

CREATING SUPPORT FOR AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME:
THE CASE OF BRAZIL, 1964-1970

By

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This dissertation analyzes the ability of an authoritarian military regime to create the requisite support which will allow it to persist and pursue the development goals which it defines for itself. Using Brazil as a case study, an exchange model is applied to examine the political resources (goods and services, information, status, authority, and coercion) which are available for utilization by the military regime to extract sector resources.

In the decade prior to the March 31, 1964, coup, Brazil was experiencing the breakdown of an authoritarian system due to the inability of the existing clientage networks to control the political participation of popular groups released by social mobilization occurring within a formally competitive system. The contradiction of a legislature and administrative system controlled by clientelists and executive offices responsive to popular groups created a stalled system and invited military rule.

In this context the Brazilian armed forces departed from the traditional veto function and seized power. The military leaders were relatively confident of their ability to restructure the political system because many officers had experience in civilian administrative roles, because their expanded view of national security gave them a strong motivation for modernizing the political and economic systems, and because they had a prescription for national development which had been formulated in the Superior War College.

The military regime's efforts to use the political marketplace to secure support are analyzed as four specific types of policy outputs. First, the regime initially directed its scarce resources (primarily coercion) toward the consolidation of its control over the political system in order to eliminate alternative sources for the supply of political goods. The resource position of the regime vis-à-vis the sectors was enhanced by the creation of a market monopoly.

Second, the available resources were used to depoliticize some sectors in order to lessen the demands made upon the system and to reduce the opportunity for overt acts of negative support. By repressing immediate demands for scarce commodities, a reservoir of political capital was created.

Third, allocations of real benefits (goods and services, authority and status) were used to maintain the

immediate support of military factions and, to a lesser extent, the industrial, commercial, and agricultural elites. Symbolic allocations of goods and services, status, and information established a base of diffuse support among previously nonsupportive sectors. This support allowed the regime to secure more sector goods for a given allocation of regime resources.

Fourth, the military regime attempted to create an institutional infrastructure for the delivery of future specific support. In the effort to build a regime party, the regime was required to expend present resources for future sector resources.

The experience of the six years of military rule in Brazil indicates that an authoritarian military regime can create the support needed to persist and pursue its goals. The Brazilian regime has been successful in consolidating its control over the political marketplace, in reducing the level of demands for scarce commodities, and in expanding immediate, diffuse support. Although a government party has been created, the reliability of the supporting infrastructure is questionable. The regime has not been willing or able (because of conflicting demands made by the military support base) to allocate the quantity of resources (specifically information and authority) needed to establish a truly strong institution.

CHAPTER I

AN EXCHANGE MODEL FOR ANALYZING POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR CONSERVATIVE CHANGE

To many political observers in the Western world, the armed forces are the enemies to world peace and well-being. The armed forces of advanced nations seemingly encourage armament races among themselves and among underdeveloped nation-states and, thus, siphon away the capital needed for more humane purposes. In addition, the armed forces of developing countries are prone to interfere in politics and seem to perpetuate a general state of instability, which is detrimental to political, economic, and social modernization.

Until the coup of March 31, 1964, the Brazilian military had a relatively good reputation for limiting its political activity. It had involved itself in politics, but the involvement was generally a veto operation designed to keep the Brazilian political process from veering too far to the left or right. When the threat to the equilibrium had passed, the soldiers returned the political power to civilian authorities. The 1964 coup,

however, ended the veto function of the Brazilian military¹ and left it in complete control of the nation.

Brazil is not a "modern nation" (economically, politically, or socially) and, thus, fits into that broad class of nations which are called "transitional."² Transitional nations--those in the process of changing from a traditional society to a modern society--are subject to military intervention since traditional norms and structures are often destroyed before modern institutions have developed. In this disrupted society, the army may be the only organized element which is capable of exercising effective political power and formulating public policy.³

¹The use of the terms "armed forces," "military," "army," "soldiers," etc. in this paper is a mere abbreviation for saying "the majority of the upper-echelon officers of the armed forces." Actually there is no single consensual viewpoint among Brazilian military officers; and that which is called the "military position" is really the viewpoint of the dominant group of officers.

²Lucian W. Pye, in his Politics, Personality and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 15-31, lists seventeen characteristics which describe a transitional polity. In terms of rank order in three key variables considered by Martin C. Needler, Brazil's middle position among twenty Latin American nations would indicate a transitional status. Brazil ranked seventh in constitutionality (a measure of stability), eighth in life expectancy (a measure of economic development), and fourteenth in electoral participation. See Political Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence and Evolutionary Change (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 90. For a more extensive comparison of aspects of modernity between Brazil and several developed nations, see Peter Ranis, Five Latin American Nations: A Comparative Political Study (New York: Macmillan Co., 1971), pp. 3-46.

³Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. John J. Johnson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 84.

Transitional societies contain several competing forms of political legitimacy. When doubt and disagreement exist as to the legitimacy of authority, the armed forces are allowed or forced to take an active political role.⁴ Samuel Huntington calls this a "praetorian society." A praetorian society has no legitimate institutionalized means for resolving conflicts. Each group must use the method which reflects its own nature and capability.⁵ That is, "the wealthy bribe; students riot; workers strike; mobs demonstrate; and the military coup."⁶

The above seems to be a correct, if superficial, description of the politics of most Latin American countries. Military intervention in Latin American politics indicates that the social and political institutions are incapable of agreement on the legitimate exercise of power.⁷ Because no class, party, or interest group has been able to exercise legitimate power for long, there are

⁴Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 105-106.

⁵Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 78-87 (hereinafter referred to as Political Order). For further discussion of praetorian societies, see Amos Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Politics," Comparative Politics, I (April, 1969), 382-404.

⁶Huntington, Political Order, p. 196.

⁷Gino Germani and Kalman Silvert, "Estructura Social e Intervención Militar en América Latina," in Argentina: Sociedad de Masas, eds. Torcuato de Tella et al. (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1965), p. 228.

recurring crises of legitimacy.⁸ This, in turn, is manifested in a more general phenomenon: "The employment of violence for political ends."⁹

In most nations which are now considered modern, the task of guiding and directing the process of development was assumed by middle-class elements. This presupposes a basic unity of values and direction among the segments of the middle class. Latin America has such a general lack of cohesion and homogeneity that there are middle classes rather than a middle class. Widespread disagreement exists among middle-sector groups as to the role of the state, the type of development desired, and the urgency of the task.¹⁰ The result has been a power struggle among segments of the middle classes, using the traditional legitimacy of the rural oligarchy or the voting power of the urban masses as levers.¹¹ If either the masses or oligarchy is about to seize power in its own name, the military is called to the rescue.

⁸Irving Louis Horowitz, "Political Legitimation and the Institutionalization of Crisis in Latin America," Comparative Political Studies I (April, 1968), 45-46.

⁹Lyle McAlister, "Changing Concepts of the Role of the Military in Latin America," Annals, CCCLX (July, 1965), 89.

¹⁰José Nun, "A Latin American Phenomenon: The Middle-Class Military Coup," in Latin America: Reform or Revolution? eds. James Petráš and Maurice Zeitlin (Greenwich, Connecticut: Fawcett Publications Inc., 1968), pp. 165-169.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 175-177.

Thus, military coups can be explained in terms of factors external to the military. First, violence is an accepted means of resolving disputes. Second, civilians often request military action. And, third, the political situation which invites a coup is often engineered deliberately or incidentally by societal groups through strikes, riots, economic troubles, or warnings against a communist threat.¹²

The political crises of Brazil in the past forty years are related to the failure of the political parties--and especially the middle-class parties--to agree upon national issues or to aggregate the interests of the different sectors of society.¹³ Add to this a haphazard system of economic organization which distributes income inequitably and a partially politicized mass public which is often ignored by the political system, and the sum is a recurring crisis. In short, Brazil has become a praetorian society because "groups have been mobilized into politics without becoming socialized by politics."¹⁴ Labor unions, peasant leagues, and demagogic politicians have brought mass groups to an awareness of politics, but the political system has

¹²Martin C. Needler, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America," American Political Science Review, LX (September, 1966), 618.

¹³Robert Dervel Evans, "The Brazilian Revolution of 1964: Political Surgery Without Anaesthetics," International Affairs (London), XLIV (April, 1968), 269.

¹⁴Huntington, Political Order, p. 83.

not allowed for their orderly participation. To preserve this system, which favors established and affluent groups (including the military), the armed forces have often been called upon to maintain order and the status quo.

Following the 1964 coup, the Brazilian armed forces retained control of the government in an attempt to create a more stable and effective political system. This effort, according to Huntington, will probably fail because "the complexity of social forces may preclude the construction of political institutions under middle-class military leadership."¹⁵ Huntington assumes that political groups in Brazil and other nations in the middle stages of political development are too varied, organized, and autonomous to allow the generals to keep the discretionary power needed to solve political problems. It is the purpose of this paper to test the obverse of Huntington's thesis. Formally presented, the hypothesis is as follows:

In a praetorian society having a moderate level of social mobilization, an authoritarian military regime may persist and have success in achieving its economic and political goals if the regime makes judicious use of the political resources at its disposal.

The hypothesis assumes that Brazil is a praetorian society in which social mobilization is incomplete, and the mobilized groups lack autonomy. These assumptions will be analyzed in Chapters II and III. It is further assumed that

¹⁵Ibid., p. 261.

the goals of the regime must be defined by the particular society as interpreted by each regime, with the immediate goal being the creation of sufficient support to allow the regime to persist and pursue its long-range goals. The analytical model used to test the hypothesis recognizes the contribution of earlier political development theorists and attempts to synthesize their efforts by avoiding normative considerations. A brief summary of the evolution of political development theory will illustrate the need for such a synthesis.

Political scientists have regarded political development as a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. Lucian Pye listed ten different, but overlapping, meanings of the concept;¹⁶ while Robert A. Packenham found five different

¹⁶Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), pp. 33-45. Political development has been defined as: the ability of the political system to confront the challenges of state-building, nation-building, participation, and distribution, Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 35; the degree of democracy, Phillip Cutright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," American Sociological Review, XXVIII (April, 1963), 253-264; nation-building and political participation in consonance with social mobilization, Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, LV (September, 1961), 69-105; the development of administrative structure, Fred Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), p. 423; the stages of growth, A. F. K. Organski, The Stages of Political Development (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 7; as political institutionalization, Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, XVII (April, 1965), 393 (hereinafter referred to as "Political Development"); the ability to solve the problems of authority, equality, and political participation, Dankwart Rustow, A World of Nations: Problems of Political

methodological approaches for the analysis of political development.¹⁷ These approaches have expanded the understanding of the conditions for problems of political change, but they have left "the quest for political development"¹⁸ an unachieved goal for political scientists.

Aside from the problem caused by the lack of a common definition for political development, the earlier scholarship can be criticized for three other problems. First, excessive emphasis was placed upon the input side of the equation. This led to the treatment of political change as a dependent variable affected by such exogenous factors as political culture, economic development, social mobilization, and literacy rates.¹⁹ By characterizing political development as a function of some social or economic dimension operating in conjunction with a particular historical sequence, the effect of political leaders and output structures has been obscured.²⁰

Modernization (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institute, 1967), p. 127.

¹⁷"Approaches to the Study of Political Development," World Politics, XVII (October, 1964), 108-120.

¹⁸John D. Montgomery, "The Quest for Political Development," Comparative Politics, I (January, 1969), 285-295.

¹⁹Phillip H. Melanson and Lauriston R. King, "Theories in Comparative Politics: A Critical Appraisal," Comparative Political Studies, IV (July, 1971), 217-222.

²⁰Joseph LaPalombara, "Macrotheories and Microapplications in Comparative Politics: A Widening Chasm," Comparative Politics, I (October, 1968), 73. See also Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, The Political Basis of Economic Development: An Exploration in Comparative

Second is the problem of treating political change as a unilinear progression toward some ill-defined goal. Societies were seen as moving in a continuum from "tradition" to "transition" to "modern."²¹ Deviations from this continuum are ignored except by some of the more sophisticated scholars, who still view "the pathologies or breakdowns of modernization" or "political decay" as aberrations from the pattern of stable development.²² Given the incidence of instability in developing nations, those with stable patterns of political change may be the actual deviant cases.²³

The third major problem is the teleology toward an ethnocentric view of Western representative democracy as the

Political Analysis (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1966), for a criticism of economic determinism and persuasive argument for the political determinism of economic development.

²¹For example, see Organski, Stages of Political Development; and Gino Germani, "Stages of Modernization in Latin America," Studies in Comparative International Development, V (1969-1970), 164-168. Germani, pp. 171-172, also makes politics the dependent variable by hypothesizing that Latin American political systems will be stabilized by expansion of the urban middle class, by massive internal migration, and by increased social mobility.

²²See S. N. Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of Modernization," Economic Development and Cultural Change, XII (July, 1964), 345-367; and Huntington, "Political Development," pp. 392-393.

²³Roger W. Benjamin, "The Dimensions of the Political Development Process," in Patterns of Political Development: Japan, India, Israel, eds. Roger W. Benjamin et al. (New York: David McKay Co., 1972), p. 16.

epitome of a politically developed polity.²⁴ The same type of political system that either fostered, or resulted from, the slow and steady economic growth in the "developed" nations of today was assumed to be also appropriate for the "developing" nations that are experiencing a telescoped process of social and economic change. In the teleological construct, every contingency was viewed as a step toward the ethnocentric and normative goal.

Other scholars have regarded political development as an independent variable or at least an intervening variable.²⁵ Political development becomes the "will and capacity" of the political system to transform the societal imbalances which arise because of the modernization revolution²⁶ or the "institutional framework capable of continuous absorption of change."²⁷ Political development can be reduced then to the "will and capacity" of the political authorities to cope with the structural changes and new

²⁴Montgomery, p. 289. For a more detailed criticism of this propensity, see Gabriel A. Almond, "Political Development: Analytical and Normative Perspectives," Comparative Political Studies, I (January, 1969), 457-460.

²⁵See Robert A. Packenham, "Political Development Research," in Approaches to the Study of Political Science, eds. Michael Haas and Henry S. Kariel (Scranton: Chandler Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 173-179.

²⁶Manfred Halpern, "Toward Further Modernization of the Study of Nations," World Politics, XVII (October, 1964), 175-177.

²⁷S. N. Eisenstadt, "Modernization and Conditions of Sustained Growth," World Politics, XVI (July, 1964), 583.

demands which are generated by the modernization process²⁸ or the "institutional framework for solving an ever-widening range of social problems."²⁹

A leading exponent of this definition of development is Samuel P. Huntington.³⁰ Huntington faults most theorists for overlooking the distinction between political modernization (i.e., political development) defined as movement from a traditional to a modern polity (thus, involving rationalization of authority, differentiation of structure, and expansion of political participation) and political modernization defined as the political aspects and effects of social, cultural, and economic modernization.³¹ The former is the theoretical end-result of modernization, while the latter is the general result of modernization not presided over by stable political institutions.

For Huntington, the level of political development of a society, in large part, depends on the strength and scope of its political institutions. The existence of political institutions which are capable of making decisions for the common good distinguishes a politically developed nation

²⁸Halpern, "Toward Further Modernization of the Study of Nations," p. 177.

²⁹Alfred Diamant, "Political Development: Approaches to Theory and Strategy," in Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change, eds. John D. Montgomery and William J. Siffin (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 16.

³⁰Huntington's formulation first appeared in "Political Development." The following comments are based on a revision of that essay in Huntington's Political Order.

³¹Political Order, pp. 34-35.

from an undeveloped one.³² Institutionalization is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability and is measured by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of the organizations and procedures as opposed to rigidity, simplicity, subordination, and disunity.³³

Huntington's key concept is that political institutionalization must anticipate, or at least keep pace with, the effects of social, economic, and cultural modernization. This is not dissimilar to the propositions of Easton (the persistence of the system involves its ability to respond to changes in demands and stresses in support);³⁴ of Deutsch (the system must be able to absorb and process more and more information);³⁵ and of Almond (the system must acquire new capabilities in order to respond to a new range of problems);³⁶ but Huntington puts far more emphasis on the need for the political community to create the needed institutions.

³²Ibid., pp. 24-32.

³³Ibid., pp. 12-22.

³⁴David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), pp. 17-19 (hereinafter referred to as Systems Analysis).

³⁵Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control (New York: The Free Press, 1963), pp. 139-140.

³⁶Gabriel A. Almond, "Political Systems and Political Change," The American Behavioral Scientist, VI (June, 1963), 8.

Although Huntington stresses the positive activities of a political elite more than do Easton, Deutsch, or Almond, he seems more pessimistic about the chances of success (perhaps because he is more cognizant of the possibility of political decay). "Revolutions are rare. Reform, perhaps, is even rarer . . . ," and he adds, even more difficult.³⁷ Institutionalization is a long process, probably requiring at least two generations before the institution is valued for its own sake and "develops a life of its own quite apart from the specific functions it may perform at any given time."³⁸ In Political Order in Changing Societies, Huntington emphasizes institutions and concludes that Leninism, or something akin to it, is the only hope for modernizing nations since it provides the proper combination of control, organization, and mobilization.

By implicitly defining political development as the institutionalization of a Leninist-type party, Huntington also succumbs to the problem of teleology. If the Leninist party is the only vehicle for effective modernization in this era of urgency, political development has only one variable, and most underdeveloped nations can be dismissed for lacking the critical determinant. It is necessary to understand institutional deficiencies, but rather than dismiss those nations with deficiencies, it would be more

³⁷Huntington, Political Order, pp. 344-345.

³⁸Ibid., p. 15.

valuable to understand how those defective institutions attempt to cope with change, however inadequate those efforts are. Huntington does not prove conclusively that an institutionalized single-party system is always successful, nor is he able to dismiss completely the oligarchical leadership responsible for political development in Japan and some European states.

By extracting the normative content from political development theory, the analysis focuses on political change (i.e., the process by which a particular regime pursues the ends which it defines for itself and the nation). To avoid the accusation of Machiavellianism, one can assume that every regime has a goal orientation which involves some mixture of Rustow's key developmental requirements of identity, authority, and participation.³⁹ If we further assume that it is the prerogative of the regime and the polity to choose the order of and the relationship among such goals, we can avoid the normative question of the rectitude of the goal orientation and concentrate on the prerequisites for expanding the range of choice as to the content of the goals and the means available for achieving them.

Samuel Huntington has suggested that the rate, scope, and direction of change in the political culture, structure, groups, leadership, and policies be analyzed to expose the

³⁹Rustow, p. 127.

effects of change on these components in terms of patterns of stability and instability.⁴⁰ To some extent, Chalmers Johnson used this type of analysis in his study of a "disequilibrated social system,"⁴¹ but unfortunately he directed his attention toward societies with such extreme disequilibrium that "insurrectionary change" (revolution) is the only alternative to continued instability. Because the analysis is concerned with the prerequisites for political change promoted by an existing regime, insurrectionary change, "which serves only the end of change itself,"⁴² is not of immediate interest since it involves such extremes in scope, rate, and direction. More important is that which Johnson characterizes as "conservative change" (gradual, structural change that avoids violence)⁴³ since it avoids the extreme costs of revolution.⁴⁴

The assumption that a political regime will prefer conservative change directs attention to the analysis of the

⁴⁰"The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and Politics," Comparative Politics, III (April, 1971), 316-319.

⁴¹Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), pp. 59-87.

⁴²Ibid., p. 58.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴It is apparent that most political leaders (and perhaps an even larger proportion of citizens) consider revolution too high a price to pay for a generally unknown outcome in spite of Barrington Moore's reluctant conclusion that "the costs of moderation have been at least as atrocious as those of revolution, perhaps a great deal more." Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 505.

prerequisites for the regime's pursuit of such change. Of concern, then, is the type of environment that will allow the regime to retain authority while coping with change and, more importantly, the type of policies that alter the regime's relationship with the environment and, thus, give the regime a wider range of choice. The range of choice is a function of the political power of the regime and is closely related to support or the absence of negative support.⁴⁵ The range of choice is increased by the efficient use of political resources in a way that will both increase the regime's power and expand its resources (i.e., to increase its support and the means available for generating more support).

"The new political economy" outlined by Warren F. Ilchman and Norman Thomas Uphoff provides a convenient model for analyzing political support.⁴⁶ Ilchman and Uphoff are interested in the means by which a statesman can expand the

⁴⁵Easton posits support as "the major summary variable linking a system to its environment," Systems Analysis, p. 156. The environment is composed of those intrasocietal factors which are external to the political system but impinge upon it and the extra-societal (international) factors which affect the political system, pp. 21-22.

⁴⁶The Political Economy of Change (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 26-48. This book is particularly useful because it analyzes political exchange at the regime level. For more universal explications of the exchange process, see Peter M. Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964); and R. L. Curry, Jr. and L. L. Wade, A Theory of Political Exchange: Economic Reasoning in Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968).

productivity of politics through judicious use of the political resources at his disposal. Thus, they are concerned with how a regime can maintain and increase its support and power while pursuing the change which it has defined as its goal.

To the architects of this model, there is a political marketplace which has many similarities to the economic marketplace. Political actors (the regime, interest groups, and institutional groups) have demands and supports which are traded in the political marketplace. The regime offers "economic goods and services, authority, status, information, and coercion."⁴⁷ Nonregime groups offer "economic goods and services, status, legitimacy, information and violence."⁴⁸ The key to "the new political economy" is the means by which the regime manipulates the exchange

⁴⁷ Ilchman and Uphoff, p. 32. In a similar analysis, Charles W. Anderson has pointed out that there are four basic tools which the State can use to make an impact on society. Among political attributes the State has a monopoly of legitimate force and is the focus of authority and legitimacy for the society. As an economic agent, the State can generate resources through taxation, borrowing, and production, and it can expend these resources for the public good. See "Comparative Policy Analysis: The Design of Measures," Comparative Politics, IV (October, 1971), 128-131.

⁴⁸ Ilchman and Uphoff, pp. 32-33. It would seem more logical to say "goods and services" without limiting services to those of an economic nature. One of the major services which a government can offer is stability and order. Stability and social peace benefit established economic interests obviously, but other groups such as bureaucrats, soldiers, and members of the liberal professions may also benefit in a manner that is not purely economic.

system in order to maximize its resources and to expand its range of choice in the pursuit of its goals. The analysis is directed to the output side of the system to ascertain the policies which are needed to alter the resources of nonregime sectors and to alter the operation and development of the political system itself.⁴⁹

In the economic model of the political system, output is of extreme importance because it is the means by which the regime manipulates its resources to ensure compliance in the environment or to increase its resources vis-à-vis the environment.⁵⁰ In this bargaining process, the regime can use its control over goods and services, status, information, coercion, and authority to elicit from the environment goods and services, status, information, violence (or no violence), and legitimacy in the form of allegiance and support.⁵¹ Of these various commodities, "the most important and versatile of all political currencies is support"⁵² because support is the basis for the legitimacy that can allow greater economy in the use of other resources.

⁴⁹LaPalombara, pp. 59-60, argues that too little attention has been paid to the output side of the political system. For a study of the effects of output upon the political system, see Giovanni Sartori, "Political Development and Political Engineering," Public Policy, XVII (1968), 261-298. Sartori presents a persuasive argument for the use of electoral systems to "engineer" a party system for the channelization of mass behavior, pp. 273-288.

⁵⁰Ilchman and Uphoff, pp. 118-120; and Blau, pp. 118-125.

⁵¹Ilchman and Uphoff, pp. 58-80.

⁵²Ibid., p. 78. Italics in the original.

Despite the importance given support, Ilchman and Uphoff do not provide a workable definition or description of the concept. They treat support as being distinct from other forms of political currency, but the distinction is not clear. In reality, the term seems to describe most of the environmental resources of the quid pro quo bargaining system. By responding to regime outputs with goods and services (taxes and productivity), status and prestige (for regime officials), information, refusal to use violence or threats of violence, and legitimacy (compliance and patriotism), the nonregime groups are providing support for the regime.⁵³

For the purpose of analysis, political support is defined as the overt actions or supportive attitudes of regime-associated groups (bureaucrats, politicians, military factions), environmental groups (clientage networks, interest associations), and individuals that give legitimacy to the authoritative decisions of the regime and, thus, allow the regime a more economical expenditure of political goods toward achievement of the defined goals. Overt actions include the payment of taxes, positive participation in the economic system, the willingness to vote for public officials and otherwise support the political system, compliance with laws and other social norms, attention to governmental information, and deference to the symbols of

⁵³See Easton, Systems Analysis, pp. 159-164.

authority.⁵⁴ Political support is not necessarily conscious and deliberate. As diffuse support, it may involve a set of attitudes which would cause the individual to respond in an overtly supportive manner in a situation where the regime or the system was under threat.⁵⁵

The more crucial areas of the analysis are the scope of support and the means by which the regime can manipulate its scarce resources to increase support in those nonregime sectors which have a relative abundance of resources. Economical pursuit of regime goals dictates the use of regime goods and services to reward supporting groups, to create new sources of support, and to form new resources. The judicious allocation of status (i.e., deference and esteem) will maintain or increase support, while avoiding the deflation of this very scarce resource.⁵⁶ Information may also be used to increase support, but, like status, it must be carefully husbanded to avoid deflation. The allocation of force is often inversely related to support, but coercion may be used against some sectors to increase support in other sectors or to discourage manifestations of negative support. Low-level and discriminate coercion may be used effectively to maintain stability and, thus, may be

⁵⁴Almond and Powell, pp. 26-27; and Easton, Systems Analysis, pp. 159-160.

⁵⁵Easton, Systems Analysis, pp. 160-161.

⁵⁶Ilchman and Uphoff, pp. 60-67. The problems of deflation and inflation of resource value are treated in pp. 136-159.

a positive factor in generating support.⁵⁷ Finally, the regime must judiciously allocate authority and influence when necessary to secure the support of political groups that have significant resources. By granting a political group limited authority or influence over some policy area, the regime may enhance its own authority in other areas.⁵⁸

Thus far, there has been no attempt to define the goals of the regime other than to assume that the regime seeks to cope with the problems of national identity, political authority, and citizen participation in a generalized manner. Ilchman and Uphoff theorize that every regime will attempt to cope with social and economic change, to induce social and economic change, to stay in authority in the present, to stay in authority in the future, and to build political and administrative infrastructure.⁵⁹ Assuming the validity of this vaguely defined goal orientation, political support becomes the immediate goal, the fulfillment of which will allow the pursuit of futuristic goals.

With political support as the central point of the analysis, the exchange model can then focus on the currency

⁵⁷Gregory B. Markus and Betty A. Nesvold have found that low-level coercion ranging from the use of curfew to the arrest and imprisonment of a few significant people generally resulted in little instability, while moderate coercion leads to intense instability. Extreme coercion lowers the level of instability but requires extreme expenditures of political resources. See "Governmental Coerciveness and Political Instability: An Exploratory Study of Cross-National Patterns," Comparative Political Studies, V (July, 1972), 237-242.

⁵⁸Ilchman and Uphoff, pp. 81-86.

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 33-36.

used by the regime to elicit the supporting actions and attitudes of regime and nonregime groups and individuals. By analyzing the experience of the military of Brazil, the hypothesis (an authoritarian military regime can persist and succeed in achieving its goals through judicious use of its political resources) will be tested. The succession of military-dominated governments which have ruled Brazil since April, 1964, have attempted to maintain support through careful expenditure of the resources available.

Specifically, four corollaries to the original hypothesis are posited.

COROLLARY 1: The resource position of the regime vis-a-vis the sectors is greatly enhanced by the creation of a regime monopoly over the political marketplace.

The Brazilian military regime initially directed its scarce resources toward the consolidation of its control over the political system in an effort to eliminate alternative sources for the supply of political goods.

COROLLARY 2: A reservoir of political capital can be created for later use by repressing immediate demands for scarce commodities.

The Brazilian regime used its available resources (coercion and information) to depoliticize some sectors in order to lessen the demands made upon the system and to reduce the opportunity for overt acts of negative support.

COROLLARY 3: Short-term support can be secured by real allocations of resources to regime-associated groups and symbolic allocations to environmental sectors.

The military regime in Brazil used allocations of real benefits (goods and services, authority, and status) to maintain the immediate support of military factions. Symbolic allocations of goods, services, prestige, and status were used to establish a base of diffuse support among previously nonsupportive sectors.

COROLLARY 4: Future, specific support by an institutionalized group requires extensive expenditures of present resources.

Recognizing the necessity of creating an infrastructure for the delivery of specific support in the future, the Brazilian regime was confronted with the need to allocate resources for uncertain future benefits.

These four corollaries to the hypothesis will be analyzed in conjunction with four basic types of policy outputs used by the Brazilian military to create political capital and to use the accumulated capital to expand support for the regime. It is first necessary, however, to review the nature of the political system inherited by the Brazilian armed forces and to analyze the role performed by the military in that system.

CHAPTER II

THE BREAKDOWN OF AN AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEM

The Brazilian political system, in official terms, has changed from a constitutional monarchy (established by the Constitution of 1824), to a representative democracy (established by the 1891 Constitution), to a corporate state (established by the 1937 Constitution), and back to a representative democracy (through the 1946 Constitution). If we ignore the formal nomenclature, however, it becomes apparent that the changes in formal structure have not resulted in much more than a gradual evolution from a semi-feudal monarchy to what Phillippe C. Schmitter has called an authoritarian system.¹

Schmitter contends that the political system of Brazil conforms, with some exceptions, to the authoritarian model used by Juan Linz to describe the Franco government of Spain.² By Linz' definition:

¹Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), pp. 376-386.

²For the original model, see Juan J. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain" in Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology, eds. Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan (New York: The Free Press, 1970), pp. 251-283.

Authoritarian regimes are political systems with limited, not responsible political pluralism; without elaborate and guiding ideologies (but with distinctive mentalities); without intensive nor extensive political mobilization (except some points in their development); and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones.³

According to Schmitter, the Brazilian system correlates quite well with the authoritarian model. There is evidence of political pluralism in Brazil, but the organized groups have generally been co-opted and controlled by the State. Schmitter found extensive elite heterogeneity in Brazil and also much autonomy of the State apparatus vis-à-vis political groups.⁴ The Brazilian system is also characterized by the absence of a guiding ideology and by the coexistence of several principles of legitimacy. The two points of deviation which Schmitter found are that Brazilian politics witnessed fairly widespread political mobilization and that there was a plurality of leadership groups (parties).⁵

³Ibid., p. 255.

⁴Schmitter, pp. 376-386. Schmitter has derived seven basic characteristics from the four points contained in the Linz definition.

⁵Ibid., pp. 380-383. The existence of a single party does not seem to be critical to the Linz model. It is useful for recruitment and socialization, but in reality the party is only one more group competing for status and access in the system of limited pluralism (see Linz, pp. 264-266). Other authorities have given the party a far more important role in authoritarian systems. See for instance the emphasis on one-party systems in the various essays contained in Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems, eds. Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (New York: Basic Books, 1970).

Schmitter's use of the Linz model is instructive, but it does not illuminate the cultural base for the authoritarian system nor does it explain why the system in Brazil was breaking down in the decade before 1964. The breakdown of the authoritarian system seems to be related to the failure of the clientage networks to prevent or control the emergence of new political actors. Several features of the Linz model--the heterogeneous elite, limited pluralism, limited and governmentally controlled mobilization, the discrete use of coercion, co-optation, and corruption--seem to describe a "clientelist polity."⁶ Political clientelism, which Legg defines as a system of "more or less personalized, affective and reciprocal relationship[s], involving actors or sets of actors commanding unequal or unlike resources and mutually beneficial transactions,"⁷ clearly encompasses the phenomena known as Transformismo or Giolittismo in Italy, Caciquismo in Spain, Coronelismo in Brazil, and a similar

⁶Keith Legg, "Regime Change and Public Policy in a Clientelist Polity: The Case of Greece and Italy," (paper presented at the 1972 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D. C., September 5-9, 1972).

⁷Ibid., p. 4. Clientelistic politics fits easily into the exchange model since there is an exchange of political goods between the patron and client, although the affective nature of the relationship may skew the exchange somewhat. In reality, however, the patron is a "political entrepreneur" providing both collective and private goods to his clients in exchange for a "profit" of some kind. For a theoretical discussion of political entrepreneurship, see Norman Frohlich et al., Political Leadership and Collective Goods (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

Greek variant. This rural bossism, confronted by demands for reform from incipient modernizing movements, lost control of the governmental machinery to truly authoritarian regimes (Mussolini in Italy, Metaxas in Greece, Primo de Rivera in Spain, and Vargas in Brazil). In spite of the fact that existence of rural clientelism was used as a rationale for the seizure of the State machinery, political clientelism was not eradicated. Indeed it still exists in Spain, Italy, Greece, and Brazil in a form which has become adapted, at least in part, to an urban, industrial setting.

There is some evidence that clientelism may be able to survive within a democratic regime such as Italy, but the overthrow of formally democratic governments in Greece (1967) and Brazil (1964) in concert with the persistence of the Franco regime in Spain seem to suggest that authoritarian regimes are more compatible with clientelistic politics. As Schmitter contends, pluralist democracy was more apparent than real in Brazil before 1964, with a democratic constitutional framework lending an air of legitimacy to an authoritarian system. The creation of the democratic framework following the overthrow of the openly authoritarian Estado Novo provided emerging popular groups with a means of circumventing the clientelist system as they competed with established political actors for the allocation of political goods. The democratic electoral system allowed the partially mobilized masses to adopt for themselves national patrons, in the form of populist politicians, who promised

them psychic and material satisfaction. The ascendance of these national patrons--Vargas, Kubitschek, Quadros, Goulart--short-circuited the clientage networks which had been the basic means of control for the authoritarian system.

Clientelism in Brazil has been facilitated by the somewhat unique historical experience of the nation. The absence of violence in the achievement of both independent and republican status, the presence of an undeveloped frontier and the absence of a strong external threat reduced the need for extensive mobilization.⁸ This lack of profound crises encouraged the development of a process of accommodation to and preemptive co-optation of new political groups and thus allowed the nation to avoid the development of serious cleavages which could have sustained autonomous movements.

The historical base of Brazilian clientelism was the patrimonial nature of colonial Brazilian society. With roots in the patriarchal society of the distant Islamic past of Portugal, patrimonialism became the cultural base for the Coronelismo and Caciquismo of contemporary Brazil.⁹ Until gold was discovered in the eighteenth century, Brazil was

⁸Robert T. Daland, "Development Administration and the Brazilian Political System," The Western Political Quarterly, XXI (June, 1968), 327-328.

⁹Aprígio Ribeiro, "O Pensamento Islâmico no Direito e nos Costumes Políticos do Brasil," Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos (hereinafter referred to as RBEP), I (July, 1957), 45-47.

never of major interest to the Portuguese crown, and royal control was generally limited to port areas. Thus, the dispersed settlements were organized around the social and economic power of the dominant family of the settlement. The family, then, and not the State or any commercial enterprise was the productive unit, the source of protection, and the dispenser of economic and social values; and the decisions of the family were made by its patriarch.¹⁰

The patriarchal clan was more than just the consanguineous family. According to Oliveira Vianna, the patriarchal clan contained both a feudal clan--a hierarchical arrangement including the family, servants, slaves, wage laborers, and even independent farmers and merchants¹¹--and the parental clan--a horizontal amalgam of all those tied by blood, adoption, copaternity, or marriage to the core family.¹² Given the nature of Portuguese colonial rule, never as organized or as strict as the Spanish rule experienced by the other areas of the New World,¹³ the

¹⁰Gilberto Freyre, The Masters and the Slaves, trans. Harriet de Onis (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), p. 31; and Oliveira Vianna, Instituições Políticas Brasileiras, Vol. I (2 vols.; Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1949), pp. 209-210. Oliveira Vianna contends that the prestige of the feudal clan was dependent not just upon the power of the patriarch to control the local situation but also upon his ability to lead aggressive forays against neighboring and distant settlements, pp. 220-222.

¹¹Vianna, pp. 211-213.

¹²Ibid., pp. 237-239.

¹³For a comparison of Portuguese and Spanish colonial rule, see Eulália Maria Lahmeyer Lobo, Processo Administrativo Ibero-Americano: Aspectos Sócio-Econômicos--Período

patriarchal clan suffered little challenge to its local hegemony.¹⁴

With the discovery of gold in the eighteenth century, the Portuguese crown began an effort to centralize administrative control over Brazil, but this was limited to fiscal controls¹⁵ and had little effect upon the economically autonomous rural latifundia. When the seat of the Portuguese Empire was moved to Rio de Janeiro in 1808, a more concerted attempt at centralization was made, but this process was halted by the establishment of an independent Brazilian monarchy in 1822.

In place of the attempt to establish a system of strict fiscal controls of a tributary nature, the new Brazilian monarchy turned its attention to achieving national unity. A national administrative system was set up, but its

Colonial (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1962), pp. 549-559.

¹⁴ Although one is tempted to use the term "feudal" to describe the relationship between patriarch and client, the lack of formal authority and total allegiance rule out the term. A better term is that of traditionalistic patrimonialism as defined by René Lemarchand and Keith Legg, "Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis," Comparative Politics, IV (January, 1972), 166-168. Lemarchand and Legg describe traditionalistic paternalism as a less-than-formal but wholly ubiquitous patron-client relationship which is replicated by state structures. For an extensive discussion of the Brazilian form of patrimonialism, see Raimundo Faoro, Os Donos de Poder (Pôrto Alegre: Editôra Globo, 1958).

¹⁵ Mário Wagner Vieira da Cunha, O Sistema Administrativo Brasileiro: 1930-1950 (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Nacional de Estudos Pedagógicos, Ministério de Educação e Cultura, 1963), p. 13.

activity seldom extended beyond the major cities. According to Vieira da Cunha:

The administration really reached limited functional sectors and limited territorial areas. The rest was left to the local clans. None of these [the clans] requested action by the government, nor did the government intend to create an organization--either judicial, political, or religious, or of services--that would contest the power of the rural patriarchs.¹⁶

Patrimonialism endured during the Empire and became even more important politically under the decentralized political system of the First Republic (1889-1930). It is during this period that authoritarian paternalism, generally known as coronelismo, operated in its most virulent form on a national political level. The term coronel is an honorary one, like doutor, and was derived from the practice--dating from 1831 to the extinction of the National Guard--of designating the leading political and economic figure (the patriarch of the local clan) of the município as commander of the local militia regiment. The social, economic, and political power which earned the man the official appointment as coronel continued to ascribe the title to the local holder of such power long after the post was abolished.¹⁷ Nunes Leal states the coronelismo operates primarily in

the municípios of the interior, which is equivalent to saying the rural municípios or predominantly rural

¹⁶Ibid., p. 32.

¹⁷Victor Nunes Leal, Coronelismo, Enxada e Voto: O Município e o Regime Representativo no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Revista Forense, 1948), pp. 7-10.

ones; its vitality is inversely proportional to the development of urban activities, such as commerce and industry. Consequently, isolation is an important factor in the formation and maintenance of the phenomenon."¹⁸

With the fall of the Empire, an exaggerated federal system--copied from the United States but superimposed over a more traditional society--was established, and this gave enormous financial and administrative power to state governments to the detriment of both the national and municipal governments.¹⁹ Authoritarian state governments with democratic trappings were formed around oligarchies which generally incorporated the most powerful coroneis of the state. With the state government controlling a preponderance of the financial resources, the local coronel, as the client of the state government, was expected to deliver the political support of his clients in exchange for local privileges and financial support.

The Constitution of 1891 had provided for decentralized administration at the municipal level, but the state oligarchies, through their control of the financial resources, were able to control municipal administration effectively.²⁰ In spite of state control, there were many types of political goods (control of the police, nominations for government jobs, personal prestige, and the opportunity to get a

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 181-182.

¹⁹Vieira da Cunha, pp. 34-35.

²⁰Ibid., p. 36.

share of the far more remunerative patronage of the state government) which made the municipal power position attractive. Since the patriarchal clans of the colony and the Empire were largely divorced from politics and their hegemony did not always correspond to municipal boundaries, the new administrative powers of the município many times involved the struggle between two clans (i.e., two coroneis). The two pretenders, then, would engage in what was often open warfare to see who would be the client of the patron state government and would thus deliver elector support in exchange for the financial largess that would make him the patron for local clients in the município.²¹

The means of the coronel's electoral support were his votos de cabresto (halter votes). The votes were halter votes because many of the voters in the município worked for the coronel or members of his clan; because even if a man owned a small piece of land, his livelihood was so precarious that he must have, at some time, help from the coronel; because the coronel might transport, feed, and buy shoes for the voter on election day; because the coronel, in a setting of weak public power, had the ability to exercise extra-legally many of the functions of the State and, thus, to bestow benefits; and because the coronel was owed a high

²¹Joseph L. Love, "Political Participation in Brazil, 1889-1969," Luzo-Brazilian Review, VII (December, 1970), 10-11; and Michel Debrun, O Fato Político (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1962), p. 111.

level of paternal deference, either out of love, fear, or a combination of both.²²

The coronel's relationship with his clients was largely paternal. Yet he was not above fraud and violence. In the First Republic, voting fraud was used extensively by both the coroneis and the state administrations to assure the electoral success of the oligarchies.²³ Violence was a prevalent feature of coronelismo although it was generally used only when other means were more uncertain or inefficient in guaranteeing the desired outcome.²⁴

Following the 1930 Revolution, the authoritarian control of the state oligarchies was replaced by an authoritarian national government, and the patron-client system of the rural coroneis was succeeded, in part, by a new system of dyadic relationships established by the state and local representatives of the national government. The old system was not totally superseded, however, since the coroneis lost only their political power. They were able to maintain control over such private goods as status and wealth and

²²Nunes Leal, pp. 18-25. For an example of how the coronel "delivers the votes" of his clients, see Leslie Lipson, "Government in Contemporary Brazil," The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXII (May, 1956), 194.

²³Jean Blondel, As Condições da Vida Política no Estado da Paraíba, trans. Alcântara Nogueira (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1957), p. 18 (hereinafter referred to as As Condições).

²⁴Nunes Leal, p. 29.

thereby preserved a base for regaining control over political goods when the climate was more favorable.²⁵

When Brazil returned to representative government in 1945, the coroneis once again were able to operate in the political marketplace, but social, economic, and political change, manifested in the rapid growth of industrialization and urbanization, along with a rapid expansion of federal bureaucratic agencies and the use of a proportional representation system, had changed the situation and limited the political importance of coronelismo. In rural areas the system was able to regain some of its former strength, however. Bonifácio Fortes could write as late as 1964 that in Sergipe there was still a "politics of oligarchy" tending toward a "politics of populism" in certain industrialized areas.²⁶ The coronel simply picked up the banner of a political party and transformed the local fiefdom into a local branch of a national party.²⁷ Although the change extended the power of the national government and the challenges from newly emerging groups seriously weakened the power of the coronel (a factor which often forced rival coroneis to put aside their traditional feuds in order to form a coalition to meet the new political threat), coronelismo is still a factor of politics in modern Brazil,

²⁵Waldemar Ladosky, "Evolução das Instituições Políticas em Minas Gerais," RBEP, No. 14 (July, 1962), 87.

²⁶"Sergipe: Democracia de Poucos," RBEP, No. 16 (January, 1964), 127-128.

²⁷Ibid.

even in nominally urban areas.²⁸ The continued presence of coronelismo, even in an attenuated form, has provided the military regime a means of controlling the participation of the rural masses, but it has also presented a problem for the creation of broad-based rural party organizations.

Industrialization and urbanization, in conjunction with the proportional representation system and the growth of the bureaucracy, reduced the significance of traditionalistic patrimonialism and gave rise to a form of clientelism which Lemarchand and Legg call modernizing patrimonialism.²⁹ With the restoration of representative politics in Brazil after 1945, altered political context made new groups available for opportunistic politicians to use for electoral support.³⁰ This brought to the fore a more conditioned and informal, yet still affective, pattern of political relationships.³¹

²⁸See José Murflio de Carvalho, "Barbacena: A Família, a Política, e uma Hipótese," RBEF, No. 20 (January, 1966), 168-173; and Luis Silva, "Implicações Políticas do Desenvolvimento Industrial de Barroso," RBEF, No. 9 (July, 1960), 242-243.

²⁹pp. 166-168. This variant is distinguished from traditionalistic patrimonialism by more extensive but still limited social mobilization, by more segmented and shifting dependency relationships, by a more diversified base of patronage, and by a state system superimposed over the clientage network.

³⁰Plínio Cabral, Política Sem Cartola (Rio de Janeiro: Gráfica Record Editora, 1967), pp. 88-89, blames the Estado Novo for the political ills of contemporary Brazil. By eliminating politics as a vocation, young idealistic aspirants went to other fields, and only the cynical and opportunistic old guard remained.

³¹Nathaniel H. Leff, Economic Policy-Making and Development in Brazil, 1947-1964 (New York: John Wiley and Sons,

The new clientelistic politicians represented interest groups, bureaucratic cliques, families, and regional groups in a quid pro quo fashion, and avoided any permanent alliances or commitment which would dilute the loyalty of the personalistic leader to his group and his position.³²

Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco contends that the dominance of the rural coronel was broken (the rural coronel was not eliminated, however) by the appearance of urban coroneis. These counterparts of the electoral patriarchs of the interior profited from the low cultural level of the new urban masses (i.e., their indifference for programs and their confidence in individuals instead of ideas).³³

The result of the personalistic and pragmatic nature of clientelistic politics was that the parties which existed between 1945 and 1965, with minor exceptions, had little ideological originality.³⁴ Only the Integralistas, the

1968), p. 118. For two theoretical discussions concerning the nature of clientelism in Brazil, see Paulo Singer, "A Política das Classes Dominantes" in Política e Revolução Social no Brasil, eds. Octávio Ianni et al. (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1965), pp. 72-78; and Pessoa de Moraes, Sociologia da Revolução Brasileira: Análise e Interpretação do Brasil de Hoje (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Leitura, 1965), pp. 104-107.

³²Robert T. Daland, Brazilian Planning: Development Politics and Administration (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967), p. 197 (hereinafter referred to as Brazilian Planning).

³³História e Teoria do Partido Político no Direito Constitucional Brasileira (Rio de Janeiro: Revista Forense, 1948), pp. 99-100 (hereinafter referred to as História e Teoria).

³⁴Luis Navarro de Britto, "A Representação Proporcional," RBEP, No. 19 (July, 1965), 239.

Communists, and the Partido Liberal (a small party which constantly fought to establish a parliamentary system) had conscious and consistent programs. All others revolved around men, not ideas.³⁵ The voter voted for a man (or the legend of a man, as in the case of Vargas), never for a party or a program. The vote was then transformed into a vote for a party.³⁶ Parties were the instruments of political brokers, and the chefe político (political boss) could "change parties with the same ease as one changes his shirt."³⁷

The chefe político belonged to a political party because the electoral system made affiliation with a national party mandatory, but the nature of the personalistic following of the chefe and the abundance of parties (as many as thirteen existed at times during the 1945-1965 period) allowed the chefe to make alliances and change allegiances with ease. Even though the situation which caused João Neves da Fontoura to comment in 1930 that in Brazil "anyone can start a political party, like opening a shop"³⁸ no

³⁵Paulo de Figueiredo, "Partidos, Congresso, Democracia," Revista de Informação Legislativa (Senado Federal), III (October/December, 1966), 105.

³⁶Wilson Martins, "Paraná: Uma Cognita," RBEP, No. 8 (April, 1960), 230-231.

³⁷Abelardo F. Montenegro, "Tentativa de Interpretação das Eleições de 1958 no Ceará," RBEP, No. 8 (April, 1960), 40. See also Bonifácio Fortes, "Contribuição a História Política de Sergipe (1933-1958)," RBEP, No. 8 (April, 1960), 87.

³⁸Quoted by Josaphat Marinho, "Institucionalização e Estatuto dos Partidos Políticos," Revista de Informação Legislativo (Senado Federal), III (March, 1966), 4

longer existed, until 1965 it was still just as easy to establish a local branch of one of the national parties.

Jean Blondel has stated that in Paraíba, as in most states, one could substitute party labels such as PSD and UDN with x and y and the study would be the same.³⁹ One might have been more correct to use labels such as "the party of chefe x" and "the party of chefe y." An extreme, but illustrative, example is provided by the 1962 municipal elections of Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais. In the shuffle for positions on the ballot to elect twenty-one representatives to the municipal council, there were no fewer than forty-eight changes of party affiliation among the thirteen parties participating in the election.⁴⁰

In Brazil "the political battle is preeminently a struggle for access to power rather than for ideology, policy, or the protection of a particular interest."⁴¹ The chefe político is a professional, and only when he has access to those who make political decisions, can he deliver the goods to his clients and, thus, maintain or improve his position. He maintains his access to the power structure and his clientele by promises (often avoiding

³⁹ pp. 154-155.

⁴⁰ Anis José Leão, "Comportamento de Eleitorado de Belo Horizonte nas Eleições de 1962," RBEP, No. 16 (January, 1964), 300-301.

⁴¹ Daland, Brazilian Planning, p. 207.

delivery),⁴² and he is also quite adept at moving to better his position. He will use miraculous solutions, scapegoats, and affective programs to increase his clientele. If there is a vacancy in the political spectrum, the politician will move to that position (rhetorically) in an effort to increase his clientele and thus enhance his bargaining position vis-à-vis the decision-makers.⁴³

The chefe político or the coronel of the rural area, and generally the chefe of an urban area as well, tends to be rather conservative and short-sighted in his dealings with his clients. His general policy is to "discourage any fundamental changes in the economic and social organization of the community but at the same time 'do something' to combat local misery."⁴⁴ This may include the distribution of money and food during a drought or the installation of a fresh water system or a medical clinic in the urban center. He opposes land distribution, better schooling, specialized skill training, and the development of local organizations to plan for irrigation or better schools. Public works--dams, roads, etc.--are favored because they give temporary

⁴²Cabral, pp. 14-17. See also Singer, pp. 74-77; and Edilson Portela Santos, "Evolução da Vida Política no Município de Picos, Piauí," RBEF, No. 10 (January, 1961), 179.

⁴³Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic, Political Trends in Brazil (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1968), pp. 5-6.

⁴⁴Beldon H. Paulson, "Local Political Patterns in Northeast Brazil: A Community Case Study," (mimeographed pamphlet from the College of Agriculture, University of Wisconsin, August, 1964), pp. 51-52.

employment, are tangible and physically impressive, and also can be used to benefit special individuals.⁴⁵

At election time the chefe político must "get out the vote" either for himself or for his candidate. In rural areas the lack of political consciousness on the part of the rural worker often leads him to question the need to vote. The distance to the polls, the loss of a work day, and the uncertainty of the act are overcome with the help of the chefe, who serves as the intermediary between the voter and the outside world.⁴⁶

In some cases, delivering the vote might require the use of electoral fraud to ensure the success of the desired candidates. The methods, too numerous to be described completely, include: voting illiterates and dead people; irregular composition of the voting table so as to admit friends and exclude enemies; voting in two electoral districts; voting under two or more names; and escorting the voter to the booth, giving specific instructions on how to vote.⁴⁷ Since every voter must be registered, fraud is

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Blondel, pp. 58-60. As communications improved, the popularity of well-known politicians often overshadowed the efforts of the chefes to mobilize voters. See José Bernardo Felix de Sousa, "As Eleições Goianas," RBEP, No. 16 (January, 1964), 285; and Nelson de Souza Sampaio, "As Eleições Bahianas de 1962," RBEP, No. 16 (January, 1964), 168-169.

⁴⁷Blondel, pp. 98-100; and Amílcar Alves Tupiassu, "As Eleições Paranaenses de 1962," RBEP, No. 16 (January, 1964), 27-30.

often as prevalent during registration as it is during the election. The chefe "helps" the citizen register just as he helps him vote--by transporting potential voters to the registration office, by filling out the required form so the citizen has only to sign his name, and often by teaching the citizen how to sign his name.⁴⁸

Aspiring candidates often purchase support of a chefe político, and the chefe, in turn, needs money to hold the support of his followers. Sometimes voters are paid specifically to vote for certain candidates. In other cases, the chefe might hand out money, food, or other items to his supporters to indicate his good will, which, of course, could be repaid with a vote for the chefe's candidate, but the quid pro quo is not specifically mentioned. Election may cost a candidate or his sponsors as much as five times the amount the successful office-seeker will be paid officially during his mandate.⁴⁹

The chefe político maintains numerous contacts within the state and national political structures in order to satisfy the wants of his clients. Although the state and national bureaucracies have been the dominant contact point

⁴⁸Literacy is a prerequisite for voting. Jean Blondel, As Condições, pp. 74-82, found that in Paraíba the 1950 census showed only 290,559 literate citizens fifteen years of age or older, yet there were 346,141 registered voters (supposedly literate and twenty-one or over).

⁴⁹Oswaldo Trigueiro, "A Crise do Sistema Eleitoral Brasileiro," RBEP, III (July, 1959), 103. See also Abelardo F. Montenegro, "As Eleições Cearenses de 1962," RBEP, No. 16 (January, 1964), 88-89.

of the clientelistic politicians, the legislative politician often serves as the intermediary between the bureaucrat and the local patron.⁵⁰ In other words, the legislator often is the patron for a number of local chefe político clients who need access to the bureaucracy. Thus, in the representative system established after 1945, the major concern of the chefe político was to get either himself or his own patron elected.

The political base of operations for the chefe político is and has been the município, just as it was for the coronel, but as Brazilian society became more mobilized and differentiated after World War II, it became increasingly more difficult for one patron to maintain total hegemony over all the clients in his município.⁵¹ Much of this difficulty related to the reforms which followed the 1930 Revolution. As a reaction to the oligarchical authoritarianism of coronelismo, these structural reforms facilitated the evolution toward a system of modernizing patrimonialism, but they also opened the way for the mobilization that would weaken the clientage base of the authoritarian system.

⁵⁰Schmitter, pp. 257-272. Schmitter states that the legislatures are only a secondary point of contact for interest group leaders, presumably because of the weak role played by legislatures in the decision-making function. Individual legislators, however, commonly provide access to administrative decision-makers.

⁵¹Barbosa Lima Sobrinho, Sistemas Eleitorais e Partidos Políticos (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1956), p. 65.

In the Third Republic,⁵² one could still find rural municípios where most of the people were apolitical even if they were literate and had voted, but situations such as that in Dores do Indaiá, Minas Gerais--where the family of the Baron of Indaiá had ruled from 1880 to 1945 with only four years out of power⁵³--were rapidly fading. Immediately after the electoral and party reforms of 1945, two-way struggles between rival clans (but now wearing the labels of national political parties) were quite common, but even as coronelismo fought to regain its old position vis-à-vis the state government,⁵⁴ the bipartite contests were changed to multipartite struggles. The power of the dual oligarchies steadily deteriorated because of the growth of functional organizations and social differentiation brought on by industrialization and urbanization and because of the use

⁵²Thomás Leonardos, As Vésperas da Quinta República: Sugestões para o Presidencialismo Brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro: Empresa Gráfica "O Cruzeiro," no date), pp. 11-12, provides a useful breakdown for contemporary Brazilian history. His "Republics": First Republic: November, 1889 to October, 1930; Second Republic: July, 1934 to November, 1937; Third Republic: September, 1946 to September, 1961; Fourth Republic: September, 1961 to January, 1963; Fifth Republic: January, 1963 to March, 1964.

⁵³Orlando M. Carvalho, "Os Partidos Políticos em Minas Gerais," RBEP, I (July, 1957), 102-103.

⁵⁴Nunes Leal, pp. 29-30. These electoral battles, often violent, were interesting in that, even after the local clans had adopted national party labels, old nicknames were still used. Thus, one would read of the patos (ducks) versus the perus (turkeys); the besouros (beetles) versus the maribondos (wasps); and the luzeiros (the illustrious ones) versus the escureiros (the obscure ones). See Carvalho, "Os Partidos Políticos em Minas Gerais," p. 102.

of the proportional representation system. More and more municípios shifted from one-party-dominant systems to situations in which three or more parties competed and no single party was able to gain a majority.⁵⁵

Although the electoral reforms that led to the decline of coronelismo were not without their faults, they were a vast improvement over the oligarchical system of the First Republic which Oswald Aranha in 1929 described as

an inheritance of slavery, without law, without freedom, without responsibility, without inspection; but with spoils, bribes, violence and fraud, not giving satisfaction to either the winner or the loser. It is a comedy presided over by arbitrary power....⁵⁶

The constitution of the Third Republic established the secret ballot, a system of electoral inspection and judicial control, and a proportional-representation system that gave unequal representation to the smaller, less populous states and, thus, sought to avoid the excesses of federal control practices by Vargas during the Estado Nôvo. In the Câmara dos Deputados (Chamber of Deputies), seats were apportioned on a minimum ratio of one seat for each 150,000 inhabitants of the state, with a minimum representation of seven deputies per state and one per territory. For each deputy above twenty, 250,000 inhabitants were required.⁵⁷

⁵⁵See, for example, Carvalho, "Os Partidos Políticos em Minas Gerais," pp. 110-111; and Nelson de Sousa Sampaio, "Eleições Bahianas," p. 144.

⁵⁶Quoted by Hélio Silva, 1926--A Grande Marcha (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1965), p. 316.

⁵⁷Article 58 of 1946 Constitution.

The system resulted in gross inequalities and the negation of the principle of proportional representation as a true reflection of the relevant shades of public opinion. For example, in 1962 one vote for a federal deputy in the state of Acre had the same value as twenty-five votes in São Paulo since the electoral quotient (the total number of valid votes divided by the number of seats) was 2,077 in Acre, while in São Paulo it was 53,544.⁵⁸ Thus, while the P.R. system has worked to break the absolute hegemony of the coroneis, it gave superrepresentation to the very areas most susceptible to coronelismo.

