DO THEY REALLY HATE US?
THE LIMITS OF U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

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To my parents and teachers, who have taught me to discriminate between right and wrong.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ......................................................................................................................... 4

ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................................... 7

CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. 8

2 RESEARCH METHODS .................................................................................................................. 15

3 HISTORICAL REVIEW .................................................................................................................. 23

   The 1940s: Uncharted Waters .................................................................................................... 23
   The 1950s: Emergence of an Alliance ......................................................................................... 25
   The 1960s: Decade of Stalemate ................................................................................................. 26
   The 1970s: Alliance Crumbles .................................................................................................... 28
   The 1980s: Partners, Not Allies ................................................................................................. 29
   The 1990s: Decade of Decay ...................................................................................................... 36
   The 2000s: War on Terror ........................................................................................................... 40

4 INTERVIEW FINDINGS .................................................................................................................. 47

   Do Pakistanis Hate the U.S.? ......................................................................................................... 47
      Military Elites ............................................................................................................................ 47
      Modernizing Elites ................................................................................................................... 53
      Religious Elites ........................................................................................................................ 55
   The U.S. “War on Terror” and Pakistan ...................................................................................... 56
      Military Elites ............................................................................................................................ 56
      Modernizing Elites ................................................................................................................... 59
      Religious Elites ........................................................................................................................ 61
   Pakistan and the Taliban ............................................................................................................. 62
      Military Elites ............................................................................................................................ 62
      Modernizing Elites ................................................................................................................... 64
      Religious Elites ........................................................................................................................ 66

5 IMPLICATIONS .................................................................................................................................. 67

6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................... 75

APPENDIX

A INTERVIEWEE LIST ..................................................................................................................... 80

B INTERVIEW GUIDE ..................................................................................................................... 82
Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

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After the tragic events of 9/11, the U.S. public searched for reasons for these horrific attacks. President George W. Bush and like-minded others reasoned that hatred for U.S. freedom by terrorists was the prime reason for the attack. Is it U.S. freedom or something else that is fomenting resentment toward the United States? To answer this question a study was conducted to survey opinions of Pakistani elites in the context of contemporary U.S.-Pakistan relations. Pakistani politics are complex, but there are three main ruling factions: the military, lay elites (politicians, bureaucrats, business people, and academics), and the clerics. Therefore, the opinions of military elites, modernizing elites, and religious elites were studied. Semi-structured interviews were used to collect data. These interviews allowed the researcher to explore the perspectives and perceptions of these important stakeholders.

The findings of this study contradict President Bush’s assertion that freedoms enjoyed in the U.S. foment hatred. Rather, U.S. foreign policy was found to be the real reason for animosity toward the U.S. This study also analyzed why current U.S. public diplomacy has failed to achieve the desired results and how public policy can be modified to help assuage Pakistani ill feelings toward the U.S.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

In rationalizing his “War on Terror,” President Bush said, “Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this chamber--a democratically elected government. . . . They hate our freedoms--our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.”¹

A Herald-Gallup poll conducted after the breakout of the Iraq war in 2003 found that 69% of Pakistanis said they would “hurt America where possible.”² But do “they” really hate our freedom or it is something else they detest? According to James Zogby, president of the Arab American Institute, people in general do not hate American people or American culture. They enjoy American music, movies, and food. “It's not our values, it's not our democracy, it's not our freedom . . . it's [American foreign] policy they don't like,” he says.³

Rather than creating friends in the Middle East, United States (U.S.) foreign policy and public diplomacy seems to be particularly adept at creating more enemies. “The very people whom the United States wanted to encourage to promote democracy from Bahrain to Casablanca instead feel trapped by a policy that they now ridicule more or less as ‘destroying the region in order to save it,’” writes Neil MacFarquhar of The New York Times.⁴ The only strategy employed in the war on terrorism is “brute force,” misleading us into believing that total annihilation of our unknown enemy through force is the only way to ensure long lasting world

peace. However, unlike many other threats faced by the world, terrorism is not a tangible enemy: terrorism is an ideology thriving on the disempowerment and impoverishment of our fellow human beings. “The U.S. is not waging war against Iraq, or Baathists, or even Muslims. It is not fighting a place or entity but a concept—‘terrorism.’ What enemy can be more of a phantom, impossible to kill or contain, than an idea?” says Robert Sparkland, a contributor to the Seattle Post-Intelligencer.5

After 9/11, President Bush appeared to accept that the U.S. is unsuccessful in reaching out to the Arab and Muslim world when he said, “We are not doing a very good job of getting our message out.”6 Furthermore, President Bush also wondered why the Arab world fails to understand what the U.S. really stands for.7 “When one is not understood by the other, it is often an indication that one does not understand the other either.”8 This also means that, as far as the Muslim world is concerned, U.S. public diplomacy is ineffective and has failed to reach its objectives of winning the hearts and minds of Muslims. Public diplomacy is defined as a “government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understandings for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institution and culture, as well as its national goal and current policies.”9 Successful public diplomacy is a communication that is “two-way reciprocal rather than simply one-way with America dictating its policy to others.”10

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7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.


10 Zaharna, “American Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World.”
While addressing the joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, President Bush said, “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”

Responding to President Bush’s statement, Zaharna, a contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus, said, “Such ultimatums are often perceived as threats and initiate a cycle of defensive communication in which the audience is immediately cued to get their guard up. Defiance, not cooperation, is often the response.”

It is imperative that we find a new strategy to deal with the concept of defeating terrorism. One of the stratagems that can defeat terrorism is the ideology of economic well-being and prosperity. British Prime Minister Tony Blair said, “Poverty and instability lead to weak states which can become heavens for terrorists and other criminals.” According to John D. Negroponte, the U.S. director of national intelligence, “entrenched grievances such as corruption and injustice and the slow pace of economic, social and political change in most Muslim-majority nations all continue to fuel the global jihadist movement.”

This means that the U.S. needs to realign and refocus its war on terror tactics and employ public diplomacy to foster better relations with Muslim world. This requires understanding the real reasons for resentment toward the U.S.

The purpose of this study is to examine U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy and its effects on elite Pakistani attitudes toward the U.S. It is the thesis of this study that those attitudes vary

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11 Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People.”
12 Zaharna, “American Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World.”
widely and have multiple origins, the understanding of which can lead to a new approach to
public diplomacy geared toward winning the hearts and minds of the people of Pakistan.

According to Stephen Cohen, a fellow at the Brookings Institute, Pakistan has been ruled
by a “secular establishment.”\textsuperscript{15} It consists of “an oligarchy consisting of less than one thousand
military, political, bureaucratic, business, and media elites.”\textsuperscript{16} According to Tariq Rahim, a
contributor to the book \emph{A History of Pakistan and Its Politics}, at the onset of Pakistan’s
independence from Great Britain, there were three main “protagonist” groups vying to set the
constitutional and ideological agenda for the future of the newly born nation: the secularizing
elites, the modernists, and the men of religion.\textsuperscript{17} The secularizing elites consisted of three main
elements. The first group was of bureaucrats and civil servants who had served during British
occupation, the British-trained military, and the elite lawyers. This group believed in the
ideology that “religion and politics must be kept separate” from each other.\textsuperscript{18} The second group,
“the modernists,” was comprised of politicians who were members of the Muslim League, the
political party most involved in Pakistan’s independence from Great Britain. This group wanted
to ingrain Islamic values into Pakistani politics and constitution, but they were “reluctant to
abandon their own political culture—that of a western-style democracy on the British model,
where laws are made by elected assemblies. They simply wanted to impart an Islamic legitimacy
to their own institutions,” writes Rahim.\textsuperscript{19} Lastly, the “men of religion” were followers of
orthodox Islam, thus religiously and politically conservative. They wanted to reorganize or

\textsuperscript{15} Stephen Cohen, “The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan,” \emph{The Washington Quarterly}, (Summer 2003):
http://www.twq.com/03summer/docs/03summer_cohen.pdf.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{17} Christophe Jaafarlot, ed., \emph{A History of Pakistan and Its Origins} (London: Anthem Press, 2004), 240.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 241.
“even replace western style institutions on the basis of medieval precedents.” The Jamaat-i-Islami and Jamiat-ul Ulma Islam were the key players in this group.

Since independence, Pakistan has had three different constitutions and suffered four military coups. According to Saeed Shafqat, author of the book Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, since its independence, Pakistan has failed to establish a stable and working political structure; instead, the search has evolved into two “political contradictions”: a military-hegemonic political system and a party-dominated political system. The military-hegemonic political system’s “primary objective was to curb participatory politics and subordinate the political parties and other autonomous interest groups to military hegemony.” On the other hand, the party-dominated political system’s “primary concern was to subordinate the military-bureaucratic elites to civilian-led party dominance, and to build an alternative to military rule.”

The military plays a key role in the political affairs of Pakistan. According to Iftikhar Malik, author of the book State and Civil Society in Pakistan, “Pakistan’s polity has been under the influence of the military through most of its history, and even when not in power [the military] has been ‘behind the steering wheel.’” According to Stephen Cohen, “Pakistan’s history shows that the army cannot run Pakistan effectively by itself but the army is also unwilling to entrust civilians completely with the job.”

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20 Ibid., 241-242.
21 Ibid., 243.
22 Ibid., 61.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
independence, the Pakistan Army has ruled the country for almost thirty years, clearly making it a major source of political power in Pakistan.

In the early days of its independence, Pakistan was essentially a dominant-party political system, ruled by the Pakistan Muslim League (PML). The degeneration and intra-party splits within the PML led to a multiple party system.\textsuperscript{28} After the most recent parliamentary election held in 2002, the Pakistan Muslim League (QA) [PML (QA)], the current ruling party and a splinter group of the PML, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), and Pakistan Muslim League (N) [PML (N)], another splinter group the of Pakistan Muslim league, have emerged as the three main modernist political parties.\textsuperscript{29}

For the first time in the history of Pakistan, the 2002 elections resulted in the emergence of an Islamic party, the Mutttahida Majlis Amal (MMA), as political contenders. Before these elections, religious hardliners were never able to acquire even 5% of the total vote.\textsuperscript{30} Polling 12.28\% of the total vote in 2002, MMA won 58 parliament seats out of a total of 342.\textsuperscript{31} They also became the main opposition party at the national level. At the provincial level, MMA was able to form its government in North West Frontier Province and a collation government in Baluchistan province.\textsuperscript{32}

According to a public opinion poll conducted last year in Pakistan by the International Republican Institute, President Pervez Musharraf, a military general, was the most popular leader


\textsuperscript{32} Cohen, “The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan,” 9.
in Pakistan. He was closely followed by Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, a member of PML (QA), former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, the president of PPP, and former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharrif, the president of PML(N).\footnote{Dawn, “Musharraf ahead of Benazir, Nawaz in Popularity Poll,” December 16, 2006, http://www.dawn.com/2006/12/16/top1.htm.}
CHAPTER 2
RESEARCH METHODS

There are three main purposes of social research: exploration, description, and explanation. An exploratory study is conducted “to develop an initial, rough understanding of some phenomenon.” Descriptive studies are conducted to precisely measure and to report about certain characteristics of a certain population. According to Earl Babbie, “Explanation is the discovery and reporting of relationships among different aspects of the phenomenon under study. Whereas descriptive studies answer the “What’s so?” explanatory ones tend to answer the question “Why?”

The purpose of this study is to explain the underlying reasons for the growing discontent within the people of Pakistan toward the people of the U.S. and its government. Moreover, after explaining the reasons behind Pakistani dissent toward the U.S., this study will go one step further and suggest remedies to counter the growing anti-Americanism in Pakistan. In order to explain these negative sentiments, the researcher used selective interviews to survey the three main sectors of the Pakistani elite: the military elite, the modernizing elite, and the religious elite. This allowed the researcher to compare and contrast opinions held by a broad spectrum of the Pakistani elite.

The researcher chose to interview elites because they are the agents who can shape or sway Pakistani public opinion. “Such individuals have the status, expertise, links to external sources of knowledge, or experience that enable them to provide information and advice about

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2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
innovations to others within their community.”⁴ In other words, they are the “critical link between policy makers and general public.”⁵ Moreover, the majority of scholars argue that elites, because of their higher status, can cause others to follow their lead. ⁶ Elites also tend to be highly educated and wealthy, and are exposed to external sources of information.⁷

For conceptualization purpose, serving and retired military officers, which include army, navy, and air force officers, are recognized as military elites. Members of think tanks, who support modernist perspectives, those politicians, businesspersons, scholars, journalists, are identified as modernizing elites. Lastly, religious leaders and clerics, who are in positions to sway public opinion, are identified as religious elites.

