soon changed significantly. In correspondence that accompanied the census, José Luís Pereira informed the governor of a recent departure of ten Caiapó “men of war.” They had received gifts, observed the aldeia, spoke with its inhabitants, and decided to convince the rest of their villages to settle there. “The new Indians left from here for their lands very satisfied with the gifts Your Excellency provided,” Sergeant Pereira wrote. “They promised to arrive here in seven
months with many people. The said Indians are residents of the Grande River on the São Paulo road.”

That these ten Caiapó hailed from the Grande River was novel, since the preceding arrivals had all come from Camapuã. It had taken close to two years, but word of the aldeia had spread throughout Caiapó territory, traveling along the same networks of inter-village communication that had permitted their warriors to raid so destructively in the mid-1740s. Villages from different regions, not just Camapuã, were now sending small groups into Goiás to investigate the aldeia. The Portuguese no longer had to contend with solely the Camapuã Caiapó, and, as they were to discover, this had serious ramifications for the social dynamic of the aldeia.

Because more Caiapó were expected, the soldiers at the aldeia attempted to have new fields planted, as the current occupants had only planted crops sufficient for themselves, but they discovered that “those whom one finds here [at Maria I] do not want to work for the others.” There were too few soldiers at the aldeia to force 112 Caiapó men, many of them aggressive warriors, to labor against their will. This forced José Luís Pereira to request “30 slaves with all their tools, hedgebills and axes to plant a good field in expectation of the said Indians [arriving].” Ethnography offers some tantalizing clues to explain why Sergeant Pereira had to request slaves to plant new Caiapó fields. Panará gardens are not communal village property: each married couple plants gardens—the husband clears the land; the wife plants, tends, and harvests the crops—which belong to the wife and her clan, not the husband (Schwartzman 1988:74). Caiapó horticultural practices were similar to those of the Panará: men felled the forests, women tended the crops, and peanuts were “greatly esteem[ed].” If
women owned the gardens and crops planted at the aldeia, then the Caiapó rejected planting the new fields because the crops were intended for others, a violation of their understanding of the proper ownership and allocation of garden resources. The Indians viewed fields as the property of woman and clans, and they saw no reason to abandon their traditional practices and, thus, refused to plant new fields. The soldiers regarded the gardens at the aldeia as the property of the aldeia and all its inhabitants, a concept that clashed with Caiapó beliefs, but they were greatly outnumbered and could do little to force the issue.

If slaves were sent to Maria I to plant new fields—no record of their activity there has survived—then the crops were still green when, at the end of September, two Caiapó arrived at Maria I to announce a “great number” of them were on their way. In May, the Caiapó had promised their village would arrive within seven months, and they proved true to their word: in late December and early January, new Caiapó began appearing at Maria I. These Caiapó, unlike their predecessors, were not greeted with fanfare. They were extremely suspicious and entered the aldeia unobtrusively. According to the new governor, Tristão da Cunha Menezes, who had by then replaced his predecessor and brother, “a large part of the men remained spread throughout the forests, which surround the [...] aldeia, owing to this nation’s ferocious disposition and the remorse they feel for their crimes.” Soldiers, however, spied the lurking warriors and noticed new faces mixed among the familiar aldeia inhabitants. More Caiapó arrivals followed. Lieutenant José Rodrigues Freire, a dragoon sent to observe the aldeia, reported many children, elderly, and, more ominously, at least 178 warriors had appeared at the end of January. The Portuguese now had an enormous horde of
Caiapó living at Maria I. These latter arrivals were neither celebrated nor invited to Vila Boa to greet the governor—quite the opposite, there was little to celebrate and great cause for concern.

On January 16, 1784, the governor dispatched a letter to Lisbon and informed the Crown all was not well with the Caiapó pacification.45 A few days earlier, an officer at Maria I had sent him a letter that told of disturbances and “Indian falsehoods.” The atmosphere at Maria I had changed since the Caiapó from the Grande River arrived, and many of the soldiers stationed there were frightened; they feared of a rebellion or an attack on Vila Boa. The new Caiapó neither followed orders nor accepted a subordinate status on the aldeia; they were, the officer said, “absolutely without obedience.” A soldier’s order to collect grass was greeted with jeers and threats of death. Almost every day, groups of Caiapó left the aldeia to kill cattle on nearby ranches and threaten ranch hands; they returned to the aldeia to boast of their misdeeds. Marauding Caiapó destroyed cornfields planted at the aldeia, despite a língua informing them “that it is for them to feed themselves,” and they harvested the corn before it had ripened. They refused to work on the communal gardens: “they do not want to work and say the blacks [i.e., slaves] work and they will go wherever they wish.” A comment that revealed the Indians’ recognition of the different statuses colonial society attributed to skin color and the demeaning lack of freedom inherent to slavery; a status they roundly refused to accept for themselves.

There was violence. The Caiapó bullied the soldiers: “I saw the chief at my quarters requesting salt and, as I was not at home at the moment, he chided me and screamed that I should be there when he went there,” the officer wrote. “His anger
reached such an extreme that he hurled a vessel he was carrying against my door.” This outburst brought more Caiapó running and a crowd quickly gathered, but there was little the frightened officer could do “with so few people in the garrison.”

The violence was not limited to the officer’s browbeating and threats to cowhands and soldiers. Soon after the last group of Caiapó had arrived, a pedestre was found murdered. One of the línguas blamed the murder on “those [Caiapó] from the forests,” but “with time,” the officer wrote, “I discovered they were from the aldeia and it was the língua who ordered the murder.” A similar fate seemed planned for this unfortunate officer as well. “These past days they warned me that they intended to grab me when I went to bathe,” he wrote, “Going to the river, I heard the sounds of people in the forest and grabbing my weapon to investigate, I heard not a whisper.” An Indian woman later warned that the Caiapó planned an ambush at the river, so the officer dispatched troops to the Fartura to investigate; they did not find anything. But there were sightings of Caiapó lurking in ambush in the forests around the aldeia and along trails leading to nearby farms and the Mossâmêdes aldeia. After the Caiapó chief’s tirade, línguas warned the soldiers that warriors were plotting another ambush. The officer, with a hint of understatement, concluded: “we are not safe.”

What had happened at Maria I? Why did the aldeia suddenly turn violent with the arrival of the Caiapó from the Grande River? First, the Caiapó had arrived in great numbers and clearly overwhelmed the ability of the soldiers to control them. As the officer said: “they are 600 [warriors] and we [are] 27, this number of people is not sufficient to dominate them.” Second, the Caiapó arriving in 1781–1782 all hailed from Camapuã, which likely aided the smooth functioning of the aldeia because, one
supposes, they were somewhat related by kinship and accustomed to interacting with one another. However, the later arrivals hailed from the Grande River and were less familiar with the Camapuã Caiapó, lacked kin ties, and were not as easily integrated into the preexisting aldeia structure, in which they competed for limited supplies of food and goods. Third, the new Caiapó were suspicious of the aldeia, which was unsurprising considering they had come from sertões near the Bororo aldeias and had suffered the heaviest fighting; such fighting had also made their warriors more hostile and prone to confront the soldiers. Further, and perhaps most importantly, the aldeia had failed to meet the expectations of the Caiapó. The governor had promised supplies of food, goods, as well as security, all of which the first “villages” arriving at Maria I had received; but the Caiapó from the Grande River neither found a warm reception, nor discovered sufficient gardens, nor received a generous distribution of food and goods. So they reacted, showing their displeasure through the familiar language of violence, which was how they had interacted and communicated with the Portuguese for over 50 years.

Indeed, from the Indians’ perspective, it was their violence that had cowed the Portuguese into providing the aldeia with its numerous presents. The frightened officer’s letter informed the governor that the Caiapó believed that “all the gifts we give them are because we fear them.”46 The Caiapó arrived at the aldeia expecting food and goods—essentially tribute—believing they had conquered the Portuguese; instead they discovered insufficient food, few goods, and expectations that their men labor like women in gardens. It was only natural that they responded with violence and browbeat
the soldiers. After all, they believed this was what had forced the governor into giving them presents in the first place.

With the Caiapó pacification unwinding and a revolt a very real possibility, the governor needed to reestablish control over the aldeia. According to the officer’s letter, without “a great garrison of soldiers not only shall we suffer but also the aldeia of São José de Mossâmades and everything nearby.” Governor Tristão da Cunha Menezes did not need to be reminded of the threat the Caiapó posed: he had observed the aftermath of one of their raids while traveling to Vila Boa, and he suspected, with some justification, the culprits of the attack were responsible for the disturbances at the aldeia. He felt more troops were needed and decided “to augment and elevate the company of pedestres to the full complement of 178 soldiers in order to place a garrison of 80 soldiers in the aldeia to subjugate the Indians to working in the fields and constructing the aldeia.”47

Readying new troops required time, which the governor could ill afford, so he dispatched 20 Acroá from the aldeia at São José de Mossâmades, “as Indians may more easily perceive some treachery in the Caiapó,” while the new troops were raised and equipped.

But sending the Acroá and new troops to the aldeia was not all that the governor did to stabilize the aldeia; he also decided to use the Caiapó in a campaign to pacify the Chavante. The Chavante were the last major people in Goiás not settled on an aldeia. They were Gê-speakers, like the Caiapó, who lived in the north and occupied vast tracts of campo east of the Araguaia River. Terrifying club-fighters and excellent archers, the Chavante had increased their attacks on settlements in the decade since the Acroá and Chacriabá were pacified: more than 14 ranches were destroyed in 1783 alone; and, in
May of 1784, they had attacked slaves near the settlement at Crixás.\textsuperscript{48} In the wake of these attacks, Tristão da Cunha Menezes decided to pacify this formidable warrior people, which would secure the northern settlements from their terrible attacks and complete the Pombaline-era pacifications (see Hemming 1987:72–74). And it just so happened that a military campaign was an excellent way of occupying the most truculent of the aldeia Caiapó. Warriors naturally preferred the dangers of fighting to the emasculating drudgery of working on communal fields; and fighting in the north would take the men far away from the aldeia, where they would be less of a threat to the soldiers and nearby settlements. And the Caiapó hated the Chavante (Freire 1951:14). They were willing to participate in a bandeira to settle an old vendetta.

The governor ordered a bandeira of 40 pedestres and 40 Caiapó readied. They plunged into the northern sertões in July of 1784, returning that November with a number of Chavante captives abducted by the Caiapó during a brief battle.\textsuperscript{49} The governor’s gambit worked: that December he informed the Crown that Maria I was secured and the need for the extra troops had passed.\textsuperscript{50} The Caiapó would eventually play a pivotal role in the Chavante pacification, serving as skilled pathfinders and native warriors in the bandeiras sent against their old enemies. Such cooperation continued in the years after 1784. Caiapó warriors were found in bandeiras sent to distant Cuiaba, where they worked as pathfinders against the “fearless and valient” Barbado Indians, or wandering southern Goiás in search of escaped slaves.\textsuperscript{51}

\textbf{Villages, Population, and Maria I}

The Caiapó “pacification” was more complex and problematic than traditional narratives have allowed. When Governor Cunha Menezes dispatched letters to Mato Grosso and São Paulo announcing the cessation of hostilities, he believed that all of the
Caiapó villages were “pacified” or, in the least, would soon come to terms with the Portuguese. However, hostilities continued with attacks on settlements and mule trains in Goiás and Mato Grosso—especially in Camapuã—and the governor’s pacification remained incomplete. Part of the reason the governor never completely subjugated the Caiapó was because their villages, though connected by networks of kin and communication, were, much like other Gê-speaking villages, politically and economically autonomous; there was no supra-regional authority to summon them from the sertões. Instead, word of the governor’s offer and what the first emissaries witnessed spread between villages and, one suspects, provoked intense debates: some Caiapó decided to accept the promises and gifts and began moving toward Vila Boa; others village ignored the governor and his promises. Some villages—probably the majority—were interested but reluctant to leave their sertões, so they sent small groups, such as the ten warriors who appeared in 1783, to investigate the aldeia. There were doubtlessly many such groups sent to Maria I, but most passed unannounced and unnoticed—thus, undocumented—through the aldeia. Since small groups of Indians were constantly arriving from or leaving to the sertões, they attracted little notice. An officer stationed at the Rio Claro, João Gaudie Ley, wrote of the arrival at the garisson of one such group from Maria I that, “as some are always coming and others going, I did not judge it news.” But some of the Caiapó whom Gaudie Ley observed coming and going were new arrivals investigating the aldeia: some returned to their villages satished that they could live at Maria I; others decided against the move. This explains, at least in part, why the Caiapó arrived gradually over a period years and hostilities, which declined after 1781, never truly ceased.
Importantly, the traditional narratives have ignored the later arrival of large numbers of Caiapó. Table 5-1 (below) lists the documented arrivals of Caiapó at Vila Boa and Maria I, which permits us to re-examine the chronology of the early populating of Maria I. There were at least five distinct arrivals of “villages” between 1781 and 1784. The first three arrivals hailed from Camapuã, the region whence came the Caiapó língua Feliciano, and where he had led José Luís Pereira and the 1780 bandeira. The first Caiapó to arrive in Vila Boa came from this region. They lived closer to one another, and networks of kin and inter-village cooperation connected their villages, which facilitated the rapid spread of the governor’s promises.53 Later, word of Maria I spread far and wide, eventually reaching villages to the south, which led to the arrival of a large number of Caiapó in late 1783 and early 1784. A few weeks later, another group of Caiapó arrived at Maria I. Whence these Caiapó came was not documented, but they were likely from the Grande River as well, perhaps stragglers following the earlier arrivals; perhaps a different village from that region; in either case, their arrival meant the aldeia was completely beyond the control of the 27 pedestres and dragoons stationed there. The message Luís da Cunha Menezes sent to the Caiapó had reverberated across the immense breadth of their territory, and, though the pacification was incomplete, it affected the captaincies of Mato Grosso, Goiás, and São Paulo (and even western Minas Gerais).

One interesting topic yet to be addressed by historians is whether the Portuguese had actually managed to attract Caiapó “villages” to Vila Boa and Maria I. Portuguese officials, administrators, and soldiers certainly believed they were dealing with villages—an assumption that subsequent chroniclers and historians readily accepted—but there
is good reason to question whether Caiapó “villages” left the sertões. As Table 5.1 shows, the villages from Camapuã were small. It was not until late 1783 and early 1784 that truly large groups of Caiapó arrived; indeed, the 178 warriors arriving in late January of 1784 were nearly equal to, or even exceeded, the total number of Caiapó men, women, and children in each of the villages that had arrived in 1781–1782.

And the villages arriving at Vila Boa in 1781–1782 appear small when compared to the reports of large villages occasionally encountered in the sertões. Pires de Campos reportedly ran across a Caiapó village—in Camapuã, no less—that he refused to attack because of its immense size. While we do not know how large this village was, it is hard to believe Pai Pirá and his Bororo were loath to attack a village of 200 or even 237 Caiapó. While possible that, because of constant warfare and epidemics, Caiapó villages were smaller in the 1780s than they had been a few decades earlier, there were reports of large Caiapó villages contemporaneous to the pacification. For example, more than 80 prisoners—of whom only two were elderly women; the others were children—were captured from a single Caiapó village in Camapuã in the early 1780s. This number of prisoners suggests a large village, since many of the able-bodied women and older children avoided capture and most of the men were away raiding. Additionally, the bandeira prospecting on Rico River reportedly counted 400 “beds” in the Caiapó village it entered; this admittedly vague description, nonetheless, suggests a village population larger than of any of the so-called “villages” arriving from Camapuã in 1781–1782. If Caiapó villages tended to be large in those places where they faced bandeiras, such as Camapuã, why were the first villages arriving in Vila Boa so small?
Perhaps, some of the Caiapó villages accepting the governor’s offer were simply smaller villages. Since smaller villages were more susceptible to bandeira attacks, the governor’s offer of peace might have been more appealing to them. And Camapuã was one region where Caiapó villages suffered bandeira attacks; so accepting peace with the Portuguese offered these small villages a modicum of safety. However, attacks from bandeiras, as we have already seen, had the effect of driving Caiapó villages together, producing large villages that even a redoubtable Indian-fighter like Pires de Campos shied away from. Presumably, Caiapó villages in Camapuã, even in the late eighteenth century, were large, formidable, and filled with numerous club-fighting warriors capable of defending their homes, women, and children. Instead of villages, it appears the governor had attracted various chiefs and their followers from the sertões. These Caiapó had weighed the advantages and disadvantages of the governor’s offer, decided it had merit, and left the sertões for Vila Boa and Maria I. The governor’s offer and Maria I had the reverse effect of bandeiras, which had driven villages together, and splintered large Caiapó villages into smaller entities of chiefs and followers willing to attempt a new tactic in their on-going conflict with the Portuguese. But the Portuguese, as was their wont, assumed the arriving Caiapó were “villages,” rather than parts of villages.

That the first groups of Caiapó arriving at Vila Boa were smaller groups of chiefs and followers smoothed the transition to the aldeia. The Caiapó arrived gradually and in small numbers, so the Portuguese were capable of providing them with impressive welcomes and distributing sufficient quantities of gifts to them. Further, the authorities and settlers in Vila Boa had little reason to fear the Caiapó, at least initially, until several
“villages” arrived. It was not until late 1783 and early 1784 that they were forced to deal with the arrival of actual Caiapó villages. Maria I was suddenly inundated by Caiapó—the number of warriors surged from 112 to over 600—who terrified soldiers, overwhelmed the aldeia, stressed (and destroyed) the communal fields; and their numbers were simply too numerous to supply with sufficient gifts. With the arrival of actual villages, the authorities suddenly faced a dilemma: what to do with so many Caiapó?

We will probably never know exactly how many Caiapó the governor had to deal with, but the population was larger than the 600 or so whom historians have commonly accepted as living there (see e.g., Chaim 1983:124; Karasch 1981:106). Unfortunately, census data of the aldeia, like that carried out by José Luís Pereira in 1783, is unavailable for the period after the Grande River Caiapó arrived; this forces historians to make inaccurate estimates. Giraldin (1997:95) was the first to argue for a larger aldeia population. He estimated between 2,400 and 3,600 Caiapó lived at Maria I, arriving at this estimate by calculating the total aldeia population based off of reports of the “more than 600 warriors,” multiplying each warrior by a factor of four or six to approximate the number of women and children. The lower ratio of four women and children to every warrior comes from the reliable data provided by Verswijver (1992:83 n. 1), which was based on the analysis of census data taken from 12 peoples from Central Brazil. The higher ratio of six women and children for each warrior was based off of a late nineteenth-century estimate of the total Caiapó population (Desgenettes 1906:223). This number should be rejected based on its purely speculative nature, eliminating Giraldin’s higher estimate of 3,600 Caiapó. This leaves us with the lower estimate of
2,400 Caiapó; however, this number does not account for the late-January arrival of 178 warriors reported by José Rodrigues Freire in February of 1784. The arrival of these Caiapó increased the number of warriors to more than 778. Accepting Verswijver’s method of calculating population, this would indicate at least 3112 Caiapó men, women, and children at the aldeia. This number of Caiapó was more comparable to the more than 2,000 Chavante “pacified” in 1788 (Freire 1951:16), and such a population explains why the 27 soldiers at Maria I were overwhelmed, unable to control the aldeia, and terrified.

**Explaining the Aldeia**

The reasons behind the Caiapó decision to settle on Maria I remain obscure. No contemporary chronicler of the pacification ever thought to ask the Caiapó why they moved onto the aldeia. This has forced historians to hypothesize, with varying degrees of success, as to why Governor Luís da Cunha Menezes succeeded where his predecessors had failed. Here, we address the most recent analyses, both of which were based on close reading of primary sources. Karasch (2005:470) had suggested four reasons: 1) a drought, lasting from 1780 to 1782, followed by heavy rains; 2) the expansion of cattle ranching, which consumed land available for hunting and gathering; 3) dependence on iron tools; and 4) increased bandeira attacks. Similarly, Giraldin (1997:94–95) proposed the Caiapó were influenced by: 1) the drought and unusually heavy rains; 2) the joint attacks by the captaincies of Goiás, Mato Grosso, and São Paulo; and 3) a captaincy-wide outbreak of smallpox in 1771. Both Karasch and Giraldin hypothesized essentially the same reasons, as each noted that climatic fluctuations and military pressure had placed the Caiapó under stress, but they differed
on the role of manufactured goods and disease. The following discussion analyzes their hypotheses and proposes additional reasons for the Caiapó settling on Maria I.

Climatic fluctuations probably played a role in the Caiapó pacification. The 1780–1782 drought was the second in a decade, as an earlier drought had occurred in the years between 1773 and 1776. This earlier drought, according to Alencastre (1864:278), was extremely severe: “the lack of rains for almost three years extinguished the fields and pastures, caused great mortality among the herds, paralyzed the mines, and obliged a great part of the population to emigrate from the captaincy.” And, much like the drought in 1780–1782, “torrential rains that caused great harm” followed the years of drought. Although Portuguese farms and ranches suffered during these droughts, Caiapó gardens were based on indigenous farming techniques, which one assumes were better adapted to local conditions and may not have been as heavily impacted. However, the back-to-back occurrence of multi-year droughts followed by heavy rains possibly proved too much for the Caiapó gardens. If so, then the Caiapó found their gardens failing at a time when hunting and gathering was difficult and, since Portuguese farms and herds had failed, pillaging was unavailable as a means of obtaining food; this time of stress must have made the governor’s offer of an aldeia, food, and supplies more acceptable.

The droughts and torrential rains meant that the expansion of ranching probably played little role in the Caiapó decision to settle at Maria I. While true that the economy in Goiás was transitioning away from mining in the latter half of the century, the years preceding the pacification, particularly the 1770s, did not witness an expansion of cattle ranching. The successive years of drought devastated and reduced Portuguese herds
and, though difficult to quantify, ranching stagnated and somewhat declined. According to Alencastre (1864:278), the droughts and torrential rains were so detrimental that many settlers abandoned their claims and settlements and migrate out of the captaincy. Far from seeing their hunting lands reduced, the Caiapó may have found lands formerly occupied by the settlers—whether miners, farmers, or ranchers—abandoned and available for hunting and gathering. Further, the Caiapó at Maria I hailed from Camapuã and the Grande River: ranching heavily impacted neither region until the early nineteenth century—indeed, much of the Triângulo Mineiro, then called the Sertões of Farinha Podre, was un-inhabited because of the Caiapó—so the incursion of cattle onto the hunting lands of these Caiapó was negligible.

More important than the droughts, torrential rains, and loss of hunting lands was the governor’s pledge of a ready supply of manufactured goods; access to Portuguese manufactured goods was perhaps the most important factor in the Caiapó decision to settle on Maria I. Pillaging goods was an important aspect of Caiapó war, and they were dependent on Portuguese manufactured goods after more than 50 years of raiding. By the late eighteenth century, however, acquiring goods through raids was extremely risky. Retaliatory bandeiras inevitably followed raiders into the sertões. Often possessing a large contingent of native retainers, these bandeiras were capable of tracking raiders and ambushing villages; this was quite unlike the failed forays against the Caiapó by unenthusiastic press-ganged soldiers led by inept commanders, like Antônio de Lemos e Faria. Since the Caiapó traded neither with the Portuguese nor their indigenous neighbors, raiding was their only means to acquire goods, and Governor Luís da Cunha Menezes’s presents and promises of more to come must have
been instrumental in attracting the Caiapó to Maria. Indeed, the importance of goods to the pacification can be judged from the reaction of the Grande River Caiapó. Upon discovering there was neither sufficient food nor presents waiting for them at the aldeia, they threatened and bullied soldiers in the belief that this would intimidate the Portuguese into giving them gifts.

Related to the increasing dangers of raiding for goods was the overall deterioration of the Caiapó military situation. By the 1770s, the Portuguese centers of authority, lines of communication, and means of supplying the mining regions were firmly established; and the leaders of the captaincies of Goiás, Mato Grosso, and São Paulo had agreed to attack Caiapó villages. The Caiapó faced a concerted military effort to destroy their villages that, however lacking in coherence and overall strategy, propelled bandeiras into the Claro, Pilões, Bonito Rivers, attacked villages in Camapuã and along the Piquiri and Taquari Rivers, and on Grande River and deep within the Triângulo Mineiro. These expeditions traveled to far-flung sertões to hunt Caiapó: according to Governor Luís da Cunha Menezes, some of them covered 200 to 300 leagues (1240 to 1860 kilometers or 770 to 1155 miles). So effective were these offensives that Caiapó villages had decided to search for new sertões.

As the sertões were increasingly circumscribed by settlements and traversed by bandeiras, the Caiapó faced the prospect of fighting internecine wars against rival indigenous groups for land and resources. There were vicious battles against the Bororo to the west, and an old vendetta-driven war against the Chavante to the north; both these peoples were fierce club-fighters in their own right and more than capable of battling the Caiapó. Worse, some of the enemies of the Caiapó, specifically the Acroá...
and Chacriabá, had recently allied with the Portuguese and were aiding bandeiras. Although greatly diminished in size by conflicts, reinforced by soldiers and their muskets, the Acroá and Chacriabá provided formidable warriors capable of blazing trails into the remotest sertões. Surrounded by enemies, attacked even in the remote corners of their territory, the Caiapó must have seen possibilities in the governor's offer of a military alliance and the end of bandeira depredations.

The most unlikely factor to influence the Caiapó decision to settle on Maria I was the outbreak of smallpox in Goiás. Outbreaks of communicable diseases had certainly ravaged Caiapó villages in the eighteenth century—though these events went unnoticed and undocumented—but they never sought succor from the Portuguese, and nothing indicates the Caiapó were in the thralls of an epidemic in the early 1780s. Although smallpox struck Goiás in the early 1770s, there is little reason to suspect the contagion had spread to villages in Camapuã or the Grande River. Soldiers routinely reported large numbers of children, elderly, and even crippled individuals among the arriving Caiapó. Epidemics, like smallpox, typically killed children and the elderly, but there were so many children an elderly among the Caiapó that they were forced to travel slowly. This suggests the outbreaks of smallpox and other noxious disease were distant memories. Further, if an epidemic had so demoralized the Caiapó that some of their villages decided to accept peace with the Portuguese, one would expect the Indians arriving in Vila Boa and Maria I to be despondent, ridden with disease, and mere shadows of the club-fighters that had once terrorized the sertões. Instead, the Caiapó were assertive, even formidable: those from Camapuã went on hunting expeditions, traded game with settlers, showed their strength by carrying heavy logs,
and refused to work on communal fields; while the later arrivals from the Grande River treated the Portuguese with contempt and subjected their “conquerors” to threats and violence; in neither case do we see the behavior of a people weakened or demoralized by epidemics.

Finally, we must include among the reasons the aldeia was accepted the presence of línguas and subtle transformations in Caiapó villages. Contemporaries and early historians of the “pacification” recognized línguas played a critical role in the settling of Maria I. Later historians, such as Karasch and Giraldin, have continued to stress the importance of línguas; however, lost in the analysis is that the línguas employed in the 1780s were of a different order than those earlier employed in the century. By the late eighteenth century, the Portuguese benefited from their conflicts with the Caiapó in the sense that they possessed large numbers of captives from whose ranks they selected línguas. For example, in 1780, there were 23 Caiapó (11 men and 12 women) living at São José de Mossâmêdes alone, and a great many captives were found in southern Goiás and Camapuã. Many of these captives, who were small children when abducted by bandeiras, had lived for years among the Portuguese: they spoke their native tongue and Portuguese, and they understood the indigenous culture of their youth and the frontier society that had abducted them. But there were also Caiapó born and raised among the Portuguese: for them the farms, ranches, and mines of the frontier were home, but they were often raised by Caiapó mothers and lived among other captives, so they too understood and straddled the indigenous and European worlds. The Portuguese selected their línguas from these semi-acculturated Caiapó, who were neither wholly indigenous nor Portuguese in terms of culture, and they, in
turn, through bridging language and cultural barriers, played a critical role in facilitating communication.

These línguas differed from those employed earlier in the century. Línguas, like those Pires de Campos released from captivity in the 1740s, were true “captives.” Recently abducted and with limited familiarity with the settlers and their language, they were not the best brokers of inter-cultural communication; to say nothing of the fact that they returned to villages that, for all intents and purposes, held the upper hand militarily. The teenaged Feliciano José Luís was similar to these captives: he was a recent captive, baptized at the governor’s behest, not because of his youth or familiarity with Christianity, but because the Portuguese believed he was the son of a chief. Feliciano’s recent capture meant his kin connections were still strong, unlike the Caiapó who had lived for years among the Portuguese, and his (perceived) privileged birth, it was hoped, meant he would hold some sway in the village. However, his role was less that of a communicator than that of a pathfinder, one capable of leading the bandeira to a village, whose skills as a mediator were enhanced by the presence of the other línguas, such as the married-couple José and Francisca. The real cajoling of the Caiapó fell to these línguas—who had carved a place for themselves in frontier society—and it was they who mixed and mingled with their clans reinforcing and reiterating the message Feliciano carried; and they traveled to a village battered by bandeiras, whose inhabitants, unlike the Caiapó 40 years before, no longer possessed a clear military advantage.

No matter how numerous and capable the línguas, the Caiapó first had to permit them into their village to hear the message they carried. Forty years before, the Caiapó
had killed some of the captives whom Pires de Campos sent to their villages, ignoring his presents and promises. The Caiapó might have abandoned the fratricidal practice of killing escapees because mounting losses meant they could ill-afford slaying men lucky enough to have survived and escaped captivity, but the influence of their prolonged contact with the Portuguese must also have played a role. By the late eighteenth century, the Caiapó were in transition and their culture differed, however subtly, from that of 50 years before. There was a growing dependency on Portuguese manufactured goods, which altered the material culture found in their villages. They also knew more about the settlers: information that was gleaned from observation or information carried to their villages by women and children escaping captivity. The Caiapó, for instance, recognized differences in skin color and understood that some people of African-descent possessed little freedom; such recognition indicates that the Caiapó were aware not only of the differences between their native and the Portuguese enemies, but that there were differences within the latter category of enemies as well. And, though the evidence is extremely scanty, there were changes their population. When the Caiapó began arriving, Ayres do Casal (1817:337) tells us: “Among them came some chiefs, one of whom had wavy hair like a mulatto.” This chief, judging by his “wavy” hair, was of mixed-descent, the progeny of a Caiapó woman—likely raped—and a man of Portuguese or African descent. He was surely not the only mixed-descent Caiapó, as women were frequently captured by bandeiras; some inevitably escaped and returned to their villages pregnant. The growing familiarity with the frontier society that they confronted and the changes to their culture, it appears, allowed enough room for understanding that, when the línguas arrived bearing the governor’s
gifts and his promises, the Caiapó did not reject them outright; they listened, heard, and came. And many other Caiapó followed them.

**Conclusion**

The arrival of the Caiapó in Vila Boa was the beginning of a new phase of their history—that of the aldeia. Their decision to settle on an aldeia was part of a trend in Goiás—one that began shortly before, and culminated under, the Directorate reforms of the 1750s—that, in short order, saw all of the captaincy’s major peoples settled on aldeias: the Acroá and Chacriabá (1774–1775), the Carajá and Javaé (1775), the Caiapó (1780–1784), and the Chavante (1788). Of these “conquests” or “pacifications,” as they were variously called, the arrival of the 36 Caiapó in Vila Boa was arguably the crowning achievement: no people in Goiás evoked more terror, fought more ferociously, or threatened mines, farms, and ranches in a wider area than the Caiapó. On the surface, the founding of the Maria I marked a radical break in the Caiapó’s relationship with the Portuguese, which, for much of the eighteenth century, was dominated by violence, even hatred; nonetheless, there was a long, albeit intermittent, tradition of accommodation and cooperation: as when the Bilreiros had traded unfortunate captives to the Paulistas for manufactured goods, or when Caiapó appeared at a farm somewhere along the road to Vila Boa and received gifts from the owner. So the transition from war to peace for the “indomitable” Caiapó was not as abrupt as Governor Cunha Menezes and subsequent chroniclers would have us believed. Nor was it as peaceful as it appeared. There was little to distinguish the bandeira José Luís Pereira commanded from the many that plunged into the sertões in search of the Caiapó. The threat of violence lurked behind the governor's offer of peace and in the minds of José Luís Pereira and the troops surrounding Feliciano’s village. Unlike other bandeira
leaders, however, José Luís Pereira arrived at a propitious moment in history: the
Caiapó were savaged by bandeiras, unable to acquire goods upon which they were
dependent, pushed into diminished territories, and fighting powerful indigenous
neighbors. Added to these challenges were the droughts and heavy rains of the 1770s
and early 1780s. It was for these reasons, as well as internal changes of their culture,
that the Caiapó did not rejected the línguas—who were not the raw captives Pires de
Campos released, but intermediaries and facilitators of communication—and the
promises and gifts they carried. Once word of the governor’s offer spread, Caiapó
began to arrive at Vila Boa and Maria I, but the “pacification,” was far from complete, as
many Caiapó remained in the sertões—indeed, the first “villages” may not have been
villages at all, but rather chiefs and their followers—and those that arrived were far from
“pacified.” There were early signs that the Caiapó were not pacified—the men carrying
the merchant’s beam; the refusal to work in communal gardens—but it became obvious
when the Caiapó from the Grande River arrived and overwhelming the guards, fields,
and available supplies at Maria I. The aldeia turned violent, and there were legitimate
fears of a rebellion—an episode subsequently ignored or forgotten by chroniclers and
early historians—but the tumultuous early days passed; the aldeia survived.

Caiapó would live at Maria I, and later São José de Mossâmêdes, until the mid-
nineteenth century, and, when they finally and irreparably abandoned the Goiás aldeias,
many moved onto new aldeias in Mato Grosso and Minas Gerais. To understand why
so many Caiapó, whose raids were legendary for their sheer destructive violence,
sought accommodation and cooperation with their erstwhile enemies, we must examine
the world they created at Maria I and Mossâmedes, a crucial, though under-appreciated, part of their history.
List of the Indians of the Caiapó Nation found in the aldeia Maria I from July 15, 1781, until May 26, 1783.

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>112</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>151</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys of the age of 8 or 10 years</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls of the age of 8 or 10 years</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys of the age of 6 or 7 years</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls of the age of 6 or 7 [years]</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Report of the young Indians born in the aldeia Maria I.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infant boys</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant girls</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Report of the Caiapó Indians who died in the Aldeia Maria I from July 15, 1781, until May 26, 1782.

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5-1. Reproduction of José Luís Pereira’s 1783 census of Maria I

Table 5-1. List of Caiapó arrivals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number of Caiapó</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 21, 1780</td>
<td>36 “emissaries”</td>
<td>Camapuã</td>
<td>AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 32, D. 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 29, 1781</td>
<td>One “village” of 88 Caiapó</td>
<td>Camapuã</td>
<td>Souza 1872:460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 29, 1781</td>
<td>Two “villages,” 237 Caiapó</td>
<td>Camapuã</td>
<td>Souza 1872:460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 27, 1782</td>
<td>One “village” of 200 Caiapó</td>
<td>Camapuã</td>
<td>AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 32, D. 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December, 1783 and January, 1784</td>
<td>A “great number”</td>
<td>Grande River</td>
<td>AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 35, D. 2131.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late January, 1784</td>
<td>A “village” of 178 “warriors”</td>
<td>Grande River?</td>
<td>AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 35, D. 2136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The one people that did not settle onto a mission was the Avá-Canoeiro (Karasch 1992:133-134, 2005:485-492). Their rise to notoriety as a ferocious and unconquerable people began with the decline of hostilities at the end of the eighteenth century, when they were simply called the Canoeiros (“Canoers”) or the Chavante de Canoa (“Canoe Chavante”), this Tupi-speaking people did not accept peaceful contact with national society until the late twentieth century.

Reproductions of the important Pombal-era Indian legislation are found in Neto (1988:152-205).

Historian Hal Langfur (2006:61) has pointed out, however, that very little historical research has been conducted on the Directorate outside of the Amazon basin, and its effects are neither well known nor understood.

For an analysis of the Directorate aldeias in Goiás, see Chaim (1983), Karasch (1992), and Ravagnani (1987).

AHU_ACL_CU, Cx. 32, D. 1996. Not much is known about José Luis Pereira. He was likely part Indian in his heritage; but he was certainly a tough Indian fighter and backwoodsman, skilled in wood lore and able to live for months at a time in the backlands. He was certainly cut from the same cloth as Pires de Campos and Pinto da Silveira, though, perhaps, without their brutality. After 1780, he commanded the Caiapó aldeia at Maria I; and, later, he married the famous Damiana da Cunha, a Caiapó leader (chapter 7). In 1789 and 1803, he participated in tough campaigns against the Canoeiro in the north of the captaincy. On this now forgotten soldier, see e.g., Souza (1872:463) and Karasch (2005:487).

Karasch (2005:469) suggested this bandeira succeeded because of it was composed mostly of natives; however, the composition was quite un-exceptional, since the ranks of most bandeiras were filled with indigenous retainers, e.g., Antônio Pires de Campos led mostly Bororo Indians, and the same can be said of João Godói Pinto da Silveira. Records of bandeiras from Mato Grosso, which were sent against the Caiapó, indicate large numbers of Bororo Indians filled their ranks, see IHGMT Pasta 101-nº 2311.

AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 32, D. 2015.

IHGB Lata 397, pasta 2.

Felciano José Luís appears in a number of letters, see e.g. AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 33, D. 2076. Oddly, he has disappeared from many of the subsequent retellings of these events (e.g. Karasch 2005). It is difficult to overstate the importance of línguas: soldiers complained that none of the Caiapó spoke Portuguese and communication was extremely difficult.

A census of São José de Mossâmedes, dated March, 6, 1780, counted 11 Caiapó men and 12 Caiapó women out of a population of 814 Indians at the aldeia; the population also included: Acroá, Xavante, Karajá, Carajó, and Javaés, see AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 32, D. 1996. A baptismal record from October 12, 1782 lists one of these Caiapó couples, José and Francisca, as well as their two children, Aleixo and Anadeto, which can be found here: AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 33, D. 2076. These two children were likely born while their parents traveled to the Caiapó in Camapuã, a roundtrip journey that lasted from October 1780 to September 1782.

AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 32, D. 1996; AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 2079.

It is generally accepted that the Bandeira left on February 15, 1780 (e.g., Alencastre 1864:315). This is equivocal. If the bandeira returned to Vila Boa after five month and six days in the sertões, then this departure date appears incorrect, since February 15 to September 21 is more than the five months and six days. The governor was inconsistent about the departure date. In a letter dated July 20, 1780, he wrote that the bandeira left on March 15, but in later correspondence claimed the bandeira had left on February 15. Accepting that the bandeira was in the sertões for five months and six days, then it would seem that it departed on April 15. Perhaps, the five months and six days referred to when the bandeira left the last Portuguese settlement along the Claro and Pilões Rivers?

AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 35, D. 2168.

AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 32, D. 2019.

AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 32, D. 2019.

AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 32, D. 2019.
See e.g., AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 32, D. 2019 and AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 34, D. 2079. The governor ordered the Caiapó to return to the sertões with his offer and return with an answer. Both Alencastre (1864:317) and Silva e Souza (1872:460) subsequently recorded that the Caiapó elder ordered the warriors to summon their aldeias from the sertões.

No names of chiefs were recorded in the governor’s correspondence. Alencastre (1864:315-318) appears to have been the first to identify the Caiapó chiefs: Romexi (the old man who arrived in 1780); the mayoral (“head chief”) Angraí-oxá and another chief, Xaquenonau (both arriving in May of 1781), Cananpuaxi (who arrived on September of 1781), and Pupuaré (who arrived in 1782). Modern commentators have employed these names ever since (e.g., Karasch 1981, 1992, 2005). However, there is good reason to suspect that Alencastre embellished his chronicle. In a letter dated December 18, 1782, Governor Cunha Menezes remitted a list of 99 Caiapó children baptized on October 12, 1782. The list includes the names of the children’s parents, the Christian names given to the baptized, and the Portuguese godparent for each child. The first children listed the children of “Pay [‘father’] Cacique Angrayoca” and “May [‘mother’] Chiunequa,” whose son, João, was the godchild of the governor. The list also includes children belonging to a man named “Chaqueenan,” another named “Romexi” (husband of “Xaquean”), a “Pupuare,” and a Canampuaxi. None of these latter individuals were identified as chiefs, though important men adopted their children. And, according to the governor, these Caiapó hailed from Camapuã and had only recently arrived in Vila Boa, see AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 33, D. 2076. While it is not impossible that a number of Caiapó men were named Romexi and that several chiefs called themselves Angraí-oxá, it seems more likely that Alencastre used a copy of the baptismal list or sources, now lost, to embellish his chronicle. Certainly, he based his narrative off the now missing Annais de Goiás (the record of government affairs) and apparently had access to the Governor’s letter and/or the diocese baptism records (which this author was not able to access in 2005). Future research may rescue the names of these chiefs and other Caiapó from the dustbin of history, but until new documents come to light, it is best not to use the names provided by Alencastre.

Fartura means “abundantly excessive” or “plentiful” in Portuguese, the river was so named because of the great quantity of fish in its waters and game found along its banks.

The ability to rush troops to the aldeia was critical to the Portuguese. Their previous experiences with settling the Acroá and Xacriabá on aldeias had taught that uprisings were likely and, when the aldeia situated far away from Portuguese settlements, near impossible to put down.

The very mundane nature of this tale makes it ring true.

The peanut, an important ritual crop, is harvested collectively and shared by the entire village, see Ewart (2005:23-24).
The "Barbado" in question were probably a subgroup of the Bororo.

For the analogous example of a Gê-speaking people entering into peaceful contact in order to acquire goods, see Turner (1992).

For example, bandeiras were organized from: São Paulo (BN I-30, 12, 17 nº 39; BN I-30, 22, 11 nº5; DI 1895, vol. 8:133-179; DI 1894, vol. 7:138-187); and Cuiabá (BN I-30, 09, 26 nº1; BN I-30, 09, 26 nº2; BN I-30, 12, 17 nº 40).

This had happened with the Panará. Schwartzman (1988:259-260) learned that, "according to myth," various Panará songs and a ceremony originally came from enemies: several women were abducted and forced to marry, but they eventually escaped and brought knowledge of foreign songs and dances to their village.

We will never know for sure if this chief was a Portuguese or slave captured and raised among the Caiapó. As we have seen, reports of Caiapó abductions of the Portuguese or their slaves were extremely rare, so this chief was not likely a former captive. Further evidence against his being a former captive is that neither the governor, nor soldiers involved in the pacification, nor the administrators at the aldeia, ever mentioned discovering captive Portuguese or Africans among the Caiapó.
CHAPTER 6
THE CAIAPÓ AT MARIA I AND SÃO JOSÉ DE MOSSÂMEDES (1781–1832)

Introduction

At the end of 1784, a great horde of Caiapó, whom the Portuguese liked to think of as “pacified,” lived on the aldeia at Maria I. When they entered the aldeia, the Caiapó were the most feared of the native peoples in Goiás: they were a lurking, black-painted threat; a warrior people who raided relentlessly and with incredible ferocity; their raiders killed women and children. In late 1831, when the Caiapó finally and irrevocably abandoned their last aldeia in Goiás, São José de Mossâmedes, to which they had been relocated after Maria I was extinguished in 1813–1814, they were no longer the same people whom the settlers had so feared in 1780–1784. Many Caiapó spoke Portuguese and worked for settlers as servants, cowboys, or rowers. There were new Caiapó leaders, not just the traditional warlike chiefs who had led their raids from the sertões and terrorized the soldiers at Maria I, and there were new ways of doing traditional tasks. The Caiapó had evolved a “mission culture.”

“Mission culture” is a term historian David Block (1999:1–2) coined to describe the native cultures that emerged in the Jesuit missions of Moxos (eastern Bolivia). Geographically isolated, defended by the Jesuits, and protected by royal prohibitions on Spaniards interacting with the native catechumens, the missions at Moxos were protected from the sort of exploitation and conflict that destroyed so many other missions in the New World. They flourished for more than a century (from the mid-1600s until the Jesuit expulsion from Spanish lands in 1767), and, during this time, the cultures of the Europeans and lowland natives intermingled to form a syncretic “hybrid,” a so-called “mission culture” that was neither completely European nor completely
indigenous. The natives acquired some degree of natural immunity to European diseases from repeated exposure: the mission inhabitants who survived epidemics passed their immunities on to their children, and, through this sad and horrible process, the Moxos missions “supported stable [indigenous] populations by the time of the Jesuit exile and for a century afterwards.” This stability allowed the Indians living in the missions to experiment with their own and European cultures. The more egalitarian societies and simple economies of the native lowlands were modified by the introduction of Spanish-style leadership: the traditional chiefs saw their positions strengthened and expanded in many ways, and the native population became less egalitarian. There was economic specialization: some Indians worked to produce food for others, especially those who labored in “European arts and industry,” such as woodcarvers and potters. European technologies and crops were introduced to the Indians. These were adopted, rejected, and adapted in a process of “mixing and selection of European and Indian modes of subsistence,” which led to “more efficient ways of performing traditional tasks.” A common example of this was the abandoning of stone or wooden tools in favor of metal cutting implements, especially to clear garden plots. Such transformations were neither the result of Jesuits control over their mission catechumens, nor were they solely the product of the Indians choosing between European and native ways; rather “mission culture” was the product of a long acquaintance, interaction, and active negotiation between European and Indigenous cultures within a more or less protected space.

Studying “mission culture” shifts the historical analysis of missions away from the inherent ethnocide and toward a more nuanced understanding of the profound effects,
not all of which were negative, that such places had on indigenous cultures. Indeed, the transformations of indigenous cultures that culminated under the Jesuits in Moxos were critical to the natives’ abilities to navigate successfully the challenges of the Spanish frontier long after the Society was expelled in 1767. As Block (1999:2) has emphasized, the Jesuits missions “established a set of mores and regimens that would dominate life in Moxos until the middle of the nineteenth century.”

A somewhat similar situation occurred in Goiás. As we have seen, the Caiapó transformation into a “mission culture” began long before Maria I. They had, for example, adapted their raiding techniques to cope with the killing efficiency of black-powder muskets and the success of Pires de Campos’s bandeira attacks, and they had incorporated Portuguese goods looted during raids into village life. Such transformations continued—indeed, they accelerated—at Maria I and, later, the aldeia at Mossâmedes. Both aldeias were places where the Caiapó, through exposure to epidemics, acquired some immunity to European disease. And Maria I and Mossâmedes, in many ways, sheltered the Caiapó from attack: there is no record of bandeiras attacking the aldeia Caiapó, even when it was apparent that they were responsible for a raid; and the supply of manufactured goods that trickled into Caiapó villages meant raiding for plunder—and provoking bandeiras—declined. New forms of leadership and economic complexity emerged at the Goiás aldeias: traditional chiefs still governed the Caiapó, but their powers were expanded; a hierarchy of chiefs based on Portuguese ranks emerged; and the position of head chief of the aldeia appears to have become reified in certain individuals and families. The Caiapó population also became less egalitarian, and the Portuguese-speaking “línguas,” who best embodied the
intermingling of European and native cultures, emerged as powerful intermediaries and leaders. And, of course, European technology and crops were introduced. Some of these enabled the Caiapó to exploit the environment more efficiently and expanded their subsistence economy.

Yet, despite all the changes, many native traditions continued at the Caiapó aldeias. The aldeia Caiapó preferred to construct their homes from native materials and in their traditional style; they cooked their food much as they had in the sertões; they practiced many traditional forms of body ornamentation; and the Caiapó maintained many ceremonies, dances, and rituals for healing and religious purposes.

There were important differences from Moxos, of course. Caiapó mission culture developed outside of a milieu of rigorous, if somewhat benign, Jesuit tutelage and administration. The Caiapó pacification took place under the Directorate, the marquis de Pombal’s Enlightenment attempt to convert and “civilize” the native Brazilians, so there were no Jesuits at Maria I and Mossâmedes (long before either aldeia was established, King José I had dispossessed and ordered the Society from his possessions in Amazonia in 1756–1757, and then the rest of his possessions in 1758–1759). And neither Maria I nor São José de Mossâmedes were geographically isolated; nor were the Portuguese prohibited from entering the aldeias; indeed, one of the purposes of the Directorate aldeias was to provide settlers’ access to Indians’ labor and the integration of the aldeia Indians into frontier society. So the aldeia Caiapó, especially once their numbers no longer overwhelmed the soldiers at Maria I, were subject to more interaction, accompanied by more abuse and exploitation, than had occurred at Moxos. Once the Indian threat in Goiás began to fade in the late 1780s, the
Directorate aldeias declined in importance and were allocated fewer resources; which greatly contributed to their later decadence, so nothing akin to the century of Jesuit tutelage in Moxos occurred in Goiás. The Directorate was finally abolished in 1798, but this had little impact on the administration of the aldeias, especially in remote Goiás, and certainly did not improve the lot of the aldeia Indians as was intended (see Hemming 1987:60–61).

There was a lot about the Goiás aldeias that was negative. We know the Caiapó suffered epidemics, hunger, abuse, and much misery, especially in the waning days of Mossâmedes; the development of their mission culture was a difficult experience. In 1819, two Europeans visited the Caiapó aldeias and later wrote largely pessimistic accounts of what they observed: Auguste François César, the provençal de Saint-Hilaire (1975), was a French voyager and botanist, who toured widely in Brazil in the years between 1816 and 1822; and Johan Emanuel Pohl (1951), an Austrian botanist and physician, traveled Brazil between 1817 and 1821; both men heard tales of devastating epidemics and simmering discontent at Mossâmedes. They denounced the forced labor and corporal punishment the Caiapó endured; they scowled at the once-lavish aldeia buildings and baroque church, many of which, though built to beguile the natives into accepting peace, had long since decomposed into rotten, roofless hulks; and they witnessed the Caiapó unhappily laboring under the watchful eyes of armed soldiers in communal fields. The Frenchman and the Austrian sadly noted the stocks occupied a prominent place in the center of the plaza and the palmatória (a wooden paddle used for beating women and children) never gathered much dust. To these European visitors, Mossâmedes was a failure: fear of stiff corporal punishment and
musket-toting guards kept the inhabitants there, and, perhaps most importantly of all to their minds, the Caiapó had never abandoned their native traditions.

Much of the subsequent historical analysis of the Goiás aldeias (e.g. Ataídes 1998:77–94; Hemming 1987:76–77) has emphasized the misery, deprivation, hunger, forced labor, harsh punishment, and failures these two visitors, among others (e.g. Cunha Matos 1874:244), emphasized and recorded. However, it is too easy to lose in the decayed extravagance of the baroque Mossâmedes church, the ennui of forced labor, and the visible reminders of corporal punishment that many Caiapó willingly remained at the aldeias—the sertões were vast and escape was possible. A small number of Caiapó even stayed at Mossâmades after the vast majority of the inhabitants had fled in late 1831; indeed, many of the fugitives quickly settled on similar, if less elaborate, aldeias in Minas Gerais and Mato Grosso, suggesting that, despite all their unattractive aspects, aldeias held some appeal to their inhabitants.

This chapter seeks to understand that appeal and describe the kind of lives the Caiapó created at Maria I and Mossâmedes. It seeks to reveal how their Gê culture intermingled with that of the Portuguese and Brazilians to create a Caiapó “mission culture,” the hybrid culture that permitted so many of them to navigate the challenges of the frontier for more than a century. For the mission culture that evolved in Goiás spread widely and affected Caiapó villages throughout the entire breadth of their territory, from the headwaters of the Araguaia River and Camapuã to the Paraná and the Triângulo Mineiro. It was only the most distant and remote Caiapó villages that were unaffected by the events unfolding in Goiás—that is, the Caiapó moving deep into the sertões north of Cuiabá, those who would become the known as the Kreen-Akrore.
For most Caiapó living east of the Araguaia, until they finally disappeared as an autonomous people in the early twentieth century, it was the mission culture that developed in the Goiás aldeias that allowed them to interact with and adapt to the frontier society that had overrun so much of their territory.

**The Physical Setting: Maria I and São José de Mossâmedes**

Unfortunately, very few descriptions, much less physical plans, have survived of the aldeias. At Maria I, Governor Luís da Cunha Menezes had planned to build an aldeia similar to that found at Mossâmedes. Surviving plans of the facilities he initially envisioned show a lavish aldeia complex.¹ A plan dating to 1782, for instance, included a house for the governor, a residence for a priest, several barracks for troops, a baroque church, and six rectangular communal houses for the Caiapó. Additionally, a mill, a large barn for goods and foodstuffs, and a stable for workhorses were planned. There were to be fruit orchards, several banana fields, and even a vineyard. This elaborate aldeia setting was quickly abandoned, probably because of cost and the rather unstable environment that developed in the early years of the aldeia. A more modest plan, dating to 1785, shows only a church, four communal houses, a small garrison house, and a ditch to bring water into the aldeia. This later plan, as we shall see, was much closer to what was actually constructed at Maria I, which always remained the more rustic of the two Caiapó aldeias.

Mossâmedes, in contrast, was a large and sprawling facility. Surviving plans for the aldeia show that the administrative center was built around a central plaza fronted by a baroque church.² Opposite the church was a summer residence of the governor, a long and narrow single-story building with an elaborate entrance facing the plaza. Flanking the plaza, and running its entire length, were Portuguese-style homes built for
the aldeia Indians: constructed of wood, these had tall doorways, narrow windows, high ceilings, and tiled roofs. Also found at the plaza was a small residence for a priest and several large barracks for troops. The aldeia had a waterwheel for grinding maize, a sugar mill, several barns for livestock and horses, and numerous storehouses. A shallow canal brought water into the aldeia for drinking and washing clothing.

When Saint-Hilaire and Pohl visited Goiás in 1819, Maria I was abandoned for almost six years and Mossâmedes decadent and declining. Maria I was in a state of complete ruin, unsurprisingly. Neither Saint-Hilaire nor Pohl expressed much interest in the former aldeia, unfortunately, and the descriptions they left were exceedingly brief. Saint-Hilaire (1975:75) only paused to examine the ruins and merely noted the governor’s house, barracks, and storehouses sat slightly apart from where the Caiapó had built their homes. Pohl (1951:367–368) left a somewhat more complete description. He observed Maria I was on the top of a low rise and near a bend in the Fartura River and, like Saint-Hilaire, noted that the aldeia was divided into two parts: there were the officials’ houses, garrisons, storehouses, and other Portuguese-built facilities, and what amounted to a Caiapó village built somewhat apart from these structures. The Portuguese-built portion of the aldeia was better preserved, being that it was constructed from more durable materials, and consisted of two wood-framed buildings. These, according to Pohl, measured 43 steps in length and 16 in width. They had the high ceilings, narrow doors and windows, and tiled roofs typical of colonial architecture of the era. One building was for the governor and his retinue; the other served the aldeia administrator, soldiers, and the aldeia priest in his occasional visits for baptism or services. The windows and doors had been removed long before Pohl’s
arrival, though scattered about inside of the buildings were some rustic furniture
probably left behind by the herders who occasionally passed through the region.\(^3\) Pohl
was also able to see that there was once a thatch dance hall in front of the governor’s
residence, but much of this structure had burned during one of the annual dry-season
burnings and only the barest outline remained.

Around one hundred paces from these buildings were work and storage areas.
There were sheds of miscellaneous use, an old iron forge, a collapsed *engenho de
açucar* (“sugar mill”) on the banks of the Fartura, a water-powered mill for grinding
maize, and what appeared to be a distillery for producing Brazilian *cachaça* (“sugar
cane alcohol”). The largest structure was the aldeia storehouse. The communal
harvest had been stored there. It was empty except for rats and bats and the high
ceiling drooped dangerously, but this was the most interesting structure at Maria I, as it
was there that the Caiapó had chosen to build their homes. The houses, unfortunately,
had burned, but the ruins that remained were sufficient for Pohl to perceive the Caiapó
had constructed their homes in a circular pattern around the main storehouse.

The Caiapó aldeia at Mossâmedes was very similar to that at Maria I: there were
Portuguese-constructed facilities and, built apart from these, the Caiapó-constructed
homes. Although the Portuguese had spent vast sums and constructed an elaborate
facility at Mossâmedes to lure hostile peoples into accepting peace, the aldeia had been
allowed to decay. By 1800, all of the Portuguese-constructed structures were falling
apart—indeed, many were abandoned—and a canal built to carry water to the aldeia
had silted up.\(^4\) Little had changed when Pohl and Saint-Hilaire visited. Pohl (1951:360)
described the aldeia as “a large quadrilateral with irregular angles in which were built
small buildings with two stories to house the officials that normally accompany the
governor.” Saint-Hilaire (1975:64) put the plaza at 145 by 112 paces and found it
“perfectly regular.” The church, Pohl (1951:360) felt, was “simple but spacious.” Saint-
Hilaire (1975:64) echoed this opinion, finding the church “a simple building […] of good
taste.” The church, with its weathered exterior, had obviously suffered from years of
neglect, much like the other buildings found at the plaza. The garrisons and other
buildings were in various stages of decay and the second story of the governor’s two-
story residence was pulled down to prevent it from collapsing, leaving behind a labyrinth
of small, open-roofed rooms on the ground floor (Pohl 1951:36).

