


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Inhaltsverzeichnis.

Bündnisse, Verträge, Konventionen, Protokolle etc.

		Nr.	Seite
	Großbritannien und Honduras. Handelsvertrag . . .	12663.	300
1887. Januar 31. (1900. Februar 3.)			
1901. März 11.	Belgien und Luxemburg. Telegraphenabkommen . .	12661.	297
„ „ 16.	Belgien und Niederlande. Telegraphenabkommen . .	12662.	299
„ August 15.	Großbritannien und Dänemark. Vertrag über die Beförderung von Prefstelegrammen	12660.	295
1902. März 5.	Vertragsstaaten. Vertrag über die Behandlung des Zuckers	12659.	265

Aktenstücke zur Geschichte des Südafrikanischen Krieges.

I. Korrespondenz der englischen Heeresleitung mit den Burengeneralen über die Zerstörung von Eigentum.

1900. Februar 3.	Orangefreistaat und Südafrikanische Republik. Die Präsidenten des Orangefreistaates und der Südafrikanischen Republik an den englischen Obergeneral. Beschwerden über Zerstörung von Farmen.	12639.	216
„ „ 5.	Großbritannien. Der Obergeneral an die Präsidenten der beiden Republiken. Antwort auf das Vorige.	12640.	217
„ „ 12.	— Derselbe an Dieselben. Dasselbe	12641.	218
„ Mai 13.	— Derselbe an Dieselben. Proklamation gegen willkürliche Zerstörungen	12642.	218
„ „ 16.	Südafrikanische Republik. Der Generalkommandant an den englischen Obergeneral. Weitere Beschwerden	12643.	218
„ „ 18.	Großbritannien. Der Obergeneral an den Generalkommandanten der Südafrikanischen Republik. Antwort auf das Vorige	12644.	219
„ Juli 4.	Südafrikanische Republik. Der Generalkommandant an den englischen Obergeneral. Neue Beschwerden	12645.	219
„ „ 10.	Orangefreistaat. Der Kommandant De Wet an den englischen Obergeneral. Dasselbe	12646.	220
„ „ 24.	Großbritannien. Auszug eines Berichtes von General Sir Redvers Buller	12648.	223
„ „ 28.	— Antworten des Obergenerals an Botha und De Wet	12647.	221

IV Sachregister: Aktenstücke zur Geschichte des Südafrik. Krieges. -- Der Aschantikrieg.

			Nr.	Seite
1900. August	15.	Südafrikanische Republik. Der Generalkommandant an den englischen Obergeneral. Antworten und Beschwerden	12650.	224
„ „	23.	Großbritannien, Der Obergeneral an den Generalkommandanten der Südafrikanischen Republik. Gründe für die Vertreibung der Familien und Zerstörung der Häuser	12651.	225
„ Septbr.	2.	— Derselbe an Denselben. Dasselbe. Guerillakrieg .	12652.	226
„ „	5.	Südafrikanische Republik, Der Generalkommandant an den englischen Obergeneral. Antwort auf die beiden vorigen	12653.	227
„ Oktober	17.	— Derselbe an Denselben. Protest gegen die englische Kriegführung	12654.	227
„ „	22.	Großbritannien, Der Obergeneral an den Generalkommandanten der Südafrikanischen Republik. Der Guerillakrieg erfordert außerordentliche Mittel . .	12655.	228

II. Bericht des Frauenkomitees über die Konzentrationslager.

1901. Dezbr.	12.	Großbritannien, Report on the concentration camps in South-Africa by the committee of Ladies appointed by the secretary of state for war	12656.	228
--------------	-----	--	--------	-----

III. Verhandlung zwischen den Niederlanden und Großbritannien über eine Vermittlung im Südafrikanischen Kriege.

1902. Januar	25.	Niederlande. Der Gesandte in London an den englischen Minister des Ausw. Bietet die guten Dienste der niederländischen Regierung an, um eine Friedensverhandlung herbeizuführen	12657.	264
„ „	29.	Großbritannien, Der Staatssekretär des Ausw. an den Gesandten der Niederlande in London. Die Initiative zu Verhandlungen muß von den Buren in Südafrika ausgehen	12658.	265

Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre 1900.

1900. April	6.	Großbritannien, Der Kolonialminister Sir F.M.Hodgson an den Gouverneur der Goldküste. Gibt es Unruhen in Aschanti?	12545.	54
„ „	7.	— Mr. Low an den Kolonialminister. Der Gouverneur der Goldküste bereitet Truppensendungen nach Kumassi vor	12546.	54
„ „	7.	— Derselbe an Denselben. Verhandlungen des Gouverneurs mit den Häuptlingen	12547.	55
„ „	7.	— Der Gouverneur der Goldküste an den Kolonialminister. Genauerer Bericht über seine Reise nach Kumassi und über die Haltung der Eingeborenen .	12558.	60
„ „	11.	— Der Gouverneur der Goldküste an den Kolonialminister. Weitere Nachrichten über die Verhandlung mit den Häuptlingen	12559.	72
„ „	12.	— Derselbe an Denselben. Die Verhandlung mit den Häuptlingen ist ohne Ergebnis	12548.	55

			Nr.	Seite
1900	April	13.	Großbritannien, Der Kolonialminister an den Gouverneur der Goldküste. Soll nach den Umständen handeln	12549. 56
	„	15.	— Mr. Low an den Kolonialminister	12550. 56
	„	16.	— Der Gouverneur der Goldküste an den Kolonialminister. Derselbe Gegenstand	12560. 74
	„	19.	— Mr. Low an den Kolonialminister. Tumulte unter den Aschantis	12551. 56
	„	19.	— Der Kolonialminister an Mr. Low. Verstärkungen sind unterwegs	12552. 57
	„	24.	— Mr. Low an den Kolonialminister. In Kumassi sind Verstärkungen eingetroffen	12553. 57
	„	30.	— Derselbe an Denselben. Kumassi ist abgeschnitten	12554. 58
	Mai	5.	— Mr. Low an den Kolonialminister. Nachrichten vom Gouverneur aus Kumassi über Angriffe der Aschantis auf die Stadt	12555. 59
	„	5.	— Der Kolonialminister an den General Lugard (Nord-Nigeria). Verstärkungen nach der Goldküste . .	12556. 60
	„	9.	— Der Kolonialminister an Mr. Low. Verstärkungen kommen von Lagos	12557. 60
	„	27.	— Oberst Willcocks an den Kolonialminister. Lage auf dem Kriegsschauplatze	12561. 79
	Juni	10.	— Derselbe an Denselben. Ernste militärische Lage. Truppenbewegungen	12562. 80
	„	15.	— Der Kolonialminister an den Oberst Willcocks. Verstärkungen sind unterwegs	12563. 80
	„	30.	— Oberst Willcocks an den Kolonialminister. Antwort auf das Vorige. Er braucht weitere Verstärkungen	12564. 81
	Juli	5.	— Mr. Low an den Kolonialminister. Der Gouverneur hat Kumassi verlassen	12565. 82
	„	13.	— Oberst Willcocks an den Kolonialminister. Militärische Maßregeln	12566. 83
	„	14.	— Der Gouverneur der Goldküste an den Kolonialminister. Bericht über die Belagerung von Kumassi und militärische Expeditionen	12568. 85
	„	23.	— Derselbe an Denselben. Entsatz Kumassis . . .	12567. 83
	„	24.	— Der Gouverneur der Goldküste an den Kolonialminister. Bericht über den Abzug von Kumassi .	12569. 96
	August	14.	— Oberst Willcocks an den Kolonialminister. Genauerer Bericht über seine Operationen bis zum 14. August 1900	12570. 105
	„	Dezbr.	23. — Oberst Willcocks an den Kolonialminister. Sämtliche Insurgentenchefs sind gefangen	12571. 120
1901.	Januar	29.	— Der Gouverneur der Goldküste an den Kolonialminister. Rückblick auf den Aufstand	12572. 120

Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah im Somalilande 1899—1901.

1899.	April	12.	Großbritannien, Der Generalkonsul Sadler an der Somalilande an den Minister des Ausw. Berichtet über das Auftreten eines Mullah Abdullah als Propheten in Dolbahanta. Er schlägt eine Expedition vor .	12490. i
-------	-------	-----	--	----------

VI Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah im Somalilande 1899—1901.

			Nr.	Seite
1899.	Juni	5.	Großbritannien. Der Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Die Macht Abdullaha breitet sich aus	12491. 4
„	Juli	16.	— Derselbe an Denselben. Dasselbe. Haltung des Sultans Nur	12492. 4
„	„	17.	— Kapitän Harrington an Lord Cromer, Sirdar in Ägypten. Hat dem König Menelek die Umtriebe Abdullaha mitgeteilt	12493. 8
„	„	22.	— Der Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Frage einer abessinischen Expedition gegen den Mullah	12494. 8
„	August	31.	— Derselbe an Denselben. Der Mullah erklärt sich zum Mahdi. Verstärkungen sind nötig	12495. 9
„	Septbr.	5.	— Der Minister des Ausw. an den Generalkonsul Sadler. Verstärkungen sind abgeschickt	12496. 10
„	„	10.	— Der Generalkonsul Sadler übersendet dem Minister des Ausw. einen Brief des Mullah. (Erhalten in Berbera, 1. September)	12500. 11
„	„	12.	— Der Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Schnelles Handeln ist nötig	12497. 10
„	„	14.	— Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Weitere Nachrichten über den Mullah und die Haltung der Stämme	12504. 13
„	„	19.	— Der Minister des Ausw. an den Generalkonsul Sadler. Wie ist die Lage?	12498. 11
„	„	20.	— Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Antwort auf das Vorige	12499. 11
„	„	21.	— Denkschrift über die Expedition gegen den Mullah	12501. 11
„	„	29.	— Der Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Neue Nachricht über den Mullah	12502. 12
„	„	30.	— Der Minister des Ausw. an den Generalkonsul Sadler. Indische Truppen nach Berbera. Mitwirkung Abyssiniens	12503. 12
„	Oktober	9.	— Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Der Anhang des Mullah zerstreut sich	12505. 17
„	„	12.	— Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Beschleunigung der Expedition ist erwünscht. Mitwirkung Abyssiniens	12508. 18
„	„	19.	— Der Minister des Ausw. an Generalkonsul Sadler. Verschiebung der Expedition gegen den Mullah	12506. 17
„	„	22.	— Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Antwort auf das Vorige	12507. 17
„	„	23.	— Der Minister des Ausw. an Generalkonsul Sadler. Beschränkung der militärischen Unternehmungen	12509. 21
„	„	27.	— Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Abyssinien wünscht die Expedition	12510. 21
„	Novbr.	23.	— Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Übersendet eine Korrespondenz mit abessinischen Behörden über Räubereien abessinischer Stämme	12511. 22
„	Dezbr.	27.	— Der Minister des Ausw. an den Geschäftsträger in Abyssinien. Die britische Grenze soll respektiert werden	12512. 25

			Nr.	Seite
1900.	März	16.	Großbritannien. Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Abyssinische Expedition gegen den Mullah	12513. 25
„	„	31.	— Derselbe an Denselben. Niederlage des Mullah	12514. 26
„	April	21.	— Derselbe an Denselben. Nachrichten über den Mullah	12515. 27
„	Juni	9.	— Der Geschäftsträger in Abyssinien an den Sirdar von Ägypten. Menelek schlägt eine englisch-abys- sinische Expedition vor	12517. 28
„	„	9.	— Derselbe an Denselben. Dasselbe	12518. 28
„	„	15.	— Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Englisch-Abyssinische Expedition	12516. 28
„	August	5.	— Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Die Lage wird unerträglich	12519. 29
„	„	5.	— Derselbe an Denselben. Weitere Nachrichten. Die Stämme fordern Bekämpfung des Mullah	12520. 29
„	Septbr.	12.	— Derselbe an Denselben. Bericht über die Expedition nach Burao	12521. 34
„	Oktober	26.	— Derselbe an Denselben. Englisch-abys- sinische Operationen	12522. 36
„	Novbr.	3.	— Derselbe an Denselben. Dasselbe	12523. 37
„	„	9.	— Das Ausw. Amt an das Kriegsamt. Anwerbung von 1000 Somalis	12524. 38
„	„	16.	— Das Ausw. Amt an den Generalkonsul Sadler. Soll mit der Werbung der Somalis beginnen	12525. 38
„	„	16.	— Das Kriegsamt an das Ausw. Amt. Denkschrift über die Expedition gegen den Mullah. Geschichte des Mullah und seiner Räubereien	12526. 38
„	„	24.	— Generalkonsul Sadler an das Ausw. Amt. Antwort auf No. 12525	12527. 42
„	„	29.	— Der Geschäftsträger in Abyssinien an den Minister des Ausw. Abyssinien wird gegen den Mullah nicht auf eigene Hand vorgehen	12531. 43
„	„	30.	— Das Ausw. Amt an den Generalkonsul Sadler. Expedition gegen die Ogadenstämme	12528. 42
„	Dezbr.	6.	— Generalkonsul Sadler an das Ausw. Amt. Der Mullah kauft Waffen im italienischen Gebiet	12529. 43
„	„	8.	— Das Ausw. Amt an den Botschafter in Rom. Italien soll Waffenlieferung an den Mullah verhüten	12530. 43
„	„	28.	— Generalkonsul Sadler an das Ausw. Amt. Feldzugsplan gegen den Mullah	12533. 45
1901.	Januar	1.	— Das Ausw. Amt an Generalkonsul Sadler. Verlangt Bericht über die günstigste Zeit für die Operationen	12532. 44
„	„	12.	— Derselbe an Dasselbe. Antwort auf Nr. 12532	12534. 47
„	„	29.	— Der Sirdar von Ägypten an das Ausw. Amt. Abkommen mit Abyssinien für den Feldzug	12535. 48
„	Februar	10.	— Generalkonsul Sadler an das Ausw. Amt. Misserfolg der Abyssinier	12536. 48
„	„	25.	— Das Ausw. Amt an den Major Hambury Tracy. Er soll zur abyssinischen Armee abgehen	12537. 49
„	März	8.	— Das Ausw. Amt an Generalkonsul Sadler. Aufenthalt des Mullah und Feldzugsplan	12538. 50

				Nr.	Seite
1901.	März	15	Großbritannien, Generalkonsul Sadler an das Ausw. Amt. Die Expedition muß sofort beginnen . . .	12539.	50
„	„	18.	— Das Ausw. Amt an den Generalkonsul Sadler. Antwort auf das Vorige	12540.	51
„	April	4.	— Proklamation an die Dolbahantastämme	12543.	52
„	Mai	1.	— Generalkonsul Sadler an das Ausw. Amt. Stärke des Mullah	12541.	51
„	„	24.	— Derselbe an Dasselbe. Fortschritte der Expedition	12542.	52
„	Juni	13.	— Generalkonsul Sadler an das Ausw. Amt. Erfolge über den Mullah.	12544.	52

Verhandlungen über die Mandschurei 1900—1901.

1900.	Oktober	1.	Großbritannien. Die Botschaft in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Rußland hat nicht die Absicht, die Mandschurei zu annektieren	12573.	129
„	„	1.	— Dieselbe an Denselben. Derselbe Gegenstand. Verwaltungsmaßregeln der Russen in der Mandschurei	12574.	129
„	„	10.	— Die Botschaft in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Rußland verlangt nur Sicherheit für Eisenbahnen und Schifffahrt in der Mandschurei	12575.	132
„	„	22.	— Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw. Die ganze Mandschurei ist in russischer Gewalt	12576.	133
1901.	Januar	2.	— Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw. Teilt den Text eines russisch-chinesischen Abkommens über die Mandschurei mit	12577.	133
„	„	3.	— Der Minister des Ausw. an den Botschafter in Petersburg. Soll über ein angebliches Mandschureiabkommen Erkundigung einziehen	12578.	137
„	„	3.	— Der Minister des Ausw. an den Gesandten in Peking. Weiß er etwas von dem Mandschureiabkommen?	12579.	137
„	„	4.	— Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw. Antwort auf das Vorige	12580.	137
„	„	5.	— Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Antwort auf Nr. 12578	12582.	138
„	„	6.	— Derselbe an Denselben. Dasselbe	12581.	138
„	„	8.	— Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Ausführliche Antwort auf Nr. 12578. Haltung der russischen Presse	12584.	139
„	„	12.	— Der Minister des Ausw. an den Gesandten in Japan. Die japanische Regierung hat die russische Regierung über das Mandschureiabkommen befragt	12583.	138
„	„	15.	— Der Minister des Ausw. an den Gesandten in Peking. Der chinesische Gesandte verleugnet das Mandschureiabkommen	12585.	140
„	„	22.	— Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Russisch-chinesische Verhandlungen. Keine Landabtretung	12586.	140
„	„	22.	— Der Minister des Ausw. an den Botschafter in Petersburg. Soll den russischen Minister interpellieren	12587.	141

		Nr.	Seite
1901. Februar	5.	Großbritannien. Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw. Rußland verlangt die sofortige Ratifikation des Mandschurei-Abkommens	12588. 141
„	5.	— Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw. Nachrichten über die Verwaltung der Mandschurei durch die Russen	12626. 168
„	6.	— Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Unterredung mit Lamsdorff. Rußland sucht einen modus vivendi mit China	12589. 142
„	13.	— Der Minister des Ausw. an die Vertretungen in Tokio, Peking und Berlin. China soll kein Separatabkommen mit einer Macht schließen	12590. 143
„	15.	— Der Gesandte in Japan an den Minister des Ausw. Antwort auf das Vorige	12591. 144
„	15.	— Der Minister des Ausw. an den Gesandten in Peking. Er hat dem chinesischen Gesandten ein Separatabkommen widerrufen	12592. 144
„	17.	— Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Lamsdorff verleugnet jede territoriale Erwerbung in der Mandschurei	12593. 144
„	19.	— Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw. Antwort auf 12590	12594. 145
„	27.	— Derselbe an Denselben. Die chinesische Regierung bittet um Unterstützung gegen die russischen Forderungen in der Mandschurei	12595. 145
„	28.	— Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Lamsdorff über die Rückkehr des chinesischen Hofes nach Peking und den modus vivendi in der Mandschurei	12596. 146
„	28.	— Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw. Ergänzung zu Nr. 12595	12597. 147
„ März	1.	— Der Minister des Ausw. an den Gesandten in Peking. Die chinesische Regierung wünscht Vermittelung in der Mandschureifrage	12598. 148
„	2.	— Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw. Der Gesandte der Verein. Staaten protestiert ebenfalls gegen ein Separatabkommen	12599. 148
„	2.	— Der Minister des Ausw. an den Gesandten in Peking. Vermittlungsfrage	12600. 149
„	4.	— Der Minister des Ausw. an den Botschafter in Petersburg. Die englische Regierung wünscht den Text des Mandschureiabkommens zu erhalten	12601. 149
„	5.	— Der Minister des Ausw. an den Botschafter in Berlin. Die deutsche Regierung wünscht die Mandschureifrage vor die Gesandtenkonferenz zu ziehen.	12602. 150
„	5.	— Der Minister des Ausw. an den Gesandten in Peking. Die chinesische Regierung soll dem deutschen Vorschlage im vorigen zustimmen	12603. 150
„	6.	— Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw. Übersendet den Text des Mandschureiabkommens	12604. 151

			Nr.	Seite
1901	März	6. Großbritannien, Der Minister des Ausw. an den Botschafter in Washington. Unterredung mit dem amerikanischen Botschafter über chinesische Sonderabkommen	12605.	152
„	„	6. — Der Minister des Ausw. an den Gesandten in Peking. Hat dem chinesischen Gesandten in London jedes Separatabkommen widerraten	12606.	153
„	„	7. — Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Lamsdorff verweigert die Mitteilung des Mandschureivertrages	12607.	154
„	„	9. — Der Minister des Ausw. an den Botschafter in Petersburg. Soll dem Grafen Lamsdorff den Text des Mandschureiabkommens vorlegen	12608.	155
„	„	11. — Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Lamsdorff lehnt eine Diskussion des Mandschureiabkommens ab	12609.	156
„	„	11. — Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw. Die chinesische Regierung fordert in Petersburg Änderung des Mandschureiabkommens	12610.	157
„	„	13. — Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Antwort auf Nr. 12608. Unterredung mit Lamsdorff	12611.	157
„	„	13. — Der Minister des Ausw. an den Gesandten in Peking. Haltung Li Hung-Tschangs	12612.	158
„	„	16. — Der Minister des Ausw. an die Vertreter in Petersburg, Peking, Tokio. Die chinesische Regierung hat eine Änderung des Abkommens in Petersburg vorgeschlagen	12613.	158
„	„	17. — Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw. Modifikation des Mandschureiabkommens	12614.	159
„	„	18. — Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Unterredung mit Lamsdorff. Er lehnt die Mitteilung des Vertrags ab	12623.	163
„	„	18. — Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Bestätigung von Nr. 12613	12615	159
„	„	19. — Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw. Näheres über die Modifikation des Mandschureiabkommens	12616.	160
„	„	20. China, Kaiserliches Dekret vom 20. März. — Der Gesandte in London soll die englische Regierung um Hilfe bitten	12617.	160
„	„	20. Großbritannien, Der Generalkonsul in Schanghai an den Minister des Ausw. Dasselbe	12618.	161
„	„	21. China, Kaiserliches Dekret an den Gesandten in London. Neues Ersuchen um Vermittlung in der Mandschureifrage	12619.	161
„	„	23. Großbritannien, Der Generalkonsul in Schanghai an den Minister des Ausw. China ist eventuell bereit, das Mandschureiabkommen abzulehnen	12620.	162

			Nr.	Seite
1901. März	23.	Großbritannien. Der Minister des Ausw. an den chinesischen Gesandten in London. Antwort auf Nr. 12617. Lehnt die chinesische Bitte ab. — Bemerkung zu Nr. 12620	12621.	162
„	„	24. — Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw. Li Hung Tschang wünscht dringend die englische Vermittlung	12622.	163
„	„	24. China. Vizekönige Lew Kwun Yih und Chang Chih Tung an den Gesandten in London. Der Mandschureivertrag soll dem Schiedsspruch der Mächte vorgelegt werden	12624.	166
„	„	25. Großbritannien. Der Minister des Ausw. an den chinesischen Gesandten in London. Antwort auf das Vorige	12625.	168
„	April	5. — Der Minister des Ausw. an den Botschafter in Petersburg. Rußland verzichtet auf das Mandschureiabkommen	12627.	169
„	„	6. — Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Übersendet einen Auszug aus dem „Messenger Official“ über die russische Politik in China . . .	12628.	170
„	„	12. — Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Unterredung mit Lamsdorff über die Mandschurei. Es habe nie ein Abkommen, sondern nur ein Programm existiert	12629.	180

Verhandlungen zwischen Großbritannien und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika über einen Kanal zwischen dem Atlantischen und Stillen Ozean.

1900. Februar	5.	Großbritannien und Vereinigte Staaten. Zusatz zu dem Vertrage vom 19. April 1850 über einen Schifffahrtskanal zwischen dem Atlantischen und Stillen Ozean	12630.	183
„	Dezbr.	22. Vereinigte Staaten. Der Staatssekretär des Ausw. an den englischen Botschafter in Washington. Der Senat hat den Vertrag vom 5. Februar geändert .	12631.	190
1901. Februar	22.	Großbritannien. Der Staatssekretär des Ausw. an den Botschafter in Washington. Rückblick auf die Verhandlungen. Der amerikanische Vorschlag ist unannehmbar	12632.	193
„	April	25. — Der Botschafter in Washington an den Staatssekretär des Ausw. Der amerikanische Staatssekretär hat ihm einen neuen Vertragsentwurf übergeben	12633.	200
„	August	3. — Der Staatssekretär des Ausw. an den Botschafter in Washington. Übersendet eine Denkschrift und verlangt Änderung des Vertragsentwurfs	12634.	202
„	Septbr.	12. — Der Staatssekretär des Ausw. an den amerikanischen Botschafter in London. Weitere Verhandlungen über die Vorschläge vom 3. August	12635.	210

XII Verhandlungen zwischen Großbritannien und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika.

	Nr.	Seite
1901. Oktober 23. Großbritannien. Der Staatssekretär des Ausw. an den Botschafter in Washington. Die englische Regierung nimmt die amerikanischen Vorschläge an	12636.	211
„ Novbr. 8. Vereinigte Staaten. Der Staatssekretär des Ausw. an den engl. Botschafter in Washington. Übersendet den definitiven Vertragsentwurf	12637.	212
„ „ 18. Großbritannien und Vereinigte Staaten. Vertrag über die Erbauung eines Schiffahrtskanals zwischen dem Atlantischen und Stillen Ozean.	12638.	213



Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah im Somalilande 1899—1901.*)

Nr. 12490. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Generalkonsul Sadler an der Somaliküste an den Minister des Ausw. Berichtet über das Auftreten eines Mullah Abdullah als Propheten in Dolbahanta. Er schlägt eine Expedition vor.

Berbera, April 12, 1899. (April 27.**)

(Extract.) || On my return from Zeyla in the middle of last month I found conflicting reports current in Berbera regarding the doings of a Mullah, by name Haji Muhammad Abdullah, in the Dolbahanta country, who, it was said, was collecting arms and men with a view to establishing his authority over the south-eastern portion of the Protectorate. It was also freely rumoured that it was his ultimate object, should he find himself strong enough, to head a religious expedition against the Abyssinians. || This Haji Muhammad Abdullah belongs to the Habr Suleiman Ogaden tribe; he married into the Dolbahanta Ali Gheri, amongst whom he now lives. His place of residence is Kob Fardod, a village inhabited by Mullahs, a day's march east of Kerritt, and distant about 170 miles from Berbera. He is a man in the prime of life, and in person is described as dark-coloured, tall, and thin, with a small goat's beard. He has made several pilgrimages to Mecca during the last three years. At Mecca he attached himself to the sect of Muhammad Salih, whose deputy he claims to be in Somaliland. || This sect was established in Berbera about twelve years ago. It preaches more regularity in the hour of prayer, stricter attention to the forms of religion, and the interdiction of Kat — a leaf the Arabs and coast Somalis are much addicted to chewing on account of its strengthen-

*) Blaubuch Cd. 597. 1901.

**) Die eingeklammerten Daten geben das Datum der Ankunft in London an. Red. Staatsarchiv LXVI.

ing and intoxicating properties. This teaching has not found much favour with the people of the town. It has been known for some time that Haji Muhammad Abdullah had acquired considerable influence over the Habr Toljaala and Dolbahanta tribes inhabiting the remoter parts of the Protectorate, but hitherto it had always been thought that this influence had been exerted for good; he settled disputes amongst the tribes in his vicinity, kept them from raiding each other, and was generally thought to be on the side of law and order. Several communications had passed between him and the Vice-Consul (Berbera), all written in proper terms, and three months ago he sent a prisoner into Berbera, against whom a complaint had been laid of robbery and violence in the interior. || Inquiries were at once set on foot to ascertain what the rumours and reports concerning this individual meant, on what they were founded, and what his possible intentions might be. The result, and his own communications made within the last few days to the Vice-Consul, leave no room to doubt but that he is now organizing a religious movement antagonistic to the Administration. || It is difficult to get accurate information regarding his doings and future intentions, both on account of the distance he is off, and because all those who willingly or under compulsion join his sect are sworn to say nothing about him, and an oath, though not usually binding on a Somali, is so when administered by a man of such reputed sanctity and power as this Mullah. The position, though, as I gather it after sifting the various reports I have heard, is as follows:—

The Mullah has abandoned his former practice of merely redressing grievances, and has commenced to proclaim himself a power in the land. He forces all within his reach to join his sect, and threatens expeditions against the Dolbahanta tribes who hold aloof. He levies blackmail for the support of his followers when supplies, which are freely given by the tribes whom he has brought under his influence, fail. || He has amongst his followers several bad and suspicious characters, who probably use his name for their own purposes. He lays claim to the possession of supernatural powers, such as being able to hear with his own ears in the Dolbahanta what is being said of him in Berbera, with the usual story of being able to turn bullets into water. || This is believed in by more ignorant people of that far-off district. It is to this belief in his supernatural powers, coupled with the fact that he has undoubtedly done much to preserve the peace in the Dolbahanta, and the power he now has of enforcing his orders through a large following, and the possession of fire-arms, that his hold over the Dolbahanta country has become so strong. || The tribes over whom this Mullah has more immediately con-

solidated his influence are: in the Dolbahanta, the Bahr-as-Samah, the Arar Samah, and the Ali Gheri; other sections of the Girad Farah are under his sway, and the powerful Mahmood Girad, against whom he threatened to send an expedition, are now said to have sent him a deputation of 300 horsemen. In the Habr Toljaala country the Aden Madoba and the Yesaf have joined themselves to him, and possibly other tribes in that vicinity. || In the Habr Gerhajis country, beyond espousing the cause of Madar Hirsi, he failed to effect anything — they would have none of him. I do not think there is any chance of his extending his influence over the two large Ishak tribes — the Habr Gerhajis and the Habr Awal — these might be depended on to operate against him. With the tribes under his sway we have no quarrel. || Owing to its distance from the coast, we have hitherto exercised no effective control over the Dolbahanta country, and have interfered but little in its affairs. Dolbahanta caravans come with regularity into Berbera, but beyond this we have but little information available as to the country and the character of its inhabitants. Since 1891, when, for various reasons, it was decided not to enter into engagements with the Dolbahanta tribes, their country has been visited but twice — once by Captain Welby in 1895, and once by Captain Merewether in 1896—97. On each occasion these parties were received well, but their object was a friendly one. What the attitude of these tribes would be in a move against this Mullah is as yet doubtful. According to some reports which have reached me, the adhesion of some of these tribes is due more to fear than in any particular interest in the Mullah's cause, and some might be glad to be rid of him. || The Dolbahanta is now an integral portion of our Protectorate, and though we have not hitherto exerted our influence there, we cannot tolerate such a state of affairs as would follow the establishment of this Mullah's rule, under the conditions which are now apparent. Nor can we permit this man to import arms against our orders, and use them to terrorize our unarmed tribes. At the same time, it would be a difficult business at present to seize this Mullah or to disarm him. || The best means of meeting this situation in the Dolbahanta would, I think, be to organize a military promenade. It seems necessary in Somaliland to make a display of force in the interior every four or five years, and such a display has never been made in the eastern portions of our Protectorate. All the people there know of us is what they have seen of the few small parties that have visited their country and what they have heard from their caravans frequenting our ports. It is now four years since the Rer Harad expedition was undertaken, and the good

effect it produced is wearing off. || So far as is known, the Mullah has some 3000 men. After the rains fall in this month and May the tribes now round him will be moving to the Haud, and he will be left with a comparatively small following. This is the time I should choose for an expedition. No opposition would be met with unless operations were directly taken against this man, and as regards that I should have to be guided by the circumstances as I find them.

Nr. 12491. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Derselbe an Denselben. Die Macht Abdullahs breitet sich aus.

Camp Sheikh, June 5, 1899. (June 27.)

(Extract.) || The position of affairs in the Dolbahanta shows no improvement, and the reports which reach me point to a further extension of Mullah Abdullah's influence. || He is now on his way back from an expedition against the Mahmood Girad, who lately raided the Ali Gheri. He is said to have been well received by this tribe, who returned the looted property and gave him a present of fifty horses. How far they have otherwise come under his influence is not reported. || Mullah Abdullah has emissaries in the Habr Toljaala and Habr Yunis countries endeavouring to win over the more influential persons of the tribes; our Akils have been tampered with, and in one or two instances overtures have been made to our officials to join the Mullah's cause. There are further direct signs in the direction of the Dolbahanta of enmity to all those in the service of the Protectorate. It is no yet known how far this is to be attributed directly to the Mullah, or to those of his immediate following who have been expelled from Aden, or who, for other reasons, are not in the favour of the Administration. || My present object is to confine this movement, if possible, to the eastern districts and prevent its spreading to the Ishak tribes, and with this view I am now on my way to visit the nearer sections of the Habr Yunis and Habr Gerhajis tribes, who have not yet migrated to the Haud.

Nr. 12492. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Derselbe an Denselben. Dasselbe. Haltung des Sultans Nur.

Hargaisa, July 16, 1899. (July 31.)

My Lord, || In my despatch of the 16th ultimo, I informed your Lordship of the state of affairs amongst the Habr Yunis tribes, and

noted that I was awaiting an opportunity of ascertaining the attitude that would be assumed by Sultan Nur. || This, I regret to say, is one of declared hostility. || I waited for some time after he had returned to his country, and then sent him a civil letter, pointing out that he had not as yet come to visit me, as is usual when my camp is in his limits, and desiring him to come in, as there were several matters I wished to discuss with him. This was on the 27th ultimo, and my camp was then at Bagan, in Habr Yunis territory. || No reply was sent to this letter; but on the 10th instant the camel sowar who had conveyed it to Sultan Nur returned to my camp near Hargaisa without his camel, arms, and uniform, of which he reported he had been stripped by order of Sultan Nur. According to his statement, he made his escape just as he was about to be sent to the Mullah Muhammad Abdullah. || I at once wrote Sultan Nur a stern letter of warning, which I dispatched by an Aida galleh messenger. In this letter I demanded the immediate return of the sowar's effects, pointed out to Sultan Nur that he could not contend against us, and that it was foolish of him to be led away by the ill-advice of designing persons, adding that if he takes heed in time, and comes into my camp now, he will be given „aman" to come and go, otherwise, if he continues this attitude he has assumed, the consequences will fall on his own shoulders, and they will be severe. || I thought it better to give him another chance of clearing himself, if he would, for several reasons. In the first place, we are not prepared for active measures yet, and it was necessary to take notice of such an act as he had just committed; again, I know him to be a weak, vain man, easily led, whose head has been turned by the praise and flattery showered upon him by the Mullah, and by the position he imagines he has attained of supremacy over his tribe through the Mullah's influence. || If he comes in, I propose to inflict a fine on him for his conduct to the sowar who took him my letter. If he continues his present attitude of hostility, and the measures I shall take at our port towns in stopping his supplies do not bring him to reason, I can see no other course open but to proceed against him actively early in the cold season, if he be still within our reach. || I have already informed your Lordship that the Habr Yunis are divided, and that this time last month only the eastern sections of the tribe had so far been affected by the Mullah's movement, the western section awaiting the return of Sultan Nur. Nur had called a large meeting of the tribe for the 22nd instant at Odweina, and I had arranged to have a man present to report what takes place. Yesterday I received letters from Haji Musa, the Head of the Mullah community of Hahiya, informing me that the westerly

sections of the Habr Yunis, including the principal portion of Sultan Nur's own tribe, the Rer Segullah, together with the Ishak sections, bordering on the Golis, amongst whom I passed, and whose Elders I interviewed on my way here had bound themselves together to keep clear of all disturbance. They are said to have told Sultan Nur that they are dependent on Berbera for their supplies, and that they do not intend to get into difficulties with us on his account, and to have told him pointedly that if he does not cease from making strife in the country, and oppressing people by his exactions, he had better clear off, as they would oppose him. If he remained quiet, and did not oppose the Government, they would accept him as Sultan, otherwise they would have nothing to do either with him or with Madhar Hirsi. As regards the Mullah, they are said to have declared that they belong to the Kadiriyah sect, that of Haji Musa, of Hahiya, and Sheikh Mattar, of Hargaisa, as opposed to the Salihiyah, that of the Dolbahanta Mullah, and that they intended to adhere to it. The reports went on to say that, finding himself opposed in this quarter, and by his own section, Sultan Nur hastily left eastwards, and is supposed to have repaired to Burao, whence he will probably re-join the Mullah.

The eastern sections of the Habr Yunis are still with the Mullah, but the position has so far improved that the westerly sections, whose attitude had before been doubtful, are now said to have definitely declared against Sultan Nur and the Mullah. At this point there is now every reason to believe this movement will now stop in its movement westwards, leaving the line of division as reported in my previous despatch. || The Aidagalleh — the other large division of the Habr Gerhajis — are reported to be unaffected by the movement. They came freely into my camp on my way to Hargaisa, and I am expecting their Sultan — Sultan Deria — here in a few days. The Habr Awal are coming in from miles around. I have now the leading men of several of their sections in here to perform the feudal custom of „dibaltig,” or mounted parade of allegiance. || Sheikh Mattar, the Head of the religious community here, is entirely on the side of law and order, and exerts considerable influence over the Habr Awal tribes in this direction, one and all of whom are opposed to the Mullah's faction. || Meanwhile, I hear of dissensions between the Mullah and Sultan Nur, partly owing to the latter having raided the Habr Toljaala Gashanbur. Madhar Hirsi, Nur's rival, is said to have again gone to the Mullah with a present of sixty camels, and it is possible that he may be again declared Sultan of the Habr Yunis, to the detriment of Nur. Whether he is so declared or not will not affect the position

to any great extent so long as the westerly sections of the tribe hold aloof. || From the Dolbahanta reports have been received that the Mullah has arrested two of our Akils, and seized the rifles of four Biladiyahs who happened to be in the vicinity with caravans. Whether the Akils went to the Mullah of their own accord, or whether they were seized by their tribes, who are hostile, and sent to him, has not yet been ascertained. || In consequence of this seizure of arms, I have had to prohibit Biladiyahs from accompanying caravans to the eastern provinces, and warnings have been issued to caravans to avoid that route. || Steps have also been taken to prevent, as far as possible, supplies reaching the Mullah from our coast towns. || Reports from the Dolbahanta are also current in Berbera that the Mullah and Sultan Nur between them are bent on stopping all caravans entering Berbera for the next six months, with a view to starve the trade of the town. This they will not be able to do. || The main caravan route to the Ogaden from the Jerato Pass through Adadleh is in the hands of sections of the Habr Yunis opposed to Sultan Nur, and caravans using this road could, if necessary, take a more westerly one through Habr Awal country, whilst caravans using the road from Bohotele to Sheikh could diverge either to the Jerato route, or eastwards through the country of the Mahmood Girad. We may, however, expect to hear that some caravans have been looted or detained in the direction of the Dolbahanta. || Reports continue to reach me that the Mullah Muhammad Abdullah has received letters from the Sheikh Salih, in Mecca, bringing him to task for his proceedings, and warning him against creating disturbances in the country, or moving in any way against us. It is further said that Sultan Nur has been told by the Mullah to put a check on his actions. || Reports in Somaliland are generally so various and so conflicting that considerable caution has to be exercised in giving them credence; but I am inclined to believe that there is some truth in these reports about the attitude of Sheikh Salih and the religious sects who are opposed to the Mullah, some of whose representatives, such as Haji Musa, went to Mecca for the purpose of ascertaining how matters stand, assure that they are true. How far the Mullah's attitude will be affected remains to be seen. || A Habr Awal man returning from the Ogaden reports that about ten days ago a party of thirty of the Mullah's followers, some armed with fire-arms, appeared amongst the Ogaden Rer Haroun, told them that the Mullah would soon be with them, and requiring them to collect a number of eating camels, which they proceeded to do. He further stated that the Mullahs of the Rer Ali, the neighbouring tribe to the Rer Haroun had declared against

the Mullah. || If this information is true, it would point to what we have heard before — that this movement is directed against the Abyssinians. I have communicated this information to Mr. Gerolimato, and suggested that he should give it to the Governor of Harrar for what it is worth. || Raids and counter-raids are taking place between the Mahomed Aysa and the Habr Toljaala Noh in connection with the agitation raised by this Mullah, and one result of the unsettled feeling in the eastern portion of the Protectorate will be that the troublesome sections of the Noh, who were unusually quiet and well-behaved last year, will break out anew, and give us further trouble on their own account.

J. Hayes Sadler.

Nr. 12493. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Kapitän Harrington an Lord Cromer, Sirdar in Ägypten. Hat dem König Menelek die Umtriebe Abdullahs mitgeteilt.

Zeyla, July 17, 1899.

(Extract.) || I have communicated to King Menelek the religious movement on the borders of the Somali Coast Protectorate, which the Mullah, Haji Mahomed Ahmed is conducting. || This movement is referred to in Consul-General Sadler's despatch to Lord Salisbury, dated the 14th April, 1899. || The King informed me that he would take steps to stifle this movement should the Mullah move into Abyssinian territory. || On arrival at Harrar I found that Dejasmach Birratu, nephew of Ras Makunan, had been detailed to watch the Mullah's movements, and capture him if possible.

Nr. 12494. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Frage einer abyssinischen Expedition gegen den Mullah.

Hargaisi, July 22, 1899. (August 12.)

My Lord, || I have received a demi-official communication, dated the 4th instant, from Mr. Gerolimato, our Consular Agent in Harrar, telling me that the King has given orders to Dejasmach Biratu, who is now acting as Governor of Harrar, to do nothing in the Ogaden without his (Mr. Gerolimato's) advice. Mr. Gerolimato accordingly asks me what to do in connection with an expedition the Abyssinians are preparing to send to the Ogaden: whether to let them go, or indirectly endeavour to stop them. From what is written, it would seem that the Dejasmach is not over anxious to proceed with the expedition. || I can offer no opinion

as to the expediency of sending a force into the Ogaden from an Abyssinian point of view; all I know about the force is that it is to be employed against a somewhat distant tribe, and that it is to catch the Mullah Muhammad Abdullah if it can. || But so far as the interests of this Protectorate are concerned, and the position with regard to the Mullah affected thereby, I am of opinion that an Abyssinian move to the Ogaden at the present time would not help us, and might be productive of an opposite effect. Were we moving ourselves directly against the Mullah, and had the Ogaden tribes declared against us, a simultaneous move on the part of the Abyssinians would certainly assist our operations. Neither of these conditions, however, exist at present. We are not moving actively against the Mullah, and the Ogaden tribes, so far as I am aware, are quite friendly to us. Their caravans are coming in from the interior to our ports, and since writing my despatch of last week I have received, through one of our Akils returning from the Ogaden friendly messages from the Rer Ali and Rer Haroun, assuring me that they are dependent on our ports for their supplies, and that they will not mix themselves up with the disturbances in the Dolbahanta. This Akil further told me that horsemen from the Mullah were expected to arrive amongst the Rer Haroun, but had not done so yet, thus contradicting the reports noted in the concluding portion of my despatch above referred to. || Were an Abyssinian expedition to appear in the Ogaden it would be the signal for the rising of all the Ogaden tribes, and probably throw them at once into the hands of the Mullah, the very contingency we wish to avoid. I do not think that this expedition is likely to catch the Mullah, and if it met with a reverse, which is quite on the cards, the prestige and influence of the Mullah would be greatly enhanced, whether he had anything to do with it or not. || For these reasons I should prefer the dispatch of this expedition postponed for the present.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. Hayes Sadler.

Nr. 12495. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Derselbe an Denselben. Der Mullah erklärt sich zum Mahdi. Verstärkungen sind nötig.

[Viâ Aden.]

Jerato, August 31, 1899. (September 3.)

(Telegraphic.) || The Mullah has suddenly arrived at Burao with a force of 1500 men, and has declared himself Mahdi. || He intends to advance on Hargaisa, and possibly Berbera, and with that object is collecting

the eastern tribes. || The movement is directed against us, and the position is serious, for, though the western tribes are loyal, they cannot be depended upon to check the advance unaided. || The employment of troops is, in my opinion, absolutely necessary: 100 mounted and 300 foot, with the co-operation of friendlies, should be sufficient to suppress the rising, and I would request the services of such a force. || The Mullah must be dislodged from Burao if he remains there, and a post must be established. The country to the west of Burao is known, and the water supply sufficient. If he moves in that direction, he must be driven back. || It is desirable that Berbera should be watched by a man-of-war. I am returning there at once.

Nr. 12496. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Minister des Ausw. an den Generalkonsul Sadler. Verstärkungen sind abgeschickt.

Foreign Office, September 5, 1899.

(Telegraphic.) || I have received your telegram of the 31st ultimo. || The Resident at Aden has, I understand, dispatched to Berbera 200 native infantry, and the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have been asked to send a ship of war there. I presume that, for defensive purposes, these measures will be sufficient. We must be certain that we have an adequate force, and we ought to know exactly what the plan is before we embark on offensive operations.

Nr. 12497. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Schnelles Handeln ist nötig.

Berbera, September 12, 1899. (September 13.)

(Telegraphic.) || The Mullah Muhammad Abdullah, is now in Western Habr Yunis, at Odweina. I estimate his force at 500 cavalry and possibly 1000 infantry. The friendly tribes have collected to oppose his march, but they lack cohesion. However, as soon as our troops take the field the whole of the western country will rise against the Mullah. If we do nothing now the Mullah's influence will extend, and the people will believe that he has taken the Hinterland from the Protectorate.

Nr. 12498. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Minister des Ausw. an den Generalkonsul Sadler. Wie ist die Lage?

Foreign Office, September 19, 1899.

(Telegraphic.) || Is there any alteration in the situation with regard to the Mullah? Do you still regard military operations as necessary?

Nr. 12499. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Antwort auf das Vorige.

Aden, September 20, 1899. (September 20.)

(Telegraphic.) || The situation remains unchanged except that the Mullah has returned to Burao, and has burned a village at Sheikh Pass. It is most necessary to begin military operations at an early date.

Nr. 12500. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Generalkonsul Sadler übersendet dem Minister des Ausw. einen Brief des Mullah. (Erhalten in Berbera 1. September.)

Berbera, 10. September. (23. September.)

From Muhammad-bin-Abdullah to the English.

This is to inform you that you have done whatever you have desired, and oppressed our well-known religion without any cause. Further, to inform you that whatever people bring to you they are liars and slanderers. || Further, to inform you that Mahomed, your Akil, came to ask from us the arms; we therefore, send you this letter. Now choose for yourself; if you want war we accept it, if you want peace pay the fine. || This and salaam.

Nr. 12501. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Denkschrift über die Expedition gegen den Mullah.

P.U.S., || I have very little to add to the letter sent by you to the Foreign Office on the 18th instant. || Consul-General Sadler's remark that „Military operations are very necessary, and at an early date”, appears to be a sufficient answer to the recommendation made by Lord Lansdowne that Sadler should be again referred to before the final decision was taken. || As regards the force, the capture of the Mullah can be best achieved by using cavalry as the bulk of the force to be employed. || Consul-General Sadler, in a letter to the Foreign Office, dated the 31st August also, says: — || „This Mullah is actually at Burao with a force from the Dolbahanta and the Ogaden, which, from the various accounts received, may be put down at 1500 men, with a large proportion

of horse. It is not believed that he has more than forty or fifty rifles with him." This confirms our information that the Mullah's following is well equipped with cavalry. || The Mullah's foot following would, in addition, be far more mobile than any regular infantry we could employ. || Consequently, there would, in my opinion, be little chance of catching the Mullah, without the employment of a force of cavalry sufficiently strong to act alone if necessary. || The report that the Mullah had sent his belongings to the Dolbahanta country, which is south and south-east of Burao, points to his contemplating retirement there himself if his present operations are unsuccessful. To frustrate such an attempt a strong force of cavalry is clearly necessary. || After carefully considering the matter I hold to my opinion that the force suggested in your letter to the Foreign Office of the 18th instant is the most suitable to be employed.

For Director of Military Intelligence,

(Signed)

William Everett,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

September 21, 1899.

Nr. 12502. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Neue Nachricht über den Mullah.

Aden, September 29, 1899. (September 29.)

(Telegraphic.) || It is reported that the Mullah, who has evacuated Burao, is now at Behotele, 100 miles south, from which he says that he will advance north again when he has collected reinforcements. Whether he really intends to do so, or has made the announcement in order to retain his hold on the vacated country, is not known. Under favourable conditions, the Mullah, now that he is back in the Dolbahanta country, may collect from 3000 to 10000 followers; but until we occupy Burao we can ascertain nothing definite as to the attitude of the tribes south of that place. || It is now more than ever necessary to effect the occupation.

Nr. 12503. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Minister des Ausw. an den Generalkonsul Sadler. Indische Truppen nach Berbera. Mitwirkung Abyssiniens.

Foreign Office, September 30, 1899.

(Telegraphic.) || War office have considered the composition of the force to operate against the Mullah. In their opinion the troops to be employed should be furnished from India, and not drawn from Aden,

and should consist of four companies of native infantry, a specially-selected native cavalry regiment, and the two machine-guns which should have arrived at Aden on the 22nd instant. || The Government of India will be instructed to dispatch this force to Berbera, and to put in command a fully qualified officer, to whom you should allow a free hand as far as possible. || The Abyssinians may offer to assist, but Her Majesty's Government do not consider it desirable that Abyssinian troops should operate within the limits of the British Somali Coast Protectorate.

Nr. 12504. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Weitere Nachrichten über den Mullah und die Haltung der Stämme.

Berbera, September 14, 1899. (October 2.)

My Lord, || On the 11th instant information was received that the Mullah Muhammad Abdullah, had left Burao and occupied Odweina, in the western Habr Yunis country. He is there coercing the western Habr Yunis tribes who water at Odweina, Adadleh, and Syk, and who had declared themselves against him and Sultan Nur. He has seized some of their principal men and a considerable quantity of their livestock grazing in the Arori and Toyio Plains. His methods are as follows: He seizes the best men of the tribes who have not declared for him and all the property he can collect. These men he beats until they agree to obey him. They are then released and sent to collect their tribesmen. These are all sworn by the triple divorce oath, and if the Mullah is satisfied, in some cases he returns the looted property, retaining what he requires for victualling his followers. A quantity of loot is reported to have been sent off to the Dolbahanta. || These are the measures in process with the western Habr Yunis tribes. They have not, however, as yet gone over to him, and still profess their readiness to oppose him. Next the turn of the Aidagalleh will come, and if all these tribes actively join the Mullah, the attitude of the Habr Awal tribes, who are now quite loyal, and who are collecting to oppose the Mullah, will in the face of such a coalition, and in the absence of any move on our part, become questionable. || This coercion is, of course, but temporary, but it is very effective as long as it lasts. As soon as this pressure is removed the tribes will return to us; and if we now take the field, at the first sign of a backward movement on the Mullah's part, the tribes will be on him, and I am informed from several quarters that many of his following will at once turn against him. || The position of the employés of the Administration is

particularly hard. The Mullah is seizing the karias, families, and property of all our servants he can find in the interior. Not content with this, I am informed that he has issued a Proclamation making the wives of all connected with the Administration lawful to his followers. The wife of one of our police who fell into his hands was divorced from her husband by the Mullah and appropriated to himself. Yesterday it was reported that a party of 200 men is being sent to seize the karia of the Ressaldar of our Camel Corps at Megag, in the Aidagalleh country. The Headmen employed by shooting expeditions have mostly had pressure put upon them. In one case a Headman sent the Mullah four camel-loads of provisions from Berbera. He was questioned about it to-day, and openly said that he had eaten the Sirkar's salt for a number of years and was not disloyal, but that he had to propitiate the Mullah to save his karia and property, which were all at the Mullah's mercy in the jungle. Many of these facts are only now coming to light. || Such a state of affairs, I would submit, cannot be allowed to continue in the British Protectorate. It will last till we move actively ourselves, for, though the tribes are partly collected to oppose the Mullah, it is doubtful whether they can of themselves be counted upon to offer any effective resistance, such is the fear this man, who is looked upon as a sorcerer, has inspired in the country. || It is unfortunate that we could not get earlier intimation of the Mullah's intention to move to Burao. I have before alluded to the secrecy which covers his proceedings, and to the difficulty of obtaining reliable information from the Dolbahanta. It will be observed from late reports that I considered the movement was subsiding, and, although we were aware that Sultan Nur had sent several letters to the Mullah to assist him in coercing the western Habr Yunis tribes, our information was to the effect that all attempts to raise a force had failed. Such was certainly the opinion of Sheikh Mattar, of Hargaisa, whose means of obtaining information are probably unequalled in the Protectorate, and whose good faith there is no reason to question. He did not consider there was any probability of a move on the Mullah's part till next spring rains, when he thought that, if he found himself strong enough, he would then create trouble in the western part of the Protectorate, or move into the Ogaden. This opinion was expressed the day I left Hargaisa on my return journey. There seems to have been an altercation, too, between the Mullah and Sultan Nur, the latter saying that he had not collected men and supplies at Burao, as the Mullah had moved earlier than he had expected. || From persons acquainted with the Habr Toljaala, I gather that the tribes actively supporting the Mullah

from that quarter are the Adan Madoba, the Rer Yusuf, and the Ahmed Farih. Members of other Habr Toljaala tribes are with the Mullah's following, but they are believed to be there more or less under compulsion. All the Habr Toljaala are now afraid that they will be looted by the Dolbahanta horsemen when the Mullah returns eastwards. Of the Dolbahanta following, too, some are said to have come under compulsion, but it would seem that the majority have been attracted by the prospect of loot.

As regards the strength of the Mullah's following, accounts differ considerably. I doubt if he has more than 1500 men with him, of which 500 would be horse. And possibly this estimation may be found to be above the mark. It is, however, most difficult to form an accurate opinion on this point. || I consider that a properly equipped force of 300 infantry 100 cavalry, and two Maxims, which I would supplement by fifteen of our Camel Corps, and thirty police, sufficient to drive the Mullah back, with or without the assistance of friendlies, and to punish him severely if he stands. I do not think there would be any risk in moving such a force anywhere through the country between this, Burao, and Habr Yunis country; and I may safely say there will be no risk of a reverse. The tribesmen the Mullah has with him have never met anything more formidable than their own spearmen; they have a great dread of fire-arms, and are by all reports in no way to be compared with the Aysa, whom we encountered in 1890. || What is urgently wanted now is an advance by our troops, for which the whole country is waiting. Our first object would naturally be to catch him, and put an end once for all to these disturbances. Unfortunately, it is very doubtful if he will stand. If he is mad, as he is said to be, he may; otherwise, he will probably fall back as soon as he hears of our force leaving Berbera. We should not in this case succeed in capturing him, unless this could be effected by the friendlies, who would be certain to harass his rear. But we should put a stop to the present insupportable state of affairs in the nearer portions of the Protectorate, and the reduction of the truculent tribes about Burao and the Habr Toljaala would be easily effected; they would most of them come in to us of their own accord. An early move is urgently called for. The longer we delay the more difficult will the matter be to deal with, and a continuation of the present position cannot but be detrimental to our influence over the tribes throughout the Protectorate. || If the Mullah is allowed to establish himself for long in this portion of the Protectorate, we may have to reckon with an increase to his numbers from the Dolbahanta, and the matter may assume wider dimensions than

it has hitherto done. || It is most difficult to lay down any detailed plan of action beyond the general lines. The condition of affairs is continually changing, and we can never say where the Mullah will be a week hence. I have before me two main lines. To drive the Mullah back from this portion of the Protectorate, catching him if we can, and to occupy Burao, afterwards moving through the Habr Toljaala country, partly to show a force in that direction, and partly, if necessary, to fine the Adan Madoba and the Rer Yusuf for their share in these disturbances. This scheme would have to be modified in accordance with the Mullah's movements. For instance, reports have been received that he intends to advance to Syk, near the Jerato Pass. If this is the case we should have to march straight on that position from Berbera, and leave the occupation of Burao till after he has been driven back. Burao is a position of considerable strategical importance. It commands the water supply of the eastern Habr Yunis tribes, and of the Adan Madoba and Rer Yusuf tribes of the Habr Toljaala. With this position in our hands we could exercise a powerful control over the surrounding country. I have suggested that 100 infantry, 25 cavalry, with one Maxim entrenched and protected by the wire zariba, would be sufficient to hold Burao. || I have lately been over the country close up to Burao, and have found that by marching viâ Warren and Wissil there would only be one march between Sheikh and Burao without water. I would propose to make arrangements to have two days' supply of water to be carried with the column. Sufficient transport can be collected here within ten days to a fortnight. || The friendly Mahomed Aysa are now collected at the Sheikh Pass; the Ayal Ahmed and Ayal Yunis have sent out men to muster at Argan to the west of the Jerato Pass, near which are also the hill tribes of the Habr Yunis, who have always been against Sultan Nur, and the Adan Aysa. On both sides friendlies could be mustered in thousands, but the difficulty would be to keep them together for more than a few days away from their karias and supplies. The strongest coalition will be that of the Habr Awal tribes near Hargaisa under Sheikh Mattar, but it is questionable whether they will go so far as to join the Habr Yunis in an attack on the Mullah at Odweina, they will probably content themselves with protecting Sheikh Mattar and Hargaisa. I have written to Sheikh Mattar on this point.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

J. Hayes Sadler.

Nr. 12505. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Der Anhang des Mullah zerstreut sich.

Aden, October 9, 1899. (October 9.)

(Telegraphic.) || Reports are confirmed that the following of the Mullah has dispersed. The Mullah is said to have moved towards the eastern portion of the Dolbahanta, but news is vague and meagre. It is reported that the nearer tribes are anxious to come in. || To control the tribes and to quash influence of Mullah I still consider it necessary to occupy Burao. Opposition is not likely to be met, but we have to guard against the contingency of the Mullah moving north again. || It is no longer necessary to retain a man-of-war at Berbera. || I am anxious as soon as possible to return to the coast.

Nr. 12506. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Minister des Auswärtigen an Generalkonsul Sadler. Verschiebung der Expedition gegen den Mullah.

Foreign Office, October 19, 1899.

(Telegraphic.) || I am in receipt of your telegram of 16th instant. || Taking into consideration the demands for the employment of Her Majesty's forces elsewhere, I have come to the conclusion that any expedition against the Mullah or among the tribes must be postponed, and that operations must, in any case, be restricted to the occupation of Burao. || If you remain of opinion that such occupation is really necessary, please state what force you require for this purpose beyond that already at your disposal.

Nr. 12507. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Auswärtigen. Antwort auf das Vorige.

Aden, October 22, 1899. (October 22.)

(Telegraphic.) || It would be desirable to take 11 cavalry and 600 infantry with 20 sappers to occupy Burao. There are only 50 infantry available at Berbera. || It is not absolutely necessary to occupy Burao, but a show of force for a month or six weeks among the nearer tribes is necessary. In the latter case we could reduce the infantry to 300. The force should be composed of selected Mahommedans. || I can manage for the present if troops cannot be spared, but it would be inadvisable to delay the expedition for long. Please see my despatch of the 12th October. || It is desirable that I should return to Berbera without delay.

Nr. 12508. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Beschleunigung der Expedition ist erwünscht. Mitwirkung Abyssiniens.

Aden, October 12, 1899. (October 23.)

My Lord, || The only information of any importance received in Berbera up to the 6th instant was the confirmation of previous reports that the Mullah's following had dispersed, and that he himself was supposed to have left Bohotele for a place further east, so as to be within easy reach of Lasader. Reports regarding him are becoming day by day more vague and meagre. || It is pretty generally believed that a Government expedition is on foot, and the Habr Toljaala and eastern Habr Yunis tribes are now reported to be anxious to make their peace with the Administration. Some of the sections are coming surreptitiously into Berbera and posing as peaceful citizens; others are sending in Petitions to show that they had nothing to do with the Mullah, or had suffered at his hands. || This is all very well. It is a natural sequence to the Mullah's retirement. But we have to guard, as far as possible, against a repetition of recent events in the nearer portions of our Hinterland, and show the tribes by a display of force in their country, of which they have hitherto had no experience, that we will not allow them to play fast and loose with us, and that the means of punishing them are at hand if they do. || Her Majesty's Government will doubtless consider whether it is worth while to incur the cost of an expedition now that the Mullah's following has dispersed, and he may be said to be out of our reach. This view of the situation has not escaped me. Personally, I have never had much hope of catching the Mullah. It could only be done had he stood his ground and awaited our advance, or were he to remain with a small following in the nearer portions of the Protectorate long enough for a surprise to be effected. || Neither of these eventualities were at any time to be depended upon. He is said to have taken extraordinary precautions to safeguard his person, amongst others retaining a bodyguard of Midgans with poisoned arrows, and these precautions would point to his not exposing himself in a position where he would be liable to be caught. || With the Habr Toljaala and the eastern Habr Yunis the events of the past few months now force us to exercise greater interference than I should have contemplated for some time to come. Our hands have, so to say, been forced by this movement which originated in the Dolbahanta, and by the necessity which has now arisen of breaking the Mullah's influence over the Ishak tribes. || As the situation at present is, it is most important to

secure a proper control over the Habr Toljaala and the eastern Habr Yunis. This can partly be done from Berbera by checking their supplies, but we see that measures taken from Berbera are not of themselves effective when the tribes move south, and are for the time being independent of our port towns. To effect this control we should for a time hold the water supply at Burao, and by a show of force in that direction and in parts of the Habr Toljaala country make it evident to the people that we will not allow any of the Ishak section to be with us at one time of the year when they are dependent on us for supplies and against us at another when they are not so dependent. The control of the wells at Burao and the move of an expedition will at once make this position clear to them. || How long we should hold Burao, and whether or not it will be necessary to keep a permanent post there, will depend upon circumstances. The present is an opportune time to occupy the wells, as the neighbouring tribes are dependent on them till next March. || If we do not move now and content ourselves with taking action against those who hold aloof from us in our coast towns, we shall have no guarantee against the repetition in Ishak territory of recent events as soon as the next spring rains fall, or indeed, at any time it may suit the Mullah to again attempt an incursion into Ishak country. The people will think us apathetic, and when the Mullah appears again, as he is certain to do unless it is made plain that he will be opposed by us, the people, uncertain as to whether we will employ force or not, will be apt to think they are left to themselves, with the result that they will be more or less thrown into his hands. Although most of the Ishak sections who have been affected by this movement have suffered thereby, the way has, in a manner, been paved for a fresh incursion by the Mullah against them, and for the extension of his influence over them; it is these results we have now to counteract. || There is another reason why any delay in the dispatch of an expedition would be inadvisable. For some time past I have been aware of a feeling in the Protectorate that with its severance from Aden the Administration has been left to its own resources, and that troops would not be available for offensive operations. An impression has also gained ground amongst the Somalis that the expedition of friendlies against the Rer Hared in 1895 was not approved by Government, and that that was to be the last expedition into the interior. These ideas are mischievous, they may have had something to do with the late troubles, and the sooner they are dispelled the better. || For the above reasons I am of opinion that the retirement of the Mullah has not materially altered the situation, except in so far that he no

longer threatens Berbera, and that it is necessary to proceed with the expedition on the general line of operations submitted in my despatch of the 5th instant. || This leaves the Dolbahanta out of the question for the time being. The settlement of that part of the country is not so important to us at present as that of the nearer Habr Toljaala, and it would be difficult to devise measures by which this could be effected without great cost, certainly till we know more about the attitude of the tribes than we do now. As matters stand, the gradual weaning of the tribes from the influence of the Mullah, coupled with the closing of our ports to those who shelter him or afford him assistance, are the measures I would rely on for the present in dealing with the Dolbahanta. Later on, other means may, perhaps, be found practicable, but in the first instance we must make sure of the Habr Toljaala. This done, and our hold established over the Ishak country, many of the Darod (Dolbahanta) sections may be expected to see that they have more to gain by peacefully trading with our ports than by following in the wake of this fanatical priest. || It has been ascertained that the rainfall has not been sufficient to raise a fresh crop of grass between Sheikh and Burao. || As regards the possible co-operation of the Abyssinians in any offensive movement against the Mullah, it is to be observed that this line of retreat through the Ogaden, only one of his lines of retreat, would be at a considerable distance from the Harrar frontier, that it would be difficult for an Abyssinian force to effectually guard our frontier at that distance from its base. || An Abyssinian force carries no rations, and depends for its supplies on what it can make the country supply. It is true that some of the Ogaden were with the Mullah at Burao, these were probably from tribes situated within the immediate range of his influence; on the other hand the Ogadens are sending in their caravans much as usual, and I have no grounds for assuming that the tribes of the Ogaden are, as a body, in any way opposed to us. Under these circumstances, it appears to me very questionable whether the reasons advanced in my despatch of the 22nd July last against an early movement of the Abyssinians in the Ogaden would not still outweigh any advantage we might hope to gain from the appearance of their force to the south of our Protectorate with the view of cutting off the Mullah's retreat. Such is my opinion at present; it may be modified if any further development takes place. || As a matter of fact, I hear from Harrar that a force of 4000 men has been assembled at Jiga Jiga. I had previously heard that an expedition was contemplated against the Rer Ali and Rer Haroun Ogaden, who had failed to comply with the demands of the

Abyssinians to restore certain loot to our tribes which lately formed the subject of correspondence. But this number is in excess of what would be required for this purpose, and it is probable that the force was concentrated on news reaching Harrar through Hargaisa of a probable advance of the Mullah in the direction of Hargaisa. || I have kept Mr. Gerolimato informed of the Mullah's movements as reported from time to time. || A copy of this despatch and of previous despatches in this connection is being sent to Viscount Cromer.

J. Hayes Sadler.

Nr. 12509. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Minister des Ausw. an Generalkonsul Sadler. Beschränkung der militärischen Unternehmungen.

Foreign Office, October 23, 1899.

(Telegraphic.) || I have received your despatch of the 12th instant, and your telegram of the 22nd instant. || Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that in the circumstances described you should for the present confine all military measures to what is requisite for insuring the security of the ports, and that any operations in the interior of the Protectorate should be deferred. || You may, with the concurrence of the Resident at Aden, ask for troops not exceeding 100 cavalry and 300 infantry if you consider any reinforcements from India necessary for the security of the ports. || It is the hope of Her Majesty's Government that with such assistance as Aden can furnish, you will find it possible to manage until next spring. If so, you should inform me in order that the transports which have been taken up to convey troops to Berbera may be quietly released by the Government of India.

Nr. 12510. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Abyssinien wünscht die Expedition.

Aden, October 27, 1899. (October 27.)

(Telegraphic.) || King Menelek has sent me a message that he is anxious that operations against the Mullah should be postponed, as he wishes to co-operate. I am instructing Mr. Gerolimato to inform King Menelek through the telephone that the expedition is postponed for the present, and that I will communicate His Majesty's desire to co-operate with us to Her Majesty's Government. || The preparations by the Abyssinians point to an effective occupation of the Ogaden.

Nr. 12511. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Übersendet eine Korrespondenz mit abyssonischen Behörden über Räubereien abyssonischer Stämme.

Berbera, November 23, 1899. (December 7.)

My Lord, || I have the honour to submit, for your Lordship's information, copy of a letter, with three inclosures, received from our Consular Agent in Harrar, and of my reply thereto. || It is extraordinary that the Acting Governor of Harrar should have taken upon himself to announce, as a probable fact, that Abyssinian troops will perhaps cross our frontier in pursuit of Ogaden tribes, and to request that the authorities at Berbera be informed in the matter. || I need hardly say that if there be any question of an Abyssinian force crossing the border of the British Protectorate, which it would be most inadvisable to allow in the present instance, the matter could only be considered by Her Majesty's Government on a representation made in a formal manner by the King Menelek. || I would submit, for your Lordship's consideration, whether it would not be desirable that Her Majesty's Agent in Abyssinia should take an early opportunity of drawing the King's attention to Gurasmach Bante's procedure in this matter. || A copy of this despatch is being sent to Lord Cromer and to Captain Harrington.

J. Hayes Sadler.

Anlage 1.

Mr. Gerolimato to Consul-General Sadler.

Harrar, November 7, 1899.

Sir, || I have the honour to forward to you herewith the copy of two letters I have addressed to Gurasmach Bante, Acting Governor of Harrar, and the translation of a letter I received from his Excellency concerning the camels looted by Ogaden tribes from our tribes.

J. Gerolimato.

Her Britannic Majesty's Consular Agent, Harrar.

Anlage 2.

Mr. Gerolimato to the Acting Governor of Harrar.

Harrar, le 31 Octobre, 1899.

Excellence, || Conformément à la demande verbale de votre Excellence, j'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer ci-jointe une liste des chameaux volés par les tribus de Rer Ali et Rer Haroun, aux tribus Somalis, sujets Anglais. ||

Le montant de cette liste est de 605 chameaux, et dernièrement ont volé encore les Ogadens 135 chameaux des tribus de Habr Yunis Gamboor, près de la place Toyo, le total donc est de 740 chameaux. || Je viens d'apprendre que les Ogadens ont pris encore beaucoup de chameaux des Habr Awal, et 413 chameaux de Abu-bakr-Musa, mais pour cela je n'ai pas encore des nouvelles des autorités de Berbera.

J. Gerolimato.

Anlage 3.

The Acting Governor of Harrar to Mr. Gerolimato.

Harrar, 22 Tamkat, 1892. (November 1, 1899.)

(Translation from Amharic.) || Peace be unto you, || The letter you addressed to me yesterday, 31st October, 1899 (European date), 21st Tamkat, 1892 (Ethiopian date), and the list of the camels looted by Rer Ali and Rer Haroun, I received, and I have to thank you. || From our side our tribes are asking for some camels looted by your tribes. || The camels looted by Rer Ali and Rer Haroun, friendly or by force, I will restore them; but I beg to inform you that for this result I am forced to send in Ogaden some troops, and I fear that when our troops arrive there Ogaden tribes will escape, and perhaps, will cross the British frontier, and I will be obliged then to follow them, and I ask you to be good enough to inform about that the authorities of Berbera. || Soon or late I will restore the camels looted. || Salutation.

Gurasmatch Bante.

Anlage 4.

Mr. Gerolimato to the Acting Governor of Harrar.

Harrar, le 4 Novembre, 1899.

Excellence, || J'ai reçu la lettre à la date du 22 Tamkat, 1892 (1^{er} Novembre, 1899), que votre Excellence m'a adressé et par laquelle je suis très content d'apprendre que votre Excellence est décidé de nous rendre les chameaux pillés aux tribus Somalis, sujets Anglais, par les Rer Ali et Rer Haroun. || De cette même lettre j'ai compris que votre Excellence, conformément à l'Article 1^{er} du Traité entre la Grande-Bretagne et l'Éthiopie, demande la permission de passer la frontière dans le cas où les Rer Ali et Rer Haroun échappant devant les troupes Abyssines entreraient dans le territoire Anglais. Votre Excellence me prie d'informer

les autorités de Berbera de cette demande, ce que je ferais par le courrier prochain, informant aussi Mr. J. L. Harrington, Agent Diplomatique de Sa Majesté Britannique en Éthiopie, et qui doit arriver aujourd'hui à Zeyla. || Certainement votre Excellence, pour éviter toutes les graves conséquences, donnera un ordre formel aux troupes Abyssines de ne pas passer la frontière avant la réponse de l'Agent Diplomatique de Sa Majesté Britannique et des autorités de Berbera soit reçue. || Quant à la réclamation des tribus d'Ogaden pour les chameaux pillés par nos tribus je m'étonne, et c'est la première fois que j'entends parler, n'ayant jamais eu aucune nouvelle de cette affaire et je crois que les tribus d'Ogaden font maintenant cette réclamation exprès pour contrebalancer notre réclamation, et je prie votre Excellence de bien noter que [sic] je vous ai envoyé concerne les chameaux pillés par les Rer Ali et Rer Haroun seulement cette année, et qu'il a beaucoup des chameaux pillés à nos tribus les années précédentes par les mêmes tribus Ogaden et que nous n'avons pas réclamé et pour lesquelles nous réservons nos droits.

J. Gerolimato.

Anlage 5.

Consul-General Sadler to Mr. Gerolimato.

Berbera, November 23, 1899.

Sir, || I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th instant, with inclosures. || It would be undesirable in every respect that the Abyssinian force operating in the Ogaden should cross the frontier of the British Protectorate, and I approve of the communication you made to the Acting Governor of Harrar on the subject in your letter of the 4th instant. || Captain Harrington, to whom you have also referred the matter, should arrive in Harrar within the next few days, and before this reaches you he will doubtless have taken steps to impress on Gurasmatch Bante the necessity of strictly adhering to the terms of the Treaty. || I shall address you again on the subject of the return of the loot claimed by our tribes. Further cases of raids by the Rer Ali and Rer Haroun Ogaden on our tribes have been reported to me, in connection with which inquiries are being instituted to ascertain correctly the number of animals raided and damage done.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

J. Hayes Sadler.

Nr. 12512. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Minister des Ausw. an den Geschäftsträger in Abyssinien. Die britische Grenze soll respektiert werden.

Foreign Office, December 27, 1899.

Sir, || You will have received from Her Majesty's Consul-General on the Somali Coast a copy of his despatch of the 23rd ultimo, inclosing correspondence with Mr. Gerolimato, from which it appears that the Acting Governor of Harrar announced the probability of Abyssinian troops crossing the frontier of the British Protectorate in pursuit of Ogaden tribes. || You are authorized to draw the Emperor Menelek's attention to this matter if you should think it desirable to do so, and to request that strict orders may be given that the Abyssinian forces shall not cross the British frontier.

Salisbury.

Nr. 12513. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Abyssinische Expedition gegen den Mullah.

Berbera, March 16, 1900. (March 31.)

My Lord, || Mr. Gerolimato, writing from Harrar on the 6th instant, reports as follows: — || Garazmach Bante, the Acting Governor of Harrar, left Harrar nine days ago on an expedition against the Mullah Muhammad-bin-Abdullah, who is at Daghabor, two days' march from Milmil. He has with him about 1200 men. || Yesterday, Dejach Beroo arrived from Addis Abbaba with about 1200 men, and is going to join Garazmach Bante. || It is also reported that the Governor of Bali, in the Arussa country, is moving on the Ogaden. || Some of the Arussa have revolted, and the news is confirmed that they have killed twenty-six Abyssinians, all small Chiefs. || Azaz Wold Jadik, Governor of the Dankali Province, has arrived at Errer; he is to punish the Aussa Dankalis on account of the loot of some caravans, in which it seems some Somalis were also concerned. || The Daghabor referred to by Mr. Gerolimato is about 30 miles east of Milmil I heard of the Mullah lately at Bulaleh, about the same distance south of Milmil. || Reports have been brought in that the Abyssinians have punished the Rer Ali, seizing all the animals of twenty-five of their karias. || The whereabouts of the Mullah have not been accurately known for some days past, nor is it yet known how he is meeting the advance of the Abyssinian expedition. Information, on both these points will be shortly forthcoming, and will be communicated by

telegram. || The Ogaden tribes are tired of the Mullah's exactions; they have but few rifles, and are deficient in ammunition, and they fear retribution at the hands of the Abyssinians; native opinion, accordingly, inclines to the view that they will not coalesce to support the Mullah, and that the latter will try and escape. || If there is truth in the latest reports which have come in that the Abyssinians are in close pursuit of the Mullah, there would seem to be a fair chance of his being caught, as the Abyssinians are mostly mounted; they have taken supplies of water on ponies, and they have been joined by horsemen from the Habr Awal tribes living outside our territory, notably the Rer Ahmed Abdillah. || The most unfortunate position would be for the Mullah to flee eastwards and rejoin his old allies, the Ali Gheri, south of Bohotele, where he would be difficult to get at, either by the Abyssinians or ourselves. The country about Bohotele is now very dry. || Owing to the rumours of expeditions against the Dankalis and Aysa, all trade between Zeyla and Harrar is at a standstill.

J. Hayes Sadler.

Nr. 12514. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Derselbe an Denselben. Niederlage des Mullah.

Berbera, March 31, 1900. (April 16.)

My Lord, || I have the honour to submit copy of an Intelligence Report by Captain Johnston Stewart of the 2nd British Central Africa Rifles, reporting on the movements of the Mullah Muhammad-bin-Abdullah; and extract from a note to my address from Her Britannic Majesty's Consular Agent at Harrar, dated the 20th instant; and translation of a letter I received this morning from Garazmach Bante, the Acting Governor of Harrar, intimating the result of an engagement which took place at Jiga Jiga, on the 21st instant, between the Abyssinians and the Mullah's forces. *) || It seems that after raiding the Rer Ali the Abyssinians did not, as was at first supposed, advance on Daghabor, but remained at Jiga Jiga, where they were attacked by a large force of the Mullah's followers on the 21st instant, with the result described in Garazmach Bante's letter. || The Mullah seems to have taken care to keep in the background; no certain information as to his whereabouts is available. It is said that, previous to the fight at Jiga Jiga, the Ogaden had risen *en masse* to oppose the Abyssinians, which would account for the large force of Dervishes reported by Garazmach Bante. It is also said

*) Diese Aktenstücke sind hier fortgelassen. Red.

that the Mullah's influence now extends to the Webbe Schebele, where the tribes, including the Negro Adone, have joined his cause and sent him assistance in men and supplies. || The messenger who brought in Garazmach Bante's letter, reports that after the defeat of the Mullah's force the survivors were set upon by the Rer Ali and Rer Haroun, who said that they and the Mullah had led them to destruction by falsely representing that the arms of the Abyssinians were powerless against them. || It is further reported that the Mullah left all his followers from the Dolbahanta, and his rifles, said to number 500, at Harradiggit, and sent on the Ogaden tribes with spears to attack the Abyssinians at Jiga Jiga. This is confirmed by news which has just been brought in, that a raiding party of the Habr Yunis who were out in the Ogaden after the Rer Ali, stumbled on the Mullah's force near Harradiggit, and lost from 100 to 150 men, all killed by rifle fire. || The defeat at Jiga Jiga has doubtless dealt a heavy blow to the Mullah's movement in the Ogaden, but if he gets away with the number of rifles he is supposed to have, his power for evil will have been by no means checked.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. Hayes Sadler.

Nr. 12515. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Derselbe an Denselben. Nachrichten über den Mullah.

Berbera, April 21, 1900. (May 5.)

My Lord, || I have but little news to report in connection with the progress of events in the Ogaden. || The Mullah is reported to be inactive at Harradiggit, having failed to induce the tribes to make another venture in the direction of Jiga Jiga, where the Abyssinian expedition remains intrenched. Native reports are that the Mullah will return towards Bohotele, but nothing certain is known as to his plans or intentions. || It is reported from Harrar that the reinforcements from Addis Abbaba have been countermanded, and that, as the hot weather is approaching, the Abyssinians do not propose to make any further expeditions into the Ogaden. || A few caravans from the Rer Ali have commenced to come into Bulhar. || A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer, Captain Harrington, and the Intelligence Branch, Simla.

J. Hayes Sadler.

Nr. 12516. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Englisch-Abyssinische Expedition.

Camp, Sheikh, June 15, 1900. (June 15.)

(Telegraphic.) || Please see Harrington's telegrams. The Governor of Harrar returned to Harrar on the 5th instant, and reported that the rumours were untrue as to the advance of the Mullah. || The latter is at Daghaboos, near Milmil. Two companies of the British Central Africa Rifles are proceeding with a Maxim to Hargaisa at once, and, if necessary, three more can follow. || I could take all available forces towards Hargaisa should the Mullah advance, but infantry could not be safely pushed into the Haud. Tribal levies could be collected; to be of any use they would require active support. || A strong force of camelry, such as the Bikanir Camel Corps, would be wanted if we are to co-operate with the Abyssinians in the Ogaden. || Repeated to Harrington.

Nr. 12517. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Geschäftsträger in Abyssinien an den Sirdar von Ägypten. Menelek schlägt eine englisch-abyssinische Expedition vor.

Jibuti, June 9, 1900.

(Telegraphic.) || Menelek has suggested that Her Majesty's Government combine with him in suppressing the Somaliland Mullah. The Mullah is reported to be threatening a movement on Harrar at present. || If it is possible to attempt diversion on Mullah's flank with forces now at disposal of Consul-General, such action is to be recommended. || Copy of this telegram sent to Consul-General for Somali Coast.

Nr. 12518. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Derselbe an Denselben. Dasselbe.

Jibuti, June 9, 1900.

(Telegraphic.) || Since my previous telegram of to-day I have seen Menelek. He informs me that he has delayed moving against the Mullah until he receives reply of Her Majesty's Government. I have explained that present season is unfavourable for operations, which would be easy in cold season. If Mullah continues his advance it would be advisable to attempt diversion. || (Sent to Sadler.)

Nr. 12519. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw. Die Lage wird unerträglich.

Hargaisa, August 5, 1900. (August 5.)

(Telegraphic.) || Yao half-battalion embarked on the 21st July; the other half-battalion cannot be spared. The Mullah's followers have raided property from the Protectorate valued at 160 000 Indian rupees; there is a panic among our Ishak tribes, and reports are current of further move by Mullah against our tribes. || Our tribes have all deserted their grazing-grounds in the Hand, and are cramped up round their water places, and are clamouring for assistance. || The position, owing to the Mullah's movement, is becoming insupportable, and may be critical if it continues. Unless we can soon operate with Abyssinia to suppress the Mullah, I shall have to create a diversion by moving with available forces, supported by tribal levies, to punish tribes who are Mullah's principal supporters round Bohotele. This could be safely done, as the eastern Ishak tribes are friendly and united.

Nr. 12520. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Derselbe an Denselben. Weitere Nachrichten. Die Stämme fordern Bekämpfung des Mullah.

Camp, Hargaisa, August 5, 1900. (September 3.)

My Lord, || In continuation of my telegram of this day's date, I have the honour to report that the raid by the Mullah's horsemen, mentioned in my despatch of the 24th July, has spread consternation over this portion of the Protectorate. From Odweina to Jefir Medir the tribes have hurried back *en masse* from the Hand with their herds of camels and flocks into their winter grazing-grounds, where they are crowded up with the tribes upon whom they have fallen back, with the inevitable result of disorder and panic in the heart of the Protectorate. || Shortly after my despatch above mentioned was written the Habr Yunis came rushing back from Odweina with reports that the water at Haradiggit had fallen short, and that the Mullah was preparing to attack Hargaisa, or to make a rush for the Odweina water. Without attaching credence to these reports of an advance I could not altogether ignore them, and made preparations to move to Odweina with a company of the Central Africa Regiment to secure the water supply, after reassuring the Habr Yunis, who agreed to return to Odweina if I proceeded there. || In the meanwhile the reports I received from Captain Swayne, who was at

Hargaisa, as to the position of affairs here, was so disquieting that I determined to ask Major Plunkett to proceed with the company to Odweina whilst I came on here. This he has done, and I have since heard that the Habr Yunis have returned to their grazing-grounds in the vicinity of that place. || At Hargaisa the position on my arrival was briefly this: The Aidagalla had come right back from the Haud on to Au Barkadleh and Hargaisa, occupying the grazing-grounds at present tenanted by the Ayal Ahmed, with whom they are on bad terms; more to the west the Samanter Abdillah have fallen back to Usbali; some of the sections of the Ahmed Abdillah have retired on the Jibril Abokr, others have scattered towards the Abyssinians; Sheikh Mattar has removed all his karias and property towards the Guban, and most of the inhabitants of Hargaisa have fled. Owing to the crowding of the tribes at this time of the year in these scanty grazing-grounds there is continual quarrelling amongst them, and close here there have already been two fights in which a number of people have been wounded. || Numerous Akils and deputations from the tribes came in to see me as soon as they heard of my arrival. Although they were somewhat calmer than they appear to have been before Captain Swayne some days previous they were still in a very excited state, clamouring for arms and to be at once led on to the Mullah. || They openly say that we do not protect them on their summer grazing-grounds, and that if these are closed to them by the armed forces of the Mullah they must lose all their live-stock by starvation as the nearer grazing-grounds — their winter resort — cannot hold them all at this season of the year, and if the grass there is now consumed they will have nothing to fall back upon at the conclusion of the summer rains. This is all perfectly true. They attach no importance whatever to our holding the water places of Adadleh, Odweina, and Hargaisa, as they say that troops located there are useless to protect them on their summer grazing-grounds, which is also true. Had we ten times the number of troops here we could not insure the protection of the tribes' herds over the vast waterless area they frequent miles to the south of our positions, though I am pretty certain that were we not holding Hargaisa now the tribes in the neighbourhood would have all rushed back on the Guban.