A unit of analysis is defined as “the what or who is being studied.”⁸ Each elite opinion leader was considered a unit of analysis, because the researcher was studying the individual belonging to a group, not the group itself. A study based on observations representing a single point in time is defined as a cross-sectional study.⁹ Because this study took place over a short period of time from April 1, 2007, to April 30, 2007, it can be considered a cross-sectional study. The majority of explanatory studies that deal with public opinion are cross-sectional in nature.¹⁰

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⁶ Feder and Savastano, “The role of opinion leaders in the diffusion of new knowledge.”
⁷ Ibid.
⁸ Babbie, The Practice of Social Research, 94.
⁹ Ibid., 102.
¹⁰ Ibid.
In the field of social science, survey research is the most widely employed research method.\(^{11}\) Survey research is considered “the best method” to indirectly describe the opinions of a large population.\(^{12}\) According to Earl Babbie, “surveys are also excellent vehicles for measuring attitudes and orientations in a large population.”\(^{13}\) On the other hand, qualitative interviews are also excellent sources for gathering information. “Contrasted with survey interviewing, the qualitative interview is based on a set of topics to be discussed in depth rather than based on the use of standardized questions.”\(^{14}\) Bingham and Moore define qualitative interviews as “conversation with purpose” in which “researcher and informant become ‘conversational partners.’”\(^{15}\) There are several advantages associated with interview research. Interview research usually has a response rate as high as 80 to 85%.\(^{16}\) Interviews also essentially eliminate “don’t know” and “no” answers.\(^{17}\) They also provide the interviewer with a unique opportunity to “probe” for the desired response and answer.\(^{18}\) According to Dayman and Holloway, data collected in interviews pertain within the confines of the social context, so, “the responses you derive from interviews are the subjective views of interviewees. Your evidence, therefore, is based on participants’ interpretations of their experiences and is expressed in their own words, using the jargon and speech styles that are meaningful to them.”\(^{19}\)

\(^{11}\) Babbie, \textit{The Practice of Social Research}, 244.

\(^{12}\) Ibid.

\(^{13}\) Ibid.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., 306.

\(^{15}\) Christine Daymon and Immy Holloway, \textit{Qualitative Research Methods in Public Relations and Marketing Communications} (London: Routledge, 2002), 166.

\(^{16}\) Babbie, \textit{The Practice of Social Research}, 264.

\(^{17}\) Ibid., 265.

\(^{18}\) Ibid.
research sometimes leads to the “discovery of different dimensions, aspects, or nuances of concepts. In such cases, the research itself may uncover and report aspects of social life that were not evident from the outset of the project.” 20

On the other hand, there are certain disadvantages associated with interview research. Sometimes an interviewee might fabricate information to enhance self-esteem and self-image. Interviews are quite time-consuming and laborious and can take a toll the on researcher.21

Generally, there are three types of qualitative interviews: unstructured, non-standardized interviews, semi-structured interviews, and structured or standardized interviews.22 Unstructured interviews are devoid of predefined questions about the interview agenda. They can be an excellent source of evidence, but also result in a heavy “dross rate.”23 Semi-structured interviews, also called focused interviews, are widely used in qualitative research. The questions are not asked in any predefined pattern, but are based on an interview guide that contains “the issues or topics to be covered and the line of inquiry to be followed.”24 Structured or standardized interviews are seldom used in qualitative field research. Every respondent is asked to answer the same predefined set of questions. As Daymon notes, “Therefore, they tend to direct participants responses, prohibiting you and your interviewee from exploring together the meaning of the object of inquiry.”25

19 Daymon and Holloway, Qualitative Research Methods in Public Relations and Marketing Communications, 167.
20 Babbie, The Practice of Social Research, 110.
21 Daymon and Holloway, Qualitative Research Methods in Public Relations and Marketing Communications, 184-185.
22 Ibid., 170-171.
23 Ibid., 170.
24 Ibid., 171.
25 Ibid., 171-172.
An online interview, such as by e-mail communication, is also recognized by scholars like Mann and Stewart as a good tool to conduct asynchronous interviews.\textsuperscript{26} E-mail interviews allow “participants to be more reflective because they can take time to respond in a more measured way.”\textsuperscript{27}

Since the purpose of this study is to examine contemporary elite Pakistani attitudes toward the U.S., qualitative interviews were used as a research method to collect data because they allowed the interviewer to explore the perspectives and perceptions of various stakeholders. In order to collect data for this study, 26 elite opinion leaders were interviewed either by semi-structured telephone or e-mail interviews. For reliability, both sets of interviews utilized the same questions (see Appendix 2 for interview guide). The questions contained in the interview guide were carefully formulated to focus on the dynamics that define the current Pakistan-U.S. relationship.

According to Patton, there are three types of interview questions: experience questions, feeling questions, and knowledge questions.\textsuperscript{28} For example:

- **Experience question**: What is your experience in dealing with US government officials?
- **Feeling question**: How do you feel about the new sanctions imposed on Pakistan by President Bush?
- **Knowledge questions**: What steps should be taken to defeat terrorism?

In our interview guide questions 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 are knowledge questions, while questions 1, 2, 7, and 9 are experience questions.

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 173.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 173.
The sample of knowledgeable Pakistani elites was selected to address the questions of the study. The interviewees were recruited through personal and family contacts. The main purpose of these interviews was to explore both current opinions as well as new ideas from which both countries could work in tandem to defeat extremism. Telephone interviews were recorded and transcribed.

In qualitative field research, analysis of data is not a one-step process, but rather a “continuous, systematic process which runs simultaneously with data collection.” According to Babbie, spreadsheets can also be effectively utilized to process and analyze qualitative data. This study made use of the Microsoft Excel spreadsheet software, to analyze the interview data.

Historical research on the U.S.-Pakistan relationship was also conducted for this thesis. The primary purpose of this research was to identify issues which define and affect the current US-Pakistan relationship.

The historical method can be defined as “an act of reconstruction undertaken in a spirit of critical inquiry designed to achieve a faithful representation of a previous age.” Historical research can also be utilized to study the cause and effect of past events on present and future events. “The act of historical research involves the identification and limitation of a problem or an area of study, sometimes the formulation of a hypothesis (or set of questions); the collection, organization, verification, validation, analysis and selection of data; testing the hypothesis (or answering the questions), where appropriate; and writing a research report. This sequence leads

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29 Daymon and Holloway, *Qualitative Research Methods in Public Relations and Marketing Communications*, 231.
to a new understanding of the past and its relevance to the present and future.”

According to Heck, “Historical research examines questions related to how and why phenomena occur.”

The primary difference between the historical research method and other research methods is that historical research relies exclusively on existing data. Historical research methods can be utilized in both quantitative as well as qualitative research. There are two prominent schools of historical research, the positivistic and idealist. Mores and Field writes, “In the positivistic or neo-positivistic school of historical research, an attempt is made to reduce history to universal laws. Discovery, verification, and categorization of data are used to analyze the data, and there is an effort to show cause-effect relationship.”

On the other hand, “In the idealist school, intuition and experience are ingredients of interpretation. From this perspective, historians believe it is necessary to get inside the event and rethink the thoughts of the originator in relation to the content of his or her time, place, and situation to make adequate historical interpretations.”

Historical research relies on two sources of data: primary and secondary. “Primary sources are the raw materials of history. They are contemporaneous records, or records in close proximity to some past occurrence. Or they might be original documents.”

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32 Ibid.
36 Janice M. Morse and Peggy Anne Field, *Qualitative Research Methods for Health Professionals*, (Sage Publication, 1995), 33.
37 Ibid.
sources are those that do not bear a direct physical relationship to the event being studied. They are made up of data that cannot be described as original.”^{39}

There are several problems associated with historical research. Sometimes there is not sufficient data available to conduct historical research.^{40} Sometimes researchers show bias and interpret historical events according to their liking.^{41} “Some researchers can accurately recite the facts of events in chronological order but fail to integrate these facts into meaningful generalizations,” said Mitra.^{42}

The historical research for this thesis was conducted by relying on secondary materials, reviewing relevant news stories in leading U.S. publications such as *The New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and *Time* magazine. Books about U.S.-Pakistan relations were also consulted.

The next chapter is a historical analysis of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. This will review the role played by U.S. public diplomacy and foreign policy in shaping and defining this relationship.

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^{40} Ananda Mitra and Sam Lankford, *Research Methods in Parks, Recreation, and Leisure Services* (Champaign: Sagamore Publishing, 1999), 86.

^{41} Ibid.

^{42} Ibid., 87.
CHAPTER 3
HISTORICAL REVIEW

The 1940s: Uncharted Waters

Even before Pakistan gained independence from Britain on 14 August, 1947, U.S. media and politicians were not warm to the idea of Pakistan. “The partition of India ‘sounds terrible’ to American ears after the experience of the U.S. civil war,” said President Roosevelt in 1942.¹ On April 22, 1946, *Time* magazine carried a picture of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the father and founder of Pakistan, on its cover with a caption that said, “His Moslem tiger wants to eat the Hindu cow.” In the same story *Time* declared that Jinnah’s political ascent was “a story of love of country and the lust for power, a story that twists and turns like a bullock track in the hills.”² Similarly, on the eve of Jinnah’s death in September 1948, *Time* carried another story titled “That Man,” which said, “Out of the travail of 400 million in the subcontinent have come two symbols--a man of love and a man of hate. Last winter the man of non-violence, Gandhi, died violently at the hand of assassin. Last week the man of hate, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, at 71, died a natural death in Karachi, capital of the state he had founded.”³

Furthermore, on the eve of Pakistani independence, *Time* carried a piece that described Karachi, then capital of Pakistan, as a “dirty, noisy and in all respects unlovely” city.⁴ Moreover, the same *Time* story declared that the people of Karachi “did not welcome Pakistan with the wild enthusiasm that swept the new dominion of India. After all, Pakistan was the creation of one

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clever man, Jinnah; the difference between a slick political trick and a mass movement was apparent in the contrast between Karachi and New Delhi.”

Pakistan gained its independence during the initial period of cold war, when the U.S. and its allies were involved in an ideological struggle to confine the spread of Communism; thus, the world was divided between U.S. block and the Soviet bloc. Pakistan right from the start allied itself with the U.S. and whole-heartedly joined the U.S. camp because “Pakistan [is] a democracy and communism [does] not flourish in the soil of Islam. It [is] clear therefore that our interests [lie] more with the two great democratic countries, namely, the U.K and the U.S.A., than with Russia,” said Jinnah on September 7, 1947.

As far as initial U.S.-Pakistan relations were concerned, President Truman’s era was one of stalemate. Mutual parleys continued between the U.S. and Pakistan, where Pakistan always emphasized the commonality of interest against Communist domination but the U.S. faced a difficult decision, choosing between Pakistan and India on the issue of Kashmir, a disputed region claimed by both Pakistan and India: favoring one country automatically antagonizes the other. Furthermore, a Pakistani request of a loan of $2 billion over five years for economic development and defense purchases was also rebuffed; instead, only $10 million was granted. On this occasion, the dismayed Pakistani foreign minister said, “Well-known friendship of Pakistan toward the U.S. and Pakistan’s obvious antipathy to the Russian ideology would seem to justify serious consideration by the U.S. Government of the defense requirements of Pakistan.” This rationale for providing assistance to Pakistan would become pervasive and

5 Ibid.
6 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 20.
7 Ibid., 27.
persuasive to the United States only a decade later.⁸ On the other hand, to resolve the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, President Truman did come forward with a proposal on August 31, 1949, stating to the United Nations the United State’s wish to hold a plebiscite on the Kashmir issue.⁹ Nevertheless, Pakistan’s willing support of the U.S. in its strategic ambitions to fight Communism in Korea and its policy in the Middle East found little favors with U.S. policy makers.¹⁰

The 1950s: Emergence of an Alliance

Eisenhower’s presidency ushered a new era in U.S.-Pakistan relations. Two pivotal trips were responsible for the U.S. foreign policy shift in favor of Pakistan, those of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Vice President Richard Nixon, who each visited the subcontinent in 1953. After his visit to South Asia, Dulles told the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) that Jawaharlal Nehru, then Prime Minister of India, was an “utterly impractical statesman.”¹¹ Regarding Pakistan, Dulles told the Foreign Affairs Committee that “those fellows [Pakistanis] are going to fight any communist invasion with their bare fists if they have to.”¹² Similarly, after his South Asian visit, Nixon reported that Nehru was “the least friendly leader” in Asia.¹³ In his NSC briefing Nixon said, “Pakistan is a country I would like to do everything for.”¹⁴ This new shift in U.S. foreign policy was described by Dana Adams Schmidt in The New York Times, who wrote “the importance of bringing in Pakistan on the defense of the Middle East is greater than

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⁸ Ibid., 21.
⁹ Ibid., 29-30.
¹⁰ Ibid., 37.
¹¹ Ibid., 56.
¹² Ibid.
¹³ Ibid., 60.
¹⁴ Ibid., 61.
the importance of preserving pleasant relations with Mr. Nehru.”  

Moreover, Pakistan entered into a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the U.S. on May 19, 1954, to enable Pakistan to maintain its internal security. To deter Communism, Pakistan, Australia, Thailand, France, New Zealand, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. formed the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) on September 8, 1954. Moreover, Pakistan’s genuine feelings of friendship were recognized and its role as a real “bulwark” against communism was appreciated: yet Pakistan remained an ally who was not fully embraced to withstand the challenges of the communism. 

Moreover, in 1953, the United States also came forward to help Pakistan in its food crisis. During the Eisenhower presidency, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship reached its pinnacle, when Pakistan was dubbed the “most allied ally in Asia.”