Many Brazilian political analysts fault the P.R. system as the cause of the excesses of personalism, demagoguery, and corruption. According to those scholars, the electoral laws, not cultural factors or ideologies, were the cause of the fragmentation and crystallization of parties into individualized groups.⁵⁹ The accusation is apparently correct since the P.R. system fostered an expansion of clientelism to a level which exceeded the ability of the system to allocate rewards and, thus, to maintain control over the partially mobilized clients.

The electoral laws encouraged a proliferation of candidates as well as a proliferation of parties. Each party

⁵⁸Luis Navarro de Britto, "A Representação Proporcional," pp. 242-243.

⁵⁹Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco, "Os Partidos Políticos Nacionais," Revista Forense, CLVII (January/February, 1955), 12-13. See also Oswaldo Trigueiro, "A Crise do Sistema Eleitoral Brasileiro," pp. 103-107.

wanted to get proven vote-getters on its list, but it would also accept as many candidates as possible in order to increase the vote total and also to collect more registration fees. This was especially prevalent in local elections since candidates tended to favor the contests where the electoral quotient was lower. In such elections the votes controlled by only one chefe político might be sufficient for election.⁶⁰ In Bahia for the P.R. elections of 1950 through 1962, the average number of candidates for federal deputy seats was only 2.48 as compared to an average of 5.40 candidates per seat in the state legislative assembly. For the seats on the municipal council of the state capital, the average was 13.4.⁶¹

The Electoral Code of 1950 provided that only those parties or alliances which achieved the electoral quotient could participate in the distribution of seats. This factor encouraged the use of party alliances in contests where the electoral quotient was high, such as federal deputy elections.⁶² In this type of situation, a small party would lose its votes if it did not ally itself with

⁶⁰See Alves Tupiassu, "As Eleições Paranaenses de 1962," pp. 36-40.

⁶¹Nelson de Sousa Sampaio, "Bahia," in Comportamento Eleitoral no Brasil, eds. Themístocles Cavalcanti and Reisky Dubnic (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1964), pp. 9-12.

⁶²See Lima Sobrinho, Sistemas Eleitorais e Partidos Políticos, p. 99; and Sousa Sampaio, "Bahia," pp. 17-18.

another party or parties, thereby achieving the quotient. In state assembly contests, and especially in elections for municipal councils, alliances were less common.

The necessity of getting elected forced the clientelistic politician to use whatever means possible, and the P.R. system reinforced the natural tendency to rely on his personal organization rather than on the party. Each candidate had to compete with all other candidates, including those of his own party list since the total vote for the candidates of the party stipulated the number of seats the party was allotted, and the candidate's position on the list of votes received by the party determined whether or not he would get one of those seats. Thus, it did not matter which party the candidate chose to run with⁶³ unless the candidate wished to be carried into office on the coattails or residual votes of a proven vote-getter.

A proven vote-getter might abandon his original party to establish the local branch of another national party so that he could use his personal strength to elect as many of his cronies as possible. As a result, the electoral laws not only made the parties irrelevant on a programmatic basis, they also encouraged the proliferation of parties. For example, in the state legislative assembly of Bahia, the seventy seats were divided among six parties in 1947, seven

⁶³Oswaldo Trigueiro states that in most cases the party is merely a place "to hang the hat." "A Crise do Sistema Eleitoral Brasileiro," p. 107.

in 1951, nine in 1955, and ten in 1959. In the municipal council of the capital, Salvador, the eighteen seats were held by five parties in 1948, seven in 1951, eight in 1955, and nine in 1959--each party in 1959 having two seats.⁶⁴

These alliances did not, however, result in anything more than momentary, pragmatic groupings. There was seldom any unity in alliances from state to state or from election to election. In the 1962 federal deputy elections, there were thirty-two alliances, but in not a single electoral entity (states, territories, and the Federal District) was an alliance composed of the same parties that formed twenty-six alliances which participated in the 1958 election.⁶⁵

Party fragmentation was encouraged by the proportional-representation system that was established in Brazil, but, in large measure, a more important factor has been the non-programatic nature of clientelistic politics. Brazil, during the Empire, borrowed from Great Britain the concept of "liberal" and "conservative" political parties, but this had little effect except to provide a new weapon, one with an external appearance of legitimacy, in the arsenal of the local oligarchies for the maintenance of their own power.⁶⁶

⁶⁴Sousa Sampaio, "Eleições Bahianas," pp. 142-143.

⁶⁵Pompeu de Sousa, "Eleições de 62: Decomposição Partidária e Caminhos da Reforma," RBEP, No. 16 (January, 1964), 10-11.

⁶⁶Debrun, p. 111. For a description of party politics during the reign of Pedro II, see Américo Brasiliense de Almeida e Melo, Os Programas dos Partidos e o Segundo Império (São Paulo: Editora Seckler, 1878).

The artificiality of imperial party politics was ended in 1873 with the founding of the Republican Party, a party which departed from the tweedledum and tweedledee nature of the traditional parties because of its program advocating positivism and the abolition of the monarchy.⁶⁷ Success spoiled the Republican Party, however, and in the absence of a strong national party organization (and a strong national government as well), it became an alliance of state oligarchies.⁶⁸ Each state had its own Republican Party with the Partido Republicano Mineiro (PRM, Minas Gerais) and the Partido Republicano Paulista (PRP, São Paulo) joining to dominate national politics. The exaggerated federalism of both governmental and party structure in the First Republic prompted Gilberto Amado, at the time of the 1930 Revolution, to write:

If Brazil is not able to form militant parties that can articulate the country from north to south, gearing the ruling wills one with another in a common feeling of positive ideas or points of view concerning education, culture and national civilization, the political life will continue to operate, no matter whatever electoral system is adopted, by a fragmented empiricism, anarchical and incurable, that will not provide means of easing the crises, solving them always by revolts, general disorder, revolutions.⁶⁹

Following the 1930 Revolution, two national parties--Ação Integralista Brasileira, a fascist party organized by

⁶⁷Melo Franco, História e Teoria, pp. 54-57.

⁶⁸Ibid., pp. 65-68.

⁶⁹Eleição e Representação (2nd ed.; Rio de Janeiro: Irmãos Pongetti, 1946), p. 175.

Plínio Salgado, and Aliança Nacional Libertador, a leftist party advocating labor and agrarian reforms--were established, but most of the parties that participated in the 1934 Constituent Assembly were very much state oriented.⁷⁰ With the advent of the corporatist Estado Nôvo in 1937, all political parties were dissolved and partisan politics remained dormant until 1945 when Vargas, recognizing the defeat of fascism, issued Decree-Law Number 7,586, which provided for proportional-representation elections for federal and state deputies and required candidates to run under national party banners.

The major parties that were organized in 1945 and 1946 were basically groups of clientelists drawn together by similar orientations to Getúlio Vargas. The Partido Social Democrático (PSD) was the party of intransigent officialdom. Like the Republican Parties of the First Republic, the PSD was rural or semi-rural and conservative, and its organizers were the chefes who had been associated with the Estado Nôvo as state and municipal officials.⁷¹ The Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB) was the urban wing of the clientelists attached to Vargas. The PTB was the party of the labor union pelego, the political broker who served as mediator

⁷⁰J. A. Pinto do Carmo, Diretrizes Partidárias: UDN-PRD-PSD-PTB-PRP-PL-PR-PSP-PSB-PDC-PST-PTN-PCB (Rio de Janeiro: Irmãos Pongetti, 1948), pp. 26-28.

⁷¹See Thomas E. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964: An Experiment in Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 56; and Melo Franco, História e Teoria, pp. 101-102.

between the workers, on the one hand, and the employers and the government, on the other.⁷²

Although the two parties generally represented quite dissimilar constituencies--the PSD representing the latifundistas and some industrialists, the PTB representing urban labor--their close affinity to Vargas provided a basis for occasional cooperation. The União Democrática Nacional (UDN), the third major party, was also unified by its members' relationship with Vargas, although in a negative manner. The UDN was a collection of the "outs"--rural chefes and latifundistas in its conservative wing and urban professionals and intellectuals in its liberal wing. All were unified by their common dislike for Vargas.⁷³

The PSD, UDN, and PTB shared the arena with many small parties. Most of these small parties were derived from local dissidence, revolts against the tyranny of party chiefs, and fights of a personalistic nature in the struggle of ambition in search for political power.⁷⁴ Some parties were only the following of the men who led them, such as the Partido Social Progressista (PSP) of Ademar de Barros and

⁷²Reisky de Dubnic, Political Trends in Brazil, pp. 52-53; and Hélio Jaguaribe, "A Renúncia do Presidente Quadros e a Crise Política Brasileira," Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, I (November, 1961), 296-298. Melo Franco, História e Teoria, pp. 105-106, calls the PTB the party of the urban caudilho.

⁷³Blondel, As Condições, p. 31; and Melo Franco, História e Teoria, pp. 102-104.

⁷⁴Lima Sobrinho, Sistemas Eleitorais e Partidos Políticos, p. 73.

the Partido Repúblicano (PR) of Artur Bernardes. Others-- the Partido de Representação Popular (the neo-fascist integralismo), the Partido Socialista Brasileiro (socialism), and the Partido Libertador (parliamentarism)--had genuine ideological positions.⁷⁵

The parties of the Third Republic were seriously hampered because they were primarily state organizations although they were national by law and were regulated by a national electoral court. Themístocles Brandão Cavalcanti cites three reasons for this. First, traditional tendencies prompted politics to return, after the Estâdo Novo recess, to the same patterns practiced during the First Republic. Second, the coincidence of electoral areas with the geographic confines of the states gave each party a need to have a state organization corresponding to the state political structure. And, third, the doctrinal problem of federalism dictated that the federal system of parties be a union of state parties without real requirements for federal organization except during presidential elections.⁷⁶

⁷⁵For the programs and statutes of the fourteen parties that existed in 1948, see J. A. Pinto de Carmo. For an analysis of party structures, see Phyllis Jane Peterson, Brazilian Political Parties: Formation, Organization, and Leadership, 1945-1959 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1962). Reisky de Dubnic in Political Trends in Brazil, pp. 93-101, discusses the role of the various parties in the critical years preceding the March, 1964, coup.

⁷⁶"Sistemas Partidários," Carta Mensual do Conselho Técnico da Confederação Nacional do Comércio, IV (September, 1958), 38-39.

Any association of at least ten thousand voters (the figure was later changed to fifty thousand) that went through the legal channels was, by law, considered a national political party. With little national unity or organization, the parties were devoid of all but very general ideological and class factors. Thus, the system was incapable of reflecting the different tendencies of the national electorate.⁷⁷ Because politicians changed parties with ease and new parties were formed, the voters found more continuity with personalities than with the transient party groupings.

Although the PSD, PTB, and UDN were consistently the major parties, party fragmentation became more pronounced with each succeeding year. In 1947 eight states had a majority party in the state legislative assembly, but in 1951 and 1955 only one state had a majority party.⁷⁸ This fragmentation was also demonstrated by the increased use of alliances in federal deputy elections. For example, in 1958 the parties as units elected 191 deputies, and party alliances elected 135 deputies out of a total of 326. In 1962 the parties elected 216 deputies, while alliances elected 193 of the total of 409 (the increase in the total of seats is due to population increase). Moreover, only nineteen deputies were elected outright in 1962 by parties other than

⁷⁷Luis Navarro Britto, p. 241.

⁷⁸Sousa Sampaio, "Bahia," p. 46.

PSD, UDN, and PTB.⁷⁹ Table I shows the increase in aggregate vote in federal deputy elections for alliances in comparison with the vote totals for the three leading parties.

TABLE I*

VOTES ACCORDED TO ALLIANCES AND MAJOR PARTIES
IN FEDERAL DEPUTY ELECTIONS

Year	Alliances	PSD	UDN	PTB
1945		2,531,974	1,575,375	603,500
1950	1,552,636	2,068,405	1,301,489	1,262,000
1954	2,496,501	2,136,220	1,318,101	1,447,784
1958	4,140,655	2,296,640	1,644,314	1,830,621
1962	5,855,692	2,225,693	1,604,743	1,722,546

*Source of data, TSE, Dados Estatísticos, Sexto Volume, 1962.

The ad hoc nature of the alliances made also demonstrates the absence of ideological considerations. Of the deputies seated in the federal chamber in 1963, almost 90 percent (367 of 409) belonged to five parties--PSD, 122; PTB, 109; UDN, 94; PSP, 22; PDC, 20. A total of 163 of those 367 deputies were elected by alliances. Applying general characterizations used by many Brazilian political analysts, the PSD and the UDN are conservative, the PDC (Partido Democrático Cristão) is a centrist party, and the

⁷⁹Data from Estados Unidos do Brasil, Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE), Dados Estatísticos, Quarto Volume: Eleições Federais, Estaduais, Realizadas no Brasil em 1958 e em Confronto com Anteriores (Brasília: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1961); and Estados Unidos do Brasil, TSE, Dados Estatísticos, Sexto Volume, 1962 (Brasília: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1964).

PTB and PSP are populist parties. The incidences of participation in alliances by these characterizations is as follows:

Conservative---Conservative	3
Conservative---Centrist	9
Conservative---Populist	11
Populist-----Centrist	3
Populist-----Populist	4

Corresponding figures⁸⁰ for the same parties in the 1959 federal chamber are:

Conservative---Conservative	3
Conservative---Centrist	4
Conservative---Populist	18
Populist-----Centrist	3
Populist-----Populist	2

The growing use of such Machiavellian alliances had the effect of further reducing the already fragile party cohesion, making it more and more difficult for executive officials to establish stable legislative coalitions with which to enact their programs. Because of the lower electoral quotients, such alliances were used less often in the elections for state deputies and municipal councilmen, but in those bodies party fragmentation made stable coalitions equally difficult. Party representation in the São Paulo legislative assembly is shown in Table II. In other states the situation was not as extreme, but it was a problem nevertheless.

⁸⁰Sources of data: Dados Estatísticos 1958 and 1962.

TABLE II*
 PARTY REPRESENTATION
 IN THE SÃO PAULO LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

Party	1954	1958	1962
PDC	4	11	12
PSD	11	7	7
PSP	17	16	13
PSB	4	6	2
PTB	8	6	12
PTN	7	10	11
UDN	7	9	11
PL	1	2	0
PRP	3	5	7
PR	7	7	12
PRT	3	6	9
PST	3	6	10
MTR	0	0	8

*From Oliveiros S. Ferreira, "A Crise de Poder do 'Sistema' e as Eleições Paulistas de 1962," RBEP, No. 16 (January, 1964), 223-224.

Party fragmentation was also less extreme in Congress, but the rural, conservative bias of that institution made difficult the passage of progressive legislation. As shown in Table III, the PTB steadily increased its strength at the expense of the rural clientelists (the PSD). The PTB never enjoyed sufficient strength however, even in alliance with some of the leftist small parties, to wrest control of Congress from the rural politicians.

Party fragmentation also had an adverse effect upon the majority elections in that it prevented the actual use of parties in those elections. Since no party was strong enough to draw a majority of the votes, alliances were required. The alliance had to choose a common candidate, who, in order to be acceptable to all, had to be an obscure

mediocrity or a clever adventurer who would have to make compromises and promises that might limit his effectiveness in office.⁸¹ After the election the alliance would be dissolved and the successful candidate left without the solid base of party support necessary to fulfill the campaign promises.

TABLE III*

MAJOR PARTY STRENGTH IN THE FEDERAL CAMARA
AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL

Year	PSD	UDN	PTB	Others	Total Seats
1945	53%	27%	8%	12%	286
1950	37%	27%	17%	19%	304
1954	35%	23%	17%	25%	326
1958	35%	21%	20%	24%	326
1962	30%	23%	27%	20%	409

*Source: Gláucio Ary Dillon Soares, "A Nôva Industrialização e o Sistema Político do Brasil," Dados, II/III (1967), 48-49; and TSE, Dados Estatísticos, 1962. Party strength in the Senate was quite similar.

The electoral reforms not only encouraged a new type of clientelism, they also made the masses the source of legitimacy,⁸² but this new means of legitimacy did not result in

⁸¹Melo Franco, "Os Partidos Políticos Nacionais," p. 13. See also João de Scantimburgo, A Crise da República Presidencial: Do Marechal Deodoro ao Marechal Castelo Branco (São Paulo: Livraria Pioneira Editora, 1969), pp. 270-272. Party alliances in majority elections of the Third Republic were actually very similar to the oligarchic alliances of the First Republic.

⁸²See Octávio Ianni, Crisis in Brazil, trans. Phyllis B. Eveleth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 51-52; Francisco Weffort, "State and Mass in Brazil," in Masses in Latin America, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 190; and Celso Furtado, Diagnosis of the Brazilian Crisis, trans. Suzette Macedo

popular allocation of the scarce resources. Local governmental units were still in the hands of the dominant economic interests of the area, and, on the state and federal levels, the middle sectors had been given only a segment of control since they were still economically dependent upon the agricultural export sector.⁸³ Politics was a compromise between these competing sectors, and the chefe político was the means by which mass support was channeled to the area of compromise, but since the chefe served the dominant economic interests while controlling his supporters through his personalistic relationship, few benefits and services flowed back to the people. Frank Bonilla quotes Brazilian observers as saying in 1961 that "neither parties nor people" can control the senators or deputies who are ultimately responsive only to organized economic interests.⁸⁴

With the chefe político being able to control legislative elections for the dominant economic interests through his personalistic and somewhat paternal relationship with his support group, a certain amount of frustration on the part of the popular sector became apparent. The reform legislation of the Estado Nôvo directed the focus of many voters, especially the urban voters of the newly

(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), p. 67.

⁸³Weffort, p. 188.

⁸⁴"A National Ideology for Development," in Expectant Peoples: Nationalism and Development, ed. K. H. Silvert (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 255.

industrialized areas, beyond the local coronel or chefe político. The voter now looked to the State, the national government, to take the lead in improving the condition of the citizens.⁸⁵ New tendencies then began to appear in the political spectrum, some with ideological overtones, but most characterized by demagogic populism,⁸⁶ and because of electoral reforms of the Vargas period, the masses were now able to make their influence felt, at least in executive contests.

Industrialization had not kept pace with urbanization,⁸⁷ and the result was a large group of unemployed or marginally employed voters who were especially susceptible to demagogic appeals. Since the parties and legislative politics were under the control of the chefes, the entrenched officials, and the dominant economic interests⁸⁸

⁸⁵Marvin Harris, Town and Country in Brazil (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), p. 103.

⁸⁶For a breakdown on the variations of these new tendencies, see Francisco Ferreira de Castro, Modernização e Democracia: O Desafio Brasileiro (Brasília: Ebrasa, 1969), pp. 108-109; and Pessoa de Moraes, pp. 118-134. Populism is the term used by Brazilians for this form of mass appeal and is defined by Hélio Jaguaribe as a more-or-less direct, non-traditional relationship between leader and masses based upon the charisma of the leader and the hope of the masses for immediate gratification of their social and economic expectations when the leader achieves substantive political power. See Problemas do Desenvolvimento Latino Americano: Estudos de Política (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1967), p. 168.

⁸⁷In the 1950-1960 decade industrial employment increased 28 percent while the urban population increased by 54 percent. See Gláucio Soares, pp. 46-47. Some of this disparity has been absorbed by the service sector, however.

⁸⁸Pessoa de Moraes, p. 224.

(all totally unrepresentative of the interests of the majority of voters),⁸⁹ the voters turned to the one area where they had some freedom from the political bosses, the majoritarian executive offices.⁹⁰

In the proportional representation legislative elections, Brazilians voted for friends, friends of friends, a goat (Pernambuco), a rhinoceros (São Paulo), and cast blank ballots because voting was required and because they often perceived the whole process of representation as a farce or a game. But, according to Goffredo Telles Junior, they would turn around and sincerely and passionately vote their preference for president because he was really the "chief of the nation."⁹¹ Presidential politics, and to a lesser extent gubernatorial and mayoral politics as well, became the outlet for the voters' frustration. The anomaly of a president responsive to popular appeals and legislative and bureaucratic structures responsive to clientelistic political brokers led to the breakdown of the authoritarian regime. The extent of political mobilization exceeded the ability of the chefes to control that mobilization. The

⁸⁹One observer cynically remarked that parties are so "representative" in their class composition that the PTB, the party of the labor unions, accepts even workers in its ranks. Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic, "A Crise do Sistema Partidário Brasileiro," Revista de Direito Público e Ciência Política, V (September/December, 1962), p. 82.

⁹⁰Nelson de Sousa Sampaio, "Eleições Baianas," RBEP, No. 8 (April, 1960), 136-137.

⁹¹"Lineamento de uma Democracia Autêntica para o Brasil," Revista da Faculdade de Direito (São Paulo), LVIII (1963), 168-170.

new groups competed for political goods in a manner that violated the exchange system of the clientage networks.

As political leadership became more and more fragmented, the authoritarian system based on clientelism became successively more obstructed as voters divided their loyalty between the local patrons and regional or national populists. The decline of the clientage networks was sufficient to allow the election of populists to majoritarian offices but, at the same time, insufficient to allow continued support for the elected leaders. President Vargas, elected as "the father of the poor people" in 1950, initially divided his attention between his popular clients and the clientelists of the system; but, as he progressively turned to the popular groups for support, these popular forces could not sustain him when he was challenged by the established political actors. In anticipation of a coup d'état, he committed suicide.

President Juscelino Kubitschek, elected in 1955 by a PTB-PSD coalition, was able to complete his term by a delicate balancing act which allowed him to avoid alienating the clientelists while, at the same time, controlling the emerging popular groups. Because of fortuitous economic conditions during the first three years of his administration, he was able to satisfy the industrial, agricultural, and military elites through a policy of developmental

nationalism and to satisfy urban workers through generous wage settlements.⁹²

Kubitschek was able to satisfy both the clientelists and the popular groups because of his lifelong experience with clientelistic politics and because the nation's financial situation allowed him to buy off the opposition. By 1959 the economic situation had deteriorated (in large measure due to Kubitschek's free-spending policy) and as a result, his successor, Jânio Quadros, did not have the resources to distribute, nor did he have the experience with the clientage networks. Using the UDN party as a label of convenience, he was elected president in 1960 as an anti-system candidate whose promises of reform, efficiency, and responsiveness drew widespread middle- and lower-class support. Once in office, however, he found his proposals for land reform, antitrust action, and limitation on profit remission obstructed by the system politicians,⁹³ and, in frustration, he resigned the presidency.

João Goulart, the political heir of Vargas and the official successor to Quadros, had been elected vice-president in both 1955 and 1960 on the PSD-PTB ticket but was so feared by military leaders and PSD and UDN politicians that he was only allowed to assume the presidency

⁹² Skidmore, pp. 166-170.

⁹³ Mário Victor, Cinco Anos que Abalaram o Brasil (Jânio Quadros ao Marechal Castelo Branco) (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1965), pp. 90-138. The rather enigmatic personality of Quadros also limited his ability to attract legislative support.

under a hastily legislated parliamentary system. Goulart successfully campaigned for defeat of that innovation, and as a result of a national plebiscite in January, 1963, he assumed full power with a return to the presidential system. He then turned to demagoguery in an effort to organize popular action with which to force the system politicians to accept his proposed reforms. This act led both PSD and UDN leaders to encourage action by the military. The contradiction between the conservative bias of the parties and the legislative system, on the one hand, and the popular bias of the presidential system, on the other hand, completely stalled the political process and invited, if not required, intervention by the armed forces.

Brazil, from 1950 through March, 1964, experienced the problems of a competitive, democratic structure imposed upon an authoritarian system. As the emerging popular groups and the populist politicians successively challenged the system, the clientage networks were progressively less able to maintain control. Competition had been quite limited prior to the 1930 Revolution. Between 1930 and 1937, competition began to expand, only to be closed off again during the Estado Nôvo period. As competition gradually began to expand again after 1946, the inherent contradiction between clientage-based authoritarianism and populism resulted in the failure of the latter to assume control. It was then up to the armed forces to rebuild the political system on what was left of the authoritarian base.

CHAPTER III

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN BRAZIL

From 1961 to 1964, Brazil experienced what the exchange model calls "hyper-inflation."¹ Party fragmentation and increased mobilization expanded the number of patrons bidding for authority allocations. The failure of the clientelists to provide political goods for their clients caused frustrated sectors to look to populist demagogues as new patrons. These new patrons submitted their bids for authority and, thus, further inflated the quantity of demands. Concurrently the decreasing legitimacy of the Goulart government deflated authority and inhibited the ability of the regime to respond to demands. The situation of hyper-inflation invited intervention by the armed forces.

The role of interventor or arbiter is not a new one for the Brazilian armed forces. With the fall of the Brazilian monarchy, the armed forces assumed the "moderating power" held by the monarch² and intervened openly in Brazilian

¹Ilchman and Uphoff, pp. 140-144.

²John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964),

politics on six occasions between the end of the Empire and 1964. In addition to these instances of overt intervention, when conflicts among political groups created crises in the authoritarian system, the Brazilian military often exerted covert pressure in defense of institutional interests.

In spite of its political activity, the Brazilian armed forces have been considered, by Latin American standards, to be generally legalistic and restrained, acting only in crisis situations and refusing to violate public opinion or legal norms for the profit of the military.³ The coup which occurred in 1964, however, began a period of intervention that was to be neither restrained nor legal. In 1964, according to Arnold Wald, the generals were again forced to act:

Analyzing the military interventions in the political life of the country, we must recognize that they were less the specific will of the armed forces than the existence of a political system which could not find adequate solutions for the impasses, thus determining, as a last resort, a military decision to impede the complete dissolution of the political and administrative process.⁴

The hyper-inflation which was obstructing the authoritarian system prior to March 31, 1964, was apparently perceived by

p. 196. The "moderating power" was taken as the unofficial right or duty to be the ultimate judge of political disputes.

³Fernando Pedreira, Março 31: Cívís e Militares no Processo da Crise Brasileira (Rio de Janeiro: José Alvaro, 1964), pp. 38-40; and John Johnson, pp. 224-231.

⁴Desenvolvimento, Revolução e Democracia (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fundo de Cultura, 1966), pp. 41-42.

the military leaders to be a problem which could not be solved by the traditional moderating power. The generals grudgingly decided that the political system would have to be rebuilt during an extended period of military rule. Prolonged intervention, then, would require the soldiers to create a support base that would extend beyond the barracks.

In a praetorian society such as Brazil, widespread support is not necessary for the mere overthrow of the existing government. First of all, the armed forces with their discipline, organization, and firepower are well-equipped for the task of seizing power.⁵ Secondly, the heterogeneity of elite groups and the several coexisting forms of legitimacy in an authoritarian polity ensure the armed forces of some civilian support, especially in a crisis situation. Such societies have many "power contenders," each of which has its own legitimate means of demonstrating its power capability.⁶ With no single universally accepted means of resolving conflicts, one or more power contenders may support a military solution.⁷

⁵For a discussion of the interventionist capabilities of the military in developing nations, see Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 31-40 (hereinafter referred to as Political Development); and S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 6.

⁶See Charles W. Anderson, Politics and Economic Change in Latin America: The Governing of Restless Nations (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1967), pp. 93-101.

⁷Huntington, Political Order, pp. 194-198; Andreski, pp. 105-106; Janowitz, Political Development, p. 29; and McAlister, p. 89.

The responsiveness of the armed forces to the entreaties of civilian groups seems to increase as the military becomes more modern and professional.⁸ The career military officer is both a professional soldier and a public servant. The professional role dictates an obedience to the political regime (and thus no political activity), but at the same time, the role gives the officer access to the means of violence. The servant role requires the officer to protect the "national interest" and, thus, may allow the officer to judge the political output of the regime.⁹ The addition of the servant role may decrease the aloofness of the heroic soldier and make him more aware of the effects of public policy to the point that he may wish to intervene in order to repair a disrupted political system.¹⁰

Professionalism in the military has expanded to include the necessity for an awareness of the effect of domestic policy upon national security. The Cuban Revolution and the fear of communist opportunism in situations of political

⁸Samuel P. Huntington in The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 84, argues that military professionalism will facilitate civilian control and thus inhibit military intervention. Finer, p. 24, argues the contrary.

⁹Kenneth Fidel, "Military Organization and Conspiracy in Turkey," Studies in Comparative International Development, VI (1970-1971), pp. 24-25. See also Morris Janowitz, "The Armed Forces and Society in Western Europe," European Journal of Sociology, VI (August, 1965), pp. 233-237.

¹⁰George Andrew Kourvetaris, "Professional Self-Images and Political Perspectives in the Greek Military," American Sociological Review, XXXVI (December, 1971), 1053-1054.

crisis have caused the armed forces of developing nations to extend the concept of security to encompass all aspects of social and political life.¹¹ A perceived fear of a communist take-over encouraged the Brazilian generals to act in 1964. A similar fear of communist success prompted the Greek colonels to take power in 1967. Fear of an anticipated consolidation of popular groups into an unmanageable political force pressed the Peruvian army into action in 1968.¹² Economic chaos brought military intervention into Ghanaian politics in 1966 and 1971.¹³ Political chaos and corruption were used to justify the military coup of January, 1966, in Nigeria.¹⁴

¹¹William Gutteridge, Military Institutions and Power in New States (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 133; and Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 173. See also Edward Feit, The Armed Bureaucrats: Military-Administrative Regimes and Political Development (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), pp. 6-8.

¹²See Kourvetaris, p. 1054; and Julio Cotler, "Political Crisis and Military Populism in Peru," Studies in Comparative International Development, VI (1970-1971), 101-102.

¹³Claude E. Welch, "Praetorianism in Commonwealth West Africa," The Journal of Modern African Studies, X (July, 1972), 212-214.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 216-217. See also A. R. Luckham, "Institutional Transfer and Breakdown in a New Nation: The Nigerian Military," Administrative Science Quarterly, XVI (December, 1971), 402-403. The July, 1966, coup in Nigeria arose primarily from ethnic considerations, a nonprofessional factor, but one which can obviously generate support in the civilian sector of society. For a discussion of this politization of "primordial ties," see Aristide R. Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa," American Political Science Review, LXII (March, 1968), 73-74, 80-83.

Professionalism may also prompt soldiers to intervene in defense of institutional interests, which the soldiers relate to their national security function. The armies of the new African states have, in some instances, intervened because of job competition or defense budget considerations.¹⁵ In many of the praetorian societies of Latin America, civilian regimes have been able to buy military support by granting salary increases, budget increases, and fringe benefits. Economic problems and progressive social legislation, however, quite often threatened to dilute the privileges of the military officers and weaken the military capability of the armed forces and, thus, encouraged military intervention.¹⁶ It is significant that the proportion of the national budget allocated to the Brazilian armed forces dropped six percentage points in the two years prior to the 1954 attempted coup d'état and dropped to an all-time low in 1964.¹⁷ Intervention based on the protection of

¹⁵See Welch, pp. 220-221; J. M. Lee, African Armies and Civil Order (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 89-97; and Michael F. Lofchie, "The Uganda Coup," Journal of Modern African Studies, X (May, 1972), 30-31.

¹⁶Needler, p. 618; and Ross K. Baker, A Study of Military Status and Status Deprivation in Three Latin American Armies (Washington: Center for Research in Social Systems, 1967), pp. 7-8.

¹⁷The defense budget decreased from 32.5 percent in 1952 to 26.5 percent in 1954 and then rose to 29 percent in 1957. From there it decreased steadily to a low of 14 percent in 1964 and then jumped to 20.9 percent in 1965 and 25 percent in 1967. Statistics derived from A Economia Brasileira e Sus Perspectivas, Vol. 8 (Rio de Janeiro: APEC Editora, 1969). Another institutional factor which encouraged the Brazilian generals to act in 1964 was a series of mutinies.

institutional or personal interests does not, of course, elicit much support from civilian groups, but institutional interests may provide the level of military cohesion that will allow the armed forces to intervene in a crisis situation.

Armies can overthrow governments because armies have a near monopoly over the means of violence. Support is necessary for a coup d'état, but the threat of violence is the critical factor. Armies are crisis organizations, and, for this reason, they are generally successful in attempts to overthrow governments because a coup is similar to the type of crisis activity for which armies train.¹⁸ This crisis orientation that facilitates intervention by the military, however, is the very factor that mitigates against rule by the military. Janowitz contends that military officers lack the leadership skills required for bargaining and political communications and are, thus, doomed to failure as rulers because they will never compromise.¹⁹ On the other hand, there is much evidence to indicate that the military can serve as a modernizing force able to develop a national consciousness, to incorporate modern practices and technology, and to foster social and economic reforms.²⁰

¹⁸According to Feit, pp. 121-122, the 1967 coup in Greece followed a NATO contingency plan.

¹⁹Janowitz, Political Development, p. 28.

²⁰See Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization"; Manfred Halpern, "Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class," in The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped States, ed. John J. Johnson (Princeton: Princeton University

The relationship is simplified by Huntington as a function of the level of social development of the society. "In the world of oligarchy, the soldier is a radical; in the middle-class world he is a participant and arbiter; as the mass society looms on the horizon he becomes the conservative defender of the existing order."²¹ The middle-class orientation of military intervention and rule is a result of the armed forces' desire to create or preserve a political context which is more open and rational than that of an oligarchical system and which does not threaten military status as a result of the social reforms of a mass democracy.²²

Thus, in the case of all developing nations except those with oligarchical systems, Huntington puts the military in an essentially negative role and seems to conclude that political change can be accomplished only by external intervention or a social revolution. Conservative change, as described by Chalmers Johnson, is highly unlikely. In particular, Huntington contends that most Latin American societies (and by extrapolation probably most South Asian

Press, 1962); Daniel Lerner and Richard D. Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force," World Politics, XIII (October, 1960), 19-44; and John Johnson, pp. 244-267.

²¹Political Order, p. 221. Huntington here seems to accept the thesis of José Nun that the middle classes of such nations are caught in a squeeze between rising popular forces and the traditional elite and that only with the support of the most modern middle-class organization, the military, can their position be maintained. See Nun, pp. 145-185.

²²See Huntington, Political Order, p. 224; and Finer, p. 47.

societies as well) are too advanced "to be susceptible to salvation by military reform" because he sees little possibility that the armed forces of such nations can become effective political brokers.²³

In spite of the argument against a solution by military reform, the armed forces are in power in many transitional states of Latin America, Asia, and Africa; and there is little evidence to suggest that they will voluntarily fade from the political picture or that other social groups will be able to dislodge them forcibly.²⁴ If the armed forces cannot be pushed out of the political arena in states that are in the middle stages of political modernization (for example South Korea or Greece), then perhaps Huntington has oversimplified the situation by stating that the soldiers could not be effective rulers in such situations.²⁵ Huntington's generalization seems to be dependent upon the assumption that societies in the middle stages of development have well-developed and autonomous interest organizations

²³Political Order, pp. 228-229. The inability of military leaders to handle complex political problems is also brought out by Edwin Lieuwen, "Militarism and Politics in Latin America," in The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. John J. Johnson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 155; and Horowitz, "Political Legitimization and the Institutionalization of Crisis in Latin America," p. 64.

²⁴McAlister, pp. 141-142.

²⁵Huntington's contention that soldiers are radicals in societies in the early stages of political modernization appears to be an oversimplification also. See Robert M. Price, "Military Officers and Political Leadership: The Ghanaian Case," Comparative Politics, III (April, 1971), 378-379.

that will thwart the efforts of middle-class military leadership to effect political change.

The assumption of autonomy is questionable. In the development of the Western European states, religious, cultural, or class phenomena were the prime movers in the creation of political parties and their parallel interest organizations.²⁶ In societies where such profound cleavages do not exist, interest organizations, especially those with a mass membership, have been slow in developing unless some factor not directly related to politics, such as an economic or social benefit, was present.²⁷ In developing nations, reformist regimes that seek to establish bases of support or to emulate the more politically developed nations often sponsor and subsidize the formation of mass-based interest organizations. In this manner both the peasant and labor "sectors" were created in Mexico and have largely remained captives of the regime since their creation.²⁸ Similarly in the urban slums of Venezuela, political mobilization has generally been initiated by outsiders--political party

²⁶ See Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds), "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 52-56.

²⁷ See Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 132-159.

²⁸ Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, Democracy in Mexico, trans. Danielle Salti (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 14-17.

workers, labor union leaders, and especially people connected with government agencies.²⁹

Where popular urban and agrarian groups are mobilized for political action (i.e., politicized) by personalistic leaders or representatives of other political organizations, the popular organizations generally lack autonomy or, to use Huntington's terminology, they have not become institutions. Thus, it seems possible that a military regime could depoliticize these groups by removing or co-opting the leadership while middle-class groups or the soldiers themselves are developing stable institutions for protracted political control.³⁰

Another assumption which apparently causes scholars to doubt the ability of the military to effect reform is that military officers are thought to have little experience in entrepreneurial or brokerage roles. Where the boundaries of the military organization are integral (i.e., relations with the outside environment are under strict control of the command hierarchy), the assumption often is correct, but the boundaries appear to be fragmented in many developing nations allowing military men extensive interaction with

²⁹Talton F. Ray, The Politics of the Barrios of Venezuela (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 81-83.

³⁰Depoliticization has received little attention by social science scholars. Daniel Goldrich mentions its possibility in his essay "Toward the Comparative Study of Politicization in Latin America," in Contemporary Cultures and Societies of Latin America, eds. Dwight B. Heath and Richard N. Adams (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 362-363.

civilian groups.³¹ Boundary fragmentation tends to increase as the soldiers become more cognizant of the effect of political and economic policies upon national security.

Moreover, where the fragmented boundaries have allowed military officers on active duty to perform roles ordinarily reserved for civilians--nonmilitary bureaucratic tasks, management of economic enterprises, teaching, nonmilitary construction management, etc.--the entrepreneurial experience apparently enhances the ability of the military leaders to provide solutions to the mobilization-institutionalization gap. Especially when the military does not have a strong partisan position, an entrepreneurial military regime may have "success in establishing order and security, the repression of insurgent minorities, the drive for the foundation of new economic enterprises, the elimination of traditional political parties and the establishment of new political frameworks. . . ." ³² Military governments, by redirecting investments, by limiting consumption, and/or by frustrating redistribution of wealth, have been remarkably successful in achieving high rates of economic development.³³

³¹A. R. Luckham, "A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations," Government and Opposition, VI (Winter, 1971), 17-18, 27-33.

³²Moshe Lissak, "Modernization and Role Expansion of the Military in Developing Countries: A Comparative Analysis," Comparative Studies in Society and History, IX (April, 1967), 254-255.

³³Irving Louis Horowitz, "The Military as a Subculture," in Protagonists of Change: Subcultures in Development and Revolution, ed. Abdul A. Said (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 44-47.

The contention that a military regime in an advanced developing nation must mobilize mass participation in order to maintain power³⁴ can also be countered by stating that the military needs only to control or co-opt the relevant political forces of the society. It is logical to argue that, if military leaders have extensive political contacts and experiences, the calculations which convince the leaders that a military take-over is feasible "may include the assumptions or experiences that masses in a particular country are neutral, negligible, or easily manipulable."³⁵ Certainly the acquisition of managerial skills by the "military manager"³⁶ and the political awareness of the professional national security manager gives the military officer the confidence that he can use the political resources at his disposal to secure sufficient support.³⁷

Furthermore, it may be reasonably easy for the military rulers to elicit at least the passive support of strategic groups. The reformist doctrine of the new type of military ruler may be sufficiently attractive to some groups to counter their dislike for coercion and control.³⁸ If the

³⁴Huntington, Political Order, p. 241; and Janowitz, Political Development, p. 29.

³⁵Ann Ruth Wilner, "Perspectives on Military Elites as Rulers and Wielders of Power," Journal of Comparative Administration, II (November, 1970), 268.

³⁶Janowitz, Political Development, pp. 40-42.

³⁷Kourvetaris, pp. 1055-1056.

³⁸For a discussion of the appeal of the new doctrinaire military rulers, see José Enrique Miguens, "The New Latin American Military Coup," Studies in Comparative International

military government produces policy, it will also earn the support of the civilian bureaucracy for as Feit states:

"Bureaucrats of all kinds will accept rulers who rule, whether good or evil, for not to do so would threaten the very principle [discipline] on which organizations rest."³⁹

The coup d'état of March 31, 1964, in Brazil marked the end of the arbiter role for the Brazilian armed forces and the beginning of a new role as ruler. Contrary to the pessimistic prognosis of Huntington, the prospects for continued military governance in Brazil seem to be good. First of all, interest associations have not been able to match the influence of clientelistic politicians. Interest associations do exist in Brazil, but the primary means of securing the desired governmental action is through the clientage system.⁴⁰ This situation insulates the government from group pressures--and, thus, gives the government greater freedom for policy innovations--since political goods are allocated on an individual basis rather than on a sector basis. The government has more discretionary options in dispensing rewards because value allocations are treated

Development, VI (1970-1971), 8-11. In Peru middle-class attitudes toward the military were mixed positive and negative, while the urban lower class supports the authority and reformism of the military. To the rural Indian, the soldiers are disliked as just another symbol of hated authority. See Luigi R. Einaudi, The Peruvian Military: A Summary Political Analysis (Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, RM-6042-PR, May, 1969), pp. 8-10.

³⁹Feit, p. 11.

⁴⁰Leff, pp. 118-131.

as rewards or favors and not as a service which is owed to the client.⁴¹

The patron-client relationship also gives the government a means of controlling incipient opposition elements. Since the patron's position depends upon his ability to deliver collective goods to his clients, the government may block the patron's access to the administrative structure, thereby weakening his control over his supporters. Where an institutionalized interest association would search for a new point of access (perhaps within an organized opposition group), in a clientage system the clients search for a new patron.

The interest associations that do function should present little difficulty for a Brazilian military government. The associations which might logically oppose a military regime have enjoyed little autonomy. Urban labor in Brazil was brought into the political arena by the corporatist government of Getúlio Vargas, and it has not been able to break out of that control.⁴² Urban labor syndicates are controlled by pelegos--clientelists who play the role of labor advocates but generally serve the government.⁴³ Rural workers' syndicates also have a potential for strong

⁴¹James C. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972, 1972), pp. 14-15.

⁴²Melo Franco, História e Teoria, pp. 99-100; and Weffort, pp. 390-391.

⁴³For a discussion of labor organizations in Brazil, see Schmitter, pp. 188-194.

opposition. At the time of the 1964 coup, however, these groups were neither intensively nor extensively organized and, in general, they were "follower" groups--successors to the patriarchal leader-follower arrangements of the traditional culture.⁴⁴ Just as the government could substitute loyal pelegos in urban labor syndicates for those whose loyalty was questionable, the unequal nature of the leader-follower arrangement in peasant groups also allowed the substitution of loyal leaders, who could then consolidate their positions through access to the administrative structure.

The only truly autonomous opposition association in 1964 was the students' organization, which proved troublesome, but because of the limited membership could be isolated and repressed. Other interest associations such as the employer and commercial associations enjoyed autonomy, but they were generally in agreement with the goals of the military regime, especially in reference to developmental policy and the need to control the mobilization of urban and rural workers.⁴⁵ Thus, the industrial, commercial, and agricultural elite could be expected to be co-opted by the policies of an authoritarian military regime; urban and

⁴⁴ Benno Galjart, "Class and 'Following' in Rural Brazil," América Latina, VII (July/September, 1964), 3-4

⁴⁵ See Luigi R. Einaudi and Alfred C. Stepan III, Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil (Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, R-586-DOS, April, 1971), pp. 88-89.

rural workers' groups could be co-opted by a carrot-and-stick approach of payoffs for cooperation and coercion for noncooperation; and other groups, such as students, could be repressed or ignored.

Another factor which should enhance the ability of the Brazilian armed forces to control and direct the political system is the fragmentation of institutional boundaries. The moderator role which traditionally accrued to the military after the fall of the monarchy is evidence of some boundary fragmentation. In the political crises of 1930, 1945, 1954, and 1964, many civilians openly requested military intervention to restrain or to overthrow the existing government.⁴⁶ As the crisis heated up in late 1963 and early 1964, civilian demands for military intervention were common and were matched by complaints coming from within the armed forces. Middle- and senior-grade officers objected to the effect of inflation upon their salaries, the chaotic state of the national economy, the growing use of violence by rural and urban popular groups, the politization of promotions, the acceptance of open communist activity, and the granting of amnesty to rebellious enlisted men.⁴⁷

The expanded conception of national security further fragmented military boundaries. Military officers became aware of the political, social, and economic context of

⁴⁶For examples of the editorial pleas for military action, see Stepan, pp. 93-115.

⁴⁷See Einaudi and Stepan, pp. 78-80.

national security, and some favored military action to set up a strong government to end the recurring crises.⁴⁸ The vehicle for imparting this new awareness was the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG), organized in 1949 by the "Sorbonne" group.⁴⁹ Generally attended by the more ambitious and intelligent officers, the ESG imbued its students with the necessity for a moral and economic redemption of Brazil, which would enable the nation to take its rightful role in the struggle of the "Christian West" against the "Communist East."⁵⁰ Students of the Superior War College heard lectures from distinguished scholars and, in study groups, formulated policy programs for dealing with security and developmental problems.⁵¹

In addition to expanding the intellectual horizons of military officers, the ESG experience also fostered contact with the political and economic power structure. Stepan reports that, by 1966, the list of ESG graduates included 599 military officers, 224 men from private industry and

⁴⁸Pedreira, p. 41.

⁴⁹A group of officers (including Castelo Branco) who had studied at the French War College.

⁵⁰Evans, pp. 279-280.

⁵¹Ronald M. Schneider, The Political System of Brazil: Emergence of a "Modernizing" Authoritarian Regime, 1964-1970 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), pp. 245-251. National security and national development were treated as distinct problems, but in the context of the overall philosophy of the ESG, the problems were intimately related. For an example of the universal approach to the subject of national security, see General Golbery do Couto e Silva, Geopolítica do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Livaria José Olympio, 1967).

commerce, 200 from the major governmental ministries, 97 from autonomous governmental agencies, 39 federal congressmen, 23 state and federal judges, and 107 professionals such as professors, writers, economists, doctors, and clergymen.⁵² The contacts made during the year-long course are maintained through an alumni association which publishes a journal and holds periodic meetings and seminars to study new problems.⁵³

At the administrative level, military boundaries have been fragmented since the Estado Novo period. On one occasion during the second presidency of Vargas, 25 percent of the cabinet were military men.⁵⁴ Brazilian army officers have extensive experience in administrative roles through service in frontier settlements, civic-action construction projects, civic-action health and sanitary advisory programs, management of critical industrial facilities, and participation in research and planning councils.⁵⁵ The army provides top executives for the National Steel Company, which operates Brazil's largest steel-producing facility; the Rio Doce Company, which is the major ore producer and shipper; and Petrobrás, the government oil monopoly. Air Force officers are prominent as top management officials in

⁵²Stepan, p. 177.

⁵³Schneider, pp. 250-251.

⁵⁴Baker, p. 78.

⁵⁵Max Garrett Manwaring, The Military in Brazilian politics (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois; 1968), pp. 90-95.

civilian factories, airlines, the weather service, and airport administration. Naval officers are involved in shipping concerns, port facilities, and the development of telecommunications and nuclear energy.⁵⁶ John J. Johnson reports that, in 1961, approximately 1,100 Brazilian military officers were on detached duty, serving in civilian positions in national, state, and local government.⁵⁷ The size of the military budget is also an indication of the scope of activity of military officers. In 1965 the armed forces, which comprised 0.3 percent of the population, handled a full 3 percent of the gross national product of Brazil.⁵⁸

The fragmented boundaries of the Brazilian military should have given the officers not only experience in administration and policy formulation but also a feel for the necessity of maintaining political support. Furthermore, this experience should have given the officers the confidence that they could be effective administrators and political brokers at the same time. Such confidence indeed seems to be an important factor in whether or not the armed forces will remain in power after a coup. Einaudi and Stepan contend that the Brazilian generals were content with the moderator role prior to the 1960's because they had

⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 95-96. See also John Johnson, pp. 211-212.

⁵⁷p. 211.

⁵⁸Paulo de Castro Moreira da Silva, "As Atividades Paralelas das Forças Armadas," Cadernos Brasileiros, VIII (November-December, 1966), 59.

relative confidence in the ability of civilians to rule and because they had little confidence in their own political capability.⁵⁹ The recurring crises from 1961 to 1964 destroyed the generals' confidence in civilian rule; and the administrative experience discussed above, plus foreign and internal military action and the acquisition of a developmental doctrine, enhanced the generals' confidence in themselves.

Brazil was the only Latin American nation to send ground combat troops to participate in World War II. After a fitful start the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) enjoyed great success against the German forces in Italy. From this experience, the Brazilian armed forces acquired a new status as the defenders of democracy and national honor with a panoply of heroes and heroic experiences. In addition the officers who served in the FEB developed a strong appreciation for the necessity of planning, unity, and cooperation.

The FEB experience also impressed its participants--many of whom went on to be the organizers of the ESG--with the importance of the social, economic, and political requisites for a modern army. The officers became open admirers of the democracy and economic organization of the United States.⁶⁰ As the Cold War became the dominant factor in international politics, the relationship between national development and national security gained more emphasis. The

⁵⁹Einaudi and Stepan, pp. 75-76.

⁶⁰Stepan, pp. 242-248.

Cuban Revolution and the threat of internal war further expanded the social and political basis for national security. And the development of the ESG doctrine identified the defense of the "Christian West," in general, and Brazil, in particular, with a strong national economy and a stable political and social structure. Thus, General Golbery warns that "indirect Communist aggression . . . capitalizes on local discontents, the frustrations of misery and hunger, and just nationalist anxieties. . . ." ⁶¹ As the ESG studied the developmental and security aspects of inflation, agrarian reform, electoral and party systems, transportation, and education, as well as internal and conventional warfare, there began to develop a military-political prescription. This doctrine, although not universally accepted by all military officers, gained more acceptance as the political crisis deepened, ⁶² and it was apparently the existence of the doctrine that gave the generals the requisite confidence to retain control of the government.

The fragmentation of the armed forces' institutional boundaries will often increase the soldiers' confidence in their ability to govern, but it may also be detrimental to military rule since fragmentation may "reduce the army's cohesion, the unity of its authority, and its ability to bargain and seek its interests as a single monopolistic

⁶¹Golbery, p. 198

⁶²Einaudi and Stepan, pp. 83-84. Castelo Branco's close association with the ESG was apparently one of the reasons for his selection as the head of the first military government.

group."⁶³ Permeated boundaries subject the military to the same conflicts which exist in the civilian sector. Armed forces which have fragmented boundaries are less involved in such conflicts (that is, they are somewhat insulated from these conflicts), but increased awareness of politics may result in a mirror effect within the armed forces.

Factionalism has not been an unusual phenomenon in the Brazilian armed forces. The revolt of the Tenentes in 1922 was a result of a schism within the army between the entrenched generals, who backed the power of the landed oligarchy, and the junior-grade officers who wanted to reform both the military and Brazilian society. The Tenente movement itself had several ideological strains, but with the 1930 Revolution, the factionalism was partially resolved by the institution of moderate reforms and the repression of the left wing, led by Luis Carlos Prestes.⁶⁴

Following World War II a new cleavage over national development, particularly over petroleum policy, emerged. At the one extreme were the nationalists who preferred exploitation of resources by Brazilians only. At the other extreme were those of the "Cruzada Democrática" (Democratic Crusade), who favored development by the best means

⁶³Luckham, "A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations," p. 14.

⁶⁴See John D. Wirth, "Tenentismo in the Brazilian Revolution of 1930," Hispanic American Historical Review, XLIV (May, 1966), 161-179; and José Artur Rios, "Atualidade de Tenentismo," Cadernos Brasileiros, VIII (November-December, 1966), 9-16.

possible.⁶⁵ In between these two groups were the legalists who generally opposed overt military involvement in political affairs. The Cruzada Democrática forces (with backing from many of the anti-communist legalists) soundly defeated the nationalists in the May, 1952, Military Club election, and, in early 1954, the conservative group forced the resignation of Labor Minister Goulart. In August, 1954, they were foiled in their planned coup d'état by President Vargas' suicide. When Juscelino Kubitschek, a Vargas protégé, was elected president in October, 1955, the conservative faction again plotted a golpe, but it was frustrated by a counter-coup led by General Lott, the legalist War Minister.⁶⁶

Following the 1952 Military Club election, some of the more radical nationalists were disciplined by the army, and during the Kubitschek regime a similar fate befell the more active conspirators of the Democratic Crusade. This did not resolve the factionalism, however. Communism was perceived as the major threat, and the cleavage over how to handle this threat remained. In 1961 following President Quadros'

⁶⁵This dispute was generally fought within the confines of the Clube Militar although there were civilian supporters for both groups. The Cruzada Democrática was largely a group of FEB veterans, who had less fear of "U.S. imperialism" than the nationalists, primarily because of their experience of cooperation with the U.S. during W.W. II. For an extensive discussion of this struggle, see Nelson Werneck Sodré, História Militar do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Civilização Brasileira, 1968), pp. 304-355.

⁶⁶A good discussion of this interesting succession of plots and counter-plots is contained in Skidmore, pp. 87-162.

hasty resignation, the former members of the Cruzada Democrática attempted to take power in order to prevent Vice-President Goulart's assumption of the presidency (an event which the rightists believed would deliver the country over to communists). This coup was foiled by the legalists, and Goulart was allowed to take office.⁶⁷ The three-way struggle among the anti-communist right, the legalist center, and the nationalist left continued through 1963.

By the end of 1963, Goulart's ineffective leadership had cost him much of his support. The few leftist officers who continued to support him were isolated.⁶⁸ Thus, there was an appearance of military unity in early 1964. A vast majority of military officers saw communism and governmental corruption as increasingly severe threats to the security of the nation, and they were nearly unanimous in placing the blame on Goulart and his political allies.⁶⁹ The Goulart experiment had driven most of the legalists to the activist camp and had isolated the leftists so that they could be purged or slowly pushed out. Unity and cohesion were more

⁶⁷He was not allowed full power, however. To allay the fears of many conservative politicians and generals, Congress hastily devised a parliamentary system. Goulart was granted full power by a January, 1963 plebiscite which repealed the parliamentary system.

⁶⁸Economic crisis, civil unrest, and especially Goulart's support of enlisted men's revolts cost Goulart support of the legalists and some leftist officers. Sodre, p. 402, however, argues that the troop rebellions were the fault of the example of the generals' own indiscipline demonstrated by their illegal political activity.

⁶⁹Einaudi and Stepan, p. 84.

apparent than real, however. After the March 31, 1964, coup, a new cleavage developed. This new cleavage involved the type of development strategy the military government would dictate.

The major points of difference between the surviving groups (the ESG officers and the right nationalists)⁷⁰ involved the following issues: the role of private foreign capital; the means for dealing with the threat of communism; the relationship with the United States; the length of military rule; and the extent of political purges.⁷¹ This conflict within the military was to be the major problem for military rule in Brazil. Yet the mere fact that this was to be the major problem is highly significant. The officers seldom questioned their ability to rule; they only questioned how to rule. Civil-military relations in Brazil had reached a point where the officers were confident that they could manipulate their political resources in such a way as to maintain the requisite support for staying in power. Policy questions would result in occasional open conflicts that would give the civilians faint glimmers of hope, but the resolve of the officers was to stay in power until their job was completed. Just how they allocated political goods in

⁷⁰ The core of the Cruzada Democrática had split into essentially two groups. One group, closely associated with the ESG, espoused a tutelary democracy that would foster economic development with the help of private domestic and foreign capital. The other group was less interested in democracy and development and more interested in moral redemption and the control of communism.

⁷¹ Einaudi and Stepan, p. 90.

order to stay in power and to perform the task which they defined for themselves is, thus, a legitimate study of political economy.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONSOLIDATION OF POLITICAL POWER

The argument against protracted rule by the military in praetorian societies experiencing the middle stages of modernization generally hinges upon the proposition that the military leaders in such societies will not be able to generate sufficient political support.¹ The importance of political support cannot be overlooked since demands coming from both the environment and from within the political system itself usually increase steadily if the system does not process them in some way (i.e., either satisfy or reject and suppress demands). Support is the energy which allows the system to process the demands,² but also the performance capability of the system determines in large measure the ability of the system to elicit various types of support.³

In the creation of support in a praetorian society, the prime requisite appears to be the development of a

¹Huntington, Political Order, pp. 261-263.

²Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," p. 390.

³For a discussion of the various types of political supports, see Easton, Systems Analysis, pp. 157-161, 249-266.

government, that is, a "generalized membership unit possessing (a) defined responsibilities for the maintenance of the society of which it is a part and (b) a practical monopoly of coercive powers."⁴ Charles W. Anderson argues that this is a basic problem of Latin American political systems--that there are many "power contenders," each with its own "power capability."⁵ In his prescription for representative pluralism,⁶ however, Anderson ignores the fact that, before representative pluralism can function, political power must be centered in governmental institutions.

Huntington makes fundamentally the same diagnosis for not just Latin American nations but for most developing nations. In a politically backward society, each leader or group pursues its own interests with the method that is most effective for the particular actor.⁷ Thus, before a political system can effectively process demands and build a solid base of support, it must first consolidate political power.⁸

⁴David E. Apter, "A Comparative Method for the Study of Politics," The American Journal of Sociology, LXIV (November, 1968), 224.

⁵Politics and Economic Change in Latin America: The Governing of Restless Nations, pp. 87-114.

⁶Ibid., pp. 367-381.