The tribes urge that formerly they were at times at war with the Ogaden, and at times at peace, and that the fights mattered very little, as in the end the losses adjusted themselves; but now, since the Mullah has appeared on the scene, all this is altered, and they are exposed to attacks by raiding parties armed with rifles, against which they cannot

contend. || One and all, they wanted to know whether we were going to help them, and, if so, how? || Some immediate arrangement was absolutely necessary to separate the tribes, and get the Aidagalla, Samanter Abdillah, and Ahmed Abdillah on to the nearer grazing-grounds to the south of this. At the present moment there is not a soul south of a line drawn from Odweina to Hargaisa, and thence along the Hargaisa River. I decided to issue a limited number of old Snider rifles which I had obtained from Berbera, with a small amount of ammunition, as a temporary measure to protect the nearer grazing-grounds. Ten rifles, with twenty rounds of ammunition, were made over to the Akils of the Habr Yunis, Samanter Abdillah, and Ahmed Abdillah, to be given to selected men whose names have been recorded, and the Akils of each tribe are made personally responsible for the safe custody of the ten weapons given to each tribe, and that no improper use is made of them. || The Aidagalla, the most important tribe to get to move a bit south, I was unable to trust with the arms in their hands, both on account of internal feuds and dissensions, and because the attitude of Sultan Deira is very doubtful. He is known to have been in communication with the Mullah; and the Abdi Bari section of the Aidagalla, who were the chief sufferers by the raid, have received letters from the Mullah offering to restore them their property if they will join him. I decided in the case of the Aidagalla to entertain twenty Baladiyahs, and distribute them among the different sections to protect their herds. They will be required for one or two months, according to whether the autumnal rains fall or not. The cost will be between 300 and 600 rupees, for which, under the extreme urgency of the case, I would solicit your Lordship's sanction. || This measure had the effect of partly allaying the excitement, and I am hopeful the tribes will now move south again for a short distance sufficient to get grazing. There were, of course, many more demands for arms which I was unable to meet. || But it would be idle to imagine that this temporary expedient in any way satisfied the tribes as to the general position. They wanted to know whether we would make a general issue of arms for the protection of the grazing-grounds, or whether we would at once lead them against the Mullah, saying that the state of affairs had now become unbearable, and that they were all ready to follow us, or go by themselves if we would arm them. That the Mullah is a long way outside our territory, and that it is the business of the Abyssinians to deal with him in the country he now occupies, are facts which they would not comprehend. They look upon the Mullah as being practically master of the situation, allowed to do as he pleases, and they do not

understand our hesitation in taking steps to suppress him. || Your Lordship will have seen from my telegram of this day that I consider the position to be serious. The tribes are losing confidence in our ability to protect them, and unless that confidence is maintained we shall not be able to count on their allegiance, and they will be driven to make the best terms they can with the Mullah for the safety of their herds and flocks, on which their very life depends. || If we cannot soon cooperate with the Abyssinians to put an end to the Mullah's movement, I have proposed to punish the Ali Gheri, who are the Mullah's chief supporters in the Protectorate, and who will probably be found between Ber and Bohotele. In such a move we could count on the support of all our Ishak tribes, and it would have the effect of drawing off from the Mullah his Dolbahanta contingent, by whose aid he is overawing the Ogaden. || I am proceeding as soon as I can to Odweina, and thence to Burao, where the tribes have been awaiting my arrival for some time past. || I will report by telegram from Burao what steps I propose to take against the Ali Gheri should they still prove refractory. || The fact of my being expected at Burao has had the effect of keeping that part of the country quiet, and when I am there I hope to be able to make such arrangements as will result in the Dolbahanta trade resuming its normal course. For some months past that part of the country has been so unsafe that the Dolbahanta tribes have been unable to secure the safety of their own caravans, and this is the reason I prohibited our tribes nearer Berbera from trading with them, insisting that their Headmen should come in themselves, as until they do so no satisfactory settlement is possible. || If a scare occurs on the eastern side of the Protectorate, such as there has been here, we shall at once have a backward rush of the tribes, and a recurrence of a good deal of the trouble we had last year.

I have said in my despatch of 24th July that the Aidagalla have themselves to blame for this raid from the Ogaden. This is true to a great extent, but it is impossible to get the tribe to see the matter in this light, especially the Abdi Bari, who are the principal sufferers. They had little to do with previous raids by the Aidagalla on the Ogaden, and they were the one section of the Aidagalla who complied with my instructions to return the animals they looted. I have, accordingly, handed them over the Aidagalla share of the animals returned by the Abyssinians. || The real cause of the panic here is the danger which the Hadr Gerhajis and Habr Awal tribes, consequent on the recent raid, see their summer grazing-grounds to be in from organized attacks by the

Mullah's followers; and in this connection, as well as the Mullah's movement in general, I have had to assure the tribes that we are not unmindful of their interests, and that we would consider what is best to be done, but that what action is taken, and when, must be left for the decision of the Government. || The question is a difficult one. If the Mullah's movement does not collapse of itself, or he is not suppressed by the Abyssinians, with or without our help, it will arise in an aggravated form next April, when the summer rains draw the tribes to the Haud. If the present position then still continues, we shall have to seriously consider the question of issuing some 200 or 300 Sniders to the tribes for the protection of their herds. There will be risk in this both of some of the arms reaching the Mullah, and of improper use being made of them by our people. But if we do not succeed in suppressing the Mullah before the spring, I do not at present see that we have any other alternative, as the Abyssinians, so long as the Mullah's movement continues, can afford our tribes no protection on the border, and we could not establish a cordon of posts in these waterless tracts. || It is absolutely necessary, if our position in the Protectorate is to be tenable, that our tribes be reinstated in their southern grazing-grounds, at least, in the nearer portions within our border. || For the present I am hopeful that the measures which have been taken will suffice to protect our tribes in the nearer grazing-grounds; it is late in the season, and they will not now venture far south. || Sheikh Mattar, the Chief of Hargaisa, has expressed himself as most grateful for the assistance rendered him by the presence here of the company of the 2nd Central Africa Regiment, and has begged that when it is withdrawn it may be replaced by a post of our police. || Owing to the 2nd Central Africa Regiment being under strength, and to the companies which proceeded to Ashantee being made up to full strength, and leaving unfits, the half batallion remaining in the Protectorate now consists of 6 officers (including the medical officer), 7 Sikhs, and 4 weak companies of 84 Africans each, with a large proportion of sick. || Their present location is as follows: — || Berbera, 1 officer, 1 Sikh, and 42 Africans. || Sheikh, 1 Sikh, and 30 Africans. || Adadleh, 2 officers, 1 Sikh, and 83 Africans. || Odweina, 2 officers, 2 Sikhs, and 111 Africans, with Maxim. || Hargaisa, 1 officer, 1 Sikh, and 100 Africans. || As soon as I can safely do so I propose to withdraw the companies from Hargaisa and Odweina, leave a police post at the former place, and concentrate our strength on the Sheikh-Burao line to anticipate any move by the Mullah on the eastern side of the Protectorate. || When the water fails in the Haud he must either move west to the Abyssinian frontier,

east of Walwal and Wardair or Bohotele, or south to the Webbe Schebele. A move west would bring him within the reach of the Abyssinians; with the exception of the Ali Gheri tribe, he has now but little hold over the Dolbahanta, and it seems doubtful if he will venture back to Bohotele, though it is quite possible he may do so. There is always water at Walwal and Wardair, in the centre of the Ogaden, and the probability seems to be that he will make his winter quarters there as he did last year. || A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer and to Her Majesty's Agent at Addis Abbaba.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

J. Hayes Sadler.

Nr. 12521. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Derselbe an Denselben. Bericht über die Expedition nach Burao.

Camp, Dubbur, September 12, 1900. (October 1.)

My Lord, || On the 18th ultimo I proceeded to Odweina. The presence of the company of the 2nd Central Africa Regiment had restored confidence in that direction so far as bringing the tribes back, and the Habr Yunis were on their grazing-grounds in the Toyo Plain. || As Odweina is quite destitute of grass and my animals had suffered from want of forage in a two days' march through a parched-up country, I decided to move on the same afternoon towards Burao, the company of the 2nd Central Africa Regiment following me as soon as transport could be collected. Major Plunkett at the same time returning to head-quarters at Adadleh. || At Gubatto, the first day's march towards Burao, I found an oasis of grass with some rain-water collected in ditch-like depressions in the ground. Here numerous deputations of the Habr Yunis came in, and I halted for three days. At one time there must have been between 400 and 500 tribesmen collected, of whom many were horsemen. || Here, as at Hargaisa, the great cry was for arms for the protection of the grazing-grounds. There had been no serious scare since the tribes had returned to Toyo, but the Elders were very uneasy and feared a raid at any moment; and both Haji Musa of Halia and the leading tribesmen urged that the company be left at Odweina till the situation was a bit clearer. || There were many matters for settlement between the various sections of the Habr Yunis who came in to meet us, and my time and that of the Vice-Consul were fully occupied in adjusting long-standing differences which both parties were anxious should be settled through our mediation. || Amongst other questions that of the Sultanship of the Habr Yunis came up, all sections present admitting their allegiance to

Madr Hirsi — Nur's old rival — in place of Nur, who is hopelessly committed with the Mullah's movement. || Before leaving Gubatto I issued four rifles to Haji Musa for the protection of the Habia Tarikha, and ten to Madr Hirsi for the protection of the grazing-grounds. These were given out on the same conditions as those issued at Hargaisa, and complete the number I intend to issue at present. || In all forty-four old Sniders were issued at Hargaisa and Gubatto. They are all in the hands of Elders who can fairly well be trusted. The number is small considering the vast area the tribes frequent, but the effect of this measure, certainly for the time, will be out of proportion to the number of arms given out. Exaggerated accounts of the arming of our people are certain to reach the Ogaden, and a certain measure of confidence has been assured to our people, who look to us for assistance. || A guard was placed over the rain water at Gubatto to keep it for the company of the 2nd Central Africa Regiment, none being found till Burao is reached. This was just as well, for this water came in very handy, and after the Africans had replenished their barrels the water was rapidly exhausted by herds of camels and flocks brought in on the news circulated by the tribesmen who came in to us to their karias that water was to be found at Gubatto. || At Burao I found the country as burnt up as at Odweina, and every animal in my camp had to be sent 6 miles off to the edge of the Arori Plain to get grazing. || On the arrival of the company of the 2nd Central Africa Regiment, it took up a position on high ground on the right bank of the river commanding the permanent wells. These wells are not — as is usually the case in Somaliland — dug in the bed of the river, but are sunk through slightly elevated ground on the left bank of the river. Water is found throughout the year at a depth of about 60 feet. || The Habr Yunis, Musa Ismail, came in, and a few representatives of the Rer Yusuf, the principal section of the Dahir Farih, one of the two large sub-divisions of the Habr Toljaala. A few of their karias were in the neighbourhood in the Arori Plain with the Habr Yunis, but owing to the drought the tribe was much scattered. || Leaving the detachment at Burao I proceeded with the Vice-Consul 20 miles to the south to Ber, the principal watering-place of the Habr Toljaala tribes after Burao. Here the Tug Der had changed its channel, rendering the old wells useless, and owing to the drought no karias were to be found. Several deputations of the Adan Madoba came in a day's journey distance to meet us, and a settlement regarding the return of looted property was effected between this tribe and a deputation of the Mahomed Aysa, who had joined us at Burao from

Sheikh, and who came on with us to Ber. || We returned quickly to Burao, as Ber was destitute of vegetation, and though its name implies a garden, such was the effect of the drought that the trees were all black, and not a leaf was to be seen. || It was here ascertained that the Ali Gheri had moved south of Bohotele, and were in the Abyssinian Ogaden, and not between Ber and Bohotele, as had been previously reported. Any move to punish this tribe will therefore not be advisable at present, more especially as we cannot withdraw the Hargaisa detachment so long as the Mullah is near Milmil, and it is also desirable to hold Odweina. || The country round Burao is quiet, and as there are no signs yet of the Mullah returning in the direction of Bohotele, the company of the 2nd Central Africa Regiment is now returning to Odweina. A blockhouse has been completed in the walled inclosure made by the Africans at Sheikh. It will be sufficient for the present to hold this post with a guard of our military police. The detachment of the 2nd Central Africa Regiment is accordingly returning to head-quarters at Abdallah, where the Berbera detachment of the regiment has already been moved owing to sickness among the men in Berbera. || The impression which my tour to Burao and Ber has given me is that with the exception of the Gashanboor section, but little reliance can be placed on the attitude of the Habr Toljaala tribes. Should the Mullah return to the eastern districts they would either join him or us, whichever they found the stronger. The Musa Ismail section of the Habr Yunis, too, as well as the Abdi Hirsi and Weid Hirsi, would probably follow the lead of the Rer Yusuf, with whom they are more in touch than with their kindred sections of the Habr Yunis. || Since leaving Burao reports have been received that plentiful showers of rain have fallen there and at Odweina.

J. Hayes Sadler.

P.S. — A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer.

J. H. S.

Nr. 12522. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Derselbe an Denselben.
Englisch-abyssinische Operationen.

Berbera, October 26, 1900. (October 26.)

(Telegraphic.) || Our Somalis have combined with Somalis under Abyssinia to attack the Mullah. Despatch follows. The Yaos are watching the border.

Nr. 12523. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Derselbe an Denselben.
Dasselbe.

Aden, November 3, 1900. (November 3.)

(Telegraphic.) || I reported by last mail that the situation was intolerable, and suggested co-operating with Abyssinia to suppress the Mullah and raising a temporary levy of Somalis 1000 strong under British officers. || Since then I have seen Harrington. His latest information from Abyssinia is that King Menelek is anxiously desirous of acting in concert with us with a strong force. I strongly recommend operating in concert, and propose that the Mullah be driven out of the Ogaden by Abyssinians. We would attack him from Burao should he retire to Bohotele. In order to do this it will be necessary to raise at least half the proposed levy at once, and have 1000 rifles with which to arm the friendlies. || With Swayne's knowledge of the country and people, I consider it indispensable that he be given local rank to command. || The cost will be small compared with the employment of regulars.

Nr. 12524. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Das Ausw. Amt an das Kriegsamt. Anwerbung von 1000 Somalis.

Foreign Office, November 9, 1900.

Sir, || I am directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a telegram from Her Majesty's Consul-General in the Somaliland Protectorate, asking for authority to proceed at once to raise and organize a temporary levy of 1000 Somalis under British officers, for the purpose of co-operating with the Abyssinian forces in the suppression of the movement which, under the leadership of the Mullah, has caused continuous trouble and disturbances on the Protectorate frontiers. || The plan of a local levy has been for some time under consideration, and Lord Salisbury is of opinion that the organization of such a force has become a necessity. His Lordship therefore proposes to authorize Colonel Hayes Sadler to take at once the necessary steps for raising at least so many men as will make it possible for him to dispense with the services of the half-battalion Central Africa Rifles. || If, as is hoped, this object can be attained without serious delay, it would become possible to transfer the Yaos to Ashantee without resorting to the plan of replacing them by troops from Aden. || Before sending the

proposed instruction to Colonel Hayes Sadler, Lord Salisbury would be glad to receive the observations of the Marquess of Lansdowne in regard to this matter.

St. John Brodrick.

Nr. 12525. GROSSBRITANNIEN.—Das Ausw. Amt an den Generalkonsul Sadler. Soll mit der Werbung der Somalis beginnen.

Foreign Office, November 16, 1900.

(Telegraphic.) || I authorize you to proceed without delay with the levy of 1000 Somalis, as proposed in your telegram of the 3rd November and your despatch of the 26th October. || With regard to the supply of officers, arms, and equipment, and the arming of friendlies, I am in communication with the War Office. || In order to release the Yaos for service in Ashanti at once, Colonel Brake suggests their being replaced by troops from Aden. The War Office support this idea. || What would this cost, if it is feasible?

Nr. 12526. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Das Kriegsamt an das Ausw. Amt. Denkschrift über die Expedition gegen den Mullah. Geschichte des Mullah und seiner Räubereien.

Haji Muhammed Abdullah belongs to the Habi Sulieman Ogaden tribe; he married into the Dolbahanta Ali Gheri. He is a man still in the prime of life, but has only recently become a dominant factor in the military and political situation of the Protectorate. || During the years 1896–99 the Mullah made several pilgrimages to Mecca, where he attached himself to the sect of Muhammed Salih, whose deputy he claims to be in Somaliland. This sect was established in Berbera about the year 1887, but has not found much favour with the people of the town. Muhammed Abdullah had, however, for some time enjoyed considerable influence over the Habr Toljaala and Dolbahanta tribes inhabiting the more remote portions of the Protectorate, and at first this influence appears to have been exercised for good. || At the beginning of last year, however, the Mullah, on the plea of a theft of camels committed by the Habr Yunis (who live within the Protectorate), raided the territory of that tribe, occupied the town of Burao, and assumed an attitude antagonistic

to the Protectorate Government, giving out that he intended to rule the interior, leaving the coast to the Europeans. He is stated to have forced persons to join his sect, to have threatened expeditions against tribes which opposed him, and to have levied blackmail generally. By these means he, for the moment, established himself as a considerable power in the Dolbahanta country, an integral part of the Protectorate. || In April 1899 the Mullah's immediate following was estimated by Colonel Sadler as 3000 men, but he was then believed to be in possession of only sixty modern rifles and a small quantity of ammunition. In the previous month he had retired from Burao to Kob Fardod. || In the following August the Mullah again raided the eastern sections of Habr Yani tribes, and reoccupied Burao with a force estimated at „1500 men, with a large proportion of horse“, and was then believed to possess about 200 rifles and a limited amount of ammunition. || His following was composed of men from the Ogaden. || Ibrahim, Ba Awadle, and Dolbahanta tribes. He gave himself out as the Mahdi, and dispatched men to all the Habr Toljaala tribes, ordering them to join him at Burao. It was even rumoured that he intended to advance on Berbera. On this the dispatch of a British expedition to deal with the Mullah was proposed by the Consul-General, who then considered that a force of „100 mounted men and 300 infantry would be adequate“. It was calculated that the Mullah could have concentrated 4000 men to meet this force, for which Burao was proposed as the objective. It was thought in the Intelligence Division that the force proposed by the Consul-General would, if supplemented by levies from friendly tribes, be sufficient at that time to deal with the Mullah; but it was pointed out that the latter's power would probably increase if the expedition were delayed. Delay was, however, deemed expedient by Her Majesty's Government, having regard to the state of affairs in other parts of the world. || At the end of October the Chief of the Dolbahanta tribe was murdered by order of the Mullah for opposition to him. The Mullah was reported still to be in the recesses of that country and to be contemplating seizing the twelve principal Sheikhs of the district. He is further stated to have impressed several hundred horses. He may be said, therefore, to have practically superseded British authority in a portion of the Protectorate. The project of an advance on Berbera appears, however, to have been abandoned.

Early in the same month (October) a boat from Jibuti conveyed a consignment of arms, reported to consist of either 240 or 400 rifles and of 40000 rounds of ammunition, to the Italian Protectorate, where, without the consent of the Italian authorities, they were bought by the

Sultan Othman Mahmood. It was thought probable by the Consul-General that the Sultan bought these arms not for his own use, but to sell again in the interior, in which case the Mullah, who, nine months later, was still offering camels for a cheap rifle, and one camel for fifteen rounds of ammunition, may reasonably be supposed to have been his customer. || In December 1899 the Mullah's following dwindled: „there were indications that the Dolbahanta was getting too hot for him“, and he retired across the Protectorate frontier to three or four days' march south of Bohotele, in the Ogaden country. Here he busied himself in trying to combine the Ogaden tribes against the tribes in the Protectorate, who had abandoned his cause, and in looting caravans. || By the beginning of February of the present year the aspect of affairs in Ogaden had „changed for the worse“. It appeared doubtful whether all the tribes in the southern Protectorate had severed their connection with the Mullah, who was reported to have acquired 140 more rifles, to have collected large supplies of grain and live-stock, and to meditate another raid into the Protectorate; this intention was, however, abandoned on the rumour of the advance of an Abyssinian force to protect the French railway, and the Mullah retired towards the Webbe Schebele. || The Mullah's immediate following at this time (about the 14th February) was reported to be about 1200 men, but it was said by an escaped prisoner that all the Ogadens had submitted to him. || In March an Abyssinian expedition of about 1500 well-armed men was dispatched from Harrar into the Ogaden country to deal with the Mullah, but his forces evaded it. The Abyssinians then fell back, after looting the country. || On this the Mullah, retaining with him his own immediate following of 1000 men (half of whom were by now equipped with rifles), and his ponies, sent forward 6000 spearmen (chiefly of the Gallas and Harrari tribes) to attack the Abyssinian force, which had halted at a watering-place, and there intrenched in a strong double zareba. In the attack, which was delivered in broad daylight with much boldness, the Somalis are reported to have retaken all the looted stock, and, although they had not a single rifle, even to have penetrated the zareba, but they were eventually beaten off with a loss of 2650 men. The Abyssinians made no attempt to pursue, and are reported to have been inspired with a wholesome dread of the Somalis. || Early in June the Consul-General reports that the Mullah is quiescent, and states that „the religious bubble, with which the movement commenced, has burst so far as the large majority of our tribes are concerned“; but Colonel Sadler points out that „the movement has thrown the country back several stages in

its civilizing advance, and has given a rude shock to our authority over a large area of the Protectorate“. || On the 9th June Colonel Harrington telegraphs from Jibuti that Menelek proposes a combined movement of British and Abyssinian forces against the Mullah. Harrington recommends the acceptance of this proposal, as „our political opponents represent us as encouraging the Mullah's action“. || On the 24th the Consul-General of the Protectorate reports that the position in Ogaden is not improving. The Mullah dominates the whole country, and „his position is, from all accounts, stronger now than it was before the attack on the Abyssinians“, which the Ogadens are said to be confident would have succeeded, had it been made by night. The Mullah is still making strenuous efforts to acquire more rifles and ammunition. In the same month a raid of 1000 of his horsemen succeeded in carrying off 2000 camels, valued at 160 000 rupees, and created great consternation over the southern portion of the Protectorate. In August the tribes affected by this raid complained bitterly to the Consul-General, that unless we protect their summer grazing-grounds from the attacks of the Mullah their stock will starve, as the grass on the winter grazing-ground is insufficient for both summer and winter requirements. These tribes had fallen back from their grazing-ground, and were far from satisfied with the few rifles which the Consul-General issued to defend their stock. Colonel Sadler, indeed, reports that „they are losing confidence in our ability to protect them, and unless that confidence is maintained we shall not be able to count on their allegiance, and they will be driven to make the best terms they can with the Mullah“. || On the day following the despatch above quoted, the Consul-General telegraphs that the „position, owing to the Mullah's movement, is unsupportable“, and that if joint operations with the Abyssinians cannot be arranged, he must move out alone with all available forces and tribal levies from the Ishak tribe to punish the Mullah's allies round Bohotele. || On the 26th October the Consul-General reports that the tribes who have suffered from the Mullah can no longer be restrained, and are collecting to attack him near Milmil, and that in consequence of this the half-battalion 2nd Central Africa Regiment had been moved up towards Hargaisa. The Mullah was continually raiding the tribes in Abyssinian territory, practising many barbarities, and but for the Central Africa Regiment would probably have attacked Hargaisa. || Colonel Sadler suggests raising native levies to deal with the „intolerable situation“. || On the 3rd November the Consul-General telegraphs that he hears from Harrington that Menelek will co-operate with a strong force, and he therefore strongly recommends

immediate concerted action to drive the Mullah out of Ogaden. He proposes to raise a levy of 1000 men (of whom two companies would be mounted), with a proper complement of British officers; Captain Swayne to be given local rank to command the whole force.

E. A. Altham, D. A. A. G.

Intelligence Division, War Office,
November 16, 1900.

Nr. 12527. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Generalkonsul Sadler an das Ausw. Amt. Antwort auf Nr. 12525.

Berbera, November 24, 1900. (November 26.)

(Telegraphic.) || It will cost, exclusive of British officers, approximately 25000 l. to arm the friendlies, and to raise, arm, and equip a levy of 1000 Somalis and maintain them for four months, after which the upkeep will be about 2500 l. per mensem. || This provides for 100 camelry, 400 mounted militia, and 500 infantry. Proposed increase in mounted branch is considered desirable. The largest item is 8200 l. for arms and ammunition. Would it not be possible to lend the rifles? || One hundred and fifty Martini Lee Metford rifles and 200 000 rounds of ammunition can be left by the Yaos. || The estimate for the levy includes cost of operations and transport.

Nr. 12528. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Das Ausw. Amt an den Generalkonsul Sadler. Expedition gegen die Ogadenstämme.

Foreign Office, November 30, 1900.

(Telegraphic.) || The Ogadens have risen in the Juba River district. Mr. Jenner, Her Majesty's Sub-Commissioner, has been murdered, and his escort cut up. It is estimated that the revolted tribes muster about 6000 fighting men. || A punitive expedition will be immediately organized under the command of Colonel Ternan, the Acting Commissioner, who has proceeded to Kismayu for this purpose to stiffen the forces there available; he has applied for half-a-battalion of Indian troops, rationed for three months. || Instead of bringing troops from India, it would be less expensive and simpler, generally, to employ detachments of the Central Africa Regiment, drawn partly from Zomba and partly from the force now stationed in your Protectorate. || Would any considerable

portion of the half-battalion in Somaliland now awaiting removal to Ashantee be available for this expedition, and, if so, how many could be sent at once? All accounts of Jubaland agree as to complete absence of fruit and fresh vegetables, so that the troops employed there will have to depend on India and Zanzibar for the necessary supplies.

Nr. 12529. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Generalkonsul Sadler an das Ausw. Amt. Der Mullah kauft Waffen im italienischen Gebiet.

Berbera, December 6, 1900. (December 6.)

(Telegraphic.) || Reports have been received that the Mullah has sent emissaries and money to the Italian Benadir Coast, to purchase arms. The exact locality is unknown.

Nr. 12530. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Das Ausw. Amt an den Botschafter in Rom. Italien soll Waffenlieferung an den Mullah verhüten.

Foreign Office, December 8, 1900.

(Telegraphic.) || Communicate to Italian Government substance of Lieutenant-Colonel Hayes Sadler's telegram of the 6th instant, which has been repeated to you, and urge them to give instructions to their Agents on the Benadir Coast to do their utmost to prevent the sale of arms to the Mullah.

Nr. 12531. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Geschäftsträger in Abyssinien an den Minister des Ausw. Abyssinien wird gegen den Mullah nicht auf eigene Hand vorgehen.

Harrar, November 29, 1900. (December 29.)

My Lord, || I have the honour to inform your Lordship that on arrival at Harrar I found that the Abyssinians had taken no steps to capture the Somaliland Mullah, but under orders from King Menelek were still awaiting some action on our part in combination with a movement from their side against him. || During my halt at Harrar, Ras Makunan sent two Ogaden Somalis who had recently escaped from the Mullah's camp near Harradiggit to my camp. || From these men's reports

it appears that the Mullah has at present a following of about 500 persons and about 300 rifles, with less than 10 rounds of ammunition per rifle. || The Ogaden are said to be tired of his exactions and cruelties, and are ready to desert him should an expedition be sent against him. || The two Somalis whom I interrogated expressed their willingness to undertake the Mullah's capture were a force of 150 rifles sent with them. They stated that with the exception of the Mullah's own Jillib (*i. e.*, sub-tribe), all his followers would disperse were an expedition in the field. || In an interview with Ras Makunan, I suggested without avail that he should attempt such an expedition, and in case of failure, we could afterwards arrange some combined expedition against the Mullah. || In course of conversation with the Ras, it appears that he favours an Abyssinian expedition from Harrar to drive the Mullah from Harradiggit and Milmil towards Bohotele, where an expedition from Somali Protectorate could attack him. || The Ras seemed to regard any single expedition either from Harrar or our side destined to failure. || I promised to lay the Ras' views before Her Majesty's Government and the Consul-General, Berbera, when, if any action were decided on, he would be communicated with. || There is no doubt in my mind that the Abyssinians have no intention of taking any action single handed against the Mullah. || The situation in the Protectorate is becoming intolerable, and delay tends to increase the Mullah's following to such an extent that a costly expedition may be eventually needed, whereas at present a small Somali levy, with the assistance of the friendly tribes, should suffice to put an end to the troubles due to the Mullah. || Failing combined action with the Abyssinians, should the Mullah's raids into our Protectorate be repeated, and his interference with the Ogaden trade continue, we shall be obliged to insist on the Abyssinians suppressing him, he being in their territory, a course which might lead to results much more serious than any expedition against the Mullah would be. || A copy of this despatch has been sent to the Consul-General, Berbera; Consul, Zeyla; and Vice-Consul, Harrar.

J. L. Harrington.

Nr. 12532. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Das Ausw. Amt an Generalkonsul Sadler. Verlangt Bericht über die günstigste Zeit für die Operationen.

Foreign Office, January 1, 1901.

(Telegraphic.) || There are several considerations which must govern the decision as to timing our movement against Mullah (see Lieutenant-Colonel Harrington's despatch of the 29th November, of which a copy

has been sent to you direct). || A punitive expedition against the Southern Ogadens on the Juba is now actually in progress. It is expected that the operations connected with it will last till the end of March. || It would be desirable to defer, if possible, the Somaliland expedition until our hands are free in Jubaland, unless it should appear that the Mullah's movement is connected with the rising on the Juba, of which so far there is no indication. || Time would also be given by this postponement to get your levy in thorough state of efficiency, though I understand you would be in a position to move much sooner should this become necessary owing to pressure from the Abyssinians or for any other reasons. || It is important to consider, on the other hand, whether it would be any advantage to us or the reverse if the operations against the Mullah were timed to begin at a particular season. The rainy season would perhaps be best from the point of view of our transport and water supply; yet if we could rely on keeping up an efficient system of water transport we might hope for considerable advantage over the enemy if we moved in the dry season, when his mobility would probably be impaired for lack of water. On the other hand, however, we should not perhaps in the latter case be able to count with equal certainty upon the Abyssinians for effective co-operation. || Report your view as to the most favourable season for operations, and your opinions generally after you have consulted Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne.

Nr. 12533. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Generalkonsul Sadler an
das Ausw. Amt. Feldzugsplan gegen den Mullah.

Berbera, December 28, 1900. (January 14, 1901.)

My Lord, || In connection with the plan and probable date of operations against the Mullah Muhammad-bin-Abdullah, it is difficult at this stage to lay down definitely any lines beyond those already indicated, viz., that the Abyssinians should drive the Mullah eastwards towards Bohotele, where our expedition should attack him. || These are the general lines accepted by Ras Makunan. || The actual plan of campaign will depend on two considerations, neither of which are yet determined: (1) where the Mullah may be at the time operations are commenced; and (2) how far the Abyssinians will allow us a free hand in the Ogaden. || We cannot tell where the Mullah may be. My information at present is that he is returning to Bohotele after the Ramzan, which would be about the 21st January. In this case our expedition would move straight on

that place. || If he stands fast in the direction of Harradiggit, which hardly seems probable in the face of an Abyssinian advance and reported dissensions among the Ogaden, we should have to either wait till he is driven eastwards, or move to intercept his retreat towards Bohotele. We could not move at once on Bohotele, as this would uncover the whole of the Habr Yunis country. || But if there is any delay in the Abyssinian advance once the time for the commencement of operations is decided, the temper of our tribes will have to be taken into account; they are very impatient as it is, and if the Mullah is, say, at Harradiggit, and our force is collected at Odweina, any protracted delay on our part would be certain to be misconstrued. || It is possible that the Abyssinians will not look with favour on our operations in a direction so immediately within their own sphere of action; but after all we are combining with them to rid the country of the Mullah, and I think that, if possible, it should be arranged so that we have a free hand to join in an attack in the direction of Harradiggit if necessary. || As I have observed I do not think this contingency probable, but we ought to be prepared for all possible developments. || When our preparations are more advanced, I propose to depute Captain Swayne, who will then be in the direction of Hargaisa enlisting Habr Awal horsemen, to confer personally with Ras Makunan and come to a common understanding as to the time and place of operations. || As regards the time, I suggested early in November that we should be ready in January. We were then only dealing with a levy of 500 and 1000 armed friendlies. To get a levy of 1500 into some training and discipline Captain Swayne would require two months after the arrival of the arms and officers, but we could manage to move in one month if the Abyssinians are then ready. It will take a few days to get the arms up country. We have nearly completed the enlistment of half the infantry portion of the levy, and it is useless to do more till we have more officers, and the arms are ready to be banded out. || The most favourable time for operations in the Ogaden, from our point of view, would be after the 18th April, when the rains generally fall in the Haud. On the other hand, the Abyssinians would probably prefer the dry season for their advance, as the Mullah will then be confined to the line of wells. Our arrangements are being made on the assumption that we move in the dry season; independently of a large supply of water casks, we shall have assistance from the tribes in the shape of native water vessels and camels to carry them, and they have freely come forward with offers in this respect. || We are now waiting for arms and officers. If these are received in the next three weeks we

should be able to move at the end of February or the commencement of March if the Abyssinians are ready by then. || The sooner we do move and put an end to the Mullah's movement the better. If then the necessary preparations are all completed on both sides, I consider that we should commence operations at the time indicated, in preference to waiting for the more favourable season of the rains. This will be arranged by Captain Swayne with Ras Makunan. || In the event of the Mullah returning to Bohotele before we advance and attempting to escape through the Dolbahanta to the coast, I will arrange with the Mahmood Girad to be on the look out and effect his capture. || With regard to the friendlies, it is probable that, whether we wish it or not, our expedition will be accompanied by horsemen of the tribes who have suffered so severely at the Mullah's hands, and it will not be politic to prevent them. They will not now be armed. They could be usefully employed in scouting and perhaps in diverting the attention of the enemy on the left flank in a move on Bohotele. || A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer and to Lieutenant-Colonel Harrington.

J. Hayes Sadler.

Nr. 12534. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Derselbe an Dasselbe. Antwort auf Nr. 12532.

Berbera, January 12, 1901. (January 14.)

(Telegraphic.) || Your Lordship's telegram of 1st January. || Please see my despatch of the 28th ultimo. || April will be the most favourable time to commence operations, and I will try to arrange so. || With regard to submitting details of discussion with the Abyssinian authorities, I would note that conditions are continually changing, and that owing to difficulties of communication it might well be that modification of details may be required before they could be sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government. || Full discretion is necessary for us to act generally on the lines already reported, or on any modification of them that may commend itself to your Lordship, as we may be compelled to move at any time if our hands are forced. || It is reported that the western Ogaden tribes have left the Mullah and have fought against him. He is moving to the east out of the probable reach of an Abyssinian expedition, and everything at present points to our being able to act as originally suggested and deal with him in the direction of Bohotele. ||

I should doubt there being any connection between the rising in Jubaland and the Mullah's movement. I have no information pointing to such connection.

Nr. 12535. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Sirdar von Ägypten an das Ausw. Amt. Abkommen mit Abyssinien für den Feldzug.

Cairo, January 29, 1901. (January 29.)

(Telegraphic.) || The Somaliland Mullah. || I received last night the following telegram from Colonel Harrington, dated the 23rd instant:— || „I have arranged with King Menelek that for the purposes of the expedition to be made against the Mullah, the frontier shall be regarded as non-existent; our force will thus be able to follow him wherever he goes. An Abyssinian officer will be appointed to accompany our force, and we are invited to detail an officer to accompany theirs. Further details are left to be arranged by Swayne and the Head of the Abyssinian force when they meet. It is desirable that Swayne should arrive as soon as possible, as delay on our part is liable to misconstruction.“ || I have informed Colonel Hayes Sadler, Mr. Gerolimato, and the Vice-Consul at Zeyla.

Nr. 12536. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Generalkonsul Sadler an das Ausw. Amt. Misserfolg der Abyssinier.

Zeyla, February 10, 1901. (February 10.)

(Telegraphic.) || It is reported by the Vice-Consul at Harrar that the Abyssinians made an advance into the Ogaden, and that from want of water and supplies some 2000 men deserted and returned to Harrar in terrible plight. || It does not appear that the expedition got anywhere near the Mullah, who is now said to be in the Ibrahim country. || Until plans are arranged, it is very unadvisable that the Abyssinians should make any further forward movement. I hope that Swayne will leave Berbera to arrange plans with the Abyssinian Commander in a week's time.

Nr. 12537. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Das Ausw. Amt an den Major Hambury Tracy. Er soll zur abyssinischen Armee abgehen.

Foreign Office, February 25, 1901.

(Extract.) || His Majesty's Government have had to consider the question of undertaking military operations against a certain Mullah Mahomet ben Abdullah, who, having declared himself to be a Mahdi, has for some time harassed the southern borders of the British Protectorate in Somaliland, as well as the neighbouring Abyssinian districts. A levy of native troops is being raised and organized into a field force by Colonel Hayes Sadler, His Majesty's Consul-General at Berbera. It will be under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel E. J. Swayne, and it is understood that it will receive, in the proposed advance against the Mullah, the co-operation of an Abyssinian force which the Emperor Menelek is prepared to employ with the same object. || In order to facilitate such co-operation, it appears to His Majesty's Government expedient that a British officer should, with the sanction of the Emperor Menelek, accompany the Abyssinian force destined to act against the Mullah, for the purpose of facilitating their concerted action with the movements of the British force under Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne. || The Marquess of Lansdowne has, with the approval of the Secretary of State for War, selected you for this duty. I am accordingly directed by his Lordship to request that you will start for Abyssinia with the least possible delay. His Majesty's Diplomatic Representative at the Court of the Emperor Menelek has been directed, by telegraph, to take such steps as may be necessary in order to enable you to carry out your mission. You will proceed to Zeyla, and, if necessary, to Berbera, before starting for the interior, in order to communicate with His Majesty's Consul-General, Colonel Hayes Sadler, and with Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne, from whom you will take your instructions as regards your military duties, and whose wishes you will carry out so far as circumstances will permit. || Your further movements will depend on the arrangements which will be made in direct consultation between Colonel Hayes Sadler and His Majesty's Agent in Abyssinia, who has been directed to obtain the necessary authority for your accompanying the Abyssinian forces.

Nr. 12538. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Das Ausw. Amt an Generalkonsul Sadler. Aufenthalt des Mullah und Feldzugsplan.

Foreign Office, March 8, 1901.

(Telegraphic.) || Mullah was reported in your telegram of the 10th February to be in Ibrahim country. || If this is the case, his movement to so southerly a region may signify that his forces are becoming disintegrated, and, even if this is not so, may call for an alteration in our plan of campaign. || Moreover, we are still ignorant of the effect of Colonel Ternan's movement round Afnadu. || His Majesty's Government are therefore all the more desirous that movements should not be precipitated without the most careful consideration. || Before Swayne commits his force, it is necessary that he should consult the Abyssinians and obtain accurate intelligence as to their intentions and resources. || In any case, His Majesty's Government would not care that Swayne's advance south should extend much further than was originally contemplated. || It is only on the distinct understanding that a risk of premature operations against the Mullah is not involved, that operations against Rer Ali can be sanctioned. || If Swayne desires, he may, subject to the above considerations, move his headquarters to Hargaisa to complete his required establishment of mounted troops. || It is of the greatest importance that the best information regarding the Mullah's strength, movements, and future dispositions should be obtained.

Nr. 12539. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Generalkonsul Sadler an das Ausw. Amt. Die Expedition muss sofort beginnen.

Berbera, March 15, 1901. (March 15.)

(Telegraphic.) || Please see your Lordship's telegram of the 9th instant. || The situation has quite changed; the Mullah has been driven by the Abyssinians to the Dolbahanta, and is now between Bohotele and Lasader, which is 60 miles east of it. || We cannot now be dependent on the termination of the expedition in East Africa, nor on co-operation with the Abyssinian force, the whereabouts of which are still unknown. || We have now sufficiently trained 1000 infantry and 100 camelry. We are purchasing 100 ponies at 25 l. owing to the difficulty of procuring horsemen, and I would solicit sanction to buy, if necessary, 100 more; on these trained infantry will be mounted, infantry being completed up to its numbers. When the expedition moves 300 or more horsemen will

join; these will be used as scouts, but rifles will not be given them. || It is essential we should not permit the Mullah to establish his power again in the eastern portion of the Protectorate, and our presence in the Dolbahanta will give assurance to any tribes who now waver. Swayne proposes to move to Burao early next month and to proceed thence against the Mullah down the Ain Valley. || The force is sufficient, and it is, I consider, absolutely necessary to take immediate action. Native reports are to the effect that the Mullah suffered severely at the hands of the Abyssinians in the Ogaden, whose western tribes turned against him. We should strike before he has time to rally. || If we wait for regulars and operations are indefinitely postponed the effect, particularly in view of the activity of the Abyssinian force, will be prejudicial to our tribes and the levy, by whom any further delay will not be understood. || The levy urgently wants a medical officer. I propose to ask for the temporary services of Surgeon Captain Anderson from Aden if Roberts is longer delayed.

Nr. 12540. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Das Ausw. Amt an den Generalkonsul Sadler. Antwort auf das Vorige.

Foreign Office, March 18, 1901.

(Telegraphic.) || Your telegram of the 15th March. || Proposal for early advance to Burao with view to offensive operations down Ain Valley sanctioned. But while we attach importance to capture or defeat of Mullah, you should understand that it would be impossible to reinforce you, and we should therefore deprecate extension of operations far into the Haud which might involve your force in any serious risk. || Purchase of 200 horses approved. || Aden asked to lend Surgeon-Captain Anderson if Roberts is delayed.

Nr. 12541. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Generalkonsul Sadler an das Ausw. Amt. Stärke des Mullah.

Sheikh, May 1, 1901. (May 1.)

(Telegraphic.) || Owing to the drought, there has been delay in advance of our expedition. || The Mullah's strength, according to the latest accounts, is about 1200 horse and 6000 foot, with 300 rifles. It is reported that he has withdrawn his advanced force from Ain to Yabel, where he now is. || A transport corps of 250 men has been formed, and

1000 friendly spearsmen will accompany the expedition in view of Mullah's reported accession of strength. || Within the next fortnight an advance may take place. || (Repeated to Cairo and Harrington.)

Nr. 12542. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Derselbe an Dasselbe. Fortschritte der Expedition.

Berbera, May 24, 1901. (May 25.)

(Telegraphic.) || Ber was reached on the 21st instant by the expedition. There has been a general rainfall, and, although grass is still scarce, the conditions are now more favourable for an advance. A fresh force of Abyssinians, whose troops have returned from the Ogaden, left Harrar on the 15th May for the Webbe River. || The above information has been repeated to His Majesty's Agents in Cairo and Addis Abbaba.

Nr. 12543. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Proklamation an die Dolbahantastämme.

Be it known to all concerned among the Dolbahanta tribes that the expedition now about to be dispatched by the Government is not against the Darod tribes of the Dolbahanta; it is to operate against the Mullah Muhammad-bin-Abdullah and those who are affording him assistance. || All persons found supporting this Mullah will be considered as hostile to the Government and will be treated as such; and tribes will be held answerable for their individual members. || All tribes are therefore required to refrain from any dealings or communications with the Mullah, to leave that part of the country in which he now is and his followers are, and to warn any of their members who may be with the Mullah to leave him at once as they will be held responsible for any acts committed by such against the Administration.

J. Hayes Sadler,

His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Somali
Coast Protectorate.

April 30, 1901.

Nr. 12544. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Generalkonsul Sadler an das Ausw. Amt. Erfolge über den Mullah.

[Viâ Aden.]

Sheikh, June 13, 1901. (June 16.)

(Telegraphic.) || Latest reports from Swayne are: — || Expedition reached Sanala, one day south-east of Eldab, on 1st June, having cap-

tured 3500 of enemy's live-stock. He left on 2nd with main body against Mullah's camp at Yahel, leaving 300 men under Macneill to guard zariba at Sanala. Since then Sharp reports from Burao on 9th that who attacks made on Macneill's zariba by 500 horse and 1500 foot. Both attacks repulsed. At 9 A. M. on 3rd, determined attack by largely increased force made by Mullah on Macneill. This was finally repelled with loss to enemy of from 400 to 500; 141 dead left outside zariba. Our casualties 10 of levy killed, 9 wounded. Up to 4th nothing further happened at Sanala. Messengers report Mullah cleared where not known. As Swayne has got between Mullah and his camp news of decisive action should soon be received. || (Repeated to Cairo and Harrington.)

Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre 1900.*)

Nr. 12545. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Kolonialminister Sir F. M. Hodgson an den Gouverneur der Goldküste. Gibt es Unruhen in Aschanti?

(Sent 3 p. m., April 6, 1900.)

(Telegram.) || Is there any truth in report contained in press telegram of serious disturbances Ashanti and despatch of troops from Accra?

Nr. 12546. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Mr. Low an den Kolonialminister. Der Gouverneur der Goldküste bereitet Truppensendungen nach Kumassi vor.

(Received 2.40 p. m., April 7, 1900.)

(Telegram.) || In reply to your telegram of yesterday's date, following telegram received from Governor of Gold Coast, at Kumasi, on 2nd April: — || Telegram begins: Inform me, after making enquiries Inspector-General of Constabulary, what number native troops he can send to Kumasi should I require assistance. He would have to send all available force of Constabulary, duties being carried on temporarily by police force. Give instructions hold them in readiness to march on receipt of instructions. Telegram ends. || Telegraph line destroyed by Ashantis between Prahsu and Kumasi, since 2nd April. Further information will be sent as soon as possible.

Nr. 12547. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Derselbe an Denselben. Verhandlungen des Gouverneurs mit den Häuptlingen.

(Received 11.28 p. m., April 7, 1900.)

(Telegram.) || Following telegram received from Governor of Gold Coast, Kumasi: — || Telegram begins: Arrived at Kumasi 26 March. All

*) Blaubuch, Cd. 501. 1901.

Native Chiefs were present. On 31st March, from information received, sent detachment Constabulary under Inspectors Armitage (and) Leggett make an attempt to obtain golden stool. Quest failed. In the meantime Kumassis, having obtained knowledge of quest, organised opposition. It was too late recall detachment (and) cancel instructions, and letter of advice sent to Armitage failed to reach. Regret to report occurrence of collision of forces. One constabulary killed, one missing, two dangerously wounded, nineteen slightly wounded, including Armitage and Leggett. 2 carriers severely wounded, 4 carriers slightly wounded, 7 carriers missing. Condition of wounded satisfactory, with exception of one dangerous case. Native Chiefs express loyalty to British Government and decline to join Kumassis. Have ordered Commissioner and Commandant Northern Territories send 1 Company for purpose of increase of garrison here and have ordered 1 Company from Accra. Hope to effect peaceful settlement and obtain all ringleaders. Active operations not necessary for the present. Will stay here pending settlement, which doing all in my power to arrive at. Hopeful of satisfactory result. Will report result by telegraph. Telegraph interrupted between here and Accra. — Hodgson. Telegram ends.

Nr. 12548. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Derselbe an Denselben. Die Verhandlung mit den Häuptlingen ist ohne Ergebnis.

(Received 11.5 p. m., April 12, 1900.)

(Telegram.) || Following telegram received from Governor 12th April: — || Telegram begins: Kumassi, 10th April. Regret to inform you that negotiations with rebel chiefs unsuccessful. Kumassis absolutely refuse to lay down arms. It will be necessary, under the circumstances, in order to prevent rebellion spreading, and to keep open trade route, and afford protection of life and property, for me to make display of superior force. Have ordered Commissioner and Commandant of Northern Territories to bring over two companies Constabulary as soon as possible. Suggest that three companies come from Jebba or Lagos. Latter preferred, as being more expeditious, and utmost expedition necessary owing to proximity of rainy season. One company of the three to remain temporarily Accra to replace Constabulary now on the way to Kumassi. Consider there would be then sufficient force bring to a conclusion. Fort renders Kumassi quite safe; sufficient provisions. — Hodgson. Telegram ends.

Nr. 12549. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Kolonialminister an den Gouverneur der Goldküste. Soll nach den Umständen handeln.

(Sent 6 p. m., April 13, 1900.)

(Telegram.) || In answer to your telegram of 10th April, I leave you discretion to act according to circumstances. Reinforcements should be ample, and I have telegraphed to Governor of Lagos to send all available troops not exceeding six companies. Communicate with him at once and, if necessary, with Lugard.

Nr. 12550. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Mr. Low an den Kolonialminister.

(Received 8.15 p. m., April 15, 1900.)

(Telegram.) || Following telegram received from Governor of Gold Coast: — || Telegram begins: Kumassi, 14th April. Received your telegram on the 11th April. No change in situation of affairs. Kings of Bekwai, Juabin, Kumawu, Agona, Nkwanta, Bompata, loyal. Had grave doubts as to loyalty of Mampon and Kokofu but they have been induced to live at Kumassi and will remain quiet. All Kumassis fully armed and refuse to disperse. 1 company constabulary expected to arrive from Accra to-day. Loyal native chiefs express readiness to afford assistance if required. Force referred to in my telegram, Kumassi, 10th April, will be sufficient as far as can see at present without requiring further assistance. — Hodgson. Telegram ends.

Nr. 12551. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Mr. Low an den Kolonialminister. Tumulte unter den Aschantis.

(Received 1.23 p. m., April 19, 1900.)

(Telegram.) || Following telegram received 18th April from Assistant Inspector Soden, Officer Commanding in British Gaman, dated 14th April: — || „Regret to inform you that two men Gold Coast Constabulary killed at Adumassi, large number of natives murdered there. Have sent to Northern Territories asking for reinforcements. Concentration of Ashantees in great numbers at Adumassi. I am now proceeding with all available forces to join Officer Commanding at Sefwhi. Will try to seize and hold Berekum, keeping back enemy by threatening attack from Berekum and Janokrum. Reinforcements urgently required. British Gaman loyal and

quiet. I am indebted to friendliness of French Government for placing at disposal communication through French Possessions." || From information received from Governor of Gold Coast, 18th April, dated Kumasi, 16th April, insurgent bands every day becoming bolder.

Nr. 12552. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Kolonialminister an Mr. Low. Verstärkungen sind unterwegs.

(Sent 4.31 p.m., April 19, 1900.)

(Telegram.) || April 19. Lugard is sending 450 Frontier Force to Lagos, of whom 150 will proceed at once to Gold Coast, and rest will remain at Lagos pending instructions.

Nr. 12553. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Mr. Low an den Kolonialminister. In Kumassi sind Verstärkungen eingetroffen.

(Received 5.30 p.m., April 24, 1900.)

(Telegram.) || Following telegram received from Governor of Gold Coast, 24th April: — || Telegram begins: Kumasi, 21st April; one Company of Constabulary, three British officers, of a total strength of 100, arrived from Accra, 18th April; same date, Ijibus left neighbourhood of Kumasi and freed eastern side of town. Insurgent bands on the road to Cape Coast, under Asamoa Kwami also left. Insurgent bands concentrating north-easterly direction and north-westerly direction. Nkoranzas reported to be joining with Kumasi, and roads impassable to Northern Territories. Have heard Parmeter, Inspector of Constabulary, on the way to coast invalided home, was attacked at Sekedumassi, a Kumasi town, but escaped, and is all safe Kintampo. Information received that European has been murdered at Nyawa in Atchima country, probably belonging to Captain Way's goldfields. Do not know name of European. No news of Lagos and Jebba forces, which are anxiously expected. Active operations in neighbourhood of Kumasi have been commenced with good result. Several native Chiefs apply for permission to submit. I insist that guns must be delivered. Several have been received. On arrival of reinforcements insurgent bands in Atchima country will be attacked in force. Dispersion of these rebels and capture of ringleaders will end rebellion. — Hodgson. Telegram ends.

Nr. 12554. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Derselbe an Denselben.
Kumassi ist abgeschnitten.

(Received 6.35 p.m., April 30, 1900.)

(Telegram.) || No news from Governor, Gold Coast, since 21st April. Serious attack on Branch of the telegraph staff whilst employed repairing telegraph wires near Esumeja, 25th April, slightly wounded and severely beaten. Telegraph clerk reports effective blockade of road to Kumasi since 25th April; impassable even to Bekwai. Special messenger of Postmaster-General reports no mail en route for coast from Kumasi, and that one mail-bag for Kumasi has been destroyed. Lagos Constabulary left Esumeja for Kumasi 6 o'clock in the morning of 28th April, accompanied by Branch. Hope that they will succeed in reopening communications.

Nr. 12555. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Mr. Low an den Kolonialminister. Nachrichten vom Gouverneur aus Kumassi über Angriffe der Aschantis auf die Stadt.

(Received 12.20 a.m., May 5, 1900.)

(Telegram.) || Following telegrams received from Governor Gold Coast: — || Telegram begins: Kumasi, April 22. Beg convey cordial thanks for complying with my requirements. In view of reported defection of Nkoranzas and disquieting reports from Officer Commanding [in] British Gaman as to state of affairs in neighbourhood of Berekum, I have applied for second company from Lugard, making two companies of West African Frontier Force. These, with Lagos Constabulary and local forces, should be sufficient, as at present advised. Hear that Lagos Constabulary will arrive at Kumasi 25th April. Telegram ends.

Telegram begins: Kumasi, April 27. Since my last telegram situation of affairs at Kumasi, regret to inform you, changed for the worse. On 23rd April force sent out to clear rebel forces to the eastward. Four Gold Coast Constabulary killed. Large number of rebel forces killed and wounded. On 25th April Ashantis surrounded town in great force, probably [?10 000] men made determined attack on fort. At half-past ten o'clock in the morning attack on Bantama threatened, and Basel missionaries withdrawn to place in safety. Rebel force in great numbers that Hausas obliged to evacuate cantonment and concentrate round fort. Severe engagement took place 2 o'clock in the afternoon and lasted until 6 o'clock. Native allies rendered every assistance and preventive measures

against nearing the fort by rebel force taken with complete success. Twenty native allies and two Hausas killed, Assistant Inspector Leggett slightly wounded. Present number occupants of fort 358, inclusive of 18 Europeans, of whom 6 are missionaries. Very anxiously awaiting arrival of reinforcements. Lagos Constabulary expected 28th April, if able to get through. Kings of Mampon, Juabin, and Aguna, in the fort, and have urged Bekwais to send men. It will be necessary under all the circumstances further reinforcements should be sent to Gold Coast.

Telegram begins: Kumasi, April 30. Yesterday serious attack on fort made by rebels. They advanced more than once into the open. Engagement took place half-past twelve and lasted till half-past three, when the rebels were routed on all sides with great loss. Their provisions, stores, as well as several guns and warlike stores, got into our hands. Two constabulary killed and ten wounded; Medical Officer Tweedy slightly wounded. Native levies rendered every assistance. Great praise due to Marshall, Special Service Officer, who took command, Inspector Middlenist having been taken ill, and Inspector Armitage, who took command of native levies of all ranks worked well. Confidence is being restored and persons are returning to their houses. At six o'clock in the evening contingent Lagos Constabulary, under Inspector-General Aplin, arrived after two days' severe fighting. Column attacked at Asagu, which Constabulary took with loss of one killed, twenty-three wounded; amongst the latter, Assistant-Inspector Cochrane severely wounded, and Inspector-General Aplin and Medical Officer Macfurlane very slightly. Following day contingent was attacked at two miles from Kumasi by force of 8 000 rebels. Great loss took place in taking stockade placed across road. Several Ashantis there have arms of precision. After fighting desperately, forces routed Ashantis, who fled. Two constabulary killed and 133 wounded, including Assistant Inspector Read and native officer Dankufi severely wounded, Assistant Inspector Ralph slightly wounded. Of remainder, six dangerously wounded and 124 slightly wounded. Am advised that Cochrane and Read displayed conspicuous gallantry. I have been unable to get letters or telegrams sent through. Intended if possible to open road to Kumasi from River Ordah by means of loyal Kokofus, who have elected new King, and from Ordah to Adansi by means of Bekwais, who are so far thoroughly loyal. Adansis still loyal. All well excepting Middlenist on sick list. Telegram ends.

Have requested Governor of Lagos send at once the 300 West African Frontier Force now at Lagos.

Nr. 12556. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Kolonialminister an den General Lugard (Nord-Nigeria). Verstärkungen nach der Goldküste.

(Sent 5.5 p.m., May 5, 1900.)

(Telegram.) || May 5. Referring to my telegram of 19th April, Governor of Lagos informs me 300 men from Jebba sailed for Gold Coast to-day. As the situation of affairs at Coomassie serious, and force on Gold Coast will consist of 450 West African Frontier Force, 350 Lagos Constabulary, 50 Sierra Leone Frontier Police, 250 Southern Nigeria Force, in addition to Gold Coast Constabulary, consider it desirable that Colonel Willcocks proceed to Gold Coast to take command of active operations in Ashanti. Trust that can be spared without serious inconvenience. Let me know when he will start, so that Governor of Gold Coast may be informed.

Nr. 12557. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Kolonialminister an Mr. Low. Verstärkungen kommen von Lagos.

(Sent 11.45 a.m., May 9, 1900.)

(Telegram.) || May 9. Colonel Willcocks has been selected to take command of combined forces, and will proceed to Gold Coast as soon as possible. You should ascertain from Lugard at what port Willcocks will embark and should send to meet him all available information on position of affairs at Coomassie, and as to distribution of troops, &c. Wilkinson should remain at Cape Coast pending arrival of Willcocks, and should organise system of supply from the base and protection of lines of communication, subject to any orders which he may receive from Governor of Gold Coast. Communicate this to Wilkinson and Willcocks as well as Governor.

Nr. 12558. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Gouverneur der Goldküste an den Kolonialminister. Genauerer Bericht über seine Reise nach Kumassi und über die Haltung der Eingeborenen.

Kumassi, April 7, 1900. (May 11, 1900.*)

Sir, || In view of the telegram which I had to despatch to you on the 4th instant, you will, I doubt not, be anxious to receive from me as soon as possible a report upon the condition of affairs in Ashanti, and the state of feeling on the part of the several tribes towards the British

*) Die eingeklammerten Daten geben das Datum der Ankunft in London. Red.

Government at the present time, and I therefore hasten to give you as full information as I can with respect to them. || 2. I crossed the Prah on the 22nd March, and reached Kumassi at 3 p.m. on Sunday, the 25th March. In passing through Adansi and Bekwai, I was received at all the villages along the route with the usual outward demonstrations of loyalty and goodwill. At Kwisa, Inkansa, the blind and very old King of Adansi, met me, and after presenting me with an address of welcome, handed me a list of grievances. Some of these I was able to deal with at once, and none of them were of any political importance, excepting, perhaps, one which referred to the compulsory supply of carriers. I was not, I must say, favourable impressed with the attitude and demeanour of the Adansis as represented by the King's Court. || 3. At Kumassi all the principal Kings and Chiefs, with the exception of the King and Chiefs of Nkoranza, who arrived later, had assembled to meet me. They, with their followers, were drawn up on either side of the road leading to the Fort. The spectacle was a very imposing one. After I had reached the Fort they all filed past me, and exchanged salutations. || 4. A rumour had been circulated in Kumassi, so the Acting Resident informed me, that I was coming to Ashanti for the purpose of announcing that Prempeh's rival — Prince Atcheriboanda — who has for some years been under surveillance at Accra, was to be installed as King of Ashanti. The Kumassis are all strong adherents of Prempeh, and upon the circulation of the rumour many of the Chiefs and their people had cleared out of the town, and gone to the neighbouring Kumassi bush villages of Atchima to arm themselves. They had, however, returned before my arrival. || 5. On Monday I was engaged in dealing with and settling the claim of the King of Western Akim to be King paramount over the district of Asanti Akim, and the question of the ownership of what are known as the Biposu lands; and on Tuesday I was engaged in listening to the claims of rival candidates to the stool of Nsuta. These are matters which I will deal with in separate despatches as soon as I can find time to do so. || 6. The Kings and Chiefs had been summoned to meet me at 4 p.m. on Wednesday. I transmit a copy of the shorthand writer's notes of my remarks to them. In addition to making to them an announcement as regards the payment of interest upon the sum due to the British Government under the treaty of Fomena, and the expenses incurred in connection with the Expedition of 1895—6, I had decided — as I was well aware that the Kumassis and their immediate adherents, the Ejisus and Ofinsus, were nursing the idea that Prempeh would sooner or later be restored to rule over them, while

others thought the return of Atcheriboanda was only a question of time — to tell them definitely and decisively that they were not to expect either one or the other, and that the Queen is now the paramount power in Ashanti. Although I felt sure that this announcement would not be a palatable one to many, it appeared to me to be necessary to make it, having regard to the large number of gold mining concessions which are being obtained and also worked in Ashanti, and so that there might be no misapprehension in the minds of the Kings and Chiefs as to the position which the Government holds towards them. || 7. I referred also to the Golden Stool, which I now feel certain exists, and which is in the custody of the Kumassis. It is, I consider, much to be regretted that when the troops occupied Kumassi in force the Kumassis were not made to produce the stool. It forms a rallying point for malcontents against the Government, and I am certain that until the Government possesses this symbol of power, which is regarded by all Ashantis with the utmost veneration, it will not be wholly secure against intrigues and trouble. It is the possession of the stool which enables the Kumassis to maintain a spirit of defiance, which is only kept in subjection by the presence of an armed force and the armament of the Fort. || 8. There is no doubt whatever, and now that I have seen matters for myself and come into immediate contact with the Kings and Chiefs, I can speak with knowledge, that the force now garrisoning Kumassi is wholly insufficient and dangerously so. It consists of a company and a half of Haansas, nominally 225 privates, but the companies are not at their full strength, and some of the men are on detachment duty in Attabubu and British Gaman. The result is that not more than 130 privates are actually available for garrison work. The Fort must always be manned, and this being so, there is no available force of sufficient overawing strength to send through the country if a demonstration in force at any place should be required. In fact, the Ashantis are not overawed as they ought to be, and must be. || 9. The armament of the Fort is sufficient, but there must be at least 2½ companies of Hausas in Ashanti for some time to come. I am taking steps to place matters on a proper footing, and instructions have already been issued in the matter. It will be necessary to withdraw from the Northern Territories some of the force now serving there, but I had intended to propose a reduction, and I think a reduction can be made. || 10. I was informed on the 4th instant by the King of Mampon that the notification as to the payment of interest was most distasteful and had been received with intense dissatisfaction. It appears that after the public meeting on the 28th ultimo

he and the Kings of Juabin, Kumawu, and others suggested a meeting among themselves to discuss the situation, but the Kumassis declined to attend, and stated that, as they now knew that Prempeh would not be restored to them, they were not going to discuss the question of payment, but would at once arm themselves, and set themselves in opposition to the British Government. They were, I have since discovered, joined by the Ejisus and Ofinsus, and had also persuaded the Kokofus to act with them by promising King Asibi, who, it appears, is the nearest blood relative to Prempeh, that he should be placed on the Golden Stool. || 11. I come now to the occurrence which gave rise to a collision between a detachment of Hausas on the one hand and the Kumassis, Ejisus, and Ofinsus on the other, in the bush villages of Atchima, with the serious and very regrettable result reported in my telegram. In December last an Ashanti lad came down to Accra to report to the Government that he had been sent by one of the guardians of the Golden Stool to reveal the stool to the Government, and to give it up with such treasure as is buried with it, if the Government would ensure the lives of the guardians and reward them handsomely. He said that they had been guarding the stool in the bush for four years, and were tired of the work. Upon consideration I determined to make an effort to get the stool, and sent my Private Secretary, Captain Armitage, by a circuitous route to the spot. He failed. I transmit a copy of his report. || 12. I brought the lad with me to Kumassi, disguised as a Hausa. It appeared to me desirable, if the Acting Resident were of the same opinion, that the Atchima villages of Bali and Nkwanta should be visited from Kumassi in force, in order to let the people there see that the Government had its eye upon them, and would not tolerate their becoming a menace to the peace of Ashanti by arming themselves and collecting munitions of war in large quantities. I thought that it might be possible if the villages were visited to give the lad another chance of revealing the hiding place of the Golden Stool. The Acting Resident having informed me that the visit of an armed detachment of Hausas to the two villages in question was very necessary, I gave him the instructions, of which I transmit a copy. The detachment started at daylight on the 31st March. It was not then known that the Kumassis and their friends, the Ejisus and Ofinsus, had armed themselves and had proceeded to the very district into which the detachment was being sent, the rendezvous of the Kumassis being the village of Atchiassi, near Nkwanta. It was known on Sunday, and an endeavour was made to get a letter of warning delivered to Captain Armitage. The messenger

failed to get through. || 13. The detachment reached Bali without any knowledge of the position of affairs. They were attacked there, and had practically to fight their way back to Kumassi. I will let Captain Armitage and Assistant-Inspector Leggett, who accompanied him, tell their own story, as they do in the reports of which I transmit copies. || 14. This is the first occasion since Sir Garnet Wolseley's Expedition that there has been an engagement between the Ashantis and the forces of the Government. The casualties among the Hausas — which I very greatly deplore — were very heavy, but those among the Kumassis must have been much heavier (reports brought in say so), and the Ashantis have seen that, although in overwhelming force, they are unable to successfully cope with even a small detachment of Government Hausas. || 15. The Hausas fought splendidly, and were well and coolly led, and it was due to Captain Armitage's pluck and courage and to the coolness under fire of Assistant-Inspector Leggett and Sergeant-Major Amadu Fulani that the detachment managed to get back to Kumassi. || 16. Sunday, the 1st April, was a day of extreme anxiety to me. The town of Kumassi was deserted. Two of the three members of the Government Native Committee — Chiefs Nantchi and Afifa — had openly joined the rebel Kumassis, with all their people; indeed, the latter is said to have been one of the principal instigators of the movement, and I feared that the movement might spread among the Ashanti tribes. Unfortunately, the Basel Missionaries, headed by Mr. Ramseyer, took fright, and in the afternoon poured down the road with their belongings to seek refuge in the Fort. They were stopped at the house I am occupying here with Lady Hodgson, and told that until the Governor thought it necessary to seek the safety of the Fort they could not be admitted. They returned, but their action could not but have added to the courage of the malcontents, as every matter occurring here would be duly reported by spies. On Monday, which was another very anxious day for me, the King of Nkoranza arrived from his country, and I heard that the Kings of Mampon, Juabin, and Kumawu had not left the neighbourhood. || 17. On Tuesday (the letter is mis-dated the 4th April) I received from the Kings of Mampon, Juabin, and Kumawu, the letter of which I enclose a copy, in which they ask permission to be allowed to get their guns, to render assistance to the Government, and I returned the reply, copy enclosed. On Wednesday morning, as soon as they heard that there had been fighting between the Hausas and Kumassis, they, together with the King of Aguna, came to the Fort. The King of Mampon is one of the most influential Kings in Ashanti, and, with perhaps the single exception of Bekwai, there are

no more powerful Kings in the country than the Kings of Mampon, Juabin, and Kumawu. This action on their part boded well for bringing matters to a satisfactory issue without the use of force, which was not at hand. || 18. When I heard on Sunday of the Kumassis having armed themselves and rendezvoused in the Atehima villages, where I had sent the detachment under Captain Armitage, my first thought was to send reinforcements to his aid, but they did not exist. There were only enough Hausas left to properly garrison the Fort, and, having regard to the existing state of affairs, Captain Davidson-Houston considered it imperative not to weaken the force in Kumassi, especially as the Kumassis might take it into their heads to attack the town. || 19. What should be done, of course, is to send a punitive force against the Kumassis and their allies, surround them in their bush villages, break up their strength, and read a lesson to the Ashanti tribes generally. It is very bitter to me to be unable to adopt this course, on account of the weakness of the garrison here; 350 men would have sufficed, but they are not here. I have ordered up a company of Hausas from Accra, and another from the Northern Territories, but to get Hausas from the Northern Territories takes at least six weeks, as the headquarters are at Gambaga, and there is no telegraphic communication with that station. The comparative proximity of Kintampo to Kumassi was one of the reasons which led me to suggest Kintampo as the headquarters of the Northern Territories. || 20. I have had no alternative but to fall back on diplomacy, and to use the Kings of Mampon, Juabin, and Kumawu, as well as the King of Aguna, who has joined them, to bring the matter to an end. After having arranged for the despatch to you of my telegram of the 4th April, I interviewed these Kings at the Fort. The King of Mampon spoke for the others. He commenced by assuring me of the loyalty of himself and the others, and proceeded to mention what I have stated in paragraph 10 of this despatch, asking me to annul the announcement as regards the annual payments to be made by them, and then stated that he and the other Kings were prepared to assist the Government against the Kumassis. I informed them in reply that I would take care that the representation they had made with respect to the annual payments should be brought to your notice, and at the same time their loyalty to the Queen, and that I should not order the collection of the interest until after I had received your further instructions. Further, that I desired them to see that the Kumassis, as well as the Chiefs with them, abandoned their hostile attitude towards the Government, and returned to Kumassi to pursue their usual avocations. They all stated that they

had only waited for my sanction in order to adopt this course. They then asked me to promise to spare the lives of the young men and of the Chiefs. I told them that the young men had been led away by evil counsel, and that I should not punish them, but that the conduct of the Chiefs must be a matter of investigation, and that any action with regard to them would depend upon the result of it. || 21. Messengers were provided by the Kumassi Chief Opoku Mensah — the senior and now the only representative of the Native Committee — who had been brought into the Fort when it was found that his colleagues, Nantchi and Afifa, had joined the rebels, and these, with messengers from the Kings, left yesterday evening for the Achemia villages. The Kings say that the Kumassis and their allies will under their orders disperse, but I consider it very doubtful if the Chiefs will come in. They must come sooner or later, voluntarily or compulsorily. I am rather hoping that they may not come in voluntarily, as the Government will then, when it has a sufficiently strong force at hand, have an excellent reason for dealing with the Kumassis once for all, and reading them a lesson. This is essential in the interests of Ashanti generally. || 22. Nantchi and Afifa will be deposed from their position as Native Councillors to the Government, and I am thinking of giving their places to Chiefs Kwabina Kokofu and Kofi Sencheri. Both these Chiefs have remained firm in their loyalty to the Government. I shall, however, defer action in this matter for a time, as, if no action is taken, it is just possible that Nantchi and Afifa may come in, and can then be arrested. Later it may be necessary to reconsider the arrangement of a Native Committee, but I think it necessary to have one in some form or other at present. || 23. I hope to find it possible to settle matters quietly and without the use of force, as the Kumassis and their adherents are stated to be less confident of themselves since the engagement with the Hausas, and if the Kings I have referred to can be induced to remain loyal and helpful. || 24. The discontent of the Kumassis, and of their adherents, the Ejisus and Ofinsus, is not a sudden creation. It has, I find, existed from the first, and has only been kept in check by the Fort and garrison, and by their firm belief in the return of Prempeh at no distant date. I am strengthened in my view by remarks made to me by Captain Davidson-Houston, who tells me that rumours of threatened risings were heard of in April, 1896, when Captain Larymore, C.M.G., reported that the Achimias were disaffected; that again in June-July, 1897, similar reports were bruited; that in December, 1898, the Kings of Bekwai and Mampong informed Captain Stewart that the Kumassis talked of taking up arms against us; and, further, that in

November last (1899) the rumours seemed so authentic that he called all the Kumassi and Achima Chiefs to Kumassi, and made them all swear oaths of loyalty to the British Government through the Native Committee. This latter affair was not, I regret, reported to me. || 25. It is very unfortunate, and I regret it extremely, that my first visit to Ashanti should have been marked by the events which I have now reported to you. But it was as well that if they were to occur I should be here to deal with them, and they have shown, at any rate, with some clearness which of the tribes may be trusted and which may not, and how matters stand with respect to them. || 26. I hope it may be found possible to induce the Kumassis to lay down their arms. In that case I shall be able to leave Kumassi next week, in order to visit the Obuassi Mines, and at the same time to quiet the King of Bekwai, whose people have been disturbed by the proceedings of the Kumassis. Should the negotiations fail, I shall have to apply for reinforcements, as without them I shall be unable to get matters into order, and I shall remain here until I have done so, unless you order to the contrary. || 27. I shall address you as soon as possible upon the subject of the introduction of a better system of administration of Ashanti, and I will then refer to the question of the annual payments by the Kings and Chiefs on account of interest. || 28. In all this hazardous and anxious time I have been very ably assisted by the Acting Resident, Captain Davidson-Houston. His knowledge of the ways of the Ashanti Kings has been of the greatest service to me, and his coolness and discretion have assisted me very materially. || 29. Telegraphic communication with Kumassi has been interrupted for some days, the wires having probably been cut by the rebel Kumassis. As soon as the confidence of the native linemen has been restored, I will get the line into working order.

I have, &c.,

F. M. Hodgson, Governor.

Anlage.

Notes taken at a Public Palarer of Native Kings and Chiefs held in front of the Fort at Kumassi, at 4 p.m., on Wednesday, 28th March, 1900.

The Kings and Chiefs having been presented by the Resident to the Governor, who spoke to each separately, the Governor addressed the meeting as follows: — || It is a very great pleasure to me, and I also

hope it is a pleasure to you, that we should meet here together to-day, and become more acquainted with one another. It has long been my wish that I should come to Kumassi, and see the Kings and Chiefs of Ashanti, for I knew many of you in the old days, before you became the subjects of our great Queen, and I have known you for four years since you have been her subjects. Let me thank you for the welcome which you gave me when I entered this town last Sunday. I am not going to take the whole of that welcome as personal to myself, because I think it was a public demonstration on your part of your loyalty to the great Queen — the Queen of England. It is possible that the loyalty of some of you is obscured by the thought that some day your old King — King Prempeh — may return and reign over you. If any of you hold that thought, let me tell him that it is a vain thought. Let me tell you once and for all that Prempeh will never again rule over this country of Ashanti. It may be also that the loyalty of some of you is obscured by the thought that perhaps the rival of King Prempeh, namely, Achereboanda, now at Accra, may some day come here again. If any of you think that this is likely, I tell him to-day definitely and once for all, that Achereboanda is never likely to leave Accra to come here with the consent of the Government. You must take it for granted, and you must believe me when I tell you that neither Prempeh nor Achereboanda will ever return to rule over this country of Ashanti. Knowing that, we must look at facts in the face. What are those facts? When the Government assumed the control of this great country of Ashanti it took over also the powers which were previously possessed by King Prempeh. The paramount authority of Ashanti is now the great Queen of England, whose representative I am at this moment. In order that the powers of the King paramount may be exercised properly, inasmuch as the seat of the Government is far away at the Coast, it is necessary to place here a white officer, who bears the title of „Resident“. Under the Governor the Resident at Kumassi exercises the powers of King paramount. You know perfectly well what those powers are, but for a moment I should like to refer to them. You know perfectly well that with the entry of the British Government into Ashanti the power of making human sacrifices ceased; that your lives are now safe. You have only to advise the white officer who is resident in Kumassi when there is any danger, and you have the strong arm of the British Government to defend you. There is one other matter that came to an end at the same time, that was the buying and selling of human beings as if they were cattle or bales of goods.

In all countries of the Queen everybody is free. Now what are the powers which were formerly exercised by the King paramount which the Government now exercises. You will recollect that whenever there was any fighting to be done the King paramount had the power of calling out the young men to come and assist him. The Queen is not likely to solicit your assistance in that way. But the Queen reserves to herself the right of calling out the men of the tribes for peaceful purposes, for example, to serve as carriers, to make roads, and to build houses. Then, again, the King paramount had the power when there was any great enterprise on hand to call his Council together, and say that he wanted to carry out such and such an enterprise, and the cost of it had to be provided for in such proportions as are well known to you all by the heads of the tribes. Now the British Government has been in charge here for four years, and it has not as yet disturbed you with any request for money. Why is that? If your country had been conquered by a stronger tribe than all of you put together, you know what would have happened to you — you would have been required to pay a heavy tribute, such as your wealth would enable you to pay. Why, then, has the great Queen not disturbed you, and asked you for money? Because she knew that many of the tribes had been driven out of their country, and wished all of you to have time to return to your country to rebuild your villages, and to get accustomed to the kind of life which you are able to lead under British rule. You know by this time what the state of things is under the British Government. You have had four years of it, and I venture to say that if you were to speak out what is in your hearts you would say that you do not want to return to the old dissensions among yourselves, and that, in fact, you do not want to return to the old state of things. ¶ Now you will recollect that after the war which was conducted on our side by Sir Garnet Wolseley there was a treaty signed at Fomena. In that treaty there was a clause in which you Ashanti Chiefs undertook to pay to the British Government a sum of 50 000 ounces of gold — 25 000 pereguins. To that sum has to be added the expenses incurred in connection with the last expedition, which amounted also to upwards of 25 000 pereguins. I dare say you are wondering amongst yourselves what I am going to say next. Some of you are saying amongst yourselves, Is the Government going to ask us to pay the money down at one time? To this I say, No, but what I am going to say to you is this, that there must be paid annually to the Resident a sum which will be called interest on this expenditure by the British Government. You must understand this also, that in order to

provide you with the protection which the British Government can give you, namely, security to your lives and peace among yourselves, there is a large annual expenditure of money by the British Government. The sum to be paid as interest is 2000 pereguins. || Spread amongst you all this sum is very small. I have a list here, which I will read out to you, in order to show each of you exactly what your obligations will be henceforward to the Government in the matter of interest.

(Hiernach soll Kumassi dem Residenten jährlich 125 Pereguins bezahlen, Mampon 150, Adansi 150, Juabin 75, N'Suta 110, Bekwai 150, Kokofu 110, Ofinsu 35, Ejisu 35, N'Koranza 150, Kumawu 35, Aguma 110, Tekiman 75, Wanki 35, Abodom 35, Bechem 75, N'Kwanta 75, Mansu N'Kwanta 150, Ahafu 35, Wam 75, Bonpata 75, Agogo 20, Obogu 35, British Gaman 100.)

This may, perhaps, be an unexpected announcement to you. But you will get to learn that in all your dealings with me I keep nothing in the background. I speak to you face to face, and let you know in full what your obligations are. || There is one matter which I should like to talk to you about. I want first to ask a question of the King of Bekwai. || (The King comes forward.) || King, I want to ask you this question. You were put on the stool not very long ago. What would you have done to a man sitting on your right hand who kept back part of the stool equipment when you were enstooled? || A. I have no power myself; my power is the Government. || Q. Then you would have reported the matter to me to deal with? || A. Yes. || Q. And you would have expected me either to get you the equipment or to punish the man? || A. Yes. || Now, Kings and Chiefs, you have heard what the King of Bekwai has said upon the point I raised. What must I do to the man, whoever he is, who has failed to give to the Queen, who is the paramount power in this country, the stool to which she is entitled? Where is the Golden Stool? Why am I not sitting on the Golden Stool at this moment? I am the representative of the paramount power; why have you relegated me to this chair? Why did you not take the opportunity of my coming to Kumassi to bring the Golden Stool, and give it to me to sit upon? However, you may be quite sure that, although the Government has not as yet received the Golden Stool at your hands, it will rule over you with the same impartiality, and with the same firmness as if you had produced it.

Now, what I want you to do — and I speak in the name of the Queen — is this, that you will on your part rule over your respective districts with firmness and impartiality. || It is a very great pleasure to

me to see the old King of Adansi sitting quite close to his old enemy, the King of Bekwai, to see the Ejisus and the Kokofus together. I think you have begun well, and what I want you to do is to forget altogether those tribal enmities which you have had in the past, to wipe the slate clean, and to begin afresh. Your country has a great future. It is full of wealth. You have kola in profusion, and you have gold in great quantity, and you are all of you aware that the white man is coming to show you how that gold can be got at to the best advantage, not only to the white man himself, but to you Kings and Chiefs. Kings and Chiefs, I want you to look to me as your friend. I have been in this country for a long time; I have had the advantage of mixing with the natives of the country, and I know a good deal of your native customs. That will help me a great deal, and although at times I may have to do certain things that may not be altogether palatable to you, as perhaps the announcement which I have made to you to-day with regard to the payment of money may not be, yet I shall try to do all I can to be your friend, and to let you see that you have some one to turn to if you have any difficulties. Devote yourselves to peaceful pursuits, and remember this, that never again will you have Prempeh as your head chief, nor may you expect to see Achereboanda here — this should be clearly understood once and for all. I am perfectly well aware that there have been communications with Prempeh at Sierra Leone, and I am perfectly well aware that he has received money from this country, but that does not signify at all. We are quite prepared to let that pass, but the time may come, if those communications increase, for us to send Prempeh to a more distant land, where no communications can reach him, but I have a sort of fellow-feeling for Prempeh. I should like him to remain in West Africa so long as he respects his position. || I think I have said everything that I have to say, both on behalf of the Queen and on behalf of myself. I repeat again, that it has been a great pleasure to me to meet all the Kings and Chiefs of Ashanti, to see their faces, and to be able to recognise them when I meet them again. || There are two things which I must not, however, forget to mention to you. One is that I have presents for you, and the other is that in connection with the collection of the interest every Chief, in order to defray expenses, will get one peregrin out of every ten that he collects. || The Governor then distributed the following presents: — (folgen die Namen der Stämme und die Summen).

Nr. 12559. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Gouverneur der Goldküste an den Kolonialminister. Weitere Nachrichten über die Verhandlung mit den Häuptlingen.

