

THE CLASH BETWEEN FORMALISM AND  
REALITY IN THE BRAZILIAN  
CIVIL SERVICE

By

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*For Jane*

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*The Winter of Our Discontent (1965)*

L.S.G.

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## CHAPTER I

### THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Recently a trend has developed within public administration to establish a comparative basis for generalization within the discipline and to place the field of comparative administration within the wider context of comparative political studies. This is, in part, a reflection of a significant movement within the social sciences as a whole which looks toward an integrative approach to man and the environment in which he lives. For some time students of public administration have shown a growing awareness of the inadequacy of traditional approaches and have expressed a need to reach into political science and the other social sciences for new tools and concepts.

Several reasons contribute to the rejection by these students of the traditional approach as being inadequate. In general, public administration, as it has developed in the United States, has been too culture-bound by American values and standards, in particular, and western European ones, in general. Legalism and formalism have characterized traditional studies to the neglect of the informal and the over-all political, social, economic, and cultural context. This traditional approach has been descriptive and prescriptive rather than analytic and comparative. It has failed to pro-

vide useful classifications and indicators. Previous categories have been inadequate -- almost totally normative and confusing -- and there have been few, if any, concepts or techniques for determining similarities or differences among administrative systems. Consequently, empirical studies, when they have appeared, have often been idiographic<sup>1</sup> and incapable of generalization.

Brazil provides an important chapter in the history of the attempts to reform and modernize administrative systems, rooted in different cultures, with the use of traditional concepts and techniques. This experience in administration is of value not only for Brazil's sister republics in the Caribbean and in Central and South America, but also for other countries experiencing similar developmental problems and dynamic change. Yet Latin America, in particular, has experienced an awakening interest in civil service reform and in the recruitment and training of public employees who are both efficient and dedicated to the public service. It is this interest which makes Brazilian experience since 1930 all the more important for the Latin American area.

Brazilian leaders in the public administration field have been trying to impose concepts and techniques borrowed from American public administration for some thirty-five years with the objective of initiating fundamental change in their nation's administrative system. They have attempted to

create a "modern" public personnel system which will replace favoritism and patronage with rational recruitment practices and they have devoted a considerable amount of time, energy, and effort to the operationalization of ideas and techniques borrowed from the economy and efficiency movement in the United States.<sup>2</sup> But today, when one looks at the functional side of the Brazilian system -- in spite of many institutional changes and much civil service legislation -- one finds that these men have accomplished very little in the way of economy and efficiency, even though these goals have been the two guiding lights of the administrative reform movement.

Within the public personnel field Brazilian administrative specialists have focused their attention since 1936 on the creation of a functioning merit system.<sup>3</sup> Although they have applied the techniques and concepts developed in American public personnel administration to make a merit system operational, they have given the merit concept a more limited meaning than is to be found in the United States. In American administration, the term "merit" is synonymous with "competence," and it is generally used in a broader context to refer to the whole attempt to recruit, train, and maintain competent civil servants. In contrast, in Brazilian usage it is more often restricted to mean the selection of qualified personnel on the basis of public examination. Granted, in

both the United States and Brazil, the objective is the selection of competent personnel for the public service, but in Brazil, when the concept is attacked or defended, it is usually done in relation to the administration of public examinations called *concursos*. These *concursos* are required for initial entry into the career public service and represent a mixture of American examination techniques with an examination process more akin to the French *concours*.

In Brazilian experience the goal of a federal civil service staffed exclusively by individuals recruited on the basis of merit (qualification proven by written examination) and competency has remained remote and somewhat unrelated to the needs of a social, political, and economic system in the midst of dynamic change where the problems of achieving an integrated, modern nation-state are paramount. When the requirement of public examination has been enforced, there has been a tendency toward restricting the selection of candidates for the civil service to those who have had the "proper" education; yet the politician has continued to eye sectors of the public service as a means of establishing a reward system for those who have rendered service either to him as an individual or to his party, while others have continued to think of the public service in terms of traditional sinecures.

The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze Brazilian

experience with the reform of its federal civil service and to demonstrate the interrelationships which have existed between the ideas and concepts on which the reform movement has been based and the political context within which the federal civil service has operated. Such an approach involves three different levels of analysis: the ideational, the idiographic, and the nomothetic. At the first level, some attempt must be made to define the values existing in Brazilian society at large which have affected the character of the civil service, to establish the values on which Brazil's political institutions are based, and to single out the values which have been inherent in the administrative reform movement. At the second level, this study is concerned with the use of material substantially confined to Brazilian experience. In this respect, it is a study of the unique, for the basic data have been gathered within a single country. This material, however, gains significance only if one attempts to place it in a larger context. Thus, the third level entails the use of both intra- and cross-cultural comparisons. Within this dissertation, these three different levels of analysis will be placed in constant interaction.

While earlier experience in Brazilian public administration is relevant and it is essential to develop a historical perspective to understand the changing character of the civil

service across Brazilian history, the emphasis of this study will fall on the years between 1945 and 1964. This is the period Beatriz Wahrlich, perhaps the leading figure in Brazilian public personnel administration, has called a "reaction to reform."<sup>4</sup> The major reason why this era has been selected is that it offers a view of the interaction between administration and politics within the context of an open system of government that is readily accessible. There is, however, a more basic reason. This period marks a particularly crucial phase in the course of Brazilian "political development" which has a definite beginning and end.<sup>5</sup> The events since April, 1964, have been such that it seems as though the country has returned, both partially and temporarily, to a closed system of government from which troublesome political forces have been excluded from politics, where a Congress subservient to the executive has been insured, and where the development of mass-based politics has been halted. It is much too early, however, to say where the April Revolution and its aftermath will lead Brazil, although there are those who suspect that a return to an emphasis on modernization within the context of an administratively controlled state is underway.

It is within this setting that the following hypothesis has been developed:

The attempt to reform the Brazilian federal civil service through the adoption of American-style public personnel policies has led to a system that is characterized by a high degree of "formalism"<sup>6</sup> in which there is considerable discrepancy between norms and reality. Related to this gap between public personnel policies and practices is a variety of "heterogeneous"<sup>7</sup> and "overlapping"<sup>8</sup> patterns. This situation, which corresponds to Riggs' model of "prismatic" society,<sup>9</sup> is the result of three independent variables: (1) the political understructure on which the civil service system is based; (2) the use of norms governing administrative behavior exogenous to the socio-political system, and (3) the application of the techniques of scientific management without adequate attention to the functional requirements of the existing system and sufficient consideration for the human elements.

Analyzing public personnel policies and practices in Brazil, one may point to a substantial gap between the formal structure, as expressed in legal norms and laws, and the way the human elements involved behave. On the one hand, there is the value commitment to a merit system and a neutral civil service contained in the movement for administrative reform and subsequent legislation, while, on the other, there is the continuance of a functioning patronage system which undercuts the legal requirements imposed. This gap does not exist, however, to the same degree at all levels. This is where the conceptualization of heterogeneous and overlapping patterns becomes useful. Administrative contrasts are to be found at the three levels of government (federal, state, and local)<sup>10</sup> within the federal service and within different geographic areas. One cannot correctly refer only to the contrast between the traditional administrative systems operating in

Brazil and the attempts at modernizing them, for variations in political and administrative development differ greatly from one extreme of the country to the other, and the institution of patronage operates in many ways.

The scope of this study, however, will be limited to the federal civil service. By and large, the contrasts existing among the state administrative systems will be excluded, although one probably can observe the full range of a developmental continuum in action at the state level -- from the administrative system functioning in São Paulo to the traditional administrative systems operating in the Northeast. Bureaucracy in Brazil, at both the national and regional levels, is large and complex and has not as yet been adequately analyzed. For this reason, it is difficult at this stage to create a proper image of the total administrative system or systems in operation in Brazil; yet such an attempt must be made if change in contemporary administrative practices is to be introduced and made to function. Probably much of the difficulty in creating a centralized, effective, coordinated national administrative system is due precisely to this absence of an understanding of the way in which Brazilian administration has operated in its socio-political context. In this respect, Brazilian administration reflects the pluralistic,<sup>11</sup> overlapping, and heterogeneous character of Brazilian social and political institutions.

This is particularly true of developments since 1945, where, as the bureaucracy has continued to grow in size and complexity, the federal administrative structure has become even more diffuse and uncontrollable through the decentralization of politics, the emergence of multiple, competing parties of a factional character -- divided internally along traditional regional lines -- and the increased demands for services from the central government as the Brazilian economy has reached the take-off state.<sup>12</sup> The major characteristic of the period between 1945 and 1964 is the failure of the effort to develop an open administrative system responsive and responsible to the political system.

To develop a focus for this dissertation, the central hypothesis was derived by posing the following questions: First, why has it been so difficult to operationalize the objectives of economy and efficiency in Brazilian public administration? Are these valid objectives in the Brazilian context? Have they helped Brazil to move forward toward the broader goal of becoming a "modern" nation-state? Secondly, has the Brazilian political structure changed in the last thirty-five years? If so, what effect have these changes had on the federal civil service? Third, are Brazilian patronage problems unique? Does comparative analysis enhance our understanding of the difficulties encountered in Brazil with civil service reform? Fourth, why has Brazil been unable to apply

effectively a body of administrative principles -- detached from the surrounding issues of Brazilian culture -- without regard to spatial or temporal elements?<sup>13</sup> These are basic questions which must be answered if one is to come to grips with the gap between the principles preached and the practices observed in Brazilian administration.

In attempting to answer these questions, the following assumptions were made: First, that politics and administration cannot be separated in reality,<sup>14</sup> and, secondly, that, to understand political conflict, whether within the context of an administrative system or not, one must pay attention to the conflicting value systems which are brought into play. This is especially true of the attempts at administrative reform in Brazil since 1936. Whether we examine the creation of the Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público (DASP)<sup>15</sup> or the efforts to institute merit system practices, we are certain to encounter a juxtaposition of traditional Brazilian values stemming from what Wagley calls the Brazilian Great Tradition<sup>16</sup> and a series of values that belong within the Weberian framework in general and within American experience in particular.

The values inherent in the technical reforms adopted by the Federal Civil Service Council (the Conselho Federal do Serviço Público Civil) from 1936 to 1938 were carried to their fullest development in the creation of DASP late in 1937 -- into which the council was absorbed. Clearly

related to these values that developed from the American reform movement at the end of the nineteenth century was a series of concepts now known as the "scientific principles of public administration." These principles, which achieved their clearest statement in the writings of Gulick and Urwick,<sup>17</sup> were supposedly of universal validity. They included such notions as span of control, the unity of command, the homogeneity of work, non-specialist administrators, a dichotomy of staff and line, the development of a chain of command, the separation of administration from politics, the specialist as "on tap, but not on top," the division of labor, and the specialization of function.

That these principles were developed largely within the context of Taylorism<sup>18</sup> and a modern, business-oriented, capitalistic society, and also that they were very much a part of the dominant value system and the political structure<sup>19</sup> of the United States at the time was largely overlooked in their application to the later stages of the Brazilian administrative reform movement. Initially, Brazilians in the public administration field simply took the techniques and concepts developed in the American economy and efficiency movement and applied them to the reform and moralization of their administrative system.

Joined with the transference of American administrative concepts was the rejection of political science by the schools

of public administration in the United States and their preference for a "trade school" orientation. In the Brazilian environment this was reinforced by the fact that political science, as a separate discipline, was underdeveloped. Separate schools of administration were created in Brazil during the post-war years and, in those cases in which it was necessary to establish them within the framework of existing university institutions, they were placed in the faculties of economic science. This neglect of the political environment within which administrative techniques and institutions function received a further stimulus from the United States technical assistance program in public administration inaugurated in 1952. The emphasis was again placed on the mechanics of administration. This approach is reflected in the fact that technical assistance in public and business administration has been administered through the same division. Within this program, the close association established between public and business administration and the emphasis on the development of rational techniques in the context of closed systems analysis has meant that there has been little exposure to the implications that the political system has had for public administration -- except as a negative factor which should be excluded if the "right" reforms are to take place.

Finally, it should be pointed out that the values underlying the American scientific management school were task-oriented and, therefore, tended to overlook the importance of

human relations in the analysis of administrative problems. In later empirical studies it was pointed out that these principles failed to function as expected in the context of American public administration.<sup>20</sup> It is no surprise that they did not produce the desired results of economy and efficiency when transferred to another society, such as Brazil, having an entirely different socio-economic and political reality and functioning at another level of economic, political, and administrative development.

On the basis of these two assumptions, there are three independent variables contained within the central hypothesis which have been selected to see if they could possibly establish a relationship with the major dependent variable: the actual behavior of the Brazilian federal civil service system. These independent variables are: (1) the political understructure on which the civil service system is based; (2) the use of norms governing administrative behavior exogenous to the socio-political system, and (3) the application of the techniques of scientific management without adequate attention to the functional requirements of the existing system and sufficient consideration for the human elements.

The term "variable" is used here simply to state in a systematic fashion a concept which can be measured. The variables selected for further analysis in the next section are both nominal and normative. They are "nominal" in that they

are "characterized by the presence or absence of a trait, but not by degrees of a trait" and they are "normative" in that they are

. . . evaluative statements to which degrees of intensity may be ascribed but which in themselves are incapable of inter-subjective empirical confirmation (*e.g.* "good," "better," and "best" administration).<sup>21</sup>

The theoretical construct which follows is developed in terms of a series of propositions that state a hypothetical relationship between two or more variables. These variables are of three types: independent, dependent, and intervening. The propositions will be developed in considerable detail and will be tested in subsequent chapters. For this reason, no attempt will be made here to state whether or not they can be supported by empirical evidence; this will be done only in the concluding chapter.

Of the three independent variables, the first is by far the most complex and the most important in understanding Brazilian experience with civil service reform. Involved in the explanation of this variable are three groups of dependent variables. The first revolves around this proposition: In instituting any program of administrative reform in a transitional society, the presence of a strong central government which insures political stability is more important than the style of the government, *i.e.* whether it is a dictatorship or a democracy.<sup>22</sup> This statement, in turn, leads to two sub-propositions: First, the success in instituting merit system practices under the first Vargas government is to be explained

in part by the presence of a strong central government committed to the reform of the federal civil service, initially through the Federal Civil Service Council and later the DASP. It is important to remember in looking at the events since 1945 that merit system practices in the federal civil service as a whole were first instituted during the ambiguous phase of semi-dictatorship prevailing before the establishment of the *Estado Novo*.

The second sub-proposition states that the problems which emerged in Brazil after 1945, both in expanding and defending a rationalized public personnel system, are to be explained in part by the excessive decentralization of authority (formal power) and control (informal power)<sup>23</sup> and by the multiplicity of competing groups in a society undergoing fundamental change, where there is a lack of consensus on the means for resolving conflict and on the basic goals of the state. In the post-1945 period, the civil service system has been based on an entirely different political understructure -- one characterized by a multiplicity of competing parties, divided internally along regional lines, and by little development of national party responsibility. In contrast with American experience, the time span involved has been short.

The second group of dependent variables centers around the following proposition: Any progress of basic reform in a traditional administrative system is certain to create opposition

The way this opposition is expressed depends on the inter-relation established between the degree of centralization or decentralization within the bureaucracy, on the one hand, and the style of politics, *i.e.* the degree to which there exists an open or closed political group, on the other. This distinction does not, however, imply a dichotomization of two polar styles of politics, but rather a continuum along which various political styles can be located. The criterion used here is the degree of participation in the political process.

It is also hypothesized that in a centralized system of administration it is more difficult to express opposition to reform because of the existence of a more effective control system capable of overriding traditional patterns and values. This control is more "effective" because major policy decisions can be made only at the top of the hierarchical structure. In contrast, in a decentralized system of administration it is easier to express opposition to reform because of the existence of numerous semi-independent administrative hierarchies, each with considerable authority for decision-making over policy and insufficient central control over traditional patterns and values. Under a dictatorship -- that is, a closed system of government -- the artificial no-conflict status of politics forces opposition to administrative reform to be internalized both within the administrative system and the external political system. In a transitional society,

the internalization of opposition to reform is almost certain to result in the confusing of basic issues and problems and in the blurring of lines among traditional, elitist-oriented groups opposed to change; liberal groups, opposed to dictatorship, who desire political democracy; and revolutionary groups, opposed to continuing a capitalistic system, who are committed to egalitarian values. Furthermore, within the framework of an open, competitive style of politics, following immediately after a period of dictatorship, it becomes easier not only to isolate the forces opposed to administrative reform, but also to understand the desire of these various groups to emasculate such an organization as DASP and to undercut public personnel reforms.

Further, it is hypothesized that this reaction to administrative reform during the Vargas era is related to fear of the bureaucracy as a control instrument in a no-party, authoritarian system and to experience with such control. An important motivation of the political parties since 1945 has been their desire to make the bureaucracy responsible to the external political system. This factor is crucial to an understanding of the subsequent struggle between the legislative and executive branches over the control of patronage. In this context, spoils system practices theoretically take on a functional character and are only dysfunctional if we look at the socio-economic pressures generated by industrial-

zation and urbanization and the subsequent need for expanded and highly specialized public services.

An important intervening variable is the size of the bureaucracy. The size of the governmental bureaucracy constitutes an important factor which intervenes both between the degree of centralization and decentralization and the style of politics. Its traditional character and spoils system practices, which are a consequence of the external political environment, are certain to limit the impact of the reform movement on traditional values and patterns of behavior.

There is one final dependent variable which is related to the first independent variable: This is the role of DASP as an agent of the executive.<sup>24</sup> It is hypothesized that the close association of DASP and the whole administrative reform movement with the Vargas dictatorship was inimical to its goals and objectives after 1945. Because reform was administered from the top down and was not based upon any popular movement outside the government, the entire program came to rely exclusively on the executive for its success. Consequently, once executive support in Brazil was no longer forthcoming and a preference was shown for spoils system practices, a strong reaction to administrative reform set in. This experience is the reverse of that of the movement for civil service reform in the United States which began in the latter half of the nineteenth century and was based on pressures

from many different quarters for an end to widespread corruption in government. That movement was but a part of a more general one to reform and to moralize the whole political process, as well as to readjust basic imbalances that had developed in the political system.<sup>25</sup>

The second independent variable -- the use of a new set of norms and principles -- involves two dependent variables, while the third -- the application of the techniques of scientific management -- is sufficient in and of itself. The first of the dependent variables is contained in the proposition that the gap between the formal requirements of the merit system and the realities of current public personnel practices is to be explained to a considerable extent by the irrelevance of these exogenous concepts to the functioning of the bureaucratic system. The second dependent variable, stated as a postulate, takes the following form: The imposition of these newer norms and principles upon traditional values has led to conflict within the administrative system as a whole. Consequently, different individuals within the bureaucracy react in different ways. Some are committed to the new value orientation, while others are committed to the traditional value orientation, and still others to both. Thus, a substantial body of intermediate or transitional individuals is attracted both to the older set of norms and principles and to the newer ones, as well. Riggs calls these

individuals "polynormative" or "normless." According to another writer, such a value conflict within the individual leads to his supporting the merit system verbally, while in practice he depends upon a particular person to obtain government employment for him extra-legally.<sup>26</sup>

To test the validity of the central hypothesis and the propositions which have been built around it, an attempt will be made to operationalize the models Riggs and Diamant have offered for the study of comparative administration.

In constructing a model for the analysis of administrative systems in "developing" areas, Riggs postulates that all existing administrative systems may be evaluated by establishing what he terms a developmental continuum. At one extreme he places a "fused" model in which all structures are highly diffuse and undifferentiated and which can be used for the analysis of administration in traditional agricultural societies. At the other end, he places a "diffracted" model in which all structures are highly specific and specialized and which can be used for the analysis of administration in modern industrial societies, such as those existing in North America and Western Europe. He adopts the viewpoint that in traditional societies approaching the "fused" model,

a significant tendency exists for action . . . to be predominantly ascriptive, particularistic, and diffuse; whereas choices in modern societies are more likely to be achievement-oriented, universalistic, and specific.<sup>27</sup>

Between these two extremes Riggs inserts what he calls a "prismatic" model for the analysis of administration in countries attempting to break the hold of traditional society and to modernize. These are the countries which have been termed "developing," if the framework developed by Almond and Coleman is utilized.<sup>28</sup> In the "prismatic" model, Riggs hypothesizes that the contrasting patterns occurring in the "fused" and "diffracted" models interact and overlap. While agricultural and industrial societies would be concentrated to a fairly high degree around the polar extremes of the continuum and would show a relatively homogeneous distribution of traits, a transitional society approaching the "prismatic" model would demonstrate "a wide variation between its still predominantly traditional hinterland and its 'modernized' urbanized centers." Such a society would also show a relatively heterogeneous distribution of traits, that is, it would combine traditional, relatively fused traits with relatively diffracted ones.<sup>29</sup> The extent to which heterogeneity and overlapping patterns occur, asserts Riggs, is an important factor, for

. . . the more prismatic . . . a society, the greater will be the social gap between its rural and urban sectors. In both fused and diffracted societies the urban-rural discontinuity will not, presumably, be so great.<sup>30</sup>

In terms of public administration, these models reflect three different sets of conditions: In a "diffracted"

society, one would encounter "a set of concrete structures or institutions specialized for the performance of administrative functions"; in a "fused" society, one would not expect to find "any concrete structures specifically oriented toward administrative functions"; and in a "prismatic" society, one would encounter "certain administrative structures operating quite specifically and effectively, while in other fields or parts of the society, no such structures [would be] found."<sup>31</sup> . . . As a consequence of this situation and the influence exerted on traditional countries by external models or standards,

. . . it is easier to adopt by fiat or law a formal organizational structure with a manifest administrative function than it is to institutionalize corresponding social behavior. . . . Hence, many formally administrative structures in transitional societies turn out to be mere façades, while the effective administrative work remains a latent function of older, more diffuse institutions.<sup>32</sup>

Diamant offers an alternative model that complements the work done by Riggs and can be used to offer another perspective on the Brazilian federal civil service. Since he is critical of Riggs' model as being too abstract and general, we might examine his model to see if his attempt at building more components into a typology of political styles and economic development can be operationalized in the Brazilian context. Whereas Riggs visualizes three distinct models on a continuum against which all societies may be evaluated, Diamant conceives of political development as an

on-going process in which new goals and demands are met in a flexible manner by a variety of patterns. While Riggs is concerned with the formulation of functional concepts which can be used to define relationships in transitional societies, Diamant focuses his attention on the goals of politics -- an element which, he says, is neglected in Riggs' analysis because of his lack of concern with alternative patterns or strategies of development. At this point Diamant's definition of political development is crucial to our understanding of his approach:

In its most general form . . . political development is a process by which a political system acquires an increased capacity to sustain successfully and continuously new types of organizations. For this process to continue over time a differentiated and centralized policy must come into being which must be able to command resources from and power over wide spheres and regions of the society. In this most general form political development is certainly a multi-normative process, in which a variety of demands and goals are being pursued simultaneously; . . . this ability to process several major demands and goals concurrently marks the "success" or "failure" of modernization.<sup>33</sup>

Since political development, as he conceives of the process, does not require the creation of particular kinds of institutions and it can move forward, stop, or be reversed, the matter of goals in a particular polity is of great importance. Diamant postulates that the two basic political goals of developing societies are nation-building and socio-economic progress. By "nation-building" he means the creation of an integrated political community within

fixed geographic boundaries where the nation-state is the dominant political institution.<sup>34</sup>

To this conceptual framework he relates Almond's idea that all political systems must acquire capacity to deal with four sets of problems: (1) an integrative capacity, which will provide for the creation of national unity and a centralized bureaucracy; (2) an international accommodative capability; (3) a participation capability, which will lead to the creation of a political culture of civic obligation and of a democratic political structure; and (4) a welfare or distributive capacity, which will provide for widespread dissemination of welfare standards and accommodation between political and social structures. Diamant states that, except for the third element, these sets of problems fit into his conception of political development. Breakdown or failure in a political system, then, stems from the fact that a particular society has had to acquire too many of these capabilities at the same time.<sup>35</sup>

From this point he moves on to two other dimensions. On the basis of Rustow and Ward, he builds into his model the viewpoint that a society undergoing modernization faces basically two types of problems: those which are beyond the control of the leaders of that society and those which are subject to their influence or control.<sup>36</sup> He also postulates that, as a developing society faces the widening range of

demands that accompany modernization, an egalitarian mass society emerges which is independent of its democratic or non-democratic character.<sup>37</sup> Within this context, different polities develop different types of public bureaucracies.

Finally, on the basis of the work done by Banks and Textor, Diamant develops a chart organizing all the polities in existence today into categories based on two variables: (1) political system goals -- whether they are post-developmental, development, or pre-developmental -- and (2) political system styles -- whether they are a polyarchy, limited polyarchy, movement regime, or traditional-autocratic. According to his analysis, Brazil is a limited polyarchy<sup>38</sup> with developmental political system goals.<sup>39</sup> Joined to this attempt to operationalize the models offered by Riggs and Diamant are two techniques used throughout this dissertation: content analysis and interviewing. Content analysis is used in two different contexts. The first deals with organization and personnel theory in basic materials related to Brazilian public administration. The indicators used for analysis of this material fall into three groups: (1) the specific terms used in Portuguese to explain administrative phenomena (those terms which are distinct from American experience and those which parallel concepts prevalent in American public administration); (2) the value system inherent in traditional public administration, which is im-

ported into Brazil from the United States, and subsequent developments in this school of thought; and (3) the way Brazilians interested in public administration handle the conflict between the techniques and principles of administration, on the one hand, and the ecology of Brazilian administration, on the other.

The second manner in which content analysis is used is to isolate issues and problems in public personnel administration raised in the press and in articles and books. Because of the broad time period included, the absence of indexing, the necessity of hiring a reliable student assistant to aid in gathering the material, and the lack of funds to finance an extended stay in São Paulo, newspaper research has been based almost entirely on the *Jornal do Brasil*. Such a reliance upon one basic news source is open to criticism from several viewpoints, not the least of which is the reputation of the Latin American press for partial and conflicting reporting on news stories. Recognizing the lack of background material for the 1945-1964 period, I consulted a well-known Brazilian historian, José Honório Rodrigues, on how one might best utilize the newspapers available in Rio de Janeiro. He suggested that material taken from the *Jornal do Brasil* be complemented with material from the *Correio da Manhã* and the *Diário de Notícias*. He stated that the *Jornal do Brasil* was not a good source

for the years between 1945 and 1950, but that, after that period, because of a reorganization, the paper became a very good general news source.

In general, the *Jornal do Brasil* has had an excellent reputation in recent years for complete and reliable news coverage. There is one notable exception that should be mentioned: Within the state of Guanabara, the *Jornal* and the *Correio da Manhã* have provided very different and conflicting reporting on Governor Carlos Lacerda's handling of the *favelas* (the hillside slums). However, the years for which the *Jornal do Brasil* has been most heavily relied upon fall between 1954 and 1964, a period in which, of the news sources available in Rio, it offers the most complete and systematic coverage of the interrelationships between the federal civil service and the political system, particularly in terms of the patronage pressure prevalent during the governments of Juscelino Kubitschek, Jânio Quadros, and João Goulart. This material has been supplemented by spot checks of other news sources, examination of relevant books and articles, and interviewing of knowledgeable persons on matters pertaining to the civil service.

These various sources of material have been organized according to two categories: the nature of the opposition to merit system practices in the federal civil service and the defense offered for merit system practices. In the first

case, this includes (1) the attack against DASP, particularly its personnel policies, as a consequence of its close association with the *Estado Novo*; (2) the justifications used for violation of merit system practices; and (3) the protection of *interino* and *extranumerário* interests<sup>40</sup> and the defense of patronage practices. In the second case, two sub-categories are involved: (1) the desire to reorganize the civilian bureaucracy along "modern" lines to achieve more effective administration in keeping with the developmental needs of the country and (2) the appearance of some public support for merit system practices: the contrast between the absence of such support in 1946 and its beginning in recent years.

The second major technique, that of interviewing, was used to get at the problem presented by the conflicting perceptions of what a public personnel system entails, what sort of civil servants are desired, and what relation should or does exist with the external political system. Elementary role analysis was used to understand the perception which different individuals, in positions of importance and with a relevant interest in these matters, had of the federal civil service. Because of the size and complexity of the administrative system and because of the multiplicity of groups with an interest in some aspect of public administration, an attempt was made to capture an insight into these conflicting

notions of what the federal civil service is. The sample used, however, was too broad and too small to provide material which was statistically reliable. Of a total of fifty interviews scheduled, forty-one were completed. Of these, the average length was forty-five minutes, although some were as brief as half an hour, while others lasted nearly two hours. Of the forty-one interviews, three were not directly related to the federal civil service: one was restricted to the personnel system in the armed forces and in the military ministries; one to the administrative reform program in the state of Minas Gerais, and one to the in-service training program of the Banco de Lavoura de Minas Gerais. But these three interviews, in the way they developed, were not unrelated to the project under consideration.

The interview guide used was semi-structured. A detailed questionnaire was prepared initially in English. It was then reduced to eight broad topics adjusted to the particular situation at hand. The interviewer considered this reduction necessary, first, to establish proper rapport and, secondly to deal adequately with the variety of interviewees selected for the sample. For example, with DASP and Fundação Getúlio Vargas personnel, much more technical language was used than with officials in public life. The majority of the interviewing was conducted in Portuguese and as complete

notes as possible were taken during the course of each interview.<sup>41</sup>

The interviews were used to locate these individuals within the social matrix that has emerged around the federal civil service and to give further light on how one might conceive of the national administrative system in relation to its social and political context. These interviews confirmed the researcher's impression that the administrative system offers an important, but neglected, focal point for understanding the political process and the course of political development in Brazil. Because of the absence of previous work on the administrative system which provides a view of its interaction with the political system, and because of the absence of reliable basic data on the participants in the public service, much of the material used in the following pages is more impressionistic than was intended, and there is a lack of quantification. The nature of the "universe" selected, the resources available, and the limitations of time and finances imposed by the scholarship held prevented the collection of more statistically reliable data. The only area where hard data were located and collected is in the attempt to measure the growth of the numbers of public employees, according to the various categories in the public service in order to substantiate patronage pressures.

A brief word is now in order as to how the material collected has been organized. Chapter II sketches the broad lines of Brazilian political and administrative development. The following two chapters deal with the theoretical framework within which the movement to reform the Brazilian federal civil service has functioned. The subject matter is centered around conceptual developments in Brazilian public administration. For this reason, the various phases do not represent strict time periods, and in one or two cases an author is included in more than one theoretical category. Chapters V, VI, VII, and VIII are concerned with the political environment in which the national civil service has functioned. The material is divided into two parts: development of a model for the study of the Brazilian political system, based on various analytic approaches taken by Brazilian authors in explaining their politics, and the years between 1945 and 1964, where consideration of the political understructure precedes a more detailed examination of the federal civil service. In Chapter VIII our attention shifts to the gap between the norms imposed in administrative reform and the socio-political environment. Central to this topic is the patronage problem in the national administrative system and the use of comparative material to make this analysis more meaningful. Chapter IX is devoted to perceptions of the federal civil service on the basis of interview

material, while in the final chapter conclusions are set forth in terms of the propositions stated at the outset.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>"Idiographic" is used here in the sense established by Riggs. That is, to describe ". . . any approach which concentrates on the unique -- the historical episode or 'case study,' the single agency or country, the biography or the 'culture area'." It is to be contrasted with the "nomothetic" approach -- one which ". . . seeks generalizations, 'laws,' hypotheses that assert regularities of behavior, correlations between variables. . ." (Fred W. Riggs, *Convergences in the Study of Comparative Public Administration and Local Government* (Gainesville: Public Administration Clearing Service of the University of Florida), p. 9). A third level in the study of any social phenomenon would be the ideational. This approach, which deals with the values and ideas emerging from cultural patterns, is a concern of anthropology and philosophy.

<sup>2</sup>The economy and efficiency movement in American public administration followed upon the general reform movement of the late nineteenth century which was oriented toward the moralization of governmental practices. By the turn of the century, "'economy and efficiency,' together with other concepts, such as 'scientific,' had replaced a 'moralistic' approach to governmental improvement." Yet efficiency as a dominant value and also as a goal, it seems, absorbed unconsciously the moral imperative of the earlier movement. "In short, a term generally regarded as descriptive, 'mechanical,' became in fact invested with moral significance. To a considerable extent the exaltation of efficiency must be regarded as the secularization, materialization of the Protestant conscience. The tenet of efficiency is an article of faith of 'muscular Christianity'" (Dwight Waldo, *The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory of American Public Administration* (New York: Ronald Press, 1948), pp. 392-394).

<sup>3</sup>The concept of public personnel administration as a topic for study first made its appearance in Brazil during the mid-1930's. Astério Dardeau Vieira is generally given credit for having introduced this subject matter into Brazil as a separate field for inquiry.

<sup>4</sup> Beatriz Marqués de Souza Wahrlich, *Administração de Pessoal: Princípios e Técnicas* (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1964). Although Wahrlich deals with a history of personnel administration in Brazil in her first chapter, the treatment of the subject is also applicable to developments in public administration as a whole. See pp. 23 ff. for her division of personnel administration into four periods.

<sup>5</sup> This term is used according to the definition established by Alfred Diamant. See the discussion of Diamant's model, p. 22 *et seq.*

<sup>6</sup> Formalism: a situation in which visible forms, such as prescribed rules and laws, neither represent reality nor correspond to human behavior (Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), p. 15). In this case the public personnel system imposed on the Brazilian civil service is formalistic because it neither represents reality nor corresponds to human behavior. For example, legally and theoretically, personnel should be recruited only through the administration of public examinations, but in reality patronage has prevailed as the dominant criterion for admission to the federal civil service.

<sup>7</sup> Heterogeneous: this term is used to describe the mixture of traditional and modern attitudes, practices, and situations existing in the Brazilian civil service and in the political system. See Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society*, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13.

<sup>8</sup> Overlapping: the creation of a new formal apparatus for the civil service which gives the impression of autonomousness, but which is in reality intimately related with the social, political, and economic systems. Specifically, Riggs uses the term to refer to the creation of a bureau or rationalized administrative structure which "gives an illusory impression of autonomousness, whereas in fact it is deeply enmeshed in, and cross-influenced by, remnants of older traditional social, economic, religious and political systems" (Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society*, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15).

<sup>9</sup> See the discussion of Riggs' model, p. 19 *et seq.*

<sup>10</sup>Throughout this dissertation, "local government" will refer to government at the level of the *município*. It should be noted here that the Brazilian municipality -- the *município* -- is closer to the county in the United States than to the city, for it consists of a population center and its surrounding rural area. Within this area a second unit of population, the *vila*, may be located, but the whole area carries the name of the major population center.

<sup>11</sup>"Pluralism" is employed here to describe a basic alteration in the nature of the Brazilian political system. This term is descriptive of the system which has emerged as the traditional order, dominated by one cohesive (although not necessarily harmonious) set of leaders, and has given way to one "dominated by many different sets of leaders (and groups), each having access to a different combination of political resources" (Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 86). While there is substantial agreement in political science on the term "pluralism," this is not true in sociology and anthropology in which a controversy is currently going on over the meaning of the word. Furthermore, in anthropology, "pluralism" is used not to describe a modern social system but rather relationships in folk societies.

<sup>12</sup>The concept "take-off stage" is based on the work of W. W. Rostow. In *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1962), Rostow states: "It is possible to identify all societies, in their economic dimensions, as lying within one of five categories: the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass-consumption" (p. 4). According to his analytic framework, Brazil has entered the take-off stage of economic growth (p. 127).

<sup>13</sup>This issue was originally stated as follows: "whether a body of principles or administration, detached from the surrounding tissue of culture can be effectively applied without regard to spatial or temporal elements" (Ralph Braibanti, *Transnational Inducement of Administrative Reform: A Survey of Scope and Critique of Issues* (Bloomington: Comparative Administration Group, American Society for Public Administration, and International Development Research Center, Indiana University, 1964), p. 69). The gist of the paper, however, is that Braibanti feels an affirmative answer to this question is impossible.

<sup>14</sup>This statement should not, however, be construed to mean that democratic development does not require some separation of political and administrative roles.

<sup>15</sup>The Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público -- the Administrative Department of the Public Service -- is a bureau of general administration created by Getulio Vargas in 1938 as an instrument for administrative reform and control over the national administrative system.

<sup>16</sup>Charles Wagley, *An Introduction to Brazil* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 5-10.

<sup>17</sup>Luther Gulick and Lyndall Urwick, *Papers on the Science of Administration* (New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1937).

<sup>18</sup>Taylorism: the search for the "one best way" in administration to provide maximum efficiency and to eliminate all unnecessary steps.

<sup>19</sup>This political structure, in contrast to the Brazilian one, may be best characterized as a competitive two-party system over a lengthy time span.

<sup>20</sup>The classic example of these principles to function as expected and of the failure to account for human behavior as an independent variable is to be found in the 1946 reorganization of the United States Patent Office. See the discussion of this attempt at reorganization in Robert T. Golembiewski, "The Small Group and Organization Theory: A Revisit to the Patent Office," *Behavior and Organization: O & M and the Small Group* (Chicago: Rand, McNally & Co., 1962).

<sup>21</sup>For a discussion of the use of proposition-building in the study of comparative administration, see Glen D. Paige, *Proposition-Building in the Study of Comparative Administration* (Papers in Comparative Administration, Special Series: Number 4) (Chicago: Comparative Administration Group, American Society for Public Administration, 1964), pp. 2-3.

<sup>22</sup>This variable is based on the work of Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor (*A Cross-Polity Survey* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1963), p. 112).

<sup>23</sup>This distinction between formal and informal power is based on Riggs (*Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society, op. cit.*, p. 209).

<sup>24</sup>The importance of this element is discussed by Gilbert B. Siegel in "The Vicissitudes of Governmental Reform in Brazil: A Study of the DASP" (unpublished Doctoral dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1964) and in "The DASP: A Study in the Deterioration of an Organizational Power Base" (Robert T. Daland, *Perspectives of Brazilian Public Administration* (Los Angeles: University of Southern California Bookstore, 1963), I, esp. p. 34.

<sup>25</sup>For a discussion of the American administrative reform, see Waldo, *op. cit.*, and Leonard D. White, *The Republican Era: 1869-1901, A Study in Administrative History* (New York, Macmillan, 1958).

<sup>26</sup>Siegel, "Administration, Values and the Merit System in Brazil," in *Perspectives of Brazilian Public Administration, op. cit.*, p. 10.

<sup>27</sup>Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society, op. cit.*, p. 23.

<sup>28</sup>Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), *The Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).

<sup>29</sup>Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society, op. cit.*, p. 29.

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 33.

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 34.

<sup>33</sup>Alfred Diamant, *Bureaucracy in Developmental Movement Regimes: A Bureaucratic Model for Developing Societies* (Bloomington: Comparative Administration Group, American Society for Public Administration, and International Development Research Center, Indiana University, 1964), p. 5.

<sup>34</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 6, 7, 9, 10.

<sup>35</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 12

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>37</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>38</sup>*Ibid.* Diamant used the term "polyarchy" to indicate "that the political regime is broadly representative, that power is not excessively centralized or monopolized, that there is wide participation in making policy decision, and that alternative policies have a chance to be heard and considered freely" (p. 27). A limited polyarchy is one "where polyarchal features have been restricted or eliminated, or where there is an appearance of polyarchy, considerable limitations have been placed on it" (p. 27). The category "movement regime" is based on Robert Tucker's concept of a "revolutionary mass-movement regime under single-party auspices." "It is revolutionary because it attempts to replace an existing regime and, once having achieved that, to carry through far-reaching changes. Next its core is an ideology which provides political orientation and gives the leadership an organizing instrument. Third, it rests on a 'mass' movement, that is to say, it draws on and rests on a base of mass participation and involvement. Finally, the revolution is guided by a militant, centralized elite or vanguard party which tries, more or less successfully, to construct an organization network reaching down to the grass roots in the villages" (pp. 27, 29). The category "traditional-autocratic" refers to "those polities whose political style has remained traditional, such as Iran and Nepal, as well as certain modernized polities whose autocratic or militaristic political style closely resembles the traditional autocracies, such as Spain, Portugal, or Paraguay" (p. 29).

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 26-28. The rest of his paper is not applicable to the analysis of Brazil since it is oriented toward the development of a model for the analysis of developmental movement regimes. Such a phenomenon, as he correctly indicates by the classification of Brazil according to another category, has been absent in Brazilian experience. Furthermore, his development of characteristics for the movement regime model is too specific to be able to look for corresponding characteristics in Brazil except according to his three broad divisions: (1) the nature of the ideology of development and its relation to the various subsystems of the social system; (2) the nature of the legitimate authority, the regime, and its functioning as a mobilization system; and (3) the structure and functioning of the administrative staff or bureaucracy (pp. 49-50).

<sup>40</sup>*Interino*: an employee hired temporarily, with the understanding that he must pass the *concurso* (the public civil service examination) at a later date to keep his position on a permanent basis. In practice, however, his

position has tended to become permanent.

*Extranumerário*: an employee who occupies a position not created by law. This category was abolished by law in 1960; however, prior to this date, an attempt was made to control admissions through this category by administering a *prova de habilitação* (a testing of the candidate's ability to exercise the responsibilities of a particular job). While these positions were originally designed to be of a transitional character, the individuals who have occupied them tended to become permanent employees of the federal government and created constant pressures for the same rights and privileges as the *funcionários públicos* -- public functionaries -- who make up the career civil service.

<sup>41</sup>See the Appendix for the interview guide.

## CHAPTER II

### THE SETTING

If Brazil is considered within the framework of the model and terminology proposed by Diamant, it may be observed that the course of Brazilian political development has been quite uneven. As an independent political system, however, Brazil has experienced essentially only a single political style: limited polyarchy. The one exception to this statement is the *Estado Novo*, when Getulio Vargas ruled according to a traditional-autocratic political style within the framework of a state which theoretically approached a movement regime style. Yet it was precisely during this period that there was a change in political system goals from pre-developmental to developmental ones. It is to a consideration of these matters that we shall direct our attention. The focus of this chapter will fall upon the broad lines of Brazilian political development during three distinct periods: the Empire, the First Republic, and the Vargas Era. In so doing, we shall proceed on the basis of what was stated as an initial assumption -- that political and administrative processes are intertwined and that the problems of administration cannot be considered independently of the political context within which they function. Consequently, the term "political development" has been interpreted broadly here to

include the evolution of a national administrative system.

Since the arrival of the Portuguese Court in Rio de Janeiro in 1808, the focal point of the Brazilian political system has been the executive -- be he an hereditary monarch, a self-appointed guardian, or an elected president. This institutional continuity between past and present is perhaps best captured in the phrase "His Majesty, The President of Brazil."<sup>1</sup> All effective government in Brazil seems to have relied on the presence of a strong executive. In turn, the presence of a strong executive as crucial to the functioning of the political system seems to be related to the importance of personalism as a central value in Brazilian culture and to the whole notion of charisma as an essential attribute of leadership.<sup>2</sup> This fact is nowhere more clear than in the recent experience of the Goulart government. The anarchy which emerged during his period of office is due, at least to some extent, to the absence of leadership and administrative ability on his part. Certainly, there were many other factors at work, but the feeling is inescapable that Goulart's lack of a means of direction was the final element in the deterioration of events leading to the revolution of March 31, 1964.<sup>3</sup>

Related to this focus on the executive as the reference point in Brazilian politics and administration is the theme of centralization and decentralization of authority

and control.<sup>4</sup> While Riggs speaks of the "disengagement" of authority and control as characteristic of transitional societies,<sup>5</sup> this situation has been present in Brazil from the time the first governor-general was sent out from Lisbon in 1549. By the end of the colonial period, an administrative system was in existence that provided unity for the diverse regions, constituting the Brazilian "cultural archipelago,"<sup>6</sup> under the authority of the Portuguese Crown. Nevertheless, many of the regions -- especially those directed by their own *audiências* -- were quite successful in escaping central control as exercised by the viceroy. In general, the Brazilian colonies were never subjected to the extremes of monarchical absolutism from which the Spanish colonies in America suffered. Centralization was imposed on Brazil relatively late and when it did occur, it appeared in a much more moderate form.<sup>7</sup>

#### Imperial Brazil

With the arrival of the court of Dom João VI, then prince regent, and the conversion of Rio de Janeiro into the seat of the Portuguese Empire, Brazil received the full impact of four centuries of Portuguese imperial institutions; among these, the bureaucracy played a dominant role, for in the course of creating an empire in the East, based on trade, Portugal had found it necessary to create a vast bureaucratic apparatus.

As Raymundo Faoro has said, Portugal became essentially a country of *funcionários públicos* (public functionaries).<sup>8</sup> Consequently, many new administrative entities appeared in Rio due to the presence of the Court, and a number of aristocratic public servants, associated with the royal house, descended on the new capital. The most inauspicious development for the future of Brazilian administration was their reinforcement of the idea of public positions (*cargos públicos*) as sinecures.<sup>9</sup>

Although Rio's status as capital of the Empire was a relatively short-lived one and the Court returned to Lisbon after the Portuguese Revolution of 1820, the imperial institutional base remained and provided the foundation for the creation of an independent monarchy in 1822, with a member of the House of Bragança on the throne.

With independence, a change occurred in the goals of the administrative system, although there was no alteration in the symbol of political legitimacy as expressed in the person of the monarch. Whereas the primary concern of the Portuguese State was the exercise of fiscal controls of a tributary nature and the maintenance of an overseas empire, the new Brazilian government turned its attention to the objective of national unity. This goal was likewise transferred to the civilian and military bureaucracy. For the first time, a truly national administrative system was created. In this process, however, the gap between formal authority and ef-

fective control remained. For all practical purposes, the impact of the administrative system was still limited to the major cities and its focus was around the Court in Rio. In the provinces, clan and oligarchical style politics<sup>10</sup> predominated and factional political struggles continued to be couched in local and personal terms. Mário Wagner Vieira da Cunha has described this situation especially well:

Except for the efforts realized to maintain social order in the face of local revolutions and foreign attacks, as in the case of the Paraguayan War, there was no effective need for administrative activity. . . .

During the Empire administration really only reached reduced functional sectors and limited territorial areas. The rest was handed over to the power of local clans. . . .

The Imperial Government also tried to reflect the power of the mercantile bourgeoisie. . . . [It was the mercantile bourgeoisie which required the greatest administrative activity of the government.] Thus, the imperial administration turned its attention more to the larger cities and to the Court than to the countryside; it took care more of external commerce than of internal commerce -- of the railroads and the ports which tied the country to the outside world rather than of the regional and local communications and supply network. It was mostly an administration that had a regulatory character, with limited financial resources and a small number of employees. Its aristocratic orientation was manifested in the expenses of the Court which reached half or more of all the total expenditures. . . . On the one hand, these were for activities carried on at the service of the Court or for its entertainment. On the other, however, these were service activities for the dominant classes [with a purpose] since the Monarch was interested in attracting to the Court the power [and resources] of the country's rural aristocracy and mercantile bourgeoisie.<sup>11</sup>

In theory, the Empire was strictly a unitary state, but, as in the case of other traditional systems, the control of the central government, as expressed through the administrative system, over local power structures was negligible. Given the predominance of local loyalties and the problem of internal communications in a territory of such vast size, the main accomplishment of the Empire was the creation and preservation of union among the Portuguese-speaking provinces and the avoidance of the emergence of a series of independent republics. Joined with this evolution toward national unity was the transition from a clan to an oligarchical style of politics. Familialistic patterns of politics continued to function, but they were brought into focus around regional centers -- particularly after the abdication of Pedro I and the publication of the Law of August 12, 1834.<sup>12</sup>

Until 1834 -- in spite of the gap between authority and control -- it is fairly correct to speak of the Empire as a regime centralized administratively but decentralized politically. After this date, the structure of power in Brazil became diffuse once again and the balance between the center and the outlying areas was upset.<sup>13</sup> A crucial element in this process was the transference of the patronage power away from the executive and its dispersal at the regional level. To capture these changes, let us turn to a primary source in this period -- the Viscount of Uruguay, the man probably most

responsible for the creation of a national administrative system in Brazil. What is most striking about this individual is the relevance of his observations to understanding present and past administrative problems in Brazil.

In his *Essay on Administrative Law*<sup>14</sup> he emphasized the fact that during the first phase of the Empire, the executive had the private right to select all provincial and municipal employees. This situation, he claimed, was altered when the *Ato Adicional* became effective because a substantial part of the patronage privilege was transferred to the provincial assemblies. The Crown, however, did retain the right to name officials to the National Treasury, the Ministry of War and Navy, and the General Post Office, and to select the presidents of the provinces, bishops, commanders-superior in the National Guard, members of the higher courts (*Relações e Tribunais Superiores*), and the employees of the Faculties of Medicine and Law and of the Academies.<sup>15</sup>

Regardless of the fact that the monarch still had important appointive powers, the Viscount was most critical of the transfer of patronage powers to the provincial assemblies. He felt that all that had been accomplished was the replacement of excessive centralization by excessive decentralization -- with pejorative effects for the country's administration. At least, before the change, he observed,

the patronage power was more distant, more impartial, and less involved in the immediate struggles and personal passions of political partisans.<sup>16</sup> Above all, he was concerned with the creation of a national administrative system which would provide the necessary framework for order and progress, and he saw further obstacles to this goal in the alteration of previous political relationships. In a newly emergent country such as Brazil, with an imperial heritage, he was convinced,

. . . good administrative institutions appropriate to its circumstances and properly developed [were] more important than political liberty. . . . The latter without the former [could not] produce good results.<sup>17</sup>

To support this assertion, he singled out the fact that the electoral changes and the decentralization which followed the abdication served to introduce chaos into the system and to nullify central power.

The Viscount reached the conclusion that the attempt to decentralize the system and to establish local self-government, with its inspiration in American and British sources, had contributed only to making national control more difficult and to increasing the regional contrasts in development. He was quite emphatic in stating that the origin of the Brazilian system -- as in the cases of Spain, Portugal, and Belgium -- was to be found in France. The special conditions that gave rise to the American and British systems

were, he said, lacking in Brazil. Furthermore, he maintained that knowledge of the French system should not be confused with imitation. If French administrative institutions were to be followed in Brazil, it was essential that they be adapted to the special conditions of the country.<sup>18</sup>

Despite serious obstacles to the creation of a centralized government, the Crown used its appointive powers to help build a body of trained public servants, and isolated attempts were made at the national level to select governmental employees on the basis of capacity. The first recorded instance of a public examination is in 1808, when written and oral tests were announced for the selection of surgeons for the Royal Brigade and the Royal Navy. In general, the Portuguese king, Dom João VI, has been credited with the search for qualified elements for the public service. Similarly, when independence was established and the first constitution was prepared in 1824, an article was included subscribing to the principle that all public positions -- whether political, civil, or military -- were open to all citizens on the basis of their qualifications. Both Brazilian monarchs -- Dom Pedro I and Dom Pedro II -- were interested in establishing a competent higher civil service based on the educated elements in the upper class (the *bacharéis*) -- especially within the Public Treasury.<sup>19</sup> But these attempts were made within the context of a state which was primarily interested in integrating, in

bringing together, in providing for its elite groups. The obstacles to centralization were such that an independent national civil service did not emerge. Nevertheless, the various emperors -- as a moderating power in the midst of factional politics -- have usually been credited with the maintenance of high standards in the selection of civil servants and this has been contrasted with the existence of spoils system practices at the provincial level.<sup>20</sup>

#### The First Republic (1889-1930)

In 1889, the attempt at creating a unitary state ended, and in 1891, a federal republic was formed in which the provinces, now named states, exercised almost complete autonomy. Although there was a change in political forms, the social and economic structure of the country remained much the same. The country retained its agrarian character and its dependence on foreign markets, and little was achieved in the way of establishing an internal network of communications. Instead, each major regional port was tied directly with its overseas market. In terms of Diamant's definition,<sup>21</sup> the First Republic represented a step backward in political development.

Even though the formal structure of the First Republic was based on the imitation of American political institutions, its functioning was totally different. The real focus of politics was around a series of regional political bosses (the

*coronéis*), some with more, some with less, power. The pre-eminent figure in each state was the governor, who shared his power through a system of alliances with local leaders at the municipal level. In a sense, it might be said that the unitary structure of the Empire was reproduced at the regional level -- with each governor providing a point of reference for the continuation of factional politics. At the national level, the president's authority (*i.e.* his formal power) was broad, but his control was limited by the autonomy of the states. As a consequence of this framework of interlocking personal alliances, the president of the republic was selected according to what is known as "governor politics" (*a política dos governadores*) -- and its subsequent corollary, "the politics of coffee and milk" (*a política de café com leite*).<sup>22</sup>

In such a case, whereby all states enjoyed a considerable amount of autonomy, regional developmental contrasts continued to grow, with obvious consequences for the distribution of power among the various states.

The concept of federalism, based on North American experience and transferred to an agrarian, regionally divided country where personal politics predominated, served merely to undermine the main contribution of the Empire -- the establishment of the semblance of national unity in a territory larger than the continental United States and faced with

serious problems of communication. The comments of Oliveira Torres add insight to this matter:

[During the Republic] Brazil was a "cultural archipelago" [where] political power was for all practical purposes concentrated in the hands of the presidents of the states.

The federal government maintained in fact a consciousness of the bid for unity in our history, but in general it did not possess the means to accomplish this since all [effective] power was handed over to the states.

A more profound analysis of the general conditions of Brazilian public administration during the republican regime before 1930 reveals this singular fact: the federal government disposed of only two arms to maintain its authority in the whole of Brazilian territory -- the Army and the National Telegraph.<sup>23</sup>

This observation is nowhere better borne out than in the case of the Canudos rebellion at the turn of the century, when the federal government was only able to halt the primitively armed movement of a religious fanatic in the hinterland of the state of Bahia after a tremendous expenditure in men, resources, and effort.<sup>24</sup>

Consequently, a highly diffuse network of state administrative systems, at contrasting stages of development, emerged and took priority over an only partially effective federal administration. These regional administrative systems were entirely at the service of the rural patriarchs who controlled the patronage power. Hence, the only limiting factor on the expansion of public jobs at this level was to be found in the financial resources of the individual states. The

main interest of the regional political bosses was in the provision of public order and the maintenance of as much power within the regional capitals as possible. From this situation stems the emphasis of these political bosses on the reinforcement of police services and their unwillingness to allow the degree of municipal authority provided for in the Constitution of 1891.<sup>25</sup>

During the Empire, the attempt at creating an imperial administrative system and tying it in with the Court in Rio, where regional elites were to be brought together, had been related to the objective of national unity. Once, however, the central focus of the Empire disappeared, only two basic functions remained for the recently created national administrative system: the furnishing of employment for a marginal middle class on the basis of regional pressures and the supplying of the minimum of service necessary for the maintenance of ties with external markets. Since these functions could just as well be carried out by the various state administrations, an additional factor, which contributed to weakening newer national administrative organs, arose.

Among the responsibilities left to the federal administration was the handling of national finances, in connection with the needs of the most prosperous states, and the supplying of public services for a rapidly growing federal district. In these terms, the scope of the federal

administration was substantially limited to the economic and political center of the country -- the Rio de Janeiro-São Paulo-Minas Gerais triangle. It was only after 1920 that the federal government began to attempt to establish itself over the order created by the rural patriarchs -- in such areas as police matters, education, public health, and communications.<sup>26</sup>

Regardless of this situation, there was apparently a top group of able public functionaries who continued to work in the federal government's major ministries. According to Loewenstein, they were attracted to these positions by relatively good pay and by the considerable prestige the positions offered. He accounted for the presence of these officials on the basis of the continuation of an elitist tradition inherited from the Empire and founded on French precedents.<sup>27</sup>

#### The Vargas Era (1930-1945)

The year 1930 provides a convenient dividing point in the course of Brazilian political development because it marks the collapse of the political order on which the First Republic was based and the initiation of a new era in Brazilian politics and administration. In October of that year, Getulio Vargas achieved power through a revolt, established a provisional government, and, on November 11, issued a decree suspending the Constitution of 1891. With this decree a return to a unitary state began; it reached its conclusion

with the *coup d'état* of November 10, 1937, and new groups, hitherto restricted by the predominance of rural interests, were given a greater voice in national politics.

