

THE DIFFERENT TIERS OF SOCIAL LIVES IN POLICIES:
POLICY BELIEFS AND DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

By

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To all who nurtured my intellectual curiosity, academic interests, and sense of scholarship
throughout my lifetime, making this milestone possible

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This study showed how specific policy beliefs are influenced by individuals' various levels of general social trust and multi-dimensional social networks such as intensiveness and extensiveness. By analyzing the 2004 General Social Survey, the study found that general social trust and network intensiveness and extensiveness conditionally influence policy beliefs based on various policy types. General social trust reinforces positive attitudes toward redistributive policies for the poor and morality policies on gay rights. Network intensiveness and extensiveness influence supportive tendencies for government regulations on morality policies, but do not do so for other types of policies. In addition, there are no statistical differences between single and multiple network intensiveness and extensiveness on policy beliefs as long as an individual is involved in any type of social network. Although there was a mixture of evidence, the study proved that various elements of social capital influence different policy attitudes.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

There is renewed interest in political science regarding the influence of individuals' social lives on politics. For instance, prominent scholars in the study of social capital, such as Robert Putnam and Margaret Levi, have successfully incorporated a discussion on the effects of social lives within the political sphere. In his depiction of the lonely American isolated from society due to thinning social connections, Putnam (2000) pulled individuals' social lives into the academic arena by examining the impact of social capital, or social networks, and the corresponding norms of trust and reciprocity on the quality of community and political life. Similarly, Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi (1998), Karen Cook (2001), and others developed the concepts of communal trust and norms as explanations for social cooperation and efficient government operation. Pamela Conover and Stanley Feldman (1984), and David Boninger, Jon Krosnick, and Matthew Berent (1995) also contributed by uncovering the importance of social groups to an individual's political beliefs.

These scholars used different approaches to introduce the various political implications of individual's social lives. Putnam (2000) argued that social networks, trust, and group norms allow the American society to accomplish collective actions and establish efficient information flow, thus enabling society to overcome selfish social problems. Putnam's long-term study comparing similar political regimes demonstrated that good governments were established by a strong tradition of social networks and a higher level of trust among citizens, rather than by the quality of the government system, party politics, ideology, social stability, political harmony, or population movements (Putnam, 1993).

Karen Cook, Russell Hardin, Margaret Levi, and others have specifically explored the concept of trust and emphasize its importance in a wide variety of social contexts across different

disciplines including philosophy, political science, sociology, history, economics, and psychology. They defined trust as an alternative, informal means of sustaining social cooperation and establishing a better society. Combining normative and empirical studies supported their original hypotheses on the normative role of trust in a society (Russell Sage Foundation). Henri Tajfel and John Turner's (1979) original works on social group attachments and scholars' recent applications of social ties in macro-level studies of society and politics suggested that individuals' psychological attachments to social groups affected their political attitudes toward candidates, forms of government, and behaviors such as voting.

However, there are some critical issues that these scholars have overlooked. First, scholarly works have not yet clarified definitions, ranges, or meanings of social capital. No consensus or agreement exists on the different aspects of social capital despite the fact that theoretical and empirical agreement is necessary to further applications of social capital studies. Many scholars have either narrowed their focus to specific types of social capital or broadened their understanding of social capital void of concrete definitions (Cook, 2001, p.23). Therefore, no concise meaning or consistent measurement of social capital exists in the field.

Secondly, previous studies too often failed to look at the multiple dimensions of social capital. Social capital studies are in the preliminary stages of identifying how various elements of social capital differ from and relate to one another. The majority of scholarly works have not differentiated specific trust from general trust, types of social networks from network extensiveness, reciprocity from trust, and connectedness at the micro-level of the individuals from identity at the macro-level of groups, regions, or states.

For instance, mainstream scholars in the study of trust, such as Cook, Hardin, and Levi, argued the importance of only a specific type of trust in certain contexts, overlooking the

different levels of social connectedness in individuals' lives. Therefore, their studies simply focused on a contextual understanding of social capital. Although some other scholars started to analyze trust as a distinctive concept by looking at situational or contextual trust differently from general social connectedness and even defined several types of trust for ordinary individuals- public incumbents, general public organizations, and political institutions (Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn, 2000)- they did not provide any theoretical reasons or empirical evidence to support how these categories were related to one another or how different levels of trust and other aspects of social norms could be used to predict social and political consequences. Therefore, their works failed to provide a complete explanation of how specific forms of trust at the individual-level are influenced by broader social trust within the political sphere.

In addition, general networks, reciprocity, and trust were treated partially or broadly as representatives of social capital according to the different purposes of each study. Previous scholars did not exhaustively deal with multiple dimensions of social capital and explore how these ideal concepts work together and are interrelated in societal contexts. For instance, scholars in the social capital field view social networks through an even narrower perspective of interpersonal attachment. Such scholars have used different types of social ties in various social and political situations, resulting in studies that are too divergent to predict a coherent pattern of political outcomes using such different perspectives of social capital. In other words, they have not confirmed the overall the pattern linking the various aspects of social capital to a specific political result. There are theoretical and empirical discrepancies that lead to difficulties in explaining what social capital means, how each different element of social capital interacts in the political contexts, and how they are developed into political consequences.

Social networks and trust are two different dimensions of social lives, each of which can be interpreted in many different ways in political processes. Thus, the differing impacts of individuals' social properties on their political beliefs need to be theoretically differentiated. Without defining the concrete dimensions of such concepts, the research will lose the capacity to deliver more accurate predictions (Braithwaite and Levi, 1998, p.69). Despite a number of great scholarly works on social capital, the outlined limitations in understating its multiple implications make the process of defining a firm theoretical approach to the subject more difficult.

The third limitation is that the majority of scholarly research has focused only on the positive or normative side of social capital, although a few insightful scholars, such as Putnam (2000) and Hero (2003) argued the possibility of the negative impacts. Social capital indeed has both positive and negative effects. One side of social ties is individuals' positive attachments to certain groups, while the other side of excessive social group attachment, such as extreme ethnocentrism or chauvinism, could isolate individuals from society. Individuals who discriminate against out-group people in order to protect their own in-group against new information could cause social conflicts and hinder social cooperation (Chong, 2000, pp.88-90). Such bridging and bonding are typical political social scenes (Putnam, 2000). Even Putnam's discussions on social networks and trustworthiness (1993 and 2000) overlooked all specific social and political functions by overemphasizing overall optimistic consequences of social capital (Franklin, 2003, p.352). Many well-known studies have overlooked the conflicting values within social networks by failing to consider or define the multiple connotations of social ties.

The final problem of previous research is a structural disconnect between individual levels of social capital and macro levels of aggregate political consequences. There are theoretical confusions between the two different levels of social capital at the individual and aggregate state, and two different levels of individual political characteristics or aggregate political outcomes. These connections have been vaguely explored without any specification. The majority of previous research in the field dealt with aggregate social capital to predict overall political tendencies and policy choices, ignoring micro level of dynamics. Thus, these studies have struggled in finding a concrete connection between social capital that are initially oriented from the micro-level of the individual and the macro-level of specific political attitudes or choices. More interestingly, none of the previous research has looked at the impact of micro levels of individual social capital on specific policy attitudes systemically as an intermediate process before determining a final policy choice and other political outcomes.

For example, some previous empirical studies, such as Margit Tavits's work on social capital and government performance, measured the links between micro levels of social capital and governmental levels of political dynamics, such as policy activism and administrative efficiency (Tavits, 2006). However, such studies omitted an important connection between the diverse factors of social capital among individuals and the steps leading to policy outcomes. In other words, the reasons of how individual levels of social capital turn out as a consequence at the macro-level were not explained. The discrete measurement of two different micro-levels of social lives and the macro-level of their political outcomes with a single indicator from each level is problematic in answering the continuum level of research question.

In addition, although some studies, such as Oorschot's research on the social connectedness of European welfare states, differentiated various types of social connectedness,

they still retained the separation of micro- and macro-spheres by neglecting individuals' intentions or motivations in state policies and separately analyzing national levels of aggregate public sector outcomes. Putnam's perspectives on social capital in his books *Bowling Alone* (2000) and *Making Democracy Work* (1993) looked at civic engagements or social networks as the core of the individual social elements needed for a successful political system, and considered trustworthiness a part of social networks. However, his research still did not clearly answer the process of how individual levels of social capital could be developed as governmental levels of political outcomes.

To deal with these limitations, my study intends to make an apparent connection between the different aspects of individuals' social capital by attempting to show how these elements of social capital are related to one another while rectifying the discrepancies between various conceptualizations of social capital adopted by scholars in previous research. I also explore the interrelation of various aspects of social capital to create a more reliable pattern and a more consistent understanding of the multidimensional elements of social capital.

In the next step, my study intends to explore the intermediate connection between the micro level of individual social capital and various policy attitudes accordingly. Moreover, instead of regarding social capital as a single conceptual dimension and measuring a one-dimensional relationship between the level of social capital and possible political outcomes, this study presumes differences in individual levels of trust and the various facets of social networks as multi-dimensional components of individuals' social lives that lead to particular political characteristics (Oorschot and Arts, 2005). In other words, it examines the ability of multiple aspects of social capital at the individual level to predict particular policy attitudes rather than

simply connecting individuals and the aggregate political possibility or looking at the effect of a single aspect of social capital on general political outcomes.

Finally, I create a pattern of the relationship between the multiple dimensions of social capital and various policy attitudes by testing how individuals' single or collective social capital elements influence their various political attitudes towards different types of public policy issues. The specific policy attitudes and beliefs are explained through multidimensional social capital at the micro level of the individual. Individuals develop particular attitudes and make various political decisions about different political issues based on the cues they can easily take from the views, preferences, evaluations, and actions of people who are part of their social lives and such a tendency is reflected on larger aggregated political pictures. My study investigates the multiple relationships between social connectedness within individuals' lives and multiple policy beliefs and attitudes as an aggregate factor before policy outcomes. Using the 2004 General Social Survey, the study determines whether different levels and various aspects of social capital shape individuals' various policy beliefs and attitudes about different types of policies.

My study found that different elements of social capital, such as network intensiveness and extensiveness, and levels of general social trust, contribute to different policy attitudes in various ways. Although common elements of social capital occur by inducing positive expectations toward government policies among individuals who are intensively involved in and have extensive social networks or interactions, there are divergent elements of social networks that are contradictory or even negatively influencing different types of policy attitudes. The study confirmed that individuals who are intensively involved in a limited boundary of social networks are less likely to be intensive in other types of social networks and less likely to trust other people beyond their social networks; however, people who engage in multiple social

networks are more likely to engage intensively in any of those social networks, but again, less likely to trust other members of the society.

In terms of redistributive policy attitudes, individuals who have higher levels of general social trust are more likely to support government redistributive policies that would help the ‘have-nots’, however, social networks did not have a significant influence on such policy attitudes. Moreover, multiple elements of social capital do not have any influence on policy attitudes toward government activism that would often create public good. However, individual social life patterns have a strong influence on policy attitudes toward government morality policies on issues like abortion and gay rights. As long as individuals engage in any type of social network, they tend to support government regulations on abortion and gay issues, placing greater values on social morality over an individuals’ freedom to choose. General social trust, however, induces individuals’ preferences on government regulations on gay rights, but not on abortion.

These tendencies are still consistent when the relationships between social capital at the individual level and policy attitudes are explored separately under different regional levels of social capital. Multiple dimensions of social capital at the individual level in regions with either higher or lower levels of social capital identically influence individuals’ policy attitudes overall besides the function of general social trust on morality policy attitudes. There is a stable positive relationship between general social trust and supportive attitudes for different types of morality policies in rich social capital regions, but the tendency becomes insignificant in low social capital regions. Such tendencies are more stable at the regional level than at the individual level where there are more fluctuating policy attitudes across different morality issues.

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter discusses the definition and multi-dimensional elements of social capital. Different elements of social capital, such as network intensiveness (bonding), network extensiveness (bridging), and generalized social trust, have different political implications and functions, and have both positive and negative features of general political and policy effects. Therefore, I explore the components of social capital and their political implications on multiple policies more closely using previous scholarly research.

Dimensions of Social Capital

Definitions of social capital

Scholars have looked at how individuals interact and what those interactions mean within communities, demographic groups, or other political boundaries. Originally, Lyda Hanifan used the notion of social capital for individuals' communal interactions. For Hanifan, social connectedness interactions are "tangible substances [that] count for most in the daily lives of people, particularly concerned with the cultivation of good will, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse" (Hanifan, 1961, p.130). Several decades later, Robert Putnam (2000) introduced the concept of reciprocal social relations to political research with greater concerns for declining social networks in American society. According to Putnam, social capital is defined as "connections among individuals- social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them" (Putnam, 2000, p.19). Both the specific and generalized reciprocity and trust that lubricate social and political processes are considered social capital, which has "externalities" that affect the wider community beyond certain boundaries of social networks or specific levels of trust (Putnam, 2000, pp.19-21)

James Coleman (1988) views social capital as “a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of actors” (p.598). Political scholars have used the concept of social capital extensively, associating it with interpersonal social interaction, connectedness, or sense of community to predict desirable political consequences such as positive policy outcomes, active political participation, and economic growth.

Based on the characteristics of social capital that scholars have adopted, previous research can theoretically be categorized into two broad areas: trust and social networks. For researchers in the field of trust, trust is a kind of social connectedness used as a good or commodity that helps members of society accomplish various purposes (Cook, 2001, p.21). General social networks can also be interpreted in different ways such as the genre of associations, extensiveness, or level of attachments. However, there is a blurred understanding of social capital and none of its related concepts are fully defined. Based on the political consequences scholars are looking at, their research has introduced various levels of trust, different aspects of social networks, and some combinations of those two tenets of social connectedness into the study of politics and policies. In general, social capital is “a glue that holds society together” (Serageldin, 1996, p.196), but we need to understand what it does and how it works within a given field of research through a reliable pattern of predictions.

Different Dimensions of Social Capital

Multiple facets of social capital can stimulate and create different political outputs. Although different elements of social capital are reinforced by each other for reciprocity and collective actions, each of them plays a unique role in a society (Serageldin and Grootaert, 2000, p.40). A number of scholars argue that social capital can be approached through dichotomous dimensional tools: the elements of social capital can be structural vs. cognitive (Krishna, 2000),

horizontal vs. vertical (Putnam, 2000; Berman, 1997), heterogeneous vs. homogeneous (Portney and Berry, 1997; Stolle, 1998), and formal vs. informal (Minkoff, 1997). Some also argue that social capital is determined by the size and volume of social networks (Ihlen, 2005, p494). In addition, social capital can be analyzed not only at the level of the individual, but also at the macro level of groups, societies, or nations.

Scholars in the field of social capital have their own ways of viewing or measuring social capital. For Putnam social capital is more likely to be based on horizontally organized formal social networks, but for Newton (1997, p.582), social capital is more likely to be based on informal social group networks. For Krishna (2000), cognitive elements of mutual collectivism are different from the systemic structures that help such mutual actions (Bastelaer and Grootaert, 2002, p.19-22). There is no theoretical agreement among scholars on the meaning of social capital, but an increasing the number of studies on social capital means that the theories will get more sophisticated and specific.

All possible macro-level political consequences depend on the dynamics of various social capital issues on the micro-level of individuals. The field of social capital can be split broadly into two schools based on the level of approach (whether research focuses on individuals or groups) and the direction of approach (whether research focuses network intensiveness, extensiveness, trust, or other substantive elements).

Social networks: theoretical understandings & empirical evidence

At the micro level of the individual's connectedness: Just as the definition and dimensions of social capital are controversial, the theme of same level social networks has been explored through different theoretical perspectives. Social networks at the individual level have been seen through the effects of psychological group attachment or individual social interaction with people who interact with each other in their daily lives. According to Conover (1988) and

Chong (2000), the degree to which social networks matter in political thinking differs based on how much each individual likes or dislikes certain groups and how much each individual identifies him- or herself with certain groups (Conover, 1988, p.54). Some scholars, like Huckfeldt and Sprague (1993), however, defined contextual concepts of social networks through individual physical interaction rather than cognitive attachment and examined the personal political choices according to the situational contacts.

Huckfeldt and Sprague argued that “individual political preference is not a simple function of individual characteristics alone, but rather the complex product of an individual’s own characteristics and predispositions of other surrounding individuals” (p.366). Individuals’ political lives extend far beyond self-evaluated partisanship. People place themselves in neighborhoods, churches, workplaces, clubs, and associations, “they make these situational choices for good reasons on rational grounds . . . , [and these] multidimensional social structures and exposures carry a political implication” (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1993, pp.374, 380). This approach emphasized the effect of social networks on individual level choices.

Conover was talking about people’s attachments to groups at large, for instance; Blacks, women, and Catholics, rather than groups that people actually see and talk with, which is what Huckfeldt and Sprague referred to. Members of various groups are often likely to pay attention to different things in the same political context. Individuals tend to evaluate others according to different criteria, and they will adopt different perspectives when making judgments and decisions on policy matters. “Group identification . . . [fundamentally] shape[s] how people look at politics . . . [because] group identifiers differ in their viewpoints, it is expected that they will evaluate public policies differently and subsequently assume distinct positions on issues” (Conover, 1984, pp. 763-4, 770). Conover argued that an emotional closeness to certain social

groups initiate “political thinking on issues where the group cues are explicit and salient” (1988, p.61).

Social attachments to groups or communities serve to form political thought and behavior. Individuals’ cultural norms, values, and group identification within a given society accumulate in the political process over time. Conover’s theoretical model (1988) demonstrated successive information-filtering processes in long-term political attitude formation through social networks. According to this model, issue preference is established in the following order: accumulated social, biological, and cultural factors influence individual perceiver’s characteristics; these particular characteristics influence perceptions of outgroup, ingroup, self, and/or policy related information; these perceptions influence evaluation of the issue through identity associations; and the evaluations determine their issue preference (p.59).