Kumassi, April 11, 1900. (May 11, 1900.)

Sir, || In continuation of my despatch of the 7th April, with regard to the situation in Ashanti, it was with the greatest regret that I had to inform you yesterday by telegraph of the failure of the negotiations on the part of the Kings of Mampon, Juabin, Kumawu, and Aguna, with the rebel Chiefs of Kumassi. They have had a series of meetings together, but the Kumassis have proved obdurate. The Kings acquainted the Acting Resident with their failure in the letter of which I transmit a copy. || 2. Upon receipt of this letter I directed the Acting Resident to request the Kings to meet me at the fort. They came in during the afternoon, and I saw them yesterday at 4.30 p.m. They were accompanied by the King of Kokofu, who had also come in to say that the rumours about his lack of loyalty were false. The Kings repeated what they had said in their letter, and after thanking them for their efforts I told them that the matter would now be dealt with by the Government, and that I required them to remain with me in Kumassi, so as to let their own people and the Kumassis see that they had ranged themselves on the side of the Government, and were loyal. I did this also in order to prevent their arming their tribes, which they would assuredly do if they returned. I stated that if my order were disobeyed I should regard the King disobeying it as disloyal, and he would be dealt with accordingly when the time came. The King of Mampon, who had informed me that he had refused an offer made to him by the Kumassis that he should be the commander of their forces, was the only King who cavilled at the order, but I declined to relax it in his favour. || 3. I transmit copies of telegrams which I addressed to the Commissioner and Commandant of the Northern Territories and to the Colonial Secretary immediately upon the conclusion of the meeting and simultaneously with the despatch of my telegram to you. || 4. I greatly deplore that at a time when it is so necessary to have no troubles in any part of Her Majesty's dominions this serious trouble should have arisen here. But I am convinced now that this uprising by the Kumassis has been a settled matter for some time, to be undertaken at the first favourable opportunity, an opportunity which my arrival here and the announcements I made when I addressed the Ashanti Kings on the 28th March unfortunately afforded them. || 5. The reinforcement from Lagos, which I have suggested

should be sent, with the two companies ordered from the Northern Territories, will, I am confident, suffice to put a stop to the rebellion of the Kumassis. So far it has, I am glad to be able to report, not spread, and I understand that the Queen of Ejisu, whose people are with the Kumassis, is anxious to separate from the rebels. || 6. Foodstuffs are coming into the Kumassi market every morning, and that is a sure sign that the people are not united in their opposition to established rule. || 7. With the arrival of the reinforcements from Lagos and the Northern Territories active operations against the Kumassis will be taken. The rains may interfere to some extent to prevent those operations being continuous, but they will be sufficiently so to admit of the Kumassis being so harassed and troubled in their surrounding villages as to break up any combination against the Government, and to read all the Ashantis a lesson. || 8. I consider it to be my duty to remain here until all troubles are at an end, and the ringleaders given up. My presence will be required to give effect to a proper submission by the recalcitrant chiefs, and to place matters on a proper footing after the troubles are at an end, and although inconvenience may be caused by my absence in connection with other matters, it is, I consider, essential in the interests of trade and of the gold mining concessions that what has to be done here should be of a permanent and lasting character. If the reinforcements arrive quickly, I should not be detained here later than the end of June. || 9. I shall entrust the conduct of the operations against the Kumassis to Major Morris, D.S.O., and shall give him an entirely free hand in the matter of details.

E. M. Hodgson, Governor.

Anlage.

A'sokori Manpon, April 11, 1900.

To Your Worship,

Sir, || We have the honour most respectfully to submit through to Your Worship for His Excellency the Governor's information — || That we have sent several messengers to Kumassi, Dweso, and Achuma people to stop their foolishness or evil doing. They said they will not stop. But whatever it may be, they will fight with the British Government. Therefore, the King of Manpon must come and be their head. But as for us we are not in their favour, and we cannot join them. We are in the favour of the British Government. Therefore we beg to ask permission from His Excellency, and go back to our countries. And if they

mean indeed to fight, then, we too will fight them at their back. || Your Worship may know really that if not the British Government the Kumassi people will not allow any one of us to stay our countries. Therefore we cannot join them in anyhow. We beg to let Your Worship know that the Kumassi people has sent for all their troops to surround us, and they said they will attack us, and force us to join them. But we cannot do so. For this purpose we ask leave from His Excellency. But we swear before our grandfather, who, under graves, that we can never join them in any way. We beg to let Your Worship know that the Governor may send some troops to pass Obogo road to come help us.

We have, &c.,

Yaw Sapon His X Mark, King of Juabin.

Quarsi Sechere His X Mark, King of Manpon.

Quarmine Adomaku His X Mark, King of Kumawoo.

Yaw Afrim His X Mark, Chief of Nsuta.

Quarjoe Daquah His X Mark, Chief of Bompata.

Writer — Prince Moses Q. Adjaye. To the Acting Resident, Kumassi.

Nr. 12560. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Gouverneur der Goldküste an den Kolonialminister. Derselbe Gegenstand.

The Fort, Kumassi, April 16, 1900. (May 24, 1900.)

Sir, || I have the honour to acquaint you with the events which have occurred since I wrote to you on the 11th instant. || 2. Late on the 12th instant, the King of Aguna came to me with linguists from the Kings of Mampon, Juabin, and Kumawu, to say that they were afraid to obey my order that they were to remain in Kumassi, as they had heard that the Kumassis intended to molest their people. I stated that the Kumassis did not dare to do anything of the sort, and I then said to the linguists, as it appeared to me that the time had come to speak very plainly, that if the Kings went back to their countries without my permission they would go as the declared enemies of the Queen, and would be so dealt with, but that if they remained their loyalty would not be forgotten. I spoke very firmly and decisively, and the next morning the Kings came themselves to say that they had received my message, and that they had definitely decided to remain with me. Since then there has been no wavering on their part, and I think that the attempt to set aside the order given to them on the 6th April, as reported in paragraph 2 of my despatch, was entirely due to the vacillation

of the King of Mampon, who is very weak and, I think, also unreliable. || 3. I have assigned the premises of Opoku Mensa, the senior member of the Native Committee, who is now detained in the Fort, to the King of Juabin, and those of the rebel Chief Nantchi to the King of Kumawu, these Kings having told me that they had no houses to live in. || 4. On the 13th April, I heard that a section of the rebel Chiefs, headed by Osei Kanyassi, the Chief of the Owiku, or Royal, tribe — a man who holds a high position in Kumassi — wanted to sever themselves from the rebels and come in, and yesterday his nephew, Kofi Senchere, one of the two Kumassi Chiefs who have remained loyal, came to me to negotiate. He asked me to pardon his uncle and let him return to Kumassi. My reply was that if Osei Kanyassi would send his linguist to me I would acquaint him with my terms. It was my intention to find out as far as possible what followers Osei Kanyassi had, what Chiefs were with him, and whether, if he made public submission and brought in a certain number of arms, it would be worth while to grant a pardon in his case. || 5. Shortly after this interview with Kofi Senchere, I saw Yow Awua, whom I had sent for (Yow Awua was a political prisoner in Elmina Castle for some ten years, and was released by me in, I think, 1893. He has been living in some state in Kumassi since the occupation in 1896, and regards himself as my particular friend), and in the course of conversation he told me that he had seen Osei Kanyassi in the town that morning (15th April), and had spoken to him; further, that he understood he was coming back again in the evening. I thereupon arranged that if he did come, Yow Awua should acquaint me. Shortly before 6 p.m., Yow Awua came himself to report that Osei Kanyassi had returned and had gone to his house. He was at once quietly arrested by Captains Davidson-Houston and Armitage, marched up under a Hausa guard, and lodged in the Fort. This is the first of the rebel Chiefs taken. I think the news was soon known among the rebels around Kumassi, because, last night, there was more drum-beating and shouting than for many nights previously, but no semblance of an attack was made. I have had all the jungle cut down right up to the swamps on both sides of the town, beyond which the rebels are grouped, and they are afraid to emerge into the open now that they know, from experience gained by the attack on Captain Armitage and his detachment, that, as has been said to me, „the white man has bullets which kill three men at one shot”. || 6. On the 14th April, the Kings of Mampon, Juabin, and Kumawu asked specially to be allowed to go to Dentasu, a place just outside Kumassi, and where from time immemorial meetings have been

held, to hear what the rebel Chiefs had to say, the latter having asked them to come. I consented. On Sunday evening, the 15th instant, they reported that they had just returned from a meeting at which most of the rebel Chiefs were present. The King of Mampon, acting as spokesman, said that the rebel Chiefs and their people were divided into two parties — one headed by Osei Kanyassi, was desirous of laying down their arms and returning to their allegiance if they could be pardoned. The other and larger party had determined to fight unless the Governor complied with the following conditions, which they had been requested to state: — || 1. Prempeh to be given back, and to regulate and collect any annual payment to be made; || 2. Permission to buy and sell slaves as in the old time; || 3. To be freed from demands for carriers; || 4. To be freed from the obligation of building houses and supplying thatch; || 5. All huxters and strangers to be sent away. || 7. I told the King of Mampon that I was surprised that he had dared to bring such a message to the Governor, or that he had allowed the rebel Chiefs to soil his hands with it; that he should have told them that if they wanted such dirty work done they should do it themselves; that he had, in fact, been treated by the rebel Chiefs as if he were a person of little or no consequence instead of being one of the principal Kings of Ashanti. || 8. I said to the three Kings that if any of the rebel Chiefs wanted to come in they would have to treat with me and agree to terms which I would name. That, as regards the terms proposed, they were, on the face of them, absurd. Prempeh, I had stated at the meeting held on the 28th March, would never come back to rule over Ashanti, and that statement was a correct one and would not be changed. That, as regards the buying and selling of slaves, black men might regard themselves as no better than cattle, to be bought and sold as opportunity offered or as circumstances dictated, but that the white man did not and would not so regard them; they had been told when Kumassi was occupied, in January, 1896, that slavery had ceased, and that announcement would never be cancelled or altered. They would not be freed from the obligation of supplying carriers or finding labour and material for house-building, but that, in the matter of carriers, I had found since I had been in Kumassi that there was some hardship caused, and that I intended to find a remedy. That, as regards huxters and strangers, Ashanti was a portion of the British Empire, in which all persons are free to live and trade where they please, and that no exception would be made in the case of Kumassi. I then told the Chiefs that I had taken notice of the terms proposed by the rebels only to make the views of the Government clear

to them personally, as they were loyal and desirous of assisting; that I now forbade them to have any more meetings or intercourse with the rebel Chiefs; and that should the latter send messages to them, they were to be sent away and referred to the Governor. I have to-day heard that messengers arrived this morning, and were sent away. || 9. All the three Kings thanked me for what I had said, and told me that they fully understood and would carefully carry out my instructions. || 10. Before the meeting closed, I was able to inform the Kings that Osei Kan-yassi, having come into Kumassi without my permission, had been seized, and was, as I spoke, within the Fort. I stated that he was only the first of a series of rebel Chiefs who would be taken by the Government, and by force, if they did not submit or were not given up voluntarily. || 11. It is, I think, clear from the terms sent to me by the Kumassis that the rebellion has been brewing for some time, and I think that this is made more clear from the letter addressed by the King of Juabin to the Acting Resident on the 27th March, of which I enclose a copy. I interviewed Yow Sapon, King of Juabin, with regard to the meaning of his letter, and I attach a copy of a minute which I wrote at the time. || 12. I regret to say that I hear that the Nkoranzas have joined the rebels, as well as the Tekimans and Bechem Ahafus. If this information is correct, the rebels include the Kumassis, Ofinsus, Ejisus, Nkoranzas, Tekimans, and Bechem Ahafus. The Bechems are stated to have taken part in the attack on Captain Armitage's detachment. I can hardly credit the statement that the Nkoranzas have taken up arms against the Government, but Captain Davidson-Houston tells me that since the accession of the new King their demeanour has on more than one occasion not been satisfactory. || 13. The Kokofu tribe seems to be divided in its allegiance. The young King Asibi leans towards the rebels, the more so now that he was compelled by his principal Chiefs to abandon the offer made to him by the Kumassis that he should be placed on the Golden Stool. They have secretly decided to depose him when the troubles here are over, and I think he has heard this. I was advised to-day that he meditated flight to the rebels at Karsi, having been in communication with the Kumassi Chief, Asamoa Kwami, who is commanding there. His movements are being watched, and I hope to be able to restrain him without actually arresting him — a step which would frighten the loyal Kings who are here with me, and would do more harm than good. || 14. Mr. Daw and Mr. Leslie Gordon came to Kumassi yesterday to see me. They report all quiet at Obuassi, although the Bekwais are under arms for the purpose of repelling any attack by

their old enemies, the Adansis. At present the Kumassis do not molest persons passing to and from Bekwai, possibly because they fear the resentment of the Bekwais, who they know are not with them. There were many armed men upon the road and the villages were, Mr. Daw tells me, deserted. There are many matters that I wanted to discuss with Mr. Daw, and I am glad that he has been able to respond to my invitation to come here, as I could not go to the mines. || 15. I learn from more than one source that Captain Parmeter, who was on his way to the coast invalided from the Northern Territories, was attacked at Sekidumasi — a Kumassi village on the Kintampo-Kumassi road — and had to seek refuge in the bush. He is stated to have got safely back to Nkoranza, and thence to Kintampo, Captain Benson having come with Hausas to Nkoranza to meet him. I have heard no details, and cannot say if the hammock-men and carriers were killed. || 16. The Rev. F. Ramseyer tells me that he has heard that the Basel Mission Catechist, named Dansu, at Sekidumasi, has been seized and, with his wife, put in log at a neighbouring village. || 17. I have written to Major Morris, warning him about the attitude of the Nkoranzas, and requesting him to read them a lesson if his force is strong enough to do it (I have asked him to come here with not less than 300 men), and to burn Sekidumasi, and, if possible, release the Catechist at the same time. || 18. There are many rumours of isolated murders and seizures, many of which are, I fear, true, and I shall be very glad when I get a large enough force here to be able to assume the offensive. || 19. I expected the detachment from Accra, under Captain Middlemist, on Wednesday, the 18th instant, but I am told that he is detained at Prahsu in consequence of his carriers having deserted. I have sent him a letter informing him that it is imperative that he should come here at the earliest possible date (the Kumassis are beginning to say that troops are not coming), and he will, I hope, find it possible to leave his loads and push on. The insurgents, the King of Mampon tells me, intend to attack the detachment by means of ambushes at Karsi, a village on the Cape Coast road, about four miles from here. I have warned Captain Middlemist. My letters are taken by Bekwais, some thirty of whom the loyal King of that tribe has sent to me. || 20. Your telegram of the 14th April reached me yesterday. I transmit a copy of a telegram which the Colonial Secretary informs me he sent to the Governor of Lagos upon its arrival at Accra, a copy of the reply, and a copy of a telegram which I sent yesterday to the Colonial Secretary. || 21. The force here, upon the arrival of all the troops ordered up, will be as follows: —

Garrison at Kumassi (including Hausas brought up by the Governor)	150
Detachment under Captain Middlemist	100
„ from Lagos under Captain Aplin	200
„ from Jebba	150
„ from Northern Territories	300
	<u>900</u>

I have also accepted the offer of the services of 50 picked men from the Gold Coast Volunteer Corps. || 22. I consider this force will be sufficient for the purposes in hand. There will also be the following guns: —

- In Garrison. — 3 Maxims, 1 Nordenfelt, 4 7-pounders.
- With Accra Detachment. — 1 Maxim.
- With Lagos Detachment. — 2 Maxims, 2 7-pounders.
- With Jebba Detachment. — 1 Maxim.
- With Northern Territories Detachment. — 2 Maxims.
- Total. — 9 Maxims, 1 Nordenfelt, 6 7-pounders.

Of these, 3 Maxims, 1 Nordenfelt, and 4 7-pounders will remain as the armament of the Fort.

I have, &c.,

F. M. Hodgson, Governor.

P.S. — I transmit copies of two telegrams which I have just received from the Colonial Secretary, and of a telegram which I am sending to him.

F. M. Hodgson.

Nr. 12561. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Oberst Willcocks an den Kolonialminister. Lage auf dem Kriegsschauplatze.

(Received 11.45 a.m., May 27, 1900.)

(Telegram.) || May 26. Cape Coast Castle. Arrived to-day. Telegram arrived from Wilkinson, Prahsu; Lieutenant Slater, 3rd Lancashire, wounded, Moinsi Hills, which are surrounded by the enemy, Wilkinson marching (to) relief. 21st May, Hall was to the north of Moinsi Hills with express intention of advancing to Kumassi. Military situation complicated; all the troops scattered, lines of communication, in absence of orders, but I will concentrate as soon as possible. Colonel Carter and Niger Coast protectorate Force will be moved to-day, and I shall follow them with 300 West African Frontier Force expected to arrive very soon.

Nr. 12562. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Derselbe an Denselben.
 Ernste militärische Lage. Truppenbewegungen.
 (Received 11.35 p.m., June 10, 1900.)

(Telegram.) || Prahsu, June 9. Just received message from Colonel Carter, dated from Kwisa, 8th June, reporting advanced from Kwisa 6th June, effected junction with Captain Hall (at) Bekwai, found rebel forces strongly fortified Dompooasi, fight continued for a long time, dislodged enemy, but on account of losses sustained, namely, seven European officers wounded, one dangerously, and also ninety other casualties, was quite unable to advance; returned to Kwisa. Position of affairs as follows. No news from Coomassie. Hall at Esumeja and Bekwai, which is friendly. Kokofu and Adansi in state of rebellion; Dengiassi most probably joining with rebel forces. || In my opinion military situation has become very serious and steady increase rebel forces. Strongly recommend 400 West African Regiment and 400 some other Colonial Corps or Indian troops, and also four 7-pounder R.M.L. guns of 150 lbs. should be sent at once, also 5 000 carriers from Sierra Leone, 3 000 Gold Coast, and 2 000 from Lagos and Nigeria. Thirty special service officers urgently required replace casualties, transport purposes, and several cases of sickness white men. Ample supplies medical stores and some more medical officers will be necessary, also European rations and rice and reserve ammunition. It is evident that extensive character of rebellion greatly in excess of what was to be understood from previous correspondence. After all lines of communication are open, road to Northern Territories must be opened. Owing to want of carriers and delay caused by this, rebellion has assumed present state. As soon as carriers arrive from Cape Coast, Melliss, Beddoes, all available forces shall be advanced to Kwisa en route for Coomassie.

Nr. 12563. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Kolonialminister an den Oberst Willecocks. Verstärkungen sind unterwegs.

(Sent 1.45. p.m., June 15, 1900.)

(Telegram.) || 15th June. As you have been informed in my telegrams of 29th May and 12th June, 300 West African Frontier Force, 200 Southern Nigeria Force, and four companies of West African Regiment have been ordered to Gold Coast and should arrive very soon. These are all the troops available immediately, but 300 Central Africa Regiment with 50 Sikhs are being sent from East Africa, and should reach Cape Coast

about the beginning of August. By that date or a little later probably further reinforcements could be made available if you think that larger force will be required. If you will give full estimate of force required for punishment of rebels and say by what date further reinforcements should arrive, arrangements will be made to meet your requirements.

Nr. 12564 **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** Oberst Willecocks an den Kolonialminister. Antwort auf das Vorige. Er braucht weitere Verstärkungen.

(Received 1.20 a.m., June 30, 1900.)

(Telegram.) || Prahsu, 29th June. I have not replied to your telegram of 15th June as I have been waiting for news from north. I have now from Bekwai to Cape Coast inclusive 1500 troops of all ranks, and three 75-millimetre, five 7-pounder guns of 150 lbs. One Company (and) one gun from Northern Nigeria arrival expected 15th July at Cape Coast, and 350 Central Africa Regiment about 10th August. About 15th August I calculate I shall have, deducting losses and cases of sickness, about 1700 troops nine guns. Above estimate does not include Coomassie garrison nor remaining Northern Territories (forces). Of the troops in garrison Coomassie quite impossible to calculate how many will be fit or available for performance of duty, and Northern Territories will be in need of all their local troops; but still I reckon upon 300 from Coomassie as I am sure they will not have any more fit for service. This will give about a total of 2000 troops. 1000 troops will be required for Coomassie and lines of communication and also (to) give support to native levies and therefore I might have 1000 troops for punitive work. This basis of calculation is (made) on what in my opinion seems likely and I am quite unable to give in greater detail till it is known what is our loss in carrying out relief (of) Coomassie. If Her Majesty's Government consider that Adansis, Ashantis, Kokofus, that portion of Nkoranza as may be in state of rebellion, and other native tribes who have given encouragement to rebel forces, are to be severely punished, their country gone through, and lasting punishment administered, it will take another 1500 troops to do it. Distances are great; healthy season too short; and those at the present time serving are having trying times and a great many cases of sickness. With this extra number (of) troops I am of opinion that the whole of rebel Chiefs' country could be searched and severe punishment meted out, but I would again repeat that quite possible some alteration may be required in estimate of which I will not fail to inform you.

Nr. 12565. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Mr. Low an den Kolonialminister. Der Gouverneur hat Kumassi verlassen.

(Received 10.15 p.m., July 5, 1900.)

(Telegram.) || Following telegram received from Governor of Gold Coast, dated Ekwanta, 26th June: — || Telegram begins: Have the honour to inform you that in consequence of column for relief not arriving and reduction of food supplies to three days and a-half it was necessary to make an attempt to push through rebel forces. Taking two days' supply of rations and leaving remainder for force of 100 left to guard the fort under Assistant-Inspectors Bishop and Ralph sufficient for twenty-four days, the column, 600 strong, left Coomassie at 5.45 a.m., 23rd June, under the command of Major Morris, D.S.O., accompanied by 700 carriers, loyal Kings of Mampon, Juabin, Aguna, Akwanta, and Nsuta, with their followers, and all Europeans, inclusive of members of Basel Mission. I was able to remain at Coomassie till the 23rd June only by reduction of supply of rations to a minimum. The force too weak to attempt to break out by the Prahsu road where the rebel forces were in great numbers, but it was given out that I should take that road and the rebel forces, hearing this, fortunately remained to await arrival. The route decided on after full consideration was that through Potasi and Terrabum to Ekwanta. At Potasi there was a stockade, which was captured by a flank movement, with loss of one killed and several wounded, inclusive of Captains Marshall and Leggett, both severely wounded. At every village passed through the advanced guard (was) attacked and the rearguard harassed, but Terrabum was reached with only loss of six killed and several slightly wounded, many of the carriers, weakened by hunger, threw away their loads, and nearly all of us have lost clothing and such provisions as we had. The march to Ekwanta has been one of great difficulty and privation, the hammock-men being too weak to perform duty and the column hampered with large numbers of persons who followed from Coomassie. We are halting here for two days to recruit and we hope to reach Cape Coast in ten days' time. We have had letters sent to Officer Commanding column for relief who, from what I hear, has reached Bekwai, acquainting him with situation, and saying that it is absolutely necessary to relieve Fort not later than 15th July. The people encamped round the Fort suffered from starvation terribly, and the rate of mortality was at least upwards of 30 per diem. The scenes witnessed were terrible. I could not attack the rebel forces with any determination owing to insufficient ammunition, and we marched out of Coomassie on 23rd June with only 150 rounds of ammunition

per man. Major Morris arrived at Coomassie with 230 Hausas on the 15th May. His services in these anxious and trying times have been invaluable to me: I cannot speak too highly of the way in which he carried out arrangements for leaving Coomassie. I have had no news of any kind since the 29th April, when the Lagos Constabulary reached Coomassie. Regret to inform you that Middlemist, Deputy Inspector-General, died of malarious fever 6th May, and Maguire, Assistant Inspector of Constabulary, killed in action 29th May. — Hodgson. Telegram ends.

Nr. 12566. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Oberst Willcocks an den Kolonialminister. Militärische Massregeln.

(Received 1.50 a.m., July 13, 1900.)

(Telegram.) || Bekwai, 9th July. Arrived to-day. Sent back 200 West African Regiment from Essian Kwanta to Kwisa to meet 150 coming from Fumsu, combined 350, and also 100 for the garrison Kwisa. They will I hope arrive at Bekwai to-morrow evening by force(d) marches. Obligated to abandon Kwisa as a temporary measure, as if Coomassie to be relieved services urgently required of all men I can get together, and is in my opinion a really desperate attempt owing to enormous number of the enemy stockaded and helped by almost impassable roads; but I have confidence in officers and men, and we will do our duty. Shall be glad of all the troops asked for as soon as they can be sent to me British officers are feeling the incessantly heavy duty and unhealthy climate; many cases of sickness. || No letter sent by Hodgson since his of 26th June. It appears that he has taken back to Cape Coast 600 native soldiers.

Nr. 12567. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Derselbe an Denselben. Entsatz Kumassis.

(Received 2.30 p.m., July 23, 1900.)

(Telegram.) || Bekwai, 20th July. Just returned from Coomassie, which was relieved 15th July, after two days' running fight, ending in successful attack and dislodging enemy from four stockades within one mile from Coomassie. Enemy's position perfectly selected and prepared on high land and completely hidden by almost impenetrable bush. I had spread report that I would attack Kokofu to the east of Bekwai on 13th July, and several thousands of the enemy came from direction of Coomassie for defence of Kokofu; but on that same day I suddenly

marched to Pekki, 15 miles to the west of Bekwai; march lasted nineteen hours, going through worst paths and jungle troops ever marched in; incessant rain prevailed. || 14th July I reached Ekwanta. Captain Eden, West African Frontier Force, and Lieutenant Edwards, Sierra Leone Police Force, carried village Treda with bayonet; village held by 600 of the enemy. Following casualties reported: four native soldiers wounded. Enemy's force extremely surprised at bayonet charge; enemy fled, leaving behind a great many goats, sheep, &c. Rearguard attacked at mid-day, but the Maxim guns soon silenced enemy's force; one native soldier West African Frontier Force (? wounded). || 15th July I left Ekwanta at dawn through roads (in) indescribably bad condition; guns moved (with) greatest difficulty, but at the same time all kept up. Rearguard attack 3 o'clock in the afternoon repulsed by Major Beddoes, West African Frontier Force. 4.30 o'clock in the afternoon Major Melliss, West African Frontier Force, and Lieutenant Edwards, Sierra Leone Police Force, leaders of scouts, heavily fired on, both of them slightly wounded. Major Wilkinson, Inspector-General of Gold Coast Constabulary, Officer Commanding advanced guard, brought up all the field guns under Phillips, West African Frontier Force, and also three Maxim guns, as it was evident that we (were) now in the face of enemy's intrenched position. I gave orders for infantry to extend to both flanks; entangled bush had to be cut before any men could possibly penetrate. After twenty minutes, infantry had extended sufficiently, facing north, and two companies facing east towards rising ground, on which side enemy kept up heavy fire, although the four Maxim guns were busily employed against them. About twenty casualties had now taken place and having full confidence in officers and men, I determined, notwithstanding the enemy being posted behind (? to advance) with the bayonet; the bugles (sounded) cease firing; they were promptly obeyed, and the charge could not have been beaten in elan by any soldiers. I am proud of Yoruba native soldiers, West African Frontier Force, who formed bulk of charging force, and any misgivings as to their qualities which may hitherto have been felt by those who only believed in the Hausas are vanished. Their gallant conduct is admiration of every officer present at fight. Bayonet charge absolutely paralysed enemy, who at once ceased firing and fled away in thousands leaving behind a great many mangled dead in the stockades and the bush, showing terrific havoc caused by 75 millimetre guns, (? news of) which will, I hope, spread over all this country. || I have destroyed war camp of the Commander-in-Chief (of the) Ashanti army situated near main road, and I entered Coomassie (at) 6 in the evening.

Terrible scene (of) desolation and of horror; stench sickening; nothing but burnt down houses and putrid bodies to be seen, the latter right up to (the) walls of the fort. Garrison delighted beyond words. Native soldiers most of them too weak to stand. British officers thanked God for relief, as a few days more would have seen the last of the defence. || I left Coomassie 17th July, leaving behind 150 native soldiers under Captain Eden, Lieutenant Mayne, Medical Officer Thompson, (and) Sergeant Desborough, R.A., all West African Frontier Force, and ample supplies of ammunition and of food for seven weeks, long before which I will have reinforced detachment with a force sufficient to feed itself from the surrounding villages, &c. I brought away from Coomassie old garrison, most of them in hammocks and also a great many refugees, women and children. Before departure from Coomassie had buried heaps of rotting corpses which must have been lying near fort for weeks past. I had also cut short bush and the grass which was growing up quite close to (the) walls of the fort. The work was sickening in the extreme, but at the same time all ranks helped bravely. In my opinion the garrison left behind at Coomassie was altogether unequal to the task of holding fort and nothing less than fear of Ashantis to attack could have saved them, notwithstanding strong fort. I have never seen anything so gruesome as the vicinity fort. I expected with my 1700 unarmed native followers and the sick and wounded some difficulty in coming out; but enemy's being completely dispersed on the 15th July seems to have frightened them, as they did not fire a shot for 25 miles' march, which took three days owing to two days' excessive rain. (Folgt die Aufzählung der Soldaten, die eine Auszeichnung verdienen.)

Nr. 12568. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Gouverneur der Goldküste an den Kolonialminister. Bericht über die Belagerung von Kumassi und militärische Expeditionen.

Government House, Accra, July 14, 1900. (August 3, 1900.)

Sir, || The last despatch with regard to the Ashanti rebellion that I found it possible to get through the rebel lines before they had closed around Kumassi was that dated the 16th April. I have made attempts since to get others and also telegrams through, but only with success apparently in the case of the latter. After the 16th April events at Kumassi proceeded rapidly, and I regret to say unfavourably. I will endeavour to place them before you as succinctly as possible in the order

in which they occurred. || 2. The detachment of Hausas from Accra, under Captain Middlemist, arrived at Kumassi on the 18th April. It was decided, after consultation and with my sanction, that it would be well to clear out any rebels there might be in the villages of Karsi and Adeabiba, which are on the Prahsu road and within easy reach of Kumassi, as well as in villages across the marsh to the eastward of the town; or should the villages be found to be deserted to burn them down. I transmit copies of the reports from the officers in command of the detachments detailed for the work. It had been intended that the marsh villages of Assim, Abakom, and Kwaman should be visited on one and the same day, but after Assim and Abakom had been destroyed, the rebels having cleared out of them, the force returned to Kumassi, leaving Kwaman to be dealt with later. || 3. Captain Middlemist arranged that a force should proceed to Kwaman on Monday, the 23rd April, under the command of Captain Marshall, Special Service Officer. It moved out shortly after 6 a.m. At 8 a.m. I heard that the force had proceeded by a different road to that which goes across the marsh to the villages dealt with on Saturday, and on enquiry I heard that the guide had taken them along the road leading to Ejisu. On this road there is a town called Kwamo (it is marked in the Intelligence Department map), and I knew from the information in my hands that the rebels were in force there and at Ejisu. || 4. In case my fear that the force was being misled should be correct, I sent off a runner with a letter to Captain Marshall instructing him, if the guide were taking him along the Ejisu road to Kwamo, not to proceed onwards, but if possible to return without coming into contact with the rebels. Unfortunately the messenger arrived too late. The force had got almost as far as Formosua when they were met by large numbers of the rebels and furiously attacked. Native Officer Akkere was, I much regret to say, killed almost at once, and in the fighting that ensued — upon the order for retreat being given — 4 Hausas were killed and 50 wounded, including in the latter Captains Marshall and Bishop and Dr. Hay. The force returned to Kumassi at 4 p.m., bringing in the dead body of the native officer, who has been buried in the Government cemetery at Bantama. || 5. This engagement was most untoward. It should not have occurred, but Captain Marshall was unaware that the guide was not taking him to Kwaman, the place named in the instructions. || 6. The conduct of Dr. Hay in standing by the body of Native Officer Akkere and bringing it in, to which Captain Marshall refers in his report, is deserving of the highest praise, and I beg to bring to your notice the conduct of Captain Bishop and certain non-

commissioned officers and men who are generally mentioned. || 7. On Sunday, the 21st April, having received sufficiently reliable intelligence that Asibi, King of the Kokofu, whose conduct is referred to in paragraph 13 of my despatch of the 16th April, intended to escape to the rebels during the night, I had him quietly arrested and brought into the fort. The next day the Kokofu Chiefs then in Kumassi waited on me and expressed their gratitude for this step. They were able to advise the Chiefs in Kokofu, and I have since learnt that Asibi's uncle — a man named Kwami Essell — has been selected for election to the stool. || 8. On Tuesday, the 24th April, the rebels on the Atchima or western side of Kumassi drew in and sent a detachment round to the Prahsu road to close it. A messenger I had sent with telegrams returned, having been fired at. || 9. On Wednesday, the 25th April, it was apparent that the rebel forces had closely surrounded the town on all sides. Natives proceeding to the watering places to draw water were fired upon and in some cases captured. At 10.30 a.m. a large force of Kumassis threatened Bantama, and Mr. and Mrs. Ramseyer and the four Europeans with them were instructed to withdraw from the mission houses and were placed temporarily in the officers' quarters in the neighbourhood of the fort, and, later, brought into the fort itself. At the same time Mr. David and Mr. Grundy, of the Ashanti Company, who were at the time staying in Kumassi, were advised to come into the fort. || 10. The rebel force in question was found to be so strong as to necessitate the withdrawal of the outposts which had been placed at Bantama, and subsequently the Hansa cantonments, which are situated about halfway between the fort and Bantama, had to be evacuated. || 11. It was found also impracticable to defend the prison, and at 3.30 p.m. the prison gates were opened and the prisoners — 43 in number — released. Many of them remained under the protection of the fort, and subsequently rendered service as labourers and so forth. || 12. Shortly before 2 p.m. the rebels on the Bantama side became actively aggressive, but were kept in check by a Maxim gun placed upon the main road. An engagement was, however, imminent. It commenced at 2.30 p.m., and lasted until 6 p.m., when the rebels were compelled to desist. During the engagement the native allies — people of the Kings of Mampon, Juabin, Aguna, and Nkwanta, as well as the followers of the loyal Kumassi Chiefs — did very well, and rendered excellent assistance. Twenty native allies were killed and several wounded. Only two Hausas were killed and one officer wounded, namely, Assistant Inspector Leggett, slightly. || 13. About 3 p.m. a determined effort was made by the Fantis

resident in Kumassi, by civilian Hausas, and by the wives of men of the Hausa Constabulary to gain admittance into the fort. There were some 2500 people striving to get in, and the gates were closed only after a very severe struggle. On this occasion Captain Middlemist was carried up to the gates in a general rush, and was only got in with difficulty and in a very exhausted state. I fear that the terrible struggle to which he was then subjected in a great measure accentuated the illness of which he subsequently died. || 14. The available force of Hausas to man the fort and keep the rebels back amounted to less than 200, the remainder being under treatment for wounds received during previous engagements. It was a most anxious time, and had the rebels been properly led the losses would most assuredly have been severe. || 15. It was found necessary during the engagement, in consequence of the large number of rebels fighting against the Government forces, estimated at not less than 6000, to evacuate not only the Hausa cantonment, as already stated, but also the hospital and Government bungalows. The Hausa cantonments were partially destroyed by fire during the following night and the roofs of the buildings within the prison stockade were also similarly destroyed. The buildings of the Basel Mission and also the Government bungalows were not fired, but the rebels looted them of furniture and carried away all doors and windows from the Basel Mission buildings. The medical stores and constabulary clothing were brought into the fort. || 16. The scene around the fort on the night of the 25th April baffles description. It would take an abler pen than mine to do justice to it. Crowded together without shelter of any kind on two sides of the fort were some 3000 refugees — Fantis, Kumassis, civilian Hausas — a miscellaneous collection of men, women, and children, most of whom were in a state of abject panic. In order to allay their terror a cordon of Hausas had been posted around them, and this cordon was kept on duty night and day until arrangements for the better location of the people could be made. || 17. Thursday, the 26th April, was spent in making sanitary arrangements for the mass of people clustered under the walls of the fort, and as food for the Hausas was unobtainable, the issue of reserve rations had to be commenced. During the night there was a tornado. The rain fell in torrents, and the state of the people outside the fort, who were for the most part without shelter, was very pitiable. || 18. During Friday and Saturday the people, taught by the lesson of Thursday night, built shelter huts for themselves, and steps were taken to better regulate the position of the camp. || 19. On Sunday, the 29th April, a determined attack was made upon the fort by the rebels. During the morning it

had been seen that they were making active preparations for an engagement, having loopholed the walls of those of the burnt houses in the Constabulary Cantonment which face the fort. || 20. In the early morning the rebels were harassed by sniping shots from the fort, and at 12.30 p.m. the engagement commenced by a heavy fusillade by the rebels upon the Hausas, who were lined up in front of the natives encamped around the fort. The rebels fought with great determination, and more than once advanced into the open. The engagement lasted until 3.30 p.m., when they were routed on all sides with great loss. Their provision stores, as well as several guns and warlike stores, were captured. Nearly 150 bodies were buried, and no doubt many bodies were taken away. Several hundreds must have been wounded. The casualties on our side were two Constabulary killed and ten wounded, including Dr. Tweedy slightly wounded. || 21. There were not more than 200 Hausas available for the engagement, but the native levies rendered every assistance. I transmit a copy of Captain Marshall's report. || 22. I wish to bring specially to your notice the conduct on this occasion of Captain Marshall, Special Service Officer, who, in the absence of Deputy Inspector-General Middlemist, then on the sick list, took command of the Constabulary; of Inspector Armitage, who was in charge of the native levies, and of Dr. A. Chalmers, who was always with the fighting line. But all officers worked well, both combatant and non-combatant, and in specially mentioning some I do not wish to detract in any way from the excellent work done by the others. || 23. This action was most important, as it freed the fort and the vicinity of it from the rebels, and cleared them out of the town. Moreover, as it was expected that the detachment of Lagos Constabulary on its way to Kumassi would arrive on the 29th April, it was very desirable to get the rebels to attack, so as to prevent their joining the force likely to be employed against that detachment. || 24. The Lagos detachment arrived at 6 p.m., under Captain Aplin, C.M.G., Inspector-General; they had had two severe engagements. The column was attacked in the first instance at Essiagu, which is a place marked in the Intelligence Department map, and shown to be on the Kumassi side of Ordarsu. The village was taken with a loss of one killed and 23 wounded, Assistant-Inspector Cochrane being severely wounded and Captain Aplin and Dr. Macfarlane very slightly. The detachment laagered at Essiagu for the night. || 25. On the following day the detachment was attacked about 2½ miles from Kumassi by a force of rebels estimated at 8000, who had constructed a strong stockade across the main road, made principally of telegraph poles, which they had removed from the

line. Great difficulty was experienced, I am informed by Captain Aplin, in getting the Hausas to storm this stockade, and it was only taken by a flank movement through the bush. With the capture of the stockade the Ashantis were routed and fled. On the occasion of this engagement two Constabulary were killed and 133 wounded out of a total force of 267. Included in the latter were Assistant-Inspector Read, severely wounded, and Assistant-Inspector Ralph and Native Officer Dankofi slightly wounded. Of the remainder six were dangerously wounded and 124 slightly or very slightly wounded. Of the dangerously wounded three have since died. Nearly the whole of the slightly and very slightly wounded resumed duty in the course of a few days. || 26. Assistant-Inspector Cochrane soon recovered from his wound, but Assistant-Inspector Read, although progressing favourably, has had one of the bones of his forearm shattered, and will be invalided to England now that he has reached the Coast. || 27. I transmit a copy of Captain Aplin's report upon his march and the engagements. I called for a return of ammunition expended, as the Lagos Force arrived at Kumassi with only 9290 rounds of Martini-Metford ammunition, or less than 40 rounds per carbine, and without ammunition for the 7-pounder guns. Major Morris, whose remarks I invited, states as follows: „I am unable to explain the enormous expenditure of ammunition, as the Officer Commanding Lagos Hausas states that there was only one stockade to be taken. I am inclined to think that the troops must have got decidedly out of hand. The whole of the fighting was at close quarters, so I cannot understand how 80 rounds of shrapnel shell came to be expended.” This, I fear, is the solution, for the force after taking the stockade failed to take away one of the 7-pounder guns, which could, Major Morris tells me, have been easily arranged, notwithstanding that the gunners had all been wounded, as the gun carriers were still available. The very small quantity of ammunition brought in by the Lagos Force had, as I will show later, a very serious effect upon the position of the troops in Kumassi. || 28. On the 30th April all ranks had a complete rest. It having been found that only one-half of the houses in the Hausa cantonment had been destroyed by fire, orders were given on the 1st May for the Gold Coast Constabulary to reoccupy the cantonment, and to fortify it against attack. At the same time the Lagos Constabulary were moved into the prison stockade, which is situated on the side of a hill, and is in a commanding position. This position was also strengthened. || 29. On the 2nd May the natives who had encamped in front of the fort were removed to the rear, and the removal of the Constabulary outside the fort and of the natives

in question rendered the sanitary condition of the fort much more satisfactory. || 30. The rebels had now massed themselves on the eastern side of Kumassi, with their right flank resting on the civilian Hausa town known as Krobo, where the Wesleyan Mission has built a house. It was thought desirable to attack this flank by means of the native auxiliaries, and on the 2nd May they moved out under Captain Armitage at 8.45 a.m. They were supported by two 7-pounder guns, and the position of the rebels was shelled before the auxiliaries advanced. I may here state that I was asked to allow this attack to take place on the previous day, but with the concurrence of Captain Aplin, then in command, I refused the application, as I considered it best to employ the men in reoccupying and strengthening the Hausa cantonment and prison stockade, and also because I did not consider the information in my hands as to the rebels' strength was then sufficient. || 31. It was found that a very strong stockade had been erected at the Wesleyan Mission House, so strong that the auxiliaries were unable to capture it. Nevertheless great loss was inflicted on the rebels, and their firing ceased simultaneously with the cessation of the firing of the auxiliaries, who made an orderly retirement to the fort. In this engagement one Hausa was wounded, one auxiliary was killed, and about 50 wounded. I transmit a report by Captain Aplin upon this engagement. On the 4th May the rebels burnt down the Wesleyan Mission House, and changed the position of the stockade. || 32. On the 6th May Captain Middlemist, Deputy Inspector-General of Constabulary, succumbed to an attack of fever, and was buried in the evening with military honours, under a clump of trees close to the fort. He was a gallant officer, full of enthusiasm for his work, and his death cast a gloom over all the occupants of the fort. || 33. The close investment of Kumassi by the rebels had resulted in the persons outside the fort being unable to provide themselves with food, and information having been received that supplies could be obtained if the rebels on the north-west were held in check, the native auxiliaries were ordered out for the purpose. Supported by 20 Lagos Hausas, under Assistant-Inspector Cochrane, they moved out at 8 a.m. on the 9th May. The mission failed in its object. A similar attempt was made with a somewhat stronger force on the following date, and this unfortunately also proved unsuccessful, the rebels being found in too great strength to do anything without a severe engagement involving an expenditure of ammunition which could not be spared. || 34. I may here state that, owing to the small quantity of ammunition brought in by the detachment of Lagos Hausas, the amount of small-arm ammunition available for the

480 Hausas in Kumassi was only 78 000 rounds. This, I decided, must be husbanded as much as possible, in case, owing to the non-arrival of relief, the party should at a later date have to cut its way through the rebel lines. This decision has in the sequel proved a wise one. The lack of a proper supply of ammunition has been more than unfortunate. It has prevented the garrison here making determined attacks upon and harassing the rebels, and the absence of such attacks must have led the rebels to imagine that they can hold their own against the Government forces. || 35. On the 4th May the loyal Kings of Mampon, Juabin, and Aguna stated that if they were permitted to open negotiations with the rebel Chiefs they had some reason to think that they could stop further hostilities on both sides. Personally I did not share in this opinion, but I saw no objection to the attempt being made. Messengers passed and repassed during the five days, and in the meantime the rebels ceased to fire upon those of the people encamped round the fort, who had to seek food on the outskirts of the town. The negotiations proved abortive, but they were not without service, because during their continuance the natives were able to bring in some loads of plantains and other food-stuffs. || 36. On the 14th May a Kroo boy arrived from Cape Coast, having brought a letter to the native representative of the Ashanti Syndicate. He was sent on to me to be questioned, and reported that he had left Cape Coast on the 4th May and that on that date there were troops of the West India Regiment in Cape Coast preparing to march up to our relief. He stated further that the Adansis had revolted. This latter announcement did not surprise me, as I suspected their lack of loyalty, and, as stated in paragraph 2 of my despatch of the 7th April, I was not favourably impressed with their demeanour when I passed through their country. I may mention that after the commencement of the rebellion messengers arrived from the King, not to express his loyalty to the British Government, but to ask „why he had not been informed by me that the Kumassis had revolted“. The information brought to me by the Kroo boy was all that reached me from the outside world from the arrival of the Lagos Hausas on the 29th April until I reached the Coast on the 10th July. || 37. The garrison was agreeably surprised on the 15th May by the sudden arrival of a detachment of Gold Coast Hausas to the number of 230 from the Northern Territories, under the command of Major Morris, D.S.O., Acting Commissioner and Commandant. Having heard before the arrival of my telegrams of an apprehended revolt of the Nkoranzas, he hastened down to Kintampo, and on his way heard of the rebellion, receiving at Zantana,

on the 28th April, my telegram, dated the 10th April, copy enclosed. I transmit a copy of his report. His march was a very fine achievement, and I beg to bring it specially under your notice. He speaks, as you will observe, in the highest terms of the conduct of the officers and men under his command. He arrived at Nkoranza just in time to prevent the King openly joining the rebels; but although the King should have been restrained from taking that step by a recollection of the acts of friendship shown to his predecessor on the stool by this Government in 1895—96, I do not, I regret to say, place much reliance on a continuance of his loyalty. He is a weak man, somewhat deficient in intellect, and entirely in the hands of his linguists and other Court officials. The Princess of Nkoranza, on the other hand, displayed a vigorous loyalty which was most timely, and which will, I submit, have to be acknowledged when the rebellion has been put down. Major Morris was, I much regret to say, severely wounded in taking a stockade which the rebels had placed across the road at Chiehiwari, but, notwithstanding this wound, from which he must have suffered considerable pain, he has been unremitting in giving me assistance and in attending to the many duties which have devolved upon him at Kumassi as Officer Commanding the Troops. || 38. The arrival of this reinforcement from the Northern Territories would have resulted in active operations against the rebels — a matter which I referred to in paragraph 7 of my despatch of the 11th April, but Major Morris very reluctantly decided that, although the force at his disposal was sufficient, no serious engagement could be undertaken until after the arrival of additional ammunition, as in the event of the occurrence of the contingency referred to in paragraph 34, all the available ammunition would be required by the outgoing column for its defence. It was hoped that only a few days would elapse before a relieving column bringing with it stores of provisions and ammunition would arrive, but day after day went by and the garrison had to witness the rebels becoming more confident without being able to take offensive action against them. I had, I may state, ordered on the 14th April 100 loads of rice (6000 lbs.) from Cape Coast. They were brought as far as Prahsu under escort of the Lagos Hausas, but they had to be left there in consequence of the defection of the carriers. This was, of course, a very serious loss to the garrison here, as had the rice arrived we could have held out for another two weeks. || 39. Major Morris decided, after consultation with me, to make a reconnaissance in force on the roads leading to the rebel camps across the marsh to the east of Kumassi in order to ascertain the strength of the rebels on that side,

and at the same time to obtain if possible some food supplies for the population encamped around the fort, which had already begun to suffer from want and hunger. The force detailed for the reconnaissance moved out in two columns at 9.30 a.m. on the 20th May. One proceeded along the road to Krobo, and the other along that to Dedesuaba. Both encountered the rebels in great force, and returned without becoming seriously engaged. One Hausa was killed and twenty-six Hausas wounded, including Captain Leggett, severely, who was shot through the arm by a bullet fired from an arm of precision. I transmit a copy of Major Morris's report. || 40. On the 21st May Opoku Mensa, the senior member of the Kumassi Native Committee, died in the fort from a severe bronchial attack. He had been brought into the fort, as reported in paragraph 21 of my despatch of the 7th April. He was attended assiduously by Dr. Hay, Assistant Colonial Surgeon, but his age was against him, and he succumbed. || 41. The 24th May being the Queen's birthday I held a parade of the Hausas at 4.45 p.m. The troops, after advancing in review order, gave a royal salute and three cheers for Her Most Gracious Majesty. During the morning a detachment of Lagos Hausas was sent out under the command of Captain Cochrane to attack a rebel camp at Ntimidi, which lies to the north of Kumassi, but returned without having found it. He was despatched a second time on the 25th May, and succeeded in capturing the stockade and entering the camp, but failed to do more in consequence of the difficulty he experienced in getting his men to advance. This conduct on their part is animadverted upon by Major Morris in a minute upon Captain Cochrane's report, copies of both of which are enclosed. It frustrated the taking of the camp, and necessitated an order for retirement. || 42. Major Morris having determined to make a further effort to take the Ntimidi camp and in doing so to obtain food supplies for the people, now suffering severely from hunger, a force of Gold Coast Hausas moved out at 4.15 a.m. on the 29th May under Captain Marshall, Special Service Officer; but the rebels were evidently prepared for the attack. They met the force in great numbers, and with the stockade repaired and raised to a height of 7 feet. I transmit a copy of Captain Marshall's report, together with a copy of Major Morris's covering minute. The strength of the resistance encountered necessitated retirement, as any great expenditure of ammunition was out of the question. It is with extreme regret that I have had to report that during the engagement Captain C. E. Maguire, Assistant Inspector, Gold Coast Constabulary, fell mortally wounded. Major Morris, under whom he had served in the Northern Territories,

speaks of him in his minute in the highest terms. His untimely death was a source of deep regret to the whole garrison, in which he had already made many friends. || 43. There now ensued a period of forced inaction. Although concerted steps were taken to obtain intelligence of the movements of the rebels and of any column which might be advancing to the relief of the beleaguered garrison, the news brought in was either so scrappy as to be more or less worthless, or else was obviously manufactured for the purpose of obtaining a reward. The rains had set in in earnest, and sickness, brought on by want and exposure, had begun to do its work. It was impossible to relieve those that were starving. The reserve rations which were being issued to the Europeans, Hausas, clerks, servants, native carriers (one biscuit a day), and native Kings and armed levies, had to be husbanded so that the garrison might remain until the very latest moment before marching out and, if needs be, cutting its way out of Ashanti. By reducing the rations for each person to a minimum it was calculated that the force could remain until the middle of June, and later it was found possible to last out until the 23rd June. Fortunately a grove of palms, from which the palm cabbage is obtained, was discovered, and with this food the extremity of starvation was to a certain extent evaded. || 44. The condition of the people had become very pitiable. It is true that a large number, probably not less than 1200, had singly and in groups gone over to the rebels, seeking the chance of life there — probably as slaves — in preference to death by starvation, but although the ranks had thus been thinned the sights which everywhere met the eye were at times heart-rending. With the advent of the rainy season and an increase in the destitution, the death-rate increased with rapid strides, and I transmit a return prepared for me by Dr. Chalmers. || 45. On the 7th June, soup made up of a few biscuits, scraps of food from the scanty meals of the Europeans, palm cabbage bought at 10s. each, and edible green leaves plucked from the trees was made for the purpose of relieving to some extent the wants of the starving children. On this day 154 children had each a small preserved meat tin of hot soup served out to them, and the number of the children thus relieved ultimately increased to over 200 a day. || 46. On the 11th June a reconnaissance was made down the Cape Coast road in order to ascertain at what distance the stockade which it was known the rebels had been constructing was from Kumassi. It was found to be about one mile out. || 47. The news brought in by spies was to the effect that the relief column had, after fighting several engagements with the Adansis, defeated them and reached the northern

boundary of Bekwai, and that an advance guard, after several engagements with the rebels, had reached Ordahsu. The hopes that this news brought were, however, never destined to be realised. || 48. In the meantime Major Morris was not delaying the necessary preparations for marching to the coast. It was decided to leave a small garrison of 100 men under Assistant-Inspectors Bishop (Gold Coast) and Ralph (Lagos), with one medical officer (Dr. Hay) to hold the fort with provisions for three weeks by which time it is expected the relief column should arrive. In case this should prove not to be the case the garrison would perforce have to evacuate the fort and endeavour to force their way out of Ashanti. I transmit a copy of instructions which I left in the hands of Captain Bishop to be acted upon in that event. || 49. The column leaving Kumassi marched out at 4.45 a.m., on the 23rd June, and I will deal in a separate despatch with its journey to the coast. || 50. The Europeans in Kumassi who have had to endure the siege besides myself and Lady Hodgson were — (folgen Namen).

F. M. Hodgson, Governor.

Nr. 12569. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Gouverneur der Goldküste an den Kolonialminister. Bericht über den Abzug von Kumassi.

Government House, Accra, July 24, 1900. (August 17, 1900.)

Sir, || In continuation of my despatch of the 14th instant, I have now the honour to report to you with regard to the necessity for attempting a withdrawal from Kumassi of the larger part of the force and all the non-combatants besieged there, on our success in the undertaking, and subsequent march to the coast. || 2. The possibility of having to get away from Kumassi unassisted was always present in my mind, because, although for the sake of British prestige in Ashanti I had decided to remain until actual starvation stared us in the face in the hope that before that stage was reached relief would come to us, I did not fail to recognize, knowing as I did by experience the many difficulties to be overcome, that a relieving column might not be able to get up from the coast in time. It was on that account that from the first I determined to conserve as far as possible the scanty stock of ammunition which we held as I have already reported to you. || 3. You have been informed in a previous despatch that upon the arrival on the 29th April of the detachment of Lagos Hausas, under Captain Aplin, C.M.G., it was found possible to re-occupy the Hausa cantonments and the prison stockade,

which had had to be evacuated when we were attacked by the rebels on the 25th April, thus safeguarding those of the buildings within them which had not been destroyed, as well as the officers' quarters and other buildings which are in close proximity to them, and which had not been materially injured. || 4. With the arrival of the detachment of Gold Coast Hausas, under Major Morris, D.S.O., on the 15th May, a further extension of the troops became practicable; protection was given to the Basel Mission property on the one side and the village of Asafu was re-occupied on the other. Thus the situation remained up to the morning of the 23rd June, when we left. On no occasion after the 29th April, when they suffered a severe defeat in their attempt to take the fort, did the rebels attempt to molest us. They „sniped“ and killed all persons who while in search of food got within range of their cordon of sentries, and they were always on the alert for any attack on our part, but nothing more. Their plan was to starve us out, and to prevent reinforcements reaching us. The map shows the position of the rebel camps and the stockades which had been constructed across every road leading out of Kumassi, and I may here state that in addition to constructing stockades the rebels, probably under the instruction of Fanti Scholars, who had read the accounts of the South African War in the English newspapers, had dug shelter-pits for themselves so that they might get out of the way of the shells from seven-pounder guns and at the same time load their muskets in comparative safety. || 5. From time to time reports came to hand of troops advancing up the Cape Coast road, but they were brought in by our own spies who were not reliable, and from the date of the arrival of the Lagos Hausas (29th April) not a single authentic communication reached me either from the Coast or from any of the detachments of troops which, as I learnt subsequently, had reached Bekwai. I myself sent off, as opportunity offered, natives with telegrams addressed to the Colonial Secretary, some of which I am glad to find passed through the rebel lines successfully, and were dealt with, and at the end of May and during June letters in French, addressed to the „Officer Commanding Relief Column“, sewn up in the hem of the men's native clothes, telling him of our condition and the necessity for pushing forward. One at least of these appears to have been delivered, as it is quoted in Colonel Willcocks's telegram to you of the 12th June. || 6. Major Morris had day by day kept a very careful supervision over the issue of reserve rations, and by cutting down the supply to Europeans, carriers, native clerks, native servants, and native kings and their armed followers to a minimum, it was found that the hazardous step of

attempting to break through the rebel lines could be postponed until the 23rd June. It was the general opinion that by that date a relieving column would have pushed its way to Kumassi, and it was not without dismay that day after day passed without either the arrival of relief or any authentic news of its near approach. So closely and completely were we invested by the rebels that we hardly dared to hope that we could unaided successfully accomplish the task before us. || 7. In the meantime Major Morris and I had very carefully considered what route the evacuating column should take, and what arrangements ought to be made for holding the fort. As regards the route it was clear from the first that any attempt to break through by the main or Prahsu road would be futile. We knew that the rebels had constructed several stockades at intervals between Kumassi and the River Ordah, that these stockades were strongly guarded and that the rebels were in large numbers at various places along the road to Esumeja. Further it had been reported that the Adansis had joined the rebels, and that fact we knew would increase the difficulty of reaching Prahsu. The chance of successfully pushing up the road to Kintampo and proceeding thence through Attabubu to the Volta was at one time thought possible, but this route was ultimately discarded in favour of either the road through Patassi to Ekwanta, or else that through Peehi to Bekwai. In the end the former was decided upon, it being considered that the latter was too dangerously close to the Cape Coast road, on which such large numbers of the rebels were massed to admit of a column weakened by hunger and privation and encumbered with non-combatants successfully pushing through. || 8. It was now that Mr. David, of the Ashanti Company, who was one of the besieged Europeans, proved very useful to us. He had been along the road to Ekwanta and through the country in the neighbourhood of it in his search for gold-bearing districts, and he was able to give fairly reliable information as to distances, villages, accommodation to be found in the villages, and so forth. Further, the King of Ekwanta, or Nkwanta, which is the proper way of spelling the place, was with us at Kumassi, and could give us a guide when the time came. We very carefully concealed our decision and gave out publicly that we should, as everyone thought, take the road to Prahsu. || 9. Early in June the distress among the people encamped around the fort became acute. There were 3000 of them in the first instance, but hunger, which we had no means of alleviating, drove many of them over to the rebels, and others died of exhaustion. The wants of the children, of whom there were some 200, were in the main met by the establishment of a soup-kitchen, from which

at least a pint of hot soup, made of biscuits, bones, scraps of food, &c., was served out every morning to each child. Over this soup-kitchen Mr. Branch, of the Telegraph Department, presided, and I cannot speak too highly of his organization, and of the care which he bestowed upon the little ones who were placed in his charge. The horses, of which there were five, were killed at intervals and served out to the carriers, so that they might have a change from the ration of biscuit with which they were supplied daily. The scenes which met the eye in June were very distressful. The death rate in the camp rose at last to upwards of 40 a day, and I must confess that at times I felt it almost criminal to prolong our hold over Kumassi until the 23rd June. Fortunately, owing to the excellent arrangements made by Dr. Albert Chalmers, assisted by the other medical officers with us, the sanitary condition of Kumassi and the general health of the besieged remained good. All those who died were carefully buried, and the carriers were kept employed in cutting bush and grass and keeping the vicinity of the fort clean and free from dirt and rubbish. || 10. All the arrangements for leaving Kumassi had been carefully worked out by Major Morris, and he had drawn up the Order of March of which a copy is enclosed. Everyone was carefully instructed as to his place in the column so that there might be no possibility of mistake or confusion. || 11. It had been decided by Major Morris, with my concurrence, to leave a force of 100 men under Captain Bishop, Assistant Inspector Gold Coast Constabulary, and Assistant Inspector Ralph, of the Lagos Constabulary, with Dr. Hay (Gold Coast) as Medical Officer, in order to guard the fort. They had provisions for 24 days, and it was considered that by the 15th July it should be possible for a relieving column to arrive at Kumassi. This force had been brought into the fort on the 21st June. A larger force was not considered necessary by Major Morris, and if arranged for would not have had provisions to last them until the 15th June [? July]. || 12. The start was to take place at 5 a.m., and as boxes had to be packed and final arrangements made, I doubt if anyone had much sleep on the night of the 22nd June. It was a night also of anxiety because it must have been in the minds of all that the following day might be their last, so hazardous was the undertaking which had to be attempted. || 13. Long before the dawn broke the carriers had received their loads — cut down in view of their weakened condition to loads of 30 lbs. in weight — and the hammoekmen were ready with their hammocks. At 5 a.m. the troops arrived to take up their places in the line of march, and with comparatively little noise all was soon ready for the start. It was only now that the

route to be taken was notified. The advance guard under Captains Armitage and Leggett moved off in good time, and the column, which consisted of 600 troops of all ranks, some 800 carriers, and other non-combatants, and about 1000 persons from the camp, was fairly on its way across the swamp to Patassi. The road was a very narrow one, wet and muddy from the rains, and enclosed on both sides by dense bush. It was a gruesome road to pass along, in the immediate presence of the enemy, especially as the advance had to be made in single file. It was not long before the sound of firing was heard in front, showing that the advance guard had reached the stockade, and come into action. The rebels were taken by surprise. They did not expect us at Patassi, and had not obtained reinforcements from the adjacent camps. There were in fact only some 300 rebels holding it. By a flank movement, commanded by Captain Armitage, while Captain Leggett engaged them in front, the rebels were cleared out, the Hausas behaving with spirit and gallantry. It was here that Captain Leggett, who had shown himself on more than one occasion previously to be a brave and gallant officer, received the wound which to the great grief of all resulted a few days later in his death. || 14. With the taking of the stockade the column moved onwards as quickly as possible, and it was the comparative rapidity with which we moved that prevented the arrival of reinforcements from the rebel camps in time to do more than harass the rearguard and the civilians who were following the column. Behind the stockade was a neatly constructed camp, each hut being well stocked with plantains and other provisions. It was here that many of the carriers and followers lost their lives. They could not be restrained from sitting down in the huts to eat. The close proximity of the enemy did not deter them, and although every endeavour was made to get them to move on, many refused to move, and so lost their lives and the Europeans the loads they were carrying. || 15. At the village of Patassi, which was not far from the stockade, the rebels were again met and cleared out by the advance guard. It was in this engagement that Captain G. Marshall, Royal West Kent Regiment, who had been sent to the front to take Captain Leggett's place, received his death wound. He was a deservedly popular officer, and his death at Adubia on the 28th June was very greatly deplored. || 16. At all the villages passed through there were engagements with the rebels, and that these several engagements and those with the rearguard were not without importance is shown by the fact that in the first three days of the march, besides the two officers referred to who were mortally wounded, no less than 23 Hausas were killed, 53 wounded, of whom 16 died

of their wounds, and 39 were recorded as missing. The casualties, in fact, amounted to 20 per cent. of the total force. || 17. The first night was spent at Terrabum. We reached that village at 6 p.m., having been travelling continuously for 13 hours with only one halt at Tekiman. At Terrabum the rebels had loopholed the houses facing the road by which we were advancing, but they were smartly cleared out and we occupied the village. Shortly after our arrival the rebels returned and commenced firing, but they dared not come too close, and the firing ceased with the advent of a storm of rain which continued throughout the night, adding, it is true, to our safety, but at the same time to our discomfort. The subsequent scene beggars description. The whole column was crowded into the narrow confines of the village, and it was impossible in the darkness and falling rain to maintain order among the carriers and others, who never for one moment flagged throughout the night in talking to each other of the occurrences of the day. || 18. The next day, in a pouring rain, we marched to Masiasu. Throughout the day the rearguard had been harassed by bands of rebels which had followed us from Patassi and two Hausas were killed and several wounded. It was on this day that most of the loads were lost. Many of the carriers were perhaps shot by the rebels, but others, weakened by hunger and tired by the march, threw away their loads. Great distress was caused in consequence. Lady Hodgson, for example, lost everything excepting the clothes she was wearing; scanty stocks of provisions saved specially and with much difficulty for the march went; beds and bedding, clothes, drugs, and medical comforts, nearly everything, in fact, was lost to us, and during the remainder of the very trying journey to the coast we had to drink unfiltered the muddy and, I fear, insanitary water which was available. Most of us had to sleep on the ground in dirty native huts covered by our clothes — our beds and blankets having been lost, and all had to endure hardships and privations of which we had never before had any experience. || 19. On the third day, after a terrible journey through quagmires and along an almost impassable road, we reached Ekwanta, where the loyal King of Nkwanta, who had come with us from Kumassi, received a very cordial reception from his people. The Union Jack was flying in the town, and we felt that at last we had reached friends. Native foodstuffs were in abundance, and although we remained at Ekwanta for two days in order to rest the Hausas and carriers, it was with great difficulty that the latter could be induced to leave the land of plenty and plunge again into the forest. || 20. The King of Ekwanta remained with his people, but he informed me that he intended

to move them across the Ofin River into Denkera, as he was afraid of being attacked by the rebels. I gave him a present of £ 80 before leaving. He is a most loyal King, and for his loyalty and assistance against the rebels while we were at Kumassi I shall recommend him with the other loyal Kings for a reward. || 21. It was reported to me at Ekwanta that the rebels intended to hinder our passage across the Ofin River, but in the end this report proved to be inaccurate. Our march was unmolested, and we reached the river on the 30th June. For two miles those who, like myself, had to walk on account of the weak state of the hammockmen, had to push through water at times 4 feet deep. Wet through we reached the river. Here Lady Hodgson and I nearly lost our lives because through some mistake we were told to push down the river in a canoe which had been sent up only for the purpose of taking us across a swamp 6 feet deep in water. The river was in flood and running swiftly, and we were more than once nearly upset on snags. I consider it providential that we at last found ourselves at the regular crossing. Two small rafts had been constructed at this crossing, and the passage of men and loads across the river was exceedingly slow and tedious. It took three days to get everyone over. || 22. From the Ofin River the remainder of the journey was performed in three detachments. It was to us all a very terrible journey, and the loss of clothes, filters, and provisions made it excessively trying. || 23. At Dengiassi — a town built on a clearing in the forest by the Ashanti Chief of Dengiassi, which is marked in the Intelligence Department map of 1895 as a district in Ashanti — I stayed in the Chief's house. He left Ashanti with all his people in 1885, and was allowed by Governor Sir Brandford Griffith, with the concurrence of the King, to locate himself in Upper Denkera. The town is a very large one. The Chief is loyal to the British Government, and he gave me a very good reception. || 24. At Mampon, the residence of the King of Tehufu, who is a man of weak character, and I am afraid addicted to drink, I was detained for a day by a sharp attack of fever, and here, on the 8th July, I received a letter addressed by Major Wilkinson to Major Morris. I had told Major Morris to push on to Cape Coast without waiting for me, and he had left a few hours before the letter arrived, which, however, I at once sent on to him. This was the first news of the outside world I had received since the 29th April. I have referred to this letter in the telegram noted in the margin. (Telegram, 13th July, 1900.) I reached Cape Coast on the 10th July, and Acera by H.M.S. „Dwarf“ on the following date.

25. I am glad to be able to report that I succeeded in successfully

bringing away from Kumassi the rebel King Asibi of Kokofu, whom I had arrested there, as already notified to you, and the loyal Kings of Mampon, Juabin, Aguna, Nkwanta, and Nsuta, as well as the loyal Kumassi Chiefs who had thrown in their lot with us from the first, namely, Chiefs Kobina Kokofu, Kwamin Tia, Kofi Sencheri, Yow Berekum, and Yow Awua. I left the King of Nkwanta with his people, as stated in paragraph 17 of this despatch. All the loyal Kings — excepting the King of Nsuta, who has been delayed on the road by illness, and will be here later — are now with me in Accra. The advantage of having them cannot be over-rated. The King of Mampon is by native custom the senior of all the Kings of Ashanti, and the rebels tried very hard to allure him over to them by various specious promises. He is not by any means a man of strong character, and I found it rather a difficult task at the outset to keep him with us. The Kings of Juabin and Aguna are sturdily loyal, but the people of the latter are, I regret to say, with the rebels. The King of Aguna is himself a very fine character. He fought more than once in the engagements with the rebels at Kumassi, and is brave and fearless. The King of Nsuta fought also on our side more than once and did good service. It is important also to have the Kumassi Chiefs referred to with us; they, too, took their part in the fighting and did bravely and well. All will be treated here with every consideration, and I will communicate with you later as to the rewards which upon their return to Ashanti should be given to them for their loyalty. || 26. It is satisfactory also to be able to report the safe conduct from Kumassi of the six Basel missionaries, including the Rev. and Mrs. Ramseyer, whose captivity with the Ashantis in 1872—73 brought on the war of 1873—74. I regret to learn, however, that Mr. Weller, one of the missionaries, died shortly after crossing the Ofin River. He had been very ill while in the Fort, and was in a precarious state of health when we marched out. || 27. I transmit a copy of a report which has been made to me by Major Morris, together with copies of its enclosures and a copy of a report from Dr. Garland, who, as Senior Medical Officer, was in charge of the medical arrangements on the march to the coast. || 28. In separate despatches I am dealing with the questions of rewards to officers who have in my opinion merited them, and of compensation to officers and men for the loss of clothing, &c., in the march to the coast and previously. || 29. I cannot close this report without thanking you in my own behalf and in that of all the officers and men who were with me for the kind and inspiring telegram which you did us the honour to send us, and without acquainting you with the

very cordial reception which I received from all classes, both at Cape Coast and Accra. Crowds lined the streets at both places and vociferated their welcome. At Accra the streets were decorated with flags, and the kind greeting from all alike made a very pleasant ending to the trials and privations which had had to be endured. I have received also many telegrams, including a very cordial one from the Acting Governor of the German Colony of Togo.

I have, &c.,
F. M. Hodgson, Governor.

Anlage.

Medical Report on Expedition from Kumassi to Cape Coast.

The expedition left Kumassi on the 23rd June the following being the strength of the column, combatant and non-combatant. || Europeans 26 || Native Troops 500 || Carriers 700. || The following is table of Europeans, combatant and non-combatant: — || Combatant 10 || Medical Officers 5 || Non-combatant 11 (7 males and 4 females). || The physique of the men of the various composing units had been greatly lowered owing to the privations undergone during the siege. || The condition of the carriers was especially bad; the majority were greatly emaciated and reduced in strength. || The condition of the Hausas was little better. The condition of the Europeans was indifferent, the majority having suffered from diarrhoea during the siege, evidently caused by eating tinned meat that had been stored a long time. || On the first day a good many casualties occurred during the attack on the Potassi stockade, and the desultory fighting that followed; I append returns. Amongst the Europeans Captains Marshall and Leggett were dangerously wounded, and Dr. Graham slightly wounded. || In the case of Captain Marshall one wound was a penetrating wound of head, the bullet injuring the parietal lobe of the brain, septic meningitis set in, patient became comatose on the 28th and died on the 29th June. || Captain Leggett received a penetrating wound in the abdomen, local peritonitis set in on the 28th, vomiting and hic-cough set in, patient sank gradually, and died on the 30th June. || Towards the end of the first day's march a great number of carriers and Hausas fell out from faintness and fatigue, many carriers going into the forest to look for food; in this way a great number of loads were lost, provisions, beds, bedding, hammocks, drugs, spare dressings, and operating cases amongst other things. || On the 24th the force marched from Terrabum, the rear-guard was attacked and one Hausa killed and two

wounded; a number of men again fell out exhausted by hunger and fatigue; the condition of the native track rendered transport very difficult. Swamps, fallen trees, and steep hills were encountered, and no food could be obtained until we reached the first village, which was about 16 miles' march. || On the 24th Nkwanta was reached, and as this was a friendly village, 2 days' halt was ordered, and the men obtained a good supply of food; most of the men far too much, and suffered afterwards from diarrhoea, dysentery and other intestinal complaints. || The advanced guard reached Cape Coast on the 10th July after 18 days' march, the force having gone through the greatest hardship and suffering; every possible condition that could militate against the health of the column existed; the men had been reduced to the last condition it would have been advisable to permit; the rains were frequent and heavy, shelter could not be obtained for the men who had at times to lie out at night in heavy rain; the march for the first two days was through hostile country; the tracks over which we marched were covered with obstructions, and at one place the column marched through a swamp averaging four feet in depth for two hours. || An adequate medical equipment had been taken from Kumassi, but owing to the condition of the carriers most of the medical comfort and drugs and the operating cases were lost.

P. J. Garland,
Principal Medical Officer to Column.

Nr. 12570. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Oberst Willcocks an den
Kolonialminister. Genauerer Bericht über seine
Operationen bis zum 14. August 1900.

Camp Bekwai, Ashanti Field Force, August 14, 1900. (September 17, 1900.)

Sir, || I have the honour to make the following report on the military operations connected with the relief of Kumasi, and the suppression of the rebellion in Ashanti, written up to date. I trust that the report will not be thought too long when it is considered that it embraces operations extending over four months, and includes details of several engagements with the enemy, which in my estimation deserve to be recorded. I enclose two reports from Major Morris, D.S.O., Royal Irish Regiment, Commissioner and Commandant of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, which detail the operations around Kumasi; the first reinforcement of Kumasi by Captain Aplin, C.M.G., Lagos

Constabulary, from the south; the second by Major Morris himself from the Northern Territories; and finally the march from Kumasi to Cape Coast, which commenced on the 23rd June, when Sir Frederic Hodgson, K.C.M.G., and six hundred men left the fort, owing to want of provisions. These reports speak for themselves, and, as the troops they relate to never came directly under my personal command until after the relief of Kumasi, I forward them in original. || 1. I landed at Cape Coast on 26th May, and remained there until 4th June, during which time I arranged for food supplies, carriers, reinforcements, got together a staff, and generally carried out the preliminary work of organising a field force. Aided by the few officers I then had, and who worked right well, everything seemed to come right somehow, even when for a short period, owing to many reverses in the front and the forces of nature acting against us, it sometimes looked as if the relief of Kumasi might prove a task beyond the powers of the small column at my disposal. Scarcity of carriers, shortness of food, impassable roads, torrential rains, unfordable rivers and no means of bridging them, seventy miles of the lines of communications practically in the hands of the enemy, these were some of the obstacles which had to be overcome, with a young force limited in numbers; but, owing to the heroic conduct of all ranks, they have been overcome, and are now things of the past. || 2. When I landed the position was as follows: — Kumasi was closely invested by the rebels, reported to number some forty thousand, and was cut off from all communication with the outer world. Relief columns had entered the place after severe fighting, but this had only added to the numbers to be fed, and the supply of food and ammunition was fast reducing. They were calling for help; but help then was impossible, for, whereas the force in Kumasi numbered seven hundred men and three hundred levies, with many guns and Maxims, the total numbers of the relief column spread along one hundred and forty miles of lines of communications numbered but seven hundred men, also with three field guns, the different units of which were continuously having to fight their way against heavy odds, depending for transport upon carriers, mostly marched by force across the Prah. Moreover, Sir Frederic Hodgson, in his telegram dated Kumasi, 4th April to Secretary of State, had remarked as follows: „In any case active operations could not be carried out till after the rainy season ended — September.“ Nevertheless it was in this very rainy season that the force under my command was battling to reach the garrison at Kumasi. || Captain Hall (West Yorkshire Regiment), West African Frontier Force, with some four hundred men, was at

Bekwai and Esumeja, and it was his presence alone which kept the Bekwai King from fleeing south, as having once cast in his lot with us, his country would have been overrun by the Ashantis immediately our troops left his town. On 23rd May, Captain Hall attacked Kokofu, but being opposed by vast numbers of the enemy was unable to capture it; his troops behaved well, but he was attempting a task which more than double the numbers were unable to effect later. On this occasion Lieutenant Edwards, Sierra Leone Frontier Police, Sergeant Griggs, R.A., West African Frontier Force, and six men were wounded. On the same day the Bekwai levies attacked and destroyed Abadom further south, and which was only held by a few of the enemy. || Kwissa was held by three Europeans under Lieutenant Slater, Gold Coast Constabulary, and twenty soldiers, and surrounded by the enemy; of this small garrison three were killed and one wounded. Two parties of carriers proceeding south under escort from Bekwai, were attacked near Dampoassi on the 26th and the 28th May, four soldiers and a carrier being killed and fifteen wounded. Lieutenant Beamish, West African Frontier Force, in command, dispersed the enemy and burnt Dampoassi. This attack showed that the Adansis had now joined the rebellion, and this greatly added to our difficulties. || 3. So far, the operations had been conducted without any plan, each officer in command of a party simply hastening up towards the goal (Kumasi) with results anything but satisfactory, and my first object was to stop this, and collecting the scattered detachments to advance on definite lines. On 2nd June, therefore, Lieutenant-Colonel Carter, C.M.G., 3rd (Southern Nigeria) West African Frontier Force, left Fumsu for Bekwai, with eleven Europeans, three Maxims, one seven-pounder gun, and three hundred and ten men. Beyond Sheramasi the column was suddenly attacked and lost four men killed and seven wounded; our fire was very wild on this occasion causing an immense waste of ammunition; the men were then new to this kind of work; I am glad to say it is very different now. || On 6th June Lieutenant-Colonel Carter and Lieutenant-Colonel Wilkinson, Gold Coast Constabulary, with three hundred and eighty men, left Kwissa to join hands with Hall at Bekwai. I reached Prahsu on the 8th June, and the following day received a despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Carter, stating that he had been opposed by the Adansis at Dampoassi, and had been obliged to return to Kwissa. The enemy had built five stockades about two hundred yards long and nearly parallel to the road at a distance of only thirty yards from it; lying perfectly still behind the ordinary thick bush, which remained untouched between the stockade and the

path, they waited until the advance guard was just opposite, and then opened a terrific fire which staggered our men; they also fired from the surrounding trees; the guns and Maxims came into action at once, and a regular duel took place, our men falling fast; no one knew then, as we do now, that the enemy were probably behind strong stockades, and there was no indication of it; the officers believed the enemy were firing from the thick bush, and thus swaying backwards and forwards the fight went on for two and a-half hours, by which time Lieutenant-Colonel Carter had received a severe wound, which incapacitated him from Command. Lieutenant-Colonel Wilkinson then took command and was himself slightly wounded; Captain Roupell, 3rd West African Frontier Force, was dangerously wounded in several places; Lieutenant Edwards, R.A., West African Frontier Force, received two severe wounds, but continued to work the guns till the entire gun detachment were disabled. It was at this stage that it was found the enemy were posted behind breastworks, as the bush had become partially cut away by the fire. Lieutenant O'Malley, 2nd West African Frontier Force, was severely wounded while working the Maxim, nearly the whole detachment being disabled; Dr. Fletcher, Medical Officer, and Colour-Sergeant Mackenzie (Seaforth Highlanders), 1st West African Frontier Force, were also wounded, a total of seven Europeans hit out of eleven present; three men were killed and eighty-nine wounded (some of whom have since died). Lieutenant-Colonel Wilkinson, seeing that the gun and Maxims were by this time out of action, that his ammunition was running short, and the enemy's fire did not slacken, determined to retire; but Colour-Sergeant Mackenzie came up to him and volunteered to carry the stockade with the bayonet, if his own company (Yoruba Company, 1st West African Frontier Force) was placed at his disposal. Wilkinson at once ordered up the Company, which was in the rear of the column, and on the arrival of the first two sections, without hesitation, Mackenzie charged at their head, followed splendidly by his own men and all others in the vicinity, their officers of course leading them. The enemy did not wait the rush, but fled in confusion, and never rallied, and it is perhaps not too much to say a disaster to our arms was thus averted, for a retirement under the circumstances might have ended in a panic. For this act of distinguished bravery I consider Colour-Sergeant Mackenzie is deserving of the highest reward a soldier can receive, and am making a recommendation accordingly. It was only last year that Colour-Sergeant Mackenzie earned the medal for distinguished service in the field on the Niger. || The column then returned to Kwissa, being

unable to advance owing to the numbers of wounded. || 4. To assist Lieutenant-Colonel Carter I sent Major Melliss, 1st West African Frontier Force, with one hundred and fifty men from Prahsu, and followed this by another hundred, my last reserve. Melliss was attacked on 12th June, his bugler killed, and Corporal Philpot (West Yorkshire Regiment), 1st West African Frontier Force, and six men wounded. Kwissa was reached on 13th June, and Carter decided to retire with the combined column to Fumsu. This decision was contrary to my orders, but Carter had just seen a letter from the Governor in Kumasi (which did not reach me till 12th June) asking for urgent help, and he intended with my sanction to move from Fumsu, via Obuassi Gold Mines, to Bekwai. He therefore used his own discretion and evacuated Kwissa. Unfortunately this led to serious consequences later. It had now become evident to me that not only were our columns being repulsed in all directions, but that the tactics heretofore used were just what suited the enemy. I therefore gave orders that in future the enemy's fire was only to be replied to, to such an extent as was absolutely necessary to give our men time to adopt some open formation, and that then the bugles would sound the charge, and the enemy be attacked with the bayonet. The results I venture to say have justified the orders on every occasion, when adopted, and have given our men immense confidence in themselves besides largely reducing ammunition carriers. || 5. On 14th June about twenty of the European miners from the Obuassi Gold Mines ran away to the Coast, leaving their comrades to hold on as best they could. Fortunately for them they were careful to avoid the vicinity of posts where British officers were quartered; their conduct was most cowardly. Mr. Webster, the Manager, with other gentlemen behaved splendidly and refused to leave, and on the 16th June, I was able to send them a reinforcement of fifty men. || 6. On 12th June I received a letter from Governor Hodgson, dated Kumasi, 4th June, in which he stated he had provisions on reduced scale to last until 11th June, and asking for help. This date was already passed, but still hoping that the statement *re* food supplies might not be exactly accurate, I sent Lieutenant-Colonel Wilkinson at once from Fumsu, via Obuassi, with three hundred men and all the available reserve of ammunition to Bekwai, to hold out a helping hand to the garrison of Kumasi when it broke out; with the departure of this column I again found myself without a reserve, but the matter was most urgent. || Captain Hall, at Bekwai, had, in accordance with my orders, sent the Nupé Company, 1st West African Frontier Force, to help Lieutenant-Colonel Carter out of Kwissa which neither Hall nor I

were aware had in the meantime been evacuated. As soon as I heard it had, I sent urgent counter-orders to Hall, but they were too late; the Company under command of Captain Wilson (Royal Irish Fusiliers) 1st West African Frontier Force, left Bekwai on the 16th June, 112 strong; they were attacked near Dampoassi by large numbers of Ashantis and Adansis, and Captain Wilson and six soldiers were killed; Staff Sergeant Payne, R.A.M.C., and twenty-five soldiers and sixteen carriers were wounded, many of them severely. The Company moved on to Kwissa, and finding it unoccupied, marched on to Fumsu under Colour-Sergeant Humphries (Royal Welsh Fusiliers), 1st West African Frontier Force, a total distance of thirty-three miles. Wilson was a soldier quite beyond the average, brave and modest. The body was carried into Fumsu, where he is buried. The Nupé soldiers behaved very well, and their losses testify to the difficulties of the march. ¶ 7. On 22nd June Lieutenant-Colonel Burroughs, with four hundred men West African Regiment reached Prahsu from Cape Coast, and on the 24th proceeded northward. Lieutenant-Colonel Wilkinson had meanwhile reached Bekwai, and was thus as near to Kumasi as it was possible to be at that time. ¶ Burroughs' column was engaged on the Moinsi Hills and carried a stockade with the bayonet; casualties, one man killed, three wounded. The rains were now in full swing, the roads almost impassable, the rivers in high flood, and the toil of moving even a mile is indescribable; it seemed at times, do what we would, it would soon become impossible to carry on further military operations. Nothing but discipline combined with determination to save Kumasi, could have achieved success, and none but those who witnessed it can imagine the trials borne by all ranks especially these excellent African soldiers who seemed impervious to all hardships. ¶ I left Prahsu on the 1st July with a large number of carriers; the river took seven hours to cross. At Fumsu on the 4th July I received a letter from Sir Frederic Hodgson, dated 26th June, Ekwanta (some 20 miles south-west of Kumasi). He stated that he, with six hundred men under command of Major Morris, had left Kumasi on the 23rd June; the force had been attacked at the villages it passed through, and had taken a stockade at Patasi; two officers had been severely wounded. One hundred men had been left in the fort, with two British officers (we found three when we reached Kumasi), and that there were rations sufficient to last till „15th July at latest“; he added he hoped I would be able to relieve the fort by that date, and then, „should you fail to do so, the fort must surrender“. In his last paragraph the Governor says „I may add that I have made several attempts, ineffectual, I fear,

to communicate with you in Bekwai, and to acquaint you with the condition of affairs in Kumasi". He must therefore have had very strong reasons for believing that a relieving force was somewhere in the neighbourhood of Bekwai, but as far as I am concerned, I heard nothing more of the Governor until he reached Cape Coast. || 8. On 30th June Lieutenant-Colonel Burroughs surprised the enemy's camp at Dampoassi on the main road, by marching into it just after dark; many guns, kegs of powder, &c., were captured, thirty of the enemy were killed before next morning, and many new stockades were destroyed. This was really the first lesson taught the enemy and was most useful thereafter. This column reached Bekwai 2nd July, and none too soon, as many of the Bekwai Chiefs were wavering in their allegiance from fear of the Ashantis. || 9. Lieutenant-Colonel Burroughs, I regret to say, contrary to my instructions, decided to at once attack and destroy the enemy's large war camp at Kokofu, which he considered was a bar to our reaching Kumasi. As will be seen, however, my intention was to force the enemy to help me into Kumasi, by withdrawing part of his forces for the defence of Kokofu. Burroughs' column consisted of one 75 millimetre gun, four Maxims, and five hundred men, also one Maxim and one hundred and fifty men in reserve. The column was assailed on all sides about eight hundred yards before reaching Kokofu, and although it is stated the men fired fairly steadily throughout, and the gun and Maxims several times literally swept the enemy back into cover, nevertheless our casualties increased till they had reached over sixty, and no progress was being made; the rear guard was also engaged. Burroughs therefore determined to retire on Bekwai, which was reached before dark. Twelve casualties occurred during the retirement, the losses amounted to one officer killed, Lieutenant Brounlie, 3rd West India Regiment, attached to West African Regiment, six officers and one non-commissioned officer, slightly wounded, viz., Lieutenant-Colonel Burroughs; Captain Stallard, Bedfordshire Regiment; Captain St. Hill, West Riding Regiment; Lieutenant Ellis, West India Regiment; Lieutenant Tighe, D.S.O., West India Regiment; Lieutenant Gibson, West India Regiment; all West African Regiment. Sergeant-Major Bosher, R.A., West African Frontier Force; also three men killed, seventy-two non-commissioned officers and men and gun-carriers wounded, namely, West African Regiment forty, West African Frontier Force thirty-four, Sierra Leone Frontier Police one. The attack on Kokofu was a mistake; but even so I am of opinion that it would have been successful if the enemy had been charged. However, Lieutenant-Colonel Burroughs himself a most cool and intrepid officer,

does not share my opinion on this latter point. || 10. I arrived at Bekwai on 9th July, saw the king, and thanked him publicly for his loyalty, and made him a handsome present. On 11th July I visited Esumeja, and made a reconnaissance with five hundred men under Captain Carleton, West India Regiment, towards Kokofu. The bush on each side of the road was cut to a distance of fifty yards, and two rough stockades were thrown up; all this was done to encourage the enemy to believe we intended an immediate advance on Kokofu, but were rather nervous about it, and it succeeded admirably. I have since learnt that a large number of Ashantis moved south from Kumasi to defend Kokofu. On the 13th July, leaving Bekwai to be held by two hundred men, I marched for Kumasi by a westerly route, through Pekki, fifteen miles north-west and eleven miles from Kumasi. The column consisted of every available man and gun, including the garrison of Kwissa, which I temporarily withdrew. || Strength: — || 2 75 millimetre guns, || 4 Seven-pounder guns, || 6 Maxims, || 700 West African Frontier Force, || 200 West African Regiment, || 50 Sierra Leone Frontier Police; || Total 1000 fighting men with 60 white men, including officers, British non-commissioned officers, and civilians attached for the occasion for duty with the transport; the carriers numbered 1700 men, including hospitals, food and ammunition for Kumasi, as well as for the entire column. The cumbersome march through this country of such a large number of men is an experience one does not wish repeated. || We left Bekwai at 6 a.m. and after a day of marching in drenching rain, the rearguard arrived at Pekki 1.30 midnight. Left Pekki at 8 a.m. next morning. One mile out the advance-guard was attacked at the fetish town of Treda, but after a quarter of an hour's firing, Captain Eden, Oxfordshire Light Infantry, with a Company of West African Frontier Force, and Lieutenant Edwards, with half a Company of Sierra Leone Frontier Police rushed the place with the bayonet. Enemy were about six hundred strong, and had several of our 303 carbines, and evidently thought themselves safe, as we captured crowds of their household goods, sheep, goats, &c. Casualties: 1 soldier severely and three others wounded; many stains of blood showed the enemy had suffered from our fire. The column was fired upon several times during the day but the Maxims played up well; one soldier wounded. Halted at a small village called Ekwanta. Neither this road nor any of the villages are shown on our maps, which are absolutely wrong in every detail away from the main road. || Left Ekwanta 15th July, 6 a.m., rear-guard was attacked about 3 p.m., enemy repulsed by Major Beddoes, Royal Dublin Fusiliers.