⁷Political Order, pp. 30-31, 78-87.

⁸Ibid., pp. 143-147.

Easton states:

Frequently the imposition upon a political community of a common division of political labor has itself made possible the slow growth of sentiments of political solidarity. . . . Initially, support had to be generated through coercion, fear of sanctions or the seduction of material rewards. Subsequently these could be supplanted or reinforced by a continuing sense of belonging together.⁹

A power arrangement, even one established by coercion, can ultimately generate its own support, whether it be the supremacy of the president, the central committee of a powerful party, or a "Revolutionary Family," by forcing the members of the political community to recognize that it is in their mutual interest to support the regime.

In other words, a regime cannot generate support unless it has control over the values that can be allocated in exchange for support. Thus, the first task for a new political regime is political capital formation.¹⁰ A new government within an institutionalized regime is not confronted by the problem of capital formation (however, it does need to guard against capital depreciation) since the political resources of the preceding government generally accrue to the new government and can be allocated in exchange for support. In Mexico, for instance, a new president has an enormous number of appointive positions to parcel out to

⁹Systems Analysis, p. 186.

¹⁰Ilchman and Uphoff, pp. 181-187.

loyal supporters¹¹ because the rules and structures of the system remain unchanged.

In a praetorian system, however, the power contenders constitute a political oligopoly where a few contenders control the market and set the exchange ratio for their own commodities in a system that has an interrelated exchange system but lacks a standard pricing system.¹² In an oligopoly or an oligopsony, it is difficult for the regime to buy constant support since the regime does not have control of all or most of the political commodities¹³ (for instance, a sector may go directly to the armed forces to buy a commodity like coercion).

In order to build up its political capital, a regime has to gain a monopoly, or near monopoly, over the desired commodities. This can be done by nationalization or monetization of the exchange system whereby a somewhat centralized national market is established.¹⁴ This involves

¹¹The president of Mexico, according to Frank R. Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 149, has direct control of over fifteen thousand "political plums."

¹²Curry and Wade, pp. 84-85, use the United States as an example of an oligopoly (really a duopoly) that functions as a stable and effective marketplace. The effectiveness of such an oligopoly, however, seems to be dependent upon the acceptance of narrow parameters for the marketplace (i.e., coercion is a rarely used commodity). There usually are no such restrictions or limitations on the use of certain resources in a praetorian society and, thus, the praetorian system is less predictable and less effective.

¹³Ilchman and Uphoff, p. 157.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 96-97.

four basic requirements. First, the regime must be indifferent to the benefits which the sectors offer. The regime must create a seller's market so that it sets the exchange rate. Second, the regime must ensure a demand for the political goods it has by closing off alternative sources of supply. Third, the regime must monopolize coercive power in order to bar the use of coercion by other actors in their attempts to challenge the regime. Finally, the regime must create a need for the goods which it has to offer.¹⁵ The regime can increase its political capital by using propaganda to enhance the value of status, central planning, order, and other commodities which it has to offer.

The authoritarian system which existed in Brazil was an oligopoly which lost its effectiveness because new actors forced their way into the system when the clientage networks lost control of the exchange market. The new groups increased the level of demands for resources which were at the time becoming scarce due to economic stagnation. Thus, the first order of business for the military regime which seized control of the hyper-inflated situation was to establish control over the political marketplace.

This consolidation was accomplished by a series of political acts through which the military leaders: (1) seized political power; (2) purged the system of undesirable elements; (3) expanded the scope of executive power; (4)

¹⁵For a discussion of these four requirements, see Blau, pp. 121-125.

responded to electoral challenges; (5) responded to legislative challenges; and (6) responded to judicial challenges.

The Seizure of Power

The action which brought the military to power in Brazil in 1964 was a relatively simple coup d'état in which there were no deaths and little fighting. It was not the action of "the people" as José Wamberto describes it,¹⁶ but it had the overwhelming support of the political and military elites and the passive acceptance of a majority of the general population.

Thus, the initial aspects of consolidation were, like the coup, relatively easy. The nation had come to an impasse. Under President Goulart inflation was rampant, the economy was in decline, the government did not have the resources to respond to the increasing level of demands, and both civilian and military support for the regime had eroded seriously.¹⁷ Goulart, unable to establish the congressional support needed to install the reforms he thought necessary, turned to popular appeals in an effort to force the conservative legislature to enact his programs.¹⁸ This act

¹⁶Castello Branco, *Revolução e Democracia* (Rio de Janeiro: Companhia Gráfica Lux, 1970), p. 43. This is a very sympathetic account of the Castello Branco regime by the press secretary for that government.

¹⁷For a good summary of the problems of Brazil at the time of the coup, see Stepan, pp. 134-152.

¹⁸Goulart's leadership in both the effort to persuade Congress to act and the attempt to create popular pressures with which to force congressional action was often

precipitated the military coup and Goulart fled to Uruguay.

João Goulart was a political operator with an instinct for power but without the ability to exercise that power effectively. His nature was to avoid making decisions, to stall a decision until the last minute in an effort to find a compromise or a jeito.¹⁹ A very rich rancher²⁰ and yet a long-time member of the professional left, Goulart apparently neither knew nor understood the true nature of the problems of the urban masses who formed his constituency.²¹ Mauro Borges, the young, reform-minded governor of the state of Goiás, places the blame for the impasse directly on the inability of Goulart and his predecessor, Jânio Quadros, to respond to the dual demands for economic development and social peace. Borges contends that irresolute leadership caught between the immobilism of the reactionary positions

irresolute and inconsistent. For a catalogue of his many mistakes, see J. J. Faust, A Revolução Devora Seus Presidentes (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Saga, 1965), pp. 47-77; and Skidmore, pp. 205-302.

¹⁹Faust, pp. 54-55. Jeito is a term which signifies the discovery of a solution to an almost unsolvable problem.

²⁰Either Goulart was a very astute businessman or he used his various political offices to expand his fortune. Beginning with a modest inheritance of 1,425 hectares, by 1964 Goulart was reputed to be the largest latifundista in Brazil. He owned, in conjunction with eight associates, properties that the military investigators estimated as almost 700,000 hectares, tens of thousands of cattle and sheep, plus many apartments, houses, airplanes, and motor vehicles. Jornal do Brasil, 1 April 1964, p. 7; 25 June 1964, p. 4; and 26 June 1964, p. 4.

²¹Faust, pp. 54-55. This probably accounts for his failure to mobilize strong popular support in opposition to the move to depose him.

and the revolutionary aggressiveness of those who desired social, economic, and political revision of the country made the coup d'état inevitable.²²

Military coups have taken place in Brazil following long periods of doubt concerning the "legitimacy of the executive to retain or assume office."²³ The coups of 1945 and 1964 were preceded by deep divisions in the national leadership as to the legitimacy of Presidents Vargas and Goulart. The attempted coup in 1961 and several lesser revolts failed because civilian opinion did not consider the removal of the president necessary.²⁴ The coup of 1964 had extensive support because influential soldiers and civilians alike believed that the nation was seriously threatened by the twin evils of communism and corruption.²⁵

²²O Golpe em Goiás: História de Uma Grande Traição (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1965), p. 106. Borges was a supporter of the coup but was removed from power later as the definition of subversion was expanded.

²³Stepan, p. 86.

²⁴For analysis of the civilian encouragement for these several coups, see Oliveiros S. Ferreira, As Forças Armadas e o Desafio da Revolução (Rio de Janeiro: Edições GRD, 1964), pp. 41-73; and Stepan, pp. 85-121. John F. W. Dulles, Unrest in Brazil: Political-Military Crises, 1955-1964 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970), provides a detailed historical treatment of coups and revolts of the period from 1955 to 1964.

²⁵The immobilism of the political system was not, in itself, sufficient grounds for forcing military action, so the issues of communism and corruption were exaggerated by political opportunists and some army generals in order to create a demand for military action. After the coup the president of the General Commission for Investigations, Marshall Tourino de Resende, stated that communism in Brazil "is a minimal problem in relation to the corruption,"

At 3:45 A.M. on April 2, 1964, a special joint session of the Brazilian congress declared the presidency of the nation vacant and installed Ranieri Mazzilli, President of the Chamber of Deputies and next in line for succession according to the Constitution, as Acting President of Brazil. Mazzilli at once began conducting himself like a president, forming a cabinet and naming military commanders,²⁶ but he was soon informed by General Artur de Costa e Silva (who had appointed himself War Minister on the rationale that he was the oldest general on active duty) that the Revolutionary High Command, composed of Costa e Silva, Admiral Rademaker, and Air Force Brigadier Francisco de Assis Correia de Melo, would make all important decisions.²⁷ The High Command demonstrated its indifference to the legitimacy offered by Mazzilli and refused to allow Mazzilli to serve as an alternative supplier of political goods. It was necessary to transfer that power to a more legitimate institution, but this would be accomplished under the control of the military leaders.

The Brazilian Constitution of 1946 provided for the election of a new president within thirty days following the

(quoted by Faust, p. 98). Maia Neto, a strong opponent of the coup, argues that corruption did exist in Brazil and in the Goulart government (as in all countries and all governments, he adds), but the civilian backers of the coup were as tainted as those removed by the coup. Brasil, Guerra-Quente na América Latina (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Civilização Brasileira, 1965), pp. 89-105.

²⁶Jornal do Brasil, 3 April 1964, p. 3.

²⁷Dulles, p. 339.

vacancy of both the presidency and the vice-presidency. But the urgency with which the revolutionaries²⁸ viewed their task caused them to make all deliberate haste in choosing a legitimate head of government to preside over the consolidation of power. General-of-the-Army Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco, chief of the Army General Staff, was selected because he had an excellent combat and academic record, he had a reputation for being apolitical (that is, he was nonpartisan), and he was closely associated with the Superior War College where the security and developmental problems of the nation had been carefully analyzed.²⁹ Castelo Branco was the consensual choice of both the civilian and military leaders of the revolution.³⁰

It was then necessary to construct a supporting majority in Congress for Castelo's election, but, given the strong backing of the "revolutionaries" for Castelo and the tendency of Brazilian politicians to disregard ideologies in their effort to attach themselves to the power of the

²⁸In reality the series of events which began on March 31, 1964, cannot be described as a revolution because the resultant changes were more quantitative than qualitative, but for the sake of uniformity the movement will herein be referred to as "the revolution" since this is the term most often used by the leaders of the movement.

²⁹Stepan, p. 217.

³⁰Jornal do Brasil, 5 April 1964, p. 3. The major exception was Costa e Silva who apparently wanted to retain power for himself according to Dulles, pp. 346-354. Confronted by the overwhelming civilian and military support for Castelo Branco, Costa e Silva finally gave in.

moment so as to avail themselves for political favors,³¹ this was not a difficult task. UDN and PSP backing was assured almost from the start, and on April 7 the directorate of the PSD voted to get on Castelo Branco's bandwagon.³² On April 11, Congress elected Castelo Branco by a vote of 361 to 5. On April 15 he was installed as President of Brazil.³³

The power of Castelo Branco to consolidate the new regime had been assured by the issuance on April 9, 1964, of one of the most important items of output of the military regime. On that date the Revolutionary High Command signed the Institutional Act (AI-1).³⁴ This act stated that the victorious revolution was legitimized by its very success, and thus, its chiefs, representing the victorious armed

³¹Cabral, pp. 60-61, states that if Luis Carlos Prestes (a communist) or Plínio Salgado (a neo-fascist) were to achieve presidential power, neither would have problems in forming a ministerial coalition or an initial legislative coalition. They would only have to distribute jobs and titles, and the politicians would stay in line until it became evident that the president was in danger of being deposed. This opportunism enabled the military to remain indifferent to offers of political support without immediately endangering the continuation of that support.

³²Jornal do Brasil, 7 April 1964, p. 3.

³³Seventy-two congressmen abstained, the majority of whom were members of the PTB. The PTB leadership announced that the party had decided to abstain because the hasty nature of the election prevented a valid opinion of Brazilians concerning the candidacy of Castelo Branco. See Victor, p. 572.

³⁴Ibid., p. 546. AI-1 was largely the work of Francisco Campos, who had been a major architect of the 1937 Constitution, which provided the constitutional foundation for the Estado Nôvo.

forces who represented "the people,"³⁵ had the power to destroy the government and to construct a new government.³⁶

The prologue of the act went on to state that the revolution had frustrated an attempt by the former government to "bolshvize" the country. The mission of the revolutionary government was to restore economic and financial order and to drain the large pocket of communists "whose purulence had infiltrated the cupola" of government as well as its administrative agencies.

The Institutional Act ordered, inter alia, the following:

1. Maintenance of the 1946 Constitution and the state constitutions except where modified by AI-1;
2. The election of a new president and vice-president by an absolute majority of Congress within forty-eight hours of the issuance of the Act;
3. Automatic approval of constitutional amendments and other proposed laws if Congress failed to act on such proposals within thirty days of submission;
4. Authorization of the president to declare a thirty-day state of siege with subsequent approval of Congress;
5. Suspension of constitutional guarantees for six months, and authorization for the president to

³⁵This is in consonance with a familiar Brazilian expression, "O Exército é o povo fardado" (The army is the people in uniform). See Faust, p. 114. On May 6, 1964, Minas Gerais Governor Magalhães Pinto explained that the people must have patience with the revolution and always remember that "the revolution was made for the people." Jornal do Brasil, 7 May 1964, p. 3.

³⁶For the complete act, see Estados Unidos do Brasil, Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, Atos Institucionais e Complementares, Vol. I of 3 vols. (Brasília: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1966), pp. 3-7 (hereinafter referred to as Atos Institucionais).

dismiss any federal, state, or municipal official or employee;

6. Authorization of investigative processes for crimes against the State or against the political and social order.
7. Authorization, during the sixty days following issuance, for the suspension for ten years of the political rights of citizens and for the voidance of the mandates of federal, state, and municipal legislators.

The Institutional Act gave the new President a wide range of powers. The thirty-day limitation on congressional action would force Congress to judge constitutional amendments and proposed laws hastily or see the proposals enacted by decree. The military government could be indifferent to legislative support since Congress was not really needed. The authorization for dismissal of government employees, the voidance of legislative mandates, and suspension of political rights gave the Revolutionary High Command, and later the President, the power to effect an extensive purge of the political system. This made the military leaders the sole dispenser of authority.

AI-1 was to expire on January 31, 1966, the date established for the inauguration of the president and vice-president who were to be elected popularly on October 3, 1965. Apparently the military ministers had thought that the country could be put back on course in less than twenty-two months. But as the definition of subversion and corruption broadened, and as the civilian support for the regime eroded due to the harsh measures instituted in the effort to

establish economic stability, many military men (particularly those of the linha dura--hard line--but also many moderates as well) and their congressional spokesmen began to press for retention of power by the military.

President Castelo Branco had made several personal pledges to guarantee the October, 1965, presidential election as scheduled, and, thus, opposed the action of Congress in July, 1964, which extended his mandate to March 15, 1967.³⁷ There was near consensus among the military and civilian leaders of the revolution³⁸ that the extension was needed in order to consolidate the revolution. Castelo, then, after reportedly telling Deputy Pedro Aleixo on July 22 that he would not accept the extension,³⁹ announced on July 24 that he would serve until March 31, 1967.⁴⁰

The extension of Castelo Branco's term in office was predicated on the fears of the leaders of the revolution that more time was needed to consolidate the goals of the movement. These fears were born out (in the perception of those leaders) in October of 1965 when candidates opposed by the revolution won gubernatorial elections in Guanabara and

³⁷Castelo expressed his opposition very clearly in a July 13, 1964, letter to Senator Daniel Krieger. See José Wamberto, Anex 11, pp. 119-120.

³⁸The major exception to this consensus was Guanabara Governor Carlos Lacerda, who had expected to be elected president in October, 1965, especially after his strongest competitor, Juscelino Kubitschek, lost his political rights in the purge.

³⁹Jornal do Brasil, 23 July 1964, p. 3.

⁴⁰Victor, p. 595.

Minas Gerais. To the "hard-line" officers and politicians, these two elections indicated that the old political forces were still very much a threat and that the military might lose control of the situation if it did not act decisively. Thus, the revolutionary regime again needed to extend its exceptional powers and to ensure that the presidential election of 1966 would not create an alternative political marketplace.

The instrument used to guarantee the continuity of the movement was Institutional Act Number 2 (AI-2), signed on October 17, 1965. AI-2 used the same rationale in its prologue as AI-1 and warned "reactionary" forces that the Revolution (now spelled with a capital "R") was yet alive and would not retreat.⁴¹ Thus, the revolutionaries publicized the value of the commodity (law and order) which they had to offer.

AI-2, which remained in effect until March 15, 1967, was far more extensive than AI-1. Its expansion of presidential power at the expense of the legislative and judicial powers will be discussed later in this chapter. As to the continuity of the revolution, it revoked the provision of the 1946 Constitution that required the election of the president and vice-president by popular vote. For the 1966 election, the president would be elected by an absolute majority of Congress from no more than two candidates. To

⁴¹For the complete text of the act, see Atos Institucionais, Vol I, pp. 15-25.

prevent party combines and trades, AI-2 abolished the existing political parties and, thereby, eliminated some of the potential alternative suppliers of political services.

This act also restored the power of the president to purge the political system of any citizen who "demonstrates incompatibility with the objectives of the Revolution." This again gave the military government a near monopoly over the rewards of status and authority and, thus, opened the door for the most powerful military man, War Minister Costa e Silva, to make a successful bid for the presidency.⁴²

Costa e Silva, as the hope of the hard line although not directly identified with that faction, made skillful use of his revolutionary credentials in the newly restricted electoral process. As the official presidential candidate of the government party, Aliança Renovadora Nacional (ARENA), he was dutifully elected by Congress on October 3, 1966.⁴³ His installation on March 15, 1967, assured the continuance of the military in power.⁴⁴

⁴²Costa e Silva had emerged as the leading military figure following the coup of 1964, but his active participation in the coup barred him from the presidency at that time. In the crisis following the gubernatorial elections of October, 1965, Costa e Silva served as mediator between Castelo Branco, who had pledged to install the new governors, and the officers of the hard line, who wanted to depose Castelo Branco in favor of a more authoritarian regime. For an account of the conciliation, see Correio da Manhã, 7 October 1965, p. 2.

⁴³The opposition party, Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB), could not find a suitable, willing, and government-approved candidate so its members boycotted the election.

⁴⁴The continuity of military rule did not ensure a similar continuity of policy, however, since Costa e Silva

The Purges

A major tenet of the art of war is that the conquering forces remove all vestiges of the enemy in order to secure and protect the conquered positions. According to J. J. Faust, the military leaders of the revolution resolved that this principle would not be ignored in 1964 as it had been following previous coups.⁴⁵ In order to establish a quasi-legal basis for the "purification" of the political system, the Revolutionary High Command included in AI-1 the authorization for the High Command, and later the president, to conduct a purge--"to suspend political rights for a period of ten years and to void federal, state, and municipal legislative mandates, without judicial review of these acts." The removal power would expire sixty days after the installation of the president. The document also authorized the president to dismiss or retire federal, state, and municipal employees for a period of six months. The commodities of status, authority, and participation and the economic values which could be derived from status and authority became a near monopoly of the government.

The purges were not entirely unexpected since Operacão-Limpeza (Operation Cleanup)--conducted in the first days following the coup--had caused hundreds of politicians,

represented a different wing of the army. For a good analysis of the differences between the policies of the Castelo Branco government and the Costa e Silva government, see Stepan, pp. 230-236.

⁴⁵pp. 123-124.

writers, and interest organization leaders who were suspected of corruption or of having communist ties to be arrested or to flee to foreign embassies.⁴⁶ The extent of the purges was unexpected, however. Under the authority of AI-1, 116 legislative mandates were voided, the political rights of 378 people were suspended for ten years, and 2,627 public employees were dismissed or retired. Including status deprivations, such as revocation of medals, honors, and privileges, 3,535 acts of punishment were meted out under the authority of AI-1⁴⁷

AI-1 was signed on April 9, 1964, and, on April 10, the first purge list was issued. The list of one hundred names included the cassação (i.e., the voidance of the electoral mandate) of forty-one congressmen--twenty-one of the PTB; two from the UDN; four from the PSD, the PSP, and the PSB; and three from the PDC and the PST. Such prominent politicians as Leonel Brizola, Abelarda Jurema, and Francisco Julião were on the list.

The suspension of political rights for ten years affected the following: ex-Presidents Quadros and Goulart, communist leader Carlos Prestes, Pernambuco Governor Miguel

⁴⁶Faust, p. 87, reports that the total number of detentions was about forty thousand. By the first of May the total number of political prisoners was estimated to be three or four thousand. This figure was reduced to a few hundred in June after the government ordered the release of those who had not been arraigned.

⁴⁷Luis Barbosa, "Vinte Mil Atos, Leis, e Decretos em Tres Anos," Jornal do Brasil, 12 March 1967, Caderno Especial, p. 3.

Arrais, economist Celso Furtado, several mayors, judges, writers, and also many prominent labor leaders.⁴⁸

New lists were issued on April 14, May 7, June 8, June 11, June 13, and June 14 when the sixty-day time period for voidance of mandates and political rights expired. These lists included many military officers, federal and state deputies, more governors and mayors, judges, writers, and teachers. Under AI-1 the following were purged: two senators (Kubitschek and Amani Silva); fifty-six federal deputies (of whom twenty-nine were PTB and eleven were PSD); the governors of Pernambuco, Sergipe, Rio de Janeiro, Pará, and Amazonas; the mayors of seven major cities (Pôrto Alegre, Recife, Natal, Brasília, Belém, Santos, and Macéio) and of many less important municípios; many state and municipal legislators; and numerous military officers, judges, writers, teachers, plus student, labor, and agrarian leaders.⁴⁹ Those affected were not told of the charges against them nor could they defend themselves or appeal the decisions.

The purges had the effect of making Congress the docile servant of the military regime because the revolutionaries' control of status and authority made most politicians reticent to speak out. With the exception of the PTB politicians, who had little hope of reconciliation with the

⁴⁸See Victor, pp. 548-550.

⁴⁹For a complete list of those who lost their legislative mandates and/or their political rights, see Jornal do Brasil, 21 June 1964, Caderno Especial, p. 8.

military, no significant protest was made by their fellow congressmen. The PSD politicians, looking for high posts in the new government and confronted with a choice between "honor and the position," decided that position was preferable.⁵⁰ Even when the party leader, Senator and ex-President Juscelino Kubitschek, was struck down, no loud protest was heard. One PSD leader likened the situation to the rancher who sacrifices a cow to the piranhas so that the rest of the herd may cross the river safely downstream. Kubitschek was the cow who would satisfy the piranhas in the armed forces.⁵¹

The purges also gave the military regime a docile group of governors.⁵² Pernambuco Governor Miguel Arrais was the first to fall after the coup. He earned the label of "communist" and the enmity of the sugar-planation owners by demanding that the owners pay their workers the minimum wage that was fixed by federal law.⁵³ Arrais was arrested by army personnel on April 1 and impeached that same day by the

⁵⁰Victor, p. 571.

⁵¹Faust, p. 127.

⁵²Except for Lacerda, Ademar, and Magalhães Pinto, whose positions as original conspirators allowed them to be quite critical of the regime until they were one by one silenced.

⁵³Faust, pp. 119-122. The minimum wage was set by Congress according to the cost of living of the particular area. Although the minimum wage for agrarian workers was quite inferior to that of industrial laborers, it was methodically ignored by rural employers.

state legislative assembly.⁵⁴ His political rights were voided on April 10, and he was kept in prison until mid-April when the Supremo Tribunal Federal (the Supreme Court) ordered his release on a habeas corpus petition. He was then summoned to testify for a military investigation of the Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros (a study group of a supposedly Marxist orientation); and after another month of imprisonment at various places,⁵⁵ he was allowed to go into exile.

João Sexias Doria, Governor of Sergipe, was another who lost his position in the first days of the revolution. Sexias was elected in 1962 by a conservative PSD-PR coalition, but he gradually moved away from the status quo policies of the rural electoral forces which elected him, trying to promote the industrial development of his state by government action. In March of 1964 he aligned himself with Goulart and, thus, earned the fervent opposition of both the UDN and the PSD-PR group.⁵⁶ Sexias, like Arrais, was arrested by army personnel on April 1, 1964, and impeached on the same day. He later lost his political rights under AI-1.

⁵⁴A correspondent of O Cruzeiro, quoted by Victor, fn., p. 526 stated that the "impeachment" of Arrais was engineered by an army colonel who had ordered army troops to surround the Assembly Building.

⁵⁵Convinced that Arrais was a communist the soldiers, one day, served him stroganoff, Russian salad, and vodka for lunch. Jornal do Brasil, 30 April 1964, p. 3.

⁵⁶Bonifácio Fortes, "Sergipe: Democracia de Raros," RBEF, No. 23/24 (July, 1967/January, 1968), 99-100.

Governor Badger Silveira of Rio de Janeiro had given verbal support to Goulart during the coup but then quickly declared himself in favor of the revolution when he saw Goulart's position was hopeless. When he later refused to appoint as Commander of the Military Police the man wanted by the local army commander, his impeachment (and also that of the Vice-Governor) was orchestrated by the army.⁵⁷ He also lost his political rights later.⁵⁸

Governors who tried to maintain a neutral position concerning the revolution did not survive. Aurélio do Carmo, Governor of Pará, waited two months before becoming a "revolutionary," and his cautiousness cost him his job and his political rights.⁵⁹ Governor Plínio Coelho of Amazonas also attempted to remain neutral but was removed by decree of Castelo Branco on June 14, 1964.⁶⁰ Many other governors were threatened with impeachment and the suspension of their political rights for various crimes (generally corruption), but most were agile enough to survive the initial purges. Lomanto Junior of Bahia had been, according to Mário Victor,

⁵⁷ See Jornal do Brasil, 3 May 1964, p. 12.

⁵⁸ The impeachment of both the governor and vice-governor of Rio de Janeiro made way for a serious struggle among various military commanders for election to the vacant governorship. According to Ibid., 7 May 1964, p. 4, there were ten candidates, all military men. General Paulo Torres was finally elected on May 6.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 10 June 1964, p. 4. See also Amílcar Alves Tupiassu, "As Eleições Paranaenses de 1966," RBEP, No. 23/24 (July, 1967/January, 1968), pp. 29-32.

⁶⁰ Jornal do Brasil, 20 May 1964, p. 3; and 16 June 1964, p. 3.

"a Trabalhista until the zero hour of March 31, but he was a revolutionary from that moment on"⁶¹ and managed to survive because he had the backing of the powerful landowners of the state and of several army generals.

In the case of Governor Mauro Borges of Goiás the enmity of powerful landowners and generals overbalanced overt support of the revolution.⁶² Borges, the son of Senator Pedro Ludivico (who had been Vargas' Interventor in Goiás and who had long been the PSD boss in the state), was elected by the PSD in 1960. The Governor had inherited, through his father, the natural enmity of the Caiado family⁶³ and the family's military allies and was distrusted by many military officers because he had been cofounder with Leonel Brizola of the National Liberation Front--a union of Brazilian "anti-imperialists."⁶⁴

Borges resisted the intimidation and threats of some army officials,⁶⁵ and he was still in office when the

⁶¹p. 559.

⁶²For a personal account of the threats and intimidations which led to the ultimate success of the attempt to depose him, see Borges, pp. 121-158.

⁶³The Caiados were, before 1930, the most powerful clan in Goiás. The family lost control of the state government in 1930 and were not able to regain it because of Ludovico's tight control first as an Interventor and later as head of the PSD "machine." By January, 1971, the Caiados were back in control of Goiás.

⁶⁴See Dulles, p. 169.

⁶⁵Castelo Branco suspended the political rights of two of Borges' cabinet members; but without proof of corruption or communism, Castelo refused to purge Borges, apparently because his father's support was needed by Castelo to mold a

purge-authorizing articles of AI-1 expired. As the definition of subversion expanded, military pressure to remove Borges increased, and Castelo Branco finally decreed federal intervention in Goiás on November 25, 1964.⁶⁶ Borges had been arrested previously on charges of subversion but was released on habeas corpus by the STF, which ruled that under the 1946 Constitution neither military nor civil justice could try a state governor without the existence of a crime being first recognized by the state legislative assembly through impeachment proceedings.⁶⁷

Finally in January of 1965, a military-engineered compromise found a candidate suitable to a majority of the state deputies, and the way was made clear for the elimination of Borges. He was impeached on January 7, and Marshall Emílio Rodrigues Ribas Junior was elected governor.⁶⁸

The purges of the six governors demonstrated to the other governors that a lack of revolutionary orthodoxy was very dangerous. The only grounds on which a governor could criticize the military government was to state, as did Lacerda, Magalhães Pinto, and Ademar, that one was more in tune with the ideals of the revolution than was the revolutionary government. But as the military government gained

PSD-UDN coalition that would be useful in Congress when the coercive power of AI-1 expired.

⁶⁶Jornal do Brasil, 26 November 1964, p. 1.

⁶⁷Ibid., 24 November 1964, p. 3.

⁶⁸Ibid., 8 January 1965, p. 4.

control over the exchange system, even this tactic was dangerous.

The validity of the punitive sections of AI-1 ended on October 9, 1964, with the publication of a long list of public officials, both civilian and military, who were dismissed from their positions because of alleged ideological or moral impurity. This remarkable document had served well as the quasi-legal means of removing actual and potential opponents of the military regime from various sectors of society and the government. Labor syndicates, student organizations, and peasant groups were eliminated as alternative sources of political benefits because the purges had removed or intimidated their leaders or because the investigations allowed by AI-1 had provided the rationale for governmental intervention in or abolition of the organizations.⁶⁹ Other purges were later authorized by AI-2 and AI-5, but these were incidental toward the confrontation of the military regime with a challenge coming from a specific area.

The Expansion of Executive Power

A second type of consolidating output was that directed toward expanding the ability of the president to install his programs. This was really not a revolutionary idea since both Quadros and Goulart had complained that they were defeated by the nature of the political system, which

⁶⁹Neto, pp. 202-203.

prevented them from enacting their reforms. In the revolutionary situation, however, expansion of executive power by legal and semi-legal means was made easy because de facto power had already been concentrated in the hands of the military leaders. All that remained was to formulate the laws which would legitimate the military government's monopoly over political goods.

In the words of General Lira Távares, one of the military intellectuals of the revolution, the movement had to search for "a mutual adjustment between power and the objectives of the nation"⁷⁰--the objectives of the nation being development, security, and democracy. The regime had to maintain sufficient political power to ensure development and security, but power that was bridled in such a way as not to compromise the ideal of democracy since the appearance of democracy was necessary for the maintenance of domestic and foreign legitimacy. This condition was not as restricting as one might think, however, since the definition of democracy used by many of the revolutionary leaders was of a Thomistic origin. Redemocratization of the nation involved "the salvation of the natural law and the dignity of the human being" (democracy writ large), and the effort toward this goal at times required "the sacrifice of the forms and rules of the democratic game."⁷¹

⁷⁰From a speech delivered at a graduation ceremony of the Superior War College, Jornal do Brasil, 18 December 1966, p. 5.

⁷¹Gustavo Corção, "Para a Normalização do Brasil," in O Processo Revolucionário Brasileiro (Brasília: Assessoria

The first institutional act gave the executive extraordinary powers, but the apparent belief of the leaders of the movement that peace and order could quickly be established and the country could be put back on course in a short period of time dictated that the exceptional powers be of relatively short duration (sixty days for the voidance of mandates and political rights and six months for the other punitive articles). AI-2 recognized the necessity for measures of a more lasting nature.

The second institutional act acknowledged the act of Congress in July, 1964, which extended Castelo Branco's term of office until March 15, 1967, and gave him broad powers until that date (it did, however, provide against continuismo by stating that the president was not eligible for the following term). During this period the president could void legislative mandates and political rights and retire or dismiss public officials at any level. This provision of AI-2 was not used to the extent that the similar provision of AI-1 was,⁷² but the threat of application was a certain

Especial de Relações Públicas da Presidência da República, 1970), pp. 36-37.

⁷²Under AI-1, 494 Brazilians lost their political rights and/or their legislative mandates, as compared to 169 under AI-2. According to Barbosa, Jornal do Brasil, 12 March 1967, p. 3, 2,627 public officials were dismissed or retired under AI-1, as compared to forty-three under AI-2. There is wide disagreement concerning the exact number of people purged from government service under AI-1. For example, Ferreira de Castro, p. 316, claims that about 4,500 federal employees and an equal number of state and municipal officials lost their jobs in the six months following the coup. This perhaps includes those who resigned in anticipation of being caught in the purge.

means of assuring the general cooperation of most politicians and bureaucrats.

AI-2 gave the president the right of initiative in proposing amendments to the constitution and imposed a thirty-day time limit for approval by an absolute majority of Congress. If not approved, or revised and approved, within that time period, the proposed amendment would automatically go into effect. Similarly, proposed laws were to be acted upon in ninety days (forty-five days for the Chamber and forty-five days for the Senate), and proposals considered "urgent" by the president were to be acted on within thirty days. Only the president could propose legislation which would change the number, character, or pay for federal posts. These same provisions were extended to the states as well and, thus, expanded the powers of the governors.

The president was also given the power to declare a state of siege without congressional approval or to extend a state of siege for a period of 180 days. He could legislate by decree or complementary act (complementary to the institutional acts) on any matter related to national security. He, furthermore, could decree the recess of Congress and of the state and municipal assemblies, whether or not a state of siege had been declared, and legislate by decree on any subject which was within the jurisdiction of the recessed body. By way of Institutional Act Number 4 of December 7, 1966, the president's decree power was expanded to include

financial matters as well as matters of national security.⁷³ From the publication of AI-2 to March 14, 1967, President Castelo Branco signed 318 decree-laws, most of which were based upon the revolutionary acts and did not require legislative approval.⁷⁴

Institutional Act Number 2, thus, took much of the legislative function away from the legislatures. If the legislators wanted to alter executive proposals at all, they had to act with haste. If an individual legislator was too vociferous in his opposition to the regime, he might lose his mandate and political rights. If the legislature as a whole obstructed the regime, it could be recessed indefinitely, and the executive would act in its stead. The only increase in the representation function of the legislators was one of little power and dubious honor. AI-2 removed the presidency and vice-presidency from popular election and made those offices subject to indirect election by Congress; and AI-3, signed on February 5, 1966, assigned gubernatorial elections to the state assemblies.⁷⁵ But because AI-2 had abolished the old parties and Complementary Act Number 4 in

⁷³For the complete text of AI-4, see Estados Unidos do Brasil, Congresso Nacional, Câmara dos Deputados, Diário do Congresso Nacional, December 13, 1966, p. 1,043.

⁷⁴Jesse de Azevedo Barquero, "Decreto-Leis," Revista de Informação Legislativa (Senado Federal), VII (January/March, 1970), 103-104. This article lists all of the decrees issued from November, 1965 through October, 1969.

⁷⁵For the text of AI-3, see Atos Institucionais, Vol. I, pp. 47-49.

essence allowed only two parties,⁷⁶ Congress and the assemblies had only two choices at best. Since the nominating procedure was generally controlled by the president (at the least, he could veto a candidate), the legislatures were placed in the position of rubber-stamping the president's choice.⁷⁷

AI-2 contained two other provisions which extended executive power. First, the president was authorized to decree federal intervention in a state⁷⁸ in order to ensure the execution of federal law or in order to prevent or suppress subversion of the public order. In the federal arrangement of the Third Republic, forceful state governments had become nearly autonomous centers of political power. The purges of governors and other state officials, plus the authorization for federal intervention, ensured that the governors would not seriously challenge the power of the military government.

⁷⁶Ibid., pp. 33-36.

⁷⁷ According to Josaphat Marinho, the Lei Orgânica dos Partidos Políticos (the Organizational Law for Political Parties) required organizational reforms that would have eliminated much of the previous party anarchy and might have led to the creation of truly national and representative parties. Unfortunately AI-2 and subsequent complementary acts rendered it "inapplicable." See Josaphat Marinho, "Lei Orgânica dos Partidos Políticos no Brasil," Revista da Informação Legislativa (Senado Federal), III (October/December, 1966), 51-58. For the text of the law, see Código Eleitoral: Atualizado e Com Toda a Legislação Complementar (Rio de Janeiro: Gráfica Auriverde, 1970), pp. 174-202 (hereinafter referred to as Código Eleitoral).

⁷⁸ This was extended to municípios as a result of Complementary Acts Numbers 5 and 8. See Atos Institucionais, Vol. I, pp. 37-45.

Second, the act raised the number of judges serving on the Supremo Tribunal Federal, the Tribunal Federal de Recursos, and the Tribunal Superior Militar, allowing the president to "pack" the courts with trusted judges. In addition, AI-2 specifically stated that revolutionary legislation and the resolutions by which state assemblies had impeached government officials or voided mandates were excluded from judicial review. Furthermore, the act gave military courts jurisdiction over civilians, even state governors, accused of crimes against national security or military institutions.

The power of the executive was further expanded by the adoption of a new constitution. The Constitution of 1946 had been amended several times by Congress under pressure from the military regime,⁷⁹ but such revisions had not been sufficient to forestall the need of the military leaders to promulgate AI-2 and the complementary acts which followed it. The movement needed a legal document which would embody the revolutionary principles and legitimize the expanded authority already enjoyed by the military government.⁸⁰

In April of 1966 President Castelo Branco had created a commission of jurists to write a new constitution. The

⁷⁹Prior to the coup, the constitution had been amended six times. From May, 1964, through May, 1966, it was amended fourteen times in addition to the suspensions and alterations dictated in the institutional acts. See Paulo Sarazate, A Constituição de Brasil: Ao Alcance de Todos (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Freitas Bastos, 1968), pp. 26-30.

⁸⁰Ferreira de Castro, pp. 331-332.

product of that commission was reviewed and revised by the president, the cabinet ministers, and the National Security Council before being released to the press on December 7, 1966.⁸¹ After considering various means of promulgating the new charter, the National Security Council decided to call Congress into a special session to consider the constitution under strict conditions specified by an institutional act.⁸²

Institutional Act Number 4 was the instrument which charged Congress with approving the new charter. The prologue to AI-4 gave the rationale for the new constitution: "That it became imperative to give the country a Constitution that . . . represents the institutionalization of the ideas and principles of the Revolution." The act called Congress into special session from December 12, 1966, to January 24, 1967, to discuss and approve the proposed constitution and any other proposals submitted by the executive power.

The timetable established by AI-4 was quite severe. Although AI-2 had previously allowed a thirty-day time limit for the consideration of amendments, AI-4 allowed only forty days for an entire constitution. The timetable was even more confining when one considers the fact that Castelo Branco had also submitted for approval within the same time period a controversial press law, which was strongly opposed as a violation of the inherent freedom of the press by

⁸¹Sarazate, pp. 52-53.

⁸²Jornal do Brasil, 30 August 1966, p. 4.

almost every editor and journalist in Brazil.⁸³ The government had, in effect, ensured extremely superficial action on both the proposed constitution and the press law by submitting two such lengthy and controversial documents for approval at one time.

AI-4 stipulated that the constitution would be promulgated by Congress on January 24, 1967, but the voting was to be completed by January 21. The final rendition could be the original project as amended or the original project if no amendments were approved or if the voting was not completed on January 21. As a result of the press for time, the 884 proposed amendments were approved or rejected in blocks of as many as one hundred, and even then the constitution was not approved until the morning of January 22.⁸⁴ The confusion was such that not until January 23 did the legislators or the people know exactly what had been passed.⁸⁵

The 1967 Constitution of Brazil incorporated much of AI-2.⁸⁶ The power of the executive was expanded through the

⁸³For criticism of this law, see the December, 1966, and January, 1967, issues of Jornal do Brasil, O Estado de São Paulo, O Globo, or Correio da Manhã. The Lei do Imprensa had the vehement opposition of both proregime and antiregime newspapers, but it went into effect with only minor changes.

⁸⁴Jornal do Brasil, 22 January 1967, p. 1. The clocks in the Câmara had been stopped at 2354 so as not to surpass the time limit.

⁸⁵Ibid., 24 January 1967, p. 3.

⁸⁶For the text of the constitution, annotated with comparisons with previous constitutions and the original project, see Sarazate or Osny Duarte Pereira, A Constituição do

following provisions:

- (1) The president is authorized to hand down decree-laws on national security or financial matters. The decrees must be approved or rejected (they cannot be amended) by Congress within sixty days.⁸⁷
- (2) The president has exclusive authority to originate legislation on financial matters, changes in quantity, character, or salary of public posts, and changes in the administration of the Federal District and the territories.
- (3) The president may request action of the Câmara within forty-five days on bills which he originates, with an equal period for the Senate; or on bills considered urgent by the president, he may require action by joint session within forty-five days.
- (4) The president may decree federal intervention in any state or município for reasons of national security, public order, execution of federal laws, or financial matters. Intervention must be approved by Congress within five days.
- (5) The president will appoint the mayors of municípios declared to be critical to national security.
- (6) The president may declare a state of siege with the provision that the act be submitted to Congress for approval within five days.

Brasil (1967) (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1967).

⁸⁷The 1946 Constitution allowed the president to hand down decrees implementing existing legislation. A decree-law is an item of new legislation enacted by decree. Under AI-1 and AI-2, President Castelo Branco handed down 19,259 decrees, plus four institutional acts and thirty-six complementary acts as of January 8, 1967, according to Jornal do Brasil, 10 January 1967, p. 3. He enacted 319 decree-laws (many of extreme importance, such as new laws on taxation, mineral exploitation, and national security), while Costa e Silva enacted forty decree-laws up to the signing of AI-5 on December 13, 1968. Five were rejected by Congress. See Jesse de Azevedo Barquero, pp. 104, 123, 141-144.

The new constitution greatly enhanced the power of the president vis-à-vis Congress and the state governments, but it did not incorporate the authority to void legislative mandates, suspend political rights, or recess Congress; and for these reasons the legislators were not quite so insecure after March 15, 1967. Thus, although the constitution was designed "to institutionalize the revolution," it did not satisfy the hard-line segment of the military because absolute control over Congress by the regime was not allowed by the new charter.

When Congress refused to bow to military pressure in December of 1968, the new constitution was shunted aside by Institutional Act Number 5. AI-5 gave the president the power to void legislative mandates and political rights, to recess any legislative unit and legislate by decree in its stead, to declare a state of siege, to intervene in state or municipal administration, and to suspend habeas corpus without congressional approval.⁸⁸ Immediately after President Costa e Silva signed AI-5 on December 13, 1968, he signed Complementary Act Number 38, which ordered Congress into an indefinite recess.

AI-5 was still in effect when Costa e Silva suffered a stroke in August of 1969. When it became apparent that the President would not soon be able to exercise the power of

⁸⁸For the complete text of AI-5, see A Nôva Constituição do Brasil de 17 de Outubro de 1969 (Rio de Janeiro: Gráfica Auriverde, 1970), pp. 115-120 (hereinafter referred to as Nôva Constituição).

his office, the three military ministers took over presidential power in the name of national security, even though Pedro Aleixo was the legal successor. The military ministers ruled by decree until Congress was called into special session in October, 1969, to "elect" General Emílio Garastuzu Médici, the consensual candidate of high-ranking military officers,⁸⁹ to serve as president until March 25, 1974. The military ministers also decreed, on October 17, 1969, Constitutional Amendment Number 1 to the 1967 Constitution. The amendment effectively incorporated AI-5 into the constitution (although AI-5 was retained because of its extra-constitutional suspension of judicial guarantees) and otherwise expanded the power of the president to rule by decree.⁹⁰

The constitutional and revolutionary power assumed by President Médici was enormous. Through various policy decisions the revolutionary leaders had expanded and consolidated executive power, relinquished some of that power, and then expanded the scope of executive power again. The net result was the creation of a huge reservoir of political capital which could be exchanged for support. The executive during the 1964-through-1970 period was, of course, confronted by many challenges, but each of these challenges was met or answered by a demonstration of the fact that the

⁸⁹See Stepan, p. 264, for a brief description of why Médici was the choice.

⁹⁰Barquero, pp. 183-184.

military regime enjoyed a monopoly of coercive power and would not share the power to allocate authority, status, or goods and services with any other political entity.

Responses to Electoral Challenges

The "revolutionaries" who installed themselves in power in April, 1964 found it not only necessary to seize, consolidate, and guard executive power but also to consolidate their control of the political arena by ensuring that elections would not be allowed to allocate status and authority to politicians who might serve as an alternative source of political benefits. No major elections had been scheduled for 1964 so the regime had ample time to prepare itself to meet electoral challenges. Indecision and other pressing problems, however, apparently prevented such foresightedness because the mayoral election in São Paulo on March 22, 1965, caught the regime without a good candidate and without clear policies for handling elections. That contest was won by a Quadros' man⁹¹ over a UDN candidate who had less than enthusiastic support of the regime.

The São Paulo mayoral election did serve to direct the revolutionaries' attention to the problem of the eleven gubernatorial elections to be held in October of that year. Minas Gerais Governor Magalhães Pinto and some high-ranking military men were encouraging President Castelo Branco to postpone or at least stagger the elections, but Castelo

⁹¹O Estado de São Paulo, 24 March 1965, p. 1.

remained determined to maintain the appearance of democratic legitimacy.⁹² Still the elections presented a danger to the new regime in that some of the more popular candidates were considered "counterrevolutionaries" who had managed to escape the purges of AI-1. In a speech obviously aimed at the PTB candidate for the governorship of Guanabara, Castelo Branco warned that democracy was more than just votes because it must be able to guarantee its permanence and must not allow itself to become infiltrated by "counterrevolutionaries interested in making provocations and injuring the revolution."⁹³

In order to prevent the election of "undesirables," the military government proposed and secured approval of a constitutional amendment which established a system of ineligibilities for public office. The amendment, ostensibly aimed at preventing corruption, made ineligible for the offices of president, vice-president, governor, vice-governor, mayor, senator, federal deputy, or state deputy anyone who had business contact with the government; who had links with a subversive political party; who had lost his political rights or legislative mandate; who had ever been convicted of graft or bribery; or who did not meet certain residency requirements (two years for mayor, four years for

⁹²Jornal do Brasil, 21 May 1965, p. 4.

⁹³Ibid., 15 June 1965, p. 1. The "counterrevolutionary" in question was Hélio de Almeida who had been Goulart's Minister of Transportation and was a gubernatorial candidate.

governor).⁹⁴ The act pointed specifically at Hélió Almeida, the PTB candidate for governor of Guanabara, by declaring ineligible all those who had served in the national government from January 23, 1963, to March 31, 1964. Since Almeida had served in Goulart's cabinet, he was declared ineligible for the election.⁹⁵

The Ineligibilities Law was also used to stymie the candidacy of a retired officer who was unpopular with the revolutionary generals. After the new law clearly vetoed the candidacy of Almeida, the PTB of Guanabara nominated Marshall Henrique Teixeira Lott as its candidate for the Guanabara governor's palace.⁹⁶ Lott was declared ineligible by the electoral court because he did not meet the four-year residency requirement.⁹⁷

Having twice failed to select a candidate who would qualify under the new rules of the game, the PTB then agreed to back a PSD politician, Negrão de Lima. Negrão was neither vulnerable to the new rules nor was he viewed as being particularly dangerous so the military government did not strongly oppose him. The revolution's man-in-Guanabara,

⁹⁴For the text, see Código Eleitoral, pp. 164-173.

⁹⁵Jornal do Brasil, 23 June 1965, p. 3. It was widely assumed that Almeida's extreme popularity gave the military regime more cause for fear than his former association with Goulart.

⁹⁶Lott was not popular with the revolutionary officers because he had foiled a coup in 1955 and also because, as the PTB-PSD presidential candidate in 1960, he had accepted the backing of many leftist groups.

⁹⁷Jornal do Brasil, 25 August 1965, p. 4.

Carlos Lacerda, was at this time becoming increasingly critical of the Castelo Branco government, and, thus, Lacerda's handpicked candidate, Flexa Ribeiro, was probably seen as being as undesirable as the PSD-PTB candidate. Only in the late stages of the campaign, when Negrão became the darling of all the antiregime forces, including the communists, did the regime begin to make threats about what would happen if the forces of "corruption and subversion" were to take power in Guanabara.⁹⁸ In spite of these threats, Negrão ran a successful campaign by attacking both the military government and Lacerda.⁹⁹

The only other serious electoral challenge for the military regime in 1965 was in Minas Gerais. There the PSD had selected as its candidate for governor Sebastião Pães de Almeida, a popular young politician. The state electoral court registered Pães de Almeida as a candidate, but the federal electoral court bowed to the argument of the government and ruled Paes ineligible because of evidence of political corruption. The PSD then nominated a long-time Kubitschek associate Isreal Pinheiro,¹⁰⁰ who easily defeated Roberto Rezende, the handpicked candidate of Governor

⁹⁸Ibid., 1 October 1965, p. 3.

⁹⁹Negrão's success, plus Lacerda's criticism of Castelo Branco while presenting himself as the revolution's presidential candidate, led to the crisis which brought on AI-2. For a discussion of the campaign and the crisis, see Ana Maria Brasileiro, "As Eleições de 15 de Novembro de 1966 no Estado de Guanabara," RBEF, No. 23/24 (July, 1967/January, 1968), 155-156.

¹⁰⁰Jornal do Brasil, 8 September 1965, p. 3.

Magalhães Pinto. As Carlos Lacerda later charged, heavy-handed action by the government probably ensured the success of the opposition in both Guanabara and Minas Gerais.¹⁰¹

In Alagoas an opposition candidate received a plurality of the votes cast, but, since he did not have an absolute majority, as required by the Electoral Code of July 15, 1965, the decision then went to the state legislative assembly. On November 8, 1965, in a vote carefully orchestrated by the commander of the local military region, the legislative assembly voted against declaring the plurality winner the elected governor.¹⁰² The stage was then set for federal intervention and on January 13, 1966, President Castelo Branco signed an intervention order which was to be effective until a governor was elected in October of 1966.¹⁰³

New governors were also elected on October 3, 1965, in the states of Rio Grande do Norte, Paraná, Paraíba, Goiás, Mato Grosso, Santa Catarina, Pará, and Maranhão. In those eight states the men elected were either the candidates of the regime or men who were quite acceptable to the revolutionaries. Regardless of the fact that the revolutionary regime had actually been defeated in only two of eleven electoral contests held at the time when the government was using a naturally unpopular policy of economic austerity in an effort to halt inflation, those two defeats were

¹⁰¹Ibid., 10 October 1965, p. 14.

¹⁰²Ibid., 9 November 1965, p. 4.

¹⁰³Ibid., 14 January 1966, p. 4.

apparently seen as evidence that direct elections were quite dangerous. Thus, AI-2 and AI-3 were used to remove the presidential and gubernatorial elections from the dangerous popular forces. The electoral calendar contained in AI-3 scheduled the elections for three separate dates with at least a month in between (gubernatorial elections, September 3; the presidential election, October 3; and the legislative elections, November 15), apparently to allow for possible reprisal against legislators who might be courageous enough to vote against the candidates of the regime.¹⁰⁴

Castelo Branco and his advisors apparently preferred more positive control of the 1966 elections when the president, vice-president, and twelve governors would be indirectly elected and twenty-three senators, plus all of the federal and state deputies, would be elected popularly. To this end, the regime included in AI-2 an article which decreed the abolition of the existing political parties. The old party system had been too amorphous and undisciplined to allow much control so the party-like organizations authorized by Complementary Act Number 4¹⁰⁵ had to have such a large base of legislative support--120 deputies and twenty senators--that it would have been literally impossible for any more than three parties to have been organized. The

¹⁰⁴O Estado de São Paulo, 6 February 1966, pp. 1, 5.

¹⁰⁵Signed November 20, 1965. For the text, see Atos Institucionais, Vol. I, pp. 33-36.

attraction of political power drew a large majority of the senators and deputies to ARENA, the government party.

With a large majority of the federal and state legislators formally associated with the government party, the means for controlling the indirect elections became clear. The ARENA Executive Cabinet, acting on the advice of President Castelo Branco, voted on April 15, 1966, to submit only one official presidential candidate for approval by the party convention.¹⁰⁶ Many politicians were consulted, but the final decision was made by the President. The same procedure was followed in selecting a party candidate for state governor.¹⁰⁷

Even the general numerical superiority of the government party did not ensure the type of electoral victories which the regime wanted. In some states the contests might be close, and one or two defections from ARENA would give victory to the opposition candidate, or the opposition members might block the election by preventing a quorum. To meet this contingency, which was a real threat in Rio Grande do Sul, Castelo signed Complementary Act Number 14. AC-14 decreed that legislators who resigned their mandates (in

¹⁰⁶Jornal do Brasil 16 April 1966, p. 4.

¹⁰⁷The nominations for the twelve gubernatorial contests naturally gave the incumbent governor some voice in selecting the official candidate to be approved by the state convention, but the final decision was still made by Castelo Branco. By April, 1966 all but two incumbent governors, Negrão de Lima (Guanabara) and Ademar de Barros (São Paulo) had declared for the government party. Ibid., 17 April 1966, p. 4.

order to avoid cassação or to prevent a quorum) would not be replaced, and only the occupied seats were pertinent for a quorum count.¹⁰⁸ Castelo Branco then conducted a house-cleaning operation in state assemblies, voiding the mandates and political rights of many state deputies (generally critics of the regime).¹⁰⁹ Since the seats of the purged deputies could not be filled by substitutes, potential opposition votes and quorum numbers were reduced, thus, making the ARENA gubernatorial candidates more secure.

One other contingency had to be confronted. If a group of dissident, but quiet, ARENA deputies suddenly bolted and voted with the opposition, the result would be very embarrassing for the regime. On July 19, 1966, the president signed Complementary Act Number 16 which required party loyalty. AC-16 was rationalized on the grounds that it would strengthen party groups and, thus, perfect democracy;¹¹⁰ but in effect the provision that a vote against a party member's candidate in an indirect election would be null ensured that not even rebellion within the government

¹⁰⁸Atos Institucionais, Vol. II, p. 15.

¹⁰⁹Jornal do Brasil, 5 July 1966, p. 3. Justice Minister Mem de Sa' is reported to have been forced to resign in June, 1966 because he refused to sign the order to void the mandates of several state deputies. His successor, Luis Viana Filho, said that he would sign the cassações "as an impersonal act, necessary as killing is in a war." Ibid., 28 June 1966, p. 3.

¹¹⁰Ibid., 20 July 1966, p. 3.

party would result in the election of an opposition candidate.¹¹¹

The revolutionary regime consolidated its control by successfully (but often somewhat ruthlessly) confronting the electoral challenges of 1965 and 1966. Elections were conducted to maintain democratic appearances, but it became relatively clear to politicians that any status and authority which they might enjoy was allocated by the military regime and not by the electoral process. The control mechanisms--party loyalty, cassações, control over the nominating procedure, indirect elections, and the Ineligibilities Law--were retained and only slightly altered for the 1970 elections. In 1970 the regime was quite successful in electing its candidates. Only in Guanabara was the opposition able to win, and even there the opposition party ran a very moderate and cautious gubernatorial candidate so as not to invite overt repression.

Responses to Legislative Challenges

Undoubtedly the most serious challenges to the revolutionaries' attempts and efforts at consolidating their power came from Congress and specifically from the Câmara dos Deputados. In order to maintain the façade of democracy, the legislative branch of government had to be maintained as much as possible, and sharp conflicts arose when the

¹¹¹See Leonidas Xausa and Francisco Ferraz, "As Eleições de 1966 no Rio Grande do Sul," RBEF, No. 23/24 (July, 1967/January, 1968), 243-247.

legislators tried to defend their dwindling authority within the political process. In order to receive support from their clients, the legislators had to have some benefits to hand out, but this need for legislative power conflicted with the military government's need to monopolize the political marketplace.

The first conflict or challenge came when the Castelo Branco government decided in February of 1965 that it no longer wanted Raneiri Mazzilli as president of the Câmara. To have Mazzilli repeat as president would be "prejudicial to harmony among the powers" due to Mazzilli's "incompatibility with the revolutionary government."¹¹² Mazzilli had probably hurt his cause in April, 1964, when he quickly had himself sworn in as acting president of Brazil without waiting for instructions from the coup leaders. Then in September, 1964, Mazzilli's name was linked with certain tax irregularities in a military investigation of tax collection in São Paulo.¹¹³ Mazzilli pleaded a clear conscience to both that charge and one concerning misuse of Câmara funds, and a military judge in São Paulo stated that Mazzilli was not legally guilty of any crime although he certainly was morally guilty.¹¹⁴ These factors, plus the fact that Mazzilli was an old PSD politician who had worked with Vargas, Kubitschek, and Goulart, tended to make the regime

¹¹² O Estado de São Paulo, 13 February 1965, p. 1.

¹¹³ Jornal do Brasil, 21 February 1965, p. 7.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 24 February 1965, p. 4.

desire someone new, preferably a UDN man since the UDN, at that time, seemed to be the party of the revolution.

Mazzilli fought stubbornly for his reelection, and the result was a very narrow victory for Bilac Pinto, the UDN candidate who had the backing of the government and its legislative coalition. So uncertain was the outcome that on the day of the balloting, Minister of War Costa e Silva held a hasty meeting of the Army High Command in Rio,¹¹⁵ perhaps to intimidate the deputies or perhaps to discuss what should be done in case of a government defeat. Mazzilli's defeat was hailed by many generals as a great victory for the revolution, and President Castelo Branco called it a major step in the political consolidation of the revolution.¹¹⁶

The next serious legislative challenge to the regime's consolidation of power was to culminate in the struggle over the form of the 1967 Constitution. Open conflict had begun on July 29, 1966, when Castelo Branco signed AC-18.¹¹⁷ This act prohibited Congress from amending or otherwise altering the budget presented by the executive, and, thus, removed one of the last vestiges of effective congressional power by denying the legislators of any control over the dispensation of goods and services. Relations between the regime and Congress were further strained as a result of some of Castelo Branco's housecleaning operations. The President

¹¹⁵Ibid., 25 February 1965, p. 3.