**The 1960s: Decade of Stalemate**

Despite few major developments, the Kennedy presidency saw a decline in U.S.-Pakistan relations. In 1962, Pakistan provided a base to the United states at Badaber, Peshawar, for electronic monitoring of Soviet missile tests and U-2 reconnaissance flights over Russia. Furthermore, the U.S. played a major role in negotiating the Indus Water Treaty of 1960, a water-sharing treaty between India and Pakistan. Despite this, President Kennedy, who was quite impressed with the “soaring idealism” of Indian Prime Minister Nehru, therefore,

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17 Ibid., 72.
18 Ibid., 62.
19 Ibid., 53.
20 Ibid., 74.
21 Ibid., 91.
22 Ibid., 113.
advocated foreign policy tilted towards India.\textsuperscript{23} In doing so, he incensed Pakistan by giving $1 billion in aid to India; compared to $150 million Pakistan was getting; despite the fact that Pakistan was earning the wrath of Soviet Union for supporting U.S. policies.\textsuperscript{24} Furthermore, Pakistan’s diplomatic relations with China proved to be another thorn in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. The U.S. considered Communist China a major threat in Asia; thus, it wanted to counterbalance China’s influence supporting India. Pakistan wanted to have good relations with China, because since India was a common enemy of both China and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{25} Therefore, U.S. support of India during the Sino-Indian War of 1962, created a great strain in U.S.-Pakistan relationship.\textsuperscript{26} Moreover, during the 1965 war between Pakistan and India, the U.S placed an arms embargo on both India and Pakistan, denying Pakistan its only source of arms, whereas India continued receiving arms shipments from the Soviet Union. Even SEATO and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) agreements failed Pakistan.\textsuperscript{27} The thing that chagrined Pakistan the most was the refusal of the U.S. to play a major role in post-war peace negotiations. Instead, it was the Soviet Union, a long-time Indian friend, who, with the blessing of the U.S., played the key role.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 115.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 118-119.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 141-142.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 114.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 161.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 165.
The 1970s: Alliance Crumbles

President Nixon, on taking office in 1970, argued in favor of close relations with Pakistan so it could withstand the pressures of the Soviet Union. In July 1971, Pakistan played a major role in establishing a bilateral relationship between China and the United States. During the India-Pakistan war of 1971, Pakistan expected the United State’s help in view of the 1959 agreements of cooperation that spelled out U.S. support against any Indian incursions against Pakistan. Instead, support withered away in the loopholes of U.S. legalities, keeping Pakistan from receiving U.S. support. Despite this, President Nixon did authorize the dispatch of a task force of eight U.S. ships to warn the Indians and the Soviets to refrain from further aggravating the situation between Pakistan and India. It is on the record that it was timely admonitions and threatening caveats by the U.S. government that brought a cease-fire between Pakistan and India and more devastation was averted. Furthermore, in response to the Indian nuclear test in 1974, Pakistan decided to acquire nuclear technology. Due to this decision, Pakistan invited the wrath of all the western countries, including the U.S. The author of this paper believes that there was discrimination in the treatment of India and Pakistan regarding their pursuit of nuclear armaments: Washington remained quite when India carried out its nuclear explosion, but it chastised Pakistan for the same action. On top of that, instead of taking action against India, the Carter administration decided to supply enriched uranium fuel to India. Regarding this situation, a top Pakistani diplomat said, “If the United States had applied sanctions against the

29 Ibid., 171.
30 Ibid., 182.
31 Ibid., 201-204.
32 Kux, *The United States and Pakistan*, 221.
33 Ibid., 239.
Indians, we would not have minded so much. We could understand U.S. favoritism towards
Israel [also a nuclear power] as a special case, but not the refusal to sanction India while hitting
so hard at Pakistan.”34 Therefore, to discourage Pakistan’s desire to acquire nuclear bomb, in the
1979 U.S. imposed economic sanctions on Pakistan, completely derailing the U.S.-Pakistan
alliance.

The 1980s: Partners, Not Allies

On December 26, 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan across Amu Darya, 
signaling the expansion of Communism across South Asia and, therefore, drastically changing
the dynamics of the then lukewarm U.S.-Pakistan relations.35 According to Thomas Thornton, a
former National Security Council staff member, U.S. foreign policy regarding Pakistan
“overnight, literally . . . changed dramatically.”36 Initially, President Carter tried to gain
Pakistan’s support to confront Communism, but no agreement could be reached. Due to its past
experience with the United States, Pakistan wanted the U.S. to “prove its credibility and
durability.”37 Furthermore, the Carter administration’s initial offer of $400 million was
dismissed as “peanuts” by Pakistan’s President Zia-ul-Haq.38 According to President Zia, the
$400 million of U.S. aid “will buy greater animosity from the Soviet Union, which is now much

34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., 245.
more influential in this region than the United States.”39 Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi
told The Washington Post, “The assistance must be commensurate with the size of the threat.”40

The incoming Reagan administration admitted that Pakistan needed far more U.S. support
than promised by the Carter administration. “I know we have had problems, but these are going
to change” incoming Secretary of State Alexander Haig told a Pakistani diplomat.41 Main point
of this new, emerging alliance was to “give Pakistan confidence in our commitment to its
security and provide us reciprocal benefits in term of our regional interests,” said Assistant
Secretary of State Nicholas Veliotes.42 The new alliance revolved around three main modalities.
First was the nuclear issue: Pakistan made it clear from the start that it would make no
compromise on the nuclear issue. In reply, Secretary Haig assured Pakistan that the nuclear
issue “need not become the centerpiece” of this new alliance. On the other hand, any nuclear
explosion conducted by Pakistan will lead to enormous strain on this new alliance.43 Therefore,
the U.S. Foreign Relations Committee voted 10-7 to temporarily waive the economic sanctions
for the next 6 years.44 These sanctions had been imposed by the Carter administration in
reaction to Pakistan’s desire to acquire nuclear weapons. Second was the issue internal politics
(during this period, the Pakistani constitution was suspended and marshal law was imposed in
Pakistan): “We would not like to hear the type of government we should have,” General K.M
Arif, Vice Chief of the Pakistan Army Staff, told Secretary Haig. “General, your internal

sec. A.


41 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 256.

42 Ibid., 256-257.

43 Ibid., 257.

44 Ibid., 260.
situation is your problem,” replied Secretary Haig.  

Third, was the modus operandi: it was decided that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) will train Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI); in return, ISI would train the Mujahideen (Afghan resistance). The author believes that these modalities reflect the double standards inherent in then-current U.S. foreign policy. In subsequent years, when the U.S. did not need an alliance with Pakistan, the Bush and Clinton administrations used the same reasons to impose military and economic sanctions on Pakistan.

In 1981, a $3.2 billion, five-year aid package was approved for Pakistan. Part of this package was F-16 aircraft, the most sophisticated at that time. Initially, the U.S. was reluctant to sell those aircraft to Pakistan, but when Pakistan related the sale of the aircraft to a test of American sincerity, the U.S. decided to equip Pakistan with F-16s. The sale of those aircraft was indicative of Pakistan’s strong bargaining position in this new alliance. U.S. ambassador to Pakistan Arthur Hummel termed the sale of the F-16s “an unnecessary luxury.” As far as Pakistan’s reasons for acquiring F-16s was concerned, General Arif concluded that there were two: Pakistan wanted an edge over Indian air power and wanted to provide a morale boost to the Pakistani people. “The acquisition of the aircraft became a symbol of national virility. The whole issue caught the imagination of the Pakistani public,” said Ronald Spiers, U.S. ambassador to Pakistan. 

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45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., 257.
47 Ibid., 259.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., 260.
The U.S. strategy to support Afghan insurgents against the Soviets was an integral part of the Regan Doctrine: to embark upon a strategy to impede the rising influence of Communism in Afghanistan, Central America, Africa and elsewhere in the Third World. On the other hand, the stratagem adopted by the CIA concentrated on narrower specifics: “The aim of the program was to cause pain. It was revenge after the series of U.S. defeats in Vietnam, Angola, Horn of Africa, etc. It was payback time,” said a U.S. intelligence officer.50

At the outset, the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan was kept concealed. There were “No signs that Pakistan is prepared to take on the role as conduit for increased U.S. and Western military aid to rebel forces fighting in Afghanistan,” reported The Washington Post.51 Initially, the CIA was spending $30 million annually, matched fully by Saudi Arabia.52 Furthermore, distribution of funds was carried out by ISI, who funneled money to fundamentalist Islamic organizations, especially to Gulbuddin Hektmatyar, an anti-American fundamentalism war lord.53 When describing these fundamentalist organizations, a former CIA official said, “They were all brutal, fierce, bloodthirsty and basically fundamentalist. There were no Thomas Jeffersons on a white horse among the Afghan resistances leaders.”54 The CIA, which was in charge of U.S.-Afghan policy, was constantly warned about turning blind eye toward funds being channeled to fundamentalist Afghan organizations. Eliza Van Hollen, a U.S. State Department Afghan Specialist, warned the CIA that the funds were giving these fundamentalist organizations “a potent form of political patronage, strengthening their standing and weakening that of more

50 Ibid., 261.
52 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 262.
53 Ibid., 274.
54 Ibid.
moderate Afghan groups.\textsuperscript{55} According to the author of this paper, if the CIA had restrained and kept an oversight on the ISI, preventing it from giving money to fundamentalist organizations, today’s Afghanistan would not have been a heaven for terrorists.

This new alliance was a blessing in disguise for Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq’s dictatorship. Instead of being repudiated for suspending the constitution, General Zia gained stature and became an international champion for opposing Communism and allowing 3.2 million Afghan refugees entry into Pakistan.\textsuperscript{56}

Unlike previous U.S.-Pakistan alliances, this new alliance was based on new semantics which meant that, for the first time, the U.S. and Pakistan were “partners, not allies.” As Kux observed, “Their relationship was a marriage of convenience,” bound together with the goal to expel the Soviets from Afghanistan. Furthermore, this time Pakistanis were not under the false impression that the U.S. was going to support them against any war with India.\textsuperscript{57}

In December of 1982, Pakistani President Zia embarked upon an official state visit to the U. S. During this visit, President Zia was severely criticized by the U.S. press for his regime’s suspension of democracy and for Pakistan’s nuclear aspirations. Responding to criticism over Pakistan’s human rights record, Zia said, “We have a constitutional government. It is a civilized government. We are not bunch of clowns.”\textsuperscript{58}

During early 1980s, it was customary for U.S. officials to visit Peshawar, Pakistan, to address Afghan refugees settled there in temporary refugee camps. The Khyber Pass, the

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 275.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 266.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.

passage linking Pakistan to Afghan refugee camps, was declared as a “well-worn VIP path.”

“I want you to know that you are not alone. You will have our support until you regain the freedom that is rightfully yours,” said U.S. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, while visiting an Afghan refugee camp. In May 1984, Vice President George Bush visited Pakistan, where he praised the Afghan freedom fighters “indomitable spirit of freedom,” which he thought had “earned the admiration of free men everywhere.” During this visit, Mohammad Nasir Khan, a local Afghan refugee, thanked Vice President Bush because “he [Bush] has helped the Jihad of the Afghans.”

Recounting the passion resonated by U.S. officials while addressing the Afghans, then Assistant Secretary of State Nicholas Veliotes said that Shultz got so emotionally “carried away when he visited the Afghan tribal near Peshawar. I thought he was going to grab a gun and run off into Afghanistan.”

Pakistan’s aspiration to acquire nuclear capability was still a causing much friction in U.S.-Pakistan relations. On April 4, 1984, Pakistani daily Nawi-i-Waqat broke a story that claimed Pakistani scientists had been successful in enriching uranium to weapons grade. Furthermore, during the same period, three Pakistanis were arrested for smuggling equipment that could have

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62 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 272.

63 Claiborne, “Bush at Khyber Pass.”

64 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 271.

65 Ibid., 275.
been used in the development of a nuclear bomb. In the light of these developments, Republican Senator Larry Pressler introduced an amendment that required the U.S. President to annually certify that Pakistan was not developing a nuclear bomb. This new certification nullified the earlier six year exemption granted to Pakistan that had enabled Pakistan to acquire U.S. military aid. Pakistani President Zia knew that as long as Afghanistan was occupied by the Soviets and Pakistan did not explode a nuclear device, even enrichment of uranium to weapons grade would not “breach the embarrassment barrier,” which would restrain the Congress from ratifying the Pressler amendment. President Zia was right: in 1987, despite of clear evidence that Pakistan was actively acquiring nuclear capability, President Reagan used U.S. national interest as a reason to certify the Pressler amendment.

In December 1987, the Kremlin signaled Washington that Russian troops would be leaving Afghanistan within twelve months. This meant post-war Afghan reconstruction was not a priority for U.S. foreign policy. “Our main interest was getting the Russians out. Afghanistan, as such, was remote from major U.S. concerns,” said Acting Secretary of State Michael Armacost. In September of 1991, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pomin signed an accord which called for both sides to stop supplying arms to various Afghan factions. With this accord the U.S. finally “washed its hands of Afghanistan.”

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67 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 277.
68 Ibid., 278.
69 Ibid., 286.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., 287.
72 Ibid., 317.
“Afghanistan is no longer on our radar screen,” said one State Department official. 

“For ordinary Afghans the U.S. withdrawal from the scene constituted a major betrayal, while Washington’s refusal to harness international pressure to help broker a settlement between the warlords was considered a double betrayal,” wrote Ahmed Rashid, the author of the book “Taliban.” The author believes that this hands-off approach toward Afghanistan by the U.S. is partly responsible for present Quagmire occurring in that country.

The 1990s: Decade of Decay

In February of 1989, the last remaining Soviet soldiers left Afghanistan, ending the nine year invasion. In October of 1990, President Bush refused to sign the Pressler amendment certification; therefore, the $564 million economic and military aid package to Pakistan was frozen. Most of the Pakistani public and press deplored this decision, and declared the United States a “fickle friend.” Furthermore, the majority of Pakistanis echoed the sentiment “with the Afghan war over, the United States no longer need[s] Pakistan. You Americans have discarded us like a piece of used Kleenex.”