Amid the roar of Dane guns, the sound of Lee-Metfords, Martinis, and Sniders, was at times plainly distinguishable. At 4.30 p.m. the advance scouts, half company Sierra Leone Frontier Police, an excellent body of men, ably commanded by Lieutenant Edwards, to which Major Melliss, West African Frontier Force, at his own request, was attached for duty this day, were fired on at short range and both officers and four men wounded. || The enemy at once opened a heavy fire from our front and right, and also tried to get at the carriers on the left rear, but these were well guarded. || Lieutenant-Colonel Wilkinson, officer commanding advance-guard, brought up all the guns and three Maxims, and opened fire in the direction of the enemy. I now came up, and ordered the whole of the infantry of the fighting-line to extend, as there was no longer any doubt that the enemy were posted behind stockades, or they could not have stood against the hail of shell and Maxim we poured in. Their fire was exceedingly heavy, but nearly all aimed high, as they hardly dare show above their breastworks. || After twenty minutes the infantry had cut sufficiently into the thick bush to give me a fair idea of their formation, three companies facing Kumasi, and three companies almost at right angles to the above, facing rising ground, from which the Ashantis kept up a steady fire. I now sounded cease fire, which was repeated by every corps, and obeyed as if on a field day. Our sudden cessation of fire seemed to entirely puzzle the enemy, for instantaneously they appeared to follow suit. There was an almost unnatural silence for a short space of time between „cease fire“ and the „charge“; then followed our hurrahs, mingled with the wild yell of the enemy in full flight. Our officers and men behaved gloriously; for it must be remembered most of the men were very young soldiers, they had suffered many reverses since leaving the coast, and had so far gained no signal success — the enemy has a great name in West Africa; our men knew that they were fighting against immense numerical odds, and above all that one is striving against an unseen enemy entrenched within a few yards' distance has a very great effect on the nerves, which even white men feel considerably. The charging line was composed of West African Frontier Force (who this day were all Yorubas), Sierra Leone Frontier Police, and one company West African Regiment. The guns were well worked under most disadvantageous circumstances. The enemy left many dead; behind one stockade was a pile of them terribly mutilated by 75 millimetre shells, of which this was their first experience. We found two stockades on the left, flanking one another, one very large one across the main road, and a fourth one between. I would

here note that whereas the Adansis build all their stockades parallel to the road only, the Ashantis invariably erect them across the road flanked by others in the bush. || Forming up in the main road, we marched towards Kumasi, a mile distant, the troops cheering wildly for the Queen, and then followed silence. No sound came from the direction of the fort, which you cannot see till quite close. For a moment the hideous desolation and silence, the headless bodies lying everywhere, the sickening smell, &c., almost made one shudder to think what no one dared to utter — „Has Kumasi fallen? Are we too late?“ || Then a bugle sound caught the ear — „the general salute“ — the tops of the towers appeared, and again every man in the column, white and black, broke into cheers long sustained. The brave defenders had at last seen us; they knew for hours past from the firing growing ever nearer that we were coming, yet they dared not open their only gate; they perforce must wait, for even as we appeared the enemy were making their last efforts to destroy the outlying buildings, and were actually setting them on fire until after dark, when a party of one hundred men went out and treated them to volleys and cleared them out. If I have gone too fully into details of the final scene, the occasion was one that every white man felt for him comes perhaps but once, and no one would have missed it for a kingdom. || 11. On the 16th July the force halted at Kumasi, and a column four hundred strong destroyed the stockades on the main south road. The remaining troops and carriers were engaged all day in the sickening task of burning dead bodies, collecting charred remains, and generally clearing jungle, grown quite close up to the fort walls. The appearance of Kumasi as it was on the 16th July, surrounded by every form of putrid humanity, does not bear further description. || It speaks well for the climate and shows what a change may be effected by a good clearance in these forests, that cholera and every other form of pestilence had not broken out, as the garrison were living literally in the midst of death in all its most appalling forms. || 12. Here I cannot but add my small tribute of praise to the gallantry and devotion of those three brave Englishmen, Captain Bishop, 3rd Battalion Bedfordshire Regiment, Mr. Ralph, Lagos Constabulary, and Dr. Hay, of the Gold Coast Medical Service, and the handful of broken-down but gallant African soldiers who, since the departure of the main body from Kumasi, had held on so tenaciously, with but slender prospects of relief, sick in body and at heart, counting the very hours, living on reduced rations with no possible hope of escape (as for this they were physically unfitted), and facing

foes, surrender to whom only meant cruel death and torture. They nevertheless cheered themselves with the thought that at least they were doing their duty, and I strongly recommend them to the favourable consideration of Her Majesty's Government. They have well maintained the traditions of their race. || 13. Leaving three officers, two British non-commissioned officers, and a garrison of one hundred and fifty West African Frontier Force, and a few Gold Coast Constabulary gunners in the fort, under command of Captain Eden, Oxfordshire Light Infantry (who volunteered for this duty), with rations for fifty-four days and abundance of ammunition, I quitted Kumasi on the 17th July with an enormous train of sick, wounded, refugees, women and children, all the old garrison (mostly carried in hammocks). || The column at times covered four miles of road and the Ashantis lost a splendid opportunity of attacking us, but they had no idea of our route and had been severely treated on the 15th; consequently not a shot was fired at us, and we arrived at Bekwai on the 19th July, after two days of incessant rain, everyone feeling that the limit of endurance had been reached. || 14. On the 22nd I sent a column, consisting of three 75-millimetre guns, two 7-pounder guns, and eight hundred infantry, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Morland, King's Royal Rifle Corps, 1st Battalion West African Frontier Force, from Bekwai, to make a reconnaissance close up to Kokofu and with orders, if opportunity offered, to attack and destroy it. The column, moved with great judgment by Morland, entirely surprised the enemy, who were not even occupying their stockades, but endeavoured to reach them in time to resist. However, Major Melliss, with F Company (Hausas) 1st Battalion West African Frontier Force, immediately charged with the bayonet, followed by other companies West African Frontier Force and West African Regiment. The enemy fired hurriedly into them from flanks and front, but did not await the rush, and our men continuing their career, and carrying a second stockade on the left, entered Kokofu, some five hundred yards distant, on the heels of the Ashantis. The town was burnt and destroyed, three of our carbines recovered, and many Sniders, Martinis, and Dane guns captured, besides quantities of food and loot of all kinds, either taken in the houses or picked up for a distance of a mile beyond, littering the path by which the enemy fled. So sudden was the attack that we had no casualties, and fortunately killed some thirty of the enemy. The Hausa carriers on this occasion kept close to the charging line with the heavy 75-millimetre gun, proving that these may be taken anywhere in West Africa. || 15. I had sent Captain Wright, Manchester Regiment, 1st West African

Frontier Force, to Obuassi gold mines to accompany and control the levies which the King of Denkera had brought to our assistance. These consisted of three thousand men, armed with Dane guns, and by the 4th August Wright had cleared any remaining Adansis out of all their country west of the main Kumasi-Cape Coast road, and destroyed their plantations and crops. These levies are now following our columns in the Adansi and Kokofu countries east of the main road. They were raised and are now accompanied by Mr. D. Hall, Assistant Commissioner, Gold Coast Civil Police. Another body of some two thousand levies, raised at Insuaim from the Akims and other tribes east of Prahsu by Major Cramer, Gold Coast Constabulary, are doing similar work by guarding the Upper Prah against the Kokofus and other rebel tribes, and have lately made a capture of some eighty Adansis. || Still a third body of levies is being raised and partially trained by Captain Benson, Shropshire Light Infantry, Gold Coast Constabulary, near Bompata, in the Kwahu country, east of Kumasi, to threaten the Ashantis in the east. || 16. On the 26th July I sent Major Beddoes, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, with a column composed of one millimetre gun, one 7-pounder gun, and four hundred men West African Frontier Force, to which was added one company West African Regiment (to garrison Kwissa). The orders were to reopen the lines of communication (temporarily interrupted), and then discover the enemy's war camp east of Dampoassi, which had so long harassed our communications and been the scene of several fights. Fortunately Beddoes captured a prisoner on the 27th ultimo, and on promise of his life this man offered to show him the camp, where he stated the Adansi King then was with his chief fetish. Marching rapidly through the forest on 28th and 29th, two most trying days, Beddoes slept the night at a village, and advanced at dawn on the 30th towards Yankoma, on the Insuaim-Kokofu direct road. The column was attacked almost as soon as it started, but two Maxims and the leading company extended, and forced back the enemy after considerable opposition; just as they retired Beddoes was unfortunately severely wounded in the thigh, and the command devolved on Captain Greer, Royal Warwickshire Regiment. Two miles further on the enemy had taken up a position by a stream, and being located by the scouts, two Maxims simultaneously opened upon them, causing a fearful panic and flight, as proved by the dead left behind and the trails of blood which our troops followed up. Shortly after this a large stockade was discovered three hundred yards in length, but the enemy did not stay to hold it. Further on the column was attacked on all sides and the rearguard engaged, the enemy advanced

most boldly to within a few yards' range, and the guns came into action front and flanks. The 7-pounder gun detachment were obliged to use their carbines, killing many rebels. Lieutenant Phillips, R.A., was now severely wounded, but continued to command the guns; he is a very gallant fellow. Lieutenant Swabey, West India Regiment, attached to the West African Frontier Force, also received a severe wound in the side, which totally incapacitated him; and Captain Monekmason, Royal Munster Fusiliers, and Colour-Sergeant Blair, Northumberland Fusiliers, both 2nd West African Frontier Force, were also wounded, with some twenty-five men. Captain Neal, 3rd Battalion Scottish Rifles, Lagos Constabulary, moving round by his left, got on the enemy's flank, which at once caused them to retire, the column following as rapidly as possible. At 4 p.m. the enemy made their last stand, covering their large war camp, and managed to hold the column at bay till nearly dark. Being aware that the Insuain levies, under Major Cramer, were advancing from the south-east, though distant a day's journey, the rebels made a great effort to drive us back; Captain Greer reports that they nearly succeeded in breaking through at a point where a 7-pounder gun was temporarily out of action. Seeing it was time to force them back, he ordered Captain Monk'mason to charge with his company, and simultaneously the other troops joined in; the enemy immediately fled and dispersed. The behaviour of the troops was excellent. The villages and war camps were captured just as darkness set in; many dead were found, ten lying in a heap, a thing seldom seen in this bush fighting. The column returned next day to Dampoassi unmolested. It was unfortunately impossible to follow the enemy owing to our small force and the number of wounded. Our total casualties, three officers severely, one officer and one British non-commissioned officer wounded, and also one man killed; six dangerously, six severely, and seventeen slightly wounded. || 17. I was anxious to strengthen the garrison of Kumasi for many reasons, and owing to thick weather, not having been able to see their night signals for two consecutive Sundays, I decided to reinforce the garrison to a total of three hundred soldiers and ten white men, and to destroy such of the enemy's stockades as might still be held in the vicinity of the fort, after which I was free to carry on operations and clear the country south of Kumasi. Accordingly on the 4th August, Lieutenant-Colonel Burroughs, with two 75-millimetre guns, two 7-pounder guns, and seven hundred and fifty men, started for Kumasi, via Pekki. The weather was fine and the roads good (being the annual August breaks in the rains), and the column reached Kumasi on the second day, losing one

carrier killed and four wounded by snipers along the road. On 6th July Burroughs sent out two columns, three hundred men each, one under command of Major Melliss, Indian Staff Corps, with West African Frontier Force only; the other under Major Cobbe, Indian Staff Corps, who had Central African Regiment and Sikhs and one company West African Regiment. || Melliss took the Bantama road, and three-quarters of a mile from Kumasi came on a stockade strongly held and which poured in a hot fire; a 75-millimetre gun opened at one hundred yards with good effect, the timbers, for a wonder, being visible; two Maxims also kept up the music; but the enemy had loopholed the stockade and would not be silenced, so after half an hour's duel Melliss with his Hausas charged with the bayonet. The enemy this time, however, did not run, but waited to try conclusions, and as the troops scrambled over the stockades a fight at close quarters took place, Melliss, Captain Merrick, R.A., and Colour-Sergeant Foster, Devon Regiment, shooting and stabbing several Ashantis. || Melliss with his usual bravery kept up the charge on and away till the war camp village and every other sign of the enemy had been passed; many of their bodies strewed the ground. Our casualties were one soldier killed; Colour-Sergeant Foster, Devon Regiment, and four soldiers, severely wounded; Major Melliss, Indian Staff Corps, and Captain Biss, Middlesex Regiment, and three soldiers, slightly wounded. || The column under Major Cobbe took the Kintampo road, and soon after leaving the Kumasi clearing was fired on; continuing his advance, Cobbe came on a stockade 300 yards in length, and was fired on from his right front and left rear simultaneously. The frontal fire came from a wing of the stockade which was invisible in the dense bush. Whilst the enemy was kept engaged in his front by the West African Regiment and gun, two companies Central African Regiment, with some Sikhs under Cobbe himself, worked round to the right. This flanking movement was most pluckily conducted, many casualties occurring, but this was partly because the advance was too slow. Bush or no bush, the final advance once actually begun is better made here without precaution than if delayed for a moment by attempting to cut a way. The fighting had lasted about one and a half hours, when the Central African Regiment and Sikhs, by this time having gained the enemy's left rear, charged them in flank. The West African Regiment and remaining Sikhs simultaneously charged from the front and left, the whole driving the enemy pell-mell before them; the camp was destroyed and some of our arms and ammunition recovered. The enemy were pursued for some distance, leaving a good number of dead. All ranks, especially those

fine soldiers the Sikhs, behaved admirably, and if it were not for this impossible forest we should soon wipe out most of the Ashantis; long pursuit is impossible, and so we have to do the same trying work over and over again. || The casualties were heavy, Major Cobbe, Indian Staff Corps, severely, and Colour-Sergeant Rose, West African Regiment, slightly wounded. Sikhs: One killed, seven severely and ten slightly wounded. Central African Regiment: One killed, ten severely and seven slightly wounded. West African Regiment: One severely, two slightly wounded. Carriers: One killed, two wounded. Total casualties: Forty-five. || 18. On 7th August Lieutenant-Colonel Burroughs with five hundred men made a night attack on the enemy's stockaded camp, one and a half miles from Kumasi, on the Kumasi-Kokofu road, having ascertained by reconnaissance that afternoon that the camp was occupied in force. Night attacks are always risky and frequently unsuccessful, but on this occasion every possible precaution was taken by Burroughs; orders were thoroughly explained to officers; and, helped by a moon, everything went as was intended, with the consequence that the Ashantis, unaccustomed to games of this sort, were found asleep. A few shots were fired by their surprised picquets, one of which cost us the life of a gallant young officer, Lieutenant Greer, West India Regiment, attached to the West African Regiment. His death was the signal for the charge, which carried all before it. By the light of the moon the strange mixture of dark races, gathered from many parts of the Queen's Empire, were for the first time in our history united in the forests of West African to battle against her enemies. Sikhs from the distant Punjab, Askaris from Somaliland and British Central Africa, Hausas from Bornu and Lake Chad, Yorubas and Mendis from the Hinterland of the West Coast, West Indians from Jamaica and other islands, and a sprinkling of Senegalese; here they were of different races, religions, and tongues, yet implicitly trusting in the white men who led them, and whose word was law. No matter what way they went, or why, they knew it was all right so long as they obeyed; and they did. The sword and the bayonet both had their turn that night, the enemy was fairly collared and paid the penalty of rebellion, large numbers were killed, and the Ashantis will remember what a night attack means. By the light of the blazing war camp, the stockades which had taken weeks to build were destroyed in an hour by the jubilant soldiers, and the force returned to the fort by 10.30 p.m. unmolested. || 19. I attach a list of casualties, from which it will be seen that the fighting has been severe and incessant; further, it has been chiefly done by the same troops, who have been called upon to accompany

the different columns time after time in quick succession owing to the limited numbers available. The percentage of killed and wounded amongst combatants only exceeds 25 per cent. || The cheerfulness of Europeans, the wonderful stamina of the men, and the devotion to duty of all have been remarkable. || 20. At the close of operations, it will be my pleasant duty to bring to notice the excellent work done by the various departments of this force, transport, supply, and medical, on which has fallen much of the labour. (Folgen Namen und persönliche Notizen.)

J. Willcocks, Colonel,
Commanding Ashanti Field Force.

Nr. 12571. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Oberst Willcocks an den Kolonialminister. Sämtliche Insurgentenchefs sind gefangen.

(Received 5.30 p.m., December 28, 1900.)

(Telegram.) || Cape Coast, 28th December. Donald Stewart telegraphs from Kumasi that rebel Chief Kofi Kofia, and also Osei Kudjoe Krum, of Bantama, have been taken prisoners. Glad to know, before leaving for England, every rebel Chief has surrendered.

Nr. 12572. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Gouverneur der Goldküste an den Kolonialminister. Rückblick auf den Aufstand.

Chylton Dene, Surbiton, January 29, 1901. (January 31, 1901.)

Sir, || I desire before proceeding to take up my appointment as Governor of Barbados to place on record in as concise a form as possible what in my judgment were the circumstances which led up to the recent outbreak in Kumassi, and I will now proceed to do so. I have referred to them in despatches which, addressed to the Secretary of State from Kumassi, are now in his hands, but it will I think be useful to bring them into one general statement. || 2. In order to deal properly with this important matter it is necessary for me to refer, and I will do so as briefly as possible, to the situation at the time of the expedition to Kumassi in 1895—6 which led to Ashanti coming under the rule of the Government of the Gold Coast. The tribes forming the old Ashanti Confederation were at that time still at variance as to the succession to the Golden Stool. The King of Nkoranza had already broken away,

although he had been unsuccessful in his negotiations for a treaty of alliance with the British Government. The Kings of Mampon and Aguna, with their respective Court parties, had prudently retired into British territory, the King of Juabin had established himself on the frontier of Ashanti and the Gold Coast Colony, watching events, and the powerful King of Bekwai secretly sought to establish friendly relations with the Colonial Government, and openly stated that he would not offer opposition to any British force which might be sent to Kumassi. This state of things, and the failure to obtain the assistance of Samory, undoubtedly led to the decision of Prempeh and his councillors not to oppose with force the march of a British expedition to Kumassi. The general feeling among Prempeh's adherents at that time was that the British troops, after marching to Kumassi, and perhaps exacting a fine, would return to the Coast, as they had done on the previous occasion, and take no further action. || 3. It was with dismay that the Kumassis and the Kings of those of the confederated tribes who supported Prempeh, found that they had entirely miscalculated events, and that the British Government not only intended to remain, but made demands which were unexpected, and which, without previous preparation, they could not comply with. Opposition was rendered impossible, because the whole system of native administration was paralyzed by the removal as political prisoners of Prempeh and the principal members of his Court, as well as the Kings who were his chief and open supporters. The young men, doubtless eager enough to fight for their king, were thus reduced to impotence. They were without leaders. The Kumassis withdrew altogether from Kumassi, and retired to their bush villages, chiefly in the Atchima country which lies to the west and north-west of the town. There remained in Kumassi only those of the chiefs, with their followers, who had been selected by the Governor to assist the Resident, and who had been ordered to remain for that purpose. The greater part of the town was abandoned, and what I found when I entered the place on the 25th March last, was as follows: — || In the centre was the fort, with the ground around it cleared sufficiently for the play of the guns manning it. On the south and south-west, a quarter entirely inhabited by Fanti traders; on the west, the Gold Coast Hausa Constabulary cantonments; on the north, a quarter inhabited by strangers, and called the Saltpond Lines, together with the Basel Mission premises, school-house, and church: and on the east, a remnant of the Ashanti town, containing the ruins of Prempeh's „palace“, inhabited by Gold Coast Police, and the huts of the native chiefs and their followers already referred to. Although the market

was well attended by Ashanti women, who came to sell their native foodstuffs, it was not difficult for anyone with a knowledge of West Africa, to see at a glance that the vast population of Kumassi still lived away from it, and had not resigned themselves to the new order of things. This fact I learnt only from my visit. || 4. Upon the completion of the expedition in 1896, a Resident was appointed, the construction of a fort and the establishment of a garrison in Kumassi were arranged, and it was decided, and the arrangement appears to have been considered suitable, to deal with the outlying tribal districts by means of a Committee of Native Chiefs, who were to confer with, and work under the orders of, the Resident, and to keep him advised of all matters affecting the welfare of the country, or acts likely to disturb the peace. Administration by means of a Native Committee was doubtless considered to be the most likely means of inducing the Ashantis generally to fall in with the altered state of things, but otherwise the arrangement had nothing to commend itself, and there was no guarantee that the members of the Native Committee, who by their position and residence in Kumassi were often able to ascertain the movements of the Government, would on their part act loyally and with a strict regard to British interests. This system of administration did not appear to me at all satisfactory. Nothing of the kind was attempted in the Northern Territories where the whole country was very properly broken up into administrative districts and sub-districts. It was, in my judgment, desirable, having regard to the circumstances under which Ashanti had been acquired, and in view of the abolition of human sacrifices, slavery, and all native customs which were contrary to justice, equity, and good Government, to be in closer and more reliable touch with the several native tribes without at the same time disturbing the local administration by the kings and chiefs of tribes. However, all had gone outwardly well up to the date on which I was appointed Governor of the Gold Coast (April, 1898). Sir Wm. Maxwell had visited most of the districts of Ashanti in 1896, and some of them in 1897, and I did not hear from him on his return to Accra in November, 1897, that he had any reason to be dissatisfied with the system of administration in question. Of this latter visit no report appears to have been made, probably because he returned to Accra shattered in health, and totally unfitted to write a report. || 5. Before I quitted the Colony on leave of absence (December, 1898), I had had no opportunity of taking the whole question into careful consideration, and, if I had, I should not, in the absence of a strong report from the Resident, have disturbed the existing order of things without first making a personal

visit to the country, more especially as, apart from my own views, there was nothing on record to lead me to conclude that the arrangements were not working well. I returned to the Colony in July, 1899, having during my leave done all I could by personal interviews to ascertain what capitalists and merchants intended to do with regard to the development of Ashanti. I was more impressed than ever with the necessity, in the interests of trade and mining capitalists, apart altogether from political considerations, of formulating a more complete system of Government. It was my wish to proceed to Kumassi as soon as the rains were over and November was fixed as the time of my visit, but the necessity of remaining at headquarters for the Concessions Bill deferred my departure until March, 1900. I left Accra on the 13th March. I had many matters to deal with besides the question of administration, namely, a disputed succession to the tribal stool of Nsuta; the tribal ownership of the Bipsu lands — a somewhat complicated matter — the claim of the King of Western Akim (Gold Coast Colony) to be regarded as King Paramount over the districts of Bompata, Obogu, and Agogo; the question of the best means of arranging for the transport of stores and Government officers to and from the Northern Territories, as well as some other matters of less importance which it is unnecessary to specify. The Secretary of State's decision to collect from the Ashantis annually a sum representing interest on the indemnity due under the provisions of the Treaty of Fomenah, and of the cost of the 1895—6 Expedition — a course recommended both by the Resident, Captain Donald Stewart, C.M.G., and myself — did not form a portion of my original programme. The decision arrived two days before I started, in March, and I then included it.

6. Up to the date of my departure from Accra there had been no reports received from Kumassi which could lead to the inference that the Ashantis were in a disturbed state and bordering on rebellion; or that they were in a state of preparation for revolt. Only one incident of a doubtful character, which I will refer to later, came to my notice, but, in itself, it did not appear to me to be a matter for immediate apprehension. There was therefore really no reason for me to consider the opportuneness of my visit, any more than it would have been necessary in ordinary circumstances to do so in connection with a visit on my part to any portion of the Colony. Apart from the desirability of making periodical visits to outlying portions of the Colony and protected territories, I had important work to do at Kumassi, and, as I had absolutely nothing of any consequence in my hands indicative of any organized arrangements for revolt, or indeed of any likelihood of disturbance, it was my duty to

make the journey. It was only after my arrival at Kumassi that I became aware that the situation of affairs was grave. As it was, I left Accra quite unconscious of any danger. This is clear from the fact that I had only the usual escort of some 30 Hausas. It may be asked why did I, as Governor, proceed to Ashanti with an escort insufficient to impress the natives with the importance of the Governor's position. My reply to that question is that I could only have taken a larger escort by seriously interfering with the annual course of instruction of the Hausa contingent at Accra, and I was proceeding to a place where there was a garrison, and where, if I required any military parade, I should be in a position to get it. || 7. I will refer now to the reports in the hands of the Government as to the condition of Ashanti. In April, 1896, a report came to hand from Captain Larymore, at the time acting as Resident, to the effect that the people in the Atchima country — that is to say the Kumassis — were plotting against the Government, and meditated an attack upon the British post at Kumassi. A detachment of Hausas, which happened to be marching down to the Coast from Northern Sefwhi, was diverted to Kumassi. No attack was made and nothing more was heard of the matter. In 1897 Mr. Vroom, C.M.G., a Native District Commissioner, was sent to Ashanti by Governor Sir William Maxwell to ascertain the state of public feeling and the nature of any grievances which he might find to exist, and made a report. This report by a native, who could, better than any white man, ascertain and gauge the true feeling of the people, indicated that the Ashantis had not at that time settled down to and acquiesced in British rule; but it was not regarded as disquieting nor was it considered necessary by Sir William Maxwell to change the system of administration in force. In 1898 troubles were apprehended in Wam. The matter, which was regarded as local, and no doubt was local, was the subject of despatches. The King was ultimately fined. Towards the end of 1899 there was a disturbance in Aguna, when a few huts were burnt down. Captain Davidson Houston, then acting as Resident, went up with a small force, and the ringleaders were subsequently arrested. This was not reported as anything more than a local disturbance without any political significance. There was correspondence with regard to the armament of the fort, which I dealt with as reported by despatch, and the armament was then considered sufficient and satisfactory. It proved to be so during the siege in which I was involved. And there has been correspondence also with regard to the strength of the garrison Kumassi. As to this the military requirements of the Northern Territories and the difficulty in getting an adequate supply of

recruits, a matter about which I have been in correspondence with you, prevented my doing very much. The garrison was not as strong as I should have wished, but was as strong as the numerical strength of the force, and the requirements of the Northern Territories and the Colony, enabled me to make it. The strength was arranged in consultation with the late Deputy-Inspector-General, who did all he could to meet requirements. It was, I believe, stated in one of the letters, I think by Captain Donald Stewart, that the garrison was not strong enough to properly overawe the Ashantis. I am not certain of this; but I am certain that nothing was said in any of the reports from Kumassi that there were any preparations for revolt or any chance of revolt. || 8. That was the state of affairs in Ashanti as known to the Government, as known to me. There was in fact nothing to lead me to conclude that my visit was either unsafe or inopportune. || 9. The whole course of the outbreak has, I think, made it abundantly clear that the malcontent Ashantis, those in fact who were one with the powerful Kumassi tribe, who were in favour of Prempeh and opposed to his rival Atcheri Boanda, had for some time been secretly preparing for revolt. The collection of the enormous quantity of warlike stores, which the siege of Kumassi, and the determined opposition to the gallant force under Colonel Sir James Willecocks, showed them to be possessed of, must have been spread over a long period. It is in itself evidence of a pre-determined outbreak. The whole history of the Ashantis is a record of wars, wars against their neighbours, who, until the power of the British began to be manifested, were either directly subservient to them or in a state of vassalage. The Ashanti warriors of 1900 were not those who had been overthrown in battle by the forces under Sir Garnet Wolseley in 1873—4. They had not tried conclusions with the British troops, and it is not perhaps to be wondered at that the warriors of a warlike race unaccustomed to any other life than that of predominance, should have decided to make an attempt to throw off the British yoke at the first opportunity which might appear to them fitting. || 10. But there were other causes for revolt. The Kumassis, the dominant Ashanti tribe, were, I was to discover, smarting under the loss of their king — Prempeh — without having struck a blow in his defence. For Prempeh was their tribal king, besides being King Paramount over the whole of Ashanti. He had been taken from them without a hand having been lifted to save him. The whole incident was a stigma upon the valour of the Kumassi warriors — a stigma which, by native custom and native tradition, blood alone — the blood of the offending white man — could wipe out. || 11. Again, the whole system of

the country had been changed with the establishment of British rule within their midst. All their savage modes of Government had been abolished. They were unable to be the proprietors of slaves, they could no longer glory in human sacrifices; they had to provide labour for public works, and they found their country over-run without molestation by strangers engaged in trade and other peaceful occupations. Further, for disobedience they were fined by the Resident, and I learnt after my arrival in Ashanti that this was a cause of dissatisfaction. || 12. The abolition of slavery and human sacrifices was a matter of course upon the occupation of Ashanti, but it was inevitable that there would be discontent in consequence. The West African native holds very tenaciously to ancient customs, and the inability of the Ashantis to obtain slaves seriously interfered with their means of livelihood. They found themselves unable to obtain a sufficient number of labourers to work in the native gold pits and to carry on their farming operations, and further they were, at the same time, called upon by their chiefs, under application from the British Resident, to supply labourers for public purposes, as for example the construction of roads, and the conveyance of Government stores. || 13. The imposition of fines is necessary in connection with the maintenance of authority, and I could not find that the exercise of this system had in any way been abused. The responsibility of fining rests entirely with the Resident who has not been required to report to the Governor this exercise of power on his part. I became aware of the fact that there was discontent arising from this cause when, on my way to Kumassi, the King of Adansi having made it a matter of complaint when I met him at Kwisa. It was also mentioned to me by Opoku Mensa, the senior member of the Kumassi Native Committee. But for the sudden outbreak of the revolt it was a matter which I should have carefully looked into. || 14. In order to show that the Ashantis had been secretly preparing for revolt, I may mention that Kofi Yami, one of the King of Bekwai's linguists, told me that towards the end of 1898 the Abodomns went to Kumassi to drink fetish with the Kumassi chiefs to fight against the white man. Kofi Yami's remarks, which were made to me during the siege of Kumassi, led me to question the loyal native kings and chiefs who were with me in the fort, and were safely brought down to Accra. I enclose copies of the statements made by the Kings of Mampon, Juabin, and Aguna, and by Chiefs Kobina Kokofu and Kobina Toto. || 15. Finally, I will refer to the Golden Stool, about which so much has been said in the newspapers. Very few people seem to realize the political value of a tribal stool. They regard it as the throne

of the reigning chief for the time being and nothing more. But as a matter of fact the stool is of far more importance to a tribe than the king or chief who occupies it. To deprive a tribe of its stool is to deprive a king or chief of all power. He cannot enforce his decrees or judgments, for he has no stool to sit upon when he delivers them. To deprive a tribe of its stool is a far more severe punishment than to deprive it of its king or head chief, because there is always a person who is known as „next to the chief“ — what we should call a deputy chief — who in the absence of the head chief through illness or from any other cause, takes his place. The stool is there for the deputy to sit upon, and everything goes forward as usual. So with the golden stool of Ashanti; so long as it remains in the hands of the Ashantis, so long does the power of the king — whether the king exists or not — remain with them. Mr. Ramseyer, whose knowledge of Ashanti and the Ashantis is perhaps unique, writes about it as follows: — „Concerning the Golden Stool, your Excellency is right in believing that it would be of the greatest importance to the British Government to get hold of it . . . the whole history of Ashanti is attached to it, and only the possessor of it is acknowledged as Head or Master of the Ashantis.“ The Golden Stool is, therefore, a valuable asset to the Colonial Government, and it is a matter for regret that its delivery was not insisted upon in 1896.¶

16. Early in December, 1899, the Secretary to the King of Accra, an educated man and a native of repute in Accra, informed me that he had a very important communication to make to me. I gave him an interview, and he brought with him an Ashanti lad — a slave — who, he said, had come to him to see the Governor. The lad's story was that he had been sent by the custodians of the Stool to say that they were tired of the work entrusted to them, and would deliver up the Stool if a white officer and some Hausas were sent secretly to them on condition that their own lives, which would thus become jeopardised, were protected, and they received a portion of the treasure kept with it. The King's Secretary vouched for the accuracy of the story and showed his belief in it by offering to accompany any detachment of Hausas I might send. The Acting Resident was at this time absent from Kumassi, and I was unable to consult him. Moreover, it did not appear to be necessary to do so, as strict secrecy was essential to success. After careful consideration I decided to make the attempt, and on the 15th January, sent a detachment of Hausas, under the command of my Private Secretary, Captain Armitage. The King's Secretary accompanied it. The attempt failed as I have already informed you, through the lad having become

frightened and refusing to take the party to the precise spot where the stool was kept. There was no disturbance of any kind, and the party returned to Accra as quietly as it had left. Captain Armitage on his return reported that he had seen quantities of warlike stores in the Kumassi bush villages he had passed through in the Atchima country, and I determined to look further into this matter after my arrival at Kumassi, because it appeared to me that the existence of such stores was a menace to our position in Ashanti. This is the incident to which I referred in paragraph 6 of this letter. Accordingly, on the 29th March, the day after the public palaver with the Ashanti Kings and Chiefs at Kumassi, I despatched a small force under Captains Armitage and Leggett to march through the principal Atchima villages, and to examine into the state of affairs, and to make a full report to me. The instructions I gave are in your hands, and they include a direction that if the opportunity occurred of obtaining the Golden Stool that opportunity was to be taken, for the force was being sent into the district in which the stool was, by common report, kept. I took this step after consultation with the Acting Resident, who saw no objection to it. I learnt later that the Atchima people had only a few days previously not properly received Mr. David, the Mining Prospector of the Ashanti Company. I enclose a copy of a letter from Mr. David, dated the 17th June, in which he states that he was in the Atchima country from the 20th March (five days before my arrival at Kumassi) to the 27th March, and that at Nkawi the people were so hostile that he dared not stay there. Had I been made aware of this state of things, I should assuredly have paused before sending an armed force among people in an excited state as to do so was to invite conflict. As it was, a conflict occurred which proved to be the commencement of the rebellion.

I am, &c.,

F. M. Hodgson.

Verhandlungen über die Mandchurei 1900—1901. *)

Nr. 12573. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Die Botschaft in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Rußland hat nicht die Absicht, die Mandchurei zu annektieren.

St. Petersburg, October 1, 1900. (October 1.)

(Telegraphic.) || Official statement published to-day declaring foreign newspaper reports of annexation of parts of Manchuria devoid of all foundation, Russian policy having been precisely indicated in previous official published communications.

Nr. 12574. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Dieselbe an Denselben. Derselbe Gegenstand. Verwaltungsmaßregeln der Russen in der Mandchurei.

St. Petersburg, October 1, 1900. (October 8.)

My Lord, || I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship copy, in translation, of a code of Rules and Regulations, published by the Military Governor of the Amur district in the „Amur Gazette“ of the 17th August, for the administration of that portion of Manchuria which is in the occupation of the Russian troops. || The first impression gathered from a perusal of these Rules and Regulations is that the Administration in Manchuria is to be of a permanent character, and I believe it to have been due to the impression caused by this publication that the reported annexation of Manchuria by Russia was announced a few days ago in the French press. || Whatever may be the ultimate fate of this province of China, I feel convinced from Count Lamsdorff's

*) Blaubücher Cd. 589, 675, 1005. — Die eingeklammerten Daten geben das Datum der Ankunft in London an. Red.

statements, from remarks made by high military authorities, and from an official communiqué made in the press this morning, copy of which I have the honour to inclose, that the Emperor still holds firm to his declared policy against any annexation of Chinese territory. || Although the campaign in Manchuria is now practically over, Mukden being at present the only town of any importance near the Russian Manchurian Railway which has not been taken by the Russian forces, it is hardly probable, in view of the paramount interests of Russia in Manchuria, that the province will be evacuated by the Russian troops before a local Government of some stability has been re-established, and before measures have been successfully applied by the Russian Government to recoup themselves for the losses which they have suffered by the destruction of the railway, and for the expense of the military operations now in progress. In any case the railway will in future be guarded by an armed and disciplined force which, in the event of necessity, will form the nucleus of a larger force for more extended operations. || Previously to the outbreak of the present troubles there was a force of 2000 to 3000 guards in Manchuria for the protection of the railway. I learn that active recruiting for this force is now in progress, and its numbers are to be raised to 12000 men under the command of officers in the regular army. Entrenched camps are also being constructed at all the strategic positions along the line.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

Charles Hardinge.

Anlage 1.

Extract from the „Amur Gazette“ of August 4 (17), 1900.

(Translation.) || The „Amur Gazette“ of the 4th (17th) August publishes the following Rules, promulgated by the Military Governor of the Amur district on the 30th July (12th August), 1900: — || „The Governor-General of the Amur has informed me by telegrams, dated the 23rd, 24th, and 25th of this July, that all the region of Manchuria occupied by our troops is henceforth withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Chinese authorities and subordinated entirely to our authority and laws. In execution of the foregoing orders of the Chief Commander of the region, I decree: || „1. I proclaim as having passed under the jurisdiction of Russian authorities the former Manchu territory of the Trans-Zeya, the inhabitants of which, according to the stipulations of the Treaty of Aigun, have hitherto remained under Chinese authority, as also the

Manchurian territory occupied by our troops on the right bank of the Amur River. || „2. The return of Chinese subjects who have quitted our river bank to the Trans-Zeya territory is forbidden; their land is to be given over for the exclusive use of Russian colonists. || „3. The former Chinese town of Aigun and Settlement of Sakhalian, together with the adjoining territory, shall be temporarily consigned to the exclusive jurisdiction of the military authorities, and all private individuals shall absolutely be forbidden to settle in the former towns of Aigun and Sakhalian, as also in their neighbourhood. || „4. The former town of Aigun and the Sakhalian Settlement can never be re-established, and only those Chinese buildings that now remain undemolished shall be left in their present condition for quartering troops and warehousing military stores. || „5. The administration of the territory occupied by our troops on the left bank of the Amur River, as also the temporary management of the Manchu territory of the Trans-Zeya pending the transfer of such territory to native Russian colonists, shall be under the jurisdiction of the Frontier Commissary of the Amur district, he enjoying the rights and discharging the duties of a District Chief as regards administration and police. || „6. For co-operation with the Frontier Commissary, and for the district administration of the Trans-Zeya region and territory of the former towns of Aigun and Sakhalian, two officials have been appointed for discharging the duties of district officers. || „7. A special Chancery shall be established for the Frontier Commissary for conducting the correspondence relating to the administration of the Trans-Zeya region and territory on the right bank of the Amur River. || „8. In view of the weak condition, arising from wounds, of Lieutenant-Colonel Golschmidt, of the General Staff, now occupying the post of Frontier Commissary, and in order to expedite the organization and establishment of order in the Trans-Zeya, Aigun, and Sakhalian territories, the duties of Frontier Commissary shall be temporarily discharged by Sotnikoff, Commanding Officer of the Amur Cossack Regiment. || „9. The place of residence of the Frontier Commissary Sotnikoff shall be the former town of Aigun. The place of residence of the district officers, and the limits of their jurisdiction, shall be fixed by the Frontier Commissary.

„The foregoing Proclamation is promulgated for general information.

(Signed)

Lieutenant-General Gribsky,
Military Governor.“

Anlage 2.

*Extract from the „Journal de Saint-Pétersbourg“ of September 19
(October 2), 1900.*

Le „Messager Officiel“ publie aujourd'hui la communication suivante: — || „Ces derniers temps a circulé dans la presse étrangère la nouvelle que la Russie aurait annexé des territoires Mandchouriens limitrophes. || „Les buts que le Gouvernement Impérial poursuit en Extrême-Orient ont été nettement indiqués dans les communications officielles qui ont été publiées et dont il ressort avec une clarté suffisante que l'assertion susmentionnée, comme quoi la Mandchourie aurait été incorporée dans le territoire de l'Empire, est dénuée de tout fondement.“

Nr. 12575. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Die Botschaft in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Rußland verlangt nur Sicherheit für Eisenbahnen und Schiffahrt in der Mandschurei.

St. Petersburg, October 10, 1900. (October 22.)

(Extract.) || I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship translation of an extract from the Trans-Caspian „Viedomosti“, containing the text of a telegram addressed by General Grodekoff, Governor-General of the Amur district, to General Matzievskoff, announcing that, according to a statement received from the Minister of War, the Emperor, with a view to the renewal as quickly as possible of friendly relations with China, had decided not to annex any portion of Chinese territory and to limit his efforts to those measures necessary for the peaceful use of the railways constructed by Russia in Manchuria, and for the free navigation of Russian ships on the Amur.

Anlage.

Extract from the Trans-Caspian „Viedomosti“.

(Translation.) || In the Trans-Caspian „Viedomosti“ the following telegram is printed from the Governor-General of the Pri Amur Province to General Matzievskoff, the 6th (19th) September:— || „The Minister of War has informed me that His Majesty the Emperor, with a view to the speediest possible restoration of friendly relations with China, has been pleased to decide not to annex any portion of China to Russian territories, but to limit himself to taking those measures which are

necessary for the peaceful and continued use of the railway built by us across Manchuria, and for the free navigation of the Amur by our vessels.“

Nr. 12576. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw. Die ganze Mandschurei ist in russischer Gewalt.

Peking, October 22, 1900. (October 24.)

(Telegraphic.) || A despatch of the 6th October from Newchwang announces that the whole of Manchuria is in Russian possession, that all officials of rank had taken flight, and that they captured Moukden on the 3rd. The Yungchow terminus of the Shanhaikwan Railway was also under the Russian flag.

Nr. 12577. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw. Teilt den Text eines russisch-chinesischen Abkommens über die Mandschurei mit.

Peking, January 2, 1901. (February 18.)

My Lord, || I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of two interesting documents, of the authenticity of which I have little doubt. || The first is a Petition to Li Hung-chang from a certain Chou Mien, who, together with two other Chinese, was delegated by the Tartar General Tsêng Chi to proceed to Lü-shun K'ou (Port Arthur) to affect a settlement with Admiral Alexeieff, in command of the Russian land forces and Pacific Squadron, whereby friendly relations between the two countries might be re-established. || Chou Mien appears to have drawn up an Agreement with M. Korostovitch (acting on behalf of Russia), whose official designation is „Foreign Secretary“ at Port Arthur. His name appears as „K'uo“ in the Chinese text. || The second document, inclosed herewith, is the text of the Agreement in question, in nine clauses. || Of these the first six deal with the more general military questions, but the seventh calls for special notice:— || „It is expedient that a Russian official with general powers of control should be stationed at Mukden for the settlement of all questions affecting the two countries.“ || „The Tartar General must give the official Resident at Mukden full information respecting any important measure he may take.“ || I may mention that the characters in the Chinese text (from which the inclosed documents are translated) are the same as the abbreviated term for a „Minister Plenipotentiary“ here or for the Chinese Resident at Llassa. || I understand that the Agreement, in the form now communicated, was signed by the Chinese and Russian

Delegates on the 22nd November last, and is now in Peking, awaiting its final confirmation.

(For Sir Ernest Satow)

Reginald Tower.

Anlage 1.

Petition to Li Hung-chang from the Expectant Taotai Chou Mien.

On the 18th day of the intercalary eighth month your petitioner received a communication from Tseng, the Tartar General, stating that he had proposed an armistice to the Russian General after the commencement of hostilities, but that it was now necessary to renew arrangements for carrying it into effect. || He ordered your petitioner, together with Jui An and Chiang-Wên-hsi to proceed to Lü Shun as Plenipotentiaries and take what steps circumstances might render possible to effect an understanding whereby friendly relations could be established. Jui started official life from the Tung Wên Kuan, and has long been employed as interpreter in the Amur Province, while Chiang-Wên-hsi is an official of this province. I find that previous to the fall of Mukden, the Russian General, A-li-k'o-hsien-fu, had sent an answer to General Tseng's despatch, stating that an armistice could only be granted on condition that the arsenals and all munitions of war should be placed in the hands of the Russians. || After the fall of Mukden, Chang, the Prefect of Chinchou, was ordered to participate in drawing up an Agreement in six clauses, whereby — || 1. Chinese civil officials were to go on with their duties just as before, so long as the Russian military occupation continued; || 2. Our troops were to avoid all hostile encounters with those of Russia, and to keep out of the way of the latter; || 3. The Russians were not to proceed beyond Shanhaikwan; || 4. The villagers in the neighbourhood were to be strictly forbidden from again damaging the railroad; || 5. The Russians were to be supplied with provisions, and || 6. Prefect Chang was to remain at K'ai P'ing, where the Agreement was drawn up, pending the arrival of the Russians at Shanhaikwan, when he was to return to his post. || Subsequently, however, the Russians did proceed beyond Shanhaikwan and captured the towns of Chinchou and Hsin Min. I also heard, after my arrival at Lü Shun (Port Arthur) that the Russians had dispatched forces in various directions eastwards, and had sent communications to the local officials bidding them not to be alarmed, as all they had to do was to hand over their munitions of war to the Russians, whereupon the latter would exterminate the Hu*) rebels on their behalf. || Now that a

*) „Hu“ (bearded).

temporary Agreement in nine clauses has been drafted, your petitioner's grief pierces his very soul, but what alternative has he? He now forwards a copy for your Excellency's inspection. The concession in the sixth clause, which permits the employment of fire-arms under certain conditions, was only obtained after repeated discussions. Now that the Hu rebels overrun the country the people have no resources left, and if the villagers are forbidden to carry arms the life of every soul in the province is in danger. || The Russian official K'uo, who was my colleague in drawing up the Agreement, has now arrived at Peking, and I humbly entreat your Excellency to demand the Russian text of the Agreement from the Russian Minister for collation. Very respectfully do I make my petition, and I humbly entreat your Excellency to console your petitioner, Chou Mien.

Lü Shun (Port Arthur), 9th month, 20th day.

Anlage 2.

Text of Russo-Chinese Agreement.

His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, desiring to preserve for ever unimpaired the friendly relations between Russia and China, has consented to allow the Chinese Tartar General and the officials under him to return to their various posts in the Province of Fêngt'ien*) which have been occupied by the Russian troops, and there to resume their former admirable government. Accordingly, His Majesty the Emperor has appointed Admiral A_____, Governor of the territories leased to Russia in the Liaotung Peninsula, placed in general control of the land forces and commanding the Pacific Squadron, to be his Plenipotentiary, and to hold conferences with the Tartar General of Fêngt'ien with a view to effecting a speedy settlement. || Tsêng, the Tartar General of Fêngt'ien, has appointed as his Plenipotentiaries Chou Mien, the Taotai, Jui An, the Sub-Prefect, and Chiang Wên-hsi, the District Magistrate, with authority to discuss the matter in all its bearings, and we have now arrived at Port Arthur. || Admiral A_____ has appointed Kúo, Resident at Port Arthur, for the control of all matters affecting the two countries, as his Representative to confer with the Representatives of China and draw up a temporary Agreement. || We have now respectively affixed our signatures to an Agreement in nine clauses, which we respectfully submit to Admiral A_____ and the Tartar General Tsêng for their indorsement and due affixing of their seals. || The clauses are as follows: — || 1. Upon the

*) Fêngt'ien, the southernmost of the three Manchurian provinces, and containing the Manchu capital, Mukden.

return of the Tartar General Tsêng to his post he must undertake to protect his province and take steps to pacify it, and must further see that no resistance be offered to the construction of the railroad. || 2. Russia having occupied posts in Mukden and other places with a view to protecting the railroad and pacifying the province, the Tartar General and local officials must treat the Russians kindly and render them every possible assistance, e. g., in providing them with lodging or provisions. || 3. Throughout the Province of Fêngt'ien rebellions have occurred on the part of the soldiery, and the railroad has been destroyed. It is therefore the Tartar General's duty to disband his various troops and dispossess them of their arms. Those who accept these conditions will be exempt from investigation respecting their former errors. The munitions of war in arsenals not occupied by the Russians must likewise be delivered over in their entirety to the Russian military officials. || 4. Places in Fêngt'ien which have not been occupied by Russia where forts and barricades were erected must be inspected by Russian and Chinese officials in conjunction, and in their presence dismantled. Arsenals for the storage of gunpowder when not required by the Russians must be dealt with in the same manner. || 5. Ying K'ou*) and other places are being administered by Russian officials pending the time when the Russian Government shall be completely satisfied as to the pacification of the country upon which it shall be permitted to the Chinese officials to resume their functions. || 6. The various cities and market towns throughout Fêngt'ien Province must carry out the instructions of the Tartar General of Fêngt'ien respecting the maintenance of bodies of cavalry or infantry for police purposes and for the protection of merchants. The villages of the province are likewise entirely under the Tartar General's orders, and it will be for his discretion to determine how many men are to be dispatched and the nature of their equipment, and act accordingly. || 7. It is expedient that a Russian official with general powers of control should be stationed at Mukden for the settlement of all questions affecting the two countries between the Tartar General on the one hand and the Governor of the Liaotung Peninsula on the other. The Tartar General must give the official Resident at Mukden full information respecting any important measure he may make. || 8. Should the police force maintained by the Tartar General at Mukden and elsewhere be insufficient for some particular emergency, the Tartar General will immediately communicate with the Russian official Resident at Mukden — no matter whether the place concerned be on the sea coast or in the interior of

*) Ying K'ou is the name given to the port of Newchwang city.

the province — and invite Russia to dispatch reinforcements to his assistance. || 9. Should any dispute arise in connection with the interpretation of any of the above eight clauses, the Russian text is to be accepted as the standard. || The above temporary Agreement shall be put into operation immediately after the return of Tsêng, the Tartar General, to Mukden; but should the Tartar General, in conjunction with the Governor of the Liaotung Peninsula, subsequently agree upon any additions or alterations that would conduce to the advantage of both nations, it will be open to them to put such into operation if found feasible.

Nr. 12578. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Minister des Ausw. an den Botschafter in Petersburg. Soll über ein angebliches Mandschureiabkommen Erkundigung einziehen.

Foreign Office, January 3, 1901.

(Telegraphic.) || Report what you can ascertain, but without making any official inquiries, in regard to an alleged Agreement between Russia and China dealing with Southern Manchuria, the substance of which was given by the Peking correspondent of the „Times“, in a telegram dated the 31st December, which appeared in its issue of the 3rd January.

Nr. 12579. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Minister des Ausw. an den Gesandten in Peking. Weis er etwas von dem Mandschureiabkommen?

Foreign Office, January 3, 1901.

(Telegraphic.) || Have you any information as to an alleged Agreement between Russia and China in regard to Southern Manchuria, the substance of which is given by the Peking correspondent of the „Times“ in a telegram dated the 31st December?

Nr. 12580. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw. Antwort auf das vorige.

Peking, January 4, 1901. (January 5.)

(Telegraphic.) || Your Lordship's telegram of yesterday. || It is believed that the report as telegraphed to the „Times“ is authentic. Full text of the Russo-Chinese Agreement has been sent from here by the bag on the 2nd January. Delegates of Tsêng Ch'i, the Tartar General, and of Admiral Alexeieff, the Russian Commander-in-chief, appear to have signed

it on the 22nd November. || The Convention is said to be now in Peking awaiting confirmation. This confirmation is not likely to take place, I learn from Chinese sources, because the Chinese Delegate who signed at Port Arthur did so without being duly authorized. Any information obtainable will be telegraphed to your Lordship.

Nr. 12581. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Derselbe an Denselben.
Dasselbe.

Peking, January 6, 1901. (January 6.)

(Telegraphic.) || With reference to my telegram of the 4th January. || Russo-Chinese Agreement has, I am informed, been referred for adjustment of terms to Chinese Minister at St. Petersburg.

Nr. 12582. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Antwort auf Nr. 12578.

St. Petersburg, January 5, 1901. (January 5.)

(Telegraphic.) || With reference to your telegram of the 3rd instant, it is impossible to ascertain facts with accuracy as yet, but it seems to be generally believed here that some provisional Agreement, such as that indicated, has been concluded by Russia with the local authorities in Manchuria, and that she may eventually acquire by Treaty the right to finish building the railway line through Manchuria to Port Arthur, and to protect it herself, the rights of the Russo-Chinese Company being transferred to the Russian Government.

Nr. 12583. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Minister des Ausw. an den Gesandten in Japan. Die japanische Regierung hat die russische Regierung über das Mandschurei-abkommen befragt.

Foreign Office, January 12, 1901.

Sir, || The Japanese Minister called here to-day and informed Mr. Bertie that his Government had inquired of the Russian Government whether it was true, as reported, that arrangements had been made between the Russian Government and the Chinese authorities for negotiations with the Chinese Minister at St. Petersburg in regard to a settlement of affairs in Manchuria, and, if so, what was the nature

of the proposed arrangements. Baron Hayashi stated that he was instructed to ask whether Her Majesty's Government would make a similar inquiry of the Russian Government.

Nr. 12584. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Ausführliche Antwort auf Nr. 12578. Haltung der russischen Presse.

St. Petersburg, January 8, 1901. (January 14.)

(Extract.) || On receipt of your Lordship's telegram of the 3rd instant, I lost no time in endeavouring to ascertain whether anything was known here of the Agreement which the Peking correspondent of the „Times“ appears to have reported to have been concluded between Russia and China with regard to Manchuria, giving the former a virtual Protectorate over that province. || I abstained, however, in compliance with your Lordship's instructions, from making any official inquiry on this subject. || No mention of the report in the „Times“ had appeared in the Russian press, and it was, therefore, only on the receipt of foreign newspapers on the 6th and 7th instant that the existence of this report and the alleged details of the Agreement were known to the general public. || I found, however, that there was a general impression in well-informed circles that the Russian military authorities in temporary occupation of Manchuria, who were charged with the pacification of that province and the protection of the Manchurian section of the Trans-Siberian line, had authority to conclude provisional arrangements with the local Chinese authorities, and before reinstating them would take steps to secure a Russian supervision over their administration for the duration of the Russian occupation. || It was thought very possible that some such Agreement as that indicated in your Lordship's telegram had been already concluded by Admiral Alexeieff, and may have been in force for some time, but it was considered extremely improbable that, in the absence of any official relations with a central Chinese Government, a binding Convention dealing with the future of Manchuria could have been entered into between the two Governments. || It was further conjectured that the Russian Government might eventually endeavour to secure from the Chinese Government some modifications of the terms of the existing agreement with regard to the protection of the terminal section in Manchuria of the Russian railway line to Port Arthur, so as to enable her to protect it more effectually against the recurrence of recent disturbances. || The Russian press strongly urges the Imperial Government

to take this course, so as to enable it to take over for the State the rights now ostensibly exercised by the Chartered Russo-Chinese Company. || Since the receipt of a copy of the „Times“ of the 3rd instant, I have been in possession of the full text of the telegram from its Peking correspondent, and I must admit that I fail to see in it any sufficient ground for concluding that the alleged Agreement necessarily implies an international arrangement giving Russia a right of virtual protectorate over Southern Manchuria, extending beyond the period of its temporary occupation by her troops for the purpose of pacification. || It might, I conceive, be argued with equal force and equal injustice, that any temporary arrangement which the allied forces engaged in a similar task in the province of Pechili may find themselves obliged to conclude with local Chinese authorities indicate their intention to assume permanently a virtual protectorate over that province, or a departure from their disclaimers of seeking any territorial advantages or annexations infringing on the independence and integrity of China. || It seems unlikely that the Russian Government would in their own interest unnecessarily take any action which would give Japan or any other Power a ground for considering themselves released from the obligation of their disclaimers.

Nr. 12585. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Minister des Ausw. an den Gesandten in Peking. Der chinesische Gesandte verleugnet das Mandschureiabkommen.

Foreign Office, January 15, 1901.

Sir, || The Chinese Minister told me to-day that it was not the case that an agreement, as stated in the newspapers, had been arrived at between the Chinese and Russian Governments for the occupation of the Province of Manchuria by the latter.

Lansdowne.

Nr. 12586. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Russisch-chinesische Verhandlungen. Keine Landabtretung.

St. Petersburg, January 22, 1901. (January 22.)

(Telegraphic.) || I am informed that Count Lamsdorff is negotiating with the Chinese Minister here with a view to guarantee Russia against the recurrence of attacks on the side of Manchuria, and to prevent frontier disturbances. These arrangements would not involve any terri-

torial acquisition or the exercise of Protectorate by Russia, but were to provide for the protection during construction and working of the line to Port Arthur.

Nr. 12587. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Minister des Ausw. an den Botschafter in Petersburg. Soll den russischen Minister interpellieren.

Foreign Office, January 22, 1901.

Sir, || On the approaching reassembly of Parliament, questions are certain to be addressed to Her Majesty's Government with regard to the alleged Agreement between Russia and China as to Southern Manchuria. || I should therefore wish you to take the first convenient opportunity of ascertaining from Count Lausdorff, whilst avoiding any appearance of demanding an explanation of the Russian proceedings, what answer should be made to such inquiries.

Lansdowne.

Nr. 12588. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw. Rußland verlangt die sofortige Ratifikation des Mandschurei-Abkommens.

Peking, February 5, 1901. (February 6.)

(Telegraphic.) || I learn that the immediate ratification of the Agreement which I reported in my telegram of the 4th ultimo is being insisted upon by the Russian Government, who desire the following conditions for permanent settlement:— || 1. The leased territory in the peninsula of Liaotung shall include the city of Kinchow. || 2. Provides for the appointment, only after Russia's previous consent has been obtained, of the Governor-General of the Manchurian Provinces. || 3. Agreement as to the strength of police force which the Chinese shall maintain will be made between Russia and China. || 4. The supervision of the above police force will be intrusted to a Russian officer on the staff of each Governor-General. || 5. Adjustment of the indemnity for military expenses will be made here; the damage to the railway is, however, not included. || 6. Russia is desirous of purchasing the railway to the north of Shanhaikwan, the purchase-money to be deducted from the amount to be claimed as war indemnity. The balance and interest of this is to

be paid from the Customs revenues in Manchuria. || 7. Custom-houses in Manchuria to be controlled and managed by Russia. || 8. Manchuria to be evacuated by Russian troops by degrees.

Nr. 12589. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Unterredung mit Lamsdorff. Rußland sucht einen *modus vivendi* mit China.

St. Petersburg, February 6, 1901. (February 11.)

My Lord, || I have the honour to report that I found an opportunity to-day, whilst avoiding any appearance of asking explanations of Russia's proceedings in Manchuria, to ascertain from Count Lamsdorff what might be stated as the actual facts with regard to the alleged agreement between Russia and China as to Southern Manchuria in case interpellations were addressed to His Majesty's Government in Parliament on this subject. || Count Lamsdorff gave me the true version of what had taken place very readily. || He said that as far as he had read the allegations in the press which would probably give rise to questions in Parliament, they had asserted that Russia had concluded, or was engaged in concluding with China, a Convention or permanent arrangement which would give Russia new rights and a virtual Protectorate in Southern Manchuria. || This was quite untrue, and the only ground for the rumour must have been the fact that the Russian military authorities who had been engaged in the temporary occupation and pacification of that province had been directed, when reinstating the Chinese authorities in their former posts, to arrange with the local civil authorities the terms of a *modus vivendi* between them for the duration of the simultaneous presence of Russian and Chinese authorities in Southern Manchuria, the object being to prevent the recurrence of disturbances in the vicinity of the Russian frontier, and to protect the railway from the Russian frontier to Port Arthur. || Some of the details of the proposed *modus vivendi* had been sent for consideration to St. Petersburg, but no Convention or arrangement with the Central Government of China or of a permanent character had been concluded with regard to Manchuria, nor had the Emperor any intention of departing in any way from the assurances which he had publicly given that Manchuria would be entirely restored to its former condition in the Chinese Empire as soon as circumstances admitted of it. || Russia was in the same position with regard to fixing a final date for evacuating Manchuria as the allies found them-

selves with regard to the evacuation of Peking and the Province of Pechili. || When it came to the final and complete evacuation of Manchuria the Russian Government would be obliged to obtain from the Central Government of China an effective guarantee against the recurrence of the recent attack on her frontier and the destruction of her railway, but had no intention of seeking this guarantee in any acquisition of territory or of an actual or virtual Protectorate over Manchuria, the object being to simply guarantee the faithful observance in the future by China of the terms of the Agreement, which she had been unable to fulfil during the disturbances. || The terms of this guarantee might possibly form the subject of conversation here between Count Lamsdorff and the Chinese Minister or be left for discussion at Peking. || Meanwhile, it might be confidently stated that any arrangements which may have given rise to the allegations in the press were purely of the temporary character of a *modus vivendi* between the Russian military authorities and the local civil authorities in Southern Manchuria, that no Convention or arrangement had been concluded with the Central Government of China, in contemplation of any alteration of the former international status of that province, which would be restored to China when all the temporary measures taken by the Russian military authorities would cease, and everything at Newchwang and elsewhere be replaced in its former position.

Charles S. Scott.

Nr. 12590. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Minister des Ausw. an die Vertretungen in Tokio, Peking und Berlin. China soll kein Separatabkommen mit einer Macht schließen.

Foreign Office, February 13, 1901.

(Telegraphic.) || Russo-Chinese Agreement respecting Manchuria. || The German Government will inform the Chinese Government that they should not, in the opinion of the Imperial Government, conclude individual Treaties of a territorial or financial character with any Power before they can estimate their obligations towards all the Powers as a whole, and before the compliance with such obligations is accepted. || I have informed the Chinese Minister that any such Agreement as that reported to have been concluded with regard to Manchuria would, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, be a source of danger to the Chinese Government, and that no Arrangement affecting territorial rights

in the Chinese Empire ought to be concluded between the Chinese Government and any one of the Powers.

(To Sir E. Satow only.) || I request that you will make a communication to the Chinese Government in the terms of that made by me to the Chinese Minister as reported above.

Nr. 12591. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Gesandte in Japan an den Minister des Ausw. Antwort auf das Vorige.

Tôkiô, February 15, 1901. (February 15.)

(Telegraphic.) || Warning to Chinese Government against making separate agreements with the Powers. || Referring to your telegram of the 13th February, the Chinese Representative here has been addressed by the Japanese Government in the same sense. They have added that China should make no separate Agreement with any Power, and that all Agreements arising out of the present negotiations should be joint.

Nr. 12592. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Minister des Ausw. an den Gesandten in Peking. Er hat dem chinesischen Gesandten ein Separatabkommen wider-raten.

Foreign Office, February 15, 1901.

Sir, || The Chinese Minister called on me this afternoon, and I informed him that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, any such Agreement as that reported to have been concluded with regard to Manchuria would be a source of danger to the Chinese Government, and that no arrangement affecting territorial rights in the Chinese Empire ought to be concluded between the Chinese Government and any one of the Powers. || Sir Chihechen Lofêngluh promised to repeat to his Government what I had said. || I have instructed you by telegraph to make a similar communication to the Chinese Government.

Lansdowne.

Nr. 12593. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Lamsdorff verleugnet jede territoriale Erwerbung in der Mandschurei.

St. Petersburg, February 17, 1901. (February 17.)

(Telegraphic.) || Russia and Manchuria. || Count Lamsdorff, while saying that when the time came for final evacuation Russia must insist

upon some guarantee against a recurrence of disturbances in this frontier province and for the better protection of her railway, distinctly disclaimed any intention to acquire for Russia any territory or Protectorate in Manchuria. || His Excellency said that he readily gave me the facts and authority to deny the truth of the reported Russo-Chinese Agreement, and to explain that nothing beyond the terms of a temporary *modus vivendi* during the period of provisional occupation by Russian troops was being negotiated. In giving the explanation, his Excellency added that he understood that I was not instructed to ask officially for explanations, but only to seek information in case questions were asked in Parliament.

Nr. 12594. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw. Antwort auf 12590.

Peking, February 19, 1901. (February 19.)

(Telegraphic.) || I made the communication on the 16th February, as instructed in your Lordship's telegram of the 13th February. || Similar instructions have been received by my German and Japanese colleagues; but the German Government did not explicitly mention Manchuria in their message to their Minister.

Nr. 12595. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Derselbe an Denselben. Die chinesische Regierung bittet um Unterstützung gegen die russischen Forderungen in der Mandchurei.

Peking, February 27, 1901. (February 27.)

(Telegraphic.) || The following telegram received from the Acting Consul-General at Hankow yesterday: — || The Viceroy's Secretary came by instruction to see me yesterday, and showed me a summary the Viceroy had received by telegram of the Treaty which is being pressed at St. Petersburg upon the Chinese Minister. His Excellency urges that the signature of this Treaty means granting exclusive privileges, and inquires how far His Majesty's Government would support China if she refused to do so. || The following are the provisions: — || 1. Manchuria to be restored. || 2. Until the last four provisions of the Treaty are carried out, Russia will maintain an additional force for the protection of the Manchurian Railway. || 3. Assistance to be given to China by Russia in keeping order. || 4. No army to be maintained by China

until the completion of the Manchurian railway, and then Russia is to be consulted as to the strength of the army. No munitions of war are to be imported. || 5. If Russia complains of any official, however high his rank, he shall be cashiered. The strength of the police is to be settled with Russia; they are not to possess artillery, and no foreigners other than Russians are to be employed in it. || 6. No foreigners are to be employed in connection with the sea or land forces in North China. || 7. Abolition of Chinese administration in the town of Chinchou. || 8. China is not to grant any mining, railway or other rights without the permission of Russia in the territory upon the Russian border, i. e., Manchuria, Mongolia, Ili, Yarkand, &c., and Russia's permission is to be obtained before China builds railways in these. No lease is to be granted to any but Russians outside of Newchwang. || 9. The indemnities of the Powers and the expenses incurred by Russia in Manchuria are to be dealt with on the same footing. || 10. With reference to the damages suffered by the Manchurian Railway and its employés, these shall be made good by the [here the meaning is obscure]. || 11. Instead of this, Concessions may be accepted or existing contracts modified. || 12. Building of a railway line, on the same terms as the Manchurian Railway, from the main or branch line in the direction of Peking up to the Great Wall. || Here Mr. Fraser's telegram ends.

Confirmation is given to this information by what I ascertain here. Pressure is being brought by the Russian Legation on Li Hung-chang to obtain his consent. The whole question has evidently been referred to the Court. || As there seems some obscurity in the last portions of Mr. Fraser's telegram I have desired him to repeat them, and will send them on to your Lordship at once.

Nr. 12596. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Lamsdorff über die Rückkehr des chinesischen Hofes nach Peking und den modus vivendi in der Mandchurei.

St. Petersburg, February 28, 1901. (February 28.)

(Telegraphic.) || In conversation with Count Lamsdorff yesterday, his Excellency again spoke to me with great earnestness in the sense reported to your Lordship in my telegram of the 30th ultimo. || The foreign Ministers in Peking, he fears, may be underrating the seriousness of the situation now, just as previous to the last fanatical outbreak they underrated it. The slight check of a foreign military expedition, or any

other isolated incident might easily provoke a fresh outbreak and involve the Powers, whose troops are still occupying the Province of Pechili in further action than is at present contemplated, and would indefinitely retard the restoration of a normal state of things in China and the return of an independent Central Government to Peking. A situation injuriously affecting business in every part of the world would thus be prolonged. || When it is remembered that all that the Chinese hold most sacred has, in their eyes, been desecrated by the foreigners in Peking, he considers it not improbable that the Court will refuse to return to the ancient capital, and he fears that if forced to return against its will with foreign troops still in occupation, the hold on the allegiance of the people will be seriously endangered. || Should, on the other hand, the Court elect to remain in Singan, where permanent buildings are in course of construction, the re-establishment of a normal state of things and of diplomatic relations will be indefinitely postponed, as we can scarcely contemplate the establishment of Legations there. || It is Count Lamsdorff's opinion that the demands of the Powers having been accepted and punishments inflicted, our aim should be the return of the Court to Peking and its re-establishment in an independent position. || He has, he informed me, spoken in similar terms to Count Alvensleben, the new German Ambassador just arrived; and I gathered clearly from his language that, until a normal state of things as indicated above has been re-established in the Chinese capital, the *modus vivendi* with regard to the occupation of Manchuria will continue in force.

Nr. 12597. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw. Ergänzung zu Nr. 12595.

Peking, February 28, 1901. (February 28.)

(Telegraphic.) || In continuation of my telegram of yesterday, the Acting Consul-General at Hankow has repeated the Articles which were not clear in his previous telegram, *i. e.*, Nos. 10 and 11 of the Manchurian Agreement. || Article 10 provides that compensation shall be settled with the Railway Company with regard to the damage done to the Manchurian Railway and suffered by its employes. || Article 11 states that the form such compensation may take is the granting of new Concessions or modification of contracts now existing.

Nr. 12598. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Minister des Ausw. an den Gesandten in Peking. Die chinesische Regierung wünscht Vermittelung in der Mandschureifrage.

Foreign Office, March 1, 1901.

(Telegraphic.) || I am informed by the Chinese Minister that he has received instructions from his Government by Imperial Edict to request the mediation of His Majesty's Government in regard to the proposed Russo-Chinese Agreement respecting Manchuria. || A similar request has been made by the Chinese Government to the German, Japanese, and United States' Governments. || The Minister read to me a telegram from the Viceroy of Wuchang containing a request for the support and intervention of His Majesty's Government. He also read to me a telegram from the Chinese Plenipotentiaries containing a similar suggestion. || I informed the Minister that the alleged new Agreement had attracted our attention; that I considered it a matter of very serious importance; and that the descriptions received by us suggested the idea that it involved not only a temporary and provisional arrangement affecting a part of Manchuria, but the virtual establishment by Russia of a Protectorate over the whole of Manchuria as well as over Chinese Turkestan and Mongolia. || No copy of the official text had, however, yet reached us. This we hoped to obtain, and we should then have to confer with the other Powers whose mediation had been invited by China. || I assumed that China would not commit herself in the meantime, and that she would await the answer to her request for mediation before she took any further steps. || The substance of my conversation with the Chinese Minister has been communicated to the German and Japanese Governments.

Nr. 12599. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw. Der Gesandte der Verein. Staaten protestiert ebenfalls gegen ein Separat-abkommen.

Peking, March 2, 1901. (March 2.)

(Telegraphic.) || With reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 14th ultimo, a similar warning will be addressed to the Chinese Plenipotentiaries by the United States' Plenipotentiary, who has just received his instructions.

Nr. 12600. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Minister des Ausw. an den Gesandten in Peking. Vermittlungsfrage.

Foreign Office, March 2, 1901.

(Telegraphic.) || Russian-Manchurian Agreement. || My telegram of the 1st March. || It has been stated to me by the Chinese Minister that his instruction to request the mediation of His Majesty's Government was by an Imperial Edict dated the 28th February. || He further explains that the telegram to him from the Chinese Plenipotentiaries expressed the hope of the latter that the Powers would not oppose the Agreement, as they are of opinion that it will not deprive China of any part of her territory or financial rights, and a rupture of the relations between China and Russia might result from opposition.

Nr. 12601. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Minister des Ausw. an den Botschafter in Petersburg. Die englische Regierung wünscht den Text des Mandchurei-abkommens zu erhalten.

Foreign Office, March 4, 1901.

(Telegraphic.) || Express my thanks to Count Lamsdorff for his permission, reported in your telegram of the 27th ultimo, to present to Parliament your despatch of the 6th ultimo, recording a conversation with his Excellency respecting the reported Russo-Chinese Agreement as to Manchuria. His Majesty's Government will avail themselves of the permission, and will present the despatch with the amendments suggested by his Excellency. || I fear that, though its presentation will somewhat allay, it will not dispel, the apprehensions created by the publication of various versions of the Agreement which is now under discussion at St. Petersburg, according to advices received by His Majesty's Government. || By the terms of these the idea is certainly suggested that much more is involved than a temporary and provisional arrangement having in view the prevention of the recurrence of the recent disturbances, as well as the protection of the railway. || There is no limit assigned for the duration of the Agreement as a whole, and its termination is made to depend, in respect of certain clauses, on the fulfilment of conditions, in complying with which there might be an indefinite delay. || Again, other provisions are of an enduring character on the face of them, and also in some cases inconsistent with the Treaty obligations incurred towards other Powers by China. || The Agreement is also described as containing provisions for the conclusion of a separate arrangement with

regard to the indemnity for the destruction of the Trans-Manchurian Railway, which is claimed by Russia. || China should not, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, enter into any separate arrangement with individual Powers which might be calculated to affect permanently her territorial, political, financial, or commercial status. || In reply to inquiries made by China as to our views, His Majesty's Government have expressed this opinion, and they are glad to find that the intention of making an arrangement of the kind is disclaimed by the Russian Government. || His Majesty's Government trust, however, in view of the persistent reports to which I have referred, that the Russian Government may communicate to them, for their information, the actual text of the Agreement or Agreements.

Nr. 12602. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Minister des Ausw. an den Botschafter in Berlin. Die deutsche Regierung wünscht die Mandschureifrage vor die Gesandtenkonferenz zu ziehen.

Foreign Office, March 5, 1901.

(Telegraphic.) || Russian-Manchurian Agreements: my telegram of the 1st instant to Sir E. Satow. || I have learnt from the German Ambassador that his Government have been informed by the American Ambassador at Berlin of the appeal which the Chinese Court have made at Washington, and of their request for advice. || It is the intention of the German Government to reply to the following effect to any such appeal. || The principle that questions affecting China should be settled by the concert of the Powers, and not directly between Cabinet and Cabinet, has all along obtained the adherence of the German Government. || Consequently, they suggest that the Chinese Government should apply to the Conference of Ministers at Peking in this matter.

Nr. 12603. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Minister des Ausw. an den Gesandten in Peking. Die chinesische Regierung soll dem deutschen Vorschlage im vorigen zustimmen.

Foreign Office, March 5, 1901.

(Telegraphic.) || Russian-Manchurian Agreements: my telegram to Sir F. Lascelles of to-day repeated to you. || Do what you can to induce the Chinese Government to accept the German suggestion that they should apply to the Conference of Ministers at Peking in this matter.

Nr. 12604. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw. Übersendet den Text des Mandschureiabkommens.

Peking, March 6, 1901. (March 6.)

(Telegraphic.) || I have obtained Chinese text, of which following is a translation: —

„1. The Emperor of Russia, being anxious to give evidence of his friendly feeling towards China, is willing to forget the hostile acts committed in Manchuria, and to hand back the whole of that country to China — its administration to be carried on as heretofore. || „2. Under Article 6 of the Manchurian Railway Agreement, the Administration is authorized to maintain troops for the protection of the line. The country, however, being at present in an unsettled condition, and such troops few in number, a body of soldiers must be retained until order is restored, and until China shall have carried out the provisions of the last four Articles of the present Convention. || „3. In the event of grave disturbances the Russian garrisons will afford China every assistance in suppressing the same that lies in their power. || „4. In the recent attacks against Russia, Chinese troops having taken a prominent part, China agrees, pending the completion of the line and its opening to traffic, not to establish an army (in those provinces). She will consult with Russia as to the number of troops she may subsequently wish to establish there. The importation of munitions of war into Manchuria is prohibited. || „5. With a view to safeguarding the interests of the territory in question, China will, on representations being made by Russia, at once deprive of office any Military Governor or other high official, whose conduct of affairs may prove antagonistic to the maintenance of friendly relations. || „A police force, consisting of mounted and unmounted units, may be organized in the interior of Manchuria. Its numbers shall be determined after consultation with Russia, and from its armament artillery shall be excluded. The services of the subjects of any other Power shall not be employed in connection therewith. || „6. In conformity with the undertaking given by China at an earlier date, she will not employ the subjects of any other Power in training Chinese soldiers or sailors in North China. || „7. The neighbouring local authorities will, in the interests of peace and order, draw up new special Regulations with reference to the neutral zone (see Agreement of the 27th March, 1898) treated of in Article 5 of the Agreement relating to the lease (of part of the Liaotung Peninsula). || China's autonomous rights in the City of Chinchon, secured to her by Article 4 of

the Special Agreement (of the 7th May, 1898) are hereby abrogated. || „8. China shall not, without the consent of Russia, grant to any other Power, or the subjects thereof, privileges with regard to mines, railroads or other matters in conterminous (*i. e.*, with Russia) regions, such as Manchuria, Mongolia, and the sections of the new Dominion known as Tarbagati, Ili, Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khoten. Nor shall China, without Russia's consent, construct [rail]roads there herself. || „Except as far as Newchwang is concerned, no leases of land shall be granted to the subjects of any other Power. || „9. China being under obligation to pay Russia's war expenses and the claims of other Powers, arising out of the recent troubles, the amount of the indemnity presented in the name of Russia, the period within which it will have to be paid, and the security therefore will all be arranged in concert with the other Powers. || „10. The compensation to be paid for the destruction of the railway lines, for the robbery of property, belonging to the Railway Administration and its employés, as well as claims for delay in carrying on the construction of the line, will form subject of arrangement between China and the Administration. || „11. The above-mentioned claims may, by agreement with the Administration, either in part or in whole, be commuted for other privileges. The grant of such privileges would involve a complete revision of the previous Agreement. || „In conformity with the undertaking previously given by China, it is agreed that a line may be constructed from either the trunk line or the branch line (of Manchurian Railway) in the direction of Peking up to the Great Wall, its administration to be governed by the Regulations at present in force.“

China's liberty of action is infringed by the prohibition to employ foreigners in Articles 5 and 6. || Article 8 is contrary to possible interests of other Powers, and lays the foundation for future treatment of those districts in the same way as Manchuria. || The railway indemnity is withdrawn from the purview of the Powers by Article 10.

