

POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN THE RURAL SOUTH:
A CASE STUDY OF GADSDEN COUNTY, FLORIDA

BY

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Any study that is based primarily on data gathered in the field relies totally on numerous individuals who choose to cooperate, sometimes at considerable inconvenience to themselves. Especially when the study seeks to probe dramatic social change, emotions may run high and individuals may suspect the intentions of the researcher and the uses to which the information they provide may be put. Under these conditions, the cooperation of the people of Gadsden County in the conduct of this study was exceptional. Leaders in both the white and black communities assisted fully in whatever ways they could. The researcher greatly appreciated this cooperation. The patience and cooperation of the individual black citizens who were chosen to participate in the study, again, was commendable. This study would have been impossible without them.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
	ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	ii
	LIST OF TABLES	vi
	LIST OF FIGURES	ix
	KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS	x
	ABSTRACT	xi
ONE	THE POLITICAL MOBILIZATION PROCESS	1
	Political Mobilization in Rural Society	1
	A Model of Political Mobilization	3
	Limitations of the Model	8
	Chapter One Notes	10
TWO	METHODOLOGY	12
	Gadsden County As a Case Study	12
	The Data Base	14
	Survey Data	14
	Leader Interviews	19
	Newspaper Analysis	20
	Some Methodological Questions	20
	Chapter Two Notes	23
THREE	OUTSIDE ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT	25
	Black Political Organizations in the United States	26
	CORE and the First Mobilization Period (1963-1966)	28
	The Second Mobilization Period (1970-1972)	35
	Mobilization in Gretna	39
	Outsiders in Gadsden County: An Evaluation	41
	Chapter Three Notes	47
FOUR	OUTSIDE GOVERNMENTAL SUPPORT	52
	Black Aspirations and the Federal Government	52
	Governmental Intervention in Gadsden County	56
	Outside Governmental Support in Gadsden County: An Evaluation	63
	Conclusion	65
	Chapter Four Notes	66

FIVE	COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION	70
	An Overview	74
	Black Leadership in Quincy.	75
	Black Leadership in Gretna.	86
	Black Leadership in Greensboro and Sawdust.	91
	Gadsden County Black Leaders Compared	93
	Conclusion.	97
	Chapter Five Notes.	101
SIX	STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS AND FACILITATORS TO POLITICAL MOBILIZATION.	103
	Political Participation and Political Awareness	106
	Physical and Economic Sanctions	111
	Organizational Involvement.	118
	Chapter Six Notes	128
SEVEN	PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION.	130
	Relative Deprivation: Theory and Measurement	130
	Relative Deprivation in Gadsden County.	134
	Outlook Perception and Relative Deprivation	138
	Group Consciousness and Relative Deprivation.	147
	Conclusion.	151
	Chapter Seven Notes	155
EIGHT	CONCLUSION.	157
	Principal Findings.	157
	Political Mobilization As a Process	162
	The Success of Political Mobilization	164
	Chapter Eight Notes	168
APPENDICES		
A	RANDOM SAMPLE SURVEY.	170
B	GADSDEN COUNTY ELITE QUESTIONNAIRE.	180
C	FREQUENCIES OF OUTLOOK PERCEPTION DIRECTION OF CHANGE VARIABLES FOR GADSDEN COUNTY AND SEPARATE COMMUNITY SUBORDINATE RESIDENTS	192
D	FREQUENCIES OF OUTLOOK PERCEPTION MAGNITUDE OF CHANGE FOR GADSDEN COUNTY AND SEPARATE COMMUNITY SUBORDINATE RESIDENTS	194
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	197
	BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.	206

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE	TITLE	PAGE
2:1	Production of Cigar-Wrapper Tobacco in Florida and Georgia, 1959-1976	14
2:2	Stratified Random Sample Data for Selected Gadsden County Communities	18
5:1	General Characteristics of Gadsden County Black Leaders and Surveyed Residents	76
5:2	General Characteristics of Quincy CIG-CORE and NBCL Factions	78
5:3	Economic Dependency of Quincy CIG-CORE and NBCL Factions	80
5:4	Ideological Orientation of Quincy CIG-CORE and NBCL Factions	80
5:5	Political Orientation of Quincy CIG-CORE and NBCL Factions	82
5:6	Quincy CIG-CORE and NBCL Factions' Evaluation of Political Strategies	83
5:7	General Characteristics of Gretna Richardson and Barkley Factions	89
5:8	Ideological Orientation of Gretna Richardson and Barkley Factions	90
5:9	Political Orientation of Gretna Richardson and Barkley Factions	90
5:10	Gretna Richardson and Barkley Factions' Evaluation of Political Strategies.	91
5:11	General Characteristics of Gadsden County Black Leaders By Community	94
5:12	Quincy and Gretna Black Leaders' Evaluation of Political Strategies	96
5:13	Ideological Orientation of Quincy and Gretna Black Leaders.	97
6:1	Gadsden County Political Participation Scale	107

6:2	Political Participation and Political Awareness By Gadsden County Black Community.	110
6:3	Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Partici- pation and Political Awareness and General Population Characteristics for Gadsden County Black Residents.	112
6:4	Economic Dependency Frequencies for Gadsden County and Separate Community Black Residents.	114
6:5	Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Partici- pation and Political Awareness and Economic Dependency for Gadsden County and Separate Community Black Residents .	115
6:6	Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Partici- pation and Political Awareness and Economic Dependency for Gadsden County Black Residents, Controlling for Income and Education.	116
6:7	Level of Formal and Informal Organizational Involvement of Gadsden County Black Population By Community	120
6:8	Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Partici- pation and Political Awareness and Formal Organization for Gadsden County and Separate Community Black Residents .	122
6:9	Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Partici- pation and Political Awareness and Formal Organization for Gadsden County Black Residents, Controlling for Income and Education.	123
6:10	Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Partici- pation and Political Awareness and Informal Organization for Gadsden County and Separate Community Black Residents .	124
6:11	Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Partici- pation and Political Awareness and Informal Organization for Gadsden County Black Residents, Controlling for Income and Education.	126
7:1	Frequencies of Present Deprivation and Past Deprivation for Gadsden County and Separate Community Black Residents .	137
7:2	Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Partici- pation and Political Awareness and Present Deprivation and Past Deprivation for Gadsden County and Separate Community Black Residents	138
7:3	Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Partici- pation and Political Awareness and Present Deprivation and Past Deprivation for Gadsden County Black Residents, Controlling for Income and Education.	139

7:4	Frequencies of Direction of Change Variables for Gadsden County Black Residents.	141
7:5	Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Participation and Political Awareness and Outlook Perception Direction of Change Variables for Gadsden County Black Residents	143
7:6	Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Participation and Political Awareness and Present Deprivation and Past Deprivation for Gadsden County Black Residents, Controlling for Outlook Perception Direction of Change. . .	144
7:7	Frequencies of Outlook Perception Magnitude of Change Variables for Gadsden County Black Residents.	145
7:8	Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Participation and Political Awareness and Outlook Perception Magnitude of Change Variables for Gadsden County Black Residents	147
7:9	Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Participation and Political Awareness and Present Deprivation and Past Deprivation for Gadsden County Black Residents, Controlling for Outlook Perception Magnitude of Change. . .	148
7:10	Frequencies of White Treatment for Gadsden County and Separate Community Black Residents.	150
7:11	Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Participation and Political Awareness and White Treatment for Gadsden County and Separate Community Black Residents . . .	151
7:12	Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Participation and Political Awareness and Present Deprivation and Past Deprivation for Gadsden County Black Residents, Controlling for White Treatment	152

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE	TITLE	PAGE
1:1	Model of the Political Mobilization Process.	5
2:1	Map of Gadsden County, Florida	16
3:1	Black News Articles and Black Share of Gadsden County Electorate As Indicators of Black Political Activity . . .	42
5:1	Militant-Conservative Continuum Based On Evaluation of Political Strategies.	82
7:1	Computations of Measures for Relative Deprivation, Direction of Change, and Magnitude of Change Variables from Hadley Cantril's Self-Anchoring, Striving Scale . . .	133

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

CIG	Civic Interest Group
CORE	Congress of Racial Equality
FAMU	Florida A and M University
NAACP	National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
NBCL	Negro Businessmen's and Civic League
SCLC	Southern Christian Leadership Conference
SEDF	Scholarship, Education and Defense Fund
SNCC	Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
VEP	Voter Education Project

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Political mobilization is defined as a process through which a subordinate group acquires and utilizes resources in an effort to challenge the politically dominant group. A model of rural political mobilization has been constructed and tested, linking the intervention of outside forces with the development of a local leadership structure and the activation of the subordinate population in an effort to alter the political status quo.

Gadsden County, Florida, a rural, predominantly black county in the northern panhandle region of the state, was chosen due to its availability and because of the dramatic increases in black political activities occurring there since the early 1960's. Primary data were collected through a survey of 199 Black residents selected in a stratified random sample of four communities (Quincy, Gretna, Greensboro, and Sawdust) and interviews with 23 black leaders in the selected communities chosen by a snowballing reputational method. Additional data were drawn

from individuals with first-hand knowledge of events occurring in Gadsden County since 1963 and from a systematic review of both local and regional newspapers. Survey expenses were paid for by a dissertation improvement grant from the National Science Foundation.

The study identified two periods of political mobilization: 1963 to 1966 and 1970 to 1972. Both political mobilization periods were associated with the intervention of outside forces. Outside organizational forces were of primary importance during the 1963-1966 period, serving to directly challenge existing racial norms and to recruit and organize local black leaders for action. During the 1970-1972 period, outside organizational forces were present only after political mobilization was already underway and played more of a subsidiary role. Outside governmental support provided an avenue of appeal beyond the white dominated local government and protection for economically vulnerable black leaders fearful of white sanctions.

While unity among local black leaders was not found to be essential to political mobilization, the emergence of a more militant leadership was identified as necessary. The expansion of local black political organization was also associated with political mobilization.

Black residents of the county became mobilized when they were a part of a communications network through which militant leaders could reach them. Especially important in this regard was the black church. Also facilitating mobilization were economic independence from local whites and the identification of personal troubles with perceived poor treatment by whites.

The study, while incapable of definitive conclusions, suggests that political mobilization is not solely an urban phenomenon but, under given circumstances, is possible in traditional, rural areas.

CHAPTER ONE
THE POLITICAL MOBILIZATION PROCESS

Political Mobilization in Rural Society

The expanding political awareness of heretofore passive members of society and their subsequent attempts to exert influence on the political system are generally associated with the breakdown of traditional society and, especially, urbanization.¹ The process by which people become available for new patterns of socialization as old social, economic, and psychological commitments are eroded has been termed "social mobilization."² Integral to the social mobilization process is the exposure to modern life through the mass media, change of residence, urbanization, occupational change, literacy, income change, and so on. Social change thus results in political change. As the politically relevant strata of the population grow, pressure builds on government to increase in scope and size, providing the services that the socially mobilized population demands. The picture developed is one of a static countryside and a teeming city, contrasted in political orientation by passivity and ferment.³

While the foundations of social mobilization theory may be basically sound, the linkage between social change and political awareness and participation requires closer examination. Magali Sarfatti Larson and Arlene Eisen Bergman found that urban migration in Peru resulted in either individual adaptation or resignation, depending on the age and motivation of the immigrant, and not collective political action.⁴ And

even when newly urbanized individuals become politically involved, as Wayne Cornelius found in Mexico City, their concern may be more with the distribution of existing government benefits rather than demands for new programs or the selection of the decision makers.⁵

If the social changes associated with urbanization do not always produce political activity, then the lack of urbanization does not necessarily mean political inertia. F. LaMond Tullis found what he termed "intense peasant movements" in rural Peru, generated by an increased ability of peasants to comprehend a changing world coupled with resistance to change by traditional elites.⁶

Within the American South, a setting analogous to many of the world's developing areas,⁷ increased political awareness and demands by blacks have been particularly evident in many traditional, rural locations. The southern black has long endured a subordinate role. V. O. Key's acclaimed 1949 work on southern politics identified the overwhelming importance the race issue played in regional politics as the politically and economically dominant whites sought to enforce passivity on the blacks.⁸ Yet, if the number of blacks elected to public office is an indication, small towns (not large cities) have been the place where the greatest number of black elected officials have emerged in recent years. In 1974, 63 percent of blacks elected to city council positions came from cities of less than 5,000 inhabitants while more than one-half of all black mayors (54%) were elected in towns of less than 1,000.⁹ In contrast, the violent urban protests of the late 1960's were not the work of recent black immigrants but of the large numbers of young blacks entirely brought up and educated in northern and western countries.¹⁰

Apparently, the dislocations envisioned by social mobilization theory are neither necessary nor sufficient to account for heightened

political awareness and mobilized political behavior by individuals who were previously nonparticipants in the political system. If social mobilization theory is flawed in predicting politicization, perhaps the fault lies in relying entirely upon social change to explain political phenomenon. Clearer insight into the specific factors that stimulate individuals toward political activity may be gleaned by examining the political forces at work. Thus, the present study seeks to focus on the ingredients of political mobilization rather than social mobilization. A traditional, rural setting has been selected to provide an environment uncluttered by the social changes enumerated by social mobilization theory.

A Model of Political Mobilization

Political mobilization is considered to be a process involving the interaction of a number of related variables which yield a mobilized response. Specifically, political mobilization is defined as a process by which one group acquires and/or uses resources in conflict with another group.¹¹ The group-based nature of the conflict focuses attention on collective attempts to alter existing realities. Resources include anything that can be brought to bear in the power struggle. Leadership may be a resource as can organization, education, numbers, and money. Psychological states, including degree of commitment, hope, anger, and unity, may be resources. Basically, any property of the individual or group that can be employed in the power struggle may be considered a resource.¹² Political mobilization, as a process, is temporal. Periods of political mobilization may be sustained or may lapse, resulting in demobilization. Scope and intensity of the political mobilization process are also relevant. While intensity is difficult to gauge in a

retrospective study, scope may be dealt with on two levels: leader and group. The mobilization of leadership resources may not arouse the bulk of group members. Similarly, the group may mobilize spontaneously without leadership, at least initially. Moreover, the extent of involvement of potential group members in the political mobilization effort is also a variable.

A model of the political mobilization process is presented in Figure 2:1. Apparent in this model is a sequential ordering of the political mobilization process according to stage. The first stage is operative under conditions where little deviation from traditional patterns of behavior has occurred in a locality for some time. This would be most likely in a rural setting where a nudge from outside may be necessary to initiate political mobilization. Of course, rural areas are not completely removed from events in the larger society. Even the most remote community has some access to the information transmitted by the communications network composed of print and electronic media. Communication by word of mouth or by residents who have traveled outside the immediate area is also possible. However, more direct forms of intervention in the rural community's pattern of life may be required. Activists, educated in the more modern centers and ready to challenge prevailing norms, may serve as a catalyst for rural political mobilization.¹³ In addition, the larger political system may lend legitimacy to demands and serve to protect those who would deviate from local norms.¹⁴ In the political mobilization model these outside forces are labeled "Outside Organizational Support" and "Outside Governmental Support." The primary role of these outside support forces is proposed to be in developing and protecting an emerging local subordinate leadership




Figure 1:1

Model of the Political Mobilization Process

structure, willing to challenge the local status quo.¹⁵ These outside forces also interact on each other, with outside groups lobbying for sympathetic policies from the larger political system and the outside government varying in receptiveness to the goals of the change-oriented groups.¹⁶ Outside organizational support is examined in chapter three, while outside governmental support is considered in chapter four.

The second stage of the model concerns leadership mobilization. For the local subordinate group to effectively press their demands for change, local leadership and organization must be developed. Specifically, a united local leadership devoted to status change must emerge along with an organizational capability through which strategies can be devised and actions coordinated. Stimulation for this development may come from outside but unless it takes root, political mobilization cannot be expected to proceed. While a mobilized local leadership may be expected to exhibit a mobilized response in its own right, it may also seek to incorporate the larger subordinate community in the effort towards change. The development of leadership resources is considered in chapter five.

The third stage of the political mobilization model involves the activation of the subordinate community. Involvement of the subordinate community in the mobilization process is contingent on both physical ability and psychological willingness. Considerable controversy has developed over whether psychological factors are relevant to the political mobilization process. Chief among the critics is Charles Tilly who states,

Despite the many recent attempts to psychologize the study of revolution by introducing ideas of anxiety, alienation, rising expectations, and the like, . . . the factors which hold up under close scrutiny are, on the whole, political ones.¹⁷

The argument is that change is borne out of a basic power struggle where the controlling factors are the coalition strength of the challengers and the ability of the dominant group to impose negative sanctions.¹⁸ While the power position of the challengers is certainly crucial to their chances of success, the exclusion of psychological factors from the mobilization equation begs the question of the legitimacy of the status quo. Group perception of the existing arrangements must be included in any consideration of political mobilization.¹⁹ Mobilization may depend on numbers, allies, organization, etc., but some predisposition to challenge must also be present. Therefore, the political mobilization model includes both physical and psychological resources.

The importance of physical barriers in the attempts of leaders to reach and recruit members of the larger subordinate population is evident. Individuals who fear for their personal safety or their economic livelihood may be less available for recruitment in the mobilization effort. Furthermore, there must be some mechanism through which the leaders can reach their potential followers. A communications network, either formal or informal, would be the key. The present model envisions organizations as playing the communications role, although other forms such as control over print or electronic media may serve the same purpose. The physical resources of the subordinate group in the political mobilization process are considered in chapter six.

Psychological resources of a subordinate population are varied. Certainly, there must be a basic discontent with the existing arrangements before the subordinate population could be motivated to mount a challenge. Discontent may be aggravated by leaders seeking a basic status change for their group. Also necessary would be some element of

group identification. A potential group may never coagulate unless some element of group consciousness is developed and promoted. Finally, the group may never become swept up in the mobilization effort if there is no hope for success. While an expectancy of success may depend upon the power position of the subordinate group to the dominant group, it need not be totally dependent on the actual distribution of physical resources. It may be foolish to challenge existing arrangements but people may have unrealistic expectations. The political mobilization model does not attempt to predict success, just the essential ingredients to political mobilization. Psychological resources of the subordinate group are discussed in chapter seven.

The end result of the political mobilization process is some sort of mobilized response by the leaders, by the subordinate community, or by both. The exact nature of this response will depend on particular local conditions and will be affected by the cultural and historic means of resolving conflict. Certainly, some degree of increased political awareness on the part of the mobilized population would be expected as well as some sort of politically oriented activity.

The Limitations of the Model

The model of political mobilization presented in this study has been derived mainly from the existing literature on political change and subordinate-dominant group relations. None of the ingredients are original; each will be discussed in detail under the appropriate chapter. The original contribution of this study is limited to the delimitation of an overall model of political mobilization where previously identified variables have been linked in an overall process.

The political mobilization model focuses solely upon the subordinate group seeking to change the existing arrangements in a local setting. Excluded from consideration is the dominant group and its efforts to suppress any attempted change or to adapt to new conditions. Furthermore, the model considers only mobilization, ignoring demobilization as a process. Insight into how people become swept up in a change-oriented effort is clearly relevant to a world in flux. The questions of dominant group reaction and demobilization are also relevant but are outside the scope of this study.

A third limitation of the model lies in its limited applicability to traditional, rural localities where the subordinate group has been effectively excluded from the political realm. The concept of political mobilization certainly has a much wider explanatory range. The narrow focus of political mobilization presented here must be seen as an attempt to develop a special theory which may be empirically investigated in other settings and later consolidated in a more general theory.²⁰

CHAPTER ONE
NOTES

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14. Lucius J. Barker and Jesse J. McCorry, Jr., Black Americans and the Political System (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Winthrop Publishers, 1976), pp. 19-21; Thomas R. Dye, The Politics of Equality (Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1971), p. 34
15. Subordinate, as used here, describes the traditional power status of the challenging group. In the present study subordinate and black are used interchangeably, with subordinate employed in theoretical discussions and black used in discussions of Gadsden County.
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CHAPTER TWO METHODOLOGY

Gadsden County As a Case Study

The basic approach employed here is that of the case study. The case study method has the particular strength of allowing the researcher to examine the richness of the subject in detail. However, a single case study cannot constitute the basis for a valid generalization. Nonetheless, a case study can make an important contribution to the establishment of general propositions tied to more general theory.¹ As such, new hypotheses can be generated and old hypotheses can be sharpened or refined. In addition, by breaking the single case into separate research sites, internal comparisons are possible. When communities in close proximity vary, the ability to isolate the factors associated with the variance is enhanced, as "background" distortions are minimized.²

Gadsden County, the setting for this study, is located in the panhandle region of Northern Florida just west of Tallahassee. It is approximately 60 percent black. Less than one-half (47%) of the residents live in towns of 2,000 people or more. Until recently black participation in political affairs had been minimal, except for a brief period during the First Reconstruction when several local black men were elected to the state legislature.³ As late as 1950, only 1 percent of eligible black voters in the county were registered; by 1960 the figure had risen to only 3 percent. Yet by 1970 the percent registered had

reached 42, compared to a fairly steady white registration of between 61 and 64 percent. Most of the increase occurred between 1964 and 1966 when the county's electorate went from 14 to 40 percent black.⁴ This initial visible surge in black political participation came at a time when the types of social changes envisioned by social mobilization theory were not apparent. Although the economic base of the county, shade tobacco, was to undergo a substantial decline in the late 1960's, the political changes preceded this major economic and social dislocation. Table 2:1 presents the production of shade tobacco in the Florida and Georgia region by acre between 1959 and 1976, the bulk of which was grown in Gadsden County.⁵

Even in times of prosperity the wealth generated by the tobacco industry was never evenly distributed. Nearly three-quarters of Gadsden County's black families earned less than \$3,000 in 1960.⁶ In the mid-1960's, the county ranked in the bottom 10 percent of United States counties in the extent of poverty, severity of poverty, family resources, educational achievement, functional literacy, and sufficiency of housing.⁷ Despite the low wages and the seasonal nature of shade tobacco production, the crop did provide a means of livelihood for many people. However, by 1976, 27 percent of the blacks in the county's labor force were unemployed.⁸

As a rural locality with a traditional plantation economy and a largely subordinate black population, Gadsden County offers a setting for studying political mobilization untainted by the dislocations identified by social mobilization theory. Although such dislocations have occurred subsequently, political changes were initiated before their impact was felt. Therefore, the political factors associated with political mobilization can be more clearly seen.

Table 2:1

Production of Cigar-Wrapper Tobacco
in Florida and Georgia

<u>Year</u>	<u>Acres</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Acres</u>
1959	5,630	1968	5,020
1960	6,060	1969	4,974
1961	5,589	1970	3,486
1962	5,213	1971	2,970
1963	5,138	1972	3,107
1964	6,047	1973	2,644
1965	6,278	1974	1,858
1966	5,802	1975	1,110
1967	5,054	1976	344

The Data Base

Data for this study were drawn from three main sources: 1) a stratified random sample of subordinate residents in four selected Gadsden County, Florida, communities; 2) interviews with subordinate leaders in the several communities; and 3) a comprehensive examination of the principal newspaper in the county, the weekly Gadsden County Times, from 1958 through 1978. Additional sources of information came from published statistical abstracts including the United States Census, regional newspapers, particularly the Tallahassee Democrat, and interviews with individuals who have an intimate knowledge of events that have transpired in the county.

Survey Data

A stratified random sample based on households was conducted between September and December 1977. No complete listing of Gadsden County residents was available so random selection was by households with schedules for determining which adult occupant (18 years or older) would be interviewed.⁹ Survey expenses were paid by the National Science Foundation through the "Grants for Improving Doctoral Dissertation

Research in the Social Sciences" program.¹⁰ Financial restrictions limited the number of interviews to about 200. These were allocated to four selected Gadsden County communities: Quincy, Gretna, Greensboro, and Sawdust (Figure 2:1).

Several considerations governed community selection. First, as the total number of survey interviews was limited, the concentration on a few communities was considered more practical than a random selection based on the entire county. Communities provided easy identification of black households due to segregated residence patterns. The one unincorporated area included in the study required an extensive mapping effort in order to locate dwellings. Assessment of race occupancy in this case was difficult.

Second, prior knowledge of subordinate political activity gleaned from newspaper accounts served as a basis of community selection. Quincy, the county seat and the site of the most visible black political activity, was a logical choice, as was Gretna, where black residents had successfully captured control of the town's government. Greensboro, located proximate to both Quincy and Gretna, represented a community with virtually no reported black political activity. Sawdust could not be considered a community in the formal sense. A small, unincorporated, predominantly black community named Sawdust lay within the area surveyed but the boundaries conformed to an enumerated census district, ED-24. It was chosen due to its location between the other incorporated communities, thus representing the political orientation of the county's purely rural black population. All four communities lay within an area of 13 miles by 6 miles. The proximate location of these communities to each other serves to reduce the "background" variables that could distort comparison.




Figure 2:1

Map of Gadsden County, Florida

Third, these communities formed an intervillage system, having a direct relationship to each other in terms of social, cultural, economic, and political activity.¹¹ If the diffusion of the political mobilization process in the county was to be charted, some interaction between communities had to be assumed. Quincy must be considered the hub of manufacturing and commercial activity for the surrounding communities with 18 establishments employing 10 or more employees. Greensboro had only two such establishments while Gretna and Sawdust had none.¹²

The communities of Gretna, Greensboro, and Sawdust were oversampled in order to provide a sufficient number of responses for comparison (Table 2:2). By the same token, Quincy, with the largest subordinate population, was undersampled. Even so, the number of interviews conducted in Quincy far exceeded those from the other communities. When aggregated, a weighting formula was employed to correct for the disproportionate sampling. The aggregated whole, while labeled "Gadsden County," in truth represented only about 25 percent of the county's black residents. Calculations for weighting were based on the 1970 Census and were probably in error by the time of the 1977 survey. Since published census data failed to provide a breakdown according to age for the smaller communities, weighting was based on total black population rather than adult population. More current information on small communities and unincorporated areas was unobtainable, leaving the researcher no alternative but to base decisions on the population data available.