The buildings found at the plaza were inhabited by a few soldiers, their families,
and around fifty agregados (“rural dependents” or “hangers-on”) (Saint-Hilaire 1975:64).
Very few Caiapó lived in the Portuguese-constructed homes, and those who did were
mostly women, the wives of the soldiers and agregados. The Caiapó claimed the
Portuguese-style high ceilings made for cold living in the rainy season (Pohl 1951:36),
so they built their homes in the traditional manner and apart from the plaza. There were
only a dozen of these houses to the west of the Mossâmedes plaza, as most of the
Caiapó had decided to build their homes nearer the communal fields, which sat about a
league away (Saint-Hilaire 1975:66; Pohl 1951:36). The Caiapó homes were very
similar, if not identical, to those they constructed in the sertões. “The roof of these is
made of straw and their structure is the same as the Luso-Brazilian houses,” Saint-
Hilaire (1975:64) observed. They were “made of posts stuck in the ground and tied with
vines to long bamboos placed transversely,” though the keen-eyed Frenchman noted
that “whereas the Portuguese are accustomed to fill in the empty spaces between the
crossed posts with mud, the Caiapó limit themselves to weaving palm fronds between them.” The houses had no windows, no interior walls, and a very narrow doorway that could be closed off by a cover of palm fronds (Saint-Hilaire 1975:66). Unfortunately, we do not know if the Caiapó had, as at Maria I, constructed a circular village: neither Pohl nor Saint Hilaire mentioned the layout of the homes, and the only other description of Mossâmedes, that of Alencastre (1865:100), merely described the houses as “spread [about] without order,” but this probably referred to the houses found just outside of the aldeia facilities, not the homes the Caiapó had constructed farther away. 5

Saint-Hilaire (1975:71) peeked inside the Caiapó homes and thought them small, dark, and smoky. There was a small fire or two smoldering in each house that he entered. Caiapó men, women, and children gathered around these fires, which were lit to provide light, warmth, and a sense of community; these were not cooking fires. Cooking was done outside of the home and in traditional-style earth ovens. These had changed little since João Godói Pinto da Silveira described them in 1760. They were shallow pits filled with stones on which women lit a fire. Saint-Hilaire (1975:71) observed: “when the stones heated sufficiently, the fire [was] extinguished, and on top of the stones was put the meat [and other food] to be cooked.” Women then covered the food with palm leaves and filled in the oven with earth. The buried coals, heated stones, and food were left for an hour or two and then the earth and coals were scooped away. “This means of cooking left the meat unevenly cooked,” Saint-Hilaire believed. Apparently, the finicky Frenchman declined to take a taste, though he “heard the Portuguese say the flavor [was] excellent.” The less persnickety Pohl (1951:364) tried some beef, which his Austrian tongue found “well cooked and tender.”
While wandering the aldeia, Saint-Hilaire (1975:70) perceived a lack of material possessions among the aldeia Caiapó. He spotted very few European-manufactured items, whether scattered about the village or stored in the homes he entered, and few of the goods he spied were left in plain sight; many items were hidden in the thatching of the Caiapó homes (cf. Ewart 2000:203). The most visible items in the Caiapó homes were hearthstones, the sleeping berths and mats, some weapons, and the distinctive Caiapó baskets. The berths were constructed of wooded stakes thrust into the ground to support a platform of branches; these berths were barely long enough for a single person. The berths were rare, since most Caiapó slept on mats woven from Buriti palm fronds (Saint-Hilaire 1975:70), which they placed on the ground and laid upon without any head support or cushion. Caiapó men still made and practiced with their famous clubs and formidable longbows. Pohl (1951:365) was keen to observe the latter in action, so a few Caiapó archers rounded up a chicken and easily dispatched their unfortunate victim at 80 paces, which impressed the Austrian.

The most prominent possessions found in the Caiapó homes were baskets called *jucunus* (Saint-Hilaire 1975:66). More than fifty years before, Pinto da Silveira had commented that Caiapó baskets were “curiously manufactured,” and their manufacture certainly fascinated Pohl and Saint-Hilaire. “Two buriti palm fronds [were] torn and woven, forming the base on which they put a little rolled-up mat, woven from the same leaves,” this, according to Pohl (1951:363), allowed the basket to be extended. “When needing to augment the size [of a basket], they stick on another rolled mat.” The Caiapó jucunus could reach a prodigious size. Saint-Hilaire (1975:70) saw baskets that
were 1.3 meters (52 inches) tall and filled with enormous loads. And women hauled these heavy baskets about on their shoulders by means of a tumpline.

We see from the surviving descriptions of Maria I and Mossâmedes that the Caiapó had, as much as was possible, attempted to recreate traditional living arrangements at both aldeias. They rejected the Portuguese-constructed living arrangements, preferring to construct their homes from traditional materials and, at least at Maria I, in a traditional pattern of a circular village. Inside their homes, the Caiapó lived very much as they did in the sertões: they slept on berths or mats, lit small indoor fires for light, warmth, and community, and cooked outside their homes in earth ovens. Inevitably, there were changes. Some women had married Portuguese and Brazilian men and lived apart from their families and in the Portuguese-constructed buildings. The communal fields were planted, worked, and harvested according to European standards, not those of the Caiapó, and the sounds and rhythms of traditional village life were disrupted by the grinding of maize in the mills, the clamor of the forges, and the presence of soldiers and agregados.

**The Caiapó Population at Maria I and Mossâmedes**

The population of Caiapó living at Maria I and, later, São José de Mossâmedes remains difficult to judge because of a paucity of census data; the general trend of both aldeias was toward decline. The population of Maria I, as we have seen, once exceeded 3,000 individuals; though this number fluctuated considerably because so many Caiapó regularly came to and went from the aldeia. Sometime before 1800—we do not know exactly when—a large number of Caiapó fled from Maria I after Governor Tristão da Cunha Menezes imprisoned one of their chief (see below). This flight considerably reduced the population of Maria I. Another large abandonment of the
aldeia followed in 1807–1808 (chapter 7). A few years later, there was an outbreak of smallpox that killed more than 80 Caiapó (Saint-Hilaire 1975:69). In 1813, there were only 129 Caiapó at Maria I: the aldeia was extinguished and the Caiapó relocated to São José de Mossâmedes.7

The Mossâmedes aldeia never had anything near the population of Caiapó found at Maria I. How large the Caiapó population was at its zenith, we cannot say, but there were a mere 138 Caiapó living there in 1813.8 And, once the Caiapó relocated from Maria I to Mossâmedes in 1814, the aldeia had 267 Caiapó. This was probably the largest number of Caiapó to live there. Many of the Caiapó relocated from Maria I to Mossâmedes found the aldeia disagreeable; flights soon reduced the population even further.

Unfortunately, we do not know exactly how many Caiapó remained at Mossâmedes in 1819. Neither Pohl nor Saint-Hilaire thought to mention the size of the aldeia population. However, in the course of condemning the Brazilian mismanagement of the aldeia, Saint-Hilaire (1975:65) mentioned, “17 soldiers barely manage to maintain together 200 Caiapó.” From this, it seems, the population had shrunk since 1814. There were so few Caiapó that the Brazilian authorities worried about the continued existence of the aldeia and authorized an expedition, commanded by Damiana da Cunha, whom we shall meet in the next chapter, to enter the sertões in search of Caiapó (Saint-Hilaire 1975:72). Although this expedition was successful, the aldeia continued to decline. In 1824, there were 128 Caiapó at Mossâmedes (Cunha Matos 1874:244). This number fluctuated, and there were between 125 and 130 Caiapó at the aldeia in the following year (cf. Cunha Matos 2004:294 and Karasch 2000:67). This
number appears very similar to the census data of 1813–1814, suggesting that the Caiapó relocated to Mossâmedes from Maria I had largely fled the aldeia.

We have no census data available after 1824–1825. The population certainly declined and became precipitously low, which led to several more government-sponsored expeditions by Damiana da Cunha. Although these expeditions were successful, the aldeia continued to decline. It whimpered a long for many years, with the population probably fluctuating around 100, until the Caiapó finally abandoned it in 1831–1832.

**Physicality, Body Ornamentation, and Clothing**

Physically, the aldeia Caiapó were an impressive people. Saint-Hilaire (1975:67) declared them “a beautiful race.” In his opinion, they possessed “all the traits characteristic of the American race,” including “a large head squeezed between their shoulders, hair that was thick, stiff, black and strait, a wide chest, red skin, and thin legs.” The Caiapó, he thought, were distinguished from other peoples by their “round heads, open and intelligent countenance, lofty stature, closely set eyes, and the dark hue of their skin.” Pohl (1951:363), thinking the Caiapó “untidy and dirty,” was characteristically less generous in his opinion. He was interested in their wide and flat feet and splayed toes characteristic of those who infrequently wear shoes, “by which one could distinguish the footprints of the Indians from others, especially in the sand of riverbanks.” Pohl sneeringly found “very little difference in the features of their faces.” Caiapó cheeks were “wide and flat, the eyes small, the nose flat. The lips thick [and] the mouth large.” Their one redemption, the Austrian grudgingly granted, was their teeth, which were “white and beautiful.” Nonetheless, he declared the Caiapó were “all equally ugly.”
The Austrian curmudgeon found the Caiapó women especially repugnant. They were “very ugly” and went about topless with “their loose and pendulous breasts deforming them.” He admitted, however, that the women were impressively strong: they simultaneously carried young children on their hips and immensely heavy loads of firewood or baskets loaded with peanuts supported only by a tumpline that passed across the forehead and maintained the weight of the load on the shoulders. The heavy burdens women carried elicited sympathy from Saint-Hilaire (1975:71): “I saw many of these poor creatures carrying enormous bundles of firewood on their backs, or transporting jucunus (baskets) full of peanuts […] held only by the strap which passed around the forehead like a belt.” Caiapó women, both visitors noted, worked very hard and were constantly in motion.

Some of the agregados living at the aldeia obviously did not share Pohl’s low opinion of the Caiapó women. A good deal of intermarriage had occurred between Caiapó women and the Brazilian soldiers and agregados. The children of these unions scampered about the aldeia, and they were easily identifiable. ‘Their eyes were wider and rounder than those of the Caiapó,” Saint-Hilaire (1975:67) noted with interest, and “they had neither the large head nor the wide chest” of the other Caiapó, though they “were distinguished entirely from the mulattos by their hair, which was neither curly [like the mulattos] nor black and thick like the pure Indians.”

Interestingly, the practice of cutting the hair in a “pyramidal fashion,” which Pinto da Silveira had observed among the Caiapó at war with the Portuguese, had been abandoned at the aldeia. Instead, Caiapó men and women wore their hair long, “descending to their shoulders” and cut “at the forehead […] in a straight line across the
eyebrows or, better said, it [was] burned with a hot coal” (Pohl 1951:363). The hair framed the face in a manner commonly seen among the modern Kaiapó or Xavante (see e.g., Verswijver 1996). Other forms of body ornamentation had declined among the aldeia Kaiapó. Pinto da Silveira claimed the Kaiapó did “not use batoques in their lower lip nor the ears,” but most Kaiapó men, in fact, had worn a small lip disk of wood, a practice that had fallen out of favor at the aldeia (Pohl 1951:364). Caiapó men and women, judging by what is known about the Panará, had also had once worn earplugs. This practice too had declined. The one exception was Damiana da Cunha. She reportedly “walked about the aldeia with little pieces of wood in her ears,” which Pohl (1951:364) thought was a “sign of her elevated ancestry.” The Portuguese and Brazilians would have frowned upon the continued use of the aggressive-appearing tonsure, lip disks, and earplugs, so the decline in their use and presence among the aldeia Caiapó was unexceptional, if not expected.

Other forms of native body ornamentation remained popular. Caiapó men, women, and children painted themselves red with urucum (annatto) and black with genipap dye. There were a number of different patterns used in body painting: the Caiapó often went about with their feet painted black (Souza 1872:494), and they used genipap to draw “disorganized, longitudinal stripes” across their bodies at ceremonial times (Pohl 1951:362). The Caiapó also habitually rubbed a viscous palm oil on their bodies. Pohl (1951:364) believed the oil offered protection against insect bites, but he found the smell disagreeable and thought the practice caused dirt to adhere stubbornly to the body. The Caiapó tied strings of animal claws and beads to their arms and legs,
these rattled whenever an individual walked or danced (Pohl 1951:362). Men, women, and children wore such “jewelry.”

Clothing was not widely worn at the aldeias. Children scampered about naked and painted in urucum and genipap. Most Caiapó men and women walked about with their chests bared and wore only a simple cotton wrap that covered them from waist to mid-thigh (Pohl 1951:363). Denunciations of aldeia nudity were legion over the years, and one suspects many aldeia Caiapó, as they were wont in the sertões, went about completely naked much of the time.11 The wraps Saint-Hilaire and Pohl observed were an acceptable accommodation to the European prudes who demanded some modesty at the aldeia. In the heat and humidity of Goiás, these wraps were far more comfortable and cooler than rough-spun cotton trousers and dresses that the authorities provided. But, when more modesty was required—for instance, while in Vila Boa to witness a holiday procession—the Caiapó men usually wore simple cotton shirts and pants; the women wore one-piece dresses. In such instances, the chief of the aldeia was known to appear in “short pants and a cotton shirt, a tricorn, a gold belt buckle, and a musket” (Pohl 1951:363). The dapper dress of this chief set him apart from his followers with a conspicuous display of his wealth and status; lesser chiefs wore similar, though less elaborate, clothing.

Caiapó men and women, despite almost fifty years at the aldeias, still impressed visitors. Caiapó men were tall, lithe, and strong—it was no wonder that the black-painted warriors had once struck such deep terror in settlers when they appeared suddenly from the forest growth, screaming, and swinging clubs. Women impressed visitors with their strength and constant hard work. Men, women, and children still
painted themselves with native dyes and wore beads and rattles. But the years at the aldeia had brought important changes: men no longer wore lip plugs, earplugs were absent, and the striking triangular tonsure was abandoned (in part because the Caiapó were not at war). Whereas Pires de Campos (1862:437) had once stated “these barbarians […] live nude, as much the men as the women,” the aldeia Caiapó wore loin clothes and, sometimes, shirts, pants, and dresses. Chiefs occasionally wore elaborate outfits that could include a musket, a gold belt buckle, and tricorn hat. Still, the Caiapó had managed to adapt native and European traditions to the context of the aldeia and find a middle road that was neither totally indigenous nor totally European.

Health and Disease

When the Caiapó began arriving at Vila Boa and Maria I, they were exceedingly healthy. There were large numbers of warriors, women, infants, small children, and elderly; the blind and the crippled were found among them. Such good health appears to have continued into the early nineteenth century. Saint-Hilaire (1975:69), for one, thought the health of the Caiapó compared most favorable to that of the local Brazilians, the majority of whom, he observed, were sickly and suffering from malnutrition and various tropical ailments. Pohl (1951:366) concurred with the Frenchman’s observation. The most visible ailment was goiter: “when accentuated,” a disturbed Saint-Hilaire (1975:51) noted, this malady “made the speech of the afflicted difficult [to understand],” and it afflicted, to some degree, almost everyone in Vila Boa. Present among “all the pedestres” at Mossâmedes, this “deformity” was completely absent from the Caiapó (Saint-Hilaire 1975:69). This was probably because the Indians consumed a wide array of forest resources that were rich in vitamins and minerals.
Although not afflicted with the same ailments as the Brazilians, the Caiapó did suffer from disease. As always, close contact between the Europeans and Indians created opportunities for the spread of lethal pathogens, and the Caiapó had been attacked by various epidemics over the years. Indeed, soon after they began arriving at Vila Boa, Governor Cunha Menezes was forced to deal with the untimely deaths of several elderly Caiapó women. More deaths followed. Outbreaks of epidemics, though poorly recorded, continued to haunt Maria I and Mossâmedes. We know, for example, a smallpox epidemic struck southern Goiás in 1811. Despite ineffective attempts to quarantine the contagion, the epidemic spread from Meia Ponte (Pirenópolis) to Vila Boa, where it caused “great ruin” (Alencastre 1865:105). The smallpox epidemic reached the aldeia Caiapó (Giraldin 1997:98), and the memory of its effect was alive and well in 1819. Pohl (1951:366) was told the contagion was “similar to ours”—that is, the sort of smallpox that attacked Europeans—though “accompanied by violent fevers” and “great mortality.” “More than 80 died,” Saint-Hilaire (1975:69) sadly related. Many of the unfortunate victims died because, “in a delirium from the fever, they went to bathe in cold water.”¹² Such outbreaks, however infrequent they may have been, were clearly devastating events and carried away many otherwise healthy individuals. Considering the ebb and flow of Caiapó to and from the sertões, epidemics unlikely remained isolated at the aldeia population: they must have spread widely and caused considerable damage even to isolated villages.

There were also endemic diseases at the aldeia. Saint-Hilaire (1975:69) observed rampant “venereal diseases.” This probably referred to syphilis, whose sores and lesions would be visible, which the Caiapó had acquired from soldiers and agregados
trading goods for sexual favors with the women. In the Frenchman’s opinion, the Caiapó were doomed to extinction because they lacked an effective means of treating such afflictions.

Although true that the Caiapó had no effective cures for smallpox or syphilis, they did possess and practice various traditional means of healing. “They [were] in the habit of scorning the remedies the Portuguese gave them,” Pohl (1951:366) stated with approval. The Caiapó, instead, preferred to “cure their sicknesses with various herbs and roots.” Many of their remedies, drawn from long familiarity with the flora of the savannahs and forests, likely had actual medicinal value and worked to relieve symptoms, if not actual disease. Other means of coping with disease were less effective. Fevers, for example, were dealt with by immersing the body in water, a practice that appears to have hastened death.

But, like many native peoples, the Caiapó saw disease as a spiritual affliction or the work of witchcraft. There were doubtlessly shamans and native healers to combat witchcraft, but we have no records of their existence, though Pohl (1951:366) saw many “amulets of tree roots and animal bones.” Almost every child in the aldeia had at least one of these amulets. These “superstitious means” of combating otherworldly sources of disease were dear possessions: none of the Caiapó would agree to trade their amulets for the trinkets the Austrian offered them. Blood was considered a powerful substance, and excess or contaminated blood was dangerous to one’s health, so the Caiapó resorted to bloodletting: “when they have a headache,” Pohl (1951:363) wrote, “they bleed the forehead by means of a little bow, with which they loose an eight-inch arrow various times against the afflicted area. The arrow has a barbed point of quartz
with a button-shaped protrusion so it does not penetrate more than needed." This miniature arrow was called a *kutuschná*. Bloodletting was a common European practice at the time and familiar to Pohl who, though finding the particular Caiapó method of bleeding peculiar, observed "they [knew] how to correctly open the veins."

The aldeia Caiapó, despite the occasional epidemic and the endemic venereal diseases, were healthier and more robust than the local Brazilians, who were tormented by goiter and other tropical ailments, largely because of diet and the use of native cures culled from the forests and savannahs. However, epidemics, like smallpox, took a heavy toll from the aldeia population; still, the individuals who survived possessed natural immunities to European disease, and the emergence of a disease-resistance population, which had begun in the eighteenth century, undoubtedly progressed at Maria I and Mossâmedes. More, despite attempts to provide "medicinal" remedies, and efforts to eradicate native beliefs concerning witchcraft, the Caiapó maintained many of their traditional means of treating disease, including roots, herbs, amulets to combat the spirits, and bloodletting.

**Religion and Ritual at the Aldeias**

Although we know amulets were used to combat spirits and witchcraft, unfortunately, very little was recorded about Caiapó religion and ritual. Saint-Hilaire (1975:70) was told "the Caiapó still living in a savage state not only do not have a religious cult nor the least idea of the Divinity." The astute Frenchman was somewhat suspicious of this information. He noticed the Caiapó word for God at the aldeia was "*puhanca*, which evidently was taken neither from Portuguese nor the Língua Geral [Tupí]," and this, to his mind, suggested the word had existed long before the Caiapó
had settled at Maria I. He concluded, therefore, that the Caiapó had practiced some form of native religion, which, we shall see, had merged with Catholicism.

Pohl (1951:361–362), who was always more willing than Saint-Hilaire to attribute savagery to the Indians, believed the Caiapó practiced barbaric rituals “in the jungles,” worshiped “the sun and moon,” and offered “human sacrifices to their cult.” Human sacrifices were almost certainly not a part Caiapó rituals, though the Austrian was correct that various rituals were practiced in the sertões, most probably including some dedicated to the sun and moon (a common enough among Amerindians to suppose its existence). Some of these rituals, despite the Portuguese and Brazilians efforts to extirpate them, continued at the aldeia. There were, Pohl said, “certain dances that, at a certain time, they practice by the light of blazing bonfires.” Painted red with urucum and dyed black with genipap, decorated with animal-claw rattles on their hands and feet, the Caiapó gathered to “chant a peculiar song—a rough yell—with the repeated exclamation: Ho! Ho! Ho!” Musicians, blowing instruments constructed from gourds or wood and horn, joined the singers. Then, Caiapó men entered the festival shouldering heavy logs, which they passed from shoulder to shoulder, dancer to dancer, as women and children joined the ritual, hefting logs “smaller” than those shouldered by the men. Such a dance lasted late into the night, “only ending around midnight.” Similarly, a pious priest, Father Silva e Souza (1872:494), sniffed in distained at licentious “celebrations and nocturnal gatherings during which, in confusion, they sought to propagate.”

Pohl, unfortunately, did not observe one of these rituals and was repeating what the Brazilians told him. Saint-Hilaire (1975:66), in contrast, observed some Caiapó
dances; however, because these were performed at the Frenchman’s request, they were stripped from the customary ritual context and, therefore, must represent only fragments of larger ceremonies and rituals. In order for the dances to be performed, pedestres were dispatched to summon Caiapó men from the fields where they worked; no women participated in the dances. The men began by forming a circle, and, as each took his place at the edge, they began stomping their feet and singing a low, slow song. Gradually, the performers began to dance more vigorously, “marking the rhythm with precision but without any vivacity, the legs slightly doubled, the body curved to the front, doing little leaps.” The song's repetition quickly bored Saint-Hilaire until, unexpectedly, the dance changed: a dancer leapt into the middle of the circle, bent over, and began to beat the ground with three fingers. With this act, Saint-Hilaire was told, the dancer meant “to imitate with this a vulture pecking at carrion.” The Dança do Urubu (“Vulture Dance”), as the Frenchman called it, flowed into the Dança da onça (“Jaguar Dance”). A Caiapó dancer pounced into the center of the circle, “his back curved, his arms extended rigidly to the ground, his fingers separated and lightly curved, like claws,” imitating a jaguar stalking and killing its prey. “After having done various turns in that posture, the dancer left the circle […] he ran after a child, threw it on his back, and returned to the circle [with the child] and continued to dance.” The dancer’s abduction of this child represented, according to Saint-Hilaire, a jaguar stalking prey, killing it, and returning to its lair with the body.14

Although indigenous rituals persisted at the aldeia, the Portuguese had tried to impose their Catholic religion on the Caiapó. In the 1780s, newly arrived Caiapó children and several elderly and ill individuals were baptized and, as we have seen,
there were failed attempts to teach the adults at least the rudiments of Catholicism. The early and enthusiastic conversions, such as that of the elderly Dona Maria, raised hopes that the Caiapó would quickly become good Christians. The Indians’ eagerness for the new religion soon faded, and, as the government’s interest in the aldeia diminished over the years—the late eighteenth-century campaigns to secure the hinterlands of Goiás from the largest and most hostile natives peoples had more or less succeeded in reducing the Indian threat and the aldeias became less important—so did the effort to convert and indoctrinate the Indians.

By the early nineteenth century, most Caiapó at the aldeia were baptized and knew the rudiments of Catholicism. Saint-Hilaire (1975:70) recorded that “except a small number of elderly, who did not manage to learn the most simple prayers and a little of the catechism, all of the aldeia Indians were baptized,” many were “married by the priest and,” he added, “some even manage to go to confession.” But it was apparent that there were few true Catholics among the Caiapó. Saint-Hilaire felt their “ideas about Christianity [were] very superficial.” This was unsurprising, as the local priest usually presented himself at the aldeia for Sunday Mass and spent little time catechizing the Indians. Pohl (1951:361) thought that, “despite all of them being baptized,” the aldeia Caiapó possessed only a thin veneer of Christianity: “these Indians,” he observed, “have not the least idea of the Christian religion. None of them know how to pray the Our Father.” In his opinion, there were no true Christian Caiapó, not “even among those that have lived more than twenty years at the aldeia.” The opinion of both European visitors was shared by another visitor, the Portuguese engineer, soldier, and, later, politician, Raymundo José da Cunha Mattos (1874:244).
All three blamed the failure to convert the Caiapó on the corrupt administrators and the lazy and absent priest.

Despite their superficial understanding of Christianity, the Caiapó enjoyed the spectacle of Catholic ritual, particularly the larger processions held in Vila Boa. Pohl (1951:361) heard “they greatly appreciate the Church festivals and always request permission to attend those performed in Goiás.” Other evidence indicates that even very late in the waning days of the aldeia, the Caiapó enjoyed these processions. In March of 1830, the president of Goiás ordered beans, manioc flour, salt, and tobacco distributed to the Caiapó at São José de Mossâmedes so the Indians could travel to Vila Boa and witness the Procession of the Senhor de Bom Jesus dos Passos.\footnote{15} Holiday processions and feasts brought relief from the drudgery of communal labor, which must have contributed to the Caiapó desire to attend these events, but there was also something more to this desire than a mere need to shirk labor forced labor. We find hints of the Caiapó love of pageantry and ritual in their great enjoyment of the Te Deum performed for them in 1781. Indeed, the Caiapó had arrived at Maria I with a love of music and ritual—both of which were methods used to greet valued visitors in their own villages—so it was unsurprising that they enjoyed observing Catholic festivals.

Unfortunately, we can only imagine how the Caiapó interpreted Catholic rituals, but they must have understood these in ways that deviated from the Portuguese and Brazilian orthodoxy. Certainly, by the early nineteenth century, if not much earlier, a syncretic folk religion that blended Caiapó beliefs and Catholicism had developed at the aldeia (it probably spread widely throughout villages in the sertões as well). As we have already seen, when asked their word for God, the Caiapó responded with “puhanca,”
indicating a syncretic intermingling of their native traditions with Catholicism. An early chronicler of Goiás, Father Silva e Souza (1872:494), writing in the first decade of the nineteenth century, recorded that important Caiapó rituals occurred “around Easter” (late March and early April). The men and women, he said, would paint themselves and celebrate “with great clamor their festivals and games,” including the “famous” log races.

Pohl (1951:362) was also told about an important Caiapó ritual that was celebrated at the same time as Lent (the middle of February and early April). Known as the quebra-cabeça (“head-buster”) festival, this ritual involved Caiapó men and women forming a circle around a chief armed with one of the famous sword-shaped clubs. The Caiapó danced with a slow and shuffling gait around the chief. Some of the male dancers carried a log on their shoulders, which they passed among themselves. After a dancer had carried the log and had passed it to another dancer’s shoulder, Pohl learned, he “leaps at the chief, kneels before him, and receives a blow to the forehead violent enough to make the blood run.” The “dancing and singing” women descended on this wounded and stumbling man to clean the blood that flowed from the chief’s blow. Pohl (1951:362) thought this “some sort of expiatory ceremony, which they say all of the Indians submit themselves to.”

A similar ritual was used to mourn the death of a wealthy or important individual (Pohl 1951:362). Mourners spent the first day after the death making “howls and lamentations” and reciting “in a sad tone, the deeds of the dead person,” such as “how many deer and game killed, the number of enemies felled, etc.” On the second day, the mourners gathered at the chief’s house for a dance. Again, male dancers passed a
heavy log, received a blow to the head from the chief, and “return[ed], with blood flowing, to the deceased’s house to scatter this blood about the body.” The corpse was then buried, “seated in a grave,” accompanied by food and personal items such as bows and arrows. More dances and songs followed and there was a “funerary banquet.” If the deceased had owned any cattle—a sign of a rich individual at the aldeia—they were slaughtered to provide meat for the feast. Saint-Hilaire (1975:71), corroborating Pohl’s description somewhat, learned the Caiapó cut their chests with a small arrow and struck their heads until blood freely flowed at the death of an important village personality or family member.

In these rituals, we find evidence that blood was an important substance to the Caiapó. More importantly, though derived from secondhand information and somewhat vague, these descriptions of Caiapó rituals show themes of penitence, suffering, blood, death, and even the afterlife (seen in the items buried with the dead)—themes also found in the Passion, Crucifixion, and Resurrection of Christ. It was no coincidence that rituals, like the “head-buster” ceremony, occurred around the time of Easter and Lent. A syncretic folk religion had developed at the aldeia, one that sought to find commonalities and reconcile native rituals and beliefs with the Catholic religion and its liturgical calendar. Caiapó traditions existed beside and mixed with Catholicism: the one did not replace the other; nor did the Caiapó reject wholesale Catholicism; rather, they sought to find an acceptable middle, grasping at and adopting those aspects of both traditions that they found meaningful.

**Social Hierarchy: Chiefs, Commoners, and Línguas**

One of the more profound changes to the Caiapó that occurred at Maria I and Mossâmedes was the imposition of hierarchy. The Portuguese and Brazilians
recognized three categories of Caiapó: Índios (“commoners”), caciques (“chiefs”), and línguas (“intermediaries”). Most of the Caiapó living at the aldeias were considered Índios, a word literally meaning “Indians” but with the connotation of “commoners.”

They were the rank-and-file of the aldeia. Above the commoners were the caciques, the Caiapó leaders. In the sertões, chiefs led because of their personalities and prestige; they persuaded and cajoled followers into action, but the position of chief was reified, ranked, and expanded such that chiefs could punish their followers and did not lead through persuasion alone at the aldeia. And, finally, there were the Portuguese-speaking línguas, the “intermediaries.” Línguas, as we have seen, were important during the pacification, which did not change at the aldeias, even though the numbers of línguas increased. The línguas became powerful leaders in their own right at the aldeias.

Índios

The Índios were, in a sense, the most important inhabitants of the aldeias. They were the most numerous of the Caiapó, and it was their active participation that made it possible for the Goiás aldeias to exist. When too many “commoners” fled, the aldeias faltered; when they abandoned Mossâmedes and refused to return in 1831-1832, the aldeia ceased to exist as a space occupied in any meaningful sense by the Caiapó (it continued to exist on paper).

The image we have of the commoners is that of a conservative people who preferred many of their own traditions to those of the Portuguese and Brazilians. Índios spoke little Portuguese, preferred their Gê language for their day-to-day interactions, lived in traditional houses, slept on wooden cots or on floor mats, cooked in earth ovens, used body paints and traditional adornments, and enjoyed hunting, fishing, and
gathering. But the índios were also responsible for many of the changes that took place at the aldeia: they abandoned the triangular tonsure, lip disks, and earplugs worn in the sertões; they adopted the use of clothing to varying degrees; and they knew a little Catholicism, which they mingled with their own native beliefs. It was often their decisions that saw various European cultural practices and manufactured goods adopted and used or rejected and ignored.

The primary role of the Índios at the aldeia, at least as far as the soldiers and administrators were concerned, was to provide labor. They planted, worked, and harvested the communal fields, herded cattle, served in bandeiras, and crewed canoes plying the Araguaia River trade. Indeed, two skills the Caiapó frequently found useful later in the nineteenth-century were first learned at the Goiás aldeias: canoeing and cattle husbandry. Building and using canoes was not something the Caiapó regularly did before Maria I, but they soon acquired these skills and, later, possessed a reputation as powerful rowers (see Kupfer 1870). Similarly, the Caiapó became skilled cattle herders at Maria I and Mossâmedes (Pohl 1951:362). Well after the Goiás aldeias had ceased to exist, there were Caiapó working as cowboys and herders in Camapuã and the Triângulo Mineiro (Ferreira 2001:22).

The Portuguese and Brazilians had attempted to teach the Caiapó other trades, such as carpentry, forging, and weaving. These efforts, from what we can tell, met with little success. No indigenous tradesmen emerge from the historical record, and neither Saint-Hilaire nor Pohl recorded observing Caiapó engaged in trades. In 1819, a mulatto woman was paid to teach Caiapó women to spin cotton and weave cloth (Saint-Hilaire 1975:65); but they found this work objectionable and frequently fled. Attempts
were later made to forcefully teach Caiapó children to weave, but they, like their parents, fled the looms.¹⁹

It is unsurprising that the Caiapó did not readily take to trades like carpentry or spinning. Such tasks, in addition to their unfamiliarity, were at odds with Caiapó notions of work. Caiapó labor was divided between the sexes: men felled the forests for gardens, but spent much of their time in other pursuits, such as hunting, fishing, and making war; the planting, maintenance, and harvest of gardens was women’s work. Hunting, fishing, gathering, and gardens provided the Caiapó with sufficient food and plenty of leisure time, so they did not need to labor for hours on end under the hot sun in communal fields or suffer the humidity indoors working looms. And the concept of producing a surplus of food or goods for storage, sale, or trade was foreign to them. At the aldeia, however, the Caiapó men were expected to fell the forests, plant and maintain the fields, and harvest the crops. They were to labor almost every day and for long hours—just like peasants—on fields planted with the expectation of providing food for all the Caiapó, the Portuguese and Brazilians, and to produce a surplus for storage and sale. The Caiapó were unaccustomed to this labor regime, which they neither understand nor cared for, and, initially, they reacted violently: for example, soldiers demanding men plant and tend fields were ignored or threatened. It was much the same with trades. These were unfamiliar tasks and deemed inappropriate, if not useless. For example, Caiapó homes at the aldeia were simple affairs and easily repaired, so they had no need to learn how carpentry and the manufacture of beam joists and the trussing of walls. Moreover, weaving to produce a surplus for sale, as the
looms at Mossâmêdes were supposed to do, was a concept foreign to Caiapó women, so it was rejected.

But the Portuguese and Brazilians wanted the communal fields planted and the looms to produce cloth; they needed the Caiapó to work. This meant forced labor. We do not know when forced labor was instituted at Maria I—it was certainly not thrust upon the Caiapó until their numbers fell well below 3,000—but it was present in the first decade of the nineteenth century, and very unpopular.20 This unpopularity remained true at Mossâmêdes in 1819. There, the Caiapó labored under armed guards five days a week (Saint-Hilaire 1975:64). On Sunday they were required to attend mass—if there was one—and then they had the rest of the day off. Monday was also free from labor requirements.

Yet, despite the imposition of forced labor, the Caiapó attitude toward work proved extremely resilient. A more or less traditional attitude toward work prevailed at Mossâmêdes, which greatly vexed observers. When forced to work in the communal fields or at trades, Caiapó men and women limited their exertions. “In all of their actions,” Pohl (1951:364) scornfully concluded after observing the Caiapó at work, “these Indians are lazy, awkward, and tire very quickly.” Saint-Hilaire (1975:69) shared the Austrian’s opinion and thought the Caiapó “inconstant and totally carefree.” He complained that they would harvest their gardens when hungry and “rarely wait until the fruit or grain [was] completely ripe” and, echoing a common critique of Indians, claimed the Caiapó “never think about tomorrow, save nothing, live only for the present, and feel supremely happy when they can satisfy their pronounced fondness for meat, booze, and tobacco.” The Caiapó did prefer spending their time in familiar pursuits rather than
laboring in the communal fields or shuffling wefts and warps at the looms. “Their favorite pastimes are to hunt, fish, and wander through the forest,” Pohl (1951:364) grumbled, adding that “even in this they do not exert themselves much. When they catch game—which is not difficult, given the abundance in the virgin forest—they relax the entire day, laying down and devoting themselves to idleness.” There was little the Brazilians could do to change the Caiapó attitudes toward work and their preference for hunting and gathering, so these persisted until the “commoners” finally abandoned the aldeia altogether, in part, to pursue their predilections without the distractions of aldeia labor.

**Chiefs**

The Caiapó caciques (“chiefs”) were the leaders of the aldeia. The position of chief had changed by the time Saint-Hilaire and Pohl visited, so it is necessary to examine the traditional role of chiefs to understand the extent of the transformation that had occurred. Unfortunately, because of limitations inherent to the available sources, this reconstruction must remain very incomplete. Pires de Campos (1862:437), for example, said that “each [Caiapó] aldeia” had “its cacique [...] who rules them.” This meant there was at least one chief in every Caiapó aldeia whom the inhabitants recognized as their most important leader. Pires de Campos named this chief the principal (“head chief”). Because each village had its own principal, we can safely assume that no chief ruled over several villages, however, this does not mean that the principal was the only chief in the village. In fact, there were many lesser chiefs in each village; the principal was only the most prominent chief. There was a lot of competition and jostling between the principal and the various lesser chiefs for political power, influence, and followers.21
Being a chief was a matter of consensus: the inhabitants of a Caiapó village agreed upon whom they felt was fit to lead; there was no sense of inherited rank that passed on through ties of kinship, meaning a chief’s children did not necessarily become chiefs. Undoubtedly, there were several criteria for evaluating chiefs, but we know only one of these for certain: war. As Pires de Campos (1862:437) said, the Caiapó “esteem most among them who has killed the most.” Presumably, those who “killed the most” were the warriors who frequently organized, participated in, and led raids. These were aggressive and bellicose men, the killers of many enemies, and they led many raids that brought significant quantities of plunder to their villages. The distribution of loot captured on raids, thus, must also have contributed to a chief’s acquisition of prestige. War was an important means through which chiefs accumulated prestige—symbolically from the act of killing and, one assumes, through the distribution of plunder—and followers.

Because the status of chiefs was dependent on how others viewed him, there were limits to their power. There were “no chiefs with absolute power,” Pinto da Silveira had observed, they had to lead “without resorting to punishment.” Oratory and well-honed skills at persuasion were probably the most potent weapons a Caiapó chief had to jostle reluctant or wayward followers into action. Because the competition and factionalism between rival chiefs was strong, a chief had to perform. Incompetent chiefs quickly lost followers: “if these [chiefs] they follow fail to administer well” said Pinto da Silveira, “their vassals, who pay them homage, switch to other leaders like traitors because among these heathen there is no principle of fidelity or any law as such.” This redoubtable Indian-fighter’s comment, depreciatory though it was, correctly
identified that a chief’s political power and influence was dependent on performance. Even the village principal could fall from grace and be replaced.

This shifting pattern of leadership declined at the aldeias. In the correspondence left by Governor Cunha Menezes, José Luís Pereira, and the soldiers dealing directly with the Caiapó arrivals, only one chief was recognized among each group of Indians to arrive. Because the Portuguese believed they were dealing with “villages,” they assumed each of the arriving chiefs was a principal. There were other leaders among the Caiapó arrivals, but the Portuguese did not recognize them or accord them as much status as the “principal.” This simplified Caiapó leadership, and, because the Portuguese singled out, recognized, and worked through a specific leader, it tended to reinforce individuals in the position of chief.

The Portuguese went further in strengthening and hierarchy among Caiapó chiefs at Maria I. Instead of recognizing and working through all of the chiefs who arrived, the Portuguese selected one chief to be the principal of the entire aldeia population. According to Alencastre (1864:317), one of the early chiefs chosen for this position was Angraí-oxá. A Caiapó chief by this name existed, as his name appears on a baptismal registry, and he was doubtlessly an important leader. In all probability, Angraí-oxá was a chief and a warrior whose reputation was widely known and respected, if not feared, among the various Caiapó villages. His rise to power at the aldeia began shortly after he arrived in Vila Boa with, according to Alencastre (1864:317), another chief named Xaquenonau. We find both of these names on a baptismal registry dating to October of 1782. From this document, it appears that, when these “villages” arrived, the Portuguese recognized at least two chiefs, namely, Angraí-oxá and Xaquenonau.
Angraí-oxá saw Governor Luís da Cunha Menezes adopt his son as a godchild, and another son and a daughter were adopted by a captain, Francisco Xavier Leite do Amaral; Xaquenonau and his wife, Cequaquaí, had children adopted by a politician and cavalry officer, Francisco Pereira Marinha, and another officer, Capitão António de Souza Telles. Portuguese of high social standing, like Governor Cunha Menezes and these officers, preferred establishing fictive kin relations with Caiapó whom they believed to be leaders, so both Angraí-oxá and Xaquenonau should be considered chiefs. However, the record from the baptism explicitly recognizes only one Caiapó “cacique,” and that individual was Angraí-oxá. When he arrived in September of 1782, Angraí-oxá was the principal chief of a single “village,” but, as far as the Portuguese were concerned in October, he was the “cacique” of two villages; and, later, according to tradition, he was the principal of all the Caiapó at Maria I.

This process continued as more Caiapó arrived at the aldeia. Angraí-oxá remained, in the eyes of the Portuguese, the principal of the aldeia, and it was to him that they first turned when in need of the aid or assistance of a chief. Subsequent chiefs arriving at Maria I, much like Xaquenonau, though previously independent leaders in their own right, thus found themselves subordinated to Angraí-oxá. These chiefs found it difficult to challenge the prominent position of Angraí-oxá because the food and goods provided to the Caiapó were first given to him for distribution. And, at the same, as raiding Portuguese settlements declined, it became more difficult for chiefs to use war and the pillage of goods as a means of acquiring prestige and followers. An old tradition, we shall see in the next chapter, holds that the position of aldeia principal became a family affair for Angraí-oxá. Reportedly, he passed his authority on to his
grandson and granddaughter, Manoel and Damiana da Cunha. The siblings, both of whom were powerful intermediaries, so goes the tradition, inherited their elevated status at the aldeia from their grandfather. We do not know for sure if Damiana and Manoel were related to Angraí-oxá, but their parents were, by all accounts, chiefs, so it seems certain that they owed their later prominence to family connections.

The Portuguese and Brazilians further reinforced hierarchy at the aldeia by organizing Caiapó chiefs into a system based on Portuguese military ranks. According to Pohl (1951:362–363), the most important aldeia chief had the rank of coronel (“colonel”). He was distinguished from the other chiefs and so-called commoners by his clothing and valuable possessions: the colonel wore a broad-brimmed tricorn hat, wool short-pants, a shirt, a belt with a gold buckle, and carried a musket. Lesser Caiapó chiefs also received titles. There was a capitão (“captain”) and an alferes (“ensign”) (Saint-Hilaire 1975:70). There were also probably sargentos (“sergeants”) and cabos (“corporals”) (cf. DI 1894, vol. 3:168). These chiefs wore clothing similar to, though less elaborate than, that of the colonel. For example, in 1829, two military-style uniforms of rough cloth, including pants and a shirt, were distributed to two of the lesser Caiapó chiefs at Mossâmades. In chapter 8, we shall see that the hierarchy of coronel, capitão, and alferes affected Caiapó villages throughout the sertões. Saint-Hilaire’s (1975:70) comment that “the Caiapó who still live in the forests are led by a chief that has beneath his control various captains” probably refers to the ranking of chiefs. And this reflects the influence the hierarchy institutionalized at the Goiás aldeias had on Caiapó leadership.
Chiefs played an important administrative role at the aldeias. They were expected to maintain their followers at the aldeia, provide labor when required, enforce rules, and dispense punishments. Here, we see one of the ways the power and authority of Caiapó chiefs had increased at the aldeia: chiefs carried out punishments, something they were unable to do in the sertões. Chiefs were also commanded warriors participating in bandeiras, as occurred, for example, when the Caiapó marched against the Chavante in 1784 (Freire 1951:15–16). And chiefs were expected to aid efforts to return Caiapó fugitives to the aldeias.

For their part, the Caiapó expected their chiefs to secure goods and defend them against excesses. We have already seen how Caiapó chiefs used violence to intimidate Portuguese soldiers and administrators into providing their followers with goods. They traded the skills of their followers for goods, dispatching, for example, warriors to aid a bandeira against the Chavante. Defending their followers was also a very important role for chiefs. In 1822, for example, a Caiapó chief interceded on the behalf of the aldeia Indians, denouncing the violent punishments meted out on the aldeia. The complaint led to the removal of the pedestre. In 1827, Caiapó chiefs brought the violent excesses of the aldeia administrator to the notice of the governor; the administrator was removed.

It was dangerous to ignore or antagonize Caiapó chiefs. They could renounce the aldeia and lead their followers into the sertões. They were even known to strike back at their oppressors, as Governor Tristão da Cunha Menezes discovered when he imprisoned a chief, provoking a mass flight from Maria I as well as a destructive raid against one of his estates (see below). The chiefs knew the Portuguese and Brazilians...
needed them and used this to maneuver, which led authorities to see them as fickle and disloyal. But what the Portuguese, Brazilians, and Caiapó expected from chiefs was not always compatible, so a chief had to maneuver carefully between authorities and followers; navigating the diverse expectations put upon them was difficult, sometimes impossible, for chiefs. Those chiefs who repeatedly angered or failed one side or the other could end up imprisoned or be abandoned by their followers. And chiefs were far from infallible at their difficult task. Cunha Matos (1874:305), for one, believed the chiefs to be among the primary exploiters of the aldeia: “these people would be more civilized if the directors, the chaplains, the garrison commanders, and their own Indian chiefs had other views of them and did not consider them as slaves and beasts of burden.”

**Línguas**

There was intermediary category of Caiapó living on the Goiás aldeias, the Portuguese-speaking línguas. Unfortunately, they were very poorly documented and little is known about them. With the except for Damiana da Cunha (see e.g., Norberto 1861; Karasch 1981), línguas remain largely unanalyzed in the major works on the Caiapó (cf. Giraldin 1997; Atáídes 1998), despite their importance.

Culturally, the línguas were neither entirely Caiapó nor entirely European: they were a mixture of the two traditions. While most, if not all, Caiapó living on the aldeias had acquired some aspects of Brazilian culture, what made línguas different was their greater familiarity with and adoption of European ways. Línguas spoke Portuguese and their Gê language, they tended to slip in among and mix with the aldeia Caiapó, the Caiapó in the sertões, and the Portuguese and Brazilians living on the frontier. It is, perhaps, because of this that the línguas were so poorly documented: they were
invisible until needed for some task, such as facilitating communication or trailblazing, and tended to blend in among the aldeia population. Because of their skills, the línguas were more influential with government authorities than the commoners, but often had less influence with administrators and commoners than the traditional chiefs. They could be leaders at the aldeias, with authority operating parallel to that of the traditional chiefs; however, the commoners accorded most línguas lower status than their traditional chiefs. But chiefs could be línguas; and línguas could be chiefs.

Caiapó línguas had emerged slowly in the decades before Maria I. Few, if any, of the early línguas had chosen to live among the Portuguese. Most were prisoners—many, perhaps the majority—captured as children and distributed to settlers as slaves; though some were born and raised by captive Caiapó mothers (many such children were of mixed-descent, like those Saint-Hilaire observed at Mossâmmedes,). They lived in frontier settlements and acquired some Portuguese language skills and familiarity with the miners, ranchers, and the slaves. This made them useful intermediaries: bandeirantes, soldiers, and governors made periodic use of these línguas in attempts to communicate with the Caiapó, almost always without success. This early population of línguas was probably not self-reproducing, and periodic influxes of captives, especially women and children, were necessary to replace those who managed to flee from or died in captivity.

Much of this changed with the pacification of the Caiapó. Their knowledge and understanding of the Portuguese rapidly expanded and was no longer limited to furtive observation, what raiders culled while pillaging settlements and corpses, and information gleamed from escaped captives. Indeed, one of the first things the Caiapó
set about doing was gathering new information. One important means of doing this was by permitting their children to live with Portuguese families. This was what happened with Damiana and Manoel da Cunha: reportedly the grandchildren of a Caiapó chief, they were baptized, adopted as godchildren by the governor, and sent to live in his house. The brother-sister team was sent to acquire knowledge of their respective genders from their Portuguese host. Damiana and Manoel were certainly not alone: the children of other Caiapó went to live with families in Vila Boa and elsewhere. In 1857, a German visitor to the Caiapó aldeia at Santana do Paranaíba met one of these children (Kupfer 1870). The “captain” of the aldeia was a língua who claimed to have learned Portuguese and “many other things” as a child living in the house of the governor of Goiás. This man was in his early forties and could not have been among the children educated in the 1780s, so the practice of sending Caiapó children to the homes of frontier elites evidently continued for a long time. And, from what we know about later Brazilian-Caiapó interaction (see chapter 8), many Caiapó parents “traded” children to frontier families in exchange for goods of various kinds. This apparently heartless practice makes sense if we accept that these parents were sending their children to observe and learn, not merely trading them away for a few trinkets; the parents of these children expected them to return someday. There were also many adult Caiapó who spent time in frontier settlements, often laboring or participating in bandeiras, and these enterprising individuals acquired a lot of knowledge. So the number of individuals capable of being línguas swelled dramatically after the pacification, and the Portuguese and Brazilians no longer had to rely on captives or the children of captives.
In the early days of the pacification, there were very few Portuguese-speaking Caiapó and no captive Portuguese or Africans mixed in among the “villages” arriving at Vila Boa and Maria I. This made communication very difficult. The Portuguese relied heavily on the línguas: they were always present in the interactions and negotiations and considered so important that authorities concerned themselves with their movements.35 Such reliance came with a heavy price, as some of the línguas’ loyalties were split, and they were not always reliable and trustworthy: the murder of a pedestre, for example, was instigated by a língua.36 Nonetheless, the Portuguese need the línguas and accorded them a lot of influence. The línguas also acquired a lot of influence from the Caiapó: the chiefs, even in the later stages of the aldeia, needed línguas to speak with the government authorities.

Línguas eventually developed into a source of authority parallel to the chiefs. Because they aided facilitating communication, they often stood between government authorities and the traditional chiefs and, typically, appeared at interactions involving outsiders and the Caiapó. A língua accompanied a Caiapó chief interacting and negotiating with missionaries on the Paraná River in 1810 (see chapter 8). Both Saint-Hilaire (1975:72) and Pohl (1951:361) recorded meeting Damiana da Cunha. Presumably, it was her task to greet and deal with visitors to the aldeia; much of what both visitors learned about the aldeia appears to have come from Damiana. And Kupfer (1870), a German who visited the Caiapó aldeia at Santana do Paranaiba in 1857, recorded that one of the first persons he encountered was a língua—who also happened to be the most loquacious of his interlocutors. This intermediary position allowed línguas to influence interaction with outsiders and the distribution of goods. A
native chief and língua on the Paraná River, we shall see, competed with one another to control the missionaries’ access and distribution of goods to the Caiapó. Damiana, as well as her brother Manoel, controlled the flow of goods into the aldeia and successfully competed against chiefs, who were often disgruntled and prone to leading their followers into the sertões, to maintain the Caiapó at Maria I and Mossâmedes. Clearly, some línguas held considerable influence on, and off of, the aldeias.

Regardless of how much authority, influence, and legitimacy that the Portuguese and Brazilians lent to the línguas, the Caiapó “commoners” accorded most of them less respect than their traditional chiefs. The missionary who interacted with two Caiapó “chiefs” on the Paraná River noted that one of them had “greater authority” (DI 1894, vol. 3:170). Although the missionary believed he was dealing with chiefs, he was, in fact, interacting with a native chief and a língua whom he thought was a “chief” with less authority (see chapter 8). Similarly, Kupfer noted the “captain” appointed by the Brazilians to run Santana do Paranaíba was shown less respect than the village chief. And the influence of Damiana da Cunha, who was accorded nearly as much respect as a traditional chief at the aldeia, was limited when confronted by what appears to have been a traditional chief in the sertões (see chapter 7).

Damiana was not the only língua with power and influence approaching that of the traditional chiefs. One of her contemporaries, a Caiapó man named Manoel, was a powerful língua (chapter 8). He had served as a pedestre in Goiás but fled from the aldeias, probably in 1808, and appeared on the Paraná and Sucuriú Rivers in 1810. He rapidly rose in power and importance in the region, using his Portuguese-language skills and superior knowledge of frontier society to set himself up as a prominent
intermediary. Manoel’s reputation eventually stretched from Itu to Cuiabá, and he was sought after by several trading and exploration expeditions sent to the Paraná. He also was a chief; however, Manoel was more powerful than most Caiapó chiefs: he controlled trade between the Brazilians and Caiapó villages on the Sucuriú River and, eventually, was recognized as a chief by several villages in the region. Manoel established a loose hierarchy of leaders, who possessed military ranks much like the chiefs in the Goiás aldeias, and appointed lesser chiefs and intermediaries in the villages he controlled.

Most línguas, unlike Manoel, did not become chiefs. The majority led simple, if quiet, lives and blended in among the Caiapó who lived at the aldeias or in the sertões. If they were of mixed descent, they easily mingled among the inhabitants of rural settlements. Often, línguas were found working on farms, ranches, and as servants. In 1816, for example, Saint-Hilaire (1975:69 n.28) met two Portuguese-speaking Caiapó servants. Many worked as pedestres, especially at the aldeias, or used their woods lore to guide bandeiras or expeditions in the backlands. In 1804, for example, two Caiapó línguas helped guide a survey expedition working in near the Claro and Pilões Rivers (Anonymous 1918:210). One of the Caiapó servants whom Saint-Hilaire met was reportedly an excellent guide. And, in 1825, Manoel da Cunha, Damiana’s brother—and an important língua in his own right—commanded an expedition to open a road into Camapuã.37 Línguas most frequently served as translators and facilitators of communication, a role they played even very late in the existence of the Mossâmedes aldeia. In January of 1832, President José Rodrigues Jardim ordered the ordered six of the ‘most civilized’ aldeia Caiapó to Vila Boa to nominate a new commander for an
expedition to the Caiapó.\textsuperscript{38} The expedition did not occur, and the Caiapó fugitives did not return to the aldeia, so these línguas were again ordered to Vila Boa to aid an expedition in October.\textsuperscript{39} The fugitives refused to return, which spelled the end of the aldeia at Mossâmades, despite the efforts of these línguas.

Long after the demise of the Mossâmades aldeia, Caiapó línguas continued to play an important role on the frontier. New Caiapó aldeias sprang up in Mato Grosso and the Triângulo Mineiro, and línguas always appeared in these. They facilitated communication with the non-Caiapó and smoothed interaction between the Indians and their Brazilian neighbors. Their numbers proliferated, and, toward the end of the nineteenth century, Brazilian ways had so thoroughly infiltrated the Caiapó that many of them were indistinguishable from the rural poor (chapter 9). There were fewer so-called Índios—the “commoners” who maintained and practiced the old traditions—than Caiapó of mixed-culture who spoke Portuguese and easily mingled with and worked among the Brazilians. The línguas lost much of their importance as cultural mediators: too many Caiapó spoke Portuguese and knew the ways of the frontier as their people slowly faded into the Brazilian population.

\textbf{Flights and Violence on the Caiapó Aldeias}

The nature of Caiapó flights and the role of violence at Maria I and São José de Mossâmades remain almost completely unanalyzed in the extent historical literature. That the Caiapó frequently fled the aldeias and resorted to violence has been attributed to discontent brought about by exploitation, hunger, and forced labor. “The Caiapó live an existence that is not agreeable to them,” said Pohl (1951:361), believing their “displeasure with their supervisors, the scarcity that many times leaves them hungry, [and] the hard labors to which they are subjected in the fields are the causes of their
diminution and weariness.” From such a perspective, Caiapó fleeing the aldeia or resorting to violence were committing acts of resistance. That resistance was involved in many of the flights from and acts of violence at the aldeias cannot be denied; but this too easily defines Caiapó actions without searching for deeper cultural motivations. We have already seen that many Caiapó practices continued at the aldeias, including homes built with traditional materials, food cooked in traditional earth ovens, and even traditional rituals and healing practices. It was the same with flights and violence: these, at times, represented the continuation of Caiapó culture within the context of the aldeia, especially the persistence of inter-village travel, trekking for resources, and the use of violent acts to accumulate prestige and communicate with outsiders. But, because the aldeias were viewed spaces wherein European culture and practices supposedly dominated, the Portuguese, Brazilians, and European visitors interpreted flights and violence as “inconstancy,” signs of discontent, and, ultimately, resistance.⁴₀

**Caiapó “Flights”**

In the early years of the pacification, there was a lot of movement of people, things, and information between Portuguese settlements, the aldeia at Maria I, and Caiapó villages in the sertões. We have seen that small groups of Caiapó traveled to Vila Boa and investigated Maria I before returning to the sertões with information and gifts; that hunting-and-gathering expeditions of men, women, and children passed through Vila Boa and Maria I, and; that parties of warriors roamed the countryside committing acts of violence.⁴¹ There was little the Portuguese could do to stop the Caiapó peregrinations, especially once the troops stationed at Maria I were overwhelmed, so this movement was tacitly accepted. Indeed, in some cases, it was actively promoted. The free passage of Caiapó to the sertões served Portuguese
interest by attracting new arrivals, thus furthering the pacification, and, at the same time, allowed the more truculent warriors to slip away instead of fighting the pedestres. This permissive attitude passed in a few years. Eventually, the Caiapó were expected to stay put, but, because the government lacked the manpower to keep the Indians in one place, it had to accept some ebb and flow of people to and from the sertões.