According to The Washington Post, “The plunge in U.S.-Pakistan relations illustrates what can happen in a poor country when it is no longer needed by a superpower.” Furthermore, this event proved to a pivotal in U.S.-Pakistan relations: “the action effectively ruptured the bilateral security partnership that had flourished during 1980s,”

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73 Ibid.
75 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 297.
76 Ibid., 310.
77 Ibid.
wrote Dennis Kux.\textsuperscript{79} In November 1991, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Security Affairs Reginald Bartholomew visited Pakistan to address Pakistan’s aspiration to acquire nuclear weapons. During a meeting with Pakistani President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Bartholomew charged, “We can’t change our policies. You have to change yours,” and walked out of the room.\textsuperscript{80} Later, the Pakistani Foreign Secretary met with Bartholomew and told him that Pakistan felt that the United States “was trying to bully them.”\textsuperscript{81}

Furthermore, Pakistan’s support for Kashmiri insurgents was proving to be the new thorn in the fragile U.S.-Pak relations. “If you get hit with this on top of Pressler, that will end the U.S.-Pakistan relationship,” the undersecretary of state for political affairs cautioned the Pakistani ambassador regarding Pakistan’s support of Kashmiri insurgents.\textsuperscript{82} Furthermore, the same training camps that trained Afghan Mujahideen were now training a new breed of fundamentalist, who were fighting not only in Afghanistan, but also in Kashmir. These were the same Arab and Pakistani fighters who had earlier engaged the Soviets in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{83} “We fought the Afghan war 14 years, and now people who were committed to our side are suddenly seen as villains and branded as terrorists,” Pakistani Foreign Secretary Shahryar Khan told The Washington Post.\textsuperscript{84} According to Dennis Kux, as far as Americans were concerned, the same “Freedom Fighters,” who fought the Soviets automatically became terrorists when they

\textsuperscript{79} Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 311.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 314.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 316.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., 322.
\textsuperscript{84} More and Anderson, “After Cold War, U.S-Pakistani Ties Are Turning Sour.”
embarked upon a struggle against India. On the other hand, as far as Pakistan was concerned, if the war against Soviet Union to gain freedom was justified, so was war in Kashmir.85

As discussed earlier, soon after the Soviets withdrawal from Afghanistan, the U.S. started to walk away from Afghanistan. “That walk became a run in 1992,” thus, “Washington allowed its allies in the region, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, free reign to sort out the ensuing Afghan civil war,” wrote Ahmed Rashid.86 The sole reason Pakistani President Zia supported Afghan resistance fighters was to have a stable Afghan government favorable to Pakistan, a dream not realized since the independence of Pakistan.87 After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Peshawar-based Afghani freedom fighters formed an Afghan Interim Government (AIG), despite the fact that Kabul was still ruled by the Communist-backed General Najibullah.88 However, in 1992, after three year of war between AIG and Najibullah, the AIG emerged as victors. Unfortunately, right after the victory, a civil war broke among AIG factions.89 When Pakistan support of the Afghan warlord Hekmetyar, a member of AIG, failed to yield any success in 1994, in southern Afghanistan Pakistan found a new instrument for its Afghan policy: the Taliban. The Taliban were the new breed of Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan. They were the graduates of the same fundamentalist madrassas that had earlier provided the recruits to fight Soviets in Afghanistan.90 During the period of 1994-1995, the U.S. supported the Taliban politically because it viewed them as anti-Iranian, anti-Shia, and pro-western, while totally ignoring their

85 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 322-323.
86 Rashid, Taliban, 175.
87 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 282.
88 Ibid., 297.
89 Ibid., 317.
90 Ibid., 344.
Islamic fundamentalist doctrine, oppression of women, and “the consternation they created in Central Asia largely because Washington was not interested in the larger picture.”\(^{91}\) During this period, U.S. diplomats, who visited Afghanistan, were pleased with the assurances they got from the Taliban that they would vehemently oppose Iran and would exterminate poppy and heroin production. Moreover, for next few years the United States supported the Taliban because of a project by Unocal, a U.S. multinational vying to build oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia through Afghanistan. In 1995, the Taliban took Herat, Afghanistan, and closed down all the girls schools. Astonishingly, the United States considered the Taliban’s takeover of Herat “as a help to Unocal.”\(^{92}\) Furthermore, in May of 1996, the U.S. Assistant Secretary for South Asia told the U.S. Senate, “Afghanistan has become a conduit for drugs, crime, and terrorism that can undermine Pakistan.”\(^{93}\) Unfortunately, her testimony fell to deaf ears and there was no policy shift, although in the later part of 1997, U.S. policy toward the Taliban started to change because of feminist opposition to the oppression women suffered under the Taliban. Since President Clinton relied heavily on the support of women for his re-election, “there was no way the U.S. could be seen as soft on Taliban.”\(^{94}\) Additionally, during 1998 and 1999, U.S. support for the Taliban evaporated because of the Taliban’s support for Osama Bin Laden.\(^{95}\) “U.S. policy appeared to have come full circle, from unconditionally accepting the Taliban to unconditionally rejecting them,” wrote Ahmed Rashid.\(^{96}\)

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\(^{91}\) Rashid, *Taliban*, 176.

\(^{92}\) Ibid., 177.

\(^{93}\) Ibid., 178.

\(^{94}\) Ibid., 176.

\(^{95}\) Ibid., 176-177.

\(^{96}\) Ibid., 182.
Before 9/11, Pakistan was the only country that had diplomatic ties with the Taliban. According to President Musharraf, Pakistan was maintaining diplomatic relations with the Taliban and its leader Mullah Omar for geostrategic reasons. “If we had broken with them, that would have created a new enemy on our western border, or vacuum of power there into which have stepped the Northern Alliance, comprising anti-Pakistan elements,” said Musharraf.

On September 12, 2001, one day after the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powel told President Musharraf, “You are either with us or against us.” Musharraf replied, “I told him that we were with the United States against terrorism, having suffered from it from years, and would fight along his country against it,” replied Musharraf. The next day, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State told the Pakistani Director of Inter Services Intelligence that if Pakistan did not support the United States, then Pakistan “should be prepared to be bombed back to Stone Age.”

Despite being a contributing partner in the war on terror, Pakistan is usually being criticized by U.S. media and politicians. “It is not that Pakistanis are more inclined toward terrorism than are citizens of any other country. It is that (Gen) Musharraf is unable, or unwilling, to confront the terrorists in his midst,” sated a Los Angeles Times editorial.

Moreover, the 9/11 Commission also passed judgment on Pakistan’s efforts to control the cross-
border infiltration of terrorists between Pakistan and Afghanistan and stated that “Pakistan must do more to fight terror.”

As far as the war on terror is concerned, Pakistan has deployed 80,000 troops on the Pakistan-Afghan border and is actively pursuing terrorists. Additionally, Pakistan’s intentions regarding its role in war on terror is made quite evident in a statement by President Musharraf, “All foreign militants should leave, otherwise they would be crushed.” Moreover, the U.S. State Department’s 2004 report, “Patterns of Global Terrorism,” also hails Pakistan and President Musharraf, who himself has been a victim of terrorism, as a steadfast and important ally in the war on terror. In addition, Pakistan has arrested and handed over more than 700 known terrorists to the U.S. Here are some of the important terrorist arrested by Pakistan:

- Abu Farraj al-Libbi, the number three man in Al-Qaeda and suspected of carrying out assassination attempts against President Musharraf. His arrest was hailed by President Bush by declaring that a major threat to peace loving people was removed. He had a bounty of $5 million.

- Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, known to be an alleged planner of the 9/11 attacks. President Bush called his arrest a “serious blow” to Al-Qaeda. He was on the FBI’s most wanted list for several years and was carrying a bounty for $25 million.

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108 Ibid.

• Omar Saeed Sheikh, sentenced to death on the charges of murdering *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl.  

• Abu Zubaydah, whose 2002 arrest resulted in warnings about possible attacks on the Statue of Liberty and Brooklyn Bridge. Abu Zubaydah also revealed Flight 93 was supposed to crash into the White House.

• Ramzi Binalshibh, an alleged coordinator of the 9/11 attacks, was responsible for the USS Cole attack and the U.S. embassy bombing in Tunisia.

Moreover, despite the full cooperation extended by the Pakistani government, the U.S. carries out strikes inside Pakistani territory with seeming disregard for Pakistani sovereignty. These types of actions not only tarnish the already shaky U.S. image in Pakistan, but also undermines the Pakistani government’s role as an effective agent against terrorism by causing civil unrest in the country. For example, on January 13, 2006, a U.S. drone, in clear violation of Pakistani airspace, fired a missile on Damadola, Pakistan, killing eighteen people, including women and children. This attack was carried out based on flawed intelligence that Ayman al-Zawahiri might be in that area. On top of that, instead of being apologetic about the loss of innocent life, U.S. officials arrogantly defended these attacks. “My information is that this strike was clearly justified by the intelligence,” said Senator Trent Lott, a former Senate majority leader.

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Recently, two prominent American officials, Director of Intelligence John Negroponte and Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns, have accused Pakistan of providing “Refuge” to the Taliban in Pakistani territory and not doing enough to counter their threat.\(^{115}\) Negroponte, in testimony to the U.S. Senate, said, “eliminating the safe haven that the Taliban and other extremists have found in Pakistan's tribal areas is not sufficient to end the insurgency in Afghanistan.”\(^{116}\)

Responding to these types of allegations, the Pakistani ambassador to the U.S. said, “We are already standing on our head, what else we could do? They [the U.S.] should not blame us for their failures.”\(^{117}\) Moreover, responding to critics of Pakistani efforts regarding the Taliban in the North West Frontier Province, Governor Lt-Gen (ret.) Ali Mohammad Jan Aurakzai, a key man in dealing with the Taliban, said that NATO was oblivious to the on-ground realities: the reason that Afghan resurgence is gaining momentum is not because Pakistan is providing the Taliban with safe havens inside Pakistan, but because moderate Afghan citizens are joining the ranks of the Taliban.\(^{118}\) According to Brian Cloughely, author of the book “Pakistan Army,” “what has happened is that U.S. air attacks on Afghan villages, together with Iraq-style military brutality by ground troops, have led the majority of Afghans to detest Americans and, by association, all foreign troops in their country.”\(^{119}\)


Governor Aurakzai also pointed out that Pakistan was doing far more than the NATO coalition, as it has deployed 80,000 troops on the Pakistan-Afghan border, which is twice more than NATO forces present in Afghanistan, and has lost around 750 of its soldiers. “We're physically manning the border; our troops are sitting there on the zero line. . . . Damn it, you also have a responsibility. Go sit on the border, fight like soldiers instead of sitting in your bases. . . . Either they (NATO) are trying to hide their own weaknesses by leveling allegations at Pakistan or they are refusing to admit the facts,” said Aurakzai.120

Current relations between the United States and Pakistan are strained, at best. An editorial in The New York Times declared the recent state visit of President Bush as “a pointless trip to Pakistan,” where “the Bush-Musharraf meeting is one between two leaders far more interested in guns than butter.”121 Moreover, this trip to Pakistan, the ground zero for fanaticism, could have proved vital to overcome the great divide between Islam and the West. Unfortunately, the editorial said, it was “overshadowed by Mr. Bush's misbegotten nuclear pact with Pakistan's blood enemy, India.”122 Additionally, instead of using this trip to build a bilateral relationship with the Pakistani people by inking a free-trade treaty that “could tangibly bind America to Pakistan in a way that no number of summit meetings or sales of F-16 fighter jets could ever manage,” it was wasted on futile discussion regarding a recent nuclear deal between the U.S. and India.123 Feelings in Pakistan regarding the visit by President Bush were well-expressed by Pat Buchanan, a former Presidential candidate and conservation commentator, who said that by transferring nuclear technology to India, President Bush has “insulted” President Musharraf, an

120 Ziauddin, “Britain will never win in Afghanistan: Aurakzai.”
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
ally in the war on terror who took more risks than any other. Likewise, the negative effects of Bush’s trip to Pakistan were quite evident from the fact that on the eve of President Bush’s visit, the Karachi Stock Exchange 100 Index nosedived and lost 462 point.

Recently, the newly elected U.S. House of Representatives passed legislation which called for curbs on American assistance to Pakistan. This new legislation requires the U.S. President to certify that Pakistan is doing its best to stop the Taliban insurgency in its territory before releasing U.S. military assistance to Pakistan. This type of legislation is not new for Pakistan and is the cause of a deep-rooted resentment of the Pakistani people toward U.S. According to Lisa Curtis of the Heritage Foundation, the decision to halt U.S. aid to Pakistan in 1990 because of concerns over its nuclear program was unwise. “Most U.S. policymakers acknowledge that this was a mistake, because it cost the U.S. valuable leverage and stoked strong anti-U.S. sentiment that still exists in the country.” An editorial in a leading Pakistani English daily, *Dawn*, equated this legislation with the Pressler Amendment passed in 1985.