¹¹⁶O Estado de São Paulo, 25 February 1965, p. 1.

¹¹⁷See Atos Institucionais, Vol. II, p. 23.

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had used the cassação purge method to rid state legislative assemblies of deputies who might have caused the regime embarrassment during the indirect gubernatorial elections, but he had personally promised Deputy Adauto Lucio Cardoso, President of the Câmara, that no federal deputies would lose their seats.¹¹⁸ Adauto then refused to recognize the presidential decree which voided the mandates of six federal deputies although rumors concerning the cassação of Adauto himself and many other prominent politicians were quite common.¹¹⁹

The refusal of the President of the Câmara to recognize a presidential decree led Castelo Branco to sign AC-23 on October 20, 1966, and thereby recess the stubborn Congress until November 22, 1966.¹²⁰ President Castelo Branco then ordered the lights, water, and telephone services to the Camara building to be cut off and the building to surrounded with troops. The few deputies who had decided to barricade themselves in the Câmara building gave up after

¹¹⁸Carlos Castello Branco, "Coluna do Castello," Jornal do Brasil, 13 October 1966, p. 3.

¹¹⁹Jornal do Brasil, 14 October 1966, p. 3; and Última Hora, 14 October 1966, p. 1.

¹²⁰See Atos Institucionais, Vol. II, pp. 33-34. The official justification for this act was that the recess of Congress was necessary in order to allow peaceful legislative elections on November 15. The action was strongly defended by the ARENA Executive Council and sixteen state governors. Jornal do Brasil, 22 October 1966, p. 3.

this show of force and the crisis was over, but not the animosity.¹²¹

Thus, from the beginning, Congress was not destined to be overwhelmingly receptive to the constitutional proposals of the regime. In October the congressional leadership had made revocation of AI-2, specifically the articles involving the power of cassação and the suspension of constitutional guarantees, the price for approval of a new constitution.¹²² AI-4, which charged Congress with approving the constitution in a very limited time period, was the regime's answer to this proposal. The government apparently hoped that the demonstration of power in the gubernatorial elections, and the closure of Congress would convince ARENA deputies and senators of the necessity for playing in accord with the rules of the revolutionary regime. The demonstration of

¹²¹Carlos Castello Branco, "Coluna do Castello," Jornal do Brasil, 21 October 1966, p. 4, reported an interesting conversation which to some extent demonstrates the philosophical differences involved in the conflict. As Câmara President Adauto Cardosa left the Câmara, he was met by Army Colonel Meira Matos, commander of the siege troops. The exchange:

Deputy: Colonel, I never would have expected to find you the executor of not only a decree of recess, but also of an operation of encirclement and military occupation of an unarmed chamber.

Colonel: And I, Deputy, never expected of you an attitude so antirevolutionary.

Deputy: Colonel, I am above all a servant of the civil power.

Colonel: And I am a servant of the military power.

¹²²Jornal do Brasil, 30 October 1966, p. 6.

power was initially successful because the legislators, voting along party lines, gave first-round approval to the new charter without amendments.¹²³ Congress then recessed until January 3, 1967.

During the recess, ARENA congressional leaders persistently tried to persuade the President and the Justice Minister (who were apparently convinced that the document was near perfect and also that the government party members should accept the wishes of their President on faith alone) to allow amendments, especially amendments liberalizing the individual rights section.¹²⁴ Amendments were allowed since the project might have been defeated if no consideration of amendments had been allowed, but they in fact altered the proposed charter very little. The time limitations made consideration of the basic document and the proposed amendments quite cursory; and the tendency (or perhaps necessity) of the government party leadership to demand and require blind obedience¹²⁵ seemed to result in an apathetic and almost mechanical surrender to the dictates of the government.¹²⁶

¹²³O Estado de São Paulo, 22 December 1966, p. 3.

¹²⁴Ibid., 3 January 1967, p. 3.

¹²⁵A declaration objecting to the way in which the new constitution was being railroaded through Congress was signed by 106 ARENA deputies on January 20. See Jornal do Brasil, 21 January 1967, p. 3.

¹²⁶O Estado de São Paulo, 22 January 1967, p. 3.

The new constitution was approved by the deadline set by the government, but the act of approving or rejecting blocks of unknown amendments,¹²⁷ coupled with the humiliations of the preceding months, showed Congress its extremely weak position. As a result there was no serious challenge to the regime by Congress for over a year. Opposition deputies occasionally denounced the undemocratic nature of the Costa e Silva government, and some young ARENA deputies enjoined Congress to defend its constitutional role, but the majority of legislators had little stomach for a serious fight until the military began a direct assault on the power base of the legislative politicians.

Early in 1968 it was rumored that the National Security Council was going to issue a decree placing 234 border area municípios under national security regulations. This would have removed these areas from the political scene by allowing the president to control the municípios through appointed mayors. Strong criticism, especially from within the government party, caused the government to deny that the act would be a decree or that 234 municípios would be involved.¹²⁸ With an estimated 90 percent of the congressmen

¹²⁷Hundreds of amendments were voted on during the final day of consideration, often in groups of a dozen or more, on the advice of party and government leaders, who generally decided the merits of an amendment by whether or not the author was a "friend." So many unknown amendments were approved that it took a special committee two days to sort it out in order to proclaim the official wording. O Estado de São Paulo, 24 January 1967, p. 3.

¹²⁸Jornal do Brasil, 7 February 1968, p. 3.

ready to reject any decree allowing extensive federal intervention in municipal politics,¹²⁹ the ARENA congressional leadership persuaded President Costa e Silva to reduce significantly the number of municípios involved.¹³⁰ The necessity for any federal intervention in municipal politics was disheartening to ARENA politicians since it was an indication that the government party, which was dominant in most of the municípios, was accorded little more respect and confidence than the opposition party.

The government won a limited and perhaps Pyrrhic victory concerning the municípios since the effort further alienated many ARENA congressmen and led to a subsequent defeat. During September of 1968, a young MDB deputy from Guanabara, Márcio Alves, became increasingly caustic in his denunciation of the military. The government asked the Superior Tribunal Federal to suspend Márcio's political rights on the grounds that he had made derogatory statements against the military (he called them torturers) and that he was guilty of subverting a national institution (he had asked mothers not to let their daughters dance with or date military men).¹³¹ The STF then asked Congress to lift Márcio's legislative immunity so that he could be tried for his alleged crimes.

¹²⁹This was the estimate of Leopoldo Peres, Secretary-General of ARENA. Ibid., 8 February 1968, p. 3.

¹³⁰The final number was sixty-eight. Ibid., 19 April 1968, p. 3.

¹³¹Ibid., 12 October 1968, p. 3.

Two months of threats, maneuvers, and occasional blunders by the government leadership resulted in a majority of the deputies voting to deny the STF permission to try Márcio Alves.¹³² This legislative rebuff to the military was answered by a new revolutionary act, AI-5, which was still in force in January, 1971. AI-5 so increased the power of the president vis-à-vis Congress that any future legislative challenges to the executive would probably be adventures in futility.

Responses to Judicial Challenges

The Brazilian Constitution of 1946 incorporated a three-way separation of powers modeled after the United States' system, and, although the Brazilian judiciary has not enjoyed the great judicial power which is derived from a common-law system, the Supremo Tribunal Federal of Brazil exercised growing influence during the post-World War II period, in part because of the prerogatives for judicial review.¹³³ The STF gradually extended its power and independence in the 1946-1964 period as the breakdown of the authoritarian system allowed more opportunities for judicial decision-making.¹³⁴

¹³²Ibid., 13 December 1968, p. 5.

¹³³For a brief discussion of the Brazilian federal judiciary, see Ferreira de Castro, pp. 237-243.

¹³⁴The STF gained much prestige when its Chief Justice, José Linhares, served as Interim-President after Vargas was ousted in 1945.

The STF never seemed to challenge directly the authority of the revolutionary leaders after the coup in 1964, but its ministers never quite realized that they were supposed to be a part of the team which was to accept and implement the wishes of the military leaders. The STF did not question the right of the military to exercise political control, but they occasionally refused to allow the revolutionary investigation teams to circumvent normal constitutional guarantees. Thus, the court ordered the release of Miguel Arrais (April, 1964) and Mauro Borges (November, 1964) on writs of habeas corpus¹³⁵ and earned the wrath of the hard-line revolutionary officers.

Even though the military was able to circumvent with little difficulty the Superior Tribunal's weak challenge, that challenge was not forgotten. In the "coup within a coup," following the October, 1965, gubernatorial elections, the hard-line officers were able to include in AI-2 a number of provisions which limited the STF's ability or willingness to challenge the military regime. First, the number of ministers serving on the Superior Tribunal Federal was raised from eleven to sixteen, giving President Castelo Branco the opportunity to name five new ministers and, thereby, establish a new majority which would be loyal to the regime. Second, the institutional act removed from the STF, and granted to the Military Court, jurisdiction over

¹³⁵Jornal do Brasil, 30 April 1964, p. 3; and 24 November 1964, p. 5.

civilians charged with a crime against national security or against the armed forces. Third, AI-2 gave the Military Court original jurisdiction to try state governors and their ministers.¹³⁶ And finally, the act removed from judicial review all previous and subsequent acts and decrees.

President Castelo Branco promptly nominated five loyal lawyer-politicians to the newly weakened Superior Tribunal,¹³⁷ and the institution did not seriously challenge the authority of the revolutionary regime while AI-2 was in effect. The 1967 Constitution incorporated the limitations of AI-2, except for the ban against judicial review of revolutionary legislation,¹³⁸ and the weakened STF remained relatively inactive until the crisis of December, 1968, brought the court into action against the military regime. Institutional Act Number 5 of December 13, 1968, was primarily a response to the congressional challenge presented when the Câmara refused to lift congressional immunity so that Márcio Alves could be tried for defaming the armed forces, but it also was, in part, a response to a judicial challenge. On the same day that the Câmara refused to allow

¹³⁶Mauro Borges had been granted habeas corpus because the 1946 Constitution prohibited action by either military or civil courts against a state governor until the state legislative assembly first recognized the existence of a crime through impeachment proceedings.

¹³⁷Jornal do Brasil, 2 November 1965, pp. 3, 12.

¹³⁸For a discussion of the effects of the 1967 Constitution on the judicial branch, see Alcino de Paula Salazar, "O Poder Judiciário na Constituição de 1967," in Estudos Sobre a Constituição de 1967, ed. Themístocles B. Cavalcanti (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1968), pp. 99-110.

Márcio Alves to be tried, the STF issued writs of habeas corpus to Vladimir Palmeiras and three other student leaders.¹³⁹

In response to this challenge by the supposedly "safe" Superior Tribunal, AI-5 suspended the guarantee of habeas corpus for all political crimes and crimes against national security or the general social or economic welfare of the nation and removed the revolutionary acts once again from the scrutiny of judicial review. Further action against the STF was taken on January 16, 1969, when President Costa e Silva signed a decree which forced the retirement of STF ministers Victor Nunes Leal, Hermes Lima, and Evandro Lins e Silva¹⁴⁰--all very distinguished jurists and scholars, but apparently too independent for the military authorities. On February 1, 1969, the President signed AI-6, which altered the 1967 Constitution, to reflect the judicial restrictions of AI-5. The act also reduced the number of ministers on

¹³⁹Jornal do Brasil, 13 December 1968, p. 7. The STF had freed forty-six student leaders on December 10 and another thirty-three on December 11. Most of these students had been in jail since the August 19 military raid of the University of Brasília and the October 12 raid of a congress of the outlawed National Student Union. Vladimir Palmeiras, the son of the Alagoas senator, Rui Palmeira, was considered by the military "hard line" to be especially dangerous, in spite of the fact that his father was a loyal ARENA politician.

¹⁴⁰Ibid., 17 January 1969, p. 3. This same decree voided the mandates of two senators and thirty-five deputies.

the Supreme Court from sixteen to eleven, eliminating the seats created in the court-packing move of 1965.¹⁴¹

Through a series of individual responses to judicial challenges of power, the revolutionary regime effectively destroyed the power and autonomy of the judicial branch of the Brazilian government. With each step to consolidate its own power and authority, the regime removed the power and authority of the theoretically countervailing and coordinated institution.

¹⁴¹For the text of AI-6, see Nôva Constituição, pp. 120-124. It was rumored that the reduction was necessary because the military regime could not find any distinguished, but "safe," jurists or politicians who were willing to serve on the impotent Supreme Court. There were, at the time, five vacancies--the three seats of the ministers who were forced to retire, plus two seats that had been previously vacated. See Stepan, p. 261.

CHAPTER V.

RESTRICTING PARTICIPATION

The crisis which brought on the 1964 coup in Brazil was the result of a breakdown of the clientelist system by which political participation had traditionally been limited. It had generally been the practice of the political system to act, at least in a limited way, in favor of a potential political group before the group achieved the coherence and differentiation needed to act on its own behalf. Potential interest groups would be co-opted into the clientage system with their leaders acting as patrons for the member clients and the organization becoming the client which would be regulated by and dependent upon the patron government. This process was effective in limiting and controlling political participation until the system gradually broke down following "redemocratization" after 1945.

After 1945, electoral necessity would often force the president to articulate and cultivate popular demands and, as a result, allow the growth of more autonomous interest organizations. Thus, the existing organizations--labor

syndicates, employers' organizations, professional groups-- were allowed to become somewhat independent of governmental control; and new groups, particularly peasant and student groups, were able to organize independent of government initiative and supervision. These new groups made increasing demands upon the government for allocations of authority, status, order, and especially goods and services. Given the deteriorating economic situation of the early 1960's and the ability of the conservative Congress to obstruct reforms, the amount of resources available for distribution did not increase in proportion to the increase in demands. This disparity between resources and demands created a situation of hyper-inflation. Limited authoritarianism based upon elite control and preemptive co-optation¹ deteriorated to a stalled or praetorian system, which invited military intervention as the new groups' demands for status, authority, and the increasingly scarce economic resources were resisted by the entrenched political and economic interests.²

¹Schmitter, p. 112, states that the system was one of artificial corporatism by means of preemptive co-optation, which required "creation of a set of legal norms governing the formation of representative associations, a set of rewards and punishments to reinforce the norms, sufficient authority to administer the rewards and punishments, and a set of institutionalized channels of representation that will provide at least a simulacrum of access and accountability."

²Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco, Evolução da Crise Brasileira (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1965), pp. 4-5. See also Antônio Octávio Cintra and Fábio Wanderley Reis, "Política e Desenvolvimento: O Caso Brasileiro," América Latina, IX (July-September, 1966),

From a government's standpoint, an excess of demand over supply is a desirable situation since inflation in the price for resources will increase the revenue of the regime in terms of support and, thus, build capital for the regime.³ Indeed, the very purpose for creating a monopoly over the allocation of political goods is to allow the regime to control the exchange rate for the benefits it supplies.⁴ In a situation of hyper-inflation, however, excessive demand may increase the propensity of dissatisfied sectors to offer their resources to an antistatesman who promises to displace the regime.⁵ When Goulart could not satisfy the demands of the entrenched sectors in Brazil, they offered their support to the armed forces in the hope of getting their demands satisfied by a new regime.

The military government inherited a situation of hyper-inflation in April, 1964, and was forced to find a way to deflate the level of demands if the political system were to be stabilized. In such a situation, a regime has two alternatives. The simplest solution is to respond to the demands.⁶ Since some of the demands had been to curb the activities of dissident and so-called subversive groups, the

70-71. Cintra and Wanderley describe Brazilian politics as a limited consociational system which broke down when economic development slowed and there no longer was sufficient wealth to allow the traditional pattern of conciliation.

³Ilchman and Uphoff, pp. 141-142.

⁴Curry and Wade, pp. 78-84.

⁵Ilchman and Uphoff, p. 144.

⁶Ibid., p. 152.

armed forces were able to satisfy some of the demands. But the military government, like the Goulart government, did not have the resources to satisfy all the demands, especially those for goods and services. In addition, partial satisfaction of the demands for goods and services conceivably could have led to increased demands for those benefits. The regime could and ultimately did increase its supply of resources, but such an effort invariably involves a time lag⁷ during which the problem would persist.

The second means of dealing with hyper-inflation is a policy for repressing sector demands.⁸ By using coercion to demobilize sectors, to bring sectors under the control of the regime, to restrict the flow of information between and among sectors, and to close alternate avenues of political exchange, a regime can deflate the demand for resources. Restriction of information and the demobilization or domestication of sectors will decrease competition for values and, perhaps, frustrate the groups sufficiently to cause them to abandon the demands temporarily. This is, of course, contingent upon the repression of alternative avenues of exchange for if the regime does not establish a political monopsony, the frustrated interest organizations and patrons could sell their resources to an aspiring antistatesman.⁹

⁷Curry and Wade, p. 100.

⁸Ilchman and Uphoff, pp. 152-153; and Huntington, "Political Development," pp. 419-421.

⁹Ilchman and Uphoff, pp. 157-159.

Thus, the problem for the Brazilian military regime, after consolidating its power, was to use its most abundant resource (coercion) to repress demands while it built up alternative resources.¹⁰ Consolidation had removed from contention those political actors and institutions which had challenged the new regime. If the society could be demobilized and the regime could lower the level of demands for political benefits, the government might have the time to build a reservoir of support that would allow it to pursue its security and development goals. This was done by (1) establishing government control over interest associations; (2) controlling political expression; (3) restricting electoral participation; (4) discrediting civilian revolutionaries; (5) controlling participation by politicians; and (6) repressing participation by students and politicians.

Control of Interest Associations

Control of interest associations in Brazil after the 1964 coup was a serious concern of the new revolutionary regime, but it was also a problem which offered an already tested solution. Most interest associations in Brazil had been formed under government sponsorship or brought under government control during the corporatist Estado Novo of Getúlio Vargas.¹¹ During this period and up to the late

¹⁰The use of coercion has its limitations of course. See Zolberg, pp. 77; and Frohlich et al., pp. 62-65.

¹¹Pedreira, p. 155. For a detailed discussion on the formation of interest associations in Brasil, see Schmitter, pp. 108-131.

1950's, both interest group pluralism and radicalism were avoided by the practice of co-optation and control through a form of clientelism known as peleguismo.

The pelego is an entrenched association leader who serves as an intermediary or broker between the government ministry and the association members. He is maintained as the head of the syndicate (the term pelego is used in Brazil primarily to describe the leaders of workers' syndicates, but the practice of peleguismo is common to employers' syndicates also)¹² through welfare paternalism, personal inducements, and various forms of governmental manipulation and repression. This practice of government sponsorship of syndicates and pelegos resulted in the bureaucratization of the associations and their appearance as quasi-governmental organizations.¹³ According to Francisco C. Weffort, "all the important organizations functioning as mediators between the State and the individual are really entities connected with the State itself rather than effectively autonomous organizations."¹⁴

It was the breakdown of this system of control that in large measure generated the crisis which allowed the military to act in 1964. Vargas had sponsored the syndical organizations during his Estado Nôvo period as support

¹²Schmitter, p. 129.

¹³Ferreira, As Forças Armadas e o Desafio da Revolução, pp. 25-26.

¹⁴"State and Mass in Brazil," p. 393.

groups and also as a means of preempting or anticipating more spontaneous forms of mobilization. During his term as a constitutionally elected president, Vargas and his Labor Minister, João Goulart, encouraged the previously docile labor syndicates to become more active and militant in articulating the demands of their members. During the Kubitschek administration and especially during the Quadros-Goulart period of the early 1960's, workers', employers', and landowners' associations were increasingly active. In some cases the government-sponsored associations became militant. In other cases new parallel organizations were formed.¹⁵ Generally there was little spontaneous political activity by rank and file members, but the leaders of the syndicates made active use of the syndical organizations against other segments of the political system.

The urban labor syndicates were the first targets of the military junta established after the March 31, 1964, coup--specifically the national amalgam of syndical leadership known as the General Workers Confederation (Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores--CGT) because that group had been most active in the attempt to secure support for Goulart.¹⁶ The military regime acted on the assumption that

¹⁵Schmitter, pp. 178-223.

¹⁶The CGT ordered a general strike for April 1 in an attempt to counter the coup. The workers did not obey the command in São Paulo, and in Rio de Janeiro, the general strike paralyzed the transportation system, leaving the center of the city deserted. Thus, military occupation of key facilities was less difficult. See Faust, pp. 78-79.

the quickest means of reducing the activism of the labor syndicates was to remove those leaders who had used their organizations to support Goulart's power play against the entrenched conservative forces of the system. Thus, the first decree issued by the Military High Command after the Institutional Act of April 9 suspended for a period of ten years the political rights of many leading labor leaders, among whom were the directors of the CGT, the presidents of the Stevadors', railroad workers', carpenters', and bank workers' syndicates, and many leaders of local syndicates.¹⁷

In the zealous search to bring to justice those whom the coup leaders considered either "corrupt" or "communist," tens of thousands of Brazilians, many of them local or regional syndical leaders, were taken prisoner.¹⁸ Many labor leaders were convicted of corruption or subversion and sent to prison, others went into exile to avoid imprisonment, and many others were harassed and intimidated by the military investigation teams. In the first three and one-half months following the coup, the government "intervened" in (literally took control of) four workers' confederations and 409 syndicates¹⁹ and dissolved many others.

¹⁷Victor, p. 550.

¹⁸Faust, pp. 86-87. Although all but some two thousand were released within sixty days, the experience served as a warning to the union leaders of what might follow if they were overly militant in pressing their demands.

¹⁹Neto, p. 202.

Once government control of the labor syndicates was regained, the military regime resorted to the practice of peleguismo as practiced by Presidents Vargas and Dutra to keep labor demands (or at least the articulation of demands) at a minimum. The vacancies created by the dismissal and suppression of the "corrupt" or "communist" leaders were filled by loyal pelegos appointed by the government. These officials were then formally elected to their posts in carefully controlled elections.²⁰

The effect of these actions upon the autonomy of the labor syndicates was devastating. The limited advances made toward autonomy during the Vargas, Kubitschek, and Goulart governments were erased by the substitution of puppets in place of the former leadership.²¹ Furthermore, this loss of leadership was compounded by a similar loss of leadership in the PTB, which, although generally not worthy of being called a true labor party, was the best congressional representative of labor interests. The result has been the creation

²⁰Schmitter, pp. 131-132. If by chance the loyalist candidate lost the election, the Labor Ministry generally prevented the winner from taking office by finding some irregularity in the election.

²¹One cannot deny that many of the labor leaders punished by the regime were actually guilty of being corrupt or subversive (communist and, thus, loyal to a foreign government). It is apparent, however, that these charges of communism and corruption were useful tools with which the revolutionary regime could eliminate a group of leaders whose militancy could have resulted in a radical change in the political and economic system of Brazil. Corruption was as common in rural municípios as in urban labor syndicates, yet, with the exception of a few flagrant examples, it went largely unpunished in rural areas. See Neto, pp. 77-82.

of a very docile group of labor syndicates. Since the pacification of the syndicates, these associations and also employers' associations have generally given strong endorsement to government plans, which often seem to be adverse to the interests of the association members.²² Although not officially prohibited except in public services and essential activities, strikes have been extremely uncommon since the government regained control of the unions.

The few instances of activism by labor syndicates or leaders have been systematically repressed. One serious strike by metal workers took place in Osasco, São Paulo, during July, 1968. It was resolved by government intervention in the union and dismissal of union leaders, some forty of whom were placed under investigation by DOPS (the federal secret police).²³ When ex-President Jânio Quadros began to make public statements in favor of the workers' position, he was charged with making political pronouncements (an illegal act since Quadros' political rights had

²²Azís Simão, "Industrialization, Planning and Occupational Organizations in Brazil," International Labor Review, XCVIII (August, 1968), 109-120. Apparently the inability of the syndicates to act in the interest of their members has caused membership problems. The government has encouraged syndicates to offer services--night classes, legal advice, social activities, etc.--to improve participation, but the Jornal do Brasil, 3 May 1970, p. 3, reports that workers in Guanabara do not bother to join the syndicates since there is no prospect that the associations will act in favor of wage increases.

²³Jornal do Brasil, 24 July 1968, p. 3.

been suspended) and sentenced to 120 days of confinement in Corumbá, Mato Grosso.²⁴

Institutional Acts 1, 2, and 5, by allowing the government to suspend the political rights of citizens deemed to be "corrupt" or "subversive," have been used to silence labor leaders (among others) who have been indiscrete in their opposition to the policies of the revolutionary regime. On occasion, more violent methods have apparently been used, but the extent of the use of violence is difficult to document. One reported case was that of Olavo Hansen, a São Paulo labor leader. Hansen was arrested on May 1, 1970, while distributing antigovernment leaflets. He died nine days later of parathion poisoning, but the police could not explain how Hansen had ingested parathion, a highly poisonous insecticide, while in jail.²⁵

Increased mobilization among rural workers was another problem which confronted the military regime immediately after the 1964 coup. Mobilization of the rural workers was a recent and quite incomplete phenomenon in Brazil. Vargas organized the urban labor forces during the Estado Nôvo period, but he ignored the rural workers, leaving intact the power of the rural landowners over their workers.²⁶ In the

²⁴Ibid., 31 July 1968, p. 3. The punishment was really ostracism since Quadros was allowed full freedom as long as he stayed within the limits of Corumbá, a city located on the Bolivian border.

²⁵See Veja (August 2, 1970), p. 32.

²⁶Scantimburgo, pp. 217-221.

late 1950's many peasant leagues were founded²⁷ as peasants (mainly sharecroppers), and especially politicians looking for a constituency, began to see the potential of rural workers' organizations.

Enabling legislation for rural syndicates was decreed by Vargas in 1944, but at that time Vargas made no attempt to form corporatist rural syndicates similar to the urban workers' groups he sponsored. João Goulart, as Vargas' Labor Minister in 1953, attempted to organize some rural workers but failed because of the opposition of rural employers, and, by 1961, only six recognized rural syndicates existed.²⁸ After 1961, however, both the unofficial peasant leagues and the officially recognized rural syndicates proliferated as Julião's socialists, the communists, and the liberal Catholic clergy competed in organizing the rural workers, but, even by 1964, no more than a small minority belonged to such organizations.²⁹

²⁷The first peasant league (Liga Camponesa) was founded in 1955 on the Fazenda Galileia in Pernambuco. The sharecroppers on the fazenda formed a mutual assistance society with the principal aim of cooperative purchases of coffins so that their dead would be given a decent burial. The owner of the fazenda accepted the invitation to become the group's honorary president but later demanded that the association be dissolved after his son and other landowners warned him against allowing communism on his lands. The peasants refused and were successfully defended by Francisco Julião, a lawyer-politician from the state capital. Julião thus found his cause and helped organize other peasant leagues. See Galjart, pp. 12-13.

²⁸Schmitter, p. 209.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 210-211. For a discussion of the problems confronting the organizers, see Neal John Pearson, Small Farmer and Rural Worker Pressure Groups in Brazil, (Ph.D.

In 1963, President Goulart gave official recognition to the potential of rural workers' organizations by sponsoring the passage of the Rural Labor Statute of March 2, 1963, and by promoting the idea of agrarian reform.³⁰ The Rural Labor Statute had the effect of extending the corporatist-syndicalist pattern to rural workers³¹ in an apparent effort to co-opt the rural workers as an extremely large support group for Goulart and his labor party.³² Needless to say, the attempt to mobilize the rural proletariat, while not presenting an immediate threat to the national political system as did the mobilization of the generally literate (and thus voting) urban proletariat, constituted a potential or long-range threat to the system and an immediate threat to the rural landowners.³³

dissertation, University of Florida, 1967). The resulting peasant organizations have been described by Galjart, pp. 3-4, not as class organizations but as successors to the "following" groups of the rural coroneis. Because the leadership was generally urban and middle class, because the goals of the groups were particularistic, and because the leader-follower relationship was personal and paternal, the fears of those who thought this mobilization was a precursor to a peasant revolution similar to that in China were probably unfounded.

³⁰Abelardo Jurema, Sexta-Feira 13: Os Últimos Dias do Governo João Goulart (Rio de Janeiro: Edições O Cruzeiro, 1964), pp. 234-235.

³¹Schmitter, pp. 130-131.

³²Jurema, p. 137.

³³Love, pp. 18-19, contends that the global political threat was long range because most rural workers were illiterate and could not vote. Increased mobilization would, however, threaten the already waning local control of the rural coroneis and would have established an already organized mass of voters (perhaps radical) if the urban

As with the urban labor groups, the action of the military regime against the rural workers' associations was directed initially at the leadership. The legislative mandates and political rights of the rural workers' few representatives in Congress (among whom was Francisco Julião) were voided. Many peasant organizers were put in jail and some were tried as being "corrupt" or "subversive." Even such mild advocates of rural reform as Governor Miguel Arrais of Pernambuco and João Sexas Doria of Sergipe were removed from office for their reform activities.³⁴ In some local areas, either outside the control of the national government or with the tacit approval of the military authorities, peasant leaders were intimidated and some were apparently assassinated.³⁵

Once the "dangerous" leaders had been eliminated and the more radical peasant leagues had been officially

proletariat were able to force Congress to approve voting by illiterates as Julião and Goulart demanded.

³⁴Schneider, pp. 139-140; and Faust, pp. 119-122. Governor Arrais favored organization of the rural workers but opposed Goulart's agrarian reform plan because he felt that dividing up the large plantations would destroy the only "rational" agricultural entities of the nation. He was more interested in forcing the employers to pay a fair salary to their employees and their fair share of taxes to the state and federal governments (Faust, p. 120).

³⁵Neto, p. 201. Like the violence against urban labor leaders, it is difficult to document the extent of such action. The number of rumors would indicate that violent reprisals were quite common but the reports of violence were seldom investigated impartially. The Jornal do Brasil, 4 July 1965, p. 7, carried a relatively well-researched report on violent reprisals against peasant leaders in Paraíba.

dissolved, the government moved to control the existing rural syndicates and to organize new syndicates. Loyal leaders were elected under close supervision by the Labor Ministry in a manner similar to that used in the urban laborers' syndicates.³⁶ As with the urban syndicates, the result of this governmental paternalism and control has been the creation of rural workers' syndicates that serve as a façade to justify the repression of more autonomous associations. The syndicates often seem to serve the government (and the employers) more faithfully than they serve their members, and, if a syndicate begins to show signs of activism in favor of workers' interests against the employer or the government, its leaders often are the recipients of pressure tactics by the local police.³⁷

Employers, merchants, and landowners were allowed to form syndicates under the same Estado Novo legislation that sponsored the urban workers' syndicates. By the mid-1950's, Brazil had a wide variety of commercial associations, professional associations, industrial groups, and rural landowner organizations, some formed as recognized syndicates and others as parallel private associations.³⁸ In general, these groups represented participant citizens and served as supplements to the existing clientage systems. Such groups did not become outwardly active in the political arena until

³⁶Schmitter, p. 212.

³⁷Jornal do Brasil, 28 November 1965, p. 5.

³⁸See Schmitter, pp. 178-188, 194-205.

the increased mobilization of the proletarian groups threatened the satisfaction of the employers' demands. Once the revolutionary regime had gained control over the proletarian groups, the employers', commercial, and landowners' associations were able to retire from the active public role to a more indirect and private form of interest articulation through the clientage system. Since the policies of the revolutionary regime were generally favorable to these groups and since they believed that the alternative to the military regime would be a return to the dangerous populism and ruinous inflation of the Goulart period, the employers, merchants, and landowners were relatively content to use private contacts with the bureaucracy in lieu of formal organizational demands.

Control of Political Expression

In conjunction with the depolitization of interest associations by means of co-optation and suppression, a regime which seeks to close off alternative routes to political power must limit or control the flow of information so that the repressed sectors cannot form an antiregime coalition. In addition, there is a need to limit the ability of an antistatesman to communicate with potential supporters. In Brazil depolitization through the suppression of workers' organizations was not sufficient to reduce the level of demands. Student and military factions were constantly trying to make themselves heard. Politicians, both

proregime and antiregime, sought to represent popular and personal interests. In addition, the harsh treatment of some groups caused the regime to worry about its image. Since they were not willing to forfeit the use of coercion, the revolutionary authorities did the next best thing--they established rules to prevent the mass media from reporting the unbecoming side of their revolution.

Censorship of printed matter has not been wholly absent from the history of Brazil,³⁹ but generally newspapers, magazines, and books were relatively free of censorship in the period following the overthrow of the Estado Novo. Even during the first three and one-half years of military rule, there was little need for strict censorship because most of the major daily newspapers were strongly against the Goulart regime by mid-March, 1964,⁴⁰ and viewed as necessary the establishment of a strong tutelary regime. The one major exception was the leftist daily of Rio de Janeiro, Última Hora. Última Hora was strongly against the military coup and was active in encouraging popular resistance. For this "subversion" both the director, Bocayuva Cunha, and the publisher, Samuel Wainer, were deprived of

³⁹For a historical review of instances of press censorship in Brazil, see Antônio F. Costella, O Controle da Informação no Brasil: Evolução Histórica de Legislação Brasileira de Imprensa (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes Limitada, 1970). Costella devotes one half of the book to colonial and imperial Brazil; only one chapter deals with censorship after the 1964 coup.

⁴⁰See Stepan, pp. 104-113; and Victor, pp. 535-536.

their political rights in the first purge list of April 10, 1964.⁴¹

Institutional Act Number 2, signed October 27, 1965, demonstrated the military government's growing concern with criticism voiced through the press. As representatives of middle-class and elite opinion, most of the major dailies were not totally opposed to the regime at this time, but they were highly critical of President Castelo Branco's austerity policy; and Carlos Lacerda was using his Tribuna da Imprensa to wage a personal attack on Castelo Branco and his Minister for Planning, Roberto Campos. Article 24 of AI-2 amended the Press Law of 1953 by stipulating that a judge, rather than a jury of journalists, would hear cases involving abuse of the freedom of the press, and it doubled the penalties prescribed for convictions. The provision was more of a warning than an act of reprisal since it was not immediately used to silence Lacerda or the other critics.

Article 141 of the 1946 Constitution had prohibited "propaganda of war, of subversion of order by violent means, and of racial or class prejudice." AI-2 deleted the phrase "by violent means." This deletion had the effect of outlawing the publication of any ideas which might be detrimental to the public order, whether or not they advocated violence.⁴² Another provision of AI-2 forbade those whose

⁴¹Victor, pp. 548-550. Bocayuva Cunha was also a PTB federal deputy so he lost his legislative mandate as well.

⁴²Costella, p. 134.

political rights had been suspended to make a "declaration concerning anything of a political nature." This was expanded by Complementary Act Number 1 of October 27, 1965,⁴³ by placing concurrent criminal responsibility on the owner of the newspaper or broadcasting enterprise.

Again, these provisions were apparently included for contingency situations since there was little use of them. So free were the newspapers and radio and television stations of governmental control, that Luis Nascimento Britto, editor of the prestigious Jornal do Brasil and, at that time, president of the Inter-American Press Association, was prompted to declare:

If there is one entirely favorable point in the comportment of the Castelo Branco government with the newspapers, it is that of the freedom of the press. The government has assured a state of freedom which previous governments, in less tense periods, did not permit.⁴⁴

The major exception to this lack of censorship was in the area of electoral propaganda. In the campaign prior to the legislative elections of November 15, 1966, the candidates (and thus the agents of the mass media) were extremely limited in what they could say. This type of censorship will be analyzed in the section involving the restrictions on electoral participation.

⁴³Atos Institucionais, Vol. I, pp. 16-27.

⁴⁴Quoted by Wamberto, p. 18.

Although the Castelo Branco government was not active in attempts to control the media, the regime's desire to restructure the legal system of the nation--to give the country new laws and a new constitution which were more in tune with the "realities" of Brazilian society as perceived by the revolutionary regime--led to a restriction of freedom of expression. The authoritarian attitude of the military leaders was reflected in the new legal system.

The constitution, presented by the regime and adopted hurriedly with few revisions by Congress, contained an affirmation of freedom of expression with the same limitations of the 1946 Constitution (as altered by AI-2). The major change, however, was in Article 166, which forbade the ownership or administration of any journalistic enterprises, including radio and television, by a foreigner or a foreign-owned corporation and further restricted the "intellectual and administrative direction" of such enterprises to Brazilians by birth.⁴⁵ The article also authorized future controls by stating:

Without prejudice to the freedom of thought and information, the law can establish other conditions for the organization and functioning of journalistic enterprises or of television and radio [stations] in the interest of the democratic regime and in combating subversion and corruption.

More damaging than the constitutional changes, however, were the provisions of the Press Law (so-called, but it also

⁴⁵For the text of this article, see Pereira, p. 554.

pertained to radio and television) pushed through Congress at the same time as the new constitution and with the same haste. As presented, the proposal allowed the government, through the Minister of Justice, draconian power to control the dissemination of information and provided excessively heavy penalties for violation of its provisions.⁴⁶ The reaction of the journalists, broadcasters, and publishers was predictably critical, and Congress softened many of the more severe provisions before approval was voted.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, when President Castelo Branco signed the bill into law on February 9, 1967, he used his item veto to alter the statute so that the end result was almost identical to the bill as originally presented.⁴⁸

On March 13, 1967, Castelo Branco signed Decree-Law Number 314, known as the National Security Law. This wide-ranging law added to the growing body of legislation restricting the free flow of information and ideas. It prohibited as crimes such acts as: divulcation of false information capable of endangering the name, authority, and credit or prestige of Brazil; offenses against the honor of any of the presidents of the powers (executive, legislative, or judicial) of the Union; incitation to war or subversion against the political and social order, to collective disobedience of the laws, to animosity among the armed forces,

⁴⁶Costella, pp. 136-138.

⁴⁷Jornal do Brasil, 22 January 1967, p. 4.

⁴⁸Ibid., 10 February 1967, p. 3.

to conflict among the classes, to paralyzation of public services, to hatred or racial discrimination; subversive propaganda; and incitement to practice crimes against national security.⁴⁹ The military courts were given exclusive jurisdiction over these crimes, whether committed by a civilian or a soldier.⁵⁰

Apparently because of the severe sanctions established by the Press Law and the National Security Law, newspapers were generally discrete in their criticism of the revolutionary regime; and the regime, clearly concerned with its "democratic" image, was hesitant to apply the new restrictions visibly although subtle pressures and partial censorship were occasionally applied.⁵¹ The most dramatic case of a violation of press freedom was the imprisonment, without benefit of trial, of the Tribuna da Imprensa editor, Hélio Fernandes, for authoring and publishing a front page editorial attacking the reputation of Castelo Branco, who had just died as a result of an airplane collision.⁵² The Justice Minister justified the detention of Fernandes, not with the Press Law or the National Security Law (perhaps because action under either of these would have required a

⁴⁹ Costella, pp. 139-140.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 140.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Fernandes called the ex-President "a cold, unfeeling, vengeful, implacable, inhuman, calculating, cruel, frustrated man . . . dried up within and without, with a heart like a true Sahara desert" (Tribuna da Imprensa, 19 July 1967, p. 2).

trial), but with the provisions of AI-2 which prohibited political pronouncements by those whose political rights had been suspended.⁵³

In August of 1967 Última Hora reporter, Flávio Távares, was imprisoned by the military police for subversion, but the real crackdown on the press was still to come. "The great division of the waters, from which censoring activities have steadily grown, seems to have been the signing of Institutional Act Number 5."⁵⁴ In the interest of preserving the democratic façade of the military regime, President Castelo Branco had resisted the demands for wholesale censorship. President Costa e Silva also resisted such demands for as long as he could, but the student and congressional crises of late 1968 made it impossible to continue to deny the demands of the hard-line military officers for more active control.⁵⁵

AI-5 did not include provisions for controlling the distribution of information, but the crisis which generated the institutional act prompted the regime to use the

⁵³Jornal do Brasil, 21 July 1967, p. 3. Fernandes had lost his political rights in a preelection "housecleaning" purge prior to the 1966 congressional elections. It is interesting to note that the government justified the detention with a legal device which had automatically expired on March 15, 1967. The Hélio Fernandes incident was also used to bar the use of television to Carlos Lacerda, the supposed political patron of Fernandes. Schneider, p. 221.

⁵⁴Costella, pp. 141-142.

⁵⁵Carlos Chagas, 113 Dias de Angústia: Impedimento e Morte de um Presidente (Rio de Janeiro: Agência Jornalística Image, 1970), pp. 153-154.

existing legislation zealously. The regime's defeat in the Márcio Alves' case took place on Thursday, December 12; AI-5 was signed and promulgated on Friday, December 13; and strict censorship began on Saturday, December 14. The December 14 issue of O Estado de São Paulo was reportedly seized on the streets, and that day's issue of Jornal do Brasil had classified advertisements interspersed with historical news items on pages normally devoted to national political news. Jornal do Brasil did not appear on Sunday, December 15. For the remainder of that month, the censors were extremely severe in what they would allow the major newspapers to print.⁵⁶

As the country returned to a certain amount of normalcy, censorship was relaxed (to a sort of "self-censorship" with the threat of intervention hanging over the head of editors who might allow too much criticism to be published),⁵⁷ but strict control was again established in September, 1969, following the incapacitating stroke of

⁵⁶In Jornal do Brasil the political column of Carlos Castello Branco did not reappear until mid-January, 1969. Following the December 13 "coup within a coup" many of the newspapers, unable to print normal news items, included, at every opportunity, pictures of Costa e Silva surrounded by military officers in uniform. This was apparently a subtle means of demonstrating the military's influence or control over the Costa e Silva government.

⁵⁷One of the demands made by the radicals who kidnaped U.S. Ambassador Burke Elbrick was that their activities be reported by the Brazilian press, which had generally been afraid to publicize terrorist activities. Schneider, pp. 294-296.

President Costa e Silva.⁵⁸ The Tribuna da Imprensa was shut down for three days, beginning September 24, for attacking government officials,⁵⁹ TV-Tupi in Guanabara was taken off the air for broadcasting information concerning the illness of the President, and the Diário de Notícias was censured for attempting to publish the same information.⁶⁰ Strict control of news facilities in Rio de Janeiro was maintained until General Médici took office as president in late October.⁶¹

On January 26, 1970, President Médici signed Decree-Law Number 1,077, approved by Congress in May of the same year, which took away even more freedom of expression.⁶² The law, ostensibly aimed at the prevention of obscene literature, required that all books and periodicals be submitted to agents of the federal police for censorship prior to their distribution. The law also applied to theatrical productions and television and radio programs.

⁵⁸Costella, pp. 141-142.

⁵⁹Ibid. The Tribuna's editor Hélio Fernandes was again imprisoned, this time for fifteen days in Campo Grande, Mato Grosso.

⁶⁰Chagas, p. 155. For some inexplicable reason the military High Command refused to allow information concerning the President's illness to be published or broadcast in Guanabara even when information was being divulged in other states. The news which TV-Tupi tried to broadcast was an interview with the President's wife.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Jornal do Brasil, 27 January 1970, p. 3; and 22 May 1970, p. 3.

The decree-law was strongly opposed by the Brazilian intelligentsia but to no avail. The revolutionary regime identified the control of pornography with the fight against subversion and communism. According to Justice Minister Alfredo Buzaid, the law--and its subsequent extensions--was needed "to preserve the integrity of the Brazilian family, which preserves the great tradition of morality, combating the insidious process of international communism which promotes free love in order to break down the moral resistance of our society."⁶³ By identifying pornography as an aspect of subversion and international communism, the regime equipped itself with a means for requiring all forms of public expression to be submitted for examination. Moreover, the vague definition of prohibited material--that which is contrary to morality and good custom--would allow the federal censors to repress almost any publication. A prime example of this was the case of O Pasquim, a weekly magazine of satirical essays and poetry, much of which was indirectly critical of the government. Several issues were censured in late 1970, and, at one point, the magazine's entire editorial staff was jailed.⁶⁴

From 1964 through the end of 1970, the revolutionary regime assembled an extensive arsenal of weapons to be used to control expression in Brazil. Although censorship during this period was never as extensive as that practiced by

⁶³O Estado de São Paulo, 15 February 1970, p. 4.

⁶⁴See Veja (November 18, 1970), p. 28.

totalitarian regimes, the effect of control measures in Brazil severely limited the ability of dissident elements to articulate their demands by way of a public forum.

Restriction of Electoral Participation

With political power consolidated, the military government faced the problem of maintaining an outward appearance of representative democracy while ensuring that alternative means of expression could not be used by frustrated sectors. Interest groups could be controlled through repression and co-optation, and the mass media could be controlled through both direct and indirect censorship, but this would be ineffective if the citizens could vent their frustrations through popular elections. The conservative bias of the congressional electoral system would, of course, prevent popular forces from gaining control of Congress, but the direct popular elections for executive offices were suitable vehicles for expression of popular dissatisfaction. In the presidential elections of 1950, 1955, and 1960, the winner was the candidate who identified himself (if somewhat vaguely) with the popular interest. This also applied to the 1945 election of Dutra, who himself made no populist appeals, but, in large measure, was elected because of the endorsement of Vargas. Thus, the problem for the revolutionary regime was to become populist itself (a tactic which was apparently totally unacceptable to Castelo Branco and only slightly more acceptable to Costa e Silva) or to

find ways to limit popular participation through direct elections.

The initial problem of selecting a president after the March 31, 1964, coup was solved in a legitimate and safe manner. If one ignores the doubtful legality of deposing an elected vice-president who was serving in the stead of an elected president who had resigned, the election of Castelo Branco by Congress was quite in accord with the constitution. Of somewhat less legitimacy, but still acceptable as a part of the "revolutionary necessity," was the removal of popularly elected governors and the selection of men approved by the regime through assembly elections which were carefully orchestrated by the local military authorities.⁶⁵

Once the "regime of exception" had been installed and the predominant opposition politicians had been purged from the system by way of cancellation of their elective mandates and/or suspension of their political rights,⁶⁶ the official position of the Castelo Branco government was that executive and legislative elections would be conducted as scheduled.⁶⁷ Irregardless of this official policy, there was widespread

⁶⁵For a discussion of how the election of Marshall Emílio Rodrigues Ribas Junior was controlled by Coronel Meira Matos, see Borges, pp. 172-175.

⁶⁶The purge included Juscelino Kubitschek, the favorite for the scheduled 1965 presidential election.

⁶⁷Ferreira de Castro, p. 319. As an admirer of the U.S. political system, Castelo Branco had several times declared himself committed to the establishment of a truly democratic form of government. This commitment can also be seen as a symbolic allocation of authority designed to elicit domestic and foreign support.

dislike among the supporters of the revolution for the idea of free elections. Commenting on the upcoming April, 1965, election for mayor of São Paulo, General Carlos Luis Guedes declared himself against such elections because "the judgment of the people is not infallible since they ordered Christ killed and freed Barabas."⁶⁸ Marshall Mendes de Moraes stated that all the military leaders except Costa e Silva were against holding gubernatorial elections in 1965 because "the people are still not capable of judging the revolution."⁶⁹

In spite of much counsel to the contrary, President Castelo Branco insisted that the eleven gubernatorial elections be conducted as scheduled even though the regime's pro-United States foreign policy stance and the unpopular economic austerity measures seemed to indicate that it was not a good time to test the popularity of the government.⁷⁰ In most cases, however, the candidates, both proregime and antiregime, were relatively "safe" and heeded the regime's warning against radicalism in the campaign. On September 30, Castelo Branco declared that the winners would be allowed to take office, but he would not permit a government that would allow the return of subversion and corruption.⁷¹ On the next day War Minister Costa e Silva repeated Castelo

⁶⁸Jornal do Brasil, 20 January 1965, p. 3.

⁶⁹Ibid., 22 January 1965, p. 6.

⁷⁰Schneider, pp. 163-165.

⁷¹O Estado de São Paulo, 1 October 1965, p. 1.

Branco's warning, and General Urrahy of the First Army declared his troops ready to sacrifice themselves in order to prevent the return of corruption and communism.⁷²

Most of the elections took place in states that were predominantly rural and still controlled by conservative politicians. The two exceptions--and, thus, the critical elections--were Guanabara and Minas Gerais; and it was in these states that the regime attempted to influence the results. In both states the government candidates, who were really the stalking horses for Carlos Lacerda and Magalhães Pinto, were soundly defeated, perhaps because of the obvious interference of the government. In Minas Gerais the regime used the Ineligibilities Law to bar a popular opposition candidate and, thus, seemed to unite the opposition forces behind their second choice, Israel Pinheiro. Pinheiro easily defeated the handpicked candidate of Governor Magalhães Pinto.

In Guanabara the regime vetoed two opposition candidates, and this also seemed to unify the opposition forces in support of the third choice, Negrão de Lima, against Governor Lacerda's candidate. The Guanabara electorate was bombarded with threats of what would happen if the "counter-revolutionary, corrupt, communist, revanchist" Negrão de Lima was elected,⁷³ but he won handily by means of a

⁷²Ibid., 2 October 1965, p. 6.

⁷³See the September 20 through October 3, 1965, issues of Guanabara newspapers, especially Tribuna da Imprensa, O Globo, and Jornal do Brasil.

campaign directed against both the military regime and Lacerda.⁷⁴ After the election the military investigation teams charged with investigating communist activity demanded that the political rights of both opposition winners--Negrão in Guanabara and Israel Pinheiro in Minas Gerais--be suspended; but Castelo Branco, apparently aware of the political costs of making popular martyrs, refused.⁷⁵ Later demands for Negrão's impeachment were denied, and his efforts to prove his loyalty to the revolution (which many residents of Guanabara have termed a do-nothing policy) were such that Castelo Branco, with Costa e Silva's approval, ordered all action against him to cease.⁷⁶ Pinheiro in Minas Gerais proved himself equally harmless and later joined the government party.

In the other 1965 gubernatorial contests, the government did not fair too badly. In Alagoas neither candidate got the required majority so the contest was nullified and a federal Interventor was appointed. The government-backed candidates in Rio Grande do Norte, Santa Catarina, and Mato Grosso lost; but in each state the winner was either in

⁷⁴For a discussion of Negrão's campaign strategy, see Francisco Pedro Coutto, O Voto e o Povo (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1966), pp. 80-93.

⁷⁵Jornal do Brasil, 26 November 1965, p. 4.

⁷⁶Ibid., 9 December 1966, p. 3. Negrão de Lima is an excellent tightrope walker. He managed to weather the crises of both AI-2 and AI-5, and his total neutrality brought him invitations to both the ARENA and MDB conventions of 1969. He attended both as a privileged spectator, remaining coolly distant from the rancor of party politics. Visão (December 5, 1969), p. 28.

favor of or neutral toward the revolution. Government-backed candidates won in Paraná, Maranhão, Goiás, Pará, and Paraíba. The government really lost none of the elections since none of those elected by the opposition could be considered "radicals,"⁷⁷ but the general consensus was that the regime had suffered a serious defeat, and the success of candidates backed by the PSD and PTB in Minas Gerais and Guanabara was perceived by the military hard line to be a return of the old political forces.⁷⁸ Popular discontent had been expressed in two elections, and this prompted the military leaders to close the system further in order to prevent such expressions in the future.

The perceived defeat led to a military crisis and AI-2, which abolished political parties and provided for the indirect election of the president. Likewise, AI-3 established that the gubernatorial elections of 1966 would be indirect.⁷⁹

The myopia of these actions cost the revolutionary regime much of its rapidly waning support. Criticism of

⁷⁷Negrão de Lima was the only governor who did not later join the government party. In reality the defeats in Guanabara and Minas Gerais were quite helpful to the military leaders since those defeats destroyed the political reputations of Lacerda and Magalhães Pinto, who with Ademar were the dominant civilians in the early revolutionary leadership.

⁷⁸Schneider, p. 169.

⁷⁹AI-3 also removed the mayoral elections in state capitals from popular participation by providing for the mayor's nomination by the governor with the approval of the legislative assembly. Atos Institucionais, Vol. I, pp. 47-49.

The policy was passionately stated by Austragésilo de Athayde:

The more those interested insist in saying that an indirect election, from a democratic point of view, is as good as a direct one, the people do not believe it. And I, with the people also do not believe it.

The authority of a government which was selected by a small political group, without constitutional powers for this, will always be contestable. Above all when this political group is at the end of its mandate, and for other well-known reasons [cassações] represents so little. . . .

I am convinced that the candidates of ARENA, with two possible exceptions, would win the contests that have been taken from the people and given to the legislative assemblies. And imagine the force such a victory would give the Revolutionary Government if it had been obtained through democratic voting. As it is no one is satisfied. . . .⁸⁰

Having removed the major executive elections from popular participation, President Castelo Branco set out to assure the government's control of indirect elections. On November 20, 1965, he signed Complementary Act Number 4, which established the rules for organizing "party-like" groups to take the place of the political parties abolished by AI-2. The party-like organizations were to be created by the incumbent members of Congress, with twenty senators and 120 deputies needed by the organization for legal recognition.⁸¹ Because of the situacionista tendency of Brazilian politics--the practice of quickly swearing loyalty to the obvious center of political power--the nascent government

⁸⁰Quoted in Ferreira de Castro, pp. 330-331.

⁸¹For the text of AC-4, see Atos Institucionais, Vol. I, pp. 33-36.

party, ARENA, soon achieved a majority in Congress and in the state assemblies and municipal councils as well.⁸²

Even the change to indirect elections and the creation of a clearly dominant government party were not sufficient, in the thinking of regime leaders, to guarantee the desired outcome in the gubernatorial elections to be held in Acre, Alagoas, Amazonas, Bahia, Ceará, Espírito Santo, Pernambuco, Piauí, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, São Paulo, and Sergipe. The most serious problem was in Rio Grande do Sul where four dissident ARENA state deputies launched the candidacy of Rui Cirne Lima, a popular law professor who had no party connections. The opposition MDB deputies quickly endorsed Cirne Lima, and with ARENA having only a 28-27 majority in the assembly, the regime envisioned a defeat in a very strategic state.⁸³

The revolutionary regime responded to this incipient challenge by voiding the mandates of two dissident ARENA deputies and five MDB deputies and by establishing penalties

⁸²The situacionista phenomenon is explained by Carvalho, "Os Partidos Políticos em Minas Gerais," pp. 1-2. Nunes Leal, pp. 23-30, explains the difficulty of being in the opposition, "for our friends, bread; for our enemies, the club" (p. 24). Thus, the opposition party, MDB, was formed by those who knew they would not be welcome in the government party.

⁸³Xausa and Ferraz, pp. 243-247. The ARENA organization in the state was having an intraparty dispute between the followers of Peracchi Barcelos and Tarso Dutra with army General Justino Alves Bastos lobbying actively for his own candidacy if the four-year residency requirement could be circumvented. See Jornal do Brasil, 1 May 1966, p. 24.

for party indiscipline.⁸⁴ President Castelo Branco then intervened in the intraparty feud by dictating the party's choice of Peracchi Barcellos. Cirne Lima withdrew as a candidate, and Barcellos was elected to take office as governor on March 15, 1967. Because the regime had effectively tied the hands of the deputies, the MDB boycotted the election. As a result, Barcellos' "victory" margin was twenty-three in favor, none against, in a legislative assembly which had been composed of fifty-five deputies.⁸⁵

Similar tactics were used in Acre where the MDB had enjoyed, before July, an 8-7 majority in the legislative assembly. Four MDB deputies were purged, and, as a result, the ARENA candidate was assured success.⁸⁶

In the other states the regime's problems were caused more by the government party than by the opposition. ARENA, at its inception, had drawn in almost all of the UDN politicians, about two thirds of the PSD faithful, plus a sizable section of the PTB, and many politicians from the smaller parties. Given the personalistic nature of the old political system, especially in the state organizations of the old parties, the revolutionary regime was guaranteed many

⁸⁴Jornal do Brasil, 5 July 1966, p. 3; and 20 July 1966, p. 3.

⁸⁵Xausa and Ferraz, p. 247.

⁸⁶Jornal do Brasil, 19 July 1966, p. 3.

faction fights within its ranks.⁸⁷ In general, President Castelo Branco allowed the state party leaders to test the strength of the many candidates before he stepped in to end the discussion. In most cases, he asked the state leaders to narrow the choice to two or three names from which he selected the candidate. If the list was narrowed to two candidates of irrevocably opposed factions, Castelo Branco ignored the favorites and selected someone outside of the opposing camps.⁸⁸ In every case Castelo Branco made it known that the final decision was his and his alone.

With such legal and political manipulation, the results of the September 3 indirect elections were predictable and elicited extremely little public response even though gubernatorial contests had been, in more liberal times, the objects of much public interest. To someone unfamiliar with the events of the previous months, the success of the ARENA candidates would have seemed phenomenal. The margins of victory for the government candidates were: Acre, 7-0; Alagoas, 36-0; Amazonas, 21-0; Bahia, 50-0; Ceará, 47-0; Espirito Santo, 34-0; Pernambuco, 49-0; Piauí, 31-0; Rio de Janeiro, 38-0; Rio Grande do Sul, 23-0; São Paulo, 81-0; and Sergipe, 31-0.⁸⁹ The MDB delegations in every state

⁸⁷For an analysis of the intraparty struggles within the various states, see Ibid., 1 May 1966, p. 24.