We can gleam some idea of the extent of this movement from the encounters a survey team had while exploring the Claro and Pilões Rivers in 1804–1805 (Anonymous 1918, vol. 84:213–214). At one point, the team encountered a dilapidated, though recently occupied, “village,” which their Caiapó guide, a man named Lourenço Manoel, claimed to be “familiar with” and identified as a temporary camp the Caiapó used while traveling. The Caiapó were very active in the region. Lourenço Manoel, the day before encountering the abandoned camp, had acquired fresh fish from friendly Indians fishing in a stream. The team also encountered signs of Caiapó passing through the region, including a large trail that a guide, who had many years experience tracking, probably Manoel, judged to be the work of perhaps 80 individuals (Anonymous 1918, vol. 84:204–205). This discovery frightened the surveyors who, because they feared an ambush, slept with their arms close at hand and posted guards that night. The survey team’s encounters indicate that, even after 25 years, aldeia Caiapó headed into the sertões to travel, hunt, and fish. Lourenço Manoel, an inhabitant of the Goiás aldeias, admitted he was familiar with the old camp the surveyors had stumbled across. The survey team noted that the Caiapó trails passed through regions rich in game, fish, and even fruit trees. Presumably, knowledge of these camps and the trails leading to them
was widespread at the aldeia and exploited by individuals and small groups leaving the aldeia to travel visit relatives in distant villages and exploit forest resources.

The exploitation of resources helps explain why the survey team discovered signs of Caiapó moving through the sertões of the Claro River. At the time, it was common to assume Indians moving through the sertões were setting off to attack settlements; indeed, the survey team assumed the passing Caiapó were hostiles, so they traveled warily, posted guards, and slept uneasily. But it was extremely unlikely that they had come across evidence of a Caiapó war party, since 80 Caiapó would have been an extremely large war party at the time, and the surveyors, after all, were not attacked. More probably, the Caiapó were trekking. Trekking was (and is) a typical Gê practice wherein the inhabitants of a village split up to travel in small family groups through the sertões, usually to exploit specific resources (Werner 1983). Trekkers moved slowly. They traveled a short distance each day, built small expedient shelters and camps, and paused to hunt and gather. A trekking expedition could travel great distance before returning to the village from which it had begun. Such treks could last a long time: for example, the modern Xavante trekked for several weeks or even months at a time (Maybury-Lewis 1974:52). The Caiapó, because of their heavier reliance on horticulture, probably did not trek for as long as the Xavante. Caiapó treks probably lasted about as long as Paraná treks, which lasted around three weeks, and, like their descendants, were directed toward acquiring resources (cf. Heelas 1979:49). In the case at hand, the evidence points to a group of trekking Caiapó: the survey team encountered trails and camps, evidence of large numbers of passing Caiapó, and sertões rich in game, fruit trees, and other resources.
That small groups of aldeia Caiapó trekked to the Claro and Pilões to hunt and fish is important to our discussion of “flights.” Many so-called “fugitives” from the aldeias were guilty of nothing more than practicing a traditional, though misunderstood, pattern of resource exploitation and peripatetic settlement. This makes it problematic to understand the movement of people off the aldeia solely in terms of “flights” brought about by discontent and harsh treatment. In many cases, one cannot discern whether a group of Caiapó “fled” from the aldeia, or left to hunt, fish, and gather, or to visit family members in another village, or to acquire a specific resource unavailable at Maria I and Mossâmedes. For example, in December of 1829, Manoel da Cunha was ordered to investigate the reasons two chiefs, Joaquim and Fabiano, had led their followers from the aldeia.\[42\] These chiefs and their followers had returned to the aldeia, and, though the Brazilians considered them “fugitives,” Joaquim and Fabiano may have been trekking group and never intended to flee the aldeia. (Unfortunately, the reasons these chiefs gave for leaving the aldeia appear not to have survived.) In March of 1830, a Caiapó woman named Victoria Maria was captured after fleeing from Mossâmedes aldeia.\[43\] The authorities ordered her imprisoned until she could be returned. Although we do not know the reason this woman left the aldeia, she may have been simply traveling. A chief named Miguel Impocaro led his family and followers from the Mossâmedes aldeia in late 1831—an act that precipitated the final abandonment of the aldeia—but this was not the first time this chief had left the aldeia.\[44\] Authorities were aware that Miguel had left the aldeia on previous occasions. Some of these “flights” were probably treks. And there is a strong possibility, discussed more fully in the next
chapter, that many of the Caiapó whom Damiana da Cunha returned to the aldeias were merely trekking.

There were, of course, instances of Caiapó abandoning the aldeia and moving into the sertões because of discontent. For example, many Caiapó fled the aldeia after Tristão da Cunha Menezes imprisoned one of their chiefs. In 1810, João Ferreira de Oliveira Bueno (1856:188), a missionary, encountered aldeia fugitives on the Paraná River. These Caiapó claimed they had abandoned the Goiás aldeias because they had not received sufficient food and clothing while living there. In September of 1829, after being punished for eating dirt, two young Caiapó fled. Both were later captured and returned to their parents. And, in early 1832, shortly after most of the Caiapó had fled from the Mossâmedes aldeia, a food shortage propelled a few of the remaining stalwarts to flee. Later, the fugitives “refused to return” and told soldiers sent after them “that they were not captives and wished to live wherever they so desired.”

So there were many instances of Caiapó tiring of the existence they found at the aldeias and taking to the sertões. They fled because of mistreatment, hunger, and abuse—doubtlessly, discontent and resistance lay behind the decision of many Caiapó who headed for the sertões—but cultural factors, such as hunting, fishing, gathering, and trekking expeditions also factored into what was perceived of as “flights.”

Giraldin (1997:97) has suggested this inability to control the movement of the Caiapó was a weakness of the aldeias, one that greatly contributed to the withering away of the resident population. While true that the ability of the Caiapó to wander off without attracting the notice of administrators and soldiers reduced the aldeia populations, the limited ability to control the Indians’ movements actually provided for
the long-term survival of Maria I and Mossâmedes. The free movement of small groups of Caiapó meant hunting and gathering continued, which decreased reliance on the increasingly diminished harvests of the communal fields, and helped keep hunger at bay. And hunger was behind at least two of the major flights from the aldeia (see chapter 7). The movement of Caiapó also permitted a circulation of trade goods to those villages that remained in the sertões. This helped attracted individuals and small groups to the aldeia and reduced tensions caused by Caiapó raiding farms and ranches to pillage (see chapter 9). Perhaps most importantly, one of the principal complaints the Caiapó had about Mossâmedes was that, because of troops stationed there and the proximity to Vila Boa, they could no longer hunt, fish, and travel as they wished (Pohl 1951:361). This, more than the Caiapó ability to slink into the sertões beneath their guards’ noses, contributed to the increased discontent and final abandonment of the Mossâmedes aldeia.

Violence

To Saint-Hilaire (1975:65) and Pohl (1951:361), it appeared that the aldeia Caiapó were thoughtlessly exploited and violently punished by thuggish soldiers and administrators. The Frenchman and the Austrian were quick to point to the prominent position of the stocks in the plaza and the use of the palmatória as evidence of this. They criticized the excessive punishment and exploitation that, they believed, led to Caiapó discontent and flights. While the Caiapó did suffer corporal punishment—something they were unaccustomed to in the sertões—government authorities did not own a complete monopoly of force at the aldeias. Antagonizing the Caiapó was dangerous and could lead to violent reprisals, of which administrators and soldiers stationed at the aldeias were well aware. Pohl (1951:361) disparaged the “ignorant and
cruel" administrator of the Goiás aldeias, because he "so feared the Indians that he did not leave his home without drawing his sword." More ominously, the Austrian averred, "soldiers, with loaded muskets, had to stand guard" during Sunday Mass and festivals "because a priest was once murdered at the alter by the Indians." No evidence corroborates this tale of a murdered priest—Saint-Hilaire, for one, did not mention it; and such a story would have caught his attention—but the mere fact it was told to a European visitor speaks to the great fear Caiapó violence still engendered. Clearly, the occasional outburst of violence of the sort that had once plagued Maria I had by no means ceased in the early nineteenth century, and administrators and soldiers regarded the Caiapó with suspicion and went about their duties armed.

Caiapó violence, however, was not a product of the Indians’ "inconstancy" or, as some historians (e.g., Ataídes 1998:90–81) have seen it, mere "resistance" to oppression. Violence was the expression of culture and often a means of communication. 49 Saint-Hilaire (1975:69) recorded that "these Indians frequently fight with one another, but never because of women." A comment that indicates violence had an important role in dispute resolution and intra-ethnic relations at the aldeia. Violence was also means of inter-cultural communication: there were cultural messages and meanings—not mindless barbarism, as some chroniclers would have us believe—in the destructive raids and the killing of women and children. Such communication was most forcefully seen when Governor Tristão da Cunha Menezes failed to supply the Maria I with sufficient quantities of food and goods. The aldeia Caiapó communicated their displeasure through violence, as one terrified soldier put it: “they say that all the
presents that we give to them are out of fear of them." In the sertões or at the aldeia, violence was culturally important to the Caiapó.

Although intimidation, bravado, and violence—elements of Caiapó war—had been brought to the aldeia—a space ostensibly populated by a pacified and allied people—to communicate displeasure, provoke fear, and procure goods, the early disturbances were successfully quelled by Governor Tristão da Cunha Menezes. The governor’s later attempts to assert control over the Caiapó were not as successful, and violence continued to play a prominent role in his interaction with the Caiapó. At some point—we do not know exactly when—the governor faced a serious problem from a demanding Caiapó chief. This chief traveled to Vila Boa to meet with the governor, but Tristão da Cunha Menezes became so angered during the interview that he ordered the Caiapó leader slapped in irons and imprisoned. The chief’s followers responded by fleeing from the aldeia. Suddenly, the governor faced the frightening prospect of Caiapó raids, so he ordered the imprisoned chief released, persuaded him to return his followers to the aldeia, and permitted the formerly imprisoned chief to return to the sertões. The chief was good to his word and returned his followers from the sertões: but only to launch a devastating raid that “did not leave stone on stone and killed pigs, livestock, and fowl and all that [they] found and [they] destroyed plantations and reduced everything to desolation.” This was more than a mere act of resistance. The raid was not conducted against a randomly chosen and isolated homestead or a convoy of mules carrying goods. Rather, using knowledge acquired from the aldeia, the Caiapó singled out and destroyed one of the governor’s estates, adapting their raiding tactics to destroy a symbol of the governor’s status. They knew that raiding the estate and
destroying the governor’s belongings underscored their great displeasure, communicated a powerful message, and avenged their wronged chief’s imprisonment.

Subsequent governors and presidents of Goiás attempted to avoid Tristão da Cunha Menezes’s mistake of antagonizing the aldeia Caiapó, especially the chiefs. For example, in 1822, a chief and several other Caiapó brought a complaint against a pedestre, Manoel Joaquim, for the use of excessive and violent punishments. Their complaint led this soldier’s removal from the aldeia and a reproof to the administrator that it was best for the chiefs to punish recalcitrant or disobedient followers. Similarly, in 1827, Caiapó chiefs complained of suffering numerous “violences and vexations” at the hands of the aldeia administrator. Their complaints resulted in the administrator being dismissed. In these examples, officials listened to Caiapó chiefs and avoided a violent response by removing the offending individuals.

Raiding also continued at the aldeia. We have already seen how the Caiapó left the aldeia to attack nearby farms and ranches in the early 1780s. These attacks were committed boldly and with no attempt to hide the perpetrators’ identities. Indeed, with such attacks, chiefs and warriors showed their followers and rivals that they were unafraid of the Portuguese and willing to confront them, thus acquiring prestige and status. Later, raids were conducted less boldly, though it was common knowledge that the aldeia Caiapó raided. Traveling the road from Goiás to the Pilões in 1823, Cunha Matos (2004:264) warned that “the Caiapó Indians appear sometimes on this road, and one should take precautions on their account. The domestic Indians of the aldeia at São José also conduct various raids disguised as wild heathen: they never kill but only rob what they find poorly guarded.” The stealing of items and avoidance of slaughters
was a judicious modification of the previous raiding behavior of the Caiapó: it reduced the chance of a violent retribution, as settlers were less likely to settle scores over stolen goods than murdered women, children, and slaves. And raiders took the added precaution of obfuscating their identities by pretending to be so-called “wild heathen,” not aldeia residents. That the aldeia Caiapó were responsible for such attacks was usually discovered by the sudden and unexplained appearance of stolen goods (see chapter 9). From what we can tell, they suffered little retribution.

Violence played an important cultural role in the aldeias of Maria I and São José de Mossâmedes. In the sertões, violence had been a tool the Caiapó employed in interacting among themselves and with others. It was a means of acquiring prestige, communicating, and capturing goods. Violence was brought to the aldeia, despite the Portuguese belief that the Caiapó were “pacified,” and it proved remarkably resilient and adaptable to the exigencies of the frontier. This innovative application and adaptation of Caiapó traditions within the context of the aldeia made the Caiapó formidable foes, as Governor Tristão da Cunha and travelers to the Pilões discovered to their dismay. Chiefs and warriors used their knowledge of their erstwhile enemies’ weakness to raid, communicate displeasure, and acquire goods, much as they had done in the sertões; but the messages they wished to convey were more effectively delivered and the ability to divert catastrophic retaliation was more sharply honed because of what they had learned.

**Conclusion**

When the Caiapó began arriving at Vila Boa and Maria I, they entered a new phase in their history, one that saw many of their native traditions mix and mingle with those of the Portuguese and Brazilians to form a hybrid “mission culture.” The Caiapó
mission culture that evolved—and continued to evolve—at the aldeias permitted the Caiapó to interact and negotiate with the frontier in ways that had not been possible before the pacification.

The Caiapó remained a physically impressive people—the men tall and lean; the women strong and active—whose health, despite the occasional and devastating epidemic and endemic venereal diseases, compared favorably to that of their sickly Brazilian neighbors. At first glance, the Mossâmedes aldeia appears to have been an indigenous place, especially in the writings of Saint-Hilaire and Pohl, as the majority of Caiapó lived apart from the Brazilians, built traditional multi-family houses, cooked in earth ovens, slept on ground mats, plaited their “curiously manufactured” baskets, painted their bodies in annatto and genipap, wore native “jewelry” and amulets, raced log races, danced in nocturnal ceremonies, and preferred hunting and fishing to laboring in communal fields or working the looms.

There had been significant changes. Some were subtle. Religious rituals, ceremonies, and dances—which were strikingly exotic to the European visitors—had mixed aspects of the native cosmologies and spiritual beliefs with Catholicism and its complex liturgical calendar. New forms of leadership had emerged: traditional chiefs governed the aldeia Caiapó, but they were ranked into a hierarchy, and their powers expanded to include punishing followers. Other changes were less subtle. The aldeia Caiapó had abandoned some forms of body modification, lip disks and earplugs were absent, and men and women had adopted loincloths and simple dresses. Caiapó men worked as herdsmen and constructed and rowed canoes on the Araguaia. The great slaughters of slaves and pillaging of mule trains were replaced by stealthy raids and an
avoidance of murder. And there were greater numbers of mixed-descent Caiapó and speakers of Portuguese. Many of these Caiapó were línguas, intermediaries who could became powerful leaders, and it was they who best embodied the mixing of native and European traditions in the mission culture of the Goiás aldeias. But these transformations came at a terrible price: there were epidemics, abuse, hunger, and much misery at the aldeias. Yet, for all the negatives, the Caiapó lived at Maria I and Mossâmedes, and, soon after the later aldeia was abandoned, many of its former inhabitants on state-supported aldeias in Mato Grosso and the Triângulo Mineiro.

Caiapó mission culture spread widely and affected villages throughout the sertões. Only the most remote Caiapó, such as those pushing into the sertões north of Cuiabá, and whom would one day become the known as the Kreen-Akrore, were unaffected. In the following chapters, we shall see the profound influence of “mission culture” on the breadth of Caiapó territory. More and more Caiapó worked as servants, rowers, herds, and agricultural workers as the nineteenth century progressed. And, by the first decade of the twentieth century, many Caiapó were indistinguishable from the rural poor of Brazil, their “mission culture” had become Brazilian culture.

1 These plans are found in Chaim (1983:228-228) and Karasch (1992b:399).
2 These plans are found in Karasch (1992:403).
3 See, MB Pct 418 (1810-1820), f. 75. Everything movable, including the doors and gates of the buildings, the roofing tiles, along with any food, goods and iron tools were ordered removed from Maria I and transported to São José de Mossâmedes in 1813. Only the support posts and the wood siding of the two buildings and the barn were supposed to be left behind.
4 IHGB-CU 1.2.8.
5 Archaeology will eventually resolve the shape of the Caiapó village. This random pattern is inexplicable. In all other cases were a description of a Caiapó villages was recorded, it was described as circular in form (see chapters 8 and 9). And the modern Panará live in circular villages, see e.g., Heelas (1979), Schwartzman (1988), and Ewart (2000). The circular village spatial organization was likely employed at São José de Mossâmedes, especially since the Caiapó shunned the pre-fabricated buildings and chose to build their homes apart from the aldeia. Previously, they had built a circular village at Maria I, and it follows that they would do so at São José de Mossâmedes. Similarly, neither Pohl nor Saint-Hilaire recorded the presence of a men’s house at São José de Mossâmedes, but this feature appears frequently in other contemporary descriptions (see chapter 8 and 9).
Governor Miguel Lino de Moraes reported that João Rósario de Nascimento, a master carpenter, was charged with

earplugs. Later descriptions of Caiapó dances (e.g., Kupfer 1870) resemble, if vaguely, those of Saint-Hilaire. He correctly pointed out that Pohl's descriptions were secondhand information, and he argued that Saint-Hilaire's descriptions of dances were too vague and readily match dances practiced by a number of other groups. There is some truth to this critique. Pohl did not witness log races during his stay, but drew his information from the pedestres and Portuguese-speaking Caiapó; they certainly had witnessed these ceremonies and much of what they told him matches what a later description of the Caiapó at Santana do Paraná, for example, the repetition of successful raids and hunts, the burial of the dead personal possessions. Similarly, considering the detail of Saint-Hilaire's observations, there is no reason to doubt the veracity of the dances he described; however, what Saint-Hilaire witnessed was removed from any ritual component, performed to satisfy the curiosity of a visitor, and performed without the participation of

women; the dances he witnessed represented elements of larger rituals practiced by the Caiapó living at São José de Mossâmedes. Later descriptions of Caiapó dances (e.g., Kupfer 1870) resemble, if vaguely, those of Saint-Hilaire and Pohl.

AHEGO Livro 155 (1828-1830), f. 63v. This procession initiates Holy Week in April.

AN Cod 807, vol. 15 f. 95v.

Saint-Hilaire (1975:64) recorded a blacksmith among the pedestres and found a carpenter at São José de Mossâmedes; however, neither individual appears to have been Caiapó. In 1827, two masons and a carpenter were ordered to the aldeia to repair the dilapidated buildings, see MB Pct 422 (1815-1828), f. 118v. That same year, Governor Miguel Lino de Moraes reported that João Rósario de Nascimento, a master carpenter, was charged with

to have meant the incredibly large lip disks and earplugs used by some peoples, for instance, those commonly depicted in nineteenth-century engravings of the Botocudo of Minas Gerais. Interestingly, Schwartzman (1988:176) observed that the Panará had also abandoned wearing lip plugs in the Xingu.

Earplugs of varying types are very common among Brazilian Indians, including Gê speakers. Among the Panará, earplugs are very elaborate and highly decorated ornaments (Schwartzman 1988:174). They are made of a long shaft of wood wrapped in colored cotton and connected to an inverted freshwater muscle shell, such that the pearly side of the shell faces outwards. Men and women wear earplugs, which do not connote rank. The piercing of the ears for these ornaments is an important ceremony and rite-of-passage, commonly performed on boys of five or six years of age: a male elder pierces the ears and “a narrow piece of wood, roughly the thickness of a pencil” is inserted into the hole to keep the wound open (Schwartzman 1988:172-173). This author has seen similar “pencils” worn in the ears of Indians (probably Xavante) traveling via the Brazilian interior. The plugs Pohl witnessed Damiana wearing likely resembled these. It is unlikely that these plugs connoted rank, as Pohl suggested. More likely, the Caiapó had continued wearing earplugs but, in the context of the aldeia, wore them only during rituals or dances. At other times, little plugs, like Damiana’s, were worn or nothing at all. This would explain why neither Saint-Hilaire nor Pohl mentioned the use of earplugs among the Caiapó, since both men visited the aldeia when little ceremonial activity was occurring. Pohl probably saw Damiana wearing the earplugs and assumed these were a sign of rank, which he contrasted with the practice of wearing earplugs among the Botocudo (Gê-speaking peoples of Minas Gerais). Among the Botocudo, earplugs, according to Pohl, did not connote rank. But Botocudo earplugs were much larger, like their batoque lip plugs, and fit within widely stretched earlobes; they were very distinct and very noticeable. In contrast, the Caiapó perforations were much smaller, since they only had to accommodate the relatively thin shaft of an earplug, and not as noticeable. Conceivably, Pohl did not notice the Caiapó had pierced ears. Damiana appears to have gone about without her earplugs, since Saint-Hilaire, who briefly described her appearance, did not mention her wearing them. He was a keen-eyed observer and would likely have mentioned something like earplugs and their connotation of rank if she had worn them.

Interestingly, Schwartzman (1988:282-283) identified this as one of the more important cultural characteristics linking the Caiapó to the Panará, as the use of a small bow and arrow in bloodletting is a practice common to the Panará today (Heelas 1979:131). The bow and arrow is called a swoka and is used to treat blood contamination or excess blood in the body, which, the Panará believe, causes aches, pains, and illness.

Schwartzman (1988:283) cast doubt on the rituals and dancing described by Pohl and Saint-Hilaire. He correctly pointed out that Pohl’s descriptions were secondhand information, and he argued that Saint-Hilaire’s descriptions of dances were too vague and readily match dances practiced by a number of other groups. There is some truth to this critique. Pohl did not witness log races during his stay, but drew his information from the pedestres and Portuguese-speaking Caiapó; they certainly had witnessed these ceremonies and much of what they told him matches what a later description of the Caiapó at Santana do Paraná, for example, the repetition of successful raids and hunts, the burial of the dead personal possessions. Similarly, considering the detail of Saint-Hilaire’s observations, there is no reason to doubt the veracity of the dances he described; however, what Saint-Hilaire witnessed was removed from any ritual component, performed to satisfy the curiosity of a visitor, and performed without the participation of women; the dances he witnessed represented elements of larger rituals practiced by the Caiapó living at São José de Mossâmedes. Later descriptions of Caiapó dances (e.g., Kupfer 1870) resemble, if vaguely, those of Saint-Hilaire and Pohl.

AHEGO Livro 155 (1828-1830), f. 63v. This procession initiates Holy Week in April.

AN Cod 807, vol. 15 f. 95v.

Saint-Hilaire (1975:64) recorded a blacksmith among the pedestres and found a carpenter at São José de Mossâmedes; however, neither individual appears to have been Caiapó. In 1827, two masons and a carpenter were ordered to the aldeia to repair the dilapidated buildings, see MB Pct 422 (1815-1828), f. 118v. That same year, Governor Miguel Lino de Moraes reported that João Rósario de Nascimento, a master carpenter, was charged with

earplugs. Later descriptions of Caiapó dances (e.g., Kupfer 1870) resemble, if vaguely, those of Saint-Hilaire. He correctly pointed out that Pohl's descriptions were secondhand information, and he argued that Saint-Hilaire's descriptions of dances were too vague and readily match dances practiced by a number of other groups. There is some truth to this critique. Pohl did not witness log races during his stay, but drew his information from the pedestres and Portuguese-speaking Caiapó; they certainly had witnessed these ceremonies and much of what they told him matches what a later description of the Caiapó at Santana do Paraná, for example, the repetition of successful raids and hunts, the burial of the dead personal possessions. Similarly, considering the detail of Saint-Hilaire’s observations, there is no reason to doubt the veracity of the dances he described; however, what Saint-Hilaire witnessed was removed from any ritual component, performed to satisfy the curiosity of a visitor, and performed without the participation of women; the dances he witnessed represented elements of larger rituals practiced by the Caiapó living at São José de Mossâmedes. Later descriptions of Caiapó dances (e.g., Kupfer 1870) resemble, if vaguely, those of Saint-Hilaire and Pohl.

AHEGO Livro 155 (1828-1830), f. 63v. This procession initiates Holy Week in April.

AN Cod 807, vol. 15 f. 95v.

Saint-Hilaire (1975:64) recorded a blacksmith among the pedestres and found a carpenter at São José de Mossâmedes; however, neither individual appears to have been Caiapó. In 1827, two masons and a carpenter were ordered to the aldeia to repair the dilapidated buildings, see MB Pct 422 (1815-1828), f. 118v. That same year, Governor Miguel Lino de Moraes reported that João Rósario de Nascimento, a master carpenter, was charged with
teaching two Caiapó his trade, which suggests no Caiapó were capable of performing these tasks, see AHEGO Livro 148 (1826-1828), f. 46v.

18 See e.g. AHEGO Livro 16 f. 20v.

19 AHEGO Livro 155 (1828-1830), f. 48.

20 AHEGO Livro 45 (1804-1809), f. 44v-45, 49, 51v.

21 AHEGO Livro 155 (1828-1830), f. 44. Much of this information matches what is known ethnographically about Gê-speaking societies generally (see e.g., Maybury-Lewis) and the Panará specifically (e.g., Ewart 2000).

22 AHEGO Livro 155 (1828-1830), f. 44. AHEGO Livro 148 (1826-1828), f. 41.

23 See e.g., IHGB Lata 397, pasta 2.

24 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023.

25 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 33, D. 2076 and AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 35, D. 2131.

26 Alencastre ascribed these names to caciques arriving in 1781, when the two caciques actually arrived in September of 1782.

27 AHEGO Livro 155 (1828-1830), f. 44.

28 AHEGO Livro 73 (1820-1822), f. 28v.

29 AHEGO Livro 85 (1820-1840), f. 50v; IHGB Lata 397, pasta 2.

30 AHEGO Livro 73 (1820-1822), f. 28. AHEGO Livro 73 (1820-1822), f. 28v.

31 AHEGO Livro 148 (1826-1828), f. 41.

32 AHEGO Livro 161 (1829-1834), f. 9v; AHEGO Livro 85 (1820-1840), f. 45-45v.

33 See e.g., IHGB Lata 397, pasta 2.

34 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 32, D. 2019; AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 33, D. 2076.

35 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 33, D. 2131.

36 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023.

37 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023.

38 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023.

39 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 33, D. 2076.

40 On the over use of resistance as an analytical tool, see Brown (1996).

41 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 35 D. 2131; IHGB Lata 397, pasta 2.

42 AHEGO Livro 161 (1829-1834), f. 9v.

43 AHEGO Livro 155 (1828-1830), f. 63-64.

44 AHEGO Livro 85 (1820-1840), f. 45; Matutina Meyapontense (hereafter, MM) 9-2-1832.

45 IHGB Lata 397, pasta 2.

46 AHEGO Livro 155 (1828-1830), f. 48.

47 AHEGO Livro 85 (1820-1840), f. 47v.

48 MM 5-8-1833.

49 In the Peixoto de Azevedo, violence was part of Panará politics, an expression of masculine status and values, and a means of social control, see Heelas (1979:61).

50 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 35, D. 2131.

51 IHGB Lata 397, pasta 2.

52 These were likely the Caiapó from the Grande River in São Paulo.

53 IHGB Lata 397, pasta 2.

54 AHEGO Livro 73 (1820-1822), f. 28.

55 AHEGO Livro 73 (1820-1822), f. 28v.

56 AHEGO Livro 148 (1826-1828), f. 41.
CHAPTER 7
DAMIANA AND MANOEL DA CUNHA

Introduction

In 1830, the president of Goiás, Miguel Lino de Moraes, was deeply worried. A horde of Caiapó from Mato Grosso had crossed the Araguaia River, and, as they moved through the hinterlands of Goiás, the flames of their campfires could be seen in the night. Warriors skulked around isolated settlements and terrified local settlers. These were not dispirited or defeated Caiapó: they had attacked mule trains, plundered goods, committed murders, and even defeated a bandeira dispatched to punish them in Mato Grosso. It was only when two large bandeiras plunged into the backlands to attack them that the Caiapó had fled into Goiás. There had been no conflicts, yet. But the specter of war with the formidable Caiapó had reappeared, and a panic, akin to those of the past century, broke out as word spread: fear emptied the roads and rivers of commercial traffic, fields lay fallow, herds went feral, and the tenuous economic prosperity of the province was threatened. There were calls for succor, demands for arms, and a clamor for action—and the president had every reason to be worried about renewed hostilities.

To assuage the fear, avoid war, and pacify the Caiapó, the president turned to a middle-aged woman, a Caiapó Indian named Damiana da Cunha. This was not the first time the rulers of Goiás had sought her aid. On numerous occasions, Damiana had plunged into the sertões and peacefully returned with Caiapó. The president summoned this quiet and unassuming woman—the wife of a military officer, and sister of the acting director at Mossâmedes—to Vila Boa with high expectations: Damiana had always succeeded in avoiding hostilities; she had always returned with Caiapó from the
sertões. Damiana, of all the people in Goiás, could pacify the Caiapó from Mato Grosso, and without the need for arms.

Because of her work in the sertões, Damiana da Cunha became famous. Nineteenth-century residents, politicians, and chroniclers of Goiás lauded Damiana and wove long-winded encomium to the noble birth and Christian piety that propelled her into the sertões:

The granddaughter of a chief, as they named her, [Damiana] understood her mission; her faith guided her to the difficult sertões, opening the road to the Indian villages, and the Caiapó, until then indomitable and haughty in their savage liberty, bowed before the sympathetic words, full of faith and love, of hope and charity, from a woman esteemed by the blood that flowed in her veins. [Norberto 1861:529]

Damiana, to such chroniclers, was much like the intrepid catechists and saints who plunged into the heathen wilds of the Old World or the missionaries and martyrs who suffered among the Brazilian Indians. In the twentieth century, historians lauded Damiana's pacifism and leadership and praised the ways she confounded expectations of women in the chauvinistic world of nineteenth-century Brazil (e.g., Karasch 1981; Brito 1982). More recently, Damiana has become controversial: she has been condemned as a “passive” agent of colonialism (Ataídes 1998:82–85). Nonetheless, Damiana da Cunha remains a local hero in the regional hagiography of Goiás. She is celebrated alongside Bartholomeu Bueno da Silva, António Pires de Campos—men who fought and slaved her people—and the other conquerors and discoverers of the mines. There is a street named after Damiana in Goiás Velho; and the locals proudly regale visitors with tales of her bold spirit, pious feats of catechism, and audacious voyages into the sertões.
Despite all that has been written about her, Damiana da Cunha remains a complex and, in many ways, elusive historical figure. Very little was ever recorded about her during her life, and much of what we know appears apocryphal; indeed, much of her written biography appears to have been derived from older oral folk traditions that were recorded and preserved by the nineteenth-century chroniclers of Goiás. We know that she was a product of the Caiapó aldeias, a língua who occupied a powerful position between the worlds of the Caiapó of the sertões, the Caiapó of the aldeias, and the frontier society of Goiás. Unfortunately, Damiana’s life has yet to be subjected to rigorous analysis, so much of what we know about her remains little more than old folk traditions reinterpreted by modern analysis and new perspectives. But she was certainly more complex than a saintly catechist, whom the nineteenth-century historians lauded, or the willful dupe of government oppression and colonialism, whom recent historians have deconstructed.

The most complete investigation of Damiana’s life is found in Karasch’s (1981) brief biography, an admirable work that follows the traditional narrative of the early chroniclers. Accordingly, Damiana was among the first 36 Caiapó sent by chief Angraí-oxá to Vila Boa in 1780. She was an infant, carried by her mother, the daughter of Angraí-oxá, and accompanied by her brother, a toddler. When Governor Cunha Menezes had the Caiapó children baptized, he adopted Angraí-oxá’s grandchildren as his godchildren and christened them Damiana and Manoel da Cunha. Then, while the other Caiapó settled at Maria I, Damiana and Manoel went to live with the governor to be educated, after which they disappear from history for almost 30 years. When we
again meet them, Damiana had become a Caiapó “chief,” a position she acquired because of her grandfather and her “Christian” education, and Manoel was a pedestre.

The early nineteenth century was a time of crisis for the Caiapó aldeias: there were crop failures and desertions; Maria I was extinguished, while São José de Mossâmedes seemed perpetually on the verge of total abandonment. Each time the end appeared nigh, the rulers of Goiás called upon Damiana: she and a small retinue of aldeia Caiapó valiantly pushed into the sertões, located Caiapó, and returned them to the aldeias. The first expedition happened in 1808. Damiana returned from the Araguaia with around 70 Caiapó. Then, in 1819, Damiana again voyaged to the Araguaia and returned with another 70 Caiapó. In 1821, there was another expedition, and more Caiapó returned to Mossâmedes. In 1828, Damiana traveled to Camapuã, and more than 100 Caiapó returned with her. Despite repeated flights and its near total abandonment, the faltering Mossâmedes aldeia was sustained by Damiana’s heroic efforts.

In 1830, Caiapó from Mato Grosso unexpectedly arrived at the headwaters of the Araguaia. There was talk of war, which Goiás had not suffered for almost 50 years, and the president reached out to Damiana to save the province—and the Caiapó—from a disastrous, costly, and unnecessary conflict. Damiana agreed and set off on an eight-month expedition, accompanied by her soldier-husband Manoel Pereira da Cruz—her second husband; the first was José Luís Pereira, the hero of the pacification—and two aldeia Caiapó, José and Luiza. Unlike her previous missions, this attempt ended unsuccessfully: only a few Caiapó returned; worse, Damiana had fallen ill with a
debilitating fever. She died after arriving at Mossâmedes, and, without her leadership, the aldeia was soon abandoned.

It is no surprise that, considering her biography, Damiana became a folk hero in Goiás. Here was a woman—an Indian woman no less—who twice married military officers and repeatedly plunged into dangerous sertões—like a bandeirante of yore—to face the formidable black-painted Caiapó; and she died tragically. Told in this fashion, Damiana’s biography was stirring, full of romance, and notably filled with derring-do. Yet, it tells us very little about Damiana or Manoel. We learn almost nothing about the siblings, the Mossâmedes aldeia, or the Caiapó; and much of what we do learn is assumed. For example, it is assumed that Damiana inherited her rank from her grandfather, Angraí-oxá, an interpretation derived from the romantic emphasis the early chroniclers placed on her birth; but inheriting status from one’s parents was something the Portuguese and Brazilians did, not the Caiapó. Another assumption: Damiana was a chief. She was almost certainly not a chief, despite chroniclers naming her as such; rather, she was a powerful and “chiefly” língua, an intermediary. Apart from the numbers of Caiapó returning with her, Damiana’s missions are treated as similar events: the assumption being that she approached un-contacted and potentially hostile Caiapó in the sertões; in fact, she preferred to work among so-called “fugitives,” Caiapó who had left the aldeias for various reasons. The traditional narrative also ignores Damiana’s brother, Manoel, who was a respected pedestre and eventually rose through the ranks to become the interim director of the Mossâmedes aldeia. His role in Damiana’s career has been downplayed, because authorities in Vila Boa accused him of corruption. Although such weaknesses in Damiana’s biography originated in the
nineteenth century, when few chroniclers and historians would have thought of finding in her anything other than a pious and spirited chief and missionary who saved frontier settlements from Caiapó aggression, we should not accept the traditional narrative without critical reflection and analysis.

Damiana and Manoel were part of an aldeia context poorly understood, even by their contemporaries, and the most prominent individuals of the Caiapó mission culture that evolved in Goiás. They were cultural “hybrids,” línguas straddling the Europeans and Indigenous cultures on the frontier, and the products of the information exchange occurring at the aldeias: they spoke Portuguese and their native Caiapó language; they were versed in the culture of both their own people and the frontier settlements; and they were strategically placed to exploit the opportunities offered by both cultures. Their success and leadership was a joint effort that, in many ways, eclipsed the power of the traditional Caiapó chiefs. Although important leaders, Damiana and Manoel were not Caiapó “chiefs” in the traditional sense: the killing of enemies, acquisition and distribution of booty, and oratory—a traditional chief’s forte—were not their paths to power. They were “chieflly” línguas, intermediaries and cultural interpreters, whose power originated with political and family connections at the aldeias, was based on their status as go-betweens mediating between cultures and controlling the flow of people, information, and goods.

This chapter attempts to develop a more satisfying biography of these remarkable siblings. It begins with the Caiapó pacification in 1780 and ends in 1832, the year that the Caiapó finally and irrevocably abandoned São José de Mossâmedes—the rotting
edifice that once seduced the Caiapó from the sertões had finally released its grasp on the them—after Damiana had died and Manoel was imprisoned.

**Damiana and Manoel**

The origins of Damiana and Manoel da Cunha’s power lay in the early days of the Caiapó pacification and the aldeia at Maria I. According to tradition, Damiana and Manoel were among the first Caiapó children to arrive in Vila Boa. As the grandchildren of the powerful chief Angraí-oxá, they had been sent with their mother, the chief’s daughter, to accompany Romexi on his voyage to Vila Boa. There is a whiff of apocrypha to this biographic detail, as neither the governor nor Alencastre (1864:346), whose writings were the most complete of the early nineteenth-century chroniclers, mentioned a chief’s daughter or her children among the original 36 Caiapó. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that Governor Menezes da Cunha identified Damiana and Manoel’s relatives as important individuals: he became their godfather, granted them the surname “da Cunha,” and took them to live in his household. Years later, Saint-Hilaire (1975:72) named Damiana the “granddaughter” of a chief, and Pohl (1951:361) thought her “a chief’s daughter.” So Damiana and Manoel were related to chiefs, we just do not know if their grandfather was chief Angraí-oxá. We have already seen how the chroniclers manipulated the names Romexi and Angraí-oxá, and, unfortunately, it will remain impossible to chart Damiana and Manoel’s kin, much less figure out when they arrived, until their baptismal records are found. The relationship to Angraí-oxá, as told in the traditional narrative, appears to represent a romantic ideal—based on an older folk tradition—added by later chroniclers who wished to see Damiana descended from a noble line of the aldeia principal, a chief who had accepted peace and found virtue in the governor’s promises and life at Maria I.
While most of the other Caiapó moved to Maria I, Damiana and Manoel remained in Vila Boa to be instructed in Catholicism, the Portuguese language, and the proper roles for men and women in frontier society. The Portuguese had several intentions in educating the children of chiefs. First, they intended to create Christians and new vassals out of the children through education. These children would then rejoin the Caiapó, serve as chiefs, and aid in integrating their people into frontier society. In this, the Portuguese rather failed: they neither acquired nor created many Christians or loyal vassals from the Caiapó; and few of the chiefly children appear to have returned to the aldeia to become chiefs. Second, the Portuguese needed Caiapó capable of speaking Portuguese, since, in the early days of the pacification, communication was conducted solely through the línguas, whose numbers were limited. Here, the Portuguese found more success: the numbers of Portuguese-speaking línguas, as we have seen, did increase. Third, the children served as “hostages” to ensure the Caiapó chiefs were faithful in their promises (Karasch 1981:106). The Portuguese discovered this tactic did not work. The presence of Caiapó children in settlers’ homes did not influence the events at the aldeia: the Caiapó refused to obey orders, came and went as they saw fit, and often threatened and intimidated their so-called “conquerors” into providing them with gifts.

That the children’s captivity had little influence on events at the aldeia was, in part, because the Caiapó did not view them as hostages. Instead, they saw the children as a means to secure new, useful, and hitherto largely un-accessible information. We have seen that, unlike many other native peoples, the Caiapó almost never abducted the Portuguese and their slaves. But the capture of women and children was a common
way for native peoples to acquire information, new ways of producing items, and technology from their neighbors, so the Caiapó were at a disadvantage, especially in the use of firearms and language skills, compared to neighboring peoples, such as the Bororo and Acroá, who lived on aldeias and participated in bandeiras. Sending children, like Damiana and Manoel, to live with the governor enabled the Caiapó to access and acquire previously unavailable information. This proved to be a successful and enduring tactic, one that was used right up until the end of the nineteenth century.

Damiana and Manoel’s later leadership positions began with this early childhood training. Raised and educated among the elite in Vila Boa, they were more familiar with the governing class, had studied and learned their ways, and spoke better Portuguese. Other children sent to live in Portuguese households did not acquire the same education that the governor’s household afforded Damiana and Manoel. The Caiapó living on the aldeia did not experience anything akin to Damiana and Manoel’s immersion in frontier society, so the vast majority of them—and even many of the línguas—were at a distinct disadvantage when dealing with the government authorities or visitors, especially compared to Damiana and Manoel. The siblings were simply better prepared to act as intermediaries. Damiana, for example, charmed Saint-Hilaire (1975:72) with her grace and manners: she was “amiable and cheery,” her features “open and intelligent,” and she “spoke Portuguese fluently.” The delighted Frenchman declared Damiana “the person who warranted the highest regard of all the Caiapó at the aldeia,” a fitting tribute to the education Damiana had acquired at the governor’s house almost forty years before.
Education was not the only reason that Damiana and Manoel rose to the fore of the aldeia Caiapó. We have already seen that the Portuguese governed and distributed goods through the agency of chiefs, which had the effect of reifying the position of chief in certain individuals and families. Because the most amenable aldeia chiefs received preferential treatment and recognition, they and their families became more powerful vis-à-vis the other chiefs; this status and recognition was then passed to the children of these chiefs by administrators. This was precisely what happened to Damiana and Manoel. According to the sources, their grandfather and father were chiefs. Accepting that Pohl had not mistaken a father for a grandfather—a rather unlikely occurrence—it appears the position of chief ran in Damiana and Manoel’s family. This was a thoroughly foreign imposition of hereditary rank and leadership onto the more or less egalitarian Caiapó; but one important to Damiana and Manoel’s positions as leaders and intermediaries.

Coming from a “chiefly” family created opportunities for Damiana and Manoel that were unavailable to the other Caiapó. It was almost certainly through family connections that Damiana married into the governing apparatus of the aldeia, when, at approximately 14 years of age, she wed José Luís Pereira, the leader of the 1780 bandeira and first administrator of Maria I (Saint-Hilaire 1975:72; Karasch 1981:107). Practically nothing is known about this marriage, not even the date (if Damiana was an infant in 1780–1781, she must have married José Luís Pereira around 1794–1795), but, considering Damiana’s youth and her husband’s important status at aldeia, this marriage must have been her parents’ or grandparents’ work. The marriage shrewdly inserted Damiana’s family into the administration of the aldeia and, thus, in a privileged
position to influence important decisions, especially the allocation of goods. José Luís Pereira, after all, was not only the leader of the 1780 bandeira, but also the soldier in charge of the Caiapó at Maria I. This appears to have been a successful tactic and worth repeating, as Damiana married another soldier a few years after José Luís Pereira died. When Pohl (1951:361) visited Mossâmedes in 1819, she was preparing to marry Manoel Pereira da Cruz, a low ranking officer.

Damiana’s family had other connections to the soldiers stationed at the aldeia: her brother Manoel was a pedestre, and her niece, Luiza, married a pedestre named José António. Poorly equipped and poorly trained, the pedestres were responsible for ensuring the Caiapó remained at the aldeia, performed their labor obligations, and contributed to the communal gardens and the harvest. As an institution, the pedestres placed Caiapó in the power structure of the aldeia and offered a route to advancement; pedestres also earned a salary and food rations, however meager, and, thus, it was a means of accumulating some wealth. Manoel’s eventual rise to the position of interim aldeia director was due, in part, to his reputation as a reliable pedestre (He once discharged a difficult mission and pioneered a road from Vila Boa to Camapuã in 1825). There were enough benefits to being a pedestre that many Caiapó served (Saint-Hilaire 1975:69), but Damiana and Manoel appear to have gone to extra lengths to maintain family members in the pedestres. (Considering Damiana’s two marriages to officers, a niece’s marriage to a soldier, and Manoel’s position, it does not seem implausible to suppose there were other family members involved in the pedestres.)

Connections to the pedestres placed Damiana and Manoel’s family in a powerful position where they could influence the distribution of goods. The record of this is
extremely fragmentary, however, though what exists shows the siblings’ role in the allocation of resources. In March of 1821, for example, Damiana da Cunha was provided with large amounts of goods to supply Caiapó traveling to Vila Boa: this included three pounds of dried meat, eight rapaduras (“blocks of crude sugar”), and three half-varas (about half a meter) of tobacco.10 And Manoel, while he was interim director of the Mossâmedes aldeia, was responsible for acquiring food and goods for the Caiapó, including salt, tobacco, shovels, axes, sickles, hoes, drills, chisels, and quantities of cloth, clothing, and other small items.11 We also know that, during her later expeditions, Damiana carried goods to gift to the Caiapó.12 It is reasonable to assume she brought quantities of goods with her on the earlier expeditions as well, though we do not have a record of this. These goods were distributed to the Caiapó to convince them to return with her; undoubtedly, there were promises of more to come.

Control over such goods was extremely important. Manufactured goods had played an important role in attracting the Caiapó to Maria I, and access to them was one reason many Caiapó remained at the aldeia in its waning days. Saint-Hilaire (1975:72) appreciated this, observing the Caiapó living at Mossâmedes enjoyed a more secure supply of manufactured goods than those who lived in the sertões. And largesse was one of the economic pillars of effective leadership among the Caiapó. Similarly, ethnographers of the Panará have noted the importance of procuring and distributing goods in village politics (see e.g., Schwartzman 1988:325–361). And, more generally, the ability to establish political power through the distribution of goods was (and remains) common among Brazilian Indians, including Gê-speakers (see e.g., Fisher 2000). Much as José Luís Pereira had distributed gifts to the Caiapó and lure them into
peace, Damiana and Manoel used goods to woo Caiapó onto the ailing Goiás aldeias and keep them there. Goods reaching the aldeia were distributed according to how the siblings saw fit, and they surely rewarded those who chose to follow them.

The pedestres also provided a means of accumulating wealth through soldier's salaries. Indeed, Damiana and Manoel's family had accumulated wealth, even considerable wealth. Damiana, for example, owned an Angolan slave named Serafim (Brito 1982:88). He died in 1811, before Damiana had achieved her fame as intermediary, so he must have been acquired through family connections and the marriage to the aldeia administrator. Considering the importance of slaves on the frontier, Serafim added to Damiana's image as an elite and chiefly individual—and not just among the Caiapó.14

Although little was recorded of Damiana and Manoel's early life, the origins of their later prominence began in the heady days of the pacification and the founding of Maria I. Damiana and Manoel were educated in the governor's house and acquired a greater familiarity with the frontier society that had overrun their territory than that possessed by the other Caiapó. Their grandfather and father were recognized chiefs with influence in the administration and distribution of goods. And their family possessed important connections: Damiana wed the first administrator of the aldeia, and her second marriage was to an officer; Manoel was a respected pedestre; and their niece married a pedestre. Damiana and Manoel’s family connections allowed for the acquisition of wealth, including an Angolan slave, and, as events unfolded, considerable political influence at the aldeias and in Vila Boa. A better education and a so-called “chiefly” family, which arose because of Portuguese notions of inherited status, permitted the
brother-sister team to ascend to the fore of línguas at Maria I and Mossâmêdes. By the early 1800s, the stage was set for Damiana’s and Manoel to exploit the crumbling edifice of the old Pombaline aldeias and emerge as powerful leaders.

**Damiana’s Expeditions (1808–1830)**

Damiana became famous because of her expeditions to the Caiapó in the sertões. Nonetheless, her expeditions were poorly documented: no consensus exists between the various chroniclers and historians of Damiana’s life concerning the number and dates of her expeditions. Norberto (1861), for instance, claimed there were four expeditions: 1808, 1820, 1828, and 1830. Britto (1982) also listed four expeditions: 1808, 1821, 1828, and 1830. Karasch (1981:119) discussed five missions: 1808, 1819, 1821, 1828, and 1830. She also suggested the possibility of other (unrecorded) expeditions.

Fortunately, despite the limitations of the available sources, it is possible to resolve the number and dates of Damiana’s recorded expeditions. Archived documents refer to expeditions in 1821, 1828, and 1830. And Damiana was preparing for an expedition at the time of her meeting with Saint-Hilaire (1975:72) in 1819. This leaves the 1808 expedition undocumented; but, we shall see, the Caiapó were subjected to heavy forced labor around 1808, and Portuguese-speaking Caiapó, who openly admitted they were fugitives from Goiás, appeared on the Paraná River in 1810. This evidence weighs heavily toward a flight having occurred around this time. Therefore, Karasch was correct, Damiana conducted five expeditions: 1808, 1819, 1821, 1828, and 1830. The unrecorded and undocumented expeditions Karasch suggested certainly occurred. Pohl (1951:361), doubtless referring to Damiana, learned that “[m]ore than once, the attempt was made to send to their native forests some of the most trusted [Caiapó] in
order to entice Indians to the aldeia.” The 1819 expedition was only the second of
Damiana’s recorded missions to the sertões. If we accept that Pohl was referring to
Damiana—and she was among the “most trusted” línguas living at the aldeia—then, it
must be that she had conducted other expeditions which were not recorded; this was
probably because Damiana organized these expeditions and received little support from
the state.

The following discussion examines each of Damiana’s recorded expeditions and
argues that she was most successful when she entered the sertões in search of aldeia
fugitives. Previous narratives of Damiana’s life have conflated her expeditions with the
1780 bandeira of José Luís Pereira, assuming that, much like her husband-to-be, she
had traveled to and bargained with Caiapó who were hostile to the frontier. We shall
see that, in fact, Damiana often sought out so-called “fugitives” from the aldeia: these
were Caiapó who had recently fled from or, perhaps better said, left the aldeia; their
location in the sertões was known; Damiana was familiar to them, a known and
respected leader and intermediary; and she, as well as her brother, probably had kin
connections with them. Aldeia fugitives proved easier to cajole into returning, and the
expeditions where Damiana contacted them were very successful and returned large
numbers of Caiapó. Such expeditions occurred in 1808, 1819, and 1828.

In contrast, Damiana’s expeditions in 1821 and 1830 returned with very few
Caiapó. During these expeditions, Damiana contacted Caiapó who had not recently
fled from the aldeia: they had limited familiarity with her as a leader; they probably
possessed weak kin connections to her and her brother; and, certainly in one case and
probably in another, these Caiapó had been involved in recent conflicts with bandeiras.
These Caiapó permitted Damiana to enter their villages, but they treated her and her promises skeptically, and she only returned with small groups of men, women, and children. Sent to investigate the Mossâmedes aldeia—Maria I was abandoned before the expeditions in question—the Caiapó discovered the aldeia was decadent and in decline. Mossâmedes had fallen from its previous glory and no longer attracted the Caiapó from the sertões, so the new arrivals soon fled and did not return from the sertões.

**The 1808 Expedition**

Forced labor was responsible for Damiana’s earliest recorded expedition. In the first decade of the nineteenth century, officials in Vila Boa attempted to reinvigorate the lagging mining economy by developing a vigorous river trade with Pará (Alencastre 1865:36; Doles 1873:45). Beginning around 1805, the Indians living in the aldeias, including those at Maria I and Mossâmedes, were subjected to labor drafts and forced to construct and row canoes on the Araguaia River. In 1806, for example, 48 Caiapó from Mossâmedes rowed five canoes north to Para (Alencastre 1865:36). Another 50 aldeia Caiapó served as rowers the following year. The difficult labor, harsh treatment, and long duration of the expeditions were resented, and the native rowers despised the river trade and desired to be free of its oppressive and onerous toil. Rowing carried men far away from their families for many months, and constructing canoes required so many men that one director warned there was insufficient labor available for the Caiapó to clear and plant gardens.

But such warnings were not heeded in Vila Boa; reinvigorating the economy of Goiás was, as always, a priority, and much of the labor for the river trade continued to come from the aldeias. Inevitably, the disgruntled and hungry Caiapó tired of this
situation, and many of them fled sometime in late 1807 or early 1808. Some of the fugitives headed south: Portuguese-speaking Caiapó, fugitives from Goiás, appeared on the Paraná and Sucuriú Rivers around this time (see chapter 8). Other Caiapó fled west to Camapuã and the headwaters of the Araguaia, regions still sparsely populated and home to populous and independent villages. Many aldeia Caiapó had trekked to the latter region as recently as 1804–1805; and Damiana, Manoel, and many of the aldeia Caiapó had originally hailed from Camapuã, so both regions were familiar and places where kin connections were strong. The events of 1807–1807 had drained the aldeias population, so Damiana da Cunha, apparently on her own volition, decided to lead an expedition to the Araguaia. Her effort was successful, and she returned with around 70 Caiapó in late 1808 or early 1809 (Norberto 1861:530). Little else was recorded about this expedition, unfortunately.

Considering the circumstances of the forced labor and the recent flight of Caiapó from the aldeias, Damiana almost certainly traveled to and contacted former inhabitants of Maria I and Mossâmedes in 1808. Exasperated with the situation at the aldeia, these Caiapó had left to avoid the onerous labor drafts and looming food shortage. They probably set off on a trek to collect food, led by a discontented chief or chiefs, and intended to return to the aldeia once the situation improved. Considering the ebb and flow of people and information between the sertões and the aldeias, the location of these fugitives was well known to Damiana. So she trekked off to the Araguaia—whence she originally hailed and possessed stronger kin connections—and appeared among the Caiapó bearing trade goods, promises of more to come, and information concerning the demise of the forced labor. The gifts Damiana distributed and the
promises she made were well received and convinced the Caiapó to return. This expedition established a pattern that Damiana would subsequently repeat—with great success and much acclaim—of reaching out to former aldeia residents who had recently fled or trekked away from the aldeia.

**The 1819 Expedition**

The years that followed Damiana's 1808 expedition saw the Caiapó at Maria I and Mossâmedes struggle. There were many flights, the Caiapó population at both aldeias waned. There were only 129 Caiapó left at Maria I when the aldeia was extinguished and the inhabitants relocated to São José de Mossâmedes in 1813–1814. At the time of the transfer, Mossâmedes had a mere 138 inhabitants. Mossâmedes proved less popular with the Caiapó than Maria I: it was older, decrepit, surrounded by depleted soils, and there were fewer game animals nearby to hunt. More agregados and soldiers lived at the aldeia, and its proximity to Vila Boa meant forced labor was more easily enforced (Pohl 1954:361). Desertions plagued the aldeia, unsurprisingly. The first to flee, presumably, were the Caiapó who had been transferred from Maria I.

In 1819, Damiana undertook a second expedition. When Saint-Hilaire (1975:72) visited Mossâmedes, Damiana had “obtained permission from the Capitão-general [i.e., the governor] to go away for three months and was intending to leave shortly.” She explained to the Frenchman that she wanted to return to the aldeia Caiapó who lived in the sertões. When Saint-Hilaire suggested this bold enterprise might fail, Damiana simply replied: “the respect they have for me is too great for them not to do as I bid.” This enigmatic response somewhat befuddled the Frenchman, though he later “concluded from her words [that] she was undertaking that voyage finding herself convinced that her compatriots would feel themselves happier at the aldeia than in the
middle of the forest.” Saint-Hilaire’s doubts proved unjustified. Damiana returned to Mossâmedes with around 70 Caiapó in 1820 (Noberto 1861:530). A baptism for the small children was held shortly after their arrival.