The changes instituted in the decree of November 11, 1930, are significant not so much because they granted to Vargas sufficient authority to recreate a strong executive as because they bore a direct relationship to ample control -- that is, with effective power to make these changes functional. Article 1 granted the president not only discretionary powers of an executive and legislative nature -- until a Constituent Assembly should meet to decide on the country's reorganization -- but also the exclusive right to decide on the appointment and dismissal of public officials. Article 2 dissolved all representative and deliberative assemblies -- federal, state, and municipal -- and Article 4 stated that federal and state constitutions were to remain in force, but subject to modification by governmental decree. Article 5 suspended all constitutional guarantees as well as the right of the courts to review decrees and acts of the government. Article 11 gave the executive the authority to appoint a federal delegate -- an *interventor* -- to each state with the power to exercise all state legislative and executive powers and to appoint and dismiss all mayors under his jurisdiction.

In November, 1933, Vargas convoked a constituent assembly, and on July 16, 1934, a new constitution was promulgated which restored the federal republic in name and granted increased powers to the federal government. The chief characteristic of this constitution, however, was its "autocratic presidentialism,"<sup>29</sup> an aspect which was made operational. Nevertheless, this period of legal "democracy" and reconstituted federalism was short-lived, for on December 18, 1935, the Chamber and Senate passed a constitutional amendment allowing them to grant authority to the president to declare a "state of grave internal commotion" -- under which all constitutional guarantees could be suspended. Through this amendment Vargas was able to exercise almost absolute power. Then, in late 1937, he used it to destroy the state he had created. With presidential elections in the offing, he initiated action by demanding that Congress declare the existence of a "state of grave internal commotion." This was followed by a Congressional act granting him state-of-war powers for ninety days, as of October 2. Finally, on November 10, he called in the troops, dissolved Congress, and established a clear-cut dictatorship under the name *Estado Novo*.<sup>30</sup>

Politically, this was a period of great instability in which Vargas took the initiative in the face of the collapse of the system built around rurally oriented state oligarchies

and attempted to create a new basis of equilibrium and consensus; economically and administratively, it was a period of great change. Yet, the economic and social structure of Brazil remained much the same as it had been during the Empire and the First Republic. The economy was based on the production of a few primary products -- among which, after the turn of the century, coffee was chief -- and the national government was almost entirely dependent on the taxes levied on external commerce. This income, however, was insufficient even for the minimal needs of the federal government, for the country was faced with constant budgetary deficits after 1909.

Beginning in 1930, in the face of the worldwide depression and the loss of the country's foreign markets, the first real push toward industrialization and diversification of the economy was undertaken. Certainly, World War I had given an impetus to economic growth, but it was nothing compared with the changes destined to occur during the 1930's. With the increase in the domestic prices of imported goods after 1929 and the growth of real income after 1934, a strong incentive was provided for the establishment of new industries. In this process, large amounts of capital were diverted from coffee into industry and trade. Although the agricultural sector of the economy continued to suffer from the fall in world prices throughout these years, the industrial sector had recovered its 1929 level by 1933. By the end of the 1930's, in contrast

to what had occurred in many of the largely industrialized countries, Brazil had reached a per capita income superior to that of 1929.<sup>31</sup>

In public administration, attention was turned toward the reorganization of the older ministries and the creation of new administrative entities. The first ministry to suffer modification was that of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce.<sup>32</sup> The responsibilities for industry and commerce were passed on to a new ministry, that of Labor, Industry, and Commerce, created by Decree 19495 of December 17, 1930; then, through Decree 221338 of January 11, 1933, the ministry itself was reorganized. The second ministry to undergo change was the Ministry of Justice and Interior Affairs. Since its creation during the Empire, it had been one of the most important. Several of its previous functions were removed and these were combined in 1931 to create the Ministry of Education and Health. This same year, the National Coffee Council was formed to deal with the continuing coffee crisis. Then, in recognition of the need for reorganization in public finance, the structure and methods of work of the Ministry of Finance were ordered updated under Decree 24036 of March 26, 1934.<sup>33</sup>

By mid-1934, this phase of administrative innovation had halted with the promulgation of a new constitution and the return to partisan politics; it was only to be resumed with the declaration of the *Estado Novo* in 1937.

Yet concern for administrative reform and expanded public service was continued in the new Congress through the leadership of Vargas. An interparliamentary commission of ten members was created under the name of, first, the Mixed Commission on Economic and Financial Reform (the Comissão Mista de Reforma Econô<sup>o</sup>mico-Financeira) and, later, the Commission for Readjustment and Tributary Reform (the Comissão de Reajustamento e Reforma Tributá<sup>a</sup>ria). Under its auspices, a subcommittee of four men was established with Joaquim Nabuco as chairman to prepare a report on conditions in the federal civil service and to offer proposals for its reorganization.<sup>34</sup> This report contained several suggestions: one for the creation of two general schedules for the federal civil service, with a division between central and regional administration; a second for the establishment of a uniform classification plan, and a third for the formation of a central personnel agency.<sup>35</sup>

The Nabuco Report, however, was suppressed and a new subcommittee was created to deal with the problems of classification and pay in the federal civil service. From this committee came a report proposing three alternative organization plans: a classification of positions based on performance; a five-step pay plan independent of promotion, and a general readjustment based on the creation of a career system within each ministry -- providing for pay according to performance

and advancement according to qualification. Vargas selected the third alternative.<sup>36</sup>

Out of this preparatory work came the Law of Readjustment (Law 284 of October 23, 1936), a landmark in the Brazilian civil service reform movement. It contained three aspects which revolutionized the federal administrative system: a classification plan; a central personnel agency, and the requirement that the admission to the career civil service be made only through selection according to public examination -- the *concurso*. There was also a fourth aspect -- the establishment of efficiency commissions -- but this was a failure from the outset. While in theory the basic unit of the classification plan was the position, or *cargo*, and there was a logical progression from position to class to career, to *quadro*, in practice the basic criterion used consisted of the concept of classes and a salary differentiation which lay within them.<sup>37</sup>

The reorganization of the federal civil service as a consequence of the Vargas-initiated reforms is summarized in Table I. It is based on a chart developed by Eduardo Pinto Pessoa Sobrinho. Although Pinto Pessoa includes the four classes of *extranumerários* as a part


of the original reorganization, Siegel states quite correctly that the grouping of non-regular personnel (*i.e.* *extranumerários*) into four categories dates from Decree-Law 240 of February 4, 1938<sup>38</sup> and not from the original measure.

Little effort was made to characterize the duties and responsibilities of individual positions due to the lack of administrative technicians trained in these skills. Within the careers, which were, in effect, the basic units in each ministry, advancement was made according to length of service (*antiguidade*). Not all positions, however, were placed under careers; these were separated into a special category and called *cargos isolados* -- isolated positions. Such positions were not subjected to the requirement of a public examination and could be filled entirely according to the wishes of the executive; yet, many of them -- those located at the middle management level -- were filled by persons who had entered the civil service through examination.<sup>39</sup>

The basic contribution of the classification part of the new law, then, was that it provided a means for systematizing the pay scales and for establishing a semblance of order in

(Text continued on Page 61)

TABLE I  
REORGANIZATION OF THE BRAZILIAN CIVIL SERVICE



<sup>a</sup> Employees contracted and paid for a specific job or for specific purposes.

<sup>b</sup> Employees hired and paid by the month. Prior to the extinction of the *extranumerário* category in 1960, these public servants were similar to the *funcionários*, although they did not enjoy their rights and privileges.

<sup>c</sup> Hired and paid by the day. They consisted of both skilled and unskilled laborers.

<sup>d</sup> Employees hired and paid for menial tasks on a piece-work basis.

<sup>e</sup>Unclassified positions. These are not included in the various classes. They correspond to certain specific responsibilities.

<sup>f</sup>These civil servants are appointed to specific positions that are permanent. The term *efetivo*, however, is equally applicable to positions in the career service, for they, too, are of a permanent character.

<sup>g</sup>These civil servants carry their ranks inherent in their persons and are not tied to fixed positions. Salaries are paid on the basis of the job performed.

the federal civil service. Also, in spite of numerous alterations, it was the only plan in existence at the federal level until a new classification plan was passed by Congress in 1960.

The second aspect of the new law involved the creation of a central personnel agency, the Federal Civil Service Council (the Conselho Federal do Serviço Público Civil). It was organized as a collegial body consisting of five members, appointed by the president, who were to possess specialized knowledge of public administration and who were not to be active in partisan politics. The council's responsibilities included the preparation and administration of entrance examinations in the federal civil service, the expression of opinion about the removal of public officials, and assistance or advice in the case of plans submitted by the efficiency commissions for the improvement of the public service.<sup>40</sup>

While this law is often referred to as the origin of the Brazilian merit system, it instituted a merit system only in the sense that initial entrance into the federal civil service

was to occur through selection on the basis of public examination. This matter is crucial when we reach the period between 1945 and 1964. In spite of the belief which has been propagated that the post-war years represent a return to an open spoils system, after the institution of a merit system conducive to a neutral and impartial civil service, it must be remembered that a merit system, as the term is understood in the United States and Western Europe, did not make its appearance at this time.

The fact that a neutral and impartial civil service did not come into existence as a consequence of this legislation may be seen by examining the functional side of the civil service in the years between 1936 and 1945. First, however, we must note a section of the report on administrative reform, prepared by Barreto, Wahrlich, and Siqueira,<sup>41</sup> which provides insight into this subject. Referring to the public personnel system in existence from 1936 to the time of the report, they mention that intermediate and upper level positions of a directive character, as well as those with executive and exclusive functions,<sup>42</sup> are selected on the basis of personal confidence. Prior to Law 284, these positions were filled by promotion. The authors of the report state that the reason for this change was the desire to open these positions to rapid access by the new elements who had come into the civil service through public examination.

In other words, it was desirable to prevent the reforms contained in that same law from being frustrated by older executives, rarely selected according to merit, who were naturally opposed to such reforms.

It was only afterwards, they say, that open selection of men to fill these positions had a harmful effect.<sup>43</sup> In this connection, it is useful to ask who stood to benefit most from the reforms instituted during the late 1930's, who were in a position to lose most, and what effect this had on political development when open political debate was reinstated in 1946.

The *Estado Novo* was essentially a highly centralized, administrative, no-party state which followed the dictates of the absolute ruler under a paper constitution. The crucial section of the constitution was Article 180:

Until the National Parliament meets, the President of the Republic shall be empowered to issue decrees on all matters of legislation for the Union.<sup>44</sup>

Since a legislature was never convened, Vargas was to govern throughout this period according to decree-law.

The governmental system was centralized to a degree hitherto unknown in Brazil. Under an hierarchical arrangement consisting of *interventors* -- the representatives of the executive, the State Departments of the Public Service (the Departamentos Estaduais do Servico Publico),<sup>45</sup> and the Minister of Justice -- the states became little more than

administrative units under the control of Vargas. In the municipalities, the prefects were given powers which, at the local level, paralleled those of the *interventor*s. They were directly responsible to the *interventor* and to the president of the *daspinho* in their states.

According to Loewenstein, who has written the most complete account of state administrative organization during the Vargas period, these administrative departments were composed of from four to ten members. The smaller states usually had four, the middle-sized states, five, and the key states of Minas Gerais, São Paulo, and Rio Grande do Sul, ten each. They functioned both as the state legislature and as the supervisory body for the *interventor* and the Minister of Justice (in the latter case, this was when his actions fell within the area of their jurisdiction). Although the *interventor* was responsible for the study, approval, and declaration of all state laws and decrees, these were valid only if sanctioned by the president of the *daspinho*. If the *daspinho* opposed any act or decree executed by the *interventor*, a two-thirds' vote by this body was sufficient to suspend action until a decision was reached by the chief executive. In addition to this control over the *interventor*, the state administrative department was responsible for reporting on all appeals against the *interventor*. These appeals were submitted, through the Minister of Justice, to the President of the Republic.

It is not difficult to understand why, under this combination of circumstances, the president of the state *daspinho* was usually more powerful than the *interventor*.

Loewenstein further states that during this era

. . . the Administrative Department [was] a team of hard-hitting, hard-working, thoroughly efficient professional bureaucrats -- mostly young lawyers, but also technicians such as accountants, civil engineers, agricultural experts, statisticians -- while in the Interventor's office the efficiency of the staff [was] vitiated by ineradicable patronage.<sup>46</sup>

At the national level, both formal and effective powers were centralized in the office of the chief executive. The principal organization through which this centralization was achieved was the Administrative Department of the Public Service -- the DASP, established on July 30, 1938, through Decree-Law 579. In the absence of a deliberative assembly, the DASP provided the legislation necessary to bring into effect Article 67 of the new constitution. This article provided for the creation of a general administrative department which would undertake a detailed study of the national administrative system with the intention of instituting changes along the lines of economy and efficiency. It also gave to this department responsibility for the annual preparation of the budget and authority to exercise control over its use, with the understanding that guide lines were to be provided by the executive. The decree-law, however, broadened the new department's functions to include the institution of

central control over personnel and materiel and responsibility for rendering assistance to the President of the Republic in the reviewing of proposed legislation. Thus, from the outset, DASP was designed to function in theory as an organ of general administration similar to that conceived by Willoughby.<sup>47</sup>

Within the area of public personnel administration, the collegial Federal Civil Service Council was replaced and incorporated into the new bureau of general administration, under the control of a single head -- the president of DASP. Initially, the new organization functioned mainly as a central personnel agency and the focus of attention continued to be on establishing limitations on patronage, instituting competitive entrance examinations, and creating controls to insure the maintenance of these policies. DASP was also granted authority to check on every placement, transfer, promotion, leave, disciplinary measure, and any other minor action that pertained to personnel practices in the ministries. Further, it was given the responsibility for the maintenance of both a pre-service and an in-service training program.<sup>48</sup>

In addition to these controls established over personnel in the public service, a coordinative apparatus was created under the name of the Council of Administration of Personnel. It was designed to promote better coordination and greater efficiency among those organs concerned with personnel, both

within DASP and the ministries. The members of the council were the chiefs or directors of the personnel agencies in the ministries and, within DASP, the directors of Personnel Orientation and Control, Personnel Research, and Selection and Training.

In theory, DASP was designed to operate as a technical organization. For individual ministerial organs, this meant they were responsible to DASP for what were deemed to be technical affairs, and to the usual hierarchy of ministerial authority for general administrative patterns.<sup>49</sup> In practice, DASP functioned quite differently. Since it came into existence within the context of a dictatorship conditioned to modernization without the mechanism of a mass-based party, it provided a convenient means for central control over the national administrative system.<sup>50</sup> As an agent of the executive, it exercised responsibilities which went beyond purely technical concerns. It is in this connection that DASP became a sort of superministry, and it was against this power that hostility developed, both within the administrative system and outside it. This hostility was increased by Vargas' use of the DASP as a focal point for criticism which might have fallen more directly on his regime.<sup>51</sup>

The Brazilian press has always been hostile to DASP and has criticized it on many occasions both as a super-

ministry and because of its close association with the *Estado Novo*. This same attitude has frequently been expressed in the Congress which came into existence with the return to a representative form of government in 1946. In both instances, the attempt to stress the neutral and technical character of the organization has been treated as fictitious. For those who found themselves excluded from the political process during the Vargas years, there is much to justify their position, and this line of criticism is perhaps best summarized by Vieira da Cunha:

Without being an organ peculiar to dictatorship, the DASP pursued a role relevant to the political game of the Dictator. It was called upon to give opinions on the most diverse matters. In this way the Dictator was able to use the prestige of a "technical organ" to give weight to those decisions which interested him most. Yet DASP brought into existence a group of persons interested in administrative problems which was the most enlightened, if not the first, to concern itself with these matters in that era. But it forced this technical corps into a structure and into lines of activity which were highly formalistic, if not dogmatic at times. DASP's greatest defect was that it tried to divorce -- be it innocent or not -- administration from the social and economic milieu which it should serve. In this way it came to search for solutions in abstract schemes, aridly repeated. It leaned toward a dogmatism interwoven with esotericism that aided it in the imposition of its decisions. And, from the implantation of these solutions, administration received a discipline artificially superimposed over the real conditions of work and over an honest and authentic body of objectives under the supervision of public organs. In spite of all that was done to provide technical improvement and greater efficiency in administration, DASP was in reality incapable of resisting pressures brought to bear by the Dictator to collaborate in the play of informal political forces.

Neither was it able to impose on Brazilian public administration anything but false measures of efficiency, nor did it hinder the exaggerated increase of a skeptical, poorly disciplined, poorly paid bureaucracy.<sup>52</sup>

Although the goal of the administrative reform movement was the introduction of efficiency, economy, and rationality into the federal civil service, actually this goal became an instrumental objective within the context of the more general goals of an integrated nation-state and the institution of socio-economic changes leading to modernization. By 1937, all this was to be accomplished within the context of a closed bureaucratic system at the service of a modernizing elite.<sup>53</sup> The crucial point, then, is not so much whether the techniques advocated were good or bad inherently as the way in which they were employed. After all, since the Vargas government was one in which the administrative structure of the state provided an excellent means for the mobilization and control of energy expended in the political process, these changes were certain to be used for the ends of that state. The notion that administration could be separated from the surrounding political environment -- particularly when many new developments were taking place in the social, the economic, and the political realms -- was used at a later date to give this modernizing elite a means of legitimizing its authority. At the outset, there was no doubt that political and administrative matters were

inseparable. It should not be forgotten that Vargas came to power because of the breakdown of the traditional political system. After a brief period of experimenting with a re-organization of political forces in a new Congress, the higher civil service -- in conjunction with the military -- was used as an instrument of political integration to overcome a highly divided, dispersed, rurally-dominated social order. During the *Estado Novo*, the Brazilian federal civil service became both an object and an agent of modernization.

An indication of the political goals to which civil service reform was directed is to be found in an article published by Azevedo Amaral in April, 1938.<sup>54</sup> This article offers a rather straightforward affirmation of the need for public functionaries committed to the *Estado Novo*. He associates the idea of the separation of administration from politics as a necessary concept in the liberal democratic state in which there is a struggle for power among competing groups. But, within the context of the *Estado Novo*, he considers, such a concept is superfluous:

An apolitical administration is, in the atmosphere of the *Estado Novo*, an absurdity which implies making ineffective the very instruments through which the State's objectives ought to be achieved. . . .

The distinction between politics and administration cannot exist in state organizations. . . . Under a liberal democratic regime the State, in conformity with the fictions created around promiscuous, direct suffrage, was in reality conquered alternately by one or another social group. These groups used the parties

as their organs of political expression. Given these conditions, it was actually convenient and at the same time necessary for public employees, in carrying out the responsibilities of their positions, to keep themselves beyond the influence of that which was called politics, although politics was hardly more than a contradicting and anarchical manifestation of the representative currents of special interests. . . . Today this is no longer necessary, for the State and the Nation are identical and there is only one set of politics.<sup>55</sup>

Under these circumstances, Amaral asserts, it is not enough to recruit civil servants who possess "intellectual, cultural, moral, and technical qualifications." What the government needs is a body of civil servants in harmony with the political goals of the state. Unless the government can obtain a political commitment from its civil servants, he believes, the "efficiency of state power" may well be endangered.<sup>56</sup>

During the 1930's, public administration theory as it had developed in the United States and Western Europe had not yet come to terms with these problems of the over-all goals of the political system and how administration fitted into the broader social matrix of a given society. Hence, in recognizing the need for administrative reform in the Brazilian civil service simply to get things done, the emphasis was placed on the acquisition of new techniques from abroad. Little, if any, attention was drawn to the importance of the underlying societal norms and the nature of economic and political development in the United States --

the principal country from which the technical elite took the principles of scientific management. They accepted and subscribed to the belief that there was in existence a body of techniques of universal validity which, when applied to an administrative system, would modernize it and lead to the goals of rationality, economy, and efficiency.

In a sense, this emphasis on administrative mechanics is understandable, for there did exist the necessity of introducing new skills and techniques in the federal civil service. For example, when the first classification plan was attempted in 1936, Brazilians interested in public administration were quite aware of the lack of technicians properly trained in the collection and analysis of the data required to establish a meaningful system of classification for the federal civil service. The same may be said of other aspects of public administration -- be it in organization and methods, budgeting, personnel administration, or whatever. From this awareness stems the interest in sending Brazilians abroad for technical training in public administration, an interest which, in the post-war era, was further stimulated by the technical assistance program of the United States. Basic to all this was an unquestioned premise that politics and

administration could and should be separated and that the role of the administrator was to implement policy goals decided outside the administrative system. This was a convenient premise both during the dictatorship and in the era which was to follow the *Estado Novo* -- particularly since it was only too easy to equate things political with the traditional or the populist style politician.

It is questionable whether the Vargas administrative reforms, carried out under the auspices of a cosmopolitan technical elite concentrated primarily within DASP, succeeded in altering the real character of the public service. Of the three basic sources on administrative change in the 1930's -- Siegel, Vieira da Cunha, and Loewenstein -- only the last provides an insight into the nature of the civil service in that period, and his comments apply essentially to the *Estado Novo* at the time of its greatest success. Nevertheless, Loewenstein was somewhat skeptical about the possibility of imposing a rationalized government service upon an existing civil service in which positions were often sought by those who wished to combine a maximum of security with a minimum of effort. He pointed out that the civil service was still vastly overstaffed and that the traditional attitude of viewing public employment as a sinecure continued. To this he joined the continued absence of time sense.<sup>57</sup>

Likewise, he hinted at the fact that the technical reforms served merely to make the system more formalistic when he stated that, although admission to the civil service was subject to the theoretical rule of competitive examination, "university diplomas . . . [were] still considered as official and 'pull' as unofficial equivalents."<sup>58</sup>

In considering the diffusion of the Vargas reforms throughout the civil service, he went on to state that there was apparently little change in the origin of public officials. While at the middle level there was a number of Italian- or German-descended public employees, at the higher positions Luso-Brazilians exercised a sort of unofficial monopoly. He also observed that, while merit was the official criterion, many of the main positions in the ministries continued to be filled on the basis of political appointments and ministers and *interventors* selected for themselves staffs of secretaries and advisers.<sup>59</sup>

Another indication that much of the civil service continued unchanged despite the technical reforms is discovered in a brief reference to José Nazaré de Teixeira Dias to the problem of supervision. Writing in mid-1942, he pointed to the fact that the institution of examinations for entrance into the lower ranks was serving to increase tension within the public service. He attributed this to the divergence in preparation and training between the new body of individuals

selected on the basis of qualification and their supervisors, who lacked the proper preparation for their responsibilities and not influenced by the new standards.<sup>60</sup> It was on this basis that he called for the focusing of attention on the middle ranks of the career civil service and for the use there of individuals trained in the new techniques. Part of the difficulty, it seems, was to be found in the fact that, even though the technical elite was committed to the modernization of the civil service according to concepts imported from the United States, this group was numerically too small and its members were faced with the necessity of using many of the same employees to man the ministerial offices.

This situation was strengthened by the continuation of the practice of promotions within the career civil service on the basis of seniority. Alaim Carneiro, in an article published in February, 1945, at the end of the Vargas regime, spoke of the difficulties involved in this connection. According to his analysis, two basic problems in changing the nature of the civil service lay in the fact that promotions, decided on the basis of years of service, undercut the "merit system" and that the rate of turnover was exceptionally low. He ascribed this latter difficulty in part to the adoption of "efficiency bulletins" (*boletins de eficiência*) and their mechanical use without any relation to what they were designed to accomplish. He claimed that these bulletins adopted

a numerical criterion which was based on the search for mathematical precision, one that was incompatible with the need for a subjective judgment. All this, he felt, pointed to the necessity for a new promotions' system which was more rational and just and which would exclude promotions on the basis of seniority.<sup>61</sup>

Still another viewpoint on the success, or lack of it, in altering the Brazilian civil service is offered by Urbano C. Berquó. While this article appeared in April, 1938 -- placing it at the beginning of the dictatorship -- it is the only one encountered that dealt with the problem of internal resistance to the civil service reforms. It is unique among the materials examined for this period in that it alone raises the question of how one might change human nature so that it will accept rationalizing reforms. He is quite candid in referring to the authoritarian character of the Vargas regime and the necessity for a loyal civil service committed to its reforms:

Discontentment and incomprehension can create an unfortunate situation. Because of hostility to the new regime or because of a desire to make the systematization of the Union's personnel administration on the basis of professional careers unviable, many servants of the State may be led to act as retarding or upsetting elements for governmental action.

Under the present regime in Brazil it is in no way admissible that a functionary consider himself *neutral* or *indifferent* and, *a fortiori*, that he adopt a hostile attitude toward the path embarked upon by the national government for the treatment and solution of public

affairs. The comfortable *laissez-aller* of the era of liberalism -- fortunately now dead -- does not coincide at all with the responsibility which is involved in the undertaking of any public function, however humble it may be. Within the context of the old meaning of the word *partisan* (*partidário*) -- which no longer has any reason to exist among us -- it is evident that every functionary should be *apolitical*, but, according to the point of view of the *national interest* -- which is that of the authoritarian State -- there is no doubt that it requires of one a political consciousness in which the higher the position occupied or the more influential it may be, the greater the understanding. . . . *Discontentment* and *incomprehension* . . . constitute the two fountains from which passive resistance has issued forth; its clearest manifestations are such that even the most unprepared observers do not hesitate in including it within the definition of *sabotage*.<sup>62</sup>

In this passage, Berquó is speaking of opposition within the federal civil service to the carrying out of the reforms instituted by Law 284 (1936) and the Federal Civil Service Council. He reduces those opposing the rationalization of the public personnel system to individuals who are either unqualified technically to continue to occupy their positions and feel that their security is threatened or who are opposed to any alteration in the traditional way of doing things and seek protection in excessive amounts of paper work.<sup>63</sup>

There is yet another approach one might take in evaluating the success or failure of Vargas in changing the nature of the Brazilian civil service. In this case, we might try to evaluate the success or failure of DASP in instituting controls over one of the more powerful traditional ministries. Such an instance is provided by DASP's attempts to take the power to formulate

and administer the budget away from the Ministry of Finance. In the decree-law establishing DASP, budgetary responsibilities similar to those of the United States Bureau of the Budget were included. The Ministry of Finance, however, provided such strong resistance to this measure that DASP's control remained largely formal. The compromise worked out provided for the formation of a special budget commission within the Ministry of Finance, under the chairmanship of the president of DASP. Although this was to be merely a temporary arrangement until DASP established its own budget division, it continued to function until early 1945, when Decree-Law 7416 (of March 26) created the appropriate Division of the Budget.<sup>64</sup> By this time, however, the entire basis of the Vargas government had begun to deteriorate and it was not long before the dictator resigned and DASP was faced with a new government hostile to its very existence. With this change in regime in late 1945, what influence DASP had over the budget, with its president as chairman of the budget commission in the Ministry of Finance, disappeared. The ministry regained its traditional power in full and DASP's Division of the Budget functioned simply as part of a formal budget process unrelated to the real decisions on how the public moneys would be allocated.<sup>65</sup>

Aggravating what appears to have been a gap between the formal controls (the authority structure) and the effective

power of DASP over the national administration was Law 284's separation of public employees into two basic classes -- the public functionaries (the *funcionários públicos*) and the *extranumerários*. The notion of a career civil service existed only in relation to the public functionary and his rights, privileges, and obligations were codified by the Vargas government in the 1939 statute.<sup>66</sup> Of the two groups, the first enjoyed a privileged position in terms of salary, security, and status, but the second was numerically larger and continued to increase in size. Entrance into the former was restricted to selection on the basis of merit, as determined by public examination, while admission to the latter depended on political or personal favoritism. Generally speaking, the *extranumerário* was marginal to the whole process of rationalization, carried out under the direction of DASP.<sup>67</sup> Such a statement, however, must be qualified, for, according to Decree-Law 1909 (of December 26, 1939), the requirement of a competitive public examination was extended to *extranumerários mensalistas*; also, access to the career civil service was open to employees in this category by Decree-Law 5175, issued January 7, 1943.

There was, then, a very definite effort to create an elite career service. In this instance, merit as a qualification for entrance was completely separated from any egalitarian values. When one considers that education was a privilege enjoyed by a relatively small percentage of the total population,

the requirement of a public examination -- based on specific, academic knowledge -- had the effect of closing off admission to the career civil service for the less privileged and channeling them into the *extranumerário* category. On the other hand, those individuals with upper-class status but without specialized knowledge could still obtain public employment by occupying positions above or parallel to the career service, granted they had the proper political access. Thus, once again, Riggs' categories for analysis are helpful in understanding interrelationships in a traditional society such as Brazil's. He distinguishes three types of recruitment norms: ascription (selection on the basis of kinship and personal ties); achievement (selection on the basis of technical skills and qualification), and attainment (selection on the basis of a combination of the first two types).<sup>68</sup> If we place examinations required in the broader context of Brazilian society, it becomes clear that they functioned according to attainment norms and that recruitment on the basis of ascription was by no means entirely displaced.

Yet these were years of tremendous growth in Brazilian public administration and rapid expansion in the economy. Ministerial staffs grew in size and their contacts throughout the country widened; two new ministries appeared, and the DASP apparatus emerged as a sort of superministry designed

to coordinate the whole administrative system. To this should be added two new elements not previously mentioned but contributing greatly to the expansion of federal services and to an increase in the number of public employees: the *autarquias* (independent or semi-independent governmental entities) and the social security institutes. At the state level, many other new administrative bodies emerged. By 1945, integration of the public service had become ever more a necessity, but the one organization created for that purpose -- the DASP -- failed to provide sufficient coordination, largely because of its desire to maintain as much control as possible in its own hands. Still, this was the moment of its greatest power, for it enjoyed privileged access to and influence upon the chief executive.

Vargas was an authoritarian, and his regime was a highly personal one. His government provided a degree of unification hitherto unknown in Brazil; yet it also set the country on the road to industrialization and the creation of a national market. As dictator, Vargas substantially replaced the "old regime" which had existed before 1930 and installed a new governmental apparatus, largely bureaucratic in character, designed to impose modernization on the nation from above. He was also responsible for the almost complete reform and unification of Brazilian civil and criminal law. And, when he saw the order of the New State was beginning to

crumble, he established a new party system and began the transition back to an open system of government. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that tremendous energies were devoted to the modernization of Brazil in economics, administration, and law, traditional socio-political forces remained intact. Otherwise, they would not have been able to regroup themselves in the way they did and reappear in the years immediately after 1945 as a major political element which had to be contended with.

In this experience with administrative reform in Brazil, there is a certain parallel with the attempts of Peter the Great to change the character of the Russian civil service. Certainly, such a comparison is risky in that there are basic differences involved -- the most obvious, for Brazil, being the lack of an authoritarian tradition and the historic drive to unite an empire of diverse peoples and nations. But there are some similarities that are worth noting here and that synthesize administrative trends in Brazil, regardless of the fact that we are dealing with distinct periods of time and different cultures. While the technical elite in the Vargas era tried to use North American administrative organization and practices as a model for modernization, Peter the Great turned to the most rationalized administrative system of his day -- the Swedish -- and attempted to impose it upon the Russian system. In both

cases, one of the major factors resulting in failure to obtain the desired change was that essentially the same men were called upon to serve the state. Their values and behavior remained much the same despite the forcible introduction of new techniques and ways of doing things. It was impossible simply to dismiss the mass of older public functionaries and replace them with others, given the elite character of these societies and the lack of any system of mass education from which new individuals might be drawn. It was impossible to undertake the really basic changes needed in the functioning of the civil service without relating them to the broader problems of these societies. Just as in the era of Peter the Great, so was the Vargas period one in which tremendous energies were devoted to modernization, but a traditional society and a traditional bureaucracy largely frustrated its designs. Likewise, the two chiefs of state were much more successful in the economic than in the political-administrative sphere. Finally, both reforming elites in the civil service identified their own authority with that of the executive and found themselves largely isolated from the social forces emerging in their respective countries.<sup>69</sup>

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Ernest Hambloch, *His Majesty, The President of Brazil: A Study of Constitutional Brazil* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1936).

<sup>2</sup>See the discussion of personalism as a central value in Latin America as a whole in John P. Gillin, "Some Signposts for Policy," in Richard N. Adams *et al.*, *Social Change in Latin America Today: The Implications for United States Policy* (New York: Random House, 1960), pp. 29-33. (Hereafter cited as *Social Change in Latin America*.)

<sup>3</sup>See Abelardo Jurema, *Sexta-Feira, 13: Os Últimos Dias do Governo João Goulart* (Rio de Janeiro: Edições O Cruzeiro, 1964) and Alberto Dines and Antônio Callado, *Os Idos de Março e a Queda em Abril* (Rio de Janeiro: José Álvaro, Editor, 1964). This point was also stressed by Orlando M. Carvalho in an interview on February 23, 1965, in Belo Horizonte.

<sup>4</sup>These last two terms are, as is indicated in Chapter I, used according to the distinction established by Riggs; he calls formal power "authority" and informal power "control" (Fred W. Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964), p. 209).

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 281.

<sup>6</sup>This term is taken from Clodomir Vianna Moog, *An Interpretation of Brazilian Literature* (Rio de Janeiro: Service of Publications, 1951), pp. 16-17.

<sup>7</sup>Eulália Maria Lahmeyer Lobo, *Processo Administrativo Ibero-Americano (Aspectos Socio-Econômicos -- Período Colonial)* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1962), pp. 549, 559. This book offers an excellent comparative administrative history of the Spanish and Portuguese colonial experience in the Western hemisphere.

<sup>8</sup>Raymundo Faoro, *Os Donos do Poder: Formação do Patronato Político Brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra O Globo, 1958), p. 105.

<sup>9</sup>See João Guilherme de Aragão, "O Cargo Público e Seu Caráter Regalista e Patrimonial na Administração Colonial," *Administração e Cultura* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa

Nacional, 1951), pp. 163-168. He considers the development of the idea that positions in Brazilian colonial administration were strictly sinecures, granted by royal favor, to be used by the ruling class. For this reason, the transfer of the Portuguese Court to Rio de Janeiro only reinforced a situation already in existence.

<sup>10</sup>This distinction is based on concepts developed by Guerreiro Ramos and discussed in Chapter V.

<sup>11</sup>Mário Wagner Vieira da Cunha, *O Sistema Administrativo Brasileiro, 1930-1950* (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Nacional de Estudos Pedagógicos, Ministério de Educação e Cultura, 1963), pp. 32-33. (This translation from Portuguese, as well as all subsequent ones, is mine.)

<sup>12</sup>This law brought into force the *Ato Adicional* and on the basis of Article 71 of the Constitution of 1824 provided for changes in provincial government. The *Ato* decentralized a substantial part of the power of the central government and, when put into effect, made it considerably easier for regional interests to predominate. For the text of the 1824 Constitution and amendments to it, see Fernando H. Mendes de Almeida (ed.), *Constituições do Brasil* (São Paulo: Edições Saraiva, 1961).

<sup>13</sup>This complex relationship between the Emperor (as the "moderating power"), the presidents of the Council of State, the presidents of the provinces, and the provincial assemblies, is described in João Camillo de Oliveira Torres, *O Presidencialismo no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Edições O Cruzeiro, 1962), esp. pp. 87-88, 100-101, 108-109.

<sup>14</sup>Visconde do Uruguay, *Ensaio sobre o Direito Administrativo* (Rio de Janeiro: Typografia Nacional, 1862).

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 215.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 215-216.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*, p. iv.

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 27, 275-276.

<sup>19</sup>Aragão, "O Cargo Público no Século XIX e o Sistema do Mérito," *Administração e Cultura*, op. cit., pp. 169-173. For a listing of the early attempts at public examinations based on competence, see the articles by Braga, Lopes, and Nascimento Silva (listed in Bibliography). An

examination of these substantiates the impression that, where public examinations were attempted, they were designed to attract to the national civil service men with a classical liberal education. Since education was a privilege of a small minority -- the only persons who had the means and the leisure to afford it -- any attempt to use knowledge as a criterion of selection was certain to insure that these individuals came from upper-class backgrounds. . . . The *bacharel* is literally the graduate of a school of law or any other school at the university level. Here it refers to the lawyer-sons of *fazendeiros*.

<sup>20</sup>Oliveira Tôrres, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-114.

<sup>21</sup>As observed in Chapter I, "political development" refers to the "process by which a political system acquires an increased capacity to sustain successfully and continuously new types of organizations." A second essential element is that "for this process to continue over time a differentiated and centralized polity must come into being which must be able to command resources from and power over wide spheres and regions of the society." A third element is the idea that, since this process does not require the creation of particular kinds of institutions, it can move forward, stop, or be reversed. For a discussion of the Diamant model, see Chapter I.

<sup>22</sup>This phrase refers to the alliance worked out between the two most important states in the First Republic in which the presidency alternated between them. Minas Gerais was at that time essentially a cattle-raising and milk-producing state, while São Paulo was the center of Brazil's coffee production.

<sup>23</sup>Oliveira Tôrres, *A Formação do Federalismo no Brasil* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1961), p. 239.

<sup>24</sup>The account of this rebellion under the leadership of Antonio Conselheiro, joined with a feeling for the hostile environment of the interior of the Northeast, is best given in Euclides da Cunha's classic *Rebellion in the Backlands* (*Os Sertões*), translated by Samuel Putnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).

<sup>25</sup>This statement is based on Vieira da Cunha's discussion of administration during the Republican period (1889-1930) (p. 36). This concentration of power at the regional level is indicative of an oligarchical style of politics as opposed to clan-style politics.

<sup>26</sup>Vieira da Cunha, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-35.

<sup>27</sup>While Loewenstein's reference to an elite group in the national administrative system is very brief, it does offer an insight which the researcher was unable to obtain elsewhere in fuller detail. See Karl Loewenstein, *Brazil under Vargas* (New York: Macmillan, 1942), pp. 17-18.

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*, *cit.*

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 22.

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 28-29, 34-37.

<sup>31</sup>Brazilian Embassy, *Survey of the Brazilian Economy, 1959* (Washington, D.C., 1959), pp. 2-3.

<sup>32</sup>It was created in 1906 under Law 1906.

<sup>33</sup>This summary of administrative change is based on information contained in Vieira da Cunha (*op. cit.*, pp. 30-60).

<sup>34</sup>Kleber Nascimento, *Classificação de Cargos no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1962), pp. 32-33.

<sup>35</sup>Gilbert D. Siegel, "The Vicissitudes of Governmental Reform in Brazil: A Study of the DASP" (unpublished Doctoral dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1964), pp. 70-72.

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 74-76. Siegel does not make it clear who suppressed the Nabuco Report. Most probably, it was Vargas, but there is not sufficient information available to justify this assertion. Siegel contrasts the approach preferred by Maurício Nabuco with that of Luis Simões Lopes -- a leading figure in this second commission, a confidant of Vargas, the first president of DASP, and the present president of the Fundação Getúlio Vargas. This difference in opinion is best expressed in the following paragraph taken from Siegel: "Nabuco felt that patronage was the 'life's blood' of the politician, and that any system which ignored this fact would be doomed to failure. Traditionally Congress and the President cooperated on this . . . [the president had the appointment power and Congress control over pay and some aspects of the organization of the bureaucracy]. At the same time he recognized the need for a more rational selection procedure. He saw no incompatibility between objective

selection and patronage. Personnel objectively tested [in his plan] were to be nominated by politicians. After entrance, career progression [was to take place]. . . .

"As the son of the famous politician from Pernambuco, Joaquim Nabuco, he saw that a complete break with the regionalistic patrimony was unrealistic. A career service had to be gradually built. By allowing the politician to freely make appointments, but from among persons judged to be competent, political support for a reformed civil service would be more easily maintained. At the same time, the careers would be closed to political appointments above the entry level. Simões Lopes, on the other hand, saw the need to break suddenly and dramatically with the past. Although Maurício Nabuco insists that President Vargas later regretted his action in permitting non-patronage based personnel selection, the idea of Simões Lopes won out in the end and it appeared 'because he was more influential upon the President': (pp. 71-72, 79-80). It is unfortunate that Nabuco's ideas were not utilized in the post-dictatorship era. It appears that in the struggle to defend DASP and the Vargas-instituted administrative reforms after 1945, intellectual rigidity set in.

<sup>37</sup>The criterion of salary differentiation was later formalized in the 1939 statute for public functionaries. The word *quadro* means literally a table or chart; however, it is used here in the sense of a service. Because of this meaning and because the term *serviço* is used in the 1960 classification law with the same connotation, the Portuguese word has been retained.

<sup>38</sup>Eduardo Pinto Pessoa Sobrinho, *Curso de Classificação de Cargos (Cursos de Administração)*, (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público, 1952), pp. 28-29; Siegel, *op. cit.*, pp. 250-251.

<sup>39</sup>Ennor de Almeida Carneiro, "Política de Remuneração," *Revista do Serviço Público*, LXVII (April, 1955), 41, 44 (hereafter cited as *RSP*); Moacyr Ribeiro Briggs, "Evolução da Administração Pública Federal," *ibid.*, III (August, 1938), 16-17; Brazil, Ministério Extraordinário para a Reforma Administrativa, *Normas para Preservação e Revigoração do Sistema do Mérito* (Rio de Janeiro, 1963) (mimeographed), p. 4; Siegel, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-79, 110-111.

<sup>40</sup>Siegel, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-81. He credits the council with these contributions: the initiation of a public personnel system; the establishment of open competitive examinations for

entrance into the federal civil service, the creation of rational bases for the provision of temporary public personnel -- a group not covered under the 1936 law (the *extranumerários*), and the initial work which led to the formation of the Civil Servants' Welfare and Assistance Institute (the Instituto de Previdência e Assistência dos Servidores do Estado). Cf., Siegel, p. 85.

<sup>41</sup>Brazil, Ministério Extraordinário para a Reforma Administrativa, Coordenador (Eloah M.G. Barreto, Beatriz Warhlich, and Belmiro Siqueira, rapporteurs), *Normas para Preservação e Revigoração do Sistema do Mérito*, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

<sup>42</sup>"On cargos de direção intermediária e superior, bem como as funções de chefia e assessoramento. . .," *ibid.*

<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

<sup>44</sup>Cited in Loewenstein, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

<sup>45</sup>Because these state administrative bodies were modeled after the national Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público -- the DASP -- they became known as *das-pinhos* -- little DASP's. They are also referred to as DSP's, although Loewenstein uses the term "Administrative Departments" as an English equivalent.

<sup>46</sup>Loewenstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-68, esp. 64.

<sup>47</sup>Warhlich is responsible for making this point initially in an unpublished paper on the DASP ("An Analysis of DASP, A Contribution to the Study of Comparative Administration," a paper prepared for the Public Administration Clearing Service, Chicago, February, 1955, p. 3). See also her reference: William Franklin Willoughby, *Principles of Public Administration, With Special Reference to the National and State Governments of the United States* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1927), pp. 360-361.

<sup>48</sup>Warhlich, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11. Although the creation of a budget division within DASP was postponed until 1945 and even then failed to function as intended, the organization was able to establish controls over equipment and materiel used in the ministries and to supervise plans for the construction of public buildings. It also undertook an active publication program, of which the *Revista do Serviço Público* (RSP) was but a small part. On the other hand, little was accomplished in

actual work simplification, intended in the creation of an organization and methods division.

<sup>49</sup> Discussing this relationship, Siegel maintains that it represented the application of the early administrative concept of the organizational separation of "ends" and "means" departments and Taylor's functional management principle (p. 129).

<sup>50</sup> In this context, the word "modernization" refers to the Vargas government's institution of change in the economic and administrative spheres with the objective of making a sharp break with the past and creating a nation as "modern" as its American or Western European counterparts.

<sup>51</sup> In his dissertation on DASP, Siegel goes into considerable detail about the way in which the organization was used to draw criticism away from the executive both during the dictatorship and afterwards. According to his interpretation, this was one of the major factors later in the destruction of its power base once executive support was no longer forthcoming.

<sup>52</sup> Vieira da Cunha, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93.

<sup>53</sup> In treating the reform movement, Siegel refers to those in this elite who participated in administration as a technical elite because of their commitment to the means and not the ends of rationalization in the public service. They are best represented in the DASP technicians (the *técnicos de administração*). These men were considered to be the real elite of the civil service -- a situation which changed considerably after 1945.

<sup>54</sup> Azevedo Amaral, "Política e Serviço Público," *RSP*, II (April, 1938), 13-15.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 14..

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 14-15.

<sup>57</sup> Loewenstein, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 102.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 104.

<sup>60</sup> José Nazaré de Teixeira Dias, "A Formação de Supervisores," *RSP*, III (August, 1942), 27.

<sup>61</sup>Alaim de Almeida Carneiro, "A Promoção nos Serviços Públicos," *RSP*, VIII (February, 1945), 40-41.

<sup>62</sup>Urbano C. Berquó, "Eficiência Administrativa e Sabotagem Burocrática," *RSP*, II (April, 1938), 5-6.

<sup>63</sup>*Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>64</sup>Wahrlich, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-2, 4-5.

<sup>65</sup>Siegel makes the statement that DASP was continually fighting ministerial efforts to decentralize or to weaken the central control process; however, other than a reference to the conflict with the Ministry of Finance, he does not offer specific instances. He mentions that conflicts between the reformers and parts of the bureaucracy were evident before the creation of DASP and that its formation in 1937 served to increase these conflicts (pp. 138-139).

<sup>66</sup>This statute was issued by Decree-Law 1712 on October 10, 1939.

<sup>67</sup>Vieira da Cunha, *op. cit.*, pp. 93, 100-101.

<sup>68</sup>Riggs, *op. cit.*, pp. 128, 135, 167.

<sup>69</sup>For a more detailed treatment of the administrative reforms of Peter the Great, see the chapter by Merle Fainsod in Joseph LaPalombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

## CHAPTER III

### THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE MOVEMENT TO REFORM THE BRAZILIAN CIVIL SERVICE

The theme of this chapter and the next -- the ideas and personalities which have had a major influence on the civil service reform movement -- leads us to consider initially our third independent variable: the application of the techniques of scientific management without adequate attention to the functional requirements of the existing administrative system and sufficient consideration for the human elements. In many respects, the administrative concepts imported from abroad and the individuals who have defended them have set the scene and conditioned the solutions offered to specific problems in the public personnel field. Once the theoretical foundation of the civil service reform movement has been established, we shall be in a better position to consider the core of the dissertation: the civil service and its political environment.

In this chapter, we shall consider first the various models useful in the analysis of American public administration,<sup>1</sup> keeping in mind their relevance to the study of Brazilian administration. A more complete analysis will be devoted to the "machine model" of traditional administration because it bears the closest relation to Brazilian organiza-

tion theory. The other models will be utilized only very briefly. My purpose here is to capture the highlights of American organization theory as it has evolved in the post-war years and to illuminate the variety of approaches that can be utilized through models for studying organizations in the United States. Once this has been accomplished, we shall examine the paths organization theory has pursued in Brazil, pointing out the similarities and the contrasts in organization theory as it is observed in Brazil and the United States.

### The Evolution of Organization Theory in the United States

#### *The Traditional Model*

Organization theory as it first developed in the United States is characterized by a "machine model" approach to the study of administration. It is task-oriented and substantially excludes human behavior from the study of administration. A basic assumption inherent in this model is the passivity of human interests. The human instrument in this context becomes little more than a communications network, a problem-solving mechanism into which problems are fed and from which expected consequences result.

This mode of analysis emerged originally out of Taylorism, with its concern for the search for "the one best way" in

the development of administrative techniques and with its orientation toward economy and efficiency as the goals of the organization. Taylor was essentially responsible for the rearrangement of procedures to increase efficiency and economy and to eliminate all unnecessary steps in a capitalist, industrial set-up. Out of his initial work in industry as an engineer, a whole school of scientific management developed.

Until the 1930's, scientific management, with its locus substantially confined to business administration, concentrated its efforts at the workshop level. Time and motion studies, based on the idea of reducing tasks to their simplest elements and speeding up production, were initiated. These, in turn, led to a modification of the "machine model" approach to account for the element of human fatigue and to allow for a physiological approach by management to worker production.

Despite this close association with business administration, administrative management theory as a field in itself got under way during the course of World War I. At the government level, the ideas of economy and efficiency were first applied through the Bureau of Efficiency created by Congress during the war years. This bureau raised the whole question of position classification according to individual duties and responsibilities. Then, with the Position Classification Act

of 1923, this school of thought was able to introduce the principle of equal pay for equal work into the federal civil service. Although economy and efficiency were major objectives, they were related to a general reform movement, one aspect of which was the moralization of American administrative practices through the removal of favoritism and corruption and the institution of a merit system.

In the 1930's, the scientific management school entered a new phase of development, one which was to carry it to its highest level of conceptualization.<sup>2</sup> A shift began away from Taylorism and its focus at the workshop level to the top of the administrative hierarchy, where organizational charts entered into vogue and where the manipulation of subordinate administrative units was emphasized. The crucial characteristic of this new development in administrative analysis was the objective of creating a rational, ordered administrative structure in which the administrator could get things done. The key word became "coordination" -- coordination to achieve the same goals of economy and efficiency. Out of this concern with coordination in the organization, a series of concepts emerged which took on the attributes of rules of universal applicability. These included such ideas as the span of control, the unity of command, the homogeneity of work, the dichotomy of staff and line, the principle of generalist administrators, and the idea that specialists

should be "on tap, but not on top." Such principles were based on the idea that since all organizations were hierarchical in character, the basic problem was how to organize all of the functions and responsibilities of the organization under the executive at the top. In this context, attention was given to such Continental administrative writers as Fayol, and Gulick was able to develop his POSDCORB concept.<sup>3</sup>

The scientific management school, with its concern for utilitarian principles of acting, consciously attempted to assume away the problem of values; yet unconsciously it imposed its own values, for it emphasized how one could and should be able to get things done with a minimum of expense and a maximum of efficiency. In this creation of a "science of administration" it was believed that not only were values unrelated to objective facts, but also that they should and could be separated. Likewise, it was postulated that administration must be separated from the conflicts which take place in the political arena. In such a context, the question of who should rule was fairly obvious: generalist administrators -- for they would constitute an educated ruling class. At the national level, this meant the president as the head of the bureaucracy, but this was to be a bureaucracy selected on democratic bases. The ideal was the British administrative class, and the goal was the creation of an aristocracy of

talent. The legislative branch in such a situation was downgraded and the notion of a strict separation of powers was rigidly maintained. But the problem of who shall determine the ends of the State and the goals and values of public administration remained unresolved. The scientific management school, regardless of its belief that it was objective and scientific in its procedures, was thus highly prescriptive. These weaknesses were transferred *in toto* to Brazil.

Once it became obvious -- as in the reorganization of the Patent Office -- that neither the scientific principles of administration nor the concern with integration and coordination among administrative management theorists was particularly applicable to real-life situations, modifications in administrative management theory began to occur. Two men who have made a significant contribution in this respect are Chester I. Barnard and Marshall E. Dimock.<sup>4</sup>

Recognizing the deficiencies of the "machine model" approach to administration, Barnard added two elements to traditional administrative theory: the importance of the individual, especially that of the executive, in an organizational context, and the notion of equilibrium and disequilibrium in the organization. Both these aspects are related to his attempt to lessen the authority and control aspects of hierarchical organization. The objective here is to bring about greater cooperation between management and the workers, with an eye toward

increasing productivity. His concept of the executive is that of a persuader who seeks to win his employees over to his point of view. One of the techniques designed to achieve this, and thus to bring about equilibrium in the organization, is the attempt to increase individual participation in decision-making. There are two premises involved: the idea that an organization is faced primarily with a problem-solving task and the notion that significant changes in human behavior can be brought about rapidly only if the persons expected to change are brought into the decision-making process; but, since the executive is responsible for structuring the situation to his or the management's advantage, this becomes but another manipulatory approach to human behavior.

Barnard continues, however, to accept the goals of the organization as given, along with the other writers in the scientific management school. His solutions remain prescriptive, not empirical, in character. They are designed simply to make the traditional framework of administrative theory more operational. Even though he stresses coordination and the importance of influencing the behavior of the members of the organization, he does not get into the entire problem of behavior. He is primarily concerned with vertical relationships; horizontal relationships enter in only as a means of expediting the vertical. This allows for the maintenance of the traditional goals of economy and efficiency.

The properly functioning organization, he maintains, is "productive"; it is not wasteful of human energy, and it is always in equilibrium.

Dimock is responsible for upsetting the idea that an organization is a "closed" system. There are, he points out, certain external factors which must be taken into account because of the influence they exert on the internal structure of the organization. In this respect, he challenged one of the major tenets of the traditional school: the principle of uniformity. His approach, in contrast, emphasized one's adjustment to the specific situation with which he comes into contact. In spite of this emphasis on the particular, however, he still subscribes to a rational, step-by-step approach to public administration. For him, administration is a clear-cut, simple process if correctly approached.

In view of the inadequacies of traditional theory, he seeks to establish a new set of organization principles on the basis of his personal experience. These include: (1) the establishment of a clear-flow of communications; (2) the adaptation of structure to the peculiar requirements of a given situation that there may be complete coincidence between function and vehicle; (3) the provision of an organizational structure adaptable to changing conditions; (4) the maintenance of organizational analysis as the continuous responsibility of the executive, rather than its periodic

pursuit by the expert; (5) the establishment of a groove, and (6) an awareness of the gap between theory and reality. While his approach is pragmatic in character, he still does not seek to change the goals of traditional public administration.

#### *The Neo-Classical or Human Relations Model*

The first real departures from traditional organization theory are found in the human relations school, in which an interest in the individual within the large group replaces concern with the task. Whereas the goals of economy and efficiency remain constant, a real attempt is made to explain the nature of conflict within the organization. The distinctive character of this school of thought is based on the Hawthorne experiments and the writings of F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson.<sup>5</sup> The purpose of these experiments originally was to get at the physical factors influencing production. It was not long, however, before the researchers involved had decided that the crucial factor was not physiological, but, rather, a matter of group identification. This led, in turn, to an examination of external environmental influences on the individual worker. Another significant discovery was that steps that were rational to management would often be interpreted nonrationally by the worker; also, it was observed that there were informal patterns of behavior within the organization that revolved around the cohesion of workers. In

many cases, this led to a divergence between the informal and the formal organization, between the natural group leader and the supervisor. In such situations it was noted that one's social relationships within a group might well be stronger than a particular economic incentive.

Nevertheless, in the human relations school, the individual remained as much a passive instrument of the organization -- although the focus now came to rest on the large group -- as in the "machine model" of traditional administration. Similarly, the search for means to maintain equilibrium in the organization, begun by those in the transitional phase, continued, although the techniques advocated had changed. Further, the question of goal formation was never touched on. The basic contribution, then, of this school lies in the attention it has drawn to the dysfunctional side of organizational behavior.

#### *The Decision-Making Model*

This model represents an even more fundamental departure from traditional public administration in that, while it is task-oriented, the emphasis moves away from concern with structure and the adaptation of the individual to a particular set of circumstances, which are deemed to be proper and best, to a preoccupation with problem-solving in the organization as the essential process. At its basis is a focus on the decision as a basic unit for administrative analysis. Within

the confines of this model, there are two entirely different conceptualizations: the abstract and the concrete.