As another example of individuals’ psychological social attachments, Chong showed political conflicts caused by resistant social connectedness against rational choice through residents of a Texas community who needed to decide whether to compromise their long-term emotional attachment to a political culture in exchange for business development that would create jobs and fuel the local economy (Chong, 2000). His study proved that the strongly tied, long-term group networks among the people of the community constrained their rational political choices and shaped the pattern of their regional economic development.

Individuals’ micro levels of social construction define their boundaries of political information and perceptions on political issues (Huckfeldt, et al., 1995). Several studies have illustrated different processes of policy perception and decision making using ranges of particular social mobilization at the individual level, be they ideological bonds, socio-economic ties, or just physical closeness within a given political boundary (Baker 1990; Erikson, McIver,

and Wright, 1987). Individuals who share relevant ideas within a group share similarities in their political issues, and thereby provide guidance for policy makers by expressing homogeneous desirability (Schneider and Jacoby, 2005, p.377). Therefore, levels of network intensiveness, such as how actively, strongly, or intensively an individual engages in social networks, determine various policy attitudes accordingly. Such community or individual level-focused government approaches can be an efficient way to deal with public issues (Coppola, 2000).

At the macro level of group associations: Although there are a significant number of studies looking at social networks at the individual level of differences in predicting political attitudes and behaviors, there are more noticeable studies on social networks at the aggregate level of group and political entities. In predicting political outputs, these macro-level theoretical approaches to social networks look at the phenomena through a cultural, societal, or political group rather than through the individual. These theoretical approaches portray social influence as the product and residue of close and intimate ties, and thus it becomes a precondition for political influence (Huckfeldt, Beck, Dalton, and Levine, J., 1995, pp.1025-27).

Several studies have found that different group memberships initiate different levels of political attitudes and different forms of political involvement. For instance, members of unions, farm associations, Greek associations, and church groups are less likely to be tolerant to a variety of policies than non-members. And union memberships influence individual members' political attitude more strongly than general community-type organizations (Cigler and Joslyn, 2002, p.15).

Kwak, Shan, and Holbert (2004) also observed that association with religious attendance, public attendance, or informal socializing results in different degrees of influence on civic engagements. Among those three types of associations, public attendance is the strongest

indicator for active civic participation. Letki (2004) looked at the three distinct dimensions of social organizations, professional/lifestyle organizations, and labor organizations during democratization in East-Central Europe. He found that community associations are the most significant indicator among the three dimensions of social interactions for active democratic activities.

Additionally, group-level political tendencies were explored through various group-based applications. A previous exit poll survey predicted political candidate popularity by assuming “group voting.” Individuals within a group, who share norms and beliefs based on ethnicity, gender, or religion, invariably have a tendency to like or dislike a political candidate (Conover and Feldman, 1984). For example, religious attachment is an important predictor for electoral political activities and political protest activities. Strong religious traditionalists are against liberal political movements such as gay rights and pro-choice legislation, so people in this group tend to hesitate to vote for liberal Democratic Party candidates.

Furthermore, while there are some regional variations, White Americans are more likely to be religious and less likely to engage in high-level political activity or protests, and they are more conservative than ethnic minority groups on social and morality public issues (DeLeon and Naff, 2004, pp.703 and 712). Different types of social networks and their standards for belonging relate to each other in different ways of political tendency and preferences (Stolle and Rochon, 2001).

Socio-economic categories representative of individual economic and social status also create homogenous policy attitudes. According to Thomas Nelson and Donald Kinder’s study, welfare beneficiaries as a group tended to interpret government support in terms of morality, and have highly positive attitudes toward government assistance. General Americans’ attitudes on

“poverty policy, federal spending on AIDS and affirmative action in employment and educational settings reflect the degree of their importance to different social groups and the broadness of social engagements. Group sentiment is a primary ingredient in public opinion” (Nelson and Kinder, 1996, p.1071). Political arguments about group images that spotlight certain social groups often activate people’s stereotypes and prejudices towards the spotlighted group. Such group sentiments then become the main clue for people to evaluate group-relevant public policy in terms of “the cost and effectiveness of the proposed policy or the principles the policy might advance” (Nelson and Kinder, 1996, p.1071-1074).

Different cities choose particular types of social services or civic inter-group programs based on race, religion, or socio-economic status. Depending on the particular groups and social networks that exist within a political boundary, policy makers need to devise different tools to reflect what the public wants. Such a community composition is crucial for political processes and the aspect is adopted in several studies on government in which the research proves that community-friendly approaches are a cost-efficient means for public development (Walsh, 2006).

Moreover, James Gibson (2001) emphasized the roles of heterogeneous weak social ties, which are relationships beyond family boundaries, during democratic transitions in Russia, Spain, and Hungary. He found that the larger the heterogeneous social networks are, the more easily they benefit the social and political movements at the national level (p.59). In addition, the extensive social location of groups in issue networks affects the information available to them about potential partners and the desirability of particular alliances. Groups of people in ranges of social networks have aggregate policy desirability and a better level of policy efficacy than people outside of certain networks. Interest groups especially, are formed through previous

interpersonal networks, and the networks become the basis of alliances to build a route of access to the government (Heaney, 2004).

Casey (2002) found a moderate correlation between social capital and states' economic performance. Putnam (2000) also added empirical evidence to the literature by proving that broad social networks are positively correlated to the macro level of state outcome in low crime rate, high economic prosperity, and a better child welfare system. Hetherington and Globetti (2002) argued that general reciprocity through multiple social networks is a significant indicator of state government performance by establishing greater accountability and efficiency for government (p.272).

Margit Tavits (2006) measured the link between extensive social networks and government performance by comparing Germany and the U.S. Her approach targeted the national levels of social capital and the governments' levels of policy activism and administrative efficiency. The study found that for both countries the level of trust, volunteerism, membership, and informal socializing were positive indicators for policy activism although they did not matter for administrative efficiency.

Overall, the factor of how broadly or extensively an individual engages in types of social networks determines homogeneous political attitudes among members of a group, or groups, and influences the macro-level of government policy outcomes. These approaches provide important tools for the present study to observe social capital across different levels of single or multiple group networks at an aggregate level by creating theoretical connections at multiple levels of social and political interactions.

General social trust: Theoretical understandings & empirical evidence

At the micro level of individual confidence on general members of society: Unlike general social networks, trust is a socially oriented emotional tie that creates a collective identity

(Braithwaite and Levi, 1998, p.378). It is a positive expectation on others in doing particular things based on belief or knowledge rather than as a category of action and behavior (Cook, 2001, pp. 7, 10). More importantly, trust is a cognitive process of moral commitments and expectations (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 2000). In social life, “trust sources include familiarity, reliable information, and generalizations based on experience with similar actors, on-going interactions, and confidence in the constraints provided by institutions” (Braithwaite and Levi, 1998, p.376). This multi-functional trust is dealt with as another component of social capital in political applications in many studies.

There have been some disagreements about levels of trust, however. Recent scholars tend to narrow down concepts of trust for their own purpose of study. For instance, Uslaner conceptualized trust “as in stranger, not as in people we already know” (Uslaner, 2004, p.502). Other scholars defined trust contextually by saying that “A trusts B to do X” (Braithwaite and Levi, 1998, p.78). For the former scholar, trust is a general and broad concept of cognitive reliance, but for the latter scholar, it is a very specific psychological status in a particular context.

Generally, people with a higher social status and who belong to the ethnic majority tend to have a higher level of social trust than “have-nots” and ethnic minorities. In addition, people from big cities are less likely to trust other people than people from small towns. These tendencies are not inherent characteristics but accumulated from mistrustful experiences with crimes and lies among people who are in a disadvantaged stage in a large, anonymous group. Such a low level of social trust “easily generates vicious spirals” at the aggregate level of the society (Putnam, 2000, p.138).

At the macro level of general social trust: There are also scholarly approaches at the aggregate level of trust. In terms of theoretical approaches, trust is proven as a core concept in normative

social and political practices and it is suggested as an alternative solution for problems in those practices (Cook, 2001, pp.307-20). Trust also often serves as an interesting element for smaller-sector politics at the local or community level. One study investigated neighborhood effects in Texas using trust as a mediator in welfare policy efficacy. The study found that the neighborhood associated with lower trust had lower collective efficacy in health and education policies and higher degrees of fear of crime and racism. Trust was a key factor for the community to be better- or worse-off as a result of the social programs. Therefore, this neighboring effect directly influences a state's particular policy direction (Franzini, et al., 2005).

Some argue that trust in government and political systems benefits democratic political processes. Others argue that individual trust towards people with whom they have only little or no direct interaction contributes to collective action. Theoretically, social trust is different from "trust in institutions and political authorities." Social and political trust may empirically relate to each other, but theoretically should be kept distinct (Putnam, 2000, p.137). Some scholars argue that "with population groups and greater structural differentiation, a great number of social relationships are based on cognitive or general trust rather than on emotional or specific trust" (Lewis and Weigert, 1985, p.973).

There are various ways to conceptualize trust based on where trust activates, the persons who are the targets of trust, and how fluctuating the trustful environment is. To explore trust in its multiple levels of political attitudes and citizenships, we may need to adopt general social trust or generalized expectancy as the core concept; to understand personal interactions we may need to take specific emotional or institutional trust into account. Regardless of whether trust is based on emotional ties among primary groups or cognitive rationality among more extensive

secondary groups, the level of trust contributes to optimistic views towards social systems and allows cooperation to be more easily recognized and proceeded (Putnam, 2000; Scholz, 1998).

Levels of general trust fluctuate throughout political events. Schmierbach, Boyle, and McLeod (2005) observed that increased levels of general trust among Americans after the terrorist attack of September 11th encouraged people's political participation and strengthened conservative policy preferences and ideology among American citizens, meaning that American citizens were more likely to support President Bush's conservative policies and religious values (pp.333, 341).

The trust level among a general group in an emergent national situation determines or creates different political environments for the political actors. During the peak of a trust mood, people were more likely to cooperate with national-level decisions and evaluate the outcomes of government policies in a positive way. Such a surge in social connectedness creates active and cooperative political attitudes among citizens, at least for a short time (Schmierbach, Boyle, and McLeod, 2005).

Another study on 31 non-metropolitan Michigan residential units found that the differential ability of political sectors to realize mutual trust and solidarity was a major source for measuring residential units' variations in determining their political needs. Therefore, several policy recommendations were endorsed based on resources of social connectedness, especially trust, which could help to facilitate collective efficacy for improving citizens' life quality in specific political sections (Cancino, 2005).

The macro level of general social trust within political boundaries is highly related to social equality and active government actions for the citizens. John Scholz and Mark Lubell (1998) found that both types of trust in government and other citizens provided conditions for a

collective solution, thus were more likely to lead to a better outcome such as tax compliance. According to Bo Rothstein and Eric Uslaner (2005), countries with a high level of social trust have higher levels of economic equality and more opportunities for individuals within the political boundary, and their governments are more active in their social policies, such as education and health.

Overall, there are specific tenets of social networks and trust, and they not only share some commonality and reinforce each other's social and political functions, but also lessen the function of other tenets. According to Gibson (2001), members of social networks are more likely to trust others and think that others trust them. Political cooperation is not likely to take place among perfect strangers. In addition, general social networks help convert strangers to friends (p.61). "Social trust and civic engagement are strongly correlated; the greater the density of associational membership in a society, the more trusting its citizens. Trust and engagement are two facets of the same underlying factor - social capital" (Putnam, 1995, p.73).

Yet as Hero (2003) argues, a high level of social capital, especially trust from particular groups, can also reduce the positive political outcome for the minority groups. Different social networks are activated by different issues and situations (Shore, 1993). Especially, particular social groups that individuals are more attached to or more deeply controlled by, determine their political preference. Policy attitudes are usually determined by personal orientations (Saris and Sniderman, 2004, p.95). Therefore, specific categorizations and different consequences of various levels of trust and different aspects of general networks need to be considered in order to conduct more consistent research.

Functions of Social Capital

The Positive Consequences of Social Capital

The majority of scholars present the positive impacts of social capital, assuming that individuals' collective engagement in public sectors is critical for effective economic and societal management and political development, and that interpersonal networks are necessary for satisfactory personal lives in both moralistic and practical benefits. Social capital is particularly more helpful for general social policies over other political or economic policies (Frank, 2003, pp.3-6). However, there are two opposite spill-over effects of social capital, which can be meaningful in varying degrees along a positive-negative continuum (Hazleton and Kennan, 2000, p.84), though it is theoretically and empirically more likely to veer toward the positive side. Let's discuss the optimistic understanding of social capital first.

At the micro level of social capital: Social capital makes more knowledge and information available for individuals in a network web, and thus helps individuals to be more efficient to cooperate with and behave among other members of a society. Thus, those with high social capital are more likely to be 'hired, housed, healthy, and happy than others who have no social connections', thus have more possibilities to relive from welfare program (Woolcock, 2001, p.68)

One study found that locally-oriented businesses, civic organizations, and churches can have positive effects on individuals' personal satisfactions (Tolbert, 2005). The study also illustrated how a community's ability to satisfy residents in terms of school systems, sanitary issues, or safety is highly related to civic involvement and active community networks (Keele, 2003). For instance, social capital within a company helps individuals develop "speed training, improve employee morale, and enhance loyalty to the company" (Putnam, 2000, p.320). In

addition, general interaction helps individuals' physical and mental health and wellbeing within a given community (Putnam, 2000, pp.288-89)

Ethnic networks often work as employment networks and business connections, especially within immigrant groups. For instance, Chinese immigrants often dominate certain services or industries through highly developed internal networks in big cities. Likewise, Korean business owners tend to initiate their careers through family connections or support. Thus, social ties within certain groups help individuals' economic wellbeing (Putnam, 2000, p.320).

Beyond ethnic group boundaries, individuals in a society tend to obtain jobs through the people around them. In fact, church groups and neighborhoods are the very foundation for individuals' social and economic activities (Putnam, 2000, p.321). Highly committed neighborhoods stabilize family lives by reducing incidents of misbehavior among family members. If parents know other parents with children attending the same school as their children, kids are more likely to be actively engaged in class. Furthermore, caring neighborhoods reduce drug use and teenage vandalism (Putnam, 2000, 314-15)

Allan Cigler and Mark Joslyn discovered that the extent of group affiliations is positively correlated with political tolerance towards social policies. Individuals who are more involved in voluntary associations tend to understand different viewpoints with greater ease. Although some variances according to group-type exist, memberships in multiple group associations also increase political tolerance towards various social issues (Cigler and Joslyn, 2002).

In sum, at the micro-level, social networks and trust enable community members to contribute to society as a whole. More importantly, social capital provides 'non-economic solutions' to any social issues (Portes, 1998)

At the macro-level of social capital: At the macro-level, intertwined networks and aggregate trust create healthy communities in terms of social and political improvement. Social capital does not work by one direction flow. Rather, it is achieved through links and relationships of two way flow between top and bottom (Glaeser, 2001, pp.39-40). Putnam argues that social networks among citizens act as a civic virtue in civil society and contain a set of predetermined connotations of economic efficiency and political benefits at the macro-level of state and national politics. The aggregate level of a community's ability to conduct collective activities is positively related to the successfulness of all governmental-level of social, political, economic programs (Putnam, 2000).

In Putnam's comparative study of Italian regional governments, he found that successful regional political entities had stronger civic engagements, integrity, and more active community organizations compared to the failed other local governments. Such civic involvements, social solidarity, and networks are accumulated as economic and political assets, and thus can help political systems be more successful and economic development more efficient (Putnam, 1993).

Social networks and associations help citizens resolve collective problems easily, allow communities to advance smoothly, develop character traits that are good for the rest of society (Putman, 2000, pp.288-90), foster robust norms of reciprocity, facilitate communication, improve the flow of information, and stabilize collaboration (Putnam, 1993, pp.173-74). In addition, levels of social networks among citizens bring minorities into society, and as a result, help ensure a more inclusive and flourishing democracy (Wolbrecht and Hero, 2005).

More specifically, studies show that social networks are relevant to several types of public policy, such as education and health programs. In particular, information sharing, lower transition costs, low turnover rates, and greater coherence of action are optimal situations for

maintaining social progress with minimal effort and governmental costs (Cohen and Prusak, 2001, p.10). The existing social networks save a lot of cost for the government to build new routes or frameworks to allocate resources to the society (Productivity Commission, 2003, p.56). Social capital itself produces collective well-being, enhances confidence in political institutions, naturally reduces crime rates, and accelerates government performance (Brehm and Rahn, 1997, p.1000; Coleman, 1988; Fukuyama, 1995; Knack, 2002).

Furthermore, extensive civic engagement from citizens provides “free spaces” for political discussions and the sharing personal ideals that would directly influence decision-making processes (Barakso, 2005). As an example, the city of Omaha, Nebraska actually provided a civic engagement program that encourages neighborhood associations to register formal documents and get involved in several city projects in order to deal with community issues more effectively. All city issues, such as natural disaster emergency management, landscaping projects, clean water, and energy problems, have been handled with a great efficiency in a shorter time period compared to other cities’ local government management processes without such devices (Fahey and Landow, 2005).

Another facet of social capital, interpersonal and societal trust, also enhances the democratic process (Almond and Verba, 1963). Democracy is an institution that allows citizens to make judgments not only about political platforms but also about the trustworthiness of people. Trust in democracy allows people to believe in each other and is therefore necessary for an effective political environment (Braithwaite and Levi, 1998, p.69). Some argue that social assurance and confidence between individuals and institutions is an essential element to building a civil society, creating invisible ties between general public and social institutions (Inglehart

1997; Mishler and Rose, 1997), as well as a shared set of values, virtues, and expectations among members of a society (Beem, 1999, p.20).