In fact, Pakistan remains a strong ally of the United States in the Middle East. Its government has taken considerable risks to support U.S. policy objectives of which the mass of its population has been extremely critical. For example, recently a terrorist organization called “Pakistani Taliban” claimed responsibility for murdering forty-two Pakistan Army soldiers. This signaled a major shift in terrorist policy, essentially making the Pakistan Army a known terror

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target. This terrorist attack was carried out in direct retaliation for the Pakistan Army’s bombardment of a Madrassa school (alleged to be training terrorists) in Bajur, a town near the Pakistan-Afghan border, which left eighty people dead.129

Nonetheless, there have been recent signs of a fragmentation in Pakistani elite public opinion, with some factions aligning themselves with the anti-American sentiments held by a major portion of the Pakistani population. “The more Pakistan and its leadership have sacrificed in order to deliver Al Qaeda to the U.S. and be the most committed ally in the war against terror, the more abuse has been hurled at it from the U.S.,” said Shireen M. Mazari, a liberal Pakistani scholar and journalist.130

This fragmentation represents a threat to the continued stability of Pakistan as a U.S. partner. Clearly, if the U.S. is to continue to have Pakistan as its ally, it is important to better understand the opinions of the Pakistani elites and the Pakistani population in order to nurture more favorable attitudes to the U.S. and decrease anti-Americanism and its threat to American strategic interests. In conclusion, it seems more likely that it is American policy toward Pakistan, not American freedoms that arouse negative feelings in the people of Pakistan towards the U.S. Through interviews with members of the Pakistani elite, the next chapter of this thesis examines the current Pakistani point of view towards U.S. These interviews will also establish the role played by U.S. public diplomacy and foreign policy in shaping the opinions of Pakistani elites.


CHAPTER 4
INTERVIEW FINDINGS

For the purpose of this study there were three major topics of inquiry (see appendix B):

Do Pakistanis hate the U.S.?; Pakistan views on the U.S. “War on Terror”; and Pakistan’s relations with the Taliban.

**Do Pakistanis Hate the U.S.?**

**Military Elites**

The majority of the military respondents agreed with the statement that American freedoms have nothing to do with hatred toward America. A Pakistani army colonel said, “No one hates Americans or America. Pakistani people like American liberty, respect American values, admire the American education system, and adore their welfare system. Most of the people living in this region desire to get settled or at least visit America once in their lifetime.”

Several military elites pointed out American duplicity in policies at home and abroad and complained that instead of exporting democracy, it supports dictators and undemocratic regimes. Pakistani military elites also blamed the contradictions in domestic policy, which enshrines the principles of democracy and freedoms, and U.S. foreign policy, which blatantly supports dictators.

A retired three-star general said:

“America is considered a country which is a hypocrite, which supports dictators irrespective of the fact that dictators flaunt the basic human rights of the people—America claims to be the champion of basic human rights! These are the glaring drawbacks in American policies which are rejected by the people. Let me emphasize that people do like American freedoms. But they hate what Bush does.

Citing examples of U.S. support of dictators, a retired brigadier general said that the U.S. lost its credibility as a champion of human rights and democracy, when it lent its support to dictators like Pinchot, Somoza, and Stroessner, who abrogated human rights and political
activities in their countries. “[The] same has been done in the Middle East, including Pakistan. The simple explanation that all was done in the best interest of the country is not well taken in our country [Pakistan], where people are stunned to watch the dichotomy in U.S. policies,” he said.

A point to be noted is that the word “dictator” was only used by retired military elites. Since Pakistan is ruled by General Pervez Musharraf, a military dictator, serving military elites refrained from using the word dictator and decried American efforts to promote democracy in Pakistan. They believed that the Pakistanis are uneasy with U.S. efforts to thrust American-Style democracy upon them. They also believed that the ideology and theory behind western-style democracy is incompatible with the local culture and way of life in Pakistan. They stressed that democracy is an evolutionary process which needs time to flourish. “In fact, America has just one recipe and unilaterally wants everyone to adopt that. America has reached this state in a few centuries and it is an evolutionary process, whereas other nations are still struggling in their evolutionary process and will take some more time in reaching the stage when U.S.-brand democracy can be beneficial for them,” said a Pakistani army colonel.

Military elites also blamed American intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan as a root cause of hatred toward it. A retired general asked, “Who has granted the right to the Americans to come and occupy Iraq? Who grants them liberty to snatch the liberty of a sovereign state? Why are they in Afghanistan? The law of the jungle, “might is right”, is being pursued by the Americans. The diction “Boss is always right” is a motto of the U.S. People think that Americans are the people who do not respect the religious, ethical values of other nations and religions.” Military elites also cited the false pretences under which Iraq was invaded as a reason for Pakistani dissent. “Devastation in Afghanistan for so-called eradication of terrorism and in
Iraq for eliminating non-existent WMDs, are also among the reasons for hatred for America among Muslims,” said a naval elite.

While citing past experiences, military elites declared America an unfaithful friend. “We as Pakistani feel that the USA has always cheated and deceived Pakistan at the time of crises. The history is full of instances of American betrayal,” said a retired general. Military elites believed that Pakistan played a key role in 1960s and 1970s to defeat communism in the Middle East. In return, Pakistan expected full-fledged U.S. support in its war against India, which never materialized. “But unfortunately they have realized that instead of helping Pakistan in 1971 with the Seventh Fleet, it never even opposed Indian policies against Pakistan. Though Nixon’s policy did support Pakistan in 1971, people still waited for the Seventh Fleet (to act),” said a retired three-star general.

The two countries again became allies in late 1979 when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to secure access to Middle East oil reserves. Pakistan played a key role in this war by opening its territory to provide logistical support to Afghan resistance groups who were fighting to expel the Soviets. As soon as the Soviets began to leave Afghanistan in 1988, the strategic alliance between the U.S. and Pakistan also crumbled and the U.S. left the area without stabilizing Afghanistan. Military elites blame this sudden abandonment of Afghanistan by the U.S. as the sole reason for prevalent instability in that country.

After the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the U.S. and Pakistan became allies again. The sole reasons for this alliance were that the U.S. needed Pakistan’s help to capture Osama bin Laden and to eradicate the threat posed by the Taliban. Military elites believed that the new alliance was on unequal footings. “Despite being declared as the major
As a non-NATO ally in 2004, Pakistan is still subject to discriminatory treatments vis-à-vis India and is often blamed for ‘not doing enough,’” said a naval officer.

Military elites also believed that unconditional American support for Israel is also a cause of resentment toward America. A retired general said that Pakistanis do not like many U.S. policies in Middle East. “They think that America is unjustified in helping the Israelites irrespective of their malice-ridden designs and plans against the Palestinians. When the whole world cries out against Israel, why do Americans still support the atrocious policies of Israel? When the UNO condemns Israel, why USA votes in the Security Council against the world opinion? People in Pakistan are not very educated. They are born with closed minds and continue to follow the rituals that they learn from their parents. The animosity against the Israelites injected into their minds is repeated in the media, in the religious sermons. So a friend of Israel is a foe of Islam and Pakistan. America is a die-hard friend of Israel, so Israel foe of Islam and Pakistan,” he said. The same general also emphasized that Pakistan does not have any hatred toward the people of Israel. “Moderate Pakistanis respect the Prophets of Israel, they respect the Holy Books of Judaism, they respect the Jews who lived along the side of their Prophet, but they reject what the Israel is doing to the Palestinians,” he said.

According to military elites, The U.S. needs to water down overtly aggressive foreign policy and create workable solutions to Middle East crises to rehabilitate its negative image in Pakistan. Responding to the question, How can the United States remove these misgivings, a Pakistan naval officer said, “There are no misgivings in the minds of Pakistanis about America. These are the ground realities.” He commented that the majority of conflicts faced by the world would cease to exist if the U.S. would rein in its hypocritical policies toward other countries, stop interfering in the affairs of other countries, stop bullying other countries, and stop
pretending to be global policeman. “Being the sole superpower does not give it any rights to enforce law of the jungle in the world. What all America requires to improve its image is total shift in its current policies and tactics,” he said.

One military believed that the United States could reduce the menace of terrorism by 75%, if it could honestly resolve Middle East crises.

According to a retired brigadier general, the collateral damage resulting from conflicts all over the world makes it difficult for the government of Pakistan to support U.S. policies. He said, “In today’s global world when real time pictures reach the living room, Muslims all over the world and Pakistanis in specific saw the authorities at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib inflamed their passions. As if it was not enough, Washington’s support for Israel continued unabated as before even after the massive bombings in Lebanon. It became morally impossible to support U.S. policies in fighting terrorism.”

The same retired brigadier general argued that it is American compassion, not American aggression, that holds the key for a better U.S. image. He also declared the Bush doctrine--U.S. has the right to invade any country that poses a threat to its security--as illegal. A Pakistani general said that it is not desirable to use force to influence international events. It would rather be more becoming if it uses its soft power of persuasion, financial help, and its strength of culture, values and prestige. He believes that American pop culture and its style of government, with freedom of speech, respect of the law, and equal rights, is the only viable weapon available to America to defeat terrorism.

Military elites also stressed the need for genuine friendship between the two countries and for help to improve the basic infrastructure in Pakistan. A retired three-star general said, “Pakistanis don’t like policy of ‘stick and carrot.’ They would only appreciate carrot without
stick. They don’t want false promises. They want a permanent friendship, not opportunity-based partnership. Every nation has the right to choose friends, but permanence of relations has its own virtues. If Americans think that their foreign policy seeks to have national-interest-oriented policy, then it will not gain trust of the country which also has NATO status. That trust must be visible to convince the populace to align them with American thought. No more sermons to do more.”

A retired general stressed the need for better relations between the U.S. government and the people of Pakistan as an avenue for a better relationship between the two countries. He cited the recent Congressional Research Service’s report which has advised the U.S. government to plan the aid in such a way that it benefits the nations, not the governments. He stressed that rather than rewarding Pakistani leadership, the relations between two countries will flourish if the U.S. makes conscious efforts to build Pakistan’s political and social institutions, rather than rewarding its leadership.

To summarize, military elites believe that the destabilization of Iraq has caused much hostility in the Muslim world, especially in Pakistan. They are also unanimous in their opinion that blatant U.S. support for Israel against Palestine is also one the main reason for the hostility found in the people of Pakistan toward the U.S. They also link the resolution of the Middle East crisis as a key to a better relationship between the two countries. Military elites think that the U.S. is unreliable and an unpredictable friend, one who befriends Pakistan just to promote or protect its own national interests. Pakistani military elites want a stable relationship with the U.S., one that protects and promotes the national interests of the both countries. Military elites blame U.S. support of Pakistani dictators as a cause of Pakistani hatred.
Modernizing Elites

The majority of interviewed modernizing elites believe that contradictions between the ideology that governs American domestic policy and the ideology that governs American foreign policy is the real cause for the Pakistani resentment toward the U.S., not American freedoms. Emphasizing this point, one elite Pakistani businessman said, “Yes, it is true people hate a democratically elected government that creates problems for other democracies and supports dictators. They hate their freedom to jeopardize other’s Freedom. They hate their freedom of religion to declare other religions as terrorists. They hate their freedom of speech making others speechless. They hate the freedom to vote for the oppressors. They hate the assembly which always ruins the global order.”

Modernizing elites also blamed U.S. support for Pakistani military dictators as one reason for Pakistani odium toward the U.S. They believed that U.S. democracy, freedom of speech, and freedom to vote has nothing to do with Pakistani resentment toward the U.S. “These are the most likeable virtues of a great nation. We also want to have the same in our country; unfortunately, Americans by supporting military dictators have never allowed us access to these ingredients of liberty and freedom,” a member of the National Assembly said.

Some of the modernizing elites blamed blatantly aggressive U.S. foreign policy as a reason for Pakistani resentment toward America. A political advisor to a chief minister said that American society is flourishing with democracy and freedom of speech, but its over-fixation with world domination is the real cause of hatred toward America. One modernizing elite declared the war on terror as a war for American supremacy. “America is being hated in the whole world, either by expressly or impliedly, due to its foreign policies. This is not a war against terrorism. In fact this is a lust of supremacy and to rule the world in the name of war against terrorism and targeted Muslim countries and proceeding in pick and choose manner...
having its own vested interest and curbing Muslim countries for establishing its supremacy in the world.”

Another modernizing elite believed that by conducting a reckless war on terrorism, the U.S. itself has become a terrorist. She said, “Because we the Pakistanis think that he [Bush] is the master terrorist. Look at the situation in Iraq, Afghanistan, and now his latest plans to attack Iran.”

Only one modernist elite mentioned the past unreliable Pakistani-American friendship as a cause of resentment toward America. He said the U.S. is not popular in Pakistan because it has continually displayed disloyalty toward Pakistan in order to promote and safeguard its own national and strategic interests. “Pakistan even suffered a lot, but still U.S. has never been valuing and acknowledging Pakistan’s suffering during the Afghanistan invasion by the USSR and during the War on Terrorism,” he said.

Just like military elites, modernizing elites also believed that a changing U.S. involvement in Iraq and the Middle East peace process is a linchpin for improving its image in Pakistan. A member of the Punjab Assembly said, “The American policies should not have bias towards religion. America should deal with Middle East countries in an open and fair manner, giving equal treatment to Palestine and Israel. The unfair treatment in Palestine has sent a very negative signal among all the small and large Muslim countries.”

To summarize, modernizing elites believe that the conflict between U.S. domestic policy and foreign policy is a cause of Pakistani detestation. The U.S., which itself is flourishing with the virtues of freedom and democracy, supports dictators like Musharraf, who openly denies the Pakistani public access to democracy and freedom. Modernizing elites also blame the U.S. for the chaos that resulted after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Modernizing elites also believe
that the U.S. is not popular in Pakistan because of its biased support of Israel in the Middle East conflict. Modernizing elites believe that the U.S. must resolve the above mentioned problems if it wants to gain the confidence of the Pakistani people.