Interviews were conducted by eight blacks, both male and female, most of whom were in their early 20's. Seven lived in Tallahassee, Florida; one was a Quincy resident. Two days of training preceded their

Table 2:2

Stratified Random Sample Data for
Selected Gadsden County Communities

	Size of Black Community (1970 Census)	Actual Number of Surveys Completed (1977)	Weighted Surveys in Gadsden County Total
Quincy	4,304	83	148
Gretna	720	51	23
Greensboro	239	27	8
Sawdust	597	38	19
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	5,860	199	198

assignments. Black interviewers were employed as a guard against a possible reluctance of the largely impoverished black population to be fully candid when questioned by a white. In a region long dominated by whites a tendency to mask true feeling would have been a problem. Attempts to conduct a few of the survey interviews by the researcher confirmed this fear. Several interviewers were assigned to each community, thus minimizing interviewer bias as a source of error. Most interviews were conducted in the month of September, although the last interviews from Sawdust and Greensboro were not completed until December. Full cooperation was given by county and community officials. A copy of the survey instrument with one of the six respondent-selection keys used is found in Appendix A.

Selection of households to be sampled varied from community to community. In Quincy, the city inspector was asked to indicate which sections of town contained the black residents. A city directory listing residences by street was then consulted and households randomly selected. In Gretna, a city map locating dwellings was available. Town officials were able to delineate the sections of town containing black

residents. In Greensboro, no city map could be obtained. An aerial photo of the town allowed streets to be mapped and town officials indicated the black sections. A "windshield survey" then completed the most difficult problem in household determination and selection. Unlike the other communities, housing in Sawdust was not segregated with all black residents living in close proximity. Locating no reliable map of dwellings, an extensive windshield survey was taken of the area. Most dwellings could be easily identified as to the race of the occupant by observation. Some error in this regard, however, was unavoidable so white households had to be replaced in the sample by black households. Actually, this occurred infrequently. In all, 199 interviews were completed in the four communities.

Leader Interviews

The principal means of determining leadership was through the random sample questionnaire. Respondents were asked to name the three most important black leaders in the community. Every effort was made to interview individuals receiving more than two nominations. A check on this determination process was made by combing newspaper articles that mentioned black political activity for names, by asking each leader interviewed to name other leaders in the community, and by asking white leaders in the community who the black leaders were. If this selection process has a bias, it is in selecting those individuals who have received the greatest publicity, ignoring those who tend to work in more subtle ways. In all, 23 black leaders were interviewed with the bulk residing in Quincy (11) and Gretna (9), only two in Greensboro, and none in the Sawdust area. The remaining leader was a Havana resident but was included because of the level of involvement in Quincy-based

black political activity. Leadership interviews were conducted by the researcher and lasted anywhere from 45 minutes to 3 hours. See Appendix B for the black leader interview instrument.

Newspaper Analysis

The back files of the Gadsden County Times provided an historical chronology of events and identification of principal actors. Although the county's weekly paper was biased in its news coverage of events in the black community (until 1970 black community news was segregated on a separate page), major events were reported and accuracy could be checked with regional papers such as the Tallahassee Democrat. All articles from 1958 to 1978 dealing with black-white conflict or black group organizational and political activity were noted on 3 by 5 cards. This file provided a finger-tip current affairs source of information, allowing the researcher to conduct the interviews with black and white leaders with some background and knowledge.

Some Methodological Questions

Time lag is a serious problem in political science research. The dynamic events which this study is attempting to examine occurred in the mid-1960's and the early 1970's. The actual research was not completed until the end of 1977. More than a decade had elapsed from when active assertion of subordinate political demands was initiated to the study of the process behind this change. Area residents responded according to their attitudes and status at the time of the interview but difficulty arises when comparing these responses to attitudes held a decade before. Judgment may tend to be retrospective. The approach taken has been to demonstrate that political mobilization has occurred, hypothesize the

kinds of variables associated with such mobilization and the individuals most likely to be affected, and test these hypotheses with data gathered from those who lived through the period. A critical assumption is that those affected have retained measurable characteristics. The best study would have gathered data before, during, and after a mobilization period. While this kind of data would be invaluable, it simply did not exist.

The time-lag problem also cropped up when conducting elite interviews. Frequently, the researcher, primed with data from the newspaper file and other sources, would arrive at the interview with a clearer view of the chronology of events than the interviewee. Gaps in memory were also apparent. By directing questions toward particular events and occasionally supplying a missing detail, the danger of "leading" the interviewee was present. However, the issue in leadership interviews was not whether the individual could remember a particular event but what could be remembered. The typical experience was for the respondent to "open-up" as the interview progressed and the respondent dusted the cobwebs off his memory.

A second methodological problem associated with this study was the connection between elite and individual behavior in the separate communities. A basic proposition in this study is that the nature and extent of elite orientation and organization influenced the actions of the larger black population. Yet, the connection between these two levels of analysis cannot be directly demonstrated. Comparatively, it can be shown that those communities with the most developed leadership structure and political mobilization contain a greater percentage of people affected by political mobilization. However valid this generalization

may be, it lacks the firm statistical support that can be provided when dealing with data generated by the survey instrument alone. Confidence in this generalization can only come with supportive data from similar studies.

Third, the basically ordinal nature of the data generated by the research instruments, both survey and elite, limits the types of statistical analysis that can be performed. The statistical measures that have been relied upon are Kendall's Tau B and C. (Kendall's Tau B is for square tables while Kendall's Tau C is appropriate for rectangular tables.)¹³ Gamma, most often employed as a statistical measure in studies based on ordinal data, has been avoided as it tends to yield inflated correlation coefficients, especially if data are arranged in a "curvilinear" pattern with one corner of the table containing zeros. For this reason the more conservative Kendall's Tau measures were used.

The main problem associated with the ordinal data was the limited ability to apply controls due to a limited N. Only with the overall Gadsden County sample were controls applied and then only one control could be applied at a time. To do otherwise would confront the problem of empty cells, the lack of a sufficient variety of responses on which calculations could be performed. Controls on the separate community data were impossible for this reason.

CHAPTER TWO
NOTES

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3. Joe M. Richardson, The Negro in the Reconstruction of Florida (Tallahassee, Florida: Florida State University Press, 1965), p. 188; Randal J. Stanley, History of Gadsden County (Quincy, Florida: Gadsden County Times Press, 1948), p. 121
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Chapter Two Notes-continued

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CHAPTER THREE
OUTSIDE ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT

The editor of the Gadsden County Times in the summer of 1964 summed up the situation succinctly: "What bothers me is the fact that so many of our colored citizens are now listening to these out-of-town and out-of-state alleged civil rights workers and evidently do not want our help anymore."¹ Before the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) sent its field representatives to Gadsden County in late 1963, only 376 blacks were registered to vote, barely 3 percent of those eligible.² Within the next three years, the number of blacks registered totaled 40 percent of the county's 10,575 voters. Until CORE arrived, Gadsden County persisted in its traditional routine with blacks holding a clearly subordinate position with little or no direct political influence. Whatever the efforts of local leaders to organize and to assist in the subsequent voter registration drives on the predisposition of Gadsden County blacks to assert their political rights, the impact of CORE and the other civil rights organizations that followed was of critical importance.

The presence of outside groups or individuals can serve to demonstrate that traditional patterns of behavior can be altered, and thus provide a catalyst for action. Although the more abstract goals of the outsiders often differ from the more concrete, redistributive goals of the local subordinate groups,³ the outsiders provide organizational and tactical expertise plus demonstrate that local authority may be successfully challenged causing a "power deflation," the realization that old

dominant-subordinate power relations have been altered.⁴ According to Patricia Due, the first CORE field secretary to organize in Gadsden County, "CORE gave the community and some of the people in it the incentive to try."⁵

The catalytic role of outside organizations has been evident in other contexts. Greene County, Alabama, despite a predominantly black population, was unable to produce a black voting majority and elect blacks to public office until outside support was forthcoming from the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and the National Democratic Party of Alabama. Seventy percent of the blacks questioned in that rural county felt that few people would have registered without the help of the SCLC.⁶ In Crystal City, Texas, Mexican-Americans were able to mobilize their number for electoral victory twice with the aid of outside groups. First, in 1963, with the help of the Teamsters Union and the Political Association of Spanish-Speaking Organizations and later, in 1969-1970, assisted by the Mexican American Youth Organization.⁷ Peasants of the valleys of La Convencion and Lares near Cuzco, Peru, organized into a federation and seized nearby lands in 1962 with the help of Hugo Blanco, a young revolutionary from Lima.⁸ The prominence of outsiders in these situations suggests the necessary relationships between outside organizational involvement and political mobilization in traditional rural areas.

Black Political Organization in the United States

Blacks did not organize on a national basis in the United States until early in the Twentieth Century. There had been slave insurrections before the War Between the States; some blacks, notably Fredrick Douglass, had been active in the Abolitionist Movement; blacks were

eventually allowed to fight on the Union side; and many blacks had held political office during the Reconstruction Period. Yet black political fortunes were largely a matter of white interest guided by conscience and political advantage rather than reasoned persuasion. In 1900 Booker T. Washington, the noted scientist of the Tuskegee Institute, founded the National Negro Business League, dedicated to the ideal that blacks could gain influence and independence in American life through commercial achievement.⁹ The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) was organized in 1909 and headed by W. E. B. De Bois. Although considered militant for the times, the tactics adopted by the NAACP were basically legislative and legal.¹⁰ The Urban League, founded in 1910, was not as protest minded as the NAACP, seeking to ease the transition of Southern rural blacks into urban life by negotiating with whites over employment opportunities and conditions.¹¹

Essentially elitest, composed of academics, professionals and businessmen, these organizations were limited in their political appeals. Most blacks, confined to the traditional rural South, were untouched by these attempts to organize for political action. Mass participation in organized protest activity by blacks did not come until the Supreme Court solidly disapproved the legal enforcement of segregation in Brown v. Board of Education (1954). The NAACP limited its response to filing desegregation suits throughout the South to force compliance.¹² However, the resistance of state governments in the face of the federal mandate led to increased militancy among blacks. The 1955 Montgomery bus boycott lead by Martin Luther King, Jr., was an example. The SCLC, organized in 1957 and presided over by King, sought to overturn segregation by active defiance of Jim Crow laws throughout the South. Such

"direct action" was not an innovation of the SCLC. CORE used direct action to desegregate private services in the North at its founding in 1942.¹³ CORE and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) organized college-age students to challenge traditional race relations. The Freedom Rides, sponsored by a coalition of CORE, SNCC, and SCLC during the summer of 1961, sought to test Jim Crow laws in transportation and service facilities in the Deep South, provoking unchecked violence, arrests, and jail terms for the protestors.¹⁴ King focused national attention on the civil rights struggle with the SCLC campaign to end discrimination in Birmingham in 1963. SNCC demonstrators sat at segregated restaurants across the South. CORE conducted campaigns in Plaquemine, Louisiana, Meridian, Mississippi, and Tallahassee, Florida.

CORE and the First Mobilization Period (1963-1966)

Gadsden County was a backwater of the civil rights movement for years. The 1954 Brown school desegregation case provoked no mention in the county weekly, the Gadsden County Times. A local White Citizen's Council was formed in 1956 which denounced integration as a violation of the word of God and the NAACP as a tool of the Communist Party,¹⁵ but there was no sign of change in the traditional pattern of local race relations. Throughout the 1950's few blacks were registered to vote and the schools remained totally segregated.

Even intensive civil rights protests in Tallahassee, only 26 miles from the heart of Gadsden County, had no immediate substantive impact. Inspired by the Montgomery bus boycott in 1955 and 1956, blacks in Tallahassee began a similar boycott in 1956 and 1957. Led by the Reverend C. K. Steel, the boycott was only partially successful.¹⁶ However,

Tallahassee was becoming increasingly a focal point for black protest activity. Patricia Stephens, a student at Florida A and M University (FAMU), heard of a CORE workshop in Palm Beach, Florida, in September 1959. After being instructed in nonviolent direct action tactics and participating in a sit-in demonstration at a Miami department store lunch counter, Stephens returned to the all-black FAMU campus in Tallahassee and organized a CORE chapter. Some initial direct action efforts at a Trailways Bus terminal proved unsuccessful but in the winter of 1960 a major campaign was launched against department store lunch counters that refused to serve blacks. After several arrests, Stephens urged students from both FAMU and the white Florida State University to "fill the jails," sparking a mass demonstration of nearly a thousand people and a tear gas barrage from police. Arrested in the demonstration, Stephens refused to pay the fine imposed for disturbing the peace and unlawful assembly and staged CORE's first "jail-in," lasting 60 days. Due to the interracial nature of the Tallahassee campaign and the publicity generated by the jail-in, Stephens and the other students who had served time were sent on a national speaking tour by CORE upon their release.¹⁷

In 1962 the Kennedy Administration moved to redirect the civil rights movement from direct confrontation to voter registration. The sometimes violent reaction of white southerners towards change resulted in highly publicized incidents. Many whites were involved in the protest activity as well, making the civil rights issue national in scope. In addition, racial problems in the United States were widely reported in the international press. With the United States seeking to present itself as the model of liberalism and democracy, the racial troubles

at home were a serious blemish.¹⁸ Seeking to cool off the situation, the Kennedy Administration secured grants from a number of private foundations which were then assigned to the biracial Southern Regional Council and used in the Voter Education Project (VEP). All major civil rights groups were to cooperate in the effort scheduled to last from 1962 to 1964 but in reality the VEP did little coordinating. Although several joint efforts were attempted, most civil rights groups staked out an area and began their own campaign. Leaders of the registration effort believed that they had been promised complete support by the Justice Department officials in light of the resistance expected in their efforts. CORE asked Patricia Stephens Due (now married to a young lawyer working for the VEP out of Atlanta) to serve as the field secretary in Northern Florida. From fall 1963 through 1964, she worked the Big Bend region of the state, principally in Leon, Liberty, Madison, and Gadsden counties.¹⁹

To call Patricia Due an outsider in Gadsden County would be technically incorrect. She was in fact a native in the county, having been born there and having spent several years in the county's public schools. She had lived most of her life, however, in Dade County in the southern tip of the state. Yet her many relatives and family acquaintances in Gadsden County gave her credibility in the black community. Dorothy Jones Coward, a friend of her mother's, provided an initial place to stay. Later, a house was provided for the CORE workers, mainly current or former college students from Tallahassee and the University of Florida in Gainesville, by the Good Sheppard, a local black charity organization.²⁰

Initially, the CORE effort consisted of two people, Patricia Due and Judy Benniger Brown, a graduate student from the University of

Florida. During the summer of 1964, however, the number of CORE workers working on voter registration swelled to nearly two dozen.²¹ The presence of these outsiders and their efforts to alter traditional practices within the county provoked a reaction by local whites that sometimes turned violent. Shots were fired into the house being occupied by CORE workers. No one was hurt but complaints to local law enforcement officials resulted in no arrests.²² The FBI did investigate the incident three days later but other than the temporary presence of federal officers, no federal protection was forthcoming.²³ In other incidents registration workers suffered beatings;²⁴ trespass charges were filed against workers attempting to talk to blacks on tobacco farms;²⁵ police followed Patricia Due and were conspicuous at registration rallies copying down license numbers from cars.²⁶ In December 1964, CORE's offices in downtown Quincy were the target of an arson attempt. Again no arrests resulted from the incident.²⁷

Prior to the arrival of CORE, the most visible black interest group in the county was the Quincy Negro Businessmen and Civic League, composed mainly of accommodationist-style leaders. The political activities of this organization were generally limited to petitioning local governmental authorities with specific grievances of the black community.²⁸ A local chapter of the NAACP also existed in Quincy but was largely dormant. One of the goals of the CORE effort was to mobilize local blacks into political action of their own. With the stimulation of CORE, the local NAACP chapter became rejuvenated. A group of black leaders in Quincy began building the organization by recruiting potential leaders. Often this proved difficult as many blacks were still fearful of economic retaliation in the face of open political activity.

Some teachers who joined the NAACP, for instance, requested that their membership cards not be sent directly to their addresses but delivered in a more discreet manner.²⁹ New organizations were established as well. A local CORE chapter, consisting mostly of younger blacks, was formed to aid the efforts of the outside CORE workers. Also, an auxiliary adult organization, the Civic Interest Group (CIG), organized in support of the CORE voter registration and education effort. CORE and CIG members helped canvass the county, explaining registration and election procedures to blacks who had no experience with either. CIG members, in addition, conducted civic education classes for elderly residents, petitioned the Quincy city commission for a patrol car for the city's black policeman, and invited speakers, such as Atlanta Senator Leroy Johnson, to address the group.³⁰

All local black political organizations eventually cooperated with the CORE effort to varying degrees. As membership in these local groups tended to overlap, the diversity of groups allowed local black leaders to lend the level of support that suited their personal preference.

Representatives of CORE were present in Gadsden County in some way until 1968. Although direct action campaigns were conducted against eating establishments, the main focus of the organization through the 1964 Presidential election was voter registration. In Gadsden County, according to Patricia Due, voter registration was direct action.³¹ Mrs. Due left the project at the end of 1964 to be with her husband in Atlanta and was replaced by Spiver Gordon, a veteran of CORE's Louisiana campaign. With VEP funds nearly exhausted, the Gadsden County campaign depended mainly on community support for its continued activities. A reduced staff maintained the North Florida Project through the winter of

1965, and although additional funding from CORE's Scholarship, Education, and Defense Fund (SEDF) kept the effort alive through the summer of 1966, the emphasis on voter registration declined. In 1966 Gordon returned to Louisiana.³²

The emphasis of CORE activity throughout the South was then beginning to shift from massive registration campaigns to the exploitation of legal avenues made possible by recent civil rights legislation and the War on Poverty. Following the termination of the VEP in 1965, John and Patricia Due moved back to Northern Florida to establish a law practice. Reflecting a growing split within the civil rights movement, the Legal Defense Fund of the NAACP ceased its legal support of CORE projects. With no lawyer in Northern Florida willing to handle civil rights cases, John Due was sent to the region on a straight salary of \$6,000 a year, paid by SEDF.³³ Operating out of Quincy, John Due attempted to take advantage of the "maximum feasible participation of the poor" provision of the Economic Opportunity Act. When a Gadsden County Community Action Agency was created in 1965 to distribute surplus food to the county's poor, controversy erupted over how many blacks would serve on the executive board and who would select them. By petitioning the Office of Economic Opportunity, John Due was able to get the number of members on the executive board increased from 15 to 27, increasing black participation. In addition, nomination of individuals serving on the board was thrown open to community-based organizations including the CIG, thus undercutting local white control.³⁴

Other activities initiated included an attempt to organize area black farmers into committees that would serve to advise the Department of Agriculture on policy making. John Due envisioned these committees

as the basis of a self-help cooperative movement. The project fell through, however, as the number of independent black farmers in Gadsden County were limited and those that did exist often chose to rent their land to tobacco corporations rather than farm it themselves.³⁵ Several law suits were filed including one challenging corporal punishment in the county's schools and another charging racial discrimination in the treatment of prisoners in the county stockade.³⁶ However, the income generated by these activities was insufficient to support a growing family. John Due found organizing in Gadsden County difficult. By 1968 support from SEDF had terminated and John and Patricia Due moved their three children to Miami, Florida, terminating the direct presence of outside organizers in Gadsden County.

CORE provided the impetus for black political action in Gadsden County. After CORE arrived, local black political organizations were formed and others revitalized. Local black leaders appreciated the assistance. According to a black school principal in Quincy, "CORE gave us the big push that started us on our way."³⁷ A black barber in Quincy said, "I was not inspired by CORE, but they made me more aware."³⁸ Coinciding with or subsequent to CORE, Gadsden County blacks registered to vote, many local blacks joined political organizations, and a number of blacks qualified for political office for the first time since Reconstruction. Some increases in political participation might have occurred anyway, given the high salience of racial issues in the mid-1960's.³⁹ But CORE must be seen as a catalyst to this process in the context of Gadsden County, helping to break the old pattern of passive subordination.

The Second Mobilization Period
(1970-1972)

Following CORE's departure, local organizational activity went into a state of decline. The local CORE chapter became inactive when its president moved to Miami.⁴⁰ The CIG ceased to function.⁴¹ The Quincy chapter of the NAACP continued but the number of active members declined to five or six.⁴² Yet this lull in organizational activity between 1968 and 1970 did not mean that blacks in Gadsden County were satisfied. Signs of growing frustrations were evident in the bombing of an electrical substation in Quincy in the spring of 1970.⁴³ A number of other bombs were found at various locations in Quincy during the months of June and July, including the courthouse and a local farm tractor dealer.⁴⁴ However, substantive black political activity did not become evident until a mass black riot erupted spontaneously in Quincy on a Saturday night in October 1970. The riot occurred against the background of growing frustrations resulting from a deteriorating economy and the lack of substantive change despite the increase in expectations generated by CORE's earlier activities.⁴⁵ The riot itself was sparked by the shooting of a crippled black man in a bar by a black Quincy policeman. The situation was brought under control after about two and one-half hours of rioting during which storefront windows were broken in the downtown area and some looting took place.⁴⁶ In the aftermath outside groups and individuals once again entered Gadsden County.

One of the most immediate effects of the riot was the revitalization of the Quincy-based chapter of the NAACP. In the weeks following the riot the NAACP announced plans for a new voter registration effort plus demanded that more blacks be hired by local businesses and governments and that access to voter registration books be facilitated.⁴⁷ An

organizing grant was received from the national NAACP and membership in the local organization expanded to over 700.⁴⁸ The Black Americans, composed mainly of school-age blacks, was also formed to assist in protest activities.⁴⁹

The Gadsden County NAACP was supported in its activities by other outside groups. Principal among these was the SCLC. SCLC officials, including the Reverend James Orange, a field representative from Atlanta, and the Reverend R. N. Gooden from Tallahassee, were active in the county in February 1971. These outside leaders provided expertise on how to mobilize and organize protest demonstrations, including two mass marches in Quincy, a march from Quincy to Tallahassee, and the picketing and boycotting of Quincy stores not employing blacks. According to Rev. Gooden, the SCLC leaders met with local leaders late into the night, discussing organizing skills and tactics.⁵⁰

The major activity during this period was the mass marches through the streets of Quincy in support of the demands being made by the black community. Even with the intense CORE activity of previous years, Gadsden County had never experienced such organized mass protest. A demonstration in support of the 1965 Voter Rights Act was staged in August 1965 with eventually about 80 marchers taking part.⁵¹ However, the march that the SCLC helped organize on February 8th had some 600 participants. Chanting "soul power," the marchers made their way to the courthouse steps where they were addressed by their leaders. "We want to serve notice on the power structure of Gadsden County," said Rev. Steel, a civil rights activist from Tallahassee, "that unless brotherhood, justice and democracy come here, there will not be one stone left upon another."⁵² The second march on the following day attracted some 350 marchers.⁵³

The organized protest activity in Quincy seemed to have a contagious effect throughout the county. On February 10th, black junior high students in nearby Havana initiated a march to protest school assignments due to integration. Sheriff's deputies broke up the demonstration with tear gas. In reaction Havana blacks formed the Black Citizen's Council and boycotted local stores to force increased hiring of blacks.⁵⁴ Two weeks later a black man was shot during an argument in Midway, a rural community between Quincy and Tallahassee. Twenty-one arrests were made when local blacks began throwing rocks through the windows of the store where the shooting occurred. Several hundred more protesting blacks gathered outside the county jail in Quincy where those arrested were brought.⁵⁵ That same day, a 10-year-old black child was killed when he tried to race a train to the crossing on his bicycle in Gretna. A protest involving 50 blacks grew out of what was felt to be an inexcusable delay on the part of the ambulance crew in getting the then still breathing child to a hospital.⁵⁶

Within this volatile context, voter registration again began to climb. The NAACP went house to house throughout the county, spoke at churches, and provided transportation to the Registrar's Office in Quincy.⁵⁷ Black voter registration jumped by over one-third in the year following the Quincy riot and subsequent demonstrations. To support the voter registration drive, Julian Bond, the Georgia state legislator, and John Lewis, director of the Atlanta-based Voter Education Project, spoke in Quincy on August 30th. In his speech Bond reminded local blacks that while violence and intimidation might have been used in the past to prevent blacks from voting, "no one is going to put a gun to your heads to make you vote."⁵⁸

The reaction of local white leaders to the mobilized black population was cautious conciliation. Law and order was demanded by the Quincy city commission in controlling the riot but orders were given to the police not to shoot anyone. "We didn't want people hurt," said the hardware store owner who was the mayor at the time. "That would only cause publicity and bring CBS from Atlanta down our throats."⁵⁹ Discussions were initiated with local black leaders and a biracial group, the Greater Quincy Human Relations Commission composed of eight whites and eight blacks, was formed to help promote interracial communications. To aid in the formation of the group, the director of the Florida Commission on Human Relations and a sociology professor from Florida A and M University were invited to the county.⁶⁰ Some symbolic changes occurred immediately. The Gadsden County Times eliminated its segregated black news section from its weekly edition and substituted the word "black" for the previously used "Negro." Substantive changes were apparent also. A major demand of the black community, the hiring of more blacks in local businesses and in government, was met. "I hired a black clerk in my store," said a clothing store owner. "The riot shocked the community into thinking that blacks had to participate more."⁶¹ Blacks were hired by most Quincy businesses, including the two major banks, at positions above the common laborer.⁶² According to a black teacher, "Most any place downtown will hire a black with a high school education and is able to meet the public."⁶³ Demands that registration books be located in a public building and hours be lengthened were also met.⁶⁴

Despite an electorate that was 50 percent black in 1972, attempts to gain electoral office in Quincy and on the county level were met with frustration. Six black candidates made a frontal assault on the white

controlled county government in the 1972 Democratic primary by filing for the offices of Supervisor of Elections, Superintendent of Schools, School Board Commissioner, and County Commissioner.⁶⁵ Only one candidate, Alfredia Lee, was able to force a run-off where she received only 35 percent of the vote.⁶⁶ An attempt in 1974 by Witt Campbell to win a position on the county school board was similarly unsuccessful although he made the best showing of a black candidate in a Gadsden County at-large election with 45 percent of the vote.⁶⁷ James Palmer's 1974 attempt to gain a seat on the Quincy city commission could manage only 30 percent of the votes.⁶⁸

Mobilization in Gretna

While Quincy was the center of most of the political activity that engulfed Gadsden County in the 1970's, other fundamental political changes were taking place six miles to the west. Gretna must be seen, in large part, as resonating the events in Quincy. Following the Quincy riot in the fall of 1970, black boycotts of two Gretna stores resulted from alleged mistreatment of blacks. In one instance a black child was said to have been struck by the father of a white child following a scuffle between the youths. The other involved the beating of a black man, described as mentally unstable but harmless, after he had been found in the bedroom of a white woman. The boycott drove both store owners from business in Gretna, demonstrating the potential of local blacks for united political action.⁶⁹ Gretna had experienced dramatic increases in voter registration during the 1960's parallel to the rest of the county. Yet despite a population 80 percent black in 1970, blacks had never held or even run for public office in the town. The government of this rural town of under 900 people was strictly small

scale. Elected officials included the mayor, five councilmen, and a town clerk. The primary reason for incorporation back in the late 1940's was to take advantage of the cigarette tax available to municipalities. These revenues helped pay for a town water system.⁷⁰

Despite whites' claim to the contrary, blacks maintained that the existence of a town government was kept secret from blacks.⁷¹ At issue was the requirement of separate registration for town elections in addition to the standard registration for county, state and national elections. Gretna's registration books were kept in a store owned by a white and no blacks were listed. In January 1971, a member of the NAACP who resided in Gretna attempted to attend a meeting of the town council but was asked to leave. Reporting the incident to the next meeting of the NAACP in Quincy, a committee was formed to investigate the matter. Upon discovery of the separate registration requirement, an appeal was made to the Florida House Committee on Elections to have the books moved to the town hall. The NAACP then spearheaded a massive effort to get Gretna blacks on the town books by canvassing the town in a door-to-door effort. Before the books closed prior to the December 1971 election, 176 black voters registered, giving blacks a two-to-one majority.⁷² In meetings sponsored by the NAACP, Gretna blacks decided to contest for the two town council positions that were available plus that of town clerk. The original feeling was that whites should retain control of the mayor's office, at least initially. However, Earnest O. Barkley, who had organized an SCLC chapter in Gretna instead of following the NAACP lead, decided to seek the office of mayor in his own initiative. Once that decision was made, the NAACP threw its support behind his candidacy. On election day the NAACP in cooperation with Gretna blacks

launched a "get out the vote campaign" by stationing people at every street corner to remind people to vote and by providing rides to the polls.⁷³ Black candidates were successful in all contests and when the three remaining council seats became available in the following December, they were captured by blacks as well.⁷⁴ Thus within the period of a year, Gretna had gone from an all-white town government to one that was totally black.