Herbert A. Simon is primarily concerned with administration as a series of rational decisions. He departs from the assumption that human behavior in the organization is, if not wholly rational, at least in substantial part intended to be so. He limits the purpose of administrative theory to establishing a boundary between the rational and the nonrational aspects of human behavior, for, according to his concept, it is responsible for developing a "theory of intended and bounded rationality." Proceeding from this foundation, he constructs a model of administrative man as opposed to economic man. While economic man theoretically "maximizes" by selecting the best alternatives from among those available to him, he postulates that administrative man "satisfices"<sup>6</sup> by looking for a course of action satisfactory or "good enough." Economic man may well deal with the real world in all its complexities, but administrative man, because of the boundary separating him from the outside world, recognizes that his world is a drastically simplified model of the real one. Since administrative man "satisfices" rather than "maximizes," Simon claims that he can make his choices without first examining all possible alternatives. By treating the world as rather "empty" and ignoring the "interrelatedness of all things," Simon asserts, administrative man can "make his

decisions with relatively simple rules of thumb that do not make impossible demands on his capacity for thought."<sup>7</sup>

The problem with this highly theoretical model is that there is a whole series of nonrational factors that enters into administrative behavior and that cannot be properly excluded if we are to understand the administrative process. It is precisely to the nonrational factors in administration that many of the other models direct their attention. Also, by concentrating at the operational level, Simon avoids the whole problem of the changing goals of the organization which occur over a time span. After all, what is rational may well vary from one period to another, according to what the goals of the organization are. Finally, this model tends to be static.

In contrast to Simon's abstract model is the concrete case study approach to administration, exemplified by the work of Harold Stein<sup>8</sup> and the Inter-University Case Program. Its distinctive contribution has been to get politics back into the study of administration. By focusing on specific decision-making issues in real life situations, it has developed an awareness of the environment surrounding administration; it has directed attention to the rational and nonrational aspects of human behavior in organization, and it has dealt with the problems created by conflicting goals and values.

But this analytic model is not without its problems.

One of the most vexing has been how to impose standards of relevance so that comparability can be achieved on a case-to-case basis; yet one of the goals of this model has been to build a body of knowledge from which generalizations about the administrative process can be reached. As the Inter-University Case Program has evolved, its cases have been essentially studies of the unique. Thus, while this method of analysis has helped to illuminate the internal process of public administration in relation to its external political goals and environment, it has failed to contribute to the development of any general theory about decision-making precisely because of the unique and unrelated character of its cases. Furthermore, there is the problem of where the cut-off falls in these materials, for in reality there is no final resolution to these cases. They are but a part of the on-going administrative process.

These deficiencies in the case study approach have been largely overcome more recently in that model that Aaron Wildavsky has developed for the analysis of the politics of the budgetary process. Wildavsky directs his attention to the over-all decision-making process in a specific area. As such, he avoids the uniqueness of the case study method, although he uses this method to collect data and on this basis seeks to generalize about the budgetary process. Likewise, he operationalizes Simon's concept of "satisficing" by

demonstrating that it is an important element in administrative behavior in budgetary matters. He is essentially concerned with the individual units in the decision-making process and the strategies and techniques they use to get public funds or to limit expenditures. This process is pre-eminently political. The merits of his approach are best summarized in his definition of budgeting. It is "concerned with the translation of financial resources into human purposes." It is

. . . an incremental process, proceeding from a historical basis, guided by accepted notions of fair shares, in which decisions are fragmented, made in sequence by specialized bodies, and coordinated through repeated attacks on problems and through multiple feedback mechanisms.<sup>9</sup>

For Wildavsky, budgeting is an on-going process which is to be better understood by relating it to its political environment and seeking to comprehend it by analyzing the process over an extended time span. As such, he broadens the whole basis of the decision-making model and opens it up to new possibilities by combining the abstract and the concrete into an effective synthesis.

### *The Bureaucracy Model*

In contrast to the three previous models, this one concentrates on the organization *per se* or the large group in an organizational setting. Within this conceptual framework, the movement has been from a concern with the formalistic aspects of bureaucracy to one in which the researcher directs his attention toward human elements in a bureaucratic context.<sup>10</sup>

The point of departure for this analytic approach is the Weberian notion of bureaucracy. As an ideal-type construct it is designed to offer a prototype for modern society. The following elements may be observed as being characteristic: rationality, impersonality, hierarchy of authority, formality, a rational set of rules, the importance of position, legitimacy, trained personnel, a career service, a monistic set of relationships, and the bureaucratization of society. Among these, the matter of legitimacy is of key importance, for, according to Weber, it is by reason of this legitimacy, granted by a formal act of law, that a bureaucracy has authority over its members. It also makes possible the creation of a rational set of rules and these provide an operational basis for the entire organization and make necessary the maintenance of written records. This development of a set of rules and a written record, in turn, provides impersonality once it is assumed that the behavior of the administrator is neutral and impartial. This situation also necessitates the existence of trained personnel having the capacity to carry out specific duties. Since continuity is a major aspect of a functioning bureaucracy, this means that a career service, with systematic methods of recruitment and internal mobility based entirely on competency, is essential. Likewise, status is attached to the position and is not related to the individual personality; once an individual leaves a position,

he leaves his previous status behind. Another aspect of the individual bureaucrat's position is the notion of a fixed salary established according to function and responsibility. Since it is assumed that a rational organization will consist of a monistic set of relationships, it is important that the hierarchy of authority be maintained and that each individual bureaucrat demonstrate a sense of obligation to the position above and responsibility to those below him. What emerges, then, is the image of a highly structured impersonal organization based on a set of authoritative relationships. While the internal objectives of the organization are economy, efficiency, and rationality, the whole matter of goals is left to be determined externally.

Those who have followed the bureaucratic model in analyzing organizations have attempted to perfect it by making it more dynamic, by enabling it to deal with conflict, and by directing attention to the informal aspects of bureaucratic behavior. This involves breaking with a "machine model" approach to human behavior. The basic premise from which these writers operate is that each organization has a life of its own and can be examined as a living entity.

One approach is to concentrate on the functions and dysfunctions of the organization as a way of getting at its dynamics and dealing with the fact that the Weberian assumption of the predictability of performance and the elimination

of friction is not valid. The major interest is in understanding the continual flux of an organization and the adaptations or the adjustments it continually undergoes. There is also an awareness of the variety of bureaucratic forms and the need to arrive at a set of common characteristics which can be interrelated with specific bureaucratic structures at particular points in time.

Another approach within this model is concerned with the fact that it cannot be assumed, as it is in the Weberian model, that people will do as they are told and that impersonality can be absolutely achieved. In this respect, attention is devoted to human behavior within a bureaucratic setting in other than neutral and impartial terms. After all, administrators, it is recognized, have individual values and are influenced by them. This leads to a consideration of the informal aspects of authority and the whole matter of the development of organizational loyalties and commitment to a specific set of goals. There is nothing that insures that the individuals in the organization will automatically develop a loyalty to the organization and a firm commitment to its goals. The problem of organization here becomes interwoven with that of recruitment and training.

A third approach within the confines of this model envisions the organization as a social system operating in a

particular social setting and which is influenced by forms tangential to its rationally-ordered structure and stated goals. This approach attacks the view of the organization as a self-contained unit constituting a closed system. Organization dynamics, according to this viewpoint, are a consequence of the process of continual adjustment and accommodation to a changing environment. A second aspect entering into the analysis of the dynamic and changing character of an organization is the informal internal structure that develops independently and interacts with the formal one. Attention is thus directed to the internal relevance of organization behavior and to understanding the external and internal forces which mold and change an organization's character.

The most recent development within the bureaucratic model has been the application of mass survey techniques to understand, in global terms, the characteristics of the American federal civil service. In this case, through an exhaustive examination of the backgrounds of civil servants, the degree of representativeness of the bureaucratic system in relation to its social environment is established. Through interviewing, character types of the civil servant are established. The focus here is on the bureaucracy essentially as a large group, analyzed according to various social criteria. For example, family, marital status, sex, geographical dis-

tribution, education, and previous employment experience. What emerges is an image of a bureaucracy, based not so much on an ideal-type construct as on a model constructed from the use of statistically relevant data.<sup>11</sup>

### *The Compliance Structure Model*

Like the bureaucratic model, the compliance structure model departs from an interest in the large organization as the fundamental unit of analysis. It differs in that, while the former directs its attention to the behavior of the organization, the latter concentrates on the behavior of the people involved as crucial to understanding how an organization functions. Writers who follow this approach challenge the coercive character of authority as it is found in the Weberian model and emphasize the importance of compliance on the part of subordinates. Within this model, several different paths are followed in analyzing compliance patterns and the nature of authority in the organization, but all begin with a recognition of the conflict potential in any organization and approach it on the basis of conflicting orientations among superiors and subordinates. The compliance structure within any organization, then, revolves around the fact that two parties are involved: one who exercises power and one who responds to it in the direction of either alienation or commitment. Similarly, all recognize the necessity of developing some means for handling the interrelationship between

organizational and individual values and goals to reduce conflict and to maintain an effective organization.

The particular way in which conflict is handled by the different writers who follow this analytic approach varies considerably. Selznick, in this particular case, focuses his attention on the "cooptation" process -- that is, the way new elements are absorbed formally or informally into "the leadership or policy determining structure of an organization" when external threats to its stability or existence arise. He states that the significance of cooptation lies not only in the fact that it may change or broaden the nature of leadership but also in its influence on the character and the role of the organization.<sup>12</sup> Presthus is oriented toward the people in the organization -- their roles, how they can conceive of themselves, and their personality types, while Thompson is interested in the problem created by individual specialization in reaction to the hierarchical structure of the organization.<sup>13</sup> Hower and Orth limit their discussion to the conflict between scientists and management in industrial research organizations as a consequence of two very different value orientations. They stress the need of management for a human relations skill and the necessity of open communications within the organization.<sup>14</sup> In contrast, Blau and Etzioni provide a much wider orientation: The first focuses on effective authority as dependent on the willingness of

subordinates to comply with directives by a superior, while the second, distinguishing between three types of power and three types of involvement in organizations, states that to maintain an effective organization there must be congruence between its goal and compliance structures.<sup>15</sup>

### *The Rationalized Systems Models*

Using the business firms as his prototype and concepts developed in sociology, Argyris constructs a highly rationalized model around two sets of variables: the formal organization and the individual.<sup>16</sup> He bases his construct on a conceptualization of human beings as need-fulfilling, goal-achieving entities and formal organizations as complex patterns of interdependent variables. An essential element in the model is the assumption that all human beings are incomplete by themselves and, as such, they achieve "wholeness" only through interaction with others. Organization, claims Argyris, is a strategy; it is a human strategy designed to achieve certain objectives. Assuming the existence of a relatively mature individual and a formal organization that maximizes the principles of scientific management, he has as his primary objective the study of the impact of the formal organization on the individual. To achieve this goal, he conceptualizes a genetic model which, once completed, he believes, will also provide dynamic explanations of organized

behavior. Thus, his model is mainly built around input-output feedback relationships.

#### *Four Social Systems Models*

These models have in common their consideration of the organization as a social system. The first is the structural-functional model, based on the concept of the organization developed by Talcott Parsons. According to Parsons, the distinguishing characteristic of an organization, as opposed to other social systems, is the primacy of its orientation to the attainment of a specific goal. He defines an organization as

. . . a system which, as the attainment of its goal, "produces" an identifiable something which can be utilized in some way by another system, an input.<sup>17</sup>

The structure of an organization, he says, may be considered from two points of view: the cultural-institutional and the group or role. His emphasis, however, is upon the first. In this connection, he states that the main point of reference for analyzing the structure of any social system is its value patterns. This defines the basic orientation of the system to the situation in which it operates, hence, it guides the activities of participant individuals. This value system, by definition, must be a subsystem of a higher order and interacts with it. It also provides the basis for classification, since organizations may be classified according to

the type of goal or function around which they are organized. The main components of the organization as a social system are divided into four analytic categories: the value system; the adaptative mechanisms (the mobilization of resources); the operative code (goal implementation), and the integrative mechanisms (having to do with the compatibility of the institutional patterns under which the organization operates with those of other organizations and social units).<sup>18</sup> The problem with this model is that it tends to be static and does not allow the researcher to deal with the organization on a time basis.

A second social system construct is to be found in the prime beneficiary model developed by Blau and Scott. On the basis of who can be determined as the prime beneficiary of the services of a formal organization, they establish four analytic typologies: mutual benefit associations, in which the membership receives the primary benefits; business concerns, in which the owners are the prime beneficiaries; service organizations, in which the clientele group is the primary beneficiary, and commonweal organizations, in which the public at large is the prime beneficiary.<sup>19</sup> The difficulty with the application of these typologies to existing organizations is that they do not allow one to account for the movement within an organization as it moves from one form of action to another. They neither provide any way to limit nor to define explicitly the clientele involved.

The third model, that offered by Sherif, focuses on the small group and, within this context, the importance of group norms and values as a factor in individual behavior and in the emergence of conflict. Sherif states:

A group is a social unit (1) which consists of a number of individuals who, at a given time, stand more or less definite interdependent status or role relationships with one another, and (2) which explicitly or implicitly possesses a set of values or norms of its own regulating behavior of individual members, at least in matters of consequence to the group.<sup>20</sup>

This model directs attention to relations between small groups rather than to relations within the group. It raises the problem of shifting individual attitudes within and outside the group.<sup>21</sup>

The fourth model centers around the concept of role analysis as a means of understanding the action of an individual in the group. In their study of Massachusetts school superintendents, Gross, Mason, and McEachern set up a closed systems model in which they concentrate on role conflict and collision around a central position.<sup>22</sup> This model is intended to supply the researcher with a tool to get at the difference in individual perceptions of role expectations, the multitude of positions which exist in a given setting, and the possibility of conflict and discensus stemming from role collision and role conflict. While it excludes the external environment, it offers a means of establishing a greater perception of individual behavior in institutional settings.

### Brazilian Public Administration

Public administration in Brazil, in contrast to that in the United States, has passed through three phases -- juridical, technical, and sociological.<sup>23</sup> While these three phases essentially describe developments in Brazilian administration over a time span, the changes in Brazilian organization theory will become much clearer if, once having analyzed this material, we seek to evaluate it in terms of analytic models based on the preceding section. This will be attempted, however, only in the concluding section of the chapter.

It is essential that we have some knowledge of the developments of organization theory in the United States so that we may comprehend properly the similarities and contrasts involved in Brazilian organization theory. It should not be forgotten that Brazilian administration theory since the late 1930's has developed from a North American basis. Yet it is equally important, in the analysis of Brazilian administrative theory, to retain a feeling for time, since there appears to be a close interaction between historic periods and analytic approaches. This is an element which has been absent in the development of North American administrative theory, particularly during the last two decades.

*The Juridical Phase*

Throughout the major part of their history, Brazilians have viewed the problems of administration within a juridical framework that is founded upon a civil law tradition. According to the categories of analysis developed by Goulart and Ramos -- the juridical, the technical, and the sociological -- the juridical phase applies to virtually all writing on Brazilian administration prior to 1936, although it does not cease with this date. It is oriented almost entirely toward abstract legal problems and is closely related to the study of administrative law. The basic sources cited by Brazilian writers belonging to this phase are primarily French and, secondarily, German, and the intellectual framework is similar to that developed in those countries for the study of administration. This is understandable if we consider that, besides the civil law tradition, cultural borrowings from France and the use of ideals based on French political and administrative institutions have preceded cultural borrowing from the United States and the use of North American political and administrative models.

For our purposes here, specific writers in the juridical phase are not nearly so important as the general framework the civil law system in Brazil creates for administrative analysis. This legal foundation is crucial to the development of administrative theory in that country

and is closely related to the failure of American-style public personnel concepts to function in the Brazilian environment.

Brazil has received its civil law heritage from two major sources: Portuguese and French. For this reason, it is of value to measure Brazilian experience along these lines with a model taken from Continental Europe rather than from the Anglo-American world. Such a model is to be found in Herbert J. Spiro's writing.<sup>24</sup>

In comparing Roman law and common law systems, Spiro initially draws a distinction between lawfulness and legalism. While lawfulness "looks upon the legal system as one instrument among several for the attainment of the goal of constitutionalism," legalism

. . . looks upon the legal system, its consistency and its elaboration, as the goal itself. All other phases of the political process are considered mere means for reaching this goal. . . .<sup>25</sup>

While there are obvious differences in style between the major continental European countries, Spiro maintains that legalism is one of their basic characteristics. In discussing Roman law, Spiro points to its exhaustive detail, its comprehensiveness, and its orderliness -- all of which are expressed in the emphasis on codification. These characteristics, he says, result in a preference for anticipatory legislation prior to experimentation -- to a feeling that nothing should be undertaken without prior legislation or

regulation.<sup>26</sup> This conception of the law leads to an emphasis on law as an ideal toward which one should aim, rather than as something to be applied to present circumstances with as much precision as possible. Another aspect is the machinery of justice, which is much more important on the Continent than in the English-speaking countries.<sup>27</sup> Spiro relates these contrasting approaches to the law to different notions of knowledge pervading the educational system and intellectual endeavors. On the Continent, he writes, there is a preference for deductive thinking in which the individual starts from general "laws" contained in a given body of knowledge and proceeds to apply them to concrete events that fit. The thought process in the Anglo-American world tends to depart from a different basis, one inductive and more dynamic in character. From the facts contained in a series of cases or case studies, one moves on to tentative conclusions.<sup>28</sup> Consequently, he maintains, in Continental Europe there is the feeling that

Just as all the law has been put together in a comprehensive, consistent, and closed fashion, so should all knowledge about other fields be ordered. Just as those who are learned in the law can dispense justice, so should those learned in the science of the state or of the economy or of society be able to dispense the fruits of their study. Just as progress was achieved by compiling the law in codes, so could progress be achieved by compiling knowledge in these other spheres into comprehensive, coherent, and closed systems. . . . [In contrast] in the English-speaking countries, lower expectations are placed on legal knowledge and political science. The law has never been systematized and, as

a consequence, there is little encouragement for attempts to systematize the social sciences in general, or political science in particular. . . They, too, may more safely grow from precedent to precedent.<sup>29</sup>

Certainly, exceptions can be found to these statements when it comes to the matter of specifics; yet they are relevant to our purposes in that they help to explain the different environment in which administrative principles and practices, developed mainly in the United States, have been expected to function. . . Throughout Brazilian legal experience, there has been a decided emphasis on the codification of the law. In fact, one of Getulio Vargas' major claims to lasting fame lies not in the creation of an authoritarian state and the ordering of Brazilian politics in the 1930's but in the fact that he was responsible for the almost complete reform and codification of Brazilian civil and criminal law during this era. In this respect, he followed what Spiro points to as an important aspect of the Roman law tradition: that of the great lawgivers who, in their codification of the law, have made a lasting contribution for the order and progress of their nations. . . Another fact which should be remembered throughout any analysis of Brazilian organization theory is the stress on the systematization of knowledge and the underlying belief that the science of administration could and should form a comprehensive, coherent, and closed system of knowledge. . . In this

development of thought, based on deductive methods of analysis, Brazilian administrative writers have retained a close contact with civil law theory.

Thus, when extensive administrative reform, with a preference for technical solutions to the problems of administration, was first begun in the mid-30's, the concern with abstract legal theory did not disappear, but continued to exist. Writers in both groups, the juridical and the technical, shared the same basic premise: that administration should be separated from politics. The origin of this concept is found in the centuries-old idea in political theory that power ought to be divided among the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary to prevent its abuse by the State. Because of the traditional predominance of the executive in Brazil and the continuation of a civil law system, administrative law in that country has always been concerned with the development of legal controls on administrative abuses.<sup>30</sup> Both groups have also aspired to essentially the same goal: an efficient public service that would meet the needs of the State and which would provide status and security for the individual civil servant.<sup>31</sup>

### *The Technical Phase*

The bulk of Brazilian administrative writing belongs to the technical phase in which administrative reform is

perceived in terms of the development of specialized skills. It is task-oriented; it substantially excludes human behavior from the study of administration; and it assumes away the importance of the human element by adopting the premise that human interests are passive in character.

Since these writings are voluminous and since the topic of organization theory is too broad for our purposes to be presented here in its totality, representative figures will be used to provide both a background and a broader framework for a more specific consideration of personnel theory in the next chapter. Three of the leading figures in traditional public administration as it has developed in Brazil -- Benedicto Silva, Wagner Estelita Campos, and Beatriz Marqués de Souza Wahrlich -- have been selected as illustrative. They express the most systematic thinking about these matters among writers belonging to their generation. An analysis of their ideas will be followed by a consideration of the ideas of two writers in the sociological phase: Alberto Guerreiro Ramos and Nelson Mello e Souza; these are men whose writings are indicative of the intellectual ferment which public administration in Brazil has begun to experience in recent years.

The first of these figures, Benedicto Silva, is the foremost representative of the school of scientific administration in Brazil. He is essentially a synthesist of the

ideas of Frederick Taylor, Henri Fayol, Luther Gulick, and Lyndall Urwick. While the word "scientific" enters into much of this writing, the emphasis is on the development of a series of principles or norms which are scientific only in that they represent supposedly universal rules for public administration. This is characteristic not only of Silva's approach but also of this whole school of thought, both within and outside of Brazil. Accordingly, his first principle is the search for the "one best way" as developed by Taylor. From this follow the so-called principles of the division of labor, the hierarchy of authority, and the development of a chain of command<sup>32</sup> and, also, the administrative theory of Fayol, with its distinction between administration and government and with the executive functions of command, coordination, and control. The fact that in his analysis Fayol is one of the guiding lights in the development of the field of public administration and that Gulick and Urwick represent little but the adoption and perfection of Fayol's basic concepts helps to underscore Silva's belief in the universal quality of these principles.<sup>33</sup>

The second personality, Estelita Campos, who was until recently the Director-General of DASP, occupies a position in Brazilian public administration not unlike that of Chester I. Barnard in American public administration. In fact, his book, *Executive Leadership, Its Techniques*

*and Its Problems*,<sup>34</sup> recently published in a third and revised edition, parallels to a considerable extent Barnard's *Functions of the Executive*. Both focus on the problems of executive management as crucial to the success of the organization; both are aware of conflict with the principles of traditional public administration and thus adopt a normative approach to these principles; both mark the transition to the human relations school in public administration with its focus on the work group and the adaptation of the individual employee to his work situation; both are concerned with the maintenance of equilibrium in the organization.

Estelita Campos' sources, like Silva's, are primarily North American -- with the exception of Fayol -- and he seeks to reduce the art of executive leadership to a series of normative principles. One of the basic values, if not the most important one, on which these principles rest is his belief in a moral reform,<sup>35</sup> both of the individuals involved in administration and the environment in which they work, as a solution to the administrative problems facing Brazil. This value, which is present throughout so much of the writing on Brazilian administration, is not so much a part of the dominant Brazilian value system as it is one which has been transferred from the United States to the Brazilian scene. In terms of personnel administration,

this leads Estelita Campos to assert that entrance into the civil service by any means other than merit is strictly immoral. The basic problem, he insists, is not so much the need for greater attention to the technical problems involved in administration as it is the necessity of a re-education of the country's directing elites in order to establish the proper moral climate.<sup>36</sup>

His conception of executive leadership is manipulatory. In this respect, it shows a close similarity with the theory of democratic leadership developed by Lewin in the experiments held at the University of Iowa in the 1930's. In one section, Estelita Campos enumerates the traits of autocratic and democratic leaders in parallel columns. The first and basic characteristic that contrasts the two is that, while the autocratic leader sets the objectives of the group in terms of his own personal interests, the democratic leader always sets them in terms of the group's common interest (the *causa comum*). He emphasizes the importance of maintaining group cooperation through persuasion instead of through compulsion,<sup>37</sup> but devotes little or no attention to the fact that this approach to democratic leadership does not necessarily allow for the expression of real grievances unless the leader is in sympathy with them.

Beatriz Marqués de Souza Wahrlich, the third writer in the Brazilian school of traditional public administration,

is one of the few authors writing in Portuguese who is concerned with organization theory *per se*. While her work has been primarily in the field of personnel administration, *An Analysis of the Theories of Organization*<sup>38</sup> reflects both the framework for her approach to personnel administration and the general status of conceptualization of administration in Brazil, until the emergence of Guerreiro Ramos.

Wahrlich divides organization theory into four categories: that of the engineers, the "anatomists," the psychologists, and the sociologists. In the first phase, she places the administrative engineers who look at administration from the bottom up and who are concerned with mechanical techniques. The leading exponents are Frederick Taylor and Henry Ford. In the second, the emphasis of administrative analysis is reversed and attention is focused at the top of the organization. Wahrlich claims it is "anatomical" because there is a basic preoccupation with form and structure. These writers are essentially rationalists, and Fayol, Gulick, Urwick, Mooney, and Schuyler Wallace are the best examples. In the third phase, she groups administrative writers who are influenced by psychology and who "interest themselves in the study of the organization as a system of control based on the recognition of individual motivations."<sup>39</sup> The most important figure here is Mary Parker Follett. Wahrlich also cites Catheryn Seckler-Hudson, Roethlisberger, Leighton, Simon, and Redfield as other significant figures. In the

fourth phase, she includes those authors in public administration who are concerned with the individual and his social setting. The basis of this school is the Hawthorne experiments. Mayo, Whitehead, and Roethlisberger are its precursors; they are followed by Barnard, Simon, Smithburg, Thompson, Selznick, and Redfield. Wahrlich laments that some of these individuals -- especially Simon -- suffer from a prejudice against traditional organization theory. She also criticizes their tendency to use esoteric expressions.<sup>40</sup>

Having examined North American organization theory, according to these four categories, Wahrlich concludes that while these various phases represent different approaches to the study of organization, we really need them all to formulate an adequate theoretical basis for administration.<sup>41</sup> She implies quite clearly that they are all reconcilable.

At the root of Wahrlich's conceptualization of administrative theory is the search for norms and principles which are to guide human behavior in organization and which, in their emphasis on reforming organization and human actions, lack a real foundation in empirical analysis. It is this approach which explains to some degree her grouping of widely divergent writers into the last two categories and which overlooks the movement away from and the dissatisfaction with traditional organization theory in these authors.

Apparently, once the belief in the existence of a body of universal principles of a technical character is accepted as a basic premise, a certain circularity of thought ensues, from which it is difficult to free oneself. Yet this does not concern Wahrlich, for, like Silva and Estelita Campos, she is essentially a synthesist of knowledge in the administrative field.

#### The Movement away from Traditional Public Administration

The emergence of a sociological school, centering around the ideas of Max Weber and paralleling the type of bureaucratic analysis found in such North American writers as Peter M. Blau, Philip Selznick, Victor A. Thompson, and Robert Presthus, marks the third phase in the development of Brazilian public administration. This school is concerned principally with the formation of a conceptual framework related to the understanding of Brazilian administrative reality. Although the ideas characteristic of this school of thought are to be found more in discussion with Brazilians engaged in the field of public administration than in writing at present, there are two men who have written in this area who are representative of this approach to administration.

The individual who has done most to make these new ideas known is Alberto Guerreiro Ramos. For him, the administrative function is pre-eminently sociological and

anthropological and only secondarily juridical and technical. That is, he says, because "it consists of initiating social change and administering it." He writes:

When we elaborate laws, regulations, instructions for the provision of service and rules, we are bringing about changes in human relations and institutions which need to be administered intelligibly on the basis of the teachings of sociology and anthropology.<sup>42</sup>

He maintains that it is not enough simply to import new techniques and ideas, for society consists of a series of interrelated parts and such new techniques and ideas must be adapted to the needs of a particular society. He cites, as an example of the use of new techniques and ideas without adequate attention to the social context, the Brazilian experience with a merit system transplanted from the United States. In this instance, the existing social system completely changed and malformed the concepts involved.<sup>43</sup>

In contrast to Wahrlich, Guerreiro Ramos is quite sensitive to the movement away from traditional administrative theory in the human relations school. For him, this school represents a new departure in North American organization theory and is unreconcilable with previous ways of thinking about administration; yet this approach is not without its limitations. He points out that in considering the enterprise to be a complete social universe, Dickson and Roethlisberger have failed to perceive "the umbilical

ties that unite it with the surrounding socio-cultural environment."<sup>44</sup>

In a later essay, he has insisted that a socio-historical view of administrative phenomena is much more necessary in underdeveloped countries than in the advanced ones. This is because, in the latter, the advance in administrative theory and techniques is concomitant with their socio-historical development.<sup>45</sup> Such a lack of awareness of the importance of the social environment, he states, undercuts the administrative reforms begun in 1938 and the political reorganization occurring in the latter part of 1945.

Another approach to the social environment within which administration functions is to be found in a recent article by Nelson Mello e Souza.<sup>46</sup> Whereas in the area of public administration, Guerreiro Ramos is more concerned with the general development of organization theory, Mello e Souza is more interested in applying this new orientation to an analysis of Brazilian experience with administrative reform. His article demonstrates an awareness of Brazilian problems which is lacking in the majority of administrative literature in Brazil, although his zeal for modern, economic, and efficient administration is no less than that of his precursors. He does not call into question the traditional values and goals of public administration;

instead, he seeks to explain why the techniques and skills imported from abroad have not functioned in Brazil as expected.

Thus, he directs his attention to "the ecology of development." His general thesis is

. . . that the application of techniques of scientific management to public administration in underdeveloped countries is handicapped primarily by non-technical problems. . . . [for] the principal focus of resistance is socio-political and derives from the structural characteristics of underdeveloped societies.<sup>47</sup>

The techniques designed to reform Brazilian administration failed because they were unrelated to administrative necessities. According to his interpretation, the Brazilian administrative system is primarily a paternalistic one, dependent on the external political environment. But this system should not be considered "pathological." It only becomes pathological if we judge it by a scale of values taken from the developed world. The challenge lies not so much in the rejection of what he calls rationalized values as in the development of a sense of timing in the careful and gradual overcoming of the problems presented by the socio-political environment.<sup>48</sup>

Whereas the reforms begun originally in 1936 lacked any basis in the political and social reality of the country at that time, he claims that by the 1960's, through industrial development, such a basis existed. In the 1930's, the "reformist movement was led by a technical elite who thought

they could resolve the problems of modernizing by transplanting theories and practices developed in other contexts, especially the United States." He says further:

Their motivation was not linked to the economic development of Brazil, but rather to the moralization of political behavior and the patterns of administration. In spite of good intentions, it neither resolved nor clarified the problems of administrative reorganization in Brazil.<sup>49</sup>

Today, conditions have changed, he affirms, and an administrative system which serves the needs of a paternalistic political system is unable to meet the demands placed on it by the pressures for economic development.

Both Guerreiro Ramos and Mello e Souza, in resorting to sociological analysis for the study of administration and in using a conceptual framework based on the work of Weber, reflect a trend that is basic to the development of the social sciences in Brazil. Sociology, joined with related aspects of anthropology, enjoys a pre-eminence in the social sciences shared only by economics, while political science has not yet developed as a strong, separate discipline. It is either tied to the legalistic and juridical phase of earlier writing on Brazilian institutions or it is incorporated into the subfield of political sociology.<sup>50</sup> This has meant that the viewpoint that public administration is closely tied to the study of political science has been rejected on several counts: First, this is due to the attempt

by writers in traditional public administration to separate administration from politics; secondly, it is due to the recent emphasis on sociology to explain the failures of the technical approach to the analysis of administrative problems, and, third, it is due to the domination of the technical assistance program by a "trade-school" orientation toward the problems of public administration.

Although it does represent a clear step forward, the sociological approach has the weakness of failing often to account for the differences between administration in the field of government and administration in the private enterprise. This point of view is further reinforced, both within and outside Brazil, by those closely tied to the field of business administration, who see little difference between administration in public and private sectors. It is true that both operate in a particular social context, but a public agency or department functions in an environment pre-eminently political and is subject to a series of cross-cutting pressures and conflicting goals and objectives which are absent in the private enterprise. The social universe of the business firm is a much more limitable and definable one. Its goals are narrower and more explicit; boundaries are more sharply defined, and its population is more limited.

Nevertheless, it is, in a sense, only natural, now that there are signs of a shift away from the techniques of

administration to interest in the administrative environment, that there should be a movement toward the development of a sociological school. Social and economic relationships have continued to undergo many changes during the last two decades. In contrast, the formal political system has only been slightly affected.

Essentially, the political system, from late 1945 to the revolution of April, 1964, functioned along the same lines.<sup>51</sup> Subsequently, the gap between the style of politics in existence and the developmental needs of the country became increasingly greater. Although the analysis of this phenomenon, as it is related to public personnel policies and practices, is more appropriately the subject of later chapters, it is pertinent to organization theory in that this particular situation can be used to explain in part the reason for emphasis on sociology to break the confines of traditional administration. Because political institutions are formalistic in character and the style of politics represents a carry-over from the period preceding the *Estado Novo*, it has seemed to many analysts that the social environment, as a consequence of changing economic relationships, has been the major determinist of political behavior, if not the sole one.

### Conclusion

Basic changes have taken place in American public administration in the last two decades which have not been adequately transferred to Brazil in spite of heavy reliance on American writers in this field and the training of substantial numbers of Brazilians in American schools of administration. Much of this is due to the hold of traditional public administration on Brazilian intellectual thought and to the commitment to reforming Brazilian administration according to the standards set by the scientific management school. Another, and perhaps more basic, explanation is to be found in the contrast between deductive and inductive reasoning which was drawn briefly in terms of the civil law tradition. The whole educational and intellectual orientation of law and the social sciences in Brazil is quite different from that encountered in the United States, where the way of thinking tends to be inductive, to be pragmatic, and to show a preference for proceeding from one isolated case to the next. As such, North Americans often tend to view means as ends in themselves. This way of thinking also tends to reflect a quality of continuous debate joined with a willingness to compromise. The development of Taylorism and later the scientific management school is very much a part of this tradition; yet when transferred to the Brazilian milieu, it becomes something quite different. This altera-

tive in the intellectual bases of this school of thought is most clearly reflected in Benedicto Silva's book, *Taylor and Fayol*. Silva considers Taylor and Fayol to be the great masters of the science of administration. Supported by essays from other Brazilian figures in the field of public administration, he embarks on a path of textual exegesis. In this work, as well as in others, he strives to fuse the contributions of Frederick W. Taylor, Henri Fayol, and their disciples into a comprehensive, coherent, and closed system of knowledge. The basic reasoning process manifested not only by Silva but by this entire school in Brazil is deductive. These men show a tendency to proceed from a set of first principles and from them they develop a theory of how administration could and should be ordered. For this reason, they have been most receptive to the administrative theory of Fayol; the POSDCORB concept of Luther Gulick, the principalist phase of traditional American administrative thought, and, more recently, the Weberian approach to bureaucracy.

By juxtaposing the status of organization theory in Brazil and the United States, it becomes clear that Brazilian public administration has been subjected essentially to a single analytic model, one which may be characterized as a "machine model" approach to administration. There is really only one exception to this statement: Guerreiro

Ramos. He alone has been willing to leave behind the confines of traditional public administration to consider bureaucracy in Brazil as a social system. His model, while it may be termed a social system one, does not have any strict parallel with the models developed to analyze organizations in the United States, although he is quite familiar with recent developments in organizational analysis and has synthesized them. After all, his is designed to form a construct which can be used to analyze more completely Brazilian public administration. In this respect, he has developed a bureaucratic model which, as a subsystem, is interrelated with the social environment.

In contrast, Mello e Souza, the other writer considered in the sociological phase of Brazilian organization theory, has not broken with the scientific management school. Instead, he has held its concepts to be valid for modern administrative systems and has moved in the direction of a bureaucratic model which will explain the failure to create a modern administrative system on the basis of a hostile environment. The model against which he measures Brazilian administrative experience is Weberian. His goal is the creation in Brazil of an administrative system which is economic, efficient, and rational, and which will eventually fulfill the Weberian requirements for modern bureaucracy. In this regard, it should be remembered that Weber's bureaucratic

construct is much closer to the "machine model" of human behavior than it is to other approaches to administrative analysis.<sup>52</sup> Given previous Brazilian experience in administrative theory and present trends, it is likely that organization theory will continue along these lines. An attempt has been made to introduce the case study technique and the decision-making model into Brazilian administration, but it has not yet produced results.

We are now in a position to turn our attention to personnel theory. Like traditional organization theory in Brazil, it is closely related to developments in North American public administration; also, it complements the systematic, comprehensive body of knowledge which has been built up in the scientific management school.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>This approach to the analysis of public administration is based on the analytic framework developed by Gladys M. Kammerer and on lecture notes and readings compiled in a seminar given by her.

<sup>2</sup>Besides Gulick and Urwick's *Papers on the Science of Administration*, other examples of this school are: John M. Gaus, "A Theory of Organization in Public Administration," in John M. Gaus, Leonard D. White, and Marshall E. Dimock (eds.), *The Frontiers of Public Administration* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936); Comstock Glaser, *Administrative Procedure, A Practical Handbook for the Administrative Analyst* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Foreign Affairs, 1941); Lyndall Urwick, "Public Administration and Business Management," *Public Administration Review*, XVII (Spring, 1957), 77-82. Critiques of the scientific management school are to be found in: Robert T. Golembiewski, *Behavior and Organization: O & M and the Small Group* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1962); James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958); Dwight Waldo, *The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory of American Public Administration* (New York: Ronald Press, 1948).

<sup>3</sup>The POSDCORB concept is designed to summarize the responsibilities of the administrator: planning, organization, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting. Gulick, "Notes on the Theory of Organization," in *Papers on the Science of Administration*, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

<sup>4</sup>See Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938), and Marshall E. Dimock, *The Executive in Action* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1945).

<sup>5</sup>Fritz J. Roethlisberger and William J. Dickson, *Management and the Worker: An Account of a Research Program Conducted by the Western Electric Company, Hawthorne Works, Chicago* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940).

<sup>6</sup>By "satisfice," Simon means that he selects the best course of action from among those alternatives immediately available to him.

<sup>7</sup>Simon, *Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization* (New York: Macmillan, 1957), pp. xxiii-xxvi, xvi. For further developments in his conceptual model, see *Models of Man: Social and Rational; Mathematical Essays on Rational Human Behavior in a Social Setting* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1957) and "The Decision-Making Schema: A Reply," *Public Administration Review*, XVIII (Winter, 1958), 60-62.

<sup>8</sup>Harold Stein, *Public Administration and Policy Development: A Case Book* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1952).

<sup>9</sup>Aaron Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1964), pp. 1, 62.

<sup>10</sup>This discussion is based on the following sources: Peter M. Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy, A Study of Interpersonal Relations in Two Governmental Agencies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955); Robert K. Merton *et al.*, *Reader in Bureaucracy* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1952); W. Lloyd Warner *et al.*, *The American Federal Executive* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).

<sup>11</sup>Examples of these four approaches, in their respective order, are: Alvin W. Gouldner, "On Weber's Analysis of Bureaucratic Rules, in Blau, *op. cit.*, Chapter I; Philip Selznick, "A Theory of Organizational Commitments," *ibid.*; Warner *et al.*, *op. cit.*

<sup>12</sup>Selznick, *TVA and the Grassroots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949), pp. 13, 15.

<sup>13</sup>Robert Presthus, *The Organizational Society: An Analysis and a Theory* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1962); Victor A. Thompson, *Modern Organization* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1961).

<sup>14</sup>Ralph H. Hower and Charles D. Orth, *Managers and Scientists: Some Human Problems in Industrial Research Organization* (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1963).

<sup>15</sup>Blau, "Critical Remarks on Weber's Theory of Authority," *American Political Science Review*, LVII (June, 1963), 305-317; Amitai Etzioni, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961). The three kinds of involvement Etzioni singles out

are coercive, remunerative, and normative, while the three kinds of power are alienative, calculative, and moral. From this syndrome, three congruent types appear: the coercive organization, the utilitarian organization, and the normative organization.

<sup>16</sup>Chris Argyris, "Understanding Human Behavior in Organizations: One Viewpoint," in Mason Haire (ed.), *Modern Organization Theory: A Symposium* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959).

<sup>17</sup>Talcott Parsons, "A Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organizations," *Structure and Process in Modern Societies* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), p. 17.

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 20, 44, 47, 57, 164.

<sup>19</sup>Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, *Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962).

<sup>20</sup>Muzafer Sherif (ed.), *Intergroup Relations and Leadership, Approaches and Research in Industrial, Ethnic, Cultural, and Political Areas* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962).

<sup>21</sup>One application of this model and its stress on the importance of group norms is to be found in an article by Faris. He points out that the individualistic explanation of conflict on the basis of the frustration-aggression formula and according to the concept of displacement (*i.e.* the use of a scapegoat) is insufficient. There is need, he says, for examining interaction among groups and the conflict stemming from group definitions of reality as a corrective to the excessive emphasis on individual action as determining group behavior. The group perception of reality and its influence on individual perceptions is a part of what Faris calls the "universality and normality of ethnocentrism." Hostility is not entirely a personality component; it originates -- at least, in part -- within the context of a specific group or groups. Likewise, the reduction of hostility is a collective process in which group perceptions and norms are modified to understand more fully the total context giving rise to the conflict (Robert E. Faris, "Interaction Levels and Intergroup Relations," in *Intergroup Relations and Leadership*).

<sup>22</sup>Four definitions are in order here: by "position," the authors mean the location of an actor or class of actors

in a system of social relationships; by "role," they mean a set of expectations, or a set of evaluative standards applied to the incumbent of a particular position; by "role conflict," they mean a difference between the expectations of the incumbent of a focal position and those in counter positions; by "role collision," they mean to describe the situation which occurs when two persons, entertaining the expectations that each can do the same thing, act on it simultaneously (Neal Gross, Ward S. Mason, and Alexander W. McEachern, *Explorations in Role Analysis: Studies of the School Superintendency Role* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958).

<sup>23</sup>This threefold division of organization theory in Brazil is based on the categories suggested by José Alípio Goulart and Alberto Guerreiro Ramos. (José Alípio Goulart, "Sociologia e Administração Pública no Brasil," *Revista do Serviço Público (RSP)*, XVI (March, 1954), 38-41; Alberto Guerreiro Ramos, *Uma Introdução ao Histórico da Organização Racional do Trabalho* (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1950).

<sup>24</sup>Herbert J. Spiro, *Government by Constitution: The Political Systems of Democracy*

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 187.

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 219.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 220-221.

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 223-224.

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 224-225.

<sup>30</sup>A recent example of this approach is Miguel Seabrá Fagundes, *O Contrôlo dos Atos Administrativos pelo Poder Judiciário* (Rio de Janeiro: Revista Forense, 1957).

<sup>31</sup>Themistocles Brandão Cavalcanti expresses this opinion in his article, "Direito Administrativo e a Ciência da Administração," *RSP*, I (March, 1940), 73-74.

<sup>32</sup>Silva phrases these last two principles somewhat differently in Portuguese: ". . . uma estrutura de autoridade e um sistema de comunicações em forma de pirâmide. . . ." See Benedicto Silva, *Uma Teoria Geral de Planejamento* (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Serviço de Publicações, 1964), pp. 25-33. While this book deals basically with

planning, it is directly related to the material under discussion because, for Silva, planning is at the heart of public administration and his discussion of planning is situated directly within the context of traditional public administration.

<sup>33</sup>For an analysis of the ideas of Taylor and Fayol, as the originators of the scientific management school, see Silva, *Taylor e Fayol* (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Serviço de Publicações, 1965).

<sup>34</sup>Wagner Estelita Campos, *Chefia, Sua Técnica e Seus Problemas* (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1964).

<sup>35</sup>By "a moral reform" he means the removal of political patronage from the federal civil service and the employment of individuals who are honest, well-trained, and capable of fulfilling their administrative responsibilities without interference by political partisans.

<sup>36</sup>Such a moral climate would be characterized by honesty, economy, efficiency, and the absence of external political intrusions. Estelita Campos, *op. cit.*, p. 138; also, "Recuperação Moral na Administração Pública," *RSP* LXIX (December, 1955), 282-301.

<sup>37</sup>Estelita Campos, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

<sup>38</sup>Marqués de Souza Wahrlich, *Uma Análise das Teorias de Organização* (Rio de Janeiro: Escola Brasileira de Administração Pública, Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1958). This book is based on the thesis completed by Wahrlich in 1954 in the Graduate School of Public Administration of New York University for a Master's degree in Public Administration.

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 45.

<sup>40</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 75-76.

<sup>41</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 79-80.

<sup>42</sup>Alberto Guerreiro Ramos, "Fundamentos Sociológicos da Administração Pública," *Jornal do Brasil*, part II (November 11, 1956), section 2, 8.

<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>44</sup>Guerreiro Ramos, *Uma Introdução ao Histórico da Organização Racional do Trabalho*, *op. cit.* What Guerreiro Ramos calls "organização racional do trabalho" is the equivalent in Portuguese in this case of what we would call organization theory.

<sup>45</sup>Guerreiro Ramos, "Desenvolvimento Tecnológico e Administração à Luz de Modelos Heurísticos" (Rio de Janeiro: Centro de Pesquisas Administrativas, Escola Brasileira de Administração Pública, Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1965(?), p. 1. Mimeographed chapter of the forthcoming book *O Estudo de Administração e as Ciências Sociais*.

<sup>46</sup>Nelson Mello e Souza (with the collaboration of Breno Genari), "Public Administration and Economic Development," in Robert T. Daland (ed.), *Perspectives of Brazilian Public Administration* (Los Angeles: University of Southern California Bookstore, 1963), Vol. I, pp. 145-171. This article was first published in Portuguese in the following form: Nelson Mello e Souza and Breno Genari, "Técnicas de Organização Científica em Sectores Específicos para o Desenvolvimento da Administração Pública," IDORT, XXXI (November-December, 1962), pp. 10-19.

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 148-149.

<sup>48</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 148.

<sup>49</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 162.

<sup>50</sup>There is, of course, one notable exception and that is the work Orlando M. Carvalho has carried out. In this connection, the *Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos* has played an important role.

<sup>51</sup>This statement is made with full awareness of the institutional changes involved in the shift to a modified parliamentary system, which followed the resignation of Jânio Quadros, and later the return to a presidential system.

<sup>52</sup>March and Simon have spoken of this relationship in these terms: ". . . Weber appears to have more in common with Urwick, Gulick, and others than he does with those who regard themselves as his successors. To be sure, Weber goes beyond the 'machine' model in significant ways. In particular, he analyzes in some detail the relation between an official and his office. But, in general, Weber perceives bureaucracy as an adaptive device for using specialized

skills, and he is not exceptionally attentive to the character of the human organism" (March and Simon, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-37).

## CHAPTER IV

### PERSONNEL THEORY

The developments in Brazilian personnel theory parallel, to a large extent, those of organization theory sketched broadly in the preceding chapter. Just as Brazilian leaders in the administrative field have approached organization theory through what is essentially a single model, so, too, have they subjected personnel theory to a single analytic framework. But, while some have begun to revise and adjust the "machine model" of traditional administrative theory to Weberian concepts and have attempted to explain its failure to function on the basis of a hostile social environment, personnel theory has remained static and formalistic.<sup>1</sup>

Involved here is a further difficulty, related to the reliance of Brazilian writers on North American source materials in public administration. Personnel theory in the United States has scarcely passed beyond the model provided by the human relations school. Yet even these ideas have failed to make an impact upon traditional ways of thinking in Brazil about the public personnel field. As in the case of organization theory, Brazilian writers interested in public personnel administration have not attempted to apply the inductive methodology inherent in the

human relations approach to the analysis of related Brazilian phenomena. When they have drawn upon the findings of this school of thought, they have incorporated them into an intellectual framework which demonstrates a preference for principles and deductive reasoning about the administrative process.

This chapter is concerned with tabulating the results from a content analysis of 138 articles and books containing material relevant to the topic of personnel theory. Of this sample, fifty were classified as belonging to a juridical or legalistic phase, while eighty-seven were characterized as technical. Although there was none that was sociological in character, there was one article falling outside the confines of the two previous categories. Strictly speaking, it belongs to the human relations school.

Although these articles and books were classified at the outset according to whether they belonged to a juridical, technical, or sociological phase, this framework will be modified. The original approach used to collect these data simply does not allow sufficient flexibility in analyzing personnel concepts and ideas. What concerns us here is the presence of a single conceptual model: the "machine model" of traditional public administration.

In the following sections we shall consider initially the legal framework within which personnel techniques and

principles have functioned. We shall then proceed to examine in detail the assumptions, values, and goals to be found in Brazilian public personnel administration materials. In this instance, we will encounter the same three basic developments that have occurred in traditional North American public administration: first, a concentration on the techniques of administration; secondly, the formulation of a series of administrative principles; and, third, a transition away from these principles toward an interest in the position of the executive as crucial to explaining the failure of these principles to produce the desired effects.

#### The Problem of Legalism in Brazilian Administration

The fifty articles and books reflecting a legalistic approach to personnel administration are concerned primarily with such legislation as the statutes of the *funcionário público* and with the interpretation of legal norms<sup>2</sup> -- either as to what the public employee should be doing and does not do, or with reference to how better to protect the rights of individual civil servants against the State.

At the center of this concern for the legal status of the civil servant lies the concept of the *funcionário público* -- the public functionary. It is a concept tied closely to Continental experience, particularly French, and quite remote from traditions in the American civil service.

In Brazil, as in France, the term *funcionário*, or *functionnaire*, is

. . . applicable only to those employees of the central government who (1) have received a commission from a public appointing authority and (2) belong to a cadre of *permanent* employees, all of which involves a fixed monthly salary and the right to a retirement pension.<sup>3</sup>

A separate terminology also exists for other public employees. In Brazil, these are the *extranumerários* and the *interinos*. Likewise, in France, the same distinction is made between personnel *ouvrier* and *temporaire*.

In Brazil, the career civil servant has enjoyed in the past, and to a limited extent continues to enjoy, a legal status carrying with it certain rights and privileges. Among these are tenure, retirement, sick leave, vacation pay, and social welfare benefits. One of the major political battles in the area of public personnel policies until 1960 was the constant attempt of those governmental employees in the *extranumerário* category to obtain these rights and privileges through special legislation. The *interino* has tried to achieve this status through another tactic -- that of having his classification changed from that of an interim employee to one with tenure. Hence, in principle, the *funcionário público* has been a permanent government employee admitted to the career civil service on the basis of merit, as proven by examination. In practice, however, his has been a status position with a certain amount of security and

a fixed income to which many persons outside the merit system have aspired. This concern with individual status in the civil service and the parallel with the organization of the French public service are important factors to remember when an American-oriented classification plan is superimposed on this foundation.

Another parallel with Continental experience in general and with French experience in particular is to be found in the desire of the civil servant to have his rights and privileges guaranteed by specific legislation and to have this legislation compiled into comprehensive legal codes. Thus, the movement in France to obtain a *statut des fonctionnaires* was reproduced in Brazil. In both cases, the goal of an *estatuto* or a *statut* was related to the desire of the *funcionário* or the *fonctionnaire* to obtain a general code fixing rules for recruiting, promoting, paying, disciplining, and retiring state employees. There is, however, one basic difference: in France, this movement took some eighty years to achieve its goal and was largely the result of pressure created by the *fonctionnaires*. In Brazil, it was of much shorter duration and the first *estatuto* was largely the result of Vargas' initiative in the attempt to create an elite civil service.

As a consequence of this concern for the legal definition of the rights, privileges, and responsibilities of the civil servant, there are several books and articles dealing

with the statutes governing the *funcionário público* and with additional rights and privileges accrued through other legislation and executive regulations.<sup>4</sup> Until 1960, when the *extranumerário* category was abolished by law, this interest in legal status also gave rise to materials dealing with the *extranumerário* which paralleled those of the *funcionário*.<sup>5</sup> A third area of interest has been those court cases that have been significant in the protection of the individual civil servant against the State.<sup>6</sup>

To understand properly the juridical framework within which the Brazilian civil service has functioned, it is essential that one place this concern with the defense of individual rights as opposed to the State in contrast with North American administrative practices where the right of the State in determining public employment is pre-eminent.

Astério Dardeau Vieira has drawn attention to the contrasting legal traditions of the United States and Brazil. Recognizing the legal systems of the two countries as a crucial variable in their approach to public personnel, he attempted to set down these contrasts in an article written in 1938.<sup>7</sup>

In the matter of the rights and guarantees of the civil servant, he places Brazil and the United States at polar extremes. In Brazil, he says, the fact that the protection of individual rights is placed over and above

his responsibilities as a public employee works against efficiency in the public service. In contrast, he points to the concept of a collective or public interest as the major element in determining the relations between the State and its servants in the United States. Within this wider framework, then, the rights and guarantees of public employment, rather than the prerogatives of the individual, are established.

To make this contrast clearer, he directs his attention to the individual's attitude toward the requirement of competitive public examinations. In the United States, once an individual has passed the required examination, the State retains the right to decide whom it will use for public employment. An eligibility list is prepared; when a vacancy appears, the Civil Service Commission selects three names on the basis of geographical apportionment. Finally, the office concerned selects the candidate it wants from among the three submitted for the position. In Brazil, he states, such a system could not function. The legal system in public personnel matters is based on the negative concept of first protecting individual rights against the State as employer. Consequently, he maintains, innumerable cases have arisen in which individuals who have passed the public examination and have not been admitted to the civil service have gone to court to protect what are deemed to be their rights against arbitrary action by the State.<sup>8</sup>

### Traditional Personnel Theory

In contrast to the protective character of the juridical materials on public personnel administration, the eighty-seven articles and books classified on the basis of a technical criterion are oriented toward the improvement of personnel administration through the institution of new skills and techniques intended to contribute to the goal of economy and efficiency in the over-all administrative system. This technical phase corresponds to the "machine model" approach of the scientific management school in both North American and Brazilian organization theory. As mentioned in the introduction, three groups of writers may be singled out within this model -- those who emphasize the techniques of administration, those who are interested in developing principles of administration, and those who are involved in the movement away from fixed principles toward a concentration on executive functions. Because literature in the public personnel field is closely tied to the assumptions, goals, and values encountered in organization theory and represents a transfer of concepts from the United States to Brazil, its characteristics and relationships to other developments in public administration will be spelled out as specifically as possible.

The "machine model" approach to personnel administration in the United States and Brazil has as its basic assumption the passivity of human interests; as its goal, maximum ef-

efficiency and economy, and as its basic value, the belief that there is a "one best way." In organization and personnel theory, the initial focus of this "model" is at the workshop level and the technique advocated is the use of modern administrative tools and skills. In personnel administration, emphasis is placed on the importance of classifying civil service positions according to the duties and responsibilities of each job.<sup>9</sup> This stress on the mechanics of personnel administration is also to be seen in the techniques prescribed for recruitment, examination administration, and pre- and in-service training.

A common value expressed in traditional American and Brazilian literature on personnel administration is that the fundamental unit of analysis is the position, not the individual. Virtually all Brazilian writers in the personnel field have accepted this value without question. From this basis they have proceeded to use the position as a basic unit in classification and to assert that it should serve as a building block for the whole administrative structure. It ought, however, to be stressed that this is a value which emerges from both the Weberian approach to rational bureaucracy and the American standards and practices. The basic idea in position classification in the United States is that all those positions in an organization involving closely similar duties and responsibilities should be grouped for purposes of re-

cruitment, compensation, and other personnel matters. The idea is "neutral" enough in itself, but it is based on the philosophy that the position is to be classified and not the person currently holding it. The notion that prestige and status stem from the public office occupied and are not inherent in the individual is one of the fundamental tenets of the "American creed."<sup>10</sup>

The emphasis placed on position as the basic unit in developing a classification plan is at variance with the entire evolution of the Brazilian civil service. There, the individual traditionally has carried status inherent in himself into the civil service and it, in turn, has reinforced his prestige as an individual. For this reason, while there is a shift in Brazilian personnel theory away from emphasis on the status of the individual civil servant as opposed to the State, this earlier concern with the individual in the employment of the State continues and is to be found in all current legislation on the subject. Thus, the emphasis on the importance of the position is superimposed upon a functioning legal system with which it is in fundamental conflict.