**Religious Elites**

There seems to be a consensus among religious elites that American involvement in Iraq and its stagnant Middle East policy is a cause of dissatisfaction and dislike among Pakistani people for the U.S.

Religious elites also cite American support of Israel as the reason for Muslim antipathy toward America. One religious scholar said, “Because the real matter of concern is not their [American] system, i.e., freedom or democracy, the actual problem lies with their undue and injustice policies towards the Third World countries, especially their own hatred, e.g., Muslims rather than Islamic system, their interference in the matter of other countries, and their support for Israel, etc.”

A local cleric also blamed U.S. support of dictators as a reason for Pakistani resentment toward the U.S. He said that the U.S. classifies itself as a democracy, yet, to promote and safeguard its national interests, it support undemocratic dictators in Pakistan. Second, the U.S. is using the support of the government of Pakistan to destabilize other Muslim countries. Pakistani leaders might be friends of the U.S., “but there is no importance of the U.S. in Pakistan’s community,” he said

Religious elites also believe that America in the form of its war on terror is actually waging war against Islam. A local cleric said, “Pakistan is a Muslim country and America is tagging the Muslims as terrorists. Because of that, America is not being given much importance among common [Pakistani] people.”
One religious elite blamed homosexuality and other problems as reasons for Pakistani dislike of the U.S. He said, “Inhuman and immoral values prevailing in the culture and society of western nations, especially homosexuality, obscenity, vulgarity, deterioration of family and relatives, is the reason that many people do not like America.”

To summarize, religious elites believe that the destabilization of Iraq is causing much hostility in the Muslim world, especially in Pakistan. Religious elites are unanimous in their opinions that blatant U.S. support for Israel against Palestine is the main reason for the hostility found in the people of Pakistan toward the U.S. They also link a resolution of the Middle East crisis is a key to a better relationship between the two countries. Religious elites also agree that U.S. support for Pakistani military dictators like General Ayub, General Zia, and General Musharraf, who all had close relationships with the U.S. government, is a cause of much antagonism toward the U.S.

The U.S. “War on Terror” and Pakistan

Military Elites

A retired major general called current tactics employed by the U.S. in its “war on terror” “not successful.” He said that the U.S. is using military tactics to resolve political problems faced in Afghanistan and Iraq. He believed that the use of brute force is causing a lot of “collateral damage,” a main cause of resentment toward the U.S. He believed that the U.S. “should use the instrument of the political, economic, and social policies to resolve the issue of terrorism. This can be complemented by suitable and minimum use of military force.”

Military elites also stressed a need for change in current tactics employed in the “war on terror.” The “USA has to adopt tactics and strategy based on co-assistance, support of just cause of people, and stop aggression against sovereign states on self-styled and self-assumed facts like weapons of mass destruction,” said a retired colonel. Military elites also blamed flawed U.S.
tactics employed in the war on terror as a main cause of the current chaos in Afghanistan and the
flourishing of terrorism in the world. “I think present American strategy is further flourishing
terrorism instead of eradicating it. We need to understand the true identity of the
people/organizations being termed as terrorists by America. Who created al-Qaeda in the first
place? It was created by America itself to fight Soviets in Afghanistan. Osama bin-Laden was
on American payroll. He and his companions were trained by CIA. We need to understand the
reasons why these slaves turned against their master. The reason is the faulty American
strategy,” said a naval elite.

Explaining the repercussions of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a general who was
directly involved in that conflict said that terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan is related to the
Middle East situation augmented by the 1980s war against Communism. He further stated,

This so called war of “Jihad” [Afghan struggle against the Soviets] took its present
trajectory when war in Afghanistan against USSR was over. There were no further
objectives of these Jihadis who had so blatantly fought against the Russians. Now their
cause shifted to Palestine, and creation of a fundamentalist government in Afghanistan.
Leading to unending fratricide and internal feuds among these Jihadis, they spread out to
various global sites of turmoil and fighting, including Africa, Middle East, Iraq, more
importantly to Kashmir and Pakistan. This is our own creation, not from some outside
land. We created a monster to kill Communism but we failed to assign it other tasks.
Monster needed a place to do foul and execute its evils, but we neither provided it an outlet
nor did we tame it to lose its pampered passion. Concept of Frankenstein evolved here and
took us by throat. We are to be blamed. Now a monster has merged with the locals in
small scale, the poison has spilled over to the innocent people who are unemployed,
uneducated, yet educated at Madrassas propagating bigoted and narrow-mindedness. We
know an empty mind is evil’s mind. So we have created volumes of evil minds who are
host to terrorism. The sanctuaries of these close-minded people flourish all along
Afghanistan and Pakistan border.

Even the military elites who support the current “war on terror” policy believe that it was
poorly executed. According to a retired general, after the American attack on Afghanistan in
2001, the Taliban were on the run and the U.S. failed to chase them to their final conclusion. He
said,
Today, Karzai [Afghan president] is holed up in his bunkerized Presidential Palace and coalition forces have not adopted offensive posture to deny the hideouts to the Taliban. They live, prosper, prepare in and around Qandhar [Afghanistan] and in the treacherous terrain of Pak-Afghanistan border. Once they were on their heels, they should have been denied any opportunity to reequip and consolidate. Instead, probably resources were utilized to protect Kabul and its residents. This was no tactics worth success. The time was spent in blaming each other, allowing the terrorists to take advantage of their division and digging hard in their trenches. So America has, so far, failed in taking good hold of the militants. So we can say that fractured relations among the concerned parties, including Pakistan, Afghanistan, U.S., Coalition Forces, and even India, have led to American failure. A comprehensive broad-based strategy aiming at “Pacification” of the hostile population is needed. People in Afghanistan live in isolated hamlets in far off areas, including tribal belt in Pakistan. They project themselves as bands of self-styled guardians of faith and public morality. They are the polluters of the minds of these ignorant and uneducated people. They need motivation, but with care and sensitivity. So U.S. needs to take it seriously, which so far it has not done. So both on military and political fronts, U.S. has not been able to deliver.

One military elite blamed hunger, poverty, and illiteracy the main reasons for the flourishing of terrorism. He said that people tend to subscribe to an ideology of fanaticism when they live a meaningless life devoid of any hope for a better tomorrow. These types of people have no access to liberal education to widen their horizons about the vast opportunities of meaningful life.

One retired general believed that terrorist thrive and survive on military conflicts all over the world. He said that we need to deny them the fighting grounds all over the world by resolving the Middle East issue, Iraq problem, and Afghanistan unrest. He argued that once turmoil in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Middle East cease to exist, the motivation and passion of terrorist to fight will diminish.

A retired brig. general believed that a recent peace deal between Pakistan and the tribes along the Pakistan-Afghan border, which is profoundly criticized by U.S. officials, is working and is a way forward to eradicate terrorists along that border. He said,

Present clashes between foreign militants and local fighters supported by the government of Pakistan are affectively flushing out the foreign militants and their local collaborators, which may result in lying of arms by these foreigners. Government and Pakistan army
must continue keeping intimate watch over these clashes to get boost out the results. Government must provide lucrative compensation to Taliban now fighting on Pakistan’s side. Government must win over the prominent leaders of Taliban. Social sector development must continue alongside creating political space in political parties with anti-Taliban and anti-extremist orientation.

To summarize, military elites believe that current U.S. tactics and policies employed in the war on terror are futile and, instead of eradicating terrorism, are the main causes for the rise in terrorism. Military elites are unanimously sending a clear message to U.S. policymakers that what is perceived by U.S. totally contradict the realities that are seen on the ground. Pakistani elites believe that terrorism cannot be defeated by brute force only; instead, the war on terror should focus on political, and economic, social issues. The U.S. should invest in upgrading and developing educational and social infrastructure in Pakistan.

Modernizing Elites

Some modernizing elites equated the “war on terror” with a war against Muslims. One modernizing elite said, “It is not war on terrorism, its war against Muslims. America is targeting only Muslims under this strategy like its attack on Iraq and Afghanistan. America is targeting the innocent people of Muslim countries by calling them terrorists.” Some Pakistani elites equated the “war on terror” to war for oil. “There is no terrorism in the world. It is only the unfair treatment by USA and UK coupled with their desire to pump oil without a meter [fuel gauge] from Middle East and particularly from Iraq without a meter which has introduced the word “terrorism.” It is like saying that if some country occupies USA and tries to run it in its own control and social manner will give birth to terrorism in USA,” said a member of the Punjab Assembly.

Modernizing elites also believe that the toppling of the Taliban in the name of the “war of terror” was not justified. A member of the National Assembly believed that the Taliban were a legitimate Afghan government that was illegally bombed into extinction. “That is commendable,
but the way they were removed, the way they were bombed and slaughtered, still persists in the minds of the people,” he said.

One modernizing scholar believed that the strategy employed in the “war on terror” is a flawed one that is having opposite effect. She believed that, instead of curbing terrorism, the “war on terror” has resulted in a loss of a tremendous amount of innocent life. “People of every country, including Americans, feel scared and unsafe. If America continues with its current aims, then time is not far away when the world will be grappled with a Third World War, which will be a gigantic and an atomic war and destruction will be unimaginable,” she said.

A political advisor to the chief minister of the Punjab Assembly said that a majority of Pakistanis believe that there should be a war against terrorism, but the way the U.S. by just is pursuing it, just by focusing on brute military strength, is causing a lot of resentment among Pakistanis.

Some modernizing elites believed that the U.S. has lost the credibility to lead the struggle against terrorism. They believe that United Nations, not the U.S., can play a significant role in freeing the world from the menace of terrorism. A Pakistani businessman said, “The best way to deal with terrorism is to let United Nations play their role. Every issue regarding to any manner should be given to the United Nations. If America has some reservations, then it should go to the United Nations. It is not the way to deal with the matter by itself without going to a proper forum that is United Nations.”

A member of the Punjab Assembly believes that terrorism will cease to exist if the U.S. withdraws its forces from Muslim countries and lets the UN take over the reconstruction process. He said that the U.S. should withdraw its forces from all Muslim countries. After that withdraw, fair and free elections supervised by the UN should take place in Afghanistan and Iraq. “The
United Nations should provide all possible help to conduct free, fair, and impartial elections without the interference of military forces of any country, especially the USA,” he said.

Few modernizing elites linked terrorism to social problems. A member of the National Assembly said, “Give education to the masses, listen to their grievances, and address their problems. No religion allows terrorism, [neither] does Islam. But these people are wrongly motivated and need comforts, facilities and guidance.”

To summarize, the modernizing elites think that the war on terror is a war against Muslim countries to occupy their oil reserves. They also think the fight against terrorism warrants a political solution, not brute force. Moreover, modernizing elites blame the rise and flourishing of terrorism on unfriendly U.S. policies toward Pakistan, which were implemented post-soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Modernizing elites believe that terrorism will exist as long as the quandary in the Middle East exists and the Iraq war exists.

**Religious Elites**

The majority of religious elites blamed social problems as a cause for the flourishing of terrorism. According to a local cleric, the people of Pakistan are being crushed by the shackles of poverty and unemployment. Justice is up for auction. Fundamentalist are taking advantage of ordinary Pakistanis’ helplessness. They brainwash and recruit them by teaching them dreams of rewards available for them in the afterlife. These brainwashed Pakistanis eventually become terrorists, who carry out heinous crimes against humanity. Government needs to take stern action against this threat.

One religious elite blamed the occupation of Muslim land by foreign forces as a reason for increased terrorism. He said, “Undue occupation of Muslim territories by foreign forces is the only reason for terrorism. For example, Indian occupation of Kashmir and Israeli occupation of Palestinian land.”
To summarize, religious elites blamed social injustice and the political and economic unrest currently prevalent in Pakistan and Afghanistan as a cause for the flourishing of terrorism. Religious elites also equated U.S. military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan as occupations of Muslim land, which is causing Pakistani resentment toward the U.S.

**Pakistan and the Taliban**

**Military Elites**

Responding to accusations made by several high-ranking U.S. officials that Pakistan must do more to stop the cross-border movement of members of the Taliban from Pakistan to Afghanistan, a retired general said,

> While sitting in USA, it is very difficult to perceive the ground realities in Afghanistan and northern areas of Pakistan. With vast resources at the disposal of the coalition forces mainly comprising of the US forces, they have not been able to crush the Taliban. President Karzai, just confined to his fortress of Presidential House, has not been able to do much to contain the Taliban. He shrugs off his responsibility by blaming Pakistan. The border is porous, laced with treacherous mountains and unreachable routes. It is just not possible to barbwire the whole length of this border. Almost 100,000 Pakistani troops are manning the border, yet it is not becoming possible to put a check on the movement of the Taliban who have intimate family relations along both sides of the border. These so-called Taliban or Mujahideens are the direct product of the 1980s when America was fighting against Communism. These fanatics, assembled from all over the world, are still in the northern areas, which are completely hostile to the Pakistani troops. The terrain is hostile being mountainous and thoroughly friendly to the locals. Pakistan Army has already lost troops and weapons in these areas and its mere presence against these local and foreign militants is de-popularizing the present government, which is already under intense pressure from the religious parties harboring militants in their wings—so dangerously creating law and order situation undermining the writ of the government. From one side local population is turning against the present regime because of its anti-terrorism policies, on the other side these terrorists get re-agitated and mount further pressure through sabotage, suicide bombings. As if this was not enough, U.S. yet puts more pressure “to do more.” Does all this keep the government? No. Government needs breathing space through sincere acknowledgement of the U.S., sincere acknowledgement from Afghan government, which is bent upon blaming Pakistan for its own misgivings and short-falls.