Outsiders in Gadsden County: An Evaluation

If visible flurries of political activity can be taken as evidence of political mobilization in progress, two distinct and major periods of black political mobilization in Gadsden County are apparent. While both periods coincided with the presence of outside groups, the sequential order of outside organizational involvement varied.

The first period of political mobilization began in late 1963 and lasted until 1966. Figure 3:1 demonstrates a dramatic increase in the black share of the county's electorate from 5 to 40 percent in this period. The ballooning of the number of black civic and political news stories appearing on the front page of the Gadsden County Times is also readily apparent during this period (Figure 3:1). The Gadsden County Times published stories concerning political and civic activities of local blacks only occasionally prior to 1964. In 1964 the number of such stories shot to 15 and did not begin to approach the pre-1964 levels until after 1966.

The sequential order of the political mobilization process as described in Figure 1:1 on page 5 is followed during this first period. CORE's decision to enter the county stimulated increased activity by




Figure 3:1
 Black News Articles and Black Share of Gadsden County Electorate
 As Indicators of Black Political Activity

local black leaders and the creation and expansion of local black political organizations. A local CORE chapter was organized to harness the energy of Gadsden County's black youth; a supportive organization, the Civic Interest Group (CIG), was founded to include adult members of the community; and the local chapter of the NAACP was rejuvenated and expanded. The involvement of larger numbers of Gadsden County's black residents came last. The lag between the increase in news stories on black political activity and the rise in black voter registration is evidence of the time sequence in the political mobilization process.

After 1966, CORE shifted its focus to community organization and was far less concerned with stimulating mass political activity. News articles concerning black political activities declined. The organizations created and activated by CORE's presence lapsed in activity following CORE's departure in early 1968. Voter registration levels for blacks stabilized near 40 percent.

The second political mobilization period was spurred by the Quincy riot of October 1970. Representatives of outside organizations again converged on the county, but with their role altered. CORE provided the stimulation necessary to mobilize local blacks in challenging their subordinate group status. CORE's influence was reflected by the scope of political activity coinciding with its presence. SCLC field representatives from Atlanta and Tallahassee helped organize marches, boycotts, and demonstrations in Quincy in the early months of 1971. However, an active, local leadership was already active prior to SCLC's arrival. The Quincy chapter of the NAACP, one of the few black organizations to still exist, was well organized with an expanding membership.

The high level of political activity by Gadsden blacks is evident by the number of black political articles in the county press. From two

articles in 1969, the number of political and civic news articles appearing on the front page of the weekly Gadsden County Times rose to 18 in 1970 and 19 in 1971 (Figure 3:1). A voter registration drive conducted by an invigorated NAACP in 1971 brought the black share of the county electorate to 50 percent. The increase in the size of the black electorate in the 1970-1972 mobilization period was only 58 percent of that of the 1963-1966 period.⁷⁵ The generally impoverished nature of Gadsden County with low educational levels among blacks may place a mounting cost on the attempt to recruit increasing numbers in the political mobilization process. The erosion of black registered voters after 1972 may indicate the difficulty of sustaining a high level of political involvement within a marginal population.

While outside organizations played an important role in the second mobilization period, the sequential order predicted by the model of political mobilization⁷⁶ was not followed. The initiating event was internal in nature, a riot sparked by a nonpolitical incident. When outsiders arrived in Gadsden County early in 1971, local leaders were already mobilized. The ordering of the stages had been disrupted by the preceding events. CORE's earlier presence had activated a local leadership and stirred the population. Although both leader and group political activity declined following CORE's departure, the local environment had been altered with a partially successful challenge of the local racial status quo undertaken. In addition, a major economic dislocation had occurred. The Quincy riot was basically a leaderless event although it stimulated local black leaders to action. This mobilized local leadership then began to organize and press for change by recruiting large numbers of the black community into the mobilization effort. Outside

groups played a supporting role in this effort but were not the initiating factor. Once political mobilization has occurred in a traditional area, outside organizations may no longer be required for further mobilization.

The order of events in the Gretna political mobilization more closely followed that established during the first mobilization period. Mobilization in Gretna was spurred by events occurring in Quincy, six miles to the east. Although Gretna residents had registered to vote during the 1963-1966 period and some had joined the Quincy-based NAACP in 1971, they initially possessed no independent organization. However, Gretna blacks had been active in two boycotts against town merchants. Within this context, the Quincy-based NAACP served as an outside organization in Gretna, recruiting leaders and organizing activities.

Political mobilization in northern Florida tended to occur first in the more urban centers, spreading eventually to the rural periphery. But this spread was not automatic. Tallahassee, less than 20 miles to the east of Quincy, experienced at least two periods of mobilization, one in 1956-1957 when a bus boycott was attempted and another in 1960 when Patricia Due led a drive to desegregate lunch counters. Despite the turmoil provoked by these events, Gadsden County was at least visibly untouched. Only when organizers came directly into Gadsden County during the first mobilization period, 1963-1966, was mobilization evident. The greatest initial impact was felt in Quincy, although blacks registered to vote throughout the county. During the second mobilization period, 1970-1972, Quincy again became the center of organized activity. Once mobilized, the Quincy-based leadership of the NAACP helped stimulate organization and registration efforts in smaller Gretna.

Following 1972, broad-based black political activity became less visible. The NAACP retained its organizational presence but active membership declined. Activities designed to incorporate large numbers of the black community in united efforts to challenge the racial status quo were replaced by law suits. Black leaders won public office in Gretna and in Quincy as a result of court mandated district elections. Lack of leadership unity and the inability to mobilize the black vote on the county level helped prevent an attempt to win county office in the 1972 democratic primary. These factors were again apparent in 1974. The data did not permit an evaluation of black and white electoral mobilization. In 1972, blacks comprised 51.9 percent of the eligible Gadsden County electorate.⁷⁷ If voting followed racial cleavages, black candidates would have had to mobilize their numbers more efficiently than white candidates. The bulge in black political and civic news articles during 1974 and 1975 reflects the leader-dominant activity of legal redress as well as electoral news (Figure 3:1).

"It takes one of us outside to unify," said Rev. Gordon from Tallahassee, one of the SCLC leaders who supported the second black mobilization in 1971. "Once we are gone, the leaders start to fragment and go their own way."⁷⁸

CHAPTER THREE
NOTES

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Chapter Three Notes-continued

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17. Patricia Due, interview; Meier and Rudwick, pp. 99, 106-107
18. Clark, p. 241
19. Interview with John Due, Miami, Florida, 12, 13 December 1977; Meier and Rudwick, pp. 175-176; Watters and Cleghorn, pp. 45-49
20. Patricia Due, interview
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22. Patricia Due, interview; Tallahassee Democrat, 26 June 1965, p. 2
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24. Gadsden County Times, 18 August 1964; Gadsden County Times, 19 August 1965
25. Tallahassee Democrat, 17 August 1964, sec. 2, p. 9
26. Patricia Due, interview; "Negroes Meet Subtle Antipathy in Quincy, Fla., Voter Campaign," New York Times, 18 May 1964, p. 25
27. Gadsden County Times, 10 December 1964
28. Interview with Robert Bryant, Quincy, Florida, 19 November 1977; Gadsden County Times, 16 July 1959
29. Interview with Vivian Kelly, Quincy, Florida, 19 November 1977
30. Interview with Dorothy Jones Cowart, St. Hebron, Florida, 21 December 1977
31. Patricia Due, interview
32. Meier and Rudwick, pp. 354-356

Chapter Three Notes-continued

33. John Due, interview; Meier and Rudwick, pp. 337-339
34. John Due, interview; Gadsden County Times, 22 July 1965; Gadsden County Times, 2 September 1965; Gadsden County Times, 9 September 1965; Tallahassee Democrat, 26 June 1965, p. 2
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49. Clarence Bryant, interview
50. Telephone interview with Reverend R. N. Gooden, Tallahassee, Florida, 30 December 1977
51. Gadsden County Times, 5 August 1965

Chapter Three Notes--continued

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53. Tallahassee Democrat, 10 February 1971, sec. 2, p. 9
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59. Gadsden County Times, 15 October 1970; Gadsden County Times, 22 October 1970; Interview with Lamar Munroe, Quincy, Florida, 23 March 1978
60. Clarence Bryant, interview; Gadsden County Times, 29 October 1970
61. Interview with Howard Fletcher, Quincy, Florida, 23 March 1978
62. Interview with Melvin Barber, Quincy, Florida, 18 November 1977; Robert Bryant, interview; Cowart, interview; Daniels, interview; Hutley, interview; Lane, interview
63. Barber, interview
64. Gadsden County Times, 18 February 1971
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66. Gadsden County Times, 5 October 1972
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Chapter Three Notes-continued

70. Watson, interview
71. Interview with Gus Richardson, Gretna, 26 July 1975; Interview with Rosalyn Smith, Gretna, Florida, 26 July 1975; Watson, interview
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73. Barkley, interview, 26 July 1975; Barkley, interview, 29 December 1977; Bethea, interview, 20 December 1977; Campbell, interview; Hutley, interview
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CHAPTER FOUR OUTSIDE GOVERNMENTAL SUPPORT

The orientation of more inclusive levels of government must be taken into consideration. If the goal of the local subordinate group is to alter the basic distribution of resources, such efforts are likely to be resisted by the local dominant group. Without support from outside government, the activities of any group seeking an alteration in the traditional distribution of resources in a given locality may be subject to sanction. Even with a basic supportive attitude by outside government, political mobilization may be difficult with the local distribution of resources favoring the dominant group. An appeal to outside government can help redress this balance. In the American context, the orientation of the federal government has had considerable impact on black aspirations.

Black Aspirations and the Federal Government

V. O. Key, Jr. demonstrated in 1949 that the entire nature of politics in the southern region of the United States revolves around the status of the black man.¹ Generally, the greater his number, the greater has been the effort on the part of the economically superior and politically dominant whites to maintain him in a subordinate position.² Where electoral politics are fairly conducted, blacks can overcome a lot of white resistance to their demands when they comprise a voting majority.³ Within the context of the larger political system, however, the

distinctly minority status of the black poses a serious handicap on his ability to pressure for change. The result has been that blacks have been dependent on the attitude of the white-dominated national government for any gains realized.⁴

The gains realized by blacks as a result of the War Between the States were the consequence of abolitionist pressure and political advantage sought by the Republican Party. The motivation of the Abolitionist, of course, was that slavery was a fundamental violation of Christian teachings and of basic human rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence.⁵ Yet, the majority of opinion in the Northern States was probably less than favorable to the cause of black equality. By 1866 only five Northern States allowed blacks to vote,⁶ and despite the ideals expressed in the Emancipation Proclamation, President Lincoln personally favored a gradual emancipation.⁷ As for the Republican Party, the votes of southern blacks were an absolute necessity. With the repeal of the three-fifths clause of the Constitution, the number of Congressional seats allocated to the Southern States would be increased by 13. If these seats along with the customary allocation were captured by the Democrats in the South, then the Republican Party might find itself in the minority. Extensive black suffrage coupled with restrictions placed on white participation insured Republican control of the federal government.

To enforce the equal treatment of blacks, the Republican Congress passed three amendments to the Constitution (Thirteen through Fifteen), a number of civil rights bills, and enforcement legislation. However, the will to insure enforcement of these commitments soon lagged with the Southern black suffering the consequences. The Compromise of 1877

traded Southern support of Rutherford Hayes for a reduction in federal intervention in Southern affairs.⁸ With the black man a symbol of sectional strife, many Northern Liberals came to believe that perhaps blacks had been pushed prematurely into equality.⁹ Meanwhile the nation was caught in an imperialist mood. If the subjugation of foreign non-white populations in the Philippines was deemed permissible, then how could equal treatment of blacks in the South be pursued with zeal? The doctrine of white supremacy achieved respectability throughout the country.¹⁰ Within this context, the United States Supreme Court proceeded to dismantle the elaborate Reconstruction legislation designed to protect the black.¹¹ In the wake Southern state governments erected a number of formidable barriers to black suffrage, including a cumulative poll tax, literacy and understanding tests administered by local registrars, and even the "grandfather clause" that waived requirements for those whose grandfathers had been eligible to vote prior to 1867.¹²

Renewed federal government interest in black aspirations awaited the wholesale migration of rural blacks into urban centers during the World Wars of the Twentieth Century.¹³ The big city machines were the first to take advantage of the large number of blacks, now separated from the traditional life styles of their forefathers.¹⁴ But the impact of these new voters was not lost on the major political parties. Even though a minority, blacks could provide the balance needed to swing an election. Voting blacks had generally allied themselves with the Republican Party, the party of emancipation and reconstruction. In 1928 Republican Herbert Hoover received about 80 percent of the black vote.¹⁵ With Republicans attempting to make inroads among voters in the South, a switch of black voters toward the Democratic Party began. By 1936 the

majority of blacks were voting for the Democrats.¹⁶ The Democratic Party preference of black voters continued and increased through the decades following Roosevelt's New Deal.¹⁷

However, supportive presidential action until the 1960's was limited. Roosevelt established the Fair Employment Practices Commission to prevent discrimination in employment by industries holding contracts with the federal government but only after numerous black organizations threatened a massive march on Washington. But with World War II and resistance from Southern legislators, civil rights declined in importance.¹⁸ The administration of Harry Truman again attempted to focus attention on the concerns of blacks by creating the Civil Rights Commission and by beginning the effort to abolish discrimination and segregation in the armed services. The Republican administration of Dwight Eisenhower put forth no innovative measures. Instead, existing policies at the national level were maintained while interference with the discriminatory practices of state governments was avoided.¹⁹ The primary source of black support during this period came from the Supreme Court. The major blow to segregation came in the 1954 case, Brown v. Board of Education. Stating that segregation was inherently unequal, the Court ruled that state laws enforcing segregation violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.²⁰

The subsequent increase in black militancy and rise of race as a national issue put pressure on the federal government to respond. Civil rights legislation passed in 1957 and amended in 1960 was significant largely in that it was passed at all. Opposition by Southern legislators had served to prevent the consideration of such legislation. By 1964 civil rights had become the predominant domestic issue in the country.²¹ Before his death in November 1963, President John Kennedy

had begun to take an increasingly stronger stand on the question of civil rights. Under Lyndon Johnson, the effort for substantive civil rights legislation was redoubled. Legislation proposed by Kennedy was expanded to make it a comprehensive document that gave the Attorney General the power to counter discrimination by state law or in public facilities as well as private facilities engaged in interstate commerce. Employment discrimination was to be prohibited in companies holding federal contracts. In addition, the law prohibited voting registrars from applying different standards to white and black applicants.²² Supported by a quarter of a million demonstrators during the 1963 March on Washington, the Congress finally passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Following the 1964 election in which blacks overwhelmingly supported the Democrat Johnson over the Republican Barry Goldwater, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was passed. The 1965 Act allowed the Justice Department to send federal registrars to counties where evidence of persistent discrimination was found. By eliminating local registrars, Southern blacks began to register in mass, approaching and even exceeding the regional registration rate for all eligible voters.²³ Black increases were mirrored by increases in the white vote as well.²⁴

Governmental Intervention in Gadsden County

Direct intervention by outside government was evident in Gadsden County as blacks became politically mobilized. The federal government has played the major role, although intervention by agents of the state government has been evident to a more limited degree.

State intervention was particularly visible in efforts to improve access to the registration books. Although there is no evidence that

the county Supervisor of Elections ever refused to register a black, the location of the books in the offices of the Gadsden County Times, plus the restricted registration hours, were long standing complaints of the black community. CORE workers in 1964 demanded that registration hours be expanded from six hours on Monday to a daily basis. Additional complaints were filed with the Florida Secretary of State that a partisan climate existed in the Gadsden County Times business office where registration was conducted, that preference was given to whites seeking to register, and that blacks received discourteous treatment.²⁵ However, no action was taken on these charges at that time. Winter of 1971 witnessed another major effort by Gadsden County blacks to deal with this issue. Two marches in the city of Quincy plus a vigil outside the county courthouse failed to get the election books moved to a public building, although county officials did agree to expand registration to five and one-half days a week. Only after a delegation from the SCLC-led march from Quincy to Tallahassee met with Governor Reubin Askew was space found in a courthouse annex and the books transferred. Gadsden County officials denied that state pressure was a factor in the decision, but march participants insisted otherwise.²⁶ Representatives from the state helped establish the Human Relations Commission following the Quincy riot. The Askew administration also sought to inject dollars into the black controlled town of Gretna, particularly in the distribution of CETA funds.²⁷ The transfer of the Gretna registration books from a private business to a public building, resulting in the registration of blacks for the first time, was also facilitated by state government intervention.

Federal government intervention has also been evident in regard to election procedures. No federal registrars were sent to Gadsden County

after the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. By that time blacks were already registering in large numbers. But the announcement of a voter purge in January 1966 led to suspicions in the black community that the purpose was discriminatory in intent. Concurrent with the CORE voter registration drive, Supervisor of Elections J. Love Hutchinson initiated the first purge of the county's registration books since 1952. CORE Field Secretary Gordon charged that the move was racially motivated and wired a complaint to the Justice Department. The purge had resulted in over 1,000 blacks being removed from the voter books upon failing to return their purge cards. Consequently, black voter registration declined an initial 23 percent. However, over 2,000 whites were dropped from the voter rolls as well during the purge. An investigation by two agents from the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department in March 1966 failed to uncover any systematic discrimination against blacks.²⁸

The federal courts have been the most active arena for direct federal involvement. Appeal to the federal courts, specifically the Fifth District Court of Appeals in New Orleans, has been an explicit tactic of civil rights attorneys practicing the Gadsden County. Believing that neither the judges nor the juries in state courts were friendly toward civil rights cases, John Due made a conscious effort to stay out of state court. If a case was slated to be tried in a state court, he would petition to have it removed to the federal courts. And among the federal courts, the Fifth District Court was seen as far more sympathetic than the more local Federal District Court for Northern Florida, especially when Harold Carswell was presiding. Besides the more liberal philosophy existing in the higher federal court, there was an additional

reason to seek a ruling there. Since local and state judges are elected rather than appointed, they may find it difficult to buck local sentiment in cases challenging traditional racial matters. In such instances, according to John Due, it was better to blame unfavorable rulings on the federal courts than to put local judges on the spot.²⁹ Kent Spriggs has handled the Gadsden County civil rights cases since opening his Tallahassee practice in 1971. Spriggs concurred with Due's opinion by terming the local district court as "mediocre." When preparing a case, he considered how it would look on appeal to the Fifth District Court rather than relying on a favorable ruling in the Federal District Court.³⁰

The federal courts were instrumental in the election of the first blacks to the city commission in Quincy. Prior to 1975, city elections were conducted on an at-large basis, although candidates had to reside in one of the city's five districts. With blacks still in the minority among registered voters, black candidates could not muster a majority of the vote. Black electoral success at the county level was equally unsuccessful.³¹ Suits filed by Henry McGill, Witt Campbell, and James Palmer in the winter of 1974 challenged the at-large method of election in both the county commission and school board and the city of Quincy on the grounds that it systematically denied black representation. Both suits against the county were dismissed on the grounds that the at-large election system was not intended to be discriminatory as it was adopted at a time when state laws effectively disenfranchised blacks.³² The Quincy suit, filed by Palmer, was upheld by United States Court Judge Middlebrooks in Tallahassee. Judge Middlebrooks ordered the city to redraw its district boundaries to reflect a more equitable distribution of population. In addition, new elections were ordered with the

requirement that candidates be elected on a district basis.³³ Judge Middlebrooks then retired and Judge Norman Roettger was assigned the task of enforcing the order. A request by the city of Quincy for a stay of execution on the order pending appeal was denied by the chief judge of the district court in Pensacola and the Fifth District Court of Appeals in New Orleans. Two predominantly black districts were then created and in the elections held in the spring of 1975 both were captured by black candidates.³⁴ The case is still open to appeal but with blacks on the city commission, no effort has been made by the city to proceed in that direction.³⁵

Perhaps the area where federal presence has had its greatest impact has been the county's school system. A dual system, despite the 1954 Brown decision, continued unchanged in Gadsden County until the mid-1960's. In response to the 1964 Civil Rights Act the county opted for a "freedom of choice" plan where students could apply to attend any school in the county. The dual system was to be maintained but blacks could attend the white schools if they so desired. In the fall of 1965, 91 black children applied to previously all-white schools while no whites made similar applications to all-black schools.³⁶ By 1968 the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, increasingly dissatisfied with the county's efforts at desegregation, threatened to withhold federal funds unless an acceptable desegregation plan was forthcoming.³⁷ Suit was eventually brought by the Justice Department in the summer of 1970 under Title IV of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to force desegregation. The plan accepted by Judge Middlebrooks divided the county into five zones with those students residing in each zone being assigned to the same school. The dismantling of the dual school system was furthered by the reassignment of faculty on a white-black ratio of 50-50.³⁸

Further appeal to federal court followed what blacks in Gadsden County felt were discriminatory hiring and promotional practices in the county school administration and an attempt to resegregate the schools internally through ability grouping. In 1973 suits were brought by Witt Campbell and Robert Love, blacks employed by the school system, alleging that the 1970 desegregation had resulted in discriminatory demotion and the advancement of whites at their expense. Campbell also charged that the failure of the county to grant him a principal assignment comparable to the one he held prior to desegregation was due largely to his civil rights activities.³⁹ Campbell initially won part of his suit but was not awarded back pay or attorney fees. Both Campbell and the county appealed with the Fifth District Court of Appeals upholding Campbell's claims.⁴⁰ The Love suit ruling issued by Winston E. Arnow, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for Northern Florida, originally sided with the Gadsden County School Board, stating that no discrimination was evident. The Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed the Arnow decision and remanded it back to his court for rehearing.⁴¹ Since 1970, the 81 percent of the new teachers hired by the system were white. In addition, of the 12 vacancies occurring among principals since 1968, 10 were filled by whites. Black school faculty were being held at the 50 percent level and black principals had actually declined from 50 percent to 35 percent. Arnow declared that the 1970 order that mandated a 50-50 ratio was not intended to be rigid. In an 80 percent black school system Arnow decided that black applicants had been arbitrarily denied employment because of race.⁴² In a suit brought by the mother of a third-grade black student, Judge Arnow found that ability grouping as applied to elementary schools in Gadsden County had resulted in

resegregation with white students concentrated in the upper sections and black students in the lower sections of each grade. He ordered a halt to the practice except to the extent it may be necessary for nondiscriminatory reasons that certain students attend special classes for part of the school day.⁴⁴ The school board appealed the ability grouping decision but the Fifth District Court of Appeals upheld the Arnow ruling in May 1978.⁴⁵

Additional appeals to federal court have been made over the issues of jury selection and private discrimination. The issue in the 1972 jury discrimination suit brought against county officials was the arbitrary exclusion of blacks from jury duty. The county argued that blacks were in fact not fully represented on juries due to deficiencies in qualifications, including the inability to follow instructions, the incapacity to make objective judgments, and the harboring of racial prejudice.⁴⁶ Federal District Court ruled against the county and ordered that jury selection be made on a random basis.⁴⁷ Late in 1976, a suit was filed in district court charging that a Quincy doctor maintained racially segregated waiting rooms. The case, which is still pending, is a class action suit seeking to obtain nominal damages for all black patients.⁴⁸

The impact of the federal courts has been recognized by Gadsden County's black leaders. Despite the feeling that federal legal intervention may aggravate racial tensions, the predominant attitude among these leaders is that individual and group advancement has resulted. "If they can get out of the law suit," said one black teacher living in Quincy, "they will go back to where they were."⁴⁹ According to a black Quincy businessman, "It lets the next one know what he can do."⁵⁰

Attitudes among the white leaders are more varied. "Court decisions have done more to influence the situation than anything," said a representative to the Florida House. "The results have been primarily positive."⁵¹ Other white leaders are more ambivalent. "The judiciary comes into places where they don't know what's going on," said a Quincy businessman. "Some actions are justified, some are not."⁵² Others are more hostile. "They have aggravated the situation through school regulations and integration," said another businessman. "They put the city on a ward system which resulted in an unqualified black being elected to the city commission."⁵³

Outside Governmental Support in Gadsden
County: An Evaluation

Despite the widespread sense of betrayal of the national government by those involved in the Civil Rights Movement, the support of outside government, particularly the federal courts, has been a major factor in the ability of Gadsden County blacks to press for change. The federal system of government in the United States allowed the exclusion of blacks from the political process in the South, particularly following the Compromise of 1877 which greatly diminished national governmental presence. Only with the reintroduction of national government support for blacks intent on altering the political balance in the various localities in the South was there substantial progress. While the 1954 Brown decision did little to affect the immediate condition of Southern blacks, it provided hope.⁵⁵ A major thrust of the Civil Rights Movement was to generate political support for national legislation that would secure political rights for black Americans.