In the United States, the concept of position developed in connection with patterns of upward mobility during a historical period that has followed -- not preceded or coincided with -- the Jacksonian revolution. In Brazil, such an

experience has been absent. It is only now that the democratic revolution, in the terms described by De Tocqueville, is being experienced in Brazil.

As T. Lynn Smith has pointed out, Brazil has traditionally had a highly stratified society, with a rigid system of social classes. In such a context, he has shown that the middle class has emerged more as a product of downward social mobility rather than as a product of upward mobility, as in the case of the United States. One of the consequences of the extended family, which is the traditional upper-class kinship unit, has been the appearance of numerous offspring for whom it has been difficult to provide sufficient source of income with which to maintain their upper-class origins.<sup>12</sup> Under such circumstances, many of these individuals have sought government positions as a way of defending the status they feel inherent in themselves. In essence, they still aspire to a series of values which are aristocratic in character and which reflect the dominant value system in Brazil.<sup>13</sup> Certainly, much of this is in the process of changing under the impact of urbanization, industrialization, and an extraordinary population growth. These traditional patterns, however, have had a great deal to do with the social character of a substantial part of the Brazilian civil service.

In the Brazilian civil service -- as in other administrative systems, such as the French, -- the individual

is more important than the position. The *funcionário público* is, above all, a middle-class individual concerned with maintaining his status. Joined to this is the fact, that, as numerous individuals in recent decades have sought to move up the social scale, employment in the public service has become one of the signs that they have escaped from their lower-class backgrounds. In the changing character of Brazilian society, the public service provides a focal point for comprehending the overlapping of older and more recent patterns of social mobility.

The fact that civil service reformers have sought to impose the concept of position as basic to the development of a rational public personnel system has merely increased the gap between policies and practices in the area of government employment. The solution for Brazilians trained in the techniques of personnel administration is not a more rigorous application of the position principle, but, rather, a greater understanding on the part of the dynamics of Brazilian society. If the techniques of classification in the public service are to be made functional, they must be adapted to a social system quite different from that of the United States. Even the value of a single classification plan for the federal civil service of a complex transitional society such as Brazil's is open to question.

*The Development of Administrative Principles*

The transition from the emphasis on techniques to a concern with the principles of scientific management, both in the United States and Brazil, is a slight, but important, one. The same basic assumptions, goals, and values remain; the major difference is that they take on a more sophisticated form. Also, to the goal of economy and efficiency is added the subgoal of coordination. To achieve the objective of a rational, ordered administrative system, in which the administrator can get things done, these writers claim that there must be a coordination of the men and tools involved. Moreover, the basic value -- that there is a "one best way" -- is further developed to include the concept of the separation of facts and values, the division between administration and politics, and the necessity of generalist administrators. As a consequence of these modifications, there is a shift of attention away from the workshop level to the top of the hierarchy, to the formulation of organizational charts, and to the manipulation of subordinate units. To achieve this, the technique advocated is the coordination of administrative tools and skills. The search for universal principles of administration now becomes the belief that they have been discovered!

In the field of personnel administration, the emphasis on mechanics is continued and expanded by the standardization

of methods of examination and recruitment, position classification, and pre- and in-service training programs.

The fact that this approach is especially normative is nowhere better noted than in two articles by Benedicto Silva.<sup>14</sup> He is convinced that there is increasing evidence that personnel administration in many countries has been placed on a rational basis, or is moving in that direction. In contrast, disorder and arbitrariness -- traditional characteristics of personnel administration -- are being substituted, with greater or less success, by civil service laws, regulations, and scientific procedures. He goes on to assert that specialists are in agreement that the principal objective of modern personnel administration is to foment increasing efficiency in government. Such efficiency is to be achieved by a rise in general efficiency, lower unitary costs, high employee morale, and better service to the public. To adopt modern techniques and methods in personnel administration, it is necessary to create a civil service based on unqualified acceptance and rigorous observance of the merit system. But this introduction of a merit system, he says, depends ordinarily on the pre-establishment of a central personnel organ, responsible for the principal phases of personnel administration.<sup>15</sup>

On the basis of these values and norms, Silva reduces the characteristics of a career civil service to fifteen

essential elements:

1. Merit as the ultimate standard for admission
2. A classification plan
3. Standardization of wages and privileges
4. Adequate remuneration
5. Recruitment only for initial positions and advancement through promotion or transfer
6. The linking together of recruitment and the educational system
7. Realism in the conceptualization of examinations
8. In-service training
9. A "true" system of vertical promotion
10. Evaluation of the individual's ability (in terms of promotion)
11. Automatic horizontal promotion
12. Tenure
13. Protection of employee interests
14. The certainty of retirement
15. Liberal and progressive conditions of work.<sup>16</sup>

*The Movement away from the Principles of Administration*

From the normative emphasis of the scientific management school, Brazilian and North American personnel theory moves into a transitional phase, where attention is drawn increasingly to the importance of executive leadership and to the maintenance of equilibrium in the organization through executive manipulation. The emphasis on coordination is

continued; however, stress falls more on the coordination of the human elements involved in the enterprise than on the techniques used. The role of the leader is to increase the participation of subordinates in the decision-making process and to obtain their compliance with the organization's demands through cooperative rather than through compulsive methods. In the personnel field, this orientation is expressed in the idea that there is a body of principles and norms to orient the administrator in his contact with employees.<sup>17</sup> There is an increasing awareness that the principles of scientific management as applied to personnel administration must be adapted to the specific set of circumstances encountered in each case. They are guide-lines rather than directives.<sup>18</sup>

It is precisely in this vein that Eduardo Pinto Pessoa Sobrinho and José Nazaré Teixeira Dias begin their book on personnel administration. They call attention to the fact that legislation regulating personnel administration -- which began in Brazil with the Civil Service Law of 1936 and reflects the imitation of foreign models -- has been excessively normative and abstract. They are also critical of the fact that debates over this or that piece of legislation have had little relation to the specific needs and problems of the individual administrator.

Their approach to the subject is concerned basically with the human element in an administrative setting. For them, the goal of efficiency is less an objective of personnel administration and more a consequence of certain other factors -- the discovery and attraction of capable personnel, their training and perfection, and the maintenance of employee morale.<sup>19</sup> Likewise, they make a clear distinction between the individual and the position. They are critical of the traditional emphasis on the position as the fundamental unit of the organization to the exclusion of the human element. Their point of reference is Leonard D. White and his idea that the fundamental unit of the organization is the position and its occupant, the employee. Hence, they define position as

. . . that body of functions and responsibilities which characterize a unit of the organization, attributed to an individual in virtue of the act of a competent authority.<sup>20</sup>

Similarly, they modify the emphasis placed on the essentiality of a classification plan in scientific administration -- it is simply a means to an end which is used in conjunction with numerous other techniques.

In the area of promotions, they advocate abandoning any rigorous adherence to mechanical procedure and replacing it with the idea that the method employed should be adapted to the particular needs of the organization. For example, the

principle that promotions should be limited to those who have already served the organization needs to be modified when there is an absence of qualified personnel and when there is a need for new blood. If the principle conflicts with the needs of the moment, it should be abandoned.<sup>21</sup>

The same approach is applied to their examination of other principles and techniques advocated in scientific administration. The focal point is that employee interests must be brought into harmony with the fundamental interests of the organization through coordination, rather than compulsion, under the leadership of capable administrators. In this respect, they continue to advocate the necessity of a central personnel organ -- one which will serve to coordinate the whole federal personnel system and which will establish harmony (or equilibrium) among the conflicting interests at play.<sup>22</sup>

A second example of this transition from the scientific management school is to be found in Raimundo Xavier de Menezes' book on the evaluation of positions as a basic element in the development of classification plans. At the outset, he cautions against excessive certainty that positions can be evaluated according to sharp concepts and scientific precision. The method has its fallacies, he writes, because, in the final analysis, it is subject to human judgment. Nevertheless, it is still the best method developed,

and thus the administrator should be aware of the subjectivism inherent in it. Recognizing the limitations encountered, Menezes states that the evaluation of positions should be directed more toward the search for internal and external equilibrium in the organization than toward conformity with principles and methods not always valid in every context.<sup>23</sup>

Several of the articles and books placed in this phase of personnel theory contain elements which, it would seem, would better warrant placing them in the human relations school. While they are concerned with human relations as such, the focus on employee-employer relations is strictly from the viewpoint of the administrator -- on how the human elements involved in the organization may be better utilized and how cooperation (in the sense of coordination) may be maximized.<sup>24</sup> It is only when this approach, with the characteristics previously enumerated, is contrasted with the work group and supervisor focus of the human relations school as developed in the United States that this difference becomes clear. In the literature on Brazilian personnel administration, this change is further obscured by the fact that a number of writers in this transitional phase make reference to the Hawthorne experiments and draw on the writings of Mayo, Roethlisberger, and Dickson without altering basically the traditional framework of their analyses.

This use of materials from the human relations school within the framework of traditional public administration and personnel administration is nowhere better demonstrated than in the writings of Beatriz Wahrlich. She occupies a position in the field of personnel administration in Brazil similar to that of Benedicto Silva in scientific administration; she is the foremost figure in the public personnel field in that country and is essentially a synthesist of ideas. These are ideas having their origin in the development of American personnel administration.

Her most recent book<sup>25</sup> -- as Wahrlich herself states in the preface -- is designed as a manual for the administrator at all levels. It is essentially a representation of a traditional approach to personnel administration along technical, "how-to-do-it" lines, modified by ideas from writers in transition away from scientific administration -- such as Barnard -- and by concepts from the human relations school. After four introductory chapters dealing with public personnel policies and practices in Brazil, Wahrlich moves on into a discussion of the scientific techniques designed to contribute to the objective of a rationalized administrative system. Because of her wide experience in attempting to institute these practices in Brazilian administration, her constant reference to the successes and failures of these techniques in reality offers an insight lacking in most of the literature on personnel administration in Brazil.

Throughout the book, underneath the specific techniques, is an interlacing of Weberian and American values. Wahrlich seeks to apply to the reform of the Brazilian civil service.<sup>26</sup> She is very much aware of the conflict that has occurred in attempting to institute a functioning merit system. She points to the source of the problems, how they have been overcome or reduced, and the necessity of eradicating the sources of resistance. Despite an unfavorable set of circumstances, her belief in neutrality remains unshaken.

Neutrality and impartiality unfortunately . . . are not outstanding characteristics of the Brazilian civil service. This is perfectly natural if we take into account the fact that the great majority of present government employees were named through patronage (*pistolão*) and not through merit, or better still, through merit determined in competitive examinations. Yet, in reality, the public examination alone can create the sort of climate favorable to the flowering of neutrality and impartiality as attitudes characteristic of the government employee. Only the granting and occupancy of positions in government through merit can stimulate the independence and confidence necessary for functional behavior which is politically neutral and impartial under any condition. The granting of positions through patronage, particularly when this patronage is of a political party character, has already substantially hindered the liberty and autonomy of the civil servant.<sup>27</sup>

A further development in Wahrlich's ideas is to be found in an article published in January, 1965.<sup>28</sup> It was originally presented as a paper at the 1963 Latin American Conference on Public Administration in Developing Countries, in Bogotá, Colombia. While the major portion of the article

is devoted to the teaching of public administration in Brazil, Wahrlich's introduction and framework of analysis tie together major trends in Brazilian organization and personnel theory.

In this paper, Wahrlich stresses the key role public administration has to play in the development process. This stems from the fact that we have entered an era characterized by state intervention and an increase in executive power. Never, she says, has social well-being been so dependent on government. To meet this challenge, it is essential that public administration become efficient. She maintains that, in the face of the conditions created by underdevelopment, the question of efficiency passes beyond the academic limitations imposed by administrative theory and becomes an imperative.<sup>29</sup>

The pursuit of administrative efficiency involves two aspects: the organizational and the human. These are related to Wahrlich's orientation toward organization theory discussed in the preceding chapter. Here the four approaches she singled out -- those of the engineers, the "anatomists," the psychologists, and the sociologists -- have been reduced to two groups. The first applies to those who analyze the civil service from an anatomical and physiological standpoint and who try to detect and to pick out structural and functional deficiencies in administration.

This approach, she states, is based on Taylorism and is characteristic of public administration during the first forty years of this century. The second involves trends that have been revolutionizing administrative theory and practice for the last twenty years. The psychologists and sociologists who make up this group conceive of administration essentially as an association of persons in which the pursuit of determined objectives depends, above all, on group interaction. Crucial to this orientation is its concern with the variables which condition the equilibrium of human relations.<sup>30</sup>

Wahrlich points to the fact that the attempt to increase efficiency in Brazilian administration has come about almost entirely through an emphasis on the organizational aspects of public administration. Very little has been done in terms of considering the human elements. According to her interpretation, the basic cause of this general failure to change Brazilian administration and to achieve efficiency is due to failure to consider the importance of the human element. Given this set of circumstances, she is convinced, a major effort must be directed toward the teaching of public administration and, more specifically, toward the training of civil servants at all levels. These constitute basic measures in the struggle against underdevelopment.<sup>31</sup> Such training, however, should be basically

oriented toward personnel at the executive level. The key to success, it would seem, lies in placing a proper emphasis on leadership in an organizational context.

Training should be *global*, that is, it ought to embrace all categories of civil servants and it ought to project itself *from the top to the bottom*, reaching initially both executive and upper level advisory positions. The support of persons in these positions is essential to any program. Qualitative deficiencies in schedules containing personnel in executive positions have a decisive role in the failure of initiatives the functioning of administration. The search for efficiency in Brazilian public administration has called for, from the beginning, the training of personnel "at the top" with the objective of making them believers in the advantages of scientific administration.<sup>32</sup>

In short, Wahrlich asserts, the preparation of personnel at higher levels ought to be the immediate objective and to retain priority in training.<sup>33</sup>

#### The Status of Personnel Theory

Brazilian personnel theory has not progressed much beyond the limits imposed by traditional public administration. Although there is a substantial literature in North American personnel administration which can be analyzed according to the human relations model, there is really only one article among the Brazilian materials surveyed that can properly be included here.<sup>34</sup> The explanation for this phenomenon is to be found in two factors: the continuing belief that there are universal principles of scientific administration which must be imposed on Brazilian administration -- if a modernized system is to be developed -- and the fact that the group focus

of the human relations school, while related to developments in American society, has little or no basis in the Brazilian environment. In the latter case, there are no universal principles asserted as such, for the concepts advanced are founded on a solid empirical basis.

There is, to my knowledge, nothing in Brazil that parallels the Hawthorne experiments; nor is there any attempt to test out principles asserted on the basis of best judgment to see if they really lead to the results claimed for them. In the transitional phase, there is some awareness that there is conflict involved between the principles of scientific management and the broad range of Brazilian experience with civil service reform, but the ultimate validity of this approach is never once called into question. Instead, the search is continued for guide-lines which will lead the administrator to his utopia where the goals of economy and efficiency are to be had through the creation of a merit system and a neutral and impartial civil service.

For the most part, organization and personnel theory in Brazil are oriented to work in terms of non-human objects. When the human element is taken into account, it is from a "machine model" approach. Thus, on the basis of the preceding analysis of organization and personnel theory, we may conclude that conceptually Brazilian public administration still operates within the framework of a closed system of thought. It is only in the area of industrial relations that a true human relations school has begun to emerge in Brazil.<sup>35</sup>

The emphasis in the public personnel field continues to be on the development of skills and techniques which will contribute to the goals of economy and efficiency in administration. The passivity of the human element in an organizational context is an unquestioned assumption. Cooperation is also assumed to be something which will result if the right techniques are employed, if the correct controls over employees are initiated, if the proper sort of person is admitted into the civil service. There is little understanding of the nature of conflict within the organization; there is no group-centered orientation that comes to terms with the problems created by human relations within the area of public personnel administration, and no one has attempted to develop a systematic model which will approach the problem of personnel administration on the basis of "open" systems' analysis.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>There is one exception to be noted: a chapter by Gilbert B. Siegel, entitled "Administration, Values, and the Merit System in Brazil" (in Robert T. Daland (ed.), *Perspectives of Brazilian Public Administration* (Los Angeles: University of Southern California Bookstore, 1963), I, pp. 145-171). Since Siegel is not a part of the Brazilian administrative reform movement, he has not been considered in the following discussion. His chapter belongs among those seeking to revise and to adjust traditional administrative theory to Weberian concepts and to relate the difficulties of Brazilian administration to a hostile social environment. There is a second attempt at explaining the failure of American-style public personnel policies to function as expected in the Brazilian environment: this is the article by Mello e Souza discussed in the previous chapter. In this case, however, public personnel problems are mentioned only incidentally as an aspect of the larger problem of administrative reform.

<sup>2</sup>There have been two such statutes in Brazilian legislation: the *Estatuto dos Funcionários* (Decree-Law 1713) of 1939, and the *Estatutos dos Funcionários Públicos Civis da União* (Law 1711) of 1952. These statutes codify the rights, privileges, and obligations of civil servants with the status of a *funcionario público*.

<sup>3</sup>Walter R. Sharp, *The French Civil Service: Bureaucracy in Transition* (New York: Macmillan, 1931), p. 15.

<sup>4</sup>Examples of these are: Carlos Schmidt de Barros Júnior, "Direitos Adquiridos dos Funcionários Públicos," *Revista de Direito Administrativo*, LI (June-March, 1958), 19-28; Fernando Henrique Mendes de Almeida, "Os Deveres de Obediência e Sigilo do Functionario Público," *Revista da Faculdade de Direito -- Universidade de São Paulo*, LIV (1) (1959), 131-148; José Augusto de Carvalho e Melo, "O Estado e Seus Servidores," *RSP*, I (March, 1949), 57-59; Armando Pereira, *Os Direitos e Vantagens dos Funcionários* (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1964); Eduardo Pinto Pessoa Sobrinho, *Manual dos Servidores do Estado* (Rio de Janeiro: A. Coelho Branco Filho, 1963) (10th ed.).

<sup>5</sup>For legalistic articles dealing with the *extranumerarios*, see: Amilcar de Araujo Falcao, "Extranumerarios; Equiparação de Salários e Vencimentos; Princípios de Isonomia

[Parecer], " *Revista Forense*, CLXXIV (November-December, 1957), 98-102; Valmiro Rodrigues Vidal, *Extranumerários União-Estados-Autarquias. Direitos e Vantagens* (Rio de Janeiro: Conquista, 1956); Paulo Poppe de Figueiredo, "Pessoal das Empresas Concessionárias do Serviço Público," *RSP*, I (March-April, 1948), 23-26; Alonso Caldas (ed.), *Previdência Social (Legislação) (Atualizada com as Alterações até 31-12-1957)* (Rio de Janeiro: Serviço de Documentação do Ministério de Trabalho, Indústria e Comércio, 1958). While the last book contains all legislation and decrees applying to the social welfare institutes, there is a substantial part involving personnel administration.

<sup>6</sup>Two books indicative of this concern with the status of the civil servant before the State are: Gilberto Spilborghs Costa, *Administração de Pessoal: Jurisprudência Administrativa* (Bahia: Imprensa Oficial, 1947) and Francisco Oliveira e Silva (ed.), *O Funcionário e o Estado* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nacional de Direito, 1957). The first is a catalogue of *regulamentos* (regulations and rules) on personnel administration, while the second contains a series of judicial decisions over cases brought into the courts by *funcionários públicos*.

<sup>7</sup>Astério Dardeau Vieira, "O Interêsse Público e o Interêsse Privado na Administração de Pessoal (Estudo Comparativo dos Sistemas Brasileiro e Norte-Americano)," *RSP*, II (April, 1938), 9-12.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, 9-12.

<sup>9</sup>Examples of this orientation are to be found in the following Brazilian sources: Adalmo de Araujo Andrade, *Diretrizes para Classificação de Cargos* (Bela Horizonte: Instituto de Ciências Econômicas, Políticas e Sociais de Minas Gerais, 1960); José de Nazaré Teixeira Dias, *Classificação de Cargos* (Rio de Janeiro: Escola Brasileira de Administração Pública, 1955); Kleber Nascimento, *Classificação de Cargos no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1962); Eduardo Pinto Pessoa Sobrinho, *Classificação de Cargos* (Rio de Janeiro: A. Coelho Branco Filho, 1962); "Classificação de Cargos no Brasil," *RSP*, III (September-October, 1948), 91-100; *Curso de Classificação de Cargos (Cursos de Administração)* (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público, 1952); Othon Sérvulo de Vasconcelos, *A Classificação de Cargos como Problema de Organização* (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1950); Vieira, *Como Classificar os Cargos* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1943).

This valuation of the classification of positions as the key to an efficient civil service within the area of personnel administration is perhaps best expressed in the original classification proposal submitted by DASP. See Brazil, Comissão do Plano de Classificação de Cargos, *A Classificação de Cargos e a Revisão dos Níveis de Vencimentos do Funcionalismo Civil da União* (Rio de Janeiro: Comissão do Plano de Classificação de Cargos, 1954).

In Brazil, Harvey Walker has had the reputation of being the leading exponent of scientific personnel administration. See: Harvey Walker, "Aperfeiçoamento -- Décima Reunião Mensal de 1943; Classificação de Cargos," *RSP*, IV (December, 1943), 99-107.

<sup>10</sup>This concept of the "American creed" is based on Gunnar Myrdal (*An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1944)).

<sup>11</sup>This development is not unlike the situation existing in the British civil service prior to nineteenth-century reforms and that in the United States during the Federalist era.

<sup>12</sup>T. Lynn Smith, *Brazil, People and Institutions* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1954).

<sup>13</sup>This phenomenon is dealt with in more detail in Chapters V and VIII, where the interrelationship between the federal civil service and its socio-political environment is considered.

<sup>14</sup>Benedicto Silva, "A Moderna Administração de Pessoal," *RSP*, LXVII (May, 1955), 216-239; "Missão e Problemas dos Serviços de Pessoal," introduction to Tomás de Vilanova Monteiro, *Problema de Pessoal da Empresa Moderna* (Rio de Janeiro: Escola Brasileira de Administração Pública, 1962).

<sup>15</sup>Silva, *RSP*, 218-219.

<sup>16</sup>Silva, in Monteiro, *op. cit.*, pp. xiv-xix. While this is perhaps the most complete list of the norms established for scientific personnel administration I have encountered in my research on this phase, other examples of this approach are to be found in the following: Urbano de Albuquerque, "Uma Política Segura na Administração de Pessoal," *RSP*, I (January, 1954), 75-77; Augusto de Bulhões, *Elementos para um Programa de Administração de Pessoal* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1945); Ennor de Almeida Carneiro, "Avaliação de Cargos," *RSP*, III (August, 1954), 28-37; "O Plano de

Remuneração, Fundamentos Teóricos e Técnica," *ibid.*, LXVII (May, 1955), 24-62; "Salário e Relações Humanas no Trabalho," *ibid.*, LXVI (January, 1955), 14-23; "Política de Remuneração," *ibid.*, LXVII (April, 1955), 41-47; Pedro Augusto Cysneiros, "Administração Pública e Administração de Pessoal," *ibid.*, I (February, 1952), 138-145; José de Nazaré Teixeira Dias, *Administração de Pessoal: Algumas Sugestões para o Aperfeiçoamento do Serviço Civil* (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público, Serviço de Documentação, 1955); Herson de Faria Dória, "A Seleção dos Servidores do Estado e a Diagnose das Contra-Indicações Profissionais," *RSP*, I (April, 1954), 29-33; *ibid.*, II (June, 1954), 29-40; Figueiredo, *Curso de Administração de Pessoal* (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público, Cursos de Administração, 1954); Monteiro, *op. cit.*; Maria de Conceição Miragaia Pitanga, "Administração de Pessoal e Planejamento," *RSP*, IV (December, 1946), 119-121; Arlindo Vieira de Almeida Ramos, "Base Científica da Administração do Pessoal," *RSP*, IV (December, 1951), 39-46; Luiz Guilherme Ramos Ribeiro, *Do Elemento Pessoal no Serviço Público* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1946).

<sup>17</sup>Dias, *Curso de Administração de Pessoal*, *op. cit.*

<sup>18</sup>Altogether there are sixteen books and articles among the materials examined which demonstrate these characteristics; one is listed in the preceding footnote. The others are: Adalmo de Araújo Andrade, *Introdução a Administração de Pessoal* (Belo Horizonte: Universidade de Minas Gerais, Faculdade de Ciências Econômicas, 1959); Brazil, Ministério Extraordinário para a Reforma Administrativo, Coordenador (Eloah M. G. Barreto, Beatriz Wahrlich, Belmiro Siqueira, rapporteurs), *Normas para Preservação e Revigoração do Sistema do Mérito* (Rio de Janeiro, 1963) (mimeographed); Augusto de Bulhões, *Curso da Administração de Pessoal (Cursos de Administração)* (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público, Divisão de Aperfeiçoamento, 1944); Dias, "A Formação e o Aperfeiçoamento dos Quadros Administrativos de Chefia," *RSP*, LXVI (January, 1955), 11-13; Ary de Castro Fernandes, *Curso de Administração de Pessoal (Cursos de Administração)* (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público, Divisão de Aperfeiçoamento, 1944); Byron Torres de Freitas, *Administração de Pessoal* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora, 1953); Anibal Maya, "Como Processar a Adaptação do Novo Servidor ao Ambiente do Trabalho," *RSP*, IV (December, 1943), 96-99; Raimundo Xavier de Menezes, *Elementos de Técnica de Avaliação de Cargos* (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público, Serviço de Documentação, 1959); Hermínio de Miranda, "O Problema da Formação do Administrador," *O Observador Econômico e Financeiro*, CXL-CXLI (February-March, 1956), 57-59; Maria

de Lourdes Lima Modiano, "Estímulo, Fator de Maior Eficiência no Serviço," *RSP*, III (August, 1949), 39-41; Sobrinho and Dias, *Princípios de Administração de Pessoal* (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1949); Antônio Fonseca Pimentel, *Alguns Aspectos do Treinamento* (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Escola Brasileira de Administração Pública, 1954); Wahrlich, *Administração de Pessoal, Princípios e Técnicas* (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Serviço de Publicações, 1964); *A Importância de Formação de Pessoal* (Rio de Janeiro: Serviço Social do Comércio, Departamento Nacional, 1960); "O Sistema do Mérito na Administração Federal Brasileira," *RSP*, XX (August, 1957), 237-254; "O Ensino da Administração Pública e o Treinamento de Servidores Públicos no Brasil," *Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos*, XVIII (January, 1965), 57-80.

<sup>19</sup>Pinto Pessoa and Dias, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 56.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.* pp. 185-186.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.* pp. 191-192

<sup>23</sup>Menezes, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

<sup>24</sup>There is one exception among the materials examined -- Dias, "A Formação de Supervisores," *RSP*, III (August, 1942), 27-29. Instead of focusing on the executive or the administrator, Dias here draws attention to the supervisor as the key man ("o homem-chave") in the organization; however, the way in which he discusses the need for the training of supervisors is similar in outlook to the characteristics attributed to this phase of personnel administration writing.

<sup>25</sup>Wahrlich, *Administração de Pessoal, Princípios e Técnicas*, *op. cit.*

<sup>26</sup>The following set of indicators was used to check out the presence of Weberian values: rationality, impersonality, hierarchy of authority, formality, a rational set of rules, the importance of position, legitimacy, trained personnel, a career service, a monistic set of relationships, and the bureaucratization of society. This list of indicators was checked out in its entirety in Wahrlich's book -- with the exception of the last one. It is present by implication as a consequence of the growing complexity of Brazilian society. In her book, values taken from the North American

administrative reform movement are to be found in the desire for a moralistically based merit system that will provide equality of opportunity and a tie-in with democratic government.

<sup>27</sup>Wahrlich, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

<sup>28</sup>Wahrlich, *Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos*, XVIII, 57-80.

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*, 58-59.

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*, 59-60.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, 60.

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*, 77.

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*, 79.

<sup>34</sup>Arlindo Vieira de Almeida Ramos, "A Moderna Administração de Pessoal e os Conselhos de Pessoal," *RSP*, II (April, 1952), 41-55.

<sup>35</sup>Indicative of this interest in human relations developing in business administration in Brazil are the following references: Evaristo de Moraes Filho, *Relações Humanas na Indústria (Lições de Sociologia Industrial)* (Rio de Janeiro: Serviço de Documentação, 1955) and Pierre G. Weil, "An Experience in Psychological Counseling and Training of Personnel in Brazil," *Training Directors Journal*, XVIII (February, 1964), 3-9. This observation is also based on an interview with Weil at the Banco de Lavoura's training center in Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais, on February 24, 1964, and on a tour of the center and conversations with the staff. References to the value of the human relations approach to the analysis of administrative phenomena in the public sector may also be found, but no attempt -- at least, to the knowledge of the researcher -- has been made to apply them to the analysis of Brazilian conditions. Indicative of the effort to introduce these ideas are, besides the Almeida Ramos article: Morton Grodzins, "Administração Pública e Ciência das Relações Humanas" (translated from English), *RSP*, XV (February, 1952), 24-36, and A. Fonseca Pimental, "O Homem na Organização do Trabalho," *Jornal do Brasil* (November 18, 1950), section 2, 8.

## CHAPTER V

### A MODEL FOR THE STUDY OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

In a recent paper, Glen D. Paige raised the question:

Are political systems to be conceived of as largely determined by the socio-economic characteristics of the societies in which they are found? Or are they to be conceived as capable of largely autonomous variation which can result in profound economic, social, and cultural change?<sup>1</sup>

The answer formulated to such a question is basic to the sort of interpretation one gives to the political structure of any country. In this particular case, it has a great deal to do with how one handles the topic of this and the two following chapters -- the political understructure of the Brazilian public personnel system and the federal civil service.

In his discussion, Paige goes on to observe that, while it has been more common to conceive of the political sphere as a consequence of socio-economic forces in a particular country, there are cases in which substantial changes may take place in the political sphere without the occurrence of corresponding marked changes in the socio-economic characteristics of a society. After examining several possibilities and referring to individual countries, he reaches the conclusion that political behavior can be conceived both as a causal and as a relatively autonomous force.<sup>2</sup>

These observations are pertinent to an analysis of Brazilian political experience for two reasons. First, Brazilian writing on politics has shown a preference for explanations which rely upon socio-economic factors and, secondly, when these observations are applied to Brazil, they point to the fact that there are events which have occurred that require an independent analysis of political behavior.

The theme of this chapter, as well as of Chapters VI and VII, will be the political context as an independent variable<sup>3</sup> interacting with socio-economic variables and directly related to an understanding of the problems of formalism in Brazilian public personnel policies and practices. This does not mean that the material which explains the political system as a consequence of socio-economic factors is irrelevant, but only that it must be brought into contact with such independent institutional factors as the division of power among the executive, the legislature, and the courts, and the existence of a diffuse multiparty system. Perhaps the most obvious political institution which has contributed to a structuring of political patterns in Brazil is the independent executive patterned after the American presidency. The commitment to this institution has been of such long standing that it has been a determining factor in the distribution of power in the Brazilian political system.

If Brazil is to be classified as a transitional society approaching Riggs' prismatic model, there is an additional political factor to be considered -- that the separation between administration and politics is incomplete in such a society. In contrast, the presence of a separation of politics and administration is what Riggs singles out as one of the most distinguishing characteristics of a "well-diffracted polity." At the same time, he maintains it is one of the most difficult changes to achieve.<sup>4</sup> Although it has been uncommon to separate the two in the course of human history, Riggs points out that such a division is characteristic of the more highly industrialized, and especially the more democratic, countries where, even though it has been an objective of policy, such a complete separation has not, in practice, been achieved.<sup>5</sup> He also draws attention to the fact that the separation of politics and administration has been more a prescriptive principle or norm, related to the underlying "value premises" of a democratic political system, than a valid descriptive hypothesis.<sup>6</sup> It is important to remember these characteristics when considering Brazilian experience with administrative reform.

Among present-day writings on Brazilian politics are three viewpoints developed by Brazilian writers which are especially helpful in understanding the environment in which

administration has functioned. These are: (1) the concept of clientele politics, with its correlate, the Cartorial State; (2) the idea that there are five types of political action which may be singled out of Brazilian political experience, and (3) the notion that there has existed throughout Brazilian history a strong conservative tradition.

When abstracted into models, these concepts provide three different approaches to the analysis of Brazilian politics.

The first of these models is found in the writings of Hélio Jaguaribe. There, the political development of Brazil is divided into four phases in accord with the country's economic history: the predominance of a colonial political and economic structure, which continued until 1850; the emergence of a semi-colonial system in the years between 1850 and 1930; the entry into a transitional period during the 1930's, and the beginnings of effective national independence afterward. In connection with these developments, a clientele style of politics makes its appearance; this is focused on the *fazenda* -- the large plantation. Each clientele group, according to his analysis, is centered around pacts of mutual interest tied to a single man who is representative of the interests of the area. These pacts are articulated first by municipality, then by provinces, and finally converge at the level of the central government.

This system, however, is not perfected until a federal republic is established and the unitary state of the Empire is abandoned. For Jaguaribe, the First Republic is essentially a period dominated politically by a marginal middle class, in league with a rural bourgeoisie which -- because of a semi-colonial economy centered around the production of coffee -- was incapable of instituting the radical changes necessary in the country's socio-economic structure to make its role functional.<sup>7</sup> Although these relationships were functional for the needs of the First Republic, after 1930 Jaguaribe conceived of them as responsible for a "social parasitism" which "strangles" relations among all classes and for a political system entirely out of keeping with socio-economic conditions.<sup>8</sup>

The correlate of clientele politics is what Jaguaribe calls the Cartorial State -- one in which voting is tied to a regime whereby favors are bargained for (usually in the form of jobs or special privileges) in return for votes.

The essence of the Cartorial State is to be found in the fact that the State is, in the first place, the maintainer or guarantor of the status quo. [It] . . . is a product of clientele politics and, at the same time, the instrument that utilizes and perpetuates it. . . . [In this system] public employment is not actually directed toward the rendering of any public service, but only to the subsidization, in a more or less indirect way, of clienteles in return for electoral support. This service, separated from social reality, without relation to the need for rendering effective public service, is converted into an infinite pyramid

of positions where innocuous papers are circulated and where the only activity which it exercises is the feeding of itself through prebendary practices (*arrecadação*). . . . Its objective is not the rendering of public services, but [instead] the provision for a marginal middle class, which since it has little to do becomes the predominant force in public opinion -- an illustrious force which votes and orients itself within the mechanism of an indirect subsidy. The dominant class indirectly subsidizes the leisure (*ociosidade*) and the marginality of the middle class, placing it within the Cartorial State, and it pays a tax which the latter returns in the form of favors (*benefícios*) for the maintenance of clientele politics and a semicolonial and semifeudal structure.<sup>9</sup>

In contrast to the economic basis of Jaguaribe's analysis of Brazilian political development and his isolation of a single predominant political style, Alberto Guerreiro Ramos abstracts from Brazilian history five ideal-types of politics related to developments in the country's social structure. These are: (1) clan-style politics, characteristic of colonial Brazil and focusing around patriarchal families; (2) oligarchical-style politics, most appropriate for the period between 1822 and 1930 and centering on the predominance of regional political bosses; (3) populist-style politics, best exemplified by the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB) -- the Brazilian Labor Party -- and representing a larger concentration of political support than the first two political styles; (4) pressure group politics, which appear only within more recent years and are concentrated around specific economic interests, and (5) ideological politics, which reach their maximum development during the Quadros and

Goulart governments. These types, he postulates, tend to constitute successive moments in the evolution of Brazil. They do not, however, necessarily disappear with the emergence of a new phase; instead, they continue as historical residues. Thus, in present-day Brazil, all five types of politics may be observed interacting simultaneously, although they rarely exist in pure form. In the rural areas, clan- and oligarchical-style politics continue to predominate, while at the national level, ideological politics set the scene.<sup>10</sup>

The approaches of both Jaguaribe and Guerreiro Ramos provide insights into the political framework; however, they need to be modified to give useful analytic tools for the 1945-1964 period.

Jaguaribe's concepts of clientele style politics and the Cartorial State are valuable in that they get at a traditional pattern in Brazilian politics: the existence of a closed system in which the mass of the people are apathetic, political power is monopolized by a landowning and mercantile upper class, and public employment becomes the prerogative of a dependent middle class at the service of the oligarchy. These concepts also help to draw attention to the gap between the political system brought into existence with the 1946 Constitution and the socio-economic changes Brazil has been undergoing. Certainly, at many levels and in

different regions a clientele-style politics continues to function with the subsequent use of positions in the public service for purposes other than the provision of public services.

The problem with the Jaguaribe model is that it is too static and that it oversimplifies changes in the social, political, and economic structure both before and since 1930. For example, he speaks of the revolution of 1930 as the second seizure of power by the middle class -- the first being the revolution of 1889. Because the ideological disorientation of the middle class was greater on this occasion than in 1889, he claims that it became more pragmatic and comprehending of the necessity for power, not only to provide itself with jobs, but also to be able to utilize the machinery of the State to perpetuate its control.<sup>11</sup> The problem posed by this analysis is that it does not draw sufficient attention to the shift away from the predominance of rural interests engaged in monocultural agriculture to the emergence of urban groups -- of a middle and upper class character -- interested in developing the national market and in achieving independence from the excessive reliance of the country on external markets.

Jaguaribe's model of the Cartorial State is much more operational when it is joined with Guerreiro Ramos' differentiation of several distinct styles of politics. This concept

of various political styles offers the advantage of escape from the traditional-modern dichotomy present in so much of contemporary political thinking. It also provides a link with Riggs' model of prismatic society which is to be imposed between the extremes of a developmental continuum. Not only does Ramos establish a framework for the changing patterns of patronage as one moves across historic periods, but he also offers categories for the analysis of heterogeneous and overlapping political patterns in the course of Brazilian political development.

On the foundation, then, of Jaguaribe's and Ramos' concepts, let us postulate a set of political relationships, based on Brazilian materials, which can operate within the wider framework established in Chapter I by models taken from Diamant and Riggs. While Brazil has remained essentially a limited polyarchy in terms of the four major political styles suggested by Diamant, the distinction of various subordinate political styles -- which represent different degrees of limited polyarchy -- should enable us better to comprehend the expanding basis of political participation which took place between 1945 and 1964 and its effects on administration.

When there are historic residues of clan-style politics in more isolated rural areas, one should be able to find the use of local public office by members of the ex-

tended family.<sup>12</sup> In the case of oligarchical-style politics, in which the focus is at the regional level and rural interests predominate, Jaguaribe's Cartorial State should come into existence<sup>13</sup> with implications at the national level when conservative parties, such as the Partido Social Democrático (PSD), are in the ascendancy. In contrast, in populist-style politics, where personalism continues simultaneously with the development of wider electoral support, the use of civil service positions should change considerably. While in Jaguaribe's Cartorial State these jobs help to provide status and security for a dependent middle class, protection against downward social mobility, and an important link in a system dominated by an "elect-elite,"<sup>14</sup> according to Ramos' concept, a populist type party such as the PTB would be inclined to use them as a means of reward for the urban working groups which form the basis of its power. In this overlapping of Cartorial and populist political styles, positions in the public sector would constitute, according to this model, a focal point in the whole process of integration through which new groups are brought into the political process. This would also involve the initiation of a movement away from a closed, elitist system toward a mass-based one in which political parties find it necessary to maintain and provide for cadres of voters.<sup>15</sup> Since there is already a premium on jobs of any sort in a

developing economy, the lower ranks of the public service may be viewed as a major means of employment and as a way to improve status for individuals outside the ruling class. Under this set of circumstances, the basis of the Cartorial State should continue to exist in the terms set forth by Jaguaribe, *i.e.* favors are bargained for in return for votes and the public service is used to subsidize its employees instead of providing services to the public at large. A change in the class basis of the Cartorial State takes place, however. If the relationships postulated are valid, then the Cartorial State should provide a means of access to the benefits of urban society for groups hitherto excluded from the political process. It is further postulated that a substantial part of what makes the federal civil service so difficult to analyze is to be found in the overlapping of these two distinct uses of patronage -- one for the protection of an educated, conservative middle class with upper class values and the other for reward to a much larger group of individuals, mostly undereducated, who are painfully aware of the privileges denied them.

The foregoing, viewed in the context of a predominant Brazilian conservative tradition, may be contrasted with the notion of an American liberal tradition, as developed by Louis Hartz.<sup>16</sup> While the concept of a conservative tradition underlies unconsciously much of the writing on

Brazil, it is clearly expressed in concrete terms for the first time by José Honório Rodrigues, in his recent book, *Conciliação e Reforma no Brasil*.<sup>17</sup> In the first essay, Rodrigues develops the theme of alternating periods of reform and conciliation in Brazilian history which have always been given a conservative hue. If, in Hartz' terms, one can speak of the frustrated conservative in the American tradition, so in Brazil, in Rodrigues' terms, one may refer to the frustrated liberal or reformer. This wide socio-historic context is related in turn to the broad problems of Brazilian development -- in the transition from a society corresponding to Riggs' fused model to a prismatic one. Rodrigues essentially maintains that all efforts at reform in Brazil have been modified or altered by the predominance of a conservative, elitist tradition which, through conciliation, has always met and overcome the threat of basic change in the system -- be it social, political, or economic.

Using Rodrigues as a departure point, we may see today's crisis as the inability of many Brazilian political leaders who, because of their ties to this tradition, have been unable to come to terms with the demands for fundamental change in their society. To this may be contrasted the changing character of United States elites and the development of an egalitarian ideology during the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian administrations which, even though it

was not borne out in practice in appointments to the higher civil service, prepared the way for greater and more open participation in government by those with non-elite status.<sup>18</sup> Nor should the fact be overlooked that changes in ideology as well as preparation for a more open system of government preceded the era of industrialization and modernization in the United States. In Brazil, the pressure for these changes has coincided with a substantial alteration in the country's socio-economic character and this has made the problem immensely more complicated.

This desire for basic change may well be called the arrival of the "democratic revolution" -- if one places Brazil in the context of De Tocqueville's writings and the general conditions to which he referred in Western Europe and the United States during the past century and avoids the constraints which have been imposed by the more popular dichotomy of the West and the non-West. Sufficient social and economic change to modify the elitist orientation of Brazilian political life and to provide an adequate basis for the expression of egalitarian aspirations has taken place in Brazil only in the last thirty-five years. The very fact that change along these lines -- in the movement from an elitist to a mass-based system of politics -- has been continually subverted by the power-holders in this society has merely increased the possibility ultimately of a violent solution to

the problems raised by this trend.

When the problems of administrative reform are placed in this wider, more embracing political context, it should not be necessary to belabor the point that it is not enough to speak of the conflict between merit as a "good" and patronage as an "evil" across Brazilian history,<sup>19</sup> and the gradual emergence of a merit approach to the fulfillment of government positions which achieves its apogee during the *Estado Novo*, only to be destroyed by the return to party politics in 1946.<sup>20</sup> Instead, attention must be focused on change in social, economic, and political sectors, the evolution of an elitist civil service as opposed to the formation of an open civil service responsive to the external political system, and problems of integration in Brazilian society at large.

If Riggs' models of fused, prismatic, and diffracted societies are applied to Brazil, one may make a good case for using the decade of the 1930's as a dividing point in that country's political development. Until that time, Brazil was essentially a traditional society resembling the fused model. This means that, since "functionally specific structures" are lacking, the upper class may be viewed as monopolizing what Riggs singles out as three basic values to be found in all societies -- power, wealth, and education. While these three values tend to "agglutinate" in all socie-

ties, in a traditional society such as that of pre-1930 Brazil, the unity or fusion of these values is most complete. Under such a set of circumstances, power includes all forms of influence.<sup>21</sup> To this must be added the importance of kinship ties and the concept of the extended family as the dominant institution in Brazilian society.<sup>22</sup>

There is, however, another way of considering the upper class in traditional Brazil aside from the framework suggested by Riggs. In this instance, the role of the upper class may be seen in a more positive light -- as the chief agent in the process whereby the masses have undergone and are still undergoing acculturation to the Brazilian variant of Western culture. In this respect, the integrative process underway is much more than just a political phenomenon.

This leads us into a consideration of the importance of values if we are to understand the wider socio-political context within which Brazilian administration has functioned. The dominant value system existing in Brazil is closely related to the continuation of a conservative tradition. These traditional values, Portuguese in origin, developed largely in the context of a New World plantation economy in a pre-industrial era. They are contained in what Charles Wagley calls the Brazilian Great Tradition.<sup>23</sup> They are also related to what John Gillin singles out as the values of the contemporary middle segments in Latin America<sup>24</sup> and to what is

often known as the "gentleman complex" -- be it in Brazil, as in the case of Gilberto Freyre's writings about the sugar cane cycle in the Northeast, or in the traditional American South, as in James Cash's *The Mind of the South*. The most useful list of social values, however, is Gillin's. While they are developed in the context of Latin American middle segments, they are of much wider applicability and supply a convenient checklist for the dominant value system in Brazil. They include personalism as a central concept, kinship and the strength of family ties, the importance of hierarchy and stratification (the master-servant relationship), "tangible materialism," the weight of transcendental values, the high worth of inner states and the emphasis on emotion as fulfillment of the self, fatalism, "decency" in mode of life, and disdain for manual labor.<sup>25</sup>

The persistence of a dominant aristocratic value system in Brazil has direct bearing on the political system and on the civil service. In turn, this value system may be related to the distinction Riggs makes among myths, formulas, and codes as distinct levels of symbolization in society. He uses *myth* to refer to "the underlying norms, the basic values or goals, the ultimate purposes, by which any human society guides itself"; *formula* to define the "ground rules, whether ideological or utopian, whereby a society distinguishes the elect from the reject, allocates rights and duties, separates

groups from one another, decides who shall make and defend its rules, what may be possessed and alienated, or what means are acceptable"; and *codes* to conceive of the "specific policies, programs, and decisions which result from political and administrative action, and the general format which shapes them."<sup>26</sup>

If we think in terms of these three different levels of symbolization in the case of Brazil, we encounter a dominant myth or value system which is aristocratic and traditional, political formulas which are egalitarian and democratic, and administrative codes which are Weberian and highly rationalistic. To this characterization must be added the notion of competing value-systems within Brazilian society which vary because of community differences, regionalism, and a sharply-defined system of social classes. The dominant aristocratic value system has been subjected to many new pressures as socio-economic change has taken place in Brazil. Wagley hints at the stresses which traditional values have been undergoing in Brazil,<sup>27</sup> but much of Brazilian writing in anthropology and sociology seems to concern itself more with the continuation of patrimonialism (*i.e.* the syndrome of traditional society) and places the conflict in terms of a traditional-modern dichotomy.<sup>28</sup>

Viewed from a still different standpoint, the conflict among value-systems according to heterogeneous and overlap-

ping patterns is but another expression of the arrival of the "democratic revolution" and the emergence of a new series of values centering around the demand for equality of opportunity and social justice and which, as such, have great implications for the political system.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Glen D. Paige, *The Rediscovery of Politics* (Bloomington, Indiana: Comparative Administration Group, American Society for Public Administration, and International Development Research Center, Indiana University, 1964(?), p. 6.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 10, 12.

<sup>3</sup>In terms of the central hypothesis stated in Chapter I, this is the first independent variable used to explain the nature of the public personnel system.

<sup>4</sup>Fred W. Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964), p. 237.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 54.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 329.

<sup>7</sup>Hélio Jaguaribe, *Desenvolvimento Econômico e Desenvolvimento Político* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fundo de Cultura, 1962), pp. 154, 170-173. The author is not quite certain what Jaguaribe means by a "rural bourgeoisie," unless this term is used to distinguish the producers of coffee and the owners of sugar mills (*engenhos*) from the rural patriarchs whose wealth was based on sugar.

<sup>8</sup>Jaguaribe, *Condições Institucionais do Desenvolvimento* (Rio de Janeiro: Ministério da Educação e Cultura, Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros, 1952), pp. 14-22.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 22-23. Jaguaribe states that the term "cartorial" is based on the similarity of this state of affairs to the use of *cartórios fiscais* -- fiscal permits or benefices -- in the colonial period. These privileges were granted to individuals for the collection of tributes (*benefícios*) due the Crown and allowed them to receive a percentage of the total sums collected (p. 22).

<sup>10</sup>Alberto Guerreiro Ramos, *A Crise do Poder no Brasil (Problemas da Revolução Nacional Brasileira)* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1961), pp. 49, 67. This analysis is most appropriate for events prior to the revolution of April, 1964.

<sup>11</sup>Jaguaribe, *Desenvolvimento Econômico e Desenvolvimento Político*, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

<sup>12</sup>The author was able to observe this during a visit to a small town in northern Minas Gerais. In this particular case, the town, which depended for its livelihood on the surrounding rural area, was sharply divided between two extended families -- one of which was PSD and the other UDN. This phenomenon is also discussed in Roger Bastide, *Brasil, Terra de Contrastes* (São Paulo: Difusão Européia do Livro, 1959), pp. 238-245; Jacques Lambert, *Os Dois Brasis* (Rio de Janeiro: INEP, Ministério da Educação e Cultura, 1959); Carlos Eloy de Carvalho Guimarães, "A Vida Política e Administrativa de Dores de Indaiá," *Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos*, I (December, 1956), 170-179; Orlando M. Carvalho, "Os Partidos Políticos em Minas Gerais," *ibid.* (July, 1957), 99-115; Luiz Octávio Viotti de Azevedo, "Evolução dos Partidos Políticos no Município de São João Evangelista," *ibid.*, III (July, 1959), 183-184; Edilson Portela Santos, "Evolução da Vida Política no Município de Picos, Piauí," *ibid.*, No. 10 (January, 1961), 160-183; Oracy Nogueira, "Os Movimentos e Partidos Políticos em Itapetininga," *ibid.*, No. 11 (June, 1961), 222-247.

The article by Orlando Carvalho offers an understanding of the movement from clan to oligarchical-style politics in the state of Minas Gerais as the framework of the state government became more closely interwoven with the municipalities.

<sup>13</sup>Referring to the way local public positions have been filled in Itapetininga, Oracy Nogueira offers an insight into this style of politics: "The naming [of individuals] to public positions, or the grouping together of these nominations, by the central power in general represented official recognition of the influence exercised by the

interested party in the local or regional sphere. This individual would have already demonstrated his influence by the physical and economic domination of his rivals and by his own defiance of constituent authority. From this achievement he would receive increased prestige and power" (p. 222).

<sup>14</sup>This term is taken from Riggs. According to his definition, the "elite" refers "to the power-holders in a society"; the "ruling class" "to those members of a society from whom the elite may be recruited"; and the "elect" to "those who hold high positions in terms of all socially prized values, not only power, but also wealth, learning, prestige, skill, and so on." In a fused model, then, "where functionally specific structures are lacking, the elite are also the 'elect'" (pp. 125-126). According to this framework, Jaguaribe's middle class becomes a part of the ruling class.

<sup>15</sup>This development, at the core of the problem of political patronage, is discussed first in Chapter VII in terms of data taken from Brazil, and again in Chapter VII from the vantage point of cross-cultural comparison.

<sup>16</sup>Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1955).

<sup>17</sup>José Honório Rodrigues, *Conciliação e Reforma no Brasil; Um Desafio Histórico-Político* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1965).

<sup>18</sup>Sidney H. Aronson, *Status and Kinship in the Higher Civil Service; Standards of Selection in the Administrations of John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and Andrew Jackson* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).

<sup>19</sup>See Murilo Braga, "Problemas de Seleção Pessoal," *RSP* (May, 1941), 103-106; Tomás de Vilanova Monteiro Lopes, "A Seleção de Pessoal para o Serviço Público Brasileiro," *ibid.*, IV (October, 1952), 19-23; G. E. do Nascimento Silva, "As Qualidades Diplomáticas e as Condições de Ingresso na Carreira," *ibid.*, LXXIX (April, 1950), 20-43; Armando Pereira, *Os Direitos e Vantagens dos Funcionários* (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1964), pp. 25-26.

<sup>20</sup>See Beatriz Wahrlich, *Administração de Pessoal: Princípios e Técnicas* (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Serviço de Publicações, 1964), pp. 23 ff.; "O Sistema

do Mérito na Administração Federal Brasileira," *RSP* (August, 1957), 237-254; Brazil, Ministério Extraordinário para a Reforma Administrativa, Coordenador (Eloah M.G. Barreto, Beatriz Wahrlich, Belmiro Siqueira, rapporteurs), *Normas para Preservação e Revigoração do Sistema do Mérito* (Rio de Janeiro, 1963) (mimeographed).

<sup>21</sup>Riggs, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-127.

<sup>22</sup>Both T. Lynn Smith and Emílio Willems consider the family to be the major institution in Brazilian society. This continued importance of the large family, with implications in the social and political realm, is one of the primary indications of the continuation and vitality of a traditional system.

<sup>23</sup>Charles Wagley, *An Introduction to Brazil* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 5-10.

<sup>24</sup>John P. Gillin, "Some Signposts for Policy," in Richard N. Adams *et al.*, *Social Change in Latin America Today: Its Implications for United States Policy* (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), pp. 28-47.

<sup>25</sup>Gillin, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-47.

<sup>26</sup>Riggs, *op. cit.*, pp. 175-176.

<sup>27</sup>Wagley, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

<sup>28</sup>For example, see Emílio Willems, "Burocracia e Patrimonialismo," *Administração Pública*, III (September, 1945), 3-8; "Problemas de uma Sociologia do Peneiramento," *Revista do Arquivo Municipal* (São Paulo), LXXV (April, 1941), 5-63; "Brazil," in Arnold M. Rose (ed.), *The Institutions of Advanced Societies* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958). This dichotomy is also carried over into some of the writing on Brazilian public administration. See Gilbert B. Siegel, "Administration, Values, and the Merit System in Brazil," in Robert T. Daland (ed.), *Perspectives of Brazilian Public Administration*, Vol. I (Los Angeles: University of Southern California Bookstore, 1963), pp. 145-171, and Nelson Mello e Souza (with the collaboration of Breno Genari), "Public Administration and Economic Development," *ibid.*

## CHAPTER VI

### THE POLITICAL UNDERSTRUCTURE (1945-1964)

The administrative atmosphere in the period between 1945 and 1964 was politically charged. For this reason, it is impossible to view the administrative problems of the country without developing some awareness of the political environment and its interaction with the administrative system. The crucial element in this interaction between administration and politics was the political party. Before 1945, national party organization was hardly known, although parties certainly did exist before this date. Related to this importance of the political party and influencing the administrative system were the rapid, but incomplete, expansion of the Brazilian electorate, the organization of eligible voters within the framework of a national party system, and the emergence of egalitarian aspirations that vastly stimulated an already active desire for political employment.

*The prismatic model.* The political party system in post-1945 Brazil reflects the conditions characteristic of a transitional society. Just as there are elements in Brazilian society which bear a direct relation to the prismatic model developed by Riggs and which have been discussed in preceding chapters, so, too, one may take the typology

offered by Riggs for the analysis of political parties and relate it to Brazilian experience. In so doing, we can arrive at an understanding of the nature of the Brazilian party system which escapes from concern with the more popular topic of why this system has failed to provide competitive parties which coalesce the views of their members on public policy.