A naval official challenged the authority of American officials for asking Pakistan to do more. “Who is America to order someone to do something? We are not an American colony, but a sovereign and independent nation. Like America, we also have to consider our own
interests prior taking any action. Pakistan is already doing enough to curb the international terrorism while maintain its own national interests. No other country has the right to force Pakistan to do anything against its own interests,” he said.

Few military elites blamed the U.S. as the cause of the current chaos in Afghanistan. A retired colonel said, “The USA is trying to fight his “War of Interest” on the shoulders of others. All these problems are the creation of USA. Pakistani government has done more than its capacity, power, and resources against the support and wishes of its own people.”

A serving Pakistan army colonel also rebuked U.S. assertions that Pakistan is not doing enough. He said,

Pakistan has deployed more troops as compared to USA and NATO ISAF troops. Pakistani forces have suffered more causalities comparing to USA or NATO troops deployed in Afghanistan. Pakistan has captured the majority of al-Qaeda people who were hiding in various part of Pakistan, which were subsequently handed over to U.S. Moreover, Pakistan is also taking political and economical steps in the region bordering Afghanistan, which is paying dividend now. Pakistan cannot kill its own people just to please U.S. policymakers and think tanks who possess partial knowledge

The majority of military elites believed that the threat of the Taliban can only be neutralized through a political solution. A retired general said,

The Taliban are the by-product of the Afghan Jihad struggle against Communists. After the war, this Pashtoon group dominated the Afghan scene after surviving the intra-fratricide and an unending feud among Afghan militants. These people projected the religious cult of a specific Imam and injected a phenomenon of the Caliphate’s time not practically possible at this time. These hamlet people are ridden with a very narrow mind and believe in dogmas, rituals and reject open mindedness and can’t move with the demand of the time. They only need motivation through liberal education to be imparted through the locals and not the foreigners. They need money to make their houses, attend schools, have treatment in hospitals and communication infrastructure to reach out to the world and allow the world to reach out to them. It will take time. Instead of hounding them with rifle, they need butter to feed. We shouldn’t propagate them as terrorists, but coin some other term as brave people who need decent living and a decent education. Through pacification programs and helping Pakistan’s government to join them in their efforts, we can tame these unguided and uneducated people. Patience and time will make the impact.
A naval officer asserted that there is no need to get rid of the Taliban. He said that the Taliban are the byproduct of a social and political system. “Like America, Afghanistan also had the right to choose any system of government for itself. Taliban are a community with certain beliefs and they have all the rights to exist in this world like other communities,” he said.

To summarize, military elites vehemently reject U.S. assertions that Pakistan is not doing enough. Military elites believe that Pakistan has been given more to do than what it possibly can accomplish. Military elites believe the problem lies in Afghanistan, where U.S. forces have failed to eradicate the Taliban. They think that the current U.S.-supported Afghan government is comprised of ruthless war lords who are despised by the majority. Military elites also believe that the U.S. government is oblivious to ground realities in Afghanistan. Instead of pursuing a military solution, the U.S. must seek a political solution to blunt the Taliban.

**Modernizing Elites**

Modernizing elites also believed that Pakistan is doing its best to stop the Taliban and that American criticism was unfair. A member of the National Assembly said, “Pakistan cannot do more.” People of Pakistan believe that President Musharraf is a stooge of America who is pursuing the U.S. agenda without consulting them. “That is why government is not able to do any more,” he said.

A Pakistani scholar said that Pakistan has done more to deter terrorism and the Taliban than any other country. “Pakistan has done whatever they could. Not any other country has done that much including USA. Why USA is not succeeding in Iraq? Should Pakistan be blamed for that? Republican governments, wrong policies are the main cause,” he said.

One modernizing elite believed that dealing with the Taliban is not as easy as it sounds and will take an ample amount of time. She said that if the U.S. with all its military might and
resources, has failed to pacify Iraq, then why does it expect Pakistan to curb the Taliban in such a short period of time with limited resources at its disposal.

In dealing with the Taliban, modernizing elites also believed in a political solution rather than a military solution. A member of the National Assembly said,

Northern people, a non-Pushtoon community, is in government and Pushtoons are out of government. So a friction exists. Pushtoons should be taken into government, be given proper representation and be looked after. They need “Pat” not “Push.” More pressure generates more hatred. We must remember when Taliban were in power, there was peace in the country. Production of opium has ceased but now neither peace is there nor is opium extinct—it is on the increase.

A Pakistani businessman said, “Taliban are not terrorists. The word ‘Terrorists’ which is being used only for Taliban, is creating more annoyance in them. They should be dealt [with] as the normal citizens. They should not be hated just because they are fighting in the name of religion. If America is against Muslims, then Taliban are against America.”

A businessman blamed the U.S. for the creation of the Taliban and asked the U.S. to find a solution. “Taliban are a menace created by USA, so they should suggest a remedy,” he said.

One Pakistani scholar believed that Pakistanis should support the Taliban. He said, “Well, as far as my personal opinion is concerned, we should support Taliban for whatever vices they may have. There was peace in Afghanistan when they were in command.”

To summarize, modernizing elites believe that Pakistan has exhaustively pursed the Taliban and cannot do more. The war on terror is very unpopular in Pakistan. Therefore, due to public pressure, Pakistan cannot pursue overtly aggressive the U.S. policies. Some elites believe that there is no quick solution to the Taliban problem; it requires long-term surgical efforts. They also believe that if the U.S. with all its military might and resources, has failed to stop the violence in Iraq, then how can it expect a poor country like Pakistan to accomplish those goals in
such a short time? Modernizing elites also suggest a political solution, rather than a military solution, to overcome the Taliban.

**Religious Elites**

A local cleric blamed Afghanistan for not doing enough against the Taliban. He said, “Pakistan is doing all that is possible to stop terrorism in its surroundings. It is the weakness of Afghan government which is causing failures against Taliban.”

Another cleric blamed the Afghan government for supporting terrorism. He said, “Pakistan wants to exterminate terrorism from its atmosphere, but Afghan government is exporting terrorism in Pakistan to weaken it.”

A religious scholar blamed the U.S. and the current Afghan government for the recent spiraling of Taliban. He said, “Pakistan is doing his best in this regard, but the wrong U.S. foreign policy of supporting corrupt war lords in Afghanistan is making Taliban popular among local people. There was a peace when Taliban were in power, now Afghans are being crushed by the current corrupt government.”

To summarize, religious elites believed that Pakistan has done enough to curb the Taliban. The solution to wipe out the Taliban does not lie with Pakistan, it lies with the government of Afghanistan. They believe the current Afghan government consists of unpopular war lords, who persecute the Afghan population, consequently, ordinary Afghans are turning to the Taliban.

From these interviews it is quite clear that the U.S has a serious image and credibility problems in Pakistan. While public diplomacy provides the necessary tools to sway Pakistani opinion in favor the U.S., this effort will require the U.S. to alter its foreign policy toward Pakistan. The next chapter will discuss how the U.S. can employ diplomacy to wins hearts and minds in Pakistan. It will also discuss the limitation of U.S. diplomacy in pacifying Pakistani resentment toward them.
CHAPTER 5
IMPLICATIONS

From the responses of the Pakistani elites, it is quite clear that the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is in need of realignment. First, U.S. policy makers need to stop giving sermons about “doing more.” They need to realize that the on-ground realities in Pakistan and Afghanistan are different from what they perceive. To eradicate terrorism, Pakistan and the U.S. need to map out a comprehensive strategy that also embraces political, administrative, and economic dimensions. Second, Pakistani elites want a relationship between themselves and the people of the U.S., not a relationship between the U.S. government and President Musharraf. Pakistan wants to build a broad-based, stable, and long-term relationship with the U.S. Pakistanis wants to have the same freedoms and liberties that Americans enjoy, which is only possible through a relationship between two democracies, not between a democracy and dictatorship. “In keeping with the traditional diplomacy of the past, America has focused its efforts on securing the support of leaders in the region, leaving those leaders the task of securing the support of the people there. Instead of being able to rally their people, more and more of these leaders are alienating themselves from their publics,” said Zaharna. Therefore, it is imperative for the U.S. to change its policy toward Pakistan and start talking directly to the people of Pakistan.

Finally, U.S. aid to Pakistan must not be solely military hardware and armaments; instead, it should first and foremost focus on poverty alleviation and welfare projects in Pakistan.

Recently, the Congress Research Service has published a report that calls for a rearrangement of U.S foreign policy. This report recommends a closer bond with the people of

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Pakistan rather than its government. According to this report, the U.S. can “improve its image in Pakistan by making aid more visible to ordinary Pakistanis.” Confirming the sentiments of Pakistani elites, this report also states that “the US partnership with Pakistan would probably be on firmer footing through conditioned programs more dedicated to building the country’s political and social institutions than rewarding its leadership.”

In the past, there were instances where direct U.S. aid has helped enhance its image in Pakistan. On October 8, 2005, a massive earthquake hit Northern parts of Pakistan killing at least 73,000 people. In response to this the U.S. army launched a humanitarian relief mission, its biggest since the Berlin air lift. This was the first instance in the history of U.S.–Pakistan relations that Pakistanis saw the compassionate side of the U.S. What were the results? The U.S. favorable rating among Pakistanis jumped from 23% to 46%, while support for Osama bin-Laden dropped from 51% to 33%. Of those polled 78% said that they have a favorable image of the U.S. because of this relief mission. “This poll documents the most significant shift in Pakistani, indeed Muslim, public opinion since 9/11,” said Husain Haqqani, a former Pakistani information minister. This suggests that the U.S. can begin to eradicate terrorism and improve its image by direct involvement in development projects. “Clearly, American humanitarian assistance can make a significant and immediate difference in eroding the popular support base

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3 Ibid.


6 Ibid.
for global terrorists. The U.S. ‘war on terror’ has not,” said Ken Billen, the President of Terror Free Tomorrow, a non-profit organization based in Washington, D.C.⁷

Furthermore, from the opinions of Pakistani elites it is very clear rehabilitation of the Tribal Belt through economic incentives is the key to defeating terrorism and the Taliban. According to Shahid Javed Burki, a former finance minister of Pakistan, Pakistan estimates that $8 billion is needed over ten years to reform the Tribal Belt, a semi-autonomous area located at the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan. “These amounts should be made available rather than spent on more vigorous military campaigns,” said Burki.⁸ But this does not mean that the development money should be given directly to the government of Pakistan. Instead, this requires direct interaction with the people of Pakistan to make sure that the money channeled for development projects in spent on development projects, not by corrupt Pakistani government officials. According to Silvio Waisbord, “Once darling of development projects, the state has fallen from grace in recent decades.”⁹ In addition, due to the lackluster performance of states in various development projects, states are deemed unnecessary. In the past, developing states played a dominant role in controlling the resources and decision-making process, without being effective in bringing about any significant success. Thus, the majority of the current development programs utilize grassroots approach in conjunction with NGOs and civic associations.¹⁰ “This shift towards a ‘scale-down,’ ‘small is beautiful’ approach has been responsible for diminishing interest in the state as an analytical category and as a central actor in

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⁷ Ibid.
¹⁰ Ibid., 148.
development programs,” explains Waisboard.\textsuperscript{11} Therefore, the new development place their emphasis theories put its weight on a bottom-up approach that promotes “the development of critical consciousness and collective mobilization at the local level.”\textsuperscript{12} In development projects, however, the state cannot be completely ruled out. It still plays an important role in the design and application of development projects.\textsuperscript{13}

In light of elite Pakistani opinion that the U.S. must make its economic aid visible to the people of Pakistan, the U.S. government can use the technique of development communication as a tool for development projects in Pakistan: this will help the U.S. not only improve its image in Pakistan, but also stamp out terrorism and the Taliban.

Therefore, it is essential to look at various development communication models that can be utilized by the U.S. in Pakistan. According to Srinivas Melkote, the most accepted definition of development means to alleviate the social and economic conditions of people,\textsuperscript{14} although there is also a debate among communication scholars on what are the real indicators of development.\textsuperscript{15} Most development communication theories are based on modernization theories. The modernization perspective is derived from neoclassic theory and is based on the notion that western and capitalist model can be infused to spur development in all types of environments.\textsuperscript{16} This perspective is rejected by Melkote “for its negative view of culture, especially religious

\begin{footnotes}
\item[11] Ibid., 148.
\item[12] Ibid., 152.
\item[13] Ibid., 148.
\item[15] Ibid., 130.
\item[16] Ibid., 131.
\end{footnotes}
culture, for its patriarchal biases, and for its androcentrism.”17 Additionally, this approach implies that for third world countries to develop, they have to forgo their cultural traditions. Consequently, the modernization perspective places too much emphasis on GNP, which includes industrialization and economic growth. Hence, they ignore the humanistic aspects of development.18 According to Melkote, “It is usually futile and may be unethical for communications and human service professionals to help solve minor and/or immediate problem while ignoring the systematic barriers erected by societies that permit or perpetuate inequalities among citizens.”19

Consequently, it is essential to explore other alternatives “to the overtly perspective and top-down model of modernization.” 20 Melkote believes that there is a need to formulate a model that which is designed to equate growth with equality, availability of basic human needs, and need for meaningful and fulfilling interpersonal relationships.21 The alternative paradigm of development communication observes “development as a process that should provide people with access to appropriate and sustainable opportunities to improve their lives and the lives of others in their communities.”22 This model finds its roots in the notion of active participation of concerned individuals at the grass root level. This model also recognizes participation as a fundamental human right that should be ingrained in any development model “as an end in itself

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17 Ibid., 132.
18 Ibid.,
19 Ibid., 143.
20 Ibid, 133.
21 Ibid., 137.
22 Ibid.
and not for its result.” The basic purpose of this type of participatory approach is to “facilitate conscientization of marginalized people globally to the unequal social, political, and spatial structures in their societies.” Most of the time, this type of approach is not applied properly. Most current development has to do with “control,” which is reserved primarily for the “experts.” This type of development purportedly requires equal partnership between marginalized people and the expert, but the “outcome in most cases has not been true empowerment of the people, but the attainment of some indicator of development . . . essentially old wine in new bottles.”