⁸⁸This was the case in Rio de Janeiro, Sergipe, and Ceará. See Ibid., 21 June 1966, p. 4; and 15 July 1966, p. 4.

⁸⁹Ibid., 4 September 1966, p. 16.

boycotted the elections, with the exception of Alagoas where four MDB deputies violated the boycott to vote for the ARENA candidate.⁹⁰

The ARENA presidential nomination went to Minister of War Artur de Costa e Silva in spite of the subtle opposition of Castelo Branco, who favored the selection of a "Sorbonne" officer as his successor. Costa e Silva's role as intermediary between Castelo Branco and the military hard line in the October, 1965, crisis made him the military favorite; and the gubernatorial elections which precipitated that crisis had eliminated the two major civilian candidates, Carlos Lacerda and Magalhães Pinto.⁹¹

Although the October 3 election of Costa e Silva was guaranteed by the same devices used to ensure the election of the ARENA gubernatorial candidates in September, the ARENA nominee actively campaigned throughout July, August, and September of 1966 in an effort to create a more favorable public attitude toward his presidency.⁹² Castelo Branco belatedly and rather unenthusiastically campaigned for the ARENA candidate and also decreed that October 3

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹For a discussion as to why Castelo Branco was not able to select the presidential candidate for his party, see Stepan, pp. 248-252.

⁹²For a review of his campaign activities, see Jornal do Brasil, 1 October 1966, p. 3. Costa e Silva's basic pledge was to "humanize" the revolution.

would be a national holiday in honor of the presidential election.⁹³

In spite of these efforts, public interest was minimal as befits an indirect election where the outcome is 295-0. The MDB boycotted the election with the exception of one deputy who cast his vote for the ARENA candidate.⁹⁴ This act, plus abstentions and absences got more attention in the press than did the election itself.

The revolutionary acts which established indirect elections were appropriate to the 1966 elections only, and the implication was that the 1970 elections for the presidency and the twenty-two governorships would be direct. The 1967 Constitution, however, maintained the indirect election of the president and vice-president, while providing for the direct popular election of state governors. In spite of the constitutional clarity on the issue of popular participation in executive elections, dissatisfaction was apparent, with opposition leaders wanting executive elections to be direct and some proregime people wanting all elections to be indirect. In September, 1967, Minister of Education Tarso Dutra, a common civilian spokesman for hard-line military officers,

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴Ibid., 4 October 1966, pp. 3-4. The MDB had pondered the idea of having a candidate but had given up after three prominent army officers--Amari Krueel, Cordeiro de Farias, and Marshall Lott--refused the honor because of adverse reaction within military circles and the certain futility of the effort. The MDB deputy who voted for Costa e Silva was banished from the party by the MDB leadership on the grounds that he had violated the party loyalty required by AC-16.

stated that the opposition would win control of Rio Grande do Sul in a direct election, a situation which the military could not permit.⁹⁵ In early 1968 rumors of a return to indirect elections precipitated the formation of a block to oppose such a move. By October these rumors were taking on a tone of authenticity with the increasing demand by the military hard line for restricting political activity;⁹⁶ but the Márcio Alves affair directed the attention of the hardliners to Congress and its undisciplined members, and, thus, pushed the demands for indirect elections to the background.

By mid-1969 the politicking for the upcoming 1970 elections (presidential, gubernatorial, legislative) again reminded many military officers of the uncertainty of popular politics. Thus, when President Costa e Silva was incapacitated by a stroke, the three military ministers decreed, by means of Constitutional Amendment Number 1, the removal of gubernatorial elections from popular participation. Article 189 of the revised constitution dictated that the 1970 gubernatorial elections would be indirect by "an electoral college constituted by the respective legislative assemblies."

The same members of Congress who had argued in 1967 and 1968 against a return to the indirect election of governors

⁹⁵Ibid., 20 September 1967, p. 3.

⁹⁶Ibid., 10 January 1968, p. 3; and 1 October 1968, p. 3. Some of the anxiety concerning direct gubernatorial elections was caused by the suggestion of some Mineiro politicians that the MDB promote Juscelino Kubitschek's wife as the gubernatorial candidate for Minas Gerais.

also were demanding revision of the 1967 Constitution to allow direct popular election of the president and vice-president. This was a constant theme of the MDB legislators, but it was also advocated by a sizable group of ARENA deputies with the quiet encouragement of Senators Carvalho Pinto and Ney Braga, both presidential hopefuls.⁹⁷ The government had to apply strong pressure in November of 1967 to defeat an MDB-sponsored amendment for direct elections, and a similar bill sponsored by ARENA Deputy Marcos Kertzman was shunted aside by the Márcio Alves controversy,⁹⁸ and, of course, forgotten with the enforced recess of Congress after AI-5.

The military officers not only disliked popular participation in governmental affairs, but they also refused to allow a politician who might be susceptible to popular demands to ascend to the presidency. When President Costa e Silva suffered the stroke on August 29, 1969, the three military ministers took provisional control of the government in his name. On August 31 they issued Institutional Act Number 12, authorizing themselves to rule by decree.⁹⁹ Even though Vice-President Pedro Aleixo was the legal

⁹⁷Carlos Castello Branco, "Coluna do Castello," Ibid., 14 October 1967, p. 3.

⁹⁸Jornal do Brasil, 22 November 1967, p. 3; and 6 December 1968, p. 3.

⁹⁹For the text of AI-12, see Nôva Constituição, pp. 138-142.

successor, the leaders of the armed forces refused to allow a civilian politician to become president.

The military ministers immediately began an informal polling process among military officers to select Costa e Silva's successor.¹⁰⁰ On October 6 the ministers announced the selection of General Emílio Garrastazu Médici, Third Army Commander and former chief of the SNI (the regime's intelligence organization). ARENA president, Filinto Muller, called a meeting of the ARENA Directorate for October 16 to nominate him.¹⁰¹ During all this time Vice-President Aleixo was still the legal (though ignored) successor, but on October 14 Aleixo's claim was eliminated when the military ministers issued Institutional Act Number 16. AI-16 declared vacant both the presidency and vice-presidency, justifying the former with the inability of Costa e Silva to resume the office and the latter with the need to fill the office on a more permanent basis.¹⁰² The recess of Congress was temporarily lifted by Complementary Act Number 72, allowing Congress to meet on October 25 to elect Médici as President and Admiral Augusto Rademaker Grunwald as Vice-President for terms to run until March 15, 1974.¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰For an account of the month-long selection process, see Carlos Chagas, pp. 155-185. A brief description is included in Schneider, pp. 298-301.

¹⁰¹Jornal do Brasil, 7 October 1969, p. 3; and 9 October 1969, p. 3.

¹⁰²For the text, see Nôva Constituição, pp. 149-153.

¹⁰³O Estado de São Paulo, 26 October 1969, p. 1. The MDB boycotted the election.

With the politicians very insecure as a result of extensive purges that followed the December, 1968, crisis and the continued threat for more purges, President Médici controlled the gubernatorial elections with fewer problems than did Castelo Branco. In the November, 1969, ARENA Convention, Médici handpicked the party president and the eleven members of the Executive Commission, choosing loyal but popular and effective politicians.¹⁰⁴ He then charged the new president, Rondon Pacheco, with gathering information on gubernatorial candidates and arranging compromises between feuding factions in state organizations. In general, Médici avoided ex-governors and active-duty military officers and selected an unusually large number of technicians and administrators who had had very little political experience.¹⁰⁵ The latter tactic was particularly useful in resolving the disputes between local factions.

Médici's job was easier than Castelo Branco's because of the strictures placed on the electoral system. The insecurity and limited profitability of politics had caused ambitious young men to seek more secure and rewarding careers. The purges removed from the ranks of ARENA most of the vocally dissident elements and from the MDB ranks many of the effective leaders. Only in Guanabara was the MDB

¹⁰⁴Visão (December 5, 1969), p. 31.

¹⁰⁵Carlos Castello Branco, "Coluna do Castello," Jornal do Brasil, 5 July 1970, p. 3. The only ex-governor selected was Laudo Natel (São Paulo), who had served as governor for eight months following the purge of Governor Ademar de Barros. Nine of the twenty-two candidates were technicians or administrators.

dominant, but even though the party had a majority in the legislative assembly, President Médici exercised control over the selection of the MDB candidate for governor. With Médici's approval, the Guanabara MDB chose a popular but cautious federal deputy, Chagas Freitas, who was subsequently elected by the assembly.¹⁰⁶

Five of the state legislative assemblies had been closed in the months immediately after AI-5, generally on charges of corruption, and they remained closed until mid-1970. While they were closed, many state deputies lost their mandates. In the general housecleaning some of the purged deputies were those who had reputations for corruption while others were MDB activists and ARENA dissidents whose removal was not justified by government spokesmen.¹⁰⁷ With the nominating procedure carefully controlled by President Médici and the state assemblies properly disciplined, the October 3, 1970, elections of twenty-two governors were conducted with no problems and little public interest.

Probably because the most radical politicians had been removed by the purges authorized by AI-1 and AI-2 and

¹⁰⁶The ARENA organization of Guanabara was told by Médici not to present a candidate.

¹⁰⁷The general impression was that most of the purges in 1970 were to rid the state assemblies of dissidents who might disrupt the October gubernatorial elections. The purge of May 20, 1970, voided the mandates of nine ARENA state deputies and only one MDB deputy. The last legislative purge of 1970, decreed at the same time that the regime authorized the last three recessed assemblies to reopen, voided the mandates of three state deputies, all MDB. Jornal do Brasil, 21 May 1970, p. 3; and 9 July 1970, p. 4.

because of the conservative nature of the electoral system for the federal and state legislatures, the revolutionary regime did not remove legislative elections from direct popular participation. This is not to say, however, that the regime allowed these elections to be a public forum for the articulation of popular demands. Various forms of intimidation were used to keep the campaigning politicians from arousing too much popular interest in the political process.

The threat of purge was used to discourage association with the so-called Frente Ampla¹⁰⁸ when regime spokesmen hinted that punitive action would be taken against active politicians who might join the opposition group.¹⁰⁹ On September 23, the vice-president of ARENA promised a purge to cleanse the slate for the November 15 legislative elections,¹¹⁰ and three days later government sources were reportedly preparing cassação and confinement orders for student agitators, Frente Ampla spokesmen, and other opposition politicians who would "demonstrate their incompatibility with the objectives of the Revolution" by being

¹⁰⁸The Frente Ampla was to be a coalition of opposition groups. The "broad front" never really organized due to government opposition and the problems of incorporating four such strong and jealous politicians as Lacerda, Goulart, Kubitschek, and Quadros into one group.

¹⁰⁹Jornal do Brasil, 21 September 1966, p. 3; and 23 September 1966, p. 4.

¹¹⁰O Estado de São Paulo, 24 September 1966, p. 3.

critical of the regime.¹¹¹ These threats had the effect of removing the revolution as a campaign issue in the 1966 legislative elections for all but the most courageous of the opposition politicians.

The purge and confinement threats were based on revolutionary acts (basically AI-2), but the regime had other legal means of repressing a free-swinging campaign. The Electoral Code of July 15, 1965, placed many restrictions on campaign activities. All campaign materials were the responsibility of the parties and had to be paid for by the parties. This meant that a candidate could not conduct his own personal campaign. The money had to be funneled through the local party organization, and the content of the campaign materials was to be controlled by the party.¹¹²

Various types of expression were prohibited by the code, including expression which might incite "violent processes for the subversion of the regime or the political and social order, animosity among or toward the armed forces, collective disobedience or defamation of public authorities."

¹¹¹Carlos Castello Branco, "Coluna do Castello," Jornal do Brasil, 27 September 1966, p. 4. The regime carried out the threat. On October 12 the government voided the mandates of six federal deputies, including MDB leader Doutel de Andrade, and warned that it would not allow corrupt or subversive politicians to participate in the November 15 election (Ibid., 13 October 1966, p. 3). On November 10 the government canceled the political rights (and thus barred from the election) eighteen MDB candidates from Guanabara. Among this group was Tribuna da Imprensa editor, Hélio Fernandes. Ibid., 11 November 1966, p. 3.

¹¹²See Código Eleitoral, pp. 124-130, for Articles 240-257 of the Electoral Code which relate to campaign activities.

The code required careful control by local authorities over the use of posters and mass meetings and prohibited radio and television advertisements during the ten days preceding the elections. In order to equalize public exposure (and carefully control it), the code stipulated that two hours a day of free radio and television time would be made available for the use of the parties. There was to be no prior censorship of the candidates' speeches, but during these broadcasts a censor from the Federal Police was on hand to cut off candidates who might violate the norms of allowable propaganda.¹¹³

Throughout the country the legislative elections of 1966 were unusually quiet because of the controls on campaign spending and propaganda and the general air of intimidation.¹¹⁴ Another factor inhibiting public interest was the absence of an election for governor. In most states the gubernatorial contest had traditionally been the political contest which generated the most public interest. Without that catalyst the election of November 15, 1966, could not

¹¹³The MDB senatorial candidate for Guanabara, Mário Martins, was cut off on September 20, 1966, when he circuitously criticized the indirect election of governors by describing indirect elections conducted by the Nazi regime in Germany. Jornal do Brasil, 20 September 1966, p. 3.

¹¹⁴See Nelson de Sousa Sampaio, "Perfil Eleitoral da Bahia--1966," RBEP, No. 23/24 (July, 1967/January, 1968), 127-128; Telmo Vieira Ribeiro, "As Eleições Catarinenses de 1966," RBEP, No. 23/24 (July, 1967/January, 1968), 221-222; and Vamireh Chacon, "As Eleições Estaduais em Pernambuco em 1966," RBEP, No. 23/24 (July, 1967/January, 1968), 88-89.

draw much interest, especially when the politicians were prohibited from arousing public emotions.

In spite of its rather obvious advantages, the government party did not do as well in the elections as might have been expected. ARENA elected 19 of the 23 senators, 277 of the 409 federal deputies, and 640 of the 1,076 state deputies, but it had done poorly in the more modern urbanized areas of the nation. In Câmara elections the MDB captured majorities in the delegations from Guanabara, Rio de Janeiro, and Rio Grande do Sul and made surprising gains in São Paulo (see Table IV). In the state assemblies the MDB maintained a wide margin in Guanabara, won majorities in Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul, and came very close to ARENA in São Paulo (see Table V). The results were not really the "strong victory" proclaimed by Castelo Branco.¹¹⁵

By late 1968 the hard-liners of the revolutionary circle had apparently decided that they had won a hollow victory in 1966. Congress and some of the state assemblies were being used as forums for the expression of criticism, which many of the sensitive members of the military hard line were loath to endure for long. When the Câmara refused to lift congressional immunity so that Márcio Alves could be tried, the ax fell on the legislators. AI-5 reestablished the authority of the regime to void elective mandates and political rights and to close Congress. Congress was then recessed indefinitely, and on December 30, 1968, the purge

¹¹⁵Jornal do Brasil, 21 November 1966, p. 21.

TABLE IV*
RESULTS OF THE 1966 FEDERAL CÂMARA ELECTIONS

State or Unit	Total Representation	Elected by ARENA	Elected by MDB
Acre.....	7	4	3
Alagoas.....	9	6	3
Amazonas.....	7	5	2
Bahia.....	31	25	6
Ceará.....	21	16	5
Espirito Santo.....	8	6	2
Goiás.....	13	8	5
Guanabara.....	21	6	15
Maranhão.....	16	13	3
Mato Grosso.....	8	6	2
Minas Gerais.....	48	37	11
Pará.....	10	8	2
Paraíba.....	13	8	5
Paraná.....	25	20	5
Pernambuco.....	24	19	5
Piauí.....	8	7	1
Rio de Janeiro.....	21	10	11
Rio Grande do Norte.	7	7	0
Rio Grande do Sul...	29	14	15
Santa Catarina.....	14	11	3
São Paulo.....	59	32	27
Sergipe.....	7	6	1
Territories.....	3	3	0
TOTALS.....	409	277	132

*From Estados Unidos do Brasil, Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, Boletim Eleitoral, "Eleições de 1966," Vol. 18, No. 216, pp. 429.

began with a decree voiding the legislative mandates of eleven federal deputies.¹¹⁶ Through a series of decrees emanating from the National Security Council, a total of 4 senators, 97 federal deputies, and 151 state deputies lost

¹¹⁶Estados Unidos do Brasil, Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, Boletim Eleitoral, "Eleições de 1966," Vol. 18, No. 216, pp. 435-437. This decree also suspended the political rights of Carlos Lacerda.

their mandates and/or their political rights in the purges that followed AI-5.¹¹⁷

TABLE V*
RESULTS OF THE 1966 STATE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS

State	Total Seats	Elected by ARENA	Elected by MDB
Acre.....	15	9	6
Alagoas.....	35	24	11
Amazonas.....	30	20	10
Bahia.....	60	48	12
Ceará.....	65	49	16
Espirito Santo.....	43	30	13
Goiás.....	39	25	14
Guanabara.....	55	15	40
Maranhão.....	40	31	9
Mato Grosso.....	30	23	7
Minas Gerais.....	82	63	19
Para.....	41	33	8
Paraíba.....	40	25	15
Paraná.....	45	37	8
Pernambuco.....	65	51	14
Piauí.....	42	34	8
Rio de Janeiro.....	62	28	34
Rio Grande do Norte.	40	37	3
Rio Grande do Sul...	55	27	28
Santa Catarina.....	45	34	11
São Paulo.....	115	62	53
Sergipe.....	32	26	6
TOTALS.....	1076	731	345

*From Estados Unidos do Brasil, Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, Boletim Eleitoral, "Eleições de 1966," Vol. 18, No. 216, p. 432.

Although many ARENA politicians lost their mandates, the ax fell most heavily on members of the MDB. The opposition party lost four senators, fifty-eight federal deputies,

¹¹⁷Also caught in the purge were hundreds of mayors and municipal councilmen. The legislative assemblies of Guanabara, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Pernambuco, Pará, Sergipe, and Goiás were recessed. See Jornal do Brasil, 2 July 1969, p. 3.

and seventy-two state deputies. The 1966 MDB gains in São Paulo were erased. Prior to AI-5, the São Paulo branch of the MDB included twenty-seven federal deputies, fifty-three state deputies, seventy-one mayors, ten councilmen in the capitol, and 1185 councilmen in the interior. By the end of June, 1969 the cassações under AI-5 and some shifts to ARENA had reduced the party's strength to twelve federal deputies, twenty state deputies, thirty-eight mayors, seven councilmen in the capital, and about eight hundred councilmen in the interior.¹¹⁸

The crisis following Costa e Silva's stroke once again allowed an attack on the legislative politicians. Decrees issued on September 11, 1969, September 30, 1969, and October 17, 1969, voided the mandates of one senator, seven federal deputies, eleven state deputies, and four mayors.¹¹⁹ Most of those affected were in some way related to politicians who had already lost their jobs and their political rights. The senator was Pedro Ludovico, father of ex-Governor Mauro Borges. Among the deputies were Lígia Douzel de Andrade (her husband was a federal deputy purged in October, 1966), Nísia Corone (her husband was a mayor purged in 1964), Maria Lúcia Araujo (her husband was a governor purged in 1964), and Júlia Steinbruch (her husband was a

¹¹⁸Ibid., 3 July 1969, p. 3.

¹¹⁹Ibid., 12 September 1969, p. 3; 1 October 1969, p. 3; and 18 October 1969, p. 3.

senator purged in January, 1969).¹²⁰ Following the installation of Emílio Médici as President on October 30, 1969, the use of the purge was maintained. The practice continued into July, 1970; but those affected were mainly state deputies, mayors, and municipal councilmen charged with corruption and subversion.¹²¹

In reality there was little need for extensive purges prior to the 1970 legislative elections because the events of 1968 and 1969 had made clear the point that only the mildest forms of opposition would be tolerated by the military regime. It had the legal means necessary to prevent any wholesale attacks upon the government, and the provisions of the 1965 Electoral Code could be used to prevent the excitation of popular demands during the campaign. In addition, the regime could use the steady improvement of the economy and the success of Brazil's entry in the World Cup soccer competition¹²² as a campaign issue for the government party.

¹²⁰A revision of the Ineligibilities Law, by way of Complementary Law Number 5, which was issued on April 29, 1970, made the spouse of a cassado ineligible for any election. This law also extended the list of ineligibilities to cover a great variety of political crimes. For the text, see Nôva Constituição, pp. 171-186.

¹²¹In some cases the purge was probably used to prepare the proper party climate for the gubernatorial elections. A case in point is that in Rio de Janeiro where the purge of July 8, 1970, broke a 23-23 tie in the state assembly by eliminating three MDB deputies and thus giving ARENA a three-vote majority. Jornal do Brasil, 9 July 1970, p. 3.

¹²²For a discussion of the role of futebol in Brazilian society, see Thomas G. Sanders, "The Social Functions of

Predictably, ARENA easily won the legislative elections, capturing over 70 percent of the seats in the Câmara, all but five of the forty-six senate seats in contest, and about 75 percent of the seats in the state assemblies. But as in 1966, ARENA showed a great deal of weakness in the more modern urban areas; and, more significant, the large number of abstentions, blank votes, and null votes¹²³ demonstrated a growing alienation of the electorate. With the political process so far removed from popular participation, many voters were apparently not willing to be a part of the sham which the electoral process had become. But for the regime apathy, although regrettable, meant limited demands and this was preferable to activism and political inflation.

Repression of the Civilian Revolutionaries

In addition to the problem of demobilizing popular groups, the revolutionary regime also was confronted by the problem of ensuring a market monopsony. It could not allow the existence of antistatesmen who might promise a better exchange rate to dissatisfied sectors in exchange for support that might force recognition (and an allocation of authority) by the regime. The purges during the first few

Fútebol," American Universities Field Staff Reports, XIV (July, 1970), 5-9.

¹²³Voting is mandatory in Brazil, and, in spite of an extensive "get-out-the-vote" campaign by the government, the abstention rate was nearly 30 percent as compared to 20 percent for 1962 and 22 percent for 1966. See Jornal do Brasil, 17 November 1970, p. 6.

months following the March 31, 1964, coup effectively silenced--either by outright loss of elective office and political rights or by intimidation--most of that sector of the political class which might have constituted a viable opposition group; but the revolutionary regime was left with the necessity of dealing with the demands for participation of those of the political elite who remained within the system. Especially troublesome were the civilian backers of the coup, who used their revolutionary credentials to question the policies of the military ruling group.

Military interventions in Brazil have not been successful without significant support by civilian elements, and the 1964 coup was strongly supported by the civilian political elite, especially by the governors of Guanabara (Carlos Lacerda), São Paulo (Ademar de Barros), and Minas Gerais (Magalhães Pinto). These governors of the three most important states of Brazil openly demanded military intervention against the Goulart government, in part because of their opposition to the policies of Goulart, but probably also because they feared that he might somehow extend his term of office and thwart their own ambitions for the presidential elections to be held in 1965.¹²⁴ After President Goulart was deposed, Ademar, Lacerda, and Magalhães each tried to identify himself with the revolution in order to use that identity as a campaign device for the presidential elections, and, thus, each demanded to be allowed some

¹²⁴victor, pp. 483-492.

participation in the political process to bolster that identity. The military-civilian alliance which allowed the coup could not long survive because President Castelo Branco had a ready-made political program which had been developed by the Superior War College, and he was loath to allow it to be altered by ambitious civilian politicians.

The most vulnerable of the three governors was Ademar de Barros. Ademar's popularity in São Paulo was useful in initially legitimizing the coup; but his peculiar brand of populism, demagoguery, and corruption was embarrassing for the moralistic and efficiency-minded men of the Castelo Branco government. Because of his reputation for corruption, Ademar was quickly ostracized from the revolutionary group; but he was able to maintain his local authority longer than either Lacerda or Magalhães,¹²⁵ probably because he did not constitute a real threat to the regime as did Lacerda and Magalhaes.

In 1965 Ademar quietly backed the extension of Castelo Branco's term of office because the postponement of the election would give him time to overcome Lacerda's lead. Ademar, however, was not prepared for the strong candidacy of General Costa e Silva following the October, 1965, crisis; and in early 1966 he took a stand against the Castelo Branco government in an apparent attempt to establish a strong

¹²⁵An IPM report on Ademar's alleged corruption was prepared in 1964 but was quietly suppressed. See Schneider, p. 138.

campaign position.¹²⁶ On March 11, he appealed to Castelo Branco to renounce the presidency as a patriotic gesture and to schedule a general election to be held within sixty days.¹²⁷ In an effort to demonstrate his authenticity as the true leader of the revolution (in São Paulo at least), Ademar called for a "march of silence" for March 19 to express opposition to the misguided policies of the Castelo Branco government. The march was a failure, but Ademar's call for a popular (if silent) demonstration renewed the government's interest in his political ethics.¹²⁸

Even though his "march of silence" was a failure, Ademar continued to attack the government for its betrayal of the ideals of the revolution, especially criticizing the economic austerity and the indirect election of the president. Unable to hope for success in the indirect presidential election, given the commanding position of Costa e Silva, Ademar resorted to political mischief in May, 1966. Ademar had never joined ARENA, but most of the politicians who had belonged to his Partido Social Progressista became members of the government party; and through them he was able to obstruct the selection of an ARENA candidate for governor of São Paulo. In addition, his state government began to issue short-term bonds, a practice which

¹²⁶Jornal do Brasil, 29 January 1966, p. 6.

¹²⁷O Estado de São Paulo, 12 March 1966, p. 3.

¹²⁸Jornal do Brasil, 17 March 1966, p. 3; and 20 March 1966, p. 4.

counteracted the efforts of the revolutionary regime to reduce inflation. These acts of mischief, plus his easily documented history of corruption, resulted in a June 6, 1966, decree which voided Ademar's electoral mandate and his political rights.¹²⁹

Outside of his opposition to Goulart and his initial support for the 1964 coup, Ademar's revolutionary credentials were rather weak because he was corrupt, he had supported Getúlio Vargas, and his party had little strength outside of São Paulo. Governors Magalhães Pinto and Carlos Lacerda had far better credentials. Both had long been opponents of Vargas and his political heirs in both the PSD and the PTB. Neither was tainted with a reputation for corruption. Both had been quite active in fomenting and supporting the coup; and both were leaders in the UDN, which served as the nucleus for civilian political support during the first two years of the revolution.

Because of the above factors, both Magalhães and Lacerda could lay claim to a role in the revolutionary leadership, and both wanted to succeed Castelo Branco as president. Lacerda was the more popular of the two with the national electorate and with UDN politicians. The problem for Magalhães then was to elicit policy outputs from the revolutionary regime that would negate Lacerda's

¹²⁹Ibid., 7 June 1966, pp. 3, 7. The charges against Ademar were not specified. The decree merely stated that he had made himself incompatible with the objectives of the revolution.

commanding position for the 1965 election. To counter Lacerda's UDN strength, Magalhães pressed for abolition of the old parties and formation of new parties along ideological (revolution-versus-antirevolution) lines.¹³⁰ In order to secure the time needed to blunt Lacerda's popular lead, Magalhães successfully led the move to extend Castelo Branco's mandate to March 15, 1967, thereby postponing the election for one year. At the same time, he was able to persuade the Minas Gerais assembly to extend his own mandate for twelve months so that he might use the prestige of the governor's office in his presidential campaign.

Magalhães Pinto attempted to justify these acts as the efforts of an experienced politician in tutoring the politically inexperienced army general, but Castelo Branco was not receptive to the fatherly counsel of Magalhães. Castelo reluctantly accepted the extension of his term of office, but throughout his first year in office he refused to agree to the other measures that Magalhães wanted. By April, 1965, Magalhães had become almost hostile toward Castelo Branco because of the President's vacillation about a total overhaul of the party structure, because of Castelo's refusal to postpone the 1965 gubernatorial elections, and because the government was doing nothing to aid Magalhães in his UDN leadership struggle with Lacerda, in spite of the fact that

¹³⁰ Ibid., 30 April 1964, p. 4.

Lacerda was becoming extremely critical of the revolutionary regime.¹³¹

Magalhães never officially broke with the revolutionary regime, but from April through September of 1965 he repeatedly suggested that the revolution needed collective leadership in an apparent effort to dilute Castelo Branco's authority. Magalhães also tried to demonstrate his political power by working for the election of his relatively unknown political lieutenant, Roberto Resende, as governor of Minas Gerais. If successful, this would have proved that Magalhães was personally able to persuade the Minas Gerais electorate to accept a political unknown.

Both attempts failed and Resende's defeat so embarrassed Magalhães that, for a short time, he joined Lacerda in open opposition to the leadership of Castelo Branco.¹³² Magalhães was careful, however, to limit his opposition to discrete criticism of Castelo Branco; and, in spite of the

¹³¹Ibid., 16 April 1965, p. 6. The government had insisted upon maintaining its democratic image by sponsoring Constitutional Amendment No. 13 of April 8, 1965. The amendment was directed at establishing simultaneous elections for all offices, but it also affirmed that the gubernatorial elections for Minas Gerais, Guanabara, and nine other states would be held in October, 1965, as originally scheduled. Ibid., 9 April 1965, p. 4.

¹³²Carlos Castello Branco, "Coluna do Castello," Ibid., 9 October 1965, p. 4. It has been argued that Castelo Branco's main goal in the 1965 elections was to destroy the political reputations of Magalhães and Lacerda. If so, the tactics used--the acceptance of the unknown candidates and the creation of popular opposition martyrs--were successful although the results of the election also precipitated the "coup-within-a-coup" which firmly established Costa e Silva as Castelo Branco's successor. See Schneider, pp. 163, 169.

fact that his presidential aspirations had been destroyed, he managed to secure the position of Foreign Minister in the Costa e Silva government.

No other man in the revolutionary circle of April, 1964, either civilian or military, held better credentials as an opponent of the previous regime than Carlos Lacerda. Lacerda had been an active, articulate, and continuous critic of Getúlio Vargas and his political heirs from Vargas' election in 1950 through the March 31, 1964, coup. At the time of the coup, Lacerda, along with Juscelino Kubitschek, was one of the front-running candidates for the 1965 presidential election so his strategy was to direct the revolution toward a military caretaker government, which would clear the way for his election in 1965. The purges of April through June of 1964 removed some of the potential opponents, such as Miguel Arrais and Leonel Brizzola. The chief threats remaining were Magalhães Pinto, Kubitschek (whose removal from the political scene was imminent), and Ademar de Barros.

The first obstacle placed in the way of Lacerda's bid for election was the July 19, 1964, constitutional amendment that extended Castelo Branco's term of office to March 15, 1967. Lacerda actively campaigned against the amendment, and, even after that effort was unsuccessful, he encouraged Castelo Branco to refuse the extension.¹³³ Castelo's refusal to take Lacerda's advice on this matter and the

¹³³Jornal do Brasil, 19 July 1964, p. 3.

ever-increasing independence of the President and his group of ESG técnicos led Lacerda to take a position in opposition to the regime's interpretation of the revolution. At the UDN convention, which nominated him as the party's presidential candidate, Lacerda declared that his platform would be "a true consolidation of the revolution."¹³⁴ Having won the UDN nomination over Magalhães Pinto, Lacerda again seemed to have the situation well in hand. Kubitschek had lost his political rights; Ademar de Barros had little strength outside of São Paulo and would probably be vetoed by the military because of his shady reputation if he seriously sought the presidency; and Magalhães Pinto, if he wished to join the fray, would have to unseat Lacerda or find another party banner to run under.

Lacerda's chief concern after his nomination seemed to be the threat of continuismo by Castelo Branco so he began to criticize the policies of Castelo Branco as being evidence of a betrayal of the revolution.¹³⁵ By pressing the attack, Lacerda apparently believed that he could prevent further extension of Castelo Branco's term of office and, also, that he could maintain his identity with the revolution while disassociating himself from the unpopular

¹³⁴Ibid., 11 November 1964, p. 3. Even though the election had been postponed for one year, Lacerda insisted upon holding the nominating convention as scheduled.

¹³⁵For a sample of the type of attacks which Lacerda aimed at Castelo Branco and his ministers, especially Planning Minister Roberto Campos, see the analysis of the 30-page manifesto sent to Castelo Branco on May 25, 1965, in Jornal do Brasil, 26 May 1965, p. 4.

austerity measures of the regime. As proof of the popularity of his interpretation of what the revolution should be, Lacerda, like Magalhães Pinto in Minas Gerais, tried to secure the election of a political unknown as governor of Guanabara. Lacerda overestimated the ability of the Guanabara electorate to distinguish between the two interpretations of the revolution, and his candidate was soundly defeated by the cautious moderate that the government's maneuvers had forced upon the opposition.

Following the defeat of his candidate, Lacerda again attacked Castelo Branco for political and economic insensitivity, and he appealed to the military to give the nation a new leader who could save the revolution.¹³⁶ The military responded to this appeal during the post-electoral crisis, but the leader was General Costa e Silva and not Carlos Lacerda. Following the crisis and the emergence of Costa e Silva, Lacerda continued his "campaign" even though his political reputation was severely damaged. His problems were compounded because he no longer had a political party after AI-2 abolished the existing parties. According to one student of Brazilian politics, this part of AI-2 was aimed specifically at Lacerda since the UDN was to hold a convention in November to reconfirm Lacerda as its presidential candidate.¹³⁷

¹³⁶Ibid., 8 October 1965, p. 5; and 9 October 1965, p. 3.

¹³⁷Sousa Sampaio, "Perfil Eleitoral de Bahia--1966," p. 118.

The abolition of the old parties put Lacerda in a bad position. The government would not invite him and his followers to join ARENA; and he would obviously be quite uncomfortable (if not unwelcome) in the opposition group, which was composed of the PSD and PTB politicians whom he had vociferously opposed throughout most of his political life. Unable to establish a third party because of the legal requirements of AC-4 and with the November, 1966, legislative elections imminent, Lacerda quietly encouraged his followers to join the opposition MDB even though the Guanabara segment of the party strongly objected to the acceptance of the Lacerdistas.¹³⁸

By mid-1966 Lacerda had been totally rebuffed by the leadership of the revolution, which was, at that time, coalescing around General Costa e Silva. Since he could not participate from within the revolution, Lacerda decided to organize a broad-front opposition group, called the Frente Ampla, to counterpoint his position to the regime. The Frente Ampla was to include all those clearly outside the system--such as Lacerda, Quadros, Kubitschek, Brizzola, and Goulart--and their supporters, plus many politicians who had joined the government party but were unhappy with the policies or the military dominance of the government. On October 27, 1966, Lacerda issued a long-awaited Frente Ampla manifesto, without the signatures of either Goulart or Kubitschek, charging the government with economic

¹³⁸Jornal do Brasil, 12 August 1966, p. 4.

subservience to the United States and with the use of neo-fascist tactics against opposition forces.¹³⁹

Negotiations directed toward the creation of the Frente Ampla continued throughout 1967 but were confronted by many problems. Foremost was the problem of finding a way in which such diverse political figures--Lacerda, Goulart, Quadros, and Kubitschek--could accommodate each other's interests and ambitions and share leadership in the proposed organization. Second was the problem of the MDB. To be a strong political force, the Frente Ampla would need to attract many MDB politicians, but the already established MDB leaders declared that their party would not join the Frente Ampla but would accept it into MDB ranks.¹⁴⁰ Third, there was the ever-present aspect of government scrutiny. The revolutionary regime made use of official statements and unofficial warnings of what might happen to Kubitschek, Quadros, and Goulart--who had all been deprived of their

¹³⁹Ibid., 28 October 1966, p. 3. Lacerda claimed that the government had threatened to confiscate the property and harass the families and friends of Kubitschek, Goulart, and other potential allies if they joined Lacerda. There was some truth to this charge, but the wait-and-see attitude concerning the future regime of Costa e Silva and the fact that, even if the existing party organization laws could be overcome (a doubtful proposition), there was no guarantee that the government would not decree new impediments, made politicians unwilling to risk the unknown. See also O Estado de São Paulo, 8 January 1967, p. 3.

¹⁴⁰Carlos Castello Branco, "Coluna do Castello," Jornal do Brasil, 26 March 1967, p. 4.

political rights--if they spoke of politics or joined a political group.¹⁴¹

In spite of the numerous problems, the Frente Ampla formally declared itself constituted, following a meeting of Lacerda, Kubitschek, and many Goulart supporters on September 4, 1967. This sudden success prompted increased government scrutiny of the leaders' activities and a warning by President Costa e Silva that, although he would use politics against politics, he would use force against subversion, a description which he said might apply to the activities of the Frente Ampla.¹⁴²

The warning was effective, and the leaders dropped their active opposition to the government and tried to persuade the regime to accept the Frente Ampla as part of a grand coalition. The regime would not surrender any authority, and Lacerda returned to active opposition. His attacks, coupled with a proposal by an MDB leader that the MDB and F.A. unite for a street campaign to generate popular support,¹⁴³ precipitated a call to action by the hard-line

¹⁴¹See O Estado de São Paulo, 7 July 1967, p. 3; O Globo, 5 July 1967, p. 2; or Jornal do Brasil, 7 September 1967, p. 7; and 9 September 1967, p. 4, for examples of the pressures applied.

¹⁴²Jornal do Brasil, 6 October 1967, p. 3. Costa e Silva also began an attempt to better his relations with ARENA congressmen in an effort to encourage dissidents to stay in the government party rather than go to the F.A.

¹⁴³Ibid., 9 January 1968, p. 3. This would have been only a temporary marriage of convenience prompted by the need of the MDB for some political personalities to help the opposition party in the municipal elections which were

military and led to a full-fledged crisis when Lacerda visited São Paulo on January 27, 1968. Even though the entire army and some air force units had been put on alert prior to Lacerda's arrival in São Paulo, he continued his assault by attacking what he called an illegitimate marriage of oligarchy to the military.¹⁴⁴ Surprisingly enough, the military leaders limited their action to a show of force.¹⁴⁵

The military demonstration had the effect of quieting F.A. activity for a while, but Lacerda maintained his one-man offensive¹⁴⁶ until the increasing student unrest during the autumn months of 1968 precipitated government action against the Frente Ampla. On April 5 Justice Minister Gama e Silva issued an order prohibiting meetings, parades, marches, or any other activity by the Frente Ampla, under threat of deprivation of political rights or fines and

scheduled for late 1968. The MDB had very little organizational strength on the municipal level.

¹⁴⁴Ibid., 28 January 1968, p. 18.

¹⁴⁵For the best coverage of this rather mysterious affair, see O Estado de São Paulo, 25-30 January 1968. Military spokesmen alternately called it a routine training exercise and an alert against a vast subversive plot only recently discovered. O Estado de São Paulo, 31 January 1968, p. 3, editorialized that the maneuvers were (1) part of a show of force by Costa e Silva to quiet demands for cabinet changes; (2) part of a show of force by Costa e Silva to intimidate Lacerda and the rest of the opposition; (3) part of a show of force by the military to persuade Costa e Silva to refuse the demands of ARENA politicians for cabinet changes; or (4) a demonstration of power to keep Quadros from joining the F.A.

¹⁴⁶In a speech on March 15, 1968, he likened the military regime to the post-bellum KKK in the U.S. because of the substitution of the sword for the law. Jornal do Brasil, 16 March 1968, p. 4.

imprisonment.¹⁴⁷ Lacerda, with a stroke of bravado, promptly pronounced the Frente dead and declared União Popular into existence, but more than a name change was needed to revive the movement. Lacerda and his nascent organization had been declared subversive; and, in the increasing climate of political repression and uncertainty caused by the student demonstrations, most of the less courageous politicians deserted the sinking ship. Lacerda lost his political rights shortly after the December, 1968, crisis. Thus, the revolutionary regime formally put to rest the demands for participation of the most persistent civilian revolutionary and ensured that the allowable political participation would be exercised through approved channels.

Control of Participation by Congressional Politicians

As the revolutionary regime consolidated its power through extension of the executive authority vis-à-vis the legislative branch between April, 1964, and October, 1969, many of the politicians who had jumped on the revolutionary bandwagon accepted the demise of congressional power with little or no objection. These people did, however, expect some possibility of participation in the decision-making process of the regime in return for their support of regime policies. Such participation was not allowed, apparently because the military people surrounding Castelo Branco and

¹⁴⁷Ibid., 6 April 1968, p. 3. The government justified the action by declaring that the F.A. was a source of agitation and subversion.

Costa e Silva had absolutely no confidence in the discretion and the ability of politicians, be they proregime or anti-regime.

Prior to October, 1965, the Castelo Branco government had experienced difficulties with Congress, but it had managed to secure passage of most of its programs. Working through the Bloco Revolucionário Parlamentar--a coalition of UDN, PSD, and small-party politicians--the regime had allowed its proposals to be modified in a limited manner, and, thus, the politicians were able to play a reduced role in the policy-formulation process. But as the economic austerity began to increase popular dissent, some politicians began to articulate the dissent and to demand some authoritative role. To back up their demands they withdrew their support of the regime.

The first real showdown followed the October 3, 1965, gubernatorial elections. Military dissatisfaction with the elections led to the October 5 military crisis; the result of which was that Castelo Branco was forced to take a hard line against political opposition by extending his presidential powers. Congress was then asked to approve a constitutional amendment which would have allowed the federal government to intervene actively in state politics. This amendment and two others pertaining to the maintenance of national security were justified by Justice Minister Juraci Magalhães as measures needed "to save democracy," measures for which the government would accept no substitutes or

modifications.¹⁴⁸ The government's congressional bloc disintegrated when the pro-Lacerda members of the UDN and some of the progovernment PSD politicians refused to give their usual support to the government proposals. The failure of Congress to deliver its support resulted in the issuance of AI-2 and, thus, cost the politicians far more than they had been asked to surrender voluntarily.¹⁴⁹

Among other things, AI-2 abolished the existing political parties, and the subsequent complementary acts authorized the formation of the two-party, government-and-opposition, system. This system was apparently designed to organize and discipline government support and perhaps, in the hopes of progovernment politicians, to provide a channel through which the legislators could play an active political role. The congressional politicians were disappointed and, in some measure, so was the revolutionary government.

President Castelo Branco had secured passage in 1964 and 1965 of much of the reform legislation he considered necessary, and, with the changes wrought by AI-2, he had little need to solicit the support of Congress during the first half of 1966. The congressional politicians during this period, however, were becoming anxious about their electoral futures--the Arenistas because the lack of popularity of the government might spawn a rejection of progovernment incumbents in the November elections and the MDB

¹⁴⁸Jornal do Brasil, 21 October 1965, p. 3.

¹⁴⁹Ibid., 28 October 1965, pp. 3-4.

people because the manipulation of electoral rules would make their own electoral success quite improbable.

This discontent became manifest on July 22, 1966, when the MDB politicians, with the aid of a few ARENA politicians, were able to convoke by petition a special session of Congress to investigate the voidance of the mandates of several Rio Grande do Sul state deputies.¹⁵⁰ The government was successful in blocking action for a few days by preventing a quorum, but the special session finally began on July 26 to hear the government's action defended by various officials and finally by the Justice Minister.¹⁵¹ Little satisfaction was gained, however, and rumors of more purges of federal and state legislators and hints of a new constitution promulgated by a revolutionary decree caused more anxiety.

The growing air of crisis, getting only a brief respite with the election of Costa e Silva on October 3, prompted many ARENA congressional politicians to plead for a moratorium on the use of the purge against legislators. Nevertheless, President Castelo Branco signed a decree on October 12 voiding the mandates of six federal deputies. The President's refusal to respect the integrity of Congress led to a

¹⁵⁰Ibid., 23 July 1966, p. 3. The reason for the cassações, as discussed earlier, was to ensure the election of the ARENA gubernatorial candidate.

¹⁵¹O Estado de São Paulo, 28 July 1966, p. 3; and 10 August 1966, p. 5.

contest of will between Castelo Branco and Adauto Cardoso and ultimately to the forced recess of Congress.

The process by which the 1967 Constitution was approved has already been briefly described. It is, however, necessary to repeat the fact that the timetable prescribed by AI-4, the simultaneous presentation of the controversial Press Law, and the no-alteration instructions issued to the ARENA congressional leadership by the revolutionary regime did not allow the congressional politicians to defend their own institutional interests nor those of their constituencies. The refusal of the revolutionary regime to allow any significant representation of interests in the consideration of the constitution caused 106 ARENA deputies to author a manifesto denouncing the method by which the document was being forced upon the legislative politicians.¹⁵² The government's lack of concern for the feelings of the members of its congressional majority is evident in Raimundo Padilha, ARENA vice-leader for the Camara. Padilha stated that the manifesto presented by the dissidents was a romantic gesture which did not interest him. He was only interested in their votes, which were positive.¹⁵³

¹⁵²This manifesto has been reprinted in Pereira, pp. 344-345.

¹⁵³Estado de São Paulo, 24 January 1967, p. 3. Padilha, a former Integralista who became governor of Rio de Janeiro in 1971, went on to state that the new constitution represented the general will of Congress and, thus, of the people because 95 percent of the MDB congressmen collaborated in the labors (though in a generally negative manner) and many MDB amendments were included in the 343 amendments (out of 884 proposed) that were incorporated in the new

The numerical success of ARENA in the November, 1966, legislative elections, the generally positive orientation toward the prospects of a "humanized" revolution as promised by President-elect Costa e Silva, and the absence of any major issues which Congress would be forced to confront¹⁵⁴ led many congressional politicians to hope that in 1967 Congress might be able to present a united front in pressing for more of a role in policy formulation.

Indeed, the very inactivity and indecisiveness of Costa e Silva during his first months in office should have offered the legislators a good opportunity to expand their role,¹⁵⁵ but the congressional politicians occupied themselves with discussions and maneuvers concerning the Frente Ampla and with the faction fight within ARENA as to who was the president of Congress. Under the 1946 Constitution the elected president of the Senate was also the president of Congress, but the 1967 Constitution created some ambiguity. The vice-president of the Republic was designated president of Congress by the charter, but the document also declared that the two houses of Congress would establish their own internal organizations with the Senate leadership presiding

charter (Ibid.). For an account of the charter adoption procedure, see James W. Rowe, "Brazil Stops the Clock, Part II: The New Constitution and the New Model," American Universities Field Staff Reports, XIII (March, 1967), 1-6.

¹⁵⁴This was due primarily to the flood of reforming decree-laws issued by Castelo Branco in his last few weeks in power.

¹⁵⁵Schneider, pp. 211-213.

over joint sessions.¹⁵⁶ Vice-President Pedro Aleixo and Senate President Auro de Moura Andrade thus engaged themselves in a sterile and somewhat ludicrous struggle for the office until Congress finally changed its internal rules on August 10, 1967, in order to clear the way for Aleixo.¹⁵⁷

Except for some demands to limit the use of presidential decrees and to liberalize the constitution,¹⁵⁸ there was little effort to increase the role of Congress while the attention of most of the politicians was focused on the Aleixo-Moura problem. Even the extremely severe National Security Law that was decreed by Castelo Branco on March 11, 1967, was largely ignored by the politicians during this period¹⁵⁹ as was an indirect invitation by Costa e Silva, delivered through an ARENA deputy, for Congress to discuss alteration of several of Castelo Branco's decree-laws.¹⁶⁰

By the time the congressmen had solved their problem over who would be the president of Congress, the increased

¹⁵⁶See Pereira, pp. 418, 474.

¹⁵⁷Jornal do Brasil, 18 April 1967, p. 3; and 11 August 1967, p. 3.

¹⁵⁸Ibid., 1 June 1967, p. 6; and 17 June 1967, p. 4.

¹⁵⁹The National Security Law, which defined the responsibilities of Brazilian citizens and authorized military punishment for various vaguely defined acts against internal and external security, was vigorously denounced by several MDB politicians, many lawyers, and even the president of the Superior Tribunal Militar. Ibid., 16 March 1967, p. 3.

¹⁶⁰Deputy Ernani Satiro, ARENA leader for the Câmara, said that no government official would initiate action to alter Castelo Branco's laws, but that Costa e Silva would not object to such initiative by Congress. Ibid., 7 April 1967, p. 3.

activity of the Frente Ampla, increased opposition by students and the Catholic left, plus general criticism of the government's lack of positive leadership had pushed President Costa e Silva to a more defensive and uncompromising position. It was at this time that the congressional politicians chose to attempt to secure an active role for Congress by refusing, in October and November of 1967, to approve several of Costa e Silva's decree-laws and by almost approving an MDB-sponsored constitutional amendment to restore direct elections.¹⁶¹ Besides this, about half of the ARENA congressmen joined those of the MDB to vote in favor of a special session of Congress, to be held in January and February of 1968, against the strong opposition of Costa e Silva.¹⁶²

The special session of Congress began in a mood of challenge similar to that which existed when the regular session adjourned in November, but a new issue had been added by a decree which was to create a new internal security organization under the head of the President's military household.¹⁶³ While Congress was debating this issue, it was revealed that the National Security Council was preparing a decree-law that would destroy the political autonomy of 234 strategically located municípios because of their importance to national security. This provoked immediate

¹⁶¹Ibid., 10 December 1967, p. 3.

¹⁶²O Estado de São Paulo, 17 November 1967, p. 1.

¹⁶³Ibid., 11 January 1968, p. 3.

cries of militarization from the opposition politicians and left the ARENA congressmen silently bewildered because they had not been consulted and also because many of the areas affected were ARENA strongholds.¹⁶⁴

The município issue had the effect of exacerbating the already significant conflict between military and civilian elements within the revolutionary regime and its political party. The widespread dissatisfaction among ARENA politicians with the refusal of the government to allow them a role in the decision-making process caused many supposedly loyal politicians to call for a complete overhaul of the revolutionary government. On February 12, 1968, ARENA Deputy Raimundo Bogea proposed a constitutional amendment that would have granted a general amnesty to all those punished by the revolution and would have called a constitutional convention to write a new charter. Bogea said that the 1964 revolution had performed an invaluable service; but its successor regime was weakening the federal system, intimidating Congress, blocking the judiciary, and frustrating the politically active sectors of the population.¹⁶⁵ The hard line of the military reacted negatively to this because the officers felt that such action would allow

¹⁶⁴ Jornal do Brasil, 6 February 1968, p. 7. Many loyalist politicians argued that it was just bad politics to abolish local political activity in areas that served as support bases for ARENA politicians.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 13 February 1968, p. 3.

corrupt and subversive elements to infiltrate the government.¹⁶⁶

The general refusal of the revolutionary regime to allow the politicians any meaningful participation made difficult the passage of government-sponsored legislation in both the special session and the regular session of Congress that began in March. During the special session the ARENA congressional leaders, on orders from President Costa e Silva, had to resort to preventing a quorum so that some decree-laws could not be voted upon and thus defeated.¹⁶⁷ This parliamentary tactic was also used to secure approval of the decree that voided the autonomy of the strategic municípios. The congressional outcry had been successful in persuading the National Security Council to reduce the number of municípios from 234 to sixty-eight before the decree-law was presented to the Congress, but the opposition was still very strong. On the day before the time limit expired, ARENA leaders had to guard the doors to the Câmara in order to prevent a quorum, a vote, and certain defeat.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁶ O Estado de São Paulo, 15 February 1968, p. 4.

¹⁶⁷ Jornal do Brasil, 16 February 1968, p. 3. Article 58 of the 1967 Constitution authorized the president to issue decree-laws on matters of national security and public finance, subject to subsequent approval of Congress. Congress was required to approve or reject the decree-law (no amendments were allowed) within sixty days. If Congress did not act within the time limit, automatic approval was assumed. Thus, by preventing a vote which would have meant defeat for some of Costa e Silva's decrees, the time limit expired and automatic approval was granted.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 29 May 1968, p. 3.

In the second year of Costa e Silva's administration, the legislative politicians made a more forceful effort to gain a participatory role in the political system, but in the end were not even able to protect the integrity of Congress. Government party leaders, torn between the often contradictory goals of maintaining amicable contacts with the revolutionary regime, on the one hand, and protecting their institution from the attacks from the linha dura, on the other hand, were unable to keep either the favor of the government by controlling ARENA party members or to avoid the closure of Congress following the December, 1968, crisis. This last effort of the legislative politicians to secure a position for themselves must be discussed in conjunction with the repression of demands for participation coming from the student sector of Brazilian society.

Repression of Students and Politicians

Prior to the spring of 1968, the military regime had attempted to limit the expression of demands through legislative politicians by the control mechanisms of purging outspoken critics, restricting the electoral process, and using a government-versus-opposition party system to maintain discipline. By late 1968 it became apparent that these control mechanisms were no longer sufficient to limit demands. The congressional politicians accepted the example of the students and began to challenge the regime in a very open manner. It was then necessary to repress both groups

in order to prevent the expression of demands to which the regime could not or would not respond in a positive fashion.

Although the university students of Brazil are drawn primarily from the middle sector of Brazilian society, their limited numbers, their status, and especially their role perception of themselves as the national conscience, disqualify them for treatment as members of a middle-sector group.¹⁶⁹ The autonomy, activism, and coherence of student groups allowed the students to exert great influence on the political system; but the interests represented were utopian and universal rather than immediate and particular; and the weapons used were ideas and dreams. As the self-appointed conscience of the nation, the students often expressed not only their own demands, but also the demands of the disadvantaged and unfortunate who could not speak for themselves. This naturally led to a conflict with the regime.

Like other social forces, the Brazilian university students were organized along corporatist lines during the Estado Nôvo period, but the national organization, União Nacional dos Estudantes (UNE), and many of the regional organizations were not placed under the usual controls (such as budgetary allocation and leadership selection procedures) by the government ministry, even though the government provided financial support.¹⁷⁰ As a result the

¹⁶⁹See Schneider, pp. 85-87; and Robert O. Myhr, "The University Student Tradition in Brazil," Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, XII (January, 1970), 126-130.

¹⁷⁰Schmitter, pp. 205-206.

UNE became a well-organized, independent, and often radical force that articulated demands for the resolution of a variety of national problems, and it served as one of the major supports for President Goulart prior to the revolution.¹⁷¹

Following the March 31, 1964, coup d'état, the national headquarters building of the UNE was burned, and most of the student leaders were arrested or driven into exile. The revolutionary regime then secured passage of the Lei Suplicy, which was intended to bring the students under control. The law removed the UNE's legal monopoly (and thus its financial support) over student organization and replaced it with the Directório Nacional Estudantil (DNE), which was equipped with the normal corporatist control mechanisms.¹⁷² To the surprise of the government officials, the UNE, even without legal sanction and financial support, remained a viable organization; and a vast majority of students gave it their support rather than the DNE, despite numerous sanctions which were designed to force students into the DNE.

In December, 1965, the government, using powers authorized by AI-2, formally abolished and made illegal the UNE because of its alleged "subversive" character.¹⁷³

¹⁷¹Schneider, p. 87.

¹⁷²Schmitter, p. 206; and Sulamita de Britto, "A Juventude Universitária e a Política," Cadernos Brasileiros, No. 48 (July/August, 1968), 5-11. The law got its name by the fact that it was written and subsequently enforced by Flávio Suplicy de Lacerda, the Minister of Education in Castelo Branco's cabinet.

¹⁷³Sulamita de Britto, pp. 15-16.

Abolition of the UNE did not abolish radical activity, nor did President Costa e Silva's promise to establish better relations with the students. The change of administrations had little effect upon the student-versus-government conflict, basically because Tarso Dutra, the Minister of Education in Costa e Silva's cabinet, was generally unresponsive to student demands. The feud simmered during 1967 only to break out in a full-fledged conflagration in late March of 1968.

The major clash in March began over a seemingly trivial matter, but the mutual animosity of the students and the military officers soon forced a series of major confrontations. The students of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro had been unhappy with the Education Ministry for its refusal to modify the Suplicy Law and for the failure of the ministry to allocate funds for improvement of University services. In specific, a remodeling process for the students' restaurant was stopped because the ministry would not release the money already designated for the project, and as a result only a small portion of the restaurant was in service. On March 28, 1968, a group of students were meeting in the restaurant to plan a protest march when the military police decided to break up the "subversive" group. The unarmed students resisted and one student was shot dead by an officer, who said later that his own life had been in danger.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁴Jornal do Brasil, 31 March 1968, p. 32.

The killing of the student, Edson Luis, immediately sparked student riots in Rio; and, in the following days, sympathy demonstrations by student and proletarian groups took place throughout Brazil. The government's response in Rio and elsewhere was total repression of the demonstrations by police and military units. Thousands of students were injured and thousands more were arrested.¹⁷⁵ The extremity of the government's response was harshly criticized throughout Brazil and especially in Congress by both ARENA and MDB politicians. This criticism in turn brought a warning by SNI Chief Médici¹⁷⁶ that congressional immunity pertained only to words, opinions, and votes, not acts, and only in the Câmara and Senate.¹⁷⁷ In addition, rumors began to circulate concerning a new institutional act to halt criticism by the politicians who the hard-line officers believed were taking advantage of the crisis and expanding it.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁵Ibid., 2 April 1968, p. 6; 3 April 1968, p. 17; and 5 April 1968, p. 7. One incident that took place outside of Rio's Candelária Cathedral is indicative of the regime's disinterest in seeking any accommodation with the students. The students had been gathered around the church for a special mass for the dead Edson Luis. They were suddenly surrounded and systematically beaten by military policemen without being given a chance to disperse.

¹⁷⁶The Serviço Nacional de Informação was created shortly after the 1964 coup to serve as a semi-secret governmental intelligence organization for political and security matters.

¹⁷⁷Jornal do Brasil, 2 April 1968, p. 6.

¹⁷⁸Carlos Castello Branco, "Coluna do Castello," Ibid., 5 April 1968, p. 4.