In Gadsden County outside government involvement cannot be clearly associated with either of the two mobilization periods identified above.

Instead, such involvement formed a general background within which local events transpired. More specifically, the federal courts integrated juries, and schools allowed blacks to be represented on the Quincy city commission, and protected the job security and advancement of black county school system personnel. Administrative action by the Office of Economic Opportunity allowed local blacks more political clout by expanding the black membership of the community action agency and by liberalizing its nominating procedure. The state government facilitated access to voter registration in Quincy and Gretna as well as helped mediate black/white differences following the Quincy riot. Both federal and state funds have been channeled into Gretna following black political control. In general, outside government provided a supportive resource that could be called upon to overcome local white resistance and help redress local power imbalance.

Of course, it is difficult to assess the exact contribution of outside governmental involvement. However, the ability of blacks to challenge the local system certainly would have been hampered in the face of outside government indifference and nearly impossible with determined opposition from that quarter. Gadsden County black leaders were cognizant of this dependence. When asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement, "The government in Washington should let local people work out their race problems and not get involved," 61 percent strongly disagreed while another 26 percent disagreed slightly. Of the 23 leaders interviewed, only three (13%) agreed with the statement and then only slightly. Two-thirds of the Gadsden County black leaders questioned could name some specific action by the national government they thought had led to improved local race relations. Nearly 40 percent could name some specific state governmental action.

Conclusion

Before CORE, SCLC, and the federal government intervened in Gadsden County, little or no substantive political activity by blacks was visible. Only with the stimulus of direct intervention by outside forces was substantive political activity in evidence. The outside groups appear to have provided the nudge needed to break the rigidity of tradition in local race relations which defined blacks as nonparticipants in political affairs. Outside governmental activity was supportive, serving to prod local white officials into taking actions they personally resisted and protecting blacks from possible retaliation, particularly through legal redress.

The presence of the federal government has been apparent in other United States case studies of subordinate mobilization. Texas Chicanos in Crystal City and Zavala County were able to gain political control through an organized mobilization of the population in 1963 and again in 1969. Federal governmental support was evident during this period through civil rights enforcement, arbitration, and financial assistance to Chicano controlled governmental units.⁵⁶ Federal legal intervention into Greene County, Alabama, in 1969 enforced fair elections and the subsequent black political control.⁵⁷

Of course, there was considerable effort on the part of local blacks in Gadsden County in achieving whatever was accomplished. Local leaders had to arise to take command if real progress was to be made. Organizations had to be created or rejuvenated to serve as vehicles for change. And the bulk of the people had to be recruited into the effort to enforce changes in the traditional patterns of race relations. The process of mobilization may be initiated by outsiders to some degree, but the locals must take up the standard if it is to proceed.

CHAPTER FOUR
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Chapter Four Notes--continued

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Chapter Four Notes-continued

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Chapter Four Notes-continued

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CHAPTER FIVE
COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION

The emergence of a politicized community elite and viable political organization are necessary resources in the mobilization process. According to Anthony Oberschall, "Although riots and precipitating incidents can be leaderless, a continuous movement of protest that seeks to obtain wide reforms or revolution presupposes both leaders and considerable organization."¹ One of the major tasks of outsiders is to seek out local individuals who have the motivation and leadership potential necessary to continue the fight for change once the outsiders have moved along.² Urban centers may be capable of incubating their own change-oriented leadership as a relatively large minority community and the relative autonomy of the city provide protection against possible dominant group sanctions.³ Once developed, this leadership can filter out into the hinterland to cultivate local leadership that may be prohibited from self-generation by a more hostile environment. Where the risks of protest are greatest, outsiders may be necessary to overcome this initial resistance to mobilization.⁴ Yet the burden of sustained mobilization must fall on the local leaders. And political mobilization requires political organization. Strategies must be devised, coordinated, and implemented. "Change comes from power and power comes from organization," said Saul Alinsky. "Power and organization are one and the same."⁵

Actually, subordinate group leaders will exist before outsiders arrive. When Gunnar Myrdal investigated race relations in the rural South in the early 1940's, the predominant leadership type was the "accommodationist."⁶ The accommodating minority leader developed a patron-client tie with an influential member of the dominant group in which small favors and personal protection were exchanged for support of the existing social order. Although selected by the dominant group to help keep his own people in a subordinate state, the accommodationist was accepted as a leader by his community because of his access to scarce resources (jobs, loans, housing) controlled by the dominant group. This type of leader closely resembles the "peripheral" leader identified by Kurt Lewin.⁷ Because of his desire for the status conferred by the dominant group, this leader will not identify with the core of his own group but instead will move toward a more peripheral position, closer to the dominant group although never part of it. He functions mainly as a safety valve, exerting his limited influence to obtain small favors and concessions from the dominant group but doing nothing to endanger his privileged position.

More recent research on subordinate leadership suggests that the pure accommodationist has been replaced by a greater diversity of leadership types. The greatest apparent change is that subordinate leaders, at least in the urban centers, have a much stronger community base of support than the old accommodationist. However, substantial variation is evident among leaders with the principal differences centering on goals and tactics. Three styles of minority political leadership have been identified.⁸

On one end of the spectrum is the conservative leader. The conservative tends to be a prominent member of his community, active in

business and civic affairs. While representing the demands of the minority community, the conservative seeks "welfare" goals, tangible improvements for individuals or the community in terms of better services, living conditions, or positions. "Status" goals, in contrast, stress the overall relationship of dominant and subordinate groups to each other. Equal treatment and integration would be typical status goals.⁹ Although the welfare-status goal distinction tends to break down on closer analysis (i.e., is paving a street a welfare goal--a limited tangible benefit, or a status goal--equal treatment of the minority community?), the conservative is more apt to seek limited, specific gains. Conservatives also shy away from confrontive tactics, trying to press demands through channels deemed legitimate by the dominant group. The conservative does not seek to mobilize the masses but to bargain with the dominant group elite, utilizing the contacts and goodwill built up over time. As an individual of high status, the conservative finds confrontation distasteful and unnecessarily antagonistic to the dominant group. With the most to lose, conservatives seek the most gradual, less threatening means.

At the other end of the spectrum is the militant leader. The militant seeks basic alterations in the structure of society, exclusively championing status goals. Militants have an idealized conception of how society should be and are impatient at the rate of progress. The tactics adopted tend to be confrontive in nature: boycotts, marches, picketing, sit-ins, mass protest meetings. The belief is that substantive change can be made only if the masses can be mobilized to press their demands. Stressing mass action and involving an ideological appeal, militants are seen as dangerous by both subordinate conservatives and

members of the dominant group. Thus militants are most liable to sanctions and tend to be economically independent of the dominant group. Generally, militants are younger than conservatives.

A third leadership style is that of the moderate. The moderate occupies the center of the spectrum between the conservative and the militant. He seeks both status and welfare goals, depending on the issue and his evaluation of what is best for the community. The moderate trusts neither the private negotiations of the conservative nor the direct-action tactics of the militant. Not afraid to be critical of the dominant community and its leaders, the moderate nevertheless will attempt to keep lines of communication open. The moderate may lend support toward militants but will shun direct involvement. Electoral means are preferred by the moderate. By channeling the vote, the moderate can reward or punish dominant group politicians, but this tactic requires sustained and sophisticated political involvement by a fairly large percent of the subordinate group and, of course, organization.

A diversity of leadership types is taken by some as evidence of subordinate group political development.¹⁰ Such diversity is considered functional as it provides a variety of avenues by which the subordinate community can press its claims.¹¹ Competition between leaders may increase pressure to achieve results.¹² However, at least in the initial phase of political mobilization, the replacement of conservative leaders by those more willing to activate the masses and confront the existing system may be required. In fact, political mobilization by the subordinate group may be dependent on the emergence of militant style leaders. The 1957 bus boycott movement in Tallahassee, Florida, witnessed the displacement of more traditional leaders by those bent toward achieving

substantive change.¹³ Particularly in small, rural communities, at least a partial displacement of conservatives by more militant leaders may be critical. Leadership unity may be an additional requirement. Without some consensus among leaders as to the goals sought and the tactics employed, the mobilization effort may be crippled by disunity. The emergence of a unified, change-oriented leadership is an essential resource in the political mobilization process.

Turning to Gadsden County, three propositions developed in the preceding discussion will be examined concerning the relationship between leadership and political mobilization: 1) community political mobilization is associated with the displacement of conservative subordinate group leaders by those of a more militant bent; 2) political mobilization is associated with the presence of political organization within the subordinate community; and 3) the greater the unity among subordinate leaders, the higher the degree of political mobilization.

An Overview

Black leaders in Gadsden County were identified through multiple sources: newspaper files were consulted; a survey of four communities requested respondents to name those leaders who had the "most say" in what happened in the community; leaders identified by previous means were asked to identify other leaders; and a limited selection of dominant group elites were asked to identify the leaders of the black community. In total, 23 subordinate leaders were interviewed.

Quincy had 11 resident leaders. One leader residing in Havana, a community not included in the study, was grouped with the Quincy leadership because of her close association with Quincy-based political organizations and activities. Nine leaders were interviewed in Gretna

and two in Greensboro. An unincorporated rural area included in the study failed to exhibit an independent subordinate leadership structure. Three of the leaders interviewed were women. Nine were employees of the county school system, although one had retired. Eight were businessmen. Others included two laborers, a policeman, a town administrator, a college instructor, and a supervisor for the county road department.

Compared to survey respondents, Gadsden County's black leadership possessed definite elite characteristics (see Table 5:1). Gadsden leaders were older, longer term residents, and considerably higher educated than the general population. The leaders were more willing to mention problems when asked and far more cognizant of race as a problem. The most striking difference between the survey population and the community leaders was their organizational membership. On the average, most Gadsden County residents belonged to only one organization, usually a church. Leaders demonstrated considerable organizational activity, with over six organizational memberships each.

Black Leadership in Quincy

Quincy was the center for the CORE mobilization effort in Gadsden County as well as the site of many of the major events that occurred during the two mobilization periods. It is here where a change-oriented leadership would be expected to emerge. The Quincy subordinate leadership that existed before CORE's arrival was organized into the Negro Businessmen and Civic League (NBCL). Its membership included mostly small businessmen and a few prominent educators. Political activities were limited to occasional meetings with the Quincy city commission to press for limited and specific welfare goals. With CORE, the NBCL was

Table 5:1

General Characteristics of Gadsden County
Black Leaders and Surveyed Residents

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Survey</u> (Wt.N=198)	<u>Elite</u> (N=23)
Age	45.6	49.1
Resident (years)	25.2	34.5
Education (years)	8.6	14.6
Total problems mentioned	2.6	3.3
Race problems mentioned	0.1	1.1
Organizational memberships	0.9	6.6

not displaced but rival organizations, the Civic Interest Group (CIG) and a local CORE chapter, were formed to coordinate local actions with the outside CORE presence. During the first mobilization period (1963-1966), CORE had a membership of several hundred. The NBCL was more of an elitest organization with only a handful of members.

By combining the members of the allied CIG and CORE organizations, the black leadership of Quincy can be divided into two dominant factions. None of the leaders identified with the other communities studied were members of either the NBCL or the CIG-CORE factions. Within the Quincy leadership, only one individual was associated with both factions. Since he was more closely associated with the CIG-CORE activities, he was assigned to that group. Two Quincy leaders could not be assigned to either group, leaving six CIG-CORE and four NBCL members for analysis.

The proposition to be tested is that the mobilization process in Quincy was associated with the emergence of a new, more militant, change-oriented leadership. If NBCL members represent the more traditional black elite in the community, then the CIG-CORE faction should be recognizably different in orientation. Specifically, they should be

younger, more militant in their orientation, and independent of the dominant group, making them less liable to sanctions.

Several methodological problems must be identified at this point. First, comparison between these groups suffers from an extremely low N. Some of the older leaders of the community associated with the NBCL have died, a major problem in studies seeking to examine events more than a decade distant. Findings must be based on the handful of respondents available. Second, no random selection assumption can be made. Black elites interviewed were specifically chosen for their leadership status and a great deal of confidence can be put in the assertion that the most important leaders have been included. Statistical tests based on significance have no meaning here except to illustrate the magnitude of difference existing between groups. Third, the assumption here is that there will be specific differences between the groups, but since the interviews were conducted some ten years after the fact, NBCL leaders may have adapted to the times, exhibiting greater militancy in a less repressive environment, while the commitment of the CIG-CORE group members may have mellowed. Myrdal suggested that even the most accommodating leader may harbor protest passions.¹⁴ John Due, during his association with the Voter Education Project, observed several older black leaders who had "Uncle Tommed" enough and were ready to demand change.¹⁵ In short, distinctions that might have been sharp in 1964 may have been eroded with time.

General characteristics portray no major differences between the CIG-CORE and NBCL groups (see Table 5:2). On the average both groups are composed of long term residents of the community. While the CIG-CORE group were younger and more highly educated, the differences were

Table 5:2

General Characteristics of Quincy CIG-CORE
and NBCL Factions

<u>Variable</u>	<u>CIG-CORE*</u>	<u>NBCL*</u>
Years of community residence	39.4	39.3
Age	51.8	55.5
Years of education	17.3	15.8
Total problems mentioned	3.5	3.8
Race problems mentioned	1.7	2.0
Organizations	8.0	10.8
Organizational leadership	2.3	4.8

*Scores are group means

not substantial, with less than a four-year gap in mean age and less than two years in education. Both CIG-CORE and NBCL members mentioned approximately the same number of problems in the community and identified an equal number of problems that were racial in nature. The greatest difference between the groups was associated with organizational membership where NBCL members tended to belong to an average of three more organizations each. NBCL members also had over twice the number of leadership positions compared to CIG-CORE members.

Striking differences in organizational membership become apparent when occupation is considered. The Quincy black elite was composed entirely of small businessmen and educators. Several served as ministers but that was not their principal occupation. Considering the fact that the Gadsden County School Board and top school administrative positions were controlled by members of the dominant group, educators would seem unlikely candidates for activist leadership. However, the CIG-CORE group was almost entirely composed of individuals dependent on the

county school system for employment (see Table 5:3). In contrast, the NBCL group was dominated by those who were at least more visibly independent of the dominant group as proprietors of small businesses. Of course, hidden dependency may exist in terms of loans and credit. Yet, this finding runs counter to the theoretical expectation that those most economically vulnerable will be least likely to undertake a direct challenge of the system.¹⁶ The explanation lies in the risk reducing protection provided by outside government, particularly the federal courts. Numerous successful law suits have been filed against the county school board on behalf of black employees, providing a degree of protection against arbitrary economic retaliation by whites.

The real question, however, is whether CIG-CORE leaders have a distinctive change-oriented outlook compared to NBCL members. In order to determine the basic ideological orientation of group members, a scale based on questions similar to those used by the SRC were employed.¹⁷ Basically, the questions probed the respondent's support of national governmental intervention in welfare (health care and schools), economics (regulation of business and full employment), and race. Those who supported national government intervention were coded liberal, while those opposed were coded conservative. None of the black leader respondents scored in the most conservative one-third of the overall scale. Within the range of scores obtained, the bulk of Quincy black leadership fell into the liberal and moderate-liberal ranges. When dichotomized into CIG-CORE and NBCL groups and compared, the tendency is for CIG-CORE leaders to group toward the more liberal range, while NBCL leaders cluster in the moderately liberal range (see Table 5:4).

Another measure of basic orientation is the evaluation each subordinate leader had of various tactics employed to induce change.

Table 5:3

Economic Dependency of Quincy CIG-CORE
and NBCL Factions

	<u>CIG-CORE</u>	<u>NBCL</u>
Dependent (Educators)	5	1
Independent (Businessment)	1	3

Table 5:4

Ideological Orientation of Quincy
CIG-CORE and NBCL Factions

	<u>1st</u>	<u>2nd</u>	<u>3rd</u>	<u>4th*</u>
CIG-CORE	4	0	1	1
NBCL	0	2	2	0

*Quarters based on the range of
observed values with the first
quarter representing the most
liberal scores

Although nearly all black leaders in Quincy participated to some extent in the CORE-sponsored voter education and registration campaign, provoking considerable hostility by segments of the dominant community, CIG-CORE members were more intimately involved. The expectation would be for CIG-CORE members to be more willing to adopt confrontative tactics than members of the older NBCL which operated within a rigid subordinate-dominant group social structure. To test the proposition, leaders were asked whether they thought a variety of political tactics were very effective, somewhat effective, or not effective. Conservative leaders would be expected to prefer tactics that would not greatly

offend the dominant group: presenting petitions, private meetings with dominant group elites, and attendance of public meetings. Militants would be expected to reject such tactics, opting instead for tactics that would confront the existing arrangement in a dramatic way: court actions, economic boycotts, and protest marches. By combining the responses, members of the subordinate elite were arranged on an ordinal continuum according to their degree of conservativeness or militancy (see Figure 5:1). Thus, a pure conservative would find petitions, private meetings, and public meetings to be very effective while court action, boycotts, and marches would be seen as not effective. A pure militant would exhibit a mirrored opposite set of responses. Moderates would fall between the two.

When applied to the Quincy black leadership, no individual fell in either the pure conservative or pure militant end of the scale. However, a clear distinction between the CIG-CORE and NBCL factions emerged (see Table 5:5). Using the median value of the scale as a division point, five of the six CIG-CORE members scored on the militant side, while three of the four NBCL members scored on the conservative side. Considered separately, however, the tactics present a curious pattern (see Table 5:6). The three tactics associated with conservative orientation (petitions, private meetings) distinguish the CIG-CORE and NBCL factions as predicted. Yet little or no relationship is apparent between each militant tactic (courts, boycotts, and marches) and leadership faction. CIG-CORE members obviously reject the conservative tactics but are split on confrontative tactics. On other tactics CIG-CORE leaders expressed a moderately greater preference for the vote, possibly because of their direct efforts in the registration effort. But this



Figure 5:1

Militant-Conservative Continuum Based On
Evaluation of Political Strategies

Table 5:5

Political Orientation of Quincy
CIG-CORE and NBCL Factions

	<u>CIG-CORE</u>	<u>NBCL</u>
Militant	5	1
Conservative	1	3

finding is a bit misleading as no Quincy black leader considered the vote to be ineffective. An overwhelming preference for both outside political support and federal grants is apparent among NBCL leaders. Evidently, these two tactics are associated in the minds of the more conservative leaders. As one NBCL member stated, "When the state comes in to support you, the county people have got to support you to get the money."¹⁸

The most striking finding is the marked effectiveness attributed to violence by the generally more conservative NBCL faction. The Quincy riot of October 1970 was a spontaneous event that caught the black leadership of Quincy unprepared. In its wake the leadership rallied to press their demands for change. All black leaders questioned expressed a personal disdain for violence, yet they varied as to their evaluations

Table 5:6

Quincy CIG-CORE and NBCL Factions' Evaluation
of Political Strategies*

<u>STRATEGY</u>	<u>KENDALL'S TAU C</u>
Petition	-.44
Private Meetings	-.30
Public Meetings	-.60
Courts	.08
Boycotts	.00
Marches	.24
Vote	.33
Black Public Official	-.08
Outside Political Support	-.39
Outside Governmental Grants	-.94
Riot	-.44

*Positive scores indicate a more effective evaluation of the strategy by the CIG-CORE faction while negative scores are evidence of effective evaluation by the NBCL faction

of its effectiveness. Said one CIG-CORE supporter, "Nothing good ever came from anything like that."¹⁹ Others, however, were quick to see the bargaining advantage of an agitated population. "You can't get cooperation until you get their attention," said a NBCL leader. "The riot called them to the table and gave us a chance to tell them what we wanted."²⁰ The riot and subsequent political activity it generated were responsible for some major alterations in subordinate-dominant group relations. "Some businesses started opening up for black employees," said another NBCL member. "They started making changes, although slowly."²¹ The more favorable evaluation of rioting as a tactic by NBCL members may be due to their ability to exploit the situation. With the riot as a vivid expression of underlying discontent in the black community,

conservative leaders could gain access to nervous white leaders trying to cope with violence.

The Quincy riot, of course, was the stimulus for the second mobilization period in Gadsden County (1970-1972). By 1970 the organizations that had been active during the first mobilization period in Quincy became dormant. The NAACP, which had been active earlier, persisted mainly as a small leadership clique. Following the riot, the NAACP became a mass organization, recruiting throughout the county and attaining a membership of several hundred. All Quincy black leaders were members of the NAACP and dominated the leadership structure of the organization. With the NAACP, the Quincy black leadership achieved some degree of unity. A general consensus among the leaders was evident in responses given to an inquiry as to the best and worst possible race relations. Most Quincy leaders saw the best possible race relations in the community in terms of true integration based on attitudinal changes and the elimination of race barriers. "Everybody ought to be treated fairly regardless of race, creed, or color," said a small businessman.²² Another common theme was the attainment of parity with whites in political influence. "If our political picture was better other things would be better in proportion," said a mortician. We should have 50 percent of our elected officials black and 50 percent white, not a one-sided affair on either side."²³

If attitudinal changes and the achievement of parity of political influence were the desired goals, Quincy black leaders concurred on what they rejected as well. The worst possible race relations, according to a school principal, would be "to go back to the 'good old days,' the way it was in the 1940's and 1950's."²⁴ Another leader was more

explicit: "Back when a boy could not go into a store or was the last one waited on; sitting in the back of the bus; getting off the sidewalk when confronting whites; going around to the back door of white homes."²⁵ The Quincy black leadership also agreed as to the trend in race relations. Seventy-five percent said that relations had improved while 25 percent said they had remained static. None of Quincy's black leaders questioned believed that race relations had worsened.

Broad agreement among the community's elite is apparent also in the political strategies of court action and voting. None of the Quincy leaders thought that either tactic was ineffective and a clear majority rated them as very effective.²⁶ The NAACP has been deeply involved with both. The NAACP was the vehicle through which voter registration drives were conducted following the Quincy riot which boosted the percent black of the county electorate to slightly over 50 percent in 1972, the high water mark. And, of course, it was the NAACP that took the initiative in Gretna to investigate the town's election system, educate Gretna residents as to their rights, register those residents, and organize them so they could assume control of the town's government.

Black political organizations in Quincy have experienced intermittent vitality. With the stimulation of outsiders or dramatic events, they have blossomed in activity and membership. As stimulation grew distant, the organizations lapsed in membership and activity withered. Ever since the arrival of CORE in 1963, however, political organizations in Quincy have drawn their activists from the same pool of leaders. Organizations that developed in response to CORE did not displace the older leadership but converted some of the older leaders to a more activist orientation and recruited new individuals into leadership

positions. The basic NAACP leadership grew from both the older NBCL membership and the CIG-CORE members. Additional organizations have reflected this pattern. A Voter's League, established in recent years to educate voters and encourage them to vote, had a limited membership drawn from individuals who had been active in the other organizations. Neither the CIG-CORE nor the NBCL cliques dominated the membership of the Voter's League which had yet to develop into an organization capable of channeling the vote of the subordinate population toward a particular candidate. The Voter's League also suffered from a lack of persistent organizational vitality. Without continuing organization through which specific goals can be articulated and strategies developed, black leaders in Quincy are left to individualistic actions or are more easily co-opted by members of the dominant group.

Black Leadership in Gretna

Gretna was not an incorporated town until the late 1970's when dominant group elites sought a charter to take advantage of the state cigarette tax refunded to communities in order to finance a water system.²⁷ The black population began to swell in the 1960's, after tobacco failed as a major cash crop and excess black laborers left the farms. Prior to CORE's campaign of the mid-1960's, no black political organizations existed in Gretna. While some residents were involved in the CORE-generated first mobilization period, the organizational center of activity was in Quincy, six miles away. Similarly, Gretna had no independent black organization when the second mobilization period in the county was inaugurated by the Quincy riot. Several Gretna residents became involved in the reactivated NAACP. When a group of Gretna residents attempted to attend a meeting of the town council in 1971, they

were asked to leave. After reporting the incident at the next NAACP meeting, a committee was appointed to investigate the matter. Upon learning the legal requirements for registering for town elections, the NAACP sponsored a massive effort to educate, register and organize Gretna residents. With an overwhelming advantage in numbers, black candidates were swept into office in the December 1971 election and completed their take over of the town government when the remaining offices were captured the following year, completely displacing the whites.

Although the NAACP was responsible for initiating community mobilization in Gretna, it provoked the formation of a rival organization. Earnest Barkley, a state hospital employee in nearby Chattahoochee and a trained educator, chose not to follow the NAACP lead and sought a charter for a SCLC chapter for Gretna. The original NAACP strategy was to challenge the whites for only a share in the town's leadership, leaving the office of mayor in white hands for the time being. However, Barkley filed for the office of mayor and then asked and received support from the NAACP. Soon after black control of the town government had been achieved, the SCLC chapter lapsed dormant. In a real political sense blacks became the new dominant group, replacing the whites. In effect, the town's government became the ongoing organization in the community for the new dominant elite.