Nr. 12605. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Minister des Ausw. an den Botschafter in Washington. Unterredung mit dem amerikanischen Botschafter über chinesische Sonderabkommen.

Foreign Office, March 6, 1901.

My Lord, || The United States' Ambassador spoke to me to-day at some length with regard to the Agreement alleged to be in contemplation between Russia and China with reference to the northern provinces of

the Chinese Empire. || His Excellency clearly recognized the importance of the contemplated transaction, if correctly reported, as threatening the Treaty rights of other Powers, and also as being something more than a temporary and provisional arrangement between Russia and China. || I handed to his Excellency a copy of Sir C. Scott's despatch of the 6th ultimo. || In reply to his inquiries I suggested that all we could do for the present was to endeavour to obtain the authentic text of the proposed Agreement, and in the meanwhile to discourage the Chinese from committing themselves to it. || I said that I had read with much satisfaction the Memorandum communicated to the Chinese Minister at Washington on the 19th February, which he had been good enough to communicate to me on the 2nd instant. I thought, in particular, that the suggestion contained in the last sentence of the Memorandum was particularly appropriate, viz., that in which the American Government expresses its sense of the extreme danger to the interests of China of considering any private territorial or financial arrangements, at least without the full knowledge and approval of all the Powers now engaged in negotiation. || I thought that all the Powers might well agree to some such arrangement as that indicated in this passage, and that we might perhaps even go further and propose, as a self-denying Ordinance which all the Powers might accept, that we should agree not to recognize the validity of any private arrangement made separately between China and individual Powers until it had been referred to the Representatives of all the Powers. If such a proposal were to be made to us by the United States' Government I felt confident that I should be able to obtain for it the support of His Majesty's Government. || The Ambassador told me that he would telegraph to Washington to inquire what the United States' Government were doing in consequence of the request made by the Chinese Government for their mediation, and that he would repeat to his Government the substance of what I had said to him.

Lansdowne.

Nr. 12606. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Minister des Ausw. an den Gesandten in Peking. Hat dem chinesischen Gesandten in London jedes Separatabkommen widerraten.

Foreign Office, March 6, 1901.

Sir, || The Chinese Minister asked me to-day whether I had any answer to give him to the three documents which he had communicated to me last week, viz.: — || 1. The imperial Decree of the 28th February,

asking for the mediation of the four Powers; || 2. The telegram received from the Viceroy of Wuchang, asking for our intervention; and || 3. The telegram from the Chinese Plenipotentiaries, in which they suggested the uselessness of further resistance to the Russian demand. || I said that I was in communication with the three other Powers whose mediation had been invoked, but that all I could say to him at present was that I held very strongly the opinion which I had already expressed to him, viz., that his Government should on no account commit itself to any Agreement of the kind said to be in contemplation.

Lansdowne.

Nr. 12607. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Lamsdorff verweigert die Mitteilung des Mandschureivertrages.

St. Petersburg, March 7, 1901. (March 7.)

(Telegraphic.) || At an interview which I had with Count Lansdorff to-day I read to him a French translation of the message contained in your Lordship's telegram of the 4th instant, but did not leave a copy of it with him. || His Excellency objected strongly to the suggestion that he should communicate to His Majesty's Government the actual text of the conditions for the evacuation of Manchuria by Russian troops which were still under discussion with China, in order to correct impressions raised as to their nature and bearing by maliciously garbled and incorrect accounts in the press. || Even supposing that the terms had been definitely fixed, and he had them in his portfolio before him, to communicate the details to a third party would, in his Excellency's opinion, be incompatible with the character of an independent State in negotiation with another. || In reply, I pointed out that neither protest nor demand for such a communication, if the Russian Government did not desire to make it in order that misconceptions might be dissipated, was contained in the words I had read to him. It was not on the press that we were dependent for the version we had of the Articles under discussion, but — and we did not desire to make any secret of this to the Russian Government — China had asked us for our views on them, and, as we had a perfect right to do, we had frankly given them. || His Excellency said that he had been informed by the Chinese that the only thing which prevented them from accepting the Russian conditions was the strong opposition of His Majesty's Government, and it was self-evident that to sow dissension between the two Powers was the object in both cases. || The question of

Manchuria was, he maintained, quite apart from the questions which were being negotiated with China by the Powers in concert, and Russia had a perfect right to make what conditions she chose for the evacuation of the province by her troops — if China did not accept these the occupation could continue. It was China which was pressing early evacuation upon Russia, and not Russia which was pressing terms on China. || Germany, his Excellency said, had always understood that this question would be settled by Russia in a separate Agreement with China apart from the other negotiations, and Count Bülow had recently repeated that arrangements about Manchuria were no concern of Germany's. || I had no knowledge, I said, of Germany's interests, and of Russia's right to take what course she liked there was no question — the question was whether China had the right to free herself from Treaty obligations to other Powers, or, while in negotiation with other creditors, to enter into separate Agreements which permanently affected her territorial, political, commercial, and financial status. || There was no intention, Count Lamsdorff said, of injuriously affecting these negotiations or interfering with the acquired rights of other Powers. || His Excellency could not, however, give me any more positive assurances than were to be found in the declared intentions of the Emperor. The violent suspicion displayed in Parliament and in the English press of their loyalty was regrettable, and was causing great irritation in the highest quarters in Russia. || His Majesty's Government, I said, were not responsible for public feeling in England. They were only anxious to allay unjust suspicions, and hoped that the Russian Government would assist them in doing so by a frank and confidential communication.

Nr. 12608. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Minister des Ausw. an den Botschafter in Petersburg. Soll dem Grafen Lamsdorff den Text des Mandschureiabkommens vorlegen (Nr. 12604).

Foreign Office, March 9, 1901.

(Telegraphic.) || Russian Manchurian Agreement: || Your telegram of the 7th March. || You should communicate the text, as reported by Sir E. Satow in his telegram of the 6th instant, to Count Lamsdorff, at the same time pointing out to his Excellency that if this version of the Agreement is approximately accurate it seems impossible to reconcile it with the assurances given by him and reported in your despatch of the 6th February, which has been laid before Parliament; that it is impossible to describe it as a contract of a temporary and provisional nature, and

that our Treaty rights are certainly affected by it. || On the other hand, it is surely reasonable that we should ask his Excellency's help in exposing the trick and putting the saddle on the right horse if, as he suggests, garbled versions of the Agreement are being circulated by the Chinese Government in order to create dissension between the Powers; and you may state that to join the Russian Government in exhibiting in its true light so discreditable a manoeuvre would afford the liveliest satisfaction to His Majesty's Government.

Nr. 12609. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Lamsdorff lehnt eine Diskussion des Mandschureiabkommens ab.

St. Petersburg, March 11, 1901. (March 11.)

(Telegraphic.) || At my last interview with Count Lamsdorff I took upon myself the responsibility of offering to show the versions of the Manchurian Agreement we had received to his Excellency in order that he might assist us in defeating together any malicious attempts to sow dissension between the Powers by pointing out where they were garbled or incorrect. || His Excellency said that these could only be pretended versions of what was at best at that moment a programme of Agreement neither concluded nor signed, in the drawing up of which his colleagues, General Kuropatkine and M. de Witte, had been equally engaged, and he positively declined to look at them or commit himself by discussing or correcting them. He added that if he were to assert that anything was correct to-day, a week from now it might be incorrect. || A temporary *modus vivendi* with the local authorities to regulate the conditions of the provisional Administration was the only agreement that had actually been concluded, and this, I understand, will remain in force until the conclusion with the Representatives of the Central Government of the further Agreement, whatever it may be, which must precede final evacuation. || His Excellency said that, in his opinion, the foreign Governments could only pursue one of two courses: either to meet Russia and the assurances which the Emperor gave in August last, with trust or with distrust, and in the latter case it would be quite justifiable for them to take whatever steps they thought were best in order that their own interests might be safeguarded. || As for Russia's interests, she would take care to safeguard them herself.

Nr. 12610. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw. Die chinesische Regierung fordert in Petersburg Änderung des Mandchureiabkommens.

Peking, March 11, 1901. (March 11.)

(Telegraphic.) || Russo-Chinese Manchurian Agreement. || At an interview this day with Prince Ch'ing I adverted to the danger on China from the Articles reported in my telegram of the 5th instant. || His Highness admitted that it was so, and stated that instructions had been sent to the Chinese Minister at St. Petersburg to press for their omission. || I told his Highness that the indemnity, to the Manchurian Railway ought to be placed on a par with other claims for indemnity and I pressed him to communicate to the foreign Representatives the draft Convention. || Prince Ch'ing replied that he would desire to invite the opinion of the foreign Representatives as soon as the draft had assumed a more definite shape.

Nr. 12611. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Antwort auf Nr. 12608. Unterredung mit Lamsdorff.

St. Petersburg, March 13, 1901. (March 13.)

(Telegraphic.) || I read, this afternoon, to Count Lamsdorff, a French paraphrase of your Lordship's telegram of the 9th instant, but did not leave him a copy or show it to him. || He told me that the Emperor approved his action in declining to discuss, officially, the details of negotiations with China which were still under consideration, and he refused to see the version of the Agreement which we had received. He argued that it was incompatible with the dignity of Russia to give information for the satisfaction of a foreign Legislative Assembly, as to the exact terms of a draft Agreement, which had not yet taken a definite form. In his opinion we could both afford to view with silence and indifference any manoeuvres not unnaturally resorted to by China in her present difficulties. || After this official reply to my proposal to communicate the translation of the Chinese version of the Agreement, he said that although he was anxious not to make any statement which could in any way be interpreted as an official assurance, or which was likely to be presented to Parliament, he thought that when the time came for the communication of the Agreement in its final form, it would cause agreeable surprise to find that it contained no stipulations affecting the

Treaty rights of other Powers, and that to secure respect for all existing Treaties had been the object of his careful attention, and that he would keep in view all that had been said to him on this subject. || He informed me, however, in strict confidence, that in order to guard against a recurrence of anti-foreign outbursts in the neighbourhood of the Russian frontier, it was quite possible that a stipulation would be included to prevent China granting Concessions to any foreigners, including Russians, for the present, as fresh foreign elements introduced before order was entirely re-established might easily provoke a renewal of the disturbances, necessitating fresh measures of repression.

Nr. 12612. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Minister des Ausw. an den Gesandten in Peking. Haltung Li Hung-Tschangs.

Foreign Office, March 13, 1901.

Sir, || The Chinese Minister told me to-day that Li Hung-chang's telegram, which he had communicated to me on the 1st instant, and which rather conveyed the impression that Li was in favour of complying with the demands of Russia as to the Manchurian Agreement, was in reality written with a different object. Li was just as much averse to such an Agreement as the Imperial Court and the Yang-tsze Viceroys, and had only suggested that China should accept it if it became clear that such a course was absolutely inevitable.

Lansdowne.

Nr. 12613. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Minister des Ausw. an die Vertreter in Petersburg, Peking, Tokio. Die chinesische Regierung hat eine Änderung des Abkommens in Petersburg vorgeschlagen.

Foreign Office, March 16, 1901.

(Telegraphic.) || Manchurian Agreement. || Sir E. Satow's telegram of 6th instant. || The Chinese Government, according to information reaching us from a reliable source, have proposed to Russia to modify Articles 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, and 12 of the draft Convention, and, after consultation with the Ministers of War and Finance, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has to some extent consented, and after it has been submitted to the Czar, an amended draft will be communicated to the Chinese Minister.

Nr. 12614. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw. Modifikation des Mandschureiabkommens.

Peking, March 17, 1901. (March 17.)

(Telegraphic.) || Referring to my telegram of the 6th instant, I am informed that the following modifications, satisfactory to China, have been made in the Manchurian Agreement. || There will be no interference by Russia in Manchuria with regard to the appointments of Chinese officials, nor with the customs or *li-kin* collection there. || The article relating to Mongolia and Turkestan is to be eliminated. || China is only to grant mining and railway concessions in Manchuria to foreigners after she has referred to Russia. || Russia withdraws her stipulation respecting foreign instructors for the army and navy. || The Chinese Administration in Kinchow is to remain. || Signature of the Agreement must take place within fourteen days. It may be made known afterwards. || I am also informed from an equally good source that the cession of Newchwang Railway will no longer be claimed by Russia, who, however, stipulates that she may have the right to construct a branch up to the Great Wall from the Manchurian line.

Nr. 12615. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Bestätigung von Nr. 12613.

St. Petersburg, March 18, 1901. (March 18.)

(Telegraphic.) || I have reason to believe that the information reported in your Lordship's telegram of the 16th instant is correct, and that a new Agreement has been drafted and approved by the Minister of War, of a more provisional character, and meeting most of the objections intimated by other Powers to China. || Any preliminary Agreement must, it is understood, be ratified by the Central Government when reinstated in a position of complete independence, but, in the meantime, as is earnestly desired by the Emperor, the Russians will be enabled to withdraw from Manchuria the greater part of the troops now in occupation. || An authoritative statement will, I understand, shortly be published further explaining the intentions of the Emperor and the motives of his policy.

Nr. 12616. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw. Näheres über die Modifikation des Mandschureiabkommens.

Peking, March 19, 1901. (March 19.)

(Telegraphic.) || With reference to my telegram of the 16th instant, the 6th Article of the Russo-Chinese Manchurian Agreement has been omitted. || Article 4. The number of troops and military posts in Manchuria is to be determined with Russia. In accordance with common agreement to be made with the Powers, prohibition of importation of arms and ammunition. Meantime, prohibition to be made by China. || Article 5. Any Governor-General, or other high official, complained of by Russia as having acted in an improper manner in matters which affect foreign policy is to be transferred at once. China may maintain a police force of cavalry and infantry, determining its strength in consultation with Russia. This body is, however, not to have cannon until the pacification of the country, and only Chinese are to be enrolled. || Article 7. The local authorities in the neighbourhood of the neutral zone, provided for by Article V of the Convention relating to the lease of the Peninsula of Liaotung, are to frame a set of special Regulations suitable to the circumstances. || Article 8. Without previous consultation with Russia, China shall not grant to any other Power, or its subjects, railway and mining concessions and commercial advantages throughout Manchuria. || Article 10. The principles agreed upon by the Representatives of the foreign Powers and approved by their Governments shall be used to adjust the indemnities for the destruction of railways, of the Railway Company employés' property, and for losses due to delay of work. || Article 12. It is stated that China has contravened a previous Russo-Chinese Agreement by constructing a railway line direct into Manchuria, from Shanhaikwan to Newchwang and Sinminting, with money borrowed from a private Company, on the 28th September, 1898. China is to give compensation for this by conceding the right to the East China Railway Company to build an extension line of its main railway to the Great Wall, on the Chihli-Manchurian boundary. || The other Articles, as they were in the original draft, remain unaltered.

Nr. 12617. CHINA. — Kaiserliches Dekret vom 20. März. — Der Gesandte in London soll die englische Regierung um Hilfe bitten.

(Communicated by Sir Chihchen Lofêngluh, March 21, 1901.) || (Translation.) || The Manchurian Agreement has now been amended, but the

stipulated time within which the Agreement is to be signed will soon expire. || As the Marquess of Lansdowne has advised us to wait for his reply, we have now to command Lofêngluh to ask Lord Lansdowne — || 1. Either to help us out of the difficulty; || 2. Or to ask Russia to extend the time stipulated for signing the Agreement. || Otherwise, we, being placed in great difficulty, will be unable to oppose Russia any further. || An immediate reply is to be expected. || Respect this.

Nr. 12618. GROSSBRITANNIEN.—Der Generalkonsulin in Schanghai an den Minister des Ausw. Dasselbe.

Shanghae, March 20, 1901. (March 21.)

(Telegraphic.) || At the instance of the Yang-tsze Viceroys, Sheng Taotai, under instructions from the Chinese Government, requests me to telegraph to your Lordship stating that six days still remain before China must ratify Manchurian Convention, and requests that England, the United States, Germany, and Japan, will intervene to obtain an extension of time with a view to the modification of the Articles regarding Civil Administration, the Chinese garrisons in Manchuria, Russian exclusive trading rights, and the railway to the Great Wall.

Nr. 12619. CHINA. — Kaiserliches Dekret vom 21. März an den Gesandten in London. Neues Ersuchen um Vermittlung in der Mandschureifrage.

(Communicated by Sir Chihchen Lofêngluh, March 23.) || (Translation.) || Although certain amendments have been made in the Manchurian Agreement, yet there are still terms which will not only prove injurious to China, but also to the other countries who have Treaty rights in that region; but as the stipulated time will soon expire, and the demands of Russia are declared to be irrevocable, it will be impossible for China, if unaided, to help herself out of the difficulty. We must therefore apply to foreign Powers to influence Russia to extend the time for further negotiations. || It was reported to us some time ago that the Marquess of Lansdowne had advised that the Agreement should not be signed whilst England and Japan were protesting against it, and the Chinese Plenipotentiaries in Peking reported yesterday that Sir Ernest Satow had promised to request the English Government to apply for extension of time from Russia. || We now command Li Shen-doh, Lofêngluh, and Wu Ting Fang to request the respective Governments to which they are

accredited to make a telegraph application to the Russian Government for an extension of time, so as to allow proper arrangements to be made for further changes in the conditions imposed upon us with regard to Manchuria. || Let the result of the consultations with the different foreign Ministers be reported to us by telegraph without delay. || Respect this.

Nr. 12620. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Generalkonsul in Schanghai an den Minister des Ausw. China ist eventuell bereit, das Mandschureiabkommen abzulehnen.

Shanghai, March 23, 1901. (March 23.)

(Telegraphic.) || I have seen a telegram received to-day by Shêng, Taotai, from the Court at Sianfu, from which I gather that if, in the event of Russia taking forcible possession of Manchuria, the other Powers would guarantee not to break off the present negotiations, and to eventually withdraw their troops from Peking, the Chinese Government would be willing to take the risk of refusing to ratify the Manchurian Convention. || Shêng also informs me that China's last day for signing Convention is the 26th March.

Nr. 12621. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Minister des Ausw. an den chinesischen Gesandten in London. Antwort auf Nr. 12617. — Lehnt die chinesische Bitte ab. — Bemerkung zu Nr. 12620.

Foreign Office, March 23, 1901.

My dear Minister, || You communicated to me on the 21st instant copy of an Imperial Decree of the 20th instant, in which it was recited that the Manchurian Agreement has now been amended, but the stipulated time within which the Agreement is to be signed will soon expire.

In the circumstances His Majesty's Government is invited — || 1. Either to help the Chinese Government out of their difficulty; || 2. Or to ask Russia to extend the time stipulated for signing the Agreement. || These proposals have been considered by His Majesty's Government. || They are of opinion that no good purpose could be served by asking the Russian Government to extend the time within which the proposed Agreement might be signed. || Such an extension would not be likely to remove the difficulties which have been created by the attempt to negotiate a separate Agreement between the Russian and Chinese Governments, or to get rid of the objectionable provisions and dangerous ambiguities which are to be found

in every version of the Agreement which has as yet come under the notice of His Majesty's Government. || His Majesty's Government remain of the opinion already conveyed to the Chinese Government by them and by other Powers, viz., that it will be a source of danger to China to enter into any such Agreement. || I may also remind you that I mentioned to you that in the event of China making separate arrangements detrimental to British interests, it might be necessary for us to consider what compensations we should require. || With regard to the suggestion that His Majesty's Government should help the Government of China out of the difficulty, His Majesty's Government have received through Mr. Brennan a communication from the Chinese Court from which we understand that what the Chinese Government most desire is an assurance that if China were to refuse to sign the Agreement and Russia was thereupon to seize Manchuria, the other Powers would all the same eventually withdraw their troops from Peking and the neighbourhood and would also continue the peace negotiations. I am of course unable to speak on behalf of other Powers; but I am able to say that, in the event supposed, His Majesty's Government would not discontinue the peace negotiations, and would be prepared to withdraw their forces (except those which it might be decided to leave in or near Peking for the purpose of securing the safety of the Legation) whenever the other Powers did the same.

Lansdowne.

Nr. 12622. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw. Li Hung Tschang wünscht dringend die englische Vermittlung.

Peking, March 24, 1901. (March 24.)

(Telegraphic.) || I have just received a visit from Li Hung-chang, who is very anxious to know whether His Majesty's Government have been able to obtain for China any extension of time for signature of the Manchurian Agreement.

Nr. 12623. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Unterredung mit Lamsdorff. Er lehnt die Mitteilung des Vertrags ab.

St. Petersburg, March 18, 1901. (March 25.)

(Extract.) || On the receipt of your Lordship's telegram of the 9th instant, instructing me to communicate to Count Lamsdorff the text supplied to His Majesty's Minister in Peking of the Agreement respecting

Manchuria, which the Russian Government was said to be pressing on the Chinese Government, I sought an interview with his Excellency, but he replied that to his great regret he would be too much occupied to receive me before Wednesday, the 13th, the usual diplomatic reception day. || Having, in the meantime, received your Lordship's permission to use my own discretion with regard to the desired communication, I took with me on Wednesday a copy of the text furnished by Sir E. Satow, and a French paraphrase of your Lordship's telegram. || I then told his Excellency that I had reported our last conversation to your Lordship and that His Majesty's Government had observed that it appeared to them only reasonable, in consequence of the suggestion that had been made, that the Chinese Government were circulating maliciously garbled versions of this Agreement in order to sow dissension between the Powers, to ask the Russian Government to assist them in exposing and defeating such a discreditable manoeuvre, and that for that purpose I had been furnished with the full text given to Sir E. Satow, and had brought it with me with instructions to point out that if this text was approximately correct it could certainly not be described as of a merely temporary and provisional nature, and that there were stipulations in it which undoubtedly affected rights which we enjoyed under our Treaties with China. || If these stipulations had been maliciously interpolated in the text, nothing, I said, would give His Majesty's Government greater satisfaction than to co-operate with the Russian Government in exposing the trick which had been played upon us, and putting the blame on the proper shoulders. || Count Lamsdorff at once said that he must firmly decline to look at the text which I had brought with me. He had, he said, made a faithful report to the Emperor of our last conversation on this subject, and His Majesty had thoroughly approved of his having declined to discuss the various versions of this alleged Agreement, which had reached His Majesty's Government, and had commanded him not to make the details of the draft Agreement in question, which was still under negotiation with China, and had not yet been given a final form, the subject of official conversation with any foreign Representative. || As regards your Lordship's message expressing the readiness of His Majesty's Government to co-operate in defeating any malicious manoeuvre on the part of the Chinese Government to sow dissension between us by circulating garbled versions of this draft, he could not help thinking that both our Governments might properly ignore any such attempts, as it was evident that, in the unfortunate predicament in which they found themselves, the Chinese would naturally resort to these methods, and it might even be said that any weak Power in the

same position would be tempted to act in the same manner. || He repeated that the Agreement was at present only in draft form, and at a later stage the Emperor would probably, of his own free will, authorize him to make some public statement with regard to it. I must be aware, he added, that original drafts of such arrangements generally contained more than appeared in the final draft, but until the Emperor sanctioned his doing so, he regretted that he could give me no official information with regard to its contents or consent to furnish replies to further interpellations in the English Parliament. || Count Lamsdorff then proceeded to remark upon the fact that I had been the only foreign Ambassador or Representative who had been instructed to suggest that he should communicate the text of this Agreement to him, and he again said that Germany had distinctly stated that she was indifferent to any arrangements which Russia might find it necessary to conclude with China in regard to Manchuria, and that the German Ambassador had quite recently assured him that his Government had no concern in the matter. || I then explained to his Excellency why I considered His Majesty's Government perfectly justified in instructing me to inquire respecting the Russo-Chinese Agreement. || Both Governments, I said, were engaged in a common negotiation with China; we had lately entered into an engagement to seek to avert any possible cause for conflict between our respective interests in China, to respect her integrity, and existing Treaties, and the Emperor had himself deigned to express to me personally his desire that there should be a frank and confidential exchange of views between the two Governments whenever any risk of conflicting interests presented itself. || We had received what purported to be the text of an Agreement which certainly did affect our Treaty rights in China, rights which we had obtained under the Treaty of Tien-tsin, after great material sacrifices, giving us an equality of treatment with all other foreign Powers in every part of Chinese territory including Manchuria, and his Excellency surely did not expect that we would ever consent to China abrogating these rights by a separate engagement with any other Power. || Our two Governments had, by a recent Agreement, which exclusively concerned railway enterprise, consented as regarded each other, and to avoid possible conflicts of interests, to forego in certain defined parts of China the use of some of our rights in supporting applications for Railway Concessions, but these rights were not abrogated as regarded China. || This, Count Lamsdorff readily admitted.

I then referred to various stipulations in the draft Agreement, which I had before me, and said that to take only one as an example, I found

that it gave Russia the exclusive right of obtaining Concessions of all kinds leases and of land in Manchuria, Mongolia, and the new territory of China, on the ground of their being contiguous to the Russian Empire. || Surely his Excellency was aware that part of this territory was contiguous to other Empires, and indeed one of the districts, named Khotan, was not in any proximity to Russian territory, but contiguous to dominions under the protection of my august Master the Emperor of India. || Count Lamsdorff replied that, as he had already informed me, he was not at liberty to discuss with me officially any details of the proposed Agreement, but if I would consent to treat his language as quite unofficial, he would tell me that when I saw the Agreement in its final form, I would, he was convinced, be agreeably surprised to find that it did not contain any infringement of our Treaty rights, such as I had feared, and that he had been carefully mindful of our engagements, and that all I had said to him on this subject had not fallen on deaf ears. || One thing he must warn me of: it might be considered necessary, by those whose special care was the prevention of disturbances and protection of the frontier, to call upon the Chinese Government not to grant, for the present, any new Concessions in Manchuria to Russians, or other foreigners, which would introduce fresh elements of foreign population, and thus provoke a fresh outbreak of anti-foreign fanaticism, such as had caused all the late troubles. || This would be a very wise and necessary precaution to take until the country had quite quieted down and the fanatical excitement had subsided, and it ought not to give rise to any reasonable objection. || He begged me to wait quietly until the Russian Government was in a position to make its own statement, and then he felt confident that I would be prepared to admit that much injustice had been done to Russia in the suspicions which this Agreement had aroused, and that he had not misled or misinformed me in any particular. || Count Lamsdorff also remarked that naturally all Agreements with the Chinese Representatives would require later on ratification by the Central Government when restored to its full independence.

Nr. 12624. **CHINA.** — Vizekönige Lew Kwun Yih und Chang Chih Tung an den Gesandten in London. Der Mandschureivertrag soll dem Schiedsspruch der Mächte vorgelegt werden.

Nanking Yamèn, March 24, 1901.

(Communicated Sir Chihchen Lofengluh, March 25.) (Translation.) || (Telegraphic.) || To the Cabinet Ministers of the British Government, ||

The Manchurian Agreement, though it has been slightly modified, is still full of objectionable provisions. The draft of it, in eleven Articles, must be known to you as it is to the Japanese Government. Russia urges China to sign it, and a certain time has been given her to do so; but China is unwilling to give away any part of her sovereign rights, and the Chinese Government has instructed their Ministers abroad to ask for the good offices of the foreign Governments to obtain from Russia an extension of time, and a favourable reply is awaited to their application. || China acted unwisely in the matter of the Boxer insurrection. The British Government pardoned the past, and agreed to leave to China an opportunity for her reconstruction. The Chinese Government and people are both extremely grateful for this, and feel encouraged to propose to introduce measures of reforms in the Administration as soon as the collective negotiations now going on shall have been concluded, and in this manner to respond to the expectations of the Treaty Powers friendly to China. || It is reported that, at the instance of Russia, the Powers will discontinue the collective negotiations in the event of the Manchurian Agreement being rejected. || As Manchuria is the cradle of the present dynasty, if we give away our sovereign rights in that region, how could China be viewed by the world as an independent country; and how could she face the foreign Powers who have exerted themselves to the utmost in her favour during the last year; and how could the balance of power in the Far East be maintained after it had been so much disturbed? These grave questions must be studied in the interest of the lasting peace of the world. || We have followed advice of the British Government to ask the Court to decide not to sign the Manchurian Agreement, and have decided to refer the draft Agreement of eleven Articles to the arbitration of the Treaty Powers, so as to effect removals of the objectionable clauses, and it might be signed then with the collective Agreement. If the foreign Governments will consent to act as Arbitrators it will be a great blessing to the East. The provinces in the south and east will only recognize the Awards of the foreign Powers, but will not accept the Russian draft Agreement. || With regard to the collective note which was signed some time ago, we pray that the negotiations at Peking may not be allowed to be interrupted by Russia, so that no new difficulties may crop up in the meantime. This is our sincere prayer and ardent desire. || A telegraphic reply is urgently requested. || *Note.* — This translation is to be accompanied by a copy of the Chinese original.

Nr. 12625. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Minister des Ausw. an den chinesischen Gesandten in London. Antwort auf das Vorige.

Foreign Office, March 25, 1901.

My dear Minister, || I have considered the telegram which you left with me to-day in which the Viceroy of the Yang-tsze Provinces inform His Majesty's Government that they have asked the Chinese Court not to sign the Manchurian Agreement, but to refer the draft to the arbitration of the Treaty Powers, if the latter will consent to act as Arbitrators. || In my letter of the 23rd instant, I have dealt with several of the points touched upon in the Viceroy's telegram. || With regard to the proposal that the Agreement between Russia and China as to Manchurian affairs should form the subject of arbitration by the Powers, I may remind you that His Majesty's Government have for some time past urged upon the Chinese Government that all Agreements of this sort should be dealt with conjointly by the Powers. Similar advice has been given by other Governments. || If, therefore, the draft Agreement be submitted to the Representatives at Peking, the Representative of His Majesty's Government will be instructed to join with his colleagues in examining and reporting upon it.

Lansdowne.

Nr. 12626. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw. Nachrichten über die Verwaltung der Mandschurei durch die Russen.

Peking, February 5, 1901. (April 1.)

My Lord, || His Majesty's Consul at Newchwang has addressed an interesting despatch to me regarding the Russian administration of Newchwang and Manchuria. Several missionaries have, he reports, gone up into the interior to see what has become of their Missions and converts. From another source I learn that two of them are named Robertson and Greig. The former started from Moukden, on New Year's day, for A-shih-to, the latter is at Kirin, whence he writes a good account of the Chinese Governor. I transmit herewith copy of Mr. Fulford's despatch.

Ernest Satow.

Anlage.

Consul Fulford to Sir E. Satow.

Newchwang, January 16, 1901.

(Extract.) || I have the honour to report upon the state of affairs here since my last despatch of the 19th November, 1900, on the subject. || The Russian Administrator, in November, put out a Proclamation in

Chinese, that all house-owners in Yingtzu must present their title-deeds for inspection, and pay 3 per cent. tax on the purchase-money. The guilds were also called upon to pay for the police expenses. || Some remarks appeared in the Shanghai papers as to this heavy tax on property, and the Russian Administrator stated the Proclamation was a mistake on the part of a Corean whom he employed as an interpreter. A new Proclamation was then issued, on the 14th December, to the effect that all transfers of land or buildings since the date of the Russian occupation must be reported, and the usual transfer fee of 3 per cent. upon the price paid to the Russian Administration. || A copy of this Proclamation was sent by the Administrator to the Consular Body, and after some correspondence the latter agreed to sign a notification to their nationals that in case of all purchases of land since the date of the Russian occupation, they shall follow the procedure hitherto in force of sending their title-deeds through their Consuls to the local authorities for verification and registration and pay the usual transfer fee of 3 per cent. The Russian authorities were to be understood to be the local authorities since the date of occupation. || The Russians have taken some pains to protect the main routes for the cart traffic from the north, and as far north as Kei Yüan (some 70 miles from Moukden) the roads are now fairly safe and a good many carts are coming down. From Kei Yüan, northwards, the road along the line of railway to Kwen Chêng-tzu and Harbin is tolerably quiet, but the road to Kirin is infested with brigands. Convoys of carts sent under Russian co-operation by the Governor-General of Kirin and guarded by Chinese soldiers are beginning to arrive here. || The Governor-General of Moukden is back in town, but not in power. He has lately put out a Proclamation to the effect that peace has been arranged in Peking, and that all robbers and brigands will be severely dealt with when Chinese rule is restored and calling upon the honest people to preserve order. || Several missionaries are in the interior, but more for visits of inspection to see what has become of their flocks than for regular work. The Russian military authorities have assisted them in many instances to travel. One has gone to Kirin viâ Vladivostock, several are in Moukden, Kei Yüan, and Liao Yang.

Nr. 12627. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Minister des Ausw. an den Botschafter in Petersburg. Rußland verzichtet auf das Mandschureiabkommen.

Foreign Office, April 5, 1901.

Sir, || The Russian Minister called to-day and handed to Sir T. Sanderson a communication, copy of which is inclosed, announcing the in-

tion of the Russian Government not to proceed further with the Manchurian Agreement, but to await the development of events, remaining faithful to the programme which they had followed from the beginning. || M. Lessar dwelt at some length on the exceptional position of Russia towards China, of her having been attacked by the latter and forced to occupy Manchuria, of her anxiety to bring the occupation to a speedy termination, and of the impossibility of submitting to the Ministers at Peking the special arrangements intended to effect that object.

Lansdowne.

Anlage.

Memorandum communicated by Russian Embassy, April 5, 1901.

Il y a quelque temps le Gouvernement Impérial est entré en pourparlers avec la Chine au sujet d'un Arrangement en vue de pouvoir procéder, dès que les circonstances le permettraient, à l'accomplissement graduel de l'intention exprimée par la Russie de restituer la Mandchourie à la Chine. Il est évident que dans ce but il était indispensable de savoir à une certaine date s'il était possible d'établir d'un commun accord avec le Gouvernement Chinois les conditions de l'évacuation de cette province. || Comme il appert des renseignements reçus, dans les circonstances actuelles un pareil accord, au lieu de servir de preuve manifeste des sentiments amicaux de la Russie envers la Chine, pourrait causer à cette dernière de graves difficultés. Aussi le Cabinet Impérial non seulement n'insiste pas auprès du Gouvernement Chinois sur la conclusion de l'Arrangement, mais se refuse même à tous pourparlers ultérieurs à ce sujet, et inébranlablement fidèle au programme qu'il a poursuivi depuis le commencement, attendra avec calme le développement des événements.

Nr. 12628. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Übersendet einen Auszug aus dem „Messenger Officiel“ über die russische Politik in China.

St. Petersburg, April 6, 1901. (April 9.)

My Lord, || With reference to my telegram of yesterday's date, I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship the full text, in French translation, of the official communiqué which appeared in the „Official Messenger“ of yesterday's date on the subject of Russian policy in China.

Charles S. Scott.

Anlage.

Extract from the „Messenger Officiel“ of March 24 (April 6), 1901.

Le „Messenger Officiel“ publie aujourd'hui la communication suivante: —
„Les faits alarmants qui se sont produits en Chine l'année dernière ont obligé tous les Gouvernements intéressés à rechercher une entente en vue du prompt rétablissement, également désirable pour tous, de l'ordre de choses normal dans le Céleste-Empire. || „Sans s'écarter nullement de l'action commune avec les autres Puissances dans la question Chinoise, la Russie devait toutefois, en raison de ses relations spéciales avec la Chine comme État limitrophe, garder une certaine liberté d'action et ne pas se lier par des engagements contraires à ses intérêts et à ses traditions historiques. || „C'est en vue de ces considérations que le Gouvernement Impérial, par la voie de communications officielles, et par une série de Circulaires adressées à ses Représentants auprès des Puissances, a pris à tâche de faire connaître en toute sincérité son point de vue au sujet des événements de Chine, et d'exposer nettement les buts qu'il était résolu à poursuivre invariablement. || „Par rapport à sa situation en présence des événements en Chine, la Russie a déclaré ouvertement dès le début, et contrairement à l'avis de certaines Puissances, qu'elle ne faisait pas la guerre à l'Empire Chinois. Dans la communication officielle du 11 Juin, 1900, il était dit à ce propos: — || „Les troupes Russes, en mettant le pied sur le territoire Chinois, ne poursuivent aucun but hostile à la Chine: tout au contraire leur présence dans cet Empire voisin et ami, au moment où il s'y passe des faits inquiétants, ne peut être que d'un secours efficace pour le Gouvernement Chinois, dans sa lutte contre les insurgés. La même idée se trouve exposée dans la Circulaire du 3 Juin, 1900, adressée aux Puissances par l'intermédiaire des Représentants Russes à l'étranger. || „Lorsque dans le Conseil des Amiraux à Tien-tsin a été examinée la question de savoir si Pékin et Tien-tsin devaient être rasés, une instruction a été envoyée le 15 Juin de l'année dernière au Vice-Amiral Alexeïeff, lui prescrivant de s'abstenir de prendre part à des actes d'hostilité semblables et qui pouvaient entraîner de nouvelles et plus grandes complications. C'est dans le même esprit que la proposition des Amiraux a été définie dans une communication adressée par la Russie à certains Gouvernements étrangers. || „Vers cette époque, le Chef du territoire de Kouantoun a reçu l'ordre, pour éviter tout malentendu, de déclarer de la façon la plus positive aux autorités et à la population Chinoises, que la Russie n'avait nullement l'intention de faire la guerre à la Chine; que les événements de Takou et de Tien-tsin, de même que les mesures prises sur l'Amour et sur la frontière de Mandchourie, étaient la conséquence du mouvement

révolutionnaire qui s'était produit, et à la répression duquel le Gouvernement Impérial employait tous ses efforts, dans l'intérêt même de la Chine. || „Telles ont été les déclarations faites par le Gouvernement Impérial à l'effet de déterminer la situation de la Russie par rapport aux événements dans le Céleste-Empire. Malgré les agressions violentes dont des points habités par une paisible population Russe ont été l'objet à la frontière, le Gouvernement Chinois, ayant conscience de la responsabilité encourue par lui, s'est efforcé de dissiper toute suspicion d'intentions hostiles de sa part vis-à-vis de la Russie. C'est ainsi que dans un télégramme du 20 Juin, 1900, adressé à Sa Majesté l'Empereur, le Bogdokhan, en faisant allusion à l'amitié plus de deux fois séculaire et aux relations de bon voisinage entre la Russie et la Chine, priait notre auguste Souverain de rechercher un moyen qui serait de nature à sauver le pays, et de prendre l'initiative pour le mettre à exécution. || „Pour ce qui est du programme politique de la Russie, c'est-à-dire des buts immédiats qu'elle s'était posés, ils ont été indiqués dans la première communication officielle relative aux affaires Chinoises, et se résumaient comme suit: —

„1. Préservation de la représentation Russe à Pékin et sauvegarde des sujets Russes contre les intentions criminelles des insurgés Chinois. || „2. Assistance à prêter au Gouvernement Chinois dans sa lutte contre l'insurrection, en vue du rétablissement le plus prompt possible dans l'Empire de l'ordre de choses légal. || „Lorsque toutes les Puissances intéressées eurent décidé d'expédier des troupes en Chine pour les mêmes buts, le Gouvernement Impérial a proposé de prendre comme règle de conduite par rapport aux événements en Chine les principes fondamentaux suivants: — || „1. Maintien de l'entente entre les Puissances; || „2. Conservation du régime Gouvernemental existant en Chine *ab antiquo*; || „3. Élimination de tout ce qui pourrait conduire à un partage du Céleste-Empire, et finalement || „4. Rétablissement d'un commun effort du Gouvernement Central légal à Pékin, lequel pourrait assurer lui-même dans le pays l'ordre et la tranquillité. || „Un accord s'est établi sur ces points entre presque toutes les Puissances. || „Bientôt après, l'approche de l'époque de l'année favorable pour les opérations militaires, ainsi que la concentration à Tien-tsin d'un chiffre considérable de troupes internationales ont mis tout naturellement à l'ordre du jour la question de la direction supérieure à donner à l'ensemble des troupes, au cas où, par la force inéluctable des choses, les détachements étrangers seraient obligés d'étendre dans une certaine mesure leur sphère d'action primitif. || „Tandis qu'entre les Puissances se produisait un échange de vues au sujet du meilleur mode d'unification de l'action des troupes internationales, Sa Majesté l'Empereur

Guillaume a adressé directement à Sa Majesté l'Empereur, et, ensuite aux Gouvernements étrangers, l'offre de mettre à la disposition des Puissances le Feld-Maréchal Allemand, Comte de Waldersee, auquel pourrait être confiée, en qualité de Commandant-en-chef, la direction des opérations des forces armées internationales concentrées sur le théâtre des opérations au Petchili. || „Animé du désir de voir se terminer le plus tôt possible les complications surgies en Extrême-Orient, Sa Majesté l'Empereur a répondu qu'il ne trouvait pas d'obstacle pour sa part à accepter la proposition de Sa Majesté l'Empereur Guillaume. || „En même temps le Gouvernement Impérial, par l'intermédiaire des Représentants de Russie, a informé les Puissances étrangères qu'en donnant son consentement à ce que le détachement Russe, au cas où une action militaire effective serait indispensable, fût soumis au commandement supérieur, et commun à tous, du Feld-Maréchal Allemand, Sa Majesté l'Empereur n'avait l'intention à aucun égard de se départir du programme politique sur les principes fondamentaux duquel avait été établi un accord complet tant avec la France qu'avec les autres Puissances. || „Cependant, contrairement à toute attente, la marche des opérations militaires au Petchili a pris une tournure si favorable, que longtemps avant l'arrivée du Feld-Maréchal Comte de Waldersee, à la suite d'une décision prise sur place par un conseil de guerre présidé par le Lieutenant-Général Linévitch, les troupes alliées se sont portées sur la capitale, ont réussi à pénétrer à Pékin, à délivrer les Légations et les étrangers qui étaient assiégés et à dissiper les forces insurrectionnelles Chinoises qui se trouvaient dans cette ville. || „Ces circonstances ont obligé le Gouvernement Impérial, pour éviter tout malentendu, d'affirmer à nouveau par une Circulaire aux Puissances en date du 12 Août, 1900, qu'il était résolu à rester invariablement fidèle au programme d'action mentionné plus haut; que, de plus, si la marche des événements au Petchili et la série d'actes agressifs commis par les insurgés Chinois à la frontière de l'État Russe avaient rendu nécessaire l'occupation du port de Nioutchouang et l'entrée des troupes Russes en Mandchourie, ces mesures devaient être considérées comme *temporaires*; qu'aussitôt qu'un ordre durable serait rétabli en Mandchourie et que tout le possible aurait été fait pour préserver la voie ferrée, dont la construction a été assurée par un accord formel avec la Chine relativement à la Concession délivrée à la Société du Chemin de Fer de l'Est Chinois, la Russie ne manquerait pas de retirer ses troupes du territoire de l'Empire voisin, si toutefois la manière d'agir des autres Puissances et de la Chine elle-même n'y mettait pas d'obstacle. || „En même temps, le Gouvernement Impérial a cru devoir prévenir les Puissances que par la

libération des Représentants Diplomatiques et de tous les ressortissants étrangers qui avaient été assiégés, il considérait la première et la principale tâche qu'il s'était imposée comme étant terminée; que la réalisation de la tâche suivante, à savoir le concours à prêter au Gouvernement Central Chinois pour le rétablissement de l'ordre normal, était en ce moment difficile, par suite du départ de la capitale du Bogdokhan lui-même, de l'Impératrice-Régente et du Tsong-li Yamèn. Considérant que dans ces conditions il n'y avait pas de motif au séjour ultérieur à Pékin des Légations étrangères accréditées auprès d'un Gouvernement qui était absent, le Gouvernement Impérial a déclaré qu'il avait pour sa part l'intention de rappeler à Tien-tsin le Ministre de Russie avec tout le personnel de la Légation et le détachement militaire Russe, dont la présence dans la capitale n'avait pas d'objet actuellement, en vue de la ferme résolution de la Russie exprimée par elle à plusieurs reprises de ne pas sortir du cadre de la tâche qu'elle s'était imposée. || „Certaines Puissances n'ont pas partagé ce point de vue de la Russie, et ont émis la crainte qu'un départ simultané de toutes les troupes alliées de Pékin ne pût être interprété par les Chinois comme un succès qu'ils auraient remporté sur les étrangers. On semblait même disposé à envisager la manière d'agir de la Russie comme une tendance à se retirer de l'accord général des Puissances dans la question Chinoise, surtout après que le Gouvernement Impérial s'était catégoriquement refusé à participer aux mesures coercitives contre la Cour de Chine à l'effet d'amener celle-ci à rentrer à Pékin. || „Pour enlever tout motif à des interprétations erronées de ce genre, les Représentants de Russie à l'étranger ont été chargés de s'expliquer dans le sens suivant avec les Gouvernements près desquels ils sont accrédités: — || „Les buts poursuivis par la majorité des Puissances en Chine diffèrent tellement des tâches qui incombent à la Russie en Extrême-Orient que nous ne saurions être surpris que ces Puissances ne se soient pas pleinement rendu compte du point de vue spécialement Russe au sujet des événements actuels. Ne désirant nullement enfreindre l'accord établi dans les questions qui sont d'un intérêt commun, nous ne jugeons toutefois pas possible de nous préoccuper de la réalisation de buts qui sont étrangers à la Russie. Nous n'avons pas déclaré la guerre à l'Empire voisin, avec lequel nous avons durant des siècles entretenu des relations amicales; c'est pourquoi, si le détachement Russe, envoyé à Pékin uniquement dans le but précis de délivrer la Légation et les sujets Russes, devait recevoir une mission tout autre, consistant dans l'occupation militaire de la capitale Chinoise pour prendre part à une action coercitive dans le cours des pourparlers qui vont avoir lieu avec le Gouvernement Chinois, cette

manière d'agir ne serait pas conforme à nos déclarations antérieures. Le Gouvernement légal de la Chine et la Cour Impériale ne peuvent retourner à Pékin qu'après le départ des troupes internationales. On ne saurait perdre de vue qu'une atteinte portée aux traditions séculaires des Chinois et au prestige de leur Gouvernement pourrait avoir les conséquences les plus désastreuses; et cela d'autant plus que les troupes internationales ne sauraient occuper indéfiniment la capitale d'un pays de 400 000 000 d'habitants, auxquels il n'est guère possible de contester le droit de vivre chez eux à leur guise. Quelque longue que soit la durée de l'occupation de Pékin par les troupes étrangères, cette circonstance empêcherait-elle les Chinois d'interpréter par la suite le départ de ces troupes de la capitale comme un succès remporté par eux? Des interprétations de ce genre ne devraient pas être mises en ligne de compte par les Puissances dans l'appréciation de la situation. D'ailleurs notre communication Circulaire relative au rappel de la Légation et du détachement Russes ne formulait aucune proposition: en prévenant amicalement les Puissances alliées de cette décision, nous indiquions seulement les motifs qui avaient inspiré celle-ci au Gouvernement Impérial. Abandonnant aux autres Puissances d'agir en cette circonstance comme elles l'entendraient, nous pensions que la différence dans le choix des moyens d'action ne portait pas atteinte à l'accord général établi entre les Cabinets par rapport aux questions de principe. || „A la suite de ces explications, le Gouvernement Impérial n'a pas manqué de faire connaître aux Puissances alliées que „dès que le Gouvernement légal de la Chine aura nommé des Représentants, munis des pleins pouvoirs nécessaires pour entrer en négociation avec les Puissances, la Russie, après une entente avec les Gouvernements étrangers, ne tardera pas de son côté à nommer des Plénipotentiaires, et à les diriger sur le lieu qui aura été choisi pour servir de siège à ces négociations.“ || „Bientôt après, les dignitaires Chinois Li Hung-chang et le Prince Tsin, qui se trouvaient à Pékin, ont été nommés par le Bogdokhan Délégués du Gouvernement Chinois et munis de pleins pouvoirs pour entrer en relations directes avec les Représentants étrangers. || „En conséquence, d'ordre de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, le Ministre de Russie en Chine a quitté Tien-tsin pour se rendre dans la capitale, à l'effet d'entrer, de concert avec les autres Représentants des Puissances, en négociation avec les Plénipotentiaires Chinois. || „Dans la prévision de négociations de cette nature, le Gouvernement Impérial avait envoyé dès le mois d'Août de l'année dernière aux Représentants de Russie à l'étranger, en vue d'un échange de vues préliminaires avec les Gouvernements auprès desquels ils étaient accrédités, des indications spéciales dont le sens général se

résume comme suit: — || „Il y a lieu de ne pas perdre de vue que dans l'affaire Chinoise, il faut distinguer nettement les questions qui intéressent chacune des Puissances en particulier, et celles qui touchent aux intérêts de tous les États en général. || „Il n'y a que les questions de cette seconde catégorie qui pourraient être l'objet des négociations à Pékin; parmi celle-ci les plus essentielles sont les suivantes: — || „1. Rétablissement sur des bases plus solides des relations régulières avec la Chine et confirmation par le Gouvernement légal Chinois de tous les engagements pris par lui vis-à-vis des Puissances. || „2. A cet effet, il sera peut-être nécessaire d'obtenir du Gouvernement du Bogdokhan un acte formel quelconque en réponse aux exigences collectives et formulées par écrit de tous les Représentants étrangers en Chine. || „3. Les Représentants seront invités à élaborer un projet de demandes collectives, en indiquant les mesures qui, d'après eux, seraient les plus opportunes et serviraient de ferme garantie que le Gouvernement Chinois n'enfreindra plus à l'avenir les engagements qu'il aura pris. || „Au nombre de ces mesures étaient mentionnées comme pouvant être utiles. — || „(a.) Une entente définitive entre les Puissances au sujet de l'interdiction de l'importation d'armes de toute sorte en Chine; et || „(b.) L'obligation imposée au Gouvernement Chinois, pour assurer l'ordre intérieur dans le pays, d'infliger une punition exemplaire au principal promoteur de l'insurrection. || „4. Les Gouvernements étrangers, les Sociétés, et les personnes privées seront indemnisés pour les pertes matérielles subies par eux pendant le temps des troubles. Afin de ne pas mettre la Chine dans l'impossibilité absolue de satisfaire à toutes les réclamations pécuniaires, et pour atteindre des résultats pratiques, il est désirable que la modération requise soit observée à cet égard. || „Ces considérations ont servi de base au Gouvernement Français pour l'élaboration d'un programme spécial de négociations avec la Chine, lequel programme a été accepté par toutes les Puissances et, sous la dénomination de „Propositions Françaises“, comprenait les six points suivants: — || „1. Punition des coupables des désordres, et en particulier du Prince Tuan; || „2. Maintien de la Loi édictée par toutes les Puissances concernant l'interdiction de l'importation des armes en Chine; || „3. Accord en principe dans la question de l'indemnité pour les pertes subies, question dont l'examen détaillé peut être remis à une époque plus favorable; || „4. Constitution d'une garde pour les Légations à l'effet de protéger celles-ci contre toute éventualité; || „5. Démantèlement des fortifications de Takou; et enfin || „6. Occupation de deux ou trois points de la ligne entre Pékin et la côte du Golfe de Petchili. || „Il a été décidé en même temps que les demandes des Puissances seraient présentées au Gouvernement Chinois sous la forme d'une note

collective des Représentants. || „Après avoir reçu des instructions conformes, les Représentants étrangers à Pékin, au mois d'Octobre de l'année dernière, ont conféré entre eux pour établir la rédaction de la note collective à adresser au Gouvernement Chinois, en prenant pour base à cet effet les six points susmentionnés des propositions Françaises. || „Au cours de ces séances, quelques-uns des Représentants à Pékin ont soumis successivement à l'examen de la réunion de nouvelles questions, qui changeaient le caractère des demandes présentées primitivement et qui ont retardé notablement la marche des pourparlers. || „C'est ainsi qu'entre autres le Gouvernement Allemand a proposé d'inclure dans le texte de la note collective des demandes relatives: — || „1. A l'érection d'un monument au Baron Ketteler à l'endroit où il a succombé; || „2. A l'envoi d'une Ambassade Extraordinaire Chinoise à Berlin, et || „3. A l'érection de monuments spéciaux dans tous les cimetières profanés. || „Ne voulant pas porter atteinte à l'entente commune entre les Puissances, le Gouvernement Impérial a consenti en principe à inclure dans la note collective les dites propositions; mais il a chargé toutefois son Représentant à Pékin d'attirer l'attention de ses collègues sur le fait que, dans les questions pendantes, il était désirable de se borner à exiger ce qui était strictement indispensable et possible, et cela d'autant plus qu'avec la condition de l'irrévocabilité des déclarations de la note collective, toutes les Puissances seraient obligées de procéder à de nouvelles opérations militaires contre la Chine et de nouvelles charges, si le Gouvernement Chinois refusait de remplir les exigences formulées par l'une des Puissances, même sur un point secondaire qui ne toucherait pas aux intérêts des autres États. || „A la suite de l'Allemagne, le Japon également a exprimé le désir qu'une Ambassade Extraordinaire fût envoyée à Tokio à l'effet de présenter les excuses du Gouvernement Chinois pour l'assassinat du Drogman de la Légation Japonaise. Sans s'opposer au désir du Japon, le Gouvernement Impérial a fait observer cependant que des propositions semblables, servant principalement de satisfaction à donner aux vues particulières d'un État, ne devaient pas entrer dans le programme commun des demandes collectives, qui avaient pour objet les intérêts de toutes les Puissances dans leur ensemble, et le rétablissement d'un état de choses normal dans le Céleste-Empire. || „En ce qui regarde la question soulevée sur l'initiative de l'Allemagne relativement aux mesures coercitives à prendre dans le but de ramener la Cour Chinoise à Pékin, le Ministre de Russie a été chargé de déclarer que le but susmentionné, de l'avis du Gouvernement Impérial, devait être atteint par des moyens pacifiques; que dans ce cas seulement le retour du Bogdokhan et de l'Impératrice-Régente dans la

capitale pourrait avoir des effets utiles, et que la Russie, en conséquence, se refusait à prendre part à des mesures coercitives contre la Cour Chinoise, lesquelles pourraient amener une nouvelle fermentation des esprits dans toute la Chine. || „Désireux de hâter autant que possible la fin des difficultés Chinoises en vue de la pacification générale, le Gouvernement Impérial n'a pas élevé d'objection contre les propositions complémentaires ultérieures, dont l'acceptation n'apparaissait pas en somme comme trop onéreuse pour la Chine. || „De cette manière ont été incluses dans la note collective des demandes concernant la suspension des examens, la modification de l'étiquette, la réorganisation intérieure du Tsong-li Yamèn, &c. || „Le texte définitif de la note, après de longues discussions, a été enfin établi; ayant été signée par tous les Représentants à Pékin, la dite note a été remise le 11 Décembre, 1900, au Gouvernement Chinois. || „Le 18 Décembre de l'année dernière, les Plénipotentiaires Chinois ont communiqué aux Représentants étrangers un Décret du Bogdokhan qu'ils venaient de recevoir et qui était ainsi conçu: „Nous avons pris connaissance de tout le télégramme de Tsin et de Li. Il convient que nous acceptions dans leur entier les douze points qu'ils nous ont présentés. Qu'il soit ainsi.“ En même temps Li Hung-chang et le Prince Tsin ont demandé aux Représentants des Puissances de fixer des séances en commun pour s'expliquer sur tous les points de la note collective. || „Au commencement de Janvier de cette année se sont ouvertes entre les Représentants des Puissances et les Plénipotentiaires Chinois des réunions officielles à l'effet d'éclaircir les modes de mise à exécution par le Gouvernement Chinois des demandes qui lui étaient adressées. || „De sérieuses divergences de vues se sont manifestées aussitôt entre les membres de ces réunions dans la question des pénalités à infliger aux auteurs principaux des désordres qui s'étaient produits dans le pays. || „S'étant prononcé, dès qu'avait été soulevée la question des punitions à infliger aux promoteurs des désordres, en faveur du remplacement de la peine de mort par d'autres peines sévères, le Gouvernement Impérial, en vue de la tournure que prenaient les discussions sur ce sujet, a prescrit à son Représentant, non seulement de ne pas entrer dans l'examen du caractère et du mode d'application de la peine capitale, mais encore de ne prendre aucune part aux discussions ultérieures concernant les punitions à infliger aux dignitaires Chinois. || „A l'heure actuelle, les Conférences entre les Représentants des Puissances et les Plénipotentiaires Chinois relativement aux demandes formulées dans la note collective, ne sont pas encore terminées. || „Concurremment aux faits qui précèdent, dans l'attente d'une prochaine solution des questions générales concernant les relations

réci-proques de tous les États étrangers avec la Chine, le Gouvernement Impérial a jugé pour sa part opportun de se préoccuper de l'organisation d'un ordre de choses durable dans les provinces Chinoises qui sont limitrophes de la Russie sur une étendue de 8000 verstes. || „Dans ce but ont été conclus avant tout entre les autorités militaires Russes et les tsian-tsioums Chinois des trois provinces de la Mandchourie, des arrangements écrits temporaires (*modus vivendi*) concernant le rétablissement de l'Administration Civile Locale. || „Subséquentement, après avoir exactement pesé toutes les circonstances dans lesquelles avaient surgi et s'étaient considérablement développés les mouvements insurrectionnels en Chine, — lesquels avaient eu un contrecoup si pénible sur les intérêts de la population paisible des confins de l'Empire Russe et sur la construction du Chemin de Fer de l'Est Chinois, le Gouvernement Impérial a élaboré un programme d'arrangement séparé avec la Chine, qui déterminait le mode d'évacuation graduelle de la Mandchourie, ainsi que les mesures temporaires ayant pour objet d'assurer la tranquillité dans cette région et de prévenir le renouvellement de faits semblables à ceux qui s'étaient produits l'année dernière. || „Il est à regretter que dans le but d'exciter l'opinion publique contre la Russie, des bruits inquiétants au sujet des buts et des intentions du Gouvernement Impérial aient été répandus dans la presse étrangère; il a été publié des textes de prétendus Traités établissant un Protectorat sur la Mandchourie, et toute sorte d'informations fausses ont été lancées au sujet de l'arrangement projeté entre la Russie et la Chine. || „Or, cet arrangement n'était destiné qu'à servir de point de départ à la réalisation de l'intention déclarée par le Gouvernement Impérial de restituer à la Chine la Mandchourie, laquelle n'avait été occupée par la Russie qu'à la suite des faits alarmants de l'année dernière. Pour pouvoir prendre les mesures militaires en conséquence, il était nécessaire de résoudre à une époque déterminée, dans le sens positif ou négatif, s'il serait possible, par la voie d'une entente mutuelle, de déterminer dès à présent le mode et les conditions de l'évacuation de la Mandchourie. || „Il résulte des informations reçues que des obstacles sérieux ont été créés à la Chine en ce qui regarde la conclusion du dit arrangement avec la Russie: c'est pourquoi aussi il s'est trouvé impossible de prendre immédiatement les mesures que l'on avait en vue pour l'évacuation graduelle de la Mandchourie. || „Pour ce qui est de la restitution complète et définitive de cette région à la Chine, il va de soi qu'elle ne pourra être réalisée qu'après qu'un état de choses normal aura été rétabli dans l'Empire Chinois et que sera raffermi dans la capitale un Gouvernement Central indépendant et suffisamment fort

pour garantir la Russie contre le renouvellement des désordres de l'année dernière. || „En maintenant le régime temporaire actuel en Mandchourie à l'effet de sauvegarder la tranquillité dans le voisinage de la vaste frontière de la Russie, et demeurant inébranlablement fidèle à son programme primitif maintes fois formulé, le Gouvernement Impérial attendra avec calme la marche ultérieure des événements.“

Nr. 12629. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des Ausw. Unterredung mit Lamsdorff über die Mandschurei. Es habe nie ein Abkommen, sondern nur ein Programm existiert.

St. Petersburg, April 12, 1901. (April 22.)

My Lord, || At Count Lamsdorff's weekly reception at the Foreign Office on Wednesday, I referred to the official communiqué which had appeared in the „Messenger Officiel“ of the 5th instant, explaining the policy and action of Russia in the Chinese question, and I said that I had transmitted the full text of this official statement by the post to your Lordship, and had telegraphed at the same time the substance of the latter part, which referred to the recent negotiations for the evacuation of Manchuria. || I said that I thought that it would be a satisfaction to His Majesty's Government to have before them this authoritative statement of the views and intentions of the Imperial Government. || Count Lamsdorff said that the statement which he had prepared for this purpose was longer than he could have wished to make it, but as there had been so much suspicion and misapprehension among the public abroad of the attitude of Russia during the Chinese crisis and in regard to the Manchurian negotiation, he had thought it desirable, particularly as in Russia there were no such channels available as Blue Books or statements in Parliament, to take the only course open to him of enlightening the public by a full and clear statement of the policy and views by which the Imperial Government had been consistently actuated since the commencement of the Chinese crisis, and he thought I would be prepared to admit that this statement was in entire conformity with the language he had always held to me when dealing with the questions to which it referred. || I readily admitted that I had the satisfaction of finding in this statement a corroboration of the language which he had held to me on various occasions, and which I had not failed to report to His Majesty's Government. || Count Lamsdorff then said that he had

been surprised to find that in some quarters of the press the conclusion had been drawn from the latter part of the official statement that the Russian Government, by dropping the negotiations for an early evacuation of Manchuria, evinced their intention of occupying that province indefinitely.³ || This was an entirely erroneous conclusion; the Emperor of Russia adhered unswervingly to His intention, so frankly and frequently declared, to withdraw the Russian troops of occupation and restore the province to its former Chinese Administration as soon as a normal state of affairs in China, and the reinstatement in Peking of the legitimate and independent Central Government capable of maintaining order in the Empire, admitted of this being done, and he was glad to believe from the latest reports from Peking that the negotiations between the Ministers and Chinese Plenipotentiaries were now making sensible progress, so as to encourage an expectation that the restoration of normal conditions in China would not be too long delayed. || With regard to the exaggerated apprehensions which the separate negotiations with China for an early evacuation of the province in question had excited, he did not mind telling me now that these negotiations had been dropped, that they never proceeded so far as the arrangement of any definite Agreement, and in point of fact the Emperor had never at any time given him the full powers which were an indispensable condition for enabling him to conclude such an Agreement. || The press and foreign Governments had, he said, spoken of an Agreement consisting of twelve Articles, but no such document had ever existed; there had certainly been a programme for the negotiations, and it had contained several points for discussion, and the alleged twelve Articles, of which varying versions had been given to the press correspondents and to other persons were evidently distorted and entirely incorrect versions of points of detail which at one time or another had been under consideration and discussion in negotiations in which, as I understood his Excellency, three different Departments of the Imperial Government had, on the side of Russia, been equally engaged. || It was thus clear, he argued, that it would have been impossible for him to have discussed the details of these negotiations with a third Government. || I asked Count Lamsdorff if he had read the report of your Lordship's statement in the House of Lords, as I thought it would have easily satisfied him that there was no desire on the part of His Majesty's Government to interfere with any reasonable arrangement of conditions for the evacuation of Manchuria, although we were clearly justified in dissuading China from entering into any separate or secret agreements with any one Power likely to affect the

claims of other creditors, particularly when it was represented to us that the proposed Agreement contained conditions derogatory to our Treaty rights and of a permanent character. || I added that I could not help feeling that if he had been able to repose more confidence in His Majesty's Government, and had been a little more communicative as to the exact nature of the negotiations, he could easily have satisfied himself of this at an earlier date. || Count Lamsdorff said that he had not yet had an opportunity of reading a full report of your Lordship's speech, but that the circumstances which he had related to me, and also the unwise interference of the press and public, which seemed to assert a very dangerous claim to be admitted to a seat and voice in the Councils of the Powers regarding China, rendered it very difficult for him to be as frankly communicative as he would have wished to have been in this matter. || I found after my interview with Count Lamsdorff that he had also told my German and American colleagues that there had never been any regular draft Agreement respecting Manchuria which could have been communicated to other Powers, but only a programme, and that the negotiations had never reached the stage of obtaining from the Emperor full power to conclude a definite Agreement.

Charles S. Scott.

Verhandlungen zwischen Großbritannien und
den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika
über einen Kanal zwischen dem Atlantischen
und Stillen Ozean*).

Nr. 12630. **GROSSBRITANNIEN** und **VEREINIGTE STAATEN**. —
Zusatz zu dem Vertrage vom 19. April 1850 über
einen Schiffahrtskanal zwischen dem Atlantischen
und Stillen Ozean.

Washington, 5. Februar 1900.

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and the United States of America being desirous to facilitate the construction of a ship-canal to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and to that end to remove any objection which may arise out of the Convention of the 19th April, 1850, commonly called the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, to the construction of such canal under the auspices of the Government of the United States, without impairing the „general principle“ of neutralization established in Article VIII of that Convention, have for that purpose appointed as their Plenipotentiaries: || Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, the Right Honourable Lord Pauncefote Preston, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary; and || The President of the United States of America, the Honourable John Hay, Secretary of State of the United States; || Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have agreed upon the following Articles:—

*) Blaubücher Cd 30. 438. 905.

Article I.

It is agreed that the canal may be constructed under the auspices of the Government of the United States, either directly at its own cost, or by gift or loan of money to individuals or Corporations or through subscription to or purchase of stock or shares, and that, subject to the provisions of the present Convention, said Government shall have and enjoy all the rights incident to such construction, as well as the exclusive right of providing for the regulation and management of the canal.

Article II.

The High Contracting Parties, desiring to preserve and maintain the „general principle“ of neutralization established in Article VIII of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, adopt, as the basis of such neutralization, the following rules, substantially as embodied in the Convention between Great Britain and certain other Powers, signed at Constantinople, 29th October, 1888, for the free navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal, that is to say:— || 1. The canal shall be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations, on terms of entire equality, so that there shall be no discrimination against any nation or its citizens or subjects in respect of the conditions or charges of traffic, or otherwise. || 2. The canal shall never be blockaded, nor shall any right of war be exercised, nor any act of hostility be committed within it. || 3. Vessels of war of a belligerent shall not revictual nor take any stores in the canal except so far as may be strictly necessary; and the transit of such vessels through the canal shall be effected with the least possible delay in accordance with the regulations in force, and with only such intermission as may result from the necessities of the service. || Prizes shall be in all respects subject to the same rules as vessels of war of the belligerents. || 4. No belligerent shall embark or disembark troops, munitions of war, or warlike materials in the canal except in case of accidental hindrance of the transit, and in such case the transit shall be resumed with all possible dispatch. || 5. The provisions of this Article shall apply to waters adjacent to the canal, within 3 marine miles of either end. Vessels of war of a belligerent shall not remain in such waters longer than twenty-four hours at any one time except in case of distress, and in such case shall depart as soon as possible; but a vessel of war of one belligerent shall not depart within twenty-four hours from the departure of a vessel of war of the other belligerent. || 6. The plant, establishments, buildings, and all works necessary to the construction, maintenance, and operation of the canal

shall be deemed to be part thereof, for the purposes of this Convention, and in time of war as in time of peace shall enjoy complete immunity from attack or injury by belligerents and from acts calculated to impair their usefulness as part of the canal. || 7. No fortifications shall be erected commanding the canal or the waters adjacent. The United States, however, shall be at liberty to maintain such military police along the canal as may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and disorder.

Article III.

The High Contracting Parties will, immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of this Convention, bring it to the notice of other Powers and invite them to adhere to it.

Article IV.

The present Convention shall be ratified by Her Britannic Majesty, and by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington or at London within six months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible. || In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Convention, and affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at Washington, the fifth day of February, in the year of our Lord 1900.

(Signed)

Pauncefote. (L.S.)

John Hay. (L.S.)

Anlage.

Convention between Her Majesty and the United States of America, relative to the Establishment of a Communication by Ship-Canal between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Signed at Washington, April 19, 1850.

Her Britannic Majesty and the United States of America being desirous of consolidating the relations of amity which so happily subsist between them, by setting forth and fixing in a Convention their views and intentions with reference to any means of communication by ship-canal, which may be constructed between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, by the way of the River St. Juan de Nicaragua, and either or both of the Lakes of Nicaragua or Managua, to any port or place on the Pacific Ocean; || Her Britannic Majesty has conferred full powers on the Right Honourable Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer, a Member of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Knight Commander of the Most Honourable

Order of the Bath, and Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Her Britannic Majesty to the United States; and the President of the United States on John M. Clayton, Secretary of State of the United States, for the aforesaid purpose; and the said Plenipotentiaries having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in proper form, have agreed to the following Articles: —

Article I.

The Governments of Great Britain and the United States hereby declare that neither the one nor the other will ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over the said ship-canal; agreeing that neither will ever erect or maintain any fortifications commanding the same, or in the vicinity thereof, or occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Central America; nor will either make use of any protection which either affords, or may afford, or any alliance which either has, or may have, to or with any State or people, for the purpose of erecting or maintaining any such fortifications, or of occupying, fortifying or colonizing Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Central America, or of assuming or exercising dominion over the same. Nor will Great Britain or the United States take advantage of any intimacy, or use any alliance, connection, or influence that either may possess with any State or Government through whose territory the said canal may pass for the purpose of acquiring or holding, directly or indirectly, for the subjects or citizens of the one, any rights or advantages in regard to commerce or navigation through the said canal, which shall not be offered, on the same terms, to the subjects or citizens of the other.

Article II.

Vessels of Great Britain or the United States traversing the said canal shall, in case of war between the Contracting Parties, be exempted from blockade, detention, or capture by either of the belligerents; and this provision shall extend to such a distance from the two ends of the said canal as may hereafter be found expedient to establish.

Article III.

In order to secure the construction of the said canal, the Contracting Parties engage that if any such canal shall be undertaken upon fair and equitable terms by any parties having the authority of the Local Government or Governments through whose territory the same may

pass, then the persons employed in making the said canal, and their property used or to be used for that object, shall be protected, from the commencement of the said canal to its completion, by the Governments of Great Britain and the United States, from unjust detention, confiscation, seizure, or any violence whatsoever.

Article IV.

The Contracting Parties will use whatever influence they respectively exercise with any State, States, or Governments possessing, or claiming to possess, any jurisdiction or right over the territory which the said canal shall traverse, or which shall be near the waters applicable thereto, in order to induce such States or Governments to facilitate the construction of the said canal by every means in their power; and, furthermore, Great Britain and the United States agree to use their good offices, wherever or however it may be most expedient, in order to procure the establishment of two free ports, one at each end of the said canal.

Article V.

The Contracting Parties further engage that when the said canal shall have been completed, they will protect it from interruption, seizure or unjust confiscation, and that they will guarantee the neutrality thereof, so that the said canal may for ever be open and free, and the capital invested therein secure. Nevertheless, the Governments of Great Britain and the United States, in according their protection to the construction of the said canal, and guaranteeing its neutrality and security when completed, always understand that this protection and guarantee are granted conditionally, and may be withdrawn by both Governments, or either Government, if both Governments, or either Government, should deem that the persons or company undertaking or managing the same adopt or establish such regulations concerning the traffic thereupon, as are contrary to the spirit and intention of this Convention, either by making unfair discriminations in favour of the commerce of one of the Contracting Parties over the commerce of the other, or by imposing oppressive exactions, or unreasonable tolls upon passengers, vessels, goods, wares, merchandize, or other articles. Neither party, however, shall withdraw the aforesaid protection and guarantee without first giving six months' notice to the other.

Article VI.

The Contracting Parties in this Convention engage to invite every State with which both or either have friendly intercourse, to enter into

stipulations with them* similar to those which they have entered into with each other, to the end that all other States may share in the honour and advantage of having contributed to a work of such general interest and importance as the canal herein contemplated; and the Contracting Parties likewise agree that each shall enter into Treaty stipulations with such of the Central American States as they may deem advisable, for the purpose of more effectually carrying out the great design of this Convention, namely, that of constructing and maintaining the said canal as a ship communication between the two oceans for the benefit of mankind, on equal terms to all, and of protecting the same; and they also agree that the good offices of either shall be employed, when requested by the other, in aiding and assisting the negotiation of such Treaty stipulations; and should any differences arise as to right or property over the territory through which the said canal shall pass between the States or Governments of Central America, and such differences should in any way impede or obstruct the execution of the said canal, the Governments of Great Britain and the United States will use their good offices to settle such differences in the manner best suited to promote the interests of the said canal, and to strengthen the bonds of friendship and alliance which exist between the Contracting Parties.

Article VII.

It being desirable that no time should be unnecessarily lost in commencing and constructing the said canal, the Governments of Great Britain and the United States determine to give their support and encouragement to such persons or Company as may first offer to commence the same, with the necessary capital, the consent of the local authorities, and on such principles as accord with the spirit and intention of this Convention; and if any persons or Company should already have, with any State through which the proposed ship-canal may pass, a contract for the construction of such a canal as that specified in this Convention, to the stipulations of which contract neither of the Contracting Parties in this Convention have any just cause to object, and the said persons or Company shall, moreover, have made preparations and expended time, money, and trouble on the faith of such contract, it is hereby agreed, that such persons or Company shall have a priority of claim over every other person, persons, or Company, to the protection of the Governments of Great Britain and the United States, and be allowed a year, from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this Convention, for concluding their arrangements, and presenting evidence of sufficient capital subscribed

to accomplish the contemplated undertaking; it being understood that if, at the expiration of the aforesaid period, such persons or Company be not able to commence and carry out the proposed enterprise, then the Governments of Great Britain and the United States shall be free to afford their protection to any other persons or Company that shall be prepared to commence and proceed with the construction of the canal in question.

Article VIII.

The Governments of Great Britain and the United States having not only desired, in entering into this Convention, to accomplish a particular object, but also to establish a general principle, they hereby agree to extend their protection by Treaty stipulations to any other practicable communications, whether by canal or railway, across the isthmus which connects North and South America, and especially to the interoceanic communications, should the same prove to be practicable, whether by canal or railway, which are now proposed to be established by the way of Tehuantepec or Panamá. In granting, however, their joint protection to any such canals or railways as are by this Article specified, it is always understood by Great Britain and the United States that the parties constructing or owning the same shall impose no other charges or conditions of traffic thereupon than the aforesaid Governments shall approve of as just and equitable, and that the same canals or railways, being open to the subjects and citizens of Great Britain and the United States on equal terms, shall also be open on like terms to the subjects and citizens of every other State which is willing to grant thereto such protection as Great Britain and the United States engage to afford.

Article IX.

The ratifications of this Convention shall be exchanged at Washington within six months from this day, or sooner if possible. || In faith whereof we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have signed this Convention, and have hereunto affixed our seals.

Done at Washington, the nineteenth day of April, Anno Domini one thousand eight hundred and fifty.

(Signed)	Henry Lytton Bulwer.	(L.S.)
	John M. Clayton.	(L.S.)

Nr. 12631. VEREINIGTE STAATEN. — Der Staatssekretär des Ausw. an den englischen Botschafter in Washington. Der Senat hat den Vertrag vom 5. Februar geändert.

Department of State, Washington, December 22, 1900.

Excellency, || I have the honour to inform you that the Senate, by its Resolution of the 20th December last, has given its advice and consent to the ratification of the Convention, signed at Washington on the 5th February last by the respective Plenipotentiaries of the United States and Great Britain, to facilitate the construction of a ship canal to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and to remove any objection which might arise out of the Convention commonly called the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, with the following amendments: — || 1. After the words „Clayton-Bulwer Convention“ and before the word „adopt“ in the preamble of Article II, the words „which Convention is hereby superseded“ are inserted. || 2. A new paragraph is added to the end of section 5 of Article II in the following language: — || „It is agreed, however, that none of the immediately foregoing conditions and stipulations in sections numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this Article shall apply to measures which the United States may find it necessary to take for securing by its own forces the defence of the United States and the maintenance of public order.“ || 3. Article III reading — || „The High Contracting Parties will, immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of this Convention, bring it to the notice of the other Powers, and invite them to adhere to it“, is stricken out.

4. Article IV is made Article III. || I inclose a printed copy of the Convention as signed, and a copy of it showing its reading as amended by the Senate. || I have instructed Mr. Choate to express to the Marquess of Lansdowne this Government's hope that the amendments will be found acceptable to that of Her Majesty. || The Supplementary Convention which I signed with you on the 5th May last, prolonging the time within which the ratifications of the Convention of the 5th February last shall be exchanged, for a period of seven months from the 5th August last, has been consented to by the Senate without amendment.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

John Hay.

Anlage.

Convention of February 5, 1900, as amended by the Senate.

The United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, being

desirous to facilitate the construction of a ship canal to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and to that end to remove any objection which may arise out of the Convention of the 19th April, 1850, commonly called the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, to the construction of such canal under the auspices of the Government of the United States, without impairing the „general principle“ of neutralization established in Article VIII of that Convention, have for that purpose appointed as their Plenipotentiaries: || The President of the United States, John Hay, Secretary of State of the United States of America; || And Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, the Right Honourable Lord Pauncefoot, G. C. B., G. C. M. G., Her Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States; || Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have agreed upon the following Articles: —

Article I.

It is agreed that the canal may be constructed under the auspices of the Government of the United States, either directly at its own cost, or by gift or loan of money to individuals or Corporations or through subscription to or purchase of stock or shares, and that, subject to the provisions of the present Convention, the said Government shall have and enjoy all the rights incident to such construction, as well as the exclusive right of providing for the regulation and management of the canal.

Article II.

The High Contracting Parties, desiring to preserve and maintain the „general principle“ of neutralization established in Article VIII of the Clayton-Bulwer Convention, which Convention is hereby superseded, adopt, as the basis of such neutralization, the following rules, substantially as embodied in the Convention between Great Britain and certain other Powers, signed at Constantinople, the 29th October, 1888, for the free navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal, that is to say: — || 1. The canal shall be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations, on terms of entire equality, so that there shall be no discrimination against any nation or its citizens or subjects in respect of the conditions or charges of traffic, or otherwise. || 2. The canal shall never be blockaded, nor shall any right of war be exercised nor any act of hostility be committed within it. || 3. Vessels of war of a belligerent shall not revictual nor take any stores in the canal except so far as may be strictly necessary; and the transit of such vessels through the canal shall be effected with the least possible

delay, in accordance with the Regulations in force, and with only such intermission as may result from the necessities of the service. || Prizes shall be in all respects subject to the same rules as vessels of war of the belligerents. || 4. No belligerent shall embark or disembark troops, munitions of war or warlike materials in the canal except in case of accidental hindrance of the transit, and in such case the transit shall be resumed with all possible dispatch. || 5. The provisions of this Article shall apply to waters adjacent to the canal, within 3 marine miles of either end. Vessels of war of a belligerent shall not remain in such waters longer than twenty-four hours at any one time except in case of distress, and in such case shall depart as soon as possible; but a vessel of war of one belligerent shall not depart within twenty-four hours from the departure of a vessel of war of the other belligerent. || It is agreed, however, that none of the immediately foregoing conditions and stipulations in sections numbered 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of this Article, shall apply to measures which the United States may find it necessary to take for securing by its own forces the defence of the United States and the maintenance of public order. || 6. The plant, establishments, buildings, and all works necessary to the construction, maintenance and operation of the canal shall be deemed to be part thereof, for the purposes of this Convention, and in time of war as in time of peace shall enjoy complete immunity from attack or injury by belligerents, and from acts calculated to impair their usefulness as part of the canal. || 7. No fortifications shall be erected commanding the canal or the waters adjacent. The United States, however, shall be at liberty to maintain such military police along the canal as may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and disorder.

Article III.

The present Convention shall be ratified by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by Her Britannic Majesty, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington or at London within six months from the date hereof, or earlier, if possible. || In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Convention, and thereunto affixed their seals. || Done in duplicate at Washington, the 5th day of February, in the year of our Lord, 1900.

(Signed)

John Hay.
Pauncefote.

Nr. 12632. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Staatssekretär des Ausw. an den Botschafter in Washington. Rückblick auf die Verhandlungen. Der amerikanische Vorschlag ist unannehmbar.

Foreign Office, February 22, 1901.

My Lord, || The American Ambassador has formally communicated to me the amendments introduced by the Senate of the United States into the Convention, signed at Washington in February last, to facilitate the construction of a ship-canal to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. || These amendments are three in number, namely: — || 1. The insertion in Article II, after the reference to Article VIII of the Clayton-Bulwer Convention, of the words „which Convention is hereby superseded“. || 2. The addition of a new paragraph after section 5 of Article II in the following terms: — || „It is agreed, however, that none of the immediately foregoing conditions and stipulations in sections numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this Article shall apply to measures which the United States may find it necessary to take for securing by its own forces the defence of the United States and the maintenance of public order.“ || 3. The excision of Article III, which provides that „the High Contracting Parties will, immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of this Convention, bring it to the notice of other Powers and invite them to adhere to it“. || Mr. Choate was instructed to express the hope that the amendments would be found acceptable by Her Majesty's Government. || It is our duty to consider them as they stand, and to inform your Excellency of the manner in which, as the subject is now presented to us, we are disposed to regard them. || It will be useful, in the first place, to recall the circumstances in which negotiations for the conclusion of an Agreement supplementary to the Convention of 1850, commonly called the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, were initiated.