The crisis was finally brought under control in April when the government promised to release, without charges, most of the arrested students and to investigate the problems within the Education Ministry. Although the investigation resulted in the dismissal of many Ministry officials, Tarso Dutra, the focal point for student action, was retained and the funds demanded were not released. Thus on June 19, new student demonstrations took place in Rio de Janeiro and spread to other cities, meeting the same harsh response as before.¹⁷⁹ By this time many ARENA politicians were pleading with the revolutionary regime to dismiss several cabinet members whom they described as incompetent. At the top of the list was Tarso Dutra.¹⁸⁰

President Costa e Silva would not fire any of his ministers, but he did agree to meet with students; and the government temporarily ceased its effort to prevent student marches. This gave the appearance of restored tranquility.¹⁸¹ Such concessions to subversive elements were not well received by the military hard line, which was demanding a state of siege and a new institutional act, especially since the MDB had succeeded in calling a special session of Congress and thereby had given politicians a safe podium from which they could criticize the regime. Apparently as a

¹⁷⁹O Estado de São Paulo, 22 June 1968, p. 1; and 26 June 1968, p. 3.

¹⁸⁰Jornal do Brasil, 26 June 1968, p. 16.

¹⁸¹Ibid., 4 July 1968, p. 6.

result of these demands, on July 5 the Justice Minister again prohibited protest marches.¹⁸² The National Security Council maintained the ban on marches in spite of the strong criticism by almost every ideological grouping in Congress that the government was relying on force instead of discussion and reform.¹⁸³

The congressional politicians were impotent to act in this continuing crisis because they were caught between the students and the military officers, and neither group gave any legitimacy to Congress. The ARENA politicians were able to express their dislike of the government's method for dealing with the students and other matters, however; and they did this on August 6 by allowing urgent debate on an MDB-sponsored bill that would have granted amnesty to the students and laborers involved in the recent crises.¹⁸⁴ The government maintained sufficient control over the ARENA politicians to prevent passage of the bill, but consideration of the bill was an open act of defiance.

During the first week of August, the government instituted a campaign to stop student demonstrations by conducting a massive roundup of student leaders. The arrests of these leaders, among whom the most popular and famous was Vladimir Palmeira, maintained a high level of

¹⁸²O Estado de São Paulo, 6 July 1968, p. 3.

¹⁸³Jornal do Brasil, 18 July 1968, p. 3.

¹⁸⁴Ibid., 7 August 1968, p. 6. Because of a strike in São Paulo in June and July, many laborers had been arrested.

student-military conflict throughout the month of August. In addition, the use of terrorist tactics by both left-wing and right-wing groups was on the increase.¹⁸⁵ Finally, the invasion of the University of Brasília and the indiscriminate use of clubs, tear gas, and rifle butts against students, professors, reporters, and interested onlookers alike, precipitated the final test between Congress and the military.¹⁸⁶

The invasion of the University of Brasília caused Márcio Moreira Alves, an outspoken young MDB deputy from Guanabara, to denounce the military and to propose a boycott against militarism. In speeches before the Câmara, Alves denounced the military leaders as torturers and asked Brazilians to shun military activities and personnel.¹⁸⁷ The response to Márcio Alves was a demand by the military hard line for sterner measures against the opposition and rumors of a possible right-wing military coup.¹⁸⁸ Even though the entire governmental structure at this time was unable to take decisive action, the linha dura did not make

¹⁸⁵For analysis of the various groups engaging in terrorist activities, see O Estado de São Paulo, 15 October 1968 p. 6.

¹⁸⁶Jornal do Brasil, 31 August 1968, p. 4. Some of the onlookers who were beaten and gassed were politicians who, upon hearing of the invasion, had rushed to the university to keep their sons and daughters out of the melee.

¹⁸⁷Ibid., 12 October 1968, p. 3.

¹⁸⁸Ibid., 15 October 1968, p. 6. Correio da Manhã, 6 September 1968, p. 4, reported that it had information concerning a coup in preparation.

a serious attempt to take over the government, presumably because the military lacked the unity required to execute a coup.

Despite rumors that Congress was to be shut down, Costa e Silva insisted that the pretense of democracy be maintained. On October 4, the President stated that "the legislative power will disappear only when I am eliminated";¹⁸⁹ and, as if to prove his faith in the constitutional system, the Justice Minister notified the congressional leaders that the government would ask Congress to suspend the legislative immunity of Márcio Alves so that he could be formally tried for defaming a national institution.¹⁹⁰ As the eyes of the nation turned to Congress for the disposition of the Márcio Alves matter, the crisis continued. On October 12, the military police broke up an illegal UNE convention in São Paulo.¹⁹¹ This was followed by more student rioting and by various acts of terrorism by both the extreme right and the extreme left. The situation was one of mutual fear and distrust by all the major groups, a crisis that the leaders of the Confederation of Commercial Associations declared could only be solved by resolute and just action by the President. President Costa e Silva agreed with the business leaders but said that the demands of the students,

¹⁸⁹Jornal do Brasil, 5 October 1968, p. 3.

¹⁹⁰Ibid., 10 October 1968, p. 4.

¹⁹¹O Estado de São Paulo, 13 October 1968, p. 1.

clergymen, and politicians, even if just, could not be met without time-consuming preparation.¹⁹²

When the revolutionary regime decided to ask the Câmara for license to try Márcio Alves, few Brazilians believed that the politicians would refuse the military's request, and it was perhaps this confidence which prompted Costa e Silva to promise that the regime would honor the Câmara's decision.¹⁹³ The initial confidence faded quickly as the Câmara began work on the controversy in early November. The MDB deputies were solidly against granting license as were several ARENA deputies, specifically those on the Justice Commission, which had to act on the request before it could go to the Camara. On November 21, ARENA leaders postponed a vote by the Commission in order to avoid defeat.¹⁹⁴ The party leaders then removed nine ARENA deputies from the Justice Commission and replaced them with nine others who had promised to vote in favor of granting the government license to try Alves.¹⁹⁵ The MDB members then began a series of parliamentary tactics, including a filibuster, to block Commission action.

The government's heavy-handed treatment of the Justice Commission won the battle but caused the regime to lose the

¹⁹²Jornal do Brasil, 26 October 1968, p. 4; and 1 November 1968, p. 3.

¹⁹³O Estado de São Paulo, 24 October 1968, p. 3.

¹⁹⁴Jornal do Brasil, 22 November 1968, p. 3.

¹⁹⁵Ibid., 28 November 1968, p. 3.

war since it convinced many ARENA deputies that the government really was not willing to accept the free decision of the Câmara. MDB delaying tactics had prevented a vote by the Justice Commission before the regular legislative session, and the government was forced to call an unwanted special session. On December 2, President Costa e Silva made a plea to ARENA congressmen for national interest and party discipline over personal convictions,¹⁹⁶ but the act was insufficient and too late. The rebellion within ARENA was such that four of the designated replacements refused to accept seats on the Justice Commission so as not to violate the promise of an affirmative vote.¹⁹⁷

On December 4, the President once again promised that the government would not use exceptional measures to solve a legal or constitutional problem; and the Army Minister, Lira Távora, officially recognized the sovereignty of the Câmara. Given these promises of noninterference, the MDB cut short its filibuster by canceling some eighty speakers who had been scheduled to testify before the Commission.¹⁹⁸ On December 10 the Justice Commission voted 19-12 to grant

¹⁹⁶O Estado de Sao Paulo, 3 December 1968, p. 3.

¹⁹⁷Jornal do Brasil, 4 December 1968, p. 3.

¹⁹⁸Ibid., 5 December 1968, p. 3. The remark by General Lira Távora received such praise from MDB politicians that he felt it necessary to clarify the statement by saying that the autonomy of one institution must be respected, but that such autonomy could not be used to protect someone who would abuse another institution. Ibid., 7 December 1968, p. 3.

license to try Márcio Alves, but the success of the moment was marred by the resignation of all ten of the MDB members of the Commission and the resignation of the Commission president, Djalma Marinho. In the process of resigning, Marinho delivered a strong denunciation of the government's tactics.¹⁹⁹

The speech by Djalma Marinho buried any remaining chance for the approval of the bill to remove Márcio Alves' immunity. On December 12, the Câmara denied the license by a vote of 216 to 141, with ninety-four ARENA deputies voting against the government. Following the government's defeat, the politicians were overcome with a combination of euphoria and fear, with some hoping against hope that the revolutionary regime would take the defeat as evidence that there should be some division of authority and some responsiveness to expressed demands. With such hope in mind, Manoel Vilça, a loyal ARENA senator, stated:

Rationalizing with a minimum of logic and beginning with the presupposition that the government will respect the rules of the democratic game, the consequences of such a serious defeat can only be, in the first place, the dismissal of the Minister of Justice for notorious and proven incompetence and, secondly, a

¹⁹⁹Ibid., 11 December 1968, p. 3. In his denunciation Marinho quoted Karl Manheim ("the true spirit of democracy lies in loyalty to generally accepted procedures"); Justice Black ("True democracy must have the confidence and courage to be free and must not ape totalitarian methods in fear"); and Gilberto Freyre ("It is easy to lead a party of slaves with only a whip, but a party of free men can only be led with ideas and convictions"). O Estado de São Paulo, 11 December 1968, p. 5.

political recomposition in depth, encompassing methods of action and the recruitment of a capable team.²⁰⁰

The revolutionary regime did not accept Senator Vilaça's rational logic. The course had been charted by the military hard line in September when they decided to accept nothing short of a military trial for Márcio Alves. President Costa e Silva was reported to have refused several compromise solutions, the latest one presented by ARENA President Krieger with the agreement of the MDB during the week prior to the crucial vote.²⁰¹ The President's reply to the last proposed compromise was a stern refusal accompanied by an allegorical warning: "The car finds itself on an incline. And descending with great speed. You gentlemen [the legislators] must try to brake it, and with dexterity, so that it does not hit the ravine."²⁰²

The ARENA politicians could not apply the brakes and the crisis came to a head. The regime--beset by student demands for more freedom, by labor demands for better wages, by politicians' demands for more participation, and by military demands for stronger control measures--repressed the students, the laborers, and the politicians. Demands must always be related to supports, and the group capable of providing the strongest immediate support (and conversely

²⁰⁰ O Estado de São Paulo, 13 December 1968, p. 3.

²⁰¹ Ibid., the last compromise presented would have suspended Márcio Alves for 120 days and promised a revision of Câmara rules to prevent future incidents.

²⁰² Quoted in Chagas, p. 126.

also the group that could most rapidly bring down the regime through a total withdrawal of support) was the military officer corps. The strong measures demanded by the officer corps were incorporated in AI-5, signed on December 13, 1968. By way of Complementary Act Number 38, issued simultaneously with AI-5, Congress was closed indefinitely.²⁰³

The military government's monopoly on coercive power had allowed it to consolidate a near monopoly over the control of political resources, and, while the leaders believed the quantity of resources to be insufficient to satisfy the inflated level of demands, they used coercion to repress the demands coming from many sectors. The revolutionaries used their monopoly of force to repress participation, as with the students, the congressional politicians, and the civilian revolutionaries, and to force participation into very narrowly confined and acceptable forms of activity, as with interest organizations and the electorate. By depoliticizing the society and thus limiting the demands for political goods, the regime apparently hoped to allow itself the time needed to create a stable reservoir of political capital that could be allocated at the regime's own rate of exchange for gradually expanding its support.

²⁰³Jornal do Brasil, 14 December 1968, p. 1. Congress did not reopen until it was called into session on October 22, 1969, to elect Emílio Garrastazu Médici as president.

CHAPTER VI

THE MAINTENANCE AND EXPANSION OF POLITICAL SUPPORT

In the political marketplace, the objective of the regime is to secure in exchange for some of its resources (goods and services, status, information, coercion, and authority) the sector resources (goods and services, status, information, no violence, and legitimacy) which will allow the regime to pursue its objectives. Of all the resources offered by the sectors, legitimacy (measured as allegiance and support) would appear to be the most important since the possession of legitimacy allows the regime to secure greater compliance for a given expenditure of its own resources.¹ Compliance, of course, may be enforced with sufficient power, but this may involve a significant expenditure of resources and may be detrimental in the long run to the effectiveness and stability of the leadership group.²

Acquiring legitimacy presents a dilemma for a regime. To achieve power the regime must supply benefits that make

¹Ilchman and Uphoff, p. 86.

²Blau, pp. 201-202.

the sectors dependent upon the regime while remaining somewhat indifferent to services which may be offered in return. To make its power legitimate, however, the regime must attempt to earn the approval of the sectors, and this means it must forswear its indifference to societal groups. As Blau states:

Legitimation requires that a leader be magnanimous in the exercise of his power and in the distribution of the rewards that accrue from his leadership, but such magnanimity necessitates that he first mobilize his power and husband the group's resources, that is, act in ways that are the opposite of magnanimity.³

The regime then must first secure a reservoir of political capital by whatever means are available; but once the reservoir has been created, the regime must legitimize its power by eliciting support if it wants to make the most effective use of its resources.

A regime which can be characterized as a political monopoly is in an advantageous position since it is the sole source of political goods. If there is no alternative market for the benefits which the sectors desire, they must recognize the authority (and perhaps the legitimacy) of the regime or do without the benefits.⁴ Furthermore by repressing the demands of certain sectors, the monopolistic regime can concentrate its resources on certain key sectors while assuming that the remaining members of the society may

³Ibid., p. 204.

⁴Curry and Wade, pp. 79-81.

be or may become "indifferent to the general operations of the system, its progress or decisions."⁵ By granting concessions to key sectors, the regime may be able to secure support (and thus legitimacy) by building a reputation of performance. The regime may also enhance its performance reputation by publicizing real or fabricated reports on its positive performance in the past and by releasing real or fabricated negative reports concerning the performance of a potential or, perhaps, imaginary alternative source of supply.⁶ Since the regime has a monopoly on the supply of information, the sectors can only accept or reject the performance reports. There can be no alternative report to rebut the regime's information.⁷

In Brazil the revolutionary regime, while it was consolidating its political power and decreasing the level of demands, was seemingly indifferent to the need to generate support, except in the case of the military, whose support was needed to maintain the regime's threat of violence. Indirectly, the maintenance of military support also earned at least passive support from the entrenched economic and political elite, who benefited from the order and stability established by the regime.

⁵Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," p. 394.

⁶Curry and Wade, p. 81.

⁷On the political value of information, see Ilchman and Uphoff, pp. 67-70.

Once its power had been consolidated and demands were reduced to a manageable level, the regime then began to use its resources to elicit the support which would legitimize and, thus, conserve its power. Military support was maintained by grants of authority to the armed forces. Diffuse support was initially secured (in a limited quantity, however) by emphasis on the regime's performance in maintaining order and stability and by discrediting the corrupt and subversive nature of the previous regime. Later, developmental nationalism, as an allocation of goods and services, status, and authority, was used to elicit positive support. These allocations were often more symbolic than real. So, too, was the democratic performance of the regime which was used to legitimize the regime both at home and abroad.

The Military as a Support Base

For a regime whose legitimacy is primarily based upon its control over a monopoly of coercive force, support by military leaders is obviously of primary consideration, especially when the regime accepts the necessity of remaining in power for an extended period of time. The military leaders who overthrew Goulart in 1964 soon divorced themselves from the old moderating pattern practiced by the Brazilian armed forces from 1889 to 1964 because they apparently believed that more time was needed to cure the ills of the political system. The social forces unleashed by Goulart and his predecessors were too dangerous to be

allowed to survive. Thus, there was general agreement among the military officers that they, not the civilian politicians, would have to conduct a general overhaul of the political system.⁸

To remain in power for months or years rather than days would require a level of unity within the officer corps that had seldom been present in the history of the Brazilian armed forces. To establish the basis for this unity, the military had to purge its own ranks of opposition elements. As a result, a few officers lost their political rights, hundreds were forcibly retired, and many others were transferred to distant or insignificant posts with the advice that they would never be promoted and, thus, would be better off if they found other careers.⁹

The military purges conducted during 1964 briefly unified the officer corps by completely decimating the left-wing nationalists, but conflict soon developed between the group of right-wing nationalists of the linha dura and the internationalist moderates led by President Castelo Branco. Castelo Branco was considered apolitical because he had remained aloof from partisan politics; but he actually had a well-defined political philosophy as a result of his long association with the ESG; and his efforts to translate

⁸Stepan, p. 222.

⁹Ibid., p. 223.

this philosophy into policy outputs severely strained the cohesiveness of the officer corps.¹⁰

Castelo Branco's interpretation of the ESG or "Sorbonne" program for national development is summarized by Alfred Stepan as four basic commitments. First, the regime would follow an active, anticommunist foreign policy which was deemed necessary for the survival of the free world. Second, the economy would be based on a free-enterprise system supported and guided by a strong central government. Third, technical and rational solutions to problems were to be preferred to irrational appeals to nationalism. And, fourth, the regime would be dedicated to the maintenance and perfection of a democratic system.¹¹ The first evidence of disunity within the officer corps was caused by the regime's commitment to reestablish an open democratic system as soon as possible.

The first institutional act gave the ruling Military Junta the power to suspend political rights for ten years and to void legislative mandates and also authorized the president, who would succeed the Junta, the same power for a

¹⁰For analyses of the ESG (Escola Superior de Guerra) doctrine, see Ibid., pp. 172-187; and Schneider, pp. 244-248.

¹¹Stepan, p. 231. For a theoretical analysis of the Castelo Branco "model" for development, see Cândido Mendes de Almeida, "Sistema Político e Modêlos de Poder no Brasil," Dados, I (1966), 20-24. The Sorbonne group believed that Brazil's future was intimately tied to that of "the Christian West" while the nationalists favored a "Brazil-first" solution with less dependence on the United States.

period of sixty days following the assumption of the office. In order to investigate those who had committed crimes against the State (and, thus, should be purged from the political system), the Junta, by way of Act Number 9, established Military-Police investigating teams.¹² The IPM's, staffed generally from the nationalist, linha-dura sector of the officer corps, set about their task of investigating subversive and corrupt elements in a zealous manner, often with little regard for individual rights or the necessity of establishing a sound legal basis for the resulting charges.

The IPM's had achieved a great deal of notoriety by the end of May, 1964, by means of their sensational, but generally undocumented, charges against prominent political figures, but they were soon to lose their most effective weapon, the cassação. Castelo Branco's authorization to void mandates and political rights was to expire on June 15, and, in deference to his promise to reestablish democratic norms, he refused to extend it. This meant that the IPM's would have to proceed through the courts if they wanted to secure punishment for those whom they accused. The courts were unacceptable since much of the so-called proof of subversion or corruption would not stand a legal test. Furthermore, the harassment of prominent politicians was not received favorably by the rationally minded ESG group or by

¹²Inqueritos Policial-Militar (IPM). For the text of Act Number 9, see Atos Institucionais, Vol. I, p. 9.

the general public, once the original revolutionary fervor died down.¹³

The refusal of Castelo Branco and his Sorbonne group to allow the type of discipline and punishment which the IPM colonels believed necessary was not a manifestation of any difference in the desired goals for the military regime, only a difference in means. The hard-line officers believed that Brazil's problems could be solved by a thorough purge of the subversive, corrupt, and immoral elements from the society. The Sorbonne group believed that the solution of the problem involved a change in the structure of the governmental institutions, that new institutions should be created to replace those which had allowed subversion, corruption, and inefficiency to flourish.¹⁴ This general agreement as to the ultimate goal of the revolution allowed Castelo Branco to maintain a semblance of unity within the military through the end of 1964 even though he rejected the methods of the linha dura. He did, however, respond to hard-line demands by pointing to the revolutionary punishment already meted out, by allowing the hard-line faction to arrange the purge of Mauro Borges, and by allowing the IPM's to continue their investigations (and, thus, their harassment) of civilian politicians.

In spite of the fact that the IPM's were able to maintain their surveillance of "subversive" and "corrupt"

¹³Schneider, p. 141.

¹⁴Pedreira, p. 57.

elements, the hard-line officers were unhappy with the slow and limited punishment for "guilty" citizens, and they complained about the so-called "softness" of the Castelo Branco government. In March of 1965 Castelo Branco insisted on holding a mayoral election in São Paulo, and, to the chagrin of the hard-line officers, a follower of Quadros won the election. Also, an incident of revolutionary terror in Paraná and the granting of habeas corpus to ex-Governor Miguel Arrais of Pernambuco were taken as evidence that the Sorbonne group was too permissive in the treatment of dangerous elements.¹⁵

In order to rid the nation of subversive and corrupt politicians, the IPM colonels began to demand that the President reestablish the extraordinary powers of AI-1 and that Congress pass a strong ineligibilities law that would prevent the election of politicians linked to the old order.¹⁶ Castelo Branco partially yielded to hard-line pressure (although he denied it) and sent to Congress several proposed amendments, one of which was an ineligibilities law similar to that wanted by the hard-line officers.¹⁷

¹⁵O Estado de São Paulo, 1 April 1965, p. 5.

¹⁶Carlos Castello Branco, "Coluna do Castello," Jornal do Brasil, 13 May 1965, p. 3. The IPM colonels were also advocating press censorship and the removal of "crime-against-the-revolution" cases from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

¹⁷Jornal do Brasil, 16 May 1965, p. 4.

Castelo Branco, of course, could not satisfy all of the demands of the linha dura and still maintain his image as a moderate, especially when some of the IPM colonels were wanting to investigate several of the government's most loyal congressional supporters. It was quite functional for the President to have the radical demands present to use as a club to force Congress to enact his more moderate proposals;¹⁸ but, when two of the IPM colonels persisted in their extreme demands to the point of openly attacking the revolutionary regime, they were dismissed from their positions and sentenced to brief periods of confinement for breach of military discipline.¹⁹

Such punishment of the most vocal critics and the passage of the Electoral Code, the Ineligibilities Law, and the Parties Statute--all designed to make the 1965 gubernatorial elections "safe"--had the effect of quieting the hard-line officers for a short period of time; but, as the electoral campaign got into full swing in August and September, 1965, they began again to voice their opposition to, what they considered, the premature and dangerous revival of democracy. When the electoral results seemingly justified the fears of the hard-line officers, they prepared for open rebellion if their demands for stricter control were not met.

¹⁸Schneider, p. 157.

¹⁹Jornal do Brasil, 24 June 1965, p. 3.

The contention of the linha dura, that the defeat of the government's candidates in Guanabara and Minas Gerais in October, 1965, was clear evidence that the moderate approach of the Sorbonne group was ineffective and dangerous, was widely accepted throughout the officer corps. In Brasília huge signs saying "Êles não voltarão" (they--the old order politicians--will not return) hung from government buildings, including the Ministry of War.²⁰ Only a strong effort by War Minister Costa e Silva, using assurances that the revolution would be continued and presumably that the government would adopt stronger measures for political control, prevented an open rebellion by the First Army in Rio de Janeiro.²¹

The near state of rebellion within the military convinced the Castelo Branco government that it must respond to the demands of the officers or lose its military support (and, thus, be overthrown by the younger officers), but an agreement on how to respond was difficult to achieve.²² Castelo Branco, hoping to maintain the legalist nature of the government, was able to persuade Costa e Silva and the linha-dura faction to agree to a plan to strengthen the regime by means of a number of congressional acts. When

²⁰ O Estado de São Paulo, 6 October 1965, p. 3.

²¹ Ibid., 7 October 1965, p. 3.

²² Justice Minister Campos resigned on October 7, creating suspicions that he could not agree to the authoritarian measures that the government was adopting under military pressure. Jornal do Brasil, 8 October 1965, p. 4.

Congress refused to adopt the proposals, the legalistic approach was doomed to failure and Castelo Branco was forced to sign a new institutional act.

The existence of factions within the armed forces officer corps does not mean that every officer is openly associated with one single faction. Actually, the political attitudes of most officers are not at all coherent,²³ and the officers are polarized only in crisis situations. The true strength of a faction within the military is limited to a small group of vocally active and strategically placed officers, who are able to persuade their less active and doctrinaire peers to support them when a crisis develops. Thus, the punishment or co-optation of a few faction leaders may be sufficient to deactivate the faction. Punishment of a few leaders after the attempted coup in 1955 effectively silenced the Cruzada Democrática for several years. Similarly, the punishment of a few hundred officers in 1964 totally eliminated the left-nationalist faction. In 1965 limited punishment of a very few officers silenced the linha-dura faction for several months.

Institutional Act Number 2 allowed Castelo Branco to silence not only many of his civilian critics, but the leaders of the hard-line military faction as well. Thus, throughout November and the early part of December, the regime was able to break up the hard-line groups by means of

²³See Mário Alfonso Carneiro, "Opinião Militar," Cadernos Brasileiros, VIII (November/December, 1966), 18-25.

transfer, reprimand, forced retirement, and in some cases, imprisonment.²⁴ With the breakup of the hard-line groups, the authoritarian measures of AI-2, and the common understanding that Costa e Silva would succeed Castelo Branco in March, 1967, military unity and support were assured²⁵ until the scenario was repeated in 1968.

The Castelo Branco regime not only had trouble maintaining the support of the younger, nationalistic officers, but it also had problems with some of the original military conspirators who were generally more interested in their own political fortunes than in the dangers of subversion and corruption. The political ambitions of these officers tended to tarnish the military acceptance of their complaints, and, except for the embarrassment of having to discipline fellow officers, they did not seriously threaten military support. General Justino Alves Bastos, frustrated by the military-sponsored residency requirement in his desire to have himself elected governor of Rio Grande do Sul, became a critic of the electoral laws and of the economic program of the government. He was removed from his command of the Third Army and forcibly retired on May 19, 1966.²⁶

Generals Olympio Mourão Filho and Pery Constant Bevilaqua became moderate critics of the Castelo Branco

²⁴ Jornal do Brasil, 9 December 1965, p. 3.

²⁵ O Estado de São Paulo, 3 February 1966, p. 3.

²⁶ Jornal do Brasil, 20 May 1966, p. 3.

government after they were denied the prestigious commands which they thought their support of the March 31 coup had earned for them. Both were kicked upstairs to the Supreme Military Court where they continued to criticize the revolutionary government, especially the militaristic nature of the National Security Law.²⁷ Both were forced to leave the Military Court following AI-5. General Amari Krueel, whose late support for the 1964 coup was crucial to the success of the conspiracy, ran a short campaign for the presidency in the post-coup political maneuvering. When his political ambitions were again frustrated in his 1966 bid to run for the governorship of São Paulo, he joined Justino Alves Bastos in May of 1966 to criticize the undemocratic nature of the military regime. To demonstrate his displeasure, he resigned his command of the Second Army on August 10, 1966, and was forcibly retired for leaving his command without authorization.²⁸

Although these men were not without supporters among the lower ranks of the officer corps, their well-known political ambitions clouded the sincerity of their complaints in the perception of the majority of the younger officers, who viewed politics as an almost immoral form of activity. This was especially true when the civilian politicians who opposed the military regime took up the cause of

²⁷Ibid., 16 March 1967, p. 3.

²⁸Ibid., 11 August 1966, p. 3; and 16 August 1966, p. 3. Krueel's candidacy was blocked by the residency requirement.

the dissenters and tried to use the dissenting officers as a wedge to split the military. Once the fallen revolutionaries were stripped of their commands, their military support faded rapidly.²⁹

The dissent of the frustrated senior officers was the only visible flaw in the unity of the officer corps during 1966 and early 1967, and this flaw never seriously affected the general level of military support for the regime. In reality Castelo Branco anticipated the demands of the officers. During 1965 he played a rather defensive role and was the recipient of attacks by both the civilian politicians, demanding a more open system, and the military hard line, demanding stricter control. Following AI-2 the President exerted his authority over the linha-dura officers by applying various forms of punishment; but, more importantly, he co-opted their issue by a series of policy outputs.

AI-2 reestablished revolutionary punishment, and this power was used to void the political rights of many of the civilians who had been accused of subversion or corruption by the IPM's--and also those potentially dangerous politicians who might be elected in the November, 1966, legislative elections. In addition, the provisions for indirect

²⁹The four officers mentioned are used as examples. Several other general officers became critical of the revolutionary regime as a result of frustration of a career or political ambitions, but the total number of such officers was rather small. General Afonso Albuquerque Lima met a similar fate following his ambitious presidential "precampaign" during 1968 and 1969.

election of the president and the governors guaranteed the ability of the military to control the selection of Castelo Branco's successor and the selection of state governors as well. Castelo Branco's reluctant endorsement of General Costa e Silva as ARENA's candidate for the presidency made Costa e Silva's election a certainty, and this was good news for most of the military officers since it meant that the unpopular Sorbonne group of officers would no longer be directing the course of the revolution.³⁰

By the time Costa e Silva took office on March 15, 1967, Castelo Branco had purged many civilian politicians; he had forced Congress to approve a new constitution which strengthened the executive and expanded the role of the military; he had forced Congress to approve the Press Law; he had decreed the National Security Law, which gave the armed forces new powers for maintaining internal and external security; and he had decreed an elaborate plan for restructuring the administrative organization of the government. Most of these acts elicited widespread support from the officer corps. When Costa e Silva assumed the presidency and named a cabinet that included nine military men in

³⁰ O Estado de São Paulo, 3 February 1966, p. 3. Even though the political values of most officers are not very coherent, the majority of officers appear to be quite receptive to nationalism; and, for this reason, the Sorbonne técnicos, with their rejection of emotional nationalism, were generally disliked. See Einaudi and Stepan, pp. 91-95.

the eighteen-man cabinet, military unity in support of the regime was at its highest level since April, 1964.³¹

The earliest cracks in this solid block of support apparently were the result of the Sorbonne group's disappointment in President Costa e Silva's failure to continue the forceful leadership of the revolution that had characterized Castelo Branco's last year in office. Rumors began to circulate in late April, 1967, of a "castelista" conspiracy against the government as a result of a speech in which Marshall Cordeiro de Farias criticized the Costa e Silva government for being "indecisive."³² The existence of such a conspiracy was denied by both the Sorbonne officers and by the military authorities within the government, but such rumors persisted until the death of Castelo Branco in July, 1967. After his death, it was thought that the political activities of the Sorbonne group would also die;³³ and this was indeed true until the crisis of late 1968.

As the crisis heated up in August and September of 1968, rumors again began to circulate concerning a golpe by the Sorbonne officers, led by Cordeiro de Farias.³⁴ Rumors

³¹Jornal do Brasil, 16 March 1967, pp. 4-5.

³²Ibid., 30 April 1967, p. 3. Most of the economic reforms decreed by Castelo Branco would show results only after careful enforcement over a period of years. The castelistas complained that Costa e Silva was sabotaging these reforms by not enforcing them. Einaudi and Stepan, p. 95.

³³Jornal do Brasil, 19 July 1967, p. 6.

³⁴Carlos Castello Branco, "Coluna do Castello," Ibid., 7 September 1968, p. 4. Cordeiro had served in Castelo

continued to abound through the remainder of 1968, even to the extent that Cordeiro had counseled some ARENA deputies to vote against granting the army license to try Márcio Alves so that the resulting defeat could be used as clear proof of the inability of Costa e Silva to govern.³⁵ Regardless of the veracity of these rumors, the activities of Cordeiro and his associates did not represent a serious cleavage within the officer corps since the younger ESG graduates had, by that time, moved away from the internationalist stance of the castelistas and toward a more nationalistic view, which brought them closer to the hard-line officers.³⁶

The apparent unity of military support for President Costa e Silva following his installation did not necessarily mean that the officer corps had forsworn all political activity. In general, the officers were quite suspicious of legislative politicians, and they periodically reminded the legislators that they would not tolerate any congressional sabotage of the objectives of the revolution. Throughout most of 1967 the linha-dura officers delivered these

Branco's cabinet but had resigned his post in opposition to the acceptance of Costa e Silva as the regime's official candidate for the presidency. For a short time in mid-1966, he toyed with the idea of becoming the presidential candidate for the MDB but abandoned the idea as a result of military opposition to his candidacy.

³⁵Estado de São Paulo, 13 December 1968, p. 4.

³⁶Schneider, p. 257. That is, they had given up the idea that Brazil's future depended on the success of the West in the international bipolar context.

reminders to Congress by way of deputies and senators who were privy to military councils,³⁷ but by December the activities of Lacerda's Frente Ampla and the growing stubbornness of Congress brought the officers out in the open.³⁸

By the end of 1967, military support for Costa e Silva was waning. On January 23, 1968, Senator Dinarte Mariz, who generally articulated the hard-line military view, warned the government that subversion from the Frente Ampla, the students, the church, and the terrorists required resolute action by the government through the use of institutional acts.³⁹ There was speculation that the mysterious military exercises of January 25 to January 30 were a threat of what might happen if Costa e Silva did not take stern measures to counter the alleged subversion and also the criticism coming from within his own party.⁴⁰

As the government proceeded from one crisis to another through 1968, Costa e Silva was beset by the same dilemma that had confronted Castelo Branco in 1965. The President was determined to maintain some semblance of constitutional legality, but each crisis brought stronger pressure from the

³⁷The most active messengers were the deputies of the "guarda Costa" group organized by Deputy Clovis Stenzel. Jornal do Brasil, 16 June 1967, p. 4.

³⁸On December 26 General Albuquerque Lima, a member of the cabinet, called for government action to repress the agitation of the Frente Ampla. See Ibid., 27 December 1967, p. 3.

³⁹Ibid., 23 January 1968, p. 3.

⁴⁰O Estado de São Paulo, 31 January 1968, p. 3.

officers to solve the crises by revolutionary means. In April Costa e Silva was able to resist military pressure to edit a new institutional act by issuing the Justice Ministry decree disbanding the Frente Ampla.⁴¹ In June Senator Dinarte Mariz advised the President to "tear up the Constitution and begin everything anew"; while Clovis Stenzel declared that the "revolution should be conducted by revolutionary means."⁴² There were constant rumors of an incipient coup by the authoritarian nationalist (linha-dura) faction of the armed forces. Unified military support for the regime in its struggle to control nonmilitary dissident groups was rapidly being replaced with open criticism of the regime for bringing discredit to the armed forces through the regime's inability to prevent or confront the crises in an effective manner.

One incident which caused a crisis within the military grew out of the regime's efforts to quell student riots. Members of an elite air force parachute-rescue group (PARA-SAR) had been used as shock troops in civilian clothing to break up student riots in April. The use of PARA-SAR for this purpose, even though clearly against military regulations, had apparently been sanctioned by Costa e Silva. When an air force brigadier, after having been frustrated in his efforts to have the incident investigated by Air Ministry authorities, publicly denounced the illegal use of

⁴¹Jornal do Brasil, 7 April 1968, p. 3.

⁴²Ibid., 29 June 1968, p. 6.

PARA-SAR, he was removed from his command. The arbitrary punishment of a conscientious officer for having complained about the improper use of a military unit was not well received by the officer corps.⁴³

Another factor tending to divide the officers at this time was the problem of presidential succession. General Albuquerque Lima, then the Minister of Interior, was attempting to establish solid nationalist backing for his candidacy in the 1970 indirect election. Albuquerque's efforts to mobilize the young officers behind the linha dura presented a threat to Costa e Silva's ability to control the direction of the revolution.⁴⁴ At the same time, Minister of Transportation Colonel Mário Andreazza was trying to organize support among civilians and the more moderate officers by advocating constitutional legality. It was supposed that Costa e Silva encouraged Andreazza's presidential ambitions as a counterforce to Albuquerque Lima and the linha dura,⁴⁵ but the effort was a failure. After the Câmara denied the government the privilege of trying Márcio Alves, the crisis came to a head; and the decision to edit AI-5 was indicative of the dominant position of the hard-line officers. The decision was reportedly made in exclusively military circles, with the most common and repeated

⁴³Ibid., 6 October 1968, p. 3.

⁴⁴Ibid., 22 November 1968, p. 3.

⁴⁵O Estado de São Paulo, 23 November 1968, p. 3.

statement being "the act will come out with or without the President of the Republic."⁴⁶

Even though AI-5 had been forced upon President Costa e Silva by the threat of the linha dura, he quickly took the offensive to regain the support of the officer corps and to regain control over it. By purging and closing Congress, by purging the courts and altering their jurisdiction, by disciplining the state legislative assemblies, and by establishing extraordinary means for dealing with civil unrest (suspension of procedural guarantees), the President effectively responded to the demands of the military officers. General Albuquerque Lima, the acknowledged leader of the linha dura, was forced to resign his cabinet post in late January, 1969, and was reassigned as head of the War Materials Division⁴⁷--a prestigious position but one without the troops needed to execute a coup. Other hard-line officers were transferred, but not ostracized, and Costa e Silva made several appeals to the officer corps to unite and pull together in order to develop the nation and to achieve democratic normalization.⁴⁸

One officer was ostracized, however. Colonel Francisco Boaventura Cavalcanti, one of the IPM colonels who had been disciplined following AI-2, was transferred to the reserves

⁴⁶Ibid., 14 December 1968, p. 3.

⁴⁷Jornal do Brasil, 28 January 1969, p. 3; and 26 March 1969, p. 7.

⁴⁸Ibid., 17 December 1968, p. 3; 16 March 1969, p. 4; and 31 March 1969, p. 3.

on May 19 for breach of military discipline and disloyalty to superior officers.⁴⁹ Such punishment for an always-loyal (if also always-overzealous) supporter of the revolution led to the ultimate failure of Costa e Silva's attempt to reestablish firm military support. General Moniz de Aragão, former president of the Military Club and head of the Department for General Provisions, sent a letter dated May 22, 1969, to the Minister of War, complaining about the publicized humiliation of Colonel Boaventura.⁵⁰ When he got no response from the ministry, he sent a new letter on June 17, repeating the morale problems caused by the Boaventura affair and charging Costa e Silva with nepotism and with encouraging "a cult of the personality."⁵¹

For his efforts, Moniz de Aragão was relieved of his post on June 30, an act which gained little military sympathy for the government. As dissatisfaction over this new affair grew steadily during the winter months, urban terrorism by radical groups was perceived as evidence that the regime could not maintain public order. At the same time, rumors spread that Vice-President Aleixo was preparing a constitutional amendment, sanctioned by the President, that would reopen Congress and provide for direct election of governors in 1970. Given the level of public violence

⁴⁹Ibid., 20 May 1969, p. 3.

⁵⁰Chagas, p. 27.

⁵¹Ibid., pp. 28-29. The letters were never published by the cautious and often-censured press, but copies were apparently circulated in both military and civilian circles.

and the general military animosity for civilian politicians, these rumors were quite disconcerting, not only to the younger officers but to the senior commanders as well.⁵²

This presented a serious dilemma for the senior generals since the President's attempt to open Congress and to generate civilian support before he had solidified his military support would be an open invitation for the young hard-line nationalists to remove the President by force and install Albuquerque Lima, some young general, or perhaps a junta of colonels.⁵³ The stroke suffered by the President on the afternoon of August 27 presented the military ministers with the chance to solve their dilemma. When it became apparent that Costa e Silva would be incapacitated for an indefinite period of time, the High Command of the Armed Forces--an organization consisting of the three military ministers, the chief of staff for each service, and the chief of the General Staff for the Armed Forces--met on August 30 to seek a solution to the problem. Vice-President Pedro Aleixo, being a civilian politician and sometimes associated with the old Sorbonne group, would not be acceptable to the majority of the officers (nor to the Navy Minister or Air Minister, who were both adherents of the linha-dura approach). The decision reached was to sacrifice

⁵²Ibid., p. 25. The rumors were well founded. Chagas, pp. 24-25, states that the decision was made on August 26 to decree the proposed amendment on September 2 and to convene the Congress on September 8.

⁵³Schneider, pp. 293-294.

constitutional legality in the interest of national security and revolutionary continuity,⁵⁴ and more importantly in the interest of maintaining military support.

Following the decision to ignore the constitutional provision for succession, the senior generals moved rapidly to conduct a preemptive coup, just as Castelo Branco had done in 1965 and as Costa e Silva had done in 1968. On August 31, they issued Institutional Act Number 12, authorizing the Military Junta (the three military ministers) to rule in the name of the President until he was able to resume the functions of the office.⁵⁵ The Junta then began to respond to the demands of the younger officers by countermanding Costa e Silva's decisions concerning the constitutional amendment and the opening of Congress. They then began a purge of Congress and the academic community. They also established the death penalty for the crime of subversion and provided for the banishment of citizens accused of subversion.⁵⁶

Perhaps the most difficult problem faced by the Junta was the problem of succession. It was soon apparent that

⁵⁴Chagas, pp. 73-75.

⁵⁵For the text of AI-12, see Nôva Constituição, pp. 138-142.

⁵⁶Schneider, p. 298. For AI-13 (banishment for subversion), see Nôva Constituição, pp. 142-144; and for AI-14 (the death penalty), see pp. 144-146. AI-13 was necessary to allow the release of several political prisoners in exchange for the release of U.S. Ambassador Burke Elbrick, who had been kidnaped by the leftist urban guerrillas on September 4, 1969.

Costa e Silva would not be able to resume the presidency for many months; and there was considerable evidence that he, like Pedro Aleixo, would be unacceptable to the linha-dura officers even if he did recover. The provision for presidential succession in Costa e Silva's proposed constitutional amendment was unacceptable since it allowed the president to be selected by the newly elected Congress in 1970 and would make the presidency an issue in the congressional elections. Even the existing format produced problems for military unity as evidenced by the "campaigning" of Albuquerque Lima and Andreazza. Yet prolonged rule by the Junta would be an open admission of militarism.

The solution reached by the Junta amounted to an allocation of authority to the officers. Each general-grade officer in the three military branches would sample the opinion of his subordinates as to the term of office for the new president and the preferred candidates for the office. The generals would then relate the results to the four-star officers, with the final decision being left to the High Command of the Armed Forces.⁵⁷ The selection process brought out the old animosities between the Sorbonne group (favoring General Orlando Geisel) and the linha-dura group (favoring Albuquerque Lima). The decision to vacate the offices of president and vice-president was made in mid-September, but it was not announced to the nation until

⁵⁷For an account of the political maneuvering related to this decision, see Chagas, pp. 155-170.

after the complicated selection process had been completed. General Emílio Garrastazu Médici became the compromise choice of the High Command because he was thought to be acceptable to the linha-dura officers and to the senior generals.⁵⁸

On October 14, the Junta issued AI-16, which vacated the offices of president and vice-president, and called Congress into session on October 25 to elect a new president and vice-president, whose terms of office would extend through Costa e Silva's term and a new term as well.⁵⁹ Congress dutifully met on October 25, 1969, and elected the only candidate presented (the MDB did not present a candidate) to a term of office which would expire on March 25, 1974. The Junta also provided the president-elect with a new constitution (called Amendment Number 1 to the 1967 Constitution, but in fact an extensive revision of that document),⁶⁰ which expanded the already-massive powers of the president.

Aided by the new powers of the office, by the existence of a purged Congress and judiciary, and by the prosperous state of the Brazilian economy, President Médici has been able to maintain a fairly stable level of military support.

⁵⁸The selection process was not completed until October 7, apparently because of Médici's hesitancy to accept the honor and Albuquerque's reluctance to give up the battle and endorse Médici. See Ibid., pp. 177-209.

⁵⁹See Nôva Constituição, pp. 149-153.

⁶⁰Only thirty-six of the 189 articles of the 1967 Constitution were carried over intact to the 1969 "amended" version.

Congress and the Supreme Court have not been in a position to challenge the policies of the regime so the hard-line officers have not felt the need to engage in political activity. Co-optation of interest groups, threats of violence against dissenters, and improvement of economic conditions have kept civil unrest at a minimum, except for urban terrorism. The existence of terrorists, however, has aided military unity by reinforcing the officers' belief in the necessity of military rule;⁶¹ and the armed forces have been given an almost free hand in dealing with the terrorists. Moreover, Médici has a cabinet of civilian technicians and military officers in which authority has been neatly divided between the Sorbonne faction and the hard-line faction. The hard-liners have priority over matters related to national security, and the Sorbonne group is generally given control over developmental aspects of national policy.⁶²

President Médici, through January, 1971, was far more active in courting the military than either of his predecessors. He has apparently tried to raise the self-esteem and the public esteem (very low throughout 1968 and 1969) of the officers by attending most of the major military events and by publicly praising the accomplishments of the armed forces. He has also, to some extent, bought the support of

⁶¹Einaudi and Stepan, p. 85.

⁶²Schneider, pp. 304-305, 308-309. The Sorbonne group, by this time, was much more nationalistic than in the days of Castelo Branco, thus, minimizing its differences with the linha dura.

the officers by keeping their pay increases well ahead of inflation,⁶³ and by directing a large proportion of the federal budget toward the armed forces. For example, on September 4, 1970, the government presented a program which was publicized as a massive assault on illiteracy. Yet the proposed budget for 1971, revealed during the same week, decreased the education proportion of the total budget from 6.6 percent in 1970 to 6.2 percent in 1971, while the military proportion increased from 13.6 percent for 1970 to 15.4 percent for 1971.⁶⁴ The literacy campaign was apparently to be financed at the expense of other educational programs. National security and military support could not be sacrificed.

Diffuse Support: Honesty and Moderation

Although Presidents Castelo Branco and Costa e Silva at times acted as if they would like to enjoy the support of politicians and of the civilian institutions, the only institution whose support was needed and curried was that of the military. The congressmen and the other civilian politicians were generally disappointing to the military men since the civilians had the practice of delivering criticism when the regime relaxed its control in an effort to allow civilian support. Likewise, the interest associations

⁶³Jornal do Brasil, 13 January 1970, p. 3; and 28 August 1970, p. 3.

⁶⁴Veja (September 9, 1970), pp. 34, 40-46.

tended to make demands for benefits that the regime was not able to deliver so co-optation and control were used to keep the interest associations quiet, at the expense of positive expressions of support.⁶⁵

This is not to say that the revolutionary regime had disdain for popular support, however. From the very beginning, it was emphasized that the revolution was made for the people--to save Brazil from the destructive forces of subversion, communism, and economic chaos.⁶⁶ Although the regime could not safely open up the system to allow positive demonstrations of support, it could continue the paternalism that had been characteristic of Brazilian politics until new institutions were created for peaceful and moderate expressions of demands and supports. In the meantime, the representative nature of the armed forces and the paternal aspects of the regime's policies were emphasized to create a low level of diffuse popular support. The revolution was said to be made for the people of Brazil, in their best interests, by the soldiers who came from the masses. The soldiers are "the people in uniform."⁶⁷

In seeking to create a minimal level of diffuse support, the regime made use of its most abundant political

⁶⁵Schmitter, pp. 309-310.

⁶⁶For example see the Preamble to AI-1, Atos Institucionais, Vol. I, pp. 3-4.

⁶⁷For various opinions justifying the popular nature of the armed forces, see Glauco Carneiro, História das Revoluções Brasileiras, Vol. II (2 vols.; Rio de Janeiro: O Cruzeiro, 1965), pp. 594-596.

resources, coercion and information, to respond to a general demand for order and social peace. The presence of corruption and subversion was publicized and often exaggerated by information provided by the regime. The purges conducted in the initial months after the March 31 coup and following AI-2 were justified as revolutionary measures designed to rid the Brazilian political system of "the purulence of bolshevism and corruption." When possible, the existence of subversion and corruption side-by-side in the same man or group was emphasized to demonstrate the evil nature of the "enemies within." For example, President Goulart was not only a subversive seeking to radicalize the nation, he was also reputed to be corrupt since he had amassed a huge fortune while serving in public office. The labor leaders also were not only subversive because of their communist connections, they were also corrupted by peleguismo.

Once Goulart and those associated with his administration had been eliminated, the regime could no longer make the direct link between corruption and subversion since the corrupt politicians who remained were largely within the government bloc, while those who might be considered subversive were in the ranks of the opposition. The continued surveillance and occasional purges of possible subversives has been described elsewhere and need not be discussed here, except to mention that, although the so-called subversives were carefully watched and sometimes punished primarily for reasons of national security, the presence of a subversive

threat was at times used as a justification for popular support of the revolutionary regime.⁶⁸

Subversion, be it real or imagined, often provided the regime with an air of legitimacy and a rationalization for silencing criticism from the opposition. Corruption was not quite so useful because after 1965 it was found mainly within the ranks of the government party. Corrupt politics was not a phenomenon peculiar to the Goulart regime, it had long been a fact of life in Brazilian politics. Bribery, nepotism, vote-buying, and misappropriation of funds had been and, to some extent, still are quite common in Brazil. A notorious example is provided by Plínio Cabral: in Rio Grande do Sul in 1963, five million cruzeiros were appropriated for the maintenance of state vehicles. The incumbent governor lost his bid for reelection in the previous October and was to leave office on January 31. To reward himself and his political cronies for their services to the state (and to make problems for his successor), the lame-duck governor spent four and one-half million of the five-million-cruzeiro fund in the first thirty days of the fiscal year.⁶⁹ Such practices (but seldom so extreme) apparently existed on every level of government, and, according to Marshall Taurino Resende, the officer in charge of all of the IPM's,

⁶⁸ A useful tactic for creating a political monopoly is to discredit a real or imagined alternative to the regime in power. See Curry and Wade, p. 81. In Brazil the reputation for corruption and subversion was used to discredit the old system.

⁶⁹ Cabral, p. 41.

political corruption was far more prevalent than subversion and a far more serious problem for Brazilian society.⁷⁰

As the revolutionary regime consolidated its power and realized the impracticality of relying upon the support of civilian politicians, it began to recognize the existence of corrupt politicians within its midst. By early 1965, the regime had turned its attention to these politicians and begun to purge them, partly as a means of ridding itself of occasional critics but, generally, in an effort to divorce itself from contradictions to the publicly emphasized principles of honesty and legality. Thus, the regime mobilized its forces to defeat Ranieri Mazzilli, an always-loyal supporter of the revolution, in his attempt to be reelected as president of the Câmara in early 1965 because Mazzilli was reputed to have been involved in some highly unethical, if not illegal, tax fraud schemes in São Paulo.⁷¹ Ademar de Barros, who had a national reputation for political corruption, was removed from his position as governor of São Paulo on June 5, 1966.⁷²

⁷⁰Neto, pp. 106-107. Taurino resigned his position in late 1964, charging that the government was protecting many of the most corrupt individuals because they were considered "men of the revolution."

⁷¹Jornal do Brasil, 23 February 1965, p. 3; and 24 February 1965, p. 4.

⁷²Estado de São Paulo, 6 June 1966, p. 1. Ademar's removal was due to his criticism of the government's efforts to control inflation, but his continued presence in power as one of the original "revolutionaries" (even if he was not then privy to the councils of the revolution) was a constant source of embarrassment for the regime.

Another device used by the revolutionary regime to limit corruption was the Law of Ineligibilities of July 15, 1965. Although its immediate purpose was apparently to establish the basis for vetoing undesirable opposition candidates in the 1965 gubernatorial elections, the bill was justified by President Castelo Branco as a moral necessity for an honest system.⁷³ The four-year residency requirement (later reduced to two years) was designed to prevent political opportunism. More importantly, the bill prohibited the candidacy for any office to persons accused of or convicted of subversion or corruption and prohibited the candidacy for any office to any executives of an enterprise doing business with the government. In this manner the regime attempted to prevent the use of public office for either economic or political gain.

The Ineligibilities Law was used sparingly prior to the 1965 elections, but in 1966 it was used extensively against both MDB and ARENA candidates, especially in Rio de Janeiro and Guanabara. By challenging the eligibility of many ARENA candidates, the military authorities were able to persuade party officials to purge from their lists many corrupt politicians who had apparently joined the government party in order to avoid the cancellation of their electoral mandates.⁷⁴

⁷³Jornal do Brasil, 10 July 1965, p. 4.

⁷⁴Schneider, p. 188.

The list of ineligibilities was incorporated into the 1967 Constitution, expanded by the 1969 Constitution, and further expanded by a decree issued by the Military Junta October 21, 1969. One of the provisions of that decree made the spouse, parent, or other close relative of an executive officeholder ineligible for legislative offices.⁷⁵ This became a source of embarrassment for the regime since it meant that the election of an ARENA candidate in the mayoral elections of November, 1969, would automatically make his relatives then serving in legislative positions ineligible for those offices. Several prominent ARENA legislators would have been eliminated, and perhaps twenty thousand politicians (mostly ARENA) would have been affected.⁷⁶ The oversight forced President Médici to issue a decree-law suspending the ineligibilities decree-law until after the municipal elections.⁷⁷

The result of the ineligibilities laws was to allow the revolutionary regime the means for vetoing candidates from either party who might have a less-than-spotless reputation. Political corruption was, of course, not eliminated, but party leaders had been forced to purge the more conspicuous offenders. In addition to the efforts to limit the

⁷⁵For the text of Decree-Law Number 1,063, see Nôva Constituição, pp. 155-167.

⁷⁶Jornal do Brasil, 25 October 1969, p. 4.

⁷⁷Ibid., 5 November 1969, p. 3. For an analysis of the Ineligibilities Law decreed by the Junta, see Paulo Lauro, Prática da Legislação Eleitoral (São Paulo: Livraria Martins, 1970), pp. 9-27.

activities of corrupt politicians, the administrative reforms decreed by Castelo Branco have established new means for controlling graft within the federal, state, and municipal administrative agencies.⁷⁸ Moreover, Castelo Branco in 1966 and Médici in 1970 were careful to choose gubernatorial candidates who had spotless reputations in addition to the general requirements of loyalty to the revolution and acceptability within the party.⁷⁹

There is little evidence to support a hypothesis that the outputs directed at controlling corruption were primarily inspired by the need to create diffuse support for the regime. Indeed, they seem to have been inspired primarily by the military officers' paternalistic desire to raise the political and administrative system to the level of the armed forces in discipline and efficiency and, at the more practical level, by the need to have some legitimate means for eliminating dangerous or critical politicians. Nevertheless, the regime was aware of the fact that a reputation for opposing corruption could be useful in generating diffuse support⁸⁰ and the policies seem to have been somewhat

⁷⁸For a discussion of the means for controlling the misuse of funds by municípios, see Ivan L. Richardson, "Municipal Government in Brazil: The Financial Dimension," Journal of Comparative Administration, I (November, 1969), 333-335

⁷⁹Jornal do Brasil, 29 January 1970, p. 3. For a discussion of the selection process, see Schneider, pp. 180-182, 319-323.

⁸⁰The ARENA Party program announced on December 6, 1965, listed as its principal objective "the perfection of representative democracy, by eliminating the distortions of

successful. In a public-opinion poll commissioned by Jornal do Brasil, the attack on corruption was most often selected (28 percent) as the most significant achievement of the revolution after five years in power. Economic development and control of subversion tied for second place (12 percent each) while control of inflation was favored by 7 percent.⁸¹ Since the respondents had the option of saying that there were no positive achievements, the results of this poll seem to be significant, especially considering the fact that it was conducted in Guanabara, the main center of opposition to the revolutionary regime.

Diffuse Support: Economic Stability
and Developmental Nationalism

When the revolutionaries came to power in 1964, the economic situation in Brazil was dismal. Due to a policy of import restriction and the resultant discrimination against exports, the economy had become stagnant in 1963 after having enjoyed an annual growth rate of about 7 percent during the previous six years.⁸² On top of this, increases in the money supply greatly accelerated the process of inflation to an annual rate of over 50 percent in 1963 and early 1964, without having the effect of stimulating

fraud, economic power and political power." See Jornal do Brasil, 7 December 1965, p. 4.

⁸¹Ibid., 13 April 1969, p. 7.

⁸²Leff, pp. 163-165.

economic growth.⁸³ The Goulart regime, confronted by demands and threats from all sides, was unable to establish a coherent program to solve the economic problems, and the chaotic situation was inherited by the Castelo Branco government.

Goulart had failed in his attempts to cure Brazil's economic ills because he lacked coercive power and support. The revolutionary regime also lacked extensive support for economic reform, but it did have a monopoly of coercive power, which allowed it to be indifferent to the problem of support. The regime gave the ESG technicians, headed by economist Roberto Campos, almost free reign to stabilize the economy. To control inflation, the wages of laborers were frozen and tight restrictions were placed on credit. To replace or supplement domestic sources of credit and to build up Brazil's depleted foreign exchange reserves, the regime encouraged private foreign investment.⁸⁴ The wage freeze displeased both urban and rural laborers, the credit restrictions were criticized by the industrialists, and the preference for foreign capital angered the nationalistic military officers.

Although the task orientation of Castelo Branco allowed him to be indifferent to the negative support which resulted

⁸³Ibid., pp. 166-167.

⁸⁴See M. C. Tavares and J. Serra, "Beyond Stagnation: A Discussion on the Nature of Recent Development in Brazil," in Latin America: From Dependence to Revolution, ed. James Petras (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973), pp. 71-75.

from his policies,⁸⁵ the stabilization program did earn the regime some support. The military leaders and the agricultural and industrial elite shared some common enemies (such as politicized workers, who demand higher wages and more participation; and guerrillas, who challenge the stability of the economic and political system) and some common goals (such as social peace and economic development through the private sector).⁸⁶ Thus, the criticism of the economic stabilization policy was partially offset by the support of the established groups arising from the suppression of popular groups.

The negative effects of the stabilization program of the Sorbonne group was in part reflected in the results of elections held in 1965 and 1966. In Pernambuco the abstention of over half the registered voters and the large number of blank or void ballots (over 20 percent) in the special election to elect a substitute for the imprisoned deputy, Francisco Julião, was attributed to the treatment of Julião and the unpopularity of the austerity measures.⁸⁷ The defeat of the gubernatorial candidates sponsored by the revolutionary regime in 1965 was likewise blamed, in part,

⁸⁵For a comparison of the task orientation of Castelo Branco and the Sorbonne group with the affective orientation of Costa e Silva and the nationalists, see Robert Stafford Byars, Small Group Theory and Political Leadership in Brazil: The Case of the Castelo Branco Regime (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1969).