Robert Axelrod (1984) showed how repeated trust among actors benefit given political structures and maximize resources through empirical game exercises. Trust reduces the social and economic complexity caused by rational predictions of individuals' interactions. Rather than calculating rational outcomes, trust creates "a simple and confidence basis" (Lewis and Weigert, 1985, p.969). Social trust contributes to social equality and encourages government actions on education, health care, labor-market opportunities, and gender equality (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005).

The Negative Consequences of Social Capital

There are a significant numbers of scholars who remain suspicious about the potentials of social capital. Depending on the different properties of social networks and trust, whether relationship boundaries are exclusive or inclusive, or the structure of a relationship is hierarchical or horizontal, there are possibilities of negative effects of social capital (Dasgupta and Serageldin, 2000, p.47). In addition, political conservatism within elements of social capital can also be a negative impact on liberal policy applications (Portes, 1998).

At the micro level of individual complexity: Social capital can disturb stable interpersonal activities and does not always benefit every single member of a society. How strongly and broadly an individual interacts with other people in a society determines the degree of the personal level of social capital. Personal ranges of social interrelationships also vary, leading to variations in emotional expectations and physical behavior boundaries. Some individuals tend to take advantage of the high level of social capital around them, but others often face disappointing outcomes from interpersonal relationships because of unwritten rules about reciprocal exchange and different levels of social capital between individuals.

Due to the various levels of social capital in different individuals and groups, it is hard to predict expected outcomes of group activities. Individuals in a society in which there is a high level of social capital can easily violate expected reciprocity after they receive benefits. Trust often creates demanding attitudes towards coworkers when completing given tasks, and unlocks responsibility, thereby causing unnecessary conflicts in collaborative works. Unspecified obligations and unpredictable outcomes with a high level of expectation can problematize task completion and make it hard to achieve social stability (Hazleton and Kennan, 2000, p.85).

Moreover, individuals with an extremely high level of social capital could be even more seriously disappointed and hurt after experiencing betrayal, and individuals who have higher levels of trust tend to expect more from others. When subjective emotional trust has failed, the emotional outrage can be more disastrous and the functional parts of the society become uncontrollable. Therefore, future uncertainty about others' actions and "the violation of particular expectations" after experiencing betrayals lead individuals to become much more distrustful of others than during their initial stage of the interaction with no trust (Lewis and Weigert, 1985, p.971).

Social capital can also create undesirable group attitudes and societal tendencies. Individuals in small towns are highly engaged in their community life, but they are less tolerant of differences and diversities (Putnam, 2000, p.352). Because social capital is often easily established by race, gender, and political affiliations, individuals within such social networks are less likely to understand people from other societal or political sectors. For instance, small communities and highly committed neighborhoods are less tolerant of homosexual teachers and interracial marriages for people of their own communities (Putnam, 2000, p.352-53). A strong

and narrow level of social capital can constrain an individual's freedom to choose (Schudson, 1998).

At the macro-level of political, societal and economic shortcomings: Discussing the NIMBY (“not in my backyard”) movement and the Ku Klux Klan activism of racial discrimination, Putnam admitted that “networks and the associated norms of reciprocity are generally good for the inside of the network, but the external effects of social capital are by no means always positive” (Putnam, 2000, pp.21-22). Intensively connected social networks or interest groups “distort governmental decision making” and “trigger political polarization and cynicism” (Putnam, 2000, p.340).

The density of social networks and bonding determines the capacity of specific reciprocity and solidarity. Putman argues that inclusive networks “generate broader identities and reciprocity” thus allowing for the diffusion of information and economic efficiency, but tightly bonded networks “reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups... undergirding specific reciprocity” thus creating not only strong in-group loyalty but also strong out-group antagonism (Putnam, 2000, pp22-23).

Kraign Beyerlein and Jone Hipp (2005) found that strong bonding networks among Evangelical Protestants led to a greater percentage of crime rates, while weak-bridging bonds between Protestants and Catholics reduced crime rates affiliated with those religious social networks across nearly all U.S. counties. Individuals' ability to build social support is constrained by their social bonding (Sachser, in press).

Rodney Hero (2003) is one of the scholars who challenge fully optimistic views of social capital on specific political sectors of public policy. He argues that the level of social capital can magnify inequality among society members. At state-level politics, Hero saw that rich social

capital benefits the racial majority but isolates the racial minority. States with high levels of trust also tend to yield worse policy outcomes that directly address racial equality for minorities, such as low-income black populations within a given political sector (Hero, 2003).

Although current public policies utilizing social capital, such as encouraging informal relationship and engaging in social activities, have a great deal of benefits, the uncertainty of social capital, the requirement of multiple reinforcements from multiple actors, and flexibility based on localism make such policies much more difficult to apply to multiple situations in an uniformed way, preserve possible effects, and measure the potential problems. Therefore, there needs to be careful adjustment and design for social-capital oriented public policies (Productivity Commission, 2003, pp. 58-60). In addition, “policies which strive towards social order and cohesion have the potential to lose individual freedom and autonomy along the way” (Franklin, 2003, p.352).

Previous scholarly research tells us that social capital can have a number of different meanings and serves as multiple causes and results in the political arena. More specifically, social networks and general social trust have different elements of social capital; and the level and range of social engagements are different dimensions of social networks. Social capital has various ways of influencing policy attitudes and political tendencies, and the effects can be both positive and negative. Considering the variety of policy types, my study assumes that individuals’ attitudes towards various types of policies may be influenced by different social surroundings or connectedness of different degrees. Various levels of social trust and social involvement filter individuals’ particular aspects of political information differently and determine levels of assessment to political information. Utilizing previous scholarly research and arguments stating that different aspects of social capital affect different policy preference

and further induce policy choices, I explore the relationship between specific elements of social capital and particular policy attitudes. I also attempt to develop reliable patterns of policy tendency using multiple dimensions of social capital.

CHAPTER 3 HYPOTHESES AND THE PERSPECTIVES

As seen in the previous chapter, there are significant interactions between individuals' policy perception/preferences and their daily interactions with other members of a society. This study examines individuals' policy beliefs that would be triggered by social elements within their interpersonal lives rather than pragmatic policy processes or policy outcomes. Previous research found significant but varied correlations between social capital and specific types of public policy consequences. For example, Putnam (2000) showed that states with intensive social networks tended to have better welfare achievement, especially for the poor, weak, or disadvantaged people (pp. 297-306, 317). People living where there are higher trust levels and reciprocal community moods tend to have positive political expectations about governments' decisions and policies (Schmierbach, Boyle, and McLeod, 2005), feel less of a necessity for government actions (Wood, Owen, and Durham, 2005), and tend to be more tolerant and understanding of differences and diversities (Cook, 2001, pp212-31).

Based on some common elements of individuals' beliefs toward certain policy type that are activated mainly by different aspects of social capital, this study categorizes multiple dimensions of social capital into social networks (intensiveness and extensiveness) and generalized social trust and also sorts various policies into three different policy attitudinal groups. Theoretically, network intensiveness is meant to measure how intensively and exclusively an individual is involved in social networks. Thus, this concept is related to Putnam's understanding of 'bonding'. In contrasts, network extensiveness measures how broadly and inclusively an individual engages in social networks, thus it is consistent with Putnam's concept of 'bridging'. Lastly, general social trust is meant to measure levels of general belief in people and society. Therefore, general social trust is different from Hardin's (2002) trust built on physical personal

interaction basis or Cook's (2001) specific social trust on particular targets. Rather, general social trust has a non-specific range of positive perception on people in general.

In terms of policy categorization related to social capital, the first category is 'redistributive' types of policy that exclusively helps or encourages the have-nots (Levy, 1986) (See Appendix B.1). The second type is 'government activism' policies that help overall societal development for the collective public (Rudolph and Evans, 2005) (See Appendix B.2). The last type is 'morality' policies that deal with morally controversial issues (Mcfarlane and Meier, 2000) (See Appendix B.3). Retrieving previous research and logical rationales, I posited these hypotheses.

On Redistributive Policies

Previous research has argued that different types of trust have different political and social potentials. Unfortunately, there is no clear answer for the function of generalized social trust on various types of public policies. Individual levels of generalized social trust can have multiple meanings, and the degrees of trust matter differently (Putnam, 2000, p.136-39).

Although there are theoretical and empirical discrepancies, some research argues that "high levels of generalized trust facilitate the provision of public goods and provides social spin-offs in the forms of ...welfare dependence, lower health care expenditures ...and so on" (Productivity Commission, 2003, p. 57). Assuming that the traits of redistributive public policies are consistent with the tendency of trust in terms of benevolence, charity, and belief, my study hypothesizes a positive relationship between general social trust and supportive attitudes toward redistributive types of public policies.

H1.1: Individuals having higher levels of general social trust are more likely to support redistributive types of public policies than individuals having lower levels of general social trust, controlling for individuals' demographic characteristics.

In pragmatic perspectives, social capital in particular, tends to contribute to a better outcome with respect to welfare policies. Through multiple social networks, people who are well connected are more likely to get greater benefits from the society, and thus have more chances to be independent from government subsidies (Woolcock, 2001, p.68). In normative perspectives, multiple heterogeneous social memberships widen and enlighten alternative viewpoints about various social and political issues, while limited homogenous group memberships could create isolated or narrow minded perspectives (Putnam, 2000, p.341). Based on the broad nature of networks, and its relevance with supportive attitudes toward helping the poor, I assume the positive relationship between network extensiveness and redistributive policy attitudes.

H1.2: Individuals involved in extensive social networks are more likely to support redistributive types of public policies than individuals who have no, or limited social networks, controlling for individuals' demographic characteristics.

As Gibson (2001) argues, broader social connectedness is more important for macro-level political changes or movements than a strong single primary group attachment that often discouraged balanced democratic movements. Individuals intensively involved in broader social networks, such as voluntary or religious groups, are more likely to be concerned and expressive about overall social equality and well-being. However, people intensively involved in a limited range of networks with limited perspectives, such as occupational/professional unions, tend to care more about their direct self-interests (Boninger, Krosnick, and Berent, 1995). In addition, the interpersonal relationship within an intensive single social network such as professional organizations or associations is often temporary, formal, weak, and limited in the range of socializations possible within the network rather than being a meaningful and close personal

interaction (Putnam, 2000, p.87-90). Therefore, my study assumes a negative relationship between a single intensive network and redistributive policy attitudes that require the sense of community for the general public rather than specific interests.

H1.3: Individuals intensively involved in a limited range of social networks are less likely to support redistributive types of public policies than individuals who are not intensively involved in any or in multiple social networks, controlling for individuals' demographic characteristics.

On Government Activism

As mentioned, social trust is considered diverse in terms of target objects, degrees, and the effects. For instance, 'thin trust' is more adequate for expanding individuals' personal networks through loose connections and encourages individuals' supportive attitudes towards the various social and political issues of others; more so than does the 'thick trust' of dense and tight emotional attachments and social exchanges (Putnam, 2000, p.136). Thus, the ambiguity suggests many different possibilities for the effect of general social trust on various policy attitudes.

Nonetheless, there is evidence that individuals with low levels of trust towards the general society or the public are more likely to rely on public or professional services and government support for their necessities rather than their neighbors or the private sector. This tendency has been observed over the last half century in American society (Putnam, 2000, p.144-145). In contrast, individuals with high levels of generalized trust tend to keep their eyes focused on their communities and concern themselves only with each other, thus self-interests are served within the community. Therefore, individuals having higher levels of general social trust would tend to be less dependent on governmental social services (Putnam, 2000, p. 135).

H2.1: Individuals having higher levels of general social trust are less likely to support government activism than individuals having lower levels of general social trust, controlling for individuals' demographic characteristics

Individuals who are more involved in broader social networks are more likely to be exposed to public issues such as education, environment and health, and discuss those issues either at the local or national levels. These individuals tend to care more, and voice stronger opinions about governmental policies on those issues (Putnam, 2000, p.51-3)

H2.2: Individuals involved in extensive social networks are more likely to support government activism than individuals who have no, or limited social networks, controlling for individuals' demographic characteristics.

Politically active individuals are more likely to support government actions although political tendencies vary depending on different party identification and the scope of political views. However, occupational/professional unions or networks focus on narrower self-interests; hence, the members of those types of organizations are less concerned with general public issues and reluctant to have governmental control over their professional spaces. Overall, members belonging to any organization that has narrower and more specific interests or goals are less likely to support governmental activism that ultimately targets the benefits of the general public rather than specific interests (Cochran et al., 2006; Putnam, 2000, pp.80-91).

H2.3: Individuals intensively involved in a limited range of social networks are less likely to support government activism than individuals who are not intensively involved in any or in multiple social networks, controlling for individuals' demographic characteristics.

On Morality Policies

Individuals trusting general society as a whole, and other members of a society tend to dislike governmental intervention in their private lives. Some scholars argue that individuals

who trust people of the general public more rather their government and political leaders, tend not to be confident about any type of government-initiated policy (Wood, Owen, and Durham, 2005). Those people believing not only in their sphere of acquaintances, but also in general public, tend to avoid any political constraints and are more likely to be tolerant of minority views. Thus, those people tend not to care about, or avoid governmental control on personal morality issues such as abortion and gay rights (Cook, 2001, pp.307-20, Putnam, 2000, p.137).

H3.1: Individuals having higher levels of general social trust are less likely to support morality based types of public policies than individuals having lower levels of general social trust, controlling for individuals' demographic characteristics.

As discussed, individuals who are involved in extensive social networks are more likely to be exposed to multiple points of view, and thus tend to be more understanding about different perspectives (Cigler and Joslyn, 2002). For the same logical reason regarding network extensiveness, the study assumes the negative correlation between multiple memberships and supportive attitudes for morality government policies that somehow constrain individuals' freedom to choose their life style. Morality issues require a great deal of tolerance toward diversity (Putnam, 2000, p.341). Therefore, extensive memberships in multiple networks would reduce the desire for governmental control on individual's lifestyle choices. However, we also need to consider that exclusive membership in a single or limited network can be worse than no membership in any network, in terms of social tolerance. Strong single in-group attachments could lead to little tolerance for out-group differences (Putnam, 2000, p.355)

H3.2: Individuals involved in extensive social networks are less likely to support morality based types of government regulations than individuals who have no or limited social networks, controlling for individuals' demographic characteristics.

As discussed in the rationale for network intensiveness, people engaging intensively in more than one social network tend to be more tolerant to differences and diversity, and are more likely to respect the rights of others (Putnam, 2000, p. 80, 137, 335). However, social capital can also create undesirable group attitudes and societal tendencies if the social networks are narrowly structured. For instance, individuals in small towns are highly engaged in their community life, but they are less tolerant of differences and diversities (Putnam, 2000, p.352). In addition, politically or religiously conservative people with a limited range of social networks would not be tolerant with societal differences (Schudson, 1998), thus dislike individuals' freedoms to choose and preferring stricter governmental regulations on social morality issues (Putnam, 2000, pp.357-8).

H3.3: Individuals intensively involved in limited range of social networks are more likely to support morality based government regulations than individuals who are not intensively involved in any or in multiple social networks, controlling for individuals' demographic characteristics.

In summary, based on previous research on social capital and various political implications, my research presumes that general social trust would encourage positive attitudes toward redistributive government policies that help socially disadvantaged people, but induce negative attitudes for other types of government interventions in both public and private spheres. The factor of how extensively, or broadly, people were involved in social networks would positively influence redistributive and government activism policies that create social equity and public goods, but negatively influence policy attitudes for government regulations on morality policies. Lastly, however, people who engaged in single or limited social networks intensively would be less likely to support both redistributive and government activism policies, but more

likely to support morality government policies that somehow constrain social diversities and differences.

Table 3-1. Hypotheses Matrix

	General Social Trust	Extensive Networks	Limited Intensiveness
Redistributive Policy	+	+	-
Government Activism	-	+	-
Morality Regulation	-	-	+

CHAPTER 4 METHOD

Data

To test the hypotheses, my study uses the 2004 General Social Survey (GSS) data gathered by the National Opinion Research Center through national probability sampling.¹ The GSS was designed to survey various social issues and political attitudes at the individual level, and has repeated many core questionnaire items and question wordings in order to facilitate time-series studies.

The GSS 2004 data were gathered through Computer Assisted Personal Interview (CAPI) using a national full probability sampling. The median length of the interview was about one and a half hours. The participants were English-speaking persons 18 years of age or over within the U.S. The sample size was 2,812 and weighted for the Black subpopulation to adjust overall ethnicity proportion in the U.S.

The 2004 GSS asked more detailed questions about individuals' civic engagements and their political attitudes. Beyond GSS general categories of demographics, media consumption patterns, negative life events, religious transformations, daily religious practice, an experiment on measuring immigration status, altruism, an experiment on measuring alcohol consumption, attitudes towards guns, social networks and group memberships, sexual behavior and genetic testing, the role of heredity, and stress and violence in the workplace, the 2004 GSS included the "citizenship module", a new series of items collected in the 2004 data.

The 'citizenship module' included questions regarding civic and political participation, social welfare policies, efficacy, misanthropy, international organizations, political parties,

¹ The principal investigators of the 2004 General Social Survey were James A. Davis, Tom W. Smith and Peter V. Marsden. These were made available to me by the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR Study Number 4295). Neither the National Opinion Research Center, Professors (James A. Davis, Tom W. Smith and Peter V. Marsden), nor the ICPSR are responsible for my analysis and interpretation of the data.

political corruption, and the working of democracy. The questions regarding these categories sought the respondent's opinions on social and political topics such as the environment, government, society in general, the economy, leisure activities, interpersonal relations, health care, personal philosophy, and other moral controversies. As is evident, the GSS is well incorporated with the perspectives of this study with reliable categories of different facets of social capital in trust and social networks to explore patterns of various policy attitudes.