This expedition appears similar to that Damiana conducted in 1808. Damiana “had obtained permission” from the authorities to leave Mossâmedes, so she, not the government, initiated the expedition. She planned on being absent from the aldeia for only three months, a relatively short time for a roundtrip voyage through the sertões (José Luís Pereira, in contrast, had wandered for three months before finding a Caiapó village; and he was guided by a recently captured youth). Damiana’s initiative and the short span she expected to be absent from Mossâmedes indicate both that she was aware of the location of the Caiapó she planned to visit and that she did not foresee problems convincing them to return. This was because she set off to contact recent aldeia fugitives, a conclusion supported by Damiana’s cryptic response to Saint-Hilaire. She told the Frenchman that the Caiapó had “respect” for her, a belief that must have been based on previous experience among the Caiapó with whom she planned to sojourn. This was, despite what Saint-Hilaire concluded from her words, an admission that Damiana was reaching out to aldeia fugitives familiar with her position as a leader at the aldeia. Finally, the number of Caiapó returning with Damiana was reportedly identical to those who had accompanied her in 1808, which suggests she was dealing with the same group of Caiapó, probably a chief disposed to leading his followers off the aldeia out of discontent or, perhaps, to trek for resources.19

The evidence indicates the Caiapó whom Damiana returned to Mossâmedes in 1820 were aldeia fugitives. The location of these Caiapó was well known at the aldeia,
they knew Damiana and recognized her as a leader, and they likely possessed kin connections to her. When Damiana appeared bearing promises and gifts, they once again agreed to return with her—exactly what she had predicted to Saint-Hilaire.

**The 1821 Expedition**

Although Damiana successfully returned Caiapó to Mossâmedes, conditions remained poor at the aldeia, and there was a lot of discontent among the inhabitants. In March of 1821, a new director, José Miguel da Silva, took control of the aldeia. His appointment coincided with a distribution of goods: Damiana da Cunha and a pedestre, Estanislav José Xavier, received 12 pounds of dried meat, eight blocks of unrefined sugar, and a quantity of tobacco to distribute. These presents, intended to aid the new director’s transition into power, did little to improve the situation at the aldeia, especially hunger.

Hunger was a pressing problem at Mossâmedes in the 1820s. After 40 years of planting, the soils and fields surrounding the aldeia were depleted and produced little in the way of foodstuffs. A list of crops grown at the aldeia in 1821 has survived: there were 80 carts of corn, 140 alqueires (an alqueire is a measure of dry goods, approximately 13.8 liters) of beans, 105 alqueires of rice, 10 alqueires of Castor beans, 20 alqueires of cotton, and 150 alqueires of manioc. The state took a tenth of these crops, a portion was sold to purchase goods and supplemental food for the aldeia, and what remained was destined to feed the aldeia—and this was precious little food for an entire year. Just as importantly, agricultural products fetched a low price at the time—something the document pointed out—so the confiscation and sale of the crops produced little in the way of tangible benefits for the aldeia.
With their fields failing, hunger setting in, and the supply of manufactured goods diminishing, many Caiapó left the aldeia. The first to go were probably those who had returned with Damiana in 1820. So, not even a year after her last expedition, Damiana again headed to the sertões. We know very little about this expedition. Although Damiana’s ability to return from the sertões with Caiapó was well known to government authorities, one suspects she again initiated this expedition; and she likely once again traveled to the headwaters of the Araguaia. Although it has been previously thought that the third expedition was as successful as Damiana’s previous expeditions and that “a great quantity” of Caiapó returned with her to Mossâmedes (Karasch 1981:114). In fact, only a mere 35 Caiapó returned from the sertões in September of 1821 (Giraldin 1997:129, n. 11).

These 35 Caiapó were almost certainly not recent fugitives from the aldeia. Although no chronicler recorded this about the 1821 expedition, it appears Damiana was unable to locate fugitives from the aldeia or, more likely, they refused her requests to return to Mossâmedes. So she encountered another group of Caiapó and entered their village, but these Caiapó had few connections to Mossâmedes and, in all likelihood, had recently suffered bandeira aggression. Damiana was able to enter by exploiting the lack of intra-ethnic warfare, her identity as a Caiapó Indian with clan membership, and her status as a língua. She found the inhabitants open to her offers of peace and promises of trade goods, but many Caiapó refused to accompany her back to Mossâmedes and, just as in the days of Governor Luís da Cunha Menezes, sent a small group of men, women, and children to investigate the promises, examine the aldeia, and acquire some gifts.
Evidence of this comes from the small number of Caiapó accompanying Damiana. It cannot be a coincidence that almost exactly the same number of Caiapó had earlier accompanied José Luis Pereira to Vila Boa. And Damiana was later to return with a similar number of Caiapó in 1831. The Caiapó in both of these examples had no or limited experience with the Goiás aldeias; they had suffered recent bandeira aggression; and they regarded the frontier with hostility and suspicion, so they warily sent a small expedition to investigate the promises they heard. It was much the same in 1821. And, after arriving at Mossâmedes, the Caiapó found deplorable conditions. Since they were sent on what was essentially a reconnaissance mission, they quickly fled to the sertões. Unsurprisingly, they did not return.

The 1828 Expedition

Abuse, corruption, and exploitation were serious problems at Mossâmedes in the years that followed. A pedestre named Manoel Joaquim was removed because of complaints that he abused the Caiapó. In 1823, Estanislav José Xavier, the same pedestre with whom Damiana da Cunha had received goods in 1821, became director of Mossâmedes, replacing the sickly and ineffective José Miguel da Silva. But this brought little improvement. In 1824, a soldier requesting a transfer from the aldeia claimed José Xavier was no better than his predecessor.

It was around this time that Raymundo José da Cunha Matos (1874:244, 304) visited Mossâmedes. He was dismayed by what he saw: the aldeia was a mere shadow of its former Pombaline glory, and the inhabitants completely indifferent to the decay that surrounded them. Cunha Matos blamed the “lack of devotion and exalted selfishness of the directors” for “the miserable decadence” of aldeia. He railed against corruption and inept administration: “These folk would be more civilized,” he declared, “if
the directors, the priests, the commanders of the troops, and their own Indian leaders treated them differently and did not consider them as slaves and beasts of burden.”

Interestingly, Cunha Matos (1874:305) included Damiana among the exploiters of the Caiapó. This irascible Portuguese officer and engineer wrote that Damiana “arbitrarily governs the Caiapó Indians, and when they are needed for some task, she goes naked and painted to the backlands, and leads the Indians as she sees fit.” That Cunha Matos felt Damiana “arbitrarily” led tells us that he found her to be neither easily persuaded nor co-opted into doing the bidding of authorities. He was not alone among the authorities in finding her actions unintelligible, if not contradictory, to what they desired: a president of Goiás later declared Damiana “capricious.” Only a few short years before, Saint-Hilaire was charmed by Damiana and held her in esteem, an opinion that reflected the beliefs of administrators, soldiers, and others at the aldeia. Why did other officials form such a negative opinion of Damiana?

Damiana’s loyalties were suspect for the very thing that made her so valuable: her status as an intermediary. In the sertões, Damiana abandoned her clothes when she entered Caiapó aldeias. Jettisoning the visible markers of frontier society, her education, and her identity as the wife of a soldier, she blended in, like a chameleon, with a deft change of her outward appearance. Painting herself red and black with annatto and genipap, she adopted a different identity, one where she was “naked and painted” among Caiapó whom the likes of Cunha Mattos considered “savages.” This ability to shift in-between the worlds of the aldeia, the sertões, and the frontier made it hard to judge Damiana’s true allegiance because her outward appearance was never fixed; it shifted and often hid her true hybrid identity.
Cunha Matos had not always had such a low opinion of Damiana. He had once thought better of her and, sharing the positive view that many others held, had earlier proposed she command a force of 100 Caiapó warriors against the Canoeiro. This was no mean task: the Canoeiro were the most formidable of the peoples then raiding the ranchers and small farmers in northern Goiás (see e.g., Toral 1984). It appears, however, that when Cunha Matos proposed Damiana lead the Caiapó against the Canoeiro, he had little knowledge of the situation at Mossâmedes. Later, he learned there were hardly any Caiapó available for such an expedition. In 1824, Cunha Mattos put the aldeia population at 128 men, women, and children, which was simply far too few Caiapó from whom to find the necessary 100 warriors needed to fight the Canoeiro.

Cunha Mattos must have changed his opinion after visiting Mossâmedes and discovering the impossibility of his plan to conquer the Canoeiro with the aid of the Caiapó. It appears that Cunha Mattos had met with Damiana and was disappointed when she refused his request for aid against the Canoeiro. He took from this encounter that Damiana “arbitrarily” led and included her in among those who reduced the utility of the aldeia.

By the mid-1820s, there was little reason for the aldeia Caiapó to remain at Mossâmedes. Corruption, poor administration, hunger, and shrinking revenues from the sale of crops meant the aldeia provided little in the way of food or manufactured goods. Only a few years before, Saint-Hilaire and Pohl had observed few manufactured goods at the aldeia. Later visitors were shocked to discover many of the Caiapó went about almost completely naked. In 1827, the resulting complaints and lack of supplies resulted in the round up, slaughter, and sale of feral cattle to purchase clothing for the
But few of the goods purchased by the slaughter appear to have made their way to the aldeia, and there were reports of Caiapó raids around this time. Cunha Matos (1874:305) had earlier noted the Caiapó “live peacefully” at Mossâmedes but “nevertheless have been accused of heading to the road and assaulting the convoys going to or coming from Cuiabá.” His comment possibly explains why some Caiapó remained at the faltering aldeia: though accused of raiding, the aldeia Caiapó were never attacked within the boundaries of Mossâmedes, which offered them security from bandeiras and aggressive settlers.

In October of 1827, another aldeia director—most likely Estanislav José Xavier—was removed after several chiefs complained that he was abusive and stole goods that belonged to the aldeia.29 The removal of the director was followed by Manuel da Cunha’s appointment as interim director of the aldeia.30 This was a tactical move on the part of the rulers of Goiás. Many aldeia Caiapó had chosen to leave the aldeia for locales that offered many of the same benefits: for example, Caiapó deserters from Maria I and Mossâmedes had successfully established contact and trade with Paulista boatmen and missionaries on the Paraná and Sucuriú Rivers (chapter 8), where they were free to live their without meddling administrators, pedestres, and forced labor; other Caiapó had moved to Mato Gross, where they worked for ranchers and farmers; and still others turned their backs on the frontier settlements and lived peacefully in the sertões at headwaters of the Araguaia River, Camapuã, and Triângulo Mineiro. Manoel was appointed in an attempt to placate chiefs dissatisfied with the aldeia and prone to leading their followers to these places.
Manoel officially controlled the aldeia from late 1827 until his removal in 1832. He served as an important intermediary between the aldeia Caiapó and the authorities in Vila Boa and, from what we can tell, was successful at securing quantities of manufactured goods. In May of 1829, for example, the government dispatched a large number of desperately needed tools, including six sickles and a dozen hoes, to the aldeia for the Caiapó to establish new gardens. So Manoel’s appointment seems to have worked, at least for a few years. Later, the Caiapó accused Manoel of selling goods for his own profit and fled from the aldeia.

With Manoel’s appointment, the brother-sister team had consolidated their influence and power at Mossâmedes. Two incidents revolving around Damiana’s 1828 expedition illustrate just how influential the siblings had become. Damiana’s niece, Luiza, as we have seen, was married to a soldier named José António. In March of 1828, Damiana requested José António be released from duty to assist her in a mission to the Araguaia. This created a small controversy. Much like his famous in-law, José António straddled the boundaries of cultures at the aldeia, and his in-between status as a língua and a soldier caused him problems. A priest working at Mossâmedes complained of seeing José António going about naked and painted, and he was ordered to report to Vila Boa in May of 1828. Government officials saw José António’s behavior as cultural apostasy and suspected he was a traitor; they feared he might provide arms to the Caiapó then attacking the roads to São Paulo and Cuiabá. The president declined Damiana’s request for her in-law to accompany her and, instead, ordered two pedestres to assist the expedition. But Damiana dug in her heels and threatened to cancel her expedition if José António was removed from the aldeia; she
demanded her niece’s husband accompany her. The president thought her behavior was “capricious and distrustful,” but he recognized Damiana’s “great ascendancy among the Indians” and knew her participation was critical to a successful outcome. He relented and permitted José António to remain at Mossâmedes and accompany the expedition.  

After the situation with José António was resolved, Damiana began her fourth, and most successful, expedition. In January of 1829, she returned to Mossâmedes with a group of 100 Caiapó, including two chiefs. Goods, food, and other small gifts, were distributed in an attempt to gain their trust and avoid their returning to the sertões. In December of 1829, President Miguel Lino de Moraes demanded the two chiefs, Joaquim and Fabiano, be reprimanded for fleeing the aldeia. He instructed Manoel to investigate the reasons they had fled with their followers and ordered them replaced by more faithful chiefs. These two chiefs must have been the ones whom Damiana returned to the aldeia. And the president’s order tells us that Damiana had once again returned with aldeia fugitives, since he reprimanded the two chiefs for having previously left the aldeia. It also illustrates the extent to which Manoel’s power at the aldeia had eclipsed the traditional chiefs. Officially, Manoel could dictate who was, and who was not, considered a chief, which had ramifications for the distribution of goods. And, through his control of the pedestres and the distribution of goods, Manoel could reward the faithful or punish the wayward; even Caiapó chiefs were subject to his rule. Whether or not Manoel followed the president’s instructions to replace the chiefs remains unknown.
The 1830 Expedition

Late in 1829, a horde of Caiapó began raiding in Mato Grosso. They waylaid a convoy carrying goods to Cuiabá, killing six pack animals and stealing some tools. No one was injured in this raid, but a second attack on a mule train left pack animals slain, goods plundered, and a foreman killed. A bandeira, composed of townsfolk and some Guaná Indians from an aldeia, was hastily dispatched from Cuiabá to punish the responsible Caiapó. A brief skirmish was fought until a Caiapó missile killed one of the Guaná, which took the fight out of the townsfolk and their allies; the bandeira retreated in defeat. Two more bandeiras were quickly organized, but the Caiapó fled before them, abandoning their village and pushing east into the hinterlands of the Claro River. They soon established a new village and began burning fields. The smoke of the fires, as well as evidence that the new arrivals were spying on isolated settlements, frightened farmers and ranchers into abandoning their holdings. Word of the new Caiapó arrivals and their conflicts in Mato Gross spread between the isolated and vulnerable settlers of the Claro, and there was a panic.

Panicked settlers and their complaints soon reached Vila Boa, and the rulers of Goiás turned to Damiana da Cunha for a final time. On May 15, 1830, President Miguel Lino de Moraes ordered 9$600 reis allocated for purchasing provisions (including a cow) and gifts to give to the Caiapó. As in 1828, Damiana da Cunha used her leverage with the president to select the participants. She picked her niece Luiza and in-law José António and requested her soldier-husband Manoel Pereira da Cruz come along. The latter request met with some resistance: someone suggested her brother should accompany her instead; but Manoel, citing his responsibilities at Mossâmades, declined to assist his sister.
The mild debate over who should accompany Damiana owed to a letter she carried on this expedition. The governor ordered Damiana to read this letter to the Caiapó from Mato Gross, but there was a problem: the chosen messenger was illiterate. Although educated in the governor’s house, Damiana’s distaff, like that of other women in Brazil, did not include reading and writing. Because of her illiteracy, Damiana requested her husband, who was literate, accompany her to the sertões. After Manoel declined to accompany the expedition, Manoel Pereira da Cruz received permission from the president and his commanding officers.

There was little to distinguish this letter from that José Luís Pereira carried into the sertões more than 50 years before. Written by the president of Goiás, the letter offered the Caiapó friendship and peace or war and annihilation, and it is worth quoting at length since it conveys the president’s intentions and encapsulates so much of the aldeia enterprise in the early nineteenth century:

Dona Damiana.

The friendship with the Indians of the Caiapó nation, our neighbors, concerns me greatly, if they knew the advantages of the civilized life and the fortune of living in the bosom of the Roman Catholic Church, according to the principle of the great God, lord of all; if they voluntarily present themselves to live amongst us, mingling with the peaceful residents of this province assisting them with their labors, and learning to work from them […] they shall recognize how much their wandering life lacks, hidden by the forests, as if they were wild beasts. This truth, recognized by you and many others Indians of the same nation living civilized amongst us shall serve […] to persuade them to accept the invitation that you make, assure them that all my intentions […] are directed to the important end of attracting them as our brothers, sons of Brazil, and for awakening in them the love of good. It is not to disturb their liberty since they are free and forever shall be treated as such.

If you find them averse to leaving their aldeias to come and live with us, do not force them but grant them passage to this capital to speak with me, where I shall treat them very well [and] give them gifts and tools for their exertions. Recommend to them that they respect the inhabitants of this
province [and] that they do not rob the fields or kill people. [...] However, if they work to the contrary, they cannot wonder why I send armed forces to the forest to punish them, as their crimes are worthy of punishment. [...] You should study these instructions before leaving to the sertão. They shall serve as a guide in the good services I expect from your zeal for the interests of the province and the people of the Caiapó Nation, whom I greatly esteem.

City of Goiás, May 15, 1830.

Miguel Lino de Moraes. The president promised much and offered little beyond Christian salvation, goods, and an opportunity to learn to work. He saw the Caiapó as children, lost in the forests, living miserably beyond the bosom of the Church and Christian civilization. But they had only to abandon their “wandering life,” and the president promised them all of the benefits of his civilization; failing that, they had the opportunity to present themselves and witness the splendor of the aldeias and receive presents and experience his largesse. In either case, he warned the Caiapó to cease their depredations; otherwise, they faced more bandeiras and destruction in their beloved forests.

The recent arrival of Caiapó from Mato Grosso had forced the president to reach out to Damiana in an attempt to avoid the sort of ruinous hostilities that had once ravaged Goiás. As with her other expeditions, Damiana planned on leading a small band to the headwaters of the Araguaia River. There must have been some reluctance on her part, however, even though she agreed to lead the expedition, since this was not the sort of undertaking Damiana normally preferred. The Caiapó from Mato Grosso were not recent fugitives from the Mossâmedes aldeia: Damiana neither was familiar with their location nor found them pliable.
From what we can tell, it appears the expedition to the Caiapó from Mato Grosso failed. Damiana did not return to São José de Mossâmedes until January 12, 1831 (Norberto 1861:533, 534, n. 22), after nearly eight months had passed. Only a small group of Caiapó accompanied Damiana. She had traveled to the depths of Camapuã, a place called Tombador ("Rough Country") near where the overland passage from Vila Boa to Cuiabá approached the “Grande River” (the upper Araguaia) (Karasch n.d.). At first the Caiapó listened to Damiana and many were inclined to follow her, but one of the villagers, probably a chief, spoke out against her and “dispersed” the Caiapó. Although the Caiapó allowed Damiana into their village, they were less familiar with her as an intermediary and leader, and, having recently confronted bandeiras, they were wary and suspicious of the Brazilians, but the lure of peace and prospect of trade goods was enticing, so a small group of 32, mostly women and children, went to investigate the aldeia. The new arrivals, like so many of those who preceded them, soon fled.

This proved to be Damiana’s final voyage to the sertões. According to tradition, she had to be carried into Mossâmedes because of a terrible fever she contracted in the sertões (perhaps malaria), and when the grateful president traveled to São José de Mossâmedes to visit the new arrivals and congratulate Damiana, he found her seriously ill and at death’s door. The sympathetic president permitted Damiana’s soldier-husband to stay by her side until the end arrived, but Manoel Pereira da Cruz did not have long to wait: his wife died at São José de Mossâmedes at the end of February or early March of 1831. Damiana was buried in the Mossâmedes church (her grave is now lost), and her death removed the only effective leader willing and capable of convincing the Caiapó to return to the aldeia. The days of the Caiapó aldeia at Mossâmedes were numbered.
The End of Manoel and São José de Mossâmedes

The Mossâmedes aldeia continued its precarious existence for two years after Damiana’s death: the plaza continued to fall into complete disrepair, the structures collapsed beneath the years of neglect, and the fields fell fallow; the hunger and discontent among the few remaining Caiapó was palpable; there were more raids originating from within the boundaries of the aldeia. It was patent to all observers that Manoel was increasingly corrupt and negligent in his administration.46

Flights, as always, plagued the aldeia. Small numbers of Caiapó, individuals and family groups, slipped away. Some vanished into the sertões; others were captured, imprisoned, and returned, as when, for example, one unlucky woman, Victoria Maria, was imprisoned for nearly two weeks in March 1830 for fleeing.47 A mass flight was suspected in August of 1830, and, in response, the Caiapó children were ordered rounded-up and re-distributed to local settlers to ensure their continued education and “civilization.”48 This draconian proposal can hardly have helped rebuild moral or ameliorate the rapidly deteriorating situation at the aldeia; but the Brazilians appear to have known that it was impossible to stop the Caiapó from fleeing, so they resorted to desperate measures. But most flights went unnoticed or unrecorded; the Caiapó simply and silently disappeared from the aldeia.

Various methods for rejuvenating the Mossâmedes were proposed. These were almost uniformly impracticable, expensive, and, therefore, unimplemented. There was an ambitious proposal to invigorate the aldeia through animal husbandry.49 But this program was quietly abandoned—it was too expensive. Several less ambitious projects commenced that involved the distribution of goods to bribe the Caiapó into staying. In March of 1830, for example, several lots of goods were ordered distributed to the aldeia,
including 12 shirts and 12 dresses of cotton and 12 camisoles of rough-spun cloth "to cover the nudity of some Indian women at the aldeia [...] and, at the same time, to serve as a stimulate so that they voluntarily trade some of their young children to be educated by private citizens." The women’s dresses were quickly followed by a distribution of goods to the Caiapó men: 12 hedgebills, 10 axes, and eight hoes, and sufficient heavy cotton cloth for 12 shirts, 12 pairs of pants, and 12 coats. A further lot of eight alqueires of beans and farinha, an alquiere of salt, and two rolls of tobacco were sent to the aldeia so that the Indians could travel to Vila Boa to witness a religious procession. The distribution of goods, at such a late date, met with little success; indeed, judging by the later complaints logged against Manoel, few of these goods actually reached the intended Caiapó.

The end came on December 28, 1831. The majority of the Caiapó, following a chief named Miguel Impocaro, who was known to have led his family from the aldeia before, slipped away. There could not have been very many Caiapó left, as authorities were shipping clothes and good for what appears to have been 12 couples, so the end of the Pombaline aldeia was anti-climatic. When informed of this flight—and, indeed, this turned out to be a flight—the president requested the aldeia priest, the only reliable authority available to investigate the circumstances, to inquire into how Miguel Impocaro and his family fled, whether in one group or many small groups, their direction, and whether it was possible to dispatch someone after them. On 18 January 1832, the president ordered the creation of an expedition of 10 or 12 pedestres to be supplied with sufficient farinha and dried meat, and requested that “six of the most civilized [Caiapó] Indians come to this city [Vila Boa] in order to nominate a commander,
receive munitions, instructions, and goods” to return the fugitives to the aldeia. But the expedition never got off the ground and was canceled in February. After this expedition was cancelled, confusion reigned in Vila Boa over what should become of the few Caiapó who remained at Mossâmedes, most of whom were women, children, and elderly. Someone proposed dissolving the aldeia, distributing the children to locals for “civilization,” and relocating the adult Caiapó to the Lago dos Tigres in the north. This did not prove to be a popular plan. In April, the town council reiterated that the aldeia should be dissolved—it was too costly to maintain—and suggested the Caiapó be transferred north to Salinas where they could work as rowers and crop producers. This plan, it was argued, had the additional benefit of placing the Caiapó near the ongoing conflict with the Chavante and Canoeiro, thus making them available as native auxiliaries on bandeiras. This plan, like its predecessor, met with little support (the elderly and women would not have served well fighting the Canoeiro). An anonymous critic published a rebuke arguing that the Caiapó would quickly flee when they learned of the proposed relocation, and that moving them from their lands would result in great mortality. The anonymous critic proposed the state should maintain the Mossâmedes aldeia and use it for what it was originally intended: to woo new levies of Indians from the sertões. This plan, like those it preceded, met with little support. It was too impractical: conditions at the aldeia had all too recently driven away Caiapó; Mossâmedes was a decayed husk that would require serious renovation before it would be able to seduce anyone into settling there, and there were simply no funds available for such repairs.
While the fate of the aldeia was debated, the blame for the 1831 flight fell on Manoel. An investigation revealed he had dillydallied in informing authorities in Vila Boa. When asked to explain the delay, Manoel claimed an illness had prevented him from sending a timely notice, but the president dismissed this as a weak, if not treacherous, excuse and suspected Damiana’s brother had “seduced” the Caiapó into fleeing. Whether willful or not, Manoel had influenced the Caiapó decision to flee from Mossâmedes: the accusations that he was corrupt and exploited his position were investigated and interviews with the remaining Caiapó revealed Manoel had sold the tools needed to work the fields and confiscated their crops. Manoel made his situation worse by requesting a discharge from his duties. This convinced the president of Manoel’s treachery, and, he believed, hinted that the disgraced administrator planned to flee. An order was issued for Manoel’s arrest and imprisonment.

Accused of corruption, suspected of precipitating the final flight of the Caiapó, and perhaps ill, Manoel was arrested and languished in prison in Vila Boa until he died—far away from Mossâmedes and the Caiapó. A trial was planned before Manoel’s death and a sergeant dispatched to São José de Mossâmedes on October 14, 1832, to gather witnesses. Ordered to bring two Caiapó chiefs to Vila Boa to testify against their erstwhile director, the sergeant discovered only seven Caiapó inhabitants remained. The others had fled, “refused to return,” and told their pursuers “that they were not captives and wished to live wherever they so desired.” It was the death knell of the Mossâmedes aldeia.

Sadly, the final exploiter of the Mossâmedes aldeia was Manoel da Cunha. He was the last in a long line of corrupt and inept directors whom Cunha Matos had thought
treated the Caiapó little better than “slaves and beasts of burden.” He was not alone in failing, since many other directors were removed over allegations of exploitation, abuse, and corruption, but Manoel was unique for being a Caiapó; he was also unique in that it was under his rule that Mossâmedes was finally and irrevocably abandoned. That Mossâmedes was finally abandoned surprised no one, as the aldeia had been on the verge of extinction for many years until the Caiapó followed Chief Manoel Impocaro into the sertões. Although authorities had formulated various plans to save the aldeia, including appointing Manoel to act as director, their efforts to halt the rot were half-hearted and ineffective, even counterproductive.

Manoel’s appointment was one example of counterproductive measure. Superficially, Manoel was a good Candidate to lead the aldeia: he was a língua, educated and literate, a reputable soldier, and familiar to the Caiapó, pedestres, and agregados living at Mossâmedes; he had already served for years as an intermediary between the authorities and Caiapó; and he was the brother of Damiana. But the bureaucratic responsibilities of being director clashed with Caiapó expectations of línguas and chiefs. Directors, chiefs, and línguas competed with one another for influence at the aldeia, and they employed similar means of attracting and maintaining followers: directors distributed goods provided by the state (they could fall back on the coercion of the pedestres when needed); Caiapó chiefs and línguas procured and distributed goods (and, like directors, aldeia chiefs could punish wayward followers). With Manoel’s appointment to director, a Caiapó língua was in control of the bureaucratic apparatus of the aldeia. The appointment expanded Manoel’s powers as a leader: he was no longer merely one of many línguas, but the most prominent and,
indeed, powerful Caiapó língua; he was also no longer a pedestre, but the acting
director in charge of the daily administration of Mossâmedes; and he became much
more than either a língua, pedestre, or chief since his new role encompassed elements
of all these identities.

Unlike his Portuguese and Brazilian predecessors, Manoel came to office heavily
constrained by the expectations and limitations the Caiapó placed on their chiefs and
línguas, especially the expectation that he be generous with the distribution of food and
goods. When Manoel was unable or failed to provide sufficient supplies, whether
because of his alleged thievery or because the state was simply unable to provide
sufficient quantities, the Caiapó became dissatisfied with his leadership. The chiefs
complained, accused Manoel of corruption—very likely, a truthful accusation no less—and
they and their followers fled the aldeia. Such flights had happened before, but the
aldeia had not collapsed as it did while Manoel was the acting director. This was
because of Damiana. During her life, she was a charismatic intermediary, a leader
untarnished by the directors’ corruption and failures, able to acquire food and goods
through her family and political connections, and, importantly, she was willing to work
for the continued existence of the aldeia. Damiana’s death removed her as a leader
and, simultaneously, left Manoel to occupy the position of director, intermediary, and
Caiapó leader. The Caiapó thought him a corrupt director and a tarnished intermediary
and leader. Discredited in his bureaucratic and indigenous leadership roles, Manoel
possessed little influence among the aldeia Caiapó and neither was able to keep them
there nor return them. In 1831–1832, there were no influential intermediaries left—
Damiana was dead, Manoel discredited—and when the ineffective and half-hearted
attempt to return the fugitives to Mossâmedes was brusquely rebuked, the aldeia effectively ceased to exist.

The fugitives’ refusal to return proved to be the final blow. In December of 1832, the president dispensed with the aldeia priest.\(^{67}\) Although the priest of Mossâmedes was largely absent and ineffective, this was an important symbolic act: the aldeia was no longer considered a place of catechism, conversion, and civilization. The remaining Caiapó were transferred to Arinos in 1833–1834 (Karasc 1998:131, 1992:412, n. 35). Although Mossâmedes existed until November of 1879, when it was declared extinct and its lands put on sale (Souza Spinola 1880), the final relocation of the Caiapó meant the lavish aldeia, which Governor José de Almeida de Vasconcelos de Soveral e Carvalho built almost 60 years before, no longer existed as a place occupied by Indians. Meaningful numbers of Caiapó, or any other native people, never again lived there.\(^{68}\)

The aldeia fugitives, after declaring they would travel where they saw fit, spread through the hinterlands. Most headed to the west. On February 24, 1833, the fires of some of these Caiapó were seen just outside the settlement at Rio Claro; frightened settlers panicked and requested arms and munitions be sent.\(^{69}\) But their fears proved exaggerated: the Caiapó simply slipped by the settlement on their way to the headwaters of the Araguaia River, Camapuã, and other locales.

**Conclusion**

Conceived and constructed to seduce the bellicose Gê-speakers of Goiás from the sertões, the once lavish aldeia at Mossâmedes—perhaps the greatest of the aldeia established under the Pombaline Directorate—had collapsed from neglect, abuse, and indifference. All the expensive grandeur that had once wooed the Caiapó and Chavante from the sertões—the plaza, the baroque church, the governor’s mansion; the
fields and orchards; and the food, goods, and tools—was decadent or gone; the bustling throngs of Acroá, Chacriabá, Carajá and Javaé were gone, having long ago fled or died from epidemic disease. Even the Caiapó, perhaps the most tenacious of Mossâmedes’s indigenous inhabitants, had decamped for better horizons. They left behind an aldeia that, without their presence, was little more than a quaint and somewhat isolated hamlet, which it remains to this day.

The end of Mossâmedes was intimately connected to the demise of its two most famous inhabitants, Damiana and Manoel. The siblings had prolonged the tenuous existence of the aldeia for many years: when too many Caiapó left for the sertões and Mossâmedes was threatened, Damiana brought them back; and Manoel, as a pedestre and acting director, controlled them. When Damiana died and Manoel was discredited, the Caiapó fled and did not return; the aldeia at Mossâmedes ceased to exist.

Damiana and Manoel were the most prominent and powerful members of the Caiapó mission culture that had developed in Goiás. They were línguas, intermediaries and cultural hybrids, possessing authority and influence in two cultures. At the aldeia and in the sertões, Damiana and Manoel were “chiefly,” but not chiefs. They were respected leaders, capable of exerting influence and acquiring followers, but their leadership was parallel to, and even undercut, that of the traditional chiefs, like the castigated Joaquim and Fabiano, who led their followers into the sertões and against whom the siblings competed. Damiana and Manoel relied on their ability to mediate with authorities in Vila Boa and their finesse in acquiring, controlling, and distributing goods to a greater degree than the traditional chiefs, so their influence was limited with Caiapó who, having chosen to remain in the sertões, possessed few connections to the
aldeias. As the events in 1831 showed, when a village leader opposed Damiana, her influence was limited. In Vila Boa, Damiana and Manoel were considered leaders capable of maintaining and controlling the Caiapó at the aldeias, and returning them there when necessary. Authorities commonly named and thought of Damiana as a chief (and likely thought the same of Manoel), but she was unlike the traditional chiefs, since neither war nor violence was her (nor Manoel’s) craft. The siblings trafficked in the subtler arts of diplomacy and negotiation, wooing Caiapó followers and peddling influence with authorities in Vila Boa through promises, deeds, and gifts. Their power came from their in-between status, their ability to slip in and out of cultures, to charm European visitors with fluent Portuguese and go “naked and painted” in the backlands; to truly never belong to either the frontier settlements or the sertões.

Explaining exactly why Damiana and Manoel maintained Maria I and Mossâmedes remains difficult. The siblings left no written explanation for their actions, and we have only the words of contemporary observers, like Saint-Hilaire (1975:72), and the later chroniclers, such as Norberto (1861:529), to guide our interpretations. They thought religion was behind Damiana’s expeditions: she was a woman of noble blood and good character who led holy missions into heathen sertões. Such rational explained the persistent effort on Damiana’s part to save the ailing Mossâmedes, and it created an appropriate persona to lionize in the regional hagiography; it was the sort of pious explanation that resonated with Europeans and Brazilians, and one that Damiana must have exploited to explain her efforts.

But not all of Damiana’s contemporaries found her Christianity convincing: Pohl (1951:361), for one, thought the aldeia Caiapó had little idea of Christianity, including
those, like Damiana, who had lived most of their lives at the aldeias. It would, however, be all too easy to dismiss religion as a motivating factor behind Damiana’s expeditions simply because a curmudgeonly Austrian found no true Catholics among the aldeia Caiapó. Faith, undoubtedly, was behind Damiana’s missions. After all, a syncretic form of Christianity was practiced at Mossâmedes, and Damiana, though failing Pohl’s measure, was educated in the governor’s house and probably considered herself a good Christian. She was, after all, more acculturated than the other Caiapó.

But one must wonder if Damiana and Manoel were not more base and self-serving, as it cannot have been lost on them that, without the aldeias, they were rural folk and indistinguishable from the many agregados, mixed-descent laborers, and detribalized Indians of Goiás. They had some stability, respectability, and wealth in their lives, but Damiana and Manoel were never very far from the bottom of the social ladder—higher up than the African slaves, certainly, but never much above the lowest of the freeborn—and it was all too easy to plummet. Damiana’s and Manoel’s identities, wealth, and success were tied to the aldeias, especially Mossâmedes, so maintaining these places meant maintaining their privileged positions on the frontier. Maintaining the aldeias as a source of privilege and power, rather than the Christian catechism and noble birth the nineteenth-century chroniclers lauded, probably comes closer to the truth of explaining Damiana and Manoel. The narrative written for them was of a selfless enterprise and faith guided by an ardor for the Christian salvation of souls, but the siblings spent their lives finding a meaningful place on a hostile frontier, one that had little more use for them and their people than as petty laborers, rowers, and ranch hands.
In challenging the older narratives, recent scholarship has not been generous to Damiana and Manoel, faulting them for participating, not resisting, the aldeias. Ataídes (1998:82–85), for example, thought Damiana a “servant” whose “passive action” aided a colonial Indian policy dedicated to eradicating her people. But calling Damiana’s actions “passive” shows bias toward the violent confrontation for which the Caiapó were famed and implied resistance was the only proper course on the frontier. But, on close examination, Damiana was anything but “passive.” Many government authorities thought her “capricious and distrustful,” precisely because she was so unwilling to submit passively to their whims. Contemporary authorities, like Cunha Matos, would have hardly viewed Damiana as a “passive” figure. Further, trekking through the backlands to return Caiapó to the aldeias was dangerous, even heroic, work: the sertões of Goiás were filled with physical deprivation and hunger—the younger Bartholomeu Bueno da Silva, reduced to boiling belt leather and pillaging Indian villages for food, nearly perished in their vastness—and there were bandits, hostile quilombos, and the famously bellicose Gê to contend with. The expeditions Damiana led were far from “passive.” This sort of obloquy, while not fair to Damiana, at least acknowledges her important role at the aldeias. Giraldin (1997: 99), in contrast, reduced her life to a mere four paragraphs and a paltry smattering of footnotes, transforming a dynamic historical figure into a life that barely merited mention, much less exegesis. Even the sympathetic Karasch (1981:117), whose work reflects the traditional perspectives of the nineteenth century, reproached Damiana, believing she “was not one of the heroic Indians resisters” because “at no time did she take up arms against the outsiders or
encourage others to do so.” But Damian was among the most unlikely of Caiapó to encourage others to resist the allure of the aldeias or to take up arms against them. It is all too easy to argue, with the benefit of hindsight, that Damiana and Manoel made the wrong choice in cooperating and accommodating, not resisting, the frontier. Indeed, Damiana and Manoel propped up aldeias inherent with ethnocide, forced conversions, forced labor, and abuse; they labored for colonial authorities who despised and exploited their people. But this should alert historians that, far from being passive agents of colonialism, Damiana and Manoel were complex people, caught in complex times, and making difficult, even contradictory, decisions. The trajectory of their lives was guided by their in-between status as intermediaries, as línguas. They had never known sertões without Europeans and might not have viewed them as foreign interlopers and invaders, and their long acquaintance and education among the Portuguese and Brazilians meant Damiana and Manoel did not necessarily share the same worldview as the rest of the Caiapó, especially those living in the sertões. Since the siblings had lived most of their lives in the aldeias, they thought of these and the frontier settlements, not the villages hidden in remote sertões, as their true homes. It very well may have been that Damiana and Manoel felt they belonged to nowhere else than Maria I and Mossâmedes. We will simply never know for sure, unfortunately.

But Damiana and Manoel were not alone in making the decision to accommodate the frontier. There were other “chiefly” línguas, contemporaries and rivals of Damiana and Manoel, who, like the siblings, hailed from Goiás and sought to participate, interact, and trade with frontier settlements. Several of these línguas appeared on the Paraná and Sucuriú Rivers where they sought interaction with the boatmen plying the rivers and
wooed missionaries. Their history, long ignored, is the subject of the chapter that follows.

---


2 IHGB 1.2.7., fl. 255; AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 32, D. 2019.

3 Cowell (1974:93) discussed the capture of women and children as a source of technological information and the Kreen-Akrore in the late 1960s.

4 The Panará are keenly interest in aspects of alien cultures. Indeed, this is one of the important underlying themes explored by Ewart (2000). For the Panará, the exploration, adaptation, and adoption of foreign technology and goods, for example, Brazilian crops, is through first-hand contact and experience.

5 Schwartzman (1984) analyzed the role Portuguese language skills played the creation of parallel leaders among the Panará in the Xingú Indigenous Park in the 1970s and 1980s. He attached importance to the ability of Portuguese-speaking Panará to control information and goods.

6 Schwartzman (1988:129) found that Panará parents select spouses for their young children; marriage outside of these selected spouses is seriously frowned upon. Pohl’s (1951:363) comment that Caiapó boys married at the age of eight years possibly reflects this practice.

7 AHEGO Livro 151 (1827-1828), fls. 47v-48. Very little is known about Luiza or José António: presumably, both were Caiapó; José António was a soldier, so he spoke Portuguese (Luiza probably did as well); and both participated in some of Damiana’s expeditions.

8 MB Pct 419, f. 40.

9 AHEGO Livro 144 (1826), fls. 31v-32.

10 See MB Vol. 376.

11 AHEGO Livro 15, f. 33; AHEGO Livro 155 (1828-1830), f. 42.

12 AHEGO Livro 155 (1828-1830), f. 71v.

13 The reference listed in Brito (1982:88): “Óbitos de São José de Mossâmedes, L. nº 1, f. 9v.”

14 A careful reading of the sources indicates that some Caiapó individuals in addition to Damiana da Cunha were able to own cattle and food surpluses for their own benefit, see Pohl (1951:362).

15 AHEGO Livro 45 (1804-1809), f. 51v.

16 AHEGO Livro 45 (1804-1809), fls. 44v-45.

17 AHEGO Livro 45 (1804-1809), f. 49.

18 MB Pct 418 (1810-1820), f. 74.

19 That a baptism was held soon after their arrival suggests nothing more than these Caiapó had absented themselves from the aldeia long enough for children to be born. The lack of a Baptism mentioned for the 1808 expedition could indicate that no children accompanied the fugitives or, more likely, that the records were lost.

20 AHEGO Livro 83 (1820-1824), fls. 11-11v.

21 See MB Vol. 376.

22 MB Pct 419 (1820-1825), fls. 94-95.

23 AHEGO Livro 73 (1820-1822), f. 28.

24 AHEGO Livro 104 (1822-1825), f. 25v.

25 AHEGO Livro 126 (1824-1826), f. 31v.

26 AHEGO Livro 151 (1827-1828), f. 48.

27 AHEGO Livro 119 (1823-1826), f. 73.

28 MB Pct. 422 (1815-1828), f. 118.

29 AHEGO Livro 148 (1826-1828), fls. 41v-42. The documents do not state who this director was. The documentation between 1823, when Estanislav Xavier began as director, and 1827, when Manoel da Cunha was appointed interim director, is best described as scanty.

30 AHEGO Livro 148 (1826-1828), fls. 41v-42.

31 AHEGO Livro 155 (1828-1830), fls.41v-42.
AHEGO Livro 155 (1828-1830), fls. 47v-48. Documents, now lost but cited by Norberto (1861:537 n. 26), included Damiana’s “nephew,” a soldier in the 29th Battalion, and his wife among those who participated in the 1828 and 1830 expeditions.

AHEGO Livro 144 (1826), f. 70v.
AHEGO Livro 151 (1827-1828), f. 48.
AHEGO Livro 161 (1829-1834), f. 9v.
AHEGO Livro 155 (1828-1830), f. 26v.
AHEGO Livro 161 (1829-1834), f. 9v.

BN II-36, 12, 14.

A special thanks to Mary Karasch for providing the following information about Damiana’s final mission.

MM 5-4-1830.
AHEGO Livro 155 (1828-1830), fls. 63, 64.
MM 7-8-1830.
MM 4-1-1831.
AHEGO Livro 155 (1828-1830), fls. 63-64v.
AHEGO Livro 155 (1828-1830), f. 64v.
AHEGO Livro 155 (1828-1830), f. 64v.
AHEGO Livro 85 (1820-1840), f. 45; MM 9-2-1832.
AHEGO Livro 85 (1820-1840), f. 45.
AHEGO Livro 85 (1820-1840), fls. 45v-46.
AHEGO Livro 85 (1820-1840), f. 47v.
MM 6-9-1832.
MM 10-10-1832.
MM 8-11-1832.
AHEGO Livro 85 (1820-1840), f. 45
AHEGO Livro 85 (1820-1840), f. 50v
MM 5-4-1832.
AHEGO Livro 85 (1820-1840), f. 50v.
AHEGO Livro 85 (1820-1840), f. 50v.
AHEGO Livro 85 (1820-1840), f. 51v.
MM 5-8-1833.
MM 5-11-1833.

There were a few Caiapó individuals at the Chavante aldeia at Carretão, the descendants of Caiapó relocated to that aldeia in 1795. An epidemic had destroyed the majority of the Chavante population, so the Portuguese attempted to reinvigorate the aldeia with a forced relocation from Maria I (Cruz Machado 1855:29). There were also numbers of captives living in various settlements.

MM 8-24-1833; AHEGO Livro 159 (1828-1836), f. 31v.
CHAPTER 8
THE SUCURIÚ AND PARANÁ CAIÁPO (1809–1827)

Introduction

“From what I observed in dealing with them,” a priest named João Ferreira de Oliveira Bueno wrote in 1820, “the Caiapó Indians of the Paraná are eager to embrace our holy religion and our laws.”\(^1\) He was describing his experiences with the Caiapó in 1810, when he had participated in a mission to the banks of the Paraná River, where fugitives from the Goiás aldeias at Maria I and São José de Mossâmedes had appeared and sought to trade with merchants traveling to Cuiabá. Father Oliveira Bueno found the Caiapó peaceful and willing to trade for goods; he even believed the Caiapó were open to Catholicism. Only a century before, the Caiapó had appeared on those same banks, but travelers to the mines, such as João António Cabral Camello and António Pires de Campos, had warned against their raids; a boatman foolhardy enough to make port and greet Indians appearing on the riverbanks risked almost certain disaster. The transformation of the Caiapó of the Paraná from terrifying club-wielders to peaceful Indians hailing passing canoes reflected the profound influence of the Goiás aldeias across the breadth of their territory. By the early nineteenth century, the Panará and Sucuriú Rivers had emerged as some of the most important centers of Caiapó ethnogenesis that occurred outside of the aldeias. This chapter examines evidence of the emergence of a “mission culture” related to that found at Maria I and São José de Mossâmedes.

The beginning of the nineteenth century was a tumultuous era for Brazil. In 1808, the Portuguese Crown, with British assistance, fled Napoleon’s invasion of Portugal and arrived in Rio de Janeiro. Soon after, Dom João, the ruling Prince Regent, took an
uncompromising and warlike position against the Brazilian Indians. Largely influenced by the interests of settlers then invading the forests of eastern Minas Gerais, whom the so-called “Botocudo”—a general term used to describe a number of hostile hunter-gatherers occupying the rugged territory along the borders of eastern Minas Gerais, southern Bahia, and Espírito Santo—resisted fiercely (see Langfur 2006), Dom João declared the last official war against a Brazilian people. Promulgated on May 13, 1808, the decree condemned the Botocudo, especially those of the Doce River in Minas Gerais, for “the most horrible and atrocious scenes of the most barbarous anthropophagy,” killing “the Portuguese and the tame Indians by means of wounds,” drinking their blood, and “defaming their bodies and eating their sad remains.”

The Prince Regent called for an “offensive war,” meaning authorities were to attack the Indians in their villages, dispatching bandeiras in search of them until, “moved by just terror,” the Botocudo were forced to “beg for peace and submit to the sweet servitude of law and promise to live in society.” As an incentive for governors to pursue his offensive aggressively, the Prince Regent authorized the enslavement of “all of the Botocudo taken with weapons in hand in whatever attack,” and these unfortunates, to atone for their aggressions, would labor “for the respective commander for ten years and the rest of the time in which their ferocity lasts.” The Prince Regent’s decrees were reminiscent of those the aggressive and warlike governors of Goiás and Mato Grosso had declared against the Caiapó in the preceding century. And the results were all too predictable: Indians, hostile or not, were declared to be “Botocudo” and attacked by anyone wishing to take slaves (Hemming 1987:92–93). In addition, in 1811, the offensive war the Prince Regent had declared on the Botocudo was officially extended.
to the Araguaia-Tocantins frontier. The native peoples of Goiás, at least those living in the north, no longer had to be declared “Botocudo” to be attacked and enslaved.

It was to their great misfortune that the Caiapó on the Paraná River began attracting the attention of missionaries (and slavers) shortly after Dom João’s first declaration of war on the Botocudo. Many Caiapó were cast into bondage because of the Prince Regent’s decrees. Giraldin (1997:108) has suggested that the opportunities to enslave Indians legally lay behind much of the contact that occurred on the Paraná in the wake of the Prince Regent’s declaration of war; however, the appearance of the Caiapó on the riverbanks was more linked to events occurring in Goiás. Although exactly when the Paraná Caiapó first began hailing canoes remains unknown, it was common knowledge at Porto Feliz on the Tietê River by 1809–1810. This was shortly after Damiana da Cunha set off on her first expedition in 1808. The events that unfolded on the Paraná must have been related to the ill-planned attempt to establish a trade route from Vila Boa to Pará via the Araguaia River, which provoked a Caiapó flight from the Goiás aldeias. Labor for this project was drawn from the aldeias at Maria I, São José de Mossâmedes, and Carretão (the Chavante aldeia): Indian men were forced to construct canoes and paddled them to the mouth of the Amazon—the roundtrip voyage could last more than a year—and their absence meant gardens were not cleared and their families suffered hunger and deprivation; to say nothing of the grumbling discontent provoked by the rigorous labor of paddling heavy canoes loaded with cargo. This unwise project resulted in a flight from the aldeia, initiated Damiana da Cunha’s career and fame, and was likely the reason Caiapó intermediaries told missionaries they were dissatisfied with life in Goiás in 1810 (Oliveira Bueno 1856:188).
Further, while true that the Prince Regent’s declaration was used to cast many Caiapó taken from the Paraná River into bondage—or “administration,” as it was euphemistically called—to see the contact that evolved in such terms obfuscates the interests of the Indians. The Caiapó initially sought riverboats and engaged missionaries by their own initiative and did so largely on their own terms. Although the fugitives from Goiás had turned their backs on the aldeias at Maria I and Mossâmedes, they could have avoided contact, retreating to the distant headwaters of the Araguaia or the sparsely populated sertões of the Triângulo Mineiro; precisely what many Caiapó did. Instead, they moved to the Paraná and Sucuriú Rivers, where Caiapó were already living, and where further contact with the Brazilians was possible. They set about establishing new encounters, in which they dictated the terms of the encounter, using knowledge gained at the aldeias and their own ingenuity to establish relationships that they found beneficial. Because of their choices, not just the Prince Regent’s declaration of war, the Caiapó made the Paraná River a focal point of ethnogenesis; one that, though poorly understood, rivaled the Goiás aldeias in importance.

Father Manoel Ferraz de Sampaio Botelho

Interest in the Paraná Caiapó began with the arrival of José da Costa Leite, a merchant plying the waterways between São Paulo and Mato Grosso, with three Caiapó youths in Porto Feliz in September of 1809 (DI 1894, vol. 3:125–126). The children were immediately taken away from the merchant: one was given to a man named Manuel de Almeida (he promptly disappeared with the child); and the other two children were taken to the governor of São Paulo to serve as evidence of the peaceful intention of the Caiapó (Giraldin 1997:108). Word of these Caiapó youth soon reached the local priest, Manoel Ferraz de Sampaio Botelho. He launched an investigation into the

Father Sampaio Botelho discovered merchants traveling to Cuiabá had been
encountering Caiapó “making great signs of peace and friendship” along the riverbanks (DI 1894, vol. 3:128). “[They] speak and deal confidently with our people, from whom they request many things and also give many things and demonstrations of desiring to live with us,” the priest learned. Such “demonstrations” included Caiapó attempting to jump into canoes to accompany the crews back to settlements: so many Caiapó had offered to accompany José da Costa Leite to Porto Feliz that he refused them, claiming his canoes lacked sufficient space—more likely, he was wary of having the notorious club-fighters mixed in with his rowers—though he eventually relented and accepted three youths whose parents offered them in trade (DI 1894, vol. 3:129).

Father Sampaio Botelho believed the time was nigh to begin a mission on the Paraná. He summarized his findings in a request for support that he sent to the Captain-General and Governor of São Paulo, António José da Franca e Horta. Initially, the governor responded favorably and requested a more complete plan, which Father Sampaio Botelho submitted in February of 1810. This plan called for an aggressive campaign to catechize all the natives of the Paraná region, not just the Caiapó, and envisioned 50 soldiers, handpicked by the missionary, and a contingent of converted Indians, many of whom were Caiapó living in Porto Feliz, to establish a mission above the Urubupungá falls on the Paraná River (DI 1894, vol. 3:132–133). Three large canoes and two smaller ones would carry the troops, línguas, muskets, shot and powder, tools for the construction of the settlement and fields, steel and iron to repair these tools, and food for the expedition’s use. In addition, there would be sufficient
quantities of tools, food, and various small trinkets to give to the Indians and, thereby, attract them to the settlement through largess.

This ambitious plan met with a mixed response in São Paulo. Some officials felt the plan offered many benefits to the state, as it established a new settlement and opened new lands to agriculture and commerce, but they questioned whether Father Sampaio Botelho was capable of bringing it to fruition (DI 1894, vol. 3:137–145). Another commentator questioned the utility of a settlement located in lands considered pestiferous, subject to frequent seasonal inundations, and separated from São Paulo by the numerous rapids and waterfalls of the Tietê (DI 1894, vol. 3:145–149). Because of the doubts expressed over his capabilities as a missionary, the vast scope of the proposed enterprise, and the difficulties offered by the topography, Father Sampaio Botelho’s ambitious proposal was not financed.

The loss of governmental financing did not stop Father Sampaio Botelho. Fired by what proved to be a resilient and enduring inner zeal for his faith, the priest set out to gather resources and commence a mission on his own. By promising investors the settlement he envisioned would lead to new discoveries of mineral wealth, Father Sampaio Botelho was able to outfit a retinue of 22 men and three canoes (DI 1894, vol. 3:150, 154–155, 159). Paulista greed for precious mineral deposits rumored to exist in sertões of the Paraná paved the way for this missionary to set forth in search of the Caiapó.

Father Sampaio Botelho’s expedition left Porto Feliz on July 10, 1810. On July 30, the expedition encountered Indians standing on the southern bank of the Tietê River (DI 1894, vol. 3:159). These were not friendly Caiapó; instead, the expedition’s first
encounter was with hostile “Goanhanaz” (another name for the Kaingang) from the sertões north of the Paranapanema River (DI 1894, vol. 3:155). The Kaingang called to the expedition, which, on Father Sampaio Botelho’s insistence, landed on a small island across from the beach on which the Indians stood. This was a smart move. The expedition’s crews, experienced boatmen familiar with the people of the region, eyed the weapons the Indians carried and were reluctant to approach closer. Father Sampaio Botelho, against advice, decided to make a landing and chose to accompany him the expedition’s river pilot, Francisco Nobre, and another man, Pedro Gomes. He ordered the rest of the crews to wait on the island, probably to their great relief, and, from the island’s safety, they watched from safety as a catastrophe, not unforeseen, unfolded.

The Indians, after luring the eager missionary within bowshot, attacked the lone canoe and its three occupants. Father Sampaio Botelho later wrote of this attack: “armed and arrayed for battle and commanded by an excited chief, who challenged me in loud shouts as if he had me as a captive, they fired onto us a rain of arrows” (DI 1894, vol. 3:155). An arrow struck Francisco Nobre, killing him; Pedro Gomes fired a musket into the Indians, but without effect; and Father Sampaio Botelho huddled beneath the gunwales. The two surviving men managed to escape with their lives and paddled away from the scene of the ambush as quickly as their canoe could carry them (DI 1894, vol. 3:150, 155, 160). After collecting his wits, Father Sampaio Botelho decided, despite the loss of an experienced river pilot, to continue and ordered his canoes down the Tietê River in search of friendly natives. Along the way, the expedition
saw the fires and smoke of many villages, but Father Sampaio Botelho wisely refrained from beaching to attempt further contact with these Indians.

On August 8, the expedition reached the Paraná River and almost immediately encountered four Caiapó fishing on the riverbanks (DI 1894, vol. 3:156). The next day, two Portuguese-speaking chiefs, António and José, and a dozen warriors arrived (DI 1894, vol. 3:150, 156). The Caiapó received tobacco, manioc flour, knives, and other small gifts. And, as the Caiapó hung around camp, Father Sampaio Botelho promptly set about attempting to woo them into returning to Porto Feliz. For three days, the Caiapó listened to the missionary. “In all this time with the said Captains António and José, I attended to the means of their religious instruction and reduction: the two know sufficient Portuguese but always responded with indifference at this point” (DI 1894, vol. 3:156). Consistently rebuffed, the frustrated Sampaio Botelho decided to try a new approach: he browbeat the Caiapó for leaving the Goiás aldeias and returning to the sertões, accusing them of raiding and murdering (DI 1894, vol. 3:161). This proved to be an unwise tactic. The chiefs rapidly tired of listening to their rude guest’s insults. Suddenly, the expedition found itself facing a great number of Caiapó warriors, all of whom were armed and arrayed for combat (DI 1894, vol. 3:156). The surprised and frightened missionary begged António and José not to attack, reiterated all of the goods he had generously distributed to them, and pleaded for the warriors to spare his life and the lives of his crew. His pleading appeared to work. Most of the Caiapó withdrew, though a few warriors lingered with the two chiefs to observe the expedition’s hasty packing and retreat to the safety of the river waters.
Father Sampaio Botelho’s attempt to catechize the Caiapó had failed. He was resolved in his purpose, however, and, despite suffering a murderous ambush and the near annihilation of his party, the missionary decided to continue descending the Paraná in search of converts. Three days after leaving the Caiapó chiefs António and José, the expedition encountered another group of Caiapó on the riverbanks. Once again, the Indians affably hailed the canoes, and, yet again, Father Sampaio Botelho hastened to disembark and converse with them. He discovered these Caiapó hailed from the Sucuriú River, a right-bank tributary of the Paraná once considered a stronghold of the Caiapó and, thus, avoided. The Caiapó on the riverbank included a chief named Manoel, his wife, as well as ten warriors, their wives, and their children (DI 1894, vol. 3:156–157). Just as before, Father Sampaio Botelho found himself conversing with a língua who was a fugitive from the Goiás aldeias. Manoel spoke excellent Portuguese and proved to be a sly and manipulative intermediary. “After asking about the name and health of Your Excellency and if our August and Sovereign Queen still lived,” Father Sampaio Botelho wrote (DI 1894, vol. 3:157), “he only spoke to me of their misery, seeking a means of transport to [come] here [and live among us].” Manoel tempted the missionary, telling him his village was filled with vast numbers of Caiapó who wished to enter into closer relations with Paulista settlements. And he promised the missionary that some Caiapó accompanying him on the riverbanks would return to Porto Feliz. Goods and promises were soon exchanged. Although no Caiapó jumped into the canoes or traded their children to the missionary, the Indians and the expedition amicably parted company. It was a first success for this hitherto unhappy expedition.
Buoyed by his interactions with Chief Manoel, Father Sampaio Botelho led his band further down the Paraná. They saw the rising smoke of distant campfires but encountered no Indians on the riverbanks. Father Sampaio Botelho was hesitant to push inland in search of the Indian villages whose smoke he spied, so he ordered the expedition to ascend the Tibagi River, a left-bank tributary of the Paraná, hoping to encounter friendly natives on the riverbanks. The hostile “Goanhanaz,” not the Caiapó, roamed these sertões, and this decision faced stiff opposition from crewmembers who, having already witnessed their pilot needlessly die, feared the native inhabitants.