Factional disputes were soon evident in Gretna, but unlike Quincy they were based more on personalities rather than organizations. The main split developed around those who supported and opposed Barkley. There is some possibility that the root of the conflict may be traced back to the original NAACP-SCLC split. However, the main outlines of the dispute seems to rest on familial considerations. Most of those

associated with the Barkley faction seem to be related. The intensity of the dispute stems from Barkley's removal from office in 1974 because of misappropriation of town funds. After suspending Barkley from his position, Florida Governor Reubin Askew appointed Gus Richardson, a councilman, to serve as mayor. Those associated with Richardson believed that Barkley had discredited the town's image and that their man had done the hard work necessary in obtaining federal funds needed for civic improvements. The Barkley people felt that Richardson had just carried through on projects Barkley had initiated and that the Richardson group had shown no initiative. Richardson's defeat by Barkley in the 1977 mayor's race further intensified the differences.²⁸

Over half of Gretna's leaders were small businessmen with the remainder employed by the county school system, the Quincy police department, Florida A & M University in Tallahassee, and the Town of Gretna. All but one of the nine leaders interviewed had either run for a town office or were employed by the town. Three leaders were identifiable as Barkley supporters and four belonged to the Richardson group. While any statistical analysis based on such a low N is dangerous, the centrality of the individuals makes comparison interesting. As Table 5:7 indicates, the general characteristics measured show no major differences between the Barkley and Richardson factions. Although the Richardson faction tends to be slightly older and a bit less educated, both factions named a similar number of community problems and neither independently mentioned race as a problem. The Barkley group tended to have more organizational memberships and have held more offices in those organizations than the Richardson people.

The ideological orientation of the Richardson group tended to be more liberal than the Barkley group. Actually, none of the Gretna

Table 5:7

General Characteristics of Gretna Richardson
and Barkley Factions

	<u>RICHARDSON*</u>	<u>BARKLEY*</u>
Years of community residence	18.0	16.0
Age	39.5	34.7
Years of education	13.0	14.3
Total problems mentioned	2.8	3.0
Race problems mentioned	0.0	0.0
Organizations	2.5	4.3
Organization leadership	0.5	2.0

*Scores are group means

leaders scored in the most conservative half of the ideological scale. When the range of observed scores was divided into quarters, the Richardson faction predominantly fell in the more liberal first and second quarters, while two of the three Barkley people fell into the more moderate fourth quarter (see Table 5:8). The more moderate orientation of the Barkley group is also reflected in the political tactics preferred. Compared on the Conservative-Militant continuum discussed above, the Richardson group scored distinctly more militant than the Barkley group (see Table 5:9). When political tactics were considered separately, the Barkley group tended to lean toward petitions, private meetings, and black public officials as the more effective means of change, while the Richardson group was more likely to favor court action, boycotts, marches and grants (see Table 5:10). Both groups unanimously considered the vote to be a very effective means of change. Only minor differences were evident concerning public meetings, outside political support and riots.

Table 5:8

Ideological Orientation of Gretna Richardson
and Barkley Factions

	<u>1st</u>	<u>2nd</u>	<u>3rd</u>	<u>4th*</u>
Richardson	1	2	1	0
Barkley	1	0	0	2

*Quarters based on the range of observed values with the first quarter representing the most liberal scores

Table 5:9

Political Orientation of Gretna Richardson
and Barkley Factions

	<u>RICHARDSON</u>	<u>BARKLEY</u>
Militant	3	1
Conservative	1	2

These findings are surprising considering the fact that the principal differences between the two factions stem from personal and family differences. Yet, the basic orientation of the Gretna factions parallels the differences found in Quincy between the CIG-CORE and NBCL groups. While no programmatic differences have been evident between the Gretna factions concerning the role of the town government in seeking federal funds for civic improvements, the basis of a philosophical split exists. In a community like Gretna where blacks comprise over 90 percent of the population, such factional competition may serve to sustain popular interest in political affairs and thus guard against possible political demobilization while insuring continued black political control.

Table 5:10

Gretna Richardson and Barkley Factions'
Evaluation of Political Strategies*

<u>STRATEGY</u>	<u>KENDALL'S TAU C</u>
Petition	-.49
Private Meetings	-.24
Public Meetings	-.08
 Vote	 Both groups scored Very Effective
Courts	.49
Boycotts	.90
Marches	.33
 Black Public Official	 -.24
Outside Political Support	.00
Outside Governmental Grants	.33
 Riot	 .16

*Positive scores indicate a more effective evaluation of the strategy by the Richardson faction while negative scores are evidence of effective evaluation by the Barkley faction

Black Leadership in Greensboro
and Sawdust

Only two individuals met the criteria for leadership status in Greensboro, the only community where blacks were distinctly outnumbered by whites.²⁹ Both Greensboro black leaders were elderly, poorly educated and economically dependent on the dominant whites.³⁰ The homes of these leaders were both modest but comfortable, a clear contrast to many of their impoverished neighbors. In all appearances the Greensboro black leaders fit the description of the classic accommodationist. Neither, however, were well-integrated in the existing political structure. While neither were willing to offer comment on court action, boycotts, and marches, both had fairly low ratings of the effectiveness of

petitions, private meetings and public meetings. One of the leaders complained that town meetings were not publicized and there was no knowledge in the black community of meeting times.³¹ Neither had ever attended a town meeting. Both had been active in voter registration campaigns, particularly during the NAACP effort of the second mobilization period. Reflecting this commitment, both rated voting as the most effective means to effect political change. Said one, "If you vote and the person you vote for wins, you get what you want."³² The other added, "The candidates have to consider you now."³³ Ideologically, both leaders ranked in the liberal to moderately liberal range of the scale employed.

No distinctive black political organization existed in Greensboro, although an NAACP chapter was reported active 50 years ago, becoming extinct when the leaders died. Only a handful of Greensboro's black residents belonged to the Quincy-based NAACP, including the two leaders interviewed. One of the leaders was also a member of the Gadsden County Voter's League, the only Greensboro member.

While both leaders were NAACP members, they demonstrated no common unity in dealing with community problems. From all indications, Greensboro's leaders operated independently of each other. Considering the deficiency in numbers, the opportunities for political participation in Greensboro were limited. Although Greensboro residents registered to vote in both the CORE and NAACP-sponsored voter registration campaigns, the lack of any community organization to plan strategy and coordinate efforts has precluded the ability to crack the community's governmental structure. Greensboro was the only community where outright intimidation was cited -- the bombing of the house of a black individual who

had attempted to register to vote some years ago. Other respondents mentioned Klan cross burnings in nearby fields in the past as well. However, except for the lack of notification of town meetings, neither Greensboro black leader mentions any current racial problem in the community. According to one of the leaders, "They all treat me the same as they treat themselves, like humans."³⁴

Sawdust had no black leaders receiving the required number of nominations and residing in the vicinity. Actually, the Sawdust region cannot be considered a community unto itself. The area surveyed included an unincorporated rural community called Sawdust plus a surrounding area which lay between the other communities studied. The leaders mentioned by Sawdust residents were typically those black leaders who had attained some prominence in one of the neighboring communities. In addition, although survey respondents were specifically asked to name black leaders, Sawdust residents were the only ones to list whites as leaders of the black community. Whites mentioned were typically individuals who at one time had employed a large number of blacks. No independent black political organization was in evidence in the Sawdust area.

Gadsden County Black Leaders Compared

Some interesting differences are evident when the leaders of the various communities studied are compared. Sawdust, with no independent community leaders, is excluded from this analysis. In general terms, the black leaders of Quincy were the most highly educated and tended to be older than the overall mean (see Table 5:11). Gretna leaders were the youngest community leaders and tended to have a high school or better education. Greensboro leaders were by far the oldest and the least educated. The Quincy leaders were more organizationally involved than

Table 5:11

General Characteristics of Gadsden County
Black Leaders By Community*

VARIABLE	COMMUNITY		
	<u>Quincy</u> (N=12)	<u>Gretna</u> (N=9)	<u>Greensboro</u> (N=2)
Age	53.3	40.4	69.0
Resident (Years)	37.0	22.7	69.0
Education (Years)	16.8	14.0	4.5
Organizational Membership	9.1	3.6	4.0
Race Organizational Membership	2.6	0.9	1.5

*Scores are group means

those in the other communities, perhaps due to greater opportunities for such involvement in a larger town. Similarly, the Quincy leaders were more likely to belong to organizations that were political or racial in orientation. In addition, the Quincy leaders were more apt to mention race as a problem in their community than those in the other communities.

Quincy clearly was the center of organized black activity. Although membership sometimes included non-Quincy residents, Gadsden County's major black political organizations were based in Quincy. Quincy also had the most developed factional divisions, following basic liberal-conservative, militant-conservative lines. Gretna's black political activity was initially a spin-off of the Quincy mobilization. The lack of any long term political organization in Gretna is probably a consequence of the youth and more recent residency of its leaders. The relative ease in which political control was achieved in Gretna has tended to mitigate race as an issue for the black leaders. In fact, one of the major questions in the community has been the degree to which whites should be allowed to participate in the town's government. With

the town council serving as the ongoing black political organization in the community, factions have developed around personality and family but which contain the seeds of more substantive differences. Greensboro's black leaders, while taking part in the political organizations based in Quincy, have not developed an independent political base in their own community, probably due to their highly dependent status.

Comparing political strategies, no major differences are evident between the Quincy and Gretna leaders concerning the accommodationist measures of petitions, private meetings, and public meetings (see Table 5:12). Concerning militant measures, Gretna leaders have found the boycott more effective than Quincy leaders who found more utility in court actions. These differences reflect the results attained in Gretna where boycotts in 1971 drove two white store owners out of business and in Quincy where law suits have served to protect black educators from demotions, to redistrict the town to insure black political representation, and to fight discriminatory practices in general. Also indicative of varying experiences are the more effective evaluations given by Gretna leaders to outside political support, blacks in public office, and federal grants in contrast to the more effective evaluation of riots and violence by Quincy leaders. Gretna has prospered under black political control, mainly through its ability to obtain federal grants for civic improvements. Gretna's leaders are well aware of their dependency on this outside financial support. Quincy, the scene of the October 1970 riot, witnessed dramatic shifts in the dominant group's willingness to discuss differences with black leaders following the riot. The more liberal orientation of the Gretna leaders on the ideology scale is probably a reflection of the scale's bias toward national governmental

Table 5:12

Quincy and Gretna Black Leaders' Evaluation
of Political Strategies*

<u>STRATEGY</u>	<u>KENDALL'S TAU C</u>
Petition	-.05
Private Meetings	.09
Public Meetings	-.05
Courts	.31
Boycotts	-.21
Marches	-.09
Black Public Official	-.27
Outside Political Support	-.18
Outside Governmental Grants	-.55
Riot	.44

*Positive scores indicate a more effective evaluation of the strategy by the Quincy leaders while negative scores are evidence of more effective evaluation by Gretna Leaders

action as the basis of liberalism (see Table 5:13). With only two leaders, comparisons based on statistical measures of association for Greensboro would be misleading. However, both black leaders in Greensboro found the accommodationist strategies of petitions, private meetings, and public meetings to be either not effective or only somewhat effective. Taken together, these leaders seem to almost totally reject any sort of accommodationist orientation. Yet, if considered in terms of fruitful results, the exclusion of these leaders from the community's governmental structure probably accounts for the pessimistic evaluations of these strategies. Neither leader offered comment on the other strategies mentioned in this study.

Table 5:13

Ideological Orientation of Quincy and Gretna
Black Leaders

	<u>1st</u>	<u>2nd</u>	<u>3rd</u>	<u>4th*</u>
Quincy	1	6	4	1
Gretna	4	1	2	0

*Quarters are based on the range of observed values, with the first quarter representing the most liberal values.

Conclusion

The black leaders associated with each community studied faced varying conditions, yet some generalizations are possible. First, the need for the recruitment of new leadership or at least the conversion of older leadership to a more change-oriented posture is a necessary condition for political mobilization. In Quincy a new leadership pool was recruited by the CORE organizers, forming an independent political organization pressing for change. Compared to the older leadership represented by the NBCL, the new leaders were more liberal and less willing to find accommodationist tactics effective. While differences can be found between the two factions in Quincy, they nevertheless shared substantial common ground, particularly the commitment to the vote, and thus could cooperate during the second mobilization period inaugurated by the October 1970 riot. It is difficult to say whether the activism apparent in the early 1970's would have been evident without the involvement of the leaders recruited earlier by CORE.

Gretna did not have a long-standing leadership structure in the black community prior to the early 1970's. The size of the black community in Gretna was in part a consequence of the declining economic

fortunes of the surrounding area, as the principal crop, shade tobacco, failed. One of the places the former farm laborers displaced by this economic reversal settled was Gretna. The black leadership in Gretna was largely recruited by the NAACP based in Quincy. While factional disputes in Gretna have been in evidence, they have not been expressed in ideological or programmatic terms. However, the seeds of such a division exist. Again, while differences between the leaders were observable, the agreement between the factions as to the basic direction the town should take and the opposition to white control have coincided with community mobilization. Black domination of the town's government has provided the black community with the organizational resource needed to maintain control.

The Greensboro leaders represent more traditional leaders with little or no direct political influence. Without an independent community political organization and with limited numbers of blacks in the community, the hopes for a political breakthrough seem virtually nil. Neither leader interviewed appeared willing to challenge the white-dominated community power structure. The Greensboro black community appears to be in a premobilization state, awaiting outside intervention and the recruitment of more activist, change-oriented leaders if black mobilization is to occur.

Second, an independent political organization is necessary for building and sustaining political mobilization. Mobilization in Quincy, both in the mid-1960's and again in the early 1970's, was accompanied by the development of locally controlled political organizations. While Gretna had no independent political organization, the town's governmental structure has served as an organizational force for the black

community. Greensboro has yet to establish any independent political organization and has exhibited little continued activism on the part of the black population.

Third, unity in leadership does not appear to be essential for mobilization, although the degree of unity may affect the success of the mobilization effort. Leadership factions were found in Quincy and Gretna, both having witnessed substantial mobilization by the black populations. It may very well be that leadership competition may serve to stimulate interest and thus heighten political awareness. Yet, competition may serve to frustrate attempts to orchestrate political activity toward a common goal. Gretna can afford competitive factions with such a large numerical superiority. In Quincy, where leaders of the black community are still struggling for political influence, disunity may be dysfunctional. In communities evenly divided on racial lines, the efficiency of group mobilization becomes critical in achieving political control.

Fourth, economic independence from the dominant community is non-essential for change-oriented political activity by leaders if some basis of protection is available. The most activist leaders in Quincy were economically dependent on the county school board but have been protected in their political activity through appeals to the federal judiciary. Most of Gretna's activist leaders tend to be small businessmen and thus have attained a degree of economic independence, but these are the very people expected to be active in community affairs. The highly dependent status of Greensboro's black leaders may be a factor in their limited activism. Both have been involved in voter registration but neither have attempted to attend a meeting of the town council.

Leaders are dependent on followers if mobilization is to be inclusive of the population. Before the subordinate population becomes available for mobilization it must possess the psychological resources, be free from constraint, and be involved in a communications network so energies can be directed.

CHAPTER FIVE
NOTES

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4. Oberschall, p. 171
5. Saul Alinsky, Rules for Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), p. 113
6. Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1944, 1962, 1972), pp. 720-722
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9. See Wilson, p. 185, for a discussion of welfare and status ends.
10. Larry C. Taylor and Jo Ann McGeorge, "The Pluralism of Black Politics: A Preliminary Approach to Black Political Development," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, 5 November 1976, p. 9
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13. Lewis M. Killian and Charles U. Smith, "Negro Protest Leaders in a Southern Community," Social Forces 38 (March 1960):256-257
14. Myrdal, p. 720

Chapter Five Notes-continued

15. John Due, quoted in Pat Walters and Reese Cleghorn, Climbing Jacob's Ladder: The Arrival of Negroes in Southern Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967), p. 190
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17. Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik, The Changing American Voter (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 23-24
18. Interview with L. R. Evens, Quincy, Florida, 17 November 1977
19. Interview with Vivian Kelly, Quincy, Florida, 19 November 1977
20. Interview with T. T. Jackson, Quincy, Florida, 17 November 1977
21. Interview with Robert Bryant, Quincy, Florida, 19 November 1977
22. Evens, interview
23. Jackson, interview
24. Interview with Witt Campbell, Quincy, Florida, 19 December 1977
25. Bryant, interview
26. Eighty-three percent rated court action as very effective while 58 percent gave the vote a similar rating.
27. See Chapter Three, pp. 39-41 for details
28. Paige Alan Parker and James W. Button, "Black Revolt in a Florida Town: The Second Reconstruction Comes to Gadsden County," March 1978 (Typewritten.)
29. Sixty-seven to 33 percent, U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, United States Census of Population: 1970, vol. 1, Characteristics of the Population, pt. 11, sec. 1, Florida
30. Ages: 66 and 72; Education: 3 and 6; Employment: supervisor, county road department and retired farm laborer.
31. Interview with Hezekiah Bradwell, Greensboro, Florida, 19 December 1977
32. Interview with Theodore Lane, Greensboro, Florida, 20 December 1977
33. Bradwell, interview
34. Lane, interview

CHAPTER SIX
STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS AND FACILITATORS
TO POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

Community involvement expands the scope of political mobilization. Subordinate leaders may demand change but in the face of intransigence by the dominant group their efforts will be futile. The resources of the subordinate community, including voting strength, financial backing, and disruptive potential, may be needed if substantive change is to occur. Subordinate group resources may be mobilized to varying degrees and efficiencies.¹ The number of subordinate individuals who can be rallied in some united effort and the relative effectiveness of their actions depends on the ability of the leadership to communicate with the membership and the ability of the dominant group to impose sanctions on those participating in the political mobilization effort. Also related is the motivational orientation of subordinate individuals. In order to be available for political mobilization, subordinate individuals must be dissatisfied with their life chances, see their problems as a matter of subordinate-dominant conflict, and feel that some sort of group effort to alter the existing state has some chance of success. Motivational disposition will be considered in the next chapter. The focus here will be on the ability of the subordinate group to coordinate its actions through internal communications, free of constraints imposed by the dominant group. In short, the facilitating impact of subordinate organization and the constraints imposed by

dominant physical and economic threats on political mobilization will be examined.

Constraints imposed on subordinate political mobilization by the dominant group may come in the form of physical or economic threats and sanctions. Actual evidence of physical intimidation may not be a deterrent to political action. Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, in the 1966 study of black southern politics, found that high levels of racial violence in the past or present were not associated with depressed voter registration rates. In fact, the lowest registration rates were found in those southern counties with little or no evidence of overt racial violence, suggesting that actual violence may be more a sign of dominant group weakness rather than strength.² In an international context Ivo and Rosalind Feierabend, along with Jennifer G. Walton, found that those countries with the lowest and very highest levels of coercion were stable.³ The implication is that the actual employment of violence is evidence that the situation has already deteriorated and that a direct threat to the existing political arrangement is underway. Far more effective in forestalling change would be a subordinate population so cowed by the fear of retaliatory violence it would be unwilling to take the initial, challenging steps.

A more subtle form of coercion is the possible loss of job, property, or home. Economic sanctions imposed by the dominant group to punish dependent subordinate individuals may have a chilling effect on political activity. Economic vulnerability was shown to be significantly related to black voter turnout in aggregate data assembled by Lester M. Salamon and Stephen Van Evera on 29 Mississippi counties in 1973. Apathy was found to be only a minor factor.⁴ The United States

Commission on Civil Rights has also identified economic dependence as a factor inhibiting black political participation.⁵ Therefore, economic dependence on the dominant group must be considered as a major constraint, diminishing the likelihood of political mobilization by subordinate individuals.

If the threat or application of physical or economic sanction may constrain political mobilization, organization within the subordinate population may serve to facilitate it. Political mobilization does not occur rapidly, if at all, through the recruitment of isolated individuals, but through individuals who are already organized.⁶ This allows block recruitment of the subordinate population, greatly increasing the efficiency of the political mobilization effort. According to Anthony Oberschall,

The presence of numerous organizations ensures a preestablished communications network, resources already partially mobilized, the presence of individuals with leadership skills, and a tradition of participation among members of the collectivity.⁷

Organization also provides the related functions of spreading out the risks of participation in the mobilization effort, creating bonds of trust between participants, and allowing for orchestrated coordinated action.⁸ It is this ongoing organization that provides the crucial link between the change-oriented leadership and the subordinate population. Within the American black community, the church has traditionally provided the organizational resource which could be called upon for political mobilization.⁹ Martin Luther King's 1955 efforts to end segregation in Montgomery, Alabama were organized through the church, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference used the black church with its autonomy from white interference as its organizational base.¹⁰ Thus

the presence of established, ongoing organizational structures that are not explicitly political in function may be important facilitators in political mobilization, by providing the organizational resources necessary to involve the subordinate population in the political mobilization process.

Political Participation and Political Awareness

If the impact of constraints and facilitators is to be determined, some measure must be constructed of the outcome of political mobilization. Political mobilization, conceived here as a process involving the interaction of a number of factors, is difficult to measure. Only the end result can be measured, the degree of political activity the political mobilization process has generated. Political activity, a state, is thus the residue of political mobilization, a process. Political activity has been operationalized in this study by two measures.

First, an ordinal scale of political participation has been constructed using six items (see Table 6:1). As the Guttman coefficient of reproducibility exceeded the accepted standard of .90, the items were added together yielding a scale ranging from zero to seven. While this political participation scale will be employed as the major dependent variable in this study, several problems are associated with its use:

1. Great temptation exists to employ the scale as an interval measure, thus allowing for increased flexibility in statistical techniques. As an interval measure, political participation could be plugged into analysis of covariance and regression formulas yielding partial correlations for the independent variable being considered.

Table 6:1

Gadsden County Political Participation
Scale*

<u>VARIABLE</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
1. Registered to vote	76
2. Voted in two or more elections	69
3. Attended a political meeting	24
4. Donated money to a political cause	18
5. Worked in a voter registration drive	12
6. Joined a political organization	8

Guttman Coefficient of Reproducibility
= .936

*Based on a weighted sample of 198

Also, mean levels of participation between communities and groups could be calculated and compared. While means will be calculated, their meaning must be cautiously interpreted. A quick inspection of Table 6:1 reveals a large gap between the percent of respondents who reported voting in two or more elections (60%) and those attending a political meeting (24%). This gap far exceeds any of the other gaps existing between the remaining items. Although it is certainly true that an individual who registers, votes, and attends political meetings is more politically active than one who has not participated politically beyond voting, no determination as to whether the more active individual is participating half again as much can be made.

2. From evidence presented in chapters three and five, it is clear that increases in political participation in Gadsden County were the result of an organized political effort. Once participating, however, it is difficult to determine whether an individual is engaged in mobilized or autonomous participation;¹¹ that is, whether the individual is participating as part of an organized subordinate group effort aimed at altering the basic political system or is participating out of habit or from some other more selfish reason. Certainly it is not beyond the possibility that individuals have been co-opted by the dominant group, attending fish fries for dominant candidates and voting for them in elections. Such manipulated participation may have been made possible by the original mobilization effort but sidetracked from the goals of the mobilizers.¹² The assumption will be made that high participation levels are evidence of political mobilization, but the possibility of manipulated, autonomous participation remains a possibility.

3. Although the political participation items used have scaled to form a hierarchical pattern, recent evidence has indicated that political participation may be specialized in nature.¹³ That is, some individuals may engage more exclusively in one mode of participation than another, but that does not necessarily rate him as less politically active. The items employed in the political participation scale have a bias toward electioneering as a basic mode, since this has been the thrust of the mobilization effort in the county.

Second, a scale of political awareness was constructed from a combination of two items. Respondents were asked to name problems in the community and were probed to elicit as many as possible. In addition, the names of three leaders of the local black community were sought.

Great variation existed in the ability of individuals to respond to these items. By adding the scores of these two measures, an overall political awareness score was obtained ranging from zero to six. The assumption made was that those individuals who could name community problems (as opposed to purely personal concerns) and the presence of leaders in the subordinate community demonstrated a higher degree of political sophistication. Subordinate individuals unaffected by political mobilization would be expected to exhibit a lower degree of political awareness.

Problems exist with the political awareness scale as well. Certainly, the scale tends to assign scores to opinionated individuals who may not have a competent grasp of political affairs in their community. However, the responses received tend to suggest that the community problems mentioned were substantive, reflecting insight and concern. Some examples of community problems were a need for doctors, more concern for blacks, railroad crossing guards, and the lack of unity in the black community. Noncommunity problems included the lack of religious conviction, laziness, and poor health. The ability to name leaders and community problems, not the particular leader or problem named, was the basis of the political awareness scale.

Political participation and political awareness correlated with each other only very moderately (Kendall's Tau C = .20), although this association was highly significant at the .0001 level. When the communities included in this study are compared, Quincy and Gretna, the communities where most black political activity has occurred, exhibit the greatest political participation and awareness (Table 6:2). Nearly 11 percent of Quincy residents and 8 percent of blacks residing in

Table 6:2

Political Participation and Political Awareness
By Gadsden County Black Community

<u>VARIABLE</u>	<u>GADSDEN</u> (Wt.N=198)	<u>QUINCY</u> (N=83)	<u>GREटना</u> (N=51)	<u>GREENSBORO</u> (N=27)	<u>SAWDUST</u> (N=38)
Political Participation					
\bar{M} =	2.06	2.14	2.18	1.85	1.37
None	21.1%	18.1%	21.6%	25.9%	42.1%
Low (1,2)	49.3	53.0	41.2	40.7	34.2
Medium (3,4)	20.3	18.0	29.4	33.3	21.1
High (5,6)	9.3	10.8	7.9	0.0	2.6
	99.9%	100.1%	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%
Political Awareness					
\bar{M} =	2.69	2.84	2.41	1.48	2.18
None	12.0%	10.8%	7.8%	37.0%	15.8%
Low (1,2)	33.0	29.0	45.1	33.3	50.0
Medium (3,4)	37.6	39.8	39.2	25.9	23.7
High (5,6)	17.3	20.5	7.9	3.7	10.6
	99.9%	100.1%	100.0%	99.9%	100.1%

Gretna score high on the political participation scale, reporting at least five political acts. Quincy and Gretna residents also demonstrated the greater political awareness with over 50 percent scoring three or above. Quincy and Gretna were also the communities with the most developed black leadership structures. In contrast, Greensboro and Sawdust, communities with little record of independent black political activity and poorly developed leadership structures, scored low on both political participation and political awareness scales. Whatever their flaws, both the political participation and the political awareness scales are consistent with the evidence presented so far as

to the degree of political activity apparent in the various communities. Thus, some confidence can be placed in these scales as measures of the state of political mobilization in the communities under consideration.