Perspectives of Categorization

Measuring Dimensions of Social Capital

Social capital is an amorphous concept and has multiple connotations. Some scholars argue that social capital needs to be explored through qualitative methods (Coleman, 1990), while others claim quantitative analysis is the only means of measuring social capital (Bourdieu, 1991). As we observed in the previous chapter, there are ongoing debates regarding the levels and dimensions of social capital. Scholars identify different aspects (or “facets”) of social capital based on their own theoretical or empirical judgment. For instance, as Bastelaer and Grootaert (2002) summarized, social capital can be approached using multiple dichotomous categories of Structural vs. Cognitive, Horizontal vs. Vertical, Heterogeneous vs. Homogeneous, or Formal vs. Informal dimensions. A social tie can be interpreted as any one of networks, roles, rules, life patterns, norms, values, attitudes, or beliefs; thus researchers find diverse meanings of social capital for different individuals and social systems. Thus, depending on the definition of social capital used, researchers need to consider possible rationales, implications, and functions of their ways of categorizations.

My research intends to examine social capital in a more comprehensive and exhaustive way. I incorporate both theoretical understandings and quantitative methods in order to explore the concept of social capital. For instance, in the categorization stage of social capital, I adopt

theoretical approaches of several scholars to determine the various implications of the multiple concepts of social capital and to retest previous empirical evidence. Multiple dimensions of social capital overlap in their social functionality and definition (Putnam, 2000). Utilizing multiple concepts of social capital such as network extensiveness and intensiveness, reciprocity, and trust that have been discussed in previous studies, my study measures multiple implications of different dimensions of social capital in policy attitudes. In order to achieve comprehensive but exclusive measurements of social capital, I sort out distinctive elements such as the difference between social networks and trust, but merge similar elements of social capital per se, under network intensiveness or extensiveness that has its own homogenous implications. Previous studies showed that theoretically both social networks and trust are core parts of social capital (Putnam, 2000), but each has its own functional effect on various political perspectives. Therefore, my study keeps core elements of social capital that would maintain their exclusivity enough to be distinguished from each other in concept and functionality, but the sum of each category would cover all possible implications of social capital.

In terms of dimensions of social networks, previous scholars argued about the intensiveness and extensiveness of social networks. In other words, depending on how broadly individuals engage in and how intensively they participate in social networks, people have different perspectives toward different policies. Therefore, the operational definition of network extensiveness is somewhat consistent with Putnam's concept of 'bridging' that connects people inclusively. In contrast, the operational definition of network intensiveness is consistent with Putnam's meaning of 'bonding' that connects members of a social group exclusively (Putnam, 2000, pp.22-3). Network intensiveness and extensiveness are consistent with the definition of social capital, but clearly distinguished from one another in individuals' social life patterns. At

the same time, these two are interrelated indicators that have different impacts on individuals' policy beliefs; thus, they should be treated as theoretically distinctive elements of social networks (Granovetter, 1973, p.1361). Therefore, I also keep network extensiveness and intensiveness as separate indicators for the range of social connectedness and levels of intensiveness in social involvement, respectively, that can predict multiple possibilities of impacts on policy attitudes.

In the measurement of general social trust, my study targets trust in participants' general social lives. There are multi-dimensional conceptualizations of trust based on its relationships with policy attitudes in political processes. Different research programs look at different aspects of interpersonal trust. Social trusts toward ordinary people may need to be differentiated from trust toward governments or political institutions. "Empirically, social and political trust may or may not be correlated, but theoretically, they much kept distinct" (Putnam, 2000, p.137). In addition, general trust toward the general public is also different from Cook's concept of specific types of trust toward a particular individual in a particular situation (2000) or Hardin's trust limited to personal relationships (2002).

Therefore, my study focuses on interpersonal beliefs toward the general public or members of a given society, namely generalized social trust, primarily in order to test the tenets of trust in the social dimension rather than trust in governments, specific institutions, or particular individuals. In other words, trust in this study is interpreted as general trust toward ordinary people in their daily social lives. Rather than defining trust as a specific or a broad concept of interpersonal belief or as confidence in political leaders or government systems that may be changeable based on individuals' given environment or resources, this study explores

general social trust toward ordinary people or society in order to measure only its social components.

After considering multiple theoretical frameworks, I determine that social capital would be explored through two categories of general social networks that physically connect members of a society either in extensive or intensive ways and general social trust that creates common facets of beliefs or norms. My study defines general social networks as public sphere interactions. For instance, civic engagement in public affairs, organizational activities for socialization, voluntary networks for general social improvement, and diversity of social engagements are the main elements of this dimension of social connectedness. General social trust is composed of beliefs toward the general public in the society. The belief that other members of the society are trusted, fair, and helpful is among the many meanings of general social trust.

In order to achieve a high reliability and validity for each measurement and scale, I adopted measures that have been used in previous studies, signaling them as reliable indicators. In the measurement of social networks, I adopted Putnam's measurement of participation level in multiple social networks and Cigler and Joslyn's numbers of networks. Network intensiveness was measured by levels of how intensively individuals were involved in given social gatherings such as volunteer work for common issues, political community meetings and others professional associations, religious gatherings, and other social and leisure activities (See Appendix A.1.). Network extensiveness was measured using the total number of memberships to which each individual belongs (See Appendix A.2.). In measuring general social trust, I utilized three different questions asking individuals' levels of beliefs in general society that have been used frequently in previous research, such as Putnam (2000) and Gibson (2001)' study on

social trust, and national panel data, such as National Election Studies (NES) and General Social Studies (GSS) (See Appendix A.3.).

Using the 2004 GSS data, I first used participation levels in multiple types of political parties, a trade union or professional association, a church or other religious organization, a sports/ leisure/ cultural group, and another voluntary association to examine individuals' network intensiveness in relation to various policy attitudes. The intensiveness of social networks was measured in four different degrees of involvement: 1 'have never belonged to it', 2 'used to belong but do not any more', 3 'belong but don't actively participate', and 4 'belong and actively participate' (See Appendix A.1.). Empirically, different types of networks were highly correspondent to each other based on Cronbach's Alpha reliability Score² (.922) with a single dimension of factor component loading³ ($\geq .854$) (See Appendix A.1.). Therefore, regardless of the differences in various associations, individuals who were involved in any social network at the degree of 4 'belong and actively participate' were coded as a group of individuals with high network intensiveness; while individuals who were involved in any network at any degree of 1 'have never belonged to it', 2 'used to belong but do not any more', or 3 'belong but don't actively participate' were coded as a group of individuals with low network intensiveness. Furthermore, in order to observe attitudinal differences between individuals who were active in only one type of social network and those who were active in multiple networks, I created

² Cronbach's Alpha reliability score indicates a coefficient of consistency among different variables. High Cronbach's alpha reliability refers to how well various different items can be constructed into a single unidimensional scale. A reliability coefficient of .70 or higher is considered "acceptable" in most social science research (<http://www.ats.ucla.edu/STAT/SPSS/faq/alpha.html>).

³ Factor analysis is an interdependence test technique. Among multiple factor rotation methods, 'Oblique principle components analysis' that computational strategies have been developed to rotate factors so as to best represent "clusters" of variables, without the constraint of orthogonality of factors was adapted in order to calculate interdependent relationships (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Factor_analysis; <http://www.statsoft.com/textbook/stfacan.html>).

dummy variables of counter-cases for single network intensiveness and multiple network intensiveness.

In terms of network extensiveness, regarding sixteen different memberships in social, cultural, religious, professional, or political associations, individuals were asked whether they had any of those memberships. The memberships achieved a reliable level of Cronbach's Alpha score of .735 and a relatively homogenous factor loading ($\geq .228$) (See Appendix A.2) among those different memberships. These categories proved to be equally important measurements in terms of network variations, thus I used the total number of each individuals' social network memberships as a form of network extension to see the influence of network expansiveness on individuals' policy beliefs (See Appendix A.2). The number of memberships ranged from 0 to 16 out of total possible number of 16. These memberships exhaustively covered all possible social, professional, cultural, and religious associations. The higher the score was, the more extensive the individual was in their social networks. Again, for a comparison of attitudinal differences between individuals who had single social membership and who had multiple memberships in a regression, I created dummy variables of counter-cases for single membership and multiple memberships.

In order to measure general social trust, I adopted three questions, 'whether people are helpful or looking out for themselves', 'whether they are fair or try to take advantage of others', and 'whether they can be trusted' that were asked frequently in previous research. They were measured on an ordinal scale of 1, 'not helpful', 'take advantage', or 'cannot trust', 2 'depends', and 3 'helpful', 'fair', or 'trust' respectively. Individuals' answers to these three questions were highly correlated each other based on Cronbach's Alpha of .66 resulting in one single dimension of factor loading ($\geq .735$) (See Appendix A.3.). Therefore, I created a single indicator of 'general

social trust' by computing a mean score of three answers for each individual in a range of three ordinal values, low, moderate, and high.

Measuring Public Policy Typology

My study was designed to investigate the relationships between social capital and its effects on policy attitudes. In other words, the study investigated patterns of individuals' policy attitudes from their social lives that have often been overlooked in previous research. Previous scholarly works have theoretically categorized types of public policies based on their substantive functional characteristics, targeting sectors, ideology (conservative vs. liberal), or approach styles (good vs. bad or progressive vs. regressive). Based on policy expectations and processes, Theodore Lowi (1964) categorized policies into distributive, redistributive, constituent, and regulatory types. Peter Steinberger (1980) determined categories of public policy from possible impacts: he categorized distributive, redistributive, and regulatory of policies based on substantive impact, adaptive and control based on political impact, areal and segmental based on scope of impact, public goods and private goods based on exhaustibility, and symbolic and tangible based on tangibility (McCool, 1995, pp.183, 229).

Cristopher Wlezien (1995) categorized five policy areas of big cities, education, environment, health, and welfare in measuring people's preferences for government spending (p.985). A similar study done by William Jacoby (1994) also observed that public attitudes toward certain types of policies such as welfare policies were qualitatively different from public preferences toward other types of government spending. Jacoby categorized various policies based on program-specific preference in welfare, environment, crime prevention, public schools, science and technology, and defense (p.347). Moreover, due to some ambiguity of policy categorizations, some scholars have used a methodological approach to categorize various policy

types using factor analyses (Letki, 2004). Each categorization seems to have its own logical rationale to understanding dimension of public policy issues.

My study explained how individuals' social connectedness influenced their attitudes toward various types of policies in particular. Therefore, based on attitude relevance of various policies that are more likely to be activated by individuals' social lives, but different political attributes that were discussed in previous policy typology studies, the study categorized various types of policy attitudes into three areas of 'redistributive policies' that are related to the social equality and benevolence for the have-nots, 'government activism' that are relevant to the collective public reciprocity, and 'morality policies' that deal with attitudes toward government regulations on socially controversial issues (See Appendix B).

In an empirical process of sorting multiple policy attitude indicators by each category of public policies, my study conducted multiple scaling tests to create a reliable indicator for each type of policy attitude beyond theoretical considerations. Before running any reliability tests, I rescaled all possible policy attitude indicators on a seven point scale to make them more consistent numerically. For redistributive policy attitude measurement, I ran reliability tests on attitudes toward government responsibility on reducing income difference between the rich and the poor, improving standard of living for the poor Americans, and helping paying for medical care (See Appendix B.1.). The three items achieved a relatively high Cronbach's Alpha score (.674) and have higher factor loading components on a single dimension ($\geq .740$) (See Appendix B.1.). Therefore, I averaged the three items on a scale of 7 from 'Government should not/ people should help themselves' to 'Government should help' and created a single index of redistributive policy attitudes. The higher scores indicated more supportive attitudes toward redistributive government policies.

For the government activism measurement, I also ran reliability tests on individual attitudes toward governmental support on public good such as ‘improving & protecting national health’, ‘improving national education system’, ‘improving & protecting environment’, and ‘solving problems of big cities’ (See Appendix B.2.). These items achieved a high Cronbach’s Alpha score of .731 and the factor components loaded as a single dimension ($\geq .476$) (See Appendix B.2). Therefore, I again created a single index of ‘government activism’ on range of 7 from ‘too much spent on it/ no government activism needs ’ to ‘too little spent on it/ more government activism needs’ by averaging these four items. Higher scores indicated more supportive attitudes for government activism.

Lastly, for the morality policy attitude measurement, I intentionally selected the most representative and controversial morality policy issues of ‘abortion’ and ‘gay issues’. As Jacoby pointed out (1994, 2005), attitudes toward different policy issues are not unidimensional. Morality policy issues are more problematic than other types of policies in Jacoby’s perspectives since they are interrelated with multiple social factors such as their ethnicity, religious beliefs, previous life experience, and so on. Therefore, I kept morality policy attitudes toward the issues of abortion and gay rights separate in my measurement. In order to achieve a more consistent attitude measurement in each issue, I included multiple degrees of questions about legal boundaries for abortion and gay rights. Attitudes toward abortion were asked in degrees of different reasons for defects in babies, women’s health, rape, poverty, an unwanted child, an unwanted marriage, and any other reason. Attitudes toward gay rights were asked through different aspects of questions, such as ‘whether the individual would allow homosexual relations’, ‘whether the individual would allow homosexuals to teach’, ‘whether the individual would allow homosexual to speak’, and ‘whether the individual would allow books on

homosexuality in the library' (See Appendix B.3). When I ran tests on these items, abortion items achieved a high Cronbach's Alpha score (.901) and relatively good factor loading on one of component scale ($\geq .584$) (See Appendix B.3-1). Gay rights items also achieved a high Cronbach's Alpha score (.793) and were loaded in one dimension ($\geq .605$) (See Appendix B.3-2). Therefore, I was able to create two attitudinal scales on abortion and gay rights policy attitudes on a seven point scale from 'no allowance/ government regulation' to 'allowance/ individual choice' for morality policy. Higher scores meant more support for individual choices and lenient government morality policies on abortion and gay rights.

Conditional Factors of Demographics

Demography is a crucial factor in individuals' shared experiences and their manner of thinking and interpretation. Where you go and how you interact with other people often determine who you are. Therefore, it is necessary to find a direct causation between the following demographic factors. For instance, being a female, head of a single household, of lower socioeconomic status, and social elements such as networks of people around the individual, interacted in predicting a single mom's policy beliefs and preferences. Hero (2003) presented ethnicity as the core demographic factor in relation to general social trust, Hetherington (2001) discussed ethnicity and socioeconomic status as it related to policy perceptions, and Jacoby (2005) had considered party identification as an important interacting factor in attitudes toward government spending in multiple types of policies in his series of related studies.

Classical demographic variables in political and social studies, such as party identification, gender, education level, age, income, ethnicity, religiosity and geographical locations were controlled or used as conditional factors in the main analyses. Party identification was coded on a seven point scale from strong Democrats, weak Democrats, Independents near

Democrats, Independents, Independents near Republicans, weak Republicans, to strong Republicans. Republicans recorded higher values in party identification. Ethnicity was categorized into two categories, the majority (value '0') and the minority (value '1'). White people were coded as an ethnic majority and ethnic minorities were comprised of all Asians, Blacks, Hispanics, Indians, and other mixed racial groups. Religiosity was categorized in an ordinal manner of 'not religious', 'not very religious', 'somewhat religious', and 'strongly religious'. Thus, higher values in religion indicated stronger religiosity. Income was coded in ordinal values of 12 from income less than 1,000 (1) to more than 25,000 (12). The raw numbers of years of education and age were used in numeric scales in predicting policy attitudes. However, numeric variables of education, age, and income were recoded in ordinal scales for descriptive analyses in order to see them conveniently in the preliminary stage of the analyses (See the values in Tables 5-5, 5-7, & 5-13).

In terms of geopolitical categorizations, I used the rationales of political sociologists' assumptions on regional variety within the large scale of the U.S. Regional characteristics have been accumulated over time through all political, economic, and cultural experiences and assets. Overall, New England and Mid Atlantic areas are areas with a high concentration of industries and have higher levels of academic circumstance; the South has a slower pace of life but strong southern identity under warmer weather and more retirees; the Midwest is a more diverse cultural and political intersection; the Southwest is more likely to be dominated by Mexican cultural heritage with less resources; and the West is culturally very diverse, thus tends to be more tolerant (Clack, Targonski, and Morgan, 1997). My study assumed that these different regional circumstances were reflected in individuals' policy attitudes.

The regions were categorized into nine different groups of ‘New England’, ‘Middle Atlantic’, ‘Eastern North Central’, ‘West North Central’, ‘South Atlantic’, ‘East South Central’, ‘West South Central’, ‘Mountain’, and ‘Pacific’. This categorization has been used continuously in previous research such as NES or GSS time series panel data, thus I adopted it into my study. There were obvious similarities among states within and differences between states that belonged to different geographical categories. In order to control the regional variance of social capital in predicting individuals’ political attitudes, I assigned Putnam’s social capital index⁴ to each state and averaged states’ scores within each region of New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, and West South Central, Mountain, and Pacific⁵. Based on these scores, I created a dummy variable of regions with low social capital in order to see a statistical difference between those regions and regions with high social capital. Regions with high social capital included New England, North West Central and Mountain, and the rest of regions were coded as a low social capital region. The dichotomous region variable was incorporated into regression analyses as a control variable.