Riggs postulates that in the prismatic model political parties must appear, at least in name, but that they fail to accomplish what is expected of them in more advanced societies, *i.e.* that they provide a channel for political mobility and access to elite status for those interested in achieving political power. Under prismatic conditions, the attainment of power continues to take place to a considerable extent outside the formal political party structure. The bureaucracy offers one of the major channels through which political power can be achieved. Rather than being entirely an administrative apparatus for the execution of policy decided on in the political system, it becomes a "primary vehicle for elite recruitment." But this channel is not open to all social strata. Thus, many of those who fail to gain access to the bureaucracy seek to achieve elite status through the political parties. Riggs further postulates that -- since the power struggle is particularly acute in a prismatic society due to the fact that a relatively small number of positions are available in the power pyramid --

a bureaucratic elite cannot be expected to surrender power without a struggle to aspirants brought forward by the "parties." . . . Instead of serving as a channel to elite status, the "parties" become incubators of counter-elites.<sup>1</sup>

On this basis, he offers the proposition: "the narrower the communal basis of elite recruitment . . . the greater the potential 'mass' basis for the 'parties.'" He continues:

The question then arises as to whether they [the political leaders] will move toward greater diffraction by institutionalizing political parties as channels for continuing elite recruitment and control over the bureaucracy, or whether the situation will remain prismatic as a result of "blanketing" the followers of the victorious "party" leaders into the bureaucracy. When this happens, of course, the bureaucracy remains institutionally -- though with a wholesale change of faces -- the primary channel of social and political mobility. . . . The inability of "parties" to provide peaceful and legal channels of access to power for their leaders makes them combative, smarting to change the regime and to displace the elite strata as a whole.<sup>2</sup>

Within this framework, Riggs develops a typology of political parties based on two variables taken from David Apter. The author has expanded Riggs' typology from a three- to a nine-fold typology and has summarized the possible combinations in the plan shown on the following page.<sup>3</sup>

*A historical sketch of Brazilian parties.* If we apply the chart presented here to Brazilian parties, both past and present, we obtain another link in the continued predominance of the conservative tradition discussed in the preceding chapter and the way it has been mitigated by the emergence of mass-based politics. By using these two

1st Variable: Type of Organization

	<u>Bureaucratic</u>	<u>Polyarchic<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>Personal</u>
<u>Durable</u>	<u>bureaucratic/durable<sup>b</sup></u>	polyarchic/durable	personal/durable
<u>Persistent</u>	bureaucratic/persistent	<u>polyarchic/per-</u> <u>sistent</u>	personal/persistent
<u>Fragile</u>	bureaucratic/fragile	polyarchic/fra- gile	<u>personal/fragile</u>

Second  
Variable:  
Time  
Span

---

<sup>a</sup>According to Riggs' definition, "polyarchic" means ". . . a form of collective personal leadership resting on consensus or voting procedures" (p. 138). In terms of the time span variable, Riggs states these relationships in this way: "the life of a fragile party can be measured in years, of a persistent party in decades, and durable parties in generations, if not centuries" (p. 139).

<sup>b</sup>The underscored syndromes are those developed by Riggs.

variables, it can be demonstrated that the conservative type party has dominated the course of Brazilian political development. Both the Conservative Party of the Empire and the Republican Party of the First Republic were personal and durable, while all the conservative type parties since 1945 -- the Partido Social Democrático (PSD), the União Democrática Nacional (UDNO, the Partido Republicano (PR), and Partido Libertador (PL) -- have been polyarchic and persistent.

In contrast, reformist parties have been relatively unsuccessful. The liberal-progressive type of parties during the Empire were personal and fragile, and hardly any parties of this sort can be discovered during the First Republic, except for the National Democratic Party (founded in 1927) which was both personal and fragile. The one major exception to this pattern is the PTB which has been polyarchic and persistent. But its development was cut short by the military coup of March, 1964. While the major and middle-class parties since 1945 have been polyarchic and persistent, there are two cases in which a personalist type of party has continued to exist. Both the far-right PRP and the labor-oriented PSP may be classified as personal and persistent.

The conservative tradition that has dominated Brazilian political experience has provided that country with a national

leadership which

. . . in its successive generations has . . . been anti-reformist, elitist, and personalist.

. . . . .

Anti-reformist because, with the rarest of exceptions, it alone proposed political reforms, especially electoral ones, and it alone offered obstinate resistance to reforms in an archaic economic structure.

Elitist, because it kept the masses -- the *povo* -- marginal [to the political process], be it through the exclusion of the illiterate, the urban worker, the inhabitant of the interior (the *sertanejo*), the agricultural worker, or be it because until today the great national groups have not incorporated the civilian masses -- the *povo cívico*.

The personalism of its political action has always predominated. Rarely has it corrected this through emphasizing problems and not persons. Affective considerations have complicated the direction of public affairs and from this has stemmed nepotism (with its subtypes of *filhotismo* -- the protection of one's children -- and *genrismo* -- the protection of one's in-laws), other variations common to favoritism that are tied to personalism, and the boss (*patrão*) -- clientele relationship of the State -- a relationship to which all politicians, from the most oligarchical to the most labor-oriented, have adhered.<sup>4</sup>

These three elements have been characteristic of the conservative parties in Brazil from the Empire to the present.

While it has been more common to speak of the two-party system of the Empire, within the framework of a factional, upper-class style of politics, it is more correct to refer to these groupings of political forces within the context of a dominant one-party system in which conservative agrarian interests predominated.<sup>5</sup> The term "party," however, should

be used with caution because these were, above all, alliances of provincial elites. Under the First Republic, these patterns became clearer, for, while there existed only one party in name, the Republicano, it was a coalition of state parties in which the Partido Republicano Mineiro and the Partido Republicano Paulista were the essential units. Small opposition parties appeared and disappeared at the municipal level with little importance. The breakdown of the political system in the late 1920's, the formation of the unsuccessful Liberal Alliance,<sup>6</sup> and the Revolution of 1930 which brought Getulio Vargas to power reflected a further fragmentation of political groupings which made it impossible for even the semblance of a national party system to develop.

*Political parties since 1945.* Following the eight years of dictatorship, the PSD, as one of the three major parties in the post-1945 era, represented a reorganization of a substantial part of the regional elites that had formed the basis of the state Republican parties. It was, in this respect, the direct descendent of the Conservative and Republican parties of earlier eras. Joined with this element were those associated with the bureaucratic structure of the *Estado Novo* and without ties to the labor movement.<sup>7</sup> It thus reflected a reorganization of conservative political forces in that its leadership consisted of a cross-section of both privileged urban society and the landowning elite.<sup>8</sup>

In contrast, there was no such continuity between past and present in the more liberal parties. Various reformist groupings have appeared during the course of Brazilian political development, but they have been isolated and unsuccessful ventures for the most part. The one party which has drawn on this experience in the post-1945 period has been the PTB. José Honório Rodrigues has expressed this legacy in these terms:

. . . in spite of its infantile maladies -- opportunism, demagoguery, populism -- it also has historic roots. It is tied, in certain sectors, to a radical tradition and, in others, to a liberal progressive one.<sup>9</sup>

Yet, the PTB introduced a new element into Brazilian politics. As an urban-based party, appealing to industrial labor, it was tied to developments dating back to around 1920, when the first significant urbanization and industrialization movements began to take place in Brazil. Vargas was responsible for first bringing the urban industrial workers into the political process and he was quite successful throughout the *Estado Novo* in maintaining their support through the institution of social welfare reforms benefiting them and through the imposition of controls and obligations on business management.<sup>10</sup> By 1943, the balance of political forces on which the dictatorship was based had begun to deteriorate. Recognizing these changes, Vargas moved in the direction of political reform. A new electoral code, promulgated in 1945 prior to the inter-

vention of the military, authorized the creation of political parties, with the stipulation that they must have a national basis, and reinstated the principle of proportional representation.<sup>11</sup> Within this context, Vargas institutionalized his control over urban labor in a party organization: the PTB. This party was to form the basis of his mass support when he was elected to the presidency in late 1950.

The third major party to appear in the post-1945 period, the UDN, was a hybrid party which, while a product of the same conservative tradition, was more immediately a consequence of a coalition of anti-Vargas forces. It has often been referred to as an urban-based party appealing to the middle and upper classes; yet it also has depended for some of its support on the same elements that were attracted to the PSD in the rural areas of Minas Gerais and the Northeast. As a conservative party, it is distinguished by its strong commitment to political democracy and by its appeal to the urban middle classes.

Nevertheless, these three major parties -- the PSD, the PTB, and the UDN -- are essentially amalgamations of various groups which vary considerably from one region to another. This condition was necessitated by the emphasis beginning in 1945 on the creation of national parties and by the fact that any large party was certain to reflect the heterogeneous character of Brazilian society. Since their primary reason

for existence was the election of public officials and the development of sufficient party organization to be able to attract sizable numbers of voters, their orientation could hardly be any other than pragmatic.

The most significant regional differentiation that cuts across these parties is that existing between the Northeast and the Southeast. It is in the Southeast that the generalizations often repeated about these three parties are most valid. There the PSD tends to be the party of the traditional regional oligarchies; the UDN appeals more to the urban middle classes, and the PTB has almost entirely an urban working class basis.<sup>12</sup>

Joined to this regional split that is reflected in any major Brazilian party is the division between pro- and anti-Vargas political alignments, regardless of the fact that Vargas committed suicide in 1954. Both the PSD and the PTB were Vargas creations, while the UDN was substantially an anti-Vargas coalition. This division was strengthened by the alliance Vargas developed between the PSD and the PTB in order to gain the presidency in the election of 1950. As a successful majority coalition which could insure control of Congress and the presidency, it had every reason to continue to exist. In spite of the tremendous strains which this alliance faced at the end of this period during the Goulart government, it survived until he was forcefully removed from office.

Beyond these three major parties which constitute the only true national parties is a plethora of smaller parties. Of these, only two are broad in scope -- the Partido Social Progressista (PSP), which is the personalist party of the governor of São Paulo, Adhemar de Barros, and the Partido Republicano (PR), which consists of a political organization in several states surviving from the First Republic. This group of smaller parties includes a number of programmatic ones, which, in addition to the PTB and the PSP, appeal to urban labor: the Partido Socialista Brasileira (PSB), the Partido Trabalhista Nacional (PTN), the Partido Social Trabalhista Nacional (PST), and the Partido Representação Trabalhista (PRT). There are also three other small pragmatic parties which should be mentioned: the Partido Democrata Cristão (PDC), the Brazilian version of the Christian Democrats; the Partido Representação Popular (PRP), the old Integralist party of Plínio Salgado; and the Partido Libertador (PL), a party confined largely to Rio Grande do Sul and favoring parliamentary government. With the exception of the PRP, these parties are often only programmatic in the formal sense and are frequently subject to intense internal rivalries among personalities. There is one final party of apparently considerable size which has not been mentioned -- the Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB) -- but it has been illegal since 1947.

In the period between 1945 and 1964, as can be seen from Table II, the political party pattern was highly unstable. This was a consequence of two factors: first, the prevalence of purely pragmatic alliances and coalitions at the state level, which were continually being formed, disbanded, and reformulated, and, secondly, the splintering of the electorate as the smaller parties gained a larger share of representation at the state and national levels. During this period, the PSD generally declined in terms of electoral support; the UDN substantially retained its representation at the national level, while it lost support at the state level, and the PTB and the PSP increased in size. At the outset, the PSD and the UDN were clearly the major parties, but by 1955 the PTB also had joined them as a truly national party. For the most part, Northeastern politics were dominated by the conservative parties, among which the PSD and the UDN exercised a major role, and were subjected to a high percentage of party alliances and coalitions. There are, however, two qualifications that must be made: This pattern was not entirely static and it did not apply to the larger cities where political radicalism was a major characteristic. In contrast, in the Southeast, party lines tended to be more rigid, smaller parties appeared to be more prevalent, and -- as already mentioned -- the PTB played a major role as a working class party.<sup>13</sup>

TABLE II  
LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION BY PARTY<sup>a</sup>  
(Number of Seats)

Year	PSD	UDN	PTB	PSP	PR	PST'	PL	PTN	PRT	PSB	PDC	PRP	No Party	Total Seats
Federal Senate														
1960?	21	19	17	1	--	--	3	1	--	--	--	--	1	63
1958	22	17	18	1	1	--	3	--	--	--	--	--	1	63
1956	23	13	16	3	4	--	2	1	--	1	--	--	--	63
1954	22	13	16	4	4	--	2	1	--	1	--	--	--	63
1950	30	13	6	5	4	2	2	--	--	1	--	--	--	63
	28	11	5	2	1	1	--	--	--	1	--	--	4 <sup>c</sup>	63 <sup>b</sup>
1947	36	14	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	52 <sup>d</sup>
Federal Chamber of Deputies														
1960?	115	70	66	25	17	2	3	7	2	10	6	3	--	326
1958	115	70	66	25	17	2	3	7	2	10	6	3	--	326
1955-														
1956	114	74	56	32	19	2	8	6	1	3	2	3	6	326
1954	120	73	66	36	16	1	10	7	--	3	3	5	--	340
1950	112	81	51	24	11	9	5	5	1	1	2	2	--	304
	97	54	43	17	5	4	2	5	1	--	--	1	63 <sup>c</sup>	304 <sup>e</sup>
1947	157	77	23	3	7	--	1	--	--	--	2	2	--	304 <sup>f</sup>
State Assemblies (Deputies)														
1960?	273	148	153	84	51	21	12	21	24	17	29	16	24 <sup>g</sup>	943
1958	276	147	154	87	53	23	15	22	26	19	30	17	94	963
1956	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1954	272	165	148	91	55	17	20	16	5	12	27	12	96 <sup>g</sup>	936
1950	302	237	137	8	46	46	20	14	5	8	14	18	--	930 <sup>h</sup>
	253	208	132	57	34	41	7	14	5	7	14	18	139	930 <sup>i</sup>
1947	354	207	95	26	53	--	5	6	--	--	5	15	--	905 <sup>j</sup>

<sup>a</sup>Brazil, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística- Conselho Nacional de Economia, *Anuário Estatística do Brasil*, 1961, pp. 456-457; 1960, pp. 414-415; 1957, pp. 536-537; 1956, p. 471; 1955, pp. 615-617; 1952, pp. 570-571; 1951, pp. 563-564; 1949, pp. 641, 638-639.

(Continued on p. 212)

TABLE II (continued)

<sup>b</sup>Distribution of other seats: PSP-PTB, 2; UDN-PR, 2; PPS, 1; PSD-PSP, 1; PSD-PL, 1; PSD-UDN, 1; PSD-PTB, 1; PSD-PR, 1.

<sup>c</sup>Other coalitions.

<sup>d</sup>Distribution of other seats: UDN-PR, 2; PPS, 1; PCB, 1; UDN-PTB, 1; PPB, 1; PSD-UDN-PTB-PRP, 1; PSD-UDN, 1; PSD-UDN-PL-PDC, 1; PR-PTB-UDN, 1; PSD-PDC-PTB-PPB-PR-PTN, 1.

<sup>e</sup>Distribution of other seats: PSD-PDP, 4; PTB-PSP, 4; PSD-PSP, 4.

<sup>f</sup>Distribution of other seats: PCB, 14; PPS, 4; UDN-PR, 6; UDN-PTB, 2; PSD-PR, 3; PSP-UDN, 1; UDN-PR-PDC-PTN, 2.

<sup>g</sup>Coalitions and alliances.

<sup>h</sup>Distribution of other seats: POT, 1; PRB, 1.

<sup>i</sup>Distribution of other seats: POT, 1.

<sup>j</sup>Distribution of other seats: PCB, 1; ED, 6; PPB, 19; PRD, 1.

All this made for a highly incongruous mixture of political styles and parties. Yet, as Peterson has noted,

prior to the events of April 1964, perhaps the greatest advantage of the loose-knit, relatively undisciplined organizational structure of the political parties was that it permitted easy entry into the political process by newly articulate groups. . . . The "extremists" purged in 1964 were primarily the politicians who had become spokesmen for the lower classes; nationalism and basic reforms of the nation's social and economic structure had been their major appeals.<sup>14</sup>

The major threat posed to the conservative order, reorganized and broadened through new political institutions in 1946, was the PTB, for its support stemmed from articulate

urban labor groups and represented the first appearance of mass politics in Brazil. The resultant political style was populism -- a phenomenon quite different from the previous styles of clan and oligarchical politics. Many commentators have preferred to interpret this urban phenomenon as a continuation of the personalist politics of the traditionally oriented rural areas. Yet, it was quite different in that it appealed to a relatively new social class, brought it into the political process, and did not organize itself around locality groups.

Populism does not appeal to consanguinity, to kinship ties in their various forms, to residential dependency, to [this type of] loyalty. It appeals to a vaguer form of social solidarity. The political boss (the *chefe político*), in this case, is a representative of interests and, once in power, his followers expect advantages to improve their social position, be they in the form of jobs, or be they in assured favors or opportunities, obtained through the manipulation of the organs of the State. The tie that unites follower and boss is *personal confidence* and not *clan fidelity*.<sup>15</sup>

*The institutional arrangements.* While the Constitution of 1946 represented a return to federalism and democratic political institutions and provided for political participation and access to elected public positions on a scale previously unknown in Brazil, the country remained a limited polyarchy with developmental goals. The right to vote was still determined on the basis of literacy. This meant that a substantial part of the population was disenfranchised,

if we consider the fact that the illiteracy rate for persons 15 years and older was 65.11 per cent in 1900, 64.94 per cent in 1920, 33.97 per cent in 1940, and 50.49 in 1950.<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, these percentages conceal the regional variations existing in Brazil. In the Northeast, according to one source, this average was probably nearer 80 per cent in 1950.<sup>17</sup> It is difficult, however, to substantiate this, since regional illiteracy rates are not contained in the census of 1940 and 1950. The only indication available is stated in terms of the illiteracy rate for those persons between the ages of 5 and 14 years. In 1950, of a total school population (ages 5-14 years) of 3,377,048 in the Northeast, only 466,433 children could read and write.<sup>18</sup> For this population group, then, the illiteracy rate was 86 per cent.

As a result of the modernization process, tensions in the social and political order had increased. In a nation where regional integration had been imperfectly achieved, the contrast between traditional rural areas and modern urban ones was greater than ever due to the unequal spread of the benefits of urbanization and industrialization. This divergence between rural and urban areas, much more complex than a simple dichotomization, was reflected in the political parties. Such a mixture of political forces, paralleling a variety of economic and political developmental patterns,

was made more visible by the nature of the political system. While the *Estado Novo* maintained a closed system of government, the political structure of the Second Republic<sup>19</sup> provided for a relatively free play of political forces. This visibility was increased by the use of proportional representation and the subsequent emergence of a multiparty system. But in a transitional society with a low degree of consensus, this combination of proportional representation and a federalist system made it all the more difficult to integrate the mass of voters and divergent alignments, of both a regional and interest group character, into effective national party organizations.

Regardless of the literacy requirement, a great expansion of the electorate took place in these years and it was the responsibility of the new parties to organize this electorate on a national basis. Whether they did so or not successfully was another matter. This growth of the electorate can be observed by examining Table III, in which votes cast for president in elections held between 1893 and 1960 are recorded. Whereas between the elections of 1893 and 1925, the total vote cast for the winning candidate scarcely doubled, by the election of 1929 it had increased almost four times.

TABLE III  
PRESIDENTIAL VOTING TOTALS<sup>a</sup>

<u>Term of Office</u>	<u>Name of Elected Candidate</u>	<u>Votes Received</u>
1894-1898	Prudente José de Moraes Barros	276,583
1898-1902	Manuel Ferraz de Campos Sales	420,286
1902-1906	Francisco de Paula Rodrigues Alves	592,039
1906-1910	Afonso Augusto Moreiro Pena	288,285
1910-1914	Hermes Rodrigues da Fonseca	403,867
1914-1918	Venceslau Brás Pereira Gomes	532,107
1918-1922	Francisco de Paula Rodrigues Alves	386,467
1919-1922	Epitácio da Silva Pessoa	286,373
1922-1926	Artur da Silva Bernardes	466,877
1926-1930	Washington Luís Pereira de Sousa	688,528
1930	Júlio Prestes de Albuquerque	1,091,709
1930-1945	Getúlio Dorneles Vargas	---
1946-1951	Eurico Gaspar Dutra	3,251,507
1951-1956	Getúlio Dorneles Vargas	3,849,040
1956-1961	Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira	3,077,411
1961-1966	Jânio da Silva Quadros	5,036,623

<sup>a</sup>Brazil, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística-Conselho Nacional de Estatística, *Anuário Estatístico do Brasil*, Vol. XXIII (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística-Conselho Nacional de Estatística, 1962), p. 362.

Following the dictatorship in the first free presidential election in fifteen years, that of 1945, the vote cast for Dutra had augmented nearly twelve-fold. Fifteen years later, in the 1960 election, Jânio Quadros received a vote that had increased twenty times, when compared with the first election held under the Republic. Another way of viewing this growth in the electorate is to consider the number of voters

registered in the last two elections before the declaration of the *Estado Novo* and those since the end of 1945; these figures are recorded in detail in Tables IV and V.

For our purposes here, it is sufficient to note that there were 1.5 million registered voters in 1933; 2.7 million in 1934; 7.5 million in 1945; 11.5 million in 1950; 15.1 million in 1954; 15.5 million in 1960, and 18.6 million in 1962.<sup>20</sup> Yet in 1950, the one year for which comparable figures are available, the registered electorate represented only 48 per cent of those of minimum voting age and over.<sup>21</sup>

Although the total size of the electorate had increased, malapportionment reduced its effects on congressional representation. Regionally, voter registration was distributed in such a way that, under federalism and bicameralism, traditional rural agrarian interests were able to dominate Congress. This is an institutional factor often overlooked. A Senate determined on the basis of three representatives from each state and from the Federal District, elected according to the majority principle, meant that agrarian-oriented, underdeveloped states were able to control that body. In the Chamber of Deputies, proportional representation was manipulated in such a way that the same rural interests were the dominant elements. The representatives of each state were elected on the basis of its

TABLE IV  
VOTER REGISTRATION (1933-1934 and 1945)<sup>a</sup>

States, Terri- tories and Feder- al District	Election of 5/3/33 (for a Constituent Na- tional Assembly)	Election of 10/14/34 (for Congress)	Election of 12/2/45 (for Pres- dent & Congress)	
			No.	% Popltn.
<u>North</u>				
Guaporé	--	--	2,902	12.13
Acre	1,968	5,130	6,895	7.63
Amazonas	4,389	9,884	31,948	6.67
Rio Branco	--	--	673	4.91
Pará	28,990	46,774	159,395	15.33
Amapá	--	--	3,365	14.07
<u>Northeast</u>				
Maranhão	12,432	45,658	109,101	7.90
Piauí	10,462	40,959	132,455	14.42
Ceará	30,478	75,509	369,550	15.82
Rio G. do Norte	18,959	47,402	131,560	15.28
Paraíba	29,664	51,452	175,634	10.92
Pernambuco	69,318	122,849	321,736	10.75
Alagoas	23,742	34,730	82,068	7.71
Fernando do No- ronha	--	--	140	11.77
<u>East</u>				
Sergipe	23,460	45,657	97,089	16.00
Bahia	91,118	185,483	440,621	10.06
Minas Gerais	311,374	530,654	1,231,251	16.29
Espírito Santo	29,731	51,994	122,281	14.50
Rio de Janeiro	69,522	158,574	383,100	18.50
Distrito Federal (Rio de Janeiro)	84,892	136,085	549,353	27.74
<u>South</u>				
São Paulo	299,074	534,487	1,688,598	20.98
Paraná	34,844	64,208	229,672	17.28
Iguaçu	--	--	16,733	15.42
Santa Catarina	36,187	88,839	248,086	19.57
Rio G. do Sul.	231,194	327,264	753,232	20.23

States, Terri- tories and Feder- al District	Election of 5/3/33 (for a Constituent Na- tional Assembly)	Election of 10/14/34 (for Congress)	Election of 12/2/45 (for Presi- dent & Congress) No.	% Popltn.
<u>Center-West</u>				
Ponta Porã	--	--	10,351	10.20
Mato Grosso	8,788	21,888	59,121	16.05
Goiás	16,114	33,691	103,079	11.13
BRAZIL	1,466,700	2,659,171	7,459,989	16.22

<sup>a</sup>Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística-Conselho Nacional de Estatística, *Anuário Estatística do Brasil*, Vol. VII (1946) (Rio de Janeiro: Serviço Gráfico do Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 1947), p. 514.

total population -- a total quite at variance with its total electorate. Since the illiteracy rate was higher among the Northeastern states, the result was that a voter in those areas was worth substantially more than the individual voter in the more highly urbanized, industrialized states of the Center-South, where the literacy ratio was a great deal higher. This meant that the traditional oligarchical groups in the Northeast were able to achieve an importance far beyond their just share. Their control over the Chamber was further insured by a constitutional provision limiting the representation of the more populous states: after a state reached twenty deputies on the basis of one deputy for each 150,000 inhabitants, each additional deputy was determined on the basis of 250,000 inhabitants. Considering that the

initiation of any change in the Constitution was the exclusive right of the Congress, this malapportionment added a further factor which insured their maintenance of a privileged position in the struggle to control political institutions and to institute mass-based politics.

On the other hand, the direct election of the President of the Republic meant that he was not only more representative of the total electorate, but also much more subject to mass pressures.<sup>22</sup> In this case, the areas which were highly urbanized and literate in comparison with the rest of the country were somewhat over-represented in terms of the total population. An example of this situation is to be found in the 1955 presidential election in which the state of São Paulo and the Federal District (now the state of Guanabara) cast approximately 30 per cent of the national vote, while they represented about 20 per cent of the total population. In this same election, the city of São Paulo, with some 5 per cent of the population, provided about 8 per cent of the national vote.<sup>23</sup>

Herein lies the key to the continued existence of the PSD-PTB coalition throughout the majority of this period. The PSD, as the most cohesive conservative party, was able to maintain the largest representation in Congress because of the weight given to rural areas in this body -- even though the increase of the urban vote and a decrease in its

TABLE V  
VOTER REGISTRATION (1950-1962)<sup>a</sup>

States, Territories and Federal District	Federal, State, and Municipal Election 10/3/50	Federal, State, and Municipal Election 10/3/54	Federal and State Election 10/3/55	Federal, State, and Municipal Election 10/3/58	Federal and State Election 10/3/60	Federal and State Election 10/7/62
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<u>North</u>						
Rondônia <sup>b</sup>	5181	11283	6995	8126	8339	12759
Acre	12284	18421	17284	14941	14941	19544
Amazonas	75367	121565	119771	88712	91929	137317
Rio Branco	3506	7196	5675	5998	5696	4984
Para	277692	345588	373125	271374	324511	421531
Amapá	6737	9982	9229	7718	7875	10649
<u>Northeast</u>						
Maranhão	262295	403586	426046	278094	384327	497436
Pauí	220073	292583	304472	232368	244262	315158
Ceará	683465	683465	509085	656716	668703	853282
R.G. do Norte	243231	324309	294870	229523	278087	321014
Praíba	346141	439460	447598	291120	353371	405407
Pernambuco	452545	837377	873070	614537	676179	851398
Alagoas	146182	195016	189977	134959	154621	192223
<u>East</u>						
Sergipe	147144	218847	200900	145303	150095	192503
Bahia	867292	1090000	1093808	920249	943317	1206453

Table V (Continued)

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Minas Gerais	1936691	2366606	2458361	2036003	2151283	2565505
Espírito Santo	180607	261969	249194	233053	235056	307009
Rio de Janeiro	631872	911081	842988	790546	827338	1115176
Guanabara <sup>c</sup>	837428	965481	992459	977839	1099490	1198588
<u>South</u>						
São Paulo	2041840	2757309	2784717	2855751	3412611	3822235
Paraná	372796	609838	672645	684881	885418	1100637
Iguaçu	--	--	--	--	--	--
Santa Catarina	367695	474379	493928	524109	581358	641582
R.G. do Sul	987236	1212792	1319170	1274344	1409310	1561162
<u>Center-West</u>						
Ponta Porã	--	--	--	--	--	--
Mato Grosso	132037	182743	194151	177004	203984	263002
Goiás	217812	363728	363728	326976	407667	510135
D.F., Brasília	--	--	--	--	23564	34010
BRASIL	11455149	15104604	15243246	13780244	15543332	18560699

<sup>a</sup> *Anuário Estatístico*, V. XXIII (1962), p. 362.

<sup>b</sup> Rondônia is the equivalent of Guaporé in Table II (p. 211).

<sup>c</sup> Guanabara is the former Federal District; it contains the city of Rio de Janeiro. The totals for the Territory of Fernando de Noronha, listed separately in Table II within the Northeast, are included here with Guanabara.

total representation over the two decades after 1945 could not be entirely mitigated. In contrast, the PTB, in terms of total votes, was the party with the greatest mass support and this support rose over these two decades. The alliance of these two party organizations made a very effective electoral organization at the national level for the election of the president and for capturing a majority in the Senate and Chamber.

*Patronage politics.* The era between 1945 and 1964 was above all one of patronage politics. In spite of the abuse which entered and the negative effects which political patronage had upon public administration, the appearance of this phenomenon, in a form quite different from that existing prior to 1930, marked a step forward in the course of Brazilian political development -- if we look beyond the specific details involved and consider not only the broad course of Brazilian political history but also the experience of other countries. Such a statement may well represent an anathema to those committed to the goals of economy, efficiency, and rationality in administration or to those who would moralize the whole governmental process. Yet it shows that Brazil has reached a particularly crucial stage in the creation of a viable political system concomitant with the whole process of modernization. Once the pressures leading toward the formation of an egalitarian mass society

begin to appear, as they have in Brazil since 1945, there seem to be but two ultimate courses open to a nation: the development of an open governmental system with representative institutions, institutionalizing the class struggle, or the development of a closed governmental system imposing total controls over that society.

The major problem facing the political system in these years was how to bring together effectively heterogeneous political forces so that continued progress could be made toward the goals of an integrated nation-state and a modern economy. Within the framework of representative political institutions, the larger political parties played a crucial role; for they were responsible for the aggregation of interests in such a way that the struggle for power could be institutionalized and at least some decisions could be made on alternative lines for public policy, before immobilism set in. During the Vargas dictatorship, the goals had been similar. To achieve a modern nation-state and a modern economy it was recognized that social changes were necessary in the structure of Brazilian society. What social changes were necessary, however, was a source of great disagreement after 1945. In general, during the Vargas dictatorship, emphasis was placed on controlled social change. Potentially, the most disruptive force was urban labor, but it was handled in such a way by Vargas that it presented no threat. After

all, it formed one of the bases of his regime. But with the return to an open political system competing and disagreeing political forces entered into direct competition.

The political culture of Brazil was badly fragmented in the years following World War II. This fragmentation was a consequence, not of Westernization impinging on "indigenous cultural heterogeneity,"<sup>24</sup> but, rather, of uneven developmental patterns and the continuation of political subcultures. These political subcultures, possessing the same common roots and sharing a common heritage, were of three major types: (1) the pre-industrial, traditionally-oriented rural elites; (2) the older middle class components, which were the recipients of a frustrated political liberalism,<sup>25</sup> and (3) the industrial elements proper: the owners of industries, middle management, and urban labor. Since the political conflict that emerged after 1945 came to involve the very survival of these subcultures and the basic form of the political system itself, there was a notable radicalization of politics. This became increasingly visible after the end of the Kubitschek government. As the presidency passed from Quadros to Goulart, politics moved away from concern with specific bargainable differences toward the presentation or defense of "conflicting and mutually exclusive designs for the political culture and political system."<sup>26</sup> Participating in this process was a multitude

of parties and, also, numerous fragile coalitions and alliances. In the meantime, as the center of political power moved from right to left, immobilism developed -- the ultimate consequence of which was a "Caesaristic" breakthrough.<sup>27</sup>

Within this framework of larger developments, the focus of the political system was on elective office -- be it for the presidency of the Republic or for a seat in the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies. During the First Republic, these positions were monopolized by the regional oligarchies and appointive positions were filled on the basis of personal and kinship ties. By 1945, the country had entered a transitional phase of development in which -- while the traditional regional oligarchies still exercised the upper hand in many areas and achieved a greater importance in the Congress than they represented numerically -- this old style of politics was no longer sufficient. The increasing size of the electorate and the effects of urbanization and industrialization led to the rise of a wide variety of groups with quite diverse interests. In the urban areas, politics developed a mass basis. In contrast, apathy continued to characterize the agricultural worker; when he did vote, it was usually in accord with the wishes of the *patrão*. Because of the transitional nature of the country, these patterns overlapped and interacted. The appointive position in the public service was still used according to personal

or political criteria, but the way it was used, the numbers of individuals involved, and their social class varied considerably.

Where either a large or expanding electorate is involved, patronage politics has provided the individual politician or the local or state party concerned with jobs in the public service which can be used for reward to the party faithful. In the case of the United States during the latter part of the nineteenth century -- a country with a two-party system existing over a lengthy time span -- patronage supplied a means for coalescing state and local party organizations into national entities. Even then, patronage was a highly disruptive force that was difficult to control because it was primarily a local and regional phenomenon. In a loosely-knit multiparty system of recent origin, such as that in existence in Brazil in this period, the dispersion of patronage among personalities and regional and interest alignments was even greater. Where patronage politics came into its greatest usage was around the federal executive and those federal deputies and senators elected on the basis of urban support. In both cases, mass politics was a dominating factor. This element, however, was absent to a considerable extent in the rural areas where an oligarchical style of politics continued and patronage served more traditional purposes.

In a recent article, Paulo Singer has described this system of political relationships between the elected official and the party follower especially well. While in this passage his comments are limited substantially to executive-legislative relations at the federal level, prior to April, 1964, they are designed to apply to state and local levels as well.

The chief executive is elected with the support of certain political groups. Once he wins the election this support is paid through positions with the government. Positions are distributed in proportion to the electoral force of each group, reflected in the number of congressional representatives that each group succeeds in electing to office. If the chief executive, himself, is the leader of a group, he will provide his group with the greatest share of positions, in such a way that it will make him stronger politically. Each position has a certain political weight, depending on the number of jobs that the person named to it can fill, on the size of the funds which can be manipulated by him, on the degree of electoral yield from the public services provided through the position. For example, positions in the Ministry of Transportation and Public Works (the *Ministério de Viação e Obras Públicas*) and in its state offices (*secretarias estaduais*) are considered to have great political weight. This political weight is due to various factors: (1) these positions permit the control of the railroads; they are considered to provide great electoral yield because of the number of jobs available; (2) the construction of highways and public works (bridges, buildings, etc.), which is also controlled by these positions, permits the persons occupying them to control sizable funds from which it is always possible to obtain considerable yield in collusion with contractors and suppliers.

Generally the chief executive attempts to increase his congressional support by attracting political groups that did not support him at the ballot box. Through paying a corresponding price in positions,

he can obtain this support without much difficulty. It is clear that the stock of positions and sinecures is limited. Some political groups will have to be excluded from the apportioning [of positions]. These will form his opposition. But for a professional politician, whatever his type, it is most distressing (and politically harmful) to stay too long in the opposition. Consequently, a third position has been invented which is neither among the "ins," nor in the opposition, but "independent" or in the "constructive opposition." This is a position which offers several advantages: its occupants are not subjected to the "wear and tear" of government, that is, they are not held responsible for the insufficiencies and shortcomings of those who are in the government and they are not able to fulfill even a minimum part of their pre-election promises; at the same time they obtain numerous favors from the government, trading their votes each time the government does not have a sure majority for a particular project which interests it. It is necessary that one note that even when the government's bloc is in the majority, it can never be sure that it can count on all its votes. This is because each deputy (councilman [*vereador*] or senator) is faithful, above all, to the particular interests of the group he represents. If a certain measure desired by the government hurts these interests, the congressional representative -- even if he is a member of the government's bloc -- will deny it his vote.<sup>28</sup>

While patronage politics was the dominant characteristic of the period between 1945 and 1964, it was most evident at the national level in those cases in which the government was based on an alliance between the PSD and the PTB. There were three governments in which this alliance functioned: the second government of Getulio Vargas (1951 to August, 1954), the government of Juscelino Kubitschek (1955-1960), and the government of João Goulart (under a parliamentary regime between September, 1961, and January, 1962, and a presidential one between January, 1962, and March, 1964).

In the intervening periods, the UDN was in the ascendancy. These were: (1) the Dutra government (1946-1950), which was based on a conservative alliance among the UDN, the PSD, and the PR; (2) the Café Filho government (August, 1954, to November, 1955), which was an interim government completing all but three months of Vargas' term of office after his suicide;<sup>29</sup> (3) the government of Jânio Quadros (January to August, 1961), in which the UDN was considered to be the party most closely allied with the government (although Quadros tried to govern as a president above the parties), and the PTB was the vice-president's party, and (4) the Castelo Branco government, which was installed by the April Revolution and represents a working relationship between the UDN and the military -- a pattern which also existed in the governments of Dutra and Café Filho.

Regardless of the fluctuations in the governing coalitions in these years, the most stable arrangement was that established between the PSD and the PTB under the influence of Vargas. The UDN was only in the government for short periods of time and its main orientation was a moralizing one in which patronage politics were condemned as one of the great evils which had to be removed. It was never in power long enough to begin to blanket in its own followers. This made it quite feasible for the party to adopt a moralizing

role and gave credibility to the claim that it did not engage in patronage politics -- at least in terms of the open distribution of jobs in the public service. Yet, if one examines the action of the UDN at the state level, one finds that its record is not so perfect. The most obvious case at hand in recent years involves criticism of the government of Carlos Lacerda in the state of Guanabara (the former federal district encompassing the city of Rio de Janeiro) for blanketing large numbers of the party faithful into the state administration.

In the constant accusations against these practices and the expression of dismay at the disorder introduced into the administrative system, the functional side of the patronage system has been overlooked. In a highly dispersed political system based on party government, the distribution of jobs and favors provided an integrating function for a wide variety of groups and interests in a country where the availability of jobs was limited, where public funds were scarce, and where the economy was undergoing the severe stresses and strains brought about by the attempt to industrialize as rapidly as possible. The heterogeneous and overlapping patterns and styles of politics prevalent throughout the country were made even more disparate under a highly unstable multiparty system joined to a federalist system of government. Under such a set of

circumstances, ideology could hardly provide a unifying factor for a party and at the same time guarantee it sufficient electoral support to elect its candidates. Neither could effective alternatives in public policy be offered as a sole means for aggregating interests. The one available unifying factor able to bring these diverse interests and groups together was the use of public office to provide jobs and favors as a means of reward for those assisting in amassing the necessary votes and resources required for election. After election, the same technique was necessary to pass legislation. It was a highly pragmatic system and it functioned most effectively during the government of Juscelino Kubitschek, for even more than Vargas he understood how and why the system functioned and was able to obtain a majority in the Congress in most cases to pass the bills he desired. As a product of the existing party system, he was a political leader in a sense that neither Quadros nor Goulart seemed to understand.

As already mentioned, the one party which used patronage politics most skillfully was the PTB. Prior to the disintegration of the Goulart government and the coup of March 31 and April 1, it was farthest on the road toward creating a mass-based party. To maintain its unity and provide reward for the expenditures of time and energy and the funds of its followers, it depended above all on the maintenance of patronage in the Ministry of Labor and especially in the

social security institutes under the jurisdiction of that ministry. Likewise, these institutes were essential administrative units which the party desired to control because of the fact that the social security programs above all benefited the urban worker, the major group to which the party appealed. At the same time, while patronage politics was crucial to maintaining what party unity there was, in the urban centers of the central and southern parts of Brazil some elements in the party had begun to move away from excessive dependency on personalities toward the formation of an ideological program in accord with its character as an emerging working class party with a humanitarian concern for the conditions and problems facing the industrial worker. The social reforms it proposed presented the greatest threat to the continuation of an elitist-oriented social and political order.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Fred W. Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964), pp. 132-135, esp. 135.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 136-137.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 138-139.

<sup>4</sup>José Honório Rodrigues, *Conciliação e Reforma no Brasil: Um Desafio Histórico-Cultural* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1965), pp. 114-115.

<sup>5</sup>According to Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco, prior to the Ato Adicional of 1834 there was only a slight polarization of political forces around those supporting the monarchy and those opposing it. The first political grouping, with a party title, to appear was the Partido Liberal. It first acquired a stable form in 1834. It was followed, states Melo Franco, by the Partido Conservador in 1836 which became the major political force in 1838. From the Partido Conservador a splinter group developed with the name of the Moderados. The Moderados, in turn, formed an alliance with the Partido Liberal which became formalized under the title of a new party, the Progressista, in 1862. In 1869, a new "liberal" alliance, favoring the establishment of a republic, emerged under the name of the Partido Liberal-Radical. This was followed in 1873 by the creation of the Partido Republicano, which was based on the ascendancy of a new rural elite: the owners of the coffee plantations. Once the monarchy was overthrown, it became the dominant political force. (Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco, *História e Teoria do Partido Político no Direito Constitucional Brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro, 1948), pp. 28-29, 33, 39, 44-46, 48-49, 52, 55.) The point which is important here is that conservative rural elites formed the focus of power both during the Empire and the First Republic: the basis of the monarchy was to be found in the plantation economy of the Northeast -- with its production of sugar, cotton, tobacco, and cacao -- while by the time of the republic -- with abolition and collapse of the monarchy -- the economic center of the country had shifted southward. There a coffee economy was in ascendancy joined with cattle production and the beginnings of industrialization. This was also the era of the rubber boom in the Amazon basin, but São Paulo was clearly the nation's economic center.

<sup>6</sup>The Liberal Alliance was a coalition of a variety of groups opposed to the pre-eminence of the coffee oligarchy. In this coalition the most powerful elements were those from Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul.

<sup>8</sup>Orlando M. Carvalho has related how the PSD was organized in the state of Minas Gerais. The following section has been taken from an article by Carvalho because it offers not only a view of how the party was formed in a key state but also because it shows how in an important area of the country that party provides a connection between past and present. "At the end of March, 1945, the Interventor in Minas ordered appointed prefects to come to Belo Horizonte, accompanied by five or ten persons of influence in their municipality. On April 8th 5,400 persons, of which 4,480 mentioned their respective professions, signed the act creating the PSD. This group constituted the nucleus of the principal local political bosses (the *chefes políticos*) -- many of them came to the [state] capital to observe the events and [yet] felt no obligation to maintain the promises stemming from their signatures to the inaugural acts of the new party. The study of the later destiny of the members of the founding groups of the PSD is very expressive, for it shows how the spirit of faction prevailed in a considerable part of its components. With the re-establishment of a political party framework, the old factions renewed once again local political struggles and the bosses passed from one party to another, without difficulty, according to maneuverings within their municipalities" (Orlando M. Carvalho, "Os Partidos Políticos em Minas Gerais," *Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos*, I. (July, 1957), 103-104.

<sup>8</sup>John J. Johnson, *Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 171.

<sup>9</sup>Rodrigues, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

<sup>10</sup>While Vargas maintained control over the urban labor movement through the Ministry of Labor, he also was able to retain support from a substantial part of the business community, for he was always able to place limits on labor's demands and was interested in stimulating industrialization. The final element supporting the *Estado Novo* was an obvious one: the military.

<sup>11</sup>Proportional representation had been included in the Vargas-initiated political reform of 1932. Other elements in this reform -- the institution of the secret vote, woman suffrage, and the creation of electoral courts -- were included in the 1946 Constitution.

<sup>12</sup>Claudio [Glaucio] Ary Dillon Soares, "The Political Sociology of Uneven Development in Brazil," in Irving Louis Horowitz, *Revolution in Brazil: Politics and Society in a Developing Nation* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1964), pp. 164-195.

<sup>13</sup>In addition to the information contained in Table I, these generalizations are based on three detailed studies of the Brazilian party system where substantial electoral data are utilized to provide a valid foundation for these conclusions: Carvalho, "Os Partidos Nacionais e as Eleições Parlamentares de 1958," *Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos*, No. 8 (April, 1960), 9-19; Dillon Soares, "Alianças e Coligações Eleitorais: Notas para uma Teoria," *ibid.*, XVI (July, 1964), 95-124; *Revolution in Brazil*, *op. cit.*

<sup>14</sup>Phyllis Peterson, "Brazil, Institutional Confusion," in Martin C. Needler (ed.), *Political Systems of Latin America* (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1964), pp. 463-509.

<sup>15</sup>Alberto Guerreiro Ramos, *A Crise do Poder no Brasil (Problemas da Revolução Nacional Brasileira)* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editôres, 1961), p. 55. In this discussion of politics since 1945, Ramos goes on to consider two other political styles: pressure group politics and ideological politics. He interprets the ascendancy of the PTB as a consequence of the predominance of populist and ideological style politics. He also considers all parties after 1945 to be affected by a populist political style (pp. 57-58, 60, 76).

<sup>16</sup>Brazil, Serviço Nacional de Recenseamento, *Brasil, Censo Demográfico* (VI Recenseamento Geral do Brasil - 1950), Vol. I (Série Nacional) (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística - Conselho Nacional de Estatística, 1956), p. 1. While the Brazilian constitution establishes 18 as the voting age, statistical materials available do not make it possible to state the illiteracy rate for those 18 and over. Neither is it possible to give percentages based on the 1960 census because the complete results of that census are not yet available.

<sup>17</sup>Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

<sup>18</sup>*Censo Demográfico* (1950), p. 92. The Northeast includes the states of Maranhão, Piauí, Ceará, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, and Fernando de Noronha (territory). While this definition is used for census purposes, it excludes two states usually included in the standard definition of the Northeast: Sergipe and Bahia.

<sup>19</sup>It is probably more accurate to speak of this as the Fourth Republic, granted the nature of the 1930 Revolution and the political reforms which were initiated under Vargas. Because of the predominance of the executive, however, the rule by decree law, and the short duration of this period, I prefer to refer to it as a transitional phase between two very different eras, rather than to speak of the Second and Third Republics which follow the First Republic and precede the *Estado Novo*.

<sup>20</sup>These figures are to be compared with a total population of 9,930,478 in 1872; 14,333,915 in 1890; 17,438,434 in 1900; 30,635,605 in 1920; 41,236,315 in 1940; 51,944,397 in 1950, and 70,969,185 in 1960 (*Censo Demográfico* (1950), *op. cit.*, p. 1; Brazil, Serviço Nacional de Recenseamento, *Brasil, Sinopse Preliminar do Censo Demográfico* (VII Recenseamento Geral do Brasil - 1960) (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística - Serviço Nacional de Recenseamento, 1962), p. 27).

<sup>21</sup>In 1950, there were 25,002,999 persons 18 years of age and older (*Censo Demográfico* (1950), *op. cit.*, p. 2).

<sup>22</sup>The initial ideas contained here and in the preceding paragraph, while they have been considerably expanded, are taken from Celso Furtado, "Obstáculos ao Desenvolvimento Econômico do Brasil," *Correio da Manhã*, February 24, 1965, 14, and February 25, 1965, 14. These are the last two articles in a series of four reprinted from a lecture given by Furtado at the Institute of Foreign Affairs, Chatham House, London.

<sup>23</sup>Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

<sup>24</sup>Gabriel A. Almond, "Interest Groups and the Political Process," in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (eds.), *Comparative Politics, Notes and Readings* (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1961), p. 131.

<sup>25</sup>While these elements existed to some degree during the Empire, their appearance as a political group dates substantially from the First Republic. With the establishment of the Republic in 1889, a new impetus was given to urban life, for the emphasis within the provinces shifted to the state capitals. This movement is reflected in the growth in size of the state capitals; they reflected a pattern of increasing urbanization without, for the most part, industrialization. These are the elements which Jaguaribe refers to as the dependent elite within the context of the Cartorial State.

<sup>26</sup>Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," in Macridis and Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 452.

<sup>27</sup>The analysis used here is based not on Almond's model for the non-West, but on the model he has developed for the major continental European political systems (Weimar, Germany, France, and Italy). I would argue that Brazilian politics in broad lines, not specific ones, is moving in a direction which has parallels with continental European experience (including that of Spain and Portugal), more than with the non-West as defined either by Almond or Lucian Pye.

<sup>28</sup>Paulo Singer, "A Política das Classes Dominantes," in Octávio Ianni, Paulo Singer, Gabriel Cohn, and Francisco C. Weffort, *Política e Revolução Social no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1965), pp. 81-82.

<sup>29</sup>The gap between November, 1955, and February, 1956, was filled by a care-taker military government.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE CIVIL SERVICE AND POLITICAL PATRONAGE

Patronage patterns in the Brazilian civil service are closely related to the chief executive and the political party structure. As one president has followed another and as the relationships among the parties have altered in the years between 1945 and 1964, so, too, have the uses of the patronage power changed in character. During these years, regardless of the existence of merit standards in Brazilian law, political patronage has functioned as the predominant criterion in the selection of federal employees.

#### DASP and the Formal Public Personnel System

*Administrative alterations.* The bureaucratic system developed by Vargas, with its technical elite at the national level, corresponds to Riggs' model of prismatic bureaucracy. It was, if not the primary vehicle for elite recruitment during the *Estado Novo*, a major source of entry into the administrative system for those from among the "ruling classes"<sup>1</sup> who had had the "proper" education. After the collapse of the *Estado Novo*, a struggle ensued between the bureaucratic elite, as represented especially by DASP officials, and the conservative parties supporting, first, Linhares' provisional government and, then, the Dutra government.<sup>2</sup>

As acting president and as the representative of a new coalition of forces, Linhares proceeded to neutralize DASP. He published his decrees directly without submitting them to DASP for review; he independently raised the pay scales of clerical employees in the Ministry of Education; he issued a decree placing regional police administrators in the Federal District within the classified civil service; and he supposedly distributed numerous jobs in the public service among friends and relatives.<sup>3</sup> According to Siegel, Linhares' "political" intrusion into the civil service was intolerable to Moacyr Ribeiro Briggs, the new president of DASP, who had been appointed by Linhares to fill the vacancy left by the resignation of Luis Simões Lopes. Consequently, after a little more than a month in office, Briggs resigned, and a mass resignation of all division heads and chiefs of services in the DASP followed. Linhares did not choose to act on the resignations and simply suspended the management of DASP. In accounting for these resignations, Siegel explained them as a consequence of both Linhares' violation of the merit principles, contained in the Code of the Public Functionaries and other civil service regulations, and the lack of preparation on the part of most DASP officials for dealing with a political system in which professional politicians were able to operate freely.<sup>4</sup>

These events were joined by a decree-law, issued by Linhares, which substantially altered DASP control over public administration, although it left intact DASP's responsibility for setting norms and standards. It declared that all executive and auditing powers over public personnel were to be the exclusive competence of the ministerial staffs and stated that DASP's authority in personnel matters was to be limited to the maintenance of the manning tables, position controls, and other central records. The division of Personnel Studies and Orientation and Audits of Personnel became simply the Personnel Division.<sup>5</sup>

Within the year, under the Dutra administration, another assault was made on DASP as an instrument of the *Estado Novo*. This time it was in the form of a bill introduced into the Chamber of Deputies which would have eliminated DASP by transferring its budgetary and other functions to the Ministry of Finance. Although the bill had the support of the UDN-PSD coalition, the basis of the Dutra government, it failed to pass. Its significance, however, does not lie in its failure to pass, but, rather, in the fact that it was prepared by the Minister of Finance.<sup>6</sup> As such, it is indicative of the attempt of the Finance Ministry to recover its traditional position of power and prestige in the administrative system. During the *Estado Novo*, its

status was considerably reduced. Nevertheless, even though the Ministry of Finance failed to achieve its objective by a frontal attack on the DASP structure, it was quite successful in regaining its original position of influence because of DASP's loss of its control powers. DASP's budgetary functions, which in theory paralleled those of the United States Bureau of the Budget, remained purely formal in character. This proposed legislation also points to the transferral to the political arena of an issue which was, during the *Estado Novo*, defined purely in administrative terms.

Other than this measure, no major attempts were made directly to destroy the organization. Instead, DASP was simply bypassed when the chief executive desired to ignore it. Dutra was primarily concerned with reducing government expenditures and, supposedly as an economic measure, forbade DASP to conduct competitive examinations during his administration. While he is usually credited with making few, if any, extralegal appointments to the civil service,<sup>7</sup> when vacancies did occur and it was necessary to fill them, he did make use of the *interino* category. As already noted, these appointments did not require the use of merit criteria.

The consequence of these alterations in the structure of DASP and the reduction of its power was to destroy

substantially the apparatus established to create and maintain an elitist career civil service. When Dutra took office as the first legally elected president under the new constitution, the way was thrown open for the resumption of political patronage. The main category through which the followers of the political parties supporting the new government were admitted into the public service was that of the *interino*. Even though DASP was still responsible for the administering of public examinations and the appointing of career civil servants, effective barriers to patronage pressures no longer existed. Without DASP's control mechanism and with the return to a more decentralized administrative system the ministries exercised a considerable amount of autonomy and regional political groups could establish influence over the federal government's field offices more easily. What happened essentially was that one elite structure replaced the other, while the federal bureaucracy remained a primary channel of social and political mobility. Thus a clientele style of politics, similar to that existing prior to the dictatorship and based on the middle and upper classes, reasserted itself.

This arrangement, however, was of relatively short duration, for when Vargas returned to the presidency in 1951, his government was based on an alliance of the PSD and the PTB. Although DASP was nominally strengthened as a more

complete and systematic classification plan was begun, *con-cursos* were reopened, and public personnel practices were again centralized, political patronage was not eschewed. In terms of the administrative system, this meant that jobs were distributed not only according to traditional patronage lines (that is, to those clientele groups in the upper and middle classes, who had contributed electoral support and considered reward was due them), but also according to new ones. Because a substantial part of his support was dependent on the PTB and the maintenance of the loyalty of urban labor leaders, patronage was used in the Ministry of Labor and the social security institutes to benefit a new class which was both numerically larger and of a different caliber in terms of education and preparation than that which had previously been admitted to jobs in the public service. The combination of the working class background of many of these individuals and the existence of an open political system meant that these newer patronage patterns were more visible than older ones. Hence, when the evils of patronage were pointed to in the press and by individuals interested in re-reforming the civil service, the focus was brought to bear most often on this particular area, while more traditional patterns of patronage were often overlooked or minimized.

Patronage benefiting urban labor operated within the

framework of a political machine. This machine had its origins during the era of the *Estado Novo* in the labor bureaucracy created in the Ministry of Labor and in the social security institutes. There was, then, no really independent labor movement. Virtually all the laws aiming at the improvement of the working conditions of urban labor had come from governmental action. This meant that initiative had come from the top down in an attempt to anticipate the demands of the worker. The most obvious part of this system was the syndical tax which was levied on all workers and employers and which was used to finance labor unions (the *sindicatos*). With the organization of political parties in 1945, the PTB assumed a major function in maintaining and expanding this whole apparatus. In this context patronage played an important role and civil service appointments here tended to fall in the *extranumerário* category.

