

HOPE VI: AN EXPLORATORY CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF
THE VILLAGE AT TECHWOOD AND IDA B. WELLS HOMES

By

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To my wonderful family and friends who have supported me throughout my academic career. Your words of encouragement and prayers are invaluable. Prayer does change things.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS¹

AHA	Atlanta Housing Authority
APA	American Planning Association
Capital fund	In accordance with section 519 of the QHWRA of 1998, all public housing modernization and development programs (CIAP, CGP, MROP, and Public Housing Development) have been consolidated into the Capital Fund, and funds are now distributed to all PHAs.
CHA	Chicago Housing Authority
Developer	An entity contracted to develop (and possibly operate) a mixed-finance development that includes public housing units, pursuant to regulations at 24 CFR 914 subpart F, and under the terms of a HUD approved proposal. In some cases, the developer may be the PHA itself. A developer most often has an ownership interest in the entity that is established to own and operate the units in a mixed finance development (e.g. as the General Partner of a Limited Partnership).
Development	A public housing project or other housing project with units under an ACC. For HOPE VI Revitalization application purposes, a PHA may propose to target one existing development, or two or more projects that are contiguous (immediately adjacent to one another) or within 1/4 of a mile from each other.
Existing conditions	Condition of the severely distressed public housing project at the time a HOPE VI Revitalization grant application is submitted. If some or the entire targeted project has been demolished as of the time of HOPE VI application, existing conditions are those as of the date the demolition application was approved.
Hard costs	The costs directly associated with the construction of a development, including labor, materials, general contractor overhead, profit and contingencies.
HOPE VI	Housing Opportunity for People Everywhere
HUD	United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
LIHTC	Low Income Housing Tax Credits, a provision in Section 42 of the IRS Code that allows investors to receive a credit against Federal

¹ All definitions sourced from HUD's Glossary of HOPE VI Terms dated November 2001 unless noted otherwise.

tax owed in return for providing funds to developers to help build or renovate housing that will be rented only to lower-income households for a minimum period of years. There are two types of credits, both of which are available over a 10-year period: a 9% credit on construction/rehab costs, and a 4% credit on acquisition costs and all development costs financed partially with below market Federal loans (e.g. tax exempt bonds)

Low-income	With respect to HUD housing programs, low-income families are those who have incomes that are no more than 80% of the Area Median Income (AMI) as defined by HUD. Note that other HUD programs and other housing programs such as LIHTC may use different income eligibility standards.
Market rate units	Housing units for which renters or homeowners do not have income eligibility restrictions
Mixed finance	A method of public housing development that involves a combination of public and private financing sources, and may include the ownership of public housing units by a PHA, a PHA affiliate, or an entity other than the PHA in which the PHA may or may not have an ownership interest
Mixed income	A mixed-finance housing development that includes a combination of public housing and non-public housing units
NCSDPH	National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing
NOFA	Notice of Funding Availability, published in the Federal Register
PHA	Public Housing Authority
Public housing unit	A rental housing unit that is eligible to receive operating subsidy from HUD pursuant to Section 9 of the Act (42 U.S.C. 1437g).
Soft costs	Non "bricks and mortar" cost expenses such as design and legal fees, taxes, insurance, construction loan debt service, developer overhead, and profit, etc.
Very low income	Households with incomes that are no more than 50% of the HUD-adjusted median family income for the area

Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School
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HOPE VI: AN EXPLORATORY CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF THE VILLAGE AT
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My study evaluated two HOPE VI projects, the Village at Techwood in Atlanta and Ida B. Wells Homes in Chicago. The research covered in this thesis centers on the significant questions concerning the achievements, impacts, obstacles, and policy implementation strategies used by housing authorities in Atlanta and Chicago. This thesis examines the Atlanta and Chicago housing authorities' successes and failures in revitalizing distressed public housing using HOPE VI as the main funding mechanism.

This study has three main objectives:

- To determine the extent of differences and similarities in policy implementation in Atlanta and Chicago
- To analyze the political and economic forces that helped to determine the outcomes of redevelopment in Atlanta and Chicago
- To discuss the implications of the Atlanta and Chicago cases for the viability of HOPE VI for the future of public housing.

Results show that HOPE VI is an effective way to reverse the discriminatory practices of the past that concentrated low-income residents into high density developments. In both case studies the housing authorities did an excellent job in not only improving the physical condition of the developments, but also improving the economic conditions of the residents.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

For the past 5 years, the future of funding for the HOPE VI (Housing Opportunity for People Everywhere) program has remained uncertain. In the proposed budget for the 2007 fiscal year, the Bush Administration recommended the elimination of funding of HOPE VI in its entirety. The Administration also called for the rescinding of the 99 million dollars the program received in the 2006 fiscal year. Critics of HOPE VI argued that HOPE VI had completed its primary goal of demolishing 100,000 severely distressed housing units. Critics in addition cited long delays between the receiving of funding and the completion of the revitalization as further reason to terminate funding.

Many view HOPE VI as a crucial contributor to addressing the deteriorating conditions of public housing in America. Supporters such as affordable housing developers Richard Barron and Jonathan Rose as well as the Urban Institute propose that there is a direct relationship between HOPE VI and an increase in investment in distressed areas by public and private sectors (APA, 2007). There is overwhelming evidence that corroborates the belief that HOPE VI brings about significant positive changes in the lives of residents and communities. The “Interim Assessment of HOPE VI” (Holin et al., 2003) provides countless examples of successful HOPE VI revitalization projects in several U.S. cities. Despite this overwhelming evidence, funding has continued to decrease considerably from 625 million dollars in 1999 to 100 million dollars in 2008 (Sard & Staub, 2008). A March 2007 report by the Urban Institute entitled “Severely Distressed Public Housing, The Cost of Inaction” (Turner et al., 2007) argued that there is a direct relationship between the lack of funding for HOPE VI and the deteriorating conditions of many of America’s public housing developments.

In the same report, the Urban Institute predicted that as many as 82,000 units of public housing were severely distressed.

On June 20, 2007, Orlando J. Cabrera, the assistant secretary for Public and Indian Housing under the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), spoke at a hearing before the subcommittee on housing and community opportunity regarding the reauthorization of the HOPE VI program. Cabrera argued that HOPE VI has been an incredibly slow moving program in which HUD is open to suggestions for improvements. He stated that only 72 of the 237 HUD funded HOPE VI projects were at completion, this number represented a 176% since 2003. Cabrera (2007) further cited the Urban Institute Report (Turner et al., 2007) which found that over the past ten years residents relocated due to HOPE VI revitalization moved to better, safer neighborhoods. Cabrera held that HUD is open to redefining the way in which his department addresses public housing issues. He stressed that HUD supports programs that are both cost effective and efficient.

On September 26, 2007, the House Financial Services Committee passed the HOPE VI Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2007. The act continued the funding of HOPE VI for an additional seven years while making a number of substantial changes to the program. The U.S. House of Representatives passed the HOPE VI Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2007 on January 30, 2008 (APA, 2008). The legislation addressed on-site mixed-income housing, off-site mixed-income development, limitation on exclusion, tenant protections, resident involvement, improvements on grant implementation, and green housing.

Purpose of Study

While there has been a continual debate about continuing funding of HOPE VI, this study hypothesizes that HOPE VI is worth continuing. HOPE VI has ability to reverse

the years of spatial isolation of low-income residents; its focus is on not only improving the physical conditions of public housing, but also the economic conditions of the residents. Research in this thesis reveals that in order for a HOPE VI revitalization to be successful, public housing authorities must encourage community support through public participation and develop public/private partnerships. This thesis specifically investigates the policy implementation strategies used by both the Atlanta and Chicago housing authorities. The two main strategies investigated were how the development teams overcame the obstacles faced during the planning process, and how public/private partnerships were instrumental in securing adequate funding. The exploratory case study method was used to evaluate the effectiveness of HOPE VI. The two case studies selected are the former Village at Techwood in Atlanta and the former Ida B. Wells Homes in Chicago.

Chapter 2 of this thesis provides a historical overview of public housing in the United States that led to the development of the HOPE VI program in 1992. Chapter 3 is an overview of the methods used in this research, and Chapter 4 presents the two case studies. Chapter 5 is an analysis of the results and implications from the Atlanta and Chicago case studies, and Chapter 6 presents the conclusion and recommendations for future research.

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

Housing: A Part of the American Dream

A house is not only a place of shelter but for many people it represents a place of refuge and security. However, for far too many families this place of refuge comes at a great cost. Countless American families are drowning in debt because of the rising cost of housing. According to HUD's 2003 report to Congress on the need for affordable housing, 5.18 million very-low-income households had worst case needs (HUD, 2005a). HUD defines worst-case needs as renters who do not receive government assistance and have very low incomes or residents that live in substandard housing (HUD, 2005a). HUD defines low incomes as earnings that fall below 50% of the area's median income (HUD, 2005a). These worst cases needs in 2003 represented 3.6 million children, 1.6 million senior citizens and 1.3 million persons with disabilities (HUD, 2005). In that same year, families with children made up almost 40% of households with worst-case housing needs (HUD, 2005a).

In 2007, HUD estimated that 12 million households spent more than 50% of their annual income on housing (HUD, 2007). According to HUD's definition of affordability, a family spending more than 30% of their income on housing classifies them as cost burdened (HUD, 2007). The price of housing today is so high that a one-worker household making minimum wage cannot afford a market rate two-bedroom apartment in any U.S. city (HUD, 2007). The need for more affordable housing is not a new problem. Congress realized early on that the lack of affordable housing was a crisis that the private sector alone could not adequately tackle.

Public Housing before HOPE VI

The first public housing developments built in the 1930s were a part of the recovery efforts from the Great Depression. Many believed that the Great Depression presented an excellent opportunity for federal intervention in the housing market (Varady et al., 1998; von Hoffman, 1996). Public housing built during the 1930s and 1940s were for poor, working families (Goetz, 2003). Public housing during that period was vastly different from public housing today. The great majority of residents were white working lower middle-class residents. “Originally, public housing was for the working-poor families who came from the bottom third of the income scale. People struggling, yes, and occasionally unemployed, with a modest portion receiving public assistance, but striving for better” (Fuerst, 2003, p. 201). The tenants selected had to have enough income to pay the reduced rent without subsidies or other governmental help. Most of the tenants selected were two-parent families. Managers of the public housing developments would conduct random visits to units to ensure that households were “sufficiently orderly” (Schwartz, 2006, p. 105). Public housing was a place where people could raise their children and not live in fear.

In June of 1933, Congress passed the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which delegated \$3.3 billion for the creation of the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works, commonly known as the Public Works Administration (PWA) (Lusignan, 2002). The PWA supported construction of public building projects including public housing. Village at Techwood in Atlanta and Ida B. Wells Homes in Chicago were two of the first public housing developments built during that period. The Housing Division of the PWA authorized local public housing authorities (PHAs) to finance the development costs of public housing (Schwartz, 2006). The Federal government would

guarantee the funding for the construction of the housing developments and tenants' rents would then be set at a price that covered all operating costs. The Housing Division of the PWA built 51 public housing projects consisting of roughly 2,000 housing units before ending in 1937 (von Hoffman, 1996).

Housing Acts 1930s-1960s

The Wagner-Steagall Housing Act (also known as the National Housing Act) of 1937 created the nation's first public housing program as a part of the New Deal. During this period, a high number of families faced unemployment due to the Great Depression. The NHA housed the temporarily unemployed and generated jobs for the construction industry. The NHA in addition established the United States Housing Authority (USHA). By 1942, USHA built 100,000 units of public housing in a 140 cities (von Hoffman, 1996). Many early public housing developments gained national recognition for their superior amenities aesthetically pleasing designs such as Village at Techwood in Atlanta. Village at Techwood during this time included high-class landscaping, parking garages, and modern kitchens (von Hoffman, 1996).