⁴ Using 14 different indicators of 1) Number of club meetings attended last year, 2) Number of community projects worked on last year, 3) Number of times entertained in home last year, 4) Number of time volunteered last year, 5) Mean response to "I spend a lot of time with friends, 6) Mean state response to "most people are honest", 7) Mean percent that served on local committee in past year, 8) Mean percent that served as officer of club or organization, 9) Mean percent that attended meeting on town or school affairs, 10) Mean number of nonprofits per capita, 11) Mean number of group membership, 12) Mean response to "most people can be trusted", 13) civic and social organization per 1000 people 1977-1992, 14) Mean presidential turnout 1988 and 1992, the index was created by the average of the standardized scores. The scores are identical to the factor scores from a principal components analysis of the 14 component variables (Putnam, 2000, p.487)

⁵ New England is comprised of Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island; Middle Atlantic is comprised of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania; East North Central is comprised of Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio; West North Central is comprised of Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas; South Atlantic is comprised of Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and District of Columbia; East South Central is comprised of Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi; West South Central is comprised of Arkansas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Texas; Mountain is comprised of Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico; and Pacific is comprised of Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, and Hawaii.

In addition, to observe the varying influences of regional social capital on policy attitudes, I created another dichotomous variable of high and low social capital regions using only six regions, and excluding the three other regions in the middle range of social capital, according to Putnam's social capital index. Again, New England, West North Central, and Mountain were categorized as a high social capital region; South Atlantic, East South Central, and West South Central were coded as a low social capital region; and East North Central, Middle Atlantic, and Pacific were excluded in order to observe the conditional effect of high and low regional social capital more clearly.

Analyses

The study reported three sets of analyses. In a preliminary analyses, I measured the correlation between demographic factors and social capital to see how those demographic variables were related to individuals' social connectedness and then controlled them to see a whether there were clear interactions between social capital and policy beliefs.

In the second set of analyses, the study considered how the dimensions of social capital related with one another by summarizing general patterns of social capital and describing interrelations among the patterns.

In the third set of analyses, the study measured the impacts of social capital on policy attitudes at both the individual and under conditional regional levels of low and high social capital. In this stage, I intended to construct solid patterns of different aspects of social capital in predicting different policy attitudes. After identifying three different types of policy attitudes in 'government activism', 'redistributive policy', and 'morality policy', I examined patterns of individuals' attitudes towards these three types of public policy attitudes using different aspects of social network and general social trust, controlling for other demographic factors. Therefore, the model equations can be written like these:

- Model 1: $Y_{\text{government activism}} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{trust} + \beta_2 \text{single extensiveness} + \beta_3 \text{multiple extensiveness} + \beta_4 \text{single intensiveness} + \beta_5 \text{multiple intensiveness} + \beta_6 \text{partyid} + \beta_7 \text{female} + \beta_8 \text{ethnic minority} + \beta_9 \text{old} + \beta_{10} \text{education} + \beta_{11} \text{income} + \beta_{12} \text{religiosity} + \beta_{13} \text{regional social capital}$
- Model 2: $Y_{\text{redistributive policies}} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{trust} + \beta_2 \text{single extensiveness} + \beta_3 \text{multiple extensiveness} + \beta_4 \text{single intensiveness} + \beta_5 \text{multiple intensiveness} + \beta_6 \text{partyid} + \beta_7 \text{female} + \beta_8 \text{ethnic minority} + \beta_9 \text{old} + \beta_{10} \text{education} + \beta_{11} \text{income} + \beta_{12} \text{religiosity} + \beta_{13} \text{regional social capital}$
- Model 3: $Y_{\text{morality: abortion}} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{trust} + \beta_2 \text{single extensiveness} + \beta_3 \text{multiple extensiveness} + \beta_4 \text{single intensiveness} + \beta_5 \text{multiple intensiveness} + \beta_6 \text{partyid} + \beta_7 \text{female} + \beta_8 \text{ethnic minority} + \beta_9 \text{old} + \beta_{10} \text{education} + \beta_{11} \text{income} + \beta_{12} \text{religiosity} + \beta_{13} \text{regional social capital}$
- Model 4: $Y_{\text{morality: gay rights}} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{trust} + \beta_2 \text{single extensiveness} + \beta_3 \text{multiple extensiveness} + \beta_4 \text{single intensiveness} + \beta_5 \text{multiple intensiveness} + \beta_6 \text{partyid} + \beta_7 \text{female} + \beta_8 \text{ethnic minority} + \beta_9 \text{old} + \beta_{10} \text{education} + \beta_{11} \text{income} + \beta_{12} \text{religiosity} + \beta_{13} \text{regional social capital}$

CHAPTER 5 RESULTS

Demographics and Social Capital

Individuals have a wide range of predisposed characteristics. Demographics are preliminary factors that determine individuals' levels of social capital or intervene in the interaction between individuals' social capital and policy attitudes or preference, thus demographics need to be taken into consideration and at least be controlled for in order to understand the dynamics of social capital and policy attitudes. In my sample, the mean age is 45.96 year old, and average level of education is between high school and college. 34% are Democrats, 36% are Independents, and 30% are Republicans. About 80% are the White people and the remaining 20 % are a mixture of ethnic minorities such as Blacks, Asians, Hispanics, Natives, and other minority groups. 46% of participants are males and 54% are females. The sample was equally gathered across different geographical regions.

Overall, Republicans, older adults, more educated, more religious, ethnic majority members (the White) and females have higher levels of social capital than Democrats and Independents, younger adults under the age of 30, less educated, less religious, ethnic minorities, and males respectively; although there are some variations across different elements of social capital in network intensiveness and extensiveness, and general social networks.

Party Identification

Political identification, one of the most influential demographic factors in politics, has a strong relationship with network intensiveness ($F[6, 1456]=14.069$, $p\leq.001$) and extensiveness ($F[6, 1458]=3.972$, $p\leq.001$) and the level of general social trust ($F[6, 862]=2.554$, $p\leq.019$). Republicans ($M=1.64$, $SD=.1.25$) tend to engage more intensively in social networks than Democrats ($M=1.29$, $SD=1.30$) and Independents ($M=0.77$, $SD=0.98$). Again, Republicans

(M=1.98, SD=1.89) and Democrats (M=1.84, SD=1.94) are more likely to be involved in multiple social networks than Independents (M=1.25, SD=1.85). Those partisan groups of Republicans (M=2.08, SD=0.51) and Democrats (M=2.02, SD=0.42) also tend to trust general society and people more than Independents (M=1.94, SD=0.42). In addition, political Independents have the highest proportions of individuals who had no activity in any network ($\chi^2=77.003$, $p\leq.001$) and no membership ($\chi^2=41.012$, $p\leq.001$) among political partisans (See 5-1 & 5-2).

In short, partisanship reflects social capital in two ways. Although social capital is a little more prevalent among Republicans than Democrats, strength of partisanship was a stronger influence in individuals' social capital than the direction of party identification. In other words, individuals who have strong partisanship tend to be more intensively involved in multiple social networks with higher levels of trust than people who have no or lower levels of partisanship (Tables 5-1 & 5-2).

Gender

Although gender does not have any relevance with network extensiveness and intensiveness, it influences levels of general social trust ($F [1, 867]=5.083$, $p\leq.001$). Females (M=2.05, SD=0.45) are more likely to trust the general public than males (M=1.98, SD=0.47) (Tables 5-3 & 5-4)

Age

In terms of age, overall older adults over 30 year old more intensively ($F [1, 1461] = 24.148$, $p\leq.001$) participate in various types of social memberships ($F [1, 1463]=10.106$, $p\leq.002$), and have higher levels of general social trust ($F[1, 867]=24.990$, $p\leq.001$) than young adults. About 32% of older adults are more strongly engaged in multiple social networks while only 19% of young adults are intensively involved in multiple social gatherings ($\chi^2=24.728$,

$p \leq .001$). About 42% of old adults have multiple memberships, but only 32 % of young adults have more than one membership ($\chi^2=8.551$, $p \leq .014$) (Tables 5-5 & 5-6).

Education

More educated individuals tend to participate in social networks more intensively ($F[4, 1458]=43.893$, $p \leq .001$) and extensively ($F [4, 1460]=51.546$, $p \leq .001$), and have higher levels of general social trust ($F[4, 863]=6.432$, $p \leq .001$) than people who have lower levels of education. About 58% of graduate level individuals are intensively involved in multiple social networks while only 11% of middle school graduates have similar levels of network intensiveness ($\chi^2=180.147$, $p \leq .001$). In addition, more than 71% of individuals above the graduate level belong to multiple social memberships, but only 16% of people who obtain middle school education have more than one social membership ($\chi^2=166.608$, $p \leq .001$) (Tables 5-7 & 5-8).

Ethnicity

Ethnic majorities are more likely to have higher levels of general social trust ($F[1, 867]=21.258$, $p \leq .001$) compared to ethnic minorities that encompass Hispanics, Asians, Blacks, and other original and mixed ethnic groups. Moreover, White people tend to participate more intensively ($F [1, 1461]=20.310$, $p \leq .001$) and broadly ($F [1, 1463]=3.500$, $p \leq .062$) in social networks than ethnic minorities (Tables 5-9 & 5-10).

Religiosity

Religious strength also shows a strong relationship with various social capital elements. For instance, individuals who are very religious tend to be intensively involved in social networks ($F [3, 1459]=44.652$, $p \leq .001$) in more extensive ways ($F [3, 1461]=20.218$, $p \leq .001$) than less religious individuals. However, there is no difference in general social trust among individuals with various degrees of religiosity (Tables 5-11 & 5-12).

Income

Income has also partial influence on social capital. Although it does not have any statistical significance in network extensiveness and general social trust, higher income people tend to engage more intensively in social networks than low income people ($F [2, 891]=6.417, p \leq .002$). The proportion of individuals who are not active in any social network is the highest among people who have a yearly income lower than \$5,000 ($\chi^2=14.665, p \leq .005$). The proportions of people who intensively engages in multiple social network (34%) and multiple social memberships (43%) are much higher for high income people than lower income people ($\chi^2=10.670, p \leq .031$) (Tables 5-13 & 5-14)

Region

Different geographical regions have different levels of social capital. For instance, overall the mountain region, including such states as Nevada, Arizona, and New Mexico, has more network intensiveness ($F [8, 1462]=2.440, p \leq .013$) and extensiveness ($F [8, 1456]=1.896, p \leq .057$) and higher levels of general social trust ($F [8, 860]=1.754, p \leq .083$) than other geopolitical regions, especially compared to the deep South states of Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi (Tables 5-15 & 5-16). These regional variances in social connectedness are well supported by previous research such as Clack, Targonski, and Morgan's argument on Southern conservatives, Midwest liberalism, and Western mellowness (1997).

Dimension of Social Capital

Overall, each individual has different levels of social capital. When analyzing network intensiveness and extensiveness, survey participants were spread out across multiple levels of networks. In network intensiveness, about 39% of people are never intensively involved in any of social organizations, associations, or informal gathering. However, about 31% of people say that they are intensively involved in a single social network and 30% of others report that they

are intensively involved in at least two different social groups. The mean of network intensiveness for each individual is .908 (SD=.823). It infers that the average individual tends to be socially active at least in one type of social networks although the extent of this activity seems somewhat limited (Table 5-17).

In terms of network extensiveness, average people are members of at least one social group (M=1.018, SD=.881) although there are some variations in types of social networks. About 38% of participants have no social membership at all, 22% of people have a single membership, and other 40% have at least two different memberships. Among various types of memberships, 31% of valid participants belong to a church group, 17% of them belong to sports clubs, 15% belong to professional society, 14% in school service, 11% in hobby clubs and art groups, and the rest of the memberships, such as youth group (10.3%), service groups (10%), labor union (9.6%), fraternal group (6.8%), veteran group (5.3%), political club (4.3%) are occupied by 5 – 10% of participants. A very small portion of people belong to farm organizations (3%) or a nationality group (2.7%). In sum, individuals seem to participate in different types of social gathering at various levels (Table 5-17).

For the measurement of general social trust, when the survey asked participants how much people could be trusted, helpful, and fair; most of them say that it depends (M=2.02, SD=.463). Only 4% of the people have a mean score of 1.5 (between '1. not trust' and '2. depends'), people who fall between the mean scores of 1.5 and 2.5 (near 'depends') are comprised of more than 71% of the sample, and people who are above the mean score of 2.5 (between '2. depends' and '3. trust') are 25% of the sample. Therefore, we can infer that majority of individuals have at least a moderate level of general social trust (Table 5-17).

Correlations between Different Dimensions of Social Capital

As expected, there are strong correlations among different tenets of social capital. According to the Pearson correlation tests, individuals who are intensively involved in at least one social network are more likely to have multiple social memberships ($r=.717, p\leq.001$). In other words, network intensiveness and extensiveness are highly correlated. However, general social trust is negatively correlated with being intensive ($r= -.362, p\leq.001$) in multiple types of social networks ($r= -.339, p\leq.001$) (Table 5-18).

When explored more deeply, general social trust is more negatively related to multiple memberships ($r= -.325, p\leq.001$) rather than to a single membership ($r= -.232, p\leq.001$). In other words, individuals who distrust other members of a society tend to belong to loose multiple social networks rather than a single social gathering. In addition, individuals who are intensively involved in a single social network tend not to intensively engage in other social networks ($r= -.190, p\leq.001$), but tend to have at least one ($r=.289, p\leq.001$) or more ($r=.165, p\leq.001$) social memberships. Moreover, individuals who have any type of single membership are less likely to have other memberships ($r= -.186, p\leq.001$). In other words, we can infer that as long as an individual has a single membership, he or she is less likely to obtain another membership (Table 5-19).

Among the different memberships, individuals who have a religious membership ($r=.476, p\leq.001$) are more likely to be intensively involved in multiple social networks, but people who belong to veteran groups are more like to be intensive only within the group, compared to other types of social memberships ($r=.118, p\leq.001$).

Therefore, we can conclude that individuals who participate in any social network intensively are more likely have any type of social membership. However, people who are intensively involved in a single social network tend not to extend their social networks. In

addition, individuals who do not trust people of the general public are more likely to have multiple social memberships and tend to be intensively involved in those social networks. This can be interpreted in that people, who do not trust acquaintances, still have a secondary group of people with whom to share certain hobbies and norms within organizations. This finding is somewhat contradictory with Putnam's argument that "people who trust their fellow citizens volunteer more often... [and] participate more often in politics and community organizations" (Putnam, 2000, p.136-37). However, as Putnam made points in his later discussion, the levels of trust on general public that are caught by such question, 'whether people can be trusted' are 'thin trust', thus the level of trust can be changeable and different from solid sense of community (Putnam, 2000, p.137). Therefore, thin trust on general public could create more desire for secondary networks that are loose but still face-to-face interaction and share certain disciplines among members.

Social Capital and Policy Attitudes⁶

On Redistributive policy

Certain demographic factors, such as party identification, religiosity, education, and ethnicity influence individuals' redistributive policy attitudes. As expected, conservative Republicans are less likely to support redistributive types of government policies that primarily help the poor and socially disadvantage people ($t = -10.042$, $p \leq .001$). However, although the significances are relatively low, ethnic minorities ($t = 1.847$, $p \leq .065$) and less educated people ($t =$

⁶ For multiple regressions, I checked multicollinearity between different elements of social capital using VIF (Variation Inflation Factor). In the full model, VIF scores for single membership, multiple memberships, single intensiveness, multiple intensiveness, and general social trust are between 1.032 and 2.261. The values above 1 indicate that there are multicollinearity effects. Therefore, I ran multiple regressions separately for each network intensiveness, extensiveness, and social capital with demographic factors. However, the statistical significance for each element of social capital is still identical with the full models. As a result, I still reports the full models.

-1.911, $p \leq .056$) who often get more benefits out of such policies are more likely to support redistributive policies compared to ethnic majorities and highly educated individuals. A negative coefficient on religiosity means that the more religious people are less likely to support redistributive government policies ($t = -2.504$, $p \leq .012$). It can be interpreted that benevolent religiosity relies on God's will, thus those individuals are less likely to rely on the government for help with the disadvantaged. Overall, there is more support for government redistributive policies among social minorities, such as ethnic minorities and less educated people, and socially liberal Democrats, while gender, age, income, and regional variation have no independent statistical effects (Table 5-20)

Controlling for demographic factors, such as party identification, religiosity, gender, age, education, income, ethnicity, and regional differences, certain dimensions of social capital influence individuals' redistributive policy attitudes. As this research predicted, individuals who have higher levels of general social trust are more supportive of government redistributive policies than people with lower levels of general social trust ($t = 5.103$, $p \leq .001$). However, network intensiveness ($t = -.905$, $p \leq .366$) and extensiveness ($t = -.460$, $p \leq .646$) do not determine redistributive policy attitudes. In other words, the factor of how intensively and broadly individuals participate in social networks has no effect on redistributive policy preferences (Table 5-20).

Model 1: $Y_{\text{redistributive policy}} = 4.687 + 0.164\text{trust} - 0.074\text{single extensiveness} - 0.038\text{multiple extensiveness} + 0.035\text{single intensiveness} - 0.081\text{multiple intensiveness} - 0.117\text{partyid} + 0.061\text{female} + 0.110\text{ethnic minority} - 0.003\text{old} - 0.016\text{education} + 0.005\text{income} - 0.053\text{religiosity} + 0.080\text{region}$

On Government Actions

Again, some demographic factors influence individuals' policy attitudes toward government activism that intends to improve national health, education, environment, and big city conditions. As expected, Republicans are least supportive of government activism ($t = -5.252, p \leq .001$). However, individuals earning higher incomes who would have the financial capability to partake in various types social responsibilities are more likely to support government activism ($t = 2.393, p \leq .017$), *ceteris paribus* (Table 5-21).