Both political participation and political awareness are influenced to some degree by other factors. Particularly, political participation reveals a moderately positive association with the general characteristics of income and education and a more modest negative association with age (Table 6:3). The influences upon political awareness tend to be less direct, with only education demonstrating a significant degree of association. Sex is not a consequential factor for either variable. The relationship between political participation and income and education is to be expected. Perhaps the most established finding of political behavioral research is the impact of these factors on political participation.¹⁴ Correlation between other variables and political participation and political awareness must take income and education into consideration as controls.

Physical and Economic Sanctions

Subordinate individuals fearful of physical safety or economic well being would not be likely participants in activity generated by political mobilization. Gauging the degree of fear is a difficult matter. Since an individual might be reluctant to admit to any personal fear, respondents were asked what would happen if a friend tried to register to vote, vote for a black candidate, or attempted to run for political office. In addition, respondents were asked to mention any problems they had heard of associated with black political participation in the area. The assumption was that the knowledge or

Table 6:3

Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Participation and Political Awareness and General Population Characteristics for Gadsden County Black Residents*

	<u>INCOME</u>	<u>EDUCATION</u>	<u>AGE</u>	<u>SEX</u>
Political Participation	.29**	.29**	-.11**	-.06
Political Awareness	.02	.19**	-.08	-.08

*Based on a weighted N of 198, drawn from the communities of Quincy, Gretna, Greensboro, and Sawdust

**Level of significance is less than .05

perception of adverse white reaction to black political participation would serve as an indication of fear, creating a barrier to political mobilization.

Only 12 percent of Gadsden County's black residents thought racial problems would result from political participation. Extreme reaction by whites in the form of economic or physical retaliation was considered a possibility by only a handful of respondents. Most of those mentioning some type of reaction felt that it would be limited to talk and general political opposition. Greensboro was the only community where respondents could remember a violent incident associated with political participation, the dynamiting of the house of one resident who attempted to vote 30 to 40 years ago. Several Gretna residents cited the problems Earnest Barkley experienced in holding a job after being elected mayor in 1971. The mention of any problem associated with political activity did not serve to depress political participation and in fact tended to enhance the likelihood of blacks to be more politically active.

The possibility of economic leverage being used against individuals to dissuade them from engaging in political activity was also considered. The use of economic intimidation to influence electoral outcomes during the Reconstruction Era was cited by Gadsden County historian J. Randall Stanley. According to Stanley, "Negro cooks were ordered to induce their husbands to either remain away from the polls or vote the Democratic ticket on penalty of the loss of their jobs."¹⁵ Since economic intimidation can be applied in a variety of ways, a multiple indicator was constructed. Economic dependence was defined as renting from a white landlord, working locally for a white private citizen or a white-controlled local governmental body, and owing money to a white individual or institution. The assumption was that increases in the sources of dependency would result in diminished willingness to challenge the white-controlled political system through political activity.

Since employment was considered a key ingredient in economic dependency, only those individuals who reported being employed at the time of the interview were included in the analysis. Levels of economic dependency varied between the communities studied (see Table 6:4). Gretna and Quincy residents scored lowest in degree of economic dependency with over 70 percent of the employed blacks reporting one or fewer sources of dependency. Nearly 80 percent of employed Gretna residents owned their homes and a substantial number (40%) commuted outside the immediate area for employment. Over 70 percent, however, reported some indebtedness to white individuals or institutions. Greensboro and Sawdust residents, living in the most remote communities studied, had the highest levels of economic dependency. These

Table 6:4

Economic Dependency Frequencies for Gadsden County
and Separate Community Black Residents*

	<u>GADSDEN</u> (Wt.N=105)	<u>QUINCY</u> (N=44)	<u>GRETNA</u> (N=25)	<u>GREENSBORO</u> (N=18)	<u>SAWDUST</u> (N=20)
\bar{M} =	1.32	1.23	1.20	1.61	2.05
No Dependency	4.5%	4.5%	8.0%	5.6%	0.0%
One Source of Dependency	61.2	68.2	64.0	38.9	15.0
Two Sources of Dependency	31.8	27.3	28.0	44.4	65.0
Three Sources of Dependency	2.5	0.0	0.0	11.1	20.0
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

*Only employed residents included in tabulations

individuals, especially those in Sawdust, were most likely to rent from whites and work locally for white employers. Sawdust residents held the highest level of debts owed to whites (84%).

When the four communities were combined for analysis, economic dependency showed a modest but significant association with political participation in the predicted direction: the greater number of sources of economic dependence, the less political participation (Table 6:5). Although economic dependence was associated with political awareness in the predicted (negative) direction, the degree of association was extremely weak and barely significant. When the separate communities are considered, most retain some degree of negative association between their residents' economic dependency and political participation, although the levels are not significant. The low N

Table 6:5

Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Participation and Political Awareness and Economic Dependency for Gadsden County and Separate Community Black Residents*

	ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE				
	Gadsden (Wt.N=105)	Quincy (N=44)	Gretna (N=25)	Greensboro (N=18)	Sawdust (N=20)
Political Participation	-.21**	-.18	-.13	-.21	-.09
Political Awareness	-.13**	-.18	.06	.12	-.10

*Only employed residents included in tabulations

**Level of significance is less than .05

probably accounts for this. Gretna, where black political success has been most complete, reveals a reduced correlation between these variables. The relationship between economic dependency and political awareness is virtually nonexistent for the residents of the separate communities studied.

Controlling for income, the relationship between economic dependency and political participation relies upon the higher income groups, particularly those earning between \$5,000 and \$9,000 yearly for its strength, while eroding sharply for individuals earning less than \$5,000 yearly (see Table 6:6). The exact opposite is true when income is controlled for economic dependency and political awareness. Apparently, individuals in the lowest income group are low participators despite their degree of economic dependence. Only among higher income groups does economic dependency exert an appreciable effect. These individuals with something to lose are the most vulnerable. Low income individuals, however, differ in their ability to name problems and

Table 6:6

Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Participation and Political Awareness and Economic Dependency for Gadsden County Black Residents, Controlling for Income and Education*

	ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE					
	<u>Income</u>		<u>Education</u>			
	Under \$5,000 (Wt. N=30)	\$5,000 to \$9,999 (Wt. N=47)	\$10,000 or more (Wt. N=22)	Under 6 years (Wt. N=14)	6 to 11 years (Wt. N=31)	12 years or more (Wt. N=61)
Political Participation	-.13	-.34**	-.29	-.44**	-.07	-.09
Political Awareness		-.34**	.09	-.32	.13	-.10

*Only employed residents included in tabulations

**Level of significance is less than .05

leaders in the subordinate community according to their degree of economic dependency, a factor not evident of higher income levels.

More ambiguous is the relationship between economic dependency and the dependent variables of political participation and political awareness when education is controlled. None of the correlations attain the accepted minimum standard level of significance ($p < .05$), although it appears that economic dependence has its most depressing impact on the political participation and political awareness of individuals with less than a grade school education.

The survey of Gadsden County's black population was conducted in 1977, nearly a decade and one-half after political mobilization was initiated. The right of blacks to participate in political affairs is no longer a major issue. The inability of blacks to successfully challenge the existing power structure at the county level has probably reduced white fears of the black vote. In addition, given the support for black political rights by outside government, manipulation rather than suppression would be a more tangible strategy. Furthermore, the county's economic base has undergone drastic changes over the past decade. A plantation system was used for the production of shade tobacco with large numbers of laborers living on the owner's land, dependent upon him for their economic subsistence. Under such conditions, the ability to apply economic sanctions was enhanced with the black laborers working, renting, and owing the same white landowner. Since the late 1960's, the shade tobacco industry has collapsed, reducing the degree of economic dependency that once existed. In 1960 over 50 percent of the black work force in the county was employed as farm laborers.¹⁶ By 1976 only 3 percent were so employed.¹⁷ Even

those scoring high on the economic dependency scale may be less vulnerable as it is likely that the sources of dependency (home, job, debt) are likely to be different whites rather than one person. Taken together, these factors help explain the modest level of support for the proposed negative relationship between economic dependency and political mobilized responses. What has been uncovered is more a residue of economic coercion that may have been practiced in the past but is no longer systematically employed. Few respondents mentioned the possibility of economic sanctions in the face of political activity. Some still harbor fears and the political participation rates of the middle income group has been depressed by this factor. But the impact of economic coercion and physical intimidation are more likely to be felt closer to the initiation of the political mobilization process rather than in the more quiescent era reflected in the survey.

Organizational Involvement

An important asset in the political mobilization process is the ability of the change-oriented subordinate elites to communicate with the rest of the subordinate population. Communication may take place through newly established organizations, long-standing formal organizations, or word-of-mouth informal discussion groups. Whatever the channel, the access of leaders to their followers greatly facilitates political mobilization. During the two periods of political mobilization in Gadsden County, mass political organization arose, providing this crucial link: CORE and the Civic Interest Group during the first period (1963-1966) and the NAACP during the second (1970-1972). However, the bulk of Gadsden County's black population belonged to neither but were instead members of black churches throughout the

county. Only 3 percent of Gadsden County residents interviewed belonged to a political organization while 76 percent said they were church members. Seventy-nine percent of all respondents said they belonged to at least one formal organization of some type. Of the separate communities, Gretna was the most organized with 88 percent belonging to at least one organization (86% belonging to a church), while Greensboro was the least organized with only 52 percent saying they belonged to a formal organization (48% church membership). Quincy was closer to Gretna with 82 percent organizational membership (78% church), with Sawdust coming closer to Greensboro with 58 percent organizational membership (55% church).

Respondents were also asked whether they regularly met with friends and/or relatives to talk about things. Over 70 percent reported doing so. Quincy has the most subordinate individuals involved in informal networks with 72.3 percent, closely followed by Sawdust and Gretna with 68.4 and 66.7 percent respectively. Greensboro had the fewest respondents reporting informal discussions with 44.4 percent.

Beyond formal and informal contact with fellow residents, respondents were asked if any political discussion resulted from these contacts. From this information two variables were constructed to distinguish the impact of formal and informal contact and political discussion on political participation and political awareness (see Table 6:7). Approximately one-third of the Gadsden County black residents interviewed reported belonging to at least one organization where political discussion occurred. Gretna had the greatest number of individuals exposed to political discussion through formal organizational contact with over two-fifths of its residents so reporting. Greensboro was an

Table 6:7

Level of Formal and Informal Organizational Involvement
of Gadsden County Black Population by Community

FORMAL ORGANIZATION					
	Gadsden (Wt.N=198)	Quincy (N=83)	Gretna (N=51)	Greensboro (N=27)	Sawdust (N=38)
No organizational membership	20.8%	18.1%	11.8%	48.1%	42.1%
At least one organization/No political discussion	44.1	47.0	47.1	11.1	31.6
At least one organization/Political discussion	35.1	34.9	41.2	41.7	26.3
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%	99.9%	100.0%
INFORMAL ORGANIZATION*					
	(Wt.N=127)	(N=53)	(N=30)	(N=16)	(N=28)
No informal organization	34.6%	32.1%	36.7%	56.3%	42.9%
Informal organization/No political discussion	19.1	20.8	16.7	18.8	10.7
Informal organization/Some political discussion	46.2	47.2	46.7	25.0	46.4
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	99.9%	100.1%	100.1%	100.1%	100.0%

*Only individuals not belonging to a formal organization with political discussion included in tabulations

enigma in this regard, with the lowest number belonging to formal organizations but with most of those with some organizational involvement reporting political discussion. The second variable, Informal

Organization, was based on only those respondents not engaged in political discussion through formal organizational membership. This was done to sift out the independent impact of informal group involvement and political discussion from any effects attributable to formal organizational political discussion. Quincy, Gretna, and Sawdust respondents all reported rates of informal organization membership and political discussion far exceeding the Greensboro levels.

Moderate correlations are evident when the dependent variables of political participation and political awareness are crosstabulated with formal organization (see Table 6:8). Not only are these correlations in the predicted (positive) direction but are highly significant as well. The exposure to organization contact and to political discussion within those organizations is likely to result in an individual who is more politically active and aware than one lacking such contact. The relation is also evident in the separate communities with only Sawdust and Greensboro providing minor exceptions. In Sawdust formal organizational involvement and political discussion had no significant impact on political participation while the same was true concerning the relationship between political awareness and formal organization in Greensboro. These, of course, were the communities that ranked lowest on all variables involved.

When controls for income and education were applied, the relationships retained their strength and were greatly increased for those earning \$10,000 or more yearly (see Table 6:9). Only for those individuals with at least a grade school education but not graduating from high school did the strength of the relationship seriously decline, although still in the appropriate direction. Obviously, organizational

Table 6:8

Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Participation and Political Awareness and Formal Organization for Gadsden County and Separate Community Black Residents

	FORMAL ORGANIZATION				
	<u>Gadsden</u> (Wt.N=198)	<u>Quincy</u> (N=83)	<u>Gretna</u> (N=51)	<u>Greensboro</u> (N=27)	<u>Sawdust</u> (N=38)
Political Participation	.32*	.34*	.22*	.32*	.14
Political Awareness	.33*	.32*	.40*	.08	.35*

*Level of significance is less than .05

contact and exposure to political discussion helped boost political activity and awareness for all income and education groups.

The overall relationship between political participation, political awareness and informal organization is more modest compared to formal organization but nonetheless highly significant (see Table 6:10). Excluded from these tabulations were individuals who were members of formal organizations with political discussion. A more apt measurement would include individuals who lacked any formal organization membership, but that requirement would reduce the N to an unacceptable low level. By excluding those exposed to political discussion in formal organizations, the impact of informal organizational political discussion becomes clearer. Thus, those individuals who are members of informal groups that meet regularly, particularly when they involve political discussion, are more apt to be politically active and aware than those lacking this contact and stimulation. The relationship between political participation and informal organization remains strong when the communities are considered separately, increasing in

Table 6:9

Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Participation and Political Awareness and Formal Organization for Gadsden County Black Residents, Controlling for Income and Education

	FORMAL ORGANIZATION					
	<u>Income</u>		<u>Education</u>			
	Under \$5,000 (WT.N=74)	\$5,000 to \$9,999 (WT.N=66)	\$10,000 or more (WT.N=24)	Under 6 years (WT.N=14)	6 to 11 years (WT.N=67)	12 years or more (WT.N=83)
Political Participation	.33*	.26*	.63*	.26*	.15	.43*
Political Awareness	.36*	.23*	.56*	.35*	.29*	.34*

*Level of significance is less than .05

Table 6:10

Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Participation and Political Awareness and Informal Organization for Gadsden County and Separate Community Black Residents*

	INFORMAL ORGANIZATION				
	Gadsden (Wt. N=127)	Quincy (N=53)	Gretna (N=30)	Greensboro (N=16)	Sawdust (N=28)
Political Participation	.26**	.18	.38**	.43**	.53**
Political Awareness	.27**	.29**	.27**	-.20	.15

*Only individuals not belonging to a formal organization with political discussion included in tabulations

**Level of significance is less than .05

strength for the more remote, rural communities. The opposite is true for the relationship between political awareness and informal organization. The strength of the correlation remains constant for Quincy and Gretna but weakens considerably in Sawdust and becomes negative in Greensboro with neither attaining the .05 level of significance. In the case of Greensboro, the low number of individuals meeting the selection criteria may account for the negative direction of the correlation.

When controls for income and education are applied, the relationship between the variables becomes less durable (see Table 6:11). For some income groupings informal organizational contact and political discussion contributes to increased political activity and awareness while it has little effect on others. No explicable pattern is evident. The same is true for the various levels of education.

The relationship between political participation, political awareness and organizational involvement, both formal and informal, is not surprising. Such findings have been reported elsewhere and have become a standard feature of political participation studies.¹⁸ Political participation is enhanced for all socioeconomic groupings when individuals are members of organizations and particularly when they are active members.¹⁹ The assertion here is that formal and informal organizations help facilitate the political mobilization process by providing the context through which information can be transmitted from leaders to followers and by generating solidarity in support of group action. Especially formal organizations with political discussion were found to enhance their members' political activity and political awareness, regardless of income and educational grouping. In Gadsden County the

Table 6:11

Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Participation and Political Awareness and Informal Organization for Gadsden County Black Residents, Controlling for Income and Education*

	Income			Education		
	Under \$5,000 (Wt. N=51)	\$5,000 to \$9,999 (Wt. N=47)	\$10,000 or more (Wt. N=11)	Under 6 years (Wt. N=29)	6 to 11 years (Wt. N=50)	12 years or more (Wt. N=48)
Political Participation	.18	.30**	.10	.22	.15	.26**
Political Awareness	.48**	-.01	.12	.43**	.20	.19

*Only individuals not belonging to a formal organization with political discussion included in tabulations

**Level of significance is less than .05

black church provided a forum for political discussion. By speaking at area churches, black leaders in the county were able to reach the larger community with their political message. The black church is thus able to serve as a formal, nonpolitical agency within the black community through which black political activity can be organized and directed.²⁰ As an enduring organization with a mass membership, the church may provide the crucial link between a population and those seeking to lead it, particularly in rural areas. Informal groupings also facilitated communications to a diminished degree.

In Gadsden County physical coercion has not been in recent evidence and therefore has not impeded the political mobilization process. Economic coercion through economic dependency has been a minor, although detectable, factor which may have been stronger at a time more proximate to the county's first mobilization period (1963-1966). Formal organizational involvement has been a major facilitating factor to political mobilization, especially where political discussion is conducted within the formal organization. The same is true for informal organizational involvement but to a lesser degree. However, the question as to whether a basic psychological predisposition is necessary before an individual becomes available for political mobilization has yet to be addressed. This issue is the focus of the next chapter.

CHAPTER SIX
NOTES

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CHAPTER SEVEN
PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS OF
POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

The importance of physical resources such as physical security, economic independence, and organizational involvement may be important but cannot completely account for subordinate political mobilization. A psychological disposition on the part of subordinate group members must be present before extensive mobilization is possible. Three basic psychological attitudes are examined here: 1) relative deprivation, 2) expectancy of success, and 3) group consciousness. While the relationship between a particular psychological state and political activity may be difficult to demonstrate empirically, the reason may be due more to inadequate theory and faulty operationalization rather than to any lack of relationship.¹

Relative Deprivation: Theory
and Measurement

In recent years the concept of "relative deprivation" has gained wide acceptance as a motivational factor that seeks to explain collective violence. According to Ted Robert Gurr, one of its principal exponents, relative deprivation is defined as the perceived discrepancy between an individual's value expectations (the goods and conditions of life to which he believes himself rightfully entitled) and his value capabilities (the goods and conditions he thinks he is capable of getting and keeping).² In short, the difference between what a person

has and what he feels he ought to have. The greater this gap, the more frustration the individual will experience, with the possibility that this frustration will spill over into collective violence.

Similar explanations have been offered by others. James C. Davies, seeking a synthesis of Karl Marx, who suggested that people rebel when conditions deteriorate, and Alexis de Tocqueville, who attributed rebellion to the slackening of repression, proposed that these theories be linked in tandem: first, de Tocqueville, then Marx.³ The result was a J-curve based on a gap emerging between steadily increasing expectations and actual need satisfactions which fail to keep pace and suffer a sharp reversal. Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Betty A. Nesvold expanded on the Davies model by suggesting that systemic frustration (analogous to relative deprivation) may be due to a variety of different patterns of which the J-curve was but one.⁴ Gurr conceptualized the various forms of relative deprivation into three basic patterns: "progressive deprivation" based on the pattern originally described by Davies, "decremental deprivation" where value expectations remain constant while value capabilities decline, and "aspirational deprivation" where value capabilities remain constant as value expectations rise.⁵

Various attempts have been made to test the relative deprivation hypothesis with mixed results. Using 48 separate indicators of relative deprivation based largely on aggregate data, Gurr found strong support for the proposition that the strife varied directly in magnitude with the intensity of relative deprivation within 114 national political systems.⁶ However, the appropriateness of using aggregate data to test a psychologically based hypothesis of individual

perception is open to question.⁷ Employing a more direct measure of "achievement optimum-achievement" (relative deprivation) adapted from Hadley Cantril's 10-step ladder scale, Edward N. Muller attempted to test the relationship between the gap in expectation and the potential for political violence.⁸ The Cantril self-anchoring, striving scale seeks to ascertain the psychological placement of individuals where the top of the ladder represents the best possible life and the bottom the worst possible. By asking the respondent to locate himself at present time, five years ago, and five years hence, the scale can determine current psychological attitude as well as past trends and future expectations.⁹ The Cantril scale's ease of understanding has made it a favorite tool in the research on relative deprivation. Muller found that support for political authority and belief that political violence has been successful in the past were superior to relative deprivation as predictors of a disposition for political violence among blacks in Waterloo, Iowa.¹⁰

The Cantril scale was adapted to the present study as well. However, no standard wording of the measure has been employed among researchers, making comparisons difficult. Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro used the top of the ladder to represent "the very best way Negroes and white people could live in the same place together" with the bottom representing the worst.¹¹ By locating the community (past, present, and future) on the scale, an indication of respondent's view of current race relations and its trend was obtained, but there is serious question as to whether this represents relative deprivation, a concept based on individual expectations. Bernard N. Grofman and Edward N. Muller have used the top of the Cantril scale to represent

the "best possible life," true to Cantril's original wording.¹² Gurr has suggested that the Cantril scale be employed but his theoretical formulation suggests that deprivation results from a gap between perceived present status and what people believe is their just due. Therefore, the Cantril scale in this study has been altered to reflect the Gurr theoretical formulation.

Respondents were first asked how things were going for them these days; whether things were pretty good, so-so, or not-so-good. Then respondents were asked what would be the one thing they would like changed and how that one thing "ought to be." Next, they were asked to describe the "worst way things could be." Finally, respondents were shown a drawing of a 10-step ladder with the top and bottom representing their description of the way things ought to be and the worst way things could be respectively. By pointing to the ladder, respondents located themselves according to where they perceived themselves today and five years ago and where they expected to find themselves five years in the future. From these scores two measures of relative deprivation, three direction of change measures, and three magnitude of change measures were calculated (see Figure 7:1). Present and past deprivation scores ranged from 0 to 10 with the greater the value, the greater the deprivation. Relative change, expected change, and total change scores ranged from negative 9 to positive 10, representing deterioration or improvement in perceived condition. Absolute relative change, absolute expected change, and absolute total change scores ranged from 0 to 10 with the higher values representing a greater perceived magnitude of change, regardless of direction. An additional measure of outlook perception was derived from a separate questionnaire

Relative Deprivation

Present Deprivation = 10 - Today
 Past Deprivation = 10 - Five Years Ago

Direction of Change

Total Change = Five Years Ahead - Five Years Ago
 Relative Change = Today - Five Years Ago
 Expected Change = Five Years Ahead - Today

Magnitude of Change

Absolute Total Change = Range: Five Years Ago to Five Years Ahead
 Absolute Relative Change = Range: Five Years Ago to Today
 Absolute Expected Change = Range: Today to Five Years Ahead

Figure 7:1

Computations of Measures for Relative Deprivation, Direction of Change, and Magnitude of Change Variables Adapted from Hadley Cantril's Self-Anchoring, Striving Scale

item which asked respondents to rate the chance of overcoming the most important problem they could name. Direction as well as magnitude scores were obtained from this question.

Relative deprivation has been offered generally as an explanation of collective political violence, particularly turmoil, conspiracy, and internal war. While political violence has been associated with black political mobilization in Gadsden County, electoral-based political action has been the most visible form of subordinate political action in both mobilization periods, 1963-1966 and 1970-1972. When mobilization leaders and participants are sufficiently integrated into the basic values of the larger political system, demanding only inclusion into the decision-making process, collective electoral activity may be an outlet for frustration. Collective political violence may be considered an extreme form of political action. The same frustrations

that would provoke individuals to violent acts may also incite them toward nonviolent political actions as well.

Relative Deprivation in Gadsden County

Two measures of relative deprivation are employed in this study: present deprivation and past deprivation. On the one hand, the past deprivation measure (based on the subtraction of the five years ago rating from 10) would be the more viable since it attempts to determine the state of mind of the respondent in 1972, a time approximate to the second mobilization period in the county. If there is any connection between the past psychological state of the respondent and his current political actions or awareness, logically past deprivation would be the determining variable. However, the interviews on which this study is based were conducted in 1977 and the ability of respondents to accurately evaluate their state of relative deprivation five years before may be subject to question. On the other hand, present deprivation is a more accurate measurement since respondents are asked to evaluate their current state of mind. Theoretically, however, it suffers, being at least five years removed from the last mass mobilization period. If relative deprivation is a volatile state, it is prone to rapid change and would be most valid in predicting individual inclusion in the political mobilization process at a time more proximate to the events. Such is the inherent difficulty in studying past human behavior. The correlation coefficient (Kendall's Tau B) between present and past deprivation is .25 (significant at $p < .0001$), indicating some, though limited, overlap between the two.

Hadley Cantril's 15-nation survey of political attitudes based on his self-anchoring, striving scale revealed an average present personal

rating score of 5.0 and average past personal rating score of 4.3.¹³ Converting these scores to present and past deprivation values comparable to the ones used here (remembering, of course, the difference in the wording of the questionnaire items), the Cantril present deprivation score would be 5.0 and the past deprivation score, 5.7. The mean values for the weighted Gadsden County and separate community scores are provided in Table 7:1. For the most part, the values uncovered in Gadsden County are similar to the Cantril averages, with Gadsden County black residents scoring slightly higher on both present and past deprivation measures. Within Gadsden County, most of the communities reveal no major deviation, except for Gretna. Both in terms of present deprivation and past deprivation, Gretna residents score lower than residents of the other communities studied. Although difficult to confirm, one possible explanation is the success Gretna's black residents have had in achieving and maintaining political control. The black take over of the town's government began in late 1971 and was completed by the end of 1972, within the time frame of the past deprivation measurement. In Quincy, attempts to achieve greater political influence have been only partially successful, while in Greensboro and Sawdust they have been nonexistent.