*The administering of civil service examinations.* The extent to which patronage prevailed in the civil service as the major criterion for admissions can be seen by examining figures compiled by Wahrlich on the number of civil service examinations administered and comparing them with the total number of positions legally subject to entrance on the basis of merit. Of a total of 695,499 candidates who signed up to take public examinations (*concursos*) for entrance into the career civil service between 1937 and 1962, 285,852 persons

actually presented themselves for examination. Of these, only 75,155 succeeded in passing. Within this group, 30,000 received their approval at a date no earlier than 1961. Unfortunately, the total number of appointments made from this list is not available. Nevertheless, even if all of those who had been approved for admission to the civil service had received appointments, they would hardly have contributed to the achievement of a career service. In the ministries alone, states Wahrlich, nearly 300,000 positions were involved.<sup>8</sup>

In the *autarquias* Wahrlich claims that there were more than 200,000 positions which theoretically should have been filled on a merit basis. Yet among them, she points to the fact that only two had maintained merit systems: IAPI (the social security institute for industrial employees) and the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econô<sup>o</sup>mico (BNDE). Until 1960, both were successful in establishing a tradition of admissions only through public examination. But these amounted to a total of no more than 14,000 persons and even there in 1960 and 1962 numerous admissions were made without public examination -- especially in the case of IAPI. Considering this small number of admissions on the basis of proven qualification and adding to it, in round numbers, the 75,000 previously mentioned, we see that the total number of persons approved through merit examinations in these years

amounts roughly to 89,000. These are to be related, states Wahrlich, to a total of half a million civil service positions. Thus, for these years, if we use Wahrlich's figures, only approximately 17.8 per cent of the civil servants had gained admission through public examination.<sup>9</sup>

Another view of the civil service in terms of over-all appointments is provided in a report prepared by DASP in July, 1961. According to the data it had collected, of a total of 300,000 federal civil servants, only 15 per cent had been admitted through public examination. DASP attributed this divergence between legal norms and reality to the fact that by that time the mass of the federal civil servants consisted of those who had belonged to the old *extranumerário* category and to the fact that only a small part of these employees had taken the proper examinations required of them: the *prova de habilitação*. Also included in this large number not properly admitted were many employees who had entered under lump-sum appropriations (*verbas globais*).<sup>10</sup>

*The role of DASP.* The post-1945 experience with patronage pressures confirmed the belief of those supporting DASP that efficiency, economy, and rationality in the civil service could only be achieved through the construction of effective barriers to keep out the mass of job seekers and to neutralize the politician's influence. Yet the objectives of preserving the civil service from political intrusions

and insuring the selection of public personnel solely on the basis of merit became increasingly remote to the political environment. Nevertheless, the moral commitment of the civil service reformers remained and they zealously defended the concept of a merit system.

As a consequence of the struggle to defend the DASP system, a certain degree of intellectual rigidity set in. In this process the validity of the principles of administration that had been learned abroad, transferred to Brazil, and later reinforced by the United States' technical assistance program in public administration, was never once called into question, for they had become a belief system. With the alteration in the political structure of the country that took place with the return to an open system of politics, those associated with DASP and committed to the goal of establishing a merit bureaucracy in Brazil attempted to create a public image of DASP as a democratic organization and to show that what it had set out to accomplish was really much more consonant with a democratic form of government. Emphasis was placed on DASP as a technical, administrative organ which was politically independent and neutral.

The fact that DASP was an instrument of the executive was both a source of strength and weakness. When Vargas was in office, whether as dictator or as a constitutionally

elected president, the organization prospered. In the area of public personnel administration this meant that *concursos* were properly administered, appointments to the career civil service were made through legal channels, and the entire personnel process was centralized under the control of DASP. The other presidents, with the exception perhaps of Jânio Quadros, were not really committed to the goals of the organization, although they all, at least at the beginning of their presidential terms of office, gave lip service to administrative reform and to the role of DASP in this area. This was because it provided a convenient cover for executive action in the area of public personnel.

Consequently, the personnel politics of the organization changed in accord with the wishes of the executive, and these changes could conveniently be cloaked in terms of moral precepts. The point could always be made that DASP was neutral and impartial and above the realm of politics. At the same time, if the executive wished to bypass the organization and meet patronage pressures directly, he had the power to do so.

DASP's control over formal appointments also could be used to defend the executive's appointive power against legislative inroads.

It is from the use of DASP according to the desires of the executive that much of the hostility in the press and in

Congress stemmed. It was not uncommon to find the same individuals bitterly attacking specific policies of the organization because of their association with political moves by the President and at the same time defending its contribution in the area of setting norms and standards for the civil service. The problem was that the normative and the political had a way of getting mixed. From a functional viewpoint the organization contributed tremendously to increasing the problem of formalism<sup>11</sup> in public personnel administration, since the dichotomization of administration and politics legally and theoretically made it more difficult to face the fact that the two were in constant interaction in the Brazilian milieu.

#### The Nature of the Civil Service

When it comes to the realm of figures it becomes very difficult to measure in precise terms the effects of patronage on the federal civil service. While data on the size of the civil service, the number of appointments made, and the various categories of civil servants are accessible, they are neither complete nor always comparable. Consequently, one finds it difficult to measure how much change the civil service has undergone in recent decades as a consequence of the changing structure of Brazilian politics.

When Brazilian sources concerned with public administration are examined, one of the topics commonly mentioned is the tremendous expansion of the federal administrative system and the excessive number of people who occupy civil service positions. A feeling for this expansion may be gained by examining Table VI. In 1938, it was reported that there were 131,628 employees at the federal level; in 1960, the totals varied between 382,790 and 421,212 employees.

The difficulty in measuring the size of the civil service stems from the autonomous status of the numerous entities included in the *autarquia* category. Before 1938, the practice of creating independent or semi-independent agencies and institutes was of little consequence, for throughout the First Republic and down to the declaration of the dictatorship in 1938, the total size of the federal civil service varied little. The creation of this multitude of administrative bodies stems from the *Estado Novo* era when, in expanding administrative services, numerous bodies of this character were established. For this reason the total given for the ministries and other federal organs subordinate to the executive in 1938 may be accepted as fairly accurate. Likewise, by 1960, an attempt had been made to establish controls over the *autarquias* and to coordinate more effectively the whole federal administrative system. The major incentive in this case was a careful survey of the

TABLE VI

SIZE OF THE BRAZILIAN CIVIL SERVICE (1938-1960)<sup>a</sup>

	1 9 6 0					An <sup>b</sup>	DASP <sup>c</sup>	JB <sup>d</sup>
	1938	1943	1953	1956	1958			
Federal Civil Servants in the category of <i>Administração Direta</i>	131,628	145,991	180,410	217,135	232,632	231,504	---	224,000
Federal civil servants in the category of <i>Autarquias</i> <sup>f</sup>						114,064	120,097	120,097
All Federal civil servants			240,000 <sup>g</sup>			345,568	---	344,097
Vacant positions <sup>h</sup>				72,829		42,141	21,411	
Occupied positions <sup>h</sup>				217,135		231,504	---	
All positions <sup>h</sup>				289,964		273,645	---	
Vacant positions <sup>i</sup>						28,115	28,115	
Occupied positions <sup>i</sup>						114,064	120,097	
All positions <sup>i</sup>						142,179	148,212	
Vacant positions ( <i>Administração Direta &amp; Autarquias</i> )						63,876		77,115
Occupied positions ( <i>Administração Direta &amp; Autarquias</i> )						318,914		344,097
Total number of positions for entire Federal civil service						382,790		421,212

(Footnotes for this Table on Page 253.)

<sup>a</sup>Mário Wagner Vieira da Cunha, *O Sistema Administrativo Brasileiro, 1930-1950* (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Nacional de Estudos Pedagógicos, Ministério de Educação e Cultura, 1963), pp. 129-130; Brazil, *Anuário Estatístico do Brasil*, V. XV (1954) (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística-Conselho Nacional de Estatística, 1954), p. 463; Brazil, *Anuário Estatístico do Brasil*, V. XXIII (1962) (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística-Conselho Nacional de Estatística, 1962), pp. 335-336; Brazil, *DASP, Relatório das Atividades do DASP, 1960* (Rio de Janeiro: Serviço de Documentação, 1961), pp. 53, 56; Adalmo de Araújo Andrade, *Diretrizes para Classificação de Cargos* (Belo Horizonte: Instituto de Ciências Econômicas, Políticas e Sociais de Minas Gerais, 1960); *Jornal do Brasil* (January 25, 1961), 5.

<sup>b</sup>An: *Anuário Estatístico do Brasil*, V. XXIII (1962).

<sup>c</sup>DASP.

<sup>d</sup>*Jornal do Brasil*. Figures are based on information released by DASP.

<sup>e</sup>*Administração Direta*: ministries and other federal administrative organs directly responsible to the Executive.

<sup>f</sup>*Autarquias*: this term applies to a plethora of autonomous agencies, departments, and services; government corporations; and mixed enterprises.

<sup>g</sup>The 1954 *Anuário* states this figure is only approximate, and is taken from the commission responsible for the creation of a classification plan, the *Comissão do Plano de Classificação de Cargos*. Questionnaires were sent to 180,000 civil servants, accounting, according to the Commission, for 72 per cent of a total of about 240,000 (*Anuário*, V. XVI (1955), p. 516).

<sup>h</sup>Category of *Administração Direta*.

<sup>i</sup>Category of *Autarquias*.

entire civil service as a new classification plan was prepared, the passing of the classification law in 1960, and the creation of a comprehensive law for the social security institutes that same year. In the years intervening between 1938 and 1960, however, it is difficult to estimate the total size of the civil service because standard sources do not offer information on the total numerical employment of the *autarquias*. The one exception to this statement is 1953, for which the estimated figure of 240,000 is available for the whole federal civil service.

A second aspect of Table VI which is relevant to understanding the context within which political patronage has taken place is the gap which can be observed between the total number of civil servants listed and the total number of positions recorded. In 1958, 217,135 civil servants were reported in the category *administracao direta*, while 289,964 positions were authorized by law. In 1960, if we use the figures supplied by the *Anuário Estatístico*, there were 231,504 civil servants and 293,645 positions available in the *administração direta*, while there were 114,064 civil servants and 142,179 positions available in the *autarquias*. This excess number of positions supplied the chief executive with sufficient freedom to make new interim appointments if he wished, thus bypassing the merit system requirement, and an argument against those who ac-

cused him of expanding the ranks of the civil service. It could always be pointed out that he had limited the expansion of the civil service and had kept the numbers hired below the maximum legal limits.

A further insight into the civil service is provided in Tables VII and VIII, in which detailed figures are presented on the number of appointments made, vacancies occurring, and positions abolished during the government of Juscelino Kubitschek. Unfortunately, such data are available only for his government, but they do give an indication of the way appointments were handled during his term. Where civil service positions created by law were involved, he cannot be accused of excessive patronage appointments, since all permanent appointments had to be made through the DASP apparatus and since the only area in which political patronage could legally be utilized was in the *interino* category. As far as the researcher has been able to ascertain, he did not violate this precept. Given his concern for legality, the major area open to him for political patronage was the *extranumerário* category; there no legal controls existed on the nature of the appointments made. An idea of the numbers of civil servants involved here may be obtained by examining Table IX. Again, however, Kubitschek cannot be held responsible for excessive appoint-

(Text continued on page 263)

TABLE VII

POSITIONS FILLED, VACANT, AND ABOLISHED DURING THE  
GOVERNMENT OF JUSCELINO KUBITSCHEK<sup>a</sup>

Positions filled and vacant ( <i>Administração Direta</i> )		T.A. <sup>b</sup>	T.V. <sup>c</sup>
Appointments ( <i>Provimentos</i> ):			
	By commission ( <i>Em comissão</i> )	262	
	Permanent ( <i>Efetivos</i> )	906	
	Interim ( <i>Interinos</i> )	673	
	Interim: Substitutions	85	
	Reinstatements ( <i>Reintegrações</i> )	3	
	Readmissions ( <i>Readmissões</i> )	29	
	Returns ( <i>Reversões</i> )	11	
	Transfers ( <i>Aproveitamentos</i> )	<u>22</u>	
1	<b>TOTAL</b>		1,931
9	Vacancies:		
5	Retirements	2,575	
6	Dismissals ( <i>Demissões</i> )	27	
	Resignations ( <i>Exonerações</i> )	769	
	Deaths	<u>85</u>	
	<b>TOTAL</b>		3,456
Appointments:			
	By commission	92	
	Permanent	1,368	
	Interim	59	
	Interim: Substitutions	1,321	
	Reinstatements	9	
	Readmissions	74	
	Returns	8	
	Transfers	<u>3</u>	
1	<b>TOTAL</b>		2,934
9	Vacancies:		
5	Retirements	2,881	
7	Dismissals	48	
	Resignations	460	
	Deaths	<u>147</u>	
	<b>TOTAL</b>		3,536

Positions filled and vacant		T.A. <sup>b</sup>	T.V. <sup>c</sup>
<b>Appointments:</b>			
	By commission	85	
	Permanent	2,497	
	Interim	686	
	Interim: Substitutions	55	
	Reinstatements	9	
	Readmissions	24	
	Returns	15	
	Transfers	23	
1	TOTAL		3,394
<b>Vacancies:</b>			
5	Retirements	3,350	
8	Dismissals	219	
8	Resignations	749	
	Deaths	92	
	Releases ( <i>Dispensas</i> )	108	
	TOTAL		4,518
<b>Appointments:</b>			
	By commission	165	
	For life ( <i>Vitalicias</i> )	132	
	Permanent	2,852	
	Interim	1,047	
	Interim: Substitutions	88	
	Reinstatements	7	
	Readmissions	39	
	Returns	19	
	Transfers	5	
	Admissions ( <i>Admissoes</i> )	66	
1	TOTAL		4,420
<b>Vacancies:</b>			
5	Retirements	3,718	
9	Dismissals	203	
9	Resignations	2,478	
	Deaths	188	
	Releases	69	
	TOTAL		6,656

Positions filled and vacant		T.A. <sup>b</sup>	T.V. <sup>c</sup>
Appointments:			
	By commission	109	
	Permanent	5,007	
	Interim	1,883	
	Interim: Substitutions	96	
	Reinstatements	8	
	Readmissions	24	
	Returns	101	
	Transfers	11	
1	TOTAL	7,239	
9 Vacancies:			
6	Retirements	2,249	
	Dismissals	133	
0	Resignations	512	
	Deaths	319	
	Releases	32	
	TOTAL		3,245
Total Appointments (1956-1960)		19,918	
Total Vacancies (1956-1960)			21,411
Positions Abolished:			
	<i>Administração Direta</i>		33,000
	<i>Autarquias: Cargos<sup>d</sup></i>	3,143	
	<i>Funcoas<sup>e</sup></i>	2,890	
	Total <i>Autarquias</i>		6,033
Total Positions Abolished			39,033

<sup>a</sup>*Anuário*, V. XXIII (1962), p. 336; *Jornal do Brasil* (January 25, 1961), 5; *Relatório*, 1960, 53-55.

<sup>b</sup>T.A = Total appointments.

<sup>c</sup>T.V.= Total vacancies

<sup>d</sup>*Cargos*= positions occupied by *funcionários*.

<sup>e</sup>*Funções*= positions occupied by civil servants without the standing of a *funcionário*. In this case, they are *extra-numerários*.

TABLE VIII

SIZE OF BRAZILIAN CIVIL SERVICE ACCORDING TO ADMINISTRATIVE ENTITIES (1960)<sup>a</sup>

Positions in the Ministries and Federal Organs Responsible to the Executive

Entities	P o s i t i o n s		
	Total	Occupied	Vacant
<u>Ministries</u>			
Aeronáutica	20005	17353	2652
Agricultura	26227	24826	1401
Educação	18411	15691	2720
Fazenda	26034	19868	6166
Justiça e Negócios Interiores	14561	13249	1312
Marinha	17184	14566	2618
Relações Exteriores	915	785	130
Saúde	19517	18998	519
Trabalho, Indústria e Comércio	6818	6232	586
Viação e Obras Públicas	101172	79882	21290
Guerra	19564	17492	2072
<u>Organs</u>			
Comissão de Readaptação dos Incapazes das Forças Armadas	25	25	---
Comissão do Vale do São Francisco	989	835	154
Comissão Executiva de Armazens e Silos	9	9	---
Comissão Executiva do Plano do Carvão Nacional	18	18	---
Conselho Coordenador do Abastecimento	71	65	6
Conselho Nacional de Águas e Energia Elétrica	54	43	11
Conselho Nacional do Desenvolvimento	20	20	--
Conselho Nacional de Economia	161	117	44
Conselho Nacional de Petróleo	332	207	125
Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público	809	639	170
Escritório Técnico da Universidade do Brasil	114	114	--
Estado Maior das Forças Armadas	108	89	19
Secretaria da Presidência da República	29	20	9
Superintendência do Plano e Valorização Econômica da Amazonia	498	361	137
TOTAL	273645	231504	42141

(Table continued on Page 260)

## Positions in the Federal Autarquias

Autarquias and the Entities to Which They Are Subordinated	N u m e r i c a l   D a t a							
	Positions (Cargos)				Positions (Funções)			
	No. <sup>b</sup>	Filled	Vacant	Abol- ished	No. <sup>b</sup>	Filled	Vacant	Abol- ished
PRESIDÊNCIA DA REPÚBLICA								
Conselho Nacional de Pes- quisas	---	---	---	--	122	85	37	-
Instituto do Açúcar e do Alcool	1162	995	167	90	450	450	--	-
Instituto Brasileiro de Bibliografia e Docu- mentação	---	---	---	--	66	36	30	-
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatís- tica:								
Conselho Nacional de Estatística	4838	3581	1257	36	---	---	--	-
Conselho Nacional de Geografia	1070	634	436	--	---	---	--	-
Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas da Amazonia	---	---	---	--	47	47	--	-
MINISTÉRIO DA AGRICULTURA								
Banco Nacional de Cré- dito Cooperativo	346	274	72	--	---	---	--	-
Caixa do Crédito da Pesca	79	66	13	4	64	52	12	-
Instituto Nacional de Imigração e Colonização	746	625	121	30	---	---	--	-
Instituto Nacional do Mate- riais	4	4	---	16	128	122	6	-
Serviço Social Rural	460	310	150	--	---	---	--	-
MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO E CULTURA								
Universidades:								
Da Bahia	2432	1454	978	10	---	---	--	-
De Minas Gerais	---	---	---	--	4505	2974	1531	100
Do Brasil	---	---	---	--	742	731	11	10
Do Ceará	1412	676	736	--	---	---	--	-
Do Recife	2453	1887	566	30	---	---	--	-
Do Rio Grande do Sul	2485	1457	1028	--	---	---	--	-
Do Pará	458	358	100	--	---	---	--	-
Do Parana	2830	1332	1498	--	---	---	--	-
Rural de Pernambuco	509	332	177	8	---	---	--	-

(Table concluded on Page 261.)

## M. DA FAZENDA

## Caixas Econômicas Federais

Amazonas	49	49	---	5	---	---	---	---
Pará	113	113	---	20	---	---	---	---
Maranhão	31	31	---	17	---	---	---	---
Piauí	28	28	---	---	---	---	---	---
Ceará	94	94	---	7	---	---	---	---
R. G. do Norte	24	24	---	1	---	---	---	---
Paraíba	79	79	---	8	10	10	---	---
Pernambuco	249	249	---	10	---	---	---	---
Alagoas	42	42	---	2	6	6	---	---
Sergipe	17	17	---	1	4	4	---	---
Bahia	266	266	---	84	---	---	---	---
Minas Gerais	858	858	---	39	---	---	---	---
Espírito Santo	82	82	---	7	---	3	---	---
Rio de Janeiro	464	464	---	68	---	---	---	---
Guanabara	3073	3073	---	547	---	---	---	---
São Paulo	2802	2802	---	---	---	---	---	---
Paraná	579	579	---	36	---	---	---	---
Santa Catarina	126	126	---	---	---	---	---	---
R.G. do Sul	656	656	---	203	---	---	---	---
Mato Grosso	43	43	---	9	---	---	---	---
Goiás	22	22	---	---	3	---	---	---
Dis. Fed., Brasília	552	258	294	---	---	---	---	---
Conselho Superior das Caixas Econômicas Federais	76	76	---	51	---	---	---	---
IBC	4313	4010	303	---	---	---	---	---
M. DO TRABALHO, INDÚSTRIA E COMÉRCIO								
Conselho Federal e Regional de Contabilidade								
IAPETC	7252	6903	349	33	3890	3890	---	---
CERA	85	79	6	46	10	10	---	---
Hospital Júlia Kubitschek	271	116	155	---	---	---	---	---
IBS	156	107	49	8	---	---	---	---
IAPB	1997	1750	247	7	---	---	---	---
IAPC	6639	6005	634	788	4410	4410	---	---
IAPFESP	5046	4254	792	432	373	360	13	---
IAPI	16433	10477	5956	---	1494	1286	298	---
IAPM	2304	1932	372	71	516	433	83	---
IPASE	8359	7131	1228	---	---	---	---	---
Inst. Nacional do Pinho	951	902	49	---	---	---	---	---
SAPS	1393	927	466	26	1127	711	416	149
M. DA VIAÇÃO E OBRAS PÚBLICAS								
Admin. do Porto do Rio de Janeiro								
Com. da Marinha Mercante	427	427	---	---	---	---	---	---
Dept. Nac. de Rodagem	4716	3277	1439	33	12206	8404	3802	10
Lóide Brasileiro	7711	7711	---	211	---	---	---	---
SNAPP	---	---	---	---	2111	2032	79	---
SNBP	---	---	---	---	750	598	152	---
TOTAL	109145	87410	21735	3143	33034	26654	6380	289

<sup>a</sup>Anuário, V. XXIII (1962), pp. 335-336 (source of information).

<sup>b</sup>Excludes cargos and funções abolished.

TABLE IX  
 CIVIL SERVANTS ACCORDING TO MAJOR CATEGORIES  
 (Prior to the classification law of 1960)<sup>a</sup>

	<u>1943</u>	<u>1958</u>
<i>Funcionários</i>		
Number with permanent appointments ( <i>Efetivos</i> )		67,096
Other <i>funcionários</i>		51,963
Total number of <i>funcionarios</i>	54,164	<u>119,059</u>
<i>Extranumerários</i>		
<i>Contratados</i>	685	
<i>Mensalistas</i>	40,277	
<i>Diaristas Tabelados</i> <sup>b</sup>	38,197	
<i>Diaristas Estimados</i> <sup>c</sup>	<u>6,762</u>	
Total number of <i>diaristas</i>	44,959	44,959
<i>Tarefeiros</i>	<u>5,906</u>	
Total number of <i>extranumerários</i>	91,827	113,573
Total Number of Federal Civil Servants	145,991	232,632

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<sup>a</sup>Vieira da Cunha, pp. 129-130; Brazil, *Anuário Estatístico do Brasil*, V, VI (1941-1945) (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 1946), p. 467.

<sup>b</sup>*Tabelados*: jobs included in fixed pay schedules.

<sup>c</sup>*Estimados*: jobs not included in fixed pay schedules. These figures are estimates only because of the difficulty of obtaining exact numbers for these employees.

ments any more than Vargas can. In 1943 that is, at the end of the *Estado Novo*, there were 91,827 *extranumerários* listed, compared with 113,574 in 1958. Considering the intervening years and the changes in government, the increases in the numbers of federal civil servants in the *extranumerário* category are not proportionately greater than the increase for the civil service as a whole. What appears to have taken place is a gradual expansion in the size of the federal civil service from the time of the dictatorship through the end of the Kubitschek government. In these years, each government, then, made its contribution to the expansion of public employment -- no one government is more responsible for political patronage than another.

How the Goulart government fits into this pattern cannot be determined numerically, since there is an absence of data on the size of the federal civil service after 1960. We do know, however, that by the time Goulart became president, the *extranumerário* category, the one which provided easiest access to the civil service for political appointees, had been abolished. Likewise, controls on the social security institutes, another major patronage area, had been established.

Yet, if one reads the newspaper accounts covering Goulart's period of office and talks with knowledgeable citizens, one finds inescapable the impression that this was a period in which political patronage reached new heights and the legal barriers

constructed around the federal civil service were breached in unprecedented numbers. There is no doubt that political patronage pressures redoubled after a brief lull in such activities while Quadros was in office, but the extent to which they occurred cannot be measured. Nor can we determine whether the waves of new appointments were based upon rotation in office or whether the total number of civil servants was simply augmented once again. Similarly, it is difficult to state precisely what the effects of the Quadros reforms were on the federal civil service, although the impression which emerges is one of a breathing period between two governments in which manipulation of the patronage power was crucial to political survival rather than one of real civil service reform and re-introduction of the merit principle.

#### The Collapse of an Elite Civil Service

Joined with the problem of political patronage was a deterioration in the elite character of the civil service. Throughout the *Estado Novo*, the development of an elite corps of civil servants was carried on effectively through the DASP apparatus despite pressures from those civil servants outside the privileged ranks of the *funcionario público* to receive the same rights and benefits as those persons within the ranks. One group within the *extranumerário* category, however, the *mensalistas*, was successful in improving its position during the

dictatorship -- although this still did not provide its members with complete equality with those of the career civil service. Through Decree-Law 1909 of December 26, 1939, the requirement of a competitive examination was extended to the *extranumerário-mensalista*. Then, under Decree-Law 5175 of January 7, 1943, the possibility of promotion<sup>12</sup> to those positions immediately above those currently held was made available to this particular group of civil servants. This was followed by a decision on the part of DASP to provide them with an improvement in salary in accordance with the same criteria employed for the *funcionários*. This decision marked the beginning of a systematization of the increases paid to the *extranumerário* with the objective of rewarding the individual in this category on the basis of merit (*i.e.* in proportion to the employee's competence).<sup>13</sup>

After 1945, controls on the *extranumerário* and on the *interino* were relaxed. Provision was made, under Article 23 of the Transitional Provisions of the 1946 Constitution, for the granting of tenure to all *extranumerários* who had a minimum of five years' service. Those workers who were employed in jobs that were of a permanent

character, who had more than five years of service or who had passed a competitive public examination (the *concurso*) or an examination demonstrating their ability to fulfill the responsibilities of a particular position (the *prova de habilitação*) received benefits placing them on a level with that of the *funcionários*. These included tenure, retirement, vacations, leaves of absence, and accessibility to jobs at higher levels. The limitation of these rights and privileges to those who occupied jobs of a permanent character was interpreted by the legal consultant of DASP to mean that those employees who afterwards accepted jobs of a temporary character, once they had acquired these prerogatives, lost them. This attitude, as expressed by DASP in several different reports, was based on the interpretation that these benefits were extended to individuals because of their occupancy of certain positions. In contrast, the viewpoint of those defending *extranumerário* interests was that these privileges were extended to the individual independently of a particular position. In general, those who favored the broadening of the rights and privileges of the *extranumerários* did so on the grounds that they were more numerous than the *funcionários*, that they were indispensable to the civil service, that in many cases they filled positions of importance equal to that of the *funcionário*, and that since they were no longer

merely auxiliary personnel, they deserved the same treatment as the *funcionários*.<sup>15</sup>

Whereas privileges were extended to a sizable number of *extranumerários* and limitations were imposed on entry into this aspect of the public service through the requirement of an examination establishing one's ability for the job at hand, the filling of vacancies in the career service by the appointment of interim (*interino*) employees provided a side entrance into the *funcionário* category. Temporary appointments, valid for only a year, had a way of becoming permanent, although legislation required that after that time the *interino* had to pass the *concurso*. According to Oscar Moreira, the *interino* appointment undercut the whole civil service system,<sup>16</sup> for it offered a means of entrance into the career civil service for those benefiting from personal and kinship ties. This was made possible by the fact that the executive had the prerogative of making each appointment to the public service and these appointments were announced in the form of decrees in the *Diário Oficial*.

As already mentioned, the DASP apparatus, designed to assist the executive in making appointments on the basis of qualified personnel, offered the president considerable freedom for juggling positions according to his wishes. This may be demonstrated by examining the Dutra government.

In the name of economy, Dutra initially adopted measures to limit personnel expenditures by reducing the number of formal appointments to the career civil service. The formal selection process, carried out under DASP's auspices, was already a long and drawn-out one; for often there was a considerable delay between the opening of registration for the examinations and the administering of them and between the announcement of successful candidates and their actual appointment to office. Related to this was the fact that the examinations were difficult and that they were often criticized for being too rigorous in relation to the positions and salaries offered. Of the total number of persons who signed up for the examination, only a small percentage passed. The limitations imposed by Dutra on the appointments made from these approved lists added a further frustrating factor for those attempting to obtain public employment through the proper legal procedures. In the meantime, he made interim -- *interino* -- appointments to fill the vacancies available in the career civil service. This tactic was repeated often in subsequent administrations.

A further example of the delays and frustrations involved in the formal selection process for the career civil service is to be found in a petition presented to the President in 1948 through the president of the Association of Brazilian Civil Servants (the Associação dos Servidores

Civis do Brasil). This petition was prepared by some three hundred candidates, approved in the last examination offered for the position of administrative official (*oficial administrativo*), and protested against the delays in their appointment to office. In a speech before the Senate, Alfredo Nasser stated their case:

Registration for the examinations for administrative officials was opened simultaneously throughout the country in 1945 and was reopened . . . twice in 1946, but only during the last few months of 1947, three years afterwards, . . . were the examinations given. Of the 10,000 candidates who signed up initially, 7,000 gave up, and of the 3,000 who took the examination, only 620 succeeded in qualifying. Of these 620, according to a notice tied to responsible sources, only the first 50, on the basis of their classification, will be appointed. The rest may receive the opportunity during the next two years, if present conditions in the country are modified. At the end of this period, those who have not been appointed will lose their standing, because the law prohibits the appointment of a candidate approved in an examination whose period of validity has ended.<sup>17</sup>

Accompanying this frustration of the examination process and the use of interim appointments was the destruction of the pay differential maintained between *funcionários* (or *interinos* in *funcionário* positions) and *extranumerários*. This came about through the passage of Law 488, known as the *Tabelas Únicas*.<sup>18</sup> The crucial section of this law was contained in Article 2 which stated that each position (whether *cargo*, *pôsto*, or *função*) and grade (*graduação*), except in the case of the president, the vice president, members of Congress, and ministers of state, was to

be paid according to the same basic pay scale. This law also established a single pay scale for personnel in the civil and military service. The elitist structure of the civil service was further modified in Article 13. There the four gradations to which *extranumerário* employees were submitted were abolished and in other articles each of these four previous divisions was adjusted to the same general salary scale. With this general improvement in the status and financial condition of the *extranumerário* and without DASP formal controls to contend with, new appointments were made to the public service under the heading of *funções* during the final years of the Dutra government, regardless of this government's original vocal concern with economy in expenditures on salaries for public employees.

When Getulio Vargas returned to the Office of the Executive as a constitutionally elected president in 1951, one of his first acts was to attempt to rebuild the structure of an elite career civil service, on the basis of competence and not on patronage, and to undo the alterations introduced by Linhares and Dutra. On February 20, he issued an executive ruling re-enacting Decree-law 5175 of January 7, 1943, and stating, in accord with Article 186 of the 1946 Constitution,<sup>19</sup> that entrance into the civil service could be made only through examination. This ruling specifically

prohibited the admission of *extranumerários* through a simple listing of names and revoked the *Tabelas Únicas* in the ministries and other organs directly subordinate to the presidency. The ruling also authorized DASP to act with urgency to revise the *Tabelas Únicas* in all ministries and other organs directly subordinate to the executive and to revise also the pay schedules of all the *autarquias*. This ruling further stipulated that all bodies affected must provide DASP with the necessary data needed for the revision. New schedules were published and the filling of all jobs by *extranumerários+mensalistas* was to be suspended as well as all other schedules and acts altering what was termed "the existing situation." Once DASP had completed its revision, it was to present to the Office of the Executive a report naming those cases in each schedule which should be given attention by the government.<sup>20</sup>

The ruling marked the initiation of an effort by the President to revive DASP and to centralize once again public personnel policies and practices under his control. DASP immediately went into action, studying the *Tabelas Únicas* and checking the validity of each appointment in question. In those cases in which violations were discovered, the individual was either removed from his position or ordered to prove his qualifications through a *prova de habilitação*. By mid-April, however, criticism began to appear in the

press and in Congress against the solutions offered by DASP, as it started to put into effect steps to end the *Tabelas Únicas*, and against the delays involved while waiting for DASP to declare its view on particular cases. In the face of this criticism, DASP issued a news release stressing the purpose of the revision:

The purpose of the government is not to harm or, even less, to provoke a wholesale dismissal of public employees because of a change of government. Instead, its purpose is to give prestige to the law, to impede arbitrary choice, and to dignify public employment. . . .

This is the reason so much that, parallel to the corrective measures, the government is attempting to name to the existing vacancies candidates selected according to examination. It is promoting new written public examinations or examinations of ability [*provas de habilitação*] that will meet the needs of the public service. In other words, its purpose is to give new prestige to the merit system, moralizing and making more democratic entrance into public positions.<sup>21</sup>

Not everyone, however, accepted the justification offered by DASP. For example, Senator Hamilton Nogueira defended the *Tabelas Únicas* in a speech delivered in the Senate. He pointed out that this law put an end to a most varied nomenclature in the case of the *extranumerário*: by ending the distinctions made among *mensalistas*, *diaristas*, *tarefeiros* and *contratados*. It was also an act passed by Congress, authorizing the executive to carry it out. The executive, in turn, had consulted DASP and new pay schedules were put into effect. This phase, he said, was not open

to criticism. When Vargas came to power, however, the law was annulled and DASP proceeded to undo the effects of the *Tabelas Únicas*. Drawing upon the fact that DASP was considered a technical organ above politics, he proceeded to call in question its policies as a purely administrative organ. DASP seemed instead a mere instrument at the service of the President, for under Dutra it had put the *Tabelas Únicas* into effect and now, under Vargas, in the name of moralizing the civil service and undoing the evils of patronage, it was destroying them. He went on to say that, according to his sources of information, these changes involved 5,000 functionaries. He then proceeded to defend the cause of the *extranumerário*. DASP, he claimed, had once again usurped the legislative capacity. The acts of President Dutra, when he made appointments under the *Tabelas Únicas*, were perfectly legal. Furthermore, the legality of this action was at least to some degree recognized by Vargas, for the day's *Diário Oficial* had just announced that Vargas, through a request from the Merchant Marine Commission, had made fifty appointments to vacancies under the commission's *Tabelas Únicas*.<sup>22</sup> These positions were *funções*, not *cargos*, which put them in the *extranumerário* category.

On the 25th of July, Vargas issued an executive ruling (*despacho*), based on an explanatory report (*exposição de*

*motivos*) prepared by DASP, modifying his previous position. To avoid paralyzing some sectors of the public service and for reasons of "social equality," he announced that he was delaying the initiation of those decrees dealing with funds spent on public servants irregularly submitted until all those individuals affected had had the opportunity to pass *provas de habilitação* and thus gain a legal right to their positions.<sup>23</sup>

The next year Vargas once again moved forward in his effort to build a federal civil service selected on the basis of competence. On March 27, Congress passed a law requiring examinations for the admission of new employees to the social security institutes and other autonomous governmental entities<sup>24</sup> and on September 18, Vargas made it effective through the use of an executive decree. The next step in reorganizing the civil service was the passage of a new Statute for the Public Functionaries on October 28.<sup>25</sup>

It is important, however, to note that Vargas' attempt to impose the requirement of public examinations and to develop a corps of competent civil servants was restricted to those with the standing of *funcionários públicos*. At the same time that he was defending the merit principle, he was proceeding with patronage appointments in the *extra-numerário* category. This was a practice he had followed

during the *Estado Novo*. This time, however, he was acting in a political context characterized by a Congress not always subservient to the wishes of the executive and by political parties in the throes of developing a mass basis.

This situation was reflected in a law passed by Congress on July 24, 1954, under which all *extranumerários-mensalistas* with five or more years of service were put on a par with *funcionários efetivos*. The law contained a section prohibiting Vargas from appointing any new employees of this grade. When it came time to promulgate the law, Vargas used the item veto to remove this particular section. He justified his action on the grounds that it would frustrate the just aspirations of a sizable number of candidates already approved in examinations (*provas*). He also vetoed another article where minimal examinations for *contratados* and *tarefeiros* were required; thus, these positions were left open to executive patronage. In this case, he stated that such a provision would alter the personnel selection process by upsetting the independence of autonomous government agencies and entities. Afterwards, however, he modified his position, for it was later stipulated that new *extranumerários* would only be admitted to temporary positions, that salary limitations would be imposed on *extranumerários* in the *contratado* and *tarefeiro* categories, and that new employees at these levels would be

admitted only through an examination as to aptitude or capacity<sup>26</sup> administered by DASP.<sup>27</sup> .

At the end of August, Vargas committed suicide and an interim government, led by Café Filho, followed. In the face of what were apparently almost overwhelming pressures for public employment, Café Filho issued an open letter to job seekers through his private secretary. In it, he said that the government was unable to promise any jobs due to the excessive number of public employees already in service and to the Treasury's inability to assume financial responsibility for any new positions. As it was, the payment of existing salaries was, in many cases, being delayed because of a lack of funds. He also made it quite clear that his government was committed to admissions on the basis of competitive examinations "without a regime of patronage and without political influence." He stated, "The Executive Office does not have nor does it sponsor candidates and it is firmly resolved to maintain this norm as an example. It is its intention not to channel requests to the ministries and any other administrative organ."<sup>28</sup> Eventually, however, Café Filho -- as others before and after him -- found it necessary to give way to patronage pressures.

An editorial published by the *Jornal do Brasil* at this time called attention to the fact that Café Filho

government was faced with this onslaught of job seekers after only twenty days of being in power. The situation it described was to be frequent in subsequent years. On the one hand, public finances were chaotic and it was essential that the new government limit expenses; on the other, political pressures were intense and were increasing for the distribution of jobs to friends, relatives, and political party associates. If the politician was to collaborate with the government, claimed the editorial, he had to be able to meet the demands of his electorate. In the case of the more powerful politician, the executive clearly could not afford to alienate his support. Yet, once patronage was allotted to these individuals, it became difficult to resist the pressures of the less important.<sup>29</sup> This dilemma seemed inescapable, maintained a second editorial, for each change of government brought with it a new army of reliable followers which replaced that of the preceding executive.<sup>30</sup>

Juscelino Kubitschek, the next president, was subjected to similar pressures on assuming office. As had his predecessors, he likewise formally affirmed his belief in the merit system, took some legal action, and then proceeded to make appointments in those areas in which the heaviest pressures were brought to bear. Shortly after taking office, he gave lip service to DASP as an instrument of administrative

reform; issued two circulars increasing ministerial and agency accountability to the executive, and authorized interim appointments according to political criteria. Wahrlich holds Kubitschek responsible for making an estimated 7,000 appointments during this period and ascribes a large part of them to the PTB as a pay-off for supporting him during the electoral campaign.<sup>31</sup> A similar figure was quoted when these appointments were debated in Congress. Kubitschek did not try to deny them; he only maintained they were made within the limits of the law.<sup>32</sup>

Further patronage potentialities were provided several months later through a directive approved by him and applicable to all the *autarquias*.<sup>33</sup> By annulling all appointments to non-classified positions and all acts granting permanent status to *interinos* without examination, beginning May, 1952, it conveniently cleared the way for many of Kubitschek's own appointments. Simultaneously this could be pointed to as an act rectifying previous violations of the civil service system. As if this were not enough, the director-general of DASP issued an official note defending the President's right to make *interino* appointments to the *autarquias*.<sup>34</sup>

While Kubitschek continued to make *interino* and *extranumerário* appointments in practice, he claimed in statements released to the press that he was really *anti-*

*empreguista* -- opposed to excessive appointments to the civil service. To back up his position he pointed to vacancies available in the civil service that he had not filled and to the number of positions he had ordered abolished.<sup>35</sup> Examples of how Kubitschek manipulated appointments to the civil service in order to maintain executive control over them and how he also retained an image of opposition to increasing the government's financial obligations to the civil service are demonstrated by two events occurring in 1957 and 1958.

In July, 1957, Kubitschek vetoed a bill passed by Congress granting a salary increase to civil servants on the grounds of the need for economy. At the same time, he made additional appointments to the public service in the *tesoureiro* and *ajudante de tesoureiro* categories. These appointments were made to a number of positions which had been conveniently opened through retirements and which offered the executive complete freedom to appoint whomever he wished. This action reflected a pattern common in executive-legislative relations throughout the Kubitschek government. While he sought to defend his patronage powers and continued to make appointments to the civil service according to non-merit standards, Congress, under pressure from civil servant groups and organizations, tried continually to provide salary increases to meet the demands

of the lower ranks of the civil service, where the largest numbers were employed and where the effects of the continuous rise in the cost of living were heavily felt.

In May, 1954, Kubitschek adopted another tactic. He went on the radio to announce that he was issuing a decree suspending all appointments until congressional elections -- scheduled for October 3 -- were complete. Adequate notice was given in advance as to exactly when the decree would be promulgated and, it seems, a wave of office seekers descended on the presidential palace before the deadline set for Monday, May 19. These headlines were carried on news articles on the inside pages of the *Journal do Brasil* the preceding Saturday and Sunday: "The Rush to Catete: They Want 20,000 Jobs before Monday"; "400 Appointees Are Awaiting IAPI's New Schedule," and "In Less than 48 Hours more than 500 Appointments Have Been Made to IAPI."<sup>36</sup> Once elections were over, the government returned to previous appointments' patterns, with the majority of the jobs being distributed in the social security institutes.

By this time the accumulation of political patronage in the social security institutes over the years had led to a situation demanding immediate attention. Financial disorder in the retirement and welfare programs of the social security institutes was rampant and, although consideration had been given to their reform before Kubitschek assumed office, little

had been accomplished in the way of reform. On becoming president, Kubitschek inherited a bill which had been previously introduced. It was intended to provide the social security institutes with a single comprehensive law and to prohibit new appointments without examination. While this bill continued in Congress for the next year, Kubitschek proceeded to have drafted a new measure for which he could receive credit. On May 23, 1958, he issued a decree establishing a commission and giving it the responsibility of preparing a draft of a law reorganizing the institutes. Article 3 of the decree repeated the prohibition contained in the original measure: all new appointments, admissions, and adjustment of services to individuals under the form of installment payments or according to similar practices were made illegal. This provision, however, differed in that it applied only to the institute benefiting federal civil servants (IPASE) and three other minor welfare organizations; the institutes in which the major amount of job patronage went on were not to be affected.<sup>37</sup>

In a new session of Congress the following year, a majority in the Chamber of Deputies agreed to freeze the bill and to push for the passage of a substitute measure granting full retirement benefits to workers 55 years old or with 35 years' service (this was later changed to 30 years). This occurred at the time Kubitschek was preparing

to ban new appointments to the social security institutes. He opposed the measure and ordered the government's bloc to remain absent from the Chamber that a quorum might not be present to vote. Nevertheless, the bill was passed a short time later and Kubitschek, without offering further opposition, sanctioned it, vetoing only those sections prohibiting new appointments.

By November, after congressional election had been held, Kubitschek had decided that in the face of the UDN's advances in the election, it was time to impose limits on the PTB and to turn the institutes over to a team of administrative technicians. This attitude was revealed by him in a conversation with PSD leaders; by then, he had become concerned with Goulart's political ambitions.<sup>38</sup> Thus, a push began to pass legislation to reform the social security system.

After much debating, many amendments (at one point, 184), and finally through consideration as an emergency measure, a comprehensive law governing the social security system was finally passed and sanctioned without any vetoes by the President in August, 1960. Since the original measure had been introduced, more than ten years of congressional consideration had passed. That the President did not use his item-veto power to cancel such a section as that limiting admissions only to those who had passed public examinations

was a pleasant surprise to those interested in administrative reform and in seeing the institutes removed from the influence of patronage. They were, however, quite correct in feeling that if new patronage appointments were desired, a suitable means of entry could be found. Nevertheless, with presidential elections in the offing and with Quadros running strong, the focus of attention of the Kubitschek government was now on protecting its appointees in the institutes and in using the reform and the principle of neutrality to protect its interests from a change in government. The new law was designed to become effective in December. After that date, each institute was to be administered by an administrative council with six members: two indicated by the government, two by those receiving benefits from the program, and two by the businesses contributing to the program.<sup>39</sup>

With Quadros' victory in the October election, the Kubitschek government proceeded to make certain that its representatives would dominate the councils. Since the terms of the appointees would not expire until December, 1964, Quadros' influence on the institutes could be minimized.

This attention to the constitution of the new councils in the institutes was accompanied by one last flurry of appointments -- as Kubitschek made his "political testament" (*testamento político*). At one point the protest in the press against these appointments reached such a level that

the Minister of Labor and the chief of the President's civilian staff<sup>40</sup> held a joint interview to provide information on these matters. Supposedly, the number of appointments involved was over 15,000. They proceeded, not to deny the appointments, but to show that they were much more limited. According to the Minister of Labor, the total number of functionaries appointed was 4,436, of which 2,779 were patronage appointments and 1,657 merit appointments (*i.e.* they were based on qualification through public examination). He went on to say that all these admissions were by order of the President, who had received great pressures from all sides at the end of his term of office. He made it clear, however, that the President was not responsible for the persons appointed; he had merely authorized the appointments.<sup>41</sup>

The success of the movement to reform the social security institutes and to remove them from partisan influence must, then, be considered within the political context within which these achievements were finally obtained. This is important to remember, for afterwards, once Quadros had resigned and Goulart was in office, there was a great cry against intrusions into an area supposedly removed from politics. This experience underscores once more the point that was made in considering the *Estado Novo*. When administrative reforms -- or any reform in government, for that matter, -- are made, attention must be given to those groups which

stand to benefit from a change in the power structure and those which will lose. Once again, the banner of merit system practices and administrative rationalization and moralization was raised to achieve what were essentially political goals.

One of the first acts of Jânio Quadros, Kubitschek's successor, was to order an investigation of previous appointments made to the civil service and to begin a program of administrative reform. On February 21, he issued a decree prohibiting further appointments -- except for those filling *cargos em comissão* and using persons selected on the basis of examination -- and ordering the dismissal of all functionaries admitted to the civil service after September 1, 1960. A provision, however, was made that 20 per cent of those dismissed could retain their jobs if they could prove the necessity of their service. Included in this investigation was a re-examination of the schedules and tables of the *autarquias* so that "with due respect for the principles of economy and efficiency, they could be adjusted to the real needs of service."<sup>42</sup> On the 23rd, under the authorization of the President, DASP undertook a survey of all appointments with the understanding that it was to prepare a list of those employees who were to be dismissed. Since the institutes presented a particular problem under the new law, a move was made to replace the government's representatives on the governing council.

On the 24th, a notice appeared in the *Jornal do Brasil* reporting dismissals within the institutes. According to this report, the institute which had been most affected by excessive appointments was IAPFESP. There numerous appointments had been made without publication in the *Diário Oficial*, as required by law. It gave the following figures on the numbers of dismissals which were forthcoming: 1,800 in IAPFESP, 1,450 in IAPTEC, 650 in IPASE, 200 in SAPS, and 95 in IAPM.<sup>43</sup> In the case of IAPI and IAPB, it stated that no official numbers had been released, but that in each case between 200 and 300 employees would be affected. Outside the institutes, the article reported, the Ministry of Transportation and Public Works had also been adversely affected by patronage. There the study was still going on, but to date in only two departments -- the highway department (Estrada de Rodagem) and the department responsible for drought measures (Obras contra as Sêcas) -- some 5,000 employees would be affected. Similarly, in the Ministry of Health there was no final report ready, but investigations had revealed that in the department responsible for dealing with rural endemic diseases (the Departamento de Endemias Rurais), 8,500 new employees had been hired within the last few months. In the same period, supposedly more than 2,000 new employees had been admitted to other departments.<sup>44</sup>

Following this announcement there were four sets of dismissals which were reported in the *Jornal do Brasil*. On March 3, anticipating action by the President, the administrative council of IAPB -- whose members had only taken office in January -- decided to act on irregular appointments to the institute to avoid presidential intervention. Under the new law governing the social security system, which made all irregular admissions after it went into effect on September 5 illegal, it annulled 269 appointments. Then, on the 25th, Quadros himself, through a decree, ordered the removal of 369 functionaries appointed by Kubitschek from IAPI. A third set of dismissals, involving 1,232 individuals, took place under the auspices of the president of IAPFESP. The last notice in the *Jornal do Brasil* regarding removals in terms of concrete numbers, referred to the removal of 1,291 functionaries in the Ministry of Transportation and Public Works from the Secretaria do Estado da Viação and from the Departamento de Correios e Telégrafos.<sup>45</sup>

It was not long, however, before previous patronage patterns reasserted themselves, for Quadros only remained in office seven months and was followed by João Goulart. In terms of the size of the civil service, Quadros' total dismissals were negligible and marked but a brief interval in a political context where patronage was essential to the politician. Once Goulart was in the presidency, the

distribution of jobs in the civil service according to political criteria reappeared.

There was one crucial difference, however, between the two presidents. Whereas Kubitschek had used the role of the president as the dispenser of patronage to build a fairly effective governmental machine and was able to use it to obtain the necessary majorities for crucial legislation he desired to see passed, Goulart was never able to use his vast patronage powers to advantage. Kubitschek certainly had his problems with the PTB and the distribution of patronage in the social security institutes, but he never lost control to the degree that Goulart did. Until January, 1963, Goulart's problems can be attributed in large part to the existence of a parliamentary regime, but this cannot account for the fact that members of Congress, in particular, those in Goulart's own party, gained the upper hand in the matter of patronage even more so after the country returned to a presidential regime.

The first indication of a new wave of appointments, as reported by the *Jornal do Brasil*, appeared in November, when the administrative director of IAPETC disclosed that there were 4,112 vacancies (*funções*)<sup>46</sup> in the institute, of which 2,056 were at the disposal of DASP. He was quoted as saying there was no reason why candidates for appointment through public examination should feel themselves

harméd by the government's decision to grant tenure and full status to 1,021 *interinos*.<sup>47</sup> The next day a strong denial came from the administrative director of IAPETC saying that he knew of no government order involving the 1,021 *interinos* mentioned by the *Jornal do Brasil*, although he did confirm the existence of 4,112 vacancies. These, he stated, were reserved as required by law -- half for promotions (*acesso*)<sup>48</sup> and half for new admissions through public examination.<sup>49</sup> Assuming the validity of the original report, it may be postulated that the director involved had to deny these appointments because, according to the classification legislation, such an action was legally invalid.

The *Jornal do Brasil* then called attention to violations in IAPI, Lóide Brasileiro (the government's cargo line), and IPASE. Through appointments published in IAPI's internal bulletin, the *Jornal* was able to account for over 3,000 irregular appointments of *interinos* to the permanent service within a three-day period.<sup>50</sup> Likewise, by examining the internal bulletins of Lóide Brasileiro, the paper encountered material substantiating over a thousand additional illegal appointments.<sup>51</sup> The number involved in IPASE, over 200, was considerably less.<sup>52</sup> In this latter case, the *Jornal do Brasil* held three men primarily responsible for these appointments: Deputy Saldanha Coelho (PTB leader in the state assembly in Guanabara), Paiva Muniz (an ex-president of IPASE),

and Dr. Raimundo de Brito (ex-director of the Hospital dos Servidores and UDN candidate for the assembly in Guanabara).

Protests against these appointments reached the point that Goulart found it necessary to issue an official statement on August 21, 1962, through the chief of his civilian staff. It ordered a rigorous investigation of the institutes for violation of Decree 51504 (June 11, 1962), which had suspended all appointments until December 31 unless under presidential authorization. According to this statement, Goulart disclaimed any responsibility for these appointments. In an interview with the *Jornal*, the president of IAPI maintained that no appointments had been made since the decree, although 1,000 had been made prior to its becoming effect and these had been invalidated. Nevertheless, he claimed that his institute needed 8,000 new employees for the proper development of its social welfare services. Also, he said Goulart could not be held responsible for appointments in this case because the institute was under the control of its council.<sup>53</sup>

In the coverage provided by the *Jornal* there were no further instances of patronage recorded until May, 1963, when a meeting between Goulart and the PTB representatives in the legislative assembly of São Paulo was covered. According to the report, Goulart agreed to name immediately 73 persons indicated by the state PTB to directive positions

in the various organs of the federal government in the state of São Paulo. The appointments were broken down in the following fashion: 11 to the Ministry of Finance, 8 to the Ministry of Agriculture, 10 to the Ministry of Labor, 10 to the Ministry of Transportation and Public Works, 7 to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, 3 to the Ministry of Education, 2 to the Ministry of Mines and Energy, 2 to the Ministry of Health, 3 to Petrobrás (the government's oil company), 5 to CES, 5 to COSIPA, 1 to SUPRA, 1 to SENAM,<sup>54</sup> 1 to Lóide Brasileiro in Santos (the seaport of São Paulo), 1 to Costeira (the government's passenger line) in Santos, 1 to IBGE (the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística), and 2 to the Ministry of Justice. Furthermore, the leader of the group, Deputy Ivete Vargas, expressed their desire to have the Minister of Labor, Almino Alfonso, replaced. The principal reason cited was that he had made appointments in the state of São Paulo unfamiliar to the state PTB party.<sup>55</sup>

Several months later Goulart made a change in the labor minister. Whether or not this incident was related to the appointment of a new minister (Amauri Silva), however, cannot be ascertained.

Attention was next called to between 1,500 and 1,700 illegal appointments to the ranks of IAPFESP. These had occurred in the state of Guanabara under the influence of PTB deputies in the state assembly. They were appointments made by

individual deputies within the party and no one wanted to accept responsibility for them.<sup>56</sup>

Then, on July 18, Goulart published another decree in the *Diário Oficial* prohibiting for a second time appointments for a year. The interpretation given to this decree in the *Jornal do Brasil* was that it represented another attempt by Goulart to gain personal control over all appointments. Given the surrounding circumstances, this was probably a correct interpretation. Appointments could be made in exceptional cases, but such appointments had to be authorized by the appropriate minister and the President.<sup>57</sup>

The next day a new crisis over appointments arose with the publication of an official statement by IAPFESP in answer to a formal request by two federal deputies giving the reasons for its appointment, prior to the new decree, of 1,500 functionaries. IAPFESP offered five justifications for its actions: they were made according to strict necessities; they were authorized by the President, who had approved only 40 per cent of the original request; all persons involved had been approved by DASP in a public examination (although not necessarily the formal *concurso*); all were *interino* appointments; and all could be verified according to the standards set for the institutes.<sup>58</sup> This was followed by a denunciation, delivered by PTB deputy José Gomes Talarico, in which he accused the president of IAPFESP, General Aluísio

Moura, of using the names of PTB state and federal deputies to make appointments to the institute. Moura countered with a statement to the effect that all his appointments had been made with presidential authorization and were entirely legal. Goulart in turn ordered the Minister of Labor to investigate the matter. The minister then made a public announcement, saying that it was entirely unfair to attribute to the President any *empreguismo* -- excessive appointments -- because the admissions were made independently without any intervention on his part.<sup>59</sup> Ten days later he issued an order decreeing federal intervention in IAPFESP under Article 133 of the Comprehensive Law governing the social security institutes and naming an *interventor*. The grounds for the intervention was that the council of that institute had named thousands of functionaries without presidential authorization.<sup>60</sup>

The federal *interventor* then halted 1,271 new appointees from taking office. He reported that the majority of these appointments had been made by the institute's council without presidential authorization. The majority of these were in Guanabara, where 629 accountants, 300 doctors, and 40 treasurers were involved.<sup>61</sup> He gave assurance, however, that dismissals would occur only after the proper investigation had occurred. In a televised interview on the 4th, the Minister of Labor stressed the fact that this

was not a political intervention -- it was purely an administrative matter.<sup>62</sup>

Since an excess of illegal appointments had taken place in virtually all the institutes, the Minister of Labor issued a memorandum which required that all *interinos* admitted beginning June, 1962, must take a public examination within sixty days to gain admission to the permanent service.<sup>63</sup> Two weeks later, he signed a directive dismissing 5,000 functionaries named to the institutes since January 1, and requiring the DNPS to submit a request to DASP asking for a report on the approved candidates who would have priority in placement in the institutes. The reason for the dismissals, he said, was financial.<sup>64</sup> The presidents of the institutes countered that the directive was illegal under the terms of the Comprehensive Law and should not be complied with. That same day, after the meeting of the social security presidents, the chief of the Minister of Labor's cabinet called a meeting of all the presidents and handed over to them officially the minister's directive. Joined with it was a second directive dismissing all treasurers appointed since January. The presidents and the representatives of the councils claimed that it was illegal. A statement was prepared by those resisting the minister's directives:

The members of the councils [*colegiados*] consider the ministerial directive to be capable of creating

a serious crisis in the social security system, since the *interinos* appointed since January are, in the majority, minor servants designated by parliamentarians, syndical leaders, and politicians who have been giving support to President João Goulart in his campaign for basic reforms.