After controlling for demographic factors, general social trust ($t = -.839, p \leq .402$), network extensiveness ($t = .103, p \leq .918$), and network intensiveness ($t = -.173, p \leq .862$) have no statistical significances on government activism attitudes (Table 5-21). Insignificant results could be caused by methodological errors or theoretical misunderstanding. When conducted multicollinearity tests, although minor effect (above one in VIF) of multicollinearity is detected, a model with a single indicator of social trust still does not have any statistical significance; therefore, multicollinearity is not the cause of statistical insignificance. Theoretically, some argue about the broad concept of government activism. The beneficiaries and the consequences of such policies are often random and not specified. As a result, the connection between social capital and the particular policy attitudes could be somewhat blurry and vague (McCool, 1995, pp.210-17).

Model 2: $Y_{\text{government activism}} = 4.924 - 0.034\text{trust} + 0.102\text{single extensiveness} - 0.011\text{multiple extensiveness} - 0.085\text{single intensiveness} - 0.020\text{multiple intensiveness} - 0.078\text{partyid} + 0.096\text{female} + 0.058\text{ethnic minority} - 0.003\text{old} - 0.002\text{education} + 0.025\text{income} - 0.005\text{religiosity} + 0.008\text{region}$

On Morality Policy

As we discussed in the method chapter, morality issues vary in terms of concepts, approaches, and solutions. Therefore, different types of morality issues, such as abortion and gay rights, have different political implications. For instance, among various demographic factors, party identification still has strong influences on abortion attitudes, but not on gay rights issues. Conservative Republicans are supportive of stronger government regulations on abortion ($t=-.069, p\leq.010$), but the tendency is faded way on gay rights issues ($t = -.010, p \leq.728$). In contrasts, older adults are more likely to be generous particularly on abortion issues ($t=2.713, p\leq.007$), but not on gay rights ($t =.368, p \leq.713$). Overall, more educated ($t=6.070, t=7.430, p\leq.001$) and higher income people ($t=2.405, t=2.446, p\leq.015$) are more likely to allow women's freedom of decision on abortion and gay rights, and are thus supportive of minimum governmental regulations on those issues. (Tables 5-22 & 5-23)

As predicted, after controlling for demographic factors, individuals who belong to a single social association or organization ($t= -7.695, t= -8.797, p\leq.001$) have supportive attitudes for government regulations on both abortion and gay rights. In addition, people who are intensively involved in such a single social network ($t= -6.976, t= -8.430, p\leq.001$) tend to support government regulations on both issues. Based on this result, we can infer that limited social networks narrow peoples' views on difference and diversity, and thus tend to diminish social tolerance.

However, unlikely my study predicted, individuals who belong to multiple social memberships ($t = -7.279$, $t = -8.426$, $p \leq .001$) and who intensively participate in those social networks ($t = -5.657$, $t = -6.862$, $p \leq .001$) are also more likely to support government regulations on individual choices regarding morality issues such as abortion and gay relations. In other words, as opposed to what was predicted, there are no statistical differences between single and multiple network intensiveness and extensiveness. Individuals who have either a single or multiple memberships, and participate with either limited intensiveness in a single social network or broad intensiveness, all tend to agree with tougher government control on both abortion and gay rights, placing greater importance on social order and morality over personal freedom (Tables 5-22 & 5-23)⁷. This infers that as long as individuals engage in any type of social gathering in any manner, they seem likely to support government supervision keeping societal order and homogeneity on morality issues.

In addition, individuals at higher levels of general social trust are partially likely to support strong government regulations, particularly on gay issues ($t = -2.260$, $p \leq .024$), but not on abortion ($t = -1.141$, $p \leq .254$) (Tables 5-22 & 5-23). These results reflect that policy attitudes toward different kinds of morality issues are influenced in a variety of ways by even the same kind of individuals' social lives and the manner in which the individuals make personal connections (White, 2003). Thus, although individuals with a higher level of general social trust tend to hold

⁷ The researcher was suspicious about the tenets of particular social group, such as religious gathering, for the reason of politically conservative views on morality issues. Therefore, the researcher re-ran multiple regressions on those two morality issues of abortion and gay rights after excluding religious groups from the measurements of social networks. However, the statistical significance for each element of social capital is still identical with the full models. As a result, the researcher still reports the full models.

higher moral values on life, faith in God, and respect of tradition, the levels of support for government control on morality issues varied depending on the type of issues considered and different perspectives.

Model 3: $Y_{\text{morality: abortion}} = -0.538 - 0.083\text{trust} - 1.228\text{single extensiveness} - 1.146\text{multiple extensiveness} - 1.440\text{single intensiveness} - 1.381\text{multipel intensiveness} - 0.070\text{partyid} + 0.025\text{female} - 0.181\text{ethnic minority} + 0.011\text{old} + 0.120\text{education} + 0.044\text{income} - 0.077\text{religiosity} + 0.166\text{region}$

Model 4: $Y_{\text{morality: gay rights}} = -0.523 - 0.178\text{trust} - 1.591\text{single extensiveness} - 1.495\text{multiple extensiveness} - 1.771\text{single intensiveness} - 1.717\text{multipel intensiveness} - 0.011\text{partyid} + 0.037\text{female} - 0.263\text{ethnic minority} + 0.001\text{old} + 0.158\text{education} + 0.049\text{income} + 0.027\text{religiosity} + 0.159\text{region}$

The Regional Context and Social Capital

Regional levels of social capital at the aggregate level of states or larger political units are a useful way to explore dynamics of political attitudes and characteristics. Using a dichotomous variable of region that was divided according to Putnam's social capital index (2000), I looked at the conditional effects of two, low and high, regional social capital circumstances on various aggregated policy attitudes. In general, rich social capital regions have a higher White population (99%) than poor social capital regions (77%) ($\chi^2 = 42.58, p \leq .001$). Other demographic variables such as gender, age, and religiosity, and party identification, however, do not have statistical variations across different levels of social capital regions.

Under both high social capital regions of New England, West North Central, and Mountain (F[12, 286]=3.948, $p \leq .001$, F[12, 286]=2.382, $p \leq .061$) and low social capital regions of South Atlantic, East South Central, and West South Central (F[12, 613]=6.554, $p \leq .001$, F[12, 613]=1.904, $p \leq .031$), network intensiveness ($t = .384, p \leq .701$, $t = .580, p \leq .562$) and extensiveness ($t = -.496, p \leq .620$, $t = .085, p \leq .932$) have no statistical significances in redistributive policies and government activism attitudes. However, both network intensiveness and extensiveness induce

supportive attitudes for government regulations on morality policies such as abortion and gay rights in both regions with high social capital ($F[12, 286]=9.673, p\leq.001, F[12, 286]=12.097, p\leq.001$) and low social capital ($F[12, 613]=13.095, p\leq.001, F[12, 613]=17.099, p\leq.001$) (Tables 5-24 & 5-25). Therefore, regional social capital conditions do not make any statistical difference in relationships between social networks and policy attitudes on redistributive, government activism, and morality policies.

However, general social trust behaves differently across different policy areas under different regional social capital circumstances. Although general social trust encourages supportive attitudes for redistributive policies in both high ($t=2.590, p\leq.010$) and low ($t=4.059, p\leq.001$) levels of social capital regions, it has a significant influence on government regulations on abortion ($t= -2.226, p\leq.027$) and gay rights ($t= -3.769, p\leq.001$) only in higher social capital regions, but not in lower social capital regions ($t=.360, p\leq.719, t=1.121, p\leq.263$). In other words, a group of people who are in social capital rich regions with higher general social trust support government regulations on morality issues, while a group of people who have higher general social trust but are in a region with low social capital do not have particular tendencies in morality policy attitudes (Tables 5-24 & 5-25).

Individuals in regions with either higher or lower levels of social capital present identical policy attitudes besides a little variation in the function of general social trust on morality policy attitudes. Compared to general social trust at the individual level that partially influences positive attitude for government regulation on one type of morality issue, gay rights, but not on the issue of abortion, policy attitudes become more homogeneous under a given regional levels of social capital. For instance, in higher social capital regions, general social trust always induces individuals' positive attitudes for government regulations on morality issues regardless

the types of different issues. In contrast, in lower social capital regions, it has no particular influence on any type of morality policy attitude. This finding supports theoretical arguments on discrepancies between individuals of micro and aggregates of macro political characteristics. As they are aggregated, political attitudes at the macro level become more orderly and seemingly uniform (Erikson and Tedin, 2007, p.93)

Nonetheless, overall findings under different regions are consistent with the tendency in the micro level of individuals' policy attitudes. As found in the previous section, higher social capital at the individual level induces conservative views toward abortion and gay rights, thus people care more about government regulations; and regional social capital circumstances do not change such tendencies of social capital on policy attitudes at the aggregate level. Therefore, the individual tendency is persistent at the aggregate level. This strong linear consistency with minimal variations between two different levels of approaches helps further development of theoretical connections of social capital dynamics across different levels of individuals and states.

Table 5-1. Party Identification and Social Capital

Demographics Party Affiliations	Network Intensiveness Mean (SD)	Network Extensiveness Mean (SD)	General Social Trust Mean (SD)
Strong Democrat	1.29(1.30)	1.84(1.94)	2.02(0.42)
Not Strong Democrat	0.98(1.17)	1.55(1.94)	1.97(0.44)
Independent Democrat	0.92(1.05)	1.65(1.81)	1.94(0.47)
Independent	0.77(0.98)	1.25(1.85)	1.94(0.42)
Independent Republican	0.91(1.07)	1.50(1.82)	2.06(0.47)
Not Strong Republican	1.13(1.12)	1.54(1.76)	2.09(0.50)
Strong Republican	1.64(1.25)	1.98(1.89)	2.08(0.51)
	F[6, 1456]=14.069 , p≤.001, N=1462	F[6, 1458]=3.972 , p≤.001, N=1464	F[6, 862]=2.554, p≤.019, N=868

Table 5-2. Party Identification and Networks Intensiveness and Extensiveness

Demographics Party Affiliations	No Intensiveness %	Single Intensiveness %	Multiple Intensiveness %	No Membership %	Single Membership %	Multiple Memberships %
Strong Democrat	33.86	31.08	35.06	33.07	21.12	45.82
Not Strong Democrat	44.31	30.59	25.10	41.02	23.44	35.55
Independent Democrat	45.38	29.23	25.38	35.88	18.32	45.80
Independent	50.18	30.32	19.49	49.28	21.58	29.14
Republican	45.24	30.95	23.81	37.60	28.00	34.40
Not Strong Republican	35.71	33.33	30.95	37.62	21.90	40.48
Strong Republican	18.69	34.58	46.73	26.64	23.83	49.53
	$\chi^2=77.003, p\leq.001$			$\chi^2=41.012, p\leq.001$		

Table 5-3. Gender and Social Capital

Demographics	Network Intensiveness Mean (SD)	Network Extensiveness Mean (SD)	General Social Trust Mean (SD)
Male	1.08 (1.19)	1.67 (1.92)	1.98 (0.47)
Female	1.11 (1.17)	1.56 (1.85)	2.05 (0.45)
F [1,1461]=0.235, p≤.628, N=1462 F [1, 1463]=1.067, p≤.302, N=1464 F[1, 867]=5.083, p≤.001, N=868			

Table 5-4. Gender and Network Intensiveness and Extensiveness

Demographics	No Intensiveness %	Single Intensiveness %	Multiple Intensiveness %	No Membership %	Single Membership %	Multiple Memberships %
Male	40.09	30.11	29.80	37.06	22.51	40.43
Female	37.81	32.64	29.56	38.55	22.41	39.04
$\chi^2=1.226, p\leq.542$			$\chi^2=.389, p\leq.823$			

Table 5-5. Age and Social Capital

Demographics	Network Intensiveness Mean (SD)	Network Extensiveness Mean (SD)	General Social Trust Mean (SD)
Less than 30 Years Old	0.79(1.01)	1.29 (1.79)	1.85(0.40)
More than 30 Years Old	1.17(1.20)	1.68(1.90)	2.05(0.47)
F [1, 1461]=24.148, p≤.001, N=1462		F [1, 1463]=10.106, p≤.002, N=1464	F[1, 867]=24.990, p≤.001, N=868

Table 5-6. Age and Network Intensiveness and Extensiveness

Demographics	No Intensiveness %	Single Intensiveness %	Multiple Intensiveness %	No Membership %	Single Membership %	Multiple Memberships %
Age						
Less than 30 Years Old	50.18	30.82	19.00	43.53	24.46	32.01
More than 30 Years Old	36.15	31.67	32.18	36.56	21.99	41.45
	$\chi^2=24.728, p\leq.001$			$\chi^2=8.551, p\leq.014$		

Table 5-7. Education and Social Capital

Demographics	Network Intensiveness Mean (SD)	Network Extensiveness Mean (SD)	General Social Trust Mean (SD)
Education			
Middle School	0.53(0.88)	0.74(1.29)	1.94(0.44)
High School	0.92(1.06)	1.27(1.61)	1.97(0.45)
Junior College	1.28(1.14)	1.69(1.87)	1.98(0.47)
Bachelor	1.49(1.24)	2.36(2.14)	2.09(0.48)
Graduate	1.87(1.34)	2.92(2.09)	2.21(0.47)
	F[4, 1458]=43.893, p \leq .001, N=1462	F [4, 1460]=51.546, p \leq .001, N=1464	F[4, 863]=6.432, p \leq .001, N=867

Table 5-8. Education and Network Intensiveness and Extensiveness

Demographics	No Intensiveness %	Single Intensiveness %	Multiple Intensiveness %	No Membership %	Single Membership %	Multiple Memberships %
Education						
Middle School	63.68	25.79	10.53	62.43	20.63	16.93
High School	42.84	35.33	21.83	42.78	24.39	32.83
Junior College	27.93	37.84	34.23	33.04	25.00	41.96
Bachelor	26.06	27.46	46.48	23.51	21.05	55.44
Graduate	19.31	22.76	57.93	13.10	15.86	71.03
	$\chi^2=180.147, p\leq.001$			$\chi^2=166.608, p\leq.001$		

Table 5-9. Ethnicity and Social Capital

Demographics Ethnicity Status	Network Intensiveness Mean (SD)	Network Extensiveness Mean (SD)	General Social Trust Mean (SD)
Minority	0.83 (1.06)	1.43 (2.00)	1.87(0.35)
Majority	1.17 (1.20)	1.66 (1.17)	2.05(0.48)
	F [1, 1461]=20.310, p<.001, N=1462	F[1, 1463]=3.500, p<.062, N=1464	F[1, 867]=21.258 , p<.001, N=868

Table 5-10. Ethnicity and Network Intensiveness and Extensiveness

Demographics Ethnicity Status	No Intensiveness %	Single Intensiveness %	Multiple Intensiveness %	No Membership %	Single Membership %	Multiple Memberships %
Minority	46.77	35.48	17.74	43.87	23.55	32.58
Majority	36.69	30.44	32.87	36.28	22.16	41.56
	$\chi^2=27.224, p<.001$			$\chi^2=8.896, p<.012$		

Table 5-11. Religiosity and Social Capital

Demographics Religious Strength	Network Intensiveness Mean (SD)	Network Extensiveness Mean (SD)	General Social Trust Mean (SD)
Not Religious	0.64 (0.94)	1.14 (1.66)	1.96 (0.41)
Not Very Religious	0.85 (1.09)	1.37 (1.71)	2.03 (0.48)
Somewhat Religious	1.18 (1.16)	1.40 (1.73)	2.08 (0.44)
Strongly Religious	1.49 (1.21)	2.07 (2.05)	2.00 (0.47)
	F [3, 1459]=44.652, p<.001, N=1462	F [3, 1461]=20.218, p<.001, N=1464	F [3, 865]=1.243, p<.293, N=868

Table 5-12. Religiosity and Network Intensiveness and Extensiveness

Demographics	No Intensiveness %	Single Intensiveness %	Multiple Intensiveness %	No Membership %	Single Membership %	Multiple Memberships %
Religious Strength						
Not Religious	59.91	22.91	17.18	49.12	24.12	26.75
Not Very Religious	51.16	25.19	23.64	42.05	24.22	33.72
Somewhat Religious	31.54	39.60	28.86	44.97	16.78	38.26
Strongly Religious	21.19	38.53	40.28	27.80	21.68	50.52
	$\chi^2=157.838, p\leq.001$			$\chi^2=61.862, p\leq.001$		

Table 5-13. Income and Social Capital

Demographics	Network Intensiveness Mean (SD)	Network Extensiveness Mean (SD)	General Social Trust Mean (SD)
Income			
Less than 4,999	0.87 (1.10)	1.49 (1.91)	1.92 (0.43)
Between 5,000-9,999	0.76 (0.92)	1.24 (1.70)	1.93 (0.43)
More than 10,000	1.22 (1.22)	1.76 (1.95)	2.04 (0.47)
	F [2, 891]=6.417, p \leq .002, N=893	F [2, 893]=2.503, p \leq .082, N=895	F[2, 514]=1.934, p \leq .146, N=868

Table 5-14. Income and Network Intensiveness and Extensiveness

Demographics	No Intensiveness %	Single Intensiveness %	Multiple Intensiveness %	No Membership %	Single Membership %	Multiple Memberships %
Income						
Less than 4,999	48.05	32.47	19.48	40.26	27.27	32.47
Between 5,000-9,999	47.46	35.59	16.95	51.72	17.24	31.03
More than 10,000	35.22	30.47	34.30	33.38	23.65	42.97
	$\chi^2=14.665, p\leq.005$			$\chi^2=10.670, p\leq.031$		