For a couple of years during and following World War II the federal government temporarily discontinued funding of low-income housing programs (Varady et al., 1998). Funding of public housing programs resumed with the passage of the Housing Act of 1949. Public housing resurfaced as a way to help low-income families cope with the shortage of housing after the war. Congress in the 1949 Housing Act declared the goal of providing "a decent home in a suitable living environment for every American family" (Martinez, 2000, p.467). Congress promised to work to help all families regardless of race and or socioeconomic status find a safe and clean place to live. It was a philanthropic goal but one that Congress has never been able to reach.

Title I of the Housing Act of 1949 unveiled an ambitious federal urban redevelopment program most commonly known as urban renewal. The federal government allocated monies to cities across the country to revamp their worst areas and replace them with a newer improved social and physical landscape. Shortly after implementation, urban renewal received harsh criticism because many felt the program did more harm than good by calling for the destruction of public housing ultimately lowering the number of affordable housing units available to serve those who needed it most. The few housing developments rebuilt under the urban renewal program usually went to people with a higher socioeconomic status shutting out many lower-income residents (Greer, 1965). Many lower-income residents faced serious financial hardships because the government provided very little assistance during the relocation period. In fact, between the years 1949 and 1964 only one half of 1% of all funds allocated to cities by the federal government for the urban renewal program went to cover the expenses to relocate the displaced families (Gans, 1967, p. 468).

In the beginning, supporters championed Title I as a means to boost property values, increase tax revenues, improve living conditions for the poor, and add additional units to the stock of affordable housing (Teaford, 2000). Public housing is very important because it reduces the number of people forced into homelessness due to the high costs of housing. The National Housing Law Project et al. had to say this about the importance of public housing:

Public Housing is an extremely valuable resource because it is housing that is guaranteed to be affordable to families at a wide range of incomes. This includes families with the lowest incomes, who are not directly under other federal housing programs. Public housing is guaranteed in nearly all situations, rents are set at a level equal to 30% of an eligible family's household income (National Housing Law Project et al., 2002, n.p.).

Urban renewal supporters believed the program would generate more investment in areas that had become underinvested, forgotten areas. However, due to the poorly worded document and various understandings and interpretations of the program, developers would often destroy residential areas devastating hundreds of families, and redevelop the area into commercial developments (Teaford, 2000). Contrary to the popular belief held by many affordable housing advocates and initial supporters of urban renewal, Title I of the Housing Act did not have any requirements in place for affordable housing. While the government would guarantee the cost of clearing the blighted areas, many developers would replace the affordable units with market rate units. This loss of affordable units further added to the deficit of affordable housing many American cities already faced.

The 1949 Housing Act mandated a one-for-one replacement to maintain a sufficient number of affordable housing available for those who needed it most. This meant that for every one unit of dilapidated housing torn down due to urban renewal, a new one had to be reconstructed (Hirsch, 1996). In accordance with this mandate, the federal government pledged to build around 800,000 units of public housing in six years (Schwartz, 2006). Regrettably, the reality was that new construction in no way kept up with demolition (Smith, 2006).

Many believed that this one-for-one replacement policy assisted in the racial segregation of public housing because construction of the replacement units took place in already heavily public housing saturated minority areas (Hirsch, 1996). Practitioners such as Smith (2006) argue that this policy reinforced the concentrations of poverty by helping the poor stay in the same neighborhoods instead of moving to better

neighborhoods. These neighborhoods continued to suffer and faced further economic decline. The federal government during this time intentionally or unintentionally created islands of poverty using federal funds.

During the 1950s and 1960s, many cities similar to Chicago were undergoing major construction of interstate highways. These interstate highways often went directly through many minority neighborhoods forcing the displacement of many families. In order to accommodate the many displaced families, numerous high-density housing developments were constructed. The locations of these high-rise structures often not unlike other public housing developments took place in areas that already faced serious racial isolation and high concentrations of poverty. The Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) chairperson once stated, “Families who must or want to live in the inner city will have to learn to live with the high-rise building” (Brodt, 1986, p. 18).

After the deconstruction of countless units of affordable housing, all in the name of urban renewal, thousands of low-income households remained displaced. The high number of displaced residents began to put more responsibility on already overburdened local public housing authorities. On average, urban renewal projects took between ten and thirteen years to reach completion (Weicher, 1972). One possible contributor to the long delay was the requirement that plans receive local and federal approval. Residents faced what seemed like no other options and began to fight back against the urban renewal program.

Congress hoped that the passage of the Housing Act of 1954 would properly address the serious lack of coordination between demolition and construction experienced during the era of the 1949 Housing Act. Congress sampled a different approach by

focusing greater attention and money on conserving and rehabilitating distressed housing instead of just demolishing it. While a number of low and moderate-income developments received funding for redevelopment by the late 1950s the federal government began to fund far more commercial redevelopment projects. The federal government believed that the redevelopment of affordable housing was not necessarily the most direct way to revitalize distressed areas (Teaford, 2000).

Congress in the Housing Act of 1954 required that neighborhoods funded for urban renewal prepare a comprehensive development plan in hopes of receiving greater support of the affected community (Teaford, 2000). The housing acts that later followed allowed for the expansion of educational institutions and hospitals located in the central city. Urban renewal even today has remained a very controversial program because of its questionable and uncertain goals and tactics. One fact that has remained consistent is the fact that more often than not the people most affected were low-income minority residents. Urban renewal even today still has a negative stigma in the African-American community. Many African-Americans view the urban renewal program as “Negro Removal” (Teaford, 2000, p. 447). Countless African-Americans believe that urban renewal aimed to keep blacks in black only neighborhoods regardless of income.

By the early 1960s, urban renewal received horrible backlash for exploiting the poor and promoting the interest of the elite and big institutions. Public housing across the country was in serious disrepair. The operating costs for many public housing developments rose faster than the incomes of the residents. This was the direct result of the Brooke Amendment in 1968, which required a tenant pay no more than 25% of their income on rent (von Hoffman, 1996). This left very little money to cover the operational

costs of the developments. The federal government needed to take action quickly to help the failing public housing system.

In 1968, the federal government first began appropriating funds to public housing authorities for capital improvements. Section 9(d) of the United States Housing Act of 1937 authorized the Capital Fund Program. The Capital Fund grants help fund development, financing, reconstruction, and management improvements of public housing. Annually public housing authorities submit data to the Public Housing Information Center (PIC). HUD then uses this data to determine the amount of funding each housing authority receives for Capital Improvements. Nevertheless, even with the monies appropriated for capital improvements, public housing was in such a terrible state that President Richard Nixon's decision in January of 1973 to place a suspension on all-federal funding for housing programs received overwhelming support (Varady et al., 1998 and Bratt, 1986).

Housing Acts 1970s-1990s

Finally, in 1974, the federal government discontinued the urban renewal program in the middle of widespread protest and demonstrations by neighborhood groups opposing the horrible effects of the program on lower-income communities (von Hofman, 2000; Teaford, 2000). The federal government began to move in a different direction of the typical public housing development with the passage of the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act. This new program granted both direct and indirect subsidies to private developers and the property owners of newly rehabilitated developments. One of the most prevalent parts of the act was the Section 8 program. "Section 8 of the Housing Community Development Act of 1974 created a complicated set of subsidies and tax incentives for constructing, rehabilitating, and maintaining

buildings with low-income rental units” (von Hoffman, 1996, p. 437). Supporters of Section 8 believed the subsidy was an efficient way to help low-income persons without using public funds for construction of public housing (Listokin, 1991). Section 8 also provided an opportunity to remedy many of the years of legislation that led to the racial segregation of housing.

New policies set in place during the 1980s further perpetuated the stigma public housing received as being housing for the poor. One such policy was the stipulation that once a household’s income reached a certain plateau, that household was no longer eligible to remain in public housing. In 1981, Congress began giving first priority to very low-income families with the amendment of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 (Jacobs et al., 1986). The median income of public housing residents fell from 57% of national median in 1950 to 41% in 1960, 29% in 1970, and less than 20% by the mid-1990s (Schwartz, 2006). By the late 1980s, nearly 20% of public housing tenants had incomes that were less than 10% of the local median income. The majority of public housing households received public assistance, and single females headed approximately two-thirds of households in public housing (National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing, 1992).

High Concentrations of Poverty

In general, PHAs decided to locate public housing in inner city lower income areas not in wealthier suburban areas. Public housing even today is typically located in areas with higher poverty levels and often predominantly minority neighborhoods. “Half of all public housing is located in tracts where minorities comprise at least 50% of the population, including 38% in tracts that are 80% minority or higher” (Schwartz, 2006, p.

108). Sixty-one percent of public housing is located in central cities and only 19% are located in suburban areas (Newman & Schnare, 1997).

A study conducted by HUD in 1994 (Goering et al., 1994) found that census tracts with higher percentage of African-Americans have a lower percentage of whites in the same tract living in public housing. Areas with higher percentages of African-Americans also have a higher density ratio of public housing households to market rate households. Originally, the residents of public housing were white working families. HUD advertised early public housing as a place that was affordable and had a strong sense of community. The high concentration of white families in public housing began to change during the 1960s and 1970s when families opted to move to the suburbs leaving the central cities and public housing for poorer often African-American families. Many white families began to relocate to the suburbs because of the loss of jobs in central cities. With the change in the demographics of the residents that lived in public housing, crime rates and drug use increased dramatically. Public housing became a place that was less than desirable for families especially those who could afford to live elsewhere.

Public Housing Design and Management

One of the major complaints shared by neighborhoods opposing the construction of public housing in their neighborhood is the poor design and construction of public housing developments. Public housing is easily distinguishable from other types of housing. In an effort to cut costs, builders routinely build public housing units with higher density and lacking many amenities and aesthetics that other non- public housing developments include. Developers often built public housing at high densities with little money spent on site development and in security and maintenance. The difficulty to integrate public housing into communities creates separation based on socioeconomic

factors. Typically, the neighborhoods in which public housing communities were constructed were just as impoverished as the projects themselves.

Poor construction and deferred maintenance often cost public housing authorities millions of dollars to correct. The effect of poorly constructed public housing developments often spills over into the surrounding neighborhoods. The dilapidated developments are, “more expensive for local public housing authorities to operate and maintain... [and they] often blighted the neighborhoods surrounding them, discouraging private investment and undermining property values” (Turner et al., 2007, p. 1).

Politicians often advocated isolating public housing from mainstream as a way to secure political support from homeowners. This practice resulted in the spatial isolation of low-income residents. This spatial creation led to the creation of the urban underclass (Wilson, 1987). Wilson concluded that breaking up the concentration of poverty would enhance the socioeconomic mobility and life chances of the low-income residents.

Public housing became infamous for its poor property management. Public housing developments typically have their own rules, regulations, police, and authority. PHAs have the power to decide what households are selected to live in the public housing developments. Generally, PHAs hired less than qualified staff members to handle the day-to-day operations of the developments. Many public housing authorities have long histories of corruption and incompetence. “Public housing in some cities have been treated as a source of patronage, with hiring decisions based on personal and political connections, not experience and education” (Schwartz , 2006, p.111). Management problems included poor operational practices, mismanagement of funds, organizational concerns, and poor response time to tenant concerns about maintenance problems. Poor

management often led to deferred maintenance costing the federal government millions of dollars. Congress sprung into action to lower these costs and remedy the horrible state of public housing in America. Congress began to rethink how to manage and maintain public housing. Focus shifted from just revitalization to also improving the design standards of public housing and management practices. Ultimately, this shift in thinking led to the creation of the HOPE VI program.