Father Sampaio Botelho prevailed over his crew’s objections. The expedition began ascending the Tibagi on August 22 (DI 1894, vol. 3:150). For three days, the canoes passed “crystalline streams, delightful beaches covered with fine stones, and high lands and beautiful places that excite the human interest and pleasure,” yet the bucolic landscape revealed no inhabitants to the missionary and his men (DI 1894, vol. 3:157). Then, at the end of the fourth day, the expedition came upon an immense aldeia. It was so large that even the zealous and reckless Father Sampaio Botelho dared not approach closer than the riverbank. He “spent the night [near the village] hearing their conversations, boys playing, axe blows, etc,” debating in hushed tones whether to push on or retreat to the Paraná (DI 1894, vol. 3:158).

Father Sampaio Botelho lost the debate: his companions refused to approach the village, whose size frightened them, and they refused to push farther into territory roamed by hostile Indians. They mutinied, turned the canoes around, and began descending the Tibagi. On the Paraná River, some of the crewmembers abandoned Father Sampaio and, commandeering one of the river craft, headed back to Porto Feliz.
The missionary followed them, turning back and ascending the Paraná. He somehow managed to convince his remaining crewmen to reconnect with Manoel. They found no signs of the Caiapó chief or his followers at the mouth of the Sucuriú, and none of the crew would agree to ascend the river in search of the friendly chief’s aldeia (DI 1894, vol. 3:162). By now the expedition members had tired of Father Sampaio Botelho and his reckless attempts to contact Indians, whether known to be friendly or hostile, and, facing the prospect of a second mutiny, he finally turned his canoes toward home.

The earlier reservations expressed about Father Sampaio Botelho’s capability to lead a mission had proved true: he had foolishly approached hostile natives, seen a river pilot killed in a foreseeable ambush, antagonized the peaceful Caiapó, and fomented a mutiny by pushing into sertões dominated by dangerous and hostile peoples. Worse, from his investor’s perspective, Father Sampaio Botelho was returning empty-handed: he had not discovered the mineral wealth as he had promised (though through his correspondence, he strove to paint a picture of a hidden arcadia waiting to be discovered); and he had acquired no Caiapó whose labor could offset investors’ contributions to the failed expedition.

As he ascended the Paraná, Father Sampaio Botelho received another shock: the governor of São Paulo had decided to finance an expedition to the Caiapó but gave the command to a missionary from Itu, João Ferreira de Oliveira Bueno (DI 1894, vol. 3:162). Father Sampaio Botelho was unaware of this expedition and had the great—and what must have been dispiriting—surprise of coming upon a well-equipped and official mission traveling to the Caiapó. Carried by the mutineers who had earlier fled from Father Sampaio Botelho, news of the serial disasters and the missionary’s poor
leadership had already reached the second expedition. The members were well aware of the eager missionary’s propensity toward mishap and ill fortune, but they took pity on Father Sampaio Botelho and provided him with a river guide, though with great reluctance and only after extracting a promise from him not to make landfall and contact more Indians.

Father Sampaio Botelho promptly forgot this promise when, for the second time, he spied chiefs António and José, along with a great number of Caiapó, on the riverbanks (DI 1894, vol. 3:151). Experience had made Father Sampaio Botelho more cautious, so he landed his party on a huge rock in the middle of the river and summoned the Caiapó to him; but none came that day. The next day, three Caiapó—two men and a boy—rowed a rickety, old canoe out to the rock and greeted the missionary. They agreed to summon both of their chiefs. Soon, a great number of Caiapó men, women, and children appeared. Chief António accompanied them. Gifts and goods were distributed, and Father Sampaio Botelho managed to “purchase” four boys and a young girl, whom he planned on taking to Porto Feliz. A Caiapó woman, who wished to visit a son living in Porto Feliz, accompanied the missionary as well, taking along her son and daughter (DI 1894, vol. 3:151, 163). In return for these Caiapó, António demanded eight machetes. A member of the party, Francisco Alves Tosta, also wished to take another young boy, named Ignacio. But António would not agree until the child’s father, who was absent and fishing on the river, was paid. The expedition managed to find Ignacio’s father, who refused to trade his child for an axe; he demanded a higher price, a hedgebill and a knife. With Ignacio’s father paid, Father
Sampaio Botelho began the return trip to Porto Feliz—no longer empty-handed or unsuccessful in his mission.

On October 12, the expedition arrived at Porto Feliz. The Caiapó woman immediately fled with her children, perhaps to look for her son (DI 1894, vol. 3:151), and evaded her pursuers for 15 days, during which time her son succumbed to a disease he had acquired on the Tietê; the surviving fugitives were eventually returned. Father Sampaio Botelho held this woman, her daughter, and the other Caiapó while the authorities debated their fate. On November 23, the governor of São Paulo declared that the Caiapó should be treated in accordance with the Prince Regent’s decree of April 1, 1809. This decree dealt with the fate of captives taken in the war against the Botocudo and, thusly, the unfortunate Caiapó woman owed 15 years of service to Father Sampaio Botelho; while the children—girls under the age of twelve and boys under fourteen—were ordered distributed to settlers to be raised and taught trades by them. What had ostensibly begun as a mission to catechize the Caiapó had become a slaving expedition, and with the blessing of an enthusiastic, if bumbling, priest.

**João Ferreira de Oliveira Bueno**

Although the floundering Father Manoel Ferraz de Sampaio Botelho had many setbacks on the Paraná River, his fortunes were at their lowest when he discovered the governor of São Paulo had indeed sponsored an official expedition to the Caiapó. The leader of this expedition, Father João Ferreira de Oliveira Bueno, proved to be a more cautious leader than Father Sampaio Botelho, as well as a more effective and sincere missionary. He also kept a detailed diary of his exploits and encounters, which was later published in the Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográphico do Brasil (Oliveira Bueno 1856:179–193), and from which the following narrative was reconstructed.
On September 3, 1810, Father Oliveira Bueno, his brother, Capitão Miguel, and a retinue of men began a 21-day journey down the Tietê to the Paraná in three canoes. Where the two rivers flowed together, they constructed a base camp on an island in the Tietê River—a wise choice considering Father Sampaio Botelho’s earlier encounter with the natives of the south bank—and began attempting to contact the Caiapó by dispatching canoes up and down the Paraná River. On September 27, Father Oliveira Bueno and two canoes descended the Paraná to the mouth of the Sucuriú River to search for Manoel; they did not encounter the affable chief, though they noticed smoke rising from the eastern bank of the Paraná. The canoes approached the shore and, being more cautious than Father Manoel Ferraz de Sampaio Botelho, they stopped on an island to sound a horn, hoping to attract Indians to the shore. No Indians appeared—at least none openly presented themselves—and Father Oliveira Bueno began to worry that the smoke belonged to an unfriendly and hostile people, so he ordered the canoes back to the base camp. Later that night, two of the expedition’s slaves hastily returned from the Urubupungá Falls after being frightened by a group of Indians.

The next day dawned with heavy rains. Father Oliveira Bueno thought his plans to travel to the Urubupungá Falls to investigate the slaves’ report were ruined, so he decided to stay in camp. His brother, Captain Manoel, despite the inclement weather, crossed to the north bank of the Tietê and encountered three Caiapó fishing in the Paraná. They agreed to accompany him back to the base camp, where Father Oliveira Bueno (1856:186) greeted them and “gave to them knives, tobacco, farinha, beans, salt
and sugar and even ordered their hair cut.” Newly shorn and laden with gifts, the Caiapó were told to return to their village and summon their chiefs.

After celebrating a morning mass the next day, Father Oliveira Bueno heard a great clamor on the opposite riverbank: the Caiapó had arrived and, standing in the shallows, they bellowed hearty salutations to the expedition. After cautiously examining the visitors for weapons or evidence of a trap from the safety of his island camp, Father Oliveira Bueno dispatched a canoe to pick up eight Caiapó, including a woman, her “sister” of perhaps ten years of age, and the three fishermen of the previous day. They received some food, a few knives, and other small trinkets, but they were only an advanced party sent to tell the missionaries that more Caiapó were on the way, including some chiefs. Soon enough, the other Caiapó arrived, unarmed like the earlier arrivals, and hailed the expedition from the riverbank. Another canoe was dispatched to pick up the 12 waiting Caiapó. All of the Caiapó were naked, except for two men wearing modest loincloths, the chiefs. Although not named by Father Oliveira Bueno, these were the chiefs António and José. “With great zeal,” Father Oliveira Bueno (1856:186–187) greeted his new arrivals, “hugging the chiefs and treating the others with the greatest kindness,” he handed out food, cheap clothing, tobacco, knives, and some scissors. One chief requested a suit, which he received, and promptly displayed his dapper new apparel to the other Caiapó. Then, following the exchange of gifts, the two chiefs sat down to sup with the missionary and impressed him with their gentility: “they ate at my table and freely used forks, spoons, and knives, drinking with satisfaction and even toasting me.” After the meal, the father trimmed the chiefs’ hair, as well as that of the other Caiapó.
This reception and the distribution of gifts worked, and Father Oliveira Bueno found the Caiapó much more genial than Father Sampaio Botelho had on his first visit. In return for two axes, two chisels, a hoe, some large knives, a large pair of scissors, a hedgebill, food, and hooks and line, five Caiapó agreed to voyage back to Porto Feliz (Oliveira Bueno 1856:187). The other Caiapó “requested farinha, beans, meat, and salt,” which they received in return for a pledge to return for mass the next day. “Showing themselves apathetic to the absence of the others [who remained behind],” the Caiapó left, the missionary thought, “very satisfied.”

As promised, the Caiapó appeared the next day. The visitors numbered more than 20 men and two small children, but no women. More gifts were distributed, and both children were “purchased” for a few trinkets. A mass followed, which the Caiapó “watched with extraordinary respect, consecrating themselves and doing everything that my people did.” After the service, Father Oliveira Bueno (1856:187–188) lectured the Caiapó and “made them see the sad life that they spend in the middle of the sertões, without necessities and shelter from their maladies, exposed to being eaten by wild beasts.” He promised the Crown would provide them with “lands to build their village, clothing, tools, and food to feed themselves.” “After a brief pause,” he recalled, “one of the chiefs, who from my perspective had the greater authority, responded that considering my utterances and their great love of the Our Lord the Prince Regent, they were ready to leave those sertões” (DI 1894, vol. 3:170).

For a moment, it appeared that Father Oliveira Bueno had succeeded at establishing a new mission and in acquiring a new supply of labor for the settlers, and, then, the chief continued to speak. The Caiapó, he claimed, did not know how to
navigate the notorious rapids of the Tietê River and, for the time being, had to remain in the sertões (DI 1894, vol. 3:152). The chief offered a solution to this problem, however, and suggested the missionary return with at least ten canoes loaded with food, trade goods, and gifts. Once the canoes and gifts arrived, the chiefs would summon all of the villages in the region to accompany the missionary. The chiefs claimed they led their own aldeia, as well as two others above the Urubupungá Falls—one large and the other small—and they told of three more aldeias on the Sucuriú, which were controlled by a different chief—this unnamed chief was Manoel—who would also ascend the Tietê. They would do this, the chiefs claimed, because the governor of São Paulo was “good” unlike “the general of Goiás[…] [who] was not good because he did not give them tools or clothing” (Oliveira Bueno 1856:188).  

After the startling proposal, the Caiapó invited the missionary to visit their village, which sat above the Urubupungá Falls, and they prepared to leave. They requested, and received, pots and clothing for the women of their village; farinha, beans, meat, and salt for the men; and the two chiefs were given a special gift of “some bottles of firewater and spirits.” As they parted, the Caiapó told Father Oliveira Bueno that he was “a good white man.”

It was a clever plan the chief—we do not know if it was António or José, unfortunately—proposed. It showed great familiarity with missionaries, as well as a willingness to use this knowledge against them. From his experience in Goiás, the chief knew that a tale of six populous aldeias—all of whose inhabitants were open to salvation, naturally—would tempt the missionary into returning. But the chief wisely obfuscated his unwillingness to migrate by proposing a logistical nightmare that required
Father Oliveira Bueno to return with ten canoes loaded with gifts and crews capable of navigating the treacherous waters of the Tietê; the near impossibility of this proposal would permit the Caiapó to remain in the sertões. Nonetheless, the chief knew the missionaries would very likely return the following year, if not earlier, with gifts and other goods.

The next day, the first of October, the Father Oliveira and his party ascended the Paraná to the Urubupungá Falls (Oliveira Bueno 1856:189). Father Oliveira Bueno (1856:189) “saw on the western bank, the Indians that were waiting,” and “ordered the canoes steered toward the site, the port of their village.” The missionary “embraced one of the chiefs […] then greeted the women with [gifts of] mirrors, scissors and tobacco.” He asked the chief to give him “some women and men” and received three couples and some children in exchange for “three axes, two hedgebills, some knives, and other trifles [including] a vest of rough red cloth and a shirt.”

While these exchanges occurred, runners were dispatched to get the children of one of the couples from the aldeia, which sat farther inland “on the edge of the campo, a half league from the river and next to a beautiful stream.” These children soon arrived, but they were accompanied by the other chief—again, we do not know if this was António or José—who angrily confronted the other chief, accusing him of undercutting the plan he had proposed the previous day. The enraged chief then turned on the surprised Father Oliveira Bueno, bitterly berating him for carrying off his brother-in-law, a youth named João. Just as suddenly, the angry tirade ended. The chief relaxed and offered to exchange a Portuguese-speaking youth named Agostino for João. He then
reiterated that he expected the missionary to return the following year with ten canoes of trading truck.

The astonished Father Oliveira Bueno was still reeling from the chief’s tirade when an old and irate woman arrived at the riverbank. “She screamed at me in her language, beating her foot on the ground.” Frightened, the missionary stumbled back, believing that the old woman was about to assault him, but one of the chiefs intervened. “I do not know what he said to her,” the confused missionary later wrote in his diary, “I only know that she soon calmed herself, and asking what she was saying, the interpreter responded that she was complaining that I was carrying away her children.” To help calm the old woman, Father Oliveira Bueno gave her a mirror, a pair of scissors, and some tobacco, and, he believed, “she soon became my friend.” As the canoes readied to leave, this woman gave her daughter a lengthy discourse filled with advice, and then helped push the canoes from the banks.

Before the canoes had floated away, the two chiefs again stated that the missionary should return the following year, and they requested more rice, beans, and salt. Father Oliveira Bueno did not have these supplies with him, so he invited the Caiapó to send someone to his camp to pick up the goods. Three Caiapó quickly jumped into a rickety canoe and paddled along after the missionary to his camp. They were given the requested goods and returned some sacks and the bottles of alcohol—which were now empty—that Father Oliveira Bueno had given the chiefs the previous day. The Caiapó then departed for their aldeia.

The tense interaction between Father Oliveira Bueno and the Caiapó indicated the river trade had created tensions within their aldeia. A contest had emerged over how
best to proceed in dealing with the missionaries (Giralдин 1997:113): one chief had proposed an ingenious (and near impossible) plan to relocate the Caiapó to Porto Feliz; but the other chief, who was willing to trade Caiapó bodies for goods, undercut his rival’s plan and authority. The acrimonious exchange occurred between a chief with “greater authority,” that is, a chief occupying a traditional leadership position based on personal prestige, and an intermediary, whose power was based on the ability to interact with missionaries and boatmen and acquire goods. In addition to feuds and power struggles between chiefs and intermediaries, Father Oliveira Bueno witnessed the inequality associated with contact and the ability of a few individuals to control trade goods, as some Caiapó were neither able to trade nor effectively interact with non-Caiapó. The old woman, for instance, arrived in a rage, stamping her feet, and screaming at the bewildered priest, who could only guess at her intent. Unable to speak Portuguese, she relied on the familiar language of violence to communicate. When the missionary learned the reason this woman was angry—from a Portuguese-speaking intermediary no less—he provided her with a few goods and, in his words, made a “friend” of her.

After “purchasing” 17 Caiapó and surviving encounters with an enraged Caiapó chief and an angry mother, Father Oliveira Bueno broke camp and began the arduous ascent up the Tietê. One of the Caiapó women was pregnant and gave birth during the return trip. Father Oliveira Bueno (1856:191) observed in surprise that she “wash[ed]…the newborn in cold water, [and] with her own hands made a hole in the ground in which she buried the afterbirth.” The newborn was wrapped in a blanket and, along with her mother, placed on a leather groundsheet and covered with a warm
blanket to keep out the night chill. Later in the evening, the mother and her child were discovered “off of the leather and entirely nude, because the mother had thrown off the covers, and this on a river and a large pool with millions of mosquitoes.” The incident disturbed Father Oliveira Bueno and he felt the birth was similar to that of “wild beasts.” The mother and newborn survived the birth, chilled air, and mosquitoes and, apparently, were no worse for the experience, since both survived the river voyage.

The expedition arrived at Porto Feliz on November 6. All of the Caiapó survived and, soon after returning, Father Oliveira Bueno dispatched a letter to the governor of São Paulo, promising to come to the city with the new arrivals (DI 1894, vol. 3:154–155). The missionary believed the mission was a success, as he had amicably traded with the Caiapó, established the basis for future interactions, and “purchased” 17 Caiapó for the meager price of a few tools, trinkets, and some food. It is not known if the Caiapó returning with Father Oliveira Bueno ever made the journey to São Paulo; in fact, little was recorded about what became of them. Judging by what occurred with the eight Caiapó returning with Father Sampaio Botelho, the adults were almost certainly subjected to 15 years of labor and the children distributed to local residents for administration and education. Father Oliveira Bueno later learned that Antônio and José had inquired into his whereabouts and complained bitterly that they were forgotten when the promised ten canoes of goods had failed to materialize (DI 1894, vol. 3:171). But Father Oliveira Bueno did not forget about the Caiapó. Although he never returned to the Paraná, the missionary wrote many letters describing his adventures and supported efforts to catechize the Caiapó for many years afterward.
Missions to the Paraná Caiapó after 1810

Contact between the Caiapó and the Paulistas continued in the years after 1810. Various expeditions descended the Tietê to trade with the Caiapó, purchased a few individuals, and returned them to settlements where the Caiapó became captives and owed their captors years of labor. Local authorities continued to justify this practice through the sly manipulating of the Prince Regent’s decrees authorizing the enslavement of captives taken in combat. No less of a figure than the zealous Father Sampaio Botelho—who, despite his bumbling on the Paraná, continued to spearhead efforts to catechize the Caiapó—became involved in this trade. He managed to convince Paulista investors that he was capable of returning from the Paraná with the Caiapó, promising souls for the Church, labor for the state, and the possible discovery of rich mineral deposits. Unfortunately, the Paulistas financing the expeditions were more interested in Caiapó labor and the possibilities of mineral wealth than the salvation of souls. They soon clashed with the ebullient missionary over the propagation of the Faith and the need for labor. The missionary lost, and it was soon clear, even to willfully blind authorities, that an illicit slave trade was operating on the Tietê.

Unfortunately, these later expeditions were not as well documented as those of 1810. We know from Father Sampaio Botelho’s brief accounts that he sent a canoe of trade goods and small gifts to the Caiapó in 1812; the canoe returned with a number of individuals, including a daughter of Chief Manoel named Coxim (DI 1894, vol. 3:191). In 1815, Father Sampaio Botelho returned to the Paraná, spending 20 days among the Caiapó; he again encountered and interacted with the chiefs António, José, and Manoel. During this visit, the missionary learned that two of the aldeias near the Tietê River had combined to form a single aldeia, and that there were another three in the
From this, we can surmise that contact with boatmen was affecting the Caiapó villages, leading to a regional reorganization and coalescing of village, perhaps associated with population decline brought about by the loss of individuals traded for goods or the outbreak of epidemic disease.

The chiefs again steered Father Sampaio Botelho’s encounter. They permitting him to trade and proselytize but were unwilling to grant the missionary free reign in their aldeias. Knowing he risked disaster if he pushed the chiefs too far or castigated them too openly, Sampaio Botelho held back, as he “feared to upset our plan [to return with Caiapó]” (DI 1894, vol. 3:167). And he sadly informed his supporters that he “could not bring more than 20 Indians boys” back with him. Still, this was a large haul of captives purchased for an insignificant price. He also carried promises and requests from the Caiapó leaders:

These chiefs swore [...] the most faithful submission and profound obedience to our August Sovereign whose protection they claim…in order to enter into the flock of Our Lord Jesus Christ. They wish to have in that land a church with a father, and all the resources for their needs, weapons to defend themselves from their enemies, [and] classes on literature and arts. [DI, vol. 3: 191]

One has to wonder if the chiefs actually requested lessons in literature and arts; such a request most likely originated with Father Sampaio Botelho. The affirmations of loyalty, vassalage, and submission to the Crown and Church ring true: the Caiapó, after all, had made similar such statements to Father Oliveira Bueno, and they knew these claims would find a warm reception with the missionaries and government officials capable of supplying the desired “resources” and “weapons.”

More interesting than affirmations of loyalty, Father Sampaio Botelho also returned with a fascinating request from Chief Manoel. In return for his support, the wily chief
requested the Paulistas confer patents of rank “to confirm [himself] and the other [Caiapó] officers […] in the positions in which they are already employed to serve better his Royal Highness in reducing the other aldeias and promising to give people when ordered” (DI 1894, vol. 3:167). The proposed hierarchy was based on European-style military ranks culled from Manoel’s service with the pedestres in Goiás: Manoel fancied himself capitão (“chief”) and “governor of all of the aldeias adjacent to the margins of the Paraná River”; his brother Joaquim was an alferes (“ensign”); two individuals named Agostinho and Bernardo were sargentos (“sergeants”); and, there were two cabos (“corporals”), named José António and João (DI 1894, vol. 3:168). This request met with support from local officials to whom a leadership scheme based on military ranks was easily intelligible; further, it was believed that the newly appointed chiefs would facilitate trade and provide needed labor (DI 1894, vol. 3: 166). Conferring these ranks reinforced hierarchy in the Caiapó villages, since those intermediaries with patents were, in the eyes of the Brazilians, distinguished from those without rank. The Caiapó who possessed these ranks effectively became the appropriate leaders for the missionaries and boatmen to seek out, and it was through them that gifts and goods flowed into their villages. Indeed, with his position solidified in the eyes of government officials, Manoel became the preferred intermediary for expeditions to seek and, within a decade, was the most important of the Paraná chiefs. His fame even reached to distant Cuiabá.

Unfortunately, we know very little about the events unfolding on the Paraná between 1815 and 1826. Father Sampaio Botelho did not return to the Caiapó. Because authorities were reluctant to invest in his plans, he had supported his mission
through donations solicited from local residents. He “formed an organization with the intention of dividing the Indians he conducted [from the Paraná] among the members to be adopted by them as children or pupils [and] by this means more easily reducing them to the bosom of the Church and making them into useful citizens” (DI 1894, vol. 3:165). Saving souls meant providing labor, and Father Sampaio Botelho’s donors expected the Caiapó returning with him to be thrust into legal bondage according to the Prince Regent’s decrees (DI 1937 vol. 59: 119). It was a good relationship from their perspective: the missionary provided a gilding of religious and moral legitimacy to what were really slaving expeditions.

There was, however, a fundamental flaw in the investors’ plans to enslave the Caiapó. Their chosen agent was fired by apostolic fervor, not slaver’s greed, and “uninterested” in outright slaving, too “charitable” toward the Indians, and brought only “those that desired to accompany him or voluntarily gave themselves to him” (DI 1915, vol. 44:123). The Caiapó ascending the Tietê, thus, were few in number, and, even worse from an investor’s perspective, Father Sampaio Botelho attempted to keep the Indians under his control. In 1815, his donors “were little satisfied with the accounting and distribution that the father did with the [20] Indians” (DI 1894, vol. 3:182). Disappointed and disgruntled, the investors decided to cut their losses and turned away from the missionary. When Father Sampaio Botelho proposed another expedition to the Paraná in 1816, he was unable to secure the necessary capital (DI 1894, vol. 3:178–181).

Expeditions to “purchase” Caiapó continued without Father Sampaio Botelho. The true purpose of the expeditions became increasingly apparent, even to willingly ignorant
authorities, since replacing Father Sampaio Botelho with someone both capable of leading expeditions and providing a legitimate cover for the ongoing enslavement of the Caiapó proved difficult. The problem was, in the eyes of one ouvidor (“judge”), the lack of agents capable of “conciliating themselves with the interests of religion and the state” (DI 1894, vol. 3:183), which meant providing labor under the pretext of saving souls. The judge lamented that even “knowing in Father Ferraz [de Sampaio Botelho] some defects, he is the only that I know who wishes to go to the Paraná out of enthusiasm, all the others [do so] for the immediate interest of helping themselves to the Indians that they take from there and nothing else.” Such was the case with a Paulista named José Velho Moreira who claimed to have twice traded with the Caiapó and requested permission to travel to the Paraná in 1816: authorities declined the request, finding him too old, too dishonest, and too obviously interested in acquiring labor (DI 1915, vol. 44:117–126). One merchant, a certain José Goes e Pacheco, was known to have brought a number of Caiapó back from the Paraná and to have treated them well; but authorities were unfamiliar with him and, despite his reputation for treating Caiapó captives kindly, wary of authorizing him (DI 1894, vol. 3:183). Both men faced opposition from Father Sampaio Botelho: he lodged a futile complaint against them in an attempt to save his mission (DI 1894, vol. 3:182). In the end, José Goes e Pacheco received a license to trade with the Caiapó and, in early 1817, returned with 21 captives, of whom 13 were given to ten investors (DI 1894, vol. 3: 184–186).12

Abandoned by local interests, Father Sampaio Botelho continued to dispatch a continuous stream of letters extolling the apostolic glory of his activities. Although he eventually succeeded in obtaining the moral support of the Crown in 1819 (DI 1902 vol.
36:87–88), such sponsorship accounted for little without financial backing. And, in the end, Father Sampaio Botelho, despite repeated efforts to return to the Paraná (see e.g., DI, vol. 3:177–181, 190–192), never again visited the Caiapó.

**The Paraná Caiapó in 1826**

The slaving expeditions to the Caiapó continued after 1816, and, when the Caiapó next appear in documents, a full a decade later, boatmen had become incredibly familiar with their villages. In 1826, the Langsdorff expedition, a team of naturalists, scientists, and artists visiting Brazil under the sponsorship of the Russian Czar Alexander I, visited the Paraná Caiapó and entered one of their aldeias.¹³ Hercules Florence (n.d.), a French-born artist traveling with the expedition, wrote a short description of the visit that shows the degree to which the boatmen and Caiapó had become accustomed to visiting one another.

As soon as it arrived at the confluence of the Tietê and Paraná Rivers, the Langsdorff expedition discovered signs of the Caiapó (Florence n.d.:34). They spied the remains of a campfire on the riverbank and a hammock made of vines dangled from near the top of a lofty tree. Florence believed the hammock served as a shelter against jaguar attacks for those slumbering on the riverbanks, but it would have provided little security from the tree-climbing cats. It did provide a keen lookout from which to observe simultaneously the Paraná and Tietê Rivers for canoes and rafts. Indeed, the Caiapó aldeia itself was ideally situated for intercepting river traffic. It sat approximately a league above the confluence of the Tietê with the Paraná, a location from which the inhabitants could easily interact with boats traveling on both rivers.

By 1826, initiating contact with the Caiapó was more or less formalized. One of the expedition’s guides attempted to summon the Caiapó by blowing on a horn made of
cow's horn, whose powerful sound reverberated across the waters of the Paraná and into the hinterlands. Florence (n.d.:35–36) turned his gaze “to the opposite bank, curious to see the Indians redden the beach, according to the picturesque expression of one of our comrades.” But no Caiapó appeared. So the disappointed party decided to cross the river and investigate. They boarded their canoes and crossed the river to the banks where the Caiapó usually greeted canoes. The Caiapó, it was well known, lived inland a short walk from the Urubupungá Falls, so the Langsdorff pushed inland, following a “wide and clean” trail for half a league until the riparian forest gave way to rolling savannah (Florence n.d.:36). At the transition between the forest and the savannah, the Caiapó had built their village. This location provided access to a variety of game, plants, and other natural resources from both the forest and savannah. And it also meant the Caiapó did not have to travel far to plant their gardens; indeed, near the edge of the forest, only a short walk away from the Caiapó village, Florence spied banana and papaya trees.

The Caiapó had not appeared at the riverbanks, the expedition discovered, because they were not home. The village was completely empty. Somewhat disappointed, Florence (n.d.:36) began exploring the village. It was circular and built around a central plaza. There were ten huts on the periphery and “in the middle of them [...] a hut that seemed to be owned in common.” This was the men’s house. It was filled with heavy logs, which, because the ends of these were hollow, Florence (n.d.:36) thought to be drums. In fact, these logs were used during races; the cavities merely provided racers with a grip to secure the heavy load on their shoulders during the race.
Except for the central hut, the Caiapó houses were all nearly identical—simple affairs much like those Saint-Hilaire and Pohl observed—though the house identified as the village chief’s was larger than the others. The doors of the houses were shut and secured by simple loops of vines. Curious to see what was inside the houses, the members of the Langsdorff expedition slipped the vine locks off the doors and slipped inside for a look around. The Caiapó homes, the intruders discovered, were filled with a kind of aggressive stinging insect that assailed their feet and scrambled up their pants legs—perhaps an appropriate punishment for the intrusion—so Florence and the others hastily retreated, regretting their inquisitiveness. Other than the biting insects, the Caiapó homes were empty.

The expedition, hoping the Caiapó would return, waited a half hour in the village. But the Indians never appeared, and someone—most likely a river pilot or a boatman—told Langsdorff that they had gone to their gardens on the Sucuriú River (Florence n.d.:36). Before leaving, Langsdorff ordered a pile of knives, axes, and other small goods left in the village plaza for the Caiapó to find. The day was too late to shoot the rapids, so expedition spent the night on the riverbanks. They encountered more Caiapó huts, “nothing more than palm fronds supported by forked sticks” (Florence n.d.:37), whose expedient form and lack of nearby gardens suggest temporary shelters used for hunting, fishing, and trekking.

Giraldin (1997:118–119) believed the failure of the Caiapó to appear when summoned by the guide’s horn and the unoccupied village indicated depopulation had occurred in the years since 1810. He argued the Caiapó practice of trading people for goods led to the abandonment of the aldeias on the Paraná. While true that large
numbers of Caiapó were ascending the Tietê River with missionaries and boatmen, particularly the latter, and this must have resulted in depopulation, very little evidence suggests the aldeia Langsdorff visited was abandoned. To the contrary, the evidence suggests a temporary abandonment, perhaps, as Florence was told, a trek to the Sucuriú. First, the expedition encountered campfires, a lofty sentinel’s outpost, and expedient shelters on the riverbanks. All of this evidence indicated the Caiapó were recently in the area. Second, the aldeia was not decrepit or slowly being reclaimed by the savannahs and forests. The Caiapó homes, unlike those Saint-Hilaire and Pohl observed at the abandoned Maria I aldeia, appeared in good repair with doors secured with vines. This suggests the inhabitants intended to return. Third, Florence was told the Caiapó were away on the Sucuriú River; he was not told the village was abandoned. The boatmen guiding the Langsdorff expedition obviously knew how to summon the Caiapó to the beaches, were familiar with beach landing where the Caiapó greeted canoes, and knew the trails leading inland to the village. If the village had been abandoned, such knowledgeable guides surely would have known. Fourth, Langsdorff left gifts for the Caiapó. He did so because he believed they would return to the village and find them. All the evidence suggests the Caiapó had not abandoned the aldeia but were simply “not home” when Langsdorff called. Rather than having abandoned their village, the Caiapó were tending gardens on the Sucuriú River, as Florence was told, or trekking. Wherever the Caiapó went—and we will never truly know—they secured the doors of their homes and did not expected nosy Europeans to snoop about uninvited.

**The Caiapó of the Sucuriú River in 1827**

On December 26, 1826, several months after visiting the Caiapó aldeia, the Langsdorff expedition encountered another band of explorers on the Taquari River.
Hailing from Cuiabá, this second expedition was searching for a shorter river rumored to exist between Cuiabá and São Paulo. There was an old rumor, dating to around mid-eighteenth century, that a canoe fleeing from the Paiaguá Indians had become hopelessly lost in the swamps but eventually found its way home via the Sucuriú River. If such a route existed, it eliminated the difficult Pardo River with its many waterfalls and rapids that required time consuming portages (Holanda 1945:150). The problem was the Sucuriú: it was home to vast numbers of Caiapó who made exploration dangerous, if not impossible, and the river was avoided by all but the most brave or foolhardy explorers for much of the century. The tale of the lost canoe was likely apocryphal, but the belief that the Sucuriú offered a quicker route to the interior was strong enough that expeditions were sent to investigate the area in the early nineteenth century (Bueno 1885; Alincourt 2006). By that time, however, the Caiapó were no longer viewed as a formidable impediment to exploration; they were, in fact, seen as a valuable source of information and guides capable of making the long-rumored route a reality.

Because the Mato Grosso expedition believed they needed assistance from the Caiapó, they carried instructions to contact Chief Manoel. Manoel’s reputation as a reliable chief and intermediary had grown since 1810. It was common knowledge, even in far away Cuiabá, that he spoke Portuguese—which he had taught to his wife and family—and had served as a pedestre in Goiás (Bueno 1885:15). Further, Manoel had told other boatmen that routes to Goiás and Mato Grosso existed, though he alluded that only the Caiapó knew these routes (Bueno 1885:15–16; DI 1915, vol. 44:118). So the President of Mato Gross, João Saturnino da Costa Pereira, who had decided to investigate the possibility of a route through the Sucuriú, wrote a letter to Manoel:
Capitão Manoel,

The Lieutenant Pedro Gomes do Prado seeks an easy route from Cuiabá to Porto Feliz and a trail to carry the canoes from the rapids of the Piquiri to the headwaters of the Sucuriú. And, as I know that you are my friend and I desire to be yours, and because they say you are a good man, I send to you...a gift of tools and clothes for you and your wife. I desire that you show the Lieutenant the route through the Sucuriú until the trail to the Piquiri; I shall be much obliged to you and all of your people that help, and conserving your good friendship with me, I shall never forget to favor you. If you wish to send one of your people with the Lieutenant to visit me, I shall treat him well and through him send more goods. Regards to your wife and all of your people, since I wish to be their friend. Cuiabá, July 31, 1826.

This letter, which the president of Mato Grosso knew would appeal to the chief and his followers, contained all of the usual promise of fidelity, friendship and, importantly, trade goods. And, to sweeten the deal, the president of Mato Grosso dispatched a letter to the Crown requesting Manoel be pardoned for deserting his post as a pedestre (Bueno 1885:16). The Crown granted this pardon and, in the event the Caiapó aided the exploration of the Sucuriú, Manoel was to be granted a sergeant’s pension.

On August 1, 1826, the expedition left Cuiabá. After descending the Pardo and ascending the Paraná, it arrived on the Sucuriú in March of 1827. It visited an aldeia that belonged to Manoel, which was empty “but with all the signs of not having been abandoned” (Bueno 1885:18). They then decided to find Manoel and, on March 13, began ascending the Sucuriú. Ten days later, they encountered paths leading from the banks of the river into the interior. The expedition disembarked, and 20 men accompanied by a Caiapó língua—a woman from Camapuã—made their way inland a half-league until they arrived at a village. The sudden appearance of the outsiders created a panic, as frightened Caiapó quickly fled into the campo. The língua called after them in their language, which stopped some of those fleeing, and a number of
Caiapó timidly reappeared from the forest upon hearing one of the intruders speaking in their language. The Caiapó approached the intruders to see what they wanted.

They happily learned that the expedition wanted information and guides, not slaves. The aldeia, “according to one [Caiapó] that knew how to speak Portuguese, did not have a chief [present], because Capitão Manoel was the chief” (Bueno 1885:18). But Manoel was away working on his fields, “there was only an Indian nominated by him to govern the others for whom they had much respect,” so the expedition questioned this man and other Caiapó about the river route. They received dismaying answers: the Caiapó claimed to have no knowledge of a river route to Cuiabá, saying only “that very far from there was found a river that ran to Goiás,” by which they probably meant the Araguaia. Discouraged, the expedition members returned to the river; followed the entire way by a number of curious Caiapó. A few goods were distributed to the Caiapó, including knives, beads, fishhooks, mirrors, and other small items.

The next day, the expedition was again approached by a small group of Caiapó, who received some gifts. Then, a larger and more cautious group of Indians appeared, “50 or 60 souls between men, women, and children, [all] totally nude” (Bueno 1885:19). They had come to trade, bringing squash, potatoes (probably sweet potatoes), manduví (“peanuts”), and other foodstuffs to exchange for goods. This proved to be the last time that the expedition saw the Caiapó.

After trading with the Indians, the expedition ascended the Sucuriú for several days but found only waterfalls and rapids. Running low on food, they turned about, headed back to the Paraná, and stopped at the aldeia for a second time. It was “deserted with all the signs of abandonment,” so the party pushed further inland to “the
plantations [but] without encountering in them any Indians” (Bueno 1885:19–20).

Confused, the party returned to its canoes, “without discovering the cause of such behavior,” and continued the voyage downstream. They never encountered Manoel or, for that matter, the rumored route to Cuiabá.

Conclusion

The interaction on the Paraná and Sucuriú Rivers illustrated the vast changes that had occurred, and were occurring, among the Caiapó in the wake of 1780. First, there was language: although the missionaries traveling to the Paraná brought línguas, their skills were largely unnecessary because of the presence of Portuguese-speaking Caiapó at every encounter. Second, warfare had declined: from the Caiapó perspective, manufactured goods and tools remained the economic motivation behind the contact, but trade, not warfare, was the primary means of acquiring goods. Third, hierarchy had emerged: formerly independent Caiapó villages had fallen under the sway of powerful intermediaries and chiefs. Language skills, trade, and the emergence of the inter-village chiefs were interrelated: it was language skills and concomitant ability to mediate trade that permitted these intermediaries and chiefs to rise to positions of power.

At first glance, the emergence of regional chiefs appears to signal a radical transformation of the Caiapó. Each eighteenth-century village, after all, had had its own chief, and no chief possessed regional powers over other villages. But the Goiás aldeias had reinforced hierarchy in Caiapó villages by recognizing certain chiefs as the appropriate leaders through whom goods, tasks, and punishments were distributed. It was natural that hierarchy began to develop among villages in the sertões, since the Caiapó brought with them what they learned at the aldeias. However, we should not
discount autochthonous roots for the emergence of chiefs like Manoel. Loose ties of kinship, cooperation, and exchange had always connected Caiapó villages; and there were mechanisms that enabled villages to come together for the purpose of attacking mining settlements. The Caiapó possessed the ability to organize at a regional level, however loosely, before the Goiás aldeias, but such organization was for the purpose of waging war, not trade. The Paraná chiefs exploited the loose regional networks between villages when they began consolidating their power over the villages in the region. Unlike earlier Caiapó chiefs, however, they trafficked in trade, not war. This reflected the broadening of the Caiapó ability to acquire goods. One of the reasons the Caiapó had raided was to pillage goods; indeed, the acquisition of goods was often the economic motor that drove attacks on settlements and convoys; and it was one of the principal reasons the Caiapó settled at Maria I. War declined in importance as a means for capturing goods after Maria I—though this remains difficult to quantify—since the Caiapó could expect gifts and learned how to work to purchase goods. This did not end to the Caiapó ability to organize their villages at a regional level. Instead of organizing raids to capture plunder, chiefs and línguas organized and controlled trade. And, though war was never truly replaced as a means of acquiring prestige, the ability to mediate contact and access to manufactured goods became a way for leaders to acquire prestige and followers.

This was best embodied in chief Manoel. He was a very sophisticated intermediary and capable of exploiting Caiapó and European traditions to his own ends. Much like the more famous Damiana da Cunha, Manoel’s rise to power was associated with the skills he learned at the Goiás aldeias. Principal of these was his mastery of
Portuguese, which he “taught not only to his wife and children but to some other Indians of his aldeia” (Bueno 1885:15), and, thereby, created a privileged group, many of them related to him, through whom trade goods flowed. Manoel also understood European-style hierarchy, politics, and religion, and he used this understanding in his interactions with missionaries and boat crews. The former pedestre sought patents of rank because he knew from experience that government officials, missionaries, and boatmen placed importance on titles. Manoel knew that capturing the symbolic power of rank legitimated him as a proper intermediary. He wooed missionaries by claiming his followers desired to become Christians, alluding to his followers’ willingness to become “civilized” in the full knowledge that missionaries, like Father Sampaio Botelho, would return bearing much-desired gifts. From what we can tell, Manoel’s efforts were very successful. By 1826, he was the primary Caiapó chief on the Paraná, at least in the eyes of expeditions traveling to the region, and his hold over trade was powerful enough that, at least on the Sucuriú River, he was able to appoint bosses in villages.

Yet, somehow, Chief Manoel disappeared from history. Nor was he alone in slipping into historical oblivion. The Paraná Caiapó, like their most prominent chief, disappeared in the years following 1827. Although the reasons for their disappearance were never recorded, we can suppose the Caiapó came to suffer grievously from the visiting missionaries and boatmen. By 1857, the aldeia visited by the Langsdorff expedition was abandoned. In that year, Dr. Kupfer (1870), a German, visited the site. The Caiapó were long gone, he observed, the aldeia completely abandoned. The houses were flattened and swept away by the elements—they were practically erased, in fact—and the savannah had slowly reclaimed much of the plaza where, some thirty
years before, Langsdorff had left tools and gifts for the missing Indians. Kupfer questioned why the aldeia was abandoned, since, to his discerning eye, the surrounding campo appeared fertile and the nearby waterfall was full of fish and other resources. He was told the Caiapó had left because the Brazilians visited too frequently. It was a plausible enough explanation—and one that had more than a bit of truth to it.

Indeed, visitors were the reason the Caiapó had abandoned their aldeia. But the unwelcome visitors were neither Brazilian nor intentionally carried to the Paraná. The old river route to Cuiabá was gradually being abandoned in the early nineteenth century (Morse 1965:165). So it was unlikely that pesky visits from boatmen alone drove the Caiapó away, since there were simply not as many canoes plying the old river route to Cuiabá. Judging by the willingness of the Paraná Caiapó to interact with missionaries and boatmen, visits from Brazilians likely became too few and too infrequent in the 1830s. But the canoes that did arrive at the riverbanks, however, carried a most unwelcome visitor—disease. The final canoes traveling to Cuiabá along the so-called “monsoon” route left Porto Feliz sometime around 1838. In that year, an outbreak of Typhoid devastated settlements along the Tietê, killing most of the guides and boatmen capable of making the trip to Cuiabá; this effectively ended the convoys of canoes traveling to and from Cuiabá (Morse 1965:165).

Sadly, the epidemic that killed the river guides and boat crews appears to have reached the Caiapó villages. We can only imagine its impact, but it must have been severe. There appears to have been a collapsed in population—the numerous villages of Caiapó on the Tietê, Sucuriú, and Verde Rivers disappeared—and reports of encounters with boatmen on the Paraná ceased. The surviving inhabitants of the
aldeias led by Manoel, Antônio, and José must have fled. Some of them appeared at Santana do Paranaíba, where a government-sponsored aldeia had been established in the 1830s. There, in 1857, Kupfer encountered Caiapó who claimed they had earlier lived in the Tietê. This was probably a reference to the aldeias visited by Father Sampaio Botelho and Hercules Florence. Typhoid, it appears, ended the Caiapó presence on the Paraná River.

Disease once again played its pernicious role. It removed the Paraná and Sucuriú Rivers as an alternative pole of independent ethnogenesis only a few years after the Goiás aldeias finally collapsed. Interestingly, many of Caiapó fleeing the Goiás aldeias and the Paraná chose to return to a state-supported aldeia and continue their interactions with outsiders. In fact, the failure of the Mossâmedes aldeia led to a proliferation of Caiapó aldeias—of which Santana do Paranaíba was only one—in regions as distant as Camapuã and the Triângulo Mineiro. And it was in these aldeias, we shall see in the chapter that follows, that most of the Caiapó lived until the early twentieth century.

1 BN II-35,26,45.
3 Porto Feliz was the port from which the flotillas making the fluvial voyage to Cuiabá embarked in the eighteenth century.
4 Pohl (1951:172-173) had a similar experience with the Chavante in August of 1819. His experience in all likelihood matches that of Capitão José da Costa Leite and is worth recounting here. Pohl encountered the Chavante early one morning on the west bank of the Sono River in Goiás. At first, there were only a few individuals, but they gradually grew in number; eventually, Pohl estimated, there were 200 or more Chavante on the riverbanks. They called to the party, making signs that they should approach, which Pohl’s party refused to do, fearing the reputation of these club-fighters. The Austrian was intrigued, however, and managed to convince his party to approach. Fifty Chavante, leaving their weapons on the banks, plunged into the river and surrounded the canoes. They carried baskets and small gourds filled with palm fruits, maize, and peanuts, which they eagerly presented for trade. One of the Chavante offered Pohl a 16 year-old girl in exchange for an iron hoe. Pohl’s Indian servant, Luís, found the girl attractive and wished to accept the trade, but the astonished Pohl indignantly refused to allow this. After exchanging a few items, the party moved on, leaving the friendly Chavante behind.
5 The following reconstruction of Father Sampaio Botelho’s mission to the Paraná River is based off the letters written by the Father himself (DI 1894, vol. 3:154-158) and the Capitão-Mor of Porto Feliz, Francisco Correa de Moraes Leite (DI 1894, vol. 3:150-152, 159-164).
In 1811, Francisco Correa de Moraes Leite (DI 1894, vol. 3:161), disputed this. He claimed Chief Manoel neither hailed the Portuguese Crown nor spoke Portuguese well. As will be seen, the evidence points toward Manoel being fluent in Portuguese customs and language.

Father Sampaio Botelho was obviously very disappointed with this discovery. His account of the voyage abbreviated this part of the voyage (DI, vol. 3:154-158), conveniently leaving out the encounter with the second expedition.

Giraldin (1997:111, 131 n. 25) suggested the Caiapó wore penis sheaths; however, Oliveira Bueno (1856:186) merely attributed the two chiefs with covering their “shameful parts,” which meant loincloths. Loincloths were the only clothing seen with any frequency among the aldeia Caiapó at São José de Mossâmedes.

The “general” to whom the Caiapó referred was probably either Dom Francisco de Assis Mascarenhas, the capitão general and governor of Goiás from 1804 to 1809, or Fernando Delegado Freire de Castilho, the capitão general and governor of Goiás from 1809 to 1820.

The documents actually stated that José Goes e Pacheco descended 23 Caiapó (DI 1894, vol. 3:184-187). Two of these Caiapó named António and José, whom Giraldin (1997:117) understood to be the chiefs António and José. Giraldin then suggested that this river trader had descended an entire Caiapó village. This would have been the same village that was later found unoccupied by Hercules Florence in 1825. Father Oliveira never mentioned descending the two chiefs and explicitly stated that the two chiefs were faithful to their promises to return with him after one year that, they contact passing boatmen and inquired when the missionary planned to return (DI 1894, vol. 3:171). Capitão Pacheco gave the Caiapó he descended Christian names, except for António and José, as they “already had the same names because they had come with Dr. João Ferreira [de Oliveira Bueno]” (DI 1894, vol. 3:187). The Caiapó António and José with Capitão Goes e Pacheco were línguas; they had arrived six years earlier with Father Oliveira Bueno and descended the Tietê River with the Portuguese to facilitate communication.

Georg Heinrich von Langsdorff (1774-1861) was a Hessian doctor, naturalist, and scientist. His exploratory/scientific expedition traveled across Brazil in the years 1825-1829.
CHAPTER 9
THE CAIAPÓ ECLIPSE (1830–1920)

Introduction

In 1848, Joaquim Alves Ferreira, the General Director of the Indians in Mato Grosso, reported “many [Caiapó] lend themselves to the service of the residents of the state and to the voyagers. They do not antagonize us openly […] one suspects [however] that they have committed some of the depredations on the road from Goiás that are generally attributed to the Coroados” (Ferreira 2001:22–23). Ferreira’s words reflected the profound and continuing influence of the Goiás aldeias, which, though judged as failure by contemporaries such as Cunha Mattos, Saint-Hilaire, and Pohl, had changed many Caiapó from a feared, club-wielding enemy to rowers, porters, and herders.

In the years since São José de Mossâmedes was abandoned, the Caiapó had continued to draw on an array of tactics to navigate the vicissitudes of the frontier. Many chose to interact with frontier society and, after fleeing Mossâmedes, settled on aldeias in Mato Grosso and the Triângulo Mineiro (which Minas Gerais annexed from Goiás in 1816). Loosely incorporated into the frontier economy, these aldeia Caiapó sought gifts from the state and worked to obtain goods. They continuously experimented with Brazilian culture, rejecting some elements and adopting others, and their own hybrid “mission culture,” accommodating it to their needs and those of the frontier. Such accommodation, however, eventually contributed to the disappearance of the Caiapó: the aldeia inhabitants, by the end of the century, had lost much of their indigenous identity and became heavily dependent on neighboring settlements for work, wages, and goods; no longer autonomous, they vanished into the great mass of rural
poor. But not all the Caiapó chose accommodation. There was a cussed and final conflict in Goiás. Cattle ranchers and farmers pushed into the headwaters of the Araguaia River, where they encountered Caiapó villages whose inhabitants defended their last redoubt. There was vicious back-and-forth fighting, which eventually left no Caiapó in a region where the topography continues to recall their once formidable presence in the names of Caiapônica, the Serra do Caiapó, and the Caiapó River. This chapter examines the Caiapó attempts to navigate the challenges of the frontier in the nineteenth century. It examines their territory and population and seeks to understand the conflicts, cooperation, and accommodation that defined the final decades of the Caiapó presence east of the Araguaia. Finally, it closes with the last glimpse of the aldeia Caiapó in Minas Gerais before they disappeared in early twentieth century.

** Territory and Population **

The Caiapó still occupied the centers of their formerly vast territory through much of the nineteenth century.¹ Caiapó villages were encountered along the Paranaíba and Grande Rivers. There were Caiapó living on the Paraná, Verde, and Sucuriú Rivers until the middle of the century. And they were encountered on the São Lourenço, Piquiri, Coxim, and Taquari Rivers (Ferreira 2001:22).² The Caiapó occupied the headwaters of the Araguaia River, especially the Caiapó, Bonito, and Claro Rivers (Moraes 1881:17–18). And they were reported near the headwaters of the Xingú, lands where some Caiapó had fled and sought refuge, far to the northwest of their traditional territories.³

Except for the latter region, the Caiapó had densely inhabited all of these places in the early- and mid-eighteenth century. A century later, their numbers had clearly declined. In the 1750s, the Portuguese had spoke of Caiapó “kingdoms” at the
headwaters of the Araguaia and Camapuã, whereas, there were reportedly a mere seven Caiapó villages in the same region in 1843. In 1848, Joaquim Alves Ferreira (2001:14) estimated 200 Caiapó lived between the headwaters of the São Lourenço and the Paraná and Paranaíba Rivers. In 1873, government officials in Cuiabá estimated the number of Caiapó in Mato Grosso at 400. Decline was evident in the Triângulo Mineiro as well. In the 1820s, a reported 1000 Caiapó were living along the Grande River (Silva 1896:341). Two aldeias in the region, Francisco de Salles and Monte Alta, supported 300 to 400 Caiapó in the middle of the century. Another aldeia, Água Vermelho, reportedly had 600 Caiapó living in it. A mere 50 or so Caiapó lived there at the dawn of the twentieth century. These estimates took into account only Caiapó who lived in state-supported aldeias or near settlements. There were many other Caiapó who lived in the sertões, especially at the headwaters of the Araguaia, but the extent of the calamitous population decline was evident and undeniable.

An end-of the-century estimate by Desgenettes (1906:223), which attempted to take into account the villages hidden in the sertões, put the total Caiapó population in Mato Grosso and Goiás at between 7,000 and 8,000. This was almost certainly an exaggeration, one based on speculation and contradicting the obvious evidence of population decline found in the more reliable observations of government officials and missionaries. There were smaller Caiapó villages, and fewer of them, and their presence in their old territories had shrunk considerably, and irreversibly, such that, when the nineteenth century closed, the days when terrified settlers and chroniclers had warned of Caiapó “kingdoms” were long past.
Conflict

Although greatly reduced in numbers, some Caiapó continued to fight settlers. But the great offensives that had once besieged garrisons and defeated musket-toting troops in battle, much like the Caiapó “kingdoms,” were a thing of the past. Nineteenth-century Caiapó raids lacked much of the extreme aggression of the previous century: they became more defensive, even surreptitious, in nature. The heaviest and best-documented fighting was in western Goiás, where fifty-year conflict simmered and occasionally boiled over at the headwaters of the Araguaia (Hemming 1987:397–398). Raiding also continued to be practiced by Caiapó living on the post-Mossâmedes aldeias: neighboring settlers frequently accused the aldeia inhabitants of attacking isolated farms and mule trains to pillage goods. Unlike the previous century or the fighting in western Goiás, there was often confusion over whether the Caiapó were actually involved in these attacks and officials, reluctant to accuse the aldeia Caiapó, laid the blame on other peoples.

The Last Conflicts in Goiás

The headwaters of the Araguaia, a region considered “one of the most appropriate in the province for cattle raising” (Spinola 1881:17), was still unoccupied by settlers in the early nineteenth century, until fertile soils and rumors of gold and diamonds attracted farmers, ranchers, and prospectors. Along the Caiapó, Bonito, and Claro Rivers, these interlopers discovered a vigorous Caiapó population, one that did not wish to see its lands absorbed into the frontier. As more settlers encroached on Caiapó lands, conflicts erupted. In 1843, numerous bandeiras moved into the sertões to attack villages and drive off the Caiapó. These were not official military expeditions, like those Pires de Campos and Pinto da Silveira had once led; rather, they were groups of
thugs, occasionally steadied by soldiers, and often armed by settlers looking to occupy Caiapó land. The government took little notice of such instances of aggression, even when soldiers participated in the attacks, and little was recorded about these early conflicts.

The situation changed when the Caiapó began fighting back, attracting official notice, condemnation, and calls for missionaries to quell the violence. In 1859, the president of Goiás, Francisco Januário Gama Cerqueira (1859:54–56), remarked: “since September of last year [1858], the Caiapó Indians, who for a long time have lived peacefully, began destructive incursions, burning the houses of the farmers […] [and] robbing everything they can carry away.” In response to these attacks, a bandeira was dispatched with “diverse tools and other objects esteemed by the savages to be distributed to them if they were encountered, and if not, to be left in places where they could find them.” If the Caiapó refused these gifts, the president ordered them to be attacked and put to flight. This bandeira returned empty-handed after spending 22 days in the sertões. The president later suggested missionaries catechize the Caiapó and proposed the creation of new companies of pedestres to help protect them (Gama Cerqueira1859b:65). Little came from this proposal. And more conflicts followed.