Table 5-15. Region and Social Capital

Demographics Region	Network Intensiveness Mean (SD)	Network Extensiveness Mean (SD)	General Social Trust Mean (SD)
New England	1.00 (1.00)	1.70 (1.98)	2.02 (0.52)
Middle Atlantic	1.27 (1.23)	1.72 (1.91)	2.03 (0.49)
East North Central	1.10 (1.17)	1.58 (1.78)	2.07 (0.46)
West North Central	1.15 (1.25)	1.72 (1.82)	2.06 (0.46)
South Atlantic	1.16 (1.20)	1.52 (1.86)	1.94 (0.43)
East South Central	1.18 (1.18)	1.76 (1.97)	2.06 (0.48)
West South Central	0.81 (1.02)	1.19 (1.98)	1.93 (0.43)
Mountain	1.24 (1.24)	2.01 (1.85)	2.11 (0.48)
Pacific	0.98 (1.14)	1.69 (1.86)	1.99 (0.47)
	F[8, 1462]=2.440, p≤.013, N=1462	F=[8, 1456]=1.896, p≤.057, N=1464	F[8, 860]=1.754, p≤.083, N=868

Table 5-16. Region and Network Intensiveness and Extensiveness

Demographics Region	No Intensiveness %	Single Intensiveness %	Multiple Intensiveness %	No Membership %	Single Membership %	Multiple Memberships %
New England	37.21	37.21	25.58	39.53	16.28	44.19
Middle Atlantic	36.13	25.13	38.74	34.03	22.51	43.46
East North Central	38.15	32.59	29.26	39.78	18.22	42.01
West North Central	37.11	35.05	27.84	32.65	25.51	41.84
South Atlantic	33.76	37.26	28.98	38.54	26.11	35.35
East South Central	33.73	32.53	33.73	34.94	21.69	43.37
West South Central	49.69	30.43	19.88	54.66	19.88	25.47
Mountain	36.73	24.49	38.78	24.49	28.57	46.94
Pacific	45.63	28.16	26.21	34.62	21.63	43.75
	$\chi^2=34.589, p\leq.005$			$\chi^2=40.041, p\leq.001$		

Table 5-17. Descriptive Social Capital

Dimensions of Social Capital	Mean(SD)	Percentage (%)	N
Network Intensiveness	0.908 (.823)		1463
Not active in any network		38.82	568
Active in single network		31.51	461
Active in multiple networks		29.67	434
Network Extensiveness	1.018 (.881)		1465
No membership		37.88	555
Single membership		22.46	329
Multiple memberships		39.66	581
General Trust	2.012 (.463)		869
Low trust		4.14	36
Moderate trust		71.12	618
High trust		24.74	215

Table 5-18. Correlations of Social Capital

	Network Intensiveness	Network Extensiveness	General Social Trust
Network Intensiveness	1.000		
Network Extensiveness	0.717***	1.000	
General Social Trust	-0.362***	-0.339***	1.000

***You need to define what your asterisks mean underneath each table

Table 5-19. Correlations of Network Intensiveness, Extensiveness, and General Social Trust

	Single Intensiveness	Multiple Intensiveness	Single Membership	Multiple Memberships	General Social Trust
Single Intensiveness	1.000				
Multiple Intensiveness	-0.190***	1.000			
Single membership	0.289***	0.049***	1.000		
Multiple memberships	0.165***	0.592***	-0.186***	1.000	
General social trust	-0.282***	-0.273***	-0.232***	-0.325***	1.000

Table 5-20. Social Capital and Redistributive Policy Attitudes

	Redistributive Policy			
	Coef.	t	sig.	
Constant		4.687	29.071	0.000
Party Identification		-0.117	-10.042	0.000
Ethnic Minority		0.110	1.847	0.065
Religiosity		-0.053	-2.504	0.012
Female		0.061	1.303	0.193
Age		-0.003	-1.682	0.093
Education		-0.016	-1.911	0.056
Income		0.005	0.554	0.579
Region High in Social Capital		0.080	1.334	0.182
Single Network Intensiveness		0.035	0.459	0.646
Multiple Network Intensiveness		0.081	0.905	0.366
Single Membership Extensiveness		-0.074	-0.905	0.365
Multiple Membership Extensiveness		-0.038	-0.460	0.646
General Social Trust		0.164	5.103	0.000

F [13, 1669]=13.949, $p \leq .001$, $R^2=0.098$, $N=1682$, *** $p \leq .01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$

Table 5-21. Social Capital and Government Activism Attitudes

	Government Activism		
	Coef.	t	sig.
Constant	4.924	24.106	0.000
Party Identification	-0.078	-5.252	0.000
Ethnic Minority	0.058	0.766	0.444
Religiosity	-0.005	-0.193	0.847
Female	0.096	1.628	0.104
Age	-0.003	-1.147	0.252
Education	-0.002	-0.173	0.863
Income	0.025	2.393	0.017
Region High in Social Capital	0.008	0.110	0.913
Single Network Intensiveness	-0.085	-0.876	0.381
Multiple Network Intensiveness	-0.020	-0.173	0.862
Single Membership Extensiveness	0.102	0.988	0.323
Multiple Membership Extensiveness	0.011	0.103	0.918
General Social Trust	-0.034	-0.839	0.402

F[13.1669]=3.606, p<.001, R²=0.027, N=1682, ***p<.01, **p<.05, * p<.10

Table 5-22. Social Capital and Attitudes toward Abortion

	Morality Policy: Abortion		
	Coef.	t	sig
Constant	0.048	0.130	0.897
Party Identification	-0.069	-2.583	0.010
Ethnic Minority	-0.167	-1.225	0.221
Religiosity	-0.082	-1.696	0.090
Female	0.029	0.276	0.782
Age	0.011	2.713	0.007
Education	0.120	6.070	0.000
Income	0.046	2.405	0.016
Region High in Social Capital	0.295	2.142	0.032
Single Network Intensiveness	-1.227	-6.976	0.000
Multiple Network Intensiveness	-1.156	-5.657	0.000
Single Membership Extensiveness	-1.434	-7.695	0.000
Multiple Membership Extensiveness	-1.368	-7.279	0.000
General Social Trust	-0.084	-1.141	0.254

F [13.1669]=37.427, p<.001, R²=0.226, N=1682, ***p<.01, **p<.05, * p<.10

Table 5-23. Social Capital and Attitudes toward Gay Rights

	Morality Policy: Gay Right		
	Coef.	t	sig
Constant	0.060	0.152	0.879
Party Identification	-0.010	-0.348	0.728
Ethnic Minority	-0.258	-1.761	0.078
Religiosity	0.023	0.444	0.657
Female	0.040	0.351	0.726
Age	0.002	0.368	0.713
Education	0.158	7.430	0.000
Income	0.050	2.446	0.015
Region High in Social Capital	0.218	1.472	0.141
Single Network Intensiveness	-1.594	-8.430	0.000
Multiple Network Intensiveness	-1.508	-6.862	0.000
Single Membership Extensiveness	-1.763	-8.797	0.000
Multiple Membership Extensiveness	-1.702	-8.426	0.000
General Social Trust	-0.179	-2.260	0.024

F[13, 1669]=46.914, p<.001, R²=0.262, N=1682, ***p<.01, **p<.05, * p<.10

Table 5-24. Regions with High Social Capital

High Social Capital	Redistributive Policy			Government Activism			Morality Policy: Abortion			Morality Policy: Gay Right		
	Coef.	t	sig.	Coef.	t	sig.	Coef.	t	sig.	Coef.	t	sig.
Constant	4.967	12.891	0.000	4.938	10.702	0.000	-0.279	-0.298	0.766	0.062	0.063	0.950
Party Identification	-0.150	-5.318	0.000	-0.098	-2.918	0.004	-0.111	-1.627	0.105	-0.053	-0.746	0.456
Ethnic Minority	-0.006	-0.028	0.977	0.532	2.178	0.030	0.214	0.431	0.667	0.309	0.600	0.549
Religiosity	0.027	0.531	0.596	-0.054	-0.876	0.382	-0.004	-0.032	0.974	0.102	0.780	0.436
Female	0.174	1.578	0.116	0.102	0.774	0.440	0.418	1.554	0.121	0.601	2.152	0.032
Age	-0.006	-1.515	0.131	-0.002	-0.347	0.729	0.021	2.103	0.036	0.016	1.577	0.116
Education	-0.033	-1.467	0.144	0.007	0.276	0.783	0.141	2.575	0.011	0.168	2.953	0.003
Income	0.007	0.369	0.713	0.020	0.915	0.361	0.058	1.324	0.187	0.030	0.665	0.507
Single Network Intensiveness	0.019	0.089	0.929	-0.131	-0.514	0.608	-1.514	-2.923	0.004	-1.932	-3.590	0.000
Multiple Network Intensiveness	0.090	0.384	0.701	0.369	1.310	0.191	-1.499	-2.620	0.009	-1.831	-3.083	0.002
Single Membership Extensiveness	-0.051	-0.257	0.798	-0.061	-0.256	0.798	-2.057	-4.239	0.000	-2.562	-5.083	0.000
Multiple Membership Extensiveness	-0.110	-0.496	0.620	-0.389	-1.461	0.145	-1.693	-3.131	0.002	-2.103	-3.745	0.000
General Social Trust	0.186	2.590	0.010	0.048	0.560	0.576	-0.390	-2.226	0.027	-0.685	-3.769	0.000
	F[12,286]=3.948, p≤.001, R ² =0.142, N=298			F[12.286]=2.382, p≤.006, R ² =0.091, N=298			F[12, 286]=9.673, p≤.001, R ² =0.289, N=298			F[12, 286]=12.097, p≤.001, R ² =0.262, N=298		

Table 5-25. Regions with Low Social Capital

	Redistributive Policy			Government Activism			Morality Policy: Abortion			Morality Policy: Gay Right		
	Coef.	t	sig.	Coef.	t	sig.	Coef.	t	sig.	Coef.	t	sig.
Constant	4.970	18.662	0.000	4.487	13.603	0.000	0.637	1.098	0.273	0.785	1.258	0.209
Party Identification	-0.120	-6.030	0.000	-0.072	-2.931	0.004	-0.044	-1.019	0.309	-0.012	-0.248	0.804
Ethnic Minority	0.111	1.151	0.250	0.023	0.193	0.847	-0.078	-0.373	0.709	-0.212	-0.937	0.349
Religiosity	-0.069	-1.870	0.062	-0.017	-0.377	0.706	-0.209	-2.591	0.010	-0.174	-2.008	0.045
Female	0.019	0.234	0.815	0.138	1.395	0.163	0.027	0.156	0.876	0.068	0.364	0.716
Age	-0.005	-1.845	0.066	-0.002	-0.617	0.537	0.004	0.644	0.520	-0.008	-1.090	0.276
Education	-0.021	-1.478	0.140	0.015	0.856	0.392	0.100	3.198	0.001	0.114	3.378	0.001
Income	-0.002	-0.158	0.874	0.039	2.249	0.025	0.044	1.456	0.146	0.076	2.357	0.019
Single Network Intensiveness	0.023	0.177	0.860	-0.119	-0.730	0.466	-1.304	-4.540	0.000	-1.568	-5.072	0.000
Multiple Network Intensiveness	0.095	0.580	0.562	-0.136	-0.673	0.501	-1.150	-3.229	0.001	-1.423	-3.712	0.000
Single Membership Extensiveness	-0.079	-0.543	0.588	0.266	1.470	0.142	-0.956	-3.007	0.003	-1.113	-3.252	0.001
Multiple Membership Extensiveness	0.013	0.085	0.932	0.276	1.465	0.144	-0.931	-2.809	0.005	-1.120	-3.138	0.002
General Social Trust	0.227	4.059	0.000	-0.022	-0.324	0.746	0.044	0.360	0.719	0.147	1.121	0.263
	F[12, 613]=6.554, p<.001, R ² =0.114, N=625			F[12, 613]=1.904, p<.031, R ² =0.036, N=625			F[12, 613]=13.095, p<.001, R ² =0.204, N=625			F[12, 613]=17.099, p<.001, R ² =0.251, N=625		

CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION

A single mother meets other single mothers in a day-care center. Those single mothers tend to experience financial and emotional difficulties. The common experiences which they share allows them to identify with one another and create more personal associations with each other than the fact that they are all single mothers. As a result of their shared experiences and personal interactions, they become alike in political beliefs and preferences.

Individuals' social lives are not predetermined elements and are not always translated directly into feelings towards political agendas because people react to various parts of politics using both explicit and implicit social interactions, such as cues in their political thinking (Conover, 1988, pp.62, 65). Based on this logic, my study argued that different elements of social capital would be activated or elevated by different types of political agendas and would vary in their influence on certain types of policy attitudes.

Demographics

Overall, in preliminary analyses, my study found that there is a relevant association between individuals' demographic factors and social capital. Individuals who have strong partisanship, and are older, more educated, and part of the ethnic majority (the White) tend to be more intensively involved in multiple social networks with higher levels of trust than people who have no, or lower levels of partisanship, and are younger, less educated, and part of the ethnic minority. However, gender has relevance only with general social trust; females are more likely to believe that people are trustful, helpful, and fair than are males. People who are very religious engage in social networks more intensively and extensively, but have similar levels of social trust toward the general public, compared to less religious individuals. In addition, in spite of some variations, different geographical regions have different levels of social capital. The

Mountain region, including states such as Nevada, Montana, and Wyoming has higher levels of social capital compared to the West or South East regions, which includes states such as Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama.

Stereotypically, liberals are more in favor of welfare programs and spending money, while conservatives favor free enterprise. “Conservatives are seen as moralistic and religious; however liberals are seen as having more flexible moral standards and not as religious.” Reflectively, Republicans have been seen as moralistic and Democrats as permissive in American politics (Erikson and Tedin, 2007, p.75, 86). Several previous researchers observed that “the American public is ideologically conservative but operationally liberal” (Free and Cantril 1967; Cantril and Cantril, 1999). Therefore, the overall majority of Americans tend to support government spending on various welfare policies (Erickson and Tedin, 2007, p.95).

More educated individuals tend to be more liberal in moral based types of public policies, such as abortion and gay rights; but less educated individuals are more likely to support “social-welfare spending issues, such as a guaranteed job and standard of living, national health insurance, and increased government services” (Erikson and Tedin, 2007, pp. 64-5).

Among various demographic factors, religion is one of the most comprehensive social networks in U.S. society. Individuals active in religious networks are more likely to “associate with other forms of civic involvement, like voting, jury service, community projects, talking with neighbors, and giving to charity”. More importantly, religiosity has been a powerful indicator of civic engagement, especially for voluntary and cultural networks (Putnam, 2000, pp.66-7).

Lastly, regarding research that shows that ethnic minorities such as Hispanics and Blacks have suffered seriously from lack of health insurance (Cochran, et al., 2006, p.256), it is natural

that ethnic minorities tend to share less social capital, but are more supportive of liberal political approaches such as social welfare policies.

Social Networks

In terms of dimensional relationships between multiple aspects social capital, according to correlation tests, individuals who are intensively involved in a single social network tend not to engage intensively in other types of networks. It seems reasonable to think that those that already had a single membership are less likely to obtain other types of membership. This finding indicates that social interactions do not unlimitedly occupy individuals' lives. People who are already intensively involved in any social network they prefer, often have less time to dedicate to other social networks. In addition, people who already have any type of social membership do not have any motivation or desire to be a member of other social associations.

According to multiple regression tests in my study, network intensiveness and extensiveness are related only to morality based policy attitudes, but are not relevant to redistributive and government activism attitudes. In addition, unlike the study that expected memberships in multiple group associations to increase political tolerance towards various social issues (Cigler and Joslyn, 2002), individuals who are in multiple social networks still tend to put greater values on societal order and morality over individuals' freedom to choose. According to results of regressions excluding elements of religious networks, the statistical significances are still identical with the model with regard to all types of social networks. Therefore, there are no overwhelming effects of religious networks on participants' conservative policy attitudes.

Therefore, the result implies that having any type of social membership increases individuals' morality values on social orders, thus the members are more supportive of stronger governmental control on morality based social issues. This tendency is more dominant in people

who engage in one homogeneous social network that shares less attitudes of benevolence and tolerance to differences (Putnam, 2000, p.341).

General Social Trust

General social trust has some contradictory characteristics of social capital against other elements of social capital, such as network intensiveness and extensiveness. In addition, the relationship between individuals' levels of trust toward the general public and various policy attitudes is not always consistent. For instance, general social trust is highly related to positive attitudes toward government redistributive policies and certain morality policies, such as gay rights, but has no relevance to policy attitudes toward government activism and other types of morality issues regarding abortion.

There could be several explanations about the dynamic implications of general social trust. First of all, social trust itself contains attitude ambivalence, and the ambivalence becomes more prevalent when it is directed toward different objects in different degrees of political situations and social environments (Craig, Martinez, Kane, and Gainous, 2005). Second, the levels of trust vary and are not linear: the maximum level of general social networks could be less positively related to social tolerance compared to moderate level of social trust (Hardin, 2002). Social trust is initially built up through interpersonal relations. Therefore, beyond certain interpersonal connections or relevant boundaries, individuals tend to withdraw their social trust (Earle and Cvetkovich, 1995, p.10-11). Therefore, general social trust could be less prevalent among individuals who belong to any social network boundaries than in people who were not in any social network.

In addition, "people who trust others are all-round good citizens, and those more engaged in community life are both more trusting and more trustworthy" (Putnam, 2000, p.137).

However, as Hero points out (2003), a greater level of social capital can isolate the minority and

ignore certain policies that are related to those people while benefiting the majority in the society. “Racially homogeneous states do well on aggregate indicators of policy, but often have very disparate relative examples of outcomes for racial ethnic minorities (p.402).” Therefore, future research should further investigate more sophisticated social trust measurements and the resulting implications.