The Beginning of HOPE VI

After more than 40 years of continual decline in the quality of public housing as well as the economic state of the residents of public housing, Congress in 1989 created the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing (NCSDPH). The NCSDPH included a congressperson, private developers, mayors, city agency representatives, and public housing residents. The chief purpose of the commission was to design an aggressive nationwide plan to eliminate severely distressed public housing by the year 2000. NCSDPH reported that approximately 86,000 units of public housing across the country were deteriorating or severely distressed (NCSDPH, 1992). The definition of distressed housing as defined by the National Commission included four components:

- Families living in distress (low levels of educational attainment/high high-school drop-out rates, high unemployment rates, and low household incomes)
- High rates of serious crime within the public housing development or the surrounding neighborhood
- Barriers to managing the environment (high vacancy rates, high turnover rates, low rent collection and high rate of units rejected by applicants)
- Physical deterioration of buildings (Schwartz 2006, p. 116)

At the time of the report by the NCSDPH, a program did not exist that sufficiently addressed the increasing problem of substandard public housing in the United States.

The NCSDPH found that it would cost the federal government around 7.5 billion dollars for the desperately needed capital improvements (NCSDPH, 1992). While the NCSDPH provided numerous recommendations on making improvements to the Major Reconstruction of Obsolete program (MROP), Congress opted to create a completely new program, which led to the birth of the HOPE VI program.

In support of the decision by Congress, the National Commission recommended that Congress fund a 10-year program at approximately \$750 million per year to remedy America's ever-growing public housing crisis (HUD, 2007). Congress appropriated the first \$300 million for the funding of the Housing Opportunity for People Everywhere (HOPE VI) program on October 6, 1992, originally known as the Urban Revitalization Demonstration (URD). The Departments of Veterans Affairs (VA), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1993 authorized HOPE VI. The NCSDPH at the time of its recommendation proposed that HOPE VI should accomplish six goals during each project:

- To improve the living environment of public housing residents
- To revitalize severely distressed sites
- To contribute to the surrounding neighborhood
- To decrease housing that concentrates very/low-income individuals
- To create partnerships with local agencies for support and funding
- To build sustainable communities (HUD, 2005)

Goals and Policies of HOPE VI

HOPE VI is a competitive grant program where local PHAs apply for funds from HUD to revitalize public housing developments that are in serious disrepair. HOPE VI funds offer a great deal of flexibility in that, PHAs uses the funds for rehabilitation, new construction, demolition, and acquisition of land and support services for residents.

Originally, to be eligible for HOPE VI funds, an applicant had to be either a PHA located

in one of the 40 most populous U.S. cities or a PHA on HUD's Troubled Housing Authority list as of March 31, 1992. This stipulation was later amended (Fosburg et al., 1996). Between fiscal years 1993-2006, HUD awarded 239 revitalization grants, totaling approximately \$5.7 billion (HUD, 2008).

The overall goals of HOPE VI according to Section 24 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 (amended in 1999) are to:

- Improve the living environment for public housing residents of severely distressed public housing projects through the demolition, rehabilitation, reconfiguration, or replacement of obsolete public housing projects;
- Revitalize sites on which such public housing projects are located and contributing to the improvement of the surrounding neighborhood;
- Provide housing that will avoid or decrease the concentration of very-low income families; and
- Build sustainable communities (U.S. Housing Act of 1937, 1999).

HUD in the Notice of Funds Available (NOFAs) outlined six steps that help in reaching the goals identified by the NCSDPH (HUD, 1993).

- Lessen concentration of low-income residents
- Creation of partnerships for additional funds
- Implement Cost-Effective Plans
- Offer opportunities for family economic independence
- Design units that blend into the community and are sustainable
- Involve residents in the planning and implementation

HOPE VI works to undertake the most depilated housing projects across the nation and revitalize these developments into secure housing for residents. HOPE VI aims to break up high concentrations of poverty that usually accompanied public housing of the past. PHAs allocate more money per unit in HOPE VI developments than other public housing developments to ensure the higher quality of each unit. "In principle these higher development costs should pay off over time, not only in terms of better quality living environments, but also in lower maintenance costs. More specifically well-

designed and constructed housing is expected to reduce vandalism and hold up better in the face of normal wear and tear” (Popkin et al., 2004, p. 21). HOPE VI works to improve the overall physical condition of the developments and provide a safer more stable environment for residents. Violence and crime had overtaken most public housing development causing a contradiction in the original goal of public housing to, “...provide safe and sanitary housing for every American family.” HOPE VI aspires to rid the developments of the crime and drugs that for so many years plagued public housing developments across the country.

A significant piece of the HOPE VI revitalization process is the improvement of the management staff of the new development. PHAs often hire private management firms to manage the new development. Each development is managed independently ensuring higher accountability. In the past, the PHAs managed each public housing development but this often resulted in poor management of the sites. With this new practice under HOPE VI revitalization, “Each site has its own operating budget, and operating costs and performance are tracked on a project-by project basis” (Schwartz 2006, p.118). HOPE VI has significantly changed the way in which people view public housing in America over the past fifteen years. The Council of Large Public Housing Authorities has this to say about HOPE VI (2004),

HOPE VI has brought the public housing program, its units, and residents into the mainstream. HOPE VI has created a new market of private investors and lenders that now view mixed-income and mixed-finance public housing as a good investment. Housing authorities are able to draw on their HOPE VI partnerships and experiences to advance and inform all aspects of their management, operations, design, revitalization, and leveraging strategies.

Policy makers believe that mixed-income communities signify more money is available to spend on education, infrastructure, and services if residents of all income

brackets were attracted. Generally, areas that have a large number of higher income residents have higher property values. Higher property values in turn increase the property taxes local governments can collect. The more money a local government collects in taxes the more money available for services. Many policy makers believe high concentrations of poverty created an environment not conducive to increasing self-sufficiency. Mixed-income heavily relies on the premise that the relocated resident will build beneficial relationships in the new community. Some believe that mixed-income communities present an opportunity to reverse discriminatory practices of the past (Joseph, 2006).

HOPE VI revitalization includes the tearing down of high-density developments as well as the reconstruction of lower density developments in an attempt to provide a more stable environment for residents. Reconstruction of the developments supports the premise of HOPE VI in improving the physical conditions of dilapidated developments and relocating the residents into mixed-income developments. Mixed-income developments are those that have both low-income units as well as market-rate units. Mixed-Income developments have become almost synonymous with HOPE VI revitalization. The theory behind mixed-income developments is that the elimination of pockets of poverty affords low-income residents with better opportunities for upward mobility. William Julius Wilson's research supports the belief that breaking up concentrations of poverty improves the opportunities available to the poor (Wilson, 1987).

Holin et al. (2003) suggests that mixed-income housing developments can be a success because it alleviates many of the social ills associated with high concentrations of

poverty. The Interim Assessment of HOPE VI (Holin et al., 2003) listed several mixed-income developments that have found success in attracting all income levels. Mixed-income housing developments generally have higher quality management and tend to be safer environments than the public housing it replaced (Rosenbaum and Stroh, 1998). Many view HOPE VI revitalization as a way to reverse years of racial discrimination in public housing. PHAs receiving HOPE VI funds work to situate mixed-income developments in racially integrated areas. In areas that are racially isolated, PHAs work to help attract all races and socioeconomic classes. The hope is that providing public housing units in these areas will reduce the number of public housing units in predominately lower-income minority areas.

While there is not concrete evidence that supports the relationship between HOPE VI and desegregation of neighborhoods, there are instances of HOPE VI revitalization that helped to integrate racially isolated areas. The 2001 Interim Assessment conducted by Abt Associates, Inc. found that cities such as Atlanta and Charlotte reported a large increase in the number of white residents relocating to the newly revitalized area. Other cities reported an increase as well but not as dramatic as those reported by Atlanta and Charlotte.

HOPE VI achieves its goals of improving the living environment of residents through demolition of dilapidated distressed housing replacing it with better lower density housing. HOPE VI policies further works to revitalize not only the site but also the entire neighborhoods. HOPE VI aims to be more than a brick and mortar type of operation, working to rebuild lives and helping advance the careers and economic stability of residents. HOPE VI has become almost synonymous with mixed-income

communities. HOPE VI works to improve the quality of life of low-income residents by allowing them to relocate to mixed-income areas and develop a sense that their new home is permanent and not a temporary dwelling unit.

Funding

A major requirement for HOPE VI funding is that PHAs must secure other funds that HUD will match. This is required because the costs of development are always greater than HOPE VI funds. A 2003 surveyed conducted by the Housing Research Foundation where 28 public housing authorities responded found that typically each PHA had around eight sources on funding. HOPE VI monies covered less than 40% of the total cost of the redevelopment. Other funding options included tax credits, commercial bank mortgages, and other federal programs such as the Federal Home Loan Bank's Affordable Housing Program (AHP). A good number of the PHAs that participated also made use of state bonds and low-income tax credit programs.

From fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2007, the current Administration has continually aimed to eliminate the funding of HOPE VI in its entirety. The present Administration went as far as to propose the withdrawal of funds from the previous fiscal year. Despite constant pressure from the Administration, Congress elected to continue the funding of HOPE VI and past legislation in January of 2008. Although funding of HOPE VI continued for another fiscal year, the amount of money available has dramatically decreased over the past couple of years (Figure 2-1). Funding appropriation dropped from almost 800 million dollars in the 1994 fiscal year to 100 million dollars in 2008 (Rice & Sard, 2008).

Public/Private Partnerships and Financing Options

Public/private partnerships are of critical importance to the success of public housing. Even with the funding PHAs receive from the federal government for the revitalization of public housing; it is often not enough to cover the construction and operation costs of that development. Market-rate units are necessary to cover these costs and allow developers to make a profit. The president of the Public Housing Authorities Directors Association testified before a House subcommittee and stated, “The use of mixed financing packages, the participation of private developers as contractors or partners, and the participation of the banking industry in financing HOPE VI projects has helped many agencies establish broader business relationships with private sector organizations” (Gutzmann, 2006, p.7).

A 2003 report by the Housing Research Foundation surveyed public housing authorities across the country to see what sources of funding were the most common. Twenty-eight housing authorities responded. Of those 28 responding housing authorities, the majority reported utilizing eight sources of funding. HOPE VI only represented 38.5% of the project cost and tax credits accounted for another 27%. In fact every one dollar of HUD money invested \$3 of private funds is invested (HUD, 2005b).

Another key player in HOPE VI revitalization is the political support of the local and state government. Often these jurisdictions have resources available to them that are invaluable. The federal government is also a major contributor. One federal program that is very helpful is the low-income housing tax credit. The low-income housing tax credit program or (LIHTC) is a federal program that presents private investors or developers dollar-for-dollar credits against their federal taxes if they invest in the development of affordable housing developments for a minimum period of years (HUD,

2001). It is has been very successful over the years in the construction of affordable housing across the country. Private investment is extremely significant for PHAs to complete projects that will meet the goals of HOPE VI.

Criticisms of HOPE VI

One of the main criticisms of HOPE VI is the cost. HOPE VI is more expensive on a per unit basis (GAO, 2001). Even HUD has spoken out against continuing funding of HOPE VI because of all of the already funded incomplete projects still waiting to be completed. HUD agrees with the Bush Administration in that HOPE VI has completed its goal of demolishing 100,000 units. Former HUD Secretary stated as of 2003, 115,000 units received demolition funding and therefore, “HOPE VI has served its purpose” (Martinez, 2003).