So far as Her Majesty's Government were concerned, there was no desire to procure a modification of that Convention. Some of its provisions had, however, for a long time past been regarded with disfavour by the Government of the United States, and in the President's Message to Congress of December 1898 it was suggested, with reference to a Concession granted by the Government of Nicaragua, that some definite action by Congress was urgently required if the labours of the past were to be utilized, and the linking of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans by a practical waterway to be realized. It was further urged that the construction of such a maritime highway was more than ever indispensable to that intimate and ready intercommunication between the eastern

and western seaboard of the United States demanded by the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands and the prospective expansion of American influence and commerce in the Pacific, and that the national policy called more imperatively than ever for the „control“ of the projected highway by the Government of the United States. || This passage in the Message having excited comment, your Excellency made inquiries of the Secretary of State in order to elicit some information as to the attitude of the President. In reply, the views of the United States' Government were very frankly and openly explained. You were also most emphatically assured that the President had no intention whatever of ignoring the Clayton-Bulwer Convention, and that he would loyally observe Treaty stipulations. But in view of the strong national feeling in favour of the construction of the Nicaragua Canal, and of the improbability of the work being accomplished by private enterprise, the United States' Government were prepared to undertake it themselves upon obtaining the necessary powers from Congress. For that purpose, however, they must endeavour, by friendly negotiation, to obtain the consent of Great Britain to such a modification of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty as would, without affecting the „general principle“ therein declared, enable the great object in view to be accomplished for the benefit of the commerce of the world. Although the time had hardly arrived for the institution of formal negotiations to that end, Congress not having yet legislated, the United States' Government, nevertheless, were most anxious that your Excellency should enter at once into *pourparlers* with a view to preparing, for consideration, a scheme of arrangement. || Her Majesty's Government agreed to this proposal, and the discussions which took place in consequence resulted in the draft Convention which Mr. Hay handed to your Excellency on the 11th January, 1899. || At that time the Joint High Commission, over which the late Lord Herschell presided, was still sitting. That Commission was appointed in July 1898 to discuss various questions at issue between Great Britain and the United States, namely, the fur-seal fishery, the fisheries off the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, the Alaskan boundary, alien labour laws, reciprocity, transit of merchandise, mining rights, naval vessels on the great lakes, definition and marking of frontiers, and conveyance of persons in custody. But serious difficulties had arisen in the attempt to arrive at an understanding, and it had become doubtful whether any settlement would be effected. || In reply, therefore, to a request for a speedy answer with regard to the Convention, the Marquess of Salisbury informed Mr. White, the American Chargé d'Affaires, that he could not help contrasting the precarious pro-

spects and slowness of the negotiations which were being conducted by Lord Herschell with the rapidity of decision proposed in the matter of the Convention. Her Majesty's Government might be reproached with having come to a precipitate agreement on a proposal which was exclusively favourable to the United States, while they had come to no agreement at all on the controversy where there was something to be conceded on both sides. || Shortly afterwards Lord Herschell intimated that the difficulties in regard to the question of the Alaskan boundary seemed insuperable, and that he feared it might be necessary to break off the negotiations of which he had hitherto had the charge. Upon this Lord Salisbury informed Mr. White that he did not see how Her Majesty's Government could sanction any Convention for amending the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, as the opinion of this country would hardly support them in making a Concession which would be wholly to the benefit of the United States, at a time when they appeared to be so little inclined to come to a satisfactory settlement in regard to the Alaskan frontier. || The last meeting of the Joint High Commission took place on the 20th February, 1899. Except for the establishment of a *modus vivendi* on the Alaskan frontier, no progress has been made since that date towards the adjustment of any of the questions which the High Commissioners were appointed to discuss. || It was in these circumstances that the proposal for a Canal Convention was revived at the beginning of last year.

On the 21st January your Lordship reported that a Bill, originally introduced in 1899, had been laid before Congress, empowering the President to acquire from the Republics of Costa Rica and Nicaragua the control of such portion of territory as might be desirable or necessary, and to direct the Secretary of War, when such control had been secured, to construct the Canal and make such provisions for defence as might be required for the safety and protection of the Canal and the terminal harbours. || It was probable that the Bill would be passed, and it was clear that additional embarrassment would be caused by an enactment opposed to the terms of the proposed Convention, and in direct violation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. On the other hand, your Lordship's information led to the confident expectation that the Convention as signed would, if agreed to by Her Majesty's Government, be ratified by the Senate. || In these circumstances Her Majesty's Government consented to re-open the question, and, after due consideration, determined to accept the Convention unconditionally, as a signal proof of their friendly disposition and of their desire not to impede the execution of a project declared

to be of national importance to the people of the United States. || Your Excellency stated that the United States' Government expressed satisfaction at this happy result and appreciation of the conciliatory disposition shown by Her Majesty's Government. || The Convention was forthwith submitted to the Senate for ratification, and on the 9th March the Committee charged with its examination reported in favour of ratification, with the insertion, subsequently adopted, after section 5 of Article II, of a paragraph containing provision that the rules laid down in the preceding sections should not apply to measures for the defence of the United States by its own forces and the maintenance of public order. This alteration was discussed by the Senate in Secret Session on the 5th April, but no vote was taken upon it nor upon the direct question of ratification. || The Bill empowering the President to construct and provide for the defence of the Canal passed the House of Representatives by a large majority on the 2nd May. The Senate, however, postponed consideration of the Bill, although favourably reported by the Committee on Inter-oceanic Canals. || After the recess, during which the Presidential election took place, the discussion was resumed in the Senate. On the 20th December the vote was taken, and resulted in the ratification of the Convention with the three amendments which have been presented for the acceptance of His Majesty's Government. || The first of these amendments, that in Article II, declares the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty to be „hereby superseded“. || Before attempting to consider the manner in which this amendment will, if adopted, affect the parties to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, I desire to call your Excellency's attention to a question of principle which is involved by the action of the Senate at this point. || The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty is an international contract of unquestionable validity; a contract which, according to well-established international usage, ought not to be abrogated or modified, save with the consent of both the parties to the contract. In spite of this usage, His Majesty's Government find themselves confronted by a proposal communicated to them by the United States' Government, without any previous attempt to ascertain their views, for the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. || The practical effect of the amendment can best be understood by reference to the inclosed copy of the Articles of the Treaty, Nos. I and VI*), which, assuming that the United States' Government would undertake all the obligations imposed by Article IV of the Treaty, contain the only provisions not replaced by new provisions, covering the

*) Nr. 12631, Anlage. Red.

same ground, in the Convention. || Under Article I of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty the two Powers agreed that neither would occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume or exercise any dominion over any part of Central America, nor attain any of the foregoing objects by protection afforded to, or alliance with, any State or people of Central America. There is no similar Agreement in the Convention. If, therefore, the Treaty were wholly abrogated, both Powers would, except in the vicinity of the Canal, recover entire freedom of action in Central America. The change would certainly be of advantage to the United States, and might be of substantial importance. || Under the other surviving portion of the Treaty (part of Article VI) provision is made for Treaties with the Central American States in furtherance of the object of the two Powers, and for the exercise of good offices should differences arise as to the territory through which the Canal will pass. In this case abrogation would, perhaps, signify but little to this country. There is nothing in the Convention to prevent Great Britain from entering into communication, or exercising good offices, with the Central American States, should difficulties hereafter arise between them and the United States.

The other two amendments present more formidable difficulties. || The first of them, which reserves to the United States the right of taking any measures which it may find necessary to secure by its own forces the defence of the United States, appears to His Majesty's Government to involve a distinct departure from the principle which has until now found acceptance with both Governments: the principle, namely, that in time of war as well as in time of peace the passage of the Canal is to remain free and unimpeded, and is to be so maintained by the Power or Powers responsible for its control. || Were this amendment added to the Convention the United States would, it is presumed, be within their rights, if at any moment when it seemed to them that their safety required it, in view of warlike preparations not yet commenced, but contemplated or supposed to be contemplated by another Power, they resorted to warlike acts in or near the Canal — acts clearly inconsistent with the neutral character which it has always been sought to give it, and which would deny the free use of it to the commerce and navies of the world. || It appears from the Report of the Senate Committee that the proposed addition to Article II was adopted from Article X of the Suez Canal Convention, which runs as follows: — || „Similarly, the provisions of Articles IV, V, VII, and VIII*) shall not

*) Article IV guarantees that the Maritime Canal shall remain open in time of war as a free passage even to the ships of war of belligerents, and regulates the

interfere with the measures which His Majesty the Sultan and His Highness the Khedive, in the name of His Imperial Majesty, and within the limits of the Firmans granted, might find it necessary to take for securing by their own forces the defence of Egypt and the maintenance of public order. || „In case His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, or His Highness the Khedive, should find it necessary to avail themselves of the exceptions for which this Article provides, the Signatory Powers of the Declaration of London shall be notified thereof by the Imperial Ottoman Government. || „It is likewise understood that the provisions of the four Articles aforesaid shall in no case occasion any obstacle to the measures which the Imperial Ottoman Government may think it necessary to take in order to insure by its own forces the defence of its other possessions situated on the eastern coast of the Red Sea.“ || It is, I understand, contended in support of the Senate amendment that the existence of the above provisions in the Suez Canal Convention justifies the demand now made for the insertion of analogous provisions in regard to the proposed Nicaragua Canal. || But the analogy which it has been attempted to set up fails in one essential particular. The banks of the Suez Canal are within the dominions of a territorial Sovereign, who was a party to the Convention, and whose established interests it was necessary to protect, whereas the Nicaragua Canal will be constructed in territory belonging not to the United States, but to Central American States, of whose sovereign rights other Powers cannot claim to dispose. || Moreover, it seems to have escaped attention that Article X of the Suez Canal Convention receives most important modification from Article XI, which lays down that „the measures which shall be taken in the cases provided for by Articles IX and X of the present Treaty shall not interfere with the free use of the Canal“. The Article proceeds to say that: „In the same cases, the erection of permanent fortifications contrary to the provisions of Article VIII is prohibited.“

The last paragraph of Article VIII, which is specially alluded to, runs as follows: — || „They“ [*i.e.*, the Agents of the Signatory Powers in Egypt] „shall especially demand the suppression of any work or the dispersion of any assemblage on either bank of the Canal, the object or

revictualling, transit, and detention of such vessels in the Canal. || Article V regulates the embarkation and disembarkation of troops, munitions or materials of war by belligerent Powers in time of war. || Article VII prohibits the Powers from keeping any vessel of war in the waters of the Canal. || Article VIII imposes on the Agents of the Signatory Powers in Egypt the duty of watching over the execution of the Treaty, and taking measures to secure the free passage of the Canal.

effect of which might be to interfere with the liberty and the entire security of the navigation.“ || The situation which would be created by the addition of the new clause is deserving of serious attention. If it were to be added, the obligation to respect the neutrality of the Canal in all circumstances would, so far as Great Britain is concerned, remain in force; the obligation of the United States, on the other hand, would be essentially modified. The result would be a one-sided arrangement under which Great Britain would be debarred from any warlike action in or around the Canal, while the United States would be able to resort to such action to whatever extent they might deem necessary to secure their own safety. || It may be contended that if the new clause were adopted, section 7 of Article II, which prohibits the erection of fortifications, would sufficiently insure the free use of the Canal. This contention is, however, one which His Majesty's Government are quite unable to admit. I will not insist upon the dangerous vagueness of the language employed in the amendment, or upon the absence of all security as to the manner in which the words might, at some future time, be interpreted. For even if it were more precisely worded, it would be impossible to determine what might be the effect if one clause permitting defensive measures, and another forbidding fortifications, were allowed to stand side by side in the Convention. To His Majesty's Government it seems, as I have already said, that the amendment might be construed as leaving it open to the United States at any moment, not only if war existed, but even if it were anticipated, to take any measures, however stringent or far-reaching, which, in their own judgment, might be represented as suitable for the purpose of protecting their national interests. Such an enactment would strike at the very root of that „general principle“ of neutralization upon which the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was based, and which was reaffirmed in the Convention as drafted. || But the import of the amendment stands out in stronger relief when the third proposal is considered. This strikes out Article III of the Convention, under which the High Contracting Parties engaged, immediately upon the Convention being ratified, to bring it to the notice of other Powers and to invite their adherence. If that adherence were given, the neutrality of the Canal would be secured by the whole of the adhering Powers. Without that adherence, it would depend only upon the guarantee of the two Contracting Powers. The amendment, however, not only removes all prospect of the wider guarantee, but places this country in a position of marked disadvantage compared with other Powers which would not be subject to the Self-denying Ordinance which Great Britain is desired to accept. It would follow, were His Majesty's

Government to agree to such an arrangement, that while the United States would have a Treaty right to interfere with the Canal in time of war, or apprehended war, and while other Powers could with a clear conscience disregard any of the restrictions imposed by the Convention, Great Britain alone, in spite of her enormous possessions on the American Continent, in spite of the extent of her Australasian Colonies and her interests in the East, would be absolutely precluded from resorting to any such action, or from taking measures to secure her interests in and near the Canal. || I request that your Excellency will explain to the Secretary of State the reasons, as set forth in this despatch, why His Majesty's Government feel unable to accept the Convention in the shape presented to them by the American Ambassador, and why they prefer, as matters stand at present, to retain unmodified the provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. His Majesty's Government have, throughout these negotiations, given evidence of their earnest desire to meet the views of the United States. They would on this occasion have been ready to consider in a friendly spirit any amendments of the Convention, not inconsistent with the principles accepted by both Governments, which the Government of the United States might have desired to propose, and they would sincerely regret a failure to come to an amicable understanding in regard to this important subject.

Your Lordship is authorized to read this despatch to the Secretary of State, and to leave a copy in his hands.

Lansdowne.

Nr. 12633. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Botschafter in Washington an den Staatssekretär des Ausw. Der amerikanische Staatssekretär hat ihm einen neuen Vertragsentwurf übergeben.

Washington, April 25, 1901.

My Lord, || Since the rejection by His Majesty's Government of the amendments introduced by the Senate in the Inter-oceanic Canal Convention of the 5th February, 1900, Mr. Hay has been engaged in framing a new draft which, as I understand, he has drawn up after consultation with prominent Senators, and which he trusts will be acceptable to His Majesty's Government. || Mr. Hay has handed me a copy of the draft, which I have the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's consideration.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

Pauncefote.

Anlage.

Draft of Convention relative to the Construction of an Interoceanic Canal.

Article I.

The High Contracting Parties agree that the present Convention shall supersede the afore-mentioned Convention of the 19th April, 1850.

Article II.

It is agreed that the canal may be constructed under the auspices of the Government of the United States, either directly at its own cost, or by gift or loan of money to individuals or Corporations, or through subscription to or purchase of stock or shares, and that, subject to the provisions of the present Convention, the said Government shall have and enjoy all the rights incident to such construction, as well as the exclusive right of providing for the regulation and management of the canal.

Article III.

The United States adopts, as the basis of the neutralization of said ship canal, the following Rules, substantially as embodied in the Convention of Constantinople, signed the 28th October, 1888, for the free navigation of the Suez Canal, that is to say: — || 1. The canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations, on terms of entire equality, so that there shall be no discrimination against any nation, or its citizens or subjects, in respect of the conditions or charges of traffic, or otherwise. || 2. The canal shall never be blockaded, nor shall any right of war be exercised nor any act of hostility be committed within it. The United States, however, shall be at liberty to maintain such military police along the canal as may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and disorder. || 3. Vessels of war of a belligerent shall not revictual nor take any stores in the canal except so far as may be strictly necessary; and the transit of such vessels through the canal shall be effected with the least possible delay in accordance with the Regulations in force, and with only such intermission as may result from the necessities of the service. || Prizes shall be in all respects subject to the same Rules as vessels of war of the belligerents. || 4. No belligerent shall embark or disembark troops, munitions of war, or warlike materials in the canal except in case of accidental hindrance of the transit, and in such case the transit shall be resumed with all possible dispatch. || 5. The provisions of this Article shall apply to waters adjacent to the canal, within 3 marine miles of either end. Vessels of war of a belligerent shall not remain in such waters longer than twenty-four hours at any one time except in case of distress, and in such case

shall depart as soon as possible; but a vessel of war of one belligerent shall not depart within twenty-four hours from the departure of a vessel of war of the other belligerent. || 6. The plant, establishments, buildings, and all works necessary to the construction, maintenance, and operation of the canal shall be deemed to be part thereof, for the purpose of this Convention, and in time of war as in time of peace shall enjoy complete immunity from attack or injury by belligerents, and from acts calculated to impair their usefulness as part of the canal.

Article IV.

The present Convention shall be ratified by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by His Britannic Majesty; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington or at London, at the earliest possible time within months from the date hereof. || In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Convention and thereunto affixed their seals.

Done in duplicate at Washington, the day of in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and one.

Nr. 12634. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Staatssekretär des Ausw. an den Botschafter in Washington, übersendet eine Denkschrift und verlangt Änderung des Vertragsentwurfs.

Foreign Office, August 3, 1901.

Sir, || The draft Convention dealing with the question of the Inter-oceanic Canal, forwarded in Lord Pauncefote's despatch of the 25th April, has been most carefully examined. || I inclose, for your information, the accompanying copy of a Memorandum explaining the views of His Majesty's Government which I have authorized Lord Pauncefote, should he think proper, to communicate to Mr. Hay. || His Majesty's Government have approached the consideration of this important question with a sincere desire to facilitate the progress of the great enterprise in which both Governments take such interest. They feel confident that the United States' Government will give them credit for the friendly spirit in which Mr. Hay's proposals have been examined, and that they will recognize that if it has been deemed necessary to suggest amendments at one or two points, it has been because they are considered requisite for the purpose of bringing about the conclusion of a Treaty which

shall be accepted as equitable and satisfactory by the public of both countries.

I am, &c.

(Signed) Lansdowne.

Anlage 1.

Memorandum.

In the despatch which I addressed to Lord Pauncefote on the 22nd February last, and which was communicated to Mr. Hay on the 11th March, I explained the reasons for which His Majesty's Government were unable to accept the amendments introduced by the Senate of the United States into the Convention, signed at Washington in February 1900, relative to the construction of an interoceanic canal. || The amendments were three in number, namely: — || „1. The insertion in Article II, after the reference to Article VIII of the Clayton-Bulwer Convention, of the words 'which Convention is hereby superseded.' || „2. The addition of a new paragraph after section 5 of Article II in the following terms: — || „It is agreed, however, that none of the immediately foregoing conditions and stipulations in sections numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this Article shall apply to measures which the United States may find it necessary to take for securing by its own forces the defence of the United States and the maintenance of public order.' || „3. The excision of Article III, which provides that 'the High Contracting Parties will, immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of this Convention, bring it to the notice of other Powers and invite them to adhere to it.'“

2. The objections entertained by His Majesty's Government may be briefly stated as follows: — || (1.) The Clayton-Bulwer Convention being an international compact of unquestionable validity could not be abrogated or modified save with the consent of both parties to the contract. No attempt had, however, been made to ascertain the views of Her late Majesty's Government. The Convention dealt with several matters for which no provision had been made in the Convention of February 1900, and if the former were wholly abrogated both Powers would, except in the vicinity of the canal, recover entire freedom of action in Central America, a change which might be of substantial importance. || (2.) The reservation to the United States of the right to take any measures which it might find necessary to secure by its own forces the defence of the United States appeared to His Majesty's Government to involve a distinct departure from the principle of neutralization which until then had found acceptance with both Governments, and which both were, under the Con-

vention of 1900, bound to uphold. Moreover, if the amendment were added, the obligation to respect the neutrality of the canal in all circumstances would, so far as Great Britain was concerned, remain in force; the obligation of the United States, on the other hand, would be essentially modified. The result would be a one-sided arrangement, under which Great Britain would be debarred from any warlike action in or around the canal, while the United States would be able to resort to such action even in time of peace to whatever extent they might deem necessary to secure their own safety. || (3.) The omission of the Article inviting the adherence of other Powers placed this country in a position of marked disadvantage compared with other Powers; while the United States would have a Treaty right to interfere with the canal in time of war, or apprehended war, and while other Powers could with a clear conscience disregard any of the restrictions imposed by the Convention of 1900, Great Britain alone would be absolutely precluded from resorting to any such action or from taking measures to secure her interests in and near the canal. || For these reasons His Majesty's Government preferred, as matters stood, to retain unmodified the provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer Convention. They had, however, throughout the negotiations given evidence of their earnest desire to meet the views of the United States, and would sincerely regret a failure to come to an amicable understanding in regard to this important subject.

3. Mr. Hay, rightly apprehending that His Majesty's Government did not intend to preclude all further attempt at negotiation, has endeavoured to find means by which—to reconcile such divergences of view as exist between the two Governments, and has communicated a further draft of a Treaty for the consideration of His Majesty's Government. || Following the order of the Senate amendments, the Convention now proposed — || (1.) Provides by a separate Article that the Clayton-Bulwer Convention shall be superseded. || (2.) The paragraph inserted by the Senate after section 5 of Article II is omitted. || (3.) The Article inviting other Powers to adhere is omitted. || There are three other points to which attention must be directed: — || (a) The words „in time of war as in time of peace“ are omitted in Rule 1. || (b) The draft contains no stipulation against the acquisition of sovereignty over the isthmus or over the strip of territory through which the canal is intended to pass. There was no stipulation of this kind in the Hay-Pauncefote Convention; but, by the surviving portion of Article I of the Clayton-Bulwer Convention, the two Governments agreed that neither would ever „occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume, or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua,

Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, or any part of Central America“, nor attain any of the foregoing objects by protection offered to, or alliance with, any State or people of Central America. || (c.) While the amendment reserving to the United States the right of providing for the defence of the canal is no longer pressed for, the first portion of Rule 7, providing that „no fortifications shall be erected commanding the canal or the waters adjacent“, has been omitted. The latter portion of the Rule has been incorporated in Rule 2 of the new draft, and makes provision for military police to protect the canal against lawlessness and disorder.

4. I fully recognize the friendly spirit which has prompted Mr. Hay in making further proposals for the settlement of the question, and while in no way abandoning the position which His Majesty's Government assumed in rejecting the Senate amendments, or admitting that the despatch of the 22nd February was other than a well-founded, moderate, and reasonable statement of the British case, I have examined the draft Treaty with every wish to arrive at a conclusion which shall facilitate the construction of an interoceanic canal by the United States, without involving on the part of His Majesty's Government any departure from the principles for which they have throughout contended. || 5. In form the new draft differs from the Convention of 1900, under which the High Contracting Parties, after agreeing that the canal might be constructed by the United States, undertook to adopt certain Rules as the basis upon which the canal was to be neutralized. In the new draft the United States intimate *their* readiness „to adopt“ somewhat similar Rules as the basis of the neutralization of the canal. It would appear to follow that the whole responsibility for upholding these Rules, and thereby maintaining the neutrality of the canal, would henceforward be assumed by the Government of the United States. The change of form is an important one, but in view of the fact that the whole cost of the construction of the canal is to be borne by that Government, which is also to be charged with such measures as may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and disorder, His Majesty's Government are not likely to object to it. || 6. The proposal to abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer Convention is not, I think, inadmissible if it can be shown that sufficient provision is made in the new Treaty for such portions of the Convention as ought, in the interests of this country, to remain in force. This aspect of the case must be considered in connection with the provisions of Article I of the Clayton-Bulwer Convention which have already been quoted, and Article VIII referred to in the preamble of the new Treaty. ||

Thus, in view of the permanent character of the Treaty to be concluded and of the „general principle“ reaffirmed thereby as a perpetual obligation, the High Contracting Parties should agree that no change of sovereignty or other change of circumstances in the territory through which the canal is intended to pass shall affect such „general principle“ or release the High Contracting Parties, or either of them, from their obligations under the Treaty, and that the Rules adopted as the basis of neutralization shall govern, so far as possible, all interoceanic communications across the isthmus. || I would therefore propose an additional Article in the following terms, on the acceptance of which His Majesty's Government would probably be prepared to withdraw their objections to the formal abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Convention: — || „In view of the permanent character of this Treaty, whereby the general principle established by Article VIII of the Clayton-Bulwer Convention is reaffirmed, the High Contracting Parties hereby declare and agree that the Rules laid down in the last preceding Article shall, so far as they may be applicable, govern all interoceanic communications across the isthmus which connects North and South America, and that no change of territorial sovereignty, or other change of circumstances, shall affect such general principle or the obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the present Treaty.“ || 7. The various points connected with the defence of the canal may conveniently be considered together. In the present draft the Senate amendment has been dropped, which left the United States at liberty to apply such measures as might be found „necessary to take for securing by its own forces the defence of the United States“. On the other hand, the words „in time of war as in time of peace“ are omitted from Rule 1, and there is no stipulation, as originally in Rule 7, prohibiting the erection of fortifications commanding the canal or the waters adjacent. || I do not fail to observe the important difference between the question as now presented to us and the position which was created by the amendment adopted in the Senate. || In my despatch I pointed out the dangerous ambiguity of an instrument of which one clause permitted the adoption of defensive measures, while another prohibited the erection of fortifications. It is most important that no doubt should exist as to the intention of the Contracting Parties. As to this, I understand that by the omission of all reference to the matter of defence the United States' Government desire to reserve the power of taking measures to protect the canal, at any time when the United States may be at war, from destruction or damage at the hands of an enemy or enemies. On the other hand, I conclude that, with the above

exception, there is no intention to derogate from the principles of neutrality laid down by the Rules. As to the first of these propositions, I am not prepared to deny that contingencies may arise when not only from a national point of view, but on behalf of the commercial interests of the whole world, it might be of supreme importance to the United States that they should be free to adopt measures for the defence of the canal at a moment when they were themselves engaged in hostilities. || It is also to be borne in mind that, owing to the omission of the words under which this country became jointly bound to defend the neutrality of the canal, and the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, the obligations of Great Britain would be materially diminished. || This is a most important consideration. In my despatch of the 22nd February, I dwelt upon the strong objection entertained by His Majesty's Government to any Agreement under which, while the United States would have a Treaty right to interfere with the canal in time of war, or apprehended war, Great Britain alone, in spite of her vast possessions on the American Continent, and the extent of her interests in the East, would be absolutely precluded from resorting to any such action, or from taking measures to secure her interests in and near the canal. The same exception could not be taken to an arrangement under which, supposing that the United States, as the Power owning the canal and responsible for the maintenance of its neutrality, should find it necessary to interfere temporarily with its free use by the shipping of another Power, that Power would thereupon at once and *ipso facto* become liberated from the necessity of observing the Rules laid down in the new Treaty.

8. The difficulty raised by the absence of any provision for the adherence of other Powers still remains. While indifferent as to the form in which the point is met, I must emphatically renew the objections of His Majesty's Government to being bound by stringent Rules of neutral conduct not equally binding upon other Powers. I would therefore suggest the insertion in Rule 1, after „all nations“, of the words „which shall agree to observe these Rules“. This addition will impose upon other Powers the same self-denying Ordinance as Great Britain is desired to accept, and will furnish an additional security for the neutrality of the canal, which it will be the duty of the United States to maintain. || As matters of minor importance, I suggest the renewal of one of the stipulations of Article VIII of the Clayton-Bulwer Convention by adding to Rule 1 the words „such conditions and charges shall be just and equitable“, and the adoption of „Treaty“ in lieu of „Convention“ to designate the International Agreement which the High Contracting

Parties may conclude. || Mr. Hay's draft, with the proposed amendments shown in italics, is annexed.

(Signed)

Lansdowne.

August 3, 1901.

Anlage 2.

Draft of Treaty relative to the Construction of an Interocceanic Canal.

Article I.

The High Contracting Parties agree that the present *Treaty* shall supersede the aforementioned Convention of the 19th April, 1850.

Article II.

It is agreed that the canal may be constructed under the auspices of the Government of the United States, either directly at its own cost, or by gift or loan of money to individuals or Corporations, or through subscription to or purchase of stock or shares, and that, subject to the provisions of the present *Treaty*, the said Government shall have and enjoy all the rights incident to such construction, as well as the exclusive right of providing for the regulation and management of the canal.

Article III.

The United States adopts, as the basis of the neutralization of said ship canal, the following Rules, substantially as embodied in the Convention of Constantinople, signed the 28th October, 1888, for the free navigation of the Suez Canal, that is to say: — || 1. The canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations *which shall agree to observe these rules*, on terms of entire equality, so that there shall be no discrimination against any nation *so agreeing*, or its citizens or subjects, in respect of the conditions or charges of traffic, or otherwise. *Such conditions and charges of traffic shall be just and equitable.* || 2. The canal shall never be blockaded, nor shall any right of war be exercised nor any act of hostility be committed within it. The United States, however, shall be at liberty to maintain such military police along the canal as may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and disorder. || 3. Vessels of war of a belligerent shall not revictual nor take any stores in the canal except so far as may be strictly necessary; and the transit of such vessels through the canal shall be effected with the least possible delay in accordance with the Regulations in force, and with only such intermission as may result from the necessities of the service. || Prizes shall be in all respects subject to the

same rules as vessels of war of the belligerents. || 4. No belligerent shall embark or disembark troops, munitions of war, or warlike materials in the canal except in case of accidental hindrance of the transit, and in such case the transit shall be resumed with all possible dispatch. || 5. The provisions of this Article shall apply to waters adjacent to the canal, within 3 marine miles of either end. Vessels of war of a belligerent shall not remain in such waters longer than twenty-four hours at any one time except in case of distress, and in such case shall depart as soon as possible; but a vessel of war of one belligerent shall not depart within twenty-four hours from the departure of a vessel of war of the other belligerent. || 6. The plant, establishments, buildings, and all works necessary to the construction, maintenance, and operation of the canal shall be deemed to be part thereof, for the purposes of this *Treaty*, and in time of war, as in time of peace, shall enjoy complete immunity from attack or injury by belligerents, and from acts calculated to impair their usefulness as part of the canal.

Article IIIa.

In view of the permanent character of this Treaty whereby the general principle established by Article VIII of the Clayton-Bulwer Convention is reaffirmed, the High Contracting Parties hereby declare and agree that the Rules laid down in the last preceding Article shall, so far as they may be applicable, govern all interoceanic communications across the isthmus which connects North and South America, and that no change of territorial sovereignty, or other change of circumstances, shall affect such general principle or the obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the present Treaty.

Article IV.

The present *Treaty* shall be ratified by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by His Britannic Majesty; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington or at London at the earliest possible time within months from the date hereof. || In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this *Treaty*, and thereunto affixed their seals.

Done in duplicate at Washington, the day of ,
in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and one.

Nr. 12635. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Staatssekretär des Ausw. an den amerikanischen Botschafter in London. Weitere Verhandlungen über die Vorschläge vom 3. August.

Foreign Office, September 12, 1901.

Sir, || I have to inform you that I have learned from Lord Pauncefote that Mr. Hay has laid before the President the Memorandum, a copy of which was forwarded to you in my despatch of the 3rd August. || Mr. McKinley regarded, as did Mr. Hay, the consideration shown to the last proposals of the United States' Government relative to the Inter-oceanic Canal Treaty as in the highest degree friendly and reasonable. || With regard to the changes suggested by His Majesty's Government, Mr. Hay was apprehensive that the first amendment proposed to clause 1 of Article III would meet with opposition because of the strong objection entertained to inviting other Powers to become Contract Parties to a Treaty affecting the canal. If His Majesty's Government found it not convenient to accept the draft as it stood, they might perhaps consider favourably the substitution for the words „the canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations which shall agree to observe these Rules“ the words „the canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations observing these Rules“, and instead of „any nation so agreeing“ the words „any such nation“. This, it seemed to Mr. Hay, would accomplish the purpose aimed at by His Majesty's Government. || The second amendment in the same clause, providing that conditions and charges of traffic shall be just and equitable, was accepted by the President. || Coming to Article numbered IIIa, which might be called Article VI, Mr. Hay pointed out that the preamble of the draft Treaty retained the declaration that the general principle of neutralization established in Article VIII of the Clayton-Bulwer Convention was not impaired. To reiterate this in still stronger language in a separate Article, and to give to Article VIII of the Clayton-Bulwer Convention what seemed a wider application than it originally had, would, Mr. Hay feared, not meet with acceptance. || If, however, it seemed indispensable to His Majesty's Government that an Article providing for the contingency of a change in sovereignty should be inserted, he thought it might state that: — || „It is agreed that no change of territorial sovereignty or of the international relations of the country traversed by the before-mentioned canal shall affect the general principle of neutralization or the obligation of the High Contracting Parties under the present Treaty.“ This would cover the point in a

brief and simple way. || In conclusion, Mr. Hay expressed his appreciation of the friendly and magnanimous spirit shown by His Majesty's Government in the treatment of this matter, and his hope that a solution would be attained which would enable the United States' Government to start at once upon the great enterprise which so vitally concerned the whole world, and especially Great Britain, as the first of commercial nations.

I am, &c.

(Signed) Lansdowne.

Nr. 12636. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Staatssekretär des Ausw. an den Botschafter in Washington. Die englische Regierung nimmt die amerikanischen Vorschläge an.

Foreign Office, October 23, 1901.

My Lord, || I informed the United States' Chargé d'Affaires to-day that His Majesty's Government had given their careful attention to the various amendments which had been suggested in the draft Inter-oceanic Canal Treaty, communicated by Mr. Hay to your Lordship on the 25th April last, and that I was now in a position to inform him officially of our views. || Mr. Hay had suggested that in Article III, Rule 1, we should substitute for the words „the canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations which shall agree to observe these Rules“, &c., the words „the canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations observing these Rules“, and in the same clause, as a consequential amendment, to substitute for the words „any nation so agreeing“ the words „any such nation“. His Majesty's Government were prepared to accept this amendment, which seemed to us equally efficacious for the purpose which we had in view, namely, that of insuring that Great Britain should not be placed in a less advantageous position than other Powers, while they stopped short of conferring upon other nations a contractual right to the use of the canal. || We were also prepared to accept, in lieu of Article IIIa, the new Article IV proposed by Mr. Hay, which, with the addition of the words „or countries“ proposed in the course of the discussions here, runs as follows: — || „It is agreed that no change of territorial sovereignty or of the international relations of the country or countries traversed by the before-mentioned canal shall affect the general principle of neutralization or the obligation of the High Contracting Parties

under the present Treaty.“ || I admitted that there was some force in the contention of Mr. Hay, which had been strongly supported in conversation with me by Mr. Choate, that Article IIIa, as drafted by His Majesty's Government, gave to Article VIII of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty a wider application than it originally possessed. || In addition to these amendments, we proposed to add in the preamble, after the words „being desirous to facilitate the construction of a ship canal to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans“, the words „by whatever route may be considered expedient“, and „such ship canal“ for „said ship canal“ in the first paragraph of Article III, words which, in our opinion, seemed to us desirable for the purpose of removing any doubt which might possibly exist as to the application of the Treaty to any other inter-oceanic canals as well as that through Nicaragua. || I handed to Mr. White a statement, showing the draft as it originally stood and the amendments proposed on each side.

I am, &c.

(Signed)

Lansdowne.

Nr. 12637. VEREINIGTE STAATEN. — Der Staatssekretär des Ausw. an den engl. Botschafter in Washington. Übersendet den definitiven Vertragsentwurf.

Washington, November 8, 1901.

Excellency, || Upon your return to Washington, I had the honour to receive from you a copy of the instruction addressed to you on the 23rd October last by the Marquess of Lansdowne, accepting and reducing to final shape the various amendments in the draft of an Interoceanic Canal Treaty, as developed in the course of the negotiations lately conducted in London, through Mr. Choate, with yourself and Lord Lansdowne. || The Treaty, being thus brought into a form representing a complete agreement on the part of the negotiators, has been submitted to the President, who approves of the conclusions reached, and directs me to proceed to the formal signature thereof. || I have, accordingly, the pleasure to send you a clear copy of the text of the Treaty, embodying the several modifications agreed upon. Upon being advised by you that this text correctly represents your understanding of the agreement thus happily brought about, the Treaty will be engrossed for signature at such time as may be most convenient to you.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

John Hay.

Nr. 12638. **GROSSBRITANNIEN und VEREINIGTE STAATEN.** — Vertrag über die Erbauung eines Schiffahrtskanals zwischen dem Atlantischen und Stillen Ozean.

Treaty between Great Britain and the United States to facilitate the Construction of a Ship Canal to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, signed at Washington, November 18, 1901.

His Majesty Edward the Seventh, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, King, and Emperor of India, and the United States of America, being desirous to facilitate the construction of a ship canal to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, by whatever route may be considered expedient, and to that end to remove any objection which may arise out of the Convention of the 19th April, 1850, commonly called the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, to the construction of such canal under the auspices of the Government of the United States, without impairing the „general principle“ of neutralization established in Article VIII of that Convention, have for that purpose appointed as their Plenipotentiaries: || His Majesty Edward the Seventh, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, King, and Emperor of India, the Right Honourable Lord Pauncefote, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States; and || The President of the United States, John Hay, Secretary of State of the United States of America; || Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have agreed upon the following Articles: —

Article I.

The High Contracting Parties agree that the present Treaty shall supersede the aforementioned Convention of the 19th April, 1850.

Article II.

It is agreed that the canal may be constructed under the auspices of the Government of the United States, either directly at its own cost, or by gift or loan of money to individuals or Corporations, or through subscription to or purchase of stock or shares, and that, subject to the provisions of the present Treaty, the said Government shall have and enjoy all the rights incident to such construction, as well as the exclusive right of providing for the regulation and management of the canal.

Article III.

The United States adopts, as the basis of the neutralization of such ship canal, the following Rules, substantially as embodied in the Conven-

tion of Constantinople, signed the 28th October, 1888, for the free navigation of the Suez Canal, that is to say: — || 1. The canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations observing these Rules, on terms of entire equality, so that there shall be no discrimination against any such nation, or its citizens or subjects, in respect of the conditions or charges of traffic, or otherwise. Such conditions and charges of traffic shall be just and equitable. || 2. The canal shall never be blockaded, nor shall any right of war be exercised nor any act of hostility be committed within it. The United States, however, shall be at liberty to maintain such military police along the canal as may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and disorder. || 3. Vessels of war of a belligerent shall not revictual nor take any stores in the canal except so far as may be strictly necessary; and the transit of such vessels through the canal shall be effected with the least possible delay in accordance with the Regulations in force, and with only such intermission as may result from the necessities of the service. || Prizes shall be in all respects subject to the same rules as vessels of war of the belligerents. || 4. No belligerent shall embark or disembark troops, munitions of war, or warlike materials in the canal, except in case of accidental hindrance of the transit, and in such case the transit shall be resumed with all possible dispatch. || 5. The provisions of this Article shall apply to waters adjacent to the canal, within 3 marine miles of either end. Vessels of war of a belligerent shall not remain in such waters longer than twenty-four hours at any one time except in case of distress, and in such case shall depart as soon as possible; but a vessel of war of one belligerent shall not depart within twenty-four hours from the departure of a vessel of war of the other belligerent. || 6. The plant, establishments, buildings, and all works necessary to the construction, maintenance, and operation of the canal shall be deemed to be part thereof, for the purposes of this Treaty, and in time of war, as in time of peace, shall enjoy complete immunity from attack or injury by belligerents, and from acts calculated to impair their usefulness as part of the canal.

Article IV.

It is agreed that no change of territorial sovereignty or of the international relations of the country or countries traversed by the before-mentioned canal shall affect the general principle of neutralization or the obligation of the High Contracting Parties under the present Treaty.

Article V.

The present Treaty shall be ratified by His Britannic Majesty and by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington or at London at the earliest possible time within six months from the date hereof. *) || In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty and thereunto affixed their seals.

Done in duplicate at Washington, the 18th day of November, in the year of Our Lord 1901.

(Seal.)

Pañcefote.

(Seal.)

John Hay.

*) Am 16. Dezember 1901 wurde der Vertrag vom Senat genehmigt. Red.

Aktenstücke zur Geschichte des Süd- afrikanischen Krieges.

I. Korrespondenz der englischen Heeresleitung mit den Buren- generalen über die Zerstörung von Eigentum*).

Nr. 12639. **ORANGEFREISTAAT und SÜDAFRIKANISCHE REPUBLIK.**
— Die Präsidenten des Orangefreistaates und
der Südafrikanischen Republik an den englischen
Obergeneral. Beschwerden über Zerstörung von
Farmen.

Bloemfontein, 3rd February, 1900.

We learn from many sides that the British troops, contrary to the recognised usages of war, are guilty of the destruction by burning and blowing up with dynamite of farm houses, of the devastation of farms and the goods therein, whereby unprotected women and children are often deprived of food and cover. || This happens not only in the places where barbarians are encouraged by British officers, but even in the Cape Colony and in this State, where white brigands come out from the theatre of war with the evident intention of carrying out a general devastation, without any reason recognised by the customs of war, and without in any way furthering the operations. || We wish earnestly to protest against such acts.

President, South African Republic.

President, Orange Free State.

*) Blaubuch Cd. 582.

Nr. 12640. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Obergeneral an die
Präsidenten der beiden Republiken. Antwort
auf das Vorige.

Cape Town, 5th February, 1900.

I beg to acknowledge your Honours' telegram charging the British troops with the destruction of property contrary to the recognised usages of war and with brigandage and devastation. These charges are made in vague and general terms. No specific case is mentioned and no evidence given. || I have seen such charges made before now in the Press, but in no case, which has come under my notice, have they been substantiated. The most stringent instructions have been issued to the British troops to respect private property, as far as is compatible with the conduct of military operations. All wanton destruction or injury to peaceful inhabitants is contrary to British practice and tradition, and will if necessary be rigorously repressed by me. || I regret that your Honours should have seen fit to repeat the untrue statement that „barbarians have been encouraged by British officers“ to commit depredations. In the only case in which a raid has been perpetrated by native subjects of The Queen, the act was contrary to the instructions of the British officer nearest to the spot, and entirely disconcerted his operations. The women and children taken prisoners by the natives were restored to their homes by the agency of the British officer in question. || I regret to say that it is the Republican forces which have in some cases been guilty of carrying on the war in a manner not in accordance with civilised usage. I refer especially to the expulsion of loyal subjects of Her Majesty from their homes in the invaded districts of this Colony, because they refused to be commandeered by the invader. It is barbarous to attempt to force men to take sides against their own Sovereign and country by threats of spoliation and expulsion. Men, women, and children have had to leave their homes owing to such compulsion, and many of those who were formerly in comfortable circumstances are now being maintained by charity. || That a war should inflict hardships and injury on peaceful inhabitants is inevitable, but it is the desire of Her Majesty's Government, and it is my intention to conduct this war with as little injury as possible to peaceable inhabitants and to private property, and I hope your Honours will exercise your authority to ensure its being conducted in a similar spirit on your side.

Roberts.

Nr. 12641. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Derselbe an Dieselben. Dasselbe.

Cape Town, February 12, 1900.

In continuation of my telegram of the 5th February I beg to call your Honours' attention to the wanton destruction of property by the Boer forces in Natal. They not only have helped themselves freely to the cattle and other property of farmers without payment, but they have utterly wrecked the contents of many farmhouses. As an instance I would specify Mr. Theodore Wood's farm „Longwood“ near Springfield. I point out how very different is the conduct of the British troops. It is reported to me from Modder River that farms within the actual area of the British Camp have never even been entered, the occupants are unmolested, and their houses, gardens, and crops remain absolutely untouched.

Nr. 12642. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Derselbe an Dieselben.
Proklamation gegen willkürliche Zerstörungen.

13th May, 1900.

C. 1575. The following proclamation was issued by me in the name of Her Majesty's Government on the 26th March, begins: Notice is hereby given that all persons who within the territories of the South African Republic or Orange Free State shall authorise or be guilty of the wanton destruction or damage or the counselling, aiding, or assisting in the wanton destruction or damage of public or private property, such destruction or damage not being justified by the usages and customs of civilised warfare, will be held responsible in their persons and property for all such wanton destruction and damage. Ends. — Lord Roberts.

Nr. 12643. SÜDAFRIKANISCHE REPUBLIK. — Der Generalkommandant an den englischen Obergeneral. Weitere Beschwerden.

Pretoria, 16th May, 1900.

In answer to your Excellency's telegram containing your proclamation of 26th March I wish to point out that I have already during the course of the war taken stringent measures to prevent the destruction, or damaging, or removal of private or public goods and property, and have already punished persons who acted contrary thereto. They were brought before the Courts and punished as criminals. But I have not yet seen that your Excellency has punished anybody notwithstanding my protest.

Repeatedly have such cases been brought to your Excellency's notice by us, but your Excellency personally refused to institute an inquiry. On the contrary your troops continue to carry on the greatest barbarities. For instance a few days ago the Government of the South African Republic received the following official report about the action of your troops on the Western boundary, begins: „It is terrible how the troops are devastating properties in the Vryburg district. Sick persons are driven on to the veldt and their houses and furniture burned. They cut the throats of the sheep and shoot the cattle dead so that nothing remains. The enemy is acting so barbarously that they dug up a newly buried corpse and threw it out in the veldt“; ends. The Government holds the troops and officers who commit such deeds responsible therefor, and if your Excellency does not have them punished then the Government also holds your Excellency responsible.

Nr. 12644. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Obergeneral an den Generalkommandanten der Südafrikanischen Republik. Antwort auf das Vorige.

C. 1684, 18th May. In reply to your Honour's telegram of the 16th instant, I have always answered your Honour's telegrams about alleged outrages by British troops to the effect that representation should be made at the time of the occurrence to the Military Commander on the spot. I have, however, made enquiries into all cases you have brought to my notice and found them to be devoid of even foundation. I feel sure your present complaint is also unfounded but have forwarded it to General Hunter who is in command in the district concerned. As the Vryburg district is part of Her Majesty's dominions, I am responsible to Her Majesty's Government alone for the behaviour of my troops in that district.

Nr. 12645. SÜDAFRIKANISCHE REPUBLIK. — Der Generalkommandant an den englischen Obergeneral. Neue Beschwerden.

Commandant-General's Camp, 4th July, 1900.

[Translation.] || [Extract.] || Your Excellency, || To my regret I must again approach your Excellency with reference to the wanton destruction or damaging of private properties, and also the inhuman treatment and even assaults on helpless women and children by Her Britannic Majesty's

troops in the South African Republic. || Complaints are repeatedly reaching me that private dwellings are plundered, and in some cases totally destroyed, and all provisions taken from women and children, so that they are compelled to wander about without food or covering. To quote several instances: — It has just been brought to my notice by way of sworn affidavit that the house of Field-Cornet S. Buys on the farm, Leeuwspruit district, Middelburg, was set on fire and destroyed on the 20th June last. His wife, who was at home, was given five minutes' time to remove her bedding and clothing, and even what she took out was again taken from her. Her food, sugar, &c., was all taken, so that for herself and her children she had neither covering nor food for the following night. She was asked for the key of the safe, and after it was given up by her she was threatened with a sword, and money was demanded. All the money that was in the house was taken away, all the papers in the safe were torn up, and everything at the homestead that could not be taken away was destroyed. The house of Field-Cornet Buys' son was also destroyed, the doors and windows broken, &c. || It has also been reported to me that my own buildings on the farm Varkenspruit, district Standerton, as well as the house of Field-Cornet Badenhorst, on the adjoining farm, have been totally destroyed, and such of the stock as was not removed was shot dead on the farm. || Further, there is the sworn declaration of Mrs. Hendrik Badenhorst, which speaks for itself. || I cannot believe that such godless barbarities take place with your Excellency's consent, and thus I deem it my solemn duty to protest most strongly against such destruction and vindictiveness as being entirely contrary to civilised warfare. || I trust that your Excellency will take all the necessary measures to punish the doers of such deeds, and in the interest of humanity I call on your Excellency to use all your power and authority to put an end to the devastation wrought by the troops under your Excellency's command.

(Signed)

Louis Botha,

Acting Commandant-General of the South
African Republic.

Nr. 12646. **ORANGEFREISTAAT.** — Der Kommandant De Wet
an den englischen Obergeneral. Dasselbe.

Field near Bethlehem, Orange Free State, 10th July, 1900.

Your Excellency, || It is with a feeling of great indignation that I have from day to day noticed the reckless devastation of property in

this State by the troops under your Excellency's command. Houses and other property are under all manner of excuses destroyed and burnt, and defenceless women and children are treated with scorn, and driven on foot out of the houses to seek accommodation under the bare heavens. Through such action great unnecessary suffering is caused. Amongst many others, this has happened to the following, viz.: — || Near Lindley: the farms of Hermanns Pieterse, Jacobus Pieterse, Christian Hattuigh, Roelof Fourie, Adriaan Cilliers, Daniel Momberg, and Gert Rautenbach. || Near Heilbron: of Hendrik Meyer, Mathys Lourens, and Jan Vosloo. || Everything belonging to these persons has been burnt and destroyed. || The wife of General Roux, at Senekal, has been driven out of the manse, while the wife of Mr. J. G. Luyt, at Heilbron, was treated very scornfully, and the wife of Commandant P. H. de Villiers has been driven from two houses at Ficksburg. There are many other cases which have been brought to my notice, but for my purpose it is not necessary to send your excellency a complete list. || I trust that, in the name of our common civilisation and humanity, your Excellency will have the culprits punished, and prevent the perpetration of such acts in the future. || However, should the troops under your Excellency's command continue to unnecessarily devastate the country in a manner contrary to the principles of civilised warfare, I shall feel obliged, however, much against my own feelings, to take such reprisals on the houses and goods of British subjects in the Orange Free State, as well as of British subjects in the Cape Colony and in Natal as I may think proper, in order to put a stop to these atrocities. || Imbued with the desire to carry on this unfortunate struggle in terms of the dictates of humanity, I have felt obliged to write your Excellency this letter, trusting that your Excellency will receive and consider same in the same spirit in which it is written.

With the greatest respect, I have the honour to be,

Your Excellency's obedient Servant,

(Signed) C. R. De Wet,

Chief Commandant of the Orange Free State Forces.

Nr. 12647. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Antworten des Obergenerals an Botha und De Wet.

1. An Botha.

Army Head Quarters, South Africa, Pretoria, 28th July, 1900.

Your Honour, || In reply to your letter of 4th July, 1900, I have now received reports from all General Officers who had troops anywhere

near Pienaars Poort on or about 17th June, and from the searching enquiry they have made into the case it appears to me to be practically impossible that the alleged outrage could have been committed by the troops under my command. The farm Elandshoek is two miles beyond the line then occupied by the outposts, and up to the 17th June and for a week after that date it had not been visited by our patrols, so that the men did not even know of its existence. On the 17th June the officer commanding at Pienaars Poort mounted the picquet at 4 o'clock and between that time and 11 a.m. on 18th no one passed through the Poort. No one left his picquet till after 11 p.m. when a patrol was sent out and returned half-an-hour later. It is incredible that men would leave camp for such a purpose running the risk of being shot not only by your Honour's patrols, but by our own picquets. Further, I would point out to your Honour that although the farm Elandshoek was frequently visited by officers' patrols between the 24th and 30th June no complaint was ever made to the officers in command of the alleged outrage, nor was such complaint made when Mrs. Badenhorst and her father came into Pretoria for safety. ¶ I have not yet received replies from General Officer Commanding Standerton, as to the alleged destruction of buildings on your Honour's and the adjoining farm. I hope the reports may prove unfounded as I have given most stringent orders that except in certain cases where railway or telegraph line has been cut, or our troops fired upon from farms, homesteads are not to be destroyed. As far as I know up to the 4th July, the date of your letter, none of our troops were in the Middelburg district.

Roberts, Field-Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa.

2. An De Wet.

Army Headquarters, South Africa, Pretoria, 3rd August, 1900.

Your Honour, ¶ I have to-day received through General Sir A. Hunter your letter dated 10th July, 1900. ¶ As your Honour is well aware, the utmost consideration has invariably been shown to every class of inhabitant of the Orange River Colony since the British troops under my command entered the country. ¶ Latterly, many of my soldiers have been shot from farmhouses over which the white flag has been flying, the railway and telegraph lines have been cut, and trains wrecked. I have therefore found it necessary, after warning your Honour, to take such steps as are sanctioned by the customs of war to put an end to

these and similar acts, and have burned down the farmhouses at or near which such deeds have been perpetrated. This I shall continue to do whenever I consider the occasion demands it. || Women and children have thus been rendered homeless through the misdeeds of the burghers under your Honour's command, but your Honour has been misinformed as to these poor people having been badly treated, as everything possible has invariably been done to lessen the discomforts inseparable from such evictions. || The remedy lies in your Honour's own hands. The destruction of property is most distasteful to me, and I shall be greatly pleased when your Honour's co-operation in the matter renders it no longer necessary.

Roberts, Field-Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa.

Nr. 12648. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Auszug eines Berichtes von
General Sir Redvers Buller.

24. Juli 1900.

Military Secretary, || I know nothing of the occurrences stated to have taken place at the house of S. Buys. The following farms on the Estates Zandfontein and Varkenspruit were destroyed by my orders, viz.: — || (1) Mrs. Dick Badenhorst, Zandfontein. || (2) A. Wessels, Zandfontein. || (3) J. Hans Badenhorst, „Kopje Allein“. || (4) Lewis Botha, Varkenspruit. || (5) Mrs. Cloete, „Kopje Allein“. || (6) A. J. Badenhorst (deserted). || The following circumstances induced me to give the order. On entering the Transvaal I caused the attached proclamation (A) to be widely distributed along my line of route. We marched from Volksrust to Standerton practically unopposed. Shortly after our arrival at Standerton our telegraph line was cut on several nights following, and attempts were made to damage the military line by placing dynamite cartridges with detonators attached upon it. These attempts were all made on or in close vicinity to the estates above named. A watch was kept and it was found that the attempts were made not by any formed force of the enemy, but by a few scattered banditti who were given shelter during the night in the houses I afterwards had destroyed, and who thence, when they could, tried to murder our patrols, and sallied out at night to damage the line. It was further ascertained that these men came and usually returned through Varkenspruit. I directed that copies of proclamation (A) should be personally left at each house, and the inmates of each should be warned that these depredations could not

be permitted, and that if people living under our protection allowed these sort of men to resort to their houses without informing us, they must take the consequences, and their houses would be destroyed. This warning had some effect for a day or two, but on 1st and 2nd of July the nuisance recommenced, and on the 7th July, having acquired full proof that the houses were being regularly used as shelters for men who were hostile to us, and who were not under any proper command, in fact, who were only acting as banditti, I had the houses destroyed. || The women and children occupying the farms were removed elsewhere with as little inconvenience to themselves as we could arrange.

Nr. 12649. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Proklamation beim Zug durch Transvaal*).

The troops of Queen Victoria are now passing through the Transvaal. Her Majesty does not make war on individuals, but is, on the contrary, anxious to spare them as far as may be possible the horrors of war. The quarrel England has is with the Government, not with the people, of the Transvaal. || Provided they remain neutral no attempt will be made to interfere with persons living near the line of march, every possible protection will be given them, and any of their property that it may be necessary to take will be paid for. || But on the other hand those who are thus allowed to remain near the line of march must respect and maintain their neutrality, and the residents of any locality will be held responsible, both in their persons and their property, if any damage is done to railway or telegraph, or any violence done to any member of the British forces in the vicinity of their homes.

Issued by General Sir Redvers Buller.

Nr. 12650. SÜDAFRIKANISCHE REPUBLIK. — Der Generalkommandant an den englischen Obergeneral. Antworten und Beschwerden.

Commandant-General's Camp, 15th August, 1900.

[Extract.] || Excellency, || On enquiry I have discovered that it is a fact, which I can have supported by affidavits, that well-disposed families living on farms are driven from their houses, and all their property taken away or destroyed. In every case the private conveyances are

*) Undatiert, offenbar aus dem Juni. Red.

taken away, so that there are instances where women with their children who, deprived of their property in this manner, were obliged to walk for miles in order to seek for food, shelter and protection from our burghers. I cannot here refrain from remarking that, in such cases the action of the troops under your Excellency's command very much exceeds the teachings of civilised warfare. || I bring these facts to your Excellency's notice because I cannot believe that they are your Excellency's instructions, and as it is done by the troops under your Excellency's supreme command, I expect that your Excellency will make an end to these atrocious deeds and barbarous actions. || In this connection I wish to remark that everywhere small bodies of troops are captured far from their main force, and who allege that they are scouts, but who in point of fact go about to rob, and that it cannot be expected that such robbers, when captured, be in future treated as prisoners of war.

* * *

In reference to the report of Sir Redvers Buller enclosed in your Excellency's letter, I emphatically deny that bodies of our burghers hide themselves or have hidden themselves at the houses mentioned, and I can only come to the conclusion that the destruction of these houses is done in a spirit of revenge, as my commandoes there were all stationed on the north-east side of the railway, whereas most of the destroyed houses are situated on the south-west side of the railway. || The case of the house of Acting-Commandant Buys mentioned by me in my letter of the 4th July last was in the district of Heidelberg and not in the district of Middelberg as your Excellency appears to think. This arbitrary destruction of houses still continues, and I must again most strongly protest against same. || I also wish to bring to your Excellency's notice that in many cases houses in which are only women and children are now bombarded.

Louis Botha,
Acting-Commandant General of the South
African Republic.

Nr. 12651. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Obergeneral an den Generalkommandanten der Südafrikanischen Republik. Gründe für die Vertreibung der Familien und Zerstörung der Häuser.

Army Headquarters, South Africa, Pretoria, 23rd August, 1900.

[Extract.] || Sir, || Your Honour represents that well-disposed families living on their farms have been driven from their houses, and that their

property has been taken away or destroyed. This no doubt is true, but not in the sense which your letter would imply. Burghers who are well-disposed towards the British Government, and anxious to submit to my authority, have had their property seized by the Boer commandoes, and have been threatened with death if they refused to take up arms against the British forces. Your Honour's contention that a solemn oath of neutrality which the burghers have voluntarily taken in order to remain in unmolested occupation of their farms is null and void because you have not consented to it is hardly open to discussion. I shall punish those who violate their oath and confiscate their property, no burgher having been forced to take the oath against his will.

Roberts, Field-Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa.

Nr. 12652. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Derselbe an Denselben Dasselbe. Guerillakrieg.

Army Headquarters, South Africa, 2nd September, 1900.

[Extract.] || Sir, || I have the honour to address your Honour regarding the operations of those comparatively small bands of armed Boers who conceal themselves on farms in the neighbourhood of our lines of communication and thence endeavour to damage the railway, thus endangering the lives of passengers travelling by train who may or may not be combatants. || 2. My reason for again referring to this subject is that, except in the districts occupied by the Army under the personal command of your Honour, there is now no formed body of Boer troops in the Transvaal or Orange River Colony, and that the war is degenerating into operations carried on by irregular and irresponsible guerillas. This would be so ruinous to the country and so deplorable from every point of view that I feel bound to do everything in my power to prevent it. || 3. The orders I have at present issued, to give effect to these views, are that the farm nearest the scene of any attempt to injure the line or wreck a train is to be burnt, and that all farms within a radius of 10 miles are to be completely cleared of all their stock, supplies, &c.

Roberts, Field-Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa.

To His Honour,
Commandant-General Louis Botha.

Nr. 12653. **SÜDAFRIKANISCHE REPUBLIK.** — Der General-
kommandant an den englischen Obergeneral.
Antwort auf die beiden vorigen.

Commandant-General's Camp, 5th September, 1900.

[Extract.] || Excellency, || In answer to your Excellency's letter, dated 2nd inst., I have to state as follows: — || 1. Whereas our whole force is very small in comparison to yours, it can naturally not be expected that large commandoes of our own should be everywhere in the field, and it therefore stands to reason that whatever is done by our side, as throughout the whole war, must be done by insignificant forces; and moreover we are obliged to split up our commandoes more and more in order to oppose the robber patrols which under your Excellency's command go about everywhere and take away from the several farms cattle and provisions. || 2. In regard to your Excellency's statement that, besides the force under my personal command, no other regular force of Boers exist, I must absolutely deny this, inasmuch as our forces are still split up and commanded in the same manner as at the beginning of the war, and in terms of the laws of the country. || 3. In regard to point 3 of your Excellency's letter, we are already aware that barbarous acts of the same nature are committed by troops under your Excellency's chief command and not only along or near the railway and where your Excellency's troops move; not only are houses burnt down or blown up by dynamite, but defenceless women and children are turned out of them and robbed of all food and covering, without there being any reason for such actions.

Louis Botha,
Acting Commandant-General of the South
African Republic.

Nr. 12654. **SÜDAFRIKANISCHE REPUBLIK.** — Derselbe an Den-
selben. Protest gegen die englische Kriegführung.

Warmbaths, 17th October, 1900.

[Extract.] || Excellency, || I regret to note that the barbarous actions of your Excellency's troops, such as the blowing up and destruction of private dwellings and the removal of all food from the families of the fighting burghers against which I have already been obliged to protest, have not only met with your Excellency's approval, but are done on your Excellency's special instructions. This spirit of revenge against burghers who are merely doing their duty according to law, may be regarded as civilised warfare by your Excellency, but certainly not by

me. I feel obliged to bring to your Excellency's notice the fact that I have resolved to carry on the war in the same humane manner as hitherto, but should I be compelled by your Excellency's action to take reprisals, then the responsibility thereof will rest with your Excellency.

(Signed) Louis Botha,
Commandant-General of the South
African Republic.

Nr. 12655. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Der Obergeneral an den Generalkommandanten der Südafrikanischen Republik. Der Guerillakrieg erfordert außerordentliche Mittel.

Army Headquarters, South Africa, Pretoria, 22nd October, 1900.

[Extract.] || Your Honour, || With regard to the remark of your Honour, as to the state of organisation which exists among the burgher forces at the present moment, I am compelled to point out to your Honour that their tactics are not those usually associated with organised forces, but have degenerated into a guerilla warfare which I shall be compelled to repress by those exceptional methods which civilised nations have at all times found it obligatory to use under like circumstances.

Roberts, Field-Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief the British Forces
in South Africa.

II. Bericht des Frauenkomitees über die Konzentrationslager.

Nr. 12656. GROSSBRITANNIEN. — Report on the concentration camps in South-Africa by the committee of Ladies appointed by the secretary of state for war*).

12. December 1901.

Para. 1. — Having been entrusted by the Imperial Government with the task of inquiring into the condition of the concentration camps in South Africa, with the view of ascertaining (1) in what way charitable funds collected in England could best be used to improve the conditions of camp life; (2) whether in our judgment alterations in the general organisation of the camps were desirable; and (3) whether their geographical position should be changed, our first task was to draw up

*) Blaubuch Cd. 893. Hier ist nur der Generalbericht abgedruckt; die Berichte über die einzelnen Lager sind fortgelassen. Red.

a list of the chief points to which on arrival at the camps our inquiry should be directed.

These are as follows: — || 1. Water supply, including arrangements for washing clothes and bathing. || 2. Sanitation and disposal of refuse. || 3. Housing, with particular inquiry into ventilation, overcrowding, trenching and drainage. || 4. Rations. || 5. Kitchens, whether central or private. || 6. Fuel. || 7. Position of slaughter places, with particular inquiry into cleansing. || 8. Beds and bedding. || 9. Clothing. || 10. Shops. Are prices regulated? || 11. Hospital accommodation; isolation of infectious cases; medical and nursing staff; are numbers adequate? supply of drugs and medical comforts; care of convalescents. || 12. Camp matrons. || 13. Resident clergymen. || 14. Discipline and morals. || 15. Education. || 16. Occupations: *e.g.*, gardening, brickmaking, shoemaking, &c., nursing, sewing, dress-making, &c. || 17. Orphans, how cared for? || 18. Local committees. || 19. A return of the deaths which have taken place in camp, showing the ages of those who have died. || 20. How many women have applied for permission to leave camp life altogether to join relatives in other parts of South Africa? || 21. Are servants allowed, and if so are they rationed? || 22. The reverent treatment of the dead, including the provision of a clean and orderly mortuary and cemetery, suitable coffins, shrouds, &c. || To these 22 points of inquiry we had originally added another, aimed at discovering the ordinary death rate of the district among the white population, but as we soon discovered that there had been no record kept of births and deaths, we were compelled to omit this from our list.

Para. 2. — It is impossible to indicate in any general manner the nature of the replies which we received to the foregoing inquiries. The differences existing between different camps are so striking that it would be misleading to attempt any but a very few generalisations concerning them, and the answers to our inquiries must be sought in the separate reports given on each camp. || We endeavoured, as far as circumstances permitted, to make surprise visits to the camps, and with this object we did not invariably pursue the most direct and obvious route from camp to camp. In no case, it is unnecessary to say, did we announce beforehand our proposed visit to the superintendent.

Para. 3. — *The best use to be made of charitable funds.* — We draw attention first to the best use which can be made of charitable funds. We have visited every concentration camp in South Africa, with the exception of the one at Port Elizabeth, *viz.*, Mafeking, Vryburg, Irene, Johannesburg, Nylstroom, Pietersburg, Potchefstroom, Krugersdorp, Ollerksdorp, Barberton, Belfast, Middelburg, Balmoral, Vereeniging, Heidel-

burg, Standerton, and Volksrust, under the Transvaal Administration; Kimberley, Orange River, Norvals Pont, Aliwal North, Bethulie, Springfontein, Bloemfontein, Brandfort, Kroonstad, Vredefort Road, Winburg, Heilbron, and Harrismith, under the administration of the Orange River Colony; and Howick, Pietermaritzburg, and Merebank, near Durban, in Natal. We have moreover paid a second visit to a not inconsiderable number of these camps. We therefore feel in a position to say that as far as the necessaries of life are concerned, viz., the provision of food, fuel, shelter and clothing, the Governments of the several Colonies are alive to their responsibilities in these matters, both to the people in the camps and to the taxpayers on whom the expense must ultimately fall. ||

Para. 4. — *Rations in the various Colonies.* — In the Transvaal we found the ration per head per week to be: — || 7 lbs. of meal or flour, 4 oz. salt, 6 oz. coffee, 12 oz. sugar, 3 lbs. meat, 1 lb. rice, || besides soap and fuel. Children have the same as adults, with the exception of meat; of this, if they are under 12, they receive half rations; over 12, everyone is considered an adult. Milk (tinned) is issued in most Transvaal camps at the rate of one quart bottle per day to each child under three or five, and to persons of any age doctor's orders. The fuel ration varies with the local supply of coal and wood, but is ample in most Transvaal camps. || In the Orange River Colony the ration per head per week was — || $5\frac{1}{4}$ lbs. meal, 7 ozs. salt, 7 ozs. coffee, 14 ozs. sugar, $3\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. meat, $\frac{7}{12}$ tin condensed milk, $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. rice*). || Children receive the same as adults. The allowances of soap and fuel varies from camp to camp. The lowest ration of fuel which we found in any camp was 7 lbs. per head per week, and we recommended this should be raised.

In Natal the ration per head per week was: —

	Adults	Children 5—12	Children under 5
Bread	7 lbs.	$3\frac{1}{2}$ lbs.	—
Meat**).	4 "	3 "	—
Potatoes (or equivalent).	$3\frac{1}{2}$ "	$3\frac{1}{2}$ "	—
Coffee	7 oz.	7 oz.	—
Sugar	14 "	14 "	—
Salt	$3\frac{1}{2}$ "	$3\frac{1}{2}$ "	—
Oatmeal	—	—	$3\frac{1}{2}$ lbs.
Milk	—	—	4 tins
Wood	14 lbs.	14 lbs.	7 lbs.

The people also receive candles and soap, at the rate of one candle per tent every other day, and 4 lbs. soap once a week to a family of seven persons.

* Rice was added on the recommendation of the Commission.

** If meat be lean, $\frac{3}{4}$ oz. of dripping or fat bacon is substituted for an equal quantity of meat daily.

The ration scale may, perhaps, convey more to the ordinary house-keeper if we append copies of a few specimen ration tickets: —

Transvaal Ticket.

Aletta Labuschagne.	31 $\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. flour.
No. in family:	3 $\frac{3}{4}$ „ sugar.
Children 2 (one under 5)	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ „ coffee.
Adults 3	1 „ salt.
—	4 „ rice.
Total 5	13 „ meat.
	1 bar soap.

To this should be added a daily bottle of milk for the baby.

Natal Ticket.

No. 93.		
Name of family — Mosterl.		
Adults,	Children over 5,	Children under 5,
3	4	0
Bread, 5 lbs. a day } Meat, 3 lbs. 7 oz. a day }		
Potatoes, 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. a week		
Coffee, 3 lbs. 1 oz. a week		
Sugar, 6 lb. 2 oz. a week		
Soap, 4 lbs.		
*Tinned milk, 4 tins.		

*) The milk was for an old lady of 70.

Orange River Colony Ticket.

No. of ticket 346.	
Name — Mrs. J. A. van Niekerk — No. in family, 7.	
Weekly ration — 24 $\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. meat.	
36 $\frac{3}{4}$	„ meal or flour
3	„ 1 oz. coffee
3	„ 1 „ salt
6	„ 2 „ sugar
4 tins condensed milk	
3 $\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. rice	

Another ration ticked in another Transvaal Camp ran: —

Jacoba van der Meuve.	28	lbs. flour
No. in family 4, all	1½	„ coffee
over 12 therefore	1	„ salt
counted as adults }	4½	„ sugar
	4	„ rice
	12	„ meat

To this must be added fuel and soap; and in this camp every head of a family at the time of our visit was receiving 1 lb. Quaker oats once a week as a gift from a Cape Town Society. The quality of the grocery ration was extremely good: raw coffee in the bean was being issued in most of the Transvaal camps and then an additional weight was usually allowed. We occasionally met with loyal English people in the camps, and these were generally full of gratitude for the excellent rations they were receiving. One said, „Look at this beautiful bread, look at my bag of meal left over from our last rationing day. Can we complain? I say that if we grumble it is for the sake of grumbling“, and so on. In another camp a „health committee“ of camp ladies interviewed our Commission, and laid various complaints before us. One member of the committee said very little, but stayed behind after the rest and said, „I am a loyal English woman. I have two sisters loyalist refugees at the coast. I should be very happy if I thought they were half as well off as we are in this camp.“ || Besides ordinary rations of food and fuel, the government in each camp have issued blankets and clothing, varying in value with the size and necessities of the camp. Valuable gifts of clothing have also been received from private societies in nearly all camps.

Para. 5. — As regards the supply of medical comforts, a most liberal and ample provision has been made by the Colonial Administrations: they include brandy, champagne, port wine, arrowroot, Chollet's compressed vegetables, tinned chickens, jellies, and all kinds of invalid food, hospital appliances, even in some camps water-beds and water-pillows. The cost of medical comforts alone in the various camps of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony comes to more than 7000*l.* a month. || Para. 6. — Considering the ample provision of all necessaries for the healthy and of necessaries and luxuries for the sick which has been made, it is rather difficult to find a suitable channel into which to direct the flow of private charity. It is well known to all experienced

in such matters that the indiscriminate distribution of charitable relief, whether in England or South Africa, by private individuals or by the State, has a demoralising effect upon its recipients; and we regret to say that in nearly every camp we heard of instances of deception and even fraud arising from the importunity of the least deserving and the difficulty of distinguishing between real and pretended destitution. || Para. 7. — It must be remembered that it has been part of the policy of the Administrations to offer a good deal of paid employment, at moderate wages, to the inmates of the camps. (In some camps the number of people receiving wages from the Superintendent is more than 150.) Moreover, if the camp is in the neighbourhood of a town, or of public works undertaken by the Government, able-bodied men have the opportunity of earning wages at the usual Colonial rates, which are high as judged by English standards. At Pietermaritzburg men in camp are, in a large number of cases, able to earn good wages in the town. These were for a time supplied with free rations in the camp, but it will be easily understood that this caused serious dissatisfaction in labour circles in the town; and the objection to this subsidised labour became sufficiently serious to procure a pledge that the free rationing of competitors in the labour market should cease. The material well-being of each camp is favourably affected by the fact that in addition to the supply of the necessaries of life to each individual free of charge, there is a considerable purchasing power created by the wages given by the Administrations for work done for the sole benefit of the camp or earned by camp people working at their ordinary pursuits outside*). || Every camp is provided with a shop or shops in which prices are regulated under martial law. In all of these, with two exceptions, we found an ample supply of, and a ready sale for, such articles as sardines, sweets, bottled fruits, tobacco, candles, tinned salmon and other fish, golden syrup, lemon syrup, jam, biscuits, lard, butter, &c., not to speak of such luxuries as silk blouses, gramophones, concertinas, jewellery, watches, sewing machines, and eau de Cologne**). || Para. 8. — Experienced philanthropic workers who had spent many weeks or months in one or more of the concentration camps confirmed the impression we had already formed that the indiscriminate distribution of clothing was doing more harm than good. Instances were

*) For example, we have seen from the wages books of superintendents that in some cases families are receiving wages for work done in camp amounting to 17 l. a month. The monthly labour bill in the Transvaal camps alone amounted in August to 5506 l. 15 s. 10 d. paid to inmates of the camps.

***) The Director of Civil Supplies now vetoes the conveyance to the camp shops of articles of pure luxury.

brought before us of the sale at less than their cost price, in the nearest town, of such articles as boots, or pieces of dress material, which had been freely, and, no doubt, with most generous intentions, given away in camp. Therefore, with some trifling exceptions, in which, from the fund placed at our disposal by the Victoria League, we supplemented in a few camps the supply of medical comforts, or established a soup kitchen, we have recommended that the main body of the fund should be used for the promotion and development of education.

Para. 9. — It must not be supposed that we believe the distribution of clothing in all cases to be unnecessary or harmful. In some it is imperative. For instance, if a case of scarlet fever is discovered in a tent, it may be necessary to burn all the infected clothing. In such cases the Superintendent should make good the loss from stores under his control, and in all camps there will be certain cases of destitution to be provided for. Charitable persons, who desire to benefit our camps by gifts of clothing, should, in our opinion, do so through the Superintendent or through the organisation created by him for dealing with charitable relief. It is the indiscriminate gifts of irresponsible persons, taking no heed of what is being done by others, which have proved harmful and demoralizing. || Para. 10. — *Camp Schools.* — It must always be remembered as a circumstance most creditable to the Administrations concerned that very soon after the camps were started, a systematic effort was made to provide the means of education free of charge for the children contained in them. School shelters were provided consisting at first of frame houses, or marquees. In October and November 1901, these were being replaced by solid but well-ventilated structures made either of sun-dried brick or stone and roofed with a sail cloth. These rooms are capable of accommodating 120 children each, and they only cost 30l. apiece, including the boarding for the seats. School furniture of a rough but practical kind is provided as well as school books, reading sheets, slates, and other apparatus; and last, but not least, a paid staff of teachers at the expense of the Colonial Governments. Mr. Sargant was appointed in February 1901, Commissioner for Education in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, and more recently (and only so far as camp schools are concerned) for Natal. It was no light task to get into working order in 33 camps spread over the vast area of the Transvaal, Orange River Colony, and Natal, the apparatus, animate and inanimate, for providing education for the children in them. The formation of the camps offered in reality an unique opportunity for placing the means of education within the reach of the Boer children. Hitherto they have

been scattered over a very sparsely populated country, with miles of open veldt separating family from family. Under such circumstances the difficulties of securing education for the children are so obvious that they need no description. But in the camps a school was provided within a stone's throw, or at the utmost within 10 minutes' walk, from the dwelling of each child. This opportunity the Government lost no time in availing themselves of, and under the able direction of Mr. Sargant, the camp schools now offer the most cheerful and hopeful characteristic of camp life. || Para. 11. — Our Commission offered criticism in several instances on the quality of the teachers and teaching provided. There is no wonder that this should have been called for. If the circumstances of the Colonies in question are taken into account, with all the ordinary occupations of civil life interrupted by warfare, the wonder is not that crowds of first-rate teachers were not available, but that the teaching was as good and as full of vivacity as it really was. But in nearly every camp there was a flourishing school, crowded by eager and intelligent children, keen to learn English, and ready to be interested in all that their teachers had to offer in the way of education, physical and mental. Mr. Sargant informed our Commission that, taking the camps one with another, at the end of October, two-thirds of the children of the school age were on the roll of the schools, and that the actual attendance was two-thirds of this. In some schools the number of children on the roll was as high as 75 or 80 per cent. of the children of the school age. It is said that at the beginning of December 1901 there were more children receiving education in the Orange River Colony than had ever been known in the history of the Orange Free State. We were informed by one of the education inspectors that the care and money which have been expended upon the education of the camp children had touched the imagination of some of the Boers. One old man was heard to exclaim that he believed the British must be God's chosen people after all, for he had never heard of any other nation paying for the education of the children of their enemies*). The schools are moreover open to other than children. In several, our Commission noted grown-up young men and women from 23 to 27 years of age, not ashamed to sit side by side with little children eager to learn and avail themselves of an opportunity of education, now probably for the first time within their reach. The pity was that the classes were too large, and with many noteworthy exceptions (Klerksdorp, Belfast, Potchefstroom,

*) The camp schools down to September 30, 1901, had cost 7245 l. 6 s. 9 d. This does not include Natal, nor the expenditure for refugee schools in towns.

Irene, Norvals Pont and Bloemfontein stand out prominently among these), the teaching left much to be desired. On speaking to Mr. Sargant on this point he dwelt on the difficulty he had encountered in securing the services of efficient teachers. Our Commission, after giving the matter most careful consideration, determined to recommend the Victoria League to place the residue of its fund at the disposal of Mr. Sargant for the purpose of improving the education in the camp schools, either by providing teachers in such subjects as hygiene and cooking, or by forming lending libraries of English books, by establishing prizes, or in any other way which his knowledge and experience might suggest*). Such a use of charitable funds is not liable to abuse; only those who deserve to benefit can obtain any share in them; and lastly, it does not encroach on those responsibilities which the Governments in the several Colonies have taken on themselves.

Para. 12. — *Camp Hospitals.* — While the schools are the most cheerful and hopeful feature presented by camp life, the organisation of the hospitals and the provision of „medical comforts“ are the features which reflect the greatest credit on the Administrations which are responsible and on the medical and nursing staffs as a whole. The dispensaries are well stocked, and the supply of all kinds of invalid food and stimulants is practically unlimited. In one camp, which was in no way exceptional in this respect, the dispenser said, „I have been for many years an assistant in one of the leading chemists in Bond Street, and I should not be ashamed to compare my stock with his.“ It is unnecessary, however, to point out that the efficiency of a hospital does not depend on a liberal supply of mechanical appliances, drugs and medical comforts, all of which can be, and are, ordered and paid for without stint by the Governments concerned. Real success depends on the medical and nursing staff. In the majority of instances these left nothing to be desired. Doctors and nurses were skilful, gentle, firm, and untiring in their devotion to their work — some of them have died at their posts. But in the few instances where the personal equation was on the wrong side everything went wrong, and the results were disastrous. Scarlet fever cases left in a hospital marquee with other patients; diphtheria „contacts“ kept in close contiguity with diphtheria patients; children

*) In acknowledging a letter from our Commission on this point, Mr. Sargant wrote, „If the money of which you speak is placed at my disposal, I will do my best to use it for educational purposes to which Government funds could not be easily applied.“ At the date of the signing of this report, December 12, 1901, this application of the funds of the Victoria League had not been confirmed.

with measles actually on them moved from unhealthy into healthy camps. All these things have been done, and the disasters which followed have swelled the death rate and brought discredit on camp administration. But our Commission, while not shrinking from pressing the responsibility for these things where it was due, feel that it is only justice to say that they were entirely exceptional; that as a rule, and with immense difficulties to overcome, the medical staff and the trained nurses deserve the highest credit for the efficiency of their hospitals. In one camp hospital a medical member of the Commission saw operations performed which she said would have reflected credit on the best equipped hospital in London, and in numerous instances both the medical members of the Commission reported that all that human skill and care could do was being done for the sick in hospital. The difficulties of the Administration have been greatly enhanced by the difficulty of obtaining a sufficient supply of good doctors and trained nurses for camp work. Sometimes those who were sent from England and elsewhere proved unfit and had to be got rid of. For a long time it was impossible to have what would have been so desirable all along, a reserve of efficient medical officers and nurses who could have been sent to any camp where their services were called for by special emergency. || Para. 13. — *General organisation of the Camps.* — As the success of schools depends on getting good teachers, and of hospitals on getting good doctors and nurses, so even more emphatically does the successful organisation of a camp depend upon getting a good superintendent. Good water, a good slope, efficient drainage and sanitation, and an ample supply of fuel are important elements in making a good camp, but the most important of all is to be found in the character and capacity of the superintendent. And here, in the most critical of all the official appointments, the difficulty of selection was the greatest. If anyone wants a doctor, a teacher, or a nurse, there are institutions to which application can be made where these are trained and equipped for their work. But there has never been a training school for camp superintendents. The work was entirely new, and the men had to learn their work by doing it with no one to help them, and with the benefit of no one's experience but their own. We desire, speaking generally, to bear our testimony to the devotion to duty, practical ability, vigilance, firmness, and kindness of the camp superintendents. Reference has already been made to the differences existing between different camps. It might have been imagined that with much the same people to deal with, the same rations (within the limits of each Colony) to distribute, and the same general principles of

organisation, one camp would be almost an exact counterpart of another. Nothing can be further from the truth. Each has its own distinctive character, its own excellences and defects, and it is, therefore, almost impossible to make generalisations about the camps taken in the mass, for what is true of one camp is often untrue of others. Each camp bears the impress of the character and capacity of its superintendent, and in going through a camp one could almost see what sort of man had been placed at its head. || Para. 14. — We felt it our duty on more than one occasion to recommend the removal of a superintendent from his post. We are glad to be able to state that in none of these cases was it necessary to recommend this course on account of undue harshness or want of feeling for the people under his charge, but simply because from such reasons as age, feeble health, or natural lack of governing and organising capacity, we felt he was unequal to the constant strain the position involves. It is not easy for those who have not seen something of the work to realise its strain. It is not merely that the camp superintendents have long hours of work, from 13 to 16 a day, but it is a peculiarly wearing kind of work. No camp superintendent can give an order and take his mind from the subject confident that the order will be carried out; the most ceaseless supervision, renewed hour by hour and day by day, is necessary to ensure the methodical carrying out of the simplest and most obvious orders. These superintendents are constantly in their camps overlooking everything, knowing everybody, and knowing also precisely what work is expected from each individual in return for wages paid. Nothing is done, and everything goes wrong, if the eye of the superintendent is withdrawn even for an hour. He requires a rare combination of mental and moral gifts and qualities. He must control almost wholly by personal influence some thousands of people wholly unaccustomed to discipline. Some camps have a wired-in enclosure for the unruly; some have „dirty lines“, otherwise called „Hogs' Paradise“, for the incorrigibly filthy; in some camps rations are docked as a disciplinary measure, but this is rare, and is almost universally regarded as unsatisfactory, for it punishes the children for the faults of their parents. Cases of actual crime can, of course, be handed over to the Magistrate or Provost Marshal. But, speaking generally, the discipline of a camp rests on the personal weight and authority of the superintendent. Justice and strict impartiality on his part are, of course, of the greatest importance, but he must also be kind and inexhaustibly patient. At the same time he must be a man who knows how to make himself obeyed. He must have a knowledge of sanitation and be enough of an engineer

to know how to make the best use of his water supply. He should take an interest in education. He must acquire the art of making the doctors, the nurses, the clergyman, and the schoolmaster work under him, and in sympathetic co-operation with him, so that he is not merely the nominal but the actual chief of every department of camp life. He must also have business training and some of the aptitudes of a grocer and corn-factor. If he can add to these acquirements a practical knowledge of gardening and half a dozen other industries such as brickmaking, tanning, carpentering, &c., he is the ideal camp superintendent. It is unnecessary to say that this ideal person is not often found in South Africa or elsewhere, but we feel the highest admiration for the spirit with which, as a body, the camp superintendents have grappled with the difficult task entrusted to them. We desire to add that it is not the firm and strict superintendent who is unpopular in his camp, but rather the man of weak character who does not know how to rule, who shows timidity or favouritism, or becomes the dupe of impostors. The Englishman is, generally speaking, more successful as a camp superintendent than the man of Dutch or Boer parentage; the bitterest complaints addressed to us in camp against superintendents were directed against men of Dutch origin. The people would say they preferred a „Verdomnde Rooinek“ to a „Schelm“ of a Boer. Speaking generally, we found that for positions of authority in the camps, especially where the distribution of gifts or favours of any kind was concerned, the people decidedly preferred an Englishman or Englishwoman to one of themselves. Constant charges of favouritism, in such positions, were preferred against their own people.