The Caiapó returned in early February of 1859. They launched a furious assault that swiftly left six farms burned and looted (Gama Cerqueira 1859a:56). As the raiders passed from farm to farm, burning and looting, news of the attack spread before them. At the sixth farm the raiders attacked, settlers had barricaded themselves inside and greeted the marauders with musket fire. One farmer “fired a shot at an Indian marching in the vanguard, who appeared to be the leader of the horde because of his topknot.”
The settlers had found on previous occasions that even a single musket blast would disperse raiders, but there was no effect this time: the Caiapó “had appeared in such numbers that the normal means of intimidating and dispersing them […] failed to instill fear.” Torch-carrying attackers braved the settlers’ musket fire and set the farm ablaze, forcing those barricaded inside to retreat from their impromptu fortress. The farmers later returned to find their homes incinerated and their belongings plundered. A second attack followed in June of that year (Gama Cerqueira 1859b:65). Frightened settlers abandoned the Caiapó and Bonito Rivers. But they soon returned, and their numbers continued to grow.

More fighting was reported over the next few years (Alencastre 1862:45). The Caiapó repeatedly attacked a farm belonging to António Gomes Pinheiro, burning his buildings and rustling his cattle. But this tough (and stubborn) farmer refused to abandon his home and holdings until, in September of 1861, a Caiapó arrow gravely wounded one of the cowboys guarding his herds. After this attack, the Caiapó retreated into sertões so deep and formidable that soldiers sent after them refused to follow. In October and November, the raiders returned and burned farms up and down the Bonito River. As the conflict developed, there were reports of Portuguese-speaking Indians hurling threats and terrifying messages were discovered scrawled on walls; the Brazilians realized they were fighting former aldeia Caiapó.

The fighting slowed for two decades. The Caiapó, after seeing the settlers repeatedly return after their attacks and having suffered counterattacks by bandeiras, had probably retreated deeper into the sertões. But settlers continued to arrive and occupy more land; a collision between them and the Caiapó was inevitable. Heavy
fighting finally erupted again in 1881 and 1882 (Magalhães 1882:2–3). In December of 1881, the Caiapó attacked the small settlement of Corrego Fundo on the Araguaia River, wounding a certain Estevão Pereira Damasceno with an arrow. The next day, the same Caiapó attacked, looted, and burned a farmhouse; no one was injured in this attack. In early 1882, a mule train opening an overland track from the settlement of Rio Bonito to the garrison at Macedina encountered a small Caiapó aldeia. The inhabitants abandoned their village to the approaching Brazilians, but their warriors later followed the trails to Macedina and slaughtered some cows before fleeing with meat and a cowhide. Later that year, around 50 Caiapó appeared at the garrison and boldly approached the gates. They approached openly, in broad daylight, and may have come to interact or trade with the Brazilians inside, but jumpy troops opened fire on them. There was a brief battle and a soldier was slightly injured in the fray. The Caiapó who “attacked” the garrison fled west into Mato Grosso, but the garrison troops did not give chase; the route the Caiapó took was too remote.

The fighting continued off and on for the rest of the decade. In January of 1889, a farm was attacked and one of the farmer’s children was hit with an arrow (Espírito Santo 1889:20–21). On that very same day, Caiapó raiders attacked a farm near their former aldeia at São José de Mossâmêdes. Worried settlers thought the fighting at the Bonito and Claro Rivers was spilling over into the capital, so the president, Felicíssimo do Espírito Santo, requested two Dominicans missionaries be sent to the Araguaia, and he hired a Caiapó língua named Joaquim to assist them. Calls for missionaries might have assuaged fears at Vila Boa, but settlers on the frontier chose a more violent course and began attacking Caiapó villages.
Much of this later conflict went unrecorded. A few years earlier, one out-going president of Goiás, Aristídes de Souza Spinola (1881:17), informed his successor that: “[one] can not imagine how many atrocities our people, even recently, have committed against the Indians [at the headwaters of the Araguaia River], which are not given publicity and are learned of by the presidency with difficulty.” The president claimed he had opposed these attacks, believing such unauthorized bandeiras increased hostilities and heightening the Indians’ mistrust, but there was little he could do to stop them. He had ordered one illegal bandeira preparing to attack the Caiapó to disperse, but it had already left by the time his orders arrived; he did not know whether it had attacked the Caiapó.

The fighting at the headwaters of the Araguaia was the final bitter confrontation between the Caiapó and the frontier that began encroaching on their lands almost four centuries before. The fighting had clearly changed, reflecting intimate contact with settlers. There were Portuguese-speaking attackers who yelled threats and, to instill terror, left written messages alongside the weapons they abandoned at the scene of an attack. Reports mentioned cattle-rustling raiders; they were quite unlike the Caiapó who had infamously and indiscriminately slaughtered livestock in Pires de Campos’s time. And, though an occasional raiding party burned and looted several farms, the offensive character of Caiapó war was muted. There were no battles like those that had occurred on the Velhas, no great slaughters like those that had brought the Caiapó such infamy a century before. Raiders burned and plundered—taking, as before, tools and food—but very few settlers or their slaves were killed in the fighting. The change in warfare was, in part, a product of population decline: there were fewer Caiapó in fewer villages; their
numbers were no longer sufficient to mobilize great offensives; and the loss of even a few men during a raid must have been keenly felt. Abandoning the massacres of the previous century must also have been a conscious decision, one based on experiences in war and at the aldeias. The Caiapó had learned that murdering settlers and slaves attracted wrath-filled bandeiras to their sertões, and their warriors avoided this as much as possible. So the Caiapó permitted families, like those who had bravely barricaded themselves into their farmhouse, to escape with their lives—something that had rarely happened in the previous century—and brought fewer bandeiras to their sertões.

Some of the raids also appear to have been defensive actions fought to delay settlement and chase off intruders. There was the curious case of the tough rancher António Gomes Pinheiro. It was only after repeatedly burning his barns and rustling his cattle that the Caiapó attacked and injured one of his cowboys. This suggests the earlier attacks sought to drive the rancher away, not kill him, his family, and his workers. When hardy settlers, like Gomes Pinheiro, refused to decamp, the Caiapó attacks grew more aggressive and, ultimately, someone was injured or killed. Murder terrified settlers into fleeing—but they always came back—and, when the settlers returned, so did the Caiapó. There were official calls for restraint and missionary aid, while the inevitable bandeiras of settlers headed to the sertões with unsurprising results: the Caiapó were gone from the headwaters of the Araguaia by the first decades of the twentieth century.

**The Aldeia Caiapó and Raiding**

In addition to the heavy fighting at the headwaters of the Araguaia, there was intermittent and small-scale raiding in other parts of Caiapó territory, principally Mato Grosso, generally associated with aldeia Indians. Almost as soon as the first post-Mossâmedes aldeias were established southeast of Cuiabá, the inhabitants were
suspected of attacking settlements. For example, soon after Caiapó were established at Piquiri, an aldeia taking its name from a nearby river, they were accused of attacking farms on the São Lourenço (Viértler 1990:57). Similar such accusations occurred regularly until the 1870s. Officials often cast doubt on the claims that the aldeia Caiapó were raiding. After all, these were ostensibly pacified Indians and, it was thought, attacking them or punishing them would only drive them off, perhaps contributing to new hostilities. It may also have been the case that the Caiapó intentionally changed the distinctive style of their weapons, if not their raiding patterns, to create doubt, implicate other peoples, and avoid retribution.

The raids the aldeia Caiapó launched were, in part, produced by official neglect. Acquiring goods was an important factor in attracting the Caiapó to the aldeias, but goods were distributed infrequently and often in small quantities to the aldeia inhabitants. For example, a few tools and clothing were distributed to the Piquiri aldeia in 1846 (RIHGB 1847:551), and it appears nothing else was sent to the aldeia until the government dispatched a copper pot there in 1853. Sometimes, when goods from the state dwindled, the Caiapó appealed directly to the government, as when six Caiapó from the Piquiri aldeia appeared in Cuiabá requesting tools, clothing, and repairs to their muskets in 1854 and 1861. But such appearances and requests were rare. It was more common for the Caiapó to leave the aldeia and plunder the goods they desired. The Caiapó attacking farms and ranches did not “abandon the tools,” one official, frustrated by the repeated occurrence of raids, noted, “many [tools] appear in the respective aldeia at Santana [do Paranaíba].”
Even with such discoveries of clear evidence of raiding, government officials were surprisingly loath to believe the aldeia Caiapó were engaging in hostilities and preferred to blame raids on their natives, principally the Coroados (Ferreira 2001:14, 23). 14 Little was known about the Coroados: they were suspected of speaking a Bororo language, lived southeast of Cuiabá, and were considered very hostile and formidable. 15 Their attacks were very similar to Caiapó attacks, and there was often considerable doubt as to whether the Caiapó or the Coroados were responsible for raids. A series of violent raids attributed to the Coroados in the years between 1849 and 1852. 16 But settlers suspected the Caiapó at Piquiri were also involved. 17 Their suspicions led to an investigation in 1853 (Barros 1987/88/89:200). 18 Similarly, local residents suspected the Caiapó at Santana do Paranaíba were involved in some of the attacks blamed on the Coroados in 1855 and again in 1872. 19

The confusion over whether the aldeia Caiapó were involved in attacks was ubiquitous enough to suggest raiders intentionally obscured their identity. A century before, rarely was there any question concerning the identity of Caiapó raiders because of the extreme violence and discoveries of their distinctive weapons. In contrast, it was unusual for authorities to recover weapons that were readily identifiable as Caiapó. It happened, as when bows and arrows found after an 1855 attack were recognized as being of Caiapó manufacture, but this was rare. More commonly, the Caiapó were betrayed by the sudden and inexplicable appearance of manufactured goods at their aldeias. In 1840, for example, a bandeira sent to investigate a spate of Coroados attacks on the São Lourenço discovered tools with a local farmer’s mark in the Piquiri aldeia (Viertler 1990:57). This farmer’s property had been recently attacked, and the
discovery meant the Piquiri Caiapó, not the Coroados, were responsible for the attacks. Similarly, in 1872, settlers’ suspicions that the Caiapó at Santana do Paranaíba were responsible for a recent attack were confirmed when tools suddenly appeared at the aldeia.\textsuperscript{20} The confusion over the identity of raiders and the infrequency with which Caiapó weapons were recovered suggests aldeia inhabitants had altered their raiding patterns and weapon manufacture in an effort to confuse authorities and obfuscate their identity.\textsuperscript{21}

Even when it was established that the aldeia Caiapó were raiding, authorities ordered little or no punitive actions against them. In 1840, after numerous complaints reached Cuiabá, the government ordered troops to the Piquiri aldeia to protect settlers; but these troops did not attack the Caiapó. No military action was taken after the weapons recovered were identified as belonging to the Piquiri Caiapó in 1855. In 1864, officials reiterated that these same Caiapó were involved in attacks.\textsuperscript{22} But the Caiapó at Piquiri suffered no reprisals. In fact, Caiapó attacks often resulted in goods being sent to their aldeias. In 1872, for instance, officials suggested the best way to end raids was through increased patrols and dispatching more supplies to Santana do Paranaíba.\textsuperscript{23} The Caiapó cannot have failed to notice shipments of goods arrived at their aldeias in the wake of raids. In the preceding century, an officer in Goiás had warned officials that the Caiapó at Maria I believed “all the gifts we give them are because we fear them,” and one must wonder if the occasional Caiapó raid was an unsubtle reminder for the government to send them gifts.\textsuperscript{24}

**Accommodation and Cooperation: Aldeias**

Although conflicts continued until the end of the nineteenth century, outright resistance to the frontier was increasingly less common. Many—indeed, most—Caiapó
sought accommodation and cooperation. As the Mossâmedes aldeia declined and was abandoned, new aldeias sprang up in Mato Grosso and the Triângulo Mineiro that were populated with many fugitives from Goiás. In Mato Grosso, former aldeia Caiapó appeared in lands west of the Araguaia, a region that had remained largely unoccupied by settlers, but the spread of farms and ranches soon forced them into competition for land and resources (Giraldin 1997:100–101). With many of them already accustomed to living in proximity to farms and ranches in Goiás, these Caiapó chose to avoid outright hostilities and settled nearer the Brazilians. When government officials in Cuiabá heard the Caiapó had appeared, they dispatched food, goods, and tools to keep the Indians living and working peacefully with their neighbors.25 Far to the east, in the Triângulo Mineiro, the so-called sertões of Farinha Podre (“Rotten Flour”), Caiapó aldeias also sprung up. Much like what occurred in Mato Grosso, settlers began arriving in force during the first decades of the century, and, when farms and ranches encroached on their territory, many of the Caiapó responded by settling on aldeias.

Compared to the lavish expenditure spent on the Pombaline aldeias in Goiás, the Caiapó aldeias in Mato Grosso and the Triângulo Mineiro were rustic affairs: there were neither many soldiers nor many rural poor living at these aldeias; nor did these aldeias have facilities like those found at Maria I, much less Mossâmedes. The post-Mossâmedes aldeias were little more than Caiapó villages loosely incorporated into the frontier; they were often officially recognized, and occasionally possessed grants of land, but rarely received shipments of goods or visits from administrators. In Mato Grosso, the administration of the aldeias was often left to nearby residents—if possible, a soldier—who performed their duties from afar, if at all. Capable, interested, or
uncorrupt directors were rare and the job so undesirable that some nominees declined the position; much as had occurred with Manoel da Cunha, there were Caiapó nominated to serve as directors. A similar situation prevailed in the Triângulo Mineiro. Settlers often attracted Caiapó to settle on their land with gifts. A few missionaries were involved with the aldeias there, but they were often absent and had little control over the day-to-day life of the Caiapó.

Even neglected by government officials, the state-supported aldeias in Mato Grosso and the Triângulo Mineiro were an attractive option for many Caiapó. In fact, some of these aldeias persisted as long as the more lavish Maria I and Mossámedes. One reason for this attraction and longevity was that aldeias provided the Caiapó with access to land. The expansion of farms and ranches, particularly the latter, had absorbed huge tracks of land, restricting the territory available for hunting and gathering. According to one European visitor, the Caiapó “gave up their earlier rambling, hunting life—or had to—since their earlier, very large hunting ground was more and more taken by the Brazilian cowboys and cattle ranchers” (Kupfer 1870). Aldeias also provided the Caiapó with supplies of tools, clothing, and other goods. Although the goods the state provided were often small in quantity, low in quality, and delivered intermittently, the supply did reduce the need to raid and pillage goods. Fewer raids meant more security against bandeira attacks. And, just as had occurred in Goiás, when the aldeia Caiapó raided, settlers were loath to attack them. Officials, even when presented with evidence that aldeia Caiapó had committed an attack, were reluctant to send punitive expeditions against them.
Although rustic, the aldeias in Mato Grosso and the Triângulo Mineiro, like those in Goiás, were envisioned as the loci of indigenous transformation: these were supposed to be bounded spaces where the Caiapó became valuable citizens. Indeed, Caiapó experimentation with Brazilian culture continued and their already modified mission culture was increasingly intermingled. They became more dependent on their neighbors, often laboring off the aldeias for wages to purchase needed things, and this had the insidious effect of further incorporating the Caiapó into the rural population. One official, for example, noted that it was difficult to determine how many Caiapó lived at the Taquari aldeia because so many of the inhabitants worked on nearby farms and ranches. It was not just their absence from the aldeias that made identifying the Caiapó difficult, but also their cultural similarity to the Brazilians. Most laborers were young, and the Brazilians made efforts to educate Caiapó children; such children were separated from their relatives for long periods of time and immersed in another culture; they learned a new language and had their native traditions and language denigrated. Many Caiapó came to identify less with their indigenous ancestry than that of the Brazilians; some chose to live among the Brazilians. Those Caiapó who did return to their aldeias were increasingly detribalized. The youth no longer spoke their native tongue well or participated in village affairs, and important traditions, like the men’s house, fell into disuse (see below).

By the end of the century, many of the aldeia Caiapó were virtually indistinguishable from the rural poor. They had become caboclos, a term used to describe detribalized Indians who were often of mixed descent. And when their aldeia lands were annexed by nearby farms and ranches, the Caiapó, already having lost so
much of their distinct native identity, were silently absorbed into the rural population. It was detribalization, not war, which finally extinguished the Caiapó as an autonomous people throughout much of their old territories.

Santana do Paranaíba

Of the later Caiapó aldeias, the best documented was Santana do Paranaíba. Two detailed reports have survived about this aldeia. The most important of these was written by Joaquim Lemos da Silva. He worked at the aldeia in 1837, probably as a soldier-administrator, and later wrote an exceptionally detailed and sympathetic account of his experiences there. The second description of the aldeia comes from a German voyager, Dr. Kupfer (1870), who visited the aldeia in 1857. He published a brief account of the visit and described many subtleties of aldeia life. These two works, while not as long as the descriptions left by Pohl and Saint-Hilaire, provide us with invaluable descriptions of the Caiapó aldeia; both descriptions flesh out the scarce details recorded in official documents.

Santana do Paranaíba was situated north of the confluence of the Paranaíba and Grande Rivers, approximately 12 miles (19 kilometers) from the Brazilian town of the same name. It sat in the sort of locale the Caiapó usual chose to live: near where riparian forests opened into scrub savannah. The inhabitants had access to game and other resources from both the forests and grasslands; and the forests were where they practiced their slash-and-burn horticulture. It was also only a short walk to the banks of the Grande River, so the Caiapó did not have to travel far to bathe or find drinking water, and a nearby waterfall ensured fish and aquatic resources were readily available. The waterfall was, according to Kupfer (1870), “where the most beautiful fish, namely during spawning season, congregated and through just fishing alone [this] offered easy
nutrition." In 1835, these resources supported a population of at least 150 (RIHGB 1847:550), many of them fugitives from Mossâmedes and the Paraná and Sucuriú Rivers.³¹

Santana do Paranaíba was a simple place with no ostentatious facilities or troops. From 1835 to 1838, there was no director, and, when one was appointed in 1838, the position was occupied only until 1843 (RIHGB 1847:551).³² The aldeia was constructed in the form of a Caiapó village. The houses were arranged in a circle around a central plaza where Caiapó men, women, and children conversed, discussed important village affairs, and practiced their rituals. According to Lemos da Silva:

It was worthy to see in the patio some of the boys, completely nude, practicing firing arrows, their bows and arrows in proportion to their size, appearing to be the sons of Mars and Venus. At this patio, I also saw a festival that consisted of a dance formed by two rows of women and a man in the middle. This man, bobbing his head forward, accompanied singing. The rows of women came forward to meet him by making little leaps until the first and the last had returned to their original positions [with] the man chanting from time to time a wordless hymn, whose sound was not disagreeable to the listener.³³

In the center of the plaza, there was a single building with a roof and open sides, which the Caiapó called the *piruá*. It was the Caiapó men’s house, the center of their political life. "I understood [the piruá] to be a house of audiences or a true rendezvous," wrote Lemos da Silva, recalling the Caiapó chiefs and their followers meeting there:

It was a rare night that the various family chiefs did not meet with the presiding tribal chief; I witnessed many times this chief having to deliberate something going to the men’s house making signs in loud voices and [he] did not wait long [before] finding himself surrounded by his subjects.³⁴

The chief of the aldeia “was an Indian of greater than normal height and of a severe character, skin already a little shriveled, [who] always walked carrying a whip on the point of a stick.” When asked the reason for the whip, the chief claimed that it was to
scrape away sweat. The other men and women did not carry these sweat-scrapers. Both sexes went about their daily affairs in loincloths—the men’s loincloths were smaller than those worn by the women—while the children scampered about completely naked.

The elaborate funerary rites of the Caiapó fascinated Lemos da Silva. “When they bury an adult, they place a well-made club in the grave next to the body,” he observed in curiosity. “I asked them why and they responded ‘this one will fight on the journey’; burying an infant, if it had nursed, they deposited a pot with milk in the grave and if it did not nurse, a pot with water, questioning the purpose, they responded ‘this one will drink on the journey.’” They called the Christian god Puancá, feared the devil, and had an understanding of the immortality of the soul. So they had some understanding of Christianity and practiced syncretic folk religion similar to that found at Mossâmedes. Native beliefs had mixed and mingled with what the missionaries and settlers had taught them. The inhabitants considered murder and adultery sins punishable by whippings (corporal punishment was something the Caiapó had learned at the aldeia).

Little had changed at the aldeia when Kupfer (1870) visited in 1857. The aldeia consisted of 20 houses built around a circular plaza. The Caiapó homes were “small loam huts with palm-leaf roofs, similar to those that the poorest class of Brazilians make.” The men’s house, an open-walled structure measuring 20 by 30 feet, sat in the center of the plaza. Only men entered this structure during Kupfer’s visit. He observed that a Caiapó man went there after “he has hunted and fished and taken care of the peacefulness [of his household]; he then sits around with the other men in [this] shelter.” Men used the logs the racers discarded as “pillows” to lounge upon.
The plaza was still the social center when Kupfer visited. When he and his retinue rode into the aldeia, they discovered the Caiapó performing a dance in the plaza. A man and six women—three on each side of him—were dancing outside the men’s house. This dance was similar to that earlier observed by Lemos da Silva. According to Kupfer, “everyone [was] stamping their feet on the ground and moving slowly perhaps ten feet forward and then again backward without moving their arms and the rest of the body and yelling loudly.” The dance stopped, the German’s party dismounted from their horses, and the Caiapó women quickly retreated to their houses. The Caiapó man, whom Kupfer had witnessed dancing, approached and greeted the visitors. He was tall, broad shouldered, and around fifty years of age. He had a grass band laced through his hair and his body was painted black with genipap; his face was painted red with urucum. It turned out that he was the village chief.

Soon after the chief greeted the visitors, the other Caiapó surrounded Kupfer and his companions. The visitors distributed gifts of tobacco and white glass beads to the Caiapó men and women. “They took them more humbly than I expected,” said Kupfer, “and then became more trusting and offered us sugar cane that others were roasting in ashes.” The Caiapó appeared healthy and fit: Kupfer spied no sick individuals among the gathering crowd; however, he later noticed that there were few elderly women and no elderly men, perhaps indicating high mortality among the aged. Most Caiapó were around five feet tall and solidly built with muscular arms and legs. The men had broad, powerful chests and thick black hair, which they cut straight across their forehead to frame the face. In Kupfer’s opinion, “their slanted eyes, strong forward jutting cheek bones, and thin beard growth gave them a strong Mongoloid appearance.” None of the
men were tattooed; some of the older ones had pierced their lower lip, a practice that had fallen into disuse among the young; and several men were painted like the chief.

Aside from the genipap dyes and urucum paints, the Caiapó used little body decoration. Neither the women nor the men made extensive use of the large, colorful, and impressive parrot feathers Kupfer had seen other Indians use. The men wore only their loincloths; women wore simple dresses and, unlike the men, colorfully adorned themselves with jewelry and long sashes made of cotton string and beads; these they draped around their necks, arms, and legs. Caiapó women especially coveted Brazilian-made red cloth—it was “like jewelry” to them—and their husbands purchased this cloth with wages earned while working for the Brazilians. Women could become bellicose when enraged. A group of Caiapó men return from a three-month stint laboring away from the aldeia while Kupfer was there, and one of the returnees was almost attacked by his wife. Kupfer heard loud voices and saw a crowd gathering around one of the houses, where a woman blocked the door and was waving a war club at her husband. This man, Kupfer learned, had returned without gifts for his wife because he reportedly spent his earnings on prostitutes. “The man, totally knowing he is guilty, behaved timidly and cowardly,” Kupfer observed, before making a quick distribution of tobacco and a few glass beads; he felt he had saved the cowering man from his wife’s wrath and a humiliating beating. “Caiapó women,” Kupfer opined after the incident, “must not be repressed and slave like, much as it is among the other tribes.” He thought most of the women were cheerful and open—especially the younger ones—and, in contrast to the curmudgeonly Pohl, he found them not unattractive.
When he Kupfer first arrived, a Caiapó man wearing trousers approached and greeted the visitors affably in Portuguese. This Portuguese-speaking Caiapó was the aldeia “captain,” its government-appointed spokesman and leader. He was a língua, not a chief, and held his position because of his ability to speak Portuguese and his knowledge of Brazilians. The captain told Kupfer that he had lived in Goiás as a youth, learning Portuguese and “many other things” while living in the governor’s house. The other Caiapó accorded him less respect than the chief. “The captain only had very little power over them,” Kupfer noted with interest. “They mostly obey him when he calls or sends them, but they often act as though they do not hear him. They appear to give more [respect] to the old cacique, [though] I did not see any punishments on account of not obeying.” The captain was somewhere around forty years of age. He was shorter than, and not nearly as broad as, the chief, and he possessed, in Kupfer’s opinion, “a serious, smart face.” He was the only Caiapó wearing trousers and the only individual to speak with the visitors at length; most of the other Caiapó spoke little Portuguese or were reticent, or unwilling, to engage the visitors in lengthy conversation. The captain offered the visitors shelter and arranged for firewood and food to be provided to them—and the party was in luck, a hunter had killed a large tapir and meat was plentiful for the moment.

Kupfer spent a total of four days at the aldeia and was able to make many keen observations. He noted that Caiapó women married early, typically after their first menses, and the ceremony was a simple affair: the prospective groom gave his bride’s parents some small gifts and the couple was considered married. These marriages, sadly, appeared to produce few children, as Kupfer saw only a few families with three or
four children. There were no unmarried women in the village, but many unmarried men. The imbalance, Kupfer thought, was because the Caiapó were polygamous. The practice left too few women available for every man to marry.

Work was gendered. Caiapó men hunted, fished, and worked in the fields in the morning. When the afternoons grew hot, the men retired to the men’s house where they gossiped and discussed village affairs. Caiapó women worked continuously at domestic chores, often while carrying children, and they impressed Kupfer with the stoic performance of their non-stop activities. Women carried heavy loads with “strong woven belts that go across their forehead and down their back where the load is secured tightly; the small children often ride on the women’s nape.” Kupfer marveled at how often women brought firewood into their homes to feed the smoky fires that constantly burned in the houses and the earth ovens used to cook food. “They heat rocks in a fire and then put the meat between the rocks and then lay twigs on top and throw earth on top of that [and] then leave the meat to cook for two hours,” a curiosity, Kupfer noted, “which gives it a tasty roasted flavor.” He saw bananas, sweet potatoes and manioc cooked in earth ovens; sugar cane roasted on open coals was a particularly tasty treat in the German’s opinion. The Caiapó, interestingly, cooked fish on a grill made of wooden staves, a practice they had learned from the Brazilians. Wild honey and forest fruits were much coveted delights.

As at the Goiás aldeias, the Caiapó had few personal belongings: “they don’t own anything but their poor loam huts, without house or kitchen devices, and the still poor weapons and mats.” They slept on mats with the addition of a piece of wood for supporting the head. Men and women owned small pipes made of clay, which they
used for smoking tobacco; a practice both sexes greatly enjoyed. Kupfer saw flutes made of ox horn. There were, of course, the famous clubs made from “stout heavy wood.” Most Caiapó men hunted with their bows and used arrows tipped with hard bamboo or sharpened hardwood; Kupfer also spied a few old and rusty muskets around the village. The men owned hunting dogs but no other domestic animals or livestock; except a small riding horse the captain owned. They had not adopted pottery—the captain proudly displayed an iron pot and a spoon to his guests; its use set him apart from the others at the aldeia—and preferred to use husks of fruits for simple bowls. Manufactured goods at the aldeia included fishhooks and knives—nearly every Caiapó man owned these invaluable items—which the Caiapó purchased with money earned by weaving mats and hats to sell in the nearby Brazilian town or working as rowers.

Kupfer did not see any healers or shamans during his visit. When ill, he was told, the Caiapó retired to their houses and “lay down on their mats stoically, or better said dully, let a strong fire burn by their feet, cover themselves with the few covers they own and wait thoughtlessly until the end of the sickness.” They did not eat when ill but would drink water and “if their fever is too high then they jump in the river next to the village […] cold water is the only remedy they use in emergency.” The dead were wrapped in mats and buried “in a consecrated place near the village.” Crosses marked some of the graves, further evidence of the syncretic Christianity practiced by the aldeia Caiapó.

In the late 1850s, Santana do Paranaíba was much as it had been 20 years before. The Caiapó lived in a circular village with a men’s house in the center, cooked in earth ovens, practiced similar traditional dances, and painted themselves with urucum and genipap. There were the inevitable changes, of course. Some changes were
seemingly simple: the Caiapó roasted fish like the Brazilians. Other changes were more important: to acquire beads and cloth, as well as other manufactured goods, the Caiapó sold crafts in Brazilian settlements and worked for wages. They were incorporated, however loosely, into frontier society and increasingly dependent on the Brazilians.

Shortly after Kupfer’s visit, locals complained the aldeia was involved in raids, and there was an attempt to assert more control over the aldeia. A new director was nominated, Sebastião José do Queiroz, but he was corrupt and did little to assert control at the aldeia. In 1861, there were complaints that a local landowner, José Joaquim de Moraes, had occupied aldeia lands and was mistreating the Caiapó. The director took no action and “far from carrying out his duties of defending the cause of the Indians […] encouraged the behavior of Moraes.” It was feared that the Caiapó would abandon the aldeia for lack of sufficient lands and pasture. The Caiapó did not abandon the aldeia in 1861, and the lands stolen from them were not returned (Giraldin 1997:102). In May of 1865, the Caiapó left the aldeia. This was probably a trek. The corrupt director doubtlessly did not know this, much less care. Unsurprisingly, he took no action to return the Caiapó. In fact, he followed the Indians’ example, slipping away to Minas Gerais and leaving the abandoned aldeia behind.

Such was the official neglect of the aldeia that Sebastião José do Queiroz lingered on as the official—and absent; indeed, fugitive—director until he was finally removed in 1871. By then, the Caiapó had returned to the aldeia—the date of their returned was not recorded—and nearby residents again accused them of raiding. These accusations were confirmed by the sudden appearance of tools at the aldeia. In response, the government proposed formalizing the supply of goods to the aldeia, which, it was
hoped, would make raids unnecessary. A new director, Manoel Pereira Dias, replaced the absentee Sebastião José do Queiroz. Ordered to promote agriculture at the aldeia, the new director, much like his predecessor, appears to have taken little interest in the task. Ignored by officials, attended by absent, corrupt, and negligent directors, the aldeia tottered along for many years.

By 1881, local Brazilians knew the Caiapó at Santana do Paranaíba as good workers and excellent rowers—one military officer declared them “the best practitioners of these rivers.” But they had become increasingly demoralized, “decimated by swamp fevers and misery,” and reportedly wanted to relocate to the garrison at Itapura on the Paraná River (south of the confluence with Tietê). Capitão Joaquim Ribeiro da Silva Peixoto, the commanding officer of the garrison, felt this transfer was beneficial: the adult Caiapó, though “born and raised in the forests” and possessing “customs very different from ours,” he said, would provide valuable labor; the children, raised away from the pernicious influence of their parents, would become valuable citizens and a “benefit the nation in the future.” The Caiapó at Santana do Paranaíba moved to Itapura—their children evidently lost their native identity, precisely what Capitão Peixoto envisioned—and no more was heard of them.

**The Piquiri Aldeia**

Much less is known about the Piquiri aldeia than Santana do Paranaíba. This aldeia was officially created in 1835, after a group of Caiapó from Goiás settled on the west bank of the Piquiri River north of Camapuã. In response to their presence, the president of Mato Grosso ordered a small garrison established to administer the reportedly 300 Caiapó (RIHGB 1847:551). The Piquiri River was remote, and the administration of the aldeia haphazard. The first director was not nominated until 1846,
amidst reports that the Caiapó had not planted gardens and hunting parties constantly left the aldeia in search of game (locals accused these hunting parties of raiding) (RIHGB 1847:551). A new director was nominated in 1851, but he declined the position.\textsuperscript{50} In 1858, there was a weak and unsuccessful attempt to recruit missionaries for the aldeia.\textsuperscript{51} A new director was appointed in 1859.\textsuperscript{52} He died in 1862.\textsuperscript{53} The next director, Manoel Ferreira Velho, was nominated because he was the only person living close to the aldeia.\textsuperscript{54} But he took little interest in the aldeia and two years past without officials in Cuiabá hearing from him.\textsuperscript{55}

Complaints that the Caiapó were raiding dogged the Piquiri aldeia from its inception.\textsuperscript{56} In 1855, two bows and some arrows discovered after an attack were identified as belonging to the Caiapó.\textsuperscript{57} This confirmed what settlers had long been saying, but no action was taken to stop the raids. In 1864, around the same time that officials complained about the lackluster director Manoel Ferreira Velho, word arrived in Cuiabá that a local landowner had shot one of the Caiapó.\textsuperscript{58} The president recommended the Caiapó not be allowed to leave the aldeia to hunt, and he ordered the director to have the Caiapó plant fields and work as servants and laborers for nearby settlers.\textsuperscript{59} This, it was felt, would keep the Caiapó from raiding as well as promote their transformation into good citizens. Unsurprisingly, the disinterested director appears to have done little or nothing. Piquiri struggled for many years after the shooting, largely ignored by officials, until it finally faded away sometime after 1882 (Giraldin 1997:101).

**The Taquari/Coxim Aldeia**

Even less is known about the Caiapó aldeia at Taquari. In 1862, there were reports of small Caiapó villages on the banks of the Piquiri and Taquari Rivers.\textsuperscript{60} Someone proposed resettling these Caiapó at the confluence of the Taquari and Coxim
Rivers, so troops were sent and the commander charged with attracting the Caiapó to an aldeia by peaceful means. To assist this effort, the aldeia directors at Santana do Paranaíba and Piquiri were ordered to send línguas to aid in contacting the Caiapó. The effort met with some success: the president of Mato Grosso was sending supplies and ordering a chapel constructed by 1864. This aldeia was short lived. War broke out between the Brazil and Paraguay, and, in 1865, Paraguayan troops invaded Mato Grosso. The Caiapó wisely abandoned the aldeia when the Paraguayan troops approached.

Some of the fleeing Caiapó returned to the sertões; others settled near farms on the Coxim River and away from the front. A large group settled on a ranch owned by António Theodoro de Carvalho. Initially, this was seen as a temporary arrangement until the Caiapó could be returned to the aldeia. The Caiapó quickly became a welcome presence at the ranch, since they provided a much needed (and cheap) supply of labor. In 1867, the need to provide tools, clothes, and small gifts to the Caiapó was stressed in Cuiabá, as locals did not want to see the Caiapó disappear into the sertões and possibly to begin raiding. In April of 1869, António Theodoro de Carvalho again requested tools and cloth for the Caiapó, and the government responded by sending 9 axes, 18 hedgebills, and 27 shirts and pants. The distribution of 27 tools and an equal number of outfits—demonstrating how many men lived at the aldeia, which was not large—appears to have worked, and the Caiapó did not return to the sertões.

By 1869, the Caiapó had planted fields and were employed on nearby farms and ranches. Many of the Caiapó lived and worked in close proximity with the Brazilians,
and the two groups intermingled, married, and established kin relationships. In 1873, a rancher named António Rodrigues Macedo adopted a seven-year old boy named José as his godson and agreed to support and to educate him.\textsuperscript{71} Other Caiapó used their familiarity with the Brazilians to borrow money and purchase goods on credit. Since a monetary-based economy was something they Caiapó understood but poorly, there were complaints that they frequently failed to repay their debts.\textsuperscript{72} The government responded with an attempt to regulate Caiapó salaries designed to prevent Brazilians from exploiting the Caiapó ignorance of money and credit.\textsuperscript{73} Whatever the result of these reforms, the Caiapó continued to work for their neighbors. Eventually, because so many Caiapó worked as servants and laborers, it became difficult to calculate their numbers at the aldeia.\textsuperscript{74}

In 1915, there were reportedly 80 Caiapó living at the aldeia, which was increasingly threatened by encroaching farms and ranches (Giraldin 1997:105). Assimilation and concomitant loss of land appears to have brought about the end of the Coxim aldeia. Culturally, the Caiapó were almost indistinguishable from their Brazilians neighbors, and, once dispossessed of their aldeia lands, they simply faded into the rural population.

**Aldeias in the Triângulo Mineiro**

A similar sad fate befell the Caiapó in the Triângulo Mineiro. In the early nineteenth century, much of the territory between the Grande and Paranaíba Rivers was largely unexplored. The eighteenth-century Portuguese, even rough wildcat miners, were reluctant to explore this region because of the large and numerous Caiapó villages they encountered there. Even after Pires de Campos had established the Bororo aldeias on the Velhas River, the Caiapó were powerful enough to scare away
prospectors and settlers, as when their attacks drove off a large bandeira prospecting on the Velhas River in 1748 (Carvalho Franco 1989:11, 312). The Caiapó presence remained an obstacle to settlement expansion, whether from eastern Goiás or western Minas Gerais, into the early nineteenth century (Langfur 1998:1).

But in the first decades of the nineteenth century, exploration and settlement of the Triângulo Mineiro increased. War, disease, and flight had left the main bodies of the Paranaíba and Grande Rivers denuded of Indian villages—one expedition recorded more than 100 leagues (c. 350 miles or 563 kilometers) of the Paranaíba was uninhabited—though many villages still remained along the various tributaries. In 1807, prospectors searching for deposits near the border with Minas Gerais discovered Caiapó villages and gardens and, fearing they were about to be attacked, beat a hasty retreat (Silva 1896:339); they managed to extract themselves from Caiapó territory without being attacked. In 1810, another bandeira stumbled upon Caiapó shelters and burned clearings in the forests: evidence of the recent clearing and preparation, if not planting, of gardens. This bandeira, like its predecessor, was not attacked, as typically occurred to those entering the region, demonstrating that the Caiapó were not as hostile as they traditionally had been. Around this time, it must be remembered, a large number of Caiapó had fled from the Goiás aldeias, and some of the fugitives must have appeared in the Triângulo Mineiro, where their influence was felt in the lack of hostilities.

Within a few years, face-to-face contact was established between settlers and the Caiapó. The commander of the 1810 bandeira, Major António Eustáquio, convinced a group of Caiapó to settle on the Grande River (Silva 1896:340). Word of this peaceful interaction spread through the sertões. By 1820, there were reportedly 1000 Caiapó
appearing along the Grande, shifting their residence between the riverbanks and inland villages, and trading with settlers and riverboats (Silva 1896:341). As always, these interactions revolved around distributions of trade goods: Major Eustáquio visited the Caiapó yearly and distributed clothes, tools, and other goods; another settler, João Baptista de Siqueira, also visited the Caiapó and provided them with food (Silva 1896:342). Much like their contemporaries on the Paraná and Sucuriú Rivers, the Caiapó in the Triângulo Mineiro appear to have actively sought this interaction. There was almost certainly a similar trade in manufactured goods for Caiapó children, whom settlers, in the argot of the day, “administered” for purposes of acquiring labor.

Word of peaceful Caiapó attracted missionaries. In 1827, Father Leandro Rebelo Peixoto e Castro arrived and established a small aldeia near the modern city of Campina Verde (Giraldin 1997:106). This aldeia faltered and failed. Other missionaries followed and found more success, and, by 1830, there were three missions in the Triângulo Mineiro. There was one on the Paranaíba River, called Macahuba (Tupi for “Palm Tree”), and two larger ones on the Grande River, Água Vermelho (“Vermilion Water,” so named because of a nearby waterfall; for this reason the aldeia was also called Cachoeira, “Waterfall”) and São Francisco de Salles (named for its founder). These were the most important and longest lasting Caiapó aldeias in the region. Macahuba existed for a little more than a decade. In 1844, its lands were sold to Father Francisco de Salles Souza—the missionary who later copied Lemos da Silva’s description—after the Caiapó had abandoned the aldeia. In 1869, another aldeia was established to the west of the Brazilian settlement at Uberaba. Known as Monte Alta (“High Hill”), this aldeia was abandoned in 1871. Around the same time,
another aldeia appeared on the Grande River, Prata (“Silver”); but it too was quickly abandoned. Almost nothing was recorded about these two aldeias.

While gifts of food, clothing, and trade goods had attracted the Caiapó to these aldeias, they also became important refuges from settler encroachment that the inhabitants were willing to defend. One of the ranchers who had initially provided the Caiapó with gifts, João Batista Siqueira, discovered this when he attempted to occupy land belonging to the aldeia at São Francisco de Salles. After Batista Siqueira and a motley crew of slaves and capangas (“thugs”) established a camp near the aldeia, an angry Caiapó crowd appeared late one night and confronted them. The Indians informed the intruders that they were unwelcome and, more ominously, that they would become enemies if they crossed a nearby stream, the boundary of their aldeia lands. Surrounded at night, facing angry Caiapó, whose reputation for violence still carried heft, the rancher and his thugs were frightened and retreated; they did not return to usurp the aldeia lands. Batista Siqueira may not have known it at the time, but he and his cronies were beneficiaries of the legacy of the Goiás aldeias. When the Caiapó discovered a rancher moving onto their lands, which they knew harbingered a threat to their aldeia, they hurried to its defense. Because some of their number spoke Portuguese and were capable of conveying their anger, the Caiapó ably defended their aldeia and warded off a threat without resorting to violence—and, thereby, avoided violent retribution from the settlers and their bandeiras.

Unfortunately, very little else was recorded about the aldeias in the Triângulo Mineiro in the nineteenth century. From a brief letter the missionary Francisco de Salles Souza wrote, it appears that a mission culture similar to that at Mossâmedes or Santana
do Paranaíba existed. “These [Caiapó] Indians have their lower lip pierced,” he recalled in the 1880s. “They lived and live in huts, sleeping on mats on wooden cots [and] sustain themselves principally from fish and game, which they cook in holes in the floor.” Traditional religious practices included divining the future through the songs of nocturnal birds; such practices existed alongside knowledge of the Christian God and the Devil. The aldeia Caiapó were polygamous. Chiefs possessed the right to take more than one wife; a non-chiefly man could only have “as many wives as the jaguars that they have killed with arrows.” This observation inadvertently provided a key detail about Caiapó life in the context of peaceful interactions with Brazilians. In the early eighteenth century, António Pires de Campos (1862:437) had described how Caiapó men accrued status through killing enemies. The bravest and most bellicose men—those who led raids, killed enemies, and captured plunder—had become chiefs. With the advent of peaceful interaction, raiding and the killing of enemies had declined; nonetheless, the fighting and killing of enemies remained important for acquiring prestige. Killing a jaguar was an act worthy of a brave warrior—and an extra wife. Importantly, quite unlike the killing of settlers and their slaves, killing jaguars did not propel bandeiras into the sertões. Peace with the frontier, though tenuous and fractured by raids and outbreaks of violence, had not ended the famous Caiapó bellicosity; instead, the object of their aggression changed, switching from dangerous human enemies to dangerous beasts.

Água Vermelho: A Final Glimpse of the Caiapó

Following the successful Caiapó defense of their lands, the aldeia at São Francisco de Salles persisted until 1871. It was abandoned after the inhabitants grew to feel it had become “unhealthy,” likely as a result of the depletion of nearby game and
available agricultural lands, and so they relocated to Água Vermelho. This was the last and longest-lasting Caiapó aldeia in the Triângulo Mineiro. Its population swelled to around 600 Caiapó in the early 1870s, but it had declined and a mere 50 Caiapó in 1911. By this time, despite the earlier Caiapó efforts to defend their aldeia, farms and ranches had encroached on much of their lands. The aldeia Caiapó and their settler neighbors lived and worked closely with one another.

The loss of land and close settler-Caiapó interaction was accompanied by detribalization, which was widespread and apparent in the last detailed description of the aldeia. In 1911, a Brazilian surveyor named Alexandre de Sousa Barbosa passed through the Triângulo Mineiro and met three siblings working on a farm called Bom Sucesso ("Good Success"). João, José, and Justina called themselves Panará Indians; but local Brazilians called them Caiapó. Fascinated by the fame of the Caiapó, the inquisitive Sousa Barbosa interviewed the three siblings and their mother, collected a list of 700 Caiapó words, and later wrote a brief history. He sent this document and the marvelous wordlist to the Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, where both languished in obscurity for almost eighty years, until Giraldin discovered them in the 1990s.

João, José, and Justina, Sousa Barbosa learned, lived at Água Vermelho. There were around 50 Caiapó who lived at this aldeia; they hunted, fished, and occasionally labored on nearby farms or made hats to sell to the Brazilians. The Água Vermelho Caiapó had lost much of their native identity and no longer constructed a men’s house: “They tell me,” Sousa Barbosa wrote of the aldeia, “that in the past there was a house larger than the others in the center of the aldeia, that they called a piruá, where great
deliberations occurred and marriages [took place].” The men’s house was the center of Caiapó political life, it was where boys were educated and lived before they married; it was where men and chiefs met; and it was where important ceremonies happened; its absence indicated a profound loss of tradition and identity at the aldeia.

There were other indications of detribalization. The siblings constantly informed Sousa Barbosa that they spoke their native language poorly and suggested he interview their mother, Cândida, claiming she knew more than they. Perhaps the siblings were aware of the limits of their knowledge of their indigenous ancestry, but Sousa Barbosa, even after interviewing their mother, felt they spoke their native tongue well enough. So it may have been that the siblings preferred an elder explain their language and traditions to an outsider. But it also might have been the case that the Panará language was declining among the younger Caiapó. As recently as 1907, youths from the aldeia were sent to school to learn Portuguese and reading and writing; many of them, as a result, could read and write, if only a little. Such education denigrated native languages and traditions, and, if the siblings had attended a Brazilian school, they might have been ashamed of their language and heritage. If so, they were probably not alone and shared this with other Caiapó youths.

Cândida proved somewhat reluctant to speak with the surveyor, but, eventually, the siblings convinced their mother to appear at his camp. When Cândida arrived, Sousa Barbosa thought her “old, sympathetic, and notably intelligent.” She was also dying—a cough, perhaps from tuberculosis—wracked her body. The sympathetic surveyor believed this old and ailing woman was terribly sad; he was dismayed when she proved reluctant to speak about her people. But, after receiving a few gifts “of little
value,” the old woman agreed to discuss her language, and, though forced to take breaks because of her coughing, Sousa Barbosa collected his magnificent word list. Sadly, Sousa Barbosa later learned, Cândida died a few months after this episode. Her death meant one less Caiapó living at Água Vermelho; one less elder who spoke the old language well; and one less Caiapó who remembered the old ways. “The rapid extinction of the Caiapó-Panará people seems inevitable,” Sousa Barbosa opined, after her death, and as he sent his word list and history to Rio de Janeiro where, much like the Caiapó at Água Vermelho, they were ignored and eventually forgotten.

**Conclusion**

By the end of the first quarter of the twentieth century, the Caiapó had ceased to exist as an autonomous people throughout their traditional territories east of the Araguaia River. It was a quiet end. The vicious war fought to expel them from their last redoubt at the headwaters of the Araguaia had ended in the last decades of the nineteenth century. The sharp report of volleys and fusillades no longer disturbed the backlands; no smoke from burning villages obscured the sky; no more miserable captives marched away from their homes. On the Paraná, Sucuriú, and Verde Rivers—all places once thickly inhabited—no villages were found: the contact, conflict, slaving, and disease had taken their toll. In Mato Grosso and the Triângulo Mineiro, the Caiapó began the twentieth century in aldeias linked to the Brazilian frontier. They gradually lost their native identity to become laborers, farmhands, and cowboys. They mixed with and became lost among the rural poor in a process that had begun at Maria I, more than a century before, and ended at Água Vermelho.

Far away to the northwest, the Panará, as the Caiapó had always called themselves, survived and prospered in the remoteness of the Peixoto de Azevedo. It
was only a few years after Sousa Barbosa wrote that the Mebengokre, whom the Brazilians had come to call the Kaiapó, first attacked the Panará. There were ambushes, fierce and unforgiving club fights, and the so-called “Kreen-Akrore,” as they became known, earned a violent reputation in the sertões, but, across the breadth of the vast territory their ancestors had once dominated, the arrows no longer sang and the clubs had long since ceased to fly.

1 In dealing with the Kaiapó of the mid- and late-nineteenth century, one of the immediate problems is deciding whether a document actually deals with the Southern Kaiapó or the Northern Kaiapó. The Northern Kaiapó were known by different names in the early nineteenth century: they were called the Gradáu in Goiás (e.g., Verswijver 1992:82) and the Coroá in Mato Grosso (see below). Contact between the Portuguese and Northern Kaiapó was intermittent and sporadic in the early nineteenth century; by the end of the century, there were some groups of Northern Kaiapó, known as the Pau d’Arco of the lower Araguaia, in more or less continuous contact with the Brazilians (Verswijver 1992:88-89). These groups of Northern Kaiapó, though distinct from the Southern Kaiapó, were called “Caiapó,” often without distinguishing them from the Southern Kaiapó. This could occur in the same document and, at times, in the same paragraph, for example, in 1882, the President of Goiás, Cornélia Pereira de Magalhães (1882:2-3), reported “Caiapó” raiders had attacked and killed 15 Karajá outside of the garrison at Santa Maria do Araguaia and killed a cowboy at a nearby fazenda; he also reported that “Caiapó” near the garrison at Macedina on the upper Araguaia River had killed a cow and wounded a soldier. All of the involved Indians were “Caiapó,” as far as the governor was concerned, but those attacking the Karajá were the Irã’ämranh-re (a group of Northern Kaiapó) (Verswijver 1992:89); the Indians attacking Macedina were the Southern Caiapó (Giraldin 1997:124). Thus, in dealing with historic documents from the nineteenth century, it is necessary to approach critically any reference to the Caiapó, as these may refer to either the Southern Caiapó or the Northern Kaiapó.

2 APMT Livro 191, f. 31v.

3 IHGB Lata 763, pasta 19. There were Caiapó in the region near the headwaters of the Xingú region by at least 1834. A document from that year described the Caiapó as “[a] suspicious nation, they have their aldeias in the immense sertões of the Paraná and the headwaters of the Xíngú,” see BN I-29, 31, 006. In 1843, José Maria de Macerata, either drawing on the 1834 document or its source, wrote that the Caiapó were a “very numerous nation that resides between the headwaters of the Paraná and the headwaters of the Xíngu.” It is clear that these “Caiapó” were Southern Caiapó, not Northern Kaiapó, as the document clearly differentiates between “Caiapó” and the Coroado or Coroá (“Coroaí”), see IHGB Lata 763, pasta 19. This document also makes a distinction between the Caiapó (i.e. the Southern Caiapó), the Coroá/Coroado (i.e. the Northern Kaiapó), and another group also referred to as the “Coroado.” The latter lived in the same region as the Coroaí and, according to the document, were possibly related to the Coroaí.

Turner (1992:313) rejected the term Coroá as referring to the Northern Kaiapó, suggesting that in most cases it referred to the Southern Caiapó or similar groups. However, it appears the term was applied to the Northern Kaiapó. The Coroá of 1843 were described as a “numerous and belligerent nation, which resides between the headwaters of the Peixe River and São João da Barra [i.e. the Apiaká River]; they live in separate houses such that their aldeias resembles a small town,” and “the Mundurukú are the rivals of these [Indians]. The Coroaí are called so because they wear a crown like monks, which they make with splinters of bamboo,” see IHGB Lata 763, pasta 19. Turner (1992:315) identified an 1875 reference to a hostile people on the São Manoel-Paranatinga, whom the Mundurukú fought and referred to as the “Itptowat,” as the Northern Kaiapó. The conflict with the Mundurukú, the proximity of the São Manoel-Paranatinga and the Apiaká Rivers, and the description of the Coroá living in aldeias that appeared to be towns and the practice of opening a tonsure support the identification of the Coroá with the Northern Kaiapó.

4 IHGB Lata 763, pasta 19.

5 BN 22,1,35.
It is beyond the scope of the present study to discuss fully the term “Coroado.” The Portuguese and Brazilians called a number of peoples in different regions of Brazil by this name; peoples as diverse as the Bororo and Northern Kaiapó in Mato Grosso; the Kaingang in São Paulo; and the Puri in Minas Gerais. The Caiapó at the headwaters of the Araguaia River were called the Coroado in the 1830s, see BN II-36,12,14. This term, however, also referred to a group of Northern Kaiapó living near the headwaters of the Xingú: an 1843 document identified the Coroado as a people living near the Peixe and Apiaká Rivers, whom the Brazilians clearly distinguished from Caiapó, see IHGB Lata 763, pasta 19.

A priest who had worked among the Caiapó, Father Francisco de Salles Souza, copied this work, which apparently was part of a larger historical treatise. The original appears to have been lost.

Lemos da Silva claimed to have difficulty communicating with the Caiapó but managed to collect a short vocabulary. According to Dr. Kupfer (1870): “of the language of the Caiapó [at Santana do Paranáiba], I was only able to note very little; the few men that understand Portuguese became tired from the questions and would only answer lightly, so I was only able to capture their attention for about fifteen minutes at a time.”

Dr. Kupfer’s first name was unrecorded. To date, this author has located practically nothing about him.


Saint-Hilaire (1975:67) recorded the Caiapó word for God as punhança.

According to Arndt et al. (1998:93), the Panará were unfamiliar with sugar in the 1970s. When first introduced to it, they consumed great quantities and quickly became ill. The lack of sugar is further evidence that the Panará ancestors had become isolated before the Goiás aldeias were established.
APMT Livro 191, f. 18v. Garcia Leal had interest in the Caiapó lands because he had donated them, see APMT Livro 191, f. 20v.

APMT Livro 191, f. 19.

APMT Livro 191, f. 60.

APMT Livro 191, f. 60.

APMT Livro 191, fls.74-74v, 102.

APMT Livro 191, f. 101v.

APMT Livro 101 (1848-1860), f. 101v.

Arquivo Nacional Cod 807, vol. 15 f. 95.

IMPL-LDR 1835 n° 7. A special thanks to Vanda da Silva, of the Arquivo Público in Cuiabá, for her assistance in finding this particular document

APMT Livro 106, fls. 89, 120v.

APMT Livro 101 (1848-1860), f. 86.

APMT Livro 101 (1848-1860), f. 103.

APMT Livro 191, f. 23v.

APMT Livro 191, fls. 27-28.

APMT Livro 191, f. 49v.

APMT Livro 101 (1848-1860), fls. 42, 43, 67v, 177v.

APMT Livro 101 (1848-1860), fls. 68-69.

APMT Livro 191, f. 46v.

APMT Livro 191, f. 47.

APMT Livro 191, f. 27v.

APMT Livro 200 (1862-1864), f. 30.

APMT Livro 191, fls. 31v-32.

APMT Livro 200 (1862-1864), f. 180.

Correio Oficial de Goás (Hereafter, COG) n.140 (2-6-1866).

APMT Livro 191, f. 61.

APMT Livro 191, f. 64.

APMT Livro 191, fls. 64-64v.

APMT Livro 191, f. 67.

APMT Livro 191, fls. 68-68v.

APMT Livro 191, f. 71.

APMT Livro 191, 98v.

APMT Livro 191, f. 98.

APMT Livro 191, f. 95.

APMT Livro 191, f. 99.

IHGB Lata 188, doc. 39.

IHGB Lata 188, doc 38, n. 43.

IHGB Lata 188, doc 38.

APM SG-06 (1869-1873), f. 5.

APM SG-06 (1869-1873), f. 53v.

IHGB Lata 188, doc 38, n. 44.

IHGB Lata 501, pasta 18.

Similarly, according to Heelas (1979:173), the Panará symbolically associated birds and their calls with communication. One way of communicating with ancestors was through a flute made from the leg bones of a bird.

IHGB Lata 501, pasta 18. Both Schwartzman (1988:366) and Ewart (2000:302) saw the emergence of Panará polygamy to contact with Brazilian society: because more Panará women survived contact, monogamy forced single women to marry outsiders, and, therefore, polygamy was “a necessary but disagreeable solution” adopted to keep Panará women from marrying into rivals, see Schwartzman (1988:366).

Ewart (2000:49-69) argued that a Panará ceremony where men attacked a nest of wasps was a metaphor for their relations with outsiders. Drawing on descriptions recorded by Heelas and Schwartzman, she found that, shortly after the Panará had entered into continuous contact with Brazilians, a time when many Panará men had participated in raids, the ceremony closely resembled an actual raid; by 1997, when the Panará no longer raided, the ceremony resembled behavior associated with receiving gifts from the Brazilians.