Other critics of HOPE VI include those who oppose any government intervention in housing. They believe that only those who work hard deserve a place to live (Husock, 1997). In June of 2002, a report titled *False HOPE: a Critical Assessment of the HOPE VI Public Housing Redevelopment Program* outlined many of the major criticisms of the HOPE VI program. There is the belief shared by many that HOPE VI is a modern day urban renewal (National Housing Law Project et al., 2003). They believe that HOPE VI is a way that the government is trying to push out lower income residents and replace them with higher income ones. Critics also cited a lack of data about successes and processes, no detailed purpose, and too many goals as more reasons to end HOPE VI (National Law Project et al., 2002, von Hoffman, 1996). The National Housing Law Project (2000) criticized HOPE VI, saying it,

Plays upon the public housing program's unfairly, negative reputation and an exaggerated sense of crisis about the state of public housing in general to justify a

drastic model of large-scale household displacement and housing redevelopment that increasingly appears to do more harm than good. (p. ii)

Although HOPE VI has many critics, the majority of the critics argue that Congress should continue funding HOPE VI with slight modifications.

Supporters of HOPE VI

Despite many attempts by Congress to end funding of HOPE VI, many housing authorities still hold the belief that HOPE VI provides an excellent way to improve the conditions of housing for many of the nation's low-income residents. HOPE VI removes the deplorable housing developments and replaces them with newer more aesthetically pleasing developments. Housing authorities that have successful HOPE VI redevelopments in their jurisdiction are working to try to replicate that success in other projects. Many public housing authorities through the HOPE VI program were able to redevelop their worst and most dilapidated housing developments into areas that are attractive and desirable places to live (Popkin et al., 2004; Turbov & Piper, 2005). Many local and state governments also support HOPE VI because of its assistance in improving infrastructure and community facilities in the areas undergoing revitalization (Popkim et al., 2004). According to Turbov & Piper (2005) "HOPE VI funds can attract new investment into places where the market was previously absent" (p. vi).

The positive changes due to HOPE VI revitalization regularly carries on into the surrounding areas. HOPE VI projects have contributed to the improved conditions of many inner city neighborhoods. Truly capturing the impact of HOPE VI on the surrounding community has proved to be quite complex for many researchers (Jargowsky, 2003; Popkin et al., 2004; Schwartz, 2006). Researchers have found it challenging to quantify the community impacts of HOPE VI developments because of

many externalities (Popkin et al., 2004). Countless cities where HOPE VI development occurred experienced a decrease in crime rates, increase in property values, improved test scores in the surrounding schools, as well as improvements in the overall well-being of residents (Jargowsky, 2003; Popkin et al., 2004; Schwartz, 2006). While HOPE VI has remained controversial, it has contributed to making many significant contributions to distressed areas and assisted in the improvement of the lives of residents.

Reauthorization

After many failed efforts by the Bush Administration, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the HOPE VI Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2007 on January 30, 2008 (APA, 2008). This legislation continued the funding of HOPE VI for an additional seven years while making a number of substantial changes to the program.

Some of the main changes under the reauthorization include:

- Extends the HOPE VI program through FY2015 (Section 13 and 14)
- Authorizes the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to waive the matching contribution requirement in cases of extreme distress or emergency (Section 3)
- Prohibits the award of demolition-only grants for any revitalization plan that proposes to demolish public housing without revitalization of any existing public housing dwelling units (Section 4)
- Increases from 15% to 25% the amount of any such grant that may be used for necessary supportive services (Section 6)
- Specifies requirements for mandatory core components of revitalization plans, including among others: (1) involvement of public housing residents in planning and implementation; (2) a program for temporary and permanent relocation, including comprehensive relocation assistance; (3) a right for resident households to expanded housing opportunities; (4) one-for-one replacement of demolished dwelling units, including onsite mixed-income housing; (5) monitoring of displaced households; and (6) green developments (Section 8) (Library of Congress, 2008)

The changes addressed the issues that critics of HOPE VI often cited as the major flaws on the program such as on-site mixed-income housing, off-site mixed-income

development, limitation on exclusion, tenant protections, resident involvement, improvements on grant implementation, and green housing. The U.S. House of Representatives passed the HOPE VI Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2007 on January 30, 2008 (APA, 2008).




Figure 2-1 HUD funding history FY 1993-2008 Source: United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2008, Retrieved March 25, 2008 from <http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/about/fundinghistory.pdf>

CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY

Data

Data from official documents, interview data from program experts, survey data from residents and observational analysis was compiled to identify program outcomes.

Documentation included the HOPE VI applications submitted to HUD by the respective housing authorities as well as direct studies done by architectural firms, newspaper articles, and other literature written in scholarly journals related to the field of public housing. Documentation also included government reports and transcripts of testimony to Congress by staff from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and information from the local public housing authorities (PHA) reports.

Methods

For the specific case studies, the researcher used the exploratory case study methodology developed by Robert K. Yin (2003). The exploratory case study method is ideal for developing a hypothesis for future investigation. Case studies are a valuable way to present an account of what happened at a point in time. Its methodological advantage is being able to capture and chronicle events that occur during the implementation of a program. Case studies present an opportunity to analyze why an event occurred and who was responsible for it occurring. In the context of this particular study, the strength is that case studies are both site and situation specific. That is to say, that the research looks at two specific HOPE VI project at a specific point in time.

The justification for an exploratory case study is to compare a current situation to another current similar situation to see what differences and similarities are present. From the investigation of each case study, conclusions will be drawn regarding the common obstacles

experienced during development, how each development team overcame the obstacles, and the community incentives that proved indispensable. In addition, suggestions will be made as to policy changes that could make the revitalization process less difficult, and encourage more public and private partnerships as an effective tool for mixed-income redevelopment.

I obtained Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval in December of 2007 as a requirement for all research involving humans (see Appendix A). From December 2007 until February 2008 researcher conducted six interviews of key stakeholders. I sent notifications by email correspondence and through telephone calls. The interviews provided information about different policy implementation techniques used by the respective redevelopment teams. Stakeholders were identified as persons who had a significant role in the revitalization of the HOPE VI projects in the cities selected as case studies. Stakeholders included employees of the local housing authorities who oversaw the public housing transformation and the developers who were the builders of the developments. I also interviewed elected officials who had jurisdiction over the areas in which the transformation took place as well as various community and resident leaders. I asked interviewees probing questions but concurrently asked opened ended questions so that the interviewee felt comfortable sharing their experience. After consultation with the chair and committee members, I developed ten questions (see Appendix B). I also asked interviewees what advice they would offer future policy makers. At the end of each interview, I allowed the interviewee to share something that the researcher overlooked and that they wanted to share.

Interviews were conducted in person and over the telephone. This was done to ensure that the interviewee was then most comfortable and accommodate the interviewee's schedules. At the conclusion of each interview, each participant received a copy of the consent form for his or

her records. At the end of all the interviews, each interviewee's response was compared to the other interviewees to see what similarities and differences were present. These interviews offered an in-depth look into the endeavors undertaken by local governments to continue the redevelopment of public housing. These interviews present an unbiased view of HOPE VI and its effects on the future of public housing.

Case Studies

The two case studies selected are the former Village at Techwood in Atlanta and the former Ida B. Wells Homes in Chicago. These two developments share a common history; President Roosevelt developed both under his Public Works Administration Agency. The Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) and Atlanta Housing Authority are two formerly troubled PHAs that took advantage of HOPE VI opportunities and today serve as models for other housing authorities around the country. Atlanta and Chicago are two vastly different cities but it is through these differences that an opportunity arises to unite pertinent information and make recommendations to aid policy makers in other revitalization efforts. Based on the data collected, the differences in each city are not so severe that a basic comparison cannot be successful.

Chicago: Ida B. Wells Homes

Chicago is very intriguing because of its unprecedented plan to revitalize around 25,000 units of public housing. The 25,000 units represented some of the worst in the country. It is fascinating to observe how the country's third largest housing authority, who suffered a great deal of adversity over the years, tackles a project so large in hopes of making positive changes in the lives of thousands of people. Chicago's plan for transformation offers a wealth of information and presents a great opportunity to gain knowledge from both their successes and failures. This knowledge will help other communities in bringing about that same positive

change. Public housing as it is today it not going to last much longer. Housing policy makers must develop programs that enable communities and residents to sustain themselves in the mist of this change of direction.

The Ida B. Wells redevelopment project was the first public housing development built exclusively for African-Americans under President Roosevelt's administration. This project sparked interest because of the long and painful history of mistreatment of displaced low-income African-Americans. Over the years, many African-American residents have become very distrusting and cynical. From the four interviews conducted in Chicago, we are able to learn how the Chicago housing authority handled this distrust while helping thousands of families relocate during the transformation. This case study provides a great opportunity to learn from mistakes and successes of the Chicago team.

Atlanta: Village at Techwood

Researcher selected the Atlanta case study because of the Village at Techwood's reputation for being a model HOPE VI redevelopment project. When policy makers think of HOPE VI, one of the first projects that come to mind is Village at Techwood. Atlanta is a city with a large African-American population; and presents an excellent opportunity to observe how the Atlanta Housing Authority relocated countless lower income African-Americans residents during the revitalization process. Atlanta's mistakes and victories provide a model for which other redevelopment projects can learn.

A complication presented during the Atlanta case study was making contact with persons who were actively involved in the Village at Techwood redevelopment more than ten years later. This was due in part to many of the people who were involved in the redevelopment no longer held a political office, resided in the city, or worked at the housing authority. Another possible reason is that Techwood is so heavily studied that the AHA has a high influx of requests for

information making it difficult for them to fulfill all requests. However, after many failed attempts, the researcher was finally able to speak with an employee from a public relations firm hired by the AHA, a well respected college professor who published numerous literary works about the redevelopment, and the researcher consulted numerous documentary sources. These three sources provided an unbiased triangular view of the redevelopment.

CHAPTER 4 CASE STUDIES

This chapter presents the findings of the research conducted from December 2007 to February 2008. This chapter is organized into two sections: Atlanta and Chicago. The two case studies selected are the former Village at Techwood in Atlanta and the former Ida B. Wells Homes in Chicago. President Roosevelt developed both developments under his Public Works Administration Agency to serve as housing for working families that could not afford market-rate housing. The Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) and Atlanta Housing Authority are two formerly troubled PHAs that took advantage of HOPE VI opportunities and today serve as models for other housing authorities around the country. Both cities have a considerably large African-American population. Although Atlanta is much smaller than Chicago is, this difference does not significantly affect the research.

This chapter explores each of these revitalization efforts separately and then uses the information collected to summarize the lessons each project offers for future HOPE VI revitalization projects. This chapter in the end suggests techniques and approaches for current and future HOPE VI projects. The lesson learned from each case study identifies deficiencies in existing policy implementation strategies while offering an opportunity to develop strategies to remedy such deficiencies.

Case Study: Village at Techwood, Atlanta

The data collected for the Atlanta case study seeks to answer the following questions:

1. What were the conditions of the public housing projects before the HOPE VI intervention?
2. How did the Atlanta Housing Authority transform these public housing projects into mixed-income communities?
3. What obstacles did the AHA, developers, and financiers face during the revitalization?
4. How has the community reacted to this transformation now, more than ten years later?

Background

During the Great Depression, Atlanta, like the rest of the country, sought an opportunity to create jobs and provide housing for low-income white families. Atlanta residents were faced with high unemployment rates and even higher crime rates. Desperate to stimulate the economy in Atlanta, petitions were sent to President Roosevelt to intervene. In response, President Roosevelt authorized the Village at Techwood to open 1935 and five years later Clark Howell Homes. In 1936, President Roosevelt as cited in (Grogan & Proscio, 2000, p. 22) named the Village at Techwood “America’s first public housing and a cornerstone of the New Deal”. In order to handle the great demand for public housing in Atlanta policy makers put strict guidelines in place to act as a filter only selecting only those households that met certain requirements. In the end, the housing authority selected 604 families to live in Village at Techwood and 688 to live in Clark Howell Homes (L. Keating, personal communication, February 26, 2008). For the most part most people considered the two developments to be one large development because of their close proximity. The Clark Howell Homes addition is to the left of Techwood, and the Palmer and Roosevelt high-rises for the elderly are located at opposite ends of the Techwood complex.