Divergence of Policy Attitudes

In terms of redistributive policy attitudes, individuals who have higher levels of general social trust are more likely to support government redistributive policies that would help the ‘have-nots’, however other elements of social capital, such as social networks, do not have any significant influence on such policy attitudes. This result reflects the different functions of social capital on even the same types of policy attitudes.

Moreover, multiple elements of social capital do not have any influence on policy attitudes toward government activism that would often create public good. This finding could be the result of particular tenets of government activism that are supposed to create and improve general social good. For government activism, Americans have mixed preferences of wanting both private choices/management and government intervention for subsidies (Erikson and Tedin, 2007, p.97). Regarding Putnam’s arguments that social networks and associations help citizens resolve collective problems easily, develop character traits that are good for the rest of society (Putman, 2000, pp.288-90), facilitate communication, improve the flow of information, and stabilize collaboration (Putnam, 1993, pp.173-74), a high level of social capital can even reduce desire or the necessity of government actions. In addition, such different statistical significances for redistributive and government activism are already suggested by previous scholars, such as Lane (2000) and Wlezien (1995), who argued for contradictory and ambivalent policy attitudes

toward different areas of redistributive and government activism policies among general American publics.

According to other findings in my research, individuals' social life patterns have the strongest relevance with policy attitudes toward government morality policies on issues like abortion and gay rights, among other types of government policies. As long as individuals engage in any type of social network, they are more likely to support government regulations on abortion and gay issues, placing greater value on social morality over individuals' freedom to choose. General social trust, however, induces individuals' preferences on government regulations on gay rights, but not on abortion.

These results reflect an incidence of social capital that not only makes people tolerant to social diversity, but also creates undesirable group attitudes, group differences, and societal isolations (White, 2003). For instance, individuals in small towns are highly engaged in their community life, but they tend to be less tolerant of differences and diversities (Putnam, 2000, p.352). Because social capital is often easily established by race, gender, and political affiliations, individuals within such social networks are less likely to understand people from other societal or political sectors. Small communities and highly committed neighborhoods are less tolerant of homosexual teachers and interracial marriages for people within their own communities (Putnam, 2000, p.352-53). Considering such a down-side of social capital, a strong and narrow level of social capital can constrain an individual's freedom to choose and require governmental regulations on societal orders (Schudson, 1998).

According to Feldman and Zaller (1992), people use diverse values, such as individualism, humanitarianism, or personal attitudes against big government, in determining their attitudes toward multiple policies. Therefore, there exist significant levels of attitude ambivalence in their

issue positions. The attitudinal ambivalence seems more predominant on governmental welfare and morality policy types. Individuals' ideological innocence results in positive attitudes toward benevolence to the have-nots and social morality. However, it creates problems by unaware practical political tensions with inconsistent policy attitudes and preferences for welfare or social policies (Feldman and Zaller, 1992, pp.268-69). All public policies have two sides, the effects and counter-effects. These policies are fixing certain parts of the political problem and benefiting certain groups of people, however they also constrain some other parts of society and groups of people. Therefore, the conflict of ideological justifications and the practical operations have been difficult for policy reformers, especially for welfare reformers (Feldman and Zaller, 1992, pp.270-71), and perpetuates individuals' ambivalent policy attitudes (Craig, Martinez, Kane, and Gainous, 2005).

Overall, although a large element of social capital, such as the levels of social trust, become more indistinguishable across different regions (Hetherington, 2005, p.21), regional differences on political and social culture have existed. Public opinion or attitudes at the macro level of aggregation are far more orderly than single answers at the micro levels of the individual. Although some individual tendencies can be cancelled out at the macro level, the macro level of attitudes was seemingly uniform and appeared obvious (Erikson and Tedin, 2007, p.93). Future research needs to address and explore the different effects of an element of social capital at the individual level and the aggregated level of regions on political attitudes.

There are variations in different aspects of social capital in predicting political consequences (Cigler and Joslyn, 2002). Individuals use different cues to determine their political attitudes and their surroundings provide important cues. Based on how intensively and broadly individuals engage in social networks, they view certain issues in more or less positive

ways (Stolle and Rochon, 2001). Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that different dimensions of social networks are activated by different issues. Among various different types of policy attitudes, government activism attitudes are less likely to relate to general social networks and morality policy attitudes are more strongly related to all elements of social capital. As the study predicted, various elements of social capital influence different policy attitudes in various ways.

Policy itself has multiple dimensions in purpose, process, and outcomes. Various political structures and individuals' predispositions determined different policy preferences and induced the government to end up with certain policy choices accordingly. For instance, homogeneous communities adopt 'areal' policies, but heterogeneous communities will adapt 'segmental' policies to satisfy diverse people (McCool, 1995, p.211).

Although the majority of individuals' political attitudes, especially policy preferences, are highly related to their own interests, a great part of their preferences are determined by political predispositions and socially shared values (Erikson and Tedin, 2007, p.65). Formal political evidence and the connection with social capital are not yet clearly shown in the academic world (Putnam, 2000, p.146).

Despite some limitation for clear causations between multiple dimensions of social capital and various policy attitudes due to uncontrollable variations, this research is coherent and parsimonious since policy attitudes and preferences tend to be more consistent and tractable than any other political attitudes. In addition, policy attitudes can be easily summarized based on attitudes towards specific public policies (Erikson and Tedin, 2007, pp. 9-18). Therefore, the patterns between multi-dimensional social capital and specific policy attitudes are more likely to be reliable.

In conclusion, it is important to understand the potential effect of social capital not only on individuals' policy preferences at the level of individual, but also on direct policy efficiency at the macro level of government on more specific policy issues such as education, poverty, employment, housing, and other living environment (The National Economic and Social Forum, 2003). Further research needs to be done to construct more reliable and valid causations.

APPENDIX A
SOCIAL CAPITAL

Social Network Intensiveness

- Indicate whether you belong to a political party (Never belonged (1), used to belong (2), belong but do not participate (3), belong and actively participate (4))
- Indicate whether you belong to a trade union or professional association (Never belonged (1), used to belong (2), belong but do not participate (3), belong and actively participate (4))
- Indicate whether you belong to a church or other religious organization (Never belonged (1), used to belong (2), belong but do not participate (3), belong and actively participate (4))
- Indicate whether you belong to a sports, leisure, or cultural groups (Never belonged (1), used to belong (2), belong but do not participate (3), belong and actively participate (4))
- Indicate whether you belong to another voluntary association (Never belonged (1), used to belong (2), belong but do not participate (3), belong and actively participate (4))

*Robert Putnam’s social capital index (2000, pp.27, 291); Kwak, Shan, and Holbert (2004)’ categorization; Letki (2004)’s membership categorization

Table A-1. Factor Analysis on Social Network Intensiveness

Factor	Component
belongs to a political party	0.871
belongs to a trade union or professional association	0.854
belongs to a church or other religious organization	0.886
belongs to a sports, leisure, or cultural group	0.889
belongs to another voluntary association	0.888

Social Network Extensiveness (Sum of memberships)

- Whether you have a membership in fraternal group (Q: We would like to know something about the groups or organizations to which individuals belong. Here is a list of various organizations. Could you tell me whether or not you are a member of fraternal group? no (0), yes (1))
- Whether you have a membership in service group (Q: We would like to know something about the groups or organizations to which individuals belong. Here is a list of various organizations. Could you tell me whether or not you are a member of service group? no (0), yes (1))
- Whether you have a membership in political club (Q: We would like to know something about the groups or organizations to which individuals belong. Here is a list of various

- organizations. Could you tell me whether or not you are a member of political club? no (0), yes (1))
- Whether you have a membership in labor union (Q: We would like to know something about the groups or organizations to which individuals belong. Here is a list of various organizations. Could you tell me whether or not you are a member of labor union? no (0), yes (1))
 - Whether you have a membership in sports club (Q: We would like to know something about the groups or organizations to which individuals belong. Here is a list of various organizations. Could you tell me whether or not you are a member of sports club? no (0), yes (1))
 - Whether you have a membership in youth group (Q: We would like to know something about the groups or organizations to which individuals belong. Here is a list of various organizations. Could you tell me whether or not you are a member of youth group? no (0), yes (1))
 - Whether you have a membership in school service (Q: We would like to know something about the groups or organizations to which individuals belong. Here is a list of various organizations. Could you tell me whether or not you are a member of school service? no (0), yes (1))
 - Whether you have a membership in hobby club (Q: We would like to know something about the groups or organizations to which individuals belong. Here is a list of various organizations. Could you tell me whether or not you are a member of hobby club? no (0), yes (1))
 - Whether you have a membership in school fraternity (Q: We would like to know something about the groups or organizations to which individuals belong. Here is a list of various organizations. Could you tell me whether or not you are a member of school fraternity? no (0), yes (1))
 - Whether you have a membership in nationality group (Q: We would like to know something about the groups or organizations to which individuals belong. Here is a list of various organizations. Could you tell me whether or not you are a member of nationality group? no (0), yes (1))
 - Whether you have a membership in farm organization (Q: We would like to know something about the groups or organizations to which individuals belong. Here is a list of various organizations. Could you tell me whether or not you are a member of farm organization? no (0), yes (1))
 - Whether you have a membership in literary or art group (Q: We would like to know something about the groups or organizations to which individuals belong. Here is a list of various organizations. Could you tell me whether or not you are a member of art group? no (0), yes (1))

- Whether you have a membership in church group (Q: We would like to know something about the groups or organizations to which individuals belong. Here is a list of various organizations. Could you tell me whether or not you are a member of church group? no (0), yes (1))
- Whether you have a membership in veteran group (Q: We would like to know something about the groups or organizations to which individuals belong. Here is a list of various organizations. Could you tell me whether or not you are a member of veteran group? no (0), yes (1))
- Whether you have a membership in professional society (Q: We would like to know something about the groups or organizations to which individuals belong. Here is a list of various organizations. Could you tell me whether or not you are a member of professional society? no (0), yes (1))
- Whether you have a membership in any other (Q: We would like to know something about the groups or organizations to which individuals belong. Here is a list of various organizations. Could you tell me whether or not you are a member of any other? no (0), yes (1))

*Allan Cigler and Mark Joslyn (2002)'s study, "The extensiveness of group membership and social connectedness"

Table A-2. Factor Analysis on Social Network Extensiveness

Factor	Component
membership in fraternal group	0.419
membership in service group	0.595
membership in veteran group	0.228
membership in political club	0.384
membership in labor union	0.249
membership in sports club	0.552
membership in youth group	0.558
membership in school service	0.560
membership in hobby club	0.439
membership in school fraternity	0.398
membership in nationality group	0.245
membership in farm organization	0.235
membership in literary or art group	0.521
membership in professional society	0.614
membership in church group	0.623
membership in any other	0.292

General Social Trust (Mean of three trust scale)

- Whether people helpful or looking out for themselves (Q: Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves? Not helpful (1), Depends (2), Helpful (3))
- Whether people are fair or try to take advantage of others (Q: Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair? Take advantage (1), Depends (2), Fair (3))
- Whether people can be trusted (Q: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in life? Cannot trust (1), Depends (2), Trust (2))

*Putnam (2000); Letki (2004); James Gibson (2001)'s index

Table A-3. Factor Analysis on General Social Trust

Factor	Component
Helpful	0.780
Trust	0.735
Fair	0.795

APPENDIX B
POLICY ATTITUDES

Redistributive Policy

- Whether government should reduce income differences (Q: Some people think that the government in Washington ought to reduce the income differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the government should not concern itself with reducing this income difference between the rich and the poor. Here is a card with a scale from 1 to 7. Think of a score of 7 as meaning that the government ought to reduce the income differences between rich and poor, and a score of 1 meaning that the government should not concern itself with reducing income differences. What score between 1 and 7 comes closest to the way you feel? (Government should not (1), Government should (7))

- Whether government should improve standard of living (Q: I'd like to talk with you about issues some people tell us are important. Please look at CARD BC. Some people think that the government in Washington should do everything possible to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans; they are at Point 1 on this card. Other people think it is not the government's responsibility, and that each person should take care of himself; they are at Point 5. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you have up your mind on this? (Rescaled to Government should not (1), Government should (7))

- Whether government should help pay for medical care (Q: In general, some people think that it is the responsibility of the government in Washington to see to it that people have help in paying for doctors and hospital bills. Others think that these matters are not the responsibility of the federal government and that people should take care of these things themselves. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this? (Government should not (1), Government should (7))

Table B-1. Factor Analysis on Redistributive Policies

Factor	Component
improve standard of living	0.816
reduce income should government reduce income differences	0.784
help pay for medical care	0.740

Government Activism

- Whether government needs to do more to improve & protect national health (Q: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on improving & protecting nations health? Too much done (1), About Right (4), Too little done (7))

- Whether government needs to do more to improve nations education system (Q: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on improving national education system? Too much done (1), About Right (4), Too little done (7))
- Whether government needs to do more to improve & protect environment (Q: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on improving and protecting the environment? Too much done (1), About Right (4), Too little done (7))
- Whether government needs to do more to solve problems of big cities (Q: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on solving problems of big cities? Too much done (1), About Right (4), Too little done (7))

Table B-2. Factor Analysis on Government Activism

Factor	Component
improving & protecting nations health	0.829
improving nations education system	0.823
improving & protecting environment	0.782
solving problems of big cities	0.576

Morality policy

On Abortion

- Whether allow abortion: Defect in the baby (Q: Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion, if there is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby? No (1), Yes (7))
- Whether allow abortion: No more children (Q: Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion If she is married and does not want any more children? No (1), Yes (7))
- Whether allow abortion: Endangered by the pregnancy (Q: Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion, if the woman's own health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy? No (1), Yes (7))

- Whether allow abortion: Poverty (Q: Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion, if the family has a very low income and cannot afford any more children? No (1), Yes (7))
- Whether allow abortion: Rape (Q: Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion, if she became pregnant as a result of rape? No (1), Yes (7))
- Whether allow abortion: Unwanted marriage (Q: Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion, if she is not married and does not want to marry the man? No (1), Yes (7))
- Whether allow abortion: Any reason (Q: Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion, if the woman wants it for any reason? No (1), Yes (7))

Table B-3. Factor Analysis on Abortion

Factor	Component
not married	0.889
wants no more children	0.872
cant afford more children	0.871
any reason	0.866
serious defect	0.717
rape	0.693
health seriously endangered	0.584

On Gay Rights

- Whether allow homosexual sex relations (Q: What about sexual relations between two adults of the same s e x d o you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all? Always wrong (1), Almost always wrong (3), Depends (4), Sometimes wrong (5), Not wrong at all (7))
- Whether allow homosexual to speak (Q: Should a men who admits that he is a homosexual be allowed to speak and make a speech in your community, or not? Not allow(1), Allow(7))
- Whether allow homosexuals to teach (Q: Should a men who admits that he is a homosexual be allowed to teach in a collage or university, or not? Not allow(1), Allow(7))
- Whether allow homosexuality books(Q: If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote in favor of homosexuality should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not? Remove(1), Not Remove(7))

Table B-4. Factor analysis on gay rights

Factor	Component
homosexual to teach	0.826
homosexual to speak	0.810
homosexuals book in library	0.769
homosexual sex relations	0.605

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Hyun Jung Yun grew up in South Korea and completed her undergraduate work majoring in Political Science at Ajou University. Starting with her undergraduate senior year as an exchange student, she continued her master's degree studying in political science and doctorate in the fields of 'political science' and 'journalism and communications' at the University of Florida in the United States of America

Her research interests are in political perception, the political communication process, policy attitudes, persuasion, and geopolitics across different levels of the individual, small group, and aggregate group. More specifically, her research in the field of political communication explores the relationship between political information process and individuals' political attitudes in different geopolitical circumstance. In the same line of interdisciplinary research, her research in political science investigates how individuals' beliefs about various policies are influenced by varying levels of multi-dimensional social capital and communication networks.

Her research in journal publications demonstrates how individuals' political perceptions and attitudes are influenced by political predispositions within a group and by political resources within a given political and media system at the aggregate level. In addition, she had coauthored several book chapters examining news coverage of policy issues and political candidates across different political regions to observe the relationship between different political characteristics and political information effects. She is currently working on analyzing the dual spirals of silence in policy opinion formation between issue minority and issue majority, effects of relationship between media and politics on voter perceptions, as well as political cynicism and information efficacy in young voters.

She also has participated in grant-supported research projects including the Florida Department of Health's 2004 Project in Media Terrorism Preparation under Dr. Mary Ann

Ferguson and Dr. Lynda Lee Kaid, Uvote inter-university research on U.S. elections under Dr. Lynda Lee Kaid, and United States Election Assistance Commission's project establishing election law database under Dr. Lynda Lee Kaid and Dr. Cliff Jones. The former project dealt with media advocacy, government public information, and issue management on terrorism. The Uvote research has focused on political advocacy and political information effects. The development of electronic database of U.S. election laws intended to provide U.S. citizens easy internet search function for comprehensive U.S. election law. She has worked for these projects as a data analyst and project manager.

She also worked as data archiving assistant for ICPSR (Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research) for a part of graduate assistantship duty. She was trained in advanced methodology through ICPSR as well as by the departments of statistics, political science, and journalism and mass communications. Her methodological training across different fields includes managements of data through various applications and various levels of statistics such as linear regression, categorical analysis, multivariate analysis, maximum likelihood analysis, game theory, content analysis, scaling, and measurement.

Her next project is to collect linearly coherent multi-level data that links individual perceptions, attitudes, and preferences with the aggregate level of media and political predispositions in different political regions, election turnouts, policy efficiency, and other media-politics routines in order to conduct research with theoretically reliable connections across different levels of dynamics.

Hyun Jung Yun who has two doctorate degrees, one in political science and the other in journalism and communications, will work as an assistant professor at Texas State University starting from August 2007.