When correlated with the dependent variables of political participation and political awareness, the measures of present deprivation yielded only a mild, though significant, negative association for the combined Gadsden County community samples (Table 7:2). Past deprivation also yielded a negative association but was so weak that it failed to meet the minimum standard of significance ($p < .05$). This negative association was generally maintained for both present and past

Table 7:1

Frequencies of Present Deprivation and Past Deprivation
for Gadsden County and Separate Community
Black Residents

	PRESENT DEPRIVATION				
	Gadsden (Wt.N=192)	Quincy (N=80)	Gretna (N=50)	Greensboro (N=27)	Sawdust (N=38)
\bar{M} =	5.59	5.65	4.78	5.70	5.82
Low (0-3)	16.1%	13.8%	30.0%	15.8%	18.5%
Medium (4-6)	47.5	47.5	52.0	42.1	48.1
High (7-10)	36.4	38.8	18.0	42.1	33.3
	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%
	PAST DEPRIVATION				
	(Wt.N=192)	(N=80)	(N=50)	(N=27)	(N=38)
\bar{M} =	5.77	5.85	5.14	5.81	5.84
Low (0-3)	17.6%	17.5%	20.0%	11.1%	18.4%
Medium (4-6)	38.4	35.0	52.0	51.9	42.1
High (7-10)	43.9	47.5	28.0	37.0	39.5
	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

deprivation in the separately considered communities, though seldom significantly as the N's declined.

The most surprising aspect of these findings is their persistent negative direction. Instead of relative deprivation propelling people to greater political awareness or collective political action (at least, electoral-based action), the opposite appeared to be true. Those expressing the greatest deprivation tended to be the less politically mobilized with those expressing the most satisfaction with their status registering higher levels of awareness and activity.

Table 7:2

Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Participation and Political Awareness and Present Deprivation and Past Deprivation for Gadsden County and Separate Community Black Residents

	PRESENT DEPRIVATION				
	<u>Gadsden</u> (Wt.N=192)	<u>Quincy</u> (N=80)	<u>Gretna</u> (N=50)	<u>Greensboro</u> (N=27)	<u>Sawdust</u> (N=38)
Political Participation	-.12*	-.12	-.15	-.24	-.15
Political Awareness	-.10*	-.12	-.09	.04	-.16
	PAST DEPRIVATION				
	(Wt.N=192)	(N=80)	(N=50)	(N=27)	(N=38)
Political Participation	-.08	-.04	-.19*	-.07	-.24*
Political Awareness	-.08	-.10	-.08	.19	-.15*

*Level of significance is less than .05

When controls for income and education level were applied, however, the predictive power of both measures of relative deprivation, weak to begin with, evaporated completely (Table 7:3). By itself, relative deprivation, past or present, contributes little to the explanation of political mobilization.

Outlook Perception and
Relative Deprivation

Many theoriest couple relative deprivation with some sort of hope or promise of success as a condition for political mobilization. According to Robin M. Williams, Jr.,

...politically significant collective conflict is not necessarily produced by extreme mass deprivation, nor by great inequality, nor by great inequality, nor by violent and severe repression. Extreme deprivation de-politicizes. Extreme deprivation coupled with highly coercive rule can keep collective conflict at low levels. It is under conditions of 'relative deprivation and hope,' rather than 'absolute deprivation and despair' that conflict flourishes.¹⁴

It is this optimistic outlook, what Walter Korpi calls "expectancy of success," that serves to enhance the chances of political mobilization.¹⁶ (By relating expectancy of success to the perceived balance of strength between the competing groups, Korpi is able to integrate structural and motivational factors into one model.) The prediction, then, is for subordinate individuals to become politically mobilized in the face of high relative deprivation only when they perceive the likelihood of success with some optimism.

Frequencies for the outlook perception direction of change variables for the combined Gadsden County sample is provided in Table 7:4. Value levels have been collapsed to ease comparison. Total change charts the perceived change from five years ago to five years hence and generally indicates that a majority of Gadsden County's black residents believed that conditions have and will improve. The relative change variable covers only the change over the five years preceding the study. Most individuals surveyed felt there had been little or no change in their relative condition with respect to the way they believed things ought to be. Approximately one-quarter of the county residents felt conditions had deteriorated, while a slightly higher percentage felt they had improved. The expected change variable, covering the individual's forecast of future five years hence, again shows

Table 7:4

Frequencies of Direction of Change Variables
for Gadsden County Black Residents

	<u>Total Change</u> (Wt.N=183)	<u>Relative Change</u> (Wt.N=192)	<u>Expected Change</u> (Wt.N=183)
\bar{M} =	2.10	.20	1.91
Negative (-9 to -2)	14.2%	25.0%	4.4%
No Change (-1 to 1)	30.6	46.4	39.9
Positive (2 to 10)	55.2	28.6	55.7
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	<u>Overcome Problem (Direction)</u> (Wt.N=173)		
Poor/Very Poor	18.5%		
Fair	47.4		
Good/Very Good	34.1		
	<hr/>		
	100.0%		

a basically positive outlook. Only a handful of respondents thought that general conditions would worsen. Finally, the perception of individuals that they would be able to overcome their most important problem yielded a more cautious outlook. While the other measures were based on a more abstract notion of change, the important problem variable dealt with a specific problem. The bulk of respondents only gave the odds of overcoming their most important problem a "fair" rating. A little more than one-third said there was a good or very good chance of overcoming their problem. In general, these variables indicate a population that was cautiously optimistic in its present and future outlook. When the separate communities were compared on these

same measures, Gretna residents tended to be the most optimistic, Sawdust residents the most pessimistic and Greensboro residents the most likely to perceive little or no change. None of the communities deviated widely from the others. (See Appendix C for comparative frequencies.)

Only the Overcome Problem (Direction) variable was directly related to either of the dependent variables and then weakly (Table 7:5). When used as a control on the relationship between the two measures of relative deprivation and the dependent variables or political participation and political knowledge, the outlook perception direction of change variables failed to perform as predicted (Table 7:6). Each relative deprivation variable was paired with outlook perception variables that measured relevant ongoing or future change. Thus, present deprivation was controlled by total change, expected change, and overcome problem (direction) variables, while past deprivation was controlled by total change and relative change. No matter which variable was used for control, the results were consistent: individuals, no matter what their outlook, were unlikely to be politically aware or politically active in the face of high relative deprivation. Twenty-four of the 30 correlations reported were negative as were all 10 significant correlations. Neither positive nor negative outlook (nor for that matter, static outlook) altered the basic negative relationship between relative deprivation and any indication of a mobilized response.

An alternative suggestion is that magnitude of change, not direction of change, determines the likelihood of collective political action in the face of deprivation.¹⁶ The rationale is that those individuals with dramatic declines in their perceived condition will react out

Table 7:5

Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Participation and Political Awareness and Outlook Perception Direction of Change Variables for Gadsden County Black Residents

	<u>Total Change</u> (Wt.N=183)	<u>Relative Change</u> (Wt.N=192)	<u>Expected Change</u> (Wt.N=183)	<u>Overcome Problem (Direction)</u> (Wt.N=173)
Political Participation	-.03	.02	-.04	.12*
Political Awareness	.03	.03	.01	.03

*Level of significance is less than .05

of intensified frustration while those perceiving dramatic improvement will experience expectations rising faster than actual condition, come to realize how bad things were in the past, and/or move to protect their improved state against possible threat.¹⁷ Though the motivations may differ, those reporting the greatest magnitude of change, whether positive or negative, would be most available for political mobilization.

The frequencies for the outlook perception magnitude of change variables for the combined Gadsden County sample are presented in Table 7:7. The absolute total change, absolute relative change, and absolute expected change measures were obtained by totalling the values on the respective total change, relative change, and expected change variable without regard to sign. The overcome problem (magnitude) was obtained by combining the good and poor categories as well as the very good and very poor categories. The variables were trichotomized to aid comparison and control. The break point between the medium and high levels was selected to provide for a useable N in the high category.

Table 7:6

Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Participation and Political Awareness and Present Deprivation and Past Deprivation for Gadsden County Black Residents, Controlling for Outlook Perception Direction of Change

	PRESENT DEPRIVATION							Overcome Problem (Direction)
	Total Change		Expected Change			Overcome Problem		
	Negative (Wt.N=26)	Positive (Wt.N=102)	Negative (Wt.N=8)	No Change (Wt.N=73)	Positive (Wt.N=102)	Poor (Wt.N=57)	Fair (Wt.N=80)	
Political Participation	-.29*	-.03	.35	-.15*	-.15*	.10	-.35*	.07
Political Awareness	-.24*	-.07	-.09	-.21*	-.06	.00	-.21*	-.07
PAST DEPRIVATION								
	Total Change		Relative Change					
	Negative (Wt.N=26)	Positive (Wt.N=102)	Negative (Wt.N=49)	No Change (Wt.N=89)	Positive (Wt.N=55)			
	Political Participation	-.15	-.13	-.09	-.26*	-.19*	.06	
Political Awareness	-.38*	-.11	-.10	-.24*	-.01	.00		

*Level of significance is less than .05

Table 7:7

Frequencies of Outlook Perception Magnitude of Change
Variables for Gadsden County Black Residents

	Absolute Total Change (Wt.N=183)	Absolute Relative Change (Wt.N=192)	Absolute Expected Change (Wt.N=183)
\bar{M} =	3.35	2.04	2.25
Low (0,1)	30.4%	46.3%	39.9%
Medium (2 to 4)	35.3	44.7	47.5
High (5 to 10)	34.2	8.9	12.6
	-----	-----	-----
	99.9%	99.9%	100.0%
	Overcome Problem (Magnitude) (Wt.N=173)		
Fair	47.7%		
Good/Poor	34.9		
Very Good/Very Poor	17.4		

	100.0%		

The magnitude of change represented on any of these variables is moderate. The mean change represented by the absolute total change score is just over three points. Generally, the highest frequencies cluster on the low and medium levels. While there is greater change over the 10-year period represented by the absolute total change variable, on the whole there are few major fluctuations, positive or negative, in expectations among the black Gadsden County residents surveyed. The least change was registered by the absolute relative change variable. Slightly greater change was indicated by the absolute expected change measure. Only slightly over one-half of the respondents thought

the chance of overcoming their most important problem was anything but fair. Among the separate communities, Greensboro residents were the least likely to have experienced or expected any major deviations in their situation (Appendix D). Sawdust residents were most likely to see absolute change, mainly on the strength of their expectations for the future. Quincy residents experienced the greatest magnitude of change from five years ago. However, the differences between communities was not great.

As was true for the direction of change version of the outlook perception variables, magnitude of change, by itself, had no impact on either political participation or political awareness (Table 7:8). The V-curve hypothesis suggested by Bernard N. Grofman and Edward N. Muller, based on a survey of the black residents of Waterloo, Iowa, receives no support here. The dependent variable in the Grofman and Muller study, however, was potential for political violence, quite different from the political participation and political awareness variables used presently. Yet, the core of the hypothesis, that collective political action is related to the magnitude of change either experienced or expected, cannot be supported.

Nor is there any support for the use of magnitude of change as a control through which relative deprivation is filtered (Table 7:9). A plausible hypothesis might be that those experiencing or expecting great change in their perceived status, regardless of direction, would be more willing to engage in collective political action in the face of high deprivation. The data does not bear this out. Once again the relative deprivation variables were matched with the outlook perception variable that represented future expectations. Of the 30 correlation

Table 7:8

Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Participation and Political Awareness and Outlook Perception Magnitude of Change Variables for Gadsden County Black Residents

	Absolute Total Change (Wt.N=138)	Absolute Relative Change (Wt.N=192)	Absolute Expected Change (Wt.N=183)	Overcome Problem (Magnitude) (Wt.N=173)
Political Participation	-.02	-.03	-.04	.07
Political Awareness	.01	.07	-.02	-.03

coefficients reported, 26 were negative, including the 7 that were statistically significant. No defensible argument can be made that individuals with a higher magnitude of change outlook are most likely to be politically mobilized. These findings only support the already familiar negative relationship between either political participation and political awareness and relative deprivation. If any factor mediates the relationship between relative deprivation and political mobilization, outlook perception, at least as measured here, does not qualify.

Group Consciousness and
Relative Deprivation

Relative deprivation has been linked to yet another factor: the lack of personal responsibility for one's condition.¹⁸ If one blames himself for his perceived position, then collective political action is not likely to be a response. There must be a target to react against. In essence, political mobilization may be contingent on the development of a "we-they" perception. Once an individual begins to see his problems as part of a larger struggle between groups, his group and the oppressive opposing group, then collective political activity becomes a

Table 7:9

Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Participation and Political Awareness and Present Deprivation and Past Deprivation for Gadsden County Black Residents, Controlling for Outlook Perception Magnitude of Change

	PRESENT DEPRIVATION								
	Absolute Total Change			Absolute Expected Change			Overcome Problem (Magnitude)		
	Low (Wt. N=55)	Medium (Wt. N=64)	High (Wt. N=63)	Low (Wt. N=73)	Medium (Wt. N=87)	High (Wt. N=23)	Low (Wt. N=80)	Medium (Wt. N=60)	High (Wt. N=29)
Political Participation	-.16	-.12	-.07	-.15*	-.11	.06	-.35*	.00	.09
Political Awareness	-.14	-.23*	.02	-.21*	-.06	.11	-.21*	-.01	-.08
	PAST DEPRIVATION								
	Absolute Total Change			Absolute Relative Change			Absolute Relative Change		
	Low (Wt. N=55)	Medium (Wt. N=64)	High (Wt. N=63)	Low (Wt. N=89)	Medium (Wt. N=86)	High (Wt. N=18)	Low (Wt. N=89)	Medium (Wt. N=86)	High (Wt. N=18)
Political Participation	-.13	-.02	-.07	-.19*	.02	-.11	-.19*	.02	-.11
Political Awareness	-.11	-.16*	-.10	-.01	-.13	-.26	-.01	-.13	-.26

*Level of significance is less than .05

rational response. Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie provided some support for this hypothesis with the finding that black respondents who spontaneously mentioned race as a problem were more politically active than those who did not.¹⁹ They termed this variable "group consciousness." Therefore, the proposition is that subordinate political mobilization is dependent on group consciousness perception.

As mentioned, Verba and Nie measured group consciousness by the respondents spontaneously naming a racial problem in response to a series of open-ended questions. Only 13 percent of the weighted Gadsden County sample responded in this manner. As this low percent made valid comparison difficult, an alternate measure was employed. Respondents were asked a series of questions which named specific problems. Responses were fixed with the respondent being asked to rate each problem listed as no problem, little problem, or big problem. Tabulated responses were as expected. Most individuals had no problem with their neighbors and listed the cost of food, the availability of jobs for blacks, and the condition of the roads as big problems. The last question in the series asked respondents to rate poor treatment by whites as a problem. The responses are tabulated in Table 7:10 for the weighted and separate community samples. About one-half of the county group thought race was no problem with over 80 percent of Greensboro's residents sharing this attitude. Over one-quarter of Sawdust's residents saw race as a big problem, the highest of the separate communities.

By itself, the white treatment variable had little relationship with political participation. The only community in which a significant relationship was uncovered was Gretna where, contrary to expectations,

Table 7:10

Frequencies of White Treatment for Gadsden County
and Separate Community Black Residents

	<u>Gadsden</u> (Wt.N=194)	<u>Quincy</u> (N=81)	<u>Gretna</u> (N=49)	<u>Greensboro</u> (N=27)	<u>Sawdust</u> (N=38)
No Problem	50.1%	46.9%	61.2%	85.2%	47.4%
Little Problem	26.6	28.4	20.4	11.1	26.3
Big Problem	23.2	24.7	18.4	3.7	26.3
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

those considering race a problem participated less (Table 7:11). A positive relationship was evident between political awareness and white treatment for the weighted sample, mainly on the strength of the Quincy subsample.

When combined with relative deprivation as a control, white treatment exerts moderate, interactive influence on the political participation dependent variable (Table 7:12). For those black residents of the county who saw white treatment as no problem or as a little problem, a significantly negative relationship was apparent between political participation and present deprivation. However, for those residents who saw white treatment as a big problem, the reverse was true. A significant positive relationship emerged in this case, indicating that those individuals with the highest relative deprivation recorded a higher level of political participation compared with those with less relative deprivation. This turnabout in the direction of the relationship demonstrates the impact a strong group consciousness can exert. The basically negative relationship between the dependent variables and relative deprivation has surfaced repeatedly in this study. Only for those black residents who saw white treatment as a big problem was the trend

Table 7:11

Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Participation and Political Awareness and White Treatment for Gadsden County and Separate Community Black Residents

	<u>Gadsden</u> (Wt.N=194)	<u>Quincy</u> (N=81)	<u>Gretna</u> (N=49)	<u>Greensboro</u> (N=27)	<u>Sawdust</u> (N=38)
Political Participation	.01	.06	-.23*	.08	-.08
Political Awareness	.19*	.23*	.02	.10	.00

*Level of significance is less than .05

reversed. Surprisingly, this change in direction did not come about gradually; those who saw white treatment as a little problem were less likely to participate politically in the face of high present deprivation than those who saw no problem with white treatment. The threshold was passed only when white treatment was perceived a major consideration.

The basic pattern was mirrored in the correlations between political participation and past deprivation, although the strength of the correlations was diminished and generally lacked significance. Obviously, the white treatment variable was influential on more activist indications of mobilized responses.

Conclusion

Contrary to expectations, relative deprivation was negatively related to both political participation and political awareness. If either of these two variables can be considered adequate measures of a mobilized response, serious question is raised as to the extent relative deprivation contributes to collective conventional political actions. However, several qualifications must be considered.

Table 7:12

Correlations (Kendall's Tau C) Between Political Participation and Political Awareness and Present Deprivation and Past Deprivation for Gadsden County Black Residents, Controlling for White Treatment

	PRESENT DEPRIVATION			PAST DEPRIVATION		
	No Problem (Wt. N=95)	Little Problem (Wt. N=50)	Big Problem (Wt. N=43)	No Problem (Wt. N=95)	Little Problem (Wt. N=50)	Big Problem (Wt. N=43)
Political Participation	-.19*	-.28*	.21*	-.09	-.22*	.11
Political Awareness	-.01	-.12	-.23*	-.10	-.09	-.08

*Level of significance is less than .05

First, the measure of political participation employed here is biased toward electoral activities. To be fair, relative deprivation theory usually seeks to explain collective political violence which may be spontaneous and lack organization. It may well be that individuals expressing high relative deprivation in this study have rejected the electoral process as an avenue for change but remain available for more violent confrontation actions. Declines rather than increases in electoral participation are more apt to be associated with instability.²⁰ No measure of riot participation was included in this study but respondents were asked if they had engaged in protest activities. Only 11 percent so indicated but 77 percent of these individuals fell within the high range of the past deprivation measure. Contrary to the findings with political participation, a positive association was recorded between past protest activity and the past deprivation variant of relative deprivation (Kendall's Tau C = .14; $p < .01$). Protest activity and present deprivation were unrelated.

Second, relative deprivation alone is generally not seen as a sufficient condition to provoke a collective response but must be tempered by some hope of success. Again, this proposition found little support in this study. In fact, outlook perception whether optimistic, pessimistic or static had no impact on the measures of a mobilized response other than to reinforce a negative association. The same was true of the magnitude of change variant of outlook perception. The most satisfied participated at a higher level and were more politically aware than those expressing high levels of relative deprivation. Incidentally, those individuals expressing the lowest relative deprivation also tended to belong to organizations especially where political discussion

occurred (Kendall's Tau C = .12; $p < .05$). Organizational involvement thus seems to mediate relative deprivation to some extent as well as promote political participation and political awareness. Of course, organizational involvement in Gadsden County means church membership.

Only when high relative deprivation was coupled with a specific source of frustration, in this case poor treatment by whites, were political participation and relative deprivation significantly related in a positive direction. For the most part these individuals most integrated into community life are recruited into the mobilization effort. They may desire change but are not driven by intense anger and frustration. They are, more appropriately, led. The exception is for those individuals who see the conflict as an "us-them" affair. Anger and frustration then find their outlet in a mobilized response.

CHAPTER SEVEN
NOTES

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CHAPTER EIGHT CONCLUSION

Principal Findings

As a case study, Gadsden County can neither prove nor disprove any generalization about the political mobilization process. What a case study can do is suggest certain hypotheses while casting doubt upon others. For the most part the present study has been able to give some credence to the following theoretical statements:

1. The intervention of outside supportive organization is necessary in order to initiate the political mobilization process in a traditional, rural environment. Despite extensive civil rights activity in Tallahassee less than 30 miles to the east in 1957 and 1960, no visible political mobilization was evident in Gadsden County prior to the arrival of CORE in 1963. During the first political mobilization period (1963-1966), political activity in Gadsden County coincided with CORE's presence. After CORE left the county in 1968, little black political activity was evident, until the Quincy riot in late 1970 sparked renewed efforts by Gadsden County blacks to alter existing race relations. While outside supportive organizations were again present during the second political mobilization period (1970-1972), local black political activity was not entirely dependent upon the outsiders. Apparently, once local subordinate-dominant group relations have been challenged, outsiders are no longer absolutely necessary to the initiation of an effort by the subordinate community to mobilize for change. However,

until the initial breach, outside supportive organization does appear to be necessary to break the existing subordinate-dominant interactive patterns and legitimize a direct challenge to the status quo.

Within Gadsden County, the case of Gretna is interesting in this light. While possessing numerical superiority prior to 1971 and being subject to the general mobilization of the first and second mobilization periods, no attempt was made to secure control of the town's government until the Quincy-based NAACP intervened. Again, direct intervention by outsiders was necessary before local blacks rose to challenge the status quo.

2. More inclusive governmental support serves to further legitimize the challenge of traditional subordinate-dominant interactive patterns and provide an avenue of appeal when the subordinate group loses out to the locally superior dominant group. The favorable civil rights policies of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations encouraged organizations like CORE to take their campaigns to local blacks throughout the South. With a basically supportive legal structure at the federal level, blacks in Gadsden County were able to win on such issues as school integration, job discrimination, the right of blacks to sit on integrated juries, and the redistricting and revamping of Quincy's electoral system. Federal government administrative intervention improved black participation on the Gadsden County Community Action Agency Board and helped funnel federal funds into Gretna's struggling black town government. State government administrative intervention was helpful in mediating black-white differences following the Quincy riot in 1970 and helped ease black access to the voter registration books in both Quincy and Gretna in 1971. Overall, though not a specific factor in the two

political mobilization periods (1963-1966 and 1970-1972), outside government provided a basically supportive backdrop to political mobilization.

3. The viability of the political mobilization process is dependent upon the recruitment of status-change oriented leaders from within the local subordinate community. The general rise in black voter registration throughout the county between 1963 and 1966 and, again, from 1970 to 1972 was associated with activist black leaders who were liberal in their political philosophies and who generally opposed accommodationist tactics of private meetings and petitions. While the data did not permit a thorough evaluation of the pre-1963 Quincy leadership structure, the leaders who predated CORE's arrival appeared to have been more conservative in their political orientation and more accommodationist than those recruited into positions of leadership following 1963. CORE's lasting influence may have been the recruitment of status-change leaders from the local community. These were the leaders who were able to step to the fore during the second political mobilization period.

4. Local leadership unity is not a factor in the initiation of political mobilization, although it may affect the success of subordinate political mobilization, especially when the numerical balance between the subordinate and the dominant populations are approximately equal. Both Quincy and Gretna had well developed leadership structures in the black communities, each composed of factions based on personality, ideology, and tactical preference. While factional differences in Gretna could be enjoyed as the predominant black majority left little room for a direct white challenge to black control, Quincy blacks were unable to convert their numbers into electoral success without the help of outside governmental intervention. The failure of blacks to score electoral

successes at the county level may be due, in part, to a lack of leadership unity.

5. The political mobilization process seems dependent on the creation or development of subordinate political organization. Certainly, those communities in Gadsden County with the most developed political organizational structures had more visible political activity as well as higher levels of political participation and greater political awareness reported by black residents. In Quincy, the old NAACP was rejuvenated while a local CORE chapter was established and the Civic Interest Group created during the first political mobilization period (1963-1966). These organizations supplemented the older Negro Businessmen and Civic League. During the second mobilization period (1970-1972), the NAACP in Quincy became a broad-based political organization for blacks. In Gretna no black political organizations existed until the NAACP in Quincy helped organize in the community in 1971. In addition, a SCLC chapter operated in the community for a short time in 1971. Since that time, the town's government has served as a political organizational structure for the community's black residents. In both Greensboro and Sawdust, communities where black political participation, awareness, and general activity have been lowest, no independent black political organizations have appeared.

6. Where outside governmental support is operative, the most effective sanction that the dominant group can employ to counter subordinate political mobilization is economic intimidation. Further, economic sanctions are most effectively applied to subordinate members above the level of absolute poverty. The survey data demonstrated a generally low level of political participation and political awareness among the most

impoverished blacks in the county, whether economically dependent or not. Only those blacks with something to lose showed a tendency to refrain from participation when economically dependent upon whites. The effect of economic dependence was subtle. Few black residents in the county reported incidents of economic intimidation. Only when economically dependent blacks were compared with blacks lacking such dependence were differences in political participation evident.

7. Political mobilization is facilitated to the degree to which the subordinate population is connected through organizations. Particularly, the black church has provided a forum for communications between leader and follower in the black community. Those blacks in Gadsden County who maintained some sort of organizational affiliation, particularly church affiliation, scored higher on both political participation and political awareness scales. Black leaders in Gadsden County reported using the churches as a means of reaching the larger community.

8. Those subordinate individuals with high levels of personal frustration will be least likely to be swept up in the political mobilization process, except to the extent that they perceive the dominant group as the source of their personal problems. When the dominant groups are identified as the source of frustration, however, greater levels of political participation will be exhibited. This finding is somewhat at odds with expectations as most theorists link a sense of deprivation with a willingness to engage in collective actions that challenge the dominant group. The concept of relative deprivation has great intuitive appeal but lacks empirical support as an explanation for collective rebellion and, by implication, political mobilization. Before relative deprivation can be discarded as an explanatory variable,

however, it must be employed as a measure at a time more proximate to the political mobilization period. Since relative deprivation seeks to measure a very volatile psychological state, it may be difficult to uncover in a post mobilization study. The evidence presented here which links political participation with higher levels of relative deprivation under conditions of perceived poor treatment from whites suggests that leaders who can successfully link the subordinate groups' frustrations to the dominant group may mobilize greater numbers.

This study could uncover no effect of optimistic or pessimistic attitudes about the future or change from the past on the political mobilization process. No matter how expectancy of success was measured in this study, it yielded no insight into political mobilization, either by itself or combined with relative deprivation. The difficulty here may be in using personal outlook to explain an expectancy of success of the subordinate groups' challenge to the dominant group.