Although Atlanta has a considerable African-American population, much of the city has remained segregated. In Dr. Keating’s 1990 book, *Race, Class and Urban Expansion* he stated that in 1990 Atlanta was the fourth most segregated city in the nation. Dr. Keating’s (1990) book further narrates the sad history of housing segregation in Atlanta. Practices in Atlanta caused many neighborhoods become segregated even though they were originally integrated neighborhoods. The civil rights movement of the 1960s called for the desegregation of the Village at Techwood and Clark Howell Homes in 1968. This decision ended the screening restrictions based on race. This change resulted in an astronomical increase of African-

Americans moving into public housing and a severe decrease in low-income whites residing in public housing. While a great number of African-Americans moved from the rural south to Atlanta, many whites left the Atlanta area as a result. More than 100,000 people mostly white residents, left Atlanta during this time (Newman, 2002). By 1970, blacks made up the majority of residents in Atlanta. Due to the dramatic change in Atlanta's population, Atlanta at one time had the highest concentration of public housing per capita of any city in the country (R. White, personal communication, February 18, 2008). Atlanta in addition had the second highest concentration of poverty in the country (Newman, 2002). Demand for affordable housing was a major concern for the country's fifth largest housing authority. The City of Atlanta faced a major affordable housing problem.

During the 1970s, many organizations sponsored efforts to revitalize public housing in Atlanta. The hope was to improve the living conditions for many low-income families. The conditions of the Village at Techwood and Clark Howell homes were deplorable. In 1980, after an inspection ordered by the then Mayor Maynard Jackson, inspectors cited the housing authority with over 10,000 code violations. Maynard Jackson soon after became very instrumental in petitioning HUD to allocate funds to renovate public housing in Atlanta. HUD awarded more than \$17 million dollars in 1981 for upgrades such as improved plumbing and electrical systems (Keating, 2000).

The Atlanta Housing Authority (AHA) was not without problems. In fact, HUD once named AHA as one of the worst in the nation (L. Keating, personal communication, February 26, 2008; Newman, 2002). During an annual inspection in 1994, HUD scored AHA 39 out of a possible 100 and threatened to take over AHA if the City did not make improvements (Newman, 2002). In efforts to improve the negative image attached with the housing authority, city

officials hired a new head of the housing authority. In 1992 after receiving harsh criticism from HUD for the poor management of public housing, Mayor Maynard Jackson hired Earl Phillips as the new head of the AHA. Earl Phillips had a reputation for helping transform Miami's housing authority. Atlanta hoped that he could do the same thing in Atlanta (L. Keating, personal communication, February 26, 2008). Phillips proposed selling portions of Village at Techwood to raise money to finance renovations of the Village at Techwood and Clark Howell. Under Phillip's leadership, the AHA adopted policies that evicted residents for the most minor infraction. AHA also stopped accepting partial rent payments. These changes resulted in the vacancy rate reaching more than 94.1% in 1994 (Atlanta Police Department, 2008; Newman, 2002). Phillips wanted both developments to remain as public housing therefore maintaining an adequate supply of affordable housing in the city. HUD approved Phillip's plan immediately. However, housing policy changed after the election of November 1993. Bill Campbell became the new mayor and Phillips quickly stepped down. Renee Glover replaced Earl Phillips and serves as the executive director today.

Atlanta Wins Olympic Bid

In September of 1990, Atlanta won their bid to host the 1996 Summer Olympics. Atlanta decided to use this opportunity to revitalize the areas near the future Olympic sites. At this time, more than 25% of Atlanta residents lived in poverty and the majority of these lived near the Olympic sites (Newman, 2002). One of the major eyesores was the Village at Techwood. The Village at Techwood went from a pristine development to an area infested with crime, poverty, and hopelessness. Crime, drugs, and overcrowded households overflowed the development. In 1994, Clark Howell and Village at Techwood had 325 assaults, 141 robberies and burglaries, 84 narcotics crimes, and 66 cases of vandalism (Newman, 2002). Crime in Atlanta was so high and in many ways, the crime in Atlanta's public housing was 19 times the crime rate of the rest of the

city (L. Keating, personal communication, February 26, 2008; R. White, personal communication, February 18, 2008). In the Atlanta Housing Authority's 1993 HOPE VI grant application, AHA described the horrendous conditions that haunted the development, "In 1992, there were 8,670 police and security responses—averaging about one every hour for an entire year. The more than 900 serious crimes reported in 1992 averaged more than one per household in the development" (R. White, personal communication, February 18, 2008).

The Village at Techwood was an area crammed with drug activity so much so that many of the buildings received the nicknames "Powder Alley" and "Horse Shoe" (R. White, personal communication, February 18, 2008). Village at Techwood was a "magnet for thugs and criminals who preyed on the single women and children that lived in the development" (R. White, personal communication, February 18, 2008). HUD gave the AHA more than 18 million dollars in grants to improve the security in their public housing but very little of this money was actually used for that purpose (Keating & Flores, 2000, p. 287). This lack of investment in crime prevention had horrific consequences for residents of the development.

In 1992, Clark Howell/Techwood had a combined total of 1,195 public housing units reporting 1,084 criminal incidents (Boston, 2005). This averages a crime rate per housing unit of .91 (Boston, 2005). Techwood/Clark Howell Homes had the most criminal activity of any of the AHA's properties with a crime rate of .393 per capita (Boston, 2005). This figure represented 69% above the City's average (Boston, 2005). Techwood/Clark Howell projects accounted for 5,654 Atlanta Police Department dispatches in 1992; representing 4.9% of the total police responses that year (Boston, 2005). It is important to note that Techwood and Clark Howell's residents only represented half of one percent of the total population (Boston, 2005). Despite the rampant crime and social ills, these developments were considered home to many residents (L.

Keating, personal communication, February 26, 2008; Keating & Flores, 2000). At the time of the city's decision to revitalize to prepare for the Olympics, there was a 90% occupancy rate and most of the female-headed households lived in the development, on average, for over seven years (Keating, 2000). Many of the residents opted to reside in the development because of its close proximity to public transportation and employment despite the horrible conditions.

Before the HOPE VI revitalization, many private investors shied away from investing anywhere near the developments. The poor conditions of the development created economic barriers that prevented property values to reach their full potential (R. White, personal communication, February 18, 2008).

Atlanta and HOPE VI

In 1994, the City of Atlanta used the 42.4 million dollars received from the HOPE VI grant as well as other sources of funding, to begin the reclamation and redevelopment of the Village at Techwood/Clark Howell into what is today Centennial Place (Salama, 1999). The new development replaced the 1081 unit of public housing with 738 units of mixed income housing — comprised of 42% market rate, 41% for public housing eligible residents, and 17% for low income housing tax credits sitting on 60 acres (R. White, personal communication, February 18, 2008). Centennial Place's boundaries include Merritts Ave to the north, Luckie Street to the west, Mills Ave to the south, and Techwood/Centennial Olympic Park Drive to the east (Figure 4-1). Centennial Place is an exemplary HOPE VI revitalization project. Practitioners often cite Village at Techwood as a model HOPE VI revitalization project because of its success in astonishingly transforming perhaps some of the worst public housing developments in the city (Salama, 1999).

The total project cost for the Techwood Redevelopment cost approximately 60.7 million dollars. On-site construction costs were approximately 47.6 million dollars totaling around

53,000 dollars per unit (Schubert & Thresher, 1996). Soft costs such as financing costs, developer fees, marketing costs, interest costs and other totaled 13.9 million dollars or approximately 14,544 dollars per unit. Some funding sources included low-income housing tax credits, FHA-insured mortgages from private lenders, and funds directly from the City.

Centennial Place is the result of a partnership between the Integral Group, McCormick Baron and Associates, Inc., and the AHA. The AHA used monies from these partnerships and funding sources to relocate 114 families from Village at Techwood and 558 families from Clark Howell Homes (Newman, 2002). The AHA did not want to “rebuild public housing” but in fact “create opportunities for residents to leave the conditions that they were stuck in, AHA wanted to break the cycle of poverty” (R. White, personal communication, February 18, 2008).

Racial composition and new investment

Between 1990 and 2000 the population of the Centennial Place community became more racially diverse. The African-American population decreased from 86.7% to 65.3% of the entire neighborhood population (Turbov & Piper, 2005). During that same time the white population just about doubled from 10.5% to 28% (Turbov & Piper, 2005). This change in the racial composition was more similar to that the rest of the city of Atlanta.

Turbov & Piper (2005) cite a 2002 study from Strata Real Estate Alliance, LLP that reported approximately \$356 million has been invested in Centennial Place since its opening in 1996. The study also reports that homeownership in the Centennial Place neighborhood increased from less than 1% in 1990 to 12% in 2000. The Strata Real Estate study concluded that as a minimum 75% of the new housing was developed because of the redevelopment of Techwood/Clark Howell. Finally the report asserts that the remaining 25% of housing would sell for much less.

Obstacles faced during HOPE VI

It is important to note that when the AHA decided to revitalize the Village at Techwood into a mixed-income development, there was no other mixed-income development available in any other city to serve as a model. In many ways, HUD developed its policies for HOPE VI projects around Atlanta's model (R. White, personal communication, February 18, 2008). Atlanta in many ways paved the way for other housing authorities to revitalize their most distressed areas and create not only public housing but "holistic communities" (R. White, personal communication, February 18, 2008).

Another major obstacle Atlanta faced during the planning process for the revitalization was the lack of trust between the families affected by the revitalization and the housing authority. Due to mistakes made in the past by the AHA, many of the residents were weary of any promises made by the housing authority. In order to rebuild some of the trust lost and to keep residents informed the housing authority held weekly meetings for a couple of years (R. White, personal communication, February 18, 2008). The meetings were an opportunity to hear residents concerns as well as to educate the public about the benefits of the HOPE VI intervention. The AHA took additional steps and formed committees that addressed resident concerns more specifically.

Political conflict was also another major obstacle that the AHA had to overcome. There was major resistance to moving voters around during the relocation (R. White, personal communication, February 18, 2008). Many critics of the revitalization had little confidence in the low-income residents being able to succeed in a mixed-income community. The AHA wanted to dispel all beliefs that low-income residents were unable to become economically self-sufficient. AHA holds on to the belief that public housing is not a permanent situation but rather a temporary assistance to those seeking to do better (R. White, personal communication,

February 18, 2008). Residents of AHA public housing developments are required to work. Families receiving government assistance are required to be proactive in trying to get out of the public housing system. The AHA views public housing as an agreement between the housing agency and the family living in the public housing development. As soon as that family becomes financially stable, they should leave the public housing system (R. White, personal communication, February 18, 2008). The AHA like many other cities has a limited amount of affordable housing. In order to accommodate the neediest of residents, AHA works to create an environment in which residents can work to become economically independent. “A family that remains living in public housing is failing and not successful” (R. White, personal communication, February 18, 2008).

Another policy that was unique to the AHA was the requirement that all the units be indistinguishable. AHA wanted to remove all the social stigmas that accompanied public housing and to do this AHA believed that all units must be indistinguishable (R. White, personal communication, February 18, 2008). AHA rented each unit based on the natural flow of residents but at the same time making sure that a certain percentage was affordable, public housing, and market-rate units (R. White, personal communication, February 18, 2008). This means that one year a unit could be rented to a household as a public housing unit then the very next year that same unit might be rented to a market rate household. The goal is to provide a level of anonymity (R. White, personal communication, February 18, 2008).