Para. 15. — *The question of passes to enter or leave Camps.* — In nearly all camps passes are required for outsiders to enter, or for residents to leave. This has been represented in some quarters as a hardship. It is, we conceive, an absolute necessity. If people are free to come and go as they please and unrestricted intercourse is allowed between a camp and the surrounding country, rations, clothing, and bedding served out in the camps at the Government expense could be freely conveyed to the enemy in the field, who are, in many instances, only a few miles away. A woman leaving one of the Orange River Colony camps, with her goods and chattels packed on a wagon, was challenged by a sentry; the wagon was searched and found to contain 240 lbs. flour, 40 lbs. salt, 28 lbs. rice, 22 lbs. coffee, besides tea, candles, soap, and milk. She signed an affidavit that they were surplus rations accumulated by her while in camp. This was obviously impossible, as

tea and candles do not form part of the regular ration. But, however acquired, they were undoubtedly intended for the Boers in the field. In another camp, women were caught attempting to convey men's clothing, bought in the camp shop, to the Boers on commando in the immediate neighbourhood. Facts such as these, of which almost every camp could give instances, illustrate the impossibility, as long as the war lasts, of allowing free intercourse between the camps and the outside world. For the same reason, the right to purchase grocery or clothing in the camp store is in some camps limited to one sovereign's worth of goods for one person at one time. Those who require more must get a special permit from the Superintendent*). || *Questions of health and morals* also have an important bearing on allowing free intercourse between camp and town. The presence of scarlet fever, diphtheria, or other infectious diseases in either town or camp often makes a strict quarantine absolutely necessary. It is obvious also that a defined area is desirable from the point of view of cleanliness. It is much easier to ensure attention to sanitary regulations if the camp area is properly defined. As regards morals, we did not receive, though we went freely and unaccompanied among the people in every camp, any complaint against our soldiers. In view of the false accusations made in some quarters, and also as a reasonable precaution necessary for the protection and discipline of both, we found an invariable rule in every camp that military camps were out of bounds for concentration camps and *vice versâ*. Far from disapproving of cutting off free communication between the concentration camps and the neighbouring town or surrounding country, we are disposed to recommend the controlling of ingress and egress more thoroughly than is the case in many camps at present. We believe that every camp would benefit by being surrounded by a fence with gates where police or sentries should be posted, to see that no one entered or departed without coming under observation. Under martial law the ordinary civilian is required to provide himself with a pass before he can go freely about the town in which he may have lived all his life. Another pass is required before he can be permitted to go beyond the outposts, and a third to enable him to be abroad at night. If these regulations as against British loyalists are necessary in war time as a military precaution, why

*) The general public may hardly be aware that the right of unlimited purchase on the part of the ordinary civil as well as military population is suspended during war time. In many districts the whole civil population were put on rations, the main difference between them and the inmates of the concentration camps being that the former paid for their rations while the latter received them gratis.

should unrestricted right to come and go as they please be extended to the inmates of the concentration camps, many of whom are near relatives of men still in commando fighting against us? || Para. 17. — *Applications for permission to reside in Camps.* — It may cause surprise in some quarters to learn that voluntary applications to enter camps are by no means infrequent. The General Officer Commanding at Harri-smith informed us that he had for some weeks ceased to bring people compulsorily into the camp at that place; nevertheless there were almost daily arrivals on the part of persons seeking permission to come in. Some arrived on the second day of our visit, having driven 28 miles through very bad weather. We have had handed to us copies of letters received by the Superintendent-General of Burgher Camps in Natal, asking leave to reside in camp. One of these was from the father of a family who stated that he was very anxious to come into camp, more particularly for the sake of the education of his children. He said he was quite willing to do any work he might be asked to do in camp without payment, in consideration of the educational benefits anticipated. || Para. 18. — *Local Committees.* — We desire to draw attention to considerations which, in our opinion, would justify the Governments of the Orange River Colony, the Transvaal, and Natal in placing very strict limitations upon the activities of the ladies and gentlemen who are known colloquially as „local committees“. Most of these committees have only had a short-lived existence, but in about five cases we found the town or village nearest to a camp had furnished a group of persons who had expressed their desire to visit the camp at regular intervals, to investigate cases of sickness and destitution, distribute gifts and so on. Such a group is known as a „local committee“. As long as they are content to work from purely philanthropic motives, and are not merely cloaking a political object under the guise of philanthropy, it would seem both cruel and unnecessary to check their activities. But is it reasonable to expect, with the country actually at war, that the British Government should allow their political and military enemies to obtain control of the camps which are being run at British expense? In several instances this has presented an actual danger. Under the specious guise of philanthropy, the local committees have aimed at the political control of the camps, and have endeavoured to overthrow the authority of the superintendents. The test which should be applied to every local committee is to find out whether they sincerely desire to help the camp people to make the best of their surroundings; how far, for instance, they have aided the women to face with energy and resource the difficulties presented by life

under such novel conditions; or whether they secretly rejoice at everything which adds to the discomforts and sorrows of camp life because these strengthen the political animosity of Boer against Briton. If the latter be the case, or if there is a reasonable probability that it will be the case, local committees should be forbidden entrance into the camps. In our opinion, no local committee should be allowed a *locus standi* in any camp without the consent in writing of the Superintendent. This, no doubt, places great power in the hands of the Superintendent, and inspection and supervision, now provided, on our recommendation, in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, are necessary to check abuse. But it is useless to put a man in a position of supreme authority in the camp and then allow that authority to be undermined by irresponsible persons who are not infrequently opposed to the supremacy of Great Britain in South Africa, and direct active and constant efforts to attain the end of its overthrow.

Para. 19. — *Recommendations respecting Camps in the Orange River Colony.* — On September 18 our Commission offered to the Deputy Administrator of the Orange River Colony the following recommendations: — || 1. That a travelling Inspector of Camps should be appointed. || 2. That compulsory labour for three hours daily for the good of the camp for adult males should be made the rule in all camps. || 3. That education should be compulsory for all of school age. || 4. That serious cases of sickness should be compulsorily removed to hospital on doctor's orders. This not to apply to children under two years of age. || 5. That an addition to the rations of $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of rice per head per week should be made. || 6. That superintendents should be instructed to encourage the making in camps of cheap bedsteads, called kartels, so as to reduce to the smallest possible minimum the number of people sleeping on the ground. That wood for this purpose should be provided by the Government where there was none available locally. || 7. That in places where there is no wood available for fuel, the coal ration should be raised to at least $1\frac{1}{2}$ lb. per head per day. || 8. That a strong effort should be made to increase the weekly truckage at present allowed for the supply of the Orange River Colony camps. || 9. That every camp should be provided with the proper apparatus for disinfecting and boiling enteric linen. || 10. That wherever practicable there should be boilers for serving out water boiling, as at Johannesburg, and that tinned milk should be issued to children mixed in the boiled water and not in the tin. || 11. That a cablegram should be despatched to the Colonial Office asking that 40 trained nurses should be immediately sent out to South Africa for service in the O.R.C. camps,

and that the selection of suitable nurses should be entrusted to the heads of specified hospitals and nursing institutions.

Para. 20. — It is a gratification to the Commission to be able to state that with the exception of compulsory education, all these recommendations were either immediately adopted or steps were taken to secure their adoption with as little delay as circumstances permitted. As regards compulsory education we waived our view in its favour in deference to Mr. Sargant's opinion that it would be impolitic at present. The travelling Inspector appointed by the Deputy Administrator is Mr. Cole Bowen, late Superintendent of the camp at Norvals Pont. He began his work in the middle of November and great advantage may be anticipated from it. He has a thorough knowledge of camp organisation and tact in carrying out his views; in moving from camp to camp he will be able to extend the knowledge of superintendents of the best features of other camps. Dr. Hime, formerly M.O.H. of Bradford and Sheffield, has been appointed medical adviser to Mr. Cole Bowen, and will accompany him in his tours of inspection. || Para. 21. — On November 12th we sent the following additional recommendations to the Deputy Administrators*: — || 1. That boilers sufficient to boil all drinking water should be supplied to all camps as quickly as possible. As all cannot be served at once preference should be given to camps where the water supply is faulty. || 2. That public bake ovens should be provided in all camps, the firing to be found by the Administration. || 3. That now and throughout the hot season a ration of vegetables or lime juice should be added once a week to the existing rations, and that jam should be issued to sickly children on doctor's orders. || 4. That in April, a ration of some kind of fat, such as dripping or lard, should be substituted for the summer ration of lime juice or vegetables. || 5. Employ a water engineer to visit camps and help the Superintendents to make the best use of their water supply. || 6. Urge the Home Government to lose no time in sending out at least 100 trained British teachers. || 7. Instruct every Superintendent not to issue so small a ration of fuel as 1 lb. per head per day. || 8. Appoint camp matrons as fast as suitable women can be found, and give them instructions based on the suggestions already handed to the Deputy Administrator. *See Appendix A.* || 9. As soon as possible supplement the supply of food stuffs on sale in the camp shops at Vredefort Road and

*) It will be observed that our first set of recommendations was handed to the Deputy Administrator on September 18th; the second on November 12th. At the earlier date we had only seen seven Orange River Colony camps; at the later date we had seen them all except one.

Heilbron. || 10. The disorganisation of the hospital at Brandfort, as detailed in our report, appears to us to call for immediate attention and action. We recommend that a competent medical officer of weight and standing be sent here at once to make a special report on the subject, and that while the present sickness lasts all possible help should be given to Brandfort in the supply of additional doctors and nurses.

Para. 22. — These recommendations were also either acted on immediately or steps were taken with a view to their adoption wholly or in part, as will be seen by a letter from the Deputy-Administrator, dated November 23rd, of which the following is an abstract: — || „The following are a few remarks upon your suggestions, showing what steps have already been taken, or are now being taken, to comply with the requirements you specify: — || 1. *Boilers*. — Eleven of these are on the rail now and another 22 have been secured. || 2. *Public Bake Ovens*. — Two ovens have been ordered in the Bloemfontein Camp as an experiment; if successful they will be supplied to all camps*). || 3. *Vegetables, Lime Juice, &c.* — Medical officers have been instructed to serve out a ration of lime juice once a week. Steps are being taken to grow vegetables with good prospect of success. Jam has always been included among the medical comforts. || 4. *Fat or Butter*. — Quotations for butter have been asked for. || 5. *Water Engineer*. — This has been done already in several camps. || 6. *Trained British Teachers*. — The Education Department has this matter in hand. || 7. *The issue of Larger Fuel Rations*. — The necessary instructions have been given in a circular letter to all superintendents. || 8. *Camp Matrons and their Instructions*. — This will be done, but there is considerable difficulty in finding suitable persons for these appointments. || 9. *Supplies to Shopkeepers*. — The shopkeepers are receiving fresh supplies. || 10. *Hospital at Brandfort*. — Steps are being taken. Another doctor and a trained nurse from England have been sent since the Commission was at Bloemfontein.“

Para. 23. — *Transvaal Camps*. — Although several of the recommendations which we offered to the Military Governor of Pretoria in respect of the Transvaal Camps were similar to those which we had submitted to the Deputy-Administrator, our recommendations, taken as a whole, were not identical for the two Colonies, because several of the changes which we had advised in the O. R. C. were in actual operation in the Transvaal before our arrival. The following is a list of our chief

*) On November 28th Mr. Bowen wrote that he was having a public bake oven put up in the camp at Brandfort, and he was sure it would be a real boon to the people.'

recommendations to the Transvaal Administration: — || 1. That a travelling inspector of camps should be appointed; we suggested Captain W. Bentinck for this post*). || 2. That now and throughout the hot season a ration of lime juice or vegetables should be added to the existing rations. || 3. That in April some kind of fat, such as dripping or lard, should be substituted for the summer ration of lime juice or vegetables. || 4. That the supply of fresh meat should be carefully watched, and arrangements made beforehand that in the event of any failure of it „cold storage meat“ should be procured. If this were impossible, camps should be removed to places where fresh meat can be obtained. || 5. That boilers sufficient to boil all drinking water should be supplied to the camps as quickly as possible. As all cannot be served at once preference should be given to those camps where the water supply is unsatisfactory. || 6. Employ a water engineer to visit the camps and help the superintendents to make the best use of their water supply. || 7. That public bake ovens be provided in all camps, the firing to be supplied by the Administration. Preference to be given to those camps where the fuel supply is scanty. || 8. Instruct every Superintendent not to issue so small a fuel ration as 1 lb. per head per day. || 9. Provide every camp with the apparatus for disinfecting and boiling the linen of enteric patients. || 10. That a ration of milk**), one bottle a day, should be issued for each child under five years old. We found this being done in some Transvaal camps, and consider it should be done in all of them. This supply of milk should be in addition to the other rations and not in lieu of them. || 11. All Superintendents should have strongly represented to them the importance, from the point of view of health, of reducing to a minimum the number of people sleeping on the ground. They should be urged to encourage the making of kartels in camp, and where no local material is available, it should be supplied to each camp by the Government. || 12. The rule requiring the compulsory removal of cases of serious illness to hospital under doctor's orders should be more strictly enforced. The rule, for good reasons, is not intended to apply to children under two years of age. || 13. A reserve staff of doctors and nurses should be formed. || 14. The sale of „Dutch medicines“ in camps should not only be discouraged, but definitely prohibited. || 15. That the

*) On December 7th we were informed by letter from Johannesburg that Captain Bentinck had been appointed General Inspector of Transvaal Camps, and that he was to have one or more colleagues.

**) This recommendation was subsequently amended, and one bottle of milk twice a day was advised for each child under three.

work of camp matrons and their assistants should be organised on the lines indicated in „Suggestions for Camp Matrons“, which has been drawn up partly from the official circular No. 87, and partly from the Commission's own paper on the subject. (See Appendix A.) || 16. That each superintendent should be allowed a sufficient supply of transport animals, to allow him to deal efficiently with the sanitation and water supply of his camp. || We believe that almost all these recommendations have been either adopted by the Burgher Camps Department, Pretoria, or that steps have been taken to secure their adoption with as little delay as possible.

Para. 24. — *Natal Camps.* — There are at present only three concentration camps in Natal — Howick, Pietermaritzburg, and Merebank, near Durban, but we have recommended the formation of other camps on good sites; these new camps to be composed of drafts from the larger Transvaal camps. || The ration in Natal, as described on pp. 2 and 3, is different from that of the other two Colonies, and better. In matters of sanitation and water supply, for drinking, washing clothes, and bathing, the Natal camps deserve to be described as first rate. The organisation of the Natal camps is, however, defective; the hospital accommodation and equipment, and the medical and nursing staffs have not been brought up to what is required; the schools are only now (December 1901) on the point of being taken over by the Education Department, and there is no method in the issue of rations. Howick and Pietermaritzburg camps are on well-chosen sites, on high ground with a good slope, but we formed an opinion strongly condemnatory of the site of Merebank. It is in a swamp, and unless it can be drained, it will continue to be hopelessly water-logged. We earnestly deprecate the continual sending of large drafts of people to Merebank in its present condition, and we both telegraphed and wrote in this sense to the High Commissioner and to the Superintendent General of the Natal Camps immediately after our inspection of Merebank. || Para. 25. — On December 11th we also offered the following recommendations respecting the Natal Camps to the Superintendent-General: —

General Recommendations respecting Natal Camps.

1. We strongly urge that no camp should be allowed to exceed 3000 in population. || 2. All camps should be fenced. A certain number of morally undesirable people have been sent down from the Transvaal camps into Natal, and it is necessary for the protection of the neighbouring towns, villages, or military camps, that the movements of these people

should be controlled. Notice should be required by the Natal authorities when people of this description are sent to them. || 3. A general Inspector of Camps is required. He should be assisted by a doctor and a sanitary engineer. They should see some good camps in the other colonies before commencing their duties in Natal. || 4. Camp matrons are urgently required in the Natal camps. Their work should be organised on the lines indicated in *Suggestions for Camp Matrons* (see Appendix A.). || 5. Cable to England for at least 20 trained nurses for work in the hospitals, and for 12 district nurses to act as camp matrons. The selection in England should be entrusted to the matrons of certain specified institutions. || 6. The method of issuing rations wants organisation. We would suggest the adoption of the block system (see Appendix C.). || 7. Milk issued as a ration for children should be given out mixed with boiled water, and not in tins. || 8. That every camp should be provided with the proper apparatus for disinfecting and boiling the linen of enteric patients and a destructor for stools. || 9. That it should be represented to all superintendents that it is of great importance to reduce to the smallest possible minimum the number of people sleeping on the ground; that they should be urged to encourage the making of cheap bedsteads in camp, and where no local material is available for this purpose, the administration should provide it. || 10. Cases of serious illness should be compulsorily removed to hospital on doctor's orders. This rule should not apply to infants under two years of age. The adoption of this rule would necessitate the increase of hospital accommodation and staff. || 11. Three hours' compulsory labour, for the good of the camp, should be required from every able-bodied man. || 12. A segregation camp for new-comers should be established in connection with each Natal camp. || 13. Suitable material should be provided to enable families to make themselves neat shelters for cooking. || We feel that the fuel ration in Natal requires revision, but this is dealt with in our general recommendations on the subject of rations (see Appendix B.). || Our Commission broke up too soon after the handing in of these recommendations for us to learn what practical effect resulted from them.

Para. 26. — Passing in review the points to which reference has already been made, we arrive at the following conclusions: — || 1. The schools are a piece of good work well started, but more and better teachers are required and better equipment. An additional supply of trained English teachers would be invaluable. The Colonial Office has been asked to arrange for this. || 2. The hospitals, with exceptions, are well organised and efficient. The provision of drugs and medical com-

forts is most liberal, but in many instances more hospital accommodation, improved equipment, and increased staff are needed. || 3. Grocery rations were excellent in quality. Meat all over the Orange River Colony and Transvaal was poor and thin. There was no fat stock in the country. In some places there was no stock at all, and the whole population, including the Boer camps, was being fed on „bully beef“. Seeing that all camps are not likely to be of so temporary a character as was at first supposed, we recommended to the High Commissioner a revision of the ration scale as detailed in Appendix B. || 4. The purchasing power of each camp in considerable. In so far as it is the result of wages paid for work done for the benefit of the camps it is not likely to diminish. On the other hand, in so far as it depends on the funds in the possession of the people when they came into camp, it must diminish as time goes on. || 5. Camp superintendents, with two or three exceptions, were hard-working, capable, and conscientious. Those whom we reported to be inefficient were removed. || 6. Some local committees have aimed at undermining the authority of the superintendents, and have acted in a manner calculated to keep alive and exasperate the bitter feeling between Boer and Briton. Permission to such committees to visit the camps should therefore be withdrawn. || 7. The fencing of the camps and the restrictions on free ingress and egress are desirable from the point of view of health and morals.

Para. 27. *Causes of the high Death-rate in the Camps.* — Considering the favourable opinion which our Commission has formed in the majority of cases on the details of camp management which have a bearing on health, we are brought face to face with the difficult problem: How to account for the extraordinary high death-rate which at one time or another has prevailed, with few exceptions, in every camp in the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal. We use the expression „extraordinarily high death-rate“; but we should add that all our efforts to obtain statistical information upon the normal death-rate in South Africa have been unavailing. No vital statistics of any kind, whether of births or deaths, were kept in the Orange Free State or in the South African Republic. Every district surgeon and medical officer of health whom we had the opportunity of consulting informed us that the ordinary death-rate was very high, as judged by European standards; but how high no one could tell us*). In a number of individual cases we found families which had

*) In Cape Colony no statistics are available showing the birth-rate and death-rate in the rural districts. Dr. Gregory, Medical Officer of Health for Cape Colony, has however compiled a series of statistics giving the number of births and deaths in the

lost a very large number of children before coming into camp. A doctor, one of the ablest the Commission have met, told one of our members that he had recently come across the remnant of a family in which the parents had just lost 9 out of 10 of their children from dysentery, while they were following a commando before coming into camp. || Para. 28. — The high death-rate in camps may, we believe, be attributed to three groups of causes, viz.: — || 1. The insanitary condition of the country caused by the war. || 2. Causes within the control of the inmates of his camps. || 3. Causes within the control of the administrations.

Para. 29. — 1. *The Insanitary Condition of the Country produced by the War.* — Taking the first of these three groups of causes first into consideration, it is a truism to say that pestilence follows in the track of war. The whole country in which fighting has taken place is poisoned. Horses, mules, and oxen are killed during battles or die of overwork and exhaustion, and their carcasses are left to putrify, poisoning earth, air, and water. Thousands of other animals are infected; rinderpest, horse sickness, and every kind of disease claim their victims; the sick beasts crawl to the nearest stream and die on its brink, and the water supplies of a whole country become tainted; or they die in the open country, the dust returns to the earth, and the dust storms for which South Africa is famous, scatter disease-laden particles over the length and breadth of the land. The insanitary condition of every country in which war is carried on is so clearly recognised that we believe it is a well-known fact that in every war at least two men die of disease for one who dies as the result of wounds. If strong men in the prime of life are struck down by exposure to these conditions, it is to be expected that women, and more especially children, should fall victims to the contamination of earth, air, and water which is the inevitable accompaniment of war. But this is not the only way in which war swells the death-rate among non-combatants. Ordinary industries, such as the production of food stuffs and the rearing of cattle, are brought to a standstill all over the theatre of war, with the consequence that in some

32 principal towns of the Colony during a period covering the years 1896–1900. Dr. Gregory observes: „It will be seen that the infantile mortality, which is everywhere excessive, is in some parts of the Colony at all times enormous: thus, in Beaconsfield, in these years the mortality among Europeans“ (infants under one year) „varies between 250 and 314 per thousand, and among coloured between 449 and 702 per thousand. In Cradock and Beaufort West, Prince Albert and Ondtshoom, the same state of things is seen. In these places, and indeed throughout the Colony, both urban and rural, the standard of sanitation is lamentable, overcrowding of dwellings, domestic filth, and improper feeding being supreme.“ The average infantile death-rate in the years 1896–1900, in the 32 towns, was 181 per thousand.

districts no fresh meat, no fresh milk, and no fruit or vegetables are obtainable for love or money. Over nearly the whole extent of the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal fresh meat is poor, thin, and comparatively innutritious. Sheep sometimes weighed as little as 11 lbs., and were considered really good if they weighed 25 lbs. Fresh vegetables were at famine prices; potatoes, 3 d. each; cabbages, 5 s. each; eggs, 7 s. 6 d. a dozen, were not uncommon prices. Fresh milk was so scarce that the whole supply had to be commandeered for the hospitals, and sometimes there was none even for the hospitals. Wherever a community of little children is found who have to be fed without fresh milk, fresh vegetables, or eggs, and sometimes without fresh meat, then a high death-rate will follow as certainly as night will follow day. || The heavy part of the death-rate in the camps is that of children under five. It is not because they are in camp, but because the war has exposed them to poisonous conditions of water and atmosphere, and has deprived them of the food suitable to their tender age. More is being done for them in camp, ten times more in the way of skilful doctoring, feeding and nursing, than could have been done for them had they remained on their fathers' farms. But in the one case every death is known and recorded, and in the other no one except their own families would ever have heard of it. The greater number of deaths in the camps during July, August, September, and October was due to pneumonia following measles. An extraordinary outbreak of septic pneumonia was taking place in South Africa, not in camps only, but in every section of the community however well fed, housed, and clothed. Disease is part of the price paid for war. The high death-rate is in a very large degree caused by economic and physical conditions produced by war, the rigour of which would probably have been as severely felt by the child population if they had been left on their farms*). || 2. *Causes within the control of the Inmates of the Camps.* —

*) In Bird's Annals of Natal, Vol. 1, pp. 459—468, is an interesting letter written by Mrs. Steenekamp, describing the hardships suffered by the Boers in their struggle against the natives under Sikonyela and Dingaan in 1837—1840. The awful massacres in which 400 of their number were brutally murdered are vividly described; but what is of special interest in connection with our present inquiry is the description of the outbreak of illness in the laagers which had been formed for the better protection of the survivors of the massacre. Mrs. Steenekamp writes: „Oh, my children, to live in so large a laager of a thousand wagons is hard, and it is also injurious to cattle. In July our laager went as far as Bushman's River. Listen now, my children, to my sad misfortunes. On 2nd February your beloved younger sister died.“ Then come further references to deaths by massacre. „On 23rd July your dear father died, and many others, your nearest relations and acquaintances. The last cases of death were probably caused by the dampness of our encampment, for nearly every day we had rain, and we could

We next call attention to the second group of causes to which we attribute the high death-rate; those, namely, for which the inmates of the camps are themselves responsible. || In what we are about to say we must speak plainly; but we have no desire to speak harshly. The Boer women have, with few exceptions, received us with kindness, and have answered our numerous questions with patience; and although we brought no gifts with us, have thanked us repeatedly, and with apparent cordiality, for our visit. But in estimating the causes of bad health in the camps it is necessary to put on record that every superintendent has to wage war against the insanitary habits of the people. However numerous, suitable, and well-kept may be the latrines provided, the fouling of the ground, including river banks, and slopes and trenches leading to the water supply, goes on to an extent which would probably not be credited except by those who have seen it. Constant vigilance, kept up night and day, is necessary to keep this pernicious habit within bounds. There is no camp which has not suffered from it more or less. The highly poisonous character of enteric excreta is well known. The extensive fouling of the floors of tents and the ground of camps by it has been the direct cause of a devastating outbreak of enteric in more than one camp. Superintendents, doctors, nurses, camp matrons war against this habit. In one instance we even heard of a clergyman who preached against it. The more intelligent of the Boers in the camps are open-mouthed against it. But in every camp it remains a chronic danger, only kept in check, when it is kept in check, by supervision of the most rigorous and constant kind. It should be remembered that this habit, which is such a source of danger in camp life, where 5000 or 6000 people may be gathered together in a comparatively small area, is comparatively harmless in the life to which the average Boer is accustomed, where family is separated from family by miles of open country. Their inability to see that what may be comparatively harmless on their farms becomes criminally dangerous in camp is part of the inadaptability to circumstances which constitutes so marked a characteristic of the people as a race.

wear no shoes on account of the mud." There was a terrible fire in the camp, in which ten persons were burned to death, and two severely injured. Mrs. Steenekamp says: „We bound the bones of those who had perished in a counterpane and buried them in a hole.“ She continues: „Shortly after the fire we were visited by measles, through which a great many deaths occurred; my old husband and myself [Mrs. Steenekamp had married again] had alone to provide for 23 children and grandchildren who were laid up, and who had to be attended by us, without house or tent, in only a wagon. Several days I was so weak through these exertions that I could hardly endure it.“

Para. 31. — Every camp has a rule, more or less successfully carried out, that every case of serious illness is, on doctor's orders, to be removed to hospital. Now, Boers, not unlike the more ignorant of the English poor, strongly object to hospital treatment for their children; consequently there are many cases of concealed illness nursed in the tents. When this illness is, as it often may be, diphtheria or measles, the risk of infection to the other children is brought as near a certainty as possible. For even at the best of times, and especially if anyone is sick in the tent, the Boer woman has a horror of ventilation; any cranny through which fresh air could enter is carefully stuffed up, and the tent becomes a hot-bed for the breeding of disease germs. || It is not easy to describe the pestilential atmosphere of these tents, carefully closed against the entrance of all fresh air. The Saxon word „stinking“ is the only one which is appropriate. A person in rude health would suffer seriously from such an atmosphere. It is, therefore, no wonder that measles, once introduced, has raged through the camps and caused many deaths; because the children especially are enervated by the foul air their mothers compel them to breathe and fall more easy victims to disease than would be the case if the tents were fairly ventilated. Every camp has a rule that tent flaps are to be lifted daily; but the Boer women so hate fresh air that this rule is only, even in the best camps, very partially carried out. Every excuse is made use of to evade its execution, and at night, of course, as near as may be, every tent is hermetically sealed. || People are often under the impression that life in tents must be very healthy, and that it involves the benefits associated with the constant breathing of pure air. So it does if ventilation is properly attended to. But if the flaps are not lifted, a bell tent becomes pestilentially close and stuffy; consequently life in tents is lowering to vitality and prejudicial to health, unless special pains are taken to secure ventilation. || Para. 32. — A third cause of the high death-rate, for which the people themselves are responsible, is to be found in their extraordinary notions regarding the treatment of disease. Bathing the person is not, in health, commonly practised among men; in illness they regard the washing of the patient as next door to murder. This feeling is at the root of a good deal of their objection to the hospital. It would be possible to fill pages of this report with accounts of the extraordinary treatment adopted by Boer women for the supposed benefit of their sick children. Some of what are known generally as „Dutch medicines“ or „droppels“ contain laudanum. Many a child has fallen a victim to laudanum poisoning, caused by a too lavish dosing by its mother with these medicines. The sale is now

forbidden or discouraged in most camps, but in too many instances the people still manage to obtain them, through „local committees“ or casual visitors, or when they themselves obtain passes to the nearest town or village. ¶ Para. 33. — Besides the pernicious „droppels“, the Boer women resort to other and even more dangerous methods of treatment for their sick children. One woman, whose children were ill with measles, painted their bodies with common green oil paint, and in the case of one of them, added a plaster made of American leather thickly daubed with the same paint. This plaster was presented to the Commission as a medical curiosity. Both the children died of arsenical poisoning. There was some talk of proceeding against their mother for manslaughter, but she had so obviously acted with no malicious intention that the idea was abandoned. Another woman, in a far distant camp, visiting in hospital her child, who had herpes round the mouth, seized the opportunity when the nurse's back was turned to paint its face and lips with vermilion oil paint. Fortunately, this was discovered while the paint was still wet and could be easily removed. Another woman, whose child was seriously ill with double pneumonia, varnished the whole of its chest and stomach, so that the poor little oppressed lungs were still more oppressed. This child was living when we saw it, but it had been impossible to get the varnish completely off. In one camp the dung of cows mixed with sulphur had been literally administered by mothers to their children. This produced diarrhoea, and when, later, measles appeared, the children were less able to withstand them. In another camp a newly-confined woman was found by the camp matron drinking a mixture of brick dust and brandy. We came across a large number of cases in which the dung of cows, goats, and pigs was being used medicinally. Sometimes it is made into a poultice, and sometimes a horrid drink is made with it. Dogs' blood is in great request as a medicine, and the comparatively harmless Reckitt's Blue is used as a cooling drink. A careful doctor in a Boer camp informed us that he abstained from the use of poisons even in liniments, for the patients were as likely as not to drink them. A camp nurse informed us that, in one instance, she had put a linseed poultice on a pneumonia patient, and returning presently to see how she was progressing, it was discovered that the woman had eaten the poultice. It is not, perhaps, unnatural that the Boers in camp should fail to understand the extreme care necessary in the feeding of enteric patients, but nurses and doctors have to be incessantly on the alert to prevent such things as dates, cakes, and lumps of meat being given to enterics by their relatives. This is also a

difficulty with which every doctor in England is familiar, and, with regard to the character of the Boer domestic pharmacopœia, no doubt parallel horrors could be found in old-fashioned English family receipt books of 150 or 200 years ago. But whatever parallels can be found, or excuses made, for these practices, in estimating the causes of the high death rate in the camps, we are bound to take them into account. A large number of deaths in the concentration camps have been directly and obviously caused by the noxious compounds given by Boer women to their children. || That this view is correct is substantiated by the fact that the children of English parents living in camp, who are, generally speaking, kept clean and are not subjected to the horrors of Boer domestic medicine, have indeed caught measles, but have been nursed successfully through them by intelligent and careful parents.

Para. 34. — 3. *Causes within the control of the Administrations.* — The camps were first of all planted in their present positions by the military authorities and were taken over by the civil government of the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony on March 1st, 1901, and of Natal on November 1st, 1901. There can be little doubt that in the first instance the military did not take sufficiently into account the difference necessary between the treatment of women and children and that of soldiers. For instance, we believe it is reckoned that sufficient tent accommodation is given to an army in the field if one bell tent is allowed to 16 men. Experience has proved that more than three times this amount of accommodation is necessary in a concentration camp, and that anything over five in a bell tent means overcrowding. Soldiers in war-time are constantly moving from place to place. A concentration camp when once planted down on a particular site will probably remain there for months or even years; it requires very serious effort and long preparation to strike camp and move to another site. We cannot feel that sufficient care has been exercised to choose only such sites on which a good and plentiful water supply and other vital requirements could be secured. In some camps both water supply and sanitation are admirable; among them we may mention Kimberley, Orange River, Norval's Pont, Johannesburg, Barberton and Krugersdorp. But in others either water supply, or sanitation, and in some both of these, are distinctly bad; we would single out as among the worst examples, as we saw them on our first visit, Mafeking, Aliwal North, Middelburg, Belfast, Kroonstad and Standerton, while for an ill-chosen site Merebank has an unenviable priority. In some of the camps just mentioned the bad water, as at Kroonstad, was the same as that supplied to the neighbouring town;

but the fact that a town has the misfortune of a bad water supply does not seem to us a reason for subjecting a camp to the same sanitary danger. Supposing it to have been imperative to have fixed a camp on a site with a very inferior water supply, we think that the attendant dangers might have been foreseen and should have been guarded against by an immediate provision of apparatus for boiling all drinking water, and of filters to filter it. In some camps we found extremely impure water being used even in the dispensary, unboiled and unfiltered.

Para. 38. — The special difficulties associated with sanitation in the Boer camps have been already referred to; but we feel that in some camps there has been a tendency on the part of the officials to sink to a low standard of order, decency, and cleanliness in these matters, rather than to face the constant wear and tear involved in insisting on a high standard. What may have been sufficient as regards sanitation, disposal of refuse, provision of bath-houses, &c. of the camps were regarded as a temporary expedient destined only to last a few weeks, becomes an obvious source of danger to health if the camps are to last months or years. We advise that the general inspectors of camps should bestow constant labour in raising the standard in those camps which require it to the higher level successfully attained in the best camps. A few words should be added here on the subject of the supply of transport animals for the camps. No superintendent, however zealous, can keep his camp clean and healthy unless he can secure the constant use of a sufficient supply of transport animals for sanitary work, the carting away of refuse, and, where necessary, the bringing in of water. || It has been pointed out that over large districts of South Africa it has long been quite impossible to obtain fresh vegetables or fresh milk. Recently the supply of meat, in more limited areas, has given out. It ought to have been foreseen that a dietary without fresh milk, vegetables, or meat would be followed by a lowering of vitality, and that scurvy would almost certainly result, and earlier precautions ought to have been taken to prevent it. A more determined effort might, we believe, have been made to secure fresh meat, however thin; and lime juice, jam, and vegetables of some kind added to the dietary would have been a reasonable precaution to have taken in view of an obvious danger. Again, when once the formidable character of the measles epidemic, followed as it was by pneumonia and kindred diseases, had made itself evident, more strenuous and earlier exertions ought to have been made to secure the services of an adequate supply of efficient doctors and nurses to cope with the outbreak. It would have been well if the Concentration Camps Department in each colony had,

from the very beginning of serious illness in the camps, set about the formation of a reserve of doctors and nurses, so as to throw quickly into any camp, which required it, extra help to enable the existing staff successfully to combat the disease. In some camps — Barberton should be particularly mentioned in this connection — a most praiseworthy effort was made from the beginning to isolate measles. Special marquees and a buck-sail shelter were erected, and Colonel Robinson, P.M.O., was successful in bringing into hospital 357 cases of measles out of a total throughout the camp of about 500. He kept the children in hospital for 16 days after the rash had first appeared, and the proportion of deaths to cases was very favourable compared to that in most other camps. Belfast, Harrismith, and, to a certain extent Balmoral, followed the same course; but we believe more might have been done in this direction if the Departments had had a staff of doctors and nurses in reserve ready to send to each camp as the epidemic made its appearance, to help the regular staff to combat the disease. These should have been sent for from England earlier than was actually the case. || Para. 36. — We desire to acknowledge, in the fullest possible manner, the generous spirit in which the Concentration Camps Departments have received our suggestions and recommendations. They have had a most difficult and thankless task in providing for the thousands of human beings for whose well-being they were suddenly made responsible. It is comparatively easy for those who come in as we do, in the attitude of critics, after others have borne the heat and burden of the day, to say that in this or that the work would have been better done otherwise. No one can have been brought in contact as we have repeatedly been, with the heads of the Concentration Camps Departments in the Colonies, without recognising their sincere desire to spare no effort to do for the camps the best thing possible under the circumstances. We have found on the part of the Deputy Administrator and the Military Governor of Pretoria the greatest readiness to accede to any suggestions we might make, and we have been especially gratified to find that they grudged nothing either in the way of labour or money which was calculated to improve the health of the camps. The chief difficulty, where difficulty existed, lay in procuring the necessary railway truckage for the conveyance of extra appliances for the camps. This difficulty, we are glad to learn, is diminishing day by day.

Para. 37. — Before the conclusion of our work we had the opportunity of submitting several of our recommendations to His Excellency the High Commissioner, and also of placing before him details

of what we had seen and heard in the various camps. In conversing with him it was impossible not to feel that we were in the presence, not of a partisan anxious only to hear what told in favour of a particular point of view, but of a statesman desirous to hear the truth, whether pleasant or unpleasant, in order that he might the more effectually grapple with the difficulties of the situation with all its vastly important bearings on the future. || Para. 38. — *The Question of the Removal of the Camps to other Localities.* — It remains now to take into consideration the third and last branch of our inquiry, *i. e.* whether it be desirable to remove the camps from their present positions. We are of the opinion that there are certain camps, such as Mafeking, Vredefort Road, Standerton, and Kroonstad, which for various reasons it would be desirable to move*). Mafeking has recently had a serious outbreak of enteric, and the ground on which the camp is pitched, although great care has been taken to disinfect it, is probably poisoned. Vredefort Road is 2½ miles from its water source, and the supply of animals for transport is far from ample. Kroonstad has an extremely bad water supply and if it could be moved to pure water it could not but be a great advantage to the whole camp. The Standerton water supply is even worse than that of Kroonstad. Besides this removal of individual camps for special reasons, there are overgrown camps reaching to a population of from 4000 to 6000 which we desire to see reduced. We believe that a camp always suffers materially when its numbers exceed, at the outside, 3000. That number is quite sufficient for one superintendent to be responsible for. The whole camp is easier worked and a more friendly and sociable spirit prevails if numbers are kept within certain limits. Therefore, if new and good sites and suitable superintendents can be found, we should welcome the reduction in numbers of such camps as Bloemfontein, Middelburg, Potchefstrom, Aliwal North, Bethulie, Irene, Krugersdorp and Volksrust, and the formation from their overflow of new camps elsewhere. Moreover, if it should become an absolute impossibility to supply the camps in the Orange River Colony and Transvaal with fresh meat, it will, in our judgment, be absolutely necessary to move their inmates nearer the coast where an ample supply of cold storage or other fresh meat will be available. If the meat cannot be brought to the people, the people must be brought to the meat. But with the before-mentioned

*) Nylstroom ought, we fear, to be added to this list. It is a good camp, but it is in a malarial district, and although the dwellers in the camp who belong to the locality may have become inured and fever proof, the staff are not similarly protected, and it will probably be impossible to maintain this camp where it now is.

exceptions, we cannot think it either necessary or desirable to urge a wholesale removal of the camps either to Natal or to the eastern part of Cape Colony. At present we have but little experience of how the natives of the Orange River Colony and Transvaal accustomed to live from 4000 to 6000 feet above the level of the sea, will stand the almost tropical heat of some parts of Natal. The actual physical difficulties and risks of moving such an immense body of people, composed, as they are, in unusually large proportions, of the very old and the very young, would be great. They would be in many cases several days on the railway. The weather is as uncertain as it is in England and the changes of temperature much more sudden and severe. An attempt to move the camps *en masse* would probably be attended by many casualties. On these considerations we recommend the improvement of conditions in existing camps, and the breaking of them up into smaller units, rather than their removal in any wholesale manner. || Para. 39. — We have observed that in some quarters suggestions have been made for (a) the simple disbanding of the camps, and (b) for the boarding out of the women and children now in camps with loyalist families in Natal or Cape Colony. We venture to think no one could make either of these suggestions who knows the conditions of South Africa. The great area of the Transvaal, the Orange River Colony, and parts of Cape Colony are stripped bare of all means of supporting life. The single line of rails from Cape Town to the Vaal River is taxed to its utmost to bring up food stuffs for the consumption of the Orange River Colony. The Transvaal is more fortunate in having other railway communication with the coast, but all its food, too, has to be brought up either from Cape Town, Durban, or Delagoa Bay. To turn the 100 000 people now being fed in the concentration camps out on the veldt to take care of themselves would be cruelty; it would be turning them out to starvation. Even if peace were declared to-morrow, Great Britain must continue to supply the camp people with the necessaries of life for some months to come. If once they were scattered over the country, what is now sufficiently difficult would become impossible. || The suggestion for the boarding out, with loyalist families in healthy situations in Natal or Cape Colony, nearly 100 000 Boer women and children whose husbands and fathers either have recently fought or are still fighting against us, shows that those who make it have never been at the pains to realize what war means. Could 100 000 French women and children have been boarded out, successfully, with the average German hausfrau while the war of 1870—71 was still going on? Or could Turks have been boarded

out with Russians during the war of 1878? Even in the camps it is frequently necessary to place physical obstacles in the way of personal conflict between the families of those Boers who have surrendered and those still in the field. To board out the women folk of one of the combatants with the women folk of the other would be to re-enact in thousands of families the fights which have been already fought, and would surely intensify the race hatred which all well-wishers of South Africa should desire to allay.

Para. 40. — In conclusion, we believe we may say that the appointment of this Commission has already been attended by the following definite results: — || 1. The appointment of travelling inspectors of camps in the Orange River Colony and Transvaal. || 2. The revision of the ration scale, including fuel. || 3. The provision of boilers for drinking water, and other sanitary precautions against the spread of enteric. || 4. An increase in the supply of qualified doctors and nurses. || 5. The more general appointment of suitable women as camp matrons. || 6. The appointment of water engineers to visit camp, and advise about water supply. || 7. The larger provision of kartels, or bedsteads, so as to reduce to a minimum the number of people sleeping on the ground. || 8. The more general provision of soup kitchens. || 9. The reorganisation of four camps, and the dismissal of incompetent officials. || 10. The increase of hospital accommodation and staff in a large number of camps.

(Signed) Millicent Garrett Fawcett, President.
 „ Katherine B. Brereton.
 „ Lucy A. E. Deane, Hon. Sec.
 „ Alice Knox.
 „ Ella Campbell Scarlett, M.D., L.S.A., L.M.
 „ Jane E. Waterston, M.D.

Durban, December 12th 1901.

Appendices to report of Concentration Camps Commission.

Appendix A.

Suggestions regarding hospital and camp matrons.

(Compiled partly from Circular 87, Burgher Camps Department, Pretoria, and partly from the Concentration Camps Commission's paper on the same subject.)

Hospital Matron.

1. There shall be a hospital matron in each camp who shall be a trained and certificated nurse of large experience, and have the qualification of being a good manager. || 2. She shall be entitled to a salary of 12 l.

per month and an allowance of 17 s. per month for uniform, free rations and quarters. || 3. Her duties shall be to have charge of the hospital, the control of the hospital nurses, probationers, and servants, and generally to manage the hospital under the direction of the medical officers, subject to the control of the superintendent of the camp. || 4. Her staff shall consist of as many fully-trained and partly-trained nurses, probationers, and servants as may be required. || 5. Fully-trained nurses shall receive a salary of 10 l. per month, 17 s. per month for uniform, free rations and quarters. || 6. Uncertificated nurses shall receive 7 l. 10 s. per month, uniform allowance 17 s. per month, free rations and quarters. || 7. Probationers shall receive 4 l. per month, free rations and quarters with uniform supplied, to be made by themselves. || 8. Probationers taken from among the refugees shall be paid from 1 s. 6 d. to 2 s. 6 d. per day with uniform supplied, to be made by themselves; the uniform to remain the property of the Hospital. Rations the same as that of other nurses, in lieu of refugee rations.

Camp Matron.

9. There shall be a camp matron in each camp, who shall be a trained and certificated nurse of large experience. She shall see that no cases of sickness, destitution, or special poverty remain unnoticed in the tents, and she shall work under the direction of the medical officer subject to the control of the superintendent of the camp. || 10. The scale of pay and allowances for the camp matron and her staff shall be the same as for the hospital matron's department. || 11. She shall divide the camp into districts; and in camps of over 1000 inhabitants and under 2000, she shall have under her one trained nurse. || 12. In camps of over 2000 inhabitants, she shall have an assistant camp matron and one trained nurse for every 1500 inhabitants over and above 2000. || 13. The duties of the camp matron shall be to teach mothers the care of children, to inculcate by all means in her power, habits of personal cleanliness and order, the airing of tents, scrupulous cleanliness in the preparation of infants' food and milk and all matters pertaining to hygiene. She shall be directly responsible for the carrying out of the doctors' orders in all cases of sickness among infants and others nursed in the tents. She shall have control of the camp nurses and probationers, and shall train the latter carefully to assist her in such duties as washing, poulticing, taking temperatures, seeing that medicines and medical comforts are properly administered, &c. || 14. The camp matron shall select the probationers from among the refugees. There should not be less than two probationers in course of training in each district; whilst, if there is an epidemic of

measles, enteric, or other disease in the camp, there should not be less than four. || 15. Each probationer shall be responsible for not more than 60 or 70 tents; she must report daily either to the matron or nurse in whose district they are placed on the order and welfare of the occupants. || 16. The probationer shall visit each tent in her section every morning with a note book, and shall make a list of all cases of sickness, giving the number of the tent and the name of the patient. The list shall be handed to the matron or nurse of the particular district by 8.30 a.m., and by her shall be passed to the doctor. || 17. The camp matron, or the assistant camp matron, or the nurse of the particular district shall accompany the doctor on his rounds, each probationer in her own section directing them from tent to tent according to the list supplied to the doctor. The probationer should not necessarily enter the tent with the doctor and matron. || 18. The probationer when the doctor leaves her section shall take his prescriptions to the dispenser to make up. She shall also make a list of the medical comforts ordered by the doctor for the patients in her section. || 19. After going round with the doctor, the matron or nurse of the district shall make out a list of the more important cases, whom she will herself visit in the course of the day, apportioning the others to the probationers to see and report on to her before 6 p.m. When the patients are ordered to hospital she shall report to the Superintendent who will arrange for the removal of the patient. The camp matron shall make it one of her special duties to see that the children whose mothers are in hospital are thoroughly cared for. || 20. The camp matron shall make out a list daily of the medical comforts ordered by the doctor, and shall see that they are duly distributed. || 21. If the camp matron or one of her subordinates should observe in any tent a case where clothing is needed, she shall report the matter to the superintendent who will refer it to the relief matron for investigation and attention. || 22. It is advisable especially during an epidemic that there should be a soup kitchen, and this shall be under the management of the camp matron who may employ any voluntary assistance; the soup shall be issued daily by the matron or her assistants to those entitled to receive it. || 23. The camp matron shall have the power to engage or dismiss the probationers belonging to her staff, notifying the superintendent in every case. || 24. If the assistant matron or any of the nurses under her should, in the opinion of the camp matron, be inefficient or unsuited for the posts they hold, she should report to the Superintendent, who shall take such steps as may be necessary to discharge such nurses or remove them to other employment, and engage others. || 25. Probationers should have a simple

uniform which should remain the property of the camp matron's department. || 26. The camp matron should organize a mess for the nurses of her department. || 27. The Superintendent will see that proper accommodation is provided for the camp matron and her staff as well as for the hospital matron. A cook and servant should be employed to the mess and the quarters of the various matron's staffs. || 28. The camp matron should not prescribe medicines, but she should have in her store for cases of emergency such items as the following: —

1 bottle castor oil.	6 tins Ideal milk.
1 „ olive oil.	1 lb. arrowroot.
1 „ vaseline.	1 „ tea.
1 „ boracic acid.	4 oz. brandy.

Appendix B.

Proposed scale of rations.

Adults.

	Per week.
Bread, Boer meal or flour	7 lbs.
*Meat	5 lbs.
Potatoes, carrots, onions or equivalents . . .	3 $\frac{1}{2}$ lbs.
**Alternative { Samp	1 lb.
{ or Rice or Beans	$\frac{1}{2}$ lb.
Coffee	7 oz.
Sugar	14 oz.
Salt	7 oz.
Milk	1 tin.
Wood	21 lbs.
Soap	$\frac{1}{2}$ lb.

Children 3 to 12 years old.

Bread, Boer meal or flour	3 $\frac{1}{2}$ lbs.
*Meat	3 lbs.
Potatoes, carrots, onions or equivalents . . .	3 $\frac{1}{2}$ lbs.
Alternative { Samp	1 lb.
{ or Rice or Beans	$\frac{1}{2}$ lb.
Coffee	7 oz.
Sugar	14 oz.
Salt	7 oz.
Milk	2 tins.
Wood	21 lbs.
Syrup or jam	$\frac{1}{2}$ lb.
Mealy meal	2 lbs.
Soap	$\frac{1}{2}$ lb.

*) When meat is thin, 1 lb. dripping or lard should be substituted for an equal quantity of meat.

***) The items here mentioned should be varied as much as possible.

Infants under 3.

Milk	2 bottles daily.
Oatmeal	1/2 lb. per week.
Syrup	1/2 " " "
Soap	1/2 " " "

The maximum wood ration for a family should be 100 lbs. || Grocery rations should be issued once a week. || Meat, bread, and potatoes daily. || Infants' milk, twice daily, mixed with boiled water. || We could suggest that patients leaving hospital should be placed on a special convalescent diet for such period as the doctor may direct.

Appendix C.

The block system of issuing rations.

A Short Report of the Issue of Rations at Bethules Camp; Population 4882.

Rations are served from a marquee in the centre of the camp; the plan adopted is as follows: — The camp is divided into blocks, each block is distinguished by a letter and contains 16 tents. When rations are issued the blocks are called up one by one by a „call boy“ appointed for the purpose. On reaching the ration tent the people stand outside in single file, according to their numbers. || The head issuer, seated at a table inside the tent, has a book in which is written the number of the tent, the name and number of each family in order, Block A coming first with the names of all the heads of families in each of its 16 tents, then Block B, and so on. As the head issuer calls out the name, the person of that name enters; the issuer then calls out the rations to which the family are entitled, with which the person is immediately served by the assistant issuers; a cross X is put in the book under the date to show that the ration has been issued. || If any name is called, and the person is not present, a note is made, and if absence is due to sickness the rations are sent so the tent by a corporal. The head of each family must fetch the rations, but this is no hardship, where 10 minutes is the average length of time any one person has to wait. When about half the people in Block A have been served, the call boy summons Block B, and so on. The whole plan of issuing was excellent. There was no waste of time and no muddle. Over 2400 persons were rationed from one tent in about two hours' time.

III. Verhandlung zwischen den Niederlanden und Großbritannien über eine Vermittlung im Südafrikanischen Kriege*).

Nr. 12657. **NIEDERLANDE.** — Der Gesandte in London an den englischen Minister des Ausw. Bietet die guten Dienste der niederländischen Regierung an, um eine Friedensverhandlung herbeizuführen.

1. Dans la pensée du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la Reine les circonstances exceptionnelles dans lesquelles se trouve une des parties belligérantes dans l'Afrique Australe, et qui l'empêchent de se mettre en rapport avec l'autre partie par des moyens directs, constituent une des raisons de la prolongation de la guerre, qui continue à sévir sans trêve ni terme dans cette contrée, et qui est cause de tant de misère. || 2. En effet, ce sont des circonstances exceptionnelles qu'une des parties belligérantes est entièrement enclavée et séparée du reste du monde, et que les Représentants des Boers en Europe sont privés de toute communication avec leurs Généraux commandant les troupes. Cette situation fait naître la difficulté que les autorités qui devraient négocier de la part des Boers sont divisées en deux parties, qui sont privées de tout moyen de délibérer ensemble. Il est évident que les Délégués Boers en Europe ne peuvent rien faire parce qu'ils ne connaissent pas l'état des choses en Afrique, et que les Boers sous les armes doivent s'abstenir de faire des démarches parce qu'ils ne sont pas au courant de l'état des choses en Europe. || 3. En outre, les Délégués en Europe sont liés par leurs lettres de créance qui ont été dressées au mois de Mars 1900, et qui les lient si étroitement à l'indépendance des Républiques qu'il ne leur serait pas même permis d'accepter le rétablissement du *status quo ante bellum* si la manière de décider les différends qui pourraient surgir n'était pas réglée en même temps. || 4. Ces circonstances font poser la question si une offre de bons offices ne pourrait pas être utilement faite par une Puissance neutre, afin de rendre au moins possible des négociations qui ne pourraient pas être entamées autrement. || 5. Pour cette raison il serait important d'être informé s'il serait agréable au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique de faire usage des bons offices d'une Puissance neutre, si ces bons offices se bornaient à la tâche de mettre en rapport les négociateurs à désigner par les deux parties. || 6. Peut-être le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la Reine pourrait être considéré comme indiqué pour remplir cette tâche par la raison que les Délégués des Boers se trouvent sur le territoire Néerlandais et ne sont accrédités qu'auprès de ce Gouvernement. || 7. Si

*) Blaubuch Cd. 906.

le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique se range à cette idée, il y aurait lieu pour le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la Reine d'adresser aux Délégués Boers la demande s'ils accepteraient de se rendre en Afrique pour délibérer avec les chefs Boers là-bas à la fin de revenir en Europe après un séjour d'une durée déterminée (peut-être de quinze jours) munis de pleins pouvoirs suffisants, visant toute éventualité, et les autorisant à conclure un Traité de Paix liant d'une manière indissoluble tant les Boers en Europe que les Boers en Afrique. || 8. En cas de réponse affirmative il deviendrait nécessaire que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique remît à celui des Pays-Bas trois sauf-conduits permettant aux Délégués Boers de se rendre librement en Afrique, d'y séjourner librement le temps convenu et de retourner librement en Europe. En outre, il serait nécessaire que le Gouvernement Britannique permît l'usage d'un code télégraphique pour faire désigner l'endroit où les Délégués susdits pourraient rencontrer les chefs des Boers. || 9. Après leur retour le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la Reine pourrait les mettre en rapport avec des Plénipotentiaires nommés par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique à cet effet, et se chargerait volontiers de mettre à la disposition de ces messieurs les localités nécessaires pour leurs réunions. || 10. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la Reine considérerait dès lors sa tâche comme terminée. || 11. Il est de toute évidence que malgré tout les négociations ainsi entamées pourraient ne pas aboutir; mais la possibilité du contraire n'est pas exclue non plus et en cet état de choses il paraît désirable de chercher à faire ouvrir des négociations dans l'espoir qu'elles seront fructueuses. Et en présence de la difficulté qui existe pour toute partie belligérante de faire le premier pas dans cette direction, il pourrait être utile qu'une tierce partie s'en chargeât et servît comme trait-d'union.

Nr. 12658. **GROSSBRITANNIEN.** — Der Staatssekretär des Ausw. an den Gesandten der Niederlande in London. Die Initiative zu Verhandlungen muß von den Buren in Südafrika ausgehen.

Foreign Office, January 29, 1902.

Sir, || You were good enough to lay before me on the 25th instant a communication from the Netherland Government, in which it was proposed that, with the object of bringing the war to an end, His Majesty's Government might grant a safe-conduct to the Boer Delegates now in Holland for the purpose of enabling them to confer with the Boer leaders in South Africa. It is suggested that after the conference the Delegates might return to Europe with power to conclude a Treaty

of Peace with this country, and the Netherland Government intimate that, in this event, they might at a later stage be instrumental in placing the Boer Plenipotentiaries in relation with the Plenipotentiaries who might be appointed by His Majesty's Government. || The Netherland Government intimate that if this project commends itself to His Majesty's Government, they will inquire of the Delegates whether they are prepared to make the suggested visit to South Africa. || It may therefore be inferred that the communication which I received from you was made on the responsibility of the Netherland Government alone, and without authority from the Boer Delegates or leaders. || His Majesty's Government have given it their best consideration, and, whilst they entirely appreciate the motives of humanity which have led the Netherland Government to make this proposal, they feel that they must adhere to the decision adopted and publicly announced by them some months after the commencement of hostilities by the Boers, that it is not their intention to accept the intervention of any foreign Power in the South African War. || Should the Boer Delegates themselves desire to lay a request for safe conduct before His Majesty's Government, there is no reason why they should not do so. But His Majesty's Government are obviously not in a position to express an opinion on any such application until they have received it and are aware of its precise nature, and the grounds on which the request is made. || I may, however, point out that it is not at present clear to His Majesty's Government that the Delegates retain any influence over the Representatives of the Boers in South Africa, or have any voice in their councils. They are stated by the Netherland Government to have no letters of credence or instructions later in date than March 1900. His Majesty's Government had, on the other hand, understood that all powers of government, including those of negotiation, were now completely vested in Mr. Steyn for the Boers of the Orange River Colony, and in Mr. Schalk Burger for those of the Transvaal. || If this be so, it is evident that the quickest and most satisfactory means of arranging a settlement would be by direct communication between the leaders of the Boer forces in South Africa and the Commander-in-chief of His Majesty's forces, who has already been instructed to forward immediately any offers he may receive for the consideration of His Majesty's Government. || In these circumstances His Majesty's Government have decided that if the Boer leaders should desire to enter into negotiations for the purpose of bringing the war to an end, those negotiations must take place, not in Europe, but in South Africa. || It should, moreover, be borne in mind that if the Boer Delegates are to occupy time in visiting South Africa,

in consulting with the Boer leaders in the field, and in returning to Europe for the purpose of making known the results of their errand, a period of at least three months would elapse, during which hostilities would be prolonged, and much human suffering, perhaps needlessly, occasioned.

Lansdowne.

Nr. 12659. VERTRAGSSTAATEN. — Vertrag über die Behandlung des Zuckers.

Brüssel, 5. März 1902.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne, Roi de Prusse, au nom de l'Empire Allemand; Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Bohême, etc., etc., et Roi Apostolique de Hongrie; Sa Majesté le Roi des Belges; Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne et, en Son Nom, Sa Majesté la Reine Régente du Royaume; le Président de la République Française; Sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume-Uni de la Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande et des Possessions Britanniques au delà des mers, Empereur des Indes; Sa Majesté le Roi d'Italie; Sa Majesté la Reine des Pays-Bas; Sa Majesté le Roi de Suède et de Norvège, || Désirant — d'une part — égaliser les conditions de la concurrence entre les sucres de betterave et les sucres de canne des différentes provenances et — d'autre part — aider au développement de la consommation du sucre; || Considérant que ce double résultat ne peut être atteint que par la suppression des primes et par la limitation de la surtaxe; || Ont résolu de conclure une convention à cet effet, et ont nommé pour Leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir: || Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne, Roi de Prusse, au nom de l'Empire Allemand: || M. le comte de Wallwitz, Son Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté le Roi des Belges; || M. de Koerner, Directeur au Département Impérial des Affaires Etrangères; || M. Kühn, Conseiller intime supérieur de Gouvernement, Conseiller rapporteur à l'Office Impérial du Trésor. || Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Bohême, etc., etc., et Roi Apostolique de Hongrie: || Pour l'Autriche-Hongrie: || M. le comte Khevenhüller Metsch, Son Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté le Roi des Belges. || Pour l'Autriche: || M. le baron Jorkasch-Koch, Chef de section au Ministère Impérial et Royal des Finances. || Pour la Hongrie: || M. de Toepke, Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat au Ministère Royal hongrois des Finances. || Sa Majesté le Roi des Belges: || M. le comte de Smet de Naeyer, Ministre des Finances et des Travaux publics, Chef du Cabinet; || M. Capelle, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire, Directeur général du

Commerce et des Consulats au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères; || M. Kebers, Directeur général des Douanes et Accises au Ministère des Finances et des Travaux Publics; || M. De Smet, Inspecteur général à l'Administration des Contributions directes, Douanes et Accises au Ministère des Finances et des Travaux Publics; || M. Beauduin, Membre de la Chambre des Représentants, Industriel. || Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne et, en Son Nom, Sa Majesté la Reine Régente du Royaume: || M. de Villa Urrutia, Son Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté le Roi des Belges. || Le Président de la République Française: || M. Gérard, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté le Roi des Belges; || M. Bousquet, Ancien Conseiller d'Etat, Directeur général des Douanes honoraire; || M. Delatour, Conseiller d'Etat, Directeur général de la Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations; || M. Courtin, Conseiller d'Etat, Directeur général des Contributions indirectes au Ministère des Finances. || Sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume-Uni de la Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande et des Possessions Britanniques au delà des mers, Empereur des Indes: || M. Constantine Phipps, C. B., Son Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté le Roi des Belges; || Sir Henry Primrose, K. C. B., C. S. I.; || Sir Henry Bergne, K. C. M. G.; || M. A. A. Pearson; || M. E. C. Ozanne. || Sa Majesté le Roi d'Italie: || M. le commandeur Romeo Cantagalli, Son Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté le Roi des Belges; || M. le commandeur Emile Maraini, Député au Parlement italien, Industriel. || Sa Majesté la Reine des Pays-Bas: || M. le jonkheer de Pestel, Son Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté le Roi des Belges; || M. le baron J. d'Aulnis de Bourouill, Docteur en droit, Professeur à l'Université d'Utrecht; || M. G. Eschauzier, Industriel à La Haye; || M. A. van Rossum, Industriel à Haarlem. || Sa Majesté le Roi de Suède et de Norvège: || Pour la Suède: || M. le comte Wrangel, Son Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté le Roi des Belges; || M. Charles Tranchell, Industriel. || Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs respectifs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des articles suivants:

Article premier.

Les Hautes Parties contractantes s'engagent à supprimer, à dater de la mise en vigueur de la présente Convention, les primes directes et indirectes dont bénéficieraient la production ou l'exportation des sucres, et à ne pas établir de primes de l'espèce pendant toute la durée de ladite Convention. Pour l'application de cette disposition, sont assimilés au sucre les produits sucrés tels que confitures, chocolats, biscuits, lait

condensé et tous autres produits analogues contenant en proportion notable du sucre incorporé artificiellement. || Tombent sous l'application de l'alinéa précédent, tous les avantages résultant directement ou indirectement, pour les diverses catégories de producteurs, de la législation fiscale des Etats, notamment: || a) les bonifications directes accordées en cas d'exportation; || b) les bonifications directes accordées à la production; || c) les exemptions d'impôt, totales ou partielles, dont bénéficie une partie des produits de la fabrication; || d) les bénéfices résultant d'excédents de rendement; || e) les bénéfices résultant de l'exagération du drawback; || f) les avantages résultant de toute surtaxe d'un taux supérieur à celui fixé par l'article 3.

Article 2.

Les Hautes Parties contractantes s'engagent à soumettre au régime d'entrepôt, sous la surveillance permanente de jour et de nuit des employés du fisc, les fabriques et les raffineries de sucre, ainsi que les usines dans lesquelles le sucre est extrait des mélasses. || A cette fin, les usines seront aménagées de manière à donner toute garantie contre l'enlèvement clandestin des sucres, et les employés auront la faculté de pénétrer dans toutes les parties des usines. || Des livres de contrôle seront tenus concernant une ou plusieurs phases de la fabrication, et les sucres achevés seront déposés dans des magasins spéciaux offrant toutes les garanties désirables de sécurité.

Article 3.

Les Hautes Parties contractantes s'engagent à limiter au chiffre maximum de 6 francs par 100 kilogrammes pour le sucre raffiné et les sucres assimilables au raffiné, et de fr. 5,50 pour les autres sucres, la surtaxe, c'est-à-dire l'écart entre le taux des droits ou taxes dont sont passibles les sucres étrangers et celui des droits ou taxes auxquels sont soumis les sucres nationaux. || Cette disposition ne vise pas le taux des droits d'entrée dans les pays qui ne produisent pas de sucre; elle n'est pas non plus applicable aux sous-produits de la fabrication et du raffinage du sucre.

Article 4.

Les Hautes Parties contractantes s'engagent à frapper d'un droit spécial, à l'importation sur leur territoire, les sucres originaires de pays qui accorderaient des primes à la production ou à l'exportation. || Ce droit ne pourra être inférieur au montant des primes, directes ou indirectes, accordées dans le pays d'origine. Les Hautes Parties se réservent la

faculté, chacune en ce qui la concerne, de prohiber l'importation des sucres primés. || Pour l'évaluation du montant des avantages résultant éventuellement de la surtaxe spécifiée au littéra f de l'article 1^{er}, le chiffre fixé par l'article 3 est déduit du montant de cette surtaxe: la moitié de la différence est réputée représenter la prime, la Commission permanente instituée par l'article 7 ayant le droit, à la demande d'un Etat contractant, de reviser le chiffre ainsi établi.

Article 5.

Les Hautes Parties contractantes s'engagent réciproquement à admettre au taux le plus réduit de leur tarif d'importation, les sucres originaires soit des Etats contractants, soit de celles des colonies ou possessions desdits Etats qui n'accordent pas de primes et auxquelles s'appliquent les obligations de l'article 8. || Les sucres de canne et les sucres de betterave ne pourront être frappés de droits différents.

Article 6.

L'Espagne, l'Italie et la Suède seront dispensées des engagements faisant l'objet des articles 1, 2 et 3, aussi longtemps qu'elles n'exporteront pas de sucre. || Ces Etats s'engagent à adapter leur législation sur le régime des sucres aux dispositions de la Convention, dans le délai d'une année — ou plus tôt si faire se peut — à partir du moment où la Commission permanente aura constaté que la condition indiquée ci-dessus a cessé d'exister.

Article 7.

Les Hautes Parties contractantes conviennent de créer une Commission permanente, chargée de surveiller l'exécution des dispositions de la présente Convention. || Cette Commission sera composée de Délégués des divers Etats contractants et il lui sera adjoint un Bureau permanent. La Commission choisit son Président; elle siègera à Bruxelles et se réunira sur la convocation du Président. || Les Délégués auront pour mission: || a) De constater si, dans les Etats contractants, il n'est accordé aucune prime directe ou indirecte à la production ou à l'exportation des sucres; || b) De constater si les Etats visés à l'article 6 continuent à se conformer à la condition spéciale prévue audit article; || c) De constater l'existence des primes dans les Etats non-signataires et d'en évaluer le montant en vue de l'application de l'article 4; || d) D'émettre un avis sur les questions litigieuses; || e) D'instruire les demandes d'admission à l'Union des Etats qui n'ont point pris part à la présente Convention. || Le Bureau permanent sera chargé de rassembler, de traduire, de coordonner et de publier

les renseignements de toute nature qui se rapportent à la législation et à la statistique des sucres, non seulement dans les Etats contractants, mais également dans les autres Etats. || Pour assurer l'exécution des dispositions qui précèdent, les Hautes Parties contractantes communiqueront par la voie diplomatique au Gouvernement belge, qui les fera parvenir à la Commission, les lois, arrêtés et règlements sur l'imposition des sucres qui sont ou seront en vigueur dans leurs pays respectifs, ainsi que les renseignements statistiques relatifs à l'objet de la présente Convention. || Chacune des Hautes Parties contractantes pourra être représentée à la Commission par un Délégué ou par un Délégué et des Délégués-Adjoints. || L'Autriche et la Hongrie seront considérées séparément comme Parties contractantes. || La première réunion de la Commission aura lieu à Bruxelles, à la diligence du Gouvernement belge, trois mois au moins avant la mise en vigueur de la présente Convention. || La Commission n'aura qu'une mission de constatation et d'examen. Elle fera, sur toutes les questions qui lui seront soumises, un rapport qu'elle adressera au Gouvernement belge, lequel le communiquera aux Etats intéressés et provoquera, si la demande en est faite par une des Hautes Parties contractantes, la réunion d'une Conférence qui arrêtera les résolutions ou les mesures nécessitées par les circonstances. || Toutefois les constatations et évaluations visées aux lettres b et c auront un caractère exécutoire pour les Etats contractants; elles seront arrêtées par un vote de majorité, chaque Etat contractant disposant d'une voix, et elles sortiront leurs effets au plus tard à l'expiration du délai de deux mois. Au cas où l'un des Etats contractants croirait devoir faire appel d'une décision de la Commission, il devra, dans la huitaine de la notification qui lui sera faite de ladite décision, provoquer une nouvelle délibération de la Commission; celle-ci se réunira d'urgence et statuera définitivement dans le délai d'un mois à dater de l'appel. La nouvelle décision sera exécutoire au plus tard, dans les deux mois de sa date. — La même procédure sera suivie en ce qui concerne l'instruction des demandes d'admission prévue au littéra e. || Les frais résultant de l'organisation et du fonctionnement du Bureau permanent et de la Commission — sauf le traitement ou les indemnités des Délégués, qui seront payés par leurs pays respectifs, — seront supportés par tous les Etats contractants et répartis entre eux d'après un mode à régler par la Commission.

Article 8.

Les Hautes Parties contractantes s'engagent, pour elles et pour leurs colonies ou possessions, exception faite des colonies autonomes de la

Grande-Bretagne et des Indes orientales britanniques, à prendre les mesures nécessaires pour empêcher que les sucres primés qui auront traversé en transit le territoire d'un Etat contractant ne jouissent des avantages de la Convention sur le marché destinataire. La Commission permanente fera à cet égard les propositions nécessaires.

Article 9.

Les Etats qui n'ont point pris part à la présente Convention seront admis à y adhérer sur leur demande et après avis conforme de la Commission permanente. || La demande sera adressée par la voie diplomatique au Gouvernement belge, qui se chargera, le cas échéant, de notifier l'adhésion à tous les autres Gouvernements. L'adhésion emportera, de plein droit, accession à toutes les charges et admission à tous les avantages stipulés par la présente Convention, et elle produira ses effets à partir du 1^{er} septembre qui suivra l'envoi de la notification faite par le Gouvernement belge aux autres Etats contractants.

Article 10.

La présente Convention sera mise à exécution à partir du 1^{er} septembre 1903. || Elle restera en vigueur pendant cinq années à partir de cette date, et dans le cas où aucune des Hautes Parties contractantes n'aurait notifié au Gouvernement belge, douze mois avant l'expiration de ladite période de cinq années, son intention d'en faire cesser les effets, elle continuera à rester en vigueur pendant une année et, ainsi de suite, d'année en année. || Dans le cas où l'un des Etats contractants dénoncerait la Convention, cette dénonciation n'aurait d'effet qu'à son égard; les autres Etats conserveraient, jusqu'au 31 octobre de l'année de la dénonciation, la faculté de notifier l'intention de se retirer également à partir du 1^{er} septembre de l'année suivante. Si l'un de ces derniers Etats entendait user de cette faculté, le Gouvernement belge provoquerait la réunion à Bruxelles, dans les trois mois, d'une conférence qui aviserait aux mesures à prendre.

Article 11.

Les dispositions de la présente Convention seront appliquées aux provinces d'outre-mer, colonies et possessions étrangères des Hautes Parties contractantes. Sont exceptées toutefois les colonies et possessions britanniques et néerlandaises, sauf en ce qui concerne les dispositions faisant l'objet des articles 5 et 8. || La situation des colonies et possessions britanniques et néerlandaises est, pour le surplus, déterminée par les déclarations insérées au Protocole de clôture.

Article 12.

L'exécution des engagements réciproques contenus dans la présente Convention est subordonnée, en tant que de besoin, à l'accomplissement des formalités et règles établies par les lois constitutionnelles de chacun des Etats contractants. || La présente Convention sera ratifiée, et les ratifications en seront déposées à Bruxelles, au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, le 1^{er} février 1903, ou plus tôt si faire se peut. || Il est entendu que la présente Convention ne deviendra obligatoire de plein droit que si elle est ratifiée au moins par ceux des Etats contractants qui ne sont pas visés par la disposition exceptionnelle de l'article 6. Dans le cas où un ou plusieurs desdits Etats n'auraient pas déposé leurs ratifications dans le délai prévu, le Gouvernement belge provoquera immédiatement une décision des autres Etats signataires quant à la mise en vigueur, entre eux seulement, de la présente Convention. || En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé la présente Convention. || Fait à Bruxelles, en un seul exemplaire, le cinq mars dix-neuf cent deux.

Unterschriften.

Schlußprotokoll.

Au moment de procéder à la signature de la Convention relative au régime des sucres conclue, à la date de ce jour, entre les Gouvernements de l'Allemagne, de l'Autriche et de la Hongrie, de la Belgique, de l'Espagne, de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne, de l'Italie, des Pays-Bas et de la Suède, les Plénipotentiaires soussignés sont convenus de ce qui suit:

A l'article 3.

Considérant que le but de la surtaxe est de protéger efficacement le marché intérieur des pays producteurs, les Hautes Parties contractantes se réservent la faculté, chacune en ce qui la concerne, de proposer un relèvement de la surtaxe dans le cas où des quantités considérables de sucres originaires d'un Etat contractant pénétreraient chez elles; ce relèvement ne frapperait que les sucres originaires de cet Etat. || La proposition devra être adressée à la Commission permanente, laquelle statuera à bref délai, par un vote de majorité, sur le bien fondé de la mesure proposée, sur la durée de son application et sur le taux du relèvement; celui-ci ne dépassera pas un franc par 100 kilogrammes. || L'adhésion de la Commission ne pourra être donnée que dans le cas où l'envahissement du marché considéré serait la conséquence d'une réelle infériorité économique et non le résultat d'une élévation factice des prix provoquée par une entente entre producteurs.

A l'article 11.

A. 1° Le Gouvernement de la Grande-Bretagne déclare qu'aucune prime directe ou indirecte ne sera accordée aux sucres des colonies de la Couronne pendant la durée de la Convention. || 2° Il déclare aussi, par mesure exceptionnelle et tout en réservant, en principe, son entière liberté d'action en ce qui concerne les relations fiscales entre le Royaume-Uni et ses colonies et possessions, que, pendant la durée de la Convention, aucune préférence ne sera accordée dans le Royaume-Uni aux sucres coloniaux vis-à-vis des sucres originaires des Etats contractants. || 3° Il déclare enfin que la Convention sera soumise par ses soins aux colonies autonomes et aux Indes orientales pour qu'elles aient la faculté d'y donner leur adhésion. || Il est entendu que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique a la faculté d'adhérer à la Convention au nom des colonies de la Couronne. ||

B. Le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas déclare que, pendant la durée de la Convention, aucune prime directe ou indirecte ne sera accordée aux sucres des colonies néerlandaises et que ces sucres ne seront pas admis dans les Pays-Bas à un tarif moindre que celui appliqué aux sucres originaires des Etats contractants. || Le présent Protocole de clôture, qui sera ratifié en même temps que la Convention conclue à la date de ce jour, sera considéré comme faisant partie intégrante de cette Convention et aura même force, valeur et durée. || En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires soussignés ont dressé le présent Protocole.

Fait à Bruxelles, le cinq mars dix-neuf cent deux.

Unterschriften.

Denkschrift, dem Deutschen Reichstage vorgelegt (29. April 1902)
bei Einbringung vorstehenden Vertrages.

Seit dem Jahre 1861 wird in Deutschland dem inländischen Rübenzucker, der seit 1841 einer Steuer unterliegt, bei der Ausfuhr eine Vergütung gewährt. Die Abgabe wurde seinerzeit nach dem Gewichte der zur Verarbeitung gelangenden Rüben, die Vergütung für den Zucker nach dem Steuerbetrage für die zu seiner Herstellung durchschnittlich erforderliche Rübenmenge bemessen. Mit der im Laufe der Zeit eintretenden Züchtung zuckerreicherer Rüben und Verbesserung des Herstellungsverfahrens mußte sich hieraus naturgemäß ein von Jahr zu Jahr gesteigertes Mißverhältnis zwischen Steuer und Vergütung ergeben, indem die Ausbeute an Zucker das angenommene Durchschnittsmaß mehr und mehr überstieg und der Überschuf des Betrags der Vergütung für

den ausgeführten Zucker über den Betrag der Steuer für die verwendeten Rüben, die „Prämie“ der Zuckerfabrikation, fortgesetzt anwuchs. || Dieses Anwachsen der Prämie und die damit verbundene Beeinträchtigung des Reinertrags der Steuer suchte die Gesetzgebung zu wiederholten Malen durch Herabminderung der Vergütungen, und als sich dieses Mittel als unwirksam herausgestellt hatte, dadurch auszugleichen, daß (von 1892 ab) unter Beseitigung der Steuer vom Rübenrohstoff und Einführung einer Verbrauchsabgabe ein feststehender Ausfuhrzuschuß gezahlt wurde, welcher jedoch nur bis 1895 gewährt werden sollte. Man ging hierbei von der Erwartung aus, daß die Konkurrenzstaaten dem gegebenen Beispiele folgen und ihre Prämien ebenfalls beseitigen würden. Diese Erwartung erfüllte sich jedoch nicht. Auch der mit dem Zuckersteuergesetze vom 27. Mai 1896 (Reichs-Gesetzbl. S. 117) unternommene umgekehrte Versuch, durch eine Erhöhung der deutschen Ausfuhrzuschüsse die anderen Staaten einer gänzlichen Beseitigung der Prämien geneigt zu machen, blieb zunächst erfolglos und führte im Gegenteile dazu, daß auch in Österreich-Ungarn die dortigen direkten Prämien erhöht und in Frankreich neben den bereits bestehenden indirekten noch direkte Prämien eingeführt wurden. || Eine Übersicht über die Höhe der Vergütungen und Zuschüsse von 1877 ab enthält die Anlage A*). || Es wäre verfehlt, über das System der Prämiengewährung ohne weiteres den Stab zu brechen. Wenn sich unser Zuckergewerbe aus den bescheidenen Verhältnissen, in denen es sich um die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts befand**), in wenigen Jahrzehnten zu einer Achtung gebietenden Stellung heraufgearbeitet hat, und wenn es heute sowohl nach dem Umfange der Zuckererzeugung als auch nach der Beschaffenheit des verwendeten Rohstoffs und der Art seiner Verarbeitung, die wiederum durch die vollendete technische Einrichtung der Fabriken und die hohe wissenschaftliche Ausbildung der Fabrikbeamten bedingt ist, als das erste der Welt dasteht, so ist dies nicht zum wenigsten auf jenes System der Materialbesteuerung und Steuervergütung zurückzuführen, welches den höchsten Vorteil denjenigen zu teil werden liefs, der das beste Rübenmaterial in der weitgehendsten Weise auszunützen vermochte. Auch als die deutsche Zuckerfabrikation dieses Anspornes nicht mehr bedurfte, war die Prämie erforderlich, um ihr, die inzwischen eine Exportindustrie geworden war, die Stellung auf dem Weltmarkt im Kampfe mit den ebenfalls aus staatlichen Mitteln unterstützten Industrien der europäischen Konkurrenzländer zu erhalten

*) Die Anlagen sind hier fortgelassen. Red.

***) Im Jahre 1849/50 wurden in 148 Fabriken zusammen 5 762 836 dz Rüben verarbeitet und daraus 423 738 dz Rohzucker hergestellt.

und zu stärken, und es war von diesem Gesichtspunkt aus nur folgerichtig, wenn das geltende Zuckersteuergesetz gegenüber den beträchtlichen Vergünstigungen, die namentlich der französische und österreichische Zucker genofs (zu vergl. die Begründung zu dem Gesetze vom 27. Mai 1896, Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags 1895/96, Anlagen Bd. II S. 1029), erhöhte Ausfuhrzuschüsse einfuhrte. || Die Inanspruchnahme öffentlicher Mittel zu dem Zwecke, der Konkurrenz der Industrien fremder Staaten entgegenzutreten, kann jedoch nur vorübergehend statthaft erscheinen. Regierungsseitig ist denn auch bei Vorlegung des gedachten Gesetzes ausdrücklich erklärt worden, daß die erhöhten Zuschüsse als Kampfmaßnahme gedacht seien, und daß die Wiederbeseitigung der Zuschüsse für den Fall vorbehalten bleiben müsse, daß es gelingen sollte, die anderen Staaten zu entsprechenden Schritten zu bewegen. Auch der Reichstag faßte bei Annahme des Gesetzes eine Resolution, durch welche die verbündeten Regierungen ersucht wurden, „mit aller Entschiedenheit dahin zu wirken, daß durch internationale Vereinbarungen eine Beseitigung der Ausfuhrvergütungen für Zucker in thunlichster Bälde herbeigeführt werde“.