⁸⁶Einaudi and Stepan, pp. 88-89.

⁸⁷Jornal do Brasil, 8 June 1965, p. 3.

on the stabilization program.⁸⁸ In the 1966 elections, the fact that 25 percent of the ballots cast in Guanabara were blank or void was seen as a protest against government policies, particularly the economic policy.⁸⁹

Despite the criticism coming from virtually all sectors of Brazilian society and the crisis which precipitated AI-2, Castelo Branco's economic policies were able to weather the storm. By late 1966 inflation had been reduced to an almost manageable rate, and the economy was beginning to expand again. President Costa e Silva, having inherited a far more favorable economic situation than did Castelo Branco, generally continued the economic policies of the Sorbonne group during his first few months in office, while searching for a way to use the improved economy as a positive support factor. After several abortive efforts to persuade factions, both within and outside the regime, to work together for the development of the nation,⁹⁰ the regime finally hit upon what it hoped would be a unifying ideology--"desenvolvimentismo" (developmentalism).

"Developmentalism," as formulated by Treasury Minister Delfim Neto and Planning Minister Hélio Beltrão, was little

⁸⁸Ibid., 10 October 1965, p. 14. It must be admitted that the heavy-handed treatment of opposition candidates and the lackluster nature of the government candidates also contributed heavily to those defeats.

⁸⁹Brasileiro, pp. 170-173.

⁹⁰For examples of these vague appeals for unity, see Jornal do Brasil, 18 July 1967, p. 3; 28 November 1967, p. 4; and 6 December 1967, p. 3.

more than an outline of goals which, if achieved, would raise Brazil to the status of a great nation.⁹¹ The goals differed only in degree to those of the Sorbonne group, but the appeal to the patriotism of Brazilians by featuring Brazil as a future "great power" was an obvious allocation of information and status designed to elicit support. Not unlike the practice of Getúlio Vargas of directing public attention away from national crises by the use of highly publicized economic undertakings,⁹² the program, if successful, would have allowed the regime to paper over domestic crises with a propaganda campaign which would divert public attention to the development programs. By publicizing the need for developmental planning aimed at great power status, Costa e Silva was attempting to create some demand for the type of commodity (planning) which the regime could offer.⁹³

The emphasis on economic development had a special appeal for the técnicos, the technocratic planners of the bureaucracy. Developmentalism offered them a special role in the formulation of long-range plans for the transformation of the economic and social context of the nation. Furthermore, the military regime's commitment to planning and execution, in conjunction with the concentrated power of the government, gave the técnicos some assurance that the plans

⁹¹Ibid., 11 January 1968, p. 4.

⁹²See Scantimburgo, pp. 205-206.

⁹³For the use of ideology in the reorientation of a political market, see Blau, p. 122.

which they formulated would actually be implemented.⁹⁴ Developmentalism also had great appeal for the industrial elite of Brazil for it assured the industrialists of the paternal protection which they have traditionally expected of the government.⁹⁵

Unfortunately for the revolutionary regime, the plan was apparently not ready for implementation when it was publicly announced in January, 1968; and the succession of crises directed both governmental and public attention away from the program. By June, 1968, however, the preliminary planning had been completed, and the President presented his Program for Strategic Development to the ARENA National Convention.⁹⁶ In his presentation, Costa e Silva stated that planned development was the key to the future of Brazil and that party unity and coherence, like that demanded by Franklin Roosevelt when he outlined the New Deal, were necessary if revolutionary change were to be achieved through planned development.⁹⁷ By the time the plan was

⁹⁴ Daland, Brazilian Planning: Development Politics and Administration, p. 30, states that planning was a regular governmental function during the Estado Nôvo and the Third Republic, but the plans were frustrated by the inability of the political authorities to agree on the implementation of the programs. For a discussion of the role of the técnicos, see Leff, pp. 143-153.

⁹⁵ Leff, pp. 182-185.

⁹⁶ Costa e Silva actually upstaged his party leaders, who spent several months preparing an elaborate program for party reorganization. The reorganization program got no attention after the development program was presented. See O Estado de São Paulo, 28 June 1968, p. 3.

⁹⁷ Jornal do Brasil, 27 June 1968, p. 3.

presented, however, the crises taking place throughout the nation were too severe to be overshadowed by the futuristic program, and Costa e Silva's attempt to achieve a unifying ideology was unsuccessful.

Developmentalism as an ideology (or propaganda device) for eliciting diffuse popular support was not effectively used until President Médici revived it in 1970. Médici, apparently more aware of the need for popular support than either Castelo Branco or Costa e Silva, was much more active in cultivating a popular image. Despite a disclaimer by his biographer, President Castelo Branco seemed to have little regard for the popular reception of his policies.⁹⁸ Costa e Silva seemed to be more conscious of a need for popular support but was only slightly more successful than Castelo Branco in generating such support. His highly publicized "campaign" before the October 3, 1966, indirect presidential election created a positive image,⁹⁹ but this popular support slowly eroded due to his less-than-dynamic leadership in the first year of office. In mid-1968 Costa e Silva instituted a practice of operating the government from different areas of the country for short periods of time in

⁹⁸Wamberto, pp. 14-16, totally denies the common charge that Castelo Branco made no effort at achieving a dialogue with either elite elements or popular forces and submits a count of the President's travels and meetings as proof of the effort (pp. 103-112). In his dissertation, Byars argues that Castelo Branco's task orientation led him to deplore any affective policies. A similar argument is made by Einaudi and Stepan, pp. 94-96.

⁹⁹Schneider, p. 182.

order to rebuild his waning support. The first attempt, conducted in the Northeast in August, was rather successful, but the crises leading to AI-5 apparently scuttled the program.

Long before Emílio Médici assumed the presidency on October 30, 1969, the old split between the Sorbonne group and the nationalists had narrowed a great deal, with the ESG group becoming more nationalistic and the nationalists realizing that national security was impossible without national development.¹⁰⁰ The younger officers of both groups had come to see the connection between internal reform and development, on the one hand, with national security, on the other hand; and their quarrel with the officers of the High Command was over the urgency of implementing the corrective measures. Médici's first speech to the nation, after his selection by the armed forces' High Command, reflected this new emphasis of the reconciled groups when he called for total commitment by all Brazilians to the goal of social and economic development.¹⁰¹

Although Médici's initial pronouncement earned him strong praise by the co-opted interest associations of both management and labor,¹⁰² Médici tended to let his progressive cabinet ministers push the theme of developmental

¹⁰⁰For an analysis of this reconciliation, see Jornal do Brasil, 23 April 1969, p. 4.

¹⁰¹O Estado de São Paulo, 8 October 1969, p. 1.

¹⁰²Jornal do Brasil, 9 October 1969, p. 4.

nationalism in the first months of his administration. Education Minister Jarbas Passarinho in December, 1969, persuaded President Médici to cancel the proposed Expo-72 for Rio de Janeiro in favor of directing the money toward completion of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. The regime publicized this act as a demonstration of its dedication for improving the quality of life in Brazil, rather than for making the nation a playground for international tourists.¹⁰³ Passarinho, Transportation Minister Andreatza, Interior Minister Costa Cavalcanti, and Planning Minister Velosos disseminated information concerning new programs in an attempt to direct attention toward national development.

While his cabinet ministers were articulating their developmentalist ideas, President Médici was attempting to establish his position of leadership. He sought to establish some rapport with civilian politicians by promising to reopen the suspended state legislative assemblies, by asking Congress to work diligently in an extended special session to review revolutionary legislation, and by sending his ministers to Congress to explain their programs and philosophies.¹⁰⁴ The President attempted to establish a dialogue with the students by receiving student leaders, by publicly affirming his great confidence in the youth of Brazil, and by instituting a sweeping reorganization of the university

¹⁰³Ibid., 12 December 1969, p. 5.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., 14 November 1969, p. 3.

system.¹⁰⁵ In a grant of status to the military, Médici attended the ceremony for the victims of the 1935 attempted coup by the communists and praised the armed forces for their constant defense of the nation. In an apparent effort to establish himself as a man of the masses, the President received Pelé to congratulate the great soccer player for having scored his one-thousandth goal.¹⁰⁶ Thus, while his ministers floated trial balloons concerning the future programs for the regime, Médici solidified his military support and developed a popular image during the first three months of his administration.

By March, 1970, the strategy for the regime was becoming clearer. In January Médici instructed his cabinet to do everything possible to control the rising cost of living, to maintain governmental austerity, and to find a means for a more just distribution of the national wealth.¹⁰⁷ At the same time, Planning Minister Veloso presented his "Project Brazil: Great Power," outlining the major developmental goals for the regime. As Médici gradually accepted this plan into his and the nationalist officers' conception of national security, the proposed "Estado Revolucionário" began to take shape. The Revolutionary State was to be a "revolutionary-but-constitutional" regime which would have the authority to alter all aspects of Brazilian society so

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 16 November 1969, p. 4.

¹⁰⁶ O Estado de São Paulo, 23 November 1969, p. 1.

¹⁰⁷ Jornal do Brasil, 7 January 1970, p. 3.

as to guarantee internal peace, external security, and a minimal level of well-being for everyone.¹⁰⁸ Development was to be the key to both national security and general welfare, and, although foreign capital would be welcomed, Brazil would not tie itself to any nation.¹⁰⁹

By this time the regime had apparently come to the conclusion that there was a direct relationship between the standard of living of the average citizen and the wave of terrorism that had recurred periodically since late 1968. Thus, the only way of permanently stopping the terrorists was to improve the lot of the citizens and, thereby, destroy the legitimacy of the terrorist groups. Having concluded that "the economy is doing well but the majority of the people are doing poorly,"¹¹⁰ Médici opened the long-recessed Congress (which since December, 1968, had met only to elect Médici) on March 31, 1970, with promises to limit inflation to 10 percent per year, and to halt subversion. Economic development and social justice (to be achieved through redistribution of the wealth) were strongly emphasized.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸From a March 10, 1970, speech delivered by Médici. Quoted by Jornal do Brasil, 11 March 1970, pp. 3, 5.

¹⁰⁹For an analysis of the shift from the staunchly pro-United States foreign policy of Castelo Branco to the moderately pro-West, but much more nationalistic, foreign policy of Médici, see H. Jon Rosenbaum, "Brazil's Foreign Policy: Developmentalism and Beyond," Orbis, XVI (Spring, 1972), 62-68.

¹¹⁰Jornal do Brasil, 11 March 1970, p. 3.

¹¹¹Ibid., 1 April 1970, p. 3.

The regime's concern over the plight of the majority of people was long overdue. Throughout the preceding decade each government had periodically increased the minimum wage; but, since these increases did not keep pace with inflation, the buying power of wage laborers steadily decreased as shown in Table VI. In addition, the minimum wage was wholly inadequate to maintain a family in most cases. A study done by a São Paulo labor syndicate in 1968 showed that a family of four required 397 cruzeiros per month to provide for general necessities, yet the minimum wage for the area at that time was 105 cruzeiros.¹¹² On top of this, one must consider the fact that most employees in nonindustrial pursuits did not even receive the minimum wage. The rosy indicators for economic growth concealed the tremendous disparity in income distribution. The Brazilian GNP grew by 8.5 percent in 1968, and 9.0 percent in 1969, yet the upper 1 percent of the population received 28 percent of the personal income, and the lower 90 percent divided only 46 percent of the total personal income.¹¹³

After having publicly recognized the poor economic position of the Brazilian masses, President Médici began his program to elicit popular support by allocating some of the political resources that had been carefully husbanded. Although he denounced the paternalism of the past, the President on April 30, 1970, announced an increase of about

¹¹²O Estado de São Paulo, 15 February 1968, p. 7.

¹¹³Jornal do Brasil, 31 May 1970, p. 16.

TABLE VI*

MINIMUM MONTHLY WAGE FOR GUANABARA

Date of Increase	Minimum Wage in New Cruzeiros	Minimum Wage in Dollars
February, 1956	3.80	47.80
January, 1958	6.00	40.60
October, 1960	9.60	50.00
October, 1961	13.44	43.20
January, 1963	21.00	44.50
February, 1964	42.00	41.00
February, 1965	66.00	35.50
March, 1966	84.00	37.50
March, 1967	105.00	38.50
March, 1968	129.60	38.50
March, 1969	156.00	37.00

*Source: Jornal do Brasil, 1 May 1969, p. 7.

25 percent in the minimum wage. In addition, he promised a reform of the social security system, a revitalization of the syndicates by giving them some control over social security for their members, and extension of the Rural Social Fund to cover all rural workers.¹¹⁴ In August the regime, with great fanfare, announced a new program which was designed to give the workers of Brazil a role in the development of Brazilian capitalism. The Programa de Integração Social (Program for Social Integration) would allow each worker to participate in the profits derived from the economic growth of the nation by establishing a saving fund for each worker. The fund is financed by a gradually increasing diversion from the employer's income tax--2 percent in 1971, increasing to 5 percent in 1973 and

¹¹⁴Ibid., 1 May 1970, pp. 4-5. This increase in the minimum wage, like the increases of the previous six years, was only a stopgap measure since it just barely exceeded the inflation which had occurred since the previous increase.

thereafter--and a share of the employer's gross receipts-- 0.15 percent in 1971, increasing to 0.50 percent for 1973 and thereafter. The money would be held in the Federal Depository drawing 3 percent interest and could be withdrawn by the employee for marriage, home purchase, retirement, or disability and would revert to the employee's heirs upon death.¹¹⁵

The creation of the Plan for Social Integration was designed both to win workers' support for the regime and to generate capital savings which could be directed toward development. By creating the workers' fund with the individual passbook as tangible evidence of participation in the profits of the enterprise, the regime apparently hoped to establish a psychology of saving and sacrifice for one's personal future.

The Plan for Social Integration drew the wholehearted support of the industrialists because it involved little cost to them since it was to be financed primarily from the employers' income tax, with only a small proportion coming from the employers' profits. Furthermore, the fund would provide a valuable source of capital for the industrialists since the government was authorized to loan out the money at current interest rates. The program in reality would save the industrialists money because it could be used as a rationale for avoiding further increases in the minimum wage

¹¹⁵Ibid., 21 August 1970, p. 3. See also a detailed analysis in Veja (August 26, 1970), pp. 28-33.

and would justify the elimination of the thirteenth salary, the oft-used practice of ordering employers to pay workers a bonus of the monthly minimum wage at Christmastime in order to counter the effect of inflation.

The highly publicized program was well received by the captive employers' and employees' syndicates and apparently also by the employees as a whole. Even the MDB politicians, who had been normally critical or at least silent concerning government proposals, openly endorsed the program.¹¹⁶ The Program for Social Integration had the effect of sustaining the "populist" image of President Médici, which had its roots in the policy statements of January-April, 1970, and which was firmly established by the President's wholehearted participation in the national euphoria following Brazil's victory in the World Cup soccer series.¹¹⁷ The athletic accomplishment with its national pride, teamwork, and mass identification and the publicized concern for the wage earners as exemplified by the Programa de Integração Social were both used in the November, 1970 elections to solicit active support for the regime.

The regime not only sought to identify itself with the less fortunate wage earners, it also tried to establish itself as the protector of the totally unfortunate. By May, 1970, the Northeast of Brazil was totally paralyzed by the

¹¹⁶Veja (September 2, 1970), pp. 20-21.

¹¹⁷See Jornal do Brasil, 23 June 1970, pp. 3, 5; and 24 June 1970, pp. 1, 4; and Sanders, pp. 5-9.

worst drought to hit the region since 1958. Hundreds of thousands of people had been driven from their homes in search of food; and neither the state governments nor SUDENE, the governmental agency created in 1958 to foster economic development in the Northeast,¹¹⁸ were able to decide upon a solution for the problem. In early June, Médici spent a week in the Northeast inspecting conditions, talking with officials, and talking with the victims of the drought. He was impressed by the victims and made promises to them that he would find a permanent solution to their problem.¹¹⁹

The permanent solution to the problem of the Northeast was a plan, first announced with little fanfare on March 16, 1970, to create a highway network for the Amazon Basin.¹²⁰ Following Médici's visit to the Northeast, the proposed highway system was integrated into the national development plan. By October, with no end to the drought in sight, the proposal had become a crash project to build a five-thousand kilometer highway from Pernambuco to the Peruvian border in

¹¹⁸For a study of the drought problems and the many ineffective governmental attempts to alleviate the situation, see Albert O. Hirshman, Journeys Toward Progress: Studies of Economic Policy-Making in Latin America (Garden City, New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1963), pp. 31-129.

¹¹⁹Jornal do Brasil, 10 June 1970, p. 3. According to one newsman who covered the inspection trip, the President, a heavy smoker, was most impressed by the fact that the drought victims could not afford even the cheapest cigarettes.

¹²⁰Ibid., 17 March 1970, p. 7.

less than two years.¹²¹ Like the Program for Social Integration, the Trans-Amazônica System was to serve two ends. First, it would provide jobs for the drought victims and, thus, would build support for the regime. Second, it would stimulate development of the long-neglected Amazon region and, thereby, open up new sources of wealth, secure Brazil's unsettled border areas, and hopefully attract settlers from the overpopulated Northeast. Like the World Cup victory, the Trans-Amazônica project excited a feeling of nationalistic pride, which was easily translated into support for the regime.

The Trans-Amazônica project is a good example of the moderate nationalism used by the third military government to draw out popular support while avoiding the loss of foreign support. The Castelo Branco government had the wholehearted support of the United States government and of the Western economic community, but the close relationship with the United States government and the foreign capitalists cost Castelo Branco some popular support and also lessened his support among the nationalist military officers. The Costa e Silva government attempted to avoid identification with the United States and was not as receptive to foreign capital. This increased both popular and linha-dura support but decreased foreign support. The Médici government has worked both sides of the street by being quietly receptive to foreign capital while

¹²¹Veja (October 14, 1970), pp. 19-21.

ostentatiously directing attention to the nationalistic developmental plans. If foreign capital is involved (and this is often the case), the government emphasizes the fact that the foreign contribution is carefully controlled by Brazilians. In addition, a rather independent foreign policy has succeeded in bolstering the nationalist image, but not to the extent that the military regime has lost the support of the United States government.¹²²

The success of Médici's efforts to create diffuse support is apparent in the opinion of the Brazilian youth. In a Marplan opinion poll conducted for the weekly news-magazine, Veja, during October, 1970, in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, and Recife, the new voters indicated a great disdain for politicians but showed considerable support for the revolutionary regime. President Médici received very high marks from the youths interviewed (many stated that he might be the best president ever) because of his support of futebol, because of his apparent interest in the working man, and especially because of his innovative character as witnessed by the Trans-Amazonica project.¹²³ Given the unsophisticated nature of Brazilian public opinion polls, it would not be valid to consider the Veja poll results as characteristic of the general population or even of the younger segment of the society, but one can safely say that the increasing prosperity of the nation and the

¹²²See Rosenbaum, pp. 66-69.

¹²³Veja (November 18, 1970), pp. 20-25.

emphasis upon developmental nationalism has apparently had the effect of channeling youthful energy away from political activity directed against the regime.

Except for three sensational incidents involving the abduction of foreign diplomats, the level of terrorism during 1970 (especially incidents of bombings and bank robberies) was well below the levels for 1968 and 1969, and, according to government spokesmen, the regime's efforts toward developmental nationalism were directly responsible for the reduction of such manifestations of negative support. In two highly publicized (and somewhat orchestrated) renunciations of terrorism by five former terrorists, the reasons given for the repudiation of terrorist tactics were related to developmental nationalism. Médici's concern for the drought victims of the Northeast, the Trans-Amazônica decision, and the idealism of the Rondon Project were mentioned in the declarations of the ex-terrorists.¹²⁴

Again one cannot automatically accept the validity of such declarations, but, given the susceptibility of the Brazilian masses for populist politics and the susceptibility of the younger segment for idealistic nationalism, it would seem logical to conclude that the regime had hit upon the proper blend of populism, nationalism, and idealism in

¹²⁴Jornal do Brasil, 4 July 1970, p. 6; and 21 September 1970, p. 3. Project Rondon was begun in 1965 as a domestic version of the U.S. Peace Corps to involve college students in helping people of backward areas build schools, clinics, water systems, etc. It is conducted under army supervision. Ibid., 23 April 1969, p. 4.

its developmental nationalism to create a significant level of diffuse support. And from the regime's standpoint, the use of the ideology of developmentalism has been a rather inexpensive venture in terms of political resources. Because of its monopoly over available benefits, the regime has been able to set its own prices for the commodities allocated. With the regime controlling information, it has been able to exaggerate its performance and, thereby, gain some legitimacy which again skewed the terms of trade toward the regime. The real performance of the government has been very beneficial to the agricultural and economic elites and has, thus, drawn support from those sectors. The publicized performance has purported to benefit the working man, and with no countering information to question the official information, this has resulted in some support from the lower sectors.

The propagation of the image of a Brazilian "economic miracle," for both domestic and foreign consumption, has to some extent been used to compensate for the violence of the regime and to proclaim the advantages of authoritarianism.¹²⁵ All of this has been achieved at very little cost since the regime has given up little status and authority, and the allocation of goods and services to the average Brazilian worker has actually declined.¹²⁶ Furthermore,

¹²⁵J. Serra, "The Brazilian 'Economic Miracle,'" in Latin America From Dependence to Revolution, ed. James Petras (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973), p. 101.

¹²⁶See Ibid., pp. 116-125.

increased legitimacy as a result of growing support for the regime should improve the regime's market situation in the future.

Diffuse Supports: The Façade of Democracy

The coup which ousted the Goulart government was justified in the name of constitutional democracy. According to the leaders of the revolution, the corruption and subversion present in the political system were leading the country into the hands of the communists and, thus, toward a totalitarian dictatorship. Since the perfection of democratic institutions was one of the goals of the revolution, the revolutionary regime was forced to maintain a democratic façade in order to prevent a wholesale withdrawal of popular support.

Because constitutional structures and procedures could neither be destroyed nor long ignored, the façade of democratic and constitutional legality was maintained by altering those structures and procedures so that their continued existence would not present a threat to the revolutionary regime. The constitutional changes for this purpose have already been discussed in Chapter IV. Each change of the constitution increased the power of the executive while paying lip service to such principles as the separation of powers, representative democracy, and civil liberties. Congress and the Supreme Court were preserved although their powers were gradually attenuated so that the façade might be

maintained. In October, 1965, Castelo Branco insisted upon the constitutional route for the reforming measures demanded by the military in spite of strong pressure from the hard-line group to close Congress. Only when he became convinced that Congress would not respond, did he sacrifice constitutional legality (and its potential for maintaining popular support) for the immediate need to maintain military support.

Again in 1968 the revolutionary regime resisted hard-line military pressure as long as possible in order to maintain the appearance of constitutional legality. Even after President Costa e Silva had signed AI-5 and closed Congress, he repeated his strong belief in democracy. In the view of the President, democracy had really been betrayed by the politicians:

The government tried the road of tolerance and got in exchange intolerance. It experimented with magnanimity and became weak. It looked for political support and saw itself betrayed by the impatriotism of not a few. We cannot permit the self-destruction of democracy.¹²⁷

To the leaders of the revolution it was the revanchist, counterrevolutionary elements that had prevented the peaceful exercise of representative democracy.

Along with the maintenance of Congress and the courts as symbols of the continued existence of democracy, the revolutionary regime also tried to preserve the appearance

¹²⁷Quoted in O Estado de São Paulo, 28 December 1968, p. 4.

of political competition. Thus, Castelo Branco, because he had promised to preserve and perfect the democratic system, insisted upon holding elections in 1965 despite warnings from the hard line that such elections would be dangerous. When a crisis developed as a result of the 1965 elections, the regime did not abolish the competitive process. It only changed the rules so that the competition would not be so "dangerous" from the standpoint of preserving the direction of the revolution. The voters were to participate vicariously in executive elections through their representatives. Competition for legislative seats was to be conducted through a controlled system of two-party politics.

To justify such alterations in the democratic process, the definition of democracy had to be changed. From a stated position that "elections and a free electoral campaign represent the evidence of democratic normality,"¹²⁸ Castelo Branco and the revolutionary regime went to the position that indirect elections are a part of the democratic tradition of Brazil and of the United States and, thus, do not contradict democratic principles.¹²⁹ True democracy was defined as being more than liberty and equality. The definition was expanded to encompass the idea of human progress; and, in pursuit of this progress, certain aspects of the narrow definition had to be sacrificed in

¹²⁸Quoted by Jornal do Brasil, 1 October 1965, p. 3.

¹²⁹For an example of this argument, see Wamberto, pp. 61-69.

order to establish the strong institutional bases for human progress.¹³⁰

As the revolutionary leaders became more and more convinced of the necessity of maintaining an authoritarian regime, their definition of democracy became more abstract. Many specific, operational principles of classical democratic theory were dismissed as not being appropriate to the new version of democracy. According to Senator Daniel Krieger, president of ARENA,

Democracy is no longer the classical version--restricted to liberty, equality, and selection of governments by the people. That has been surpassed by emerging ideas and interests in its evolution. . . . Democracy is now the solidarista version that conserves the main framework of the original construction but is more sensitive to the realities of the present and the perspectives of the future and incorporates in its structure the principle of social well-being.¹³¹

Social solidarity and well-being, therefore, became major components of the new democratic theory; and traditional concepts such as liberty, equality, and competitive politics could not be allowed to interfere in the quest for solidarity and well-being.

Once democracy had been redefined as social solidarity and well-being, it was relatively easy to fit democracy into developmental nationalism. Thus, Emílio Médici, in his

¹³⁰Corção, pp. 35-37.

¹³¹Jornal do Brasil, 11 May 1968, p. 3. Solidarismo is a Christian natural-law philosophy emphasizing Christian charity and community solidarity. See Fernando Bastos de Ávila, Solidarismo (Rio de Janeiro: AGIR, 1963).

first broadcast to the nation as the presidential candidate, promised to leave democracy installed in the nation at the end of his administration; but the democracy which he spoke of would be an aspect of the nation's social and economic development.¹³² In subsequent pronouncements, President Médici continued with the theme that democracy was tied closely to development, that individual liberty and well-being could not be disassociated from the autonomy, strength, and well-being of the nation, and that development and democracy were the responsibility of all Brazilians.¹³³

The subtle juxtaposition of the ideas of nationalism, democracy, developmentalism, social responsibility, and individual well-being did little for the idea of democracy itself, but this may have been the true purpose of the regime. The continued existence of the democratic façade gave the appearance of democracy in order to confound those who criticized the authoritarian nature of the regime and, thus, to prevent any serious manifestations of negative support. Furthermore, the use of the façade allowed the preservation of democratic structures that would be needed if and when conditions were suitable for transition to a more competitive political system.

¹³²Jornal do Brasil, 8 October 1969, p. 3. For the text of this speech, see Emilio Garrastazu Médici, O Jôgo da Verdade (Brasília: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1970), pp. 9-15.

¹³³See Jornal do Brasil, 28 February 1970, p. 3; 11 March 1970, p. 5; 1 April 1970, p. 3; and 2 April 1970, p. 3, for examples.

As long as the revolutionary regime maintained the support of the armed forces, it would have the coercive power to produce outputs that could generate further support for the government. Direct, positive military support was critical to the success of the regime, but military support alone would not be sufficient in the long run to guarantee the type of political change which the revolutionary leaders desired. Repressed or co-opted political groups would not remain repressed or co-opted without the creation of a minimal level of diffuse support among the relevant sectors of Brazilian society. The promotion of honesty and moderation, the use of developmental nationalism, and the maintenance of the democratic façade were, in part, directed toward achieving the base of support and legitimacy that would allow the regime a great deal of economy in the use of its political resources for the immediate goal of retaining power and the ultimate goal of stability and security.

CHAPTER VII

INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT THROUGH A REGIME PARTY

As a regime accumulates a reservoir of political capital, it is able to exchange some of its resources for additional resources. Some of the expenditure of regime resources can be directed toward eliciting the political support which will allow a more economical use of political goods. Support that is derived from a quid pro quo exchange of goods and services, authority, status, information, or coercion may, however, be tenuous and transitory if the regime does not establish ongoing and legitimate procedures for allocating benefits and a reservoir of support that can be delivered when the regime's store of resources may be insufficient to solve the problem of the moment. An effective political system, then, is characterized by the existence of institutions that are independent of the personalities that occupy structural roles.¹

In military-controlled authoritarian systems the allegiance of administrative structures is not a major problem.

¹Huntington, Political Order, p. 24.

Since the military is the government, allocations of authority and status and the defense of institutional interest will generally ensure that the armed forces will administer the coercion which the regime requires to maintain control of the society. Likewise, the civil bureaucracy will allocate benefits, as instructed by the regime, because indiscipline would threaten the institutional interests of the bureaucracy.² In Brazil the revolutionary regime's problem with military officers was one of restraining their delivery of coercion and not one of refusal to deliver. Nor has the Brazilian regime had any difficulty in persuading the civil bureaucracy to perform its administrative functions.³ Administrative discipline in Brazil was significantly facilitated by the fact that the military and civilian bureaucratic structures had long had the characteristics of stable institutions.

Institutionalized political support is often a problem for an authoritarian regime because the necessity of maintaining a political monopoly inhibits the willingness of the regime to allocate the information, status, and authority required to create a supporting institution. Yet, the existence of such an institution or institutions is extremely important for political socialization, for recruitment of leaders, and for increasing the predictability of

²Felt, pp. 8-14.

³See Robert T. Daland, "Attitudes Toward Change Among Brazilian Bureaucrats," Journal of Comparative Administration, IV (August, 1972), 199-203.

political support.⁴ Institutions facilitate the education of new groups as to the rules of the game so that they may participate in politics without threatening the regime. More importantly, an institutionalized infrastructural group can provide information, leaders, and mobilized support without the necessity of an immediate payoff of political goods in exchange.⁵

The most commonly used and, perhaps, the most effective institution for delivering predictable support is the political party.⁶ Parties, as theoretical representatives of popular opinion, can provide legitimacy for the regime. They can produce information which the regime needs for formulating policy. They can organize and channel popular participation into generally accepted patterns so as to limit the amount of coercion necessary to maintain social peace. And a party may serve to create additional status and authority positions, which the regime can use as political resources.⁷ The creation of a political party as an institutionalized supporting structure is not without

⁴See Blau, pp. 273-276; and Ilchman and Uphoff, pp. 210-211.

⁵Blau, p. 279.

⁶Huntington, Political Order, pp. 89-92; Ilchman and Uphoff, pp. 225-232. For a discussion of the positive role of political parties in the process of political development, see Myron Weiner and Joseph LaPalombara (eds.), "The Impact of Parties on Political Development," in Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

⁷Ilchman and Uphoff, pp. 226-227.

significant costs to the regime, however. As stated above, party creation may involve the allocation of information, status, and authority (and perhaps coercion) which the regime may be loath to give up. In addition, the expenditure is immediate while the dividends are to be delivered at some future, but unspecified, date. Nevertheless, the dividends would seem to justify the expenditures if the institutional party is successfully established because the resulting support and legitimacy will allow the regime to receive a more predictable and larger amount of sector resources for a given expenditure of its own resources.

In Brazil the military regime attempted to create an institutionalized government party that would deliver political support and, thereby, legitimize the authoritarian regime. In this effort the regime used its resources to manipulate party and electoral statutes and to establish the means for disciplining party members. The leaders have also attempted to establish strong local party structures that would allow better control of the clientage network.

The Regime Commitment to Party Reorganization

During the first year in power, the leaders of the revolution began to realize the inadequacy of the political system that they were trying to guide back to normalcy under the tutelary rule of Castelo Branco. Indeed, the revolutionary leaders grudgingly recognized that the old multi-party system was a major contributor to the corruption,

demagoguery, and ineffectiveness which led to the 1964 coup. The multiplication of parties, created in part by the proportional-representation system of election, severely hampered the independence of majority-elected officials since electoral success required a coalition of parties. Once a president or governor was elected, his coalition cabinet became a heterogeneous complex without the discipline and unity needed for effective administration.⁸

In addition to the heterogeneity of coalitions among different parties, there was little evidence of national party organization. The federal nature of Brazil, the fact that the electoral constituency corresponded to the territory of a state, led to the formation of a party nucleus at the state level only. With direct popular election of the president, there was no institution, such as the United States Electoral College, to promote a national organization.⁹ Brazilian parties were national only because legislation required them to be national. In actuality Brazilian political parties were ad hoc organizations for achieving political power "without popular expression, without organization by which the party voter is able to express his will. The parties have neither programs nor ideologies. Their only goal is the power to distribute public jobs."¹⁰

⁸Luis Navarro de Britto, pp. 246-247. See also Borges, p. 106.

⁹Lima Sobrinho, p. 42.

¹⁰Cabral, pp. 116-117.

Long before the military assumed direct control of the government, some members of the Sorbonne group recognized the need for party reform. David Carneiro, in a Superior War College lecture delivered in 1959, emphasized the need for fewer, more disciplined political parties. He advocated an electoral law that would allow a new party to be created only if there was a group presenting a new program. Thus, the parties would represent ideas and programs instead of personalities.¹¹ An application of Carneiro's ideas was the original thrust of the revolutionary regime's efforts to reform the party system in 1965. Through the 1965 Electoral Code, the Parties Statute, and the Law of Ineligibilities, the regime tried to make the party system more manageable and, thus, a better system for aggregating interests and organizing political support.¹²

The 1965 reforms were not successful in delivering the organized participation and support that the regime desired (in reality, the reforms were not given sufficient time to be properly tested) and more draconian measures were instituted. Following the abolition of the existing parties by AI-2, President Castelo Branco became an advocate of a government-versus-opposition arrangement. In November, 1965, he made it clear to his congressional leaders that he wanted a single government party even though his political advisors

¹¹David Carneiro, Organização Política do Brasil (Departamento de Estudos, Escola Superior de Guerra, C-47-59, 1959), pp. 19-20.

¹²Ferreira de Castro, p. 317.

warned him of the difficulties involved in fitting a majority of the congressmen into the proposed Aliança de Renovação Nacional.¹³ The decision to create a party-of-the-revolution was apparently related to three factors. First, by abolishing the old parties and creating a single government party, it would be easier to block the presidential aspirations of Carlos Lacerda. Second, the single government party would allow better discipline in passing government-sponsored legislation than the coalition Bloco Parlamentar Revolucionário. Third, the civil-military crisis which led to AI-2 probably convinced Castelo Branco that the tutelary regime could not succeed and that a strong revolutionary party was needed before the military would be able to return to the barracks.

Once the decision concerning ARENA was made, the party became a major part of the political program by which Castelo Branco sought "to give the country a solid political structure, capable of serving as a political support for the Revolution."¹⁴ Castelo Branco presided over the formation of the government party (and in a limited way over the creation of the opposition MDB also) and left his successor with a two-party system in place of the thirteen-party conglomeration that had existed.

¹³Carlos Castello Branco, "Coluna do Castello," Jornal do Brasil, 26 November 1965, p. 4.

¹⁴From an August 13, 1966, speech. Jornal do Brasil, 14 August 1966, p. 3.

President Costa e Silva declared himself a believer in the two-party system that Castelo Branco had set up since "such a system ideally could unite all the tendencies of the country."¹⁵ Costa e Silva had difficulty maintaining party unity and often seemed indifferent to the problems confronting the party leaders, but he continued his vocal support for the revolutionary party: "A great democratic party, united, vigorous and identified with the most profound tendencies of the popular spirit, is the vanguard and best support of the regime. . . ." ¹⁶

Likewise President Médici, in his inaugural speech, dedicated himself to the strengthening of the revolutionary party so that it could be an instrument of political socialization as well as a factor of support for the government.¹⁷ For Médici, the party would be the rock on which the Brazilian representative system would be built.¹⁸

Despite the verbal dedication of the three presidents to the idea of establishing a two-party system dominated by a strong government party, the creation of such a system proved to be quite difficult. First of all, the military officers' traditional distrust of civilian politicians precluded giving the loyal congressional politicians the

¹⁵Ibid., 28 October 1967, p. 3.

¹⁶O Estado de São Paulo, 4 October 1968, p. 3.

¹⁷For the text of the speech, see O Jôgo de Verdade, pp. 31-36.

¹⁸Speech to ARENA convention, October 20, 1969. For text, see Ibid., pp. 41-45.

authority and status needed to organize and discipline the party members. Second, the personalism and clientelism inherent in the existing party system made difficult the task of blending the various personalities and interests into just two parties. The early dissatisfaction with the artificial two-party system was such that Senator Petrônio Portela commented: "If the rumored third party were founded right now, there would be no one in either ARENA or MDB."¹⁹ The statement was undoubtedly an exaggeration, but it was indicative of the discomfort involved in restricting political activity to the confines of a two-party system and, thus, of the problems which would confront efforts to build an institutionalized party that could deliver electoral and legislative support and, perhaps, take control of the government when the soldiers decide to return to the barracks.

Party Statutes

Federal legislation has generally played a significant role in defining the characteristics of Brazilian political parties so it was not surprising that the revolutionary regime should try to change the party system by using its authority to alter the party statutes. The so-called "national" parties that existed prior to the March 31, 1964, coup were national only because federal legislation required that they have support in more than one state. Shortly before the end of the Estado Nôvo, Getúlio Vargas issued

¹⁹Jornal do Brasil, 13 June 1968, p. 3.

Decree-Law 7,586, which allowed the creation of political parties. The decree-law specified that the party had to have at least ten thousand voters distributed in five or more states. In 1946 the requirement was raised to fifty thousand voters in five states with at least one thousand in each state, and the 1950 Party Statute provided for cancellation of a party's national registration if it did not demonstrate national electoral support (i.e., elect one representative to Congress and receive at least fifty thousand votes under its label in a national election).

With such minimal requirements for qualifying as a "national" party and without some other factor, such as a parliamentary system or an electoral college system to require some semblance of a national organization and a motivation to achieve majority status, there was a general proliferation of parties. Most of the parties were state or, at best, regional organizations and only the PTB, PSD, and UDN could claim significant national strength. These three parties normally drew 60 to 70 percent of the vote; but in the early 1960's they were more and more forced to take part in ad hoc alliances to maintain their positions vis-a-vis the growing smaller parties.

Assuming that the existing larger parties would become more effective and manageable if the many small parties were eliminated, the first action of the revolutionary regime was aimed at tidying up the existing system by increasing the minimum requirements for party organization. In

April, 1965, the regime sent to Congress proposed legislation that would greatly reduce the number of parties.²⁰ Congress softened the requirements somewhat, but President Castelo Branco, by discrete use of his item veto, effectively returned the statute to its original form.²¹ The final version of the Lei Orgânico dos Partidos Políticos required a party to present proof within one year to the Supreme Electoral Court that it had the following: (1) party directorates in at least eleven states; (2) twelve federal deputies elected from at least seven states; and (3) at least 3 percent of the total vote in the last election for federal deputies.²² These minimal requirements, along with the other basic reforms contained in the law, combined to make the Statute a very progressive law which, according to Josaphat Marinho, would have led to the creation of truly national and representative parties and, thus, the effective exercise of representative democracy.²³

The Parties Statute was not given a chance to fulfill its promises. To the military hard line, the reluctance of Congress to pass certain legislative proposals sponsored by the regime and the lack of total success in the October,

²⁰Jornal do Brasil, 23 April 1965, p. 3.

²¹O Estado de São Paulo, 16 July 1965, p. 4.

²²The congressional version of the bill allowed official registration if any one of the conditions were met. For the text of the Parties Statute, see Código Eleitoral, pp. 174-202.

²³"Lei Orgânico dos Partidos Políticos no Brasil," pp. 51-58.

1965, gubernatorial elections were indications of the dangers involved in relying upon the ad hoc coalition of PSD and UDN politicians as a support base for the revolution. Thus, AI-2 included the abolition of all existing parties.

The abolition of the parties by AI-2 was apparently intended to hasten the process of party reform since it carried a provision that new parties could be organized in accordance with the Parties Statute. The act did immediately what the Parties Statute would have done in July of 1966, but nothing more. Shortly after the publication of AI-2, however, President Castelo Branco and his advisors apparently changed their minds as to the nature of the party system which they desired for Brazil. On November 20 they issued AC-4, which significantly altered the requirements for creating new parties.

Complementary Act Number 4, calling for the creation of organizations which would have the attributes of political parties, represents the basic policy decision to create a bipartite system. The act authorized members of Congress, in a group composed of not less than 120 deputies and twenty senators, to create within forty-five days organizations that would function in place of political parties until the organizations might be registered as legal parties in accord with the Parties Statute.²⁴ The democratic procedures of the Parties Statute were ignored in AC-4, and the organization of the party-like associations was strictly from the

²⁴ See Atos Institucionais, Vol. I, pp. 33-36.

top down. The charter members in Congress were to elect the national directorate, which would then select each state directorate, which would then select the municipal directorates.

Theoretically, the requirement for 120 deputies and twenty senators would have allowed the formation of three parties since there were 409 deputies and sixty-six senators (independence was made undesirable by a stipulation that those congressmen who did not join a party-like organization could not serve on legislative committees). This was not to be, however, despite the contention by some political analysts that, in a society such as that of Brazil, political tendencies cannot be reduced to a number less than three.²⁵ Rather than organize by political conviction, the pseudo parties organized by political position (i.e., the "in's" versus the "out's"). Almost every politician whose political past made him acceptable to the regime opted for the "in" position. As a result, the government party very quickly counted over forty senators and some 240 deputies in its charter membership.²⁶

²⁵For example, J. Colombo de Souza, "Distorções na Reforma Político-Eleitoral," Arquivos de Comissão de Constituição e Justiça, II (January/June, 1966), 37-39, argues that the three basic groups in Brazil are those favoring conservatism, those favoring reform toward the left, and those favoring reform toward the right. A bipartite system can only exist in a petrified society of satisfied people.

²⁶For a brief discussion of reasons for joining the government party, see Aderson de Menezes, "As Eleições Federais de 1966: A Legislação Eleitoral e o Bi-Partidismo Nacional," RBEF, No. 23/24 (July, 1967/January, 1968), 10-12.

The rush to join ARENA was such that there was some doubt as to the possibility of organizing an opposition party that would be able to meet the legal requirements. In late November, Castelo Branco emphasized to a group of PSD politicians the absolute necessity of having an opposition party; and Justice Minister Juraci Magalhães hinted that a new complementary act would be issued if the requirements of AC-4 prevented the creation of a second party.²⁷ When the MDB organizers finally announced on December 10 that the party was able to request official recognition, it was rumored that it had taken much pressure by both opposition leaders and government leaders to persuade Senator Aarão Steinbruch to become the twentieth senator to sign the MDB list.²⁸

Aside from the problem of achieving the required number of senators for the opposition party, the regime experienced problems in getting agreement as to the composition of the national, state, and municipal directorates. While the MDB had trouble finding individuals who were willing to brand themselves as opposition by serving on the party's directorates, the government suffered from not having enough positions to satisfy the many candidates and factions competing for status and authority. Just before the forty-five-day time limit required by AC-4 was to expire, the regime

²⁷Jornal do Brasil, 24 November 1965, p. 5; and 27 November 1965, p. 4.

²⁸Ibid., 11 December 1965, p. 6.

published AC-6, which extended the time limit for registration to March 15, 1966. When it became evident that agreement concerning the division of positions would not be possible even with the postponed deadline, the regime on January 31 issued AC-7, which, inter alia, created more positions in the state and municipal directorates and, thus, made agreement possible.²⁹

Just before the extended time period expired, ARENA submitted its request for registration as a party-like organization. Its national directorate included thirty-three federal deputies (among whom was Plínio Salgado, the leader of the fascist-oriented Integralistas of the 1930's), eighteen senators, and twenty-two distinguished citizens (among whom were ex-President Dutra, several ex-governors and ex-ministers, novelist Raquel de Quiroz, several professors, and the leaders of several employers' and employees' syndicates).³⁰ When Congress organized in 1966, ARENA counted 43 senators against 21 for MDB and 254 deputies against 150 for MDB.³¹

In spite of the dissatisfaction with the policies of the Castelo Branco government and the internal dissension between ex-PSD and ex-UDN factions, the provisional government party was held together through the 1966 elections.

²⁹For AC-6, see Atos Institucionais, Vol. I, p. 39; and for AC-7, pp. 41-43.

³⁰Jornal do Brasil, 16 March 1966, p. 4.

³¹Menezes, p. 11. There were two senators and five deputies who had not joined either party.

Following the elections, President Castelo Branco and President-elect Costa e Silva gave the party leaders the regime's official blessing to transform the party-like organization into a legal political party. Although in normal circumstances ARENA would have had little trouble in gaining official recognition, its leaders at this time perceived a need for haste since Lacerda's proposed Frente Ampla, if constituted, might draw away a sizable proportion of ARENA's membership.³²

President Castelo Branco, however, saw another way to blunt the threat coming from Lacerda or any other dissident group which might try to constitute itself as a political party. The 1967 Constitution repeated the provisions of the 1946 Constitution concerning a representative democracy based on the plurality of parties. It also repeated the principles concerning electoral court supervision and the prohibition of party alliances contained in the 1965 Parties Statute but added a new twist to the party system. Section VII of Article 149 specified that organization of a political party required "10 (ten) percent of the electorate that had voted in the last general election for the Câmara dos Deputados, distributed in two thirds of the states with a minimum of at least 7 (seven) percent in each of the states, as well as 10 (ten) percent of the deputies in at least one third of the states and 10 (ten) percent of the senators."

³²Jornal do Brasil, 26 November 1966, p. 4.

This negated the principle of party plurality since it would be virtually impossible for a new organization to meet these requirements. According to legal specialists attached to the Superior Electoral Court, a prospective party would need at least 1,800,000 signatures of citizens who had voted in the November, 1966, election, with a distribution that would demand the prior existence of a strong national organization.³³ To maintain registration, an existing party was only required to demonstrate the affiliation of 10 percent of the deputies distributed in at least one third of the states and the affiliation of 10 percent of the senators. The 1,800,000 signatures were not required. ARENA and MDB both qualified and, under such an arrangement, would not have future rivals to worry about.

ARENA and MDB successfully registered as legal political parties in January, 1967, by fulfilling the requirements of the Parties Statute. In mid-1966 the state parties had held conventions to elect their directorates, and these officials assumed their identical posts in the recognized parties as a result of AC-29, signed December 26, 1966.³⁴ Little organization work had been done at the municipal level since the appointment of the directorates in early 1966, however; and, by early 1969, the parties were in legal

³³Ibid., 23 February 1967, p. 4.

³⁴For the text of AC-29, see Código Eleitoral, pp. 251-255.

difficulties for having neglected to fulfill all the requirements of the Parties Statute.

Article 47 of the Parties Statute required that the party present proof, within twelve months from the date of its registration, that it had organized in at least twelve states.³⁵ Article 33 stipulated that a state directorate could not be organized until at least one fourth of the municípios had legal party directorates. The MDB was hard pressed to meet this requirement in at least twelve states.³⁶ Furthermore, the automatic assumption of party directorate posts by the officials of the party-like organizations, as decreed by AC-29, was to be effective only until mid-1968. At that time municipal, state, and national conventions were to be held to elect new directorates. Since the only convention held was that of the national organization, the party organizations were, theoretically, no longer legal. Presumably because of the recurring crises throughout 1968, these violations were overlooked.³⁷

On May 20, 1969, President Costa e Silva acted to prevent the self-dissolution of the parties by signing AC-54. This act implicitly excused the violations of the Parties Statute by overruling any part of that law which conflicted with the complementary act. AC-54 established

³⁵This was changed from eleven to twelve by AC-29.

³⁶Carlos Castello Branco, "Coluna do Castella," Jornal do Brasil, 27 April 1969, p. 4.

³⁷Diário de Notícias, 21 May 1969, p. 3.

new dates for the municipal, state, and national conventions and provided for a "bottom-to-top" reorganization of the parties by having the municipal conventions elect delegates to the state conventions, which would in turn elect delegates to the national convention.³⁸

The postponement of the municipal conventions from April to August excused the violation of the Parties Statute, but more than time was needed. In order to constitute a municipal directorate, the party had to have the signatures of 5 percent of the voters in municípios of up to one thousand voters (in larger municípios the percentage was significantly less, thus, discriminating against the MDB, which had more support in the urbanized areas). Because the cassações following AI-5 had decimated the MDB leadership ranks, the party did not have the manpower in many states to register voters or to organize the municipal directorates. According to the MDB national officials, the party had a good chance of organizing the required one fourth of the municípios in only eight states, a fair chance in four others, and no chance in the remaining ten.³⁹ Thus, in order to maintain the façade of an opposition party and to facilitate local organization for ARENA, the regime was forced to modify the requirements.

³⁸For the text of AC-54, see Código Eleitoral, pp. 267-275.

³⁹Carlos Castello Branco, "Coluna do Castello," Jornal do Brasil, 7 June 1969, p. 4.

AC-56, signed on June 18, 1969, extended the deadline for party-member registration from the June 20 date dictated by AC-54 to July 10 and lowered the number of party members needed to form a municipal directorate.⁴⁰ Even this was not sufficient to guarantee the MDB's survival. Many local officials had apparently not understood the regime's desire to maintain the semblance of a two-party system and were using intimidation to prevent the registration of voters with the MDB. On June 26 the Justice Minister implicitly told these officials to end their intimidation by stating publicly that voters wanting to register with MDB would be guaranteed the freedom and safety to do so.⁴¹

Both ARENA and MDB were able to weather the storms of reorganization and held their municipal conventions as scheduled on August 10, 1969, in the municípios where the parties were able to organize. Despite the political turmoil resulting from the incapacitation of President Costa e Silva, the state conventions were conducted as scheduled on September 14, 1969. ARENA was able to establish a directorate in every state; but the MDB, despite the softened requirements, could muster the required percentage of municipal organizations in only thirteen states.⁴² In order to allow both parties to continue their efforts to organize directorates in the municípios and to allow MDB to continue

⁴⁰ Jornal do Brasil, 19 June 1969, p. 18.

⁴¹ Ibid., 27 June 1969, p. 3.

⁴² Ibid., 16 September 1969, p. 3.

its effort to organize in the remaining nine states, AC-61, signed by Costa e Silva on August 14, 1969, extended the organization period to April 15, 1970.⁴³

Because of the succession crisis which resulted from Costa e Silva's illness, the Military Junta postponed the national party conventions from October 12, 1969, to March 5, 1970,⁴⁴ but on October 27 the Junta moved the date back to November 20, 1969,⁴⁵ apparently because President-elect Médici wanted to establish himself as the leader of ARENA as soon as possible. At the convention Médici took personal control of the government party, telling the delegates that he wanted an early convention to affirm his faith in the revolution and the party of the revolution. The President told the party faithful that they would be the support of his government and that the success in achieving full democracy and the goals of the revolution depended upon the diligence, hard work, unselfishness, and idealism of the party members.⁴⁶

Médici personally selected Deputy Rondon Pacheco for the ARENA presidency. The energetic leadership of Pacheco and the personal interest of President Médici, coupled with

⁴³For the text of AC-61, see Código Eleitoral, pp. 280-290.

⁴⁴This was done by means of AC-66, signed on September 19, 1969. See Ibid., pp. 290-291.

⁴⁵By means of AC-77. See Ibid., pp. 305-307.

⁴⁶Jornal do Brasil, 21 November 1969, p. 3. For the text of his charge to the convention, see Médici, pp. 41-45.

the economic prosperity, the World Cup victory, and the popularity of Médici's social and economic developmental programs, combined to allow ARENA to function without further alteration of the legislation pertaining to political parties. The MDB needed some help, however; and, strangely enough, it came from the Military Junta.

The purges that followed AI-5 deprived the MDB of much of its leadership and many of its more popular politicians. The loss of leaders and proven vote-getters would obviously create electoral problems for the MDB. Since there existed no incipient third party to take advantage of a liberalized system, the three military ministers bowed to the advice of the politicians and reduced the constitutional requirement for party status from 10 percent of the electorate, distributed in two thirds of the states, to 5 percent, distributed in at least seven states. The 10 percent representation in both houses of Congress was dropped altogether.⁴⁷ The change was fortuitous since the MDB senate representation following the 1970 elections was barely above the former 10 percent minimum.

The various items of legislation concerning political party organization demonstrates that the revolutionary leadership's dedication to party reorganization was more than rhetoric. Through a trial-and-error process, the regime was approaching, by the end of 1970, the type of party system that it wanted. A strong, well-organized

⁴⁷Article 152 of the 1969 Constitution.

government party could deliver legislative and electoral support and, thus, legitimize the regime because of the representative nature of the party. A weak opposition party would provide a controllable channel for opposition activity and would give the appearance of competition to add to the democratic legitimacy of the regime. The party statutes were easily manipulated because of the regime's control of authority and coercion allowed it to force congressional passage of desired laws or to decree the existence of desired laws by means of institutional or complementary acts. This use of authority and coercion constituted immediate expenditures of regime resources for future benefits. It was then necessary to ensure the success of the regime party in order to have some confidence that the exchange would be profitable for the regime.

Electoral Laws

Although President Castelo Branco was able to create a two-party system by fiat, something more was needed to ensure that the government party would have the appearance of legitimacy. In a democracy, legitimacy is measured by popular support, delivered through the electoral process, so some means of guaranteeing strong support for the government party was essential. As with the creation and maintenance of the artificial two-party structure, manipulation of the laws concerning the electoral process was the means to the desired end.

The revolutionary regime was concerned with electoral laws long before the two-party system was created. With the hope that the existing political system could be improved by certain electoral reforms instituted by the tutelary government, President Castelo Branco charged the ministers of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Electoral Court with preparing recommendations for electoral reform. This group's recommendations, handed down on August 8, 1964, were as follows: (1) there should be more emphasis on and control over municipal party organizations; (2) there should be increased minimum requirements for establishing political parties; (3) election to legislative positions should be in part by district and in part by proportional representation; (4) women should be required to vote; (5) elections for all offices should be simultaneous, and mandates should be coincidental; (6) an official ballot should be required; (7) there should be better policing of elections and more use of mechanical devices; and (8) party alliances should be prohibited.⁴⁸

Most of these reforms and some additions, such as the Ineligibilities Law and the restrictions on campaign propaganda, were incorporated in the package of party and electoral reform amendments which Castelo Branco submitted to Congress in April of 1965. Congress was not able to complete action on the Electoral Code within the sixty-day time limit required by AI-1 so Castelo Branco promulgated the new

⁴⁸Jornal do Brasil, 9 August 1964, p. 10.

code as originally submitted.⁴⁹ Like the Parties Statute, the Electoral Code was a progressive piece of legislation, especially in its provisions for an official ballot, better supervision and inspection of the electoral process, and the prohibition of party alliances in proportional-representation contests.⁵⁰ Unfortunately, the milieu of popular hostility toward the regime prior to the 1966 elections forced the alteration of certain provisions of the code in order to guarantee the success of regime candidates.

For purposes of both immediate and long-range support, the revolutionary regime needed a solid ARENA victory in the legislative elections of November, 1966. Regime officials were fearful that many ARENA deputies would be defeated if the existing proportional-representation system were used so they discussed various means of avoiding such defeats. In earlier discussions, several forms of district elections--varying from a multimember, winner-takes-all type to a single-member, majority system--were studied.⁵¹ These were dismissed as not sufficient to guarantee an ARENA victory, and the discussion turned to a simple extension of legislative mandates for two or four years.⁵² Later discussions involved plans for the indirect election of senators

⁴⁹Ibid., 16 July 1965, p. 4.

⁵⁰For a discussion of these progressive reforms, see Menezes, pp. 11-14.

⁵¹Jornal do Brasil, 6 April 1966, p. 6.

⁵²Ibid., 14 April 1966, p. 3.

and the election of deputies by a distritão (expanded district) system, whereby an entire state would become an electoral district from which the party receiving a popular plurality would get all the deputy seats.⁵³

By July Castelo Branco had rejected all of these proposals as either impractical or too extreme. Instead, he decided to rely upon a system involving an individual ballot, the use of sublegends, and a linked-vote requirement. The individual ballot, outlawed by the 1965 Electoral Code in favor of the official ballot, was a ballot which the candidate or the party printed and distributed to the voters. The voter would then take to the polls the ballot of the candidate or party that he preferred, the ballot was validated, and it became the man's vote. This system not only invited fraud, but was also a financial burden on the candidate. Orlando M. Carvalho reported that one candidate for federal deputy in Minas Gerais in 1954 printed 930,000 ballots in order to receive a total of 17,000 votes--an average of fifty-five ballots per vote.⁵⁴

In order to avoid the problems mentioned above, the Electoral Code of 1965 prohibited the use of the individual ballot and provided for an official ballot listing the candidates for majority elections and having a space for the name, number, and party of the voter's preference for the

⁵³ Ibid., 13 May 1966, p. 3; and 13 June 1966, p. 6.

⁵⁴ Ensaios de Sociologia Eleitoral (Belo Horizonte: Edições da Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos, 1958), p. 48.

proportional-representation contests. On August 9, 1966, President Castelo Branco, by means of AC-20, reestablished the individual ballot for the 1966 election for all except state capitals and cities with populations of 100,000 or more.⁵⁵ Since the individual ballot favored the candidates and the parties with the most money and the best organization, the move was clearly designed to help ARENA candidates because it was to be used in rural areas--the location of the traditional clientage machines that had almost unanimously joined ARENA. The MDB, with less money and inferior organization in the rural areas, could not match the ARENA organization in the printing and distribution of individual ballots.⁵⁶

Since the official ballot was not to be used nationwide, there was no concerted effort to teach the voters how to use it; and this factor also worked against the opposition by cutting down the number of valid votes in the urban areas--the very areas where the MDB, as the successor to the PTB, would have its major strength. With the voter having to memorize the name and number of his choice for the P.R. election, and having to write the name and number on the

⁵⁵For the text, see Código Eleitoral, pp. 247-248.