Today the Village at Techwood is gone and in its place sits a beautiful 758-unit community of two- and three-story townhouses and the new state-of-the-art, 13 million dollar Centennial Place Elementary School. Centennial Place is comprised of a little more than 300 public housing units. These units are indistinguishable from the 311 market-rate and 126 tax-credit units

(Turbov & Piper, 2005). Centennial Place is under private management and includes tot lots, clubhouse, community room, a swimming pool, and other amenities. Today the market-rate for a three-bedroom apartment in Centennial Place is \$1520 a month (Centennial Place Website, 2008, n.p.). The Atlanta Housing Authority was successful in transforming Village at Techwood from a “housing project” into an area that today boasts a new elementary school, high-tech library, childcare facilities, and YMCA (Grogan & Proscio, 2000, p. 22).

The crime rate in Zone 5 today is significantly lower than before the HOPE VI redevelopment. In 2001, after revitalization the total crimes reported dropped to 62 in respect to the 738 revitalized mixed-income housing units were 738 representing a crime rate per housing unit of .08 (Boston, 2005). This shows a 91% decrease in crime since 1992. The overall feel of the environment is now a safe place where families can raise children and not live in fear.

Criticisms of Atlanta Transformation

While most people would consider the Atlanta transformation was a success there are some that would argue that it had several negative effects on former residents. Dr. Keating a college professor at the Georgia Institute of Technology and as a former consultant for the tenant association at Techwood had this to say when asked if he considered Techwood a success, “It depends on what side you are on” (L. Keating, personal communication, February 26, 2008). In other words the business community and university were in support of the transformation. They considered Techwood and its residents to be a nuisance. The business community saw HOPE VI as an opportunity to evict the lower income residents and replace them with upper middle class families. Only 92.9% of the original residents were able to return to the new development (L. Keating, personal communication, February 26, 2008). However, the residents of the development did not see the transformation as beneficial. They focused more on all that they would be losing. Many of the residents of Techwood were especially skeptical of the intentions

of the AHA. For years the AHA ignored resident complaints about pest control, appliance problems, utilities, and other maintenance concerns (Keating & Flores, 2000). The way in which the AHA handled resident concerns was despicable. Residents lived in constant fear and very little was done to alleviate some of their fears. Seventeen out of 20 residents cited fear of crime and drugs as their primary concern (Keating & Flores, 2000).

When Atlanta first began to plan for the transformation of Techwood in the early 1990's, it was before Congress passed the HOPE VI program. Atlanta originally petitioned HUD for an unprecedented 90 million dollars for the redevelopment of distressed public housing including Techwood. Soon after this petition Congress passed HOPE VI and Atlanta was able to reapply for funding under HOPE VI. "The first application was horrible, it had extensive disregard for the relocation of residents" (L. Keating, personal communication, February 26, 2008). HUD rejected the first application saying it "doesn't have any meat to it. There is no complete plan of action" (Pomerantz, 1991).

During Atlanta's application process word had already spread that Techwood would be demolished and many residents began to vacate units without any help from the housing authority. Vacancy rate during this period reached an all time high. In March of 1993 Techwood Homes had a vacancy rate of 49.7% and Clark Howell Homes' vacancy rate was 22.4% (Boston, 2005). By 1995 there were only 26 residents left in the development. There were lots of reports of trickery done by the AHA to exclude former residents from returning to the new site (Keating & Flores, 2000). Despite promises made during the application process, continued pressure from the business and university community to demolish the public housing communities and replace it with upper income residents emerged. Things during this period were chaotic and severely out of hand. Lots of corruption and broken promises by the housing authority left many residents

feeling neglected and hopeless (L. Keating, personal communication, February 26, 2008).

Residents were told that they would be able to move into the new development but because of many strict criteria only 78 of the original residents were selected to move into the new development. Many of those selected were the former community leaders and presidents not the typical residents (L. Keating, personal communication, February 26, 2008). Dr. Keating pointed out that the Techwood transformation was unique in that there were no other residential neighborhoods in the immediate area surrounding the development. This in many ways contributed to the interests of the businesses and university prevailing over the needs of the residents (L. Keating, personal communication, February 26, 2008).

In November of 1993, Techwood's fate seemed bleak when Bill Campbell was elected mayor. Maynard Jackson who served before Campbell was a champion of preserving Techwood, but Campbell favored the business community. Some believe it was this change in administration that caused Earl Phillips to step down and Renee Glover who was a corporate lawyer and senior aide for Campbell, to step in as executive director (L. Keating, personal communication, February 26, 2008; Keating & Flores, 2000).

Dr. Keating believes that Techwood offers numerous lessons for public housing agencies across the country. He believes that, "Redevelopment is an intricate part of public housing" but "the replacement housing should be built first" (L. Keating, personal communication, February 26, 2008). Finally, Dr. Keating believes that the relocation of the public housing residents should not be managed by HUD or the housing agency but instead an independent third party.

Lessons learned from Atlanta

From the interviews conducted in the preparation of this case study, several important lessons emerged.

Lesson 1: Public/private partnerships are critical

Centennial Place was the result of a development partnership of the Atlanta Housing Authority and a group of private companies collectively known as the Integral Partnership of Atlanta. These private companies run the day to day operations of the development such as collecting rent and maintenance issues (Newman, 2002). This allows the housing authority to spend less time focusing on the day to day issues of the development and spend more time on providing affordable housing to residents. Some believe that Atlanta's public/private partnership serves as a model for other housing authorities (White, 1997).

Lesson 2: Communication and resident participation through all phases is crucial

This helps minimize the concerns and fears of residents. Atlanta's development team met with resident committees twice a week, and then met with the rest of the residential body every six weeks so that issues could be resolved and the lines of communication remained open (R. White, personal communication, February 18, 2008). On paper Atlanta did an extraordinary job of engaging the residents in at all phases of the planning process. However, Keating & Flores (2000) paint an incredibly different picture. They speak of corruption and misrepresentation of information that in many ways suppressed resident's participation in deciding what would happen to their community. Public participation and transparency of actions reduces the chances of corruption claims.

Lesson 3: Legal backing is necessary

In view of the fact that there is a severe lack of trust between residents and the AHA, legal backing is an excellent way to rebuild some of that lost trust. Legal recourse strengthens resident's confidence in the agreements. The AHA recognized this and drafted agreements and created a legally binding enforceable document that gives residents legal recourse (R. White, personal communication, February 18, 2008). Countless studies argue that resident concerns

need more attention. While this is important, it is even more crucial that residents are confident that once they vote on something, the public housing agency will carry out the will of the residents. If the agency does not, it is important that the residents have some way to hold the agency accountable.

Conclusion

While there is mixed opinions about the benefits of the HOPE VI intervention in Atlanta, there are significant lessons that policy makers can learn from the Atlanta case study. Atlanta and its development team should be commended for developing the “Atlanta Model” for which many public housing authorities developed their redevelopment strategies. However, public housing authorities should learn from some of the mistakes that Atlanta made in handling residents during and after the relocation process. Despite the controversy that surrounds the AHA, one thing is apparent, HOPE VI transformed Atlanta’s approach in developing and managing public housing.

Case Study: Ida B. Wells Homes, Chicago

Background

Another city notorious for HOPE VI revitalization is Chicago. The Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) is the third largest in the country and has a long history of poor management and lawsuits. Since 1992, CHA received the most HOPE VI revitalization grants to date (HUD, 2007 n.p.). HUD awarded the CHA demolition and revitalization grants for the Cabrini Homes Extension (1994), Henry Horner Homes (1996), ABLA (1996, 1998), Robert Taylor Homes (1996, 2001), Madden and Wells [Ida B. Wells] (2000), and Rockwell Gardens (2001). In the 1990s, public housing in Chicago was at an all time low. Chicago public housing had become high crime and impoverished areas that served as breeding grounds for drug transactions. Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, the CHA faced serious management problems that

prohibited the CHA from properly addressing these serious conditions. CHA's problems were so extreme that in May 1995, HUD took control of the housing authority. HUD gave control back to the City in 1999 and CHA worked to revamp its horrible legacy and developed a massive plan (T. Preckwinkle, personal communication, February 7, 2008).

In 1999, the CHA developed a plan that received the moniker "Plan for Transformation." "The plan called for the demolition of all of the CHA's gallery high-rise buildings, as well as several thousand mid-rise and low-rise units, the development of mixed-income replacement housing, and the relocation of as many as 6,000 families with Section 8" (Popkin & Cunningham, 2001, p. 7). On February 6, 2000, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) approved the Chicago Housing Authority's Plan for Transformation (J. Caffrey, personal communication, January 11, 2008). The plan was the largest reconstruction of public housing in the nation. The Transformation plan was so well received by HUD that it received around eight HOPE VI implementation awards (J. Caffrey, personal communication, January 11, 2008). The CHA under this plan aimed to "renew the physical structure of CHA properties, promote self-sufficiency for public housing residents, and reform Administration of the CHA" (J. Caffrey, personal communication, January 11, 2008). More than eight years after the adoption of the "Plan for Transformation", the CHA is still passionately overhauling public housing in Chicago.

One of the developments on the list for "transformation" is the now Oakwood Shores development comprising the former Ida B. Wells (1941), Wells Extension (1955), Clarence Darrow Homes (1961), and Madden Park Homes (1970). The Ida B. Wells Development was the first low-income housing built exclusively for African-Americans in the city of Chicago and the largest demonstration developments built under the Public Works Administration.

Originally, Ida B. Wells' homes were not poor housing, but rather housing for low-income working African-American families. The original development incorporated a city park that comprised of athletic parks and playgrounds (J. Caffrey, personal communication, January 11, 2008). According to Jessica Caffrey the Development Manager for the Chicago Housing Authority, the four severely distressed housing projects were contiguous and sat on approximately 72 acres near the south side of Chicago (J. Caffrey, personal communication, January 11, 2008). The Ida B. Wells housing project was the fourth public housing created by the Public Works Administration (PWA) in the Chicago area. The development took its name from Ida B. Wells a crusader, women's rights advocate, journalist, and speaker. From the beginning, these over 3,200 units were highly concentrated segregated public housing (J. Caffrey, personal communication, January 11, 2008). In the early 2000s almost 60 later after first opening, the Ida B. Wells development became "the stereotypical big-city housing project, rocked by gangs and drugs" (Parish, 2007, n.p.).

Conditions before HOPE VI

Ida B. Wells Homes and surrounding areas was one of the nation's poorest communities (Popkin et al., 2003). According to the CHA's HOPE VI application, mechanical, plumbing, electrical, sanitary, and water supply systems were so faulty that the CHA received numerous citations for not providing regular supplies of hot and cold water or heat (Popkin et al., 2002, p. 2-5). In March of 1993, LeAlan Jones, 13, and Lloyd Newman, 14, collaborated with public radio producer David Isay to create a radio documentary entitled Ghetto Life 101 which chronicled ten days in the life of Ida B. Wells' residents. This documentary received numerous awards (Sigma Delta Chi Award, the Ohio State Award, the Livingston Award, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting Awards for Excellence in Documentary Radio and Special Achievement in Radio Programming) for candidly giving an in-depth look into life at Ida B. Wells. The wide

spreading crime that the documentary spoke of 14 years ago still existed well into the 2000s. Ida B. Wells Homes remained the target of numerous police investigations over the years. In 2005, a major drug bust by police resulted in the arrests of 44 members of the Gangster Disciples (a notorious gang founded in Chicago in the 1960s) (Parish, 2007, n.p.).

In 1970, Madden Park Homes opened as the last public housing development built in Chicago (J. Caffrey, personal communication, January 11, 2008). Madden Park consisted of three high-rise buildings, seven garden style buildings, and had a density of over 60 units to the acre. The addition of units from Madden Park further negatively affected an already heavily burdened public housing community. The Clarence Darrow Homes many believe served as the poster child for the failure of high-rise public housing in Chicago and across the country. The Clarence Darrow Homes became infamous after the story of neighborhood children throwing a five-year-old boy out of a 10 story window for refusing to steal candy received national attention.