APM SG-06 (1869-1873), f. 53v.
86 IHGB Lata 188, doc. 39.
87 IHGB Lata 188, doc. 39.
CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION: CIRCULAR VILLAGES, ENEMIES, AND WAR

Introduction

When Alexandre de Sousa Barbosa visited Cândida and her children in the Triângulo Mineiro, the frontier, which first began expanding into their ancestors’ lands more than three centuries before, had finally and irrevocably overrun the Caiapó or propelled them deep into sertões to the northwest of the Araguaia. Their ancestors’ contact began in the early sixteenth century, when the Paulistas found the Bilreiros willing to trade captives for manufactured goods, but this trade soon collapsed into slaving and open warfare, which pushed the Bilreiros from the southern periphery of their lands. They found some peace in the sertões north of the Paraná, which the Paulista slavers avoided for much of the seventeenth century, but a need for slaves and rumors of gold and diamonds soon brought the bandeiras north. When gold and diamonds were discovered at Cuiabá and Goiás, a terrible conflict erupted. It raged across an immense territory, which stretched from the Triângulo Mineiro to Camapuã, and burned for the better part of the eighteenth century. The Caiapó fought a war that confounded the Portuguese: their warriors were tough and ruthless, they travelled great distances to raid, murder, and pillage, and, then, retreated into sertões so distant and so remote that soldiers and even bandeirantes were loath to follow them there.

But no matter how tough the Caiapó were, no matter how ruthless their raiders, and no matter how deep and formidable the sertões, the fighting eventually took its toll. The eighteenth century closed with accommodation and cooperation between many Caiapó and the settlers. Some of the Caiapó settled at Maria I, and, though the aldeia was a violent and unruly place in its early days, this was where many Caiapó lived until
the first decades of the nineteenth century. A hybrid “mission culture,” which was neither wholly indigenous nor wholly European, developed at the aldeia, and, armed with information learned at the aldeias, the Caiapó navigated the challenges of frontier. Even after Maria I was extinguished, Caiapó continued to live at the Mossâmades aldeia in Goiás, and, when that aldeia’s Pombaline allure finally gave way, many of the former residents settled on state-supported aldeias in eastern Mato Grosso and western Minas Gerais.

There were other Caiapó who, though having lived at Maria I or Mossâmades, elected to flee and, then, set about establishing new contacts, but on their own terms. By 1810, their villages had established trading relationships with the boats plying the waters of the Paraná and Tietê Rivers. In these villages, there were new kinds of leaders, who controlled trade through their language skills, and novel forms of hierarchy, based on information gleaned from the Goiás aldeias, and new tensions, created by limited access to manufactured goods. This interaction carried on for a generation, until a disastrous epidemic struck in the late 1830s, when the trade on the Paraná and Tietê Rivers collapsed.

And there were always Caiapó who rejected the state-supported aldeias. Many Caiapó elected to remain in the sertões of Camapuã, the headwaters of the Araguaia, and the Triângulo Mineiro. There, they lived their lives much as they always had, raided settlements occasionally, and fought for their lands when settlers began arriving to farm, ranch, and scour the streams and riverbanks for gold. A conflict simmered at the headwaters of the Araguaia for the last half of the nineteenth century, and the fighting, by the end of the century, left the region devoid of the Caiapó. When the twentieth
century dawned, the Caiapó who had remained in their traditional lands were settled in aldeias north of Camapuã and along the Grande River in the Triângulo Mineiro; they were surrounded by farms and ranches, worked and labored for their former enemies, and the last of the aldeia Caiapó gradually disappeared into the rural population.

This final chapter attempts to explain some of the events described in this narrative through an analysis of the internal social structures ethnographers have documented among the Panará, the descendants of the Caiapó who migrated away from the Araguaia and survived. This chapter will argue that some of the most important social structures identified among the Panará, namely, their concepts of others and matrilineal clans, existed among the Caiapó. It contends that these had important ramifications for the trajectory of the Caiapó encounter with the frontier, especially their infamous and violent form of warfare. And there was something different about Caiapó warfare, which terrified settlers in Goiás and Mato Grosso in a way seldom seen, then or since.

This chapter also attempts to reconcile an important contradiction between Caiapó history and Panará ethnography, namely, the occasional reports of the Caiapó abducting captives. If the Caiapó possessed clans similar to those of the Panará, then, it follows, that they, like the Panará, should not have raided for captives. Through an analysis of Panará clans, a hypothetical explanation is developed to explain how the Caiapó were, in fact, able to incorporate captives into their villages. This chapter also examines the lack of intra-ethnic warfare among the Caiapó and the stability of their villages when in contact with outsiders. In contrast, many Gê-speakers, for example, the Northern Kaiapó, often splintered into mutually hostile factions that went to war with
one another, producing more mobile and bellicose societies (Verswijver 1992:138–142). And, finally, this chapter addresses the role of vengeance in Caiapó war. While much of what is presented here must necessarily remain hypothetical, since identify social structures and tropes from documents requires a leap of faith at times, one hopes that a long-term and diachronic analysis of Caiapó history can contribute, if but slightly, to the wider understanding of Gê-speaking societies.

**Panará, Hipe, and Índios**

The Panará are a Gê-society. Gê-societies are dialectical societies (see Maybury-Lewis 1979). Dialectical societies express their social organization in terms of dualities, for example, the opposition between the village periphery and center (Heelas 1979), the opposition between men’s societies (Turner 1979a, 1979b), or the opposition between nature and society (Seeger 1981). The Panará are a dialectical society, and the most fundamental opposition they recognize is that between themselves and outsiders (Ewart 20003:262).

In the Peixoto de Azevedo, the Panará divided all people into either panará or hipe (Heelas 1979:64–65; Schwartzman 1988:105). All Panará were panará, meaning they were “people,” who belonged to one of the four matrilineal clans, lived in Panará villages, and possessed Panará culture. All non-Panará were hipe, “enemies” or “others.” These outsiders lacked clans, did not live in Panará villages, and had alien culture. Hipe were considered dangerous and hostile; but the things they possessed were interesting. The Panará recognized no distinction between various types of hipe: all non-Paraná, regardless of their cultural differences, were hipe (Heelas 1979:65).

This dichotomy was “fixed”—Panará could never become hipe; hipe could never become panará (Schwartzman 1988:105). This binary division of the social universe
had important ramifications for Panará history. For example, seeing the world in terms of people and enemies meant the Panará had no peaceful contact or interaction with their neighbors: there were marriages, no ritual or ceremonies, and no trading contacts with other peoples (Heelas 1979:65). And the Panará did not raid for captives, since such captives would never be able to acquire clan membership and a place in the village.

The opposition between panará (people) and hipe (enemies), which was apparently fixed and immutable in the Peixoto de Azevedo, has proved to be flexible and able to account for the changing circumstances of contact with outsiders (Schwartzman 1988:367; Ewart 2000:48–49, 2003:273). The Panará continue to categorize themselves as panará (“people”) and non-Panará as hipe, but these categories have expanded and are no longer as exclusive as they were in the Peixoto de Azevedo. There are now different kinds of hipe: there are Índios (“Indians,” also called sotangka, “ugly things”); and there are hipe (“others”). Indian is an in-between category: they are not Panará, but they are culturally similar to Panará. The Panará extend the category of Índios to themselves—the Panará, compared to the Brazilians, are “Indians”—and, conversely, they use the term panará to describe other indigenous groups (Schwartzman 1988:367). This was not done in the Peixoto de Azevedo. Indians are quite unlike non-Indians, the hipe. They are the Brazilians and other non-Indians who possess markedly different and distinctly non-indigenous cultures. The Panará still view hipe as a source of valuable and interesting items, but they do not necessarily consider them hostile or dangerous enemies.
As early as the first decades of the nineteenth century, the Caiapó thought about their social universe somewhat similarly to the Panará. Saint-Hilaire (1975:66), for example, wrote:

The Portuguese gave—I do not know why—the name Coiapós or Caiapós to these natives. From what they told me, it appears that a group of them, who still live in the forests, without any other tribes nearby had no name to identify themselves, and because of this, they came to use the word Panariá to distinguish themselves as a race from the blacks and whites. From which one may conclude, in my opinion, that that word came to be used after the sufficiently recent discovery of the region, and that beforehand, the Coiapós *probably believed themselves alone in the universe*. [emphasis added]

Panará is clearly recognizable in Saint-Hilaire’s “Panariá,” and, importantly, the Frenchman recorded what appears to be the essence of a worldview that divided the social universe into people (“panará”) and others (“hipe”). This passage described not only an autodenomination, but also a cultural category. The Caiapó called themselves Panariá, Saint-Hilaire learned, “to distinguish themselves as a race from the blacks and whites.” But, before the arrival of the Portuguese and their slaves, the Caiapó had “no name to identify themselves” and “probably believed themselves alone in the universe.” Since they occupied territories abutting other peoples, whom they raided, the Caiapó were not, in fact, isolated. They could have been “alone in the universe” only conceptually, that is, if they reserved the category of “people” for themselves and excluded their neighbors. These neighbors would have been hipe.

The Caiapó certainly thought of visitors, like Saint-Hilaire, as hipe. Pohl (1951:365), for example, used a flint and steel to light a fire—this was something, he claimed, the Caiapó had never before see—and the Indians exclaimed in wonder: “Ó itpé! (Oh! The whites).” Pohl’s (1951:399) wordlist also included *itpé* as the Caiapó word for *um branco* (“white person”). Later visitors to other Caiapó aldeias also
recorded this term. Kupfer (1870) collected a wordlist at Santana do Paranaíba that included *hepé* (“white man”). And Von Martius published a small wordlist, also collected from Santana do Paranaíba, which recorded *itpe* as the word for a “white man” (cited in Magalhães 1957:229). In each case, the word was transcribed differently—*itpé*, *hepé*, and *itpe*—but recognizably as *hipe*, and this word was translated as “white man.” Clearly, for the aldeia Caiapó, this word described non-indigenous people, cultural others.4

It does not necessarily follow from this that *hipe* had always meant “enemy.” But the hostile contact and incessant fighting strongly supports the assumption that the *hipe* visiting the aldeias were formerly considered enemies. The Caiapó had routinely tossed the corpses of their victims in fires, for example, and even went so far as to open graves and desecrate corpses, reportedly cooking the bodies as if they were game. This was the sort of treatment the Panará meted out to witches—and witches were considered a kind of *hipe*—whom they killed, cremated, and scattered the ashes (Schwartzman 1988:270). So we can be fairly certain that *hipe* had meant enemies—enemies so noxious that they warranted treatment usually meted out to witches—who, at the same time, were also a source of goods, the plunder Caiapó warriors typically pillaged during their attacks. But *hipe* must have come to mean “others” in the context of peaceful interaction at the aldeias; and the “others” remained a source of interesting and valuable things. Pohl’s tinderbox was an example of this fascination with the goods the *hipe* possessed: the aldeia Caiapó, who lit fires with friction sticks, marveled at his use of a flint and steel.
So panará lived at Mossâmedes in the early nineteenth century. They lived among, and were visited by, hipe. But some of their neighbors were considered “Indians,” an important clue that these categories had changed. In his wordlist, Saint-Hilaire defined panaríá as meaning índios (“Indians”). Either Saint-Hilaire asked an informant how to say “índio” and was told “panará,” or he asked what “panará” meant and was told “índio.” In either case, the Caiapó had clearly expanded their use of the term panará to include other indigenous groups. Formerly hipe, native peoples had become panará (“people”), and, conversely, the Panará had become índios (“Indians”). The exclusive Caiapó cultural identity, panará (“people”), which had once excluded indigenous groups, had transformed into an ethnic identity that included non-Caiapó indigenous groups, while excluding the Brazilians, Africans, and Europeans (cf. Schwartzman 1988:367). This was, much as it was with the Panará, because of the vast cultural differences the indigenous and non-indigenous groups—a difference that must have been more striking when confronted by a distinctly non-Brazilian Frenchman or Austrian.

This worldview of “people,” “enemies/others,” and “Indians” had not developed at the Goiás aldeias, but, rather, possessed much deeper time depth. For example, the Panará thought in terms of people and enemies. Their ancestors, from what we can tell, had never lived at Maria I or Mossâmedes (Schwartzman 1988:286), so they must have brought thus worldview with them when they began their northwest migration out of Camapuã and the headwaters of the Araguaia River in the early 1770s. This means that, at least by the late eighteenth century, the Caiapó thought about the social world in terms of panará and hipe. This explains why the Caiapó had neither peaceful contact,
nor ceremonies, nor alliances with other peoples. This situation was quite unlike some of their contemporaries, for example, the Acroá and Chacriabá famously allied with one another to raid mining settlements in Goiás. The Caiapó did not have similar alliances because, as Saint-Hilaire thought, they “believed themselves alone in the universe.” They were surrounded by hipe.

The Caiapó, quite unlike their Panará descendents, however, recognized different kinds of enemies. At least by 1784, the Caiapó had discerned differences among the non-native hipe. At Maria I, the Caiapó had refused to perform labor they deemed appropriate for enslaved Africans. Of this refusal, one soldier stated: “they do not want to work and say the blacks [i.e., slaves] work.” This meant the Caiapó were cognizant of the difference between freeborn “whites” and enslaved “blacks,” a recognition based on differences in skin color, status, and labor. This observation must have preceded Maria I, and by many years. The Caiapó had observed slaves laboring for their owners for decades before 1784: they cannot have missed the differences in culture, skin color, and lack of freedom. After all, the Caiapó slaughtered slaves by preference, suggesting they recognized different kinds of non-indigenous hipe, so the milieu of more or less peaceful and continuous contact found at the aldeia was not necessary for the distinction to develop.

The Caiapó also recognized differences between the indigenous and non-indigenous hipe, and long before the Goiás aldeias. For example, there were the Caiapó abductions of native women and children, but they almost never abducted women and children from the settlers and their slaves. Since this behavior had preceded the aldeias by many decades, so too, then, had the Caiapó realization that
there were indigenous and non-indigenous hipe. The Portuguese and their slaves were hipe—in the sense of a radical otherness—“enemies” who, unlike their interesting and valuable things, could not be assimilated into Caiapó villages. Native peoples were panará—in the sense of being indigenous—they were "Indians" similar enough to the Caiapó for their women and children to be assimilated into their villages. Indigenous peoples, whom the Caiapó might too have called sotangka, “ugly things,” were dissimilar to the hipe enemies.

These categories of “people,” “enemies,” and “others” were in flux for much of the eighteenth century, something seen in the rare abduction of a settler’s child or the occasional report of peaceful interaction between Caiapó warriors and farmers. The Caiapó were experimenting with these acts, trying to fit the settlers and their slaves into their appropriate and logical place in the social universe. The Caiapó, in this sense, differed from the Panará of the Peixoto de Azevedo, as their world was populated by many and sundry kinds of hipe.

**Village Morphology: The Periphery**

Since the Caiapó divided the social world into “people,” “others,” and “Indians,” then, perhaps, they stressed clans as an important aspect of their identity. Much like the opposition between panará and hipe, clans play an important role in defining Panará identity (Heelas 1979:79–81; Schwartzman 1988:106; Ewart 2003:263). Membership in a clan defines a person as being panará. There are four, exogamous clans; every Panará belongs to one of them. A person inherits their clan membership through their mother and, once born into a clan, a person remains a member for life. Those not born into a clan cannot obtain clan membership and, thus, can never become panará and a member of their society.
Panará clans play an important role in organizing village space. Each clan has a fixed position on the edge of the village periphery, and each clan always occupies the same position relative to the other clans. Although the village periphery is constructed around a circular plaza, it is better to conceive of the clans as a line running from east to west, an alignment mimicking the sun’s course across the sky (Ewart 2003:264). Two clans are associated with the ends of the east/west axis: Kwakjatantêra, associated with the east and meaning “people of the buriti root”; and Kwasôtantêra, associated with the west and meaning “people of the buriti leaves” (Schwartzman 1988:107; Ewart 2003:264). These are the beginning and end respectively of the east-west axis and, when bent around the circular plaza, these two clans are located next to one another. The clans in the center of the line, from the east to the west, are: Krenoantêra, the “people without houses,” and Kuosinantêra, the “people of the rib.” Ideally, all Panará villages have all four clans located in the same space around the village periphery. The village periphery, conceptually, represents an ordered space of clans; physically, because the Panará are uxorilocal (men move into their wife’s household), the village periphery is formed of matrilineal households of women related through clan membership, their husbands, and their children.

Because all Panará men and women have clan membership, and because every clan has specific location on the village periphery, every member of their society is associated with a specific space on village periphery (Ewart 2003:263, 265). This association applies to a person’s own village, as well as any other Panará village that person may enter. Clans allowed a person or a group of persons to arrive in a new village and find an appropriate space on the village periphery with people of the same
clan membership. This facilitated inter-village movement of people. Indeed, a lot of movement of people between villages was required for all villages to possess all four clans, since intra-village feuding potentially could leave a village without all four clans (Schwartzman 1988:108).

Although all Panará possess clan membership, the sexes live their lives differently in relation to their clans (Ewart 2000). The village periphery is a domestic space composed of uxorilocal houses. Born into a particular household and clan, Panará women live more or less in the same location on the edge of the village periphery, even if they move to another village. Men, in contrast, live their lives by moving throughout the village. They are born in their mother’s house and into a clan, then move into the men’s house in the village center, and, after marriage, go to live in their wife’s household. They have children and become elders while living in a household and clan in which they were not born. When a man dies, however, he is not buried in his wife’s household and clan; rather he returns to his mother’s house and clan for burial. The location of clans, households, and women creates a powerful sense of community and continuity at the village periphery (Ewart 2000:204, 2003:266). Even the dead return to their clans.

It is impossible to establish with absolute certainty that the Caiapó possessed clans similar to those of their Panará descendants. Certainly, the periphery of a Caiapó village was a domestic space associated with women and their families. The periphery was where the Caiapó built their homes with their smoldering hearths, and it was where women cooked in earth ovens. The hearths and ovens were fed by the constant labor of women. It was to the periphery that Caiapó women retreated when Kupfer arrived at
Santana do Paranaíba in 1857. The Caiapó dead were buried behind the homes at that aldeia. None of this, of course, firmly establishes the Caiapó had clans, but it does strongly suggest an association between women and the village periphery, as well as similar mortuary practices. Other Gê-speakers, such as the Northern Kaiapó, have clans, so we can probably safely assume the existence of Caiapó clans. However, most Gê-speakers do not emphasize their clans as an aspect of their identity. It is, then, a question of whether the Caiapó emphasized clan membership like their descendants.

There is evidence that strongly suggests they did. The Caiapó rejected the prefabricated houses at Mossâmedes. These homes were built around the rectangular plaza and designed for nuclear families. The houses were neither organized around a circular periphery, nor were they multigenerational households wherein lived related women, their husbands, and their children. The Caiapó had rejected the houses, claiming the lofty roofs were too cold in the rainy season (Pohl 1951:360). Instead, they chose to construct traditional homes in a traditional fashion and from traditional materials to the west of the aldeia. Drafty roofs were probably an excuse, one that—unlike clans—administrators and European visitors could relate to and understand. Alencastre (1865:100) inadvertently provided a critical clue supporting this interpretation. The Caiapó-constructed homes, he believed, were “where the married couples lived by preference or those who could not under any circumstance live in the common quarters.” Married Caiapó couples lived in houses of their own construction by “preference,” because the women had rejected the pre-fabricated homes: the alien construction interfered with living in matrilineal households normally organized on the
circular village periphery according to clans. Further evidence of clans can be inferred from the movement of people, information, and things between Caiapó villages during and after the founding of Maria I. Such movement, it would seem, was facilitated by the existence of clans.

Accepting that the Caiapó possessed clans, and that these clans were similar to Panará clans, we must explain the reports of abducted women and children. Captives lacked clan affiliation and, much as was the case among the Panará, should have been incapable of being assimilated into the fabric of village society. But captives were abducted and seemingly incorporated into Caiapó villages (recall the missing Araxá women and children, Pires de Campos’s description of “captives,” the attacks on the Goiá, and the much reduced Crixá). An admittedly faint memory of such abductions appears to have survived among the Panará. After a ritually reenacted raid, Heelas (1979:222) saw a doll returned to the village center. This doll could be considered a symbolic representation of a captive taken on a raid. Since a memory of the abductions survived, it seems possible that whatever means of incorporating them might also have survived.

This is possibly found in the clans themselves. There is a sense of temporality to the clans’ east-west arrangement, an orientation that mimics the sun’s passage across the sky (Ewart 2003:264). The names of two of the Panará clans, Kwakjatantêra, “people of the buriti root,” and Kwasôtantêra, “people of the buriti leaves,” refer to the beginning (the roots) and end (the leaves) of a buriti palm tree. These clans, conceptually, are associated with the rising and setting of the sun, the beginning and end of a day, and the growth of a buriti palm from beginning (the roots) to end (the
leaves). Because the Panará construct circular villages, the Kwakjatantêra and Kwasôtantêra, as the ends of an east-west axis, always sit next to one another on the village periphery, “a situation where the two temporal poles, which are also thought of as beginning and end, are in fact next to one another” (Ewart 2003:264). The location of these clans, with their association with time and growth, on the village periphery “effectively expresses the denial of temporal transformation through the closure of beginning and end, where there is nothing between base and leaf.” A situation causing Ewart (2003:265) to ask perspicaciously: “what, after all, is a circle other than a line without beginning and end?” The circular periphery of clans, with its beginning and end always meeting, symbolically represents continuity—a continuity physically represented in, and reinforced by, the location of women and their households. Temporality, and with it transformation, Ewart has argued, are denied by the sense of continuity found in the clans at the village periphery.

The Panará clans, with their denial of temporality, functioned to exclude captives in the Peixoto de Azevedo. Since they neither possessed nor could acquire clan membership, captives could never be assimilated into village life (Heelas 1979:65). But it may have been the case that Caiapó clans were less exclusive and, instead of preventing assimilation, merely obscured transformations at the village periphery, at least at the conceptual level. Wedged between the root and base clans, there is a clan called Krenoantêra, the “people without houses.” This, however, was not the only interpretation of this clan name. “The meaning of all the clan names were never given without some pause for reflection,” Ewart (2003:277, n. 11) observed during her fieldwork, especially the Krenoantêra clan. The Panará thought this clan name “might
mean ‘people of the shallow’; *kre no* = shallow, no depth.” What if the *Krenoantêra* clan was “shallow” and possessed “no depth” in the sense of time? Was it a clan of newer people, “people of the shallow [time]”—people, that is, captives, who had no clan affiliation—inserted between the timeless continuity found at the conjunction of the Buriti root and base and rising and setting of the sun? Having arrived as outsiders, that is, as hipe without clan affiliation, these captives would have been foreign outsiders—that is, “people without houses.”

Here, it becomes important that the Caiapó worldview had changed long before the Goiás aldeias. The Caiapó recognized the similarities and differences between panará (“people”), índios (“Indians”), and hipe (“enemies” or “others”). Women and children from neighboring indigenous groups, unlike the settlers and slaves, were culturally similar enough to the Caiapó to be hidden within the clans. Much like the plunder pillaged by warriors—an axe accompanied the doll into the village center in the ritual Heelas observed—captives were brought into the village center. They were assigned a space on the periphery, the “people without houses,” and their presence was masked, at least at the conceptual level, by a sense of community found in the other clans.

This provides a plausible, if hypothetical, explanation for the abduction of native woman and children. The Caiapó clans, with their sense of continuity and denial of time and transformation, conceptually obscured the presence of new people on the village periphery. This made it possible for the Caiapó to abduct women and children, like the unfortunate Araxá, and incorporate them into their society, while maintaining an emphasis on clan affiliation as part of ethnic affinity. When the Caiapó became isolated
in the distant Peixoto de Azevedo, the practice of abducting captives was abandoned, and the ancient captives all but forgotten—their memory preserved in the name of a clan and a ritual.

**Village Morphology: The Center**

The preceding discussion, drawing on ethnography, set about to establish that the Caiapó thought in terms of people, enemies, and Indians, possessed clans, and did indeed take captives. Ethnography can also inform our understanding of the morphology of Caiapó villages. For the Panará, the association of women, domesticity, and timeless continuity of the clans on the village periphery contrasts with the village center. The village center is a public space where ritual and discourse takes place. It is where chiefs orate, where men meet to discuss village affairs, and where the Panará bring hipe visitors to meet their leaders. The village center is where goods entering the aldeia pass before being redistributed. Unlike the village periphery, the center is a transformational space (Ewart 2003:262). It is in the village center that the morphology of Panará villages has dramatically changed. This transformation was associated with the Panará moieties.

All Panará belong to one of two moieties: *kyatantera*, “people of the root,” and *tsótantera*, “people of the leaves.” (Schwartzman 1988:108). Moiety affiliation is chosen, not inherited, and it may change through time. Panará moieties are important for collective activities, such as rituals and collective hunting and fishing expeditions. The center of the village is where the Panará moieties meet. In the Peixoto de Azevedo, the Panará constructed two men’s houses in the village center. These houses were organized east to west, and each moiety occupied its own house: the
kyatanera to the east, and the tsôtantera to the west, mimicking the east-west orientation of the clans of the same name (Schwartzman 1988:108).

The Panará abandoned this practice of constructing two men’s houses in the Xingú (where they had been transferred after contact). Instead, their village contained a single men’s house, which was shared by the two moieties, constructed off to one side of the village center. Across from the men’s house, the Panará constructed a soccer field. Ewart (2003:270) has argued that the loss of a men’s house was due to the Panará reorganizing the village center to reflect their interaction with hipe. When the Panará constructed two men’s houses, their most frequent interaction was intra-ethnic, and this was represented physically by the presence of two men’s opposing houses in the village center. In the 1970s, politics were shifted away from the village—away from Panará interactions—and toward the non-Panará, the Brazilians and other native peoples in the Xingú. Outsiders, their things, and their politics became very important to the Panará, and the village center was reorganized to reflect this change. The Panará abandoned one of the men’s houses and built a single men’s house for the moieties to share. The two moieties, thus, looked across the plaza toward a symbol of the outsiders and their things, the soccer field. This changed the morphology of the village center to a “better” opposition that contrasted Panará identity (the men’s house and its two moieties) with the non-Panará (the soccer field) (Ewart 2003:270). The center of a Panará village, Ewart (2003:271) has concluded, is “the privileged location for encountering and appropriating alterity,” a space open to, and transformed by, what occurs beyond the confines of the village periphery.
It appears to have been the same for the Caiapó. The descriptions we have of Caiapó villages indicate that they resembled the Panará village in the Xingú. The village at Maria I, according to Pohl (1951:367–368), was circular and constructed around the main storehouse of Maria I.\(^9\) Hercules Florence (n.d.:36) visited a Caiapó village on the Paraná River that consisted of ten houses constructed around a circular plaza. In the center of the plaza sat a single “common” house. We have two excellent descriptions of Santana do Paranaiba that tell us the aldeia was circular with a single house in the village center.\(^10\) And, finally, the Caiapó at Água Vermelho had once constructed circular village with a house in the village center.\(^11\) In each of these examples, the Caiapó lived in a circular village with a single house in the center.

The documents strongly indicate this structure was a Caiapó men’s house and, further, that the village center was a public space associated with men, politics, ritual, and hipe. The house in the village center was where the orations of chiefs and deliberation of Caiapó men took place. According to Lemos da Silva, it was a “true rendezvous” where the village chief and men met and discussed village affairs.\(^12\) This structure, said Souza Barbosa, was “where great deliberations occurred.”\(^13\) According to Kupfer (1870), women did not enter this building, but Caiapó men went there to relax and discuss their affairs. And Lemos da Silva had earlier admired the Caiapó boys practicing the use of their bows and arrows there. This indicates the structure these chroniclers observed was a men’s house.

Although we do not have direct evidence of Caiapó moieties, much less that these moieties occupied the men’s house, there is no reason not to assume their existence. The Panará, after all, possessed moieties, and nothing indicates that they developed
these in the years after migrating to the Peixoto de Azevedo. So it seems reasonable to assume the Caiapó possessed moieties, and these moieties shared the single men’s house in the village center.

The village center was also a place of ritual and ceremony, even hipe. It was in the plaza that Lemos da Silva and Kupfer observed the Caiapó performing dances. And the village center was where the Caiapó performed the rituals Saint-Hilaire and Pohl described. The center was where visitors were greeted and their goods distributed. Langsdorff, almost certainly on the advice of river guides familiar with the Caiapó, left presents left in the village center (Florence n.d.:36). Kupfer was steered to the village center upon his arrival, and it was there that Caiapó men greeted him; it was from the village center that Kupfer’s gifts were distributed. This association of the village center with outsiders and their things was powerfully represented at Maria I: the Caiapó, foreshadowing their descendants’ soccer field, had constructed their village around a communal storehouse.

Since the village center was associated with men, politics, and outsiders, it was no accident that each of the described Caiapó villages had a single men’s house in the plaza. In each case where we have a description of a Caiapó village, it appears that the inhabitants had altered the village center. Instead of two men’s houses, presumably each belonging to a moiety, the Caiapó had constructed a single men’s house that belonged to both moieties. It would not be surprising to find, through future archaeological excavations, that the Caiapó at Maria I had constructed the men’s house across from the storehouse. This would have been a “better” opposition that contrasted
the internal politics of the village with the external politics of the outsiders (cf. Ewart 2003:274).

**Village Fissioning and Stability**

That contact with outsiders resulted in the transformation of the village shape of a Gê-speaking people is not of itself novel. The morphology of Northern Kaiapó villages, for example, transformed with contact. Originally constructed around circular plaza with two men’s houses in the center, Kaiapó villages lost a men’s house to become circular villages with a single men’s house. This transformation, however, occurred for decidedly different reasons. Whereas the Panará reorganized their village center to represent an opposition between their two moieties and the hipe, the morphology of Kaiapó villages changed because of political factionalism and internal strife. For them, the single men’s house belonged to a single moiety, as the other moiety was driven from the village in sanguineous feuds. The difference between Kaiapó and Panará villages, we shall see, has important ramifications for understanding Caiapó history.

Gê villages are highly independent of one another. This is especially true of the Northern Kaiapó, among whom exists what has been called an “ideology of self-sufficiency” (Ewart 2003:261). A Kaiapó village, according to Turner (1979a:174), is a “self-regulating, self-reproducing, autonomous social entity.” Each village requires no interaction with other villages, whether politically, economically, socially, or ritually. And Northern Kaiapó villages are notoriously unstable and prone to fracturing (Turner 1979a, 1979b).

Typically, the split occurs because of political factionalism between the two moieties. Kaiapó moieties are important for communal activities and rituals necessary for the social reproduction of the village. Structurally, each Kaiapó moiety possesses
strong internal solidarity due to bonds of reciprocity between members; but the moieties are weakly linked to one another, and their interaction is weakly regulated by notions of restraint and respect (Turner 1979b:209–210). The two moieties, thus, tend to develop into political factions, and the factionalism leads to rivalry and conflict between the moieties. Tensions can reach the point that the men of one moiety leave the village with their families. The subsequent single-moiety village is structurally functional due to the opposition found between the junior and senior age-sets found within a single moiety; this enables a single moiety to perform all the collective and ceremonial functions of a two moiety village (Turner 1979b:212).

Villages typically splintered into smaller villages close to when the inhabitants entered into intense contact with Brazilians (Verswijver 1992:138–142). Typically, there were disagreements over the pros (access to goods) and cons (disease) of contact with Brazilians. Access to, and dependence upon, western goods also created internal tension. The disagreements and tension often led to a club fight—the Kaiapó blamed these fights on adultery—between political rivals from each of the moieties (Verswijver 1992:139). The loser of such a club fight, along with his allies and fellow moiety members, fled the village and established a new community. The new village they established, however, had only a single men’s house in the village center. The two new villages often remained on hostile and began attacking one another: the resulting intra-ethnic warfare and vengeance killings were notoriously violent.

The factionalism had the effect of reducing the size of Kaiapó villages, spreading them through the sertôes, and transforming their shape. Nineteenth-century villages could be extremely large before entering into contact with Brazilians. Posey, for
example, estimated one pre-1870 Kaiapó village had a population of between 3700 and 5000 (Verswijver 1992:181). These villages were also somewhat stable. For example, the village Posey visited had been occupied for almost 70 years. As intra-ethnic warfare increased, however, Kaiapó villages became smaller and, since the inhabitants often moved their villages out of fear of attack, more mobile (Turner 2002:330–331). These smaller, more mobile villages had a single men’s house occupied by a single moiety in the village center. This pattern of village fissioning and structural transformation was common. Indeed, Turner (1965:30, 1979:1979) found that no Mekragnoti villages possessed both moieties by the early 1960s. And Bamberger (1979:133) dated the last report of a Kaiapó village with two men’s house to 1936, long before they entered into sustained contact with Brazilians in the 1950s.

In contrast, this pattern of village fissioning and intra-ethnic warfare did not occur among the Panará. Even during the difficult years preceding contact, a time that included the sudden appearance of outsiders, the deadly 1968 Kaiapó massacre, and the outbreak of epidemic diseases, the Panará did not experience an upsurge in village splits and intra-ethnic warfare. Panará villages did experienced intense political disputes and increased social tensions, but these did not shatter into mutually antagonistic entities (Schwartzman 1988:300). When the morphology of Panará village changed, it reflected external political changes. This transformation was not due to internal political factionalism, the loss of a moiety to a village schism, and the onset of endemic intra-ethnic warfare.

In fact, far from fissioning into mutually antagonistic entities, Panará villages appear to have come together and, until disease devastated their population, even
grown somewhat larger. In the late 1960s, the Panará lived in at least seven villages spread throughout the Peixoto de Azevedo (Heelas 1979:8; Schwartzman 1988:296). The survivors of the Mekragnoti attack of 1968 fled to a neighboring village, named Sonsenasân, where they unsuccessfully attempt to organize a counterattack that included men from four villages: Sonkanasan (the attacked village), Sonsenasân, Inkuipo, and Kyaunakye (Schwartzman 1988:299). It was only a short time later that the Villas-Bôas brothers initiated the first expedition to contact the so-called Kreen-Akrore. The Panará abandoned villages in front of the expedition and fled to the more remote villages away from the advancing hipe. As village populations swelled, food resources were overexploited; this fueled further village abandonment and population consolidation (Schwartzman 1988:299). By 1969, the Panará had abandoned four villages, and their entire population was concentrated in three villages: Pa’tsperi, Yopuyupaw and Pinkasainko. By 1973, village abandonment and population consolidation—accompanied by the outbreak of disease—had reduced the Paraná to a single village, Yopuyupaw (Schwartzman 1988:300–301).

This was also a period of intense debate and considerable social tension for the Panará (Ewart 2003:268). Elders and young men argued over the pros and cons of approaching the hipe. Elders did not want to approach the Brazilians, fearing they and their goods were dangerous, while the younger Panará viewed the outsiders as a source of valuable goods; the young men wanted to contact the hipe. This very stressful time was added to by the outbreak of epidemics. The Panará blamed the strange diseases, as well as the sudden and unexpected appearance of the hipe, on witchcraft. Accusations of witchcraft were hurled; some of the accused “witches” were
murdered, their bodies “burned, [a] treatment never normally given the dead” (Schwartzman 1988:270). Tensions ran so high that the killing of witches was a significant cause of violent death in the Peixoto de Azevedo (Schwartzman 1988:268); the violence could have fractured villages or brought about war.

Yet, despite the debates, the epidemics, and the witchcraft killings, Panará villages did not splinter. Intense debate did not erupt into club fights, in part, because of the weakly formed Panará moieties (Ewart 2003:267). The moieties did not provide a vehicle for dividing men into antagonistic political factions that produced fights. The outbreak of epidemics was a more serious problem, one that created tensions that threatened to split Panará villages. The witchcraft accusations and killings occurred along clan lines. According to Schwartzman (1988:272), the “witches were mostly killed by groups of men from clans other than their own, often by groups of brothers.” There were killings between villages as well. The clan-based killings could have splintered villages or produced vengeance raids between villages leveling witchcraft accusations at one another. But no evidence suggests Panará villages went to war with one another (Heelas 1979:67). Such “internal warfare,” according to Schwartzman (1988:279), “was prohibited.”

The very loci of witchcraft accusations, the clans, were also the reason war did not erupt. A person accused of witchcraft could move to another village and find a place on the periphery with fellow clan members. Because there was a lot of movement of people between villages in the Peixoto de Azevedo, such a fugitive might have relatives among whom shelter was to be found. That Panará moieties did not explode into antagonistic political factions facilitated this movement, since a person could move
between villages with less fear of encountering blood feuds and vengeance killings. This movement of people reduced intra-village tension by providing a release for divisive factionalism. In fact, a similar lack of intra-ethnic warfare existed among the Bororo who “insist that violence never occurred between villages or regions of their society,” and for whom the “historical accounts, admittedly limited and inaccurate, indicate nothing to the contrary” (Crocker 1985:71–72). This “almost unique” lack of internal warfare, Crocker argued, “can be understood only through the formal plan of the Bororo village and the attributes of the clans arranged there,” which allowed people to circulate between villages.

Another reason Panará villages go to war against one another was that they redirected their internal social tensions onto the hipe (Schwartzman 1988:259, 279). This helped provided a medium for village solidarity, one trumping tensions created by the emphasis on clan membership: “warfare itself, based on collective, inter-village male groups that cross-cut clan ties asserted an internal solidarity of the whole society that counterbalanced the potential schismogenic tendency of clan based witchcraft killings” (Schwartzman 1988:365, 379). Internal social tension was projected away from the village-centered sources of instability, the debates between old and young men and the clan-based witchcraft accusations, and onto a perceived external threat, the hipe. Rather than fighting amongst themselves, Panará men mobilized for warfare against hipe. The ability to shift internal social tensions outside of society, as well as the lack of hostile feuding between villages, permitted collective activity between villages in a region. The refugees from Sonkanasan, for example, organized what proved to be an unsuccessful counterattack against the Northern Kaiapó that involved warriors from four
villages. This was possible because the involved villages considered the Kaiapó hipe and, at the same time, were not actively pursuing wars of vengeance against one another.

That the Panará fled outsiders and sought shelter in neighboring villages when attacked or approached by outsiders, whom they perceived of as dangerous, does not appear remarkable at the first glance. The sheer rapidity that epidemics reduced the Panará population may have prevented villages from splitting apart by not allowing sufficient time for social tensions to produce a village split or an outbreak of intra-ethnic warfare. However, there is some historical evidence to support that this would not have happened. For example, large Caiapó villages were commonly encountered in places where intense conflicts raged: Pires de Campos encountered a village in Camapuá that was so large he dared not attack it with his Bororo. Camapuá was one locus of conflict between the Caiapó and the frontier. Such large villages were stable and required a concerted military effort to destroy. And nothing indicates Caiapó villages, large or small, went to war with one another. In fact, as far as can be determined from the consulted documents, there is no evidence of intra-ethnic warfare. Antagonisms certainly existed between villages—there was, for example, competition and antipathy between the various Caiapó arriving at Maria I—and we can read political factionalism in the flights from the Maria I and Mossâmedes. But there warfare did not erupt among the Caiapó at the time of the “pacification,” and the reason Damiana da Cunha was able to approach aldeia fugitives was because they were not fighting an intra-ethnic war fueled by vengeance killings.
Far from finding evidence of Caiapó villages attacking one another, we have evidence of Caiapó villages participating in raids. During the furious backlash Pires de Campos provoked in southern Goiás, Caiapó villages “came in great lots,” Pinto da Silveira claimed, “aiding one another to repeat their hostilities.” One chronicler told how a bandeira attack on a Caiapó village in Camapuã was successful because “the men from their aldeia and from another went along the Goiás road to plunder” (Taunay 1981b:226). Such descriptions of the inhabitants of several Caiapó villages rallying to attack a common enemy rings truthful in the light of the Panará organizing a multi-village counter attack. There is even evidence of Caiapó villages, much like those of the Panará, coalescing when in contact with outsiders. Encounters with boatmen and missionaries on the Paraná River did not splinter Caiapó villages, despite the obvious indications of powerful internal debates and conflicts engendered by political rivalries and access to goods recorded by Father Oliveira Bueno (1856:189). Instead, some of these villages coalesced under the leadership of powerful chiefs and intermediaries (DI 1894, vol. 3:191). The extremely large village Pires de Campos encountered in Camapuã was probably the result of Caiapó villages fleeing his depredations, finding solidarity and safety in greater numbers, which swelled the size of remote villages (cf. Flowers 1994:261–262).

On the whole, it can be said, Caiapó villages appear to have been relatively stable in the context of colonial contact. They were certainly stable enough, as well as numerous enough, for entire regions and rivers to be named after them. Anyone traveling to Caiapônia, the Serra do Caiapó, and the Caiapó River knew what people they would encounter. It was the same for the seventeenth-century Paulistas: they
knew who waited for them at the end of the “old road to the sertões of the Bilreiros” (Neme 1969:125). Such stability was facilitated by their clans, which allowed refugees from war or witchcraft accusations to insert themselves into the periphery of a host village. Internal debates and tensions did not fracture Caiapó villages, because these were projected onto the outsiders, the hipe. Warriors mobilized to murder settlers and slaves, not each other, and village participated in attacking a perceived common enemy. More raids meant more plunder, more tension, and more diseases; this meant more fights over access to and distribution of goods, more debates, and more accusations of witchcraft, and more movement of people—and, in a vicious cycle, more attacks on hipe settlements.

**Pillage and Vengeance in Warfare**

Unfortunately, Panará warfare has yet to receive systematic ethnohistoric analysis, though the available data allow for some generalizations. As an institution, warfare rapidly declined in importance after the Panará were transferred out of the Peixoto de Azevedo. Previously, it was part of the dry-season ceremonial cycle (Ewart 2000:76–77) and important to the reproduction and maintenance of society (Schwartzman 1988:206–207). Panará men were produced by warfare: encountering signs of enemies or raiding enemies was a reason to perform collective rites of chest and back scarification of men; leading raids and killing hipe were means of accruing status; and the collective participation of men in raids, as we have seen, negated the social tensions created by witchcraft accusations and killings (Schwartzman 1988:258, 279). Warfare, thus, was an important social and ritual institution.

It also served a means of obtaining *soti* (“things”) (Ewart 2000:66–67). To the Panará, soti are interesting by virtue of being produced by hipe, and they are desired
because they expand the potential of Panará society (Ewart 2000:164). “Several varieties of crops (kinds of potatoes and cara) were said to have been stolen from enemies,” Schwartzman (1988:259) learned, “and enemies were the source of glass beads and metal knives.” The things acquired from enemies were not only tangibles, since various songs and a ceremony came from enemies, having been learned by abducted women, who later escaped and returned to their villages. This interest in outsiders things was (and is) very common to Gê-speakers: the Northern Kaiapó interacted with their neighbors, whether through war or trade, to acquire new and interesting things, including ornaments, manufacture techniques, ceremonies, songs, and firearms (Verswijver 1992:149).

Since the Panará did not have peaceful interaction with their neighbors, warfare was the means by which new items were introduced into their society (Ewart 2000:66–81). The pillaging of goods was important to Panará warriors, and there was a heavy element of exchange in war. Panará warriors left the villages with their clubs and exchanged them for items plundered from victims. For example, the Panará who killed Richard Mason carried off his machete and left their clubs with his body. Warfare was roughly analogous to hunting expeditions, since warring and hunting brought things into the village (Ewart 2000:77). Ewart (2000:81) observed Panará hunters decorating game like hipe: a peccary was given a lip disk like an enemy warrior. Warriors returned with plunder; while hunters returned with game decorated like enemies.

Panará warfare was also fueled by vengeance, but, unfortunately, we do not know much about its role. Verswijver’s (1992:137–138) description of the back and forth raiding between the Mekragnoti Kaiapó and the Panará indicates that these raids were
motivated by vengeance. Except for the last and most devastating attack in 1968, each Mekragnoti raid produced a furious Panará counterattack. During the years before the Kaiapó had acquired guns and ammunition, Panará warriors charged into Kaiapó villages to fight with clubs. Later, when the Kaiapó possessed quantities of firearms, the Panará lurked outside villages and killed isolated and vulnerable victims. (Both tactics are eerily familiar to those the Caiapó had employed.) Because the Panará did not distinguish between types of hipe, it seems reasonable to assume that any hipe attacking their villages would have produced a similar attack fueled by vengeance.

It is interesting to note, however, that vengeance was not behind the Panará encounters with Brazilians in the 1960s and 1970s; rather they approached the outsiders out of inquisitiveness and interest in their things (Schwartzman 1988:290). Encounters with Brazilians occurred before the 1960s, but these were rare since Panará oral traditions maintained the memory of the tumultuous and violent encounters of the past; they, quite understandably, shunned contact (Schwartzman 1988:286). Yet, curiosity propelled some Panará to investigate the hipe. A number appeared at the Cachimbo air-force base because of the gifts they had discovered in the forest and curiosity over whether planes were “fierce” (Schwartzman 1988:290). Although the oral traditions of conflicts to the east provoked fierce debates within Panará villages, what finally drove the Panará to establish contact was their desire to access soti, “things.”

We know more about Kaiapó war and the role of vengeance. The Kaiapó fought two basic types of wars: “internal” and “external” wars (Verswijver 1992:171). Internal wars were waged against rival Kaiapó groups for revenge and glory. Attacking a Kaiapó village was viewed as particularly brave and dangerous, and such raids
provided warriors with opportunities to display manly bellicosity and accrue status (Verswijver 1992:166). It also provided an opportunity to settle old scores, as the killing of one’s kin requires retribution in kind. Vengeance, for the Kaiapó, serves as a “conclusion” that “abolishes the infringement of the killing of a kinsman” (Verswijver 1992:173). A warrior attempting to organize a raid against another Kaiapó village frequently pointed to the need to avenge losses suffered in previous conflicts. Raiding Kaiapó villages was dangerous. The Kaiapó, after all, were skilled club-fighters, and attackers entered villages to provoke fights with their clubs. This resulted in more casualties. The casualties, in turn, required more raiding to avenge the deceased.

“External” war was waged against non-Kaiapó peoples, including other indigenous groups and the Brazilians. The Kaiapó did not think non-Kaiapó and Brazilians worthy opponents for accruing status: other peoples were “weak” and “tame,” easily captured, and rarely counterattacked (the Panará were the exception); firearms made the Brazilian formidable, but they “were not really considered brave” (Verswijver 1992:169–170). Fewer Kaiapó warriors took part in attacks on non-Kaiapó, making these raids more dangerous and more valorous for the warriors involved.

Vengeance played a limited role in motivating external warfare (Verswijver 19992:173). The Kaiapó suffered few casualties in these raids, so there was not a lot of vengeance to be had. Instead, warriors attacked non-Kaiapó to capture plunder. Pillage, especially of firearms and useful tools, was what motivated the Northern Kaiapó to attack the Brazilians. The Kaiapó did not attack the Brazilians to abduct women and children, though this occasionally happened. Native peoples were attacked to pillage things, such as headdresses, or abducted women and children from whom songs and
ceremonies could be learned. This quest for things was the driving force behind Kaiapó contact with their neighbors (Verswijver 1992:149). They shared the Panará practice of adopting goods and rituals from neighboring groups, and such borrowed or pillaged items became *nekrets* ("ritual wealth") that were incorporated in ways that made them important to cultural reproduction (Verswijver 1992:171).

Unlike the Kaiapó, as we have seen, the Caiapó did not fight so-called “internal” wars. Here, the Northern Kaiapó example helps us but a little. But they did fight external wars against neighboring native peoples and settlers. As we have seen, Caiapó warriors abducted women and children from native groups, a situation somewhat analogous to the Northern Kaiapó. Perhaps, like the Mekragnoti, most Caiapó attacks against settlements were motivated by the need to acquire things, rather than a need to avenge the dead.

Indeed, the acquisition of goods lay behind much of the Caiapó interaction with the frontier. The earliest records indicate the Bilreiros traded captives to obtain goods. Reports from the eighteenth and nineteenth century also indicate raiding was a means of obtaining goods. In early 1764, for example, Caiapó raiders killed a large number of slaves in Goiás. Although all of the Caiapó managed to escape a bandeira sent to ambush them, they left “in the victor’s hands the spoils they carried.”18 The attack at Médico fell upon slaves, and the raiders pillaged a large quantity of tools and other goods that a posse of aldeia Indians recaptured.19 A bandeira attacking and destroying a Caiapó aldeia in Camapuã in the early 1780s “captured many things, pieces of metal, knives, etc., things they [the Caiapó] had stolen on other occasions” (Taunay 1981:226). In 1829, the Caiapó attacked a mule train, killing the pack animals to plunder the goods
the animals carried.\textsuperscript{20} In 1859, Caiapó raiders were “burning the houses of the farmers […] robbing everything they can carry away” (Gama Cerqueira 1859:54–55). Another attack, they plundered “everything they believed useful” from the farms and ranches (Gama Cerqueira 1859a:56). Clearly, the capture of plunder was important to Caiapó raiders.

This is not to say that vengeance played little or no role in Caiapó attacks. But finding examples of vengeance in documents is a difficult, if not impossible, enterprise. Giraldin (1997:81), for example, did not find any unambiguous examples of vengeance killings. Instead, he examined and compared the number of victims killed by bandeiras and Caiapó raiders during the course of a series of raids around the Arraial das Antas in the 1750s. According to his analysis, a bandeira had attacked the Caiapó in 1753. This provoked an extremely large counterattack in 1755. In response, a bandeira attacked the Caiapó, capturing six Caiapó women and 25 children. The Caiapó again attacked in 1756, killing 19 slaves. Giraldin concluded that the 19 slaves killed represented a “number almost close to the 31 [Caiapó] lost in the preceding ‘white’ attack.” The slaves, in his opinion, were murdered to avenge the Caiapó abducted by the bandeira. This is slim evidence. The 19 slaves killed were only a little more than half of the 31 Caiapó captured; and that number ignores the Caiapó killed by the various bandeiras. Further, vengeance killings rarely work in the sense of a one-to-one correlation between the loss of kin and the killing of an enemy. Among the Mekragnoti, “the victim is not killed by a single warrior, but rather by the corporate group of warriors, each of whom struck the victim with their club” and “all, or nearly all of the Mekragnoti warriors who participated in a raid are reckoned to have ‘killed’ and this irrespective of the numbers of
effective victims” (Verswijver 1992:179). If vengeance worked the same way among the Caiapó, and there is no reason to believe it did not, then the killing of a single enemy potentially would have satiated several warriors, even the entire raiding party. There was no need to kill 32 slaves, or even 19, to avenge 32 Caiapó dead. A smaller number would have sufficed.

We are seeing something other than vengeance in the yearly return of raiders to Arraial das Antas. The fighting around the Arraial das Antas was more extensive than the 1755–1756 attacks (see appendix-a). The attacks began when the Caiapó killed three women on the roads outside of the settlement in 1750. Several years of quiet followed. Then, in 1755, there was a massive attack that killed 44 people, mostly slaves. The following year, the Caiapó returned and killed 19 slaves. In 1757, they reappeared. Two slaves died in the attack, but one of the Caiapó warriors was killed. A final Caiapó assault that killed five more slaves happened in 1758. In four subsequent years, there were four back-to-back attacks. It was not surprising that settlers in places like the Arraial das Antas felt besieged by the Caiapó.

The capture of plunder best explains the pattern of fighting. The 1750 attack was a typical Caiapó raid. It involved a small number of warriors who killed isolated victims and carried off a few plundered goods. It was not followed by an attack for several years, because there was no reason for the warriors to return. The 1755 attack, in contrast, was massive; its success indicates the raiders had caught their victims unaware and unprepared, and they must have secured a huge trove of booty. More than 40 slaves were killed while mining and their tools were plundered; and those slaves who survived would have abandoned their possessions to the Caiapó. Unlike
the 1750 attack, this huge haul of plunder drew the Caiapó back to the Arraial das Antas. Some of these attacks probably hailed from different villages. As word spread between villages, it would have inspired so-called “copy cat” attacks, much as the 1968 massacre of the Panará inspired a second Mekragnoti village to send warriors into the Peixoto de Azevedo. The subsequent attacks were less effective—the returning raiders, after all, had lost the element of surprise—captured less plunder, and even saw a warrior killed. Eventually, the Caiapó quit returning. It was the great quantity of plunder captured in 1755, not vengeance, that caused the Caiapó to reappear at the Arraial das Antas.

Similarly, much of the early fighting in southern Goiás and Camapuã was motivated by a Caiapó desire for plunder. Earlier attacks were small raids and ambushes that killed a few slaves and captured a few goods. It was the frequency, unpredictability, and violence of these attacks that terrified settlers, not the size. Caiapó losses on these raids were low, since it was common for their warriors to outwit and outfight soldiers, like Captain Lemos e Faria, dispatched after them. Indeed, before Pires de Campos and the Bororo arrived from Cuiabá, the populace of Vila Boa was so tired of defeats that they greeted the killing of a mere two Caiapó as a great victory. Instead of vengeance, Caiapó warriors set forth to pillage what must have seemed an endless supply of exotic, interesting, and useful goods during the two decade after the discovery of the mines.

In Goiás, this changed with Pires de Campos’s arrival in 1742. He quickly destroyed a number of Caiapó villages. A period of calm followed. Vila Boa was unthreatened for seven years, but it sat somewhat distant from the densely inhabited
regions of Caiapó territory. Farther south, the attacks soon resumed. And, when Pires de Campos began attacking villages in the Triângulo Mineiro, a densely occupied region, the Caiapó appeared in huge numbers, attacked settlements, confronted and fought soldiers, and besieged troops. The press-ganged troops and armed thugs and slaves were entirely incapable of defending against these war parties, which swept into and threatened settlements in western Minas Gerais. It was only when Pires de Campos and the Bororo defeated these Caiapó war parties and began savaging their villages that some semblance of security returned.

The wide-ranging war parties were unlike the Caiapó attacks that had preceded them in Goiás. They were onslaughts that involved great numbers of warriors murdering, burning, and looting. A need to avenge losses, not the pillage of goods, propelled these warriors to attack. War chiefs, who had seen their village savaged by Pires de Campos, roused followers with calls to settle scores and avenge the dead. Their calls were heard throughout the region, and villages rallied. Caiapó vengeance, for those who witnessed it and survived, was terrible to behold. It subjected the settlers to a different kind of war, one where the Caiapó confronted their enemies in open battle. They appeared on the Velhas, besieging troops, firing flaming arrows, and attempting to provoke club fights. It was this sort of fighting that had destroyed the Araxá village and nearly annihilated the Goiá and Crixá. Usually reserved for natives enemies, such tactics were brought to bear against musket-toting settlers and soldiers, and with great effect. A lot of hard fighting was necessary to reestablish security in southern Goiás.

Nothing similar occurred in Camapuã, even though there was a lot of fighting there. Pires de Campos never established aldeias of Bororo to patrol the hinterlands of
Camapuã, unlike southern Goiás where he founded three aldeias and repeatedly dispatched bandeiras in search of the Caiapó. These bandeiras entered Camapuã, even fought Caiapó there, but they did not destroy villages and enslave the inhabitants to the extent that occurred in southern Goiás. Their presence, lacking aldeias that functioned as garrisons, was much more ephemeral; in fact, on at least one occasion, Pires de Campos and the Bororo were forced to retreat from Camapuã. The region remained, well until the next century, largely unoccupied. A small cluster of settlements sprung up near the portage at the headwaters of the Pardo River, where the passing flotillas encountered a number of farmers who risked Caiapó attack to grow crops, but these were places where voyagers replenished their supplies. They were never defended by garrisons of Bororo and, thus, never had to face massive Caiapó onslaughts fueled by vengeance.

**Conclusion**

Caiapó warfare and many of the other events detailed in the historical narrative were the product of a fateful collision between an aggressive colonial state and a dialectical society that divided the social universe into people and enemies, placed great emphasis on clans, and was fascinated by outsiders and their things. It has been argued that the panará and hipe social categories existed, that these categories transformed with contact, and that these categories influenced the violent confrontation. The miners, adventurers, and slaves heading to the mines at Goiás and Cuiabá were hipe, a form of otherness whom the Caiapó thought of as, and treated like, witches. For much of the eighteenth century, they slaughtered the hipe without mercy. The fighting was intense and enduring, in part, because, contrary to other Gê societies, Caiapó villages did not splinter when in contact and conflict with outsiders. Their villages
remained stable, sometimes participated in joint raids, and did not fight one another. This was because, much like their Panará descendants, the Caiapó emphasized the organization of clans around their village periphery—clans that were capable of incorporating women and children abducted from neighboring peoples—possessed weakly formed moieties, and projected internal social tensions onto hipe, against whom they mobilized for war.

Such mobilization made the Caiapó formidable opponents. Destroying a Caiapó village did not produce pleas for succor and calls for submission. Vengeance and a need to avenge losses produced great Caiapó onslaughts that almost severed Vila Boa from the coast in the mid-1740s. The Caiapó turned native tactics against their musket-toting enemies: they aggressively confronted settlements and bluntly attacking troops, turning their traditional raiding tactics into a powerful tool of resistance. Such calls for vengeance were not behind many of the Caiapó attacks, at least in the sense of being what motivated warriors to take up the war club; instead, many warriors left their villages to pillage valuable goods and other things they desired. They almost certainly, like the Northern Kaiapó, did not think their non-indigenous enemies brave—after all, the worst savaging they met was at the hands of allied Bororo, not soldiers—though they feared and respected their deadly firearms.