Fortunately, there are two models of development communication which can overcome the above mentioned problems. First is participatory action research (PAR). In this process, the people on their own develop methods of consciousness-raising of their existential situation; the knowledge that is generated or resuscitated is by collective and democratic means. This is followed by reflection and critical self-evaluation, leading to endogenous social action.

Poor and marginalized people are dominated by three distinctive ways: control of the recourses of “material production,” control of resources of “knowledge production,” and control “over power that legitimizes the relative worth and utility of different epistemologies/knowledges.” Most of the time, the needs and wants of the marginalized and oppressed people

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23 Ibid., 138.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 138.
26 Ibid., 139.
27 Ibid.
are disregarded by the elites. Therefore, PAR allows poor and oppressed people to capture control of the development process and tame it according to their own needs and wants.\textsuperscript{28}

Another successful alternative model to modernization is the concept of empowerment. According to Melkote, “community empowerment is the process of increasing control by groups over consequences that are important to their members and to others in the broader community.”\textsuperscript{29} Empowerment can also be defined as the “manifestation of social power at individual, organizational, and community levels of analysis.” One good thing about empowerment the model is that it focuses on the proportioned relationship between the pertinent people, while treating all communication participants equally in a “subject-subject” relationship rather than the “subject-object” association practiced in diffusion and marketing approaches. Therefore, in contrast with the modernization perspective, in the empowerment perspective “the locus of control in this process rests with the individuals and groups involved and not with experts, the development communication professional, or the sponsoring organizations.”\textsuperscript{30}

Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet to solve the menace of terrorism. Moreover, bombs and bullets are certainly not the preferred option. Furthermore, western models of development models, which are based on capitalism, also show no promise in this regard. According to Steeves, “Nonmaterial considerations of religion and spirituality are seldom examined in the scholarship or practice of western development aid—except as obstacles to change under the dominant paradigm of modernization.”\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 140.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 142.

In this study, Pakistani elites pointed out few reservations that are beyond the scope and dimensions of U.S. policy. According to a recent study conducted by the University of Maryland, 85% of Pakistanis responded that terrorism is “never justified.” Moreover, an overwhelming 78% of Pakistanis want terrorist to be brought to justice. A majority of Pakistanis reject terrorism, and a majority of Pakistani elites dismiss force as a logical tool and tactic to defeat terrorism. Therefore, regardless of the content of the message communicated through U.S. public diplomacy, it will fail to stimulate the desired response from the people of Pakistan as long as no substantial changes are made to U.S. foreign policy. “No amount of spin in public diplomacy will compensate for an American foreign policy that negatively affects others. In communication between peoples, actions still speak louder than words,” said Zaharna. 

One can conclude that U.S. efforts in Pakistan must turn away from coercion toward development programs that support the Pakistani people in meeting both their spiritual and materials needs. This will create a climate that will build favorable public opinion toward the U.S. in Pakistan.

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34 Zaharna, “American Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World.”
CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Today, Pakistan is one of the most geo-strategically important states in the world. On its north and East, it borders two rising global powers, China and India, respectively. On its west it borders two ticking time-bombs: Afghanistan and Iran. In the past, Pakistan has been a reliable and dependable ally to the U.S. In the 1960s, Pakistan sustained Soviet wrath and animosity by allowing the U.S. to use its military bases for U-2 spy aircraft. Pakistan helped the Nixon administration to establish diplomatic relation with China. During the 1980s, Pakistan played a key role in defeating Communism and ending the Cold War when it helped the U.S. blunt the Soviet desire to gain access to warm waters to control the flow of Middle East oil.

All Pakistani elites interviewed agreed that American freedoms have nothing to do with American unpopularity in Pakistan. They all blame the contradictions in American domestic policy and foreign policy. They are appalled at American support for dictators, who deny Pakistanis the virtues of freedom and democracy. They believe that with disregard for democracy and freedoms, the U.S. supports Pakistani dictators in order to protect and promote its own national interest. In the 1960s, the U.S. supported Pakistani dictator General Ayub to counter the threat of the spread of Communism in the Middle East In the 1980s, the U.S. supported Pakistani dictator General Zia to deny the soviets the access to Middle Eastern oil reserves. Since 2001, in the name of its “war on terror,” the U.S. has supported another Pakistani dictator, General Musharraf. Why? If the fruits of democracy and freedom have made the U.S. the most powerful country in world, then why deny the people of Pakistan the same virtues?

Due to the past unreliable friendship, Pakistani elites do not trust the U.S. Military elites are angered at the U.S. for not supporting Pakistan in its wars in 1965 and 1971 against India. They also are angered at the U.S. for abandoning Afghanistan after the soviet withdrawal in 1989.
without implementing a political solution and leaving Pakistan alone to suffer the consequences of the Taliban. Pakistani elites believe that Pakistan always has been treated as a disposable friend by the U.S. They want a relationship that is based on mutual national interest of both countries, not on the self-interest of the U.S. government. Pakistan wants to build a broad-based, stable, and long-term relationship with the U.S. It wants to enjoy the same freedoms and liberties enjoyed by the U.S. population. A segment of the elite is deeply disturbed about U.S. policies in Israel, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Pakistan wants to see these issues amicably resolved, putting a lid on people’s frustration regarding these issues. It is not the American people and their enshrined principles of fair playing that are disliked, but rather specific American actions in the Middle East and Iraq that annoy the people of Pakistan.

Pakistani elites also vehemently disapprove of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Religious and modernizing elite dismiss the war on terror conducted in Iraq as a war for oil and Middle East domination. Pakistani elites believe that, by targeting Muslim countries only, the U.S. has unleashed a war against Muslims, not a war against terror.

Pakistani elites also decry the strategies employed by the U.S. in its war on terror. They think that the U.S. is trying to solve a political problem through the instrument of blunt and brute force. Pakistani elites believe that terrorists thrive on conflict; therefore, as long as conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Middle East are not resolved, terrorism will continue to burgeon. Pakistani elites are aware of the threat posed by terrorism against Pakistan, but they want to confront terrorism with a strategy that contains the ingredients of political, social, educational, and economic development.

Pakistani elites believe that the Taliban is a political movement; thus, it can only be pacified through a political solution. They believe that the Taliban are flourishing in
Afghanistan, not because of Pakistan, but because of the current Afghan government. Pakistani elites believe that the current Afghan government is comprised of non-Pushtoon war lords, yet, 60% of the Afghan population and all of the Taliban are Pushtoon. As long as Pushtoon and Taliban are kept out of power, the Quagmire in Afghanistan will continue.

Pakistan elites believe that recent peace deal between the Pakistan government and the local tribes, which is heavily criticized by U.S. policy makers, is the best way to defeat the threat posed by the Taliban. Due to this peace deal, the tribal leaders have unanimously declared war against the Taliban. To crush the Taliban, supportive local tribesmen must be befriended, not alienated.

Pakistani elites also belittle accusations by the U.S. media and politicians that Pakistan is not doing enough to tackle the Taliban and terrorism. They believe U.S. elite media and politicians are oblivious to facts and devoid of knowledge of on the ground realities. Pakistani elites believe that Pakistan has fought the war on terror with all the resources that it could muster. Pakistani efforts in regard to the war on terror deserve American gratitude, not American criticism. Pakistani elites also believe that Pakistan should not be put under undue duress to “do more”; instead, it should be acknowledged as a strong partner which has stood shoulder to shoulder with the U.S. in its war on terror.

Despite the predominantly anti-American Pakistani elite opinion, all is not lost. All affluent Pakistani people send their children to the U.S. for education and go themselves for medical check up and proudly talk about their relatives living in USA. In fact, the USA is like a dreamland for most. Educated people remain current about it. Also American technology, ranging from cars to tanks, is very popular in Pakistan and is considered more dependable compared to technology coming from other regions.
Furthermore, Pakistanis developed a tremendous liking for the U.S. for its unflinching help during the 2005 earthquakes in which 70,000 lives were lost. Pakistan should be helped financially, economically, politically and educationally to advance its development. This will help to broaden their intellectual dimensions to put them on the path to free thinking and valuing the meaning of freedom and liberty. Extension of welfare projects, spread over the whole of the country including the Tribal Belt, would augur well for bringing the two countries closer.

It is quite evident from the responses of Pakistani elites that U.S. Middle East policy is one of the main reasons for the anti-Americanism prevalent in Pakistan. Therefore, the USA must find a suitable solution to the Middle East crisis. Currently, Pakistan and Israel do not have diplomatic relations. The U.S., a staunch supporter of Israel and “ally” of Pakistan, can move the Middle East crisis in a new direction by helping Israel and Pakistan to establish diplomatic relations.

This study relied on non-probability sampling to select a sample of Pakistani elites. Therefore, the elites opinion revealed during this study may not be representative of the full range of Pakistani elite opinion.

The responses elicited through e-mail interviews were short and limited in scope. Telephone interviews on the other hand, allowed the researcher to probe more deeply for answers. The responses received were more unreserved and informative.

Due to financial restraints, the researcher was not able to travel Pakistan to do in-person interviews. In-person interviews would have allowed the research to probe more effectively and also allowed the researcher to register facial expressions and body language and respond to it. This might have resulted in richer data.
Future studies on this subject should use a probability sample. Instead of qualitative interviews, a focus group approach would provide the opportunity for a debate among Pakistani elite opinion leaders, which could reveal new information not possible to access via interviews.

Moreover, due to the current U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. image is very poor in Pakistan. This may have further skewed the elite opinions gathered for this study.

Despite the fact that participants in this study were promised confidentially, many influential military generals and political leaders refused to participate in it. Also, responses elicited through religious elites were not cohesive and comprehensive.

Biases resulting from the wording of some questions might also have resulted in biased answers. Courtesy biases of interviewees also could have affected the responses they gave, i.e., respondents might have felt compelled to give suitable answers to help the researcher to achieve the main objective of the study: to unearth the reasons behind U.S. unpopularity in Pakistan. Moreover, in order to look good, the respondents might have resorted to socially desirable answers. Interviewer’s reactions to interviewee’s answers and interviewer’s efforts to probe for answers might also have biased interviewee’s responses. The researcher’s own association and identification with Pakistan and desire to obtain suitable data might also have generated some biases.

Nonetheless, the study was able to identify some underlying reasons for Pakistani dislike toward the U.S. government and to suggest some remedies for reducing the animosity between the two countries.
APPENDIX A
INTERVIEWEE LIST

1. Lieutenant General (Retired).
2. Major General (Retired).
4. Colonel (Retired).
5. Lieutenant Commander, Pakistan Navy.
7. Anonymous officer, Pakistan Army.
9. Member of Parliament, Punjab Assembly.
10. Member of National Assembly.
11. Political Advisor to Chief Minister.
12. Political Advisor to former Prime Minister of Pakistan.
14. Think Tank.
15. Prominent Businessman, Faisalabad, Pakistan.
17. Political Advisor to member of National Assembly.
18. Scholar, Lahore, Pakistan.
20. Scholar, Lahore, Pakistan.
22. Bishop, Lahore, Pakistan.
23. Local Cleric, Faisalabad, Pakistan.

24. Local Cleric, Lahore Pakistan.

25. Author and scholar, Lahore, Pakistan.

APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW GUIDE

Do Pakistanis Hate the USA.?
• Why do you think the United States is not popular in Pakistan?

• In rationalizing his “War on Terror,” President Bush said, “Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this chamber--a democratically elected government. . . . They hate our freedoms--our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.” Do you agree/disagree with this statement? Why?

• What steps can the U.S. take to remove your misgivings toward it?

US ‘War on Terror’ and Pakistan
• Do you think the current tactics and strategy employed by the U.S. in its “War on Terror” are successful in eradicating terrorism? If yes/no, why?

• What are the reasons for terrorism?

• What is the best way to defeat terrorism?

Pakistan and the Taliban
• Recently, prominent U.S. officials have suggested that Pakistan is not doing enough to curb Taliban living in Pakistan. Do you agree/disagree? Why?

• How should we deal with the Taliban?

• Recently, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution that requires the U.S. President to certify that Pakistan is playing its role in curbing the Taliban in Pakistan before releasing military assistance to Pakistan. Some people have correlated this resolution with the Pressler amendment, which in the past proved to be a thorn in the U.S. Pakistan relationship. How it will impact the current relationship between the two countries?
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Hammaad Shams was born on July 5, 1978 in Sargodha, Pakistan. The eldest of three children, he grew up mostly in Lahore, Pakistan, graduating from Army Public High School in 1993. He received his BA in Communications from the Augusta State University in May 2004. Currently, he is pursuing a degree in MA in Mass Communications from the University of Florida.