Political Mobilization As a Process

The process through which a subordinate group acquires and utilizes resources in an effort to challenge the politically dominant group has been termed "political mobilization." In a traditional, rural locality the political mobilization process has been conceived as occurring in stages: first, the intervention of outside forces including more inclusive governmental support and, most importantly, the direct presence of outside supportive organizations. These outsiders serve to legitimize the challenge of the entrenched local subordinate-dominant political status quo by recruiting local residents into the effort and stimulating political organization. Second, the local subordinate leadership with their outside governmental and organizational support,

reach out to the larger subordinate community, attempting to activate the subordinate population in the conflict with the dominant group. Third, the subordinate community becomes activated to the extent to which it is free of potential dominant group sanctions, organizationally accessible, and able to link personal frustration to perceived ill treatment by members of the dominant group. A mobilized subordinate group is characterized by observable political activity by the leaders, the participation of large numbers of the subordinate community in politically oriented activities, and, at the minimum, a greater general political awareness by the subordinate population.

Within the context of Gadsden County, the sequential nature of political mobilization from outside intervention to local leadership and political organizational development followed by general black community participation was apparent only during the first political mobilization period (1963-1966). Gretna, in 1971, exhibited a similar pattern with outsiders intervening from Quincy but some political activism was evident in Gretna prior to direct outside intervention.

During the second political mobilization period (1970-1972) the sequential nature of the process was reversed. First came a spontaneous riot with participation by members of the black community; second followed the activation of local leaders and the revival of political organization; and, finally, the arrival of outside supportive organizations and individuals to assist local blacks in pressing their demands for change. The second mobilization period occurred in the context of a major economic dislocation, the decline of shade tobacco production and the resultant loss of employment security by many Gadsden blacks. Also, the political activism of the first political mobilization period

possibly served to create expectations for change that had been largely unfulfilled. Apparently, once the dislocations identified by social mobilization theory are experienced, political mobilization can be triggered by local events and personalities without direct outside intervention.

The Success of Political Mobilization

The present study has attempted to identify the variables associated with the initiation and development of the political mobilization process, not to predict its success. However, the political mobilization literature has tended to focus on the determinants of success for political mobilization. Key among the ingredients necessary for political mobilization to secure gains is the distribution of resources among the contending groups.¹ Both the absolute size of the subordinate community and its ratio to the dominant group were found to be crucial in determining the success of demand/protest mobilization and electoral mobilization in 10 Northern California cities between 1960 and 1979.² William R. Keech found a curvilinear relationship between the percent of the total electorate that was black and payoff of voting. Higher payoffs were most likely when the black share of the electorate was under 30 percent, when blacks posed no direct threat to white control, and over 50 percent, when blacks could achieve political power despite white opposition.³

A second vital factor which accounts for some degree of success stemming from political mobilization is subordinate political organization. Some authors have suggested that the unsettled atmosphere characteristic of the mobilization period is the most potent weapon of the

insurgents, with intensity declining once organizations are established.⁴ However, Rufus P. Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb found that political organization by minority groups in urban Northern California enhanced political mobilization.⁵

One further factor uncovered by Browning, Marshall and Tabb influencing the success of political mobilization was the existence of a liberal coalition with which the subordinate group could join forces against more conservative elements in the dominant community.⁶ Thus, the ideology of at least some elements of the dominant group and their interest in the efforts by the subordinate group to press for change were considered relevant in predicting a successful outcome of political mobilization.

The present study has suggested that the degree of unity of the subordinate leadership may affect success, especially when the size of the subordinate and dominant communities are approximately equal. Success also appeared related to the closeness of community boundaries. Blacks in Gadsden County have been able to organize more successfully at the town and city level where specific demands can be addressed and where political office is more accessible. The difficulty in organizing at the county level has made success less attainable.

Of course, once a subordinate group has been mobilized and, even obtained a measure of success, numerous possibilities exist. The subordinate group may achieve some degree of political control or perhaps be able to bargain with the dominant group from an independent power base. Another possibility is for the subordinate group to become frustrated by determined resistance by the dominant group and largely withdraw from politics. Finally, the leaders of the political mobilization

effort may be coopted by members of the dominant group, resulting in the manipulation of the subordinate group.⁷

Political mobilization in Gadsden County was only partially successful. In the first political mobilization period, white-enforced social norms were defied and blacks registered to vote in large numbers. But despite several attempts to secure political office by black candidates in the city of Quincy and on the county level no political victories were achieved. Perhaps it was this frustration that helped spark the 1970 Quincy riot and the second political mobilization period. Again, visible political activity by black leaders was in evidence with another expansion in the voter rolls. Successes were apparent this time. The voter registration books were moved from a private business to a public office, Quincy business establishments began employing blacks, Gretna blacks captured control of the town's government, and with the help of federal governmental intervention, political representation was achieved in Quincy.

No similar success, however, was obtained at the county level nor in Greensboro where blacks are a distinct minority and lack organization. Throughout Gadsden County, blacks are still poorly educated with many living in absolute poverty. Whether blacks in Gadsden County will initiate future attempts to mobilize their resources to gain further concession from the dominant whites is beyond the scope of this study. Certainly, they have developed the leadership and organizational skills within an environment of decreased ability by whites to effectively impose sanctions. Outside organizational support is no longer necessary to initiate political mobilization, though a favorable orientation by the state and federal governments may still be required. The black

church is still capable of transmitting messages from leader to community. If personal frustration builds within the black population and this frustration is linked to white behavior, the political mobilization process may recur.

CHAPTER EIGHT
NOTES

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
RANDOM SAMPLE SURVEY

I To start with, how long have you lived in (NAME COMMUNITY)?

Have you lived in this same house all that time? _____

(IF NOT), where else did you live? _____

Who all lives here with you? _____

II A lot of the folks I have talked to have told me about the problems they feel are the most important in the nation, in their community, and in their own lives. I would like to get your opinion on the problems you feel are most important.

(a) What sort of problems do you think are the most important in the nation as a whole? _____

(b) What sort of problems do people in this community have? That is, here in (NAME COMMUNITY) _____

(c) What sort of problems do you have personally? _____

Of the problems you just told me about (READ BACK THE RESPONSES), which of these do you think is:

(a) The most important? _____

(b) The next most important? _____

Appendix A-continued

(c) The least most important? _____

What do you think the chances are that these problems can be overcome in the future? Do you think the chances are Very Good, Good, Fair, Poor, or Very Poor that:

(a) (MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM) can be overcome?	VG	G	F	P	VP	DN
(b) (NEXT MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM) can be overcome?	VG	G	F	P	VP	DN
(c) (LEAST MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM) can be overcome?	VG	G	F	P	VP	DN

I am going to read to you a few things that some other people I have talked with feel are problems for them. Please tell me if any of these is a problem for you. Is it a Big Problem, Little Problem, or No Problem to you?

(a) Unfriendly neighbors	BP	LP	NP	DN
(b) Food cost too much	BP	LP	NP	DN
(c) No good jobs for Blacks	BP	LP	NP	DN
(d) Bad roads	BP	LP	NP	DN
(e) Poor treatment from Whites	BP	LP	NP	DN

III People often have different ideas about the way things ought to be for them.

1. For the most part, are things these days going Pretty Good, So So, or Not So Good for you?

PG SS NG DN

Appendix A-continued

2. What is the one thing that you would like to see changed the most? _____

How do you think this (NAME THINGS JUST MENTIONED OR THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM STATED ABOVE, IF NEEDED) ought to be? _____

3. What would be the worst way things could be for you, that is, if things were as bad as they could be? _____

4. Here is a picture of a ladder. (HAND RESPONDENT LADDER CARD.)

Suppose we say that the top of the ladder is the way things ought to be for you. (POINT TO THE TOP.) At the bottom is the worst way things could be for you (POINT TO THE BOTTOM.) Where on this ladder (MOVE YOUR FINGER UP AND DOWN THE LADDER) would you say you are today? (HAVE RESPONDENT POINT TO A RUNG AND RECORD THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER.) Where on this ladder were you five years ago? Where do you think you will be in five more years?

(a) Today _____

(b) Five Years Ago _____

(c) Five Years from Now _____

IV Have there been any voter registration drives around here over the past few years or so?

Yes No DN

IF NO, SKIP TO NEXT QUESTION; IF YES, CONTINUE)

Appendix A-continued

(a) When did (these) voter registration drive(s) take place?

(b) Who conducted this (these) voter registration drive(s)?

(c) In your opinion was this (these) voter registration drive(s) successful? _____

Has there been any race trouble around here over the last five years or such, such as a riot, a demonstration, or a march?

Yes No DN

(IF NO, SKIP TO PART V.; IF YES, CONTINUE)

(a) What sort of trouble was it? _____

(b) Have any changes taken place around here since that trouble happened? If so, what sort of changes have taken place?

(c) In general, have things around here gotten Better or Worst since those things happened?

Better Worse DN

(d) Why do you think things have gotten Better (Worse) since that time? _____

Appendix A-continued

V Some people take more interest in political matters than do others.

Which, if any, of the following things have you done? Have you:

- | | | | |
|---|---|---|----|
| (a) Worked in a voter registration drive? | Y | N | DN |
| (b) Ran for public office? | Y | N | DN |
| (c) Registered to vote? | Y | N | DN |
| (d) Given money to someone running for public office? | Y | N | DN |
| (e) Talked to a public official to get him to do something? | Y | N | DN |
| (f) Joined a political group like the NAACP or the SCLC? | Y | N | DN |
| (g) Talked about politics with friends or neighbors recently? | Y | N | DN |
| (h) Been in a protest march or demonstration? | Y | N | DN |
| (i) Voted in regular elections? | Y | N | DN |
| (j) Gone to a political meeting or a rally? | Y | N | DN |
| (k) Put a political bumper sticker on your car? | Y | N | DN |

VI What do you think the White folks around here would say or do if a friend of yours:

(a) Registered to vote? _____

(b) Was known to have voted for a Black running for office?

(c) Ran for office himself? _____

Appendix A-continued

Have you ever heard of anything happening to Blacks around here who have taken part in political matters? (IF SO), could you tell me about it? _____

VII I would now like to ask you a few questions about yourself:

1. Do you have a job or business? Yes No

(IF NO, GO TO 2 BELOW; IF YES, CONTINUE)

(a) What do you do? _____

(b) Where do you work? _____

(c) Who do you work for? _____

(d) Is your boss White or Black? White Black

(d) Have you worked there long? How long? _____

(IF RESPONDENT HAS HELD JOB FOR 10 YEARS OR LONGER, SKIP TO 2. IF NOT, REPEAT PREVIOUS QUESTIONS UNTIL EMPLOYMENT RECORD FOR THE LAST 10 YEARS IS COMPLETED).

2. Does someone else here in your family have a job?

Yes

No

Appendix A-continued

(IF NO, SKIP TO 3; IF YES, CONTINUE)

(a) What do they do? _____

(b) Where do they work? _____

(c) Who do they work for? _____

(d) Is their boss White or Black? White Black

(e) How long have they worked there? _____

(IF THE JOB HOLDER HAS HELD THE JOB FOR 10 YEARS OR LONGER, SKIP TO 3. IF NOT, COMPLETE EMPLOYMENT PICTURE FOR JOB HOLDER FOR THE LAST 10 YEARS BY REPEATING ABOVE QUESTIONS).

3. Do you or anyone you live with receive welfare of some kind?

Yes No DN

(IF NO, SKIP TO 4; IF YES, CONTINUE)

(a) What is the name of the program? _____

(b) Does this welfare money make up A lot, Some, or Not Much of
they money you and your family has to live on?

A Lot Some Not Much

4. Do you own your home here or do you rent?

Own Rent DN

(IF RENT), is your landlord a White or Black?

White Black

Appendix A-continued

5. Do you owe any money? Yes No DN

(a) (IF YES), Do you owe A Lot, Some, or Not Much money?

A Lot Some Not Much

(b) Do you owe this money to a White or Black?

White Black

VIII Are there any groups or clubs, such as a church or social group,
that you belong to? Yes No DN

(IF NO, SKIP TO 2; IF YES, CONTINUE)

1. Could you tell me the name(s) of the group(s) or club(s) you
belong to?

(FOR EACH ORGANIZATION NAMED, ASK IF RESPONDENT (a) ATTENDS
MEETINGS REGULARLY; (b) EVER BEEN ELECTED TO AN OFFICE IN THE
GROUP; (c) IF ANY POLITICAL DISCUSSION TAKES PLACE WITHIN THE
GROUP, AND (d) IF SO, HOW MUCH POLITICAL DISCUSSION TAKES PLACE)

Organization	(a)		(b)		(c)		(d)		
	Attends		Officer		Discussion		How Much		
_____	R	NR	O	NO	Y	N	AL	S	NM
_____	R	NR	O	NO	Y	N	AL	S	NM
_____	R	NR	O	NO	Y	N	AL	S	NM
_____	R	NR	O	NO	Y	N	AL	S	NM

2. Do you ever get together regularly with some friends or neigh-
bors and talk about things? Yes No DN

(IF NO, SKIP TO IX; IF YES, CONTINUE)

(a) How often do you get together? _____

(b) Where do you get together? _____

Appendix A-continued

TO BE COMPLETED BY INTERVIEWER:

1. Respondent's sex: Male Female
2. Type of Dwelling: (a) Detached House (d) Apartment House
 (b) Duplex (e) Other _____
 (c) Mobile Home
3. Type of Neighborhood:
 (a) Extreme Poverty (d) Upper Middle Class
 (b) Lower Middle Class (e) Wealthy
 (c) Middle Class
4. Location: (a) Rural (d) Suburban
 (b) Scattered Houses (e) Urban
 (c) Spaced Housing
5. Comments: _____

APPENDIX B
GADSDEN COUNTY ELITE QUESTIONNAIRE

Hello, I am Paige Parker from the University of Florida. I am conducting a survey of the changes that have taken place in Gadsden County over the last ten to fifteen years, particularly in regard to political matters and race relations. In talking to the people of this community your name has repeatedly been mentioned as a leader of the Black community. Your opinion on these matters is thus of particular importance. Would you be willing to answer some questions as a part of this study?

I. First of all, I would like to learn more about you.

1. How long have you lived here in _____ (NAME COMMUNITY)?

(IF NOT ALL OF LIFE), where else have you lived before moving here? _____

2. What is your current occupation? _____

(a) Where do you work? _____

(b) Who do you work for? _____

(c) What other jobs or positions have you held? _____

Appendix B-continued

3. Where did you attend school? _____

(a) What was the last year of school you attended? _____

(b) Have you received any additional training? _____

4. What is your age? _____

II. As a leader of the community, I would like to get your opinion on some of the problems that Black citizens face. What, in your opinion, are the most important problems facing the Black residents of (NAME COMMUNITY)? _____

Of these problems (READ RESPONSES), which do you think is:

(a) The most important? _____

(b) The next most important? _____

(c) The next most important? _____

What do you think are the chances that these problems can be overcome in the future? Do you think the chances are Very Good, Good, Fair, Poor, or Very Poor that:

(a) (MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM) can be overcome? VG G F P VP DN

(b) (NEXT MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM) can be overcome? VG G F P VP DN

(c) (NEXT MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM) can be overcome? VG G F P VP DN

Appendix B-continued

III. Now people often have different ideas about the way things ought to be for them.

1. For the most part, are things these days going Pretty Good, So-So, or Not So Good for you?

PG SS NG DN

2. What is the one thing that you would like to see changed the most? _____

How do you think this ought to be? _____

3. What would be the worst way things could be for you, that is, if things were as bad as they could get? _____

4. Here is a picture of a ladder. (HAND RESPONDENT LADDER CARD)
 Suppose we say that the top of the ladder is the way things ought to be for you. (POINT TO THE TOP) At the bottom is the worst way things could be for you. (POINT TO THE BOTTOM)
 Where on this ladder (MOVE FINGER UP AND DOWN LADDER) would you say you are today? Where on this ladder were you five years ago? Where do you think you will be in five more years?

(a) Today _____

(b) Five Years Ago _____

(c) Five Years Hence _____

Appendix B-continued

IV. People differ in the way they view the government. Please indicate how you personally feel about each of the following statements. Please state whether you Agree Strongly, Agree Slightly, Disagree Slightly, or Disagree Strongly.

- | | | | | | |
|---|-----|-----|----|-----|-----|
| 1. The government ought to help people get doctors and hospital care at low cost. | ASt | ASl | NO | DSl | DSt |
| 2. The government should leave things like electric power and housing for private businessmen to handle. | ASt | ASl | NO | DSl | DSt |
| 3. If cities and towns around the country need help to build more schools, the government in Washington ought to give them the money they need. | ASt | ASl | NO | DSl | DSt |
| 4. The government in Washington ought to see to it that everybody who wants to work can find a job. | ASt | ASl | NO | DSl | DSt |
| 5. The government in Washington should let local people work out their race problems and not get involved. | ASt | ASl | NO | DSl | DSt |

V. These next questions are concerned with the influence that the state and national governments have had here in (NAME COMMUNITY), especially in regard to race relations.

1. Has the state government done anything here in (NAME COMMUNITY) to encourage good race relations? What? _____
- _____
- _____

Appendix B-continued

Has the state government done anything here in (NAME COMMUNITY) to hurt race relations between Blacks and Whites? What?

2. Has the national government in Washington done anything here in (NAME COMMUNITY) to encourage good race relations? What?

Has the national government in Washington done anything here in (NAME COMMUNITY) that has hurt race relations? What?

3. Do you know of any law suits that have been undertaken on behalf of Blacks in this community to protect their rights? (IF SO) what law suits have been filed and when? _____

- (a) What has been the result of this (these) law suit(s)?

Appendix B-continued

(b) Overall, do you think that this (these) law suit(s) have helped or hurt race relations in this community? _____

VI. There are many different methods that people use to try and change things. Please indicate the effectiveness of each of the following methods by which Blacks in this community have tried to get things changed. Please tell me if each method was Very Effective, Somewhat Effective, or Not Effective.

Voting	VE	SE	NE	DN	N/A
Petitions	VE	SE	NE	DN	N/A
Private meetings with White Leaders	VE	SE	NE	DN	N/A
Attendance at public meetings	VE	SE	NE	DN	N/A
Court actions	VE	SE	NE	DN	N/A
Boycotts	VE	SE	NE	DN	N/A
Marches and demonstrations	VE	SE	NE	DN	N/A
Outside political pressure from state or national government	VE	SE	NE	DN	N/A
Blacks holding public office	VE	SE	NE	DN	N/A
Rioting or violence	VE	SE	NE	DN	N/A
Other:					
_____	VE	SE	NE	DN	N/A

Appendix B-continued

Which one of the above methods do you think has been the most effective means of influencing change? Why? _____

Which has been the least effective? Why? _____

VII. These next questions have to do with organizations and groups that you belong to or that exist here in (NAME COMMUNITY).

1. Do you belong to any organization or group, such as a church, civic, or social group? (IF SO) which organizations do you belong to? _____

Are there any such organizations that you belonged to in the past? _____

Do you hold or have you held any positions of leadership in these organizations? (IF SO) what positions have you held and when? _____

2. Are there any Black political organizations that exist or have existed here in (NAME COMMUNITY)? _____

Appendix B-continued

How large a membership does (did) this (these) organization(s) have (had) in (NAME COMMUNITY)? _____

What sort of activities does (did) this (these) organization(s) engage in? _____

3. To what extent have nationally based Black political organizations such as CORE, NAACP, and SCLC been active here in (NAME COMMUNITY)? _____

(a) Have outside representatives of such organizations ever visited this community? When? _____

(b) What sort of activities did they engage in while they were here? _____

Appendix B-continued

(c) How successful were these outside representatives in their efforts? _____

(d) Were there ever any conflicts or problems between representatives of outside groups or between outside representatives and local Black leaders? _____

VIII. Now I would like to ask you about particular events that may have taken place here in (NAME COMMUNITY).

1. Have any voter registration drives been conducted here in (NAME COMMUNITY). (IF SO) when were they conducted? _____

Who conducted these voter registration drives? _____

How successful, in your opinion, were these drives? _____

Appendix B-continued

2. Has there been any sort of race trouble such as a riot, a protest, a demonstration, or a boycott here in (NAME COMMUNITY) in the last ten or fifteen years? (IF SO) what sort of trouble was there and when did it occur? _____

What was the cause of this trouble? _____

Who participated? _____

What happened as a result of this trouble? _____

Do you think that things have gotten Better, remained the Same or gotten Worse since then? B S W DN

Why? _____

Appendix B-continued

3. Have representatives of the Black and White communities ever attempted to sit down together and discuss whatever problems they might have? When? _____

What was the result of that effort? _____

IX. Besides yourself, who would you say are the five most important leaders of the Black community here in (NAME COMMUNITY) today?

Who were the most important leaders of the Black community ten or fifteen years ago? _____

Who are the five most important leaders of the White community here in (NAME COMMUNITY) today? _____

Who were the most important leaders of the White community here ten or fifteen years ago? _____

Appendix B-continued

X. What do you think would be the ideal race relations? _____

What do you think would be the worst race relations? _____

For the most part, do you think that relations between Blacks and Whites here in (NAME COMMUNITY) are Improving, staying about the Same, or getting Worse? I S W DN

Why? _____

APPENDIX C
 FREQUENCIES OF OUTLOOK PERCEPTION DIRECTION
 OF CHANGE VARIABLES FOR GADSDEN COUNTY AND
 SEPARATE COMMUNITY SUBORDINATE RESIDENTS

	<u>Gadsden</u> (Wt.N=183)	<u>Quincy</u> (N=77)	<u>Gretna</u> (N=45)	<u>Greensboro</u> (N=22)	<u>Sawdust</u> (N=37)
Total Change					
\bar{M} =	2.10	2.05	2.31	1.96	2.30
Negative (-9 to -2)	14.2%	14.3%	13.3%	4.5%	16.2%
No Change (-1 to 1)	30.6	31.2	22.2	45.5	27.0
Positive (2 to 10)	55.2	54.5	64.4	50.0	56.8
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%
	(Wt.N=192)	(N=80)	(N=50)	(N=27)	(N=38)
Relative Change					
\bar{M} =	.20	.20	.36	.11	.03
Negative (-9 to -2)	25.0%	26.3%	16.0%	18.5%	31.6%
No Change (-1 to 1)	46.4	46.3	48.0	59.3	36.8
Positive (2 to 10)	28.6	27.5	36.0	22.2	31.6
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	(Wt.N=183)	(N=77)	(N=45)	(N=22)	(N=37)
Expected Change					
\bar{M} =	1.19	1.87	1.96	1.55	2.24
Negative (-9 to -2)	4.4%	3.9%	4.4%	4.5%	5.4%
No Change (-1 to 1)	39.9	41.6	35.6	40.9	32.4
Positive (2 to 10)	55.7	54.5	60.0	54.5	62.2
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%

Appendix C-continued

	<u>Gadsden</u> (Wt.N=173)	<u>Quincy</u> (N=72)	<u>Gretna</u> (N=45)	<u>Greensboro</u> (N=23)	<u>Sawdust</u> (N=34)
Overcome Problem (Direction)					
Poor	18.5%	18.1%	20.0%	21.7%	17.6%
Fair	47.4	52.8	26.7	43.5	35.3
Good	34.1	29.2	53.3	34.8	47.1
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

APPENDIX D
 FREQUENCIES OF OUTLOOK PERCEPTION MAGNITUDE
 OF CHANGE FOR GADSDEN COUNTY AND SEPARATE
 COMMUNITY SUBORDINATE RESIDETS

	<u>Gadsden</u> (Wt.N=183)	<u>Quincy</u> (N=77)	<u>Gretna</u> (N=45)	<u>Greensboro</u> (N=22)	<u>Sawdust</u> (N=37)
Absolute Total Change					
\bar{M} =	3.35	3.35	3.47	2.23	3.54
Low (0,1)	30.4%	31.2%	22.2%	45.5%	27.0%
Medium (2 to 4)	35.3	33.8	37.8	40.9	40.5
High (5 to 10)	34.2	35.1	40.0	13.6	32.3
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	99.9%	100.1%	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%
	(Wt.N=183)	(N=80)	(N=50)	(N=27)	(N=38)
Absolute Relative Change					
\bar{M} =	2.04	2.10	2.00	1.52	1.87
Low (0,1)	46.3%	46.3%	48.0%	59.3%	36.8%
Medium (2 to 4)	44.7	43.8	42.0	33.3	60.5
High (5 to 10)	8.9	10.0	10.0	7.4	2.6
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	99.9%	100.1%	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%
	(Wt.N=183)	(N=77)	(N=45)	(N=22)	(N=37)
Absolute Expected Change					
\bar{M} =	2.25	2.21	2.27	1.73	2.73
Low (0,1)	39.9%	41.6%	35.6%	40.9%	32.4%
Medium (2 to 4)	47.5	46.8	51.1	54.5	45.9
High (5 to 10)	12.6	11.7	13.3	4.5	21.6
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%	99.9%	99.9%

Appendix D-continued

	<u>Gadsden</u> (Wt.N=173)	<u>Quincy</u> (N=72)	<u>Gretna</u> (N=45)	<u>Greensboro</u> (N=23)	<u>Sawdust</u> (N=34)
Overcome Problem (Magnitude)					
Fair	47.4%	52.8%	26.7%	43.5%	35.3%
Good/Poor	34.9	30.6	53.3	52.2	38.2
Very Good/ Very Poor	17.4	16.7	20.0	4.3	26.5
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Paige Alan Parker was born in Bell, California, on August 14, 1947. Primary and secondary schooling was received in Jerome, Idaho. Undergraduate education was conducted at Washington State University in Pullman, Washington, where two degrees were awarded: a B.A. in political science in June 1969 and a B.A. in journalism in June 1972. In the interim between these degrees, two years were spent in Ecuador with the Peace Corps. A master's degree in political science was awarded by Bowling Green State University in Ohio in August 1974. Work towards the Ph.D. degree in political science was continued at the University of Florida at Gainesville between 1974 and 1978. The Ph.D. degree was awarded in June 1980.

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

James W. Button, Chairman
Associate Professor of Political Science

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Alfred B. Clubok
Professor of Political Science

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Alfonso Damico
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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

John Saw
Professor of Statistics

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

June 1980

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