Prior to applying to HUD's HOPE VI program for funds, the Chicago Housing Authority hired the architectural firm of Campbell Tiu to assess the physical deficiencies of Ida B. Wells, Madden Park, and Clarence Darrow Homes. The firm concluded that the sites were unsuitable for residential use (J. Caffrey, personal communication, January 11, 2008). The firm found that the major structural and system deficiencies plagued all the sites. The sites had serious mechanical, plumbing, sanitary, water supply, and electrical problems. The condition of the sites presented such a health hazard that the City of Chicago cited the Chicago Housing Authority for building code violations related to plumbing and heating in units. The inspectors also reported signs of water damage, leaking pipes, and serious structural integrity issues. The CHA was also cited for poor site drainage, poor garbage storage, lack of landscape, and lack of adequate site

lighting in all four sites. Perhaps some of the most serious health threats were the lead paint and asbestos sighting on all four sites. There were also reports that squatters occupied many of the abandoned units, further adding to the safety problem faced by the development. Another safety concern was the high number of vacant lots that surrounded the development. According to the 1990 Census, 72% of residents in the Madden/Wells area were below the poverty level. Over half of the residents were on welfare and only 46% reported employment as their primary source of income. An astonishing 98% of the residents identified themselves as African-American and only 1% of residents identified themselves as White.

In "Residents at Risk: A Profile of Ida B. Wells and Madden Park", researchers conducted a study, spanning October 2002 to May 2003 (Popkin et al., 2003). The CHA provided the Urban Institute with a list of 750 households and the Urban Institute surveyed 569 containing 1,587 individuals. The study found that women headed 87% of the households. Eighty-two percent of the heads of households lived in CHA housing for more than 10 years. Fifty-two percent of the households reported annual incomes of less than \$5,000 and only 23% of the heads of households reported employment (Popkin et al., 2003).

The information from the study (Popkin et al., 2003) suggests that the majority of the population spent a significant amount of time living in this development. Three-quarters of the households reported living in the neighborhood for more than ten years, 82% have also lived in CHA public housing for more than 10 years, and 72% lived in Wells/Madden for more than 10 years. More than 85% of the residents were women (Popkin et al., 2003). This suggests that the makeup of residents were single mothers who were unemployed and lived on government assistance. Around 40% of the households surveyed reported having someone with some sort of

disability living in the household (Popkin et al., 2003). This fact largely contributed to the low incomes of many of the households in the development.

A significant number of households surveyed were in serious violations of the terms of the lease. Some common lease violations reported included unpaid rent, unpaid utilities, and drug arrests or convictions. The residents that were in violation of the lease had a greater chance of not being selected to reside in the new development. According to Popkin et al. (2003) over 120 households reported having at least one violation and 14% of that number reported having three or more. The three most common violations were unpaid bills, household members with criminal records, and unpaid rent.

The Ida B. Wells Homes accounts for three census tracts in an area known as the Douglas Community Area. According to the 1990 census, 93% of the Douglas Community Area was African-American (S. Newsome, personal communication, February 15, 2008). “The Douglas Area has the seventh highest poverty rate and the eighth highest percentage of children living in poverty among Chicago’s 77 Community Areas. Between 1993-1995, Douglas residents had the second highest infant mortality rate, rates of low infant birth weights ranked among the 10 highest in Chicago communities” (J. Caffrey, personal communication, January 11, 2008). The dropout rate in the development was around 59.6% (F. Dawson, personal communication, January 4, 2008). Madden Park in its entirety is located in the Oakland Community Area. The Oakland Community Area in 1990 had the highest unemployment and poverty rate in the city. The median income in this area in 1990 was only \$5,069 annually, representing only 19% of the city’s median income (T. Preckwinkle, personal communication, February 8, 2008; J. Caffrey, personal communication, January 11, 2008). According to the 2000 Census of the 952 people living in Census Tract 3603 (where Ida B. Wells Homes is located), 125 households had a

reported income of less than \$10,000 (U.S. Census, 2008). The median household income for that area in 1999 was \$11,563 (U.S. Census, 2008).

Transformation Begins

In 2000, the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) received 35 million dollars from the HOPE VI grant program for the revitalization of 90 acres the Ida B. Wells, Wells Extension, Madden Park Homes, and the Clarence Darrow Homes collectively known as Oakwood Shores (HUD, 2007). The original developments offered over 3,200 public housing units on 94 acres of land. The redevelopment scheduled to take place in five phases over a seven-year period planned for 3,000 housing units with only 1,000 being public housing units. The other 2,000 units planned to include market rate, affordable rentals, and a number of units within each income tier of housing (Levy & Gallagher 2006, p. 1).

Oakwood Shores HOPE VI project is a collaboration led by The Community Builders (TCB), Chicago Housing Authority, HUD, Granite Asset Management, Ujima, Inc., and the existing residents. The developers for the first phase of this multi-phase redevelopment plan are Oakwood Boulevard Associate, Community Builders, Granite Development, and Thrush Companies. TCB is the lead developer for rental units and managing member of the development team. Granite Asset Management leads the development of for-sale units and Ujima focuses on the social services aspect including resident outreach and workforce development.

The Oakwood Shores development is located in the Near South Side Community near the Bronzeville area. Oakwood Shores' boundary area includes 26th Street to the north and 47th Street to the south, Lake Michigan to the east and Interstate 90/94 to the west (Figure 4-2). Oakwood Shores is in close proximity to Lake Michigan and Burnham Park. Oakwood Shores is

located just east of the five-mile stretch of public housing that included the Robert Taylor Homes, the largest public housing development in the world.

In the fiscal year 2005, the CHA broke ground on the Oakwood Shores development Phase 1B after the successful completion of Phase 1A. Phase 1 consists of 21 low-rise apartments with backyards and alleyways. Oakwood Shores, Ida B. Wells, Madden Park, and Darrow Home's successor development is located in Bronzeville a historic neighborhood located near Lake Michigan. From the 1940s-1960s Bronzeville was an area that attracted thousands of African-Americans that migrated to Chicago in hopes of a better life. Bronzeville was the center of the black metropolis and the place thousands of African-Americans decided to call home during the Great Migration (MacArthur Foundation, 2007). Bronzeville was an area that represented a close-knit community of working middle and upper class African-Americans. Many believe that urban renewal and the addition of more low-income units during the 1960s was the catalyst for the downward spiral of the community (S. Newsome, personal communication, February 15, 2008). The high concentration of public housing, crime, and poverty tore the very foundation of the neighborhood. The property value decreased dramatically and the number of abandoned buildings increased as did demolition and tax delinquencies. This HOPE VI transformation was an opportunity to restore this historic neighborhood.

As of September 30, 2007, Oakwood Shores had 63 total units with eleven of the units occupied by 30 residents with one real estate transaction (Phase 2A) scheduled to take place in the 2008 fiscal year (F. Dawson, personal communication, January 4, 2008). According to the CHAs Moving to Work 2008 report released in December 2007, approximately eight of the for-sale units are to be public housing units, 127 market-rate units, and ten affordable units (Figure 4-1). The CHA intends to build 900 planned units FY 2008 thru FY 2015. These units will

include town houses, single-family homes, row houses, and condominiums (CHA, 2007). Phase 2A includes construction of an additional 199 units of which 81 are public housing units, 61 are affordable, and 57 are market-rate units (F. Dawson, personal communication, January 4, 2008).

Many affluent African-Americans are relocating back to the area to work to rebuild the area into “Old Bronzeville”. Old Bronzeville in many ways represented a “mixed-income” development. The new development hopes to recreate the traditional Chicago Street and alley pattern and incorporate landscaped boulevards, public parks, and pedestrian walks (MacArthur Foundation, 2007). Property values are increasing due to the transformation. The median home price was \$269,100 as of January 2007, which shows an 11.35% increase over the previous year (Chicago Home Estates, 2008).

CHA Today

The Chicago Housing Authority after a five-year take over by HUD is now one of the nation’s most ambitious housing authorities with the passage of its plan for transformation. Prior to this plan Alderman Toni Preckwinkle described CHAs management of Ida B. Wells as a “disgrace” and “deplorable” (T. Preckwinkle, personal communication, February 8, 2008). Though not perfect, the CHA has been successful in improving countless lives. According to Lewis A. Jordan, the Chief Executive Officer of the Chicago Housing Authority, 9,400 senior housing projects are at completion, and the CHA has helped more than 4,000 residents find jobs (J. Caffrey, personal communication, January 11, 2008). Those working closely with revitalization efforts in Chicago believe that the new direction the CHA is taking in handling public housing provides a great opportunity to correct many of the mistakes made in the past.

Lessons learned from Chicago

Although Chicago is a larger city than Atlanta, it faced many of the same obstacles but a few lessons were unique to the Chicago transformation:

Lesson 1: Housing authorities must be aware of gang activities

Many of the residents were distrusting and were apprehensive about buying into the redevelopment. Chicago like Atlanta rallied support by holding meetings that involved the residents and greater community. One situation that the development team dealt with the locations of the meetings; a great number of the public housing residents did not attend certain meetings because they were located in a rival gang area. Community leaders and residents combated this situation by hosting all meetings at a local church, which was located in a neutral zone.

Lesson 2: Unite public housing residents with community

The housing authority and community leaders worked to unify the public housing residents and the greater community. In the beginning, the housing authority would host two separate meetings, one for public housing residents and one for the rest of the community. This caused great division and further added to the negative stigma associated with public housing residents. Initially when the housing authority held the combined meetings, many of the residents were afraid to speak because they did not know how the rest of the community would view them because they lived in the public housing development. Later this changed and the meetings served as a way to help residents build connections and a sense of community.

Conclusions

While it is still very early into the construction of Oakwood Shores there are some remarkable lessons that this project offers. The CHAs Plan for Transformation is extremely ambitious and builds on the “Atlanta Model”. One of the major problems that Chicago faced was a high concentration of gang activity that divided the community. Policy makers must be aware of the culture and issues that a community faces if they want to have higher levels of resident participation. In Chicago, a reoccurring theme was removing the negative stigma

associated with being a public housing resident while promoting economic self-sufficiency. Bridging the gap between public housing residents and the rest of the community was incredibly essential to the future success of the development. This facilitated public housing residents in developing the sense that they were actively participating in the decision making process. This united community removed many of the fears and uncertainty that were on the minds of the public housing residents. Chicago Housing Authority did an excellent job in transforming from one of the worst public housing authorities in the country to a model housing authority.

Table 4-1: Techwood vs. Centennial Place Overview

	Techwood	Centennial Place
HUD Funding		\$42 million
Total Public Housing Units	1,195	360 public housing 311 market-rate 126 tax-credits
Development Team		AHA, HUD, McCormack Baron and Associates, Inc., and the Integral Group, LLC
Amenities	1 st Public Housing Development in U.S. Close to Public Transportation Close to Downtown	\$13 million Centennial Place Elementary School Community Room Pool Tot Lots YMCA
3 bedroom market-rate		\$1520/month

Source: R. White, personal communication, February 18, 2008



Figure 4-1 Centennial Place Boundaries

Source: Google Maps, 2008. Retrieved March 31, 2008 from,
<http://maps.google.com/maps?ie=UTF-8&hl=en&tab=wl>

Table 4-2: Ida B. Wells vs. Oakwood Shores Overview

	Ida B. Wells	Oakwood Shores
HUD Funding		\$42 million
Total Public Housing Units	3,320 (including Madden and Darrow Homes)	1,000
Development Team		CHA, HUD, TCB, Thrush Companies, Granite Asset Management, and Ujima Inc.
Amenities	1 st development built for African-Americans in Chicago Largest Demonstration built under PWA Close to Lake Michigan	Lake Michigan Historic African-American Neighborhood Traditional Chicago Street Pattern Public Parks Pedestrian Friendly
3 bedroom market-rate		\$864-\$1300

Source: J. Caffrey, personal communication, January 11, 2008



Figure 4-2 Oakwood Shores Phase 1 Boundary

Source: Google Maps, 2008. Retrieved March 31, 2008 from <http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&tab=w1>

CHAPTER 5 ANALYSIS

After comparing the similarities and differences between each development outlined in the two case studies, the following lessons were learned:

- HOPE VI funding must be continued
- Community support through public participation is essential
- Public/Private partnerships work

Lesson 1: HOPE VI Funding Must Be Continued

In both case studies, the common theme shared by the development teams was the overwhelming desire to improve the physical conditions of the development while improving the economic conditions of the residents. HOPE VI is a success primarily because it is one of the only public housing programs that places focus on promoting economic self-sufficiency. As many local housing agencies and HUD are becoming less and less interested in continuing public housing, public housing authorities are helping prepare residents for the inevitable end of public housing. HOPE VI is excellent because it helps public housing residents integrate into the greater society through mixed-income developments.