In ihrem Wunsche, die Prämien aufgehoben zu sehen, begegneten sich Regierung und Reichstag mit den Regierungen verschiedener anderer Staaten, wie denn auch vor 1896 teils mit, teils ohne Zuziehung Deutschlands bereits wiederholte Versuche, zuletzt auf der Zuckerkonferenz zu London in den Jahren 1887 und 1888, in dieser Richtung unternommen worden waren. Auf der letzteren Konferenz war bereits von der Mehrzahl der vertretenen Mächte ein Vertrag wegen Abschaffung der Prämien unterzeichnet worden, der indessen nicht in Kraft trat. Insbesondere lag dies an der ablehnenden Haltung Frankreichs, zum Teil auch daran, daß in England, wo man bis dahin der Kolonien wegen die Beseitigung der Prämien betrieben hatte, zeitweilig eine andere Richtung, welche das Interesse des englischen Zuckerverbrauchers in den Vordergrund stellte, das Übergewicht gewann. Einen erneuten Anstoß erhielt die gegen die Prämien gerichtete Bewegung durch das am 24. Juli 1897 in den Vereinigten Staaten in Kraft getretene Zollgesetz, nach welchem von allem eingeführten Zucker ein Zollzuschlag in Höhe der etwaigen ihm in seinem Ursprungslande gewährten Vergünstigung erhoben wurde — eine Maßnahme, die nicht nur den prämierten Zucker auf dem Marke des den Zuschlag erhebenden Staates zu schädigen, sondern auch im allgemeinen preisdrückend zu wirken geeignet war. Es sei gleich hier bemerkt, daß später, vom Mai 1899 ab, ähnliche Zuschlagszölle gegen prämierten Zucker auch in Britisch Ostindien eingeführt worden sind.

Auf Einladung der Königlich belgischen Regierung traten daher im Juni 1898 in Brüssel Vertreter von Deutschland, Österreich-Ungarn, Belgien, Spanien, Frankreich, Großbritannien, den Niederlanden, Rußland und Schweden zusammen, um über die gemeinsame Beseitigung der Prämienvorteile zu beraten. Die meisten vertretenen Staaten waren bereit, die Vergünstigungen, welche sie ihrem Zucker gewährten, aufzugeben; dagegen wollte Frankreich nur seine direkten Ausfuhrprämien als hierunter fallend angesehen wissen, und Frankreich sowohl wie Rußland weigerten sich entschieden, ihre innere Steuergesetzgebung, aus welcher sich erhebliche indirekte Zuschüsse für die Zuckerfabrikation ergeben, in der Konferenz zum Gegenstande der Verhandlung machen zu lassen. Da die französischen und russischen Vertreter in diesem Sinne durch bestimmte Verhaltensanweisungen ihrer Regierungen gebunden waren, erschien es den Beteiligten rätlich, die Beratung zu vertagen, bis durch Verhandlungen von Regierung zu Regierung eine neue Unterlage für den abzuschließenden Vertrag gewonnen worden sei. || Nachdem darauf zuerst die belgische Regierung auf Grund gewisser während der Konferenz gemachter Vermittelungsvorschläge mit Frankreich unterhandelt hatte, setzte sich die französische Regierung, bei welcher inzwischen, wohl zumeist aus finanzwirtschaftlichen Gründen, eine der Unterdrückung der Prämien günstigere Stimmung Platz gegriffen hatte, unmittelbar mit dem Deutschen Reiche und Österreich-Ungarn in Verbindung. Auf Grund von Beratungen, die teils in Berlin, teils in Paris geführt worden waren, kam an letzterem Orte am 22. Oktober 1900 ein vorläufiges Abkommen zwischen den drei Staaten zustande. Frankreich verpflichtete sich hiernach, unter der Voraussetzung des Wegfalls der Prämien in den übrigen beteiligten Ländern, nicht nur seine direkte Prämie vollständig aufzuheben, sondern auch seine indirekte Prämie erheblich zu verringern. Letztere besteht darin, daß dem gewonnenen Zucker, soweit die Ausbeute über $7\frac{3}{4}$, aber nicht über $10\frac{1}{2}$ Prozent des Rübengewichts hinausgeht, ein Steuernachlaß von 30, soweit sie $10\frac{1}{2}$ Prozent überschreitet, von 15 Franken für den Doppelzentner gewährt wird. Nach dem Abkommen sollte die erstere Ermäßigung um $\frac{1}{3}$ gekürzt, die letztere ganz beseitigt werden; die Folge wäre eine Herabsetzung der indirekten Prämie auf wenig mehr als die Hälfte und bei wachsender Ausbeute eine fernere stetige Verminderung dieser Prämie gewesen. Der Bestand der Zuckerkartelle in Deutschland und Österreich-Ungarn wurde durch das Pariser Abkommen nicht berührt. || Auf Grund dieser Vereinbarung wurde im Dezember 1901 in Brüssel in die Fortsetzung der Beratung eingetreten. Von den im Jahre 1898 vertretenen Staaten hatte Rußland seine Teilnahme abgelehnt. Italien und

Rumänien waren neu hinzugekommen, doch ist letzterer Staat vor Abschluß der Verhandlungen wieder zurückgetreten. Wie zu erwarten, fand das Pariser Abkommen allgemeine Billigung; es ergaben sich jedoch andere Schwierigkeiten, die im Jahre 1898 noch nicht bestanden hatten. Insbesondere wurde neben dem Kartelle der österreichisch-ungarischen Zuckerfabriken das um die Mitte des Jahres 1900 ins Leben getretene deutsche Zuckerkartell von fast allen Seiten heftig angegriffen, indem man der Thätigkeit der Kartelle eine übermäßige Steigerung der inländischen Produktion und einen starken Druck auf den Weltmarktpreis zur Last legte. Dem Widerspruch der deutschen und der österreichisch-ungarischen Vertreter gegen eine Einbeziehung unserer Kartellverhältnisse und der bezüglichlichen Gesetzgebung in die Beschlussfassung der Konferenz wurde zwar Folge gegeben, doch wurde, um die Wirksamkeit der genannten Kartelle, die die Möglichkeit einer Steigerung des Inlandpreises voraussetzt und daher auf einen hohen Zollschutz angewiesen ist, abzuschwächen, verlangt, daß in der abzuschließenden Übereinkunft der Überzoll, d. h. der Betrag, um welchen die Belastung des eingeführten Zuckers die des einheimischen Zuckers überschreitet, thunlichst niedrig bemessen werde. Namentlich wurde von England, dem es im Interesse seiner Kolonien, besonders der westindischen, um eine alsbaldige Hebung des Zuckerpreises auf dem Weltmarkte zu thun ist, als unerläßliche Bedingung für das Zustandekommen des Vertrags die Forderung aufgestellt, daß der Überzoll nicht mehr als 5 Franken für den Doppelzentner betragen dürfe; doch gelang es im weiteren Verlaufe der Verhandlungen, eine Erhöhung dieses Betrags auf 6 Franken für raffinierten Zucker und $5\frac{1}{2}$ Franken für Rohzucker durchzusetzen. Infolge des wiederholten Hinweises von unserer Seite, daß man auf eine derartig niedrige Bemessung des Überzolls schon deshalb nicht eingehen könne, weil Frankreich eine indirekte Prämie in etwa derselben Höhe beibehalte, und diese Prämie bei der Eigenart des französischen Steuersystems schon an sich wie ein Schutzzoll wirke, ließ ferner die französische Regierung sich, um das Zustandekommen des Vertrags zu ermöglichen, zu einem völligen Verzicht auf ihre Prämie herbei. Schließlich lagen die Verhältnisse derartig, daß die diesseitige Regierung vor die Wahl gestellt war, entweder auf die erwähnte Bindung der Zölle, welche nach den bisherigen Erfahrungen für den Schutz des heimischen Gewerbes gegen das Eindringen fremden Zuckers ausreicht*), einzugehen oder die Verhandlungen zum Scheitern

*) Belgien hat mit einem Überzoll in Höhe von 4,50 Franken für 100 kg Rohzuckerwert, Holland mit einem solchen in Höhe seiner Prämie, die in den letzten Jahren

kommen zu lassen. || Für die in letzterem Falle zu besorgende nachhaltige Schädigung der deutschen Zuckerindustrie glaubte die Regierung die Verantwortung nicht übernehmen zu können.

Nach den Erklärungen, welche die englischen Vertreter in Brüssel abgegeben haben, konnte in Übereinstimmung mit sonstigen, auf diplomatischem und anderem Wege hierher gelangten Nachrichten nicht bezweifelt werden, daß bei erfolglosem Verlaufe der Beratungen die Regierung von Großbritannien gegen den deutschen Zucker sehr scharf vorgehen und ihn nicht bloß in Höhe der Ausfuhrzuschüsse, sondern auch in Höhe des Kartellnutzens mit Ausgleichszöllen belegen werde, voraussichtlich überdies unter Abschluss von Sonderverträgen mit anderen zuckererzeugenden Ländern, namentlich mit Frankreich, dessen Zuckerausfuhr nach England in neuester Zeit eine große Bedeutung gewonnen hat. Es war ferner gewiß, daß Britisch Ostindien die dort bereits bestehenden Zollzuschläge entsprechend erhöhen, und wahrscheinlich, daß die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika dem Beispiele folgen würden. || Die hieraus sich ergebende Lage wäre geradezu verderblich für die deutsche Industrie gewesen.

Deutschland hat (Anlage B) beispielsweise im Betriebsjahr 1900/01 (in Rohzuckerwert) nach

Großbritannien	6 287 000 dz
Britisch Ostindien	101 000 „
den Vereinigten Staaten	<u>2 854 000 „</u>
zusammen	9 242 000 dz

ausgeführt, während die gesamte Ausfuhr 11 414 000 dz betrug, so daß also durch die beim Nichtzustandekommen der Übereinkunft zu erwartenden Ausgleichsmaßnahmen gegen den deutschen Zucker mehr als 80 Prozent unseres Exports bedroht gewesen sein würden, wobei zu bemerken ist, daß auch von den übrigen 20 v. H. noch ein nicht ganz unerheblicher Teil auf englische Kolonien entfällt. Großbritannien selbst hat nach amtlichen englischen Angaben, die ausführlicher in der Anlage E wiedergegeben sind, im Jahre 1900 bezogen (in dz)

weniger als $1\frac{1}{2}$ Gulden (= 2,55 \mathcal{M}) für den Doppelzentner Rohzucker betrug, die inländische Industrie ausreichend zu schützen vermocht, und in belgischen industriellen Kreisen hält man einen Zollschutz von 2 bis 3 Franken für vollkommen genügend. Auch in Deutschland ist seit Bestehen des Kartells der thatsächliche, d. h. der um die Prämie und den Preisaufschlag gekürzte Zollschutz nicht höher gewesen, als er in Zukunft sein wird.

	Rohzucker	Raffinade
aus Deutschland*)	1 632 000	6 029 000
„ Österreich-Ungarn	95 000	55 000
„ Frankreich	2 404 000	2 201 000
„ den Niederlanden	226 000	1 149 000
„ Belgien	1 053 000	307 000
„ Rußland	12 000	31 000
„ anderen Rübenzuckerländern	24 000	660
„ Rohrzuckerländern, und zwar		
britischen Besitzungen	700 000	70
anderen Ländern	577 000	5 700
im ganzen	6 723 000	9 778 430.

Allerdings würde England die Menge von 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ Millionen Doppelzentner in Rohzuckerwert, die es aus Deutschland und Österreich-Ungarn bezogen hat, wohl kaum ohne weiteres durch anderen Zucker ersetzen können. Jedoch kommt in Betracht, daß infolge der gegenwärtigen Übererzeugung an allen Stapelplätzen ungemein große Vorräte an Zucker lagern, die der Verwendung harren. Wenn und soweit die Vorräte dem englischen Prämienausgleichszolle nicht unterworfen würden, würde der englische Bedarf, außer aus der Neuerzeugung der prämiensfreien Länder, aus diesen Beständen gedeckt werden und es könnte dadurch unmittelbar eine vollständige Stockung des deutschen Zuckerabsatzes nach England eintreten, die bei der gegenwärtigen ersten Lage der deutschen Zuckerindustrie für diese verhängnisvoll werden würde. Und wenn nach Aufbrauchung der vom Ausgleichszolle freien Vorräte England wieder auf den deutschen Zucker zurückgreifen müßte, wäre doch eine beträchtliche Schmälerung der deutschen Ausfuhr und in späterer Zeit deren gänzliches Aufhören zu erwarten. In den Rübenzuckerländern, welche außer Deutschland vorwiegend an der Versorgung des englischen Marktes beteiligt sind, hat in den letzten Jahren die Erzeugung (Doppelzentner, Rohzuckerwert) betragen:

	1898/99	1899/1900	1900/01
in Frankreich	7 379 000	8 692 000	10 403 000
„ Belgien	1 865 000	2 541 000	3 031 000
„ Holland	1 491 000	1 700 000	1 783 000
zusammen	10 735 000	12 933 000	15 217 000

*) In der englischen Einfuhrstatistik erscheint als deutscher Zucker auch der über Hamburg beförderte Zucker aus Österreich-Ungarn. Die deutsche Statistik des Jahres 1900 ergibt für die Ausfuhr von Zucker deutschen Ursprunges nach Großbritannien die folgenden Ziffern:

Rohzucker	1 638 051 dz,
Raffinierter Zucker	3 498 027 „.

oder 1900/01 gegen 1898/99 in runder Summe mehr 4 500 000 dz, was einen Schlufs darauf zuläfst, welcher bedeutenden Fortschritte die Zuckererzeugung dieser Länder im Falle einer Begünstigung auf dem englischen Markte fähig sein würde. Beachtenswert ist auch die Zunahme der — in der Hauptsache nach England gehenden — Ausfuhr aus Frankreich, die in demselben Zeitraume betragen hat (Doppelzentner)

	1898/99	1899/1900	1900/01
Rohzucker . . .	1 732 000	2 211 000	3 806 000
Raffinade . . .	1 270 000	1 492 000	1 865 000

oder 1900/01 gegen 1898/99 mehr (in Rohzuckerwert) 2 735 000.

Nimmt man die Aufwärtsbewegung in der Produktion der anderen Länder hinzu, so wird man nicht zweifelhaft sein, dafs für England, da der Weltverbrauch mit der Welterzeugung nicht annähernd gleichen Schritt hält, in absehbarer Zeit die Möglichkeit gegeben sein würde, sich im Notfall auch unter Ausschlufs Deutschlands mit Zucker zu versorgen. Die deutsche Zuckerindustrie wäre aber nicht in der Lage, für den Wegfall der Ausfuhr nach England auch nur annähernd Ersatz durch vermehrte Beschickung anderer Märkte zu finden. Die in Europa und den Mittelmeerländern noch offenstehenden Absatzgebiete, z. B. Norwegen, die Schweiz, die Türkei, sind nicht aufnahmefähig genug und werden zum Teil auch zu sehr von der Konkurrenz, insbesondere der österreichisch-ungarischen, beherrscht. Was aber die überseeischen Absatzgebiete anlangt, so ist namentlich mit Rücksicht auf die Vermehrung der Rohrzuckererzeugung mit ziemlicher Sicherheit anzunehmen, dafs sie sich dem deutschen Zucker mehr und mehr verschliessen, jedenfalls aber nicht in gröfserem Mafse öffnen werden. || Es darf hier unerörtert bleiben, welche wirtschaftlichen Machtmittel dem Deutschen Reiche zu Gebote stehen, um einer Kampfmafsnahme von seiten Englands, wie sie in der nachteiligen Zollbehandlung des deutschen Zuckers liegen würde, wirksam zu begegnen. Denn die Zuckerindustrie selbst, um deren Schutz es sich vorliegend handelt, würde im Falle eines Zollkampfes auch bei einem für Deutschland schliesslich günstigen Ausgang auf das Empfindlichste geschädigt worden sein. Das Interesse der deutschen Rüben- und Zuckererzeugung erheischt für die Zeit, in welcher der inländische Konsum den erzeugten Zucker noch nicht aufzunehmen vermag, in erster Linie gebieterisch die Sicherung des englischen Marktes. || Die Erreichung dieses Zieles aber erscheint durch ein Eingehen auf den vorliegenden Vertrag gewährleistet, zumal der deutsche Zucker danach bei der Einfuhr nach England nicht blofs mit allem Zucker anderer Länder die gleiche Behandlung erfährt, sondern ihm der Wettbewerb auch dadurch erleichtert wird,

dafs durch den Wegfall der Prämien dem Zucker der Nachbarländer zum Teil eine höhere Begünstigung entzogen wird, als es bei uns der Fall ist. || Frankreich, Österreich-Ungarn, die Niederlande und Belgien verzichten ebenso wie wir auf ihre Prämien. Belgien wird außerdem seine Steuergesetzgebung der unserigen anpassen und damit die Gewähr bieten, dafs seiner Industrie in Zukunft nicht etwa versteckte Vorteile erwachsen können. Italien, Schweden und Spanien, die zur Zeit als Zucker- ausfuhrstaaten nicht in Betracht kommen, behalten nach dem Brüsseler Vertrag ihre Gesetzgebung vorläufig bei. Sie hätten aber dasselbe beim Fernbleiben von der Konferenz für sich erreichen können, und ihre Beteiligung an der Übereinkunft ist für uns nicht wertlos; denn einmal sind sie genötigt, sobald sie künftig zur Ausfuhr übergehen, sich allen Bedingungen des Vertrags zu fügen, und andererseits haben sie schon jetzt gegen den Zucker aus Prämien gewährenden Ländern Ausgleichs- maßnahmen einzuführen, so dafs sie also, soweit sie überhaupt noch Bedarf an ausländischem Zucker haben, diesen im wesentlichen durch Bezüge aus den Vertragsstaaten decken müssen. Dafs Rumänien vor Abschluß des Vertrags zurückgetreten ist, ist für uns von geringem Interesse, da dieses Land für die Einfuhr kaum mehr in Frage kommen, eine Ausfuhr aber sich dort nicht aufrechterhalten lassen wird, nachdem der Zuckerexport mit einem Ausfuhrzolle belegt worden ist. *)

Von hervorragender Bedeutung für eine dem deutschen Erzeugnisse günstige Regelung des Zuckermarkts werden neben dem Verzicht Frankreichs auf seine volle Prämie immer die Zusicherungen bleiben, welche England im Falle des Zustandekommens des Brüsseler Abkommens für die Dauer des Vertrags abgegeben hat. Danach soll in Großbritannien der Rüben- und Rohrzucker unter den gleichen Bedingungen zur Einfuhr zugelassen werden, insbesondere soll der Zucker aus den britischen Kolonien

*) Erzeugung, Einfuhr, Ausfuhr und Verbrauch von Zucker betragen in Rumänien in den letzten Betriebsjahren vom 1. April 1896 ab:

Betriebsjahr	Erzeugung	Einfuhr	Ausfuhr	Verbrauch an inländischem Zucker	Gesamt- Verbrauch
	dz	dz	dz	dz	dz
1896/1897	17 087	150 152	—	28 163	178 315
1897/1898	32 223	150 414	—	27 568	177 983
1898/1899	105 763	155 355	—	54 295	209 649
1899/1900	83 533	79 489	—	83 546	163 035
1900/1901	187 145	36 452	26 782	116 506	152 958
1901/1902 (6 Monate).	65 214	2 260	37 073	72 842	75 102

und zwar sowohl aus den selbständigen Kolonien (hierher gehört der australische Bund, d. h. die vereinigten Kolonien des Festlandes von Australien, ferner Neuseeland, Kapland, Natal, Kanada, Neufundland), als auch aus den Besitzungen (Britisch Ostindien)*) und den Kronkolonien — keinerlei Vorzug eingeräumt erhalten. Für die Kronkolonien, von denen hier hauptsächlich die westindischen Inseln zu erwähnen sind, übernimmt Großbritannien ferner die Verpflichtung, daß dort keine direkte oder indirekte Prämie eingeführt werden wird. Endlich hat die englische Regierung auch bezüglich der Behandlung ihrer Raffinerien ein wichtiges Zugeständnis gemacht. Bisher wurde beim Eingange der Rohware aus dem Auslande der Rohzuckerzoll erhoben, und bei der Wiederausfuhr nach erfolgter Verarbeitung der Zoll nach den Sätzen für raffinierten Zucker erstattet, und hierin konnte bei der hohen Bemessung des Raffinadezolls im Verhältnisse zum Rohzuckerzoll eine gewisse Prämie für die englischen Raffinerien gefunden werden, die von den festländischen Sachverständigen je nach ihrer Auffassung von der in jenen Raffinerien erzielten Ausbeute auf 0,20 bis 1 \mathcal{M} für den Doppelzentner beziffert wurde. In Zukunft werden dagegen die Fabriken dem Niederlagesystem unterworfen werden, d. h. sie werden unter Verschluss und ständiger Bewachung arbeiten, und es wird, unter Wegfall des gegenwärtig den Prämienvorteil bedingenden Vergütungsverfahrens, der Zoll für den wieder

*) Von den Selbstverwaltungskolonien haben nur Neu-Süd-Wales und Queensland auf dem australischen Festlande sowie Natal eine nennenswerte Zuckerproduktion, und zwar betrug diese nach englischen Quellen im Jahre 1900 203 000 beziehungsweise 940 000 und 172 000 dz.

Ausgeführt wurden im gleichen Zeitraume von dem in Queensland erzeugten Zucker 504 000 dz Rohzucker und 135 000 dz Raffinade (fast ausschließlich nach Neu-Süd-Wales, Viktoria und Neu-Seeland). Nach Wegfall der Zollschränken zwischen den Kolonien des australischen Festlandes wird aller Voraussicht nach jede Ausfuhr von Zucker aus Queensland aufhören und der Produktionsüberschufs dieser Kolonien im Zollinlande verbraucht werden. Die Ausfuhr Natals — 79 000 dz — geht fast ausschließlich nach der Kapkolonie und wird auch künftig dahin gehen, da sie wegen des südafrikanischen Zollvereins zollfrei dort zugelassen wird und die Kapkolonie ganz auf auswärtige Zufuhr angewiesen ist.

Deutschland führte nach der diesseitigen Statistik im Betriebsjahr 1900/01 aus (in Rohzuckerwert)

nach Kapland	31 000 dz
„ Britisch Australien	48 000 „
„ Britisch Nordamerika	310 000 „.

In Britisch Ostindien betrug im Fiskaljahr 1900/01 (in Rohzuckerwert) die Einfuhr 2 955 000 dz, die Ausfuhr von Zucker eigener Erzeugung 152 000 dz, die Ausfuhr von Zucker fremder Erzeugung 39 000 dz.

Genauere Angaben über den Zuckerverkehr in den englischen Selbstverwaltungskolonien sind in der Anlage E enthalten; daselbst findet sich auch eine ausführliche Zuckerstatistik bezüglich Britisch Ostindiens und der wichtigeren Kronkolonien.

in das Ausland gelangenden Zucker unerhoben bleiben. || Der Zucker aus Prämien gewährenden Staaten, die dem Abkommen nicht beitreten, wird in allen Vertragsstaaten mindestens in Höhe der Prämie mit Ausgleichszöllen belegt werden und demnach dort nicht mehr wettbewerbsfähig sein. Hierdurch verlieren insbesondere die Bedenken an Gewicht, welche sich aus dem Fernbleiben Rußlands von der Konferenz herleiten; übrigens hat man sich in Rußland allem Anscheine nach das Ziel gesteckt, unter Beschränkung der Ausfuhr den Binnenbedarf zu erweitern und die Erzeugung den Bedürfnissen des Binnenmarkts anzupassen. Andererseits muß die unmittelbare Folge des durch den Vertrag geschaffenen Zustandes die sein, daß in den Vereinigten Staaten und in Britisch Ostindien die gegenwärtigen Ausgleichszölle gegen den künftig prämierten Zucker der Vertragsstaaten außer Wirksamkeit treten. Eine dahin gehende ausdrückliche Zusage ist für Britisch Ostindien auf der Brüsseler Konferenz abgegeben worden.

Die großen Vorteile des Vertragsschlusses für die deutsche Zuckerindustrie würden hiernach voraussichtlich von allen Seiten anerkannt werden, wenn sie dabei nur die Ausfuhrprämie zu opfern und nicht auch infolge der Bindung des Überzolls auf den Gewinn Verzicht zu leisten hätte, welcher ihr aus dem Bestehen des Kartells erwächst. Indessen ist in dieser Beziehung, gleichviel wie man über Berechtigung und Zweckmäßigkeit der Ringbildungen urteilen mag, zu beachten, daß dieser Gewinn, der sogenannte Kartellnutzen, auch in Verbindung mit dem Ausfuhrzuschusse noch nicht die Höhe der von einzelnen anderen Staaten aufgegebenen Vergünstigungen erreicht, — er wird von den Nächstbeteiligten, für Rohzuckerfabriken und Raffinerien zusammengenommen, auf 3 bis 4 *M* für den Doppelzentner, von anderer Seite etwas höher berechnet —, und daß andererseits das Kartell, um diesen Nutzen zu erzielen, den inländischen Konsum um annähernd das Vierfache des genannten Betrags im Preise belastet hat. Letzterer Umstand ist für die Industrie selbst von sehr unerwünschten Folgen begleitet gewesen. Denn wenn er den seit Bestehen des Kartells eingetretenen Rückgang des Verbrauchs nicht allein verschuldet hat, so hat er zweifellos in erheblichem Maße dazu mitgewirkt, während doch nach Lage der Verhältnisse das künftige Gedeihen der Industrie lediglich von der günstigen Weiterentwicklung des Inlandkonsums erhofft werden kann. || Daß, sofern der Preis des inländischen Zuckers um den Betrag der Belastung durch das Kartell sowie um denjenigen des Ausfuhrzuschusses und der durch die Beseitigung des letzteren ermöglichten Steuerermäßigung sich vermindert, eine starke Zunahme des Verbrauchs selbst dann eintreten wird, wenn die

internationale Abschaffung der Prämien, wie anzunehmen, zu einer Steigerung des Weltmarktpreises führt, darf nach der bisherigen Entwicklung nicht bezweifelt werden.

Es sind an inländischem Zucker (auf Rohzucker berechnet) gegen Steuerentrichtung in den freien Verkehr gesetzt:

Betriebsjahr	im ganzen dz	auf den Kopf der Bevölkerung kg
1889/90	4 931 153	10,2
1890/91	5 160 205	10,38
1891/92	5 213 109	10,37
1892/93	5 551 728	10,94
1893/94	5 733 423	11,18
1894/95	6 137 203	11,84
1895/96	7 429 451 *)	} 12,32
1896/97	5 603 495 }	
1897/98	7 069 387	13,05
1898/99	7 558 980	13,76
1899/1900	8 490 645 **)	15,21
1900/1901	7 739 684	13,65
1901 (Rechnungsjahr)***) .	7 620 000	13,31

Die Genehmigung des Brüsseler Vertrags, die sich nach den obigen Darlegungen in erster Linie aus Rücksicht auf die Zuckerindustrie selbst empfiehlt, wird hiernach auch den weiten Kreisen der Konsumenten zu gute kommen und im Laufe der Jahre ihre günstige Einwirkung auf die Lage der Reichsfinanzen nicht verfehlen.

Bezüglich der letzteren hatte sich der neuerdings eingetretene Rückgang des Verbrauchs (Anlage C) und die damit verbundene stärkere Ausfuhr sehr nachteilig erwiesen. Die Reineinnahme an Zuckersteuer, die in den Rechnungsjahren

1897	96 084 012 <i>ℳ</i>
1898	107 878 111 „
1899	116 092 585 „
1900	125 396 977 „

betrug, also in regelmässiger Steigung begriffen war, ist im Rechnungsjahr

1901 auf	109 117 000 <i>ℳ</i> †)
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*) Vorausversteuerung wegen bevorstehender Änderung des Gesetzes.

**) Vorausversteuerung wegen bevorstehenden Inkrafttretens des Zuckerkartells.

***) Vorläufiges Ergebnis.

†) Vorläufiges Ergebnis.

gesunken, und für 1902 ist ein weiteres Herabgehen zu erwarten; dies würde sich voraussichtlich in den kommenden Jahren fortsetzen, wenn die beabsichtigte Änderung der Zuckersteuergesetzgebung nicht zur Durchführung gelangt. || Schliesslich sei noch bemerkt, dass die bei einem Teile der Industrie bestehende Besorgnis, der Rübenzucker werde nach Wegfall der staatlichen und privaten Begünstigungen dem Wettbewerbe des Rohrzuckers erliegen, nicht begründet erscheint. || Wenn oben angedeutet ist, dass bei der Zunahme des Zuckerrohrbaues mit einem Verluste des deutschen Absatzes nach den Vereinigten Staaten gerechnet werden müsse, so bezog sich dies u. a. auf die kubanischen Verhältnisse, und es waren hierbei andere Erwägungen als die einer allgemeinen natürlichen Überlegenheit des Rohrzuckers maßgebend. Für die europäischen Märkte ist nach früheren Erfahrungen eine solche Gefahr jedenfalls ausgeschlossen. Selbst in der Zeit, in welcher der deutsche Zucker nur eine ganz niedrige Prämie genoss, ist ihm auf seinem Hauptmarkt in England der Rohrzucker kein gefährlicher Gegner gewesen. Die Einfuhr aus Rohrzuckerländern nach Großbritannien ist vielmehr, wie die Übersicht in der Anlage E ersehen lässt, von Jahr zu Jahr stetig, und zwar

von 11 219 000 Cwts. Rohzucker und 2 282 000 Cwts. Raffinade im Jahre 1885
auf 2 513 000 „ „ „ „ 11 000 „ „ „ „ 1900

zurückgegangen. Im Jahre 1901 weist die absolute Ziffer der britischen Einfuhr aus Rohrzuckerländern zwar wieder eine kleine Zunahme auf, die Einfuhr an Rübenzucker ist aber in noch größerem Verhältnisse gestiegen. || Die vereinzelt in der deutschen Presse aufgetretene Behauptung, dass nach Herabsetzung des Überzolls auf 5 bis 6 Franken der Rohrzucker den Rübenzucker in dessen eigenem Produktionslande werde verdrängen können, wird u. a. durch das Beispiel Hollands widerlegt, wo ein viel geringerer Zollschatz (zu vergl. die Anmerkung auf S. 278) sich auch dem Rohrzucker gegenüber als ausreichend erwiesen hat. || Dass in den bisherigen Verhältnissen im Laufe des für die Dauer des Brüsseler Vertrags vorgesehenen fünfjährigen Zeitraums eine wesentliche Änderung Platz greifen werde, ist nicht anzunehmen. || Der Inhalt des vorliegenden Vertrags selbst giebt im einzelnen zu nachstehenden Bemerkungen Anlass: || Im Artikel 1, welcher den Grundsatz aufstellt, dass keinerlei direkte oder indirekte Prämien für die Erzeugung oder die Ausfuhr von Zucker gewährt werden dürfen, ist nach den Verhandlungen der Konferenz der Begriff der Erzeugung von Zucker im weiten Sinne auszulegen, so dass z. B. auch der Rübenbau darunter fällt. Unter Zucker wird dagegen hier, wie auch in den übrigen Vertragsbestimmungen nur der im eigentlichen Sinne so genannte Zucker, im wesentlichen also der Rohr-

und Rübenzucker verstanden. Glykose, Stärkezucker u. s. w., ferner Melasse und dergleichen Zuckerabläufe, auch Rübensäfte, werden von dem Vertrage nicht getroffen. || Für die Herstellung von zuckerhaltigen Waren darf gleichfalls eine Prämie nicht gezahlt werden, doch ist eine Vergütung der Steuer, die den Betrag der letzteren nicht übersteigt, zulässig. Die sonstigen Bestimmungen des Vertrags, z. B. diejenige des Artikels 2 über die ständige Überwachung der Fabrikation, finden auf die Herstellung der zuckerhaltigen Waren keine Anwendung. || Wenn Abs. 2 die aus der „fiskalischen Gesetzgebung der Staaten“ sich ergebenden Vorteile erwähnt, so sollen damit nach der Absicht des Vertrags auch die nicht vom Staate selbst, sondern von Provinzen, Gemeinden u. s. w. ausgehenden Begünstigungen getroffen werden. Des weiteren hebt der Abs. 2 die hauptsächlichsten Fälle der Prämien-gewährung hervor, ohne jedoch die Aufzählung damit zu erschöpfen; so war man in der Konferenz z. B. der Ansicht, daß die Festsetzung besonderer Tarifsätze für die Beförderung des Zuckers auf öffentlichen Transportanstalten zwar im allgemeinen nicht hierher gehöre, daß jedoch unter Umständen auch hieraus, etwa im Falle einer Beförderung unter dem Selbstkostenpreise, eine indirekte Prämie erwachsen könne. || Mit dem Verbot, einen Teil der Produktion ganz oder teilweise von der Abgabe zu befreien — Abs. 2 unter c —, sollen Steuersysteme, wie das französische, unmöglich gemacht werden, doch wird dadurch ein Steuernachlaß für Zucker zu gewissen Zwecken, z. B. zur Viehfütterung, nicht ausgeschlossen, vorausgesetzt, daß dieser Nachlaß die Gewährung einer Prämie für die Zuckererzeugung nicht in sich schließt. || Artikel 2 unterwirft die Fabriken dem in Deutschland bereits zu Recht bestehenden Niederlageverfahren (§§ 8 ff. und 24 ff. des Zuckersteuergesetzes). Wie bereits erwähnt, äußert die Bestimmung ihre Wirkung auch auf Großbritannien, indem die dort bestehenden Raffinerien hinfort in der im Artikel 2 bezeichneten Weise unter Überwachung gestellt werden müssen. || Artikel 3 setzt den Überzoll, d. h. die Spannung zwischen Zoll und Steuer, auf höchstens 6 Franken für den Doppelzentner raffinierten oder dem gleichzustellenden Zucker und auf 5,50 Franken für den Doppelzentner Rohzucker fest. Die Beschränkung bezieht sich nur auf den im eigentlichen Sinne so genannten Zucker, welcher allein den Gegenstand des Vertrags bildet. Um jeden Zweifel auszuschließen, ist jedoch im Abs. 2 auch noch besonders ausgesprochen, daß sie auf die Nebenerzeugnisse der Fabrikation keine Anwendung findet. || Als dem raffinierten gleichzustellender Zucker wird aller Zucker anzusehen sein, der in irgend einer Form, ohne vorherige Raffinierung, zum menschlichen Genusse zu dienen bestimmt oder geeignet ist. || Abs. 2 besagt ferner,

dafs die Eingangszölle in Ländern, welche keinen Zucker erzeugen, nicht unter die in Rede stehende Beschränkung fallen. Die Vorschrift ist ohne praktische Bedeutung, denn auch wenn sie nicht bestände, würden es die betreffenden Länder in der Hand haben, ihre Zölle beliebig zu erhöhen, wofern sie nur der blofsen Form halber für den im Inlande etwa zu erzeugenden Zucker eine um $5\frac{1}{2}$ bis 6 Franken niedrigere Steuer festsetzten. || Dafs die augenblicklich nicht produzierenden Länder zu einer derartigen Steuerfestsetzung gezwungen sind, sobald sie zur Erzeugung von Zucker übergehen, versteht sich von selbst und ist zudem in den Sitzungsprotokollen der Brüsseler Konferenz ausdrücklich festgestellt worden. || In diesen Protokollen ist ferner ausgesprochen, dafs die Vorschrift den fraglichen Ländern nur hinsichtlich ihrer rein fiskalischen Zölle freie Hand läfst, dafs sie ihnen aber nicht zugleich eine gröfsere Freiheit als den anderen Ländern giebt, um Schutzzölle etwa zu Gunsten von Raffinerien oder sonst einzuführen. || Die für den Überzoll vorgesehenen Beträge sind Höchstsätze, und innerhalb dieser Grenzen kann daher der Überzoll für Raffinade und Rohzucker beliebig und ohne Berücksichtigung des Verhältnisses von 6:5,50 festgesetzt werden. || Artikel 4 regelt die Erhebung der Zuschlagszölle für prämierten Zucker. Diese dürfen nicht niedriger sein, als die gewährten Prämien; die Festsetzung höherer Zuschläge ist gestattet, auch ist jeder Staat berechtigt, die Einfuhr prämierten Zuckers zu verbieten. || Besteht die Prämie darin, dafs in dem Ursprungslande der Überzoll das im Artikel 3 festgesetzte Mafs übersteigt, so soll bis auf weiteres die Hälfte des Unterschieds zwischen dem thatsächlichen und dem im Artikel 3 bestimmten Überzoll als Prämie angesehen werden. Würden beispielsweise in einem Nichtvertragsstaat ein Zoll von 50 und eine Steuer von 20 Franken erhoben, so wäre der Zuschlagszoll für raffinierten, aus diesem Staate stammenden Zucker auf $\frac{50 - (20 + 6)}{2} = 12$ Franken zu bemessen, vorbehaltlich der Befugnis

der im Artikel 7 näher bezeichneten ständigen Kommission, auf Verlangen eines Vertragsstaats diese Ziffer anderweit zu berechnen. || Artikel 5 sichert dem Zucker aus den Vertragsstaaten und ihren Kolonien — ausgenommen Britisch Ostindien und die englischen Selbstverwaltungskolonien — bei der Einfuhr in einen anderen Vertragsstaat das Recht der Meistbegünstigung zu und untersagt die differentielle Behandlung des Rohr- und Rübenzuckers. || Artikel 6 behandelt die Verhältnisse der drei Staaten Spanien, Italien und Schweden, auf welche die Vertragsbestimmungen über die Prämiengewährung, die Überwachung der Fabriken und den Überzoll erst Anwendung finden, wenn sie anfangen,

Zucker auszuführen. Gemeint ist hiermit nicht eine blofs zufällige Ausfuhr geringer Zuckermengen, sondern ein Export von einer gewissen Erheblichkeit. Ob ein solcher vorliegt, entscheidet die ständige Kommission, deren Beschlüssen von dem betroffenen Staate längstens binnen Jahresfrist Folge gegeben werden muß. Die Gründe, aus denen die Ausnahmestellung der drei Länder unbedenklich und ihr Beitritt zum Vertrage trotz der für sie vorgesehenen Ausnahmen erwünscht erscheint, sind oben angeführt. || Die näheren Bestimmungen über die Zusammensetzung und die Thätigkeit der Kommission giebt der Artikel 7. Die Arbeiten der Kommission werden danach in der Hauptsache begutachtender Art sein, und nur in einigen besonders bestimmten Fällen, so bei den eben erwähnten Entscheidungen gemäß Artikel 6, bei der Feststellung des Vorhandenseins und der Höhe der Prämien in den Nichtvertragsländern und bei den Anträgen solcher Länder auf Zulassung ihres Beitritts zum Vertrage, wird ihren Beschlüssen eine bindende Kraft zuerkannt. || Die Aufgabe der ständigen Geschäftsstelle, welche der Kommission beigegeben ist, liegt zum großen Teil auf dem Gebiete der Statistik. Ihre Veröffentlichungen werden um so wertvoller sein, als sie auch die bezügliche Gesetzgebung und Statistik der dem Vertrage nicht beitretenden Zuckerländer umfassen sollen. || Artikel 8 verpflichtet die Vertragsstaaten, dafür zu sorgen, daß transitierender Zucker aus Prämien gewährenden Ländern in dem Bestimmungslande nicht die Vorteile des Vertragszuckers genießt. Auch wenn eine solche Vorschrift nicht gegeben wäre, würden die einzelnen Vertragsmächte in ihrem eigenen Interesse hierauf zu achten haben. || Artikel 9 enthält Vorschriften über das Verfahren beim Beitritt anderer Staaten zum Vertrage. Es ist außer Zweifel, daß solche Staaten nur beitreten können, wenn sie sich den Bestimmungen des Vertrags in jeder Beziehung unterwerfen. Etwaige Ausnahmen hiervon könnten nur durch eine neue Konferenz unter Zustimmung sämtlicher Vertragsstaaten zugestanden werden. || Nach Artikel 10 tritt der Vertrag am 1. September 1903 in Kraft. Eine weitere Hinausschiebung dieses Termins, die von einem großen Teile der deutschen Zuckerindustrie gewünscht wurde, war auf der Konferenz in Brüssel nicht zu erlangen. Der von unserer Seite gestellte Antrag, den 1. September 1904 zu wählen, wurde nur von Oesterreich-Ungarn unterstützt, von allen anderen Staaten aber als gänzlich unannehmbar bezeichnet, da bei einer solchen weiteren Verzögerung eine derartige Ansammlung von Zuckervorräten auf der ganzen Welt eintreten müsse, daß die Industrie sich am 1. September 1904 vor einer gänzlichen Stockung des Absatzes sehen würde; dies müsse im gleichmäßigen Interesse aller zuckererzeugenden Länder vermieden

werden. Auch nach Ansicht deutscher Zuckerinteressenten läßt sich diesen Gründen Berechtigung nicht absprechen. || Das Abkommen bleibt zunächst fünf Jahre in Kraft und gilt, sofern es nicht 12 Monate vor Ablauf der Vertragsdauer gekündigt wird, weiter als je auf ein Jahr verlängert. Die Kündigung auch nur eines Staates giebt jedem anderen Vertragsstaat ebenfalls das Recht des Rücktritts.

Gemäfs Artikel 11 findet das Abkommen auch auf die Kolonien der Vertragsstaaten mit Ausnahme derjenigen Grofsbritanniens und der Niederlande Anwendung. In Ansehung der letzteren bestimmt das Schlufsprotokoll, dafs in den niederländischen Kolonien und den englischen Kronkolonien dem Zucker keine direkte oder indirekte Prämie gewährt und dafs der Zucker aus den niederländischen Kolonien und sämtlichen englischen Kolonien und Besitzungen bei der Einfuhr in das Mutterland nicht günstiger behandelt werden darf als die Erzeugnisse der Vertragsstaaten. Der vollständige Beitritt der englischen Kronkolonien zum Vertrag ist vorbehalten. || Im Gegensatze zu den Kronkolonien bleiben die englischen Selbstverwaltungskolonien (der australische Bund, Neu-Seeland, Kapland, Natal, Kanada, Neufundland) bis zu ihrem etwaigen Beitritt in jeder Hinsicht aufserhalb des Vertrags. Sie behalten also auch das Recht der Prämien-gewährung. Dafs dieser Umstand für die deutsche Industrie von keinerlei Bedeutung werden kann, ist schon oben nachgewiesen.

Britisch Ostindien, dem die gleiche Stellung wie den Selbstverwaltungskolonien vorbehalten ist, wird dem Brüsseler Vertrage voraussichtlich beitreten. || Aus Artikel 12 ist hervorzuheben, dafs das Unterbleiben der Ratifizierung von seiten Spaniens, Italiens oder Schwedens den Vertrag noch nicht hinfällig macht; im übrigen soll er, vorbehaltlich etwaiger anderweiter Abmachungen, nur dann Gültigkeit erlangen, wenn er von den beteiligten Regierungen bis zum 1. Februar 1903 bestätigt worden ist. || Im Schlufsprotokolle findet sich noch die Vorschrift, dafs ein Vertragsstaat, falls bei ihm beträchtliche Mengen an Zucker aus einem anderen Vertragsstaat eingehen sollten, gegen letzteren unter gewissen Umständen den Überzoll mit Zustimmung der ständigen Kommission um höchstens einen Franken für den Doppelzentner erhöhen darf. || In Anbetracht der verschiedenen Voraussetzungen, an deren Erfüllung eine solche Erhöhung des Überzolls geknüpft ist, muß angenommen werden, dafs die Bestimmung nur in seltenen Ausnahmefällen praktisch werden wird. Ein Nachteil für die deutsche Zuckerausfuhr ist von ihr nicht zu befürchten. || Unsere innere Gesetzgebung wird durch das Inkrafttreten des Brüsseler Vertrags vom 5. März 1902 nach verschiedenen Richtungen

hin beeinflusst. Die erforderlich erscheinenden Änderungen des geltenden Gesetzes sind in dem zugleich mit dem Vertrage vorgelegten Gesetzentwurfe wegen Abänderung des Zuckersteuergesetzes enthalten, zu dessen einzelnen Bestimmungen nachstehendes zu bemerken ist:

Zu Artikel 1 des Gesetzentwurfs.

Der Entwurf geht davon aus, daß mit den Ausfuhrzuschüssen zugleich die durch die Gesetzgebung von 1896 eingeführte Betriebssteuer und der Zuschlag dazu, also auch die mit dem letzteren in engstem Zusammenhange stehende Kontingentierung, aufgehoben werden müssen. || Der Zuschlag für die über das Kontingent hinausgehende Produktion, welcher nach dem Betrage des Ausfuhrzuschusses bemessen ist, ist als eine Herauszahlung des letzteren für den nicht innerhalb des Kontingents erzeugten Zucker gedacht, und die Betriebssteuer stellt sich, insbesondere soweit sie von allen Fabriken gleichmäÙig — in Höhe von 0,10 *M* für den Doppelzentner — entrichtet wird, als eine bloÙe Kürzung der staatlichen Prämie dar. Beide Abgaben verlieren daher ihre Berechtigung, sobald die Prämie selbst wegfällt. Hieran vermag der Umstand nichts zu ändern, daß die fraglichen Einrichtungen, die Betriebssteuer wenigstens in ihrer Steigerung für die größeren Betriebe, noch weitere Zwecke — Erhaltung der Konkurrenzfähigkeit der kleineren und mittleren Fabriken und Verhütung einer übermäßigen und sprungweisen Vermehrung der Zuckererzeugung — verfolgten; denn es erscheint der Zweifel berechtigt, ob sie in der wesentlich abgeschwächten Form, welche sie gegenüber dem ursprünglichen Vorschlage der Regierung im Reichstag erhalten haben, zur Erreichung dieser Zwecke in ausreichendem Maße geeignet gewesen sind. Es sei in dieser Beziehung bemerkt, daß die Steigerung der Betriebssteuer nach der Regierungsvorlage in Staffeln von 5 δ und 5000 dz geplant war, während sie nach den Beschlüssen des Reichstags in Staffeln von 2½ δ und 10 000 dz erfolgt, und daß auch die Kontingentierung, u. a. durch die hohe Bemessung des Gesamtkontingents und durch die Milderung der Strafe für Kontingentsüberschreitungen, ihrer auf Eindämmung der Produktion gerichteten Wirksamkeit zum nicht geringen Teil entkleidet worden ist. Nach der beigefügten Übersicht über den Betriebsumfang der Zuckerfabriken ist die in dem Zuckergewerbe schon früher beobachtete Entwicklung zum Großbetriebe durch die Einführung der Betriebssteuer nicht in der erwarteten Weise hintangehalten worden, und was die Zunahme der Erzeugung betrifft, so ist diese mindestens im laufenden Betriebsjahre weit über das für die Industrie selbst erwünschte Maß hinausgegangen, denn die voraussichtliche Produktion des Betriebs-

jahrs 1901/02 übersteigt diejenige des vorigen um 3,2, die des Jahres 1899/1900 um 5 und die Produktion von 1894/95, die höchste vor Erlaß des geltenden Gesetzes, um 4,7 Millionen dz*). In den Kreisen der Zuckerindustrie ist denn auch die Auffassung weit verbreitet, daß die Fabriken durch die Art der Kontingentierungsvorschriften des Gesetzes geradezu zu einer Steigerung der Produktion angereizt worden seien, indem sie sich auf diese Weise für die Zukunft ein ausgiebiges Kontingent hätten zu sichern suchen müssen. || Wird hiernach die Betriebssteuer und die Kontingentierung in der gegenwärtigen Form nicht beizubehalten sein, so verhehlen sich die verbündeten Regierungen doch nicht, daß es auch nach Aufhebung der Ausfuhrzuschüsse notwendig erscheinen könnte, behufs der Bekämpfung der Überproduktion in der Zuckerindustrie und behufs des Schutzes der kleineren Fabriken gegenüber den großen Unternehmungen auf gesetzlichem Wege vorzugehen. Sie werden daher in eine wiederholte sorgfältige Prüfung der Frage eintreten, ob die Einführung, sei es einer neuen gestaffelten Betriebssteuer, sei es einer Kontingentierung in anderer Form oder eine sonstige durchgreifende Reform der Zuckersteuer im Interesse der beteiligten Industrie und der mit ihr verbundenen Landwirtschaft liegt. Gesetzliche Maßnahmen so umfassender Art aber können unter allen Umständen nur auf Grund eingehender Ermittlungen und im Einvernehmen mit den Vertretungen der Interessentenkreise getroffen werden; sie erfordern daher zu ihrer Vorbereitung und zur Erledigung in den gesetzgebenden Körperschaften möglicherweise eine längere Frist, als sie bis zu dem für die Ratifikation des Brüsseler Vertrags vorgesehenen Endtermine zu Gebote steht, und müssen aus diesem Grunde eintretendenfalls einer späteren Gesetzgebung vorbehalten bleiben.

Zu Artikel 2 des Gesetzentwurfs.

Schon in dem Gesetze von 1896 war im § 79 Abs. 2 vorgesehen, daß im Falle einer Herabsetzung oder Aufhebung der Ausfuhrzuschüsse gleichzeitig eine der Ersparnis an diesen Zuschüssen entsprechende Herabsetzung der Zuckersteuer eintreten solle. || Die Ersparnis beziffert sich

*) Die deutsche Zuckererzeugung betrug (Doppelzentner in Rohzucker):

1883/84	9 606 093	1890/91	13 362 214	1897/98	18 443 996
1884/85	11 467 303	1891/92	11 980 257	1898/99	17 224 291
1885/86	8 381 049	1892/93	12 308 347	1899/1900	17 954 785
1886/87	10 182 816	1893/94	13 660 013	1900/1901	19 791 183
1887/88	9 588 635	1894/95	18 279 735	1901/1902	23 000 000
1888/89	9 908 909	1895/96	16 370 573		(Schätzung).
1889/90	12 613 534	1896/97	18 212 232		

für das Rechnungsjahr 1901 (nach der vorläufigen Ermittlung), wie folgt:

Gezahlte Ausfuhrzuschüsse 34 115 000 *ℳ*
(nach Abzug der erstatteten Beträge).

Davon ab:

Zuschlag zur Zuckersteuer (Betriebssteuer und
Betriebssteuerzuschlag) 6 089 000 „

Bleibt künftig wegfallende Ausgabe . 28 026 000 *ℳ*

oder auf den Doppelzentner der gegen Steuerentrichtung in den freien
Verkehr gesetzten — für das gedachte Rechnungsjahr 6 857 000 dz
betragenden — Zuckermenge 4,09 *ℳ*.

Für die früheren Jahre berechnet sich dieser Betrag etwas niedriger, für die nächsten Jahre aber würde er voraussichtlich wieder anwachsen, so daß eine Summe von rund 4 *ℳ* als die auf den Doppelzentner verbrauchten Zucker entfallende Ersparnis an Zuschüssen angesehen und die Verbrauchsabgabe von 20 auf 16 *ℳ* herabgesetzt werden kann. || Jede weitere Steuerermäßigung würde auf längere Zeit, bis zur Deckung des Ausfalls durch das allmähliche Anwachsen des Konsums, zu einer Schmälerung der Einnahme, selbst gegenüber dem wenig befriedigenden Ergebnisse des letzten Rechnungsjahrs, führen und bei der gegenwärtigen Finanzlage nicht zulässig sein.

Zu Artikel 3 des Gesetzentwurfs.

Die Vorschrift entspricht dem bestehenden Rechtszustand; ihre Aufnahme in das Gesetz soll jeden Zweifel darüber ausschließen, daß hierin für den vor Inkrafttreten des Gesetzes gegen Zuschußgewährung in eine Niederlage aufgenommenen Zucker auch für die Zukunft nichts geändert wird.

Zu Artikel 4 des Gesetzentwurfs.

Sofern der Brüsseler Vertrag von den in Betracht kommenden Staaten ratifiziert wird, würde das Gesetz mit dem 1. September 1903 in Kraft treten, mithin zu einer Zeit, wo das Betriebsjahr 1903/04 bereits begonnen hat. Eine allgemeine Verlegung des Beginns des Betriebsjahrs erscheint jedoch nicht geboten. Eher würde eine gesetzliche Übergangsbestimmung bezüglich der Zeit vom 1. August bis 1. September 1903 in Frage kommen können. Die Zuckerfabriken sind nämlich in der Lage, den vor dem 1. August über das Kontingent hinaus hergestellten Zucker erst nach diesem Tage abfertigen zu lassen. Sie ersparen auf solche Weise den Zuschlag zur Betriebssteuer (§ 65 Abs. 2 des Gesetzes), während

sie im Falle der Ausfuhr oder Niederlegung dieses Zuckers während des Monats August den vollen Ausfuhrzuschuss gezahlt erhalten. || Der Entwurf sieht jedoch von einer hiergegen gerichteten Maßnahme ab. Denn einmal ist der Zeitpunkt der Entnahme des Zuckers aus der Fabrik nicht bloß von dem Belieben des Besitzers, sondern von einer Reihe anderer Umstände abhängig, und sodann handelt es sich bei der Herübernahme eines Teiles der Zuckererzeugung in das neue Betriebsjahr um ein Verfahren, welches, soweit dies vorteilhaft erschien, von den Fabrikanten bisher regelmäßig geübt worden ist. Es wäre unbillig, ihnen dieses Recht gerade zu einer Zeit zu verschränken, in der sie ohnehin die Schwierigkeit des Überganges in neue Verhältnisse zu überwinden haben. || Übrigens würden die in Rede stehenden Zuckermengen der Betriebssteuer nur zum Teil entzogen werden können, da auf den Zucker, der im Monat August 1903 aus der Fabrik abgefertigt wird, die Vorschrift des § 65 Abs. 1 des Gesetzes ohne Zweifel Anwendung findet. || Eine Änderung der Bestimmungen über den Eingangszoll (§ 80 des Gesetzes) ist in dem Entwurfe nicht vorgesehen. In dieser Hinsicht sind die Vertragsstaaten gemäß Artikel 3 des Vertrags verpflichtet, den Überzoll für raffinierten und dem ähnlichen Zucker auf 6 Franken und für Rohzucker auf 5,50 Franken im Höchstbetrage für 100 kg zu bemessen. Nach dem Schlufsprotokolle kann der Überzoll unter gewissen Umständen um einen Franken erhöht werden. Nach Artikel 4 des Vertrags haben die beteiligten Staaten ferner die Verpflichtung, den bei ihnen eingehenden Zucker aus Ländern, welche für die Erzeugung oder die Ausfuhr von Zucker Prämien gewähren, sofern sie nicht dessen Einfuhr verbieten, mit einem Sonderzolle zu belegen, welcher mindestens der gewährten Prämie gleichkommt; der Betrag dieser Prämie wird von der einzusetzenden ständigen Kommission festgestellt. || Die hier gedachten Bestimmungen treten, da der Vertrag selbst Gesetzeskraft erlangt, mit seiner Inkraftsetzung für die Dauer des Vertragsverhältnisses ohne weiteres in Geltung. Über diesen Zeitraum hinaus schon jetzt bindende Vorschriften zu treffen, erschien teils an sich, teils auch im Hinblick auf die gegenwärtig schwebenden Verhandlungen über die Neugestaltung des Zolltarifs nicht angezeigt. Hervorzuheben ist, daß die Herabsetzung des Zolles für den, den Gegenstand des Vertrags bildenden Zucker im eigentlichen Sinne (Rohzucker und Verbrauchszucker) die Zollbemessung für die übrigen im § 80 aufgeführten Erzeugnisse (Rübensäfte, Füllmassen, Abläufe, auch natürlichen und künstlichen Honig) unberührt läßt.

Der dem Reichstage vorgelegte Gesetzentwurf lautet:

Artikel 1.

Der zweite und dritte Teil (§§ 65 bis 79) des Zuckerstenergesetzes vom 27. Mai 1896 (Reichs-Gesetzbl. S. 117) werden aufgehoben.

Artikel 2.

Die Zuckersteuer (§ 2 Abs. 1 des Gesetzes) wird auf 16 Mark von 100 Kilogramm Reingewicht festgesetzt.

Artikel 3.

Wird Zucker, welcher vor Inkrafttreten dieses Gesetzes in eine Niederlage aufgenommen worden ist, nach dem genannten Zeitpunkt in den freien Verkehr oder in eine Zuckerfabrik übergeführt, so ist der darauf gewährte Ausfuhrzuschuß zurückzuzahlen.

Artikel 4.

Dieses Gesetz tritt gleichzeitig mit dem am 5. März 1902 in Brüssel zwischen dem Reiche und einer Anzahl anderer Staaten abgeschlossenen Vertrag über die Behandlung des Zuckers in Kraft.

Nr. 12660. **GROSSBRITANNIEN und DÄNEMARK.** — Vertrag über die Beförderung von Priefstelegrammen.

Kopenhagen, 15. August 1901.

The Government of His Majesty the King of Denmark and the Government of His Britannic Majesty deeming it expedient to make use of the faculty accorded by Article XVII of the International Telegraph Convention of St. Petersburg, have agreed upon the following provisions:

Article I.

The terminal rates applicable to telegrams exchanged between Denmark on the one hand and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland on the other hand, by direct cables of the Great Northern Telegraph-Company, are reduced 50 per cent, in respect of „press“ telegrams, i. e. telegrams intended for publication in newspapers. || The minimum charge for a press telegram is 75 Öre in Denmark, 10 d. in the United Kingdom.

Article II.

The reduced tariff fixed by clause I is subject to the following conditions: || 1. Press Telegrams can only be handed in at telegraph offices from 6 p. m. until 9 a. m. on the following morning in the local time

of each country. || They must be addressed to newspapers or news agencies in Denmark and to newspapers registered for the reception of inland press telegrams at the reduced tariff or to news agencies in the United Kingdom, and must not contain any passage of a private nature or any announcement or communication the insertion of which in the newspapers is usually paid for. They must be addressed only to the newspapers or agency concerned, and not to any person connected with the Management of the newspaper or agency in any capacity. || 2. The admission of a news agency to the benefit of the reduced tariff for press telegrams is subject to the consent of the Administration of the country in which the agency is situated. || 3. The reduced tariff only applies to press telegrams in plain language in Danish or English. Both languages may be used in the same telegram. || Stock Exchange and market quotations may be accepted in press telegrams at the reduced tariff on the condition that each quotation is accompanied by an explanatory word. || 4. Press telegrams are only accepted for transmission on presentation at the Office of origin of special cards which the Administration of the country of origin shall make out and issue to correspondents of newspapers or agencies who ask for them, and produce such documentary evidence as each Administration may consider necessary, as, for example, a declaration of the Manager of the newspaper or agency concerned undertaking to conform to all the conditions fixed by the present agreement. || 5. The address of a Press telegram must correspond exactly with that on the card. The use of abbreviated and registered addresses is allowed if they are recorded on the card. || 6. Only one special indication is applicable to press telegrams: that adopted for multiple telegrams. The charge for the respective copies is the same as for copies of ordinary private telegrams. || 7. Press telegrams are transmitted in turn with ordinary private telegrams charged at the full tariff. They are transmitted in the same order after 9 a. m., if, at that hour, they have not reached their destination.

Article III.

1. Telegrams presented as press telegrams which do not fulfil the conditions stated in Article II are charged for as ordinary telegrams. Nevertheless the ordinary tariff is only applied to the private passages, announcements or publications contemplated in the first paragraph of Article II when the telegram does not present any other irregularity. || 2. The usual tariff for private telegrams is also applicable to any telegram at the reduced tariff which is not intended for publication in its

entirely. The telegraph stations are entitled to require the addressee of the telegrams at the reduced tariff to show that the telegrams received in this way are published in their entirety, and in particular as often as may be requested by the telegraph Administration to transmit to the Office of destination a local newspaper in which they have been inserted. || 3. Any surcharge arising under this article is collected from the addressee and retained by the office of destination.

Article IV.

Telegrams which benefit by the reduction of tariff stipulated in Article I are transmitted with the indication „Z“ at the beginning of the preamble, and inscribed in the accounts with the same indication. || Moreover the indication „Press“ is inserted before the address, and this indication is included in the number of words charged for.

Article V.

In points not provided for by the present Agreement, press telegrams are subject to the provisions of the International Telegraph Regulations in force for the time being.

Article VI.

The present agreement shall take effect as soon as possible after signature and from a date to be fixed by mutual consent by the Danish and British Administrations. It will remain in force for one year from the date of denunciation by one or other of the Contracting Parties.

In witness whereof the Undersigned namely the Minister of Foreign Affairs of His Majesty the King of Denmark and His Britannic Majesty's Envoy extraordinary and Minister plenipotentiary to His Majesty the King of Denmark, duly authorized to that effect, have executed the present Agreement and have affixed their seals thereto. || Done in duplicate at Copenhagen the 15th August 1901.

(undert.) Deuntzer.
(L. S.)

(signed) Goseken.
(L. S.)

Nr. 12661. **BELGIEN und LUXEMBURG.**—Telegraphenabkommen.

Luxemburg, 11. März 1901.

*Convention télégraphique entre la Belgique
et le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg.*

Sa Majesté le Roi des Belges et Son Altesse Royale le Grand-Duc de Luxembourg, désirant faciliter les relations télégraphiques entre la Belgique et le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, et usant de la faculté qui leur

est accordée par l'article 17 de la Convention télégraphique internationale signée le 22 juillet 1875 à Saint-Pétersbourg, ont résolu de conclure une convention remplaçant les Déclarations du 31 octobre—3 novembre 1879 et du 25—30 septembre 1886, datées de Bruxelles et de Luxembourg, et ont nommé pour Leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir: || Sa Majesté le Roi des Belges, || M. Michotte De Welle, Chevalier de l'Ordre de Léopold, Décoré de la 2^e classe de l'ordre de la Couronne Royale de Prusse, Commandeur des Ordres de la Couronne de Roumanie et de Saint-Grégoire le Grand, Chevalier de 3^e classe de l'ordre de la Couronne de Fer d'Autriche etc., etc., Son Ministre Résident, Chargé d'Affaires de Belgique à Luxembourg, et || Son Altesse Royale le Grand-Duc de Luxembourg, || M. Eyschen, Chevalier de l'Ordre du Lion d'Or de la Maison de Nassau, Grand-Croix de l'Ordre de la Couronne de Chêne et de l'Ordre d'Adolphe de Nassau, Grand-Croix de l'Ordre de Léopold de Belgique, etc., etc., Son Ministre d'Etat, Président du Gouvernement, || Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes:

Art. 1^{er}. La taxe des télégrammes ordinaires échangés entre la Belgique et le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg se compose d'une taxe fixe d'un demi-franc, à laquelle est ajoutée une taxe de cinq centimes par mot jusqu'au cinquantième mot inclusivement; à partir du cinquante et unième mot, cette dernière taxe est réduite à deux centimes et demi. || Art. 2. Chacun des deux offices contractants conserve le montant de toutes les taxes indistinctement qu'il a encaissées. || Art. 3. Les télégrammes échangés entre deux bureaux du même pays, en empruntant le réseau télégraphique de l'autre pays, donnent lieu à une bonification de fr. 0,02 par mot au profit de ce dernier. || Art. 4. Les télégrammes arrivant à un bureau de l'un des deux Etats, voisin de la frontière, peuvent être transportés par exprès sur le territoire de l'autre Etat, dans un rayon à déterminer de commun accord par les deux Administrations. || Art. 5. Les Administrations télégraphiques des deux pays pourront, à toute époque, modifier de commun accord, et sauf approbation de leurs Gouvernements respectifs, le tarif déterminé à l'article 1^{er}, ainsi que les dispositions des articles 2 et 3 de la présente Convention. || Art. 6. Les dispositions de la Convention télégraphique internationale et du règlement de service qui la complète sont applicables aux relations directes entre la Belgique et le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg dans tout ce qui n'est pas réglé par la présente Convention, laquelle remplace et abroge les Déclarations signées à Bruxelles et à Luxembourg les 31 octobre—3 novembre 1879 et 25—30 septembre 1886. || Art. 7. La présente Convention entrera en vigueur à une date à fixer par les Administrations télégraphiques des deux pays et sera maintenu

indéfiniment, sauf la dénonciation qui pourrait en être faite, une année à l'avance, par l'une des Hautes Parties contractantes. || En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé la présente Convention, qu'ils ont revêtue de leurs cachets.

Fait en double exemplaire à Luxembourg, le 11 mars 1901.

M. Michotte de Welle.

(L. S.)

Eyschen.

(L. S.)

La Convention qui précède entrera en vigueur le 1^{er} mai 1901.

Certifié par le Secrétaire général
du Ministère des Affaires étrangères,
B^{on} Lambermont.

Nr. 12662. BELGIEN und NIEDERLANDE. — Telegraphenabkommen.

Haag, 16. März 1901.

Sa Majesté le Roi des Belges et Sa Majesté la Reine des Pays-Bas, désirant faciliter les relations télégraphiques entre la Belgique et les Pays-Bas, et usant de la faculté que leur accorde l'article 17 de la Convention télégraphique internationale, signée le 22 juillet 1875 à Saint-Pétersbourg, ont résolu de conclure un nouvel arrangement et ont nommé pour Leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir: || Sa Majesté le Roi des Belges, || Le Comte Degrelle-Rogier, Commandeur de Son Ordre de Léopold, Commandeur de l'Ordre du Lion Néerlandais, Grand' Croix de l'Ordre d'Orange Nassau, etc., etc., Son Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire près la Cour Royale des Pays-Bas; || Sa Majesté la Reine des Pays-Bas, || Monsieur W.-H. de Beaufort, Chevalier de l'Ordre du Lion Néerlandais, etc., etc., Son Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, || Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes:

Article premier. Les deux premiers articles de l'arrangement télégraphique conclu entre la Belgique et les Pays-Bas, le 27 octobre 1893, sont remplacés par les suivants: || „Art. 1^{er}. La taxe des télégrammes ordinaires échangés, directement entre la Belgique et les Pays-Bas se compose d'une taxe fixe d'un demifranc, à laquelle est ajoutée une taxe de cinq centimes par mot jusqu'au cinquantième mot inclusivement; à partir du cinquante et unième mot, cette dernière taxe est réduite à deux centimes et demi par mot. || Art. 2. Le montant des recettes résultant du trafic direct belge-néerlandais est partagé par moitié entre les deux

administrations. Il est, en conséquence, attribué à chaque pays, par télégramme ordinaire transmis, la moitié de la taxe fixe et la moitié de la taxe par mot.“ || Article deuxième. Les administrations télégraphiques des deux pays pourront, à toute époque, modifier, de commun accord et sauf approbation de leurs gouvernements respectifs, les tarifs et les conditions de partage des taxes déterminées par le présent arrangement et par l'article 4 de l'arrangement précité du 27 octobre 1893. || Article troisième. Le présent arrangement entrera en vigueur à une date à fixer ultérieurement par les administrations télégraphiques des deux pays; il aura la même durée que l'arrangement du 27 octobre 1893.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé le présent arrangement, qu'ils ont revêtu de leurs cachets.

Fait en double, à La Haye, le 16 mars 1901.

C^{te} Degrelle-Rogier.

W.-H. de Beaufort.

(L. S.)

(L. S.)

L'arrangement qui précède entrera en vigueur le 1^{er} mai 1901.

Certifié par le Secrétaire général
du Ministère des Affaires étrangères.

B^{on} Lambermont.

Nr. 12663. GROSSBRITANNIEN und HONDURAS. — Handelsvertrag.

Guatemala, 21. Januar 1887. (Ratifiziert 3. Februar 1900.)

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and his Excellency the President of the Republic of Honduras, being desirous of maintaining and strengthening friendly relations, and of promoting commercial intercourse between the dominions of Her Britannic Majesty and the territories of the Republic, have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, and have named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say: || Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, James Plaister Harriss-Gastrell, Esq., Her Britannic Majesty's Minister Resident and Consul-General to the Republic of Honduras; || And his Excellency the President of the Republic of Honduras, his Excellency Dr. Don Jerónimo Zelaya, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary; || Who, after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles: —

Article I.

The High Contracting Parties agree that, in all matters relating to commerce and navigation, any privilege, favour, or immunity whatever which either Contracting Party has actually granted or may hereafter grant to the subjects or citizens of any other State shall be extended immediately and unconditionally to the subjects or citizens of the other Contracting Party; it being their intention that the trade and navigation of each country shall be placed in all respects by the other on the footing of the most favoured nation.

Article II.

The produce and manufacture of, as well as all goods coming from, the dominions and possessions of Her Britannic Majesty, which are imported into Honduras, and the produce and manufactures of, as well as all goods coming from Honduras, which are imported into the dominions and possessions of Her Britannic Majesty, whether intended for consumption, warehousing, reexportation, or transit, shall be treated in the same manner as, and, in particular, shall be subjected to no higher or other duties, whether general, municipal, or local, than the produce, manufactures, and goods of any third country the most favoured in this respect. No other or higher duties shall be levied in Honduras on the exportation of any goods to the dominions and possessions of Her Britannic Majesty, or in the dominions and possessions of Her Britannic Majesty on the exportation of any goods to Honduras, than may be levied on the exportation of the like goods to any third country the most favoured in this respect. || Neither of the Contracting Parties shall establish a prohibition of importation, exportation, or transit against the other which shall not, under like circumstances, be applicable to any third country the most favoured in this respect. || In like manner, in all that relates to local dues, Customs formalities, brokerage, patterns or samples introduced by commercial travellers, and all other matters connected with trade, British subjects in Honduras, and Honduranian citizens in the dominions and possessions of Her Britannic Majesty, shall enjoy most-favoured-nation treatment. || In the event of any changes being made in Honduranian Laws, Customs Tariff, or Regulations, sufficient notice shall be given in order to enable British subjects to make the necessary arrangements for meeting them.

Article III.

British ships and their cargoes shall, in Honduras, and Honduranian vessels and their cargoes shall, in the dominions and possessions of Her

Britannic Majesty, from whatever place arriving and whatever may be the place of origin or destination of their cargoes, be treated in every respect as national ships and their cargoes. || The preceding stipulation applies to local treatment, dues, and charges in the ports, basins, docks, roadsteads, harbours, and rivers of the two countries, pilotage, and generally to all matters connected with navigation. || Every favour or exemption in these respects, or any other privilege in matters of navigation which either of the Contracting Parties shall grant to a third Power, shall be extended immediately and unconditionally to the other Party. All vessels which, according to British law, are to be deemed British vessels, and all vessels which, according to the law of Honduras are to be deemed Honduranian vessels, shall, for the purpose of this Treaty, be respectively deemed British or Honduranian vessels.

Article IV.

The subjects or citizens of each of the Contracting Parties shall be permitted to reside permanently or temporarily in the dominions or possessions of the other, and to occupy and hire houses and warehouses for purposes of commerce, whether wholesale or retail. They shall also be at full liberty to exercise civil rights, and therefore to acquire, possess, and dispose of every description of property movable and immovable. They may acquire and transmit the same to others, whether by purchase, sale, donation, exchange, marriage, testament, succession *ab intestato*, and in any other manner under the same conditions as natives of the country. Their heirs and legal representatives may succeed to and take possession of it, either in person or by procurators, in the same manner and in the same legal forms as natives of the country. || In none of these respects shall they pay upon the value of such property any other or higher impost, duty, or charge than is payable by natives of the country. In every case the subjects or citizens of the Contracting Parties shall be permitted to export their property, or the proceeds thereof if sold, freely and without being subjected on such exportation to pay any duty different from that to which natives of the country are liable under similar circumstances.

Article V.

The dwellings, manufactories, warehouses, and shops of the subjects or citizens of each of the Contracting Parties in the dominions and possessions of the other, and all premises appertaining thereto destined for purposes of residence or commerce, shall be respected. Except under the conditions and with the forms prescribed by the laws for natives of the country, such dwellings and premises shall be exempt from search

or domiciliary visit, and books, papers, or accounts shall be exempt from examination or inspection. || The subjects or citizens of each of the two Contracting Parties in the dominions and possessions of the other shall have free access to the Courts of Justice for the prosecution and defence of their rights, without other conditions, restrictions, or taxes beyond those imposed on natives of the country, and shall, like them, be at liberty to employ, in all causes, their advocates, attorneys, or agents from among the persons admitted to the exercise of those professions according to the laws of the country.

Article VI.

The subjects or citizens of each of the Contracting Parties in the dominions and possessions of the other shall be exempted from billeting and from all compulsory military service whatever, whether in the army, navy, or national guard or militia. They shall likewise be exempted from all contributions, whether pecuniary or in kind, imposed as a compensation for billeting and for personal service, and, finally, from forced loans and military exactions or requisitions of any kind.

Article VII.

The subjects or citizens of either of the two Contracting Parties residing in the dominions and possessions of the other shall enjoy, in regard to their houses, persons, and properties, the protection of the Government in as full and ample a manner as native subjects or citizens. || In like manner the subjects or citizens of each Contracting Party shall enjoy in the dominions and possessions of the other full liberty of conscience, and shall not be molested on account of their religious belief; and such of those subjects or citizens as may die in the territories of the other Party shall be buried in the public cemeteries, or in places appointed for the purpose, with suitable decorum and respect. || The subjects of Her Britannic Majesty residing within the territories of the Republic of Honduras shall be at liberty to exercise in private and in their own dwellings, or within the dwellings or offices of Her Britannic Majesty's Minister, Consuls, or Vice-Consuls, or in any public edifice set apart for the purpose, their religious rites, services, and worship, and to assemble therein for that purpose without hindrance or molestation. The same stipulations shall be observed in regard to the citizens of the Republic of Honduras within the territories of Her Britannic Majesty.

Article VIII.

The subjects or citizens of each of the Contracting Parties shall have, in the dominions and possessions of the other, the same rights as

natives, or as subjects or citizens of the most favoured nation, in regard to patents for inventions, trade-marks, and designs, and the protection of industrial property, upon fulfilment of the formalities prescribed by law.

Article IX.

Each of the Contracting Parties may appoint Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls, Pro-Consuls, and Consular Agents to reside respectively in towns or ports in the dominions and possessions of the other Power. Such Consular officers, however, shall not enter upon their functions until after they shall have been approved and admitted in the usual form by the Government to which they are sent. They shall exercise whatever functions, and enjoy whatever privileges, exemptions, and immunities are, or may hereafter be, granted there to Consular officers of the most favoured nation.

Article X.

In the event of any subject or citizen of either of the two Contracting Parties dying without will or testament, in the dominions and possessions of the other Contracting Party, the Consul-General, Consul, or Vice-Consul of the nation to which the deceased may belong, or, in his absence, the representative of such Consular officer may, so far as the laws of each country will permit, take charge of the property which the deceased shall have left, for the benefit of his legal representatives, until an executor or administrator be named.

Article XI.

The Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls, and Consular Agents of each of the Contracting Parties residing in the dominions and possessions of the other shall receive from the local authorities such assistance as can by law be given to them for the recovery of deserters from the vessels of their respective countries.

Article XII.

Any ship of war or merchant-vessel of either of the Contracting Parties which may be compelled by stress of weather, or by accident, to take shelter in a port of the other, shall be at liberty to refit therein, to procure all necessary stores, and to continue their voyage, without paying any dues other than such as would be payable in a similar case by a national vessel. In case, however, the master of a merchant-vessel should be under the necessity of disposing of a part of his merchandize in order to defray his expenses, he shall be bound to conform to the Regulations and Tariffs of the place to which he may have come. || If

any ship of war or merchant-vessel of one of the Contracting Parties should run against or be wrecked within the territory of the other, such ship or vessel, and all parts thereof, and all furniture and appurtenances belonging thereunto, and all goods and merchandize saved therefrom, including any which may have been cast out of the ship, or the proceeds thereof if sold, as well as all papers found on board such stranded or wrecked ship or vessel, shall be given up to the owners or their agents when claimed by them. If there are no such owners or agents on the spot, then the same shall be delivered to the British or Honduranian Consul-General, Consul, Vice-Consul, or Consular Agent in whose district the wreck or stranding may have taken place, upon being claimed by him within the period fixed by the laws of the country; and such Consuls, owners, or agents shall pay only the expenses incurred in the preservation of the property, together with the salvage or other expenses which would have been payable in the like case of a wreck of a national vessel. || The goods and merchandize saved from the wreck shall be exempt from all duties of Customs, unless cleared for consumption, in which case they shall pay the same rate of duty as if they had been imported in a national vessel. || In the case either of a vessel being driven in by stress of weather, run aground, or wrecked, the respective Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls, and Consular Agents shall, if the owner or master or other agent of the owner is not present, or is present and requires it, be authorized to interpose in order to afford the necessary assistance to their fellow-countrymen.

Article XIII.

For the better security of commerce between the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty and the citizens of the Republic of Honduras, it is agreed that if at any time any interruption of friendly intercourse, or any rupture, should unfortunately take place between the two Contracting Parties, the subjects or citizens of either of the said Contracting Parties who may be residing in the dominions or territories of the other, or who may be established there, in the exercise of any trade or special employment, shall have the privilege of remaining, and continuing such trade or employment, without any manner of interruption, in full enjoyment of their liberty and property, so long as they behave peacefully and commit no offence against the laws; and their goods, property, and effects, of whatever description they may be, whether in their own custody or intrusted to individuals or to the State, shall not be liable to seizure or sequestration, or to any other charges or demands than

those which may be made upon the like goods, property, and effects belonging to native subjects or citizens. Should they, however, prefer to leave the country, they shall be allowed to make arrangements for the safe keeping of their goods, property, and effects, or to dispose of them, and to liquidate their accounts; and a safe conduct shall be given them to embark at the ports which they shall themselves select.

Article XIV.

The stipulations of the present Treaty shall be applicable to all the Colonies and foreign possessions of Her Britannic Majesty, so far as the laws permit, excepting to those hereinafter named, that is to say, except to — India; The Dominion of Canada; Newfoundland; New South Wales; Victoria; South Australia; Western Australia; Queensland; Tasmania; New Zealand; The Cape; Natal.

Provided always that the stipulations of the present Treaty shall be made applicable to any of the above-named Colonies or foreign possessions on whose behalf notice to that effect shall have been given by Her Britannic Majesty's Representative in the Republic of Honduras to the Honduranian Minister for Foreign Affairs within two years from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty. || The Treaty shall apply in the case of such Colonies or foreign possessions from the date when this notice is given to the Honduranian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Article XV.

Any controversies which may arise respecting the interpretation or the execution of the present Treaty, or the consequences of any violation thereof, shall be submitted, when the means of settling them directly by amicable agreement are exhausted, to the decision of Commissions of Arbitration, and the result of such arbitration shall be binding upon both Governments. || The members of such Commissions shall be selected by the two Governments by common consent; failing which each of the Parties shall nominate an Arbitrator, or an equal number of Arbitrators, and the Arbitrators thus appointed shall select an Umpire. || The procedure of the arbitration shall in each case be determined by the Contracting Parties; failing which the Commission of Arbitration shall be itself entitled to determine it beforehand.

Article XVI.

The present Treaty shall continue in force during ten years, counted from the day of the exchange of the ratifications; and in case neither of the two Contracting Parties shall have given notice twelve months

before the expiration of the said period of ten years of their intention of terminating the present Treaty, it shall remain in force until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the Contracting Parties shall have given such notice.

Article XVII.

The present Treaty shall be ratified by Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland and by his Excellency the President of the Republic of Honduras, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Tegucigalpa or Guatemala as soon as possible. || In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.

Done at Guatemala, the twenty-first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty-seven.

(L.S.) J. P. H. Gastrell.

(L.S.) Jerónimo Zelaya.

Protocol.

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries of the High Contracting Parties, in proceeding to the signature this day of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the Republic of Honduras, do hereby declare that by the words „a port“ in Article XII (first paragraph), as regards vessels in distress, is intended „a port or roadstead of any kind, whether or not it be a port of entry“. It is likewise understood between the undersigned Plenipotentiaries that British subjects, in like manner as Honduranian citizens, shall pay the same municipal taxes, such as the tax on places of business in Honduras. || Done in duplicate at Guatemala, this twenty-first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty-seven.

(L.S.) J. P. H. Gastrell.

(L.S.) Jerónimo Zelaya.

Protocol.

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries of the High Contracting Parties to the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation signed between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the Republic of Honduras on the twenty-first of January, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-seven, being duly authorized thereto, have agreed as follows:—|| 1st. The stipulations of the said Treaty shall not be applicable to any

of the Colonies or foreign possessions of Her Britannic Majesty unless notice to that effect shall have been given on behalf of any such Colony or foreign possession by Her Britannic Majesty's Representative accredited to the Republic of Honduras to the Honduranian Minister for Foreign Affairs within one year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of the said Treaty. || 2nd. Her Majesty's Government may in the same manner give notice of accession on behalf of any British Protectorate or sphere of influence, or on behalf of the Island of Cyprus, in virtue of the Convention of the fourth of June, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-eight, between Great Britain and Turkey. || 3rd. Her Majesty's Government shall also have the right to separately terminate the Treaty at any time on giving twelve months' notice to that effect on behalf of any British Colony, foreign possession, or dependency which may have acceded thereto. || 4th. It is understood that in all cases in which the provisions of the said Treaty accord the treatment of the most favoured nation, that term shall not be held to include the Central American Republics. || 5th. The stipulations of the said Treaty will be applicable to India, including the territories of any native Prince or Chief in India under the suzerainty of the British Government, subject to the following reservations: — || 1. The Government of India reserve the discretionary power to prevent any foreigner from residing or sojourning in, or travelling through, India, as above defined, without their consent. || 2. In regard to the native States of India, the rights of citizens of the Republic of Honduras, under Articles I and IV of the said Treaty are subject to the same limitations as those which are, or may be, in force as regards the European British subjects. || 3. The right to appoint Consuls under Article IX of the said Treaty shall, in India, be restricted to the seaport towns of the provinces under the direct administration of the Government of India.

Done in duplicate, at Guatemala, this third day of February, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred.

(L.S.)

G. Jenner.


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