The President of IAPC, Jurandir Perachi, forms a part of the group who will not comply with the ministerial directive, on the basis of the thesis that it involves a profoundly inhuman and discriminatory aspect: it does not order the dismissal of those who benefit from *cargos isolados* -- unclassified positions.<sup>65</sup>

This particular incident made quite clear the degree to which the PTB was divided internally over the matter of patronage. Goulart was unable to pull these conflicting elements together to provide sufficient support for his legislative programs. Eventually the presidents of the major institutes -- IAPC, IAPETC, IAPM, and IAPFESP -- sent official letters to the DNPS saying that they would comply with the two disputed directives. Following this, the director of the DNPS was able to make a statement to the *Jornal* closing the incident: the councils, while considering the minister's act illegal, would respect his decision in accord with the principle of the hierarchy of authority.

Thus, in the years between 1945 and 1964, a patronage bureaucracy responsive to the needs of the external political system came into being. Simultaneously, the administrative reforms enacted into law by Vargas during the 1930's not only remained in effect but were supplemented by new legislation

enacted during these years. The result of the interaction of these two orders -- the one legal, the other functional -- was an administrative system which became increasingly formalistic -- one in which the divergence between prescriptive norms and human behavior steadily grew.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>See the definition of "ruling class" as distinguished from "elect" and "elite" used in Footnote 15, Chapter V.

<sup>2</sup>In the transition back to representative governmental institutions, José Linhares served as acting president until elections could be held and a constitutionally elected president could assume office. He was followed by Eurico Gaspar Dutra.

<sup>3</sup>Gilbert B. Siegel, "The Vicissitudes of Governmental Reform in Brazil: A Study of the DASP" (unpublished Doctoral dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1964), pp. 148-149.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 150-151.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 154-155. This decree-law, No. 8323-A of December 8, 1945, also lowered the status of the director of DASP from "president" to "director-general." The other aspects of the reform, which pertain to responsibilities in other areas besides personnel, are discussed by Siegel (pp. 154-159). This decree was followed by another on January 24, 1946, which implemented the reform in detail and created the framework under which DASP was to act in the post-1945 years. The status and responsibilities of DASP were further reduced by limiting its budget.

<sup>6</sup>Siegel credits the Minister of Finance, Pedro Luiz Correia e Castro, with the preparation of the bill (p. 171).

<sup>7</sup>For example, see Siegel (pp. 168, 170, 172).

<sup>8</sup>Beatriz Marqués de Souza Wahrlich, *A Importância da Formação de Pessoal* (Rio de Janeiro: Serviço Social do Comércio, Departamento Nacional, 1960), p. 18.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, in Brazil, Ministério Extraordinário para a Reforma Administrativa, Coordenador (Eloah M. G. Barreto, Beatriz Wahrlich, Belmiro Siqueira, rapporteurs), *Normas para Preservação e Revigoração do Sistema do Mérito* (Rio de Janeiro, 1963) (Mimeographed).

<sup>10</sup>*Jornal do Brasil* (hereafter cited as *JB*), July 8, 1961, 5. The *extranumerário* category was abolished in 1960.

<sup>11</sup>"Formalism" is used here, according to the definition established in Chapter I, to distinguish the body of prescribed rules and laws governing administrative relationships and actual administrative behavior on the part of the human actors involved.

<sup>12</sup>A distinction in terminology, however, was made to maintain the separation between the *funcionário* and the *extranumerário*; promotions for the *extranumerário-mensalista* were placed under the category of *acesso* (access), while the term *promoção* (promotion) was reserved for the *funcionário*

<sup>13</sup>Maria Joana de Almeida Fernandes, "Aspectos da Política de Extranumerários," *Revista do Serviço Público* (hereafter cited as *RSP*), II (May-June, 1947), 114-115.

<sup>14</sup>The terminology in Portuguese at this point becomes quite confusing for the outsider. *Concurso* is used in two different contexts: It can mean any general examination and it also refers to the written competitive public examination which is required for admittance to the initial ranks of the career civil service. Likewise, the term *funcionário* is used to mean any public employee in general, while specifically it refers to the career civil servant. Both *concurso* and *funcionário* will be used here in their more limited sense; in this respect they parallel the French *concours* and *fonctionnaire*, as was pointed out in Chapter II. The examination required for the *extranumerário* was instituted toward the end of the dictatorship. It is called a *prova de habilitação*, literally a test of ability, and is not nearly as rigorous as the *concurso*. The emphasis in this case is merely on competence for a particular job. A further distinction in terminology involves the use of *função* to refer to an *extranumerário* position, while *cargo* is limited in technical writing to positions in the career civil service. Again, however, the latter term has a second and wider meaning, that of any general position. Here it will be limited to the first usage. With the passage of the 1960 Classification Plan the term *extranumerário* disappears; however, the *função* remains as the term used for jobs for temporary personnel (*pessoal temporário*), contract labor (*pessoal de obras*), and personnel of an executive, advisory, or staff character, hired for particular responsibilities.

<sup>15</sup>This argument, frequently presented to the legislator, is quite well summarized in José Medeiros, "Estabilidade do Extranumerário," *RSP*, III (July, 1950), 56-58.

<sup>16</sup>Oscar Vitorino Moreira, "O Interino em Cargo de Carreira em Face da Constituição," *RSP*, I (March, 1950), 14-16.

<sup>17</sup>*JB*, July 10, 1948, i.

<sup>18</sup>Brazil, "Lei Número 188 - De 15 de Novembro de 1948, Dispõe sobre o pagamento de vencimentos, renumeração ou salário de pessoal civil e militar de União," in República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil, *Coleção das Leis de 1948, Atos do Poder Legislativo (Outubro a Dezembro)*, Vol. VII, pp. 55-77.

<sup>19</sup>Article 186 states: "the first investiture in a career office or in others that the law may specify shall be effected by competition followed by a health examination," *Constitution of the United States of Brazil, 1946 (as Amended)*, Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1963), p. 47.

<sup>20</sup>*JB*., February 20, 1951, 6.

<sup>21</sup>*JB*., April 17, 1951, 6.

<sup>22</sup>*JB*., July 20, 1951, 9.

<sup>23</sup>*JB*., July 27, 1951, 9.

<sup>24</sup>Law 1584.

<sup>25</sup>Law 1711.

<sup>26</sup>These examinations are termed in Portuguese as "uma prova de aptidão ou de habilitação."

<sup>27</sup>*JB*, July 24, 1954, 6; August 8, 1954, 5. The number of this law was 2284. The *diaristas* were not dealt with in this law because, under Law 1765 of December 18, 1952, they had been advanced to the *mensalista* level.

<sup>28</sup>*JB*., September 9, 1954, 6.

<sup>29</sup>*JB*., September 15, 1954, 5.

<sup>30</sup>*JB*., September 18, 1954, 5.

<sup>31</sup>Interview with Wahrlich, cited by Siegel, p. 256.

<sup>32</sup>*JB.*, July 14, 1956, 5.

<sup>33</sup>*JB.*, May 5, 1956, 5.

<sup>34</sup>*JB.*, June 27, 1956, 6.

<sup>35</sup>These figures are cited in Table VII, pp. 256ff., *supra*.

<sup>36</sup>*JB.*, May 17, 1958, 4; May 18, 1958, section II, 12. Catete was the name of the presidential palace in Rio de Janeiro prior to the move to Brasília. IAPI, as previously noted, is the alphabetical title of the social security institute benefiting industrial workers.

<sup>37</sup>*JB.*, May 23, 1956, 6. See the Appendix for a listing of the social security institutes.

<sup>38</sup>*JB.*, November 11, 1954, 4.

<sup>39</sup>Under the new law, the individual institutes retained administrative and financial autonomy; in the personnel field this meant the power to organize and to control their own employees. At the same time, the whole system was to be better coordinated by two bodies: the Conselho Superior da Previdência Social and the Departamento Nacional da Previdência Social (DNPS). Their responsibility was the over-all supervision of the social security system and the establishment of similar conditions for all beneficiaries. Through the DNPS the institutes, while retaining substantial autonomy, were subordinated to the Ministry of Labor and through that department there were to be given the same organization as the ministry and were to be governed by the same norms.

<sup>40</sup>The presidential staff is divided into two sections: one civilian and the other military -- the *Casa Civil* and the *Casa Militar da Presidência*.

<sup>41</sup>*JB.*, December 20, 1960, 4.

<sup>42</sup>*JB.*, February 22, 1961, 1.

<sup>43</sup>See Appendix for complete titles of these organizations.

<sup>44</sup>*JB.*, February 24, 1961.

<sup>45</sup>*Jornal do Brasil*, March 3, 1961, 5; March 25, 1961, 3; April 2, 1961, 4; April 4, 1961, 5.

<sup>46</sup>In the 1960 Classification Plan (Law 3780), the distinction between *cargo* and *função* was maintained, although the distinction between the *extranumerário* and the *funcionário* disappeared. Article 19, which contains this provision, refers to previous legislation: Articles 18 and 23 of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, Law 2284, and Law 1711 (Article 264). It affirms that in all respects the *extranumerário* is equal to the *funcionário*. The interpretation given to this section was that it required five years of service to be effective for the *extranumerário*. This, however, was altered by Decree 48921 (1960), which stated that all *extranumerários*, including those with less than five years' service, had become *funcionários*. Two types of temporary personnel were retained: *pessoal temporário* and *pessoal de obras* (employees hired on a contract basis). According to Article 4, Paragraph 1, a position (*cargo*) is that body of attributions and responsibilities entrusted to a functionary, retaining the characteristics of creation by law, its own designation, a fixed rating (*número certo*) and payment from the public treasury. In contrast, Article II states that the *função gratificada* (literally, a paid position) is not a job, but an advantage granting access to a salary.

<sup>47</sup>*JB.*, November 10, 1961, 5.

<sup>48</sup>In Brazilian personnel administration, the distinction is made between *promoção* and *acesso*. Article 29 of the 1960 Classification Plan defines the former as "the advancement of a functionary, according to the criteria of merit and seniority, to the next class within the same series of classes." It specifies that one-third of these shall be according to seniority and two-thirds according to merit. *Acesso* is advancement, through examination, to a rank in another class above the current one. Article 34, Paragraph 2, states that half of these vacancies shall remain open to those functionaries who have the same professional formation, but are at a lower level, while the remainder are open to those qualified through public examination (*concurso*).

<sup>49</sup>*JB.*, November 11, 1961, 8.

<sup>50</sup>JB., June 16, 1962, 8; June 23, 1962, 8; June 26, 1962, 4. This information was based on IAPI's *Boletim do Serviço*, Nos. 104 (June 5), 105 (June 6), 106 (June 7), and 108 (June 11). These were all published with an earlier date to avoid violating a presidential decree in effect which would prohibit all appointments until December 31. These sources are also referred to in a report prepared by employees of the institute, protesting the appointments. This report was published in the *Jornal* (July 5, 1962), 5. Deputies Nei Maranhão and Ferreira Lima based their reference on *Boletins do Serviço* Nos. 980106J(JB., [July 4, 1962], 3), with regard to these violations.

<sup>51</sup>JB., June 20, 1962, 3. This information was based on Lóide's internal bulletins, *Boletins*, for the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th of June.

<sup>52</sup>JB., June 26, 1962, 8.

<sup>53</sup>JB., August 23, 1962, 10.

<sup>54</sup>See Appendix for the complete titles of these organizations.

<sup>55</sup>JB., May 9, 1963, 3.

<sup>56</sup>JB., July 14, 1963, 12; July 17, 1963, 4; Carlos Amaral, "As Controvertidas Nomeações de Interinos para a Previdência Social em 1963" (manuscript), (to be published shortly under the Fundação Getúlio Vargas' case study program in public administration), p. 17.

<sup>57</sup>JB., July 18, 1963, 4; Amaral, p. 16.

<sup>58</sup>JB., July 19, 1963, 3.

<sup>59</sup>JB., July 20, 1963, 9.

<sup>60</sup>JB., August 1, 1963, 10.

<sup>61</sup>JB., August 2, 1963, 3.

<sup>62</sup>JB., August 4, 1963, 3.

<sup>63</sup>JB., August 21, 1963, 5.

<sup>64</sup>JB., September 3, 1963, 4.

<sup>65</sup>JB., September 4, 1963, 8. The *cargos aislados* referred to here were generally located in the upper levels of the institute's personnel system.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE GAP BETWEEN NORMS AND REALITIES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Having traced the course of administrative and political development in Brazil, we are in a position now to consider what has been stated as the second independent variable in the central hypothesis: the use of norms governing administrative behavior exogenous to the socio-political system. Related to this independent variable are two dependent propositions: First, the gap between formal requirements of the merit system as adopted and the realities of current public personnel practices is to be explained to a considerable extent by the irrelevance of these exogenous concepts to the functioning of the bureaucratic system and, secondly, the imposition of these norms and principles upon traditional values has led to conflict within the administrative system as a whole. These propositions will be approached from three different perspectives: (1) the values involved; (2) the nature of technical assistance in public administration, and (3) the character of Brazilian political and administrative institutions. In the last case, attention will be focused on comparative analysis.

#### *Values and Administration*

Generally speaking, writers and commentators have treated problems of reform in the Brazilian federal civil

service according to a dichotomization between the traditional and the modern, corruption and reform, morality and immorality, "patrimonialism" and rationalized administrative practices. This dichotomy of thought is reflected throughout organization and personnel theory in which an effort has been made for the last thirty-five years to impose a value system essentially Weberian in character.<sup>1</sup> As was pointed out in Chapters III and IV, the major part of Brazilian administrative thought has passed through a series of stages paralleling North American administrative experience without ever having considered its socio-political understructure. While technical concepts for improving administrative economy and efficiency have been transferred in their entirety and adapted somewhat to previous Brazilian traditions and outlook in administration, the whole debate over the proper relationship between administration and politics in a democratic regime -- which emerged out of the civil service reform movement in the United States -- has been overlooked.

It is only relatively recently, since Brazilian administrative thought has entered a sociological phase, that attention has been devoted explicitly to the problem of values. In this case, the values inherent in "patrimonialism" (that is, the traditional order) have been contrasted with those of Weberian bureaucracy. Such an approach was

adopted by Emílio Willems in the field of sociology beginning in the 1940's; however, it is only now that Weber has entered into vogue in administrative circles that Willem's work on bureaucracy has been utilized. In the materials examined in organization and personnel theory it was mentioned that only three writers had really entered this phase -- although there were many others who were influenced by it and were adopting this approach. One factor reinforcing this interpretation has been the emphasis placed by many analysts of the Brazilian scene on the traditional role of the extended upper class family in Brazilian politics and the continued existence in many rural areas of the local political boss, the *coronel*. The syndrome of "patrimonialism" as a basic characteristic of Brazilian society has been extended to urban movements where the political leader who engages in a populist style of politics is seen as a modern-day inheritor of this tradition.

Undoubtedly the family has been a major institution in Brazilian society, and this condition has affected the nature of politics in that country considerably. Developments since 1945 have, however, reflected changes for the political and administrative system which makes it impossible to explain completely the problems of patronage in the civil service as a consequence of "patrimonialism" and the importance of personal

and kinship ties stemming from the *parentela*.<sup>2</sup> As Wagley has indicated, the existence of the *parentela* in the present period has been substantiated really only among the provincial upper — class in the Northeast through community studies by anthropologists. He states that kinship ties are probably less extensive in recently settled frontier areas and in the larger cities among the lower classes. The aspect of this which is of greatest interest here is the *parentela* pattern in the larger cities. Although community studies of large cities are lacking, Wagley indicates that it is probable that large, elite kinship groups still dominate Brazilian economics and exercise an importance in politics. But the other social classes in the major cities apparently do not share in practice this familial form. Yet, according to Wagley, the idea of the *parentela* continues to persist for all groups.<sup>3</sup> He accounts for this in the following manner:

The persistence of the widely extended *parentela* in Brazil must be considered as the reflection of deep-seated Luso-Brazilian values. . . . The traditional emphasis upon the *família* and the *parentela* provides a model for human relations that is an aspiration for even those segments of the society that cannot live in this way. The predominance of kinship in ordering social life explains the relative absence in Brazil of such voluntary associations as parent-teacher groups, garden clubs, civic clubs, and the like. People give greater value to kinship relations than to relations based upon common interest or even occupation.<sup>4</sup>

This value placed on family relationships is an important element in the dominant value system existing in Brazilian society. In Chapter V, the elements in this syndrome of values were spelled out as specifically as possible and linked to the persistence of a conservative tradition in the course of Brazilian political development. The continuation of the value placed on kinship ties -- originally in the context of the patriarchal family and today transformed into the *parentela* -- alludes to the vitality of this tradition and its adaptation to the social, economic, and political changes which the country has been undergoing.

At the same time, the dominant value system has been subjected to pressures brought to bear by competing value systems in Brazilian society that vary because of community differences, regionalism, and a sharply defined system of social classes. Prior to 1920 these value systems were relatively isolated from one another and their congruency with the dominant value system was not questioned. During the 1920's and the early 1930's, under the impact of socio-economic change, these interlocking and mutually exclusive relationships began to break down. With the inauguration of the dictatorship, however, potential conflict was limited and competing political groups were kept isolated from one another. But with the return to an "open" political system in 1945 and in the face of the

movement toward national integration and pressures arising from urbanization and industrialization, diverse value systems, previously insulated from one another, were brought into close contact. Potentially, the most explosive situation arose from the contact between traditional, upper-class political actors, with elitist and attainment-oriented desires<sup>5</sup> and recently-arrived, working-class or upward-mobile political actors, with egalitarian and achievement-oriented aspirations. Certainly, the aspirations of those belonging to the urban working class were often utilized by individuals outside the industrial labor force for more immediate political gains, but this should not obscure the existence of goals and values quite at variance with the existing political and social order and the presence of political actors committed to these goals and values.

While this represents an obvious over-simplification of a complex situation, my purpose here is to emphasize the importance of values as a variable for political and administrative analysis. The way in which any set of values is introduced into a nation's experience has a great deal to do with the degree of congruity or incongruity between formal political and administrative institutions and human behavior.<sup>6</sup>

The fact that Brazil made the transition from colony to nationhood by maintaining on the throne a member of the

House of Bragança as a symbol of political legitimacy and without altering substantially the traditionalist, aristocratic values inherited from Portugal had much to do with its ability to resist the internal conflicts and separatist movements that threatened to destroy the new nation. The political and administrative institutions of the Empire were thoroughly congruent with the dominant value system and with the objective of achieving societal integration among the nation's elite groups. This same elitist orientation continued with the establishment of a federal republic, for the egalitarian potential inherent in the model adopted from the United States was related to the needs of Brazilian society in no way; it simply provided a convenient framework within which each regional elite could operate fairly independently. It was only after 1945 that the values on which political democracy has been predicated were expanded to the social and economic realm and that a politically-aware mass group -- urban labor -- appeared to exploit this potential. In the meantime, a third set of values had been introduced in the administrative reform program adopted during the late 1930's. These values were essentially Weberian in origin, but with the emphasis on technical efficiency and economy and the premise that administration and politics could and should be separated, there was no particular problem in incor-

porating this system. With the return to an "open" political system in 1945, the conflict potential in these administrative techniques and principles first became apparent, for they were at variance not only with traditional elitist values but with egalitarian ones as well. Thus, the dominant value system, aristocratic and traditionalist in character, was challenged by the egalitarian aspirations of urban labor; the democratic possibilities inherent in the political "formulas" of republican government were first exploited; and the rationalistic basis of the nation's new administrative "code" was made more formalistic than ever.<sup>7</sup>

#### Technical Assistance

Until now, very little has been said about technical assistance programs in public administration. This is because, for the most part, they have been extraneous to the administrative and political developments dealt with in preceding chapters and because they have been built on the theoretical foundations established by Brazilians themselves in the field of public administration during the late 1930's and the early 1940's. Granted the fact that technical assistance programs sponsored by the United Nations and the United States have contributed to perfecting the techniques used in public administration, they still have not had any effect on changing the nature of the administrative system

and making it more efficient, economical, and rational. Yet, these were the very objectives and goals the public administration programs hoped to help make operational and the *raison d'être* for their creation and for the funds allocated for their undertakings. This situation is not exactly unrelated to experience along such lines elsewhere in what is usually termed the "underdeveloped world."

In evaluating experience with technical assistance in the public administration field, Edward Weidner has singled out three basic approaches to the administering of aid which offer additional insight into the way the problems of Brazillian administration have been handled. The first approach consists of those who maintain that really very little can be transferred in the way of administrative know-how to other countries because of the tremendous divergence in conditions. A second approach has been that adopted by those administrators who would reduce the very differences that the first group points to. Their goal has been to export to underdeveloped countries as many modern administrative processes and practices as possible. Within this framework, Weidner distinguishes three subgroups. One of these is committed to the initiation of administrative change through the use of the principles of administration. Another stresses techniques, while the other emphasizes the universal nature of the management process. Weidner includes within

this latter subgroup the United Nations, the University of Pittsburgh, and the University of Southern California.<sup>8</sup> The third approach, he says,

. . . rejects both the do-nothingness of the first . . . and the minimizing of cultural differences of the principalists, technicians, and universalists. . . . It seeks a rich variety of institutions, practices, and values in the modern world and urges that a country work toward its own distinctive ends in its own distinctive ways. The purpose of technical assistance is not to transfer specific theories, techniques, practices or processes, but to explore with host country personnel their own situations and problems and to develop their own distinctive solutions and courses of action. Visitor and host should examine together the history and situation of their countries to see if the experience of the more developed suggests lines of inquiry or directions for innovation in administration for the one that is less developed. In general, this school holds that points of stimulus are likely to involve approaches to learning rather than skills, motivations and attitudes rather than detailed content; ideas rather than gadgets.<sup>9</sup>

By and large, Brazilian experience in public administration has been confined to Weidner's second approach to technical assistance -- with a heavy emphasis on the techniques and principles of administration. Virtually no attention has been given to the analysis in depth of the existing system. Rather, European, North American, and Brazilian participants in the various public administration programs have proceeded to devote a great deal of time and energy to the teaching or learning of administrative methods and to their application to administrative situations. However, while they have made a considerable contribution to the perfection of

the formal system, they have achieved very little when it comes to real change in administrative practices.

This emphasis on technical public administration may be observed by examining briefly Brazilian experience with United States assistance. While the United Nations was also involved in the early 1950's in a public administration program, its aid was channeled entirely through the newly created Brazilian School of Public Administration. As such, it provided for the service of experts in the field of public administration, the granting of fellowships for study abroad, and, to some extent, the provision of equipment.<sup>10</sup>

On December 19, 1950, the United States and Brazil signed their first bilateral agreement under the Point Four program. The section dealing with public administration provided that technical assistance was to be offered in personnel administration, budgetary and financial administration, and organization and methods. This aspect of the agreement became effective in May and July, 1952, when two public administration advisors arrived under the auspices of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. This was followed by the organization of a Brazilian board of advisors on public administration, consisting of eleven prominent Brazilians interested in administrative improvement who were not to be influenced by "political considerations." By November, they

developed a program in public administration calling for the training of 646 Brazilian officials in sixteen different fields of public administration over the next three years. Basic training was to occur in Brazil and and these officials were to be sent abroad only in the cases in which proper training facilities were lacking.<sup>11</sup> The three-year projected results of this program are contained in Table X.

Eleven projects for administrative improvement were planned by the board, and by mid-1953, eight were underway. Six of the projects were defined as follows: (1) a survey of the federal personnel system in preparation for a new classification plan for the civil service; (2) a survey of the public personnel system in the state of São Paulo; (3) a survey of the public personnel system in the city of São Paulo, with the objective of developing modern testing procedures and training programs for municipal employees; (4) a survey of governmental agencies operating in the Northeast to help provide a coordinated plan for dealing with the drought area; (5) the organization of a department of public administration at the University of Minas Gerais, and (6) a survey of the medical assistance service offered by the Institute of Retirement and Pensions for Commercial Employees (IAPC) for the purpose of reorganization.<sup>12</sup>

In 1956, the United States signed a contract (PBAD Personnel-Project 512-72-016) with DASP for further im-

TABLE X

PROPOSED THREE-YEAR PROGRAM FOR THE TRAINING OF  
BRAZILIANS IN TECHNICAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION<sup>a</sup>

Public Administration Activity	Place of Training		
	Brazil	Abroad	Total
Municipal Administration -			
General	50	10	60
Financial Administration	50	20	70
Personnel Administration	90	15	105
Budget Administration	100	20	120
Organization and Methods	90	10	100
Public Relations	25	5	30
Supply Administration	20	10	30
Police Administration	---	15	15
Hospital Administration	---	9	9
Traffic Administration	---	6	6
Postal Service Administration	---	6	6
Governmental Accounting	20	10	30
Supervision	10	6	16
Indian Administration	---	3	3
Training Technicians	---	6	6
Public Administration -			
General	25	15	40
	---	---	---
TOTAL	480	166	646

<sup>a</sup>*Progress in Public Administration*, II (November, 1953), 2-3.

provement in administrative practices through the use of American technical specialists and through additional training of Brazilians in technical administration. Over a seven-year period beginning in June, 1956, and ending October, 1962, fifteen Americans were brought in for purposes of technical assistance in financial management, personnel administration, and organization and methods. Besides a chief and two deputy chiefs, this involved one program analyst, one specialist in budgeting, one in accounting, two personnel generalists, two in-service training experts, two technicians in position classification, and three in organization and methods.<sup>13</sup>

This program ran into difficulties from the beginning. Perhaps more than anything else it was due to the fact that it was based on DASP and by that time that organization no longer exercised the effective powers of an organ of general administration. Siegel, in his dissertation, has referred to the difficulties of this contract in organization and methods. The men assigned to DASP were rejected outright and were excluded from assisting directly in the ministries and other agencies of the federal government. Under the agreement, DASP was to direct and control these activities, but it lacked the real power to see that any changes were executed.<sup>14</sup>

Then, in May, 1959, the University of Southern California, participating directly in a six-year contract negotiated between the United States and Brazilian governments in public and business administration, undertook the training of professors in public administration at the Los Angeles campus and the setting up of missions at the Brazilian School of Public Administration in Rio de Janeiro (this was the main office), the School of Administration at the University of Bahia, and the Institute of Administration in the Faculty of Economic Sciences at the University of Rio Grande do Sul. In the period extending from 1960 through 1964, forty-five Brazilians were trained in public administration at the University of Southern California. No other universities in the United States were included in the program.<sup>15</sup>

Thus, as of July, 1965, when the University of Southern California's contract had expired, one could look back over experience in this area since the early 1950's and see a certain degree of continuity in the separate programs carried out in the area of technical assistance in public administration. These programs had made a valuable contribution in stimulating the further development of administrative techniques and practices which paralleled those to be found in the United States and Western Europe. Certainly, a shortage of administrative specialists still existed, but

the situation was no longer the same as it was in 1936 when the need for a detailed classification plan was recognized and yet there was not the trained personnel corps available to draw one up. Yet, the problem for North Americans and Brazilians was that in spite of the time, effort, and resources spent in the last two decades, the administrative system continued to function in much the same way.

In explaining this failure to achieve economy and efficiency in administration and to establish what was considered the necessary correlate, a neutral and impartial civil service, selected on the basis of merit, the whole matter of values examined briefly at the beginning of the chapter enters in. Joined with this are the broader patterns of administrative and political development examined in earlier chapters. The technicians, the principalists, and the universalists in Brazilian administration have worked from a value basis essentially Weberian in character and functional only where the necessary economic, social, and political underpinnings that belong to modernized systems already exist. Since Brazil has already entered the take-off stage of economic growth, if we use Rostow's terminology, and social relations have undergone and are undergoing alteration, it is important that we turn to a comparative examination of political and administrative institutions to understand why it is the po-

litical understructure which has been the major obstacle to further development along economic and administrative lines.

#### A Comparative Perspective on the Brazilian Civil Service

One of the basic reasons why American-style public personnel policies have remained formalistic and have failed to establish a neutral and impartial civil service conducive to the goals of economy, efficiency, and rationality in administration is that Brazilian political and administrative institutions in the post-1945 era have fulfilled a predominately integrative role.<sup>16</sup> A second reason is that simultaneously these institutions have had to develop a welfare or distributive capacity. On the one hand, they have had to face pressures from urban labor for better working conditions and more effective social welfare programs; on the other, they have had to meet the demands of the business community for greater economy and efficiency in administrative procedure and for stability in the political system at large. The problem has been that none of these demands has been met adequately for the whole society. Finally, because of the commitment to representative political institutions, the system has had to deal with an increase in political participation by the urban masses.<sup>17</sup>

This brings us back to the problems of administrative and political development. Bert Hoselitz has developed a model for the analysis of bureaucratic development which may be related to Diamant's view of political development stated in the initial chapter and used in Chapters II, V, and VI. To recapitulate, Diamant conceives of political development as a multi-normative process in which the success or failure of a system depends on its ability to deal with a variety of demands and goals; as a continuing process it can move forward, stop, or be reversed.

Hoselitz takes Talcott Parsons' classification of socially relevant actions into four groups -- the latency sector, the integrative sector, the goal-gratification sector, and the adaptive sector -- and uses them to analyze bureaucracy as a social system, first, in terms of their function as systems and, secondly, in relation to a bureaucracy's time span. The aspect of his essay most related to the topic of this chapter is his treatment of the integrative and adaptive capacities of a bureaucratic system. In dealing with the integrative function, he points to the importance of the general norms prevailing in a society. He postulates that:

. . . in societies with strongly held ascriptive norms in the distribution of occupational roles, i.e., in societies in which status considerations predominate in determining who gets what jobs,

procedures of recruitment into the bureaucracy will also exhibit a strong admixture of ascription. . . . Hence, it should not surprise us if we find that such behavior as the appointment of relatives to official posts, succession to a bureaucratic office by a family member of the holder, and similar aspects of recruitment along ascriptive lines which are often encountered in societies at the threshold of political modernization, are merely a transference of generally valid norms regulating social action designed to meet the integrative needs of the society as a whole to a peculiar institution in this society.<sup>18</sup>

Once a rationalized system of recruitment with an emphasis on achievement rather than ascriptive criteria is imposed on a bureaucratic system in such a society, double standards and conflict develop within the bureaucracy. In addition, "it creates conflict between the bureaucracy and other institutions, since there is a danger that alternative standards -- i.e., integrative patterns -- may be applied."

Finally, it creates conflict within the individuals who man the administrative apparatus, since the latent values governing action in the society as a whole may not apply to certain institutions in it, and antagonism may develop between the basic values of social life as a whole and those applying to a particular institution in the society. . . . These factors may lead to a fractionalization of the bureaucracy, i.e., the dual economy which is so often stipulated by some observers as necessary in modernizing countries may have its counterpart in a dual bureaucracy.<sup>19</sup>

Dual bureaucracy is also related to a modernizing country's adaptive capacity, since a rationalized, achievement-oriented bureaucracy may well be developed in the

capital and a few other large urban centers, while in the rest of the country officials conform to these principles externally and continue in fact to follow a set of norms which emphasize patrimonial and prebendary objectives.<sup>20</sup>

Another way of viewing the difficulties involved in administrative development is to introduce the element of time. On this basis Hoselitz hypothesizes that a society passes through several phases in the process of modernization. In this process, a society

. . . is confronted as a major functional requisite [first] with problems of solidarity or integration, then with those of a systemic goal attainment, and finally with those of adaptation.<sup>21</sup>

He further postulates that as a system becomes more concerned with the goal-gratification sector (out of which a greater degree of structural differentiation arises), it tends to destroy the primacy of the integrative subsystem.<sup>22</sup>

If we apply this model to Brazil and relate it to Diamant's concepts, the Brazilian civil service may be viewed as existing in a society in which the integrative functions still predominate. As was indicated at the beginning of this chapter, the dominant value system contains ascriptive elements, While this value system has undergone modification and has been subjected to pressures since 1945 which make it no longer functional in many sectors of Brazilian society, prior to 1930 civil service

recruitment was carried out primarily according to ascriptive standards, based on this dominant value system. Where Hoselitz's observations are most applicable, then, in this aspect, is to Brazilian administrative experience prior to the Vargas dictatorship. During the *Estado Novo*, an effort was made to create a rationalized system of recruitment based on achievement criteria. The consequence of this effort was a situation which corresponds to Hoselitz's concept of dual bureaucracy, not only between the major urban centers and the outlying areas, but also within the ministries and between the ministries and DASP. But, during those years, the conflict inherent in this situation did not materialize. Once the dictatorship had ended and attention had shifted to the building of a representative political system, integrative patterns of recruitment reasserted themselves.

There is, however, one refinement which must be introduced. Formally during the Vargas dictatorship recruitment for the federal civil service was made on the basis of achievement criteria, yet in practice what occurred was that selection was made on the basis of what Riggs calls "attainment."<sup>23</sup> Achievement-oriented criteria introduced into a highly stratified society where the benefits of that society were substantially confined to the upper classes limited admission to the civil service to those of upper class background.

For Hoselitz's concept of integration to be useful in the analysis of Brazilian experience, it must be expanded to account for patronage along lines other than ascriptive criteria. In using the concept of integration, Hoselitz turns to the patterns of bureaucratic and political development in continental Europe, especially in France, and then suggests that the same developmental sequence is occurring in Asia and Africa. The problem with examining the course of bureaucratic development in the major European countries is that their experience in moving away from an integrative phase was confined to administrative change within the context of conservatively-oriented political systems where political participation was limited. In France, national integration and the creation of a centralized independent bureaucracy preceded the Revolution of 1789. In contrast, in Brazil, the problems of political and administrative integration have continued on into an era in which mass-based politics have begun to develop.

To understand these interrelationships properly, it is necessary to consider the timing of the movement to change the recruitment patterns of the civil service from ascriptive to achievement-oriented criteria. It also makes a great deal of difference whether patronage meets integrative functions within an aristocratic or democratic framework -- within the context of a liberal or conservative

national tradition. The importance of these variables -- patronage and the timing of changes in the recruitment pattern -- can be demonstrated by briefly comparing the experience of three countries: England, the United States, and Brazil.

The term "patronage," however, requires some clarification before proceeding further. Its use is to be found in two contexts: the distribution of positions in the public service according to personal and kinship ties and distribution according to party service. In Portuguese the term usually employed is *pistolão*.<sup>24</sup> For example, when Wahrlich refers to patronage and the spoils system in American experience, she uses the term *pistolão*, as the equivalent.<sup>25</sup> Another term sometimes used is *patronagem*, as in the case of patronage parties -- *partidos de patronagem*.<sup>26</sup> In either case, however, the focus of the expression in Portuguese is on the individual who uses his prestige and influence on behalf of someone seeking a job, appointment, or promotion. It is usually interpreted as a part of the syndrome of "patrimonialism." Strictly speaking, the term is not the equivalent of the spoils system as generally understood in American politics. Furthermore, the association of patronage with political party organization and rotation in office has not existed in Brazilian experience until recently and only then in conjunction with

traditional patronage practices.

Paul Van Riper, in his history of the United States' civil service, has introduced some clarification in the concept of patronage which is useful here:

Before the nineteenth century most civil servants were chosen upon what have been called, not always too appropriately, political grounds. That is, most public appointments were made on the basis of partisanship, influence, wealth, family, personal loyalty, blackmail, or charity, rather than intelligence or competence to do the work. This is the system of patronage as opposed to the merit system. It should not be inferred, however, that the latter, because of the implications of the word "merit," is necessarily more efficient than the former. . . . A patronage system, though it usually tends in that direction, is not necessarily a spoils system, a term reserved for the more personal and partisan varieties of patronage politics. Conversely, as evidenced in nineteenth century China the merits recognized by a merit system may not be geared to the needs of the state.<sup>27</sup>

A further distinction which ought to be introduced is the use of patronage by the political machine in American politics. In this connection, James Wilson has added a definition which offers further refinement of the concept:

A "machine" is defined as that kind of political party which sustains its members through the distribution of material incentives (patronage) rather than non-material incentives (appeals to principle, the fun of the game, sociability, etc.). "Patronage" is customarily used to refer to all forms of material benefits which politicians may distribute to party workers and supporters. Here it will be used to refer (generally) to the fund out of which the patronage jobs and favors are provided and (specifically) to the jobs and favors themselves. "Patronage jobs" are all those posts, distributed at the discretion of political leaders, the pay for which is greater

than the value of the public service performed. This "unearned increment" permits the machine to require that the holder perform party services as well.<sup>28</sup>

Discussing the aristocratic character of patronage in Great Britain before the completion of civil service reforms in the years between 1854 and 1870, J. D. Kingsley has emphasized its function as a part of the upper class monopoly on politics, stemming from the Settlement of 1688 -- until this monopoly was challenged by the rising commercial upper-middle class. This patronage system served two functions: a charitable one, in that it provided jobs for indigent members of the aristocracy, and a political one, in that it provided a recognized means of securing and maintaining parliamentary seats. Initially, this first function was more significant, but as years passed, political organization became more important and patronage came to be used more according to political expediency than according to family fortunes and personal friendships.<sup>29</sup>

According to Finer, political patronage at this time was utilized for two purposes: (1) to get individual members of Parliament to support a particular measure brought forward by the administration and (2) to prepare the way for an electoral victory. This system provided a certain amount of stability, for there was no rotation in office.

Finer notes that until about 1804, Great Britain was governed by either one-party government, no-party government, or ministerial government; alternation between parties developed only after 1832.<sup>30</sup> What made this system function was the fact that a small electorate was involved. At the close of the eighteenth century, observes Finer, the electorate was between 200,000 and 250,000. Thus,

. . . throughout the century . . . the rare individuals who had a right to vote were given preference in appointment to the public service and as public officials they were expected to cast their vote as their administrative chiefs directed.<sup>31</sup>

In contrast, in the United States the patronage system developed to meet democratic, not aristocratic, pressures. While stability, continuity, and relative efficiency were characteristic of the federal civil service in the period between 1789 and 1829, it was essentially an administration of gentlemen. Granted there was a substantial difference between the Federalists and the Jeffersonian Republicans, still both were committed to the concept of a permanent public service removed from the control of patronage. Yet at the state level trends developed which were to be repeated at the national level with the election of Jackson in 1828. As Carl R. Fish has indicated, the genesis of the spoils system in the United States is to be found in the states in the years between 1775 and 1828. By 1828, every state in the North and West was faced with

an established spoils system or with an element desirous of instituting it.<sup>32</sup> This element was absent in the South, for what still existed there was a government controlled by the upper classes, in which there were both leaders and followers, but no party organization. This gradual extension of party patronage went hand in hand with growing acceptance of democratic doctrine after 1801, for one of the elements inherent in this doctrine was the idea of rotation in office and fixed terms of office.<sup>33</sup> "Rotation was imposed," maintains L. D. White, "because it was demanded from below, not merely because it was advocated from above."<sup>34</sup> What gradually emerged was a new type of office seeker replacing the gentleman, first in New York and Pennsylvania and then at the national level with Jackson, who incorporated into the national administration men from the West.<sup>35</sup> Both White and Fish emphasize the fact that the emergence of patronage in American experience is simultaneous with a rapid expansion of the ideas of democracy, with a growth of the electorate, and with the development of mass-based party organizations founded on winning elections.

The most important influence on the administrative system during the years from Jackson to Lincoln was the wide enfranchisement of adult male citizens and their organization into a national party system, accompanied by a surge of democratic sentiment that fanned an already active desire for office. . . .

National party organization was hardly known before the 1830's, although both Federalist and Republican parties existed and strong party organizations became well established in some states, notably New York. The origin of the national party structure began with the end of the congressional caucus in 1824.<sup>36</sup>

When the experience of Great Britain with patronage is juxtaposed with that of the United States, the mixed character of patronage in Brazil becomes clearer. In the period prior to 1930 what existed was a pattern of patronage that paralleled British experience in broad terms. Both countries maintained what were essentially caste bureaucracies where there was a close connection between administration and politics and where government was dominated by the upper classes. In light of this experience, Jaguaribe's concept of the Cartorial State contains aspects of both the general and the specific. It defines a situation peculiar to Brazilian experience which is at the same time made more meaningful by considering the experience of a country such as Great Britain.

Likewise, when the experience of the United States is considered, the limitations of this model for explaining patronage patterns in post-1945 Brazil become obvious. To date, political and administrative studies of Brazil -- especially those of its political parties -- have missed the connection between patronage and the development of faltering, but nevertheless *national*, party organizations

which have attempted to come to terms with the emergence of a mass electorate and to guide it in such a way that elections can be won. Similarly, egalitarian aspirations by large numbers of citizens have been voiced; this phenomenon also has certain parallels with American experience in the 1830's. It is different in that the transition was not gradual with the development of patronage patterns in the states which broke with previous party dependency on local notables. Clearly that was impossible under the Vargas dictatorship. Furthermore, the social classes expressing these desires were radically different. In America, they were primarily an independent yeomanry, while in Brazil they consisted of politically conscious members of the urban working classes. But in both countries, mass-based national party organization began with the organization of machine politics and with the problem of properly controlling the state and local branches of the party to win elections. There is a similarity in the use of party patronage by political bosses in both countries.

It is in this connection that the whole timing of the movement to reform the federal civil service and to impose notions of economy and efficiency become crucial. Again this point can be best understood by comparing briefly the experience of Great Britain and the United States with that of Brazil.

In Great Britain the demands for civil service reform coincided with the rise to power of a commercially-oriented upper middle class which demanded an economic and efficient civil service to better carry on its activities. Preceding these reforms in the civil service was a reform of the political system centering around the Reform Bill of 1832, an expansion of the electorate, and the institution of a competing two-party system beginning around 1804. Economically, Great Britain had already entered the take-off stage in development and by 1850 had reached technological maturity. The era of administrative reform followed these developments and extended from 1853, with the reform of the Indian Civil Service, and 1854, with the Northcote-Trevelyan report, to the Order in Council of June 4, 1870 -- an order which marked a turning point in the functioning of the civil service. From that time forth to the rise of the first Labor government to power in 1924, what existed was a harmony of outlook between the permanent officials and the new governing class in which participants agreed on the value of a neutral civil service.<sup>37</sup>

In the United States the movement for civil service reform also began after significant political and economic alterations had taken place -- during what White calls the Republican Era (1869-1901). Yet a functioning merit system really first achieved its success in the following thirty

years, only to run into difficulties during the Depression and the organization of the New Deal programs; then it moved forward again in the 1940's and 1950's. This is to be related to an economy which entered the take-off stage between 1843 and 1860 and achieved maturity in 1900. In terms of politics, the expansion of the electorate, the growing acceptance of democratic doctrine, the formation of national party organizations, and the establishment of an open, representative federal bureaucracy all preceded the reform movement in administration. Furthermore, civil service reform was couched in terms of morality, not in terms of economy and efficiency until relatively late. It was into a political structure where the problems of participation had already been substantially dealt with that first economic and then administrative development was channeled.

In contrast, in Brazil several patterns of development have all converged at once. The civil service was reformed according to the concepts of economy and efficiency during the Vargas dictatorship. This was the era when the pre-conditions for economic take-off were established. The take-off phase in economic development really did not begin until 1951 with the return of Vargas to power. At the same time institutional instability remained endemic to the political system; there was the need to deal simultaneously (1) with a rapid expansion of the electorate, (2) with the development of national party organizations

(within the context of a new multiparty system following after eight years of a no-party system), (3) with the rise of aggressive labor movement, and (4) with the egalitarian potential of the representative political institutions adopted.

It is probable that, until the participation and distribution problems are resolved in Brazilian politics, institutional instability will remain a characteristic of the political system with unavoidable effects on the nation's federal civil service. Whether those who now exercise a monopoly on political power opt for an "open" or "closed" system to solve this dilemma is another matter.

The political understructure of the country, then, is a fundamental factor in the success or failure of any movement to institutionalize rationalized recruitment methods for its civil service. The technicians, the principalists, and the universalists in American public administration have failed to draw attention to the fact that our administrative system rests on a particular political foundation which is characterized by a competitive two-party system over a lengthy time span and an economic system that has expanded in opportunities for the educated.

This highly competitive two-party system, while resting upon certain values with respect to democracy in the United States, also, in turn, shapes democratic values. Unquestionably, the nature of that competition

and the closeness of it to many states as well as in our national elections, coupled with the continuity of our parties and their progress and competition for people from the economy makes the demand for a merit system wholly rational and *functional* in our context.

In contrast, in traditional and/or transitional societies and nations, where real political competition is either nonexistent or sporadic at best, there is no political understructure for a merit system. Or, for that matter, for any other aspects of public administration as we know the administrative system in the United States. An administrative system, with its bureaucracy becomes in the traditionalist and/or traditional society a prime instrumentality for exercising dictatorial power and also for maintaining a party in power and heading off the possibility of political opposition parties developing.<sup>38</sup>

While exceptions to the above statement can be found in the Brazilian milieu, it can be applied meaningfully to that nation's experience. First of all, it should be obvious by now that Brazil's political understructure has not been able to support a functioning merit system. During the *Estado Novo*, in the absence of political competition the bureaucracy functioned as a prime instrumentality for exercising dictatorial power and for maintaining the Vargas government's political order for eight years. The fact that it failed to head off the possibility of opposition parties developing was simply a consequence of the deterioration of the Vargas government's power basis. Regardless of the desirability of economy and efficiency in administration, the Vargas-initiated administrative reforms served the needs of a dictatorial state. With the re-emergence of representative political institution in 1946 it should surprise no one that the administrative system should come under assault

from political groups outside that bureaucratic structure, particularly when it attempted to retain its closed character by continuing to restrict entry to the career civil service to initial positions. Throughout this period, the goal of a closed, European-style civil service remained constant among civil service reformers.

It is even more important in the Brazilian context to be aware of the political understructure because of the nature of the model followed. The political institutions adopted in the Constitution of 1946 followed an American model. This factor, joined with administrative reform begun around 1937 based on American administrative techniques, has meant that some of the problems inherent in the American system have been transferred to Brazil. Granted that the two social orders and their dominant value systems are quite different, there still are some parallels with American experience which provide an additional insight into the problems of Brazilian administrative reform.

Paul Van Riper has contrasted the political understructure of the American civil service with that of Great Britain and most continental European countries in these terms: whereas in the latter case the civil service developed under unitary, parliamentary governments, in the United States it has developed from a constitutional system based on federalism and the separation of powers. To this

condition he adds the fact that American political parties have not been integrated and centralized. Under our system, he says, state and local politicians not only have possessed a substantial amount of independence but have also tended to try to control those parts of the federal government which have had a direct influence on their own constituencies. He points to the fact that the division of power between the federal government and the states has worked against the formation of strong party organization and that under such a set of circumstances, traditionally, patronage and spoils have been relied on more to maintain party unity than principles and policies.<sup>39</sup>

Van Riper argues that public personnel problems are central to the problems of power in the American system.

Under our Constitution, the value of the patronage to a Chief Executive who wished to obtain legislative approval of his political program can hardly be overestimated. We know that the Presidents, without exception, have deliberately used the patronage for political purposes. Actually, the executive authority to appoint and remove public officials is one of the few constitutional influences making for governmental decisions in terms of national rather than local interests. It could be argued, with considerable justification, that the value and use of patronage as a consolidating influence has up to now far outweighed the damage caused by the appointment of technically incompetent persons. Certainly, if our past is any indication, we may expect a continuation of our legislative-executive antagonisms, so often reflected in manipulations of the public service.

It is our constitutional situation which has hindered and probably will continue to impede the develop-

ment of a full career service in governmental work.<sup>40</sup>

At the same time, the use of patronage in our political system must be considered over a lengthy time span. When the development of our parties and political institutions is considered on this basis, there is an obvious contrast between patronage patterns in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

To summarize this course of political development all too briefly, political patronage, as an integrating factor within the development of party organizations based on an expanding electorate, first began at the state level roughly in the two decades preceding the election of 1828; with Jackson's assumption of power in 1829, these practices passed on to the national level. The use of patronage as a politically integrating force continued to rise constantly until 1861 and then levelled off, not with Lincoln's first term of office, but with his second. Then, from 1865 until about 1883, the political use of appointments in the federal civil service rose again before beginning to level off a second time.

By 1901, the concept of a merit system had taken hold -- only to suffer a minor setback with Woodrow Wilson's first administration. This was followed by a rapid expansion of the merit system until it reached a high point under the Hoover administration, only to receive another setback

with the Depression and the inauguration of the New Deal program. Once the social change initiated by the New Deal had achieved a firm foundation, it was possible to expand the coverage of the merit system to new heights so that by the time there was another shift in political power -- with Eisenhower's government -- there were very few positions left in the federal civil service which could be used for patronage purposes.

Thus, stability in the civil service seems to show a correlation with stability in our party system and expansion of our economic system. Also, the greater percentage of jobs filled on a patronage basis during the nineteenth century and its gradual decline in the twentieth is to be related to the maturation of the American political-economic system. The major problems facing our political and administrative institutions throughout the nineteenth century were integrative: prior to the Civil War they were primarily regional in character; after the Civil War they were primarily ethnic as the wave of immigration to the United States rose and its character changed drastically. In integrating newly arrived immigrants and their successive generations into the American political system, political machines and their dispensing of patronage served a real need in our major urban centers. Likewise, in impoverished rural areas with a relatively high illiteracy rate, political patronage con-

tinued to supply jobs to the party faithful. Furthermore, even today, although political patronage has passed from the national scene, it continues to function in many areas of our country at the state, county, and local levels of government. At these levels, the problem of patronage still exists, for as Eldersveld had indicated in a recent study of political parties in the Detroit area, the problem remains of how to deal with the "personal-reward motivated person at the grass roots with whom the district chairman perceived they had to contend."

. . . There was a clear-cut indication in both parties that the congressional district elite felt more people could be attracted to party work, and turnover in the precincts diminished, if party work was less altruistic and volunteer. The district chairmen were willing to admit that many people entered party work "to improve their own lot," socially or economically, and that it was difficult to satisfy these workers without more political largess to distribute.<sup>41</sup>

In this connection, one wonders what the effect of the civil rights revolution will be on both the political and administrative systems of our country as the anti-poverty program really gets rolling and bypasses the established structure of local government to create new jobs pulling in the poor. Our pressures for public employment through channels other than those provided by the merit system are by no means over. In short, the impact of ethnic integration on our political and administrative institutions,

which was so great after the Civil War, has by no means ended. In this context it will be interesting to see how those public administrators committed to merit system practices and to the democratic ethos of our society will react.

Already sharp conflict has emerged in many of our communities, both large and small, in connection with the Community Action Committees and their programs over who gets appointed. The Federal government in the Economic Opportunities Act of 1964 has required that the poor must be represented through representation of their neighborhood organizations. The Negroes, especially CORE and the NAACP, have capitalized on this. Also, Adam Clayton Powell has gotten into the act and in the case of HAR-YOU, an organization created to help Harlem youth, he has complicated matters because he wants to name the people and run the program. Elsewhere, the NAACP wants to name the people and run the poverty program at the local level. Also, of course, they demand the right to pick people for jobs under the program as well as committee positions. This is a new group that has been alienated that is trying to enter the politico-socio-economic process and regards a program and jobs in it as no small part of their key to success.<sup>42</sup>

None of the foregoing, however, should be construed to mean that Brazilian experience should or could parallel these developments exactly, but what comparative analysis

does show is that Brazilian political and administrative difficulties are neither entirely unique nor peculiarly characteristic of the non-Western world. The basic political and administrative problems facing Brazil are integrative in character and it is within this context that participation and distribution capacities must be developed. As has been demonstrated throughout the preceding chapters, Brazil has met its problems of administrative and political development within the context of a mixed system. The political culture of the country is increasingly drawing near to the model of a fragmented political culture, along the lines set by Almond for for the analysis of the major continental European systems. Institutionally the political system has followed an American model during the First and Second Republics. Administratively, the country has mixed the goal of a closed bureaucratic system, along European lines, with administrative techniques developed to meet American administrative needs as that system matured. Its political parties approach the multiparty system as developed in Weimar Germany, France, and Italy, yet organizationally the major parties have much in common with the problems faced by American parties throughout the nineteenth century, particularly in the era preceding the Civil War. This is to be found by examining patronage patterns in the two countries, yet even this analysis has shown a mixture of aristocratic and democratic patterns which

clearly goes beyond American experience. Finally, if we follow Lipset's analysis, the dominant value system is of a character that is closer -- within the context of Anglo-American countries -- to that of Canada and Great Britain, than to that of the United States. The problems facing Brazilian government and administration have become even more complex due to the convergence of conflicting demands and pressures on the total system.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>A list of Weberian values is set forth in Footnote 26, Chapter IV.

<sup>2</sup>As defined by Charles Wagley, the *parentela* includes all relatives along maternal and paternal lines whom an individual recognizes as kinsmen. It also includes one's affinals as well as the *compadres* (intimate friends based usually on godparent relationships). Wagley points out that ". . . while the patriarchal family type of the agrarian past may have disappeared, a larger network of relatives which I shall call the *parentela*, has persisted with modified but important functions in Brazilian social, economic, and even political life" (Charles Wagley, "Luso-Brazilian Kinship Patterns: The Persistence of a Cultural Tradition," in Joseph Maier and Richard W. Weatherhead (eds.), *Politics and Change in Latin America* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 175).

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 186-187.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 188.

<sup>5</sup>The term "attainment" is based on the work of Riggs. He postulates that elite recruitment in all societies may be evaluated on the basis of "a scale extending from ascription to achievement, with 'attainment' as an intermediate category" (Fred W. Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964), p. 129). In traditional societies

approaching the fused model he infers that elites tend to be recruited by ascriptive criteria, while in more advanced societies approaching the diffracted model, achievement functions as the major criterion. He singles out as ascriptive criteria such elements as one's "birth, sex, age, and generation, family or clan membership. . ." (p. 126). In contrast, achievement criteria involve admission to elite status on the basis of universalistic tests of ability in such matters as learning, industry, communications, and organizational skills. At the same time, he points out that such a state of affairs does not exist entirely in any contemporary society, although many may approximate it (p. 126). The idea of "attainment" applies to criteria which combine ascribed and achieved criteria of recruitment (p. 128).

<sup>6</sup>This importance of values in analyzing and comparing social systems has been stressed by Lipset. See Seymour Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation, The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective* (New York: Basic Books, 1963), pp. 4, 210.

<sup>7</sup>These terms "value system," "formulas," and "codes" are used to distinguish three different levels of political symbolization. See the previous discussion of these ideas as developed by Riggs at the end of Chapter V. Riggs' term "myth" has been replaced by the term "value system."

<sup>8</sup>Edward W. Weidner, *Technical Assistance in Public Administration: The Case for Development Administration* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1964), pp. 221-223.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 224.

<sup>10</sup>These experts included such men as Roscoe Martin, Harvey Walker, Henry Reining, Enrique Tejera-Paris, Francois Grazier, Leslie Lipson, Pedro Muñoz Amato, and Lyle Cunningham. The United Nations also offered three fellowships for one year each and a maximum of twenty-one fellowships in the period 1952 to 1956. The primary purpose of these grants was to train professors of public administration. See Michael Loew, "The Brazilian School of Public Administration, 1951-1956," report prepared for the United Nations (mimeographed), pp. 10-12, and Edward J. Jones, Jr., "Brazilian School of Public Administration, Getulio Vargas Foundation," report, May 15, 1963 (mimeographed), p. 1.

<sup>11</sup>"Technical Co-operation in Brazil," *Progress in Public Administration*, II (November, 1953), 2; João Guilherme Aragão, *Resultados e Perspectivas do Ponto IV no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: DASP, Serviço de Documentação, 1959), p. 7. Unfortunately, only partial figures are available as to the number of individuals who actually completed further training in public administration under this plan.

<sup>12</sup>*Progress in Public Administration*, II (November, 1953), 3.