The argument shared by many critics that HOPE VI has served its purpose and therefore should be discontinued is a fatally flawed argument. The problems of distressed public housing and poor quality of life for residents can not be solved with a one time solution. These problems need continual attention and support for which HOPE VI is the answer. The federal government must make a commitment to continue funding HOPE VI and creating similar programs to maintain an adequate stock of affordable housing.

The observations that the stakeholders in Chicago and Atlanta made about the importance of continuing HOPE VI highlight how critical HOPE VI is to the future of public housing. Without HOPE VI funding many public housing revitalization projects would be unable to reach

completion. The elimination of HOPE VI funding would stifle creativity in developing techniques to help low-income residents. Without the stability provided through HOPE VI funding, PHAs would have to focus more attention securing other sources of funding and not spending that time actually addressing the problems of residents.

Lesson 2: Community Support through Public Participation is Essential

One of the major obstacles that each project faced was getting the support of the residents in the community. In the past, HOPE VI projects did not pay enough attention to the needs of residents during the relocation process. Residents did not receive the proper assistance when trying to enter the private rental market causing many to face homelessness. This caused many residents to become apprehensive of any government funded redevelopment. Many residents became accustomed to broken promises and felt that the housing authority would not be sensitive to their needs and concerns during the planning and implementation processes. Today many forward thinking housing authorities like the AHA and CHA have learned from the errors of the past, and now have policies in place that ensure the housing authority does more to address relocation services for the displaced residents.

Under HOPE VI PHAs are obligated to maintain resident councils to stimulate more public participation. Collaboration between the PHA and residents in the development to create a shared vision, reoccurring communication, and information-sharing is the key to getting full participation and support from residents. If for any reason, residents feel excluded it is the responsibility of the PHA to take measures to ensure that the resident's feelings and concerns are properly addressed. While it is naïve to believe that every resident will participate, it is important that every resident is given the opportunity to do so.

After countless criticisms of HOPE VI redevelopment projects, many public housing authorities have developed plans to that include more resident participation at all stages. The

belief is that by rallying more community support the transition of revitalization typically runs smoother. In both case studies in the beginning of the revitalization, there was much resistance and a lack of support from the community. Once the public participation increased the housing authority was able to gather more support and the transition became much easier. Atlanta and Chicago are working diligently to keep residents informed and increase resident participation.

Successful HOPE VI revitalization depends on the community backing the change. If the housing authority shuts citizens out this phase, there will be serious repercussions such as lawsuits and other forms of protest. One way that housing authorities can gain the trust and support of the residents is to hold the housing authority more accountable for their actions and promises. If HUD established a way to supervise housing authorities to guarantee to the residents that the decisions the housing authority and residents make (after receiving HUD approval) will be implemented. Residents would be more likely to give ideas and support the revitalization if they had some sort of legal assurance that if the housing authority does not follow through on the promises they make, the residents have the option of legal recourse.

Lesson 3: Public/Private Partnerships work

One of the major benefits of HOPE VI is the requirement that PHAs match funds. This is beneficial because it requires PHAs to develop partnerships and become more innovative in raising funds. Interviews with the developers and community leaders revealed that there is an overwhelming amount of interest to continue the redevelopment of public housing using the public/private partnership begun under HOPE VI. There is a strong indication that public housing authorities and community leaders are continuing to look for alternative ways to finance public housing due to the constant cuts in funding of HOPE VI projects. The government alone can not finance the redevelopment and management of public housing, thus making public/private partnerships all the more crucial.

HOPE VI has been extremely successful in generating participation in public housing redevelopment from the public and private sectors. Under HOPE VI stipulations, HUD forces housing authorities to collaborate with city officials to strategize on how to handle public housing concerns. This forces local governments to develop partnerships to secure the financial future of HOPE VI redevelopment projects. HOPE VI is able to marry a broad range of interests and resources together all to reach a common goal. In the cases of Centennial Place and Oakwood Shores, the private-public partnership greatly lent itself to the success of these developments. Although federal support of HOPE VI has continued to shrink over the past five years, the impact of HOPE VI has remained strong. HOPE VI is a great example of how the public and private sector can think creatively to improve the quality of life of the residents.

Concluding Analysis

While both the Atlanta and Chicago case studies had a lot of similar experiences during the planning process, both had different complexities that greatly influenced the revitalization process. One complexity that was unique to Chicago was its location in a historic African-American neighborhood. Due to the limited scope in this research this is only minimally explored. However, this fact added an extra level of complexity to the revitalization process in Chicago because of restrictions placed on development in a historic neighborhood. In Atlanta the extra level of complexity was Atlanta's sprawl pattern development. Atlanta's sprawl pattern in many ways led to disinvestment of private developers in the inner city because it was cheaper just to build in the suburbs. There was no incentive for developers to develop near the public housing developments located in the inner city. Finding investors willing to take the risk to invest money in the inner city proved to be quite difficult for the housing authority. Despite these extra complexities both development teams overcame these setbacks by encouraging

community support through public participation and developing public/private partnerships that today serve as model for other HOPE VI projects.

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS

This thesis began on the premise that HOPE VI was a program that Congress needed to continue to fund HOPE VI because of its unprecedented ability to reverse the years of isolation of low-income residents, all while improving the physical conditions of public housing and the economic condition of the residents. The review of public housing literature in chapter 2 and a discussion of the Atlanta and Chicago case studies in chapters 4 and 5 strongly supported this conclusion. This thesis used the exploratory case study methodology to explicitly investigate the policy implementation strategies used by the Atlanta and Chicago housing authorities. The two central strategies investigated were how the development teams overcame the obstacles faced during the planning process, and how public/private partnerships were instrumental in securing adequate funding. Despite conflicting views on whether or not funding for HOPE VI should be continued, most would agree that HOPE VI has successfully revitalized many of the nation's most distressed public housing. However, the most impressive accomplishment of HOPE VI is its ability to improve the economic conditions of public housing residents. In the two case studies investigated in this thesis, it was abundantly clear that high concentrations of poverty produced many problems that in many ways limited the opportunities available to residents. Using HOPE VI as the primary funding source served as a catalyst for attracting investment in historically underinvested areas. While HOPE VI is not a perfect program, it is one that needs to be continued. As countless families are continuing to drown in debt, government intervention is becoming increasingly more necessary. People deserve to not only have a place to live, but a place that is safe and sanitary. HOPE VI ensures that those who may not ordinarily be able to afford a decent place to live are able to do so.

Unlike public housing from the past that was similar to a holding cell, HOPE VI developments have higher design standards and have better management. HOPE VI has given low-income residents the opportunity to relocate to a cleaner and safer environment that previously excluded them. HOPE VI levels the playing field in housing. Over the past sixteen years HOPE VI has created an environment in which public housing authorities are able to think creatively how to revitalize and manage public housing. Atlanta and Chicago are two cities from which public housing authorities across the country can look to for knowledge.

This research focused on policy implementations strategies used by the Atlanta and Chicago Housing Authorities, but because of limited resources and time, there is a lot of potential for further investigation. Additional research seems necessary to examine the full range of strategies used by both development teams as well as by other housing authorities in other across the country. Contributions to HOPE VI research can be made through more stakeholder interviews and monitoring the progress for a longer period. There are countless ways to monitor the successes of HOPE VI mixed-income developments; however, this thesis was only able to assess it through interviews with parties actively involved in the revitalization. This thesis only touches the surface of policy implementation strategies.

APPENDIX A
CONSENT FORM

Dear _____:

I am a graduate student at the University of Florida. As part of my thesis research, I am conducting an interview, the purpose of which is to learn about any problems or successes during the HOPE VI revitalization process. I am asking you to participate in this interview because you have been identified as a highly knowledgeable person and or directly involved in the HOPE VI revitalization efforts. Interviewees are asked to participate in an interview lasting no longer than 45 minutes. The schedule of questions is enclosed with this letter. You will not have to answer any question you do not wish to answer. Your interview will be conducted by phone or at your office after I have received a copy of this signed consent from you in the mail. With your permission, I would like to audiotape this interview. Only I will have access to the tape, which I will personally transcribe, removing any identifiers during transcription. The tape will then be erased.

There are no anticipated risks, compensation or other direct benefits to you as a participant in this interview. You are free to withdraw your consent to participate and may discontinue your participation in the interview at any time without consequence.

If you have any questions about this research protocol, please contact me at 708-539-7959 or my faculty supervisor, Dr. Joseli Macedo at 352 3920997 (461). Questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant rights may be directed to the IRB02 office, University of Florida, Box 112250, Gainesville, FL 32611; (352) 392-0433.

Please sign and return this copy of the letter in the enclosed envelope. A second copy is provided for your records. By signing this letter, you give me permission to report your

responses anonymously in the final manuscript to be submitted to my faculty supervisor as part of my course work.

Amanda Montgomery

I have read the procedure described above for the School Curriculum Interview assignment. I voluntarily agree to participate in the interview and I have received a copy of this description.

Signature of participant Date

I would like to receive a copy of the final "interview" manuscript submitted to the instructor. YES / NO

APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. How were you involved in the HOPE VI revitalization project?
2. What were the conditions of the development prior to the HOPE VI revitalization process?
3. What were the anticipated outcomes of the HOPE VI revitalization project?
4. What were some of the obstacles faced during the planning process/policy implementation for the revitalization?
5. What measures were taken to address these obstacles?
6. Was the community in support of the revitalization efforts?
7. After the completion of the project, how did the community react to the new development?
8. How has the new development affected the community today?
9. Do you believe that the revitalization was a success?
10. What recommendations would you make to future HOPE VI revitalization projects?

APPENDIX C
INTERVIEWEES

Atlanta:

Dr. Larry Keating Professor Emeritus Georgia Institute of Technology; also served as a consultant to the residents at the Village at Techwood

Rick White Public Relations, Atlanta Housing Authority

Chicago:

Jessica Caffrey Development Manager, Chicago Housing Authority

Felicia Dawson Developer, Community Builders

Shirley Newsome Former Chairmen of the North Kenwood Oakland Conservation Community Council

Toni Preckwinkle Aldermen, Chicago Fourth Ward

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Amanda Montgomery was born in Jackson, Mississippi. After living in over ten cities, Amanda made Gainesville her temporary home while pursuing a Master of Arts in Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Florida. In 2006, Amanda graduated summa cum laude from Bethune Cookman College in Daytona Beach, Florida, with a Bachelor of Arts in political science. While an undergraduate, Amanda served as the president of her chapter of Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority, Inc. Currently, Amanda works as a graduate research assistant at the Shimberg Center for Affordable Housing.

Amanda's future aspirations are to become a public servant that serves as the voice for the under represented segments of the population. Amanda is a firm believer that "To whom much is given, much is expected."