This explanation of Caiapó warfare, while in many ways hypothetical, draws from the available historical and ethnographic data and, one hopes, moves the historical exegesis beyond the traditional perspectives of violence for the sake of violence (Taunay 1950) and the so-called “indomitable defense” of territory (e.g., Ataídes 1998) frequently used to explain their history. It looks to native structures and logic to inform
our understanding of seemingly inexplicable, even barbaric, acts, and it contributes to
our wide knowledge of Gê-speaking societies by providing greater time depth to their
historical experiences.

**Directions for Future Research**

Finally, in closing, we suggest a few directions for future research. Much archival
research remains, of course. There are many important and interesting documents
about the Caiapó still to be found in archives. Research for our study was not
conducted in São Paulo, where numerous documents relating to the Caiapó most
certainly exist. Of particular interest are a number of documents relating to the fighting
in and about northern São Paulo in the 1760s and 1770s, including an official
investigation into the fighting. The superintendent of the Goiás mines, Agostinho
Pacheco Teles, conducted an official investigation into the fighting around Vila Boa in
the late 1730s or early 1740s, and it is possible that this document has survived in São
Paulo. The Projeto Resgate Barão do Rio Branco, a vast collection of digitized colonial
documents stored in Lisbon, has made it easier to access colonial documents sent to
Portugal, but many of the digitized documents are difficult to read; many, in fact, are
simply unreadable. Unfortunately, numbered among these illegible reproductions are
several critical to understanding the campaigns of Antônio Pires de Campos as well as
the pacification of the Caiapó. Research in Portuguese archives, therefore, is
necessary, especially at the University of Coimbra, where exist a number of letters
relating to Pires de Campos’s campaigns and accounts written by Pinto da Silveira, the
greatest eighteenth-century chronicler of Goiás. Documents concerning Damiana da
Cunha exist in the Instituto Histórico e Geográfico de Goiás in Goiânia. There is a
collection of Caiapó artifacts, which Pohl collected while visiting the Mossâmedes
aldeia, in the Museum für Völkerkunde (Museum for Ethnology) in Vienna, Austria. And the Langsdorff expedition collected a Caiapó-Portuguese-German wordlist, which was stored in a naval archive in Saint Petersburg, Russia. It would be interesting to visit the collection and acquire the wordlist.

There are several colonial maps in existence that would greatly inform our study. One map, which appears to be the companion piece to Pinto da Silveira’s testimony regarding the native peoples of the Araguaia basin and the campaigns of Pires de Campos, exists in the Itamaraty Archive in Rio de Janeiro. There is also a map of the territories of the Caiapó, Curumará, and Chavante that is currently archived in Portugal. Plans of both Caiapó aldeias in Goiás, Mossâmedes and Maria I, are stored in archives in Brazil and Portugal.

A wider and more comparative reading of Indigenous history and ethnography will greatly inform the historical study of the Caiapó. The number of archival-based histories of the Brazilian Indians is rapidly expanding, offering more opportunities for comparative analysis. Time constraints, inherent to the writing of a dissertation, prevented a wider reading of ethnography. Future study includes closely examining the ethnography of the Northern Gê, particularly the Kaiapó and Apinayé, whose history we have touched upon, if briefly, as well as the more distantly-related Central Gê, such as the Xavante and Xerente. Ethnography, it would seem, would be particularly fruitful for examining the period in which Gê-speakers enter into contact with the frontier. Even a superficial reading of ethnography hints at important insights into the role of línguas. It would also be informative to examine the copious ethnography of the Bororo, whose ancestors were the great eighteenth-century enemies of the Caiapó, and without whose
assistance, quite possibly, the terrible open conflict that raged east of the Araguaia might have continued well beyond the 1780s. The Bororo, like the Panará, place a great deal of importance on clans organized around a circular village periphery.

---

1 For a discussion of what it means to live according to Panará ways see Ewart (2000).
3 It is interesting to note that Saint-Hilaire did not record the Caiapó using hipe. Saint-Hilaire (1975:67) translated “white man” as cacatéa and branco (“white”) as mácaça. Kupfer (1870) included kateté as meaning the color white. Similarly, Souza Barbosa recorded the word for the color white was as Kateté. These were similar enough to Saint-Hilaire’s cacatéa to suggest that this Caiapo word meant the color white. In Brazil, to say branco meant both the color white and people of European descent. In this case, it appears Saint-Hilaire asked his informant for the Caiapo word for branco. He meant a person of European descent, but his informant interpreted this as meaning the color white and replied cacatéa.
4 Lemos da Silva’s wordlist includes ipé. He translated this word as meaning “man” generally, not white man.
5 AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 35, D. 2131.
6 A similar phenomenon is recorded among other Gê-speaking peoples. Lea (1992:131) discussed Northern Kaiapó villages in terms of uxorilocal “houses” organized along the village periphery. Although not expressed as rigorously as Panará clans, Kaiapó houses are generally constructed in the same location along the village periphery, even when the village relocates. Similarly, this organization is observed when the Kaiapó construct their hunting camps. A similar phenomenon of clans organized on the village periphery is found among the Bororo.
7 According to Schwartzman (1988:108), not every Panará village possessed all four clans in the Peixoto de Azevedo, since the spatial organization was not rigorously observed in the construction of hunting or trekking camps.
8 This information comes from the Panará village in the Xingú Indigenous Park. The Panará have since returned to the Peixoto de Azevedo region, and Ewart (2005:30, n. 6) discovered during a 2003 visit to the Panará that they had once again begun to construct two men’s houses in the village plaza.
9 Unfortunately, Saint-Hilaire (1975:75) did not comment on the shape of Maria I. Neither Pohl nor Saint Hilaire described Mossâmedes as a circular village. Both visitors described the decaying baroque church and aldeia buildings, but they ignored the actual Caiapó-constructed portion of the aldeia. Saint-Hilaire (1975:66) mentioned the Caiapó houses were scattered about amidst trees. Similarly, Alencastre (1865:100), writing forty years later, described the Caiapó houses at the aldeia as “spread without order and in different directions.” Yet, judging by the overall indigenous character of the aldeia, e.g. the earth ovens and the house construction techniques, it seems extremely unlikely that São José de Mossâmedes was not built in the form of a circle. In favor of a circular construction of the aldeia, Pohl’s (1951:361) described what appears to be a men’s houses:

   They [the Caiapó] maintain today some forms of their ancient way of life, for instance, certain dances that in certain times they practice at night by blazing bonfires. To this end, they come together in a place four arms across and paint themselves with urucum and genipapo […].

This admittedly vague reference of a “place” that the Caiapó reunited to paint themselves before ceremonies possibly describes the Caiapó men’s house. Future archival or archaeological research may reveal the shape of the aldeia at São José de Mossâmedes.
10 IHGB Lata 501, pasta 18; Kupfer 1870.
11 IHGB Lata 188, doc. 39.
12 IHGB Lata 501, pasta 18.
13 IHGB Lata 188, doc. 39.
14 That would have been about the size of Maria I in 1784-1785.
15 Schwartzman (1988:292) estimated that between 1968 and 1977 epidemics killed at least 80% of the Panará population. By the time the Panará were transferred to the Xingú Indigenous Park in 1975, they were reduced to 79 individuals in a single village.
A special thanks to Stephen Schwartzman for providing this information.
APPENDIX A
ATTACKS DISCUSSED IN THE TEXT

The following is a list of Caiapó attacks. Far from definitive, it lists those attacks that may be attributed to the Caiapó with reasonable certainty. There were many other attacks about which little or nothing was recorded, particularly those occurring at remote mining camps or along the long monção route to the gold mines at Cuiabá.

1732–1733
Bartholomeu Bueno da Silva (Anhangüera) and a small party abandon gold and diamonds in the sertões around the Claro and Pilões Rivers due to Caiapó attacks (RAHE 1980:43).

Mid–1730s
Caiapó raiders follow a bandeira back from the Caiapó River and kill a son of Manoel do Rigo Cabral and another man, both of whom were herding cows (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

João de Veiga Bueno led a bandeira to the Caiapó River. An ambush killed 10 or 12 of this party while prospecting (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

Raiders appear at the Arraial da Barra, four leagues downstream of Vila Boa, near a home belonging to Barholomeu Bueno da Silva. Slaves believe the sounds of the attack are “pigs” eating the fields and give chase, but discover four dead praceiros (?) (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

At the same time as the preceding attack, raiders kill a slave two leagues from Vila Boa (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

The first attack on the “old road” from São Paulo at the site of “Itamamana,” 20 leagues south of Vila Boa. The Caiapo “kill 6 slaves, rob all the tools, and burn everything” (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

Second attack on the road to São Paulo but closer to Vila Boa. Three slaves killed, accompanied by pillage and arson (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

On the São Paulo road, 14 leagues from Vila Boa, near João Leyte da Silva’s holdings, raiders attack a convoy, kill 15 horses, scattered and destroyed the cargo and pillaged the tools: “on this occasion, a boy disappeared, whom one supposes was eaten by the said heathen” (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

Raiders attack a location belonging to Pascoal Gil on the Pedras River, nine leagues from Vila Boa, surrounding the house for five days and killing a slave. Francisco Rodrigues “with a shot of lead to the head of a brute, made the rest retreat” (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).
Raiders attack a nearby site belonging to António Gracia, 10 leagues from Vila Boa, killing a “white and a mulatto” and injuring a slave. The owner escaped on his horse (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

1740
The Caiapó attack in the area of Ouro Fino, a half league from Vila Boa, killing seven male slaves, and two female slaves. Horses and other livestock are also slaughtered (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023; see also, Brasil 1980:132).

Seven leagues from Vila Boa, raiders kill 14 male slaves and a female slave, mutilating their corpses (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

Four leagues from Vila Boa, Caiapo kill two slaves belonging to António Pereira Barbalho and a mulatto (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

At a location five leagues from Vila Boa, the Caiapo kill three more slaves belonging to António Pereira Barbalho, steal tools, and burn everything (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

1741
December: The Caiapó attack a league outside of Villa Boa, and the governor creates two companies of twenty pedestres to patrol the roads.

1742
At the “Ribeira do Hyrohý” (Uruhu?), Caiapó kill two slaves and three whites, “and from one named João Pimenta, they cooked and ate the meat,” slaughtered livestock, “and left the place burned and robbed of tools” (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

March 16: A patrol under the command of António de Lemos e Faria attacks a Caiapó raiding party near the headwaters of the “Hyrohý,” taking two Caiapó trophy heads (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 6, D. 493; IHGB-CU 1.2.2. f. 248; see also DI, vol. 22:165–169).

A large bandeira, consisting of the two companies of troops and some slaves for prospecting, enters the area of the Anicuns River, a tributary of the Rio dos Bois. They attempt an attack on a Caiapó village, which António de Lemos e Faria spoils by shouting while preparing an ambush (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

António da Silva Leme attempts to contact the Caiapo using a Goiá Indian as a translator. The Caiapo appear to lay down their arms but ambush the party, killing all (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

August: António Pires de Campos arrives with the Bororo. They discover the bodies of António da Silva Leme and the others killed in the ambush opened and
the remains cremated. The bandeira assaults a Caiapo village on the Anicuns River, “where it made a great slaughter and took many prisoners.” Seven years would pass before the Caiapo returned to assault Vila Boa. The São Paulo road remains under constant attack (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

1743–1744

Caiapó raids heavily attack along the São Paulo Road, inflicting a series of devastating defeats on the Portuguese. A farm between the Velhas and Uberaba River was destroyed, with many slaves slaughtered and the inhabitants dispersed (Taunay vol. 11, 1950:246).

A farmer named Manuel Ferreira attempted to fight the raiders near Lanhoso, but the Indians burned his farm and diverted his attack. There was a panic and flight to the Rio Grande, where there were troops camped out; this camp swelled with Portuguese refugees and their slaves (Taunay vol. 11, 1950:246).

A man named Manuel Raso marched from the Rio Grande to fight the Caiapó. He encountered them at the Lanhoso, where he suffers a grievous defeat and losses men, horses, and his baggage train. He escapes at night to the fort on the Rio das Velhas (Taunay vol. 11, 1950:246).

A second contingent of troops, under the command of a certain Capitão Luciano Nunes Teixeira, was defeated at the Lanhoso. “Because of these incidents, the traffic along the road from São Paulo to Goiás was paralyzed; no one dared confront the terrible Bilreiros” (Taunay vol. 11, 1950:247).

Raids sweep into Minas Gerais, depopulating farms from “Aragem” to within three leagues of the Vila de São João del Rei. There were attacks at “Palhano,” others by the São Marcos River, and in the vicinity of Paracatú. In response, Pires de Campos destroys at least three Caiapo villages (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

1746

António Pires de Campos signs a new agreement to attack the Caiapó with Bororo relocated from Cuiabá to the São Paulo Road at Rio das Pedras.

Caiapó raiders kill the wife and three daughters of José de Almeida (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

1746–1747

From the Rio das Pedras aldeia, António Pires de Campos permits captive Caiapó to return to their aldeias with offers of peace, including a group of men with a “casique’s son” and two women. None of them returned.

Pires de Campos and the Bororo begin to attack the Caiapó along the road to São Paulo. Major attacks occur with the garrison at Rio das Velhas besieged, which
Pires de Campos and the Bororo break. The bandeira trails the raiders to a village but find it abandoned (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

Pires de Campos and the Bororo attack Caiapó aldeias along the Grande River, capturing and slaughtering many. They learn the Caiapó had killed the returning men as “traitors” but permitted the two women to return, “for being less agile” and, therefore, unable to escape the Portuguese (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

1747–1748(?)
A farmer living at a place called Espinha (“Spine”) near the São Paulo road peacefully interacts with a group of Caiapó, giving them knives and other presents and letting them meet his wife and children. The Caiapó promised to return and, some months later, attacked the farmer. The farmer escaped, but the raiders pass on to kill 9 or 10 slaves and the farmer’s father-in-law, António Dantes, burning him in a barn (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

1748
Heavy Caiapó raiding along the road between São Paulo and Vila Boa: “at the Lanhoso […] they frequently attacked the inhabitants and travelers, surrounding the herds for three or four days until the inhabitants fled” (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

The Caiapó attack a bandeira prospecting on the Rio das Abelhas (“River of Honey Bees,” also called the Velhas River) (Carvalho Franco 1989:11, 312).

1749–1750
The Araxá, a small tribe living along the Grande River in the Triângulo Mineiro, were destroyed in a violent Caiapó raid (Brasil 1980:145). This attack led the governor to search for new indigenous allies on the Araguaia River, where António Pires de Campos was injured by a Cururú arrow.

1750
January 5: The Caiapó attacked near the Arraial de Rio Claro, killing a slave and a soldier named Francisco da Cruz and injuring a dragoon (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 6, D. 492; IHGB-CU 1.2.2. f. 383v; AHEGO Livro 1, fol. 45).

An attack around the same time killed a woman and her two daughters, somewhere along the road to the Arraial das Antas (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

June 12: The Caiapó attacked a convoy moving from Cuiabá to Goiás near the Arraial de Rio Claro. António de Almeida Falcão was hit by arrow and later dies (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 6, D. 492; IHGB-CU 1.2.2. f. 383v).
Pires de Campos attacks Caiapó villages at the headwaters of the Caiapó River (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

1754

Caiapó attacked a farm belonging to Capitão Geronimo Martins da Cunha, killing five slaves working in a field and stealing their tools (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

Two slaves belonging to Rodrigo de Souza were killed while they worked near the Pilões River; their tools were stolen (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

Two days after the preceding attack, the Caiapo attacked along the Fartura River, killing seven slaves belonging to João Alvarez da Cunha and his brother-in-law, Salvador Fernandes (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

December 9: Outside of the Rio das Velhas aldeia, the Caiapo killed a female Indians (probably Bororo) and injured a pedestre with an arrow wound. The Caiapo also killed a horse and surrounded several others (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023; AHEGO Livro 9 f. 43v).

Around the same time, a farmer named Francisco Gonçalvez, who was aiding in the construction of the road to Vila Boa, returned home to find two slaves killed, his home burned, and his furniture and chests smased and scattered about (AHEGO Livro 9 f. 43v).

1755

July 17: The Caiapó attack field on the Ribeiro da Onça, near the Arraial das Antas (modern Anápolis) killing Manuel da Costa Portela and 43 slaves (AHU_CL_CU_008, Cx. 18, D. 1072). This, and reports of Caiapó sighting near the Uruhu River and the killing of three (including two slaves) near the Pilões River, provoke a bandeira (AHEGO Livro 9 f. 38v). The bandeira, led by João de Godói da Silva, captured six women and 25 children (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 14, D. 829). These captives were part of a large trek, and those escaping the bandeira killed a slave belonging to Luís de Pina (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

A large Caiapó raiding party attacked a group of men commanded by Francisco Gonçalvez along the road to São Paulo causing “great damage,” including the deaths of two slaves and the theft of “all of the tools, a chain, pans for mining, and old nails” (RIHG-GO 1979:53; AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

Two Slaves and a pedestre disembarking from a canoe were killed along the Pilões River (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).
1756
June 7: A Caiapó attack at the Arraial das Antas killed nineteen slaves owned by Baltazar de Godói e Gusmão (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 15, D. 907; AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

1757
A few months before June, a man and his wife were killed in a Caiapó attack (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 14, D. 856).

A raid left two slaves outside of the Arraial das Antas dead, but one of the raiders was killed in the assault (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

Little more than two leagues from Corumbá, the Caiapo killed a “mulatto and his wife, robbing all all the tools that they had in their home” (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

1758
Caiapó killed four slaves outside of Corumbá and carried off the equipment used to work the fields (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

April 23: The Caiapo kill three slaves belonging to Lieutenant Luís Leandro and a “bastard,” while they were extracting honey from a tree. The raiders make 24 leagues before a bandeira caught them, but they managed to evade the conflict, leaving their weapons and spoils behind (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

April 24: Raiders attack outside of the Arraial das Antas, killing five slaves. The Bororo fail to track the raiders (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

The Caiapó attacked farms and killed seven “people” near the Arraial of de Santa Luzia, “where they [had] never attacked before, as it is beyond the frontiers attacked before” (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

1759
A second raid near the Arraial of de Santa Luzia cost two more lives (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 17, D. 1023).

1764
A group of at least 100 Caiapó attacked slaves working in an agricultural field, killing a large number and two Portuguese. A bandeira sent after the raiders surprised the Caiapó on 16 February, killing some and gathering up a great quantity of booty and weapons left behind by the fleeing Caiapó (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 20, D. 1220).

1767
The Caiapó attack fields near the Arraial of de Santa Luzia in Goiás. A bandeira was formed of sixteen Bororo from Rio das Pedras led by a pedestre named Victor.
António. This bandeira surprised a Caiapó raiding group killing more than 14 and assault a village, destroying it and capturing 18 boys. The Rio das Pedras Bororo attack another on the road to São Paulo taking fourteen prisoners (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 23, D. 1440).

1771
March 21: Around 200 Caiapó attack a group of 400 slaves working outside of Cuiabá at a place known as Arraial do Médico, killing at least 41 slaves and three Portuguese (AHU_ACL_CU_010, Cx. 15, D. 931; AHU_ACL_CU_010, Cx. 19, D. 1198).

1771
July 23: A Caiapó attack outside of Cuiabá killed four slaves (AHU_ACL_CU_010, Cx. 19, D. 1198).

July 24: A second Caiapó attack outside of Cuiabá killed eight slaves belonging to Salvador Rodrigues de Algueira (AHU_ACL_CU_010, Cx. 19, D. 1198).

1772
September 5: The Caiapó attack three leagues from Mogi-Guaçu and kill six people and burn two houses (BN I-30, 12, 17 nº 39).

October or November: José Gomes de Gouvea attacks the Caiapó somewhere between the Pardo and Grande Rivers (Giraldin 1997:84).

1773
March 15: Three killed and a barn burned in a Caiapó attack outside Cuiabá at a place called the “Ribeiron do Bandeira” (AHU_ACL_CU_010, Cx. 19, D. 1198).

July 13: Three killed outside of Cuiabá (AHU_ACL_CU_010, Cx. 19, D. 1198).

1774
Outside Villa Boa, the Caiapó attack a group of slaves owned by Francisco de Lemos, killing nine (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 27, D. 1776).

1778
April 25: Caiapó raiders killed Alferes do Regimento Cavalria Auxiliar, Joao de Souza Taveira, 1.5 leagues from Villa Boa; killed ten slaves and burned the houses, slaves quarters, barns and storehouses (AHUG_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 32, D. 1996).

1783
While on route to take possession of the government, the governor of Goiás, Tristão da Cunha Menezes, witnessed the results of a Caiapó assault on the São Paulo Road. Raiders attacked a mule train, killing the wife of the owner and his
cousin. Eight or ten pack animals were killed and the goods they carried looted. These Caiapó later arrived at Mari I (AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 35, D. 2131).

1798
March 6: A Caiapó attack in Mato Grosso kills a slave and her two children (Siqueira 1872:39).

March 18: A Caiapó raid killed seven slaves in Mato Grosso (Siqueira 1872:39).

1829
December: The Caiapó attack a mule train, killing six mules to raid for tools. A second attack results in the death of a convoy boss, resulting in bandeiras; a Guaná Indian dies from a Caiapó arrow in the subsequent fighting (BN II-36, 12, 4).

1858
September: The Caiapó attack at Torres on the Bonito River at the headwaters of the Araguaia River. On September 9, Caiapó raiders attacked a farm on the Caiapó River, killing livestock, burning fields and the slaves’ house, and killing one slave. A nearby farmer found his house burned along with all it contained. Troops sent after the Caiapó raiders failed to find them (Gama Cerqueira 1859:54–55).

1859
January 9–10: A Caiapó raid burned six houses on the Bonito River with the raiders carrying off everything that was not destroyed in the fires (Gama Cerqueira 1859:56).

June 2: Caiapó raiders attacked and plundered a farm belonging to Manoel da Silva, near the Bonito River (Relatório 1859a).

1861

September 9: Over the course of the year Caiapó raiders attack several times the farm of Capitão António Gomes Pinheiro. On the 9 September, the raiders kill one of the capitão’s cowboys, and a bandeira chases the Caiapó back toward the Caiapó Grande River (Relatório 1862).

1861

October/November: Caiapó raiders attack and burn farms belonging to José Ignácio Simões, António Fernandes, and Gabriel António de Morães, and a barn belonging to Estevão José Penna de Vasconcelos (Relatório 1862).

1865

December 20: A group of Caiapó raiders attacked with clubs a number of soldiers at Jotobá, killing Joaquim Fernandes Pinto. A second attack at Taquaral da Violas results in two killed Indians (IHGB DL 364.14).
November 22: A caravan moving toward the settlement at Macedina encounters an empty Caiapó aldeia. Later, the Caiapó attacked the caravan (AHEGO Caixa 4, 1882).


December 12: Caiapó attack the Ponte Alta fazenda of Francisco Carvalhães, burning a house (AHEGO Caixa 4, 1882).

February 4: Around 50 Caiapó attacked the settlement at Macedina, where they injured slightly a soldier named Manoel Cecilio Cardoso; they then retreated into Mato Grosso (Magalhães 1882:3).

January 6: The Caiapó attacked a farm belonging to Antônio Netto de Cerqueira Leão, near the former aldeia of São José de Mossâmades. On the same day, Caiapó raiders killed a child of a farmer on the outskirts of the garrison at Macedina (Relatório 1889).
LIST OF REFERENCES

Archival Sources

Arquivo Histórico Estadual de Goiás, Goiânia.
Livro 16: Livro de Registro de Portarias do Governo (1758–1765).

Livro 45: Cópias de Ofícios do Capitão-General da Capitânia (1804–1809).


Livro 104: Registro de Ofícios ao Comandantes das Diretores das Aldeias (1822–1825).


Livro 126: Registro de Ordens do Governador das Armazas ao Comando Militar (1824–1825).

Livro 144: Secretária de Governo Correspondência do Governo da Província (1826).


Livro 151: Correspondência Dirigidas ao Governador as Armas (1827–1828).

Livro 155: Secretária de Governo Livro de Registro da Oficios e Ordens Expedidas.


Livro 159: Secretária de Governo Livro de Registro dos Ofícios do Governo Provincial a Diversos (1828–1836).


Arquivo Histórico Estadual de Goiás, Goiânia: Documentos Avulsos.
Caixa 3, Pacote 1.
Caixa 4, 1882: Relatório Apresentado à Assembléia Legislativa Provincial de Goiás pelo Governador Cornélio Pereira Magalhães.

Caixa 204, 1871: Ministério dos Negócios da Agricultura, Comércio e Obras Públicas, Caiapó.

Correio Oficial de Goiás.


Arquivo Público de Mato Grosso, Cuiabá.
Anais do Senado da Câmara de Cuiabá.

Câmara de Cuiabá (1760–1790).

Câmara de Vila Bela (1770–1779).

Governo: Luis Pinto de Sousa Coutinho (1771).

Governo: Luís Albuquerque de Mello Pereira (1773).

Governo: Luis de Albuquerque de Mello Pereira e Caceres (1782).

Livro 14: Registro de Ofícios Expedidos dos Ministérios da Fazenda, Marinha, Justiça, Estrangeiras (1825–1834).


Livro 153: Correspondência entre esta Presidência e a Câmara Municipal.


Livro 200: Correspondência Oficial entre a Presidência e as Câmaras Municipais, Párocos, Bispos, Juiz de Paz, Director Geral das Índios, Administrador da Correio e Pessoas Particulares (1862–1864).


Arquivo Nacional, Rio de Janeiro.
Arquivo Público Mineiro, Belo Horizonte.
Microfilme, rolo 546, #969 Carta de Ignácio Correia Pamplona a Dom Rodrigo
Josê Menezes. Fundo Delegacia Fiscal: Arquivo Casa dos Contos. 5-5-
1781.

Fundo Secretária Geral-SG 06. Registro de Correspondências da Diretoria Geral
dos Índios de Minas Gerais (1869–1873).

Biblioteca Nacional, Río de Janeiro: Seção de Manuscritos.
I-30,9,42 n° 12. Carta [de Manuel Rodrigues de Araújo Belém] a Luís António de
Souza Botelho Mourão, Governador da Capitania de São Paulo, Tratando
das Providências Tomadas para a Captura de um Delinquent e da
Dificuldade Encontrada no Alistamento de Soldados para a Expedição de
José Gomes de Gouveia. Mogi Guaçú, 01-06-1767.

I-30,22,22 n° 5. Carta dos Oficiais da Câmara de Mogi Mirim ao Governador Luís
António de Souza Botelho Mourão, Remetendo Lista dos Mais Capazes
para Servir na Nova Companhia de Mulatos, Bastardos e Carijós. São
José de Mogi Mirim, 28-06-1772.

I-30,12,12 n° 39. Carta [de José Gomes de Gouveia] a Luís António de Souza
Botelho Mourão, Governador da Capitania de São Paulo, Tratando da
Ameaça dos Índios Caiapós no Distrito de Mogi Guaçú. Jaguari, 18-09-
1772.

I-30,12,17 n° 40. Carta [de José Gomes de Gouveia] a Luís António de Souza
Botelho Mourão, Governador da Capitania de São Paulo, Dando Parte
das Medidas Tomadas para a Execução de Ordem de Formar Companhia
de Pardos a Fim de Combater os Ataques dos Índios Caiapós. Mogi
Mirim, 16-10-1772.

Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, Rio de Janeiro.
Lata 129, pasta 9. Breve Notícia do Gentio Bárbaro que Há na Derrota da
Viagem das Minas do Cuiabá por António Pires de Campos, 1729.

Lata 188, doc. 39. Descrição Feita por Alexandre de Souza Barbosa sobre os
Índios Caiapós e Panarásc. Vocabulários e mapa da Região Ocupada
pelos Caiapós.

Lata 397, pasta 2. Redução dos Índios da Capitania de Goiás (Arquivo do Dr.
Ernesto Ferreira França Filho).

Lata 501, pasta 18. Carta Dirigida ao Tenente Coronel António Borges Sampaio
sobre os Primeiros Habitantes do Sertão de Mato Grosso. Acompanha
Notas do Capitão Joaquim Lemos da Silva sobre os Índios Caiapós.
Lata 763, pasta 18. Ofício de Frei José Maria Mecerata ao Coronel Zeferino Pimental Moreira Freire, Presidente da Província de Mato Grosso, Enviado o seu Trabalho: Relação das Diversas Nações de Índios que Presentemente Habitam a Diocese de Mato Grosso. Pelo bispo de Cuiabá José António dos Reis. 24-8-1843.


1.2.2. Expõem o Governador de São Paulo á Respeito da Invasão e Hostilidades Cometidas pelo Gentio Caiapó nas Circumvizinhanças da Vila de Goyaz. São Paulo, 29-1-1743.

1.2.2. Sobre a Conta que Deu o Ouvidor Geral das Minas do Cuiabá José de Burgos Vila Lobos, á Respeito de Ser Conveniente Dar-se Guerra á Varios [gentios]. 9-7-1732.

1.2.2. Dá Conta o Governador de São Paulo, á Respeito da Invasão e Hostilidades Cometidas nas Circumvizinhanças de Vila Bôa de Goiáiz. 29-1-1743.

1.2.2. Responde o Governador de São Paulo, sobre os Insultos e Hostilidades que no Goiáiz Cometiam os [gentios] daqueles Circumvizinhanças e o que Escrivem á Respeito o Intendente de Goiaiz, Intendente e Prevedor de Fazenda do Cuiabá e Ofícios da Camara de Vila Real de São Paulo.

1.2.2. Sobre a Conta que Deu o Governador do Goiaiz, Marcos de Noronha, á Respeito das Hostilidades do [Caiapó] e o Encontro que Teve o Coronel António Pires de Campos com uma Companhia de Soldados que Levava, Matando-lhes 16 pessoas e Regresando-lhes 32. 6-10-1751.

1.2.2. Dá Conta o Governador de [Goiaiz], Marcos de Noronha, á Respeito de Duas Aldeias de Gentio Bravo, que Hostilizavam Vários Arraiaes daquela Capitania. 8-5-1753.


1.2.2. Dá Conta o Governador do Goiaiz, Marcos de Noronha, de que Tem Obrado para Reduzir e Aldear Vários [gentio] e do Procedimento de João Leme para com os Mesmos. 22-5-1753.

1.2.2. Dá Conta o Governador do Goyaz, Marcos de Noronha, das Hostilidades em Alguns Arraiaes daquela Capitania e Propõe os Meios que lhe Parecem mais Comodos para se Evitar os Insultos do Mesmo Gentio. 23-5-1753.
1.2.4. Ofício de Luís Pinto de Louza Coutinho á Martinho de Mello e Castro, Informando sobre o Estado de Capitania e sobre os Tapuias e Cayapós dos vizinhanças do forte de Bragança. Vila Boa, 6-12-1771.

1.2.4. Ofício de Luís Albuquerque de Melo Pereira e Cáceres a Martinho de Mello e Castro, Participando Ter Mandado Expedir Algumas Bandeiras em Perseguição do Gentio Cayapó. Vila Bela, 18-12-1772.


1.2.6. Dá Conta o Governador [...] o Conde de São Miguel dos Insultos de Gentio Caiapó contra o Guarda-Mor daquelles Minas, do Descobrimento que Mandou Fazer nos Sertões de Norte, dos Gentios que se Conduziram por Meio desta Expedição, da Necessidade que Ha se Formar Nova Aldeia e Pede a Aprovação das Despezas á Este Respeito Contraídas. Lisboa, 23-9-1758.

1.2.6. Sobre a Conta que Deu o Conde dos Arcos, da Falta de Missionarios para a Redução dos Gentios da Capitania de [Goiáz]. Lisboa, 8-1-1755.


1.2.7. Ofício de João de Mello á Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado, sobre Hostilidades dos Caiapó e Xavante. Lisboa, 7-6-1764.


1.2.7. Ofício de José de Almeida de Vasconcellos á Martinho de Mello e Castro Acerca de Civilização dos [Indios]. Lisboa, 2-5-1773.

1.2.7. Ofício de José de Almeida de Vasconcellos á Martinho de Mello e Castro sobre os Repetidos Ataques dos “Silvestres” e “Caiapós.” 20-6-1774.

1.2.7. Ofício de José de Almeida e Vaconcellos ao Marquês de Pombal, Remetendo Copia da Carta Instrutiva que Dirigiu ao Intendente, Nomeando-o Diretor Geral dos [Indios]. 21-7-1775.

1.2.7. Ofício de Luiz da Cunha Menezes á Martinho de Mello e Castro, acerca das Providencias Tomadas para a Civilização dos Silvestres. 1780.

1.2.7. Ofício de Luiz da Cunha Menezes á Martinho de Mello e Castro, á Respeito da Extração da ouro e da Redução e Civilização das Nações de Silvestres. 9-8-1781.


1.2.8. Ofício de João Manoel de Menezes á Rodrigo de Souza Coutinho acerca do Estado em que se Achão São José de Mossâmedes e Maria Primeira. Lisboa, 9-7-1800.

Instituto Histórico e Geográfico de Mato Grosso, Cuiabá.
Pastas: 97-Nº 2128. Carta de João Batista Duarte ao Capitão-General Discorrendo sobre a Organização de uma Bandeira para Combater os Índios Caiapó, de Acordo com os Princípios de Guerra Justa. Cuiabá, 7-4-1771.


Pastas: 101-Nº 2306. Carta de Manoel Francisco da Silva para a Presidente de Província de Mato Grosso Discorrendo sobre a Organização de Bandeira para Apresamento de Índio, assim como sobre as Difficuldades do sertão. Cuiabá, 19-7-1778.

Instituto de Memoria do Poder Legislativo, Cuiabá.
Livro de Decretos e Resoluções, Ano 1835.

Museu das Bandeiras, Goiás Velho.
Pacotes: 338: Bens da Fazenda Real.
Pacote 405: Ordens Regias (1750–1783).
Pacote 413: Vila Boa Provedoria de Real Fazenda, Período (1749–1752).
Projecto Resgate Barão do Rio Branco: Documentos Manuscritos Avulsos Referente à Capitania de Goiás Existentes no Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Lisbon.


AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 5, D. 358. Carta do Intendente e Provedor da Fazenda Real de Goiás, Manuel Caetano Homem de Macedo, ao Rei [Dom João V], sobre a Instalação do Coronel António Pires de Campos com os Índios Bororós, na Estrada para São Paulo. Vila Boa, 30-4-1748.


AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 5, D. 417. Carta do Governador e Capitão-General de Goiás, Dom Marcos de Noronha, ao Rei [Dom João V], sobre a Dificuldade de se Fazer Guerra contra os Índios Caiapós, os quais Infestam os Caminhos de São Paulo a Goiás, Devido à Falta de Armas e Munições e acerca da Falta de Aldeamentos para Conterem as Investidas dos Ditos Caiapós e dos Índios Acroá-Assú e Acroá-Mirim. Vila Boa, 10-12-1749.

AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 5, D. 427. Carta do [Governador e Capitão-General de Goiás], Dom Marcos de Noronha, ao Rei [Dom João V], sobre a Chegada de Dois Padres Missionários que Juntos com António Pires de Campos Farão a Redução e Aldeamento dos Índios Araxás, que Vivem na Passagem do Rio Grande, Ficando estes Últimos Seguros das Hostilidades dos Índios Caiapós e acerca da Côngrua que se Deverá Pagar aos Ditos Missionários. Vila Boa, 29-12-1749.

AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 6, D. 456. Consulta do Conselho Ultramarino, ao Rei Dom José, sobre a Carta do Governador e Capitão-General de Goiás, [Conde dos Arcos], Dom Marcos de Noronha, acerca do Requerimento do Coronel António Pires de Campos, Defensor do Caminho que Vai de São Paulo a Goiás, contra os Índios Caiapós, Solicitando Ajuda de Custo para Remediar a sua Vexação e Despesas que Têm Feito com os Índios Bororós. Lisboa, 14-11-1750.
AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 6, D. 492. Consulta do Conselho Ultramarino, ao Rei Dom José, sobre a Preocupação que o Intendente e Administrador do Contrato dos Diamantes do Rio Claro Tem com as Novas Investidas dos Índios Caiapós nos Arredores do Arraial e o Encontro que o Coronel António Pires de Campos e uma Companhia de Aventureiros Teve com estes Índios, Matando-lhes Dezesseis e Prendendo Trinta e Duas Pessoas. Lisboa, 7-11-1751.

AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 6, D. 493. Requerimento de António de Lemos, ao Rei [Dom José], Solicitando a Confirmação da Carta Patente no Posto de Capitão de uma Companhia de Soldados Aventureiros para Resistir às Invasões dos Índios Caiapós. [12-10-1751].


AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 7, D. 547. Resumo de uma Consulta sobre as Novas Investidas que Fizeram os Índios Caiapós e o Encontro que com Ele Teve o Coronel António Pires de Campos. 6-10-1752.

AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 8, D. 569. Provisão (Cópia) do Rei Dom José, ao Governador e Capitão-General de Goiás, Conde dos Arcos, [Dom Marcos de Noronha], Determinando que se Leve em Conta na Provedoria da Fazenda Real a Despesa feita por António Pires de Campos, com o Estabelecimento de uma Aldeia de índios Araxás no Rio Claro. Lisboa, 28-5-1753.
AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 8, D. 576. Provisão (Cópia) do Rei Dom José ao Governador e Capitão-General de Goiás, Conde dos Arcos, [Dom Marcos de Noronha], Ordenando se Ajuste com António Gomes Leite a Redução Pacífica do Índios Acroás, Debaixo dos Mesmos Prêmios e Circunstâncias que se Observaram com o Coronel António Pires de Campos e com as Cláusulas que por Morte deste se Ajustou Condiçionalmente com o seu Irmão Manuel de Campos Bicudo. Lisboa, 31-5-1753.

AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 9, D. 616. Ofício (Resumo) do Governador e Capitão-General de Goiás, [Dom Marcos de Noronha], ao [Secretário de Estado da Marinha e Ultramar], Diogo de Mendonça Corte Real, sobre o Ajuste Condiçional que Fez com Manuel de Campos Bicudo para Conservar Livre dos Ataques Indígenas o Caminho das Minas de Goiás. 1753.


AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 12, D. 731. Carta do [Governador e Capitão-General de Goiás], Dom Marcos de Noronha, ao Rei [Dom José], em Resposta à Provisão sobre a Redução do Índio Acroá, Ajustada com António Gomes Leite. Vila Boa, 11-4-1755.

AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 13, D. 775. Ofício do [Governador e Capitão-General de Goiás], Conde de São Miguel, [Dom Álvaro José Xavier Botelho de Távora], ao [Secretário de Estado da Marinha e Ultramar], Diogo de Mendonça Corte Real, sobre o Estabelecimento das Aldeias de Índios Tapirapés e Cururús, Inimigos dos Caiapós; os Acroás da Aldeia do Duro e as Hostilidades que Têm Feito os Xacriabás. Vila Boa, 12-12-1755.

AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 13, D. 780. Provisão (Cópia) do Rei Dom José, ao [Governador e Capitão-General de Goiás], conde de São Miguel, [Dom Álvaro José Xavier Botelho de Távora], Determinando que se Estude a Melhor Maneira de se Conseguir a Redução Pacífica dos Índios Acroás e Caiapós, e em não Conseguindo, se Existe Justa Causa para Ihes Fazer Guerra. Lisboa, 11-3-1756.

AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 14, D. 829. Consulta do Conselho Ultramarino, ao Rei Dom José, sobre a Carta do [Governador e Capitão-General de Goiás], Conde de São Miguel, [Dom Álvaro José Xavier Botelho de Távora], acerca de como Procedeu com Seis Índias e Vinte Cinco Crianças Aprisionadas pelo Capitão-Mor da Conquista do Gentio Caiapó, João de Godói Pinto da Silveira. Lisboa, 5-2-1757.
AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 14, D. 856. Carta dos Oficiais da Câmara de Vila Boa, ao Rei [Dom José], Expondo as Atrocidades Cometidas pelos Índios Caiapós e Insistindo na Guerra Ofensiva como Único Meio de Repressão. Vila Boa, 11-6-1757.

AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 15, D. 907. Consulta do Conselho Ultramarino, ao Rei [Dom José], sobre a Carta do [governador e capitão-general de Goiás], Conde de São Miguel, [Dom Álvaro José Xavier Botelho de Távora], acerca dos Índios Caiapós ao Guarda-Mor de Goiás, Baltazar de Godói Bueno e Gusmão; o seu Procedimento a este Respeito; a Expedição que Organizou aos Sertões do Norte da Capitania; os Índios Conduzidos por esta Expedição e a Necessidade de se Formar uma Nova Aldeia. Lisboa, 23-9-1758.


AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 18, D. 1072. Requeremento de Rita Rodrigues Neves e os Órfãos seus Filhos, Viúva que Ficou de Manuel da Costa Portela, ao Rei [Dom José], Solicitando Moratória por Tempo de Cinco Anos, Constrainindo os Credores a Esperar, ainda que se Encontrem Alguns com Penhora ou Bens Adjudicados nas Partilhas, em Virtude de seu Marido Ter Falecido em 1755 na sua Lavra do Ribeirão da Onça, Juntamente com Quarenta e Três Escravos, Devido um Ataque dos Índios. Goiás [23-1-1762].

AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 20, D. 1220. Ofício do [ Governador e Capitão-General de Goiás], João Manuel de Melo, ao Secretário de Estado [ da Marinha e Ultramar], Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado, sobre os Novos Ataques dos Índios Caiapós e Xavantes que se Mantinham em Boa Vizinhança; a Suspeita destes Ataques Serem Fomentados pelos Jesuítas Espanhóis; acerca da Junta que Convocou Ter Decidido Fazer Guerra Ofensiva aos Índios e a Bandeira que os Moradores de Pilar e Crixás Estão Organizando para Combatê-los. Vila Boa, 7-6-1764.

AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 22, D. 1370. Ofício do [ Ouvidor-Geral de Goiás], Desembargador Antônio José de Araújo e Sousa, ao [ Secretário de Estado da Marinha e Ultramar], Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado, sobre a Conclusão da Obra da Cadeia de Vila Boa de Goiás; a Formação de uma Bandeira contra as Hostilidades dos Índios Caiapós. Vila Boa, 12-7-1766.

AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 23, D. 1440. Ofício do [ Governador e Capitão-General de Goiás], João Manuel de Melo, ao Secretário de Estado [ da Marinha e Ultramar], Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado, sobre as Invasões dos Índios Caiapós no Distrito do Arraial de Santa Luzia e Rio das Velhas e acerca do Sucesso de Duas Bandeiras Organizadas contra Eles, das quais Tomaram parte os Bororós do Rio das Pedras. Vila Boa, 22-6-1767.

AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 27, D. 1776. Ofício do [ Governador e Capitão-General de Goiás, Barão de Mossâmedes], José de Almeida Vasconcelos [ de Soveral e Carvalho], ao [ Secretário de Estado da Marinha e Ultramar], Martinho de Melo e Castro, sobre os Repetidos Ataques e Mortes Executados pelos Índios Caiapós e Xavante, e acerca das Bandeiras Formadas para Descobrimento de Novas Minas em Goiás. Vila Boa, 20-6-1774.

AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 28, D. 1838. Ofício do [ Governador e Capitão-General de Goiás, Barão de Mossâm edes], José de Almeida Vasconcelos [ de Soveral e Carvalho], ao [ Secretário de Estado dos Negócios Estrangeiros], Marquês de Pombal, [ Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo], sobre a Criação de Aldeias Indígenas; o Sucesso na Civilização dos Carajás e Javaés; os Provimentos de Boca e Guerra que Enviou para as Ditas Aldeias sem Recorrer aos Recursos da Fazenda Real, Utilizando-os no Aumento das Praças de Pedestres e no Estabelecimento da Aldeia dos Índios Acroás que Servirá de Barreira aos Ataques dos Índios Caiapós. Vila Boa, 15-6-1776.
AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 28, D. 1855. Ofício do [Governador e Capitão-General de Goiás, Barão de Mossâmedes], José de Almeida Vasconcelos [de Soveral e Carvalho], ao [Secretário de Estado dos Negócios Estrangeiros], Marquês de Pombal, [Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo], sobre suas Práticas Administrativas acerca da Aldeia de São José de Mossâmedes e Solicitando as Determinações e o Provimento da Fazenda Real para a Civilização dos Carajás, Javaés e outras Nações Indígenas. Vila Boa, 20-9-1776.


AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 32, D. 1996. Ofício do [Governador e Capitão-General de Goiás], Luís da Cunha Menezes, ao [Secretário de Estado da Marinha e Ultramar], Martinho de Melo e Castro, sobre o Aldeamento da Nova Beira, Habitada pelos índios Carajás, Carijós e Javaés; as Medidas Tomadas para Conter as Hostilidades dos Índios Caiapós e Xavantes e Manter a Amizade dos Índios Aldeados no Presídio Estabelecido sob o Comando do Alferes José Machado de Azevedo; as Descobertas de Salinas que Prometem Grande Abundância e Propondo a Formação uma Bandeira Composta de Índios, Comandada pelo Capitão de Pedestres José Luís Pereira, para Tentar a Pacificação dos Índios Caiapós. Vila Boa, 1780.

AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 32, D. 2019. Ofício do [Governador e Capitão-General de Goiás], Luís da Cunha Menezes, ao [Secretário de Estado da Marinha e Ultramar], Martinho de Melo e Castro, sobre o Envio de uma Bandeira para Persuadir pela Amizade os Índios Caiapós, Seguindo Todas as Instruções Vindas do Reino, Baseando-se na Experiência Inglesa e Francesa da Sujeição dos Índios; o Encontro com o Cacique dos Caiapós; Solicitando Provisão da Fazenda Real para esta Importante Diligência e Propondo a Construção de uma Aldeia para Abrigar a todos os Índios da dita Nação, Denominando-a Dona Maria I. Vila Boa, 20-7-1781.

AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 32, D. 2025. Ofício do [Governador e Capitão-General de Goiás], Luís da Cunha Menezes, ao [Secretário de Estado da Marinha e Ultramar], Martinho de Melo e Castro, sobre as Medidas Administrativas para Animar a Extração de Ouro em Goiás e Promover a Civilização dos Índios, Impulsionando as Obras da Aldeia de São José de Mossâmedes, e acerca do Aldeamento dos Índios Caiapós na Aldeia Denominada Dona Maria I. Vila Boa, 9-9-1781.

AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 34, D. 2079. Carta do [Governador e Capitão-General de Goiás], Luís da Cunha Meneses, à Rainha [Dona Maria I], sobre a Formação de uma Bandeira de Cinquenta Soldados Armados com Armas de Fogo para Civilizar os Índios Caiapós. Vila Boa, 10-1-1783.

AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 34, D. 2104. Ofício do [Governador e Capitão-General de Goiás], Luís da Cunha Meneses, ao [Secretário de Estado da Marinha e Ultramar], Martinho de Melo e Castro, Remetendo Carta do Sargento Regente da Aldeia Maria I, José Luís Pereira, e Relação dos Índios Caiapós da dita Aldeia. Vila Boa, 3-6-1783.


AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 35, D. 2136. Ofício de José Rodrigues Freire, ao [secretário de estado da Marinha e Ultramar], Martinho de Melo e Castro, sobre a Falta de Mantimentos em Vila Boa e a Chegada de Grande Quantidade de Índios Caiapós para Serem Aldeados. Vila Boa, 12-2-1784.

AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 35, D. 2156. Ofício do [Governador e Capitão-General de Goiás], Tristão da Cunha Meneses, ao [Secretário de Estado da Marinha e Ultramar], Martinho de Melo e Castro, sobre as Hostilidades Cometidas pela Nação Xavante na Repartição do Norte de Goiás; a Formação de uma Bandeira com Soldados da Companhia de Pedestres para Enfrentar os índios Caiapós; a Despesa para seu Municiamento; Algumas Considerações acerca das Instruções para a Civilização e Redução dos Índios e, em Razão do Estado Miserável da Capitania. Vila Boa, 17-7-1784.
AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 35, D. 2168. Ofício do [Governador e Capitão-General de Goiás], Tristão da Cunha Meneses, ao [Secretário de Estado da Marinha e Ultramar], Martinho de Melo e Castro, sobre a Captura de Alguns Índios Xavantes pela Bandeira Composta de Quarenta Soldados da Companhia de Pedestres, Armados e Municiados, e de Quarenta Índios da Nação Caiapó da Aldeia Maria I. Vila Boa, 10-12-1784.


AHU_ACL_CU_008, Cx. 41, D. 2510. Ofício do [Governador e Capitão-General de Goiás], Dom João Manuel de Menezes, ao [Secretário de Estado da Marinha e Ultramar], Dom Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho, sobre o Estado de Ruína em que se Encontram as Duas Aldeias de São José de Mossambesed e Maria I; a Indisciplina dos Índios que nelas Habitam, e Propondo Agumas medidas. Vila Boa, 9-7-1800.

Projecto Resgate Barão do Rio Branco: Documentos Manuscritos Avulsos Referente à Capitania de Mato Grosso Existentes no Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Lisbon.


AHU_ACL_CU_010, Cx. 21, D. 1257. Ofício do [Governador e Capitão-General da Capitania de Mato Grosso] Luís de Albuquerque de Melo Pereira e Cáceres ao [Secretário de Estado da Marinha e Ultramar] Martinho de Melo e Castro em que Informa sobre a Tomada de Posse das Novas Minas de Ouro na Serra Guarajús; um Ataque dos Índios Caiapó à Vila de Cuiabá e a Bandeira que 80 homens, a Terceira que Saiu dali para Ir Conquistar e Catequizar os Selvagens. Vila Bela, 28-12-1779.

Published Sources

Apolinário, Juciene Ricarte

Alencastro, José Martins Pereira de


Almeida, Francisco José de Lacerda e

Almeida, Maria Regina Celestino de

Anonymous, ed.


Araújo, Francisco Lopes de

Arnt, Ricardo with Lúcio Flávio Pinto and Raimundo Pinto

Artiaga, Zoroastro

Assis, Antero Cicero de


Ataídes, Jézus Marco de


Ataídes, Jézus Marco de, ed.
2001   Documenta Indígena do Brasil Central. Goiânia: Editora da UCG.

Azevedo, António Peixoto de

Bamberger, Joan

Barbosa, Francisco Oliveira

Barickman, Bert Jude

Barros, Edir Pina de

Baruzzi, Roberto with L. F. Marcopito, M. L. C. Serra, F. A. A. Souza and C. Stabile

Baruzzi, Roberto Geraldo with Vera Lucia de Barros and Douglas Rodrigues and Ana Lucia Medeiros de Souza and Heloisa Pagliaro

Block, David

Boxer, Charles. R.

Brasil, António, ed.
1980  Documentos Históricos de Goiás. Revista do Instituto Histórico e 

1982  Documentos Histórico de Goiás. Revista do Instituto Histórico e 
Geográfico de Goiás. 10:17–50.

Britto, Célia Coutinho Seixo de 

Brown, Michael. 

Bueno, João Ferreira de Oliveira 
1856  Simples Narração da Viagem que Fez ao Rio Paraná o Thesoureiro-Mór 
da Sé d’esta Cidade de São Paulo. Revista do Instituto Histórico e 

Cabrall Camello, João António 
1863  Noticias Praticas das Minas do Cuiabá e Goyazes, na Capitania de São. 
Paulo e Cuiabá, que Dá ao Reverendo Padre Diogo Soares, o Capitão 
João António Cabrall Camello, sobre a Viagem que Fez às Minas do 
Cuiabá no anno 1727. Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico 

Cagle, Hugh Glenn 
2001  The Geneology of the Atlantic Order: Just War, the Jesuit Position, and 
Racial Hierarchy in Colonial Brazil. M.A. thesis, Department of Latin 
American Studies, Clemson University.

Campos, António Pires de 
1862  Breve Noticia que Dá o Capitão António Pires de Campos do Gentio 
Barbaro que Ha na Derrota da Viagem das Minas do Cuiabá. Revista do 

Carneiro da Cunha, Manuela 

Carvalho Franco, Francisco de Assis 
1940  Bandeiras e Bandeirantes de São Paulo. São Paulo: Companhia Editora 
Nacional.

1989  Dicionário de Bandeirantes e Sertanistas do Brasil. Belo Horizonte: 
Editora Itatiaia Limitada.

Casal, Manoel Ayres do 
Chaim, Marivone Matos


Clendinnen, Inga.


Correa Filho, Virgílio

Costa, António Corrêa da

Couto, Luiz do.

Cortesão Jaime, ed.

Cowell, Adrian

Crocker, J. Christopher

Cruz Machado, António Candido da
Cunha Matos, Raymundo José da


Davidson, David. M.

Desgenettes, Raimundo Henrique

Doles, Dalísia Elizabeth Martins
1973 As Cominicações Fluviais pelo Tocantins e Araguaia no Século XIX. Goiânia: Editora Oriente.

Espírito Santo, Felicíssimo

Ewart, Elizabeth
2000 Living with Each Other: Selves and Alters amongst the Panará of Central Brazil. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Anthropology, University of London.


Fausto, Carlos


Ferguson, Brian. R.


Ferguson, Brian. R. and Neil L. Whitehead, eds.


Fernandes, Florestan

Ferreira, Joaquim Alves
2001 Notícia sobre os Índios de Mato Grosso dada em Ofício de 2 de Dezembro de 1848 ao Ministro e Secretário de Estado dos Negócios do Império, pelo Diretor Geral dos Índios da então Província. Cuiaba: IHGMT.

Fisher, William
Florence, Hercules  

Flowers, Nancy  

Fonseca, João Severiano da  

Freire, José Rodrigues  

Gama Cerqueira, Francisco Januario de  


Giraldin, Odair  


Gross, Sue A.  

Heelas, Richard Hosie  

Hemming, John  


Holanda, Sergio Buarque de

Ihering, Herman von

Karasz, Mary

Kiemen, Mathias C.
1954  The Indian Policy of Portugal in the Amazon Region, 1614–1693.
Washington, D.C: The Catholic University of America Press.

Kok, Glória

Kupfer

Langfur, Hal


Leitão, Sérgio

Leite, Serafim
Leite, Serafim, ed.

Leite Morais, Joaquim de Almeida

Leme, Pedro Taques de Almeida Paes

Lima Magalhães, Magna

Lowie, Robert

Alcântara Machado, José de

Maclachlan, Colin


Mascarenhas, Francisca de Assis

Maybury-Lewis, David

Maybury-Lewis, David, ed.

McCreery, David

Meireles, Denise M.

Mello, Tancredo Fernandes de

Mendes Rocha, Leandro

Metcalf, Alida C.
2005 Go-Betweens and the Colonization of Brazil, 1500–1600. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Métraux, Alfred

Monteiro, John Manuel


Morse, Richard M.

Nimuendajú, Curt

1942 The Šerente. Los Angeles: University of California.

1946 The Eastern Timbira. Los Angeles: University of California.

Neme, Mário

Neto, Carlos de Araújo Moreira Neto

Norberto, Joaquim
Olimpio Machado, Eduardo

Oliveira, José Joaquim Machado de
1861 Os Cayapós. Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro 24:491–524.

Palacin, Luís

Palacin, Luís and Ledonias Franco Garcia and Janaína Amodo
2001 História de Goiás em Documentos. Goiânia: Editôra UFG.

Pizarro e Araujo, José de Souza Azevedo

Pohl, João Emanuel

Porto, Aurélio

Posey, Darrell

Price, David

Ravagnani, Oswaldo Martins


Rodrigues Jardim, José
Rolim, António

Schmuziger Carvalho, Silvia M.

Schwartzman, Stephan

Sá, Joseph Barbosa de

Saint-Hilaire, Augueste de

Senna, Nelson de

Silva, António José da

Silva, Colemar Natale

Souza, Luís António Silva e

Souza Spinola, Aristides de

Steward, Julian

Taunay, Affonso de Escragnolle

Turner, Terence

Urban, Greg

Vasconcelos, Cláudio Alves de
Vasconcelos, Simão de  

Verswijver, Gustaaf  


1996 Mekranoti: Living among the Painted People of the Amazon. New York: Prestel.

Viertler, Renate Brigette  

Wagley, Charles  

Werner, Dennis  
1978 Trekking in the Amazon Forest. Natural History 87(9):225-238.


Whitehead, Neil L.  


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

David Louis Mead attended the University of Florida for his Bachelor of Arts, Master of Arts, and Doctor of Philosophy. In all that time, he never attended a Gator football game. He is married, has one son, and lives with three cats.