<sup>13</sup>Harry Kenn, "Fact Book," a collection of materials on US/AID projects and contracts in public and business administration in Brazil, p. 14.

<sup>14</sup>Gilbert B. Siegel, "The Vicissitudes of Governmental Reform in Brazil: A Study of the DASP" (unpublished Doctoral dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1964), p. 241.

<sup>15</sup>University of Southern California Contract ICAC-1138 in Harry Kenn, *op. cit.*; Jones, "End-of-Tour Report" (July 12, 1961, to June 21, 1963), p. 2 (mimeographed); Escritório do Governo Brasileiro para a Coordenação do Programa de Assistência Técnica (Ponto IV), "Folheto-Relatório sobre o Programa Unificado do Ensino de Administração Pública e de Empresas," draft form of a report, pp. 16, 36-38 (mimeographed). The number of participants trained in the United States was obtained from the US/AID offices in Rio de Janeiro. The business administration program was run separately in São Paulo under the auspices of the University of Michigan.

<sup>16</sup>The term "integration" is used here within the context of the model developed by Bert F. Hoselitz. This model is discussed in the following pages. At the same time, the term is employed according to the meaning given to it by Parsons and Riggs.

Parsons states that the concept "concerns the compatibility of the institutional patterns under which organizations (and subsystems in the society) operate with those of other organizations and social units" (Talcott Parsons, *Structure and Process in Modern Societies* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960), p. 57. "The primary integration of the social system is based on an integrated system of generalized patterns of value orientation. A system or a subsystem of concerted action which (1) is governed by a *common* value-orientation and in which (2) the common values are motivationally integrated in action is . . . a collectivity. It is this integration by common

values, manifested in the action of solitary groups or collectivities, which characterizes the partial or total integrations of social systems" (Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils (eds.), *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 202-203). Riggs uses the Parsonian concept of integration as a point of departure and combines it with Julian Steward's distinction of levels of integration among folk cultures: "Steward offers the concept of 'level of socio-cultural integration' as a criterion, in which the size of the domain brought within a socio-political system appears to be the primary variable. . . . On Steward's showing, levels of integration vary independently of culture. . . . If this distinction [between integration and culture] can be sustained, then it may be suggested that the ability of a society to adapt itself to the problems of survival in the contemporary world, including the modernization of its political and administrative practices, is not primarily a matter of *culture*, but rather a matter of its *level of integration*. Not that the two are quite unrelated. On the contrary, particular culture traits may facilitate or hamper evolutionary changes, or 'development'" (Riggs, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-64).

<sup>17</sup>The concepts used here are based on Almond's idea that all political systems must be able to meet four sets of problems: they must develop an integrative capacity, an international accommodative ability, a participation capability, and a welfare or a distributive capability (Gabriel Almond, "Political Systems and Political Change," *American Behavioral Scientist*, VI (June, 1963), 7.

<sup>18</sup>Hoselitz, "Levels of Economic Performance and Bureaucratic Structures," in Joseph LaPalombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 175-176).

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 176.

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 183.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 188.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 198.

<sup>23</sup>See the discussion of achievement, attainment, and ascriptive criteria at the beginning of this chapter, Footnote 5.

<sup>24</sup>*Pistolão* also has other meanings; for example, it is commonly used to refer to getting something "fixed," such as a document, a ticket, or a license.

<sup>25</sup>Beatriz Marquês de Souza Wahrlich, *Administração de Pessoal: Princípios e Técnicas* (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Serviço de Publicações, 1964), pp. 17, 33. She speaks of the era of spoils system practices as "o império do pistolão" (p. 17). An alternative expression which she uses for a spoils system is "sistema do nepotismo" (p. 33).

<sup>26</sup>Emílio Willems, "Burocracia e Patrimonialismo," *Administração Pública*, III (September, 1945), 3-8.

<sup>27</sup>Paul P. Van Riper, *History of the United States Civil Service* (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson & Co., 1958), p. 8.

<sup>28</sup>James Q. Wilson, "The Economy of Patronage," *Journal of Political Economy*, LXIX (August, 1961), 370.

<sup>29</sup>J. Donald Kingsley, *Representative Bureaucracy, An Interpretation of the British Civil Service* (Yellow Springs, Ohio: The Antioch Press, 1944), pp. 33-35.

<sup>30</sup>S. E. Finer, "Patronage and the Public Service: Jeffersonian Bureaucracy and the British Tradition," *Public Administration*, XXX (Winter, 1952), 340, 356.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, 340.

<sup>32</sup>Carl Russell Fish, *The Civil Service and the Patronage* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1963 [reissued; first published, 1904]), pp. 79, 103.

<sup>33</sup>Leonard D. White, *The Jacksonians, A Study in Administrative History, 1829-1861* (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 397.

<sup>34</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 301.

<sup>35</sup>*Loc. cit.*

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>37</sup>See Kingsley for the development of this inter-relationship between the reformed civil service and the

structuring of political power in nineteenth-century Great Britain (*op. cit.*, esp. pp. 188, 278-280).

<sup>38</sup>Personal letter from Professor Gladys M. Kammerer, September 22, 1964.

<sup>39</sup>Van Riper, "The Constitution and the Patronage," *Personnel Administration*, XI (November, 1948), 1-2. The value of patronage as an integrating factor within our governmental system and our political parties is also discussed in the following two sources: Harvey C. Mansfield, "Political Parties, Patronage, and the Federal Government Service," *The Federal Government Service: Its Character, Prestige, and Problems*, The American Assembly (New York: Columbia University, 1954) and Wallace S. Sayre, "Introduction: The Federal Government -- a Possible Approach to the Topic," *The Federal Government*.

<sup>40</sup>*Personnel Administration*, XI (November, 1948), 5-6.

<sup>41</sup>Samuel J. Eldersveld, *Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1964), pp. 274-275.

<sup>42</sup>For a discussion of the Negro revolution and the possibility of a wider political alliance banding together the poor in our society, see C. Vann Woodward, "After Watts -- Where Is the Negro Revolution Headed?" *New York Times Magazine* (August 29, 1965), 24-25, 81-84.

## CHAPTER IX

### CONFLICTING PERCEPTIONS OF THE NATURE OF THE CIVIL SERVICE

Another way of approaching the second independent variable -- the use of norms governing administrative behavior exogenous to the socio-political system -- is to consider conflicting perceptions of what the civil service and its public personnel system entail, and what relation should or does exist with the external political system.

The following individual perceptions of the civil service should be considered in relation to the material contained in the previous chapters. The interview material on which the content of this chapter is based is in itself insufficient to offer a complete image of the civil service, for it was collected with a different purpose in mind: to broaden the viewpoint previously presented and to pinpoint the perceptions which individuals -- selected on the basis of reputation, position, and a relevant interest in these matters -- had of the civil service within a broad social matrix. This material, however, casts further light on how one might conceive of the federal administrative system in relation to its social and political context.

The interview material collected offers a parallel with data obtained from sources already cited in this respect,

and which, while it is not significant, does provide closure with Brazilian organization and personnel theory. If this material is classified according to what a public personnel system entails and what is involved in administrative change, thirteen of the interviews may be characterized as technical and structural in orientation; one as normative; five as focusing on the functions of the executive as crucial to changing the administrative process; and eight as sociological in character -- in that they consider change in the administrative system as a consequence of the external social system. Seven of the interviews fall outside the boundary imposed by the status of organization and personnel theory in Brazil. These materials conceive of the civil service as an integral part of the political system. As might be expected, the men interviewed in these instances looked at the civil service from positions outside the administrative system.<sup>1</sup> These orientations provide a correlation with what has previously been considered as the political context of the Brazilian civil service.

The interviewees classified in the first category represented a variety of backgrounds: Two were officials in the Ministry of Finance at the middle management level (one of these has written extensively in the field of public personnel administration); one was located in DASP; one in Petrobrás; one in the US/AID program in public administration; one in

the Conselho Nacional de Economia; one was a judge, a former DASP employee and a former member of the presidential staff; one was a general in the army and an official in a governmental agency; one was a professor of public administration in Rio de Janeiro active in the public personnel field in the state of Guanabara; another was a professor of public administration in the same city and has spent a career in government and in teaching in the public personnel field; one was a professor of public administration in Belo Horizonte; and one was actively engaged in the administrative reform program in the state of Minas Gerais.

The interviews all had one characteristic in common: These individuals perceived the civil service and the problems of administration in terms of structures and techniques. In each case their attention was focused on how to obtain personnel who were well trained, competent, and free of political association. They operated essentially from the premise that administrative matters were best left to the technician and should remain free from political influence. At the same time, none of them denied that this premise had not operated properly during the past two decades; nevertheless, in their minds this situation did not affect its validity. Economic and efficient administration, they felt, was contingent on the exclusion of political influences from the normal functioning of administrative organs. The major task

ahead, from their viewpoint, was the restructuring of the civil service to achieve modern public administration and the construction of new and more effective barriers against external political intrusions. At the same time, they believed that a modern civil service would better serve the desires and needs of those directing the political system.

The single interviewee whose approach could be classified as normative was a professor of public administration and was an official in the Ministry of Finance; he had spent his entire career in government. His approach was similar to that of the technicians. It varied only in that by focusing his attention at the top of the administrative hierarchy he saw the need to reorganize not so much according to the incorporation of modern techniques as through the application of principles, universal in character. Yet these principles, he said, would become viable only as further progress was made in democratic development. He was quite cognizant of the problems raised by the external political system, yet his belief in the validity of the merit system and principles of administration remained firm. At the same time, he felt that what had previously been stated as "scientific principles" were open to question. A modern and efficient civil service in Brazil, he believed, would become operational as the political and economic system matured. His viewpoint also varied in that he saw no way in which ad-

ministration could be separated from politics, even from a theoretical point of view. This was probably due to the focus of his attention at the policy-making level of administration. The administrative problems facing Brazil today, he said, were the equivalent of social engineering. Even though a transition in Brazilian administration was under way, there was still no audience, no clientele, to whom writers expressing new ideas or approaches could direct themselves.

The third set of interview materials focused on the civil service from the standpoint of those with executive functions and adopted the approach that the crucial area in administrative change centers around the recruitment, training, and proper use of those located in the higher civil service. If the right sort of direction and guidance could be assured in the civil service, these men felt that previous difficulties in creating a "modern" administrative system could largely be overcome. This orientation was expressed in interviews held with a ranking DASP official, an American professor participating in the US/AID program in public administration, a professor of political science in Rio de Janeiro who has long been active in the field of public administration, a ranking official in the Fundação Getúlio Vargas who has participated in every previous administration reform program, and an employee of the Ministry of Planning participating in the formation of a new ad-

ministrative reform plan for the Castelo Branco government. The specific way in which this preference for focusing attention on executive functions was expressed varied, from those who saw the major failing in the civil service as the lack of leadership skills and the absence of an executive training program to those who asserted that a greater effort must be made to establish an administrative class which could properly direct, control, and coordinate the administrative process and function as the guarantor for administrative reform.

The fourth grouping of the interview materials centered around those individuals who have adopted a sociological approach to the analysis of administrative phenomena. This group was composed of three professors of public administration in Rio de Janeiro, one of whom has previously been active in politics; two professors of sociology; one professor of history and sociology who has had 30 years' experience in one of the social security institutes; and a director of one of the government's *autarquias*. These men viewed the character of the Brazilian civil service as a consequence of the social environment within which it functions. According to these interpretations, the concept of a merit system and the use of administrative techniques borrowed from more advanced countries was dysfunctional in the Brazilian milieu because of the absence of a social

system which was supportive. To institute any meaningful change in the civil service -- or in the political parties, for that matter -- these people maintained that a basic change in the country's social structure must first come about. For them, the predominant characteristic of Brazilian society was its patrimonialism (*i.e.* its traditional nature). This was an element, they said, which could be traced throughout the political and administrative systems. These men contrasted the characteristics of a patrimonial administration with those of modern administration. Within the Brazilian context this was related to a struggle between an old system based on a clientele type of politics and the pressures for economy and efficiency in administration. Likewise, the patronage system as a traditional means for entry into the public service was contrasted with the creation of a merit system in which selection is made on the basis of the most competent. In one instance, this led an interviewee to assert the necessity of an administrative class -- one which, with the full awareness of the social environment, would play a crucial role in development and in consolidating the power of a political regime committed to modernization. In such a case politics and administration would be joined, instead of separated, and a dynamic movement led by a modern elite and challenging the traditional order would be created.

In contrast to the preceding perceptions of the civil service, there was one final group which saw the civil service as functioning in a highly political environment. For these individuals, it was impossible for one to consider the civil service without being aware of the fact that it was a major element in the functioning of Brazilian politics. Two of these men were federal deputies who had been in Congress for the past two decades and had exercised an important role in the passage of legislation relevant to the federal civil service; one was a lawyer and professor who had held positions previously in DASP, the Ministry of Labor, and in the presidential cabinet; one was an ex-administrative official who was currently employed in private business and still active in the public personnel field; two were professors of political science; and one was an American official with an interest in labor and civil servant organizations. While their individual views of the civil service varied, they all held in common an interest in it as an integral part of the political process. For them, the character of the civil service was related to the problems of executive-legislative relations, the structure and organization of the political parties, the way in which interest groups acted in the Brazilian context, and the nature of syndicalist organizations.

As might be expected, the individuals constituting these various groupings perceived the major problems facing the civil service and public personnel administration in quite different terms. There were, however, certain common problems which were singled out by each group. All groups pointed to the persistence of patronage pressures in spite of numerous devices designed to establish a civil service based on merit. The individual terminology used and the explanations given varied considerably, but none denied that a mass of unskilled civil servants had gained entrance through various non-merit channels and presented a serious barrier to any attempt to alter the character of the civil service. Also, whether or not these groups, or the individuals comprising them, supported the premise that administration below the policy making level should be separated from politics, they agreed that the political environment was at variance with the creation of a "modern" civil service. As one American official in the public administration put it, the major problem in Brazilian administration -- as in other underdeveloped areas -- was how to eliminate nepotism and political opportunism, for without a merit-based civil service, United States administrative technicians and Brazilian nationals trained in the United States could not be adequately utilized. In another instance, an interviewee stated the problem in these terms: In those cases in which

individuals had received training in administration, whether in Brazil or in the United States or both, none of them was really prepared to deal with the highly politicized environment in which he had to function. Yet, he said, the structure of political power in the Brazilian system was such that pressure groups in their effort to influence public policy focused a major part of their attention on those departments and positions in the public service which they deemed crucial to their interests. Still other interviewees, in discussing the highly political character of the federal administration, emphasized the fact that in many cases interest groups preferred to bypass the Congress and the political parties (which were basically electoral organizations) so that they might focus their attention directly upon the administrative system -- either to neutralize the enactment of decrees and legislation hostile to their interests or to bring about favorable action on their behalf.

Beyond this, there was little consensus on what constituted the major problems faced by the civil service. Those interviews classified in the first three groups viewed the problems within the framework of traditional public personnel administration. Theirs was essentially a "closed" system approach. They stressed the obstacles presented by such problems as the inadequacy of current examination techniques; the difficulty of organizing and carrying out

in-service training programs; the failure to establish a rationalized salary scale in an inflationary economy; the incomplete character of the classification of positions plan and the delays in its application; the slow character of mobility within the civil service; the insufficiency of governmental resources to provide adequate salaries for the number of civil servants employed, joined with the government's inability to reduce the number of employees where they were in excess and at the same time to keep better staffs in the offices where skilled personnel were needed; and the excessive amount of paper work required for those going through the proper procedural channels. In one case, an administrative official, on the basis of his experience as a departmental director in one of the ministries, singled out the difficulty of breaking the administrative routine and providing coordination among the ministers or within the same ministry as particularly vexing. In spite of efforts at introducing new techniques and methods, he found, after a lifetime in administrative positions, that the bureaucratic process continued to function basically as it always had functioned. It was for this reason that he stated that the fundamental problem facing the civil service involved how to obtain and keep trained, competent personnel.

Those in the third category tended to focus the problems at the higher levels of the civil service to explain why it was difficult to obtain more qualified individuals. In one case, an interviewee explained the major problem to be not how to impose a viable merit system, but how to open up the development of leadership skills so that those without university training could be drawn upon and utilized. He stated that the belief in a merit system had been essentially learned in the United States, transferred to Brazil, where without a system of mass education, it had become another means of locking in members of the elite, and utilized to maintain a closed administrative system. He also viewed the type of examination required as a major bottleneck which further stimulated the desire of many to bypass the legal requirements and to gain entry through more traditional means. The problem, as he conceived it, was not how to stop mass pressures for public employment, but rather how to accept them as part of the push to open up jobs in the public service to the common man and to focus attention on how to utilize these pressures to the best possible advantage and how to advance people within the civil service on the basis of qualification, ability, and reward for new skills learned.

In every case, the interviewees explained the gap between formal public personnel policies and the way the

personnel system has functioned in practice as a consequence of the political environment within which the civil service has operated. These policies which were designed to restructure the civil service, to provide a more competent and highly skilled personnel, and to contribute to the objectives of economy and efficiency were most often viewed as incongruous with a political and social system that was basically patrimonial in character. The attempt to create a modern administrative system was contrasted with the traditional character of Brazilian society and politics. In several cases, interviewees noted the fact that the techniques and concepts contained in the field of personnel administration, as imported from the United States, were most successful in modern industrial firms and, within the public sector, in the state of São Paulo, where an adequate social and economic basis functioned that made these concepts operational. Many of the interviewees explained this gap solely as a consequence of the unjustified intrusion of partisan politics into the administrative arena. They maintained that these policies offered the best way to achieve a "modern" civil service and could function properly only if effective barriers were constructed to keep out the politician and pressures for public employment. This viewpoint was not confined to to any one particular group, but was to be found in different forms in all five. In

many cases it was believed that these violations would disappear as the problems of economic development were overcome. In others, the emphasis was placed on the human factor: New administrative techniques were imported, but individual attitudes and orientations both within and outside the administrative system, remained unchanged. Still others spoke of the fact that structural reforms and the introduction of new procedures and techniques really accomplished very little in the way of change. They were imposed formally, but individual offices and departments continued to function substantially along traditional lines. The formalistic character of the administrative system, the lengthy paperwork and the delays involved, the need to get certain things accomplished, were conducive, they believed, to the development of informal lines of communication where matters could be expedited in much less time and much more efficiently.

Politically this was explained by the existence of clientele politics: The whole structure of Brazilian politics was viewed as one in which the major focus was on building a large number of political supporters who then required rewards and jobs. Under such conditions, a merit-based civil service, neutral and impartial in character, was deemed to be a fiction. This was particularly true, said one source, since the attempt at administrative

reform was itself a kind of politics.

In six cases, attention was centered on the DASP experience. It was singled out as an example of what can happen when ideas and institutions are transferred from one country to another without regard for the environment within which they function. What occurred was simply the erection of a new administrative structure through laws and decrees without an attempt to create an understanding for the value of the new system in political channels. One interviewee stressed the fact that DASP was systematically formed on the basis of American experience and that the ideas behind the whole administrative reform movement had come basically from the United States.

This view expressed by one viewing administration from its wider political context is to be contrasted with another belonging to the technical-structural category, in which the validity of these concepts and the techniques inherent in them were defended. This individual emphasized the point that the technical aspects of public personnel administration must be incorporated because they represented the only proven way that efficiency and economy could be achieved in administration. He went on to say that it was absolutely essential that models be imported from abroad. After all, from his viewpoint, a body of techniques of universal validity existed. The responsibility of the

Brazilian, then, was to develop forms for utilizing them. In this case, he said, we were dealing with science and in science we turn to those countries which are not advanced for their models. The merit system is one of these, and it is a model which is of use to us. In essence, the great ideas are the same in any place. The great error is the failure to adapt these models to the particular situation at hand. There is, he affirmed, but one body of techniques; they are international and neutral, though in each instance they are subject to social, economic, and political limitations.

Two of the interviewees, in discussing the DASP experience, focused their attention on difficulties which had arisen within the civilian bureaucracy. One indicated the shortage of qualified, trained personnel for administrative positions. The reforms became formal because of the lack of skilled personnel in sufficient numbers to carry them out and because those committed to administrative reform were too few in comparison with the total size of the civil service. After 1945, this situation was, he said, further aggravated because of the decline in real salaries and the attractiveness of higher paying jobs in private business. The second interviewee cited three factors as relevant to understanding the DASP experience. First, he stated that too much emphasis was placed originally on preparing person-

nel in DASP without devoting adequate attention to the preparation of personnel in the ministries who would carry out the reforms initiated under the auspices of DASP. At the ministerial level there was an absence of an administrative class trained in the new skills and capable of exercising the leadership needed to alter the character of the administrative system. Under these circumstances the publication of personnel directives by DASP was not enough, for these directives had to be carried out essentially by the same people. Hence, they were internally sabotaged. A second factor was the nature of DASP: Its responsibilities were too extensive in relation to its ability to carry them out. During the dictatorship, the emphasis was on control rather than coordination; to this day, the organization has functioned very poorly as a coordinative apparatus, yet this was one of the major reasons for its creation. The third factor cited was the absence of public opinion defending the merit system; it was a concept imported from abroad and imposed from above.

Still another explanation of the formalistic character of the DASP structure and the violation of the norms it set in the public personnel field was provided by a politician. He explained the gap between theory and reality in personnel matters as a consequence of the fact that the DASP structure was entirely unrelated to the needs and desires of the

mass of civil servants. As one who had been active in the handling of numerous pieces of legislation benefiting the lower ranks of the civil service, he visualized the objectives and desires of those at the top of the administrative hierarchy and associated with the DASP principle as incompatible with the needs and aspirations of the mass of civil servants. This was due, he felt, to DASP's lack of concern with the human aspect of administration. In too many cases its views on technical administration and on the achievement of economy and efficiency were imposed, regardless of the social cost. Thus, the lower ranks of the civil service found a more logical recourse to action to lie in the political realm where, in association with urban labor groups, they could bring pressure to bear on the government in such matters as, for example, salary increases. The conflict with DASP, he stated, arose when it ceased to be purely a personnel organ, began to try to control all aspects of administration, and demonstrated an unwillingness to compromise and to have its policies questioned. In explaining patronage pressures, he stressed not its aristocratic character but the large numbers of people who sought public employment to escape their poverty-stricken surroundings. Thus, patronage had its humanitarian side in a social and economic system full of inequalities. This he contrasted with a government which sought neither to under-

stand nor to deal with the social inequities that gave rise to these conditions, but rather to construct a higher and more effective wall to bar such influences from the federal civil service.

Another politician, discussing the contrast between the policies regulating appointments to the civil service and the practices used in making them, explained the phenomenon of *empreguismo* -- the excessive seeking of employment in the public service -- as the consequence of not one, but a variety of pressures. On the one hand, there were the traditional pressures brought to bear on a person in public life. These involved kinship and friendship ties. He related this to the strong sense of family existing in Brazil and to the desire of the large family to see all its members protected and provided for. Then there were those who, lost in the turmoil, change, and instability of contemporary Brazilian life, sought a safe haven in the public service where they could be assured of a steady, if modest, income. There was yet another cause to which he pointed: This was the growth of the population of the country, the expanding size of the potential working force, and the insufficient number of jobs to grant employment to all. Finally, he discussed the patronage pressures experienced by such a party as the PTB. These, he noted, were quite different from those faced by the PSD, a party

consisting of traditional elements. Although not a member of the PTB himself, he saw the party as one which was based on the lower classes and immigrant labor groups. Within the party, he stated, there was a sizable number of active participants with Syrian-Lebanese background. Although not as large numerically as the Irish, their interest in politics was comparable to that of the Irish in American politics at the turn of the last century. In this respect he pointed to the description of politics contained in *The Last Hurrah*. He went on to say that while the PTB has always had a special interest in the Ministry of Labor and in the social security institutes, the positions of treasurer and assistant treasurer in the various departments and ministries were among the most popular for all types of patronage.

The ideal model that emerges from this interview material is that of a civil service which will function with the autonomy of the French but with administrative skills and techniques taken from the United States. In the majority of the interviews conducted, the researcher noted a sense of frustration. In spite of all the attempts to reform the character of the Brazilian civil service, the general feeling observed was that it has continued to function substantially as it always had and has remained responsive to external political influences regardless of the effort to

exclude them. After some thirty-five years of emphasizing the techniques of administration, whether focusing at the operational level or at the policy making level, it has become obvious that something else is needed. Yet, the problem remains of where does one go from here. The major problem in Brazilian administration is no longer the development of administrative know-how, for the country possesses quite sophisticated, academically trained people in administration and the social sciences who have an understanding of the requisites of modern public administration as it has developed in the West.

Most of the people interviewed took refuge in the idea that the goal of modern, economic, efficient administration will become realizable only in time -- as the social and economic system matures. But they are equally aware that there is not the time to wait. Increasingly, administrators in Brazil have emphasized the necessity for more effective public administration if further progress is to be made in the area of economic development. In general, the problems created by patronage and political influence throughout the administrative system have been considered an evil which must be removed at all costs; an embarrassing situation which, although recognized, should be dispensed with as quickly as possible. Little attention has been devoted to understanding these pressures and analyzing their

causes. The major need, it would seem, is for innovative behavior and for a willingness to break with foreign models and, understanding the total context within which the institutions of other countries function, to look for Brazilian solutions to what are, in the final analysis, Brazilian problems. This is hardly an original observation, for something quite similar was expressed by the Viscount of Uruguay over a hundred years ago when he discussed the application to Brazil of English, American, and French administrative institutions.<sup>2</sup>

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Seven additional interviews were held, but the material collected from them was not relevant to the purposes of this chapter. It should also be noted that the size of this sample was restricted by the nature of the scholarship held. The researcher had neither the means nor the time available to carry out this interviewing on a wider numerical and geographical basis. The interviews were held in two cities: Rio de Janeiro and Belo Horizonte. While Brasília is formally the capital of the country, Rio de Janeiro remains a major administrative center.

<sup>2</sup>Viscount do Uruguai, *Ensaio sôbre o Direito Administrativo* (Rio de Janeiro: Tipografia Nacional, 1862), Ch. XXXI.

## CHAPTER X

### POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION

#### Summary

As a nation-state, Brazil has followed an uneven course of political development. During the Empire, progress was made toward the goal of integrating a series of diverse Portuguese-speaking provinces into one nation where among the regional elites, at least, a sense of national consciousness had begun to emerge. During the Republic, this integrative process halted as a federalist system of government replaced a unitary state and the emphasis shifted to the regional capitals. Certainly, this process was initiated before the declaration of the First Republic, but the nature of the political institutions imposed after 1889 heightened the forces favoring regional autonomy and worked against the effort to create a unified state. The absence of any external threat which might endanger the political union previously established left each state relatively free to pursue its own interests and operate substantially as a self-contained unit.

The Revolution of 1930 and the emergence of Getulio Vargas as the major political actor marked an incisive alteration of previous political patterns. After a short-lived effort to reform the political structure of the nation under

republican institutions, Vargas abolished them and instituted a unitary state committed to the goals of nation-building and socio-economic progress. This state, however, was autocratic in character. By 1945, faced with both external and internal changes beyond its control, it passed out of existence. Once again, the country experimented with federalism, bicameralism, organized parties, and political democracy -- with the qualification that only the literate could vote. The goals of the political system remained the same; the major difference was that a concerted effort was made to achieve them through the development of representative political institutions. Yet this experience with republican institutions, patterned after an American model, was quite different from the First Republic. Active political forces were no longer confined to a landowning and mercantile elite.

The socio-economic changes of the 1920's and the 1930's engendered a new series of political forces. The basic change occurring was the initiation of mass politics. While the rural laborer remained apathetic, for the most part, the industrial worker developed a sense of political consciousness which, in turn, altered fundamentally the whole pattern of politics. Thus, the push toward industrialization and modernization coincided with the arrival of the democratic revolution with its egalitarian aspirations. In spite of

this, neither the traditional regional elites nor the technical modernizing elites seemed willing to accept as legitimate the demands of an expanded electorate and the institution of constraints on their prerogatives. During the Goulart government, a notable radicalization of politics took place and the immobilist struggle among competing, irreconcilable political forces led eventually to the breakdown of the system.

Within this fluctuating pattern of political development, Brazil has experienced three different approaches to the organization of a national civil service: the caste bureaucracy of the First Republic; the guardian bureaucracy of the *Estado Novo*, and the patronage bureaucracy of the Second Republic.<sup>1</sup> The primary characteristic of the civil service prior to the Vargas-initiated reforms in the 1930's was its identification with the dominant social classes and the selection of civil servants on the basis of ascriptive criteria. The guardian bureaucracy of the *Estado Novo*, as personified in the DASP, was devoted to the common good as interpreted by a select number of individuals. Both were elitist systems, but they operated in totally different ways. The technical elite of the dictatorship was well trained, within the limits of the possibilities available during the 1930's. It was devoted to the principle of unity as essential to the creation of a coordinated,

effective state. It was also totally committed to the goals of the Vargas government and to the programs designed to contribute to the realization of these goals. The technical elite took considerable pride "in being inflexible as well as benevolent in its relations with the public, and unimpressed by outside criticism."<sup>2</sup> Yet, before the institutions of a guardian bureaucracy could take root in the Brazilian environment and provide a parallel with the administrative system of France and that of Germany, the political understructure changed once more. Under the impact of representative political institutions and the beginnings of mass politics, the guardian bureaucracy gave way to a patronage bureaucracy. It was, however, a patronage bureaucracy combining both aristocratic and democratic practices. In the former case, it served the purpose of what remained of the traditional aristocratic social order; in the latter, it was closely related to the rise of competitive party politics within the framework of democratic governmental institutions and to the attempt to use patronage as a means of political control.

Nevertheless, in spite of these changes, there was a substantial amount of continuity in Brazilian administration. This was particularly true in the more powerful ministries which were able to remain relatively impervious to the external political environment. One such case was that of the

Ministry of Finance. Since the days of the Empire, it has been a strong, relatively independent ministry, with its own personnel system, bureaucratization, and -- while subject to patronage pressures -- substantial insulation from political fluctuation.

Regardless of its importance as an integrative mechanism, the patronage bureaucracy of the Second Republic was not all-pervasive. What existed, as in the case of the United States during the Jacksonian era (1829-1861), was a dual public personnel system, "one sector partisan, rotating its personnel; the other, based in part on examinations and in part on custom, neutral and permanent."<sup>3</sup> Within the context of Brazilian experience, the first tended to dominate the personnel practices of the social security institutes, while the second appeared to be more prevalent in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, particularly within the career foreign service, the military ministries, and the Ministry of Finance. This distinction, however, should not be drawn too rigorously, because available material seems to suggest that the elements of a dual personnel system are to be found throughout all the ministries, the social security institutes, and many of the *autarquias*. The ways in which these elements are combined contrast considerably.<sup>4</sup>

### Conclusions

In the first chapter, the central hypothesis was stated in terms of three independent variables selected to see if a possible relationship could be established between them and a dependent variable. The dependent variable of this study is the actual behavior of the Brazilian federal civil service system, while the independent variables are the political understructure on which the civil service system is based, the use of norms governing administrative behavior exogenous to the socio-political system, and the application of the techniques of scientific management without adequate attention to the functional requirements of the existing system and sufficient consideration for the human elements. While this study has demonstrated that all three independent variables are related to the behavior of the civil service system, the first is by far the most important.

In considering the political understructure, we may conclude that Brazilian experience with administrative reform over a lengthy time span has shown that the style of politics is of crucial importance. This factor was not sufficiently accounted for in the propositions developed around the first independent variable. This study has shown that instead of being an independent variable it is more correctly regarded as an intervening variable based, in turn, on two

independent variables: the degree of centralization (that is, structural-institutional factors) of national government and the extent of political and social stability. Furthermore, there is no evidence in this study that necessarily supports the validity of what was presented as the first proposition -- that in instituting any program of administrative reform in a transitional society the presence of a strong central government insuring political stability is more important than the style of politics and location of authority, *i.e.* whether it is a dictatorship or a democracy. The concept of political styles was not sufficiently developed at this point to account for Brazilian experience. A more accurate statement would involve the degree to which an "open" or "closed" political system exists, as was done in the second proposition.

The centralization or decentralization that has taken place at different points in the course of Brazilian political and administrative development is intimately related to the political styles of the various periods. Hence, the theoretical distinction drawn between political style and the degree of centralization cannot be made operational. What made it possible for Vargas to impose sweeping administrative reforms during the 1930's was the monopoly he exercised on political power. Once this monopoly was broken and a political style emerged based on a mass electorate,

competitive party politics, and the division of power between the executive and Congress, his administrative reforms assumed a purely formalistic character because they were unrelated to the attempt to develop a representative and competitive political system in which the administrative system would be responsive to its demands.

This point is crucial because, in the original conceptualization of this study, the distinction between representative government and the rise of competitive politics or a competitive political system was not clearly stated; yet Brazilian experience has shown that this distinction is absolutely essential to understanding developments in the country's political system. What existed before 1930 was a decentralized political system which was representative, but not competitive except for those individuals participating in politics who were either members of the upper class or a small, conservatively oriented middle class. Between 1945 and 1964, what emerged was a decentralized and highly competitive political system functioning within the framework of representative government. As a consequence of this widening range of demands accompanying modernization, the possibility of creating an egalitarian mass society presented itself for the first time in Brazilian history. This development was cut short by the April Revolution, which, strictly speaking, was a *coup d'état* rather than a

revolution. Since that time, a representative form of government has been maintained, but the scope of competitive politics has been considerably reduced and subjected to stringent centralized controls.

The material does, however, support the validity of what was offered as a sub-proposition: that the success in instituting merit system practices under the first Vargas government was to be explained in part by the presence of a strong central government committed to the reform of the federal civil service. Yet it needs to be further refined by adding that what made this possible was the moratorium imposed on competitive party politics. The same is true of the second sub-proposition: that the problems that emerged in Brazil after 1945, both in expanding and defending a rationalized public personnel system, were to be explained in part by the excessive decentralization of authority (formal power) and control (informal power) and by the multiplicity of competitive groups in a society undergoing fundamental change, where there was a lack of consensus on the means for resolving conflict and on the basic goals of the state. It is the second part of this proposition that has had the greatest relevance in accounting for the difficulties encountered in making the formal personnel system functional in the period between 1945 and 1964. The political understructure during these years was simply not supportive of

a federal civil service governed by the values and the goals of economy, efficiency, and rationality. Consequently, the public personnel system imposed during the 1930's and strengthened by subsequent legislation became increasingly formalistic, due to the authoritarian character of these controls and the influence of the political party in opening up competition and their destruction of the autocratic origin of the reforms.

The second major proposition offered to explain the political understructure -- that any program of basic reform in a traditional system is certain to create opposition -- does not warrant separate consideration if we take into account the material presented in Chapters IV, V, and VI. This statement, joined by a second (that the way this opposition is expressed depends on the interrelation prevailing between the degree of decentralization or centralization within the bureaucracy, on the one hand, and the style of politics, on the other) only complements the preceding statements.

The other relationships postulated in that section did, however, prove to be valid in the form in which they were prepared. It was hypothesized that in a centralized system of administration it was more difficult to express opposition to reform because of the existence of a more effective control system which was able to override traditional patterns and values. It was also stated that this control

was more "effective" because major policy decisions could be made only at the top of the hierarchical structure. This is precisely what occurred during the *Estado Novo*, for it was essentially an administrative state in which political decisions were made at the top of the hierarchical structure and the administrative control system created was used to see that they were carried out. The administrative reform program appeared to be a substantial success from the outside, yet when materials from this period are examined, it becomes apparent that conflict and opposition to the reforms did go on within the administrative system. The monolithic structure of the *Estado Novo*, however, obscured this situation. Conflict between traditional and modern administrative concepts and practices was simply internalized.

Outside the technical elite, essentially the same men were called upon to serve the state; their values and behavior remained much the same, in spite of the fact that new techniques and ways of doing things were forcibly introduced. It was impossible to dismiss the mass of older public functionaries and to replace them with others, given the elite character of this society and the absence of any system of mass education from which new individuals might be drawn. Had the whole structure of the administrative system been effectively renovated and a new body of public functionaries substituted, the bureaucratic apparatus created by Vargas

would not have collapsed so easily once competitive party politics were resumed. Once DASP was reorganized, its power curtailed, and its elite corps of civil servants disbanded, patronage politics resumed at a new and more intense level.

In spite of all this, though, the legal norms and principles governing public personnel practices remained in operation -- at least theoretically -- and were reinforced by additional legislation. For this reason, they have been termed formalistic, since they did not correspond to the way in which personnel actually gained entrance into the public service, nor did they account for the pressures brought to bear by political parties in an integrative stage of development.

It was also hypothesized that the reaction to administrative reform during the Vargas era was the fear of the bureaucracy as a control instrument in a no-party, authoritarian system and of experience with such control. In addition, it was stated that an important motivation of the political parties emerging after 1945 was their desire to make the bureaucracy responsible to the external political system. The material presented in Chapters VI, VII, and VIII confirmed this conceptualization only in part. While these statements are fairly descriptive of the immediate post-dictatorship years, they are not as applicable to the remainder of the period. By that time, the concept of an

elite civil service based on merit and determined through public examination had collapsed without much resistance. Once the control apparatus of DASP had been destroyed and a political system dependent on the extensive use of privilege had developed, this fear of the bureaucracy as a control system was no longer an important motivation. The struggle was, rather, one of seeing who could capture public office and gain control of patronage powers.

The size of the federal civil service, which was singled out as an intervening variable, was an important factor in this study. Subsequent reforms or attempted changes in public personnel policies and practices have been complicated by the number of civil servants employed by the government. Furthermore, the period between 1945 and 1964 is marked by substantial expansion in public employment. Any basic reform must come to terms with the whole administrative system and that task is almost overwhelming. The size of the federal civil service during the 1930's presented no small obstacle in carrying out the original administrative reforms, and by 1964, the total civil service, in all probability, had doubled.

The third dependent variable isolated for the analysis of the political understructure -- the role of DASP as an agent of the executive -- was likewise of considerable use. The material in Chapters VI and VII confirms the relation-

ships hypothesized. This examination of the political system and the patterns of political patronage verifies the assertion that the close association of DASP and the whole administrative reform movement with the Vargas dictatorship was inimical to its goals and objectives after 1945. Chapter VII also substantiates the use of DASP according to executive wishes.

In the case of the second independent variable -- the use of norms governing administrative behavior exogenous to the socio-political system -- two propositions were developed. First, it was postulated that the gap between the formal requirements of the merit system and the realities of current public personnel practices was to be explained to a considerable extent by the irrelevance of these exogenous concepts to the functioning of the bureaucratic system. The second proposition stated that the imposition of these newer norms and principles upon traditional values had led to conflict within the administrative system as a whole. Of these two propositions, only the first was confirmed by this study. Chapters VII and VIII contain material supporting this assertion. The patronage system that developed after 1945 made the formal personnel system inoperative; however, there is nothing in this material which can be used to prove the validity of the second proposition. The only effective way of checking this statement would be to take a representative sample of the civil service and

collect new data through interviewing. The interviewing material collected in this study does not provide any valid basis for generalization along these lines; instead, it is of most use in providing closure with other materials collected within the general context of the second and third independent variables.

The third independent variable -- the application of the techniques of scientific management without adequate attention to the functional requirements of the existing system and sufficient consideration for the human elements -- was dealt with in considerable detail in Chapters III and IV. On the basis of this subject matter, we may conclude that in terms of the internal administrative system the basic deficiency of the scientific management school in Brazil has been its neglect of the prescriptive bases from which it has been operating and its failure to test empirically the principles it has asserted. But this is not a failing of Brazilian writers in public administration in particular. Rather, it is a consequence of the belief transferred from traditional American public administration that the hallowed principles it proclaimed were universal and scientific and that they represented the one best way of achieving economy and efficiency in administration. Nor can the premise that administration can and should be separated from politics be supported by empirical evidence in the Brazilian milieu. The un-

questioning acceptance of this value has obscured the importance of the environment within which any administrative system functions. Yet an understanding of this environment is essential if the problems of administrative reform and change are to be faced realistically in Brazil. Instead, Brazilian administrators have preferred to concern themselves with the active role of public administration in the modernization process and have devoted little attention to the influence of the environment with which they are dealing on actual administrative processes -- except as a corrupting factor which must be excluded.

Scientific public administration in general, and in Brazil in particular, has not been able to come to terms adequately with the human element in administration and with the whole question of human values. It makes little difference whether people are trained in better and more effective techniques of administration if no attention is given to changing traditional values and adapting them to the needs of modern society. The Vargas-initiated administrative reforms certainly implied a new set of values, but these values were simply imposed on the existing system through legislation and structural alterations. No attempt was made to come to terms with the conflict emerging between individual values and the new norms which had been forcibly applied to the administrative system. After 1945, it became apparent that the presence of

these norms did not necessarily lead to any change in administrative behavior.

Training in the public personnel field must deal directly with the socialization of large numbers of students and in-service trainees so that they can become more aware of the new normative system which must be accepted if merit system practices are to become functional. This means no less than the abandonment of traditional aristocratic norms and the substitution of egalitarian ones of the sort spelled out by De Tocqueville in the last century and by Myrdal in the present one if the problems created by the emergence of an egalitarian mass society are to be adequately handled. After all, there is nothing inherent in this process, which is now underway in Brazil, that necessarily guarantees it will assume a democratic or a non-democratic character. Training must also prepare these individuals to face the fact that administration is not necessarily above the political arena but very much a part of it. This is especially true when social upheavals are underway and new groups are seeking to gain entrance into the political process. Civil servants must also be prepared who will have an open mind for new ideas and concepts at variance with the accepted way of doing things in the more "advanced" countries and who will be capable of innovative behavior of the sort that can meet these developmental pressures and needs peculiar to the Brazilian system.

In training programs, there is the need to place an emphasis on preparing generalist administrators who can perform a critical political role. Until now, emphasis has been placed on developing administrative techniques. In future training programs, a shift away from a technical approach to administration to one in which individuals with a general background and with an awareness of the fact that they must be capable of dealing with conflict and politics should take place. While training programs are moving in the direction of preparing generalist administrators, still little attention has been given to preparing these individuals to deal with political necessities. Also, this present movement in the direction of generalist administrators is based on a concept in traditional public administration in which administrators are viewed as a sort of democratic ruling class, Platonic in character and representative of an aristocracy of talent.<sup>5</sup>

At the same time that individuals with a general background are being trained for administrative careers, it is necessary, if the country is to move in the direction of providing an open system of government and developing political mechanisms for dealing with social change, that these same individuals be prevented from "impeding the development of countervailing centers of political power."<sup>6</sup> Finally, if the country is to return to a competitive style of party politics, some understanding must be developed for the pressures which

have made patronage so important in the years between 1945 and 1964. Rather than attempting to exclude political influence entirely, mechanisms must be developed to meet the demands of those groups who have deemed it necessary to exercise an influence on the administrative system to assert and to protect their interests.

The examination offered of organization and personnel theory in Chapters III and IV, however, should not be interpreted to mean that Brazilian administration must pass through each of the phases developed in American administration. Rather, with an awareness of the various models that can be utilized for the analysis of organizations in the United States, emphasis should be placed on an empirical analysis of the Brazilian administrative setting and on the development of concepts descriptive of Brazilian administrative reality. The need in Brazil is to come to terms with the problem of instituting functional changes in the administrative system. The criticism of traditional public administration, which underlies much of the content of these two chapters, should not be interpreted to imply a total rejection of traditional concepts and techniques; instead, this critique marks but an attempt to bring into consideration additional factors. These concepts and techniques apparently have their greatest application in the modern industrial firm functioning in a capitalistic society -- although, even

here, their validity has been questioned at times.

Scientific administration in Brazil has made a substantial contribution in terms of the introduction of new ideas, skills, and techniques. But now that this foundation has been established, it is time to develop a greater understanding of the social context within which administration functions and of the fact that political interrelationships are of crucial importance. This amounts to an application of the dictum offered by Waldo in discussing the economy and efficiency movement in the United States: "The descriptive or objective notion of efficiency is valid and useful," he observed, "but only within a framework of consciously held values." To this he added the concept of an "hierarchy of purposes" and a "pyramid of values" as a means for developing a new philosophic basis for administration.<sup>7</sup>

In such a context, it is fundamental that the assumption that administration and politics can and ought to be separated from politics be re-examined. Far too often this assumption has functioned as a premise in the Brazilian setting, protecting bureaucratic interests and aiding in the erection of barriers to defend bureaucratic power from "political" encroachments. In the literature on Brazilian public administration which has appeared since 1945, one may note two sets of interrelated values: those of economy and efficiency and those of democracy. Those of democracy, however, have been weak and

by and large present only by implication; yet the meaning and significance of democracy is a central problem to Brazilian political and administrative development. In contrast, those of economy and efficiency have been vigorously asserted so that in combination with the premise separating politics and administration they have been used to develop the goal of an administrative system independent of political controls. While the administrative system in the period between 1945 and 1964 was made responsible, accountable, and responsive to the external political system through the use of patronage, in theory this relationship has been categorically rejected as an evil.

The major bottleneck in Brazilian political and administrative development is not the lack of officials possessing the required knowledge and skills. It is, instead, the failure to create an accepted and legitimate set of controls stemming from groups active in the political process and the absence of a clear set of policies determining what the political goals of the nation are and how they will be achieved.<sup>8</sup> Throughout the discussion of the Brazilian political system, it has been stated that the two basic political goals have been nation-building and socio-economic progress. Generally, these two goals have been present more by implication than by actual statement. What is lacking is a set of sub-goals designed to relate these two elements to the political system

and to determine how these objectives will be achieved. It is probable that before a change can be effectively instituted in the civil service -- this is assuming that the country will eventually return to an open political system -- basic alterations must occur in the political institutions of the country. Since, according to La Palombara, "there appears to be some incompatibility between rapid economic development, on the one hand, and democratic political development, on the other," it is of crucial importance that greater attention be paid to the whole problem of political development and that the political system desired become a "consciously sought goal."<sup>9</sup> Brazilian experience with an open political system in the period between 1945 and 1964 demonstrates the impossibility of maintaining a separation between administration and politics in a society in which the predominant concern of the political system is still integrative. The objective of displacing the influence of the politician and at the same time retaining his support for a professional civil service involved goals that were incompatible. This was because, as Joaquim Nabuco observed in the 1930's, political patronage was the politicians' "life blood." In the effort to make an open, representative form of governmental operational and to develop a national political party system, based on a mass electorate, political patronage has played no small role.

The course of Brazilian political development has been hindered by a failure to develop two crucial mechanisms: (1) a built-in structure capable of dealing with reform and (2) a style of politics in which bargaining and compromise become possible. Both of these mechanisms are crucial to progress in political development. The political institutions emerging after 1945 represented a step forward in developing these capabilities -- only to be frustrated by the lack of leadership and any really cohesive set of forces after the resignation of Quadros. For all the imperfections of the Kubitschek government, it still stands as the government which made the greatest progress in developing these mechanisms.

Given this close interaction between administration and politics in Brazil, we may conclude that for Brazil the concepts and ideas developed in political science -- in particular, those contained within comparative government and comparative administration -- have a great deal to offer in comprehending the nature of the administrative system. In the Brazilian environment, neither the thesis that "public administration should be divorced from political science" nor the thesis that "we [should] proceed from a 'disciplinary' to a 'professional school' perspective or orientation"<sup>10</sup> is conducive to coming to terms with the administrative problems facing the country. If anything,

past experience with administrative reform and with the difficulties presented by formalism in the public personnel field demonstrates that Brazilian public administration could stand to profit considerably by a closer association with political science. This does not mean that there should not also be a reaching out into other academic disciplines for new concepts and data, but rather that the study of public administration in this particular case should join hands with the same quest that is now going on within political science as a whole. This observation could probably be extended to the rest of Latin America.

Finally, it should not be forgotten that historically and culturally Brazil is as much a part of Western civilization as are the United States, Canada, and Australia. While our national experience, as well as that of Australia, has been governed by a liberal tradition, Brazilian experience has been tempered by a conservative tradition. Brazil's departures from its European heritage are no greater than those to be found in the previously mentioned countries. Much can be gained in understanding the Brazilian political order by starting from a European point of reference -- particularly one oriented toward the Latin countries on the Continent.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>These types of bureaucracy are based on concepts developed by Morstein-Marx (*The Administrative State: An Introduction to Bureaucracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 55-71).

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 60. This is taken from a section in which Morstein-Marx describes the character of the Prussian bureaucracy in the years between 1640 and 1740; yet his comments are equally descriptive of the technical elite created by Vargas.

<sup>3</sup>Leonard D. White, *The Jacksonians, A Study in Administrative History: 1829-1861* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1954), p. 315.

<sup>4</sup>The research conducted by Rood and Sherwood supports this notion of a dual personnel system. In their study of various ministries and agencies, they found that there were small clusters of public servants who, regardless of statutory position or formal authority and changes in government, took the responsibility for getting the work of government done (John Rood and Frank Sherwood, "The Workhorse Group in Brazilian Public Administration," in Robert T. Daland (ed.), *Perspectives of Brazilian Public Administration* (Los Angeles: University of Southern California Bookstore, 1963), pp. 47-56.

<sup>5</sup>This observation is based on one aspect of Waldo's critique of traditional American public administration (Dwight Waldo, *The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory of American Public Administration* (New York: Ronald Press, 1948), pp. 89, 97).

<sup>6</sup>This statement is based on a proposition stated by Joseph La Palombera in discussing essays by Morstein-Marx and Braibanti that "particularly in the new states where the need for national integration is paramount, the proliferation of functional specialists in administration will add to the many centrifugal forces that already exist. When a society is rent by all sorts of social and political forces pulling in conflicting, disintegrative directions, the administrative generalist may be a vital cement, holding the system together. It may well be that programs of economic development require a certain amount of functional expertise in administra-

tion. . . . But there must be accorded equal attention to the critical political role that the administrative generalist can perform, as well as to the need for preventing these generalists from impeding the development of countervailing centers of political power" ("An Overview of Bureaucracy and Political Development," in Joseph La Palombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 20-21).

<sup>7</sup>Waldo, *op. cit.*, pp. 203-205, esp. 203.

<sup>8</sup>This observation is based on a recent article by Fred M. Riggs ("Relearning an Old Lesson: The Political Context of Development Administration," *Public Administration Review*, XIV (March, 1965), 77).

<sup>9</sup>La Palombara, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>10</sup>These theses are taken from Waldo ("The Administrative State Revisited," *Public Administration Review*, XXV (March, 1965), 28.

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## APPENDIX

## APPENDIX

### ALPHABETICAL TITLES OF AGENCIES AND INSTITUTES REFERRED TO IN THE TEXT

IAPB	Instituto de Aposentadoria e Pensões dos Bancários
IAPC	Instituto de Aposentadoria e Pensões dos Comercários
IAPETC	Instituto de Aposentadoria e Pensões dos Empregados em Transportes e Cargas
IAPFESP	Instituto de Aposentadoria e Pensões dos Ferroviários e Empregados em Serviços Públicos
IAPI	Instituto de Aposentadoria e Pensões dos Industriários
IAPM	Instituto de Aposentadoria e Pensões dos Marítimos
IPASE	Instituto de Previdência e Assistência dos Servidores do Estado
SAPS	Serviço de Alimentação da Previdência Social
COSIPA	Companhia Siderúrgica de São Paulo
SUPRA	Superintendência da Reforma Agrária
SENAM	Serviço Educacional Nacional de Aprendizagem dos Marítimos
IBGE	Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística
DNPS	Departamento Nacional da Previdência Social
DASP	Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público
CFRA	Conselho Federal e Regional da Contabilidade
IBA	Instituto Brasileiro do Sal
IBC	Instituto Brasileiro do Café
SNAPP	Serviço de Navegação da Amazônia e Pôrto do Pará
SNBP	Serviço de Navegação da Baía do Prata

### INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. What have been the chief problems in the public personnel field?
2. How would you explain the gap between public personnel policies (as stated in theory and law) and the way the personnel system has functioned in practice? To be more specific, how do you explain the continued existence of patronage practices after some thirty years of attempting to develop a merit system? Have political developments since last April changed this? In what ways? Has Brazilian experience with patronage in the civil service been entirely negative and harmful to the needs of the administrative system? Should political party influence be excluded from the administrative system? What about the executive's appointive power -- are controls to be imposed on it? Does *empreguismo* vary according to party?

3. What are the needs of the Brazilian civil service? What are the goals of Brazilian civil service reform? What policies and practices are designed to achieve these goals? Why have these policies and practices not achieved the ends for which they were designed? Where has the emphasis been placed on reform in the civil service? On techniques? On training? On human behavior? What is needed? Does administrative reform bear any relationship to political reform? If so, what? If none, why?
4. What has been the main source of ideas for the development of an efficient and effective civil service? How effective has UN technical assistance in public administration been? US/AID? Is Brazilian experience unique -- or can the experience of other countries be of assistance in public administration?
5. What is the role of the administrator in the higher civil service? What sort of relationship exists with the political system? What sort of relationship should exist? Is the concept of the public interest of use here? What is the public interest? What sort of civil servant is desirable? How does one go about recruiting him?
6. In studying the Brazilian civil service, are the civil servant organizations of any importance?
7. Which have been the most powerful ministries? Have *empreguista* pressures been exerted equally on all ministries or have they varied according to ministry?
8. What influence has the move to Brasília had on Brazilian administration? Which departments, agencies, and divisions have been involved? Does day-to-day administration continue to function in Rio de Janeiro for all practical purposes?
9. What is the future of DASP? Is there a need to revise the organization or should it be abandoned?

## VITA

Lawrence Sherman Graham was born in Daytona Beach, Florida, on July 12, 1936. He received his primary and secondary education in local schools. He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Spanish from Duke University and a Master of Arts degree in Hispanic Studies from the University of Wisconsin. He spent his junior year at the University of Madrid, in Spain.

He has received the following awards and grants: a teaching assistantship in Spanish (University of Wisconsin, 1958-1959); a Fulbright scholarship to the University of San Marcos (Lima, Peru), with an additional grant for special studies at the University of Chile (Santiago, Chile), from July, 1959 to July, 1960; a grant from the Cultural Division of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations for study at the Catholic University in Rio de Janeiro (August - December, 1960); a University Fellowship at the University of Wisconsin (February - June, 1961), and a National Defense Foreign Language Fellowship in Portuguese for studies leading to the Doctor of Philosophy degree (June, 1961 - August, 1965). The NDFL Fellowship provided for two trips to Brazil: one to study at the University of Rio Grande do Sul, Pôrto Alegre (June - August, 1961) and the other to conduct field research for the dissertation in Rio de Janeiro (August, 1964 - April, 1965).

Mr. Graham's academic experience also includes participation as a student interne in the United Nations Office of Public Information program (August, 1963) and in a two-week seminar at Harvard University with Brazilian student leaders and United States graduate students (July, 1964, and July, 1965). The first year he attended the special program at Harvard as a graduate student and the second year he returned as a discussion group leader. Finally, his experience as a student includes a summer spent in a small Mexican village (Alejandra, Morelos), from June to August, 1955, as a member of a work camp.

He is a member of the following honoraries and professional associations: Sigma Delta Pi (Spanish honorary fraternity), Pi Sigma Alpha (national political science honorary fraternity), the American Political Science Association, the Southern Political Science Association, the American Society for Public Administration, and the Comparative Administration Group.

Since September, 1965, Mr. Graham has been employed as an Assistant Professor in the Department of Government, University of Texas, in Austin.

He is married to the former Jane Sharp Merrell; they have two children, Merrell Anne Graham and Virginia Lee Graham.

This dissertation was prepared under the direction of the chairman of the candidate's supervisory committee and has been approved by all members of that committee. It was submitted to the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was approved as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

December, 1965


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
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
  

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