⁵⁶Frank P. Sherwood, Institutionalizing the Grass Roots in Brazil: A Study in Comparative Local Government (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1967), pp. 71-72.

ballot, there were ample opportunities for mistakes and, thus, for invalid ballots.⁵⁷

The other two means for promoting the success of ARENA, the sublegend and the linked vote, must be analyzed together since they were part of a quid pro quo between both Castelo Branco and Costa e Silva, on the one hand, and the congressional politicians, on the other. The linked vote, stipulating that the voter's choices for federal deputy and state deputy were to be of the same party, was included in the 1965 Electoral Code at the insistence of Castelo Branco in order to discourage support for the smaller, regionally oriented parties. The measure was unpopular with many politicians who felt that their personal political appeal was far stronger than the appeal of the party.

The sublegend system, whereby two or more factions could appear as separate lists under the banner of the official party, was strongly favored by most of the politicians since it allowed loyal followers of a popular politician to ride the coattails of their leader. The measure was disliked by both Castelo Branco and Costa e Silva because it made the government party appear to be nothing more than an alliance of the old parties and personalities. Furthermore,

⁵⁷Dalmo de Abreau Dallari, "Repostas do Eleitorado Paulista aos Estímulos de uma Nôva Ordem," RBEP, No. 23/24 (July, 1967/January, 1968), 192-195. In São Paulo in 1966, the voter had to choose from a list of 161 candidates for federal deputy and from a list of 389 candidates for state deputy.

the sublegend system encouraged loyalty to personalities rather than to the party and the regime.

Despite his dislike for the sublegend system, Castelo Branco deemed it necessary in order to keep dissident groups in the proposed government party from going to the opposition. Thus, AC-4 allowed the use of sublegends for the 1966 elections. AC-7 limited the number of sublegends to three, but this figure was generally adequate to encompass the factions within ARENA (usually former members of the PSD, UDN, and a smaller party that was strong in the particular region). In P.R. elections the seats would be divided among the sublegends by the same method as that used to divide the seats among parties. In majority elections each party could run three candidates, with the votes of the three being totaled as the vote for the party. The seat would then go to the majority party candidate who received the most votes.

ARENA was the larger party and had the greater problem with factionalism and, thus, benefited most from the use of sublegends. The sublegend system allowed the ARENA factions to compete among themselves while still guaranteeing a victory for ARENA in the aggregate results. The MDB also contained factions, but its weak and defensive position did not generally allow the type of open struggle that took place in ARENA. Only in Guanabara, where the MDB had incorporated the PSD, the PTB, and the Lacerda wing of the UDN, was the opposition party able to use the sublegend system to

its advantage in overlaying its factions.⁵⁸ In the other states, the sublegend system worked to the advantage of ARENA. For example, in Rio Grande do Sul, the three ARENA candidates for the senate seat polled a total of 672,480 votes against 638,140 votes received by the single MDB candidate. The result was that Guido Mondin of ARENA was elected even though he received only 322,901 votes, a little more than half of the number of votes received by the MDB candidate.⁵⁹

Congress registered its collective fear of the linked vote in 1966 by approving a constitutional amendment that would have eliminated the requirement,⁶⁰ but Castelo Branco used his item veto to maintain the device for the 1966 elections.⁶¹ When Congress opened in 1967, the legislators were concerned about future elections because the linked vote was still required and there was no sublegend system to allow the resolution of factional disputes. All through the 1967 session of Congress, a majority of the ARENA deputies pushed for the adoption of a sublegend system and the repeal of the linked-vote requirement, against the opposition of President Costa e Silva and the MDB. Costa e Silva thought such action would maintain the factionalism of ARENA. The

⁵⁸Brasileiro, pp. 161-173.

⁵⁹Xausa and Ferraz, pp. 233-235.

⁶⁰O Estado de São Paulo, 15 April 1966, p. 1.

⁶¹Jornal do Brasil, 6 May 1966, p. 3.

MDB deputies believed that such action would further guarantee the future hegemony of ARENA.⁶²

In February of 1968, Costa e Silva finally agreed to the sublegend system, apparently as a result of the demands of his party members and as a concession needed in order to persuade São Paulo Mayor Faria Lima to join ARENA.⁶³ The President did not agree to repeal of the linked-vote requirement, however. Instead, he proposed a total link, involving both the majority elections and the P.R. contests.⁶⁴ The ARENA deputies and Costa e Silva finally compromised by accepting a sublegend system and a linked vote for P.R. elections; and, in spite of the efforts of MDB and dissident ARENA politicians to prevent a vote, Congress passed the bill on June 4.⁶⁵ The bill allowed a maximum of three lists of candidates, with the total number being no more than two candidates for each seat.⁶⁶

In spite of the fact that Costa e Silva had allowed Congress to reestablish the sublegends, there was growing opposition to the system by some ARENA politicians and many military officers, who shared the fear that continued

⁶²Carlos Castello Branco, "Coluna do Castello," Ibid., 29 August 1967, p. 4.

⁶³Jornal do Brasil, 10 February 1968, p. 3.

⁶⁴Ibid., 30 March 1968, p. 4.

⁶⁵O Estado de São Paulo, 5 June 1968, p. 1.

⁶⁶For the text of Lei No. 5,453, see Código Eleitoral, pp. 257-265. Sublegends were not allowed for majority elections.

factionalism would ultimately destroy the government party.⁶⁷ The system was allowed to remain in effect for the 1969 municipal elections; but, by early 1970, President Médici was apparently convinced that he could safely do away with this contradiction to his idea of a unified revolutionary party. Thus, Lei No. 5,581 of May 26, 1970, allowed the political parties to register a maximum of three candidates for every seat in P.R. contests, but without sublegends. For majority elections the party could only register one candidate for each office.⁶⁸ The party link between the state and federal deputy choices and the official ballot remained as required by the 1965 Electoral Code.

Manipulation of the electoral laws was not needed for the 1970 elections. The long recess of Congress and the purge of some dissident ARENA politicians following the December, 1968, crisis had disciplined the ARENA politicians to the necessity of suppressing their factional differences. Also the cassação of many popular MDB politicians greatly reduced the opposition's chances of success. Furthermore, the prestige of Médici, the popularity of the regime's programs, and the improved economic situation all tended to aid the ARENA politicians and to sublimate factional differences. With no rigging of the election other than the

⁶⁷ See the comments of Deputies Clovis Stenzel, Cunha Bueno, and Rafael de Almeida in Jornal do Brasil, 21 November 1968, p. 3.

⁶⁸ For the text, see Código Eleitoral, pp. 323-330. The law established the rules for the 1970 elections.

linked vote and the allowance of three candidates for each seat in P.R. contests (clearly designed to aid ARENA since it had more available candidates than did the MDB), the government party won an impressive victory. ARENA elected 222 of the 310 federal deputies, won 37 of the 42 senate seats up for election, and won even more decisive victories in the state and municipal assemblies.⁶⁹

One other item in the electoral system which tended to favor the government party was the allocation of seats in Congress. In addition to the overrepresentation of the smaller states in the Senate caused by the principle of equal representation for states, the Câmara was also skewed in favor of the smaller states. The 1946 Constitution as altered by Amendment 17 allowed a state one deputy per 300,000 inhabitants up to a total of twenty deputies. For every deputy in excess of twenty, 500,000 inhabitants were needed. Seven was the minimum number of deputies per state, and each territory had one deputy. This was the system in effect for the 1966 election, and, since ARENA was stronger in the more sparsely populated states, the system naturally worked to the advantage of the government party.

The 1967 Constitution was even more favorable to the smaller states and, thus, to ARENA. It provided for one deputy for each 300,000 inhabitants up to twenty-five deputies and, thereafter, one deputy per each million

⁶⁹ See Veja (November 25, 1970), pp. 21-27; and Jornal do Brasil, 20 December 1970, p. 24.

inhabitants. This system was never used, however, being superseded by a different system in the 1969 Constitution. Article 39 of the 1969 Constitution allowed three deputies for the first 100,000 voters or fraction thereof. From 100,000 to three million voters, there would be an additional deputy for each 100,000 voters. For the area between three million and six million voters, there would be an additional deputy for each 300,000 voters. Above six million the figure would be one deputy for each additional 500,000 voters.

This new system was designed, in part, to promote participation since only the number of registered voters, not the number of inhabitants, would decide the representation for the state. It was also intended to erase some of the inequity of representation. That the regime was generally successful in achieving the former is demonstrated by the fact that the number of registered voters rose from just over twenty-two million in 1966 to over twenty-nine million for the 1970 election.⁷⁰ The new system also removed some of the inequity of representation, but the system was still quite skewed in favor of the smaller and less-urbanized states--as shown in Tables VII and VIII. For the 1966 Câmara election, the coefficient of variance for the voters-per-deputy ratio was .391. Under the new system in

⁷⁰"Eleições de 1966," p. 424; and Jornal do Brasil, 26 September 1970, p. 3.

1970, the coefficient of variance was reduced to .324, a figure that still reflects a large measure of inequality.⁷¹

TABLE VII*
1966 ELECTORAL RESULTS FOR THE CÂMARA

State	Voters	Deputies	Voters/ Deputy	ARENA	MDB
Acre.....	27,309	7	3,901	4	3
Alagoas.....	224,957	9	24,995	6	3
Amazonas.....	160,747	7	22,964	5	2
Bahia.....1,	394,598	31	44,987	25	6
Ceará.....	926,431	21	44,116	16	5
Espirito Santo.....	377,884	8	47,236	6	2
Goiás.....	649,320	13	49,948	8	5
Guanabara.....1,	497,401	21	71,305	6	15
Maranhão.....	292,443	16	18,278	13	3
Mato Grosso.....	318,441	8	39,805	6	2
Minas Gerais.....3,	067,453	48	63,903	37	11
Pará.....	478,683	10	47,868	8	2
Paraíba.....	553,055	13	42,543	8	5
Paraná.....1,	476,143	25	59,046	20	5
Pernambuco.....	999,651	24	41,652	19	5
Piauí.....	346,029	8	43,254	7	1
Rio de Janeiro.....1,	323,799	21	63,038	10	11
Rio Grande do Norte.	398,571	7	56,939	7	0
Rio Grande do Sul...1,	927,976	29	66,482	14	15
Santa Catarina.....	787,719	14	56,266	11	3
São Paulo.....4,	901,494	59	83,076	32	27
Sergipe.....	218,194	7	31,171	6	1
Territories.....	39,133	3	13,044	3	0
TOTALS.....	22,387,251	409		277	132

*Source, "Eleições de 1966," pp. 424, 429.

Because the new representation system was not quite so skewed toward the smaller, less-urbanized states where ARENA was almost totally dominant, the bias against the MDB was

⁷¹Coefficient of variance equals the standard deviation of the voters-per-deputy ratio divided by the mean of the voters-per-deputy ratios for the states. See Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Social Statistics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), pp. 73-74. Since the territories are extremely overrepresented, they were not used in computing the standard deviation.

not as extreme in 1970 as under the system used in 1966. In 1966 the MDB elected 38 percent of the deputies from states whose voters-per-deputy ratio was above the mean for the twenty-two states and only 23 percent of the deputies from states whose ratio was below the mean. In 1970 MDB elected 29 percent of the deputies from the states above the mean and 18 percent from the states below the mean. The bias in favor of ARENA was still present, but not to the extent as formerly.

TABLE VIII*
1970 ELECTORAL RESULTS FOR THE CÂMARA

State	Voters	Deputies	Voters/ Deputy	ARENA	MDB
Acre.....	40,104	3	13,368	2	1
Alagoas.....	274,933	5	54,987	4	1
Amazonas.....	215,908	4	53,977	3	1
Bahia.....	1,953,576	22	88,799	20	2
Ceará.....	1,318,582	15	87,906	12	3
Espirito Santo.....	494,947	7	70,707	5	2
Goiás.....	889,930	11	80,903	7	4
Guanabara.....	1,779,112	20	88,956	7	13
Maranhão.....	470,731	7	67,262	6	1
Mato Grosso.....	370,843	6	61,807	6	0
Minas Gerais.....	3,803,422	35	108,669	28	7
Pará.....	596,838	8	74,605	6	2
Paraíba.....	649,999	8	81,250	5	3
Paraná.....	2,103,681	23	93,638	19	4
Pernambuco.....	1,316,539	15	87,769	12	3
Piauí.....	458,922	7	65,560	6	1
Rio de Janeiro.....	1,600,497	18	88,917	11	7
Rio Grande do Norte.....	442,516	6	73,763	4	2
Rio Grande do Sul...2,442,930	26	93,959	14	12	
Santa Catarina.....1,071,248	13	82,404	9	4	
São Paulo.....6,548,835	43	152,299	32	11	
Sergipe.....254,100	5	50,820	5	0	
Territories.....35,361	3	7,120	1	2	
TOTALS.....29,256,659	310		224	86	

*Source, Jornal do Brasil, 26 September 1970, p. 3; and 20 December 1970, p. 24.

Another device for ensuring ARENA hegemony was the use of indirect elections. Many of the hard-line military officers, seeing the ease and "safety" of Castelo Branco's hasty but constitutional election by Congress, demanded early in 1965 that gubernatorial and presidential elections be permanently insulated from popular participation. Castelo Branco, however, insisted that such elections would continue to be direct; and, to this end, he pushed through Congress a constitutional amendment maintaining direct elections.⁷² The only real significance of the amendment, aside from upholding the principle of direct elections, was that it provided that the successful candidate receive an absolute majority.

The principle of direct election for executive offices became expendable as a result of the 1965 gubernatorial elections. AI-2 provided for the election of the president and vice-president by an absolute majority of the members of Congress. In order to ensure the success of government candidates in the 1966 gubernatorial elections, AI-3 provided for election of governors and vice-governors by an absolute majority of the members of the respective state assemblies.⁷³ Thus, in 1966 the municipal mayors were the only executive officials elected directly.

The use of indirect election for the governors in 1966 was considered to be only a temporary necessity, and Article

⁷²Jornal do Brasil, 9 April 1965, p. 4.

⁷³See Código Eleitoral, pp. 213-215.

13 of the 1967 Constitution reestablished the direct election of governors. This was not so for the presidency, however. Article 76 of the new charter provided for the election of the president and vice-president by an absolute majority of the members of an electoral college composed of the members of Congress and delegates selected by the state assemblies. Each state assembly would select three delegates, plus one additional delegate for each 500,000 voters in the state.

With ARENA having control of Congress and all but three of the state assemblies, the MDB realized that it would never be able to compete realistically for the presidency so the MDB politicians began an effort to reestablish the direct election of the president. They were aided in this effort by some dissident ARENA deputies who saw the indirect election as a means by which the military officers could dictate their choice for president. With some ARENA help, the MDB was able to force Congress to vote on an amendment providing for direct election of the president. The measure lost, but the narrow margin was embarrassing for the regime.⁷⁴ MDB politicians and some of the dissident ARENA deputies continued to push for direct election all through 1968, and one ARENA deputy proposed a presidential primary, but these efforts were in vain.

The fears concerning the military's intention to dictate the succession process were born out in September and

⁷⁴Jornal do Brasil, 23 November 1967, p. 3.

October of 1969. Following Costa e Silva's stroke, the military ministers shunted aside the Vice-President, who was the legal successor, circumvented the party nominating procedure, and ignored the electoral college system as they imposed their man on the nation. The generals were not yet willing to share authority even through the indirect system which they had devised.

The 1969 Constitution, decreed by the Military Junta, maintained essentially the procedure of the 1967 charter for electing the president. Since AI-16 stipulated that the president whom Congress was to elect on October 25, 1969, would not only complete the remainder of Costa e Silva's term of office but another full term as well, a presidential election would not soon concern the military officers. Gubernatorial elections would, however, since they were scheduled for 1970. The Junta included in the 1969 Constitution a provision for the direct popular election of governors; however, as a means of maintaining tight control over the state executive offices, a transitory article stipulated that the 1970 elections for state governors would be realized by the respective state assemblies acting as electoral colleges.

The indirect election of President Médici in October, 1969, and of twenty-one ARENA governors in October, 1970, (the 1966 state assembly elections had given the MDB control of Guanabara, Rio de Janeiro, and Rio Grande do Sul, but the purges of 1969 and 1970 erased the MDB majorities in Rio de

Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul) gave the revolutionary group and ARENA firm control of the major executive offices through 1974. Only in the mayoral offices of the larger cities could the MDB expect to achieve any real political power, and even there the cards were stacked against the opposition. The 1967 Constitution and the 1969 revision allowed the governor of a state to nominate, with the approval of the state assembly, the mayor of the capital. Since the larger cities, the ones in which the MDB could be expected to have the greatest appeal, were generally state capitals, this opportunity for exercising political power and for building a firm political base was denied to the opposition. Thus, through several revisions of the electoral system, the regime stacked the cards in favor of its own party.

Party Discipline

As the revolutionary regime manipulated party statutes to limit the formation of opposition parties and manipulated electoral laws to ensure the success of the government party, it was also necessary to establish means for exercising some discipline over the political conglomeration that was to be the revolutionary party. Given the opportunistic nature of Brazilian politics, it was not difficult for the holders of power to create a large group of nominal

adherents,⁷⁵ but ensuring continued loyal support by that group, especially in times of adversity, was another matter.

The initial civilian supporters of the revolution were, for the most part, UDN politicians. Since the UDN was a minority party, the government created a majority coalition by inviting the PSD politicians to become a part of a government coalition in Congress.⁷⁶ This arrangement soon proved to be unsatisfactory because the government was not able to exercise the discipline necessary to counter the jealousy and animosity existing between the PSD and UDN groups, nor was it able to counter, before October, 1965, the leadership challenges coming from Lacerda and Magalhães Pinto.

The events following the 1965 gubernatorial elections solved the leadership challenges by establishing Costa e Silva as the successor to Castelo Branco. Lacerda was forced into the position of a maverick, and Magalhães Pinto was obliged to give up his challenge if he too wanted to avoid the position of a maverick. AI-2 did not, however, solve the problem of the PSD-UDN conflict. Following the creation of ARENA as a party-like organization, the conflict continued over such matters as the presidency of the Câmara, the allocation of positions in the Câmara organization and

⁷⁵Cabral, p. 28.

⁷⁶Jornal do Brasil, 29 August 1964, p. 1.

the party itself.⁷⁷ In these feuds President Castelo Branco was either forced to make the decision himself or to persuade the dissidents to accept the decisions of the majority.

Castelo Branco's intervention in the selection of the congressional leadership temporarily solved the conflict, and his extensive use of the decree powers granted him under AI-2 limited the role of Congress and, thus, the possibilities for rebirth of the problem in Brasília. Because 1966 was an election year, the problem shifted soon from Congress, however, to focus on the state party organizations. The use of sublegends allowed the voters to resolve the conflict over senatorial and deputy candidates, but selection of candidates for the twelve gubernatorial contests had no such easy solution. Here Castelo Branco was able to exert party discipline and to select personally the ARENA candidates, in part, because of the coercive powers granted to him by AI-2 and, in part, because his intervention allowed the politicians to avoid the responsibility of making decisions that would have been extremely difficult to achieve and that would have certainly been divisive.

Castelo Branco's intervention in the selection of gubernatorial candidates established the precedent for the selection of candidates by the president,⁷⁸ and the

⁷⁷Ibid., 16 February 1966, p. 3; 25 February 1966, p. 4; and 27 March 1966, p. 4.

⁷⁸State party leaders in 1970 openly conceded the selection process to President Médici even though the PSD-UDN

existence of a single authority who could arbitrarily resolve a conflict did much to reduce the importance of the conflicts that were related to the old-party loyalties. The situation still persists, however, but not as a major conflict. In April of 1967 the non-UDN ARENA deputies were formally complaining about a UDN monopoly of ARENA and congressional offices by ex-UDN politicians.⁷⁹ Other complaints concerning discrimination against state groups were also heard,⁸⁰ but the chief source of conflict after September, 1966, and the chief disciplinary problem revolved around the role that certain institutions would play in the restructured political system. Problems within ARENA involved the roles of Congress and the government party within the revolutionary regime. Unhappy with Castelo Branco's arbitrary purges of some state and federal deputies prior to the 1966 elections and the regime's treatment of Câmara Presidente Adauto Cardoso when he tried to defend the purged deputies, some of the younger, more idealistic ARENA deputies almost revolted during the congressional consideration of the 1967 Constitution. One hundred six deputies signed a declaration abhorring the way in which the constitution was being forced upon them; but, in the end, they submitted to party discipline and voted in favor of the new charter.

conflict had been dulled in most states by the passage of time.

⁷⁹Jornal do Brasil, 14 April 1967, p. 4.

⁸⁰Ibid., 11 May 1967, p. 3; 9 March 1968, p. 3; and 2 August 1968, p.3.

The dissident ARENA deputies reluctantly voted in favor of the constitution, knowing that under the restrictions placed upon Congress, a policy of obstruction would deprive them of any influence on the new constitution. Castelo Branco was soon to leave office, and they apparently hoped that Costa e Silva would be more receptive to the idea of greater participation by both Congress and the party in the decision-making process. The hopes of the dissidents were raised when Costa e Silva discarded his original list of ministers after receiving complaints from party leaders that they should have been consulted in the process of selecting a cabinet.⁸¹

The youthful dissidents began to pressure Costa e Silva to create a unified, doctrinaire party even before he took office. Led by Rafael Magalhães, José Guerra, Marcos Kertzmann, Aluísio Alves, and others, the group of deputies which called itself "the Red Guard" sought to increase the role of Congress and to create a strong ideological party in order to counter the power of both the old-guard politicians and the hard-line military officers.⁸² Throughout most of 1967, the dissidents were unable to attract much interest because of the dispute over the presidency of Congress. Furthermore, Costa e Silva and most of the military, congressional, and party leaders tended to ignore party

⁸¹ Carlos Castello Branco, "Coluna do Castello," Ibid., 15 February 1967, p. 4.

⁸² Jornal do Brasil, 14 February 1967, p. 4.

problems while their attention was focused on the proposed Frente Ampla (many of the members of the Red Guard were followers of Lacerda or had some interest in the Frente). By November of 1967, however, there was sufficient dissatisfaction with President Costa e Silva to allow the dissidents the opportunity to force their recognition. On November 16, the dissidents joined with the MDB deputies to defeat two government proposals; and, on November 30, they again joined MDB politicians to invoke, over the strong opposition of the President, an extraordinary session of Congress.⁸³

The defeats suffered by the regime were sufficient to force recognition of the disciplinary problem within the party, but Costa e Silva was neither prepared to satisfy the dissidents by allocating some authority to them nor was he inclined to use punitive measures. In response to a strong letter of criticism concerning both the party and the government, Costa e Silva replied to the author, Rafael Magalhães, that he understood the problems and the impatience of youth, but he could not work miracles.⁸⁴ By February, 1968, a state of immobilism existed in the government, which was then caught between the demands of the military hard line and the demands of labor and student groups. Almost the same situation existed in Congress

⁸³ O Estado de São Paulo, 17 November 1967, p. 1; and 1 December 1967, p. 3.

⁸⁴ Rafael's letter was printed in Jornal do Brasil, 17 January 1968, p. 3. The President's reply was printed in Ibid., 24 January 1968, p. 3.

between the older ARENA stalwarts and the opposition deputies, who could often count on the support of the ARENA dissidents.

The problems in Congress concerned two major items of legislation. Most important to the regime was the bill to allow the government to intervene in the affairs of municípios which the military considered critical to national security. This bill was opposed by all but a few of the congressional politicians although only the MDB politicians and the ARENA dissidents chose to oppose it openly. Of major importance to many of the older ARENA congressmen was the Sublegend Bill, which they considered necessary for the maintenance of their personal political followings. The Sublegend Bill was opposed by the MDB because it would ensure ARENA hegemony and by the ARENA dissidents because it would prevent the evolution to a unified doctrinaire party. In an effort to bring the dissidents back to the government fold, Costa e Silva created a party commission to formulate a party program, began to meet with regional congressional delegations, and appointed several new party vice-leaders for Congress.⁸⁵

The effort to win support by allocating limited information, status, and authority failed. The dissidents maintained their opposition to the municipal intervention bill (even though the number of municípios involved had been

⁸⁵Ibid., 20 February 1968, p. 3; 20 March 1968, p. 3; and 18 May 1968, p. 3.

greatly reduced to make the measure more palatable) to the extent of issuing a manifesto drawing analogies to Lasswell's "Garrison State."⁸⁶ The measure finally became law because of the expiration of the time limit stipulated in the 1967 Constitution. Even this dubious victory was tainted by the fact that the party leaders in the Câmara were able to prevent a vote on the measure (and, thus, almost certain defeat) before the time limit expired only by falsely declaring that a quorum did not exist.⁸⁷

The Sublegend Bill received only lukewarm backing by Costa e Silva, who agreed to allow it only because the congressional leaders assured him it was needed to hold ARENA together. The combined opposition of the MDB and the ARENA rebels so frustrated the leadership's attempts to get the bill passed that ARENA President Daniel Krieger resigned his party position. Costa e Silva, shocked by Krieger's resignation, convinced several ARENA dissidents that only they could save the party. His efforts apparently provided the narrow margin of victory for the Sublegend Bill.⁸⁸

Outside of the MDB politicians and a few of the more idealistic ARENA dissidents, the Sublegend Bill was not objectionable to most of the congressmen. The difficulty in securing its passage lay not in the content of the bill itself, but in the nature of the relationship between the

⁸⁶O Estado de São Paulo, 1 May 1968, p. 3.

⁸⁷Jornal do Brasil, 28 May 1968, p. 3.

⁸⁸O Estado de São Paulo, 5 June 1968, p. 1.

government and the party politicians in Congress. Many ARENA politicians resorted to symbolic revolt in order to protest their second-class treatment. One ARENA senator remarked that "a marginalized political class cannot be obligated only to the duty of obedience. If the government does not like politicians, it cannot expect their support."⁸⁹ The regime's negative attitude toward Congress and the fact that the 1967 Constitution had deprived Congress of much of its former control over legislative appropriations limited the individual congressman's ability to influence bureaucratic decisions and, thus, denied him power to deliver political goods for his area. If the politician could not secure or take credit for the values allocated by the political system, the only means by which he could maintain the support of his constituents was through the vote-getting publicity that would result from opposing the regime. The refusal of the regime to share its resources with the party politicians actually exacerbated the disciplinary problem.

Still unwilling (and probably unable because of pressure coming from the linha dura) to do more than attempt to paper over the conflict by promising to consult with the dissidents, Costa e Silva did little to reverse the trend toward wholesale rebellion within the government party. The regime's handling of student and labor unrest and its banishment of Jânio Quadros gave the leaders of the rebel group

⁸⁹ Senator Leandro Maciel, quoted in Ibid., 1 June 1968, p. 3.

new ammunition. In late November the regime's open intervention in the congressional procedure concerning the Márcio Alves case gave cause for open rebellion against the government.

President Costa e Silva had assured the congressional politicians that the government would not interfere in the handling of the Márcio Alves matter and would accept the final decision of the Câmara. Confronted with a close vote (and a possible defeat) in the Justice Commission of the Câmara, the regime instructed the party leadership to replace unreliable ARENA commission members with deputies of proven loyalty to the regime. Thus, on November 27, 1968, nine ARENA deputies, several of whom had long been active rebels, were replaced.⁹⁰ This interference ensured a favorable vote for the government in the commission, but it also was the apparent cause of defeat in the plenary session of the Câmara. The Câmara voted against lifting the congressional immunity of Márcio Alves, and the hard-line military officers forced the issuance of AI-5.

Once the regime-of-exception had been reestablished and the democratic façade of a functioning legislative branch had been put in limbo, the regime set out to punish the opposition for taking its role too seriously and to eliminate the leadership of the rebellious group within the government party. Of the nine men who had been removed from the Justice Commission, three were purged and two others

⁹⁰Jornal do Brasil, 28 November 1968, p. 3.

were eliminated in the 1970 election. Rebel leaders Aluísio Alves, Flores Soares, Hary Normanton, Isreal Novaes, Jorge Curi, José Guerra, Marcos Kertzmann, Montenegro Duarte, Pedro Gondim, and Vital do Rego were also purged. The most outspoken critic of the regime, Rafael Magalhães, was somehow missed by the purge; but he was persuaded to forgo further political activity and did not seek reelection in 1970.⁹¹ Only eight of some twenty-six ARENA deputies who served as the nucleus for the Red Guard in 1967 survived the purges and the 1970 election. Two deputies accused of corruption, Osmar Dutra and Souto Maior, were also among the twenty-eight ARENA deputies who lost their legislative seats as a result of the AI-5 purges.

Following the publication of AI-5 and the forced recess of Congress in December, 1968, the government party was allowed to atrophy while its rebels were being purged and its other congressional members were given time to ponder the insecurity of their own futures. Daniel Krieger, who was reelected as party president in July, resigned again following the government defeat in December. Acting-President Filinto Muller refused to attempt a reorganization of the party until he got assurances from the party members that they would submit to party discipline.⁹² The party

⁹¹Ibid., 20 December 1970, p. 24.

⁹²Diário de Notícias, 8 April 1969, p. 4; and 17 April 1969, p. 4.

remained in suspended animation until President Médici brought it back to life in November, 1969.

The series of purges and the long recess of Congress had a sobering effect on the ARENA politicians. Somewhat apprehensive about the future of politics in general and uncertain about the scope of future purges, many congressional politicians began to look for new careers during the long recess.⁹³ Following the election of Médici,⁹⁴ the ARENA congressmen promised total cooperation with the President.⁹⁵

The regime was not prepared to rely on the effect of the purges and the long recess to ensure party discipline, however, despite the pledge of loyalty by party members. The revised constitution of October 17, 1969, established an absolute requirement of party discipline. Modeled after the 1966 disciplinary measure (AC-16), Article 152 of the revised charter provided for the automatic voidance of the mandate of any legislator--federal, state, or municipal--who by his attitude or vote opposed the established leadership of his party or left the party under whose banner he was elected. The effect of this article was to make breaches of party discipline very costly. Any politician who voted for an opposition candidate in an indirect

⁹³Ibid., 4 May 1969, p. 4.

⁹⁴At the time of his election, Médici was the official ARENA candidate but not yet a member of the party. Jornal do Brasil, 26 October 1969, p. 3.

⁹⁵See Visão (November 7, 1969), pp. 19-25.

election would automatically lose his mandate. Furthermore, a dissident could not change his party without suffering a similar fate.

Perhaps even more critical was the fact that a "demonstrated attitude of opposition" to the leadership could be the grounds for cassation. An ARENA politician's criticism of the government or party could be construed as being a demonstration of opposition. The ease with which the regime persuaded Congress to limit its own power, in April of 1970, provides an illustration of the new discipline. In spite of the penalty against votes in opposition to party leadership, legislators would still have been able to oppose their leaders in secret since roll call or nominal voting was seldom used in Congress. To guard against such secret opposition on major issues, the regime pushed through Congress a law requiring nominal voting in efforts to override a presidential veto. Although many ARENA politicians opposed the measure, not one was willing to speak against it for fear of cassation.⁹⁶ Thus, the regime used the prohibition against opposition-by-attitude to limit the possibility of secret opposition-by-vote.

With an election scheduled for November of 1970, with AI-5 and its threat of purge still in effect, and with the constitution now requiring absolute party loyalty, the regime and the party leadership were able to exercise

⁹⁶Carlos Castello Branco, "Coluna do Castello," Jornal do Brasil, 30 April 1970, p. 3.

careful discipline over ARENA party members in Congress through both 1970 sessions. And barring an extremely serious crisis, it appears that there would be few future disciplinary problems in the government party at the national level.

State and Local Party Organization

Intraparty feuds between the vestiges of the old-party groups had, for the most part, been eliminated at the national level by late 1970; but the problem was still salient at the state and municipal levels. The government party, lacking homogeneity and ideological fervor, was a long way from resembling its presumed model, the Mexican PRI, at all levels in 1966⁹⁷ and was still far from the model in 1970 although it was making progress toward unity and centralization.

At the root of the regime's problem of local organization was the nature of the old-party system. Since the requirements for organizing a political party, especially a provisional one, were quite minimal prior to 1965, almost anyone could set up his own party.⁹⁸ As machines for distributing power without regard for popular expression, programs, or ideologies, the parties became ad hoc groupings

⁹⁷Sousa Sampaio, "perfil Eleitoral de Bahia--1966," p. 150; and Cândido Mendes, p. 20.

⁹⁸Cabral, p. 79.

of clientelists in pursuit of power.⁹⁹ The legal requirement that the parties be "national" only served to force the creation of other ad hoc groupings with national scope. Because local organizations revolved around a single personality with power as the only interest, the local parties could just as easily have joined the MDB as ARENA in 1966. Both parties were "sacks of cats"--aggregations of antagonistic interests which were maintained at the state and local level only for the convenience of the moment.¹⁰⁰

ARENA's problem was that too many local cats wanted to be in the ARENA sack. This problem also existed at the national level, but to a lesser extent, because, even though many of "the occupants could be at ease in either of the sacks, many are in one because of not being allowed to enter the other."¹⁰¹ Since the military regime was more aware of the political credentials of the politicians who operated on the national level, it was better able to screen the federal deputies and senators who joined the party. Some were apparently vetoed by the regime; and others, knowing that they would not be welcome or at ease in the government party due to past political connections, were not tempted to join ARENA. State and local politicians had not had the opportunity to establish damaging relationships with the anathema

⁹⁹Ibid., pp. 116-117.

¹⁰⁰J. Flóscolo da Nobrega, "As Eleições de Novembro na Paraíba," RBEF, No. 23/24 (July, 1967/January, 1968), 77-78.

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 78.

politicians (Goulart and Brizzola in particular), and their political reputations were not so well known to the leaders of the revolution. As a result, fewer individuals were refused entry in the government party. In Bahia, for example, eleven of the thirty-one federal deputies joined the MDB in 1966 while only nine of the sixty state deputies went to the opposition party even though there was little ideological difference between the two state organizations.¹⁰²

The fact that the state and local politicians were more willing and able to jump to the government party than their federal-level counterparty increased the competition for local power because often the two or three clientage groups that had operated as local structures of different political parties within a município were now all in ARENA. With the primary political conflict then lodged within the government party, the regime was confronted with state and local power struggles which, because of their traditional character, could not be solved by the local organization itself. Thus, it was necessary to use some external authority to resolve the impasse.

In the 1966 elections for both mayors and legislators and in the municipal elections of 1968 and 1969, the voters were the final authority. Since the local and state parties could not resolve the conflict in 1966, the regime established, by complementary act, the sublegend system whereby

¹⁰²Sousa Sampaio, "Perfil Eleitoral de Bahia--1966," pp. 119-122

the apportionment of P.R. seats and the selection of the party's best vote-getter for majority contests were done by the general electorate. The Sublegend Bill of June 14, 1968, provided the same solution for the municipal elections of 1968 and 1969. For the indirect elections of governors in 1966 and 1970, the outside authority was the president. Both Presidents Castelo Branco and Médici directly intervened in the choice of ARENA gubernatorial candidates, generally by choosing nonpoliticians or politicians who were not directly connected with the major factions within the state party organizations.

Aside from the conflicts over nominations, the major problem concerning local party organization which confronted the regime was getting the local officials to establish permanent party structures. President Castelo Branco apparently believed that strong grass-roots party organizations would be one of the major factors in guaranteeing a stable democratic system for Brazil. To this end, the Parties Statute of 1965 required a national party to have state party organizations in at least twelve states, with an additional requirement that a state party organization could not be established until one fourth of the municípios of the state had created local party organizations. These local party organizations were to be legally constituted by gaining the support of 5 percent of the electorate and by electing a party directorate in a convention of party members.

When the old parties were abolished in 1965, the regime, through AC-4, provided for the organization of new party structures from the top down (i.e., the national directorate would select the state directorates, which would, in turn, appoint the municipal directorates). These provisional structures were to serve in lieu of elected directorates for the 1966 elections, but following those elections the provisional organizations were to establish regular structures as required by the Parties Statute. Due to the apparent difficulty of resolving the local intraparty conflicts, the regime issued AC-29 in November, 1966, in order to extend the period for organization to the normal even-year convention dates provided by the Parties Statute.¹⁰³ The state party organizations could appoint municipal directorates in the interim but only for municípios that fulfilled the 5-percent-of-the-electorate requirement of the Parties Statute.

President Costa e Silva and his national party leaders seemed to assume that the appointed local leaders would fulfill the organizational requirements by the April 7, 1968, date for the municipal conventions. The assumption was unjustified because only a very small number of municípios held party conventions.¹⁰⁴ The provisional municipal organizations of ARENA and some of the state organizations were so tenuous and contained such potential conflicts

¹⁰³See Código Eleitoral, pp. 251-255.

¹⁰⁴Jornal do Brasil, 9 April 1968, p. 12.

between rival patrons who were seeking authority and status positions that the appointed leaders were loath to risk the faction disputes which were certain to surface in an open-convention process.

The demonstrated weakness of the local organizations spurred some of the national party leaders to action, but their proposal for increasing the strength of local and state organizations by allowing those groups greater autonomy was rejected by Costa e Silva.¹⁰⁵ The President preferred a more centralized structure that would perhaps allow greater control over the clientage networks, and he apparently hoped that the Strategic Development Program would provide the impetus for unifying and motivating the ARENA politicians.¹⁰⁶ In September of 1968, the President sent Senator Ney Braga on a national inspection trip to study the progress of party organization. Braga reported that, although the Development Program was well received, it was indispensable to push organization in accord with the Parties Statute in order to establish a militant political base for the regime.¹⁰⁷

The failure of ARENA to renovate the political class of Brazil was demonstrated by the November, 1968, municipal elections. Although widely heralded as a strong victory for

¹⁰⁵Ibid., 23 May 1968, p. 3.

¹⁰⁶O Estado de São Paulo, 28 June 1968, p. 3.

¹⁰⁷Carlos Castello Branco, "Coluna do Castello," Jornal do Brasil, 9 October 1968, p. 4.

the government party, it was really a victory for the established clientelists, most of whom had joined ARENA. According to ARENA Deputy Clovis Stenzel, "ARENA is a party of personalities, and the people went with the personalities that they had gone with before."¹⁰⁸ Further evidence of the need to establish strong local organizations through which to recruit and socialize new loyal politicians was provided by the mass indiscipline in the Márcio Alves affair.

AI-5, issued as a direct result of the regime's defeat in the Márcio Alves case, provided the government with the means for removing many of the personalities that were blocking local reorganization; and it also provided a threat to spur some of the other recalcitrant politicians into activity. Although the purges conducted under the authority of AI-5 were primarily aimed at overly critical MDB state and federal deputies, fifty-four of the 136 state deputies purged were ARENA politicians. Only three ARENA state organizations, those of Espírito Santo, Goiás, and Pará, were not directly affected by the purges.¹⁰⁹

While the purges were being conducted and military investigation teams were working in each state gathering evidence for possible new lists of politicians to be purged, Costa e Silva was urging his ARENA leaders to press local

¹⁰⁸ Jornal do Brasil, 20 November 1968, p. 4. Stenzel was a frequent critic of the party, but he criticized the lack of loyalty and discipline within the party.

¹⁰⁹ "Eleições de 1966," pp. 435-437.

party men to complete the reorganization process.¹¹⁰ The local party conventions had been scheduled for April 6; but, due to the unsettled political climate, the conventions were informally suspended, and the regime, by means of AC-54, rescheduled the municipal conventions for August 10. Through June and July, ARENA Acting-President Filinto Muller and his aides kept almost constant pressure on the state party directorates to press local leaders to forget their differences and get on with the business of registering voters and securing the requisite signatures for legal party organization.

The municipal conventions held in August were far more successful than those held in April of 1968, but still ARENA was able to establish legal organizations in only slightly more than half of the municípios.¹¹¹ Continued activity in organizing the other municípios was complicated by the illness of Costa e Silva, but Acting-President Muller sent telegrams to all of the state directorates instructing them to persist in their efforts to establish local party organizations and to hold the state conventions as scheduled on September 14.¹¹²

Once the succession problem had been solved and President Médici took firm control of the national party organization, the forceful leadership of Médici and his

¹¹⁰O Estado de São Paulo, 30 April 1969, p. 3.

¹¹¹Jornal do Brasil, 13 August 1969, p. 12.

¹¹²Ibid., 7 September 1969, p. 10.

subordinates, coupled with the fact that national, state, and municipal elections were scheduled for November, 1970, spurred local ARENA leaders into action. Although the law which established the timetable for the 1970 elections¹¹³ did not specifically require municipal conventions, it did require a município to have a legally recognized party organization in order to send delegates to the state conventions which were to be held before August 3, 1970. Municípios which had set up local structures prior to August 10, 1969, could send the same delegates that were sent to the September, 1969, state conventions. A municipal party group that had organized after August 10, 1969, was to have its delegates elected by the local directorate, but only if the local organization had met all of the legal requirements of the Parties Statute. Thus, if municipal politicians wanted to enjoy the status and informational benefits that were to come from participation in the state conventions, they had to ensure that their local organization met the legal requirements prior to the state convention.

The state conventions were held in mid- and late July and were fairly harmonious meetings. President Médici had personally selected the ARENA candidates for governor and had, thus, removed from the convention agendas the decision with the greatest potential for conflict.¹¹⁴ The conventions

¹¹³Lei No. 5,581 of May 26, 1970. See Código Eleitoral, pp. 323-330.

¹¹⁴Jornal do Brasil, 26 July 1970, p. 3.

were allowed to select senatorial candidates and to approve the lists for the P.R. contests. With every state having at least two senate seats open and each party allowed to list three candidates for every potential seat in a P.R. election, the conventions had much room for compromise.

Although the old PSD-UDN conflict had been almost completely resolved on the national level and was rapidly disappearing at the state and municipal level, one vestige of that old conflict refused to die. The enduring faction fight was in the state of Paraná and involved Ney Braga, Paulo Pimentel, and Leon Peres. Ney Braga, elected governor in 1960, was a member of the PDC (Christian Democratic Party), which had often allied itself with the UDN against the PSD. When ARENA was organized in Paraná in early 1966, the old interparty struggle was transformed to an intraparty struggle with the PDC-UDN group, led by Ney Braga, confronting the PSD group, led by Pimentel. Castelo Branco temporarily resolved the conflict by giving the majority PSD forces the gubernatorial nomination (Pimentel) and the PDC-UDN forces, the senatorial nomination (Braga).

Castelo Branco's solution was only transitory and the power struggle was soon renewed.¹¹⁵ The conflict continued up to the 1970 elections for which Médici selected Leon Peres, formerly in the UDN and a long-time foe of Pimentel, as the ARENA candidate for governor. President Médici, threatening to discipline both factions, was able to

¹¹⁵Ibid., 3 June 1967, p. 3.

suppress the conflict during the electoral campaign,¹¹⁶ but the charges and countercharges were renewed after the elections.¹¹⁷ The conflict in Paraná will probably be a problem for ARENA for some time to come; and similar, although much less spectacular, feuds exist in some of the other states and in many municípios, but the government party showed significant progress during 1969 and 1970 in the sublimation of such conflicts.

A major factor in the sublimation of such conflicts has been the regime's more effective use of its power to allocate goods and services for the purpose of extracting disciplined support from state and municipal politicians. Brazilian municipalities have traditionally been quite limited in their authority to extract their own financial support so one of the principal functions of a municipal politician or a local patron was to exercise influence upward (generally through a legislative politician) in order to secure economic resources for his community or clients.¹¹⁸ Thus, the local politician could offer electoral support to the state or federal deputy in exchange for the goods and services that the local patron could provide for his clients.

The administrative reforms decreed by the Castelo Branco government and the taxation provisions of the 1967 Constitution further limited the taxing authority of state

¹¹⁶ See Veja (September 26, 1970), p. 15.

¹¹⁷ Ibid. (December 2, 1970), p. 24.

¹¹⁸ Sherwood, pp. 73-75.

and municipal governments, but these reforms did provide for more revenue for the states and municipalities. The 1967 Constitution established the State Participation Fund and the Municipal Participation Fund, each of which received 10 percent of the federal revenues coming from taxes on income and industrial production. Although the discretion of state and local officials was limited in order to discourage corruption, the administrative reforms also limited the discretion of federal officials by requiring the federal government to deliver vast sums of money to local officials without regard to loyalty to the regime.¹¹⁹ The regime allocated its resources without requiring a quid pro quo from the local politicians, and this appears to have exacerbated the organizational problem by encouraging local disputes for control of the new funds.

The situation was changed in 1968. As the regime began to search for new sources of revenue to finance the developmental projects, the Participation Funds became somewhat expendable, especially since the existing mechanism provided for a lopsided exchange in favor of state and local politicians. By means of Complementary Act Number 40 of December 31, 1968, the regime reduced the automatic contribution to the Participation Funds to 5 percent of the revenue from income and production taxes and created a special fund that was to be financed by 2 percent of the above-mentioned

¹¹⁹Richardson, pp. 329-336.

taxes.¹²⁰ By reducing the automatic contribution, the regime was able to expand the resources available for its own use; and, by reducing the ability of state and local officials to provide goods and services, the regime directed demands toward the federal government.

More importantly for party discipline, however, the special fund could be allocated to individual state and municipal governments at the discretion of federal officials and could be used as a reward for loyalty to the regime and party. A state or local official who obstructed party organization or resisted the discipline of the party leadership might lose his allocation from the special fund, or he might also lose the automatic allocation if he were guilty of some fiscal indiscretion. In either case, he would not be able to supply benefits to his clientele. On the other hand, if the official was loyal to the regime and party, he would benefit from the regime's monopoly over the political marketplace. As a part of the regime, the local official would have total control over the allocation of political goods at the local level. Patrons would be forced to accept his prices since he would be a part of the regime's monopoly.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 338.

A Party Regime or a Regime Party

The Brazilian constitution establishes "the plurality of parties" as a basic principle of the democratic regime; and the revolutionary government has, by word and deed, expressed its dedication to a bipartite political structure; but, in fact, the Brazilian political system has come to resemble a one-party system. The manipulation of party laws and electoral laws, plus the intimidation of opposition groups through purges, threats, and other forms of coercion, have discouraged the formation of a third party and also have almost guaranteed the impotence of the opposition party. According to Paulo Bonavides, "It is inconceivable that the opposition party could come into power democratically and revoke the revolutionary legislation."¹²¹ If the opposition could surmount all of the legal barriers which now exist or would be thrown up if a serious threat developed, it is extremely doubtful that the military would let the opposition assume power.

In terms of the nominal control of political offices, ARENA has been very successful. At the end of six years of military rule, the government party could claim the affiliation of the President, the Vice-President, and twenty-one of the twenty-two governors in its official ranks. ARENA could boast of having fifty-eight of the sixty-six seats in the federal senate and 222 of the 310 federal deputies. ARENA

¹²¹A Crise Política Brasileira (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Forense, 1969), p. 18.

controlled the legislative assemblies of twenty-one of the twenty-two states and had elected the mayor and a majority of the councilmen in about 80 percent of the municipios.

In terms of popular participation, popular identification, recruitment, interest aggregation, and the real exercise of power, ARENA is still a poorly developed political institution. The basis of discipline and organization have been established, but loyalty and organization seem to be motivated by fear of coercion and the promise of immediate benefits than by institutional identity and confidence of future, intangible rewards. The strength of the government party is contingent upon its sponsorship by the regime, and few of its members value it as a political institution in its own right. This lack of institutional coherence is primarily the result of the refusal of the regime to allocate sufficient resources to the party. The regime expects the party to deliver support for the legitimation of the regime (and the party does this in a limited manner because it has no viable competition), but the regime has not allowed the party the needed political goods to legitimize itself. The regime has created a regime party in order to benefit from the economy which can be derived from the existence of legitimacy, but the generals have not yet been willing to expend the immediate benefits that would allow the future economy of a party regime.

CHAPTER VIII

PROGRESS THROUGH AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME

The evidence indicates that an authoritarian military regime can persist and can demonstrate progress toward its goals. The military regime in Brazil has experienced three different leaders; and, although there has been some alteration of policy, the authoritarian nature of the regime has remained relatively constant. The emphasis on stability, national security, and economic development has been maintained; and, if the relative absence of social unrest since 1969, coupled with a real increase in Gross National Product of over 9 percent annually since 1968 are accepted as evidence, the regime has made significant progress toward its goals.

The persistence and progress of the Brazilian regime has been made possible by the regime's efficient use of its political resources. The regime began with an abundance of coercive power and enjoyed some elite and popular support, but it had only limited status, authority, and goods. The use of coercion to consolidate control over goods and

services, information, status, and authority alienated much of the original support. The loss of support required the regime to expend more of its resources (particularly coercion) to extract compliance, but the loss was compensated by the far greater amount of regime capital resulting from the consolidation of power.

The regime's market situation was enhanced by the reduction of demands. Even with the political resources monopolized by the military government, there still were not sufficient resources to satisfy the hyper-inflated demand structure. The regime's market monopoly, however, allowed the repression of demands because no alternative source of satisfaction existed. Once the demand level was reduced, the regime was able to invite demands for benefits that the government was willing and able to allocate.

The ability of the military government to be selective in soliciting and responding to demands enabled it to expand regime support gradually. Realizing that some support was necessary for the efficient use of political resources, the Brazilian regime held some sectors constant at a minimal level of benefits while allocating real benefits to sectors whose support was critical to resource economy. Since the authoritarian nature of the regime prohibited alternative sources of supply, the pricing system favored the regime. The critical sectors (the military factions and the commercial, industrial, and agricultural elites) were offered real benefits (order, material benefits, information, and limited

authority) in exchange for their support. Popular sectors were generally offered symbolic benefits (meaningless electoral participation, authority, and status through co-opted organizations, and highly publicized but empty economic rewards) in exchange for diffuse support.

The military regime in Brazil was relatively effective in using its political resources to increase its capital, to decrease and control demands, and to solicit immediate support. The success of these three categories of policy outputs was probably due to the nature of the exchanges. Because the policies were designed to elicit an immediate response of sector goods, the regime was able to use a trial-and-error method. If a specific policy which offered a reward did not bring the desired response, the regime generally used its coercive power to overcome the resulting damage and then attempted to elicit the response with a different type of allocation.

The creation of a supporting infrastructure has not been amenable to the trial-and-error form of exchange, however; and this may present future problems for the regime. Although the authoritarian regime in Brazil has allocated some of its immediate resources for future benefits, the inherent conflict between the demands of the immediate support base (the military officer corps) and the demands of the future support base (the regime party) has apparently prevented the allocation of sufficient resources to the party. Authoritarian politics preclude the dispersal of

authority and information, yet it is difficult to construct an effective institution in the absence of those commodities. Ideally the party should be the link by which specific elite and popular support is transmitted to the regime. The real value of the link is especially apparent in times of system stress; but, barring an engineered test, the regime can never know whether or not the link is sufficiently strong to function as it should in a crisis situation.

The Brazilian regime created a government party by manipulating the statutes for party organization and ensured the party of electoral success by altering the electoral laws. In addition, the military leaders attempted to force local clientelists into the confines of local party structures by closing off other means of participation and by providing, through the state and municipal budgets, financial rewards for regime loyalty. Along with the means for rewarding loyalty, punitive procedures for indiscipline were established. The strength of the engineered party has not yet been tested, however; and there is some doubt that party discipline would weather an economic crisis. Organizations must function satisfactorily for several years before the members begin to value the organization for itself. Institutional loyalty must be based upon satisfying personal associations, on the memory of past benefits, and on confidence in future benefits instead of attachment to the organization for the promise of immediate payoffs. It is

possible that the members of ARENA are interested in the immediate exchange only and have little appreciation for the organization itself and little confidence in the future benefits which the infrastructure promises. If this is the case, then the regime has built only a very weak link between itself and the people--a link that might well break if the regime no longer has the coercive power or other benefits to satisfy the immediate demands of the members.

In spite of the questionable status of the supporting infrastructure, Brazil's authoritarian military regime has been successful. Of what relevance then is the Brazilian experience of military authoritarianism to other developing nations? The exact societal context which confronted the Brazilian generals may have been sui generi, but the phenomenon of military-dominated authoritarianism has become somewhat common in developing countries. The Brazilian case indicates that a military regime which carefully evaluates the resources at its disposal and uses those resources to accumulate more resources can demonstrate progress toward its goals. The marketplace situation may vary from nation to nation due to differences in regime resources, sector resources, and regime goals, but the critical exchange for a regime is the allocation of available resources in a way that will generate regime support among the relevant sectors of society. Thus, the general sequence of resource consolidation, market control, solicitation of immediate support,

and creation of supporting infrastructure would seem to be appropriate for most authoritarian regimes.

It is difficult for a liberal social scientist, given the usual bias in favor of political systems that provide for the allocation of values in a generally egalitarian manner, to analyze objectively an authoritarian military regime since such regimes often make little pretense to egalitarianism. Authoritarian regimes do exist, however, and in increasing numbers; and social scientists should concern themselves with the productivity of the policies of such regimes. Because hungry, disoriented people living in a chaotic society make poor democrats, it may be that authoritarian regimes can provide the social stability and discipline, the economic infrastructure, and perhaps the political infrastructure necessary for the transition from a praetorian system (or nonsystem) to a stable, democratic system.

This then is perhaps the real value of the exchange model for political analysis. It allows the researcher to avoid teleological pitfalls and normative judgments as he evaluates, with clinical detachment, the productivity of the policy choices of a political regime. This is not an argument against the normative judgment of an authoritarian regime. Rather, it is hoped that the political economy can provide a more effective means of justifying political ethics. The political economy admits the efficacy of coercion for forcing compliance, but it also can demonstrate

that compliance can be gained with less cost to the regime by establishing a solid base of voluntary political support. By analyzing the relative costs of securing sector resources through the use of violence as compared to the costs (in terms of regime resources) and the productivity (in terms of sector resources received) of securing sector resources through a quid pro quo exchange of goods and services, information, status, and authority, the limitations of coercion can be forcefully demonstrated.

In the Brazilian case coercion was quite useful, especially in the early stages of the military regime when coercion was virtually the only abundant resource, but the evidence indicates that allocations of authority and status to the armed forces, allocations of goods and services to the industrial and agricultural elites, and allocations of goods and services, status, and authority (largely symbolic) to popular groups were more effective than equal allocations of coercion in soliciting the support which the military regime needed to pursue its goals. The economies resulting from limiting the use of coercion, in relation to other resources, are demonstrated by the experience with student groups in 1968 as compared to 1970. By directing more positive allocations toward the students and the popular forces they were acting for, the Brazilian regime was able to reduce the manifestations of negative support (riots and terrorism).

The future success of the Brazilian military regime may well depend upon the recognition of the political costs associated with the continued use of coercion. During the six years of military rule examined in this paper, the Brazilian generals have proven themselves adept at manipulating the political market to the advantage of their regime, but a six-year period is insufficient for drawing long-range conclusions. Some of the diffuse support for the regime is undoubtedly dependent upon the rapid expansion of the Brazilian economy, a factor not examined in depth here because of research limitations. An economic crisis, due to either internal or external factors, might erode much of the elite support which the regime enjoys. Current economic prosperity and social peace, along with the threat of violence, have almost destroyed the market opportunities for antistatesmen, but a crisis might suddenly increase the ^{VALUE} price of the resources which antiregime groups have to offer. Similarly, an economic crisis would limit the goods and services which the regime could exchange for support.

The most critical factor to the regime's long-range success in its quest for national development, however, would seem to be the existence of a strong, supportive infrastructure. If the military regime does not allocate to the government party sufficient authority, status, and information for the creation of a complex, coherent, adaptable, and autonomous institution, the generals may find themselves with no resource other than coercion with which to

confront an impending crisis. Coercion may be sufficient in the initial period of military rule when the memory of an ineffective government (such as that of João Goulart) may provide a convincing argument in favor of coercion; but, in the absence of a vivid recollection of such a government, coercion would probably be insufficient. Only a strong institution whose members have a personal and professional commitment to the future of the organization can provide the specific support needed to weather a serious crisis.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Bruce Raymond Drury was born in Fullerton, Nebraska, on January 2, 1939. He received his primary and secondary education in local public schools. He has a Bachelor of Arts degree (1960) and a Master of Arts degree (1968) from the University of Nebraska at Lincoln.


Mr. Drury served as an officer in the United States Navy from July, 1960 to June, 1963. From 1964 through 1967 he was employed as secondary education Spanish instructor in the Red Cloud (Nebraska) City Schools. Since August, 1971 he has served as an instructor in the Department of Government of Lamar University, Beaumont, Texas.

Mr. Drury was the recipient of a two-year National Defense Education Act (Title IV) fellowship, which allowed him to complete course requirements at the University of Florida. He was also the recipient of an NDEA (Title VI) fellowship in Portuguese, which enabled him to conduct field research for the dissertation in Rio de Janeiro (August, 1970-February, 1971).

Mr. Drury is a member of the American Political Science Association and the Southern Political Science Association.


He is married to the former Donna Marie Wademan. They have three children: Michael Raymond, Joan Marie, and Jonathan Wade.

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
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
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
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This dissertation was submitted to the Department of Political Science in the College of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

June, 1973

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